Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar

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Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar

Françoise De Bel-Air

Abstract: In 2013, Qatar ranked second worldwide in terms of per capita GDP. This is due to its huge endowment in hydrocarbons and the small size of its national population, the smallest in all GCC countries. Exploiting the resources and channeling them into ambitious development policies required massive imports of foreign labour. The country’s total population has quintupled since the mid-1980s; moreover, foreign nationals made an estimated 85.7 per cent of all residents and up to 94.1 per cent of all employed population in 2013. The awarding of the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar in December 2010 turned the spotlight on the country’s dilemma regarding the “number vs. rights trade-off” issue: Qatar has one of the most constraining kafala systems in the region. Paradoxically, however, demographic data also indicate that a growing share of foreigners live with their families, give birth in the country, and intermarry with Qataris. The strict separation between nationals and migrants could thus start slowly eroding.

Keywords: Qatar; Foreign Population; National Population; Nationals and Foreign Labour; Migration Policy; Statistics; Labour Camp; Human Rights; Sponsorship; Family Reunification; Second Generation.

In 2013, Qatar ranked second worldwide in terms of per capita GDP, with about $100,000 per resident annually. This is due, first, to its huge endowment in hydrocarbons: the country has the third largest natural gas reserves worldwide as well as sizable oil reserves; it is also the top producer and exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the world. Second, reaching such a level of individual wealth is actually made possible by the modest size of the country’s national population, the smallest in the GCC.

When the exploitation of Qatari oil fields started in 1949, the country had hardly 16,000 inhabitants, down from about 27,000 as recorded half a century earlier in 1908.¹ The collapse of the traditional
economy based on pearl trade in the 1920s, and economic and political tensions with Bahrain in the
1930s had dispersed Qatar's elusive and mobile population—local semi-nomad and nomad Bedouin
groups, fishermen, merchant families with slaves, and a few thousand of Persian origin, some of them
Shiites and the others Sunni Arabs (the hawla). Qatar's ruling family and the British Protectorate au-
thorities who set up the oil sector resorted to importing workers from the Indian subcontinent and from
the Arab Middle East, due to the local manpower's low level of literacy and industrial skills. In 1970,
shortly before Qatar gained independence (1971), the first census was conducted. It estimated the total
population at 111,113, of which 45,039 were Qataris and 66,094 foreigners. This was the first and last
time that population estimates for nationals and non-nationals would be disclosed in the country.

Indeed, the small size of the national population, even if it has been expanded to include some
naturalised families from Iran and the Arab Middle East, is considered a great challenge in Qatar. It can
be argued that the oil rent guaranteed each of the few Qatari citizens a high standard of living, protection
and security such as free health care, housing grants, subsidised utilities and education to university level.
Expenditure per student in education, for example, was one of the highest in the world in the 2010s and
Qatar stands high in the Human Development Index rankings (0.834, the top one in the Arab region,
and ranked 36 worldwide in 2013). However, fulfilling the rulers’ ambitions to modernise the country’s
institutions and infrastructure to a world-class level, and more generally, investing the huge hydrocarbon
revenues requires equally huge numbers of foreign manpower, too large to ever be fully replaced by the
small numbers of Qataris. Therefore, in the view of many Qatari citizens, the high population imbal-
ance is not so much a blessing (many foreign workers cater for the needs of the few nationals) as a curse
(Qatari identity, constructed after independence, is under considerable strain).

This dilemma has deepened since 2003. The increase in hydrocarbon prices spurred a hike in pro-
duction and attracted growing amounts of FDI into the country until the 2008 financial crisis. Qatar's
economic growth rate shot up to 15 per cent yearly during the period, as infrastructure investments
boomed (for example, in real estate, tourism, and education). Immigration rates, at the same time, rose
tremendously, especially that of low-skilled, Asian construction workers. The awarding of the 2022 FIFA
World Cup to Qatar in December 2010 and the debates surrounding this event which pointed at abuses
of unskilled foreign labourers on the country’s building sites actually underlined Qatar’s dilemma. Qatar
has one of the most constraining kafala systems in the region and no category of expatriates is exempted
from Qatari sponsorship. And yet, a survey conducted in 2010 showed that citizens felt sponsorship
laws needed to be even stricter. The “number vs. rights trade-off” is indeed at work in Qatar, whereby
the bigger the expatriate population, and especially “blue collars” among them, the less rights they are
likely to be granted. Considering that leaving the situation unchanged is not an option in view of the
tremendous international pressure exerted on Qatar, the country is faced with two choices. The first is to
limit the numbers while increasing foreign workers’ rights; the second is to sustain high levels of immi-
gration while at the same time loosening the demographic imbalance between nationals and foreigners,
through blurring the distinctions of status and identity separating the two parties.

Until mid-May 2014, the first option seemed to be the favoured policy target. In Qatar’s National
Vision 2030, the master plan for Qatar’s development planning launched in 2008, two of the five main
challenges to address were: “Modernisation and the preservation of tradition” and “the size and quality
of the expatriate labour force and the selected path of development.” Qatar Population Policy passed in 2009 tackles both, first, by promoting higher fertility rates among Qataris and second, through advocating for “improving recruitment policies in line with a knowledge-based economy” (i.e., limit the recruitment of unskilled labourers and substitute technology to number). This seemed in line with official announcements made for several months, which promised substantial reforms to the country’s labour and migration policies. It was expected that the sponsorship rule, which conditions exit from the territory and change of employer to the sponsor’s consent, would undergo substantial revisions or even be cancelled altogether. However, decisions released on May 14 by the Ministries of Interior and Labour and Social Affairs enforced more state oversight and regulation of the foreign workers’ exits and professional mobility but for fixed-term contracts holders only, harsher penalties in case of labour law violations, and electronic wage payments, for instance. The kafala and the exit permits were not abolished as was hoped. Moreover, such amendments still have to be endorsed by Qatar’s Shura (Advisory) Council, and no timeline was set for the approval.

Inward Migration

Stocks

As mentioned previously, Qatar’s demographic data conceal figures for total national and non-national populations. Only aggregated figures for the total resident population (Qataris and non-Qataris together) are made available, of which the validity cannot be assessed. Available data indicate that in mid-2013, Qatar’s total population stood at 2,003,700, up from an estimated 373,392 in 1986. The country’s population thus more than quintupled in a twenty-seven year span, at an average rate of 6.2 per cent yearly.

Figure 1: Evolution of Qatar’s population and growth rate (1986-2013)

![Figure 1: Evolution of Qatar’s population and growth rate (1986-2013)](image)

Source: QSA (Statistical Yearbook, 2014)
Growth rates rose after 2003 to peak at an amazing 17.3 per cent in 2008 and seem to have picked up again since 2010. If accurate, newest data for 2013 may confirm the start of the massive rise in workers’ recruitment which was forecasted since the awarding of the Football World Cup bid to Qatar. Moreover, the stocks of males, mostly foreign, in the country had already increased spectacularly over the period 2003-2008.

Indeed, in 2010, non-Qataris were estimated at 1,456,362 or 85.7 per cent of the total resident population of 1,699,435, a significant increase from previous decades. Between 2004 and 2010, Qatari population thus grew at a rate of 3.9 per cent. As for non-Qataris, estimates suggest that their rate of growth reached 14.6 per cent on average over the period, a very high figure.

Figure 2: Qatar’s total population and estimates of the proportion of non-nationals at census years (1970; 1986; 1997; 2004; 2010)

Qatar’s foreign population is heavily distorted demographically. Men outnumber women by almost 1 to 5 (sex ratio for the population aged 15 and above reached 493 males for 100 women in 2013) and those in working-age groups (15 to 64 years) made up as much as 90 per cent of foreign nationals in 2010. On average, this population is relatively less educated (60 per cent have below secondary level education) as compared to the Qatari nationals (37 per cent only at similar education levels). At the same time, 17.8 per cent of non-nationals held a university degree (as compared to 30.9 per cent of Qataris) in 2012.

At first sight, Qatar also displays an amazing pattern of spatial segregation of its expatriate population: the share of those living in labour camps, presumably non-nationals, went markedly up between 1970 and 2010.
2004 and 2010. By that date 918,150 persons, i.e., more than half of Qatar’s total resident population and 70 per cent of all resident men alone, actually dwelt in this type of housing. Labour camps host a relatively young (average age: 34 years) and less educated population than the non-nationals as a whole: 73.5 per cent have a primary school education level or less while 5 per cent hold a university degree.\textsuperscript{18}

Figure 3: Proportion of Qatar’s total population living in labour camps, by sex (1997; 2004; 2010)

This emphasises the spectacular levels of economic growth experienced in Qatar over the 2000s, which gave an impetus to the import of foreign, mostly male, labourers.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, non-nationals are largely dominant on Qatar’s labour market. In 2013, out of a total 1,543,265 strong labour force, 1,450,703 were non-nationals. Of those, 1,448,007 were employed, or 94.1 per cent of the total employed population, which is higher than in any other GCC state.\textsuperscript{20} Within the foreign employed population, men outnumber women by 1 to 8.

Public wealth allows for a large public sector\textsuperscript{21} in the country, which employs 80.6 per cent of the working Qataris. By contrast, 78.4 per cent of all employed non-nationals are involved in the private sector. Non-Qataris make up 99 per cent and 60.8 per cent, respectively, of the private sector and public sector manpower, due to their overwhelming share in the country’s total workforce.

Non-nationals, in effect, dominate numerically in every occupation level (from 80 per cent of all managers to 99 per cent of those in unskilled positions). Yet, most remain clustered in the lowest occupation categories (“craft and related trade workers” to “elementary occupations” account for 72 per cent of the non-nationals). Among Qataris, 81 per cent are in “white collar” positions, from managers to clerks.\textsuperscript{22}
As regards activity sectors, 54 per cent of Qatari, males and females, work in “public administration”; besides, many of the female citizens are employed in education. For expatriates, the construction sector stands out by far as the main employer. In 2006, 125,000 workers were recorded in that sector, a quarter of all employed foreign nationals. Three years later, in 2009, recruitment in this activity had more than quadrupled and was peaking at 558,000 workers, or 47 per cent of the total foreign workforce. In 2013, the sector still employed 39.2 per cent of all foreign labourers and, as shown in the graph, started gaining in absolute size, probably a sign of the construction fever ahead of the 2022 World Cup. Workers in domestic labour, in retail trade, and in education also more than doubled their numbers during the years 2006–2013.

It is worth mentioning that females display a more contrasted employment pattern than males. Most non-national females (58.6 per cent) are recorded in the domestic sector, but the governmental sector also employs 14 per cent of them. Thirty per cent of female expatriates are in “white collar” occupations, in the education and health sectors (10.4 and 7 per cent), as well as in public administration, retail trade, and transportation.

In Qatar, like in the other GCC states, foreign manpower is mainly recruited in Asia. As Table 1 shows, four of the major suppliers of manpower to the country (India, Nepal, the Philippines and Bangladesh), with 1,088,556 workers as of September 30, 2013, made up about three quarters of the foreign workforce. Indians, like elsewhere in the GCC, made the bulk of all expatriate labourers – 31.2 per cent of all employed nonnationals – with the Nepalese close behind. Arabs workers accounted for no more
than 10 per cent of the total. Among them, Egyptians alone account for a half but make up 5 per cent only of all foreign labourers.

**Table 1: Foreign workers in Qatar by country of citizenship (selected nationalities, 2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / region of citizenship</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>452,578</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>339,901</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>165,447</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>130,630</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab countries</td>
<td>146,577</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Egypt</td>
<td>72,487</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>18,474</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>14,147</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>10,222</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>8,341</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>4,312</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total employed population 2013 (Q.4)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,449,234</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:

**Asian countries:** Qatar National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) estimates as of September 30, 2013 published in Al-Raya Newspaper, October 1, 2013.


Since the boom years of the 2000s, and even more so since the country was awarded the hosting of the 2022 World Cup, international public attention has been drawn, for obvious reasons, towards Qatar’s massive expatriate groups of mostly Asian, low-skilled, single male workers in labour camps. Yet, does this national, occupational, and spatial clustering of foreign residents mean that Qatar is only a place for temporary, labour-bound sojourn? Indeed, the proportion of inactive (i.e., family dependents) among
non-Qataris decreased over the years: from 16 per cent of all foreign residents in 2004 down to 8 per cent in 2009, at the peak of economic growth and recruitment in the construction sector. In 2010, moreover, half of the non-Qataris surveyed in the census had been residing in the country for only two years and less. Another third had spent five years and more in Qatar, and 8.4 per cent of non-nationals had been residents for 15 years and more.27

Table 2: Non-nationals in Qatar by migration status and country/region of citizenship (selected nationalities, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/region</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Family dependents</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>452,578</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>92,224</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>544,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>339,901</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>340,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>165,447</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>19,201</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>184,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>130,630</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>6,615</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>137,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab countries</td>
<td>146,577</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>135,229</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>281,806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
Asian countries: Qatar National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) estimates as of September 30, 2013 published in Al-Raya Newspaper, October 1, 2013
http://gulfmigration.eu/estimates-of-non-nationals-by-country-of-citizenship-and-migration-status-selected-nationalities-qatar-26-

Arab countries: Qatar Ministry of Labour data for August 2013,

As it appears, the nationality or regional origin factor plays an essential role in defining the conditions of stay in Qatar. Nepalese and Bangladeshis are quasi-exclusively workers, thus clustered to the lowest tier of the occupation and income ladder (and presumably housed mostly in labour compounds). On the opposite end,28 half of resident Arab nationals are family dependents. In Qatar, a minimum salary of QR10,000 and a certified rent contract in the worker’s name condition the possibility for a worker to sponsor his family members as dependents.29 The large amount of dependents among the Arab residents as a whole, thus, suggests that most of them perform skilled and highly-skilled, well-paid activities. Up to 92,220 Indian expatriates (17 per cent of this national group), are also classified as dependents, which means that this very large community comprises a diversity of skill levels and occupation profiles.

Moreover, the likelihood of some non-nationals in the highly-skilled and upper-income brackets settling, at least for some time, with their family in Qatar is first confirmed by the proportional increase in female expatriates classified as “house makers,” a category of the inactive foreign population. Indeed, this can be taken as a proxy to assess the relative share of foreign households within all families (Qatari
and non-Qatari) residing in the country, hence roughly indicating the scale of family reunification. For twenty years, indeed, foreign housewives accounted steadily for half of the total; yet their share increased throughout the 2000s to finally reach 75 per cent of all housewives in 2012-2013. Among these, most were Arabs (63 per cent).

The increase in the number of non-Qatari school students since 2003 also confirms this growing trend towards family reunification. As compared to Qatari pupils’ population, the “other nationalities” (Asians as well as Westerners) gained in number and in relative share, while the Arab students also increased in number but remained steady at 30 per cent of the total during the decade. It is interesting to note that as early as 2003-2004, before the hike in recruitment of foreign labourers, all foreign school students were already outnumbering Qatari students.

Figure 5: School children in Qatar by nationality group, in numbers and in proportion of total (2003-2012, available years)

This suggests that parallel to the massive hiring of low-skilled workers for turnkey construction projects, Qatar had also started pursuing a policy of upgrading its workforce by attracting highly-skilled manpower, in line with the objectives defined for Qatar National Vision.

Flows

In Qatar, the Ministry of Interior’s data on residency permits are not made available to the public in yearly statistical publications, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs does not disclose records of labour permits granted by occupation level. It is, therefore, impossible to assess the hypothesis that, parallel to the recruitment of unskilled labourers, an upgrading of the workforce did bring into Qatar highly-skilled personnel and their families.
The distribution of students in schools by nationality group, nonetheless, suggested that non-Qatari pupils (Arab and other expatriates) had already outnumbered Qatari in the same age groups. The distribution of births by nationality group of child\textsuperscript{35} confirms the assertion that inflows of Arab and Asian newborns, after nosediving during the 1990s in the aftermath of the First Gulf War, rose steadily from the beginning of the 2000s alongside the growing stocks of foreign residents. As of 2011 (last year available), Qatari made only 36.8 per cent of all newborns in the country.

**Figure 6: Registered live births by nationality group of child (1981-2011)**

![Graph showing registered live births by nationality group of child (1981-2011)](image)

Source: Bulletin of Vital Statistics, QSA.

Interestingly, this may also imply that Qatar is increasingly becoming a multicultural society, which includes infants born not only to wealthy, highly-skilled expatriates financially able to sponsor their inactive family members, but also children born to any legally-residing couple. In effect, article 17 of law no. 9 of 2004 which regulates expatriates’ entry, departure, residence, and sponsorship matters, states that “A residence permit may be applied for within sixty days of the date of birth or the date of entering the country in respect of a child born to an expatriate whose family has obtained residence permits. If the child was born outside the country and one or both parents have a valid residence permit, the child shall be permitted to enter the country within two (2) years of its birth.”\textsuperscript{36} Births on Qatari territory or migration of infants thus should contribute to diversifying non-Qatari resident population in terms of occupation level (workers of every skill level may still be living with their spouse, if the latter came as a
labourer, thus sponsored individually), and also ethnically, as we have seen that most Asians, in contrary to Arabs, are active.

Another factor signals the quiet emergence of a demographic diversification in Qatar: the increase in mixed marriages (i.e., between a Qatari and a foreign spouse) from 8.5 per cent to 13.7 per cent of all marriages between 2000 and 2011 (last available data).37

Figure 7: Marriages of Qatari men with foreign women (2000-2011)

Figure 8: Marriages of Qatari women with foreign men (2000-2011)

Source: Bulletin of Marriage and Divorce, QSA, given years.
Female Qataris marry foreign nationals in higher numbers than male Qataris; however, they most often choose citizens from other GCC states (between 4 and 10 per cent of all female unions). Male Qataris, by contrast, started turning to non-GCC Arabs and Asians, in modest, yet slightly growing proportions. Obtaining naturalisation in Qatar is a constraining process for non-nationals: it requires 25 years of continuous presence in the country. However, the foreign spouse of a Qatari male can obtain citizenship after five years of marriage; similarly, children of a Qatari mother, as well as individuals with exceptional skills useful to the country, are all granted a priority status in qualifying for naturalisation. Rising numbers of highly-skilled residents with family members born on Qatari territory and of mixed marriages, therefore, could lay the ground for future ethnic diversification and demographic expansion of the national Qatari population. For the time being, therefore, Qatar’s policy choice does not seem to be that of a reduction of migration inflows along with a significant increase in workers’ rights. It could be, rather, a very slow and highly selective absorption of some foreign nationals into Qatar’s citizenry.

Sources


Babar, Zahra. *Free Mobility within the Gulf Cooperation Council.* Doha: CIRS, Georgetown University, 2011.


Qatari and Gulf Press, partially through: “Gulf in the Media: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration.”

Endnotes


6. In contrast to Bahrain, which (at least on paper) scrapped it altogether, or Saudi Arabia, where foreign investors do not require Saudi sponsorship since 2000, for example. The UAE also reformed its rule of conditioning sponsorship change to the obtaining of a non-objection certificate from the worker’s sponsor.


11. Qatar Statistics Authority provides figures disaggregated by nationality (Qataris/non-Qataris) for the population aged 15 and above only. The UN Statistics Division stated in 2008 that civil registration of births and deaths in Qatar had reached a coverage rate of 97% in the 1990s: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCUQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Funstats.un.org%2Fvitalstatkb%2FAttachment80.aspx&ei=6PymU5YdyaQ787yBsAY&usg=AFQjCNH0OywW3issTrFW9qYFnAMUfHXHJ9w. However, other issues can be raised as regards the quality of population statistics in the country: population and housing census 2004, for instance, was conducted on the total Qatari population, but only on a sample of the non-Qatari resident population. Census 2010, however, covered the whole of the resident population.


13. Providing population estimates published before 2010 census were accurate (see note 10), this fall could be an effect of 2008 financial crisis.
14. The figures have not been published by QSA which does not release figures of total population disaggregated by nationality as explained earlier, either for the Qatari or for the non-Qatari population. These are GLMM estimates based on QSA data. See http://gulfmigration.eu/population-by-nationality-qatari-non-qatari-census-1970-2010/.

15. See above, note 10.


17. Labour camp or labour gathering population is defined as follows by the Qatar Statistics Authority: A group of persons of the same gender usually staying in housing units. They live as a group (collectively) but there is no relationship between them and they do not form a living household. They are 2 to 6 (small cluster) or seven or more persons (big clusters) who usually belong to one organization (company, establishment, etc).


19. Al Khor area, for example, where as many as 87.4 per cent of all residents are recorded living in labour camps in 2010 (48 per cent in 1997) is home to many employees of the oil industry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Khor. To date, in 2014, labour camp dwellers are known to be also construction workers involved in the many building sites related to the 2022 World Cup.


22. The other 19 per cent are distributed between the "services and trade", "crafts and related trades" and "elementary occupations" categories.


24. Other Asian nationalities are also present in Qatar in sizable numbers: Pakistanis, Indonesians, Sri Lankans, and Iranians, for instance.

25. Non-Qatari GCC nationals may not be accounted for in MoL’s figures, which are drawn from labour permit data. In the GCC countries, the Unified Economic Agreement between the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (chapter 2, art. 8), guarantees no distinction between nationals and other GCC countries’ citizens as regards freedom of movement, work and residence, ownership, exercise of economic activity in every GCC state. See Zahra Babar, *Free Mobility within the Gulf Cooperation Council* (Doha: CIRS, Georgetown University, 2011), 3. Therefore, they may be working in Qatar without holding a permit.

26. Apart from probably numerous other Asian nationalities, the remaining 15 per cent of foreign workers also comprise Europeans, North Americans, Australians and New Zealanders. Non-Arab Africans (especially from the Horn and Eastern parts of Africa as well as from Ghana) are also present in Qatar.

28. Data for Western expatriates are not available.

29. QR10,000 is equivalent to $2,747, or 2005 Euros (May 10, 2014). Obtaining a rent contract and bills in their name is also difficult for most resident workers, who often have to sub-rent their flat for the real estate prices are very high in Qatar. http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/qatar/219493/getting-family-visas-tough-for-some-expats.

30. The indicator is imperfect because: a) some females may be also part of a household, while working in Qatar (sponsored as an individual worker, by a Qatari national or establishment); and b) it assumes that Qatari family formation process has not changed significantly over the years (increase in age at marriage or in divorce rates, for instance). However, this remains the only way to estimate the number of foreign households, which is not published in Qatari statistics.


32. Zahra Babar in her study of Arab immigrants in Qatar quoted MoL’s figure of 50,550 Arab housewives as part of the 135,229 Arab family dependents recorded in August 2013. However, Arabs might be over-represented among foreign households, due to their generally low activity rates.

33. Some MoE-SEC’s yearbooks in the decade did not display detailed information on students’ nationality groups.

34. 67,893, as compared to 62,329 Qatari pupils enrolled (from Kindergarten to secondary level).

35. Unsmoothed curve. Late registered births are not counted in the year of birth, but the year of declaration.


37. Source: Bulletin of Marriage and Divorce, QSA, given years. This is in spite of Law number 21 of 1989 which regulates the marriage of Qataris to foreigners. According to the law, a committee of officials from different government institutions, including the Ministry of Awqaf, examines applications for such marriages (from male and female citizens) and gives its recommendation to the Ministry of Interior, which has the final decision. The law makes an exception for those wanting to marry someone from another GCC country, their cousin, or the son/daughter of a Qatari mother. http://gulfmigration.eu/law-no-21-of-1989-regulating-marriage-to-foreigners-2/.

38. This is worth noting, as anywhere else in the GCC, males marry away more than females, due to rising bride prices.

Françoise De Bel-Air

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Publication Reference: Citations and quotations should always include either the long or the short reference provided here. Generally the long reference should be used but in exceptional cases (e.g., not enough room), the short reference may be used.

Long Reference: Françoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar,” Explanatory Note No. 8/2014, Gulf Labour Market and Migration (GLMM) programme of the Migration Policy Center (MPC) and the Gulf Research Center (GRC), http://gulfmigration.eu


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