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Legal and symbolic membership –
Symbolic boundaries and naturalization intentions of
Turkish residents in Germany

Nils Witte

European University Institute
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
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EUI Working Paper **RSCAS** 2014/100

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ISSN 1028-3625

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Printed in Italy, October 2014
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/
www.eui.eu
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Abstract

The lasting disenfranchisement of foreign residents presents democratic countries of immigration with a problem of legitimacy. The urge to open access to citizenship has been omnipresent in the academic debate since Walzer's Spheres of Justice. But what if immigrants do not want to naturalize in spite of liberal access? While many researchers studied the costs and benefits of naturalization little is known about the role of symbolic membership. This paper goes beyond past approaches. Next to pragmatic reasons of citizenship acquisition it considers the relation of immigrants to the majority group. The theoretical framework is developed from empirical findings and draws on the concept of symbolic boundaries. The analysis is based on a survey of Turkish residents in the German city of Hamburg. This group gains few additional rights through naturalization. Hence, symbolic aspects of membership become vital in the decision-making process. Results confirm the relevance of rights-oriented motives connected to the legal status. Moreover, symbolic aspects of membership are shown to be crucial for naturalization intentions. This insight offers an interpretation also for the non-naturalization of eligible immigrants. The paper is embedded in a larger project, where qualitative follow-up interviews explore variant perceptions of and responses to symbolic boundaries.

Keywords

Germany, immigration, naturalisation, citizenship, symbolic membership, legal membership

1. Introduction*

A growing body of literature deals with the moral, legal, and social implications of migration for citizenship. There is wide agreement in normative writings that access to citizenship must be open for newcomers. Indeed, most countries of immigration have liberalized access to national membership. Although contemporary immigrants to these countries face more liberal naturalization laws than their predecessors, a considerable number refrains. Liberal access may be a necessary condition for naturalization but, apparently, it is seldom sufficient to motivate large scale immigrant naturalization. Social scientists have been interested in immigrants' motives for citizenship take-up starting early with Bernard's (1936) pioneering work. However, most scholars concentrated on tangible benefits and few have explicitly asked what discourages immigrants from citizenship acquisition. In particular the role of subtle exclusions and inclusions of national communities for immigrant naturalization has been neglected. This paper seeks to explain why many immigrants refrain from naturalization, and why some do naturalize. Both symbolic and instrumental reasons are considered. Special attention is given to the relevance of symbolic boundaries. A model combining both aspects is tested empirically on a sample of Turkish permanent residents in the German city-state of Hamburg. Their case merits consideration for several reasons. First, they constitute the largest group of resident aliens both in Germany (22% of foreign pop.) and in Hamburg (21%) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013a). Second, they naturalize more often than EU-citizens and less often than immigrants from unstable and little developed countries, such as Afghanistan or Cameroon (Vink et al. 2013) (see Fig.1 and Fig.2).¹ Finally, rising numbers of Turkish naturalizations during the 1990s, as well as a sharp decline since 1999, point to their sensitivity for legal changes (see Fig.3). It is noteworthy that based on the required time of residence, 90% of Turkish residents in Germany were eligible for German citizenship in 2012 with an average time of residence of 26 years, while at the same time their annual naturalization rate was barely 5% in the last 20 years, with a peak in 1999 and an average of 2.6% between 2002 and 2012 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013b).² Since legal boundaries make an important contribution to the explanation of naturalizations, it is reasonable to hold them constant for analysis. Therefore this study concentrates on a single group. This focus will help to gain a deeper understanding of symbolic factors for naturalization and refusal of German citizenship. In the remainder of the introduction, a more detailed account of the German situation is given followed by a discussion of the relevance of citizenship acquisition.

Until the 1990s, citizenship was relatively difficult to obtain in Germany (e.g. Howard 2005; Joppke 1999) and rights for migrants were granted based on constitutional resources irrespective of national belonging (Joppke 2001). As elsewhere, there was no entitlement for naturalization. Research focused therefore on asking why immigrants were not *allowed* to naturalize more easily and on developing normative arguments for including immigrants into the body of citizens (Bauböck 1994; Brubaker 1992; Carens 1987). Only more recently, scholars started asking why immigrants did not *choose* to naturalize. A short summary of this research is given below. As Brubaker (2004) remarks,

* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at GLOREA Conference on Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanism, Aarhus University, June 2013; DVPW Conference on Naturalization, Participation, and *Willkommenskultur*, University of Münster, July 2013; and at Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS), University of Bremen, July 2013. I am particularly grateful for discussions with and comments by Rainer Bauböck, Petyo Bonev, Christoph Burckhardt, Patrick Fick, Olaf-Groh Samberg, Alex Street, Michael Windzio, Matthias Wingens, and two anonymous reviewers. The survey "Attitudes towards Citizenship and Naturalization" (ACN) 2012 could be realized thanks to generous funding by BIGSSS and many persons' support. I am indebted to the Türkische Gemeinde Hamburg and numerous colleagues who helped me to improve, translate and implement the survey

¹ There is little to be gained by naturalization for EU-citizens and more for persons from unstable or poor countries.

² Since 2002 the Federal Statistical Office records naturalization shares of persons potentially eligible, defined by permanent residence of at least 10 years (ibid.). Since time of residence is not the only one criterion, this is only an approximation of the true share of persons eligible.

before the 1990s, even the political left in favour of migrants' rights extension sought ways to do so without naturalizing them, because their naturalization was considered paternalistic. In 1990, the Federal Constitutional Court set a limit to the extension of rights to non-citizen residents, when it ruled suffrage for non-citizens unconstitutional. Instead, it pointed out naturalization as the proper way to include immigrants into the democratic state. Since then, awareness of naturalization issues is reemphasized in public and academic discourses. Even though constitutional changes were made in 1992 to allow for suffrage of EU-citizens in municipal elections, two arguments can be made in favour of naturalization. First, EU-citizens are not allowed to vote in regional (*Landtagswahlen*) and national elections. More importantly, the extension of franchise does not include non-EU-citizens. Hence, Germany's largest immigrant group, the Turkish, are excluded.

Substantial liberalizations of naturalization rules were introduced for the first time in 1990 (for summaries see Hailbronner 2012). These legal changes were triggered by the end of the USSR. Subsequent immigration of so-called ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche* or *Aussiedler*) was paralleled by the birth of guest workers' grandchildren and their automatic exclusion from citizenship. This unequal treatment of the two groups, namely ascription of citizenship to the first group, and foreigner-status for the latter, called for change.³ A new foreigners law was issued, that expanded residence rights for German-born descendants of immigrants and established naturalization by entitlement (*Anspruchseinbürgerung*) for that group. Further, 'regular naturalization' (*Regelneinbürgerung*) was introduced for the first generation. Requirements and charges for naturalization were reduced and exceptions were introduced to allow for retaining citizenship of the country of origin in certain cases. In 1993, naturalization by entitlement was extended to the first generation. In 1999, the new coalition government of Social Democrats and the Green party introduced elements of *ius soli* that became effective in 2000. Since then, German citizenship is granted automatically to all children born after 1990, if at least one parent has lived in Germany since eight years or more (*Optionskinder*).⁴ At the same time, civic tests for citizenship acquisition have been introduced that pay tribute to the restrictive tradition in German citizenship law (Goodman 2012). Still, the reform means a clear departure from the 'ethnic model' as described earlier by Brubaker (1992).


But is national membership a relevant issue in the 21st century? Some scholars argue that we live in a post-national era, where individual rights are increasingly guaranteed by international human rights regimes rather than by national citizenship (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1997). In that view, migrants do not depend on citizenship to enjoy civil and social rights. They already hold the rather comfortable status of *denizens* (Hammar 1990). Certainly, there is some evidence in the novelty of supra-national legitimization of universalistic personhood as well as of liberal post-war-conceptions of individual rights. However, from a normative point of view, Marshall's (1992) category of *political citizenship* is essential. In Germany, with some exceptions for EU-citizens, significant political rights are still reserved to German citizens. Also, EU-citizens gain active and passive voting rights by their permanent residence only at the municipal level, not in regional nor federal elections while "[t]here is no reason to assume that local decisions affect foreigners more than national ones" (Bauböck 1994: 224). This presents national and regional governments with a problem of legitimacy (e.g. Bauböck 1994, Walzer 1983). The subjects of their decisions are deprived of the basic democratic right to influence who decides and what kinds of issues are put on the agenda, namely active and passive voting rights. The solution to this problem of legitimacy in the current legal framework is their

³ See Janoski (2009) on the role of party power and Hofhansel (2008) on the role of courts in the development of naturalization policies in Germany.

⁴ To avoid confusion: After reform parents residing since at least eight years were entitled to claim German citizenship for their offspring born between 1990 and 2000, since 2000 the same happens automatically (*StAG* §4). *Optionskinder* have to make a choice for either nationality between the age of 18 and 23 (*Optionspflicht*). Recently, the coalition government in office since 2013 has revised the law in favour of dual citizenship (for the draft law see Bundestag Drucksache 18/1312).

naturalization as it is the way to grant them political rights.⁵ However, it is simply not feasible to grant citizenship to any subject crossing the border, as even proponents of “open borders” and generous naturalization rules admit (Carens 1987). Rather, there must be a reconciliation of both aims: legitimacy and exclusive membership. States normally solve the conflict by defining conditions of membership for newcomers. This is not an issue for temporary migrants and mobile persons with intentions to return (e.g. tourists, seasonal workers etc.). It is a relevant question for second and third generation migrants, i.e. persons born in the country where their (grand)-parents migrated to, while first generation labour migrants fall somewhere in between. The permanent settlement of post-war migrants has created pressure on new countries of immigration to liberalize access to citizenship. In fact, some scholars observe a Western European convergence towards lower requirements combined with assimilative policies (Joppke 2005; Joppke and Morawska 2003). By contrast, Goodman’s (2012) detailed examination of single countries reveals a fortification of national models and particular responses to country-specific pressures. To sum up, I challenge the argument of post-national membership and emphasize the significance of national citizenship for both normative and empirical reasons.


Figure 1 Naturalization rate as % of eligible persons 2002-2011 by country of origin (selected non-EU)



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2013b, 2009). See footnote 3 for definition of eligibility.


⁵ Actually, their political incorporation would be sufficient. But so far there are few cases of full political incorporation without citizenship and there is no reason to expect Germany’s implementation of such a rule.

Figure 2 Naturalization rate as % of eligible persons by country of origin 2002-2011 (selected EU)



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2013b, 2009). See footnote 3 for definition of eligibility.

Figure 3 Total naturalizations by country of origin 1985-2011 (selected non-EU)



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2013b, 2009) and www.eudo-citizenship.eu.

2. Research Findings

Research on naturalization behaviour of former guest workers in Germany has shown a decreasing importance of host country citizenship. This ‘devaluation’ was caused by the extension of civil and social rights for permanently resident aliens. Immigrants from EU-countries’ lack of interest in German citizenship can be explained partly in those terms. It is noteworthy that toleration of multiple citizenships of EU-citizens since 2007 has not dramatically increased naturalizations.⁶ Likewise, former guest workers from third countries gain little from naturalization in terms of rights, because they enjoy a secure status of permanent residence.⁷ A further disincentive is the requirement to renounce their former passport when naturalizing.⁸ What remains at stake, however, is the access to voting rights, active as well as passive ones. Additionally, non EU-citizens gain access to certain jobs in the public sector and special self-employed professions, and cross-border travel is facilitated. Neither of these rights is individually relevant per se. Individual benefits result from individual preferences. Research finds various factors to be relevant for the decision to naturalize but fails to relate macro-level factors to individual preferences. Also, most studies lack a strict connection of theory and data, either due to lack of theory or due to poverty of the data source. This project seeks to overcome those shortcomings by drawing on an issue-specific survey. It was guided by research findings and the theoretical concept of symbolic boundaries since an early phase.

Research findings vary depending on the immigrant group under consideration and the dependent variable assessed, i.e. performed or intended naturalization. If not consistent, some factors can be found to positively affect naturalization proclivities in more than one study: identification with the host country (Diehl 2002; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Prümm 2004; Söhn 2008; Wunderlich 2005), political interest (Diehl and Blohm 2011, 2008, 2003; Kahanec and Tosun 2009; Prümm 2004; Söhn 2008; Wunderlich 2005), intention to stay (Diehl and Blohm 2011, 2008, 2003; Prümm 2004) and having German friends (Constant et al. 2007; Diehl and Blohm 2003; Wunderlich 2005). Some scholars drew attention to the relevance of family related motives for naturalization decisions (Prümm 2004; Street 2014, 2013; Wunderlich 2005). The non-acceptance of dual citizenship was shown to impede naturalizations both qualitatively (Prümm 2004) and quantitatively (for the US Mazzolari 2009; for EU-countries Vink et al. 2013). Diehl and Blohm assessed naturalization intentions and decisions in a framework similar to the one applied here. However, they made little effort to operationalize symbolic boundaries from their secondary data. This study resorts to cross-sectional data that is unique for three reasons: The survey focused on the question of naturalization, it was informed by the findings reported, and it was developed with reference to the theoretical concept of symbolic boundaries. The next section describes this study’s theoretical foundations.

3. Theoretical Background

In this study, the intention to naturalize is assumed to be guided by individual preferences. However, individual preferences do not emerge in a vacuum. They are shaped (1) by social relations and (2) by legal rules in the country of origin *and* the country of immigration. The former include relations with peers and relations to the majority group. Legal rules refer to two contexts. In the host country rules of citizenship acquisition and restrictions for non-citizens are most relevant. With respect to the country of origin three main issues are at stake: Loss of citizenship in the case of naturalization, rights of

⁶ In accordance with EU rules (Council of Europe 1993) legislation was changed in 1999 to allow for multiple citizenships of EU-citizens. However, before 2007 this applied only in the case of reciprocity with a member state (Hailbronner 2012).

⁷ The permanent statuses are ‘settlement permit’ and ‘EU long-term residence permit’ (AufenthG, Part1, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_aufenthg/index.html).

⁸ Exceptions apply among others to states that do not release citizens from national allegiance (*StAG* §12; BMI 2009 Anwendungshinweise).

expatriates, and rights of former citizens. For example, a person might be inclined to naturalize only if multiple citizenship is tolerated by the two relevant states. Also, an immigrant willing to work as a police officer may not be inclined to naturalize, if she is allowed to do so as a non-citizen. As of the social relations, peers may influence the decision, simply because they serve as role models. The relation to the majority group is relevant, because in this relation the social requirements of belonging to the group of Germans are negotiated. These requirements are the root of symbolic boundary perception. Definitions are vague compared to legal rules, they may vary by context, and individuals may perceive them differently.

Table 1 Conditions of naturalization for immigrants from different countries of origin in one receiving country: Germany (one example per cell)

dual citizenship toleration			rights granted to alien residents		
in <i>outgoing</i> naturalizations	in <i>incoming</i> naturalizations	DC	civil rights	civil rights + social rights	civil rights + social rights + political rights
renunciation difficult or impossible	No	-	Not possible qua legal definition		
renunciation difficult or impossible	Yes	✓	Iran	Tunisia	-
No	Yes	✗	-	-	Austria
Yes	Yes	✓	-	Switzerland	Italy
No	No	✗	Azerbaijan	Japan	-
Yes	No	✗	Russia*	Turkey	-

DC = dual citizenship allowed at naturalization in Germany. *(Special rules apply to Russians with German ancestry. Sources: German bilateral social security agreements, Social Insurance Agreements between Switzerland and the EU, Japanese Nationality Law, Azerbaijani law. Figure by author.

The explanatory model refers to citizenship acquisition under specific legal conditions. All immigrants from one country of origin naturalize under equal legal rules and deal with the same majority group. Hence, neither aspect informs the explanatory model.⁹ Because these conditions are not varied, nothing can be said about the effect of legal rules and the effect of dealing with German as opposed to Dutch or American hosts. In a longitudinal or a comparative study with immigrants from different countries of origin or in different host country contexts these macro-level factors would be a necessary element of the explanatory model. Here, the focus is on factors below the group-level. Individual-level variables are expected to explain variation in intentions to naturalize. Individual preferences, expectations and perceptions are categorized into those covering aspects of symbolic membership and those covering aspects of legal membership. The symbolic category refers to sense of belonging, peers, and relations with the majority group. The legal one covers genuine rights and expected material benefits or costs. Additionally, preferences, expectations and perceptions are differentiated into those that increase the inclination to naturalize and those that decrease the inclination to naturalize since both outcomes are of interest.

⁹ This is a simplification. For example, the status of residence can make a difference to the toleration of dual citizenship in the case of political refugees. Since this study mainly deals with labour immigrants and their families, this simplification seems justified. However, 16% of survey participants claim having a limited residence status (ACN 2012). This issue is addressed below.

As mentioned before, there is good reason for the focus on one country of origin and one country of immigration. Naturalization under equal conditions makes immigrants' motives comparable. However, I introduce a typology of sending-country-receiving-country-constellations, in order to show how this study can be integrated into a larger comparative framework. I differentiate the conditions of naturalization inside a single receiving country context along three dimensions: dual citizenship in incoming naturalizations (yes/no), dual citizenship in outgoing naturalizations (yes/no), and rights granted to alien residents (civil rights/ civil+social rights/ civil+social+political rights). Table 1 illustrates how these three dimensions generate 18 potential outcomes of which nine have empirical representations for Germany as a receiving context. The first two dimensions of 'dual citizenship toleration' follow from respective nationality laws. Dual citizenship toleration (DC) in a specific sending-country-Germany constellation results in four out of nine existing variants. The third dimension of 'rights granted to aliens' is operationalized as follows: civil rights are the basic category, social rights refer to bilateral agreements on social security (*Sozialversicherungsabkommen*), and political rights refer to enfranchisement. In the last category only EU-countries are to be found. This differentiation could easily be expanded further, especially for the dimension of 'rights granted to alien residents'. An even more complete typology would take into account rights granted by the country of origin: What rights do external citizens enjoy, and what rights do former citizens enjoy once they lose citizenship? Scholars comparing immigrants from different origins should adapt their analytical framework to sending and receiving context they study. In this paper the most relevant rights related to the country of origin are accounted for.¹⁰ The typology shown in Table 1 may not be complete, but the three differentiations define crucial conditions that make naturalization more or less attractive from the outset. For the case studied here, political rights are the main gain of naturalization and renunciation of Turkish citizenship is the main loss. According to this typology, naturalization in Germany is most attractive for immigrants from countries like Iran and least attractive for those from countries like Austria. Iranians earn social and political rights while they keep their former citizenship whereas Austrians lose their former citizenship and gain only few additional rights in Germany compared to their former status. All other countries lie somewhere in between. This typology makes it also apparent, why comparing motives of immigrants from different origins is not necessarily insightful and eventually misleading. Research has not paid enough attention to country of origin related rules of naturalization (renunciation or loss of original citizenship). Although some scholars have drawn attention to the "constellations of citizenship" between sending and receiving countries (Bauböck 2010; Freeman and Ögelman 1998; Vink and Bauböck 2013), not enough efforts have been made to take this aspect into account in empirical studies (exception Vink et al. 2013). This outline of a typology integrates the case of Turks in Germany into a comparative framework and shows how it relates to other sending-country-receiving-country-constellations.

a. Legal Membership

There are few tangible benefits of naturalization for most Turkish persons in Germany. Social and civil rights have been granted partly right away, to attract the then so called guest-workers and calm unions, and then successively by help of the Federal Constitutional Court. It controlled the intransigent application of constitutional rights to all residents regardless of German citizenship (Joppke 1999). Among those rights are the generous application of social insurance rules through bilateral agreements between Germany and Turkey and extensive rights of family reunification for permanent residents, two aspects that are important incentives for naturalizations elsewhere (Yang 1994). Remaining legal benefits belong to four realms: political rights, cross-border mobility, work, and military service. Enfranchisement is a substantive consequence of naturalization for both, state and individual. A further benefit of naturalization is the range of travel rights with a German passport. Visa obligations are absent for many countries where they would be required based on the former citizenship and EU-

¹⁰ Hypotheses about political and property rights and military service refer to the country of origin (H4-H6).

citizenship potentially improves diplomatic protection abroad. Also, in some cases naturalization may entail certain convenience vis-à-vis public administration. Residence permits need not be renewed, border controls might be less strict and time consuming, and leaving Germany for more than six months is possible without losing the right to re-enter, an asset for transnational migrants.¹¹ Cross-border mobility at the same time improves job opportunities, for the German passport might alleviate work related travels. Besides, naturalization provides access to jobs restricted to German or EU-citizens, to be found in the public sector and in independent personal services such as dentists, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers and architects (Steinhardt 2012: 815). Naturalization might clear obstacles for borrowing from banks, a relevant issue for self-employed persons. More broadly, naturalization potentially fosters a trustful relation between employer and employee, because it signals long-term commitment to the country of residence. Finally, a potential benefit of naturalization for male immigrants is the avoidance of military service in Turkey. However, not all persons can avoid military service in this way. As explicated below, Turkish authorities have various procedures to deal with conscription of their emigrants.

Hypothesis 1: Turkish residents who want to have the right to vote in Germany are more inclined to naturalize.

Hypothesis 2: Turkish residents who expect job-related benefits from having a German passport are more inclined to naturalize.

Hypothesis 3: Turkish residents who expect travel-related benefits from having a German passport are more inclined to naturalize.

Naturalization can be perceived as instrumentally disadvantageous, too. First, obligations towards the host country arise, that might be considered undesirable. Most importantly, this is true of conscription, an obligation that, besides its symbolic significance, is time consuming as is its surrogate civil service.¹² Second, loss of the former citizenship may involve the loss of rights. Legislation has been changing over the years in this respect but it indisputably involves the loss of political rights.

Hypothesis 4: Turkish residents who want to have the right to vote in Turkey are less inclined to naturalize.

Until 1995 retention of Turkish citizenship was beneficiary for other reasons, too. Release from Turkish citizenship involved the loss of considerable rights in the home country that affected heritage and house ownership. The ‘pink card’ (*pembe kart*), introduced in that year, granted citizenship-like rights to former Turkish citizens, hence eliminating these disincentives. However, it has not been claimed quite often (Caglar 2004).¹³ In 2009 the pink card was renamed blue card and broadly guarantees the retention of rights for former citizens.¹⁴ Release from Turkish citizenship as well as dual citizenship is lawful since 1981 (Kadirbeyoglu 2012). Release is required from Turks that want to naturalize in Germany. However, a considerable number reacquired Turkish citizenship during the 1990s responding to encouragement by Turkish authorities. Formally, this procedure did not conflict with German law (*‘Inlandsklausel’*) until 2000’s reform. An estimated number of 50,000 naturalized persons lost their German citizenship, following their reacquisition of Turkish citizenship, after the new law became effective.¹⁵ Keeping the Turkish passport, apparently, is an important issue for

¹¹ See *AufenthG* §51, 1.

¹² If this obligation is a central disincentive, a rise in male naturalizations is conceivable after the abolition of conscription in Germany in early 2011. The last date of recruitment was January 1st 2011 (*WehrRÄndG 2011*, Section 7). Panel data including the years before and after reform would be necessary to test for such an effect.

¹³ Those rights relate to residence, property, work, etc. (Law 4112/1995). Caglar’s (2004: 279) rough estimates of pink card claims rest on inquiries at the Turkish consulate in Berlin.

¹⁴ Law No. 5901/2009 Turkish Citizenship Law, Art. 28.

¹⁵ There were investigations on the numbers by German federal administrations. The numbers mentioned, however, rest on estimates by Turkish officials (cf. Bundestag Drucksache 15/5006).

immigrants. However, since 1995 the loss is mostly symbolic, because, rights can be kept with few exceptions. While in theory there is little loss of genuine rights, Turkish emigrants might not be aware of the law reform or the reform might not be effective. Thus, an *expected* loss of rights, especially connected to heritage and real estate ownership, should be kept in mind as a possible disincentive for renouncing Turkish citizenship.

Hypothesis 5: Turkish residents who want to keep rights to property and real estate in Turkey are less inclined to naturalize.

Finally, the cumulative benefits relating to German passport are more meaningful, the more years remain to deal with the German labour market and authorities. Besides, there are some issues that are not addressed separately in the questionnaire such as accessibility of credit schemes or eligibility for scholarships that are reserved to German students. The cumulative benefits of Turkish citizenship become more meaningful towards the end of the career, when many first generation immigrants make plans for return to Turkey or transnational arrangements between both countries.¹⁶

Hypothesis 6: Younger Turkish residents are more inclined to naturalize than older ones.

Another legal innovation of the 1995 reform refers to military service. Before, Turkey did not allow emigrants to renounce Turkish citizenship, unless conscription was fulfilled. Since then, there are two procedures to circumvent military service. Payment of 5,000 to 10,000 Euros, depending on the age, reduces service from two years to three weeks. Alternatively, emigrants under the age of 40 can petition their authorities for deferment and renounce Turkish citizenship while deferred.¹⁷ Emigrants under 40 years of age should be expected to pick the second less costly option. Those who are older may not be required by the German state to renounce their Turkish citizenship in order to naturalize, but risk recruitment and a fine should they enter Turkish territory.¹⁸ Hence for men above the age of 40, the incentive structure is less clear.

Hypothesis 7: Men under 40 who have not fulfilled their conscription in Turkey, are more inclined to naturalize than those over 40 and those who already did their military service.

The bureaucratic process of application for citizenship represents another hurdle. Immigrants who apply for German citizenship must prove sufficient knowledge of German language, demonstrate knowledge of the German social and legal order, and pay a considerable fee.¹⁹ Also, they must deal with Turkish authorities and pay fees for release from Turkish citizenship. Additionally, civic and language tests eventually represent symbolic boundaries to the host society. These hurdles are addressed in the next section.

Hypothesis 8: Turkish residents who perceive naturalization to be costly are less inclined to naturalize.

b. Symbolic Membership

As could be seen, many rights have been granted to permanently resident Turkish citizens in Germany. Also, the Turkish state increasingly guarantees rights for its former citizens. Hence, the gains from acquisition of the new citizenship are rather small as are the losses caused by the renouncement of the old one. This is true at least for those indifferent about exercising their political rights and those who

¹⁶ Many first generation migrants have property in Turkey but offspring in Germany. Those migrants tend to opt for perpetual migration between both countries.

¹⁷ Cf. Bundestag Drucksache 16/13749 and 17/9809.

¹⁸ Age in connection with conscription is treated as a reason for dual citizenship toleration (BMI 2009 Anwendungshinweise, 12.1.2.3.2.2).

¹⁹ See StAG §§10, 38. At the time of the survey, the fee was 255 Euro for adults and 51 Euro for minors naturalizing together with their parents.

do not need it for professional reasons. Are political participation and labour market access then the only remaining stakes in naturalization? Obviously, besides substantial rights citizenship involves also feelings of belonging. In Brubaker’s words “[n]ation membership in a more informal sense, however, is not administered by specialized personnel but by ordinary people in the course of everyday life, using tacit understandings of who belongs and who does not, of us and them” (2010: 65). To account for this “informal membership” I conceptualize citizenship as a legal boundary that is closely connected to the making and unmaking of symbolic boundaries.²⁰

Claiming citizenship corresponds to *crossing* the legal boundary between national groups “without any change to the boundary itself” (comp. Alba 2005: 23). The concept of boundary crossing is used in connection with bright boundaries – applicable where the location of individuals is discrete and unambiguous. The second category of boundary *blurring* applies, where the location of a person on either side is ambiguous, e.g. when two nationalities are acquired by birth. Third, the endowment of host-country born children of immigrants with citizenship qua *ius soli* corresponds to *shifting* the legal boundary so that “populations situated on the one side are now included on the other” (comp. *ibid.*: 23). Some incidences are more difficult to put into one of the categories, for example when citizenship acquisition does not involve loss of the original passport. Here, a boundary is crossed, but it gets blurred, because membership is now ambiguous. The distinction of the three boundary types becomes even more complex, if social features of boundaries are considered next to the legal aspect. I label them symbolic boundaries.

Table 2 Typology of boundaries

		Legal boundary			respective definition of belonging
		bright	blurred	shifted	
Symbolic boundary	bright	A1	B1	C1	exclusive definition of belonging
	blurred	A2	B2	C2	hyphenated identities accepted
	shifted	A3	B3	C3	redefinition of identity for the new group as a whole
respective legal rule		exclusive citizenship	dual citizenship	unconditional naturalization	
examples for Germany		Turkish citizens	Italian citizens	German repatriates from USSR	

Source: Own adaptation from Alba (2005), and Zolberg and Long (1999).

Besides legal aspects, social relations are essential in boundary construction (Zolberg and Long 1999). While Alba’s (2005) focus is on the institutionalisation of boundaries, Zolberg and Long (1999) do mention social *and* institutional elements of boundaries but do not explicitly differentiate between them. In this paper, I propose a conceptual clarification through separation of both elements. Table 2 illustrates the constellations that result from accounting for both kinds of boundaries synchronically. For example, boundary shifting is a legal matter, subject to institutional change. Nonetheless, it is an empirical question of the social inclusion of new members. It results from legal change *and* the way it

²⁰ Besides citizenship, Alba (2005) mentions religion, language, and race as potential institutionalisations of boundaries between mainstream culture and immigrant groups.

is perceived by new and old members. Automatic endowment of the so-called ethnic Germans with citizenship at immigration during the 1990s was such a process in legal terms (C in Tab.2). But the societal inclusion and its individual perception by the new members are to be treated separately and to be examined empirically.²¹ The same is true of the differentiation between boundary blurring and boundary crossing. A boundary may be blurred in a legal sense, because dual citizenship is accepted, while a naturalized individual still perceives her action as boundary crossing, for example because her peers tell her, that she cannot feel attached to both nationalities at the same time (B1 in Tab.2). In the empirical case considered here, the legal boundary is bright, because as a general rule dual citizenship is not tolerated. The question yet unanswered is, how alien residents perceive symbolic boundaries. This question is relevant because it may explain variant inclinations to naturalize.

Of course the separation of legal and symbolic rules is conceptual. Empirically, rules of citizenship acquisition (legal boundaries) mirror to some extent the construction of symbolic boundaries by the majority group.²² But two arguments can be made in favour of this separation. First, although interdependent, legal and symbolic boundaries are not necessarily congruent. Second, symbolic boundaries are not institutional but a matter of variant subjectivities. In this study boundary perception is measured by feelings of accommodation and experienced discrimination of Turks in Germany. Accommodation points to a blurred or shifted boundary or a bright one that has been crossed, and collective discrimination points to a bright one that has not been crossed. Therefore, feelings of accommodation and discrimination are expected to influence the decision to naturalize as follows.

Hypothesis 9a: Turkish residents who feel more accommodated are more inclined to naturalize.

Hypothesis 9b: Turkish residents who experience group discrimination more often are less inclined to naturalize.

Crossing a bright boundary is likely to involve considerable symbolic costs. The identity connected to the former citizenship will be at risk if not lost, because there is no ambiguity in social belonging. Where a symbolic boundary is perceived as bright, hyphenated identities are not permissible. Since naturalization in Germany involves the renunciation of the former citizenship for Turkish immigrants (A in Tab.2), perception of the symbolic boundary as bright is likely.²³ Hence, crossing the boundary may involve a perceived loss of the former cultural identity.

Hypothesis 10a: Turkish residents who perceive the Turkish passport to be expressive of a Turkish identity are less inclined to naturalize.

Besides symbolic costs, there might be symbolic benefits of attaining host country citizenship. If there is a perceived bright boundary between the Turkish and the German group, that the immigrant wants to cross, the passport might exercise a symbolic meaning that helps to cross the perceived boundary. Research findings support the assumption of Germans' exclusive definition of belonging to their group (Bail 2008; Mäs et al 2005; Schneider 2001: 223ff; Westle 1999: 187f.) and the perception of such a boundary by Turkish immigrants (Anil 2007; Ehrkamp 2006; for non-Germans without further differentiation Hochschild and Lang 2011). While it is unclear, if naturalization is actually instrumental in achieving informal membership, the expectation of such an effect should be conducive to naturalization intentions of persons willing to cross.

²¹ In fact, in the 1990s they were addressed by the hyphenate 'Russian Germans' (*Russland-Deutsche*), suggesting a *blurred* social boundary (C2), or as expatriates (*Aussiedler*), suggesting a *bright* social boundary (C1). If it has *shifted* (C3) in the meantime, remains to be shown.

²² An infamous example is the collection of 5 million signatures opposing the introduction of dual citizenship by the conservative party CDU in 1999.

²³ There are exceptions to the rule of avoiding multiple citizenship (see footnote 9). Some exceptions apply to Turkish immigrants (e.g. political refugees, accepted asylum seekers), thus perceptions of the legal practice are likely to depend on word-of-mouth and rumours.

Hypothesis 10b: Turkish residents who perceive the German passport to be conducive for attaining a German identity are more inclined to naturalize.

So far, symbolic membership has been considered in terms of relations with the majority group. Further, family and friends may change symbolic boundary perceptions. First, role models can be expected to affect the decision to naturalize. The more peers have taken this step, the more insecurity is reduced. Second, peers that crossed the boundary might be perceived as distant because they are ‘on the other side’. Hence, more naturalized peers should lead to a higher inclination to naturalize. And third, having naturalized friends indicate that a bright boundary has been crossed or that boundary blurring or shifting has occurred.

Hypothesis 11a: Turkish residents with more naturalized family members are more inclined to naturalize.

Hypothesis 11b: Turkish residents with more naturalized friends are more inclined to naturalize.

Overall, children of immigrants should feel a stronger connection to Germany. Not only did we were they raised in a Turkish parental home, they also grew up in a German social and cultural environment. Thus, on average generation 1.5 and 2nd generation should have a stronger sense of belonging to Germany.

Hypothesis 12: Generation 1.5 and 2nd generation are more inclined to naturalize than first generation immigrants.

4. Methods and Data

Survey Design

A random sample was drawn from the public register in the German city-state of Hamburg. 2000 permanent residents were contacted by mail with an optional online response (November-December 2012). The population from which the sample was drawn was restricted to Turkish citizens between the age of 16 and 60.²⁴ This selection intentionally disregards persons that already naturalized. First, in this way the legal frame of naturalization is the same for all observations at the time of the survey. Second, the study is specifically interested in those, who did not naturalize (yet). Consequentially, results should be understood with regards to non-naturalized Turks. The aim of age limitations at the top and at the bottom was to focus on persons for whom naturalization is a relevant matter.

²⁴ This also excludes multiple citizens.

Table 3 Population and sample by gender and first letter of family name

		Male	Female	Total
A-F	population	8,070	6,726	14,796
	sample	500 (6.2)	500 (7.4)	1,000 (6.8)
G-Z	population	11,854	9,967	21,821
	sample	500 (4.2)	500 (5.0)	1,000 (4.6)
Total	population	19,924	16,693	36,617
	sample	1,000 (5.0)	1,000 (6.0)	2,000 (5.5)

Share of respective population in parentheses. Source: Public register of Hamburg, 2012.

Further sampling criteria are gender and initial letter of the family name (see Tab.3). Half of the sampled family names start with a letter between A-F, the other half starts with G-Z. Male and female participants are represented equally. In total 5.5% of the population were contacted, women and family names in A-F being slightly overrepresented. Sampling according to the alphabet was supposed to assure variance in the reception of an invitation to naturalize by the mayor, described below. Contact was established via mail with directions for an optional online-questionnaire to improve coverage and reduce costs (De Leeuw et al. 2008b). The letter was followed by a reminder-postcard one week later as recommended by the Tailored Design Method (Dillman 2007).²⁵

The questionnaire was developed from a thick literature on naturalization motives of immigrants, with special focus on Germany. It covers all aspects of naturalization that have been identified as relevant by the literature (see Ch.2). Further, it includes several items that aim at capturing the perception of symbolic boundaries. Finally, it asks basic socio-demographic information. The questionnaire was translated to Turkish with “simple direct translation” and combined with elements of the “committee approach” (Pan and De la Puente 2005). In addition to the author of the study, four Turkish speakers were involved in the translation, whereof two are also fluent in German. Repeated pre-tests were run at several points in time including before and after translation. Both, the online-mode and paper-pencil questionnaires were tested separately. Pre-test participants included survey experts, migration scholars, representatives from the German Turkish community who assist aliens interested in naturalization, and (German-) Turkish residents.

Finally, Hamburg has some specific qualities. First, it has political autonomy as a federal city state featuring a single naturalization authority which should imply a rather coherent implementation of administrative policies. Second, the city has been running a campaign to encourage naturalizations since December 2011. A prominent element of the campaign is a letter of invitation by the mayor sent to all aliens who fulfil the residence requirement, an approximate number of 137,000 persons. Since letters are sent in margins of 4,000 pieces, it takes almost three years.²⁶ The letters are sent in alphabetical order, hence the sampling by family name that is described above to allow control for an effect of letter reception. Next to the letters, the campaign entails celebrations of naturalization in the town hall, a mentoring program for persons willing to naturalize (*‘Einbürgerungslotsen’*), a PR campaign for identification featuring naturalized celebrities, and the introduction of naturalization

²⁵ Dillman recommends further reminders and repeated delivery of the questionnaire. However, due to financial constraints some deviations from the recommended procedure were unavoidable. Next to Dillman, I followed recommendations for survey design by De Leeuw et al (2008a) and Schnell (2012).

²⁶ The campaign had been started under the conservative and green party coalition government even earlier in November 2010. The social democrats, in office since 2011, embraced the campaign by adding said letter of invitation.

issues at school.²⁷ The context for the survey was intended to push salience of the issue of naturalization and thereby improve response.

5. Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of the central variables. The dependent variable merits some attention. About half of respondents intend to naturalize in the future, while half of them are reluctant. As outlined in the introduction, annual naturalization rates are below five percent of the eligible population. How can this gap be understood? Is it an effect of self-selection into the survey? Or is correlation between intended and performed naturalization simply low? Since the population's intentions to naturalize are unknown, the most promising way to rule out self-selection is to compare this finding to other studies. In fact, some scholars present naturalization intentions for immigrants from Turkey and former Yugoslavia similar to the ones obtained from ACN 2012 (Tab.A1). Although none of them reports results for Turks at regional level, naturalization intentions reported by Kahanec and Tosun (2009) are similar for Turks at national level and for labour immigrants more generally at the regional level for Hamburg. Other studies report somewhat lower naturalization proclivities of Turks at the national level, while they are always higher for Turks than for other immigrant groups (Constant et al 2007; Diehl and Blohm 2003). Apparently, the correlation of intended and performed citizenship acquisition is low. In line with that interpretation 81% of respondents in ACN 2012 would naturalize 'rather' or 'definitely' if dual citizenship was tolerated. Since the regulation of dual citizenship is an ongoing debate in Germany, some people could be postponing naturalization, because they hope for legal change.²⁸ There are two more reasons that may explain the difference. First, the temporal frame of reference of the annual rate exaggerates the gap between intentions and deeds.²⁹ And second, not all persons willing to naturalize are eligible.³⁰ Hence, the high share of persons willing to naturalize is not necessarily a sign of self-selection. Another requirement for the dependent variable is its variance. First, both groups are of interest, those who are inclined to naturalize and those who are not. And technically, sufficient variance on the dependent variable is crucial to calculate regression models. Hence, the ayes *and* the nays should be represented in the sample and they are.

²⁷ For further information on Hamburg's idiosyncrasies see Farahat (2013).

²⁸ See Grote (2014) for a recent summary of German party positions in the debate on naturalization.

²⁹ The cumulative naturalization rate of Turks 1985-2012 with the 2012 population as a reference is 36% (own calculation based on Statistisches Bundesamt 2013b; www.eudo-citizenship.eu). This is of course only a rough approximation because in- and out-migration is not taken into account.

³⁰ For example, 11% of respondents in ACN arrived in Germany less than eight years ago, 19% are not eligible if self-declared non-eligibility and self-reported poor or very poor German language skills are taken into account next to the residence requirement. Implications for the models are addressed below.

Table 4 Sample characteristics

Variable	Indicator(s)	Observations	Percent	Mean	Std. Dev.	Imputed values
Intention to naturalize	Single Item	240	100.00			0
	4 - Definitely		20.8			
	3 - Rather yes		25.8			
	2 - Rather not		38.8			
	1 - Certainly not		14.6			
Political rights Germany ⁱ	3 Items - Factor variable	248		0 1		20/16/32
Expected job-related benefits ⁱ	4 Items - Factor variable	248		0 1		6/3/2/4
Expected travel options ⁱ	6 Items - Factor variable	248		0 1		6/7/9/9/ 12/10
Genuine rights Turkey ⁱ	2 Items - Factor variable	248		0 1		10/12
Conscription due in Turkey of persons under 40 years	Single Item	242	100.00	0.12	0.33	13/13
	0 - No		87.6			
	1 - Yes		12.4			
Perceived costs of acquisition/release	2 Items - Factor variable	248		0 1		
Feel at home in Germany ⁱ	Single Item	249		3.23	0.81	28
Perceived group discrimination ⁱ	Single Item	249		2.63	0.77	46
Turkish passport identity-relevant ⁱ	2 Items - Index variable	248		0 1		3/6
German passport identity-relevant	Single Item	244	100.00	2.40	1.08	
	4 - Totally agree		17.6			
	3 - Rather agree		32.8			
	2 - Rather disagree		21.3			
	1 - Strongly disagree		28.3			
Share of German family members	Single Item	244	100.00	2.31	0.90	
	4 - All		10.3			
	3 - More than half		29.9			
	2 - Less than half		40.1			
	1 - Nobody		19.6			
Share of close friends that naturalized	Single Item	239	100.00	2.34	0.84	
	4 - All		9.2			
	3 - More than half		30.5			
	2 - Less than half		45.6			
	1 - Nobody		14.6			
Gender female	Single Item	245		0.49	0.50	
Age	Single Item	245		38.36	10.14	
Log. Personal income ⁱ	Constructed from precise and categorized income	249		6.52	1.89	70
Education in years	Constructed from highest educational degree	246	100.00	10.45	4.70	
	0 - No degree		5.3			
	5 - Primary School		12.2			
	8 - <i>Hauptschule</i>		21.1			
	10 - <i>Realschule</i>		23.6			
	13 - <i>Gymnasium</i>		20.3			
	18 - University		17.5			
	Generation		Constructed from 'country of birth', 'year of birth', and 'year of arrival'	244	100.00	
1 - 1st	44.7					
2 - 1.5	31.6					
3 - 2nd	23.8					

Categories are not reported for variables with imputed values (marked with an index) and other continuous variables.

Next to the distributions Table 4 presents information on imputed values per item. Values were imputed by regression, whenever $R^2 > 0.3$ in a linear regression model. Detailed information on the operationalization of independent variables is provided in the appendix (Tab.A2). Additional information about the index variables resulting from factor analysis can be found there as well (Tab.A3). It should be noted, that political rights and property rights in Turkey were combined to one factor because they are highly correlated. This puts H4 and H5 to test in conjunction.

Multivariate Statistics

Results from multivariate analysis by and large confirm the expected effects on the intention to naturalize. However, some effects are unexpected and deserve further consideration. Also, some conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between legal and symbolic incentives for naturalization. Table 4 shows the results of five ordinal logistic regression models. In the first models, legal aspects of membership are considered without socio-demographics (M1) and with socio-demographics (M2). Then, symbolic aspects of membership are considered without socio-demographics (M3) and with socio-demographics (M4) before the full model is presented (M5). Variables are structured in three blocks: Legal aspects, symbolic aspects, and socio-demographics. They appear in the same sequence as the hypotheses formulated above. Legal aspects include interest in political rights in Germany (H1), expected job-related benefits (H2), expected travel-related benefits (H3), interest in political, property, and inheritance rights in Turkey (H4+H5), a dummy for persons under 40 years of age who still have to make military service (H7), and perception of naturalization and release from Turkish citizenship as costly (H8). Symbolic aspects include feeling at home in Germany (H9a), perceived discrimination against Turks in Germany (H9b), perceived identity relevance of the Turkish passport (H10a), perceived identity relevance of the German passport (H10b), share of naturalized family members (H11a), and share of naturalized friends (H11b). Socio-demographic variables include dummies for gender and generational status (H12); age including a quadratic term to account for non-linearity (H6); logarithmic personal income and education in years. The results are as follows.

Model one confirms expected effects for the legal aspects. Interest in political rights in Germany has a positive effect on the intention to naturalize. The expectations of job- and travel-related benefits both have positive effects; the same is true of conscription. However, as the introduction of interaction effects described below reveals, the expectation of travel-related benefits exists only for those groups with educational degrees higher than none and lower than university. With relation to the country of origin, interest in political and property rights in Turkey has the expected negative effect. Also, perception of the naturalization procedure as costly has a negative effect that is not statistically significant. All other effects are statistically significant.

In the second model, socio-demographics are included into the regression. Effects of the legal aspects change only marginally. An exception is the effect of conscription that becomes weaker and ceases to be significant. Also, the effect of perceiving naturalization as costly is now irrelevant. Among the socio-demographic variables the age terms and generational status show the only significant effects. As hypothesized, persons that were born (2nd generation) or grew up (generation 1.5) in Germany are more inclined to naturalize than those who arrived as adults, the effect being significant only in the former case (H12). Age has an independent negative effect (H6). So among two persons born in Germany the younger one has a higher inclination to naturalize all else equal. The quadratic age-term means that the increase in the negative effect of age is the weaker the older the immigrant is. Income and being female both have positive effects on the intention to naturalize, but neither is statistically significant. Education in years has no effect on the intention to naturalize according to M2.

In M3, the effect of symbolic aspects of membership is assessed. Two variables in M3 capture the perception of symbolic boundaries: Feeling at home in Germany and perceived discrimination of

Turks. In line with the argument of symbolic boundaries, there is a strong positive effect of feeling at home and a strong negative effect of perceived group discrimination, both statistically significant. Perceived relevance of passports for the respective identities has the expected effects on the intention to naturalize as long as one considers only the direction (H10a, H10b). There is a negative effect of perceiving the Turkish passport relevant for a Turkish identity; and there is a positive effect of perceiving the German passport relevant for a German identity. However, neither of these effects is statistically significant. So, neither are persons that feel they would lose their Turkish identity by release from the old passport less inclined to naturalize, nor are those that feel they would gain German identity by acquisition of the new passport more inclined to naturalize. Reference group are persons who consider these passports to be irrelevant for their identities, all other variables being equal. For the number of naturalized kin and friends (H11a, H11b) results are contrary to the hypothesized positive effect, though significant only in the first case. Hence, there is no support for the hypothesized imitation of peers.

The addition of socio-demographic variables to the regression in M4 does not change the effects in major ways. However, the identity relevance of the German passport seems to get stronger and the negative effect of naturalized family members is no longer statistically significant. The effects of the socio-demographic variables are similar to M2. However, being female now has a negative but statistically insignificant effect. This is an indication that symbolic and instrumental incentives work differently for men and women. A further change with respect to M2 is lower significance-level belonging to the 2nd generation. Both age effects become weaker and the quadratic term ceases to be statistically significant. As in M2, effects of income and education are negligible.

M5 contains all variables: Legal, symbolic, and socio-demographic ones. Findings for the legal aspects look very similar to those in M1 and M2. Effects are relatively stable for interest in genuine rights in both countries, and aspiration of job- and travel-related benefits, though the latter is less significant now ($p < 0.1$). The positive effect of conscription persists, but is no longer statistically significant. The effect of financial costs is negligible as it was in M2. Findings for symbolic variables are also similar to findings from M3 and M4. The positive effect of accommodation and the negative effect of discrimination persist and are still highly significant ($p < 0.01$). Also, the negative effect of having more naturalized family members persists, and is more significant than before ($p < 0.05$). The negative effect of having more naturalized friends persists, too, but is not statistically significant. While identity relevance of the German passport was somewhat harder to refute based on M3 and M4, this becomes easier based on M5. The same is true for identity relevance of the Turkish passport. Among the socio-demographic variables the negative main effect and the positive marginal effect of age are statistically significant ($p < 0.1$). There is still a positive effect of belonging to the 2nd generation. The effect for gender gets now closer to zero and is even less significant than before.³¹ All other effects are similar to the prior models and are not statistically significant.

A comparison of M1 with M3, and of M2 with M4 gives some idea of the significance of legal aspects, compared to symbolic aspects of membership. Higher Chi-square values (Tab.5) and adj. R^2 in OLS (Tab.4A) in M1 and M2 compared to M3 and M4 respectively, point to a little higher relevance of legal aspects for the intention to naturalize. However, some rights-oriented motives like interest in political rights are of course intertwined with symbolic aspects of membership. Overall, the models confirm Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Further, there is some evidence for a positive effect of conscription on the intention to naturalize, but too weak to read it as a clear support of H7. A larger sample with a larger share of persons who still have to fulfil their military service might deliver clearer results. There is some evidence for a negative effect of perceived financial costs in M1, but this cannot be read as support for H8 after negligible effects in M2 and M5. Overall, legal aspects are strong explanatory factors for the intention to naturalize. Among symbolic variables, there is strong support

³¹ The effect of gender is noteworthy, because the direction differs between M2/M5 and M4. However, the gender specificity of effects is beyond the scope of this paper.

for Hypotheses 9a and 9b. Accommodation thus positively affects the intention to naturalize and experienced collective discrimination has the opposite effect. The confirmation of the generational effect (H12) underlines the meaning of a sense of belonging to Germany. The expected effects for identity-relevance of passports established in H10a and H10b cannot be confirmed in spite of some evidence for a positive effect of identity-relevance of the German passport in M3 and M4. Legal aspects seem to explain variance in M5 that is explained by identity relevance of the German passport in M3 and M4. Hypotheses 11a and 11b on following peers' example in crossing the boundary must be rejected according to M3, M4, and M5. Overall, LR-Chi² (Tab.5) and Adj.R² (Tab.A4) suggest a good fit of the theoretical model.

Table 5 Ordered Logistic Regression on Intention to Naturalize

	M1		M2		M3		M4		M5	
<i>Legal aspects of membership</i>										
Interest in political rights Germany ⁱ	0.452**	(3.29)	0.603***	(4.14)					0.626***	(4.07)
Expected job-related benefits ⁱ	0.282**	(2.12)	0.327**	(2.27)					0.354**	(2.36)
Expected travel-related benefits ⁱ	0.273**	(2.01)	0.326**	(2.28)					0.254*	(1.73)
Interest in genuine rights Turkey ⁱ	-0.864***	(5.76)	-0.833***	(5.33)					-0.688***	(4.21)
Under 40 conscription due in Turkey	1.174**	(2.72)	0.702	(1.36)					0.749	(1.39)
Perceived costs of acquisition/release	-0.166	(1.22)	-0.065	(0.46)					-0.027	(0.18)
<i>Symbolic aspects of membership</i>										
Feel at home in Germany ⁱ					0.914***	(5.14)	0.742***	(3.88)	0.633***	(3.17)
Perceived group discrimination ⁱ					-0.596***	(3.30)	-0.718***	(3.74)	-0.607***	(2.97)
Turkish passport identity-relevant ⁱ					-0.069	(0.47)	-0.085	(0.55)	-0.042	(0.26)
German passport identity-relevant					0.167	(1.31)	0.191	(1.44)	0.004	(0.03)
Share of German family members					-0.244*	(1.66)	-0.246	(1.61)	-0.332**	(2.05)
Share of close friends that naturalized					-0.028	(0.18)	0.021	(0.12)	-0.008	(0.04)
<i>Socio-demographics</i>										
Gender female			0.357	(1.17)			-0.366	(1.34)	0.174	(0.55)
Age			-0.244**	(2.54)			-0.157*	(1.69)	-0.193*	(1.96)
Age squared			0.003**	(2.35)			0.001	(1.24)	0.002*	(1.67)
Log. Personal income ⁱ			0.066	(0.86)			0.015	(0.21)	0.059	(0.74)
Education in years			-0.005	(0.16)			0.004	(0.13)	0.002	(0.05)
<i>Generation 1 (omitted)</i>										
Generation 1.5			0.321	(0.96)			0.474	(1.45)	0.333	(0.93)
Generation 2			0.987**	(2.40)			0.791*	(1.89)	0.826*	(1.78)
<i>Cutpoints</i>										
cut1	-2.114***	(9.49)	-6.004***	(3.02)	-0.904	(0.99)	-5.567***	(2.80)	-6.036***	(2.68)
cut2	0.283*	(1.78)	-3.375*	(1.71)	1.448	(1.57)	-3.045	(1.54)	-3.153	(1.41)
cut3	1.790***	(8.69)	-1.743	(0.89)	2.749***	(2.96)	-1.606	(0.82)	-1.422	(0.64)
<i>N</i>	215		215		215		215		215	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.13		0.18		0.09		0.13		0.22	
LR Chi ² (degrees of freedom)	72.99 (6)		99.25 (13)		48.38 (6)		74.63 (13)		123.30 (19)	

/z/-statistics in parentheses, ⁱvariables that have imputed values; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; Source: ACN 2012, own calculation

Robustness Checks

Some robustness checks were performed on the models reported in Table 5. First, the addition of language skills to M5 does not change results. Second, results do not change if a dummy-variable for a limited vs. unlimited residence status is included although there is a positive non-significant effect of having a limited status. Third, OLS regression models have been calculated, because a Brant test indicates a violation of the parallel lines assumption for ordered logistic regressions. As can be seen in Table A4 results from OLS regression do not reveal substantial differences compared to the ordinal logistic regression models presented above. Fourth, the eligibility to naturalize was controlled for as follows. All persons who declared not to be eligible, arrived less than eight years ago, or reported 'poor' or 'very poor' German skills were excluded. The application of the models on this subset of cases causes only minor changes in the results while reducing the sample size to N=173. It therefore seems reasonable to keep the cases in the sample.

Finally, interaction terms of socio-demographic and explanatory variables of the kind mentioned in Ch.4 have been included into the models to test for group-specific effects. Since gender and age do not suffer from non-response bias, such tests have been restricted to education. Indeed, some interactions with education reveal non-linear effects. I report instances where net-effects have a different sign for different sub-groups. Net effects result from adding main-effect and interaction-effect. These sub-group specific effects could be revealed by introduction of dummy-variables for educational degrees. The interaction of education and travel-benefits is such a case (Tab.A5). The net-effect is positive for all groups except university graduates and persons without formal degree; for both of them it is negative and non-significant. Hence, the positive travel-effect is underestimated for persons with medium education and misrepresented for the educational groups at the extremes. A similar case of such a u-shaped relation is discrimination. The net-effect is negative irrespective of the educational degree. However, if interactions with education are taken into account one can see that it is weaker for persons without education and those with university degree. It is strongest for those with a Secondary *Gymnasium* degree. Again, the effect for the middle-group is underestimated if education is included as a linear variable. Taking into consideration that persons are not adequately represented by educational degree, the average effects of travel-benefits and perceived discrimination for the population is not necessarily different. Since the effect of university graduates and persons without education is almost equal, overrepresentation of the former and underrepresentation of the latter does not matter here. Still the strong representation of those with degree from *Gymnasium* might lead to a slight overestimation of the overall effects for the two variables. All other interactions do not change the results reported in Table 5. Accounting for the sample size, those models are as parsimonious as possible. Therefore education is treated as a continuous variable in those models. It may be imprecise because some educational interaction-effects are actually non-linear but it seems justified because inclusion of education-dummies does not change the reported results in major ways.

Overall results seem to be robust to several tests. However, the tests also suggest some caution with the interpretation of some effects. Namely, the effect for expected travel-benefits deserves more attention. It is in fact non-linear and negative (although insignificant) for those with university degree and without any educational degree. These persons seem to have other than travel-related reasons to naturalize.

Limitations

Despite efforts to enhance response as recommended by the literature (e.g. Edwards et al. 2002; Porst 2001) the response rate is 12.5% (Tab.6). Irrespective of the response rate non-representative selection of participants into the survey should be considered. Age and gender are relevant variables to be checked for such selection (Moore and Tarnai 2002). Table 6 shows the response rate by gender. A paired t-test for equal means does not reject the null-hypothesis that both genders are represented

equally ($p > 0.79$). Also, a test of the age distribution in the sample for non-normality is negative (Fig.A1).³² A comparison of kernel density to a normal distribution reveals little difference, both for the realized and the original sample (Fig.A2). Finally, a QQ-plot reveals no difference between age distributions of original and realized sample (Fig.A3).

Table 6 Response statistics

	Male	Female	Gender unknown	Total
<i>Pool</i>	19,924	16,693		36,617
Original Sample	1,000	1,000		2,000
Wrong address / person moved house (UO)	-40	-31		-71
Thereof contacted again under new address	4	3		7
Reception rejected / Mailbox full (UO)	-2	0		-2
Gross Sample	962	972		1934
Nonresponse	-873	-869		-1742
Online Response	24	11	4	39
Mail Response	105	114	2	221
Break-Offs (more than 50% missing values)	-4	-5	-2	-11
Total Response I (I+P)	125	120	4	249
Response Rate (base: original sample; RR2)	12.5%	12.0%		12.5%
Response Rate (base: gross sample)	13.0%	12.3%		12.9%

UO, I, P, and RR2 refer to AAPOR standard definitions. Sources: Public Register Hamburg; ACN 2012.

There are some other respondent characteristics, where distribution in the original sample and the population are unknown, while they might influence participation. General interest in the question of naturalization, literacy, affinity to social surveys, political interest and the hope to voice needs figure prominently among factors likely to impact addressees' inclination to respond. The distribution of the respective variables points to an overrepresentation of educated, literate, and politically interested persons. Since distributions of these variables in population and sample are unknown this remains speculative. However, there are reference points from other studies for actual distributions of German skills (Tab.A6), political interest (Tab.A7), and education (Tab.A8). They point to an overrepresentation of the top-groups. Hence descriptive statistics should be interpreted carefully. German skills, political interest, and educational degrees are above the population average. This results from oversampling of educated persons and persons with high political interest. Along the same lines, general interest in the issue is likely to cause an oversampling of two groups: those with a strong inclination to naturalize and those who are unwilling and want to communicate their reasons.

What are the implications of these misrepresentations? Higher educated persons could differ systematically from those with lower or no formal education. For example, they might expect higher benefits for their job from naturalization, because citizenship tends to be more relevant for white-collar jobs, typically associated with higher rather than lower education. Multivariate analysis is a remedy to this simple kind of misrepresentation, as long as the respective variables can be controlled

³² Miller (1997) recommends normal probability plots as the most obvious test: "If a deviation from normality cannot be spotted by eye on probit paper, it is not worth worrying about." (1997: 13)

for and as long as all groups are represented in the survey. A problem arises if the strength of effects of independent variables on naturalization intentions is different for over- and underrepresented groups. Results of multivariate analysis are biased if there is an interaction effect between belonging to a misrepresented group (e.g. education) and one of the explanatory variables (e.g. expected travel-benefits), i.e. if an interest in travel-benefits increases naturalization intentions of Gymnasium graduates but not of persons without formal education. This has been accounted for and effect variation by educational degree has been identified and described above for expected travel-benefits and perceived group-discrimination. Finally, as in any statistical analysis, unobserved variables that influence the naturalization decision could bias results. For example, if dual citizenship is tolerated in some cases this might change those persons' naturalization intentions from the beginning.³³ As a bottom line, the selectivity of the sample causes biased descriptive statistics but is less problematic for multivariate analysis.

6. Summary and Discussion

The aim of this paper is to gain a better understanding of naturalization decisions. The case of Turkish immigrants and their descendants was selected because of their lasting exclusion from the polity. The majority of that group is eligible for naturalization, raising the question, why this exclusion lasts in spite of dwindling legal hurdles. This paper makes use of original survey data that allow for investigation of both, reasons to naturalize and reasons to leave it. The focus on non-naturalized persons allows for examining a group that has been neglected by past research. The concept of symbolic boundaries is applied to the case of citizenship acquisition. The inclination to naturalize is understood as resulting from the consideration of legal *and* symbolic motives. Both are shown to matter.

While the use of original survey data allows for new insights into naturalization decisions it also carries some problems. The crucial question is: What can we infer from a sample that suffers from high nonresponse, has been drawn in one German city, and is restricted to one country of origin? This threefold question is answered step by step. Obviously, a sample that is representative on the federal level would be preferable. There are surveys of this kind (e.g. ESS, LFS, GSEOP), but they do not provide the variables necessary to test the hypotheses formulated above. This was the reason to design a survey that is specific to the issue. So how should the imperfection of the sample be dealt with? Probable biases have been discussed at length above. It is likely that the sample is not representative of the population. However, the focus of this study is not on univariate statistics but on the bundle of motives that help us understand naturalization from the perspective of the alien resident. While uni- and bivariate results have to be read with great care, effects that are robust in multivariate analyses have more scope, as long as bias-inducing variables are observed and included into the model. Moreover, Chapter 5 reports robustness checks that aim at controlling consequences of selection effects. Most findings could be qualified in this way. Can the case of Hamburg be generalized? The federal system has to be taken into account when it comes to integration policies (Henkes 2008). However, in the case of naturalization policies, all Turkish immigrants face the same legal framework that defines their residence and their eventual citizenship acquisition. And according to Farahat (2013) *Länder*-implementations of national citizenship law look very similar. While Kahanec and Tosun (2009) find naturalization propensities to differ between the regions, their multivariate models do not change once they include regional dummies. This finding implies that individual mechanisms are equal irrespective of the regions immigrants live in. So findings from this study should apply to the rest of Germany. The final question is, if the case of Turks can be generalized to immigrants from other countries of origin? That was not the purpose of this study and remains to be shown. Table 1

³³ That would also thwart the typology of Fig. 4. 13 survey participants stated in the respective item that they may have both citizenships but the response is uncorrelated with naturalization intentions ($r = -0.04$) and their exclusion from regression does not change results presented in Ch.5.

provides relevant dimensions of comparison with groups from other countries of origin. The framework could easily be applied to other cases. Similar conditions as for Turkey apply for example to Macedonia and Serbia.³⁴ However, this paper's primary aim was to understand the underlying motives of naturalization decisions under comparable legal conditions, hence the restriction to one country of origin.

Analyses show that besides pragmatic considerations, symbolic motives are important factors for the intention to naturalize. Two legal aspects that are closely connected to the intention to naturalize are interest in voting and property rights. While the positive effect of political interest in Germany confirms former findings (Diehl and Blohm 2011, 2008, 2003; Kahanec and Tosun 2009; Prümm 2004; Söhn 2008; Wunderlich 2005), the negative effect of interest in genuine rights in Turkey has not been assessed before. A possible reason for these effects is that some migrants wish to exert genuine rights in both countries.³⁵ This provides an explanation for findings of other researchers about a positive effect of tolerating dual citizenship (Mazzolari 2009; Vink et al. 2013). However, the wish to exert rights in both countries conflicts with the current rule of avoiding multiple citizenships for non-EU citizens. A law reform allowing dual citizenship thus might clear significant obstacles to higher naturalization rates. As pointed out in the introduction, enfranchisement of alien residents is a normative requirement that is difficult to reject by democratic states. Besides enfranchisement, there are further rights-oriented motives that increase inclinations to naturalize. The expectation of job-related benefits increases inclinations of all groups and expectation of travel-related benefits increases inclinations of those with educational degrees lower than university. While researchers already explored the positive economic effects of naturalization (for Germany Steinhardt 2012; Gathmann and Keller 2014)³⁶, the expectation of a citizenship premium by immigrants and its effect on their naturalization intention was assessed in this study for the first time. No effect can be found for the perception of the procedure as costly. Hence, reduction of the fee is not likely to have a positive effect. Overall, younger persons are more inclined to naturalize than older migrants, which was interpreted as a cumulative effect of legal benefits. Other studies that assess the intention to naturalize also find negative age effects (Diehl and Blohm 2011, 2008, 2003; Kahanec and Tosun 2009), while those using actual naturalizations as their dependent variable find positive age effects (for Germany: Diehl and Blohm 2011, 2008; for 16 European countries: Vink et al. 2013).³⁷ This suggests some self-selection into the respective populations. Apart from these pragmatic considerations, symbolic motives make an important contribution to the explanation of intentions to naturalize.

The perception of bright symbolic boundaries seems to impede the intention to naturalize. The positive effect of accommodation in Germany (feel at home and generational status) and the negative effect of perceived group discrimination underline the empirical significance of immigrants' relation to the majority group for naturalization. Following the concept of symbolic boundaries, these factors are understood as immigrants' perception of legal rules and of their relation to the majority group. Opposite to former research (Diehl 2002; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Prümm 2004; Söhn 2008; Wunderlich 2005), feeling at home was used as an indicator for belonging, instead of identification with the host country. Still, the positive effect of feeling of belonging confirms their findings. The higher inclination to naturalize among generation 1.5 and 2nd generation was interpreted along these lines as resulting from a stronger emotional attachment to Germany. A negative effect of having naturalized family members contradicts former findings. The selection procedure was offered as an

³⁴ Obviously, historical differences of nation-building would have to be taken into account in a comparison.

³⁵ While the factor variables are per definition uncorrelated, the original variables of interest in franchise in both countries are rather strongly correlated (Pearson's $r=.19$).

³⁶ According to Steinhardt (2012) effects are positive for both genders but result from self-selection in the case of women. Gathmann and Keller (2014) find a low premium for men but a strong one for women. Also, they find a higher premium for recent immigrants than for 'guest workers'.

³⁷ Diehl and Blohm (2011; 2008) work with two datasets: The Microcensus has information on actual naturalizations, the GSEOP on intentions.

explanation for this unexpected result. Street (2013) reports the phenomenon of family strategies for the case of Austria and United States; single family members may deliberately decide to refrain at a moment when the rest of the family naturalizes. Overall, results indicate that improving accommodation and reducing collective discrimination of aliens could increase naturalization rates. But bright boundaries are not transformed into blurred or shifted ones by legal decree. This needs a joined effort of politics and society. Even where political reforms aim at blurring and shifting legal boundaries, transformations of symbolic boundaries occur only once these legal changes are reflected in everyday communications between immigrants and members of the majority group.

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Appendix

Table A1: Intentions to naturalize according to different studies

Authors	Constant et al (2007)		Diehl and Blohm (2011, 2008)			Diehl and Blohm (2003)		Diehl (2002)		Kahanec and Tosun (2009)		This study	
Data	SOEP 2005 Household heads		SOEP 2001-2003			SOEP 1998		Integrationsurvey des BiB		Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (2002). "Ausländer in Deutschland - Marplan Studies"		ACN 2012	
Nationality	Former Yug., Turkish	Turkish	Turkish	Former Yug.	EU-15	Turkish	Former Yug.	Turkish young adults	Italian young adults	Turkish	Spanish, Italian, Turkish, Greek, Former Yug.	Turkish	
Spatial reference	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Western Germany	Hamburg	Hamburg	
Interest	++	17,8%	17,4%				15,2%	8,8%	23,6%	2,2%	25,6%	18,8%	14,1%
	+						20,8%	10,8%	16,9%	9,9%	23,5%	32,8%	37,4%
	-	50,0%	NR				34,7%	36,2%	17,9%	35,4%	41,9%	48,4%	25,0%
	--						40,4%	31,8%	11,8%	39,8%			20,1%
Already naturalized	24,3%	26,3%	17,1%	14,6%	6,8%	6,5%	5,4%	28,9%	13,0%	24,3%	26,3%		
intention to nat. in the next 6 month										21,4%	14,1%		
intention to nat. in the next 2 years			33,6%	22,3%	5,8%								
N	387	247	NR	NR	NR	558	297	1104	820	NR	NR	249	

All statistics as reported in the respective publications. NR: not reported. Compilation by author.

Table A2: Operationalization of Independent Variables

Variable	Items
<i>Legal aspects</i>	
Political rights in Germany ⁱ (Factor variable)	10. By naturalization you get certain rights. Independently of your intention to acquire German citizenship: How important do you consider the following rights? (Very important, rather important, rather unimportant, not important at all)
	a. Franchise in federal elections (the federal parliament elects the chancellor)
	b. Franchise in local elections
	c. Franchise in European elections
Genuine rights in Turkey ⁱ (Factor variable)	11. In case of a naturalization in Germany you normally lose Turkish citizenship meaning loss of rights in Turkey. How important do you consider the following rights? (Very important, rather important, rather unimportant, not important at all)
	a. Franchise in national elections
	b. Right to inheritance and real estate
Expected job-related benefits ⁱ (Factor variable)	18. Irrespective of your current citizenship. In how far do you agree with the following statements about citizenship and job? (Likert-scale: fully applies, rather applies, does rather not apply, does not apply at all)
	a. By naturalization, my income would improve
	b. By naturalization, my chances of finding a job would improve
	c. By naturalization, colleagues and chiefs would discriminate against me less frequently
	19. Regarding your current or future jobs: In how far does the following apply to you? (Likert-scale: fully applies, rather applies, does rather not apply, does not apply at all)
a. I want to have a job, where I need German citizenship (e.g. certain public sector jobs, or jobs that involve travel)	
Expected travel options ⁱ (Factor variable)	17. Irrespective of your current citizenship. In how far do you agree with the following statements about benefits of German citizenship for travel? (Likert-scale: fully applies, rather applies, does rather not apply, does not apply at all)
	a. German citizenship is beneficial for my travels inside EU
	b. German citizenship is beneficial for my travels between Germany and Turkey
	c. German citizenship is beneficial for my travels outside EU and Turkey, e.g. Americas, Asia, Australia
	d. German citizenship is beneficial for my work related travels
	e. German citizenship is beneficial for family visits
	f. German citizenship is beneficial for other private journeys
Perceived costs of acquisition/release (Factor variable)	20. Naturalization causes financial and bureaucratic efforts. You have to apply in a German office and eventually contact Turkish offices for release. In how far does the following apply to you? (Likert-scale: fully applies, rather applies, does rather not apply, does not apply at all)
	a. I find naturalization in Germany too expensive
	b. I find release from citizenship in Turkey too expensive
<i>Symbolic aspects</i>	
Turkish passport identity-relevant ⁱ (Index: Cronbachs α 0.80)	21. The loss of Turkish citizenship is standard in the case of naturalization. Irrespective of your intention to apply for German citizenship, and irrespective of the obligation to renounce the Turkish passport in your case: In how far do you agree with the following statements? (Likert-scale: totally agree, rather agree, rather disagree, strongly disagree)
	a. If I lose Turkish citizenship, I am no longer a Turk
	b. My loss of Turkish citizenship, means loss of my Turkish identity
German passport identity-relevant	21. The loss of Turkish citizenship is standard in the case of naturalization. Irrespective of your intention to apply for German citizenship, and irrespective of the obligation to renounce the Turkish passport in your case: In how far do you agree with the following statements? (Likert-scale: totally agree, rather agree, rather disagree, strongly disagree)
	c. By naturalization, you acquire some German identity
Feel at home in Germany	23b. I feel at home in Germany
Perceived group discrimination	28. How often did you have the impression, that in Germany persons of Turkish origin are treated unjustly <u>only because of their origin</u> ?

Table A2: Operationalization of Independent Variables (continued)

Variable	Items	
	14. The following is about your family and friends (all, more than half, less than half, nobody)	
Share of German family members	14a. How many of your next family members (parents, siblings, offspring) possess German citizenship?	
Share of close German friends	14b. Think about your close friends. How many of them possess German citizenship?	
Share of close friends that naturalized	14c. How many of your close friends acquired citizenship by naturalization?	
<i>Socio-demographics</i>		
Education	37. What is your highest educational degree?	years
	a. No degree	0
	b. Primary school (till 5 th grade)	5
	c. Primary school / <i>Volksschule</i> / <i>Hauptschule</i> or similar (till 8 th /9 th grade)	8
	d. <i>Realschule</i> or similar (till 10 th grade)	10
	e. Gymnasium or similar (till 12 th /13 th grade)	13
	f. University / university of applied sciences / <i>Hochschule</i>	18
Generation	Generated from 'country of birth', 'year of birth', and 'year of arrival': 1st generation (born in Turkey), 1.5 generation (born in Turkey, age at arrival<6), 2nd generation (born in Germany)	

Table A3: Scoring Coefficients for Selected Independent Variables (Factor Analysis)

Item	Travel	Job	Pol. GER	ID Turk pass	Finan. costs	Rights TUR
Travel: Inside EU	0.25452	-0.10402	0.01977	-0.00994	0.0756	-0.02961
Travel: Between GER and TUR	0.25418	-0.07066	-0.01743	0.08954	-0.01716	-0.00982
Travel: Outside EU and TUR	0.24841	-0.06663	-0.02076	-0.10232	0.05432	0.00362
Travel: Work-related	0.17731	0.09198	-0.06087	-0.01916	-0.05204	0.02878
Travel: Family visits	0.27723	-0.03979	-0.11457	0.13892	-0.05528	0.07932
Travel: Other private journeys	0.26601	-0.05203	-0.00866	-0.05484	-0.01489	-0.04568
Job: Improve income	-0.09117	0.33854	-0.01145	-0.10212	0.02581	0.01209
Job: Find a job easier	-0.07489	0.32317	0.01746	-0.04338	-0.05097	-0.0806
Job: Less discrimination on job	-0.10796	0.33127	-0.00596	-0.03154	0.0318	0.03776
Job: Citizenship required	-0.02288	0.24997	-0.02449	0.0437	-0.04974	0.01007
Political rights GER: Federal	-0.08975	0.00476	0.4098	-0.00065	-0.02901	-0.02911
Political rights GER: Local	-0.05845	-0.04842	0.40201	-0.01707	0.06111	-0.04438
Political rights GER: EU	-0.04865	0.01563	0.34202	-0.00429	0.00449	0.01703
Identity and passp.: Being a Turk	0.01898	-0.06325	0.02099	0.52168	0.00399	-0.04734
Identity and passp.: Turk. identity	0.02244	-0.06056	-0.03189	0.52192	-0.02203	0.02147
Financial costs: Acquisition GER	-0.01945	-0.00914	-0.00766	-0.03425	0.51973	0.0619
Financial costs: Release TUR	0.00573	-0.03718	0.03681	0.00264	0.53627	-0.09416
Genuine rights TUR: Vote	0.00298	0.0175	0.00041	0.00828	-0.0434	0.54163
Genuine rights TUR: Property, heritage	0.00233	-0.02539	-0.04801	-0.02982	0.01334	0.55024

Regression based on varimax rotated factors.

Table A4: OLS Regression on Intention to Naturalize

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
<i>Legal aspects of membership</i>					
Interest in political rights Germany ⁱ	0.186*** (3.16)	0.234*** (4.03)			0.236*** (4.03)
Expected job-related benefits ⁱ	0.135** (2.32)	0.137** (2.35)			0.138** (2.42)
Expected travel-related benefits ⁱ	0.124** (2.08)	0.140** (2.41)			0.101* (1.78)
Interest in genuine rights Turkey ⁱ	-0.358*** (6.08)	-0.335*** (5.74)			-0.255*** (4.30)
Under 40 conscription due in Turkey	0.544*** (2.99)	0.288 (1.39)			0.279 (1.40)
Perceived costs of acquisition/release	-0.084 (1.43)	-0.034 (0.59)			-0.019 (0.33)
<i>Symbolic aspects of membership</i>					
Feel at home in Germany ⁱ			-0.044 (0.63)	-0.049 (0.72)	-0.047 (0.77)
Perceived group discrimination ⁱ			0.072 (1.18)	0.076 (1.28)	0.011 (0.19)
Turkish passport identity-relevant ⁱ			0.416*** (5.29)	0.325*** (3.98)	0.216*** (2.85)
German passport identity-relevant			-0.272*** (3.32)	-0.305*** (3.80)	-0.237*** (3.11)
Share of German family members			-0.131* (1.87)	-0.114* (1.66)	-0.146** (2.31)
Share of close friends that naturalized			-0.011 (0.15)	0.013 (0.17)	-0.012 (0.17)
<i>Socio-demographics</i>					
Gender female		0.120 (0.95)		-0.179 (1.49)	0.035 (0.28)
Age		-0.100*** (2.67)		-0.071* (1.77)	-0.074** (2.00)
Age squared		0.001** (2.46)		0.001 (1.30)	0.001* (1.70)
Log. Personal income ⁱ		0.023 (0.73)		0.006 (0.19)	0.021 (0.69)
Education in years		0.000 (0.03)		-0.001 (0.11)	0.002 (0.13)
<i>Generation 1 (omitted)</i>					
Generation 1.5		0.141 (1.03)		0.201 (1.39)	0.153 (1.10)
Generation 2		0.444*** (2.62)		0.372* (1.95)	0.385** (2.12)
Constant	2.460*** (40.08)	4.019*** (5.11)	2.042*** (4.87)	4.086*** (4.86)	3.976*** (4.77)
<i>N</i>	215	215	215	215	215
Adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.264	0.334	0.169	0.251	0.387

/t/-statistics in parentheses, ⁱvariables that have imputed values; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; Source: ACN 2012, own calculations.

Table A5: Ordered Logistic Regression on Intention to Naturalize

	M6		M7	
<i>Legal aspects of membership</i>				
Interest in political rights Germany ⁱ	0.630***	(4.08)	0.681***	(4.30)
Expected job-related benefits ⁱ	0.361**	(2.40)	0.422***	(2.72)
Expected travel-related benefits ⁱ	0.244*	(1.65)	-0.365	(1.05)
Interest in genuine rights Turkey ⁱ	-0.695***	(4.24)	-0.673***	(4.07)
Under 40 conscription due in Turkey	0.709	(1.30)	0.714	(1.27)
Perceived costs of acquisition/release	-0.045	(0.30)	-0.007	(0.05)
<i>Symbolic aspects of membership</i>				
Feel at home in Germany ⁱ	0.622***	(3.09)	0.692***	(3.32)
Perceived group discrimination ⁱ	-0.623***	(3.03)	-0.705***	(3.33)
Turkish passport identity-relevant ⁱ	-0.045	(0.27)	-0.038	(0.23)
German passport identity-relevant	-0.003	(0.02)	0.014	(0.10)
Share of German family members	-0.331**	(2.03)	-0.407**	(2.42)
Share of close friends that naturalized	-0.001	(0.01)	0.053	(0.28)
<i>Controls</i>				
Gender female	0.146	(0.45)	0.043	(0.13)
Age	-0.186*	(1.87)	-0.166	(1.62)
Age squared	0.002	(1.59)	0.002	(1.26)
Log. Personal income ⁱ	0.055	(0.70)	0.073	(0.89)
<i>Education None/Primary (omitted)</i>				
Education Secondary I	-0.107	(0.22)	-0.015	(0.44)
Education Secondary II	0.184	(0.38)	0.216	(0.02)
Education Gymnasium	-0.068	(0.14)	-0.008	(0.19)
Education Tertiary	-0.127	(0.26)	-0.097	(0.90)
<i>Generation 1 (omitted)</i>				
Generation 1.5	0.291	(0.77)	0.345	(1.66)
Generation 2	0.774	(1.63)	0.805*	
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
Education Secondary I * Travel			0.765*	(1.65)
Education Secondary II * Travel			1.128**	(2.29)
Education Gymnasium * Travel			0.844*	(1.78)
Education Tertiary * Travel			0.023	(0.04)
<i>Cutpoints</i>				
cut1			-5.905**	(2.50)
cut2			-2.972	(1.26)
cut3			-1.170	(0.50)
<i>N</i>			215	
Pseudo R^2	0.22		0.24	
LR χ^2 (degrees of freedom)	123.98	(22)	132.30	(26)

/z/-statistics in parentheses, ⁱvariables that have imputed values; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; Source: ACN 2012, own calculations.

Table A6: Descriptive Statistics of Language Skills

	ACN 2012	ZiD 2001	ACN 2012	ZiD 2001
Turkish, oral skills			German, oral skills	
Very poor	0.8		3.2	
Poor	5.2		19.7	
Fair	47.8	89.7	45.0	50.8
Very good	46.2		32.1	

Sources: ACN 2012; ZiD 2001 are self-gathered data from Salentin and Wilkening (2003) for non-naturalized Turks on national level. They summarized ‘fair’ and ‘very good’.

Table A7: Descriptive Statistics of Political Interest

	ACN 2012	ACN 2012		GSOEP 1996
Franchise, federal level Germany		Franchise, national Turkey	Political interest	
Not important at all	4.4	11.4	no	84.6
Rather unimportant	11.4	25.3		
Rather important	31.7	26.1		
Very important	44.9	33.3	yes	15.4

Sources: ACN 2012; GSOEP 1996 as reported in Diehl and Blohm (2001) for Turkish persons on national level; Missing up to 100%: Missing values.

Table A8: Descriptive Statistics of Education


Highest educational degree	ACN 2012	Highest educational degree*		Highest educational or professional degree**		
		ZiD	GSOEP			
None		None		None		
Primary (5 th grade)	5.2	} Secondary Gymnasium	14.6	24.1	34.0	
Secondary (8 th /9 th grade)	12.1				Second. (8 th /9 th)	} 36.6
Secondary (10 th grade)	20.9				Second. (10 th) Gymnasium	
Gymnasium (12 th /13 th grade)	23.3		76.4	70.3	Tertiary	13.5
Tertiary	20.1		9.0	14.7	Still in system	9.2
	17.7					(2.1)
						6.1

*Salentin and Wilkening (2003) for non-naturalized Turks on national level based on self-gathered data (ZiD 2001) and GSOEP 2000.

**All Turkish nationals living in Germany above the age of 15. Statistics are not strictly comparable for several reasons: Official statistics refer to the national level in 2012, not to Hamburg, they refer to all persons above the age of 15, and shares for educational degrees and professional degrees were calculated separately, where ‘Tertiary’ counts as a professional degree (Statistisches Bundesamt, Bildungsstand der Bevölkerung, 2013).


Other Sources: ACN 2012; Missing up to 100%: Missing values.

Figure A1 Normal Probability Plot of Age in the Sample




Sources: Public Register of Hamburg; ACN 2012.

Figure A2 Age Distributions and Kernel Density of Original (0) and Realized Sample (1)



Sources: Public Register of Hamburg; ACN 2012.

Figure A3 QQ Plot of Age in Sample (0) and Realized Sample (1)



Sources: Public Register of Hamburg; ACN 2012.

Author contacts

Nils Witte

Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS)

Postfach 33 04 40

D – 28334 Bremen

Germany

Email: nwitte@bigsss-bremen.de

EUDO CITIZENSHIP contact and submission of working papers:

Email: eudo.citizenship@eui.eu

<http://eudo-citizenship.eu>

