The Link between Migrant Integration and Transnational Mobility: Who, What, How and Why

ITHACA Final Comparative Report N. 7/2015

Laura Bartolini, Ruby Gropas, Irina Isaakyan and Anna Triandafyllidou
European University Institute

Funded by DG Home of the European Commission
The Link between Migrant Integration and Transnational Mobility:
Who, What, How and Why
ITHACA Final Comparative Report N.7/2015

LAURA BARTOLINI, RUBY GROPAS, IRINA ISAAKYAN
AND ANNA TRIANDAFYLLIDOU

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

ITHACA PROJECT
ITHACA Comparative Report

The ITHACA Research Project

ITHACA - Integration, Transnational Mobility and Human, Social and Economic Capital

ITHACA studies the links between migrants’ integration and their transnational engagement. Migrants engage in transnational mobility for an array of economic reasons as well as emotional or political ties with their country of origin. They develop transnational business, trade, investments, or social and cultural programmes and circulate between their two countries. ITHACA explores the interconnections between the integration process and transnational mobility of migrants and aims to answer three key questions: To what extent, and in what ways, do integration conditions in the country of destination encourage transnational mobility? What are the conditions in the country of origin that may encourage transnational mobility? What type of transfers take place through the transnational mobility of migrants? ITHACA focuses on economic integration and mobility conditions as factors that encourage or prevent transnational mobility.

The ITHACA project is hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou (anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu). The project is funded by DG Home of the European Commission.

The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s)

The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), at the European University Institute (EUI), directed by Brigid Laffan from September 2013, was set up in 1992 as a complementary initiative to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. The Centre hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the European Union. One of its core themes is Migration.

Anna Triandafyllidou is Professor at the Global Governance Programme (GGP) of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) of the EUI. Within the GGP she coordinates the Research Area on Cultural Pluralism. She is the Scientific Co-ordinator of the ITHACA Project. Ruby Gropas is Research Fellow at the Global Governance Programme and co-ordinator of the ITHACA project. She is also Lecturer (currently on leave) in International Relations at Democritus University of Thrace, in Greece. Laura Bartolini and Irina Isaakyan are Research Associates at the Global Governance Programme of the RSCAS. Laura Bartolini holds two MA degrees (University of Florence, and Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin). Irina Isaakyan holds a PhD from the University of Edinburgh.

For further information:
ITHACA Project
Global Governance Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Via delle Fontanelle, 18, 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy
Fax: + 39 055 4685 770
E-mail: anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu or roubini.gropas@eui.eu
http://ITHACA.eui.eu
Executive Summary

The ITHACA project aims at contributing to the rising interest of scholars and policy-makers in migrant transnationalism and its effects on countries of origin and destination including the effect on migrants themselves and their families. The project specifically focuses on transnational mobility rather than on transnationalism writ large, and particularly so on the link between transnational mobility and the migrant integration conditions. It also looks at the type of transfers generated by transnational mobility. We consider transnational mobility to be the basic - but also more intensive - form of transnationalism. We look principally at transnational mobility for economic purposes [i.e. the migrant engages in economic activity in either country]; and we look at the different type (social, cultural and economic) of transfers that it generates. In this context, we shall seek to answer the basic questions of:

- **Who**: what is the identikit or a possible typology of transnationally mobile migrants?
- **What**: what type of transnational mobility do they engage in?
- **How**: how does it take place, through which means, what are its basic features, what are the conditions that enable or prevent transnational mobility? What is the relationship between integration conditions and transnational mobility of migrants?
- **Why**: what are the motivations of migrants who engage in transnational mobility? What are the reasons, opportunities or factors that drive them to become transnationally mobile? To what extent and in what ways might conditions of integration influence this transnational mobility?

This report presents a comparative analysis of four country reports on Austria, Italy, Spain and the UK. The aim of this paper is to explore from a qualitative perspective the link between transnational mobility and overall transnational engagement, and the relationship between transnational mobility and integration. Our analysis is based on a non-random sample covering the four countries of destination (Austria, Italy, Spain and the UK) and the five countries of origin (Bosnia, India, Morocco, the Philippines, and Ukraine). We focus on the experiences of our transnationally mobile informants looking at who they are, what they do and how/why they do it. We thus construct a typology of the transnationally mobile migrant.

The report starts with a brief discussion of the relevant literature concerning the links between integration and transnationalism in Section 1. Our study is then contextualised within the wider field of economic and social transnationalism (Section 2). In Section 3 we offer a brief socio-demographic overview of our sample looking at their nationality, age, gender, education, profession and family status.
In Section 4, we propose a matrix that illustrates the links between overall transnational economic and civic engagement, and physical transnational mobility as defined in the project’s research design. Our study shows that such links are dynamic and may change during the life course of a migrant. In addition, transnational physical mobility is sometimes inversely related to remittances and overall investment back home: the more people travel back and forth, the less they remit/invest. Also the role of digital mobility is important here: investing in a family home, family business, buying land or philanthropic projects are often coupled with email correspondence and other digital communication tools. It may be supplemented by collaboration with relatives, rather than seeking to be physically present in a place where the project is made. It turns out that while physical transnational mobility may be a quintessential form of transnational living, it is often a factor that runs counter to intensive transnational engagement because it takes away resources (money, but also time of absence from job at destination, school holidays for the children). There is thus a rather asymmetric relationship between transnational mobility and engagement.

Geographical distance is shown to be a relevant factor but not a decisive one: Bosnians travel more often between Austria and Bosnia than Bosnia and the UK. At the same time Moroccans travelling back and forth between Italy or Spain and Morocco find the investment in this mobility challenging: it requires money and it also requires a secure residence status that allows for such mobility. For some, however, such mobility may also be a survival strategy creating opportunities for self-employment and trade, coping thus with unemployment and reduced income at the destination country.

Physical mobility between the Philippines or India, on one hand, and Austria, Italy, Spain or the UK, on the other, may be extremely expensive. However, for some of our informants it was affordable even if dictated solely by nostalgia or civic solidarity projects. In some cases such mobility was also necessary to develop business opportunities and cultivate customer relations.

Finally (Section 5), we look at the relationship between integration and transnational mobility. Recent research on the links between integration and transnationalism suggests that integration is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for transnationalism. We have therefore decided to treat both phenomena as co-existing. In other words, we are not looking for causal relations but rather on how the two phenomena develop together.

The table bellows summarizes the relationship between transnational mobility and integration, implicating nuances of migrant biographies and trajectories. It is clear though that an important factor in the development of the transnational mobility project is not just the ambition and desire of the migrant but also the phase they are in, in their life project. Thus for some transnational mobility is a further development of their overall migration project and thus while their integration (workwise, income and
socially) is high, they are seeking for a further economic outlets to invest, or they are cultivating/honouring family ties or, last but not least, they are involved in philanthropic projects back home.

The relationship between transnational mobility and integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Mobility</th>
<th>High Social and Economic Integration</th>
<th>Combination of high economic integration and low social integration or vice versa</th>
<th>Weak Social and Economic Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Family Transnationalist</td>
<td>Homeland Investor</td>
<td>Preparing for Return</td>
<td>Returning Family (Wo)man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(High or Moderate)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Economic Transnationalist</td>
<td>Global Businessperson</td>
<td>Resource Mobiliser</td>
<td>Second Chance Mobile Transnationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(High or Moderate)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Civic Transnationalist</td>
<td>Global Citizen</td>
<td>Homeland Reformer</td>
<td>Nostalgic Mobile Transnationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(High or Moderate)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For those in our middle column, mobility is a way of mobilising more resources and preparing for return (reconnecting with family and investing in some property or activity back home). It may though also be a question of aiming at or hoping for engineering change in their country of origin which may (or not) foster their eventual return.

Last but not least transnational mobility may be a sort of reactive transnationalism, seeking to prepare return, both through reconnecting family ties, creating job opportunities and reconnecting with the overall social context of the origin country.

Obviously these projects are different those who are young and aiming to create a future for themselves and their children and for those who become interested in transnational mobility and engagement at a later life stage, as a sunset return migration. There are also migrants that are caught in a downturn at the country of destination (e.g. Moroccans in Italy), which actually obliges them to move from the far left column of those transnational but well integrated to the middle or right hand column of those less well integrated and more geared towards return.

Keywords

Transnational mobility, integration, migration, return migration, human capital, social capital
# Table of Contents

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 6  
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................... 9  
List of Tables and Figures ....................................................................................................... 10  
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 11  
   1. Migrant Integration, Transnationalism and Transnational Mobility: what do we know? ........... 13  
   Defining and operationalising integration ............................................................................. 15  
   Transnationalism and transnational engagement ................................................................. 17  
   The integration-transnationalism link .................................................................................. 19  
2. The ITHACA focus ............................................................................................................. 21  
   Data and Methods of Analysis .............................................................................................. 22  
   The stakeholders’ questionnaire ........................................................................................... 23  
   The migrants’ questionnaire: structure and target group ..................................................... 23  
3. Who are the Transnationally Mobile Migrants? ................................................................ 26  
5. Why: Integration and Transnational Mobility Dynamics .................................................... 35  
   Case 1: A Global Businessperson and a global citizen living in between Spain and the Philippines .... 37  
   Case 2: A Global Businessperson and Resource Mobiliser who turned into a Global Citizen living between Italy and Morocco ................................................................. 38  
   Case 3: A Homeland Investor Preparing for Return who later became a Global Businessperson between Ukraine and Italy .................................................................................. 38  
   Case 4: A Returning Family Woman, Nostalgic Mobile Transnationalist between the UK and India... 39  
   Case 5: An Global Businessperson and Resource Mobiliser turned into a Nostalgic Mobile Transnationalist between the UK and Bosnia Herzegovina ................................................. 40  
Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................... 41  
References ................................................................................................................................. 43
List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: A typology of transnationalism according to sector of activity and degree of institutionalisation 18
Table 2: Total sample by country of destination and origin, absolute numbers and shares 27
Table 3: Demographic profiles, by CoO and returnees (%) 28
Table 4: The Transnationalism-Mobility Matrix 29
Table 5: The relationship between transnational mobility and integration 36

Figure 1: ITHACA countries of origin and destination 23
Figure 2: ITHACA questionnaire for migrants 25
Figure 3: Fieldwork – places of interviews 26
Figure 4: Number of travels between CoO and CoD, by CoO (%) 30
Fig. 5: N. of travels between CoO and CoD, by CoD (%) 30
Fig. 6: Average time spent on visit (%) 30
Figure 7: Main activities to deal with while on visit (% multiple answers allowed) 30

Frequently Used Abbreviations

AT Austria
BIH Bosnia Herzegovina
ES Spain
IND India
IT Italy
MOR Morocco
PHI the Philippines
UK United Kingdom
UKR Ukraine

CoO Country of origin
CoD Country of destination
1. Introduction

The way we approach migration and settlement today is rather different from what was in the past. There is now a much wider recognition of the various forms that migration may take, departing from the more classical view that migration involves movement from the country of origin to the country of destination with a perspective of settling down in the latter. Indeed, there is more attention to the different forms of short term migration (such as seasonal or shuttle migration for instance) (Triandafyllidou 2013), and to the fact that migration may be circular or it may also involve more than two locations.

There is also a concomitant shift of attention away from push and pull factors to a network-based understanding of migration – that is, as an organized flow of people motivated by a multiplicity of factors (economic, political, social, cultural), and embedded within a network of social relations (involving both migrants and natives) and institutions (civil society, international organisations, alongside state authorities are important actors). In other words, the idea is that migration cannot be understood by simply looking at the country of origin or at the country of destination and at the differences between them. Attention must be attributed to the context and the liminal spaces between the “origin” and “destination”. Indeed, studying migration today is more about an understanding of the journey rather than about the arrival at “Ithaca”.

Following from the above, increasing attention is paid to the wide range of relations that migrants develop with people, organisations, communities, and networks in their country, region, or community of origin, and the ways these webs of relations link in with individuals, organisations, communities and networks in the country of destination. Transnational linkages have been increasing in intensity, in scope and in variety (Faist 2000). The ‘modern’ trans-migrant is ‘at home’ in a number of different social worlds, s/he is active in different economies or markets, and participates in cross-border social networks and political movements (Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes 2006, 285). Schunck (2011, 260) suggests that complex phenomena like transnational social spaces, transnational communities and transnational networks (Faist 2000) presuppose transnational activities. He defines transnational activities as specific actions that the migrant undertakes and which “connect” the country of origin and the country of destination. For instance visits to the country of origin are the most basic type of a transnational activity as they involve physical border crossing.

ITHACA is about the transnational mobility of migrants between their place of origin and their destination. We approach physical transnational mobility as a form of intensive transnational activity that can have a crucial impact on both destination and origin. Such impact is both related to the migrants
themselves and their families and the economic and social projects they develop through their back and forth activities and remittances that they carry to their country of origin.

Financial remittances have been considered as an exemplary form of migrant transnationalism (Vertovec 2002). Resource flows across borders are however not limited to money flows in the form of remittances but also include immaterial - social - remittances in the form of ideas, identities, behaviours and social capital (Levitt 2001) which are equally important in the impact they may have on the country of origin. Overall, most research has explored the impact of migrant transnationalism on the country of origin. The resource flows of transnational mobility towards the countries of destination have attracted less attention, yet as Eischen has argued, “immigrant contributions may be symbiotic across borders, with both the country of origin and settlement benefitting, and synergistically so” (in Eckstein and Najam 2013, 13).

The ITHACA project aims to contribute to the rising interest of scholars and policy makers in conditions for migrant transnational mobility in the countries of origin and destination as well as with regard to the migrants themselves (and their families). It concentrates specifically on transnational mobility rather than transnationalism writ large, and particularly so on the links between transnational mobility and the migrant integration conditions.

We consider transnational mobility to be the basic but also more intensive form of transnationalism. We concentrate on transnational mobility for economic as well as social or civic purposes, and we also look at the different types (social, cultural and economic) of transfers that it generates (Isaakyan 2015).

More specifically, we shall seek to answer the basic questions of

- **Who**: what is the identikit or a possible typology of transnationally mobile migrants?
- **What**: what type of transnational mobility do they engage in?
- **How**: how does it take place, through which means, what are its basic features, what are the conditions that enable or prevent transnational mobility? What is the relationship between integration conditions and transnational mobility of migrants?
- **Why**: what are the motivations of migrants who engage in transnational mobility? What are the reasons, opportunities or factors that drive them to become transnationally mobile? To what extent and in what ways might conditions of integration influence this transnational mobility?

It should be noted that transnationalism and transnational mobility apply only to a minority of all migrants (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002). Portes (2003) argues that the share of immigrants who are transnationally active rarely exceeds one third of all immigrants. In addition,
only a small share of immigrants participate regularly in time and resource intensive transnational activities as for instance transnational entrepreneurial activities (Schunck 2011, 261).

The report starts with a brief discussion of relevant literature concerning the links between integration and transnationalism. Indeed our focus is on transnational mobility but very few, if any, of the surveyed studies address mobility (physical or virtual as such). Nonetheless our study is contextualised within the wider field of economic and social transnationalism. We offer a brief socio-demographic overview of our sample looking at their nationality, age, gender, education, profession and family status.

We develop a typology concerning the link between overall transnational economic and civic engagement, and physical transnational mobility as defined in the project’s research design, while section six looks at the relationship between integration and transnational mobility. Recent research on the links between integration and transnationalism suggests that integration is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for transnationalism to emerge. We have therefore decided to treat both phenomena as co-existing. In other words, we are not looking for causal relations but rather on how the two phenomena develop together.

1. Migrant Integration, Transnationalism and Transnational Mobility: what do we know?

For long, the study of migrants’ transfers mainly focused on the regular financial remittances sent to their households in the country of origin to cover core subsistence and consumption needs, education and healthcare costs, and home-improvement works. Progressively, the social, cultural and political capital that migrants were transferring through their continued engagement with their country of origin throughout their migration project – at different stages, and across different generations – was ever more acknowledged and recognised. Indeed, the breadth of transnational home engagement of migrants has been steadily documented through rich sociological studies mainly in North America over the past thirty years, and more recently in Europe (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013; Zhou and Tseng 2001). Furthermore, the migration-development policy nexus that attracted significant policy interest over the past decade, triggered much research on the economic value and potential of remittances (Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002; Tamaki 2011), while transnationalism studies indicated the importance of social remittances on the home communities and more recently also the importance of reverse remittances (Ambrosini 2014; Mazzucato 2008).

This expanding and fascinating field of research in migration studies has equally delved into the interactions between migrant integration and transnationalism (Faist 2000; Basch, Schiller, and Blanc
1994; Lacroix 2013; Levitt 2001). This growing field of scholarly research has, since the early 2000s, concentrated on the wide range of relations that migrants develop with people, organisations, communities, and networks in their country, region, or community of origin, and the ways these webs of relations link in with individuals, organisations, communities and networks in the country of destination. There has been some research on conditions of integration and resources that are usually considered prerequisite for transnational activities: thus there have been studies on attachments that migrants develop to their country of origin, on forms of transnationalism, and on what is tangibly transferred in-between the countries (Eckstein and Najam 2013; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; Erdal and Oeppen 2013). Migrant transnationalism involves important transfers not only of economic but also social and human capital, notably not only of money but also of ideas, networks, behaviours, even identities (Levitt 2001). The importance of transfers has been recognised by international organisations. The World Bank and the IOM are illustrative of this as they have conducted extensive research on the extent and size of economic remittances and on their impact on the homeland economies¹.

Transnational linkages appear to have been increasing in intensity, in scope and in variety (Faist 2000). (Schunck 2011, 260) has suggested that complex phenomena like transnational social spaces, transnational communities and transnational networks presuppose transnational activities. He defines transnational activities as specific actions that the migrant undertakes and which “connect” the country of origin and the country of destination. For instance, visits to the country of origin are the most basic type of a transnational activity as they involve physical border crossing, while remittances have been considered as an exemplary form of migrant transnationalism (Vertovec 2002). Resource flows across borders are obviously not limited to money flows in the form of remittances but also include immaterial, social remittances in the form of ideas, identities, behaviours and social capital (Ambrosini 2014; Levitt 2001) which are equally important in the impact they may have on the country of origin. Overall, most research has explored the impact of migrant transnationalism on the country of origin. The resource flows of transnational mobility towards the countries of destination have attracted less attention, yet as Eischen has argued, “immigrant contributions may be symbiotic across borders, with both the country of origin and settlement benefitting, and synergistically so” (Eckstein and Najam 2013, 13).

Empirical research has suggested that migrants’ decisions with regards to their tangible, practical or symbolic engagement in the economic, social, cultural and political sphere at origin are likely to depend upon, among other things, the trajectories and conditions of their integration at destination (see inter alia Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1994; Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002; Tamaki 2011; Carling and Hoelscher

¹ See the work of Dilip Ratha overall, including http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Remittances-PovertyReduction.pdf
2013). They may also be connected with the perspective of eventual return and reintegration into the origin country. The capacity and desire to engage in transnational behaviours seems thus to be affected by a range of factors that concern the migrant’s individual characteristics and situation (both in the country of origin and in the country of destination) and by the wider economic and political conditions in both countries.

In this context, our research studies the interaction between migrant integration and their physical transnational mobility contextualising this interaction within the wider biographical and family project of the migrant. In the following sub sections we briefly review the main findings of recent studies on the link between migrant integration and transnationalism. ITHACA builds on these findings and seeks to carry them further with a special focus on the inter-relation between processes of socio-economic integration and physical transnational mobility within the life of the migrant and her family. We explore the driving force behind transnational mobility – indeed a rather pronounced form of transnational engagement – and look at how immigration and emigration policies may also hamper or facilitate such mobility.

**Defining and operationalising integration**

Immigrant integration has long been at the heart of sociological research and policy-making. Approaches to integration have been underpinned by normative and highly political considerations alongside evidence-based ones. The definition of migrant integration provided in the Common Basic Principles for the Integration of Third Country Nationals (Council of Europe 1997) is very basic – “integration is a two-way process of accommodation by all migrants and residents of member-states” – and mainly aims at emphasising that integration is not a one way process of the migrant integrating at the country of residence but rather a process that involves the whole of society.

 Nonetheless much of the policy debate focuses on individual migrant competences such as language learning, employment, educational attainment and relevant “migrant integration” data, without necessarily due attention to the actual process of integration (Mahendran 2013). Migrant integration policy discourses often involve an imagination of society and the majority culture as a bounded unit to which migrants as individuals have to integrate, see actually assimilate. Thus integration requires the migrant to achieve a set of attainments in education, language and economic self-sustenance. In addition, while the policy discourse requires individuals to conform with the majority culture, their failure is attributed collectively to their minority culture that is not sufficiently “modern” (Schinkel 2013).

Conditions for integration encompass economic, social and cultural dimensions, and it is generally agreed that integration is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. Integration processes involve both migrants and
the receiving society, while the role of the sending country is increasingly taken into consideration.\(^2\) In effect, as Nebiler (2013) has pointed out, sending countries may impact in their expatriates’ integration in the countries of destination through formal or informal channels, and through formal and informal actors. Government actors, non-governmental organisations, churches, families and even the media may thus play a role in the integration process of the migrant in the society of settlement as well as in their transnational engagement.

The definition of integration adopted by the Council of Europe (drawing from the work of Bauböck 1997) includes a common framework of legal rights and active participation in society, on the basis of minimum standards of income, education and accommodation. Integration also requires freedom of choice of religious and political beliefs, cultural and sexual affiliation, within the framework of basic democratic rights and liberties (Bauböck 1997, 15). Ager and Strang have formulated a framework to study processes that may facilitate integration and to identify domains in which access to and achievement of integration matter. These domains include the sectors of employment, housing, education and health, assumptions and practices regarding citizenship and rights, processes of social connection within and between groups in a given community, and barriers to such connections stemming from lack of linguistic and cultural competences fear and instability (Ager and Strang 2008, 184–185). In effect, integration involves real economic and cultural spaces; it involves a political realm, the social sphere and everyday public life. Integration measures are frequently broken down into structural and socio-cultural components. Structural indicators of integration refer to the individual situation in terms of employment and economic condition, as well as in terms of political and legal spaces opened by the legislative and institutional context at destination (political participation, regular residence and access to citizenship, etc.). Heckmann and Schnapper (2003) distinguish two further dimensions (alongside the structural and cultural aspects), notably interactive integration, which denotes the degree to which personal relations crosscut over ethnic boundaries, cross-cultural marriages, and the participation in associations and the civil society; and identificational integration which denotes the subjective identification with the country of origin and the country of residence and/or with ethnic groups, the naturalization behaviour, and the acceptance of migrants by the society (prevalence of prejudices and discrimination).

Regardless of the challenges associated with various approaches to integration, the concept is meaningful in enabling us to draw some insights as regards the degree of stability and security that migrants may have in the country of destination and the sort of resources they have that may facilitate, enable, encourage or even determine their transnational activities. Indeed, as migrants’ transnational engagement has intensified

\(^2\) See notably the INTERACT project: http://interact-project.eu/
and transnational lifestyles have emerged, destination countries have begun to consider alternative integration models (Pitkänen, İçduygu, and Sert 2012). This is particularly interesting and deserves more detailed attention as there exists very limited insight into what is needed to empower people to mobilise, work, interact and live in transnational settings. What sort of skills or competences might initiate or facilitate transnational engagement? What instruments or policy measures may be relevant? And finally, which actors may be relevant in the integration process?

**Transnationalism and transnational engagement**

The field of transnational migration studies has been expanding in recent decades. Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Blanc-Szanton defined ‘transnationalism’ as a social process through which migrants establish social fields that cross geographical, cultural and political borders. Their work emphasised migrants’ agency, and shed light into the kinship networks that extend across two or more states, as well as the activities that may either be facilitated or be dependent on cross-state connections. In their pioneering book *Nations Unbound* (1994: 6) they defined transnationalism as:

> “the process by which immigrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain multi-stranded social, economic and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, and through which they create transnational social fields across borders”.

Although transnational social relationships existed long before they were actually identified as such by the social sciences, in more recent research, transnationalism has been conceptualised as a novel phenomenon in the context of globalisation. Indeed it differs from previous forms and patterns of migration because leaps in technology, communication and transportation infrastructure have facilitated migrants in kick-starting, maintaining, or developing their home-based relations, activities and interests to an unprecedented extent and with an unprecedented intensity. Transnational migration is in this sense both a manifestation and a consequence of the process of globalisation.

This changing migration context has been defined by Duany (2002, 358) as resulting in ‘mobile livelihoods’. Duany has argued that as people spatially extend their means of subsistence across various local, regional, and national settings and geopolitical borders, they also move along the edges of cultural borders, such as those created by language, citizenship, race, ethnicity and gender ideology. These mobile livelihoods have significant implications for the construction of labour markets, discourses and policies of citizenship, language policies and ultimately also national identities. In effect, transnational migrants may claim membership and participation in multiple polities thereby challenging the traditional model of participation. They may claim citizenship in a country in which they are resident, or part time resident or
even absentee, or they may have the citizenship of a country in which they do not live. The facilitation of dual citizenship is effectively a recognition that people can have multiple ties, some of them extending to other nation states, and transnational lives (Pitkänen, İçduygu, and Sert 2012). Migrants are thus active agents in transformations that are underway globally (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2009).

These definitions unavoidably lead the discussion to ‘who is a transnational migrant’? Some have attempted to confine the notion to political activists or economic entrepreneurs who conduct cross-border activities on a regular basis (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003). Others have preferred wider definitions as regard the range of activities (including non-professional ones such as family ties) (such as Bryceson and Vuorela 2002). And, others still have argued that ‘bodily’ geographic mobility is not a requirement (Ambrosini 2014).

Transnationalism has been categorised on a number of dimensions. Portes et al (1999) for example have suggested a typology according to sector of activity (economic, political and socio-cultural) and on degree of institutionalisation that has since been expanded and adapted in various directions.

**Table 1: A typology of transnationalism according to sector of activity and degree of institutionalisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of institutionalisation</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Socio-Cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Informal cross country traders; Small businesses created by return immigrants in home country; Long-distance circular labour migration.</td>
<td>Home town civic committees created by immigrants; Alliances of immigrant committees with home country political associations; Fund raisers for home country electoral candidates.</td>
<td>Amateur cross-country sport matches; Folk music groups making presentations in immigrant centres; Priests from home town visit and organise their parishioners abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Multinational investments in Third World Countries; Development for tourist market of locations abroad; Agencies of home country, banks in immigrant centres</td>
<td>Consular officials and representatives of national political parties abroad; Dual nationality granted by home country governments; Immigrants elected to home country legislatures.</td>
<td>International expositions of national arts; Home country major artists perform abroad; Regular cultural events organised by foreign embassies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the context of the ITHACA project, we probe further into transnational mobility that involves economic activity. Transnational migration, similarly to circular migration is part of larger frameworks of cooperation and exchange (see Cassarino 2008). These frameworks may be more or less regulated and may or may not have pre-existing economic, political and cultural ties between the countries involved.

Ambrosini (2014, 4) argues that the level of involvement is higher in circulatory transnationalism where the migrant (entrepreneur) travels back and forth and gradually decreases in forms of connective or commercial transnationalism and is weakest in symbolic transnationalism. Indeed, transnational mobility is part of circulatory transnationalism. It involves the physical activity of travelling back and forth for purposes of economic activity. We define economic activity as a notion that is wider than employment. It involves economically participating through a range of activities that produce added value or income in kind or in money: for instance, cultivation of crops, house repairs or other types of income or resource generating activities at origin and destination.

Transnational mobility, even more than transnationalism writ large, concerns a minority of all migrants. As pointed out by many studies (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002; Portes 2003), only a small share of immigrants participate regularly in time and resource intensive transnational activities, as for instance transnational entrepreneurial activities (Schunck 2011, 261), let alone engaging in regular physical travel between destination and origin countries.

Moreover, transnational mobility may be more trans-local than transnational. Translocality involves local-to-local connections across national boundaries that are created through everyday practices of transnational migrants; it involves the concept of life space: the locations with which the individual interacts, such as job, leisure, family, residence. Research has been increasingly claiming the importance of local-to-local connections of transnational migrants and the concept of translocality has offered an ‘agency oriented’ approach to transnational migrant experiences (Brickell and Datta 2011, 3). In effect, research on translocality has focused on how social relationships across locales shape transnational migrant networks, economic exchanges and diasporic space, and it has been argued that transnational activities are only effective when they are firmly anchored in particular locales (see Zhou and Tseng 2001). Networks linking California’s Silicon Valley and the Hsinchu region in Taiwan or Hyderabad in India are illustrative of such translocal networks.

**The integration-transnationalism link**

The majority of existing studies on integration and transnationalism have been conducted in the US and, as far as European countries are concerned, few attempts have been made to investigate trends and
mechanism of integration and transnationalism in a comparative way and among the most represented migrant communities across Europe. Moreover, much of the existing literature is qualitative in nature and there is a lack of quantitative studies dealing with the overall level of transnationalism across migrant groups and its links with structural and socioeconomic integration indicators for cross-country or group comparisons. Perhaps a reason for this paucity of studies is a lack of data on transnational engagement beyond (registered) economic remittances and much less an impossibility to study empirically the phenomenon of transnational mobility through existing databases.

Recently, more studies have focused on the interaction between integration and transnationalism, generally finding an asymmetric relationship which may manifest itself in the following three configurations:

1) Integration and transnationalism coexist in side-by-side, in parallel, without influencing each other;
2) Increase in integration leads to a decrease of transnationalism and vice versa; and
3) Both integration and transnationalism positively reinforce each other.\(^3\)

In the same vein, Carling and Pettersen (2014) look at how integration and transnationalism may affect intentions to return to the home country. They find that they actually strongly do but not in a fixed way. Thus weak integration and strong transnationalism are a good predictor of an intention to return (other things being equal) but they note that integration and transnationalism can also cancel each other out when people are both well integrated and strongly transnational, and when they are strongly integrated and weakly transnational. Erdal and Oeppen (2013) conclude that the relationship between integration and transnationalism can be either additive, synergistic or antagonistic. We have found this distinction of the modes of interaction between integration and transnationalism helpful also in analysing our informants’ accounts on how integration fosters, impedes, or indeed develops in parallel with their transnational mobility and related transnational engagement.

\(^3\) For more detail, see the review in Gropas, Triandafyllidou, and Bartolini 2014; Tsuda 2012.
2. The ITHACA focus

Our study has been exploratory in character as there is no register or database where transnational mobility patterns of the kind that we are investigating here are registered or where we can identify a cohort of migrants that are transnationally mobile and hence, select from them through some sort of quantitative sampling. Therefore we have taken transnational mobility as our entry point to the study of the linkages between integration conditions and transnational mobility. We identified migrants who are transnationally mobile and investigated their integration patterns and conditions. We investigated their different types of transnational mobility and related economic activity and different types of transfers that they do. This research strategy prevents from statistically checking causal inferences as to how different socio economic integration variables or specific individual features influence transnational mobility. However, it gives us a strong vantage entry point as it allows us to explore in depth and in a variety of countries and with a variety of migrant groups the phenomenon of transnational mobility and map the processes that lead to it.

Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo (2005, 899–900) refer to empirical analysis undertaken on transnational engagement (specifically (Goldring 1998; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2002; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999) and have identified three explanations for transnational participation which we paraphrase and adopt for investigating not just transnational engagement but also transnational mobility:

- **Linear transnationalism/transnational mobility** is the continuation of pre-migration bonds across border, and based on these people send remittances, travel back home, and establish ethnic institutions in their country of destination to maintain links with their places of origin;

- **Resource-dependent transnationalism/transnational mobility** occurs when migrants try to reconstitute their linkages with their country of origin once they have accumulated enough resources to be able to. Thus, transnationalism emerges with time when the accumulation of adequate resources enables migrants to engage in philanthropic or business projects in their country of origin, travel back home to implement their projects, and eventually turn the economic or social-cultural between the home and host societies to their advantage;

- **Reactive transnationalism/transnational mobility** is the result of a relative failure of the migration project which did not turn out to be what the migrant expected or hope for. Transnational activities and trips back home may be the result of frustration with occupational careers or the social status attained in the country of destination, so the migrant seeks to establish links with the country of origin where the results of their migration project may enjoy greater prestige and may open opportunities for return and reintegration.
Based on this initial distinction we have looked at the conditions and factors that impact the link between integration and transnational mobility at the individual level. In this, age and life-course stages at which emigration, return migration or re-return is decided and enacted are important factors to consider, as are gender and family obligations. Indeed, few studies have addressed these issues in the past (Schunck 2011; Levitt 2003). Level of education, knowledge of the language(s) of the country of origin, access to citizenship (and therefore access to dual citizenship), level of wealth, access to political connections are also considered defining conditions.

We have also sought to explore the motivations for transnational mobility. Also resources that are mobilised, the ways in which they are mobilised, and to what intent they are mobilised may differ. In effect, some migrants are ‘pioneers’ in the sort of transnational activities they become engaged in, while others may be ‘followers’ attempting to repeat the success stories of others. Some are successful in the transfers that they make, and others less so; some do act as agents of change while others do not.

**Data and Methods of Analysis**

ITHACA engages into a comparative study of five migration systems (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014, 26–27), involving four EU destination countries – Austria, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – and five non-EU origin countries – Bosnia Herzegovina, India, Morocco, the Philippines and Ukraine – as described in Figure 1.

Among these destination and origin countries, ITHACA defined some specific corridors in order to compare the impact of different origin countries in the same destination and, vice versa, the specificities of different destinations for migrants of a definite origin country:

- North Africa–EU migration system – Moroccans in Italy and Spain;
- Western Balkans–EU migration system – Bosnians in Austria and the UK;
- Eastern Europe–EU migration system – Ukrainians in Austria, Italy, Spain and the UK;
- Asia–EU migration system – Indians and Filipinos in Austria, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Hence, the survey was carried out in all 9 countries in order to capture both transnational mobile migrants residing in Europe at the time of the survey and returnees to their origin countries with still strong (economic) ties with their migration destination. The fieldwork in all destination and origin countries was grounded on two questionnaires, designed to reach transnationally mobile migrants and stakeholders both at origin and at destination.
The stakeholders’ questionnaire

Through ITHACA’s fieldwork our aim was to collect the voice of national, local and regional authorities both at origin and at destination, of diaspora and migrant organizations and NGOs, of trade unions, professional and business associations, as well as relevant banks, financial and political/diplomatic institutions (embassies/consulates). Through the interview protocol we sought to explore the characteristics of transnational mobility and understand where transnational mobility was mainly an individual choice, part of a collective choice or, whether existing integration or re-integration policies have a role in shaping (either supporting or preventing) a successful economic transnational experience. Interviewed stakeholders also shared their views about the advantages and disadvantages of different types of transnational mobility, either from the point of view of the institution they represent or of their country of origin or destination.

The migrants’ questionnaire: structure and target group

The interview’s structure intended to grasp both quantitative data and qualitative information from transnationally mobile individuals at origin and at destination. The questionnaire was intended for face-to-face interviews lasting around one hour each and administered by interviewers in the language(s) chosen/spoken by the interviewee (either their mother tongue – Arabic, Bosnian, Hindi, Tagalog, Ukrainian – or Italian, Spanish, German, English, French, or a combination of these languages).
After the entry filters, the questionnaire addressed basic demographic information, the situation before leaving, upon migration and at present, and the economic activities and engagement across the two countries etc. (see Figure 2). The aim of tracing this data at different phases of their migration trajectory was to document how their life-cycle developed along their migration cycle and also register where and what kind of formal or informal human capital had been obtained or accumulated throughout the migration experience, i.e. studies and education degrees; language acquisition etc.

The questionnaire then concentrated on identifying the economic activities and engagement across the two countries, and it also aimed at registering the motives and intensity of their transnational mobility. Lastly, the questionnaire also intended to capture how the interviewees perceived their migration experience, what they appreciated in their countries of origin and destination and their plans for the future.

As explained above, the general aim was capturing as much as possible in our sample migrants who engage in transnational economic activities and who were (physically) mobile. At the moment of defining the fieldwork criteria, the profile of transnationally economically active and mobile migrants emerged as to be not very common among the overall migrant population in any of our countries of interest. Therefore, the fieldwork looked for migrants who were transnationally engaged and to then investigate whether and to what extent physical (im)mobility between two places was associated with their transnationally activities, as we expected the intensity of mobility to fluctuate significantly according to different life-course stages and steps of the migration trajectory, and to depend on time and financial constraints faced by migrants at the moment of the interview. For this reason, we started the fieldwork from the assumption that mobility, although important, is not necessarily defining in terms of the transnational engagement at any time of the migration experience. Since we wish to explore the nexus between integration, transnational engagement, transfers and mobility, we decided to maintain a scope wide enough to be able to capture the relevance of mobility from different perspectives. At the end of the fieldwork only a small 8% of the total sample didn’t travel at all over the past two years between the origin and the destination country for contingent problems (family-related, legal documents, economic crisis, conflict at origin). The majority of the sample is actually transnationally engaged and physically mobile between two places on a regular and intense level (see next Section).

As for nationalities, although in principle we focused more on first generation migrants born abroad and who had not naturalised in their European destinations (TCNs), in some cases the acquisition of citizenship of the country of settlement emerged during the interview.

---

4 For more details on the sampling strategy and the fieldwork process, see Section 3 of the ITHACA Quantitative Report (Bartolini 2015).
The fieldwork in all countries began in July 2014, but the majority of the interviews were conducted in the period between October 2014 and March 2015. The survey was directly coordinated by each partner institution in the countries of destination (European University Institute in Florence, International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in Vienna, the London Metropolitan University in London and the Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid). In addition, national experts in each origin country were responsible for conducting the interviews with returnees who continued to engage in regular transnational activities with their previous countries of residence.

In one third of the cases, interviewees were contacted by phone (or skype) as it was not possible to meet them personally (because of distance or unfeasible working hours). Interviewers gathered responses with printed copies of the questionnaires, notes and, in almost half of the cases, tapes to cross check information, especially for open-ended questions with detailed answers. To collect data in an efficient, easy and timely manner, the recorded data was uploaded onto an online survey tool (Survey Monkey). Interviews uploaded on Survey Monkey are in English irrespective of the language in which the interview was conducted. This allowed us to collect all interviews from all teams in the countries of origin and
destination, and to proceed with a centralized data cleaning and mining before starting with the analysis. At the end of the surveying period (June 2015), the online survey platform was closed and the overall dataset was exported and processed in a centralized way before starting with country-level analyses.

Figure 3: Fieldwork – places of interviews

Source: Bartolini 2015, 28.

3. Who are the Transnationally Mobile Migrants?

The final composition of the sample disaggregated by country of destination and/or of origin is presented in Table 2. The total sample is composed by 324 individuals:\(^5\) Indians are the more numerous (25%), while Filipinos are the smaller group altogether (12%). Returnees, i.e. migrants interviewed in the origin country and returned after a period spent in one of the four EU countries, represent almost 16% of the total and are treated separately as they are likely to distinguish themselves from their co-nationals who are still living the migration experience.

As for their general demographic characteristics, the total sample is almost balanced in terms of sex (54% of interviewees are women), but there are interesting differences by country of origin. Ukrainians and Filipinos are predominantly female (72%), while women are only 41% of Moroccans and, noticeably, 36% of all returnees. Interviewed migrants and returnees are on average medium- to mature-age

\(^5\) From the original dataset we dropped out 3 observations of Moroccans living in the UK and 4 observations of Bosnians, see Bartolini 2015.
individuals: only Bosnians have a consistent (33%) share of people below 30 years of age, while more than half of all Filipinos have more than 50 years old.

Three quarters of the total sample was born in an urban area and almost two thirds is married or cohabiting with a stable partner. Ukrainians and Filipinos show the highest share of divorced, separated or widowed individuals. Moreover, Filipinos have at least one child in 82% of the cases, while the share of migrant parents is lower for Bosnians (41%) and Moroccans (51%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>EU country of migration</th>
<th>BIH</th>
<th>IND</th>
<th>MO</th>
<th>PHI</th>
<th>UKR</th>
<th>Ret</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total (%)         | 13.9 | 25.0 | 15.4 | 12.0 | 17.6 | 16.0 | 100.0 |

Source: Bartolini 2015, 30.

As regards to their financial condition, our respondents were asked to evaluate and assess it prior to migration. The majority of Bosnians, who mostly moved as asylum seekers considered their condition as good or very good. This was also the case for Indians, who often migrated as highly-skilled middle-class individuals. Moroccans and Filipinos however assessed their condition before migration as bad or average in the majority of cases.

The sample is clearly skewed towards highly educated individuals (see Table 3). Only 2% has low or no formal education at all, while around 68% has a graduate or post-graduate degree. Indians are the more highly-educated (51% with a post-graduate degree), while among Bosnians and Moroccans secondary education (high schools, vocational schools or colleges) is more frequent (47 and 38% of them respectively).

Moreover only about 40% of the total has been trained exclusively in the country of origin. A large part of our interviewed populations – especially among Bosnians, Moroccans and Indians – have studied also abroad, acquiring skills and formal qualifications either in their country of destination or elsewhere. Returnees seem less likely to have a mixed educational experience than the rest of the sample, followed by Filipinos and Ukrainians. Although our transnationally mobile migrants are typically well-educated, only
a small number of them (mainly Indians) hold degrees from the country of destination. The majority of our informants have obtained their university degrees from the countries of origin that remain officially “unrecognised” in their places of destination.

Thus, our study (based as said on a purposive sampling strategy) shows that a typical transnationally mobile migrant may be a man or woman, they are highly educated, in their late 30s or early 40s, with a relatively good financial situation, married with children, and live in cities. In the following section we look at how transnational mobility may be related to other forms of transnational engagement while Section 5 discusses how transnational mobility and integration develop in interaction.

### Table 3: Demographic profiles, by CoO and returnees(%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>BIH</th>
<th>IND</th>
<th>MOR</th>
<th>PHI</th>
<th>UKR</th>
<th>Ret.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-29</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (years)</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edu level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-graduate</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban place of birth</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married/cohab.</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div/Sep/Widow</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children (Yes)</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Good&quot; or &quot;Very good&quot; financial cond. before migration (self-assessed)</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (a.v.)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bartolini 2015, 30.

### 4. What? And How? Modes of Transnational Mobility and Transnational Engagement

The long-distance economic relations of migrants with their homelands and of returnees with their past destination country have been extensively studied (Guarnizo 2003). The transnational economic engagement of migrants and returnees and their attachment to both their country of current and past
residence depend on how they build their social networks and on how they create their transnational social fields and spaces between the countries of origin and destination. As already discussed, we looked for migrants or returnees who had travelled between the origin and the destination country at least once over the two years previous to the interview. Even among transnational migrants who had not travelled recently for contingent problems (family-related, legal documents, economic crisis, conflict at origin), only 8% of the total sample are people who did not travel during the past two years. Our fieldwork actually revealed that we needed to explore links between physical transnational mobility and overall transnational economic and civic engagement – rather than to concentrate on transnational physical mobility as such. We thus produced the following matrix:

Table 4: The Transnationalism-Mobility Matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of mobility</th>
<th>Intensive Transnational Mobility (3 times a year or more)</th>
<th>Moderate Transnational Mobility (1-2 times per year)</th>
<th>Limited Transnational Mobility (less than 1 a year, e.g. only 1 travel in the last 5 years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transnationalism</td>
<td>Mobile Family Transnationalist</td>
<td>Moderately Mobile Family Transnationalist</td>
<td>Immobile Family Transnationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remitting for family needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(education, subsistence, home creation and improvement)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic investment</td>
<td>Mobile Economic Transnationalist</td>
<td>Moderately Mobile Economic Transnationalist</td>
<td>Immobile Economic Transnationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in business or shop in the country of origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic investment</td>
<td>Mobile Civic Transnationalist</td>
<td>Moderately Mobile Civic Transnationalist</td>
<td>Immobile Civic Transnationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Developing a philanthropic project / running an NGO / Mobilizing politically)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation.

The number of visits and the average time spent abroad may vary according to the geographical distance between the two countries, as well as to the existence and accessibility of various means of transportation (flights but also cars, buses, trains and ferries). Our data seem to support the idea that shorter geographical distances and cheaper connections make the differences in determining the frequency of visits: Bosnians are by far the more mobile group (78% of them travelled 4 times or more), followed by Ukrainians and Moroccans. Indeed, more than half of interviewed Filipino migrants travelled only once and among Indians the most frequent answer (46% of them) has been 2-3 times, confirming that transoceanic migrants tend to travel less.
Figure 4: Number of travels between CoO and CoD, by CoO (%)

Source: Bartolini 2015, 45. N=324

Fig. 5: N. of travels between CoO and CoD, by CoD (%)

Fig. 6: Average time spent on visit (%).

Figure 7: Main activities to deal with while on visit (%, multiple answers allowed)

Source: Bartolini 2015, 46. N=324
Since overseas migrants tend to concentrate on a fewer number of visits, these last more (from three weeks to more than one month) than visits to Bosnia, which on average last around seven - ten days. The most intense back and forth movements of Bosnians, Ukrainians and to a lesser extent Moroccans, allow them to often distinguish between business trips and holiday periods with family and friends, while this distinction is less clear cut for Indians and Filipinos. While family issues are the first and ever present reason for travelling, this is almost always accompanied by other motives. In approximately 60% of cases migrants also take care of their properties (house or land) and their economic activities, often pointing to the fact that a long-distance control to their investments is not sufficient for a proper management. The third most common activity among migrants is sorting out bureaucratic issues (22-32%).

Geographical distance is a relevant factor but not a decisive one for transnational physical mobility. Our proposed matrix (Table 4) seeks precisely to show how proximity and cheap or expensive travel can interact with the level of income of the migrant both at destination and back home and the type of project they engage in (economic vs family vs civic engagement).

Thus Bosnians in the UK may travel less between the two countries compared to Bosnians in Italy for instance, but engage civically with what is happening in Bosnia and seek to raise awareness and mobilise support for their country of origin (immobile civic transnationalist).

Last year when we had the financial crisis first in February then the natural disaster of the floods in May, I and other Bosnian people organised a Bosnian solidarity group in Brighton. We organised events in London & at Brighton University - connecting via Skype with NGOs on the front line in Bosnia - to spread the word of what people were going through there, to organise collective support with clothes, medicines but most importantly, to create this platform of researchers, practitioners in the UK and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to make sense of the events, to mobilise help. It was also a way to bring the insiders’ perspective & raise awareness how people can help.

At the same time Moroccans travelling back and forth between Italy or Spain and Morocco find the investment in this mobility challenging: it requires money and it also requires a secure residence status that allows for such mobility. A Moroccan man who lives in Spain notes the limitations posed to him by the type of work permit he holds:

*Given I am registered in the Spanish employment office I cannot be more than 15 days abroad yearly. For this reason I have not contract in this job in Morocco, and each time I go back and forth I am afraid of being detected by Spanish authorities. (immobile economic transnationalist)*
The financial crisis in Spain and Italy has made transnational mobility a challenge for informants from the three more distant countries of origin (immobile economic transnationalists):

Raja (Indian man, lives in Barcelona, 54 years old): “I have not been able in the last 5 years to go to India, where I have family and properties, because I had to close my shop of mobile phones and currently the only income in the home is from my wife”.

Vasichka (Ukrainian woman, lives in Madrid, 47 years old): “I have not gone to Ukraine since 2011 because my husband is unemployed and moreover he has serious health problems. Therefore, I cannot help my sister in the small store of cleaning products that we have opened there”.

Transnational physical mobility between the Philippines and the destination countries may appear too expensive but then so is mobility between India and these countries. Several informants in Italy or Spain pointed out to the fact that actually they cannot afford both mobility and sending money back home and they consider remittances more important than visits, when money is too tight.

Teresa (Filipino woman, lives in Madrid, 43 years old): “I traveled the last time to Philippines in 2009, despite I have a grocery rented there that I would like to check. Although I have kept my job during the crisis, some members of my family have not, so we have to cut not necessary expenses, especially from the birth of my granddaughter”.

However there were transnationally mobile migrants in our interviewee sample, mostly Indians in the UK but also Filipinos in Spain, or Ukrainians in the UK who travel back despite the high cost. Among the UK based Indians, these are usually relatively young informants, from an affluent family who probably initially came to the UK to study and then stayed on to work. They thus can afford the physical mobility alongside their engagement with transnational civic or economic projects.

I run a charity and we are sending money to India to orphanages and wherever is needed; when I go to India, I visit those places where the money was sent. Our charity got an endowment, which we invest here, in the UK, and the profits are sent to India. (Indian man in London, mobile civic transnationalist)

“One of the most important is to manage personally some projects of the international consultancy specialized in energy, infrastructures and financial services that my partners and me have opened there”.  (Filipino man who lives in Barcelona, Spain, mobile economic transnationalist)
Sandra, one of our respondents from the Philippines, supported her nephew and niece financially and emotionally to set up an internet café, which now provides an income to both of them. Furthermore, she regularly travels there to maintain this support:

* I always have to check how they are, they imperatively need my support. (...) I am worried about these children, I absolutely have to fly there every year (...) because I want to support these children financially and morally. (mobile family transnationalist)

Moreover, migrants may seek – through transnational mobility - a strategy for complementing their reduced income (because of unemployment or underemployment) (mobile economic transnationalists).

* Ali (Moroccan man, lives in the East Coast of Spain, 35 years old): “I am engineer, and during the current crisis, as I lost my job as construction worker in Spain I am travelling to Morocco more frequently to work in several projects”.

* Yuri (Ukrainian man, lives in the East Coast of Spain, 36 years old): “I have visited Ukraine more frequently in the last two years to make business with second-hand cars since I lost my job as warehouse assistant in Spain in 2013”.

On the other side, for those who have migrated as students and for those who come from wealthier families, remitting for family support has never been the purpose of migration and they may engage in sporadic transfers on special occasions (as in our case of Indians in the UK). Mazzucato (2011) defines the term reverse remittances as the flows of capital from home communities to migrants. Parents have financed the studies of many Indian and Ukrainian respondents during the years they were post-graduate students in the UK, including sponsorship of home visits on holiday trip. Once the migrant finds employment in the UK that is matching his/her qualifications, his/her parents restrict their support only to cover his/her home visits. Cultural specificities thus define different modalities of family support.

The experiences of Filipino and Indian respondents in the UK are at the opposite ends of the continuum. Filipino migrants would drain their resources to provide financially for family when back home. In return, they would get valuable family time of cooking, eating and partying together as well as help with child care. It is cultural, they explain. Conversely, most Indians, in their late 20s to middle 30s, spoke of their families (parents) covering everything during home visits.

* I do spend money there but generally I do not need to worry about anything. It is the culture we belong to: accommodation, food, driving me around.
Family support of the migrant' transnationalism has thus become a distinct form of valid transnational capital. The interviews revealed different forms of family support that facilitate migrants’ travelling back home. These include childcare, looking after properties and helping with investments; the provision of accommodation and lifts during visits.

Reverse remittances are important as a complement of both economic and civic transnational mobility. Investing on a family home, family business, buying land or indeed philanthropic projects is often coupled with following up through email and other digital communication tools as well as through relying on close relatives, rather than seeking to be physically present there, where the project is made.

As Fadel (Moroccan man in Spain) says: “If I had had to manage the construction of my house in Morocco personally, probably I would have found some problems related to Moroccan Administration. But this matter was dealt with by my brother, who lives there and knows the Moroccan construction sector very well.”

In the same line, Aziz admits that fortunately his sister and brother in law live in Morocco, so they can check usually the construction of his house there. “Otherwise it would be much more difficult”. Also the Philippine Teresa explained that her rented grocery is managed by her family there. An Indian female academic in her mid-30s felt tremendous gratitude for the support of her parents in her transnational engagement with India:

My parents help me massively; I would not be able to do it without them. I do not need a hotel when I go there; they pick me up from the airport; I don’t have to think of money conversion; even clothes I keep there; these are clothes particular for there – culturally determined to visit government offices; I can’t be in trousers. Basically, I don’t have to plan the trip.

While physical transnational mobility may be the quintessential form of transnational living, it can also be a factor that runs counter to intensive transnational engagement because it takes away resources (money, but also time of absence from job at destination, school holidays for the children). Lapus lives in the UK. He travelled with his family to the Philippines once in the past two years and stayed for a month. They can afford to go there only once in three years.

Hospitals’ annual leave is eight weeks. It is cheaper to go to America and Europe than the Philippines. It is expensive during the school holiday when prices are double. (immobile family transnationalist.)
The exploration of the links between transnational physical mobility and other types of economic, civic and social (family) engagements suggests that while moving between two places and living in-between may be considered the most intensive form of transnationalism, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for transnational living. The actual relationship between physical mobility and other forms of transnational engagement relates not only to the level of income and type of project but also with regard to migration status (and possibility to travel back and forth) and family or other kinship support at the country of origin as well as situation/practical conditions at the country of settlement (annual leave, school holidays). The majority of the respondents are seriously concerned about their retirements and pensions and plan their transnational mobility accordingly. In their transnational travel and engagement, they see an opportunity to maintain social benefits in the country of origin.

5. Why: Integration and Transnational Mobility Dynamics

Recent research on the links between integration and transnationalism suggests that integration is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for transnationalism to emerge. In ITHACA we have decided to treat both phenomena as co-existing. In other words, we are not looking for causal relations but rather on how the two phenomena develop together. Our study points to the relevance of immigration policies of the country of destination and emigration/diaspora policies in the country of origin as important factors that facilitate or actually hamper transnational mobility. However most interestingly our study shows that transnational physical mobility and its relationship with integration has more to do with the migrant’s life trajectory and the phase they are in, in their migration project. Table 5 summarises they typology that we have elaborated.

The table implies a variety of different migrant biographies and trajectories. It is clear though that an important factor in the development of the transnational mobility project is not just the ambition and desire of the migrant but also the phase they are in, in their life project. Thus for some transnational mobility is a further development of their overall migration project and thus while their integration (workwise, income and socially) is high, they are seeking for a further economic outlets to invest, or they are cultivating/honouring family ties or, last but not least, they are involved in philanthropic projects back home.

Our fieldwork in four destination countries and five countries of origin shows that the above typology helps to make sense of a mobile transnational migrant’s life trajectory and of the dynamic interplay between social and economic integration at destination, mobilisation of financial and social resources at
origin, policy options (stability and security of residence that allows for frequent mobility) and the personal as well as family-related desires and needs of the individual. Below we provide by way of illustration some exemplary cases that showcase how transnational mobility and different types of transnational engagement develop through the different life phases of a migrant.

The above mentioned categories do overlap to a certain extent, which is illustrated by the cases below. Indeed they are often life course dependent: when both types of integration (economic and social) become weak, a prospective returnee turns into a family returning migrant, while an active homeland reformer may become no more than a nostalgic mobile transnationalist.

Table 5: The relationship between transnational mobility and integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Mobility</th>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Weak Social and Economic Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Family Transnationalist (High or Moderate)</td>
<td>Homeland Investor</td>
<td>Preparing for Return</td>
<td>Returning Family (Wo)man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Economic Transnationalist (High or Moderate)</td>
<td>Global Businessperson</td>
<td>Resource Mobiliser</td>
<td>Second Chance Mobile Transnationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Civic Transnationalist (High or Moderate)</td>
<td>Global Citizen</td>
<td>Homeland Reformer</td>
<td>Nostalgic Mobile Transnationalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation.
Case 1: A Global Businessperson and a global citizen living in between Spain and the Philippines

Vicente (58) studied a BA in Economics in Philippines 40 years ago, and since then he has been very transnational. Firstly he worked several years in Hong Kong, and in the middle of 80’s he came for the first time to Spain to study for a MBA. From then on he has always lived in other European countries working for different multinational enterprises. At the beginning of the 2000s Vicente and some partners decided to set up his own international consultancy specializing in energy, infrastructures and financial services. They opened two offices, one in Spain and the other one in Philippines. Since he and his wife returned to Spain in 2009, he focused his professional activity in this firm. He counted on the help of several friends from his previous employment in Spain who had supported his reintegration to the country. “Currently Spain is my home so much as Philippines. I like being integrated in all countries where I live, and now I have more Spanish friends than Filipinos”.

Vicente travels to Philippines three times a year because he keeps strong professional and personal links there. On the one hand, there are several projects in his consultancy that he manages personally. On the other hand he likes visiting relatives, traveling as a tourist and checking on his properties, especially his farm. This life in-between both countries does not create any emotional problems for Vicente. On the contrary, he admits: “I have strong emotional links with Philippines, but such links do not suppose a barrier in relation to my feelings about other countries where I lived as United Kingdom, Netherlands or Spain. I have a global identity, and I am proud of that”.

As Vicente enjoys the Spanish-Filipino dual citizenship, he does not face any legal problems when traveling between both counties. He is very critical about the Filipino society: In his opinion the lack of planning is a serious problem, and both the financial system and the civil service are inefficient and bureaucratic. Vicente has always collaborated with NGOs and foundations devoted to development. In Spain, he cooperates with a NGO that carries out programs for migrant integration, and in Philippines - with a foundation that provides education and home to people in need.

In relation to his future plans, he plans to continue going back and forth between both countries. Lately he is resuming his academic activities writing papers and a book, teaching in Spain in a MBA and promoting research relations between Europe and Asia.

At the very end of the interview, Vicente added on a final note: “Migration is both an emotional and political matter. At the European level it is necessary to find a balance between opening and integration. The arrival of high-skilled migrants and their integration should be promoted, because this kind of migrants brings valuable knowledge. Migrations bring closer countries of origin and destination, what promotes economic and commercial relationships and generate synergies”.

ITHACA Comparative Report
Case 2: A Global Businessperson and Resource Mobiliser who turned into a Global Citizen living between Italy and Morocco

Leyla, 48, now lives in the north-east of Italy. She grew up in a city south from Marrakesh and then worked as a teacher in one of Morocco’s most cosmopolitan cities. She has a University degree in Physics earned in Morocco. But when she moved to Italy, she began to work as a cleaning lady. Eventually, she also obtained a post-graduate degree in inter-cultural mediation in Italy and she now also works part-time as a cultural mediator in schools. She spoke Arab, Berber, French and English and when she moved to Italy, she learnt Italian and German too.

She followed her partner and moved to Italy but always visited Morocco regularly, even a few times a year sometimes, and generally stayed for periods up to one month. She tried to trade, informally and mainly between the two countries, by bringing Argan Oil or Berber kaftan tissues that she would then sell on the Italian market. Lack of a substantial market did not allow this initiative to flourish. Now she only brings Argan oil back to her city of residence in the north east of Italy for her friends and the principle reason she returns to Morocco now is for family reasons and not for trade. She also returns less frequently than she used to because she has a child now in Italy and the infrastructure and opportunities for raising a child in Italy are better than in Morocco. She would like to return more frequently but does not have the resources at present and since her trading efforts were not fruitful she does not have employment opportunities in Morocco whereas she has a job in Italy. Although she find work and material conditions better in Italy (particularly for her child), she feels nostalgic for and connected with the Berber culture, seeking ways to maintain this connection as regularly as she can. She feels that if she were able to obtain Italian citizenship, she would be also able to get a job better suited to her qualifications. She wishes to continue promoting Moroccan and Berber culture in order to improve understanding of this culture in Italy and perhaps eventually to create conditions conducive to trade and cultural exchanges.

Case 3: A Homeland Investor Preparing for Return who later became a Global Businessperson between Ukraine and Italy

Volodymyr is 53 years old and holds a university degree in the arts. He is married and has two children. He wanted to open a restaurant in his home town in western Ukraine. He decided to migrate to Italy alone in 2008 in order to gather enough money to set up a family restaurant. He was supported in this migration project by family and friends that he had in Italy. They helped to pay for his travel and then helped him find a job in domestic work and eventually in building. Once he was able to regularise his status he started returning more frequently. He always regularly remitted money earned back to his family in Ukraine, usually through the services of Western Union. Although he migrated alone, when speaking of Italy, he referred to the country as
his second home and feels particularly attached to Italy. After five years in Italy, he returned home in 2013 and
opened an Italian restaurant in his home city where he currently employs four people. He now travels up to 6
times a year back to Italy, staying a few weeks each time, in order to purchase foods and goods for his
restaurant. He maintains a long term residence permit in Italy. His plans for the future including a second
restaurant in Ukraine. He seeks to remain permanently in Ukraine while being able to visit Italy for work and
social purposes as often as he can. He has helped two friends return and find work in Ukraine.

Case 4: A Returning Family Woman, Nostalgic Mobile Transnationalist between the UK and India

Suprija is a single mother and an academic in her 30s. She came to the UK 12 years ago, on a scholarship, to
study for her Master's degree; she then continued to a PhD. Her work requires frequent travel to India where
she goes for fieldwork. In the past two years, she went there 8-10 times; she stays on average for two to three
weeks. Sometimes she would go for six weeks, putting her daughter in a nursery there. She has her own
transnational routine. She has a life in the UK and in India. Suprija travels a lot in rural areas looking at social
policy issues and gender dynamics. She always combines her research visits spending time with her parents and
her brother's family. Her young daughter always travels with her. If I were to travel just to see my family, it
would be once a year.

For her, it is paramount to be able to go to India and come back. I would not be able to live in the UK. It
reorganises me to go back home. It is like a drug. I need my fix. The longest I have been here was 9 months and
it was impossible to live with. My heart is in India. I hang out with friends; it is the people I go back to. It' the
place, the food, the weather, the culture; it's the feeling one can't explain-just being myself. Her parents are a
great support to her. They travel to the UK to help her with her daughter. Before coming to the UK, she worked
for an international NGO in Jaipur with a long-term contract. Both her parents had businesses. And she was in
a very good financial situation.

She would return to India if she could have the same job there. Thinking about the advantages of immigration
to the UK, she believes that those are not economic as she would have done better if she had stayed in India.
The benefits for her are only social - the system, which works and is not so bureaucratic, the roads, the
infrastructure are better. For her, the greatest disadvantage is her daughter not learning much Hindi and
missing the culture. I am so far away from my family. At minimum I need 12 hours to reach them, which is very
scary. She misses the Indian culture. During the biggest Indian festival, she is always at work. This does not
make me feel like home.

She has invested in a house in the UK. Ideally, she would like to go back to India but recognises that it is
becoming impossible as the father of her daughter is in the UK. Mainly, I want to be settled. Travelling is
taking its toll on me.
Case 5: An Global Businessperson and Resource Mobiliser turned into a Nostalgic Mobile Transnationalist between the UK and Bosnia Herzegovina

Demir is a single man of the Bosnian origin. He is in his 30s, and he runs a school. He was head-hunted for the job. He was still in high school when the war broke out. In the spring of 1992, the family was resettled in Australia where he completed high school and went to University, graduating in business studies. He spoke no English when he first went to Australia, at the age of 14. A project manager in construction, he decided to emigrate to the UK, on Tier 4: temporary work scheme (Commonwealth Programme). 

I always wanted to come back to Europe, in an English speaking country. Demir has a dual Bosnian-Australian citizenship.

He is a frequent traveller to Bosnia. In the last two years, he visited 10-15 times, staying from two weeks to a month at a time. I am nostalgic for the culture, the music, my friends. I only have distant family there. Apart from that, Bosnia does not suit my way of thinking. I prefer to live in a modern society. I need to live in the Western world. I don't like how they process the world there.

Demir goes to his new residence in the capital Sarajevo, where he bought a house with own savings. He faced many difficulties with the investment: bureaucracy, corruption and lack of market. Bureaucracy is a standard item in Bosnia; everything happens through who you know, not what you know.

Recently he arranged the work placement of two Bosnian people in London to develop their knowledge and experience in special needs education, and return afterwards. He has been involved in fund-raising for projects in Bosnia. Two years ago he helped build a house for an elderly couple. Last year he collected money for the floods in the UK and then drove to the destination where there was need.

When asked about state programmes for engaging the Diaspora for home country development, he commented: It will be a long time before we see anything like this. Corruption is on a very high level. Politicians see the Diaspora as a direct threat to their security. Politicians won’t allow things to be done differently.

On the question of belonging to the origin country he said that for a long time he felt strongly about the Yugoslav identity and he was very disappointed with the break-up of Yugoslavia. After the war I say I am passionate to be Bosnian. It is the survival instinct to fight off the people who pushed you out.

He has no family or relatives in the UK but he has lots of friends and business associates. He regularly attends Bosnian music events in London. I gained a life in London, a life style and cultural experience I always wanted. What I lost was closeness with family. He plans to make a home in the UK and continue to travel to Bosnia to stay engaged with life and culture there.
Concluding Remarks

In spite of the over-abundant scholarship on transnational economic, political and social engagement; empirical research specifically on transnational mobility remains extremely limited. In this connection, ITHACA is one of the first studies to look into the links between mobility and other forms of transnational engagement.

The analysis presented here is based on the ITHACA quantitative and qualitative survey of 324 transnationally mobile migrants and returnees living between four destination countries (Austria, Italy, Spain, and the UK) and five origin countries (Bosnia, Morocco, India, the Philippines and the Ukraine). The report integrates findings from the four Country Reports focusing each on one of the destination countries at hand (König et al. 2015; González Enríquez and Martinez Romera 2015; Gropas, Bartolini, and Triandafyllidou 2015; Markova and McKay 2015), the quantitative analysis of the ITHACA survey results (Bartolini 2015) and the report on social remittances taking place between the countries (Isaakyan 2015).

In a nutshell, our study shows that migrants who are transnationally mobile and who engage into economic (and also social) transnational activities (including remitting and investing into some form of economic/productive activity at the country of origin) are not those who are best integrated or most successful, nor are they those who are dissatisfied with their situation at the destination or those who feel marginalised and excluded and hence engage into some form of reactionary transnationalism to compensate downward socio economic mobility at destination.

Transnationally mobile migrants are sufficiently integrated at destination: They have been there for several years and have already solved the main first arrival problems of speaking the language of the destination country. They have typically gone beyond survival needs but their labour market integration is not necessarily uneventful. Transnational mobility emerges for some as a way to improve their economic situation and create a viable return at origin while for others transnational mobility and investment is just another form of improving their economic situation and maximising their income. In other words, as also commented earlier, some are transnational by opportunity and others by necessity. Transnational mobility is a matter of personal choice that is of course inter-related with the background of the migrant, their conditions at origin and destination and their overall life trajectories.

Our transnationally mobile migrants are typically highly educated. They hold degrees obtained mostly in their country of origin. Only a small number of few high-skill (elite) professionals hold degrees also from the country of destination. Indeed, while economic or institutional integration are neither sufficient nor
necessary conditions, education appears to be a necessary condition but not sufficient (not all highly educated migrants are transnational, but all transnationally mobile migrants are highly educated).

Bearing the hallmarks of transnationalism, their transnational mobility is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for their transnationalism. It interacts closely with transnational economic, civic or social (family related) engagement in very complex ways. Indeed transnationally mobile migrants are people who have close ties with the country of origin, often through family members left behind particularly children or other first degree relatives. Their future is thus somehow closely connected still with the country of origin. Naturally the nature of these ties varies in relation to the age and lifecycle phase of each migrant and their family situation, hence we may speak of young families transnational mobility and transnational engagement (where it is the parents who are transnational, and they have both young children, at origin or destination, and elderly parents at origin) or of middle aged people or older who seek to prepare their return or to capitalise on their migration experience by improving their future prospects.
References


Bartolini, Gropas, Isaakyan, Triandafyllidou


