Corridor Report on Germany: the case of Turkish and Russian immigrants

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Germany is an important immigration country in the European Union. It receives a major share of the total flows into the EU as well as intra-EU migrations. In 2013, net migration to Germany was well above 400,000, its highest level since 1993.¹ The two most prominent groups of non-EU migrants in the country come from Turkey and Russia. According to the German micro-census, in 2012 there were 1,490,000 migrants born in Turkey and 991,000 migrants born in Russia living in Germany. However, the flows of newcomers differ: in March 2014, out of 7,731,958 foreigners (non-nationals) who were registered in the Central Register of Foreigners, 20% were born in Turkey and 2.8% in the Russian Federation.

These numbers reflect not only the different migration histories of the two groups, but the differentiated policies that have been applied towards them. For example, for many years ethnic Germans born in the Russian Federation received their citizenship upon entry into Germany, and thus are not registered as foreigners. This policy on ethnic immigration (limited since 2006) has had an important impact on integration outcomes of Russian immigrants.

Turkish and Russian migrants have long histories with Germany, and over the years they have come through many channels. Turks came en masse as guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s: that migration continues today on a smaller scale. Both countries have produced a large number of asylum seekers, with Kurds escaping persecution in Turkey and Chechens fleeing the war and oppression in Russia. Furthermore, family reunification has been an important source of new Turkish immigrants since the mid-1970s and, later on, for Russian immigrants as well.

In both cases, the country of origin has been an important factor shaping integration outcomes. They set the initial conditions for migration and create specific emigration and diaspora policies geared to serve particular groups among the emigrating population. In this light, Turkey fares worse than Russia as regards main indicators of human development (such as literacy, education, health), but it has more comprehensive and active emigration and diaspora policy. While Russia focuses on spreading the culture and language, Turkish government has developed a number of initiatives that serve diaspora engagement in various spheres of life, from religion to business.

### Table 1. Main axis of diaspora policy: the Russian Federation and Turkey compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language and Culture</strong></td>
<td>Governmental network of the Russian Centres for Science and Culture (operated by Rossotrudnichestvo)</td>
<td>Yunus Emre Institutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td>No governmental institution; support for the Russian Orthodox Church</td>
<td>Yes, through the Turkish Islamic Association of Religious Affairs [DITIB], present in 17 countries worldwide; over 900 chapters/subsidiary associations in Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organising diaspora (e.g. support for associations)</strong></td>
<td>Yes; support for cultural activities.</td>
<td>Yes; intensive support for all types of activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political rights for the diaspora</strong></td>
<td>Voting rights for Russian citizens living abroad, including external voting.</td>
<td>Voting rights for Turkish citizens living abroad, including external voting. Limited political rights for Blue Card holders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic and social rights in the country of origin for non-citizens and descendants</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (Blue Card)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for returnees</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizenship of non-residents</strong></td>
<td>Dual citizenship tolerated, but legally allowed only in the case of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. As of 2014 – obligation to inform authorities about possession of another passport.</td>
<td>Dual citizenship allowed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ elaboration
We evaluate the integration of these two groups into German society on three dimensions for which the most reliable and robust data has been obtained, both in qualitative surveys and in quantitative data collection. These are: access to citizenship, education, and labour market integration.

The final comparison of Turkish and Russian-born migrants in Germany is well illustrated by the integration indexes.

Table 2. INTERACT Integration Index for Germany: Turkish vs. Russian immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkish immigrants</th>
<th>Russian immigrants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Market Integration Index</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Integration Index</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship Integration Index</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti (2015)

Citizenship

In the light of the German citizenship law, which was dominated by the principle of an “ethnic nation” up until 1999 (jus sanguinis), a significant proportion of migrants with Turkish background reside in Germany as denizens, more than 55% of whom are Turkish nationals. In contrast, a majority of Russian migrants (85%) possess a German passport as ethnic Germans. In absolute terms, it is also important to note that more Turkish immigrants (or their children born in Germany) apply for German citizenship than Russians. This is clearly related to eligibility criteria: there are more Turkish migrants who have stayed in Germany for more than 10 years (a requirement for naturalisation) and more young Turks born and brought up in Germany (another requirement). For the same reasons, the average age of naturalised Turks is much lower than that of Russians. Those Russian migrants who do not have ethnic German backgrounds are usually quite recent labour migrants or Chechen asylum seekers, rarely meeting criteria for naturalisation.

As regards dual citizenship, it is allowed in Germany only in some unique circumstances that include difficulties with renouncing procedure. Out of all Russian nationals (not necessarily born in Russia) who are not ethnic Germans and who naturalised in 2013, over one third kept Russian citizenship. This might be a consequence of a policy of the Russian state that discourages dual citizenship and can refuse to accept such renouncement. As regards Turks, out of all Turkish nationals who naturalised in 2013, 17.5% kept Turkish citizenship. This may be a consequence of both German policy pushing people of Turkish origin to naturalise and the Turkish state policy of a Blue Card: an instrument allowing the Turks in Germany to apply for German citizenship and renouncing the Turkish one while keeping the basic rights in Turkey.

Education

Russian migrants in general have better education indicators than Turkish migrants. They are more likely to be enrolled in school between ages 15-25. They also outperform native Germans in this regard. Russian immigrants are also twice as likely as Turkish immigrants to be enrolled in educational institutions between ages 25-35. The same pattern is visible when comparing indicators of the tertiary-educated in the migrant population. Russian migrants have a
four-times greater share of tertiary-educated persons than Turkish migrants, which is slightly higher than the German population. The differences are related to the education systems in the country of origin. Russia has a higher share of secondary and tertiary-educated persons in its total population than Turkey: as reported by OECD in 2011, the share of upper secondary-educated persons aged 25-64 in Russia and Turkey was 94% to 18%, respectively; and tertiary-educated in the same age group: 53% to 14%.3

The pattern thus reflects the impact of the country of origin on skill levels. Clearly the Russian score is high here, even when compared to the German population, and in contrast to the Turkish population. Russian migration is clearly a skilled one. However, educational attainment does not entirely translate to better achievements in the labour market.

Labour market integration

In contrast to the previous indicators of integration, the labour market integration of Russian migrants seems to be more problematic. What comes to light is a clear gap between the migrants (from Turkey and Russia) and the majority group. In general, Russian immigrants have a higher unemployment rate than Turks. However, due to the fact that women from Russia are more active in the labour market, overall they have a higher share of participation in the labour force than Turks. Still, it is lower than the natives. Russian-born immigrants also have a high over-qualification rate, which is similar for Turkish migrants.

If these results could be expected in the case of regular migration flows, they are particularly disappointing for Russian-born immigrants given their relatively high skill levels. They can be explained by the specific policies covering ethnic Germans, who entered the country in the 1990s. The unemployment rate for Russian-born immigrants is a consequence of protective welfare policies and an unselective ethnic immigration policy that disregarded labour matching. That policy encouraged immigration not because of specific needs at the labour market but because of symbolic ties. Thus people who came had difficulties matching their skills with available job openings; often their skills have not been recognised. Also, immigrants from Russia were entitled to full welfare support that discouraged some from re-training to acquire new, more sought-after skills. As a consequence, the mismatch is so large that the migrants born in Russia cannot make up for it even in the presence of strong performance in other integration measures (high share of naturalisations) or a strong country-of-origin effect (high educational attainment).

The role of the civil society

Beyond the concrete integration-related legislation, policies, and measures provided for by the German government and bureaucracies on the different federal levels, a number of other actors may affect (either positively or negatively) the integration of migrants from Russia and Turkey. These actors include political and societal institutions in the countries of origin, as well as non-state actors in Germany. Increased attention has been paid to the role of associations founded and administered by migrants themselves. For many years, migrant organisations in Germany were scrutinised by research that attempted to determine whether their existence and activities would foster integration or, on the contrary, yield disintegrating effects.4 Currently

migrant organisations are accepted as socio-political interest groups whose formation and governance is subsidised and whose representatives are nominated for advisory bodies or consultative fora. As regards the major countries of origin, out of the roughly 16,000 “associations of foreigners”, approximately 11,000 can be regarded as associations dominated by people of Turkish origin. Furthermore, many of these Turkish organisations keep up strong ties with their country of origin (Sezgin 2010). There are more than 20 umbrella organisations alone, most of which focus on fostering integration, although not exclusively. For instance the “Turkish Community in Germany” (Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland e.V.) has become a firm voice in almost all integration debates. It was only recently that the association lobbied for the adoption of a Federal Law for the Inclusion and Participation of Migrants.7

The spectrum is not as elaborated among the associations of Russian-origin migrants. This can be attributed primarily to the fact that for the most part, as ethnic German immigrants, migrants from Russia or the Soviet Union were in a privileged situation. They lacked the impetus to lobby for support and integration, or to establish methods of representation, on an ethno-national basis. On the contrary, it was the established German welfare organisations competing with concepts and project proposals for integration measures to cater for the needs of Aussiedler, particularly since the late 1980s.8

Currently, a handful of kin associations consider their role to be interest representation. They include cultural associations as well as social support organisations that provide integration measures, among other things. With a focus on trade and entrepreneurship, migrant business associations sometimes take over integration-related tasks as well, particularly with regard to labour market integration, anti-discrimination, diversity, and inter-culturalism. There is a well-established organisational spectrum for both countries of origin, with organisations such as the Federal Association of German-Russian Entrepreneurs (Bundesverband Deutsch-Russischer Unternehmer e. V.), or the Association of Turkish Entrepreneurs and Industrialists (Verband Türkischer Unternehmer und Industrieller in Europa e. V.). In addition to these, migrant associations and cooperative networks with specific agendas have been established, e.g. to support the educational attainment of their communities, both in the formal and non-formal educational sector.

Conclusions

Migrating groups have different characteristics (flows and stocks) and each group has been subject to a different entry policy, including different rights and obligations. In fact, the structural and policy factors at the destination are the key elements that influence the success of integration or failure of migrants. As regards the impact of the country of origin, understood as policies and practices targeting diaspora for

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5. Ibid.
better integration, it is rather negligible so far. The diaspora policies do not directly support integration. Even Turkish Blue Card has limited impact on actual naturalisation rates as we have seen above.

Indeed, diaspora policies often re-focus migrants’ attention back to the country of origin. Often such policies can have unintended consequences for integration outcomes, e.g. when policy of investing at home supports Turkish migrants’ cross-border business activities by giving them employment at destination; or when policy enhances Russian-language proficiency among the diaspora members, who are then able to use this language in international business environments due to the position of Russia in world trade. There is an important group of actors on various levels of governance that work to improve the final outcome. In the case of migrant organisations and organisations helping migrants in Germany, they form an additional arm of integration policy. Being close to migrants and having intimate knowledge of their integration needs, they focus on topics and fields of action that are most relevant for a successful migration story. They also form the most tangible bridge between the origin and destination.