The impact of the current military conflict on migration and mobility in Ukraine

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Abstract

In seeking to investigate the recent changes in migration matters in Ukraine since EuroMaidan, annexation of Crimea and hostilities in Donbass, this paper explores the situation on the ground using the available data (including official statistics, figures of the international organizations, media reports and public surveys) as well as expert voices from different disciplines. It covers the period from winter 2013/14, when the first individual circular movements started, to autumn 2014, marked with intense mass displacement which has been rapidly growing since then. It is indicated that the observed conflict was triggered out by externally orchestrated factors and agents and would not have been caused by internal economic, political or cultural contradictions alone. Given the unprecedented challenge that Ukraine, being in the middle of the conflict, is currently facing, it also addresses the potential for a policy and the institutional framework to deal with migration since the crisis.

Keywords

Migration, mobility, military conflict, displacement, IDPs.
1. Overview: 2014 as a milestone challenging mobility and migration patterns in Ukraine

The present note explores the recent changes in migration matters in Ukraine with available data (including media reports, official statistics and public surveys) and expert voices from many different disciplines. We seek to investigate the main changes in migration and mobility and ask how the dynamic of movements is connected with the annexation of Crimea and hostilities in Donbass. Given the unprecedented challenge that Ukraine is currently facing, we are also keen to address the potential for a policy and the institutional framework to deal with migration since the crisis.

**Development: from individual moves to mass migration.** It should be noted that we have clear indications of a direct correlation between the recent conflict and changes in migration patterns in Ukraine. Mass migration was caused by external factors and would not have been caused by internal economic, political or cultural contradictions alone. The issue of language, often referred to as a pretext for conflict in public discourse, has never been a key factor. Experts argue that the decision to migrate is always made by people, rather than by governments, politicians and NGOs. Yet migration can be prompted by many orchestrated factors and agents.

The first individual circular movements, which can be referred to as a result of the conflict in Ukraine, started during the EuroMaidan events in December 2013-February 2014 and involved mainly pro-Ukrainian volunteers, journalists and activists who moved internally, typically coming to Kiev, to take part in the protests. After Victor Yanukovych’s escape from Kiev through Crimea to the Russian Federation in late February 2014, others followed. These included the Prosecutor general, the Tax and Interior ministers as well as other members of the Cabinet. These made their way to Crimea, Russia or the neighboring states. Individual escapes were followed by separate group outflows of the disbanded Ukrainian riot police Berkut, which took part in an operation against anti-government protesters in Kiev: they fled to Russia. The Russian authorities offered the ex-top Ukrainian officials and their families Russian citizenship: though the Federal Migration Service declined to comment on Putin’s active organizational role in Yanukovych and his allies’ escape. By contrast, the prompt issuance of Russian passports to the Berkut officers, as well as an offer of career opportunities in the Russian regions, have been widely commented upon by the Russian authorities. Russian media reports claim that up to 100 Berkut officers fled to Russia as Berkut might have been threatened by lynch mobs in Ukraine. The issue of asylum for refugees from Ukraine in Russia has remained at the top of the political agenda since then, and we shall see how this skews migration statistics (see Annex 2).

The mass movement of people from one region of Ukraine to another began during the occupation of Crimea by Russian irregular forces and grew still more significant after the Crimean referendum held in March 2014. Migration flows are usually a reaction of peoples to deterioration in living standards or to the violation of human rights. During military actions, people resettle without thinking

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1 Interview with Irina Pribytkova, the leading expert of the Institute of Sociology (National Academy of Sciences, Ukraine).

2 Some of the ex-official and members of the Yanukovych clan currently on the wanted list, include Eduard Stavitski, ex-Minister of energy, and Sergei Kurchenko, the youngest Ukrainian oligarch, who gathered their wealth through large-scale corruption schemes, have got citizenship of foreign countries (Israel in the case of Stavitski, and Serbia in the case of Kurchenko). Emigrating abroad, where possible, has become a trend among the escaped Yanukovych officials. Most of them, however, seem to have found asylum in the Russian Federation. See: http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/rossiya-ne-vydast-yanukovicha-ukraine-158931_.html, date of access November 20, 2014.

3 Interviews with Irina Pribytkova, Aleksandra Dvoretskaya, a human rights activist of the VOSTOK-SOS (the Kiev-based NGO), and a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Ukraine (UNHCR) representative.
whether their well-being will be improved or not: they just want to escape. A period of intense movement has been observed since the escalation of the conflict in Donbass, May-June 2014 and has been rapidly growing since then. Experts assume that from 90 to 60 per cent of the displaced move internally. Their choice of destination is usually kinship-oriented (people move closer to relatives to get direct help or support in finding accommodation). Overall, we can speak of the growth of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from 2,954 in March to 430,059 in October 2014 (see graph below) and 472,605 as of 21 November, 2014. Most experts we talked to estimate that the real figure might be two or three times as high for the simple reason that most IDPs are unregistered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>IDPs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>7114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>10841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>54405</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>111616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>221960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>295156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>430059</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: author’s graph based on the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) monthly reports.*

Who is moving and where to. There have been two massive flows of displaced individuals observed so far: 1) migrants from Crimea; 2) migrants from the Donetsk and Luhanks regions, notably, from the zone of anti-terror operations and from the territories occupied by pro-Russian separatists.

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4 Interview with Irina Pribytkova.
5 Interview with Aleksander Sushko, Scientific Director of the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Irina Pribytkova and Varvara Zhluktenko, Communications and Outreach Officer (International Organization for Migration Mission in Ukraine).
6 Kinship migration among IDPs is not to be underestimated, although no data is available due to the low profile in the adopted registration procedures (people are not asked if they stay with relatives, they just provide their place of terminal residence with no further details). UNHCR in Ukraine estimates that 80 per cent of IDPs live in the private sector, meaning that they stay with relatives, friends, other host families, or in rented apartments. The rest live in a variety of collective centers created spontaneously by religious or civic groups, or even by generous individuals; others have been organized by the regional or municipal authorities using both public and private premises. As we have discovered from our small survey among 10 unregistered IDPs, three have got assistance to pay for accommodation from their employers (who decided to resettle their office in a more peaceful neighboring regions in Ukraine), and seven resettled in cities where they have relatives or friends (either staying at their places or finding private accommodation).


Most displaced Crimeans are ethnic Tatars (Muslims) concerned about the growing pressure on their community. Others are ethnic Ukrainians and Russians who leave for different personal and professional reasons. These include Ukrainian military men who remained loyal to the government in Kiev (either those who voluntarily discharged or remained on service and who have been evacuated by the Ukrainian government to other regions of Ukraine); politically active pro-Ukrainians, such as journalists, human-rights lawyers and artists, who are afraid of harassment; business owners who complain about the deteriorating business climate in the annexed Crimea; different professionals who feel difficulties in adopting Russian procedures and fear the consequences of new supervisors brought in from the Russian Federation; and students who want to continue their studies in Ukraine. The reported number of IDPs from Crimea has grown from 12,161 in June to 18,992 in October 2014 and to 19,406 as of 21 November, 2014.

Displacement from the conflict-affected zone in Donetsk and Luhansk started because of the increasing violent hostilities between pro-Russian separatists, para-military armed groups and the Ukrainian forces creating insecurity for civilians and due to the breakdown in local public services: specifically the lack of water, electricity, food supply and health care. It is observed that politically-active people with pro-Ukrainian attitudes (both ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Russians and of other origin) are more likely to leave Donbass. Also, families with children are more motivated to flee the conflict zone. The number of IDPs from the east has grown from 42,244 in June to 411,067 in October (see figure below) and to 453,199 as of 21 November, 2014.

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10 According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), one of the agencies providing up-to-date data on Ukrainian conflict, the estimated number of civilians living in war-affected areas in Donbass is 5.1 million people.


12 UNHCR data.

13 UNHCR data.
As to the main destinations within Ukraine, Lviv was among the first region to accept IDPs from Crimea. When hotlines started, and volunteers settled pioneering displaced persons in the private rented sector. Later on, the local authorities provided IDPs with accommodation in health camps. It should be mentioned that IDPs from the Crimea and IDPs from Donbas have different resettlement preferences: Crimeans prefer to stay in the West of Ukraine, while Donbass IDPs went to keep close to the neighboring Eastern regions and have some fears about moving to the West or Central part of Ukraine. Currently, Western Ukraine is no longer the major hub for the displaced, and a growing number of IDPs are spread across the country with the majority of IDPs now hosted in the East. In line with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Ukraine (UNHCR) reports, the largest number of IDPs is hosted in the areas immediately surrounding the conflict-affected area: in the remaining peaceful areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as in the Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhie regions. Kiev, the Ukraine’s capital, with its developed infrastructure and better labour market opportunities, is also becoming an increasingly important host city for IDPs. Many displaced have returned home following the ceasefire. Either their home areas have become peaceful or these areas remain conflict-affected but, as people cannot make living outside their localities or worry about damage to their property, they prefer to return, in any case. The Head of the Interagency Headquarter for Coordination in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers states that in September 51,800 people, who earlier left Donbass due to the warfare, have now returned to their dwellings. The officials define this phenomenon as “reverse movement”. Yet, it needs to be noted that a significant part of this movement is related to temporary returns to secure property and visit relatives unable or unwilling to leave conflict-affected areas.

Speaking of the main abroad destinations, the neighboring countries (including both the CIS, including Russian Federation, Belarus, and EU member states and associated members, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Slovakia and Romania) remain the main goal for asylum seekers. Trying to compare the scales of internal and external migrations, we can analyze the data of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) with reference to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine reports: as of 1 September, the number of IDPs was 259,741 while approximately 300,974 fled to neighboring countries (of these, 260,015 applied for refugee status or temporary asylum in Russia). As of 21 November, the number of IDPs was 472,605, and 523,396 have fled to neighboring countries (it is estimated that 434,453 of these have applied for refugee status or temporary asylum in Russia) (see graph below). It must be remembered that international

14 Interview with a UNHCR representative.
15 Interview with Manfred Profazi, Chief of the IOM Mission in Ukraine (International Organization for Migration).
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movements are rather more accurately reported as compared to the internal flows (for the simple reason that it is getting more difficult for Ukrainians to cross the border and stay abroad as an irregular emigrant). We estimate, then, that the real number of IDPs (who move freely and do not register) is several times higher than the number of those who fled abroad, including those resettled in the Russian Federation. It is worth noting that all cases of applying for refugee status are reported. In fact, most, particularly in Europe, get refusals\(^\text{20}\). Presumably, we can expect more rapid internal movements over time, as compared to international movements. This tendency has also been noted by the experts we have interviewed\(^\text{21}\).

![Dynamics of registered internal and international movements in Ukraine in September and November 2014, in persons](image)

**Source:** author’s graph based on the OCHA monthly reports for September and November 2014.

**Short- and long-term effects of the conflict.** The problem of IDPs is a new phenomenon for Ukraine, it has never faced before. Unprecedented growth of forced internal migration can be seen as short-term immediate impacts of the conflict. There remains the question of how long other regions can help IDPs to sustain (or how long they will sustain themselves), and at what point this might become an overwhelming international outflow of migrants?\(^\text{22}\) Experts argue that two major factors can minimize the risk of growing international movements: 1) successful migration policies and arrangements

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\(^\text{20}\) As our experts report, Europe is not that popular as a destination for migration now, because to become a successful applicant you need to prove that you have used internal opportunities first. Not all Ukrainian territory is considered dangerous at the moment. Specifically, a Ukrainian NGO supporting displaced persons VOSTOK-SOS had experience of cooperating with several migration centers in Warsaw dealing with refugee applications, and most if not all of them were unsuccessful, because people were not able to show that they had used the opportunities of internal resettlement first. People have to give evidence that their location at the territory of Ukraine is dangerous for their life and health. So, applicants are refused. Interviews with Aleksandra Dvoretskaya and Alexander Sushko.

\(^\text{21}\) Interview with Alexander Sushko.

\(^\text{22}\) Interview with Manfred Profazi.
As media provides the most easily available up-to-date reports, we have monitored the news in the leading Ukrainian, Russian and international media sources since the conflict began. The news with a focus on migration and mobility issues gives us a rich and informative picture of recent developments.

2. Migration and mobility discourse since the crisis in Ukraine: main problems reflected in media reports, official data and public surveys

As regards international movement seen as an effect of crisis, UNHCR reports that during the first half of 2014 the number of Ukrainians who requested asylum in 44 developed countries increased by 490 per cent compared to the same period in 2013. During the first half of this year, Ukrainian filed 4,097 applications for asylum (compare this to 694 applications in 2013, +490 per cent). Still, these figures are far lower as compared to other troublesome origin countries: Syria (48.4 thousand applications for asylum), Iraq (21.27 thousand), Afghanistan (19.34), Eritrea (18.86), Serbia and Kosovo (12.3). Our experts estimate that the number of asylum seekers from Ukraine to other foreign countries will remain stable, and no considerable irregular migration flow to the EU countries should be expected in the near future. It is assumed, though, that EU countries might consider changes in Schengen visa procedures making them more complicated (as the Polish consulate in Ukraine did on October 15) to avoid possible turmoil in the consulates.

23 Experts emphasized that migration is currently urged by the fact that Donbass infrastructure is largely destroyed. According to the State Emergency Service data, 11,325 objects have been demolished by October 2014 (including 4,500 houses, 4,733 energy-, water- and heat-supply objects, 217 education, 45 healthcare, 51 culture institutions, 1,551 transport and communication objects, 132 industrial enterprises) (see published data and expert interviews in the Ukrainian Pravda editorial Who will pay for ATO. Available at http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2014/10/8/496686/view_print/, date of access October 10, 2014). In October 2014 Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko estimated that half of the infrastructure and 42 per cent of the industries of Donbass have been destroyed as the result of hostilities. See also: UN creates interactive map of destruction in Donbas. Available at: http://www.unian.info/society/1040681-un-creates-interactive-map-of-destruction-in-donbas.html, date of access February 5, 2015.

24 Ibid.

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26 Interview with Manfred Profazi.

27 Interview with Manfred Profazi and Varvara Zhlukenko.

28 Ibid. It should be added as regards external migration from other countries to Ukraine that, as IOM reports, Ukraine is no longer a major transit country for irregular migrants as compared to other destinations, specifically the South-Eastern Mediterranean route. The problem still needs to be tackled, but the crisis did not make it more attractive for external migrants to use this route through Ukraine.
The first stories relate to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation and include the autumn 2014 waves of IDPs returning to their homes in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions during the periods of ceasefire in Donbass (see Annex 1). Throughout the conflict, we have seen several key conceptual issues influencing migration and political discourse.

Speaking of the definitions, it is clear that using correct terms are essential. Although such terms as “IDPs”, “refugees”, “asylum seekers”, “resettle”, “forced migrants” are employed, they are often used in a fairly random way: for example, the term refugee / (ukr.) біженці are often applied in the context of internal migration. Yet, there should be no confusion in public discussions and policy documents. As experts have noted, though Ukraine has had little experience of dealing with IDPs, it should make use of United Nations standards as regards forced displacement IDPs that have been developed during the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Georgia, and Moldova. Dealing with internal displacement, experts use the term IDPs (ukr. внутрішньо переміщені особи). Those who have been forced to leave Ukraine in order to escape war, persecution, or humanitarian disaster are, in fact, potential refugees or asylum seekers. But, as lots of them never apply for such status and plan to return to Ukraine after the conflict, it is more appropriate to speak about international movements with different subcategories.

As regards record keeping, there are serious problems with the accuracy of figures. Published interviews, as well as our own talks with experts, confirm that, in most regions of Ukraine, it has become difficult for the authorities to maintain up-to-date records on the number and location of the IDP population. The registration of IDPs is organized through coordination councils affiliated to the State Emergency Service. Yet, the procedures for registration vary from region to region, and no centralized database is created. As the data are scattered across different agencies, no one knows the accurate figures so far. Also, there is a problem with the methodology of record keeping as some people return home only temporarily to take belongings. Yet, they are excluded from the records once they leave and thus they disappear from the final data. Furthermore, many IDPs do not register with the authorities at all. Yes, registration is important for persons who wish to transfer their social benefits or pensions from one region to another, or for people who want assistance in finding accommodation. But many IDPs see little to gain in registering because registration does not give them any formal documentation to prove their displacement, nor access to any assistance program. As a result, most unregistered IDPs continue to rely on their own resources, as well as those of family, friends, and civil society. These resources are being exhausted, and an increasing number of IDPs simply return home.

As real figures are currently unknown, the Ukrainian authorities seem to have underestimated the real scale of IDPs needs including housing, education and healthcare. This was particularly evident during the first months of the conflict. Experts in the Council of Europe had forewarned the Ukrainian authorities about the risks of late response to the IDPs problem, but it seems that officials were hoping...
that the conflict would have soon resolved itself with no need for additional investments. UNHCR was among the first organizations monitoring IDP movements. UNHCR, in fact, tried to keep tabs on displacement with reference to the fragmentary data gained from the state authorities (specifically, Ukrainian State Emergency Service, Ministry of Interior and State Migration Service of Ukraine), international agencies (OCHA, ILO, etc.) and NGOs. It should be noted that Ukrainian officials currently refer to the same data: for example, in November, the Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister announced that the number of IDPs stood at over 400,000 people; this is in line with the up-to-date UNHCR report. So, we can admit that among the available up-to-date data UNHCR statistics are most reliable.

As IOM argues, with a plenty of sources on migration in Ukraine, it should be ideally one. It is not that there must be one database. Rather, it would be important to see how the central authorities access these data, ideally in real time, collect it and have a full picture of migration flows including foreigners and Ukrainians. This should be the base for decision-making and policy advice. International organizations in Ukraine have a mandate to inform the public about migration: compiling data from different sources, putting them in time context and explaining them. There are a lot of myths about migration in Ukraine and from Ukraine, and statistical accuracy can demystify. As an example of data exercise, we have used the official statistics for analyzing reports on a number of refugees from Ukraine in the Russian Federation, which becomes an increasingly politicized target for mystifications and propaganda (see Annex 2).

Future dramatic scenarios of displacement are a problem that cannot be resolved without grounded policy oriented analysis. To understand future migration trends we have to analyze people’s motivations. That is why international agencies are trying to collect such data. Certainly, one should take into account that the predictive capability of survey methods is limited (sociology cannot scientifically plot how a person will behave). Nevertheless, there is the hope of tracing changing migration aspirations.

The representative survey carried out by the Institute of Demography registered the current trend towards decline in the number of labor migrants from approximately 1.5 mln. in 2005-2008 to 1.2 mln. in 2010-2013. According to experts, the decline in migration was caused by the global economic crisis and reduced employment opportunities abroad. The conclusion was that there would not be any significant labor migration growth in the next two to three years: “Labor migration potential has been exhausted, all niches are already filled. Middle-aged and senior Ukrainians who wanted to leave did that already, while young people without work experience and without degrees recognized abroad will find it difficult to leave and find decent jobs.” Since 2002, the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian

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36 Interview with Manfred Profazi.
37 Ibid.
38 For example, IOM is currently involved in the first household survey on remittances with a focus on three selected countries of destination: Russia as a major destination country for obvious reasons, Canada with one of the largest diasporas and predominantly long-term migration rather than short and circular, and Italy as a major female migration destination. The data will be available in 2015.
40 We refer here to the opinion of the former national coordinator of the International Labor Organization in Ukraine Vasily Kostritsa. See: Ukrainians answered the motherland’s call: number of citizens going abroad to work went down // Kommersant, No. 86 of 29 May 2013. Available at: http://www.kommersant.ua/daily/7001378, date of access July 13, 2013.
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National Academy of Sciences has been studying migration mobility on the basis of previous, including circular, experience of relocations (this methodology was developed by sociologist and demographer Irina Pribytkova). According to their data based on the representative survey, from 2006 to 2012 there was a decline in the share of those with labor migration experience\(^{41}\). Two years later, in 2014, the number had risen from 13.7 to 17.0 percent. This was mostly due to an increase in circular movements: the number of those who have been abroad to earn money more than once is reported to have grown slightly as compared to previous years. Also, over the last ten years the number of respondents planning to move abroad in the near future, in order to earn money, remains low, at about 5-6 per cent. Now, in 2014, we see 7.4 per cent plan to go abroad to earn money (see table below). Still, we have no indication of growing emigration aspiration, as fewer people plan to leave their place of living for good: compare 16.1 per cent in 1992, 19.3 in 2002, 19.4 in 2008 (the economic crisis year), 20.1 in 2013 and, finally, 16.2 in 2014 (during the current conflict).

**Previous labor migration experience and migration plans (%)**

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<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
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<td>15.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As comparative data prove, Russia is becoming a less popular place to move to as compared to other places in Ukraine and other countries outside the former USSR. Still, dynamics within the most wanted destinations are falling, too (see graph below).

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Other interesting results include the motives for migration. In 2014 people demonstrates a growing concern over inter-ethnic conflicts. Most probably, mainly due to the Russian media propaganda and widespread stereotypes, this figure is highest in Donbass 17.1 and East 11.0 per cent, and lowest in the Centre 4.4 and West 4.3 per cent. Worries related to language issue remains low across all regions, including Donbass (see table below).

### What reasons might force you to leave your place of residence? (%)

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<tr>
<td>Health-harmful environment</td>
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<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intention of finding new job</td>
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<td>18.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>To study</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becoming closer to relatives and friends</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation (returning to the birth place or place where you have grown up or studied)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing climatic environment</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To escape interethnic conflicts</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just to change the place of residence</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To avoid language difficulties</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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The impact of the current military conflict on migration and mobility in Ukraine


To sum up, a detailed analysis of migration aspirations and their dynamics make it easier to evaluate tendencies which, considering the fragmentary and unsystematic nature of statistical data, cannot be otherwise verified. Thus, the scale of external movements, particularly emigration, is often exaggerated. As to the possibly growing number of Ukrainians who might emigrate because of the conflict in Donbass, there are no indications and no reports from EU member-states that the number of those has increased. Maybe it is too early to come to conclusions but what we have now gives no confirmation of risks42.

3. Internal migration: public, non-governmental and international responses to the IDP problem (based on expert assessments)

According to the commentaries provided by the representatives of different organizations dealing with the issue of internal forced migration, the Ukrainian government should play a leading role in monitoring and managing IDPs.

At the beginning of 2014 chaos was observed in state attitudes towards IDPs but finally the government started taking actions. The Law on the Legal Regime on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine was adopted in April, though the entry and exit procedures have not been developed thus far. Also, the Regulation On Provisions of terminal stay for families resettled from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol (so-called Regulation 213) was adopted in June, allowing 25 mln UAH for settlement of IDPs from Crimea in health camps: though it should be noted that these funds covered only regions who have signed agreements with the camps. Another positive, yet not fully accomplished, step was amendment of the Internal Revenue Code in September (this allowed changes as to medical assistance, or recovery of destroyed and damaged buildings43). However, it is still not clear when exactly the amendments are going to be implemented, because the list of needs has to be approved by the Ukrainian parliament first. The decision as to IDPs allowance (441 UAH for those able to work, and 882 UAH for disabled) was taken in July, but Parliament adopted it only in October, though it is not clear why there was such a long delay44. Finally, on October 20, under considerable public pressure, the Ukrainian parliament has adopted the long-awaited IDPs legislation (again, it took nearly a month for the President of Ukraine to sign the IDPs Law on November 19, 2014). Regardless of the delay, this is an important step for initiating standardized registration procedures and for facilitating IDP access to public services and humanitarian assistance. It also guarantees full access to education and healthcare.

As a drawback hampering effective work, it is emphasized that administrative framework in Ukraine is very outdated. All institutions require documents in hard copies. For example, you can face serious employment problems if your work record book is lost (or left in rebel-occupied territory). Ukraine has not succeeded in creating any electronic documentary database of migration service, in the last twenty years. Indeed, the country still depends on Soviet-type record keeping. Ukraine urgently needs software to be developed for easy IDP registration. Moreover, it can help somehow to

42 Interview with a EU Delegation to Ukraine representative.

43 The draft project allows for compensation starting from 10,000 UAH for minimum damages and up to 150,000 UAH for large-scale destruction. When the compensation phase starts, it will be necessary to develop effective implementation mechanism. But, again, acts have to be registered, submitted to the Ministry of Finances and later on to the Cabinet of Ministers. In Ukraine all these steps are very complicated and time-consuming.

44 For more details on Ukraine’s IDPs legislation, please visit “Legal framework” database at http://unhcr.org.ua/uk/resursi/pravovi-dokumenti-m/zakonodavstvo-ukr#IDPs, date of access November 20, 2014.
solve employment problems, as volunteers from among the IDPs can be hired for uploading
resettlement data.

The Ukrainian government is currently scaling-up assistance but they need to realize the scale of
the humanitarian crisis. At the beginning of the conflict, for understandable reasons, the government
focused more on security and political aspects. Now, since the IDP Law has been adopted, the
resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers defines the registration process. The mechanism for receiving
benefits is in place, and the international agencies and NGOs prepared to deal with the issue provide
their assistance on a regular basis, the government should be more active in implementing this action
plan. Given limited resources and lack of capabilities, the government can request the international
community to provide either additional funding or consultancy (the initiative should come from the
authorities). Currently, Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine coordinates this process, linking government
actions to international efforts.

In terms of the contribution of international organizations, several agencies have proved themselves
of key importance in direct IDP support. IMO has directly assisted 5,000 IDPs and closely cooperates
with other UN agencies in different provisions including non-food assistance, resettlement issues,
clothes, sleeping belongings, etc. UNICEF deals with the most vulnerable women and children, the
World Health Organization (WHO) provides medical assistance to IDPs. UNHCR is active in
collecting data, regularly sharing information through its webpages and trying not to duplicate
information from other agencies. UNHCR also brings the urgent needs of IDPs to the attention of the
government: this includes discussing draft laws, adjusting the existing legislation with the United
Nation standards, and persuading governments to use the successful experiences of the international
community in dealing with the displaced.

All experts have acknowledged the significant support for IDPs provided by Ukrainian civil society
(private persons and NGOs). NGOs have a social care service dealing with resettlement and
humanitarian assistance. Reporting on the scale of their services can serve an additional source of data.
Specifically, VOSTOK-SOS, one of the most active NGOs dealing with IDPs, has started to collect
this data since 5 May (when the first shots were fired and the administrative buildings were captured
in Lugansk triggering an intensive migration flow). Thus far they have resettled about 12,000 persons.
They have created a database of those who want to resettle and those who are ready to offer private
flats and houses for IDPs accommodation. One of the UNHCR executive partners in Ukraine, Charity
Fund “Right to Protection” also collects data (they receive reports from their headquarters in the East
and West of Ukraine on a regular basis and make it available to partners).

Further developments will be determined by just what the Ukrainian authorities are able to provide
to IDPs: if conditions are satisfactory, people will stay in Ukraine, if not they will leave. Ukraine’s
progress in dealing with the IDPs influences relations with the European Union and has implications
for the visa liberalization process. When visa liberalization was developed, there was no forced
displacement problem in Ukraine. However, it is evident, that in order to preserve the visa-free
arrangements with EU countries, it is necessary to demonstrate that Ukraine has kept up with
international standards in internal displacement.
4. External migration: policy implications for Russia, Europe and the rest of the world (based on expert assessments)

According to VOSTOK-SOS statistics based on telephone calls, only one call out of 100 on the hotline refers to emigration to Europe and Russia. There is no doubt that there are refugees from Ukraine in Russian territory\(^{45}\) but in terms of data the only reliable source is Federal Migration Service (FMS, Russian Federation), and no one should be confused by the figures. Regular movement has always existed between Ukraine and Russia as a major destination for Ukrainian labour migrants, many Ukrainians commute between Ukraine and Russia on a daily, monthly and yearly base. But we should be aware that labour migrants and other visitors should not be mistakenly perceived as refugees. Thus far Russian statistics as to the total number of refugees from Ukraine remain doubtful (see ANNEX 2).

In many cases refugees from Ukraine are expected to resettle in the North of Russia, the Far East and Siberia, where they might have better job opportunities, but most people find this inappropriate and return home. What should the Ukrainian authorities and other responsible partners do with that highly politicized issue? First of all, the rights of all Ukrainian citizens crossing the border of the Russian Federation should be protected by the state of origin. It is a responsibility of the state to make people aware what they should expect when they move to Russia and their opportunities if they stay in Ukraine. People should not be frustrated because they have no information on the current situation in Ukraine, including the terms and requirements for receiving social benefits and pensions (the issue provoking considerable public concern). Too bad, the Ukrainian government lags behind in providing full objective information. The same rules should be applied when we speak about other international destinations. Most experts we have talked to have argued that lack of information, late response to urgent needs and fear of responsibility are the main problems for state migration policy.

As one of our experts said, ‘in many countries in most times the pure facts about migration (like figures on migrants as compared to the total population) was never a decisive factor for the public. It’s often a very irrational and emotional moment of being afraid of ‘the foreigner that comes’\(^{46}\). This feeling that Europe is surrounded by numerous crises generates insecurity. Taking this into account, there is uncertainty and doubts on the Ukrainian side as regards visa liberalization: experts assume that it will be postponed with the excuse of the current conflict and instability in Ukraine. It is also unlikely that visa liberalization will be launched by other countries, which remain among the most popular destinations outside the EU, particularly the USA and Canada. Yet, today there are no objective reasons for arguing that a visa-free regime is going to facilitate the growth of illegal entries. For those who are keen to cross the border and work abroad illegally, a visa regime is not a barrier. Visa-free travel offers considerable advantages in favour of more intensive international movements. Still it is not enough to guarantee personal safety, social security and successful integration in host societies for those who need more than that (including shelter, healthcare, employment and education). That is why it is quite unlikely that visa-free regime will lead to an increase in irregular migrants from Ukraine to EU countries. Dramatic events that could have considerably influenced migration and mobility in Ukraine have already taken place. Even in the case of further conflict escalation in eastern Ukraine, external migration from Ukraine is not expected to increase, because most IDPs who planned to resettle have already done so. Most probably, a considerable number of these IDPs do not plan to return to their previous places of residence in the near future due to the breakdown of local infrastructure and weak employment opportunities in conflict-affected areas, so more internal movement is likely.

\(^{45}\) It should be noted that, apart from kinship motivation for migration to Russia, people also pay attention to accessibility of location and security of travel (when they travel from Donbass, they have either no checkpoints or a few of them on the way to Russian Federation, while they have to pass through five of them on the way to Ukrainian territory).

\(^{46}\) Interview with Manfred Profazi.
Conclusion: current results, outlook, and recommendations

Ukraine, it is clearly seen as the conflict tends to escalate\(^{47}\), is still in the middle of an IDP crisis. The situation is highly unpredictable now. It might still get worse (with a new frozen conflict similar to the Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Chechnya). But after the latest aggravation things might also get settled (as conflict-affected territory is getting larger, an increasing number of civilians suffer, and more attention is paid from the side of the international community to the dramatically deteriorating crisis in the middle of Europe). The future will largely depend on the Russian Federation’s real endeavors and attitudes to Ukraine as a geopolitical entity in the international environment.

Similarly, speaking of the other factors affecting migration such as Ukraine’s economic conditions, labour market and social development, no easy predictions can be made. For the economy, specifically in trade, Ukraine as well as Moldova is planning to create a free trade zone in 1.5 years. The Russian leadership is opposed to this process. Ukraine needs more resources to succeed, so, regardless of the military conflict, more efforts should be made to strengthen the democratic process, enforce the rule of law and carry out far-reaching reforms.

The number of IDPs will most probably gradually grow but, at the same time, many of the displaced will return home, regardless of what happens, because health centers where they live now are not very convenient in the winter\(^ {48}\). Some IDPs, indeed, have already returned. External migration is not likely to increase considerably. Currently Ukraine is involved in the second phase of visa liberalization, and the EU is expected to make the decision as to short-term visa applications next year, yet the current crisis in Ukraine might delay the visa-free regime.

As to the policy and institutional framework, our talks with experts who have referred to different aspects of dialogue and cooperation with stakeholders, demonstrate that thing are in place but there is a need for increased efficiency, facilitating faster registration, and equally meeting needs. The government needs to see where it gets funds to pay rental subsidies. It needs to do more not only for IDPs but also for those communities that supports IDPs. The long-term needs of IDPs are also an issue, not least making them self-supporting: it not just a question of getting them through the winter. We must ask where income-generating activities can be developed, so that IDPs can take care of their needs as soon as possible and give something back to the community they live in.

If the authorities come with an initiative of special projects to deal with IDPs, the EU Delegation and other international agencies are likely to support them but more initiatives should come from the government. Now the mechanism for cooperation between the Ukrainian authorities, EU agencies and NGOs is rather good (it has improved considerably over the last couple of years). But the government is underbudgeted and cannot manage their own staff, provide training schemes, and buy equipment, while international organizations and NGOs have more experienced and better training. This creates a certain gap when such problems as IDPs occur (international agencies and NGOs are better placed to deal with them than local government). We are not talking about a reluctance to deal with the problem, rather a lack of preparedness. Dealing with displaced people is a profession, and only those who are committed can succeed in this work.

\(^{47}\) According to the UNHCR most recent data (as of January 23, 2015), the number of IDPs has reached 921,640 already, the number of asylum seekers in neighboring counties – 260,060, the number of other forms of stay seekers – 370,614. See: http:// unhcr.org.ua/en/2011-08-26-06-58-56/news-archive/1244-internal-displacement-map, date of access February 4, 2015.

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References


Annex 1

Migration situation in Ukraine in media reports
(selective of thematic top news, editorials and interviews from the leading Ukrainian, Russian and international media since the conflict’s beginning to the end of October 2014).

(Russian) UN reports on 10 thousand IDPs in Ukraine in May. One third of those are children. The displacement of people from one region to another has started before the Crimean referendum held in March 2014 and has grown constantly since then. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) presents most recent statistics of displacement with reference to the data gained from the local authorities. Among the IDPs they observe those who have been displaced twice: once from Crimea to the East of Ukraine, and then from the East to other regions. Most of the displaced were Crimean Tartars but the local authorities also report on the growing number of ethnic Ukrainian, Russian as well as mixed families among the IDPs. Most people move to the Central (45 per cent of the observed IDPs) and Western (26 per cent) parts of Ukraine. The number of asylum seekers to foreign countries remains low. Read the full story here.

Released 20 May, 2014

(Russian and Ukrainian) According to the UN, the number of forced migrants in Ukraine reached 34,000 in June. Those people were forced to leave their dwellings due to the warfare in the East of Ukraine. The UN have accounted for nearly 19,000 of displaced. At the same time, in line with the local authorities’ estimations, yet a further 15,000 escaped to the territories where the UN keeps no records so far. In May most IDPs among the observed 10,000 were Crimean Tatars but the focus has shifted to the population from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions since then. People flee their homes to escape from fire and food crisis on the terrain of military conflict. Read the full story here.

Released 17 June, 2014

(Russian) Interview with Alexander Muzykantski, the Russian human-rights ombudsman in Moscow, gives substantial analysis of the situation with Ukrainians asking for asylum in Russia as of July. Taking into account the current circumstances in Ukraine, the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS) allows Ukrainian citizens a period of stay in the Russian Federation for additional 180 days (previously, only 90 days of stay once in a 180-day period, either total length or successive visits, was allowed). Interview refers to the recent up-date of the FMS on ‘24 thousand of refugees’ having applied to 348 centres of temporary settlement in Russia. The Ombudsman points out at the absence of the federal goal-oriented programme to support such people in Russia (only a State Program for Assisting Compatriots Residing Abroad in Their Voluntary Resettlement in the Russian Federation is developed and is currently applied in such cases, though it does not properly address their needs). Also, according to Russian migration legislation, people from Ukraine arriving in Russia since the military conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk cannot be formally defined as refugees and usually are required to submit an application for temporary shelter (not an asylum seeker’s application as applied in the case of refugees). Temporary shelter is a different status which is not enough for receiving work permit. Read the full story here.

49 This is a bilingual source: both Russian and Ukrainian versions are available on-line.
50 (russ. пункт временного размещения).
Released 15 July, 2014

(English) UNHCR Offices, Field Units, Missions and Implementing partners present one of the first detailed records on the IDPs Statistics in August accounting for 139,170 IDPs in Ukraine. Among those 14,000 are from Crimea and 125,000 are from the East. See full map with statistics here.

Released 8 August, 2014

(Russian) Famous Russian economist Sergei Aleksashenko commented on the exaggerated migration data referred to by the Russian officials and widely published in the media (specifically, 813,000 refugees from Ukraine in the Russian Federation reported in August). Aleksashenko compared the official figures of the FMS and came to the following conclusion: the total number of incoming foreigners (including students) during the seven months of 2014 is almost the same as during the correspondent period in 2013 (compare 11.5 million in 2014 to 11.6 million in 2013). The growth of foreigners in 2014 is considerably lower than in 2013 (compare 963,000 in 2014 to 1325,000 in 2013). Consequently, there is no evidence of hundreds of thousands refugees from Ukraine in the official data, and analysts need to be aware of this. Read the full story here.

Released 28 August, 2014

(Russian and Ukrainian) The number of forced migrants from the zone of anti-terrorist operation (East) and Crimea exceeds a quarter of a million people, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine reports in September. The total number of those who have resettled from the zone of anti-terrorist operation (Donetsk and Luhansk regions), Crimea reached 271,160 people, including 80,649 children and 34,145 incapable and elderly. The number of people from the Crimean makes up 17,302, including 4,828 children and 1,247 incapable and elderly. Daily, 1022 people are resettled, including 10 from Crimea. Most people are resettled in the part of the Donetsk region which remains under the control of Ukraine (75,660), Kiev city (28,509), Zaporizhia (24,016), Dnipropetrovsk (21,796), the part of Luhansk under control of Ukraine (19,815), Kharkiv (17,888) and Odessa (13,772) regions. Read the full story here.

Released 8 September, 2014

(Russian and Ukrainian) Three transfer stations for displaced persons were shut down in September to avoid risk of attacks and subversive actions. The press-centre of National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine informed that the activities of three transfer stations (in Volnovakha (Donetsk region), Schastie (Luhansk region) and Orly (Dniepropetrovsk region) were suspended due to continuous attacks on the Ukrainian territory. Early, seven transfer stations had been organized. The remaining four are still open for those who want to escape the combat zone. Read the full story here.

Released 8 September, 2014

(English) BBC timeline of the Ukrainian crisis since Independence till September 2014 gives a retrospective picture of the conflict pointing out at a phenomenon of migration during war (for the first time in the contemporary history of Ukraine). Specifically, starting from the early August, as heavy fighting erupts in Donetsk city, the UN says more than 1,000 civilians fled the conflict zone every day. On 18 August a convoy of refugees from the Luhansk area was hit by rockets. Both sides deny carrying out the attack. Read the full story here.

51 When referring to people who move internally, the international organizations use the term IDPs, while Ukrainian public bodies usually speak of forced migrants, temporary displaced or resettled people (ukr. переселенці). Local media’s current usage of the terms is still confusing (for example, the term refugees is often used when speaking of internal migrants).
(Russian) 20 terrorists claiming to be forced migrants were arrested near Berdiansk city in September. As the Head of the Berdiansk Regional Administration reported, 20 injured rebels and organizers of mass turmoil and pro-Russian manifestations were detected due to the activities of the infiltration groups consisting of the Ukrainian interior ministry and state security service members, as well as servicemen. Read the full story here.

(Russian) The concept of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ (including former USSR Republics) is under discussion, the Nezavisimaya News editorial stated in September. Russia is desperate at losing its ‘near abroad’ territories including Ukraine which is going to build a wall on the borderline to stop black border crossing and illegal arms delivery to the pro-Russian rebels in its East. The new understanding of the alien ‘abroad’ involves major changes in border management and, specifically, put an end to the free movements between the states within ‘near abroad’ with national passports only. Read the full story here.

(Russian) ‘Returning home? If there is peace this week’, the Russian Novaya News editorial tells the individual stories of the refugees from Ukraine who once stayed in the centre of temporary settlement in Donetsk city (Rostov region, Russian Federation) and now adopt different life strategies (either returning home or moving to different cities in Russia). On 5 September, the Donetsk centre accommodated up to one thousand people but was shut down. Thus, there has been only one remaining centre in the Ukraine-neighboring Rostov region, located in Matveev Kurgan. Most of the refugees there hope to be able to return home in the ceasefire. It is also stated that an increasing number of centres of temporary settlement are organized in other Russian regions. The Russian authorities claim there have been nearly 60,000 refugees from Ukraine temporarily residing in 1000 centres all over Russia now. Read the full story here.

(Ukrainian) Almost 52,000 people have returned their homes in Donbass. The Head of the Interagency Headquarter for Coordination in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers informs in September that 51.8 thousand people, who earlier left Donbass due to the war, have now returned home. The officer defines this phenomenon as reverse movement. Specifically, 2,326 returned during one day, on 21 September. A considerable number of people are still resettled in other regions of Ukraine (including 16,850 from Crimea and 105,437 from the zone of anti-terrorist operation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions). Among the recipients, the most active are Kiev city (21,740 of forced migrants are hosted there), as well as Zaporizhia (15,194), Dnepropetrovsk (14,415), Kharkiv (13,942), Odessa (8,016), Poltava (6,934), Kiev (5,594) and Lviv regions (4,625). Read the full story here.

(Ukrainian) The estimated number of people living in conflict-affected areas is 5.1 million people, the Ukrainian media announces with reference to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) report produced in collaboration with humanitarian partners. As of 18 September, the number of IDPs is 275,489 while approximately 341,000 people

52 Here, as in many other news items, the term refugee (рус. беженцы) is wrongly used with reference to IDPs and forced migrants.
have fled eastern Ukraine to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Of these, over 300,000 have sought refuge in Russia. The infrastructure damage assessment in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts was finalized, demonstrating that at least 1,968 facilities were damaged during the conflict, including 659 public buildings, 1230 private houses, and 178 businesses. The damages are estimated at US $440 million. The prioritization of recovery and livelihood activities is key to achieving quick results before the winter. Read the full story here. For OCHA full report read here.

Released 21 September, 2014

(Russian) The Rossyiskaya News published an interview with the Head of Russian Federal Migration Service Konstantin Romodanovsky who points out that 180,000 people from Ukraine have applied to receive temporary shelter or refugee status in the Russian Federation, 110,000 have gained this status already, 500 people apply daily to be supported within the State Program for Assisting Compatriots Residing Abroad. Most people are resettled in the Central and Siberian Federal Districts (not in Moscow and St. Petersburg, he emphasizes53). Read the full story here.

Released 23 September, 2014

(Ukrainian) State Migration Service of Ukraine has developed a mechanism for the registration of forced migrants from Crimea. According to the document, the citizens of Ukraine who move from the Crimean Peninsula to the mainland are eligible for registration without any changes in their residence permit. They will be provided with confirmation of their current place of residence. Read the full story here.

Released 25 September, 2014

(Ukrainian and English) Ukrainians rushed en masse to get refuge in the West, Ukrainian press reports with reference to the UNHCR report. During the first half of 2014 the number of Ukrainians who requested asylum in 44 developed countries increased by 490 per cent compared to the same period of 2013. In the first half of this year, Ukrainian filed 4,097 applications for asylum (compare this to 694 applications in 2013, +490 per cent). The EU countries are the main destinations for the Ukrainian asylum seekers: 3,302 applications were registered during the first half of 2014 (compare this to 403 in 2013, +719 per cent). The largest number of applications for Ukrainian asylum lodged in Poland (636), United States (359), Italy (297), Germany (255), and Sweden (235). Also, Ukrainians submitted 653 applications for asylum in Canada and the USA (+ 154 per cent to that of 2013). Yet, these figures are far lower as compared to other troublesome origin countries: Syria (48.4 thousand applications for asylum), Iraq (21,270), Afghanistan (19,340), Eritrea (18,860), Serbia and Kosovo (12,300). Read the full story here and here.

Released 26 September, 2014

(Russian) Refugees’ stories: East and West, an editorial of the Donetsk regional media tells two stories of forced migrants in Poland and in Russia. Against the background of Russian official propaganda giving a false picture of Russia’s ability to administer growing migration flows from Ukraine treating incomers much better than EU countries are able to (see the Interview with of Russian Federal Migration Service Konstantin Romodanovsky above), individual voices give vivid examples of real provisions in the earmarked host regions. Read the full story here.

53 On September 25 Romodanovsky also pointed out that 900,000 Ukrainians currently live in the Russian Federation. We should be aware, though, that this number includes all groups of Ukrainian citizens, including registered workers and students.
(Russian) The Russian Federal Emigration Service discusses possibilities of allowing Moskovites to give Ukrainian refugees’ legal asylum provided that those refugees are their relatives. However, no official documents have been issued thus far. Read the full story here.

Released 27 September, 2014

(Russian) In September Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) informs on the growing number of respondents in the Russian Federation who prefer sending refugees from Ukraine back to their origin country. Specifically, only 40 per cent of the respondents in September think that it is necessary to create reasonably good conditions for refugees’ reception and stay in the Russian Federation (10 per cent decrease is observed as compared to July). An increasing number of respondents want refugees to go back as soon as the situation in Ukraine becomes better (compare 45 per cent in September to 39 per cent in July). More respondents are convinced that Russia should stop hosting refugees from Ukraine (compare 7 per cent in September to 4 per cent in July). As to the naturalization process, 53 per cent support a simplified procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship for refugees from Ukraine, 36 are again it. Also, only 29 per cent see more refugees arriving from Ukraine in the Russian Federation, 38 per cent think that their number is low, 18 per cent do not see any indication that refugees from Ukraine arrive in Russia. Read the full story here.

Released 29 September, 2014

(Russian) The number of IDPs has reached 321,000 people, the Interagency Headquarter for Coordination in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers stated on September 29. Read the full story here.

Released 29 September, 2014

(Russian) Ukrainian media with reference to the UN News Centre informs about the dramatic deterioration of living conditions in the area of conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Up to 5 million people still live in the area controlled by pro-Russian rebels. Local population suffers from food insecurity, lack of drinking water and personal hygiene products (the local Red Cross used up most of stock and is enable to replenish due to the complicated and insecure transportation situation). The official number of IDPs is 295,000 people, the report says. As winter is approaching, these people need to be provided with warm clothes and winter tents. Read the full story here.

Released 30 September, 2014

(Russian) Forced migrants from Donbass: how do they live in Kiev? Interviews with agencies and public officials dealing with the resettled people and with migrants themselves. People are not able to plan ahead having troubles renting apartments and making a living in the Ukrainian capital. See full story here.

Released 30 September, 2014

(Ukrainian) Ukraine completely ignores its IDPs, complains one of the forced migrants from the East in the Radio Freedom editorial in October. Ironically, she says, the international organizations are more competent as regards forced migration statistics and are more aware of the displacement challenges and needs. Forced migrants feel not only abandoned but also stigmatized and face multiple forms of prejudice and discrimination because of their allegedly pro-Russian and separatist attitudes. Read the full story here.
Released 1 October, 2014

(Ukrainian) A growing number of returnees from Russia to Ukraine has been observed during the recent two weeks, the Russian and Ukrainian press inform with reference to OSCE report. OSCE observers work on the Russian-Ukrainian border, specifically in Donetsk and Gukovo (Rostov region), the two border crossing points. As the intensity of fighting in the conflict zone dies down, and the situation with water- and food-supply gets relatively more stable, people tend to return, the report says. Overall, the average number of border crossings has increased from 7,801 to 8,289 persons per day. Over 10,000 have returned from Russia to Ukraine through those two border crossing points during the last week. Read the full story here.

Released 1 October, 2014

(Russian) UNHCR Offices, Field Units, Missions and Implementing partners present the update on the IDPs Statistics in October accounting for 360,770 IDPs in Ukraine. Among those 18,289 are from Crimea and the rest, 342,481 are from the East. See full map with statistics here.

Released 2 October, 2014

(Russian) The official number of people resettled from the zone of anti-terrorist operation to other territories of Ukraine has reached 350,000 in October, the Prime-Minister of Ukraine Arseni Yatsenyuk says. Yatsenyuk claims that all these people will be put on the special register to receive allowance approved recently by the Ukrainian government. During the meeting with the Ukrainian clergy he calls for support from the church to help resettled migrants to make it through the winter. Read the full story here.

Released 3 October, 2014

(Russian) Interview with Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, points out the lack of centralized record keeping system for dealing with IDPs. The Ukrainian authorities do not know the real number of resettled and don’t understand the real scale of their needs including housing, education and healthcare. The data are scattered across the local agencies, no one has accurate figures. Also, there is a problem with methodology of record keeping as some people return home only temporarily to get belongings. Yet, they are excluded from the records immediately upon leaving and thus disappear from the data. Muižnieks estimates the growth of IDPs’ number at 10,000-20,000 each week from Donbass only. Experts in the Council of Europe have forewarned the Ukrainian authorities about the risks of late response to the IDPs problem, but it seems that the officials were hoping that the conflict would have been resolved soon with no need for additional investments. Read full story here.

Released 6 October, 2014

(Russian) The flow of forced migrants forced up property rates in Ukraine, the Association of realtors informs in October. The most popular destination for buying and renting economy property are the Donbass-neighboring regions which remains under control of the Ukrainian authorities (Kharkiv, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporizhia) as well as Kiev and Lviv. The average rates have increased by 15-20 per cent over two-three recent months. Read the full story here.

Released 9 October, 2014

(Ukrainian) Informative stories of resettled persons and interviews with the NGOs activists assisting transfers and resettlements published by the Hromadske radio reveal a huge coordination gap in IDPs provisions. The Ukrainian authorities make little efforts to utilize its administrative resources for coordination and information purposes. Ironically, the officials of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Interagency Headquarter for Coordination send applicants directly to the NGOs and
volunteers trying to avoid troubles and escape responsibility. Lack of communication between the agencies hinders progress in developing a centralized mechanism for IDPs sufficient control and management. Read the full story here.

 Released 9 October, 2014

(Russian) Almost 400,000 forced migrants from Crimea and Donbass are resettled in other regions of Ukraine, the Social Policy Minister Liudmila Denisova reports in October. Among 399,964 IDPs 50 per cent are of working age, 31 per cent are children, and 19 per cent are disable and elderly. The real figure might be far more numerous as lots of migrants do not apply for support arranging their accommodation themselves or with help of their relatives. Read the full story here.

 Released 9 October, 2014

(Ukrainian) The number of resettled persons from Crimea and Donbass has reached 407,459 people, Interagency Headquarter for Coordination in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers states. Read the full story here.

 Released 12 October, 2014

(English) Ukrainian press regularly refers to a detailed profiling and needs assessment of the IDPs provided by the UNHCR Ukraine. The last up-date report of 17 October stated that the number of IDPs has dramatically increased since the beginning of August 2014. Specifically, from 155,800 on 13 August to 417,246 on 16 September. The largest number of IDPs is hosted in the areas immediately surrounding the conflict-affected area: in peaceful areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhze regions. Many IDPs have returned to northern parts of Donetsk regions, and following the ceasefire, some IDPs have returned to the conflict-affected area. Read the full report here.

 Released 17 October, 2014

(Ukrainian) The long-awaited IDP legislation was adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament 20 September. This is an important step for initiating standardized registration procedures and facilitating IDP access to Government services and humanitarian assistance. According to the law, each IDP of working age is eligible to receive 884 UAH allowance from the state, and each disabled IDP will receive half of that amount (442 UAH). It also guarantees full access to education and healthcare. Read the full story here.

 Released 20 October, 2014

(Russian) In 2013, citizens of Ukraine received the highest number of permits issued in the EU28 (236,700 beneficiaries, or 10.0 per cent of the total number of new residence permits), ahead of citizens from India, the United States and China, the Ukrainian press notes with reference to the Eurostat data. Ukrainians benefited from residence permits mainly for employment reasons (64.1 per cent of the first residence permits issued to Ukrainians in 2013). Of the 236,700 Ukrainians granted residence permits in the EU28 in 2013, more than 70 per cent were for Poland (171,800). Read the full story here.
The impact of the current military conflict on migration and mobility in Ukraine

Released 22 October, 2014

(Russian) The number of resettled persons from Crimea and Donbass has reached 430,059 people, Interagency Headquarter for Coordination in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers informs. Same data are given by the UNHCR Offices, Field Units, Missions and Implementing partners. Read the full story here.

Released 24 October, 2014

(Ukrainian) More than 190,000 resettled Ukrainian citizens voted during the Parliamentary elections, the Ministry of Social Policy informs on October 26. This figure refers to the voters who came to polls at places of their terminal residence. It is not clear, however, how many IDPs are among the resettled voters. Also, as the Central Election Committee of Ukraine reports, the expected number of votes among those who have fled from Donbass to Russia is low. Read the full story here.

Released 26 October, 2014

(Ukrainian) Internet map of needs assessment of population in Donetsk and Luhansk regions has launched in Ukraine, the Ukrainian press claims 27 October. This is a private initiative of the Media Group Ukraine and Dopomozhemo TV-Production supported by the Humanitarian Headquarter of the Rinat Akhmetov Charity Fund. The data presented on the map is provided due to phone survey and interviews with local experts and social workers. Total 2100 respondents in 27 cities have been interviewed on September 13-16, October 3-5, and October 10-13. Read the full story here.

Released 27 October, 2014
Annex 2

Assessing the scale of migration from Ukraine to Russian Federation: selected data with notes

To trace the dynamics of recent migration flows to the Russian Federation (RF), we have compared Census data 2002 and 2010 with the Federal Migration Service (FMS) figures for Ukraine and other origin countries (see table 1 below). Different instruments for calculating Ukrainians as foreign nationals are used here and there, so, we cannot speak of the huge change from 93,000 in 2010 to over two million in 2014. Obviously, if we look at the FMS data, there is a considerable increase from 1.357 mln in 2012 to 2.651 mln in 2014. Still, even if the FMS data are fully reliable, these people are not refugees, as these include all visits, travel, business, etc. Also, we do not know how many of these people have left the RF by now. On 2 July the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine during the press-conference noted that the RF presents the total figure of border crossing as refugees arriving to the RF.

Table 1. Foreign citizens in Russian Federation: Census and FMS data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Census 2002(^{54})</th>
<th>Census 2010(^{55})</th>
<th>FMS 2012*</th>
<th>FMS 2013**</th>
<th>FMS November 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>231 thousand</td>
<td>93 thousand</td>
<td>1.357 mln</td>
<td>1.610 mln</td>
<td>2.651 mln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>64 thousand</td>
<td>87 thousand</td>
<td>1.040 mln</td>
<td>1.194 mln</td>
<td>1.105 mln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>71 thousand</td>
<td>131 thousand</td>
<td>2.346 mln</td>
<td>2.620 mln</td>
<td>2.335 mln</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{*}\)Data with reference to the FMS are taken from the article Boxix B. (2014), Migration policy and its implementation in Russia [in Russian]// Соціологія: нейропі, нейропод, нейропсих, №2, C.74.

\(^{**}\)As FMS presents only the most recent data and does not keep records of the previous years open to the public, the data with reference to the FMS as of December 2, 2013 are taken from the secondary source.

As FMS reports, the total number of Ukrainian citizens staying in the Russian Federation (including tourism, business, study, transit and other purposes of visits) have increased from 1.638 mln 1 June, 2014 to 2.651 mln 5 November, 2014 (which means almost one million increase, see tables 2.3 below). However, this is not supported by figures on the number of foreign citizens put on migration registration, naturalized, issued residence permits or temporary stay (see table 4 below), which shows no spike. There are two possibilities. First, the share of foreign citizens from other countries in the RF decreased simultaneously to the abrupt inflow of Ukrainians, though we have not found any confirmation of that in the available data for 2014, and, moreover, the overall growth of foreigners in Russian Federation 2014 was considerably lower than in 2013\(^{56}\). Second, most the Ukrainian citizens never registered in the RF (and thus cannot be reported as refugees). There is no evidence of eight hundreds of thousands refugees from Ukraine (as Russian media widely reports) in the official data of

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\(^{56}\) This is also a tendency being observed in 2015. See Adomanis M. (2015), Immigration into Russia is on pace to fall by 10 per cent / Forbes, February 2, 2015. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2015/01/02/immigration-into-russia-is-on-pace-to-fall-by-10/, date of access February 3, 2015.
The impact of the current military conflict on migration and mobility in Ukraine

the FMS. It does not mean that the number of refugees from Ukraine is scarce. It does mean, though, that the official statistics give no evidence of the real number, and this should be taken into account by analysts. This statement is also supported by the commentary of Sergei Aleksashenko, a celebrated Russian economist.

Table 2. Total number of Ukrainian citizens staying in Russian Federation as of 1 June, 2014 (including tourism, business, study, transit and other purposes of visits)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Up to 17 years old</th>
<th>From 18 to 29</th>
<th>From 30 to 39</th>
<th>From 40 to 49</th>
<th>From 50 to 59</th>
<th>Above 60</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>65,384</td>
<td>315,737</td>
<td>260,385</td>
<td>209,716</td>
<td>133,690</td>
<td>52,590</td>
<td>1,037,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>55,668</td>
<td>137,085</td>
<td>106,570</td>
<td>106,103</td>
<td>89,150</td>
<td>601,139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,638,641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: selected data of the Federal Migration Service of Russian Federation.

Table 3. Total number of Ukrainian citizens staying in Russian Federation as of 5 November, 2014 (including tourism, business, study, transit and other purposes of visits)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Up to 17 years old</th>
<th>From 18 to 29</th>
<th>From 30 to 39</th>
<th>From 40 to 49</th>
<th>From 50 to 59</th>
<th>Above 60</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>196,071</td>
<td>474,256</td>
<td>363,216</td>
<td>270,050</td>
<td>172,510</td>
<td>75,878</td>
<td>1,551,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>170,530</td>
<td>263,979</td>
<td>193,591</td>
<td>165,988</td>
<td>163,931</td>
<td>141,109</td>
<td>1,099,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,651,109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: selected data of the Federal Migration Service of Russian Federation.

Table 4. Selected data on overall migration situation in Russian Federation as of 5 November, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Past nine months of 2014</th>
<th>Same period of the previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of foreign citizens arrived in RF (crossed the border)</td>
<td>15,889,421</td>
<td>17,342,369</td>
<td>14,027,752</td>
<td>15,259,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of foreign citizens put on migration registration</td>
<td>6,477,674</td>
<td>7,075,857</td>
<td>6,860,036</td>
<td>6,178,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of foreign nationals and persons without citizenship currently staying in RF</td>
<td>10,085,049</td>
<td>10,847,352</td>
<td>11,760,866</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of issued work permits</td>
<td>1,340,056</td>
<td>1,273,984</td>
<td>948,570</td>
<td>951,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issued residence permits or temporary</td>
<td>346,830</td>
<td>350,093</td>
<td>297,537</td>
<td>260,529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Naturalized (gained citizenship)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>95,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>135,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>107,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>98,740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Compatriots and Family members arrived in RF and gone through FMS registration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>56,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>34,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>58,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>22,266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: selected data of the Federal Migration Service of Russian Federation.
The scale of migration to Russian Federation can be also analyzed through independent reports from the Centres of Temporary Accommodation, specifically from one of the most active in the Ukraine-neighboring Rostov region, located in Matveev Kurgan. Notably, 31 October, UNHCR in the RF reports that according to government estimates, some 60,000 people from Ukraine were sheltering in the Rostov region in mid-July. But in October the number has fallen to about 43,000 as some people returned home or moved elsewhere in the RF. About 95 per cent of those displaced in the RF are staying with friends, relatives or generous families.

Also, note some indirect indications of a relatively stable migration situation based on the State Statistic Service data (see below). We observe a natural decline in the population in Ukraine but no figures on arrived/left prove that Ukraine is losing population because of considerable external migration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimation of current population as of September 1st</td>
<td>43,486,604</td>
<td>43,324,758</td>
<td>43,212,903</td>
<td>43,109,926</td>
<td>42,977,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration gain (in persons)</td>
<td>6,293</td>
<td>7,285</td>
<td>21,620</td>
<td>12,547</td>
<td>13,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of arrived persons</td>
<td>352,268</td>
<td>362,982</td>
<td>378,853</td>
<td>363,930</td>
<td>325,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of left persons</td>
<td>345,975</td>
<td>355,697</td>
<td>357,233</td>
<td>351,383</td>
<td>312,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total coefficient of migration gain (per 10,000 persons)</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>4,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: selected data of the State Statistic Service of Ukraine.*

In one of the interviews in July 2014 Russian sociologist Vladimir Mukomel also addressed the problem of Ukrainians in RF and estimated their future return: ‘I have doubts as to the considerable number of refugees from Ukraine planning to stay in Russia. As experience of other conflicts proves, most of the refugees returned to their place of residence within a month or two, maximum within three months. Such situation occurs, for example, in Transnistria, where the majority of IDPs returned to their homes in three months. The fact that the majority of them did not apply to gain the status of temporary asylum or refugee status, means that they expect to go home’.

We assume that the number of Ukrainian nationals registered by the FMS will be decreasing within the next months (we will watch the FMS website and other sources to follow-up).
Author contacts:

Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik

Shovkovychna 12, room 313.
00021 Kiev
Ukraine
Email: katya_iva@yahoo.com