ITHACA - INTEGRATION, TRANSNATIONAL MOBILITY AND HUMAN, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL TRANSFERS

Conceptualising the integration-transnationalism nexus

ITHACA Report

Ruby Gropas, Anna Triandafyllidou and Laura Bartolini
European University Institute

Funded by DG Home of the European Commission
Conceptualising the integration-transnationalism nexus

ITHACA Report

RUBY GROPAS, ANNA TRIANDAFYLLIDOU AND LAURA BARTOLINI

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

ITHACA PROJECT
The ITHACA Research Project

ITHACA - Integration, Transnational Mobility and Human, Social and Economic Capital

ITHACA studies the links between migrants’ integration and their transnational engagement. Migrants engage in transnational mobility for an array of economic reasons as well as emotional or political ties with their country of origin. They develop transnational business, trade, investments, or social and cultural programmes and circulate between their two countries. ITHACA explores the interconnections between the integration process and transnational mobility of migrants and aims to answer three key questions: To what extent, and in what ways, do integration conditions in the country of destination encourage transnational mobility? What are the conditions in the country of origin that may encourage transnational mobility? What type of transfers take place through the transnational mobility of migrants? ITHACA focuses on economic integration and mobility conditions as factors that encourage or prevent transnational mobility.

The ITHACA project is hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou (anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu). The project is funded by DG Home of the European Commission.

The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s)

The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), at the European University Institute (EUI), directed by Brigid Laffan from September 2013, was set up in 1992 as a complementary initiative to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. The Centre hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the European Union. One of its core themes is Migration.

Anna Triandafyllidou is Professor at the Global Governance Programme (GGP) of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), European University Institute. Within the GGP she coordinates the Research Area on Cultural Pluralism. She is the Scientific Co-ordinator of the ITHACA Project.

Ruby Gropas is Research Fellow at the Global Governance Programme of the RSCAS and Lecturer in International Relations at Democritus University of Thrace. She holds a PhD from Cambridge University.

Laura Bartolini is Research Associate at the Global Governance Programme of the RSCAS. She holds a MSc’s degree in Development Economics from the University of Florence and a Master in Public Policy and Social Change from the Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin.

For further information:

ITHACA Project
Global Governance Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Via delle Fontanelle, 18, 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy
Fax: + 39 055 4685 770
E-mail: anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu or roubini.gropas@eui.eu
http://ithaca.eui.eu
Abstract

In ITHACA we explore the links between migrants’ integration and their transnational mobility. We concentrate specifically on transnational mobility for economic purposes, and examining the type of transfers (social, cultural and economic) that are generated through it.

In this paper, we discuss the ways in which integration, transnationalism and the relationships between the two have been conceptualised. Given the diversity in scope and in intensity that characterises transnational mobility, we suggest that there is a need to revisit the various facets of the interconnections between the two phenomena and take into account new variables to explain: under what circumstances migrants engage in transnational mobility; in what ways does their integration in the society of settlement influence this engagement; what sort of transfers are being made; and in what ways are the particular characteristics of each migration corridor relevant for the link between integration and transnational mobility. We thus define the boundaries of our research and critically analyse the available quantitative strategies for addressing the multidimensional nature of the integration-transnational mobility matrix.

Keywords

Transnational mobility, integration, migration, return migration, typologies, indicators
1. Introduction

For long, the study of migrants’ transfers mainly focused on the regular financial remittances sent to the origin households to cover core subsistence and consumption needs, education and healthcare costs, and home-improvement works. Progressively, the social, cultural and political capital that migrants were transferring through their continued engagement with their country of origin throughout their migration project – at different stages, and across different generations – was ever more acknowledged and recognised. Indeed, the breadth of transnational home engagement of migrants has been steadily documented through rich sociological studies mainly in North America over the past thirty years, and more recently in Europe. Furthermore, the migration-development policy nexus that attracted significant policy interest over the past decade, triggered much research on the economic value and potential of remittances, while transnationalism studies indicated the importance of social remittances on the home communities and more recently also the importance of reverse remittances.

This expanding and fascinating field of research in migration studies has equally delved into the interactions between migrant integration and transnationalism. This growing field of scholarly research has, since the early 2000s, concentrated on the wide range of relations that migrants develop with people, organisations, communities, and networks in their country, region, or community of origin, and the ways these webs of relations link in with individuals, organisations, communities and networks in the country of destination. Research has probed into the conditions of integration and the resources that are requisite in order to facilitate or enable transnational activities, on the kind of attachments that migrants hold or pursue with their country of origin, on the forms that transnationalism takes, and on what is tangibly transferred between the countries. Migrant transnationalism involves important transfers of not only economic but also social and human capital, notably not only of money but also of ideas, networks, behaviours, even identities (Levitt 2001). The importance of transfers has been recognised by international organisations. The World Bank and the IOM are illustrative of this as they have conducted extensive research on the extent and size of economic remittances and on their impact on the homeland economies1.

Transnational linkages appear to have been increasing in intensity, in scope and in variety (Faist 2000). Schunck (2011, 260) has suggested that complex phenomena like transnational social spaces, transnational communities and transnational networks presuppose transnational activities. He defines transnational activities as specific actions that the migrant undertakes and which “connect” the country of origin and the country of destination. For instance, visits to the country of origin are the most basic type of a transnational activity as they involve physical border crossing, while remittances have been considered as an exemplary form of migrant transnationalism (Vertovec 2002). Resource flows across borders are obviously not limited to money flows in the form of remittances but also include immaterial, social remittances in the form of ideas, identities, behaviours and social capital (Levitt 2001) which are equally important

---
1 See the work of Dilip Ratha overall, including http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Remittances-PovertyReduction.pdf
in the impact they may have on the country of origin. Overall, most research has explored the impact of migrant transnationalism on the country of origin. The resource flows of transnational mobility towards the countries of destination have attracted less attention, yet as Eischen has argued, “immigrant contributions may be symbiotic across borders, with both the country of origin and settlement benefitting, and synergistically so” (Eckstein and Najam 2013, 13).

Empirical research has suggested that migrants’ decisions with regards to their tangible, practical or symbolic engagement in the economic, social, cultural and political sphere at origin are likely to depend upon, among other things, the trajectories and conditions of their integration at destination (see inter alia Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1994; Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002; Tamaki 2011; Carling and Hoelscher 2013). They may also be connected with the perspective of eventual return and reintegration into the origin country. The capacity and desire to engage in transnational behaviours seems thus to be affected by a range of factors that concern the migrant’s individual characteristics and situation (both in the country of origin and in the country of destination) and by the wider economic and political conditions in both countries.

In this context, our study aims at exploring the links between migrants’ integration and their transnational mobility through concentrating specifically on transnational mobility for economic purposes, and examining the type of transfers (social, cultural and economic) that are generated through it. In this paper, we provide a literature review of integration, transnationalism and the relationship between the two, with a specific attention to main theoretical advancements on typologies and interconnections between the two phenomena. Through this, we aim to define the boundaries of our research and critically analyse the available quantitative strategies for addressing the outlined topics.

A thorough literature review of the way integration and transnationalism have been defined and debated in migration studies is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, in the next two sections we aim to highlight the dimensions of integration and transnationalism that we need to explore further in order to understand a) in what ways integration impacts transnational mobility and, b) in what ways integration impacts the sort of transfers that are catalysed and pursued through transnational mobility.

2. Defining and operationalising integration

Immigrant integration has long been at the heart of sociological research and policy-making. Approaches to integration have been impregnated by normative and highly political considerations alongside pragmatic ones. The definition of migrant integration provided in the Common Basic Principles for the Integration of Third Country Nationals (Council of Europe 1997) is pretty basic – “integration is a two-way process of accommodation by all migrants and residents of member-states” – and mainly aims at emphasising that integration is not a one way process of the migrant integrating at the country of residence but rather a process that involves the whole of society.
 Nonetheless much of the policy debate focuses on individual migrant competences such as language learning, employment, educational attainment and relevant “migrant integration” data, without necessarily due attention to the actual process of integration (Mahendran 2013). Migrant integration policy discourses often involve an imagination of society and the majority culture as a bounded unit to which migrants as individuals have to integrate, see actually assimilate. Thus integration requires the migrant to achieve a set of attainments in education, language and economic self-sustenance. In addition, while the policy discourse requires individuals to conform with the majority culture, their failure is attributed collectively to their minority culture that is not sufficiently “modern” (Schinkel 2013).

Conditions for integration encompass economic, social and cultural dimensions, and it is generally agreed that integration is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. Integration processes involve both migrants and the receiving society, while the role of the sending country is increasingly taken into consideration.\(^2\) In effect, as Nebiler et al (2013) have pointed out, sending countries may impact in their expatriates’ integration in the countries of destination through formal or informal channels, and through formal and informal actors. Government actors, non-governmental organisations, churches, families and even the media may thus play a role in the integration process of the migrant in the society of settlement as well as in their transnational engagement.

The definition of integration adopted by the Council of Europe (drawing from the work of Bauböck (1997) includes a common framework of legal rights and active participation in society, on the basis of minimum standards of income, education and accommodation. Integration also requires freedom of choice of religious and political beliefs, cultural and sexual affiliation, within the framework of basic democratic rights and liberties (Bauböck 1997, 15). Ager and Strang have formulated a framework on the processes that may facilitate integration identifying domains in which achievement and access matter. These domains include the sectors of employment, housing, education and health, assumptions and practice regarding citizenship and rights, processes of social connection within and between groups in the community, and barriers to such connections stemming from lack of linguistic and cultural competences and from fear and instability (Ager and Strang 2008, 184–185). In effect, integration involves the real economy and the cultural spaces, it involves the political realm, the social sphere and everyday public life. Integration measures are frequently broken down into structural and socio-cultural components. Structural indicators of integration refer to the individual situation in terms of employment and economic condition, as well as in terms of political and legal spaces opened by the legislative and institutional context at destination (political participation, regular residence and access to citizenship, etc.). The measures of the social sphere instead refer to emotional, cultural, religious and social markers of integration. The ‘markers’ and the ‘means’ of integration tend to include the following dimensions:

\(^2\) See notably the INTERACT project: http://interact-project.eu/
Education (participation rates; achievement; recognition of qualifications, skills and competences including vocational and professional qualifications, and entering employment);

Employment (position in the labour market and access to employment; employment/unemployment rates and duration, occupation and level; proportions in dangerous/dirty jobs, all by age/sex; self-employment and proportions in key professions (such as architects, lawyers, teachers, engineers, doctors), and in managerial and governmental posts);

Income (absolute and relative earnings);

Access to citizenship (also political participation and political rights);

Access to housing and social benefits;

Civic participation;

Language acquisition; and

Judicial indicators (relating to arrests, convictions, police and judicial behaviours).

These concepts and definitions of integration have been radically critiqued by Michel Wieviorka (2013) who has argued that so-called ‘models of integration’ are all failing, while authors such as Thomas Faist (2013) have proposed that integration, multiculturalism and transnationalism should be seen as interrelated rather than as mutually exclusive models.

Nonetheless, in spite of the challenges associated with the various approaches to integration, the concept is meaningful in enabling us to draw some insights as regards the degree of stability and security that migrants may have in the country of destination and the sort of resources they have that may facilitate, enable, encourage or even determine their transnational activities. Indeed, as migrants’ transnational engagement has intensified and transnational lifestyles have emerged, destination countries have begun to consider alternative integration models (Pitkänen, Içduygu, and Sert 2012). This is particularly interesting and deserves more detailed attention as there exists very limited insight into what is needed to empower people to mobilise, work, interact and live in transnational settings. What sort of skills or competences might initiate or facilitate transnational engagement? What instruments or policy measures may be relevant? And finally, which actors may be relevant in the integration process?

3. Transnationalism and transnational engagement

The field of transnational migration studies has been expanding in recent decades. Anthropology has been influential in introducing the concept of ‘transnationalism’ into migration studies in the 1990s, which has since grown as an area of study that has bridged disciplines and brought together insights from social anthropology, economic studies, sociology, political geography as well as political science and international relations, in studying different kinds of interactions that migrants develop between the sending and receiving countries, and the impacts these may have on either ends.
Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Blanc-Szanton defined ‘transnationalism’ as a social process through which migrants establish social fields that cross geographical, cultural and political borders. Their work emphasised migrants’ agency, and shed light into the kinship networks that extend across two or more states, as well as the activities that may either be facilitated or be dependent on cross-state connections. In their pioneering book *Nations Unbound* (1994: 6) they defined transnationalism as:

“the process by which immigrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain multi-stranded social, economic and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, and through which they create transnational social fields across borders”.

Alejandro Portes defined the concept further, recognising the ways in which migrants live in ‘transnational communities’ (Portes 1997; Portes 2003). He emphasised the regular and sustained social contacts and dense networks that migrants develop across political borders in their quest for economic advancement and social recognition. Through these networks, migrants are able to lead ‘dual lives’ in a way, moving between cultures, often maintaining two homes, and pursuing economic, political and cultural interests that require their (regular) presence in both countries of origin and destination (1997: 812).

The fact that individuals may lead transnational lives or heavily engage in transnational activities does not however necessarily lead to the development of transnational communities. Transnational communities, as all communities, require the existence of mutual trust and shared identities (see Faist 2004 on the Turkish migrants in Germany and their contacts with Turkey). Portes et al (2002) also coined the term ‘transnational fields’ to refer to the web of contacts created by immigrants who engage in repeated back-and-forth movements across national borders in search of economic advantage and political voice. The variety of terms and concepts may highlight different dimensions of the phenomenon, but what they essentially refer to are “relatively stable and persistent social relationships, identifications, patterns of communication and transfers of resources, which connect migrants and non-migrants in two or more nation-states, mostly the migrants’ country of origin and the country of residence” (Nieswand 2011, 32).

Although transnational social relationships existed long before they were actually identified as such by the social sciences, in more recent research, transnationalism has been conceptualised as a novel phenomenon in the context of globalisation. Indeed it differs from previous forms and patterns of migration because leaps in technology, communication and transportation infrastructure have facilitated migrants in kick-starting, maintaining, or developing their home-based relations, activities and interests to an unprecedented extent and with an unprecedented intensity. Transnational migration is in this sense both a manifestation and a consequence of the process of globalisation.

This changing migration context has been defined by Duany (2002, 358) as resulting in ‘mobile livelihoods’. Duany has argued that as people spatially extend their means of subsistence across various local, regional, and national settings and geopolitical borders, they also move along the edges of cultural borders, such as those created by language, citizenship, race, ethnicity and gender ideology. These mobile livelihoods have significant implications for the construction of labour markets, discourses and policies of citizenship, language policies and ultimately also national identities. In effect, **transnational migrants may claim membership and**
participation in multiple polities thereby challenging the traditional model of participation. They may claim citizenship in a country in which they are resident, or part time resident or even absentee, or they may have the citizenship of a country in which they do not live. The facilitation of dual citizenship is effectively a recognition that people can have multiple ties, some of them extending to other nation states, and transnational lives (Pitkänen, Içduygu, and Sert 2012). Migrants are thus active agents in transformations that are underway globally (Schiller and Çağlar 2009).

These definitions unavoidably lead the discussion to ‘who is a transnational migrant’? Some have attempted to confine the notion to political activists or economic entrepreneurs who conduct cross-border activities on a regular basis (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003). Others have preferred wider definitions as regard the range of activities (including non-professional ones such as family ties) (such as Bryceson and Vuorela 2002). And, others still have argued that ‘bodily’ geographic mobility is not a requirement.

Transnationalism has been categorised on a number of dimensions. Portes et al (1999) for example have suggested a typology according to sector of activity (economic, political and socio-cultural) and on degree of institutionalisation that has since been expanded and adapted in various directions.

**Table 1: A typology of transnationalism according to sector of activity and degree of institutionalisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of institutionalisation</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Socio-Cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Informal cross country traders; Small businesses created by return immigrants in home country; Long-distance circular labour migration</td>
<td>Home town civic committees created by immigrants; Alliances of immigrant committees with home country political associations; Fund raisers for home country electoral candidates.</td>
<td>Amateur cross-country sport matches; Folk music groups making presentations in immigrant centres; Priests from home town visit and organise their parishioners abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Multinational investments in Third World Countries; Development for tourist market of locations abroad; Agencies of home country banks in immigrant centres</td>
<td>Consular officials and representatives of national political parties abroad; Dual nationality granted by home country governments; Immigrants elected to home country legislatures.</td>
<td>International expositions of national arts; Home country major artists perform abroad; Regular cultural events organised by foreign embassies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: from Portes et al (1999)
Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) proposed a typology of transnational activities from a different perspective, focusing on the political sphere. She distinguished two types of transnational political practices:

- transnational immigration politics as politics of the country of destination when the country of origin is involved in helping improve the legal or socio-economic status of its citizens;
- and homeland politics in which migrants and refugees engage in that are directed to their home country – these include diaspora politics and translocal politics (by immigrants who aim to improve the local community from which they originate).

In the context of the ITHACA project, we probe further into transnational mobility that involves economic activity. Transnational migration, similarly to circular migration is part of larger frameworks of cooperation and exchange (see Cassarino 2008). These frameworks may be more or less regulated and may or may not have pre-existing economic, political and cultural ties between the countries involved. Ambrosini (2014) draws a typology of four types of transnational economic activities:

“[The first type involves] circulatory transnationalism represented by activities that physically connect the two sides with the land carriers linking many Italian cities with a variety of destinations in Eastern Europe. Second, there is a connective transnationalism represented by activities that link the places of origin and transfer shops, phone centres, and increasing internet cafés and other services related to new communication technologies. A third broad area of economic activities can be categorised under the label of commercial transnationalism. It includes the businesses that offer various ‘ethnic’ products, mainly food, but also furniture, clothing and gift items. A fourth category comprises activities mainly related to the area of leisure and in which transnationalism has a primarily symbolic connotation (Turkish baths, yoga centres etc.).”  
(Ambrosini 2014: 4, emphasis added)

Ambrosini concentrates his typology on the country of destination and on the bottom up activities undertaken by immigrants. He argues that the level of involvement is higher in circulatory transnationalism where the migrant (entrepreneur) travels back and forth and gradually decreases in forms of connective or commercial transnationalism and is weakest in symbolic transnationalism (Ambrosini 2014, 4).

Indeed, transnational mobility is part of the circulatory transnationalism as defined by Ambrosini. It involves the physical activity of travelling back and forth for purposes of economic activity. We define economic activity as a notion that is wider than employment. It involves economically participating through a range of activities that produce added value or income in kind or in money: for instance, cultivation of crops, house repairs or other types of income or resource generating activities at origin and destination.

What is worth noticing here, is that transnational mobility, even more than transnationalism writ large, concern a minority of all migrants. As pointed out by many studies (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002; Portes 2003), only a small share of immigrants
participate regularly in time and resource intensive transnational activities, as for instance transnational entrepreneurial activities (Schunck 2011, 261).

Moreover, transnational mobility may be more trans-local than transnational. Translocality involves local-to-local connections across national boundaries that are created through everyday practices of transnational migrants; it involves the concept of life space: the locations with which the individual interacts, such as job, leisure, family, residence. Research has been increasingly asserting the importance of local-to-local connections of transnational migrants and the concept of translocality has offered an ‘agency oriented’ approach to transnational migrant experiences (Brickell and Datta 2011, 3). In effect, research on translocality has focused on how social relationships across locales shape transnational migrant networks, economic exchanges and diasporic space, and it has been argued that transnational activities are only effective when they are firmly anchored in particular locales (see Zhou and Tseng 2001). Networks linking California’s Silicon Valley and the Hsinchu region in Taiwan or Hyderabad in India are illustrative of such translocal networks.

Through our empirical work, we aim to build on these typologies further in order to also differentiate between two main types of transnational mobility and thereby consider what kind of capital transfers are involved in each case. The first involves transnational mobility after settlement in the country of destination and the second involves mobility that may occur after return migration.

**Transnational mobility after settlement:** The migrant is settled in the destination country but engages into economic activity in his/her country of origin. This economic activity may take the form of investments e.g. buying property, opening a shop or simply employment e.g. construction work, trade, cultivating land. It may also take the form of civic activism (promoting contacts between hometown of origin and destination, creating transnational partnerships, creating programmes for study and exchange between the two places). The migrant circulates between the two countries but is mainly based at the country of destination.

**Transnational mobility after return:** In this case, the migrant has returned to the country of origin after having spent abroad a number of years, working or studying or for family reasons. S/he takes advantage of her/his transcultural capital (knowledge of and networks in both countries) to develop economic or civic activity that is transnational in character (e.g. trade, business, real estate or other work or cultural, political, civic initiatives). The migrant circulates between the two countries but is mainly based at the country of origin.

4. The integration-transnationalism link in the recent literature

The majority of existing studies on integration and transnationalism have been conducted in the US and, as far as the European countries are concerned, few attempts have been made to investigate trends and mechanism of integration and transnationalism in a comparative way and among the most represented migrant communities across Europe. Moreover, much of the existing literature is qualitative in nature and there is a lack of quantitative studies dealing with
the overall level of transnationalism across migrant groups and its links with structural and socioeconomic integration indicators for cross-country or group comparisons.

Recent studies have investigated the relationship between these two phenomena, underlining from time to time similarities and differences between the two in terms of applicable research methods and concepts. According to the specific adopted approach, these studies suggest different positions on the type of relationship between integration and transnationalism at the individual level (Erdal and Oeppen 2013). The most alarmist views present the issue as a dual loyalty challenge which each migrant has to confront and which is at the core of fears and mistrusts in the receiving population: as long as the difference between natives and foreign born is perceived as too deep, the alarmists may claim that there is no possibility of filling the (perceived) gap as long as transnational ties keep foreign born citizens loyal to their country of origin, their religious and cultural background etc. (Nagel and Staeheli 2008; Faist 2000). Another negative position on the issue is that of presenting transnationalism as a survival strategy adopted by migrants who find it difficult to integrate at destination. In this case, migrants rely on transnational networks to survive in the first stages of their presence abroad, to find work and accommodation for instance, hence ending up in segregated, homogeneous communities for which integration might result more difficult (Faist 2000; Cohen and Sirkeci 2005). In the same line, transnational activities compete with integration efforts in terms of time and resources and can therefore impede a throughout process of integration in the society of destination (Kivisto 2001).

On the opposite side, more positive positions present the processes of integration and transnationalism as mutually supportive. A successful economic integration for instance is a pre-condition for migrants to engage in transnational investments or return visits as suggested by Levitt (2003), as well as indicators of structural integration – length of stay abroad, employment stability and education levels – are positively associated with transnational entrepreneurship and political engagement in the home country (Hammond 2013; Vertovec 2009; Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2002). Also, indicators of social, political and economic integration of migrants are associated with higher transnational engagements in the case of the UK according to Jayaweera and Choudhury (2008). On the reverse side, transnational visits to the origin countries are found to have a positive effect on integration as they generate resources to be invested abroad (Oeppen 2013).

Increasingly, both at the theoretical and at the empirical level, many studies adopt a more pragmatic attitude to the study of the links between integration dimensions and transnationalism ones (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Kivisto 2001; Vertovec 2009; Haas and Fokkema 2011; Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2002; Jayaweera and Choudhury 2008; Mazzucato 2008; Nagel and Staeheli 2008; Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes 2006). Integration and transnationalism are not incompatible and the empirical observed relation between the two may vary according to many different factors. Indeed, the multifaceted role of integration on transnationalism is often recognized, distinguishing the effect of structural, economic indicators which allow the migrant enough resources to engage in transnational activities, and the effect of sociocultural indicators of integration which account for a progressive detachment from the origin country (see Cela, Fokkema, and Ambrosetti 2013 for an empirical study on Eastern migrants in Italy, or Carling and Pettersen 2014 on migrants in Norway).
In many of these studies, authors are also well aware of the risk of incurring in a “reverse causality” issue: observing a strong (positive or negative) correlation between one or more dimensions of integration and of transnationalism is not enough to establish a straightforward causal relationship. Distinguishing the cause and the effect while the two phenomena are simultaneous is inherently difficult. Moreover, both of them are likely to be influenced by third (unobserved) variables, which could explain the reason for the observed correlations and for which data are often missing. In some cases, as argued by Vertovec (2009), self-confidence or self-esteem may help explain why migrants more involved in transnational activities and practices are those with higher integration levels and vice versa. In others, longitudinal approaches allow to disentangle the changing relationship between integration and transnationalism at different points in the life course of a migrant (Mazzucato 2008; Castagnone et al. 2014). To address the issue, more quantitative multivariate analyses are required to complement existing qualitative evidence.

**Theoretical frameworks and practical implementations**

Some recent research has explored the mechanisms of interaction between transnationalism and integration in ways that are relevant for ITHACA’s fieldwork. Tsuda (2012) has suggested four ways of conceiving the relationship: a zero-sum relationship, where increasing the efforts on one side leads to less involvement in the other; a side-by-side relationship in which the two phenomena coexist without influencing one another; a positively reinforcing relationship where the two processes strengthen each other; a final negatively reinforcing relationship, where a failure in one process negatively affects the other.

In the same vein, Erdal and Oeppen (2013) propose the typology presented in the table below, where the relationship between integration and transnationalism is conceived as either additive, synergistic or antagonistic.

**Table 2: Typology of interactions between integration and transnationalism from Erdal and Oeppen (2013: 878)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of interaction</th>
<th>Additive</th>
<th>Synergistic</th>
<th>Antagonistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-cultural integration and transnationalism</strong></td>
<td>Feeling of belonging and socio-cultural connections in country of origin and of settlement</td>
<td>Feeling of belonging and connections in one place give confidence to further develop connections in other</td>
<td>Feeling of belonging and socio-cultural connections in one place displace feelings of belonging in other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural integration and transnationalism</strong></td>
<td>Economically active in country of origin and of settlement (Dual citizenship + regularized mobility)</td>
<td>Resources gained in one place are invested to develop further resources in the other</td>
<td>Demand for resources in one place limits ability to meet demands in other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Building upon these theoretical conceptualizations, other studies have focused on the relationship between transnationalism and integration by starting from the premise that, at the individual level, these are neither connected in a predictable way, nor are they independent from each other. Carling and Pettersen (2014) propose an integration-transnationalism matrix as a conceptual framework for the analysis of migrant’s multiple attachments and use it to empirically analyse
return migration intentions on migrants of ten immigrant groups residing in Norway. In this work, as in a previous one by de Haas and Fokkema (2011), integration and transnationalism are conceived and empirically measured as instrumental in the explanation of a component of the overall migratory strategy, namely return (Carling and Pettersen 2014; Haas and Fokkema 2011). In their analyses, transnationalism and integrations are depicted as two intersecting dimensions, operationalised either as “weak” or “strong” in order to produce four categories. Empirically, each dimension of the matrix is based on three dichotomous indicators with migrants categorized as “strongly integrated” or “strongly transnational” if one or two out of the three indicators are present. In particular, ownership of property in the origin country, visits to the origin country in the past 5 years, sending remittances at least once a year are three dummy variables which account for transnationalism, which is here limited to “social and economic transnational practices with a low level of institutionalisation” (Carling and Pettersen 2014, 2). Among integration measures, host country language proficiency, sense of belonging to the host country and no experiences of discrimination whilst abroad are taken as the three indicators of socio-cultural integration (Haas and Fokkema 2011; Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes 2006). Economic variables such as employment conditions and income related information are considered separately and not within the integration dimension, since they are likely to have a direct impact on return intentions (Carling and Pettersen 2014).

**Figure 1:** The integration-transnationalism matrix from Carling and Pettersen (2014: 4)

A more simplified typology which allows for two opposing categories – being the two phenomena either complementary or substitute - is often referred to in qualitative studies which account for single national communities in a particular country or city, as in the case of Somalis in the UK or Asian migrants in Vancouver (Hammond 2013; Ley 2013).

In order to adopt a holistic, multidimensional approach to the study of transnationalism and its interconnection with integration, Dekker and Siegel (2013) have built a multidimensional transnationalism index and propose two encompassing typologies to be used for their empirical investigation on migrants in the Netherlands: a complementary and a substitute category which share commonalities with the Erdal and Oeppen (2013) and Tsuda (2012) work. Seeing transnationalism and integration as complements means assuming that migrants who are better integrated show at the same time a higher degree of participation in transnational activities, other factors being constant. On the contrary, postulating a trade-off in terms of time, resources and
energy between investing in integration or in transnational activities requires assuming that those who are better integrated participate less in transnational activities than their less integrated peers, as the two involvements are deemed as substitutes (Dekker and Siegel 2013). Moreover, authors add a further qualification for the association between integration and transnational practices to account for the impact of migrant economic and financial circumstances. Their multidimensional transnational index\(^3\) is built out of three dimensions of the transnational sphere – the socio-cultural, the political and the economic one – which are defined as a synthesis of a broader list of indicators which encompasses many single behaviours and practices, from the number of visits to the origin country to type and frequency of contacts with friends and family, from participating into organizations and associations at origin or at destination to investing money in properties or income generating activities (Dekker and Siegel 2013, 6–8).

**Figure 2: Typologies of the transnational practices – integration relationship from Dekker and Siegel (2013: 4)**

Empirical findings support the hypothesis for a complementary role of transnationalism and integration: the double loyalty of transnational migrants does not hamper their integration, provided they have the minimum level of resources which are needed for the two engagements not to compete (Dekker and Siegel 2013).

5. **Pursuing a multidimensional approach to integration and transnational mobility**

As already discussed, integration and transnationalism are two multi-faceted and often debated concepts. Beyond the normative elements inherent to the public policy discourses related to both, we consider them as two social processes through which migrants negotiate their attachments and their sense of belongings to (at least) their country of origin and of destination. Being multidimensional, they have to be disaggregated in measurable activities and indicators in order to grasp the complexity of the domains inherent to each of them. While the identification of tailored indicators is usually possible with micro-level, case-study survey data, secondary data

---

\(^3\) A detailed explanation of the methodology is not provided in Dekker and Siegel (2013), but their multidimensional index is built re-adapting the Alkire and Foster method for the construction of multidimensional poverty measures (see [http://www.ophi.org.uk/research/multidimensional-poverty/alkire-foster-method/](http://www.ophi.org.uk/research/multidimensional-poverty/alkire-foster-method/)).
from official institutions (national surveys or census data) often do not offer the desired level of disaggregation. At the same time, the strength and type of interpretation of the information conveyed by an indicator is strictly connected to the level and unit of analysis.

What we wish to attempt here is to provide the operational definitions which can be adopted within ITHACA in order to pursue both qualitative and quantitative analyses that will enable us to disentangle conditions and factors that affect the links between integration and transnational mobility in different destination countries and migrants from different origin countries.

**Aggregate and individual measures available**

Let us first turn to the integration side of the equation. Assessing the extent or degree of a migrant’s integration in the receiving society is challenging. Just as challenging is the comparison across time and across countries, not least because of the diverse normative understandings of what integration actually entails, what it presupposes, and how it is ‘achieved’. At the European level, the April 2010 Zaragoza list of indicators provides a synthesis of the debate among Member States and has been adopted at the EU level for cross-country comparisons. The list and its possible extensions (Huddleston, Niessen, and Tjaden 2013) is grounded on the availability of comparable statistics at the European level on at least employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship conditions.

**Table 3: The Zaragoza Indicators for Migrant Integration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Core indicators:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Core indicators:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social inclusion</td>
<td>Core indicators:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active citizenship</td>
<td>Core indicators:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zaragoza Declaration

Source: Eurostat 2011

Although there has been an increasing effort of harmonization guided by Eurostat and pursued by the national statistical offices of the Member States, still data sources and collection methods vary and do not always offer a sufficient degree of disaggregation. Indeed, many
indicators of the Zaragoza list are calculated from micro-survey data (EU Labour Force Surveys and EU-SILC mainly) which are primarily designed for representing the overall population and which may under- or mis-represent the immigrant resident population. Hence, although country-level data can provide the broader national context of integration for the European countries of destination included in the ITHACA project – namely Austria, Italy, Spain and the UK – these have to be complemented for an in-depth analysis of each single migration corridor considered in ITHACA.

Turning next to transnational practices and markers of transnationalism, these have been even less codified than integration measures in the recent academic and policy-oriented literature. While the only data available at the aggregate level for cross-countries comparisons are those on transnational economic transfers (remittances), many other dimensions have been highlighted in different empirical, mainly studies qualitative in nature (see the previous section).

Indeed, the ITHACA project focuses on transnational mobility involving economic activity, hence on practices and activities which pertain to the economic spheres and to some extent to the sphere of social/civic participation. The choice of transnational mobility rather than of transnationalism writ large is intended to highlight the basic and maybe more intense form of transnationalism in the economic sphere. At the same time, this choice reduces the overall reference population of migrants which can be identified as transnationally mobile (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Portes 2003; Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014) and requires specific survey data for making transnational activities visible. Indeed, to qualify transationally mobile migrants we need information on their physical activity of travelling back and forth between their origin countries for economic purposes (frequency, motivations, trends and changes), as well as information regarding their transnational economic transfers and their investments at origin (properties, land, shops or other economic activities), and on their engagement in ethnic organizations and associations abroad.

ITHACA seeks out this information through over 350 in-depth qualitative interviews that we are undertaking with transnationally mobile migrants in both sending and destination countries. Our focus is on third country nationals, mainly of first generation, who are transnationally mobile:

- first generation migrants who may still be third country nationals or who may also have naturalised. They are migrants who are settled in their country of destination but who are transnationally mobile;
- return migrants: migrants who have returned to their country of origin after having lived abroad in one or more countries and who are transnationally mobile.

The ITHACA interviews aim at exploring the ways in which individual conditions of migrants and their wider household situation shape their transnational mobility. As such we inter alia explore:

---

4 While we do not exclude second generation migrants from our study they are not our primary focus. As we shall explain in the last section of this paper, we shall seek to capture transnational mobility that involves households/families and where both first and second generation migrants may be involved.
- Gender as well as family relations: who is where? (offspring, partner, dependents, wider familial connections);
- The length of residence in country of destination and country of origin;
- The residence status or access to citizenship;
- The educational and skills background;
- The type and conditions of occupation the individual is engaged in whether in the country of origin or of destination;
- Their socio-economic situation in their country of origin prior to migration and at present (i.e. whether they or their family own property, have a business, etc)
- And finally, the migrant’s life-cycle (i.e. the biographical phase a respondent is in) and whether there exists an expectation/plan of ‘return’.

A multidimensional approach for the individual level

Drawing from the empirical evidence and the methodological approaches for the study of the integration and transnationalism link at the individual level highlighted in the previous sections, we propose here a strategy for the use of micro data that will be gathered through the multi-sited fieldwork undertaken by the ITHACA research team in order to identify quantitative indicators of migrant integration and transnational mobility. This would allow us to complement the analyses on qualitative collected data with quantitative insights from the pooled interviews.

The Table below proposes a preliminary list of indicators which are relevant to the study of the two phenomena and which are available from the ITHACA interviews.

Table 4: Integration and Transnationalism indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Transnationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demographic indicators (controls):</td>
<td>Physical mobility:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Age, length of stay, family/HH</td>
<td>- number of visits to the CoO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structure in CoD and CoO</td>
<td>Virtual mobility:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural indicators:</td>
<td>- membership of a cultural, religious or development organization in the CoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Host country language proficiency</td>
<td>and/or of diaspora associations in the CoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Education indicators:</td>
<td>Mobility through transfers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>highest educational attainment,</td>
<td>- remittance transfers to the CoO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share of tertiary educated</td>
<td>- investments in the CoO (ownership of a property or an entrepreneurial activity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>among those aged 30-34 years,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>place of attainment of the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education level (CoD, CoO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural indicators:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Employment indicators: employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status, work intensity (part-time/full-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time), share of self-employment,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share of overqualified workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Social inclusion indicators:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>measures of income stability and/or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>level, share of property owners in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Active citizenship / residence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status: share of migrants that have</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acquired</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
citizenship, share of migrants with a long-term residence permit

These indicators and measures are suitable to grasp the multi-dimensional nature of the two phenomena and to test different hypotheses on the link between them. In particular, our multidimensional approach allows us to distinguish between different forms of integration and transnationalism:

- Which dimensions of integration matter most for the migrant to engage in transnational mobility?
- What kind of transnational mobility (physical, virtual or through transfer) is more affected by the level of integration in the usual region of residence of the migrant and in what direction?
- Which conditions in the country of origin, country of destination, or the migration corridor are relevant in encouraging or hindering transnational mobility?

Following the approach to transnationalism of Dekker and Siegel (2013), the three dimensions of transnational mobility can be defined as binary indicators and can contribute to the creation of a single, synthetic measure of overall transnational mobility. Hence, integration indicators can enter as independent variables in a regression to explain the variation observed in the binary indicators of transnational mobility (dependent variables).

Table 5 below shows the possible intersections and signs of the relationship for each single dimension of integration and transnational mobility, with the last column including a single, multidimensional index of transnational mobility which aggregates three different dimensions. Testing different empirical models allows multiple checks for robustness of findings and will help grasp stable results, results which are consistent with different regression specifications and variables’ definitions.

**Table 5: A multidimensional integration-transnational mobility matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Physical transnational mobility</th>
<th>Virtual transnational mobility</th>
<th>Mobility through transfers</th>
<th>Transnational mobility index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural integration</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural integration</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our study is exploratory and qualitative in character as there is no register or database where transnational mobility patterns of the kind that we are investigating here are registered or where we can identify a cohort of migrants that are transnationally mobile and hence, select from them through some sort of quantitative sampling. Therefore we have taken transnational mobility as our entry point to the study of the linkages between integration conditions and transnational mobility. We shall look for migrants who are transnationally mobile and will investigate their integration patterns and conditions. We shall also investigate their different types of transnational mobility and related economic activity and different types of
transfers that they do. This research strategy prevents from statistically checking causal inferences as to how different socio economic integration variables or specific individual features influence transnational mobility. However, it gives us a strong vantage entry point as it allows us to explore in depth and in a variety of countries and with a variety of migrant groups the phenomenon of transnational mobility and map the processes that lead to it.

Conditions affecting transnational mobility
Different legal, economic, social and political conditions are relevant in understanding when, why, and how migrants engage into transnational mobility for economic purposes. These conditions may concern the country of origin, the country of destination (or even another location), the migration corridor that links the two countries together, and the particular situation and socio-economic features of the migrant.

a. Conditions concerning the country of origin
Governmental and non-governmental actors from the countries of origin may influence transnational ties directly or indirectly through economic measures that aim to attract financial transfers and investments; through cultural initiatives that aim at maintaining or reviving cultural heritage; through political measures that aim at expanding the constituency; and through legal actions that aim at supporting their citizens’ rights. They may develop diaspora policies aimed at maintaining links with their populations outside their borders. Or, they may develop specific emigration policies that may encourage, restrict or limit outward migration, return migration and different forms of mobility (circular, seasonal, temporary or other). These come in the form of bilateral agreements with countries of settlement concerning employment visas, visa facilitation measures, agreements on recognition of qualifications or portability of rights, etc (see Unterreiner and Weinar 2014, 3–12).

Countries of origin may influence transnational engagement indirectly through developments that have nothing to do with migration per se. In effect, conditions in the homeland define migrants’ transnational engagement at different degrees and at different stages. Positive conditions in the country of origin – for instance social, economic or political transformations - may attract its nationals who have chosen to emigrate from their country to consider return or, they may attract some form of engagement with the homeland. In many cases, rapid economic growth may provide opportunities for entrepreneurial investment and the cases of China and India have become textbook examples testifying to this. Negative conditions, or deterioration in the countries socio-economic or politico-institutional situation may equally serve both as triggers (for instance in the form of political activism, or humanitarian assistance) or as obstacles to migrants’ transnational engagement.

In some cases, countries have introduced specific incentives to reach out, target and attract its emigrant population, to encourage return and/ or transnational engagement. Tax incentives for return migrants or for their investment from abroad have facilitated migrants’ decisions to pursue investments back home. Policies aimed at attracting and facilitating the transfer of remittances or even encouraging their investment into specific sectors may also influence decisions to (re)engage with the homeland. So far, for most migration-sending countries, the challenge has been to formulate appropriate policies that will facilitate the leveraging of remittances for development. Studies have shown that policies aimed at channelling remittances to specific
investments have had limited success. On the contrary, what seems more effective is to improve the overall investment climate in the country of origin and to encourage the use of banking channels (thereby enabling savings, investment and even access to credit based on remittance history) (Gropas 2013).

Facilitating the **portability of social, welfare or pension benefits** may be relevant. Even more so, the recognition of professional or academic qualifications acquired in third countries may also serve as an incentive, not only in terms of opening the labour market to nationals who have lived/ studied/ worked abroad, but also by particularly valorising the experience and expertise gained from ‘abroad’. This valorisation may be expressed by finding employment that corresponds to the skills (educational, professional) that they have acquired abroad, it may be expressed in financial terms, or in the form of social recognition (for instance invitations to participate in Advisory Boards in firms, NGOs, foundations, public sector organisations, etc.). Many countries have also engaged into a wide range of actions that tends to be referred to as **Diaspora policies**. These policies may include offering extended voting and participation rights to members of their diaspora, military duties and responsibilities, sponsoring language teaching in third countries, offering national curricula education in third countries, offering scholarships to second or third generation migrants, or other such policies that actively seek to maintain a link with the homeland or actively seek to ensure some sort of return (see Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013). Countries of origin may also pursue policies and initiatives that aim at the integration of their emigrants in third countries in the first instance, but which may eventually serve as feedback loops and channels through which to encourage their nationals to maintain links with their societies of origin and reinvest in them. For instance, origin countries may pursue **bilateral agreements with destination countries aimed at improving their migrants’ labour market insertion**, improving their language acquisition, or their vocational training, or encouraging dual citizenship (Nebiler et al 2013). These measures are intended to maximise the benefits of integrating in the society of settlement and improve the migration outcomes. This results in increasing the potential for their expatriates to accumulate human, social and economic capital. The remittances that will mostly likely be repatriated are not the only motivation behind such policies.

These policies do not need to be pursued by the state only. **Non-state institutions and organisations may also be active in reaching out to emigrant communities** in order to pursue economic or other interests. This has been typically the case of hometown associations in Mexico-USA migration. Commercial chambers, banks and financial institutions, real estate funds, NGOs, Churches, cultural foundations, media outlets are some actors that may be involved in triggering transnational engagement of emigrants. Just as important are ties and links with families in the homeland.

Moreover, **new technologies** have served to substantially transform the nature of interactions between diaspora groups/ emigrant communities, governmental and non-governmental organisations in origin and destination countries (Sheffer 2003). The ease of access, low-cost and extensive potential for outreach that new technologies, and mainly internet and social media networks, have offered have facilitated communication and interaction among local, regional, national and global NGOs and IGOs, and they have enabled the mobilisation of transnational resources and transfer of economic, cultural and political resources to unprecedented levels.
Finally, **changes in the political and wider security situation** in the country of origin may also affect migrants’ transnational activities. Political crises, instability and tense regional geopolitical developments may hinder or discourage migrants to engage in transnational activities with their country of origin, while at the same time they may trigger return migrants to re-establish links with prior places of residence in order to create additional alternatives and potential future exit strategies.

b. **Conditions in the country of destination**

Conditions in the country of settlement do not only shape migrants’ socio-economic and political integration; they may also influence individuals’ decisions to ‘exit’, to become ‘vocal’ and to express their ‘loyalty’ transnationally. They have the potential to influence outcomes and choices in both positive and negative ways thereby enhancing or hindering transnational mobility.

**General economic conditions in the country of destination may ‘push’ migrants to seek some sort of ‘return’ to their country of origin.** For instance, economic stagnation, recession or even crisis may lead migrants to seek economic opportunities elsewhere (and their country of origin is often the first place to look at). Similarly, at a more micro level, encountering a glass ceiling for further advancement or facing direct or indirect practices of discrimination and a generalised anti-immigrant climate may also lead migrants to seek opportunities elsewhere.

At the same time, however, **‘push’ factors for transnational mobility do not necessarily have a negative connotation.** On the contrary, there may be conditions and factors that facilitate, trigger or encourage migrants to engage in transnational activities, particularly of an economic nature. There may be institutions and organisations that are active in their outreach activities to promote links and relations with third countries (notably with the source countries) in order to pursue economic or other interests, such as commercial chambers, banks and financial institutions, NGOs. Or there may be a general entrepreneurial culture in the country of destination that views in a positive light and thereby rewards transnational or global activism and entrepreneurship. This could serve as a motivational factor for the migrant to engage with their country of origin not only because of the benefits s/he may reap there, but also for the social reward or upward mobility that s/he may experience in the country of destination if their transnational project is successful (in political or economic terms).

Finally, there are **legal and political conditions in the country of destination that may facilitate or hinder transnational activities.** The access that the country of destination provides to legal, long-term residence, citizenship and political participation, as well as inclusion in the welfare system is among these.

c. **Migration corridors**

Remittance research has highlighted the concept of ‘remittance corridors’. The World Bank in particular has referred to this for analysing remittance flows from one country of origin to one

---

specific country of destination through their Bilateral Remittances Corridor Analysis (see in particular Hernandez-Coss et al 2007). Remittance corridors are framed in three stages: the origination stage (decisions about amounts to be remitted and transfer mechanisms taking by migrants their host country), the intermediary stage (the actual transfer of the funds through different actors) and the last mile or distribution stage, when remittances arrive to their receivers. This is certainly a useful way to attempt to measure migrant transnational (financial) transfers.

As already referred to above, remittance data overall, including for most corridors is scarce and incomplete. There have been increasing efforts to gather relevant data from different sources: balance of payments data, data from central bank or other regulatory agencies, numbers reported by banks, other formal financial institutions or money transfer organizations to at least ‘capture’ the phenomenon between pairs of countries. However, even this only goes so far, as it is not able to measure the funds that are transferred through informal channels thereby really only capturing a slice of the phenomenon.

Moreover, the concept of a ‘corridor’ is slightly restrictive as it gives the impression that the ties between the country of origin and destination are quite rigid and introvert between the two places. This is obviously not the case as migrants and migrants’ communities of origin are not influenced by transnational ties between two nation-states only. The migrant may have migrated to a number of destinations and may be maintaining different kinds of links with each, and at the same time his/ her household, might maintain ties to individuals and societies in several other nation-states at the same time.

In spite of the shortcomings of the concept of a ‘corridor’ we consider that it does make sense to consider the connections that do exist between pairs of sending and receiving countries. The migration corridors that we intend to examine through the ITHACA case studies ‘pair’ together countries that have different kinds of migration history (longer and more recent), they include a wide variety of migration pathways (from the classic post-colonial migration pathway, to asylum and forced migration as a result of war, to circular migration and post-1989 East-West migration), and very different kinds of formal and informal bilateral relations. We intend to examine different migration corridors in order to examine whether and to what extent the conditions that tie specific pairs of countries together may be relevant for migrants’ transnational mobility and their economic activities.

d. Individual conditions
At present, ‘return’ is acknowledged as a much more fluid and multi-faceted concept, as in fact is migration. The shift away from thinking of migration and settlement in ‘permanent’ terms has shed light on different varieties of migration. Indeed, the repetition of the act of migration and its often periodic nature, has been documented in migration studies over the past three decades and has enriched the way migration is conceptualised to also include different forms of mobility. Serial and circular migration, temporary and seasonal migration, suitcase migration are some of the typologies that have been coined to map the various pathways of migration and mobility (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014).

In 1974, Cerase provided an early typology of the main reasons for which migrants return to their country of origin. Although in this project we only consider return migration in the case of
individuals who are active transnationally, Cerase’s typology offers a useful starting off point (Williams and Baláž 2008, 95) to delve deeper into the particular conditions that contribute to migrants’ decisions to engage in transnational mobility. He argued that return can be driven by:

- **failure**: the migrant returned because s/he did not manage to find a job or cope in the host country. In this case, the process of integration never really began or was very dysfunctional;
- **conservatism**: This is a planned move (often before the migration project begins) that is effected when the migrant has generated enough wealth or other capital to achieve his/her desired economic goals. In this case the migrants has been oriented towards the country of origin from the outset and throughout the experience of migration, thereby tending to experience very restricted forms of integration in the destination country;
- **retirement**; and what is often referred to as sunset migration;
- **innovation**: The migrant returns with the intention of being innovative, or perhaps on realisation that s/he has reached the limits of what can be achieved at the destination with the newly acquired skills and knowledge.

Virkama et al have suggested that transnational migration involves some changes in one’s social status. They have noted that when “migrating to another country, individuals need to renegotiate their status in the new host society, but their status also changes in the sending society” (Virkama et al. 2012, 90). In today’s interconnected world however, upward social mobility is not automatically achieved through an increasing consumption potential as was the case in past decades for instance. Moreover, given that migrants’ socio-cultural profiles are more diversified than in the past, and conditions in the countries of origin and destination are being impacted in dynamic ways by the effects of globalisation, the drivers of transnational mobility may be much more complex than those that have so far characterised return migration.

Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo (2005, 899–900) refer to empirical analysis undertaken on transnational engagement (specifically (Goldring 1998; Schiller and Fouron 1999; Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2002; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999) and have identified three explanations for transnational participation:

- **Linear transnationalism** is the continuation of pre-migration bonds across border, and based on these people send remittances, travel back home, and establish ethnic institutions in their country of destination to maintain links with their places of origin;
- **Resource-dependent transnationalism** occurs when migrants try to reconstitute their linkages with their country of origin once they have accumulated enough resources to be able to. Thus, transnationalism emerges with time when the accumulation of adequate resources enables migrants to engage in philanthropic or business projects in their country of origin and when they are able to turn the exchanges between the home and host societies to their advantage;
- **Reactive transnationalism** is the result of resources being negatively associated with cross-border ties. Transnational activities may be the result of frustration with occupational careers or the social status attained in the country of destination, so the migrant seeks to establish links with the country of origin where the results of their migration project may enjoy greater prestige/ opportunity.
We will dig into the empirical material that we are collecting through this project to examine these three explanations and identify the conditions and factors that impact the link between integration and transnational mobility at the individual level. In this, age and life-course stages at which emigration, return migration or re-return is decided and enacted are important factors to consider, as are gender and family obligations. Indeed, few studies have addressed these issues in the past (Schunck 2011; Levitt 2003). Level of education, knowledge of the language(s) of the country of origin, access to citizenship (and therefore access to dual citizenship), level of wealth, access to political connections are also considered defining conditions.

We also aim at exploring the selectivity effect in migrants’ transnational engagement. It has been widely documented that individuals with high human capital tend to migrate more and extensive research has been conducted on migrants’ agency in their migration project. It is interesting to therefore consider the determinants that trigger transnational engagement. Motivations for transnational mobility may differ widely. Also resources that are mobilised, the ways in which they are mobilised, and to what intent they are mobilised may differ just as much. In effect, some migrants are ‘pioneers’ in the sort of transnational activities they become engaged in, while others may be ‘followers’ attempting to repeat the success stories of others. Some are successful in the transfers that they make, and others less so; some do act as agents of change while others do not. We aim to identify the conditions or the particular characteristics that lead to these categories and understand the sort of transfers that are made in either case. In short, we will examine migrants’ intentionality and agency in order to understand the drivers of their transnational mobility.

Theories of return migration offer valuable insight in our effort to identify the macro and micro factors and conditions that may impact the dynamics of transnational engagement. Although we do not offer a thorough critical review of these theories in this paper, we consider it useful to highlight some interpretations and perspectives of return migration here in order to map out the full range of potentially relevant factors. Turning to neoclassical economics first, their focus is on wage differentials between receiving and sending countries as well as migrants’ expectations for higher earnings in the host countries. Return migration is considered as the outcome of failed migration that did not yield the expected benefits (i.e. their human capital was not rewarded as expected) and therefore an anomaly as migration is intended to be permanent (Cassarino 2004, 255–256). On the contrary, new economics of labour migration views return migration as the outcome of a ‘calculated strategy’ which occurs when the individual’s or the household’s goals have been achieved. As such, it happens as a result of a successful experience. Skills and savings are gathered in the host society with the aim to send remittances back home and eventually return and accomplish upward socio-economic and professional advancement. Structural approaches to return migration on their part emphasise context, i.e. the social and institutional factors in the home country. These influence migrants’ decisions (or expectations) to return and determine the extent to which returnees have the capacity to innovate or act as agents of change. Interestingly, they also influence migrants’ integration in the society of settlement (Cassarino 2004, 262). As regards social network theory, this approach underlines the linkages and regular exchanges that migrants have with their former places of settlement; these linkages are part of the migrant’s social capital that is paramount to his/her ability to return.
These different perspectives mentioned in brief here are useful at highlighting various dimensions of transnational mobility and the conditions that may define its forms and its outcomes. However, the diversity in scope and in intensity that characterises transnational mobility suggests that we need to revisit the various facets of this phenomenon and take into account new variables to explain:

- under what circumstances do migrants engage in transnational mobility;
- in what ways does their integration in the society of settlement influence this engagement;
- what sort of transfers are being made;
- and in what ways are the particular characteristics of each migration corridor relevant for the link between integration and transnational mobility.
References


