Corridor Report on France
The case of Turkish and Tunisian immigrants

Lorenzo Gabrielli

INTERACT Research Report 2015/14
INTERACT
Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

Research Report
Corridor Report
INTERACT RR 2015/14

Corridor Report on France
The case of Turkish and Tunisian immigrants

Lorenzo Gabrielli
GRITIM – Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
INTERACT - Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

In 2013 (Jan. 1st), around 34 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) were currently living in the European Union (EU), representing 7% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working together to build a cohesive society.

Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: first, where they come and second, where they now live. While integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants interact with their home country.

INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights).

INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way?

A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done.

INTERACT is co-financed by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built by CEDEM, UPF and MPI Europe.

For more information:
INTERACT
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI)
Villa Malafrasca
Via Boccaccio 151
50133 Florence
Italy
Tel: +39 055 46 85 817/892
Fax: +39 055 46 85 755
Email: mpc@eui.eu

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/
Abstract

This corridor report analyses the integration patterns of Turkish and Tunisian immigrants in France on a comparative basis. The goal of the report is to understand the role of origin countries and societies in the integration of these two immigrant communities in France. Following the INTERACT project’s idea of “integration as a three-way process”, the report analyses the integration of Turkish and Tunisian immigrants in France not only from a country of destination perspective, but also from the point of view of the countries and societies of origin. To do this, we apply a methodology that brings together three different types of original sources: a legal and political framework analysis at both origin and destination, a quantitative analysis on some specific integration dimensions (labour market, education, and citizenship), and a survey on civil society actors.

The analysis conducted emphasises that historical and language ties between the country of origin and destination may play a role in specific dimensions such as education and, in a lesser way, on the labour market (through bilateral agreements). These linkages also play an indirect role on the compositions and specific time evolution of the two migration flows to France. Countries of origin may also play a role concerning access to citizenship through the evolution of their policies in this area.

**Key words**: Immigration, Integration, France, Turkey, Tunisia, Diaspora, Tunisians, Turkish
# Table of contents

1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 7

2. Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 7

3. Immigration trends of Tunisians and Turkish people into France .................................... 8
   3.1 Tunisian migration to France ....................................................................................... 8
   3.2 Turkish migration to France ....................................................................................... 9
   3.3 Comparing Tunisian and Turkish immigration in France .......................................... 10

4. Institutional and policy framework .................................................................................... 14
   4.1 Institutional and policy framework of integration policy in France ............................... 14
   4.2 Institutional and policy framework of emigration/diaspora policies of Tunisia and Turkey 19

5. Integration trends of Tunisian and Turkish migrants in France and explanatory factors ....... 28
   5.1 Labour market ............................................................................................................. 29
   5.2 Education .................................................................................................................... 32
   5.3 Citizenship .................................................................................................................. 34

6. Impact of actions of civil society organisations dealing with migrants from Tunisia and Turkey in France ............................................................................................................. 35
   6.1 Impact of other factors ............................................................................................... 38

7. Main conclusions .............................................................................................................. 39

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 40
1. Introduction

The objective of the present corridor report is to understand the role of policies and actions of origin countries and societies in the integration process of their emigrants. To do so, we have chosen to analyse the case of two different origin countries, Tunisia and Turkey, and their integration paths in a single destination country, France.

Before beginning the analysis, it is important to underline some specific differences between the two origin countries in order to correctly contextualise the integration trajectories of the two chosen communities. In the case of Tunisia, French is a very diffused vehicular language (it is not even the official language of the country), and was one of Tunisia’s official languages during the French colonization (between 1881 and 1956). In the case of Turkey, these kinds of linguistic and historical ties with France do not exist.

We also need to keep in mind that the population size of the two countries of origin is very different: Tunisia’s population is less than 11 million inhabitants, while the Turkish population is more then 76 million.

Looking at macroeconomic data, we can isolate more differences between the two countries. Tunisia has a per capita nominal GDP of 4,232 dollars, an HDI (Human development index) level of 0.712 (high, 94th position in the world), and a Gini index (measuring income distribution inequalities) of 36.1, while Turkey has a per capita nominal GDP of 10,666 dollars, an HDI level of 0.722 (high, 90th position in the world) and a Gini index of 40.0. In spite of some similarities in HDI levels and the Gini index, the GDP levels are quite different in the two origin countries.

Looking at the political context, we have to bear in mind the Tunisian revolution of 2011, which overthrew the former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and started a new political phase, in which State institutions thoroughly reorganized their functions. These events have had consequences on the recent development of Tunisian policies towards their emigrants and the diaspora.

As regards religion in the two origin countries, the vast majority of the population is Muslim, following Sunni Islam. In Tunisia, the new Constitution of 2014 establishes that Islam is the official state religion (which must also be the president’s religion), but also recognizes freedom of religious practices. In the case of Turkey, the Constitution establishes that the State is secular and that there is no official religion. In Turkey, Islam is the most followed faith, but there is more religious diversity then in Tunisia, given the presence of Alevi populations (who follow Shia Islam combined with Sufi elements) and other Shiite followers. In both countries very small groups of religious minorities exist: Oriental and Greek Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Jews and a small number of Protestants in Turkey; Catholics, Jews and a small community of Protestants in Tunisia.

2. Methodology

The report is based on three different data sources (data triangulation): an analysis of the legal and political frameworks; a quantitative analysis; and a survey of civil society organisations working with migrants.

The report is part of the INTERACT project. INTERACT’s analysis of the legal and analytical frameworks is divided into countries of origin and destination. In the countries of destination we analysed the integration policy framework; in the countries of origin we analysed emigration and diaspora policy frameworks. The main questions asked concerned main stakeholders, policy actors, policy discourses, and legal frameworks. For the quantitative analysis we built a synthetic index of integration which allows a comparison of the level of integration of migrants in EU Member States by dimension and by migration corridor.
At the same time, a survey specifically focused on non-state actors was carried out. The INTERACT survey was an exploratory survey conducted between December 2013 and September 2014. The survey targeted civil society organisations working in 82 countries (28 EU countries of destination and 54 countries of origin with more than 100,000 migrants residing in the EU). Any organisation dealing with migrant integration in one of the eight dimensions (labour market, education, language, social interactions, religion, political and civic participation, nationality issues, housing) could take part in the survey. Respondents could choose between one and three integration dimensions in which their organisation was active. The survey was translated into 28 languages and over 900 responses were collected online and over the phone. Although the exploratory character of the survey does not allow one to make generalisations about the whole population of civil society organisations, it sheds light onto how these actors’ activities impact migrant integration between the origin and destination. However, the survey does much more than just map these activities in the comparative context. It also shows how organisations perceive states of origin and their policies in the context of the day-to-day reality of incorporating migrants into the receiving society. In this report, only information pertaining to Tunisian and Turkish migrants in France is presented.\(^1\)

3. Immigration trends of Tunisians and Turkish people into France

In the following section we will analyse the migration trends of the two chosen communities to France. We will also conduct a comparison of the trends concerning Tunisian and Turkish immigrants in France.

Understanding the specificities of these two communities qualitatively and quantitatively represents a key step in evaluating the effective role of origin countries and societies’ actions in the integration patterns of the two immigrant groups in France.

3.1 Tunisian migration to France

A first important element that we have to take into account to contextualise the Tunisian migration flows, are the colonial ties that Tunisia has with France (*Protectorat français de Tunisie*, French protectorate of Tunisia), which commenced with the Bardo Treaty in 12 May 1881 and lasted until 20 March 1956, when the country took its first steps to becoming an independent State (the Tunisian Republic was officially declared on 25 July 1957). Those colonial links constitute a determinant factor in the development of migration flows between the two spaces. Considering Tunisian migration to France, the first waves were linked with the two World Wars, mainly with the second one, when the protectorate provided soldiers to the French army and workers to industry, as well as a labour force during the post-war periods.

In comparison with the other Maghreb countries, Morocco and Algeria, Tunisian emigration flows to Europe appeared later. In 1954 only 4,800 Tunisians were residing in France, while the estimated number of Algerians was 300,000 (Simon 1974: 11).

During the end of colonial period, and after its independence, Tunisia faced a demographic expansion together with high underemployment, low standards of living, and a significant economic imbalance between towns and rural areas. Initially, this situation produced internal mobility, from the South to the North, from the interior to the coastal areas, and to the capital city. Afterwards, the saturation of urban employment resulted in the development of international migration flows. Even skilled workers already employed in Tunisia searched for better salaries and job conditions in Europe (Oueslati 2009: 13).

The two main periods of Tunisian migrations to France, according to Oueslati (2009), took place after the country’s independence in 1956. At this point, the flow of Tunisians began to grow

\(^1\) For more information, please refer to the forthcoming INTERACT survey report.
‘anarchically’ until the beginning of the 1960s. As reported by Simon (1974: 12), between 1955 and 1958, 5,000 to 10,000 Tunisians emigrated each year, with a slight decrease between 1959 and 1964, when around 5,000 departed each year. A second period followed the signature, on 9 August 1963, of the “Grandval” bilateral convention organizing the recruitment and stay of Tunisian workers in France. The agreement was complemented by a protocol of professional formation of adults in France. After this agreement, emigration flows became more structured by the Tunisian government, as well as by France. Between 1969, when the application of the agreement effectively entered into force, and 1972, more than half of state-controlled Tunisian emigration was headed for France.

Between the 1960s and 1970s, Tunisian migration flows were mainly composed of young men. Tunisian immigrants from the 1950s and 1960s were mostly from the peasantry and had little education, while young and more skilled persons composed the flows of the seventies.

After the mid-1970s oil crisis and the interruption of formal recruitment, family reunifications and the number of Tunisian women in France began growing. At the same time, irregular flows started to develop, as did irregular stays (in the case of the ‘overstayers’). These flows represent the Tunisian population’s main channels of entry in the last few decades.

According to data from the OTE (Office des Tunisiens à l’Étranger), in 2012, 668,668 Tunisians migrants were living in France, and comprised 54.7% of the total 1,223,213 Tunisians emigrants in the world (OTE 2012). Those numbers include seasonal workers, children born in France and also bi-national citizens.

Between 1999 and 2004, 27,511 Tunisians returned to their home country, after their retirement or voluntarily (OTE 2012).

In France, Tunisian immigrants are concentrated in several areas: the Paris region, Côte d’Azur, Var, and Rhône-Alpes. Each concentration is comprised of immigrants who mainly originate from the same geographical area in Tunisia. A territorial redistribution of the population emerged after the restructuring of the industrial sector in France. Tunisian immigrants who worked in the factories in Lyon and its suburbs, in Saint-Étienne, Bourges, and Isère, then moved to southern regions of France and to the Paris region. Increasingly, Tunisian migrants have been employed in the service sector (hotels, restaurants, local shops) or have turned to the creation of small businesses.

3.2 Turkish migration to France

The Turkish migration flows to Europe have a main difference from those coming from Maghreb: they developed later than the Maghreb flows (De Tapia 2004: 4).

In the case of France, the start of formal flows is marked by a bilateral agreement on labour recruitment that was signed between France and Turkey on 8 May 1965. The objective of this agreement was to cover the French labour market shortage not covered by immigrants coming from other countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal (De Tapia 2004; Akgündüz 2008). In reality, the French National Bureau of Immigration (OFI) started signing collective contracts to recruit Turkish workers at the beginning of the 1970s, attracting these immigrant workers to industrial areas (Alsace, Vosges, Rhône-Alpes) and some rural areas (Auvergne and Limousin) (Burdy 2006: 63).

The first flows were mainly composed of young unskilled workers from rural regions of Turkey who mainly became employed in France’s industrial sector. During the 1970s, Turkish migrants’ employment sectors diversified to include services, commerce and tailoring.

The majority of these early migration flows were composed of people coming from the central and eastern regions of Anatolia (around 60%), and from Aegean regions (10%) (Kazancigil 2008: 114-116).
As a result of the oil crisis and the interruption of the formal recruitment of foreign workers, family reunifications started to increase in 1974 and became the main entry channel in the country. The proportion of women in the Turkish migrant stock in France has grown in a parallel way.

This immigration was marked by a high economic dynamicity. The entrepreneurial approach is very important in Turkish migration trajectories and, beginning in the 1980s, this field of activity grew progressively, given the decreasing possibility of finding employment in the industrial sector.

In 2002, 17% of Turkish migrants in France were craftsman, tradespeople or business owners (Kazancigil 2008: 114-116). This was the highest level of entrepreneurs among immigrants, higher than that of the Italians, Spanish and Portuguese. Through their entrepreneurial success, some members of the Turkish community in France began to gain prestige and act as mediators between the Turkish community and the destination society. However, two out of three migrants are still workers (33% skilled, and 30% unskilled workers) (Kazancigil 2008).

As regards their geographical distribution in France, Turkish immigrants are concentrated in specific areas of the country: the city of Paris (in the 10th district of faubourg Saint-Denis) and the Île-de-France region, as well as in Alsace, Rhône-Alpes, Provence and Côte-d’Azur.

The population of Turkish immigrants in France is quite young, when compared to Maghreb countries for example, which is a sign of the significant weight of family reunification. There is a high number of Turkish migrant associations that have been created in France, some of which are linked to Turkish political parties, while others are connected to different Muslim brotherhoods (De Tapia 2004: 11).

3.3 Comparing Tunisian and Turkish immigration in France

Of the Tunisian immigrants residing in France in 2008, 25% arrived at the end of the 1960s. The arrival of Turkish migrants in France is spread over time (INSEE 2012: 102). Comparing both flows over the long term, Tunisian migrants generally arrived earlier than Turkish migrants (between the 1970s and 2000s for the former, and between 1980s and 2000 for the latter) (INSEE 2012: 103).

For the period between 1995 and 2006 (as showed in Figure 1), the trend of both migrations flows is similar, with a common growing tendency. In the case of Tunisians, the growth is more dramatic than that of Turkish migrants after 1999, even if the numbers become more similar at the end of the period considered.
Figure 1. Evolution of Tunisian and Turkish migration flows to France, 1995-2006

![Graph showing the evolution of Tunisian and Turkish migration flows to France, 1995-2006.](image)

Source: INED, *Flux d’immigrants par année et par nationalité de 1995 à 2006*

Looking at the evolution of the stock of foreigners from these two countries (Figure 2), it is possible to point out that the number of Turkish foreigners in France is growing, most significantly between 1982 and 1990 and less significantly afterwards. In the case of Tunisian foreigners, the trend is different, considering the decrease in their numbers after 1990. When compared to data on the flows previously outlined, these figures raise a question about the reasons for this divergence. We must consider the fact that two phenomena play a key role in the decrease of the number of Tunisian foreigners: the acquisition of French nationality, and older immigrants’ return to the origin country.

Figure 2. Evolution of the number of foreigners, 1982-2011

![Graph showing the evolution of the number of Tunisian and Turkish foreigners in France, 1982-2011.](image)

Looking at the shares of immigrants of the two countries out of the total immigrant population in France (Figure 3), a progressive convergence emerges at the end of 2000s.

**Figure 3. Evolution of the shares of Tunisian and Turkish immigrants**

* (% of the total population of immigrants in France)

The age of migrants upon their arrival shows that Turkish immigrants arrive younger than Tunisians; in 2008, the average age of migrants upon arrival was 22 years old for Tunisians, and 20 for Turks (INSEE 2012: 103).

As regards the “second generation”, in 2008, about 110,000 Tunisians were born from two immigrant parents and 70,000 from just one immigrant parent; about 70,000 Turks were born from two immigrant parents and 10,000 from just one immigrant parent (INSEE 2012: 105).

With respect to the Tunisian active population in France, in 2008, 133,199 people older than 15 years old are were active. Looking at the gender share, 67.65% were men (90,236 persons) and 32.25% were women (42,963 persons). As regards age, the most represented age groups are from 25 to 59 years old, for both men and women. Of unemployed Tunisians, 18,551 were men, and 12,821 were women. These data indicate that women were more represented among the unemployed (INSEE 2012).

In 2008, the active Turkish population in France (15 years old and older) was composed of 137,437 persons. The most represented age groups were between 25 and 44 years old, for men and women, as showed by Figure 3.

---

2 The definition of an immigrant in France is different from the definition of a migrant which is used in the INTERACT project. The INSEE definition of immigrants is as follows: “Under the terms of the definition adopted by the High Council for Integration, an immigrant is a person who is born a foreigner and abroad, and resides in France. […] Immigrant status is permanent: an individual will continue to belong to the immigrant population even if they acquire French nationality” (http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/immigre.htm [Accessed 15 May 2015]).
Figure 4 shows that Turkish immigrants are a younger population than Tunisians. The data indicates that Turkish migration in France is more recent than Tunisian migration. There are 96,314 Turkish men in France (70.08% of the total number of immigrants) and 41,123 women (29.92%) (INSEE 2012).

Unemployed Turks number 37,727, and are composed of 19,578 men and 17,148 women. The percentage of unemployed Turkish women is higher than men (given their lower share of the total Turkish population). And the percentage of unemployed Turkish women is higher than Tunisian women.

According to data from INSEE (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques) on family size, it appears that Tunisian households are more frequently composed of 2 people than Turkish ones (Figure 5). In comparison, Turkish households are larger, and are more frequently composed of 4 or 5 people than Tunisian ones.
Figure 5. Immigrant families according to family size and the country of birth of the reference person or partner, in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 people or more</td>
<td>6 people or more</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 people</td>
<td>2 people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 people</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 people</td>
<td>4 people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4. Institutional and policy framework

4.1 Institutional and policy framework of integration policy in France

The starting point of the integration policy in France can be placed after the suspension of foreign worker recruitment in July 1974. At this time, Paul Dijoud was designated the secretary of immigration, under the new government of President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. In the previous period, State institutions considered the phenomenon a temporary issue, and focused mainly on the reception of immigrant workers, addressing legal and social reception, and social housing for workers.

Stopping the formal recruitment of foreign workers has had an impact on the stabilisation of migrants already present in France, as well as on the development of family reunifications. During the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981), the National Office for the promotion of immigrant cultures was created (Office national pour la promotion des cultures immigrées – ONPCI). The programme “The teaching of languages and cultures of origin” (Enseignements des langues et cultures d’origine – ELCO) also constitutes a good example of the perception of the immigration at this time. The State’s actions were oriented more to the return of immigrants than to their stable integration in France. In the period after the oil crisis, this trend was also exemplified by the aid-for-return policy, best known under the “Stoléru million”, named after the amount of money promised in 1977 for voluntary return by Lionel Stoléru, the Secretary of State in charge of the condition of manual workers of the time.

At the end of 1970s, after the first riots in the suburb of Lyon, the question of ‘second generations’, started to appear as an issue needing governmental action (Rea and Tripier 2003). At this point, this question began to be politicised, and at the same time, controlling migration flows became one of the government’s main concerns. During the 1980s, intense legislative activity addressed the issue of immigration, formulating laws on the entrance and stay of foreigners, conditions of citizenship eligibility, and the fight against discrimination. Beginning with the “Bonnet” law of 10 January 1980,
which introduced deportation as a sanction for illegal stays, this intense normative production has made the legislative framework on immigration more and more complex (GISTI 2011).

With family reunifications and the stabilisation of migrants in France, the French perspective on the foreign population in the country changed progressively. A first key step in this direction was the arrival of the Socialist party to power in 1981. In 1982, the government created the Agency for the development of intercultural relations (Agence pour le développement des Relations Interculturelles – ADRI), and in 1984 created a single residence permit, without geographic and working-sector limitations. The beginning of the 1980s was also characterised by massive demonstrations against discrimination and for equality.3

The Secretary of State for immigration, François Autain, established the strategy of an “insertion policy for immigrant communities”, which was implemented through a city policy on education and social development.

With the arrival of Michel Rocard in the government in 1988, the idea of migrant integration was addressed with unprecedented force. In this period, an Inter-ministerial Committee on Integration (Comité interministériel à l’intégration) was established, as was the High Council on integration (Haut Conseil à l’intégration). In the different French governments between 1991 and 1997, there was always a specific Ministry or a Secretary in charge of cities and integration, to give attention to this issue.

The extensive debate during these years on the issue of ‘laïcité’, the principle of secularism of the State vis-à-vis the wearing of religious symbols in schools (and particularly the Islamic headscarf) needs to be mentioned. The Minister of Education at this time, Lionel Jospin, developed a law banning the wearing of religious symbols in schools.

To understand the French approach to integration policies, it is important to note the ‘assimilationist’ approach of French integration policy, which does not target longer-term immigrants as recipients of specific integration measures. According to this orientation, the key element for the successful integration of foreigners into French society is to accept and respect the basic principles and values of the French Republic. Many authors have shown that integration policy can be understood as a paradoxical injunction that assumes both permission (“we accept you”) and denial (“give up your culture”).

It is also important to point out the strong debate about the danger of a culturalising reading of the issue, mainly focused on criticizing the multi-culturalist approach on integration that is diffused in other EU countries. The political discourses against some minority groups with immigration backgrounds, which are well exemplified by the position of the extreme right National Front (FN) and which question migrants’ assumed integration difficulties, are themselves very often restricted to a culturalising reading that points out cultural differences. The most striking example is definitely the creation of a “Muslim issue”, which views Islam and its believers as “incompatible” with the values of the French Republic (Deltombre 2007; Hajjat and Marwan 2013).

The issue of migrant integration is generally very present in the French political agenda of recent decades, and is approached differently by the various parties: the parties more oriented to the left wing are more concerned with the integration issue, while right oriented parties are more concerned with security, “illegal” immigration, and communitarian issues (communautarisme) as a threat to the Republic and “national identity”. However, considering the growing significance of the issue in the electoral campaigns, a consensus is sometimes absent even within the same party.4

---

3 We refer to the “Marche pour l’égalité des droits et contre le racisme” held in 1983, and the march “Convergence pour l’égalité” held in 1984.

4 A clear example of this is the recent statement by the former Ministry of the Interior, Manuel Valls, about the “difficult integration of Roma”, as well as the dismantling of Roma camps and the expulsion of a young pupil of Roma origin. See: http://www.lemonde.fr/a-la-une/article/2013/09/25/roms-la-faute-de-manuel-

INTERACT RR2015/14 15
The actual integration policy involves different institutional actors, at both the national and local level. The administrative organisation of the integration policy through the beginning of 2013 was planned as follows:

- Inter-ministerial services: the Inter-ministerial Committee on Integration (CII) and the Inter-ministerial Committee on the city (CIV) was established in 1989, under the government of Michel Rocard. The CII is led by the general secretary of the Ministry of the Interior and includes, under the Prime Minister’s authority, the Ministers or secretaries that relate to the integration issue.

- The ministerial services: the Secretary-General on immigration and integration (SGII) within the Ministry of the Interior (renamed “Secretary of immigration, asylum, and foreigner assistance”) is composed of eight services including the asylum service and the “Reception, foreigner assistance and citizenship services” (DAAEN) —previously called “Immigration, reception, integration and citizenship services” (DAIC) until October 2013. The DAIC used to be the main administration for integration actions. This service was in charge of all questions about the reception and integration of the immigrant population settling in France legally and permanently; the DAAEN seems to have kept the same functions. This service (which is also within the Ministry of Culture and the Cité Nationale de l’Histoire de l’Immigration – CNHI) elaborates the rules regarding naturalizations, the acquisition and removal of French citizenship, and the registration of applications for spouses.

As regards State offices, we must mention two main structures.

- The High Council of Integration (HCI), founded in 1989 at the request of a Prime Minister, elaborates propositions concerning all questions related to the integration of foreigners. It contributes to the preparation of the inter-ministerial committee on integration, organizes open debates, and leads a network of researchers and research institutes. An annual report is provided to the Prime minister.

- The French Bureau for Immigration and Integration (OFII) was created in March 2009. It reports to the Ministry of the Interior and is the only State bureau in charge of legal immigration. Its main competences are: managing the procedures of entrance and stay on the national territory through prefectures, diplomatic and consular positions; the reception and the integration of immigrants who are authorized to stay in France and who have signed the “Reception and integration contract” (Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration – CAI) with the State; and the reception of asylum applicants and assistance for the return and reintegration of foreigners in their country of origin.

At the local level, the integration policy, defined and implemented by the DAAEN, is implemented under the supervision of the prefects of the region, through the Regional directorates of youth, sports and social cohesion (Directions régionales de la jeunesse, des sports et de la cohésion sociale – DRJSCS). The DRJSCS, established in each region in 2010 under the authority of the local prefect, include the Social departments of local offices of health and social affairs (DRASS), the Regional directorates of youth, sports and social cohesion (DRJSCS) and the Regional directorates of the national agency for social cohesion and equal opportunity (ACSE). The territorial directorates constitute another actor of integration policy at the local level.

(Contd.)


The government of Jean-Marc Ayrault, who was in charge until March 2014, has prompted a reform of the integration policy, and some departments are currently under modification. With the arrival of Manuel Valls as Prime Minister, the perspectives of the reform are even less clear.
The local integration programmes for the immigrant population (PRIPI)\(^6\) have been established by state services (reception, assistance for foreigners and citizenship services). They determine all actions pertaining to the reception of new immigrants and the social, cultural and professional promotion of immigrants. The local authorities and specialized associations, the OFII and the ACSE, work together to implement these programmes.

To implement all the actions planned in the PRIPI, the ADLI (Agents de développement local d’intégration) were created in 1996, to act as resource persons and mediators for specific populations in a specific zone on different issues (social and professional promotion for women, access to health care and social rights for elderly immigrants, parental support and educational achievement for immigrants’ children, information about rights of newcomer foreigners, and intercultural mediation).

At the department level, the department Prefect is the delegated Prefect for equal opportunity (PEDC). Its mission includes the coordination and implementation of government policy, department integration programmes (PDI), and the management of the PRIPI.

The main state offices are the ACSE and the National urban renovation agency (ANRU). In 2009, after several reshuffles, the ACSE lost its competences on integration (which were transferred to DAIC and to OFII). Its level of control was reduced to the local level, similar to the DRJSCS.

**Main policy tools and focus of integration measures**

The Ministry of the Interior has two main tools in the field of integration policy: the reception and integration contract and naturalization requirements.

The first pillar of French integration policy is the Reception and Integration Contract. It is detailed in the article L311-9 of the Code of Entry and Stay of Foreigners and Rights of Asylum (CESEDA) of 2004, and has been compulsory since January 2007. The contract, signed between the State (represented by the prefect) and the foreigner, establishes an obligation for the foreigner to further his “integration into the French society and Republic”, and is valid for a period of one year, at which point it is renewable. It is aimed at newcomers from outside the EU and the granting of residence permits depends on the migrant’s respect of the contract. The OFII finances and implements the services prescribed by the contract: civics training, language training and learning about practical life in France, a skills assessment and, if needed, social assistance.

In this framework, learning French represents a clear priority. According to a report by the High Council of Integration in February 2012 (HCI 2012), “[t]he knowledge and the practice of the language of the reception country constitutes the fundamental core of all integration policy. Without this, integration is not conceivable; exclusion or isolation become standard and withdrawal into oneself, a way out”\(^7\).

---

\(^6\) The PRIPI (*Programmes régionaux d’intégration des populations immigrées*) was initiated in 2010 under the authority of the prefects of the regions. This new generation of regional programmes for the integration of immigrants aims to implement integration policy at the territorial level in association with all the local actors, according to their specific needs. As of 30 July 2012, 26 PRIPI have been finalised in all the regions of the France and in most of the French overseas departments (DOM). Their priorities are the teaching of French language and the coordination of linguistic offerings, access to employment, health care and social rights for elderly immigrants, parental support, the integration of immigrant women and the fight against specific violence against them.

\(^7\) The same report underlines that “language training is the biggest state spending within the integration policy and it is mostly funded by OFII within the CAI and out of the CAI (33.5 million euros in 2010) but also by PRIPI (language training accounts for one third of the PRIPI programme’s total spending which was nearly 5 million euros in 2010), by the DAIC at the national level (460,000 euros in 2010), and by FEI (1 million euros in 2011) – a minimum of 40 million euros just for the integration policy” (HCI 2012).
Several measures have been implemented for language training. The OFII is in charge of two types of language trainings: the language training planned within the CAI and the language trainings planned for persons already on the territory prior to the enforcement of the CAI. The OFII calls on the training providers in each department to ensure that the trainings lead to issuance of a diploma. To this end, beginning in 2013, these trainings have been delivered as “French Integration Language” training (FIL).8

In 2008, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Education also adopted an experimental measure aimed at foreign pupils’ parents called “opening schools to parents to ensure integration”. It consists of language training for parents in their children’s school.

At the professional level, a certain amount of French training in professional circles was authorized by a law in May 2004 (Art. L6313-1 of the Labour Code), in collaboration with OPCA (authorized agencies).

A decree in December 2008 (N° 2008-1344) created a “Seal of Approval for Diversity” (Label Diversité)9 in order to promote diversity and prevent discrimination in the context of human resource management and also within public services, local and regional authorities. It was drafted under the auspices of the State by the ministry responsible for integration, with input from the Ministries of Labour and Employment and the support of the National Association of Human Resource Managers (ANDRH). It is addressed to all public and private employers, concerning their policy of recruitment and career management (and covers the prevention of all forms of discrimination recognised in the law).10

Another measure taken in this field is the assessment of professional skills, organised by OFII in the context of the CAI (Article L.311-9 of the Ceseda). It takes about three hours and aims to enable newcomers to showcase their experiences, qualifications and know-how in seeking employment.

The second pillar of the French integration policy is access to French citizenship. The acquisition of French citizenship by those who cannot claim either citizenship by descent or citizenship by birth depends for the most part on the Minister of the Interior in charge of naturalizations. It concerns naturalizations and re-integrations (by decree) and citizenship through marriage.

The law related to immigration and integration, established on 24 July 2006, did not change the competence of the Minister in charge of naturalizations or his freedom to grant citizenship at his discretion, which is seen as a granting a favour to the foreigner who requests it. Nevertheless, the law strengthens the requirements regarding integration into French society and increases the solemnity of process required to receive French citizenship. The acquisition of French citizenship is seen as the achievement of an integration process and a special relationship with France.

The law of 16 June 2011, related to immigration, integration, and citizenship, established a new requirement concerning the mastery of the French language and the “assimilation” of French culture and values. It emphasizes the language and cultural assimilation that is required for foreigners applying for French citizenship: the level of French language expected from newcomers is high. The

---

8 In 2011, the State implemented a new educational method of French learning for foreigners called the “French integration language”. This new labelled educational method is presented as bringing a better French teaching to foreigners. The label is aimed at training agencies. It guarantees the quality of teaching and organizes the validation of language levels accepted by the administration.


10 The Seal is awarded on behalf of the State. A commission (representatives of the State, employers, trade unions and experts) assesses candidates and makes recommendations. After an audit and assessment procedure, the seal is awarded for four years, with a mid-term evaluation after two years. As of August 2012, 364 legal entities had received the Seal, representing 830,000 employees. See: http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Accueil-et-accompagnement/Emploi-et-promotion-de-la-diversite/Le-label-diversite [Accessed 20 May 2015].
applicants should have a sufficient knowledge of French history, culture, and society, and also support the principles and the fundamental values of the Republic.\textsuperscript{11}

All nationalities benefit from the same measures at the local and national level. No immigrant is targeted by any specific rules because of his nationality. Nonetheless, with regard to the regulation of entrance and stay, and access to the labour market, bilateral agreements\textsuperscript{12} can have indirect consequences on the integration of migrants on French territory, as in the well-known case of Algeria.

This is also the case with Tunisia, which signed a bilateral agreement with France on residence and work (17 March 1988) (\textit{Accord franco-tunisien du 17 mars 1988 en matière de séjour et de travail}), which was amended on several occasions: by the exchange of letters on the regime of movement of persons of the 19 December 1991 (\textit{Journal Officiel}, 7 July 1992), the amendment of 8 September 2000 (\textit{Journal Officiel}, 16 October 2003), and finally by the Framework agreement of 28 April 2008\textsuperscript{13} (Art. 2 of the protocol).

\textit{Main policy tools before departure}

The main existing tools relating to pre-departure measures to further integration are managed by the OFII, and include evaluation measures and training abroad (prior to CAI).\textsuperscript{14} These measures are mainly related to language learning, and concern the beneficiaries of family reunification or the spouse of a French citizen. When they apply for visas in their country of origin, they have to take a compulsory test based on their knowledge of French language and the values of the Republic. Based on the results of the examination, the diplomatic and consular authorities implement a training that lasts a minimum of two months and leads to the issuance of another examination. The acquisition of the visa depends on the applicant’s regular attendance of the training.

The OFII is the only interlocutor for diplomatic and consular authorities and is represented abroad in nine countries, including in Tunisia and Turkey. In countries where it is not represented, an agreement is signed with a delegating body, primarily French cultural institutes or \textit{Alliances françaises}, to apply for an assessment.

\textbf{4.2 Institutional and policy framework of emigration/diaspora policies of Tunisia and Turkey}

Looking at the policy and institutional frameworks of the two countries of origin chosen in this corridor report, it is necessary to look comparatively at the two countries’ trajectories and actions in the field of emigration and diaspora policies, in order to understand their differences and similarities. In the case of Tunisia, one must take in account the fact that the revolution of 2011 deeply changed the country’s political landscape, as well as its institutional structures and approach towards Tunisian emigrants.

The attitude of Tunisia \textit{vis-à-vis} of the emigration of its citizens has changed over time (Simon 1974: 14). Looking at the first period of the emigration, between 1955 and 1963, the government was generally opposed to emigration, considering it a risk to lose their skilled workers during the creation

\textsuperscript{11} For more on the ways to access to citizenship (by operation of the law, by declaration, acquisition by a Prime Minister’s decree, through a proposition by the Minister in charge of naturalizations), consult http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?rubrique113 [Accessed 25 May 2015].

\textsuperscript{12} An updated list of multiple existing bilateral agreements is available on the site of the association GISTI, on: http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?rubrique135 [Accessed 20 May 2015].

\textsuperscript{13} “Accord cadre France-Tunisie du 28 avril 2008, relatif à la gestion concertée des migrations et au développement solidaire entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République tunisienne”, Tunis 28 April 2008, and in force after 1 July 2009.

of a national economy after independence. After 1963, Tunisian authorities had to face unemployment on the national labour market, as well as informal outflows of migration. This led to the signature of various bilateral workforce agreements with France (on 9 August 1963), but also later with the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Libya. At the same time, in 1967 Tunisia created an Office of professional formation and employment (OFPE), which had a special division of emigration with the mission of controlling growing emigration flows at each level.

In general terms, the current Tunisian emigration policy tries to combine two different elements: sending some of its citizens overseas, and keeping strong ties between emigrants and their origin country. Before the Tunisian revolution in January 2011, the two main axes of Tunisian emigration policy, within the framework of the Economic and Social Plan 2010-2014, were: promoting legal migration through the signing of agreements with European countries and other countries outside Europe (Canada, Australia, etc.); and strengthening links with Tunisian emigrants in order to encourage their participation in local development. More precisely, for the period 2009-2014, the emigration policy continued the programme developed by the government to promote legal migration by boosting bilateral agreements with Italy and France, and through openness to the private sector by granting permission to private employment agencies to act at the level of international investment on the one hand, and strengthen actions towards the Tunisian diaspora to increase its participation in development efforts, on the other.

After the fall of the former regime, the transitional democratic government faced two important events related to migration: the upsurge of irregular migration into Italy and the massive return of Tunisians from Libya. Moreover, since the revolution, Tunisian migrant associations have applied to participate in the redefinition of migration policy. Migration issues are part of the important social, economic and political changes brought about by the revolution. Indeed, on the one hand there is a new attitude on the part of the public authorities regarding Tunisian migrants, and on the other hand there is a significant interest in participating in the work of rebuilding the country that is expressed by emigrants through elites and leaders of associations that are active in the countries of immigration. The entry of several bi-national politicians into political life has encouraged expatriate elites to contribute their skills to the new administration.

In the case of Turkey, the policy framework on emigration has also evolved in a significant way over time. In the 1960s, in order to decrease unemployment and benefit from remittances as tools of development, the Turkish state promoted emigration through bilateral labour agreements. In the early stages of mass migration, the Turkish state adopted an economic mentality that focused on remittances and expected migrants to return to Turkey. At this time, Turkey’s emigration policy was linked to its First Five-year Development Plan (1962-1967), which emphasized the “export of surplus labour power” as a crucial tool for development. Aiming for a reduction in unemployment and increases in the inflow of remittances, Turkey signed bilateral labour recruitment agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany (1961), Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium (1964), France (1965), Sweden and Australia (1967). During this first wave of migration flows to Europe in the 1960s, the overall state emigration policy in Turkey was based on facilitating remittance flows and the easy return of labour migrants.

Alerted by the first signs of permanent Turkish settlement in Europe, the Turkish state started taking measures to encourage returns to Turkey. During the 1970s, a voluntary return programme was implemented together with the United Nations Development Programme. To facilitate the integration process of returning migrant workers, the Turkish state established schools teaching German as a foreign language to migrants’ children who had returned from Germany and introduced programmes to reduce taxes on returning workers’ real estate and entrepreneurial purchases. However, the influence of these state attempts has remained limited. Various programmes were initiated during this period to channel workers’ remittances into employment generating investments. However, these initiatives did not live up to the expectations of balanced development across the country.
In the 1980s, permanent Turkish settlement in Europe was generally accepted. The economic mentality of the state’s emigration policy was slowly replaced with social, cultural, and political measures to support integration abroad. Parliamentary debates from the 1960s to 1980s demonstrated this gradual change in the state’s perception of emigrants as the “distant workers” changed to “migrant workers”, “Turkish citizens abroad”, and “minorities in Europe”. During this period, the Turkish state increased its engagement with Turkish emigrants in the host countries and created legal and official incentives in order to secure links with emigrants, and to closely monitor and improve the conditions of Turkish emigrants in Europe. The Dual Citizenship Law (1981) and the inclusion of government responsibilities concerning Turkish emigrants in the 1982 Constitution served these aims.\(^\text{15}\)

In the 1990s, the Turkish state began institutionalising measures to monitor and control its overseas populations. The Blue Card procedure introduced in 1995 (known as the Pink Card before 2009) is the result of the emigration policy that promoted settlement in Europe without losing ties with the home country. With the Blue Card procedure, Turkish nationals who gave up Turkish citizenship to become citizens in their country of residence were granted political and social rights in Turkey. This card provided Turkish nationals and their children with rights equivalent to those of Turkish citizens, with the exception of voting rights.

Beginning in the 2000s, the state became actively involved in bringing together domestic institutions and Turkish representatives from a wider geography with the main aim of maintaining cultural ties. Turkey’s increasingly systematic approach towards Turkish emigrants culminated with the establishment of a new government department called the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı) in 2010. This presidency aims to maintain and strengthen the relationship of the Turkish state with Turkish citizens living abroad. Turkey’s systematic approach towards emigration is gradually becoming more visible with the general expansion of political, civic, socio-economic and cultural rights of emigrants.

Looking at the public discourses on emigration and at the weight of this issue on the political agenda, we have to point out important evolutions in the two countries, even if the practical implementation of these changes seems to be different in the two cases.

In Tunisia, an annual commission follows up at the National Parliament on emigration issues. However, since the 2011 revolution, concern about emigration has risen and become more important on political agenda, as proven by the creation of a “State secretary of migration and Tunisians abroad” (SEMTE) in 2012. Through this institution, the new guidelines of migration policy focus on three aims: drafting a national strategy on migration between the EU and Tunisia,\(^\text{16}\) strengthening the feeling of belonging to the homeland for Tunisians abroad,\(^\text{17}\) and strengthening the emigrant community’s involvement in the current democratic process and in the country’s development.

In the case of Turkey, State discourses on emigration have also changed greatly over time. In 1980s, the state’s aim was only to maintain ties with emigrants. In the 2000s, the state’s aim is to benefit from emigrants as representatives of Turkey abroad. Media discourse has also evolved from

\(^{15}\) Article 62 of the 1982 Constitution noted: “The Government takes measures to ensure the family unity of Turkish citizens working in foreign countries, to educate their children, to meet their cultural needs, to provide social security, to protect their link to the motherland and to facilitate their return.”

\(^{16}\) On various issues such as border management, labour emigration, assistance to the Tunisian community abroad, return and reinsertion, migration, and development. The SEMTE works in collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social Issues.

\(^{17}\) By ensuring effective assistance to Tunisians abroad, the protection of rights of the community, an improvement in the system of social protection and in the quality of administrative services addressed to Tunisians abroad, as well as support for community integration and prestige in host countries. SMTE and OTE (Office of Tunisian abroad) are responsible for these actions.
focusing on returns in the 1970s to concentrating on the conditions of emigrants abroad in the 1980s, and on emigrants’ achievements in their host countries in recent years.

Strengthening ties with Turkish emigrants living abroad is an issue on the political agenda. The 2000s have been marked by an intense institutionalization in relation to Turkish emigrants. On the one hand, since 1998, established institutions such as the Advisory and High Committees for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad have been monitoring and reporting the challenges faced by Turkish emigrants to the Turkish Parliament.

With regard to the institutions dealing with emigration and diaspora policy, the responsible state’s bodies in Tunisia are the Ministry of Labour, the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation (ATCT), and the Office of Consular Affairs (under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The Ministry of Social Issues and Solidarity (through the Office of Tunisians Abroad) elaborates emigration policies. A new dedicated state structure, the State Secretariat for migration and Tunisians living abroad, focusing on emigrants, communities abroad, and returnees was created in December 2012, in the aftermath of the revolution. Currently, the General Secretary is Houcine Jazaïri, a member of the Ennahdha Islamist political Party. This institution is in charge of migration and aims to merge visions, ensure good governance of resources, support coordination between partners, and understand opportunities in the field of migration.

In the case of Turkey, during the mass migration flows to Europe, the two core institutions regulating the flows of labour migrants with the aim of promoting economic growth and development were the State Planning Organisation (DPT) and the Turkish Employment Service (İİBK). Other institutions and programmes supported these two main bodies. These supporting institutions and programmes included, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security Overseas Branch, the First Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967) (1963), the Law on Housing and Artisan Loans and Lending Money to Workers Abroad (1964), the Second Five Year Development Plan (1968-1973) (1968), Coordination Committees on the Problems of Workers and Citizens Abroad, the Village Development Cooperatives, and the State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank (1975).

On the one hand, since 1998, established institutions such as the Advisory and High Committees for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad have been monitoring and reporting on the challenges faced by Turkish emigrants to the Turkish Parliament. On the other hand, the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, which is attached to the Prime Ministry, has been coordinating the services that state institutions offer to Turkish citizens living abroad. On the cultural front, the Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs and Yunus Emre Institutes teach Islam and Turkish culture to emigrants. As regards legal services, the General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs is responsible for Blue Card procedures for Turkish nationals who have given up their Turkish citizenship but wish to benefit from rights similar those held by Turkish citizens. On the media front, the public television TRT broadcasts internationally and acts as a tool of communication between Turkey and emigrants abroad.

As regards the state diaspora policy, Tunisia encourages migrants’ sense of belonging to their country of origin. The Tunisian government insists on five main goals: providing health care (a bilateral agreement with France exists on this issue); strengthening cultural ties with migrants and their descendents (by establishing cultural programmes, teaching Arabic language, and providing imams for religious celebrations); promoting investment and remittances; gathering knowledge and savoir-faire abroad; and developing information systems for expatriate citizens. Tunisia is leading negotiations with host countries over the entry of migrants and their living conditions. For example, the periodicity of stay is indicated in the framework of technical cooperation. Students receiving a scholarship to study in the EU must commit to returning to work for three years in Tunisia (by Decree of the Minister of Higher Education, 31 October 2001). The state also provides tax benefits for both temporary and permanent return. The state also supports remittances from the diaspora, and promotes emigrants’ economic installation in Tunisia.
An overview of the Turkish diaspora policy over time shows a move from a policy promoting return migration to one that maintains economic and social ties with emigrants; continues to institutionalize the monitoring and control of overseas populations; and promotes the state’s active involvement and representatives of Turks abroad.

While the Turkish diaspora policy focused on return migration in the 1960s, this policy changed with the first signs of permanent settlement of emigrants in the 1970s. As a measure against cultural assimilation, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet) started sending religious officials (imams) to European countries in 1971. The post-1980 period was marked by the increasing engagement of the state with Turkish emigrants in host countries. Education, culture and social security were considered priority areas for stabilizing links between emigrants and the homeland.

Within this context, the Ministry of Education and the Directorate of Religious Affairs sent Turkish teachers and imams to host countries. In 1985, the Turkish government initiated the establishment of the Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs (DİTİB) in Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, and other countries (Bahar 2014). Today, DİTİB is the largest Turkish diaspora organisation with more than 1,000 mosque associations under its roof in Germany. In the 1990s, two institutional steps were taken to strengthen links between Turkish emigrants and the home country. In 1998, the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu) and the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Üst Kurulu) were founded under the Prime Ministry, in order to monitor problems faced by Turkish citizens abroad and report them to the Turkish parliament. Since 1998, the numbers of representatives in these two committees have increased and the countries with representatives have expanded geographically. In keeping with this approach, the 2000s saw Turkey’s first attempt to promote its cultural assets abroad through the establishment of the Yunus Emre Institutes, which mainly aim to teach Turkish language to a young generation of Turks with migration backgrounds. In 2010, the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı) was set up with the objective of maintaining and strengthening the relationship of the Turkish state with Turkish citizens living abroad, persons of Turkish origin living outside of Turkish territories, and with foreign students in Turkey.

Regarding the legal aspects of the diaspora policy, three developments deserve attention. The first one is the introduction of dual citizenship (1981), which significantly increased the number of Turkish citizens who obtained the citizenship of their host country. The second legal development is the inclusion of Turkish citizens abroad in the 1982 Constitution. The third development is the Blue Card procedure which, since 1995, has granted political and social rights to migrants who gave up Turkish citizenship to become citizens in their country of residence.

In Tunisia, the institutions responsible for the creation and implementation of the diaspora policy are: the Ministry of Foreigner Affairs (via local embassies and consulates abroad); the Ministry of International Cooperation and the Ministry of Labour, which are responsible for employment and professional insertion; the Ministry of Social Affairs and Solidarity, which deals with social, cultural and economic issues (social security, the teaching of Arabic, investment support); the Office of Tunisians Abroad and the National Social Security Fund (CNSS), which are responsible for the implementation of diaspora policy’s measures; the Ministry of Culture, which deals with cultural programmes, reinforcing the attachment of Tunisian migrants and their families to their country; and finally, the Ministry of Religious Issues, which provides imams for religious celebrations. The bureaucratic unit focusing on migrant communities abroad is the Office of Tunisians Living Abroad (Office des Tunisiens de l’étranger – OTE). It belongs to the State Secretariat for migration and Tunisians living abroad (Ministry of Social Affairs and Solidarity) and represents a consultative expatriate council. This office publishes scientific reports, analyses, and expert notes on the state of Tunisian migration.

In Turkey, there are currently three major institutions responsible for the creation and implementation of the diaspora policy. In 1998, the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living
Abroad and the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad, founded under the Prime Ministry, searched for and monitored problems faced by Turkish citizens abroad and communicated them in the Turkish parliament. While these two institutions aim to be a channel of information between emigrants and the Turkish Parliament, the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities was established in 2010 as the decision maker in determining diaspora policy.

As regards the political and civil rights of emigrants, the framework in the two origin countries seems to be quite similar concerning voting from abroad and the modalities of casting votes.

The Tunisian electoral system is currently being overhauled due to the 2011 political break, i.e. the end of the period of dictatorship and the establishment of a democracy. Until then, the political involvement of Tunisian citizens abroad was limited; they were allowed to vote only for the presidential election and referendums, and not in regional or local elections. Since then, Tunisian migrants have obtained rights equal to the rest of Tunisia’s citizens (they can vote at every level, both presidential and legislative), but the law concerning the modalities of voting is currently pending. For the moment, emigrants have already voted, through foreign consulates for their representatives in the constituent assembly during the first election after the revolution, on 21 October 2011.  

To register as a voter from abroad one must: be 18 years old; have a clean record; be a resident abroad; be registered in a foreign consulate; and initiate the registration process before the time limit established for each election. Emigrants receive a convocation notice and then need to go to the consulate closest to their residence to vote in person with their election card and their ID card. To vote in a special electoral district (for presidential and parliamentary elections), emigrant citizens must be in their home country.

As regards the institutions in Tunisia that are responsible for the voting process, the Ministry of Interior is in charge of voting rights and applies them abroad through consulates in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organizes the electoral process abroad through consulates and embassies. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for dismantling (counting votes) the boxes that come from Tunisia.

Turkish citizens living abroad can vote in general elections, presidential elections and for referendums in Turkey. Any Turkish citizen who is 18 and older can vote in elections and referendums. There is no time limit after which voters are excluded. The only condition for voting is having one’s address registered at a nearby consulate. Turkish citizens (including dual citizens) can also stand in the elections.

Concerning the modalities by which emigrants can cast votes from abroad, there are four different possibilities: by regular mail, at the borders, at consulates abroad, and electronically. At each election, the Turkish High Election Council announces the modality of vote casting according to the country and election. Even though Turkish citizens residing abroad can vote in Turkey's general elections, until recently there was no practical method for implementing this other than setting up ballot boxes at the airports for emigrants travelling to and from Turkey. This was changed with the 2008 amendment to the law on elections and voter registration.

The Turkish High Election Council decides on the modality of voting based on the type of election and country. The voter may cast votes on the border (up to 75 days prior to the election date, at consulates abroad (up to 45 days prior to the election date) and electronically (up to 30 days prior to the election date). When the ballot box method is used, voters do not need to come to the custom points; they instead vote in the countries in which they are residing.

---

18 Municipal elections were announced in June 2014 by Imed Hamami, the president of the election commission in the constituent assembly; but as stated before, Tunisian migrants do not yet have the right to vote in municipal elections or at other levels while abroad.
There are some differences regarding dual and multiple citizenship. In Tunisia, dual and multiple citizenship is allowed. Turkey adopted a dual citizenship regime (1981) as a practical integration tool for its migrant citizens living abroad, given Turkish emigrants’ permanent settlement in Europe. The dual citizenship regime is highly encouraged by the Turkish state. Former Turkish nationals can also apply for the Blue Card.

Concerning military service, there is an issue connected with nationality: before the age of 20, a bi-national resident in Tunisia must express his desire to perform his military duty in France or in Tunisia, according to the bilateral agreement of 4 January 2007. In both cases, the army is mandatory. Bi-national residents in France have the choice of performing national service in France or in Tunisia according to Tunisian law (for twelve months of national service).

In Turkey, male dual citizens are allowed to serve for shorter periods (as of 2013, for 21 days in the Turkish compulsory military service) by paying a fee in foreign currency (6,000 euros or its equivalent in another foreign currency).

Regarding the socio-economic rights of emigrants, a first point to take into consideration is the existence of bilateral agreements on labour migrations.

The Tunisian Ministry of Employment is actively working to promote legal migration. Currently, the issue of establishing formal channels to recruit foreign workers for EU countries is strictly connected with the issue of cooperation in managing irregular migration flows towards Europe and the acceptance of readmissions of irregular migrants.

Concerning France, its first bilateral agreement on the labour force was signed in August 1963. After an initial application, France suspended the agreement unilaterally, in response to the nationalisation of colonial lands. The formal recruitment of Tunisian workers started again in 1969, when a mission of the ONI (the French national bureau of immigration) was opened in Tunis, to work in collaboration with the OFPE (the Tunisian Bureau of professional formation and employment) (Simon 1974: 14). A newer Tunisian-French agreement on legal migration was signed in 2008, which stipulated the granting of work visas to 9,000 Tunisian candidates for emigration (even if applications do not exceed 3,000 per year). As in the case of Italy, the agreement includes also the issues of managing irregular flows, readmissions, and development aid. Today, Tunisia is trying to re-engage the agreement and for this reason, a cooperation programme has been implemented. It aims to strengthen the capacities of structures in charge of international investment, such as the National Agency for Employment and Independent Work. To fill vacancies in France, close cooperation was adopted between the two Tunisian institutions (ANETI) and the French National Agency for Employment (ANPE), which currently no longer exists. Thus, it is expected that Pôle Emploi (the French employment agency) will address periodic offers and ANETI will try to provide Tunisian candidates to satisfy these employment offers. The government has developed an active policy in this field that involves both emigration institutions and those in the private sector. These private placement offices abroad must inform the Ministry of Employment of investments that they make abroad under the provisions of the implementing decree established.

Some bilateral agreements exist between Tunisia and France on different issues such as double taxation, the portability of social rights, labour rights and investments. The Agreement eliminates double taxation and establishes rules on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters (28 May 1973). Other bilateral agreements include the Agreement on residence and work (17 March 1988), the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments (20 October 1997), the Agreement on social security (26 June 2003), and the recent Framework agreement for the concerted management of migration and inclusive development (28 April 2008).

On its side, Turkey has signed bilateral agreements against the double taxation of income with 80 countries, including France. Additionally, real estate income is taxed in the country where the real estate is located. In addition, Turkey has signed bilateral social security agreements with 23 countries,
including France, allowing the portability of social rights. These social security agreements allow health benefits for emigrants visiting Turkey and for retired emigrants who have returned to Turkey. Moreover, Turkish citizens and persons with dual citizenship living abroad can choose to retire in Turkey in order to benefit from the country’s retirement rights.

In the case of Turkey, the State has elaborated several programmes supporting emigrants’ engagement in the country. During the mass migration period of the 1960s, the Turkish government initiated three development programmes to engage emigrants in the Turkish economy. The first project for reintegrating the return migrants’ savings into local economies was the creation of the Village Development Cooperatives, established in 1962 with the aim of developing rural areas. Between 1965 and 1973, there were approximately 1,400 cooperatives. However, most cooperatives aimed to secure jobs for their members and facilitated migration rather than realizing productive investments in the villages through remittances. The second programme, which started in 1960s, included support for the establishment of workers’ joint stock companies that would invest in the less developed regions of the country. “Workers’ joint stock companies” are a more developed form of village development cooperatives as they seek the promotion of industrialization on a country basis. The aim was to create job opportunities for returning migrants and to open a channel for the economic use of their savings. In order to be qualified as a joint stock company, the company was to be founded by individuals working abroad or who had already returned to Turkey, with fifty percent of the initial capital to be financed by migrants. In 1975, there were more than 100 joint stock companies, but many of them faced financial problems and did not succeed. A third programme supporting emigrants’ engagement in the economy was the establishment of the State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank in 1975. The bank advocated for mixed enterprises organized by the state and for private capital, including workers’ remittances. However, this effort has not been successful either for overall enterprises or for channelling investment resources into less developed regions.

Concerning customs and import incentives, in the case of Tunisia there are some mechanisms to encourage Tunisians abroad to invest in the country, at legal, administrative and regional levels. Some specific regions are classified as areas of investment incentives, whereby Tunisians abroad can receive 10 years of tax exemption. Other incentives exist in agricultural regions through the Agency for the promotion of agriculture. Furthermore, businessmen abroad have the right to import goods related to their core activities (industrial, commercial or agricultural) without paying customs duties.

Concerning the cultural rights of emigrants, some differences emerge from the analysis of the two origin countries.

There are no Tunisian schools teaching a national curriculum in the EU (there are some in Gulf countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, etc.). Equally, there are no Turkish national schools abroad teaching the national curriculum. 19 Nevertheless, more than 11,000 schools have been opened in 140 countries by Turkish entrepreneurs under the auspices of the Gülen Movement. While these private schools implement the Turkish national curriculum abroad and teach Turkish, they have not been established by the National Education Ministry of Turkey. No clear and trustworthy data exist on which schools in Europe are linked to the movement, how many students are enrolled in these schools, and the relationship of the Turkish state with this movement. 20 In France, a Gülen school called Collège Educ’Active was opened in 2009 in Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, less than 20 km South of Paris.

---

19 However, the need for developing the national curriculum in line with the educational needs of Turkish children in Europe is on the agenda of the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (Yurttaş Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı). The Presidency organized a “Workshop on Curriculum Design for Turkish Children Living in Western Europe” together with the Yunus Emre Institutes, to design a curriculum for age groups of 5-6, 7-11, and 12-15.

20 For more information on this movement, see Tuguslu 2012. On the particular issue of the Gülen schools in France, ibid.: 195-213.
It is important to add that at the end of 2014, a Turkish prosecutor charged Fethullah Gülen with “operating an armed terror group” and issued an arrest warrant for him (Letšch 2014).

In Tunisia, there are some French foreign schools teaching their national curriculum. In Turkey, many foreign schools were founded at the end of the 19th century such as the American Academy for Girls, Robert College, Saint Joseph, Saint Benoît, Saint Pulchérie, Liceo Italiano, and Österreichisches St. Georgs-Kolleg Istanbul. Today, these schools teach the national curriculum of Turkey as required by the national education policy. The distinction between these foreign schools and Turkish schools is that the foreign schools’ have an emphasis on intensive language courses apart from the classes required by the state. Aside from foreign schools which teach the national curricula, several international schools such as the British International School and the Istanbul International Community School in Turkey serve the children of expatriates living in Turkey and teach their national curriculum. As regards French schools in Turkey, the Lycée Pierre Loti in Istanbul is a mixed school with a French programme, attached to the Académie of Grenoble. There is also a Lycée Charles de Gaulle in Ankara, attached to the same institution.

In the Tunisian curriculum, students need to learn at least three languages: Arabic, French and another language of their choice, either English, German or Italian. Turkish students are obliged, starting from the fourth year of primary school, to take one of nine languages (English, French, German, Japanese, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, or Arabic). English is most common choice.

In destination countries, Arabic lessons are offered in every Tunisian embassy to Tunisians abroad and local populations. The Ministry of Social Issues (via the Office of Tunisians Abroad) is in charge of Arabic teaching abroad. All consulates abroad have to propose Arabic teaching to the members of the diaspora. The responsible institutions in this field in Tunisia are the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Youth and Sports, and the National Youth Observatory.

Turkish language is taught abroad in line with the “Turkish and Turkish Culture Programme” which allows Turkish children abroad to benefit from elective Turkish classes in their schools. Turkish language is also taught at the Yunus Emre Institutes, which promote Turkish culture and language in 25 centres in 17 countries. The EU countries where the Yunus Emre Institutes are located are Belgium, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Romania. An office of the Yunus Emre Institutes opened in 2012 in France (Centre Culturel Yunus Emre France, at the Champs Elysées) but it is not listed on the Institute’s official web page and apparently is not yet active.

Turkey sends Turkish Language and Culture teachers to host countries based on the decision by the Inter-Ministerial Common Culture Association (Bakanlıklararası Ortak Kültür Komisyonu). Teachers and instructors sent abroad serve in Turkish Culture Centres that are linked to Turkish Embassies or Turkology Departments of Universities. They can also be Turkish class teachers in European schools. While there is no official list of countries to which Turkish teachers are sent, the Turkish Ministry of Education has representation offices in several countries, including France. As regards the education of Turkish children abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established the number of teaching staff to be sent abroad for this purpose.

Concerning media in origin countries that is broadcasted outside the country, all Tunisian media is in Arabic/Tunisian Arabic and can be received in all countries abroad. They are closely followed by Tunisian diaspora in Europe and in the Gulf region. The programme Hawza twasel (The Link), created for migrants in order to help them maintain ties with Tunisia and to introduce key Tunisian figures abroad, has been broadcast on the former TV7 (the government channel). A new private media, the channel Nessma, aims to gather viewers from throughout the North African countries and from the Maghreb’s diasporas. Some specific programmes target a certain country, while other programmes gather people from all Maghreb countries and the diaspora. The goal of this Tunisian-Italian owned media initiative is to shape a “Maghreb” identity that includes diaspora.
Turkey’s only state television broadcaster, the TRT, broadcasts abroad through the TRT-Turk. Private Turkish TV channels have also established European channels such as Show Turk, Turkmax, Euro D, Kanal 7 Avrupa, and ATV Europe, which all broadcast abroad in Turkish.

At the end of the 1960s, Turkish newspapers started publishing in Germany and established their own press houses there. The leading daily newspapers published abroad are the Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, and Zaman, which are European editions of newspapers published in Turkey, and the monthly Post which has 10 different local editions all over Europe. These newspapers are published in Turkish. The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities has been publishing a quarterly journal in Turkish called Artı 90 since January 2012. The journal references the Ottoman past and calls for Turkish emigrants, co-ethnics, and ex-Ottoman citizens to reconnect with the Turkish state.

In both countries of origin chosen in this report, no particularly relevant policies focused on emigrants have been developed at the local or regional level. In Tunisia, there is no local government; governorates (decentralized administrations) implement the national programme. There is no differentiation between the regions. In Turkey, the local governments’ approach towards emigrants generally centres on non-migrants living in their hometown rather than being emigrant-centred. Some district municipalities in migrant-sending areas (as in the example of Emirdağ in Afyon and the non-governmental organisation EYAD established in Belgium) assist migrant associations’ campaigns targeting the hometown. As of yet, there is no research on local governments’ emigrant policies and no official data is available on emigrant-centred policies that have been created and implemented by local governments.

5. Integration trends of Tunisian and Turkish migrants in France and explanatory factors

In order to evaluate the integration trends of Tunisian and Turkish migrants in France, we will analyse the existing data concerning three specific dimensions of integration: the labour market, education, and access to citizenship.

Using the Principal Component Analysis technique, the number of relevant indicators was reduced and replaced with a smaller number of new variables for each dimension of integration considered. These new variables (principal components) explain the maximum amount of variation among the performances of different immigration corridors, considering the three domains separately. On this basis, a synthetic index that allows the ranking of the immigrant corridors within each dimension was created. The main indicators building up the main three indexes were:

the Labour market integration index

- Employment rate
- Unemployment rate
- Activity rate
- Over-qualification rate

the Education integration index

- Highest educational attainment
- School enrolment rate at age 15-25

---

21 Such as providing assistance to low-income families, providing wheelchairs for the disabled, providing public hospitals with medical tools, and building school libraries, mosques and fountains in the migrant-sending district in Turkey.
• School enrolment rate at age 25-35
• % of international students at age 20-24

Citizenship integration index
• Citizenship acquisition rate
• % of naturalised citizens of the total born-abroad population (2013 data)

The indexes rank the corridors based on the level of integration by assigning numbers from 0 to 1. The higher the rank, the better the integration. In the corridor reports, the index is calculated without taking into account the gap between migrants and natives. It should be interpreted whereby the higher the index, the better the performance of that corridor compared to the other corridors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGIN</th>
<th>Labour Market</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Access to citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index</td>
<td>Gap index</td>
<td>Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan, and Bonfanti (2015); note: year of reference 2012, as for the following tables if not explicitly mentioned.

The integration index elaborated for Tunisian and Turkish migrants in France shows significant differences between the two communities in the three fields considered (Table 1). In all of the three fields analysed here, the level of integration of Tunisian immigrants is higher than for Turkish immigrants.

Regarding the labour market, the index shows an important dissimilarity between the two communities and attributes a level of 0.50 to Tunisian immigrants, versus a level of 0.15 for Turkish immigrants. The index on education also shows a difference between the two communities, even if lower than in other dimensions: 0.21 for Tunisians, versus 0.05 for Turkish immigrants. The index on access to citizenship again shows significant differences between the two communities: the index is 0.77 for Tunisians, but 0.41 for Turks.

In the following pages, we will try to link the differences emerging through the different indicators of each dimension with the existing policies of origin countries to understand the role of state actors, if they exist. In a following section, we will concentrate on the possible role of non-state actors, and on other explanatory factors of such trends.

5.1 Labour market

Looking at general data on Turkish and Tunisian immigrants in the French labour market (Table 2), we can point out that the pattern of Tunisians is closer to that of French nationals than to Turks.

Looking at the employed share of the total working age population, only 40.4% of Turks are in this category, versus 51.7% of Tunisians, and 64.8% of French. This low share of employed persons among Turkish migrants is due to a very high number of inactive and unemployed people compared with both Tunisian migrants and – to a large extent – French people. Indeed, the share of unemployed is 15.3% for Turks, 11.3% for Tunisians, and 6.6% for the French population. The share of the inactive population is 44.3% for Turkish immigrants, 36.9% for Tunisian immigrants, and 28.7% for French nationals.

The unemployment rate is obviously higher for all three groups: 27.4% for Turkish immigrants followed by 18% for Tunisians, and 9.2% for French people.
Table 2. Working age population born in Turkey, Tunisia and France by status (in shares) and unemployment rates (%), France, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Working age population status</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With regard to types of employment (Table 3), Tunisians are more self-employed than Turks (respectively 20.3% and 15.2%), although both groups are more self-employed than the French (only 10.7%).

Table 3. Employed population born in Turkey, Tunisia and France by type of employment (in shares), France, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Self-employed</th>
<th>Employee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With regard to employment by sector (Table 4), the data for Tunisians are particularly similar to those of the French population, while the data for Turks show some dissimilarities. The percentage of immigrants employed in agriculture is quite limited (1% of Tunisians and 2% of Turks, compared to 3% of the French population). The share of the population employed in manufacturing and the service sector show more significant differences. The shares of Tunisian immigrants and French nationals employed in the manufacturing sector (respectively 22% and 23%) and in the services sector (77% for Tunisians and 76% for French nationals) are quite similar. However, Turkish immigrants in particular are more employed in the manufacturing sector (52%) and less in services (46%).

Table 4. Employed population born in Turkey, Tunisia and France by sector of employment (in shares), France, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As regards occupational levels based on ISCO categories (Table 5), the data show that the pattern of Tunisian immigrants is again very close to that of the French population, while the data for Turks are relatively different. The share of Turkish employees in higher-skilled occupations (ISCO categories 1, 2, and 3) is only 14.3%, while the share of employees in lower-skilled occupations (ISCO categories 4 to 9) is 85.7%. The employment pattern for Tunisians is quite different when compared to the Turkish one: 43% are employed in higher-skilled occupations, versus 57% in lower-skilled ones, a picture very similar to the pattern for the French population (44% in higher-skilled occupations, and 56% in lower-skilled ones).
Table 5. Employed population born in Turkey, Tunisia, and France by level of occupation (in shares), France, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Share of employees with occupational ISCO from 1 to 3 (high-skilled occupation)</th>
<th>Share of employees with occupational ISCO from 4 to 9 (relatively low-skilled occupation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To explain this difference, we must note that the share of tertiary educated Tunisians in France is higher than that of Turks (18% of Tunisians, and 8% of Turkish immigrants). However, this cannot be the only factor explaining the groups’ significantly different patterns regarding access to higher occupations. Tunisians immigrants’ greater familiarity with the French language can surely be considered another very important explanatory factor.

Concerning bilateral agreements on labour recruitment, it is necessary to understand if any of them have allowed immigrants easier access to higher occupations.

In the case of Tunisia, the 1963 “Grandval” bilateral agreement, organizing the recruitment and stay of Tunisian workers in France, is complemented by a protocol of professional formation for adults in France. It is difficult to understand the weight of this provision, but it may constitute another explanatory factor. It should also be kept in mind that Tunisia has signed a bilateral agreement with France on residence and work (17 March 1988, French-Tunisian agreement on residence and work, amended in 1991, 2000, and finally by the Framework agreement of 28 April 2008). This agreement, concerning the regulation of entrance and stay, as well as Tunisian immigrants’ access to the labour market, can also be an explanatory factor of the aforementioned differences in the employment categories.

As regards reasons for those with an inactivity status, only 4.6% of inactive Tunisians and 5.1% of inactive Turks are composed of students (compared to 32.9% of the inactive French population). The percentage of retired persons among the inactive population is similar between Tunisians (38.2%) and French nationals (35.5%), while the percentage of Turks is quite low (7.1%). Concerning the category ‘other reason for inactivity status’, this accounted for 57.2% of Tunisians, and 87.7% of Turks (compared to only 31.6% of French nationals).

In order to understand this difference in the share of retired Turks in France versus Tunisians, we can hypothesise different explanatory reasons that would require further research for confirmation. Is it possible that Turkish immigrants are younger then Tunisians? Is it possible that retired Turkish immigrants in France return to their homeland more than Tunisians do? Could some of the contents of the bilateral agreements on social security have a role in this issue?

A bilateral agreement exists between Tunisia and France on the portability of social rights, and on social security. Turkey has also signed a bilateral social security agreement with France, allowing the portability of social rights. This social security agreement allows health benefits for emigrants visiting Turkey and for retired emigrants who have returned to Turkey. Turkish citizens and dual citizens living abroad may prefer to retire in Turkey in order to benefit from retirement rights there.

---

Concerning the higher weight of the category “other”, explaining inactivity for Turkish and Tunisian immigrants compared to the French population, it is possible that it is linked to the inactivity of women of these two communities. However, why in the case of Turkish inactive immigrants is the figure so high? Further research on this issue is needed.

Concerning unemployed people (Table 6), the percentage of Turks searching for employment for less than half a year is higher than for Tunisians (22% in the case of Tunisians, and 33% in the case of Turks), while the percentage of unemployed Tunisians searching for more than two years is higher (34% in the case of Tunisians, versus 27% in the case of Turks). The data on unemployed persons searching between half a year and less 2 years are similar (44% of Tunisians, 40% of Turks). The data with regard to Turkish immigrants are closer to those of French nationals than to those of Tunisians.

Table 6. Unemployed population born in Turkey, Tunisia and France by time for searching a job (in shares), France, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Less than half a year</th>
<th>More than half but less than 2 years</th>
<th>More than 2 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From this data, Turkish immigrants seem to spend a shorter time finding a new job after becoming unemployed. It is very difficult to understand if origin countries and societies play a role in this issue. It seems more probable that these data are more connected with the sector of labour market in which the two communities are employed in France, as well as with the actions of (and migrants’ access to) migrant social networks in the country.

5.2 Education

Regarding the share of the population between 15 and 25 years of age who are enrolled in formal education (Table 7), both communities differ significantly from the French population pattern. Only 30.4% of Tunisians and 37.6% of Turkish immigrants are enrolled in formal education, versus 64% of French nationals.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Enrolled in formal education</th>
<th>Not enrolled in formal education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Looking at the population aged 25 to 35 (Table 8), it is interesting to note that Tunisians represent the higher share of the population enrolled in formal education, even higher than the French population (5.2% in the case of Tunisians, 1.5% in the case of Turks, and 2% in the case of the French population).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Enrolled in formal education</th>
<th>Not enrolled in formal education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is possible that this high level of the population between 25 and 35 years old who are enrolled in formal education is linked with the data on international students coming from the two countries. Therefore, the indicators concerning international students going to France from the two origin countries show a large dissimilarity, with an important imbalance in favour of Tunisian international students. In the period 2005-2012, the annual average number of international students going to France was 10,842 for Tunisians, but significantly lower for Turks, only 2,324 (Table 9).

Table 9. Average annual number of flows of international students with Turkish and Tunisian citizenship going to France, 2005-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of citizenship</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>10,842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNESCO; Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan, and Bonfanti 2015.

To explain this imbalance in the case of Tunisian international students, one needs to consider the different weight of the French language in the education systems of the two origin countries.

Other elements explaining this difference in international students are the larger similarities between the Tunisian and French education systems, as well as the long historical and institutional links between the two countries. The larger diffusion of French schools in Tunisia, compared to Turkey, probably constitutes another factor. A last potential explanatory element, needing further research, regards the possibility that the historical links between France and Tunisia eases the recognition process of foreign diplomas.

Looking at the level of education of the two immigrant communities in France, the Tunisian pattern is again closer to that of French nationals than to Turks: 82% of Tunisian immigrants in France are non-tertiary educated, versus 92% of Turkish immigrants (Table 10).

Table 10. Population born in Turkey, Tunisia and France by level of education (in shares), France, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Share of non-tertiary educated</th>
<th>Share of tertiary educated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The data reveal some variations in the fields of study of Tunisian and Turkish immigrants residing in France. With regard to tertiary educated immigrants, Tunisians have a lower share of humanitarian studies (10%, versus 33% of Turks), while the share of people educated in technical studies (53% of Tunisians, versus 43% of Turks) and in health related studies (17% of Tunisians, versus only 4% of
Turks) is significantly more elevated. In the case of individuals educated in the Social Sciences, the numbers concerning the two communities are very similar (17% of Turkish immigrants, and 18% of Tunisians).

In order to understand these dissimilarities, without disposing some of the corresponding data about the countries of origin, we can draw some hypotheses. Firstly, the differences in the fields of the immigrant’s education may be related to different patterns of foreign worker recruitment in France. Secondly, the differences may also be related to the different dynamics of entry in the French labour market for the two groups of immigrants (i.e. there are more Tunisians in the health sector), and to the effects of migrant networks in channelling new migrants according to labour market opportunities. However, these hypotheses need further research to be confirmed.

5.3 Citizenship

Looking at the average number people granted French citizenship granted per year by immigrants from the two communities considered here, the numbers are relatively similar: 11,781 for Turkish and 11,335 for Tunisians (Table 11).

Table 11. Annual average number of acquisitions of French citizenship by previous citizenship, 2004-2008, France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous citizenship</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>11,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>11,335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EUDO citizenship. EU; Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan, and Bonfanti 2015. The indicator is based on the average for 2004-2008. The indicator is based on the average for 2004-2008.

However, if we look at the share of immigrants born abroad with French nationality (Table 12), the figure changes drastically. Only 27% of Turkish immigrants residing in France have French nationality, versus 66% of Tunisian immigrants in the country.

Table 12. Population born in Turkey and Tunisia by citizenship, France, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>French citizenship</th>
<th>No French citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From these two figures we can note different considerations. In general terms, the two immigrant communities considered here clearly do not have similar access to French nationality. Nevertheless, during recent years, the trend of Turkish and Tunisian immigrants obtaining French nationality has clearly become more equilibrated.

The share of French naturalization among Turkish immigrants has grown substantially between 1999 and 2004-5, increasing from 15.2 % to 25.7%. However, it is still lower than the share of Tunisians obtaining French citizenship (40.2 % in 1999, increasing to 45.2% in 2004-2005).\(^{23}\)

A first explanatory factor that is linked with the different shares of immigrants who have obtained French citizenship, has to do with the different regulation of double nationality in the two countries of origin considered. The disposition of the Tunisian code of nationality of 1956 and its various

---

subsequent modifications did not require the loss of Tunisian nationality if another citizenship was acquired. At the same time, the policy of the Turkish government, which did not formally allow dual nationality until 1981 (in order to keep the link between emigrants and the origin country as strong as possible), surely had a significant impact on Turkish immigrants’ lower access to nationality in France, compared to Tunisians’.

The recent changes and the equilibration of access to nationality between the two communities, which is highlighted by the average acquisition of nationality in the last years, may be connected to Turkey’s policy change on dual citizenship. However, it is also possible that there are other factors connected with immigrants’ trust of their origin country.

Is the low share of naturalisation among Turkish immigrants in France linked to an efficient Turkish policy of maintaining strong linkages with emigrants? It is difficult to answer to this question. In any case, it is clear that emigrants’ level of trust of their origin country must also be considered. Political, economic, and social evolution in Turkey over the last few decades may have played a role in this trend. At the same time, the stagnant political and economic situation in Tunisia, under the long Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime, may have discouraged the return of emigrants and pushed more Tunisian citizens to ask for French nationality.

The consequences of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) entry into power in 2003 and the rise of moderate Islamism in Turkey, and the political openings in Tunisia after the end of Ben Ali regime in 2011, need to be better analysed in the near future. Looking at the average number of Tunisians and Turks asking for French nationality in the last year, it is certain that an equilibration has occurred, even if it is difficult to link it clearly with these political changes in the origin countries.

6. Impact of actions of civil society organisations dealing with migrants from Tunisia and Turkey in France

Non-state actors in France

As clearly underlined by the 2012 Report of the High Council of Integration (HCI 2012), provided to the Ministry of the Interior, associations are a key actor needed to succeed in integration. Associations are very involved in training programmes and the implementation of the law, through the support and assistance of immigrants. Even if an inventory of associations exists, it is difficult to have a clear framework of the associations that work specifically on integration. Some of them are recognised by the State, through financial support.24 Other actors do not have official interactions with state institutions, as in the case of associations or larger solidarity networks of actors (including migrants themselves), which for the most part use informal practices, for instance through neighbourhood religious organisations.

The range of associations’ missions turns out to be very broad. Associations are involved in language training, teaching civics and the values of the Republic, supporting parents, providing housing for immigrant workers, and compiling a history and memory of immigration. They share the objectives planned by the state integration policy. The administrative mechanisms are complex and numerous studies have confirmed their existence (Fassin and Fassin 2006; Sirevjiol 2013; Tucci 2013). Actions such as legal aid are implemented by associations to fight discriminatory practices and to help

24 Apart from the State, other founders of associations working in the field of migrant integration are the DAIC, the OFII, the European fund for integration and, at the local and regional level, the new DRJSCS and the departmental directorate for social cohesion (DDCS), and some prefect offices of immigration within the PRIPI. Moreover, other programmes subsidize integration policy such as the town policy, and the equality between men and women policy, between other.
migrants with their daily administrative tasks. Some of those associative structures’ actions are also concerned with culture.

At the local level, these types of actions correspond for instance to events or parties, whose objectives are to create social ties, to promote inter-cultural exchanges with background objectives of increasing recognition and legitimacy, and furthering the equality of social minority groups and immigrants. An action can have various objectives.

With regard to Turkish associations and civil society organisations in France, we can mention two examples: “A ta Turquie”, a socio-cultural association located in Nancy which is active in cultural and social activities, publications, and communication; and ACORT (a citizen assembly of the Turkish population), active in the field of migrant reception, and French lessons.25

Concerning Tunisian associations, the two clearest examples are: the ATF (the Association of Tunisians from France),26 active in the field of legal aid, cultural actions, and French lessons; the FTCR (the Federation of Tunisians for citizenship on both shores), a federation of associations from different towns and regions of France since 1994, which is active in various fields such as access to rights and the fight against discrimination, inequality, and exclusion. The ATF took the place of the UTIT (Union of immigrant Tunisian workers), which was created by Tunisian immigrants in France and in 1901 was the first immigrant association established under French law.

Non-state actors in Tunisia

Concerning the engagement of non-state actors, in the case of Tunisia there are currently many relevant actions, initiatives, and activities involving migrant associations, professionals, and student networks abroad. In the past, the Tunisian diaspora remained silent for fear of reprisals by the regime.

Today, young emigrants have been investing en masse in politics and aspiring to participate in rebuilding the country. Nearly three years after the revolution, dozens of associations have been created in France, and they are involved in the democratic transition in Tunisia. The Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTE), created in 2011, is a federation of 154 associations representing Tunisians abroad (including 64 in France).

Presidents of independent migrant associations want to carry the voice of immigrants to the new Parliament. Supported by other organisations, the Association of Tunisians in France (ATF) presented a letter on 25 February 2011 to the President of the High Commission for Political Reforms to request that a future electoral law give the “right to vote and eligibility to stand for parliamentary elections to Tunisians living abroad and the right to choose representatives from among them”.

Thus, three representatives of Tunisian emigration – including Kamel Jendoubi, an emblematic figure of the emigrant movement who was forbidden to return to his country for over 20 years – and were asked to be part of the national commission for political reform, whose main task is to prepare the election of the Constituent Assembly, which has been called to draft the new constitution of Tunisia. Currently, the objectives of non-state actors are in line with state actors’ aims for diaspora engagement.

Non-state actors in Turkey

Turkish emigrant solidarity networks based in host countries have been the most visible non-state actors engaged in emigrant-centered activities. Since the mass migration flows of the 1960s, Turkish


emigrants have established non-governmental organisations aiming to create solidarity among townspeople (emigrants coming from the same town) abroad and to serve the origin town or village through the provision of services.

The first task of emigrant solidarity associations today is to create a channel of information among Turkish townspeople in the destination country and between the origin area and townspeople outside their country of origin. Websites established by solidarity networks include news from a town’s people, business advertisements, calls for business partnerships, and real estate listings to buy, sell or rent; overall, they merge homeland news with news from abroad under the same umbrella. The second task of non-governmental organisations established by Turkish emigrants is still to create solidarity in the destination country. The third task of emigrant solidarity associations is to provide a wide range of services for their hometown such as organizing campaigns for low-income families, providing wheelchairs for disabled people, and building libraries for schools and mosques. These activities are organized in cooperation with the local government in Turkey.

In the case of Turkey, emigrant solidarity associations’ objectives, which consist of providing services to both emigrants in the host country and non-emigrants in their hometown, fit well with the state’s aims for diaspora engagement. The official aim is maintaining and strengthening the ties between Turkish emigrants and the state. The social and economic integration of emigrants in the host countries is considered crucial while cultural linkages are understood to be the core of the relationship between emigrants and the home country. In this context, the activities of solidarity associations are in line with state actors’ aims because they keep cultural linkages alive by creating awareness about emigrants’ responsibilities towards their hometown and supporting integration in the host country (through a wide range of activities from language courses to counseling services). There is no data on whether emigrant solidarity associations receive funding from the Turkish state.

**A final summary of non-state actors’ impact on integration process**

The role that these associations, as well as the other existing CSOs oriented to immigrants, play in the integration process of Tunisian and Turkish immigrants in France is surely important, but it is also difficult to quantify. Comparing the action of non-state actors in France and in origin countries, it is clear that the deeper effects on immigrants’ integration are produced by actors operating in destination countries.

Looking at the exploratory Survey carried out in the field of the INTERACT project in order to understand the actions and perceptions of non-state actors on Tunisian and Turkish integration, we can glean some additional information.

Of the main fields in which Tunisian CSOs who participated to the survey are active, the labour market, political and civil participation, education, language, and social interaction are the most prominent fields in order of importance. As regards Turkish CSOs, their main fields of activity are political and civil participation, language, the labour market, education and social interactions. The most common typology of CSOs dealing with migrant integration is largely that of the association; they are either small or large organisations (in the case of organisations dealing with Tunisian migrants) or various sizes of organisations (in the case of organisations dealing with Turkish migrants).

As regards the services offered in the field of labour market integration, support for training, the provision of information about legal frameworks, institutional settings at destination, and available jobs are the most common, for Tunisians as well as for Turks. In the case of Tunisian CSOs, it is interesting to note that they are also active in lobbying for legal incentives and priorities and for the recognition of qualifications.

---

27 For more information, please refer to forthcoming INTERACT survey report.
Regarding CSOs’ opinions on the most effective measures for helping immigrants to find a job, Tunisian CSOs feel that governmental policies and/or initiatives of the country of origin supporting employability of migrants abroad and pre-departure official programmes are the most important, while Turkish CSOs emphasise the key role of the activities implemented by associations in country of origin.

Occupational skills-matching and employment are the fields in which both Turkish and Tunisian CSOs believe they have the greatest impact on the employment status of immigrants.

Concerning CSO actions in the field of education, the main activities of Turkish and Tunisian CSOs consist of providing homework assistance to children and informing immigrants about student opportunities abroad. In the case of Tunisian CSOs, a main goal is also lobbying institutions at the emigrants’ destination to recognise diplomas from the countries of origin.

In the field of language, both CSO groups are active to teach immigrants the official language of both the origin and destination countries. The Tunisian CSOs that answered the survey are also lobbying institutions in Tunisia to promote teaching the language of the destination country to potential immigrants.

A last important consideration emerging from the exploratory survey that deserves to be stressed is that kinship and associations are perceived by CSOs as the key instruments of learning the language of the country of origin. In the opinion of Turkish CSOs, religious organisations are also playing a key role in this field.

6.1 Impact of other factors

As we have already mentioned in a previous part of this analysis, the diffusion of French language in Tunisia, due to historical reasons that are linked with the French colonisation of the country, surely represents an explanatory element of the different integration patterns between the two immigrant communities analysed here, even if its weight is difficult to measure. This element may also play a role, directly or indirectly, in the different dimensions of integration, such as education, social and civic participation, access to the labour market, residential integration, and political participation.

Colonial and historical linkages between Tunisia and France also play a key role in determining the existence of bilateral regulation in different fields related to immigrants’ situation in France.

At the same time, the specific historical evolution of Tunisian and Turkish migration flows to France can play a role; for example, the formal recruitment of Turkish workers has lasted just for a few years, while that of Tunisians has been in force for a longer period.
7. Main conclusions

In the three fields analysed by the integration index on Tunisian and Turkish migrants in France, the labour market, education, and access to citizenship show significant differences between the two communities. The level of integration of Tunisian immigrants is higher than that of Turks in all the fields.

Some of the dissimilarity in integration patterns has to be connected with the particular historical, linguistic and cultural links between Tunisia and France. Some other differences can be linked with the specific time evolution of the two migration flows to France, as well as with the lower average age of Turkish immigrants in the country. The higher level of tertiary educated Tunisians in France, compared to Turkish immigrants, also plays a role in some other patterns.

Looking at the role played by State actors in the countries of origins, the different existing bilateral agreements on worker recruitment between France and Tunisia appear to be a possible explanatory factor of this difference in integration patterns between the two chosen communities, and particularly in the field of the labour market. In particular, the pattern of Tunisians in the labour market is closer to that of French nationals than to Turkish immigrants, at different levels. Concerning the employment of immigrants by sector, Tunisians are more employed in the services sector than Turks are, while the latter are more employed in the manufacturing sector than in services.

Also looking at the types of occupations according to the ISCO categories, data show that the pattern of Tunisians immigrants is very close to that of the French population, while the Turkish pattern is relatively different. The share of Tunisians employed in higher-skilled occupations is much higher than the share of Turks, the majority of whom are employed in lower-skilled occupations. It should be pointed out that there are other explanatory factors for this dissimilarity of patterns in the labour market: such as the higher share of tertiary educated Tunisians, as well as the higher familiarity of Tunisian immigrants with the French language.

Looking at the differences in the field of the educational attainment, it is difficult to assess the impact of origin countries. Moreover, the fact that one of the countries of origin widely uses French language, even if it is not an official language of the country, complicates the comparison of origin actors’ roles. Concerning the number of international Tunisian students going to France, a main reason seems to be linked to language and similarities in the education systems.

In the field of access to citizenship, the fact that Turkey allowed dual nationality only after 1981 may explain the higher rate of nationality acquisition in the case of Tunisians. This can also be confirmed by a progressive equilibration of the data on access to French nationality. Even if it is difficult to verify, it is possible that the very proactive Turkish policy on maintaining links with emigrants, as well as emigrants’ trust of origin countries and institutions has played a role in this field.

As regards the role of civil society actors and immigrant organisations, both in Turkey and Tunisia as well as in France, their immigrant integration activities have a less structural character, and can appear at first view to be less relevant. However, these activities, and particularly those implemented by CSOs, immigrant organisations, and associations in the country of destination surely have a strong impact on immigrant integration due to their proximity. In any case, their impact is more difficult to quantify and evaluate, due to the exploratory character of the survey, and to the number of diverse organisations that participated. Further research on this specific issue will be very useful to allow a deeper analysis of CSOs’ impacts.
Bibliography


İçduygu, A., and D. Sert 2010. *Consequences of Transnational Citizenship for Migrant Sending Countries: A Debate on Dual Citizenship*, COMCAD WP no. 87, Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD), Bielefeld: University of Bielefeld.


