INTERACT – RESEARCHING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS’ INTEGRATION AS A THREE-WAY PROCESS - IMMIGRANTS, COUNTRIES OF EMIGRATION AND COUNTRIES OF IMMIGRATION AS ACTORS OF INTEGRATION

Turkish and Chinese Immigration to the Netherlands Corridor Report

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INTERACT - Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

In 2013 (Jan. 1st), around 34 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) were currently living in the European Union (EU), representing 7% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working together to build a cohesive society.

Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: first, where they come and second, where they now live. While integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants interact with their home country.

INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights).

INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way?

A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done.

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Abstract
This report compares two quite different corridor migrations to the Netherlands. Turkish immigration is larger and more recent than Chinese immigration, which goes back to the beginning of the 20th century. The report aims to better understand the variation in several dimensions of Turkish and Chinese immigrants’ integration – in particular, the labour market, education and citizenship. It is based on an original methodology combining different data sources (the existing literature, an analysis of the legal and political frameworks, a quantitative analysis, and a survey). It aims to test the INTERACT project’s main hypothesis which conceives of integration as a three-way process.

This report provides insight on the integration policy developed in the Netherlands (ethnic minorities policies) and links it to Turkish and Chinese diaspora policies. It tries to shed light on the impact that Turkey and China may have on the integration of their diasporas in the Netherlands. The main findings are the following: firstly, the countries of origin are concerned about their migrants abroad and develop policies accordingly. Secondly, Turkish and Chinese migrants’ integration in the Netherlands present different characteristics and the interaction between the Dutch integration policy and their respective diaspora policies is a complex one. Thirdly, the impact that Turkey and China have on integration is different with regard to the different dimensions of integration. And finally, non-state actors based in the countries of origin may also have a significant impact on migrants’ integration.

Key words: Immigration, integration, diaspora, Netherlands, Turks, Chinese

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Introduction

Since 1945, the Netherlands has been a country of immigration (in the sense that incoming migration became more important than emigration) (Vink 2007). Several phenomena have contributed to this shift. During the 1940s and 1950s, numerous Dutch citizens (about 300,000) returned to the Netherlands after the independence of Dutch colonies: the former Dutch East Indies (1949), New Guinea (1958) and Surinam (1975) (Vink 2007). In parallel, during the 1960s, Dutch authorities implemented a policy of “guest worker” immigration (gastarbeiders) through bilateral agreements with the countries of origin. Workers from Italy, Spain, and later from Turkey and Morocco, arrived in the country and were mainly perceived as temporary migrants. However, after 1973 and the official end of foreign worker recruitment, immigration continued through labour migration but also through family migration and asylum seeking.

In 2013, the Netherlands had a population of 16,778,025, including around 4.7% (796,235) foreigners, nearly half of whom came from countries of the European Union (47.8%). However, the criterion of nationality gives an incomplete view of the demographic contribution of immigration to Dutch society. It is estimated that 21.1% of the population of the Netherlands have a foreign background (that is to say, at least one parent born outside the Netherlands). The two biggest groups with a foreign origin are people of Turkish origin (395,302 persons in 2013) and people of Moroccan origin (368,838 persons in 2013). The group of persons with Chinese origin is far behind, with 80,082 persons living in the Netherlands.

Turkish and Chinese immigration in the Netherlands are historically quite different. Chinese immigration started at the beginning of the 20th century with the presence of Chinese sailors in the Netherlands in 1911. During 1920, other groups of Chinese people settled in Europe around small commercial activities. After World War II, the Chinese community started to grow around catering activities (Pieke 1992). The Chinese population also came to the Netherlands after the independence of former Dutch colonies such as Indonesia and Surinam where there were already Chinese migrants. Immigration from Turkey is more recent and mainly started with the policy of “guest worker” recruitment during the 1960s through the signature of bilateral agreements. Turkish migrants mainly came from the villages in Central Anatolia and the Black Sea Region and mostly settled in cities such as Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Utrecht (Azak 2008). After the official end of foreign worker recruitment during the 1970s, Turkish immigration continued, especially through family migration (Beets, Bekke, and Schoorl 2008).

Facing durable immigrant settlement in the country, the Netherlands started to implement explicit integration policy in the 1980s. This policy, called “the minorities policy”, was quite innovative in Europe as it was based on the recognition of several ethnic minorities, who were able to develop their own institutions in certain domains such as culture, religion or language. However, during the 1990s and 2000s, this “multi-cultural” approach evolved into a more assimilationist one.

The following report compares corridor migrations to the Netherlands in order to better understand the variation regarding several dimensions of integration of Chinese and Turkish migrants. A corridor means a pair of countries: one of origin and one of destination. The objective of the INTERACT project is to explore the impact of the country of origin in the integration process of migrants settled in the European Union. Therefore, the project raises several questions: “To what extent do policies pursued by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-

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2 Source: ibid.
3 Source: ibid.
state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way?".4

The report is based on existing academic literature and data about Turkish and Chinese immigration and integration in the Netherlands. In addition, several national reports were produced by INTERACT’s correspondents in both countries of origin (including Turkey and China) and countries of destination (including the Netherlands). An important part of the report is based on the findings of those country reports. Moreover, the INTERACT project includes the production of two original sets of data. Statistical information was collected in order to compare integration trends in the EU countries. This includes the production of several integration indexes regarding different dimensions of integration, which allow a certain degree of comparison between migrant populations. However, when this report was written, integration indexes for the Netherlands were not available. In this context, existing reports and Dutch statistics have also been used. The second set of data comes from a qualitative survey conducted with civil society organisation volunteers or employees dealing with immigrants in the country of origin and in the 28 EU countries. The survey was implemented mainly through an online questionnaire. Several phone and face-to-face interviews were also conducted. The questionnaire targeted 9 different dimensions of integration (employment, education, linguistic skills, religious practices, social relations, political and civic participation, housing and issues related to citizenship and nationality). This survey provided information about the perception of civil society organisations’ members regarding the integration of migrants and the impact of countries of origin in the process. Twelve organisations working with Turkish migrants and two working with Chinese migrants responded to the survey so the results presented here must be considered purely exploratory.5

The first part of the report provides an overview of immigration trends from China and Turkey in the Netherlands. The second part gives insight into the institutional and policy frameworks guiding Dutch integration policy on the one hand, and Chinese and Turkish emigration and diaspora policies on the other hand. The objective here is to stress potential coherence or tensions existing between policies of the countries of origin and the country of destination. In the third part, the report focuses on the integration trends that characterize Turkish and Chinese migrants in the Netherlands. Three dimensions of integration are addressed: labour market integration, education and access to citizenship. Finally, a fourth part aims to explain the integration trends of the two immigrant populations.

4 See the INTERACT project website: http://interact-project.eu/ [Accessed 20 May 2015].
5 This corridor report is based on a research realised on the course of 2013, 2014 and 2015. The first part of the research (based on the existing literature, online informations and INTERACT national reports) was conducted between September 2013 and May 2014. The second part of the research (based on the INTERACT statistical and qualitative sets of data) was mainly conducted between March 2014 and January 2015.
1. Immigration trends of China and Turkey in the Netherlands

The objective of this section is to provide an overview of immigration from Turkey and China into the Netherlands. The first part gives historical overviews of the evolution of Dutch immigration policy on the one hand and Chinese and Turkish immigration in the country on the other hand. In the second part, statistical information on migration flows from Turkey and China are presented. Finally, a third part tries to characterize the Chinese and Turkish populations that are present in the Netherlands.

1.1 Historical background

1.1.1 General trends of Dutch immigration policy

The Netherlands, like many European countries, has a long history of immigration. Between 1590 and 1800, the Netherlands welcomed a foreign-born population of protestants from France and Jews from Southern and Eastern Europe (Focus Migration 2007). The foreign-born population decreased during the 19th century. The period between 1870 and World War II was also a time of significant emigration. Then, after World War II, the Netherlands experienced a new immigration. Post-war migration resulted in decolonisation. The independence of Indonesia in 1945 and later of Suriname in 1975 led to significant immigration to the Netherlands. Dutch-Indonesians and Moluccans feared losing wealth and stability in the case of Suriname. Moreover, migrants came from other Dutch “overseas territories” such as the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (ibid.).

During the 1960s, the Netherlands also started to recruit “guest workers” from the south of Europe and from Yugoslavia, Turkey and Morocco. After the official declaration of the end of foreign labour recruitment in 1974, many of the guest workers decided to stay and immigration from Turkey and Morocco, for example, continued through family reunification or family formation (ibid.). In recent decades, other kinds of migration such as irregular migration and asylum seeking have increased.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Netherlands did not see itself as an immigration country. Migrants were not considered permanent and no integration policy was implemented. Eventually recognizing the fact that many immigrants would stay in the Netherlands, public policy shifted towards integration policy. Alongside this integration policy, which aimed to achieve more equality on the socio-economic level for ethnic minorities, more restrictive conditions for labour migration and, later, family migration and asylum were progressively implemented during the 1980s and 1990s. Through the Labour of Foreign Workers Act (1979) and the Labour of Aliens Act (1995), the policy objective was to restrict the entrance of low-skilled migrants due to the loss of jobs in the industry sector and to continue to attract high-skilled workers in the context of the growing service sector (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). During the 1990s, the Dutch government also aimed to reduce irregular immigration. In 1998, the Linkage Act made a legal residence status necessary for accessing public services such as secondary or higher education, housing, rent, subsidies, handicapped facilities or healthcare. This measure generated important protests from actors such as doctors, teachers, private organisations and politicians and was softened on several points (for example, the restriction concerning education for children) (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011).

Regarding family migration, there was a shift in the 1990s from a “group-oriented approach to one focusing on individual integration” and “family migration started to be seen as a problem for the integration of individuals” (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). More restrictive family migration measures were introduced, producing tensions with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties. An example is the requirement, since 2005, that non-Dutch family members who want to immigrate have to pass an integration test in the country of origin. Their family rights thus became conditioned upon their knowledge of Dutch language and Dutch society (Groenendijk 2008).

Restrictions on asylum have also been introduced in Dutch law. From 1977 to 1987, annual quotas were used to determine the number of refugees allowed to settle in the country. Facing a growing
number of asylum seekers, the Regulation of the Reception of Asylum Seekers (ROA) was introduced in 1987. The aim was to limit asylum seekers’ access to social benefits and independent housing. The reception of asylum seekers was organised in specific places (ROA houses) and they received modest sums of money instead of social benefits. This new policy was a way of managing asylum flows by deconstructing the image of the Netherlands as an attractive destination country (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). In 1992, the New Admission and Reception Model for Asylum Seekers (NTOM) was introduced. Asylum seekers were no longer taken in charge by ROA housing. The local authorities’ responsibility has been limited to the reception and integration of asylum seekers who passed the asylum procedure, even though local authorities and grassroots organisations in charge of asylum seekers on a day-to-day basis often protested against this measure. In the 1990s, other measures were also taken in order to reduce the number of asylum applications and the duration of the asylum procedure (ibid.).

1.1.2 Chinese immigration in the Netherlands

The Chinese population is one of the oldest and more diversified ethnic minority in Netherlands in terms of spoken language, migration history and socio-economic situation (Pieke and Benton 1998). If Turkish immigration was historically linked with labour migration and “guest worker” programmes, Chinese immigration seems to have more diverse motives (labour migration, migration linked with decolonisation, asylum seeking, etc.). Before World War II, Chinese immigrants were hired as sailors by Dutch navigation companies. They settled in the Netherlands and when navigation activities started to go into crisis during the 1930s, they developed commercial activities. Chinese sailors mainly came from the Guangdong province, close to the British territory of Hong Kong (Pieke 1992). In addition, Chinese workers from Zhejiang province in China were hired during World War I to dig trenches in the north of France. After the war, they were forced to go back to China but some of them managed to settle in Europe, including in the Netherlands. These two groups grew rapidly after World War II through catering activities (ibid.).

After World War II, other Chinese immigration flows developed through de-colonisation processes in Indonesia and Suriname and through asylum seeking. A first group of Chinese immigrants came from Indonesia. They were characterised by good education levels, and arrived in the Netherlands after Indonesia’s independence. The Chinese population in Indonesia was over a million and had developed an elite in the context of the colonial hierarchy, with children going to Dutch schools and some people studying in Dutch Universities. Only a small minority of this group settled in the Netherlands (Oostindie 2010). Many of these “Indo-Chinese” immigrants were academics and a large proportion worked in the medical sector as doctors, dentists or pharmacists in the Netherlands (Pieke and Benton 1998). The same phenomenon occurred after the independence of Suriname in 1975. However, Chinese immigrants from Suriname were characterised by a lower socio-economic level. A third group of Chinese immigrants arrived from Vietnam as “boat people” and obtained refugee status from the Dutch authorities. As Chinese from Suriname, they were mainly characterised by a low socio-economic profile (Pieke 1992).

During the 1960s and the 1970s, Chinese migrants from Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia came to the Netherlands to work in catering activities (ibid.). This immigration phenomenon was encouraged by the rapid expansion of the catering sector in the Netherlands and by the fact that the immigration of the first Chinese migrant community of Guangdong and Zhejiang was more difficult due to the Peoples’ Republic of China’s emigration restriction measures (Pieke 1992). However, Chinese communities in the Netherlands seemed to show several differences in their situations. The Chinese from Guangdong, Zhejiang and Hong Kong built strong community networks in the country whereas the Chinese migrants from Singapore and Malaysia were mainly low-skilled migrant workers with no strong social network in the Netherlands (ibid.). A recent report from the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) noted the recent evolutions of Chinese immigration to the Netherlands (Gijsberts, Huijnk, and Vogels 2011). During recent decades, Chinese immigration to the Netherlands
has grown significantly. Unlike the first flows of immigration, new Chinese migrants come mainly from the Peoples’ Republic of China. In the same way, after the implementation of stricter rules on working and family migration in the Netherlands, the (legal) immigration increase seems to be linked with the growth of students and high-skilled migrants.

1.1.3 Turkish immigration in the Netherlands

A significant part of Turkish immigration in the Netherlands was related to the policy of “guest worker” recruitment. Significant migration from Turkey started between 1964 and 1974 within the framework of bilateral labour agreements between Dutch and Turkish governments. These agreements were signed in order to meet the need of workers due to economic growth in the Netherlands, in particular in labour-intensive sectors such as the textile industry and road construction. In parallel, the Turkish government organised the emigration of workers in order to decrease unemployment in the country and in return, expected help for development through workers’ remittances. These migrants mainly came from villages in Central Anatolia and the Black Sea Region and they mostly settled in cities such as Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Utrecht (Azak 2008). As in other countries, the presence of these male low-skilled foreign workers was seen as temporary. However, even if the Dutch government officially stopped labour recruitment after the oil crisis in 1973, Turkish immigration continued and increased during the 1970s through family reunification, family formation and some irregular labour migration (Beets, Bekke, and Schoorl 2008).

During the first half of the 1980s, more restrictive labour migration policies were introduced in order to limit the entrance of low-skilled migrants and to channel the entrance of high-skilled migrants (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). This measure, stricter rules for family reunification and the economic recession, probably resulted in the decrease of Turkish immigration flows between 1980 and 1984 when only 4,100 Turks immigrated to the Netherlands. Turkish immigration started to grow again during the second half of the 1980s through marriage migration and also as a result of economic growth (Beets, Bekke, and Schoorl 2008). It decreased again during the 1990s in the face of new restrictive family migration measures (ibid.).

1.2 Immigration flows from Turkey and China in the Netherlands

Several comparisons can be made between Chinese and Turkish immigration in the Netherlands. First of all, the evolution of these immigrations shows opposite trends. Overall, between 1995 and 2009, Turkish immigration decreased somewhat (with 5,254 Turkish immigrants in 1995 and 4,441 in 2009) (Figure 1). After a peak in 2002-2003, Turkish immigration decreased until 2007 and then increased slightly after 2008. On the contrary, Chinese immigration increased during this period (with a slight decrease between 2003 and 2006). In fact, if in absolute numbers Chinese immigration was much lower than Turkish immigration in 1995 (1,392 Chinese immigrants versus 5,254 Turkish immigrants), the trend has reversed since 2007. In 2009, 5,241 Chinese immigrants moved to the Netherlands versus 4,441 Turkish immigrants.
The 2009 annual report of integration, entitled “At home in the Netherlands”, provides some information about migration motives from Turkey and China for the year 2007 (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010: 52). The motives are quite different between the two groups of migrants (see Figure 2). In the case of Turkish migration, the first motive of migration is family reunification (66.7% of immigration from Turkey in 2007). The second motive is study (16.7%) and the third is work (12.5%). Asylum seekers represent 4.2% of immigration from Turkey. In the case of Chinese migration, family reunification is also quite important but only represents 17.1% of immigration. The first migration motive for Chinese migrants is study (42.9%), followed by work (25.7%). Asylum seekers represent 5.7% of Chinese migrants’ immigration motives. According to Gijsberts, Huijink and Vogels (2011), the importance of students in the recent increase of Chinese immigration could be an explanation for the increase in emigration which characterizes the Chinese population in the Netherlands. This
emigration of the Chinese population to the Netherlands could be the result of the return migration of some young students who move back to China after their studies.

If the motives of immigration appear to be quite different, it is interesting to note that between 2000 and 2007, the motives of migration from China and Turkey followed the same general evolution (see Table 1). Both groups experienced an increase in work reasons (4% to 12.5% for migrants from Turkey and 7.7% to 25.7% for migrants from China) and study (2% to 16.7% for migrants from Turkey and 26.9% to 42.9% for migrants from China). On the contrary, motives of asylum seeking and family reunification or formation decreased, although family migration has remained the most common motive for migration among Turkish migrants. In this regard, Chinese and Turkish migrants followed the general trend of migration to the Netherlands, which was characterised between 2000 and 2007 by an important growth of labour migrants and students and by a decline in family migration (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010). A decline in “migration marriages” was also observed between 2004 and 2007, especially among people of Turkish or Moroccan origin. This phenomenon may be linked with the more stringent rules introduced in 2004 for such marriages (ibid.). The number of marriage migration applications granted after the introduction of these measures has declined 37% (ibid.). In this context, the number of marriages with a Turkish partner (man or woman) from Turkey decreased and marriages with Turkish partner from the Netherlands increased (ibid.).

Table 1. Turkish and Chinese migration motives in 2007 (absolute number x1000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Asylum</th>
<th>Family reunification</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010: 52.

1.3 The Turkish and Chinese population in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, adherence to an ethnic minority is classified by the country of birth or by the parents’ country of birth rather than by nationality. Data on Turkish or Chinese populations often refer to population as having a Turkish or Chinese background regardless of their nationality. It is not always possible to distinguish between first and second generations of migrants. In this context, in the following paragraphs, terms such as “population with Turkish/Chinese origin” or “Turkish/Chinese population” are referring to people living in the Netherlands who have at least one parent born in Turkey or China. In addition, the term “Chinese population” and “population of Chinese origin” refers to immigrants and their descendants coming from the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) and from Hong Kong (Gijsberts, Huijnk, and Vogels 2011).

1.3.1 Two growing populations but with different dynamics

Even if Turkish immigration flows seem to decrease and Chinese immigration seems to increase, the population of Turkish origin in the Netherlands is still much more significant than the population of Chinese origin (Figure 2). According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek – CBS), in 2013, there were 395,302 persons of Turkish origin versus 61,890 persons with a Chinese background from the Peoples’ Republic of China in the Netherlands and more 18,192 persons

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6 1 November 2004, two restrictions were implemented regarding people wishing to bring their partner to the Netherlands. First, the minimum age of the partners (both the partner in the Netherlands and the partner from another country) was raised from 18 to 21 years. Second, the income requirement was also raised from 100% of the statutory minimum wage to 120% (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010).
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from Hong Kong. In 2013, Turkey was the first country of origin among populations with foreign backgrounds in the Netherlands. During recent decades, populations with either Turkish or Chinese backgrounds increased. However, between 1996 and 2013, the population of Chinese origin (first or second generation and from the Peoples’ Republic of China or from Hong Kong) increased faster (+97.2%) than the population of Turkish origin (+46%). The growth of the population of Chinese origin in the Netherlands is mainly due to the growth of people from the Peoples’ Republic of China (without Hong Kong). The number of people from Hong Kong has stayed quite stable.

Figure 2. Population by origin 1996-2013

According to Gijsberts and colleagues (2011) the recent growth of the Chinese origin population in the Netherlands is mainly due to immigration and much less to natural growth. On the contrary, the Turkish population has grown mainly through birth rates. In fact, according to Statistics Netherlands (CBS) data, the migration rate of the Turkish group was negative between 2005 and 2008, even if it seems that first generation Turkish immigration began to increase again after 2008. In 2009, the second generation represented 48.4% of the population of Turkish origin in the Netherlands and 30.6% of the population of Chinese origin (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010).

1.3.2 Several socio-demographic characteristics

The reports of Gijsberts and Dagevos (2010) and of Gijsberts, Huijnk, and Vogels (2011) provide information on several socio-demographic characteristics of the Chinese and Turkish populations in the Netherlands. In terms of nationality, the majority of the population of Turkish origin hold dual

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7 Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS), available on:

8 Hong Kong became a British colony in 1842. In 1997, this territory was returned to China. It is one of the two special administrative regions of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC). Its political and legal system is different than that of the PRC.
nationality and only a small minority (less than 5%) hold only Dutch nationality. For the population of Chinese origin, the situation is reversed: more than 60% of the first and second generation Chinese population hold only Dutch nationality and only 8% have both Chinese and Dutch nationalities.\(^9\)

In terms of household composition, single person households are over-represented in the population of Chinese origin (43.7%) compared with the population of Turkish origin (28.7%). According to Gijsberts, Huijnk and Vogels (2011), this could be explained by the fact that recently-arrived Chinese migrants were usually single when they arrived. The proportion of single-parent households is comparable between the two groups and is also comparable – even if slightly higher – with the Dutch population. Finally, households inhabited by a couple or by more family members are better represented among the Turkish population (60.5%) than in the Chinese population (48.7%) (Gijsberts, Huijnk, and Vogels 2011).

2. Institutional and policy framework

What are the main policies regarding migrant integration in the Netherlands? Are China and Turkey producing policies regarding their populations abroad? To what extent do those policies strengthen or contradict the Dutch policy regarding integration? To answer these questions, this section will focus on both the integration policies implemented in the Netherlands and on the emigration and diaspora policies implemented in Turkey and China.

Assessing the coherence and the contradiction between Turkish and Chinese policies towards their own diaspora on the one hand and the integration policies in the Netherlands on the other hand is quite difficult because the evaluation depends on the definition given to the concept of integration. Thus, the following section also aims to give an overview of the evolution of the definitions of integration in the Netherlands, Turkey and China.

2.1 Integration policy in the Netherlands

As Penninx (2006) has pointed out, the Netherlands experienced an original and innovative integration policy in the European context of the 1980s through the implementation of a “minorities policy”. However, this model has changed considerably in recent decades, prompting integration scholars to talk of a shift from multi-culturalism to a more assimilationist stance (Vasta 2007). The following section will firstly focus on the different steps of integration policy in the Netherlands with special attention to the practices concerning immigrants from China and Turkey. Secondly, the current Dutch integration policy is presented. In addition to the academic literature on the subject, this presentation is mainly based on the Netherlands country report written by Fenya Fischler in the framework of the INTERACT project.

2.1.1 The evolution of minorities and integration policies in the Netherlands

Bruquetas-Callejo, Garcés-Mascareñas, Penninx, and Scholten (2011) described the evolution of the integration policy in the Netherlands through several periods: the integration policy during the 1970s, the 1980s and the implementation of the Ethnic Minorities Policy, the integration policy during the 1990s and finally, the more recent shifts of the 2000s. This report will use the same organisation.

\(^9\) According to Liu and Du (2013: 6), if dual nationality is not recognised by the Chinese state, a child born in China with one parent holding the Chinese nationality and one parent holding a foreign nationality can acquire a dual citizenship in the case of countries following “the principle of single ancestry in the acquisition of nationality” (such as the Netherlands) (ibid.). This phenomenon probably explains why the number of Chinese migrants holding a dual citizenship is not equal to 0.
Integration policies before and during the 1970s

Vasta (2007) used the notion of “pillarisation” to describe the early Dutch tradition toward minorities. This concept emerged in the 19th century and allowed for tolerance of diverse religious groups (mainly Catholics and Protestants) who could maintain religious specificities and create their own institutions. The “pillarisation” ideology continued during the period of the “ethnic minorities policy” with the idea that migrants should be authorised to use semi-autonomous institutions and preserve their own culture and group integrity (Vasta 2007). However, in the 1970s, the idea of maintaining migrants’ own identity was strongly linked to the idea that immigrants (as guest workers arrived in the 1960s) should return to their home country (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). For example, in 1974 the Mother Tongue and Culture Programme was created in order to prepare migrants for reintegration to their home country. During this period, different policies were implemented by different ministries whose visions on integration were not necessarily consistent. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment still considered immigration a temporary phenomenon, whereas the Ministry of Culture, Leisure and Social Work had realised the tension between the idea of temporary stay and the reality of long-term settlement (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). Progressively however, it became quite clear that guest workers as well as migrants from the de-colonisation process were going to stay in the Netherlands. The question of their integration and of the need to coordinate the different measures already in place came to the fore of the political agenda. The rise of migrant unemployment in the 1970s and the phenomenon of family migration also brought new demands. Specific funding for reception courses were claimed by schools with significant numbers of migrant children (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). In 1979, the Public Policies Scientific Council produced a report noting this tension between the idea of a temporary stay and the reality of the durable settlement of migrant populations (Penninx 2006).

The implementation of the Ethnic Minorities Policy During the 1980s

At the end of the 1970s it became clear that with immigration flows linked to de-colonisation, the guest workers policy and later asylum seeking, the Netherlands had become a country of immigration with a significant migrant population settling in the country. The Ethnic Minorities Policy officially started in 1983. The main concern was fighting the risk that groups with socio-economic disadvantages and which were perceived as ethnically or culturally different would become durably marginalised in Dutch society (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). However, the Ethnic Minorities Policy was not a policy specifically focused on migrant integration. On the one hand, it targeted only some minorities and did not include all migrants. And on the other hand, it also targeted people who were born in the Netherlands but who were seen as disadvantaged because of their origin and their social position (Penninx 2006). In 1983, the list of groups defined as “ethnic minorities” included fourteen populations: Surinamese, Antilleans and people from Aruba, Moluccans, Turks, Moroccans, Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks, Yugoslavs, Tunisians, Cape-Verdeans, Gypsies and also some native semi-nomadic people called *woonwagenbewoners* (Guiraudon, Phalet, and ter Wal 2005). The main principles of the Ethnic Minorities Policy have been summarised in three points (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011):

1) The policy aimed to achieve the equality of ethnic minorities in the socio-economic domain; inclusion and participation in the political domain; and equity in the domain of culture and religion within constitutional conditions.

2) The policy was targeted at specific groups regarded as being at risk of becoming distinct minorities: guest workers, Moluccans, Surinamese and Dutch Antilleans, refugees, gypsies and *woonwagenbewoners.*

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*Woonwagenbewoners* is the Dutch word for nomadic populations.
3) The policy was intended to cover all relevant domains and ministries, while being strongly anchored in the governmental organisation.” (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011: 143)

The policy was implemented through several domains identified by Penninx (2006). In the legal and political domains, attention was put on the suppression of potential discrimination based on nationality, ethnic origin or religion according to national legislation. In addition, the right to vote and to be eligible to stand for local elections was given to foreign residents in 1985. The law on nationality was changed in 1986, allowing easier access to naturalisation. Access to dual nationality was also facilitated in 1992. Consultative structures were also created for all the specific groups targeted by the Ethnic Minorities Policy in order to give them a voice. Migrant organisations were also subsidized by public authorities (Penninx 2006). In the socio-economic domain, the labour market and unemployment, education and housing were the three main axes of the policy (Penninx 2006). Special training courses and education programmes were created for ethnic minorities. An agreement was also passed between employers’ organisations and labour organisations to offer more jobs to minorities. In 1992, a law tried to push employers to strengthen minority representation among their employees. However, the effect of these measures stayed weak (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). Other measures were taken in the field of education with the allocation of extra funding to schools welcoming children from specific groups targeted by the Ethnic Minorities Policy. Schools received more funding per pupil for children of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean origin (Crul and Doomernik 2003). In the domain of housing, from 1981 foreigners in a regular situation were allowed access to social housing. In terms of cultural, linguistic and religious practices, the idea was to let minorities and their organisations organise themselves. The state’s role here was more to facilitate than to restrict or control (Penninx 2006). Some funding was also used to develop education for children in their language and culture of origin but this aspect of the policy was rapidly criticised as inefficient and counterproductive (Penninx 2006).

People of Turkish and Chinese origins were not equally affected by the Ethnic Minorities policy. Being considered “at risk”, Turkish minorities were a target group and for example, as shown before, schools welcoming Turkish pupils were eligible for extra-funding. On the contrary, people of Chinese origin were not recognised as a minority by Dutch authorities. As a consequence, the Chinese were not included in policies and subsidies targeting disadvantaged migrant groups. During the 1980s however, concern rose in Chinese organisations, which were worried about the rise of unemployment, the growing need for Chinese language schools for the second generation and the lack of integration of the Chinese (Pieke and Benton 1998). The Dutch government proposed to study whether the population of Chinese origin should be able to access minority status. After four years of research and discussions, the government declined to grant minority status to the Chinese, arguing that they were not sufficiently disadvantaged in terms of employment, education or housing (Pieke and Benton 1998). Finally, it seems that in the Netherlands, academic research on the Turkish population is more developed than research on Chinese populations. Numerous studies exist on the question of the integration of Turkish people (Crul and Doomernik 2003; Dagevos et al. 2006; Azak 2008) (sometimes in comparison with the Moroccan population), while works on Chinese populations in the Netherlands are still rare. Except in early academic works (Pieke 1992; Pieke and Benton 1998), reports on the integration of the Chinese population (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010) or which focus specifically on this population are quite recent (Gijsberts, Huijnk, and Vogels 2011).

Since the 1990s, a progressive shift towards integration policy

At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the Ethnic Minorities Policy began to be criticised. First of all, it became clear that the objectives in terms of labour market participation and educational achievement for example were not achieved (Vasta 2007). Progressively, a new discourse about integration emerged and the focus was put on individuals rather than on specific groups, and on

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11 Since 1985, non-EU foreigners legally residing in the Netherlands for at least five years have been able to participate in local elections (Schrauwen 2013: 1).
education and employment rather than on cultural and multi-cultural policies (Penninx 2006). Furthermore, the process of integration was mainly described as the migrant’s responsibility, and the idea of migrant self-reliance – a migrant taking charge of his or her own integration – became dominant (Vink 2007). Efforts were made to provide obligatory programmes for newcomers which included Dutch language lessons or social and professional orientations (Vasta 2007).

This evolution encountered a shift in the early 2000s (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). The shift occurred in a context characterised by the success of Pim Fortuyn’s populist discourse against Islam and migration and when his party (Lijst Pim Fortuyn - LPF) accessed power after his murder in 2002. The success of the LPF pushed all the political parties to adjust their discourses about immigration and integration (Penninx 2006). Another event influenced discourses about immigration and integration in the Netherlands: the murder of the Dutch moviemaker Theo Van Gogh in November 2004 by a young Dutch citizen of Moroccan background. As it appeared that the crime was motivated by religious matters and that the murderer was a radical Muslim and second generation Moroccan, this murder was largely interpreted in the media and in political discourses as a sign of the failure of Dutch integration policies (Penninx 2006). In 2004, a new integration policy was proposed. According to Groenendijk (2008), this policy differs from the preceding one in several aspects: immigrant culture was no longer seen as a positive thing but as a risk; integration was seen as the migrant’s responsibility, with migrants bearing the major portion of its costs (paying for the costs of language lessons, for example); integration was seen as assimilation in the sense that it is not principally directed to support migrants’ cultural plurality but rather to promote migrants’ cultural conformity with what was presented as Dutch cultural normality (Groenendijk 2008).

2.1.2 The current integration policy in the Netherlands

The authorities involved

At the national level, the coordination of the integration policy is handled by the Integration and Society Department (Integratie en Samenleving) of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. As noted by Fischler (2014), this Department collaborates with other Dutch authorities in several areas; Dutch municipalities and local authorities are responsible for implementing integration and participation policies. As regards unequal performance in education and unequal access to the labour market, the Integration and Society Department works in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences. Other policies are conducted in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, and with the Ministry of Security and Justice, for example.

Main policy tools: between integration and immigration policy

The main policy tool regarding integration in the Netherlands is the system of “civic integration” (inburgering). This system is implemented through several steps. As of 2006, migrants who need a temporary stay authorisation to go to the Netherlands must first pass a “civic integration exam” in the country of origin before departure. The integration test is assessed at the Dutch Embassy or Consulate located in the country of origin (Fischler 2014). It consists of an evaluation of basic Dutch language proficiency and knowledge of Dutch society through a computer-based exam. Failure to pass this test can result in the refusal of a residence permit. Moreover, migrants have to pay a significant amount of money to pass the exam (350 euros) and in case of failure, the cost is not refundable. Turkish nationals and their partners are exempted from the civic integration exam.

Another civic integration exam is compulsory for migrants who have settled in the Netherlands. As stated on the Dutch government’s website: “once migrants have settled in the Netherlands, they are legally required to integrate into Dutch society.”12 Newcomers have to pass the exam within three years and if they fail, retake it until they succeed. Once again, the exam concerns Dutch language

proficiency and the knowledge of Dutch society. This civic integration exam is a requirement for naturalisation and failure to pass it may result in the loss of a residence permit.

As it is explicitly stated on the Dutch government’s website, the integration requirement has been made stricter since 1 January 2013. Under the new system, migrants are considered “responsible” for their own integration. They must pay for their civic integration courses and examinations (EMN 2012). Loans are available if needed but must be repaid in full, including interest (Fischler 2014). In addition, as of 2014, the Dutch government made plans to strengthen the civic integration requirement by increasing the level of “self-reliance” required of new migrants and by adding a “labour market module” to the current requirement. A pilot project of “participation agreements” (a physical contract which new migrants will be asked to sign) will also be implemented at the municipal level. This project aims to “demonstrate the rights, duties and fundamental norms of Dutch society to newcomers” (ibid.).

Several authors have pointed out that this integration policy is closely linked to immigration policy as language and integration tests allow the Dutch government to select and exclude certain categories of migrants (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011: 148; Penninx 2006). The civic integration test abroad is seen by the Dutch government as a way to decrease the number of family reunifications and family migrations to the Netherlands (Groenendijk 2008). The policy’s intended objective appears to be less about increasing integration and more about being a tool to reduce immigration.

From specific integration policy to a general focus on participation

At the local level, authorities no longer employ a specific targeted policy but rather aim to strengthen participation and integration through a general diversity policy. The Dutch integration policy does not target specific ethnic groups of migrants anymore. However, several groups are excluded from the requirement to take the civic integration examination abroad: people under 18 or above 65 years old; nationals of an EU or an EEA country; nationals of Switzerland, Monaco, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Vatican City, the US or South Korea as well as Turkish nationals and their partners and Surinamese nationals who have received their primary education in Dutch and have written proof of this; persons who have come to the Netherlands for a limited period, for work, study, employment as an au pair, on an exchange scheme or for medical treatment; and family members of a person with an asylum residence permit. Thus Turkish nationals are exempted from examinations abroad and on principle, Chinese people are not. However, an important factor of exemption is the migrant’s motive and duration of immigration in the Netherlands. Students or temporary workers – who seem to constitute an important part of Chinese immigration in terms of motives, as seen before – should be exempted of this kind of examination.

In conclusion, it seems that there is no specific integration policy focusing on specific groups of migrants, such as populations from China or Turkey for example.

Local authorities and non-state actors

Even if the national integration policy has experienced a radical evolution since the 1980s, a resistance to this shift can be noticed in several cities (Penninx 2006). Resistance comes from local authorities and civil society actors which assume day-to-day integration activities. In this context, non-state actors such as associations or civil organisations play an important role in the integration process.

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14 According to the Netherlands country report, the project has faced significant criticism and has not been implemented so far.
The Netherlands hosts a large variety of migrant organisations, sometimes targeting specific groups. Those migrant organisations cover a large range of activities such as sport, youth activities, etc. Some of these organisations focus on integration or work and social participation. But since 2005, subsidies from the state have no longer been available for these activities (Fischler 2014).

The Netherlands also hosts several minority consultative bodies which target specific populations. Both Turkish and Chinese minorities are represented through the Turkish Consultative Body (Inspraakorgaan Turken – IOT) and the Chinese Consultative Body (Inspraakorgan Chinezen – IOC), together with the Platform for Mollucans, the Consultative Partner of the Government of the Netherlands Representing South European Communities, the Consultative Body for Dutch Citizens of Caribbean Descent, the Alliance of Dutch Citizens of Moroccan Descent, the Consultative Body for Surinamese and Refugee Organisations in the Netherlands. All of these groups are represented in the National Consultation on Minorities (Landelijk Overleg Minderheden – LOM), which is a consultative platform created by the Minority Policy Consultation Act in 1997. The platform’s tasks include relaying the Minorities Consultative Body’s communications to the government and producing recommendations before the government makes decisions.

While this report cannot provide a complete inventory on the integration activities of these organisations, many of their activities aim to increase the participation of their target population. The Chinese Consultative Body, for instance, organised an “Integration tournament”, in order to increase Chinese participation in sporting activities, and a project aimed at supporting the emancipation and participation of Chinese women in the Netherlands (Fischler 2014). In the same way, according to the LOM website, the Turkish Consultative Body has organised a project called “Education: the heart of the integration process”, which is aimed at improving parent participation in the education of their children.

At the municipal level, local authorities can also develop projects with possible impacts on the integration of specific populations. For example, the city of Amsterdam has established relationships with local governments in several countries abroad (Fischler 2014). An agreement with the city of Sisli (Turkey) was signed in 2012. This agreement concerns the exchange of knowledge in several technical (fire-fighting, transportation, etc.), economic (city marketing), and academic areas but also in cultural and artistic areas. “City ties” between Dutch and Turkish cities are often based on Turkish migrants’ cities of origin (Mügge 2010). Projects such as summer schools for children in the Netherlands or information exchanges in the area of health care between the city of Haarlem and the city of Emirdag (ibid.) are diverse.

In conclusion, the Netherlands integration policy is characterised by an important evolution since the 1970s. During recent decades, the Dutch government has shifted from a policy targeting specific “socio-economically deprived” minorities from a welfare perspective and letting these minorities freely develop their own cultural, linguistic and religious institutions to a policy that focuses on individuals, insists on self-responsibility and aims at much more cultural conformity from a more assimilationist perspective. It appears that the focus on specific minorities has been abandoned by the Dutch government. In this context, it seems that integration practices focusing on specific migrant groups are more a feature of non-state actors such as migrants’ associations.

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17 According to the LOM website, the chairmen of the LOM organisations form a consultative board which makes decisions about joint activities and coordinates those activities: http://www.minderheden.org/page/The-LOM-Board [Accessed 20 May 2015].


2.2 Emigration and diaspora policies in Turkey and China

2.2.1 Emigration policies

During the 1960s, while several European countries were organizing the immigration of “guest workers” in order to satisfy the need of workers in industrial activities, Turkish authorities organised the emigration of Turkish workers. The idea was twofold: to decrease unemployment in the country and to use the remittances of workers abroad to sustain the country’s development. Emigration was organised through bilateral agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany (1961), Austria (1964), the Netherlands (1964), Belgium (1964), France (1965), Sweden (1967) and Australia (1967). During this period, the main portion of the Turkish policy towards emigrants facilitated remittance flows and the return of labour migrants (Baser 2013). Turkey also experienced emigration phenomena through asylum-seeking as a consequence of the Kurdish conflict in the country (Fassmann and Içduygu 2013). In addition, the coup d’état in 1971 and 1980 resulted in politically-motivated emigration (Mügge 2013).

During the 1970s, the first signs of Turkish labour migrants’ durable settlement in host countries appeared. Turkish authorities first reacted by encouraging return migration. Programmes were implemented to facilitate the reintegration of Turkish emigrants in their home country. For example, the Turkish state implemented schools teaching German language for migrant children returning from Germany. Taxes reductions on real estate and entrepreneurial purchases were also introduced for Turkish labour migrants returning to Turkey. However, these policies had only limited effects (Baser 2013). Progressively, the idea that Turkish labour migrants would settle durably in the host country began to be accepted and Turkish emigration and diaspora policies started to evolve. Rather than aiming for the return of national workers, Turkish authorities implemented social, cultural and political measures for integration abroad. The predominant idea currently is to maintain and strengthen relationships with Turkish citizens living abroad (Baser 2013).

China did not organize massive worker emigration as Turkey did in the 1960s. After the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, conditions for leaving the country became very strict and few authorisations were granted (Thunø 1996). Emigration was interpreted as a “betrayal” (Xiang 2003). The situation changed after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). On the one hand, the opening of 14 coastal cities oriented toward overseas investment in the 1980s resulted in the encouragement of export-oriented enterprises and in the weaker control of the central government on emigration in these areas. On the other hand, Chinese emigration policy evolved (ibid.). First of all, Chinese emigration management experienced a phenomenon of “individualisation”, in the sense that emigration was increasingly perceived as a matter of recognition of individual rights and not as a matter of a person’s status in the state system, as before. The second phenomenon was emigration’s “institutionalisation”, in the sense that Chinese emigration was increasingly facilitated by several intermediate agencies providing information and services for prospective migrants. In addition, it is interesting to note that China also experienced two forms of organised but poorly regulated labour exportation. The first form was the case of subcontracting companies sending workers abroad to complete projects. The second form was specialised labour supply firms sending workers abroad without being involved in the projects as subcontractors.

Xiang also points out that China has strongly encouraged skilled migration, such as student migration, which became an important part of the new Chinese emigration. This kind of migration is well regulated, with the implementation of policies encouraging both the temporary and permanent return of these skilled migrants. On the other hand, less attention has been given to the regulation of the exportation of low-skilled emigrant workers (Xiang 2003). The Chinese policy on skilled migration with the Netherlands can be seen as quite coherent. As with many countries around the world, the Dutch immigration policy has tried to channel students and high-skilled migrants to the country. Accordingly, foreign students are exempted from the civic integration test.
2.2.2 Diaspora policies

The case of Turkey: keeping legal, social and cultural links with Turkish people abroad

Several elements have illustrated Turkish authorities’ growing attention to Turkish emigrants and the diaspora abroad. First of all, Turkish citizens abroad were mentioned in the 1982 constitution. Article 62 noted: “The Government takes measures to ensure the family unity of Turkish citizens working in foreign countries, to educate their children, to meet their cultural needs and to provide social security, to protect their link to the motherland and to facilitate their coming back” (Baser 2013). In 1998, two institutions were created to address issues faced by Turkish citizens abroad: the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu) and the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Üst Kurulu). In 2010, a new government department called the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı) was created (Baser 2013: 7) “with the objective of maintaining and strengthening the relationship of the Turkish state with Turkish citizens living abroad, people of Turkish origin living outside of Turkish territories and with the foreign students in Turkey (İçduygu and Aksel 2013).

The Turkish diaspora policy targets different areas of migrant social life abroad. Two important legal measures were taken by Turkish authorities in order to strengthen political and civic links with Turkish people abroad. The first measure was the introduction of dual citizenship in 1981. This dual citizenship regime allows Turkish citizens to request the nationality of another country without giving up Turkish citizenship. Dual citizenship, which is seen as an integration tool for migrant citizens living abroad, has been highly encouraged by Turkish authorities (Baser 2013). The other important legal measure is the pink card procedure that has been in place since 1995 (known as blue card after 2009). This card gives rights almost equivalent to Turkish citizenship to Turkish nationals and their children when host countries reject dual-citizenship and force migrants to give up their Turkish citizenship during the naturalisation process (ibid.).

In terms of political and civil rights, Turkish citizens abroad (including dual citizens) can vote in and stand for general and presidential elections in Turkey, and also vote for referendums. As a condition of voting, one must have an address registered in a Turkish consulate and be 18 years old or older. Turkish citizens abroad can vote in different ways (by mail, at the borders, in consulates abroad and electronically (ibid.). Consequently, Turkey has produced strong policies in order to maintain political and civic links with Turkish populations abroad.

Is the strengthening of these policies contradicting the Netherlands integration policy? Two reflections can be made. On the one hand, regarding the nationality issue, since 1997 when the requirement of renunciation of the nationality of origin in the case of naturalisation was re-introduced (this requirement was abolished in 1991), the Netherlands has maintained that people must in principle hold only one nationality. Acquiring Dutch nationality should result in the loss of the nationality of origin. However, exceptions to this rule exist and according to Gijsberts and Dagevos (2010), the number of persons holding dual nationality has risen. Still, the Turkish recognition of dual citizenship can be interpreted as contradicting the Dutch principle of unique nationality. On the other hand, it seems quite clear that the Turkish recognition of dual citizenship encouraged many migrants to choose to become naturalised Dutch citizens – at least during the 1991-1997 period when the renunciation requirement was abolished – which can be interpreted as an encouraging sign of integration. In this context, more than half of the first generation Turkish migrants in the Netherlands hold Dutch nationality (as well as their Turkish nationality). As shown above (Part II.3), in comparison, Chinese migrants are more likely to retain only one nationality (Dutch or Chinese) (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010).

In terms of emigrant socio-economic rights, Turkish authorities signed bilateral agreements against double taxation with all EU countries except Malta. Turkey also signed agreements on the portability of social rights with 23 countries including the Netherlands (Baser 2013). These social security agreements allow for the provision of health benefits to Turkish migrants visiting Turkey or to retired
Turkish and Chinese Immigration to the Netherlands – Corridor Report

Turkish migrants who have returned to Turkey. During recent decades, Turkish authorities also implemented several programmes aimed at the reintegration of emigrants into the Turkish economy. A first project was the creation of the Village Development Cooperatives in 1962 to secure the returning emigrant’s savings in the local economy. A second programme, started in the 1960s, aimed to create job opportunities for returning emigrants and to channel their savings into the local economy. A third programme was the creation of a State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank in 1975 which included worker remittances in mixed private-public Turkish enterprises. However, the success of these programmes in increasing the participation of Turkish emigrants in the home country economy seemed to be limited (Baser 2013).

The existence of bilateral agreements between Turkey and the Netherlands regarding the portability of social rights and double taxation seems to be complementary for both economic integration in the Netherlands as well as for the phenomenon of return migration to Turkey.

In order to maintain and strengthen relationships with the Turkish diaspora abroad, Turkish authorities have from early on been concerned with maintaining strong cultural links with the Turkish population abroad. During the 1970s, an important part of the diaspora cultural policy seemed to be focused on fighting against cultural assimilation in the host country (İçduygu and Aksel 2013). For instance, in 1971, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) became involved in the policy of targeting workers abroad; it sent official imams to European countries and acted as an umbrella association over the mosques and religious associations abroad (ibid.). According to the work of Mügge (2010), the Diyanet has highly institutionalised ties with several Turkish organisations in the Netherlands.

In the field of language and cultural education, Turkey created several Yunus Emre Institutes in European countries which aimed at teaching Turkish language and culture to young generations with a Turkish background (Baser 2013). According to the Yunus Emre website, there is one institute in the city of Amsterdam. In addition, Turkey also sent Turkish language and culture teachers to serve in several cultural centres linked with Turkish embassies abroad (Baser 2013). Finally, Turkish newspapers and televisions broadcast and publish in Europe. It is also interesting to note that from the fourth year of primary school, Turkish pupils must study one of nine foreign languages (English, French, German, Japanese, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Chinese or Arabic) but Dutch is not included. According to Baser (2013), there is no official data about the share of each language taught in schools in Turkey except for some statistics from the Ministry of Education showing that English is largely preferred at each level of education.

It is quite difficult to evaluate the coherence and contradiction between Turkish policies toward the diaspora and integration policies in the Netherlands because the evaluation depends on the definition given to the concept of integration. For Dutch authorities – at least at the national level – it seems that integration is currently mainly defined as a process focussing on cultural conformity with the supposed Dutch rules and values (whereas cultural plurality and migrants’ cultural bonds with the country of origin are seen as potential obstacles to integration). On the contrary, the Turkish diaspora policy is strongly oriented towards the objective of improving the situation of migrants abroad and the objective of maintaining cultural, religious and linguistic links with Turkish migrants. In fact, since there has been a shift in Dutch integration policy, the interests of both sides have to be looked at accordingly. During the Dutch minorities policy, the interests of both countries converged as maintaining Turkish cultural identity was seen as both an asset and a condition of integration by Dutch authorities and as a right by Turkish authorities. The shift toward a more assimilationist stance in Dutch policy requires Turkish migrants to conform more to the Dutch “majority” identity which can be seen as conforming less with the interests of Turkish authorities.

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20 Law no. 3201, 22 May 1985.
21 Regulation on Foreign Languages in Schools in Turkey, Law no. 2923.
The case of China

In 2012, there were approximately 50 million Chinese people living abroad across 100 countries (Liu and Du 2013). In this context, the Chinese government attaches a great importance to the overseas Chinese. This special attention is not limited to Chinese citizens abroad but also includes foreign citizens of Chinese origin (Pieke 1987).

Since 1949 and the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Overseas Affairs Office, whose task is to bring “together overseas Chinese and returned overseas Chinese forces to contribute to the development of China” (Liu and Du 2013), has organised actions in support of Chinese people abroad through several principles and guidelines: protecting the rights and interests of overseas Chinese, supporting the long-term development of overseas Chinese, encouraging overseas Chinese to respect host country traditions and etiquette and to live with local residents in harmony, and promoting friendship and cohesion among themselves (ibid.). China’s overseas Chinese policy has evolved progressively since its creation, targeting new groups of Chinese migrants. At the beginning, the Chinese authorities clearly differentiated “overseas Chinese” (Chinese citizens residing abroad) and “Chinese overseas” (ethnic Chinese with foreign citizenship). Primarily concentrated on the overseas Chinese, the diaspora policy progressively extended its target group to Chinese overseas and also to the “new migrants” who left China after the 1980s and who are often well educated (Xiang 2003). At a national level, the main objectives of the Chinese Overseas Affairs Office seem to be: promoting the reunification of migrants with the home country, expanding overseas Chinese diplomacy, spreading Chinese tradition and culture, establishing a friendly image and reputation, maintaining links with Chinese people abroad, promoting Chinese language education and defending Chinese overseas interests (Liu and Du 2013).

In terms of political and civic rights, Chinese citizens abroad are allowed to vote and stand for elections. However for those who have settled abroad, this right is limited to the county level of the peoples’ congress. The modalities of electoral registration are set up by provincial governments. To participate in elections, Chinese who have settled abroad have to return to China and cannot vote through mail, the embassy or special polling stations abroad (Liu and Du 2013). So accessibility to voting rights seems to be more difficult for Chinese emigrants than for Turkish emigrants, for example. Unlike Turkey, China does not recognise dual nationality and in principle, acquiring a foreign nationality should result in the loss of Chinese nationality. In practice, it seems that children with one Chinese parent and one parent holding a foreign nationality can acquire dual citizenship (ibid.). In a way, the non-recognition of dual citizenship is in accordance with the Dutch principle that people may hold only one nationality. In the context of the assimilationist tendency of the Netherlands integration policy, the fact that up to 60% of the first and second generation Chinese population holds only Dutch nationality and only 8% have both Chinese and Dutch nationalities (Gijsberts, Huijnk, and Vogels 2011) can be seen as coherent with the national policy even if, as stressed above, the situation is different between first and second generation migrants and also since nationality does not presume how people effectively see and consider themselves.

Regarding the social and economic rights of Chinese nationals abroad, China has signed ninety-nine agreements in order to avoid double taxation. However, until now, only two bilateral agreements regarding social security have been signed with Germany and South Korea. Those agreements aim to ensure that Chinese people who are subject to Chinese social security are exempted from paying for social assurance again in the host country (Liu and Du 2013). In order to strengthen social and economic links with Chinese people abroad, Chinese authorities have stated that diaspora Chinese can participate in social insurance. As an example, people who leave China before meeting the statutory conditions for receiving state pensions can keep their personal social security account to enjoy their pension benefits when they reach the required age (ibid.). In this regard, it seems that cooperation between China and the Netherlands regarding the portability of social rights is less developed than between the Netherlands and Turkey. However, no data was available to assess whether this lack of an agreement has produced significant problems for Chinese migrants in the Netherlands.
In the cultural domain, China started to establish Confucius Institutes abroad in 2004. In 2012, there were 400 Confucius Institutes across the world and 500 Confucius classrooms in primary and secondary schools (Liu and Du 2013). According to the Confucius Institute website, there are two Confucius Institutes in the Netherlands and three Confucius Classrooms. The official mission of the Confucius Institutes is “to promote Chinese language and culture, enhance friendship between China and foreign countries and encourage multi-cultural development worldwide so as to contribute to the building of a harmonious world” (ibid.). The creation of a Confucius Institute is the result of an agreement between a foreign organisation and the Chinese institution. The foreign organisation has to make a voluntary application. Then a cooperation agreement is discussed and signed by both the Chinese and foreign institutions. A central objective of the Confucius institutes seems to be the dissemination of Chinese language and culture abroad. They target Chinese migrants but they are also open to a wider audience including the Dutch population. Furthermore, in order to keep a strong link with the Chinese diaspora abroad, China facilitates access to education in China for the children of Chinese migrants residing abroad. Accordingly, the children of Chinese people living outside the country can attend colleges and universities in China, just as the children of the Chinese residing in China can. Finally, like the Turkish media, the Chinese media broadcasts internationally, through Radio China International and China Central Television (ibid.).

Once again, it is quite difficult to evaluate whether the Chinese cultural policy towards its diaspora contradicts or strengthens the Netherlands’ integration policy. On the one hand, the evolution of Dutch policy towards more cultural homogeneity seems to be quite contradictory with projects aiming to strengthen cultural links with Chinese diaspora abroad. On the other hand, the Chinese authorities’ guidelines, which aim to encourage overseas Chinese to respect host country traditions and etiquette (ibid.), and the collaboration between Chinese institutions and host country organisations to create local Confucius Institutes can be seen as signs of coherence. Furthermore, since the public discourses about the cultural integration of migrants in the Netherlands are often focused on the question of Islam, Chinese cultural policy towards the Chinese diaspora can be perceived as less problematic than issues about the Turkish cultural policy towards its diaspora, in particular in light of the religious diaspora policy organised through the Diyanet.

3. Integration trends of Chinese and Turkish migrants in the Netherlands

First of all, neither Chinese nor Turkish migrants constitute homogeneous groups in the Netherlands. Both groups are diversified in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, education, migration status and socio-economic situation. During the 1960s and 1970s, Turkish immigrants were predominantly young low-skilled male workers. But after the end of the foreign worker recruitment policy in 1973 and the phenomenon of family migration, Turkish immigrants diversified in terms of gender and age. In addition, Turkish immigrants are also diversified in terms of ethnic origin (some are of Turkish origin, some are Kurdish) and in terms of religious practices (Azak 2008). As seen above, Chinese immigration has a long history in the Netherlands. Chinese migrants came from different regions (from the PRC and in particular from the provinces of Guangdong and Zhejiang, Hong Kong, the former Dutch colonies, etc.) (Pieke 1992). Chinese immigration also diversified with the growing importance of Chinese students coming to Dutch universities and the immigration of Chinese highly skilled workers to the Netherlands (Gijsberts, Huijnk, and Vogels 2011).

This section is based on data produced by INTERACT’s statistical analysis (Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan, and Bonfanti 2015) and on available literature regarding integration in the Netherlands. As in the other INTERACT corridor reports, three dimensions of integration are addressed particularly: labour market integration, education and access to citizenship. The INTERACT quantitative analysis is based mainly on the national Labour Force Survey. In the framework of the INTERACT quantitative survey, migrants have been defined according their country of birth. In other words, in the following paragraph, terms such as “Chinese migrants” and “Turkish migrants” refer to people born in China/Turkey. However, as specified before, Dutch reports and statistics about integration often focus not only on the migrant population but on the population with a “foreign background”, which is defined as people who have at least one parent who was not born in the Netherlands. Since some of these reports and statistics will be used in the following paragraphs, terms such as “people with a Chinese/Turkish background” and “people of Chinese/Turkish origin”, will refer to persons with at least one parent not born in the Netherlands.

3.1 Labour market integration

The set of results provided by the INTERACT project shows some important differences between Turkish and Chinese migrants regarding integration in the labour market. Table 2 shows that both Chinese and Turkish migrants have a higher unemployment rate than the Dutch population. An important difference exists, however, between the situations of Turkish and Chinese migrants; the former is more frequently unemployed than the latter. In fact, regarding employment and unemployment, the situation of Chinese migrants is quite close to the situation of Dutch people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS, Enquête Beroeps-Bevolking (EBB) 2012, INTERACT quantitative team elaborations.

Chinese and Turkish migrants also appear to occupy different segments of the Dutch labour market. A first difference can be seen in the occupational levels – defined by ISCO classification – of the two populations. While 51.1% of the Dutch occupied a high qualification occupation and 48.9% a less qualified occupation, Turkish migrants are under-represented in high qualification occupations (25.8%) and over-represented in less qualified occupations (74.2%). For Chinese migrants, the situation is reversed. They are over-represented in highly qualified occupations (56.6%) and less represented in less qualified occupations (43.4%). An interesting piece of information from the
The INTERACT quantitative survey is that Turkish migrants often occupy jobs for which they are overqualified. 29.3% of the Turkish migrants are in this situation versus 26.7% of Chinese migrants and 14.1% of Dutch people.

Table 3. Occupational level and over-qualification rate (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISCO 1 to 3 High qualification occupations</th>
<th>ISCO 4 to 9 Less qualified occupations</th>
<th>Over-qualification rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS, EBB 2012, INTERACT quantitative team elaborations.

In terms of employment sectors occupied by the Turkish and Chinese populations in the Netherlands, the research didn’t find statistical data that allowed for a direct comparison. However, statistics were available for the population with a Turkish background and the report of Gijsberts and colleagues (2011) provided additional information. Regarding the population with a Turkish background, Table 4 shows that Turkish workers are more frequently employed in industry than workers with a Dutch background (26.3% versus 19.1%) and are less frequently employed in services jobs (69.8% versus 77.3%).

Table 4. Labour force occupation by ethnic origin and employment sector in 2011 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agriculture Forestry and Fishing</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish origin</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch origin</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS (Statline).

Regarding the population with a Chinese background, Gijsberts and colleagues (2011) presented the repartition of Chinese and Dutch workers among jobs sectors for the year 2009. Figures from the report show a very strong concentration of Chinese workers in the catering sector (43% of the workers with a Chinese background versus 5% of the native Dutch workers) but also – to a lesser extent – an over-representation in sectors such as financial institutions or business services (Gijsberts, Huijnk, and Vogels 2011). The striking concentration of Chinese workers in the catering industry can be interpreted as the result of the historical implantation of Chinese migrants in this activity, resulting in a phenomenon of chain migration (Pieke 1992: 37ff). However, this phenomenon of concentration seems to be lower than in the past (Gijsberts, Huijnk, and Vogels 2011).

Chinese and Turkish migrants in the Netherlands seem to be characterised by different labour situations in comparison with the Dutch population. The Turkish migrants are characterised by a disadvantaged situation in comparison with the native Dutch. They are more frequently unemployed and they seem to occupy lower segments of the labour market (with an over-representation of jobs in industry for example). On the contrary, Chinese migrants seem less disadvantaged in comparison with the native Dutch situation. The unemployment rate of Chinese migrants in the Netherlands is lower than for Turkish migrants, for example. In addition, the occupational level of both populations shows an over-representation of highly qualified occupations among Chinese migrants.

3.2 Education

As regards labour market insertion, Turkish and Chinese migrants have quite different profiles in terms of education levels. The share of tertiary educated is very different between these two
populations. It is nearly four times higher among Chinese migrants (46.3%) than among Turkish migrants (12.7%). Interestingly, the share of tertiary educated among Chinese migrants is much higher than among the Dutch population (28.8%).

Table 5. Education level (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Share of tertiary educated</th>
<th>Share of non-tertiary educated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS, EBB 2012, INTERACT quantitative team elaborations.

The gap between the two populations also exists with regard to the enrolment rate in educational institutions. The enrolment rate of Turkish migrants is lower than the enrolment rate of Chinese migrants, which is closer (or equivalent) to that of Dutch people. This is true for populations between 15 and 24 years old and between 25 and 35 years old.

Table 6. Enrolment in educational institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Share enrolled in an educational institution (in %)</th>
<th>Share NOT enrolled in an educational institution (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-35</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-35</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>85.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-35</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS, EBB 2012, INTERACT quantitative team elaborations.

As shown above, Turkish and Chinese migration to the Netherlands are not responses to the same motivations (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010). The first motive of immigration for Chinese migrants is study, while it is family reunification for Turkish migrants. Regarding the Chinese population, the educational profile of the different waves of Chinese migrants has evolved through time (Gijsberts, Huijnk, and Vogels 2011). The early migrants (prior to 1990) were mainly poorly educated with a significant share of primary-educated people (ibid.). On the contrary, more recent Chinese migrants (since 2000), are much more highly educated (ibid.). According to the authors, this evolution is linked with the growing importance of study migration from China but also with the improvement of the educational situation in the origin country (ibid.). During the 1960s and 1960s, Turkish migrants arriving in the framework of the “guest worker” policy were also mainly characterised by a low level of education. More recently, study migration has risen among Turkish migrants but remains lower than for Chinese migrants (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010).

Table 7. Number of international students in the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>International students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2,073</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNESCO statistics.
3.3 Access to citizenship

According to the INTERACT quantitative survey, 64.8% of Turkish migrants (born in Turkey) and 70.6% of Chinese migrants in the Netherlands hold Dutch citizenship. The citizenship legislation of the Netherlands has to be understood in the context of Dutch integration policies (Van Oers, De Hart, and Groenendijk 2013). In a context in which the Dutch integration policy is shifting toward a more assimilationist perspective, “the current policy, in which admittance, a secure legal residence and Dutch citizenship are regarded as remuneration for integration, is the opposite of the minorities’ policy of the 1980s” which “intended to improve immigrants’ legal position by facilitating access to Dutch nationality” (ibid.). Dutch citizenship is no longer considered a tool of immigrant integration but rather a goal or a prize for migrants who are designated as “integrated”.

Figure 3 shows the evolution of the total number of citizenship acquisitions in the Netherlands between 1985 and 2008. The rise in the number of citizenship acquisitions between 1990 and 1996 can be partially explained by the abolition of the nationality renunciation requirement in 1991 and its re-introduction in 1997 (Van Oers, De Hart, and Groenendijk 2013). The drop in the number of citizenship acquisitions during the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s occurred in the context of strengthening conditions for naturalisation. In 1997, the renunciation requirement was re-introduced and on 21 December 2000, an amendment to the Nationality Act introduced an integration test as a condition for naturalisation.

**Figure 3. Total citizenship acquisitions in the Netherlands (1985-2008)**


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23 Authors also mentioned the high level of immigration and asylum seeking of the early 1990s and the policy of decentralisation in the Netherlands since 1988 (Van Oers, De Hart, and Groenendijk 2013: 18).

Between 1996 and 2008, 108,075 persons with Turkish citizenship acquired Dutch citizenship. This was also the case for 11,895 persons whose citizenship of origin was Chinese citizenship.\(^{25}\)

As mentioned above, the Turkish and Chinese populations in the Netherlands show differences in terms of single and dual citizenship. In 2008, the majority of first generation Turkish migrants held dual citizenship (a little less than 60%) while most others held only Turkish citizenship (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010). The portion of Turkish migrants holding only Dutch citizenship was very limited. The situation was quite different for the first generation of Chinese migrants, who mainly fell into two groups: migrants holding only Dutch citizenship (more or less 40%) and migrants holding only Chinese citizenship (between 40% and 50%). Less than 10% of first generation Chinese migrants held dual citizenship in 2008 (\textit{ibid.}). This difference may be explained by the policies of the countries of origin regarding dual citizenship. In fact, Turkey has allowed dual citizenship since 1981 in order to encourage integration abroad without giving up Turkish citizenship. On the contrary, China did not recognise dual citizenship and a Chinese citizen who acquires a foreign nationality abandons the Chinese one (Liu and Du 2013). This difference can explain the large number of Turkish migrants holding dual citizenship, whereas this is the case for only a very small portion of Chinese migrants.\(^{26}\)

However, the question of the effect of Dutch policy on the phenomenon of dual citizenship remains. In fact, since 1997 and the re-introduction of the renunciation requirement, the objective of Dutch authorities has been to reduce cases of dual citizenship. The proportion of Turkish migrants applying for naturalisation dropped after 1997 with the re-introduction of the renunciation requirement (Van Oers, De Hart, and Groenendijk 2013).\(^{27}\) More specific data on Turkish migrants who arrived after 1997 should be useful to estimating the effect of Dutch policy on the phenomenon of dual citizenship.


\(^{26}\) As mentioned above, according to Liu and Du (2013: 6), if dual nationality is not recognised by the Chinese state, a child born in China with one parent holding the Chinese nationality and one parent holding a foreign nationality can acquire dual citizenship in the case of countries following “the principle of single ancestry in the acquisition of nationality” (as the Netherlands) (\textit{ibid.}). This phenomenon probably explains why the number of Chinese migrants holding a dual citizenship is not equal to 0.

\(^{27}\) As mentioned above however, Turkish authorities provide a solution for Turkish people forced to renounce to their citizenship of origin in case of naturalisation. They can ask for a blue card which provides political and social rights in Turkey.
4. The impact of the country of origin and civil society organisations on the integration of Chinese and Turkish migrants in the Netherlands

The INTERACT survey was an exploratory survey conducted between December 2013 and September 2014. The survey targeted civil society organisations working in 82 countries (28 EU countries of destination and 54 countries of origin with more than 100,000 migrant residents in the EU). Any organisation dealing with migrant integration in one of the eight dimensions (labour market, education, language, social interactions, religion, political and civic participation, nationality issues, housing) could take part in the survey. Respondents could choose between one and three integration dimensions in which their organisation was active. The survey was translated into 28 languages and over 900 responses were collected online and over the phone. Although the exploratory character of the survey does not allow one to make generalisations about the whole population of civil society organisations, it sheds light onto how these actors’ activities impact migrant integration between the origin and destination. However, the survey does much more than just map these activities in a comparative context; it shows how organisations perceive states of origin and their policies in the context of the day-to-day reality of incorporating migrants into the receiving society. In this report only information pertaining to Turkish and Chinese migrant groups in the Netherlands are presented.28

In order to complement the results from the survey, this portion of the report is also based on the Turkish and Chinese country report from INTERACT, and on additional academic articles and published data.

The results of this survey allowed us to ask organisations’ workers about their perception of the impact of both state and non-state organisations in the process of migrants’ integration. In other words, the question which is addressed here is: How do organisations’ workers valuate the impact of Chinese and Turkish authorities on the integration process in the Netherlands? However as the number of responses of organisations dealing with Chinese and Turkish migrants in the Netherlands has been quite low (12 for Turkey and 2 for China), the following section must be read cautiously and should be improved with more data in the future.

As mentioned above, in the Netherlands, many non-state organisations are active in the field of migrant integration. A large range of activities is covered (sport, cultural activities, labour market integration, social participation, youth activities, etc.) even if subsidies seem to have decreased for several activities (Fischler 2014). The Netherlands also hosts several minority consultative bodies which target specific populations. Both Chinese and Turkish minorities are represented through the Turkish Consultative Body (Inspraakorgaan Turken – IOT) and the Chinese Consultative Body (Inspraakorgaan Chinezen – IOC). As mentioned above, these consultative bodies are part of the National Consultation on Minorities (Landelijk Overleg Minderheden – LOM), which is a consultative platform created by the Minority Policy Consultation Act in 1997 whose tasks include relaying Minorities Consultative Body communications to the government and producing recommendations.

Small, medium and large size organisations working with Turkish migrants in the Netherlands were interviewed. The organisations working with Chinese migrants were one foundation and one association and were considered medium and medium-large organisations. Each person interviewed was able to choose up to 3 questionnaires referring to several dimensions of integration (labour market integration, education, language, religion, social interactions, political and civic participation, residential integration and access to nationality). Respondents were asked to choose the questionnaires that corresponded with their organisation’s main activities. Accordingly, it is possible to estimate the integration dimensions mainly addressed by those organisations.

Among the 12 organisations dealing with Turkish migrants, 7 were active in political and civic participation, 6 in labour market integration, 5 in education, 5 in social interactions, 2 in language

28 For more information please refer to the forthcoming INTERACT survey report.
skills, 2 in religion and 1 in access to nationality. Among the 2 organisations dealing with Chinese migrants, 1 was active in labour market integration, 1 in language skills and 1 in political and civic participation. Of course with only 2 examples, more data is necessary to analyse the case of Chinese-oriented associations. Regarding the Turkish-oriented association, several comments can be made. First of all, the important focus on labour market integration and education suggests that associations are highly concerned with the relatively disadvantaged position of Turkish migrants within those two dimensions (see part.3). The focus on political and civic participation is interesting as it is the dimension most addressed by Turkish-oriented associations. To explain this, one hypothesis could be that the integration policies in the Netherlands were historically characterised by a space that was given to minorities to organise themselves and to have a voice in public discourses. In this context, strengthening the civic and political participation of migrants could be seen as a way to enhance minorities’ visibility and participation in public debates. Interestingly, the strengthening of migrant language skills does not seem to be a priority for Turkish-oriented organisations.

4.1 Impact of Turkey and China on integration in the Netherlands

4.1.1 Countries of origin care about their populations abroad

As described in Chapter 2 of this report (part 2.): both Chinese and Turkish authorities pay attention to the situations of their populations abroad. On the bases of the reports of Baser (2013) and Liu and Du (2013), this attention is twofold: on the one hand, Chinese and Turkish authorities are attentive to maintaining cultural, economic and political links with their diasporas and on the other hand, they also try to secure rights and opportunities for their diasporas in the country of destination. Both countries seem to be attentive to maintaining a link with citizens who are considered valuable for national development. For example, one point of the current Turkish diaspora policy is to “attract Turkish diaspora entrepreneurs back to Turkey and encourage them to invest in Turkey” (Baser 2013: 8). In China, authorities (Ministry of Education) “issued ‘On Adopting Further Measures to Attract Outstanding Students and Scholars Abroad’, and proposed ‘to establish a fast channel and encourage returnees to come back to work in China’” (Liu and Du 2013: 3). Xiang (2003: 30) has pointed out that a 1992 State Council circular “emphasizes that all returned overseas students shall be welcomed no matter what their past political attitudes were.”

This attention not only concerns the first generation of migrants but also the second generation. In 1995, the Turkish state implemented a pink card (which become a blue card after 2009), which allowed Turkish nationals who had given up their Turkish citizenship to become citizens in their country of residence and gave their children “rights equivalent to those of Turkish citizens, excluding the rights of voting” (Baser 2013: 6). In China, children of diaspora Chinese are allowed to participate in the national educational system and can access college and universities in China where “they will be treated equal to the children of Chinese mainland residents” (Liu and Du 2013: 7) according to a 2006 notice of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance.

4.1.2 Impact of the countries of origin on integration in the Netherlands

The following section aims to answer two questions: According to the associations, what is the impact of Turkish and Chinese policies on integration in the Netherlands? And to what extent do Turkish and Chinese organisations in the country of origin participate in activities implemented by migrant organisations in the Netherlands? The survey seems to bring out the importance of the country of origin and its institutions in the process of integration in the Netherlands. However, this impact is variably valued by Turkish and Chinese-oriented associations in the Netherlands.
Regarding labour market integration, which is one of the dimensions most developed by associations, both Turkish and Chinese-oriented associations generally valuate the impact of the country of origin positively. They believe that associations based in the country of origin, governmental policies or initiatives from the country of origin and pre-departure programmes are effective in helping migrants to find a job in the Netherlands.

In terms of migrants’ social interactions, the situation is much more nuanced. Turkish-oriented associations in the Netherlands (unfortunately, no Chinese-oriented associations answered to this questionnaire) mainly believe that such policies from the countries of origin are largely non-existent or do not know about such policies. For respondents who identify an impact of the country of origin on the social interaction of migrants, this impact is considered as having both a positive and negative impact on migrant integration in the Netherlands.

Beyond the impact of countries of origin, the survey emphasised the fact that, according to the organisations’ workers contacted, maintaining links with the country of origin can have important effects on the integration of migrants abroad. This also seems to be the case for civic and political participation. In fact, actors felt that the political and civic participation of migrants in their country of origins’ politics have an impact not only in their civic and political participation in the country of destination (here, the Netherlands) but also in dimensions such as: social relations, labour market integration, school performance, religious practices, access to nationality and residential integration. A small difference emerges between Chinese and Turkish migrants, in the sense that actors dealing with Chinese migrants responded that the political and civic participation of Chinese migrants in their country of origins’ politics only has a small impact on their political participation in the Netherlands. However, it is important to note that if the survey gave information on the perceived impact of political and civic participation in the country of origin on different aspects of integration in the country of destination, it did not say if this impact was evaluated positively or negatively by the actors.

The INTERACT survey provided information about partnerships built by Chinese and Turkish-oriented associations in the Netherlands. It is possible to have an overview of the ways in which Turkish and Chinese organisations are considered potential partners for activities regarding integration. This aspect is explored for civic and political participation. In the case of Turkish-oriented associations, collaborations exist with both the country of origin and country of destination. Collaboration with governmental institutions, political parties, NGOs, immigrant and diaspora organisations and international organisations were raised by some of the actors contacted. In the case of governmental institutions and political parties, it seems that Turkish organisations in the Netherlands implement actions both with Turkish or Dutch authorities, even if collaborations with the latter are more often evoked. With only one answer, the case of Chinese organisations is difficult to assess.

4.1.3 The question of the impact of non-state actors in Turkey and in China

Both Turkey and China show examples of civil society organisations involved in the integration of nationals abroad. In the Turkish case for example, the Gülen Movement has opened a large number of private schools abroad, teaching Turkish language and the Turkish curriculum without being established by the National Education Ministry of Turkey. However, clear data about schools that are linked with the Gülen movement in Europe seem to be non-existent (Baser 2013).

Several Chinese non-state organisations have also developed programmes towards Chinese overseas. For example, the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, established in 1956, works as a contact point between the party, the government, and returned overseas Chinese and their family. It provides, for example, legal training for returned overseas Chinese and organizes cultural events (Liu and Du 2013). The Overseas Chinese Committee of the National People's Congress also organizes several projects, such as research about the implementation of the “Protection of the Rights and Interests of Returned Overseas Chinese and the Family Members of Overseas Chinese” in 2012.
(Liu and Du 2013). Other kinds of stakeholders, which seem important in terms of diaspora and “go-abroad” policies are the research institutions and scholars engaged in research about these issues, who for example, participate in discussions about migration laws (Liu and Du 2013).

The case of China is particularly interesting with regard to the recent growing importance of migration studies. Liu and Du (2013) have noted two associations: The Western Returned Scholars Association and the Chinese Scholar and Students Associations. These associations are formed by returned diaspora students. They participate in maintaining links with Chinese students abroad and receiving their opinions and requests “with the aim to unite and encourage the majority of diaspora students to contribute to socialist construction” (ibid.: 11). In addition, Xiang (2003) has described the emergence of a new kind of non-state organisation linked with study migration. According to the author, “education agencies” have been created since the end of the 1990s. These agencies provided information about schools in destination countries but also assisted students with administrative processes (admissions, visas and passports). The author stated that “many education agencies are, in fact, recruitment agencies working for overseas schools. For each student the agency recruits, the overseas school pays the agent a certain commission” (Xiang 2003: 31). Facing this new actor’s emergence, Chinese authorities started to regulate this activity in 1999. Given the importance of study migration to the recent Chinese immigration phenomenon in the Netherlands, it should be interesting to further investigate the impact of these kinds of actors.

From a broader perspective, Xiang (2003) has described emigration agencies which provide a broad range of services for Chinese emigrants such as information, administrative support (passport and visa applications), settlement services (opening bank accounts abroad, registering for medical insurance, English language training, etc.) and sometimes helping with a trans-national marriage arrangement (Xiang 2003). This phenomenon and the tendency of Chinese authorities to regulate these emigration agencies led the author to note the possible emergence and institutionalisation of an “emigration industry” in China.

4.2 Impact of civil society organisations’ actions dealing with migrants from China and Turkey in the Netherlands

Twelve organisations working with Turkish migrants and two working with Chinese migrants contacted in the Netherlands responded to the INTERACT survey. In the following paragraphs, the focus will be on the way they address the question of integration (through an analysis of the types of services they provide to migrants).

4.2.1 Actions and services provided by the civil society organisations working with Chinese and Turkish migrants in the Netherlands

The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of the different tools used by migrant organisations to improve integration in the Netherlands. The INTERACT survey has provided data about labour market integration, migrant social interaction and migrants’ political and civic participation.

A large range of services regarding labour market integration is offered by organisations dealing with Turkish and Chinese migrants in the Netherlands. Activities offered by Turkish-oriented associations include incentives to employers to hire migrants, the provision of information about available jobs, lobbying for legal priorities and for the recognition of migrants’ qualifications and the provision of support for training and information about the Dutch legal framework. Even if the number of contacted Chinese-oriented organisations was very small, the same services were presented with the exception of training support. According to actors working with Turkish migrants, their organisations have an impact on employment, on matching the skills of migrants with their occupations and on migrant career advancement. The only domain raised by Chinese-related organisations was
employment. It is interesting to note that none of the persons contacted felt that the organisation had an impact on migrant wages.

Regarding social interaction, the survey only provides results for organisations working with Turkish migrants. It appears that all contacted organisations tend to develop interactions between immigrants and other residents through mentoring programmes. Surprisingly, cultural visits or activities such as sports in the Netherlands were not mentioned.

As with labour market integration, the survey pointed out that a large range of activities aiming at improving migrants’ political and civic participation in the Netherlands is offered by migrant organisations. The variety of activities is notable in the case of organisations working with Turkish migrants. In the case of organisations working with Chinese migrants, the smaller number of activities is likely a result of the fact that only one organisation answered the questionnaire related to political and civic participation.

In the case of Turkish migrants, it is interesting to note that activities concern political and civic participation in both the country of origin and the country of destination, with a better representation of the latter. Seven organisations provided information on civic and political rights and duties in the Netherlands and five provided information on civic and political rights in Turkey. Activities lobbying politicians were implemented in the same way. They target politicians in Turkey and in the Netherlands but more often in the latter.

Main conclusions
Several key findings emerge from this corridor report.

1. The countries of origin (China and Turkey) are concerned about their migrants abroad

One outcome related to the diaspora policies of China and Turkey is that these countries of origin are attentive to their populations abroad. Both promote harmonious integration in the Netherlands (the country of destination) and simultaneously encourage the conservation of links (cultural, economic, political, etc.) with the country of origin. In a more specific way, special programmes are implemented in order to strengthen the link with migrants who are considered particularly valuable to the country’s development: entrepreneurs abroad or international students, for example.

2. Turkish and Chinese migrants’ integrations in the Netherlands present different characteristics

Statistics on Chinese and Turkish migrants’ integration in the Netherlands show important differences in different domains. In terms of labour market integration and education, Turkish migrants are the most disadvantaged with a significant rate of unemployment, over-representation in lower segments of the labour market and a lower level of education. Chinese migrants are characterised by a different position. Still disadvantaged regarding unemployment relative to Dutch natives, Chinese migrants nevertheless have a lower unemployment rate than Turkish migrants, better representation in the higher segment of the labour market and a better education level (even higher than that of Dutch people). In terms of citizenship, Turkish migrants in the Netherlands often hold dual citizenship, while Chinese migrants do not (less than 10%). On the contrary, the proportion of Chinese migrants holding only Dutch citizenship is more significant than the proportion of Turkish migrants.

Please refer to the report for precise information on the statistics used concerning integration in the Netherlands. Dutch statistics about integration often focus on populations of migrant origin. They also include persons who did not migrate themselves (such as migrants’ children, for example).
3. The interaction between the integration policy in the destination country and diaspora policies in the country of origin is a complex one

Some examples show the importance of considering the impact of the interaction between country of origin and country of destination integration policies. The case of access to citizenship shows how policies (and their evolution) in both the country of origin and the country of destination create different possibilities for migrants (access to dual citizenship, opportunities to keep rights in the country of origin in case of naturalisation, etc.). For example, Dutch naturalisation (which in principle requires the applicant to renounce their citizenship of origin) has not had the same effect on Chinese and Turkish migrants; Turkish authorities provide a mechanism (the blue card) in order to secure rights in Turkey for Turkish migrants who have had to give up their Turkish citizenship during their naturalisation abroad. The following table shows the legal and political systems that frame Turkish and Chinese diasporas abroad.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal framework for emigrants/diaspora</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal and organised structure</td>
<td></td>
<td>Formal and organised structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach towards emigrants</th>
<th>Controlling, protecting and engaging the diaspora</th>
<th>Controlling, protecting and engaging the diaspora</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities</td>
<td>- The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad</td>
<td>- Ministry of Public Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad</td>
<td>- Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Chinese Ministry of Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main state-actors</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue Card</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 Bilateral agreement in force with the Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic rights</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right to vote in Presidential election, general election and for referendums</td>
<td>Right to vote in and stand for elections. For Chinese migrants settled abroad, this participation cannot go beyond the county level of the people’s congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political rights</th>
<th>Right to vote in Presidential election, general election and for referendums</th>
<th>Right to vote in and stand for elections. For Chinese migrants settled abroad, this participation cannot go beyond the county level of the people’s congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language and cultural and religious rights</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs, Belçika Turk Islam Diyanet Vakfı, cultural programmes and language courses. Turkish teachers and imams sent abroad</td>
<td>Confucius Institutes promote Chinese language and culture abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dual citizenship</th>
<th>actively supported as a tool for integration abroad</th>
<th>Formally forbidden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
4. The impact of the country of origin is differently evaluated regarding the different dimensions of integration

Survey respondents from organisations dealing with Chinese and Turkish migrants seem to feel that the country of origin has an impact on migrant integration in the Netherlands. However, data shows that this impact can be differently evaluated depending on the dimension of integration. For example, the impact of the country of origin is considered important to labour market integration but – regarding Turkey – less important with regard to migrants’ social interactions in the Netherlands.

5. Non-state actors based in the country of origin may also have an impact on migrants’ integration in the destination country

State actors in the country of origin are not the only actors involved in the process of integration. Non-state actors based in Turkey or China also have an impact on their respective emigrants’ integration in the Netherlands. An interesting case in China is the “education agencies”, which provide information and administrative support to Chinese students moving abroad (Xiang, 2003). These agencies are sometimes remunerated by schools in the countries of destination (ibid.). From a broader perspective, Xiang (2003) has described emigration agencies that provide a large range of services (from opening bank accounts to registering for medical insurance) sometimes including transnational marriage arrangements. He points out the possible emergence and institutionalisation of an “emigration industry” in China (ibid.: 35). It is thus important to take into account the diversity of actors, including non-state actors, that are involved directly or indirectly in the migration process and which may have an impact on the integration process.
Bibliography


