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Luigi Achilli

BECOMING A MAN IN AL-WIHDAT: MASCULINE PERFORMANCES IN A PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMP IN JORDAN

Abstract
This article explores the complex interplay between masculinity and nationalism amongst Palestinians living in a refugee camp in Jordan. As the expression of either immoral behaviour or unthinking radicalism, youth masculinity in the camp is widely perceived in Jordan as a symbol of cultural and political difference and the failure of camp dwellers to embrace assimilation. However, camp dwellers' masculinities are not uniform. I argue that young men's ability to navigate and master diverse and sometimes contrasting registers of manhood enables them to reproduce a Palestinian national identity in exile while achieving socioeconomic integration in Jordan. In pursuing this argument, the article has two goals: to challenge popular stereotypes about Palestinian refugees in Jordan today; and, on a broader level, to problematize the discursive mutual dependency between nationalism and hegemonic masculinity in the study of Palestinian masculinity.

Originally set up in 1955 to host Palestinians who had fled Palestine following the establishment of the State of Israel, the refugee camp al-Wihdat is today part of Amman, the capital of Jordan.[1] Al-Wihdat's inhabitants, like many other Palestinian refugees in Jordan, enjoy full citizenship rights through an amendment to the Passport Act of 1949. Nevertheless, many people in Jordan suspect that al-Wihdat (and Palestinian refugee camps in general) is inhabited by unruly individuals incapable of integrating into Jordanian society. Local authorities, for example, describe its inhabitants—male adolescents and young men especially—as threatening and hostile "others,"[2] a depiction that feeds into pejorative popular views of the camp dwellers.

I encountered such a pejorative view in my conversation with the head of al-Wihdat's police station, from whom I was seeking approval to conduct research in the camp. As he sat in his armchair watching a popular Lebanese soap opera on a large plasma TV, he complained to me about his troubles at work:

> My job is very difficult. Here there are many sorts of crimes! . . . Everything! Drugs, stabbings, homicides, fights . . . *Everything*! [We have problems] in the summer especially, when young men get out of their houses and vent their frustrations . . . Unemployment and the poor conditions

Luigi Achilli is a Research Assistant at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (MPC), Florence, Italy; e-mail: luigi.achilli@eui.eu

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> of infrastructure aggravate the situation . . . Yes, you can say it, the camp is much worse than the surrounding areas. It is a dangerous place!

This kind of representation is echoed by the Jordanian upper class in well-off neighborhoods of West Amman, and even in poor areas of the city. “Be careful in al-Wihdat; it’s a dangerous place,” I was continuously reminded by people genuinely concerned for my safety after hearing the subject of my research.[3] “Folks from outside” (*nās min barra*), as camp dwellers call them, think of al-Wihdat and other camps in contradictory terms as places of immoral sinners and religious fanatics, as hubs for troublemakers (*mashkaljiyye)* in general.

People from the outside see youth as most dramatically exhibiting deviant behavior. A constant source of social anxiety, camp youth are seen as idlers and loafers (*dawāwīn*) who are responsible for a large share of the problems that afflict the camp—from petty crimes, such as fighting, theft, and drug dealing, to family feuds to political radicalization and Islamic fundamentalism. The alleged social marginalization and political estrangement of refugees has led some authors to question the very idea that camp dwellers—young men (*shabāb*) especially—nurture any genuine feeling of identification with the Jordanian state.[4]

These enduring stereotypes about camp dwellers are involuntarily reinforced by a specific understanding of masculinity in the scholarly literature. An established body of scholarship exists on the discursive construction of masculinity. Highlighting the fictitious character of masculinity, this scholarship has explored gender’s role in the imaginative and material production of the nation.[5] A portion of this literature deals with the relationship between gender norms and Palestinian nationalism. Drawing on the notion of “hegemonic masculinity,”[6] it has explored the performance of a style of manhood that celebrates militaristic notions of irreducible resistance and independence,[7] the anxieties emanating from the incapacity to embody this ideal of masculinity,[8] the shunning of the “feminine” within official Palestinian national discourse,[9] and the coexistence of different scripts of masculinities.[10] In a recent article on the construction of masculinity in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan, for example, Jason Hart has shown how camp dwellers “reproduce the camp as an authentic location of an exilic national community” through the instantiation of a hegemonic masculinity.[11] This ideal form of masculinity takes shape around heroic expressions of independence, bravery, and male assertiveness; it is defined in opposition to supposedly feminine characteristics, such as submissiveness and passivity.

In this article, I explore the complex interplay between masculinity and nationalism amongst Palestinian refugees living in al-Wihdat. In so doing, I challenge not only popular stereotypes about Palestinian refugees in Jordan today, but also the discursive mutual dependence between nationalism and hegemonic masculinity in the literature. The display of manly values is doubtless central to the way young men in the camp express Palestinian nationalism whilst in exile.[12] Yet I argue that, more than the performance of a hegemonic masculinity, it is the ability to downplay overt expressions of these values and to move between diverse and contrasting styles of manhood that enables the reproduction of Palestinian nationalism in exile.

When used to assess the imbrication of gender and Palestinian nationalism, the concept of hegemonic masculinity has a number of interrelated problems. First, it sets a

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standard of masculinity against which all other masculinities are measured, leading to a poor understanding of the complexities of being a Palestinian man in the camps. According to the logic of hegemonic masculinity, Palestinian men in al-Wihdat can only be interpreted as frustrated individuals, whether due to ostracism in their communities for not upholding the qualities of hegemonic masculinity or due to marginalization within broader Jordanian society, where their display of those same qualities are seen as evidence of unruliness and unwillingness to integrate.[13]

Second, the notion of hegemonic masculinity seems to imply a binary understanding of refugees' agency: while certain "hegemonic" virtues such as assertiveness and independence are associated with Palestinian nationalism and resistance to integration, "subordinate" male traits such as passivity and compliance are association with assimilation and normalization in the host country.[14] Accordingly, refugees can either assert a virulent and liminal national identity by performing a hegemonic masculinity, or pursue integration in Jordan through a subordinate masculinity.

However, living in exile in al-Wihdat, refugees continuously reproduce their allegiance to Palestinian nationalism *despite* performing attributes traditionally associated with a subordinate masculinity. As Marcia Inhorn states, the notion of hegemonic masculinity "obscures the lived reality of different forms of masculinity as *ever-changing social strategies* enacted through practice. Actual men's performances of gender are constantly in flux and may change radically as their social-physical circumstances change."[15] In the camps, young men certainly aspire to act out a hegemonic masculinity, but they are critical of those who yearn to embody such ideals exclusively, accusing them of being unable to adapt to changing circumstances in Jordan.[16] I show here that the very people who, to use Robert W. Connell's phrasing, are "complicit" in reproducing hegemonic masculinity sometimes appreciate and even seek to embody attributes that are antithetical to it.[17]

HEGEMONIC IDEALS OF MASCULINITY IN THE CAMP: FROM *DAWĀWĪN* TO *SHUYŪKH*

At first glance, paradigmatic styles of manhood in al-Wihdat parallel a local cliché that camp dwellers are inherently unruly.[18] These styles are best embodied by the figure of the *dawānjī* (pl. *dawāwīn*).[19] The word *dawānjī* shares the same root as *dīwān*, and the plural form of *dawānjī*, *dawāwīn,* is also the plural form of *dīwān*, the latter of which means the collected poetic works of an individual or a tribe. In daily speech the term *dawānjī* has come to indicate someone who boasts and brags, and who passes time telling stories and idling in the company of friends rather than working. *Dawāwīn* organize their time around forms of sociability that, according to "mainstream" attitudes in the camp, are immoral, such as consuming alcohol and drugs. They are also said to exhibit a strong appetite for women, independence, male assertiveness, and transgressive behavior. In Jordanian dialect, the word *dawānjī* is generally used to denote any kind of thug or troublemaker, regardless of origin or place of residence. However, the word also evokes a hostile attitude toward the authorities that is widely associated with "camp refugees" (*awlād al-mukhayyam*, or *mukhayyamjiyye*).

Violence is frequently said to be a distinguishing feature of masculinity in the camp. In fact, violence is etched onto the faces of *dawāwīn* in the scars stretching diagonally

122 across their checks, which are the result of cuts they inflict upon each other as reminders
123 of some past event. The association between *dawāwīn* and violence is further reinforced
124 by sensational nicknames.[20] For their unpredictable and explosive behavior, *dawāwīn*
125 earn sobriquets such as *kharṭūsh* (from *kharṭūsha*, meaning "cartridge") or *bunduqiyye*
126 (rifle).

127 *Dawāwīn* often display other distinctive features as well. These include long hair, a
128 purposefully long fingernail (on the little finger) in which they take pride, and shabby
129 dress. A *dawāwīn* can typically be seen in jeans, dirty t-shirts, and tattered tracksuits
130 that are occasionally combined with garish garments such as studded shoes or belts
131 with brash metal buckles. Tattoos are also common among the *dawāwīn*: many in the
132 camp have three points tattooed on the back of their hands between the thumb and the
133 forefinger, which supposedly symbolize the three-word sentence *kuss ukht al-ḥukūma*
134 (translated loosely as "fuck the government"). At the time of my fieldwork, being a
135 *dawānjī* was for some a source of pride. People who self-identified with the category
136 proudly displayed its associated features.[21] Still, the term *dawāwīn* carried clear negative
137 connotations, and those who complied with this ideal type enjoyed little support in or
138 outside the camp.

139 Things were different in the past. "There was a time when the *dawāwīn* were
140 *muḥtaramīn* [respectable]!" people often told me. Many of my friends in the camp
141 saw the traits associated with the *dawānjī* as the most tangible consequence of the
142 existential emptiness and socioeconomic marginalization experienced there, especially
143 among young men.[22] There was a time when Jihad—who in the 1960s spent time in an
144 Israeli prison— proudly displayed a large tattoo depicting Palestine on his right forearm.
145 By the time of my fieldwork, however, the situation had changed drastically. Jihad now
146 felt awkward about the allegiance engraved on his body: "I am not young anymore and
147 al-Wihdat is different now ... before there were a lot of *dawāwīn* in al-Wihdat, and I
148 was one of them ... But now I do not want people to think that I am a *dawānjī*."

149 In the years immediately before and after the showdown in 1970 between the Jor-
150 danian army and the PLO militias (i.e., the civil war, or Black September), *dawāwīn*
151 fitted the ideal of active resistance. Even today, in the narratives of refugees, the terms
152 *fidāʾiyīn* (guerrilla fighters) and *dawāwīn* often intersect. As long as the figure of the
153 armed fighter embodied the ideal of resistance, the *dawāwīn*'s quarrelsome spirit could
154 be admired and respected. However, Black September precipitated a dramatic change
155 of status for the *fidāʾīyīn* in Jordan, leading to their expulsion from the kingdom. The
156 center of Palestinian resistance shifted first to Lebanon, and then to the occupied ter-
157 ritories. With the Jordanian state's decimation of the *fidāʾīyīn,* on both the political
158 and military levels, the myths encircling them began to fade.[23] This—along with the
159 significant growth of so-called "revivalist" religious discourses in Jordan[24]—led to the
160 rearticulation of camp ideals of masculinity in terms of a different set of values. De-
161 void of political significance, *dawānjī* masculinity became *de facto* marginal, immoral,
162 even dangerous; shaykh masculinity, by contrast, became increasingly prominent and
163 accepted.

164 The Arabic word shaykh (pl. *shuyūkh*) has a wide range of meanings, though in the
165 camp it primarily refers to piety and Islamic knowledge. The term is applied to those
166 adopting a pious lifestyle and with broad knowledge of Islamic doctrine, regardless of
167 political affiliation (though at times it may be used to respectfully address an elderly

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man or a local leader). More pointedly, a shaykh is one who strives to live by the Prophet Muhammad's example. Although displaying a long beard, a modest haircut, and a *dishdāsha* (an ankle-length, long-sleeved garment, similar to a robe) is often sufficient to gain the appellative of shaykh, many feel that these features do not alone indicate that one is a "real" shaykh. Being a shaykh is regarded as a genuine, holistic, and all-encompassing endeavor that leads the believer to develop and sustain a God-fearing personality. In exchange for complete rigor and devotion, the man of piety achieves a life devoid of all ambivalences and inconsistencies.

The way in which religious commitment (*iltizām*) finds expression in the lives of believers varies widely—from the mere fulfillment of major religious duties, such as prayer, almsgiving, and fasting, to attempts to realize a morally and spiritually elevated self. In principle, a pious Palestinian man in the camps would not only choose the mosque over the street; the pious man would also avoid contact with the opposite sex, refrain from lying, and abstain from consuming intoxicating substances (alcohol, nicotine, hashish, and so on). Moreover, he would participate in social and political activities that promote Palestinian resistance, collect *zakat* (alms-giving) and distribute food to the poor, as well as listen to cassette tape sermons of and study the Qurʾan. In other words, his *iltizām* would find expression in a spectrum of social, political, and embodied practices all centered upon submission to God. These dispositions converge in the figure of the shaykh, who according to many of my informants in the camp is the perfect exemplar of a human being (*insān*) and of manliness (*rujūliyya*) in the modern world.[25]

The emergence of the *shaykh* model is not unique to al-Wihdat but rather is common among Muslims in the region. The widespread fascination with this style of masculinity can be explained by the increasing power of Hamas in the Occupied Territories, the concomitant loss of PLO influence,[26] and the general rise of Islamism in the Middle East.[27] In Jordan, mounting levels of religiosity are both symptomatic of, and responsible for, the growing popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that has factored significantly in the lives of male adolescents and young men in al-Wihdat. Since 1971 the Brotherhood and its political arm, the Islamic Action Front, have filled a vacuum in the camp left by the diminishing influence of the PLO's various factions. Advantaged by a special relationship with the regime at a time when all other groups and movements were repressed, the Brotherhood built an extended network of health and cultural centers, charitable societies, and youth clubs both inside and outside al-Wihdat.[28] The capillary grassroots activism of the Brotherhood—along with its campaigns against corruption and normalization with Israel, and for political inclusion and democratization—allowed it to disseminate its ideology and develop a following in order to become one of the main representative political bodies in the camp. Although it would be misleading to explain camp dwellers' masculinity through their allegiance to a singular group or movement, the Brotherhood has undoubtedly driven a growing fascination with ideals of Islamic manhood among refugees.[29] This is especially true of the youth, whose clubs—once firmly in the hands of PLO factions—have fallen under the influence of the Brotherhood.

The exhibition of transgressive behavior—once idealized as a sign of masculinity among *dawāwīn*—is no longer met with a sympathetic public among the Muslim Brothers and those who—like them—generally identify themselves as *shuyūkh*.[30]

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POTENCY, MASCULINITY, AND NATIONALISM

In a compelling article, Joseph Massad points out that the "national agent" in Palestinian nationalistic discourse articulated by the PLO is a young, muscular, and self-assertive male.[31] The hegemonic position of this kind of masculinity in the reproduction of Palestinian national identity is also evident in al-Wihdat. Although not everyone in the camp embodies the image of the hard-boiled fighter or the pious man, the youth aspire to act out these ideals of manhood. They perceive the Palestinian national predicament as being tightly connected to performances of idealized notions of manhood characterized by independence, fierceness, and potency. Indeed, it would be a mistake to see the two ideals of manhood—the *dawānjī* and the shaykh—as antithetical. Despite obvious differences between them, the shaykh has taken over the *dawānjī*'s role as a fighter and borrowed many of his virile qualities.

In the camp, the shaykh embodies a style of masculinity that is appreciated not only for its pious qualities, such as religious devotion, spirituality, and studiousness, but also for its association with male assertiveness, independence, and potency.[32] Camp dwellers perceive Islam as crucial to re-enacting hegemonic gender norms. A case in point relates to polygyny. I heard several times in the camp that there is nothing wrong with marrying two or more women so long as the man is capable of treating his wives equally. The latter, of course, demands a great deal of sexual potency: the Muslim man must be not only hypervirile, but also sexually prolific. As Inhorn points out, "the Islamic mandate to reproduce an Islamic 'multitude' encourages pronatalism within polygynous marriage, with some men producing their own small tribes of children from multiple spouses."[33] Interestingly, very few of the men whom I met in the camp are polygamous. Whether certain attributes and practices associated with hypervirility are simply narrated or actually embodied by people in the camp is irrelevant here. What is important is that certain hegemonic attributes invoke considerable fascination amongst the youth. The powerful, virile patriarch who can satisfy his wives and has fathered many children represents an ideal of physical strength and endurance. While staring at a robust, bearded man one day, a friend—whose father was a shaykh—called my attention to the man's imposing figure: "look, Luigi, you see the shaykh over there? You see his arms [mimicking the shape of the man's massive biceps]? *Shuyūkh* are strong, even stronger than *dawāwīn*." With a self-satisfied tone he went on to point out how physical strength and bravery are as important qualities for these men of faith as their pious dispositions.

To many in the camp, Islam also plays a role in reproducing ideals of militarism and heroism. When *dawāwīn* lost their appeal amongst the refugee community, the *shuyūkh* inherited the militaristic and heroic traits with which *dawāwīn* were associated. The Muslim man's duty to defend Islam when it is threatened from inside or outside made the shaykh a veritable bastion against imperialism. In al-Wihdat, the cultivation of a pious self enables these men to hold on to the ideological imperative of Palestinian nationalism. According to my interlocutors in the camp, Islam allows them to pursue meaning in the face of the broken promises of secular nationalism; it is also key to overcoming Arab national divisiveness by uniting Arab Muslims, eventually leading, it is hoped, to the eviction of the evil (*shayṭānī*) forces of Zionism and Western imperialism from Palestine. When reflecting on the possibility of political change, many camp dwellers invoke the

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example of Muslim leaders such as Salah al-Din, whose triumphant liberation of the Holy Land from the crusaders centuries ago is evidence of the power of his faith (*īmān*).[34]

This Islamic ideal of masculinity still exerts considerable fascination in al-Wihdat. Young men recall the time when their fathers fought Israelis in Jordan or in Lebanon; they are proud to have a family member who died while pursuing the goal of national liberation. One such young man is Abu ʿUmar, whose piety earned him the appellative of shaykh. When Abu ʿUmar was three years old, his father became a *shahīd* (martyr) after Israeli soldiers killed him in Lebanon. He was buried in a cemetery in Syria, where his son periodically visited him. At the time of my fieldwork, Abu ʿUmar was in his early thirties, and he was proud of his father for what he saw as his glorious death. On a few occasions, he also confessed his wish to fight for Palestine and Islam in the Occupied Territories: "I want to go to Palestine to fight. I don't know when; I only know that I will go, [and] not necessarily to kill—I can also help in other ways."

Abu ʿUmar's urge to follow in his father's footsteps was particularly evident during our two-day journey to Aqaba together. On the last leg of the journey, the road ran parallel and with great proximity to the Israeli–Jordanian border. My companion glanced with feelings of both excitement and sorrow at the nearby city of Eilat in what is today Israel. Turning his gaze away from the hills and back to the Jordanian side of the border, Abu ʿUmar frowned and said: "I can't see these mountains and do nothing. My father died for them, and I don't do anything."

Physical prowess and militarism do not encompass the full extent of shaykh masculinity. At its core is the capacity to be a virile agent of change. This capacity contrasts with a rather passive ideal of femininity according to which women should be merely the nurturers and makers of men.[35] According to this ideal, women's national role is to comply with an astringent code of modesty that includes, for example, the adoption of specific veiling practices and relegation to the familial sphere.[36] Palestinian nationalism is thus discussed in highly gendered terms. If young men see struggling against the Israeli occupiers and colonizers as a highly masculinizing deed, they perceive "resettlement" (*tawṭīn*) into the host country as a feminizing act because it indicates a passive acceptance of their political situation.

The full extent to which resettlement is considered to be indicative of an inferior masculinity was revealed to me in a conversation with Hussein, a young man I came to know during my stay in the camp. Hussein was in his early twenties when I first met him. He lived with his family in a small house in a low-income area of al-Wihdat. At the time, Hussein was studying in the university to become a high-school teacher. He was also volunteering at an educational program for orphans held in a camp youth center. During one of this program's sessions I had the chance to hear his opinion on the difference between refugees from the camp and refugees living in well-off areas of Amman. "They are all fags (*manāyik*) and whores (*sharāmīt*)," he said, referring to the descendants of the so-called "generation of 1948" (*jīl al-nakba,* or *jīl al-thamāniya wa-arbaʿīn*).[37] When I asked him what he meant by this, Hussein responded that,

> refugees from '48 are different; they are all well-off people who live in places like Jabal Amman, Shmisani, or Abdun [affluent neighborhoods in West Amman]. They don't care about Palestine, they don't live in the camps anymore, and they have money. They are like the *urduniyyīn* [Transjordanians]; there is not even a difference between them and the *yahūdī* [Jew]! Have you seen

> how their women go out in Jabal Amman? None of them is veiled! . . . Here in al-Wihdat, most of the people are refugees from 1967 [Palestinians who arrived in Jordan after the 1967 war]. We are different . . . we are more respectful of Islam and still care about Palestine!

Several aspects of Hussein's comments are particularly noteworthy. First, he seems to overlook the fact that al-Wihdat camp was actually set up to accommodate refugees from the first exodus—the "generation of 1948." Second, his statement reveals the intersection of class and gender in the performance and representation of masculinity. Al-Wihdat is located in the heart of the densely populated working-class quarters of East Amman. Although socioeconomic and power disparities exist within the camp, a larger socioeconomic and power chasm separates camp dwellers from the rich Jordanian–Palestinian upper-class living in the wealthy neighborhoods of West Amman. In his comment, Hussein links socioeconomic integration, moral disposition, and national identity in order to establish a gender difference between the refugees of 1948 and those of 1967. The former are more likely to have found a decent job over the course of almost four generations in Jordan. For this reason, they moved out of the camps and ultimately adopted what he terms an "immoral" lifestyle. In Hussein's view, the comfortable and luxurious lifestyles of these refugees have caused them to forget their origins (*aṣl*) and political struggles, rendering them unfit to represent the Palestinian national cause. Moreover, since national honor is tightly intertwined with gender and religion, their sexuality and morality are also deviant.[38] To Hussein, refugees outside the camps are "fags" and "whores." It is marginalized and pious males from the camp ("the 1967 generation") rather than rich Palestinians who best embody the Palestinian national predicament.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING DOCILE

The image of the heroic fighter does not fully exhaust the repertoire of actions and attributes associated with dominant ideals of masculinity in al-Wihdat. It is accompanied by another model predicated upon the capacity to act as a provider and a nurturer. Despite camp dwellers' harsh criticisms of those who have "abandoned" the moral and manly space of the camp to live in well-off areas of Amman, virtually all youths hope to make enough money to leave al-Wihdat one day. In fact, Hussein—the very person that drew such a sharp distinction between camp and noncamp refugees—studied at the university and worked hard as a clerk in a chic West Amman hotel in order to put himself in position to secure a good position and earn enough money to wed and leave the camp.[39] Such an aspiration has to be understood as his negotiation between ideological conviction and practical needs.

Young men's willingness to act as breadwinners is located in a moral code shared among Palestinian refugees in which family provider masculinity is a marker of respected adult status.[40] In the Palestinian case, then, the family-provider model is clearly entangled with that of the "bourgeois-in-the-making."[41] According to Massad, this "includes not only the masculine ability to launch armed struggle, but also to have a bourgeois economic status. The appeal is made in the context of the Palestinian diaspora, where most of the Palestinian bourgeoisie now lives."[42] The nationalist agent is one who pays

for the education of “his” brother and sister, takes care of “his” parents, raises “his” children, and dreams in “his” heart of returning to Palestine.[43]

For the refugees in al-Wihdat, the rising cost of living has rendered docility and compliance the only available paths to full social adulthood. In addition, since Black September, the government has discouraged overt expressions of toughness and hostility among refugees by implementing a number of measures aimed at tightening its control over the camp. In 1986, for example, the Nadi al-Wihdat passed under the control of the Ministry of Youth and Sport. Originally set up and supervised by the UNRWA, in the 1970s the club grew into a major sports club and a place of political activism. A decade later, the government widened Sumayya Street, a small alley that crossed the camp from northwest to southeast, turning it into a large two-lane road in order to allow tanks to enter.[44] A few years later, on the occasion of the outbreak of the second intifada, the government also visibly enlarged the police station located on the outskirts of the camp. Many refugees have felt the need to deemphasize certain characteristics that could be perceived as aggressive or independent.

Nader, the owner of a game room notorious in the camp for attracting *dawāwīn*, explained to me how the increasing government control is leading to the gradual normalization of al-Wihdat: “Yes! Before, there was *mafia*! Here, right here, where we sit, there was a man that controlled the whole neighborhood (*ḥāra*). I knew at least five *dawāwīn* that were living here and were hanged by the government. Now, the only mafia here is the government.” Nader’s narrative is corroborated by Assaf, a man in his thirties who, when I first met him, managed a local NGO in the camp: “Yes, many [*dawāwīn*] were arrested.” Like him, Assaf sees the normalization of the camp (i.e., its economic, political, and social integration into the city of Amman) as the result of the government’s exerting control over the territory. Another factor, in his view, has been camp dwellers’ need to find work in a context marked by ethnic discrimination and fierce competition over employment: “Now most of them [the *dawāwīn*] work. They don’t have time to fight and make problems. If you want to live in Jordan, you need a job. This is not easy for anybody. For us [people from the camp] it is even more difficult because there is racism in Jordan; nobody will ever employ you if you behave like a *dawānjī*.”

Negative stereotypes about camps and refugees further hinder camp dwellers from finding work. Many of my interlocutors admitted to having lied to their potential employers about their place of residence, claiming to live in the adjoining neighborhood of Ashrafiyya. This discrimination is particularly visible in the public sector, where “East Bankers” are usually privileged over “Palestinians.” One friend of mine in his late twenties summarizes this situation well:

> After graduating from college, I had to wait four years before finding a teaching position! Do you know how long it takes for *urduniyyīn* [Transjordanians][45] to find a place? No time—it’s straightforward! For us it is as if there is a wall beyond which you cannot go. For example, if you work for the police [*shurṭa*], you can’t have more than three stars [senior commander]. I had to wait four years before getting a place as a teacher with a salary barely enough to pay my expenses [250 dinars] . . . if we were in Palestine, it would have been different; there we would have had land, a good position, work, *wāsṭa* [relationships of patronage]! If you want to get a job here in Jordan, you need to work hard, harder than the *urduniyyīn*.

390 The most viable strategy for gaining employment is to build social connections rooted in
391 the camp but extending beyond its borders. Refugees' economic hardships largely relate
392 to *wāsṭa*, or more precisely, the lack of it. While this term can be translated literally
393 as "means" or "intermediary," here it indicates specifically the family connections and
394 relationships of patronage that are central to obtaining a job, credit, favors, and housing
395 in Jordan. The term refers to both the process of intermediation and the person who, by
396 virtue of his or her connections and reputation, provides services and connectivity.[46]
397 In Jordan, ethnic discrimination leaves Palestinian refugees with very few opportuni-
398 ties to set up the right connections. And yet building networks is extremely important.
399 For young male students enrolled in the university, for example, it can make all the
400 difference in determining whether they land a job in the future. My interlocutors saw
401 their Transjordanian peers in the university not as inimical others but as friends and
402 companions with whom they could have fun, work together, and share other aspects of
403 life. In the context of the university, *shabāb* from the camp deploy traits of masculinity
404 such as studiousness, docility, and diligence rather than hostility, aggressiveness, and
405 independence, to succeed.[47]
406 Camp dwellers not only accept aspirations and behaviors that diverge and at times even
407 contradict normative ideals of masculinity in the camp, they also embrace them. Yet these
408 different codes of masculinity do not stand in opposition to each other; they are all part of
409 how refugees manage their national predicament in the context of exile in Jordan.[48] Camp
410 dwellers see docility and compliance as essential to maintaining Palestinian nationalism
411 as a viable project. Overt displays of independence and aggressiveness devoid of rational
412 reflection can exacerbate their socioeconomic marginality. Rather than treating poverty
413 as a source of authenticity, many camp dwellers claim that being *maskīn* (poor or
414 miserable) leads people—especially young men—down a crooked path, the end point
415 of which is clear to all: entire families lacking a fatherly example and stable financial
416 support; children and adolescents lacking proper guidance and turning to the streets;
417 *shabāb* lying on the sofas of barber shops or idling on footpaths, engaging in immoral
418 activities such as cursing, smoking, watching pornography, and drinking alcohol.
419 Many of the people with whom I spoke in al-Wihdat perceived the camp's deteriorating
420 infrastructure as part of an international conspiracy to liquidate the Palestinian issue and
421 sink refugees into despair and oblivion. As a friend told me while pointing to a group of
422 children playing amidst garbage and debris piled up in the middle of a narrow alley:

> 423 I am afraid for the future! If you live in a bad environment, you grow wild; if you are poor, you
> 424 don't eat; and if you don't eat, you can't sleep. So what do you do? You think, and you get angry,
> 425 more and more, until . . . until something bad happens. This [situation of ours] is still not the lowest
> 426 point, but we are close to it. Once people get to the bottom, they will start making trouble, maybe
> 427 kill each other . . . This is what they [Israel and the USA] want! They want us to kill each other!

428 Once refugees have sunk into despair and oblivion, social uneasiness and tension among
429 them become a threat to the national cause. In this context, refugees yearn not for
430 marginality but rather to reproduce their political identity in terms of practical responsi-
431 bilities, such as securing income.[49] The otherwise negative connotation of being acquies-
432 cent and compliant acquires a positive dimension in the camp, indicating ethico-political
433 qualities such as that of *ṣumūd* (resilience or steadfastness).[50]

MANAGING COEXISTING MASCULINITIES: TROUBLE, INCONSISTENCY, AND ANXIETY

Palestinians' commitment to nation and family are not at odds with one another. Amongst the youth in al-Wihdat "breadwinner masculinity" constitutes an alternative, yet equally attractive, script of masculinity to that of the *dawāwīn* and the *shuyūkh*. Like the other ideals of masculinity in the camp, breadwinner masculinity serves to reinforce patriarchal structures and normative relations of gender domination by prioritizing the man's role as provider over the rather passive role of women in the family.

However, while the image of the "glorious fighter" sits comfortably within the hegemonic ideal of masculinity, that of the "nurturer father" does not, straddling as it does the border between the masculine and feminine domains. To be bourgeois-in-the-making in a context marked by overt discrimination against Palestinian refugees, camp dwellers have to display a form of docility that contradicts the very principles upon which the Palestinian nationalist agent is built: male assertiveness and independence. Significantly, the very attributes that make up breadwinner masculinity—nurturing and steadfastness—are often ascribed to the feminine sphere in official Palestinian nationalist discourse as well as in camp dwellers' narratives.[51] When the ideal of the patient and nurturing mother overlaps with the ideal of the stoic and providing father, the boundaries between normative ideals of masculinity and femininity get blurred: what traditionally makes a woman a woman becomes constitutive of manhood.[52]

Interestingly, these seemingly contradictory scripts of masculinity—the independent fighter and the docile breadwinner—coexist simultaneously in the lives of my informants. To today's camp dwellers, manliness necessitates an active process of thinking about the consequences of one's actions. Take, for example, the story that Anas, a young man in his mid-twenties whom I came to know for his studiousness and piety, shared with me from the time he and his friend worked as seasonal workers at a branch of Kentucky Fried Chicken in a wealthy area of Amman. One day several of their Transjordanian colleagues at work allegedly disrespected them by ordering them around, in response to which Anas and his friend beat them up soundly. Anas told me with evident self-satisfaction: "*shabāb* from the camp are different from *shabāb* living in Jabal ʿAmman and Shmisani, and Abdun! We are *mukhayyamjiyye* [camp refugees], they are like girls [*banāt*]!"

However, on another occasion, Anas chastised his friend for not being able to secure a long-term job, claiming he was lazy (*kaslān*) and too short-sighted to understand that being reliable and trustworthy is in most cases more profitable than displaying hyper-toughness and independent behavior. Because even ordinary jobs are hard to come by in Jordan, dedication and docility are essential virtues for successfully securing a decent economic position. While Anas was obviously proud of the sheer exhibition of masculine potency in the first episode he recounted, he disapproved of the unthinking display of roughness and independence:

> He is a *dawānjī*. He can't do the same job for more than a couple of weeks ... [because] he is too lazy ... [Also,] he always argues with his employers. After two weeks maximum he loses his job. [Most days] he wastes his time in the game rooms, watching girls or drinking ... if he is lucky enough to find someone to pay for his booze!

The attempt to reconcile diverse ideals of masculinity is a deeply fragile project in which men frequently experience failures, setbacks, and frustrations.

Within this framework, it is important to shed light on the relationship between the youth in the camp and the authorities. From the viewpoint of local authorities, and indeed in the popular imagination, *shabāb* in al-Wihdat embody opposition to the state. Their interactions with *shabāb* often involve disciplining, monitoring, and repression, all of which *shabāb* find humiliating and injurious. Harassment at the hands of overzealous police officers, camp dwellers told me, is so common that refugees carefully avoid passing by the massive al-Wihdat police station (*makhfar*) without their identification papers. If stopped without proper documents, they can be detained in the station until a relative or a friend comes to vouch for them.

Discrimination and stalled upward mobility, especially in the public sector, endanger camp dwellers' transition to social adulthood, which is dependent upon the capacity to provide for the family and live independently. They also exacerbate the marginalization of camp dwellers' masculinity, relegating it to a condition of liminality or negation. Negative stereotypes that accompany camp dwellers in their relationships with the broader Jordanian society further aggravate this crisis of masculinity. My interlocutors frequently complained to me about their incapacity to forge a productive masculinity by getting married, having children, and being responsible for wife and kids. Getting married is a costly affair and the ability to afford it is undermined by discrimination in the public sector. This situation has exacerbated the feeling amongst camp dwellers that they are second-class citizens. As Abu Shadi, a young man who works as a taxi driver in Amman, put it:

> We are not strangers [*ajānib*] in Jordan, but we are also not like Transjordanians [*urduniyyīn*]; we are second-class citizens [*muwāṭinīn min al-daraje al-thāniye*], even fourth class! If a Palestinian, a *nawarī* [equivalent to "gypsy"], and an Egyptian go to the *makhfar* [police station], the Palestinian will be the first to be arrested! . . . I have a friend [a Jordanian of Palestinian origin] who works as taxi driver. He was going to Aqaba with a friend of his, a Jordanian, who was driving another car. The police stopped the two cars. One [officer] asked for their passports and said to the other [police officer] "this one is fine, he is *ṭafīlī* [inhabitant of al-Tafila]."[53] They let him go and gave my friend a ticket for speeding . . . You see, Amza [pointing at his brother, who is two years his junior]? He passed the *tawjīhī* [secondary examination] with a 70. That's very good, but he didn't find a job. Transjordanians who get 50 in the *tawjīhī* find a job! And they can work in the army or in the police. Let me tell you, we are beneath the Jordanians!

If discrimination and negative stereotypes tarnish camp dwellers' chances of living a life like that of other Jordanian citizens, they also restrain any enthusiasm for male potency, political independence, and toughness. This point is evident in Jordanian filmmaker Sandra Madi's documentary *Qamar 14*, which takes place in al-Baqʿa, a large Palestinian refugee camp on the outskirts of Amman. The film depicts the real life of Faraj Darwish, a young boxing champion whose promising career came to an abrupt end upon his refusal to fight an Israeli boxer. Born and raised in al-Baqʿa, Farag, similar to many other *shabāb* in the camps, was filled with frustration due to unemployment and unfulfilled aspirations. He passed his time chatting with friends, idling at home, and playing with homing pigeons. Unlike other *shabāb* in the camps, however, there was a time when Faraj was well known and popular in the country.

In 2004, when he was twenty-one years old, Faraj won the Arab boxing champion title in Algeria, a victory that earned him the chance to meet the King of Jordan in person. Despite his accomplishment, however, in 2006 the Jordanian Boxing Federation barred the newly decorated champion from competing officially again due to his refusal to fight an Israeli boxer at an international competition in Turkey. The discriminatory ban irremediably damaged Faraj's blooming career, leaving the boxer powerless and embittered, capable neither of reaching full socioeconomic integration within the kingdom nor of becoming a virile symbol of Palestinian nationalist struggle as a boxing champion from Baqʿa.

CONCLUSION

Terms like "refugee camp" or "camp dweller community" might induce lingering assumptions about the homogeneity of models of masculinity. In Jordan, these ideal forms of masculinity are abstracted and reified—some romanticized, others "abjected,"[54] but all pointing to the camp dwellers' lack of integration despite their status as citizens. However, camp dwellers' masculinities are not uniform. In this article, I have demonstrated that it is young men's ability to move through and master diverse and sometimes contrasting registers of manhood that enables them to reproduce a Palestinian national identity in exile. In so doing, I have also exposed the utility and limitations of the notion of hegemonic masculinity in relation to camp dwellers' discourses about and performances of manliness.

Over the course of their adolescence and early adulthood, young men in the camp reproduce "Palestinian nationalism" as a system of human values and as an everyday reality through the negotiation of diverse ideals of masculinity, most notably the figure of the *dawānjī* and the *shaykh*. My research shows that Black September and its immediate aftermath caused a shift in masculine ideals in the camp. Whereas before Black September there were many *dawāwīn* in the camp, after this event the *dawānjī*, disillusioned by the broken promises of Palestinian nationalism and deprived of their political agency by poverty and governmental control, was gradually replaced by the *shaykh* as the dominant model of masculinity in the camp. Despite their obvious differences, however, *dawānjī* and *shaykh* masculinities share common attributes traditionally ascribed to what authors have called hegemonic forms of masculinity. The performance of these two paradigmatic models of masculinity in the camp is thus exemplary of the working of hegemonic masculine norms at the level of the political subject. In the narratives of my informants, the Palestinian national subject is clearly represented in masculine terms and re-enacted through the display of male assertiveness, physical strength, and independence.

However, I have demonstrated that the flexibility of camp dwellers' masculinity is, more than anything else, a means to ensure the reproduction of a Palestinian national identity in the context of their exile in Jordan. While hegemonic gender norms remain crucial, in certain contexts they do not play their normative role. In other words, hegemonic masculinity is not the only way of being a man in the camp.[55] Not only are certain attributes generally associated with subordinate masculinities and/or femininity (such as docility and passivity) sometimes preferred over more manly virtues, they might even constitute an important source of nationalist agency. Refugees' display of

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567 these attributes reflects their reconciling of the fact of exile in Jordan with their strong
568 desire to uphold the values and ideals of Palestinian nationalism. Moreover, it opens a
569 space in Palestinian national discourse for seemingly subordinate and feminine ways of
570 being male, a space that is generally overshadowed by sometimes-cumbersome ideals
571 of masculinity.

572 Nevertheless, the simultaneous performance of antithetical forms of masculinity does
573 not always bear success. Discrimination at times jeopardizes refugees' attempts to
574 carry out "ordinary" male lives, leaving them powerless and frustrated. The incapacity
575 to perform a more contingent masculinity—that is, to harmonize different styles of
576 masculinity—ultimately jeopardizes their chances of entering social adulthood as both
577 Palestinian and Jordanian males. The failure to move through conflicting registers of
578 masculinity reinforces refugees' experiences of marginality and ultimately broadens the
579 chasm between the "refugee" and the "citizen," relegating camp dwellers to a condition
580 of liminality.

581 NOTES

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586 Raymond Aphtorpe, Beth Baron, Sharif Ghazal Tbeileh, Tobias Kelly, Laleh Khalili, Magnus Marsden, Alice
587 Massari, Lucas Oesch, and Sara Pursley. All mistakes are my own.

588 [1]After conducting preliminary research in the Palestinian refugee camps of Jordan from May to December
589 2004, field research for this paper was carried out in the al-Wihdat refugee camp from July 2009 to September
590 2010 and complemented by return trips in February–March 2011 and March 2012. During this time, I lived
591 mostly in the camp. Though participant observation remained the most important part of my research and field
592 notes my main primary source, I have also conducted a number of semi-structured interviews and devoted
593 some time to analyzing refugee texts, textbooks, blogs texts, and other published material.

594 [2]Among my informants, "youth" is a relatively broad category that encompasses a wide spectrum of
595 people. However, the term is often used to refer to unmarried young men between their teens and early thirties.
596 This age group is generally referred to as *al-shabāb*.

597 [3]The regime has deployed this image to criminalize the antigovernmental demonstrations that have swept
598 across Jordan during the Arab revolts. See Luigi Achilli, "Disengagement from Politics: Nationalism, Political
599 Identity, and the Ordinary in a Palestinian Refugee Camp in Jordan," *Critique of Anthropology* 34 (2014):
600 234–57. For comparative literature in the region, see Paul Amar's analysis of the security state's manipulation
601 of internationalist feminist campaigns in order to delegitimize the political protests held in Egypt against
602 Mubarak's regime. Paul Amar, "Turning the Gendered Politics of the Security State Inside Out? Charging the
603 Police with Sexual Harassment in Egypt," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 13 (2011): 299–328.

604 [4]See especially Sami al-Khazendar, *Jordan and the Palestine Question: The Role of the Islamic and Left*
605 *Forces in Foreign Policy-Making* (Chicago: LPC Group, 1997).

606 [5]The contribution of sociology and anthropology to the study of gender and nationalism has been con-
607 spicuous, to say the least. See, for example, Deniz Kandiyoti, *Women, Islam and the State* (Basingstoke:
608 Macmillan, 1991); Michael S. Kimmel, *Manhood in America: A Cultural History* (Oxford: Oxford University
609 Press, 2006); Anne McClintock, Aamir R. Mufti, and Ella Shohat, eds., *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation,*
610 *and Postcolonial Perspectives* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); George L. Mosse,
611 *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Julie
612 Mostov, "Sexing the Nation/Desexing the Body: Politics of National Identity in the Former Yugoslavia,"
613 in *The Gender Ironies of Nationalism Sexing the Nation*, ed. Tamar Mayer (New York: Routledge, 1999),
614 89–112; Andrew Parker, *Nationalisms and sexualities* (London: Routledge, 1992); Elizabeth A. Povinelli,
615 "Native Sex: Sex Rites, Land Rights, and the Making of Aboriginal Civic Culture," in *The Gender Ironies of*
616 *Nationalism: Sexing the Nation*, ed. Tamar Mayer (New York: Routledge, 1999), 163–86; Nira Yuval-Davis,

Gender and Nation (London: Sage, 1997); and Nira Yuval-Davis, Floya Anthias, and Jo Campling, *Woman, Nation, State* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989).

[6]According to R. W. Connell, hegemonic masculinity is an ideal type of manliness that exhibits general patterns. This ideal combines a number of attributes ranging from male assertiveness and emotional detachment to heterosexuality, physical strength, and attractiveness. Since the performance of this style of masculinity requires access to specific resources, it generates dominance not only over women but also over subordinate men who cannot comply with it. See R. W. Connell, *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics* (Cambridge: Polity, 1987); and R. W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept," *Gender Society*19 (2005): 829–59.

[7]See, for example, Penny Johnson and Eileen Kuttab, "Where Have All the Women (and Men) Gone?" *Feminist Review* 69 (2001): 21–43; Julie Peteet, *Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); and Peteet , "Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian Intifada: A Cultural Politics of Violence," *American Ethnologist* 21 (1994): 31–49.

[8]See, for example, Samar Kanafani, "Leaving Mother-Land: The Anti-Feminine in Fida'i Narratives," *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 15 (208): 297–316; Amalia Sa'ar and Taghreed Yahya-Yunis, "Masculinity in Crisis: The Case of Palestinians in Israel," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 35 (2008): 305–23.

[9]For an analysis of the highly gendered character of Palestinian national discourse, see among others, Joseph Massad, "Conceiving the Masculine: Gender and Palestinian Nationalism," *Middle East Journal* 49 (1995): 467–83; and Rosemary Sayigh, "Palestinian Women and Politics in Lebanon," in *Arab Women: Old Boundaries, New Frontiers*, ed. Judith Tucker (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1993), 175–95.

[10]See, for example, Rhoda Kanaaneh, "Boys or Men? Duped or 'Made'? Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military," *American Ethnologist* 32 (2005): 260–75; and Daniel Monterescu, "Stranger Masculinities: Gender and Politics in a Palestinian-Israeli Third Space," in *Islamic Masculinities*, ed. Lahoucine Ouzgane (London: Zed, 2006), 123–42.

[11]Jason Hart, "Dislocated Masculinity: Adolescence and the Palestinian Nation-in-Exile," *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 21 (2008): 64–81, esp. 64.

[12]A comment is in order to avoid hasty conclusions among readers about the constitution of masculinity in the camp. The specific focus of the present article has led me to overemphasize the discursive role of Palestinian nationalism in shaping camp dwellers' masculinities. While it is significant to investigate the place of nationalist values and ideals in the making of proper men, it is equally important not to forget that the articulation of masculinities in and outside of the Middle East depends upon broad socioeconomic and political forces. In this sense, I agree with Farha Ghannam that scholars need to take into account the whole array of social structures—especially class, religion, age, and race—that shape masculine subjectivities in order to reach an exhaustive conceptualization of how masculinity is enacted, challenged, and reinforced. Farha Ghannam, *Live and Die Like a Man: Gender Dynamics in Urban Egypt* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2013), 12.

[13]See Hart, "Dislocated Masculinity."

[14]Ibid. As Khaled Furani and Dan Rabinowitz correctly put it, "the ethnographic work that emerged after Palestine's admission into mainstream anthropology since the 1980s . . . [has] tended to produce depictions of Palestinians as locked in a bind between repression and resistance, ubiquitously struggling for national sovereignty." Khaled Furani and Dan Rabinowitz, "The Ethnographic Arriving of Palestine," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40 (2011): 484.

[15]Marcia C. Inhorn, *The New Arab Man: Emergent Masculinities, Technologies, and Islam in the Middle East* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012), 45.

[16]In this sense, the performance of masculinity among young men in al-Wihdat might be partly explained by Demetriou's notion of a "hybrid block," or Inhorn's concept of "emergent masculinities." Both authors take positions against Connell's "hegemonic masculinity" by problematizing gender hierarchies and emphasizing how male selfhood is not static but rather an ongoing act. The way young men in al-Wihdat enact different forms of masculinities in their daily lives reflects processes of social, political, and economic change, with men navigating and adapting to a changing world. However, in my analysis I do not privilege emergent forms of masculinity to the detriment of the old ones. New masculinities do not necessarily displace older ideals of manhood; both can be displayed simultaneously by the one individual. My approach acknowledges the coexistence of these different registers and, more important, accounts for the anxieties and contradictions

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that such coexistence entails. Demetrakis Z. Demetriou, "Connell's Concept of Hegemonic Masculinity: A Critique," *Theory and Society* 30 (2001): 337–61; Inhorn, *The New Arab Man*.

[17]Connell, *Gender and Power*.

[18]Scholars have documented in considerable detail the importance of violence—endured, narrated, or performed—to the creation and reproduction of masculinity in the Arab Middle East. Violence and masculinity have been studied extensively in Palestinian studies in particular. See, among others, Peteet, "Male gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian Intifada." On the intersection of violence and masculinity elsewhere in the Middle East, see especially Michael Gilsenan, *Lords of the Lebanese Marches: Violence and Narrative in an Arab Society* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1996). On violence and patriarchy, see Suad Joseph, "Brother/Sister Relationships: Connectivity, Love, and Power in the Reproduction of Patriarchy in Lebanon," *American Ethnologist* 21 (1994): 50–73.

[19]The world "*dawāwīn*" is often used in daily speech to refer to both a group people and a single individual.

[20]On nicknames, see, among others, Gabriele Vom Bruck and Barbara Bodenhorn, *The Anthropology of Names and Naming* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). On nicknames in Jordan as a device of social control, see Richard T. Antoun, "On the Significance of Names in an Arab Village," *Ethnology* 7 (1968): 158–70. On the use of nicknames among criminals, see Diego Gambetta, *Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate* (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 2009), 230–50.

[21]Compare with Hart, "Dislocated Masculinity."

[22]A fascinating aspect of recent work on youth across the world is scholars' tendency to focus on the anxieties that many young men experience in times of social and economic uncertainty. See, for example, Craig Jeffrey, *Timepass: Youth, Class and The Politics of Waiting in India*(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010); Adeline Masquelier, "The Scorpion's Sting: Youth, Marriage and the Struggle for Social Maturity in Niger," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 11 (2005): 59–83; Samuli Schielke, "Boredom and Despair in Rural Egypt," *Contemporary Islam* 28 (2008): 251–70; and Oskar Verkaaik, *Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan*(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).

[23]Laleh Khalili, *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Mary N. Layoun, *Wedded to the Land? Gender, Boundaries, and Nationalism in Crisis* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001).

[24]On "political Islam" in the Muslim world, see Faisal Devji, *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005); Nikki Keddie, "The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do 'Fundamentalisms' Appear?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40 (1998): 696–723; Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*(New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). For an anthropological critique of the concept, see Charles Hirschkind, "What is Political Islam?" *Middle East Report* 27 (1997): 12–14.

[25]On the imbrication of piety, gender, and modernity in the Middle East, see, for example, Lara Deeb, *An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shiʿi Lebanon* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006); and Sabah Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

[26]On the political influence of Hamas in the Occupied Territories, see Zaki Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007); Loren D. Lybarger, *Identity and Religion in Palestine: The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, *Hamas: the Islamic Resistance Movement* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010); Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). On the relationship between Hamas and the Brotherhood, see especially Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000).

[27]On the PLO's loss of influence in the region, see especially Jamil M. Hilal, "The PLO: Crisis in Legitimacy," *Race and Class*37 (1995): 1–18; and Salim Tamari, "The Palestinian Movement in Transition: Historical Reversals and the Uprising," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 20 (1991): 57–70. For a thorough analysis of the history of the Palestinian National Movement, see Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[28]For an analysis of the growing popularity of the Brotherhood in and outside refugee camps in Jordan, see Quentin Wiktorowicz, "Islamists, the State, and Cooperation in Jordan," *Arab Studies Quarterly*21 (1999): 1–17. For an analysis of the waning of the influence of the Muslim Brothers in Jordan, see, amongst others, Khaled

727 Hroub, "Jordan: Possibility of Transition from Electoral Rut to a 'Constitutional Democratic Monarchy,'" *Arab*
728 *Reform Brief*, 18 December 2007, accessed 7 January 2015, http://www.arab-reform.net/spip.php?article1145,
729 1–6.
730 [29]Cf. Hart, "Dislocated Masculinities."
731 [30]This recalls a pattern highlighted by other anthropological work conducted in the Arab Muslim world that
732 points to some of the ways in which the path from youth to adulthood involves young men being confronted
733 with the choice to join either "the party of drugs" (*ḥizb al-zalta*) or the "party of the mosque" (*ḥizb al-jāmiʿ*).
734 See Ismail, *Political Life in Cairo's New Quarters.*
735 [31]Massad, "Conceiving the masculine."
736 [32]On the relationship between Islam and hegemonic masculinity in Western and local stereotypes of the
737 "Middle Eastern man," see Inhorn, *The New Arab Man*. For comparative literature on the *dawanji-shaykh*
738 resemblance, see Salwa Ismail's and Wilson C. Jacob's discussion of the *futuwwa-baltagi* type. Ismail, *Political*
739 *life in Cairo's New Quarters*; Wilson C. Jacob, "Eventful Transformations: al-Futuwwa between History and
740 the Everyday," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49 (2007): 689–712.
741 [33]Inhorn, *The New Arab Man*, 50.
742 [34]Scholars have documented abundantly the resemblance between nationalist and Islamist discourses. See
743 especially James Gelvin, "Modernity and Its Discontents: On the Durability of Nationalism in the Arab Middle
744 East," *Nations and Nationalism* 5 (1999): 71–89; and Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam*; Sami Zubaida, "Islam
745 and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions," in *Nations and Nationalism* 10 (2004): 407–20. For the
746 context of the Palestinian struggle for national sovereignty, see Khalili, *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine*,
747 33; Oroub, *Hamas*. For a regional variant of the "Islamic model" of masculinity among Palestinians, see
748 Daniel Monterescu, "'A city of Strangers': The Socio-Cultural Construction of Manhood in Jaffa," *Journal of*
749 *Mediterranean Studies* 1 (2001): 159–89.
750 [35]This reflects Hamas's position vis-a-vis women according to which "Muslim women have a role in the
751 liberation struggle which is no less than the role of men; for woman is the maker of men, and her role in guiding
752 and educating the generations is a major role"; Hamas charter as quoted in Hroub, *Hamas*, 278. This gendered
753 difference, so familiar in the Islamist context, are not alien to the nationalist heroic discourse; Massad, for
754 example, explains how the discrepancy between the role of men and that of women in the national project "is
755 central to the concept of Palestinian nationalist agents as masculine. While men actively create glory, respect,
756 and dignity, women are merely the soil on which these attributes, along with manhood, grow. It is as soil that
757 they are the 'guardians' of Palestinian lives and survival." Massad, "Conceiving the Masculine," 474.
758 [36]
759 [37]Palestinians who were forced to move to Jordan following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.
760 [38]For a comparative discussion of the relationship between national and sexual boundaries among Pales-
761 tinians living in Israel, see, for example, Kanaaneh, "Boys or men? Duped or 'made'?"; Monterescu, "City of
762 'Strangers.'"
763 [39]In this sense, the notion of *tāʾhīl* (socioeconomic rehabilitation) is opposed to that of *tawṭīn* (permanent
764 resettlement). In camp dwellers' narratives, the former represents their attempt to secure a decent lifestyle
765 without jeopardizing the Palestinian "right of return" (*ḥaqq al-ʿawda*); the latter is best exemplified by the rich
766 Palestinian refugees who have pursued integration in Jordan, mindless of the Palestinian national predicament.
767 See Jalal al-Husseini, "UNRWA and the Palestinian Nation-Building Process," *Journal of Palestine Studies*
768 29 (2000): 51–64.
769 [40]On how the construction of "masculinity" amongst Palestinians is steeped in the responsibilities of kinship,
770 paternity, and brotherhood, see among many others Iris Jean-Klein, "Mothercraft, Statecraft and Subjectivity
771 in the Palestinian Intifada," *American Ethnologist*27 (2000): 100–27; for a similar account, see Suad Joseph,
772 "Brother/Sister: Connectivity, Love and Power in the Reproduction of Patriarchy in Lebanon," *American*
773 *Ethnologist*21 (1994): 50–73.
774 [41]Massad, "Conceiving the Masculine," 478.
775 [42]Ibid.
776 [43]Ibid.
777 [44]Joseph Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia
778 University Press, 2001), 347.
779 [45]The term "Transjordanian" has been used in the relevant literature to indicate the population that became
780 citizens of the State of Transjordan, and successively citizens of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, by virtue of
781 the nationality laws of 1928 of the Emirate of Jordan. There was not an exact equivalent of "Transjordanians" in

782 the camp. In daily usage, refugees would refer to Transjordanians either through the general term *urdunniyyīn*
783 (which literally means "Jordanians") or through the word *badawī* (Bedouins).
784 [46]For an analysis of *wāsṭa* in Jordan, including its evolution and present-day practice, see Robert B. Cun-
785 ningham and Yasin Sarayrah, *Wasta: The Hidden Forces in Middle Eastern Society* (London: Praeger, 1993);
786 and Basem Sakijha and Saʾeda Kilani, *Wasta in Jordan: The Declared Secret* (Amman: Press Foundation,
787 2002).
788 [47]See also Hart, "Dislocated Masculinity."
789 [48]Recent work on Palestinians has recognized the flexibility of Palestinian conceptions of masculinity and
790 ways in which young men strategically soften their hyper-masculinity in order to facilitate their socioeconomic
791 integration within the broader Jordanian society. See, for example, Monterescu, "Stranger masculinities"; and
792 Hart, "Dislocated Masculinity." In this article, I show how this "flexibility" does not necessarily herald a
793 withdrawal from ideological commitment.
794 [49]Tobias Kelly, "The Attractions of Accountancy: Living an Ordinary Life During the Second Palestinian
795 Intifada," *Ethnography* 9 (2008): 351–76.
796 [50]On how socioeconomic integration can serve as a strategy for reproducing the values and ideals of
797 Palestinian nationalism in exile, see Achilli, "Disengagement from politics."
798 [51]Rhoda Kanaaneh, *Birthing the Nation: Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel* (Berkeley, Calif.: Uni-
799 versity of California Press, 2002); Kanafani, "Leaving Mother-Land"; Massad, "Conceiving the Masculine."
800 [52]For a similar argument in regard to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, see Julie Peteet, "Gender and
801 Sexuality: Belonging to the National and Moral Order," in *Hermeneutics and Honor: Negotiating Female*
802 *"public" Space in Islamic/ate Societies*, ed. Asma Afsaruddin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
803 1999), 70–88. This ambiguity is clearly contained in the concept of *ṣumūd* (resilience or steadfastness), which
804 is to Palestinian nationalism such. Because *ṣumūd* indicates passive resistance in the face of overarching
805 forces, it is usually used to refer to the feminine sphere of patient endurance. Laleh Khalili points out how "the
806 archetypal sumūd narrative commemorates women's quiet work of holding the family together and providing
807 sustenance and protection for the family." Khalili, *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine*, 101. See also Kanafani,
808 "Leaving Mother-Land," 313. As a swathe of scholarship has demonstrated, however, the term has become
809 a form of infra-politics and organizational policy amongst Palestinian refugees in general. See among others
810 Helena Lindholm-Schulz, *The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism: Between Revolution and Statehood*
811 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
812 [53]Al-Tafila is a town located 183 kilometers southwest of Amman and known to be inhabited predominantly
813 by Transjordanian families.
814 [54]Karen P. Ewing, *Stolen Honor: Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin*(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
815 Press, 2008), 6–11.
816 [55]Cf. Connell, *Gender and Power*.