The Ideological Scramble for Africa

The US, Ghanaian, French and British Competition for Africa's Future, 1953-1963

Frank Gerits

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization of the European University Institute

Florence, November, 2014 (defence)
European University Institute
Department of History and Civilization

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For Dorien
Thesis Abstract

The ideological scramble for Africa tells the story of an international competition between the US, France, Ghana and the UK. Against the background of rising Soviet interests, these countries worked to convince leaders and peoples in Sub-Saharan Africa of their pan-African, capitalist and imperial plans. Between 1953 and 1963, Africa’s position in the international system was not primarily determined by the struggle between the USSR and the US. African leaders did not simply play off the Cold war superpowers against each other to extract gains. Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Ghana, projected his own pan-African ideology to other parts of the continent.

What was at stake in this scramble were the so-called ‘minds’ of African peoples. Nkrumah blamed colonialism for instilling non-white populations with an inferiority complex, while policy makers in the West drew on the insights of ethno-psychology to argue that underdevelopment was a psychological problem. To develop men into the modern mindset or, conversely, to create an ‘African Personality’, policymakers relied on education and information media.

When other African statesmen were unwilling to support Ghana’s pan-African vision, Nkrumah’s public discourse became more stridently anticolonial, in an attempt to mobilise the African general public. With the atrocities of the Congo crisis in mind, President John F. Kennedy and the Europeans began to see anticolonial nationalism as an emotional response to the tensions that came out of the modernisation process. Western officials therefore decided to modernise the socio-economic structures of ‘emerging’ societies, since psychological modernisation had failed.

Those shifting views on African development profoundly influenced the way in which the Bandung Conference, the Suez Crisis, the independence of Ghana, the Sahara atomic bomb tests and the Congo crisis were understood. As a whole, this analysis presents a sharp departure from a narrative in which non-Western actors are depicted as subaltern agents who can only resist or utilise Cold War pressures. It seeks to address the broader question of why pan-Africanism ultimately failed to become a fully developed interventionist ideology, capable of rivalling communist and capitalist proscriptions for African development.
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Acknowledgements

As I was sitting in the back of a tro tro van (a Ghanaian minibus that travels between different cities) and the bus passed the monkeys who went on a scavenger hunt for garbage ejected from car windows, I began to wonder: how did I end up here? What was an international historian doing on the road from Accra to Elmina? What did my new friends, ‘real’ Africanists, think of a parvenu with no real knowledge of African political and social structures? However, as time passed I found myself asking those questions less and less. I found out that Ghana, and Africa for that matter, is much more connected to the world than generations of teachers had led me to believe. Accra, like other urban centres in Africa, is a place where you can purchase anything: a dictaphone to do an interview with a retired diplomat, a photo camera, or a piece of French toast. Akwabaa souvenirs are also made in China. By the end of the trip I felt vindicated: the premise of my research project, that an African country could be the protagonist of an international history, was not only a compelling perspective, but also one that could explain the continent’s position in the international system.

As I struggled to convert the result of my excavations in the archives into a coherent historical analysis, many colleagues, friends, archivists, librarians and outstanding academics in the field came to my aid. First and foremost, I have to thank my supervisor, Federico Romero. His professionalism, subtle wit and keen analytical eye are unmatched. It is not hard to see why he is held in such high regard in Italy and beyond. Even when he became the head of the history department he remained closely involved with my work as well as the writing of his other doctoral students. My external supervisor, Idesbald Goddeeris, deserves my special thanks because he encouraged me many years ago to start a doctorate. He also motivated me to go to the European University Institute (EUI), while he continued to offer support from Leuven. Dirk Moses acted as my second reader. His ability to accurately deconstruct chapters and improve my writing has proven to be invaluable. I am grateful that Sue Onslow, a world authority in the field of South Africa and Rhodesia studies, has agreed to join my doctoral examination.

It will come as no surprise that international and transnational research agendas require considerable resources. I am therefore grateful for the grants I received from the European Association of American Studies, the Fondation Biermans-Lapôtre, the American Studies Association of Norway, the Kluge Centre and the EUI.
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I am extremely lucky to have a close group of friends who have kept me grounded and stuck by me even when I was not able to make it to our gatherings. When the Paris archives closed unexpectedly in my first year, Wim Paulissen, Stijn Sillen and Wout Vandelaer picked
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Finally, this dissertation is dedicated to Dorien Styven. She puts up with my constant urge to explore archives and incessant need to question every aspect of the past and present. While doing groundbreaking work at the Kazerne Dossin Memorial and Museum in Mechelen, she has also found the time to proofread chapters and encourage and support me. It is because of her that I am able to do what I do. Without her unconditional love I would be a shadow of a man. Without her the past four years would have been a waste of time.
The Ideological Scramble for Africa
Abbreviations

AAPC  All-African Peoples’ Conference
AEF  Afrique équatoriale française/federation of French Equatorial Africa
AF  Alliance Française
AFP  Agence France-Presse
Amcon  American consulate
AMAE  Archives ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris
Amembassy  American embassy
ANC  African National Congress
AOF  Afrique occidentale française/federation of French West Africa
AWF  Ann Whitman File
BAA  Bureau of African Affairs
BBC  British Broadcast Corporation
BDEE  British Documents on the End of Empire
CAOM  Centre des archives d’outre-mer
CCTA  Combined Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara
CENIS  Center for International Studies, Harvard
CHAN  Centre historique des archives nationales, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine Cedex, Paris
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CIAS  Conference of Independent African States
CID  Centre d’information et de documentation du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi
CIS  Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
COI  Central Office of Information
CPP  Convention’s People’s Party
CRO  Commonwealth Relations Office
DA  Direction Amérique
DAL  Direction Afrique-Levant
DAM  Direction des affaires Africaines et Malgaches
DAO  Direction de l'Asie et de l'Océanie
DDEL  Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
DGACT  Direction générale des affaires culturelles et techniques
DGRC  Direction générale des relations culturelles
FLN  Front de Libération National/National Liberation Front
FNSP  Fondation nationale des sciences politiques
FO  Foreign Office
FOA  Foreign Operations Administration
FRUS  Foreign Relations of the United States
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GBP  British Pound
GPRA  Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic/Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne
IBS  USIA Information Broadcasting Service
ICA  International Cooperation Administration
IPD  Information Policy Department
IRD  International Research Department
JFK  John Fitzgerald Kennedy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JFKL</td>
<td>John F. Kennedy Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNII</td>
<td>Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSE</td>
<td>London School of Economics</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAE</td>
<td>Ministère des affaires étrangères</td>
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<tr>
<td>Memcon</td>
<td>Memorandum of conversation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Mouvement National Congolais</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSRC</td>
<td>Moorland-Spingarn Research Center at Howard University</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives and Records Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North-Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLM</td>
<td>National Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Security Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo/Opération des Nations Unies au Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti Communiste Français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Padmore Library, Accra, Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Public Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRAAD</td>
<td>Public Records Archives and Administration Department, Accra, Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Rassemblement Démocratique Africain</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.d.</td>
<td>Sine dato/without date</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDECE</td>
<td>Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage/Service for Foreign Information and Counterespionage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StateDept</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives, Kew, London, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAM</td>
<td>Union africaine et malgache</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKIO</td>
<td>United Kingdom Information Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>United States Information Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
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<td>WH Office</td>
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Illustration 1: A map of Africa that divides the continent into different ‘reception areas’. The map was used by the NATO ad-hoc study group on broadcasts to Africa South of the Sahara in 1961. Source: NATO Confidential Document, AC/201 (A) D/3, “The Ad Hoc Study Group: Broadcasts to Africa (South of the Sahara): Note by the Portuguese Delegation”, 29 August 1961, E2/853/1 NATO Study Group Africa, BBC-Archives.
Introduction

An Africa-Centred International History.

The journey was much too swift. I should probably have stayed twice as long in each place.

— D.A. Roberts, an official of the British International Research Department, during his Africa trip in 1960.

It is the night of 17 January 1961. In the bush of Katanga, the secessionist province of the former Belgian Congo, Patrice Lumumba is pushed in front of a tree and shot. As the headlights of the cars that lit the execution site blare out, Frans Verscheure, a white Belgian police inspector, Julien Gat, the Flemish head of the military policy and two other white service men order the African soldiers to bury him together with the bodies of Maurice Mpoko and Joseph Okito, two party militants of the Mouvement national congolais (MNC). Lumumba — a postal clerk turned politician — had been ousted as prime minister by President Joseph Kasavubu, on 5 September 1960. When Lumumba in turn fired Kasavubu, a political crisis was created amidst riots, ethnic tensions and secession which prompted Joseph-Désiré Mobutu to stage his first military coup.

This transition to independence became an international crisis. As the blood of Lumumba and his supporters soaked the humid soil of the bush ten kilometers outside of Elizabethville, the Belgians, the Americans and — reportedly — Baroness Park of Monmouth at MI6 could file away their assassination plans. The Belgian Operation L and the hiring of a Greek assassin, named Georges, in September 1960, coincided with the landing of Sidney Gottlieb, a doctor employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who carried a toxin that could generate an indigenous disease. The CIA field officer, Lawrence Devlin, knew his guest had received orders from the director, Allen Dulles, who in the National Security Council (NSC) had characterised Lumumba as a ‘Castro or worse.’ President Dwight D. Eisenhower also muttered that he wished Lumumba would ‘fall into a river full of crocodiles.’

1 Secret report, D.A. Roberts to FO, “Information Work in West Africa”, 5 August 1960, 1, INF 12/1338, TNA.
He was committed to keeping the troops of the United Nations (UN) ‘in the Congo even if [...] such action was used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight.’

Why did the Congo attract so much attention? Why was Eisenhower willing to be dragged into a possible proxy war with the Soviet Union in a part of the world that had – according to his critics and historians – never before captured the attention of this prudent president? Africa in the 1950s offered little political or military gain, there had been no African counterpart to the Berlin crisis, communism and Soviet intrusion were considered to be a minor threat while a policy in support of the colonial powers could mean the loss of anticolonial leaders’ support, and backing African nationalism could alienate the European partners. And yet, Lumumba was suddenly considered to be a threat to continental and international stability.

To understand Lumumba’s assassination we must look beyond the Cold War and consider the role of African leaders and the multi-centric nature of Africa’s international history after 1945. Lumumba’s flaming indictment of Belgian colonialism in his independence day speech and his inability to halt the rioting on top of a constitutional crisis, triggered dormant fears about what might happen if the continent went without imperial guidance. In the 1950s the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah and the Americans had already turned to public diplomacy as a way to make the transition process fit their goals. Their use of pamphlets, newspapers and education as modernisation instruments generated an ideological competition that forced France and Britain to rethink the way in which they used their former colonial management tools.

The day after Lumumba’s execution, local miners stumbled upon an arm protruding from the soil. With the Congo at the centre of global attention, the conspirators acted quickly. The bodies were hacksawed into pieces, dissolved in acid and other remains burned. What the flames could not consume, however, was the symbolic value of this African leader. An internal report of the United States Information Agency (USIA) – the American institution responsible fore public diplomacy – described how the ‘Lumumba symbol’ was used by the ‘so-called “radical” African countries (the Casablanca group) which claim to be the voice of the future’. When reports about Lumumba’s murder hit the press stands, riots broke out in

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Accra as Nkrumah made an emotional radio speech about the threat of neocolonial infiltration. For the French, who were preoccupied with the propaganda coming from Radio Cairo and the Algerian Front de Libération National (FLN), and the British who were waging a psychological war of their own against the Mau Mau in Kenya, Lumumba’s rise to the status of anticolonial symbol was an unwelcome development.⁶ Viewed as a hero by some, a Communist and a demagogue by others, and above all a threat to stability and murdered in the ‘year of Africa,’ Congo’s first prime minister embodied Africa’s new engagement with the international system, a relation that was highly symbolic.

At the heart of this thesis is an attempt to explain how a continent captivated by postcolonial problems in the 1950s became a Cold War arena from the mid-1960s onwards. Specifically, why was pan-Africanism overtaken by the Cold War ideologies? International historians stress that the salient feature of the Cold War outside of Europe was the violent and interventionist nature of modernisation programmes, while Africanists view the Cold War as a static, realist element that crushed emancipatory aspirations and alternative political projects.⁷ However, in Africa proxy wars only became vital in the 1970s. The shifting views of liberationist thinkers and modernisation theorists on the psychological and cultural impact of colonialism and modernisation characterised the preceding era between 1945 and 1963.

The symbolic dimension of decolonisation was heightened mainly because emerging countries in Africa and the Third World could not ‘indulge in power politics’ but had to rely on ‘moral and political strength’ as Sukarno, the leader of Indonesia, phrased it at the Bandung Conference of 1955.⁸ Africa became the target of an ideological scramble.

This introduction defines the concepts that sustain the argument of an ideological scramble, outlines the principal research questions in relation to the historiography, makes a case for the multi-centric approach and the Africa-centred perspective and presents the archival sources on which the following eight chapters are based.

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⁸ Memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, “Subject: Bandung Conference of April, 1955”, 12 May 1955, 3-4, OCB Central File Series, WH Office, NSC Staff Papers 1948-1961, Box 86, f: OCB 092.3 (File #2) (2) [April-November 1955], DDEL.
Key Concepts

Conceptualising Africa’s post-war international history as an ‘ideological scramble’ for hearts and minds enables us to think about Africa not just as a Cold War problem, but as a ‘crowded house’ with many different actors who had diverging interpretations of Africa’s international issues. Some key concepts such as the ideological scramble itself, but also psychological modernisation, cultural assistance, informational diplomacy, public diplomacy, pan-Africanism, decolonisation, Third World and Cold War are defined in this section.

Unlike the scramble of the 1880s, the ideological scramble was not a European competition to carve up the continent, but an international struggle between the USSR, the US, France, Ghana and the UK to convince African leaders and peoples of their plans for the future. As cultural centres multiplied, the United States Information Agency, the British Information Policy Department (IPD) and the Direction générale des relations culturelles (DGRC) did not only focus on their target audience but were also forced to contain ‘the unfriendly propaganda of our friends.’ President John F. Kennedy was told that the ‘people who call themselves our allies’ did the greatest damage to the American image.

In the Third World, and particularly in Africa, public diplomacy was employed to foster what was called psychological modernisation. Social psychologists like Talcott Parsons developed techniques to draw men and women into the modern mindset. Parsonian theory was related to the reception of European social theory in the US and had its origins in academic debates of the 1920s and 1930s, a time when classic ethnography began applying psychiatric and psychological theories to analyse the so-called ‘native mind’. Consequently, the influential Harvard Department of Social Relations approached modernisation as a process that affected entire societies.

Yet, in 1957 Walt W. Rostow and Max F. Milikan did away with this attention for developmental psychology, claiming values could be instilled more effectively through ‘programs of common action.’ People would gain confidence by seeing new factories, better farming methods and improved health care facilities. Improving the social, political and economic structures as well as the ability of poorer nations to absorb investments was crucial. This division between psychological modernisation and socio-economic modernisation is

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9 Reid uses the term but upholds the idea that the continent became a Cold War battleground in the 1950s, see Richard J. Reid, *A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 293.
presented here as a fundamental break in Africa’s international history. Nonetheless, the idea that underdevelopment was at its core a psychological problem remained influential.\textsuperscript{12}

The endurance of ethno-psychology allowed the settlers in Algeria and Kenya to explain away violent resistance as the symptom of a mental disorder.\textsuperscript{13} This psychological conception of modernisation theory, the liberation from the backwardness of tradition and the convergence with the social practices and living standards of the West, was also part of the French imperial ideology, which saw its colonial subjects as potential ‘black Frenchmen’ a status that could be attained by assimilating the French language and culture. Local populations and French officials, however, approached those cultural tools as instruments to climb the social ladder.\textsuperscript{14} Parallel to shifting modernisation paradigms, the French replaced ‘assimilation’ — which aspired to substitute African cultures with French culture — with ‘association’ in which France and Africa became partners for development. British indirect rule made civilizational ideology less explicit, but in practice the British shouldered the ‘white man’s burden’ through education in schools such as Achimota in Ghana.\textsuperscript{15}

As the world of empires gave way to a postcolonial order, cultural assistance and informational diplomacy, jointly referred to as public diplomacy became vital in dealing with so-called ‘transitional’ societies. Public diplomacy has been defined as ‘an international actor’s attempt to conduct its foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics’. It also included cultural diplomacy, an interaction with the public that relies on exhibitions, art and theatre rather than pamphlets, radio and film.\textsuperscript{16} ‘Cultural assistance’ employs those media to

\begin{footnotes}
speed up the psychological modernisation process, rather than win the Cold War although those aims could not be rigorously separated. When USIA operatives and British Council officials debated the rationale behind their joint English language programme, they concluded that English could be considered ‘a neutral skill (aid programs)’ as well as ‘a vehicle of cultural projection (information programs).’

In practice, cultural assistance was never clearly defined. Eisenhower referred to the term in a speech in 1956 as helping the new states, ‘with their ancient culture’, in spreading education. The Central Office of Information (COI) made an attempt at a definition only in 1961, by distinguishing between bilateral aid and technical assistance. The financial aid enabling a country to purchase capital items had to be distinguished from the latter term, the training of personnel. Moreover, by 1961 the COI – unlike the British Council – saw the offering of a radio transmitter not as a way to generate gratitude, but as a means to facilitate the COI’s influence over content. Conversely, cultural assistance, foreign aid and information were inextricably linked in France, leading to confusing conversations. When Roger Seydoux, the French director of cultural affairs explained to the director of the British Information Research Department (IRD), Ralph Murray, that he was responsible for cultural and technical assistance, Murray responded that ‘technical assistance fell outside his purview’ even though their tasks were the same.

Pan-Africanism rejected the claims of psychological modernisation. Historically, pan-Africanism refers to a conscious movement that began at the end of the nineteenth century among men and women of African descent and has embraced at particular times both abstract ideas of the cultural and ‘racial’ unity of all peoples of African descent, as well as a drive for continental unification. Although it embraced specific movements, such as Garveyism,

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Books, 2010), 4–5; Nicholas J. Cull: “Public Diplomacy’ Before Gullion: The Evolution of A Phrase”, 18 April 2006. http://usepublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/060418_public_diplomacy_.before_gullion_the_evolution_of_a_phrase/) explains how the ‘earliest use of the phrase ‘public diplomacy’ to surface is actually not American at all but in a leader piece from The Times in January 1956. It is used merely as a synonym for civility in a piece criticizing the posturing of President Franklin Pierce. The modern meaning of the term ‘public diplomacy’ was coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a distinguished retired foreign service officer, when he established an Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy; A further distinction can be made with cultural diplomacy.


particular individuals like W.E.B. Du Bois and events like the Pan-African Congresses, it became a political ideology when it was adopted by the newly independent state of Ghana.  

Decolonisation is defined here as a process whereby a formal power relation between the colonial powers and indigenous political elites was exchanged for a range of possible futures. In the 1970s and 1980s optimism about the opportunities that came with flag independence was overtaken by dependency theory, a model that posited a wealthy centre and a dependent poor periphery. It has led evaluations of African decolonisation to cohere around two positions. Scholars, like Mahmood Mamdani and Basil Davidson argue that the culture of authoritarianism, which came with the indirect colonial rule, was perpetuated after independence. Others, like Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, maintain that colonialism was unable to change the African social and political structures, making the Western nation state model unstable after independence. Decolonisation, as Frederick Cooper has noted, also allowed colonisers to shed obligations and avoid colonial subjects’ claims to citizenship. Todd Shepard further argues that decolonisation reshaped the West. The term gained currency at the end of the Algerian War, when the French state failed to convince people in its territories to identify themselves as French. De Gaulle and France began defining decolonisation as the tide of history and in that way ended the relative colour blindness of French republicanism. After 1962, Algerians of ‘Muslim origin’ could no longer be ‘European’ or ‘French’. Decolonisation was thus a complex two way process of change that affected the international system.

Frantz Fanon’s definition of the Third World as a project that consciously rejected the notion that non-whites were unfit for self-government is vital here. The concept of the Third World – Tiermondisme – came into existence in the 1950s. The French demographer Alfred

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Sauvy launched the term when he made an analogy with the so-called ‘third estate’ to refer to the poor and populous areas of the world. Adopted by French journalists, it was quickly redefined by Fanon and used at the Bandung conference because of its ability to create coherence among the poor, non-white and uncommitted areas of the globe. The intellectual debate about the meaning of the Third World resurfaced in the 1970s. In the Anglophone world, Immanuel Wallenstein rejected the term and argued that there was only one ‘world system’ with a dominating capitalist centre and semiperipheries. In France, Claude Liauzu wrote about how, by the 1980s, the term had become a symbol for New Left students who wanted to advance their own cause.26 The Third World was not solely created through superpower intervention, but also wielded as a symbolic weapon.27

Alternatively, the attempts to write African American internationalism into Cold War historiography in order to conceptualise the post-war era as the age of international race relations has done little to inform us about the international history of Africa after 1945. While convincing in its effort to analyse how Afro-American activists tried to internationalise their struggle for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s, the writings of Jim Meriwether and Gerda Plummer remain accounts of a transnational civil rights struggle, not US foreign policy towards Africa.28

The views of civil rights activists in the US should not be confused with how others saw the world. The claim that African-American views of Ghana motivated Eisenhower to develop a policy towards Africa is not supported by the sources.29 Further, the focus on race narrows the possible range of international interactions, while paternalism is often cited to explain inaction on the part of American policy makers leaving many questions unanswered. Moreover, American officials on the ground in Africa were more concerned with education than with the impact of US segregation. American decision making towards the emerging


27 Global Cold War historians acknowledge the diverse origins of the Third World concept, but see its political importance only in relation to the Cold War, see Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 111; McMahon, “Introduction”, 3.


29 Grimm makes this claim by showing how African-American activists petitioned Eisenhower. However, he never mentions a response, nor does he show how and when Eisenhower took civil rights into account: Kevin E. Grimm, “Gazing Toward Ghana: African American Agency in the Eisenhower Administration’s Relations with Africa”, *Journal of Contemporary History* 48, no. 3 (July 1, 2013): 578–96.
African nations therefore has to be considered within the larger sweep of the international history of the twentieth century and the Cold War.

The Cold War was a term introduced by George Orwell in 1945 to criticise the state of undeclared war between the US and USSR. Intense debate about its origins has been replaced by an effort to define its conceptual limits. The Cold War is considered to be a project, a period and an international system. For Anders Stephanson the Cold War was a US project. The Cold War was the manner in which the US reversed isolationist tendencies and engaged international politics.\(^8\) Odd Arne Westad’s *Global Cold War* makes the case for a pluralist conception of the conflict: the Cold War as the spread of US and Soviet-centred concepts of development, which fuelled a global war of ideas. For Westad, the Cold War is a period between 1945 and 1991 in which the US and the USSR dominated international affairs, but it is also an international system that was exported to the Third World where local conflicts intensified because of it.\(^9\) Federico Romero, by contrast, limits the Cold War to a conflict that was ultimately about Europe, the only area where the prospect of superpower war was plausible.\(^10\)

Westad’s view of the Cold War as a clash of two interventionist ideologies is analytically valuable, but runs the risk of becoming a catch-all label for every international event of the twentieth century. It is important to stress that if the history of colonialism is not the history of development, as Cooper writes, it is also true that the Cold War and interventions to promote a different model of society are not the same. When we accept Westad’s definition of intervention, ‘a concerted state-led effort by one country to determine the political direction of another country’, it is clear that revolutions in Africa were not just Soviet-inspired or US-sponsored.\(^11\) France, the UK, Ghana and Egypt were all eager to influence the direction of African countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Pan-Africanism or Pan-Arabism might have been less universalist, but it was not less interventionist. On the ground they were ranked besides communism or capitalism and not understood in solely racial terms, but viewed as alternative models.

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It is therefore productive to think about the Cold War in line with the literary study perspective as one – admittedly important – mode of knowing that shaped the way reality was understood and analysed.\(^3\) The Cold War was not simply an international system that hatched in Europe and was exported to the Third World. Its foray into an area that was wary of intervention and keen on keeping the Cold War out of its territories required the superpowers to constantly negate that they were waging Cold War, something that profoundly influenced the battle for hearts and minds. The Cold War was present in the background, but actors were preoccupied with more immediate concerns.

**Historiography and Research Questions**

This analysis is an attempt to break away from a Cold War understanding of postwar Africa by rethinking agency and Africa’s position in the international history of the 1950s and 1960s. Specifically, Ghanaian and other African diplomats are presented here as the central historical agents, while the developments which affected the continent are understood as the outcome of a multi-centric interaction between the French, the British, the Ghanaians and the Americans, rather than the result of a Cold War encounter between East and West.

The focus on Nkrumah’s Ghana stems not only from the fact that it was the first African colony with an African prime minister that gained its independence in the 1950s, but more importantly that it had an interventionist ideology of its own: pan-Africanism. With it, Ghana determined the parameters of inter-African diplomacy and how other African leaders on the continent interacted with the wider Cold War world.

Two questions structure the narrative and recur in each of the eight chapters. First, what was the aim of public diplomacy within the different strategic blueprints for Africa? Second, what was the most effective way to influence so-called ‘African’ attitudes, according to the practitioners? The answers to these questions engage writing on the global Cold War, African decolonisation, the history of public diplomacy and the literature on cultural transfer and Americanisation.

The Global Cold War and African Agency

An Africa-centred perspective challenges a global Cold War narrative in which Sub-Saharan Africa is still approached as a ‘heart of darkness’, located outside of the normal dealings of diplomacy. Admittedly, the study of the history of South Africa and Rhodesia has generated a complex and nuanced literature in which the interaction between white settler governments, local African populations and international actors is studied closely. The scholarship on Sub-Saharan Africa has lagged behind.

Overall, international historians have written about the continent’s relation to the Cold War in three ways. The groundbreaking work of Odd Arne Westad and the insightful analysis of Heonik Kwon deal with the broader Third World and remain close to the subaltern resistance narrative. They argue that the US and the USSR were ideologically driven to prove the superiority of their social models and in that way perpetuated and exacerbated ongoing violent civil wars. A second group of historians and journalists argue that the Soviet threat enabled the colonial powers to retain their empire. Jason Parker has argued that the link between the Cold War and anticolonial resistance was more complex. He distinguishes two stages: an early repressive period from 1945 to 1955 characterised by a crackdown on the new states and the progressive-internationalist projects of the civil rights movement and a post-Bandung phase in which the Cold War rivalry accelerated the demands and the American recognition of self-rule, as shown by Suez, Ghanaian independence and Little Rock.

A third group of studies has emphasised that postcolonial diplomats were not mere pawns or proxies in the Cold War game. The work of Elizabeth Schmidt, Matthew Connelly and Salim Yaqub has presented postcolonial leaders, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sékou Touré or Ahmed Ben Bella, as realists who are not driven by ideological conviction, but exploit the only weak spot of the Western powers, namely the fact that their foreign policy...
was shaped by Cold War ideology. The ability of Third World leaders to harness the Cold War and appropriate ideological discourses in an attempt to maximise its potential benefits has thus been acknowledged.

At the same time, however, non-Western actors remain subaltern in character. They engage the rest of the world on Cold War terms and are only able to resist or utilise Cold War pressures. The agency of Third World actors is narrowed to harnessing ‘the dominant international reality of their age, the Cold War, to maximize potential benefits.’ Ghana is solely seen as a target, even though Ghanaian diplomats unfolded a public diplomacy operation that had to project the idea of African unity to other parts of the continent. What the perspective of the global Cold War obscures is how Nkrumah’s project competed with and impacted upon the Western blueprints for the continent. Even Matthew Connelly, who makes a case for removing the Cold War lens, writes about an Algerian FLN that worked to exploit Cold War tensions as well as every other international rivalry that offered potential leverage. While Jeffrey Byrne’s work looks more closely at the ways in which Ben Bella and Houari Boumediene worked out a separate socialist ideology the Algerian project remained national. In Byrne’s analysis, African nativist ideologies, such as pan-Africanism, relied for their substance on Leninism and Marxism, which he sees as quintessential Cold War ideas.

Historians have thus cracked open the bipolar world and have come to use post-colonial studies not only as a source of inspiration, but have also criticised it for its dismissal of an historical narrative, international historians are still unable to see African leaders and other postcolonial diplomats as independent actors on the international stage. The subaltern

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42 Connelly, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization”, 239, 222.


44 Dane Kennedy famously called upon the historians of decolonisation to integrate postcolonial theory in a critical way into their work, see Dane Kennedy, “Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory”, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 24, no. 3 (1996): 345–63.
resistance narrative persists, which is problematic because it flattens the complex strategies that diplomats from (former-) colonies pursued. The possibility that African action might actually alter the significance of the Cold War for Africa is underestimated.\textsuperscript{45}

\textit{The History of Decolonisation, African Studies and Multi-Centric History}

While paying more attention to the agency of African leaders can help us better understand the events that make up the international history of Africa, the multi-centric approach allows us to refine the connection between the developments on the continent and the international environment. Recent work in African studies by scholars such as Jean Allman and Frederick Cooper has paid sustained attention to transnational networks and the role of imagined political futures beyond the nation state.\textsuperscript{46} Nonetheless, those alternative African projects are considered to be inevitably flawed due to their susceptibility to the machinations of the Cold War. The question with which Africanists grapple is how radical pan-African experimentation could persist despite the damaging effects of the Cold War. Even Frederic Cooper – whose subtle writing informs much of the scholarship – argues that outside powers could ‘either provide the sustenance an unpopular regime needed or sponsor alternatives’ – a pattern set by the ‘American and Belgian action against Patrice Lumumba.’\textsuperscript{47}

This realist understanding of the international system which excludes the continent itself, is widely accepted by Africanist scholars.\textsuperscript{48} The field of African studies finds itself divided between afro-optimists\textsuperscript{49}, who see the continent’s potential wasted by incompetent

\textsuperscript{45} I paraphrase Cooper who made this point for colonial and post-colonial history, see Frederick Cooper, “Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History”, in \textit{The Decolonization Reader}, ed. James D. Le Sueur (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 28.


\textsuperscript{47} Cooper, “Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective”, 187.

\textsuperscript{48} ‘Until the Cold War ended in the later 1980s, foreign aid gave African rulers extensive patronage at very little cost in dependence’, see John Iliffe, \textit{Africans: The History of a Continent}, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 271.

leaders, and afro-pessimists, who argue that Africa’s exceptional link with poverty and corruption eroded its potential for unification.⁵⁰ In Nkrumah’s case, the gap between ideals and reality has been explained by blaming him personally or by pointing to his lack of qualified advisers. In recent years however, Nkrumah has acquired the reputation of a charismatic leader whose radical pan-African experiment was thwarted by the pressures of the Cold War.

Moreover, as Stephen Ellis points out, African historians are generally more interested in commentary about present day Africa which can accompany an accurate description of the past. A resistance narrative remains popular in a context where many historical essays are seen less as the product of academic labor and valued more as expressions of nostalgia or tragedy.⁵¹ Paradoxically, Africanist scholarship and African history can therefore not adequately explain the international positions that were taken by a first generation of African leaders who saw the world through an anticolonial, rather than a Cold War lens. Nkrumah was not only preoccupied with jet propelling Ghanaian society into modernity, but also worked to project pan-African ideas abroad.

This work seeks to demonstrate how the literature on African studies and the global Cold War could engage in a more constructive dialogue and attempts to address certain questions that have gone unanswered as a consequence of the disregard for African agency and the multi-centric nature of change.

**Public Diplomacy as Strategy: a Comparative Approach**

The widely shared commitment to cultural assistance exerted a profound influence on the direction of the overall strategy for Africa, particularly in the areas of foreign aid and the sustenance of authoritarian regimes. Close examination of the evidence rejects the idea that public diplomacy is a separate section of foreign policy governed by its own logic,⁵² or that it

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was solely a means of disguising state interference. Neither can public diplomacy be viewed as simply another diplomatic instrument to project influence through controlled cultural exchange. The analysis of public diplomacy as a development tool in Africa provides us with a powerful perspective that can address the contradictions in the scholarship on American, French, British and Ghanaian policies towards sub-Saharan Africa.

In the case of the US, Eisenhower emerges not as a cynical president who ignored Africa whilst having a coherent psychological strategy for Europe. On the contrary, providing education to the Third World allowed Eisenhower to act in ways that reconciled his long-term aim of global stability and his short-term willingness to be ‘on the side of the natives for once’ For the president, the direct communist threat took a back seat to paternalistic concerns about leadership skills, a claim that is advanced in the first chapter.

The way in which the Kennedy administration approached public diplomacy towards Africa elucidates how an appreciation for public opinion and a downgrade of the United States Information Agency to a polling institution could go together. Moreover, his call to appreciate nationalism as a force outside of the Cold War has been seen as a plea for more understanding of Third World leaders. However by reflecting on the manner in which the Kennedy administration used education and information material, it becomes clear that the president did not necessarily see nationalism as something that constituted a positive force for change. American driven modernisation had to convert an anticolonial attitude, which was the expression of frustrated and passive behaviour, into a rational can do attitude. In doing so this dissertation rejects the prevailing view of Kennedy as sympathetic to African nationalism.

Similarly, apparent contradictions in Nkrumah’s foreign policy become comprehensible through the public diplomacy perspective. When Nkrumah voiced disappointment about his


policy of African Unity and at the same time proposed it as a solution, he was not irrationally obsessed, as David Rooney has argued. In reality, this plea was a public diplomacy strategy to mobilise the population behind his plan for direct unification. The assertive and emotional way in which he did so after 1960 has been interpreted as a form of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Yet Nkrumah remained staunchly nonaligned, even after Lumumba’s assassination, believing that the Cold War had to be kept out of the continent if he wanted to realise his own ideological project of African unity, a project based on the propagation of ideals outside Ghana’s borders.

France has been credited with being the first country to understand the potential of ‘soft power’ – the ability of one nation to attract other nations to its cultural values and consequently adopt its way of thinking – which is distinct from hard power where others are coerced through offers of compensation, through bargaining and negotiating, or by making threats. However in a comparative history that includes the US, the UK and Ghana it becomes clear that French public diplomats were not interested in projecting a set of French ideas. Rather officials sought to promote cultural links between African elites and France as a way to gain a higher social status. With de Gaulle’s return in 1958, French culture came to be used in a more political way, but this did not mean that the French ideas would be promoted. Instead, cultural and educational resources were more consciously granted to those countries that were expected to remain closely allied with France, particularly after 1960.

Similarly, a focus on the successes of the BBC has obscured the fact that the British believed a campaign in support of the British Empire to be unnecessary. The gift of information tools would generate goodwill. Only after the Congo crisis, did Macmillan realise that a more integrated approach was required.

By approaching public diplomacy as a perspective on strategic decision making, rather than a completely separate area of international relations, we are better able to understand areas of the world that were not obvious hotspots of Cold War conflict.

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57 ‘Elle contribue pourtant à façonner un milieu favorable à la réalisation de ses objectifs: c’est ce que les politologues de Harvard appellent aujourd’hui le pouvoir doux […] la France qui fut le premier pays au monde à recourir au soft power,’ see Laurence Saint-Gilles, “La culture comme levier de la puissance: le cas de la politique culturelle de la France aux Etats-Unis pendant de la guerre froide”, *Relations Internationales* 28, no. 4 (2009): 99.
The Power of Culture, Beyond Soft Power and Americanisation

Lastly, this study considers propaganda techniques from a cross-national perspective. What – according to the practitioners – was the most effective way to influence the African psyche? Instead of turning to the soft power logic of attraction or to Gramscian cultural hegemony to explain the logic behind the public diplomacy programme, this thesis presents a close examination of cultural assistance activities. It does so not only to offer a historical critique of the easily employed dichotomy between hard and soft power, but also because an analysis of day-to-day public diplomacy activities tells us what American cultural power – or French, British and Ghanaian ideological influence for that matter – looked like to others. In this way, we can address the difficult issue of reception.

The power of culture, how exactly public diplomats believed their operation would create influence, was not simply a matter that occupied armchair theorists. In the beginning of the 1950s it became the single most important factor shaping the trans-Atlantic relation on the ground in Africa. The settler government in Kenya and the British Colonial Office, for instance, believed that information programmes could only affect African attitudes if messages were explained clearly and slowly. In this respect, the American operation was harmless since African target audiences would be unable to understand the subtle anticolonial narrative behind American ideas.

An examination of the propaganda techniques used reveals that the perception of American power or Ghanaian influence was often determined by external factors.

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Specifically, while public diplomats might fear or sympathise with the ideas that were spread by a competing information office, they disagreed on how certain media – such as film, pamphlets or even classroom education – worked to effect the so-called ‘African mind’. Thus a technique considered harmless by the Americans might be seen by the French or the British as having a destabilising effect on the attitudes of their African subjects.

By analysing how public diplomats believed they could establish influence, the notion that public diplomacy was a form of soft power is called into question. Soft power is partially a post-Cold War justification of the strategy to project American ideals abroad. Joseph Nye devised the concept in response to Paul Kennedy’s thesis of decline. Labelling USIA strategy as soft power, therefore, comes close to circular reasoning.\(^6\) Edward Lock and others have furthermore pointed out that Nye takes structural forms of power, the power that is exercised by social structures such as shared norms or values, together with relational forms where an actor exercises power by changing the values of others.

Nye’s confusion stems from the fact that he has not taken into account that American soft power can only exist when the US more or less conforms to international norms.\(^6\) Nye sees soft power as a uniquely American resource. However, as Christian Reus-Smith has indicated, power can only exist within a social relation and is not a resource that can be accumulated. Political science has yet to untangle these knots. Some, like Reus-Smith, have dismissed Nye’s concept of soft power entirely, while others, like Sarah Graham, have sought to address its deficiencies, extend the concept and widen its scope both geographically outside of the US and historically before the Cold War.\(^6\)

Because of the cultural turn, an analysis of the way cultural resources were used to produce power has been subordinated to understanding the larger cultural forces at work upon


foreign policy. How public diplomacy activities were expected to create influence is therefore not clearly understood. A public diplomat is presented as someone who wants to reach a target audience, which in turn is able to resist the ideological message. Within this configuration however, it becomes difficult to grasp that propaganda or cultural assistance was often counter-propaganda, developed in competition with other information services.

In this way, the issue of reception is also addressed. Instead of attempting to measure the reception of public diplomacy by the target audiences, this study analyses the way in which public diplomats, rather than publics, perceived their own and their competitors’ propaganda. Contrary to the existing studies of reception, we are able to hear the voice of the receiver. More importantly, instead of only registering practitioners’ discontent about the outcomes of their efforts, a study of the learning process becomes the analytical focus. Public diplomats on the ground as well as strategists in different capitals adopted and adapted each other’s strategies and techniques in effect producing hybrid products of propaganda and education.

This focus on techniques is an essential explanatory element in the scramble. Diverging opinions and misperceptions about how public diplomacy affected target audiences had concrete political effects and accelerated the scramble. In the American logic, for instance, education created responsible citizens. For the French, education was about granting access to higher forms of culture and prestige, leading them to interpret the US activities as an attempt to displace them. These subtle misunderstandings deepened the animosity among the different players. These dynamics can only be analysed by integrating multiple vantage points into one analysis.

Multi-Centric Approach, Africa-Centred Perspective and Cross-National Dynamics

The historians who take a multi-centric approach, writing history from multiple vantage points, have come in for a fair bit of criticism. Even Matthew Connelly, a principal advocate

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65 Power can be defined as ‘the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate,’ see Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, 39.
66 Historians in the field of public diplomacy acknowledge that there is no sustained attention to workplace culture, see Osgood and Etheridge, “Introduction: The New International History Meets The New Cultural History: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Relations.”
of this approach, observed that: ‘[i]n terms of both geographical areas or areas of inquiry, ranging too far afield can result in a work without real insight into any particular one.’

Much of the critique stems from this concern. Multi-centric history, because of its scale, magnifies certain methodological problems that characterise history as an academic discipline. In particular, the highly constructed nature of the narrative – which is held together by theory and transnational lenses – is considered to be a problem for many more empirically driven historians.

The most-repeated, and yet perhaps the most curious criticism, pertains to the scope of the topic. Combining the diplomacy of multiple countries and understanding their interconnections is simply too taxing for one historian to handle, or so the argument goes. Concretely, books that deal with American foreign policy that span five presidents or the entire Cold War period are considered to be more convincing because they deal with the same context, whereas the global perspective integrates many seemingly unconnected worlds. This raises an important question: should the explanatory power of a historical analysis be judged on its ability to give a dense contextualisation or is a more abstract and general sketch of the historical milieu also acceptable?

Two considerations are important here. First, every choice to structure a narrative in a certain way entails the loss of some context, the loss of some part of history that is not adequately explained. This very notion drives historical revision. Second, a broader analysis reveals things that close examination cannot. The plea to contextualise seems to be informed by a positivist notion that it is possible to address every aspect of a certain topic. What historians do, however, is highlight which aspects of reality are relevant to explain the studied phenomena. International historians consider the international context to be the most appropriate. Ultimately, an inevitable question arises: how important is the national setting in explaining foreign policy when we acknowledge that in multi-centric history, the units of comparison are each other’s point of reference? Sergei Shenin’s America’s Helping Hand, for instance meticulously reconstructs the bureaucratic infighting during the creation of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) and Eisenhower’s ability to compromise between the aid and anti-aid groups within the Republican Party. However, it does little to illuminate what Eisenhower’s own conception of aid was and how it fitted with the existing aid paradigms that were put forward in the UN, by France or the UK.

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67 Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, ix.
A better way of approaching this problem is by acknowledging that the task of the historian is not to provide as much context as possible, rather, he has to re-conceptualise the historical narrative. Even though many still believe that international and global historians want ‘to tell the story of the world as a whole’, what really drives research is the ambition to reframe the debate by focusing on international interaction.69

A second point of criticism pertains to the handling of archival sources. Mario del Pero claims that the abundance of American and British sources makes a balanced, multinational approach impossible. At the same time he criticises historians for their eagerness to integrate sources from all over the world.70 In short, the approach is condemned for not being source driven enough, while suffering from documentary fetishism. Ultimately, the multi-centric approach never wins. Essentially, Del Pero draws our attention to the perils of archival research, which are exponentially increased by the international approach but common to historical research of the twentieth century. Historians not only diligently search through archives, they also know when they have enough material to understand the events under study. The stacks of paper that are located in archives are ultimately only fragments of past events and an exhaustive use of sources is, while laudable and crucial as a working method, ultimately utopian.

What is important is the kind of questions we ask. The use of French, British and American sources still allows for an internationalist way of seeing by looking at the international connections of choice and problems. For instance, the notion that Eisenhower had no policy towards Africa could only be rejected because French, British and Ghanaian sources made clear that the US was part of an internationally shared strategy in which public diplomacy was used to make minds modern. Moreover, it allows us to capture a reality that lies beyond the sources. For instance, we can only understand why Kennedy and Nkrumah’s initially excellent relationship deteriorated so rapidly when we appreciate the history of mutual misunderstanding and misinterpretation that preceded it.

A third problem concerns individuals, prime movers, and causation. Fredrik Logevall issues a warning: ‘to privilege the foreign as much as the United States […] is to risk being ahistorical, by assigning greater influence to some actors than they may in fact deserve. The

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69 At the same time David Bell points out that ‘a remarkable amount is absent as well,’ see David Bell, “This Is What Happens When Historians Overuse the Idea of the Network”, *The New Republic*, October 25, 2013, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114709/world-connecting-reviewed-historians-overuse-network-metaphor.

United States is not merely one power among many. As Connelly has concluded, though, rather than accepting America’s exceptional power, this methodology allows us to test it. American power appeared less or more threatening from different vantage points, enabling us to define more clearly what American power looked like to others.

The last allegation leveled at the multi-centric historian is that he is not so different from the old diplomatic historian and his ‘orthodox form of diplomatic historiography, which consists simply of telling what a second secretary or a chargé d’affaires has said.’ However, diplomatic historians in the past tended to focus on the diplomatic interaction of one state whereas a history from multiple perspectives channels our attention to how the decisions of other international actors, state and non-state, influence the decision making process, how representation and misinterpretation shaped decisions that cannot otherwise be explained.

Specifically, a cross-national approach is adopted here by focusing on the interstate competition rather than the government to people activities. Governmental propaganda agents are seen here as independent actors, who had encounters with the agents of other governments and non-private actors, which shaped their own strategies. The information and colonial talks, the Africa talks within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bilateral meetings were the three major encounters where the views of target populations and strategies were directly or indirectly exchanged. The adoption and adaptation of public diplomacy techniques and strategies will be referred to as a cross-national phenomenon, as it is something governmental actors did, whereas the freedom fighters stationed in Accra are considered to be transnational actors who operate outside of the framework of the state.

The study of public diplomacy and cultural assistance in different national environments nonetheless requires caution. Marc Bloch was alarmed by homonyms that could trick the historian into believing that terms and concepts that appear to be similar indeed mean the

72 Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, viii.
same. Connected with this was Bloch’s preference to compare only the comparable.\textsuperscript{75} Bloch’s view presents a limitation, however, because a comparison of seemingly different things can often highlight similarities and shed new light on hitherto unstudied issues.\textsuperscript{76} Nonetheless, in comparing European, American, and Ghanaian public diplomacy a conceptual problem is evident. On the one hand, the more formalised American concept of ‘public diplomacy’ differs from European ‘cultural relations’ and the strident Ghanaian propaganda and assistance to freedom fighters. On the other hand, European and Ghanaian information offices fulfilled tasks similar to those of the ICA and USIA with whom they came into contact and saw as competitors. It is precisely for that reason that they are considered here together as characters of the same story.

Organisation and Sources

This international history of Africa is a triangular story that centres on the emergence of the United States and Ghana as new ideological players and the response of the former imperial powers, France and the UK, to their presence. The period between 1953 and 1963 began with the psychological warfare campaign against the Mau Mau in Kenya, Eisenhower’s inauguration and the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu in 1954, which shifted French attention to its possessions in North and West Africa.\textsuperscript{77} The narrative ends with Macmillan’s resignation in October 1963, Kenya’s independence, the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the break-up of the Ghana-Guinea Union and the termination of the Algerian War with the signing of the Évian agreement in 1962. In the US, Kennedy was assassinated and attention shifted to Apartheid South Africa as the first Cubans landed in Guinea-Bissau in support of Amilcar Cabral.\textsuperscript{78}

The need to understand how concerns about the so-called ‘native mind’ shifted in conjuncture with the Cold War and decolonization has influenced the structure of the story


told here: a ten year period is divided into two sections with eight chapters in which a
different actor was able to shape how Africa was perceived internationally. Part 1 explores
how ideas about psychological modernisation shaped international decision making until
1960. Chapter 1 describes Eisenhower’s attempts to convince Winston Churchill and Pierre
Mendès-France of the need to prepare their colonial subjects for self-government. Calls for
independence were not ignored by the president because of a Soviet threat, as argued in the
1960s, nor did foreign aid plans fail due to domestic resistance as revisionists suggest.
Eisenhower believed that he was supporting the case of self-government by offering
education. Claims about his ad-hoc decision making, or his indifference to Africa in the belief
that the Third World was not ready for democracy, become less credible in light of his
commitment to cultural assistance. Conversely, on the ground, French and British public
diplomats were convinced that US officers shared their understanding of education as a
colonial management tool, leading to Anglo-American cooperation and French-US
competition.

Chapter 2 analyses the Bandung Conference of 1955 not as a racial event, or as an
attempt to reject or utilise the Cold War, but as a symbolic manifestation of the Third World
project. Participants rejected the notion that ‘emerging peoples’ were not capable of self-
government while newly independent states in Asia offered assistance to dependent territories
in Africa. They wanted to deliver on the promises of the civilising mission, to succeed where
the West had failed. To British, French and American ears however, the Bandung delegates
did not reject Western guidance, but demanded an enhanced colonial project with more and
better aid. Paradoxically, the West expanded its activities in the areas of assistance.

Chapter 3 assesses this issue of foreign aid in the aftermath of the Bandung conference.
In the French and British foreign aid schemes, public diplomacy was now used as a shield
against foreign influence and a way to promote aid schemes, Eisenhower, however, believed
foreign aid could only work if it was linked with education. It explains why aid in real
numbers remained low even though Eisenhower vocally supported assistance policies: he
invested in cultural assistance. Particularly after the Suez crisis of 1956, public diplomats
worked hard to convince African peoples that they wanted the civilization mission to succeed.

Chapter 4 assesses how Nkrumah and the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs built a
network of political activists throughout Africa and the spread of the so-called ‘African
Personality’. The claim that Nkrumah exchanged his peaceful policy of ‘Positive Action’ for
violence is challenged. Violence in itself was never considered to be sufficient, it needed to be
backed by an effort to strengthen the self-confidence of the African by spreading the ‘African
Personality’ in an attempt to break the psychological chains of colonialism. Public diplomacy thus shaped Nkrumah’s diplomacy at every turn.

Chapter 5 dispels the myth that France completely withdrew from Guinea after the territory refused to enter the French Community in 1958. While the British and the Americans have long been cast as hesitant players, the ideological scramble reveals how their initial caution dissipated because of Ghana’s appealing propaganda. The ideological scramble allowed the French and British to believe they were in control of decolonisation, while Nkrumah could claim he had an impact on Western policies. Even though ‘orderly transition’ remained the watchword, Ghana’s actions forced public diplomats to take their African target audience into account and led them to imitate each other’s successful public relations techniques.

Part 2 looks at how the socio-economic paradigm became a dominant lens through which events in Africa were understood. Chapter 6 describes the collapse of psychological modernisation. As independent African countries multiplied, doubts arose about the competence of existing cultural assistance schemes. When the French tested a bomb in the Sahara desert, Nkrumah embarked upon a propaganda campaign that showed the West that African leaders were able to operate in an international environment. The brutality of the Congo crisis in turn underscored that psychological modernisation had failed and made Nkrumah realise he would need to mobilise mass support for there to be any chance of attaining African unity. Rather than understanding both events as episodes of the Cold War, it is argued here that Ghana’s campaign against the bomb forced the US, the UK, and France to take a public stance. Moreover, the chapter argues that rather than the rumors about the communist sympathies of the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, it was his reputation as a demagogue that led to his assassination.

Chapter 7 explores how policy makers in the global north sought to harness the second dominant reality of their age besides the Cold War, namely decolonisation, by offering African leaders education and economic assistance. Even though Kennedy, de Gaulle and Macmillan all presented their aid as a way to attain pan-African goals, the evidence suggests that anticolonialism was seen as the outcome of piecemeal colonial modernization, which had made African leaders emotional and envious. In doing so the image of Kennedy as someone who had sympathy for the cause of African nationalism is rejected.

Chapter 8 elucidates how after 1961 the relations between Ghana and the Western nations, particularly the US, were shaped by misperceptions about each other’s public diplomacy. For many African leaders, the activities at the cultural centre became weapons that
were aimed at undercutting the African cultural identity. Modernisation theorists on the other hand considered those same cultural centres as places to demonstrate the gains that came with modernisation and increase the benevolent American image. Unknowingly, Ghana and the US deepened their animosity towards each other. Where pan-Africanism became an emotionally charged and unconstructive force in the eyes of American policy makers obsessed with technical change, US public diplomats were cast as neocolonial shock troops.

Taken together these eight moments challenges a narrative in which non-Western actors remain subaltern agents with significant influence but without the ability to present a viable alternative to the Cold War pressures that they can only resist or utilise. The principal actors analyzed here are the Americans, the Ghanaians, the French and the British officials who listed each other as their most important competitors. The Communist challengers – the Soviet-Union, Cuba, China and the Eastern Bloc – only appear in the margins because the first generation of African leaders considered the Cold War to be a sideshow to the fight for independence in the 1950s. Even though Egypt, Belgium, and Israel were important they only occasionally appear. Nasser was a force to be reckoned with and his influence extended as far as Zanzibar and East Africa, but his main foreign policy goal was leadership in the Middle East.79 Belgium for its part created the Centre d’information et de documentation du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi (CID) in 1950. These archives, however, are lost.80

The geographical area studied here has several names such as Tropical Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Non-Arab Africa. The term that will be employed here is Sub-Saharan Africa, a region defined in line with the United Nations Statistics Division as all of Africa except the Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, but with the Sudan included in sub-Saharan Africa.81 Apartheid South Africa and the Portuguese colonies fall outside of the purview of this study because they constitute a separate problem and only

gradually became a priority for Nkrumah, who initially even sought rapprochement with South Africa.

The Gold Coast/Ghana (1957), Guinée-Conakry (1958), Congo-Léopoldville (1960), Kenya (1963) and Senegal (1960) have been selected because these territories became symbols of the African struggle for independence and were involved with the ideological debates about Africa and emerge in diplomatic correspondence. This selection further offers a representative set of countries: one ‘loyal’ (Senegal) and one ‘rebellious’ (Guinée) French former colony, one ‘loyal’ (Gold Coast/Ghana) and one ‘rebellious’ (Kenya) British former colony and the Belgian colony of the Congo, a key territory for imaginations and hard economic interests.

The events in Nigeria, Liberia, Algeria, (British) Sudan, Tanzania and Egypt have been surveyed in a less systematic way. Nasser’s propaganda campaign is only studied in so far as it influenced the decision making of the four principal actors. Julius Nyere’s African socialism – *Ujamaa* – was crucial to Tanzania’s domestic politics and was noticed in other parts of Africa. His bid for regional influence, however, falls chronologically outside the period under study here. The low priority given to countries such as Nigeria or Liberia stems from the fact that these countries did not aspire to present their own overall view for a new Africa. They were not therefore major ideological competitors, only minor players in the international history of Africa during this early period. The decade between 1953 and 1963 was an era in which ‘blueprints’ were crucial sources of international influence.

With the opening of new archival collections in Ghana, and facilitated access to documents in the UK, the US, France and Belgium it is possible to tell a new story. The recent declassification at the national archives of Ghana and the Padmore Library in Accra were vital, particularly because many documents were destroyed after the coup of 1966. The sources from this ‘accidental archive’ were supplemented with documents from institutions like the Bodleian Library in Oxford and the Moorland-Spingarn Research Center at Howard University. In recognition of the important place of oral history within African societies, the last living diplomat under the Nkrumah regime, K.B. Asante, was also interviewed.\(^\text{82}\)

Although declassification requests were made in the British and French archives, it was the declassification at the national archives in College Park Maryland as well as the Eisenhower and Kennedy libraries that proved to be vital in shedding new light on American

\(^{82}\) Jean Allman declassified the Presidential Office Files without which this thesis could not have been written. The documents in the Padmore Library were indexed by Jeffrey Ahlman in 2010, see Jean Allman, “AHR Forum Phantoms of the Archive: Kwame Nkrumah, a Nazi Pilot Named Hanna, and the Contingencies of Postcolonial History-Writing”, *American Historical Review* 118, no. 1 (2013): 128.
public diplomacy between 1961 and 1963. In the Eisenhower library, the often-overlooked collection of Abbott Washburn has been studied more closely. While the archives in Kew are easily accessible, the history of British information policy in Africa has not been written. Many boxes therefore still contained unopened letters.83

Within postcolonial theory the archive is perceived to be a site of power. Achille Mbembe argues that the postcolonial state requires archival technologies to exercise rule. Consequently a failed state is a state that is unable to deploy archiving technologies.84 The historian, however, is not swayed by his claim. The foreign affairs archives in Europe and the US are also filled with piles of unprocessed and mislabeled material. Nonetheless, it is those reams of papers and the improved access to African archives that hold the potential for an Africa-centred international history and offer the possibility to better understand Africa’s changing relation with the rest of the world.

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PART I. THE GOSPEL OF STABILITY (1953 – 1957)
I. Orderly Transition

Eisenhower’s Strategy for Africa versus the British and French Plans for Empire (October 1952 - October 1955)

Self-government is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end, to the building of the good life […] Our aim is to make this country […] a shining light throughout the whole continent of Africa, giving inspiration far beyond its frontiers.

– Kwame Nkrumah, Motion of Destiny Speech, 10 January 1953. 85

One must always keep in mind that the initiatives undertaken by the United States aimed at increasing its cultural influence on the African continent – with the exception of Liberia – are recent. After the improvisation of the post-war period, a more organized approach is now pursued.

– Letter from Henri Bonnet, the French ambassador in Washington to Robert Schuman, the minister of foreign affairs, 30 March 1950. 86

Self-government! Self-government and education. Put the vote before the people. […] and that there would be some internal political turbulence. That had to be expected.

– Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s staff secretary, when asked to clarify Eisenhower’s stance on colonialism, 10 April 1982. 87

A nationalism is developing out of frictions and frustrations and not out of the smooth working out of colonial policy. […] favourable in some respects to the development of an anti-imperialist front and the first stage of the colonial revolution. Counter-communist propaganda will not cure this, and it may inflame it.

– William Harold Ingrams, adviser on information services and the expert on communism in the Colonial Office, 4 March 1952. 88

In 1951, Margaret Trowell, the head of the Makerere Art Institute in Uganda visited schools in Kenya together with one of her African pupils, Joseph Nitro to encourage the European settlers to take an interest in the trainees. According to Richard Frost, the British Council representative in East Africa, Nitro and his fellow students often felt isolated because they could only interact with uneducated Africans. The visitors coincidentally stayed with Jocelyn Grant, mother of the British writer Elspeth Huxley – whose article on Ghanaian independence and the supposed African appetite for authoritarianism, would resonate with British, French...

86 ‘Il faut toutefois se garder d’oublier que l’action entreprise par les États-Unis en faveur de son influence culturelle sur le continent africain est, sauf au Liberia, toute récente; improvisée au lendemain de la guerre, elle cherche maintenant seulement à s’organiser à la lumière des premières expériences,’ see Letter, Henri Bonnet to Robert Schuman, ‘Effort Culturel des États-Unis en Afrique,’ 30 March 1950, 3, DAL, Généralités 1944-1952, 49QO/57, AMAE.
88 Notes, W.H. Ingrams, 4 March 1952, CO 537/7779, TNA.
and American officials who referred to her in their writings.\footnote{Elspeth Huxley, “Two Revolutions That Are Changing Africa”, \textit{New York Times Magazine}, May 19, 1957, 9.} In the beginning of the 1950s, though, there was little to suggest the continent was becoming a theatre of ideological conflict. During their visit Trowell and Nitro were invited to a cocktail party organised by a group of settlers who had become curious when the dean of Makerere spoke about educated Africans, because none of them ‘had ever met one’. Nitro was judged to be a peculiar specimen: ‘charming and so cultured and interesting’. The British Council official, Richard Frost, complained that the settlers made his educational mission difficult.\footnote{Highly confidential report, Richard D. Frost, “Visit to District Commissioners in Western Kenya 21st to 26th August 1950”, 4 September 1950, 6-8, BW 95/3, TNA.}


Winston Churchill’s age – he was 79 in 1953 – and his tendency to pepper casual conversations with remarks about British imperialism have sparked a multitude of attempts to determine which parts of the Churchillian lexicon were genuine and which elements were political-tactical manoeuvering.\footnote{Ronald Hyam, \textit{Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 225.} Likewise, while accounts on Charles de Gaulle are more polemised, the narrative on French Africa in the early 1950s sustains the view that cultural ties with France eased decolonisation. Even Tony Chafer, who has convincingly deconstructed the myth of a transition managed by French officials and local elites argues that it was the French language and republican ideals that allowed both groups to present decolonisation within the \textit{métropole} as progressive.\footnote{Chafer, \textit{The End of Empire in French West Africa}, 5, 12.}

Such a narrow understanding of cultural assistance neglects the extent to which policy makers in capitals, officials on the ground and academics at universities all struggled to come
to terms with a new phenomenon: nation-building. The term surfaced in the 1950s and was consciously used by Lucian W. Pye who argued that nation-building required leaders with a stable psychology and societies that had, or could, come to terms with their former rulers. It is argued here that calls for independence were not ignored by the Eisenhower administration because of a Soviet threat, but rather seen through the lens of psychological modernisation. American officials already believed they were supporting the case of self-government by offering preparation. Conversely, Churchill and Mendès-France did not simply reject Eisenhower’s requests because they feared ideological intrusion. Since education and information were not part of a war of words but perceived to be a form of assistance for which the ‘native’ would be thankful, the cultural assistance operation was not significantly expanded. Access to French culture represented social mobility, while the offer of British communication infrastructure would create goodwill.

Disregard for the centrality of cultural assistance has made it difficult to reconcile contradictions that emerge from the documents. Eisenhower, for instance, has been seen as someone who wanted to create stability at all costs, ignored the demands for independence and supported right wing dictatorships and the NATO allies. At the same time, he tried to uphold the American anticolonial ideal when writing to French and British policy makers or at NSC meetings. Revisionists blame domestic resistance for the gap between Eisenhower’s discourse in support of aid and his limited results, and post-

94 Although political science distinguishes more rigorously between state-building – the construction of a functioning state – and nation-building – with more of a focus on identity – in the fifties, both concepts were used interchangeably. Tilly’s paradigm shifting work on state-building theory was actually sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and the Ford Foundation and was explicitly meant to assist the emergence of organised independent countries in the Third World, see Charles Tilly, Gabriel Ardant, and Social Science Research Council (US) Committee on Comparative Politics, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), i–xiv.
95 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 170.
revisionists argue that the president conflated nationalism with communism. The notion that Eisenhower saw Africans as racially incompetent, thus making a genuine policy in support of independence impossible has become widely accepted among historians of the global Cold War and even those writing on public diplomacy.

Likewise, two equally convincing views on Churchill’s imperial stance exist. Drawing on his opposition to Indian independence, some have cast him as a staunch imperialist. Others, who look at his legislative work – rather than his discourse – wonder if Churchill was even interested in empire. As Colonial Office minister in 1920 he was viewed as someone opposing imperial expansion, while he did not have an imperial programme as prime minister. Historians since the mid-1990s have viewed him as a pragmatist who believed in the civilising mission but was willing to compromise. However, how Churchill and British officials reconciled their belief in the benevolence of empire with its dismantlement remains unexplained.

In the case of France, it is unclear to what extent the country was able to project cultural power in the 1950s, even though a shared set of values is precisely what is seen as a binding factor between officials in Paris and elites in Africa. Historians are divided into those who believe the French ability to maintain cultural hegemony was debilitated by the swift defeat in the Second World War and Americanisation and others who discern a persistent influence of

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99 Attention to modernisation theory has not overturned the view that Eisenhower made ad-hoc decisions rooted in racial fears. According to Connelly, the fear of racial war made Eisenhower accelerate decolonisation in Algeria, and Westad sees Eisenhower as a president who operated outside of the American interventionist tradition, while Long agrees with post-revisionists who argue that Eisenhower intervened in Singapore out of Cold War concerns, but the success of cultural diplomacy made for a mixed, rather than a disastrous, outcome. See Westad, The Global Cold War, 27; Matthew Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence”, American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (2000): 741; Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 76; S. R. Joey Long, Safe for Decolonization: The Eisenhower Administration, Britain, and Singapore (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2011), xi.


French ideas. As Tony Chafer demonstrates, African elites used their continued intellectual link with France opportunistically, which they presented as a progressive project. Yet a great deal is assumed about the intentions of French public diplomats, making it even harder to measure its impact.

These various interpretations fit together, however, when viewed from the perspective of an ideological scramble. A re-examination of the evidence brings two arguments about strategy to the surface. First and foremost, the Eisenhower administration had an Africa strategy that was derived from civilisational discourses and aimed to export the American model through education to ensure an orderly transition. Second, Churchill and Mendes-France resisted those far-reaching plans, something that was never obvious to Eisenhower because the European and American views drew on a shared vocabulary of education and preparation.

Semantic confusion allowed officials in Whitehall to cling to the illusion of the civilising mission as they were being forced out of Africa. As long as Africans were educated to understand British decisions, influence would be maintained. A genuine effort to convince Africans was not considered, because such a move would turn them into political actors – unconceivable to the British in the 1950s. Education had to forestall not foster self-government. In French Africa, that rationale was even more pronounced. French cultural centres were used to thwart political movements rather than promote a set of alternative cultural norms. In that way cultural superiority and anxiety could coexist.

Additionally, these misunderstandings among Cold War allies were reproduced on the ground through a range of tactics. How did cultural assistance affect the attitudes of Africans in the eyes of operatives? It is argued here that more than anything else it was the various answers to that question that led public diplomats to fight with each other. How cultural assistance worked to affect change was a contentious issue: development aid for some, an inflation of African prestige or an attempt to attain stability for others.

At the same time, these disputes reveal an awareness about the connections between political ‘maturity’ and the power of ideas on the one hand and the capacity to maintain the empire or sustain American security on the other. The ability of public diplomats to prepare, educate and convince Africans ensured at least a minimal form of control over a process with

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104 Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 234.
an uncertain outcome. This is the argument about policy making and public diplomacy on the ground that is presented here in two parts.

Exploring the Links between Preparation and Stability (1953-1954)

In his memoirs, President Eisenhower wrote about how overwhelmed he had been by decolonisation: ‘In flood force, the spirit of nationalism had grown in all Africa’. The determination of the peoples for ‘self-rule […] resembled a torrent overrunning everything in its path, including frequently the best interests of those concerned.’ Although the United States had no direct strategic interests on the African continent, with a ‘position of leadership in the Free World’, the US – in the words of Eisenhower – did not want to ‘see chaos run wild among hopeful, expectant peoples and could not afford to see turmoil in an area where the communists would be only too delighted to take an advantage.’ This often repeated imagery of a flood or mighty river that could ‘burst through barriers and create havoc’ was part of a burgeoning discourse of modernisation. The destructive force of this flood was reminiscent of longstanding imagery of uncontrollable hordes and the ‘yellow peril’. Yet, Eisenhower’s choice of words also suggests inevitability, revealing his confidence and determination about the fact that he could ‘make constructive use of it.’

When he wrote his manuscript in the early 1960s, Eisenhower must have re-read the notes he had made during his conversations with Churchill, the living emblem of the British Empire. A few days before his inauguration, on 6 January 1953, Eisenhower expressed his views on the rise of nationalism in a dinner conversation with the British prime minister. The president argued that ‘dependent peoples’ did not automatically look to Europe for guidance, but had to be convinced that their only hope of maintaining independence was ‘through cooperation with the free world.’ While possibly slower, it had the certainty of being ‘orderly’ as well as ‘healthy and sound.’ For the president, colonialism was on the ‘way out as a relationship among peoples,’ the only thing left to do was to focus on eliminating the

106 In Jim Meriwether’s interpretation, this quotation illustrates how prejudice prevented Eisenhower from developing a coherent policy. Matthew Connelly takes the ‘flood’ comment as proof of Eisenhower’s fear of racial war, but overlooks the potential that the president also saw, see Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 91; Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens”, 766; James H. Meriwether, “‘A Torrent Overrunning Everything’: Africa and the Eisenhower Administration”, in *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War*, ed. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 176.
107 Diary Entry on Tuesday, 6 January 1953, 3-5, AWF, DDE Diaries Series, Box 1, DDEL.
obstacles that prevented ‘self-government’ and ‘win adherents to Western aims.’ In short, a territory could become independent provided it was sufficiently prepared.

Initially, Eisenhower asked the leaders of the imperial powers to make speeches that impressed upon dependent peoples that their legitimate claim for self-rule came with a heavy responsibility. The American presence in Puerto Rico had taught the Americans that people would insist upon retaining their connections with the mother country once you explained to ‘the native the responsibilities and increased costs.’ While he had also written to the French prime minister, Pierre Mendès-France, the president was convinced that ‘no other could’ do it ‘so well’ as Churchill. When the British prime minister informed Eisenhower about his talks with Soviet leader Georgy Malenkov, Eisenhower proposed instead ‘a thoughtful speech on the subject of the rights to self-government.’ In the first sentences of this letter he emphasises that the speech would have to deal with the need for education and announce the cooperation of the ‘Western World to bring educational opportunities to all peoples.’ The British prime minister was more defeatist:

In this I must admit I am a laggard. I am a bit sceptical about universal suffrage for the Hottentots even if refined by proportional representation. The British and American democracies were slowly and painfully forged and even they are not perfect yet.

Eisenhower was disappointed, pledging to ‘never stay around in active position so long that age itself will make me a deterrent to rather than an agent of reasonable action.’ Even though the president was 62 years old he considered himself to be better with the times.

Eisenhower, together with Henry Byroade and George V. Allen, his assistant secretaries of State for the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, had taken the British civilisation mission – which claimed to prepare its colonies for independence – seriously. The 1946 development plan for Nigeria for instance focused on raising academic standards in view of the country’s need for well-educated men in the public services. Nonetheless, Eisenhower drew a sharp distinction between the American plans and the line taken by the former colonial powers –

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109 Letter, Eisenhower to Alfred M. Grunther, 30 November 1954, AWF, DDE Diary Series, Box 8, DDEL.
112 Confidential, “Broad Lines of Future Educational Policy in Nigeria”, August 1959, CO 936/564, TNA; Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 37.
which he considered to be an ‘old-fashioned, paternalistic approach’ – confident that the newly liberated people would look to them for guidance. Churchill told Eisenhower that he believed that after independence nations would still ‘recognize the wisdom of our suggestions.’ For the president this could only be true in the abstract. American or British plans would not be accepted unless so-called ‘emerging peoples’ were convinced by persuasion and example.\(^{113}\)

**The Gift of British Information Services**

Eisenhower did not fully comprehend how accurate his own observation was: for UK officials the establishment of information departments was a ‘gift’ to the colonies that were on the road to independence.\(^{114}\) Communication technology had been a crucial material pillar of the British Empire. Edward Linley Sambourne’s cartoon of Cecil Rhodes holding a telegraph line from Cape Town to Cairo became an iconic image of British imperialism, as Harold Innis developed his influential argument that empires and the Commonwealth had been shaped by communication infrastructures such as the telegraph, the radio and railways. Assisting former colonies in the establishment of their radio and press service would turn them into viable states and therefore create goodwill towards the UK.\(^{115}\) Harold Evans of the Colonial Office (CO) for instance believed it would force local politicians to hesitate before tampering with the truth.\(^{116}\)

The notion that information services were a form of aid was so pervasive that when Secretary of Foreign Affairs Anthony Nutting, appointed the Drogheda Committee to assess the value of the government’s information effort in 1952, some members of the committee worried that the UK would never be able to handle the overwhelming demand. Privy Counsellor J. Boyd-Carpenter felt that if UK information offices were built in Nigeria, the Gold Coast and the British West Indies it would become very difficult to deny other colonies what they called ‘a similar benefit’.\(^{117}\) The final report thus also recommended shifting the

\(^{113}\) Diary Entry on Tuesday, 6 January 1953, 3-5, AWF, DDE Diary Series, Box 1, DDEL.

\(^{114}\) Confidential Notes, “Notes of a Meeting Held at the British Council on Thursday, 8th September 1960 to Hear a Report from Mr. Fowells on his visit to the Congo”, 8 September, BW 154/1, TNA.


\(^{116}\) Minutes, Watrous for Evans, 16 March 1954, CO 1027/74, TNA.

\(^{117}\) Andrew Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist: The Information Research Department* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 243; Letter, J. Boyd-Carpenter to David Maxwell Fyfe, GOVO, Office, 20 January 1954, CO 1027/70, TNA.
information focus to the colonies, because there was no need to preach to the converted in Europe.\textsuperscript{118}

The British Council, founded as a non-official institute of cultural diplomacy, only partially agreed with this reasoning. It did not want to scale down its European operations because it believed so-called ‘friendships’ would not endure if taken for granted. Moreover, the political bias of the report could not be followed because the Council’s usefulness lay precisely in its non-political character. The officers at the Council entertained a conventional view of cultural exchange as a two-way street, something officers emphasised when a Nigerian Council office was set up in 1953.\textsuperscript{119}

Policy officials only made a step towards that reasoning when they were confronted with colonial resistance. When riots broke out in Accra, in 1948 in the aftermath of the war, the Watson Commission – tasked with an investigation – concluded that the ‘failure of public relations’ had been ‘as a major contributory cause of the Gold Coast disturbances.’ As a result an information department was established in that territory.\textsuperscript{120} The British believed that their African subjects would accept the British judgment as long as any decisions were properly explained through media.

Nothing strengthened the British more in this belief than the vicious war against the Mau Mau, a section of the Kikuyu, a social group in Kenya. The Kikuyu had lost their land and status when the first commissioner of the British East Africa Protectorate, Charles Eliot, decided in 1902 to attract white settlers so the Uganda Railway Company could pay its debts. Because some of the Kikuyu had been able to profit financially during the Second World War, returning veterans, including Jomo Kenyatta, turned the socio-economic conflict into a surge for independence.\textsuperscript{121} Sir Evelyn Baring, governor of Kenya, declared a state of emergency on 9 October 1952 and arrested 180 leaders after senior chief Waruhiu was murdered. The Mau Mau began to mobilise parts of the population through a set of oaths, each expressing a deeper commitment to violent resistance. The dirty war that followed, with

\textsuperscript{118} Memorandum, [1954], CO 1027/70, TNA; In the US it would take another six year before the Sprague Committee made the same recommendation, although USIA funds were already being transferred to the so-called Third World. A renewed policy on overseas information services was set out in the White Paper of July 1957, which took full account of the Drogheda Committee’s earlier report, particularly as it pertains to financial resources. Financing for the information services increased each year from £13000000 in 1957 to £20200000 in 1961, see Reply, Charles Hill to Christopher Mayhew, 10 July 1961, FO 953/2050, TNA.


its connections to the Cold War and transnational networks, has overshadowed the profound influence it had for the British information strategy.  

Nonetheless, for the CO it was clear what made Kenya’s resistance violent: the absence of an information department. Even though Harold Evans had been struck by fever on his flight from Nairobi to Dar es Salaam, he still wrote a pencil note to impress upon the director of the Information Service in Kenya, Charles Carstairs, that he had to transform his service into a genuine information machine. The problems with the Kikuyu were seen as a failure of information services, not as a failure of policy and action. From July 1953 onwards Baring was pressured into giving maximal publicity to various schemes for social betterment deployed to win over the insurgent Kikuyu, for instance with a booklet in Swahili that depicted a helpful multi-racial police, a recurring propaganda theme.

To explain why elements within the Kikuyu kept resisting – even after the CO had sent out its PR expert Granville Roberts to create ‘publicity’ for the settlers – the Mau Mau were diagnosed with a mental disorder. A string of experts such as anthropologists Max Gluckman and Louis Leakey and the former Governor of Kenya Sir Philip Mitchell, but most prominently John Carothers, all believed the initiation oath of the Mau Mau was a manifestation of a psychological defect (illustration 4).

Paradoxically, the pathological interpretation of Mau Mau resistance also undercut the information effort. Harold Evans even began to doubt if the increase of information was worth the effort. He considered the idea that a so-called ‘psychological warfare expert’ would solve all difficulties to be misguided. In the end what was needed was someone who knew the ‘African mind’ in general and the ‘Kikuyu mind’ in particular. It was not psychological war

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125 Notes, 27 July 1953, CO 10247/40, TNA.

but psychological modernisation that was needed. The British also faltered on their commitment to create a UK information service. Only when a survey in 1954 revealed that the presence of offices of the United States Information Agency was creating problems in Kenya did the CO decide to step up its information effort in those areas.127

Ultimately, ethno-psychology was a way to rationalise the predicament British officials and settlers found themselves in: the modern imperial enterprise required an information effort, but a defence of colonial decisions implied an acknowledgement of political grievances. In a conversation with Michael Blundell, minister on the war council in Kenya, Churchill displayed this mixture of the pathological and the political. He had been astonished by the change that had come over the ‘minds’ of once ‘happy, naked and charming people.’ For him the challenge was not of a military nature, but a question of how to get to the rebels’ minds. Yet when Blundell agreed that the killing of ‘savages’ was tragic, Churchill retorted: ‘Savages, savages? Not savages. They’re savages armed with ideas – much more difficult to deal with.’128

**French Culture as the Key to Upward Social Mobility**

Eisenhower set himself up for disappointment once again when he wrote to Mendès-France whom he found to be ‘Churchillian in his attitude towards dependent peoples’ afraid that his prestige would be reduced if he lost ‘one iota of the area […] over which he exercised some degree of influence.’129 Mendès-France had shifted the focus to French Africa after negotiating an armistice for Indochina in June 1954 and announcing autonomy for Tunisia. However, the tools Eisenhower relied on to promote self-government were, in the French case, used to defuse political aspirations. In the *centres culturels* of French West Africa – 157 centres by 1956 – magazines such as *Paris-Match* and *Bingo* were on offer. By granting access to French culture the aspirations for social mobility and progress of young people were met. Blinded by their experience with *évoluées*, French officials grossly misread the political potential of this situation. The *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA), the main political party in French West Africa, campaigned against the centres and wanted to transform them into *maisons des jeunes*, under their own control.130

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127 Notes in the file, Carstairs, 30 March 1955, CO 1027/83, TNA.
128 Quoted in Toye, *Churchill’s Empire*, x.
129 Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 64; Personal and confidential letter, Eisenhower to General Alfred M. Grunther, 30 November 1954, AWF, DDE Diary Series, Box 8, DDEL.
A direct threat to the colonial authority could only come from the outside. The delegates from Cameroon, the Ivory Coast and Senegal, who had attended the festival of the World Assembly of Youth in Singapore, for instance, were monitored closely by the French because the anticolonial discourse pervaded those gatherings was dreaded by the French colonial authorities. In addition, the French did not trust the Americans. The ambassador to Washington, Henri Bonnet, purposefully exaggerated the communist threat in Africa and encouraged every official to do the same even though the French intelligence service had informed him that there was no imminent danger. Bonnet also concluded from reading Vernon McKay’s books that the Americans were unknowledgeable about Africa, which could lead the USIA to underestimate the effects their anticolonial statements could have upon Africans.

Nonetheless, despite 157 cultural centers, cultural activities were never used to project a body of French ideas. When the people within the political section of French foreign affairs tried to convince the Direction générale des relations culturelles (DGRC) in 1954 to expand into British Africa, arguing that French culture also had a political function, they were simply ignored. Cultural assistance was a privilege bestowed upon Africans hungry for development, not a political instrument aimed at intransigent activists. Wielding it as such would only reward such behaviour.

Nevertheless, those significantly different rationales behind cultural assistance were hardly ever clear to Eisenhower, Churchill and Mendès-France, men born at the turn of the nineteenth century who shared a paternalistic view of African peoples. As a young man,
Churchill was involved as a war correspondent in the Mahdist War in Sudan and the Second Anglo-Boer War in South Africa. He admired the bravery of his opponents, but in his assessment the virtues of barbarism were ‘outweighed by the intelligence of the invaders and their superior force of character.’\textsuperscript{134} Mendès-France for his part was a staunch believer in the universality of republican values. As a member of the Popular Front government of Léon Blum in 1936 he helped design a colonial reform project that sought to liberalise and humanise French colonialism while binding the colonies more closely to France.\textsuperscript{135}

It was the absence of a colonial tradition or a link to Africa that distinguished Eisenhower from his colleagues. His prejudice about other races and his faith in education was initially rooted in a narrative about failed Reconstruction after the Civil War, but developed fully when he accompanied General Douglas MacArthur between 1935 and 1939 as assistant military advisor to build a viable Filipino army, in the event of a Japanese attack.\textsuperscript{136}

In his diary, Eisenhower describes the locals as intelligent children who were, however, difficult to educate due to their lazy nature. He expected from the Filipinos ‘a minimum of performance from a maximum of promise.’ Eisenhower saw them as unaccustomed to the requirements of administrative and executive procedure. His relationship with ManueL L. Quezon, the Philippine president, remained one of distance. ‘Why in the hell do you want a banana country giving you a field-marshallship?’ he had asked Macarthur after he, himself had refused this honour.\textsuperscript{137}

As president, Eisenhower frequently referred to this period of his life in discussions about the Third World and Africa, as an example of a society in transition. He claimed to understand what drove African leaders because of his experience with ‘primitive people’ on the islands in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{138} During an NSC meeting on 18 June 1959, for instance, he remarked that if the US had not trained the Filipinos in democracy for about forty years, the

\textsuperscript{134} Winston Churchill, \textit{The River War}, 2nd ed. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1933), 7.
\textsuperscript{135} Turpin, “La Communauté Française: un avenir pour la république?”, 59; Chafer, \textit{The End of Empire in French West Africa}, 226.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 106, 109; Diary Entry on Tuesday 20 July 1937, AWF, DDE Diary Series, Box 1, DDEL.
\textsuperscript{138} Memorandum of the 397\textsuperscript{th} Meeting of the National Security Council, 26 February 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61, National Security Council Series, Box 11, f: 397\textsuperscript{th} Meeting of NSC, DDEL; Also see Memorandum of Discussion of the 432\textsuperscript{nd} Meeting of the National Security Council, 14 January 1960, Papers as President, 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 12, f: 432\textsuperscript{nd} Meeting of NSC, DDEL; Discussion at the 410\textsuperscript{th} Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, 18 June 1959, 4, Papers as President, 1953-1961 [NSC Series], Box 11, f: 410\textsuperscript{th} Meeting of NSC, DDEL; He also referred to the preparation of the Philippines in his talk with Nkrumah, see Memorandum of Conversation, 24 July 1958, \textit{FRUS 1958-1960}, Vol. 14: Africa, 647-652.
The Philippines would have become a military dictatorship. Rather than propaganda, his request for speeches was motivated by an expansive concept of security that aimed to create a stable global environment that valued American ideals.

Instead of waiting for the colonial powers, the Eisenhower administration asked Abbott Washburn, the deputy director of USIA, in October 1954 to investigate the state of American overseas education. Washburn began to cooperate with Waldemar Nielsen, a political scientist at the Ford Foundation, resulting only in 1960 in the Program for the Development of Education in the Emerging Countries. The International Cooperation Administration (ICA), however, stepped in and expanded educational programmes in Africa after 1955. Its predecessor the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) had, in 1954, worked to establish a permanent cooperation between American universities and the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) where the French and the British met to discuss their joint development programmes. These institutions did not only turn to aid as a short term security measure.

Eisenhower’s repeated requests for a speech were thus not mere propaganda, but a manifestation of an expansive concept of security. For Eisenhower, a stable transition to self-government could only be produced by applying his so-called ‘great equation’: a combination of spiritual force, economic force and military force. In Eisenhower’s national security doctrine, NSC 162/1, the export of American values abroad was the keystone. In doing so, he built upon Truman’s NSC 68 which had already entrusted the US with a special role in the world.

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139 Nwaubani argues that Eisenhower’s requests for a speech, made in private letters, were a propaganda stunt, but he overlooks the fact that the US would not have gained from a speech made by the imperial powers, see Ebere Nwaubani, *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2001), 39.


responsibility for imposing order by means that were consistent with ‘the principles of freedom and democracy.’

Eisenhower, Churchill and Mendès-France were not kindred spirits as has been implied by historians. What distinguished Eisenhower was his obsession with preparing African societies for self-government through cultural assistance. By contrast, British communication media and French cultural products were only seen as gifts to Africans demanding progress. Eisenhower granted Africans a minimal form of agency by stressing the need to convince and educate them, rather than assume their reflex to follow the ‘white man’.

Strategies of Manipulation and Modernisation (1953-1955)

In the absence of a clear blueprint, local officers were forced to make it up as they went along. The Jackson Committee, appointed by the president to devise a global information strategy in 1953, not only marked the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) but also encouraged every local United States Information Service (USIS) post to develop its own policy. The confusing and overlapping set of responsibilities within the French bureaucracy made it possible for local posts to ignore directives and establish their own strategies. Likewise, the British programme was managed by the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), the Colonial Office (CO), the Central Office of Information (COI), and the British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) with its empire broadcast service. The Information Policy Department (IPD) within the Foreign Office (FO) emerged as the key agency, but the multitude of institutions effectively ended London’s stronghold over the colonial administrations that were also setting up information departments.

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This autonomy required public diplomats to make a decision about their attitude towards competitors and allies. The CO and the settlers in Kenya were eager to cooperate with the USIS posts in different African territories, contrary to the French who were irritated. Why, it is asked here, was this the case, particularly as settlers were not known for their hospitality? To explain the different response to American ideological intrusion and elucidate how French public diplomats and the settlers experienced American power, we need to examine the propaganda techniques they employed. At local posts it was a combination of everyday activities, academic insights and assumptions about so-called ‘primitive’ people that provided operatives with a working theory and an inkling of how their activities affected African attitudes.

More importantly, this theory about the most effective combination of message, medium and target audience profoundly influenced the judgment made of other information services. Complaints about the intrusiveness of American culture, the outcry over neocolonialism or loathing of anticolonial propaganda were not a response to an expanded presence, but resulted from diverging theories about the power of culture.

Those ideas had an effect at the most basic level, namely on the rate at which information offices expanded after the War in key territories such as the Gold Coast, Kenya, French West Africa and the Belgian Congo. Comparatively speaking, the USIA deployed a massive operation. By 1953, the Americans had thirteen posts in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Union of South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Liberia, the Gold Coast and the Belgian Congo. In this year the continent still fell under the responsibility of the Near East, South Asia and Africa branch, led by Edward V. Roberts. Only in 1958, with John Noon as programme coordinator, was a separate branch for Africa created.

Because of the USIS expansion, the UK information officers did not feel an urgent need to increase their presence. Assuming USIA could step in and deliver some of the necessary education, the secretary of state for the colonies in 1950, James Griffith, ordered the colonial authorities to cooperate with USIS posts that had been set up after the war. Until 1954 the Colonial Office had no overseas staff to handle the material they sent out. Only two years after the Drogheda report, in 1955, UK Information Offices opened in Accra, the Port of

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Spain, Trinidad, Kuala Lumpur and Lagos and a branch office was set up in Kingston, Jamaica. The CO also wanted to plant offices in East Africa and the West Indies, increase the number of films and pamphlets produced and expand the British Council services.

Unlike the British, Jean Jurgensen, the chief of the Africa section at French foreign affairs, only wanted to establish a close relationship with USIA to limit the emergence of possible anti-French sentiments. His predecessor, G. Monod, had professionalised the consular network in Africa, but the cultural diplomacy section of embassies had remained underdeveloped. In the early 1950s, French cultural officers struck a defensive pose as the USIS worked to promote education in the Gold Coast and French West Africa, promoting the US image in East Africa and working to ameliorate the effects of Belgian paternalism in the Congo.

Finding Ways to Foster a Stable Transition in the Face of French Resistance in West Africa

In the Gold Coast, education became the USIS’s top priority. In 1951, Kwame Nkrumah was elected as the so-called ‘leader of government business’ on a programme that demanded immediate independence and promised free compulsory education and the construction of institutes for scientific, technical and agricultural training. According to USIS official Eugene Sawyer, Nkrumah needed American support because his adherence to education spoke to American conceptions of a stable transition to independence.

Crucially, the USIS’s drive in support of education determined the way in which information material was deployed. It was not only films and pamphlets that were used as educational resources, education also had a public relations effect that was unique to Africa.

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The USIA believed that its educational policy produced Africans who were more interested in the outside world – such as the American problems of the Jim Crow laws and segregation in the US. The often-discussed civil rights campaign of the USIA in Africa was not primarily aimed at countering Soviet allegations. Principally, it had to repair the damage to the American image that was transferred via its own programme to educate Africans. The challenge was particularly pressing in the Gold Coast where the population was comparatively more educated, which led to an ‘almost psychotic concern with the whole issue of race-relations in America.’ African leaders in British Africa were seen as being quicker and more direct in their reaction against the civil rights stories coming out of the US because they were responsible for internal affairs. Linking the Soviet threat to the civil rights story was part of a strategy aimed at convincing Congress to increase the funding of the USIA’s Africa operation.

To foster psychological modernisation without damaging the American image three principal tactics were relied upon: private foundations, a periodical called American Outlook and personal contacts. The cooperation between the American government and private foundations, most notably the Phelps-Stokes Fund, was vital in denying that the USIS was only interested in fighting the Cold War. In 1955 Fred L. Hadsel of the State Department travelled to New York where he offered the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation and the Phelps-Stokes Fund financial assistance for their African programmes. Private foundations were an essential intermediary between the state and ambitious Africans. While Eisenhower’s reliance on private initiative has been seen as an indication of his disinterest in

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[158] The early accounts that emphasise USIA’s civil rights campaign in Africa draw heavily on USIA’s official reports to Congress and have therefore firmly established the civil rights narrative, the earliest example is Peter Kofsky’s official history: Draft, Peter L. Kofsky, “The United States Information Program in Africa, 1945-1970: A History & Interpretation”, 2-1, RG. 306, A1 1072, Box 9, f: African Program, Historical Background 1970, NARA.

African developments, it actually suggests a profound understanding of the situation on the ground. In the 1960s, the Eisenhower administration was even indirectly praised for its approach by Kennedy’s undersecretary of state, George Ball, who pointed out that working with non-governmental organisations made Africans more willing to participate:

From the beginning of educational exchange programs [with Africa], the government has played a minority role. The success of these programs has been based in major part on the active participation and support of non-governmental, voluntary organizations of many kinds. [...] it is important that this cooperative approach, with a strong private base, be continued. 160

A second effective way to influence the educated mind was found in American Outlook. First published in March 1952 as a pamphlet with 750 issues a week, it later also had a French version, Perspectives Americaines. Its second page was intended to be inspirational and to have some local relevance. The other sections contained world news, American national news, items about economic development, news on minorities in the US and labour news meant to project an image of the US as a country committed to development and race equality. 161 To exploit what was believed to be the eagerness of newly educated Africans to follow the news on civil rights developments, a special edition was printed in May 1954 when the Supreme Court judged separate but equal education in the US to be unconstitutional. In 1951, a class action suit had been filed against the board of education of the city of Topeka, Kansas which called upon the school district to desegregate its education. The newspaper presented that story as one part of a broader narrative of progress with ‘setbacks as well as advances’ – a message which was illustrated by a timeline reaching as far back as Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation.

Ultimately the techniques the USIS employed suggest that repairing the damage caused by educating Africans – who were assumed to be more vocal about racial inequality – was easy. The USIS sought to exploit the weakness of the so-called African character, namely their susceptibility to manipulation which required preparation for democracy. The USIS was willing to step in and provide those lessons, but in the meantime published a little comic in its newspaper called Did you Know, which always combined two depictions of trivial facts for instance about salmon or the length of the Mississippi river with a statement on how India

160 Summary, George Ball, “Report to the President on Sub-Sahara African Student Programs”, 13 October 1961, Papers President Kennedy, NSF, Box 2, f: Africa: General, 9/29/61-10/31/61, JFKL.

with its ‘free enterprise technique’ was out-producing ‘totalitarian communist China’ or how the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 had led to a massive amount of casualties.\textsuperscript{162}

Besides printing, the USIS staff in Accra also developed personal contacts. Nkrumah in particular was often approached after 1952 because he was the archetypical African leader the USIS wanted to promote in other parts of the continent: a US educated black man who worked towards a stable transition to self-government. A personal relationship with Nkrumah even made it possible for a USIS staff member to draft Nkrumah’s important anticommunist speech of 25 February 1954 in which he declared that active communists could not be employed within any section of the state, including administration, education, labour, information services, police and the army. The inflow of communist or Marxist inspired literature was monitored while Gold Coasters were barred from attending conferences behind the Iron Curtain.\textsuperscript{163}

It was these tactics, which the USIS only considered to be stepping stones to education, which caught the attention of the French ambassador to Ghana, Marc C. Renner in 1949 because they clashed with French thinking about cultural diplomacy. He saw USIS officers move into the biggest building of Accra, equip an impressive cinema, furnish a vast reading room with glossy publications such as \textit{Time Magazine} and produce sensational exhibitions. In short: ‘luxurious,’ but ‘mediocre’ propaganda.\textsuperscript{164} That judgment was the result of Renner’s belief that USIS activities were manipulative. He was convinced for instance that Nkrumah’s visit to Lincoln University in the US had been orchestrated. It made the USIS competitor a minor threat to French cultural prestige in Africa, which had barely been tarnished by the war. That lesson was drawn during an embassy party where indigenous chiefs told him they still admired France (illustration 2). For Renner the power to create a positive disposition was found in the cultural achievements, not in the way in which messages were conveyed. Manipulation, as he termed it, could not compete with the French culture, which had achieved grander things.\textsuperscript{165}


\textsuperscript{163} Semi-Annual report to NSC, “The Near East, South Asia and Africa (NEA)”, 16 July 1954, 6-7, RG. 306, P 253, Box 3, f: Reports to NSC, NARA; Secret report, “Communism in the Gold Coast”, [1954], CO 1035/120, TNA.


USIS activities within French West Africa itself, however, were seen as a more imminent threat because they ventured into the field of education, which France considered to be the bedrock of its colonial power. Already in 1950 the local French came into conflict with Perry N. Jester, the US Consul in Dakar, who also ran a small USIS post. Jester was direct and confrontational in the eyes of the French. He had harassed a religious leader, Ibrahim Diop, with questions about the tensions between Catholics and Muslims, anti-communism and Arab propaganda brochures. At the same time he had proposed cooperation in cultural matters behind the back of the French authorities. Diop played both parties against one another by informing the already irritated French authorities. Jester was replaced by Jane Ellis who assured the French Ambassador to Washington, Henri Bonnet, that she wanted to improve French-American understanding. France had to prevent the USIS from offering Africans an alternative route to a more civilised culture, a concern Jane Ellis seemed to understand when she promised to temporarily halt the promotion of university exchange programmes and even covered the exhibition windows of the cultural centre.166

All the while the department of social welfare and community development of the colonial authorities in the Gold Coast used the USIS to implement its programme. In February 1954, Disney films on health such as *Cleanliness Brings Health*, *Insects as Carriers of Disease*, and *Hookworm*, were ordered for showing in rural areas, without any concern for the potential destabilising effects of American film. Even when USIS advised against showing the films because people had been booing, the cinema officer of the public relations department in the Gold Coast still purchased them through the UNESCO coupon scheme.167 While the presumed limited grasp of African target audiences opened the door for misunderstanding from the perspective of USIS officers, it was a safeguard against undesirable ideas in British eyes. Meanwhile, France struggled to understand why the UK allowed the US to become a provider of social mobility, eroding the basis of colonial power. These differences about the

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166 Haut-Commissaire to ministre d’outre-mer, 6 September 1950, ministre de la France d’outre-mer to direction Afrique-Levant “activité Consul des USA Jester à Dakar”, 15 September 1950; Henri Bonnet to Robert Schuman, “Chef du Service d’Information américain à Dakar”, 20 April 1950, DAL, AOF 1944-1959, 34QO/4, AMAE ; Louisa Rice does not mention the conflict between Jester and the French authorities in Dakar. She paints Jester and Ellis as officers who made the case for an American cultural policy that was completely consistent with French interests. Documents in the French foreign affairs archives, however, shows that Ellis was actually brought in to solve the problems Jester had caused, see Rice, “Cowboys and Communists.”

concrete effects of cultural assistance made cooperation between the settlers and the Americans possible.


**Anglo-American Cooperation in East Africa**

The settlers in Kenya, who under the pressure of the CO had created a new department of information in 1954, called upon the USIS for assistance. How exactly the new information department in Kenya was supposed to implement its expansive new mission was left to the judgment of local officers, because it was unlikely that the House of Commons would approve new funds for the hugely unpopular Kenyan settlers. The CO admitted that the information services faced huge practical difficulties, but continued to insist that the settlers should implement the guidelines from London, albeit in their own way.168

Drawing on General Gerald Templer’s counterinsurgency experience in Malaya, Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Lyttelton advised that the indigenous population needed to be made more aware of the benefits that British imperial rule had delivered. Templer considered winning the hearts and minds of the people to be 75% of the struggle,

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making information an essential component of good governance, rather than simply a way to improve the negative image that was created by the internment of Mau Mau fighters. Harold Ingrams, the adviser on information services and the expert on communism at the Colonial Office, backed that strategy because he believed that this approach could prevent communist propaganda from gaining traction. The African populations, however, did not believe the settlers or the British had their developmental interests at heart, which even led British Council officials to be identified by Africans as a covert communist organisation. In their imagination, only outsiders would be willing to provide them with educational assistance.\textsuperscript{169}

The CO entrusted Thomas Garrett Askwith, the leader of a small group of liberal-minded settlers and co-founder of the multi-racial United Kenya Club, with the responsibility of devising an information approach that would appeal to African target audiences. He was therefore sent on a study trip to Malaya in the summer of 1953. The principal lesson he drew was that the target audience needed to be given concrete evidence that the government was working to advance development. The ‘multi-racial’ state therefore became a central public relations theme. It was a societal model in which Africans and Europeans would work together, albeit, with the settlers firmly behind the wheel and African votes carrying less weight.\textsuperscript{170}

To convey this message, the settler government believed that Africans needed to be lectured like children. In the racist imaginations of the settlers, this unsophisticated technique was found to be suitable for the peoples they were confronted with. Most cynically, a lecture series was organised in the detention camps – the so called ‘reserves’ – where the Kikuyu were detained in brutal conditions. In March 1954, British Council official Richard Frost for instance, worked in three different reform schools in the Nyeri Reserves where he showed films explaining the structure of an English village and gave a series of talks about life in Britain. According to Frost, the ‘resisters’ who had been forced to attend became gradually more interested in how the UK had become prosperous. Frost describes himself as a pleased schoolteacher who believed that, because of his teaching skills, he had been able to sew


\textsuperscript{170} Elkins, \textit{Britain’s Gulag}, 110–111; Memorandum, “The work of the African Information Services in Kenya”, 8 September 1953, Memorandum, “Information to the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru in Central Province”, 9 September 1953, CO 1027/40, TNA.
doubts into the minds of his audience, making a more ‘constructive education’ which fitted Western norms possible.\(^{171}\)

The lecture approach returned in a colourful series of pamphlets in Swahili designed to explain how the settlers helped the people of the colony. The first booklet in the series, *Serkali Inakusaidai*, contained a lecture given by a member of the Kenya forest department to African students at a School in Kabete (illustration 3). Another booklet explained why education was being provided, but the text made no effort to appeal to its audience. Readers were spoken to and did not have a say in how goals were to be reached: ‘The increased and improved facilities for education which government is placing before the African means that in the near future Africans will be graduating [and] tried out in these posts of responsibility and it is up to them to show that they can carry out their duties’,\(^{172}\)

The African Information Services of the Settlers informed but did not appeal, turning every media outlet into a lecture. This also made broadcasting the strongest weapon to influence ‘the minds of Africans’. Gramophone recordings were supplied to the mobile information vans to assistant with the rehabilitation of the Mau Mau detainees at the Athi River. Films borrowed from other sources were first viewed for suitability by a selection committee and turned into lectures by the presence of a live commentator. By providing a magnetic sound strip projector the service was able to project a film in different parts of the colony simultaneously and have an appropriate commentary in the local vernacular.\(^{173}\)

Multimedia material could never reach African minds without being adequately explained.

The Kenyan settlers – normally wary of outside influence – had no problem with the presence of American officials in East Africa. They even encouraged US officials to execute their development programmness so the settlers could reach the goals set by the Beecher Report of 1950 and the East and Central Africa Study Group of 1953, which had both recommended the expansion of African education, particularly on an intermediate level.\(^{174}\) They asked the International Cooperation Administration to provide teachers and trainers, who had a professional teaching qualification as well as experience in woodwork, metalwork

\(^{171}\) Confidential Letter, Richard A. Frost to Frederick Crawford, 30 March 1954, BW 95/3, TNA.

\(^{172}\) Report, “Information to the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru in Central Province”, 24 September 1953, CO 1027/40, TNA.


and other handicrafts. After careful screening by the settlers these candidates were employed at the Royal Technical College in Nairobi.  

The officials at ICA and USIS Nairobi, had their own reasons to cooperate with the settlers. For one, the state of emergency had made work impossible. To publish an English-Swahili version of *The Negro in America Life* with printing operators that were being called to military service, USIS began to rely on the East African Literature Bureau that had been founded in 1948 as part of the Colonial Welfare and Development effort. Nonetheless, even the Literature Bureau was forced to rely on the British Council because the latter assisted small libraries in Kisumu and Mombasa. Apart from the rat infested Pumwani Hall, Nairobi had no functioning library in 1954 besides the bookshelves at the USIS and the Indian posts. Like the USIS, the BC had its own reason to intervene. They were not interested in the Mau Mau, but wanted the hand over the libraries in Mombassa and Kisumumu ‘at some time in the future’.  

The most important reason for the USIS to cooperate were newspapers, such as the *Eastern Nigerian Guardian*, which had ridiculed the American efforts in support of civil rights. By supporting the multi-racial idea, John Noon hoped to lend more credence to American efforts to stimulate the coexistence of different races. With no prospect of self-government, educational exchanges turned into a promotional tool for the American image. American Consul General Edmund J. Dorisz wanted to address the lack of trained leadership, not only to foster stability, but also because the lack of knowledge about the US heightened the risk of perpetual misunderstanding.  

Educational exchanges were therefore not offered to promising Africans, but to officials of the settler government, such as Michael Blundell in 1952 in support of his plans to study American civil rights efforts as an example for multi-racial cooperation in Kenya. USIS-Nairobi further participated in a colony wide drive to raise funds for the Girl Guide Association of Kenya, by throwing a party and presenting an exhibition of American square

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dancing, opened by the wife of the governor. In the racial pacification of Kenya, the US could lead by example.

USIS participation in the education department’s first inter-racial physical education training course stressed this point further, by sparing no effort to impress and entertain the audience. Noon spoke on the American child to a group of 75 European, African and Asian teachers. His colleague, Shirley Smith addressed the same group on American women while sports films and the USIS film *Choosing a Career* were employed as a teaching aids. A third lecture was devoted to the fundamentals of American square dancing and afterwards the teachers were asked to invent their own dance to perform in front of the rest of the class.

In contrast to the self-interested, effective US-settler tandem, French activities in East Africa were limited to presenting the marvels of French culture. The French consul in Nairobi, A.G. Morand, had been trying to ride the wave of educational expansion to promote the French language. He offered books to the Royal Technical College in Nairobi, which was planning to open its doors in 1956 in the hope that some students would become interested in learning French. His attempt to increase the funding for the French school in Zanzibar, built in the 1930s to uplift the tiny French speaking community at the Comoros, failed. His successor Pierre Meyer, again tried to raise the funds of the school from 12,000 shillings to 20,000 shillings in 1956 and requested a teacher from France.

The repeated refusal to invest in East Africa – and in that way expand French influence – underscores that French cultural assistance in Africa was a defensive move aimed at keeping competitors out of France’s colonies. Limited by his own understanding of education, as a way to provide Africans with the prestige of higher cultures, Morand interpreted the choice of settlers in Kenya for technical education as a conscious strategy on the part of the Kenyan government. A more academic formation would only be a breeding ground for revolts. Unlike the settlers, who cooperated in a carefree fashion with the Americans, the


French understood that education was about more than development. It was about colonial power. Through the lens of the international scramble, it is clear that the often-described anti-Americanism of the settlers only grew gradually as their situation became more dire.\textsuperscript{182}

Illustration 3 and 4: On the left, a pamphlet on education produced by the information department in Kenya, outlined the efforts that had been made to educate the African population of the territory. The government also produced pamphlets that were intended for the settlers and vilified the Mau Mau insurgents. As the white population was advised to keep an eye on their gun, the Mau Mau insurgency was also delegitimised by demonising the insurgents. Source: Pamphlet, “Serkali Inakusaidia...Kazi Ya Askari Polisi Wa Kenya”, S.d., Pamphlet, “Guard Your Gun”, S.d., CO 1027/40, TNA.

\textbf{Ameliorating the Developmental Wasteland of the Belgian Congo}

By contrast, France was more interested in the Belgian Congo. Even though it was not a French territory, the importance of the French language, the vicinity of the French territory Congo-Brazzaville on the other side of the Congo river and its strategic position in the heart of Africa motivated Paul Lorion, the new French consul, in 1954 to coordinate the activities of the different centres of the Alliance Française in Leopoldville, Luluabourg, Matadi, Elisabethville, Usumbura, Stanleyville and Bukavu.\textsuperscript{183} Up until then the Alliance Française

\textsuperscript{182} Horne traces anti-American sentiment back as far as mid-1928, however the situation was more complex, see Horne, \textit{Mau Mau in Harlem?}, 41.
\textsuperscript{183} Letter, Paul Lorion to Georges Bidault, “Alliance Française au Congo Belge”, 7 April 1954, Afrique Pays A à D 47-57, f: Congo-belge, AF.
had mainly serviced the local French community, despite French anxiety about the American presence. Like the DGRC, the Alliance Française organised very few cultural events, such as theatre shows or art exhibitions which highlights an important aspect of the high culture approach as a French strategy of cultural diplomacy. Africans were considered to be interested only in the French culture as a means of social mobility and they were certainly not expected to be developed enough to appreciate genuine examples of French culture.

The challenging situation of the Congo, where the watchful eye of the Belgian authorities made communicating with the African populations extremely difficult, also highlights a particular aspect of the methods of the United States Information Services, namely how references to modernisation theory were used to reconcile the American desire to support self-government as well as the European powers. Contrary to what Kenneth Osgood has argued, the public diplomacy operation was not confined to the minimum necessary for a holding operation against Soviet intrusion. On the contrary, USIS officers cleverly played on developmental clichés that were Harboured by the colonial authorities. Like Eisenhower, USIS-Leopoldville found the Belgian authorities to be paternalistic because they made no effort to convince Africans of the need for progress.

Arthur S. Alberts developed a public relations theme that he summarised as ‘what is good for the African helps all’. He believed that in this way he could convince both the Belgian authorities and the Congolese of his good intentions. In its communication USIS-Congo emphasised that the African population had to accept ‘responsible guidance’, because even the more evolved Congolese – l’évolué – were considered to be slow, lazy, emotional and unable to fully comprehend democracy. Furthermore the USIS also planned to employ informational materials which were specifically designed to ‘influence the African away from half-baked attitudes and toward maturity.’

By supporting the nascent development efforts of the colonial government USIS hoped to obtain the trust of the Belgians. USIS health and hygiene films were distributed by the Belgian Congo Information Service and USIS even subscribed to the myth perpetuated by the Belgian colonial government to acquire legitimacy, namely the idea that Leopold II had liberated the Congo from the Arab slave trade. Without reservation, the American public

185 For the argument of the ‘holding operation’, see Osgood, Total Cold War, 127.
186 Foreign service dispatch, USIS-Leopoldville to USIA, “Covering Despatch for USIA Classified Despatch No. 30”, 30 June 1954, 4, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, NARA; The Belgian colonial government had established a system in which Africans received a degree which ‘proved’ that they were more ‘evolved,’'évolué.
affairs officer (PAO) filmed a ceremony at a monument that was dedicated to Belgians who had fallen in the war against the Arab slave traders in Maniema.

Once USIS had gained the trust of the colonial authority, in 1953, it could focus on African target audiences and cultivate what it considered to be a developmental wasteland that was ‘wide open to any serious cultural activity’. The British Council had left the office founded during the war while local activities such as the concerts of Radio Congo Belge and overpriced art exhibitions attracted only a few visitors.  

The USIS, conversely, began to design its information material to bring ‘the African away from half-baked attitudes and toward maturity’. Because the so-called psychology and degree of advancement of the Congolese was considered to be lower than in other parts of Africa, due to the Congo’s relative isolation from the West, some caution was required. To head that challenge, the PAO even contemplated cooperating with Pepsi cola, because it was selling 48,000 bottles per day in the Leopoldville area and in that way provided the only flicker of civilisation. By providing cultural assistance to the African population and convincing the Belgian authorities that this would foster a better grip on the African peoples, USIS officers were able to service both groups.

In short, the power of culture, the question of how exactly public diplomats thought their operation would create influence, was not only a matter that drew the attention of armchair theorists. In the beginning of the 1950s, it became the single most important factor shaping the trans-Atlantic relation on the ground in Africa. The settler government and the CO, for instance, believed that information could only be effective if it was clearly explained. Therefore they considered the American operation in Ghana and Kenya to be innocuous and even beneficial.

The French for their part were suspicious of the Americans because they held a radically different view on the way in which education affected African attitudes. In the American logic, education created responsible citizens. Students acquired the critical thinking skills necessary to oppose demagogues. Most French officers, by contrast, had a keen eye for the social function of a diploma due to the tradition of *évolués*. Education – particularly in the French language – was about acquiring access to a higher form of culture and consequently prestige for African peoples. In that way, local elites remained wedded to France. When the

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188 Foreign service despatch, USIS Leopoldville to USIS, 28 June 1954, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, Box 1, NARA.
US appeared to offer an alternative educational path, the French could only conclude that they did so in order to supplant the French.

Conclusion: Taking the Sting out of Transition

In 1899 the popular magazine *McClure’s* published Rudyard Kipling’s poem, ‘The White Man’s Burden, the United States and the Philippine Islands’, a sombre warning of the cost of empire, but also a plea for the US to take up its responsibility and encourage the cultural development of the indigenous population. With Eisenhower’s ascent to the presidency, the US became more willing than ever to address that burden.

Providing education to the Third World allowed Eisenhower to act in ways that reconciled his long-term aim of global stability and his short-term willingness to be ‘on the side of the natives for once.’ For Eisenhower, the direct communist threat took a back seat to paternalistically inspired concerns about leadership skills, particularly in the early 1950s when full independence was still only one of many possible futures. In this light, the often asked question whether Eisenhower favoured independence becomes less relevant: independence was inevitable in the eyes of the president, but only acceptable if the countries were stable and prepared for the task ahead. The US was more than willing to step in and provide this preparation.

Churchill and Mendès-France understood Eisenhower’s far-reaching plans and resisted his repeated requests to put their civilisational discourses into practice. But what Eisenhower explained away as old-fashioned colonial intransigence was in fact already a novel way of using cultural tools, suited to pacifying African populations who began demanding political and socio-economic rights after their participation in the Second World War. In its cultural centres, France provided limited access to its superior culture to distract from political claims. The absence of a French cultural counteroffensive did not reflect cultural anxieties as has been argued, nor can France be presented as the first country to have understood the merits of soft power and rely on its culture to build influence as others have claimed.

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190 This conclusion rejects the image of Eisenhower that has been presented in the literature. Based on a 1959 conversation between Eisenhower and de Gaulle, Brenda Plummer even claims that the Eisenhower administration was not prepared to shoulder the burden of educating populations, see Plummer, *In Search of Power*, 65.
191 ‘Elle contribue pourtant à façonner un milieu favorable à la réalisation de ses objectifs: c’est ce que les politiologues de Harvard appellent aujourd’hui le pouvoir doux (…) la France qui fut le premier pays au monde à recourir au soft power’, see Saint-Gilles, “La culture comme levier de la puissance: le cas de la politique culturelle de la France aux États-Unis pendant de la guerre froide”, 99; Dubosclard, *L’action artistique de la*
French culture and values, such as republicanism, were never promoted. Instead, the idea that the French culture was superior stood front and centre because this allowed French-educated African elites to derive a higher social status and made them eager to maintain their link with France. That is why France could continue its cultural operation while the claim of the universality of republican values was beginning to crumble.

The British in turn were confident that as long as they provided their territories with radio and press services they could maintain their influence. The discrepancy between the violence of Kenya and the cooperative attitude in Ghana was explained by the absence of information services in East Africa. The view that African subjects would accept British decisions if those choices were explained to them, allowed Churchill to believe he was holding on to African possessions while he presided over the liquidation of the British empire. Unease about Africans talking back to the colonial authority, as in the Mau Mau uprising, was rationalised by depicting them as sufferers of a mental disorder.

For the British and French the African peoples were only socio-economic subjects, while the American view conceived of the indigenous population of African territories as potential political agents. As public diplomats on the ground came to see the so-called ‘native mind’ as a threat to international security, they acted upon it by establishing educational projects designed to foster democratic citizenship. Because the British nor the settlers believed the ‘African mind’ was suited to western organisational models they welcomed USIS projects as development assistance. The French held comparable views, but considered education the source of their colonial power and therefore thought the Americans wanted to erode the basis of French influence. The single most important factor shaping the trans-Atlantic relation on the ground in Africa was therefore not the Cold War, but opposing conceptions of the power of culture, how exactly public diplomats thought that their operation would create influence.

With the possible exception of the Trinidadian intellectual, George Padmore, who vocally rejected the characterisation of Kenyatta’s political and socio-economic demands as the ramblings of ‘black savages,’ Africans were conspicuously absent in the European and American blueprints. Only the Western imaginations of ‘the African’ – as a racial term – structured Western decision making. Even a gathering of Third World leaders at the Bandung

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192 James, “‘What We Put in Black and White’: George Padmore and the Practice of Anti-Imperial Politics”, 194; George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa (London: Dennis Dobson, 1956), 255.
Conference would not push Western leaders to expand the role of African agency in their plans for a new Africa. It is this story that is explored in the second chapter.
2. Bandung as a Symbolic Battle

*Moral Strength, The Brown Man’s Burden and Western Assistance (1955)*

[The president] expressed the hope that it will heed the universal longing of the peoples of the world for peace and that it will seek a renunciation of force to achieve national ambitions. The president hailed the Bandung Conference as providing an opportunity, at a critical hour, to voice the peaceful aspirations of the peoples of the world.

-- Statement by John Foster Dulles, American secretary of state, 17 April 1955.\(^{193}\)

We estimate that the importance of the Bandung Conference is exaggerated and that the planned developments greatly surpass the real capabilities of the participating countries who often have diverging interests, different levels of economic potential and are still very weak militarily.

-- Note produced by the intelligence branch of the French government, 6 April 1955.\(^{194}\)

The mistakes of my country and perhaps the mistakes of other countries here do not make a difference; but the mistakes the Great Powers do make a difference to the world and may well bring about a terrible catastrophe.

-- Jawaharl Nehru, prime minister of India and prominent organiser of Bandung, 22 April 1955.\(^{195}\)

The Secretary of State said that he also felt some concern about the proposed Afro-Asian Conference. It seemed that one of the main items to be discussed would be colonialism and he felt that such discussions were somewhat out of date in the modern world.

-- William D. Allen, assistant under secretary of state for foreign affairs at the British Foreign Office, 25 November 1954.\(^{196}\)

Between 18 and 24 April 1955, Third World leaders gathered in Bandung, Indonesia, a ‘sleepy resort town blessed with mild weather’. A few days earlier, on 15 April, the prime minister of Indonesia, Ali Sastroamidjojo, had begun welcoming delegates from Asia and Africa on behalf of the five organising countries: Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia and Pakistan. At a meeting of the prime ministers of those countries at Colombo in April 1954, Sastromidjojo had proposed an Afro-Asian gathering and after a


\(^{194}\) ‘Peut-être estimera-t-on que l’importance de la conférence de Bandung a été exagérée et que les développements envisagés dépassent de beaucoup les possibilités réelles des Pays participants dont les intérêts sont souvent divergents et dont les potentiels économique et militaire sont encore très faibles,’ see Secret note, Rousset for secrétariat général du gouvernement conseil supérieur du renseignement commission du Sud-Est Asiatique, “la première Conférence afro-asiatique, Bandung – (Indonésie) 18 April 1955 par le commandant Rousset - S.G.P.D.N.”, 6 April 1955, 5, DAO, Généralités, 124QO/190, AMAE.


second meeting in Bogor, invitations were sent out for the Bandung Conference, a meeting often seen to be the birthplace of Third World solidarity.197

Here was the dream of a turning point in international affairs, an attempt to create some form of common ideology whereby Third World states could obtain a place within an international system still dominated by imperialism. Yet that sense of Afro-Asian solidarity was fragile. First of all there was disagreement about the principles that underpinned the gathering. At the Colombo meeting, discussions had centred on different ways in which ‘anticolonialism’ was to be understood. The Indonesians wanted to heighten their prestige and demanded a constructive discussion, for the Ceylon ministry of foreign affairs a ‘colour line-up against the Europeans’ was central, while the Pakistanis hoped to criticise colonialism and confront Nehru over the issue of Kashmir. Territorial, geopolitical, and economic interests also divided the delegates at Bandung. Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India for instance wanted the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attend because both countries shared a long border.198

The complexity of the conference produced a historiography in which myths were duplicated and subsequently debunked. Neither Nkrumah nor the leader of Yugoslavia, Joseph Tito, attended the conference. The Bandung Conference did not directly lead to the Non-Aligned Conference of 1961 in Belgrade and none of the delegates ever explicitly argued that anti-white sentiments united them.199 A ‘romantic’ reading of the conference has been replaced by three interpretations that extend from ‘realist’ to ‘racial,’ making it easy to see what Bandung was not about, but leaving questions about the conference agenda and the Western perceptions unanswered.

A first strand of scholarship, by political scientists in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s presented Bandung as the birthplace of the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1989, H.W. Brands claimed that ‘those in attendance and those watching Bandung signalled a refusal to accept the bipolar scheme, to join the superpower competition.’ Peter Willetts disagreed. For him the

198 Confidential, CRO, “Proposed Afro-Asian Conference to be held at Djakarta about February/March 1955, Factual Note”, 17 November 1955, DO 35/4665, TNA; The international system of the 1950s was shaped by imperial ideas, see Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, Lawrence Stone Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 1–27.
Belgrade Conference of 1961 and Bandung were two separate phenomena. A second group of new social and cultural historians has left Cold War claims behind and instead presents the meeting as based on racial solidarity. The starting point for scholars such as Penny Von Eschen, Jason Parker and Brenda Plummer is the American civil rights movement and Richard Wright’s notion of the ‘Color Curtain’. Bandung is presented as a turning point in the racialisation of international affairs. In response recent debates have tried to determine the precise meaning of Non-Alignment as a political project and the role of Bandung in its establishment.

This chapter, in contrast, presents the Bandung Conference as a pivotal moment in the ideological competition of the 1950s when competing plans for a world after empire were promoted by the former colonial powers, anticolonial leaders as well as the United States and the Soviet Union. Communist and capitalist proscriptions of the future rivalled pan-African, pan-Arab plans as well as the French the British development schemes which were promoted through diverse public diplomacy programs. Furthermore to understand what motivated the Bandung delegates the position of Africa has to be considered. A re-examination of archives in France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Ghana and Belgium suggests that references to ‘racial solidarity’ and the Cold War were part of a comprehensive and ambitious project to end the nativist inferiority complex and expose colonial hypocrisy. The writings of liberations thinkers such as Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor, and Franz Fanon crystalized the core concern of anticolonial leaders. Fanon’s definition of the Third World as a project that

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consciously rejected the notion that non-whites were unfit for self-government was vital and produced two shared aims.\(^{203}\)

Firstly, the delegates realised that their efforts to obtain a seat at international negotiating tables would amount to nothing if they did not expose the hypocrisy of the civilising mission. The claim that the non-white peoples of the world were unfit to govern themselves was rejected as a myth. Imperial intervention had led to exploitation and destruction, hardly examples of good governance. In his opening speech the Indonesian president, Sukarno, pointed out that real statesmanship needed ‘to be based upon the highest code of morality and ethics’ rather than a drive to control the world.\(^{204}\) Only Third World nations, who had spiritual, moral and political strength on their side could successfully promote those norms.

Secondly – less notably – the Bandung delegates wanted to succeed where the imperial powers had failed and deliver on the promise of economic development as a way to speed up the independence process, particularly on the African continent. Not only did the conference attendees endorse Algerian independence and the struggle against South African Apartheid, they also launched calls to bring expertise and knowledge from Asia to Africa. Educated at British public schools, leaders such as the Indian prime ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru and John Kotelawale, the prime minister of Ceylon, subscribed to the western discourse of premature independence: independence could only be granted after sufficient preparation. The independent Asian nations of the Bandung coalition therefore had the duty to take on what the Asian-African Conference Bulletin termed the ‘Brown man’s Burden’.\(^{205}\)

Even though the delegates could not agree on a programme for practical support, it was the critique on botched Western-led development that caught the attention of France, Britain and the US. Western concerns about a possible propaganda victory for anticolonial voices or the People’s Republic of China were soon overtaken by the issue of aid. In the Western view, the Bandung delegates had not rejected colonial guidance, but rather had complaints about the aid they received. Doubts about the sincerity of the colonial authorities and their commitment to development needed to be addressed. The conference prompted the UK, the US and even

\(^{203}\) Vijay Prashad has used Fanon's definition in an uncritical way and describes the different conferences that dealt with an anticolonial theme, for instance in Brussels in 1928, Bandung in 1955 and Belgrade in 1961 as expressions of the same Third World project, see: Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 314; Prashad, *The Poorer Nations: A Possible History Of The Global South*, 1–13; Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World*, xv – 1.

\(^{204}\) Quoted in memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, “Subject: Bandung Conference of April”, 1955, 12 May 1955, 3-4, OCB Central File Series, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-1961, Box 86, f. OCB 092.3 (File #2) (2) [April-November 1955], DDEL.

France to reaffirm their commitment to colonial development and come up with better plans for educational assistance and foreign aid.

While the call for morality in international affairs has been extensively studied, Bandung’s developmental aspiration has gone unnoticed, which has led historians to conclude that the Afro-Asian meeting had no effect on Western decision making. Even Odd Arne Westad – who puts economic development at the heart of post-war international relations – writes that the final communiqué’s main significance stemmed from the ten principles it prescribed. Historian’s emphasis on race or the Cold War mirrors the observations of contemporary commentators. Homer Jack, George McTurnan Kahin and Filipino diplomat Carlos Romulo were all struck by the bold rejection of the Cold War, while Richard Wright wanted to cast his own struggle for civil rights in a more international light when he wrote The Color Curtain. However, initial concerns about anticolonial propaganda were overtaken by the fear to be outcompeted by the independent Asian nations as the primary providers of development assistance. It is argued that Asian paternalism towards Africa fundamentally influenced the conference agenda and pushed Western officials to increase their commitment to assistance.

The Road to Bandung: The Conference as a Propaganda Challenge

Before Sukarno and Nehru had even uttered a single word, countries outside of Asia and Africa began assessing the plans on the table and were concerned about this initiative. Even after the preparatory meeting in Bogor in December 1954 British Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd, wanted to discourage the participation of the African colonies. Convincing the leaders of British Africa would not be easy, CO officers noted, because a refusal to accept this invitation would turn those African leaders into ‘stooges of the West’, Doubts lingered until January 1955 when William Allen of the Foreign Office was informed by a French colleague that they would also bar the leaders of their territories from going. When in that same month the State Department backtracked on its original decision to encourage participation, the British took the necessary steps and approached Nkrumah.
The Western powers did not believe the delegates would be able to turn the conference into a success, let alone set up a third bloc. The French foreign affairs ministry informed Prime Minister Edgar Faure that a meeting would result in neverending discussions. The US and the UK for their part were concerned with what might happen now that inexperienced and ‘racially unfit’ leaders had convinced themselves they were able to perform on an international stage. After a conversation with Roger Makins, the British ambassador to Washington, Dulles began to fear that the conference participants would subscribe to any manifesto as long as its contents were racial and anticolonial. R.W. Parkes, counsellor at the British Embassy in Djakarta and principal British informant on the meeting, also questioned the skill of the organisers. At the Bogor meeting he had already been forced to sit through one of the worst shows of Indonesian dancing he had ever seen, in which Sukarno’s young son and daughter had participated. For Parkes, this betrayed a lack of knowledge about what constituted appropriate conference etiquette.

The US and the UK did not take the delegates seriously, but unlike the French they dreaded the propaganda fallout. British decolonisation in Africa could be cast as a hoax and the American gospel of an ‘orderly transition’ might be presented as support for the colonial powers. Some form of action was therefore required.

**American Low Profile in the Run Up to Bandung**

During a meeting at the State Department, it was clear that no-one really knew how to respond to this challenge because Bandung presented US policymakers with an unsolvable propaganda problem: how could they confront Soviet allegations without being accused of exporting the Cold War to the Third World, a key concern of the Bandung delegates? An Afro-Asian working group under the chairmanship of William S.B. Lacy, US ambassador to Korea, recommended a restrained approach in which the US should only take a public position on specific issues without referring to the conference itself. Instead of sending out

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209 Outgoing telegram, 30 December 1954, DAO, Généralités, 124QO/190bis, AMAE; Note pour monsieur le president Edgar Faure, 14 February 1955, DAO, Généralités, 142QO/190ter, AMAE.

210 Confidential, Roger Makins to FO, 8 January 1955, FO 371/116975, TNA; Confidential letter, R.W. Parkes to Anthony Eden, 7 January 1955, FO 371/116975, TNA; The British High Commissioner in India had initially also thought that the proposals for a conference were ‘half-baked’ and almost impossible, due to the conflicting interests of the countries involved, see Nicholas Tarling, ‘“Ah-Ah”: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955”, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 23, no. 1 (March 1992): 77.

information officers, the plan was to keep in close touch with US allies. With little available information and without a conference invitation, Dulles could only conclude that Bandung would raise many ‘interesting problems’ particularly in the area of propaganda.\footnote{Memorandum from the acting chief of the reports and operations staff (Gilman) to the secretary of state, “Subject: Main Points of Attached Status Report on Afro-Asian Working Group”, 8 February 1955, \textit{FRUS 1955-1957}, Vol. 21: East Asian Security, 29-30; Memorandum of Discussion, “230th Meeting of the National Security Council”, 5 January 1955, AWF, NSC Series, Papers as President 1952-1961, Box 6, f: 230th Meeting of NSC, DDEL.}

Much to the irritation of the State Department, the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) – which had to match policy decisions with public diplomacy operations – disagreed and established a working group of its own with the aim of fostering ‘Free World awareness’ and putting the Soviets psychologically on the defensive. Charles Douglas Jackson, Eisenhower’s advisor for psychological strategy, also weighed in with his advice. He considered the meeting in Indonesia to be diplomatically insignificant and therefore an excellent public diplomacy opportunity. Not only could the first steps be taken towards an ‘earth-wide racial reconciliation’, but the Soviet allegations of American imperialism could also be countered. A public diplomacy operation had to prevent China and North Vietnam from dominating the conference, make India the leading power instead of China and inspire a resolution that would condemn ‘Soviet colonialism’ in Eastern Europe.\footnote{Secret memorandum for the under secretary, 12 January 1955, OCB report, “Reactions to the Afro-Asian Conference (Compiled by the OCB Staff)”, [1955], RG. 59, A1 1586C, Lot 62D430, Box 35 f: Bandung, NARA; Report, “The Bandung Conference Thoughts and recommendations”, [1955], Jackson, C.D.: Papers, 1931-1967, Box 78, f: N-Misc. (1), DDEL.}

He wanted to draft speeches in which a new economic plan for Asia was announced and sympathy for the democratic development of Africa and Asia expressed. At the same time, Jackson underscored how important it was to avoid the appearance of American interference in local politics. This requirement shelved Nelson Rockefeller’s proposal for a presidential speech, particularly after Dulles judged a press conference or an informal address to be more effective because it created less exposure. Eventually, Jackson’s suggestions made it into a collection of press statements on the economic programme for South and East Asia. The choice of a boring press statement had to avoid the appearance of a propaganda effort or interference.\footnote{Report, “The Bandung Conference Thoughts and recommendations”, [1955], Jackson, C.D.: Papers, 1931-1967, Box 78, f: N-Misc. (1), DDEL; Memorandum for Honorable James C. Hagerty, 6 April 1955, Memorandum for governor Sherman Adams, 6 April 1955, Official file, “Proposed Comments by the president on economic program for South and East Asia, 1953-1961”, 31 March 1953, Memorandum for governor Adams, “Subject: Proposed Presidential Speech before the Bandung Conference”, 31 March 1953, Official File, 1953-1961, WH Central Files, f: OF 116 ff Asian – African Conference (Bandung Conference), Box 503, DDEL.}

The highlevel debates a few weeks before the Bandung Conference neatly capture the duality of the American approach to decolonisation. On the one hand, we have the officials at
the NSC and the State Department who considered colonialism to be one of the two major propaganda problems, together with peaceful coexistence. When the State Department reflected on its interests in Africa, it listed the wide variety of resources it offered such as chrome, rubber, uranium, diamond, but ultimately concluded that the long term attitude of the people provided the key to the continent.  

On the other hand, Eisenhower and Nixon could not bring themselves to see the Bandung participants as legitimate diplomatic interlocutors. In the NSC both men guffawed when Eisenhower remarked ‘facetiously’ that the US could best handle the situation by handing out a few thousand dollars to each of the delegates. He remarked, again teasingly, that the NSC could approve any method ‘up to but not including assassination of the hostile delegates’. Using the CIA expression of ‘plausible deniability’ and labelling the Third World leaders as bribable politicians, Eisenhower sarcastically signaled that he considered these people to be unprepared for a role on the world stage.

The Eisenhower administration did not want to physically eliminate the Bandung participants, nor did it ignore the potential to win the goodwill of Third World nations in the run up to the conference as has been argued, most prominently by Jason Parker. On the contrary, the proactive American attitude reflected a deep understanding of the PR problem at hand. The State Department, the OCB, Jackson and Rockefeller all tried to come up with an acceptable propaganda theme, but struggled with one key problem: vocal support for the anticolonial project could be interpreted as insincere and merely an attempt to export the Cold War to the Third World.

On 28 February 1955, the US missions abroad were instructed to coordinate their actions with their British colleagues. The only effective approach was an indirect one, working with allies and journalists. The head of the nineteen-strong Philippine delegation,

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Carlos Romulo, was approached and encouraged to voice his pro-Western and pro-American views, while American journalists were phoned and asked to report on the conference.  

*The British Problem of African Attendance and Nkrumah’s Diplomatic Game*

Henry Hopkins, the UK minister of colonial affairs, agreed with the American analysis. The Afro-Asian meeting would be a ‘bogus affair’ but its propaganda impact could be damaging for British interests in Africa. In the British analysis the Bandung organisers were obsessed with obtaining publicity, which forced the FO to welcome the conference publically as it worked to prevent the leaders of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but particularly Nkrumah, from attending. The State Department approved. The propaganda experts of the UK bureaucracy believed a communications strategy, whereby a list of apologies for colonialism were promoted, would be ineffective. On 13 January 1955, the Cabinet therefore approved a behind the scenes approach. An interdepartmental meeting decided that resolutions unfavourable to British interests as well as the emergence of an Afro-Asian bloc needed to be prevented while communism was to be discredited.

When Charles Arden-Clarke, the governor of the Gold Coast, went to talk with Nkrumah he was surprised to find that the leader of government business had already come up with an alternative. Nkrumah told the British representative that he did not want to go to Bandung himself, but he was keen to send a representative because non-attendance would lower the prestige of the Gold Coast. He charmed Arden-Clarke by suggesting that a Gold Coast representative could provide an antidote for anticolonialism by speaking up for the way in which the UK had treated the Gold Coast aspiration. The governor was swayed by Nkrumah’s proposals because it allowed for Gold Coast attendance without losing face, an important concern of the Colonial Office in particular.

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221 Telegram, governor to secretary of state, 8 January 1955, 2, Telegram, secretary of state to governor, 21 January 1955, FCO 141/5051, TNA.
The leader of the Gold Coast was playing a complex diplomatic game in which he publically abided with British demands while working behind the scenes. Nkrumah seems to have tested the British diplomatic waters by allowing K.A. Gbedemah, the minister of finance and number two in the government, to plant an article on a mission abroad which had to establish diplomatic ties with other countries. Gbedemah’s plan was a clear violation of the agreement with the UK which had left the governor in charge of external affairs. When the British swallowed Nkrumah’s story – that Gbedemah had acted as a lone ranger – he knew he had enough leeway to act independently.

In a letter to Nehru that had not been approved by the governor, he wrote about the efforts to arrange personal meetings with Kojo Botsio, a leading figure in Nkrumah’s Convention’s People’s Party (CPP) and Gold Coast delegate. He was also more candid about the fact that the UK did not allow him to go: ‘the Governor is still responsible for the external affairs of the country, including all matters affecting relations with foreign states’, In his approved letter to Sastroamidjojo, by contrast, Nkrumah made no mention of any planned personal meetings. After his return, Francis Dei-Anang informed Arden-Clarke that he had taken an interest in what was going on behind the scenes but assured the governor’s secretary that he had not participated in those informal meetings. From the Bandung episode, Nkrumah emerges as a shrewd diplomat, which the British at the time, and historians since failed notice.

**French Optimism**

The French regarded Bandung in light of Indochina and North Africa and were angered when the FLN appeared at the conference and even obtained diplomatic recognition. However, in the months leading up to the conference, French officials believed that the resentment about the Asian ambition to gain prestige at the cost of Africa would outweigh the anticolonial rhetoric. The meeting was seen as an attempt to reattach Africa to Asia, which would

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224 The most recent account on the Western responses to the Bandung Conference still presents Nkrumah as someone who abides by British rules and even states that it was Arden-Clarke who had proposed to let a Gold Coast delegation participate, see Kweku Ampiah, *The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, UK and Japan* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007), 128.
exacerbate the overpopulation problem of Asia. A history of ‘assimilation’ made it hard for officials to see Africans as independent international actors, let alone a serious threat. Like the British, the French underestimated the diplomatic skills of the Gold Coast: Kojo Botsio’s visit to Nigeria was seen merely as a diverting personal distraction. Moreover, it led them to believe that Africans would come to see the problem as they did, in terms of Asian dominance. The French intelligence officer who had labelled Bandung the beginning of the end for the white race found few kindred spirits at the foreign ministry. The envoy the French government had sent out to Karachi, New Delhi, Rangoon, Bangkok and Saigon in mid-March, also concluded after a friendly conversation with Nehru that there was no cause for concern. Anxieties, which had been fuelled by the 1954 defeat in Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent loss of empire in Asia, were groundless.

Despite French apathy, British analysts had concluded that the French were anxious to insulate Africa from Asian influence. Jacques Viot, the French ambassador to London, had personally asked British officials if it was possible to prevent Ethiopia and Liberia from attending. When the French remarked to the British that African participation ‘made little sense either on geographical or ideological grounds’ they meant exactly that. The Foreign Office was wasting its time thinking about an African-Asian connection that simply did not exist. Even the minister of France d’outre-mer, Peirre-Henri Teitgen, who generally responded more quickly to anticolonial activity, was unconcerned.

The hasty conclusions the British drew from the French remarks betray a deep anxiety about their ability to control the situation. The French ambassador to Singapore wrote in January 1955 that the majority of the English on the ground struggled to understand the initiative. Unlike the French, the UK officials in Djakarta feared that the conference could

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226 ‘le menace l’Asie surpeuplée’ see Note for direction général des affaires politiques, “A/S: Conférence afro-asiatique”, [January 1955], DAO, Généralités, 124QO/190bis, AMAE.
228 Connelly quotes him, to show the racial fears in France, but generally speaking there was more confidence with regard to Africa, see Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 81.
230 Draft submission, “Afro-Asian Conference”, [January 1955], FO 371/116977, TNA.
231 Quote taken from: Tarling, “‘Ah-Ah’: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955”, 86.
increase the feelings of hostility towards the West in countries involved in the anticolonial struggle.²³³

This wait-and-see attitude has led many to conclude that France, the UK and the US did not take the Bandung Conference seriously, or that Eisenhower did not understand that the Third World nations could be won for the cause. In light of the ideological scramble it is clear that the delegates were not seen as independent actors on the international stage. However, the British and the Americans did not underestimate the propaganda appeal and worked to limit the propaganda fallout.

The Conference Agenda: The Brown Man’s Burden and Moral Strength

On the first day of the conference, Sukarno and Vice President Mohammed Hatta, accompanied by the five sponsoring premiers and some chief delegates such as Chou En-lai, Nasser and Romulo, entered the conference hall. The delegates came from 26 different countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, the People’s Republic of China, the Philippines, Siam, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Vietnam, India, Persia (Iran), Saudi Arabia, North Vietnam, and Yemen.²³⁴

In spite of this geographical diversity, the practical obstacles and internal divisions, the delegates in Bandung were united by the fact that all of them had been labelled ‘unfit’ to govern, a claim contested in the writings of Aimé Césaire, Franz Fanon, CLR James, but also George Padmore, Nkrumah and even Jomo Kenyatta. These liberationist philosophers made two key points. First, they deconstructed how colonial governments had instilled the native population with an inferiority complex. Second, they stressed the hypocrisy of the imperial enterprise, which had promised development but brought destruction. In 1955, the Martiniquan writer Aimé Césaire attacked the European claims of moral superiority. Europe bragged about its so-called achievements, the diseases it had cured, and the improved

²³³ Letter, consul de France à Singapour to DAO, “a.s. Entretien avec M. Dudley”, 31 January 1955, 6, DAO, Généralités, 124QO/190bis, AMAE; This contradicts the findings in Tarling, “‘Ah-Ah’: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955”, 110.

standards of living it had delivered, while in fact the Europeans had only taught men to have an ‘inferiority complex, to tremble, to kneel, despair and behave like flunkeys.’

In *Black Skin, White Mask*, Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist and key theorist of the Algerian War, rejected the so-called dependence complex. In his *Psychologie de la colonisation*, Octave Mannoni had argued that the Malagasy could not bear the fact that they were not white men. Fanon exposed this insight as false: the ‘white man’ had imposed discrimination and had robbed the non-whites of their self-worth.

Even Richard Wright – in defiance of the persona he has become in history books – realised that the meeting in Bandung was less about the racialization of international life and more about the elimination of ‘racial shame’. He tells the story of a woman who locked herself in the bathroom to whiten her skin, a literary move to demonstrate Bandung’s essential aim, namely the eradication of the ‘feeling of inferiority that the white man has instilled’.

Wright also asked the essential political question that preoccupied leaders at the conference: how could the force unleashed in Bandung be harnessed to mobilise a stagnant population whose soul had been corroded by the colonial enterprise? To address the nativist inferiority complex, the delegates wanted to mobilise moral, political and spiritual strength. At the same time they wanted to succeed where the imperial powers had failed and deliver on the promise of economic development as a way to speed up the independence process, particularly on the African continent.

**Moral Strength**

Sukarno stressed the central theme in his opening speech when he explained that the former colonies had little real military power. The only weapon at their disposal was ‘spiritual’ in nature. Addressing the representatives that filled the conference hall, Indonesia’s leader defined a particular form of soft power available only to those who had suffered the humiliations of colonialism in Africa and Asia:

> “What can we do? The peoples of Asia and Africa wield little physical power. Even their economic strength is dispersed and slight. We cannot indulge in power politics. Diplomacy for us isn’t a matter of “the big stick”. Our statesmen by and large aren’t backed up with serried ranks of jet bombers. What can we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs and mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. Asia and Africa,


238 Ibid.
1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half of all human population, can mobilize what I have called the moral violence of nations in favour of peace. 239

The newly emerging nations had little real power and the fight against colonialism would have to be fought on the battlefield of ideas and international norms. The primacy of ideas also stemmed from the devastating consequences of a possible violent conflict which would invite intervention and open the door to the use of atomic weapons. Not only was independence at stake, but also ‘the end of civilization and even of human life.’ Sukarno found an ally in the Iraqi prime minister, Mohammed Fadhil Jamal who argued that the world needed ‘ideological disarmament’, the end of the Cold War. Weapons of mass destruction had to be eliminated, but the morality in international relations had to be increased. Jamali made an impassioned plea for ‘moral rearmament and physical disarmament whereby men of all races and nations […] work for mutual harmony and peace.’ 240

When John Kotelawala described the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe as ‘another form of colonialism,’ he angered many (illustration 5). Not least because an analogy damaged the shared project of moral strength in which the Cold War in its entirety was rejected as immoral. Oscar Morland, the British ambassador to Indonesia, was pleased. When Kotelawala had stayed overnight at the British ambassador’s residence, Morland had assured him that the speech was a good move. Nehru though, gave the Ceylon delegate the cold shoulder at the party of the Gold Coast delegation, forcing him to mince his words a day later. 241 The Indian prime minister had been so shocked that he did not notice that Kotelawala also subscribed to the main theme of the conference when stating that the ‘argument of force’ had to yield to ‘the argument of spiritual power’. 242

If soft power was about the ability of one nation to attract others to its cultural values and consequently come round to its way of thinking – attractive power – moral force was about the power to mobilise support. 243 Césaire’s and Fanon’s analysis had to be taken seriously self-confidence had to be increased. Through emotional appeals and rhetorical flair,

242 Secret inward telegram, UK High Commissioner in Ceylon to CRO, 18 April 1955, FO 371/116981, TNA.
243 Nye, “Soft Power”, 160; See the introduction to this thesis for a critique of Soft Power.
calls for action and the potential promise of an increased weight on the international stage, anticolonial leaders tried to convince the West that they deserved a place at the table. At the same time they wanted to impress upon their populations that they were heading in the right direction.

Nehru’s and Sukarno’s show of statesmanship was not just a matter of self-admiration. Statesmanlike behaviour had to make them acceptable in the West and destroy the myth that they were unfit for self-government. Nehru’s ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, also known as ‘Panchsheel’, was not simply a move by Nehru to claim leadership of the Afro-Asian coalition, but a symbolic effort. Formulated in a trade agreement with China in April 1954, those principles included mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. In Bandung, Nehru declared that Asia and Africa were no longer made up of ‘yes-men’. He wanted to work with Europe on an equal footing and believed that the growing Asian influence had to be exercised in a direction that had integrity.244

‘Moral strength’ made the Western response to Bandung and the anticolonial project difficult. In his report on the conference, the British expert R.W. Parkes, expressed his disappointment about the fact that the achievements of empire had not received more recognition. The ‘Eastern nations’ as he called the Bandung participants, appeared to have been swayed by rhetorical tricks: ‘words, vital, hopeful, constructive words’ had proven to be more important than actions. He found that in Asia actions did not necessarily speak louder than words and there was little gratitude. He realised that Nehru and his fellow statesmen wanted their former colonisers to acknowledge them as equals:

The East is no longer age-old, inscrutable, unchanging. It is young, eager, drunk with new nationalism and freedom, but also desperately anxious to behave with maturity and make a good showing before its elders if not betters.245

Additionally, as Portugal noted in a NATO meeting of May 1955, Bandung gave rise to an Afro-Asian mystique. The British embassy in Djakarta had already seen an example of this

during the conference when it was rumoured that the armistice in Dien Bien Phu of 1954, had come about under the impulse of the five Colombo Powers.\textsuperscript{246}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Illustration 5: The Prime Minister of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), John Kotelawala (middle, wearing a garland of flowers) with Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Indonesian Premier, soon after Kotelawala’s arrival at the airport of Bandung. Source: Pamphlet, “Bandung 1955”, [1955], RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 5, f: General – Bandung Conf, NARA.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{246} Memorandum, “Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council held at the Palais Chaillot, Paris, XVIe”, 10 May 1955, NATO/CR (55) 21, NATO; Confidential letter, British embassy Djakarta to FO, 30 April 1955, FO 371/116984, TNA.
The Brown Man’s Burden

As the conference went on, an alternative to Western-led development emerged, most eloquently described in an article reprinted in the *Asian-African Conference Bulletin* entitled: ‘The Brown Man’s Burden’ (illustration 6). By inverting the relationship that had been envisioned in the ‘White Man’s Burden’, the author called upon the free nations of Asia to do what the West had refused: pass on their experience to solve the ‘problems in administration’ and invest in ‘underdeveloped economies’. The civilising mission needed an alternative since the colonial promises of ‘partnership’ had proven to be false, while the ‘progressive realisation of self-government’ had only been used to ‘soften the reality of exploitation.’

The journalist succinctly summarised the – implicit but pervasive – development agenda of the Bandung delegates. Many of the Colombo powers shared the belief that an orderly transition depended on being well prepared. Crucially different, however, in their view was a commitment to address instability instead of exploiting it: ‘The brown man’ also ‘had a burden to carry’, because unrest in one region threatened everyone. Kotelawala for one emphasized that states liberated from colonialism had to be assisted to ensure they would not relapse into ‘other forms of servitude’ and that those who had won their independence had a ‘solemn duty’ to offer knowledge and expertise.

In his closing speech, Nehru presented Europe, Asia and America as interconnected and important areas in the world, while he spoke about Africa as a continent of tragedy and slavery. He made a plea to take up ‘the brown man’s burden’, by arguing that it was up to Asia to help Africa. The final communiqué of the Asian-African Conference listed economic development as its first and most urgent priority as the participating countries pledged to exchange know-how, offer experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment to still dependent territories for demonstration purposes and organise regional training programmes.

For France the commitment to development was the final proof that the Asian powers wanted to replace the West, obtain a ‘rôle titulaire’ and become the new guides to

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independence. A few days before the conference opening the British had already stressed that a widely shared idea in Asian countries had to be contested, namely that Asian people were the ‘natural saviours and champions of the Africans against the white man.’ The unspoken notion of a brown man’s burden further added to the already existing tensions between Africa and Asia. In the run up to the conference, the term Afro-Asian had already been disliked in Asia because it gave Africans a sense of pride as the UK representative in Kathmandu noticed when talking to officials or reading newspapers.

The speeches at Bandung also strengthened Nkrumah’s ambivalence about the Afro-Asian coalition as a separate group in international affairs. He believed Africa’s problems could only be solved by establishing an African Union under his leadership, not by means of Afro-Asian solidarity. Furthermore, Nkrumah and his adviser George Padmore wanted to avoid a scenario in which European guidance would be supplanted by Asian paternalism. Padmore proposed a ‘conference to match Bandung on an African scale’ where Asians would be observers and Africans would take the lead. Contrary to Robert Vitalis’s claim, Nkrumah’s diplomatic manoeuvres were not only driven by the need to counteract Nasser. Although the Egyptian leader was a formidable opponent – with Radio Cairo and his message of Egyptian identity as a confluence of Arab, Islamic and African influences – Nkrumah dreaded Asian paternalism.

Even though the delegates never worked out a systematic approach to assist the dependent territories of Africa, the so-called Brown Man’s Burden is significant because it was a vital aspect of the conference’s appeal. Particularly, the accusation that the West had used aid as a pretext for exploitation struck a sensitive cord among the Western powers. In the Western imagination, Nehru and Sukarno had not become the standard bearers of a new anticolonial order, but competitors in the ideological scramble to provide cultural assistance. It was unacceptable that they would be outcompeted by these complete novices in foreign affairs.

Note for direction general des affaires politiques, “A/S: Conférence afro-asiatique”, [January 1955], DAO, Généralités, 124QO/190bis, AMAE ; Also, the French ambassador in a conversation with Allen of the FO, see W.D. Allen to Alan Lennox-Boyd, “Afro-Asian Conference”, 6 January 1954, FO 371/116975, TNA.

Letter, FO to Middleton, [February 1955], DO 35/6097, TNA; Confidential letter, Embassy of Katmandu to F.S. Tomlinson, South-East Asia Department Foreign Office, 14 April 1955, DO 35/6098, TNA.


Vitalis argues that Nkrumah was only concerned with Nasser in his diplomacy surrounding Bandung and ignores Nkrumah’s concerns about Asian paternalism, see Ibid., 276; W. Scott Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 46.

Drawing Lessons: Bandung as a Question of Aid

As reports from Indonesia arrived, Western observers could breathe a sigh of relief. The inexperience of participants in Bandung had not led to undirected anticolonial anger or a propaganda disaster for the West. On 10 June 1955 the African section of French foreign affairs informed its personnel in Africa that its prediction had been correct: Africans were not sufficiently evolved to comprehend the abstract and imprecise issues that made up the world of international affairs. Likewise, the main report by Jacques Roux, the man who directed the section on Asia and Oceania at foreign affairs in Paris, saw the anticolonial discussions as a minor point. Instead he focused on the more realist aspects of the meeting: Nehru’s reputation
had been overshadowed by Chou En-Lai’s popularity. His proposal to negotiate with the Americans on Formosa had been a positive development.\textsuperscript{254}

In contrast to France, the Anglo-American officials apprehended the propaganda damage. At the State Department there was some concern about the trust Afro-Asian delegates had placed in the United Nations (UN). The US officials predicted that the institution would become used increasingly to force the issue of decolonisation. In general, however, the free world had scored a substantive success, according to the member of the OCB who sat down to evaluate the Conference. Important free world principles had been endorsed and anti-western or pro-communist statements avoided.\textsuperscript{255}

The Foreign Office agreed: alarmist predictions had been unwarranted. Francis Cumming-Bruce, the adviser on external affairs to the governor in Ghana, further concluded that the Gold Coast delegation had behaved in an exemplary fashion after a conversation with Dei-Anang in which the latter kept his informal diplomatic contacts a secret. The Gold Coast party, organised jointly with the British Council in Djakarta, was further cited as evidence. A newsreel and a short film on the recent elections had been shown to prove there was a benevolent side to colonialism. The ambassador in Djakarta noted that the Gold Coast delegation was partially responsible for the generally satisfactory way in which Britain emerged from the Conference.\textsuperscript{256} With their ‘command of English,’ but also their ‘general intelligence and good sense’ they were living examples of the British civilising mission.\textsuperscript{257}

\textit{French and American Cultural Assistance Fortified}

When Western observers began to dissect the speeches in Indonesia they came to a remarkable conclusion: the Bandung delegates had not rejected colonial guidance, but had


\textsuperscript{255}Confidential telegram, Roger Makins to FO, 12 May 1955, FO 371/116985, TNA; Notes, Geoffrey Caston, 24 May 1955, CO 936/350, TNA; Memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, “Subject: Bandung Conference of April, 1955”, 12 May 1955, WH Office, OCB central File Series, Box 86, f: OCB 092.3 (File# 2) (2) [April-November 1955], DDEL.

\textsuperscript{256}Tarling, ‘‘Ah-Ah’: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955”, 109.

\textsuperscript{257}Confidential letter, British Embassy Djakarta to FO, 5 May 1955, Memcon, F.E. Cumming-Bruce, “Record of Talk with Mr. Dei-Anang”, 2 May 1955, FCO 141/5051, TNA; quotes taken from confidential letter, British Embassy Djakarta to FO, 5 May 1955, FO 371/116984, TNA; Confidential letter, Djakarta to FO, 22 April 1955, FO 371/116981, TNA; The party was attended by Jawaharlal Nehru, his daughter Indira Ghandi, Indian diplomat Krishna Menon, Sudanese Prime Minister Al Azhari, the Lebanese diplomat Charles Malik, the prime minister and the economic affairs minister of Indonesia, the Liberian and Ethiopian delegations and John Kotelawala’s delegation.
complaints and harboured doubts about the sincerity to fulfil the imperial duty and pursue the economic and educational development of their colonies. The focus on the diplomatic and racial implications of the Afro-Asian meeting has led historians to conclude that the meeting did not affect French, British or American policies towards the Third World. However, that assessment overlooks how Bandung was transformed in the Western imagination from a propaganda problem into a development challenge during the course of the conference.\textsuperscript{258}

American officials did capitalise on the opportunity to seek out Third World goodwill by offering preparatory tools. The British began drafting a statement to reaffirm their commitment to a policy of a guided and orderly transition. Even within the French diplomatic apparatus Bandung forced a change. Leopold Senghor, deputy of Senegal and minister responsible for international cultural matters in Edgar Faure’s government, devised a plan to improve French cultural assistance. He had welcomed the conference as an opportunity for Africans and Asians to affirm their so-called ‘personality’. In a speech at the Congress of Black Writers in 1956, he defined the meeting as a chance to revitalise the African culture that had been so important in the development of European and American cultures.\textsuperscript{259}

\textit{Négritude} had been pioneered by Senghor and Césaire in the interwar period as a way to reaffirm ‘black’ values, art and culture which the French civilising mission had sought to repress. Through poetry and reflections on African art, written in French, Senghor deliberately attempted to counter the claimed universalism of French culture with his own claim to universalism for black culture.\textsuperscript{260}

At the same time, Senghor – in his role as minister in the French government – wanted to accelerate African progress by combining the French and African civilisations to foster African progress. On 30 April, only six days after the closing session, he informed his minister of foreign affairs, Antoine Pinay, about his plans to visit Nigeria, Sierra-Leone and the Gold Coast. He wanted to improve the French cultural assistance to Africa and devise a

\textsuperscript{258} The French response to Bandung has not been thoroughly assessed but there is agreement that Bandung generated little response in terms of policy, see Parker, “Cold War II”, 891–892; Tarling, ‘“Ah-Ah”: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955”, 108–111; Amady Aly Dieng, \textit{Les Grands Combats de la Fédération des étudiants d'Afrique noire de Bandung aux indépendances, 1955-1960} (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009), 1–15.


American officials were even faster in their response. Two days before the end of the conference on 22 April 1955, Andrew Berding, officer in the Bureau of Public Affairs of the State Department, sent around a paper entitled ‘Use of Nationalistic Aspirations in the U.S. Information Agency’s Operations’. Berding argued that particularly in Africa, communism had been successful in identifying itself with nationalism because of the presence of the European powers, a fact that the US had to take into account. The best hope for using nationalistic emotions was the enlargement of an educational programme for foreign youths and political reformers in ‘democratic techniques’. In that way the government structures of new nations could be improved.\footnote{Memorandum for Andrew Berding, 9 May 1955, RG. 59, A1 1587-M, Box 63, f: Nationalism, NARA.}

\section*{Colonial Publicity and ‘Bandung in Reverse’ in the UK}

The speed with which the State Department turned towards educational assistance contrasted with the difficulties to assess the diplomatic ramifications of the Afro-Asian meeting and suggest officials had given little thought to the development aspect of conference. In May 1956, the State Department could only recommend that their embassies refrain from taking a position until they had established how serious the Asian-African aspirations were.\footnote{Circular, 22 May 1956, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 5, f: Afro-Asian Conference - 1956, NARA.}

The British, on their part, revived a plan from 1954 to propagate the idea of British colonial achievement. The Bandung Conference taught Foreign Affairs Minister Anthony Eden that the target audience would not simply accept that message. The imperial enterprise needed to be actively propagated, goodwill consciously created and discontent about the poor level of foreign aid reduced. The British wanted to promote the benefits of imperialism together with the French and added an ‘appreciative reference’ to the other powers in Africa in their planned statement.\footnote{Confidential, Anthony Eden, “Colonial Publicity”, 6 August 1954, CO 1027/72, TNA; Letter, H T Bourdillon to ITM Pink, “Proposed General Assembly speech defending colonialism”, 24 September 1956, Goldsworthy, David, ed. The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957, \textit{BDEE} 1994, Vol. 3, Pt 1, p.408-411 (no.169); The tempering of American ideas was also in line with the way the UK responded to American ideas before the conference.} Furthermore, they decided that they could not only talk about
the forthcoming independence of the Gold Coast and the Federation of Malaya because the impression would be created that the UK wanted to cover up its problems in Kenya.\textsuperscript{265} The assertive Bandung Conference made the British information services – at least on the level of strategy – more political.

The British and the Americans were in agreement: Bandung had signalled a call for better development. That shared understanding motivated Dulles to contact the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, at Geneva in November 1955. He knew Macmillan supported positive imperial propaganda as an alternative to the obscure statements the UK government had been issuing since the interwar period. Already in August 1941 the British ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax, had told Dulles’s predecessor that the British government was considering a Colonial Charter on Britain’s colonial responsibilities.\textsuperscript{266} Dulles now returned to that idea and proposed a ‘Bandung in reverse.’

The ‘Bandung Conference in reverse’ idea was a final attempt to entice the British into making the statement on self-governance Eisenhower had wanted since 1953.\textsuperscript{267} Dulles proposed the organisation of a conference where the colonial powers would announce a plan that would lead to self-determination of their colonies and thus seize the initiative from the Soviet Union. Contrary to nonaligned leaders and historians who have cast Dulles as an inflexible Cold Warrior with little sympathy for the independence cause, the secretary of state saw himself as an adherent to the American tradition of anti-imperialism.\textsuperscript{268}

Once Western officials noticed that the positions taken at the conference were moderate, they renewed their commitment to high-quality foreign aid. Dissatisfaction with the substandard level of colonial assistance programs was considered to be the main complaint that arose from the deliberations in Bandung.


\textsuperscript{266} Morris, \textit{British Techniques of Public Relations and Propaganda for Mobilizing East and Central Africa during World War II}, 210.


\textsuperscript{268} Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, 14 May 1956, \textit{FRUS, 1955-1957}, Vol. 22: Southeast Asia, 267-268; For the beginning of a more nuanced interpretation of John Foster Dulles see Rakove, \textit{Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World}, 3. However, Rakove does not explain how Dulles’s negative statements about nonalignment can be understood as a positive American project for self-government.
Conclusion: Bandung as the Call for a Better Colonial Project

At least as important as the anticolonial aim to regain the morality within international relations and certainly more neglected in the history of the conference and the Western response was the influence of colonial developmental ideas. The notion that Asian nations had a responsibility to foster the development process in Africa to enable independence was pervasive among the delegates at Bandung. It even made Nkrumah hesitant about fully supporting the Afro-Asian project. Nonetheless, he had deceived the British in order that a Gold Coast delegation might attend the meeting. Nkrumah as the shrewd diplomat who wanted to establish diplomatic ties without getting caught up in the plans of Nehru, the British or Nasser, is something historians have missed.

The accusation that the West had been insincere about preparing nations for self-government was the first point Western analysts noticed in their post-conference reports. A plea to leave the territories in Africa and Asia, to Western ears sounded like a call for better assistance. Officials in the UK, the US and in France – where there had been little anxiety in the run up to April 1955, despite historian’s claims to the contrary – therefore decided to deepen their commitment and expanded their educational assistance schemes. That conclusion has faded into the background of historical understanding and has been buried by research on the diplomatic and racial aspirations of the conference. In the next chapter we explore the ideas and tools that sustained the renewed Western commitment to aid.
3. Hungry Minds

_The Question of Aid and the Challenge of African and Arab Nationalism (October 1955 - March 1957)_

One third of all mankind has entered upon an historic struggle for a new freedom: freedom from grinding poverty. Across all continents, nearly a billion people seek, sometimes almost in desperation, for the skills and knowledge and assistance.

– Dwight D. Eisenhower, second inaugural address, 21 January 1957.²⁶⁹

We believe that the constitutional advance of the Gold Coast has significance far beyond the boundaries of our country. […] This official publication, produced in London and distributed overseas, will show something of our determination to catch up with the deficiencies of the past and to meet the challenge of the future.

– Kwame Nkrumah about the Ghanaian periodical, _The Gold Coast Today_, 18 January 1956.²⁷⁰

The expansion of the French language and culture, once again, was the main purpose of my mission. All that [observations] demonstrate the urgent need to define – and implement – a French cultural policy.

– Leopold Senghor, report on his travel to Africa, October 1955.²⁷¹

[W]hat has been described as a new communist offensive has begun, particularly in the Arab areas of the Middle East: and it seems clear that while there may, as yet, be no evidence of a direct Russian offensive in the African Colonies, it is likely that the common pattern of communist expansion will be followed, and that advantage will be taken of affinities of language, religion, and geography.

– IRD analysis, 1956.²⁷²

In 1956 Alfred Bannerman, a Ghanaian student from Koforidua, attended the New York Herald Tribune Forum with 32 other students. When the group visited the White House, the president’s car pulled out of the driveway. As Alfred and the others cheered and waved, Eisenhower ordered his car to stop and allowed the students to swarm around the vehicle. Afterwards, Alfred proudly reported how he shook hands with the president and that Eisenhower had wished him and Ghana good luck. In the spirit of intercultural understanding, Pan American World Airways had given each of the young delegates free round-trip transportation and Bannerman was offered the opportunity to speak at the Atlantic City convention of the Association of School Administrators about the struggle for independence.


²⁷⁰ “A Message by the Gold Coast Prime Minister, the Hon. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah”, _The Gold Coast Today_, January 18, 1956, Vol. 1, No.1, 1.


²⁷² Draft telegram, [1956], CO 1035/7, TNA.
in the Gold Coast. Together with other delegates, he appeared on television shows that dealt with the literacy campaigns in the Gold Coast and Mexico.273

Eisenhower’s encouragement of private educational programmes was not limited to welcoming African students. The Bandung Conference had made Western officials realise that the peoples in the colonial and postcolonial world were not only hungry for food or material progress, they also had a thirst for knowledge. This vocabulary reflected a wider trend within the school of psychological modernisation theory, which argued that the psychological makeup of men and women could be modernised through education and with the help of other techniques. David McClelland, for instance, a social psychologist at Yale, published *The Achievement Motive* in 1953, which argued that the need for achievement was like the need for food, one wanted it more the longer one went without it.274

Responding to this alleged cry for aid required an expansion of cultural assistance schemes, something that Western public diplomats had already committed themselves to after Bandung. In the face of anticolonial nationalism, particularly Nasser’s propaganda campaign towards British East Africa and French West Africa, the promise of the civilising mission had to be reaffirmed. African peoples needed to be reassured that their developmental needs would be met, in spite of Radio Cairo’s proclamations.275 Eisenhower publically committed to the creation of a systematic cultural assistance effort in an important speech at Baylor University in May 1956. Leopold Senghor wanted to improve French language teaching to advance African societies. While the different offices within the British government increased the funding for the British Council, an institution founded in 1934 to organise British education and cultural activities abroad.

After 1955, cultural assistance became an integrated part of foreign aid doctrines towards Africa. It is argued here that the centrality of this type of assistance profoundly affected the foreign aid debate in the US. In 1956, direct aid to Africa amounted to less than two per cent of the total US economic aid abroad while aid-grants were only considered well into Eisenhower’s second term.276 But how can we explain why a fiscal conservative like Eisenhower pushed for aid to the Third World while at the same time economic aid in real

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numbers remained low? Eisenhower’s conviction that the Soviets attached more weight to political tactics, the free market ideology, and the fear that countries would remain permanently dependent as well as the bureaucratic infighting between traditionalists – who saw economic aid as a short term security measure, and progressives – who considered foreign aid as one part of a long-term development effort, have all been cited as possible explanations.  

Likewise, the scholarship on the French and British activities in the developing world approaches public diplomacy as a separate area of foreign policy preoccupied with propaganda wars. Ignoring the developmental ambition of many of these programmes, makes it difficult to explain how French language teaching or British educational work was expected to influence the direction of colonial societies. In the highly politicised French historiography of the early 1960s diplomat and writer Louis Dollot sparked a debate when he argued that the spread of the French language could yield economic and political gains, a claim rejected by Suzanne Balous. She argued that French cultural diplomacy was political but only in the sense that it tried to secure the position of the French language in international relations. Any possible commercial interest was outweighed by French development aid. New social and cultural historians leave that debate behind and instead accept that the goals of French public

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diplomacy were ‘schizophrenic’ and contained deep-rooted contradictions. It has even been argued that the civilising mission was never part of French public diplomacy.\(^{280}\)

Like their French counterparts, British historians only mention the British cultural efforts in Africa in passing, assuming public diplomats could never establish a bold propaganda campaign aimed at rejecting colonial nationalism or communism.\(^{281}\) Even Tony Shaw, who sets out to reinstate Anthony Eden as a decisive leader in the psychological warfare campaign during the Suez crisis, is forced to admit that a sustained effort to mobilise public support was difficult because the UK cabinet lacked the confidence to establish a key propaganda theme.\(^{282}\) James Vaughan’s book on British propaganda in the Middle East argues further that officials on the ground turned to the British Council and cultural diplomacy, in light of their failure to win over opinion because of a Cold War emphasis.\(^ {283}\)

In the aftermath of Bandung, cultural and educational assistance became the key instrument to heighten prestige because it was the only way in which the commitment to development, criticised at Bandung, could be reaffirmed. In the following the French, the British and the American doctrines are analysed and their implementation assessed. The commitment to feeding hungry minds makes it possible to explain Eisenhower’s ambiguous position on foreign aid.

Satisfying the Hunger for Education (1955-1956)

The question of whether officials were always able to distinguish nationalism from communism looms large in the background of a history about the Western engagement with the Third World.\(^{284}\) As already apparent in the early fifties, the Eisenhower administration was able to differentiate between the challenge of nationalism – a positive force if leaders were sufficiently prepared for the task ahead – and communist infiltration. In 1956 Eisenhower explicitly acknowledged that looking at the world through a Cold War lens was misguided. It was clear for Americans that ‘communism seeks to dominate or to destroy’ while ‘freedom


\(^{281}\) Osgood, “Words and Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and Eisenhower’s Propaganda War in the Third World”, 18.


\(^{284}\) This debate was stimulated in particular by Matthew Connelly who has convincingly rejected McMahon’s claim that the Eisenhower administration insisted on viewing the world through the distorting lens of a Cold War. McMahon’s view has remained influential however, see McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism”, 457; Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens”, 739–740.
seeks to cooperate and to help others build’, but Eisenhower cautioned that the people of the world were ‘not necessarily thinking in terms of opposing concepts of communistic dictatorship and of human rights and freedom.’ For the president, these two problems were interrelated but ultimately separate, and thus required a different response.

The only foreign policy operatives who credited the Soviet Union with some influence in Africa were to be found in the British Foreign Office. Encouraged by the Information Research Department (IRD), founded in 1948 to produce anti-Soviet material, the FO officials tried to convince officials at the Colonial Office that the ‘Bandung label’ was increasingly being used to camouflage communist inspiration. Based on a publication for the Soviet Academy of Sciences, they maintained that Egypt and North Africa were a ‘bridge’ for Soviet intrusion. For the British that image was especially potent because it played on an older image of Egypt as the entry port for Arab slave traders in the 1880s. Nonetheless, the assistant under secretary of the Colonial Office, Charles Carstairs, believed policy making suffered from the Foreign Office’s insistence on a ‘Russian drive’ in Black Africa. Particularly irritating was a meeting with the French who kept talking about the Soviet intrusion of the continent.

In April 1956, the British ambassador to Paris, Gladwyn Jebb had visited the Quai d’Orsay where they confirmed his suspicions about the communist threat in Africa. The French officials told him that – according to their information – the Soviets were planning to open an embassy in the Gold Coast after independence. However, the French threat analysis had revealed that the communist influence in Accra was non-existent. By feeding the anxiety of the British, the French believed they would be able to convince the UK of the need to contain Nkrumah’s emerging anticolonial discourse. Renner, the ambassador to Ghana, for instance had been furious about the anticolonial conference of Labour politician Fenner Brockway in Accra.

Officials at France d’outre-mer were concerned about Nasser’s pan-Arab influence in Chad and the Sahel. Young muslim religious leaders, so-called marabouts, were attracted to the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, which was not only a political centre but – more importantly – a place where the Arab language was being taught. Upon their return, the

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286 Confidential memorandum, IRD, 1 August 1956, CO 1035/17, TNA; “Soviet Penetration of Africa”, February 1956, FO 975/97, TNA; Minutes, Mr. Watson, Mr. Carstairs, 10 May 1956, CO 1035/126, TNA.

287 Letter, Gladwyn Jebb to Selwyn Lloyd, 31 October 1956, CO 1035/120, TNA.

288 Renner also refers to the negligible Soviet influence, see Letter, Renner to DAL, “Congrès anti-colonial”, 25 March 1955, DAL, Ghana 1953-1965, 50QO/6, AMAE.
students would have a better grasp of the Arab language, which would lead them to a better position in the French estimation. This was a problem for a colonial power that considered its language as a primary source of influence.\footnote{Report, “Note sommaire sur les influences pan-islamiques et pan-arabes en Afrique Noire Française”, [1956], 8, 2261/2, Affaires Politiques, CAOM.} Nasser was threatening the French position as the primary suppliers of upward social mobility.

For the Americans, the French, and the British, nationalism was not the only problem, but it was clearly the most urgent issue. The officers at the Foreign Office were the only ones who prioritised Soviet containment over the management of nationalism and economic development, but could not convince the other branches of the UK foreign policy apparatus. The expansion of the cultural assistance machine was considered to be the most appropriate response.

**British Colonial Publicity as a Dam against Hostile Ideas**

The three overseas departments – the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, and the Colonial Office – had decided by the summer of 1955 to expand their information work. Most important was the substantial expansion of the British Council work in the so-called underdeveloped countries. In 1954, the British Council officials had complained that the expansion of the radio and press services to the colonies took financial resources away from their own operation. Only a year later, they received a significant increase in funds, £271,560. This was a substantial amount in comparison to £133,850 for the COI, £130,000 for the BBC, £64,000 for the CRO, £27,500 for the FO Information Service and £23,000 for the CO Information Service.\footnote{Minutes, Watrous for Evans, 16 March 1954, CO 1027/74, TNA; Draft paper for OIS (Official) Committee, “The Overseas Information Services Prospects for Expansion in 1956/1957”, [1955], CO 1027/72, TNA; Report, CO, “Information activities undertaken by the Colonial Office in the African territories”, [1958], INF 12/978, TNA;}

The British Council was to promote and spread the British language overseas. Through direct teaching in institutes and with the help of recognised examinations, the Council tried to convince as many Africans as possible to learn English. In that way, British values were projected while at the same time societies were developed. The interdepartmental committee concluded that it was important to strike a balance between the needs of the information services and the long-term need for educational and cultural work by the British Council. Contrary to what James Vaughan has been argued, the anxiety that came with political crisis
and nationalist activism did not cause the British officials to dismiss long-term educational programmes. In fact, those operations were expanded.\textsuperscript{291}

Nonetheless in Ghana a counter-subversion committee was established, officially to keep communist publications out. It was admitted, however, that only 22 Europeans and 33 Africans in the Gold Coast had a known connection with communism. The British were driven to seal off its colony from outside ideas due to the unrest that had erupted in Ghana in 1954. A dispute between Nkrumah and the Ashanti over the cocoa pricing scheme had led to violent protests and calls for secession. Francis Cumming-Bruce, the adviser on external affairs to the governor, had even told Anthony Eden that the Gold Coast could slide into chaos after independence if an insufficient number of British officers remained. This opinion enjoyed widespread support among academics like David E. Apter, the first political scientist who worked on Ghana. As the Africa division of the Colonial Office conceded, their efforts were not directed against communist activism but were actually aimed at discouraging Nasser’s attempts at subversion.\textsuperscript{292}

\textit{Négritude as the French Public Diplomacy Strategy}

Nasser’s pan-Arab propaganda and the Bandung moment also led Leopold Senghor, deputy of Senegal and minister responsible for international cultural matters, to travel to Lagos in Nigeria, where on 11 October, he stepped off his plane at the airport of Ikeja. His appearance alone was proof of the successful symbiosis between African and French civilisations. He declared brotherly greetings from France, a country where ‘Muslims were an integrated part of society.’ As he was whisked off to a waiting car to watch the rugby game between Abidjan and Lagos, journalists sent out press reports describing the man as cutting an impressive and cosmopolitan figure.\textsuperscript{293}

His immaculate suit and his eagerness to speak to the press were no coincidence. Senghor believed French prestige was in need of some repair due the pan-Arab propaganda and the international public relations campaign waged by the Algerian Front de Libération


\textsuperscript{292} Minutes, Prime Minister, 1 September 1955, PREM 11/1367, TNA; Secret, “Communism in the Gold Coast”, CO 1035/120, TNA; David E. Apter, \textit{Ghana in Transition} (New York: Atheneum, 1955), 3; Note for C.Y. Carstairs, 2 July 1956, CO 1035/126, TNA.

\textsuperscript{293} ‘où il y a aussi des Musulmans’, see Letter, Paul Raymond to DAL, “a.s requitte adressée à M. Senghor”, 12 November 1955, 1, DAL, Généralités 1953-1959, 49QONT/66, AMAE.
National/National Liberation Front (FLN), but also because Soviet and American propaganda were on the rise. Antoine Pinay had been so surprised when the UN General Assembly condemned the French repression in September 1955 that he lashed out against Soviet Foreign Minister Vyachslav Molotov during a dinner party in New York. The French government therefore approved of Senghor’s visit to British West Africa, which had been organised under the pretence of French-British cultural cooperation. Officially he set out to study the British educational system and their Colonial Welfare and Development programme.294

His real mission was to be kept secret. He wanted to export the French language and culture, while introducing and developing French language education to advance the development of African peoples and increase French prestige. When asked about the trip in the French-British talks in November 1955, the French officials acted as if Senghor’s identification of the problems – too little French language education and no connection between elites in French and British Africa – was the result of a close empirical study, even though these had been forgone conclusions.295

What had been a literary movement pioneered by Senghor and Césaire to reaffirm ‘black’ values, art and culture became a strategic framework for French cultural diplomacy in Africa. As outlined in his review, Présence Africaine, Senghor believed African civilisations had fostered many of the European and American cultural achievements. That link between French and African cultures had to be reinvigorated in support of African progress. The French language was essential to this project. French prestige was not only dependent upon French values, which found their expression first and foremost in its literary achievements. The teaching of the French language at the same time had to facilitate the study of science, because France was a country of imaginative solutions, a ‘terre d’imagination’. That nation was institutionalised by replacing the Direction générale des relations culturelles with the Direction générale des Affaires culturelles et techniques (DGACT). Lastly, the teaching of French served a wider societal purpose. In Senghor’s opinion, the practice of teaching indigenous languages, fairly common in British Africa, hindered the advancement of the

295 Memcon, “Point III Relations culturelles entre les territoires d’Afrique Occidentale Française et les Territoires Britanniques”, 30 November 1955, DAL, Généralités 1953-1959, 49QONT/52, AMAE.
African people as a whole, because the lower classes – unlike the elites – could not seize upon the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the French culture.296

More important than the emphasis on the French language as a tool to advance French prestige, science, and the societal model, was Senghor’s interpretation of Nègritude as a civilisational instrument since it allowed all members of the French bureaucracy to maintain their own view of what French cultural diplomacy was supposed to achieve. 297 He saw the French language as a way to ‘advance’ Africans of all social layers, while Pinay emphasised the potential economic gains of cultural centres, and the DGRC was excited about the opportunity to distribute information about France in Africa. This diversity of views stemmed from the fact that France had a long tradition of public and cultural diplomacy in which multiple aims and definitions had already been formed. What everyone essentially agreed upon was that a better organisation would further their own goals. 298

The prominence of racial identity and pride offered the French a set of powerful ideas to work with. For Senghor, Nègritude was a way to elevate African societies, not only economically but also culturally and spiritually, in cooperation with the metropole. We ‘mean to be Negro-African and French at the same time’ declared Senghor on Radio Accra.299 His emphasis on the French culture and language, as a modernising force uniquely suited to boosting African development rather than as a colonial tool aimed at cultivating African loyalty, would prove to be durable. It returned in the French plan for cultural expansion that de Gaulle approved in 1958 and even seeped into the bilateral cooperation agreements that were concluded between France and its former African territories after 1960.

The Baylor Philosophy and the Export of American Values

For American policy makers, aid was a problematic issue as they struggled with an old problem. Americans considered their policies of assistance to be rational and non-ideological.

Nobody could therefore guarantee that new nations would not choose the wrong form of modernity: communism. It was Harland A. Cleveland, a deputy administrator of the Marshall Plan, who in June 1950 captured this sentiment in a popular phrase: the ‘revolution of rising expectations’. He explained that the West had caused the Korean War by showing the potential of modern science and ideas.  

‘Who was going to have title and ownership over these plants which had been built with U.S. funds?’ Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson asked in the NSC of 1954: ‘If the ultimate owner was the state, we would be helping these countries proceed down the road which led to […] Communism.’ In 1956, Eisenhower pointed out that the differences between the American model and communism were not as clear to the rest of the world as they were to him or to the rest of America. When Allen Dulles of the CIA discerned a pattern of coordinated long-term operations designed to advance communist influence in the underdeveloped world, the question of how the US could provide economic aid while ensuring that the new nations would not choose in favour of communism became even more pressing.

How could the US avoid engineering its own downfall? Eisenhower’s National Security document, NSC 162/2, had already hinted at the solution in 1953:

> Outside economic assistance alone cannot be counted on either to solve their [the uncommitted areas], basic problems or to win their cooperation and support. Constructive political and other measures will be required to create a sense of mutuality of interest with the free world and to counter the communist appeal.

In Africa after 1955, these ‘other measures’ were found in the employment of information and education. In no part of the world was the thirst for knowledge considered to be greater than in Africa: ‘whoever brings the African education has the power to influence him in a basic fashion.’ The State Department summed up the ways in which people – who were portrayed as difficult children – could be educated. The memorandum included the USIA operation, which in Europe was geared towards winning the Cold War:

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300 David Ellwood, *The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 274; The phrase was also used by the British, for instance by the senior information officer in British Guinea, Lloyd Searwar in his analysis of information services in the Third World, see Lloyd Searwar, “The Role and Problems of Information Services in the Underdeveloped Territories”, [1959], INF 12-867, TNA.
(a) Increase our general information program, including libraries, press information, etc;
(b) Expand our exchange of persons programs;
(c) Move to assist local education, especially in the vocational and medical fields. In view of the inevitable maladjustment of the foreign trained student, this local effort may well be the major one on our part.  

On 25 May 1956, Eisenhower laid out his doctrine of nationalism, trade, and various forms of international cooperation in a speech at the Baylor University in Texas, a crucial foreign policy speech on the Third World on which he had worked for days (illustration 7). He asked the college graduates to take individual initiative to promote a world society that respected the values in which they were graduating believed. Eisenhower pleaded for a comprehensive effort, rather than ‘makeshift arrangement to meet day-to-day crises.’ If a stable, prosperous, peaceful world was to be developed, other peoples had to be taught how to become more like the US. Specifically:

the peoples of other nations must, through similar study and thought, recognize with us the need for this kind of cooperation. This is not easy. Many nations, though their cultures are ancient and rich in human values, do not possess the resources to spread the needed education throughout their populations. But they can wisely use help that respects their traditions and ways.

To make the free world stronger, adequate institutions of modern techniques and sciences had to be built in areas of the world where ‘the hunger for knowledge and the ability to use knowledge’ went unsatisfied.

Eisenhower subscribed to a Wilsonian brand of internationalism that equated the spread of American values with security, a philosophy that had become much more applicable in an increasingly interconnected world. He wanted to further the aspirations of those who founded the republic and saw American security as linked ‘with the security and aspirations of liberty loving people in many other lands.’ Without a so-called community of interest supported by American-style social structures, military and economic action would be

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The Ideological Scramble for Africa

futile. 308 Americans in private organisation had to teach Third World nations about democracy and equip peoples with the values needed to ascertain a stable transition, not only because this would address the demand for education, but also because it increased American security.

Clarence Randall – Africa expert of the Eisenhower administration and chairman of the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy – shared these objectives. His Randall Report opposed the use of aid disbursements because they would have no control over the way in which funds were used. 309 When the Council on Foreign Economic Policy was asked to focus on Sub-Saharan Africa in June 1958, Randall identified the increase of educational facilities and the elevation of educational standards as the most urgent needs. Teacher training and vocational training programmes had to be expanded, new training institutions had to be established and support given to the construction of a Central African University. Ghana was considered to be the best possible host country and funds were found in the mutual security programme. In its fourth recommendation, Randall wanted the administration to insist on the increase of private support for missionary schools in the area.310

Eisenhower, the fiscal conservative who pushed for economic aid to the Third World but provided little hard cash, relied on cultural assistance. While Matthew Connelly has pointed to Eisenhower’s fears of a racial North-South conflict to explain his firm stance on aid, the documents indicate that the president subscribed to the optimism of development theorists in times of peace, and saw aid in combination with education as a viable and effective instrument to transform foreign societies. Eisenhower’s actions were thus not only motivated by the fear of a possible race war.311

Public diplomats became obsessed with increasing the transformational power of cultural assistance. The Bandung Conference and the threat of Arab nationalism not only prompted Eisenhower to present his ideas in a more developed fashion, but also shifted education and culture from colonial management tools into instruments of development. Where the president sought to foster a stable transition, however, Senghor and his British colleagues hoped they could reaffirm their commitment to development and keep Arab nationalism at bay.

309 Adamson, “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’?: The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World”, 63.
311 For this claim, see Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens”, 765.
Reaffirming the Commitment to Assistance on the Ground (1955–1957)

In France and the US, committees were established to monitor the implementation of the new blueprints for cultural assistance, while the British Council started spending its new funds. Their principal task was to investigate how education and culture could be most effectively used to affect the development of Third World peoples. But how could success be guaranteed? Through deliberation officials wanted to identify the key element that made education and culture work.

**Improving French Language Education**

On his journey, Senghor had met teachers who were unqualified and taught French as a ‘dead language’ – a problem since the French language was seen as the basis of rational thought and prestige. The only powerful response against Cairo’s anti-French propaganda was therefore not vigorous counterpropaganda, but an enhancement of teaching methods. From Senghor’s viewpoint, the improvement of language education would offer a road to development and in doing so improve the French reputation. As Albert Charton, the inspector general of education
in French West Africa and an important theoretician, put it in 1936: French education was about forging a ‘moral alliance’, not about ‘moral conquest’.312

The power to ignite development and increase prestige could only be found in an expression of French culture, not in a propaganda campaign. Despite Radio Cairo’s verbal attacks, Radio Brazzaville held on to its wartime task of producing news for a global audience. The information post that Senghor wanted to build in Accra was meant to disseminate books, rather than engage in a war of words.313 Unlike the Americans who were funding the Jazz tours of John Birks ‘Dizzy’ Gillespie in the Middle East, and the official and unofficial performances of Louis Armstrong in Ghana, the DGACT only financed initiatives like the PEN Club, an international literary club presided over in France by André Chamon of the Académie française.314

In the closing lines of his report Senghor urged his colleagues not to let his recommendations become a dead letter. Nonetheless, at the inter-territorial conference in Fort-Lamy where the impact of pan-Arab propaganda was debated, Senghor’s recommendations were ignored and it was decided that press publications and films in Arabic should be produced to counter the Egyptian, Russian, and American publications circulating in the cities of French Africa.315 The difference between Paris and the people at France d’outre-mer was illustrated by their behaviour at the conference of black writers and artists in September 1956, which had been organised by the founder of Présence Africaine, Alioune Diop. While the DGRC entertained the attendees with a cocktail party, the officials of France d’outre-mer were pacing the floor, worrying about Diop’s alleged ties with so-called extremist groups.316

Therefore, it was the actions of schoolteachers such as Thomas Boateng that determined what Senghor’s call for a better French cultural diplomacy looked like on the ground. In August 1956, this Ghanaian French teacher from a school in Tamale arranged an excursion to

315 Top secret memcon, “Proces Verbal de la Conférence Interterritoriale sur les principaux problèmes Musulmans”, 31 January, 2261/2, Affaires Politiques, CAOM.
316 Note d’Information politique, Ministère de la France d’outre-mer, “La Propaganda Islamique dans les Milieux Africains,” 11 June 1955, 2261/2, Affaires Politiques, CAOM.
Abidjan in cooperation with the educational services of Côte d’Ivoire. Victor Gares, consul in Accra, encouraged such activities because they were in line with Senghor’s vision of the French language as the route to French culture and modernity.\footnote{Letter, Victor Gares to DAL, “Voyage à Abidjan des élèves de l’Ecole Secondaire de Tamale, Gold Coast”, 6 August 1956, Note pour le Secrétaire General, “Création à Accra d’un poste d’information”, 5 April 1956, DAL, Ghana 1953-1959, 50QO/8, AMAE; Letter, P. Barbusse to Alioune Diop, 15 September 1956, DGR CST, Echanges Culturels, 1956-1959, 241QO/254, AMAE.}

\textit{Mass Education, Private Initiatives, and Technical Assistance in the Service of American Ideas}

The Americans also tried to establish a set of working principles. Through deliberation in three separate committees, three important guidelines about the execution of the Baylor philosophy were agreed: mass education rather than attention for elites was important; private initiative had to be strengthened; and technical assistance was only important if it fostered education.

On 7 December 1956 a conference at the Baylor University – organised to give substance to Eisenhower’s Baylor speech – turned its attention to Nigeria where the Foreign Mission Board of the Southern Baptists Convention had made the decision to establish a four-year college. While mirroring the association between Ibadan and the University of London, they rejected the British educational system because it was considered to be elitist.\footnote{Report, Paul Geren, “Conference on Implementation of the Baylor Proposal”, 1956, RG. 59, A1 5082, Box 3, f: Educational & Cultural Exchange, NARA.} A literacy programme was therefore established at Baylor that sought to shelter people from the woes of ignorance, superstition, and other fears with which illiterates supposedly struggled. The creation of the English Language Institute and the construction of an international house for the international students at Baylor would help export American values and create more advanced ‘emerging’ societies:

\begin{quote}
A university can be a center for such [basic literacy] studies, drawing those from many nations who wish to study this body of principles and return to their own countries to teach it to others, and they to others, until it reaches out to the thousands of villages in Asia and Africa.\footnote{Charles E. Johnson, “Progress Report on Activities of the OCB Inter-Agency Committee on the President's Baylor Proposals”, 17 July 1957, RG. 59, A1 5082, Box 3, f: Educational & Cultural Exchange, NARA.}
\end{quote}

In June 1956, the OCB formed an inter-agency committee tasked with finding a formula that permitted the US government to have a voice in the organisation of private initiatives whilst remaining uninvolved in the specifics of the programme itself. Private initiatives remained key because too much American influence would make target audiences suspicious.
Nonetheless, government funds were required if any of these initiatives was to be successful. The Baylor University for instance had only raised $140,000 for the construction of a Nigerian-American House. A Committee on Arts and Sciences for Eisenhower sent out a questionnaire to 30,000 American educators requesting project suggestions as 25 workshops were organised to consider what Americans should know about overseas countries.

The US Office of Education stepped in and catalogued the initiatives of private foundations in its survey, *American Cooperation with Higher Education.* The report also illustrated how widely Eisenhower’s vision of technical assistance – as a means to project values – was shared by others. ICA, the central agency that provided technical assistance, had initiated a university contract programme in 1953, which brought the US government, an American and a foreign university together. The American university provided staff, books, and facilities on its own campus for a training faculty. Besides the ICA and USIA, the International Educational Exchange also became more involved.

Nonetheless, some USIS officers on the ground were unhappy with the emphasis on the modernising potential of American public diplomacy and demanded a better policy to guard against Soviet propaganda. From his post in Leopoldville, Robert G. McGregor wrote to George V. Allen that the Africans he met were interested in what the Soviets had to say because the USSR took a clear anticolonial position. He therefore applied the Baylor principles in a more flexible way and also used basic English classes to convey the benefits of Western society. In 1956, a group of American information officers even publicised Dag Hammarskjold’s visit to the Near East as they handed out pamphlets about the resolution

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321 The list of projects was still impressive: the Carnegie Corporation undertook library development in British East Africa, the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College had an ICA contract with Harar Agricultural College and the Presbyterian Church of the USA supported the Cameroon Christian College. In Ghana, the Carnegie Corporation funded the library of the Gold Coast College of Technology, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church supported 519 students at the Bekwai Training School and the Hartford Seminary Foundation gave one research grant for the University College of the Gold Coast see memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, “Subject: Progress Report on Activities of the OCB Inter-Agency Committee on the President’s Baylor Proposals”, 26 June 1957, 143, 158, 154, 151, 188, 139, 192, 204.

against colonialism that had been proposed by a group of US Congressmen to boost their anticolonial credentials.\textsuperscript{323}

It was therefore the ICA rather than the USIA that stepped in to execute most of the educational programmes in Africa even though private initiatives remained essential. This not only led to a massive aid operation, particularly after Ghana’s independence in March 1957, but also created a persistent conflict between the USIA and ICA.\textsuperscript{324} The ICA had to produce technical ‘how-to-do-it’ types of material while the USIS had to advertise the ICA’s progress and make people ‘want to do it’ – a task the USIS officers avoided. However, by March 1960 the USIA was forced to produce publications such as \textit{ICA-Ethiopia’s Point 4 News}.\textsuperscript{325}

\textit{Increasing the British Presence}

To offset the costs of the expensive radio broadcasts and make the much needed cultural aid possible, the BBC proposed to cooperate with the Voice of America (VOA), which had initiated direct broadcasting to sub-Saharan Africa in 1956 with radio broadcasts that dealt with American history, women’s activities and education, and ways in which American ideas could help build viable societies.\textsuperscript{326} Richard Turnbull, who had dealt with the Mau Mau and needed all the help he could get to counteract the Swahili broadcasts of Radio Cairo and All India Radio contacted the American consul to Kenya, Edmund J. Dorsz.

The US consul, who was still keen on countering the bad press the American civil rights issue had generated, agreed to draw up a list of themes on which he thought both the US and the UK agreed. The support of an orderly transition to self-government was listed above the desire to stimulate economic, social, and cultural development, resistance against interference from India, Egypt, the USSR, or the acceptance of communism and the removal of racial


\textsuperscript{324} There was an enormous amount of ICA activities in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly those pertaining to education are part of a massive collection that spans 18 boxes, only a fraction of the material is presented here.


\textsuperscript{326} Bell, “Developing a ‘Sense of Community’: U.S. Cultural Diplomacy and the Place of Africa during the Early Cold War Period 1953-54”, 132.
barriers. Until the Suez crisis of October 1956, the British and Americans believed they had gained each other’s support.

Mutual misperception even led to a new stereotype among the British diplomats, that of the clumsy USIS officer who was unfamiliar with African norms and British sensitivities. This label made the CO more forgiving. When Lagos acquired a new USIS officer in March 1955, the British were not notified, making Harold Evans conclude that the clumsy efforts of the Americans to proclaim the American way of life made their own job more difficult. Because of their ‘clumsiness or stupidity’, USIS officers could get away with promoting the American anticolonial ideas. At other times this stereotype hindered cooperation. The USIA’s suggestion to target African exchange students in London was dismissed by CO officer Peter Mennell as a foolish idea because he deemed the PAO of the American Embassy in London to be incompetent.

All the while, the British Council expanded its language education programmes in Africa in their attempt to establish English as a world language. Inspired by the support given to the French schools of the Alliance Française by the DGRC, they decided to expand their grants for schools overseas in 1956. Like the French they invested in quality, with better training programmes for secondary school teachers and headmasters. Unlike Senghor, however, the BC did not expand into French Africa.

By 1956 there was a remarkable methodological convergence among the Western public diplomats. For cultural assistance to lead to results, quality was agreed to be paramount. For aid to lead to prestige, results were essential. That consensus crumbled when tanks appeared on the banks of the Nile.

The Suez Crisis: the US goes it Alone

On 26 July 1956, Nasser decided to nationalise the Suez Canal after France and the UK had withdrawn their offer to fund the construction of the Aswan Dam. The military intervention, staged by France and Great Britain on 31 October, ostensibly to eject Israel who had invaded a few days before, was condemned by Eisenhower and the USSR. This crisis had resulted...
from a confluence of political and economic motivations and had consequences that were even more complex. But the old fashioned imperial intervention made clear that Western cooperation in Africa had its limits. The American plan to equip Africans with the ideas required to build a stable and democratic society was incompatible with the British and French strategy to expand cultural assistance schemes which were meant to reaffirm their position.³³²

Although the Bandung Conference had directly motivated the State Department to increase its efforts in the area of cultural assistance, the Suez crisis made clear that American efforts would only be effective if the US programmes were executed in an autonomous and more prominent fashion. On 5 January 1957, Eisenhower therefore reaffirmed his commitment to an orderly transition in the most theatrical way possible. In an address before a joint session of Congress, he asked to pass a resolution authorising him to pledge increased economic and military aid.

Eisenhower wanted to prevent the Soviets from filling the power vacuum left behind by the British in the Middle East. At the same time the so-called Eisenhower doctrine also sought to contain Nasser’s radical Arab nationalism, as Salim Yaqub has convincingly argued. Even though Eisenhower felt ‘these Arabs’ were unable to understand the American ideas of freedom or human dignity, he still encouraged Arab unity.³³³ The administration’s belief in the power of American cultural assistance and its proactive policy in sub-Saharan Africa might explain Eisenhower’s openness towards the Middle East.

In sub-Saharan Africa though, the Suez crisis made the USIA and the administration realise that effective American cultural assistance had to be clearly distinguishable from French and British activities. Dulles stowed away his proposal for a ‘Bandung in reverse’ and instead impressed upon other members of the National Security Council that they would need to decide if ‘the future lies with a policy of reasserting by force colonial control’ or if they, the US, would ‘oppose such a course of action.’³³⁴ The USIA also sent a paper to its posts explaining what local officials could do to ‘implement the Eisenhower doctrine psychologically’. To counteract the allegation that the doctrine was only a paper guarantee, every piece of information had to stress that the US resolutely opposed colonialism. Charles Lucet, the chargé d'affaires of the French embassy in Washington had understood the

³³³ Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 1–2.
³³⁴ Memorandum of Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 1 November 1956, AWF, Papers as President 1952-1961, NSC Series, Box 8, f: 302nd Meeting of the NSC, DDEL.

Thus for American cultural assistance to be effective, it was to be distinct from what its competitors were doing. After Ghanaian independence the USIA only increased its involvement on the continent, much to the dismay of France and the UK.

Increasing the Transformational Potential of American Foreign Aid (1957)

The commitment to education exerted a profound influence on the overall direction of the foreign aid strategy of the Eisenhower administration. Where the French and British used public diplomacy to demonstrate the effectiveness of their aid programmes, the president turned cultural assistance into the cornerstone of his entire foreign aid strategy.

The Baylor philosophy shaped Eisenhower’s position in the foreign aid debate, a discussion that centred on the transformative power of aid grants. Eisenhower’s insistence on the importance of foreign aid in his second inaugural address encouraged his advisor for psychological strategy Charles Douglas Jackson and Walt Rostow to urge the president to support foreign aid, ‘using your second inaugural as a springboard.’\footnote{Shenin, America’s Helping Hand, 113–114.} Eisenhower considered the foreign aid bill of 1956 an absolute necessity. He also lectured others on the merits of aid: ‘I have talked endlessly it seems to me on the subject and you know the mediocre success I have had, even with some of the Republican members of the Congress.’\footnote{Eisenhower, Dwight D. to Barbara Bates Gunderson, 7 June 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1891. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1891.cfm.}

Nonetheless, an earlier attempt of Rostow and Jackson to sell Eisenhower on a ‘World Economic Plan’ had failed. The idea for such a plan had emerged at the Princeton Inn Conference of 1954, a gathering of likeminded academics who wanted to convince the Eisenhower administration of the need for a socio-economic approach to modernisation. For them, public diplomacy was important, but only to create sufficient dramatic appeal so people would want it and governments would be forced to adopt it.\footnote{Kimber Charles Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001), 53.} Rostow attributed the failure of his plan to the entrenched position of traditionalists within the Eisenhower administration who
saw foreign aid a short-term security measure. In 1957, Rostow and Jackson therefore began a new attempt and asked Paul Hoffman, the director of the Economic Cooperation Administration, to send Eisenhower his article ‘Blueprint for foreign aid’.

A closer look at Walt Rostow and Max Milikan’s epoch making A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy of 1957 reveals the grounds for their disagreement. Both men rejected education as an effective modernisation tool because it was fraught with difficulties and was inefficient. In their own words: ‘values […] can be much more quickly grasped and promoted through programs of common action than through debate or education.’ Instead, poorer nations needed aid grants to accumulate capital and jump-start the modernisation of societies. Cultural resources were important only as a public relations tool.

For Eisenhower, however, cultural assistance had to be the cornerstone of any foreign aid strategy. Through his plea to integrate educational assistance into the foreign aid programme he developed a threefold critique on the progressive doctrine of foreign aid. In ‘Blueprint for foreign Aid’ Hoffman argued, as Rostow and Max Millikan did, that the encroachment of Soviet aid could only be stopped if it was matched by a competing American offer. To be effective, this offer had to be ‘without strings attached’, while the purpose had to be ‘one which the countries themselves can wholeheartedly share.’ There was nothing wrong with gaining political and military friends by offering aid, Hoffman agreed, but it was ineffective. Friendships and alliances that could be bought with dollars were not to be trusted. Moreover, Moscow’s propaganda agents would use ‘angry cries about strings’ to cast the US in the image of ‘colonial master’. Therefore, Hoffman claimed, aid had to be used to create a favourable environment in the long run.

In his correspondence with US Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, Eisenhower suggested a third way between the security-focused use of aid and the long-term development strategy. The president agreed with Humphrey’s argument that ‘neither education or mutual aid is in itself sufficient. Only in their unity will we find the strength necessary to do what we need to do.’ But economic aid could only create allegiance and serve as an engine of development if it had ‘strings’, Eisenhower argued. The US had to

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339 Millikan and Rostow, A Proposal, 83.
actively instil in so-called underdeveloped people a ‘true desire for individual freedom’ and ‘persuade them permanently to our way of life.’ Thus Eisenhower did not believe, as Rostow would later argue, that American values could be grasped by the general public through offers of aid programmes or building factories.

A second important element of Eisenhower’s views on aid was his doubt about the transformative power of development aid. The US could not simply export the success of its own development: ‘This I believe because the circumstances and conditions that allowed a few men to put a steel plant in a corn field and another successful one in a marsh are as different from today's conditions in most of the Afro-Asian countries as day is from night.’ He was happy to find that Humphrey agreed with him on an issue so close to his heart: aid that flowed from the US to a developing country would not result in a transformation of values.

Finally, Eisenhower questioned if economic assistance could affect political change. Eisenhower agreed with the progressives in part, there was value in promoting ‘economic development and political progress even if Communism did not appear.’ However, this did not mean that the president was a new convert to the progressive gospel of long-term foreign aid. He further clarified his view in January 1960. Eisenhower believed that the US had to educate peoples first, only then assist: ‘if the countries [...] oriented themselves towards Moscow, we would not wish to undertake programmes for their orderly economic development and political progress.’

During Eisenhower’s visit to Morocco, King Mohammed V told the president that the US should help the countries of Africa to become independent and then assist in their development. Eisenhower unsurprisingly argued against ‘precipitate action’ in the granting of independence and he characterised the king’s reasoning as ‘putting the cart before the horse.’ For the president, the US needed to assist a country culturally before it became independent.

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344 Millikan and Rostow, A Proposal, 38.
347 Memorandum of Discussion of the 432nd Meeting of the National Security Council, 14 January 1960, Papers as President, 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 12, f. 432nd Meeting of NSC, DDEL.
Reversing that strategy would be ineffective because many governmental structures would already be in place.\textsuperscript{348}

Eisenhower and Humphrey’s views were not parochial but part of a globally shared modernisation outlook. A group of experts at the UN had already reached the conclusion in 1951 that financial assistance would not be sufficient because, in many places, individual psychology and social organisation created obstacles to development.\textsuperscript{349} The educational challenge was further hampered with another fear of the modernisation theorists: overpopulation. A country that had reached the saturation point in population long before its people understand or, indeed, even hear of the terms ‘personal rights’ and ‘personal freedom’, Eisenhower argued, presented far different problems from those Americans faced in the first half of the 20th century. Overpopulation, the vision of a vast throng of underdeveloped people haunted Eisenhower, who feared constructive developments projects would collapse under the pressure of ‘one and a half billion hungry people.’\textsuperscript{350}

Eisenhower’s statements were not mere rhetoric. On 1 July 1955, the Foreign Operations Administration was replaced with the ICA run by John Hollister.\textsuperscript{351} In testimonies to Congress after 1957, ICA officials repeatedly mulled over the fact that Africa required a different type of assistance. In setting up the so-called ‘Fund for Africa’ it was emphasised that the existing aid categories did not meet the necessities of Africa South of the Sahara. What the continent needed was a special form of aid with an emphasis on the creation or expansion of educational and training institutions.\textsuperscript{352}

The ICA regional director for Africa, Marcus J. Gordon, wanted to create ‘productive citizens’. He linked education with socio-economic development and security when he stated that economic development depended as much upon a ‘state of mind’ as on the ‘possession of natural resources.’ The educational system had to produce skilled workers to support

\textsuperscript{348} Memorandum of Discussion of the 432\textsuperscript{nd} Meeting of the National Security Council, 14 January 1960, Papers as President, 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 12, Folder: 432\textsuperscript{nd} Meeting of NSC, DDEL; Draft, Peter L. Koffsky, “The United States Information Program in Africa, 1945-1970: A History & Interpretation”, 2-1, RG. 306, A1 1072, Box 9, f: African Program, Historical Background; 1970, NARA.


\textsuperscript{351} Shenin, America’s Helping Hand, 201.

\textsuperscript{352} See chapter 4; Arthur L. Richards and Jane M. Alden, “Relations of Mutual Security Act Amendment to the President’s Baylor Proposals”, S.d., RG. 469, P 36, Box 3, f: Africa Fund, NARA.
development as well as trained public administrators and leaders in Government because he believed that no country could achieve political stability and subsequently encourage economic development without a well-trained corps of public administrators.

The financial means for training consequently rose from $93,000 in 1957 to $473,000 in 1960. The ICA’s cultural activities resulting in the ‘enlightenment or improvement of the current status or development of a culture’ embraced virtually the entire range of the ICA’s technical cooperation activities in Africa. Education programmes were to focus on leadership training, not merely on the export of what was found useful in American education. The number of African students training in the US and countries outside of Africa, taking short courses, and enrolling at night schools increased rapidly. On-the-job training was being provided on a country-by-country basis and in 1960 Gordon’s top priority became teacher training and the increase of educational materials. Secondary school programmes had to turn out educated citizens, inform leadership styles, as well as prepare candidates for colleges, universities, as well as for the new scientific and technical courses and in the humanities.353

Conversely for the French and British, cultural diplomacy acted only as a lubricant for economic aid schemes such as the Colombo Plan, and the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara (FAMA), which was an organ of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA). The French and the British met in these commissions to discuss their joint development projects and economic assistance programmes towards Africa. A brochure on the CCTA and FAMA for instance displayed the results of French led development: from scientific training, to education on soil erosion and the training at professional schools (illustration 8).354

In France and the UK, pamphlets were printed to highlight the merits of economic aid while cultural assistance was seen as a form of aid that was distinct from financial and technical assistance. For the American president, however, cultural assistance was an essential element in his overall foreign aid strategy.

353 Shenin, America’s Helping Hand, 62; Presentation transcript, Marcus J. Gordon, “Subject: Activities of the ICA in Africa in the Education and Cultural Fields”, 23 November 1959, 13, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 2, f: ICA, NARA; Other plans were the development of education in the areas of the English language, adult and community education, literacy and educational administration, see Presentation by Marcus J. Gordon, Regional Director for Africa and Europe, “Subject: Activities of the ICA in Africa in the Education and Cultural Fields”, 23 November 1959, 13, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 2, f: ICA, NARA.

Conclusion: Culture and Information as Modernisation Tools

After the Bandung Conference of 1955 and in the face of Nasser’s challenge, the ‘mind’ of African peoples became a development target rather than a security concern. Through more elaborate cultural assistance schemes, Western policymakers raced to be the first to offer Africans education. This move would create the conditions for American values to be internalised by the Third World peoples, to make it possible for the British to safeguard the transition to self-government of a country such as Ghana, or to allow them to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the French culture and language.

The belief in cultural assistance exerted a profound influence on Eisenhower’s – often misunderstood – foreign aid doctrine. The positive outcome of modernisation projects, public health programmes or factory construction, would not automatically plant the right ideas in people’s mind. Eisenhower rejected what Rostow termed the ‘demonstration effect’; he believed values had to be actively taught.355 Meanwhile, the British and the French used informational resources as a way to sell their colonial development schemes to reaffirm their commitment to development.

The African target audience remained conspicuously absent in these visions for psychological modernisation; success could be attained by improving the quality of the aid on offer. Even though the Americans became more interested in the people356 – everybody had to possess the right type of skills to become a participant in a democratic society – Africans never acquired agency.

That disregard for local customs would sometimes make education hard to sell. Odweanomana, a 25 year old Ghanaian man, for instance, had written a letter to the advice column of the Sunday Mirror on a topic related to education. The six men in his house had told him he should not marry a certain girl because she was literate. Literate women were supposedly more inclined to leave their husbands if they went bankrupt, whereas the illiterate women would stay.357 Education could thus make women appear less suitable marriage partners and weaken their social position, a side effect the idealist Western planners did not even contemplate.

356 This counteracts the claim that public diplomacy in the Third World focused only on elites. This critique is worked out further in chapter 5, see Osgood, Total Cold War, 114; Osgood, “Words and Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and Eisenhower’s Propaganda War in the Third World”, 16; Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 145; Dueck, The Claims of Culture at Empire’s End, 16; Robert J. Young, Marketing Marianne: French Propaganda in America, 1900-1940 (Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 174.
It is only when Nkrumah’s Bureau of African Affairs began producing pamphlets in which he promoted the so-called ‘African Personality’, the self-confident African, and giving activists political training, that the West began to pay attention.
4. Mental Decolonisation


We are proud that we are able to make our independence the means by which the forces of nationalism are strengthened […] throughout the continent of Africa. We are prepared to move ahead, side by side, with African patriots everywhere, not with guns but with ideas.

– Nkrumah in the Africa Freedom Day broadcast, 1959. 358

The tribute paid to the head of government by those who only yesterday were themselves considered and treated as a sort of monarch, seems to justify the recent statement of Mr. Kofie Baako that with the ‘rapid development of industrialization and education, there would be nobody, in twenty years’ time, to follow the parasol of the chief.’

– Louis de Guiringaud, French ambassador to Ghana tries to understand the political transformation in Ghana, 1958. 359

I do not think we need be unduly alarmed at the prospect of Dr. Nkrumah calling a Pan African Conference.

– J.S. Bennett, an officer at the Colonial Office, 26 March 1957. 360

As Mrs. C.G. Johnson, of the West African Cocoa Research Institute served her two sons pancakes for dinner, a British man knocked on her door. Standing in the drizzle of Accra’s evening rain was A.R. Philips of the BBC, who enquired if he was at the right address. Indeed he was. Mrs. Johnson had agreed to lodge Philips’ team, which was there to coordinate the activities of the Ghana Broadcasting Service and prepare a programme for the BBC Home Service. So great was the interest in the story of Ghana and its independence that, with 306 accredited overseas and local correspondents on the scene, there was literally no room at any inn in the capital city and the BBC had been reduced to putting up correspondents in private homes. 361 Nkrumah was keen to exploit this PR potential (illustration 9).

Journalists received daily briefings between 2 March 1957 – the arrival of Princess Marina, the Duchess of Kent, and 7 March 1957 – Nkrumah’s closing press conference. The press hotel had a direct radio connection with London, was fitted with a bank, a post office


359 ‘L’hommage rendu au chef du gouvernement par celui qui, hier encore, était considéré et traité comme une sorte de monarque, paraît également justifier l’affirmation récente de M. Kofie Baako selon laquelle “avec le développement rapide de l’industrialisation et de l’éducation, il n’y aura plus personne, dans 20 ans, pour suivre l’ombre d’un chef”, see Outgoing telegram, Guiringaud to DAL, 15 July 1958, DAL, Ghana 1953-1965, 50QONT/15, f: Politique interieure, AMAE.

360 Minutes, J.S. Bennett, 26 March 1957, CO 936/576, TNA.

where the popular new Ghana stamps were sold, a book shop and a bar with free drinks, while a fleet of buses took reporters to official functions around the country. In the midst of all this excitement the BBC even forgot to play its recording of the independence celebrations of 6 March.\footnote{Confidential letter, J.B. Millar to Bernard Moore, 25 March 1957, Ghana Information Services, “The World Press and Ghana Independence”, 23 March 1957, Transcript, R.J. Moxon, Director of Information Services, “Ghana Independence Celebrations: List of Fully Accredited Overseas and Local Correspondents”, 6 March 1957, E1/1, 433/1 Ghana Independence Celebrations, 1957, BBC-Archives.} When The Birth of Ghana was finally aired, listeners heard a story in which the triumph of African nationalism and the representation of British imperial policy as an emancipatory endeavour were intertwined.\footnote{Draft, “Opening Announcement for ‘The Birth of Ghana’”, E1/1, 433/1 Ghana Independence Celebrations, 1957, BBC-Archives.} The programmes that followed maintained that line, even when a group called the Ghana Union complained that the Ghanaian drumming performances that were featured were unrepresentative of Ghana’s ‘true culture’.

This concern for the true culture of Africa became the core of Ghana’s foreign policy and had been at the heart of the last legislative assembly on the eve of independence. When Nkrumah took over the portfolios of defence and external affairs, he declared Ghana would be converted into a ‘centre for the discussion of African problems.’ In his independence speech on the old polo grounds in Accra he declared that ‘just minutes ago’ he had laid out a programme to create an ‘African Personality and identity.’ In his view, this was the only way to show the world that the continent was ready to fight its own battles.\footnote{That same night he also opened the Ghana Museum; “Ghana is free forever”, BBC-World Service, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/focusonafrica/news/story/2007/02/070129_ghana50_independence_speech.shtml; “Ghana’s Foreign Policy will not be dictated by the Need for Aid”, Ghana Today, March 20, 1957, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2; George P Hagan, “Nkrumah’s Cultural Policy”, in The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah: Papers of a Symposium Organized by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, ed. Kwame Arhin (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1993), 1.} In doing so, he rejected the insights of Carothers and other ethno-psychologists who had argued that the African was psychologically unfit to organise a society.

Ironically, Nkrumah – a man who gazed at the world from beneath a pair of constantly frowning and expressive eyebrows – has been described in those terms because he had been unable to execute his grand non-violent strategy to unite Africa. Scholars in the 1960s and 1970s questioned Nkrumah’s intellectual capacities. The first book that dealt with Ghana’s foreign policy presented him as ‘a marginal man, intellectually insecure.’\footnote{Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 418; Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960.} When members of the Ghanaian bureaucracy began publishing their memoirs in the 1980s, Nkrumah came to
be seen as an inpatient idealist whose plans were thwarted by his corrupt aides.367 In recent years, Nkrumah has acquired the reputation of a charismatic leader whose radical pan-African experiment was damaged by the pressures of the Cold War.368 This has led some to return to a neocolonial interpretation, arguing that the West plotted against African unity.369 Others have shown that pan-African activism was sustained by transnational networks.370

The focus on Nkrumah’s failure, alleged hypocrisy or inability to resist the machinations of the Cold War, has eclipsed the actual goals and methods of Ghanaian diplomats and leaders. Foreign policy was shaped by the psychological and cultural impact of colonialism, a crucial concern of Third World intellectuals. In Black Skin White Mask and The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon uses psychoanalytical terms to describe the inferiority complex that colonialism imposed upon the black man. Albert Memmi, a Tunisian essayist, published Portait du colonisé/Portrait du colonisateur in which he explores the psychological effects of colonialism on colonised and colonisers alike.371

In 1964, Afari-Gyan coined the term ‘mental decolonisation’. As a lecturer at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, he had come to the conclusion that the transition from colonialism to independence, and ultimately to socialism, required not only political, but also economic, social and cultural action. A new view of the dignity of man was needed, ‘a view


which demands a change of mental attitude, of personality’, something Ghana had been committed to since independence.\(^{372}\)

The Ghanaian aspiration to mentally decolonise Africans raises three important issues that will be addressed. First, the main goals of Ghana’s foreign policy and its relationship to the ideology of pan-Africanism will be reassessed in light of Nkrumah’s worldview – which was made up of imperialists and anticolonialists. Second, the pan-African conferences that were staged in Accra are studied. Not only do these meetings illuminate how much Ghanaian officials wanted to create a network of political activists, the debates also shed light on Nkrumah’s ambiguous stance on the use of violence in decolonisation. He wanted to convince African leaders and audiences of the need for African unity, making public diplomacy the core of his non-violent approach abroad. However he did not reject violence as a matter of principle. Nkrumah was hesitant because he felt the root of the problem – the psychological and cultural impact of colonialism – would remain intact. Lastly, the ways in which Ghanaian officials tried to attract people to Accra to acquire what the Bandung delegates had defined as ‘moral strength’ are analysed.

Illustration 9: Kwame Nkrumah addresses the crowd on the old polo grounds on the eve of independence, a few minutes after midnight, 6 March 1957. Source: “Ghana’s Foreign Policy Will not be Dictated by the Need for Aid”, Ghana Today, March 20, 1957, Vol. 1, No.2, 2.

\(^{372}\) Research paper, K. Afari-Gyan, “The Problems of Mental Decolonisation”, [1964], Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-38, f: Afari-Gyan, MSRC.
African Unity and the ‘African Personality’ as Nonalignment

Nkrumah developed his belief in a united Africa during the interwar period, when intellectuals of African descent in the US and the Caribbean became more active and pan-Africanism gradually evolved from a utopian to a political project. The first Pan-African Conference in London, in 1900, was followed by successive Pan-African Congresses in 1919, 1921, and 1927, in which W.E.B Dubois played an important role and where the ties with Africa were discussed. In 1937, C.L.R. James, Jomo Kenyatta and George Padmore established an International African Service Bureau in London to increase the impact of their activism by bringing together political activists, trade unionists, and intellectuals. 

Around the same time, in the spring of 1935, Kwame Nkrumah arrived in New York to study at Lincoln University where he started writing *Towards Colonial Freedom*, an intellectual critique on colonialism that presented economics as the basis of imperialism. At this point, Nkrumah’s declared aim was the establishment of a West African union, which was re-imagined as a continental union under George Padmore’s impulse.

That meeting with Padmore occurred in Manchester, where Nkrumah helped organise the Pan-African Congress of 1945, a gathering that gave more substance to pan-Africanism as a political project. Padmore presented a vision of anti-imperialism and pan-Africanism in which non-violence rather than violent resistance was chosen, and priority was given to political rather than economic revolution. The meeting concluded that pan-Africanism should be seen as an independent ideological system, a counterweight to capitalism and communism. In 1956, Padmore expanded on this idea when he wrote *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* In his preface Richard Wright writes about the importance of race and colonialism in the African worldview:

Black people primarily regard Russian Communists as white men. Black people primarily regard American, British and French anti-Communists as white people… Is that surprising? It ought not to be.

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In Manchester, Nkrumah’s star rose to unseen heights. After being invited by Joseph Danquah to become the secretary-general of the United Gold Coast Convention in December 1947, he founded the Convention’s People’s Party (CCP) in 1950. With their plea for ‘independence now’ he won the elections and became the ‘leader of government business’ in 1951 and Prime Minister at independence on 6 March 1957.

Ghanaian independence was the pivotal moment when the political pan-African project increased its interventionist aspirations. ‘Our independence is meaningless’, Nkrumah claimed, ‘unless it is linked up totally with that of the African continent.’ If Ghana’s anticolonialism stopped at its borders, the country would be unable to maintain its independence. The fact that Ghana was founded on the idea of liberation and African unity, rather than on an exclusive concept of nationalism was thus the outcome of half a century in which pan-Africanism evolved into a mature political ideology.

Pan-Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology

Whether pan-Africanism was a separate ideology or if more weight has to be given to the fact that its substance relied on Wilsonianism and Leninism is debatable. Admittedly, the hegemonic messages of Soviet-Chinese communism and American liberal capitalism helped postcolonial regimes define their domestic policy and gave rise to different types of African socialism. George Padmore’s biography, for instance, exemplifies the complexity of pan-Africanism: he was born in Trinidad in 1903, worked in the US, joined the Communist Party which he left in 1933, moved to London in 1935 and ended up in Ghana where, as Nkrumah’s Advisor to the Prime Minister on African Affairs, he became the key planner of Ghana’s public diplomacy strategy.

Nevertheless, Ghanaian foreign policy was guided by a set of systematically expressed concepts. Ghanaian pan-Africanism consisted of a political philosophy (anticolonialism and ‘African Personality’), a theory of history with slavery as a key moment as well as a vision for the future (African unity), a national and international explanation of the legitimacy of the regime (positive neutrality and disarmament). All components were promoted on a

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378 Byrne, “Africa’s Cold War”, 101–102; Much of the literature has not recognised pan-Africanism as a separate ideology and has instead devoted most of its energy to determining if and when Nkrumah turned towards the Soviet Union, see Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1–15.
continental scale, but the ‘African Personality’ and ‘positive neutrality’, in particular, shaped foreign policy.

First among the pan-African principles was anticolonialism. As a student, Nkrumah had defined colonialism in a Leninist way, as a system rooted in the hunger for raw materials. Yet he also stressed the fact that education only served the spread of European ideas and denied Africans the skills needed for nation building. By the time Nkrumah watched the fireworks on the eve of independence, colonialism had become a system that oppressed the sense of African self-worth. ‘We must change or attitudes, our minds’, he claimed, ‘we shall show the world that the African man is capable of managing his own affairs.’

For Nkrumah, who had been born in Nkroful in Nzima, close to the slave fort of Elmina, the slave trade marked the start of a long history of continental exploitation. At the Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) in 1958, he offered his linear view of history in which the ‘slave trade and the rape of Africa’ by the European powers were the decisive factors shaping the history of Africa. The abolition of the slave trade was followed by colonialism, which had enslaved Africans in their own territories and had transformed into a more subtle form of exploitation, neocolonialism. Nkrumah’s book *Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism* referred to Lenin, but presented colonialism as something that touched every aspect of life. Neocolonialists worked in subtle and varied ways, Nkrumah claimed, and they were active in the economic field, but also in the political, religious, ideological, and cultural spheres.

The ‘African Personality’, the revival of a ‘common fundamental sentiment’ among Africans, was considered to be vital in the battle against neocolonialism. Colonialism had not only oppressed local cultures, but had also duped generations into believing that the solution for Africa’s problems lay outside the continent. Nkrumah adopted the ‘African Personality’ – a term coined by Edward Wilmot Blyden, an American-Liberian educator, in 1893 – to stress

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the autonomous role of the African on the international stage where for ‘too long in our history, Africa has spoken through the voices of others.’

Like Senghor’s Négritude, Nyerere’s Ujamaa, Mobutu’s Authenticité and Kaunda’s ‘African Humanism’, the ‘African Personality’ – or genius – was an idealised ‘authentic’ image of the past that provided a framework to visualise the future of African unity. The ‘African Personality’ was close to Aimé Césaire’s definition of Négritude which combined the ‘fraternity of olden days’ with the ‘the productive power of modern times’ in an attempt to go beyond the past, not repeat it. Nkrumah, for his part, stressed the differences with Négritude, casting it as an idea that presented Africans as possessing merely ‘sensitivity’ not rational capacities.

After 1960, the ‘African Personality’ increasingly came to be seen as the product of his environment. In the words of Ghana’s principal newspaper The Spark: ‘in an imported environment that does not reflect his language, his customs, his dress, his food, his music, song and dance’ the African could not be truly at home.

To create that distinct form of modernity, African unity was required. Neocolonialism had only been able to succeed because the continent had been divided into small units that were unable to develop on their own. Instead, the different parts had to rely on the former imperial power for defence and economic development. Disagreement about the optimal form of unity and the relation to the former coloniser created three blocs after 1960. Ghana was part of the Casablanca group, which also comprised Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Algeria, and Libya. As ‘radical’ socialist states they called for the immediate formation of a pan-African government, and strongly criticised the former imperial powers. The Brazzaville Group consisted of the other French colonies aimed at the integration of French Africa with a strong connection to France. The Monrovia group united the more pro-capitalist and pro-American countries that advocated a gradualist approach towards unity. In July 1959, Ghana, Guinea and Liberia formulated a declaration of ten principles in Sanniquellie. Nkrumah was willing to negotiate because he feared that union would be seen merely as a propaganda stunt.

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386 Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism, xiii; Yao Gebe, “Ghana’s Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D’état”, 169; Asamoah, “Nkrumah’s Foreign Policy 1951-
‘Positive Neutrality’, used interchangeably with nonalignment, was the fourth component of pan-Africanism. The guiding principle of Ghanaian diplomacy amounted to a Monroe Doctrine for Africa. Nkrumah connected ‘Africa for the Africans’, a plea by the founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, Marcus Garvey, with the American foreign policy doctrine of 1823 in his speech before Congress on 24 July 1958: ‘Our attitude […] is very much that of America looking at the disputes of Europe in the 19th century. We do not wish to be involved.’ Just as the US wanted to keep the Europeans out of the American continent, Ghana believed that ‘the peace of the world in general is served, not harmed by keeping one great continent free from the strife.’

Nkrumah shied away from exploiting the Cold War rivalry because he believed interference would only draw Africa into the conflict, ‘When the bull elephants fight, the grass is trampled down.’ Playing the USSR and the US against each other would not yield benefits. It would only result in the destruction of less powerful nations.

Peace and disarmament, the opposition to thermo-nuclear weapons, were therefore part and parcel of Nkrumah’s pan-African and anticolonial worldview. Nkrumah opposed the use of thermo-nuclear weapons and presented himself as a mediator in Vietnam in 1965, in the Palestine-Israeli conflict and the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

Pan-Africanism as a Foreign Policy: Shrugging the Colonial Past

This set of five ideas compelled Ghana to engage in public diplomacy targeted at political activists in other African territories. In July 1956, Padmore had already urged Nkrumah to personally manage the Gold Coast’s image abroad. If Nkrumah wanted his ideas to materialise they had to be vigorously propagated, integrated in concrete projects and cemented in institutions. One year after independence, Nkrumah went to the national assembly to set down his foreign policy. Officials of the American embassy, who had been able to get their hands on the corrected draft of Nkrumah’s speech, noticed that favourable

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references to the Commonwealth had been exchanged for an increased role for Ghana in Africa. 391

Early Ghanaian diplomacy had been sensitive to PR and concerned with African liberation but, by its very nature, was pragmatic in outlook. Nkrumah enjoyed cordial relations with the French ambassador, Marc Renner, and at CCTA meetings the Ghanaian delegation had made friendly and informal approaches to the delegates of Apartheid South Africa. They even urged South Africa to set up some form of permanent representation in the Gold Coast. London had invested in the creation of a diplomatic service. A total of 30 officers attended the part-time course on international relations at the London School of Economics (LSE) while the Ghana government negotiated with Whitehall in 1954 over the establishment of a High Commissioner in London, the US and Canada. 392

Pushed by Padmore, Nkrumah fashioned an image of himself as a revolutionary. His educational background had been far from radical however. After attending Achimota school in Accra, a missionary school where British and African customs and cultures were combined, he left for the US and Britain. The fact that Ghanaian public diplomacy targeted potential leaders, rather than the people, was a reflection of that background. Furthermore, echoing civilisational discourses about premature independence, Nkrumah considered all dependent territories to be ‘backward in education, in agriculture and in industry’ and in need of assistance. 393

Ghana’s UN representative, Daniel A. Chapman, also believed that education needed to produce men and women for the public service to facilitate the institutional development of the modern self-governing state. 394 At the same time, he forcefully rejected the notion that self-government had to be postponed until the educational standards were high enough, an excuse often used to postpone independence. Ghana would step in and train political activists and provide political information to strengthen the structures of the future state and build a revolutionary network.

393 Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, x; James, “‘What We Put in Black and White’: George Padmore and the Practice of Anti-Imperial Politics”, 208.
Nonetheless, Nkrumah was acutely aware that the age of mass communication had changed foreign policy. Mobilising public opinion was the most effective way to expose colonialism as immoral. In the Afro-Asian group at the UN, for instance, he spoke about how international public opinion was forcing nations to act in increasingly more ethical ways.\(^\text{395}\) Similarly, during a television recording at the UN TV studio, he declared that the founding members of the UN had hoped that ‘world public opinion would develop on the basis of international morality.’\(^\text{396}\) Once in exile, in 1966, Nkrumah would grow to regret his reliance on persuasion and propaganda. Nonetheless, until the early sixties, the belief in propaganda was widely held. Alphonse Ebassa, a freedom fighter in Sierra Leone wrote to Ghana’s principal propaganda institution, the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), to request more copies of the monthly periodical they produced, *Voice of Africa*, because propaganda had proven to be more ‘powerful’ than guns.\(^\text{397}\)

### African Unity as a Foreign Policy Goal

What then was political education and propaganda supposed to achieve? What were the aims of public diplomacy within Ghana’s overall Africa strategy? Chiefly, as an ambassador of Ghana, S.E. Quarm, stated, Nkrumah did not have a credible military option nor the capacity to declare effective economic sanctions. He therefore had to rely on ‘informal diplomacy’ with Radio Ghana, the Ghana Trade Union Congress and the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA) as the primary tools to coordinate the struggle against colonialism.\(^\text{398}\)

What is more, the BAA had to spread the ‘African Personality’. Ghanaian propaganda projected a narrative of a shared African past that was distinct from Europe. In 1960, for instance, a series of postcards was disseminated that depicted Africans at the bedrock of every major intellectual achievement, such as mathematics and philosophy (illustration 10). In December 1962, the first international congress of Africanists was organised to explore a

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‘common fundamental sentiment’ and give the ‘African Personality’ a semi-scientific underpinning. In an interview with K.B. Asante – conducted in 2012 – the ways in which he and Nkrumah had propagated the African past to heighten the self-confidence of his fellow Africans was a recurring theme:

Whether in Africa or in Ghana, we found out, Nkrumah found out, that most people at the time wanted to do things the European way. [...] So Nkrumah tried, what you call, the ‘African Personality’, self-confidence. We even sometimes exaggerated what the African had done over the years, as you can see. It was intentional.

Lastly, the numerous trips of BAA officials were a cover for intelligence gathering. In November 1959, the 5th meeting of the African Affairs Committee – which coordinated Ghana’s Africa policy – decided to send out intelligence officers to obtain vital information in dependent territories under the guise of cultural, football, or athletic associations. Until late 1959, decision makers had to rely on newspaper reports and correspondence from friends outside of Ghana. To ensure they had Nkrumah’s backing, the committee members stated that ‘Comrade Padmore’ had approved of the idea to create an intelligence service.

Ghanaian public diplomacy had many faces – as a product of necessity due to the lack of ‘real’ power, an instrument to instil Africans with the right values, even as a front for an intelligence operation – but it was principally aimed at accelerating the march to African unity. To achieve African unity, territories would have to pass through four stages of development: the attainment of freedom and independence, the consolidation of that freedom and independence, the creation of unity and community among the African states and the economic and social reconstruction of Africa. In practice, these phases were overtaken by day-to-day events, something Nkrumah admitted at the freedom fighters conference of June 1962.

More importantly, Nkrumah’s strategy for Africa was only one of many in a veritable glut of blueprints for the new Africa. The rivalry between Nkrumah and Nasser, for instance, came into the open when the Egyptian delegation was not invited to attend Ghana’s independence celebration. The most outspoken was the competition with President William

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400 Author’s interview with K.B. Asante, conducted on March 13, 2012, in Labadi, Accra, Ghana.
401 Minutes of meeting, “Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held on November 19th 1959 at Flagstaff House at 8 P.M.”, 19 November 1959, SC/BAA/251 African Affairs Committee, PRAAD-Accra.
Tubman of Liberia, who propagated his own so-called 15-Year Unification Programme, a plan that wanted to expand the national development programme of 1944 to the rest of the continent.\footnote{Foreign service despatch, Peter Rutter to Amembassy Accra, “Ghana’s Relations with Egypt”, 16 May 1957, CDF 1955-59, 645.5694/2-1756 – 645U.86B322/1-2959, NARA; Elwood D. Dunn, \textit{Liberia and the United States during the Cold War: Limits of Reciprocity} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 81–85.}


It was the NSC that accurately captured the confusing situation that Nkrumah and his competitors faced:

\begin{quote}
The African’s mind is not made up and he is being subjected to a number of contradictory forces. This pressure will increase in the future. The African is a target for the advocacy of Communism, old-fashioned colonialism, xenophobic nationalisms, and Egyptian “Islamic” propaganda, as well as for the proponents of an orderly development of the various political entities in the area in question, closely tied to the West. The eventual political orientation of the emerging African states will probably be determined by what the leaders and peoples conceive best serves their own interests, measured primarily in terms of “independence” and of “equality” with the white man.\footnote{Letter, S. Everett Gleason Acting Executive Secretary to government agencies, “U.S. policy toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960”, 26 august 1958, 4, WH Office, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 25, f: NSC 5818 Africa South of the Sahara, DDEL; Robert Murphy, makes the same point in the tripartite talks with the UK and France on 16 April 1959: “The Africans were on the whole immature and unsophisticated and were subject to many pressures – Communist, Pan-African, Islamic – all of which made it difficult for those African leaders who were Western minded to keep their followers on the right path”, see secret record, “Summary Record of the first meeting at Ambassadorial level held on April 16”, 16 April 1959, 2, FO 371/137966, TNA.}
\end{quote}

To rise to prominence, Ghanaian policy makers – who had been moulded by the colonial education system – began projecting an image of Ghana as a revolutionary centre. Driven by a sense that the Ghanaian nation and its ideas about African unity would perish if it did not intervene in other African territories, Ghana began to spread propaganda and train political activists of other territories. Those activities were aimed at strengthening a network of freedom fighters, which had been established at two conferences in Accra.
Converting Accra into a Revolutionary Mecca

To attain their goals, Nkrumah and his aides relied on a fundamental mechanism. They wanted to convert the symbolic strength of Ghana into real power by building a network of freedom fighters throughout Africa. These political activists would in turn convince the people and, once in power, fix their gaze on Ghana, ultimately leading to African unity. Thus Accra had to be converted into a revolutionary Mecca that could rival other anticolonial centres like Cairo and, by 1960, Dar es Salaam. Ghana’s position as a pan-African nation was directly dependent upon its ability to attract and influence African leaders. Its propaganda therefore had to be easily identifiable. Hence, in December 1959, Nkrumah asked the broadcast department to begin every news broadcast of the Voice of Africa with a signature call: ‘This is the Voice of Africa coming to you from Radio Ghana, Accra.’

The first and most direct initiatives to establish the revolutionary network were the Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) between 15 and 23 April 1958 and the All-African People’s Conference (AAPC) from 8 to 13 December 1958. The AAPC sought to form a network that included Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia, Julius Nyerere of

Illustration 10: ‘The science of chemistry was originated by Africans in the ancient empire of Ghana.’ A postcard from a series on pan-African history. This type of propaganda was a source of inspiration for the French who were looking for ways to improve the effectiveness of their own cultural activities. Source: Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/34, Ghana 1960-1965, AMAE.

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407 Minutes of meeting, “Sixth Meeting of the African Affairs committee held at the Flagstaff House at 1 P.M. on Friday, 4th December, 1959”, 4 December, 1959, RG. 17/2/501 African Affairs Committee 1959-1960, PRAAD-Accra
Tanganyika, Joshua Nkomo of Southern Rhodesia, Patrice Lumumba of the Belgian Congo, Tom Mboya of Kenya and Kanya Chiume of Nyasaland. The fact that leaders from independent African countries were able to meet in Accra was in itself a rejection of the claims of ethno-psychology. In Nkrumah’s words, it was proof that they had become ‘the masters of their own fate.’

The Conference of Independent African States and the Establishment of the Network

Unlike the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, which marked the beginning of Africa’s colonial tragedy, and distinct from the Brazzaville Conference of 1944 – understood by Nkrumah as a ploy to thwart the progress of ‘Positive Action’ – the CIAS aimed at strengthening the ties between the different territories of Africa. Initially, American and British officials were nervous. Sir Charles Arden-Clarke wanted to persuade Nkrumah not to proceed with the conference, while the American ambassador to Ghana, Wilson C. Flake doubted if Nkrumah would be able to organise the meeting at all. However, by February 1958, both the Colonial Office and the CIA had reached the conclusion that the CIAS would be a good opportunity to contain Nasser’s pan-Arab ambitions.

Mohammed Ahmed Omaar, a friend of Nkrumah and Padmore, played on these ambitions when he assured Chapman Andrews at the CO that the conference was indeed intended to seize the political lead in Sub-Saharan Africa before the communists and the Egyptians had the chance. The CO therefore encouraged Ako Adjei, the Ghanaian minister of the interior, to take a more assertive stance against Nasser’s Egypt, communism, and the Soviet Union. But Adjei formally denied that those goals had been pursued to attract a sufficient number of participants to the conference. Nkrumah knew that he had to plan carefully. In order not to monopolise the initiative and upset Egypt and Liberia, he allowed

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the African ambassadors in London – who had gathered there for the Commonwealth conference of 1957 – to do some of the preparatory work.\footnote{Confidential letter, Khartoum to FO, 26 March 1957, CO 936/576, TNA; Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 32.}

By April the organising committee had agreed on a list of five goals, which could be read as an instruction manual for African Unity: the exchange of views on foreign policy and other common interests, the consolidation of independence, help for dependent territories, the strengthening of economic and cultural ties, and securing peace. Two of the three points that were added to this agenda, foreign subversive activities in Africa and the creation of a permanent machinery after the Conference, point to the more activist attitude on the part of Ghana that wanted to break away from British influence. Moreover, Nkrumah wanted to see African cooperation in a broad set of fields, because he believed neocolonialism – a geopolitical practice whereby a country could be indirectly controlled – relied on a varied set of tools that were not merely violent in nature. Economic penetration, cultural assimilation, ideological domination, psychological infiltration, and subversive activities were all important.\footnote{Annex agenda, “Conference of Independent African States, April 15 to April 23”, [1958], 3, Speech transcript, “Conference of Independent African States”, 15 April 1958, Draft provisional agenda, “Conference of African States”, [1958], SC/BA/136 Conference of Independent African States, PRAAD-Accra; Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom, 1–3.}

Once the CIAS started, with speeches, discussions, and receptions where Nkrumah and Tubman danced together to Ghanaian Highlife music, France stayed away from the meeting altogether while the State Department sent a personal message from Dulles to Nkrumah with well wishes. Only the UK Information Office set up shop alongside the other independent nations in Accra’s Community Centre, which had been converted in an area where all states attending the conference could create publicity displays. The United Kingdom Information Office (UKIO) distributed issue No. 57 of Commonwealth Today, which was picked up by the Soviet Press Service representative, but also by Ghanaians who also left with a large complimentary portrait of Nasser. It strengthened the British in their belief that they could provide a counterbalance to Nasser’s growing influence in West Africa.\footnote{Confidential letter, Washington to FO, 10 April 1958, Extract from letter, N.A. Leadbitter UKIO to R.I. Hall CRO, 23 April 1958, INF 12/863, TNA; Letter, Henri-Francis Mazoyer consul Congo to DAL, “s.e.: L’opinion et la conférence d’Accra”, 25 April 1958, 5, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/43, f: Première Conference d’Accra, documents (mars 1957- avril 1958), AMAE.}

Overall, however, the CIAS was a rude awakening for the Western powers. Influencing Nkrumah had been more difficult than expected, leading to intense debate about the upcoming AAPC of December 1958. The colonial governments had a big stake in preventing as many as...
possible from participating in this meeting where political activists from still dependent territories were set to meet. Even the Belgians in the Congo, who normally ignored anticolonial activism, took action. The *Voix du Congolais*, a Belgian publication aimed at the évoluées, presented the CIAS as a propaganda event that through ‘l’infiltration psychologique’ (psychological infiltration) wanted to drive a wedge between Europe and Africa. The criticism of European slavery was presented as hypocritical because the Arab slave trade was not condemned.\(^{414}\)

The CO fell back into old paternalistic habits. Perhaps a stern talk with Nkrumah would persuade him to cancel the conference?\(^{415}\) In the ensuing discussion, William D. Allen of the Foreign Office rejected the idea of talking to Nkrumah. He believed that the call for African unity was aimed at the white settlers as well. In his paternalistic analysis this was exactly what the UK had been trying to do in multi-racial territories, such as Kenya. The proposal to talk with Nkrumah was also opposed by the Commonwealth Relations Office, because they understood that a memorandum that contained the British position might become a dangerous propaganda weapon in the hands of Padmore.\(^{416}\) In short, the British bureaucracy acknowledged the power of Nkrumah’s propaganda, but did not see him as an immediate threat to British colonial claims.

Conversely, the French had been surprised by Nkrumah’s organisational aptitude and for the first time began to see him as a contender in French Africa. However, they did not see the propagandist dimension of the CIAS. What were intended as symbolic resolutions at the closing of the conference, were judged to be absurd and seen as a sure sign that the meeting had failed.\(^{417}\)

In July 1958 Nkrumah visited the US where the conferences were only mentioned in passing. But in light of the AAPC, USIS-Ghana now became more active. Exclusive interviews with Tom Mboya, the conference chairman, and with Michael Olatunji, President of the All African Students Union of the Americas were published. The Afro-American Congressman Charles C. Diggs Jr., further asked USIS to assist in organising a press

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\(^{415}\) Minutes, R.N Posnnett to Mr. Watson and Mr. Jerrom, 13 August 1958, Minutes for secretary of state, 25 July 1958, CO 936/579, TNA.
\(^{416}\) Secret letter, W.D. Allen to N.D. Watson, 30 September 1958, Secret draft, A.W. Snelling for Mr. Eastwood, [July 1958], CO 936/579, TNA.
conference from his room, which was attended by the Ghana New Agency, Radio Ghana and Guinea Press who were able to hear answers that were drafted by USIS.\footnote{Memcon, 23 July 1958, Memcon, 24 July 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 647-652; Foreign service despatch, USIS-Accra to USIA-Washington D.C., “USIS Coverage of the All African Peoples Conference”, 16 December 1958, RG. 306, P 74, Box 17, f: Ghana 1959 Info. Gen, NARA.} It is clear that the success of this first conference, and particularly Nkrumah’s ability to act as an independent actor, took the West by surprise.

**The All-African Peoples Conference: Debating the Role of Non-Violence and Propaganda**

Nonetheless, the AAPC of December turned out to be a disappointment for Nkrumah, who wanted to gather party leaders, trade unionists and other freedom fighters to ‘work out a blueprint for the future’ of dependent Africa. However, Nkrumah’s plan for non-violent ‘Positive Action’ was met with opposition. The conference became a platform for one of the most heated debates surrounding the use of violence as opposed to the reliance on public diplomacy and propaganda in decolonisation. In his address, Fanon highlighted the aggressive nature of the French colonial system. The Algerians had tried non-violence, but in the face of French aggression they had been forced to take up arms.\footnote{Telegram, Accra to secretary of state, 25 July 1958, RG. 59, CDF 1955-1959, 645.5694/2-1756 – 645U.86332/1-2959n, NARA; Ahlman, “The Algerian Question in Nkrumah’s Ghana, 1958–1960”, 74.}

In this context, Padmore had been looking for the appropriate term to name the resistance fighters, leaders of women organisations, trade unionists, students, and musicians who would be gathering in Accra. Eventually, the term ‘freedom fighter’ was settled upon because it refuted the claim that ‘Positive Action’ was a passive concept, and it also replaced the word ‘terrorist’ – which the British had used to tarnish the cause of the Mau Mau.\footnote{Author’s interview with K.B. Asante, conducted on March 13, 2012, in Labadi, Accra, Ghana; Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds, 34.} Nkrumah’s opening speech emphasised non-violence. ‘We have pride’, he said, ‘in our determination to support every form of non-violent action.’\footnote{All-African People’s Conference: Speeches by the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening and Closing Sessions on December 8th and 13th, 1958 (Accra: Community Centre, 1958), 2.} In a commemoratory address one year later he maintained that it was not guns but ideas and moral force that offered the only sure road to victory.\footnote{“Ideas and Courage, Not Guns”, Ghana Today, April 29, 1959, Vol. 3, No. 5, 1.}

Despite Nkrumah’s zealous entreaty for non-violence and his reliance on propaganda, he supported violent resistance, for instance by opening a Chinese-led training camp in Mankrong in 1961. Historians explain this contradiction by pointing to Nkrumah’s disillusionment with the decolonisation process. Jeffrey Ahlman writes that Nkrumah’s faith...
in the Ghanaian model of non-violence began to sour in the face of the Congo crisis, the Algerian War and the Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa. Nonetheless, how do we explain why Nkrumah—who had built his entire reputation on ‘Positive Action’—supported violence? Why did he not formulate a response to Fanon’s portrayal of the Algerian situation? Why did he not provide some nuance to Fanon’s argument that violence was inevitable in the face of French atrocities? Ahlman hints at an answer when he argues that Nkrumah, at least in principle, sympathised with many of the arguments advanced by Fanon. By 1966, Nkrumah seemed to have come around to Fanon’s assertion when he voiced regret about the fact that his policy of African liberation has been leaning so heavily on propaganda:

As I wrote to you some time ago, the situation in Africa and the stage which the African revolutionary struggle has reached, demands a new approach as to political action. Persuasion and propaganda must be backed by revolutionary armed struggle [...] This is now my conviction after 18 years struggle by other means.

However, this statement did not reflect a change of heart. While Fanon and Nkrumah are often presented as opposites, they had a shared understanding of colonialism as a psychological problem. Fanon was convinced that the psychological chains of colonialism could only be broken by violent means: ‘colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence.’ At the same time, he acknowledged that radio had been a potent weapon for the French colonisers, which made the Radio Alger an important instrument of resistance. When Fanon became the FLN’s ambassador to Ghana, he also noted how the Louis Armstrong’s jazz performances, ‘American Negro diplomats’, scholarships, the Voice of America, and the German and Israeli cultural activities, made African unity difficult.

In short, Fanon and Nkrumah diagnosed colonialism in the same way, but in Nkrumah’s opinion Fanon’s remedy fell short. Fanon did not explain the transformational mechanism behind violence. As Nkrumah was rewriting his own guerrilla warfare handbook in 1966, he noted that The Wretched of the Earth was ‘a powerful book’ but without a ‘practical

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425 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 36.
revolutionary philosophy.’

What distinguished Nkrumah from Fanon was not his principal rejection of violence, but rather the conviction that violence in itself was not ‘a cleansing force’. According to Nkrumah, violence did not free ‘the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction’, as Fanon had written, nor make him ‘fearless’ or restore ‘his self-respect’. Violent resistance had to be backed by an effort to strengthen the self-confidence of the African and spread the ‘African Personality’ and culture.

Nkrumah had initially found Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence ineffective. In Nkrumah’s analysis, non-violence could only work when backed by a ‘strong political organisation.’

 Already in 1952, Nkrumah emphasised that ‘Positive Action’ was not only about ‘strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation’; they were ‘a last resort’. More important were the ‘Positive Action’ techniques, which became an essential part of the curriculum at the Ideological Institute in Winneba, where freedom fighters were trained from 1961 onwards. A specific topic of attention was the organisational policies and procedures of political parties who were campaigning for independence, including the organisation of elections, party branches and propaganda vans.

In his opening speech to the AAPC, Nkrumah stressed that the ethical and humanistic side of the African people could not be ignored. The conference resolutions gave some support to those who were ‘compelled to retaliate against violence’, but also valued the mobilisation of world opinion and the education of the African people. At the ‘Positive Action’ conference in April 1960, he reiterated that ‘the passive sympathy of the African masses’ had to be converted into ‘active participation in the struggle for the total emancipation of Africa.’

To attain these goals, the AAPC had to create a network of leaders to guide the African public.

Both conferences had an impact on Nkrumah’s image. The Eisenhower administration and the Macmillan government still viewed Nkrumah as an ally in their attempt to bring about

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427 Milne, Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years, his Life and Letters, 174; The sociologists Peter Worsley, made a similar observation ‘Fanon’s writing […] is ruthlessly honest and highly intellectual, if not always worked through’, see Worsley, ‘Frantz Fanon and the ‘Lumpenproletariat’, 193.

428 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 94.


432 Draft memorandum, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of political science”, [1961], BAA/RLA/423 Kwame Nkrumah Institute Winneba, 1961-63: Memos, Reports (Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute), PL.

an orderly transition to self-government, while the French still considered Nkrumah to be a small problem. In January 1958 Renner even believed Nkrumah suffered from a mental illness.\textsuperscript{433} Nkrumah’s plea for non-violence had made a particular impression in London, but also in Washington – where the first assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Joseph Charles Satterthwaite, and Robert Murphy of the State Department, praised the attendees of the AAPC for their moderate position.\textsuperscript{434} Officials at the CO had even picked up gossip in the corridors, where Nkrumah’s warnings about the different forms of colonialism were interpreted as a condemnation of Nasser.\textsuperscript{435}

In Africa the conferences lowered Nkrumah’s standing because they had widened the gap between the violent and non-violent approach, between radical adherents of African unity and gradualists, and between French Africa and Ghana. Diop told the American ambassador to Paris that the conferences had been a political event of ‘immense importance’ but he felt that the French Africans had been ‘crushed’ by British Africans. With no translators on site it had been difficult to participate.\textsuperscript{436}

Nonetheless, with the CIAS and the AAPC Nkrumah had laid the groundwork for a network of political activists. The AAPC resolutions called upon independent African countries to offer aid and support African unity, more specifically ‘through propaganda and education to discourage tribalism.’\textsuperscript{437} By contrast to what historians have argued, Nkrumah did not grow to accept violence as decolonisation became more brutal, but believed violent resistance was ineffective if it was not combined with an effort to promote the ‘African Personality’. The Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs, who worked to strengthen the network, picked up that challenge.


\textsuperscript{434} Press release, “Address by the Honorable Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs before the Southern Assembly (Tulane University): The United States and the New Africa”, 17 January 1959, CDF 1955-59, 611.70/10-158 – 611.7194/12-457, NARA; Confidential letter to Mark E. Allen, E.G. Le Tocq, 12 December 1958, CO 822/1349, TNA; Secret record, “Summary Record of the first meeting at Ambassadorial level held on April 16”, 16 April 1959, 2, FO 371/137966, TNA.

\textsuperscript{435} Confidential letter to Mark E. Allen, E.G. Le Tocq, 12 December 1958, CO 822/1349, TNA.

\textsuperscript{436} Letter, Amembassy Paris to StateDep, 6 January 1959, CDF 1955-59, 611.70/10-158 – 611.7194/12-457, NARA.

\textsuperscript{437} Resolutions of the All African People’s Conference Held at Accra, Ghana December 5-13, 1958, 7.
Bureau of African Affairs: Improving the Network

In the resolutions of the AAPC, freedom fighters were encouraged to use ‘propaganda and education’ to attain unity, while the leaders of independent countries were asked to assist the fighters.\(^{438}\) After George Padmore died, on 23 September 1959, these resolutions were given substance when Nkrumah replaced the office of advisor to the prime minister on African affairs with the Bureau of African Affairs. In doing so, he wanted to put Padmore’s work on a permanent basis and in that way he realised Padmore’s dream: a bureau, officially a non-governmental organisation, to support independence movements. Nkrumah named himself as the acting director, and A.K Barden became the secretary, after Kofi Baako had temporarily filled that position.\(^{439}\)

Already in the 1950s, the BAA became the topic of espionage stories because they provided financial and moral aid to African freedom fighters. It also led to a tense relationship with the African Affairs Secretariat and the ministry of foreign affairs, two branches of the Ghanaian bureaucracy that managed the official diplomatic relations. A.K Barden wrote to Nkrumah that the idea of sending out activists had not been very well understood.\(^{440}\) The secretive way in which BAA officers were forced to work did not help matters. For instance, in 1960 Kofi Baako had fled into the office of the bank manager to evade the suspicious stares of clerks and customers, which he received when he collected a bag filled with dollar bills intended for the freedom fighters outside of Ghana.\(^{441}\)

The Bureau of African Affairs as a Public Diplomacy Institution

However, the BAA and its predecessor, the Offices of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on African Affairs, defined themselves in public diplomacy terms – as actors in the ideological scramble.\(^{442}\) They ran literacy classes and educational campaigns for expatriates and devoted

\(^{438}\) Ibid.

\(^{439}\) Nkrumah quoted in Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 107; Minutes of meeting, “Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held on Thursday”, 22 October 1959, SC/BAA/251 African Affairs Committee, PRAAD-Accra; Eschen, Race against Empire, 11; James, “‘What We Put in Black and White’; George Padmore and the Practice of Anti-Imperial Politics”, 235; Resolutions of the All African People’s Conference Held at Accra, Ghana December 5-13, 1958, 7.

\(^{440}\) Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 20 May 1964, SC/BAA/357 Bureau of African Affairs 16/10/53 – 30/7/65, PRAAD-Accra; Author’s Interview with K.B. Asante, conducted on March 13, 2012, in Labadi, Accra, Ghana by Frank Gerits.

\(^{441}\) Letter, Kofi Baakoo to Nkrumah, “Operation Independence Transfer of Financial aid to Freedom Fighters”, [1960], BAA/RLAA/370 Correspondence with the President, 1960: BAA Reports, Correspondence (Nkrumah, Nationalist Organizations), PL.

\(^{442}\) This rejects Thompson’s claim that the BAA’s financial mismanagement led to failure. Even though Ahlman makes important steps in redefining the BAA, he does not see Nkrumah as a player in the ideological scramble,
most of their time to the production of information material. Despite rumours of espionage and financial mismanagement, the BAA described itself as an information office and maintained a research department, protocol division, printing press, library, linguistic secretariat, conference hall and publications section. Some of the political organisations in dependent Africa were represented by their own personnel in the bureau. Other movements, such as the Mouvement de Liberation Nationale in the Belgian Congo had their own material printed while AAPC pamphlets rolled off the BAA presses and were sent out to the rest of the continent.

Admittedly, Ghana’s government had declared that it would give financial assistance to all freedom fighters in their attempt to free themselves from the imperial yoke. However, Nkrumah understood that handing out dollar bills would not suffice. At the end of 1959, when £20,000 had been funnelled to others on the continent, Nkrumah reiterated that assistance would only be given to organisations that fully subscribed to the idea of African independence and unity.

Education, journalism and, increasingly, radio were more important than dollar bills particularly because these so-called ‘Positive Action’ techniques were appropriate in an international system where decolonisation had acquired a symbolic dimension. Kofi Baako, the first director of the BAA, described the 1950s and 1960s as a time of ‘national rivalries, ideological competitions and racial antagonisms.’ The importance of ideas led to a foreign policy that relied heavily on propaganda and aspired to build a network of political activists. In the vernacular of Ghanaian diplomacy, this approach relied on non-violence and ‘Positive Action’. In Padmore’s words: ‘That is why Nkrumah has made it a principal plank of his
government’s foreign policy to render every kind of support, short of violence, to the struggle for national independence in Africa and wherever else it is being carried on.  

Essential in all this was the network strategy, a public diplomacy technique that betrayed the elitist bias of Ghanaian government officials. Rather than targeting the general population directly, the BAA invested in political education for potential leaders who could in their turn convince their people to look towards Ghana for guidance. The resolutions of the AAPC had explicitly subscribed to this approach: ‘Be it resolved that steps be taken by political, trade union, cultural and other organisations to educate the masses about the dangers of these evil practices and thereby mobilise the masses to fight these evils.’

In Ghana, the BAA turned to political education, revolutionary journalism, and radio as means to establish and strengthen a revolutionary network on the continent that would be loyal to Ghana.

**Education and Political Training**

Ideological training was one of the most direct ways in which the ties with Accra could be strengthened. In September 1958, Padmore had been advised by W.W.K. Vanderpuye of the ministry of education to offer scholarships that were different from the academic grants already offered to Liberians. Vanderpuye wanted to emulate the Indian and Egyptian cultural exchange scholarships, which had an explicit political goal. As early as 12 November 1959 Nkrumah announced his plans in a meeting of the African Affairs Committee to convert the Winneba Party College into an institute where selected members of all nationalist movements could receive training in how to achieve African unity. The institute would, in Nkrumah’s words, ‘propagate firmly the essence of African unity in Ghana and throughout the continent of Africa.’

Until the opening of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in 1961, other buildings and organisations within Ghana were used. On 11 November 1960, the Kwame Nkrumah Youth Training School, an extension of the training base of the Ghana Young Pioneers in Teshie, was opened. This youth movement aimed at cultivating a revolutionary form of citizenship and patriotism while the Builder Brigade, a state-led group of young men

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446 Telegram, Padmore to Jian, Times of India and Nkrumah, 6 September 1959, BAA/RLAA/413 Cablegrams, 1959: Telegrams (Travel Plans, Miscellaneous), PL.


448 Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa: Documentary Evidence of Nkrumah’s Interference in the Affairs of Other African States, 44.
undertaking public construction work, was also visited by freedom fighters to learn those values, even though it was far from revolutionary. New documents reveal that the ICA that had covertly funded the establishment of this organisation.  

The school trained youths from Nyasaland and 108 Gambians, of which 50 returned to their country after completing a general course in youth leadership. According to the report they had an important part to play in the reconstruction of Gambia. A lecture on the one-party system, given at a school in Cape Coast, provides a glimpse of this education. Pacing up and down in front of the blackboard, the lecturer asserted:

These people may try to make comparisons between their countries and ours, between other countries and ours, between some world leaders and our leaders and point fingers here and there at some failings in some of our people in an attempt to bring our country into ridicule or to reduce it into some inferior position.

The response was simple: ‘I am proud of Ghana. I must do my duty to my country.’

Ghana’s use of education as a means to plant ideas, as well as a way to prepare future leaders, not only reveals Padmore’s enduring influence but also betrays how much officials had been influenced by the European ideas they chose to reject.

**Revolutionary Journalism**

The many newspapers that the BAA spread throughout Africa exposed a similar logic. The focus on press material to create a language for African activism was Padmore’s second legacy. As a former journalist of *The Chicago Defender* and *The Pittsburgh Courier*, he ordered the dispatch of 300 daily copies of *Evening News* and *Ghanaian Times* to ‘selected people, news agencies of European countries as well as those of independent and dependant African States’ in January 1959. These periodicals were government-owned products of biased, but serious, journalism – which, despite the professed revolutionary role of the press, remained elitist and aimed at strengthening the ties with Accra.

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452 Letter, Collecumer Clerical Officer to Nkrumah, 8 January 1959, BAA/RLAA/247 1962 Receipts: Bills, Correspondence (BAA), PL.
Although read out in public, newspapers were first and foremost meant for an educated audience that was able to digest academic essays on the ‘African Personality’. One of those articles, allegedly written by Dorothy Padmore and published in the Ghanaian Times, posited that the Africans in British Africa had been more successful in safeguarding their Africanism compared to their counterparts in French Africa.453 The illiterate reader was aided by cartoons that tried to illustrate what it meant to be African while postcards and all sorts of other visual material was produced to demonstrate the rich African past.

Padmore worked to expand his readership to include more influential people. In July 1958 he asked the Americans to help him improve his mailing list, filled with individual organisations that might be interested in the publications or bulletins his office distributed. The importance of newspapers even convinced the USIA to distribute Padmore’s old newspaper *The Pittsburgh Courier* throughout the continent (illustration 11).454

The power of the so called ‘revolutionary press’ therefore lay more in creating a common understanding among elites in Africa about what it meant to be African. Nkrumah’s invitation to W.E.B. Dubois to take charge of the *Encyclopedia Africana* project and his commitment to fostering African Studies, both project that were aimed at collecting information from the entire continent written by Africans for Africans, has to be understood in the same light.455

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Illustration 11: A slide taken from a presentation given by The Pittsburgh Courier to the USIA as part of an attempt to convince the USIA to distribute the newspaper throughout Africa. It argued that, as an Afro-American newspaper, it had a unique position in which it could convince an African readership of the good American intentions. Source: Presentation, Olcott H. Deming, Public Affairs Adviser for African Affairs, 15 December 1959, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, f: IPS, NARA.
Radio and the Network Strategy

In 1957, the Ghana External Broadcasting Service and *The Voice of Ghana* were founded. These services compiled news bulletins and were intended to project Ghana’s image abroad, but until transmitters became strong enough in 1961, radio remained an instrument of national education. However, Nkrumah was keen on strengthening his external broadcasting capacities, an ambition he inserted into the second Five Year Development Plan (1959-64). By March 1958, two advisors from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation had arrived in Ghana with a plan for a radio network at an estimated cost of £1,077,950 and an annual operation cost of £169,410. In its first stages the new service was to be broadcast in English and French.  

Until 1961, however, radio remained part of the network strategy. With its capacity for radio broadcasting, Ghana was able to become a member of the Union of African Radiobroadcasting, which was founded on 23 May 1960 with its permanent seat in Rabat, its administrative component in Tunis, its technical commission in Cairo, and the committee responsible for the exchange of programmes based in Accra. Even though Nkrumah was not yet able to project his ideas abroad, radio allowed him to cement the idea of African unity in yet another institution.

People in the Network

The weak link in Ghana’s network strategy concerned the selection of suitable candidates. Day-to-day life at the African Affairs Centre – which provided accommodation and meals to the freedom fighters in Accra – illustrated the problem. There were various reports of rowdy behaviour among the student population. One student, Evelyn Molabatsi, for instance had become so drunk that she had almost been run over by a van and had verbally abused the security guard at the gate of the centre. Other women turned to prostitution. Fights among men were also reported, and a Kenyan student had tried to force his way into another student’s bedroom at four in the morning.
These reports not only elucidate how difficult it was for Ghanaian men to come to terms with changes in female gender patterns, but also had political consequences. On 11 November 1960, a special mission left Accra, comprised of A.K Barden, the director of the Bureau of African Affairs, John Tettegah, a board member of the Bureau, and W. Wilson, security officer of the ministry of foreign affairs. They wanted to examine what the network strategy had accomplished thus far and study how their contacts with trade unionists, the youth groups and women’s associations could be improved. Delays and organisational difficulties limited their visit to Sudan, Kenya, and Tanganyika.

They confirmed that no financial assistance should ever be given to any political organisation without first having conducted an on-the-spot analysis. More importantly, their report wanted to impress upon readers that each target group had a particular political potential that needed careful and tactical exploitation. They were interested in the youth groups and students because ‘the fire kindled by the youth in sincerity can never be quenched.’ Barden’s team therefore offered scholarships to Sudanese students to enable them to study in Ghanaian labour institutions. What made the women politically useful was their perceived urge to ‘exercise their political rights’. The pan-African project could thus offer an opportune avenue for women who were ambitious in this respect.

In short, Barden’s team wanted to better understand how the ‘political consciousness’ of different groups within different African societies could be exploited and they analysed political organisations as part of this endeavour. The writers of the report paid no attention to the preferences of mass target audiences or communication strategies. Ghanaian influence in Africa had to be increased through a network of political activists in a non-violent way if the ‘African Personality’ and African unity were ever to be realised.459

Conclusion: an Anticolonial and Pan-African Worldview

The pan-African ideology influenced Ghanaian diplomatic activity on several levels. On the level of interpretation, Africa’s problems were perceived as the consequence of a colonial system and the outcome of neocolonial machinations, rather than the by-product of a superpower competition. On the level of foreign policy formulation, Ghana’s diplomacy became geared towards exploiting the only advantage it had over its imperial opponents: its African credentials and what the Bandung Conference had labelled its ‘moral strength’.

On the level of policy execution, violence was considered to be ineffective because it did not address the underlying problem of colonialism: the blow to African self-confidence and the balkanization of the continent. The Bureau of African Affairs therefore sought ways to draw politically active Africans into a network. Even though Accra presented itself as a revolutionary centre, the effectiveness of its public diplomacy operation relied heavily on African leaders, not on a mass audience. Political training, newspapers and even radio were all used to establish and strengthen an elitist political network. Their belief that pan-African activism would not only work to the advantage of Accra, but also strengthen the leadership of future independent states betrayed how far Nkrumah and his aides remained the victims of the very thing they wanted to fight: mental colonisation.

Nkrumah and his aides were prisoners of the European ideas they claimed to reject as they distrusted the population abroad and instead chose to rely on a network of leaders. The BAA wanted to construct a revolutionary Mecca to rival other centres such as Cairo and Dar Es Salaam.

The first test for the strength of Ghanaian diplomacy was the independence of the French colony of Guinea in 1958. The UK, the US and particularly France were forced to alter their approach to public diplomacy in the face of Ghana’s ideological challenge. It is their response to the rise of Ghana as a new competitor that is explored in the next chapter.

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5. Showcasing Development

**Competing for African Attention in Guinea in the Shadow of Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism and the Move towards Authoritarianism (1957 – 1960)**

We prefer poverty in liberty to riches in slavery.

> – Ahmed Sekou Touré, the leader of Guinea, in his speech in front of the General Assembly in Conakry during de Gaulle’s arrival, 25 August 1958.\(^\text{461}\)

We have tried to have our cake and eat it, to avoid offense to our friends in Europe and to give only a cautious encouragement to the legitimate aspirations of self-government. [...] the result has been to please neither and to lose the psychological and ideological initiative. This has indirectly benefited communism.

> – American Interagency Working Group on Educational and Cultural Programs in Africa South of the Sahara, 18 March 1960.\(^\text{462}\)

Nkrumah’s independence speech, in which he envisioned an Africa that was ‘ready to fight its own battles’, presented Paris, Washington and London with a new challenge: nationalist leaders who promoted their own plans for Africa and relied on authoritarian development models.\(^\text{463}\) How Nkrumah’s pan-African blueprint shaped the decision making of those outside of the continent is a heavily debated question.

Some have argued that French and British plans for imperial reform foresaw the creation of independent states. Guia Migani, for instance, argues that Guinean independence accelerated the decolonisation of French Africa, until plans were implemented after 1960 that allowed France to restore its influence. Ronald Hyam has most prominently developed a parallel argument for the British Empire.\(^\text{464}\) Others question the extent of British and French planning and claim that African independence reshaped the decolonisation process and

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limited what the imperial powers and the US were able to achieve. Further, the degree to which Eisenhower in particular was truly committed to creating a set of liberal democracies in Africa is subject to debate. It has been argued that Cold War concerns forced the president to support authoritarian regimes from 1958 onwards. But why did Eisenhower sacrifice democracy for development by supporting the so-called ‘strong men’ – particularly when he believed American values were essential for long-term stability, as has been argued in the previous chapters?

These dynamics converged on 28 September 1958, when Guinea, a West African country led by Ahmed Sékou Touré, rejected the new French constitution in a referendum. After his return as prime minister of the fourth French Republic, de Gaulle had given the French territories two options: accept a subordinate position in a newly created French Community, or choose immediate independence and the loss of French aid. Touré’s Parti Démocratique de Guinée-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (PD-RDA) had advocated the no vote under the impulse of students, trade unionists, and the party’s youth wing. Subsequently, French civil servants packed their suitcases and destroyed much of the infrastructure while the construction of the Konkouré dam was terminated. However, Ghana and the USSR, but also the British and the Americans, almost instantly rushed to Touré’s aid as part of a miniature scramble that is ignored in the existing scholarship in favour of the narrative of East and West competition.

Studying the race to Guinea within the wider context of the ideological scramble between the years 1958 and 1960 rejects the notion that the Americans were complacent in the face of Soviet intrusion and questions the degree to which the French withdrew from Guinea. Historians such as Fred Marte and Laciné Kaba for instance, have emphasised that the French retreat from Guinea was radical because of the conflicting personalities of de Gaulle and Touré. Nonetheless, they pay less attention to the international competition for Guinea and the efforts of others within the French bureaucracy that worked to limit the impact

of de Gaulle’s disdain for Touré. The perspective of the ideological scramble further reveals that officials on the ground adjusted their public diplomacy techniques in response to Ghana’s propaganda campaign and the pressure of Guinea’s independence, while the belief in a guided transition was not affected. Thus the historians that claim decolonisation was a planned undertaking and the historians that reject that narrative by studying the influence of African nationalism are both right: because both tell a story that is only partial.

Specifically, then, the following pages analyse how the idea of a planned route to self-government remained surprisingly influential among anxious planners who were forced to improvise. First, the way in which British and American determination to assist Guinea influenced French decision making in Africa is assessed. Second, how Nkrumah’s pan-African propaganda campaign impacted upon the tactics of public diplomats on the ground will be explored. For instance the French ambassador in Accra, Louis de Guiringaud, began to emulate the successful tactics of his colleagues in an attempt to make aid attractive, rather than qualitatively superior – as had been advocated by Senghor in the years before. The final part discusses how Eisenhower managed to uphold his commitment to American democratic values and an orderly transition while supporting authoritarian regimes. Taken together, the events of the late 1950s offer insight into the complexities of the gospel of stability. The race to Guinea reveals that the showcasing of development was a skill that public diplomats only acquired over time as the competition intensified.

Expanding Cultural Assistance and the Race to Guinea

Eleven days before the referendum, the French ambassador Jean Mauberna asked teachers who were holidaying outside of Guinea not to return, a punitive measure that reflected the French views on development in which teachers and language were essential. The fact that Touré had ordered all his ministers and senior officials to learn English within a year not only illustrates his aspiration to speed up the integration of British and French Africa, but also that Touré subscribed to the French ideas about development and language. In Touré’s view,


The showcase was thus not part and parcel of modernisation theory, see Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2010), 179.

Africa needed ‘moral and spiritual’ as well as material aid. Moreover, the figure of the teacher held an almost mythical status in postcolonial societies where pedagogical leadership styles were adopted to teach populations how to become full citizens of a modern nation state that needed to catch up with the West.471

**Analysing Guinea through the Lens of an Orderly Transition**

A few weeks after Ghana’s independence, Eisenhower wrote a letter to his Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, in which he recommended ‘a combination of the broadest and most persistent kind of education’ to address the critical condition brought about by the ‘spirit of nationalism’ and the ‘deep hunger for some betterment in physical conditions and living standards.’ ‘Like men’ the administration would have to wipe out the conditions of instability that could make the communist ideology flourish and damage the independence of new countries such as Ghana.472 As the US Bureau of African Affairs was created within the State Department in 1958, a strategic paper maintained that the most pressing issue was the long-term attitude of the 120 million people living South of the Sahara.473 The Baylor Program was executed by working out a standard procedure for educational exchanges and the *Harrar Report* by George Harrar was published at the National Academy of Sciences, which recommended an expansion of the teaching in science and technology.474

Even Macmillan, who faced a crisis in the settler colony of Nyasaland, remained wedded to the old formula of the British information services. The state of emergency declared by Governor Robert Armitage on 3 March 1959 resulted in the death of 51 Africans. When the British High Court investigated Armitage’s justification – an alleged plot of Hastings Banda’s National African Congress (NAC) to indiscriminately kill Europeans and

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Asians – Judge Devlin unexpectedly dismissed the ‘murder plot’ as a fabrication. Nonetheless, when turning to the cause of the conflict Devlin maintained that an insufficiently developed information services had been at the root of the unrest. John C. Hyde of the UKIO in Uganda therefore proposed the production of a series of films about the federation in which Europeans and Africans cooperated. Historians are in agreement that the crisis signalled the ‘moral end of the British empire’, but the UK ideological strategy suggests a different chronology. In April 1959 the official British goal remained an orderly and gradual evolution to independence, implemented through the development of ‘institutions of central government’.

Consequently ‘orderly transition’ – not direct Soviet containment – became the lodestar of the Western response to Guinea. Although Soviet intrusion would be particularly challenging, Secretary of State for the Colonies Lennox-Boyd believed that any kind of ‘power vacuum’ was potentially risky and required early intervention. He wanted to provide Nigeria with a radio transmitter as a counterweight to the hostile broadcasts of Radio Conakry, even though he did not know if Touré supported Ghana’s brand of pan-African nationalism or if he had been seduced by communist ideas. The first assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Joseph Satterthwaite, also felt that the US had to support independence – provided a country was ‘able to undertake its responsibilities’ – by strengthening the resolve of the new nations ‘in their own capacities’.

In 1958, the French had yet to play the Soviet card. In the belief that the UK could still be a valuable ally, the French representative in the Anglo-French talks warned that it would be ‘a serious psychological mistake’ if Africans were led to feel that the West was only interested in them for ‘Cold War reasons’.

477 Secret record, “Summary Record of the third meeting at Ambassadorial level held on April 20”, 28 April 1959, FO 371/13966, TNA.
479 Draft record, Anglo-French talks, 1 December 1958, FO 371/137940, TNA; Confidential letter, C. Steel to FO, 31 March 1955, FO 371/116979, TNA.
was insufficiently prepared for independence, the British and Americans felt forced to intervene. Nkrumah’s vocal rejection of imperial guidance did not affect the belief in psychological modernisation. It only made Whitehall and the White House rethink the way in which that right was exercised, particularly after Nixon’s Africa trip of 1957.

Illustration 12: Joseph C. Satterthwaite lights a cigarette for Julius Nyerere, leader of the Tanganyika African National Union and later president of Tanzania. It was these types of meetings that irritated the settlers and the British, because they believed it gave Africans an inflated sense of self-worth. Source: Undated photo, Satterthwaite Papers, Box 3, Bentley Historical Library.

Africa as a Battleground for Hearts and Minds

After attending the independence celebrations in Ghana, Nixon visited Morocco, Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya, Italy, and Tunisia. Considering his tour, the vice president reflected on the ‘wider significance of the emergence of the new nation of Ghana’ and concluded that its success was crucial. Specifically, the eyes of the world would be on Ghana to determine whether the formula for an ‘orderly transition’ was durable and applicable elsewhere. In Nixon’s estimation, the advance of technology made the influence of ‘ideas and principles’ even more pervasive. He therefore made a plea to increase the number of information posts, understanding that American influence did not only depend on assistance in matters of education and public health but also rested on whether the people in Africa
continued to understand the American principles of ‘independence, equality and economic progress’.  

Eisenhower agreed with Nixon, particularly after Nkrumah’s visit to the US in July 1958. During the NSC meeting of August 1958, that discussed Thomas White’s plan for military bases in Africa, the president frequently returned to the issue of public diplomacy: ‘We must win Africa, but we can’t win it by military activity […] we couldn’t win wars unless we won the people.’ Nixon added that cultural relations would also enable the US to support a brand of ‘neutralism, which the national independence movements favor’ without being accused of importing the Cold War, a recurring concern since the Bandung Conference of 1955.

In 1959, Alec Douglas-Home, the secretary of state for commonwealth relations, also adjusted the course of the British information services which had relied primarily on the development of radio and press services. However, ‘Afro-Asian propaganda’ developments in the Arab world and the manifestations of African nationalism – in Accra but particularly in Nyasaland – forced the Colonial Office to become more involved in information activities, as well as becoming more committed to presenting international news in the ‘correct’ way. Interestingly enough, Alec Douglas-Home reached that conclusion after a conversation with Nkrumah in which the Ghanaian leader had told him that British decisions in Africa were under the close scrutiny of African public opinion. Nkrumah advocated that Britain should produce a ‘declaration of principles’ on colonial policy to stress its commitment to fostering ‘self-government’.  

Rather than promoting the benefits of imperialism and improving assistance schemes, as happened after Bandung, UK Information Offices needed to prevent the liberal story of a guided transition from crumbling under the pressure of Nkrumah’s propaganda campaign which had brought ‘racial problems in the Central African Federation and Kenya’ to the fore. Robert Marett of the IPD labelled this ‘the goodwill’ strategy in which a tactical offering of aid had to be combined with ‘a more or less orthodox type of information job’ inside and

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outside of British Africa. The Next Ten Years in Africa, a government report, reflected an acute awareness of the power of African public opinion:

If Western governments appear to be reluctant to concede independence to their dependent territories, they may alienate African opinion and turn it towards the Soviet Union; if on the other hand they move too fast they run the risk of leaving large areas of Africa ripe for Communist exploitation.

From 1958 onwards the UK information officers were asked to inform their African target audiences about the advances in British as well as French decolonisation. Imperial reform was promoted as a single enterprise.

Contrary to Eisenhower and Douglas-Home, de Gaulle ignored African nationalism in the French plan for cultural expansion of 1959. Admittedly, there was more attention for the concrete political ‘advantages’ that came with cultural diplomacy. However, French cultural assistance to Africa was not solely a cloak to hide cynical agendas of weapon shipments and business deals, nor were French operatives naïve enough to think that cultural, technical, commercial and linguistic aid would simply entice the former African colonies to develop according to a French model, as many have argued. For France, assistance was not about creating and selling an image of French grandeur.

Instead, the projection into Africa was about striking a deal. The French believed they had something to offer and they expected support in return. Therefore, institutions such as the universities, cultural centres and language schools had to be renovated, French books had to create an appetite for the French language by focusing on scientific, technical and medical knowledge and, where possible, educational cooperation had to be improved by making the services more useful. This service mentality – ‘véritable politique d’offre de services’ – avoided hurting African nationalistic pride and made French culture more attractive. The plan did increase the visibility of the French cultural operation. The Americans had calculated that the plan increased spending from $40,270,000 to $49,680,000 by 1963.

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484 Quoted in Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, 256.


486 ‘véritable politique d’offre de services’, Note pour le premier ministre, “a/s. Conception et organisation d’ensemble de l’action culturelle et technique française à l’étranger”, 8 October 1959, 1-3, 2 DE 61, f: Juin
In short, Nkrumah succeeded in giving Africans a place in the blueprints of Whitehall and the White House, albeit not as political actors but as propaganda targets. Specifically, public diplomacy had to pave the way for psychological modernisation to be effective. The officials at the Quai d’Orsay, on the other hand, saw the French language and culture as a modernising force that needed little introduction. That subtle difference led to conflict when Nkrumah succeeded in forming the Ghana-Guinea union on 22 November 1958, which was accompanied by a Ghanaian loan for Tour of £10,000,000.487

In French government quarters there was outrage because they believed the British had helped Ghana. Nkrumah was not considered to be an independent actor in international affairs and French newspapers accused the UK of destabilising the French Community. The conspiracy allegation angered the Colonial Office where African public opinion was taken seriously. The stories published by French newspapers fed anti-British sentiment as far as the bazars of Morocco where the French periodicals were also read.488

To minimise the PR damage, the British informed the French in December 1958 that they were already helping Touré by recruiting English teachers, while radio recordings of the first 50 lessons of the BBC’s ‘English By Radio Course’ were offered to the minister of education and broadcast a day later on Radio Conakry. In response, the French representative suggested that Touré was under communist control, but the British officials were adamant about the need for action – ‘whatever the situation.’ De Gaulle realised he was rapidly losing influence when the French counterespionage service listed the assistance missions that had already visited Guinea by December 1958. Besides the delegations coming from the US, West and East Germany and the Afro-Asian solidarity secretariat, Guinea sent its envoys to Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Houphouet’s Ivory Coast and even the UK.489

The American assistance mission is particularly remarkable since Eisenhower withheld the official recognition of Guinea until 1 November 1958, which historians have interpreted as a form of support for France.490 More important, however, was Eisenhower’s view on

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487 Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, 68–69.
489 Confidential, “Record of Anglo French Official Talks on Africa held in London on December 7 and 8”, 8 December 1958, CO 936/564, TNA; Notice d’information secret, SDECE, “La Situation Interieure et les Relations Extérieures de la Republique de Guinee (Oct.-Nov. 1958)”, 2 December 1958, 27, DAL, Guinee (sous dérogation), 51QO/35, AMAE.
decolonisation, which led him to be less proactive. As Dulles explained, it was not in the American interest to reward ‘premature independence’. The rumours about Guinea’s possible turn towards the USSR made a foreign aid scheme problematic. As Eisenhower had already argued in his correspondence with Humphrey and Hoffmann, aid would only strengthen Moscow if it was not part of an integrated cultural assistance strategy. He was therefore pleased that Touré had invested so much time in education, a priority for new nations. Eisenhower, the fiscal conservative who pushed for economic aid to the Third World without providing a lot of hard cash once again relied on cultural assistance.

In August 1959, the ICA survey team arrived in Guinea to investigate the possibilities to provide assistance. Touré, who had also hired an Afro-American PR adviser, understood that he could use the oversupply of aid offers against the French. That same month, Ismaël Touré – Sékou Touré’s half-brother – publically suggested recognising the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) as the legitimate government of Algeria, to see how far he could go in his negotiations with the French. When Touré visited the US in October 1959 he was promised 150 scholarships and the placement of 50 Guinean students per year for three years. Moreover, a seminar for Guinean teachers was organised (illustration 13).

Touré also tried to use the arms shipments from Czechoslovakia and the rumours of Soviet intrusion to put pressure on the British and Eisenhower. In a conversation with Satterthwaite in October 1959, he asked for funds for the construction of the Konkouré dam, hinting that the Soviets had already made an offer. In September 1959, he invited the British chargé d'affaires, Wynn Hugh-Jones, to meet him and denied Guinea’s relations with the Soviet bloc. He claimed to have only accepted an invitation to visit Moscow under great pressure, asserting that Khrushchev had even sent an aircraft to Conakry. While waving the Soviet-Guinea agreement on cultural cooperation under Hugh-Jones’ nose and claiming it also granted financial aid, he stated he would not sign it unless he was sure there were no strings to

493 The entire conversation can be found in Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 133.
the aid the Soviets had offered. It is therefore not surprising that de Gaulle’s memoires describe Touré as a demagogic dictator, who skilfully forged public opinion.


**Debré’s Early Return**

Already by January 1959, the French wanted to slow down the race to Guinea and started negotiating a cultural protocol with Touré. They also sent an unofficial diplomat, Pasteur Mabille, to investigate what motivated others to go to Guinea. At the Africa Department of the Foreign Office, Mabille was assured that the UK had nothing to do with the Ghana-Guinea union. In his meeting with Dulles, he was asked why de Gaulle had granted Guinea independence if the general still wanted to intervene. Because the French could not see African leaders as independent actors on the international stage, contrary to the British and Americans, Mabille’s mission only generated more international tension.

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494 Confidential letter, Wynn Hugh-Jones to FO, 2 September 1959, FO 111/138838, TNA.
496 Confidential memorandum, A.T. Oldham, 14 January 1959, FO 371/138170, TNA.
At the Quai D’Orsay, they remained convinced that the Americans and the British were silently undermining the French Community. Robert Murphy of the State Department told the French ambassador to Washington, Louis Joxe, that he could not understand why the Quai d’Orsay would not allow him to appoint ambassadors if the threat from the Soviet Union was imminent, we ‘are ready now!’ he claimed. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa James Penfield was also eager to know where the ICA was permitted to intervene. The USIA and ICA were keen to put programmes in place because the creation of ‘civil servants capable of assuming responsibility’ required time.

On 16 June 1959, the psychological warfare committee of France was instructed by Prime Minister Michel Debré to take action because he wanted to maintain Guinea in the French Franc zone and preserve some level of intellectual influence by providing the necessary educational infrastructure. In mid-May, after other NATO members could not be convinced of the seriousness of the Soviet threat, a negotiation team led by the DGACT director Roger Seydoux was sent to Guinea to resume negotiations about an economic and cultural agreement. That decision was driven less by the 4,000 remaining French inhabitants and their economic interests, than it was by competitors with their feet in the door to Guinea, possibly unlocking the rest of French Africa in the process.

‘Avoiding another Guinea’: How to Make Aid Attractive

In the face of intense competition, public diplomats behind their desks in Africa were forced to think about ways in which they could make their aid attractive. As James Saccio, the deputy director of the ICA, asked in 1960: how could another Guinea be avoided? The issue of attractiveness preoccupied one man in particular, Louis de Guiringaud, the French ambassador to Accra, who was confronted with a Ghanaian propaganda campaign in which

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497 Secret record, “Summary Record of the third meeting at Ambassadorial level held on April 20’, 28 April 1959, 2, FO 371/137966, TNA.
498 Penfield to Ferguson, “Suggestions for Airgram to Paris and Conakry”, 1 May 1959, RG. 59, A1 3112B, Box 1, NARA.
501 Confidential letter, J.S.H. Shattock to J.H.A. Watson, 21 May 1959, FO 371/138837, TNA.
France was depicted as Africa’s enemy alongside a growing group of students who chose the US or Germany over a visit to France.\textsuperscript{504}

Marett of the IPD also registered the complaints of UK information officers who were dragged into a ‘ludicrous scramble to give away money.’ With aid so easily available, it had become difficult to impress African leaders.\textsuperscript{505} In August 1959, for instance, books, water pumps, two child incubators, and twelve portable spraying machines were quickly offered.\textsuperscript{506} At the same time, the UK officers were unhappy about the Americans who heightened the impact of their aid by driving around ‘American experts, jeeps and blonde typists.’\textsuperscript{507} Conversely, in East African territories settlers worried about Ghana’s propaganda.\textsuperscript{508}

In spite of the British observations, the USIS posts in West Africa also felt cornered by their competitors, particularly the Soviets. Unlike Eisenhower, who prioritised long-term development, the USSR focused on ‘impact-type projects’ which turned ‘Guinea into a showpiece of apparent development.’\textsuperscript{509} The American promise of an increased gross national product was ‘no substitute for a “showcase’” Saccio complained. Like the Soviets, the ICA would need to start appealing to the ‘vanity, the hearts or stomachs’ of Africans.\textsuperscript{510}

In response, public diplomats started building their showcases in order to reach a target audience beyond the elite, an effort that historians have overlooked. Richard McMillan, the newly appointed UKIO director in Ghana, had already decided after Ghana’s independence that his team would need to go ‘into the bush’ and beyond the ‘influential few’ with film viewings in every village where he believed at least four million ‘illiterates’ would be affected.\textsuperscript{511} In October 1957, Argus Tresidder made a similar plea in his \textit{Study of the Cultural Program in Africa}.\textsuperscript{512} In February 1960, the ambassador to Guinea, John Morrow, proposed

\textsuperscript{505} Report, R.H.K. Marett, “Report on visit to East Africa by R.H.K.”, March/November 1960, 12, INF 12/863, TNA.
\textsuperscript{506} Confidential letter, FO to Conakry, 28 August 1959, FO 111/138838, TNA.
\textsuperscript{508} Report, R.H.K. Marett, “Report on visit to East Africa by R.H.K.”, March/November 1960, 8, INF 12/863, TNA.
\textsuperscript{509} Emphasis in the original, see Confidential, Department of State, “Communist Influence in Guinea”, 9 March 1960, RG. 59, CDF 1960-63, 751.56311/1-760 – 751F.00/7-261, NARA.
\textsuperscript{510} Memorandum for the Honorable Joseph C. Satterthwaite Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Department of State, L.J. Saccio, “ICA Paper on US Assistance to Tropical Africa for Mr. Dillon”, 25 March 1960, 9, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: English teaching, NARA.
\textsuperscript{511} Notes, B.A Cockram, 10 May 1957, DO 35/9716, TNA.
\textsuperscript{512} Report, Argus Tresridder, “A Study of the Cultural Program in Africa with Especial Reference to Education: Program Development and Coordination Staff Information Center Service United States Information Agency”,
the creation of a mobile medical team to increase the impact of American aid, a gesture that was ‘at once dramatic and easy to implement.’

However, no one was more motivated than Guiringaud. He explained the lack of interest in French culture by pointing to Africans who were supposedly insufficiently prepared for a culture that came from a ‘highly civilised’ country. The terrain had to be ‘psychologically prepared’ by making the audience familiar with certain aspects of French life. Every cultural manifestation was bound to fail if it was not accompanied by an effort to disseminate news about France in an attractive way. In defiance of the official policy in Paris, Guiringaud attended the signing ceremony of the Ghana-Guinea union, because he felt Guinea was not yet lost. Moreover, he wanted to convince Nkrumah of his plan to let French technicians back into Guinea through Ghana. Touré told the French ambassador that he would not sign the Ghana-Guinea agreement if France could offer an alternative.

Guiringaud tried to make the civil servants in Paris see that a hostile attitude towards Guinea only gave Ghana propaganda ammunition. The minister of foreign affairs, Maurice Couve de Murville, Debré and de Gaulle, however, did not understand the PR dimension of the race to Guinea and had ‘been unpleasantly’ surprised by the ambassador’s move. ‘Being cordial was one thing’, Debré remarked sarcastically, ‘staying at a reception for two hours’ was a different matter. De Gaulle believed the Guineans needed France and would eventually return. The obstinacy of civil servants at France d’outre-mer – who cast the Guineans as ‘nègres communists’ – further marginalised Guiringaud’s position. Instead, the
ambassador began looking for new ways to genuinely promote France, leading him to observe his competitors.\textsuperscript{519}

\textit{Conflict in Print}

Guiringaud became an eager student of print material. He read \textit{Les Nouvelles de Moscou}, \textit{American Outlook}, \textit{London Press Service}, \textit{Indian News}, \textit{News of the Week}, \textit{News from Israel}, \textit{London Illustrated}, and \textit{Commonwealth Today}. The latter had particularly impressed him. He asked Paris for a brochure on the French Community that could serve as a starting point for his own publication which would also have large photographs and articles on de Gaulle’s travels abroad. Guiringaud had been particularly inspired by the richly illustrated issue 73 of \textit{Commonwealth Today}, which reported Princess Margaret’s visit to the Commonwealth Exhibition and had been stapled to the diplomatic dispatch (illustration 14).\textsuperscript{520} Within the British logic, however, \textit{Commonwealth Today} was not seen as a means to project UK ideas, but as a guide containing ‘practical help’. In 1953, there had even been a brief discussion about selling the publication, with a circulation of 106,000, rather than handing it out for free.\textsuperscript{521}

Guiringaud was also impressed by the high quality of the publications produced by the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs. The French were interested in booklets such as \textit{New Ghana} and \textit{Ghana Today}, but particularly in the postcards that were disseminated depicting Africans as being at the bedrock of every major intellectual achievement, such as mathematics and philosophy. ‘Africans’ had taught the Greeks the alphabet, and architecture had originated with ‘African mothers’ laying foundations for their houses. The Ghanaian propagandists themselves had borrowed, because the scenes had been painted by an American artist, Earl Sweeting.\textsuperscript{522} The layout was qualitatively superior and had therefore attracted the ambassador’s attention because he was seeking a way to improve the appeal of his own operation and produce better quality publications.

\textsuperscript{519} Monsieur Daridan, ambassade de France au Ghana, 21 Novembre 1958, DAL, Guinée, 50QO/36, f: Relations Guinée – Ghana, AMAE.


\textsuperscript{521} Letter, J.T. Hughes to Arnold Harrison, 27 January 1953, INF 12/597, TNA; Colonial Office, “Information activities undertaken by the Colonial Office in the African territories”, [1958], INF 12/978, TNA.

Guiringaud’s attention had not only been drawn by British and Ghanaian publications, but also by the USIA that came out in support of civil rights. John A. Calhoun of the State Department had been anxious about Nkrumah’s ‘pan-African’ propaganda, in which he ‘spoke of his country as a haven for persecuted Negroes.’\footnote{Memorandum for Mr. Gerald D. Morgan, John A Calhoun, “Request from the Civil Rights Commission: Treatment of Minorities in the United States – impact on our foreign relations Part B – Area Review”, 4 December 1958, RG. 306, P 283, f: Minorities in the US [Folder ½], NARA; State department report, “Treatment of Minorities in the United States – Impact on our Foreign Relations”, RG. 306, P 283, Box 11, f: Minorities in the US [Folder ½], NARA.} This change in the USIA’s communication led to conflict with the settlers when Gordon P. Hagberg of USIS-Nairobi distributed the *Pittsburgh Courier* that told the story of Ghanaian independence.\footnote{C.Y. Carstairs, 17 March 1958, CO 1027/332, TNA; Secret letter, Douglas W. Williams, “Note on alleged Anti-Americanism among British Officials in East Africa”, 23 April 1958 and Memorandum of conversation, Mr. Vaughan Ferguson and Mr. Roberts, Douglas Williams Colonial attaché, 4 March 1958, and secret letter, Chief Secretary Nairobi to W.A.C. Mathieson, 13 July 1957, 2-3, CO 1027/332, TNA.} Conflict centred on the supposed effects of USIS’s propaganda publications. The settlers saw the American habit of having personal conversations, as well as the production of positive stories about civil rights advancements, as detrimental to their cause because it gave Africans an inflated sense of self-worth (illustration 12).\footnote{Secret letter, E Barring to Carstairs, 19 April 1958, FCO 141/6731, TNA.} The USIS-officers went to ‘embarrassing’ lengths in the ‘business of currying favour with potential trouble-makers’ such as Tom Mboya.\footnote{Secret letter, Douglas W. Williams, “Note on alleged Anti-Americanism among British Officials in East Africa”, 23 April 1958, Memorandum of conversation, Mr. Vaughan Ferguson and Mr. Roberts, Douglas Williams Colonial attaché, 4 March 1958, Secret letter, chief secretary Nairobi to W.A.C. Mathieson, 13 July 1957, 2-3, CO 1027/332, TNA.}

It was this kind of attraction, this type of emotion the French ambassador admired. Where his predecessor Marc Renner had seen the manipulative skills of USIS officers as a form of weakness, Guiringaud understood that French educational aid would have to be promoted in a spectacular way.
Illustration 14: Louis de Guiringaud, the French ambassador to Ghana was inspired by this issue of Commonwealth Today. Source: Pamphlet “Commonwealth Today”, 2, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/72, AMAE.

Teachers and the Political Dimension of Education

In the new plan for French cultural expansion, however, there was still no attention for its appeal. By offering teachers, societies could be modernised and French prestige increased. By recalling the French teachers from Guinea, that progress would be stalled. De Gaulle’s spectacular and radical retreat has received most of the attention, obscuring the fact that French DGCT officials – working behind de Gaulle’s back or with his tacit permission – maintained a presence in Guinea. The decision of 78 French teachers to stay in Guinea in 1958 delighted the DGCT, because it meant that in 1960 – when France officially recognised

Guinea – only 25 new teachers needed to be hired while the inflow of teachers from the Soviet bloc had remained limited.  

By 1960 an increasing number of teachers wanted to leave, which was detrimental for the French who believed that the future Guinean leaders could not be oriented towards France without proper schooling. Teachers in Guinea left for a variety of financial and emotional reasons, but above all because they felt threatened by the anti-French broadcasts which was produced by Radio Conakry with the help of Ghana. Pierre Siraud, the chargé d’affaires in Guinea therefore wanted to encourage the teachers to stay:

The problem of maintaining our cultural presence in Guinea is pressing. If the teachers who are here refuse to remain at their posts […] change their minds. They are needed however to ensure a sustained influence of French culture in this African country which politically and economically is moving closer to the countries of the East each day.

When France accorded Guinea diplomatic recognition on 2 January 1960, Roger Sedoux sent M. Mauffrai – the former inspector of primary school education in Morocco – to Guinea to re-establish a cultural service within the embassy.

However, Guiringaud again came into conflict with Paris because he believed French language education could not be separated from the political climate of a particular country. In Ghana for instance, French language classes would not increase French prestige but undermine the French Community by facilitating the exchanges between French and British Africa. Guiringaud signalled to Seydoux that the Ghanaians who had signed up had admitted that they wanted to learn French so they could visit the countries of the French Community and spread the ‘Ghanaian gospel’. The ambassador to Tunis had similar complaints while the French intelligence service agreed with Guiringaud that the introduction of compulsory French language education in Ghanaian schools was not necessarily a victory for French

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528 Note pour le ministre, DGCT, Enseignement et Oeuvres, 10 May 1960, DAL Guinée, 51QO/61, f: Guinée: Education et relations culturelles, AMAE.
532 Roger Seydoux, 22 May 1959, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/65, AMAE.
cultural diplomacy. These language programmes were intended to reduce the language barriers and foster African unity, something that would not benefit the French interests.\(^{533}\)

Nonetheless, foreign affairs in Paris held on to the conventional logic behind language education: the spread of the French language and culture would – irrespective of political views – instil the African with an admiration for the French culture and should thus be encouraged where possible.\(^{534}\) French lack of attention for the political aspects of education opened the path to competitors who all wanted to be the first to get their foot in the door.

In July 1959, the ICA had already sent out Marie Gadsden, an Afro-American teacher who was setting up an operation on her own, which by October 1960 resulted in two classes of 10 advanced students and a beginner class of 28.\(^{535}\) Christopher Ewart-Biggs, a senior officer at the FO and MI6, believed that this initiative had to be countered. The opportunity had to be seized to make British rather than American books the standard for English teaching in Guinea. This was a battle for hearts and minds. If the Americans convinced a Guinean minister that American books better suited his needs, the British had to dissuade him and if possible offer more money.\(^{536}\)

To not be outdone by the Americans, J.D.B Fowells of the British Council travelled to Guinea in January 1960 and made some grand promises even though he admitted in his correspondence that there were only 4 teachers available (illustration 15). Like the French, the British Council began sending their textbooks to the ministry of education. An unknown teacher, C.H. Judd, was placed in the lycee classique for boys in Conakry to make a start with English language education. The good relations between Guinea and the UK and the aspiration to make ‘friends not rivals’ out of the French teachers of English, had to convey a joint commitment to fostering African self-government.\(^{537}\)

The USIA for its part wanted to be first. The agency’s English consultant, James Echols bluntly admitted in 1958, as would Wilbert Petty the PAO in Conakry two years later, that they were not interested in increasing the use of the English language. Teaching provided a way to ‘reach key groups’ and if those people were already sitting in classes organised by the


\(^{534}\) Note, DAL, 13 August 1959, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/65, AMAE.


\(^{536}\) Memorandum, Christopher Ewart-Biggs, 29 September 1959, FO 1110/138838, TNA.

British Council, the USIA would not be able to teach and influence them. In 1960, the USIA partnered with the English Language Service to establish the first English language programme in Guinea at a cost of $21,000. At USIS-Conakry resources were allocated on the basis of impact: because some students had already become fluent, intensive language courses received more funds.

While the teaching of English emerged as one of the USIA’s top priorities in the Third World, the inexperience of the US information officers is often overlooked. By 1960, the American ICA and USIA personnel had undertaken so many study trips that the British expats, particularly in Ghana, were tired of answering the same questions. The British officials, impressed upon their American visitors that it was necessary to study the basic facts of the educational system before departure, rather than taxing their staff who were already overburdened with their own educational expansion. More importantly, the cooperation that had existed in the early 1950s was replaced by an intense competition among allies who were looking for ways to make their aid more attractive.

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541 Osgood, Total Cold War, 309.

Illustration 15: The British had found recruiting teachers a challenge and therefore started campaigns to stimulate British teachers to teach overseas. This pamphlet was introduced by Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, who was the Chairman of the National Council for the Supply of Teachers Overseas. Source: Pamphlet, “Why not teach for a time Overseas?”, [1961], CAB/5534, TNA.

Understanding the Power of the Radio

With the invention of the transistor radio in the 1950s, radio became a cheap and popular medium with a profound impact. In April 1959, for instance, Chad Chipunza, a member of the federal government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was dragged from his car and assaulted by demonstrators because he had refused to admit in an interview broadcast on Radio Ghana that ‘Africans were treated worse than dogs.’

The ability of radio to rouse people to action attracted Guiringaud. In the run up to the referendum, he gave an exposition on Radio Ghana about the new constitution. It was a story of progress that had its origin in the aftermath of the French revolution, when the representatives of Sénégal and Réunion had been invited to take a seat in the National Constituent Assembly. At the Brazzaville conference in 1944, de Gaulle took the next step by

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543 Foreign service despatch, Stephen Gurney Gebelt to StateDept, Ghana Government Statement Concerning Visit of Mr. Chipunza, Member of the Federal Government of Rhodesia and Nyassaland, 29 May 1959, RG. 59, CDF 1955-59, 645.5694/2-1756-645U.863322/1-2959, NARA.
creating the French Union. In this linear narrative, the proposed French Community was the next stage in an ongoing process of increasing people’s happiness. 544

Paris followed a different logic however. In 1960, the Foreign Office even had to convince the French not to cease their radio transmissions. Because British strategy hinged on a joint defence of a guided decolonisation process, the UK decided to cooperate with Radio Brazzaville, which now focused on countries in Africa. However, by late 1960 the French were happy that the British had kept them in the game, because the information department of Guinea had created a popular anti-French radio station under the leadership of Bangoura Karim. 545

Instead of instigating a radio wave offensive, as Guiringaud had wanted, the secretariat of the French Community increased the number of African pupils in the so-called courses on French radio techniques at what used to be the radio school of France d’outre-mer. It was not a French ideological offensive, but training that would increase prestige. The funding for the radio stations in the territories that made national programmes and educational radio was increased in 1960 to 83,739,885 French francs, an increase of 10% compared to 1959. To limit adverse propaganda, radio-jamming stations were placed in the Ivory Coast. 546

The French cooperation with the British had been the outcome of a struggle between the Commonwealth Relations Office, which reasoned about radio in terms of PR and the Colonial Office, which wanted to create goodwill through training and the setup of a radio infrastructure. When an envoy was sent out to study how the French had been able to maintain their grip on French Africa, he came back with a list of the radios, libraries and information services that were operating in Dakar, rather than a close study of the French techniques. In May 1959, in the face of hostile broadcasts from Conakry and Accra, the CRO realised its mistake and began to limit the broadcast capability of African countries by decreasing the aid grants it offered. Moreover, the CRO opposed the plan of the CO to give Nigeria a more

powerful transmitter to counter the possible Soviet bloc broadcasting station in Conakry. Unlike the Colonial Office, the CRO realised that the transmitters they had help build could one day be used against them.\textsuperscript{547}

In February 1959 Henry Loomis of the USIA Information Broadcasting Service (IBS) was concerned with the low number of listeners. To get the educational ‘forum lectures’ placed on local radio stations, mass popular entertainment like Jazz had to be offered as well. Unlike the BBC, who believed radio could effectively reach a massa audience, Loomis’ preferred target audience was the recently educated members of society who were supposedly interested in everything, unlike the general public that only listened to ‘indigenous music’ and the university educated listener who would be too critical. The USIA and the State Department emphasised that there had to be more attention to music with a broad appeal, Jazz had to be danceable not progressive. The experience that USIA officers possessed in the field of radio allowed it to conquer a mass audience in a more tactical way than the British and the French, who only gradually understood that their African audiences had to be enticed to turn their radios on.\textsuperscript{548}

\textit{Inspiring Examples, Changing Methodologies, a Wide Target Audience}

By untangling the multi-centric knot of the miniature scramble for Guinea, French public diplomacy is considered in a new light. Historians argue that the Second World War created a creeping sense of self-doubt while French culture was still celebrated, resulting in a French cultural diplomacy enterprise that could be described as ‘schizophrenic’.\textsuperscript{549} However in Africa there were constant doubts about the ways in which French culture was offered, while the belief in French superiority remained unshaken. Constant tactical modification by local officers only appear as inconsistencies with hindsight.


Moreover, public diplomats were not only interested in the elites of the Third World as historians have argued, and nor was that tactical choice typically British or French. Interest in the influential elite was combined with an attempt to better inform African mass audiences. From 1958 onwards, pamphlets, film and radio were used to promote British aid as widely as possible, to ‘prepare’ unsophisticated minds for French culture and ‘open the door’ to the elite target audience in the American case.

Lastly, in the competitive climate of the late 1950s public diplomats constantly looked towards competitors to improve their efficacy. Public diplomacy did not therefore merely reflect national ideas or identities. American officials did not always agree with their own propaganda nor did other messages reflect deeply held beliefs as has been argued. Public diplomats also saw themselves as professionals who searched for ways in which they could influence their target audiences. Furthermore, this cross-national process of adoption and adaption refutes a narrative on hegemonic Americanisation in which the USIA with its superior public relations methods would have been the most important source of influence. The French borrowed techniques from the USIA, but also turned to the British and the Ghanaians for inspiration. Public diplomacy in Africa was not solely preoccupied with the projection of strongly held ideological beliefs, but was the product of a multitude of influences.

Strong Men as Caretakers

The Guinea crisis unfolded as a number of so-called ‘emerging’ nations were confronted with military takeovers and a trend towards authoritarian leadership styles, including Ghana where Nkrumah approved the Preventive Detention Act in 1958. When Nixon returned from the independence celebrations in Accra he wondered whether African leaders could maintain democracy as they took on the challenges of development. Employing the imagery of a snake shedding its skin, the British journalist Elspeth Huxley became widely quoted among French and British ambassadors who referred to her analysis in their correspondence while


Noon used her article as the basis of the USIA’s 1957 ‘Study of the Cultural Program in Africa’. Huxley called to mind a continent that was undergoing two revolutions: the transition from colonialism to independence and the leap from tribalism to modern civilisation. Somewhere in that process the mythical tribal leader could return.⁵⁵³

In a way, the agenda had already been set before the problem emerged. During the first tripartite talks on Africa on 29 April 1957, Joxe tried to convince Murphy that Africans had a ‘natural element of susceptibility to authoritarian regimes’. He claimed democracies in Africa could not ‘be created overnight’. However, his attempt to undercut Murphy’s optimism failed. It was US policy to help the ‘native African races’ to attain their goals without being dragged into the struggle between east and west.⁵⁵⁴ One of de Gaulle’s closest advisers, Jaques Foccart, by contrast build a network that connected authoritarian African leaders to France as a way to maintain influence.⁵⁵⁵

Only in May 1959 Ramsey and the State Department presented a policy to turn the trend towards authoritarianism to the advantage of the US. In Latin America, military regimes were leading societies through their socio-economic revolutions. At the same time, Ramsey admitted that identifying with an authoritarian regime made the US a target for anti-regime propaganda, but little prestige would be lost if the leaders were making progress.⁵⁵⁶ Historians consider the meeting to be the birth of a Cold War policy in which right-wing dictators were supported because it was seen as practical and inevitable.⁵⁵⁷ Nonetheless, the members of the administration, as well as Eisenhower himself, maintained their belief in the value of civic education and resisted the French and British encouragement to utilise the authoritarian trend to their advantage.

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⁵⁵⁴ Secret record, “Summary Record of the first meeting at Ambassadorial level held on April 16”, 27 April 1959, 2, FO 371/137966, TNA; Marry Montgomery’s narrative uses this quotation to claim that Murphy agreed with Joxe even though the record implies disagreement, see Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and the United States, 1957-1966”, 113.


⁵⁵⁶ “Political Implications of Afro-African military takeovers (State Department Presentation)”, 27 May 1959, Papers as President 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 11, f: 410th Meeting of NSC June 18, 1959, DDEL.

While Eisenhower was pondering how he was going to phrase his criticisms of the report, he limited his initial comments to complimenting Ramsey for ‘a fine paper’ that was ‘beautifully organised’; ‘the validity of [Ramsey’s] conclusions’, was a totally different matter. Eisenhower accepted the need to support military leaders, but only as a short-term emergency solution. He identified two major problems. First, this policy clashed with the fundamental democratic values of the US. He referred to a conversation he had had with late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who had just passed away, about the biggest threat to the American model: ‘Can our system of free government stand the strains which it must endure because of our tolerance of pressure groups and other kinds of uniformed thinking?’.  

Guided by older fears that saw the US transform into a garrison state because of the Cold War, and already pointing to his speech about the military-industrial complex, Eisenhower attached a lot of value to the export of the American democratic model and therefore remarked that the rising young military leaders, on which the US was forced to rely, had to be influenced by the American military assistance personnel. Without training, people who had lived ‘so long under dictatorships’ could not be expected to ‘understand our ideas of freedom’ or ‘run a successful government’.

In his report to the president after his visit to Ghana, Nixon agreed: ‘the Free World has a vital interest’ in helping them to develop ‘governmental institutions which are based on principles of freedom and democracy’.

Secondly, Eisenhower did not agree with the way Ramsay minimised the trade-off between stability and propaganda. Ellsworth F. Bunker, ambassador to India, had told Eisenhower about the ‘terrific propaganda campaign that the Soviet Union was waging against us in India.’ Other NSC members agreed with the President’s opinion about the importance of the educational and cultural solution. Eisenhower called on Clarence Randall to give his opinion. Randall, the Republican businessman and part-time Africa expert of the Eisenhower administration who had toured the continent in 1958, detected too much readiness to ‘give up pushing for democratic ideals’ and instead ‘wanted to see more and better

558 Memorandum of Discussion of the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 June 1959, 2, Papers as President 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 11, f: 410th Meeting of NSC June 18, 1959, DDEL; The authors in the previous footnote have used the ‘fine paper’ quotation to show that Eisenhower agreed with Ramsey’s report, even though the president was very critical of the State Department. Macdonald attributes one of Joxe’s quotations to Murphy while both historical actors actually disagreed. Schmitz states that the report was approved by the NSC, however the text actually approves the production of follow-up studies, see MacDonald, “The Challenge of Guinean Independence, 1958-1971”, 113; Schmitz, Thank God They’re on Our Side, 17.

559 Memorandum of Discussion of the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 June 1959, 3, Papers as President 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 11, f: 410th Meeting of NSC June 18, 1959, DDEL.

education for civilians’, he also saw ‘a real chance for free government in the region of Africa south of the Sahara.’ The man most historians consider to have been cynical when it came to Africa thus proved himself to be optimistic about Africa’s chances of attaining an American style of democracy.\footnote{Memorandum of Discussion of the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 June 1959, 4, Papers as President 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 11, f: 410th Meeting of NSC June 18, 1959, DDEL}

The report Randall had authored in 1954 also offered a method for reaching authoritarian leaders because it gave an expansive interpretation of what military assistance could do if it was coupled with the spread of American values. While waiting for the conclusion from the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, Eisenhower looked to General William Draper for other ideas as he established a presidential commission on US military assistance. The Sprague Committee, established in 1959 to evaluate American public diplomacy, picked up a lot of ideas from the Randall and Draper Committee Report. In its broader recommendations it identified the need for a plan to guide the development of the military and the internal security forces as a way to contribute to the political, economic and social development of the area.\footnote{Connelly, \textit{Fatal Misconception}, 186; Report, “Africa South of the Sahara”, 1960, US President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad: Records 1960-61, Box 9, f: Africa # 31 (1), DDEL.}

A coherent approach to reaching authoritarian leaders was worked out in a plan entitled ‘The Collateral Effects of Training Foreign Military Personnel’ on 16 May 1960. Its reading of history established that newly created nations consider military forces essential to their independence and they exert a far greater influence on political and economic developments than is the case in older nations. This could lead to dictatorship and economic stagnation, as in Latin America, or to an enlightened role, as in Burma. The informational objectives in every country were aimed at guiding the state towards political stability and economic viability and eventually towards democratic institutions. It was therefore important to create a situation in which the military could contribute to those goals.\footnote{Privileged Information for Use of President’s Committee only, “The President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad: The Collateral Effects of Training Foreign Military Personnel”, 16 May 1960, 2, US President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee), Box 20, f: PCIAA #10(1), DDEL.}

The mutual defence agreements were a ‘unique psychological opportunity’ to encourage the armed forces to make ‘an enlightened and positive contribution’ to long-term development. It offered the opportunity to ‘create a sympathetic attitude’ towards the American efforts to help them along that road. The training programmes, which were primarily designed to teach armed forces how to use modern equipment efficiently, had
important ‘collateral effects’ on attitudes. Namely, they could offer military trainees leadership qualities and a better understanding of American values. Through the Military Assistance Advisory Group local armed forces could be encouraged to work on the development of the local economy and social development. Posts on the ground agreed.\(^{564}\)

To sum up, while NATO members agreed that Africans were attracted to ‘authoritarianism’ their concrete response differed markedly.\(^{565}\) The British and, particularly, the French sought to exploit the move to authoritarianism in a straightforward way, as Eisenhower was looking for ways to maintain democracy. When Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s staff secretary, was asked in 1982 what Eisenhower believed to be the best course of action when an authoritarian leader could come to power, he did not hesitate: ‘self-government!’\(^{566}\)

**Conclusion: Showcasing Aid**

Accounts on the Guinea crisis identify American and French misperceptions about the Cold War and African nationalism at the root of the conflict. French Prime Minister Debré, however, reversed de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw French aid, a decision that was motivated by the competition coming from British and American officials who were not hesitant, as historians have argued, but eager to offer cultural assistance.\(^{567}\)

Orderly transition – rather than direct Soviet containment – was the compass that the West followed in Guinea. Eisenhower’s commitment to cultural assistance even influenced his stance on authoritarian leadership. Contrary to claims made most prominently by David Schmitz, Eisenhower supported authoritarian leaders only reluctantly. In his vision, the sustenance of so-called ‘strong men’ always had to be complemented with a civic education programme that could transfer American democratic leadership skills. Officers on the ground noticed that their target audience was not interested or preferred the services of competitors.

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\(^{564}\) Report, “The President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad: The Collateral Effects of Training Foreign Military Personnel”, 16 May 1960, 2, US President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee), Box 20, f: PCIAA #10(1), DDEL; Foreign service despatch, Amembassy Addis Ababa to StateDept, “Role of Military in Less Developed Countries”, 30 September 1959, Foreign service despatch, Amembassy Tripoli to StateDept, “Role of Military in Less Developed Countries”, 1 October 1959, RG. 59, CDF 1955-59, 611.70/10-158 – 611.7194/12-457, NARA.

\(^{565}\) Note by the Political Division, “Communist Penetration in Africa”, 23 April 1960, 2, CM(61)43-e, NATO-Archives.

\(^{566}\) “Interview with Andrew J. Goodpaster, Jr. on April 10, 1982 for Dwight D. Eisenhower Library”, on p. 33-35, in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection.

In defiance of de Gaulle, the French ambassador to Ghana courted Touré and adopted the public diplomacy techniques that made Ghana, the US and the UK successful.

As noted by Cooper, modernisation theorists were not only driven by the simplifying logic of ‘high modernism’ – the hubristic endeavour at making every problem technically legible; the modern apparatus of rule was itself wracked by doubts and particularisms.\(^{568}\) In Africa those doubts were acutely felt at the cultural centres but hardly understood by de Gaulle, Eisenhower and Lennox-Boyd who held on to their ideas about cultural assistance. The rift between higher and lower levels led public diplomats on the ground to adopt the successful methods others used to showcase their cultural aid, in effect producing hybrid forms of public diplomacy.

In sum, a multi-centric analysis of the Guinea crisis not only rejects a nationalist narrative that claimed decolonisation was the outcome of an imperial plan, but also refutes a counter narrative that presents African nationalists as people able to spin decolonisation to their advantage. The historical claim of planned decolonisation merely reflects the beliefs of policymakers who ignored the improvisation of local officers. At the same time, Nkrumah’s swift creation of the Ghana-Guinea Union actually made it harder to sell his pan-African plan for Africa, because it motivated public diplomats to showcase their own aid plans and actually invited more Western involvement.

Ultimately, Guinea brings into focus how much the West held on to the idea of an orderly transition, a notion that did not disappear even when countries declared their independence. Only the violence of Algerian independence, as Todd Shepard has argued, would lead French officials to adopt the term ‘decolonisation’ and reassess their relationship with colonial subjects.\(^{569}\) Cultural aid was never questioned. If target audiences rejected cultural products and public diplomacy, there had to be something wrong with the way in which it was showcased. The gospel of stability only fell apart when Africa became the theatre of two international crises, one in the Congo and one in the Sahara.


PART II. THE GOSPEL OF MODERNITY (1960-1963)
6. Things Fall Apart

The French Atomic Bomb, the Congo Crisis and the Collapse of Stability (1960 – 1961)

The explosion of the A-bomb on African soil already drenched in blood by the monstrous Algerian war and by the fierce repressive measures taken in Kamerun – to mention only territories under French domination – constitutes an intolerable threat to the African peoples in their struggle for independence.

– Protest letter from the president of the Republic of Guinea, Sekou Touré to Secretary-General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld, 4 March 1960.570

Nearly a year has passed since the infant Congolese nation was born prematurely into the reality of ‘independence’ […] The prognosis for the struggling child is not optimistic in the short run. There is every indication that it must rest for years in the UN incubator, with no real strength of its own – except a precious capacity for talking like an adult

– Fitzhugh Green, PAO of USIS-Leopoldville after independence, 30 May 1961.571

1960 was a turning point. Not only did 17 new countries gain their independence but, and more importantly, old strategies based on ideas and psychology fell apart in the face of the Congo crisis and the decision to detonate a French atomic weapon in the Sahara. On 13 February 1960, in the vicinity of Reggane in Algeria the first French bomb was tested, in defiance of Ghana’s campaign against the detonation. Despite – or because of – the loosening French grip on Algeria, de Gaulle still laid claim to the Sahara because of its mineral wealth.572

A few weeks earlier, on 20 January 1960, 60 Belgian officials and 95 Congolese politicians gathered in Brussels for a month of talks that resulted in a date for independence, 30 June 1960. As elections were held in May 1960 the Comité Spécial du Katanga, which allowed the central government in Leopoldville to control the mining industry in the province of Katanga, was dissolved. On independence day, the first Congolese prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, gave a speech in which he harshly condemned Belgian colonial exploitation, to the dismay of the young Belgian King Baudouin. A day later, a Belgian army general, Émile Janssens, conveyed to his Congolese troops, the Force Publique, that independence had changed nothing by writing ‘before Independence = after Independence’ on a chalkboard.

570 Foreign service despatch, Zachary P. Geaneas USUN to StateDept, “(IO-UNP) – Letter From President of Guinea Concerning French Atomic Bomb Test in the Sahara”, 8 March 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA.
572 Memorandum, “Sahara: Expériences nucléaires et spatiales”, 18 October 1961, 2 DE 87, FNSP.
Consequently, riots broke out in Thysville, setting in motion the chain of events that eventually led to Lumumba’s assassination.573

What are scholars to make of the French nuclear test in the Sahara and the crisis in the Congo? International historians and Africanists insist on reading both episodes as moments where the Cold War realities of the international system intruded on Nkrumah’s ambition to keep Africa out of the bipolar conflict. Both incidents initially offered Ghana and the Afro-Asian community in the UN the opportunity to play an autonomous role on the international stage, so the story goes, but the Cold War constraints, and Lumumba’s request for Soviet intervention, limited Nkrumah’s space to speak from a position of nonalignment. Moreover, Nkrumah himself became disappointed and realised that ‘the space to imagine new worlds’ had become a luxury ‘no one could […] afford.’ The Cold War, the competition between the Soviet and the American social system, forced anticolonial leaders to take the real balance of power into account.574

Yet when the Sahara atomic bomb is assessed from multiple vantage points, the Cold War appears as an opportunity. By framing the explosion as an element of Cold War politics the French and British avoided the real issue at stake – the right to interfere in African affairs – which in turn allowed Nkrumah to promote his anticolonial ideology. By referring to the health risks and the Geneva test ban negotiations, which lasted from 1958 until 1962, the UK could support Ghana and criticise France without risking its remaining colonial claims. By making generic statements about nuclear disarmament, the USIA could avoid the issue altogether. At the same time, this myopic focus on the nuclear factor blinded the French to the strength of African nationalism.

Likewise, the Congo crisis was not a moment where the United States betrayed its ‘democratic values and rights to self-determination’ in a ‘relentless search for dominance over the Soviet Union’, as has been argued, nor was the emergency in the heart of Africa unquestionably a Cold War crisis.575 It is argued here that Eisenhower approved of

574 Allman, “Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom”, 97; Plummer, In Search of Power, 74; Biney, The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, 112,152; As Thompson writes, Nkrumah ‘had designed his Congo policy to keep the Cold War out of Africa; the crisis had introduced it despite its efforts’, see Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 160; Rooney sees Nkrumah as skilful, but in the end claims that he was humiliated by the forces of the Cold War, which frustrated his genuine attempt to solve the crisis, see Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, 284.
Lumumba’s murder because it would help preserve American values by eliminating a demagogue. American officials and their NATO allies agreed that the Congo crisis was the result of under-preparation for self-government, an analysis that profoundly shaped the Western response, and something that historians have ignored.

Their failure to adequately deal with these crises therefore did not stem from a Cold War habit. Western officials acted out of a sense of desperation. The confrontation with Africans who demanded their political rights in an international propaganda campaign, and others who seemed out of control, signalled that psychological modernisation had not worked. In their search for a new way to acquire influence in Africa, leaders created complex modes of conflict that walked and talked like the Cold War, but were not about a bipolar competition to promote the American or Soviet forms of modernity. Historical research on the Congo crisis in particular does not reflect that complexity, but instead analyses these events from a Cold War centred view, while postcolonial criticism relegates that bipolar history to an analytical margin, making nineteenth century colonial Europe the object of its criticism.576

Specifically, then, it is argued here that African attitudes often influenced Western decision-making in unexpected ways, while the Cold War did not damage Ghana’s Pan African project in 1960. A reading of American, Ghanaian, British and French documents reveals four contradictions that are not accounted for in the literature. For one, why did public diplomacy planners not decide on an all-out battle for hearts and minds with the Soviet Union in Africa? Further, it is assumed that Nkrumah could not realise his pan-African vision because the Cold War forced him to take the real balance of power into account. However, it is difficult to reconcile that claim with the British, American, and French response to Ghana’s campaign against the bomb. Third, historians argue that Lumumba came to be seen as an instrument of Soviet influence or even as a communist. Yet they do not explain why Lumumba needed to die while other leaders with communist sympathies were allowed to stay in power. Lastly, the Congo crisis is seen as a moment that pushed Nkrumah towards the East, an argument that is not supported by the sources.577 It is these four problems that are explored here.


576 Here I expand on the insight of Heonik Kwon who writes: ‘postcolonial criticism […] results in a misrepresentation of the main object of the critique. In Chakrabarty’s otherwise forceful rendering of European ideas of political modernity and their historical particularity, there are no traces of a modern Europe as we know of it – that is, the Europe, that, after experiencing a catastrophic war, was divided into mutually hostile forces.’ Kwon, The Other Cold War, 130.

577 For one old and one very recent example: Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 160; Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 142.
Public Diplomacy after Independence: From Psychological to Socio-Economic Modernisation

In the beginning of 1960, it was unclear if the strategies of the 1950s that were informed by the insights of psychological modernisation would also work on a continent with self-governing states. When public diplomats gathered to rethink their operation, they had to determine what Africa’s new relationship with the world was and how the Cold War and the string of independence declarations affected their decisions.

Ghanaian diplomats realised that after 1960 they would not only have to fend off neocolonial influence, but also convince the leaders of other African countries that African unity could yield significant benefits. The special mission that had set out from Accra in November 1960 to investigate the possibilities for pan-African activism had concluded that this would be particularly difficult in territories with ethnic tensions. Ibrahim Abboud, for instance, had welcomed Barden in Sudan where the non-Arab south was subjugated to a policy of ‘Islamisation.’ Abboud welcomed Ghanaian officials to make him acceptable in the south. Barden, the BAA director, was keen on exploiting that agenda. By offering scholarships, establishing pan-African trade unions and creating women’s organisations in Sudan he could limit Nasser’s pan-Arab influence. Not only the superpowers, but also Ghanaian diplomats were willing to increase the tension in countries like Sudan if it served their own goals.578

Decolonisation also placed a heavy strain on the American public diplomacy machine, which had been designed to fight the battle for hearts and minds with the Soviet Union. In 1960, Eisenhower therefore asked Mansfield Sprague, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, to evaluate US informational strategy. The resulting Sprague report was a stock taking exercise of how the lofty ambitions of the Jackson Committee had fared, in light of the emergence of ‘under developed nations.’579

The changing world was an important topic of discussion in the committee meetings. The deputy director of the USIA, Washburn, for instance talked about ‘the trend to a multipolar world.’ Unlike Henry Kissinger, who saw political multi-polarity as a problem,


579 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 180; Report, “Conclusions and Recommendations of the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad”, December 1960, 2, 13, U.S. President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) Records, 1959-61, Box 26, f: Printed Committee Report, DDEL.
Washburn welcomed the countries that were ‘not aligned with either side.’ In his analysis this development was in line with the American spirit of self-determination and incompatible with Soviet coercion. Livingston T. Merchant from the State Department disagreed: Washburn might be right in the case of the UN, but ‘in terms of power the world is in fact bi-polar and is likely to become more so.’

Their debate reflected an ongoing discussion beneath the surface of American foreign policy. The world was changing; but were these changes relevant in diplomatic terms? The answer to that question depended on the type of diplomacy one was engaged in, something the Sprague Committee acknowledged by pointing out that modern diplomacy came in many guises, ranging from the formalised government-to-government communications to ‘electronic diplomacy’. Because Washburn operated in the world of day-to-day symbolic combat, a place where real power relations were less important, he paid more attention to a small country such as Ghana that could use its prestige as a substitute for real power. Merchant, a seasoned diplomat, saw the world in starker and more realist tones.

Nonetheless, when it came to Africa even the State Department acknowledged that this was not primarily a Cold War problem. Satterthwaite denied that the US was running a race with the USSR. The Sprague Committee did not see an immediate threat, but wanted to ‘pre-empt’ Africa ‘for the Bloc’, something Dulles had stressed in his conversations with Eisenhower. In Africa, the PRC and the USSR did not constitute a direct threat. Communism was seen as a disease that could thrive in the development process, a problem that the Americans – in a cynical twist – could even create for themselves if they did not consciously imprint their values through cultural assistance. The Sprague Report saw communist activities as ancillary, at best, to the real problem, which was the so-called

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581 Report, “Report of the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad”, 1960, 8, US President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad: Records 1960-61, Box 26, f: Report of the PCIAA, DDEL.


revolution of rising expectations, the idea that unfulfilled, increased expectations create unstable political situations.\textsuperscript{584}

Because of independence, it became more important not only to prepare but also to favourably dispose leaders towards the US. The Sprague report recommended a presidential speech to glamorise the new $20,000,000 ICA Special Assistance Program for Tropical Africa while the efforts to educate and expand leadership cadres had to be strengthened. Ultimately, however, Americans saw leadership training and the promotion of a favourable American image as intertwined. Inexperienced Africans did not understand how international diplomacy worked, it was reasoned, which allowed for a distortion of the American image if decisions were implemented slowly. The cumbersome administrative procedures seemed to be particularly unsuited to Africa, and could result in so-called ‘negative psychological impressions’ on African leaders who were deemed to be unfamiliar with bureaucratic restrictions.\textsuperscript{585} This was Wilsonianism at its most paternalistic: a world run by American standards benefited Africans and Americans alike.

The French tried to plant the seed of doubt by distributing two maps of Africa among their colleagues. One depicted bloc penetration through Egypt and Ethiopia, another displayed communism together with a pan-African and pan-Arab arrow coming from Egypt and Ghana. The second map was handed to the British with the urgent plea to undertake joint action if the colonial powers wanted to maintain their position in the face of African nationalism. The British were unimpressed, even though Macmillan had been concerned about the future of parliamentary democracy in Africa. A few days later, Herter was given the bipolar map of Africa by Debré, which Herter found exaggerated (illustration 16). James Frederick Green, the former US consul in Leopoldville, also saw the map and understood that the French wanted to mislead them.\textsuperscript{586}

What France failed to understand was that neither the US nor the UK was guided by a straightforward logic of Cold War containment. Paradoxically enough it was in the NATO committee on communist penetration in Africa that the most pressing problem surfaced:

\textsuperscript{584} Report, “Report of the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad”, 1960, 10, US President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad: Records 1960-61, Box 26, f: Report of the PCIAA, DDEL.
\textsuperscript{585} Report, “Africa South of the Sahara”, 1960, US President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad: Records 1960-61, Box 9, f: Africa # 31 (1), DDEL.
nationalism. The members concluded that nationalism had led to unrealistic expectations, which made the so-called ‘white man’ less confident about his ability to address the challenge of African development. Whereas in the past, education could have addressed these issues, profound economic and social changes had rendered this tool useless. The leaders who had been educated in the West were still unstable, discontent, and resentful.\(^{587}\)

In the sands of the Sahara and the bush of the Congo, it became clear that psychological schemes of modernisation to draw Africans into the modern mindset had failed. Instead, leaders turned towards socio-economic modernisation, in which the socio-economic conditions not the African attitudes were targeted. All the while Nkrumah was forced to look for a new way to compete with other African leaders who resisted his pan-African aspirations. Nkrumah therefore took the lead in a propaganda campaign against the bomb.

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Illustration 16: This map was produced by the French military staff and depicts the different threats to the French presence on the continent, namely communism, pan-Arabism, and pan-Africanism (Fermentation africaine). Where Ghana, Guinea, the Belgian Congo and Nigeria are seen as strongholds of pan-Africanism, Nasser’s Egypt is seen as a mixture of pan-Arab and communist influences. It was these types of maps that French officials gave to the British to convince them to form a joint front. Source: Plans and Operations Militaires, “Reprise des Conversations Tripartites sur L’Afrique: Menaces et Zones Sensibles”, 6 April 1960, DAL, Généralités 1960-1965, f: entretiens franco-américains juin 1959-aout 1962, AMAE
No Longer at Ease: The Sahara Atomic Bomb and the Assertive African

In 1959, France made clear that it wanted to test an atomic bomb in the Algerian Sahara desert, a moment that provided Ghana with the first real opportunity to confront de Gaulle’s conception of Africa. At the same time, Ghana, together with the West, discovered the mobilising potential of African nationalism. When the Afro-Asian Peoples Secretariat in Cairo organised an anti-Atomic Bomb Test Day in October 1959, Ghana could not stay behind because protest on the streets of Cairo strengthened Nasser’s anticolonial reputation. Nkrumah therefore utilised his network and requested the help of other African leaders, such as Keita in Mali, to mobilise African opinion.

In November 1959, 22 Afro-Asian countries succeeded in having a UN resolution approved that expressed concern about the health risks of the atomic fallout. In the lead up to the vote, the British had considered drafting a watered down version of the resolution, a plan that was eventually dropped after personal intervention by Macmillan who felt they could not offend Ghana and Nigeria, the two leading nations behind the campaign against the bomb. Wilson Flake, the US ambassador in Accra, was surprised when the Minister of External Affairs, Michael Dei-Anang, reassured him that the Anglo-American vote against the resolution would soon be forgotten. Nkrumah had accomplished the desired PR effect. Couve de Murville, for his part, was afraid that the Afro-Asian bloc would only further destabilise the UN with its unreasonable demands.

The British interpretation of African disgruntlement, Americans on the side-line, Ghana’s discovery of propaganda, France’s inability to see Africans as international actors and the UN vote already reflected the positions of the participants in a public debate about the future of colonialism that was shrouded in Cold War language.

Ghana Discovers the African Public: the Campaign against the Bomb

For its campaign against the bomb, Ghana relied heavily on its newspapers. To reach a mass audience, more attention was being devoted to the production of gripping and richly illustrated stories. The accusatory discourse focused on the health risks that attended the

590 “Big UN Vote Calls on France to Drop Bomb Plan”, The Times Saturday, November 21, 1959; Telegram, New York to FO, 18 November 1959 and Secret Minute, Macmillan, 30 October 1959, PREM 11/2694, TNA.
591 Telegram, Wilson Flake to secretary of state, 8 December 1959, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA; Letter, Couve de Murville to de Gaulle, 12 March 1960, CM 7 1959, FNSP.
bomb, rather than the legitimacy of French colonial claims. *The Evening News* described the French decision to explode the bomb in apocalyptic terms that were appealing to a religious society. A cartoon depicted the devil guiding de Gaulle to a ballistic missile with the caption ‘Instrument of imperialists to crush down African Personality (illustration 17).’

Feelings of indignation were also stirred in a directly religious way, through a prayer for instance:

> O God of Mother Ghana and All Africa. Thou knowest the peaceful stand, which Ghana is taking against the French A-bomb test. Not in France but the Sahara. Thy sons and daughters truly implore thee. For peace and concord of all nations. Change thou the heart of France. To desist testing an A-bomb in the Sahara. Our God-given Sahara thou mayst preserve and incline France to our pleas and protests. And from the claws of all warmongers. Save Mother Ghana and all Africa. Prove to the world as thou did in the days when Daniel was cast into the den of lions. That through Thee France’s Atom bomb test must surely fail and put to shame. From Mother Ghana and all Africa in particular. Wipe away the perils of French imperialism. And save us and the future generations. Through thy Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, Amen.

A discourse on health, pacifism, and religion had to unite a fragile coalition of Africans and pacifists from beyond of the continent. The reverend Michael Scott, a renowned anticolonial activist, A.J. Must, who founded the American Committee on Africa, and Michael Randle, chair of the Direct Action Committee against Nuclear War, were just some of the people who descended on Accra, a city where peace activists, anticolonial freedom fighters and Afro-Americans found a public forum and a common cause.

Besides the press, the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs tried to rouse the public with stories of spontaneous protest, such as the journey of the Sahara Protest Team to the bombing site in January 1960. On Radio Ghana the trip was presented as a holy war and had been financed by a fundraising campaign during a rally at the West End Arena in November 1959, meant to increase exposure. Even though both teams became stranded in Upper Volta, the mission was still successful because it created awareness about the bomb as pamphlets were distributed in French, English, Arabic and Hawza and spectacular stories were printed in newspapers. Gbedemah even sent the team back after they had been dropped back into Ghana by French soldiers because their confrontations had aroused so much international interest.

Ghana’s provocative language was effective. Guiringaud complained about the women protesting under his window. When he asked them to leave, they shouted back that a bomb would lead to an embargo of French goods. The Ghanaian government even provided the

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ambassador with a retired policeman for his personal protection. These women also created organisations such as Ghana’s Women’s League, Ghana Women’s Atom-Test Committee and the Accra Market Women’s Association, all of which were covertly supported by the state. Their open letter rejected the ‘sugar-coated propaganda’ of France and played on maternal instincts: “For us who breast-feed children and know the sacrifices involved in our birth-pangs in order to bring forth a single human being to life, the Sahara Atom test is most wicked and inhuman.”

In short, the imperative of shaping and manipulating public opinion had become central for Ghana. This is even more evident when contrasted with the Nigerian diplomats who were aware of the PR dimension of the bomb, but more concerned about its immediate health risks. Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewe visited London in September 1959 to demand British nuclear experts, which he then posted in Nigerian monitoring stations even though Macmillan reassured Balewe that the Harmattan, a dry dusty Sahara wind, could not carry the fallout in the direction of Nigeria. Nigeria’s unilateral move as well as the British guarantees for assistance to Sierra Leone angered Nkrumah, because he felt they weakened the international position of the African bloc.

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595 Incoming telegram, Guiringaud to DAL, 8 February 1960, f: Mesures de blocages des avions français a Ghana, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/72, AMAE.
596 Letter, “The Ghana Women’s Anti-Atom Test Committee”, 13 February 1960, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/72, AMAE.

**Debating Decolonisation in Cold War Terms: The Western Response to Ghanaian Activism**

It was Ghana’s propaganda campaign that forced the CRO, the USIA and even Guiringaud to publically take a position. Guiringaud’s response was complicated. Not for a moment did he pause to consider the legitimacy of French testing in the Sahara, but he understood that a public response was required in the face of Ghanaian propaganda, which had led the unintelligent mass audience – ‘gens simples’ – to panic, and the educated parts of the public to harbour doubts about the French intentions.

The ambassador wrote a rather factual sounding six-page pamphlet based on the speech that Jules Moch, the French representative in the UN disarmament commission, had given during the debate on the Afro-Asian resolution against the bomb. It included three diagrams that compared the blast site in the Sahara to those of Nevada and Balkhash to further substantiate the claims about safety. The pamphlet played on the perceived need for prestige of the elite, which Guiringaud called the ‘les cercles évolutés.’ Someone with a certain level of education, the pamphlet stated, would not want to be guided by the same emotions of the
common people. ‘As an educated and responsible person’, the pamphlet went on, ‘you would not like to be guided by such arguments only by your judgement on a matter of this importance’.

According to the French embassy, the pamphlet was a success. It had been well received among diplomats and at universities and resented by government offices in Accra. Ghana’s finance minister, K.A. Gbedemah had described the pamphlet’s content as a blatant lie and the Ghanaian Times of 9 February 1960 had printed a reply which according to Guiringaud was unsubstantiated and merely contained insults. A protest letter from the Belgian professor and former health minister, Arthur Wauters, and a transcript of Gbedemah’s speech were handed over to the embassy.

Guiringaud, like de Gaulle, felt that African leaders had no right to interfere with what they perceived to be French affairs. The fact that France, through the Secretariat of the French Community, began offering internships in its energy commission and its atomic facilities – believing this was good public relations – further underscores the French inability to think outside of the colonial framework. French officials did not question their right to be in Africa.

The British, by contrast, attempted to depoliticise the campaign against the bomb and avoided decolonisation because they realised that traditional colonialism was on the way out. They placed the bomb in the context of the Geneva test ban negotiations and the Cold War. The conversation between Macmillan and Balewe, for instance, bordered on the absurd. Although they agreed on a joint Nigeria-UK commission to measure the nuclear fallout, both men seemed to be living on different planets. As the Nigerian delegation complained about French neocolonialism, Macmillan stoically maintained that the real challenge was nuclear proliferation.

In the House of Commons debate, Macmillan avoided the symbolic impact of the bomb. When a Labour member of parliament (MP), Fenner Brockway, claimed that the Sahara was not only a matter of the danger of the fallout, but also a matter of the resentment of African

600 Letter, Secrétaire d’etat aux relations avec les etats de la Communauté to l’envoyé exceptionnel et plénipotentiaire de la république française et de la Communauté à Abidjan, 11 October 1960, Ministère de la Coopération, Direction de la coopération technique et culturelle, 19810443/47, f: Historique de la DCT : Organization, CHAN.
601 Brief for the Prime Minister, “The Visit of the Nigerian Prime Minister”, 17 September 1959, PREM 11/2892, TNA.
countries, Macmillan stated that the technical issues had been studied and further expressed his hope that the Geneva negotiations would be successful. When another MP rose to disagree with Macmillan, stating that the main problem was the affront to African feelings, Macmillan stuck to his position: the Nigerian ministers that had visited London had been anxious about the health risks.\footnote{Debate transcript, “Oral Answers”, 10 November 1959, Secret telegram, secretary of state for colonies to Sir J. Robertson, 31 March 1960 PREM 11/2892, TNA.}

Nonetheless, this was a tactical move. Macmillan and UK foreign officers knew they needed to find a public relations strategy that balanced the French viewpoint with the need to support Nigeria and Ghana. The FO believed that the British ‘public reaction’ would become an important element in the future relations with France. Ignoring the hostile reactions in Africa – as France was doing – was not an option, since Ghana’s propaganda campaign had fed rumours about a French-British conspiracy to wipe out the African population on the continent. Therefore the UK officers were ordered to deny any involvement, declare that the UK would not resume testing as long as negotiations were ongoing in Geneva and state that their own research had found that fallout did not pose any significant risk to health.\footnote{Letter, A.W. Snelling to J. Chadwick, 12 February 1960, DO35/9341, TNA; Confidential telegram, FO to posts, 11 February 1960, PREM 11/4242, TNA.} In a private conversation with de Gaulle, Macmillan voiced his discontent about the French behaviour, explaining that it made the British position in Africa almost impossible.\footnote{Très Secret, “Conference Occidentale a Quatre : Tete-a-tete du General de Gaule avec M. Macm illan, au Palais de l’Elysee le 21 Decembre 1959 de17h.40 à 18.15”, 21 December 1959, 7-8, Fonds de la présidence de la République de Charles de Gaulle, 5AG(1)/661, f: Janvier du 21 Decembre 1959, CHAN.}

Conspicuously absent in this war of words was the USIA, a consequence of the OCB’s decision to remain silent. Nevertheless, when Nigerian newspapers began to blame the US for the situation, because the Americans had denied the French access to the ‘atomic club’, George Allen decided that some damage control was needed. The USIA’s response was \textit{Making It Safe to Stop Nuclear Testing}, a story produced for USIS-Accra, but sent out to all the posts. By describing how the US had made every effort to share its nuclear technology and by emphasising the deception of the public by the USSR, it was suggested that the US had been forced into the business of atomic weaponry. The second part of the pamphlet explained that nuclear energy had peaceful uses and that the American testing procedure was safe, with only three lives lost since the beginning of the tests in 1945. Still, a few days before the explosion, the USIA’s guidelines to its posts worldwide maintained that the less said by US officials the better.\footnote{Foreign service despatch, “Nigerians Protest French Atomic Tests in the Sahara”, 21 July 1959, Outgoing Message, Allen to posts, “Infoguide: French Nuclear Test”, 19 August 1959, Letter, Tom Graves to Glen Smith, 10 November 1959, Secret telegram, secretary of state for colonies to Sir J. Robertson, 31 March 1960 PREM 11/2892, TNA.}
Ghana’s propaganda campaign thus forced the USIA and British to respond in ways that subtly acknowledged African grievances but did not upset de Gaulle who considered the bomb to be a French affair and African opposition an expression of mass hysteria induced by Ghana. By referring to the Cold War in broad terms, the Anglo-Saxons wanted to remain middle-of-the-road, a course of action that became untenable once the bomb was activated.


*Testing Bombs, Testing Alliances: Britain takes Nkrumah’s Side and the Disintegration of the Anti-Bomb Coalition*

On the afternoon of 13 February 1960, Dr. J.A.T. Dawson of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment – which manufactured the UK warheads – left for Nigeria to join the UK-Nigerian Scientific Committee. During the flight to Lagos, he was called into the cockpit at

4:30 PM because the radiation monitor on board had recorded 3 milliroentgen while flying over Kano in Nigeria, an indication that the weapon debris had travelled in a different direction than predicted. After careful study in Lagos, the team concluded that the amount of fallout had been below harmful limits. Dawson then travelled to Ghana to study the data of the Canadians who had quietly set up radiation monitoring equipment at Nkrumah’s request.\(^{606}\)

Once the bomb exploded, the UK was quick to investigate if its reassurances about the potential fallout matched the actual measurements. Even though the UK-Nigerian Scientific Committee concluded that the dust particles, which had travelled to Ghana and Nigeria, were harmless, the Nigerian prime minister was still angry (illustration 18).\(^{607}\) Furthermore, when Sierra Leone and Gambia also asked for help in measuring the fallout, Macmillan and CRO officers began to worry about the opportunities this offered Ghana in terms of propaganda.\(^{608}\)

In light of that threat to their public image, the British grew increasingly disaffected with the French. When, at the end of 1960, a new Afro-Asian resolution requested countries to refrain from further testing, the UK delegation in New York was instructed to vote in favour. The bomb and the already erupted Congo crisis made the British choose for its territories in Africa rather than France, something the British representatives at the UN kept secret from their French colleagues until just before the vote. The new public diplomacy strategy that the Foreign Office drew up in 1961 stressed that the British record of decolonisation had to be clearly distinguished from the French actions.\(^{609}\)

Guiringaud was unaware of any wrongdoing and despite his efforts to promote French culture in Ghana he was unable to see the symbolic dimension of the Sahara tests. When he bumped into the British ambassador at a cocktail party, Guiringaud told him that he found the campaign against France unnecessary and exaggerated. ‘But your bomb is a political affair is it not?’ the British ambassador replied. Guiringaud interpreted this snide remark as evidence of envy about France’s entry into the small group of atomic powers. Even when Nkrumah in a private conversation with the ambassador hinted that his propaganda on nuclear safety was a way to reject French colonialism, Guiringaud still replied that the Sahara was French and that

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\(^{606}\) Confidential, “Note on Visit to Nigeria (February 13\(^{th}\) – February 20\(^{th}\), 1960)”, 21 March 1960, EG1/685, TNA; Confidential inward telegram, Ottawa to CRO, 31 March 1960, EG1/685, TNA.

\(^{607}\) The committee consisted of J.R. Clackson, Director of Meteorological Services, Nigeria, O.D. Macnamara, senior radiology specialist, Nigeria, B.E.C. Agu, physicist at the University College Ibadan and J.A.T. Watson, see Confidential letter, N. Levin to Roger Makins, 23 March 1960, 1, Confidential, “Note on Visit to Nigeria (February 13\(^{th}\) – February 20\(^{th}\), 1960)”, 21 March 1960, 1, EG1/685, TNA.

\(^{608}\) Letter, A.W. Snelling to Hunt, “Fake Independence”, 2 March 1960, DO35/9424, TNA.

\(^{609}\) Minute, N. Pritchard, 13 December 1960, DO 177/19, TNA; Memorandum, FO, “Information Policy for Africa”, 30 June 1961, FO 953/2031, TNA.
the French access to the nuclear club was not up for discussion, after which he rose from his seat and left.\footnote{Confidential report, Guiringaud to DAL, “a/s : M. Nkrumah, la bombe et nos amis”, 23 février 1960, f: Mesures de blocages des avions français à Ghana, DAL, Généralités, 49QONT/72, AMAE ; Letter, Guiringaud to Couve de Murville, 14 February 1960, DDF, 1960, Tome 1, 175.}

Additionally, the Executive Council of the French Community supported the bomb as a measure to protect French Africa.\footnote{“A French bomb-not only for France?”, The Manchester Guardian, July 10, 1959.} Senghor, for instance, had expressed his amazement that the 208th explosion provoked such emotion, while the 207 non-French tests had gone unnoticed. The press release of the French embassy on the day of the explosion played down the health risks, listed the results of the tests, and stated that the French decision had been made because nuclear weapons had become a fact of international life.\footnote{Foreign service despatch, Donald Dumont to StateDept, “Position of UPS on French Atomic Explosion”, 24 February 1960, Foreign service despatch, “Reaction in Guinea to French Atomic Test”, 20 February 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA; Press Release, Ambassade de France Service de Presse et d’Information, “France’s First Atomic Explosion”, 13 February 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA.}

When a second device was detonated on the first of April, even Eisenhower felt forced to react. At the Washington meeting on 22 April 1960, he passed on warnings from nine African nations to de Gaulle that the French nuclear tests in the Sahara were driving them to the Soviet camp.\footnote{Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States, and the Algerian War (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 2001), 212.} In Ghana, propaganda became less involved with the peace movement and more aimed at furthering Ghana’s pan-African ambitions.

Ghanaian officials lost sight of the possible consequences of their propaganda. Gbedemah for instance had been forced to cancel the freeze of all the assets of French firms, when other African countries did not follow the Ghanaian example. Ghana’s claim within GATT for equal treatment and its application for loans with the IMF were weakened by the trade restrictions put in place against France. Nonetheless, the second secretary of the American embassy, Howard W. Potter, understood that the economic sanctions were mainly designed to have a political effect.\footnote{Foreign service despatch, Howard W. Potter to StateDept, “Factors Causing Withdrawal of Sanctions Imposed in Protest Against French Saharan Bomb Tests”, 28 April 1960, Foreign service despatch, Howard W. Potter to StateDept, “Ghana Reinforces Economic Sanctions Against France in Protest Against Saharan Bomb Tests”, 14 April 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA.}

More importantly, in April 1960, international peace activists like Bill Sutherland became disillusioned with Nkrumah at the Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security in Africa. Jean Allman argues that peace activists were unhappy because Nkrumah was unable to resist the pressures of the Cold War and as a consequence gave them less freedom to experiment. However, Sutherland hardly mentions the Cold War in his memoirs. What he
criticises is Nkrumah’s use of the peace movement to advance Ghana’s position in Africa and the rest of the world.615

Unlike the propaganda campaign before the explosion, Nkrumah’s speech at the Positive Action conference presented the nuclear bomb as an attempt to ‘balkanise’ the continent and destroy the ‘African Personality’. Peace activists like Sutherland were disappointed because original disarmament proposals were submerged in the pan-African agenda. Nkrumah had discovered that the emotions that the bomb raised could be used to mobilise the so-called ‘masses’ in the service of African Unity. International peace activists and Nkrumah went their own way, not because of the Cold War but because Nkrumah wanted to pursue his own agenda.616 The USIA therefore described Nkrumah’s call for an emergency conference as an attempt to retain his leadership position in Africa where other newly independent nations rejected Ghana’s ideas. Nigeria, for instance, passed an emotional motion in its House of Commons that condemned France’s ‘disregard of African sensibilities.’617 The USIS officers in Accra, however, expected Nkrumah to be isolated in his pleas for African unity, a perceptive observation.618

In summation, all actors in this story avoided the real stakes of the debate, namely the future of African self-government. Ghana’s campaign focused on health risks to sustain the coalition between peace movements outside of Ghana and the uneducated African public. The UK had to balance its relationship with France, safeguard its own atomic energy interests, and maintain the goodwill of its former colonies, and therefore treated the bomb as an issue of nuclear proliferation. France did not consider the African sensitivities and simply stated that their test posed no health threats, while the USIA presented the US as a responsible nuclear nation. The Americans had been forced to detonate a bomb because its Cold War adversary could not be trusted. Thus a debate that was at its core about the future of colonialism was discussed in Cold War terms.

617 Incoming airgram, Dorros to secretary of state, “House of Representatives Passes Strong Motion Regarding Future Sahara Bomb Tests”, 7 April 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA.
With the second test, these coalitions fell apart under the pressure of African public opinion: Ghana cut its ties with the international peace movement to emphasize the message of African unity, while even the USIA and Eisenhower felt forced to react in light of French intransigence. The British choice to support Ghana instead of France is remarkable in light of what has been written about British decolonisation. Ronald Hyam and Frank Heinlein for instance, emphasise that the UK was forced to give up its empire because of international pressure, but they do not include African countries and cite the French referendum in 1958 as an event that prompted British officials to rethink their approach. What the Sahara bomb shows is how important Ghana was in UK decision making and how France – rather than an example – was a disruptive force in British decolonisation policy.

By the time the UK gave up its support for France, it was not the assertive claims of African nationalism but the perceived ‘primitive’ behaviour in the streets of Leopoldville that preoccupied the imaginations of policy makers. That interpretation profoundly influenced decision making in the Congo.

**Things Fall Apart: The Congo Crisis and the Unhinged African**

On 30 June 1960, King Baudouin arrived in Leopoldville to witness the transfer of power from the Belgians to the newly formed Congolese government in which Lumumba took the position of prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu became the president. After King Baudouin sung the praise of Leopold II as a civiliser and Kasavubu promised to honour the longstanding ties between both nations, Lumumba approached the podium and made an impromptu speech in which he reminded his audience of Belgian exploitation and racism. Baudouin had to be persuaded by Gaston Eyskens, the Belgian Prime Minister, to not walk out of the ceremony. Only 48 hours later, workers went on strike to demand better working conditions and riots broke out among the soldiers of the Force Public, while the mineral rich province of Katanga, which was led by Moise Tshombe, declared its independence with Belgian support.

But what determined international decision making about the Congo and eventually created a climate in which Lumumba’s assassination became acceptable? While historians have condemned the state-led murder, they do not explain why it was that the Congolese

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prime minister had to be eliminated and other left-leaning leaders were allowed to stay in power. Lumumba came to be seen as an instrument of Soviet influence, most historians claim, a perception encapsulated by Dulles’s utterance that Lumumba was ‘a Castro or worse’.\textsuperscript{621} In this narrative Eisenhower is a man solely motivated by the Cold War competition, a characterisation that is widely accepted even by those who analyse the influence of racist tropes on policy.\textsuperscript{622} However, Lumumba’s reputation as a demagogue was more important for the British, the Belgians, and particularly Eisenhower because demagogy was what he wanted to avoid. Accordingly, it was officials in these three countries that devised a plan to murder Lumumba.

\textit{The Congo as an Educational Wasteland}

In response to the riots and the Katanga secession, the US quickly approved the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), while Britain and France abstained. Afraid it would set a precedent for Rhodesia, Macmillan supported ONUC but not the use of force in Katanga while de Gaulle opposed the entire operation. Through the anticolonial lens of Lumumba and Nkrumah the position of the two colonial powers was seen as a form of support for Katanga. However, the Quai d’Orsay, like Macmillan was not willing to support the secession. Both men feared that open support would lead to disgruntlement in the remaining African colonies, open the door to more UN intervention, and lead to secessionist claims in the Bas-Kongo, which could threaten the territorial integrity of Congo-Brazzaville.\textsuperscript{623}

The widespread unrest had come as a surprise because many believed that Belgian colonial rule had given the ‘heart of darkness’ a more modern heartbeat (illustration 19).\textsuperscript{624} When King Baudouin travelled to Leopoldville, for the independence celebrations, he found a

\textsuperscript{621} Memorandum of Discussion at 452nd Meeting of the NSC, 21 July 1960, \textit{FRUS 1958-1960}, Vol. 14: Africa, 338-41; The interpretation of the Congo crisis as an episode of the Cold War and Eisenhower’s approval of Lumumba’s death were two claims that were established for the first time by Madeline G. Kalb, see Kalb, \textit{The Congo Cables}, 27–28.

\textsuperscript{622} Only Kevin Dunn has departed from the Cold War explanation by studying how the American media scripted a narrative of ‘cold war competition and Congolese barbarity and chaos.’ Eisenhower, however, is still cast as the voice of a ‘Cold War competition’, Kevin Dunn, \textit{Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity} (New York and Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 65, 99–101; Borstelmann, \textit{The Cold War and the Color Line}, 129–131.


\textsuperscript{624} The Belgian government was surprised, as the official investigation revealed: De Vos et al., \textit{Lumumba: De Complotten? De Moord.}, 31.
clean and modern city, that had undergone a dusting with the pesticide DDT to kill the mosquitos. J.D.B Fowells of the British Council was impressed to find skyscrapers, wide boulevards, air conditioned hotels, night clubs, and even a British Congo club where inhabitants of the Commonwealth gathered. What was maddening for the American and British public diplomats who had been hiding under their desks, was that the Congolese seemed to refuse the order and prosperity that colonialism had brought. Couve de Murville for his part had already in April 1960 predicted that the prosperous Congo would descend into chaos once the ‘white man’ left.

In determining why there was so much atrocious violence, de Murville and his colleagues settled upon a familiar explanation: the Belgians had insufficiently prepared the Congolese for self-government. The educational programmes of Radio Congo Belge, initiated in 1959 and set to expand in 1960, were soon forgotten, despite initial success. By the end of November the Leopoldville station had already received 25,000 letters from listeners each month, making it almost impossible to correct and return every essay. Newspaper commentators, however, criticised the Belgian colonial government for creating an uneducated mass with only a few educated leaders. In December 1959, the American embassy expressed its concern after reading an old Belgian plan, authored by Jef Van Bilsen in 1955. This Belgian lawyer had estimated that 30 years and 50,000 secondary school graduates were needed to establish essential government services. What had been a report to justify a continuous Belgian presence, was read by the Americans as a cry for help. In his

627 The director had thought about handing out radio sets that could only receive the local wave length, to protect the public from ‘mischievous material from outside’, but in the end he decided that the time for such ‘illiberal’ measures had passed, see Restricted, consulate general to information executive department, 25 November 1959, CO 1027/252, TNA.
628 Note, “C.W. de Kiewiet President Univerisy of Rochester: Education in the Congo, in the New York Herald Tribune”, 8 January 1961, BW 90/59, TNA; American headlines emphasising the chaos in the Congo, see Dunn who focuses on the way in which Lumumba’s image was constructed: Dunn, Imagining the Congo, 87–91.
629 ‘Irrational forces at work among the Congolese, similar to many other backward people’ meant that they would have to receive training in self-government before they were ready, see Foreign service despatch, Amembassy Brussels, “United States Policy Toward the Belgian Congo”, 10 December 1959, 3, RG. 59, CDF 1955-59, 611.55921/9-1257 – 611.565/11-2957, NARA; Jef Van Bilsen, Un plan de trente ans pour l’émancipation politique de l’Afrique Belge (Kortrijk: Vooruitgang, 1956); General Andrew Goodpaster wrote to Herter: ‘The Congo crisis points up one of the world’s most urgent needs: The absence of trained and educated people to take over leadership and administration of the new African nations’, quoted in Tom Shachtman, Airlift to America: How Barack Obama, Sr., John F. Kennedy, Tom Mboya, and 800 East African Students Changed Their World and Ours (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 151.
memoirs, Macmillan blamed the Belgians for leaving a ‘gap that the native Congolese could not fill.’

On independence day, delegates therefore brought educational assistance plans with them to Leopoldville in an attempt to manage the transition to independence. Belgium belatedly initiated a crash scholarship and trainee programme for students, which by 1962 had produced 200 university graduates and had allowed 1,000 Congolese to complete training courses of three to six months. Robert Murphy, who headed the American delegation, announced that he had 300 scholarships on offer at the same time as the USIA flew in staff and equipment to meet the challenge by simultaneously strengthening 33 posts in 21 African countries. The French consul in Congo, Henry-Francis Mazoyer, had been overwhelmed by the stacks of application forms on his desk, but in line with the guidelines from Paris had refused to help a delegation of the Katanga government. For contemporaries, the Congo was not a site of bipolar struggle but an educational wasteland.

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631 As Dunn has shown the Congo crisis was rooted in the conflicts over Congolese identity and who had the authority to author that identity. However, it was not only the Belgian colonial narrative that relied on needs of the Congo, this was a transnationally shared discourse employed to explain the chaos. Dunn makes this argument in Dunn, *Imagining the Congo*, 71, 64.

632 The document lists earlier initiatives, see Airgram, Amembassy Brussels to StateDept, “The Training of Africans in Belgium”, 11 January 1963, RG. 59 1960-1963, CDF 561.913/8-560 to 570C.003/10-661, NARA.

Illustration 19: Picture taken from a pamphlet that was produced by the Belgian government in the Congo entitled, Université Lovanium/Lovanium-Universiteit, 1956-1957. By showing white and black students together in one classroom, the idea of a harmonious colonial society was projected abroad. Source: Pamphlet, “Université Lovanium/Lovanium-Universiteit, 1956-1957”, [1957], BW 90/59, TNA.

The African and the International Side to Congolese Education in the General Assembly

To fulfil the perceived demand for education, Western leaders realised they had to cooperate. After Raymond Hare of the State Department admitted that he had no clue what to do, Roger Seydoux confessed that France needed help with a request to train 100 to 200 Congolese in French technical schools. The British information officers received an enormous number of requests to study in the UK, for instance by a group called ‘Les Amitiés Congolais’ – a motley crew of Congolese journalists and Bulgarian refugees.634

Contrary to this anxiety, Ghanaian diplomats and other African freedom fighters were excited. Congolese independence was seen as the opportunity they had been waiting for. When the AAPC in Tunis received news from the Belgian roundtable conference, they concluded that the Congo would be a ‘springboard for effective propaganda’.635 In line with the network strategy of the BAA, experts of the Bank of Ghana, Ghanaian doctors, engineers, and civil servants poured into the Congo alongside Ghanaian soldiers. Not only was an agreement signed with Lumumba, secretly establishing the Ghana-Congo-Guinea union, the

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634 Memcon, StateDept, 11 July 1960, RG. 469, P 206, Box 1, f: Africa-General 7/60 – 12/60, NARA; Confidential, Letter Information Office Leopoldville to FO, 16 August 1960, BW 154/1, TNA.
Ghanaian chief of staff, General Alexander, also took command of the ONUC troops and disarmed the mutinous Congolese Army.\textsuperscript{636}

At the 15\textsuperscript{th} session of the UN General Assembly, which started on 20 September 1960, the problem of African development and education was internationalised. The General Assembly is remembered mainly for the emergence of the Afro-Asian group, Khrushchev’s Troika proposal, and the debate on the UNOC intervention in the Congo. Nonetheless, what is striking is how many speeches dealt with the need to offer the Congolese people education and training.

Macmillan, for instance, declared that administration, health, education and other services essential in a modern state could be provided more efficiently if larger administrative units were formed. This message was part of the new information strategy that had emerged during the Sahara bomb crisis, which presented British colonialism as an undertaking that fostered stable self-government. Unlike the discussion about colonialism at the UN, Macmillan stated in his speech that the UK had already proven to be willing to relinquish responsibility once colonies were prepared for self-government: ‘where are the representatives of these former British territories? Here they are, sitting in this hall [...] who dares to say that this is anything but a story of steady and liberal progress?’\textsuperscript{637}

The French wanted to internationalise the educational problem in a different way. In de Gaulle’s estimation, the chaos in the Congo had been the result of insufficient Western cooperation, and this had left room for the UN to intervene. Debré and de Gaulle continued to see the US as bent on replacing France in the area of culture, economic aid and the training of African administrative personnel. Western cooperation had to put a check on American ambitions and discourage opposition groups in French Africa to call on the UN to intervene. In his letter to Eisenhower, de Gaulle argued that it made little sense to give the UN more responsibility, an organisation where the West, ‘the birthplace of common sense and freedom’ would be outcompeted by the Afro-Asian bloc and the USSR.\textsuperscript{638} Ultimately, de Gaulle wanted to avoid an international precedent whereby the UN would become the principal manager of decolonisation.

\textsuperscript{636} Quoted in Thompson, \textit{Ghana’s Foreign Policy}, 124; Note, “Half of the Armed Force of Ghana are serving in the Congo”, [1960], Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-9, f: 209 The Congo, MSRC.

\textsuperscript{637} Quoted in Horne, \textit{Macmillan}, 2012, 2:278.

In his speech, Eisenhower hinted at such a scenario. He unfolded a concrete programme for Africa, ‘an all-out United Nations effort’ meant to help African countries with their educational activities. Thus the image of a president who only reluctantly participated in the UN General Assembly hardly does justice to the zeal with which Eisenhower called upon his fellow delegates to provide Africans, and the Congolese in particular, with ‘the mental tools to preserve and develop their freedom.’ Without an international effort at psychological modernisation ‘loud speakers in the public square’ would be able to ‘exhort people to freedom’ lacking any constructive plan for society. Besides a UN educational programme, he pledged to assist the UN in matters of African security, proposed the establishment of a UN fund for the Congo and wanted to involve the UN in long-term modernisation efforts.\(^{639}\)

The ICA created a UN programme for Africa and worked out the details in the course of October 1960. Before the General Assembly, ICA secretary Alice May had already sent out a transcript of Eisenhower’s speech because aid to Africa had been such a central theme. Immediately after the president’s speech, the ICA distributed an illustrative draft resolution among different UN delegates, which covered all the African proposals of the President.\(^{640}\) When the UN secretariat objected because they felt they had not been given enough responsibility, adjustments were made to give UNESCO more influence. At a meeting in Paris, the US pushed UNESCO to add an additional million dollars to their budget for aid to education in Africa, and Herter instructed the US delegation to make a voluntary contribution of two million dollars. To ensure ‘maximum strategic and psychological impact’, he also asked the US delegates to ensure the announcement was dramatic and well timed.\(^{641}\)

The American public image in the Third World was important. The Sprague Committee had underscored that African leaders needed more than education, they also needed to be instilled with a more favourable attitude towards the US. As a firm believer in the power of psychological war and propaganda, in February 1960 Eisenhower had asked the president of the Motion Picture Association, Eric A. Johnston, to explore the possibility of distributing

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641 Airgram, Herter to Posts, “Subject: Aid to Education in Africa trough the UN System of Organizations”, 22 November 1960, RG. 469, P 206, Box 1, NARA.
films in Africa that presented an accurate picture of the US. In November 1960, he welcomed African UN delegates to the White House, sent them on a tour across the US, established USIA representation at the UN while the USIA covered African activity at the General Assembly.

Ultimately, Eisenhower was willing to sacrifice the American public image at the UN if it served the orderly transition to independence. In the long run, the president argued that offering assistance to educational development was the soundest course of action. The US therefore joined France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Australia, the Dominican Republic, Portugal, Spain and South Africa in abstaining from General Assembly Resolution 1514. The anticolonial resolution had been put forward by the 22 Afro-Asian countries in December 1960 and constituted a ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial peoples and territories’ which was voted 89 to 0 in the UN General Assembly.

Nkrumah entered the General Assembly as a vindicated man. The crisis in the heart of Africa justified what he described in his speech as ‘his continuous outcry’ against ‘the threat of balkanisation in Africa’, as well as his ‘daily condemnation of neo-colonialism’. The Belgian support of the Katanga secession and the international tension about the Congo validated Nkrumah’s pan-African worldview and did not collapse the international politics of the Cold War into Africa, but only strengthened Nkrumah’s conviction that Africa’s problems could be solved by a joint African front. In August 1960, Nkrumah had already taken action by turning a Conference of Independent African States in Leopoldville, into a meeting to discuss the distribution of aid to the Congo. It was a way to keep the problems in the heart of the continent under African control.

The 15th General Assembly of the UN was not only a historic meeting where the Cold War stakes of the Congo crisis were raised with each thud of Khrushchev’s shoe on his desk.


644 Report, “Conclusion and Recommendations of the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad”, December 1960,US President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad: Records 1960-61, Box 26, f: Printed Committee Report, DDEL; Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960, 44.

More importantly, different aid philosophies for the Congo were put forward. Eisenhower wanted to get as many delegates as possible to initiate educational programmes in the Congo, to make sure the Congolese were developed into the so-called modern mindset. His plan contrasted sharply with Nkrumah’s call to keep foreign powers out. At the same time the British were mainly interested in peddling their liberal understanding of colonialism, while the French wanted Western cooperation to prevent new demands for self-government from arising. Those differences only intensified new problems on the ground, where cooperation had broken down since the landing of 19,825 UN troops on 15 July.

*The Scramble for Congolese ‘Minds’ Intensifies*

The main Western priority was the protection of white lives, while the Congolese government with Ghanaian support wanted to expel the Belgian troops and reunite the country. If an ambiguous UN mandate had made cooperation difficult, it was the disagreement about the final aims of a Congolese development programme that perpetuated suspicion and divisions. USIS officers argued that the Congo had been isolated from the outside world for so long that the first country to arrive in the Congo would have a great impact.\(^646\) The French, the British and the Americans were able to nonetheless continue cooperating because they all believed the operations of their competitors eventually served their own goals.

The British Foreign Office believed the Congo crisis offered a new opportunity to present a liberal image of British imperialism, separate from that of the French, particularly after the second French atomic bomb of April 1960.\(^647\) Initially, the CRO had only encouraged the Ghanaian deployment in the Congo, believing Ghanaian success could stop dissatisfaction in Kenya and prevent what was called a second Congo.\(^648\) Only a day after this decision was made, however, they realised that an aid operation would be even more beneficial for the UK image, particularly when it was contrasted with the French intransigence in Algeria. The Congo turned into an ‘IRD paradise’, in which anti-communist material was in high demand: it was published by the two main papers of Leopoldville, the *Courrier d’Afrique* and *Actualités Africaines*, radio broadcasts used information bulletins as news, priests and even

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\(^647\) The FO was eager to exploit the opportunities in the area of education and information still open to them, see Confidential, Letter Information Office Leopoldville to FO, 16 August 1960, BW 154/1, TNA.

two lecturers at Lovanium University used IRD pamphlets, such as *the Interpreter*, as teaching tools. By improving its public image the UK would also benefit financially thanks to the presence of companies such as Unilever, Shell, B.P., Barclays, and the large number of British missionaries. Business interests were thus always part of a wider set of concerns.

France, by contrast, was interested in winning over Congolese government officials to avoid a situation in which the UN would be the sole interlocutor for educational and technical assistance programmes. The DGCT had become convinced that cooperation with other Western countries, separate from the UN, was still possible. Particularly in October 1960, when the first Congolese students who had been funded through the ICA Third Country Scheme arrived in Paris. ICA funded the training of Africans in countries outside of the US, in an attempt to get as many trainees as possible ready for government positions. Couve de Murville was convinced that they would be able to get French experts into a key position in the new Congolese government led by Antoine Gizenga.

What the French saw as a step to Western cooperation was in fact an American effort to put in place stable state structures. Eisenhower wanted to ensure the supply of teachers and educational material through cooperation. To foster collaboration with the British, the State Department pointed out that a ‘Sovietized Congo’, so close to the East African colonies, would be disastrous, particularly with the already considerable influence of Cairo. The British Council only agreed to cooperate because it felt that competition would give the entire operation a political complexion in the eyes of the Congolese, a dent in the image of the

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liberal imperialist. Western cooperation was thus based on a fragile confluence of subtle misunderstandings.

Nkrumah stood alone in his support for Lumumba. Kasavubu tried to seize the Ghanaian and Guinean pamphlets, hidden in large packing cases filled with medical supplies destined for the UN Indian Hospital. Together with the troops, a mobile cinema van of the Ghana Information Services had been unloaded. The van was officially meant to entertain the troops, but was secretly used to promote African unity. With little support for the African leaders who were unwilling to let him acquire more influence in the Congo, Nkrumah turned to the people. William Tubman, the president of Liberia, even publically expressed his irritation about the Ghanaian assistance mission to the Congo. Subsequently, Nkrumah could not secure enough support for the creation of an African High Command. He had already proposed such a joint structure at the AAPC in 1958, but now launched the proposal again to reconcile Lumumba, who wanted the UN troops to leave, and the Western powers, that wanted to maintain their presence.

Furthermore, even his relationship with Lumumba was tumultuous. The idea that Nkrumah and Lumumba had a warm relationship is the product of Ghana’s propaganda machine; it is hardly supported by the facts. Under the stress of the crisis, their relationship quickly soured. Nkrumah was informed by Andrew Djin, Ghana’s ambassador to Congo, that the high regard Lumumba once had for the Ghanaian leader, was quickly fading away.

**Lumumba, the African Demagogue**

The chaos of the Congo became a self-fulfilling prophecy spurred by imperial decline. Nonetheless, the narrative of the demagogue leading an uneducated population had real consequences when it began to centre on one man: Patrice Lumumba. During the Congolese election campaign, Lumumba had been branded as a slick politician by most observers. In May 1959, the adviser to the Belgian minister of Congo, Maurice Van Hemelrijck, described him as ‘a political chameleon’ with a strong tendency to tell each audience what it wanted to
King Baudouin told Stanley M. Cleveland only three days before independence that he was ‘fully aware of Lumumba’s weaknesses and particularly of the fact that he was not very honest.’ Nonetheless, the king still considered him to be ‘the logical man to form the Government.’

When Lumumba gave his inflammatory indictment of Belgian colonialism on independence day, he unknowingly confirmed the Western cliché of the African strong man. This leader could attain stability if he adhered to Western norms, but turned to demagoguery when he was insufficiently educated. Nonetheless, even when Lumumba travelled to New York to make his case for the withdrawal of the Belgian troops at the UN, the references in the American press about an emotional Lumumba were relatively mild, because he had had the looks of a jazz musician. He became a liability only when he was placed under house arrest on 14 September 1960, after general Joseph-Desiré Mobutu’s first coup. Ian Scott, the UK ambassador in Leopoldville, wanted the UN to stop protecting Lumumba, which in his view would lead to Lumumba’s departure, his imprisonment by Mobutu, or a new constitution that would prevent Lumumba from exercising dictatorial powers. H.F.T. Smith of the Foreign office made it clear that ‘killing him’ would be preferable.

Eisenhower and the officials at the State Department were fed numerous reports that played into their long-standing preconception of the Congolese as ‘a restless and militant population in a state of gross ignorance – even by African standards.’ In May 1960, for instance, the US president had been surprised by the flurry of political activity in the run-up to the Congolese elections, which he found remarkable since he was unaware that many people in the Congo could read. The French were an exception. They never publically accused Lumumba of being a communist, because they did not want to become involved in Congolese

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655 Van Hemelrijck’s adviser was named Georges Dumont, see Foreign service despatch, Stanley M. Cleveland to StateDept, “Congo Minister’s Chief Adviser Comments on Belgian Congo Policy”, 29 May 1959, RG. 59 CDF 1955-59, 655.563/6-1256 – 655A.00/5-2959, NARA.
656 Foreign service despatch, Amembassy Brussels to StateDept, “Conversation with King Baudouin on African and other Questions”, 27 June 1960, RG. 59, CDF 1960-63, 611.70/2-860 – 611.70/2-1362, NARA; Baudouin’s private remarks only three days before independence give more weight to the thesis that the Belgian government did not believe Lumuba was a Communist, even though publically officials created doubts about this, see Anne-Sophie Gijs, “Une ascension politique teintée de rouge. Autorités, sûreté de l’état et grandes sociétés face au ‘danger Lumumba’ avant l’indépendance du Congo (1956-1960)”, Journal of Belgian History 42, no. 1 (2012): 57.
659 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 573.
internal affairs – leading the French embassy personnel to hide every time they saw a Belgian official in the street.660

The French restraint contrasted sharply with the report of W. Averell Harriman, the president’s self-appointed emissary to Kinshasa, who predicted that Lumumba would continue to cause difficulties because he was a ‘rabble-rousing speaker’ who had shrewdly manoeuvred himself through Congolese politics.661 At the offices of USIS-Leopoldville, Fitzhugh Green felt that Lumumba was a ‘magnetic demagogue’ who had not only used his personality, but had also turned to bribery and threats and what he called ‘gangsterism’ to claw his way into the driver seat of government.662 Clare Timberlake, US ambassador in the Congo, felt Lumumba had only created chaos for the two months he was in power.663 In September 1960, even the Sudanese prime minister urged Herter to ‘get rid of Lumumba.’664 With their own agendas in mind, local officers and other officials pushed the Eisenhower administration – committed to fostering American model democracies, free from demagoguery – to act. When Allen Dulles heard Eisenhower’s wish that Lumumba would ‘fall into a river full of crocodiles’, he could only interpret this as a green light for his assassination.665

Ghanaian Nonalignment and New Plans for Africa

Lumumba’s reputation as a demagogue materialised amidst an atmosphere of riots that – far more than the allegation that he had communist sympathies – eventually sealed his fate. While a Soviet takeover was the worst case scenario, Larry Devlin, the CIA station chief in Leopoldville, could imagine an immediate and far more pressing danger: Lumumba in power with chaos as the inevitable result. The perceived African inability to govern remained the key problem.666 The CIA would never execute its plan.

On the night of 17 January 1961 Patrice Lumumba was executed on the orders of the leaders of the secessionist province Katanga. The persistence of the chaos after Lumumba’s

664 Confidential letter, Z.R. Hoyer to secretary of state, 29 September 1960, FO 371/146646, TNA.
death was yet another confirmation that the diagnoses of Africa’s disease – immaturity – had been accurate. While 1960 – the year of Africa – had prompted much discussion, it was Lumumba’s murder that brought home the point that independence required a new strategy towards Africa if longstanding goals were to be achieved. This new strategy was particularly obvious in Ghana, where Lumumba was turned into a pan-African hero.

**Lumumba, the Pan-African Hero**

On 23 February 1961 – after news of Lumumba’s assassination hit the press stands – A.K. Barden of the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs and Captain Hassan left for Leopoldville to discuss the new situation with the deputy prime minister of Lumumba’s government, Antoine Gizenga, who lost no time in summoning a cabinet meeting to devise a joint strategy. A direct communication line between Nkrumah and Gizenga was established while the troops were given underground support and vital public services were funded by Ghana. More importantly, continuous radio propaganda by independent African states was made possible.667

Neither Nkrumah nor Barden had been surprised by Lumumba’s assassination. Not only had rumours about Lumumba’s arrest been circulating daily, more importantly pan-African ideas compelled Ghanaian diplomats to believe that his assassination had resulted from a lack of inter-African cooperation, which had made neocolonial intrusion possible.668 The public diplomacy strategy was adjusted accordingly: publics rather than potential African leaders, trade unionists or freedom fighters were now the target of Ghana’s public diplomacy efforts. The people had to convince their leaders to support African Unity. Nkrumah had come to realise that unifying the African continent required a clear and coherent ideological message presented in an emotional and appealing way. The chosen style can be characterised as a published form of *radio trottoir*, where newspapers such as *The Spark* and *Voice of Africa* were filled with fake telegrams, cartoons and rumours to mobilise the population.669

The use of Lumumba’s murder provided the best example of this new strategy (illustration 20). Lumumba had written a letter to his wife which was also ‘meant for the Congolese and African peoples as well as for the peoples of the world’ and contained an

668 For those rumours, see Letter, Djin to Nkrumah, 15 September 1960, Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-4, f.10, MSRC; Thompson concludes that Nkrumah ignored the realities in Leopoldville while Nkrumah actually looked at reality through the Cold War lens, see Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, 140.
669 Ellis launched the term, see Ellis, “Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa”, 19.
anticolonial discourse. The BAA spread the letter as a pamphlet and republished it in *Voice of Africa*, a newspaper read by freedom fighters, but also in newspapers such as *Workers World*, for a more general audience. Lumumba wrote: ‘what we wish for our country, namely its right to an honourable life, to a stainless dignity and an unlimited independence is not what is desired by Belgian Colonialists and their Western allies […] They have corrupted some of our compatriots, they have bought off our independence.’ Lumumba ended his political testament with words that were music to Nkrumah’s ears, because they embedded the Congolese struggle within the fight against colonialism on the entire continent: ‘Long live the Congo, Long live Africa.’

When Ghanaian officials found out that the son of Maurice Mpolo – a party militant of Lumumba who had been executed with the Congolese Prime Minister – had fled to Somalia, they were eager to fly him over to Accra, not to train him but to use him as a propaganda weapon. In July 1961, *Voice of Africa* published an interview with Denis Prosper Okito, the son of the late president of the Congolese senate, who was the third man murdered alongside Lumumba. In his interview Okito praised Ghana’s support in the Congo crisis, with a focus on its massive technical capabilities. He had ‘been greatly touched by the way a small country like Ghana, with very limited resources so selflessly devoted itself to the welfare of the Congo. […] Ghana was among the first to offer us troops […] technicians, health personnel and administrative officers.’

After 1961, Ghana’s technical assistance was not only meant to create a network of revolutionaries, but was used more explicitly to project an image of Ghana as the leading modern nation of the African Revolution. Okito’s interview focused on Ghana’s leadership and vision: ‘We know that if Ghana’s numerous suggestions to the United Nations Secretary-General had been followed’ and the Force Publique had not been strengthened by ‘the foreign imperialists, the possibility of a military dictatorship terrorizing the country would never have arisen and the legal government of the Congo would be in power today.’

The BAA also published a letter directed at Pauline Lumumba, the wife of the murdered Congolese leader. The letter was not a typical enumeration of imperialist crimes concluded with a call to fight and liberate Africa. Instead it played on readers’ emotions and attempted to convey Lumumba’s death on a very personal and individual level:

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671 Letter, official secretary ministry of foreign affairs to embassy Ghana in Somalia, “Mr. Alfred Mauric M’polo”, 31 August 1961, BAA/RLAA/964 Correspondence with Foreign Ministry, PRAAD-Accra.

‘Mummy, Lumumba has been killed’, grieved my little boy and his eyes moistened with tears as he brandished his clenched little fist. His grief was profound, Pauline, and he will take this grief into his years of manhood, and he will be the hero I expect him to be one day. Pauline, none of us wants to become a coward, but, none of us wants an empty death, for life is so precious, life is not senseless but will erect a radiant new world. But Pauline, were death demanded from us, we would comply voluntarily, as Lumumba did, with the certitude of heroes that refuse to bow.  

In the pan-African propaganda, Lumumba had become a hero for the African cause. Even the man responsible for Lumumba’s assassination, Moïse Tshombe, understood he had to convince African public opinion of his innocence. He wrote a letter to Nkrumah in 1964 in which he urged him to tone down the Ghanaian rhetoric. The hostility of public opinion made his political career impossible.  

Internationally, Nkrumah’s choice for an emotional anticolonial discourse was interpreted as a move towards the Eastern bloc. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter for instance had already interpreted Nkrumah’s UN speech as a signal that the Ghanaian leader was ‘leaning towards the Soviet bloc.’ Historians, by relying on the sources from Washington, Paris and London, have argued that Lumumba’s murder finally made Nkrumah realise he had to play a Cold War game, leading him to seek rapprochement with the USSR. Documents from the Ghanaian archives show how nonalignment remained Ghana’s foreign policy.

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674 ‘J’estime que le moment est venu de faire toute la lumière et je ne peux rester plus longtemps sous le coup de cette accusation devant l’opinion africaine et l’opinion mondiale’, see Letter, Tshombe to Nkrumah, 31 January 1964, SC/BAA/307 Tshombe, PRAAD-Accra; Raoul Peck’s film has been particularly influential in maintaining the image of Lumumba as a hero, see Raoul Peck, Lumumba (Zeitgeist Video, 2000).
Illustration 20: This photo, taken from Ghana Today, shows how Ghanaian diplomats were keen on projecting an image of Lumumba as an anticolonial hero. The caption that accompanied the photograph reads: ‘The murder, not merely of an individual but of a principle.’ The periodical, Ghana Today, was an official publication that was disseminated abroad. Source: Ghana Today, March 15, 1961, Vol. 5, No. 2, 3.

The Preservation of Nonalignment

On 3 March 1961, an unknown aid tried to convince Nkrumah to take a more realist approach to Ghana’s nonaligned position because he believed international politics were ‘tough’. Ghana’s ‘tactical move to the Left’ had to be adjusted if a maximum of capital was to be obtained from ‘all sources abroad’. He questioned the wisdom of rigorously adhering to nonalignment, particularly because Ghana’s domestic economic structure resembled that of the Soviet Union.676

Furthermore, he felt Ghana’s image abroad had to be promoted in a better way, because Nkrumah’s leftist statements had frightened overseas investors. Therefore, he urged Nkrumah to play off the Cold War powers against each other. Most outside observers already understood Ghana’s foreign policy in that way, and in its efforts to obtain funding for the Volta River Project Ghana had already followed this course without major consequences. In his own words:

676 These documents offer us a glimpse of the inner workings of Ghanaian diplomatic decision-making. They suggest that Nkrumah did not only talk with people who praised him. Instead advisors had become skilled in providing carefully phrased and indirect criticism, contrary to what has been argued: Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 418; Peter T. Omari, Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship (Accra: Sankofa Educational Publishers, 2000), 8.
Most people assume that there has been a definite move on Ghana’s part to play the East off against the West (as has been done by the U.A.R.), and it can be argued that some of the progress with the Volta River project has been made possible by these methods. There is no quarrel with Ghana overseas in the use of these tactics.  

When the All-African Peoples Steering Committee, which had been established after the 1958 conference, met in Dar es Salaam from 26 to 30 January 1961 they viewed the calamities on the continent through a pan-African lens. The crises in Algeria, the Congo and South Africa, and the French atomic bomb test, were not an indication that the Cold War had arrived on African soil. On the contrary, these crises were the dying breath of colonial regimes. The real problem was the failure of the Congolese people and other African peoples to unite. Political parties, the trade union organisations, youth movements, and women’s groups therefore had to win the people to achieve African unity. Through the pan-African lens, the Congo crisis was seen not as the emergence of the Cold War but as a wakeup call that signalled more pan-African activism was required.

_The End of Cultural Assistance_

The change of Nkrumah’s strategic focus from leaders to the people was matched by the changes made by Western public diplomats, who had lost faith in their ability to develop men into the modern mindset. The details of a new socio-economic approach were worked out in the course of 1961, but the atrocities in the Congo offered the final proof that education could not change attitudes.

For Britain, the Congo was the place where the ‘goodwill’ strategy came to die. In 1961 the Foreign Office explicitly acknowledged that the promotion of its own achievements would never work if they could not criticise the other colonial powers. They had only hesitantly compared the ‘chaos left by the Belgians’ with the state in which former British dependencies had reached independence, because doing so would damage the entire Western presence on the continent. After the Congo-crisis, the British would no longer let their PR campaign be influenced by what the Belgian and French colonial powers were doing.

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The competition with the US and France intensified. When Wyndham travelled to Elizabethville, Usumbura and Bukavu in 1961, the Foreign Office told the Americans in the Information Working Group that their effort was limited to Leopoldville, a blatant lie. Despite Macmillan’s attempts to plan decolonisation, de Gaulle’s insistence in 1958 to jointly decide whether to stay or go, and claims that de Gaulle’s African policy profoundly influenced British decisions, it was the Congo crisis in combination with Nkrumah’s pan-Africanism that drove the UK to emphasise the uniquely liberal character of their enterprise and drag France and Belgium down if necessary.\footnote{Memcon, “US-UK Information Working Group Meeting”, April 1961, FO 953/2027, TNA; Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, 263–265.}

In January 1961 Kennedy became president which signalled the end of educational assistance to Africa. Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy strongly believed in aid grants as an engine of socio-economic modernisation, while he felt more concerned about the adverse effects of rumours and misinformation. In February 1961, the Congo Steering Committee was created with the new assistant secretary of state for African affairs, G. Mennen Williams, as its chairman. Their focus was on the absence of decent journalism, which had created a so-called information vacuum.\footnote{Memorandum, “Working Committee on the Congo”, 8 February 1961, Box 51, A1 1587-M, f: Congo Working Committee 1961-2, NARA; Confidential letter, Roger Tubby to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, “Information Needs in Africa”, 30 March 1961, RG. 59, A1 1587-M, Box 51; NARA.} This ‘psychological vacuum’ or ‘void’ was being filled by rumours and free news services from the Eastern Bloc, which fed regional loyalties, emotionalism and bred political instability.\footnote{Memorandum, “Subject: Information System in the Congo”, 2 March 1961, 1, Memorandum, Edwin M.J. Kretzmann to C. Vaughan Ferguson, “The Psychological Void in Africa”, 15 February 1961, Box 51, A1 1587-M, f: Congo Working Committee 1961-2, NARA.}

Cyrille Adoula’s survival as prime minister, however, required political stability. Adoula, an anticommunist trade unionist with CIA connections, enjoyed Kennedy’s support despite the fact that Lumumba’s ally, Gizenga, emerged as the clear favourite in parliament. Many historical accounts present Kennedy’s support for Mobutu as the next step.\footnote{See for instance: Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa, 68–69; Westad, The Global Cold War, 140–141.} The efforts of the committee were ignored even though they recommended an alternative strategy aimed at moulding public opinion, since they believed the influence of a military man would be lost in the vastness of the Congo. The contingency plan for the Congo stressed that Adoula’s legitimacy and the American image rested on the re-establishment of the public administration and a promotion of the modernisation efforts.\footnote{Confidential, Vaughan Ferguson and Edwin M.J. Kretzmann, “Information Program for the Congo”, 15 February 1961, 2, Box 51, A1 1587-M, f: Congo Working Committee 1961-2, NARA; Secret Draft,
Since modernisation theorists believed that armed resistance could thrive in so-called primitive societies where governments were weak, the communication between the government and the public had to be strengthened. This was primarily achieved by offering a $10,000 grant to improve infrastructure, providing radioteletype equipment with a one-year subscription to a news agency wire service and by sending in an operator to maintain equipment and train personnel. The final goal was the creation of a Congo-wide information network that could provide newspapers, newsreels, and wall posters. In the long term, an international news agency for Africa was to be founded and staffed with Africans because the local population mistrusted Western news sources. VOA had already begun broadcasting to the Congo to support Adoula and the modernisation process.

The public image of the UN was also to be improved by installing a ticker service to keep a check on the international news that local newspapers and international press agencies received. A new information service costing $850,000 was to be built. Edwin M.J. Kretzmann, chairman of the information sub-committee, even proposed the creation of a small inter-African mutual assistance service, which would distribute Red Cross relief supplies, food, and provide a communications training mission to run an information network. Within the Kennedy administration, public diplomacy had become a tool to fight insurgency, a means to strengthen the structures of weak states.

The Congo also changed the mindset of French officials such as Jean Sauvagnargues, the ambassador to Ethiopia, who called an emergency meeting on 20 January 1961 at the Quai d’Orsay to coordinate a coherent information campaign designed to convince the ‘less informed’ Africans about the French nuclear tests, something that had never crossed the minds of the French policymakers. Much like Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Program, which highlighted the positive aspects of nuclear energy, French ambassadors proposed a massive

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propaganda campaign in English including a proposal for an African Atomic Energy Agency to survey the peaceful uses of atomic energy and a heavily publicised seminar in Paris.689

The officials at the French Ministry of Cooperation felt they had to catch up with the British who had invested massively in the previous years. The British white paper they had access to struck them as highly relevant to their own situation, which demanded the marketing of the French socio-economic solutions and cultural achievements in a new and competitive environment. ‘As a nation, Great Britain has a great deal to offer’, the UK paper stated, yet ‘we delude ourselves if we think that in a fiercely competitive world these things are self-evident.’ Every effort had to be made to ensure the peoples of other countries understood UK ideas and policies. Word for word, that was what the French felt they needed in a world where everyone courted the favour of an African target audience.690 While the Congo had prompted the Americans to transform cultural assistance into a counterinsurgency tool, the French and British went into the sixties obsessed with promoting their colonial enterprise.

In short, the Congo emergency brought inter-African conflict to the surface while the Americans and British came to see Nkrumah as a formidable opponent in the realm of ideas. A direct consequence of the Congo debacle was the creation of the Casablanca group made up of Nasser, Nkrumah, Touré, and Modibo Keita of Mali. In May 1961 the Monrovia group was established as a response: a political grouping of 20 to 22 states with the Brazzaville group at its core that defended the interests of French Africa. Nkrumah’s interference with the affairs of other African countries also irritated USIS officers in Leopoldville who now made plans to compete with Ghana’s pan-African propaganda.691 When Mark Mwithiga, the chairman of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), was arrested by the authorities in Kenya carrying a letter in his pocket from Ghana’s BAA that promised support, Nkrumah lost his credibility as an interlocutor. The subversive Ghanaian activities in Kenya were not helping the British case

689 Memcon, “Compte-rendu de la reunion tenue au Quai d’Orsay le mardi 17 janvier 1961 de 17 h 30 à 19 h 15”, 20 January 1961, Ministère de la Coopération, Direction de la coopération technique et culturelle, 19810443/47 Histoire de la DCT, f: Historique de la DCT Organisation, CHAN.
690 The French estimated, 6.6 million francs for the BBC, 5.1 million for the British Council and the same amount again for the FO, CRO and the CO, see Memorandum, “Note sur les moyens d’information demandés par le Secrétariat d’Etat aux Relations avec les Etats de la Communauté”, [1960], Ministère de la Coopération, Direction de la coopération technique et culturelle, 19810443/47 Histoire de la DCT, f: Historique de la DCT Organisation, CHAN.
of a smooth transition. After 1960, Nkrumah and the Ghanaian form of pan-Africanism had very few allies left.\textsuperscript{692}

While the Congo crisis was influenced in important ways by the Cold War, the conflict was not determined by it. Rather, the dramatic failure to educate African target audiences into the modern mindset shaped the Western approach to the Congo. American public diplomats concluded that it was not African attitudes, but socio-economic structures that had to change if they wanted to maintain their influence. Conversely, the British and the French began to promote their approach to decolonisation. Meanwhile, Nkrumah decided that African audiences rather than nationalist leaders had to be targeted through emotional anticolonial propaganda. This divide between the American use of public diplomacy as a counterinsurgency tool and the European and Ghanaian public relations campaigns would characterise the 1960s.

Conclusion: the Transition from Psychological to Socio-Economic Modernisation Schemes

Lumumba’s assassination was the highpoint as well as the endpoint of an internationally shared view on African development. Even though historians consider the Congo as ‘the first hot spot of the Cold War’,\textsuperscript{693} for contemporaries the Congo emergency corresponded with another nightmare, namely that of an unstable postcolonial state led by a demagogue. The brutality – real and constructed – that filtered through diplomatic cables and news reports, with television as a new medium, awakened dormant fears that preceded the Cold War. The African response to the Sahara atomic bomb as well as the new public diplomacy plans had already shown the assertive side of African nationalism, requiring a more imaginative approach to maintain influence. At the same time, Nkrumah recognised that he would have to devise a new strategy to promote African unity, since other African leaders refused to support him.

These new doubts strengthened old concerns about ‘premature independence’ because the so-called development of Africans into a modern mindset had not resulted in a reorientation towards Western norms and practices. Ghanaian training had also failed: the leaders of newly independent countries did not follow Accra, but opposed Nkrumah’s

\textsuperscript{692} Secret and personal letter, T. Neil Permanent Secretary Office of the Chief Secretary, 18 April 1961, FCO 141/6735, TNA; Milton Obote in Uganda remained a staunch supporter of Nkrumah’s regime, see Agyeman, \textit{Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa}, 96.

\textsuperscript{693} Mazov, \textit{A Distant Front in the Cold War}, 2.
proactive stance. Those anxieties became entangled with what might happen if the Soviet competitor would succeed where the West had failed and – in the Ghanaian case – what might happen if the entirety of Africa suffered the same fate as the Congo.

Jointly, the Sahara and the Congo offer insights into the relationship between decolonisation and the Cold War. Actors were remarkably flexible about the lens they applied to understand events on the ground. Macmillan for instance knew that African leaders were disgruntled about the arrogant French behaviour but chose to talk about the French atomic bomb as a Cold War problem. De Gaulle and his ambassador to Ghana were unable to see Africans as independent actors, which led them to conclude that the British and the Americans were jealous of the ‘force de frappe’.

At the same time the colonial powers were concerned about the precedent set by UN intervention in the Congo. Eisenhower for his part knew the Congo could become a Cold War battleground, but wanted to address the more immediate problem of inadequate leadership. Nkrumah remained staunchly nonaligned. Africa had not acted as one during the Congo crisis, which had made neocolonial intrusion possible. His new emotional propaganda campaign, which denounced all forces outside of Africa, targeted the African peoples rather than the leadership, which had opposed his plan for a united African front.

However, this does not mean that the Soviet threat, mineral riches, and strategic considerations were not important in deciding to intervene in the Congo. Rather it is argued that understanding why Lumumba was murdered and why the Congo came to be defined as an international crisis requires a look beyond the Cold War. Business interests, Cold War political concerns, Belgian involvement and the inexperience of the Congolese politicians were all constructed and expressed an underlying desire for orderly development.

Describing the Congo as ‘a likely trouble spot’, as a territory that was unprepared for independence, as a playground for the great powers, or as a place inextricably linked with violence and human suffering – from Leopold II to Kabila – explains very little. Moreover such explanations run the risk of perpetuating a colonial and postcolonial myth that the peoples on the African continent were somehow in need of more preparation to participate in politics. Mamdani’s contention that colonial rule in the countryside was characterized by a form of ‘decentralised despotism’ exercised by chiefs who depended on a colonial master and after independence on the new national leaders, is interesting in this respect. It implies that the chieftaincy was hardly affected by decolonisation, while as Paul Nugent explains, the chiefs were among the principal casualties of decolonisation. Moise Tshombe, for instance, was not a disgruntled chief, but a national politician who opportunistically exploited tribal interests.

The focus on the brutal aspects of Congolese history finds its origin in the British campaign against forced labour in the Congo Free State. Edmund Dene Morel and British missionaries used the mass media in the beginning of the twentieth century, such as photos and newspapers, to expose the exploitation in the Congolese colonial economy including the cutting off of hands, a campaign that vilified Leopold II. While the horrifying ‘red rubber’ industry affected the daily lives of the Congolese, it is unclear why King Leopold’s ghost is still summoned to explain the atrocities of the 1950s or Mobutu’s rule.

The emphasis on Congolese atrocities becomes even more remarkable when the narrative of Congolese decolonisation is compared to that of India. Even though violence, secession, and UN intervention in 1949 were all part of the British departure from India, these events are not relied upon to explain other chapters in Indian history.

Congo and the propaganda or the Sahara bomb taught the diplomatic corps from Flagstaff House to the White House, that their interpretation of Africa’s position in the international system – in dire need of guidance – had been correct, but the road towards it –

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698 The ‘Trouble spot’ quotation is taken from Mazov, see Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 78; Bechtolsheimer, “Breakfast with Mobutu: Congo, the United States and the Cold War, 1964–1981”, 228; Also in their upcoming book, Bruce Kuklick and Emmanuel Gerard present historical actors as figures that sprang up from Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness: Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba (Boston: forthcoming at Harvard University Press, 2015).


the American reliance on civic education, the exclusive spread of French culture in French Africa, the creation of goodwill and the ideological training of leading freedom fighters by Ghana – had been misguided. The riots in Kinshasa were the beginning of the end for an internationally shared discourse of stability and a group of public diplomats who had believed in it and adopted each other’s methods.

African hearts and minds – assertive and uncontrollable after 1960 – had become a threat rather than an opportunity in the modernisation and development of Africa. New approaches to maintain some form of influence had to be found. One man in particular, John F. Kennedy, would come to symbolise this new socio-economic way to win Africa and profoundly shaped the British, French and Ghanaian relations with Africa after 1960.
7. Managing Modernisation

The Competition for the Anticolonial Project and Socio-Economic Modernisation as Foreign Policy (1961-1963)

We must if necessary be prepared to draw a distinction between those good records and those of some other powers, [...] otherwise all these situations can be lumped together by our enemies and made to serve as a mass condemnation of colonialist-imperialist policies.

– Foreign Office, Information Policy for Africa, 30 June 1961.\textsuperscript{702}

Does a developing country have to repeat for its development the various steps or ‘stages’ that had been the historical pattern in countries now industrialized?

– Nkrumah in a conversation with Seymour Melman of Columbia University, 24 June 1962.\textsuperscript{703}

Through language, culture, technology, trade, where sentiment is involved, links between states are intensified, making these states in their own way part of a French world that grows through everything that is French [while] the attachment to France and de Gaulle is not forgotten.

– Charles de Gaulle, draft note for the council of ministers, March 1963.\textsuperscript{704}

With a purposeful tread, Nkrumah approached the podium of the first Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade in September 1961.\textsuperscript{705} When reflecting on the conference agenda, he stated that the meeting should not create ‘a third bloc’, instead, time had to be devoted to the mobilisation of ‘moral force’ as a way to balance the influence of East and West. Nonetheless, on a continent with seventeen newly independent states, even Nkrumah could not ignore the international environment. He referred to the Cold War not as a neocolonial ploy, but as a real problem with pressing issues like Berlin and the space race. Even though Nkrumah saw nonalignment as an opportunity to bring morality into international affairs, his speech stressed the need to improve living standards. Disarmament had to be pursued not only because war would devastate the continent, but also because arms expenditures channelled financial resources away from this more important goal.\textsuperscript{706}

Nkrumah touched upon the paramount issue of international relations after 1961: foreign aid and its moral, social, economic, and political implications. The Belgrade

\textsuperscript{702} Memorandum, FO, “Information Policy for Africa”, 30 June 1961, FO 953/2031, TNA.

\textsuperscript{703} Limited official use, “Notes on Conversation with President Nkrumah on Sunday, June 24, 10-11:30 a.m.”, 28 June 1962, CDF 1950-54, 511.45K3/10-1254 – 511.45R3/7-2850, NARA.

\textsuperscript{704} Qu’il s’agisse de la langue, de la culture, de la technique, des échanges commerciaux ou qu’il s’agisse de sentiment, multiplier les contacts avec les États pour qu’ils fassent partie à leur manière d’une sorte de monde française et qu’ils se développent à travers ce qui est français […] N’oubliez pas leur attachement à la France et de Gaulle, see Charles de Gaulle, \textit{Lettres Notes et Carnets: Tome IX} (Paris: Plon, 1986), 318.

\textsuperscript{705} Where ‘Non-Alignment’ refers to the meeting of 1961 and the movement that sprang from it, the term ‘nonalignment’ defines a certain diplomatic position between the two Cold War blocs.

\textsuperscript{706} Speech transcript, Nkrumah, 2 September 1961, 1-11, FO 371/161222, TNA.
Conference forced policy makers in Paris, London and Washington to take a long hard look at ‘anticolonialism’, ‘nonalignment’, ‘neutralism’ and ‘Afro-Asian solidarity’. It was their fascination with the socio-economic modernisation process that determined what they saw. Anticolonialism and its derivatives were seen as an emotional response, a consequence of the stress that came with the development of ‘emerging’ societies. The bold attitude that characterised nonalignment was evaluated within the metric system of modernity. Deemed the product of frustration by the US, the result of too little development by the French and an expression of the cultural differences between Europe and Africa in the British estimation, nonalignment was listed together with the reliance on agriculture and runaway fertility as an additional symptom of underdevelopment.

Nevertheless, those who have studied Non-Alignment set out to uncover what the political project was about in geopolitical terms, what distinguished it from traditional neutralism and how it transformed from Bandung to Belgrade and Cairo. Political scientists in the 1960s, most notably G.H. Jansen, scrutinised the different statements, speeches and organisational decisions in an attempt to deconstruct the myths of Third World unity and racial solidarity that emerged shortly after the conference. Nehru’s realpolitik became a topic of particular interest. By employing the term ‘nonalignment’ for the first time in May 1950, the Indian prime minister was able to pursue relations with communist countries, most prominently China, without risking the support of domestic and international players. In the 1980s, Robert A. Mortimer tried to assess how the influence of non-alignment impacted upon international politics.

Conversely, social and cultural historians have chosen to shift their attention back to the racial aspects and the symbolism of Non-Alignment through discourse-centred work that presents Belgrade as a key moment when international relations became overlaid with racial meaning. Others, who draw on postcolonial archives or reassess the evidence in American or British archives, have settled on a different conclusion. For one, the pragmatism and realism of foreign policy makers in the postcolonial world is stressed. Rinna Kullaa, for instance, shows how Yugoslavia and Finland developed very particular brands of

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nonalignment to steer clear of absorption into the Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{711} Moreover, it is clear that Western policy makers were unable to understand what Non-Alignment as a project was about.\textsuperscript{712} While the field is thus becoming more varied, the fundamental opposition between a realist understanding of the Non-Alignment Movement and a racial interpretation has persisted.

This ambiguous reading of the international environment is in part due to Kennedy’s record on the Third World, which is partial, contradictory, and complicated by the president’s preference to rely on informal advisors.\textsuperscript{713} Nonetheless, the president’s reputation as someone who sympathised with African nationalism remains\textsuperscript{714}, and is hardly tarnished by the revisionist narrative of the 1970s that portrayed Kennedy as a Cold Warrior.\textsuperscript{715} Post-revisionists discern a sincere personal commitment to ending colonialism with few concrete results.\textsuperscript{716} In the most recent books, Kennedy and his aides emerge as people who were perceptive enough to distinguish communism from nationalism, but lacked the sensitivity to acknowledge the adverse effects of the modernisation they promoted. What was misguided was how planners and experts conceptualised social distress as a technical problem solvable by governmental planning, not their views of African nationalism.\textsuperscript{717} Yet Kennedy’s commitment to modernisation theory also comprised the fear of a modernisation process turned sour.


\textsuperscript{713} ‘He has not wished to give clear authority to any one of these men over another, preferring to retain the right of direct communication and command’, see Memorandum for the president, “Current Organization of the White House and NSC for dealing with International Matters”, 22 June 1961, 2, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 405, f. Memos to the President: 6/6, JFKL; The view that the scandals surrounding Kennedy’s personal life impacted on his foreign policy have never received much attention: Mark J. White, ed., “The Private Life of a Public Man”, in Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 272.


The Cold War was not the only international reality that was harnessed to maximise potential benefits. The global Cold War perspective was also reversed. Diplomats from the global north worked to exploit that other international reality of their age: decolonisation. Specifically, diplomats sought to transform anticolonial nationalism and nonaligned internationalism into something that was considered to be more ‘constructive’. Kennedy’s ambition to make the anticolonial project more compatible with Western, so-called modern standards was shared by Macmillan and de Gaulle who believed their assistance projects could turn pan-Africanism in particular into a force for economic development and, consequently, prestige.

Arguing that the French and the British tried to reap the benefits from anticolonialism confronts a historiography on decolonisation that has never found a firm footing. Unlike the new imperial history writing, which grapples with cultural, racial and gender tropes, the study of decolonisation has remained preoccupied with high politics and economics. Even fifty years after Macmillan’s Wind of Change speech, the British narrative on decolonisation still alternates between economic and geopolitical explanations for the liquidation of empire.718

Likewise, the French scepticism towards postcolonial theory and the trauma of the Algerian War has led to highly politicised narratives that drift between a positive assessment of Coopération and the Francophonie719 and accusatory accounts with Foccart, de Gaulle’s point man, in a leading role.720 Even in those histories that occupy a middle ground, de Gaulle still appears as the driving force behind policy, leaving little room for African initiatives to impact upon French policy making.721 In that way, it becomes difficult to explain how and why the UK branded itself as an expert of African development, de Gaulle began to present himself as a Third World champion, and the US became eager to manage anticolonial sentiment.

In this light two questions become relevant: what function was public diplomacy supposed to perform, now that the road to modernity was socio-economic rather than educational? Further, what was left of old colonial management tools like education and foreign aid, which had proven to be ineffective in the face of postcolonial crisis? Before turning to educational and economic assistance, however, we must examine how the global north understood the Non-Aligned Movement.

**Belgrade and Nonalignment as an Obstacle to Modernity**

With the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade of January 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) became an international reality. In July 1956, Nasser, Nehru and Tito had decided on a conference during their meeting in Brijuni. Yet when delegates gathered to determine how they could politically harness a shared anticolonial sentiment and use the momentum of 1960, a tension within the Third World project surfaced. Realists like Ahmed Ben Bellah of the Algerian GPRA, who saw the NAM as a lever to acquire financial resources, faced leaders such as Ibrahim Abboud and Nkrumah who wanted to construct an ‘ideal international society’ geared towards world peace. For them, the NAM was a means to prevent Cold War intrusion and a way to give substance to anticolonial internationalism.\(^\text{722}\)

Ideologically, Belgrade therefore signalled the institutionalisation, but also the end of anticolonial internationalism as a separate project of international relations. The majority of the Non-Aligned leaders were no longer interested in making the international system more equal, but wanted to get more out of the existing international structure in terms of political influence and economic aid. That paradox is lost on most historians. Mark Atwood Lawrence for instance simply claims that ‘Non-Alignment became the centrepiece of Third World organizing in 1961.’\(^\text{723}\)

**Non-Alignment and Anticolonialism as Roadblocks to Modernisation**

With such an ambiguous agenda, it took a long time before Western unease about Belgrade was translated into concrete diplomatic action. The NATO Council meeting concluded that ‘nothing particularly new’ had emerged. Couve de Murville reported to posts in Africa and Asia that anticolonialism had been the principal issue at Belgrade, but a third bloc had not

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\(^{722}\) Byrne, “Our Own Special Brand of Socialism”, 103–104; Speech transcript, “Address by H.E. El Ferik Ibrahim Abboud”, [January 1961], 2, FO 371/161222, TNA.

\(^{723}\) Lawrence, “The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment”, 144.
been formed. He agreed with the French officials in Yugoslavia, who expected that a UN caucus would be formed to demand more aid. The Americans and the British, by contrast, were worried the USSR might succeed in gaining nonaligned support for Khrushchev’s peace proposal for Berlin. A unilateral treaty with East Germany would effectively block American, French, and British access to the city.724

As the pros and cons of a message from Kennedy to the delegates were debated at the White House, the British IRD sent a diverse set of booklets to Belgrade, such as The Communist Viewpoint, Communist Infiltration in the Congo, but also a more positive pamphlet on the power of economic assistance, Rostow on Growth. This uncertainty about the best communication strategy was triggered by a concern that too much attention would give the delegates an unjustified sense of importance. The British diplomats were ordered to discuss their plans with French, German, and American colleagues, which led the State Department to adopt the British guidance. ‘I particularly like scaring them with the loss of economic aid’, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy Kohler admitted. It was decided to impress upon Belgrade delegates that their survival was intertwined with the outcome of the Berlin crisis.725

Once the Belgrade meeting had ended, most Western observers concluded that the NAM conferences were potential roadblocks to the modernisation of emerging societies. Where Bandung had strengthened cultural assistance programmes in 1955, Belgrade signalled a need to address the remaining resentment towards colonialism. As Rostow told Kennedy, nonalignment was a matter of national tactics not of moral commitment. In the NSC, Kennedy stated that an American policy in favour of free and independent countries could create problems, for instance in the case of Yugoslavia and Ghana. New conferences – Bandung II in Algiers (1964) and Belgrade II in Cairo (1965) – became an obsession for the administration and the Foreign Office. In Africa, that energy was directed towards Nkrumah and his brand of pan-Africanism.726

724 “The Belgrade Conference”, [1961], CM(61)119, NATO-Archives; Circulaire, Couve de Murville to représentants diplomatiques de France à l’étranger, 9 September 1961, DDF, 1961, Tome 1, 374-376; Arnaud to affaires étrangères, 3 September 1961, DAO, Généralités, 124QO/412, AMAE; Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, 63.
726 Memorandum, Rostow to Kennedy, “Neutralism and Foreign Aid; or Belgrade Reconsidered”, 27 September 1961, DDRS; President Kennedy’s Remark to the 496th NSC Meeting, January 18, 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 8: National Security, 238-239; At the Foreign Office they believed the ‘novelty of conferences and international
The Challenge of Belgrade and the Year of Africa

In the Western perception, the independence wave in Africa and the Belgrade Conference created a whole host of new problems that required innovative solutions. As Kennedy’s transition team and USIA officials noted in December 1960, the concern for an orderly and stable transition had been overtaken by the demand for economic growth. Kennedy’s Task Force on Africa was concerned that the American modernisation project would be flooded by the ‘revolutionary tides’ of anticolonialism – a destructive force in ‘emerging societies.’

When G. Mennen ‘Soapy’ Williams, the new assistant secretary of state for African affairs and his wife, Nancy, went on their Africa trip in March 1961 they were shocked to find that Africans knew little about the world. Williams was concerned about African impatience to get ahead, because without a clear project it could only lead to unfulfilled ambitions and frustration. Eugene A. Raymond, the chairman of the United Friends of Africa, wrote to Williams in a similar vein: ‘It seems these people in general desire our aid but for some strange reason lack the capacity for expressing gratitude.’

The dramatic social and economic challenges new African states faced and the fierce way in which African leaders wanted to guard their independence also made the British goodwill policy problematic. A benevolent image of imperialism could no longer be promoted. When A.W. Snelling of the CRO met with Nkrumah and his cabinet secretary, A.L. Adu on 23 March 1960, things quickly fell apart. Nkrumah started talking about ‘fake independence’ while he fulminated against the defence agreements France had concluded with its former colonies. Even though Nkrumah reassured Snelling that he was able to differentiate between the benevolent British policies and French neocolonialism, the British were not sure if the Africans on the receiving end of the Ghanaian campaign to mobilise pan-African opinion would be able to make that distinction. To avoid trouble with Nkrumah the CRO realised it needed a communication strategy that differentiated between the French and the British record on decolonisation.

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De Gaulle was confronted with a cascade of independence declarations in French Africa, a development that had been stimulated in part by the fact that Guinea remained afloat with Ghanaian support. Existing bilateral and multilateral agreements were hurriedly elevated to an official policy, known as Coopération. France provided economic, military and cultural aid, the Brazzaville group transformed itself in the Union africaine et malgache (UAM) and agreed to vote with France in the UN General Assembly. Members of the UAM thus played a decisive role in shaping Franco-African structures, received aid and as a group were better able to react against the Ghanaian and Guinean subversion and propaganda which destabilised their regimes. The agency of the leaders of French Africa is rarely explicitly acknowledged by French historians, who are more interested in de Gaulle’s decisions.730

De Gaulle’s televised speech in which he defended this new form of cooperation in July 1961 was indicative of the level of improvisation. The cost of empire had made disengagement inevitable, de Gaulle declared, in his calculated political vernacular. But if France could ‘establish new relations based on friendship and cooperation’, ‘t’ant mieux!’; all the better!731 It took the French government until 1963 to establish a commission – led by and named after Jean-Marcel Jeanneney – that was tasked with devising a doctrine for Coopération.732 Even the Francophonie, a cooperation among the totality of French speaking peoples, France’s cultural coating of postcolonial structures, was advocated by Jean Marc Léger in Québec and adopted by Senghor. The term ‘francité’ was more commonly used in the 1960s, until Senghor reintroduced the term in November 1962 in an article for Esprit that analysed the international position of the Francophonie. De Gaulle’s talent for adopting ideas that had been accepted and had proven to be workable led his personal Africa adviser, Jacques Foccart, who was building his network of African leaders at the Secrétariat general, to conclude that the general was not interested in Africa.733

However, Foccart was wrong. De Gaulle was not the only leader overwhelmed by the postcolonial situation in Africa. Kennedy was anxious about anticolonial leaders who did not

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730 Turpin describes this process with flair and in great detail but only concludes that the formation of the UAM was a ‘succès pour la France’, see Turpin, De Gaulle, Pompidou et l’Afrique (1958-1974), 151–154; An exception is Chafer and Todd Sheppard, see Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 223–236; Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, 3–15.
732 Migani sees the Jeanneney report as an example of the successful French management of decolonisation, but she does not explain why the report was only written after the cooperation structure had already been created, see Migani, “De Gaulle and Sub-Saharan Africa: From Decolonization to French Development Policy, 1958 - 1963”, 264.
have a socio-economic project to meet the aspiration of so-called emerging peoples, while the British were more concerned with the PR implications. Their fears were mirrored by and developed in synergy with an academic establishment that analysed Western led modernisation and the psychological effects of technological change.

**The Experts and Modernisation as a Psychological Problem**

Innovations in anthropology and the social sciences in the late 1950s had created an acute awareness of the need to devise modernisation schemes with an eye for the local context in which they were introduced. Where modernisation theorists such as Rostow and Milikan advocated economic aid alongside technical assistance and tactically assumed that cultural differences were only footnotes to their plan to attain modernity, cultural relativist anthropologists such as Bronislaw Malinowski and Audry Richard at the LSE as well as Claude Lévi-Strauss at the Collège de France had made participation observation in so-called ‘primitive’ societies popular. Technocratic optimism, but also anxiety about the adverse psychological effects of intervention shaped the diplomatic plans that sought to project modernity into the Third World; this, in spite of historians who claim that the promises of a bright modern future were never seriously questioned.

Pivotal in this dual view on modernity was Margaret Mead’s *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*, a UNESCO sponsored book that went through numerous reprints and remained an important text into the 1970s. Mead found it necessary to think about the changes that were introduced by technical experts in order to protect the mental health of a world population in transition. Change introduced emotional tension, and that tension had to be addressed, or the individual would remain in ‘a state of maladjustment or frustration.’ African leaders also spoke this language of psychology to legitimise their development projects and promote new kinds of behaviour in the service of progress. Kenneth Kaunda, for

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734 Cooper points out that modernisation theorists were not merely driven by a hubristic attempt at making every problem technically legible, but he does not explain where this tension originated, see Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 343; Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 141; Joseph Morgan Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 254.


instance, mimicked Mead’s work when he wrote that political frustration was a psychological time bomb under the independence project.\textsuperscript{738}

In the post war United Kingdom, the World Federation for Mental Health promoted a psychological theory of development. In its estimation, cultural differences were psychological and formed at youth and therefore adaptable to modern Western models. Audrey Richards for instance wrote that development officers on the ground had to pay more attention to convincing locals. John Strachey – a British minister who had been involved in the abortive Tanganyika groundnut scheme – came to a similar conclusion when he reflected on the end of empire in 1959. He concluded that acquiring mastery of the physical environment would not be effective as long as the tensions that came from intercultural conflict were not managed. All the while Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism showed that all cultures shared underlying patterns and deep structures. Cultural differences were adopted in the younger years and could thus be unlearned if needed.\textsuperscript{739}

Unlike Macmillan who was only indirectly influenced by these changing academic positions or the case of France where governments were unsympathetic towards postcolonial intellectuals such as Sartre, Kennedy developed his views in synergy with the academic establishment of modernisation theory. Walt W. Rostow and the World Bank director, Eugene Black, believed modernity was “fundamentally, political and psychological rather than narrowly economic.”\textsuperscript{740} Nonetheless, Rostow’s weapon of choice remained economic aid because an industrial economy provided the most solid basis for political and social change.\textsuperscript{741} Kennedy also adopted Rostow’s fear that modernisation could awaken the latent hostility intrinsic to nationalism and anticolonialism. A report from Harvard’s Center for International Studies (CENIS) had already in 1955 informed its readers about the unsettling effects of a take-off process.\textsuperscript{742}


\textsuperscript{741} Ekbladh, \textit{The Great American Mission}, 173; Rostow, \textit{Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid}, 44.

The vocal anticolonial image that the Belgrade Conference projected was seen in the West as a confirmation of what academics and policy makers had already established in the course of the Congo crisis. A vocal anticolonial discourse was the sign of a disturbance in the modernisation process, the expression that developmental aspirations had not been matched with a constructive modernisation programme.

A Competition to Transform the Anticolonial Project

Public diplomats in the global north wanted to transform the anticolonial project into a venture that was considered to be more constructive. They therefore sought to eliminate the roadblocks that prevented them from modernising these societies. The American assumption that modernisation was potentially dangerous and would inevitably reach down to the personality demanded a foreign policy that acknowledged those views. In Britain the obsession with African cultural uniqueness was considered to be the problem. All the while French officials ignored those psychological and cultural arguments. They argued that not enough economic development had caused new national leaders to turn on the West. Consequently a competition to harness anticolonial nationalism surfaced.

**British Decolonisation as an Extension of Pan-Africanism**

For the British Foreign Office, the ‘strongly-marked vein of sentimentality’ was an opportunity to present British aid as a form of support for African unity. A meeting of British officials from East and West Africa in May 1961 concluded that pan-Africanism would eventually serve as a dam against Soviet encroachment. Until that time, information officers had to show the British support for the pan-African aspiration. At the same time the support for the anticolonial pan-African position was not without risk. When the IPD did some research work in Kenya they concluded that the self-confidence of many Africans was born of ignorance and inexperience. Undemocratic, violent, and ‘tribal’ attitudes would re-emerge when under emotional stress.

In the interest of the British image, Ralph Murray, the director of the IRD, recommended that these doubts were not voiced ‘publicly’. British information policy had to

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744 Record of meeting, “Meeting of Her Majesty’s Representatives in West and Equatorial Africa”, 16-19 May 1961, FO 371/154740, TNA; Confidential memorandum, McMullen, “United Kingdom Information Office, Kenya”, [1961], FO 1110/1447, TNA.
keep the idea of British support for the pan-African aspirations alive. In British Africa, the British Council promoted the UK as a ‘modern, progressive and far-sighted country’ willing to cooperate with African governments in attaining their goals. Additionally, they created a French language education programme to remove the language barrier, which the CIAS had identified as the biggest stumbling block on the road to unity. Old colonial information services were replaced with UK information offices, which received information brochures on pan-Africanism that could serve as the basis of propaganda.\textsuperscript{745}

The idea that all the colonial powers were in the same boat was abandoned. In the new information police for Africa the French became competitors. By 1963 this had not only become an issue of image building, but a matter of principle. BC officers believed that French aid had been ill conceived while French policy was seen as unsuited for the real needs of West Africa. The key was convincing leaders in French Africa that progress and stronger inter-African cooperation could only be attained if they got to know their English speaking neighbours, accepted technical aid outside of France and went to English language classes.\textsuperscript{746}

Nonetheless, the British made this shift quietly. When the French in the colonial talks asked for a joint front, J.C. Petrie of the Foreign Office nodded quietly while she evaded French requests to secure better BBC treatment of the French decisions in Africa and ignored the proposal to exchange information material that dealt with their colonial policy. Only when talking to the Americans – whose help was needed, did the British gesture that they would work to ease anti-French sentiments on the continent. Believing that officials within the Kennedy administration – though not necessarily Kennedy – were obsessed with the Cold War, the UK delegates told their American interlocutors that the French educational and cultural training in Africa was still a trump card in the Western hand.\textsuperscript{747}


\textsuperscript{747}Memcon, “Anglo-French Information Talks: Notes for Meeting”, 19 December 1961, FO 953/2050, TNA; Memorandum, “United States – United Kingdom Information Working group Meeting: UK Brief: Other Western Efforts”, April 1961, FO 953/2029, TNA; The British believed that Kennedy was less obsessed with communism than his aides, ‘the Americans may be tempted to turn an exercise of this nature largely into an anticomunist exercise. This should be resisted along the line of the Kennedy message to Congress since if we are to present Western aid effectively it is essential that we do so in a positive fashion’, see Confidential
Andrew Defty’s conclusion, that the UK from 1948 onwards kept expanding its efforts to battle communist propaganda, thus requires some nuance. The British information operation in Africa did not fail because it focused too much on Cold War themes and ignored local realities. Rather, if there was a lack of success it has to be attributed to the illusion, entertained by the UK information services, that British aims and pan-African aspirations could be connected in an effort to further the British position.

**Making French Development Visible**

The French engagement with Africa was also changing. A research paper on pan-Africanism prepared by the Ministry of Cooperation and sent out to all the posts in Africa defined Ghana’s pan-Africanism as a utopian project. Cultural cooperation was a way to steer African societies away from this unattainable goal. Senghor’s claim, in 1956, that the French language was a modernising force uniquely suited to boosting African development was now expanded to the entire assistance operation. As Debré phrased it in 1963 there was a ‘spiritual need’ for France. It was important that the French action culturel contributed to the relief of societal needs and was clearly distinguishable from what the French territorial governments were doing.

Even though Debré founded the Ministry of Cooperation to manage the different bilateral cooperation agreements, it was at the meetings of the chiefs of missions where concrete decisions were made. In January 1961 it was decided that assistance projects had to be highly ‘visible’. Rather than simply a form of publicity, it was essential that projects were effective to elucidate that French aid had the power to develop societies. In that way France

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749 Letter, Debré to Couve de Murville, 3 January 1963, CM 8 1963, FNSP.


Assistance was about more than aid-grants, it also represented a certain impression of France as a nation at the forefront of development.

More precisely, the French cultural projection into Africa was less about creating an elaborate illusion of ‘great power status’ than it was about gaining genuine influence. French culture was offered as a form of development aid in exchange for the support of de Gaulle’s international policy. The decision to use French culture in a more political way in the early sixties did not mean, as many have argued, that cultural resources were used as propaganda to somehow entice the former African colonies to develop according to a French model.\footnote{752 Garret, “Conclusion: A Gaullist Grand Strategy?”, 302-303; Frank, “La machine diplomatique culturelle française après 1945”, 332; Rice, “Cowboys and Communists.”} Cultural resources were more consciously granted to those territories that were expected to remain loyal to France.

As historians such as Guia Migani have noted, France increasingly wanted to present itself as a special interlocutor for the Third World after 1961.\footnote{753 Migani, “De Gaulle and Sub-Saharan Africa: From Decolonization to French Development Policy, 1958 -1963”, 263.} What is striking is that de Gaulle’s choice for that course of action was far from unique. Similar to the British who sought to present their aid as an extension of the pan-African aims, the French goals were promoted as a form of support to nonalignment. France was the only country that had proven to be autonomous towards the superpowers. By offering French assistance in competition with Soviet and American aid, de Gaulle strove to break the bipolar mould and in doing so let the ‘non-alignés’— among which de Gaulle counted himself – emerge.\footnote{754 Quoted in Guia Migani, \textit{La France et l’Afrique Sub-Saharienne, 1957-1963} (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008), 157.}

\textit{Kennedy and Anticolonialism as a Destructive Force}

Unlike to the French and the British officials, JFK had been less confident about the possible tactical benefits of anticolonialism. Anticolonialism was the outcome of the half-hearted modernisation attempts of colonial regimes. Rapid social change and the breakdown of traditional control had led to psychological and social disruptions making Africa a ‘potentially dangerous place’.\footnote{755 Speech transcript, “New Approaches to African Policy”, S.d., Theodore C. Sorensen Papers, Subject Files 1961 – 1964, Box 34, f: Foreign Policy Africa, JFKL;} Further modernisation offered a solution but was not without risk. A
second moment of rupture could potentially strengthen the existing frustration, Kennedy reasoned. In his *Foreign Affairs* article – which had actually been written by speechwriter and close friend Ted Sorensen – Eisenhower was scolded for not understanding the forces of nationalism. ‘Modern nationalism’, he wrote ‘has a twin heritage. In one of its aspects it reflects a positive search for political freedom and self-development, in another it is the residue of disintegration and the destruction of the old moorings.’\footnote{John F. Kennedy, “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy”, *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 1 (October 1959): 44, 48.}

His call to appreciate nationalism as a force outside of the Cold War framework has been seen as a plea for more understanding of Third World leaders. What is striking however was his assessment of nationalism as not necessarily a positive force for change. When Kennedy moved into the White House, he established a foreign policy that approached modernisation as a two-headed creature. In his inauguration speech he hinted at that duality when referring to man and his ‘power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life.’\footnote{John F. Kennedy, “Inaugural Address”, 20 January 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8032.}

Rostow, Kennedy’s deputy to the national security assistant, had been writing at the same time about the disturbing character of the revolution of modernisation, and talked about individual men who were torn between the old and familiar way of life and the attractions of a modern way of life.\footnote{Walt W. Rostow, “Countering Guerrilla Attack”, in *Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961*, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 465–66.}

Kennedy therefore authorised the development of counterinsurgency programmes not only ‘to defend against communist rebellions in friendly, impoverished countries’;\footnote{Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World*, xxii.} but more importantly to cushion the blows of development. The psychological rupture that the modernisation process brought with it had to be monitored. For Kennedy, providing military expertise to deal with guerilla warfare was only a first step. What was needed in the final analysis was a ‘a political effort.’ His interviewer, Joseph Alsop, noticed that Kennedy was obsessed with guerilla warfare, had closely studied the literature and even knew Mao Tse-Tung’s dictum by heart: ‘Guerrillas are like fish, and the people are the water in which the fish swim. If the temperature of the water is right, the fish will thrive and multiply.’ Consequently, Kennedy believed that by controlling the temperature of the water, by managing the socio-economic conditions, the guerrilla fish would not be able to multiply.\footnote{Quotes taken from an interview with Joseph Alsop, who in the past had worked for the British Information Service, see Stewart Alsop, “Kennedy’s Grand Strategy”, *Saturday Evening Post*, March 31, 1962, 14, 16.}
The Counterinsurgency of USIA: Monitoring the Thermostat

The USIA had to monitor the thermostat to prevent frustrations from turning violent and insurgency from occurring, but it would also disseminate leaflets in times of active insurgency such as the Vietnam War. The USIA became an important agency for the new counterinsurgency strategy of 1961 in which the need for early detection of latent insurgency was stressed. In the words of Sorensen, counterinsurgency specialists did not only have to work as ‘fire fighters’ who only handle insurgency after it breaks out, they had to prevent it. The USIA operated under an unspoken counterinsurgency logic, even in Africa where the first examples of initial or active insurgency were only found in 1963 when governments collapsed in Congo-Brazzaville, Liberia and the Somali Republic.761

Although historians have applauded Kennedy for his ‘instinctive understanding of the power of the image’, it is clear that Kennedy saw public opinion as an obstacle that needed to be overcome, not as a tool to acquire power.762 He belittled the USIA’s traditional information task, as the selling of free enterprise and the description of the perils of communism. Instead he advocated the use of more traditional forms of diplomacy. As a presidential candidate he had criticised Eisenhower for exporting American cultural patterns to Africa and when Nixon returned from his trip in 1957, Kennedy stated that the people of Africa were interested in development and a decent standard of living, not doctrine. Despite C.D. Jackson’s attempt to plant at least an inkling of the political warfare problem in Kennedy’s mind, the USIA became a polling institute that measured global public opinion. It is no coincidence that Peter L. Koffsky only mentions Kennedy in passing in his official USIA history.763


Kennedy’s rejection of a conventional battle for African minds was based on a simple calculation. If stomachs were hungry, minds did not care for ideas. If ideas were offered without providing an economic basis, the frustration would be exacerbated and sow the seeds for the American demise. Communication media, as social scientist Daniel Lerner had pointed out in 1958, were powerful modernisation tools that needed to be handled with care. Radios, for instance, enabled Third World peoples to imagine a better world, but also risked turning the revolution of rising expectations into a revolution of rising frustration if demands for development were not met.\textsuperscript{764}

All levels of the administration were in agreement on this point. The ‘New Frontier’ people in the Task Force saw anticolonialism as ‘a state of mind, a psychological hangover from the past.’ It provided African leaders with an excuse to not take the initiative: ‘The long colonial era produced habits of opposition not of responsibility […] acceptance of genuine responsibility tends to be postponed by blaming ‘colonialism’ for every problem and every dispute.’\textsuperscript{765} American development planning, the State Department maintained, offered the ‘moral equivalent of anticolonialism.’\textsuperscript{766} The official American strategy towards the uncommitted nations therefore defined neutralism as only incidentally a reaction to the Cold War.\textsuperscript{767} Robert Good, fellow at John Hopkins and secretary of the Task Force, identified the prevention of communist intrusion in Africa as only ‘the minimal objective.’ Measures to deal with the negative emotion of anticolonialism were more important.

Modernisation was supposed to go on where anticolonialism had stopped and turn frustrated and passive behaviour into a rational can do attitude. This was what Kennedy meant when he spoke about positive neutrality.\textsuperscript{768} Contrary to de Gaulle or Macmillan, who acknowledged the political opportunities created by anticolonialism, Kennedy could only see a threat to his modernisation project.


\textsuperscript{765} Confidential report to the honorable John F. Kennedy by The Task Force on Africa, 31 December 1960, 8-10, Pré Presidential Papers, Task Force on Africa, Box 1073, f: Task Force Reports, JFKL.

\textsuperscript{766} Grubbs, \textit{Secular Missionaries}, 77.


\textsuperscript{768} Confidential, Report to the Honorable John F. Kennedy by The Task Force on Africa, 31 December 1960, Pré Presidential Papers, Task Force on Africa, Box 1073, f: Task Force Reports, JFKL.
A Cross-National Diagnoses of ‘African Mental Attitudes’

Because officials in Washington felt overwhelmed, they turned to the British for help. The British soothed their American colleagues by explaining that what was often understood as ingratitude, was simply an expression of the pre-colonial ‘client/protector system’ whereby strong men were supported as long as they maintained their power. The FO also agreed to research the African psychology and combine their know-how with French expertise. This exercise resulted in two psychological sketches of the so-called African attitude, which identified subtle differences between the new French, British and American approach to Africa and revealed areas of competition and cooperation.\(^{769}\) Once again, vague and diverging ideas about the developmental state of what was called the African psyche and culture, became the single most important factor shaping the trans-Atlantic relation on the ground in Africa.

The FO for instance, turned to anthropology to understand pan-Africanism. After studying the ‘Davidson theory’, which saw a return of the old African patterns of life and the ‘sceptical theory’ which regarded pan-Africanism as a purely anti-white propaganda stunt, the FO settled on a ‘pragmatic theory’. Whether ancient African civilisations had existed or not – and the FO believed the evidence to be sketchy – Africans wished that there had been such civilisations, making it a fact of life. ‘Much of their present touchiness’ and the centrality of African culture, the FO believed, came from feelings that the African peoples ‘were in the twentieth century without normal credentials.’ In this respect the French were believed to be more in touch with African reality because culture had ‘a far more central position’ in their policies.\(^{770}\)

Those French analysts were tolerant of the emotions of frustration. Unlike the FO, this stemmed not from an attempt to link up with pan-African goals, but was rooted in the belief that the African was the victim of the economic and social situation that conditioned his state of mind. Recent political independence combined with economic dependency had led them to behave like adolescents desperate to assert their independence, even if it is not in their best interest. Like the New Frontier people, they saw a tendency to blame every failure on colonialism. But contrary to the American view, the problem was not modernisation that had


\(^{770}\) Memorandum, “African Mental Attitudes”, [undated, 1961], FO 953/2076, TNA.
happened too quickly but too little of it. Cultural and informational diplomacy had to contribute to economic development, not only provide propaganda.\textsuperscript{771}

Contrary to these extensive analyses, Nkrumah had given little thought to what the ‘African Personality’ meant exactly. For him, the political utility of the term was what mattered. After 1960, however, a more circumscribed African ideology had to be promoted. An analysis of the concept written by D.B Sam, an editor of \textit{The Spark}, ended up on Nkrumah’s presidential desk. In Sam’s memorandum, the historical narrative was maintained. After the Berlin Conference, the colonial powers systematically attempted to destroy the ‘African Personality’; what was new was the attention paid to the socio-economic surroundings and its effects on mental attitude and physical behaviour. In this analysis, human development was the outcome of a continuous interaction between hereditary and environmental factors. Although Nkrumah never gave up on the spiritual side of pan-Africanism, it is clear that the ‘African Personality’ could not escape the new gospel of socio-economic modernisation that sought to influence by changing social structures, rather than personalities.\textsuperscript{772}

Everyone thus reached the same conclusion: to influence the attitudes of so-called ‘emerging’ African peoples, socio-economic structures had to be targeted. At the same time there was disagreement about the specific gear that needed to be engaged to get the modernisation machine turning. Were modernisation efforts supposed to be more cautiously implemented to prevent frustration from happening? Or was too little socio-economic development the cause of emotional anticOLONIALISM, as the French had concluded? Perhaps – French officials reasoned – the problem of emotionalism was blown out of proportion and more attention needed to be paid to the cultural sensitivities on the continent?

The diverging views about the mental state of the so-called ‘African’ led the Kennedy administration to a particular division of labour. US officials were willing to compete with the European powers in the area of aid, but allowed France and the UK to remain active in education. Thus the Kennedy administration did not compete with the European powers because it was convinced that European influence on the continent was by its definition wrong, as argued by historians such as Philip Muehlenbeck who present a favourable image of Kennedy. Rostow, for instance, had described France as a partner in creating so-called

\textsuperscript{771} Memorandum, “Contribution à une définition du comportement psychologique africain en face de l’information et de l’action culturelle étrangères”, [1960-61], DAL, Généralités, 49QONT/69, f. Folder : AFR-III-1 Documentation générale sur la zone géographique, AMAE.

‘islands of responsibility’, places where the development process could be executed in an organised fashion.\textsuperscript{773}

Education: Human Resource or Ideological Weapon

In their epoch making \textit{A Proposal} of 1957, both Rostow and Millikan rejected the notion that modernisation could be fostered through the spread of ideas and education. This approach – preferred by the colonial state and by Eisenhower – had been fraught with difficulties and had proven to be ineffective. Values would be more quickly grasped and promoted through programmes of common action rather than through debate or education. They inverted the logic upon which Eisenhower’s drive for education and public diplomacy had been built. Essential for political responsibility was that individual men and women had the confidence that it was in their power to improve their own situation.

According to Rostow, people would become more confident by seeing new factories, better farming methods, improved public health and education, and better transport. Nonetheless, Charles Douglas Jackson, Eisenhower’s advisor for psychological strategy, had referred to Rostow, a key thinker on modernisation in the Kennedy administration, as an expert in political warfare and saw him as the clearest thinker and most articulate expounder of psychological war.\textsuperscript{774} How then can we reconcile the image of Rostow as someone who targeted minds and at the same time rejected such an approach?

For Rostow this was an issue of tactics. Changing an individual’s convictions was the aim of modernisation, but it required tangible action. More precisely, democratic values were not a prerequisite to economic development; concrete programmes provided the opportunity to demonstrate political democracy. Rostow’s approach actually corresponded with C.D. Jackson’s beliefs about the importance of words corresponding to deeds. The final report of the Jackson Committee concluded that the Cold War could not be won by words alone. What the US did was vastly more important than what it said.\textsuperscript{775} Rostow built upon Jackson’s assessment.

Unlike Rostow, the strategic insights on education on the side of the former colonial powers were less elaborate. The British saw student exchanges and educational aid as a

\textsuperscript{774} Millikan and Rostow, \textit{A Proposal}, 83; Letter, C.D. Jackson to Abbott Washburn, 2 February 1953, Jackson C.D Papers, 1931-1967, Box 63, f: Jackson Committee (2), DDEL.
\textsuperscript{775} Osgood, \textit{Total Cold War}, 81.
gateway to return to Africa, because Africans wanted ‘to prove now that a black or coloured man’ was ‘as good as a white’ man. Unlike the Kennedy administration, the British Council did not fear this trend but welcomed students who were eager to learn as quickly as possible. The French for their part were mainly preoccupied with bringing students back to their country of origin, which was important because they were relied upon to instigate French led development.

**American Education as a Human Resource**

In the Kennedy administration, education was a way to develop human resources. As Kennedy said in his message to Congress which dealt with foreign aid on 22 March 1961: ‘Their primary need at first will be the development of human resources, education, technical assistance and the groundwork of basic facilities and institutions necessary for further growth.’ The belief in education as a tool to teach values to Third World subjects would fade almost instantly.

James J. Halsema of USIA was unhappy when he read the proposals of the Kennedy administration. He felt that the development of communication and education for its own sake was erroneous. He suggested it was akin to the US supplying people with guns without trying to convince them against whom they should be used. The first Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Culture, Philip Coombs, published his often quoted *Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy* because he had not been able to realise his vision for a diplomacy of ideas and education within the Kennedy administration. Nonetheless, even Coombs acknowledged that education had to be part of the modernisation project aimed at assisting developing nations. The USIA was fighting a losing battle.

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The End of the Baylor Philosophy

To save the Baylor philosophy, Abbott Washburn proposed a possible presidential speech. The Wilsonian logic and the connection with America’s mission would have to be emphasised by quoting Jefferson, who had argued that we act ‘not for ourselves alone, but for the whole human race.’ The speech proposal went on to repeat the argument Eisenhower had made at Baylor University. A massive educational effort was needed if the peoples of Africa were to receive the basic skills required to build modern self-governing societies. In an attempt to appropriate the modernisation discourse he pointed out that food was only ‘one of the two great human needs of the newly emerging nations of Africa, Asia, and South America’, educated men and women were at least as important.  

The Washburn-Nielsen education programme itself was also rewritten in a more combative style to dispel the doubts that were harboured by modernisation theorists. It blended concerns about instability with the new aspiration for socio-economic modernisation: ‘Eventual political stability in these countries depends on an educated populace. A democratic government does not flourish on empty minds, any more than it does on empty stomachs.’

Washburn’s efforts were quashed during a 14-minute conversation with Kennedy in the Oval Office on the morning of 22 March 1961. As he gave the president the Sprague report, which Kennedy thumbed through in a way that suggested to Washburn he had never seen it before, the USIA’s deputy director began to complain about the scattered responsibilities and the need for additional funding. Throughout the conversation Kennedy nodded his head, expressed some interest but deflected the conversation towards a discussion about the February issue of Reader’s Digest. As Kennedy walked Washburn through the door, the deputy director did not realise that the meeting had been the end of his vision for overseas education.

It was a subtlety that also escaped others. George V. Allen wrote to his deputy director eight days later because he could not understand Washburn’s grievances. Allen felt that Washburn’s proposal was similar to Fulbright’s bill and could not understand why he did not support the new bill. At the UN, Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s policies on education were difficult to separate. On 23 March 1961, Adlai E. Stevenson mentioned Eisenhower’s speech

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at the 15th General Assembly in his own speech at the UN committee on Africa, which marked UNESCO’s new programme to advance African education. He gave Eisenhower’s words a new interpretation. African education was important, not because it furnished people with the mental tools to preserve and develop their freedom, but because of the clear relationship between education and an accelerated modernisation.783

In the end, the Kennedy administration never believed that education alone could reach the goals of modernity. Education without real world results was considered to be meaningless. Moreover, this type of learning could create a dangerous situation in which people would be filled with aspirations and ideas that they would not have the possibility of realising.

At the same time the Americans sought to exploit the growing disaffection among African exchange students who had been sent to universities in the Eastern bloc, most famously the Lumumba Friendship University. Students were confronted with low living standards and racism and turned to the US for help. An informal working group together with the British convened in Bonn in 1962, where the biggest number of Africans ended up requesting a transfer to the US.784 However, the Americans could not come to an agreement with the British and French about what to do with these renegade students, because in French and British eyes it were precisely these students, and their longing for a better education, that sustained their own educational reputation.

**A British-French Competition for Students**

Technical, scientific and language training had to turn students into essential links between the UK and Africa and at the same time increase the connections between French Africa and the British territories, particularly because there was a demand that was not being met by Peace Corps volunteers.785 The French on their part wanted to seal off their territories from American and British initiatives.

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In Ghana for instance, the British Council efforts were not only expanded but also propagated in pamphlets that outlined its work in past and present-day Ghana. At the same time, the Ghana Association of French and English Teachers, which was run by the British Council, invited seven French-speaking West African countries to send observers to a four-day teacher conference. By organising these conferences and housing the French Teachers Association’s library of textbooks and tapes, the BC paid lip service to the cause of African unity. Through talks with Nkrumah, BC officials also tried to gauge what form of help would be appreciated the most. When the director F.H. Cawson suggested the construction of a language laboratory in May 1963 and offered help with science education at the pre-secondary school level, he noticed how the president’s face lit up. Aware of Nkrumah’s ambitions to turn Africa into a powerhouse of modernity and African unification, the Council activities were presented as educational assistance pure and simple and as a means to train Ghanaians for their work in other developing countries.

Most importantly, the cultural officers were more willing than ever to confront the French, the Americans, and even the information officers of the Federal Republic of Germany. Like generals preparing for the spring offensive – with strategic maps to boot – the report on the Prospects of British Council Developments in the Countries of French-Speaking West Africa was presented on 12 May 1963. It aimed at undercutting the French presence in Africa. Elwyn Owen, director of the Africa department at the British Council, concluded that the French were only successful because of their willingness to invest hugely in technical assistance and personnel while aid and co-operation from other countries were actively excluded. In Owen’s estimation, the USIA and AID came in second because they delivered quality.

In practice, however, because of strict French control, British intrusion proved to be difficult leaving only Guinea and Mali as areas of influence. Instead French-speaking West Africans were invited to British Africa to learn English, which was presented as a form of support to pan-African integration. The French became willing to cooperate only when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) emphasised the need for a common language in 1964.

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After a discussion at the French embassy in London, Soutou, the director of the Africa section at the ministry of foreign affairs, agreed to write a joint history of Africa in French and English in order to counter what they saw as the pro-Marxist works.  

Until 1963, de Gaulle had refused to cooperate with the British Council. The UK officers believed this was related to the fact that the English language would facilitate the entry of liberal and pan-African ideas. The fact that the French had been so unwilling to cooperate, however, was a consequence of the new goals that French education had set for itself. Through the provision of scholarships, but more importantly through radio education, an elite abroad needed to be formed that not only entertained a French cultural frame of reference, but more importantly followed French practices that could contribute to economic and social progress.

In the face of French and British competition, the USIS officers on the ground became increasingly uncomfortable with the technocratic view on language education of the Kennedy administration. On 11 April 1963, Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Culture Lucius D. Battle, asked Rostow to develop a clear strategy for English language teaching. He felt the USIA did not teach English for its own sake, but only as part of an information programme that projected American values. The USIS officers did not want to leave education to the British and French, because they still believed in the direct transmission of ideas. Rostow was more interested in economic aid – an area in which the Kennedy administration tolerated little competition.

A Battle of Socio-Economic Principles: The Development Diplomat and the PR Side of Economics

Debates about economic aid are characterised by stark contrasts. Did France harshly impose the French Franc zone and use economic aid to maintain its influence or was Coopération a way to aid developing nations? Did Britain’s weakening economic position compel the UK to

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leave or did British business interests reinforce military commitments? These were persistent questions. For instance, when the British Ministry of Overseas Development was founded in 1965 it wanted to develop Africa while the FO and the CRO interjected that aid should improve the trading position of the UK. All these questions exemplify the extent to which economics after 1960 had become a moral issue at the heart of international politics. Acceptance of economic aid implied the acceptance of the donor’s ideas.  

**The American Development Diplomat and the Risk of Overselling Aid**

Despite Hamerskjöld’s plea to make aid available through the UN rather than on a bilateral basis, the UN decade of development became an era of competition in which many parameters were set by leading members of the Kennedy administration. Their struggle with the Soviet Union brought internal debates to the fore: was economic assistance in essence about furthering long-term humanitarian goals or was it to be used as a political weapon? However, another discussion about the transformational power of economic aid affected the arguments of realists and idealists alike. What was at stake was an item that is often overlooked in the catalogue of modernist fears – which not only included overpopulation and hunger, but also the psychological implications of intervention. Ever since the demographer Frank Notestein asserted that technology could adjust a peasant’s psychology, there had been some apprehension among development theorists about the effects of their interference. Those concerns were amplified by Rostow who saw modernisation as an integrated process where profound economic changes were spurred by non-economic motives.

These fears had already bubbled to the surface at an ICA conference on aid to Africa in May 1960. George V. Allen asserted that political developments in Africa had increased the ‘expectations of American aid’ and doubted if the amount of American assistance could ever match African hopes or needs. Economic aid also introduced the dangerous psychological element of ‘let down.’ The US faced the ‘psychological dangers of over-selling a U.S.

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792 Hyam, *Britain’s Declining Empire*, 427; Byrne, “Our Own Special Brand of Socialism”, 427.
government effort’ that was necessarily limited by financial constraints. The USIS propaganda efforts about the ICA therefore had to be held within certain confines.\footnote{Memorandum, Edward V. Roberts to George V. Allen, “Notes for Your Remarks at ICA Conference on Tropical Africa, 10:00 a.m. – 12:15 p.m., Tuesday, May 17, 1960”, 16 May 1960, 2-3, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 2, f. ICA, NARA; The Sprague Committee members had also written about the ‘psychological potentialities of foreign aid programs’, see “Conclusions and Recommendations of the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad”, December 1960, 13, U.S. President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) Records, 1959-61, Box 26, f. Printed Committee Report, DDEL.}

The Kennedy administration was determined to integrate these side effects more effectively into its strategic thinking about aid programmes, in line with the changing formulae of modernisation that targeted societies to change people’s behaviour. In its Senate report of March 1960, for instance, the Center for International Studies (CIS) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology had noted that the most basic economic change that would be required was ‘psychological’. People had to be shown that the world was not fixed, but could be manipulated by applying logic. In a memorandum to the president on foreign aid, Rostow stressed that decisions about investments had to be made with the absorptive capacity of developing nations in mind, a key point in *A Proposal*.\footnote{Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, 155–202.}

At the same time, he made the case for ‘shooting high to maximize the psychological and political effect’ of the cash flow towards underdeveloped areas. Rostow believed in the power of economics, but rejected the notion that people were driven solely by rational economic considerations and understood the risk of unfulfilled aspirations.\footnote{Memorandum, Rostow to Kennedy, “The Strategy of Foreign Aid 1961”, 22 December 1960, Pre-Presidential Papers, Transition files, Task Force Reports, 1960, Box 1074, f. Task Force Report, JFKL; In Pearce’s estimation, Rostow only referred to psychological and political effects as a move to convince Congress, see Pearce, *Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid*, 80, 93.} As he wrote to Kennedy in 1961: ‘we have stirred great hopes in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America [and] we must back our play or those hopes will fade.’\footnote{Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy, 2 February 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 9: Foreign Economic Policy, 208.}

The manager of those hopes was the development diplomat, an idea launched by the director of the World Bank, Eugene Black, and a confidant of Rostow and Kennedy. This diplomat was supposed to be an artisan of economic development, who would use economic tools and other disciplines as best as he could to place opportunities in perspective and illuminate the choices before decision makers in the underdeveloped world. Henry Ramsey, the man at the State Department who had tried to convince Eisenhower of the need to support authoritarian development, welcomed the idea. It provided the US with a long-term solution
to insurgency that addressed the political and psychological problem of resistance against modernisation.  

The effectiveness of development diplomacy did not only depend on the substantial amount of capital needed to create tangible proof that investments were paying off. What was further needed was contacts and lines of communication throughout the underdeveloped world. As a Senate Report by MIT experts had concluded, the communication of ideas was not meant to increase the admiration for the American standard of living, rather information had to be provided that could help the modernisation process advance. The USIA became the principal supplier of development diplomats.

**Playing up French and British Aid**

Unlike the development diplomat, the British and French were keen to emphasise that the aid they had on offer was unique. Where the French believed that French solutions were particularly suited for African development, British officials thought in terms of PR. In March 1960, Macmillan gave a speech at the Commonwealth and Empire Industries Association designed to buttress an aid policy he denied the UK was executing. He denied that the British sought commercial benefits, limited aid to ‘large-scale projects of the maximum advertising value’ or that he was jealous of the assistance given by other governments. He did so, while the FO, in agreement with the CRO, were making plans to glamorise technical cooperation and other forms of aid.

After close study, the FO decided on a ‘wholesale overt propaganda’ campaign to remain credible in the face of competing aid offers. Yet, by 1961 this campaign was adjusted and more attention was paid to implying that there was a mutual interest between Africa and the non-communist world. The FO took its cue from the Soviets who appeared more

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801 Letter, Miss Fell to James Hadfield, “Theme of Aid to Developing Territories”, 14 September 1960, INF 12/882, TNA; Report, R.H.K. Marett, “Report on visit to East Africa by R.H.K.”, March/November 1960, 11-12, INF 12/863, TNA.

successful because they overlaid their efforts with what the British called a ‘forward-looking philosophy.’ To be successful, a so-called ‘enlightened’ common Western philosophy on aid had to be promoted, particularly after the Sino-Soviet split. The British exaggerated their part in this common effort.

Concretely, these views had already affected the Volta River Scheme in late 1960. Because most of the aid was American and Canadian and the UK only provided £5,000,000, the CRO initially wanted to remain low key. The CIO however wanted to emphasise the UK contribution to a joint Western aid effort, for instance by publishing a substantial pamphlet in June 1960 entitled ‘Britain’s Contribution to Economic Development Overseas’. When the CRO meeting went on to discuss the Indus Waters Scheme propaganda, FO officials wanted to stress the scale of the project, the large amount of the aid and the international co-operation it involved. While the US was doing everything it could to downplay its aid to limit the adverse effects of potential disappointment, the UK cared only about its prestige.

In the Aid Publicity Working Group, established in April 1961 to discuss a joint UK-US approach, conflict became inevitable. The British zeal to promote aid efforts was met by the constant cautions of Ted Sorensen, Pierre Salinger and Ed Murrow. On colonialism the Americans appeared defeatist, according to the British delegation. They ‘tend to think that the best course is to batten down and weather the storm’ in the face of the emotional drive for independence. The American attitude towards the exploitation of Western aid was not much better for the British because Murrow refused to present American aid as part of a Western cooperative effort. He felt there would be too great an association with NATO.

At the same time, British eagerness to cooperate with the US deepened the conflict with France. Debré in particular felt double-crossed by Whitehall. They appeared so willing to follow Kennedy’s instructions about aid that it sapped their own prestige, causing what he called ‘psychological damage’ and a loss of African respect that could never be restored – even with massive amounts of foreign aid. Moreover, aid was not only a tool to maintain influence, it was also the sole guarantee – with French cultural and economic tools working as

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804 Britain’s Contribution to Economic Development Overseas (London: Central Office of Information, 1960); Letter, Miss Fell to Mr. Hadfield, 14 September 1960, INF 12/882, TNA.

one – to attain the full socioeconomic development of Africa. Gabriel Lisette – minister of economic and foreign affairs in Chad – had already made that argument when the Communauté was drawn up, but it was now adopted by the people working at the ministry of cooperation. 806

Conflict about the Peace Corps

The different rationales that buttressed foreign aid doctrines inadvertently clashed when Kennedy announced the establishment of the Peace Corps, an undertaking inspired by the volunteers of Crossroads Africa. Like the Alliance for Progress in Latin America it relied on the youth of America to execute US led development. On 24 March 1961, Sorensen met with director Sargent Shriver and they agreed that the USIA would have to perform an important role in making the Peace Corps a success, because the initiative was expected to have a major psychological impact. 807

That form of support, however, elicited certain questions from the people on the ground who were used to selling the US, while the general policy on the Peace Corps was to limit publicity, to limit the risk of frustration. ‘We cautioned against excessive publicity which might generate unwarranted expectations’ the USIA wrote. The success of the Peace Corps had to be gauged from its performance abroad. Adhering to this guideline, the IMS section was considering producing a film on the Peace Corps that would be general and factual. 808

Booklets on the Volta River were aimed at explaining clearly the opportunities and limits of the project. The fact that the Peace Corps did its work quietly thus had little to do with modesty or the idealism of the 1960s, as Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman has argued. 809

Despite their efforts to avoid publicity, the Peace Corps still provoked a response because others who were in the business of development reasoned about aid in terms of publicity and influence. The French Ministry of Cooperation had even been inspired to create their own so-called Volunteers for Progress, announced on 24 April 1963 with the first volunteers arriving in Dakar in September. The British felt less threatened because they

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806 Note d’information, 22 March 1961, 2 DE 66, f: Conversations Franco-Américains, FNSP; Bat, Le syndrome Foccart, 87.
believed the Peace Corps had been inspired by their own Voluntary Service Overseas which enabled the British to present the Peace Corps as one component of a wider Western effort to develop the continent.\textsuperscript{810}

In spite of Nkrumah’s dubious stance towards foreign aid, the Kennedy administration sustained its effort to convince him. This was not an expression of Kennedy’s willingness to aid any African nation regardless of its political orientation, but fitted a worldview where anticolonialism in itself could never represent a positive force for change.\textsuperscript{811} The Americans used their information resources to downplay the possible effects of aid. The British set out to present their effort in concert with the US to play up their share in developing Africa, an unexplored dimension of what Walter Lippmann termed the ‘imperial gambit’,\textsuperscript{812} the supposed shared interests that were created by the parallel decline of the British empire and the rise of the American empire. All the while the French believed that the fact that their aid was more compatible with African societies would lead to better results and, therefore, greater prestige.

Conclusion: Planting the Road Signs to Modernity

From 1961 onwards policy makers exchanged their strategy of psychological modernisation for a policy of socio-economic modernisation, which had a significant impact on public diplomacy. What had been a key instrument to make minds modern in the 1950s, became a tool to deal with the adverse effects of economic aid after 1960.

The stories of modernisation theorists in the Kennedy administration summon up images of a break with the past, of an unrivalled optimism that the world could be remade. It is a story where idealists who pushed for modernisation are often cast in a more positive light than the realists who chose to adhere to a Cold War outlook on the world. However, the doubts of the disruptive effects of modernisation connected both groups. For Kennedy, the behaviour of someone like Nkrumah’s was unsurprising. He understood his critique on the US and his talk of neocolonial ploys as the consequence of frustration.

While the US administration did not distinguish sufficiently between neutralism, nonalignment, and anticolonialism, it is doubtful if a more precise identification of the diverse


\textsuperscript{811} Muehlenbeck, \textit{Betting on the Africans}, xiii.

concepts would have fundamentally altered the American diplomatic course, as Robert Rakove has argued.\(^{813}\) Eisenhower and Kennedy were both idealists who believed the US had to help the modernisation process on its course. Eisenhower, by contrast, was more positive about the ability of public diplomacy to change emerging people’s attitudes, while the Kennedy administration was sceptical about the ability of African peoples to behave rationally.

De Gaulle and Macmillan, for their part, found it difficult to understand Kennedy’s novel approach to public diplomacy, but what was clear to them was the fact that they would have to stage a sustained propaganda campaign of their own if they wanted to remain relevant as agents of development. In comparison to Kennedy, and somewhat counter intuitively, anticolonialism posed less of an immediate threat. Rather than a problem, a strident anticolonial discourse was seen as an opportunity to improve the public image by promising to assist African governments in attaining their economic and political goals.

Those differences played out in the areas of education and economic aid. The Kennedy administration never believed in education as a way to jumpstart modernisation, which left room for the British and the French to use the aspiration among young people to strengthen their image as the providers of development. In the area of economic aid, that confrontation between the socio-economic problem-solving attitude of the Kennedy administration and the PR logic of the British and French was more problematic. Where the USIA used its information resources to downplay the effects of aid, reluctant to oversell and perpetuate frustration, the British wanted aid to be promoted as a joint Western effort in which they played an important part. This British desire to cooperate with Kennedy was not appreciated by the French who felt that it was not the ‘Western’ but the ‘imperial’ aid effort that needed to be promoted if both the UK and France wanted to stand a chance against Kennedy’s aid offensive.

Paradoxically, this turn towards socio-economic modernisation increased the concern about the subversive qualities of public diplomacy in the course of the 1960s, particularly among American and Ghanaian officials. Films or exhibitions in cultural centres and newspapers became powerful tools to steer developing societies in the right direction as they dealt with the ramifications of economic assistance. By that logic, competing ideas remained dangerous because they could increase the frustration about the development process or – in Ghana’s case – undermine the advance of the ‘African Personality.’ To ‘immunise’ their

\(^{813}\) Rakove refers to the semantic confusion that came from using nonalignment as a synonym for neutralism, see Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World*, 67.
target audiences against adverse ideas, Ghanaian public diplomats began to list the dangerous neocolonial plots that might ensue if African unity did not swiftly materialise as American public diplomats began to call attention to the advantages of US led modernisation. The next chapter will analyse this second task that the managers of modernization took on.
8. Immunisation


It is the responsibility of our representatives to ensure that our policy is understood. Though almost all the African States appear to have at heart the liberty of Africa some seem to feel that there is no need to adopt a militant attitude. The imperialists will never willingly and without strong pressure relinquish what they still hold in Africa.


Because of this new and increased competition, we will have to run faster to remain in the same place.

– USIS-Accra faces harsh competition after 1960, 24 June 1960. 815

It is true that if some country, in Africa, were to adopt the Socialist system, that might mean that a few drops would be added to the bucket of Communism […] But the question arises as to what is Socialism in the view of all these people. Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah, Sukarno, all of them have said that they want their countries to develop along Socialist lines; but what kind of a socialist is Nasser when he keeps Communists in jail?

– Nikita Khrushchev in a conversation with Kennedy at the Vienna Summit, 3 June 1961. 816

After lunch, John F. Kennedy invited Nikita Khrushchev for a stroll around the lush gardens of the residence of the American ambassador in Vienna, which were in full bloom in June 1961. As their interpreters tried to keep up, the president complained that his consultations with senators were time consuming, to which Khrushchev retorted: ‘Well, why don’t you switch to our system?’ 817 Some subtle wit was possibly needed to lighten the mood after their serious debates, which had ranged from the neutral status of Laos, to Berlin, ideology, and the capacity of both systems to spur development. Kennedy believed that the Soviet Union was seeking to eliminate free systems.

Khrushchev replied that he was under the impression the US ‘wanted to build a dam’ to prevent the development of the ‘human mind and conscience’; an impossible endeavour. If ‘we start struggling against ideas’, he suggested, conflicts and clashes between the US and the

816 Memcon, “Vienna Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev”, 3 June 1961, 12-13, RG. 59, Records of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Miscellaneous Subject Files, 1961-1968, Box 65, f: Kennedy-Khrushchev Talks, NARA.
817 Memcon, “Vienna Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev”, 3 June 1961, 1-2, 3 PM, RG. 59, Records of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Miscellaneous Subject Files, 1961-1968, Box 65, f: Kennedy-Khrushchev Talks, NARA.
USSR would become inevitable. Reflecting on his obsession with guerrilla warfare, Kennedy interjected that Mao Tse Tung had declared that power was at the ‘end of the rifle’. Khrushchev replied that the USSR could not be held responsible if communist ideas developed. Ideas once born would continue to exist: ‘There is no immunization against ideas!’

By 1961, the notion of ideological immunisation was well established. Target populations did not only need to be convinced, they also needed to be educated about the perils of competing ideologies. The terms ‘immunisation’ and ‘vaccination’, known in circles of European psychological warfare specialists in the 1950s, were used by counterinsurgency experts in the 1960s and accepted by the leaders of young African states, if not in principle then at least in practice. As shown in chapter 7, pathologising metaphors were essential in a policy of modernisation and counterinsurgency where communism was characterised as an infectious disease and nonalignment as a psychological disturbance. According to Rostow, the communist virus spread mainly through guerrilla warfare. This conviction formed the basis of the ‘Rostow thesis’, which entrusted the military with directing the modernisation process while it also recommended the destruction of the external support of guerrilla insurgents. This strategy was rooted in Rostow’s basic logic: if people were motivated to improve their situation when they saw modernisation at work, modernity could also be achieved when populations were forced to experience modernity.

Having just emerged from colonialism, new African governments were wary of foreign ideas and reluctant to submit themselves to a new form of Western paternalism. They tried to fend off an emerging international discourse on human rights and democracy, which they perceived to represent potential interference in African affairs. Nonetheless, deeper ideological incentives were also at work. Nkrumah believed that his developing society needed sheltering from neocolonial propaganda. Less radical leaders, such as Hastings Banda in Malawi, were also adamant about the uniqueness of African ways. El Ferik Ibrahim Abboud of Sudan hinted at the threat posed by Western ideas at the Belgrade Conference. He

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818 Memcon, “Vienna Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev”, 3 June 1961, 12:45 PM, 4-5, RG. 59, Records of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Miscellaneous Subject Files, 1961-1968, Box 65, f: Kennedy-Khrushchev Talks, NARA.

819 By the late 1950s the ‘brainwashing’ scare – a fear that the Reds had cracked the problem of controlling human behaviour – had shifted to a more objective interest in ‘immunisation’, see Giles Scott-Smith, *Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network: Cold War Internationale* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 34.


defined ‘political ideology’ as a form of interference because it touched ‘on the belief and freedom of a nation’ and could lead to ‘political indoctrination’; while Selassie talked about ‘engorgement’ – a gradual process that destroyed identity and personality.\textsuperscript{822}

The important role of public diplomacy in American counterinsurgency policy has become overshadowed by the repressive nature of the Rostow thesis, while the gross violations of human rights by Nkrumah’s generation have obscured the ideological incentives at work in the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{823} At least as important as foreign aid, but neglected in the history of post-1960 Africa is the work of public diplomats who were called upon to deal with the adverse consequences of the foreign aid strategy. Films or exhibitions in cultural centres and newspapers could become powerful weapons in the hands of people with communist sympathies because they could increase the level of frustration. Ghana was also vigilant about a so-called neocolonial propaganda campaign to undermine the advance of the ‘African Personality’, the term Nkrumah invoked to refer to his pan-African project. When French and British public diplomats after 1961 began to build cultural centres to promote their assistance, they actually strengthened the Ghanaian perception of the international environment.

Although historians have taken an interest in counterinsurgency situations, their work tends to focus on how these programmes created an awareness of new security problems like hunger and overpopulation.\textsuperscript{824} The attempts to develop a public diplomacy programme in a counterinsurgency situation remains largely unexplored due to the fact that the bulk of the documents of the Special Group – a team created to set out the counterinsurgency strategy – were classified. With their declassification a first analysis has become possible.

The immunisation logic behind public diplomacy sheds new light on two significant questions that are addressed here in two parts. Principally, why did Ghana begin an anti-American campaign after 1961 when it was the Kennedy administration that provided the much-needed funds for its Volta Dam? Historians claim that the increasingly anti-American stance reflected Nkrumah’s growing appreciation for the USSR and its social model. Second, how did US diplomats deal with Ghana’s aggressive stance within the framework of their counterinsurgency strategy?

\textsuperscript{822} Speech transcript, “Address by H.E. El Ferik Ibrahim Abboud President of the Supreme council of the Armed forces of the republic of the Sudan at the conference of the Non-Aligned countries held at Beograd, Yugoslavia”, September 1961, 11, FO 371/161222, TNA; Speech transcript, “Address Delivered by His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I to the conference of Non-Aligned states held at Belgrade, Yugoslavia”, September 1961, 11, FO 371/161222, TNA.


\textsuperscript{824} Connelly, Fatal Misconception, 181.
Part of the answer can be found in a radically different approach to public diplomacy, which fed and sustained US and Ghanaian misperceptions of each other’s aims. It requires a closer look at Ghana’s new public diplomacy strategy after 1960. Nkrumah’s shift to an emotional form of propaganda – with ‘Revolutionary Journalism’ – was considered crucial for reaching the African general public, but it made the pan-African project appear irrational in the eyes of modernisation theorists who saw this as a flaw in the development process. With France and the UK on the sideline after 1960, it is this story of misunderstanding between Ghana and the US that sealed the fate of the pan-African project internationally, an ideology that would be swiftly overtaken by the Cold War.

A New Nonalignment Strategy: Emotionalism and Ghana as the Modern Pan-African Nation

On 7 October 1961, all heads of mission in African countries were called to Accra to discuss how Ghana’s foreign policy could be explained more effectively. Nkrumah argued that the African diplomat had to create public opinion. In 1961 therefore, the ministry of foreign affairs began to invest in public diplomacy outside of Africa with exhibition windows in New York and London.825 Ambassadors had to make Ghana’s policy understandable and push other African independent territories into adopting a ‘militant attitude’ against interference in African affairs. In June 1960 a strategic paper of the BAA had already recommended a more aggressive propaganda campaign because the tensions between Ghana and other African countries were seen as a consequence of the lack of contact, which created suspicion about Ghana’s aims and motives.826

Even though the spread of Ghana’s brand of pan-Africanism had always been an uphill battle in French Africa, where the belief in ‘assimilation’ was strong, the problem became more pressing after 1960. Leaders of other African countries which Accra had given political training or assistance began to resist Ghana’s plans for African unity: Although Milton Obote in Uganda remained an ally, Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Moboya of Kenya, as well as the Tanzanian leader, Julius Nyerere, disagreed with Nkrumah on four issues. Nyerere, first of all,

advocated a regionalist approach and pushed for an East African Federation, whereas Nkrumah believed regional groupings would reduce the incentive for further integration. Additionally, Kenya and Tanzania wanted a gradual step-by-step plan for unity. Nkrumah’s third complaint was that the gradualists were unwilling to commit all their resources and energies to the cause. All the while these statesmen debated ways in which continental prosperity could be attained: with Nyerere’s plough and pickaxe, or being jet-propelled towards modernisation as Nkrumah argued.\textsuperscript{827}

At the foundational meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963, Nyerere stressed that continental unity could be attained only through practical steps, a statement he repeated a year later at the Cairo conference. He felt Nkrumah was willing to wreck the unification of Africa just so that some ‘stupid historian’ could record that he had wanted African unity when nobody else did. Even Nkrumah’s closest ally, Touré, declared it was not ‘philosophical formulae or doctrinal theories’ that Africa needed but co-operation.\textsuperscript{828} In essence, the disagreements about the path to African unity centred on the role of persuasion and propaganda in attaining African unity. By 1963, pan-Africanism was alive as a project, but dying as an ideology. In an Africa clambering for material advancement, a policy of ideas sounded hollow.\textsuperscript{829}

\textit{Teleguided Diplomacy}

Nkrumah was unable to comprehend the hesitation on the part of his colleagues. He explained the lack of support by blaming the subtle manipulations of neocolonialists in the cultural and ideological sphere. Through so-called ‘teleguided diplomacy’, neocolonial states had been able to divorce leaders from their people. Other African leaders refused to cooperate with Ghana and reach African unity because the imperialists had convinced a number of truly anti-imperialist states such as Kenya and Tanzania to compromise. Great Britain and France were seen as shady puppeteers pulling their vicious strings ‘to make us cut each other’s throat for the sake of their diabolical purposes in Africa’ Nkrumah wrote. As mere puppets, African


\textsuperscript{828} Nkrumah’s vision received its final blow when on 15 June 1963 the East African Federation was founded, see Thompson, \textit{Ghana’s Foreign Policy}, 1957-1966, 307.

\textsuperscript{829} Agyeman and Thompson both note that the Cairo conference signalled the end of Nkrumah’s pan-African ambitions, see Agyeman, \textit{Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa}, 83; Thompson, \textit{Ghana’s Foreign Policy}, 242.
leaders were steered towards making decisions that went against the interests of their own people.\footnote{Nkrumah, \textit{Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism}, 239; Interview transcript, “Questions by Pravda Correspondent”, [1963] 8, RG. 172/538 Miscellaneous 1962-1966, TNA; Nkrumah, \textit{Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah}, 6.}

Ghanaian public diplomacy officials therefore began to target the African peoples rather than their political leaders. They presented Ghana as a modern nation with good international relations, capable of leading an African union. State visits and the projects of the development secretariat, such as the Tema Harbour, the Volta River Dam and Ghana Airways, were all organised with an eye for Ghana’s international reputation. Students who were in Accra on a government scholarship to study a technical profession were featured in \textit{Voice of Africa}. A report on Haile Selassie’s state visit – entitled ‘Two African leaders speak’ – had to impress upon readers that Nkrumah was an important international statesman. A teacher diligently writing formulae on a blackboard, or experimenting with test tubes, had to convey that an intensive study of science was a crucial feature of Ghanaian education. Between 1961 and 1964, 76 African students from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia passed through the Government Secretariat School in Accra, technical schools, teacher training colleges, and universities.\footnote{Secret memorandum, 25 March 1961, SC/BA/244, PRAAD-Accra; “Two African leaders speak...”, \textit{Voice of Africa}, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1961, 16; “Ghana Trains Africans”, \textit{Voice of Africa}, Vol. 4, No. 7&8, July-August 1964, 4-5.}

The image of the modern nation was part of an emotional propaganda operation devised to target a mass audience. The style employed might be characterised as a published form of \textit{radio trottoir} (pavement radio).\footnote{Stephen Ellis launched the term, see Ellis, “Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa”, 19.} Newspapers like \textit{The Spark} and \textit{Voice of Africa} were filled with bogus telegrams, cartoons, and rumours illustrating the dangerous neocolonial plots that might ensue if African unity did not materialise. Stories about the Portuguese brutality in Angola and Mozambique, transcriptions of Nkrumah’s rousing speeches, and articles about the alleged plans to build NATO bases (accompanied by detailed maps), were all motivated by this key concern. The attempt on Nkrumah’s life in Kulungugu on 11 August 1962, when the Ghanaian leader was handed a bomb concealed in a bouquet of flowers, was immediately seized upon as an opportunity to ‘strengthen the independent position of Ghana in African Affairs’, as Barden phrased it.\footnote{“A Warning”, \textit{Voice of Africa}, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1962, 16; “Speech Delivered by Osagyefo the President at Conference at Cairo on Sunday, 19th July 1964”, \textit{Voice of Africa}, Vol. 4, No. 7&8, July-August, 1964; “Dangers of NATO War Bases in Africa”, \textit{Voice of Africa}, Vol. 2, No. 10, 11&12, October-December 1962, 20-21; Restricted note, Barden to Magnus George, “Anti-Neo-Colonialist Demonstration”, 12 August 1962, BAA/RLAA/424 Anti-Neo-Colonialist Demonstration, 1962: Memos, PL.}
Contrary to historians who see the assassination attempt as the final cue for Ghana’s alignment with the Soviet Union, the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs saw that crisis as an opportunity to make an emotional call to rise up against neocolonialism. Nkrumah personally ordered Barden to organise a demonstration against neocolonialism in Accra, albeit one that was to appear spontaneous and mobilise mass support outside of Ghana. The BAA director therefore asked every staff member of the bureau to write a slogan while a news item about the demonstration for the external broadcast was already being prepared. He wanted to gather no less than 50,000 demonstrators by bringing freedom fighters, CPP members, ex-servicemen and the Asafo companies (a traditional warrior group), in wider Accra, Winniba and Swedru, to Accra.

Although this endeavour ultimately failed and was little more than a small gathering of children holding French flags and signs reading ‘Down with Neo-Colonialism and Imperialism’, the plan points to a sensitivity for public relations which had been less prominent before 1960 and shows that BAA operatives were eager to create the illusion of spontaneity that was felt necessary to acquire mass support for Ghana’s pan-Africanism throughout Africa.

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834 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 279; Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, 308–310.
Illustration 21: The Spark was Ghana’s principal newspaper, which was also distributed abroad. It is a good example of radio-trottoir style journalism. This was the first issue in which stories about Spanish neocolonial ploys, cartoons and one of Nkrumah’s speeches were printed. Source: “Africa Recovers”, The Spark, December 15, 1962.
**Redefining Nonalignment in Propaganda Terms**

Ghana’s vocal propaganda campaign was part of Nkrumah’s inter-African struggle to establish African unity, not an indication of his growing sympathy for the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Nkrumah staunchly refused to play off East against West, even after Lumumba’s assassination, because he believed this was a game that Africa would lose. When Leonid Brezhnev visited Ghana in February 1961, visits from Tito, Senghor and Mennen-Williams as well as Nkrumah’s own visit to the US in March 1961 were deliberately scheduled in close proximity to reflect Ghana’s nonaligned stance, something that was not always understood in the West, nor appreciated by historians who have singled out Brezhnev’s visit to illustrate the degree of Soviet penetration.836

The more theatrical form of nonalignment drew inspiration from de Gaulle and the New Left counterculture in the US, something historians have also overlooked. The ghostwriters of *Neo-Colonialism*, with Nkrumah’s approval, quoted *The Invisible Government*, a New Leftist piece of literature which defined the US government as ‘a loose amorphous grouping of individuals and agencies’ with the CIA at its heart.837 De Gaulle proved that an assertive stance with a proposal to transform NATO, the creation of a nuclear ‘force de frappe’ and the rejection of Americanisation, could increase French grandeur and have favourable results.838

In his critique of French colonialism Nkrumah could barely disguise his admiration for de Gaulle’s ‘effective penetration’; France had accomplished what Ghana aspired to do, namely the creation of particular ‘attitudes’ in Africa. In his 1964 book, Nkrumah described France as a colony of the American empire and de Gaulle, as someone who defied American power. The Sahara Atomic test, the intervention in Gabon, and de Gaulle’s visits to Cambodia and Latin America were all seen as ways to defect from American power.839 If de Gaulle and American beatniks defied American power, Nkrumah could not lag behind if Ghana was to establish a credible neutral position. Nkrumah indirectly became a silent ally of de Gaulle in his search for a world that was not dominated by the superpowers. That shared view would

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eventually lead to the largely forgotten state visit of Ghana’s foreign affairs minister, Kojo Botsio, to France in June 1965.\textsuperscript{840}

More important in the early 1960s was Ghana’s renewed commitment to public relations, which prompted a redefinition of nonalignment in propaganda terms. That commitment affected Ghana’s bilateral relations, its stance on international organisations, and the implementation of its policy towards freedom fighters in Africa. Kojo Botsio explained that the appearance of nonalignment was at least as important as adhering to the principle. Above all, ‘the manner and timing of foreign policy statements’ was deemed essential. Bilateral trade relations, diplomatic representations and foreign aid relations could not be entered into lightly, even student scholarships had to be allocated in such a way that they were not only genuinely non-committed, but also ‘seen to be non-committed to any of the two power-blocs.’\textsuperscript{841}

Nkrumah further believed that international organisations had become institutions that supported states that defied the ‘world opinion’. The UNOC intervention in the Congo had destroyed Nkrumah’s trust in the UN as an organisation that would foster ‘international morality’\textsuperscript{842}. Imperialists had abused the ‘resources and facilities’ of the UN to manipulate public opinion, something Ghana had to be vigilant about.\textsuperscript{843}

Nonalignment also had to facilitate the BAA assistance policy of aid for freedom fighters and avoid debates within the BAA about support for liberation movements, which were becoming splintered along Cold War lines. Diplomats such as Kwesi Armah demanded a ‘machinery’ with better-greased wheels to avoid a choice between, for instance, supporting Potloko Leballo’s Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) or Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.\textsuperscript{844}

But, principally, nonalignment was a way to immunise Ghanaians from adverse foreign propaganda. Both the East and the West were explicitly barred from using Ghana as a ‘propaganda forum’. S.A. Moore of the ministry of foreign affairs therefore scrutinised the

\textsuperscript{840} Telex message, J.E. Bossman to Couve de Murville, “Telex Message from Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. President of the Republic of Ghana Addressed to his Excellency General Charles de Gaulle. President of the republic of France”, 2 June 1965, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/52, AMAE.

\textsuperscript{841} “Ghana Foreign Affairs, A monthly Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, July 1963, Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-9, f: Foreign Relations – Ghana Foreign Affairs vol. 2 No. 2, MSRC.


\textsuperscript{844} Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 223.
press releases that were issued by every embassy in Accra. The USIS officers saw Ghana’s warning as a way to deal with the ‘increased propaganda competition’ on the continent. USIS-officers therefore tolerated Nkrumah’s accusation that the USIA was planning a propaganda offensive against the developing countries. He had also been convinced that a psychological warfare strategy for Africa had found its way onto the agenda of NATO meetings.

Moreover, Nkrumah personally tried to convince other African leaders of the need to immunise their population against neocolonialist propaganda. In a letter to Nyerere in December 1961, Nkrumah wrote that too much democracy would only hand imperialists the sticks to beat them with. The linguistic differences in Africa were another example of an artificial division: ‘we can even make love without the help of any language!’ he quipped. The real dividing line between French and British Africa was drawn because French Africa still leant on its former coloniser, a problem that could not be resolved by economic cooperation alone. Sound economic integration needed a ‘stable political direction, force and purpose.’ In Europe, he wrote, there was still confusion because the continent failed to build a sound foundation for political action.

In a letter to Kenyatta, Nkrumah expressed concern about the foreign-owned press, which he described as ‘one of the formidable enemies of our political struggle.’ Formal independence had made intervention difficult, but the press was a ‘deadly weapon’ that remained in the imperialists’ arsenal, and they were more than willing to disseminate ‘vile propaganda’ that magnified internal differences. Nonetheless, ‘to all this there is happily an effective antidote’ Nkrumah wrote, ‘the establishment of a strong party press.’ He offered to send an expert from the Guinea Press, a corporation formed under the government-sponsored Industrial Development Corporation, who would bring samples and assist the local journalists in this endeavour.

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848 Letter, Nkrumah to Nyerere, 8 December 1961, Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-20, f. 12, MSRC.
Nkrumah’s Attempt to Separate Foreign Aid and Ideas

How did Nkrumah reconcile his vigilance about so-called neocolonial intrusion with his acceptance of foreign aid? Nkrumah believed he could accept foreign aid so long as he guarded against the ideological accompaniments. Moreover, he wrote in 1957 that the Western-funded Volta Aluminum Company was crucial if Ghana wanted to enter the age of modernity and play a leading role in the attainment of African unity. In 1961, Mboya also told his audience at an Oxford meeting that Kenya accepted aid because it was needed, claiming he was ‘capable of gauging the ulterior motives’ of those who offered assistance.

For Nkrumah the ‘African Personality’ was not threatened as long as Ghana invested in ideological education. He instructed the freedom fighters in 1958 at the AAPC not to ignore the ‘spiritual side of the human personality’, because he felt Africans were still seen by the West as incapable of rising above their material needs. In Nkrumah’s view, the longing for material progress made them vulnerable to subjugation. If technical training was offered without an ideological component, students would become a liability to the nation even with an increase in productivity. The Spark also ran articles that rejected the philanthropic narrative advanced by ‘diplomatic missions, cultural centres and information offices’ which had become notable buildings in the African urban landscape of the 1960s. In contrast, articles described foreign aid as a form of trade that benefited recipient countries as well as the donor. Ghana’s ideological education had to neutralise the potential harm that came with foreign aid.

The separation between ideas and aid was nowhere clearer than in Ghana’s response to the Peace Corps, which launched its first operation in Ghana. The Spark presented the American volunteers as innocent, but mocked the French ‘Volunteers for Progress’, describing them as the ‘volunteers of regress’. At the same time Nkrumah banned Peace Corps articles and a Volta cartoon strip in Daily Graphic, both of which had been prepared by the USIA. People in Nkrumah’s staff told the Peace Corps members that Nkrumah did not want to risk his ability to criticise American influence by permitting the Daily Graphic to

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852 All-African People’s Conference: Speeches by the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening and Closing Sessions on December 8th and 13th, 1958, 2.
print Peace Corps material. This explains how Nkrumah could phone Shriver to apologise for the critical articles that had appeared in the Ghanaian Times that he himself had approved.855

Nkrumah trusted the money, but fought the importation of ideas. In his understanding, modernisation and industrialisation were not flawed models, but powerful tools that had been wielded by the wrong people. With the instruments for advancement at their own disposal, leaders like Nkrumah, Kenyatta or Nyerere believed they could make a change and accept aid from different corners while shaping their societies in their own forms of African Socialism.

**The International Problem of the Ghanaian Propaganda Campaign**

The redefinition of nonalignment in propaganda terms, Ghana’s shift towards emotional propaganda and a radio-trottoir style of journalism was a decision aimed at reaching a broad audience. At the same time, this vocal anticolonial stance increased the perception of Ghana as a subversive force in Africa. It made the BAA the primary suspect when Sylvanus Olympio, the president of Togo, was murdered in 1963. Olympio had advocated the recreation of German Togoland and claimed parts of Ghana.856

It was in this light that the West came to view Nkrumah, who not too long before had been considered an ally or, in the French case, a manageable threat because of his alleged mental problems.857 It was not Nkrumah’s flirtation with the Soviet Union, but his assertive attitude that caused nervousness at the USIA because it could rouse others ‘to vent their apprehensions and frustrations.’858 Reports of Ghanaian subversion time and again confirmed that Nkrumah was not turning towards the Soviets, yet his desire to export pan-African ideas was poised to cause problems. To Kennedy, Nkrumah’s behaviour was unsurprising. It

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856 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 10–11, 308–316.


angered him, but he never acted upon it. He understood the Ghanaian leaders’s actions as the product of frustration, something that was difficult to manage directly. By August 1963, however, certain officials within the USIA had grown tired of sitting on their hands and even advised reducing Ghanaian appeal by increasing the ‘African awareness of the extent of the communist influence in Ghana.’

In 1960, British diplomats fought over that question. The CRO eventually concluded that Nkrumah had no desire to throw in his lot with the communists, but they were still concerned – believing Ghana’s leader overestimated his ability to play with fire and not get burned. Only by 1963 the British realised that the Ghanaian influence in East Africa had increased at their own expense. The BAA divided trade unions in Uganda, circulated forged British telegrams in Kenya, and supported the opposition in Zanzibar. The French ambassador in Ghana, Guiringaud, warned the ministry of French foreign affairs that Nkrumah believed he was a ‘messiah’ with a god given mission to liberate Africa.

Ghanaian diplomats were very much aware of the damage caused by their leftist and anticolonial image and therefore urged the press corps to devote more attention to the way in which the country was presented. All this was to little avail. Western diplomats remained concerned about Nkrumah’s vocal anticolonial discourse, which brought stories of neocolonial plots to the attention of the African public.

The Newspaper War: The Information Vacuum, Revolutionary Journalism and Ghanaian Ideological Education

The international impact of Ghana’s new public diplomacy strategy is demonstrated by the newspaper war, a war of words that erupted in the early sixties between Ghana on one side and the US and the UK on the other. The deviating journalistic practices strengthened the mutual misperception and even influenced the negotiations of the Volta River Project.

861 Draft, “Points for Discussion with the Ghana Press Corps”, [1961], 3, 5, RG. 17/2/62 Miscellaneous, PRAAD-Accra; The document shows that the relation between the Ghanaian state and the press was less direct.
862 A term used at the CRO in the aftermath of the French atomic bomb crisis: Secret letter, L.J.D. Wakely, to G.W. Chadwick, 26 February 1960, DO 35/9341, TNA.
Radio Troittoir and the ‘Information Vacuum’

On 20 March 1961 Kennedy personally asked Carl T. Rowan, the acting secretary of public affairs and first Afro-American director of the USIA, to prepare an analysis of the press in Africa which concluded that there was an ‘information vacuum’. After the departure of the colonial powers, many Africans had remained illiterate and could therefore not fully enjoy freedom, because the ‘very essence of freedom’, Rowan argued, was the ‘right and the opportunity to make a choice.’ Without the necessary skills, however, Africans remained ill-informed about the choices that were available in terms of development, leaving them vulnerable to tyranny.

According to Rowan, not a single aid programme could truly succeed unless the information vacuum was addressed by providing good reading material. The US had to act, because the door was left open for competitors from the Eastern bloc, as well as for Reuters and Agence France-Presse (AFP). While USIS Dakar asked the USIA to increase the American wire services, the USIA’s experienced assistant director for Africa, Edward V. Roberts, was not convinced that more wire services would solve the core problem. The public would only read articles if an African journalist – Roberts suggested a Nigerian – could be placed in Washington or at the UN. 863

Already in 1958, USIS-Accra had noticed that the local newspapers rarely dealt with international subjects or supported US policy. The British on their part had invested immensely in information as a pillar of the newly independent state of Ghana, while even the French in 1961 were turning towards educating Africans in ‘world affairs’ instead of limiting their education to national and regional matters. The notion that Africa was struggling with an ‘information vacuum’ was thus widely entertained and was strengthened when misinformation about the situation on the ground in Congo had severely handicapped the American ability to deal with the crisis. 864

Ghana’s stories about neocolonial plots, which were supposed to mobilise the public, would lead to trouble (illustration 21). In October 1961, for instance, Voice of Africa published a set of forged telegrams allegedly sent from the CRO. The words of the so-called authentic telegram were directed at the reader of the newspaper:

864 Cablegram, Accra to USIA, “RE USIA CA-852, October 4; USITO circular telegram 177, November 15”, 20 November 1957, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f. Press in Africa [Folder ½], NARA; Memcon, “Anglo-French Talks on Information Expanded Record”, FO 953/2029, TNA.
You ought to know better what is really going on [...] foolish not to realize that only by appearing to let you and the other white settlers down to some extent, can H.M.G. get the Africans to accept a plan that in fact is in your interests.865

In March 1963 *The Spark* ran a sensationalist story about the secret war of the CIA entitled ‘The Killer at Your Door’. The story contained pictures of a gun with a silencer, radio equipment and shoes with espionage material. The journalist further accused the CIA of planning Lumumba’s murder, it was claimed that Dean Rusk’s son had been stationed in Nigeria and estimated that 500 agents were active in Ghana. In the first issue of *Voice of Africa*, French colonial manipulations were exposed. A photo was printed showing a French policeman who allegedly made sure that people would vote for de Gaulle’s Algerian policy. Besides sensationalist stories, publications also became more visual with cartoons and large photographs: a strong African man strangling a white colonial officer, an armed African officer leading his men into battle or a large picture of a manhandled Lumumba filled the pages (illustration 22).866

This blend of rumours, sensationalism, cartoons and emotional appeal – already tested in the campaign against the French bomb in the Sahara – was now becoming the working principle of the Bureau of African Affairs. A.K. Barden wanted to ensure that ‘as many as possible of the reading public’ would be ‘encouraged to buy and read *The Spark*’ Ghana’s main ideological newspaper which also had a French language edition *L’Étincelle* and was founded in 1961. Kofi Batsa, the newspaper’s chief editor, had to distil concrete ideas from Ghana’s vague pan-African ideology and crystallise Nkrumah’s thinking into specific policies.867 The paper aimed at educating the Ghanaian public, while it had to convince as many people as possible in the rest of Africa. What plagued the newspaper was not illiteracy – newspapers were read out loud in public and leaflets were a common mode of political communication, from Accra to the coffee houses of Mogadishu – but distribution problems. A network of agents was therefore established in February 1963.868

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The BAA also attacked its former coloniser and criticised the British newspapers for publishing sensationalist stories about Nkrumah’s authoritarian rule. British officials concluded that their attempts to establish a free press had failed. A.W. Snelling of the CRO asked Kweku Boateng, the Ghana minister of information, to consult him before any anti-British material was published. He also struggled to understand how the UK could be presented as a cultural and economic imperialist in the newspapers when Nkrumah welcomed foreign investments in his radio addresses. Even though Boateng made excuses for his journalists by stating that Ghanaian writers were operating in a foreign language, making it difficult for them to be subtle, Snelling noted sarcastically that their knowledge of offensive English was impeccable. Despite these problems, the CRO was unconcerned.  

The French ambassador, Guiringaud, who was used to criticism directed towards France’s role in Africa, also began to worry at the end of 1960 that the Ghanaian press could affect African attitudes across the continent. He asked the ministry of foreign affairs to send him an English language expert so that France could respond to allegations in a fitting way.  

For American officials, Ghana’s behaviour confirmed the psychological profile of the anticolonial African. The newspapers were a ‘major outlet’ through which Nkrumah ‘vented frustration and anger toward outside forces’ he could not control, the US embassy reported. Solving this problem was a technical matter. Rowan’s report to Kennedy suggested it would be useful to train African journalists. Instead of becoming less involved, as Nkrumah had hoped, the US felt compelled to intervene.  

Even though Kennedy saw it as an expression of frustration he still wanted to contain Nkrumah’s PR offensive. Unlike the British, the US embassy in Accra realised that the anti-Western tone of Ghana’s newspapers was not a reflection of government policy. They understood that Nkrumah had separated his role as political agitator from his role as pragmatic government leader. What made American officials take action, however, was the fact that Nkrumah’s vocal anticolonial discourse could derail the American foreign aid strategy for Africa. With a foreign aid bill in Congress, post-colonial crises in Congo and
Portuguese Africa and the case of the Aswan Dam in mind, the White House was battling against Congress and public opinion, which did not dismiss Nkrumah’s rants as expressions of frustration but demanded that aid purchased allegiance. Why else would the US invest in aid?\(^{873}\)

Even though the Kennedy administration saw the competition with Moscow as its most pressing task, the Volta River project became a tool to prevent the foreign aid strategy for Africa from disintegrating. Ambassador Russell recommended the implementation of the Volta project in February 1961, not solely because it would represent the sole Western foothold in Ghana, but also because backing down would create doubts in underdeveloped countries about the sincerity of Kennedy’s aid efforts. Only a month earlier he had indicated that financing the Volta River project was self-defeating if the anti-American campaign was maintained.\(^{874}\) The allocation of foreign aid funds therefore had to be tactically employed so that Congress could be convinced that aid was an issue of strategy and assure the rest of Africa that US aid was sincere.

This dual image could only be kept afloat by urging the Ghanaian leader to soften the harsh tones of the articles that were being published. A presidential commission headed by Clarence Randall – Eisenhower’s Africa expert – travelled to Accra in the week of 22 October 1961, officially to investigate whether the US should go ahead with the project to finance the Volta River Project. However, Randall tried to convince Nkrumah of the need to improve public opinion about the US. In December 1961 Randall was send back to Ghana to convey to Nkrumah that Kennedy needed help in reassuring the American people. He urged the Ghanaian president to contact the embassy before information became ‘distorted in the press.’ The NSC meeting that was held upon Randall’s return confirmed that approving the Volta project was the only possible choice. A refusal to proceed would be misunderstood across Africa. Thus on 12 December 1961, the Volta project was approved.\(^{875}\)

Ghana’s journalistic practices became the core of American-Ghanaian relations. In 1963 William Brubeck, the NSC specialist on Africa, included ‘information media’ and ‘posture on

\(^{873}\) Letter, Accra to State Department, 4 December 1962, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 100, f: Ghana-General 11/62-12/62, JFKL; Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World*, 177.


major international issues’ among his eight criteria for evaluating future development activity in Ghana. William P. Mahoney, the new American ambassador to Ghana in 1962, noted on 1 February 1963 that only a major alteration of Ghana’s propaganda policy would lead to good Ghana-US relations. Mahoney’s primary task was therefore to improve the public image of the US in Ghana by establishing a personal relationship with Nkrumah.

Ultimately, the Volta river project strengthened Kennedy in his conviction that public opinion was a liability, not an opportunity, for attaining his policies. Until Kennedy’s assassination, Edgar Kaiser, the CEO of the aluminium company that had taken on the Volta project, visited Nkrumah every few weeks to plead for moderation. When the exiled opposition leader, Kofi Busia, testified in the US senate about Ghana in December 1962 and Senator Thomas Dodd began talking about the ‘first Cuba in Africa’, Kaiser visited Nkrumah’s office once again. ‘How can president Kennedy go on with his foreign aid program, how can he risk the whole foreign aid program?’ Kaiser asked. More than any flirtation of Ghana with the Soviet Union, it was this question that shaped US-Ghana relations.


877 Telegram, Mahoney to secretary of state, 31 January 1963, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 100, f: Ghana, General 1/21/63 – 1/31/63, JFKL.


879 Incoming telegram, Accra to secretary of state, 19 January 1963, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 100, f: Ghana, General 1/1/63 – 1/20/63, JFKL.
Revolutionary Journalism

The newspaper war not only made its mark on the American policy towards Africa but also affected the Ghanaian understanding of how imperial propaganda actually worked. Attacks in the press persisted despite complaints from the Kennedy administration, which in turn only strengthened the Anglophone perception that something needed to be done to improve the information resources on the continent.

From 1962 onwards, journalists were informed that the wording and the style of foreign news could contain secret messages. It was therefore forbidden to copy news stories from Western newspapers. In 1963 the BAA began publishing *The African Chronicler*, a newspaper in which journalistic pieces coming from *The New York Times*, *The Christian Science Monitor* and *The New York Herald* were reprinted in a dry and factual style. Written for Africans by Africans there was a guarantee that this bulletin did not conceal any secret ideological messages. Accordingly, when the Afro-American magazine *Ebony* began its operations in Ghana, *The Spark* was quick to warn that the periodical could poison the atmosphere in Africa with neocolonialist theories and create disunity.  


By 1964, Richard Wright at the Ghana Institute of Journalism turned this push against foreign news into a coherent theory. The institute had to impress upon its students that objectivity was a constructed Western notion. In his classes, Wright stressed how Western newspapers systematically distorted stories and he unveiled the Cold War bias of news organisations. He indicated that even the most objective of the Western papers used the term ‘free world’ even though countries such as South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and Spain were included in that definition.

The practice of revolutionary journalism was based on the conscious adoption and adaption of other writing styles to reach the maximum effect. Wright argued that an African style of journalism had to replace the journalism that wanted to adopt Western moral and political values and imitate the BBC. By contrast, Africa journalists should write for a broad African audience and simplify their prose so that everything was easily understandable.

The calls to arms for the freedom fighters were a thing of the past for Wright. He believed journalism was not about the slogans or jaded clichés, but about inciting people to action. He praised the Soviet style because the selection of materials and the blending of facts and commentary clearly showed the political orientation of the nation. From the French, Ghanaian journalists could learn nothing because Wright considered their style to be literary and vague. The Americans, on the other hand, had a good style with short and lively sentences. Their adherence to objectivity was the only problem. For Wright, this was a sign of mediocre intellectual capabilities and the product of morally dubious societies. The revolutionary journalist, by contrast, was required to have a solid ideological background, an extensive knowledge of Africa, and the ability to differentiate between friend and foe in his treatment of the news. The journalist was an instrument of the African revolution in which everyone, not only those who were politically active, was involved.

Nkrumah’s strategic shift towards emotional appeals to the African population thus deepened the animosity between the US and Ghana. Even though Wright integrated Western journalistic principles, Western notions of ‘emotionalism’ were strengthened and the political project of African unity was marginalised.

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The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute and Ideological Training

If information could never be objective, education also needed to go beyond the transmission of technical skills. Teachers had to mould the new nation by counteracting the education of colonialism and present Ghana as a modern nation.\textsuperscript{882} At the opening of the Institute of African Studies in October 1963, Nkrumah maintained that education was not merely a development tool, but a ‘gateway to the enchanted cities of the mind.’\textsuperscript{883} Exchange students were valued, not as nodes in a political network but as living PR dispensaries for Ghana. Scholarships, for instance, were awarded for students to study in Ghana’s schools, in spite of language difficulties and insufficient qualifications.\textsuperscript{884}

The majority of these students ended up at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (KNII) in Winneba, of which the foundation stone was laid on 18 February 1961. Only a small section was sent to the University of Ghana, in Legon.\textsuperscript{885} The KNII had been founded in Winneba, a traditional CPP stronghold. Its mere existence exemplified the degree to which pan-Africanism had become a fully-fledged interventionist ideology. The institute was preoccupied with research in the ideological training section, but was also actively involved in projecting the ideology abroad, in the Positive Action Training Centre. Book projects such as the ‘Great Lives in Pan-Africanism Series’ and courses in political science presented the institute as a serious academic enterprise. Even the more practical courses on nutrition, agricultural organisation, and social welfare were never approached as purely technical matters. Knowledge was never objective: it had to serve the pan-African cause.\textsuperscript{886}

By 1961, a ten-week training programme had been developed. Students would be taught the basics of political organisation, learn ideological theory and become intimately acquainted with Ghana. Four weeks of theory were combined with two weeks of practical experience and two weeks of evaluation in which problems were discussed. The practical part of the training consisted of rallies and visits to the CPP Headquarters, Trade Union Congress, Young Pioneers, Builders Brigade, National Council of Ghana Women and Farmers Council. The

\textsuperscript{882} Quoted in Haizel, “Education in Ghana, 1951-1966”, 55.
theoretical part consisted of five elements: communication techniques, positive action techniques, principles of party organisation, organisation of elections and other subjects according to the needs of the nationalist students. \(^\text{887}\)

This curriculum remained midway between the BAA’s network strategy and a full-blown ideological offensive for the people. Since most students came from countries that were not necessarily wedded to socialism, the BAA – which devised the external course – decided to remove socialism from the curriculum. Instead, ‘Positive Action’ techniques received more attention, as well as the organisation of policies and procedures for political parties, such as elections, party branches and propaganda vans. \(^\text{888}\) That decision, to give public relations priority over ideological training, led to a fight between A.K. Barden and Secretary of the National Council for Education A.L. Adu. The latter wanted to give the institute a more academic direction, staffed by highly qualified academic staff. A.K. Barden on the other hand wanted people who fully understood African liberation and ‘Nkrumahism’. \(^\text{889}\)

At the KNII, Ghana’s newly extended hand to the general population was a difficult step leading to a propaganda fiasco with disgruntled students. It is not known how many students attended the ten-week training courses, but a great number of them were unhappy with the quality of their training. They demanded a Western-style education with its technocratic gloss because it cradled the promise of progress. In December 1961, a group of 40 Somalis, for instance, travelled to Accra on Ghanaian scholarships to receive short-term training in accountancy, nursing and midwifery, agriculture and chemistry. However, they went on a hunger strike because they were unhappy with the Ghanaian living standards. In the end, very few foreign students, only 2.8%, were admitted on a full-time basis. In the second academic year, 1963-1964, the total student population of the institute was 205, while 247 new students were admitted. In total, 373 were Ghanaian, 7 were senior ranking officers, and 7 were non-Ghanaian. \(^\text{890}\)

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\(^{887}\) Draft Memorandum, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of political science”, [1961], BAA/RLAA/423 Kwame Nkrumah Institute Winneba, 1961-63: Memos, Reports (Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute), PL.

\(^{888}\) Memorandum, [14 September 1961], Draft memorandum, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of political science”, [1961], BAA/RLAA/423 Kwame Nkrumah Institute Winneba, 1961-63: Memos, Reports (Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute), PL.


\(^{890}\) Foreign service despatch, “Somali-Ghanaian Relations Reach New Low in an Exchange of Leaflets”, 21 February 1962, RG. 59, CDF 1960-1963, 54J.603/9-1062 to 551J.61/10-361, NARA; Again in October 1964 students were deported back to Kenya because they showed more interest in activities outside of the classroom,
American Public Diplomacy as Counterinsurgency: Damming Frustration

Despite US concerns about the quality of Ghanaian journalism, it was American newspapers that started a tenacious rumour about the Russian arms shipments to Ghana in 1961. Even though weapons had also been purchased in the West, journalists claimed that these deliveries were meant to supply liberation fighters. Although the Ghana Information Service denied such a connection in 1961, the Ghanaian archives reveal that on 14 September 1964, in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador Georgi Rodionov, Nkrumah confirmed that he had agreed to channel Soviet arms to Agostinho Neto, the leader of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) who had Marxist sympathies. The documents thus confirm a suspicion harboured by historians.\(^{891}\)

In *Voice of Africa*, Nkrumah began to support the so-called armed revolution. His turn to violence was an issue of tactics and did not stem from a disappointment about non-violence as was already clear at the AAPC. His shift towards the peoples of Africa compelled him to resort to guerrilla warfare because he noticed that it even appealed to unskilled farmers. Ghana would need to tap into that source of popular support.\(^{892}\)

However, rumours about arms deals and Nkrumah’s turn towards violence made policymakers, particularly in Washington, nervous about what might happen when their modernisation policies got out of hand and turned violent. NSC staffer, McGeorge Bundy was aware that the ideological confrontation in the Third World favoured and intensified internal conflict, particularly when the support of one of the two superpowers was enlisted.\(^{893}\) It is in this context that the USIA became an important player in the American counterinsurgency strategy. In Africa, the fragile state structures of Congo became an important source of concern.


\(^{893}\) His interdepartmental committee agreed, consisting of representatives of the State Department, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USIA, CIA and the United States Agency for International Development, see Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, “Subject: Counterinsurgency Doctrine”, 13 August 1962, 3, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 338, JFKL.
In December 1961, USIA director, Murrow was asked to become a member of the Special Group on counterinsurgency.\(^{894}\) The USIA integration into the group stemmed from Kennedy’s views on the USIA as an agency that was important for the counterinsurgency strategy. Ted Sorensen, JFK’s special advisor and former USIA officer, also preferred hard persuasion and was disdainful about a long-term engagement based on cultural diplomacy.\(^{895}\) Murrow accepted Sorensen’s view of the job, in part because it enabled him to elevate USIA officers to the status of diplomats, instead of being perceived as marketers, a deep-seated frustration among USIA’s personnel.\(^{896}\)

The new mission of the USIA came out of Murrow’s lecture at the Interdepartmental Seminar on the Problems of Development and Internal Defense on 31 July 1963 where he noted that the USIA’s role had changed somewhat over the years. To his own contentment, he noted that the old public relations mission of the USIA had been discarded: ‘The first sentence, “to help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives” does not say we are to make friends, it does not say we are to publicize the activities of USIA. It does not say that we are obliged to tell a full and fair picture […] It makes of us a foreign policy oriented agency to support U.S. policy objectives.’\(^{897}\) That transformation of the USIA into a psychological instrument of foreign policy had already begun under Eisenhower, with the Sprague Report that recommended the USIA should take on a psychological task: making sure programmes were presented in such a way that resentment would be minimised.\(^{898}\)

Specifically, the USIA took on three new tasks. First, it was entrusted with the ‘immunisation of those sectors of foreign society’ which were most likely to be the ‘breeding ground for insurgency.’ In a transitional society, Rostow argued, the government’s psychological, political, and administrative grip on a country was weak. This was a moment when guerrillas could thrive. The USIA therefore had to foster the relationship between


\(^{895}\) Although Cull claims that Murrow was fond of saying this phrase, see Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 190.


\(^{898}\) Report, “Conclusions and Recommendations of the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad”, December 1960, 6, U.S. President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) Records, 1959-61, Box 26, f: Printed Committee Report, DDEL.
governments and their people. In the memorandum outlining the counterinsurgency doctrine, General Maxwell D. Taylor agreed that developing societies required professional advice and assistance for their public information services and ‘psychological operations’ to be effective and keep the channels of communication open.\footnote{Conference paper, “A Review of Behavioral Sciences Research In Support of Air Force Programs in Counter-Insurgency and Limited Warfare by James L. Monroe”, 18 April 1963, MC 440, Ithiel de Sola Pool Papers, f: Westpoint meeting 4/18/63, MIT-Archives; Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Maxwell Taylor, “Subject: Counterinsurgency Doctrine”, 13 August 1962, 30, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 338, JFKL.}

Murrow himself was enthusiastic about the transistor radio as a medium, convinced that, one day, historians would recognise it as a major revolution in communications. He believed the new communication media allowed USIS officers to reach 10 million peasants otherwise untouched by so-called normal communications. In the Congo, for instance, weekly newsreels in French, Lingala and Swahili as well as the publication of *Perspective Americaines*, had nothing to do with winning friends for the United States or the exploitation of the American way of life. For Murrow, the purpose of those activities was to legitimise Adoula’s leadership.\footnote{900 Confidential, “Guidance for USIA Programs and Operations”, [1963], RG. 306, P 296, f: C.I. Agency Doctrine and Organization, Box 8, NARA; Lecture transcript, “Problems of Development and Internal Defense Seventh Session: The Role of USIA in Modernization and Internal Defense by the Honorable Edward R. Murrow”, 31 July 1963, 19, 4, 13-14, RG. 306, P 296, Box 11, f: Edward R. Murrow – Speech July 31, 1963, NARA; Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, “Subject: Counterinsurgency Doctrine”, 13 August 1962, 30, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files Meetings & Memoranda, Box 338, JFKL.}

This subtlety was lost on the British who wanted to promote their assistance to the new Congolese state as a way to create a favourable impression of the UK. Because they realised their efforts paled in comparison to the US they asked the Americans if they would be willing to include British material in the audio material they provided to the Congolese information services. Unlike their American counterparts the British – like the French – felt comfortable in their new role as salesmen, glad to shed the trauma of Kenya, Malaya, Palestine and Cyprus. Like advertisers who could conduct scientifically based consumer research to reveal hidden impulses, they wanted to know what drove their target audiences.\footnote{The term ‘salesmen’ was used in Report, W. Wilson, “Inspector’s Report on Information Work in Leopoldville”, [July 1961], FO 953/2050, TNA; Confidential Memorandum, McMullen, “United Kingdom Information Office, Kenya”, [1961], FO 1110/1447, TNA; Confidential, “U.S./U.K. Information Working Group Meeting, Washington April 28-30, Item C6: Audience Research and Reaction in Asia and Africa”, [1964], FO 953/2175, TNA; For the French perspective, see Report, Jean Desparmet to DAL, “Mission d’étude des moyens d’information francais en afrique centrale et orientale”, 6 May 1964, 33, DAL, Nord Est Afrique 1960-1965, 35QO/8, AMAE.}

Secondly, the information agency advisory function became more important. Departments had to seek advice if they were considering policies that could affect foreign public opinion. The financing of the Volta Dam, Murrow argued, did the US more good in
other areas of the continent than in Ghana because it provided others with a concrete example of economic aid that had been offered irrespective of the policies of the recipient. That expertise was further used in the Interdepartmental Seminar on the Problems of Development and Internal Defense. The USIA organised the five-week course at the Foreign Service Institute where the leading lights of modernisation theory such as Rostow and Pye lectured with materials and case studies prepared by the agency.902

Lastly, as counterinsurgency experts, USIA officers became ‘less publicists for America, more propagandists for progress.’ Concretely, this meant that ‘social reforms, economic programs and self-help themes’ were promoted. A small healthcare project in the Sudan was the subject of a film made in an attempt to get others to follow this example. This is what Rostow called the demonstration effect: by exhibiting the advantages of modernity others would follow; a process that was also described by communication experts such as Ithiel de Sola Pool.903

As a propagandist for progress and with its immunising and advisory functions, the USIA became important in making counterinsurgency more ‘people oriented’ rather than ‘hardware oriented’, as MIT researchers phrased it.904 The crucial playing field for a more people-oriented counterinsurgency in Africa was the cultural centre where the misperception between the US and Ghana deepened further, while the UK and France stood on the sideline and tried to promote their aid.

The Cultural Centre as a Battle Ground: The Demonstration Effect and Cultural Imperialism.

With the new working principles of the Ghanaian BAA and USIA as well as the British and French officers who had become shrewd salesmen, operations on the ground expanded rapidly. At the same time this was a counterintuitive development: new close personal relations between leaders of new African states and the former colonisers, particularly in France, seemed to push the African public into the background while cultural assistance was

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overtaken by the socio-economic modernisation project that operated on the assumption that cultures would become more homogenised. However, African leaders also asserted their cultural difference, which fitted uncomfortably with the Western gospel of modernity and rationality.

Exhibiting Modernity, Fighting Cultural Intrusion, Promoting Development

The Americans were convinced they could counter the counterproductive effects of modernisation and calm frustrated anticolonial voices by displaying the advantages of an emerging world culture. British academics like Audry Richards agreed, arguing that the failure of development schemes in the 1930s was the fault of the agricultural officer, not the ‘lazy African’. Peasants had been forced to plant crops, but had not been shown the advantages ‘of a dramatic change’. This exhibition of modernity was what Rostow termed the demonstration effect.

Nkrumah interpreted this technique as an aggressive move to influence Ghanaian society. Nonetheless, his resistance and anticolonial discourse was believed to be beneficial in the long run. Rostow argued that external intrusion made leaders launch their societies into modernity. The leaders of a traditional society would not be prepared to break down the social structures for the prospect of more profit, but would only choose the path of development when they felt threatened by more advanced foreigners. Rostow called this ‘reactive nationalism’.

Meanwhile, the French and British relied on cultural diplomacy activities to prop up their position, which only fed the existing Ghanaian concern about neocolonialism. Public diplomacy became a self-enforcing cycle of misunderstanding. The views about the ways in which public diplomacy affected target audiences were so radically different that an attempt to improve relations could end up causing an aggressive response. Public diplomats all agreed that the developmental state of their African target audiences was the problem, but their assessment of what was needed to address the issue differed.

The Americans, for instance, saw themselves as part of the solution. USIA operatives wanted to get societies out of the semi-developed phase of colonialism, because the suboptimal preconditions for take-off resulted in a longing for the pre-colonial past, not a forward thrust. John Brown, prolific writer and public diplomacy thinker, poignantly

905 Conference notes, Richards, “Concept of the lazy African”, 22 February 1961, Richards/14/12, LSE.
identified the problem. The globalisation of popular culture where ‘people all over the world wear blue jeans’ occurred simultaneously with a renewed appreciation for ‘chauvinistic forms of intensely local culture.’ Public diplomats therefore had to work to make the demonstration effect less shocking for those who valued ancient African cultures.

The Ghanaians for their part were keen on exploiting the perceived emotionalism of the broader population. The general public, African students, leaders, and women were now integrated in a PR campaign for Ghana bent on projecting the image of a modern Ghana ready to lead Africa. Public diplomats therefore looked for a way to appeal to a mass audience and turned to film to reach a broad target audience.

Unlike Ghana, the French saw too little development as a problem because Africans were not able to understand French policies and culture. African news media therefore had to be relied upon to ‘psychologically prepare the terrain’ for the import of French culture. Informational diplomacy could be used to increase the knowledge of French culture not only for the political figures and intellectuals, but also for the rural and urban population.

The British bought into Nkrumah’s pan-African narrative and identified the cultural background as the key determinant of African behaviour and opinion. They also turned their operation into a propaganda effort where they overthought how they could best influence intellectuals and the general public. In short, while the former colonial powers saw the promotion of their image as the main aim of their activities, USIS wanted to demonstrate development while Ghana’s operation defied both by asserting the ‘African Personality’.

**The Universalisation of the Cultural Centre**

Nonetheless, all these different techniques came together at the cultural centre (illustration 23). Because of the success of the American cultural centres, which were visited by Africans to obtain language education and foreign publications, the concept of the cultural centre became widely adopted by other actors in the field. The British Council, for instance, was encouraged to abandon the strict separation between informational diplomacy and cultural assistance, and instead create cultural centres with reading rooms, exhibition spaces, and a

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910 Memorandum, “African Mental Attitudes”, [1961], FO 953/2076, TNA.
cinema, following the USIS example. In reality, the sources of inspiration were more varied. In Fort Lamy, the British had been impressed by the French cultural centre, designed by Le Corbusier in 1960, proving to the British that the French stuck to their strategy of high culture.\footnote{Letter, BC Chad to BC, September 1962, BW 154/1, TNA}

Admittedly, the cultural centre in the capital of Chad was steeped in the French tradition of cultural diplomacy, with a museum, an auditorium, and a youth centre.\footnote{Ministère de la Coopération, “Note sur le centre culturel de Fort-Lamy”, 8 November 1962, DAM, Généralités, 1089 INVA/239 Coopération 1961-1975, f: Débuts politiques de la coopération (1961-1963), AMAE.} However, in the face of Ghanaian propaganda efforts, the local French operatives like David Weckselmann, a French teacher of the Alliance Française at the University of Ibadan, had wanted to emulate the successful centres of USIS and the British Council with their audiovisual rooms and libraries.\footnote{Letter, David Weckselmann to Couve de Murville, “a/s: Report de fun d’année universitaire”, 1 June 1960, Afrique Pays M à Z 1958-1963, f: Nigeria-Ibadan, AF.}

The cultural centres established through the bilateral cooperation agreements with the new nations in French Africa were now meant to promote France. Jean Desparmet, who travelled to the newly opened embassies in Central and East Africa to study their informational strategy, came to the conclusion that the exhibitions, films and radio programmes provided through these centres were the most effective way to promote France. He saw ‘information as a technique, but above all a mental attitude.’\footnote{‘L’information est une technique, mais c’est surtout une attitude mentale’, see: Jean Desparmet, “Mission d’étude des moyens d’information français en Afrique centrale et orientale”, 6 May 1964, 15, DAL, Nord Est Afrique 1960-1965, 35QO/8, AMAE.}

Ghana could not lag behind. The envoy conference of 1961 therefore decided that ‘Africa’s cultural unity’ made the ‘cultural medium the best means of promoting political Unity in Africa’ and an expansive cultural plan were approved. The African Affairs Secretariat began producing appealing pamphlets, troupes of dancers were sent to the neighbouring African states, an Arts Festival in Accra was proposed and the study of African culture became essential at the universities. The \textit{Voice of Africa} ran articles on Ghana’s cultural heritage. In 1962, the Ghana government printing press published \textit{Fifty Unknown Facts about the Africa with Complete Proof}, in which G.K. Osei reminded historians that the black races, Egyptians and Ethiopians, had cradled civilisation. New Ghanaian cultural...
centres, with tape recorders, recordings of Ghanaian tunes, films, and pictures about Ghana became essential to illustrate the unity of all of Africa’s cultures.915

In that strategic vision, USIS officers became the enemies because, unlike Ghana, they assumed that societal norms and cultural identities would converge. On 11 January 1963 Manhoney received a note requesting the removal of William B. Davis, the Cultural Affairs Officer and Carl C. Nydell the regional medical officer. Nydell had been arrested on a plane on the runway in Accra where Kofi Baako, the minister of defence, personally notified him that plans for a coup had been found in his suitcase. When Edgar Kaiser and Chad Calhoun pointed out that this could endanger the Volta river project, Nkrumah backed down and Kennedy resumed the financing of the Volta River project.916 The Americans did not understand what they had done wrong. But the eviction of cultural officers in Ghana, Guinea and Mali was resisted because USIS officers feared that without their cultural centres, African leaders would only increase and escalate the tensions of the transition process, making Soviet intrusion only a matter of time.917 Contrary to their mission to build more understanding, the cultural centres thus became the focal point of conflict in Africa.

916 Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 18 January 1963, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 100, f: Ghana General Subject 1/1/63 -1/20/63, Relations with Ghana, JFKL; Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 217.
917 Outgoing telegram, StateDept/USIA to Amambassy Bamako, 24 May 1961, RG. 59 CDF 1960-63, 511.703/6-161 -511.70E3/6-161, NARA.
Illustration 23: The Cultural Centre is still a lively place of cultural activities in African cities. This picture shows the centre of the Alliance Française in present day Accra where film screenings, cultural manifestations and French language education are organised, March 2012. Source: photograph taken by the author.

**Conflicting Public Diplomacy Techniques**

USIA’s entire operation was pressed in the service of the demonstration effect. For Murrow for instance, English teaching had to facilitate the emulation of American modernity. The emerging parts of the world wanted to ‘share our knowledge and emulate our machine age productivity’, and the learning of English was seen as a good way to attain this. More importantly, the USIA was looking for ways in which the marvels of modernity could be demonstrated without offending African target audience and their attachment to the idea of an ancient African culture. One way of doing this was by drawing parallels between the American experience and African realities. In 1962, the VOA produced a radio show that told the story of an African student coming to the US for study, to facilitate the connection of the listener with American modernity.\(^{918}\)

That attempt to connect so-called ‘African’ realities and American ideas, stemmed in part from the perceived success of Ghanaian propaganda. A comic book was printed called *They Wanted Freedom: Life Stories and Legends of West Africans, Americans and Others who Served Their Peoples* (illustration 24). The booklet drew parallels between West African and American drives for freedom. It was a hybrid propaganda product that combined the

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ancient history of African kingdoms with American Comic books. On the left page Askia Mohammed, the leader of the Songhai Empire, is described as a man who ‘wanted freedom for the mind and spirit, freedom to teach.’ On the right page George Washington’s story is recounted, how he fought the British and as first president laid the foundation for the republic, implying both Africans and Americans shared similar notions of freedom.  

Ghana interpreted this propaganda approach in a very different way. They remained anxious about possible neocolonial intrusion, believing that modern media could exert a secret but powerful impact. The Office of the President therefore tried to exploit those powerful weapons themselves to reach a wide audience; for instance by producing a movie called The Ghanaians, which was to be dramatic and full of special shots, because ‘the devil doesn’t have to have all the good tunes’. Audiences by now had been exposed to ‘sophisticated techniques used – and abused’ in film, TV, newspapers and other mass-communications media. The Office of the President therefore hired a British director, Terry Bishop.

In the opening scene, audiences saw a plane flying over the Volta River followed by a scene of the slave forts of Elmina, Cape Coast, and Christiansborg where despite slavery the ‘way of life of the people remained intact’. The ‘African Personality’ was further presented as one of the three sources of Ghana’s wealth besides gold and cacao as well as a source of happiness, underscored by the Highlife music playing in the background. The final part of the film transported audiences to a university where students critically engaged with their lecturer, amidst a school building that was still under construction – showing a ‘willingness to innovate’. Other housing projects were shown with children staring at them in awe: ‘So much achieved, in so short a time!’ The film signalled in a very explicit way that other African countries should follow the modern nation of Ghana.

In the meantime, the French on the ground began to pay more attention to publicity. In defiance of Paris, where officials considered French cultural assistance as a development tool, local officers also tried to use French cultural assistance as a way to acquire influence and control. When Radio Ghana started emissions in French, France concluded a technical assistance agreement so they could provide Accra with a French radio expert. In that way France wanted to retain some control over what was being broadcast. The governments of the UAM were also assisted in the setup of radio education. At the same time a 30-minute radio

919 Booklet, “They Wanted Freedom: Life Stories and Legends of West Africans, Americans and others who served their Peoples”, [1964], Washburn, Abbott: Papers, 1938-2003, Box 104, f: USIA (8), NARA.


921 E.K. Okoh to Dr. Conor Cruise O’Brien, 1 November 1963, RG. 17/2/256 Correspondence, PRAAD-Accra.
package was sent to the radio stations in French Africa, tailored to what radio listeners had asked their radio stations to inform them about, ranging from international news to sports.\footnote{Letter, Grousset to Couve de Murville, [1961], Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/34, AMAE; Report, “Note sur l’activité de la société en 1961”, [1961], Ministère de la Coopération, Direction de la coopération technique et culturelle, 19780282/14, CHAN.}

In the sixties, the French suddenly started to pay attention to the comfort of filmgoers in French theatres because they noticed that the comfortable and spacious theatres in which the Americans offered high quality colour film attracted many of customers and therefore had a big propaganda value. Jean Desparmet wanted to form a clientèle for the post and make the public relations effort permanent, a term that returned throughout his correspondence with Paris.\footnote{[F]ormer une sorte de ‘clientèle’ du poste’, see Jean Desparmet, “Mission d’étude des moyens d’information français en Afrique centrale et orientale”, 6 May 1964, 33, DAL, Nord Est Afrique 1960-1965, 35QO/8, AMAE.} The French in Kenya also decided to cancel the viewing of commercial French films because it was estimated that the African public would not appreciate those movies and started looking for more popular films. For the first time, French officers wanted to know what their African target audience preferred. Paul Tate, cultural attaché in the French Embassy of Accra, deliberately stayed in a second-rate hotel that was often frequented by Africans to make contact with them.\footnote{Letter, Guiringaud to DAL, “Information Politique”, 14 May 1960, 2, Report, Stephane Golmann, “Report de Mission Effectué Par Monsieur Stephane Golmann Pour le Compte de La Direction Generale Des Affaires Culturelles et Techniques du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Francaises au Ghana”, 31 December 1960, 8, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/72, AMAE.}

The British Council concentrated on the distribution of books to improve the British PR image. This turned the cheap book programme into an area of competition. When the BC officer, Paul Sinker, drove Barbara Ward, an anthropologist on Africa and one of Kennedy’s advisers, to the airport he therefore impressed upon her that American assistance was unnecessary. The British Council was more than qualified to handle the big demand for teachers and teacher trainers, and the liaison with teachers and books.\footnote{Brief, “Heads of Mission Conference”, [1963], BW 93/7, TNA; Journal Entry, Barbara Ward, “African Journal October 10th – December 7th 1963”, 10 October 1963, Barbara Ward Papers, Box 6, F. 34 Naval War College Papers: Problems of Communism, Georgetown University Library.} The increase of books for Africa under Murrow in 1962, however, was less aimed at publicity and had to support the modernisation process. He asked for books in English, and more importantly in French, to communicate what modernity meant.\footnote{Draft, Peter L. Koffsky, “The United States Information Program in Africa, 1945-1970: A History & Interpretation”, 2-1, RG. 306, A1 1072, Box 9, F African Program, Historical Background 1970, NARA.}

Nonetheless, the renewed emphasis on the demonstration effect for the Americans did not mean that public diplomats had lost sight of the possible PR advantages for the American image. Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Carl Rowan, for instance, wanted to offer...
assistance mainly on a person-to-person basis, because it was more difficult for an African student or businessman to go home and show a ‘lack of gratitude’ towards an individual than towards an organisation.\textsuperscript{927}

In short, what the Americans saw as the demonstration effect was interpreted in Ghana as an attempt at intrusion and by the French and British as a competing propaganda stunt. What had been cultural assistance in the 1950s, now became a weapon in the Ghanaian perception.

Conclusion: Modernity and Neocolonial Intrusion

The exchanges between Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Kenyatta represent some of the most intriguing artefacts from the archives. Their correspondence elucidates how inter-African conflict about national borders, and the strategy to create African unity, motivated Nkrumah to choose a more emotional form of propaganda, a course of action that ultimately weakened his international position. After 1960 he began to voice his disappointment about pan-Africanism while at the same time he proposed African unity as a solution, which some have seen as the sign of an irrational obsession. In fact, for Nkrumah this sort of plea was a tactic to mobilise the majority of the population behind his plan for direct unification. Nkrumah believed that leaders who questioned his approach had become subjected to teleguidance, the victim of French and British manipulation. Therefore African peoples rather than leaders had to be counted on to reach African unity.928

The Americans at USIS posts and the State Department failed to understand Ghana’s new strategy. Nkrumah’s impassioned propaganda campaign validated what modernisation experts such as Rostow had been saying: vocal anticolonialism was a form of frustration that came with the modernisation process, a call to intervene and manage that process. All the while the UK and France sat on the sidelines and produced propaganda as a substitute for real influence. Ironically, they had learned many of their public relations techniques from USIS officers, who after 1961 became less interested in propaganda battles and more interested in demonstrating the effects of modernisation.

The US and Ghana thus had diametrically opposing views on what public diplomacy was supposed to achieve. The Ghanaian attempt to warn Africans of the machinations of neocolonialism, and ‘immunise’ them from this threat, was interpreted in the US as a disturbance in the ongoing modernisation process. It prompted the Americans to intervene more rather than less. Nkrumah’s ‘Revolutionary Journalism’ was in the American analysis the result of an ‘information vacuum’ created by the departure of the colonial administrators. Conversely the demonstration effect, embraced by the Americans to enhance modernisation, was interpreted in Ghana as an attempt to intrude upon the ‘African Personality’.

On a continent that was preoccupied with African cultural uniqueness and embroiled in debates about militant pan-Africanism, cultural centres became battlegrounds and cultural

928 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, 320; In 1963 Nkrumah realised what the House of Foreign Relations Committee would conclude in a 1964 report: ‘Certain foreign policy objectives can be pursued by dealing directly with the people of foreign countries […] Through the use of modern instruments […] of communications’, see Osgood, Total Cold War, 4.
officers carried dangerous ideas. In an international environment obsessed with economic aid and socio-economic modernisation, Nkrumah’s choice for emotional propaganda and radio trottoir – with its fake telegrams, cartoons and rumours – marginalised pan-Africanism as an irrational political project. Modest changes in day-to-day public diplomacy tactics, aimed at creating a more positive attitude, actually increased tensions and deepened the animosity between Ghana and the US.

Nonetheless, in an African context where ideas were mistrusted, but aid welcomed, the superpowers had a competitive advantage. Rather than propagating their input like the British did, or branding technical aid as conspicuously French – analysed in chapter 7 – the US and the USSR went to great lengths to present their aid as the best and only road to modernity. The superpowers believed and convinced African governments that their assistance programmes were a matter of technocratic efficacy not of ideology. Leaders like Nkrumah believed they could safely accept aid as long as they kept ideas out.

However, in a world where aid had become an ideologically charged weapon of the Cold War, the principles of a donor could not be separated from the assistance he offered. By 1963, Nkrumah’s highly emotional discourse on the ‘African Personality’ sounded out of touch to officials in Africa, Europe and the United States in a world where power came to those who could offer a rational, technocratic solution to social problems. It is this fundamental historical shift that will be discussed in the conclusion.
Conclusion

How Postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa became a Cold War Battle Ground

The history of the ideological scramble for Africa is built on two claims: the importance of African agency and the multi-centric nature of change in African international history after 1945. Developments in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1950s and 1960s were never directly the result of a Cold War dynamic in which the competition between East and West limited the African space to act. The Cold War was the backdrop of a more immediate confrontation between French, British, American, and Ghanaian public diplomats. Specifically, Ghanaian decision-making was motivated in more direct ways by inter-African conflict about the shape of African unity. At the same time the disagreements among the NATO allies about the future of colonialism determined what the public diplomacy strategy looked like.

Yet many African scholars and Africanists argue that it was the Cold War that limited Nkrumah’s space to speak from a position of nonalignment. It is assumed that the bipolar struggle forced the Ghanaian leader to take the so-called real balance of power into account. Instead of articulating a utopian programme for African unity, Nkrumah had to concentrate on Ghana’s survival – leading him to seek rapprochement with the USSR. Conversely, international historians stress that anticolonial leaders skilfully exploited the East-West competition to extract gains. At the same time it is stressed that when this strategy was executed poorly – Lumumba being an often-quoted example – it would open the door to the disruption and violence that came with the clash of Cold War ideologies and superpower interventions. This thesis, on the contrary, argues that Nkrumah was not simply a realist who played off the Cold War superpowers against each other, but someone who had an ideological plan – African unity – that required him to keep the Cold War out.

Still, from 1964 onwards – when the Cubans landed in Guinea-Bissau to aid Amílcar Cabral – Africa was drawn into the zero-sum game of alliances and proxy wars, characteristic of the global south in the 1970s. What needs explaining then is how a continent captivated

by postcolonial problems and pan-African beginnings became an arena of the Cold War from the mid-1960s onwards, particularly when the first generation of African leaders – to which Nkrumah belonged – had been so wary of outside intervention. A conclusive answer to this question cannot be given here: the relation between African decolonisation and the Cold War is infinitely more complex and requires an integrated analysis of the so-called ‘Second Liberation’ of the 1970s in Portuguese and Southern Africa.

Nevertheless, the research presented here suggests that a more modest approach can provide the first fragments of an answer if we ask the same question from an Africa-centred standpoint, namely why was pan-Africanism overtaken by the Cold War? More concretely: why did pan-Africanism fail to become a fully developed interventionist ideology, capable of rivaling communist and capitalist proscriptions for African development? The key to answering that question lies in the Congo crisis when international discourses on progress shifted from psychological to socio-economic modernisation, which created a situation in which Ghanaian, American, French and British misperceptions of each other’s plans were reinforced.

The Congo crisis and the independence wave of 1960 were the turning points in this history, but not because the continent became the arena of Cold War conflict. American, French, British, and Ghanaian decision making during the Congo crisis was not simply a response to the Soviet threat. More importantly, the atrocities in Leopoldville signalled to Western public diplomats that so-called ‘African minds’ could not be developed into the modern mindset. Therefore Western leaders turned to aid-grants to spur the modernisation of African societies and maintain a degree of influence. The new importance of economic aid after 1960 – further stimulated by the missionary zeal of Kennedy’s national security adviser, Walt Rostow – not only made economics the moral issue at the heart of international politics, but also turned Nkrumah’s vocal pan-Africanism into an irrational and unpractical set of ideas, incompatible with the Western norms of modernity and rationality. Moreover, like other African leaders, Nkrumah believed he could accept foreign aid as long as he kept ideas out and vocally promoted his project for African unity, while the Cold War powers and the colonial powers assumed that the acceptance of aid implied the approval of their ideas.

This argument of mutually reinforced misperception is built upon three key conclusions that surface from the history that is presented here. First and foremost, it is argued here that

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933 Hyam, *Britain’s Declining Empire*, 427; Byrne, “Our Own Special Brand of Socialism”, 427.
Ghanaian diplomats between 1953 and 1963 operated in an environment that was determined less by the Cold War and more by what the NSC aptly termed a set of ‘contradictory forces’, which included pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, nationalism and Négritude, in addition to France and Britain’s new liberal notions of empire and development. In that setting, public diplomacy turned into an instrument of development, not a tool to fight a Cold War battle of words.

Secondly, public diplomats on the ground adopted and adapted each other’s successful techniques, which led to educational programmes and information campaigns that were surprisingly hybrid and cross-national. At the same time, however, diverging opinions of the power of culture – how exactly public diplomats thought that their operation would create influence – became the single most important factor shaping the relationships between public diplomats. For Americans, cultural centres after 1960 became a space to present the advantages of modernisation. They believed it would stimulate a desire to become more modern. Nkrumah, however, felt African audiences had to be sheltered from those ideas, which would only diminish African self-confidence and undermine his pan-African project. The French and British used cultural centres to play up their efforts as aid providers. In short, while all actors agreed African societies needed to be modernised, diverse views on how public diplomacy affected African attitudes determined if public diplomats saw each other as allies or enemies.

These two arguments about the strategic aims and techniques of public diplomacy are sustained by a sense that the chronology of Western policies in Africa needs to be refined, which is the third claim put forward here. Modernisation theory was not only Kennedy’s signature policy and hailed by the French and British as an alternative to colonial development schemes in the 1960s. In the 1950s the belief that the so-called ‘native mind’ or ‘native personality’ could be remade by modernising ‘minds’ through education, remained the widely accepted form of engagement with so-called underdeveloped peoples, in an international system that was still shaped by imperial thought. It is argued here that the

934 NSC paper, S. Everett Gleason acting executive secretary to government agencies, “U.S. policy toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960”, 26 August 1958, 4, WH Office, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 25, Folder: NSC 5818 Africa South of the Sahara, DDEL; Robert Murphy, made the same point in the tripartite talks with the UK and France on 16 April 1959: ‘The Africans were on the whole immature and unsophisticated and were subject to many pressures – Communist, Pan-African, Islamic – all of which made it difficult for those African leaders who were Western minded to keep their followers on the right path’, see Secret record, “Summary Record of the first meeting at Ambassadorial level held on April 16”, 16 April 1959, 2, FO 371/137966, TNA.

935 Mark Mazower has argued that British imperial thought provided an important contribution to the formation of the United Nations, see Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 13.
independence wave of 1960 opened the door to socio-economic schemes of modernisation that targeted societies rather than mentalities. This paradigm shift in thinking about development and international relations provides the essential backdrop to many of the policy decisions concerning Africa.

How these three key insights about the international environment, as well as the aims and techniques of public diplomats in Africa and the specific views on modernisation, influenced the scramble is discussed here. Further, while the thesis does not principally address the issue of deep causation, a multi-centric history of public diplomacy cannot avoid addressing the question of how interstate competition and cooperation modified national strategies and techniques and how these changes propelled the ideological scramble forward. In the final paragraph, the relationship between pan-Africanism and the Cold War will be assessed. But first, the impact of shifting ideas of modernisation and African agency upon public diplomacy strategies will be addressed.

A Multi-centric History of Public Diplomacy

Ghanaians and other anticolonial statesmen shaped Western decisions at every critical stage in counterintuitive ways. A firm goodbye from Nkrumah’s mouth sounded like a call for help to Western ears. The small-scale disturbances in Africa after the war, for instance, were seen as the result of too little information and cultural assistance. The Accra riots of 1948 led the British to look for new ways to clarify their colonial policy as the French tried to restrict the number of USIS posts in Africa. Eisenhower believed colonialism was on the way out and therefore wanted to prepare leaders for the responsibilities of self-government, which rejects the argument that the American president wanted to avoid Africa as much as possible or sacrificed the legitimate drive for independence in light of the Cold War.

At the Bandung Conference of 1955, the leaders of newly independent nations wanted to debunk the myth of the civilising mission that they were unable to manage their own affairs or act independently in international relations. In their speeches Nehru and others further accused the colonial powers of promising development but delivering destruction. Asian leaders therefore committed to offering African colonies aid, to speed up their march to independence. Historians have ignored Bandung’s developmental aspirations and have therefore concluded that the West had no response to the meetings. They overlook how the critique of botched Western-led development led the West to improve its schemes of cultural assistance and aid. Paradoxically, Bandung did not lead the colonial powers to a ‘hurried
scuttle’ – as Churchill suggested, but compelled them to deepen their commitment to the colonial project. Likewise, Nasser’s assertive nationalism, in the course of the Suez crisis of 1956, made Eisenhower no less reluctant to intervene. It only stressed the need to separate American aid from the French and British efforts.

Furthermore, Ghanaian independence in 1957 and the tumultuous decolonisation of Guinea in 1958 did not affect the faith in a guided transition that was held by de Gaulle, Lennox-Boyd, and Eisenhower, who maintained that African leaders needed to be prepared for the responsibilities of independence. Public diplomats on the ground therefore did not begin a war of words to counter the strident anticolonial propaganda they were faced with. Instead they looked for ways to better showcase their aid. The fact that African target audiences did not attend the activities of the cultural centres did not signal a rejection of Western led-modernisation; it indicated that the aid on offer had to be showcased in a better way.

Similarly, when the Congo crisis and the propaganda campaign against the Sahara bomb brought to the fore Africans who violently rejected colonial guidance, the Americans, British and French could only see the failure of their psychological approach to development. Consequently, socio-economic structures became the target of development projects. When Nkrumah shifted to a more emotional form of propaganda to draw African peoples into his project for African unity, he was seen in the West as someone who was frustrated, an attitude brought about by the tensions of the modernisation process. Conversely, Nkrumah believed he could protect his populations from foreign ideas and yet still accept economic aid, a miscalculation on his part.

**Modernity and African Agency: between African and Western International Perceptions**

Explaining this recurring disconnection between African and Western ideas is difficult because, even fifty years later, the hold on the imagination of the ‘year of Africa’, 1960, as well as Kennedy’s mission to modernise the Third World through foreign aid is still strong. It requires us to attend to African agency and the changing nature of modernisation theory.

First, the African nationalist diplomats who suddenly appeared at the UN might have enjoyed prestige on the continent but they were not taken seriously by the West – who could not conceive of non-whites as diplomats with proper foreign policy objectives of their own.

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936 Church uttered these words in the context of the decolonisation of India, see Toye, *Churchill’s Empire*, 272.
937 The African prestige in the UN is emphasised by Irwin, *Gordian Knot*, 9.
In March 1960, for instance, de Gaulle and the British ambassador in Paris mocked the ‘eccentricities’ of the Afro-Asian members whose presence made the UN useless.\(^\text{938}\)

A second, less tangible, but more profound development was the transition from a psychological brand of modernisation to a socio-economic conception of modernisation, which divides the scramble into two periods. In the 1950s, the belief that the so-called ‘African man’ could be remade by developing him into the modern mindset through education remained influential. The independence wave of 1960, however, opened the door to socio-economic schemes of modernisation that targeted societies rather than mentalities. The theorists behind psychological modernisation became discredited because of their share in the oppression in Algeria and Kenya. However, the atrocities in the Congo showed Western public diplomats that psychological modernisation had failed. Instead, the switch was made to socio-economic modernisation.\(^\text{939}\)

The transition from psychological to socio-economic modernisation, and the diverging views about the extent to which African diplomats were able to act independently on the international stage, directly influenced Africa’s position in the world.

**Revising National Historiographies: Entangled Public Diplomacy**

The emergence of Eisenhower and Nkrumah as key protagonists in Africa not only undercut longstanding views in the literature of a president who only took ad-hoc decisions and an African nationalist leader who zigzagged between the Cold War superpowers. What is also brought into focus is how difficult it was for the French and the British to rethink the logic of what had been archetypal instruments of the civilising mission: education and information. In the 1950s, the colonial powers found themselves being forced to offer cultural assistance to keep up with Ghanaian ideological training schemes and the efforts of the American International Cooperation Administration (ICA). In spite of a persistent decolonisation narrative that presents decolonisation as a planned enterprise, the colonial powers were never able to plan the relinquishment of their colonial responsibilities.

Under the impulse of Leopold Senghor, French cultural influence was projected to British Africa after the Bandung Conference of 1955. The violent counterinsurgency measures in Algeria discredited France on the international stage and French attention had to be redirected towards increasing the welfare of Africans who could benefit from learning the

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\(^{938}\) Letter, Jebb Gladwyn to Selwyn Lloyd, 2 March 1960, PREM 11/2888, TNA.

French langue. For France, assistance was not about creating and selling an image of French grandeur. In a comparative perspective, it becomes clear that cultural assistance was about striking a deal: French cultural aid was offered in exchange for support of de Gaulle’s international stance. French cultural diplomacy has been characterised as schizophrenic and contradictory, because doubts about the status of French culture coexisted alongside the belief in the superiority and universality of French culture.

Yet, French operatives constantly doubted the way in which French culture was offered, French culture itself was never questioned. If Africans did not come to their cultural centres, the French reasoned, there had to be something wrong with the way France presented what it had to offer. To reach more people, the French ambassador to Ghana, Louis de Guiringaud, started imitating the PR methods of his competitors from 1958 onwards, much to the dismay of de Gaulle and his prime minister, Michel Debré. Admittedly, the French plan for cultural expansion of 1959 allowed for a more political use of French culture but this did not mean that French culture would be promoted. Instead, cultural resources were more consciously granted to those countries that were expected to remain closely allied with France, particularly after 1960.

From the moment the UK organised elections in its colony of the Gold Coast in 1951, the British believed that the dismantlement of old imperial structures would earn them enough respect to maintain their influence on the continent. Accordingly, a propaganda campaign in defence of the British Empire was considered to be unnecessary. Instead the radio and press infrastructure of the territories was developed to produce stability and gratitude. After the Bandung Conference of 1955, the British government increased the funding for the British Council, an institution that had been founded in 1934 to organise British education and cultural activities abroad. When in 1958 Guinea became independent, the British began to disseminate the notion that they were committed to a guided decolonisation process together with the French.

After the French atomic bomb and the Congo crisis, however, Macmillan realised that colonialism could no longer be sold as a benevolent enterprise. Instead, UK cultural assistance began to pay lip service to the aims of African unity. English teaching in French Africa for instance was presented as a way to foster integration between British and French speaking Africa.

940 Rice, “Cowboys and Communists.”
The British information operation outside of Europe did not fail because it focused too much on Cold War themes and ignored local realities, rather, the lack of success has to be attributed to the illusion that British aims and pan-African aspirations could be connected. By 1961, the French and the Americans also believed they could jump on the pan-African bandwagon and transform anticolonial nationalism into something less hostile. Statesmen like Nasser or Ben Bella, who consciously exploited the Cold War for their own gain, found the company of their Western counterparts who in turn tried to extract gains from anticolonial internationalism, but presented themselves as primary providers of aid.

That anticolonial project was most eloquently defended by Nkrumah, who remained steadfastly neutral in the Cold War, even after Lumumba’s assassination and the emergence of a group at the Belgrade Conference that prioritised economic and political gain over the Third World project that sought to create a more equal international system. He believed this was the only way to shield the continent from the icy winds of the Cold War. Moreover, his emotional call for African unity, while political support from other African leaders diminished, was not the result of an irrational obsession. On the contrary, in the symbolic fight that decolonisation had become, his belief in the ability of propaganda to rouse the African leaders, and later the African peoples, in support of pan-Africanism was a reasonable choice.

The thesis further demonstrates that Eisenhower had a coherent strategy for Africa that was built on education and optimism about the abilities of the African to learn and apply American ideas. By contrast Kennedy, who was wary of public opinion and let his aides do most of the work, was pessimistic about the African ability to behave rationally and comply with international norms. For those in the White House after 1960, anticolonialism was a sentiment expressed by nationalist leaders who felt frustrated by the slow pace of progress and who harboured resentment towards the colonisers and the US. Public diplomats had to manage those feelings through an integrated counterinsurgency campaign. The perspective of the ideological scramble reverses a persistent perception of a sclerotic Eisenhower presidency and the dynamic Kennedy administration. In the paternalistic mindset of the 1950s and 1960s, Eisenhower actually gave Africans more credit than Kennedy ever would.

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942 Vaughan makes this argument about the failure due to an inappropriate connection with the Cold War in Vaughan, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57*, 247.
The ‘African’ as a Security Concern: Foreign Aid, Strong Men and the American Liberal World Order

All these separate public diplomacy strategies were driven by a common concern about the developmental state of formerly colonised peoples and what independence would mean for the international system. It was not racial war, but denied opportunities for progress that became the key issue in the position of the African continent within the international system. Taking Eisenhower’s commitment to cultural assistance as well as Kennedy’s critical attitude towards public diplomacy and anticolonial aspirations into account, forces a revision of longstanding claims in the literature about US engagement with the developing world – especially in the area of economic aid, but also in the use of more coercive means, authoritarian rule and counterinsurgency. The conviction that Africans needed cultural assistance profoundly influenced the strategy of the preeminent power in the international system of the 1950s and 1960s: the United States.

The fact that economic aid in real numbers remained low under Eisenhower, even though he vocally supported aid programmes in the Third World, was rooted in the president’s belief that foreign aid could only be effective in unison with educational and information assistance. His support of authoritarian leaders is often cited as evidence that the American president saw Africans as incapable of understanding democracy. However he was hesitant about that support, as he maintained that long-term stability could only be achieved by educating leaders how to organise a democratic society. He approved a practice whereby American training programmes for the military forces were complemented by a civic education programme that was meant to transfer American democratic leadership skills.

Conversely, the question of whether Kennedy’s economic assistance was in essence about furthering long-term humanitarian goals or attaining political goals was within the administration itself overtaken by a discussion about the transformational potential of foreign aid. Realists and idealists alike believed they had to manage the adverse psychological effects that foreign aid could create. The modernisation of societies, it was believed, introduced emotional tension and could exacerbate the state of postcolonial frustration if the hopes and needs of the African were not matched with sufficient amounts of aid.

Kennedy therefore authorised the development of counterinsurgency programmes not only ‘to defend against communist rebellions in friendly, impoverished countries’, but,

943 Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens”, 765; Connelly suggests that Eisenhower, de Gaulle and even Kennedy all feared the North-South conflict, but overlooks the optimism that characterised calmer periods.
944 Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, xxi.
more importantly, to cushion the blow of its own modernisation efforts. By demonstrating the positive effects of modernisation, the USIA had to prevent the frustrations from becoming violent and avoid insurgency. Kennedy’s commitment to modernisation theory thus also comprised the fear of a modernisation process turned sour, which historians tend to disregard.\(^{945}\)

‘Drivers’ behind the Scramble

As C.A. Bayly writes in his classic *The Birth of the Modern World*,\(^{946}\) most historians want to know why things changed. The question is difficult because drivers of change are often the result of a complex interplay of factors. Nonetheless, the question is pressing in a multicaentric history of public diplomacy that presents African leaders as independent actors on the international stage and at the same time acknowledges the limits of their success. Nonetheless the Western states were not the ‘prime movers’ of this story. What sustained the competition was the complex interaction between, on the one hand, policy makers who assigned a particular role to public diplomacy within their Africa strategy and, on the other hand, public diplomats on the ground who had their own ideas about the power of culture and what public diplomacy could achieve. It is these two drivers on a high level and a lower level that are addressed here.

*The First Catalyst of the Scramble: The Power of Culture*

The scramble accelerated when public diplomats in one office noticed they had been deceived by colleagues from other countries that were active in Africa or, even worse, when local officers felt they had underestimated the effect of a competitor’s propaganda on the African target audience. The settlers provide us with the clearest example. The settler government and the Colonial Office believed that information could only be effective if it was clearly explained, thus they considered the American operation in Kenya to be harmless and even useful as an extra provider of aid. When the USIA shifted to personal contacts with the African population after 1958, the settlers began to complain because they felt it could give

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Africans an inflated sense of self-worth, and have destabilising effects on the attitudes of the African population.  

Thus the prominent presence of the US and Ghana did not imply a preponderant amount of ‘soft power’ in Africa. An examination of the propaganda techniques reveals that the perception of American power or Ghanaian influence was often determined by external factors: the medium employed or the alleged inability of the African target audience to understand the messages they received. The supposed lack of expertise on the ‘African mind’ among the ranks of competing public diplomacy services exacerbated the situation because those operatives underestimated the adverse effects of their actions for the development of the Africans. Neither the French nor the settlers were happy with the personal approach of the USIS officers, because – allegedly – it inflated the sense of African self-worth.

For the British and the French, Africans in the 1950s were only socio-economic subjects, while the American outlook presented Africans as potential political agents. When public diplomats on the ground came to see the so-called ‘native mind’ or ‘native personality’ as a threat to international security they acted upon it by setting up educational projects that would foster democratic citizenship. Because neither the British nor the settlers believed the ‘African mind’ to be suited to western organisational models, they welcomed USIS projects as development assistance. The French held comparable views, but considered education to be the source of their colonial power and therefore thought the Americans wanted to erode the basis of French influence.

After the Bandung Conference of 1955, Western public diplomats believed they could maintain their influence by offering better quality assistance. However, the preferences of African target populations were not taken into account; this oversight turned out to be a mistake. At Ghanaian independence it dawned on Western diplomats that they had to showcase their assistance if they wanted to be noticed among an oversupply of plans for Africa. Because the question of how to attract African target audiences had hardly ever been posed, public diplomats began to adopt and adapt the techniques that had made their competitors successful. The French ambassador to Ghana, Louis de Guiringaud, became a particularly eager student of propaganda techniques, ploughing through stacks of periodical and Ghanaian propaganda leaflets.

What becomes apparent when looking at the exchange of different public diplomacy techniques among public diplomats on the ground is that not only were the Western means of

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947 Secret letter, E Barring to Carstairs, 19 April 1958, FCO 141/6731, TNA.
communication adopted by anticolonial activists, such as the Algerians, but the reverse was also the case: Ghanaian propaganda techniques became a source of inspiration for Western public diplomats. There was no binary opposition between a homogenous coloniser and a powerless mass of subjects, as Edward Saïd claims. So-called ‘Western’ and ‘Oriental’ actors borrowed and re-invented methods to attain influence in a global and intercultural war for the soul of the new Africa.

More important was the divide between the high-level policy makers and the public diplomats on the ground, who were forced to make it up as they went along. In light of the situation in Guinea in 1958, USIS officers urged their chiefs to pay more attention to the threat coming from the ‘high impact’ type projects of Soviet development, while the conferences of British information officers decided that radio and printing presses should only be offered if the UK would be able to monitor and guide the messages that were produced with these communication means. Undoubtedly the most striking example of this tension between the higher and lower level was the confrontation between the old style of de Gaulle and the PR approach of Guiringaud. While both man believed in the value of the French language as a development tool, Guiringaud realised that he had to court Africans instead of assuming their interest in French initiatives. Eventually, however, higher levels came around to the PR way of thinking, elucidating how little planning mattered in a constantly evolving situation where improvisation and constant recalibration were the only appropriate response.

In the 1960s, new ideas about the African attitude and mental state emerged. For the US that attitude was a potential liability to the modernisation of societies, because the transition from tradition to modernity introduced emotional tensions. Conversely, Nkrumah believed that Africans were susceptible to anticolonial propaganda and needed to be immunised against it or sheltered from it. What Rostow therefore saw as the demonstration effect, whereby the advantages of modernity were exhibited, was perceived by Nkrumah as an attempt to infiltrate society ideologically.

The fact that the Kennedy administration never believed in education as a means to jumpstart modernisation allowed the British and the French to use the educational aspirations among young people to strengthen their image as the providers of development. The diverging conceptions of how economic aid affected African attitudes created more problems. While the Americans wanted to downplay the possible effects of their aid programme to limit

the possibility of disappointment and frustration, the UK and France wanted to promote their efforts, making cooperation in the area of aid impossible.

The complaints about the intrusiveness of American culture, the outcry about neocolonialism or the loathing of anticolonial propaganda – which all emerged at one point or another during the scramble – were the outcome of the diverging beliefs held about the power of cultural intervention. The single most important factor shaping relations on the ground in Africa was therefore not the Cold War, but opposing conceptions of the power of culture, and how exactly public diplomats thought that their operation would create influence.

The Second Catalyst of the Scramble: Alliances Rooted in Misunderstanding

The scramble was accelerated not only by conflicting ideas about the power of culture, but also by broken promises and rude awakenings. Africa’s relative isolation from the Cold War allowed for different and unexpected alliances that went beyond East-West and North-South divides. Often these coalitions unravelled as quickly as they had come about, because they were built on a host of misunderstanding about aims and techniques.

The most famous example is the break between Eisenhower and his NATO allies after the Suez crisis of 1956. Eisenhower and Dulles understood after 1956 that the colonial powers were not interested in preparing African peoples, or other ‘emerging’ nations for that matter, for a stable transition. Before Suez, both men had been convinced that they shared a commitment to fostering self-government while writing Churchill and Mendès-France. Eisenhower regained some confidence when he saw how de Gaulle engaged Algeria and Africa in 1958, using a formula similar to Eisenhower’s mix of cultural assistance and cautious foreign aid. Nonetheless, the point Dulles made in 1956 remained valid: colonial control had to be opposed if the US wanted to end up on the right side of history.

In 1961 Nkrumah and Kennedy became each other’s allies because both men believed they shared in the belief that anticolonialism and nonalignment were essential determinants of Africa’s postcolonial condition. However, for Nkrumah anticolonialism was a way to resist intervention, a Monroe doctrine for Africa. By contrast, Kennedy saw anticolonialism as a form of frustration brought about by years of oppression and kindled by the momentous changes of the modernisation process. His positive approach to Non-Alignment therefore

949 ‘Thus it was that those nations that elected to take the route to independence via the French Community did so with relative smoothness’, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 572.
950 Memorandum of Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, November 1, 1956, AWF, NSC Series, f: 302nd Meeting of the NSC, DDEL.
meant exactly that: turning frustrated and passive behaviour into a rational can do attitude for development, a call for action. Their alliance was thus bound to fail. While there was a difference between the Non-Aligned Project, nonalignment and neutralism and the Kennedy administration recognised the difference tactically, in reality many of these movements were conflated as the manifestation of frustration.\(^{951}\)

The British stubbornly stuck to the illusion that their organised relinquishment of colonial responsibility had earned them ‘goodwill’. Even when agents of the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs were caught in Kenya with subversive propaganda material in their bags and Ghanaian money in their pockets, the information officers still believed they could do business with Nkrumah. After 1960 they even believed British aims for Africa were compatible with the pan-African targets because activities in favour of the English language and culture would indirectly lead the Africans in the French territories to know their English speaking neighbours, bringing African unity one step closer.

After independence, on 6 March 1957, the Eisenhower administration and the Macmillan government had still viewed Nkrumah as an ally in their attempt to bring about an orderly transition to self-government while the French ambassador, Marc Renner, did not see the Ghanaian leader as a threat because he believed Nkrumah suffered from a mental illness.\(^{952}\) As time went on, Nkrumah turned out to be a serious threat to French claims in Africa, something Renner’s successor, Guiringaud, addressed directly. However, after 1960 the Franco-Ghanaian relations silently improved. Nkrumah became an ally of de Gaulle outside of Africa because both wanted a world that was not dominated by the superpowers.

The French and British cooperation had always been tumultuous. The British plans to jointly promote imperialism as an enterprise that had brought development and progress was sabotaged by the explosion of the French atomic bomb in the Sahara. For France, however, international cooperation had to give the French more leeway, not make imperialism palatable, which was Macmillan’s intention. When Macmillan started cooperating more closely with the Americans after 1960, particularly in the area of foreign aid where they funded the Volta River project, the French Prime Minister Debré felt betrayed because it

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\(^{951}\) Robert Rakove refers to the semantic confusion that came from using nonalignment as a synonym for neutralism, see Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World*, 67.

made the aid grants of the former colonial powers seem trivial. The French had always been suspicious of the American intentions in Africa and were therefore dismayed that the British broke the colonial alliance. De Gaulle failed to understand that his insistence to test the French atomic bomb in the Sahara made the British side with its territories in Africa rather than France.

That British switch in 1960 already hints at what is argued here. The vital accelerator of the scramble was the intensification of inter-African diplomatic disagreement about the eventual shape of African unity and the means by which unification could be achieved. Ghana and the BAA had invested in building a revolutionary network that by 1960 was collapsing as its members – such as Nyerere, Mobya, and Kenyatta – turned their backs on Accra. In response, Nkrumah embarked on a demonstrative propaganda campaign that he believed would convince the African peoples to follow him. At the same time he wanted to warn them about the neocolonial powers that had a hold over the African leaders who refused to cooperate with Nkrumah. However, Kennedy caught wind of the Ghanaian press campaign, which further eroded Nkrumah position. When he began supporting armed insurgency in the late 1960s, because it attracted young uneducated Africans to the cause, Nkrumah lost all support.

However, unlike Fanon, Nkrumah did not consider violence in itself ‘a cleansing force’. According to Nkrumah, violence did not free ‘the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction’, nor did it make him ‘fearless’ or restore his ‘self-respect’. Violent resistance had to be buttressed by an effort to strengthen the self-confidence of the African and spread the ‘African Personality’ and culture. Public diplomacy and newspapers therefore remained important. Nkrumah’s shift to violence – despite what some historians have suggested – did not express disappointment with the Ghanaian model that was based on non-violence and the spread of ideas.

Taken together these relations elucidate how complex modes of conflict rooted in the changing political situation on the continent, rather than clear-cut North-South or East-West divides, determined policymaking.

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953 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 94.
The Political Project of Pan-Africanism and the Emergence of the Global Cold War

African scholars and Africanists tend to assume that it was the Cold War that limited Nkrumah’s space to speak from a position of nonalignment. Conversely, international historians stress that anticolonial leaders exploited the East-West competition to extract gains. However, Nkrumah saw the world through a pan-African and anticolonial lens, in terms of imperialists and anticolonialists. To fully understand why pan-Africanism was overtaken by the Cold War ideologies and failed to become a successful international ideology it is therefore necessary to assess Ghana’s diplomacy.

Pan-Africanism and the Shift from Ideas to Assistance as a Source of Power

Admittedly, Nkrumah’s failure to turn pan-Africanism into a viable ideological alternative was a matter of financial power. Nkrumah was unable to provide credible amounts of foreign aid. Although Kofi Baako, the first secretary of the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs, might have lined the pockets of political activists with dollar bills and brought students to Ghana’s schools, Accra could not finance the construction of the symbols of modernity such as dams, schools, or agricultural and industrial projects. With the French and the British being selective about aid grants, economically weakened and discredited by the colonial experience, the USSR – with the PRC – and the US emerged as attractive alternative beacons of assistance. The country plan that the PAO in Accra, Mark B. Lewis, wrote in 1963, mentions the USSR as its only adversary in the area of development, while in earlier versions France and the UK had been cited as interfering with US development plans.

At the same time, decolonisation and the Cold War were also about ideas, not just about hard economic and military interests. To understand why Cold War ideologies became more appealing on a continent that had tried to resist East-West intrigues, and to explain why Ghana’s pan-African message gained less traction in the 1960s, Ghana’s changing public diplomacy techniques need to be examined. As freedom fighters became national leaders and turned their back on Ghana, Nkrumah realised he had to reach over the heads of African leaders and mobilise the population by producing emotional propaganda full of rumours about neocolonial plots to illuminate what might happen if Africa did not unite.

956 Foreign service despatch, Mark B. Lewis to USIA, “Country Plan”, 7 August 1962, RG. 306, UD-WW 92, FRC 1, NARA.
Internationally, however, Nkrumah’s shift to emotionalism backfired because the prevailing ideas about nation building had changed. Whereas in the 1950s African minds had been targeted to ascertain the orderly transition to a modern future, after 1960 the socio-economic structure became the instrument to change the African man. The – perceived – everyday conditions in which African peoples were forced to live in the Sixties became the decisive variable in explaining behaviour. In effect, the success of the modernisation project was decoupled from the African ability to learn, an essential tenant of psychological modernisation.

Triumph in the state-building project after 1960 hinged on acquiring control over the physical surroundings and the socio-economic development process leading to the rational future. In Western eyes, however, Africans became more susceptible to manipulation because the modernisation process introduced tensions and resentment towards Western – ‘colonial’ – ideas, leading to frustration and emotionally driven, irrational decisions. Public diplomats were therefore preoccupied with managing those feelings because anti-American, anti-French or anti-British charges would more easily be believed. The West believed that the hesitant colonial attempt to modernise societies had created a target audience that was more receptive to those interpretations.\(^{957}\)

American power, Ghanaian influence, and the Soviet threat were now measured by the ability to deliver on the promises of development rather their capacity to change the African psychology. Economic aid had become the paramount international issue and its acceptance implied the approval of a donor’s principles, at least in the West.\(^{958}\) Sorensen, for instance, acknowledged in his analysis of the USIA that world leadership could no longer be claimed by confronting the Soviet. The US could only come out on top internationally if it addressed the problems of birth control, agricultural modernisation, industrialisation, urban congestion, education, and the development of viable political, economic, and social institutions.\(^{959}\) Guerrilla leaders like Amilcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau, realised this early on and therefore cloaked their struggle with ‘scientific Marxism’, not pan-Africanism or other nativist conceptions. In his party directive of 1965 Cabral was clear:


\(^{958}\) Byrne, “Our Own Special Brand of Socialism”, 427–428.

Always remember that the people are not fighting for ideas, nor for what is in one man’s mind. The people fight and accept the sacrifices demanded by the struggle in order to gain material advantages to live better and in peace, to benefit for progress and for the better future of their children. \(^{960}\)

The stress put on the material dimension of the African future is all the more striking when it is juxtaposed with Nkrumah’s remarks at the AAPC in 1958:

> And here we must stress that the ethical and humanistic side of our people must not be ignored. We do not want a simple materialistic civilisation which disregards the spiritual side of the human personality and man’s need of something beyond that filling of his stomach and the satisfaction of his outward needs. \(^{961}\)

By 1963, Nkrumah’s talk about an ‘African Personality’ and ‘immunisation’ sounded old-fashioned, painfully out of touch in a world where international influence came to those who could offer a guaranteed, ‘scientific’, route to modern material progress. It was precisely this issue that had divided the delegates at Belgrade in 1961: was the Third World still relevant as an ideological project in the face of developmental challenges?

In an international system where rationality and technocratic skill were the norm, pan-Africanism appeared an increasingly less credible alternative. Irrational and naively ‘ideological’, it no longer fit with the march to progress as defined by the West. Nkrumah’s tactical shift to loudly appeal to African populations, in a *radio trottoir* fashion, may have been appropriate in the African context but it confirmed Western notions of ‘emotionalism’.

At the same time, Nkrumah had no qualms about accepting foreign aid provided that sufficient time and effort was devoted to ‘immunising’ the peoples against foreign ideas. However, for the Europeans and the Americans the line between foreign assistance and ideas had become increasingly blurred in a postcolonial world. Paradoxically enough, African leaders had learned to separate ideas and assistance at universities in the West where they had listened to Daniel Bell who had proclaimed the end of ideology. \(^{962}\) At the same time the US and the USSR convinced African leaders in the 1960s that their aid was about technocratic superiority, not about ideas.

In a way, therefore, Nkrumah and Eisenhower were kindred spirits. Eisenhower also worried that the wrong form of modernity – communism – would emerge if American values were not explicitly exported alongside foreign aid. Kennedy, by contrast, lived in a different age. For Kennedy, and for Rostow, it was industrial development that could demonstrate the


\(^{961}\) *All-African People’s Conference: Speeches by the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening and Closing Sessions on December 8th and 13th, 1958*, 4.

values of American-led progress. The USIA only had to counteract the risk that African heads would be filled with aspirations that might not be met, leading to disappointment and frustration with the US. Consequently, aid coming from the US and the USSR expanded in a fairly unproblematic fashion as pan-African ideas deteriorated. As a man of the old world of the 1950s, Nkrumah was unable to find an appropriate response.

The Cold War as Seen From Africa, a Complicated Question

In contrast to the argument about pan-Africanism, the narrative can only hint at how decolonisation influenced the East-West struggle on the continent. What is clear is that the conflict was more complex in Africa than in Europe where the USSR did not have to deal with an emerging Chinese competitor. The US also did not have to compete with the European powers for influence, although admittedly there was constant mediation and compromise. Moreover, the sharp contrast between the European ‘Long Peace’ and the bloody, destructive global Cold War does not hold true for the 1950s and early 1960s. The Cold War and decolonisation were two symbolic battles that merged at the cultural centres in Africa, but a conventional propaganda war was all but possible, because Africans were considered to be in need of development. Information services became the providers of cultural assistance, not the nerve centres of ideological war against the USSR.

What is less obvious is how the African experience of decolonisation influenced the way in which the Cold War played out on the continent. In a multi-centric history of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Cold War emerges not simply as a continuation of colonialism with other means, nor as a system or a period. At different times, to different actors, it was a bargaining chip, a distraction from questions about independence, and a way to discredit an African leader or Western diplomats who offered aid. USIS officials were therefore constantly forced to look for ways to fight the Cold War without mentioning the communist adversary because African nationalists did not allow their countries to become ‘propaganda battlegrounds’. Cultural centres faced closure in Ghana and Guinea and had always been subject to tough negotiations.

At the same time, Western actors did not hesitate to use the Cold War threat to create an Africa that would fit neatly into their own plans. The French kept on convincing the

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964 Westad by contrast has no doubt that the ‘Cold War in the South’ was ‘a continuation of European colonial interventions’, see Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 5.
Americans that the French presence was the only guarantee against communist takeover. Macmillan referred to the Cold War during the Sahara bomb crisis to avoid talking about the constitutional future of African territories. In 1963, the USIA even suggested increasing the ‘African awareness of the extent of the communist influence in Ghana’ so that Nkrumah’s star could rise no further. It is clear that between 1953 and 1963, the Cold War lens was flexible when it came to affairs in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In the end, combining an Africa-centred perspective with a multi-centric history approach reveals how Sub-Saharan Africa was not a heart of darkness, located outside of the normal dealings of diplomacy. Indeed, every time Western actors made that assumption, they were forced to rethink their programmes. The leaders of postcolonial states were not realists without an ideological project who exploited the only weak spot of the Western powers, namely the fact that their foreign policy was shaped by ideology: Liberal capitalism or communism. Pan-African experimentation encountered its limits because it did not adhere to the new gospel of modernity. By combining these two approaches, I reject a persistent narrative in which non-Western actors remain subaltern agents who have significant influence but lack the ability to present a viable alternative to Cold War pressures that they can only resist or utilise. The possibility that the actions of African leaders might have actually altered the boundaries of the Cold War system as it unfolded on the African continent and in other parts of the Third World is underestimated. Defining the conceptual limits of the global Cold War in light of the broader 20th century might thus lead to Africa, where the Cold War conflict unfolded in unexpected ways.

966 Excellent examples are: Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution; Schmidt, Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958; Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism.
Appendix 1

The Public Diplomacy Network.

At the end of World War II a network of information and cultural agencies was hesitantly established and expanded into Africa during the 1950s. The British programme divided planning and operation among the Foreign Office (FO), the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), the Board of Trade, and the Central Office of Information (COI). Policy control was vested in the Foreign Office (FO) where the Information Policy Department (IPD) emerged as the key agency for the Britain’s information officers. In 1948 the Information Research Department (IRD) was established as a FO department that focused on intelligence and the production of anti-Soviet material. The BBC had created an empire broadcast service in 1932 targeting white, English speaking listeners while in 1934 the British Council had been founded as a non-official institute of cultural diplomacy. In Africa they were productive in the most consistent way. This multitude of institutions ended the stronghold that London, together with the Ministry of Information (MOI), had over colonial administrations that had also established colonial information offices. Every problem therefore led to intense discussion between British Council representatives, colonial information officers and UK information officers. Until 1960 these agencies would remain active only in British Africa.

The French cultural operation also consisted of a haphazard set of organisations. The cultural sections of French embassies were the main coordinators of policy, the Direction générale des relations culturelles (DGRC), founded in 1945 as a successor to the Service des œuvres françaises à l’étranger, supplied most of the material. When in 1956 the ‘Service de coopération technique’ was created its name was changed to Direction générale des affaires culturelles et techniques (DGACT). Both had relations with a private organisation: the Alliance Française, which had been founded in 1883 to spread the French culture and organise language education. While this gave the ‘action culturel’ a non-political colour, it also hindered the use of the alliance as a political tool. As the post-war era progressed ambassadors grew more and more dissatisfied with the confusing and overlapping

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967 Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57, 16; Potter, Broadcasting Empire, 47.
969 When scientific cooperation with the industrialised countries became important the name was changed again in 1969 by creating the Direction générale des relations culturelles, scientifiques et techniques (DGRCST).
970 Duboscclard, Histoire de la Fédération des Alliances Françaises aux Etats-Unis, 155.
971 Frank, “La machine diplomatique culturelle française après 1945”, 337.
responsibilities, but also had room to craft their own strategy. In the words of Jean M. Desparmet, consul in Salisbury:

The information material that is actually sent to the diplomatic posts is produced by the Direction générale des affaires culturelles et techniques, the Direction des services d'information et de presse, the Direction des archives diplomatiques et de la documentation. The posts can hardly distinguish between the different sources from which these documents emanate. Their viewpoint is purely pragmatic. The only thing that interests them is that the material is immediately usable.

In 1957, Roger Seydoux, the DGACT director, proposed an expansion plan, which focused more on a political use of culture and the newly independent states and was approved by de Gaulle in 1958. The ‘Ministère de la Coopération’, was responsible for the ties between French Africa and France and had a Direction de la cooperation technique et culturelle and was particularly active over the radio waves, through SORAFOM. The French became active outside of their own territories in a more coherent way in 1955.

The United States Information Agency (USIA) was founded by Eisenhower in 1953 with a network of local United States Information Services (USIS), which had been established right after the war in liberated countries. The Jackson Committee – appointed by the president to devise a global propaganda plan – encouraged every USIS post to develop its own policy. The International Cooperation Administration (ICA), founded on 30 June

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974 Frank, “La machine diplomatique culturelle française après 1945”, 346–348; Rapport de présentation, [1958], 19780282/12 Activités ’58–’61, CHAN.

975 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, x.

1955, operated in the field of education in anticipation of a plan that the USIA deputy director, Abbott Washburn’s was drawing up, but never realised.977

In Ghana, the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA) was officially a non-governmental organisation that coordinated financial and moral aid to freedom movements and the populations in dependent African territories. Founded in 1959, it was separate from the African Affairs Secretariat, which in its turn was part of the Office of the President and detached from the Ministry of External Affairs, which changed its new name to Foreign Affairs. George Padmore asked K.B. Asante – the later principal secretary – to join the African Affairs Secretariat after a visit to Tunis, where Asante was then working at the diplomatic post. After an early supper, they discussed the future of Ghana over whisky. In 1961, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became responsible for the public diplomacy operation outside Africa, for instance in exhibition windows in New York or London.978

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