Citizenship: Historical Development of

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Abstract

Historically, the distinctive core of citizenship has been the possession of the formal status of membership of a political and legal entity and having particular sorts of rights and obligations within it. This core understanding of citizenship goes back to classical times and coalesced around two broad understandings of citizenship stemming from ancient Greece and Imperial Rome respectively that later evolved into what came to be termed the ‘republican’ and ‘liberal’ accounts of citizenship. This entry first examines these two classic views, then looks at how they changed during the Renaissance and Reformation, and finally turns to the ways the two were to some extent brought together following the American and French revolutions within the liberal-democratic nation state.

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Historically, the distinctive core of citizenship - at least within the Western political tradition – has been the possession of the formal status of membership of a political and legal entity and having particular sorts of rights and obligations within it that distinguish one from being either a subject or a casual visitor, on the one hand, or performing some other non-civic social role, such as a friend, a neighbour or a good Samaritan, on the other. Different conceptions have offered different views as to what the criteria of membership should be; the nature of the political and legal institutions to which a citizen belongs; the content of their rights and duties; and the character of the norms and attitudes citizens require to exercise and fulfil these civic entitlements and obligations. However, all agree that citizenship is a political and legal artefact that creates a condition of civic equality among those who possess it with regard to the prerogatives and responsibilities it bestows and requires.

As J. G. A. Pocock (1995) has argued, this core understanding of citizenship goes back to classical times and coalesced around two broad understandings of citizenship stemming from ancient Greece and Imperial Rome respectively that later evolved into what came to be termed the ‘republican’ and ‘liberal’ accounts of citizenship. In what follows, we shall first examine these two classic views, then look at how they changed during the Renaissance and Reformation, and finally turn to the ways the two were to some extent brought together following the American and French revolutions within the liberal-democratic nation state.

*The Two Classic Conceptions*

The canonical text of the Greek version of citizenship is Aristotle’s *Politics* (335 - 323 BC), with ancient Athens the model. Aristotle regarded human beings as ‘political animals’ because it is in our nature to live in political communities – indeed, he contended that only within a *polis* or city-state could human potential be fully realised. However, he believed people played the roles appropriate to their natural station in life, with only some qualifying as *politai* or citizens. Though neither the qualifications Aristotle deemed appropriate for membership of this select group nor the duties he expected of them are regarded as entirely suitable today, they have cast a long shadow over the history of citizenship and their inner rationale still underlies much contemporary thinking.
To be a citizen of Athens it was necessary to be a male aged 20 or over, of known genealogy as being born to an Athenian citizen family, a patriarch of a household, a warrior – possessing the arms and ability to fight, and a master of the labour of others – notably slaves (Finley 1983). So gender, race and class defined citizenship and many of the main later debates have turned on how far they continue to do so. As a result, large numbers were excluded: women, though married Athenian women were citizens for genealogical purposes; children; immigrants or ‘metics’ – including those whose families had been settled in Athens for several generations, although they were legally free, liable to taxation and had military duties; and above all slaves. It is reckoned that the number of citizens in Athens fluctuated between 30,000 and 50,000, while the number of slaves was of the order of 80-100,000. Therefore, citizenship was enjoyed by a minority, though a substantial one. Yet, this was inevitable given the high expectation on citizens. For, their capacity to perform their not inconsiderable citizenly duties rested on their everyday needs being looked after by the majority of the population, particularly women and slaves.

Aristotle described as citizens those who ‘rule and are ruled by turns’ (Aristotle, 1988, 1259b1) Though the duties involved differed between polities and even different categories of citizen within the same polity, at some level citizenship involved ‘the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration’ (Aristotle, 1988, 1275b1) In Athens this meant at a minimum participating in the assembly, which met at least 40 times a year and required a quorum of 6,000 citizens for plenary sessions, and, for citizens aged over 30, doing jury service – again, a frequent responsibility given that juries required 201 or more members and on some occasions over 501. Though jury service was paid, jurors were chosen by lot from among those who presented themselves to discourage both its becoming a regular income and jury packing. In addition, there were some 140 local territorial units of government, or demes, with their own agora or assembly points for public discussion of local affairs and passing local decrees.

Meanwhile, many citizens could not avoid holding public office at some point. Apart from generals, who were elected by the assembly and could serve multiple terms if successful, public officers were chosen by lot, served for one or two years maximum, with key roles often rotated between office holders. These devices aimed to increase the likelihood that all citizens had an equal chance of exercising political power, with the short terms of office and the checks operated by the different bodies
on each other ensuring this power was severely circumscribed. Yet, though there were no career politicians, citizenship itself, if one adds military service and participation in local affairs, was a fairly full occupation.

Athens was unusual among Greek city-states in being so democratic. Indeed, Aristotle, who periodically resided in Athens but was not born there and so was not an Athenian citizen, expressed a personal preference for systems that mixed democracy with aristocratic and monarchical elements. However, even in those systems, citizenship remained fairly onerous. Like Plato, Aristotle esteemed the austere citizenship code of Sparta. By contrast to Athens, where the arts, philosophy and leisure were much admired, Sparta emphasised military service above all else. Male children were separated from their families aged 7, subjected to a rigorous training, and thereafter attached to a ‘mess’. Given they still had to attend the Assembly, Spartan citizens became even more permanent public servants than their Athenian counterparts. In fact, it was precisely their limited opportunities to develop private interests that Plato in particular so admired.

Aristotle acknowledged that such forms of citizenship were only possible in small states. That was important not just so everyone could have a turn at ruling and to keep the tasks of government sufficiently simple as to be manageable without a professional bureaucracy or political class, but also because it was only in smaller settings that the requisite civic virtues were likely to be fostered. Although the Athenians probably invented the idea of taking a vote to settle disagreements, unanimity was the ideal and most issues were settled by consensus - if need be following extended debate. Aristotle surmised that such concord or *homonoia* depended on a form of civic friendship among citizens that was only likely in tightly-knit communities. Citizens must know each other, share values and have common interests. Only then will they be able to agree on what qualities are best for given offices and select the right people for them, harmoniously resolve disputed rights, and adopt collective policies unanimously. Even so, agreement rested on citizens possessing a sense of justice, being temperate by exercising self-control and avoiding extremes, having a capacity for prudent judgement, being motivated by patriotism, so they put the public good above private advantage, and being courageous before danger, especially military threats. In sum, a citizen must not belong ‘just to himself’ but also to ‘the polis’.
Though the Greek model of citizenship was the privilege of a minority, it provided a considerable degree of popular control over government. True, the Assembly and Council tended to be dominated by the high born and wealthy, while Aristotle’s ideal of concord was often far from the reality, at least in Athens. There were persistent tensions between different classes and factions, with disagreements often bitter and personal, ending with the physical removal of opponents through ostracism and even their execution on trumped up charges of treason. Nonetheless, in a very real sense those people who qualified as citizens did rule, thereby giving us the word democracy from the Greek _demokratia_ or people (_demos_) rule (_kratos_).

Unsurprisingly, Greek citizenship has appeared to many later thinkers as the epitome of a true condition of political equality, in which citizens have equal political powers and so must treat each other with equal concern and respect. They have viewed the trend towards delegating political tasks to a professional class of politicians and public administrators with foreboding, as presaging a loss of political freedom and equality, and lamented the - in their opinion - short-sighted tendency for ever more citizens to desert public service to pursue personal concerns. By contrast, critics of this model of citizenship argue that it was not so much an ideal as hopelessly idealised. In reality, it was doubly oppressive. On the one hand, it rested on the oppression of slaves, women and other non-citizens. On the other hand, it was oppressive of citizens in demanding they sacrifice their private interests to service of the state. As we saw, the two forms of oppression were linked: citizens could only dedicate themselves to public life because their private lives were serviced by others.

Later liberal commentators have condemned these last features of Greek republican citizenship as potentially despotic (Constant 1819, Berlin 1969). They criticise not just the way non-citizens got treated as less than fully human, but also the demand for the total identification of citizens with the state, with all dissent seen as indicative of self-interest rather than an alternative point of view or valid concern. They castigate such regimes as both repressive and corrupt— not least in diverting all talent away from the private sphere of the economy on which the wealth of a society rests. Ironically, making the public sphere the main avenue of personal advancement did not prevent but promoted the abuse of power for private gain. They trace these problems to a flawed view of liberty that falsely links freedom with civic participation. Aristotle’s defense of this linkage rested on a perfectionist account of human flourishing, with civic involvement a means to human self-realization,
whereby individual and collective autonomy can be reconciled by subsuming private interests under the public interest. Many liberals reject such ‘positive’ conceptions of liberty as suggesting human freedom lies in the pursuit of particular ends. Instead, they advocate a ‘negative’ conception that consists of being free from interference to pursue one’s personal good in one’s own way. They claim freedom of this latter sort merely requires a just constitutional regime that limits the power of government to maximising freedom from mutual interference and has no intrinsic link with democracy.

Imperial Rome offers an important contrast in this respect and one that forms part of the genealogy of the liberal view. Eligibility for Roman citizenship was at first similar to the criteria for Greek citizenship - citizens had to be native free men who were the legitimate sons of other native free men. As Rome expanded – initially within Italy, then over the rest of Europe and finally into Africa and Asia - two important innovations came about. First, the populations of conquered territories were given a version of Roman citizenship while being allowed to retain their own forms of government, including whatever citizenship status they offered. Second, the version of Roman citizenship given was of a legal rather than a political kind – ‘civitas sine suffragio’ or ‘citizenship without the vote’. So, the Empire allowed dual citizenship, though it reduced Roman citizenship to a legal status. As a result, the legal and political communities pulled apart. The scope of law went beyond political borders and did not need to be co-extensive with a given territorial unit. To cite the famous case of St Paul – on arrest in Palestine, he proudly declared himself ‘a Jew of Tarsus, a city in Cilicia, a citizen of no mean city’. But not being in Tarsus, it was his additional status as a Roman citizen that allowed him to claim rights against arbitrary punishment, thereby escaping a whipping, and to ask for trial in Rome.

According to the Aristotelian ideal, political citizenship had depended on being freed from the burdens of economic and social life – both in order to participate and to ensure that public rather than private interests were the object of concern. By contrast, legal citizenship has private interests and their protection at its heart. Within Roman law, legal status belonged to the owners of property and, by extension, their possessions. Since these included slaves, a free person was one who owned himself. So conceived, as in many respects it remains to this day, law was about how we could use ourselves and our things and those of others, and the use they may make of us and our things. As the example of St Paul shows, the resulting privileges and
immunities, including the right to sue and be sued in given courts, were far from trivial. However, that the rule of law can be detached from the rule of persons, in that those subject to it do not have to be involved in either its making or its administration, creates disadvantages as well as advantages. The advantage is that the legal community can, as we saw, encompass a number of political communities and hold their rulers and officers to account, thereby limiting their discretion to act against the law. Law can be universal in scope and extent, enabling millions of dispersed individuals to pursue their private interests by engaging and exchanging with each other across space and, through such legal acts as bequests, through time, without any direct contact. The disadvantage lies in these same citizens becoming the imperial subjects of the law’s empire, who are ruled by it rather than ruling themselves. Yet the rule of law is only ever rule through law by some person or persons. Law can have many sources and enforcers, and different laws and legal systems will apply to different groups of persons and have differing costs and benefits for each of them. If law’s empire depends on an emperor, then the danger is that law becomes a means for imperial rule rather than rule of and for the public.

Towards Republicanism and Liberalism
Both these conceptions underwent significant alterations over time in response to changing social and political circumstances and new intellectual preoccupations. As a result, they gradually became re-configured on rather different ontological and epistemological assumptions. Of particular importance were the struggles between religious and secular politica l authorities, on the one hand, and, crosscutting this conflict, those between city states and monarchical rulers, including the imperial pretensions of successive Holy Roman Emperors, on the other. These struggles both shaped and were shaped by political thinking from the middle ages to the Reformation. Two related developments emerging from this process were particularly significant: the separation of religion and politics, and the crystallisation of notions of political sovereignty - be it of the people or their rulers - in the context of a polity possessing the features of a state: namely, a monopoly of coercive power over those residing within its territorial boundaries. For example, each of them plays a key role in Marsilius of Padua’s important tract Defensor Pacis (1324). This work draws on both the political and democratic and the legal and imperial conceptions of citizenship explored in the last section, adapting them to the context created by the two sets of
struggles mentioned above to ground the legal sovereignty of the Emperor Louis of Bavaria against the claims of Pope John XXII in a doctrine of popular sovereignty.

It is against this background that we need to explore the significant reworkings of the two classic conceptions of citizenship brought about by Machiavelli and Hobbes respectively. Both offer secular accounts of citizenship that link popular sovereignty to the right to rule of those possessing sovereign political authority. Yet its role within their respective accounts was very different. While Machiavelli appreciated the part laws can play in securing the rights and liberties of citizens under a monarchical regime, he contended liberty was only fully secured within a republic where the people exercised political power in ways that allowed them to mutually check each other, thereby obliging all citizens to act collaboratively and in the public good. By contrast, though Hobbes grounded the right to rule in the mutual consent of the people, he maintained that in the process the ruled surrendered their sovereign power to their rulers. Moreover, he regarded the unlimited and undivided sovereignty of an absolute ruler – preferably, though not necessarily, a monarch - as offering the surest basis for law and the protection of liberty.

Machiavelli’s account draws on the Roman republican model of citizenship more than the Greek model associated with Aristotle, explored above. While there are some similarities between the two, there are also striking differences. Though classes existed in Greek society, including among those who qualified as citizens, the ideal of citizenship became classless with the aspiration to ‘concord’ a product of putting class and other private interests to one side. Instead, the Roman republic was born of class discord and the struggle of the plebeians to obtain rights against the patricians. For the theorists of the Roman model – Cicero (44BC), the historians of the Roman republic and, drawing on them, Machiavelli (1531) - this on-going class conflict gave politics and citizenship a much more instrumental character than the Greek model theorized by Aristotle. Roman citizens never possessed anything like the political influence of their Athenian counterparts. Despite the creation of Tribunes of the People, elected by a Plebeian Council, true power rested with the Senate. While entry to the Senate ceased to depend on rank around 400BC, since it was composed instead of the popularly-elected magistrates, it was dominated by the patricians – especially among the higher magistracy, particularly the Consuls who formed the executive. The slogan *Senatus Populusque Romanus* (‘The Senate and the Roman People’, frequently abbreviated to SPQR) suggested a partnership between the Senate and the people
within the popular assemblies. In reality, Senate and people were always in tension, with the influence of the plebeians waxing and waning depending on their importance as support for different factions among the patricians.

Applying these ideas to renaissance Florence, Machiavelli argued the Roman experience showed how the selfish interests of the aristocracy and the people could only be restrained if each could counter the other. The republic institutionalized such mutual restraint by ensuring no person or institution could exercise power except in combination with at least one other person or institution, so each could check and balance the other. The need to divide power in this way was elaborated by later republican theorists. It was a key feature of the city states of renaissance Italy, especially Florence and Venice, which inspired Machiavelli’s writings on the subject, and influenced the political arrangements of the Dutch republic into the eighteenth century. Republican ideas also informed the constitutional debates of the English civil war of the seventeenth century, influencing writers such as Milton and Harrington. In the work of Montesquieu and, following him, the American Federalists, especially Madison, the check and balance of powers became a central element of the US Constitution (Hamilton, Madison, Jay, 1787-8).

Underlying this account was a distinctively realist view of citizenship, which could be more easily adapted to modern democratic politics than the Greek view. Instead of viewing the private interest and the public interest as diametrically opposed, so that all elements of the first had to be removed from politics, the public interest emerged from the clash and balancing of private interests. Consequently, citizens had self-interested reasons to participate because they could only ensure that their concerns figured in any collective decisions so long as they took part and were counted. Quentin Skinner (1998) and Philip Pettit (1997) have argued that the neo-Roman version of republicanism rejects the ‘positive’, Aristotelian view of liberty as self-mastery for a ‘negative’ account of freedom as the absence of domination or mastery by another. Citizens need not identify their will with that of the polity; merely seek to ensure that government and the laws address the interests of all in an equitable manner through being obliged to ‘hear the other side’. Liberty results from a political system where none are the masters of others because all have an equal influence over how public policies are framed and implemented.

Once again, this republican argument can be contrasted with the liberal notion of liberty as freedom from interference. As we noted, this position has its origins in
the Imperial view of citizenship centered on providing the legal protection of an individual’s civil liberties, especially the right to property. Much as Machiavelli can be regarded as defending the link between political citizenship and liberty on a new basis, Hobbes can be read as criticising this linkage and putting forward a new defense of the link between legal citizenship and liberty. In framing his argument, Hobbes drew on the contemporary natural law tradition in which individuals are conceived as proprietors of themselves and the world, possessing rights in both for their self-preservation. Although Hobbes regarded humans as capable of perceiving and pursuing laws of nature, he did not believe these precepts allowed them to live peacefully without government. Infamously, he depicted the state of nature as a war of all against all. He ascribed this condition to each person being judge, jury and executioner in their own case and acting on their own private judgment – itself a product of their exercising their ‘right of nature’ to do anything which they judged necessary to their preservation. As a result, in the natural state people would live in a permanent condition of insecurity in which neither industry nor any of the activities associated with civilization would be possible. Hobbes contended each person ought to be rational enough to see this state was not conducive to their ability to safely pursue their interests and to perform those actions most conducive to peace – a set of practical imperatives he terms the Laws of Nature. The solution was for individuals to lay down a part of their right to all things and to establish an absolute sovereign with sufficient power to hold all in awe. Hobbes contended the passage from the natural to the civil state could be regarded as the product of a mutual covenant or social contract between the members of society, whereby they ceded their right to private judgment concerning those matters most conducive to their preservation to a sovereign political authority. So long as these sovereign authorities could offer effective protection to those subject to their rule, the ruled had an obligation to obey their commands. Nevertheless, the ruled retain a right to self-defense that allows them to resist a sovereign that puts their lives in danger.

Hobbes sketched much of this argument in a book published in Latin in 1642 with the title De Cive, or ‘On the Citizen’, although it got its most famous statement in the English version of the Leviathan published in 1651. From the republican perspective, his argument that citizenship was secured through subjection to an absolute Leviathan seems like a contradiction in terms. However, Hobbes takes issue with this view. Writing in the context of the English civil war and the religious
conflicts of contemporary Europe, Hobbes contended that sovereignty cannot be divided or limited and still offer a reliable source of stability and peace. To divide or seek to limit sovereignty is to risk institutionalizing the disagreements and conflicts that characterize the state of nature and would undermine the effectiveness of the sovereign authority. Moreover, the citizens of a despotic regime could enjoy as much as, and possibly even more liberty than, those of a self-governing republic, since they too could live under the protection of laws that guaranteed their ability to exercise their rights in pursuit of their private interests.

Both Hobbes’ view of the state of nature and his claim that sovereignty must be absolute were disputed by others writing in this tradition. For example, John Locke (1690) thought that human nature was more benign than Hobbes and believed he had underestimated the degree to which state power might be an even greater danger to an individual’s liberty than other individuals. Nevertheless, the contrast with the republican account of citizenship persists. Two features are especially important. First, rights are commodified as individual possessions, with political society being justified by providing for their preservation. Rights are subjective, pre-social and pre-political rather than being grounded in what is objectively or politically determined as right or good for a society, as the Greek and neo-Roman notions contended. Second, political legitimacy rests on a presumed act of consent whereby sovereignty is transferred from the people to the political institutions that govern them. The presumption of consent rests on the supposed rationality and necessity of this transfer once individuals begin to interact with each other on a regular basis. It is then held to persist until such time as the relevant institutions or persons fail to maintain the terms of the original compact, with the continued political participation of citizens an optional extra.

This mode of argument has proved tremendously influential in international law, especially human rights law (Pufendorf 1673; Kant 1795), and fed into contemporary cosmopolitan conceptions of citizenship. A natural affinity also exists between this account and the liberal defense of the constitutional state. The state and its authorities are deemed to be bound by the act of constitution that justifies and legitimizes their institution, which thereby serves as a higher law to which they can be held to account – ultimately by the people, but in some accounts by their authorized representatives too – be they judges or politicians. This position also underlay views
of commerce as resting on a natural system of liberty grounded in the natural rights to ownership of oneself and one’s possessions.

Significantly all three come in for trenchant criticism from J J Rousseau (1755, 1762), who subjects the natural law tradition to a radical republican critique and reworking. Rousseau contends that the state of nature only takes on a Hobbesian character once individuals interact and become mutually dependent on each other, yet he agrees with Hobbes that to the extent that states are in this condition in the international sphere they too are in a state of war. However, he regards the Hobbesian social contract as systematically disadvantaging the propertyless and exploited, who only accept it out of fear. His solution was to propose a republican social contract, in which the natural freedom each individual enjoyed when independent from others in the state of nature is replaced by a civil freedom that derives from each citizen participating directly in formulating laws that accord with a general will that stems from, and applies equally to, all. In other words, as with Hobbes sovereignty is single and indivisible, but it remains popular as only then will the laws favour the common interest rather than the partial interests of certain particular individuals over others. The difficulty was that Rousseau doubted that citizens would consistently will what was generally for the good of all – that perhaps such collective goods would not exist – outside of relatively small, undifferentiated political communities of moderate wealth. On his reading of republicanism, therefore, the original dilemma apparently persists whereby a society of equal citizens who rule and are ruled in turn only seems possible in societies that are exclusive in their membership and constrain the private lives of citizens – a vision that seems both anachronistic and coercive. As Adam Smith (1776) and Benjamin Constant (1819), two of Rousseau’s prominent critics noted, allowing each citizen to pursue their private interests so far as was compatible with a like pursuit by others might result in social and economic inequality but it also fostered both the commerce necessary for the wealth of nations and provided greater opportunities for individuals to exercise their liberty. Yet both retained republican worries that in a society depleted of civic virtue, the necessary, if minimalist, state regulation risked being exploited by the rich and powerful for their own ends, and Smith especially was concerned for the misery of the poor. Therefore, a central issue was whether a modern commercial republic was possible.

Liberal Democratic Citizenship: Uniting Republican and Legal Citizenship?
The opportunity to create a modern republic confronted the two great revolutions that inaugurated the modern democratic era – the American revolution of 1776 and the French revolution of 1789. Both attempted to resolve it by seeing their constitutional settlements as instances of an actual contract between citizens. So, the putative authors of the American constitution are ‘We the People of the United States’, while the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen declares ‘the source of all sovereignty lies essentially in the Nation’. However, these formulas preserve a dualism between the ‘public’ political citizen, who acts as a collective agent – the ‘people’ or the ‘nation’, and the private, ‘legal’ citizen, who is the subject of the law and the possessor of ‘natural’ rights to liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness. Civic virtue gets assigned to a single constitutional moment and enshrined in the institutions that popular act creates, leaving selfish citizens to pursue their personal interests under the law. Meanwhile, a tension between the two models persisted. As Rousseau had noted, it is doubtful that even the most well-designed institutions and laws can economize too much on the virtues of citizens, or that citizens feel they are ‘theirs’, if - the founding moment apart - they cannot actively participate in shaping them.

The liberal democratic regimes that emerged during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries struggled with this tension, mixing in their different ways elements of both the republican and the legal forms of citizenship. Lying midway between a city state and an Empire, the nation state emerged as their most viable alternative – able to combine certain key advantages while avoiding their disadvantages. If the polis was too small to survive the military encroachments of Empires, the Empire was too large to allow for meaningful political participation. The nation state had sufficient size to sustain both a complex economic infrastructure and an army, while being not so large to make a credible – if less participatory – form of democracy impossible. As a result, it became subject to pressures to create a form of citizenship that could successfully integrate popular and legal rule by linking political participation and rights with membership of a national democratic political community.

The sociologists T H Marshall (1950) and Stein Rokkan (1974) established what has become the standard narrative of the evolution of modern democratic citizenship. They saw citizenship as the product of the interrelated processes of state building, the emergence of commercial and industrial society, and the construction of
a national consciousness, with all three driven forward in various ways by class struggle and war. The net effect of these three processes was to create a ‘people’, who were entitled to be treated as equals before the law and possessed equal rights to buy and sell goods, services and labour; whose interests were overseen by a sovereign political authority; and who shared a national identity that shaped their allegiance to each other and to their state. In a brilliant essay, Marshall argued there had been three periods in the historical evolution of citizenship as a given group fought to attain equal status as a full member of the community. The first period, from the seventeenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, saw the consolidation of the civil rights needed to engage in a range of social and economic activities, from the freedoms to own property and exchange goods, to liberty of thought and conscience. The second period, from the end of the eighteenth century to the start of the twentieth, coincided with the gaining of political rights to vote and stand for election. The third period, from the end of the nineteenth to the mid twentieth, involved the creation of social rights that gave citizens ‘the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society’.

Though modelled on Britain, Marshall’s account reflects not just the new liberal and social democratic consensus behind a welfare state fashioned by such British thinkers as T H Green, L T Hobhouse and W H Beveridge, but also similar intellectual and political movements elsewhere, like the Solidarists in France and progressives in the United States (Bellamy 1992, Kloppenberg 1986). Nevertheless, his argument has attracted considerable criticism. He is said to overlook the role external pressures played in promoting rights (Mann 1987), while the three sets of rights neither arose in quite the order or periods that he mentions, nor proved quite as complementary as he assumed. Thus, social rights emerged in most countries before rather than after political rights - often being offered by the politically dominant class in the hope of damping down demands for political rights. Social and civil rights can also clash, as with the right to property (Bellamy, Castiglione, Santoro, 2004). However, these corrections to the details of his argument are perfectly compatible with its underlying logic, whereby the development of legal rights stems from a subordinate group employing formal and informal political strategies to win concessions from those with power in their fight to be treated with equal concern and respect.
Writing in the 1950s, when the economies of west European countries were in the ascendant and welfare spending expanding, it was natural for Marshall to view social rights as the culmination of the struggle for an ever more inclusive and egalitarian form of citizenship. Needless to say, subsequent events have tended to challenge that optimistic conclusion. For a start, many aspects of the post-war welfare settlements Marshall celebrated got eroded during the economic downturn and restructuring of the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Various New Right politicians and theorists argued for the privatisation of numerous public services on the grounds they would be not only cheaper and more efficiently run but also more responsive to consumer pressure via a free market than they had been to the democratic pressures of voters upon politicians and state administrators. They also questioned whether welfare was a right of citizenship (King and Waldron 1988,). Many of the economic and social assumptions on which this settlement rested have also been criticised by those seeking to further expand rather than curtail citizenship. Environmentalists have attacked the emphasis on increasing economic production (Dobson, 2003), feminists the continued overlooking of the subordinate role of women (Lister, 2003), multiculturalists the failure to even mention issues of cultural, religious or ethnic diversity (Kymlicka, 2000 ), cosmopolitans the focus on the nation state (Benhabib, 2004) and so on.

These developments have challenged the view of the sovereign, liberal democratic, nation state as the context for citizenship. Internally, it has been argued that the people have become too diverse for popular sovereignty not to risk degenerating into the tyranny of the majority unless minority rights have strong legal protection. Externally, state sovereignty has been regarded as both ineffective and unjust. Ineffective, because the state cannot offer citizens economic or physical security in a world dominated by global markets and global threats such as climate change, international terrorism and nuclear weapons. Unjust, because birth into a rich or a poor, a democratic or a tyrannical state is simply a matter of good or bad luck. State sovereignty simply allows citizens of rich and democratic states to avoid their duties towards the citizens of poor and tyrannous states, often adding to their poverty and tyranny in the process. Yet, if the new forms of multinational and global citizenship attempt to go beyond sovereignty, they have for the most part found inspiration in the pre-sovereign, classical models of ancient Greece and Imperial Rome and remain caught in the dilemma of reconciling the advantages and avoiding
the disadvantages of the republican and the liberal, the democratic and the legal models of citizenship.

**Primary Sources**


**Secondary Sources**


