Becoming Recognizable

Postcolonial Independence and the Reification of Religion

Maria Birnbaum

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

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For

Sara Birnbaum

1988-2010
Abstract

The thesis argues that international scholarship has failed to take into account the manner in which the process of recognition presupposes and reproduces already recognizable objects and agents. The example used in the thesis is that extant studies on the recognition of religion in international affairs assume that religion is always already present and intelligible as a category of political thought and action. It continues to demonstrate how this tendency is inherent in the theory and practices of recognition more broadly. In forgoing study of the processes through which these agents and objects were differentiated and individuated in the first place, recognition cannot but contribute to their reification. Moving beyond this impasse in IR Theory, the thesis argues, requires a more finely attuned genealogical sensitivity when it comes to the question how entities of international politics become recognizable. This suggests that scholars dwell on the processes through which they are constituted and made intelligible, i.e. recognizable.

This insight is illustrated with reference to how “religion” became internationally recognizable as a differentiable and politically relevant category in and through two distinct yet related historical processes: the partition of South Asia with the establishment of Pakistan and the foundation of the state of Israel in the wake of the demise of the British Empire. Both states were claimed, enacted and subsequently recognized along the lines of religious difference; Muslim/non-Muslim in the case of Pakistan and Jew/non-Jew in the case of Israel. By studying macro and micro processes through which religion became a differentiated, taken-for-granted juridical, cultural and political category the thesis shows the processes through which religion became recognizable and how this particular recognizable version of religion was reified through the international recognition thereof, that is, the recognition of these two states as a Muslim Homeland and a Jewish National Home.

The thesis thus argues against the assumption that religion, in and of itself is a root cause in the establishment of these two states, a source of violence in the ongoing conflicts with their neighbors, or an instrument of peace. Rather it argues that religion was made recognizable and reified in a particular shape and meaning through the processes of the international recognition of the two post-colonial states. Rather than looking to recognize the importance of religion in international affairs, the thesis investigates the multiple manners in which religion emerged as a politically salient point of reference according to which a changing international order took shape and along the lines of which new international agency was and is claimed and recognized.
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**Introduction**

It is the end of November of 1947, and inside the quarters at Lake Success, on the outskirts of New York City, the members of the United Nations General Assembly are preparing to cast their votes regarding the Partition of Palestine. In February, earlier that year, the British cabinet had decided to return their Mandate and hand over the "Palestine Question" to the newly founded United Nations (UN). The General Assembly had met in a special session and established a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in order to reexamine what had come to be known as the "Palestine problem", the possibilities of Palestinian partition and the prospective constitution of an independent Israeli state. On November 29, the recommendations of the UNSCOP were brought before the UN General Assembly at Lake Success in New York, where the vote was held.

Pakistan had gained independence only a few months earlier, on August 14, thus ending two centuries of British rule, together with India. Both Pakistan and Israel were recognized as sovereign states a year apart at the end of the Second World War, representing the beginning of the decolonialization of the British Empire. Both gained their independence through partition from their neighbors delineated largely according to religious marcation. Pakistan was the "Muslim Homeland" that had been separated from non-Muslim India and Israel was the "Jewish National Home" carved out of non-Jewish surroundings. The centrality of religion to the partitions, as well as the emergence and recognition of these two new international actors, would seem to be evident. However, rather than arguing for the recognition of religion in international affairs, this thesis will ask: How did religion become recognizable as a distinct and differentiable category within these processes of international relations?
This thesis is a theoretical investigation into the question of recognition. More precisely it is an investigation into the questions of recognition and religion in international relations. In common terminology, and in most academic work recognition is about empowerment. It is about elevating an individual or a community into actorhood, about giving a voice to those who lacked one, and enabling participation in the social and political processes that are relevant to them. I do not aim to refute that meaning. Recognition is indeed about empowerment. However, it is not only about empowerment. It is also about dependency and pre-conceived routes of access. In order to recognize something, it needs to be or to be made recognizable, it needs to fit into the framework of visibility. How is one to recognize something that one cannot see? Further, in order to extend recognition, there needs to be someone or something to extend it to. Recognition requires a preexisting object or subject to empower. Throughout the thesis, I will argue that there are a number of problematic aspects of recognition in international relations, which have received too little attention, and which have consequences that speak directly against the empowering aim of recognition itself. I will not suggest that we should dispose of recognition, but rather shall argue in favor of extending and deepening the way in which it is thought of and used.

After examining different approaches to recognition and religion, I will argue in the first part of the thesis that recognition tends to assume that the agents, identities, objects, and concepts that are to be recognized are already clearly differentiated and, more importantly, that they are differentiatable. Recognition pays little attention to the manner in which these objects, concepts or identities become differentiated, or, as I will put it, it sidelines the processes through which they become recognizable. Recognition presupposes its agents, objects and the epistemic frameworks within which they feature. Through the recognition of these agents or objects, for example, through the extension of rights and responsibilities to them, they will be reproduced as separate and separated entities, sidelining the process by which they emerged. I refer to this aspect as a lack of genealogical sensitivity, by
which I mean a lack of attentiveness to the processes by which concepts, identities, agents, or objects emerge as differentiated and differentiable entities, ripe for recognition. I argue that this lack of genealogical sensitivity reflects a reifying tendency in recognition, that is, a particular form of forgetfulness about these processes of emergence.

In the second part of the thesis, I investigate ways of how to approach these reifying tendencies of recognition and how a stronger genealogical sensitivity to the processes by which something becomes recognizable in international relations might be nurtured. I argue that while international recognition may understood to be a top-down process, when recognition is given, for example, by an international community, this framework does not suffice as an explanation or help to reach an understanding of the recognition process, unless the bottom-up processes of pre-closure, that is, the processes of becoming recognizable or becoming intelligible, are also analyzed in detail. Further, I will argue that unless these latter processes are taken into account, the framework of recognition will tend to reproduce itself, its objects and agents. This theoretical argumentation is then illustrated with reference to the cases of the international recognition of Pakistan and Israel.

**Outline of the chapters**

The first chapter engages with the work regarding recognition and religion in international relations. Rather than presenting a more traditional literature review, the chapter outlines the arguments of three “critical” IR scholars, examining in detail the constructivist account of Daniel Philpott, the English School account of Scott Thomas and the Habermasian account of Mariano Barbato. All three scholars agree in their diagnosis that religion has been systematically excluded from the theory and practice of international relations, and while they list different reasons for this exclusion, they continue to agree about its problematic nature and argue for the need to recognize religion in international affairs.
While Philpott draws attention to the lack of published material on the topic, Thomas sees the exclusion of religion as a symptom of a fundamental assumption regarding the origins of the current “Westphalian” international order. This “Westphalian presumption”, Thomas argues, mythologizes the privatization of religion and the secularization of international relations. Barbato’s Habermasian account also understands the exclusion as more than a epistemic blind spot, but sees it emerging from the dominance of a more general form of secular liberal thought that renders religious traditions, actors and ideas as necessarily partisan, irrational and dogmatic, in contrast to its own enlightened, secular neutrality.

The neglect or systematic sidelining of religion is problematic to Philpott as it ignores the fact that religion lies “at the very root of modern IR.” Religion is constitutive of the current Westphalian international order of sovereign states, since this order would never have emerged, were it not for the way in which the Reformation and Protestant ideas of political authority shaped the states’ interests in sovereign statehood. Thomas, on the other hand, argues for the need to contextualize the basis upon which religion was excluded from IR, that is, the “Westphalian assumption” that religion in public life causes political upheaval, intolerance, war and destabilizes the international order. Westphalia, Thomas continues, did not secularize the international system, but religious doctrines, cultures and civilizations continued to impact upon the common culture underpinning different international societies throughout history. Christendom was, and continued to be, the framework for international practices of diplomacy and war, practices that are incommensurable outside of this framework. The Westphalian presumption also skews the understanding of the present “resurgence of religion” in the global South, regions where religion never lost its political and

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1 Philpott 2000: 206.
social power to begin with.\textsuperscript{5} Leaving this presumption intact, the global resurgence of religion seems like an internationalization of a private matter, threatening the international order. Barbato’s Habermasian accounts regarding the promises of what he calls a post-secular society also acknowledge a systematic exclusion of religion from public deliberation.\textsuperscript{6} Here, however, the exclusion stems less from scholarly neglect or historical narratives, and more from secular liberalism’s skepticism concerning religion’s purported neutrality. However, equating secularity with neutrality forgets how the Hellenic roots of current Western political theory were deeply intertwined with early Christian thought.\textsuperscript{7} More important than the fact that religion is already intertwined with the ‘secular’ political traditions aiming at its exclusion, is the fact that religion needs to be recognized on epistemological grounds. Religion should be recognized in public discourse on “substantive” grounds, since it carries the semantic potential for secular thought, keeping something “hermeneutically vibrant” and “intact” that would “otherwise have been lost elsewhere”.\textsuperscript{8} Further, since rational morality is “unable to foster any impulses towards solidarity, that is, towards morally guided collective action,” and since pure practical reason lacks the ability to answer up to the disintegrating imperatives of the market and a modernization moving “out of control”, (international) political theory “has good reasons to be open to learning from religious traditions.”\textsuperscript{9}

After outlining these different arguments for the recognition of religion in international relations, I ask what it is, precisely, that these scholars want to have recognized. What do they understand “religion” to be? The chapter concludes with a conceptual analysis of each author’s understanding of religion and claims that, while arguing for the need in IR to recognize the importance of religion, none of these scholars reflect sufficiently on what it is they want to have recognized, and how this phenomenon has emerged as a differentiable entity, that is, how it has become

\textsuperscript{5} Thomas 2010b: 507.
\textsuperscript{7} Habermas 2008: 110ff.
\textsuperscript{8} Habermas 2008: 142.
\textsuperscript{9} Habermas 2010: 79; 2008: 109.
intelligible or recognizable – to them and to a broader intellectual community – in the first place. They all lack what I call a genealogical sensitivity.\footnote{Geuss 2002, 1994; Visker 1991.}

In the second chapter I discuss the critical aspects regarding recognition in a broader sense, by engaging with social and international political theory.\footnote{At this point I want to clarify and differentiate the focus of the thesis. The thesis is not a performative analysis of recognition politics in IR. It is not making claims about the benefits or problems of international political entrepreneurs using the recognition language or framework to make their claims. These actors – claiming recognition for Somaliland, Timor Leste or Kosovo – work with reified versions of their acclaimed states, they invoke by evoking them. This is another kind of analysis and does not fall within the scope of this thesis. The thesis is an exercise in theory analysis and critique, the points illustrated with historiographical material.} After outlining the broad currents of that scholarship, I go on to point out that many of these accounts presuppose their objects and agents. That is, they assume that there already is someone or something to which recognition can be extended, they assume a differentiated social ontology without asking how this differentiation came about. Axel Honneth, for example, assumes a “potential” identity to become “actualized” through recognition. Charles Taylor requires an identity as a benchmark, in order to evaluate possible, and damaging effects of, misrecognition, while Alexander Wendt argues for the development of a single World State through the integration of individual states, pre-differentiated “Selves” able to overcome the differentiation into a collective “Us”. By recognizing the difference of others, as a respect for cultural and other differences, recognition is envisioned as leading towards more peaceful international relations. However, the recognition of differences does not only empower those who embody this difference, but, prior to it, also assumes the existence of this difference, and, by extending rights and responsibilities to these entities or agents, it reproduces them.\footnote{Markell 2005.} Rather than transcending a differentiated social reality, recognition assumes and reproduces it. I argue, therefore, that recognition presupposes its agents and objects, and ignores or forgets about the way in which these differences come about or how they are reproduced. Forgetting about the way in which difference is produced also means forgetting about the alternatives to this differentiated order. I refer to this form of...
forgetfulness as *reification*, and argue that recognition inhabits a reifying tendency that has not been addressed sufficiently within international scholarship. The last part of this chapter, therefore, discusses the relationship between recognition and reification within international relations.

I argue throughout the chapter that greater attention should be afforded to the processes by which an agent or object of recognition becomes recognizable. By attending more to these processes of differentiation, the reifying tendency of recognition can be countered. This argument builds upon the assumption that recognizability epistemologically precedes recognition, that is, in the words of Judith Butler: "One ‘exists’ not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being recognizable.” Recognizability comes before recognition. A category, subject, object, agent, state, identity, etc. needs to be recognizable as such in order to be recognized. They need to be “visible” within the current framework of knowledge, in that particular epistemic framework and its scheme of classification. As recognizability comes prior to recognition, and as recognition in this way, is dependent upon the current epistemic framework, that which is visible, and recognizable, in this framework will be recognized and maintained. There is, so I argue in this chapter, a reproductive power in recognition, in that it tends to reproduce its epistemic framework and the agents and objects within it. The argument does not imply that the epistemological frameworks cannot change or that the recognition of agents and objects does not have an impact upon what can be “seen”, “known” or recognized. However, it also posits that such a change in new ranges of “visibility” necessarily constitutes a change in recognizability, i.e. a part of the process of becoming recognizable. In this sense, struggles for recognition can therefore be read as struggles for recognizability, a quest to change the system within which the individuals and groups find themselves. My argument is against assumptions by scholars such as Honneth, who need to assume a “potential” identity to be “actualized” through recognition, and thereby imply that this “potential”

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13 Butler 1997: 5.
identity is already recognizable. I argue against these assumptions regarding pre-
differentiated, pre-existing objects and agents. Ignoring the investigation of how
these objects and agents become recognizable will leave the framework of
recognition to stabilize and reproduce itself, as well as the objects and agents within
it. This is problematic for several reasons. First, by leaving objects, agents and
epistemic frameworks intact recognition affirms the power structure in place. While
this need not be a problem in and of itself, it does undermine the sensitivity to new
forms of agency, i.e. those forms that do not – yet – play on the existent register of
visibility or recognizability. This lack of sensitivity towards the new will, in the end,
impoverish the plurality of any social system worth its name, leaving it blind to that
in process of emerging and reproducing that which already is. Besides undermining
the premises of plurality the reification of subjects and objects of international
affairs becomes dangerous when it treats social facts as natural ones. The
forgetfulness of reification allows for natural kinds to be instrumentalized and
“turned unproblematically onto sentient beings.” (Levine 2012: 46). This would
leave those who do not fit the reified concept as deviants and legitimately treated
accordingly.

In the third chapter, I illustrate the discussion and arguments made in the thesis so
far on the examples of the international recognition of Pakistan and Israel. I had
argued that recognition sidelined or “forgot” the processes by which an object or
agent became recognizable, and that it displayed a reifying tendency. In this chapter,
I illustrate a number of these processes, and show the different ways in which they
contribute to making the “Muslim Homeland” of Pakistan and the “Jewish National
Home” of Israel recognizable as such, processes that would have been sidelined in
case of simple recognition. I argue that the multiple processes of becoming
recognizable, that is, the processes of differentiation – between Muslim and non-
Muslim, Jew and non-Jew – were stabilized through colonial governing practices
such as the census, administrative maps, national regulations such as quotas in
political representation, local representative administration, strikes and violent
outbreaks, et cetera, but that they were finally reified through the process of
international recognition, thereby forgetting the preceding struggles to form and uphold these differentiations.

The chapter takes a closer look at three instances of differentiation. The first part on numbers describes the process through which the Indian census contributed to homogenizing the heterogeneous group of Indian Muslims into a politically representative entity. In Palestine, the immigration policies under the British Mandate had contributed to the understanding of Jews as immigrants, but also, of the European immigrants as Jews, irrespective of their cultural-linguistic, historical, geographical, religious, political or any other, differences. The second part on representation shows the Muslim League and their leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, claiming and gaining sole representational power over the British Indian Muslims, enforcing the distinction favored by their “Two Nation Theory” between the Muslims and the non-Muslims as being fundamental, national and civilizational in nature. In Palestine, the international recognition of the authority of the Jewish Agency settled the acclaimed difference between Jews and non-Jews, similarly to the Muslim League, as a fundamental difference between two "peoples", and tied the Jews to the Palestinian territory. The last section on boundary drawing illustrates the work by the boundary commissions in British India to separate the future Pakistani Muslim Homeland from its non-Muslim neighbor. It showed how the knowledge of the census and the colonial maps were authorized and their conflictual background erased. It further describes the work of refugee administration, militias and the institutions reclaiming "abducted women" to inscribe the official border between the newly separated international agents on the ground. In Palestine, the work of the Peel commission authorized the claims of the Balfour declaration and the Mandate of the League of Nations regarding the separate nature of the Jews from the non-Jews, and territorialized these differences. Ten years later, this distinction made its way into the United Nations’ deliberations on Israeli independence, and was thereafter inscribed into international law through the partition of Palestine.
These historical instances of demarcation illustrate the contested, political, and processual nature of the categories of “religion”, “Muslim” and “Jew” during the process of Pakistani and Israeli recognition. The international recognition of Pakistan and Israel reified the boundaries around and between political, social and religious communities. It reinstated the logic of a differentiated social ontology of “Self” and “Other”. The recognition process reproduced and reinstated the colonial epistemic framework of differentiated and differentiable religious and cultural communities, reifying them into internationally recognized and recognizable political entities.

In the first part of the thesis – Chapters 1, 2, and 3 – I discuss international recognition and religion, and argue that recognition is partly problematic, as it presupposes and reproduces its objects, agents and epistemological frameworks and “forgets” about the processes by which these have emerged. I frame it as a lack of genealogical sensitivity, and argue that recognition contains a reifying tendency. In the second part of the thesis – Chapter 4 and 5 – I approach these questions of reification, recognizability and genealogical sensitivity and continue the argumentation of the previous chapters regarding the reifying aspects of recognition, as well as the call for an approach that can nurture genealogical sensitivity vis-à-vis the process of how something becomes recognizable in international relations. I do so by tapping into post-postivist scholarship, and in particular by engaging its emphasis on the importance of questioning ontological premises and denaturalizing seemingly natural knowledge, an aspect which I term “becoming”. The emphasis of this perspective of “becoming” on the processes by which knowledge – for example of differentiated agents and objects or of a particular epistemic system – emerges reflects precisely the genealogical sensitivity I saw as lacking from the framework of recognition examined in the first part of the thesis.

While this perspective of “becoming” offers me a way to engage with genealogical sensitivity and track the processes of how something becomes recognizable, it tends
to underestimate the dependency of the stability of knowledge for objects and agents to be intelligible, an aspect contrasting with becoming, which I term "being". Allowing the being to incorporate itself into naturalized knowledge, forgetting about the way it "became" what it "is” would end up reifying the being. This was the aspect of recognition that I am aiming to avoid. What I am pursuing, instead, is a balance between being and becoming, between stabilizations of knowledge and an awareness of their non-natural character. I want to attain a level of balance in the tension between being and becoming, not allowing one to dominate the other. After outlining different alternatives to this sought-for balance, therefore, I argue at the end of the chapter for an alternative to recognition. This alternative builds on the critical power of becoming in order to open up space for alternative knowledge, objects and agents, and then argue in favor of filling this space with a multitude of different beings, leaving the truth-claim of each being to balance out the truth-claim of the others. The hope was, in this way, to nurture the genealogical sensitivity of "non-reified" thinking. I refer to this as an analysis of "becoming recognizable" and thereby refer to the "becoming" as the necessary genealogical sensitivity and the "recognizable" as the "beings" without which the object, agents, and identities of recognition – in the case of the thesis, "religion" – would not be intelligible in the first place. While the argumentation of the thesis is indebted to post-foundational thought, it is not in its entirety a post-foundational thesis, but rather an attempt to balance foundations against each other, against a single "being" gaining the status of the single Being, i.e. become reified. This way I hope to nurture the genealogical sensitivity sought in the first part and which was necessary in order to open up to those new agents, objects, subjects, frameworks that are not yet recognizable as such. I aim to present a perspective sensitive to the way new objects and agents become recognizable in international relations.

The fifth and final chapter is also the second illustration of the theoretical discussion of the previous chapter. While I focused on tracing the processes by which religion, Muslim and Jewish, emerged as recognizable categories in the third chapter, in this chapter I place greater emphasis on the outcomes – the “beings” of Muslim or Jew –
emerging from these processes. I do so in order to show the emergence of multiple "beings" in the constellation of religion in international relations. While the first illustration had been broad in range and wide in scope, this second illustration places a much narrower focus on two individuals: the colonial intellectual Reginald Coupland, and Pakistan’s UN representative and future foreign minister, Muhammad Zafrullah Khan. These two men are interesting, as they occupied opposite positions during the negotiations leading to the partition of Palestine and Israeli independence in the United Nations in the fall of 1947, and also opposite positions regarding the partition of India and the independence of Pakistan. While Coupland had been the author of the first Palestine Partition Plan – the "Peel report" – upon which the final plan was based, and had argued against the partition of British India, Khan represented the opposition to Palestine Partition and thus the independence and international recognition of the state of Israel, while representing the claim to partition in the Pakistani case.

The “religion” that emerges from underneath the focus on Coupland and Zafrullah Khan is ambiguous and partly contradictory, and questions any reified assumptions regarding religion in the context of international recognition. Coupland understood the “Jewish” and the “Muslim beings” as natural and essential, the Jewish “race” being differentiated by its particular religion since ancient times. While the essence of these beings was fundamental, there was not a zero-sum relationship between them and their non-Jewish or non-Muslim neighbors. While the boundaries around the Jewish “race” of Palestine and the Muslim “race” of India were clear-cut and impossible to transcend through assimilation, it was possible to accommodate them within a single political community, as had been done within the British Commonwealth before. In the case of “Jewish Israel” the references to religion are melted into a single pot together with “race”, “nation”, and to some extent “culture” and does not seem to cause much trouble in and of itself. In the case of “Muslim Pakistan” religion had become more clearly differentiated from “race” and “nation”, and was now seen to threaten the political solution to a political conflict by pulling back Pakistani nationalism to old Pan-Islamic ideas. Religion, in this sense, was an
outdated framework, which needed to be overcome, and the British Indian Muslims needed to be emancipated from their religious consciousness, as had been the case in Europe and during course of most Arab nationalist movements. The difference between Muslim and non-Muslim here refers to differences in race, nation and culture, but does not have to include a difference in religion. Religion, in the case of Pakistan, did not have to be central to – or should not even have been part of – (the definition of) Muslims and their claims to political independence.

Khan, on the other hand, mainly stayed away from essentialized categories, emphasizing time and again their contingent nature. While representing the Muslim League in the negotiation of the international border between India and Pakistan – which had an acclaimed “Two-Nation Theory” of fundamentally different Hindus and Muslims – he remained cautious in this vocabulary. The British Indian Muslims needed a “homeland”, but more in order to escape the economic and social subjugation by the Sikhs and Hindus during British rule than due to an inherent need to territorialize Islam.

At the UN negotiations, Khan needed to balance furthering the Pakistani claim as a Muslim National Homeland, while refuting the same right for a Jewish National Homeland to the Palestinian Jews. He needed to argue the case that the Jews were different from the Palestinian Arabs, but without recognizing their specific status as a nation with the right to self-determination as the case had been for the Pakistani Muslims. Even if he had been cautious with regard to using the essentialized language of different “races”, “religions” or “nations”, Pakistan had claimed independence as a Muslim Homeland due to religiously marked differences from its Indian neighbor, and he had to clarify why the Jews were not a comparable case to the Muslims. Facing the Second World War legacy, Khan could not return to the Muslims’ need for socio-economic refuge, since the Russian and European Jewish immigrants to Palestine, who would be the backbone of the new Jewish state, had every reason to seek refuge outside of their home countries following the genocide of the Holocaust. The distinction he then ended up drawing between the Indian
Muslims and the Palestinian Jews on one hand side, and the Arab non-Jews and the Palestinian Jews on the other, was that of being or not being indigenous. The temporal argument of connection to the territory – the Indian Muslims were a part of the land before partition was considered – became his main point of differentiation. Zafrullah Khan tried to distinguish a “Jewish minority” from a “Muslim nation” with reference to their status as peoples indigenous to the land. In the end, it was not a particularly successful venture. While Khan’s attempts to stir this solid brew and loosen the essentialized categories remained unsuccessful, Coupland’s understanding of the natural distinction between Jews and non-Jews found its way into the Peel report, and from there into the negotiations of the UN General Assembly, and became authorized via international law.

During his time in the Indian/Pakistani boundary commission, Khan represented the Muslim League with a clearly reified understanding of the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims. Similarly, in the UN, Khan represented the opposition to the Palestine partition and Israeli independence, a group of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan and Iraq, which was also very insistent on reified distinctions between Jews and non-Jews. Although representing two bodies with a strongly reified language and understanding of the situation, Khan hardly ever adopted that language.

The aim of these different illustrations will be to emphasize and illustrate the processes of how the “Muslim Homeland” of Pakistan and the “Jewish National Home” of Israel became recognizable as such. By showing how the multiplicity of different “Muslim” and “Jewish” beings emerged from different processes, I hope to counter the reifying tendencies in recognition that were identified in the first part of the thesis. I thereby hope to nurture a genealogical sensitivity within the recognition framework and thereby the sensitivity to the emergence of new forms of “religion” not yet recognizable as such. The aim of this, then, is to sustain a multiple and “mutually incompatible ways of seeing.” (Levine 2012: 63), i.e. a particular understanding of plurality that is not reducible to the recognition of difference.
In this thesis, I will argue that increased attention should be paid to the process of *becoming recognizable* in international relations. I will investigate how to approach the reifying tendencies that featured in the recognition framework, that is, how to approach the forgetfulness of the processes of emergence of objects, agents, and epistemic frameworks of recognition. I will investigate what are the processes of 'becoming' in international relations, that is, how do objects and agents become recognizable and how do epistemic frameworks change in order for new agents and objects to become recognizable. I will to nurture a genealogical sensitivity in the framework of recognition in order to avoid the dangers of reification. The end of the first part argues that unless these kinds of investigations are conducted into the premises on which recognition rests, it is bound to remain within, and reproduce, its originating epistemic framework and the particular bias that such a framework carries. If the question of recognizability is not afforded sufficient attention, the framework of recognition will tend to stabilize and reproduce itself and the objects and agents within it, losing the ability to recognize new international objects and agents not yet recognizable as such. The second part attempts to prepare the ground for answering these questions and for nurturing a genealogical sensitivity against the reifying tendencies in recognition. It does so by suggesting an approach whereby the multiple versions of the recognizable objects and agents – the *recognizable beings* – balance each other's truth claims. The limits of the recognition framework, as well as the alternative approach of *becoming recognizable*, will be illustrated through the cases of the international recognition of the "Muslim Homeland" of Pakistan and the "Jewish National Home" of Israel. By re-reading these two cases, my illustrations will try to stem the reifying tendencies of this recognition onto "religion" in international relations.
Chapter 1: Recognizing religion

Before the 2001 attacks in New York and the subway bombings in London and Madrid, scholars of international relations paid very limited attention to the question of religion. Political theory in general and international relations in particular had approached its objects of study through a framework of the modern and the rational, both of which explicitly refrained from engaging with religion. Indeed, its relevance was expected to decline as modern society developed.  

Accordingly, the different parts of modern society – economy, law, and politics – were viewed as self-sufficient, without any need for a religious context. In addition, the current international order was considered to have emerged at a point in time when religion had been separated from politics, at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Finally, the community of IR scholars and the discipline they constituted were increasingly rooted in a positivist method and rationalist ontology that were unable to provide a quantitative measurement of the “intangible” or accommodate the non-rational or irrational. Given this “secular” starting point, how was IR to deal with this new empirical challenge? Secularity has not only been seen as a normative necessity of the modern state, but also as a historical empirical development, characteristic of „modernity“. The process of secularization refers to a supposedly actual historical pattern of differentiation and transformation of the “religious” sphere, i.e. the religious institutions and churches, and of the secular sphere, the economy, science, health and state (Casanova 1994). The idea is simple, Peter Berger writes, “modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the mind of individuals” (Berger 1999: 2; Taylor 1998: 32-35; Habermas 2005: 317ff; Norris/Inglehart 2004: 7; Connolly 1999: 19-25; Lynch 2000: 744).

The reason for this was supposed to be the progress of science and its inherent rationality. These were expected to replace irrationality and superstition of religion (Berger 1999: 2ff). Within the social sciences, and particularly within sociology, a general theory of secularization was developed. These, at first modern European, and later increasingly globalized historical transformations, were seen as a part of a general teleological and progressive human and societal development (Casanova 1994, 2003: 5). The progress was seen as one departing from the “primitive Sacred” to the “modern Secular”. Most famously, Max Weber believed that what he called the “process of rationalization” – the increasing dominance of a “scientific mindset” in all cultural settings – would dissolve the magical belief of modern man, trapping the him in an “iron cage of” rationality (Kippenberg 2003: 214ff; Berger 2008: 23). This thesis of disenchantment (Entzauberung der Welt; Weber 1968[1913]) was not definitive, but even with the possibility of a re-enchantment (Wiedererzauberung) Weber saw the decline of religion as the most possible development accompanying the modern “rationalization” process (Weber 1988[1920]: 254; see also Kippenberg 2003).

with the phenomenon of religion?

Some attempts have been made to incorporate religion into prevailing positivistic methods. These take their cues from various sociological studies, which connect the religious identity of an individual with his or her social behavior and choices. It is argued that, although religion is seldom the single cause of action when it affects the behavior of policy makers, it can “inspire, cause or influence conflict” to such a degree that it can no longer be neglected as an important factor, particularly in the arena of international security. It is thus claimed that IR is broadened in its explanatory potential through the inclusion of religion as a variable. In this sense, religious actors are to be viewed as something ontologically different from their secular counterparts with a different rationality and particular “idiosyncratic” reference systems. Religion, in this sense, is a “world of its own”.

Scholars employing a more interpretative, hermeneutic approach have questioned this kind of focus, which investigates the influence of religion as a variable on the individual mindset. For these scholars, religion, as such, cannot “create behavior,” since the category itself is man-made and thus needs to be approached in a more historically and contextually sensitive manner. Rather than taking religion at face value, this kind of critical scholarship argues for the need to investigate the consequences of thinking of religion as a separate category, distinct from politics and distinct from the secular. If religion was seen as the “other” with regard to the secular, and the secular, for example, was argued to be necessary for neutral,

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18 Fox/Sandler 2004: 71.
legitimate government, the contestation over what the secular – and its religious “other” – meant and whom it included proved to be a struggle over legitimate political power and participation. Further, if the secular was argued to be a precondition for the workings of reason and rationality, a precondition for accountability, then the understanding of what or who was secular or religious also became a question of who could or could not be included as fully recognized, rational and accountable actors into the moral and political orders of an international system or society.

For example, in her work on the politics of secularism in international relations,22 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd argues that “the determining conditions and effects of what gets categorized as ‘religion’ are historically and culturally variable”.23 Rather than assuming that religion impacts upon international relations in one way or another, she asks how “processes, institutions, and states come to be understood as religious versus political [as private versus public] and [how to] ascertain the political effects of such demarcation”.24 Hurd sees secularism as one of the modalities governing this demarcation and formation of religion, and as such “one of the most important organizing principles of modern politics,”25 and an integral “part of the cultural and normative basis of international relations theory”.26 Hurd's work – and that of other scholars - presents secularism as a mode of governance regulating and constituting the boundaries of religion and its legitimate space and place. Religion seems missing from IR scholarship, because most IR scholars adopt a view of the world based on a secular “reality,” whereby scholars miss out on “secularism's role in the production of the subjects that it presupposes” that is, both religion and the secular. Nor do they account for the political decision-making process that demarcates the category of “religion” from that of "politics”.27

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24 Hurd 2008: 16, my brackets.
26 Hurd 2008: 10.
27 Hurd 2004: 254, 256.
Secularism in international relations, in this sense, is a power/knowledge regime with a productive power, constituting religion as something distinct from the public, political and liberal secular sphere of international relations, and most often as private, apolitical, and illiberal. The failure to recognize the constructedness of religion and the “moral, political, and epistemological consequences” of secularism explains why “students of international relations have been unable to properly recognize the power of religion in world politics”.28

The various versions of secularism – as an epistemic category or a “power/knowledge regime” – have been analyzed as tools of power of the modern state, as a Eurocentric framework of thought with powerful workings in the post-colonial world and in the reproduction of an Islamic “other”.29 Building upon this critical work, post-secular accounts emerged articulating alternatives beyond contemporary secular frameworks.30 These have traced the “return” or “resilience” of religion in modern life and have argued for new models of politics, which would be able to include the growing number of religious arguments, communities and ideas in the public realm. On the other hand, the post-secular also featured as a framework for new forms of critical thinking that challenged the view that the values of equality, democracy, inclusion, freedom, or justice are best pursued within a liberal and secular framework.31

In the following chapter, I will focus on three scholars who identify with theoretical positions in international relations where the abovementioned virtues of historical and contextual sensitivity are written large, namely Social constructivism, the English School and Habermasian Critical Theory. I will analyze in detail the

30 Through the work of political theorists such as Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, Judith Butler, Talal Asad, Craig Calhoun and William Connolly.
31 Mavelli/Petito 2012.
argumentation of Daniel Philpott, Scott Thomas and Mariano Barbato. All three agree in their diagnoses that religion has been systematically excluded from the theory and practice of international relations. While they list different reasons for this exclusion, they continue to agree about its problematic nature and argue for the need to recognize religion in international affairs. Theirs are not simply arguments regarding the importance of a concept in international relations theory, but that religion – as ideas (Philpott), communities (Thomas), or an epistemic treasure-chest (Barbato/Habermas) – represents a fundamental part of the fabric of international relations itself. After outlining and analyzing their arguments in detail, I will point out that, while arguing for the need to recognize the importance of religion in international relations, neither of the scholars reflect sufficiently on what it is they want to have recognized, and how it became intelligible or recognizable – to them, the discipline or a broader international audience – in the first place. They all lack, what I call, a genealogical sensitivity, regarding the recognition of religion in international relations.

**Social constructivism: Daniel Philpott and the kinetic energy of ideas**

“*No Reformation, no Westphalia*”

International relations has neglected religion, Daniel Philpott argues, referring to a survey of “leading international relations journals over the period 1980-99”. Only six out of 1600 articles feature religion as an “important influence”. This fact is problematic for a whole range of different reasons. First, he states, religion cannot be ignored, since it lies “at the root of modern international relations” and the

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32 These three authors represent historical and contextual sensitive approaches and all question the exclusion of religion from international scholarship. However, while they are critical of the exclusion, none of theirs are “crude” inclusion arguments. These are made elsewhere and are rather easy to deconstruct. Rather, the following authors arguments can be placed much more close to the IR “critical” mainstream and each represent a particular “critical” school of thought, Critical theory, the English School and Social Constructivism.

present Westphalian international order. The order refers to a system of sovereign states that emerged after Protestant principalities challenged the prevailing authority of the Catholic Church and its aligned Empires in 16th and 17th century Europe. While “Westphalia” has been understood by a majority of international scholars to mark the move from the idea of Europe as unified by Christendom to a system of sovereign states, from a religious to a modern, secular world, Philpott argues that this very international order would never have emerged were it not for the way in which the Reformation and Protestant ideas of political authority had shaped states’ interests in sovereign statehood. “[P]lumb[ing] the causal logic behind this correlation, I argue that the intrinsic content of Protestantism itself point to sovereignty”. The “Westphalian” international order that followed the settlement of these conflicts “made the territorial state the cornerstone of the modern state system.” Morgenthau 1985 (1948): 294; for a critical reading of Westphalia see Osiander 2001; Krasner 1993; Spruyt 1994; Blaney and Inayatullah 2000, 2001; David Campbell similarly argues that the narrative of a clear medieval-modern break is used to sanctify the identities forged by the state system. (1992: 46ff). Leo Gross called Westphalia “the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world” (Gross 1948); Quentin Skinner argues that after Luther the “idea of the Pope and Emperor as parallel and universal powers disappears, and the independent jurisdictions of the sacerdotium are handed over to the secular authorities.” (Skinner 1978b: 15). According to Stephen Krasner the settlement at Westphalia “delegitimized the already waning transnational role of the Catholic Church and validated the idea that international relations should be driven by balance-of-power considerations rather than the ideals of Christendom.” (Krasner 2001: 21). The new Westphalian system recognized the state as the dominant actor, “replacing the transnational authority of the Catholic Church.”(Thomas 2005: 54). Within such a state system the “role of the divine was in effect marginalized.”(Fox/Sandler 2005: 23). The ‘integrationalism’ of religion and politics of the Medieval Europe and its Res Publica Christiania was “defeated” by the Westphalian settlement. (Philpott 2009: 187). The “secularizing spirit of this settlement of the Thirty Years War” expanded through the globalization of the Westphalian state system “to a global dominion that still endures.” (Philpott 2002: 71). In this sense, Westphalia secularized the international system.

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34 Philpott 2000: 206.
35 Regarding religion, the Treaty of Osnabrück revises the Diet of Augsburg and the right of the ruler to implement religious unity onto his territory. Instead, the treaties in 1648 wrote that each part of the empire from there on be settled according to the situation on 1 January 1624 (Münster section 47; Osnabrück article 5.1ff). The authority of the polities were deprived of the power given to them in Augsburg to determine the religious liation of their lands and Osnabrück further guaranteed the private exercise of recognized confessions, that is, Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist. (Asch 1997).
36 The “Westphalian” international order that followed the settlement of these conflicts “made the territorial state the cornerstone of the modern state system.” Morgenthau 1985 (1948): 294; for a critical reading of Westphalia see Osiander 2001; Krasner 1993; Spruyt 1994; Blaney and Inayatullah 2000, 2001; David Campbell similarly argues that the narrative of a clear medieval-modern break is used to sanctify the identities forged by the state system. (1992: 46ff). Leo Gross called Westphalia “the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world” (Gross 1948); Quentin Skinner argues that after Luther the “idea of the Pope and Emperor as parallel and universal powers disappears, and the independent jurisdictions of the sacerdotium are handed over to the secular authorities.” (Skinner 1978b: 15). According to Stephen Krasner the settlement at Westphalia “delegitimized the already waning transnational role of the Catholic Church and validated the idea that international relations should be driven by balance-of-power considerations rather than the ideals of Christendom.” (Krasner 2001: 21). The new Westphalian system recognized the state as the dominant actor, “replacing the transnational authority of the Catholic Church.”(Thomas 2005: 54). Within such a state system the “role of the divine was in effect marginalized.”(Fox/Sandler 2005: 23). The ‘integrationalism’ of religion and politics of the Medieval Europe and its Res Publica Christiania was “defeated” by the Westphalian settlement. (Philpott 2009: 187). The “secularizing spirit of this settlement of the Thirty Years War” expanded through the globalization of the Westphalian state system “to a global dominion that still endures.” (Philpott 2002: 71). In this sense, Westphalia secularized the international system.
37 Philpott 2000: 207.
38 Philpott 2000: 206.
international relations becomes more clear, then perhaps its place in international relations today will be taken more seriously."39

The quest to "take religion more seriously" not only stems from the fact that religion is constitutive for the present international system, but also from the fact that religion represents a challenge to this very international order. Religious international organizations, such as Al Qaeda, "directly challenge the authority structure of the international system".40 This challenge ought to "call to direct far more energy to understanding the impetuses behind [these] movements".41 Only by understanding the ideas that motivate these religious groups will their actions become intelligible, and only then can appropriate political responses be found. These actors "were animated by a kind of conception, were organized around a kind of idea, and appraised the international system to a kind of notion [to] which international relations scholars have paid relatively little attention: religion."42

International relations must recognize the centrality of religion to these dynamics and must overcome its own secular bias. "[W]e must come to understand that these groups are defined, constituted, and motivated by religious beliefs ... Out of these beliefs, they then construct a political theology [that] prescribes action accordingly. That such beliefs constitute influential global networks and motivate their actions call into question the secularization of international relations, in both practice and theory."43 In other words, international relations must recognize religion.

**Ontological assumptions**

If religion is to be recognized as an influential component of international relations, what, precisely is this “religion”? How do we distinguish religious ideas from other ideas? How is religion different from culture, or ethnicity? Philpott provides us with

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41 Philpott 2002: 77.
42 Philpott 2002: 66f.
43 Philpott 2002: 93.
two ways to proceed: First he offers a definition, mainly in order to differentiate religion from "Marxism, Nazism, nationalism and witchcraft". Accordingly, religion is "a set of beliefs about the ultimate ground of existence, that which is unconditioned, not itself created or caused". Later, he modifies this core definition, preferring to use the term "political theology", which he sees as a less closed and more open-ended term than religion. However, even if political theology differs from religion so as to be more sensitive to social and political contexts, it is still constituted by the tenets, beliefs and doctrines of religion. The difference with potential secular counterparts "is brightest" when religion is a source of preferences, that is, in terms of its ideas. For Philpott, religion is religious ideas, and these are "powerful, autonomous, and not simply the by-product of nonreligous factors ... Ideas shape politics. A religious actor is more likely to engage in certain forms of political activity ... the stronger it holds doctrines that favor those activities ... In any particular context, political theology translates basic theological claims, beliefs and doctrines into political ideals and programs".

Secondly, Philpott points out, religion can be differentiated from non-religion by looking at the practices they bring about. Ideas are mirrored in the practices of those who believe in them, that is, their "converts" on the ground. In reference to the impact of Protestant ideas of the constitution of the Westphalian international order, Philpott writes: “We know that people have [adopted Protestant ideas and] become Protestants when they organize into new congregations, speak, worship, teach, and write like Protestants." That is, the evidence of the impact of ideas and the "evidence of conversion, of identity formation" that follow from the adoption of the ideas "lies in the new religious practices of those who adopted [them]."

44 Philpott 2002: 68.
45 Philpott 2000.
46 Philpott 2009: 198.
First, there is a logical circle here: The Protestant ideas are supposedly made evident through Protestant practices. If one rejects the definition of these practices as Protestant, the impact of Protestant ideas is vacant. That is, if the ideas of “the separation of powers” and “tolerance” that came with the Reformation had been the trademark of another kind of thinking, religion would have had little to do with the Westphalian settlement, and thus with the international order emerging from that settlement. There is nothing intrinsic to religion tying it to Westphalia that could not have been provided by other philosophical traditions or movements. Why, then, highlight the importance of religion? And how can we assume that this religion is commensurable throughout four centuries?

Secondly, and more importantly, ideas are not simply mirrored in practices, but are also constituted by them. That is, ideas can represent rationalizations for already ongoing practices, and practices can be productive of the ideas they later claim to embody. Philpott does not take into account the constructive power of the enactment of “Protestant ideas”, that is, he omits to explain precisely how and in what way the practices that were defined as Protestant were productive of the ideas that are understood as Protestant.\(^{50}\) Philpott lacks a genealogical sensitivity concerning the productive power in the performance of “religious” practices for religious ideas and thus for “religion” itself. Further, he ignores the way in which the use of the term – referring to something Protestant or Sunni, etc. – is productive of the meaning of these religious references.\(^{51}\) Neither the power of the use of the meaning of religion, nor the power of the practices upon the religious ideas are taken into consideration. Ideas – be they of sovereignty or of religion – impact upon international relations but, per Philpott, are not formed by them.

To be clear, Philpott does not state that ideas are autonomous of context, but that they arise in circumstances and contexts that nourish such ideas. Further, there is not one single idea, but a conglomerate of different ideas, gravitating around one

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\(^{50}\) Adler/Pouliot 2011; for a critical review see Ringmar 2014.

\(^{51}\) For the “use” of language in language games see: Wittgenstein 1953.
basic background idea. However, as sensitive as Philpott may be towards the complexity of ideas, he lacks sensitivity regarding how these emergent ideas are dependent, or rather, how they are constituted by the way in which they are subsequently performed or used. Philpott lacks a genealogical sensitivity for the productive power in the performance of "religious" practices and how they and their use are constitutive of the meaning and the scope of religious ideas and of religion itself.

Problems regarding the ontological assumptions

Why is this problematic? Philpott himself states that "a complete genealogical account of the origin of an idea is impossible ... such an account is not my aim here."\(^5\) However, Philpott throws out a genealogical sensitivity with the bathwater of a full-fledged genealogy. The task is not to carry around the history of each term one uses to explain or understand international dynamics. Rather, it is of including a measure of sensitivity to different productive powers in the performances of "religious" practices and a modicum of sensitivity concerning how the use of religious references is constitutive of the ideas that can be argued in reference to it. Neither the power of the use for the meaning of religion, nor the power of the practices for the religious ideas are taken into consideration here. Philpott’s account lacks this genealogical sensitivity, and through his quest to have religion recognized in the “theory and practice” of IR, he reaffirms a very particular understanding of what religion is, empowers those who can claim this version of religion, and sidelines the debates and struggles on how this present state of affairs came to be. He lacks a genealogical sensitivity regarding the emergence of religion as a knowable, distinguishable issue, power or agent in international relations.

\(^{5}\) Philpott 2001: 258.
The English School: Scott Thomas and the Westphalian Presumption

According to Scott Thomas, religion has been excluded from international relations not so much due to the negligence of its scholars, but rather due to a particular misconstruction of history, more precisely, a misconstruction of the history of the Westphalian Peace and its secularizing consequences. The “Westphalian presumption” builds on the widespread view of the Peace of Westphalia that “delegitimized the already waning transnational role of the Catholic Church and validated the idea that international relations should be driven by balance-of-power considerations rather than the ideals of Christendom.”53. This new state system overcame the “integrationalism” of religion and politics of Medieval Europe and its Res Publica Christiania, which were thus "defeated".54 The "secularizing spirit of this settlement of the Thirty Years War" was to expand through the globalization of the Westphalian state system "to a global dominion that still endures."55 In other words, Westphalia secularized the international system. Thomas views this Westphalian presumption as permeating the discipline of international relations and informing the “liberal international project” more generally.56

He argues for the need to contextualize the basis upon which religion was excluded from IR. The sidelining of religion is not a random matter, he points out, but is a symptom of a particular understanding of the Westphalian Peace, suggesting that the European “Wars of Religion” between 1550 and 1650 had proven that, when religion was brought into public life it caused political upheaval, intolerance, and war, and destabilized the international order. In this sense, cultural and religious pluralism is considered to threaten international stability and challenge a sustainable peaceful international society. In order to minimize the effect of

56 Thomas 2000: 815; see also Thomas 2005: 151; Blaney and Inayatullah (2000) claim that the Westphalian system, and the intellectual heritage following from it, reinforce the idea that –religious, cultural, and social – uniformity is necessary in order to prevent international disruption of order and that, unmanaged, differences will cause disorder. "Westphalian system … functions primarily to reinforce this suspicion of difference. (Blaney/Inayatullah 2000: 32).
religious disagreement and to end the destructive role of religion in international relations, the modern state, the privatization of religion and the secularization of international relations represented the necessary reforms.\textsuperscript{57}

The Westphalian presumption misconstrues historical and, in effect, current international relations. Religion did not simply disappear from the international realm following the Westphalian Peace. As a consequence of the transfer of loyalties from religion to the state and the consolidation of the state’s monopoly on the use of power and coercion in society, religion was deprived of its social and disciplinary powers and was accorded a role that was better compatible with the powers of the emerging sovereign state. However, religious doctrines, cultures and civilizations continued to impact upon the common culture of the international societies to come, and Christendom was – and continued to be – the framework for international practices of diplomacy and war, practices that would be incommensurable outside this framework. The Westphalian presumption, Thomas continues, not only furnishes a false picture of Westphalia as the secularization of international relations, but also skews the understanding of the international “resurgence of religion” today. This seems especially problematic in the global South, or other regions than never experienced the Westphalian “privatization” of religion, where the latter retained its political and social power. Leaving the Westphalian presumption at work, the global resurgence of religion seems like the internationalization of a private matter, the reemergence of something that should have long since retreated into the inner life of the individual sovereign states. With the Westphalian presumption at work, the increased international importance of religion lurks as a threat to the Westphalian settlement and its international order and stability.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{58}Thomas 2003: 24.
Rereading Westphalia: From socially embedded religion to abstract dogma

For Thomas, the view of Westphalia as a point in time – whether real or symbolic – when international relations were freed of the influence of religion, is too great of a simplification. The actual change was a different one. Rather than representing the beginning of secularized international relations, Westphalia provided a change in the meaning of religion to one more compatible with the powers of the evolving state. In the time preceding Westphalia, Thomas points out, religion carried a social meaning, that is, *religio* was meaningful only in reference to practices within the particular (Christian) communities that sustained it.\(^{59}\) However, this changed during the early modern period. “As a result of the modern concept of religion the virtues and practices of the Christian tradition came to be separated from the communities in which they were embedded.”\(^{60}\) The development from the social to the modern meaning of religion was necessary, according to Thomas, in order to make religion “compatible with the power and discipline of the state”.\(^{61}\) Religion was detached from the virtues and practices of the ecclesial community and was privatized in the – abstract – form of belief and conscience. The “previous [intellectual and social] discipline of religion was taken over by the state, which was given the legitimate monopoly on the use of power and coercion in society.”\(^{62}\) The state used this “invention of religion” to legitimate the transfer of the ultimate loyalty of people from religion to the state as part of the consolidation of its power. The state had to separate “doctrines and beliefs from practices and communities as part of state-building and affirming internal sovereignty”.\(^{63}\)

The Westphalian presumption that “religious and cultural pluralism can not be accommodated in international society, but must be privatized, marginalised, or

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\(^{59}\) Thomas 2003: 24ff, 2005: 54ff.

\(^{60}\) Thomas 2000: 821.

\(^{61}\) Thomas 2000: 822.

\(^{62}\) Thomas 2000: 822; In the words of Thomas Hobbes: “This the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather [to speak more reverently] of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defense.” (Hobbes 1991 (1651): 120 emphasis added); See this understanding reflected in Grotius’ “De Veritate Religionis Christianae”.

even overcome – by an ethic of cosmopolitanism – if there is to be international order” builds on this version of religion as a privatized dogma, detached from practice. Thomas’s conceptually critical reading of religion in international relations shows how the Westphalian presumption needs this very “invention of religion”. The only way of separating religion – and its previous disciplinary power – from the realms of state power was to reject the way in which this state power and the international society, in which it was embedded, were dependent upon it. A new version of religion was needed, a “modern” version which could be much more easily accessed and controlled. The new religion – the dogma and doctrines – were to remain in the private sphere, and not interfere with the public matters of the state or the international system of which the latter was part. Not necessarily problematic in itself, Thomas states, the Westphalian presumption, nonetheless, skews the analysis of religion in present international relations, not only due to the incommensurability of concepts between different historical periods, but also because international relations scholars “risk misunderstanding the [present] global resurgence of religion if we apply a modern concept of religion to non-Western societies where this transition is incomplete, or it is being resisted as part of their struggle for authenticity and development.”

During the conflicts preceding the Westphalian settlement, the role of religion was not one of doctrine. “[W]hat was being safeguarded and defended in the Wars of Religion was a sacred notion of the community defined by religion, as each community fought to define, redefine, or defend the boundaries between the sacred and the profane as a whole.”66 In this sense, religion in early modern Europe should be interpreted as a “community of believers rather than as a body of doctrines or beliefs as liberal modernity would have it.”67 The Westphalian presumption ignores this, treats Westphalia as the beginning of secularized international relations and the occurrence of religion within this international realm as a threat to this

65 Thomas 2005: 23.
Westphalian secular order. The Westphalian presumption excludes religion and generally perceives the growing reference in international relations to religion as the internationalization of a private matter and, hence, as a problem.

However, Thomas points out, religion is not a problem in international relations. Rather, the international realm is permeated by it. The formation of the international “thick practices” of diplomacy and war were deeply embedded in a particular religious and cultural tradition of Christendom, and are incommensurable when placed outside of this framework. Beyond the fact that religion historically has been the bones around which the muscles of the practices of war and diplomacy evolved, it continues to play a central role in the “global South”. International relations “has to develop a more complex understanding of religion since religion is an increasingly (or, indeed, always has been) an important part of the way people in the global South interpret their personal lives and social world”.

The fact that this part of the world will comprise almost 90 per cent of the world’s population by the year 2050 and that the discipline of international relations is becoming increasingly pluralized to cover a “truly multicultural international society” should urge international scholars to “take[e] cultural and religious pluralism seriously [as it] will be an important part of the international politics of the twenty-first century”. Ceasing to exclude religion from IR, Thomas points out, entails countering the Westphalian presumption and its version of religion as private, abstract, de-contextualized belief. “If the global resurgence of religion and cultural pluralism are to be taken seriously, then a social understanding of religion and its importance to the authenticity and development of communities and states should be recognised as part of any post-Westphalian international order.”

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69 Thomas 2010b: 507.  
70 Thomas 2000: 819.  
71 Thomas 2000: 816.
The centrality of the living tradition: MacIntyre and the English School

Rather than settling with the Westphalian presumption and its version of de-contextualized religion, Thomas sees promise in the historical sociology of the early English School, that of Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield and David MacKinnon, who prioritize taking "seriously the impact of religious doctrines, cultures and civilizations on international relations". These scholars see international society and its intersubjective sense of belonging between states as having emerged via a common culture, which underpinned different states-systems in history. It was "a prior or deeper agreement among states ... necessary to develop rules, laws, norms, or institutions of international society. In other words, a deeper understanding [was] necessary for the rational interest of states to foment international cooperation." 73 This deeper understanding, common culture or underlying foundation emerges out of cultural and religious contexts of different types of state-systems. "This is why the early E[nglish] S[chool] ... emphasized that a common cultural or religious foundation was often necessary for the existence of the different historic states systems or international societies in history." 74 More recent scholars of the English School have mostly abandoned the question of religion. While some scholars still argue for the need for cultural foundations of international society, they are rather referring to a common cosmopolitan culture of liberal modernity. 75 To these scholars, the "resurgence of religion" and the pluralism advocated in its name, appears more as a challenge than as a resource.

According to Thomas, the Westphalian presumption indicates a change from a social meaning of religion to that of an abstracted dogma. Rather than depicting a historical development, however, this presumption mythologizes the privatization of religion and the secularization of international relations. Moreover, the redefinition of religion during this time period was a necessary means to

72 Thomas 2005: 17.
73 Thomas 2005: 150.
74 Thomas 2005: 94.
75 Wheeler 2000; Linklater/Suganami 2006.
consolidate the power of the emerging state, and should be treated and analyzed as such, instead of built upon as if it were a given condition. The exclusion of religion from international relations, Thomas argues, rests upon this assumption that religion is a private matter. Related to the English School, this view distorts the way in which a multitude of international practices, norms and institutions are rooted in religious traditions and communities, and leaves the international resurgence of religion misunderstood. Leaving the Westphalian presumption at work, this resurgence appears as a threat to the international secular order. However, by questioning the Westphalian presumption and addressing religion via a different historical sensibility, Thomas argues that religion is better understood as a social tradition, or as a “living tradition”.

This “living tradition”, or social tradition, follows on from the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and the view that human actions only become intelligible once they are interpreted as a part of a larger narrative of the collective life of individuals, communities and states. Values, virtues, practices and identities are expressed through and rooted in the culture, tradition and history of the particular communities in which they are embedded. Thus, practices of warfare or statecraft can only be understood if one takes into account the larger context within which they took place. According to Thomas, before Westphalia, this context was Christendom, and the practices of international relations – war and diplomacy – were embedded in the wider religious and cultural traditions of Christendom. Between the 15th and 17th century, these practices became detached from the Christian traditions, “Christendom gave way to the invention of religion, and religion came under the modern state’s power and discipline.” The international practices were detached from Christianity as a social tradition, and were reduced to rules and further codified by the merging idea of international law. Thomas’s MacIntyrean reading of this process argues that this reduction of the thick practices of international relations – those embedded in the social traditions of “world religions,

76 MacIntyre 1984[1981].
77 Thomas 2003: 42.
cultures and civilizations” – to thin practices of procedural rules has “undermined the basis for the social bond that made them binding in international society” in the first place.78 By detaching rules from practices and the practice communities out of which they grew, “the debates on just war, arms races, or humanitarian intervention have become incommensurable not only within the Western societies, but among Western and non-western countries as well.”79 This is also the case for religion. The reduction of religion from its social meaning as a “living tradition” to an abstracted and static dogma or set of beliefs has rendered religion private, and as such necessarily excluded from the realm of international relations. Instead of adopting the Westphalian presumption and excluding religion from IR, Thomas argues for a re-reading of these historiographical accounts, which would enable scholars and practitioners alike to take religion “seriously”. "Taking religious and cultural pluralism seriously means identifying those practices of particular religions and cultural traditions ... cultivating and supporting them.”80

Taking religion seriously: Affirmation, restoration and recognition

Thomas argues for the need to contextualize the basis upon which religion was excluded from international relations, namely the "Westphalian presumption” and continues to argue that religion needs to be “taken seriously” in world politics. However, one might object, if religion is not a set of doctrines, as the Westphalian presumption claimed, what is it then? The first hint in this direction was given via MacIntyre’s framing of religion as a social and a “living” tradition, one that evolves and changes with the community within which it is embedded. However, if religion is "living" and changing with its context, what, precisely, is to be taken seriously? Once Thomas detaches the meaning of religion from the stable core of dogma and doctrine and ties the definition of religion to the changing life of the community, it becomes difficult to understand what he wishes to have recognized.

78 Thomas 2005: 43.
79 Thomas 2005.
80 Thomas 2005: 45.
In the end, Thomas’ argument that we should “take religion seriously” is, on the one hand, an argument against the necessity – and possibility – of a public sphere with individuals detached from their “cultural and religious” convictions. On the other hand, it is an argument for the recognition of religion, the religious communities – “faith communities” – and the organization that embodies them. Thomas illustrates the different segments of world politics where religion already plays a role – democracy promotion, economic development, international cooperation, diplomacy, peace building – and lists organizations that embody this embedded understanding of religion – Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, Christian Aid, Fatayat (The association of young Islamic women), the Women’s Welfare Association (Indonesia), Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement (Sri Lanka), and Sarkan Zoumountsi Association (Cameroon). He sees this embodied and embedded religion in the United Nations, or at the tables of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Thomas wants “religion” to be a part of a multitrack diplomacy, assuming its role next to governments, NGOs and professional organizations, business communities, research institutions et cetera. In taking religion seriously, Thomas argues for the recognition of religious communities at the deliberation table of international organizations, in fora for international conflict solution, diplomacy and democracy building.81

This position, however, carries with it a range of problems. First, as Rogers Brubaker has argued, there needs to be a great deal of care taken when using self-description of groups and their leaders’ distinguishing characteristics. The groups and their elites belong to the empirical data rather than to the analytical toolkit. “We must, of course, take vernacular categories and participants’ understandings seriously, for they are partly constitutive of our object of study. However, we should not uncritically adopt categories of ethnopartisan practice as our categories of social analysis … participant’s accounts … often have what Pierre Bourdieu has called a

*performative* character. By *invoking* groups, they seek to *evoke* them, summon them, call them into being. ... Reification is a social process, not simply an intellectual bad habit. ... To criticize ethnopolitical entrepreneurs for reifying ethnic groups would be a kind of category mistake. Reifying groups is precisely what ethnopolitical entrepreneurs are in the business of doing. ... As analysts, we should certainly try to *account* for the ways in which – and conditions under which – this practice of reification ... can work. However, we should avoid unintentionally *doubling* or *reinforcing* the reification of ethnic groups in ethnopolitical practice with a reification of such groups in social analysis.”

The language of elite participants in international organizations – so called “first level” language – should not be abstracted up to the level of analysis, since the partisans have the task of mobilization and, using the language accordingly, they will seek to “evoke what they invoke”. Abstracting the language of practitioners and elites to the language of analysis legitimizes the claim to representation by these practitioners and elites. It confirms the authority over religion by those who claim to represent it. If this religion – that of the groups and their elites – is what Thomas wants to have “taken seriously,” then his model reinstates the power structures of those communities who claim to be religious and the elites within these communities who claim to represent them. How are the “living traditions” of religious communities and traditions supposed to stay “alive” if they are (only) recognized in the form in which their elites represent them?

Aside from the question of the reification of the communities’ elites’ definition of religion, another problem arises with regard to Thomas’ attempt to have religion recognized in IR and the fora of international relations. That is the question of how to take something seriously that one has rendered contingent? How to grasp the moving vehicle of a “living tradition”? If religion, the very thing Thomas wants us to “take seriously,” is tied to the communities within which it resides, we will take

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82 Brubaker: 2004: 9f; For the relation between practical knowledge and theory in IR see: Guzzini 2013: 528ff.
something else seriously on every occasion. The contingency of Thomas’ definition of that which he wants IR to take seriously seems to undermine his own venture. Alternatively, it forces us to “take seriously” the claims to authority and representation by those who can and have already exercised authority and engaged in representation, those who are already recognizable in their claim to religion, that is most commonly, the communal elites. Or, it invests the IR scholar him- or herself with the power to define what religion “is”, a definitional task that is one of theology, and not social or political science.

While Thomas emphasizes the constantly changing nature of these communities – as ‘living traditions’ – I argue that when these ‘living traditions’ are recognized as agents within international relations, their particular version of religion is authorized and thereby reified. I argue that the arguments for recognition of religious communities and traditions in international relations are preventing the “living tradition” from staying “alive”. The argument for recognizing religion in IR carries a reifying power, and Thomas lacks a genealogical sensitivity to this process.

_Habermasian Critical Theory: Mariano Barbato and post-secular international relations_

Mariano Barbato is also critical of the way in which religion has been sidelined in international relations. Categorically excluding religion misses out on its potential to provide new perspectives and insights onto international problems. This could be tapped into through the channels of Jürgen Habermas’ post-secular society. Accordingly, the semantic figures of religious communities “harbor concepts of the self, community and agency beyond class [or] state” and might help to “find figures of thought” for new solutions and approaches to world politics.83 “For global community these semantics are rather rare. Religious semantics offer resources for fueling deliberation processes with notions of arguing beyond narrow concepts of

83 Barbato 2010a: 554f.
self-interest and for imagining a new community beyond the given ones”. Recognizing religion in IR, therefore, would enable the discipline to address issues of international community and the development of global social bonds in a different manner, which he sees as particularly crucial in the face of the expanding economic rationale of self-interest currently undermining wider prospects of global community. Religious semantics are seen to be able to “improve a political culture which struggles to defend its secular concepts of justice against the pathologies of neo-liberal modernisation and globalisation”, while “old representations” of world politics lack these conceptual resources for “developing alternatives to the present impasses”.

Barbato’s Habermasian post-secular account argues for the recognition of religion in international relations in a comprehensive manner. “Post-secular emancipation, as I would like to term the project, argues that a liberal society must allow religious citizens the right to bring their arguments forward from a religiously informed perspective and even in a religious language. In the perspective of an emerging global public where a religious majority is here to stay, this post-secular emancipation of the religious masses from the secular elite is pretty much in line with Hegel’s struggle for recognition.” Barbato’s attempt to have religion recognized in IR argues for the realization of a Habermasian post-secular society. In order to analyze this account in detail, therefore, I will continue with a close reading of Habermas’ own writings, since it allows me to engage in greater detail with the underlying assumptions of this post-secular account.

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84 Barbato 2010a: 552.
85 “Habermas’s interest in the moral sense of religious communities is derived from his recognition of the poverty of the secular discourse, which in its neo-liberal and naturalistic form has engendered the diagnosed pathologies but which nevertheless provides insufficient resources for counteracting its derailments” (Barbato/Kratochwil 2009:12, see also Barbato 2010a:458ff).
86 Barbato 2010a: 549.
87 Barbato/Kratochwil 2009: 324.
88 Barbato 2010a: 549.
The Habermasian post-secular society

As one of the most prominent contemporary liberal theorists, Jürgen Habermas begins his work on post-secularism by developing a critique of the lack of self-reflection within political liberalism regarding its dependency on a particular version of secular reason, and the following categorical exclusion of religion. After developing this critique, he suggests an alternative, “postsecular”, account, in which the “unexhausted semantic resource” of religion and the truth potential of religious arguments are not, a priori, ruled out of public discourse. Habermas’ account of the postsecular society is therefore not only an account of a broader inclusive public sphere where religious arguments “count”, but is an argument for the particular inclusion of religion on epistemological grounds, since religion, per Habermas, is able to keep knowledge “hermeneutically vibrant” that “would have been lost elsewhere”.

In what follows, I argue that there is a distinctive productive power in Habermas’ argument for the recognition of religion, and that he “makes” religion through arguing for its recognition. I will investigate the Habermas’ ontological assumptions regarding religion, that is, I look at the kind of religion Habermas constructs and what he envisions entering the public sphere under the banner of “religion”. I point out that Habermas’ vision of religion is restricted to a particular “Judeo-Christian” variant, or those versions thereof that embrace the egalitarian, individualistic, universal ethics emerging out of this “Judeo-Christian” tradition. Concluding, I shall suggest that Habermas’s critique of the lack of self-reflection on the limits of secular philosophy and his critique of the exclusionary tendencies in secular political theory do not need to amount to a positive recognition of religion in public life. The issue is more fruitfully addressed through a different take on the remedies of exclusion, one which will be analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

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89 For a critique of the concept of the postsecular see Joas 2008a: 107; 2008b.
90 Habermas 2008: 110; henceforth only referred to in page number.
In 2001, Habermas gave a speech on *Faith and Knowledge* during the granting of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade. He was reacting to the events following the 9/11 attacks in New York, and the growing fear of radicalization of partisan positions at either end of the secular-religion spectrum. In his essay collection *Zwischen Naturalism und Religion* (Between Naturalism and Religion), in 2005 he broadened this thematic into a more general diagnosis of a problematic development in contemporary liberal democratic societies, namely the withering of social solidarity and civic integration. Habermas identified how the social bond of liberal democratic societies was eroding and was being replaced by growing self-reference, individual preferences and polarization, all in the wake of the ever-expanding logic, language and imperative of the market. He addressed this problem of disintegration and deteriorating solidarity through the critical examination of one set of polarized positions: those of the religious and the secular.

The broader Habermasian vision of democratic society builds upon an understanding of a pre-existing social solidarity between the citizens. The latter engage with each other in public discourse, in order to deliberate about the foundations and structures of their common existence, and, ideally, agree upon consensually accepted norms. It is a constant process of deliberation, whereby each citizen disposes of the opportunity to present and the obligation to justify his or her arguments in a so-called "ideal speech situation," free from asymmetric coercive power and systematic distortion of communication, leaving only the "unforced force" of the "better argument".\(^{91}\)

This arena for deliberation is dependent upon an attitude that enables solidarity between its members in order to prosper. It is an attitude that cannot be legally enforced by the liberal-democratic state, but which the state needs to assume to be a product of a historical learning process. It is an attitude "osmotically open at both

\(^{91}\) Habermas 1984: 171ff.
ends”, which yields a willingness to alter one’s original position.\textsuperscript{92} It is, further, an attitude that acknowledges the equality and freedom of one’s fellow citizens, and which self-critically recognizes that one’s own truth may not be the truth of others. This attitude, upon which solidarity depends, is undermined in the secularist public sphere where religious arguments, reasons and agents are labeled as irrational, and as such rejected as illegitimate in public discourse. While Habermas defends the exclusivity of nonreligious reasoning in the “formal public sphere”, i.e. at the institutional level of parliament, court and public administration, he argues for eliminating this exclusiveness in the “informal public sphere”.\textsuperscript{93}

In this more recent critique of the “secularist” exclusion of religion in informal public deliberation, Habermas argues for a deepening of what he sees as being at the very heart of liberal modernity, namely the capacity for self-reflection and self-criticism. His postsecular account prescribes a “self-reflexive overcoming of a rigid and exclusivist secular self-understanding of modernity.”\textsuperscript{94} This ”presupposes an epistemic mindset that is the result of a self-critical assessment of the limits of secular reason.”\textsuperscript{95} Habermas challenges secular thinking to reflect upon its own limits and to review its claim to neutrality. Part of the exclusion of religion from the public sphere and its arenas of deliberation builds upon the assumption that the secular is equivalent with the neutral, and that religion is necessarily partisan in nature. However, Habermas states, ”[t]he neutrality of state power vis-à-vis different worldviews, which guarantees equal individual liberties for all citizens, is incompatible with the political generalization of a secularized worldview.”\textsuperscript{96} Rather, secular philosophy and political theory, in their Hellenic roots, must deepen their respective understandings of their shared history and the ways in which they mutually shaped and were shaped by early Christian thought.\textsuperscript{97} Secularist

\textsuperscript{92} Habermas 2001: 15, my translation; Cf., 1981, vol. 1: 385ff.
\textsuperscript{93} Habermas 2010: 130.
\textsuperscript{94} Habermas 2008: 138.
\textsuperscript{95} Habermas 2008: 139f.
\textsuperscript{96} Habermas 2008: 113.
\textsuperscript{97} Habermas 2008: 110f, for a different reading see Osiander 2000.
arguments for the exclusion of religion must understand their own dependence upon the traditions they are trying to silence. As the "major world religions belong to the history of reason itself (...) (p)ost-metaphysical thinking misunderstands itself if it fails to include the religious traditions alongside metaphysics in its own genealogy."98 In excluding religion from the fora of public deliberation, "secular society would ... cut itself off from key resources for the creation of meaning and identity."99

In the normative argument outlined above, Habermas claims that the exclusion of religion from public deliberative fora furthers a the disintegration of the polity and undermines social solidarity. It is, however, not only on grounds of inclusion that religion ought to be acknowledged. "Philosophy ...[also] has good reasons to be open to learning from religious traditions."100 Habermas does not only challenge secular thinking to engage in deeper self-reflection and criticize the exclusion of religion; he also emphasizes that religions could contribute positively to secular thought. Therefore, religion should not only be acknowledged due to the value of more perspectives on truth, but also on epistemological grounds.

Secular reason needs to be enriched for two different reasons: First, Habermas points to the "motivational weakness of rational morality [which] does not foster any impulses towards solidarity, that is, towards morally guided, collective action".101 Further, he points out the inability of pure practical reason to answer up to "a modernization spinning out of control armed solely with the insights of a theory of justice. The latter lacks the creativity of linguistic world-disclosure that a normative consciousness afflicted with accelerating decline requires in order to regenerate itself."102 Secular reason is, in other words, insufficient to provide

99 Habermas 2008: 131; see also Habermas 2001: 22.
100 Habermas 2008: 109.
101 Habermas: 2010: 74f; This does not mean that liberal democracies do not develop their own, rational, forms of solidarity or morality, both evolving out of the deliberative process, but somehow this does not seem to be enough.
102 Habermas 2008: 211.
solutions to the spread of the imperatives of the market, a modernization moving “out of control”, and the disintegration that will follow.

Here, Habermas introduces his epistemological argument about religion in public discourse. According to this argument, religious traditions carry a "semantic potential"\(^\text{103}\) and "a special power to articulate moral intuitions" which makes “religious speech into a serious vehicle for possible truth contents”.\(^\text{104}\) In which way does religion carry these semantic potentials that qualifies as worthy of a recognition different than that of other sources of knowledge? What makes religion different? It is useful to quote Habermas at length:

“Holy scriptures and religious traditions ... have articulated intuitions concerning transgression and salvation and the redemption of lives experienced as hopeless, keeping them \textit{hermeneutically vibrant} by skillfully working out their implications over centuries. This is why religious communities, provided that they eschew dogmatism and respect freedom of conscience, \textit{can preserve intact something that has been lost elsewhere} and cannot be recovered through the professional knowledge of experts alone. I have in mind sufficiently differentiated expressions of and sensitivity to squandered lives, social pathologies, failed existences, and deformed and distorted social relations. A willingness on the part of philosophy to \textit{learn} from religion can be justified on the basis of the asymmetry of epistemic claims, not just for functional but ... also for \textit{substantive} reasons.”\(^\text{105}\)

In other words, religion carries a semantic potential for secular thought, because it has kept something “\textit{hermeneutically vibrant}” and “\textit{intact}” that would "otherwise have been lost elsewhere" and should, on “\textit{substantive}” grounds, not be excluded from public discourse.\(^\text{106}\) What does this claim about the contribution of religion to

\(^{103}\) Habermas 2008: 142.
\(^{104}\) Habermas 2008: 131.
\(^{105}\) Habermas 2008: 110 my italics.
\(^{106}\) The possibilities and problems of the translation of this religious knowledge into secular language in order to be understood by those outside of the religious community has been discussed in length.
secular discourse presuppose? In the following section, I will try to answer this question, and will show why this epistemological recognition of religion is problematic.

Bound by recognition and the “making of” religion

Per Habermas, religion carries a semantic potential and could enrich secular thought epistemologically. This is possible because religious knowledge has been kept “hermeneutically vibrant” – or “awake”, as it were, in the German original – and has thus kept knowledge alive that would have been lost elsewhere. Philosophy and political theory ought to stay open to this kind of knowledge, not only for functional reasons or for reasons of just representation in public discourse, but for *substantive* reasons.

In the following, I shall point to a number of problems in Habermas’ epistemological argument: I will describe the productive power of his argument for the recognition of religion, the way in which Habermas constructs – “makes” – religion by arguing for its recognition. Thereafter, I examine what kind of religion Habermas has in mind, and conclude that his understanding of religion is limited to a “Judeo-Christian” version, or those forms of religion that embrace the egalitarian, individualist universal ethics emerging from this “Judeo-Christian” tradition.

As Habermas argues for the recognition of religion, he is not reflecting upon the constitutive, that is, the constructive or productive, power in his arguments. Patchen Markell has argued for a stronger visibility of the productive powers of recognition. He writes: “’Recognition’ is sometimes used to refer to the successful cognition of an already-existing thing, but [it also refers] to the constructive act through which recognition’s very object is shaped or brought into being … recognition does not

by others (Barbato 2010a; Cooke 2011; Lafont 2007, 2009). Before the possibility or impossibility of translation can be discussed however – how religion can contribute to secular discourse– we need to discuss what this contribution presupposes.
simply know its objects but makes them”. Recognizing religion in the public sphere does not simply empower it, it does not merely remove it from the vault that is our private life; it also fixates that which is to be understood as religion. It draws boundaries around that which is supposed to be recognized under the label of religion. As I will show, Habermas recognizes a particular form of religion, one that fits his requirements for a liberal, deliberative democracy.

However, recognition is not simply productive; it is also has a reproductive momentum. Only those subjects are recognized that are, previous to the recognition, recognizable. Markell writes that "by making the ... institutionalization of rights dependent upon one’s recognizability as the bearer of an identity, the politics of ... recognition risks subjecting the very people whose agency it strived to enhance”. Recognition binds those whose subjectivity it aims to empower more closely to who they “are”, that is, to the categories and characteristics by which they are recognized. Recognizability comes before recognition. If religion is recognized, the distribution of rights, resources, or political access is tied to the recognizability of a group as religious. This recognizability is dependent upon what is currently "seen". It is dependent upon whom the prevailing power structures or epistemic frameworks promote into a position from whence they can claim to be the representatives of religion. The consequence is that existing forms are maintained; powerful groups are recognized as "authentic” representatives for legal or political purposes, and their status thereby reinforced. In this sense recognizing religion has a reproductive momentum.

In other words, recognizing religion has a productive and reproductive power, neither of which are discussed by Habermas. There is no critical or genealogically informed perspective displayed within Habermas’ postsecular account regarding

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107 Markell 2000: 496; See also Thomassen 2011.
108 Markell 2003: 175.
109 Bartelson points to a similar problematic of recognition, presupposing an identification of the actor to be recognized, distinguishing between those who are to be recognized and those who are not. However, he does not point to the conservative momentum of this presupposition. (Bartelson 2013: 121).
religion. Besides lacking a genealogical sensitivity, Habermas, further, does not address the performative aspect of the term “religion”. This means he lacks a way to assess the consequences of a particular meaning of religion. He ignores the question of who is empowered by this version of religion and who is not. He does not attend to the question of what arguments gain legitimacy, or are seen as inevitable. He takes the term for granted, and therefore misses out on the politics deeply interwoven into the term.

Markell’s point raises important questions: What does Habermas imagine to fall within the category of religion? Which type of religion does Habermas want us to acknowledge the importance of? When he states that “a philosophy which relates to religion as a contemporary intellectual formation enters into a dialogue with it instead of talking about it”\(^\text{110}\), what – or who – does he see embodying this ‘it’? With whom is Habermas engaging in dialogue, exactly?

Behind these questions lies the importance of boundary drawing. How do we know when religion is and when it is not? What and who ought to be acknowledged, included, and accorded a political voice in a Habermasian postsecular society? Further, who draws the line? In the following section, I shall examine the boundaries that Habermas draws around the concept of religion and will analyze how his arguments are productive of religion.\(^\text{111}\) If religion carries an epistemological value to philosophy and political theory, the question is crucial as to what gets included into the category. Or, perhaps even more importantly, who gets included and who does not, whose voice is amplified and whose is not.

\(^{110}\) Habermas: 2010: 77.

\(^{111}\) For an extended account of various “makings-of” religion see Dressler/Mandair 2011.
Habermas’ ontological assumptions regarding religion

Habermas does not specify what he means by religion. He uses the term interchangeably with religious communities, individual believers, religious consciousness or religious language. The closest he gets to a definition is when he speaks of the “unexhausted semantic potential [that] can be found only in traditions which ... have not yet completely dissolved in the relentless acceleration of modern conditions of life”. These traditions are the “world religions which [carry] the only surviving element of the now alien cultures of the Ancient Empires”, rooted – as antique philosophy – in the “middle of the first millennium before Christ, i.e. to what Jaspers called the ‘Axial Age’”.

Although religious, as well as non-religious, mentalities and forms are shaped by the processing of “cognitive dissonances” and the “modernization of public consciousness’ affects and reflexively transforms religious and secular mentalities”, there is still something in the religious communities that has been kept "hermeneutically vibrant [and] preserve[d] intact ... that would have been lost elsewhere” and that is a source of “unexhausted semantic potential“. Habermas’ argument for the epistemological value of religion – and the reason for its acknowledgement and respect – builds upon a vision of conserved religious knowledge.

112 Habermas 2008: 110.
113 Habermas 2008: 131.
114 Habermas 2008: 231.
115 Habermas 2008: 130
116 Habermas: 2010: 77f, for a critique see: Reder 2010.
117 Habermas 2008: 142.
118 Habermas 2008: 141; In contrast to normative-political convictions, “[e]very religion is originally a ‘worldview’, or ‘comprehensive doctrine’ also in the sense that is claims the authority to structure form of life as a whole.” (111). “As it happens, this special status prohibits a normative-political assimilation of religious convictions to ethical convictions, as practices by Forst (Forst (2002): 93-100) when he accords the principled priority of procedural over substantive criteria of justification precedence over the distinction between religion and secular reasons.” (Habermas 2008: 129, Fn. 35).
120 Habermas 2008: 111.
121 Habermas 2008: 110.
Apart from being of ancient origin and able to deliver knowledge “intact”, having emanated from these historical roots, Habermas also conditions the forms of religion that are permitted to enter into public discourse. These are those religions that “embed egalitarian individualism of modern natural law and universal morality in the context of their comprehensive doctrine.”\(^\text{122}\) Beyond the criteria of having “eschew[ed] dogmatism and respect freedom of conscience”,\(^\text{123}\) the form of religion that Habermas grants entry into the informal public sphere need to fulfill the Kantian conditions of egalitarian individualism and universalistic morality. I concur with Partha Chatterjee that the “claim that religious movements and parties may well have a legitimate place in modern politics if they agree to confine themselves to rational debate and persuasion ... only a plea for a particular kind of religion.”\(^\text{124}\) In our Habermasian case, I argue that his postsecular society is in no way more inclusive of formerly excluded perspectives, but is selectively inclusive vis-à-vis those perspectives that correspond with his preexisting model of a liberal deliberative democracy.

I want to point out two things: First, I want to emphasize that Habermas’ epistemological recognition of religion relates to a conservative vision of social knowledge as something that has been protected from “erosion” and that has been kept “intact” or pure.\(^\text{125}\) This view assumes a purity of religion and a distinct demarcation between the religious and the non-religious,\(^\text{126}\) a kind of boundary-

\(^{122}\) Das gelingt nur in dem Masse, wie sie (die religiöse Bürger) den egalitären Individualismus von Vernunftrecht und universalistischer Moral auf einsichtige Weise in den Kontext ihrer umfassenden Doktrinen einbetten.” (Habermas 2005: 143).

\(^{123}\) Habermas 2008: 100.

\(^{124}\) Chatterjee 2006: 59.

\(^{125}\) For a different critique regarding Habermas’ protection of religion from erosion, see Lafont 2007: 251f, 2009.

\(^{126}\) "Religious certainties are in fact exposed to increasing reflective pressure in the differentiated architecture of modern societies. Religiously rooted existential convictions, by dint of their if necessary rationally justified reference to the dogmatic authority of an inviolable core of infallible revealed truths, evade that kind of unreserved discursive examination to which other ethical orientations and worldviews, i.e. secular ‘conceptions of the good,’ are exposed. This discursive extraterritoriality of a core of existential certainties can lend religious convictions (on certain readings) an integral character.” (Habermas 2008 129f). A few pages onwards an ambivalent view
drawing which, and here I agree with Günter Kehrer, is a theological question, and not one of political or social theory. Secondly, and more importantly, however, I want to point to the productive or constructive process that is taking place below the surface of Habermas’ argumentation. Here, we see the constructive nature and productive power of arguments of recognition and their reifying effects. While not clarifying what he means by religion, he still implicitly shapes and makes it, and draws its boundaries throughout his work. Religion in this form, acceptable to public discourse, has ancient roots, can deliver knowledge intact from these roots, and subscribes to the imperatives of egalitarian individuality and universal morality.

The amplified voice of “Judeo-Christian” heritage

Habermas’ postsecular society is one in which religious arguments, reasons and justifications are not simply to be categorically disregarded as irrational or as lacking any form of truth, but must be acknowledged as sources of knowledge. However, when religion becomes a marker for that which needs to be recognized in public discourse, we need to ask what belongs in the category and who makes these decisions. In more general terms, it must be clarified who is given a voice in public discourse under the label of religion, and who is denied that voice. Habermas draws a distinct line around the legitimate speaker, when he states that the “egalitarian individualism of modern natural law and universalistic morality” must be embedded in the context of the religions’ comprehensive doctrines in order for them to be given access to public discourse and in order for them to be able to claim recognition for their arguments and justifications.128

comes to display: “As long as secular citizens are convinced that religious traditions and religious communities are, as it were, archaic relics of premodern societies persisting into the present, they can understand freedom of religion only as the cultural equivalent of the conservation of species threatened with extinction.” (Habermas 2008:138).
127 Kehrer 1998; see also Charles Taylor’s critique of this “epistemic break” in Butler et al. 2011: 49f.
128 Habermas 2008: 137.
My critique of Habermas’ account is less about the nature of deliberative discourse or democracy, and it does not intend to contribute to the discussions regarding restrained or unrestrained public debate. My critique is more about the fact that Habermas’ postsecular alternative to a hardened secularism is one where the traditions molding the idea of secular reason are given more space, whereas those that are fundamentally different are as excluded as they had been in the previous secular settings, if not more so. Habermas’ postsecular account is inclusive for the traditions which are already a part of the genealogy of (liberal) reason, those in which “egalitarian individualism” and “universal morality” are not only embedded, but out of which they have grown. The tilt towards a particular type of the so-called “world religions” is difficult to miss.

"For the normative self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or a catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of a continual critical re-appropriation and reinterpretation. Up to this very day, there is no alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a post-national constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in the past, from this substance. Everything else is idle postmodern talk.”

Emphasizing as it does the importance of the “Judeo-Christian” heritage of secular reason and the liberal values of egalitarian individualism and universal morality,

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130 "One might say that in its will to “include the other”, Habermas’s thinking about religion has a paradoxical tendency to perform the thing it most seeks to avoid, namely to exclude the “Other” or to exclude otherness. Its problem is that precisely in its will to universal accommodation, it may only end by immunizing itself against a challenge from something more profoundly outside of itself.” (Harrington 2007: 59).
131 Habermas 2002: 148f, my italics.
what would Habermas’ postsecular society look like outside of the cultural realm of Christianity? What is to be done with traditions that claim themselves to be religious but neither have Axial Age roots nor an ancient doctrine to show for it? Why should they carry less “semantic potential” for secular thinking?

The Habermasian post-secular account argues for an (international) political community built on less exclusive frameworks than the current secular variants. It argues against the categorical exclusion of religious agents, arguments and ideas and for the recognition of religion’s semantic potential for secular political thinking. However, the argument implicitly restricts who and what can and should be included under the banner of religion to those who align with its “Judeo-Christian” variant, or those versions thereof that embrace the egalitarian, individualist universal ethics emerging from this “Judeo-Christian” tradition. The arguments for the recognition of religion are productive of that which they argue in favour of. However, no attention is given, neither by Barbato, nor by Habermas himself, to the productive or reproductive powers of recognition. Neither display this form of genealogical sensitivity. This is problematic, since Habermas’ post-secular account sets out to broaden the scope of eligible speakers in public discourse, but ends up limiting it to those who are recognizably religious, that is, recognizably religious according to the implicit standards established by Habermas. It marginalizes those who do not comply with established criteria delimiting the recognizably religious, and writes a whole range of possibilities out of the picture, as those who remain unrecognized will necessarily struggle to achieve a place on the public register of recognition.132

Conclusion

This first chapter engaged with the work that has been conducted in IR regarding the question of religion. It thereby analyzed in detail the accounts of: the social

132 See also Judith Butler’s discussion of Althusser’s argument for the constitutive power of “naming” (1997a: 5ff, 28ff).
constructivist, Daniel Philpott; the English School scholar, Scott Thomas; and the Habermasian Critical Theorist, Mariano Barbato. All three scholars agree in their diagnoses that religion has been systematically excluded from the theory and practice of IR, and while they list different reasons for this exclusion, they continue to agree about its problematic nature and argue for the need to recognize religion in international affairs. In their arguments for the recognition of religion in international relations, however, none of the scholars paid much attention to what it was they wanted to have recognized. None of the three reflected on how religion has become intelligible or recognizable – to them, to an international political public, or to the discipline of IR – in the first place. They all lacked, what I called, a genealogical sensitivity to the process by which religion emerged as a differentiated and differentiable entity.¹³³

In the following chapter I will engage in greater detail with the aspects of recognition and will show that this lack of genealogical sensitivity is not limited to the work on religion and international relations, but is but one aspect of a more general problematic feature in the broader recognition framework.

Chapter 2: Recognition

During the 1990s, questions of recognition increasingly came into focus, due to the flourishing literature on multiculturalism and identity politics at both international and domestic levels. At an international level, this manifested itself in the analyses of identity-based conflicts, helping to explain why some actors seemed to act against their material interests, in search of an identity-based goal. In contrast to the prevailing realist and liberal approaches, the focus on recognition emphasized the importance of identities – subjectivities – along with the more traditional quest for power or wealth. Recognition was, however, not simply one end among many others, but a basic need. Unlike other basic needs, such as the need for shelter or food that could be fulfilled without changing the concerned individuals or groups, the need for recognition was considered different, as the very fulfillment of this particular need served to constitute the individual or collective as a particular kind of actor. Recognition mattered in international relations, because it described the process through which actors came to exist as actors within the international system, and to take on a particular identity within that system.

Recognition featured not only as a part of the constituting process of international actors’ (collective) identities, but also as an intrinsic part of the social nature of the international system itself. Mutual recognition between sovereign states was most prominently seen by scholars of the English school as a sign of the transformation of an international system into an international society. It was

134 Onuf 2013; Greenhill 2008: 345.
135 Ringmar 1995; Wendt 2003; Erman 2013.
137 Greenhill 2008: 344.
part of a gradual social incorporation of international actors into a rule-governed society of sovereign states.\footnote{Reus-Smit 2011: 209.} The international society thereby signified a higher level of social integration of the states into a common frame of reference, norms, institutions, and practices.

While the English School saw mutual recognition between sovereign states as reflecting the existence of an international society, the quest to achieve this recognition and the consequence of this quest have since transcended the focus on international society. Recognition was, in this sense, not only a sign of the fact that the international system had evolved into an international society, but was further seen as a mechanism by which the international system expanded and evolved, possibly to a more peaceful state. In the work of Alexander Wendt, for example, the struggle for recognition is a mechanism by which the international system will expand and emerge into an overarching global collective identity.\footnote{Wendt 2003: 517, 528, 541.} For Wendt, “desires for recognition [would] undermine systems that do not satisfy them”\footnote{Wendt 2003: 514.} and would thus perpetuate the development towards a system that did satisfy them, eventually emerging in the form of what he called a “World State”.\footnote{In a different manner Christian Reus-Smit also argued that the struggle for recognition for individual rights has played a role in the evolution and institutional transcendence of the international system of sovereign states. (Reus-Smit 2011).} While Wendt’s teleological vision of the international future is quite specific to his work, the understanding of recognition as positive empowerment runs through international scholarship on recognition more broadly.\footnote{Honneth 2011; Lindemann 2010; Onuf 2013.}

In the previous chapter, I pointed out that arguments for the recognition of religion in international relations assumed religion to be a pre-differentiated object awaiting recognition, and I argued that these arguments lacked a sensitivity to the process by which religion had become a recognizable, differentiated object of recognition in the first place. That is, I argued that recognition arguments lacked a genealogical
sensitivity. In this chapter, I will continue to discuss the contours of recognition, but will do so with a stronger focus on (international) political theory. After outlining the broad scopes of the literature, I will look more closely at two features that I consider problematic: First, I will argue that recognition presupposes and reproduces its entities, that is, its objects, agents or identities. Second, I will argue that recognition depends on the previous recognizability of its objects, that is, it is can only “see” what the current epistemic framework allows it to “see”. In this sense, recognition is reproductive of the epistemic framework within which it features. The last part of the chapter discusses the relationship between recognition and reification, by which I mean more precisely, the forgetfulness of the process by which object of knowledge become knowable. Or, in terms that are more familiar within the context of the chapter, a forgetfulness of the process by which the recognized becomes recognizable. Concluding the chapter I will suggest an approach that places a greater emphasis on how something becomes recognizable in international relations.145

**Recognizing difference**

Recognition has featured as a central element in the context of questions regarding collective identity formation or the expansion of international society. Depending on the context and the particular scholar, recognition may be differentiated in multiple ways. Patchen Markell separates cognitive from constructive aspects of recognition where the latter reflects its productive power in a way lacking from the former. Alexander Wendt distinguishes thick from thin recognition, and Eva Erman between declaratory from constitutive recognition, while Nicolas Onuf is sceptical concerning the possibility of drawing any distinctions whatsoever.146 Jens Bartelson presents

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145 To be clear, I will not argue that recognition is simply reproductive or it that merely reifies its objects. What I do argue is that the emphasize on the empowering aspects of recognition with which IR scholarship is usually concerned, needs to be balanced out with a stronger focus on the more problematic aspects.

146 Markell 2000; Wendt 2003; for an elaboration on “thick” recognition see Strömbom 2013; Erman 2013, Onuf 2013.
another categorization, which I think is helpful, as it distinguishes but does not necessarily separate forms of recognition depending on their different aims.\textsuperscript{147} In this sense, a distinction may be made between political, legal or moral recognition, where political recognition refers to what counts as a relevant actor in the international system and how they gain their standing. Legal recognition concerns the grounds upon which a state should be admitted as a member of the international society of states, that is, what it takes to qualify as a member of the international society. Moral recognition, on the other hand, argues for the equal moral worth of different communities or cultures. It is through the recognition of the equal standing of the different communities and collective identities that moral recognition is argued to enable peaceful co-existence between them.\textsuperscript{148} The concept of recognition has, in this sense, been invoked to explain how the "more undesirable consequences of international anarchy can be mitigated through the mutual recognition of collective identities. Here the concept of recognition is used to suggest a way out of the international system, by telling us how the conflicts this system engenders can be resolved by increasing respect for cultural and other differences."\textsuperscript{149}

While the debates on recognition in international relations have been intimately connected to the upsurge of writings on multiculturalism and identity in the national and international context, they have also been intertwined with literature on the subject of international law.\textsuperscript{150} The central question here was whether the formal recognition of an international actor as a state simply amounted to declaring a legally significant fact, since a number of objective conditions for the constitution of a polity as a state have already been met, or whether the act of recognition itself represented the formal constitution of the polity in question as a state in relation to other states.\textsuperscript{151} Depending on how one answered this question, recognition was seen either to declare or to constitute the polity as a state, that is, as an actor within

\textsuperscript{147} Bartelson 2013.
\textsuperscript{148} Wendt 2003; Bartelson 2013; Honneth 2011.
\textsuperscript{149} Bartelson 2013: 109.
\textsuperscript{150} Oppenheim 1912; Kelsen 1941.
\textsuperscript{151} Onuf 2013: 122; Erman 2013.
the domain of international relations. According to declaratory theory of recognition, an actor in the international system is recognized as a state when it fulfills a certain set of criteria – possessing a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.\textsuperscript{152} Declaring statehood, in this sense, is therefore a mere formality and has no legal effect as to the actual existence of the actor as a state. Recognition, per such a construction, declares something that already exists, rather than bringing something into existence. Statehood, as a result, exists, independent of recognition by other states.\textsuperscript{153} In contrast, according to the constitutive theory, recognition is a necessary requirement for international agency. Only by being recognized by other international actors, can a political entity become an international actor with the according rights and responsibilities.\textsuperscript{154} It is this final constitutive strand that has emerged as predominant in international theorizing, and this will represent the focus of the rest of this chapter.

The constitutive theory of recognition adds to the declaratory theory the productive, relational and social power of recognition. In this sense, recognition is not only cognitive of existing actors, but elevates into actorhood those international entities that are recognized. A polity becomes a state through recognition \textit{as such} by the other, previously recognized, states in that international system or community. The status of these actors is dependent upon recognition, a mutual understanding about who or what constitutes actors within the international political setting. It is in this sense relational and social, with no actor existing outside this context as such.

Behind this constitutive and relational view of recognition lie references to G.W.F. Hegel’s work on recognition between individuals and the mutual dependency in the development of their subjectivity. Hegel’s analysis in the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} describes the self-defeating tendency of asymmetrical structures of recognition such

\textsuperscript{152} Fabry 2010; Erman 2013.
\textsuperscript{153} Shaw 2003; Krasner 2013.
\textsuperscript{154} Oppenheim 1912; Lauterpracht 1944.
as the master-slave (Herr und Knecht) relationship and emphasizes the need for reciprocity, or mutuality in recognition.\textsuperscript{155} In other words, it argues that it is not enough to engage in a monodirected recognition, but that each recognition must take place within a context of equally valued actors.\textsuperscript{156} Recognition is only valuable if it comes from someone perceived as having dignity and worth, and since the slave in the Herr und Knecht relationship lacks these features, his recognition of the master is ultimately “worthless”.\textsuperscript{157} Hegel’s model assumes that all human individuals have a basic need to receive recognition from others. Furthermore, this should consist of a mutual recognition between equals. The very self-consciousness of the individual “Self” is dependent on the recognition (Anerkennung) of others, meaning that others confirms our sense of self, which we, then, objectify as personal identity. Hegel sees the “two self-consciousnesses” of the “Self” and the “Other” develop in relation to, and as dependent upon, each other. “They recognize themselves as mutually (gegenseitig) recognizing each other.”\textsuperscript{158}

Hegel’s theory of recognition continues to describe the way in which man’s desire for recognition drives forward a pattern of societal development.\textsuperscript{159} This is thought to proceed through alternating steps of conflict and reconciliation. The desire for recognition compels the individual to challenge the existing order in a way that, when and if it is successful, gives rise to new orders that are better able to fulfill his recognition needs.\textsuperscript{160} However, the achievement of the new, reconciliated order is

\textsuperscript{155} Hegel 2009(1807).

“Two men in a hypothetical ‘state of nature’ each attempt to secure the recognition of the other by entering into a head-on battle with one another. Their confrontation ends with one actor surrendering to the will of the other, whereby creating a relationship of domination that is best characterized as a master-slave relationship. However, the struggle for recognition doesn’t end there; the master remains dissatisfied with the fact that he has only secured recognition from an actor that he himself is unable to recognize as an equal, and at the same time the slave develops a growing sense of his possibility for full freedom and agency as a result of performing the work that the master forces him to do. Eventually the slave fights to free himself from the control of the master and sets the stage for the emergence of a society built upon the principles of liberal democracy that will allow for all individuals to be granted lasting recognition through the exercise of their basic rights of citizenship” (Fukuyama, 1992: 192–208; Greenhill 2008: 353).

\textsuperscript{156} Williams, 1997.

\textsuperscript{157} Hegel § 184; Honneth 1995; see also Onuf 2013.

\textsuperscript{158} Honneth 1995.

\textsuperscript{159} Honneth 1995: 17.

\textsuperscript{160} Honneth 1995: 17.
not in itself satisfactory, and will come to generate further conflict as individuals struggle to attain an even more satisfactory level, where recognition is claimed for new facets of the subjects’ identities.\textsuperscript{161}

When this logic enters into international scholarship, the struggle for recognition of Hegel’s individual subject is scaled up to a collective identity formation, with Alexander Wendt arguing “that the struggle for recognition between states will have the same outcome as that between individuals, collective identity formation and eventually a state.”\textsuperscript{162} Accordingly, the identity formation of an international subject is paralleled with that of an individual. While the differences are numerous – a state lacks a single consciousness, single memory, or will, and does not display the same physical vulnerability as an individual – the essential aspects of an international subject could usefully be dug out by the analogy. In order to maintain its existence, an international actor – in most cases a state – must be recognized as such by the other members of the international community. The formative processes of the identity and subjectivity of a state are thus dependent upon recognition by other states, how they acknowledge each other’s existence, demand and receive respect, or ask for equal treatment. Statehood in this sense is not merely a factual phenomenon, but a normative phenomenon permeated by practices of recognition, the ”Self” of the state dependent on the recognition by the ”Others”\textsuperscript{163}.

The attempt to “scale up” the logic of recognition from the individual to the collective is, however, ambiguous. Aleida Assman argues that the two are indeed intimately intertwined, while Arash Abizadeh points out that these two processes of identity formation are distinctively separate.\textsuperscript{164} While the individual identity is always dependent upon an external ”Other” to mirror its self-consciousness, Abizadeh argues that the collective identity can be formed by a mirror of an internal

\textsuperscript{161} Honneth 1995: 16.
\textsuperscript{162} Wendt 2003: 493; see also Wendt 1999 for an analysis of the state-as-person.
\textsuperscript{163} Fabry 2010; Erman 2013; for a critical reading of identity as a self/other relationship see Onuf 2013.
\textsuperscript{164} Assman: 2013: 78ff; Abizadeh 2005.
“Other”. That is, "the constitution of the collective identity via recognition or dialogue is not dependent on the existence of excluded individuals. … Whether collectivities with an external other are better able to win identification is an empirical question."165

Irrespective of this critique of the problems of “scaling up” from individual to the collective, the constitutive power of mutual recognition à la Hegel has left its mark on IR theorizing. As mentioned above, Alexander Wendt’s vision of a teleological development towards a "World State" is one example. Applying Hegel’s logic of the struggle for recognition, Wendt argues for a fundamental restructuring of the logic of the international system from one consisting of individual states to a "World State", with an overarching, global, collective identity.166 He sees states engage in struggles for recognition – brought about by technological advances, the destructive potential of which needs to be balanced within the existing logic of anarchy – the resolution of which leads to the formation of a common collective identity of the states in question, causing the state’s underlying interests to align.167 The (new) sense of "Self" is formed through the interaction with "Others". In the end, the process of collective identity formation culminates with the formation of a global collective identity that encompasses the entire human population, creating what Wendt calls the "World State."

Transcending the particular and developing into a universal entity, as Wendt envisions, however, assumes the starting point to be one where the playing field is made up of clearly distinguishable, bounded communities – states in this case – that insist on being recognized in their particularity. In other words, it seems to depend on a preexisting logic of differentiation. Wendt views this as one of the major paradoxes that his teleological theory is bound to overcome, stating that "if the desire for recognition is about being accepted as different, the effect of mutual

166 Wendt 2003.
recognition is to constitute collective identity or solidarity” or “[t]wo actors cannot recognize each other as different without recognizing that, at some level, they are also the same”.168 The mechanism perpetuating the teleological drive towards a “World State” is the fact that “just as the willingness of individuals to participate in a collective identity ultimately depends on their recognition as separate individuals, so too would groups entering into a larger identity want their difference recognized”.169 The central point here is that there is, and needs to be, a difference that can be recognized and subsequently overcome. There needs to be a difference between the “Self” and the “Other” before they can insist on the recognition thereof and continue to reconcile in a higher level “We”.

While the teleological aspect of Wendt’s approach and that of others can be viewed as problematic in its own right, that is not my aim here. Rather, I want to point out the way in which Wendt requires a preexisting, potential “Self”, without whom the struggle for recognition – and the development towards an overarching collective identity – would not be possible. Wendt requires a differentiated logic, a differentiated social ontology, in order to argue for the mechanisms of recognition to take the individual “Selves” into a larger “Us”. There needs to be a preexisting subject “Self” of the collective identity in order for Wendt’s recognition to gain a foothold. Similarly, Axel Honneth recently argued for the link between peaceful international relations and the recognition of (pre-)existing collective “Selves”. “The path for civilizing international relations primarily lies in sustained efforts at conveying respect and esteem for the collective identities of other countries.”170 The recognition of the particularity, and the difference, of “others” would “civilize” international relations.

Recognition reflects empowerment. This is especially the case if we stay with the idea that recognition not only strengthens existing actors, but also actualizes them,
bringing them into existence as actors and subjects in the way the constitutive perspectives argued. However, besides being empowering, recognition also seems to build upon an assumption of preexisting difference between the potential subjects. Assuming the existence of this difference reflects an underlying differentiated social ontology, that is, an understanding of the world as constituted by differentiated and differentiable bounded groups, waiting to be recognized in their difference, and waiting to extend recognition to others. In this sense, rather than necessarily transcending this differentiated social logic, the process of recognition presupposes it. Further, as I will argue below, recognition not only presupposes differentiated and differentiable entities but, by extending rights and responsibilities to them, by acknowledging them as the carriers of a particular identity, recognition reinforces and reproduces them. Due to the fact that recognition builds upon a differentiated social ontology, it reinforces the boundaries around and between social, political and cultural collectivities and communities, reinstating the logic of a differentiated social ontology, while sidelining alternative orders.

At this initial point I tend to agree with Abizadeh that this differentiated understanding of the world as parcelled up in "Selves" and "Others" is not necessary at all. "The problem with such a misdescription [of conceptual or metaphysical necessity of an "other"] however, is that its only function is to reify the politically generated dynamics that, by reference to other possibilities, it is the task of normative political theory to call into question."\(^{171}\) The question of “Self” and

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\(^{171}\) Abizadeh 2005: 59; for a discussion on the reifying potential in questions of identity see exchange by McSweeney, Buzan and Waever in Review of International Studies 1996-1998; see Rancière for an alternative account of recognition, where the subject does not emerge through reconciliation of the image of the self and its recognition by the other, but through struggle, by inferring disruption in the ontology of the social order. "The subject that emerges in the struggle against the tort is itself torn; it is a political identity that retains the social difference, and is therefore the true identity of identity and difference. This is an antiontological identity that is nonontological because it proclaims to be different from ontological difference" (Deranty 2003: 151). Rancière’s recognition is of the workers who are not recognized as workers but as artists, poets, playwrights, those transgressing and subverting the order of things, by claiming the right to have a meaningful voice beyond the constraints of their social destiny.
"Other", therefore, is not one to theoretically assume prematurely, but to investigate empirically and historically. These two levels of empirical practices and analytical theorizing should be kept distinct. As argued in the previous chapter regarding the way in which ethnic elites use the “Self/Other” language, these are performative discourses and practices, and should be appropriately analyzed for what they are, namely instruments used to mobilize the constituencies of certain elites. This essentially amounts to evoking difference by invoking difference. “Scaling up” from the primary level of discourse to theoretical levels of ontology would represent a mistake. An ascription of difference in discourse must be acknowledged, and its consequences analyzed. However, it must be analyzed as an empirical "social fact" and not a theoretical necessity.

**Problematic aspects of recognition**

In this part of the chapter, I wish to engage more thoroughly with the logic of recognition, and especially focus on the problematic aspects thereof. I will do so by addressing two main problems: First (1), the way in which recognition presupposes and reproduces its entities – that is, the objects, agents and "identities" of recognition. Second (2), the way in which recognition reproduces the system of knowledge within which it features, that is, how it is reproductive of the current epistemic framework. I will argue that these two problems reflect a reifying momentum in recognition that has not yet been afforded sufficient attention in international theory. In the last section, therefore, I will discuss the relationship between recognition and reification, and will argue for the need to analyze the manner in which objects, agents and identities become recognizable in the first place.

Recognition presupposes and reproduces its objects and agents

The first argument continues the previous discussion, regarding the way in which recognition depends on – and reproduces – differentiated and differentiable entities,
agents, and identities. Behind the argument lies the following claim: The game of recognition – demanding, extending or receiving – is considered to be a part of a constant political activity, through which agency is acquired and identities are formed. However, it is done so with a vision of “identity as the always already settled criterion of proper intersubjective relations.” An identity is suggested and assumed, and this identity grounds and guides the carrier’s actions. The strife for recognition of identity or agency simulates an impossible goal of sovereignty over identity as the sovereignty over knowledge about who one actually is. The desire for sovereignty attempts to render the constant project of identity building a stable and a steady ground for action. This is a mistake. The following paragraphs elaborate on this.

Recognition assumes and strives for the sovereignty of identity and agency

The argument that recognition assumes and strives for sovereignty in identity may seem like a paradox, given that, as described above, identity was supposed to evolve out of a relationship between the subject and its "other". Indeed, the entire body of recognition literature was a critique of the very idea of sovereign and isolated agency. Identity was neither a static fact, nor in any way contextually independent. What I refer to as sovereignty in identity, however, touches upon something different. While the constitutive theories of recognition view identity as deeply inter-relational, they assume that identity at a particular point in time is "knowable". The quest for recognition contains a desire for the “sovereignty in knowledge"; that is, in the prospect of arriving at a clear understanding of who you are and of the nature of the larger groups and communities to which you belong, and of securing the respectful recognition of these same facts by others.” In this sense the logic of “recognition is animated by a vision of sovereign agency, in which people are

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172 Markell 2003: 59f.
empowered by self-knowledge and by the confirming recognition of others to act in accordance with who they really are”.

Projecting the possibility of sovereignty into the future, as something that may be accomplished and should be striven for, however, on the one hand, treats identity as independent of action, and, on the other, treats the actions of one’s self and of others as fully predictable. In his re-reading of Hegel, Patchen Markell argues against the common understanding that Hegel assumes recognition to be a precondition of genuine agency and the action that follows from this agency, authentically one’s own action. This agency or identity, Markell argues, is not a condition or a state that can be secured or recognized in advance of action. Rather, Hegel’s view of action is much more complex. While action indeed originates out of a relationship of recognition, action outruns recognition, leaving it inevitably belated. Rather than simply originating from identity, action and practices are constitutive thereof. Identity is not simply the ground for action but is, rather, dependent upon actions and the discourses that surround it. It is the "results of action and speech in public". It comes into being through the “public words and deeds through which actors ‘make their appearance’ in the world.”

Since action will always be partly unpredictable, identity and agency are, and will remain, non-sovereign.

By assuming and striving for sovereignty in terms of knowledge of identity, in Markell’s terms, recognition misses out on the “constitutive vulnerability to the unpredictable reactions and responses of others”. Rather, recognition represents identity as an authoritative fact, a “fait accompli”, positing it as the source and guide of human actions and relations. This settled, “authentic” identity, however, does not exist, nor does the sovereignty in knowledge that assumes it. “[P]olitics, after all, is in part a response to the experience of vulnerability, to the fact that our identities

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175 ibid. 13
176 See similar point by Campbell 1990, 1992, but without direct reference to Hegel.
177 Markell 2003: 5.
are shaped in part through the unpredictable responses of other people: this is what makes being recognized by others seem so acutely important in the first place. The trouble is that the politics of recognition responds to this fact by demanding that others recognize us as whom we already really are." Recognizing identities depends upon an impossible goal of sovereignty over identity as sovereignty over the knowledge about who one already is. The desire for sovereignty attempts to make the ever-ongoing project of identity seem to be a stable and a steady ground for action.

Despite its good intentions, recognition misunderstands the relationship between identity and action and is blind to the "non-sovereign" character of human action, that is, the "practical limits imposed upon us by the openness and unpredictability of the future", its contingency and chance. Rather than striving to eliminate the contingency and aiming for this kind of sovereignty, identity must be understood without this kind of absolute rigidity, and as fundamentally incomplete.

Recognition assumes it to be possible to know who we and others are; it assumes sovereignty in knowledge in identity, and recognition of this knowledge by others. Recognition assumes that this identity will guide and ground our actions, and that knowledge about the one will bring knowledge about the other. If we know who an actor is, it is possible to know what the actor will do. However, recognition misses out on the fact that identity not only grounds action, but, more so, it is constituted by it, including the performative claims to recognition themselves. Further, since human action never can rid itself of its non-sovereign character – that is, such action will always be partly unpredictable – the identity that is formed by these actions can never be fully sovereign. There is a limit to what we can expect our knowledge of ourselves and of others to do for us. The pursuit of recognition expresses an

\[\text{178 ibid. 14.} \]
\[\text{179 Markell 2003: 4f, 63, 89ff.} \]
\[\text{180 Campbell 1992; Markell 2003: 186.} \]
aspiration to sovereignty and plays into a framework where identity is the always already settled criterion of proper intersubjective relations.

The benchmark of misrecognition

Another way in which recognition assumes its objects – besides sovereign identity or agency – comes to the fore through the question of the failure of recognition. In his work, Charles Taylor is keen on keeping recognition from essentializing identities, for example through patronizingly valuing minorities simply due to their oppressed status. While doing this, however, Taylor still needs identity as a benchmark by which to judge the various recognizable structures that are available.\footnote{Taylor 1994.} It is on the basis of identity that the failure of recognition is measured; misrecognition understood as the failure to appropriately respect people or collectives for who they “really are”. However, this understanding of injustice as misrecognition is “only intelligible if recognition itself is a matter of the respectful cognition of an identity that is in some sense independent of the vicissitudes of human interaction, of the political play of recognition and misrecognition – for if identities were not independent in this way, they could not serve as reliable benchmarks by which to judge the adequacy of particular recognitive act of structures.”\footnote{Markell 2003: 59.}

Recognition presupposes its entities through the way in which it assumes and strives for sovereignty in identity and agency, and through the way in which misrecognition assumes an existing identity as a benchmark for failed recognition. A further indication of how recognition presupposes its entities is reflected in Axel Honneth’s argument that recognition indicates the transition from “potential” to an “actual” identity.\footnote{Honneth 2002: 510.} The pre-existence of a “potential” identity in this case is necessary as a criterion for judging the adequacy of the act of recognition, which

\footnote{\textsuperscript{181} Taylor 1994.} \footnote{\textsuperscript{182} Markell 2003: 59.} \footnote{\textsuperscript{183} Honneth 2002: 510.}
would lead into an "actualized" identity.\textsuperscript{184} That is, even if the “Self” only emerges through interaction with others, this constructive theory of recognition still seems to, somehow, depend on the existence of a “potential” entity, identity, or agency. Otherwise, again, there can be no way to assess when recognition is successful or has failed. When Honneth, as in a recent chapter on recognition in international relations, argues that “[t]he path for civilizing international relations primarily lies in sustained efforts at conveying respect and esteem for the collective identities of other countries”,\textsuperscript{185} he is implying the actualization of the potential collective identities of these other countries. Or, as he argued, against Markell, a few years earlier, “the struggle for recognition represents a struggle for the social articulation of preexistent knowledge.”\textsuperscript{186} The “preexisting knowledge” of a “potential” identity implies the assumption of a pre-differentiated entity awaiting recognition.

Until this point, much of the discussion referred to recognition in general terms. In the words of Markell, however, much of the “dynamic is the same when it comes to the assumption of state sovereignty, viewing it as a completed, authoritative fact, instead of an on-going, open ended activity”.\textsuperscript{187} In the forthcoming sections, therefore, I wish to continue to expand upon the possibilities of this critique of individual recognition at an international level.

\textit{International recognition assumes the existence of preconstituted actors as a baseline for its explanatory endeavor}

As we saw above, the game of recognition – demanding, extending or receiving – is conceived as a part of the constant political activity through which agency is acquired and through which identities are formed. However, this is achieved via a vision of “identity as the always already settled criterion of proper intersubjective

\textsuperscript{184} Honneth 2002: 510.
\textsuperscript{185} Honneth 2011: 35f.
\textsuperscript{186} Honneth 2007: 356.
\textsuperscript{187} Markell 2003: 27.
An identity is asserted and assumed that grounds and guides the carrier's actions. The theory of moral recognition in this sense, seems to "assume that the entities to be morally recognized already are given, be they national communities of (sic! or) cultures. It is therefore tempting to argue that moral recognition actually depends on prior *political* recognition of these entities, constituting them as bounded containers of distinct cultures." That is, in order to extend recognition to multiple varieties of different states, communities, or cultures, they need to be distinguishable and ready to recognize, i.e. recognizable. They need to have been politically recognized – that is, "existent" beforehand, via the constructive act of political recognition.

However, while theories of political recognition view acts of mutual political recognition as constitutive for the status of the state – as we saw above in Honneth's reference to the "potential" becoming "actual" – they also need to assume an actor that can enter into these games of recognition. That is, political recognition needs to assume the "existence of pre-constituted actors as a baseline for [its] explanatory endeavor". Or, in the words of Oliver Kessler and Benjamin Herboth to "frame politics in terms of recognition is to presuppose a world *a priori* divided into a multiplicity of distinct and separated collectivities".

International recognition reproduces a social ontology of differentiated agency

While the constitutive theory of recognition binds the existence of international agents to the intersubjective act of recognition, it is still dependent upon differentiated and differentiable entities prior to that recognition. It depends on "potential" entities that can be "actualized" through recognition. As we saw above with Wendt’s vision of a “World State”, the evolution of the international system

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188 Markell 2003: 59f
189 Bartelson 2013: 119, my italics.
190 Bartelson 2013: 113, 114.
from one consisting of separate sovereign states stuck in a condition devoid of overarching political, moral and legal authority towards an overarching collective identity was dependent upon differentiated, bounded communities seeking recognition for their individual particularity.\textsuperscript{192} It builds upon an assumption of a preexisting difference between potential subjects. Rather than transcending this differentiated logic of the international system, recognition presupposes it, and, by extending responsibilities and rights to the differentiated agents, recognition reproduces them and the system in which they exist. Recognition thereby solidifies boundaries around and between political, social and cultural collectivities, reproducing a differentiated social logic. Recognition perpetuates the dilemma of humankind divided into bounded groups, ensuring that they “remain locked in their cycles of identity-based conflict.”\textsuperscript{193}

Rather than simply assuming sovereignty in identity in the way described for recognition above, the concept of sovereignty functions in international recognition as a source of self-identity and a principle of self-recognition, allowing for a particular kind of actor to become a possible object of recognition, while excluding those who do not conform to this ”symbolic form” from the realm of possible recognition.\textsuperscript{194} In the case of Pakistan, which we will revisit in the next chapter, there had been a long process of consolidating the British Indian Muslim population into a sovereign ”nation”, on behalf of which a state could be claimed. In Israel, the ”Jewish National Home” had constituted an intimate part of pre-State politics, and the distinct nature, particular identity and sovereign agency of the Jewish people had hardly been a matter of dispute on either side of the growing political rift. The subsequent processes of international recognition in the two cases took the claim by the nationalist movements regarding the particularity and sovereignty in terms of the identity and agency of their nations, and “actualized” them into international “reality.” It would, however, be a mistake to assume the recognition of this “Muslim

\textsuperscript{192} Wendt 2003.
\textsuperscript{193} Greenhill 2008: 361.
\textsuperscript{194} Bartelson 2013: 111.
"Recognizability before recognition": The reproduction of epistemological frameworks

While the previous section argued that recognition presupposed its objects, agencies and “identities”, this section will continue to argue that recognition reproduces these agencies and identities as well as the epistemic system in which they exist. In Judith Butler's words: "One 'exists' not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being recognizable."认识到这一点，在特定的语境下，现有形式——所谓的“现时的存在”——将会得到维持；有权势的群体将被确认为合法或政治意义上的“正宗”代表，他们的地位因此得到加强。在这种意义上，承认是建立在一种固有的保守逻辑上：既然承认依赖于可认性，它就依赖于现有语境和基础分类制度的范围。如果 something falls

195 Butler 1997: 5.
196 Bartelson 2013: 121.
outside of the epistemic range of the possible object of recognition, it will have a harder time becoming recognized. While I am not arguing that the agents are thereby locked within this epistemic framework forever – agents may be able to change the framework in which they operate, as shown by the example of the Muslim League, below, and in the following chapter – I am arguing that more attention should be given to the fact that recognizability comes prior to recognition from an epistemological point of view. Unless the process by which objects and agents become recognizable – or make themselves recognizable by changing the epistemic framework – is given more attention the framework of recognition is bound to reproduce itself and the bias inherent in that particular framework.

The next chapter will deal in greater detail with the case of the British Indian Muslims and the international recognition of Pakistan. Allow me, however, to briefly illustrate the point of recognizability in the context of this example. Pakistan was claimed, constituted and subsequently recognized as a "Muslim national home”, that is, it differentiated itself from its Indian neighbor mainly through the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim populations, land and property. The Muslims of South Asia were a very heterogeneous group, speaking multiple different languages, in possession of very different social statuses, practicing a wide range of different rituals, with a broad register of different historiographical trajectories. They had been a heterogeneous group throughout the two centuries of British Raj. During the Raj, however, the British had created different governing mechanisms, all of which refleted a particularist epistemic system. For example, as British India gained more "democratic” features, as the voting rights were expanded and the political system of representation was "fitted” onto the India population, this was accomplished through membership of groups. That is, the Indian population was divided into groups of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, et cetera, and these groups were accordingly provided with “proper” political representation. It was not that the British thought that all Muslims were the same, but this was the epistemic system in place in order to govern the 300 million strong population of the South Asian subcontinent.
The Muslims of British India had been made recognizable through a British epistemic system, categorizing them into a particularity. At the end of the British reign, "Muslim" was an eligible political category, one on the basis of which rights could be claimed and responsibilities could be shouldered. That process had been a slow, intricate and complex part of the British Empire which had made these "Muslims" visible and recognizable by only leaving one option of belonging open in the census, which was the main instrument for the purposes of quantifying the population. You were either a Muslim, or a Hindu, or a Sikh, (et cetera) but nothing in between. This group had then been accorded political importance, as they determined the quota in terms of the representation in the local parliament. Further, the group developed even clearer boundaries, as these British Indian Muslims were represented by a single party during the negotiation of the British Indian partition, alongside the Indian National Congress of Nehru and Gandhi and the British government.

Recognition, in this sense, followed a top-down process, with the British making the British Indian Muslims recognizable as a subject. However, as the next chapter will show, the process of becoming recognizable was as much a bottom-up process as a top-down one. The claim, for example, by the political party of the All-India Muslim League and its leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah, that they spoke for all of India’s Muslims, and their struggle to sideline representational claims by other Muslim groups and by the Indian National Congress, are relevant in this context. While the British had been instrumental in creating a British Indian Muslim subject, Jinnah and the Muslim League continued to claim political sovereignty on behalf of this subject by arguing for its status as a nation with the right to statehood and not as a “mere minority” among other minorities.197

197 See Jinnah’s presidential speech at the Lahore meeting of the Muslim League in 1940, where he argues for the “Two-Nation Theory” declaring the fundamental difference between Muslims and Hindus and the impossibility of accommodating both in the same state. This will also be analyzed in detail in the next chapter.
To be clear, I am not implying that the British “invented” the British Indian Muslims that then came to constitute and populate the future state of Pakistan. Around 100 million individuals identified as Muslims at the time of Indian partition, and 60 million of these came to be a part of the Pakistani state. What I am saying, however, is that in order to claim statehood, to claim and be recognized as an agent in the international system, an entity needs to be recognizable as a state, or as in this case as a nation with the right of statehood. This process of recognizability, or rendering an entity recognizable, in which the British partook with reference to the Indian Muslims, was a complex, power-ridden process. I do not believe that the framework of recognition in international scholarship today is capable of according due sensitivity to these processes, but argue that recognition rather assumes these entities – such as the British Indian Muslims – to be existing prior to recognition. This way the processes of differentiation are sidelined, “forgotten” and reified at the moment of international recognition. International recognition stabilized the category of British Indian Muslims into a Pakistani state, and thereby concretised the acclaimed difference from the Indian non-Muslims. A difference that had been the product of struggle and power games was reified into international law.

An analogy of this can be found in the mythological figure of Medusa. As a Gorgon, Medusa is not one of the most endearing characters of Greek mythology, and the fact that her hair is made up of snakes is the less troubling part of her character. Her most distinctive feature is not her hair, but the fact that her gaze turns people into stone.¹⁹⁸ Like Medusa, I see recognition as leaving its objects frozen in a world that will forget about the fact that the objects were ever alive. Like Medusa, there is a power inherent in recognition to reify its objects. I believe that this aspect of the relationship between recognition and reification is often omitted from discussions on recognition in IR, where the focus tends to be much more on the empowering aspects of recognition. The last part of this chapter therefore proceeds to investigate this relationship.

¹⁹⁸ See also Appiah 2005: 110 for another Medusa analogy.
Recognition and Reification

"All reification is forgetting." Horkheimer/Adorno 199

Reification

Medusa’s gaze of recognition turns what it sees into stone and forgets about the way in which these objects came to be recognizable as such in the first place. I will refer to this forgetfulness as a process of reification. It is the forgetfulness of the processes through which objects of recognition emerge, how they become intelligible and possible to "know". That is, I refer to reification as the process of sidelining genealogical sensitivity. The argument is that there is a relationship between recognition and reification that has yet to be engaged with in detail in international scholarship.

The terminology of reification has, in itself, been a part of (international) political theorizing for at least five decades since Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann opened up a broader constructivist approach to social reality in the mid 1960s. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. Reification perceives the products of human activities as if they were something other than human products, detaching the individual as the author or the "maker" of the world from the product of his or her making. The term has since been used parallel to, and synonymously with, other

201 Berger/Luckmann 1991(1966): 89
terms such as naturalization and essentialization, or objectification, instrumentalization, alienation or "thingification" (Verdinglichung). 203

Karl Marx has provided a strong reference for writings regarding reification, even though analyses of reification processes had been part of different philosophical traditions long before him. Marx writes that with the emergence of capitalist society the "social character of activity, as well as the social form of the product, and the share of individuals in the production here appears as something alien and objective ... the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relations between things." 204 Marx describes the loss of the social character of activity, an alienation of the producer from the activity of labor and a detachment from the product of labor that accompanies capitalist production and the exchange of commodities.

Theodor Adorno continued that reified concepts describe social phenomena as if they had the properties to which the concepts refer, as if they were identical to the object they describe, and are "cut off from the living subjects which constitute the substance of concepts." 205 He calls this reified thinking identity-thinking. "To believe that a concept really covers its object, when it does not, it to believe falsely that the object is the equal of its concept." 206 Reification, for Adorno, was a forgetfulness of the distinction between theoretical concepts and the "real-world" things they claim to describe or refer to, thereby "erasing the distinction between concepts and things in themselves". 207 Reification thus emerged as a process of forgetting about the social nature of concepts, things and objects and the assumption that they are equal to that which they refer to.

203 Guillaume 2007; Hanrieder 2011; Elman 2005; Fraser 2000; for a critical discussion on the use and misuse of the term prior to Adorno as well as the "mistaken" attribution of the term to Hegel and Marx, see Rose 2014(1978): 36ff.
205 Adorno 1964: 533f.
207 Levine 2012: 64.
The reifying power of recognition

I will not be the first to investigate the relationship between recognition and reification. Axel Honneth has extended his work on recognition by connecting it, or rather, the forgetfulness of it, to reification.\textsuperscript{208} My point, however, will not be so much that reification is the forgetfulness of recognition, but, on the contrary, that recognition has a reifying power.

Honneth had argued that mutual, "intersubjective" recognition between individuals was absolutely central to the identity formation of the human subject. He understands reification as a process of forgetting about the dependency on social relations, human cognition "delud[ing] itself that it has become autonomous of all non-epistemic prerequisites" that is, independent of the producer's role in the making of the objects of knowledge.\textsuperscript{209} Similarly to Berger and Luckmann, above, Honneth points out "that knowledge of the true was itself dependent on the making of the objects of that knowledge."\textsuperscript{210}

For Honneth, it is an "annul[ation of] the form of elementary recognition that ensures that we existentially experience other humans as the other of our self", it is a forgetfulness of the primal recognition that two humans accord each other in a fundamental process of intersubjective interaction.\textsuperscript{211} "[This] 'forgetfulness of recognition' can now be termed reification. I thereby mean to indicate the process by which we lose consciousness of the degree to which we owe our knowledge and cognition of other persons to an antecedent stance of empathic engagement and recognition".\textsuperscript{212} In this sense, the affective attachment that recognition reflects is a precondition for any kind of subsequent cognition of the world and society. This

\textsuperscript{208} Honneth 2008.
\textsuperscript{209} Honneth 2008: 56.
\textsuperscript{210} See Giambattista Vico and his principle of "verum-factum", in: Introduction by Martin Jay: 5, vgl. 1988: Fin-d siècle Socialism and Other essays).
\textsuperscript{211} Honneth 2008: 154.
\textsuperscript{212} Honneth 2008: 56.
attachment is what is forgotten and lost in the reification process. Reification is a process of detachment. Recognition one of attachment.

The relationship which Honneth sees between recognition and reification is thus an inverted one. Recognition is fundamental to – and precedes – the possibilities of human cognition of the Self and of the world. Reification is the process of forgetting this interrelational dependency, allowing for humans to treat each other as "things", since they have forgotten that they are dependent upon one another. Reification is about detachment, about forgetfulness of the dependency of attachment through recognition. However, if it is true that recognition equals attachment, and that both are lost in the reification process, does not that attachment assume a prior separateness, or a prior differentiation between the subjects and the concepts? What would otherwise be attached? A differentiation is after all, what "distinguishes attachment from fusion where no boundaries between self and other can be found. And so differentiation is as much a condition of attachment ... as it is a consequence".213 While Honneth argues that differentiation and detachment come with reification, and that this phenomenon is thus the opposite of recognition, I argue that this differentiation is a precondition for, and a consequence of, recognition, since it presupposes and reproduces differentiated entities to form attachments and to recognize each other.

Conclusion

After sketching different ways in which recognition has featured in international scholarship, I argued in this chapter that there are two problems to the logic of recognition. First, recognition presupposes and reproduces its entities, that is, the objects, agents and "identities" of recognition. This seemed like a paradox, since the main argument put forward by thinkers of recognition posited that the objects, agents and "identities" were not sovereign in and of themselves, or in any way isolated from their surroundings, but that they developed in a relationship of mutual recognition between the "self" and the "other". Recognition was a relational and

213 Butler 2008: 106.
inherently social endeavor. My argument, however, did not refer to the existence of the substance of a preexisting identity, but of identity itself as something which can be known once and for all, which grounds action and functions as a benchmark against which successful or failed recognition could be measured. Recognition in this sense assumes the possibility of, and strives for sovereignty in, identity and agency, the “potential” becoming “actual”. The pursuit of recognition expresses an aspiration toward sovereignty, and plays into a framework where identity constitutes the always already settled criterion of proper intersubjective relations.

The second aspect of recognition discussed herein posited that recognition reproduces the epistemic framework within which it features. Here, I started from the assumption that before a person, group, category, institution, etc. can be recognized, it needs to be recognizable as such and continued to argue in this sense that recognition was thereby bound to reproduce the systems of knowledge present at the time of recognition, since these enabled the visibility and the recognizability of some, but not of others. That which remained unrecognizable within these epistemic frameworks would have a hard time becoming recognized. The consequences are that existing forms – the “present-beings” – are maintained; and that powerful groups recognized as “authentic” representatives for legal or political purposes – and their status – are thereby reinforced. In this sense, recognition is build upon an inherently conservative logic: Since recognition depends on recognizability, it is dependent upon the epistemic range allowed for by the present context and the underlying classificatory schemes, and since each epistemic framework and each classification scheme is dependent upon context, that is, is historically and spatially contingent, the process of recognition will tend to reproduce the bias of that particular epistemic framework. The argument does not imply that epistemological frameworks cannot change, or that the recognition of agents and objects does not have an impact upon what can be “seen”, “known” or recognized, but rather that this change in new ranges of “visibility” is also a change in recognizability, i.e. a part of the process of becoming recognizable. In this sense, struggles for recognition can therefore be read as struggles for recognizability, a
quest to change the system within which the individuals and groups find themselves. My argument is against assumptions by scholars such as Honneth, who needs to assume a “potential” identity to be “actualized” through recognition and thereby implies that this “potential” identity is already recognizable. I argue against these assumptions regarding pre-differentiated, pre-existing objects and agents. Leaving the investigation of how these objects and agents become recognizable will allow the framework of recognition to stabilize and reproduce both itself and the objects and agents within it.

These two problematic aspects of recognition were argued to reflect a reifying tendency of recognition, and the final part of the chapter investigated the relationship between recognition and reification. Reification was described as a process whereby the social nature of concepts, identities and objects was forgotten and as the assumption that these concepts are equal to that which they refer to. That is, reification detached man from his own authorship of the human world and alienated the concepts and identities from their process of emergence, seeing them as independent of all social, political or cultural prerequisites.

Rather than staying with the framework of recognition in international theory as it stands today, I argued in this chapter for the need to address the reifying tendency inherent in recognition, in particular by analyzing in detail the process through which the pre-differentiated entities of recognition came to be available for recognition in the first place. That is, I argue that before we as scholars continue analyzing the benefits and problems of recognition in international relations, we require a stronger genealogical sensitivity in order to analyze the process by which objects, agent, concepts, identities, et cetera become recognizable. The following chapters attempt craft such a level of sensitivity for the purposes of such an analysis.
Chapter 3: The processes of becoming recognizable: An illustration of the recognition of Pakistan and Israel

In this chapter, I will illustrate the critical arguments made thus far. By analyzing the international recognition of Pakistan and Israel, I will bring together the discussion regarding the recognition of religion and the recognition of states, and will demonstrate the processes by which the "Muslim Homeland" and "Jewish National Home" became recognizable as such. I have argued so far that the framework of recognition presupposes already differentiated objects, agents or identities and thereby misses out on their very process of differentiation. Recognition, in other words, lacks a genealogical sensitivity. In the following chapter, I will therefore illustrate a few of the differentiation processes that recognition not only misses out on, but folds into forgetfulness and ultimately reifies.

The British withdrew from India in August 1947, and the Crown's colonial holding was partitioned into the Indian Union – containing the larger part of the British Indian subcontinent, including most of the princely states – and Pakistan – containing the northwestern and northeastern provinces, including the princely states of Kashmir, Gilgit, Baluchistan, and Sindh. Partition had come after a seemingly abrupt British decision to leave a year earlier than originally planned. The new international border was drawn through the northwestern province of Punjab and the northeastern province of Bengal to separate the "Muslim National Home" from their future "non-Muslim" neighbor. The dichotomy of "religious

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214 Pakistan and Israel are taken here as paradigmatic cases which carry a number of similarities – both became independent after decades or centuries of British rule, Pakistan in 1947 and Israel in 1948, both we argues along the lines of religious difference – yet are not treated in a comparative manner but as two separate illustration of the theoretical argument. The material that I will use in this chapter is mainly based on primary archival UN documents, collections of primary documents from the Peel and the Punjabi Partition Commissions as well as secondary literature.
difference” was mirrored in Palestine, where the British withdrew from their Mandate a year later, in 1948. With the birth of Israel, the "Jewish National Home” – which the League of Nations’ Mandate had authorized the British to establish – was separated from its "non-Jewish” surroundings. The international borders that came to surround these two states thus followed the demarcation line between Muslim and non-Muslim in the case of Pakistan and between Jew and non-Jew in the case of Israel. While this demarcation has come to seem almost natural to observers of international relations today – the “Jewish state of Israel” under constant threat from, or as a constant aggressor against, its regional neighbors, or “Muslim violence” flowing out of the now constitutionally anchored Islamic Republic of Pakistan215 – neither the demarcation itself, nor the translation of differences in religion to differences in state are as unproblematic as they appear. Rather this apparent simplicity masks the struggles and turmoil that took place under these headings for decades and centuries before they were recognized as politically significant for the two new international agents.

In the following sections, I will examine this history of demarcation and differentiation. I will argue that these multiple processes of differentiation – between Muslim and non-Muslim, and Jew and non-Jew – were stabilized through colonial governing practices such as the census, administrative maps, quotas in political representation. I gather these colonial governing practices under the heading of *numbers*. Processes of differentiation were also stabilized via local, national and international representative administration – which I discuss under the heading of *representation* – and the actual drawing of the border around the to-be-states and the following surveillance, violence and refugee administration – which come together under the heading of *border-drawing*. All of these processes contributed in various ways to differentiating Muslims from non-Muslims and Jews from non-Jews, but I will continue to argue that they were finally reified – and the

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215 Pakistan become a constitutionally “Islamic Republic” in 1956 and the current Pakistani Constitution endorses "democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam” (Preamble to the constitution of Pakistan, current version, in force since 1973).
struggles to form and uphold the differentiation forgotten – through the process of international recognition. These processes of demarcation and differentiation are lost once the focus is placed upon questions of recognition alone. As I argued in the previous chapter, recognition presupposes difference, and is bound to reproduce it unless a stronger genealogical sensitivity is brought into the analysis.

The emergence of Pakistan and Israel: The British withdrawal from India and Palestine

On June 3, 1947, the British Government issued a statement announcing the “intention of transferring power in British India to Indian hands”. The Second World War had left the British heavily indebted, dependent not only on their colonies, but also on the declaredly anti-imperialist United States. The recent war had seen the international order which had been established via the negotiations at Versailles crumble, leaving the League of Nations with its Mandate system and Woodrow Wilson’s limited but broadly disseminated idea of self-determination merge a new order, with the United Nations struggling to take up the mantle, and emerge as an independent organization during the beginning of what would come to become known as a Cold War.

The newly elected British Labour government called upon two boundary commissions to be established to “demarcate the boundaries ... on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims.” 216 Independence was to come at midnight on August 14, 1947, allowing for about ten weeks’ preparation. British lawyer Cyril Radcliffe left for India on July 7 to head a commission, tasked with demarcating the boundary between the emergent states. It was his first visit to the subcontinent. Six weeks later the results of the commission, the “Radcliffe line”, became an international border. It not only separated the Indian Union and Pakistan but also divided the northwestern region of Punjab, bordering

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216 Cmd. 7136.
Afghanistan, and the northeastern region, bordering Burma, into respective Indian and Pakistani territories. The Radcliffe Award demarcated "Muslim Pakistan" from its "non-Muslim" Indian neighbor, in the terms used in the official brief. Fourteen and a half million people crossed the border after partition out of which between 500,000 and two million died in the warlike conditions that followed.217

On February 18, earlier that year British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin218 spoke to the House of Commons about Palestine: "We are unable to accept the scheme put forward either by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution of our own".219 Four days earlier, the British cabinet had decided to return their Mandate, and hand over the "Palestine Question" to the United Nations. Responding, the General Assembly met in special session in New York, and established a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to re-examine the Palestine problem. The committee toured the country during the summer of 1947, and presented their report on September 1, later that year. There was unanimity in UNSCOP about the need to terminate the Mandate and a majority in favor of partition into two states. A minority proposal, however, was also presented which would give Palestine independence as a "federal state" with locally governed, separate Arab and Jewish autonomous areas. It would leave Palestine a unitary state under "Arab domination".220

During the following two months, three specially appointed subcommittees of the UNSCOP developed the terms of the different recommendations. At the end of November, UNSCOP’s recommendations were brought before the UN General Assembly at Lake Success in New York, where the vote was held on November 29.

217 Jalal 2013: 5; Chester 2009: 81.
218 Foreign Secretary Bevin and Prime Minister Attlee did not necessarily see the Jews in Palestine as an emerging nation, but rather as a religious group displaced by war. On a visit in Washington in 1945 Bevin told president Truman that he hoped that the Jews would play their part in reconstructing Europe and not "over-emphasise their separateness from other peoples." (Times 14 November 1945, quoted in Schindler 2008: 58).
220 Schindler 2008; Bevin regarded the UNSCOP’s majority report as unjust and immoral, Morris 2008: 48; 73.
Two-thirds of the votes were necessary for ratification. "When the tally was complete, thirty-three states had voted yes, thirteen no, and ten had abstained. Partition had passed, but not very comfortably ... The nays had consisted of the Arab and Muslim states, Cuba, and India".221

Resolution 181 (II) thereby terminated the British Mandate for Palestine and establish two states, one Jewish, the other Arab, bound in an economic "union". The British pullout was to be completed "no later than 1 August 1948". With the UN resolution passed, massive demonstration erupted in cities across the Middle East and North Africa, and within the following hours, the previous Mandate experienced an eruption of violence, turning into a civil war. The sentiment of zero-sum conflict before the UN Resolution was transformed by the latter into an full-scale war, drawing in the neighboring countries of Trans-Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. The culmination was the exodus of between 600,000 and 760,000 Palestinian Arabs, the refusal of the Israelis to allow them to return, and the unwillingness, combined with inability of the neighboring Arab states – apart from Transjordan – to absorb them.222 On May 14, 1948, Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, proclaimed the establishment of "the Jewish State" in Palestine.223 While the Israeli state was de facto recognized by the United States within eleven minutes after the end of the Mandate, Britain took over eight months and Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria and about 30 other states still do not recognize the state of Israel.224 On the last day of the British Mandate – May 14 – with the conditions on the ground radically changed, the UN commission was formally dissolved. The British had withdrawn from India and had left the future of Palestine in the hands of the newly established United Nations. While the process had been accompanied by near-civil

221 Morris 2001: 186.
223 From the declaration of independence: "hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the state of Israel." (reprinted in Laqueur/Rubin 2008).
224 Schindler 2008: 43.
war-like conditions, Pakistan and Israel had emerged as two new international agents and were shortly thereafter granted membership of the UN.225

Analyzing processes of differentiation between Muslim and non-Muslim, Jew and non-Jew

At the end of the decade, Pakistan and Israel were internationally recognized as sovereign states. That did not mean that they were universally recognized – conflicts concerning their status remain until today – but it meant that they were recognized by a large majority of the other sovereign states in the international system, and that they functioned as such in an ever-growing number of international arenas. One of the arguments of the previous chapter was that – international – recognition reifies its objects, that it, for example, forgets about the process by which the object became recognizable as a possible agent of international relations. Recognition assumes already differentiated objects, and loses sight of the differentiation process. In the remaining part of the chapter, I will illustrate three of these processes of differentiation and demarcation under the headings of numbers, representation and border-drawing. I will start by examining how the demarcations became inscribed into the very heart of imperial and mandate governing rationality, that is, through the census and the enumeration of minorities.

Numbers: Census, enumeration and immigration

Pakistan

The population upon whose behalf the "Muslim National Home" of Pakistan was claimed had been a part of the British Indian Empire for centuries. These British Indian Muslims had been a heterogeneous group, estimated to comprise

approximately 100 million individuals at the time of partition. Speaking different languages, belonging to different social strata, and carrying out different cultural rites and rituals, made the fact that the British administration had categorized them under the same label seem partly arbitrary.

One of the most influential examples of colonial categorization as governing practice was the census. The British conducted a census in India every ten years, beginning at the end of the nineteenth century. It was intended to serve as a "scientific" basis for knowledge about Indian local society, mapping the population according to professions, language, caste, religion, et cetera. The Indian Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians thus became quantifiable as communal entities. The census’ enumeration of the Indian population into communities further functioned as a point of reference for the colonial state when it introduced representative political institutions, most clearly reflected in the decision to introduce separate electorates for Muslims, at the provincial level in 1909, and as they extended provincial self-government through the Government of India Acts in 1919 and in 1935. These "marked" electorates aimed to increase Muslim representation in the system of elective local government. At the same time, however, they also sanctioned the linking of religion with political representation, power and patronage. The enumerative power of the census’ categorization was probably the most influential example of the effect that colonial administration and bureaucracy had on consolidating the Muslim political constituency and stabilizing the demarcation between Muslim and non-Muslim. As categories, the "Muslims" and the "Hindus" consolidated and lent stability to the British experience of heterogenous Indian social, political and cultural life.

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226 "The dilemmas on imagining a coherent Pakistani nation have been compounded by regional and linguistic diversities that have resisted being melted down to fit the monolithic molds of the state’s Islamic identity.” (Jalal 1995: 74; see also Jalal 2013 and Devji 1998, 2013).
228 Talbot/Singh 2009. For example with facts such as the number of mimes in 1941 India was around 60,000. (Census of 1941).
230 Zuriek 2007; Balagangadhara/Keppens 2009.
“mechanism for organizing and perpetuating state power”, as has been argued many times before. However, while this “process of individualizing, categorizing, and disciplining corporeal bodies” functioned as an instrument of domination, it also opened up space for “liberation”, in the sense of making a certain “Muslim voice” audible in an otherwise overarchingly British power setting. Through the census, and its power to construct “a pattern and a structure that lent coherence to [the British] cultural experience of India”, however, the colonial regime had indeed elevated into actorhood the entity or identity of “the Muslims”, and had made them recognizable as such. Although the close connection between the census and political representation and power left this connection highly charged, it remained relatively unchallenged until the very end of the British rule. Instead, as we saw above and will examine in detail below, the census featured as the single most important point of reference for separating the new Pakistani state from the Indian Union.

Israel

The counting and categorization of population was a different issue in Mandate Palestine. Rather than being connected to political representation and the governing of minorities, the numbers in Palestine were intimately connected to the question of immigration, that is, the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine under the auspices of the British Mandate. In September 1922, after the First World War, the League of Nations allotted the Mandate over Palestine and Iraq to the British. The Mandate stipulated that Palestinians should receive “administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.” While

233 The counsel of the Indian National Congress loudly contested the reliability of the 1941 census figures (Ahmed 1999: 124), which were said to have been particularly problematic due to an unprecedented increase in Muslim population between 1931 and 1941. While its contestability was not questioned by the other members, the representative of the Muslim League, Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, argued that the Commission had no choice but to rely on the figures. (Ibid: 142).
234 Cmd. 7136.
doing so, the British were to facilitate the establishment of a "Jewish National Home" through immigration.\textsuperscript{235} The Mandate thereby affirmed the Balfour Declaration given by the British Government to the head of the British Zionist Federation, Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, five years earlier in 1917. Thereby the British were to enable the establishment of a “national home for the Jewish people” which would be facilitated through immigration by European Jews to Palestine.\textsuperscript{236} However, just as was the case with the British Indian Muslims, European Jewish immigrants to Palestine were made up of greatly diverse and polyphonous cultural-linguistic groups of Eastern, Central and Western Europeans, and a multitude of diverse efforts were needed to consolidate the new members of the Jewish society into a common Jewish community.\textsuperscript{237}

For one, the Balfour Declaration, as well as the Mandate itself, spoke of Jews and non-Jews only. The Palestinian Arab population was mentioned only as “non-Jewish communities”, and not explicitly by name. Jews were further alone in being labeled “national” in addition to being a religious community in Palestine. All other communities were neither "national" nor named. Instead, they were subsumed under the category of the "other inhabitants of Palestine", or "non-Jews".\textsuperscript{238} One of the few suggestion of Arab nationality occurred in Article 22 of the Mandate, which stipulated that English, Arabic, and Hebrew should be the future official languages of Palestine.\textsuperscript{239}

Palestine under a British Mandate had heightened the salience of the Balfour Declaration, but it had also given it an international legal status. The draft


\textsuperscript{236} The Declaration read that "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." (Balfour Declaration, reprinted in Kattan 2009: 42).

\textsuperscript{237} Sand 2009: 255; Schindler 2008: 11; Shapira 2012: 9, 15.


\textsuperscript{239} League of Nations: The British Mandate in: Laqueur/Rubin 2008: 35; See also: Zureik 2007.
instrument of the Mandate included the Balfour Declaration, and with it, also a recognition of the historical connection between the Jewish people and land of Palestine. It also confirmed the separate nature of the Jews from their non-Jewish neighbors. These categories of "Jews" and "non-Jews" further became the two main population categories in the Palestinian census classification.

Through the Balfour declaration, the British were to facilitate Jewish immigration to Palestine, in order to establish a "Jewish National Home." On the one hand, it was a pledge to help Jews immigrate to Palestine. On the other hand, since more than 90 percent of the immigrants to Palestine during the Mandate were categorized as "Jews" by the Jewish Agency, the Jew/non-Jew demarcation also became one between immigrant and non-immigrant. The connection between Jew/non-Jew and immigrant/non-immigrant was furthered by the Arab response to the increasing influx of people from Europe during the Mandate. The growth of the Jewish population of Palestine from 56,000 to 650,000 during the thirty years of British rule not only laid the groundwork for the creation of a durable Jewish society – or a "Jewish National Home" – but confirmed the initial fears of the Palestinian population regarding the expansive aims of the Zionist movement and made immigration a "matter of life and death" for the Arab population.240

The question of immigration became increasingly infected throughout the Mandate. While the initial argumentation of the British officials tended to measure numbers of immigrants according to the economic ability of the Palestinian society to absorb them, the immigration question soon became a brick in British wartime negotiation. As the British increasingly came to see the war in Europe as unavoidable, they promised the Arab states to limit Jewish immigration to Palestine in return for their support against the Germans. As the war proceeded, the British continued to use the number of Jewish immigrants in order regulate its influence in the region,

emphasizing the difference between the Jewish immigrants and the non-Jewish indigenous population.\textsuperscript{241}

Representation

Pakistan

Besides the enumerative power of the census to differentiate and demarcate the Muslims from the non-Muslims and the Jews from the non-Jews, political representation figures as a further instance of demarcation. In British India, the All-India Muslim League would become the main representative body for Indian Muslims, and would voice the claim to an “independent sovereign” Pakistani state.\textsuperscript{242} While the Muslim League and its leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah only consolidated the movement’s representational function in the beginning of the 1940s, Jinnah had previously made his position clear on the relationship between the Indian Muslim and non-Muslim populations. In his presidential address to the All-India Muslim League meeting in Lahore 1940, Jinnah presented the “Two-Nation Theory” as a justification for a separate Muslim “homeland”. Hindus and Muslims, he stated, were two nations, two irreconcilably “different civilizations”, a difference that went through every grain of human life down to marriage and food.\textsuperscript{243} Due to this fundamental difference, no settlement was to be expected nor should it be imposed. “To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a

\textsuperscript{241} This was to be the origin of MacDonald’s historic White Paper of 1939 which set British policy on a pro-Arab course: Palestine was to become independent in ten years as a unitary state, with Jewish immigration restricted to 75,000 over a five-year period. “This figure was calculated to ensure that the Jews would constitute no more than a third of Palestine’s population. Any increase was made consitional on Arab consent. The principle that had guided immigration policy up until then – the country’s economic ability to absorb newcomers – had finally been rescinded.” (Segev 2000: 440).

“With the defeat of German forces at El Alamein, the British attempted to disband the Palmach (the elite military unit) since it no longer served their interests. There was a revision to the proposal of the 1939 White Paper where the Jews were expected to remain a permanent minority in Palestine. Immigration would be dependent on Arab goodwill. At a time when Jews were desperately attempting to find ways out of Nazi-occupied Europe, this marked a turning point in Zionist relations with the British.” (Schindler 2008: 37).

\textsuperscript{242} Jinnah’s presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan August 11, 1947, in: Burke 2000: 25.

\textsuperscript{243} Jinnah’s address at the Lahore meeting in 1940, in: Saiyd 1940: 13.
numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent, and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state." 244 The Indian Muslims, according to Jinnah, were not a minority of the Indian nation, but a nation “according to any definition of the term, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state.” 245 The “problem in India”, he continued “is not of an intercommunal character, but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such.” 246

During the Second World War the position of the Muslim League, and its claim to represent “All India’s Muslims”, were strengthened. British wartime international relations, especially the exigency of the war effort in South Asia – which was the frontline of the Japanese advance – depended on Indian support. In 1942, Winston Churchill sent Stafford Cripps to India to negotiate with the Indian leaders, and to “sell the promise” of India receiving Dominion Status at the end of the war in exchange for its support for the British war effort. 247 While the Muslim League lent its support, the Indian National Congress and its leader Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru not only refused, but subsequently launched the „Quit India“ movement, demanding immediate independence. The British responded by banning the Congress and imprisoning its leadership, including Gandhi and Nehru. The weakening of the Congress, which had claimed to represent all Indians, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, bolstered the position of the Muslim League and that of Jinnah vis-à-vis the colonial regime. Subsequently, Jinnah was invited by the British on equal footing with the Congress leaders, thereby implicitly accepting the Muslim League’s claim to speak for the Indian Muslims. He demanded parity between the Congress and the League, between "Hindustan and Pakistan", and allowed the conference on constitutional reform in Simla 1945 to fail after refusing to accept

244 Jinnah’s address at the Lahore meeting in 1940, in: Saiyd 1940: 13.
245 Jinnah’s address at the Lahore meeting in 1940, in: Saiyd 1940: 9f, 14.
246 Jinnah’s address at the Lahore meeting in 1940, in: Saiyd 1940: 12.
Muslim representation in future Executive Council that was not chosen by the League.248

The real struggle in which the Muslim League and Jinnah took part, however, was not only the struggle for a territorial homeland for India’s Muslims, but rather one to create a united “Muslim community” in India despite its cultural, linguistic, demographic, religious and political plurality.249 The idea of a Muslim Homeland, or a Muslim community, took shape through struggles between regional and national politics250, between the multiplicity of particular local meanings attributed to these religious markers, and in light of the need for a unified Muslim front on the national stage.251

Early on, Jinnah had rejected appeals to the religious specificity of the Indian Muslims. Attempts to frame Muslims as a religious minority, as had previously been done by Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, would “confine [the Indian Muslims] to the demographically and constitutionally powerless, degraded, and impossible position” of a minority, living “ tolerated” under a Hindu Raj.252 The Muslim League was, however, not only prevented to make much use of Islam as the set of religious beliefs and practices of a minority population due to its leaders’ opinions, but also due to the opposition of a broad range of Muslim clerics.253 Many of these rejected the quest for Pakistan and supported the acclaimed secular, if Hindu dominated, Indian National Congress. “To opt for Pakistan then, was to give up India as part of the Muslim world” and lose the possibility to regain influence within the subcontinent.254

250 Jalal 1994(1985)).
252 Devji 2013: 85; 2007: 88. At the Congress in Nagpur 1920, Jinnah parted with the INC after they adopted Gandhi’s non-cooperation resolution, stating that “I will have nothing to do with this pseudo-religious approach to politics. I part company with the Congress and Gandhi.” (Das 2004(1969)).
254 Devji 2007: 86.
As partition grew closer, the Muslim League had sidelined other Muslim representatives, and Jinnah had gained the position as the League’s – and its constituents’ – “sole sokesperson”. Jinnah had rejected the relegation of India’s Muslims to the status of a religious minority – which would have been able to provide the unifying power needed to bridge the heterogeneity of particularities of Indian Muslim life – and Muslim clerics had refused to give their support to a “Muslim Homeland”. According to Jinnah, the Muslims were a nation. However, national projects had previously been consolidated through language and natural borders of mountains, rivers or oceans; and were reinforced by historiography, religious rituals, et cetera. The Indian Muslims, however, were heterogenous in every respect. This greatly heterogeneous people had “such elements of tradition or religiosity working rather to divide them more, by region, language, sect and class. Islam as an agglomeration of prejudice, practice, and superstition, held together by juridical categories like separate electorates and personal law on the one hand, and external boundaries of caste … on the other, had to be translated into a national unity of another kind”. Whatever this consolidating power would be, it was clear by the mid-1940s that it would be voiced through the representational authority of Jinnah and the Muslim League, and it was not religion in any institutional sense.

In the elections of February 1946, the League’s victory vindicated its claim to speak for Muslim India. As Talbot and Singh have argued, the “consolidation of political allegiances around religious community both reflected and contributed to the communal polarisation.”

257 Jinnah’s position on religion left little space for Muslim imaginings. Having reached the goal of a “Muslim Homeland” on the basis of the two-nation theory, Jinnah called for a separation of state and religion, as well as equal citizenship rights regardless of affiliation. At the first meeting of the Pakistani constituent assembly on August 11, 1947, he stated: “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State.” (Jinnah 2009(1948): 8).
258 Talbot/Singh 2009: 36.
Israel

In Palestine, the political representational situation was different. While the highest-ranking political authority of the country was vested in the High Commissioner, who represented the United Kingdom, and while no Palestinian parliament or cabinet could claim popular representation, the Mandate had foreseen a representative body for its Jewish population. Designed to "advis[e] and cooperat[e] with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine", the Jewish Agency represented the Palestinian Jews, both Zionist and non-Zionist. It centralized different Jewish land acquisition and settlement projects. There was, however, no equivalent body for the "non-Jewish" population.

Throughout the decades of Mandate rule, demands for representational government and the halting of land sales lay at the root of the reoccurring violence, riots and protests, always dealt with in tandem with the question of Jewish immigration. This was also the case during the Arab Revolt in April 1936. What started as dispersed acts of violence throughout Palestine, became countrywide riots, and ended in six month-long strikes. The already significant gap between "Jews" and their "non-Jewish" counterparts grew deeper with each act of violence.

The semi-official status accorded to the Jewish Agency by the British and the League of Nations through the Mandate conferred international legitimacy upon the Zionist movement and guaranteed it access to international arenas in London, New York and Geneva. The demarcation between Jew and non-Jew was therefore internationally sanctioned and institutionally grounded, as the Jewish Agency

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claimed representation, not only for Palestine's Zionists, but for all Jews, both inside and outside Palestine, with regard to the Jewish State.

In contrast, the Palestinians were not granted the same national recognition and institutional framework. The wording of the Mandate for Palestine mentioned the "civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine", but remained silent on their political or national rights. During the 1930s, the surrounding countries of the region underwent processes of decolonialization. In Iraq, the Mandate was replaced by self-government, and in Egypt, the terms of the British protectorate were amended in Egypt's favor. As the rest of the Class A mandate countries moved towards independence, Palestine alone was "governed by a regime that did not grant representation to the majority of the population." Further, the representational situation was complicated by the fact that the Mandate itself contained the recognition of the Zionist project of building a "National Home" in Palestine. Any claim to a political representation within the framework of the Mandate would have implicitly accepted its terms, and thereby the right of establishment of a Jewish National Home.

In 1923, a British proposal was put forward for an Arab Agency to be appointed by the High Commissioner. Rather than being elected as was the case with the Jewish Agency, it was "a pale reflection of the Jewish (representative body), without sanction in the Mandate, and without international standing." In this vacuum, Palestinian Arab politics were increasingly dominated by a religious leadership that had been authorized and subsidized by the British. After taking control over the Palestine territories, the latter had created the entirely new post of the "Grand Mufti of Palestine" (al-mufti al-akbar), who was also designated the "Mufti of Jerusalem and the Palestine region" (mufti al-Quds wal-diyan al-filistiniyya) as well as head of the new "Supreme Muslim Council", an advisory body on "Muslim" courts, schools and charities. The "existing system was completely restructured by the British, who

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262 Shapira 2012: 84, see also Khalidi 2001: 19.
effectively placed the mufti above all other religious officials in Palestine.”264 To this newly created position of unprecedented power, the British appointed Hajj Amin al-Husayni. “Among all the other leaders of national movements in Arab countries during this period (and among Palestinian leaders), the mufti was alone in being a leading religious figure, whose base of power was a ‘traditional’ religious institution, albeit a newly invented one.”265 After the 1936 revolt, the British exiled most Arab leaders in 1937, while others fled, some never to return to the country, most notably Hajj Amin al-Husayni himself. The British took control of the Supreme Muslim Council, appointed British officials to supervise it, and deprived the mufti of its revenues.266 As the Second World War approached, the rift between the Jewish Agency and the Mufti grew wider. It finally came to a head with the Israeli claim of statehood267 at the 1942 Biltmore Conference in New York, while the Mufti subsequently left for Germany, supporting the National Socialist German and Fascist Italian war efforts.268

Border drawing and the transfer of population

Pakistan

After the war, the newly-elected Labor government witnessed the British being driven out of the Indian subcontinent. Despite long deliberations between the Muslim League, the Indian National Congress and the British, the three parties were unable to find a path to independence involving a unified India, and on June 3, 1947, His Majesty’s Government announced the transfer of power to and the partition of British India. Independence was to come ten weeks later, at midnight on August 14, 1947. British lawyer Cyril Radcliffe was dispatched to India on July 7, to head a commission tasked with demarcating the boundary between the two emergent states. It was his first visit to the subcontinent. Six weeks later, the results of the

264 Khalidi 2001: 22.
267 At this time in the form of a “Jewish Commonwealth”.
commission, the “Radcliffe line”, became an international border. It separated the Indian Union and Pakistan but also divided the northwestern region of Punjab, bordering Afghanistan, and the northeastern region, bordering Burma, into respective Indian and Pakistani territories. The Radcliffe Award demarcated “Muslim Pakistan” from its “non-Muslim” Indian neighbor in the terms used in the official brief from the British Government. While one must be cautious when estimating the casualties of the civil war-like conditions that followed partition, numbers suggest fourteen million people crossing the border of which between 500,000 to two million died.269

*From the top: The Radcliffe Boundary Commissions*

Radcliffe and his Punjabi and Bengali commissions had been instructed to "demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of [the Provinces] on the basis of ascertaining contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. ... For the purpose of determining the population of district, the 1941 census figures will be taken as authoritative. [The commissions] will also be instructed to take into [consideration] other factors”.270 Apart from the census, the primary source of information upon which Radcliffe relied in drawing his lines were the colonial maps. No information was gathered through the commissions’ own surveys or "by consulting the local administration, police, revenue officers or bureaucrats in the border districts.”271

The official maps which Radcliffe utilized had been commissioned for two principal reasons. The first was colonial administration, such as tax collection, and logistics, like transportation, roads and railways. The second main function of the maps of British India had been military, especially in the northeast, where the advancement of the Japanese forces in 1942 had highlighted the need for precise cartographical

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269 Jalal 2013: 5, Chester 2009; Khan 2007; Pandey 2001
270 Partition of the Punjab (Sadullah 1983): 1f.
271 Chatterji 1999: 224f.
knowledge. The mark of colonial administration and military imperatives on the maps available for Radcliffe's border mission became clear in the factors which needed to be considered besides the census as "other factors", that is, lines of communication, roads, railways, canals, and military bases, leaving aside questions of trade patterns and kinship, and the cultural and religious significance of cities and regions.

As provided for in the statement of June 3rd, the commissions were to demarcate the boundaries according to the contiguity of Muslim majority areas – according to the census – while taking "other factors" into consideration. In the Punjabi commission, these "other factors" were insisted upon by the INC and the Sikhs, the latter pushing for recognition of the importance of religious and cultural heritage in areas where they could never claim numerical majority. In the end, the "other factors" that trumped the cards of the census were rivers, canals, railroads, roads and military bases. These were the factors that were visible on Radcliffe's maps.

As discussed above, the enumerative power of the census had shaped and strengthened the perception of clearly demarcated and distinguishable religious communities without communal or individual overlaps. The colonial maps, heavily dependent upon administrative and military knowledge, superimposed these reified religious communities onto visible territory. The census and the map came together in the cartographic representation of a religious/national composition, thereby "naturalizing a territorialized politics of ethnic/national self-determination".

References:

272 Khan 2007; Chester 2009.
274 The Sikh representative to the Punjabi commission Sardar Harnam Singh argued that in the Balfour Declaration Palestine was described as the homeland of the Jews even when they were a minority in it in 1917. A similar logic ought to be able to apply to the Sikhs in the Punjab. (Partition Proceedings, Vol. II: 133). The references to the religious significance of Sikh shrines in Muslim majority areas were dismissed by the Muslim League's elected judges Din Muhammad and Muhammad Munir as "most ridiculous, most unjustifiable and most unreasoned" (Ahmed 199: 149f). Also, the reference to the Sikh's "religious freedom" as an important "other factor" was dismissed (Ibid.).
275 Campbell 1998: 79.
The census “fill[ed] in politically the formal topography of the map.”\textsuperscript{276} The stronger these categories were presented as natural – eventually making their way into international relations as ontologically fixed entities – the more alternative accounts emphasizing alternative political possibilities were pushed to the side.

\textit{From the bottom: the everyday life of porous borders}

The border drawing by Indian and British officials was, however, but one in a myriad of instances that helped to demarcate Muslims from non-Muslim. Differing from the Punjabi border in the northwest, for example, the Bengali border between India and eastern Pakistan was intended to be kept porous.\textsuperscript{277} Still, two factors worked to seal it: "The first was the drive to stop smuggling. The second factor was the difficulty of impressing the official policy of openness upon border police and militia."\textsuperscript{278} As the Muslim National Guard had become obsolete, unemployed young men were plenty in the swelling border communities, and the Bengali government began to issue calls for Muslim youth to build up a 150,000 strong non-official Muslim military organization called Ansar Bahini.\textsuperscript{279} This militia seemed to have been behind a trend starting a few years after partition in which Muslims from border villages in West Bengal moved to Pakistan after burning down their own houses. This made it impossible, not only for the Hindu population to inhabit their homes, but also left the Muslims who quit India with nothing to return to. The

\textsuperscript{276} Campbell 1998: 79.
\textsuperscript{277} Chatterji 1999, 2007, 1994; The Bengal Radcliffe line disrupted every aspect of existence for the rural community along the border, rupturing agrarian communities all along its length. Grazing one’s herds along the borders became risky business, where rivers formed the borderline, fishermen were attacked, villages were cut off from their markets and markets were cut off from the hinterlands that served them. The disruption of roads and railways separated the North of Bengal from the rest of West Bengal, and interrupted the multi-million rupee tea trade of the Assam region. Further, hospitals and courts lost the staff that manned them and the border separated people from their families. (Chatterji 1999: 231ff).
In theory, many West Bengalis continued after partition to own land in East Pakistan and vice versa, holding legitimate claims to cross the Radcliffe line to attend to their business on the other side. In practice, however, late 1940s Bengal saw three different conflicting national directives active, leaving the local police the “discretion to decide which particular policy prevailed in each individual case.” (Chatterji 1999: 234).
\textsuperscript{278} Chatterji 1999: 233.
\textsuperscript{279} Chatterji 1999: 236f.
“presence of armed border militia did much to re-kindle communal hostilities along the border. If this is correct, it would seem that the played an important part in strengthening the border and making it more impregnable.”

In contrast to the Bengali border, there was an official agreement in the Punjab to complete the “transfer of populations” on the basis of religious community, which was the only one of its kind in India. The figure of ‘the refugee’ in this region was marked by a sense of religious belonging. However, it was not simply the task of fixing citizenship onto religious differences, since not all Muslims could become Pakistanis, and some Muslims wanted to remain in, or return to, their homes in India.

Bordermaking, Vazira Zamindar writes, was not a simple geographic project, but one that ran through households and the inner worlds of family ties. As such, the control of movements of people and property by national institutions – such as that of the Custodian of Evacuee Property – helped to shape the “Muslim” community alongside the defining imprint of citizenship.

“The very ways in which one came to be marked as Muslim were transformed by the process of this long Partition, of dividing, categorizing, and regulating people, places, and institutions for bounding two distinct nations, and they accrued new meanings, for alongside citizens there emerged the ‘undefined’, the ‘stateless’, and a landscape of divided families.” Zamindar shows how the quantification of refugees on either side of the official border categorized the “displaced people” as “Muslims” or “non-Muslims” and how the one category of those leaving, the “evacuees”, was translated into the number of individuals of the other category that could be housed in their abandoned property, the so called “evacuee property”.

280 Chatterji 1999: 239.
284 Zamindar 2007: 86; It was not only the dichotomizing effects of “evacuee property” laws that helped to fix what was “Muslim”, but also the fact that this category of “evacuees” were partly assumed to include all religious minorities as “intending evacuees”, fitting the religious category into the status of a leaving, or soon-to-leave, population, emptying the land for the expected refugees from
"Thus it is ironic that the very formulation of evacuee property laws as a cornerstone of rehabilitation programs of both states ended up fixing these two sets of refugees in an oppositional relationship."285

Other ways in which the control of the movement of population closed the seal on what was "Muslim" and sedimented its difference to the non-Muslim were the surveillance of family ties in Pakistan of Muslim Indian civil servants – non-Muslims not being surveilled in the same manner – and the programs to repatriate Muslim, Hindu and Sikh women abducted in the Punjabi region to their respective "nation", partly against their own will.286

A further factor in consolidating the difference between Muslim and non-Muslim was fear and violence. The wide-ranging violence accompanying the process of Indian partition did not simply separate, disrupt and destroy, but, according to Gyanendra Pandey, was part and parcel of the creative process of the unities that emerged from this process. Violence and unity in this sense constitute each other. "Violence happened – and can only happen – at the boundaries of community. It marks those boundaries. It is the denial of any violence 'in our midst', the attribution of harmony within and the consignment of violence to the outside, that established 'community'."287 The violence in 1946 and 1947, as well as the slaughter of the days of partition and independence, were in this sense also constitutive of a process consolidating the "Muslims", making them even more distinguished and distinguishable from those who were not Muslims.

Colonial, official government inscribed and shaped the knowledge about "Hindu", "Sikh" and "Muslim" identities, recognizing their salience by accounting for them in

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287 Pandey 2001: 204.
political electoral representation. The creation of an international border between these constructed but nonetheless real communities further sharpened the edges of the blurry categories that otherwise embodied them, reifying and forgetting the processes through which they emerged. Through national and local channels: the regulation of trade; the burning of houses; the management of refugees and their property; the projects to recover abducted women and to engage in surveillance against Indian Muslim state functionaries; the control over the movement of people and property; through these, and many other processes, the meaning and scope of Muslim identity and a "Muslim Homeland", were transformed. The boundary drawing of partition – the official, clean, rational and "representative" one, or the unofficial, messy, long and partly arbitrary one – represented the parting of ways of two "religious communities", inscribing them and the states formed around them into the international system, irrespective of their historical formation.

Israel

Contrasted with the hasty creation of the new South Asian borders, plans had been available for Palestine for more than a decade before the UN recommended partition in November 1947, modeled on the first partition plan of the “Peel report”288 Partition ideas for Palestine had been circulating throughout the period of the British Mandate, but the escalation of violence in 1929 catalyzed British officials to begin in earnest to further develop their ideas. Until the mid-1930s, these ideas – mainly in the form of proposals for cantonization – remained vague and abstract.289 The Arab uprisings of 1936 concretized the ideas, but did so in the form of full partition. “After several months of unrest, it became clear to many British administrators that anything other than a ‘clean cut’ would continue to complicate the definition and practical governance of a national entity.”290

289 Erskine 1935; Cust 1935.
290 Sinanoglu 2009: 147.
The "clean cut" would become the official British position a year later, through the Report of the Royal Commission, better known as the Peel Commission after its chairman Lord William Peel.291 The report not only confirmed the Mandate's distinction of Palestine's two essentially different Jewish and non-Jewish peoples, but also territorialized them. 292 In its unanimous report, the Commission recommended that Palestine be partitioned into an Arab state – which was to be joined with Trans-Jordan – a Jewish state, and a new British mandatory area, which would cover the "Holy Cities" of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth, and a corridor to Jaffa. Despite the fact that it left many questions open – such as the precise lines of partition, or the manner in which it was to be implemented – the Peel report was the first public proposal of partition put forward by British official representatives.

The departure of the Commission in November 1936 was triggered by a violent rebellion in April that same year, preceding the general strikes that were to follow. Although the "Arab uprising" was not the first in mandatory Palestine, it had definitely been the most violent in its history. The Commission was given the task of reporting on the causes of the uprising and proposing methods for rectifying the causes of Arab and Jewish grievances.293 Running to nearly 400 pages in its attempt to outline and analyze the complexities of the Palestinian situation, the Peel

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291 CMD.5479.
292 CMD.5479: 62.
293 The committee were to 'ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the Mandate, either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances upon account of the way in which the Mandate has been, or is being implemented; and if the Commission is satisfied that the grievances are well founded, to make recommendations for their removal and for the prevention of their recurrence.' (Cmd. 5479: ix).

"The Peel Commission was the most thorough inquiry into the Palestine conflict carried out thus far, but there was something misleading about it. The royal commission had not, of course, come to 'study' anything; it had come to help the government divest itself of Palestine. Lord Peel seems to have brought with him a foregone conclusion: 'The social, moral and political gaps between the Arab and Jewish communities are already unbridgeable', he wrote to the colonial secretary." (Segev 2000: 401)

"The commission was intended as cover to help the British find a relatively graceful exit from an increasingly uncomfortable situation. Segev (2000: 413) refers to this kind of commission of inquiry as a 'ritual procedure'. (...) Such bodies allowed the British to maintain the appearance to judicial objectivity and rationality, when in fact political considerations played a determining role in policy decisions." (Chester 2008: 89).
Commission's report was the work of six appointed members, who had spent the previous eleven months listening to the oral testimony of British officials, Jews, and Arabs (though the latter boycotted the Commission until a week before its departure), reading letters, memoranda, and petitions, and touring Palestine and parts of neighboring Trans-Jordan. It also reflected the Commission's experience of a Palestinian "reality", that to a great extent already was parted into two separated communities. The salience of this experienced partition on the ground was expressed in the Commission's detailed analysis of separate Arab and Jewish economies, school systems, lifestyles, residential areas, and even health facilities. "The thirty-year transitional Mandate period (had) enabled the Jews to establish a society and economy of their own in Palestine."

Starting its narrative from the Biblical days of Abraham, the report traced the history of the problem in Palestine, examined the economic, social, and political life under the Mandate, and offered suggestions for managing problems within the terms of the Mandate. However, the report's central recommendation, and that which is important for our analysis, fell outside the bounds of the Mandate altogether. It saw the Mandate as unworkable as long as Jews and Arabs could not be brought together in a single representative legislature. The situation in Palestine had reached a "deadlock", and "if the existing Mandate continued, there was little hope of lasting peace in Palestine". In order to lead the reader to this conclusion, "the report had to make the case that the conflict was indeed driven by a clash of two distinct and irreconcilable national communities rather than by ethnic

294 Lord Peel himself, Secretary of State for India from 1922 to 1923 and a member of the joint select committee on the Indian constitution in 1933–4; Sir Horace Rumbold, a diplomat in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia; Morris Carter, chief of Tanganyika Territory from 1920 to 1924 and chairman of the 1932–3 Kenya land commission; Reginald Coupland, Beit professor of colonial history at Oxford and editor of the Round Table from 1917 to 1919; Laurie Hammond, governor of Assam from 1927 to 1929 and chairman of the Indian delineation committee in 1935–6; and Sir Harold Morris, president of the Industrial Court from 1926 to 1945.
295 Sinanoglu 2009: 149
296 Klieman 1980: 289
297 Shapira 2012: 98
298 CMD.5479: Chapter 22: 380ff
299 CMD.5479: Chapter 22: 380
hatreds, economic competition or domination, anger over immigration, or poor government.”

The function of the extensive historical part of the report that went 2000 years back into Jewish history was mainly to make the historicist argument of the deep historical, spiritual and now ideologically national Jewish connection to the land of Palestine, presenting the Jews as fundamentally different from the non-Jewish population.

What the over 400 page long report did, in the end, was to reaffirm the Zionist narrative of a Jewish historical connection to the land of Palestine, the idea of the Jewish people "return[ing] to their historic homeland”, and the fundamental difference of the Jews from their non-Jewish neighbors. In this sense, the report stated that the “culture of Arab Palestine ... born as it is of Asia, it had little kinship with that of the National Home, which, though it is linked with ancient Jewish tradition, is predominantly a culture of the West. Nowhere, indeed, is the gulf between the races more obvious.” The commission had taken the situation they found on the ground – that of separate education systems, economies and language – as evidence reflecting the narrative of the separate nature of the two peoples of Palestine.

On 2 April 1937, the Daily Herald broke the story of the Commission’s plan for dividing Palestine, which was officially endorsed by the British government when it was published on 7 July 1937. The partition line more or less followed the existing Jewish and Arab settlement pattern. The proposed Jewish state was estimated to contain some 225,000 Arabs, who were to be transferred, modeled on the exchange between Turkey and Greece during the 1920s. It would come with “just compensation” for those moved, but for those who objected, the transfer would be

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300 Sinanglou 2010: 134; “It is not a natural or old-standing feud.” (CMD.5479: 395)
301 Dubnov forthcoming: 36; Sinanglou 2010: 135
302 CMD.5479: 3
303 CMD.5479: 2, 117.
304 "Before the operation the Greek and Turkish minorities had been a constant irritant. Now the ulcer has been clean cut out, and Greco-Turkish relations, we understand, are friendlier than they have ever been before.” (CMD.5479: 390); See also Shields 2013.
implemented by the British; "in the last resort" by means of compulsion. The Arab Higher Committee rejected the plan in July 1937. Jewish opinion remained divided.

Though initially rejected, the Peel report resurfaced ten years later in UN negotiations on Israeli independence and the partition of Palestine in the fall of 1947. "[N]early a decade after the Peel report's release, the United Nations recommended the partition of Palestine, using the Peel proposals and maps as a blueprint."305 In February 1947, when the British had decided to leave Palestine and hand over the question of its future to the United Nations, they did not expect that the UN would achieve a binding resolution, which required a two-thirds majority, mainly due to previous Soviet opposition to Zionist policies. However, contrary to British and Arab expectations, both Eastern and Western blocs supported the draft resolution.306 The UN decision to partition intensified the waves of violence that had engulfed Palestinian society during the final years of the British Mandate. A month before Israel declared itself independent, the Arab states surrounding the future state countered the first attempt at a large-scale Jewish offensive. "The Arab Legion's goal had been to take control of areas designated as part of the Arab state and as far as possible avoid clashing with the Jews".307 However, each "wave of violence brought with it further distancing and segregation of these national communities, each into its own territory."308 On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared the independence of the Israeli State. Within the following months the Jewish State of Israel was recognized by a majority of the world's existing states. The war of 1948 continued, and ended with the expulsion of between 600,000 and 760,000 Palestinian Arabs. "Now, given the destruction of all the Jewish settlements on the Arab side, and the Arab evacuation from the Jewish side, a new reality materialized: two ethnically homogenous states, a mainly Jewish one and a purely

305 Sinanoglou 2010: 120.
306 Shapira 2012: 15f.
307 Shapira 2012: 165.
308 Shapira 2012: 96.
Arab one. The conclusion was that the State of Israel could not allow the Arabs to return to their homes.  

Conclusion

This chapter has tried to illustrate the processes by which the “Muslim Homeland” and the “Jewish National Home” became recognizable as such. The previous chapter had argued that recognition assumes – and reproduces – already differentiated objects, agents, or identities and thereby misses out on their process of differentiation. Recognition, in this sense, lacked genealogical sensitivity. The chapter illustrated some of these differentiation processes, in the case of Pakistan, the differentiation between the British Indian “Muslims” and the ”non-Muslims” and in the case of Israel, between the ”Jews” and the ”non-Jews”.

In British India, the census was argued to have reified the heterogeneous group of British Indian Muslims into a homogenous, politically representative entity. In Palestine, the Mandate reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration's distinction between Jews and non-Jews, which continued to serve as the categories in the subsequent census. The question of political representation showed a Muslim League under M.A. Jinnah claiming and gaining sole representational power over British Indian Muslims, continuing to deepen the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as fundamental, national and civilizational. And prior to history and politics. In Palestine, the international recognition of the authority of the Jewish Agency affirmed the alleged difference between the Jews and the non-Jews as a fundamental difference of two “peoples”, and tied the Jews to what had previously been claimed as Palestinian territory. The boundary drawing and subsequent transfer of population illustrated the work by the boundary commissions in British India to separate the future Pakistani ”Muslim Homeland” from its ”non-Muslim” neighbor. It showed how the knowledge of the census and the colonial maps were authorized and their conflictual and ambiguous background erased. Further, local border

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control, family surveillance and refugee administration were illustrated in the micro-activities undertaken to stabilize the officially sanctioned separation. In Palestine, the work of the Peel Commission authorized the claims of the Balfour declaration and the Mandate regarding the separate nature of the Jews from the non-Jews, and territorialized these differences. Ten years later, this differentiation made its way into the United Nations’ deliberations on Israeli independence, and was thereafter reified and inscribed into international law through the partition of Palestine.

These historical instances of demarcation illustrate the contested, political, and processual nature of the categories relied upon by authorities that recognized the states of Pakistan and Israel in the late 1940s. The international recognition of Pakistan and Israel reified the boundaries around and between political communities. It reinstated the logic of a differentiated social ontology of "Self" and "Other". The recognition process reproduced and reinstated the colonial epistemological framework of differentiated and differentiable religious and cultural communities, reifying them into internationally recognized and recognizable political communities. International recognition of Pakistan and Israel may have been intended to empower national communities and further peaceful coexistence. It was, however, also a process of reification of religious difference into political difference.

In the fourth chapter, I will continue the theoretical discussion of the second chapter, investigating different responses to the problematic aspects of reification in international relations. I will continue to argue for the importance of genealogical sensitivity, and for the need to investigate, rather than assume, the differentiation processes predating recognition. That is, I will continue to argue for the importance of an investigation into the question of how to become recognizable in international relations.
Chapter 4: Becoming recognizable

In the previous chapters, I argued that recognition in international relations lacked a sense of the way in which its objects had become possible to recognize, or recognizable. That is, I argued that the framework of recognition in scholarship often lacked sensitivity vis-à-vis the processes of emergence of its objects, agents and epistemological frameworks. It lacked, what I termed as genealogical sensitivity. In this sense, Chapter 2 showed that recognition presupposed and reproduced its objects, agents or identities, and that it harbored a reproductive power vis-à-vis the framework of knowledge – the epistemic framework, within which the recognition itself took place. In the last part of that chapter, I argued that these aspects of presupposing and reproducing objects and epistemic frameworks, together with the lack of genealogical sensitivity implied that recognition held a reifying power. By that, I meant precisely the tendency to “forget” about the processes by which an object or agent of international relations becomes recognizable, that is, available for recognition.

In this chapter, I wish to continue this line of thought, by asking how these processes of reification, recognizability and genealogical sensitivity can be approached. How can we regain the lost perspectives of the processes through which agents, or objects became recognizable to international scholars? One of the more elaborate bodies of literature on the problems of, and possible answers to, reification has come from a perspective that was generally skeptical to claims regarding any kind of premises concerning the way the “world was”, including claims that the world was constituted of pre-differentiable entities, susceptible to recognition or in danger of misrecognition. I will engage with this “post-positivist” literature and extract from it the aspects that I believe to be helpful for the particular question of recognition. Finally, I will attempt to sketch a possible version
of how I wish to engage with recognition. Rather than accessing recognition through the more common means that I rendered problematic in Chapter 2, I will argue for an approach that traces the multiple paths by which an object of international relations – an agent, a concept, or an identity – becomes recognizable.

**Post-Positivism: Against the forgetfulness of reification and remembering the process of becoming**

I begin my introductory remarks concerning post-positivist thought by emphasizing the heterogeneity of this body of literature, appending the disclaimer that I cannot, nor do I attempt to, fully cover this vast intellectual landscape. This is not a literature review. What I will do, however, is highlight two aspects which cut across many of the different accounts that I subsume under the label of post-positivist scholarship. On the one hand, we find the rejection of ontological realism and the correspondence theory of truth, and on the other hand, is the rejection of monism or the singularity of knowledge, truth, or method. Other characterizations are certainly possible and may even be more conclusive, but by focusing on these two aspects, I open a discussion on the importance of processes – of what I will call "becoming" – and plurality – what I will discuss as "pluralization" – two aspects that will continue to inform my own approach to recognition, which will be outlined below.

Post-positivist thought emerged in IR throughout the 1980s and 1990s, influenced by a growing interest in work on the philosophy and sociology of knowledge.\(^{310}\) The first central aspect of this scholarship relevant to our discussion is its wide-ranging rejection of ontological realism and the correspondence theory of truth, two cornerstones of more standard methodology. While ontological realism assumed the

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existence of a "world out there," correspondence theory argued that propositions are true when they match, that is, when they correspond with this reality.

Ontological realism reflects the premise that the world exists independently from its observer. Against this assumption, Immanuel Kant demonstrated that what is observed is always constituted by, and dependent upon, the observing subject. Reality could not be known through experience of the "factual" world of phenomena, but only through the faculty of reason. Time, space, content, meaning and even causation are all categories of the mind. "Insofar as the subject is deeply implicated in the constitution of the object, it is impossible to derive concepts and theoretical assertions directly from 'the facts.' If the objects of experience are not simply 'out there', to understand the world we have to reflect on the categories we use." In other words, because the objects of the world are dependent on the subject who perceives them, no objective "facts" or "truths" can be derived from observing these objects. We can, however, reflect upon the categories we use to describe or make sense of our observations. As these very categories are part of the human mind and not a "property of the object world", an alternative to ontological realism is required in order to understand how we gain knowledge as humans. "Any such alternative will highlight the constitution of what we perceive as the world through our cognitive endowment and conceptual instruments." That is, any alternative to ontological realism would focus on the way in which knowledge about the world is constituted through human faculties. This is, however, not a one-man-show but, for the post-positivists as well as for Kant, a collective endeavor.

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311 George 1994: 11, 21, 156.
316 For the consequences of self-referentiality and its relationship to illness see: Friedson 2009a, 2009b.
cognitive faculties of others are ultimately inaccessible, the alternative to ontological realism needs to build on the way in which these "cognitive endowments and conceptual instruments" are publically displayed, that is, through the interpretation of motives and through the meaning of intersubjective socially and culturally transmitted schemes. An alternative to ontological realism would, in other words, take the "intersubjective quality of social reality" seriously.317

The correspondence theory of truth is intimately connected with ontological realism and assumes that one can grasp reality through conceptual matching, that is, the concepts we use to describe the world are assumed to correspond with the thing they describe. However, if the Kantian critique of ontological realism described above is correct, and the subject is always part of the constitution of the object, then there can be no physical reality with which the concepts can correspond. What we perceive as the world cannot be separated from our minds and the theories and concepts we use to make sense of it. An alternative to this correspondence theory will therefore focus on the processes through which knowing subjects create knowledge about the world, that is, how we reach consensus on our shared theories and concepts.318 In sum, a critique of ontological realism and the correspondence theory of truth takes seriously the intersubjective quality of social reality, and will focus on the processes through which knowledge is constituted as authoritative and is expressed in theories and concepts.

This critique manifested itself via many different expressions, with scholars of IR arguing for a closer investigation into the ways in which international scholarship itself constructs authoritative knowledge about the world – in the literal sense of the word – by presenting their operative concepts and theories as reflecting the "way things are".319 Instead, the post-positivist scholars wanted to know how this “way

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317 Friedrichs/Kratochwil: 704.
318 Friedrichs/Kratochwil: 705.
319 Cox, Ashley (1987; 1988; 1989), Ashley/Walker (1990), Hoffman, Linklater and Steven Smith argued in favor of the necessity for IR to consider its philopohy of science underpinnings becuase of
things were” had come to appear as a natural condition, and as an unquestionable foundation upon which theories could be built. They sought to “de-naturalize” what had come to seem natural. Many did so by pushing for a historicist analysis of knowledge, similarly to constructivist scholarship – with which the post-positivists had many of these meta-theoretical concerns in common\textsuperscript{320} – seeking to “reveal the connections between representations of social reality and the social production of knowledge (...) and problematizing the relationship between the nature of the social world as we observe it, and the socio-historical conditions that make it appear as an objectively given given order”.\textsuperscript{321}

Echoing the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, post-positivist IR scholars sought to trace the emergence of ideas and practices and examine the “condition of possibility” for certain knowledge and its concepts and institutions.\textsuperscript{322} Emphasizing the mutual constitution of power and knowledge, scholars sought to “unmask the operation of power in the ‘knowledge’ of global politics”\textsuperscript{323}, "expose choice poising as truth”, \textsuperscript{324} "reveal how problematic are the taken-granted

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\textsuperscript{320} Price/Reus-Smit; But also differed clearly from. As Judith Butler has argued, constructivist arguments tend to operate in two ways. In the first, discourse becomes an omnipotent force so deterministic that ‘it’ acts as the governing subject such that all accounts of human agency are expunged. In the second – which keeps with the logic of the first, but changes the character of the subject – the volitional human agent reigns supreme and willfully engages in construction without constraint. (Butler 1993: 4-12).

For the differences in critical international relations theory – neo-Gramscian scholars such as Robert Cox, those drawing on the Frankfurter school and Jürgen Habermas such as Andrew Linklater, the postmoderns drawing on Foucault, Nietzsche and Derrida, such as Ashley, Walker and Shapiro, and the feminist work done by Elshtain, Enloe, Sylvester, Tickener – see Hutchings 2000.

\textsuperscript{321} In order to further a "reflexive" stance among scholars concerning the way in which knowledge is constituted at the international level, with reflexivity meaning the awareness of the social processes that subtends the production of knowledge and how this knowledge in turn is reflected in the practices, beliefs and commitments of social agents (including IR scholars) Hamati-Ataya 2013: 671, 674, 681 see also Guzzini 2000, 2005; and Hamti-Ataya 2011).

\textsuperscript{322} Resonating with Nietzschean and Foucaultian work, it challenged the foundations of Enlightenment thought, the idea of progress, modern notions of rational humankind, meaning constructed in dichotomous relationships and universalist assumptions in theory and method, Cochran 1995: 239

\textsuperscript{323} George/Campbell 1990: 281

\textsuperscript{324} John Varquez 1995: 220
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structures”

pointing to the "acts of force that enables [their] founding and [further, how these] are dissolved into acts of forgetting”,

that is, pointing to their process of reification. In short, this post-positivist scholarship questioned the assumptions that underpinned the claims to knowledge of the world, as well as the ontological realism and correspondence theory of truth that supported them. I will return to the attempts at denaturalization and the focus on constitution below, where I will discuss it as a contrast between “becoming” – which refers to the processual constitution of knowledge – and “being” – as stabilized knowledge.

This skepticism of ontological realism and correspondence theory is accompanied by another feature of post-positivist thinking that I wish to highlight, namely the rejection of what is often referred to as an Archimedean point of truth, or a belief in monism. In other words, the rejection of the single version of truth, of perspective, or method from whence to judge the validity of analytical or ethical claims to knowledge. In short, post-positivists were all about plurality. Contrasting with the acceptance of the Kantian critique of ontological realism described above, this commitment to plurality was argued to be explicitly anti-Kantian. Against Kant’s vision of human reason as the only channel through which the individual could access reality or universal truth, post-positivists presented a position that was “marked by pluralism in values, methods, techniques and perspectives”, “portend[ing] a new pluralism as the cutting ... edge of international theory”. But, as Thomas Biersteker pointed out, this was no common understanding of plurality, or pluralism along the lines of more liberal forms of thinking. Rather, it was a “critical pluralism, designed to reveal embedded power and authority structures,

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325 Lapid 1989: 242
326 Ashley 1988, Alker 1996.
327 Bartelson 1995
328 Jahn 1999.
329 Burke 2008: 365; Connolly 1995
330 Price/Reus-Smit: 1999: 262
332 Dunn 1987: 79, see also: Lapid 1989: 244
333 DerDerian 1988: 190
provok critical scrutiny of dominant discourses engage marginalised peoples and perspective and provide a basis for alternative conceptualisations”. In the following sections, I will discuss this “critical” understanding of plurality – which I will call pluralization – by contrasting it with the more common understanding of pluralism.

This form of pluralism understands plurality as a multiplicity of entities residing in an existing network of social relations. These entities can be included into the network, whereby the plurality grows, or they can be excluded, whereby the plurality is limited. Pluralism in this sense reads plurality along the dichotomous lines of inclusion and exclusion. The recognition arguments that were explored in the previous chapters reflect this position, where recognition or inclusion featured as the remedy to exclusion. By viewing exclusion and inclusion in a dichotomous manner, however, narratives of exclusion predetermine that which can be included. In this sense, the exclusion narratives prestructure the inclusion possibilities. As long as inclusion or recognition is the answer to exclusion, any critique of exclusion will amount to an argument for inclusion or recognition featuring within the same frame of reference, and will thereby reproduce this particular frame of reference. From the point of view of this pluralism, a plurality of more or less stable units in a pluralistic whole can be settled, sanctioned and secured by different institutions, regulations, arguments for recognition, or distributions of rights.

However, as David Campbell has demonstrated and Maja Zehfuss has argued, by starting from the assumption of pre-established, separate entities inhabiting these social networks, this form of pluralism – and the associated forms of tolerance and liberalism – underplays the importance of the processes through which these very entities have come into being. “The fascinating, subtle creation of the subject … is

334 Biersteker 1989: 264
not part of an analysis which starts by postulating subjects. Hence, political questions, for instance about how subjects come to be in the first place, are ignored.339 ... I worry that questions which concern these starting points are not asked”.340 Since the focus in pluralism is rather on the interaction of preconstituted units, without regard for the processes of their emergence, “theorists both bypassed complex and normatively freighted constitutive questions (How did the units come to be?), and naturalised and depoliticised their own role within them.”341 As a result, this form of pluralism remains “unattuned to the crucial role new enactments or performances play” in generating new entities susceptible to recognition.342 It also ignores the possibilities that had not already been realized and were not yet available for recognition.

In contrast with this understanding of plurality as pluralism, post-positivist work emphasized a different kind of plurality, one that I will refer to as “pluralization”. On the surface, this call for plurality is very similar to the previous pluralist one, with many of its tenets following Judith Butler’s point that “[t]he task, it seems, is to compel the terms of modernity to embrace those they have traditionally excluded.”343 Through “embracing” the excluded, “difference” and “alterity” would not only be “celebrated” but “those forces that efface, erase or suppress alterity [would be] actively oppose[d] and resist[ed]”.344 This pluralizing modus seeks “the active affirmation of alterity.”345

Now, if pluralization seeks to affirm alterity, or embrace difference, how does it differ from the former pluralist versions of this argument? One possible entry point is the understanding of the exclusion problematic itself. As distinct from the view of pluralism, pluralization does not understand exclusion and inclusion in a

340 Zehfuss 2002: 35.
341 Barder/Levine 2012: 596.
344 Campbell 1998: 5.
345 Campbell 2005: 133; see also Walker/Ashley 1990.
dichotomous manner, that is, as opposite locations along a line of increasing social and political justice. Rather, exclusion is a tragic necessity for all human endeavors. It is necessary, since it is the consequence of a boundary drawing process involved in every kind of human action. Boundaries are drawn around concepts in order to make them intelligible, between inside and outside, or between the self and others. It is here that I locate the difference between the two types of responses to the critique of exclusion. On the one hand, in the approach described in the previous section on pluralism, exclusion is the opposite of inclusion, and inclusion, therefore, is the answer to the exclusion problematic. A contrario, the approach I will describe in the following paragraphs views exclusion not as the absolute opposite of inclusion, but as something inevitable to any kind of human endeavor. This only becomes problematic once the boundary between the excluded and included is naturalized, when this very boundary becomes normatively laden and the mutually constitutive relationship between the “inside and outside” is no longer acknowledged. That is, it becomes a problem once a dichotomy between the excluded and the included leads to a detachment of the one from the other, when the “interdependency” is forgotten and the boundary is naturalized or reified.

This detachment comes from the process of forgetting that the boundaries are the effect of social and political negotiations and struggles, and not an ontological constant or natural divide, or forgetting about the interdependency between the seemingly dichotomous components. This detachment is a necessary condition for the possibility of naturalizing the separation and treating each part as a given. The pluralization response to exclusion is, therefore, not to be found within the framework of the exclusion/inclusion dichotomy, but as a more complex web of relationships and dependencies. While pluralism seeks to protect the plural form and sees the conditions of plurality in protective institutions or regulations,

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346 Abbott has described boundaries as seemingly coherent line made up out of individual dots. (Abbott 1995); Walker 1993.
347 Honneth 2008
348 See here discussions on the dangers of reification as forgetting Adorno 1964; Honneth 2008; Levine 2012.
pluralization seeks a plurality through strengthening the conditions for plurality, that is, in questioning preconditions for exclusionary structures, namely naturalized boundaries.

To sum up, from the perspective of pluralization, exclusion becomes problematic once boundaries become fixed and normatively laden, a dichotomous either/or-relationship becomes stabilized and the interdependency across the border is not acknowledged. The quest of pluralization is deeply intertwined with the questioning of that which is settled, an analysis of boundary drawing and boundary stabilization. It feeds on a critical genealogical denaturalization of settled knowledge. That is, it is based upon a genealogical approach, one that explores the alternatives to the present state of things and authorities. It "strives to thaw perspectives which tend to stay frozen within a particular way of life, to offer alternative accounts [of] possibilities crowded out by established regimes of thought."\textsuperscript{349}

From the pluralizing perspective, the possibility of plurality lies in this critical approach, this denaturalization, or genealogy. Pluralization opens up the possibilities for other versions of history, knowledge, truth, identities, or conceptual meanings through critical and genealogically sensitive approaches. It seeks to create conditions enabling possibilities for the formulation of alternatives, be they conceptual, ethical or identitarian. It seeks to intervene into "established modes of thought ... disturb those practices that are settled ... render as produced that which claims to be naturally emergent ... foster possibilities being foreclosed or suppressed by that which exists or is being put in place." It represents a "concern or dissatisfaction with what is settled and creates the conditions of possibility for the formulation of alternative."\textsuperscript{350}

By enabling a destabilization of settled boundaries and normalities, critique and genealogy are the conditions for plurality and the answer to exclusionary practices

\textsuperscript{349} Connolly: 1995: 28
\textsuperscript{350} Campbell 1998: 4; See also: Inayatullah/Blaney 2004.
or theories. As William Connolly states: “For it is when a genealogical sensibility is mapped onto the pluralist imagination that both perspectives achieve their highest level of attainment.”\(^{351}\) In its affirmation of plurality, this genealogically sensitive approach sees the source of exclusion in hardened, dichotomous entities, as well as settled knowledge, institutions, authorities and powers. The answer to this exclusion, therefore, is not the inclusion of more entities, but rather the softening of dichotomies, and the questioning of settled knowledge, institutions, authorities and powers.\(^{352}\) It emphasizes what Derrida has called “becoming”, which Connolly picked up on, the latter contrasting it with “being.”

**Being and Becoming**

Connolly embraces Derrida’s differentiation between being and becoming\(^{353}\), and uses this conceptual pair to differentiate between “crystallizations that persist, even as subterranean forces may accumulate within them”\(^{354}\) and a movement “from a netherworld below the register of positive acceptance, identity, legitimacy, or justice onto one or more of those registers.”\(^{355}\) Despite the somewhat nebulous characterization, the main distinction between being and becoming is one between equilibrium and emergence, or between stability and process, and this is how I will continue to use them. Becoming, in this sense, is used to describe contingent, complex, uncertain, interconnected, “messy” processes, “intermediate” and between moments of equilibria, that is, between moments of being. While the moments of being represent states of stability, they are not the states towards which the process

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\(^{351}\) Connolly 1995: 32.

\(^{352}\) Settlement, as such, was seen to depend on a suppression of deviating voices. "Regimes of truth" could never keep their status as such without annihilating its competitors’.


\(^{354}\) Connolly 2005: 121; "I agree (...) with philosophers of becoming who say that various degrees of creativity are always in play. However, I further contend (...) that various constellations have internal powers of maintenance which help to sustain them as organisms or states before the pressure of accumulation triggers a more radical process of diequilibrium and teleo-searching. This is the issue posed even by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari when they ask, 'What holds things together'? Connolly 2012: 405.

\(^{355}\) Connolly 2005: 122
of becoming strives. The “world of becoming”, as Connolly describes it, is a world in movement, but not a movement towards a distinct end.

In his emphasis on the importance of “becoming” – the “politics of becoming” in a “world of becoming” – Connolly is implying more than a principled view or description of social and political dynamics. He is not simply arguing that the world is contingent and complex. Like many other post-positivist scholars, he is also arguing for an “ethos of disturbance”, meaning that there is an ethical component to this work, which is disruptive vis-à-vis settled knowledge, boundaries and naturalized entities. This “ethos of disturbance”, however, is not simply disruptive; its aim is not simply to display the “actual” contingency of the world by forcing any stable part of it into motion. The aim of this “disturbance”, per Connolly, is, rather, to achieve a balance between becoming and being between the “politics of governance and the politics of disturbance”. However, since the becoming is “perpetually susceptible to forgetfulness” a “perpetual case [has] to be made for the renewal of democratic energies of denaturalization” of final markers. In other

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356 “World of becoming consisting of multiple force-fields with different speeds and degrees of agency (...) marked by surprising turns in time, uncanny experiences (...). Time periodically folds the new into being in a universe that is intrinsically open to an uncertain degree and in which this or that force-field flowing ‘outside’ the purview of another may abruptly introduce new pressures into it. Becoming, an open universe, multiple dimensions of the outside, all these work upon each other according to such a philosophy/creed. In a world of becoming, emergent formations are often irreducible to patterns of efficient causality, purposive time, simple probability or long cycles of recurrence (...) a philosophy of becoming calls attention to a host of messy states and processes ‘intermediate’ between subjects and objects, or better put, not readily assimilable to either prefabricated container (...) They also call into question fantasies of human mastery over a world of solids” (Connolly 2011: 70ff)

357 Connolly 1995, 1999, 2001, 2011, 2013; see also Alexander Barder and Daniel Levine’s critique of constructivist IR scholarship, seen as merely managing global politics, building of a set of predetermined concepts and understandings of a consensually constituted reality, followed by a call for disruptive theorizing and politics. They quote Adorno, saying that ‘the splinter in your eye is the best magnifying-glass’; those tools are to be valued which scatter, disrupt or disflect one’s perspective precisely because of the fact of that scattering, disrupting or diffraction. (Barder/Levine 2012: 602).


359 “there are periods of relative stability and equilibrium in most temporal zones or force-fields in a world of becoming (...) But, particularly when one mode of endurance is touched (...) moved by another moving at a different speed on another tier of chrono-time, a more dramatic change may be in the cards” (Connolly 2011: 73, italics in original).

360 Ibid.: 21.

words, since the settled being will always reign supreme over the processual becoming – since the fact is "perpetually susceptible to forgetfulness" that this being is but a settled becoming and neither natural nor necessary – the "energies" of becoming must therefore be nurtured. The aim is to achieve a balance between being and becoming in which the tension between them does not dissolve into a consensual agreement about the "way things are", letting the being merge into reification. “These tensions constitute my ideal [...] of democratic politics as an ambiguous medium of enactment and disturbance.”362 However, more than being an ideal, it is a “regulative ideal for pluralist politics itself”.363 Since the aspect of becoming is on a constant losing streak, however, Connolly sees the balancing act of being and becoming as taking place in the "active cultivation of generosity to contemporary movements of pluralization”364, or in the cultivation of an ethos of responsiveness,365 that is, in the cultivation of virtues, which “radicalize the experience of contingency”.366 So, even if the becoming’s "ethos of disruption" is not an end in and of itself, or the final stop of these denaturalizing attempts, it is a necessary means of balancing against the strength of being and keeping this being from merging into reifications through the forgetfulness of its relationship to becoming, that is, its processuality. In this sense, Connolly’s emphasis on the ethos of disturbance is a means of attaining a level of balance in the tension between being and becoming.

Approaching the question of recognition from the perspective of becoming seems to provide the genealogical sensitivity that was lacking from the prior approaches to recognition illustrated and discussed in Chapter 2. It takes issue with the identified reifying aspects of recognition by focusing on the process of emergence of the objects or agents that were to be recognized. Its emphasis on the analysis of how these objects came to be, and how they came to become intelligible to scholars of

362 Ibid.: 103.
international relations, seems to provide an answer to the critique that recognition presupposed and reproduced its objects and frameworks of knowledge. The perspective of becoming offered ways to track the emergence of the objects of recognition, to denaturalize the knowledge about them and the epistemic frameworks within which they featured. In this sense, the post-positivist approach of becoming presents itself as a viable optional approach to recognition in international relations.¹⁰⁷

I agree with Connolly regarding the problematic aspect of sidelining the interdependent relationship between being and becoming – which was also emphasized in Honneth’s work on reifications – and that their tension must be kept and nurtured rather than overcome and mastered. However, I do not agree with him

¹⁰⁷ Finding a balance between being and becoming via an ethos of disturbance, and thereby opening up the space for the formulation of alternatives to the present state all sounds good in abstracto, but what would this perspective of becoming look like, for example, within the recognition process of Pakistan described in the previous chapter? In the case of the role of the census, the perspective of becoming would illuminate the way in which this works as a “modern instrument of domination and liberation (...) a mechanism for organizing and perpetuating state power” (Foucault 1997: 2f) Or, it would highlight the ontologizing process Campbell calls “ontopolitics” by zooming in on the enumerative power of the census to shape and strengthen the perception of clearly demarcated and distinguishable religious communities without communal or individual overlaps. It would combine this power with that of the map, heavily dependent on administrative and military knowledge, which inserted these ontologized religious communities onto visible territory. Regarding the work of drawing a border, the perspective of becoming would bring to the fore the work that the refugee administration carried out in categorizing “displaced people” as “Muslims” or “non-Muslims” and how the one category of those leaving, the “evacuees”, was translated into the number of individuals of the other category that could be housed in their abandoned property, the so-called “evacuee property”. It would illuminate the way in which the evacuee property laws ended up fixing two sets of refugees – Muslim and non-Muslim – in an oppositional relationship. It would dig deeper into the role of the recovery programs of Muslim women abducted in the Punjabi region to their respective “nation”. Colonial government inscribed and shaped knowledge about “Hindu”, “Sikh” and “Muslim” identities, recognizing their salience by accounting for them in political electoral representation. The creation of an international border between these constructed but nonetheless real communities further sharpened the edges of the blurry categories that embodied them. Chatterji and Zamindar in Chapter 3 described ways in which the artificial lines drawn on a map became geopolitical realities. Through the regulation of trade, the burning of houses, murder of fishermen crossing borderline rivers, the management of refugees and their property, the projects to recover abducted women and keeping Indian Muslim state functionaries under surveillance, controlling the movement of people and property, through these, and many other, processes the meaning and scope of Muslim, and the establishment of a state founded on Islam, as a “Muslim Homeland” was transformed. The boundary drawing of partition – the official, clean, rational and democratic one, or the unofficial, messy, long and partly arbitrary one – represented the parting of ways of two “religious” communities, inscribing them and the states formed around them into the history of the international system.
that the being will always trump the becoming, leaving it in the margins of collective memory to be forgotten. Connolly had argued that since this was the case, the disruptive power of becoming must be nurtured and prioritized over the aspects of being. I do not share this assumption, but rather argue that becoming inhabits a much more central position in individual and world politics alike. I agree with Mary Douglas and David Chandler that it is the power of disorder and the experience of contingency – as aspects of becoming – that necessitate beings as instruments, controlling this contingency and the power of disorder.\textsuperscript{368}

In order to develop this line of thought, it is important to clarify the difference in my use of the terminology of being from that of reification. While being is a state of equilibrium and stability, reification is the state that knowledge arrives at when the genealogical process of its emergence is forgotten and naturalized. Beings are stabilizations of meanings, identities, concepts, and states, which are necessary for objects, agents and events to be intelligible; this is the basis upon which thinking about world politics is predicated. While being is necessary for intelligibility, reification is the sedimentation of this being as \textit{the being}, as a foundational ontology about how the world \textit{“is”}. Reification is the state I wish to avoid. Being, on the other hand, is a necessity for the intelligibility of objects and agents in world politics, and emerges through a stabilization of the process of becoming. When the relationship and the interdependency between being and the process of becoming – the genealogical sensitivity to the process of emergence – are forgotten, the knowledge and its objects and agents are reified. It is this latter reification that was identified as a part of the logic of recognition in the first part of the thesis, and it is this that I am trying to find an alternative to in this chapter. In other words, reification occurs when the relationship between being and becoming is sidelined to benefit of being as \textit{the being}. As an alternative, I am trying to find a way to maintain the tension of this relationship between being and becoming without lapsing into the domination of either, neither of being as reification, nor of becoming as constant disruption.

\textsuperscript{368} Douglas 2002(1966); Chandler 2013.
Mine is not the first attempt to compose an account where neither being nor becoming is accorded priority. Others, such as accounts on Critical Realism, New Materialism or various versions of pragmatism, practice or performativity, have sought different ways to think about their relationship. I will shortly outline these accounts before proceeding to sketch the route that I will follow in the last chapter, the approach I call *becoming recognizable*.

**Pragmatism, practice and performativity: Being as reiterated becoming**

Those scholars working on pragmatism, practices and performativity will have to forgive me for classing them together under a single heading. As I am not to extend the discussion to these variations, but will merely make use of them to illustrate a few of the many attempts to address the relationship between – what I have thus far labelled – being and becoming, I hope they will deign to be instrumentalized in this somewhat crude manner. The scholarship on pragmatism, practices and performativity has criticized the bifurcation between being and becoming as an artificial construct that wishes to protect the sanctity of the being.\(^{369}\) They have seen themselves as being equipped to build bridges between the gaps of the forces of stability and change\(^{370}\) to “help us to move … to a non-foundationalist epistemology that acknowledges the historicity of knowledge without annihilating the realism of the common world we live in”\(^{371}\) or to “escape from the epistemological deadlock” of deconstruction, by circling in on the “useful and reliable” knowledge constructed within community of practices, the moral or judicial barometer of which is

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\(^{369}\) See: Friedrich Kratochwil, Raymond Duvall, Arjun Chowdhury, and Janice Bially Mattern in the edited volume on International Practice by Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, but also empirical chapters in which Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams analyze the practices of private security companies, or Janice Gross Stein discusses the community of practice constituted by NGOs working in the field of humanitarian aid (Abrahamsen/Williams 2011; Bially Mattern 2011; Duvall/Chowdhury 2011; Stein 2011). Others, such as Patrick Morgan provide a practice-based account of the policy of deterrence and Norrin M. Ripsman of balances of power, while Richard Little discusses the British government’s response to the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s and Lene Hansen the Muhammad cartoon crisis in Denmark in 2005/06 (Hansen 2011; Little 2011; Morgan 2011; Ripsman 2011).

\(^{370}\) As well as the meaningful and the material, the rational and the practical, agencies and structures, Adler/Pouliot 2011; for a critique see Ringmar 2014.

\(^{371}\) Hamati-Ataya 2012: 291.
composed of tribunals of one’s peers, rather than being based upon a Kantian judgment of Reason.\textsuperscript{372} While rejecting the idea of a foundational “Kantian” reality or being, they do not fully accept the anti-foundational kind of rejection found in the perspective of becoming, but rather build on an image of the reality of a being as constituted through practices, performances, or other forms of practical or textual reproductions.\textsuperscript{373}

While I will not go into the controversies regarding the textual or non-textual basis for these accounts, I will point out that much of the work on performance, or performativity, refers to the work of John Austin, who argued that some statements do not simply assert a given fact, but rather bring about – performatively – the very fact they express. “To say something is to do something”.\textsuperscript{374} This understanding of performatively constituting “reality” has been developed by Jacques Derrida who diverges from Austin, whom he criticizes for underestimating the constitutive role of rupture in speech, that is, the fact that there will always remain a risk of the utterance not being able to reproduce the expected form.\textsuperscript{375} He therefore differentiates between the performative – which is creative – and the citational – which is referential and iterative. Judith Butler develops this line of thought by showing that gender is an effect of performative and iterative practices, which are never able to entirely fix their identities, and which will therefore always be open to change.\textsuperscript{376} In IR, this understanding of performativity was applied to work on state identity in the 1990s with David Campbell or Cindy Weber arguing that the identity of the state as an international actor is produced by the acts which \textit{ex post} appear as the acts of a naturally given state.\textsuperscript{377} In other words, the accounts on pragmatism, practices and performances relocated the question of being, viewing it as the

\textsuperscript{372} Friedrichs/Kratochwil 2009: 712 “This is not to deny the experience of physical reality, in whatever form. The point is rather that the assumption of ‘objective’ physical reality is inadequate as a foundation for social science (ibid. 705); Friedrichs/Kratochwil 2009; Bourdieu 2004; Wittgenstein 1953

\textsuperscript{373} Wittgenstein, Kaplan, Austin

\textsuperscript{374} Austin 1962; Austin/Urmson/Warnock 1979.

\textsuperscript{375} Derrida 1988.

\textsuperscript{376} Butler 1990; 1993.

\textsuperscript{377} Weber 1998; Campbell 1998, see also Dillon and Everart 1992.
stabilization of different modes of becoming, be these reiterations, performances or practices.

New Materialism: Assemblages of beings

Coming under the heading of New Materialism are approaches of Agent Network Theory (ANT), post-humanism, complexity theory and other labels put on a group of approaches that have devoted renewed attention to agency in social and political theorizing.\textsuperscript{378} From the critique of "liberal modernist" conceptions of the world, in which agency is seen to lie only in the human subject, the New Materialists emphasize the lack of autonomy of this human subject. Rather, agency is seen to lie in the web of relations, in complex, fluid, overlapping networks and assemblages of human and non-human elements.\textsuperscript{379} Agency is temporarily constituted by the emergent web of heterogeneous relations\textsuperscript{380}, dependent upon a network of alliances within a "shifting, heterogeneous and expansive relations field" where it is the relation that matters more than the actors themselves.\textsuperscript{381}

If we wish to continue with the terminology used thus far, these scholars also seek to find a different balance between being and becoming. While the centrality of their ontological uncertainty leaves one to assume that they are focused on the strength of the becoming, they do not "postulate a world in which everything is always in radical flux."\textsuperscript{382} Rather, the balance sought here between being and becoming sees these assemblages and networks as constituted of beings, as stabilizations that interact, clash and constitute new forms of agency. It "is the agency of 'being' which is at work beneath the world of 'becoming' ... differing modes of being clash in unpredictable ways."\textsuperscript{383} However it is a very particular understanding of being. As

\textsuperscript{379} Bennett 2010; Chandler 2013.
\textsuperscript{380} Law 2009: 71.
\textsuperscript{381} Barry 2013.
\textsuperscript{382} Connolly 2012: 401.
\textsuperscript{383} Chandler 2013: 528.
David Chandler puts it “what is key to the understanding of being at stake here is that it is not determinable beforehand, it is not isolatable as an inner essence, it is being that is determinate only in that particular assemblage or at the particular moment of intersection.” In these assemblages, beings are interacting and changing each other, rather than being changed – or constituted for that matter – by any autonomous human agent. The understanding of being in this sense is similar to the accounts of practices and performances, in that it is non-foundational. However, differing from the previous account is the emphasis on the multiplicity of beings necessary to create the networks and assemblages. In fact, as Chandler continues, the “creativity of new material or post-human approaches stems from the attention to a great range of ‘being’, enlarging the number of actors and actants and their traces, connections and mediations.”

A balance between being and becoming is therefore emergent through the complex actions and interactions of numerous agential assemblages.

Critical Realism: Being as the condition for any process of becoming

A still different approach to the relationship between being and becoming has been proposed by work on “Critical Realism”. Here, the anti-foundational aspects of becoming are acknowledged, but not in the way in which New Materialism embraced and built a being around this ontological insecurity. Rather, as Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight have argued, Critical Realism takes the existence of an underlying reality as a condition of possibility for events and perceived and/or experienced phenomena. In this sense, the aspect of becoming is acknowledged as the way in which social ontologies are constructed. However, the very condition of becoming and the possibility of multiple interpretations of reality, are dependent upon one underlying reality. “Ontologically, if discourses do construct their own objects, then what constructed the discourses themselves? ... Even the term

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386 Patomäki/Wight 2001: 223.
construction, ... implies a set of materials, whether social or natural, out of which this so-called reality is constructed and which have to exist prior to the construction. An underlying reality, or being, is the very condition of possibility for all kinds of constructions or constitutive processes of becoming. Differing from the two previous accounts, where being appeared as a stabilization of becoming, the Critical Realists emphasize the way in which becoming depends upon an underlying being. Otherwise, becoming would have no place to start from, no pieces from which to create constructions, and no material from which to construct the constitutively working discourses.

These different approaches have tried to find other ways of thinking about the relationship between being and becoming than those offered by more common Kantian traditions or the post-positivist rejection thereof. In the final part of this chapter, I will outline the alternative that I wish to argue for.

**Becoming recognizable: Beyond recognition and beyond critique**

"[T]he impossibility of a universal ground does not eliminate its need: it just transforms the ground into an empty place which can be partially filled in a variety of ways (the strategies of this filling is what politics is all about)." (Ernesto Laclau, 1995: 158).

'Politics is the terrain of competing ontologies'"(Colin Wight 2006:2).

These quotes by Ernesto Laclau and Colin Wight illustrate the basic idea of the alternative that I wish to explore in these last paragraphs. The perspective of becoming had argued for the “impossibility of a universal ground”, and opened itself up for alternatives to settled knowledge, which had claimed the necessity of this ground(ing). The becoming opened up space which could be “filled” with a variety of beings, in a variety of ways, letting their individual truth-claims balance each other,
chastening “identitarian thinking” and thereby avoiding a reification of agents and objects, concepts and identities. Allow me to explain this process step-by-step.

Post-positivism allowed us a focus on how something becomes recognizable insofar as it closely follows the emergence of something as intelligible. It asks how something becomes recognizable, but also, moving further, asks how the possibility of becoming recognizable depends upon the epistemic system within which the recognition features. While arguing that recognition has a reproductive momentum vis-à-vis this epistemic framework – recalling Butler’s point that only that which is recognizable can be recognized – I also asked how this very framework of knowledge is changed through the newly recognized agents, concepts, identities and objects. In this sense, how does the process of becoming recognizable influence the epistemic systems and the possibilities of – yet others – becoming recognizable within them? My interest in recognition focusses on how an object becomes recognizable, but also how this recognition changes the framework within which recognition features. The question that remains, in this sense, is therefore: how can we maintain sensitivity toward novel forms of existence, of agency, or concepts without forging them into the intelligibility – the recognizability – of current cognitive or epistemic systems? How can we unlock the language of emergence without forcing it into the straightjacket of predetermined grammar?

As we saw above, Connolly suggested for this an “ethos of responsiveness”, that is, a constant nurturing of the denaturalizing qualities of different systems, practices and discourses, while Innana Hamati-Ataya has argued for an expanded reflexivity of, and in, IR scholarship itself. Acknowledging both these forms of calls, I will pick up on an argument made recently by Daniel Levine. In his work on “Recovering Interntional Relations” he also argued for nurturing a form of reflexivity, what he calls a “sustainable critique”, meaning a change in the conduct of IR theorists, to include a greater degree of pluralism in perspectives, similar to a Nietzschean perspectivism, what he calls building up a “constellation” of reified perspectives on a particular question, event or issue.
To Levine, critical scholarship has been of great importance to international scholarship. However, critique alone does not have the ability to sustain itself, but tends to relapse into new reifications, and new naturalizations of new beings. Acknowledging the problems of these reifications, he argues that, instead of attempting to rid ourselves of these sedimented beings, we, as IR scholars, should rather sustainably manage them, and in that way, sustain the critical momentum. In order to do that, Levine draws on what Theodor Adorno has called *constellations*. These constellations arrange “multiple perspectives around a particular event or cluster of events in world politics for the specific purpose of managing reifications. … The aim is to construct polyvocal and highly pluralist narratives. Individual paradigms are understood to function like snapshots or sonar soundings: a means by which preexisting political-social-normative sensibilities are stretched and fitted onto a complex, indeterminate, vital world.” 388 Through these constellations, identitarian thinking in international relations theory can be chastened, and the dangers of reification avoided.

Levine addresses the shortcomings of critique in international relations as a loss of momentum. Critical attempts in IR so far – innovative work by Barry Buzan, Chris Brown, David Baldwin, Stefano Guzzini, Jef Huysmans, Jens Bartelson, etc. – have debunked individual reifications, but have not taken issue with the deeper underlying problem at stake. The problem is, Levine points out, not the reifications as such. “All knowledge is predicated on reifications”. 389 In order to create practical knowledge, it is necessary to simplify and reduce the complexity of the world. Yet with this simplification, one risks naturalizing ontological assumptions of certain “fact-value traditions”. 390 Reifications occur when this step of reduction is forgotten and the simplifications are taken to be correspondent with reality. “Theory, it would

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388 Levine 2012: 101f.
389 Levine 2012: 38.
390 Levine 2013: 17.
seem, can live neither with reification nor without it.” The challenge for Levine is therefore to retain a balance between the need for reifications on the one hand, and the danger of naturalizing the ontological assumption of the reifications on the other. Similarly to Connolly’s account above, he seeks a balance between the necessity of stabilizations – what he calls reifications – and the critique of the naturalization of these stabilizations. Critical IR has thus far unveiled naturalizing tendencies, but it overlooked how scholars and practitioners depended upon reifications. The task can therefore not be to unveil individual reifications or beings, but to seek a more “sustainable” solution.

Thinking and the creation of practical knowledge can never escape reifications. Therefore, Levine argues, we must devise a way to work with them, while maintaining an awareness of the fact that they are reductions and simplifications. Levine seeks a way to balance the need for reification with the danger of forgetting the fact that reifications are not natural. He frames his argument in the terminology of reifications alone. In my reading of him, I make the distinction between being and reification, with being referring to the stabilization of knowledge necessary for the intelligibility of objects and agents and the naturalization of these stabilizations as reifications. In the terms of this chapter so far, Levine’s argument would therefore run approximately thus: the beings cannot be eradicated, but the acceptance of their presence must come with a reflection on fact that they are simplifications and reductions of their own becoming. That is, instead of an ad hoc critique of an individual concept, norm, or identity, a “sustainable critique is needed”.

Similar to the position of Connolly, Levine sees the becoming as on a constant losing streak, and notes that critique has created an opportunity to undermine the strength

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391 Levine 2013: 17.
392 Levine 2013: 53; A similar point is made by Hutchings “This insecurity is best summed up as a capacity for constant theoretical self-reflection in which the vulnerability of the conditions of possibility of critique is acknowledged even as its claim to authoritative judgment is made” (Hutchings 2000: 87). Also “Critique is premised on the impossibility of a definitive answer to the conditions of its own possibility and can only content itself with the acknowledgment of the revisability of any grounds on which its specific claims are based” (ibid.: 90).
of the being, to the advantage of the becoming. Connolly’s answer to strengthen the perennially losing side of the becoming was to nurture an ethos – of generosity, of engagement, and of disruption. Similarly, Levine looks to nurture an affective-intellectual disposition and a philosophical-normative sensitivity, in short, an ethos of chastened reason. "Chastened reason points theorists toward seeking tools by which to enhance and preserve sensitivity to reification in its encounter with world politics."\(^{393}\) Rather than trying to overcome them, Levine wants to "sustainably manage\(/\) reification: accepting its centrality to conceptual thinking and actively devising tactics and practices by which to remember its effects and contain them."\(^{394}\) In order to do this, Levine turns to Theodor Adorno’s constellation, which embodies an attempt to balance reifications against each other, not in order to achieve a consensus between conflicting perspectives, but to allow for the reifications of each perspective to counterbalance those of others. It aims at retaining the conflict and tension, thus "chasten[ing]" the reason that is drawing on this constellation. “In practice that means cultivate a hermeneutic or curatorial … disposition that takes up a variety of affects as it weaves together stories of world politics”.\(^{395}\)

Adorno himself described his constellation as a “juxtaposed, rather than integrated cluster of changing elements that resist reduction to a common demoninator, essential core, or generative first principle.” \(^{396}\) When Levine applies it to international relations, it is to describe the arrangement of “multiple perspectives around a particular event or cluster of events in world politics for the specific purpose of managing reifications. … The aim is to construct polyvocal and highly pluralist narratives.”\(^{397}\) Levine proposes two ways of integrating Adorno’s work into IR scholarship. “The first step lies in … identifying key ways in which identitarian

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\(^{393}\) Levine 2012: 34.  
\(^{394}\) ibid. 29.  
\(^{395}\) ibid. 228  
\(^{396}\) cited in Bernstein 1992: 8; See also Jay 1984; Levine 2012.  
\(^{397}\) Levine 2012: 101f.
thinking moves to conflate concepts and real-world things”. Now, on the one hand, concepts allow theorists to separate phenomena, events, or issues from an otherwise undifferentiated continuum of an interrelated world. They are necessary instruments of intelligible communication. On the other hand, concepts subsume the particular under the general, and force differences into one unitary system of thought, one “truth that silences all others”. Concepts tend to become conflated with the real-world things they originally aimed to describe. It is this tendency Adorno calls identitarian.

Further, similarly to the work undertaken by aesthetic IR, it aims to “engage the gap that inevitably opens up between a form of representation and the object it seeks to represent.”

This “chastening” of identitarian thinking falls within the category of non-identity in the negative dialectic of Adorno. Thus, for Levine, the “second step (of research) lies in developing a constellation of methodological paradigms that keep those various forms of non-identity in view”. The aim of such counter-balancing is to "continuously estrange concepts from the world they mean to describe: continually chastening reason by disrupting its identitarian tendencies and thus checking them ...

... this process of estrangement [called] non-identity ... Theorists are positively obliged to engage in a negative mode of thinking". For Adorno, refusing simple categorization was the only way of avoiding the danger of reification and the distancing and forgetting of the human suffering inherent in (world) politics that accompanies such reductions. This does not mean the abolition of concepts or categories, but is rather a call for reflection on the reifying effects and their de-humanizing consequences.

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398 ibid. 241.
399 Bleiker 2000: 140.
400 For Adorno, there has always been identitarian tendencies, but in the late-modern era, that process of conflation have taken on potentially world-destroying dimensions. The dangers of conceptual thinking, to Adorno, became different and much more pressing "after Auschwitz and Hiroshima." (Horkheimer/Adorno 1987).
401 Bleiker 2001: 512.
403 Levine 2012: 72.
The work of the constellation is to actively intervene, in order to ensure that the “awareness is not lost to reification’s peculiar form of forgetting.” The perspective carries along much of the impetus from the approach of becoming, but without the need to rely on a single winner in the genealogical struggle of meaning. Also, its meta-positioning does not force it to detach itself from the narratives – or the narrators – of being. Rather, it aims at retaining the richness of each being, while balancing their truth claims against each other and thus avoiding identitarian conflation of one being with the being.

While Levine’s chastening takes place within the realm of IR theorizing and its methodological paradigms, I will use this idea of constellations to illustrate the approach I take to counter the reifying tendencies of recognition which I identified in Chapter 2, and to nurture genealogical sensitivity within the process of becoming recognizable. The following chapter will illustrate this approach with reference to the historiographical material that was introduced in Chapter 3. There, the parallel processes towards international recognition of the “Muslim Homeland” of Pakistan and the “Jewish National Home” of Israel were used as illustrations for the processes by which “religion” in international relations became recognizable, a perspective which would have been lost, had the religious features of these two new international actors and their path to statehood simply been recognized. In the following chapter, I will continue the illustration of how religion “became recognizable” in international relations, by focusing less on the processes by which something becomes recognizable, but more on the outcomes of these processes, that is, showing how the “beings” of the “Muslim Homeland” and the “Jewish National

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404 ibid. 110.
405 Similar movements between – instead of within or against – beings is outlined by Kojin Karatani, who prescribes a continuous movement between discourses (Karatani 2005). The repeated change of angle should not be misread as a search for a stable third position, but it “is rather in the instability and permeability of totalisation that we might discern the dynamics of forceful attempts at discursive closures.” (Svensson 2013: 4). This is also to be found within the Actor-Network literature or in the literature of the so-called “New Materiality” (Law 2009; Latour 1993; Latour and Woolgar 1986; See also Millennium Special Issue 41(3), 2013). See also Heideggerian approaches to the pluralisty of the present, for example in Chakrabarty 2000.
Home” came to be intelligible as such. With Levine’s image of the “sonar-soundings” in mind I will outline a – limited – constellation of “Muslim” and “Jewish” “beings”, with the hope that these illustrations will nurture a non-identitarian thinking regarding religion in international relations.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I continued the argumentation of the previous chapters regarding the reifying aspects of recognition, as well as the call for an approach that can nurture genealogical sensitivity vis-à-vis the process of how something becomes recognizable in international relations. I did so by tapping into post-postivist scholarship, and in particular by engaging its emphasis on the importance of questioning ontological premises and denaturalizing seemingly natural knowledge, an aspect which I termed “becoming”. While this aspect offered me a way to engage with genealogical sensitivity and track the processes of how something becomes recognizable, it tended to underestimate the dependency of the stability of knowledge for objects and agents to be intelligible, an aspect contrasting with becoming, which I termed “being”. Allowing the being to incorporate itself into naturalized knowledge, forgetting about the way it “became” what it “is” would end up reifying the being. This was the aspect of recognition that I aimed to avoid. What I pursued, instead, was a balance between being and becoming, between stabilizations of knowledge and an awareness of their non-natural character. After outlining different alternatives to this sought-for balance, I presented the alternative that I wanted to work with. This alternative built on the critical power of becoming in order to open up space for alternative knowledge, objects and agents, and then argued in favor of filling this space with a multitude of different beings, leaving the truth-claim of each being to balance out the truth-claim of the others. The hope was, in this way, to nurture the genealogical sensitivity of “non-identitarian” thinking. Thus, I aimed to present a perspective sensitive to the way new objects and agents become recognizable in international relations.
**Chapter 5: Being “Muslim Pakistan” and “Jewish Israel”: Reginald Coupland and Muhammad Zafrullah Khan**

In this final chapter, I return to the cases of Pakistan and Israel, in order to illustrate the theoretical discussion of the thesis’ last part. The last illustration – presented in Chapter 3 – demonstrated the different *processes* by which these two international actors became recognizable as a “Muslim Homeland” and a “Jewish National Home”. In contrast, this chapter wishes to illustrate the different *outcomes* of such processes, that is, the outcome of the processes by which knowledge was stabilized around Pakistan as Muslim and Israel as Jewish. While the last illustration was wide in scope, the focus of this chapter will be narrowed down to two individuals. I will trace the processes by which Muslim Pakistan and Jewish Israel become recognizable in each of their cases – that is, I will follow four processes – and outline the Muslim Pakistan and Jewish Israel that emerged from them. I had argued in the pervious chapter that by multiplying the number of these outcomes – what I called “beings” – it would be possible to create a ”truly pluralist narrative” of these two new international agents, that is, to chasten simplified, ”identitarian” thinking and thereby to counter the problematic, reifying aspects of recognition that had been identified in Chapter 2.

The first part of the thesis had argued that recognition was problematic, since it presupposed and reproduced its objects, agents and epistemic frameworks, and accorded too little attention to the process by which these emerged. I argued that recognition, in this sense, lacked genealogical sensitivity, and that, by sidelining and “forgetting” about the processes by which objects, agents and frameworks emerged,

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406 The sources of this chapter are, beyond the documents from the UN archives and partition documents used in chapter 3, mainly the writings of Zafrullah Khan and Reginald Coupland themselves. Zafrullah Khan’s speeches in the UN General Assembly and Sub-commissions are added to this.
recognition had a reifying tendency. I sought to investigate reification as the forgetfulness of the processes of emergence, of how something becomes recognizable. I asked what are the processes of becoming in international relations, that is, how do objects and agents become recognizable, and how do epistemic frameworks change in order for new agents and objects to become recognizable. Finally, I inquired how we might nurture genealogical sensitivity in the framework of recognition in order to avoid the dangers of reification. In the end of the first part, I argued that, unless these kinds of investigations are conducted into the premises upon which recognition rests, the latter is bound to remain within and reproduce its originating epistemic framework and the bias which that framework carries.

In the second part of the thesis, I sought to address these questions of reification, recognizability and genealogical sensitivity. I began by addressing “post-positivist” scholarship, due to its general skepticism to any kind of reified ontological premises concerning the way the “world is”, including the claims of recognition regarding a pre-differentiated – and differentiable – world. I termed this perspective one of “becoming”, in order to emphasize the importance placed on the process of emergence, of becoming recognizable instead of assuming a recognizable object or agent prior to recognition. This processuality reflected the genealogical sensitivity that I saw as lacking from recognition in the first part of the thesis. However, while the perspective of “becoming” raised the prospect of an analysis of the emergence of the entities of recognition, it tended to underestimate the dependency on a certain stability of these entities for them to be intelligible, a state of equilibrium that I referred to as “being”. To put it in other words, I was searching for an approach that allowed me to keep the genealogical sensitivity of the process of “becoming” while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of moments of equilibrium of “being”. “Becoming” was important in order not to let these “beings” crystallize into reifications – not naturalizing their ontological assumptions – but it was not designed to make the “beings” altogether redundant. I sought to retain the tension between being and becoming, not allowing one to dominate the other. My suggestion was to allow the perspective of “becoming” open up space for alternative
knowledge, truth, concepts, agents, et cetera, through its genealogical sensitivity, and then fill this space with a multiplicity of "beings", allowing their competing truth-claims to balance each other out, thereby hindering one "being" from becoming dominant and settling into reified knowledge. I described this as an analysis of "becoming recognizable" and thereby referred to the "becoming" as the necessary genealogical sensitivity and the "recognizable" as the "beings" without which the object, agents, identities of recognition – in the case of the thesis, "religion" – would not be intelligible to in the first place. “The existence of many such worldviews helps remind the theorist of the limits of any single one.”407 By positioning the different beings against each other, the hope was to disrupt identitarian – reified – thinking, which conflated concepts and real-world things, in my case religion in international relations. In the following sections, I will present the setting for the forthcoming analysis, and will introduce the two individuals whose life and work will provide the basis for the analysis.

**Becoming Muslim Pakistan and Jewish Israel**

Late November in 1947, the recently founded United Nations (UN) was voting on the "Palestine Question". The future of the former British Mandate had been under investigation since spring that year, and different sub-committees of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) had presented their recommendations regarding partition and the possibilities of establishing an independent "Jewish state of Israel". Although the majority proposal had been in favor of partition and Israeli independence, few believed that the proposal would be able to unite the two-thirds of the votes necessary to pass the recommendation. The Pakistani representative Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, who had led the opposition to the partition plan and Israeli independence, even spoke of it as the "mutilation of a living body".408 Against this background of opposition and expectation of failure, the

vote cast confirmed the partition plan and envisioned recognizing Israeli independence in spring 1948.

Pakistan had been recognized only a few months earlier, in August 1947, gaining its independence together with India after almost two hundred years of British rule. Together with the party of the All-India Muslim League, the same Zafrullah Khan had argued for an independent “Homeland” for British Indian Muslims in Pakistan, separated, as it were, along lines of “religious difference” from its non-Muslim Indian neighbor. During the fall of 1947, he found himself in the General Assembly of the UN arguing against the prospects of a future state with *prima facie* similar lines of demarcation, namely those between Jewish and non-Jewish communities. The borders of the future “Jewish state” had been – and would continue to be – a subject of great controversy, but the categories in which these questions were cast were those assuming a separation between Jewish and non-Jewish populations, land and property.

As I previously pointed out, the cases of Pakistan and Israel are not meant to be compared, but rather function as an illustration of two historically parallel processes of international recognition in the beginning of the decolonialization process after the Second World War. Both gained their independence through partition from their neighbors, largely according to differences in religious denomination: Pakistan was the “Muslim Homeland” that had been parted from non-Muslim India, while Israel was the “Jewish National Home” that had been carved out of its non-Jewish surroundings. This seems like a perfect illustration of the argument that we should recognize religion in international relations. Religion, one could put it, is at the very center of these partition processes, and therefore absolutely central to the creation, authorization and legitimization of new international actors. However, the thesis has thus far argued the contrary. Recognition of religion would, instead, reify it and the agents and orders arising in its name. It would depoliticize the process by which religion became recognizable, intelligible and differentiated as a clearly defined entity, and it would sideline
alternatives to it. Rather than recognizing religion in international relations, I argued for an investigation into the processes by which religion became recognizable as a differentiated and differentiable point of reference – a concept, an identity, a state – to begin with.

Reginald Coupland and Muhammad Zafrullah Khan

As Beit Professor of Imperial History at the University of Oxford, Reginald Coupland was sent to Palestine in 1936 with the Royal – “Peel” – Commission in order to investigate the underlying reasons for the recurring violence under the British Mandate. Coupland had previously studied the unification of nationalities within Britain, and national conflicts within the Empire – Canada, South Africa and as, an editor of the influential imperial journal, The Round Table, the partitioning of Ireland – a legacy which meant that he left for Palestine with a great deal of authority on the matters concerned.409 Although the report he eventually wrote for the commission was not the first to suggest a territorial solution to the Palestinian conflict, the “Peel” report was the first conclusive official British document arguing for the full partition of Palestine. Ten years later, in 1947, the report became the foundational document for the partition plan for Palestine that was adopted by the UN.410 Four years after the publication of the Peel report, in 1941, Coupland was sent to British India where he was given a similar task, being asked to investigate the prospects of constitutional change and the possibilities of partition. Despite distinct similarities in his analysis of the Palestine and Indian situations411, he rejected the latter’s claims to partition. Both in Palestine and India, Coupland was in close contact to the proponents and architects of partition to come.412

409 Coupland 1917a, 1917b, 1925.
412 During his stay in Palestine from November 1936 to January 1937, Coupland had a close dialogue with Chaim Weizmann and other representatives of the Jewish Agency (Dubnov forthcoming 33, 40).
The Pakistani representative at the UN, Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, led the opposition to the Palestine partition plan in the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), and later in the General Assembly, until its vote on November 29, 1947. Soon to be appointed the first foreign minister of the newly established state, Khan had a long track record of representative functions under the British Raj. From 1935 until 1941, he represented the Indian Muslims at the British Indian Viceroy’s Executive Council, and led the Indian delegation to the League of Nations in 1939. He presided over the Muslim League, and took part in drafting its Lahore Resolution in 1940, which proclaimed the Muslim League’s claim to Pakistan for the first time. Further, he represented the Muslim League in the Radcliffe Punjabi Boundary Commission in drawing the India-Pakistani border in the spring of 1947. Some weeks after Pakistani independence, and three weeks after granted membership to the UN, Khan led the opposition to the Palestine partition plan as chair and secretary of a Sub-Committee of the UNSCOP investigating Israel’s claims to independence.

In the following section, I will analyze Coupland and Khan’s parts in the process of ensuring that the “Muslim Homeland” of Pakistan and the “Jewish National Home” of Israel became recognizable as such. In the vocabulary used thus far, an attempt has been made to describe the becoming of two versions of two “beings” of religion – Muslim and Jewish – in order to allow their truth-claims balance each other. I will approach Coupland through his writing of the Peel report on Palestine in 1936/37 and his work on India in 1941, published 1942/43. Khan is read through his work on the Indian Boundary Commission in 1947 and in the UNSCOP Committee on Palestine later the same year.

While it is unclear as to Weizmann’s influence over the report’s final form, the intimate contact between the two men and Weizmann’s heavy lobbying in London would have helped reassure Coupland of the desirability of partition (Weizmann to W. Baer, Zurich, 27 June 1937, Letters and Papers, vol. XVIII, 124-5; Sinanglou 2010: 126; Fraser 1988: 665).
Reginald Coupland, Palestine and the Peel commission

The Palestine Royal – “Peel” – commission had been sent out to analyze the escalation in violence in Palestine and, as an extension of this, the broader conflict in the Mandate that had increased in intensity over the previous years. It was a conflict between the claim of a Jewish population – which had been promised a ”National Home” in Palestine by the British in the 1917 Balfour Declaration, and later in the Mandate through the League of Nations – and an Arab population whose independence had been assured to them by the same British in return for their support in the First World War.

For Coupland, the conflict in Palestine was, at the “core of the case … political … Nor is the conflict in its essence an interracial conflict, arising from any old instinctive antipathy of Arabs towards Jews … It is, as elsewhere, the problem of insurgent nationalism”. The tensions between Arabs and Jews had emerged between conflicting national claims, and therefore, in the end, this was a political conflict. There was no doubt in his mind that it was a complicated issue – “a conflict between right and right” – one that had hardened through the persistent use of violence. It was, however, a political conflict, and as such, subject to a political solution.

While the conflict, to Coupland, was political, the groups inhabiting this conflict, were not. The Jews and the Arabs were fundamentally different. They were two different “races”, or “nations”, which had different religions and different cultures. The “culture of Arab Palestine … born as it is of Asia, it had little kinship with that of the National Home, which, though it is linked with ancient Jewish tradition, is

413 "His Majesty's Government view in favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home of the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement to the object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of exiting non-Jewish communities in Palestine" (Letter from Mr. Balfour, then Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, to Lord Rothschild, November 2, 1917, also known as the Balfour Declaration).

414 H. McMahon’s pledge to the Sheriff of Mecca, 1915/1916, original in Arabic, English version quoted in: Palestine: Legal Arguments Likely to be Advanced by Arab Representatives, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Halifax), January 1939, UK National Archives, CAB 24/282, CP 19 (39).

predominantly a culture of the West. Nowhere, indeed, is the gulf between the races more obvious.” While the roots of the Arab “race” are not further defined, the particularity of the Jewish “race” was a “historical fact”. As early as “1100 BC the Israelites … were already distinguishable from the peoples of the coast … by their peculiar religion”.417

However, while the difference between the groups was fundamental, they were not, as such, incompatible. There was no “zero-sum game” between these “nations”, “races” or “religions”. The British Commonwealth had been able to accommodate multiple national claims within one single political community, and there was, in theory, nothing that should hinder Palestine from going down that same path. In spite of the rock-hard boundaries around the groups, there was no incompatibility, as such, between them. While it “had long been obvious that the notion of a cultural ‘assimilation’ between Arab and Jew is a phantasy”418, there was nothing, in theory, standing in the way of political accommodation. The overcoming of the conflict would, therefore, amount to working across these boundaries, not modifying or questioning the boundaries themselves.

While “politics had begun to play their part in alliance with religion … "In Palestine, as elsewhere in the Moslem world, nationalism had been more political than religious".419 The same was true for the Jews, where "Zionism, in fact, is Jewish nationalism, and like nationalism elsewhere … its driving force is political rather than religious."420

Rather than arising from the incompatibility of "religions", "civilizations" or "races", the antagonism between Jews and Arabs, according to Coupland, was "a conflict

416 Ibid. 117.
417 Ibid. 2.
418 Ibid. 120.
419 Ibid. 66f.
420 Ibid. 118.
[that] had been created between two national ideals”.\textsuperscript{421} The reasons for the emerging violence were ”obvious ... the establishment of the National Home [as the] blank negation of the rights implied in the principle of national self-government [for the Arabs].” As “the National Home has grown the fear has grown with it that, if and when self-government is conceded, it may not be national in the Arab sense, but government by a Jewish majority.”\textsuperscript{422}

The conflict between the Jewish and Arab population did not arise out of a zero-sum game by two incompatible ”races”, but rather due to the competing claims of Zionist and Arab nationalisms. These claims had concretized into a hardened conflict line, and were spurred on by a fear of minority subjugation. That is, a conflict that was, in the beginning, not a zero-sum game, had been turned into one, as the claims of the respective nationalisms became seen as increasingly incompatible. The antagonism had hardened until, at the point when Coupland was writing, ”nobody ... [would] venture ... reconciliation between the Arabs and the Jews.”\textsuperscript{423} To describe what the conflict had become, Coupland drew on accounts from the ground. ”To quote the Arab delegates of 1922 again, 'Nature does not allow the creation of a spirit of cooperation between two people so different.”.\textsuperscript{424} In the end, the Peel report and Coupland stated that, a conflict that would have been possible to solve within a single state, had hardened its conflict lines to the extent that a partition along these very lines seemed to be the only feasible response to the constant violence.\textsuperscript{425}

Although partition seemed inevitable in the case of Palestine, it was not unproblematic. The largest difficulty was the minorities left on each side of the new border. “The existence of these minorities clearly constitutes the most serious hindrance to the smooth and successful operation of Partition. The 'Minority

\textsuperscript{421} Ibid. 61.
\textsuperscript{422} Ibid. 131.
\textsuperscript{423} Ibid. 373.
\textsuperscript{424} Cmd 1700, p. 28; Ibid. 62.
\textsuperscript{425} Peel Report 363ff.
Problem’ [was one of the] intractable products of post-war nationalism.”

Reflecting the view of this being a political conflict between essentially different "races", Coupland suggested that the minority problem could be solved by population exchange. An example could be found in the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s: "Before the operation the Greek and Turkish minorities had been a constant irritant. Now the ulcer has been clean cut out, and Greco-Turkish relations, we understand, are friendlier than they have ever been before." The "irritated" relationship between the "Greek nationals of the Orthodox religion" and the "Turkish nationals of the Moslem religion" had been solved by a clean, simple and accurate surgical operation. The medical metaphor of extracting the "ulcer" of alien minorities confirms the view of these "nations", "races" or "religions" as homogenous entities that could be plucked away for sake of the health of the larger organism. While not necessarily problematic as such, once the “ulcer” became "irritated" it needed to be removed. This "irritation" was, in itself, not inevitable, but when left to fester long enough, had to be taken care of.

In Palestine, Coupland saw an Israeli state taking shape as a political claim by an essentially homogenous Jewish group. The Jews could be measured and accounted for, referring to the estimates made in the 1931 census, and the territory, that this group had purchased until the date of partition. The recommendation of the Peel report continued to suggest an absolute halt of Jewish immigration to Arab territory until the date of partition. Once published in July 1937, the British government officially endorsed the report, but its partition proposal was undermined by the Woodhead Commission’s report a year later, which found that

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426 Peel Report: 390, my brackets.
427 Ibid. 390.
428 Ibid. 390.
429 "Seeing the intermingling of different ethnonational groups as a source of friction and a potential future war, the notion of population transfer – i.e. forced displacement of mass populations – came to be seen not only as a legitimate ‘vaccine’ but also as a ‘progressive’ solution for many of the crises taking place in Europe’s post-dynastic backyard (…) compulsory resettlement of national minorities would be organized and regulated by international treaties.” (Dubnov forthcoming: 26).
430 While homogenous in their cultural, racial and religious sense, there was no question regarding the political heterogeneity.
the Jewish state would contain an Arab minority amounting to 49 per cent of its total population.\textsuperscript{431} The initial limited impact of the report and its partition plan, however, did not undermine its authority as it featured as the blueprint for the UN’s Palestine partition plan ten year later.\textsuperscript{432}

Coupland, British India and the claim to Pakistan

Four years after the publication of the Peel report, in 1941, Coupland was sent to British India to analyze the constitutional problem in India on behalf of Nuffield College, Oxford, with which he was affiliated. His writings concerning India contain a parallel structure to that the Peel Report, giving a long survey of the history of India, before moving into the political impasse he was sent to analyze, and lastly concluding with recommendations for the future. Similarly to his position on Palestine, the conflict in British India was seen as one between competing nationalisms, and therefore presented a political problem. While in Palestine, these competing nationalisms had plunged into an irreversible conflict, Pakistani nationalism was relatively new and was therefore possible to modify. The “doctrine of Partition has been preached for so short a time that Moslem convictions about it can hardly yet have been set in an unbreakable mold”.\textsuperscript{433}

As in Palestine, these nationalisms were tied to groups who were essentially different. Coupland's work continued the logic of previous reports.\textsuperscript{434} The groups

\textsuperscript{431} Cmd. 5854; See also UN doc.: A/364: 39.
\textsuperscript{432} Arie Dubnov’s account of the intellectual history of Coupland presents the paradox in accommodating his firm belief in the need to partition Palestine with his aim for unity within the British Commonwealth. The paradox, however, disappears once viewed through a federal escatological framework, that is, an understanding that only by gaining separate nation-states would the Jews and the Arabs be able to overcome their idiosyncracies and become a part of the unity in the Commonwealth of Nations. Since the transnational and comparative thinking was influential with Coupland and many of his contemporaries, the Palestinian solution of partition should have been suggested in the Indian case as well.
\textsuperscript{433} Coupland 1943: 18; 75
\textsuperscript{434} Referring to Lord Durham’s report from 1912, Coupland quotes „I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state, I found a struggle not of principles but of races … every contest … has run its course.” (ii; 53)
were made up of “two sharply contrasted ... social systems, the ways of life and thought, they have inspired. Hinduism has its primeval roots in a land of rivers and forests, Islam in the desert.”\footnote{Coupland 1942a: 31; Coupland 1943: 16.} He went on to contrast the monotheism of Islam with the different manifestations of Hindu divinity, the simplicity of the mosque with the rich imagery of the temple, the equality of Islam with the Hindu caste system, Arabic and Persian as the classical language of the one as against the Sanskrit of the other.\footnote{Coupland 1942a: Chapter 3, see also Fraser 1988 for a more detailed analysis.} It was an analysis of Indian development, which ran very closely to the “Two Nation” theory, a theory that had become the basis of the Muslim League’s case for Pakistan a few years earlier.\footnote{Ibid.}

However, while Coupland had been rather clear regarding the political nature of the Palestinian conflict and the essential nature of the groups behind the claims in the Peel report, he was more ambivalent in the case of India. Here, the nationalisms were younger, and the rift between them not as far-reaching or long-lasting. Partition, therefore, did not seem as necessary as between Jews and Arabs but a one-state solution could – and should – be aimed for.\footnote{Ibid. 16.}

While the political conflict between Hindu and Muslim nationalisms did not seem to have sedimented itself into an unbridgeable abyss, the conflict was complicated by the way in which religion seemed to have infiltrated it. While the Jews and Arab Muslims in Palestine were fundamentally different, an accommodation of both “races” would have been possible. In India, Coupland registered a stronger influence of religion into the very core of the conflict, hindering its solution. He writes, “Not until this religious group-consciousness has been eclipsed, as it has long been in most Western countries, by a sense of allegiance to some other kind of group will Indian politics cease to be dominated by religious differences.”\footnote{Coupland 1943: 100-110.} The reference to “Muslims” – and their difference to the “non-Muslims” – represented an

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\begin{itemize}
\item Coupland 1942a: 31; Coupland 1943: 16.
\item Coupland 1942a: Chapter 3, see also Fraser 1988 for a more detailed analysis.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid. 16.
\end{itemize}
amalgamation of race, nation, culture and civilization, religion itself, and seemed to undermine rational thinking, thereby preventing a political solution to a political conflict.

What Coupland saw as a political conflict between competing nationalisms had taken on a religio-cultural color. This needed to be overcome in order to return to the political nature of the conflict and the possibility to solve it politically. It had been overcome in Europe, where it was a remnant of the past. Also, in the newer versions of nationalism growing in the rest of the Muslim world, this reference to religion no longer represented the prevailing practice. With regard to the Pakistani claim to independence through partition, Coupland wrote, "There is another point on which the ideology of Partition seems out of date. The nationalism it preaches is based on religion. It is because they are Moslems that the Moslems of India are entitled to political independence ... Yet in inverting the dictum of *Cujus regio, ejus religio*, in looking forward to creating a political nexus between Pakistan and the Moslem countries of the Middle East (...) are not the Partitionist inviting a repetition of what happened twenty years ago? If Panislamism was dead then, can it be resuscitated now?" He continues that it is in this “character of its nationalism that the doctrines of Partition seems reactionary.”

While the conflict, as in Palestine, was political, it seemed in Pakistan more muddled with “religion”. Interestingly, where Coupland analyzed the “Hindu-Moslem antagonism” he drew an analogy between the recurrent religious riots in Belfast and those in India, “the old-standing quarrel between Catholics and Protestants in Ulster” having "similar features with the Hindu-Moslem quarrel in India". However, in both cases, the conflicts "aris[e] from a difference of race, stiffened by a difference of religion". Tensions arising between Hindus and Muslims were therefore "at root a cultural conflict". However, as in the case of Palestine, this “cultural conflict

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440 Ibid. 106.
441 Coupland 1943: 15.
442 Ibid. 16.
is reinforced by political tradition. ... It is this political aspect of the feud which now dominates all else, and the reason for that is crystal clear ... Religious peace was part of the Pax Britannica. Toleration was imposed by a neutral authority. However, the birth of Indian nationalism brought politics into the picture, and inevitably, almost automatically, Hindu-Moslem antagonism grew with its growth ... it adopted from the outset the democratic ideology of the West. Crudely interpreted, democracy means the rule of the majority, and Indian Moslems were well aware that they numbered rather less than one-quarter of the Indian people.” The essentially political conflict of nationalism had taken on the color and the complications of the racial, religious, cultural differences prevailing within the Indian subcontinent.

The minority question was, according to Coupland, inherent to nationalism. Further, as the Palestine and the Indian conflict were conflicts between nationalisms, it was only natural that the problem of minorities would emerge. The claims for Pakistan as a “Muslim Homeland“ were therefore not simply interpreted to be claimed in respect of a “Muslim nation", but rather in respect of a minority in fear of subjugation under the “rule of the Hindu Raj", amplified by the Indian National Congress’ “unitarian“ and “totalitarian“ tendencies. While the Palestinian solution to the minority problem would be achieved by a surgical clean-cut population exchange, the fear of the Indian Muslim minority and the connected national aspirations would, from Coupland’s perspective, have been able to be accommodated in a single Indian state. Not least due to the difficulties in transferring a population the size of the British Indian Muslim.

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443 Ibid. 16f.
444 There was no question about the fact that the Indian Muslims were a nation. „If a people feels itself to be a nation, it is one. And that most Indian Moslems or, at any rate, their leaders now feel that they are a nation is not in doubt.” (Coupland 1943a: 110). This differed from the picture of the Muslim League, with which Coupland otherwise had shared many assumptions. „Grounding itself on the principle of self-determination as enunciated by the American president Woodrow Wilson, the essence of the AIML’s (All-Indian Muslim League) demand was that by international standards Indian Muslims were not a minority but a nation entitled to exercise sovereignty over areas where they were in the majority.” (Jalal 2013: 8); see also Devji for an account on a non-territorial understanding of the Muslim and Jewish nation (Devji 2013).
In short, while the political conflict in Palestine had come too far to allow for an accommodation of the essentially different Jews and Arabs, the religiously influenced political conflict in India still had the potential to be reversed. The “Muslim” and “Jewish” beings emerging underneath the spotlight onto Coupland were essentialist; the boundaries between the being of the “Muslim” and “non-Muslim” or the “Jew” and “non-Jew” were not to be transcended. In the Jewish case, religion was included in the amalgamation of other identitarian categories such as race or culture, and was not in itself politically problematic. In the case of the Indian Muslims, religion was a problem, and unless the religious consciousness was overcome, it would continue to hinder a political solution to an essentially political problem.

Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan and the Radcliffe boundary Commission

While Coupland was still speaking within a colonial context, Muhammad Zafrullah Khan was addressing a much more profoundly international audience. As a lawyer under the British Raj, Zafrullah Khan had come to hold high representative positions for the British Indian Muslims on the Viceroy’s Executive Council, as well as for India as a whole at the League of Nations. After the British withdrawal, Zafrullah Khan represented Pakistan at the United Nations. A few weeks after his country attained membership, he was elected Chair and Secretary of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee of the Palestinian Question. The Committee had been given the task of developing a detailed plan based on a Palestinian one-state solution. Khan was thereby the head of the opposition to the Israeli independence claim.

Only a few months earlier, Khan had represented the Muslim League at the Radcliffe Boundary Commission, negotiating the future border between India and Pakistan. This Muslim League had voiced its claim to Pakistan seven years earlier, in 1940, in what has come to be known as the Lahore declaration.445 Here, Muhammad Ali

445 Jinnah 1940.
Jinnah, the head of the Muslim League, had pointed out the incompatible differences between Muslims and Hindus. These, he said, "have two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither inter-marry, nor even inter-dine. Indeed, they belong to different civilizations. Their views of this life and the life hereafter are different. The Muslims are not a minority as the word is commonly understood ... Muslims are a nation according to any definition of the term, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state."\(^{446}\) This "Two-Nation Theory" claimed that Muslims were fundamentally different from non-Muslims, that they constituted a nation of their own and, as such, had a right to an independent state.

While Khan’s demands for Pakistan were unmistakable, he did not refer to the language of two incompatible races, nations or religions in the same manner as Jinnah. Rather, once in the Radcliffe Boundary Commission, he spoke solely on the basis of Muslim majority in some regions of the subcontinent.\(^{447}\) The numerical strength was to be ensured by use of the 1941 census, which, contested though it may have been, was the only viable measurement of the population. Further, Zafrullah Khan, time and again, stated that the "real reason" for partition was not the incompatibility of nations or races, or civilizations for that matter, but rather the economic disparity and exploitation of Muslims by Hindus and Sikhs under British rule.\(^{448}\) Therefore, as a protection from further subjugation, a Muslim “national home” was needed for the Muslim nation.

Khan, the United Nations and the opposition to Israeli independence

A few weeks after Pakistani independence, in August 1947, Khan was sent to the United Nations as its first representative. Soon, he was to lead the opposition to the partition of Palestine and the independence of Israel. However, despite Khan’s own

\(^{446}\) Reprinted in Gwyer and Appadorai:441ff.
\(^{447}\) Partition of the Punjab (Sadullah 1983): 254ff.
\(^{448}\) Partition of the Punjab (Sadullah 1983): 405.
caution in arguing for Pakistan on the basis of the rights of a “Muslim nation”, these had been the officially recognized claims that had been put forward as underpinning Pakistani independence. At the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question and the General Assembly, Khan’s resistance to Israeli independence was questioned. How was the Israeli claim in any way different from that of Pakistan? In which way was a Jewish National Home different from a Muslim National Home?

Responding, Khan pointed to the Pakistani Muslims’ connection to the land. While they were indigenous to their country, the Palestinian Jews were not. Khan did not accept the Jewish narrative of the ancient connection with the land of Palestine. The Jews were immigrants to Palestine. Their numbers had grown extensively during recent years, but their sheer numbers were not sufficient to legitimize a claim to political independence.450

The Palestine Question was considered as urgent due to the situation of European Jews following the Second World War. While pointing out his unquestionable sympathy for the refugees,451 Khan insisted that the question of refugees and displaced persons was separate from claims concerning the political sovereignty of Israel. Jewish immigration had begun before the war, and had been authorized and regulated by the British Mandatory Power. The Mandate had been managed by the British since the end of the First World War, and had included two sets of – possibly contradictory – pledges and promises. First, a promise had been made for Arab independence in return for support rendered to the British War effort against the Ottoman Empire and Germany.452 This promise was unclear regarding the potential inclusion or exclusion of Palestine. Then, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 had stated

449 Legal and illegal immigration to Palestine had pushed the Jewish population in from 174,600 in 1931 to 608,200 in 1946. The Arab population was estimated to have grown from 693,000 to 1,076,700 in the same time period (UNSCOP Report on Palestine A/364)

450 A/AC.14/32, Report by the Sub-Committee 2.

451 Palestinian had received almost the equivalent number of refugees as every other state combined, and had no capacity to support continued mass immigration.

British support for the creation of a "Jewish National Home". This was another promise with vague edges, since it did not clarify whether this "Home" was to emerge through statehood, or within a preexisting state.

While the representatives of the Israeli independence claim – the Jewish Agency – saw no contradiction between these pledges, but rather a clear vow for a post-mandatory Israeli state, Khan, with the representatives of Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Afghanistan, read the promise of a "Jewish National Home" as a promise for a "cultural centre"\footnote{A/AC.14/32, p. 7, Report by the Sub-Committee 2.} that provided no foundation for any kind of political claims to independence. As this "Jewish National Home" lacked a clear definition, it became a central point of disagreement. However, Khan argued that, no matter what the "National Home" actually meant, the Balfour Declaration had tied its promise to a second sentence, namely that “it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine". The promotion of this Jewish National Home could not be allowed to infringe upon the rights of the indigenous population. Further, per Khan, the Mandatory Power was also obliged to protect the Mandate from "control of the government of any foreign Power"\footnote{Article 5 of the Mandate; A/AC.14/32, p 15f, Report of the Sub-Committee 2, 11 November 1947.}. Elevating the claim of a "Jewish National Home" to the claim to a "Jewish State" was nothing short of this kind of infringement, and the claiming of control by a Foreign Power. Even if the promise of the Balfour Declaration, and later the Mandate, to establish a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine was indeed legitimate, that very Mandate would in itself not allow for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.

When Khan was asked in the Ad Hoc Committee by Chaim Weizmann, again, to clarify the difference between the right of Pakistan to independence and the Israeli claim, his differentiation was a temporal one. In contrast to the Indian Muslims, who had "already been settled in India before the matter of partition came up for"
discussion” the Jews were immigrants to Palestine. The claim of these non-indigenous immigrants did not only go against the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Mandate, Khan argued, but it went counter to the Charter of the UN. "The United Nations cannot subscribe to the principle that a racial or religious minority ... can insist upon the breaking up of a homeland or shatter the political, geographical, and economic unity of a country without the consent, and against the wishes of the majority. ... [This] constitute[s] a dangerous precedent which might be adopted by dissident elements in many states and thus become a source both of internal conflict and international disorder." The sheer number of Jews in Palestine was not in itself sufficient to generate a political right to independence. The Arab majority of the whole of Palestine disposed of the right to decide over its own fate – of self-determination – and not just a Jewish minority.

Rather than acknowledging the right of self-rule by Jewish majority areas, as he had claimed for the Muslims of Pakistan, the “national Home” of the Jews could rather be accomplished by securing the 600,000 "Jews already in Palestine ... as a minority, complete religious, cultural, linguistic, educational and social freedom within the independent State of Palestine”. Instead of granting the Jewish population a state, they would be protected in the same manner as the national minorities in any other country, that is, through the granting of a number of rights.

As in the negotiations of the Pakistani-Indian border earlier that same year, Khan used the language of “race”, “civilization”, “nation”, or “religion” very scarcely in referring to the Palestinian Jews. Much more frequent are references to the Jewish people, the Jewish minority, or simply Jews. The distinction between the Jews and the Arab “non-Jews” was not framed as fundamental in the way Coupland conceived of the situation, nor were the two groups seen, as such, as incompatible. This careful vocabulary, however, was not without reason. Had Khan emphasized the difference

455 A/AC.14/SR.7, p. 38, Ad Hoc Committee, 7 October 1947.
and the "racial", "religious" and in extension, the "national" specificity of the Jewish population, he would have prepared the ground for claims to independence on behalf of that very nation. Any similar iteration of the "Two-Nation Theory" that had constituted a foundation for the Pakistani claim to statehood, had to be avoided. The two peoples were, to Khan, not incompatible. There were "no territorial frontiers between Jews and Arabs"; there was no natural border along which an international state border could be drawn. Violence in the past had cleaved the groups apart from each other. Partition would only reify this separation and perpetuate the violence emerging from it. Partition "in the case of Palestine would amount not to the setting up of two self-contained entities, but to the dismemberment and mutilation of a living body."\textsuperscript{458} Instead of working towards strengthening the trust and deepening the relationship between two mutually politically, economically, socially dependent groups, the partition would "forcibly driv[e]... a Western wedge into the heart of the Middle East."\textsuperscript{459} Rather than solving a problematic situation, partition would contribute to its perpetuation.

\textit{Constellation of beings}

The representatives of the national movements – the Jewish Agency in Palestine and the Muslim League in India – presented Israel and Pakistan to an international audience as Jewish and Muslim Homelands in need of statehood through partition from their non-Jewish and non-Muslim neighbors. In this chapter, I sought to illustrate the way in which these references to religion in international relations became recognizable as such, by tracking the formation of two different "beings" of religion that is, the "Muslim Homeland" of Pakistan and the "Jewish National Home" of Israel. I accomplished this by analyzing the way in which the differentiation was made between the Jewish and non-Jewish, and the Muslim and the non-Muslim, respectively, by placing a "spotlight" on two contemporary players in the shaping of

\textsuperscript{458} A/AC.14/32, p. 45, Report of the Sub-Committee 2. 11 Nov. 1947.
\textsuperscript{459} A/PV.126, p.12, 126th plenary meeting of the General Assembly.
these differences, namely Reginald Coupland and Muhammad Zafrullah Khan. Both Coupland and Khan were interlocutors in the two cases; examining their work therefore presents an unusual possibility to look more carefully at the way “religion” was formed, by tracing the processes of “Muslim” Pakistan and “Jewish” Israel becoming recognizable, in a relational manner.

The religion that emerges from our examination of the work of Coupland and Zafrullah Khan is ambiguous and partly contradictory, possibly explainable through the different contexts and the different audiences to which they had to cater. Coupland still found himself within the framework of the British Empire in the midst of processes of decolonialization, upholding an image of an active Britain, participating in the process of deconstructing its Empire, instead of being its passive victim. While the UN negotiations regarding Israeli independence in 1947 build on Coupland’s Peel report, when he was writing in 1937, Coupland was located within a colonial discourse with the possibility of a multi-national state containing essentially different “races” still enduring.

A brief look at how these players constructed the “beings” of “Muslim Pakistan” and “Jewish Israel” shows that the colonial intellectual of Coupland understood these concepts as natural and essential, the Jewish “race” being differentiated by its particular religion since ancient times. While this difference was fundamental, there was not a zero-sum relationship between the Jews and their non-Jewish neighbors. While the boundaries around the Jewish “race” of Palestine and the Muslim “race” of India were clear cut and impossible to transcend through assimilation, it was possible to accommodate them within a single political community as had been done within the British Commonwealth on previous occasions. In the case of Palestine, the references to religion are melted into a single pot together with “race”, “nation” and to some extent “culture” and do not seem to cause much trouble in and of themselves. In the case of Pakistan, religion had become more clearly differentiated from “race” or “nation” and was now seen to threaten the political solution to a political conflict by pulling Pakistani nationalism back to old Pan-
Islamic ideas. Religion, in this sense, was an outdated framework, which needed to be overcome, the British Indian Muslims emancipated from their religious consciousness, as had been the case in Europe, and in most instances of Arab nationalism. The difference between Muslim and non-Muslim here refers to difference in race, nation and culture, but does not necessarily include a difference in religion. Religion, in the case of Pakistan, did not have to be part of – or should not even have been central to – Muslims and their claims to political independence.

Khan, on the other hand, mainly stayed away from essentialized categories, emphasizing time and again their contingent nature. While representing the Muslim League in the negotiation of the international border between India and Pakistan – which put forward an acclaimed “Two-Nation” Theory of fundamentally different Hindus and Muslims – he remained cautious in his use of this vocabulary. The British Indian Muslims needed a “homeland”, but more in order to escape their economic and social subjugation by the Sikhs and Hindus during British rule than due to an inherent need to territorialize Islam.

At the UN negotiations, Khan needed to balance the Pakistani claim to a Muslim National Homeland while refuting the same right to a Jewish National Homeland vis-à-vis the Palestinian Jews. He needed to argue the fact that the Jews were different from the Palestinian Arabs, but without recognizing their specific status as a nation with the right to self-determination, as the case had been for the Pakistani Muslims. Although he had been cautious of the essentialized language of different “races”, “religions” or “nations”, Pakistan had claimed independence as a Muslim Homeland due to religiously marked differences from its Indian neighbor, and he had to clarify why the Jews were not a comparable case to the Muslims. Facing the Second World War legacy, Khan could not return to the Muslims’ need for socio-economic refuge, since the Russian and European Jewish immigrants to Palestine, who would be the backbone of the new Jewish state, had every reason to seek refuge outside of their home countries following the genocide of the Holocaust. The distinction he then ended up drawing between the Indian Muslims and the Palestinian Jews on the one
hand, and the Arab non-Jews and the Palestinian Jews on the other, was that of being or not being indigenous. The temporal argument of connection to the territory – the Indian Muslims were a part of the land before partition was considered – became his main point of differentiation. As Faisal Devji has argued, this point was weak, if anything, since the Pakistani movement started in the provinces outside the future Pakistan, where the Indian Muslims were a minority. Further, in order to “consolidate” post-partition Pakistan, a population exchange of almost 15 million people had to take place, with hundred of thousands, if not millions, dying in the process, while still leaving almost 40 out of India’s 100 million Muslims outside Pakistani territory. Zafrullah Khan tried to distinguish a “Jewish minority” from a “Muslim nation” with reference to their status as peoples indigenous to the land. In the end, it was not a particularly successful venture.

During his time on the boundary commission, Khan represented the Muslim League with a clearly reified understanding of the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims. Similarly, in the UN, Khan represented the opposition to the Palestine partition and Israeli independence, a group of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan and Iraq, which was also very focused on reified distinctions between Jews and non-Jews. Although representing two bodies with a strongly reified language and understanding of the situation, Khan hardly ever adopted that language. However, while Khan’s attempts to stir this solid brew and loosen these essentialized categories remained unsuccessful Coupland’s understanding of the natural distinction between Jews and non-Jews found its way into the Peel report, and from thence, into the negotiations of the UN General Assembly, with this understanding eventually becoming authorized in international law.

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Conclusion

Reginald Coupland and Muhammad Zafrullah Khan are individual “spotlights” which I have used to illustrate the relational and international character of “religion” becoming recognizable in international relations. Their accounts are by no means comparable, and the analysis does not attempt a comparison of any kind. While Coupland was a part of the colonial apparatus, Khan embodied a part of the post-colonial independence movement. What brings them together, however, is that their accounts ended up on the table at the UN, as opposing perspectives on the same problem.

Coupland adopted the language of national – racial, religious, cultural – homogeneity, in a manner very similar to that of the national movements, and abstracted it into an analytical framework and policy recommendations. While this had made him adopt the narrative of the Jewish Agency regarding the essential nature and difference of the Jewish Nation and its right to a national Home, Zafrullah Khan had had to modify the connection between religious differences and the claims to nation-statehood in order to reconcile upholding own claim to a Muslim nation-state while refuting the Jewish one.

With this brief sketch, I tried to show the processes by which “Muslim” Pakistan and the “Jewish” state of Israel became recognizable as such. By focusing on Coupland and Khan’s versions of these two instances – these two “beings” – I can begin to conceive of a pluralist narrative of religion in international relations, hopefully contributing to chastening a thinking that conflates the concepts – of religion, either Muslim or Jewish – with the “real-world” versions thereof. They are a part of conceptual, national, international, identitarian, cultural and minoritarian politics. Simply recognizing religion would mean abstracting it into an analytical category, thereby detaching it from the context from which it evolved and sidelining the struggles, chances and processes behind it. It would sideline the politics of conceptual demarcation, the politics of recognition, and the politics of religion. It
would mean taking the “winners” of the genealogical battle at face value, and thereby reifying the end product, that is, the religious marker in Pakistani and Israeli international agency. However, if the borderlines of new international actors are to follow the lines of “religious” boundaries – Muslim and non-Muslim or Jew and non-Jew – this boundary-drawing must be investigated rather than taken for granted.

The accounts of Coupland and Khan can easily be read as two opposing approaches: Coupland, an arch-imperialist unable to rid himself of his essentialized worldview of clearly bounded entities inhabiting the world, confronted with Khan, a post-positivist hero, trying his best to denaturalize the hardened line of the colonial heritage he was left to deal with. This is, naturally, not the picture I wanted to leave. While I cannot make any judgments regarding the motives, interests or fears of the two men, nor do I claim to explain their arguments or actions, I can follow their arguments. What emerges are two complex accounts of contemporary actors trying to make sense – and to some extent, to make political gains – from two seemingly separate, yet connected, situations in the midst of a changing international system, both deeply entrenched in a violent history and destined for an even more violent future to come.
Conclusion

"Political differences, differences conditioned by political inequality, economic exploitation, and so on, are naturalized and neutralized into cultural differences, different ways of life, which are something given, something that cannot be overcome, but must be merely tolerated. To this, of course, one should answer in Benjaminian terms: from culturalization of politics to politicization of culture." 461

This thesis has been about recognition. More precisely, it has been about recognition and religion in international relations. Despite claims to the contrary, religion has (re-)emerged as a central reference point in international relations. It frames the claims to sovereignty by Syrian and Iraqi armed forces seeking to redraw the map of the Middle East. It authorizes local leaders in “nation-building” or “democracy-promoting” projects in Sudan, Burma and China. It marks the borders of legality in the changing Egyptian political landscape and the highest political authority of the transforming Iranian society. Religion seems omnipresent, and its importance for international relations is beyond doubt. Besides featuring in everyday international affairs, religion was argued to lie at the very center of the constitution of the current, Westphalian, international order of sovereign states emerging as a direct consequence of Protestant challenges to Catholic profane and ecclesiastical authority. “No Reformation, no Westphalia”, Daniel Philpott stated. Alternatively, responding to current challenges to the claim of the “secular neutrality” of liberal democracy, post-secular, Habermasian, alternatives argue for a more differentiated and inclusive – international – government recognizing religion in public discourse.

In this thesis, I started from these claims for the need to recognize religion in international relations, and argued that this is not as unproblematic as it seems. “Religion” didn’t simply sit around waiting to be recognized. I analyzed the work by

three international scholars and their arguments for the recognition of religion, and concluded that they did not reflect upon what it was they wanted to have recognized. None paid attention to the way in which the “religion” for which they sought recognition had emerged as a differentiated – and differentiable – entity, ready to shoulder the weight of recognition. What religion “was” varied, depending on the argument that was made; it was a set of ideas (Philpott), the “living tradition” of a community (Thomas), or an epistemic treasure-chest (Barbato and Habermas). None of these scholars asked how religion had come to be recognizable as religion, nor did they reflect on the way their own arguments contributed to this process, that is, how their arguments for recognition were, in fact, constructive, or productive of that for which they sought recognition. I termed this problematic aspect as a lack of genealogical sensitivity.

Following this close reading of scholarship on religion and the recognition thereof, I engaged in a more detailed analysis of the framework of recognition itself. I pointed out that accounts such as those of Axel Honneth, Charles Taylor, and, in IR, Alexander Wendt, built their recognition arguments on the assumption that the entities of recognition – in these cases “identities” – were available prior to the recognition process itself. While acknowledging that the substance of these entities changed – the particular identities emerging through intersubjective processes between a “Self” and an “Other” – the existence of the entity itself was taken for granted. Honneth saw a “potential” identity becoming “actual” through recognition; Taylor needed a benchmark against which he could estimate the damage of misrecognition; and Wendt needed pre-differentiated “Selves” overcoming their differences and merging into an “Us” of the World State. These recognition arguments presupposed a differentiated social ontology, assuming that the agents and objects that were susceptible to recognition were differentiated and differentiable prior to recognition. Against this, I argued that the process of becoming recognizable epistemologically preceded recognition, meaning that only that which is recognizable within the current framework of knowledge can be recognized. Following from this is an argument for the investigation – rather than
the assumption – of the processes by which the entities of recognition became susceptible to be recognized, that is, how they became recognizable. The argument did not imply that the epistemological frameworks cannot change, or that the recognition of agents and objects does not have an impact on what can be “seen”, “known” or recognized, but rather argues that this change in new ranges of “visibility” is a change in recognizability, i.e. a part of the process of becoming recognizable. In this sense, struggles for recognition can be read as struggles for recognizability, a quest to change the system within which the individuals and groups find themselves. My argument countered the assumptions by scholars, such as Honneth, who needs to assume a “potential” identity to be “actualized” through recognition, and thereby implies that this “potential” identity is already recognizable. I argued against such assumptions regarding pre-differentiated, pre-existing objects and agents. Neglecting the investigation of how these objects and agents become recognizable would allow the framework of recognition to stabilize and reproduce itself and the objects and agents within it.

Building upon the argumentation of the first chapter, I continued to argue that recognition lacks genealogical sensitivity, by which I mean that it lacks attentiveness to the processes by which concepts, identities, agents, or objects emerge as differentiated and differentiable entities, ripe for recognition. I argued that this lack of genealogical sensitivity reflects a reifying tendency in recognition, that is, a particular form of forgetfulness about these processes of emergence. In the second part of the thesis, I continued to investigate means of approaching these reifying tendencies of recognition, and how a stronger genealogical sensitivity to the processes by which something becomes recognizable in international relations can be nurtured. I suggested starting from a perspective of “becoming”, in order to emphasize the importance placed upon the process of emergence, of becoming recognizable, instead of assuming the existence of a recognizable object or agent prior to recognition. This processuality reflected precisely the genealogical sensitivity I saw as lacking in recognition in the first part of the thesis. However,
while the perspective of “becoming” raised the prospect of an analysis of the emergence of the entities of recognition, it tended to underestimate the dependency upon a certain stability of these entities in order for them to be intelligible, a state of equilibrium that I referred to as “being”. In other words, I was looking for an approach that allowed me to maintain the genealogical sensitivity of the process of “becoming”, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of moments of equilibrium of “being”. “Becoming” was important, in order not to let these “beings” crystallize into reifications – thereby not naturalizing their ontological assumptions – but it was not supposed to make the “beings” altogether redundant. I sought to retain the tension between being and becoming, not allowing one to dominate the other. My suggestion was to let the perspective of “becoming” open up space for alternative knowledge, truth, concepts, agents, et cetera through its genealogical sensitivity, and then fill this space with a multiplicity of “beings”, allowing their competing truth-claims to balance each other out, thereby hindering one “being” becoming dominant and settling into reified knowledge. I described this as an analysis of “becoming recognizable” and referred to the “becoming” as the necessary genealogical sensitivity and the “recognizable” as the “beings” without which the object, agents and identities of recognition – in the case of the thesis, “religion” – would not be intelligible in the first place.

This theoretical argumentation was illustrated through the international recognition of Pakistan and Israel. The first part of the illustration – Chapter 3 – attempted to demonstrate the processes that would be assumed or taken for granted if the framework of recognition were left as it was. Here, I outlined different processes by which Pakistan had become recognizable as a “Muslim Homeland” and Israel as a “Jewish National Home”, that is, how religion had become intelligible as an internationally relevant and differentiable category, and how the “Muslim” and the “Jewish” had become recognizable points of reference, demarcating these two new international actors. I picked out three instances through which these processes could be traced. First, I looked at numbers. That meant that I tracked the way in which different uses of numbers had shaped the meaning or the “being” of
Muslim Pakistan and the Jewish state of Israel. One such example was how the categorization in the British Indian census had forced its population to identify with one single category, either Muslim, Hindu, Christian, Sikh, etc. Since the census and its categorization – a process referred to as the "enumeration of minorities" – was the ground upon which political representation was extended, the stakes increased and the authority of this very "being" was increased. Second, I showed how the claim to political representation in itself had formed what could be understood to be "Muslim" or "Jewish" international actors. In the case of Israel, the Jewish Agency had been authorized by the British Mandate to represent – Zionist and non-Zionist – Jews in questions regarding the "Homeland", while Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his Muslim League had claimed and, after an internal struggle, had gained the role of the "sole spokesman" for the British Indian Muslims. What became recognizable as "Jewish" or "Muslim" policies and claims were thus – also – dependent upon the internal politics of the power struggles for representation. The last process of becoming recognizably "religious" in these two cases was the process of border drawing. I tried to show that, both from the top-down perspective of official border-drawing commissions – Radcliffe in the case of Pakistan and Peel in the case of Israel – and from the bottom-up perspective, the drawing of boundaries was dependent upon, and produced, a particular kind of knowledge about what the border was supposed to demarcate. In the case of Pakistan, the official brief had been to separate "Muslim" from "non-Muslim" areas, property and population, while in Israel a similar distinction had been between "Jew" and "non-Jew". The aforementioned census played a great role in settling where and who these categories referred to, but so did colonial, administrative and military maps where roads, rivers and storage facilities demarcated the borders of the future "Muslim Homeland" and "Jewish state". Further, this demarcation process was also furthered by more grounded processes such as refugee administration, or the "retrieval" of "abducted" women. Simply recognizing religion in the cases of Pakistani and Israeli independence would side-line these processes of enumeration, representation and border-drawing, forgetting about the emergence of the "Muslim" and the "Jewish" as recognizable categories, and thereby reifying religion.
The second illustration continued the argument for the importance of analyzing the process of *becoming recognizable*. While the first illustratory chapter focused on tracing the processes by which religion, both Muslim and Jewish, emerged as a recognizable category, the second illustration put greater emphasis on the “beings” – Muslim or Jewish – emerging from these processes. It did so in order to show the emergence of multiple "beings" in the constellation of religion in international relations. While the first illustration was broad in range and wide in scope, this second illustration placed a much more limited focus on two individuals: the colonial intellectual Reginald Coupland and Pakistan’s UN representative and future foreign minister Muhammad Zafrullah Khan. These two men were interesting, as they constituted the opposite positions during the negotiations that led up to Indian partition and Israeli independence in the United Nations in the fall of 1947. While Coupland had been the author of the first Palestine Partition Plan – the "Peel report" – upon which the final plan was based, Khan represented the opposition to Palestinian partition and thus the independence and international recognition of the state of Israel. Not only, however, were these two men on opposing sides of history – Coupland embodying the colonial regime and its partition plan, while Khan shaped post-colonial Pakistan and rejected the partition of the former Palestine Mandate – but each played a significant role in both individual cases. Only four years after leaving Palestine with a plan for partition, Coupland was sent to British India to analyze the possibilities of constitutional change and partition there. Khan, on the other hand, had played a significant role in representing the British Indian Muslims during the British Raj and, through the Muslim League, their claim to Pakistan on the Radcliffe boundary commission. A few weeks after Pakistani independence, he was sent as its first representative to the UN where he led the opposition to the partition of Palestine. These two “spotlights”, therefore, not only give us a view on how two individuals partook in the processes of shaping the recognizability of "Muslim" Pakistan and the "Jewish state of Israel", but provide us with a much more transnational and relational perspective concerning these processes.
What emerged underneath these two "spotlights" were contradictory and ambiguous accounts of the "Muslim" and the "Jewish" "beings". An image emerged that, indeed, questioned any reified assumptions regarding religion in the context of international recognition. The "Jewish being" featured in Coupland's account as an ancient, fundamentally separate racial, national, religious and cultural entity contrasting with Khan's minimal, temporal distinction of the Jews as non-indigenous immigrants. The "Muslim being" for Coupland was as fundamental as the Jewish one, but differed in respect of religion, which, in the Jewish case played a limited role in and of itself, while in the Muslim case, the people required emancipation from their religion in order to allow for a political accommodation with the non-Muslim population. Khan’s internationally relevant Muslims were, on the other hand, mainly a socio-economic category without distinct essence to differentiate them from the non-Muslims. By illustrating the ambiguous and partly contradictory "Muslim" and "Jewish" beings, I aimed to counter the reifying tendencies in the recognition of religion that were identified in the first part of the thesis. It was an attempt to nurture a genealogical sensitivity within the recognition framework and to illustrate it on behalf of religion.

At the center of the thesis stand two set of tensions. First, the tension between the need for stabilization in order to make the world intelligible – stabilizations that I called "beings" – and the dangers of reification (as "frozen" beings) as the "naturalization" of social facts. While post-foundational work has been very successful in its attempts to denaturalize reifications, it has paid less attention to other forms of non-foundational stabilizations. I try to develop this line of thought by differentiating between reification and being and search for ways to cultivate the latter while avoiding the former. This tension – between the need for beings and the dangers of reifications – is paralleled by a second tension, namely that of recognition and subjectification, or, better, between the different aspects of subjectification. On the one hand side recognition has an empowering aspect, that of creating a subject or being constitutive of agents. On the other hand side recognition subjectifies in more problematic sense of the word, namely subordinates the recognized to the
power and the epistemic framework of the recognizer. The thesis places most its focus on the problematic aspects of recognition, that is, being subjectified rather than on the becoming a subject. The empowering aspect of recognition featured less prominently as it has been treated in length by others.

As with all academic work, the question arises regarding relevance. In which way are these arguments original? Or, hasn't post-foundational work done this before? To this I would like to clarify that this is not a straight forward post-foundational thesis. The first part of the thesis argues that there is a reifying tendency to recognition and that a genealogical sensitivity is lacking from the study of religion and recognition in IR. This is, indeed, an argument put forward by many other – post-foundational – scholars before me, even if it has had different form and focus. If the thesis would have ended there it would have been a rather typical post-foundational work, identifying a reifying tendency in recognition and asking where to go in order to nurture the genealogical sensitivity that seems missing. But the second part of the thesis continues and deepens the discussion by identifying limits to post-foundational reasoning and suggesting a different path.

While the second part continued the first part's search for a genealogical sensitive approach, it did not end with a deconstruction of religion – others have done this too. Rather, what the second part does is to restructure different kinds of post-foundational theorizing around a discussion about "being" and "becoming" and to frame my critique of recognition's reification as a stabilization of "beings". It is therefore not an argument against stabilizations as such, but against their particular reified version. Instead of deconstructing religion, I sought to reconstruct different understandings of it – different stabilized meanings or "beings" – and placing them in what Adorno called a constellation. What I saw the genealogical sensitivity doing was not only to deconstruct and critique prevailing knowledge but opening up a space for a multiplicity of stabilized meanings, or "beings", letting their individual truth claims balance each other. This was what the fifth chapter aimed at by reading Coupland and Khan. Both men were, in different ways part of the process of
recognizing Pakistan and Israel, both with a contested – and indeed contestable – usage of the terminology of religion. However, instead of leaving them after deconstructing their understandings and uses of "religion" I continued to reconstruct them and place the different "religions" in relation to each other. Rather than aiming to keep the plate clear of foundations – as post-foundational work would do – my aim was to enable a multiplicity of different foundations and in that manner work against a single "being" gaining the status of the single Being, i.e. become reified. This way I hoped to nurture the genealogical sensitivity sought in the first part and which was necessary in order to open up to those new agents, objects, subjects, frameworks that are not yet recognizable as such. The aim of this, on the other hand, was to sustain a multiple and "mutually incompatible ways of seeing." (Levine 2012: 63), i.e. a particular understanding of plurality that is not reducible to the recognition of difference.

I would argue that my account of becoming recognizable is more than an application of post-positivist scholarship to the question of recognition. While it does show ways in which the aspect of processuality – what I called becoming – is central for any account that aims at addressing reifications, it did not satisfy itself with a "critique of the recognition of religion", or a "genealogy of religion in international relations". Instead, what I sought was a balance between the processuality and the states of equilibrium – between the becoming and the being – without assuming, as Connolly and Levine have done, that the aspect of becoming is constantly in danger of being forgotten. I do not believe that the aspect of processuality, of becoming, needs to be protected from the strength of the being or from the forgetfulness that exemplified reification. Rather, I agree with Mary Douglas that the reproduction of stability – in being – is a reflection of the “potency of disorder” of everyday (international) life. In this sense, the way in which being is emphasized and prominently featured is not necessarily due to a process of forgetfulness – reification – but a mechanism of controlling the contingency that is the human condition, as well as a reduction mechanism of the complexity inherent in human
Rather than being sidelined or “forgotten”, the processuality within the aspect of becoming is constantly present. The balancing act between being and becoming is therefore not one which I seek to use in order to compensate for the strength of being; rather, it represents their inherent and constant tension. Leaving being to take over would indeed amount to reification. Allowing becoming to gain the upper hand would ignore the dependence on states of equilibrium for the intelligibility for objects, agents, events, institutions, et cetera in international affairs.

Another question that may arise concerns the ethical and political consequences of the suggested approach. As it builds on a post-positivist approach, it is susceptible to the common critique that it lacks the ability to distinguish a good “being”, “narrative” or “version of reality” from a bad one, not only in the sense of plot, characters and ending, but in a much more fundamental ethical sense. Some stories are ethically less desirable than others. Some are able to consolidate conflicting perspectives, while others are directly destructive. There cannot be an absolute equality between each “being”. Further, if all “beings” are lined up next to each other without rank or order, where does the politics of it all go? Is there not a danger of depoliticizing the recognition process? I would reject both scenarios. Neither ethics nor politics disappear from my perspective, but in order to see them, one needs to shift away from the assumption that ethics or politics require deontological grounding, that is, that judgments of right or wrong, good or bad result according to the way in which the “beings” align themselves with a particular moral content. Rather, my perspective is neither nihilistic nor depoliticizing, since it maintains the ability to judge. However, instead of judging the different “beings” on behalf of their content, that is, their correspondence to a deontological moral ground, I would argue that it is possible to judge them on the grounds of the consequences of their

See Chandler 2012 for a critical view on post-positivist Enlightenment critique, emphasizing precisely this point that they were not necessarily looking for firm foundations, but, to a greater extent, were looking to balance out contingency and certainty and transforming complexity into regularities susceptible to understanding, thereby “humanising the world”. Rather than seeking freedom as the independence from natural laws, they sought freedom in the knowledge of these laws. (Chandler 2012: 517-520).
representations of reality. Instead of asking what is the inherent ethical content of this “being”, I ask what are the political implications of constructing and representing reality in this manner. What follows from the narrative that brings about a particular image of the world? What are the consequences of these representations? It is also not de-politicizing, as the politics is relocated to the activity of filling the epistemic ground with various versions of how things are supposed to be, filling it with “beings”. In the words of Colin Wight: “Politics is the terrain of competing ontologies”.

In line with this critique, one could continue to ask where responsibility is located once the aim has been set to create a “truly pluralist narrative” by allowing a multiplicity of “beings” into the ring. If every perspective – each being – is “equalized”, who carries the responsibility for the overall picture? Who can be called upon to take responsibility for the consequences of this or that constellation of beings? My response here resonates with the previous answer. If we accept Immanuel Kant’s argument that truth and knowledge are not properties of things in the world but – since they are always filtered through the observing subject – functions in semantic systems and a reality that is not directly accessible, but rather represented, then political and ethical responsibilities stem from this representation. Such an understanding asks for the consequences of the politics involved in representing reality in this or that manner. The charges of nihilism, ethical relativism or depoliticization with regard to my approach are understandable and my response will probably not satisfy the challengers, since it assumes a different – non-deontological – ground of reasoning. However, since it puts ethics and politics into the choices made regarding the way in which one represents one's “being” – in the process of becoming recognizable – it places the burden of responsibility at the very center of each and every actor who partakes in the construction of these “beings”. Coupland’s picture of a “Muslim” being in need of emancipation is not ethically dismissible simply because it goes against the ideal of

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equality of religions, but rather due to the fact that a paternalistic image of communities or individuals will create a conflictual situation within these communities or individuals, who will eventually demand an end to paternalistic politics. Further, even if he was not the source of the ideals underlying these policies, his role in producing and reproducing this particular “Muslim being” leaves him responsible for it.

In this thesis, I argued in favor of increased attention being paid to the process of becoming recognizable in international relations. I sought to investigate how to approach the reifying tendencies that featured in the recognition framework, that is, how to approach the forgetfulness of the processes of emergence of recognition’s objects, agents and epistemic frameworks. I asked about the processes of becoming in international relations, that is, how objects and agents become recognizable and how epistemic frameworks change in order for new agents and objects to become recognizable. Finally, I asked how it would be possible to nurture genealogical sensitivity in the framework of recognition, in order to avoid the dangers of reification. In the end of the first part, I argued that, unless these kinds of investigations are conducted into the premises upon which recognition rests, it is bound to remain within, and reproduce, its originating epistemic framework and the particular bias that this framework carries. The second part attempted to prepare the ground for answering these questions and for nurturing a degree of genealogical sensitivity vis-à-vis the reifying tendencies in recognition. It did so by suggesting an approach where the multiple versions of the recognizable objects and agents – the recognizable beings – balance each other’s truth claims. The limits of the recognition framework, as well as the alternative approach of becoming recognizable were illustrated with regard to the international recognition of the “Muslim Homeland” of Pakistan and the “Jewish National Home” of Israel”, that is, by reference to religion in international relations. These historical instances of demarcation illustrate the contested, political, and processual nature of the categories relied upon by the authorities that recognized the states of Pakistan and Israel in the late 1940s. Their international recognition reified the boundaries around and between political
communities and reinstated the logic of a differentiated social ontology of "Self" and "Other". The recognition process reproduced and re-instantiated the colonial epistemological framework of differentiated and differentiable religious and cultural communities, reifying them into internationally recognized and recognizable political communities. By re-reading these two cases, my illustrations attempted to stem these reifying tendencies of this recognition with regard to "religion" in international relations.
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