Diaspora-making as a State-led Project

Turkey's Expansive Diaspora Strategy and its Implications for Emigrant and Kin Populations

Aslı Selin Okyay

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

Florence, December 2015
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ABSTRACT

States’ efforts to create, expand or mobilise extraterritorial populations of emigrant or kin origin have been largely dealt by separate strands of scholarship. This thesis aims to bridge these two strands and offer a broader understanding of home-states’ role in diaspora-making by analysing why and how Turkey has evolved into a hybrid origin-reference state claiming and engaging an expansive diaspora composed of emigrants and a broad set of kin populations defined beyond co-ethnicity.

The empirical analysis traces the state’s transformation through focusing on its categorisation and identification practices and policy-discourse repertoire oriented towards these different types of transborder populations over the last two decades. It argues that the ways in which the state identified and targeted both emigrants and external kin groups changed as a function of the interaction between: i) economic liberalisation and outward economic expansion, ii) shifts in the state’s foreign political and identitarian positioning vis-à-vis the West and its non-Western neighbourhood and iii) differing elite-sponsored conceptions of nationhood and narratives of nationalism. These interacting underlying factors have led the home-state to gradually expand the scope and diversify the composition of its transborder membership universe, while simultaneously engage in practices of selection and hierarchisation within its broad diaspora based on its changing definitions of ideal emigrants and external kin.

This thesis also scrutinises the implications of changing rationalities and modalities of the state’s diaspora making for the targeted populations. Empirical examination of the cases of the Turkey-origin emigrant population in Germany and the co-ethnic minority in Bulgaria demonstrates that the home-state, through its varying definition, (sub)categorisation, and engagement efforts, significantly impacts the diasporic membership claims and practices of both emigrants and co-ethnics. State-led diaspora-making has (re)structuring effects particularly on intra-minority dynamics as well as different sections’ stances towards and relations with the home-state.
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List of Abbreviations

**AABF**: Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Federation of Alevi Associations in Germany)

**AABK**: Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu (European Confederation of Alevi Associations)

**AADDB**: Avrupa Atatürkçü Düşünce Dernekleri Birliği (Union of European Atatürkist Thought Associations)

**AAIB**: Almanya Alevi İslam Birliği (Union of Alevi Islam in Germany)

**ACF**: Alevi Cemaatleri Federasyonu (Federation of Alevi Communities)

**ADD**: Atatürkçü Düşünce Dernekleri (Atatürkist Thought Associations)

**ADGB**: Almanya Demokratik Güçbirliği Platformu (Union of Democratic Forces in Germany)

**AEBF**: Avrupa Ehl-i Beyt Federasyonu (European Ehl-i Beyt Federation)

**AKP**: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

**ANAP**: Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)

**ATIB**: Avrupa Türk İslam Kültür Dernekleri Birliği (European Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Centres).

**ATIF**: Almanya Türkiyeli İşçiler Federasyonu (Federation of Workers from Turkey in Germany)

**ATIYAB**: Avrupa Ticaret ve Yatırım Birliği (European Business and Investment Association)

**ATT**: Avrupa Türk Toplumu (Turkish Community in Germany)

**BAT**: Berlin Alevi Toplumu-Cemevi (Berlin Alevi Community-Cem House)

**BCP**: Bulgarian Communist Party

**BDP**: Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Party for Peace and Democracy)

**BHC**: Bulgarian Helsinki Committee

**BSP**: Bulgarian Socialist Party

**BTC**: Berlin Türk Cemaati (Berlin Turkish Community)

**CDU**: Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CEE: Central and Eastern Europe

CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)

CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States

CSCE: Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe

CSU: Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)

CU: Customs Union

DAHR: Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania

DEHAP: Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People's Party)

DEIK: Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu (Foreign Economic Relations Board)

DIB or DİYANET: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs)

DIDF: Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu (Federation of Democratic Workers’ Associations)

DITIB: Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs)

DP: Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party)

DPT: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (State Planning Organisation)

DSP: Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)

DTGK: Dünya Türk Girişimciler Kurultayı (World Turkish Entrepreneurs Congresses)

DTIK: Dünya Türk İş Konseyi (World Turkish Business Council)

DTM: Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı (Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade)

DTP: Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party)

DYP: Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)

EEC: European Economic Community

EOI: Export oriented industrialisation

EU: European Union

FDI: Foreign direct investment

FP: Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GCIM</td>
<td>Global Commission on International Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFMD</td>
<td>Global Forum on Migration and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCNM</td>
<td>High Commissioner for National Minorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People’s Democratic Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGMG</td>
<td>Islamic Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (Islamic Community Milli Görüş)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRD</td>
<td>Der Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import substitution industrialisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOMKAR</td>
<td>Konfederasyona Komeleyên Kurdistanê li Ewrûpa (The Confederation of Associations from Kurdistan in Europe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRM</td>
<td>Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Co-ordinating Council for Muslims in Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGH</td>
<td>Milli Görüş Hareketi (National Outlook Movement)</td>
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<td>MGK</td>
<td>Milli Güvenlik Konseyi (National Security Council)</td>
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<td>MHP</td>
<td>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)</td>
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<td>MNP</td>
<td>Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRF</td>
<td>Movement for Rights and Freedoms (BG: Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi; TR: Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MÜSİAD</td>
<td>Mustakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (The Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMSP</td>
<td>National Movement for Stability and Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSU</td>
<td>Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist Underground)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of the Islamic Conference</td>
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OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCO: Programme Coordination Office
PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers’ Party)
PPFD: People’s Party Freedom and Dignity
PRB: People’s Republic of Bulgaria
RP: Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
SMEs: Small and Medium Enterprises
SP: Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
TBMM: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)
TD-IHK: Türkisch-Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammer (Turkish-German Chamber of Industry and Commerce)
TDU: Türk-Alman İşadamları Birliği (Union of Turkish-German Business Associations)
TDV: Türk Dış ticaret Vakfı (Turkish Foreign Trade Foundation)
TDV: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (Turkish Diyanet (Religious Affairs) Foundation)
TES: Turkish Employment Service
TGB: Türkiye Gençlik Birliği (Youth Union of Turkey)
TIKA: Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency)
TIM: Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi (Turkish Exporters Assembly)
TMB: Türkiye Müteahhitler Birliği (Turkish Contractors Association)
TOBB: Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey)
TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TÜMSİAD: Tüm Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği (Association for All Industrialists and Businessmen)
TÜRKSOY: Türk Kültür ve Sanatları Ortak Yönetimi (Common Management of Turkish Culture and Arts)
TÜSİAD: Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association)

TUSKON: Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists)

TWCs: Turkish Workers Companies

UETD: Union of European Turkish Democrats

UN: The United Nations

UND: Uluslararası Nakliyeciler Derneği (International Transporters Association)

UNESCO: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

VIKZ: Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (Association of Islamic Cultural Centres)

YEI: Yunus Emre Institute

YEK-KOM: Yekîtiya Komalên Kurd li Elmanya (Federation of Kurdish Associations in Germany)

YSK: Yüksek Seçim Kurulu (Supreme Election Board)

YTB: T.C. Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı (Overseas Turks and Kin Communities Agency)

YYVDK: Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu (Consultation Commission for Citizens Living Abroad)

YVDK: Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu (Consultation Commission of Citizens Abroad)

ZMD: Der Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Central Council of Muslims in Germany)
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

An increasing number and range of states have been granting rights, statuses, and symbolic as well as material resources to populations permanently settled beyond their borders in ways defying the principle of territoriality underlying conventional conceptions of membership in a nation-state. Some states like Mexico (Fitzgerald 2009; Smith 2003a) concentrate their efforts on emigrant populations composed of their overseas citizens and former citizens. Others like Hungary (Kantór et al. 2004) predominantly focus their efforts on populations that affiliate with or are presented as belonging to the claimant state’s ethno-nation even though they were left out of that state’s current borders as a result of changes in international frontiers. The main laboratory of the latter strand is the post-Soviet space and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and most studies limited their attention to state interest in ethnically defined and geographically rather clearly delineated kin populations.1

Paralleling the clear demarcation of the mandates of these “pure” cases of migrant sending-states and kin-states, strands of scholarship dealing with these two types of state-transborder population configurations have also developed in a rather bifurcated way.2 They have remained largely confined within their autonomous analytical, conceptual, and empirical spaces. Insulated from each other, the explanatory frameworks aiming to understand what motivates states to claim and target these two types of transborder populations have also largely tilted towards opposite directions.

Explanations of state interest in creating diasporas out of their globally dispersed expatriates tend to prioritise challenges posed or transformations structured by (economic) globalisation for both less developed states of the global South (Levitt & de la Dehesa 2003), as well as for

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1 Seol and Skrentny (2004) and Skrentny et al. (2007) examining kin-states in South East Asia were exceptions with regards to regional concentration. Brubaker (2000) and Zevelev (2001; 2008) analysed state construction of and interest in transborder “kin” defined beyond co-ethnicity in the case of Russia and its “compatriots” abroad.
2 Following the terminology suggested by Brubaker and Kim (2011: 22), I use the term ‘transborder’ to refer to both emigrant and kin populations that are permanently ‘outside the territory of a particular state, yet is represented as belonging in some way to that state or to the nation associated with that state’. It should be noted that “transborder kin” does not only refer to populations living in the states neighbouring the “origin” state and/or those populations inhabiting the border zones.
affluent countries of the global North (Gamlen 2006; Larner 2007). By contrast, the strand explaining kin-state interest and action tends to single out ethnic nationalism as an end in itself (Lake & Rothchild 1998; van Evera 1994). More nuanced accounts pointed to instrumental uses of ethnic nationalist discourses and ideologies by legitimacy- and vote-seeking domestic political actors in competitive political settings (Verdery 1998; Waterbury 2010b). Overall, the former literature has given more significance to broader (global) political economic structure and the state’s interaction with it, while the latter has largely looked through domestic and ethno-national(ist) lenses.

In addition to the abovementioned “pure” forms of migrant sending-states and (ethnic) kin-states, there are also those that I call hybrid origin-reference states. A hybrid origin-reference state claims, constructs, and targets an expansive, multi-register, and multi-layered diaspora including citizens and former citizens with personal or ancestral emigration background, as well as ethnically defined kin over whom the borders moved at some point. However, the transborder membership universe claimed by such a state is bigger and more diverse than the sum of emigrants and transborder co-ethnics. It assembles its expansive diaspora through using a combination of legal, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and rather ambiguously defined cultural-historical membership criteria. Russia with its notion of “compatriots abroad” developed since the late 1990s (Zevelev 2001) exhibits such characteristics. Dating equally back to the 1990s, Turkey too has been lodging claims on a broad and expanding range of transborder populations composed of emigrants, co-ethnics, and kin populations defined otherwise.

The latter cases suggest grey zones rather than black and white separations between globally versus ethno-nationally framed motivations, international versus domestic factors behind state interest in different “types” of transborder populations, as well as those between “pure” ethnic kin-states versus (migrant) diasporising states. They also point to a “hybrid” kind of state claiming and targeting both “types” of populations, as well as to a modified conception of transborder “kinship” defying the widely accepted one based primarily on ethnicity.

This dissertation aims to offer a deeper and more complex understanding of the case of an origin state that is not classifiable in either pure way. Dealing with such a hybrid case requires an analytical lens through which we can nuance our understanding of states’ transborder member-making and engagement practices. It simultaneously requires a dialogue between the
two strands of scholarship and offers a potential to bridge them for the sake of an improved understanding of the state’s role in making, shaping, and engaging “its” transborder members. By exploring one of those grey zones through examining why and how Turkey has become a state with a claim on an expansive, multi-register, and multi-layered “diaspora”, this thesis aims to contribute to such dialogue. It particularly aims to contribute to our understanding of (i) drivers of state interest in, (ii) modalities of state engagement of, (iii) outcomes of state action towards transborder populations falling into migrant and co-ethnic categories as well as those non-migrant populations not fitting our existing categories.

As the expansive and multi-register nature of the state’s diaspora notion suggests, the making and construction of various “types” of transborder members is explicit and central to such kind of state action. Over the course of the last two decades Turkey transformed itself from a state with limited interest in predominantly ethno-nationally defined transborder kin into one simultaneously claiming and engaging emigrant, co-ethnic, and not only ethnically defined external kin populations. It has also exhibited variation in terms of the ways it defined, (sub)categorised, and approached the entirety and different constituent units of this membership register. The examination of these definitional and categorical changes allows one to shed light on why and how states attempt making and moulding “their” diasporas. As it should be clear by now, this project draws on and aims to contribute to approaches that denaturalise “diasporas” (Brubaker 2005) and approach diaspora-making as a political project (Bauböck 2010) led, in this case, by the origin-reference state.

The main empirical question that the thesis seeks to answer is:

- Why and how have Turkey’s categorisation and identification practices and policies oriented towards emigrant and transborder kin populations changed?

At a higher level of abstraction, the main question aims to understand why and how a state reconfigures the composition, scope, and core defining characteristics of populations making up its transborder membership universe. Policies and discourses oriented towards targeted populations are largely conditioned and structured by state categorisation practices (Brubaker & Kim 2011). They are also tools to promote and institutionalise these categories and what

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3 Such a concerted diaspora politics approach and analytical cross-fertilisation was already suggested by Waterbury (2010a). These suggestions will be further discussed in the following section.
the state wants them to mean and serve to ‘attach consequences to categories’ (Ibid.: 24). Hence, the main question also aims at understanding how the state’s changed categorisation practices translate into its discourses and policies oriented towards both kinds of extraterritorial populations. By tracing the changes in the (sub)categories and the policy-discourse repertoire targeting these populations simultaneously and in a dialogical way, I aim to shed light on the links between state categorisation practices and policies as well as discourses oriented at a fluctuating set of transborder populations.

At a second level, the thesis aims to shed light on the impact of these macro-level state-led changes on the political struggles among targeted populations and their relations with the origin state. In an effort to better understand how states shape transnational social and political action (Bauböck 2003; Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004), the thesis examines what happens at the micro-level after states launch and reconfigure their diaspora-making projects. It examines the implications of changing state definition, categorisation and engagement practices for the forms, degrees, and claims of transborder membership of migrant and non-migrant target populations. Hence, the additional empirical question for the case studies is:

- What have the implications of Turkey’s changing categorisation and policies been for its emigrants in Germany and co-ethnics in Bulgaria?

This dissertation argues that the distinct ways in which Turkey defined, delineated, (sub)categorised and targeted both emigrant and transborder kin populations changed as a function of transformations in: (i) the conception of nationhood and narrative of nationalism constructed and promoted by state elites; (ii) the desired degree of the economy’s openness and locations chosen for economic expansion and interpenetration; (iii) the political, cultural, and identitarian positioning of the state vis-à-vis the “West” and its “non-Western” neighbourhood. While singling out the above factors, the dissertation also demonstrates that these were framed and shaped by transformations in the broader political and economic conjuncture. Economic neoliberalisation and the political conjuncture following the end of the Cold War were of particular importance. The ways in which different state elites related to the confession-based socio-political organisation of the Ottoman Empire and its relationship with the “West” largely shaped their constructions of identity for the nation and the state as well as for emigrants and kin-groups.
1. STATE-LED PROJECTS OF DIASPORA-MAKING: TARGETING, CHANGE, IMPACT

1.1. Politics of targeting: Migrant sending-states, kin-states, and hybrid origin-reference states

A cluster within scholarship on migration, transnationalism, and diaspora focused on the discourses and policies deployed by a broad range of migrant sending-states to sustain their links with their emigrants abroad (e.g. Gamlen 2006, 2008; Levitt & de la Dehesa 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003d, Smith 2003a). Kin-state activism was dealt by studies focusing on international security and inter-state conflict (e.g. Carment & James 1997; Lake & Rothchild 1998; van Evera 1994), and nationalism (e.g. Brubaker 1996; Chinn & Kaiser 1996; Melvin 1995).

A general tendency contributing to the bifurcation of migrant and kin “worlds” has been conceiving of the former relationship as a product and manifestation of “new” global developments’, and of the latter as a remnant of “old” historical legacies’ reminiscent of 19th century nationalisms (Joppke 2005: 247). Economic transformations in the broader context associated with globalisation have been understood as structuring state-expatriate relations, and the efforts of states of origin to construct and engage their diasporas (Larner 2007; Ragazzi 2014). The proliferation of studies focusing on the link between (migrant) diasporas and development (Gamlen 2014) contributed to the economic framing of this type of relationship and to the conception of purely economically motivated sending states. In the other configuration, a scholarly tendency to overstate ethnic nationalism as the *explanans* behind kin-state activism remained largely intact. This tendency overshadowed other not-so-ethnic factors linked to elite or regime change, domestic and transborder power struggles, and transformations in the broader political-economic context (Brubaker & Kim 2011; Waterbury 2010b).

Scholars have recently pointed to a need for cross-fertilisation between these two domains of diaspora politics (Brubaker & Kim 2011; Joppke 2005; Waterbury 2010b). Arguments in favour of such analytical, conceptual, and empirical dialogue are grounded in empirical observations of parallels between the two types of configurations. Despite expectations of widespread irredentist aggression by kin-states, state efforts focused on building and sustaining social, cultural, economic links with external minorities, while refraining from
territorialising them (Csergő & Goldgeier 2004). In the ‘post-irredentist paradigm’, the kin-state discourse and policy repertoire show parallels to those of migrant sending-states (Waterbury 2010a). The two types of triadic configurations also share a ‘structurally isomorphic’ geometry, providing fertile ground for spotting similarities and differences, as well as ‘interferences and combinations’ between the two (Bauböck 2010: 311).

Analytical cross-fertilisation and using a broader diaspora politics lens serves also a corrective and nuancing function enriching our understanding of the state-transborder member nexus, as well as the state’s role in it. Waterbury (2010b) demonstrated that it is useful to move away from the trap of ethnic nationalism in explaining state interest in transborder co-ethnics and in factoring in elite interest, contingency, political expediency and regime type. Cross-fertilisation between the two configurations might reveal how the mandates of kin-states may ‘be reinforced by contemporary global processes’ (Joppke 2005: 247). It has similar potential in moving away from globalist extremes in the sending-state – emigrant nexus and factoring in the ‘nationalism in transnationalism’ (Bauböck 2010). Situated beyond the border, dispersed to varying degrees, but envisioned and presented as belonging and connected to the “origin” state, both kinds of populations have become objects of state-led diasporisation projects. The ‘third way offered by diaspora studies between nationalist and globalist approaches’ (Faist 2010: 25) has the potential to enrich our understanding of the motivations behind, implications of, and changes in these state-led projects.

This dissertation follows the abovementioned suggestions for enhancing the dialogue between the two strands of scholarship by examining the case of a single state that falls also empirically into the “subject matter” of both strands. By targeting both “kinds” of populations, a hybrid origin-reference state by definition defies clearly demarcated and incompatible explanatory frameworks reserved for sending-state and kin-state activism respectively. The endeavour of explaining drivers of “hybrid” state interest in both kinds of transborder populations and of shedding light on the outcomes of state engagement efforts in both configurations provides also fertile ground for analytical cross-fertilisation. Instead of placing rationalities structured by global processes and national(ist) drives at the two opposite extremes in our explanations of transborder state practices and policies, the hybrid state perspective offers a potential for a dialogue also between these two perspectives.
Which rationalities lie behind the state’s endeavour of targeting both kinds of extraterritorial populations? Why do some states develop expansive, multi-register, and multi-layered notions of diaspora? Are there links or parallels between the reasons that drive the state’s expansion of registers in its overall notion of “diaspora”? How does the state reconcile notions of transborder membership defined by the legal status of citizenship on the one hand and by subjective identity markers on the other? What are the implications of the “expansive” scope and diverse composition of claimed populations for the substance (policies, discourses) of the state-led diaspora-making project?

1.2. Changing extent and content of the state’s transborder membership universe

Studies examining states’ relations with and policies towards their transborder populations approached the question of change in two major ways. On the one hand, scholars examined the variation in the degree of state interest in embracing and incorporating extraterritorial populations. Migration scholars demonstrated that the level of home-states’ interest in emigrant populations fluctuated as a function of elite interest, political expediency, contingency, and the state’s interaction with broader political-economic structure (Fitzgerald 2006; Sherman 1999; Smith 2003a). Within the ethnic kin configuration, the state was presumed to be unconditionally interested in the fate of its external co-ethnics stemming from ethnic affinity. Discarding that assumption, Waterbury (2010b) showed that Hungary’s waxing and waning levels of interest was largely conditioned by domestic political actors’ power and legitimacy seeking behaviour in a competitive political context.

On the other hand, scholars focused on the overall change in the ways in which states relate to populations outside their territories. These studies analysed the overall shift from grounding membership to the state and the nation in territoriality to detaching the former from the latter. They also examined the implications of this “mental” shift for state policies and discourses oriented at these absent migrant and non-migrant members (Csergö & Goldgeier 2006; Ragazzi 2009; Smith 1997).

Brubaker and Kim (2011) point out that most studies examining change in state policies presume a predetermined, static, and neatly delineated set of transborder populations without problematizing how these populations are ‘constituted’ by the state as ‘belonging’ to that state. As the category of emigrant is based on the possession of personal or ancestral
citizenship to the claimant state, the question of variation in the scope and composition relates mostly to the making of the non-migrant transborder members. The presumption of a predefined kin population gained plausibility because in most of the CEE kin-states under scrutiny the transborder populations are rather clearly delineated according to historical, geographical, and ethnocultural specifications. Shifting the attention to ‘politics of identification’ and focusing on the cases of Germany and Korea, which lack such clarity, Brubaker and Kim demonstrate that the state plays a central role in defining and delineating populations belonging to its transborder (co-ethnic) membership register. The constituent units of this register show variation engendered by the state’s border-crossing group-making and unmaking practices driven by non-ethnic factors. Hence, the authors suggest that states’ transborder member-making practices should be problematized, instead of taking ‘the existence of such populations for granted’ (ibid: 64).

Problematizing and examining the state’s claiming of transborder populations as its own populations also helps our analyses escape the trap of naturalising “diasporas” (Brubaker 2005; Dufoix 2008), and focus on why and how they are made or remade by state-led diasporisation projects. Analysing the case of a state that has been lodging claims on an expanding set of transborder populations including emigrants, co-ethnics, and other “types” of kin provides a good case for deepening our understanding of the contingent nature of ‘politics of identification’. Particularly the latter group of non-ethnic kin allows shedding light on “creative” discursive and political strategies states use in forging and institutionalising various forms and degrees of transborder “kinship”.

This thesis aims to examine why and how the state reconfigures the scope, composition, and core defining characteristics of “its” transborder members. First, through examining the case of a state whose transborder membership register exhibited a great deal of variation in terms of its overall *scope* and *composition*, this dissertation sheds light on the role of the state in constructing, claiming, and constituting different extraterritorial populations with various types of links to the state as belonging in some way to the overarching framework of its diaspora. In doing so, it aims to detect and highlight contingent factors, structuring effects of the broader political-economic context, and domestic elites’ interests and ideologies underlying the formation, transformation, and constant re-moulding of this dynamic and growing “diaspora”.

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Second, this project adds another dimension to the question of the state’s border-crossing categorisation practices by examining sub-categorisation and hierarchisation within those populations that are included in the overall framework of emigrants and kin. States do not only delineate the boundaries of populations that are included into their transborder members, but also attempt to shape and give certain meanings and appearances to what is inside these delineated boundaries. A significant dimension of state-led diaspora-making is to ‘impose groupness’ on populations (Brubaker 2002), and to attribute certain defining characteristics, functions, collective identities, and ways of behaviour to the group (Dufoix 2008; Ragazzi 2010). Being called the emigrant or kin population of a state comes with a package of core defining characteristics, forms of loyalties, highlighted national (or civilisational) attributes, sets of societal values etc.

While the state generally presents this package as applying to the entirety of its global nation or diaspora, its content is appropriated by some and contested by others among those that are included within the overall scope. The state’s attitude towards sections that subscribe to the package and those that contest and challenge the ingredients of it is likely to be different. This dissertation examines why the main ingredients of this package change. It pays particular attention on how such definitional changes translate into the state’s informal yet crucial sub-categorisation, centralisation-marginalisation and hierarchisation practices within its “sets” of emigrants and transborder kin.

1.3. Implications of changing state categories and policies for targeted transborder populations

By now it is widely acknowledged that rather than demising and becoming less relevant in the face of non-state actors’ transnational practices and connections, states of origin sustained their salience in shaping transnational social and political action (Bauböck 2003; Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). Albeit in reconfigured ways, home-states retain their capability to project power and authority on populations also beyond borders, particularly in the case of their overseas citizens (Brand 2006). Identification and categorisation practices illustrate the state’s extraterritorial exertion of ‘symbolic power’ (Brubaker & Kim 2011). ‘Extra-territorially extending’ states are also able to shape degrees and forms of membership of different transborder groups through allocating material, political, and organisational resources to some
and not others, and vesting some but not others with the discursive power of representation (Smith 2003a: 329).

Changes in the extent and content of the state’s diaspora-making and engagement project potentially imply redefinitions of the “some” as well as “others”, which have significant implications for “diasporic” politics at the micro level. By examining the implications of changing categorisation and engagement modalities towards emigrant and kin populations, the thesis aims to shed light on the mechanisms and tools through which states actually shape transnational or intra-“national” transborder political and social action. In particular, this dissertation analyses the implications of the state’s revised and broadened kinship definition for transborder co-ethnic populations. It also examines the impact of changing sub-categorisation and hierarchisation practices on homeland-related agendas and intra-group dynamics of ethno-religiously and politically heterogeneous emigrant populations.

2. THE CASE AND THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS

2.1. Turkey as a migrant sending-state, kin-state, and hybrid origin reference state

The establishment of Turkey within its currently held borders signified the last step of a series of processes of gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, accompanied by incremental losses of territory and populations. When the nation-state was established in 1923, its resident population was composed of a Turkish-speaking, Sunni Muslim majority, and several ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, while ethno-linguistically Turkish and/or religiously Sunni Muslim populations were left out of its territory (Poulton 1997a). The phenomenon of large-scale emigration emerged in the 1960s through state-led labour exportation, and continued at high paces in the last three decades of the 20th century mainly through family reunification and political asylum. The latter trajectory was closely linked to the incompatibility between highly contested homogenous conceptions of nationhood imposed by state elites and collective claims reflecting the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity within the population (İçduygu 2009a).

Having experienced both population movement across borders, as well as border movement across populations, Turkey has had the historical material and the potential of actively claiming both types of transborder populations. Turkey is a case of a state that has exhibited a
great deal of variation in terms of the ways it defined, categorised and subcategorised, and approached the entirety and different “constituent” units of its transborder membership register. It used to be a kin-state concerned with populating its territory and homogenising its incipient nation with the “right kind of people” before 1945. The definition of the “right kind of people” was never unambiguously ethnic; ambivalent combinations between religion and former membership to the Ottoman Muslim millet always acted as an intervening factor in defining belonging (Kirişci 2000), challenging conventional understandings of merely ethnonationally defined transborder kin. It became a clear case of a temporarily labour-exporting, remittance-seeking, return-oriented sending state between the 1960s and 1990s, while the long-distance “management” of political dissidence and transborder nation building were important aspects of its face as a sending state in the 1980s and the 1990s (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c).

The state’s interest in claiming and engaging both overseas citizens and not merely ethnically defined kin populations became visible around the same time, corresponding to the aftermath of the Cold War and neoliberal restructuring of the economy, and the concomitant ‘diaspora turn’ (Agunias 2009). The synchronised timing raises the question of ‘why now and not before’ (Ragazzzi 2009) and hints at potentially complementary logics driving state interest in different types of populations. State interest in claiming and engaging both “categories” of populations increasingly continued despite changing hands of power from the ethnic Turkish nationalist and secularist elites to initially “conservative democratic” and lately Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in the 2000s.

While the scope of claimed populations has grown in the latter period, the rhetorical, practical, and substantial content of identifying and engaging emigrant and kin populations witnessed changes. The establishment of the Overseas Turks and Kin Communities Agency (T.C. Başbakanlık Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, YTB)4 in 2010 indicated that building and engaging the expansive, multi-register, and multi-layered diaspora was not to remain only rhetoric.5 Designated as a diaspora-specific bureaucracy under the

5 The institutionalisation and formalization of the hitherto not-so-visible diaspora talk of Turkey and the AKP government’s demonstration of commitment towards ‘overseas Turks and kin/related communities’ has recently triggered research interest in the topic, mostly from a policy assessment perspective. For an analysis evaluating Turkey’s diaspora policy and its reception in Germany, and providing recommendations for host-country authorities, see, Aydin (2014). For an account assessing diaspora policy and providing recommendations for
Prime Ministry, the Agency was assigned three different registers: First, citizens, former citizens, and their descendants settled in third countries permanently or for long term; second, co-ethnics and kin communities identified through a combination of ethno-linguistic, religious, historical, cultural membership criteria; and third, international students predominantly coming from the broader kin space, for which Turkey offers fully funded undergraduate and postgraduate education. Officials label these three categories as ‘diaspora of citizens’, ‘historical and cultural diaspora’, and ‘affinity diaspora’ respectively.⁶

The processes through which Turkey has become a “hybrid origin-reference state” offer opportunities to examine changes not only in the level of state interest in somewhat predetermined sets of populations, but also in the constitutive identification, definition, delineation, and (sub)categorisation practices, i.e., ‘politics of identification’ (Brubaker & Kim 2011). Thus, examining the case of Turkey allows for contextualising and tracing changing identification and engagement practices of a single state oriented at these various “types” of transborder populations. Such examination provides ample ground for shedding light on parallel, interacting, and complementary contingent factors, structuring effects of the broader political-economic context, as well as domestic elites’ interests and (nationalist) ideologies shaping state member-making practices directed at both emigrant and kin populations.

The in depth empirical analysis of this thesis focuses on the 1990s and 2000s, while the chapters provide historical background regarding state categorisation practices and ways of relating to kin populations and emigrants that had long-term effects on state behaviour in the last two decades. I take the year 2002 as a dividing line between the 1990s and the 2000s.⁷ It marks the beginning of the replacement of the Kemalist state elite, i.e., the secular establishment by the moderately Islamist AKP. I distinguish these phases because elite change of such nature implies striking differences between predominant official conceptions of nationhood, narratives of nationalism, and state identity, particularly with respect to the ways in which the elites relate to the Ottoman legacy, ethno-nationality, Islam, and the “West”.

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⁶ Author’s interview with the Vice-President of the Overseas Turks and Kin Communities Agency, Ankara, 19 April 2012.
⁷ Obviously, like any effort of slicing up history into distinct periods with different paradigms should do, I also acknowledge the existence of certain continuities between these periods as well as transitory phases.
2.2. Selection of “targeted populations”

This dissertation examines the implications of macro-level changes in the extent and content of the state’s diaspora-making and engagement project for the forms, degrees, and claims of membership of both kinds of targeted populations. It aims to shed light on the actual impact of changing state transborder member-making and engagement practices on the addressees. It should be noted that the purpose of this thesis is not to detect and examine the links between these different types of populations, while the analysis puts ample effort in shedding light on indirect interferences and inherent contradictions caused by the state’s lately developing concerted approach to an expansive diaspora. In order to examine the diaspora side of the configuration, I chose the emigrant “community” in Germany and the co-ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria as my cases.

Germany hosts the bulk of citizens and former citizens with personal or ancestral migration background from Turkey. Emigrants in Germany have traditionally received the highest level of attention from the homeland state elites as well as the broader public, being treated as the emigrant community. The diversity of migration trajectories, identity-related backgrounds, and political stances within the overall emigrant category is well reflected among the population in Germany. Accordingly, the “community” displays a broad spectrum of diasporic stances and mobilisation expressed and practiced through a myriad of political organisations (Ögelman 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b).

The co-ethnic minority in Bulgaria was chosen for three major reasons. First, it is the biggest extraterritorial ethnolinguistic Turkish minority in terms of its size. Second, there is a political party whose constituency, cadres and agendas are predominantly Turkish, namely, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF, Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi). It has been part

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8 It should be noted that the purpose of this thesis is not to detect and examine the links between these different types of populations. Nevertheless, the analysis puts effort in shedding light on indirect interferences and inherent contradictions caused by the state’s lately developing concerted approach to an orbited diaspora.

9 The separation of diaspora and home-state resorting to diaspora politics is an analytical tool to be able to examine processes and I acknowledge that they actually ‘co-constitute each other’ (Gamlen 2008: 852).

10 According to the 2010 numbers provided by Turkey’s Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1,629,480 Turkish citizens reside in Germany, making up to 43.2 per cent of all overseas citizens. According to a 2011 survey commissioned by the Overseas Turks and Kin Communities Agency, the ‘estimated population of those with Turkish origins living in Europe’ is 3,965,150: 2,502,000 out of this total live in Germany (YTB 2011: 3).

11 According to the 2011 census in Bulgaria, ethnic Turks constituted 8.8 per cent of the total population, corresponding roughly to 650,000 people (NSI 2011). My interviewees composed of minority representatives and Turkish diplomatic officials provided estimates within the 10-15 percent range, with a corresponding population of 800,000 to 1 million.
of mainstream parliamentary politics in Bulgaria since its establishment in 1990, and despite ups and downs, as well as a myriad of criticisms, it managed to retain electoral support of the great majority of the minority. This provides a picture in which ethnic entrepreneurs are rather clearly identifiable and the co-ethnic socio-political organisation is structured in relation to one focus. It has also had sustained relations with the “motherland” since 1990 as the organisation speaking in the name of the Turks of Bulgaria, which allows for detecting and inquiring the impact of changes in kin-state engagement on the minority representatives’ “motherland”-related perceptions, stances, actions, and relations.

Third, unlike populations that have been incrementally and variably added to Turkey’s transborder kin register, all ethno-linguistic Turkish minorities mainly in the Balkans and Cyprus, including those in Bulgaria have been included in the kin definitions of the state from its inception, even if the degree and form of state embracement varied. Hence, focusing on a ‘co-ethnic’ population in the conventional sense provides fertile ground for examining the implications of the changing scope and composition of the state’s transborder kin register as well as its re-definitions of kinship for a population that regarded itself, and was treated by the motherland as belonging to ‘front line co-ethnics’ (Poulton 1997a) from the beginning.

3. METHODOLOGY, EMPIRICAL DATA COLLECTION, FIELD RESEARCH

This project has a ‘case-oriented approach’ informed by historical contingencies and seeking in-depth knowledge of a single case (Della Porta 2008). Making Turkey into a case of hybrid origin-reference state, i.e., ‘casing’ (Ragin 1992: 218) an empirical phenomenon, the project seeks to engage in ‘critical reflection on the conventional boundaries and commonly accepted categories of social and political phenomena’ (Venesson 2008: 230).

As the aim is to examine a single state’s categorisation practices and policies directed towards emigrants and external kin communities, the project also has a comparative dimension. The comparison is not of the two types of transborder populations, but of the drivers of state interest in, modalities of engagement of, and outcomes of state action towards these populations. Hence, the aim of the comparative dimension is to find out similarities as well as differences in the ways the state constructs, categorises, and engages these populations. The objective is to contribute to a more complete and nuanced understanding of state-led diaspora making and engagement, particularly with regards to what motivates states to channel their
energies and resources for such projects. The comparison also aims at demonstrating similarities and differences in how states shape transborder membership claims and practices in ethnically homogenous minority contexts and those characterised by highly politicised identitarian heterogeneity.

The project has an equally significant concern with explaining the factors underlying change in the ways the state relates to and acts upon these two types of transborder populations. A within-case analysis (Mahoney 2000) aiming to explain when, why, and under what conditions change occurs is fit for such endeavour. As the project aims to account for the factors, mechanisms, and contingent transformations underlying Turkey’s gradually becoming a hybrid origin-reference state since the 1990s, the project makes use of process tracing. By tracing the processes and mechanisms explaining Turkey’s changed attitude vis-à-vis its overall diaspora and its constituent units, this research links multiple ‘data points’ (Rueschemeyer 2003) to provide an explanatory narrative of change. Process tracing is used in order ‘to identify processes linking a set of initial conditions to a particular outcome’ (Venesson 2008: 224), and to highlight the role of contingency.

As the research aims at understanding the macro-level changes in state attitude, discourse, and policies towards the two types of populations, as well as how these changes impacted the micro-politics, stances, claims, and actions of targeted populations, I conducted a ‘multi-sited’ fieldwork (Marcus 1995) in Turkey, Germany, and Bulgaria. As part of my aim to understand changes in state attitude, I interviewed officials active in various aspects of diaspora engagement policy-making and implementation. I carried out my field research in Ankara during April and May 2012. During this time, I conducted a total of 10 semi-structured interviews with officials from the various units of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish Development and Cooperation Agency, the Overseas Turks and Kin Communities Agency, and the Directorate of Religious Affairs. In addition to providing me with information on the activities of these state agencies with regards to both kinds of populations, they allowed me to get the “official positions” on Turkey’s emigrant and kin policies. I tried to focus on the issues of motivations as well as change in comparison to the Turkish state in the 1990s.

I completed my field research in Berlin, Germany during September-October 2012. During that time, I conducted 17 face-to-face semi-structured, open-ended interviews and two phone interviews. Berlin was chosen as the site for the fieldwork because it has a heterogeneous
emigrant population reflecting the diversity of migration trajectories, identity-related backgrounds, and political stances of the emigrants in Germany. As it is the capital city, NGOs as well as other types of organisations like business organisations established by people with origins in Turkey are manifold. My interviewees included community leaders, NGO representatives, ethnically or religiously oriented associations, business organisations set up by Turkish citizens and former citizens, two academics working on legal-political issues related to immigrants (particularly on those with origins in Turkey), and one official from Turkey’s embassy to Berlin and one from the consulate. The main aim was to collect interviews with a wide range of “diasporic elites” claiming to represent different diasporic stances related to the homeland state and perceptions on its “diaspora policy” as realistically as possible.  

Since my goal was to get a snapshot of the broader landscape of stances, and to spot crucial issues for further analysis, the sample did not aim to be representative of the whole “community”. I specifically targeted interviewees who have been active in some aspect of political associational activity and have had a claim to represent their respective constituencies since the 1990s. This long-term perspective was deemed necessary in order to assess whether there were significant changes in the home-state’s attitude, discourse, and policies in the two periods, and how these have been perceived by the minority elites. As “Turks in Germany” is a well-researched population in its various aspects, I tried to compensate for the stances I was not able to access through the use of secondary literature and ample information and publications organisations have on their websites. Finally, many informal conversations I held throughout my stay and direct observation during some “community events” were rather useful in reaching my aim of taking snapshots of the broader landscape of stances.

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12 Even though I refrained from spelling the word diaspora in my questions and conversations in order not to impose terms on my informants, almost all interviewees called the issue at hand “Turkey’s (or the AKP’s) diaspora policy”.

13 Two diametrically opposed events were rather illuminating in that sense, particularly for observing what we can robustly distinguish as antagonistic and corporatist stances. One such event was the opening reception of the new embassy building in Berlin on 30 October 2012, in which the embassy invited the representatives of the “whole Turkish community in Berlin” as expressed in the dozens of conversations I had during the event. The other was the joint mass protest organised by Alevi, Kurdish, and left-leaning organisations against then-PM Erdogan the next day, which gathered the “other” side of the “Turkish” community not only from Berlin but various parts of Germany.
The field research in Bulgaria was conducted during January-February 2013, during which I conducted a total of 26 interviews. It was composed of stays of differing lengths in Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas, Shumen, and Kardzhali. Sofia, Plovdiv, and Burgas are the sites where I conducted interviews predominantly with officials. In Sofia I had interviews with deputies and politicians from the MRF and from the then-recently established splinter-party formed by ethnic Turks; the People’s Party Freedom and Dignity (PPFD). I also held interviews with incumbent and former officials affiliated with the Grand Mufti's Office, officials at Turkey’s diplomatic representations, as well as with other ethnic activists.

The latter two are the capital cities of the two main regions predominantly inhabited by Turks, in which I had the opportunity to conduct interviews both with officials from the local Grand Mufti’s offices as well as representatives from many local, small-size social, cultural, educational associations catering to the Turkish community. I deliberately limited my interviewees to “ethnic” Turks and excluded non-Turkish Muslims. My attendance at local community events in the Turkish regions (as my informants call them) and particularly at the General Congress of the MRF on 19 January 2013 gave me good opportunities for holding informal conversations and engaging in direct observation. During the interviews, as was the case during the interviews in Berlin, I tried to focus on the comparative aspect between the two periods through including informants who have been active in minority politics and associational life since the 1990s. It should be noted again that there was neither the objective nor is there a claim to “representativeness” speaking in the name of the whole community, as the aim was to learn about the stances, positions, and discourses of ethnic entrepreneurs and those with a claim to speak in the name of the community.

In addition to the interviews, I have reviewed a comprehensive set of policy documents, parliamentary research commission reports, legislation, government programmes, yearly activity reports of state and non-state bodies involved in various aspects of emigrant and kin engagement as primary sources, while I also benefited from secondary literature. Analysing parliamentary minutes provided me with officially stated government positions with regards to emigrants and kin communities. I have made use of the debates also for detecting the general frames of the political debate, converging and diverging stances within the broader spectrum of political actors, as well as objections and criticisms by opposition parties. I also

\[^{14}\text{I also did day trips for an interview in Topolitsa and another in Razgrad, and a day trip to Gotse Delchev.}\]
did a three-days research at the Library of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in Ankara, which allowed me to have access to some of the publications by various ministries and the Parliament. The empirical analysis also relies on media reporting, which was particularly useful in tracing processes through following events, speeches, and other publicly known developments that crucially impacted the state-diaspora configurations under consideration. Online and print newspaper research dating back to the 1990s was used for that objective. Media reports as well as youtube videos were useful in accessing public statements of state officials, as well as broader “homeland” public debates on these extraterritorial populations.

4. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

Chapter 2 lays out the analytical and conceptual background on state-led diaspora-making and engagement through a multidisciplinary review of the literature. It first engages with the question of how to think of “diaspora” and critically reflects on states’ political uses of it. It then examines how migrant sending-states and kin-states reconfigured their relationship with absent populations as to create extraterritorial forms of membership. Finally, the chapter reviews the rationales, dynamics, and systemic factors underlying state interest in making emigrant and transborder kin populations theirs and highlights some explanatory biases, conceptual fixities, and analytical blind spots within the two strands of literature.

Chapter 3 provides a historicised contextual map of major economic and political transformations in Turkey, which I see as crucial for explaining the state’s expansive diaspora making project oriented at emigrants and transborder kin populations in the last two decades. Taking the year 1980 and the AKP’s coming to power in 2002 as two breaking points, the chapter focuses on transformations in the economic development model, elite-sponsored conceptions of nationhood and narratives of nationalism, and the state’s political-cultural self-positioning vis-à-vis the West and its non-Western neighbourhood.

Building on the contextual map provided in the previous chapter, Chapter 4 analyses how Turkey’s outlook on its emigrants changed in the 1990s and the 2000s. It focuses on the home-economy’s urge for further integration with global capital, different understandings of nationhood among elites, and the state’s orientation vis-à-vis Europe as factors shaping the state’s different readings of the expatriate landscape in these periods. Particular attention is
paid to how the state’s changing layering and sub-categorisation practices fed into its discourses and policies towards the entirety of emigrants as well as its various components.

Chapter 5 traces and explains change in the ways Turkey defined its transborder kin through variably drawing on ethnonational and/or religious sources of identity. It focuses on the strategic foreign political and economic drivers behind expansions in the scope of transborder kin claimed by the state in the post-Cold War era and in the 2000s. It also tackles the question of how different elite conceptions of nationhood and narratives of nationalism have fed into redefinitions of “kinship” and resulting state hierarchisation practices.

Chapter 6 analyses the implications of changing extent, content, and modality of Turkey’s diaspora-making project for targeted emigrant populations by examining the case of the “citizen diaspora” in Germany. It particularly focuses on the implications of the expansive and multi-register diaspora policy for the emigrant “community” characterised by ethnic, religious, ideological, and political heterogeneity. The chapter examines how the state’s changed sub-categorisation and hierarchisation practices shape the intra-“group” dynamics as well as forms and degrees of informal membership of different groups.

Chapter 7 analyses the implications of Turkey’s reconfigured rationality of kin-making and engagement and its revisited transborder kinship hierarchy for transborder, intra-“national” membership politics in the light of the case of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. It particularly focuses on the implications of the broadening and diversification of transborder kin claimed by Turkey and changing definitions of kinship on the perceptions, stances, discourses, and claims of membership of this this prototypical external co-ethnic minority.

Chapter 8 summarises the main findings of the thesis, discusses their broader implications, and suggests further research agendas.
CHAPTER 2

STATES AND MIGRANT AND NON-MIGRANT DIASPORAS: CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL, AND COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS

This chapter lays out the analytical and conceptual background on state-led diaspora-making and engagement that the dissertation draws upon and attempts to nuance further. The first section briefly presents the various uses of diaspora first as a label and later as a concept. Then it reviews analytical approaches on how to think of and explain this concept, opting for thinking of diaspora as political project rather than a describable social fact. A cautionary analytical discussion is provided in the last part, which focuses on the question of with what reasons and to what effect states’ diaspora-making projects use the term to label their potential constituencies.

In line with the objectives of the dissertation, the second and third sections direct the focus on how the literature has dealt with the relations between states of origin and emigrants on the one hand and kin-states and transborder kin minorities on the other. By overviewing theoretical and empirical scholarship from transnational migration studies, nationalism, and international relations, the section looks at how migrant sending-states and kin-states reconfigured their relationship with populations beyond their borders and became more strongly engaged in transborder membership politics.

Finally, the last section provides an engaged overview of explanatory accounts examining the rationales and dynamics underlying origin-states’ enhanced interest in making migrant and non-migrant transborder populations theirs. Rather than delineating the literature according to the type of transborder population, the sub-sections are structured along clusters of factors that were highlighted in the literature dealing with each configuration. The first sub-section surveys explanations based on economic rationalities, the second sub-section visits foreign political considerations, and the third sub-section concentrates on accounts emphasising domestic politics, symbolic and substantial nation-building projects, and legitimacy-seeking elites. The final sub-section turns the attention to recently flourishing scholarship linking the spread of diaspora engagement from the 1980s onwards to neoliberal restructuring of the economy, the state, and the ways of governing populations.
1. HOW TO THINK OF DIASPORA?

The questions of what a diaspora is and how diaspora should be conceptualised have preoccupied scholars in various disciplines for long. This section briefly reviews different scholarly responses to these questions and opts for thinking of diaspora as political project rather than a describable social fact. The last part discusses the ways in which states use the category in their diaspora-making projects to address their potential constituencies. It particularly focuses on the state’s use of diaspora to reconfigure the scope, composition, and prescribed content of their claimed transborder membership universe.

1.1. Describing the nature of diaspora as social fact

Until mid-twentieth century, the use of diaspora remained limited to theological writing referring to the peculiar historic experience of forced dispersal of Jews as a religious group. Early in the second half of the century, the term had been used as a label for a wider scope of dispersed populations such as the ‘African’ diaspora, as well as Armenian, Chinese, Greek, Irish, and Palestinian diasporas, without much concern for conceptualisation.\(^{15}\) Towards the end of the century, the term increasingly featured ‘in the self-representations of a wide range of groups and initiatives’ (Brubaker 2005: 4). Going beyond social science, diaspora became ‘primarily a political slogan’, used in public, political, and popular lexicons (Bauböck 2008: 2).

The diversification and quantitative inflation of the term’s uses led to two definitional strands differing in their stance on who should be “rightly” termed as diasporas. Some argued for opening the definition as to encompass non-archetypal, “new” cases of populations with other-than-traumatic motivations behind their dispersal (Armstrong 1976; Sheffer 1986). Those who opted for keeping it as a prerogative of populations that fit the historical profile, tasked themselves with providing a set of common criteria for establishing “genuine diasporaness”. These criteria were largely drawn from the specificities of the Jewish case (Safran 1991).\(^{16}\)

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\(^{15}\) See, Dufoix (2008: 5-20) for an ancient and recent history of the term’s usages.

\(^{16}\) Safran’s criteria for “diasporaness” are: ‘dispersal to more than one destination; a collectively shared memory of the homeland; a feeling of partial alienation in the host countries they live in; a commonly held dream about
The categorical approaches to diaspora accentuated the preservation of a bounded communal identity deriving from and attached to the idea of a common original homeland, which, in most of the cases overlapped with a territorial nation-state. The emphasis on common ethno-national belonging faced criticism on the grounds of neglecting “intra-community” differences, reifying ‘absolutist notions of “origin” and “true belonging”’ (Anthias 1998), and naturalising ‘the nation-state, identity, and community’ (Soysal 2000: 2-3). Objecting to the idea of clearly demarcated communal identities implying a pure essence that resists dislocation, scholars of post-modern thought, post-colonial studies and cultural studies developed an opposite way of conceptualising diaspora. Within this realm, diasporas were thought of as the embodiment of hybrid, fluid, deterritorialised, displaced identities, constantly in motion (Appadurai 1996; Gilroy 1993; Hall 1990; among others).

While the more traditional approaches focused on ‘boundary-maintenance’ and preservation of group identity, post-national definitions emphasised ‘boundary-erosion’ and hybridisation (Brubaker 2005: 6).17 However, despite their differing conclusions on the “nature” of diaspora they displayed similar attitude regarding: (i) how to think of what diasporas are; (ii) explaining how “diasporic identity” comes into being and how people are made to subscribe to it; (iii) problematising who the mobilisers behind diaspora formation are and what purposes and expectations underlie such mobilisation.

Regarding the first point, both tended to think of diasporas as ‘substantial entities’; that is, as ‘distinctive communities with distinctive identities’ (Brubaker 2005: 10-12), even though they differed on their take on the kind of identity they presumed. Second, in both cases the process of becoming diaspora was somehow treated as happening naturally following dispersion. In other words, the history of dispersion and the condition of living in a country of settlement separate from one’s land of origin were seen as automatically leading to diasporic identities

17 See also, Mavroudi (2007), for a critical overview of the bifurcated conceptualisation of ‘diaspora as bounded’ and ‘unbounded’.
and behaviour. These assumptions led them skip the step of problematisation and explanation of how, by whom, and why these distinctive communities and identities are formed, transformed, or deformed.

1.2. Diaspora-making as project

In his conceptual intervention to the debate on the uses of diaspora, Brubaker pointed out the common fallacy of thinking of diaspora as if it was a substantial entity and a countable social fact, and cautioned about the misleading potential of taking this entity as a legitimate ‘category of analysis’ (Brubaker 2005). Diaspora, like categories of “ethnic groups” and “nation” that were misleadingly treated as entities matching real demographic substance, required handling with caution in order to avoid ‘groupism’. Brubaker defined groupism as: ‘the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis’ (Brubaker 2002: 164). Thus, the first step to avoid falling into the trap of groupism was to think of diaspora as ‘a category of practice’ that is used ‘to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilise energies, to appeal to loyalties’ by agents of group-making projects (Brubaker 2005: 12).

Following this logic, Brubaker’s suggestion was to approach groupness as a variable that fluctuates based on contingency. This would enable and require examining events that trigger increasing levels of groupness and analysing deployment of strategies by agents of ‘group-making’ projects to attain high levels of groupness (Brubaker 2002: 167-174). If one thinks of group-making ‘as a social, cultural, and political project, aimed at transforming categories into groups or increasing levels of groupness’ (ibid.: 171), “diaspora-making” should also be thought of as a project, in which specific discourses and strategies are deployed for making targeted constituencies subscribe to, and mobilise for certain diasporic stances. Such an approach would allow one to discern with which objectives, through which mechanisms, to what specific kinds of “end products” agents of diaspora-making projects target their constituencies. It would also enable one to take change both in form and in degree into

18 Ragazzi (2010: 62) aptly summarised this tendency as ‘attributing to structural conditions the role of agency’ and explaining diasporic behaviour ‘not by a sociology of the actors but by a description of the conditions’.
19 Dufoix (2008: 55) makes a similar point where he argues that many usages of diaspora end up creating an ‘illusion of essence’. This is done through treating diaspora as if it was corresponding to a substance, a reality, the existence of which is evidenced by the archetypal and factual Jewish case.
account. In other words, it helps one to go beyond the ‘static view of diaspora’, which ‘exempts it from any examination of its modalities of establishment, decline, transformation, or disappearance’ (Dufoix 2008: 56).

Conceiving diaspora as a ‘political project’ equips one with analytical tools that help explaining diaspora formation, unlike approaches focusing on trajectories of dispersal, development of ‘lateral’ links, and intergenerational collective identity transmission that do not go beyond classification and description (Bauböck 2010: 313-316). Thinking of diaspora as political project initiated and run by ‘minority elites in countries of settlement but also by homeland country governments’ incorporates elites’ ‘interests and ideologies’, and hence, agency into the picture (ibid.: 315).20 Without necessarily disregarding broader structural frameworks, but through situating diaspora-making agents within these frameworks, it allows one to find answers to questions such as why these elites are interested in diaspora-making, who do they target in which ways, and how they make their targeted constituency subscribe to and mobilise for this project. The latter part is important, as it urges one to inquire the implications of these political projects for targeted populations, as well as for ‘various agents and institutions involved’ (Faist 2010: 11).

Hence, a “diaspora as political project” approach allows one to explain why and how diasporas are made, remade, and possibly also unmade. More specifically, and of interest for this dissertation, it enables one to examine how shifts in home-state elites and their ‘interests and ideologies’ embedded in broader structural frameworks might translate into change in: (i) the targeted, included, and excluded constituencies, (ii) the content of collective group identity the project aims to provoke, (iii) the goals for which transborder populations are expected to mobilise, and (iv) the discursive and practical tools used by these elites to attain the desired outcomes.

Finally, a “diaspora as project” approach allows one to zoom out and look at “diaspora politics” as a dynamic, interactive, and contentious space, transcending a conceptual picture where diaspora-makers act upon given, static, and substantial entities. Within this space,

20 See Sökefeld (2006), for a similar approach seeing diaspora formation as the goal of social mobilisation processes, in which ‘agents of diasporic imagination’ play crucial roles in addition to ‘political opportunities’ and ‘mobilizing structures’. Also see, Waldinger (2008: xiv), for an argument for examining processes of imagination and construction of populations as diasporas through the ‘self-conscious diasporic discourses and projects of states and émigrés’.
different state and non-state diaspora-making projects interactively contest for their own depictions of community and terms of homeland-diaspora relationship to prevail and to gain legitimacy in the eyes of targeted audiences. There is not only change in degree, i.e., lower/higher levels of groupness, but also re-positioning, reconfiguration, and hence, change in form and content within this field of interacting diaspora-projects.

Dufoix’s conceptualisation of different but interwoven and interacting ‘structuring modes of collective experience abroad’ is useful in better understanding the latter aspect. The ‘centro-peripheral’ and ‘antagonistic’ modes are important for the aims of this dissertation, as they are defined mainly through the stance towards and forms of relationship with the home-state. Communities organising primarily in relation to the country of origin and often under ‘national diaspora’ labels have centro-peripheral forms of relationship with the home-state. Collectively held and expressed ‘antagonistic’ positions question, challenge, or deny accepting ‘the legitimacy of the current regime’ in the origin state (Dufoix 2008: 62-63).

What is more important is that these modes are not mutually exclusive and eternally held. They ‘do not exist in pure form’ and in isolation from each other, and movement from one mode to another (and back) is possible (ibid.: 66). These changes can occur as a result of conscious efforts and changing strategies of state and non-state group-making and remaking projects. They might also be driven by shifting political and social developments within the home- and host-states that have implications on the content of different diasporic stances and their positioning vis-à-vis states and “rival” diaspora projects. Thus, transitions from centro-peripheral to antagonistic structuring modes and vice-versa, passages between other forms, or shifts from the “aloof-indifferent” option to specific diasporic stances within the same “community” are possible. Static understandings of diaspora and unchanging centro-peripheral forms of relationship haunts the external kin minority – kin-state constellation even more due to presumed “unshakable” ethnic ties and solidarity (Waterbury 2010b). Nevertheless, this presumably harmonious relationship is not immune to change and re-

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21 While transborder populations in question constitute the central audience and judge of this contestation, gaining consent and legitimacy in the eyes of political authorities of the host-state, of the homeland society and the international community are also among the conditions for the success of these projects. One can also include “the scientific observer” into this target audience.

22 These structuring modes are: ‘centro-peripheral’, ‘enclave’, ‘atopic’, ‘antagonistic’. Dufoix differentiates these ‘ideal types’ à-la Weber based on their form of relationship to the home-state regime; the local, national, or transstate levels of their organisation and operation; and their relationship to a ‘referent-origin’—which can be the home-state or “homeland” in some cases, but also ‘a nation, people, land, or nonterritorial identity’ (ibid.: 62-64).
positioning and contestation towards the kin-state on the part of the minority, as this thesis also demonstrates.

1.3. Diaspora as a tool for (re)configuring the state’s transborder membership universe

As ‘the politics of transborder membership is in the first instance a politics of identification, transborder populations must be identified and construed as “belonging” to the state before they can become the object of state policies’ (Brubaker & Kim 2011: 24). In other words, through diaspora-making policies and discourses, states attempt to ‘attach consequences to categories’ (ibid.). At the stage of delineating the scope of extraterritorial populations of an origin state, the category of “diaspora” is preferred for various reasons. Particularly, thanks to its nature allowing for ambiguity and over-stretching, the label of “diaspora” is used by states for dynamically readjusting the scope of their transborder populations.

Once the state incorporates certain populations into a “possession-belonging nexus”, it needs to fill this nexus with meanings. It needs to create a template of its diaspora specifying which characteristics the latter should display, how it should behave and relate to the home-state. The ingredients of this template might change depending on the contingently prioritised objectives, concerns, and expectations of the state in constructing and engaging extraterritorial populations. At the stage of filling the delineated diaspora with content, the concept of “diaspora” becomes a tool in states’ hands for reinforcing primordialist understandings of national belonging, imposing uniformity on diverse populations, and assigning a collective sense of duty to maintain and better the homeland. These characteristics and expected ways of behaviour attributed to diasporas in official lexicons owe a great deal to “bounded national” conceptualisations and the “archetypal cases” they are based on.

1.3.1. Readjusting the scope and composition: Expanding and diversifying diasporas

States’ exercises for counting and mapping their diasporas are crucial steps in diaspora-making projects (Gamlen 2006). In these counting exercises, numbers tend to be ‘maximally inclusive’ calculating a total based on some sort of ‘ancestry’ (Brubaker 2005: 11). At the
stage of identification, the use of diaspora allows states for claiming a wide and potentially further stretchable range of extraterritorial populations.

By using the category and the discourse of diaspora, the state can claim populations with different legal statuses. It can also lump populations with different trajectories of becoming “extraterritorial” together in its category of diaspora. The two conventional types of such populations are called migrant diasporas and transborder kin minorities, differentiated through their trajectories of separation from, and their legal relationship to the origin state. It becomes more complicated for states to identify extraterritorial populations as theirs when a relatively clear and justifiable legal link between that state and claimed populations, namely, current or recent citizenship is absent. However, it also becomes easier to claim various kinds of links, as unlike prior, current, or ancestral citizenship, identitarian parameters derived from shared history and culture are more subjective and forgeable.

All in all using the category of diaspora or that of the overseas nation comes in handy for states trying to claim populations through generational stretching (so-called old migrations), based on ancestral membership to polities preceding the current state, or by forging ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural commonality. Following Brubaker and Kim (2011), instead of taking ‘the existence of such populations for granted’ (ibid.: 64), one should examine how and in relation to which populations states politically and strategically make and use the overarching category of diaspora.

Such problematisation of processes and projects of transborder member-making also bears great potential for tracing and explaining change in the constituent “units” of a state’s diaspora. The scope of included populations, as well as the “parameters” justifying the state-forged links are subject to change over time and based on context. The ways in which who is identified as “‘belonging’” to the claimant state on the basis of what kinds of links and commonalities are ‘contingent, contested, variable, and revocable’ (ibid.: 24). The lexicon of diaspora suits into a framework where states’ definition of the extent and the content of their transborder populations show variation. Hence, diaspora and accompanying ‘rhetoric of engaging the global nation’ (Waterbury 2010a: 135), or more vague and broad concepts like
civilisation for that matter, provide flexibility and ambiguity for states that aspire to identify and engage different types of populations. 23

In addition to being included into or excluded from the broader universe of a state’s claimed transborder members, the contingent and variable nature of belonging “parameters” also implies potential hierarchisation among those that are included into an overarching diaspora category. Which populations exhibiting which parameters would be placed at the core or would be pushed to the margins of a state’s diaspora might vary depending on that state’s alteration of the gist of its diaspora definition. The variation in extent and content might take place, while the label of diaspora tends to give an appearance of stasis, homogeneity and a certain degree of commonality bringing these populations together under a single label.

1.3.2. Stipulating the content: (Re)narrating the ideal diasporic subject

States call transborder populations their diasporas in order to evoke a set of expected functions, characteristics, and forms of relationship among the addressed audience. Subscribing to ‘positivist’ definitions of diaspora à la Safran, the targeted populations are ‘prescribed’ to be ‘homogeneous and cohesive’ and to have ‘a ‘natural bond’ with their homeland (Ragazzi 2010: 48-50). Thanks to concepts like ‘mobilised diaspora’ (Armstrong 1976) developed in the North American context, diaspora often also implies characteristics such as high level of political organisation, economic success, ability to act like an interest group, and having leverage on host-settings. This is particularly the case with regards to migration-induced diasporas in the affluent North. Being the origin state’s diaspora seems to have partially different meanings for less wealthy and influential external kin or migrant minorities in less wealthy and influential host-states, while aspects of prescribed homogeneity, cohesion, and natural bonds remain integral. As generally the aim is to position the origin state as the protector and patron of these populations, it implies that the latter not only needs such guardianship, but also enthusiastically welcomes it.

Waterbury shows that not all states choose to activate this dual-potential of enhancing their transnational engagement with both types of diasporic populations and instead prefer to ‘target specific populations abroad depending on what these populations can offer the homeland state’ (ibid.) My point here is that when the claimant state is interested in various populations due to what they have to offer, whether these populations can be classified as kin or emigrant, or even if they could not be justified as exactly fitting in any of those categories, the ambiguity and flexibility of the diaspora discourse comes in very handy in expressing the state’s expansive claims over populations that do not share much other than being identified as extraterritorial populations of that state.

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In both cases, the home-state structures the relationship, at least at the discursive level, by portraying a collaborative and affective relationship that has existed and will continue to exist between the two. Expressed in Dufoix (2008)’s typology of ‘modes’, states prefer and portray their relationship with the diaspora as fitting into a centro-peripheral framework. While those that see themselves as part of that state’s diaspora subscribe to a ‘centro-peripheral’ position and have no problems in acting like a ‘loyal “colony”’ (ibid.: 66), others frame their opinions and actions vis-à-vis the home-state antagonistically. People belonging to a third group might categorically belong to the claimed population, but might be aloof or uninterested in positioning and defining themselves in relation to the home-state.

While home-states tend to numerically include all these sections to reach the maximum possible sum, the non-ideal, i.e., non-centro-peripheral stances or forms of relationship dissolve and disappear within states’ uses of diaspora. Thus, according to Dufoix, the diaspora lexicon tends to downplay politics while promoting uniformity’, because ‘if political militants are included in the “diaspora” numbers, their uniqueness disappears, even though they may differ radically from other migrants in their relationship to the country of origin’ (ibid.: 60).

Similar effects can be detected also with regards to socioeconomic standing, and core cultural values that are attributed to the diaspora. This is generally done by referring to showcase individuals or sections of transborder populations that are perceived as the embodiment of certain socioeconomic statuses, “national” characteristics, cultural values that the state wants to highlight in the concept of its diaspora. The constructed image of this “ideal diasporic subject” is then projected to the totality of the diaspora in state narratives. Specific ways of ‘appropriation of the diaspora concept’ are contingent on the particular roles that the state designs for transborder populations as part of its broader strategy at a particular moment, within a particular context (Dickinson & Bailey 2007: 760). Hence, the narrative of the ideal diasporic subject, and that of the global nation is subject to change. For instance, if this role is part of a broader project of ‘globalising’ the state and particularly its economy, the content of the concept of diaspora is filled with characteristics like ‘professional success through

24 See, Ragazzi (2009: 389), for an argument along similar lines, in which he argues that the increasingly “trendy” –and somehow depoliticised- ‘diaspora’ and ‘global nation’ vocabulary makes different migration motivations and trajectories, i.e., labour versus exile, and hence potentially different stances towards the home-state disappear.
participation in global networks’ (ibid.: 770). This has been the case in India, and these characteristics become essential parts of diaspora definitions of an increasing number of home-states.25

In short, using the category of diaspora helps states to appear as all-encompassing and claim vast and globally dispersed communities as long as numbers and the scope of dispersal are concerned. The state projects the narrative drawn from its ideal diasporic subject definition to the entirety of this vast diaspora. The stereotyping of the nation and its diaspora as a whole is done while states implicitly differentiate and categorise those sub-sections that fit this narrative from those that do not. The global diaspora discourse gives the all-encompassing appearance and helps concealing inclusion of some and exclusion of others, centralisation of some and marginalisation of others under the supra-category. Constructing global nations maximally extends the size and the ambit of the extraterritorial nation, while covertly sifting those that belong to the “real” nation from those that do not. The state narrates the real nation and hence describes the ideal diaspora member that lies at the core of the state’s diasporic map. While the narrative of the ideal diasporic subject is subject to change, the state’s central role in narration, categorisation according to the narrative, and shaping membership practices of different categories perseveres.

2. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN CREATING MIGRANT DIASPORAS

This section focuses on how migrant sending-states have reconfigured their relations with and policies towards their emigrants since the 1990s and how these changing relations have been dealt with in the literature. Following the trajectory of scholar development, it first critically engages with transnationalist accounts that examined border-crossing actions and practices of non-state actors. It then shifts the attention to the entry of states of origin to the “transnational” scene around the 1990s, and reviews the strand of scholarship analysing the active role of the state in creating and mobilising diasporas and “global nations”.

25 Even though the Indian state includes pre-independence emigrants that left as indentured labourers, post-independence emigrants that left as low-skilled workers mainly to Gulf States, and those that left as highly educated, skilled workforce to industrialised countries into the total of its ‘20 million strong diaspora’, the “strength” of the diaspora is assumed to stem from the last section (ibid.: 765-766). While the distinction between different layers is being implicitly kept intact, state elites, whose interests have been reconfigured within the context of the neoliberal restructuring of the state, narrate a set of essential characteristics derived from the latter layer as embodied by global “Indianhood” in its entirety (Varadarajan 2010: 135-137). See Section 3.4 for a more elaborate discussion on the elite-led re-narrations of the ideal national and diasporic subjects shaped by redefined elite interests within changing broader political economic context.
2.1. Transmigrants, transnational ethnic lobbies, long-distance nationalists

The literature on home-states’ efforts to reconfigure their relationships and links with their emigrants was a latecomer in comparison to “transnational migration studies”. Challenging the notion of the ‘uprooted migrant’ (Handlin 1973 [1951]) and the narrow focus on the receiving contexts, transnational migration studies demonstrated migrants’ continuing mobility and activities across borders, and their sustained links with their regions, countries, and societies of origin with the help of advancements in transportation and communication (Basch et al. 1994; Glick-Schiller et al. 1992; Kearney 1991; Mahler 1998, among others). The “home” state and its involvement in transnational spheres were mentioned ‘in passing’, if at all, in most of these accounts (Brand 2006: 5).26 The early migrants’ transnationalism literature used a predominantly political-economic lens informed by world-system theory, and fused it with a “celebratory” approach to transnational phenomena. This led to the outcome that nation-states mainly featured as the hegemonising forces imposing national identities from which “transmigrants” (Basch et al. 1994) skilfully escaped by rendering national-territorial configurations of belonging and membership obsolete. Based on such understanding, some accounts reached the conclusion that transnational phenomena developing independent from the nation-state were the harbingers of a ‘post-national age’ (Kearney 1991).27

Scholars located at the conjunction of liberal-constructivist international relations (IR) approaches and US-based studies focusing on interest groups as actors in American domestic and foreign politics developed a rather different picture of diasporas. These accounts regarded diasporas as identity-motivated transnational ethnic lobbies. These transnational lobbies were able to exert considerable influence on politics in both their states of residence and origin, thanks to their peculiar condition of being ‘geographically outside the state, … but identity-

26 Criticism from within transnationalism scholars came from Smith, who claimed the role of the “home” state ‘in creating transnational forms of political and social life, and in maintaining local, ethnic and national identities linked to the home country’ had been overlooked (Smith 1998: 200). See also Smith 2003a and 2003b for state-sensitive analyses from within the transnationalist literature.

27 For a critique on transnationalism’s tendency to overlook the role of the state, see, Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004); for a critique on the one-sided depiction of all transmigrants as embodying subaltern subjectivities and a counterhegemonic morality, see, Ong (1999). For a similar critique of the ‘hype of hybridity’ in the case of cultural studies’ handling of diasporas, see Mitchell (1997). For an argument challenging this one-sided celebratory depiction and pointing out to the roles played by different ‘social layers’ within diasporas in sustaining ‘systems of rule’ through their distinctive forms of relations to ‘hierarchical structures of power’, see Varadarajan (2008).
wise ‘inside the people’ (Shain & Barth 2003: 451). These accounts presumed that diasporas’ maintained “original” collective identity made them commit to their homeland’s wellbeing, while their socialisation in their democratic, pluralistic, economically developed hostlands turned them into progressive transformative forces. While this branch of scholarship took diasporas’ interaction with states more seriously, they tended to vest diasporas with high degrees of autonomy from the state. The state at most featured as receiving ‘criticism and pressure to reform’ from the diaspora (Varadarajan 2010: 25).

As opposed to this relatively “harmonious” diaspora-state relationship and the benign portrait of diasporas, other approaches paid attention to the rather troubled relationship between the home-state and diaspora, and the latter’s potentially ‘malign role’ (Anderson 1998: 73). Anderson’s concept of ‘long-distance nationalism’ took into account both minority nationalisms of stateless diasporas and majority nationalisms of ‘state-linked diasporas’. The ‘long-distance nationalism’ of stateless minorities was directed at destabilising an existing nation-state’s territorial sovereignty and dissenting to that state’s oppressing, homogenising attitude. State-linked long-distance nationalists aimed at reinforcing the long-distance home-state’s authority, legitimacy, and its nationalist projects. In either case, Anderson drew a rather grim picture of long-distance nationalists. He found particularly troubling the ‘radically unaccountable’ political engagement of economically well-off individuals, and ‘incalculable consequences’ of their engagement for ‘the former Second and Third Worlds’ (ibid.: 73-74). Anderson was one of the few that highlighted the ‘dark side of transnationalism’ (Waterbury 2010a: 134) within the context of the study of migration-induced diasporas and their relations to their homelands. While having nuanced the academic “hype of transnationalism”, his account also suffered from a totalizing tendency drawing a picture of all diasporic mobilisations as holding potentially dangerous extreme nationalist stances.

30 Sheffer (2003: 73) defines ‘state-linked diasporas’ as ‘those groups that are in host countries but are connected to societies of their own ethnic origin that constitute a majority in established states’.
31 Scholarship exclusively focusing on long-distance minority nationalisms highlighted the challenge posed by ‘transnational ethnic networks’ (Wayland 2004) to the sovereignty of established nation- states over territories of these minorities’ ancestral homelands and over their own people, the latter being ‘minorities seeking separation, secession, or independence’ (Sheffer 2003: 150).
32 See also, Glick-Schiller and Fouron (1999); and Skrbiš (1999).
2.2. States of origin as salient actors shaping the transnational sphere

Concomitant to the development of transnationalist literature in the 1990s, empirical evidence pointed out a converging trend among an increasing number of sending-states to build, maintain, and institutionalise links with their overseas citizens and their descendants. Case studies of sending-state engagement in expatriates’ lives discerned an emerging set of policy tools found among a wide range of states of origin. The ‘diaspora building and engagement’ (Gamlen 2006) policy repertoire contained common elements in different cases, such as courting expatriates through symbolic gestures and celebratory rhetoric (Martinez-Saldaña 2003; Nyiri 2001); extending social and political rights through amending citizenship laws (Barry 2006; Escobar 2006; Jones Correa 2001); granting them absentee voting rights (Collyer & Vathi 2007; IDEA 2007); and establishing special diaspora advisory bodies and institutions (Levitt & de la Dehesa 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Gamlen et al. 2013).

Hailing the developmental potential of diasporas also left its mark on the 1990s and 2000s (Brinkerhoff 2008). The New Economics of Labour Migration perspective (Stark & Bloom 1985) and its wider empirical application in the 1990s (e.g. Massey & Parrado 1994; Durand, Parrado & Massey 1996; Taylor 1999) rejuvenated optimistic approaches towards positive effects of migration and remittances on socioeconomic betterment of left-behind households, hometowns, and regional economies. Some governments at local, regional, and central levels created programmes for channelling remittances into local development projects in the late 1990s (Faist 2008). Mexico’s ‘tres-por-uno’ programme, co-sponsoring public works by matching funds from hometown associations and governments at both regional and federal levels was the best known example (Portes 2010).

The following stage in the early 2000s witnessed the emergence, promotion, and spread of the migration-development and/or diaspora-development nexus (Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002). The shifting emphasis from stimulating local socioeconomic development to boosting economic growth and integrating homeland economies into global markets led to a change in the understanding of diasporas’ developmental potential.  

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33 One variation or another of such policies geographically stretch from China (Nyíri 2001) to India (Khadria 2008), from Mexico (Smith 2003a; Fitzgerald 2006; 2009) to Central America and the Caribbean Basin (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Laguerre 1998); from the Middle East (Brand 2006) to Africa (e.g. Morocco-Tunisia; Brand 2006; Eritrea; Koser 2003). Compilations of different case studies covered a wider range of analyses of sending-states’ relations with their expatriates. See, for example, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003d; Castles & Delgado Wise 2008; Green & Weil 2007.
Incentivising affluent diaspora members to invest in their homelands, as in the cases of China and India (Saxenian 2005), and establishing formal networks of those sections with high levels of skills, professional and/or scientific expertise (Meyer 2001) have come to the fore as state-led mechanisms that can activate this potential. Substantially differing from the post-war understanding of the link between temporary migration and development, home-states do not expect expatriates to return physically to compensate for the negative effects of ‘brain drain’ and to contribute to their homelands’ global economic integration and thereby to their development (Larner 2007: 334-337).34

These new policy measures vis-à-vis expatriates signified a deeper shift in states’ stance towards presence/absence and inclusion/exclusion. When the ‘export and return’ logic was predominant (Smith 1997), the “norm” for states of origin was allowing exit, regulating temporary emigration, and encouraging and facilitating return. Emigrants’ presence outside the state’s territory was seen as transient and exceptional. Therefore, permanent residence abroad was incompatible with being regarded as part of the state’s population, citizenry, and nation. The mid-1990s witnessed the gradual shift toward the ‘global nation’ logic (ibid.). This meant that being permanently absent ceased to be a criterion for terminating the emigrant’s citizenship and/or membership relationship with the state. Following the shifting logic, many states announced their eagerness to build and sustain border-crossing relations with their ‘global nations’.35

The observation that states were busily constituting and embracing “their” diasporas highlighted the continuing salience, and the active role of the state in creating, taking part in, and shaping ‘transnational social spaces’ (Faist 2000). This made revisiting and refining existing theories about the “transnational” necessary. It increasingly became clear that transmigrants were not engaging in cross-border action in a vacuum, transnationalism was not always counter-hegemonic, and states were not demising in the face of the transnational and the global.


34 See, Paine 1974; Penninx 1982; Beijer 1970, among others, for examples of the earlier understandings of the migration-development nexus.
35 Smith later labeled them ‘homeland policies’ expecting return to ‘diasporic policies’ aiming to maintain links and loyalty without the return pre-requisite (Smith 2003b: 726).
cautioned against transnationalist accounts neglecting the role of the state in the face of autonomously flourishing migrant transnational practices by contending that ‘the attitude of sending country governments is still a crucial factor for explaining transnational identities and activities among migrant communities’ (ibid.: 708). Through attempting to shape identities and actions with their diaspora-making projects, ‘governments can be a focal point for activities that can periodically galvanize diverse and dispersed networks into a cohesive diaspora’ (Gamlen 2011: 6). This dissertation largely draws on accounts that brought the salience and the active role of states in shaping transnational and diasporic phenomena to our attention.

3. KIN-STATES: FROM DISTURBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM TO DIASPORISERS

This section focuses on the shifting relations between kin-states and kin minorities as well as on the changing ways in which these relations have been seen, understood, and explained in various fields of scholarship. The first part critically engages with the accounts that explain state interest in external kin minorities through ethnic nationalism and those that approach the relations between the two as potentially generating ethnic tension and inter-state conflict. The second part focuses on the changing ways in which states have been relating to and engaging their transborder kin in the post-Cold War era, pointing out a shift from territorial to transterritorial membership also within the kin-state – kin minority constellation.

3.1. Dangerous liaisons between ethnically motivated states and their transborder kin

The literature on the border-crossing relations between kin minorities and external homelands followed a rather separate path compared to that analysing the expatriate-origin state nexus until very recently. Unlike a population that became extraterritorial through international border-crossing and settlement, a kin minority’s ‘relation to an external homeland has come

36 The 2002 report of the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law (hereafter, Venice Commission) ‘on the protection of national minorities by their kin-state’ has argued that for kin minorities the state of residence should be regarded as the “home-state”. Referring to the migrant sending state as the “home-state” and to the states of settlement as the “host-state” has been rather standardised. While I acknowledge that the “home-host” distinction might be problematic in both configurations, throughout this dissertation, I will refer to the countries of residence and citizenship of kin populations as the “host-state” in order to prevent confusion and to align the kin-state and migrant sending state terminologies.
about through the movement … of borders across people’ and its ‘situation in the ‘hostland’ is one of … settled minority that has lived continuously in a particular territory over many generations’ (Bauböck 2010: 312). In the absence of both territoriality and citizenship as defining the relationship between a state and a population, links and relations between these two, based merely on ‘putative ethnonational affinity’ (Brubaker 1996: 56) was seen as a deviation from the international state system based on the Westphalian congruity of territory, sovereignty, and population.

A relationship going against this congruity, while implicating possession on the side of the external state, and belonging on the side of the concerned population, was regarded as an anomaly and potential threat to the international order of things. Hence, such relationship heralded inter-state tension, if not outright conflict and war (van Evera 1994). As in many cases the territory inhabited by the “contested” population tended to be between two neighbouring states, scholarship focusing on this “problematic” relationship revolved around issues like threatened territorial integrity of states, secession, annexation, irredentism, and revisionism. Scholarly interest in transborder kin/co-ethnic populations and their ‘external national homelands’ (Brubaker 1996) had grown within nationalism literature. The relationship also attracted attention from branches of IR focusing on the causal relationship between ethnic nationalism and war (van Evera 1994), and implications of state-seeking nationalisms for inter-state conflict and international security.37

The literature considered state action central to this type of trans-state, intra-national sphere, unlike abovementioned accounts depicting highly mobile transmigrants and diasporas as rather autonomous actors operating from the global North. The objective of inquiry was to find out how ethnicity affects the international system and how ‘malignant’ and ‘dangerous’ attributes exhibited by many ‘Eastern nationalisms’ led to war and violence (van Evera 1994: 8).38 Largely drawn from the post-Soviet Eastern European context of the 1990s, and seen

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38 According to van Evera, post-1945 Western Europe broke with its malignant nationalist past, as opposed to Eastern Europe (ibid.). This strand of the literature confirms the criticised tendency to regard the CEE as ‘quintessentially’ ethnic, not only within academia but also within ‘popular, journalistic and political imagination’ (Schöpflin 2004: 92). This regional bias associating the East with ethnicity and ethnic conflict, and juxtaposing it to the “civic” West, had its roots in the conceptualisation of distinct Western and Eastern nationhoods and nationalisms, namely, ethnocultural nation of the East versus civic, citizenship-based political nation of the West (Kohn 1945). For critiques of the ethnic-civic dichotomy, see, Brubaker (2004: 132-147); Todorova 2005; and Yack 1996.
through a highly securitised and conflict-oriented lens, kin-states were more often than not regarded as potential aggressors ready to intervene and destabilise interstate relations (Gagnon 1994/1995). Some accounts depicted these ethnonationally-motivated states as trying to territorialise left-behind sections of the nation through expansionist-revisionist moves or other strategies.  

Apart from implicating that kin-state embracement of external kin minority is potentially dangerous, this strand of literature presumed unchanging levels of reciprocal ‘feelings of solidarity’ between kin-states and their ‘ethnic kin’ (Lake & Rothchild 1998: 4). More problematically, they attributed to this shared ethnic identity the status of the *explanans* behind specific ways of behaviour of both the minorities and the kin-states. Minorities’ expectations, preferences, and actions were considered as being shaped by their ethnonational collective identity, which they shared with their external homeland. Hence, they were presumed to invariably demand assertive protective action from the kin-state or ultimate unification with the latter. However, a closer look into intra-minority dynamics showed that while ethnic entrepreneurs presented territorial autonomy and patronage from the kin-state as the demands of the whole “group”, wider sections of the minority not necessarily shared these demands (Brubaker 2004; Brubaker et.al. 2006).

With regards to state action, the problem was the tendency to assume that this somewhat naturally felt ethnic affinity motivates kin-states act on behalf of their co-ethnics, independently of government or regime change, broader political economic structure, geostrategic conjuncture, and other “not-so-ethnic” factors. In her work focusing on how domestic political concerns and electoral competition play substantial roles in ‘changing stances, policies, and levels of kin-state engagement’, Waterbury aptly argued that ‘while ethnic solidarity across borders provides the context and the justification for kin-state

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39 For instance, Van Evera detected three forms of state attitude towards national diasporas in a scale from least dangerous to most dangerous. The least dangerous option was “diaspora-accepting” nationalism of states that settle for ‘partial union’, coming to terms with leaving part of the national diaspora under the authority of their “new” states. He gave China as an example to that type, without specifying towards which new “home” states it conceded transborder Chinese. The second option was uniting the whole nation through incorporative immigration strategies (Germany’s repatriation of the *Aussiedler*); and through diaspora-annexing strategies (Pan-Serbian strategy), the last one being the most dangerous of the three (Van Evera 1994: 12).

40 The argument is drawn from the case of Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) that claims to speak on behalf of the ethnic Hungarians in Cluj, Romania (Brubaker 2004: 20-27). See also, Bauböck for a discussion of other stances than pro-autonomy or pro-annexation such minorities might hold (Bauböck 2010: 312). As a matter of fact, minorities that are concerned about jeopardizing their situation as an internal minority in their states of residence and citizenship might approach the kin-state’s over-assertiveness with reservation (Waterbury 2010b: 17).
policymaking, thinking of ethnic affinity as the main driver of action overstates its causal significance’ (Waterbury 2010b: 16, emphasis added).

Brubaker & Kim (2011: 25) also argued that the ‘explanatory value of the notion of ethnic nationalism’ largely remained unquestioned and overstated in the literature on ‘transborder membership politics’, and particularly politics involving co-ethnics. This tendency misleadingly overshadowed factors pertaining to ‘geopolitical contexts, state categorisation practices, and political struggles’ contingently shaping border-crossing membership politics and policies (ibid.). In other words, the analytical blind spot contributed to the concealment of other factors, interests, dynamics and processes underlying kin-state activism.

3.2. Changing modalities of kin-state action in the post-Cold War era

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent change of borders generated territorially and politically defined multi-ethnic, multi-national citizenries. It also led to the compartmentalisation of the citizenry into those citizens that belong to the ‘core nation’ or the ‘state-bearing nation’ and those that do not (Brubaker 1996: 55-79). While the latter group legally, politically and territorially are members of their states, ethnoculturally, they “belong” to the ‘core nation’ of external multinational states. Brubaker’s seminal triadic configuration devised an analytical framework, in which nationalisms of such minorities and the two states that they link interact and dynamically shape actions of each constituent party. As for state parties, ‘nationalizing states’ take measures for achieving political, economic, and cultural strengthening and eventual predominance of the ‘state-bearing nation’ to the detriment of the minorities within their borders (Brubaker 1996: 46). In the face of such majority nationalisms, ‘external national homelands’ assume responsibility to protect their external kin minorities from assimilationist and discriminatory practices of nationalizing states.

41 While I agree with Waterbury’s point on the limits of an understanding seeing ethnic affinity as the mere driver of kin-state action, I find her statement that ‘[t]he relative strength of ethnic ties should remain more or less static over time, and are most often treated as such in the literature’ slightly problematic (ibid.). While ‘the strength of ethnic ties’ is indeed treated as static in the literature, instead of subscribing to that interpretation, we should further inquire cases, in which ‘ethnic ties’ might lose their centrality in the state’s kinship definition, and hence, their strength. As the case of Turkey demonstrates, state elites might redefine kinship parameters as to prioritise religion and vague civilisationary references as they think such definition opens up new possible zones of political and economic influence beyond borders and strengthens the elite’s hand in domestic struggles over holding power and the monopoly over “national identity” (See Chapter 5 and Chapter 7).

42 A total of 21.15 per cent of the population of the post-1989 states in the CEE were categorised as being outside “the titular national majority” of their states of residence (Pogonyi, Kovács, & Körtvélyesi 2010: 6).
More often than not, nationalizing states simultaneously act as ‘external national homelands’ vis-à-vis their co-ethnics/kin in other nationalizing states (Brubaker 2000: 4-5). So, nationalizing projects within one’s borders are in accord with kin-state discourse and activism, as both supposedly serve the protection of the ‘core nation’ whether inside or outside the borders of the state that is ‘of and for’ that putative ethnonational group (Brubaker 1996: 63). This triadic ‘interdependent relational nexus’ that widely surfaced in the ‘New Europe’, while not necessarily always ‘deeply conflictual’, bore potential to become ‘explosive’ (ibid.: 57-59).

The break-up of Yugoslavia was the major instance where this explosive potential became realised. However, the reaction of the international community to the war in Yugoslavia proved that revisionist or irredentist aims and means of kin-states could only remain as ‘fantasies’ if political and economic integration with the West and especially with the European Union (EU) was an objective (Stewart 2004: 133). In other words, it became evident for states that ‘the cost of a traditional nationalism, which requires either secession or a change in state boundaries, remains extraordinarily high in Europe’ (Csergő and Goldgeier 2004: 26).

Increasing costs of pursuing irredentist objectives are also manifestations of the changing relationship between territory and prosperity, and the interaction between economic globalisation and nationalism (Hall 2011). According to Hall, political elites in states like Hungary realised that ‘prosperity could be found in the market rather than through political advancement’ (ibid.: 23). Thus, such states refrained from attempts to destabilise borders for the sake of uniting the nation. Those that were ‘unable to adapt to market forces’, like Milošević’s Serbia, pursued territorial expansion and ‘play[ed] the nationalist card in the most repulsive manner imaginable’ (ibid.). Similarly, Brubaker argued that border changes became less necessary, more costly, and more difficult due to declining ‘material significance of territory’ in augmenting state power and a simultaneous ‘sacralisation’ of existing territorial frontiers in international discourse and international organizations’ (Brubaker 2000:

43 Serbia, Croatia, Romania, and (potentially) Russia were examples in this regard (ibid.).
44 The paternalistic responsibility to strengthen ties with kin communities and the duty to assist and protect them was often inscribed into constitutions of kin-states, such as those of Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Ukraine (Fowler 2004: 196).
45 See, Agnew (1998) for the severing of the links between state power and territory as a result of the opening up of the world economy and the increasing disassociation of ‘property rights and capital accumulation’ from ‘state territoriality’. Agnew argues that within such reconfigured scenario, states seek power—and prosperity—in orientating themselves to ‘market access’ and in attracting ‘mobile assets’ to their territories (ibid.: 58-59).
In fact, even though many states in the region were becoming interested in their external kin, Saideman and Ayres (2008) demonstrated that in most cases kin-state action did not turn into irredentist attempts or ethnic conflicts.

These developments led to a renewed outlook emerging within the academic strand examining relations between state-transborder kin populations, which had been developing in complete isolation from the sending state/diaspora literature. Accounts in this realm, mainly focusing on the CEE, have pointed to novel forms of state policies and strategies used in identifying and embracing these populations. Waterbury (2010b: 6) argued that “diaspora policies of kin-states serve a specific political and strategic purpose” instead of being dictated by feelings of constant ethnic solidarity. The level of kin-state interest showed therefore variation, rather than following a linear pattern. In addition, both the means and the aims of reconfigured “kin-state” activism were found to be not too different from those used by migrant sending-states (Waterbury 2010a; 2010b). However, as the inter-state controversy created by Hungary’s Status Law illustrated, kin-state action beyond certain “light measures”, was still reproached from a public international law perspective (Kántor et.al. 2004).

Policy repertoire shared by an increasing number of kin-states in the ‘post-irredentist paradigm’ includes measures aimed at improving legal standing of minorities in their countries of citizenship, maintaining cultural and linguistic ties through establishing formal and informal institutions, and incorporating the kin into the “political nation” through granting citizenship based on ethnic descent and/or ancestral membership (Waterbury 2010a:

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46 See, Kantór et al. 2004, and Ieda 2006, *in general*, for kin minority engagement in the CEE, contextualised within the processes of nation-building and European integration. See, King & Melvin (1999), *in general*, for extensive analyses of kin-state activism among Soviet-successor states. For comparative examinations of kin minority engagement, see, particularly, chapters by Halász; Csergő & Goldgeier; and Singh in the 2006 volume. For a broader geographical perspective and case studies beyond the CEE, see, chapters by Özgür-Baklaçoğlu; Oka; De Graaf within the same volume.

47 The Venice Commission report (2002) constituted the ‘most consistently elaborated analytical legal report on the question’, although it was not legally binding (Halász et. al. 2004: 329). In a nutshell, the Commission conferred the main responsibility of minority rights protection to the state of citizenship and residence, while requiring all states to abide by liberal norms of human rights and national minority-rights protection. While it limited legitimate kin-state engagement to supporting kin minorities in the realms of language and culture, it also acknowledged and legitimised kin-state – kin-minority relations. See, Palermo & Sabanadze (2011), *in general*, for more updated accounts evaluating the internationally accepted distribution of responsibilities on national minority protection, and particularly from the perspective of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM). For two major publications of the HCNM on the issue, see, ‘The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies’ (OSCE HCNM 2012), and particularly, ‘The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations’ (OSCE HCNM 2008).
The latter is either done through granting fast-track naturalisation conditioned by residence in the kin-state, or more controversially, through granting external citizenship without requiring domicile in the kin-state. This new modality of transborder kin engagement was labelled ‘virtual nationalism’ (Csergö & Goldgeier 2001), or ‘transsovereign nationalism’ (ibid. 2004). Virtual nationalism was defined as aiming ‘to incorporate ethnic kin into the concept of nation and offer special economic and cultural ties without proposing to change borders or encourage population movements’ (ibid. 2006: 284). Hence, the state’s objective is ‘ensuring that the diaspora remains diasporic, rather than becoming returnees’ (King 1999: 11).

4. DYNAMICS UNDERLYING STATE-LED DIASPORA-MAKING PROJECTS

The transformation from ‘export and return’ to ‘global nation’ logic, on the one hand, and from irredentism-inclined kin-state nationalism to ‘virtual nationalism’, on the other, showed a converging shift in state attitude vis-à-vis extraterritorial populations. The “norm” shaping state attitude and action towards these populations shifted from territorialising them through return, annexation or population movements, to transterritorialising and diasporising them through novel discourses and policies. The ‘diaspora turn’ (Agunias 2009) in state attitude and policy-making\(^\text{50}\) led to increasing academic interest in understanding why states of origin become interested in claiming, making and engaging their transborder populations and through which rhetorical and practical tools they attempt to attain desired outcomes. Explaining divergence and convergence in the goals and means of diaspora-making projects emerged as a task for comparative analyses. Trying to understand the spread of such transformation at a specific point in history rendered necessary examining contingent

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\(^\text{48}\) Some states also opt for what Bauböck termed ‘ethnizenship’, which he defined as ‘external quasi-citizenship’ on the basis of descent and ethnic affinity (Bauböck 2007: 2396). Also called ‘fuzzy citizenship’, this status is a “transnationally adjusted” legal membership status entitling its holder to more extensive range of rights and benefits than an ordinary foreign citizen in the realms of entry, residence, employment, social security, and education within the kin-state (Fowler 2004: 205-214). On the spread of such legal membership statuses in the CEE, see, Bauböck, Perchinig & Sievers (2009).

\(^\text{49}\) For a general overview on external citizenship offered by CEE states to co-ethnic minorities, see Pogonyi, Kovács, and Körtvélyesi (2010). For a cross-country overview of external citizenship legislation—including descent-based provisions—of the 28 EU member states, see Dumbrava 2014.

\(^\text{50}\) Demonstrating the widening range of this turn, Gamlen et al. (2013) detected a steady increase in the number of states with some level of ‘diaspora institution’ from 1980s onwards. As of 2013, more than half of the United Nations member states were reported to have a diaspora institution.
structural political-economic conditions under which the ‘diaspora turn’ happened. The broader diasporic transformation in state thinking led to the need for analysing and theorising the implications of such projects for our understandings of membership in a nation-state, inter-state and trans-state relations, and hence of transnationalism, and nationalism.

As mentioned before, the literature on origin states’ relations with “their” transborder populations has largely bifurcated into two self-contained “migrant – sending state” and “kin minority – kin-state” branches until recently. Suggestions for ‘bringing the two sets of literature into dialogue with each other’ (Waterbury 2010a: 133) and changing our lens to see a broader frame of ‘diaspora politics’ (Waterbury 2009) departed from the observation that there are parallels in the rhetorical and practical means used by kin- and emigrant-engaging states (Waterbury 2010a). ‘Contemporary global processes’ have been blurring the distinction between objectives of these two “types” of states in embracing both “kinds” of populations (Joppke 2005: 247). As these two types of triadic configurations also share a ‘structurally isomorphic’ geometry, analytical and empirical dialogues between the two realms have the potential to provide fertile ground for spotting similarities and differences, as well as ‘interferences and combinations’ between the two (Bauböck 2010: 311).

Such interactive learning effect has already been visible according to Waterbury. She argues that migration-centred studies started to see the potential ‘dark side of transnationalism’, whereas the kin-state literature discovered ‘the contingent and instrumental nature of state policymaking towards diaspora groups’ (Waterbury 2010a: 134). In short, adopting an encompassing approach and a dialogical framework towards ‘transborder membership politics’ (Brubaker & Kim 2011) potentially offers to produce ‘a much more complete picture of the role of the homeland state in shaping transnational practices’ (Waterbury 2010a: 133). Analysing origin-state engagement through a broader framework of diaspora politics that is also sensitive to context, contingency, and historicity also promises a ‘third way offered by diaspora studies between nationalist and globalist approaches’ (Faist 2010: 25).

Following these suggestions, this section attempts to provide an overview of explanatory accounts that have been preoccupied with the objectives, dynamics, rationales and developments underlying origin-states’ enhanced interest in making migrant and non-migrant transborder populations theirs. Rather than delineating the literature according to the type of transborder population, the following sections are structured based on clusters of factors that
have been highlighted in the literature dealing with both configurations. The first section
surveys explanations based on economic rationalities, the second section visits foreign
political considerations, while the third section engages with accounts emphasising domestic
politics, symbolic and substantial nation-building projects, and legitimacy-seeking elites.
Finally, the fourth section looks at the relatively recently developing scholarship that aims to
account for the general widespread phenomena of ‘diaspora turn’ from roughly the 1980s
onwards, approaching it as one of the manifestations of transformations in the broader
political-economic structure.

4.1. Economically motivated diaspora-making and engagement

Economic motivations and in particular remitting potential took the lion’s share in explaining
efforts by sending-states to establish or to reinforce their links with their expatriates (Brand
2006; Itzigsohn 2000; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Portes 1999). From approaches closer to the
world-systems framework, this was considered to be particularly the case for ‘developing
nations’ as they faced challenges in terms of balance of payments and trade connections ‘in an
increasingly interdependent global economy’ (Levitt & de la Dehesa 2003: 599).

However, contrary to widespread assumptions about diaspora engagement mechanisms being
‘symptoms of ‘backwardness’’, and hence deployed exclusively by states in the global South
(Gamlen 2008), Gamlen’s large-N comparative study showed that diaspora policies, including
economically motivated ones, were also found in the global North (Gamlen 2006). Larner
(2007: 334) similarly argued that ‘diaspora strategies’ are not prerogatives of the South, but
can be found also among ‘middling’ developed countries of the ‘North’ such as New
Zealand, Scotland, Canada, Australia, Singapore and Ireland’. These countries, unlike ‘the
heartlands of neoliberalism’, where diaspora engagement is not as visible, have ‘difficulty
accessing the capital and skills needed to succeed in the global economy’ (ibid.).

Furthermore, states like Mexico and India have been recipients of remittances long before
‘any organized endeavours … to hail their diasporas as part of the national community’

51 Attracting remittances is still among the primary motivations for smaller economies, where remittances
constitute a considerable share of the GDP as a bigger financial resource than foreign direct investment or
overseas development aid. This is the case for states like Haiti, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Jamaica, Ecuador, and
the Dominican Republic (ibid.).
(Varadarajan 2010: 11). In some other cases, like that of Turkey, the state activated a fully-fledged diaspora strategy in the second half of the 2000s, although the absolute as well as relative value of remittances has been showing a downward trend since 1998 (See Chapter 4). Beyond facing a natural fall in remittances, the state itself was decreasing the interest rate while increasing the tax on remitted money since 2003 (Bettin et. al 2012; Paçacı Elitok 2013). In addition to these individual cases, a recent study surveying thirty-five countries with diaspora engagement strategies found out that neither the absolute nor the relative value of remittances could be singled out as satisfactory explanatory factors behind the development of diaspora strategies (Ragazzi 2014).

Hence, Varadarajan (2010: 12) aptly argued that ‘while it is important to not overlook the need for remittances in explaining the changing relationship of states and their diasporas, it is also important to not overstate its significance’. This does not mean that economic factors are not an important part of the explanation for the rise of diaspora projects. Rather, what should be corrected is a widespread ‘assumption that equates economic rationales with the need for remittances’ (ibid.). The economic rationale behind governments’ embracement of their diasporas is not any more limited to capturing their remittances. Nor is it about a straightforward transaction in the form of unidirectional flow of foreign currency from expatriates in ‘discrete’ receiving states to the economically nationally contained home-state (Larner 2007).\(^52\)

Economic motivations, and in general the political-economic context were not given much importance in explaining what drives kin-states toward developing diaspora engagement. If and when taken into account, what constitutes economic interest in the kin-state realm was mainly understood as overcoming labour shortages in certain sectors and for lower skill-levels through allowing immigration of co-ethnics. Approached as such, the only way to economically benefit from transborder kin populations is through their “territorialisation”, which seems incompatible with the gist of ‘transsovereign’ or ‘virtual’ nationalism.\(^53\) The

\(^{52}\) For now it suffices to say that economic rationales, while still crucial in determining the degree and form of diaspora engagement, as well as the characteristics of “ideal diasporic subjects” cannot be restricted to remittance inflows anymore. This issue will be revisited in Section 3.4.

\(^{53}\) In fact, some states impose restrictive entry and residence requirements that treat potential ethnic or culturally affinitive migrants as ordinary foreigners. This is the case for states that try to prevent the territorialisation of kin populations through mass co-ethnic immigration, while continuing to transnationally engage them as their kin populations. Turkey’s restrictive attitude towards Turks of Bulgaria demanding to enter the country as economic migrants in the post-1989 period is a case at point (Özgür-Baklacioğlu 2006a). Similarly, the perceived threat of
argument for such kind of co-ethnic labour importation is that states prefer these populations to other sources of “foreign” labour, as they assume that ethnoculturally similar kin populations would be socioeconomically and politically less costly to integrate (Joppke 2005).

The assumption is that co-ethnic/kin populations are resident citizens of economically less developed countries than the kin-state or they are in a disadvantaged minority socioeconomic position. This makes them unable to remit or invest, and hence economically insignificant in contrast to migrant diasporas. Summarising this assumption, Waterbury (2010b: 6) argued that ‘[e]conomic interests play less of a role in nonmigrant diaspora situations, particularly when the homeland state is more economically developed than those beyond the border’. With the same line of reasoning, Melvin and King (1999: 224) claimed that kin-state measures generally stop at the level of ‘rhetoric and “moral support”’, since substantially embracing these populations bring ‘limited economic gains’, if not, ‘costs’.

Examples of kin-states’ labour importation are those of South Korea opening its labour market exclusively to ethnic Koreans in China and the Soviet Union (Seol & Skrentny 2004); Japan opening its 3-D labour market to persons from Japanese ancestry in Brazil and Peru (Skrentny et al. 2007: 797-798); Hungary granting special work permits allowing ethnic Hungarians to join its labour market to a maximum of three-months per year (Ieda 2004: 27); Russia trying to attract assimilable labour force from among “ethnic Russians”; and Italy and Spain meeting their low-skilled labour needs through allowing descendants of their historical emigrant communities in Latin America (Waterbury 2010b: 7).

The examples given in these accounts reflect the confusion around compartmentalising nonmigrant and migrant populations. This confusion translates in different conclusions different studies reach. For instance, Skrentny et al. include Japan, and its co-ethnics that were extraterritorialised as a result of “old migrations” to their kin-state cases. They also include economically driven diaspora policies of China, Taiwan, and Korea targeting those high-skilled co-ethnics in developed countries with investment potential. As a result, they conclude that co-ethnic policies in Asia are ‘geared toward economic development’ and serve economic interests (Skrentny et al. 2007: 795). Waterbury mentions Japan’s, Italy’s, and Spain’s low-overloading its domestic labour market with low-skilled co-ethnics was among the reasons behind Germany’s phasing out of its immigration and naturalisation policies towards the Aussiedler (Joppke & Rosenhek 2001).
skilled co-ethnic recruitment from Latin America as examples to economically driven kin-state behaviour. These populations fall into the category of extraterritorial populations that came into being through old waves of outmigration or as a result of the shrinking of a proto-state’s jurisdictional space through the loss of its former colonies, rather than the widely accepted kin definition fitting the CEE cases. Nevertheless, the tendency to strictly compartmentalise certain populations in certain host countries, with certain levels of capital and skills keeps her from including cases like economically driven engagement of global Chinese, Indians, Irish etc. into the scope of kin-state policies. These latter populations are considered to belong to the migrant diaspora strand, where economic rationalities are regarded as the prime driver of state engagement. Thus, she concludes that kin-state policies are not that much driven by economic considerations.

However, diasporising states do not seem to make such strict categorisations separating migrant/nonmigrant and recent/old emigrant. Rather, they prioritise those that are personally equipped with ‘professional success’, ‘global fluency’, and ‘networked individualism’ (Dickinson & Bailey 2007: 766). States also target transborder populations merely due to the strategic importance of their regions (and markets) of residence in offering new economic venues and connections. States might not consider kin minorities as personally offering economic resources of certain kind, namely, direct flows of remittances and investment into the kin-state. However, expectation of direct financial or investment flows from the “diaspora” into the diasporising state’s economy is one kind of economic rationality behind state-led diaspora engagement. The home-economy’s expansion towards external markets might be equally important for states that are in search of trade partnerships, export markets, and cheap production sites for their “national” bourgeoisie. The regions and countries of populations that might be construed as the state’s kin might be chosen due to their attractiveness for homeland-based businesses, and hence for the state. The state, possibly together with the businesses, might initiate and reinforce contacts and relations with these economically attractive venues through claiming, identifying, and engaging “kin” populations.

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54 The host-state being economically less developed and penetrated to a lesser extent by foreign economies might be an incentive rather than a disincentive for engaging the kin in that state, when economic rationality is thought of in these broader terms.

55 A striking example, in which kin-state activism has been mostly explained by national identity building, and analysed as if it was free from economic interests due to the lack of human and financial capital of kin populations has been that of Russia. See, Zevelev 2001; Melvin 1995. Although King & Melvin (1999/2000)
In other words, the presence of discovered, rediscovered, or created transborder kin in strategic markets might justify and catalyse the kin-state’s economic expansion and interpenetration efforts. As I demonstrate in Chapter 5, the perceived opportunity offered by inventing and forging transborder kinship relations for economically propelling the state and its businesses towards external markets might even be one of the most important factors in shaping the state’s (re)configuration of its kin universe. Hence, I argue that we should not limit economic resources to personal remitting-investing potential of transborder populations, as well as reconsider the economic rationalities associated with state-led kin engagement.

4.2. Diasporas as ethnic lobbies or justification for projecting power beyond borders?

It is widely assumed that states are motivated to engage their expatriates in order to capitalise on their potential as a political influence instrument in their host-countries. States expect their emigrants to exert such pro-homeland influence through constituting a considerable national electoral block and actively lobbying hostland political authorities. This is the case especially for expatriates in powerful or strategically important host countries. The ethnic lobby argument owes its popularity to the well-known Irish-, Jewish- and Armenian-American cases (Brand 2006: 16). The portrayal of ethnic lobbies as privileged transnational interest groups able to exert influence in both their host- and home-states also contributed to home-states’ expectations for their expatriates to behave and be effective in similar ways. 56

Leaving aside the question to what extent expatriate populations apart from few cases actually have the capacity to play this role, it seems to be certainly a valued function that states of origin warmly welcome, encourage, and incorporate into their diaspora discourse (Dufoix 2008; Smith 2003a; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). However, Brand found out that this aspect has not been ‘central to states’ initial decisions to establish or revamp institutions involved with expatriates’ (Brand 2006: 217, italics in original). Nevertheless, states regard prospects of lobbying as an additional source of influence, which they expect to gain higher importance gradually throughout the course of expatriate engagement (ibid.).

56 The Croatian diaspora’s influence in the immediate diplomatic recognition of the newly independent Croatian state (Dufoix 2008: 94).
Even if most of the studied kin minorities were not in a position to play an “effective lobby” role vis-à-vis their states of residence and citizenship, their existence enabled kin-states to pursue foreign policy interests towards host-states (Melvin & King 1999; Melvin 1999). States might assume the right to monitor the conditions of their external kin in order to assist and protect them by claiming to hold responsibility for the well-being of these populations. Instrumentalised as such, the existence of such populations might equip kin-states with justification for involvement in the internal and external affairs of their states of residence.57

In some cases the kin-state aspires to claim responsibility over transborder populations spread to a wider geography, like the case of Russia and its 25 million ‘compatriots’ in the ‘Near Abroad’. Exerting political influence and establishing Russia’s dominance in the post-imperial space constitutes a major part of the latter’s kin engagement. Thus, its duty to protect its vast transborder kin is presented as shouldering ‘the burden of being a “great power” and having to provide “leadership” and guidance to neighbouring states’ (Melvin 1999: 41). The claim and image of a kin-state with its humanitarian, cultural, developmental “responsibilities” has been used to position the claimant state vis-à-vis other states and the international community. Hence, ‘diaspora engagement … plays an important role in political legitimation, both domestically and geopolitically’ (Waterbury 2010a: 138).

Foreign policy formulation of states, and especially that of ‘trading states’ (Rosecrance 1986) are increasingly intertwined with, and shaped by neoliberal ‘economic considerations, such as the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment’ (Kirişçi 2009: 33-34). Besides, as mentioned before, state power is increasingly “economised” (Brubaker 2000), and detached from state territoriality (Agnew 1998). Against such framing context, Fowler (2004: 192) argued that:

>‘in an era of increased global interdependence and economic competition but unstable international political alliances … states have an interest in expanding their

57 Already more dominant and powerful states have instrumentalised the issue of protecting transborder kin as a means to achieve foreign political ends. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia to protect its citizens (after it granted external citizenship to South Ossetians in Georgia) in 2008 was the most blunt example of such instrumentalisation. The protection of kin minorities served as a means to Russia’s aims of ‘securing leadership in the territory of the former Soviet Union’ (Zevelev 2008: 55).
‘expatriate’ relationships to encompass people of any citizenship living abroad with whom they can identify any kind of historical or cultural link.

In short, efforts to position the state as the leader of specific regions or the centre of political and economic zones of influence might play a considerable role in setting the scope and specifying constitutive elements of transborder populations. The chosen scope and content might require readjusting the criteria that a state uses for defining kinship and hence for justifying its links to kin populations. The criteria might include, but go beyond ethnicity, which would then influence specific policies and discourses used by the kin-state.

The efforts of state elites to use narratives of a rising centre of power and to depict themselves as the architects of such ascendance closely relate also to their goals of gaining, holding, and consolidating power and legitimacy in the eyes of domestic audiences. The dynamics underlying diaspora-making projects that go beyond neatly defined and spatially demarcated expatriate and/or co-ethnic populations will be revisited in the following section.

4.3. Domestic politics as the incubator of diaspora-making projects

The third stream of explanation centres on domestic political returns that origin state elites expect from engaging emigrant or kin communities. The first part of this section discusses scholarship that highlighted political expediency and a normative shift towards broader democratic inclusion within homeland contexts that have undergone democratisation, regime liberalisation, and transition to competitive party politics. The second part turns its focus on political actors that instrumentalise kin-engagement as a manifestation of populist ethnic nationalisms for their legitimacy- and vote-seeking agendas. The section closes pointing to the limitations of explanations based on populist ethnic nationalism within domestic politics, particularly in the case of hybrid origin-reference states.

58 It should be noted that states embraced co-ethnic/kin populations to use them as an interface with their countries and regions of settlement long before the era of “increasing interdependence”. For instance, Weimar Germany’s interest in Sudeten Germans was part of a broader strategy “to gain diplomatic leverage in pursuit of other foreign policy aims - especially to promote the interpenetration of the German and Czechoslovak economies as part of a broader aspiration for German economic hegemony in East Central Europe and the Balkans” (Brubaker 2000: 10).
4.3.1. Engaging emigrants out of political expediency or as part of a normative shift?

Home-state elites’ search for resources to sustain and boost their domestic legitimacy and to gain advantageous positions within electoral competition contributes to enhanced rhetorical and practical diaspora-engagement. Examining the Mexican case, Sherman (1999) found that home-states’ interest and efforts tend to wax when home-elites face new competitors, and when public discontent and challenge to elites’ legitimacy become vocal. Embracing expatriates gains pace due to the increased need of various homeland political actors for additional financial, organisational and electoral resources potentially offered by citizens abroad. Such motivation was found to be crucial particularly for newly emerging political elites in democratising context (Itzigsohn 2000: 1144). Hence, relative liberalisation of former authoritarian regimes (Brand 2006: 18) and the replacement of single-party hegemonies by competitive party politics in states of origin tend to heighten the political value of expatriates.

These accounts approach democratisation primarily from an intensified political-electoral competition perspective, as a result of which expatriates, in the eyes of homeland political actors transform into an additional constituency to compete for. In cases like Mexico, the fact that the PRI’s legitimacy had been largely undermined in the 1990s and its decades-long single party position was lost at the end of the decade played a major role in the passing of the 2005 legislation allowing for absentee voting in presidential elections (Smith 2003a; 2008). In other cases like Italy, independently of a democratic transition process, that the homeland political elite aimed at consolidating its political power and expected advantageous electoral returns from a potential overseas constituency was decisive in the enfranchisement of expatriates.\textsuperscript{59}

Others approach democratisation as a normative shift leading to further inclusion of broader sections of the citizenry into the polity, and to the widening of the range of rights granted by states to their citizens. Aiming to explain the quantitative increase and geographic spread of enfranchisement of expatriates in the last three decades, Rhodes and Harutyunyan (2010) pointed to the overall trend towards democratisation and the internationally diffusing normative shift. The normative shift and its wider diffusion has been leading to more

\textsuperscript{59} The well-known case of enfranchising expatriates due to such direct electoral calculations was the move of Berlusconi government in 2002, which was expecting positive returns from external voters to its own advantage. The outcome of the 2006 elections was the opposite, where external votes were decisive in Berlusconi’s defeat against Prodi (Pogonyi 2014: 136).
inclusive citizenship regimes and to a broadened set of rights granted to citizens. Hence, rather than impacting political expediency considerations, democratisation somewhat automatically leads to gradual democratic inclusion of hitherto excluded societal sections, including expatriates, into the polity (ibid.). In some cases, transition to democracy led to legal and political incorporation of former political exiles as part of redressing past violations of human rights (IDEA 2007), confirming the argument for normatively rather than strategically driven expatriate political inclusion.\footnote{Spain, Portugal, Mexico, Brazil, Honduras, Peru, Namibia, South Africa, Cape Verde, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iraq were given as examples for states whose political incorporation of their former exiles was mainly seen as induced by such transitions (Brand 2014: 56).}

However, closer inspection of the specific timing and particularities of provision of external voting rights in different cases and regime types suggests that we need to be more cautious in drawing a generalizable direct line between democratisation leading to diaspora engagement and political incorporation (Brand 2014). The discourse of providing a fuller set of rights to all citizens was widely used as justification among states, including those with authoritarian regimes. However, in her examination of the politics of expatriate enfranchisement in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, Brand (2010) found other not so democratic purposes behind such discourses. Moves to open channels for expatriate electoral incorporation aimed at rallying additional support for leaders whose legitimacy has been on shaky grounds, ‘increasing sovereignty over expatriates with resources to be tapped’, and ‘reinforcing security’ through a different means of monitoring’ (ibid.: 97).\footnote{See also, Brand 2014, for a broader range of comparison of specificities regarding provision and practice of ‘out-of-country (OCV) voting’ among ‘transition regimes’ in the post-Arab Spring era, where she sheds light on the variety of motivations behind OCV provisions, despite common use of inclusive citizenship discourses in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Jordan, and Yemen.}

In addition, such generalised causal arrow from democratisation to expatriate incorporation and embracement is problematic also because democracy and democratisation in different contexts often mean quite different things. In some contexts, democracy is understood primarily as ‘competition between different elites’ and ‘it is mainly a procedural matter; people’s participation is limited to elections in which candidates representing different elites are chosen’ (Nun 2003, paraphrased in Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008: 665). Hence, such “procedural democratisation” might lead to inclusion of broader sections of voters – including non-resident ones - into the register, while the driving force behind enfranchisement could be limited to these ‘different elites’ interests in consolidating their political standing.
All this is not to say that democratisation and electoral competition plays no significant role in engaging diasporas and ‘opening of the political field’ to the previously excluded expatriates (Itzigsohn 2000: 1146). However, these cautionary remarks should be taken seriously as they point to limitations in explaining diaspora engagement projects of authoritarian, non-democratic, or “procedurally democratic” states. In addition, it is necessary to look closer at the specificities of interactive dynamics between general “trends” and their appropriation in individual political contexts, out of which specific forms of political incorporation emerge.

4.3.2. Ethnic kin-states, hybrid origin states, and the limits of domestic political explanations

Legitimacy and electoral gain seeking through nationalist-populist instrumentalisation and appropriation of transborder co-ethnic/kin engagement was spotted as one of the major drivers of kin-state activism. This was the case especially in the CEE, where state borders as well as the regime changed overnight. The transition from authoritarian single-party regimes to politically competitive settings required extensive re-orientation, re-organisation, and ideological readjustment on the side of political elites. The reference to ethnocultural nation was particularly appealing in the post-Soviet ‘nationalizing’ contexts, where ‘ethnonational identities were perhaps the principal form of ‘collective consciousness’ that socialism produced’ (Verdery 1998: 294). Thus, ‘the rhetoric and symbols with the greatest electoral appeal were the national(ist) ones’ (ibid.). Creating and reproducing a self-image as the political actors that represent and look out for the border-transcending nation had the potential to offer ‘a unique source of legitimacy’ for newly emerging inexperienced elites lacking ‘organizational resources or a track record of ideological positioning’ (Waterbury 2010a: 140).

In addition to the instrumentalisation of kin engagement for attracting resident nationalist votes, granting external citizenship to and enfranchising the transborder kin might be deployed as a direct way of gaining comparative electoral advantage. This was the case in Croatia, where the nationalist leader Franjo Tudjman was able to win consecutive electoral victories in 1995 and 2000 thanks to ethnic Croat votes from Bosnia-Hercegovina (Waterbury 2009: 4). External votes cast in Moldova contributed to Traian Basescu’s victory in Romanian presidential election in 2009 (Pogonyi, Kovács, & Körtvélyesi 2010: 11). Viktor Orbán’s
Fidesz changed the Hungarian citizenship law to grant external citizenship to ethnic Hungarians and those whose ancestors held Hungarian citizenship in 2010. Following this move, the 2011 electoral law granted these new non-resident citizens the right to vote (Pogonyi 2014: 134). Around 200,000 new citizens without residence requirements registered for the elections in April 2014. 95.49 per cent of approximately 130,000 valid votes went to the Fidesz-KDNP alliance (Végel 2014).

Apart from its vote-capturing potential, assuming the kin-state role was symbolically used in nation building and identity construction by post-socialist political elites trying to overcome legitimacy crises in the face of rapid and radical transformation.62 Discourses positioning the kin-state as the protector-patron also serve the purpose of projecting an image of grandeur, indicating the recapturing of power that the state once had, and heralding the ascent of the nation as a whole. Depicting an image of kin minorities as not only depending on their kin-state’s guardianship, but also enthusiastically welcoming such external patronage is important for two nationalist-populist purposes: First, it illustrates the alleged greatness, generosity, and benign nature of the kin-state. Second, it demonstrates that ethnic, cultural, religious ties and feelings of solidarity between the kin-state and these populations are natural, and hence resist the passing of time, geographical distance, and the not-so-natural state borders that separate the two.63

Most of the cases examined in the CEE region were limited to rather clearly delimited ethnocultural minorities who were separated from their ‘external national homelands’ through relatively recent border changes (Brubaker & Kim 2011). In other words, most kin-states examined in the literature are ‘ethnic kin-states’ (Singh 2006). Singh defines them as states that ‘border or are close to the region and are inhabited by co-nationals with whom kin minorities share and maintain strong ethnocultural and ethno-religious bonds’ (ibid.: 305).

62 In post-Soviet Russia, imagining a border-crossing ethno-cultural nation served as a central marker of the state’s new identity, around which ‘disoriented’ political elites and sections of the resident population were able to ‘regroup’ (King & Melvin 1999/2000: 120). Kin/co-ethnic engagement was also used for substantial nation-building. Preferential immigration and naturalisation of co-ethnics were used to address the “demographic deficit” of states like Kazakhstan, the putative ‘core nation’ of which constituted only 39.7 per cent of the total population at the time of independence (ibid.: 128).

63 Hungary used the discourse of increasingly “outdated” territorial borders separating the naturally connected members of the nation from each other. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, argued that a reevaluation and relaxation of territorial borders’ rigidity and significance was needed to minimise the ‘negative consequences of ‘modern’ statehood felt by inhabitants of formerly disputed territories not fully at ease with their current state status’ (Fowler 2004: 215).
The state’s delineation of its external kin minorities cannot be completely clear-cut in any case and was not in these cases either. However, in CEE ethnic kin-states, there is smaller room for ambiguity at the stage of identification compared to some other kin-state cases. There is less ambiguity due to the relative clarity of the ethnocultural and/or previous legal membership criteria used by the state, the geographical specification and limitation of the kin’s places of domicile, and the relative neatness of the event that is taken as the signifier of the nation’s separation by borders. For instance, Hungary’s definition of its transborder members specifies where these members currently reside, through which specific historical event they were left outside the borders of contemporary Hungary, and which ethnolinguistic traits they demonstrate and self-identify with. Its transborder kin ‘comprises those residents and citizens of neighbouring states who continue to identify their ethnocultural nationality as Hungarian, the great majority of them descendants of persons who were, before 1920, citizens of Hungary’ (Brubaker & Kim 2011: 66, fn. 53). Hence, the concept of who is a transborder member of the Hungarian nation in the state of Hungary is relatively less ambiguous (ibid.). Most cases in the region have similar historical, geographical, and ethnocultural specifications in their definitions of the state’s transborder kin.64

However, not all kin-states delimit “their” transborder kin as unambiguously.65 Particularities of the timing of nation-state formation and the adoption of “modern” notions of citizenship might cause ambiguity in delineating which transborder populations “belong” to the external nation-state.66 In some cases, like the Ottoman millet system, membership was historically not organised along ethnicity but along religious and confessional lines. This had its implications for contested definitions of what constitutes nationhood and who constitutes the transborder members of such contested nation. In others, like the case of ‘russified settler communities’, the imperial system distinguished these multi-ethnic settlers based on their political function in the ‘imperial expansion and consolidation’ rather than their ethnicity, and hence ‘ethnic and

64 See, for example, Halasz et al. (2004: 339) for the Slovenian, and Iordachi (2004: 246) for the Romanian versions.
65 A closer look at the history of ‘transborder membership politics’ of states like Germany and Korea, showed that these claimant states have been narrowing down and expanding the scope of their kin universe, contingently and variably framing specific sets of notions as central to their definition of “kinship”, or blending not so congruous criteria to identify a wider range of populations as “their” kin. Changes in the ways these states have constituted and delineated transborder populations had been shaped by broader geopolitical and interstate contexts, ideological positioning embedded within a divided state setting, and institutional legacies of relations between populations and predecessor political units (Brubaker & Kim 2011).
66 For instance, colonial-era migrations to China took place before the state became independent and a South Korean citizenship in the modern sense was instituted. This led to the initial exclusion of Korean origin Chinese citizens from the scope of co-ethnicity (Brubaker & Kim 2011: 59-60).
national identities remain ill-defined among the settlers’ (Melvin 1999: 50-51). In post-imperial settings, the transfer of these populations from the jurisdiction of the former political unit happened in a more distant past and/or in multiple stages within a gradual process. This makes justification of kin-state claims based on possession of ancestral membership to the former polity less clear-cut.

More important than the historical givens regarding populations’ distinctive extraterritorialisation trajectories or their varying putative commonalities with the kin-state, is the state’s strategic and contingent use of this ambiguity and complexity to create and claim a “malleable transborder kin universe”. A state with a claim on such transborder kin universe has the capacity to expand and shape this universe by referring to various kinds of membership criteria and mobilising different historical commonalities. As the kinship definition is not only based on co-ethnicity, such malleable kin universe comprises multiple forms and degrees of transborder kinship linking the claimant state and the various registers. Hence, the state can and does introduce hierarchical layers within its malleable kin universe to provide an internal structure to it.

For instance, Russia has been using multiple, partly overlapping, and at times incongruous criteria to define its “diaspora” in the Near Abroad. Populations have been defined through their links to Russia by virtue of their co-ethnicity (russkie), their linguistic commonality (russkoiazychnye), their Russianness in the territorial sense (rossiiane), their common roots in the fatherland (compatriot, sootechestvennik), and their possession of contemporary Russian citizenship (grazhdane). According to Brubaker, the core co-ethnic term (russkie) was used within domestic political contexts for its potential to yield popular support. Vis-à-vis international audiences, the Russian state preferred ‘compatriots’, as its ‘political meaning was overlaid by a mélange of criteria based on some combination of descent, ethnicity, past citizenship, and spiritual-cultural orientation’ (Brubaker 2000: 16). Using the lexicon of compatriots enabled Russia ‘to expand [its] jurisdictional claims in the near abroad’ (and to represent those claims as transcending a narrow ethnic interest in protecting ethnic Russians)’ (ibid.: 17). While this ‘hybrid’ notion provided the Russian state with a certain level of legitimacy to claim a wide variety of populations, ‘it provided little basis for concrete policy programs’ (Melvin & King 1999: 212).

67 For a more detailed account on post-Soviet Russia’s ambiguous and multilayered construction of its diaspora/compatriot categories, see Brubaker (2000: 16-17); Melvin (1999: 37-39).
Analysing kin engagement as embedded within processes and projects of ethnocultural nation-building contributes to our understanding of the contingent, contextual, and contested nature of transborder ethnocultural membership politics. Nevertheless, it might fall short of explaining efforts of states claiming populations defined beyond ethnocultural criteria. This seems to be the case in contexts where political elites heavily rely on narratives of an ascending nation and state making an assertive reappearance on the world stage. As the cases of Russia and Turkey seem to highlight, these narratives are closely related to and embedded within claims of reviving the state’s past imperial grandeur and influence. In these cases, the historical baggage of the contemporary kin-state offers a set of opportunities shaping the specific ways in which it can forge and revive multiple past relations. Historical ambiguities are then *strategically* used to transform multiple forms of past relations into a more complex set of kin-state claims encompassing a wider scope of populations than the subset of ethnocultural co-nationals.

4.4. Diaspora-making as a manifestation of neoliberalisation

A relatively recent strand in scholarship became interested in shedding light on the implications of transformations at the broader political economic structure, i.e., neoliberalisation, for the timing of the spread, and converging modalities of diaspora-making and engagement projects. This section focuses on two aspects within the literature associating state-led diaspora engagement with neoliberal restructuring and its impact on governing populations. The first part engages with critical scholarship on “diaspora and development” that analyses why a specific modality of *migrant* diaspora engagement has been adopted by an increasing number of states and enthusiastically promoted by international organisations, multilateral platforms, and some academic strands. The second part engages with the theoretical literature analysing the links between neoliberalisation and states’ efforts to construe and engage diasporas, as well as their implications for the conventional understanding of modern-state sovereignty and authority.
4.4.1. Neoliberalisation and the hype of diaspora and development

The late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed the emergence, promotion, and spread of the migration-development and/or diaspora-development nexus (Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear, & Engberg-Pedersen 2002). Within this nexus, which was labelled the ‘new mantra’ (Kapur 2004), home-states have been prescribed to engage their diasporas for attracting investments, securing technology and knowledge flow from the diaspora, and realising a networked structure with the origin state at its centre. The ultimate aim of these measures is achieving economic growth and better connectedness of the homeland economy to the global market structures. Primary target populations for home-states to engage are those sections that are equipped with high degrees of capital, skills, and talents, and in possession of dense networks and key connections within global markets. 68 Organisation of forums and meetings, 69 and dissemination of policy recommendation reports and publications with the initiative of receiving states, think thanks, and international organisations 70 played a major role in the widespread acknowledgement of the strong connection between diaspora engagement and development, and in the legitimisation and promotion of diaspora strategies (Gamlen et al. 2013).

Gamlen (2014) calls these widespread efforts by politicians, experts, and scholars to encourage origin states to incorporate diasporas into their development strategies the ‘new migration-and-development optimism’. Some regarded this “hype of diaspora and development” as a symptom of the diffusion of neoliberal thinking on the respective roles and functions of the state, the market, and communities of individuals (Faist 2008). In other words, in line with the general neoliberal shift that assigns part of the state’s welfare-related responsibilities to active individuals and self-helping communities, diasporas and

68 For influential studies advising origin states to benefit from their expatriates’ specialised high-skills through forming transnational scientific, professional, talent-based networks, see, Meyer and Brown 1999; Meyer and Wattiaux 2006.
69 The establishment of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) in 2005 with the initiative of the UN General Secretary, the decision to hold annual forums under the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in 2007 on the proposal of the UN General Assembly High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in September 2006, the first ministerial level meeting ‘Diaspora Ministerial Conference’, organised by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 2013 are among these institutionalised forums and intergovernmental meetings.
70 Publications, reports, and surveys have been commissioned and published by think thanks such as the Migration Policy Institute (Newland & Patrick 2004), by the World Bank (Kuznetsov 2006), and by the IOM (Ionescu 2006).
communities of transnational actors have been assigned the role of ‘transnational agents in the current round of the development nexus’ (ibid.: 23).

What was understood from (homeland) development and in which ways diasporas were going to contribute to it was primarily derived from the crucial role played by the highly-skilled, entrepreneurial sections of overseas Chinese and Indian in the macro-economic “success stories” of these effectively neoliberalising economies. Hence, diaspora engagement à la China or India has been prescribed as the policy option for development. As a result, development has come to be largely understood as achieving deeper integration of the homeland in the global economy, and increasing its economic competitiveness (Pellerin & Mullings 2013).

Pellerin and Mullings (2013: 94) suggested that recommended policy mechanisms based on the abovementioned models ‘function as truth regimes’ even though ‘there is surprisingly little systematic and concrete evidence’ illustrating ‘context-specific achievements of specific policies’. In other words, the diaspora-development agenda is promoted despite the dearth of knowledge on actual mechanisms through which diaspora engagement substantially impacts homeland economies and societies (Gamlen et al. 2013; Dèlano & Gamlen 2014). This led some scholars to point to ‘agendas linked to neoliberalism and immigration control’ as the genuine motivations behind the ‘migration-for-development thinking’ (Gamlen 2014).

See also, Kapur 2004 and de Haas 2012, for accounts explaining the “the hype of diaspora and development” through the penetration of neoliberal agendas in the ways of thinking about development and how to engender it with lower levels of state involvement and reduced costs for the state. See, Glick-Schiller 2010, for a critique along similar lines, which also links the rise of mobility and circularity promotion by diaspora-development agendas to restrictive and selective immigration policies of the receiving countries in the global North. See, Gamlen (2014: 589-591) for a brief overview of other accounts highlighting the latter point in their critiques.

The authors note that the contributions of Saxenian (2005, 2006) were rather influential in shaping the concepts and the dominant logics of the diaspora-development nexus paradigm. In these accounts, Saxenian focused on the success of China, India, and Taiwan in attracting investments and enterprises of their diaspora, particularly those with booming businesses in Silicon Valley.

The relations and connection between many origin states and their diasporas do not show resemblance these homeland-diaspora models, nor are the economic, commercial, or innovative capacities of many diasporas at a comparable level to the Chinese or Indian diasporas. Nevertheless, this does not mean that policy-makers in states of origin are not allured by the idea and convinced by the existence of a strong connection between economic “success” and effectively engaging their diasporas a-la-China or India. This seems to be definitely part of the story in the case of Turkey and the explicitly economic face of its diaspora engagement efforts. Links are often made between the necessity to successfully weave an entrepreneurial diaspora network as wide as possible and playing in the “premiere league” of global economic competition. China and India frequently feature as examples that are looked up to in this respect even though the economic potential and the networked structure of a potential Turkish diaspora is not –and realistically cannot be- comparable to these model diasporas (See Chapter 4).

For a concise but extensive overview of the re-emergence of migration and development optimism within academia and policy circles, and the critical response this new agenda has encountered within various
4.4.2. Diaspora-making as a neoliberal way of governing national populations

One of the central questions for studies aiming to account for the general ‘diaspora turn’ (Agunias 2009) as well as for its manifestations in different origin state-diaspora constellations was ‘why now and not before’ (Ragazzi 2009: 383). The shift from territorialising transborder populations to incorporating them to the category of populations that can be governed meant that the state was actively configuring and reinforcing forms of relationship that go against the conflation of its territory and population, on which the conventional understanding of modern-state sovereignty and authority is based (Gamlen 2008; Ragazzi 2009). While they considerably nuanced our understanding of states’ motivations behind engaging diasporas, explanations based on ‘strategic-tactical’ reasons fell short of accounting for the specific timing of this shift, which was the manifestation of a broader transformation in conventional ways of conceiving the state, rather than just a policy change (Ragazzi 2009). In addition, while macro-structural explanations failed to account for diaspora engagement by countries at the ‘core’ of the global economy, explanations based on benefit extraction failed to explain why states that do not seem to have prospects of these benefits – remittances, votes and legitimacy within competitive politics - still engage their diasporas (Gamlen 2006; Varadarajan 2010). Hence, these accounts pointed to the changing ways of thinking of the market, state, territory and population engendered by neoliberal restructuring of the economy and the state as the primary transformation within which diaspora strategies have been embedded.

Drawing on Foucault’s ‘modalities of government’ Ragazzi matches three different ways of thinking of and governing extraterritorial populations by the state with three types of modalities (Ragazzi 2009: 385-391). The state, primarily concerned with governing territory under a ‘disciplinary modality’, aims at territorializing and homogenising populations contained within its clearly delineated and bounded territory. Hence, the existence of a section of the population outside its territorial confines is an abnormality that should be normalized through return migration in the case of emigrants, and annexation, or preferential immigration in the case of transborder kin populations. ‘Liberal governmentality’ implies that the state is disciplines, and particularly within political geography, see Gamlen (2014). For accounts that base their explanation and criticism on the spread and predominance of neoliberal agendas and ideologies, see (ibid.: 587-588).
mainly concerned by not being able to match the population to the resources of its territory.\textsuperscript{75} Thus, it tolerates the physical absence of part of population only if such absence is temporary and beneficial for the state. What temporarily surplus labour-exporting governments in the post-war era had in mind reflected the liberal governmental rationality. Finally, under a neoliberal form of governmentality, the concern for what is economically to be governed transcends the state’s territorial borders, while the main reference for belonging and the criterion for membership is ‘the community’, defined irrespective of territorial insiderness. On the one hand, this implies that “diasporas”, construed as belonging to the community despite their territorial outsidersness, become populations legitimately governed by origin states. On the other hand, states see dispersion as ‘a resource and a legitimate modality of political existence’ rather than as an anomaly (ibid.: 389).

A similar approach can be found in Larner (2007)’s analysis of the case of New Zealand within the framework of ‘diaspora strategies’. Tracing the shifts in predominant conceptions of expatriates as part of national economic development strategies since the 1960s, she discerns a ‘developmentalist/welfarist’ approach, followed by a ‘brain circulation’ approach. The ‘developmentalist/welfarist’ approach is concerned with brain drain and requires physical return for expatriates to contribute to homeland development. The ‘brain circulation’ approach sees expatriates still largely through a developmentalist lens, while emphasising the circulation of their social and financial capital through networks (ibid.: 335-336). Finally, she contends that concomitant with the entry of globalisation ‘into the policy lexicons of economic development ministries around the world’ (ibid.: 332), governments and international organisations devised ‘diaspora strategies’. ‘Diaspora strategies’ aim at building and involving dense and multiple networks of ‘entrepreneurial, globally networked subjects [that] create new possibilities for economic growth and in doing so contribute to the development of a knowledge-based economy’ (ibid.: 334).

Approaching globalisation as ‘a specific representation of the world’ that is ‘constituted through political rationalities and socio-technical practices, which imagine and mobilise spaces and subjects in particular ways’ (ibid.: 332-333), Larner argues that spaces of diaspora are similarly imagined as characterised by networks, connectivity, innovation, and mobility,

\textsuperscript{75} Governmentality, essentially a ‘liberal’ form of thinking about the objects and technologies of governing, Foucault (1991 [1978]) argued, was different from sovereign rule. Liberal governmentality is concerned with governing populations rather than territory. Populations are governed through getting their consent and providing their welfare, rather than enforcing the rule over territory through physical coercion.
whereas diasporic subjects are presented as entrepreneurial, successful, and connected. While political-economic elites adhering to neoliberal principles and striving for global economic competitiveness are the main actors in imagining and creating diaspora spaces and subjects, it is neoliberal “governmentality”, ‘the very idea of ‘globalisation’ that is giving rise’ to such imagining and creation (ibid. 342). Drawing on the example of the making and engaging of the ‘Kiwi Diaspora’, Larner draws attention to the lack of ‘nationalistic or cultural discourses’ and references to ‘community and identity’ within ‘economically motivated’ and framed diaspora strategies (ibid.: 340).

Larner separates the realm of identity, community, and nationalism from the domain of political economy, and argues for moving diaspora engagement analyses to the latter. Arguing against such separation, Varadarajan (2010) shows the close and ‘mutually constitutive relationship’ between the two realms underlying diaspora-making and engagement projects, which she calls the production of ‘the domestic abroad’. Rather than being clean from nationalistic discourses and detached from the domain of community and identity, she regards the production of ‘the domestic abroad’ as the ‘diasporic reimagining of the nation’. Such reimagining is ‘the peculiar transnational nationalism embraced by state actors’ in an effort to cope with the challenges posed by the neoliberal restructuring (ibid.: 18).

Building her analysis on the Gramscian concept of “hegemony”, Varadarajan argues that the rearticulation of the political-economic elites’ interests in relation with the transformation of global capitalism has pushed the elite to renarrate the nation, its boundaries, defining characteristics, and identity. Maintaining hegemony depends on the elites’ ability to create an appearance of themselves as ‘seamlessly emerging from and legitimately representing the interests of a broadly defined imagined political community’ (ibid.: 48). In an effort to sustain this appearance despite the reconfiguration of their interests within the context of the neoliberal restructuring of the state,

‘state elites have turned toward their diasporas, constituting them variously as “newly

76 In the particular case of India, state elites have been positing ‘success’, ‘the spirit of enterprise’, and ‘the indomitable will’ that characterised global Indians as making up the essence of India and Indianness, while they accompanied this discourse with a narrative depicting a globally rising, competitive, and influential India and “Indianhood” stemming from these essential qualities (ibid.: 135-137). In the pre-independence period, overseas Indians were narrated as crucial elements of anti-colonialist movement, thanks to their endurance in preserving their ‘culture and religion’ (i.e. their Indianness) even under colonial domination away from their homeland (ibid.: 61).
valorized subjects” of the state, as essential elements of the national body politic, and as members of a broader political community that have the right to institutional protection’ (ibid.: 49).

Hence, neoliberal restructuring provides the common framing context for a majority of contemporary diaspora-making and engaging states as they have been going through similar concerns of aligning themselves as to better meet ‘the demands of international capital’ (ibid.: 14). However, keys for grasping the specific ways in which every nation-state has evolved in relation to the neoliberal phase of capitalism, and how the peculiar form of this relationship has shaped distinguishable modalities of diaspora-making and engagement can be found in their particular historical trajectories, especially those pertaining to evolving dynamics between the state, the bourgeoisie, and the conception of the “nation”.

This latter point reminds us one more time that rather than being opposing and clashing forces, nationalism and globalisation dynamically interact and take new shapes through this interaction (Hall 2011). These new shapes, then, have implications for the ways of (re)thinking the nation, the state, and the changing role of territory and identity in the relationship between the nation and the state. Finally, an analytical framework sensitive to the interactively evolving relationship between elite interests and ideologies and the broader structure suggests that the domain of “culture, community and identity” should not be detached from that of “political-economic structure” in understanding the making of diasporas through contingent, variable, and context- and actor-based ‘transnational nationalisms’ of home-states.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter laid out the analytical framework within which this dissertation is embedded. In line with the objectives of this dissertation, the overview has engaged with scholarship on: (i) the conceptual and analytical approaches to diaspora and states’ uses of this label; (ii) on the evolving relationship between migrant sending-states and expatriate populations on the one hand, and kin-states and external kin minorities on the other; (iii) explanations and analyses focusing their attention on why, how, to what effect, and on what conditions states attempt to make certain migrant and non-migrant transborder populations theirs.
The first section highlighted that thinking of diaspora as a political project deployed by state and non-state actors not only allows one to discern with which objectives, through which mechanisms, to what specific kinds of “end products” agents of diaspora-making projects target their constituencies, but also enables one to take change in form and degree into account. Hence, the dissertation adopts an approach zooming out and approaching “diaspora politics” as a dynamic, interactive, and contentious space, within which different state and non-state diaspora-making projects interactively contest for their own depictions of community and terms of homeland-diaspora relationship to prevail and gain legitimacy in the eyes of targeted audiences. While trying to understand and explain diaspora politics, it is crucial to remain cautious on the political uses of the label, which diaspora-making actors employ with particular purposes and to create specific representations of reality.

The second and third sections focused on origin states’ reconfigured conception of and re-envisioned relationship with migrant and kin populations beyond their borders. The shift from territorialising to diasporising populations detected in both realms points to a growing detaching of territoriality from membership and vice versa. Return and physical presence within the country of origin seems to cease to be a condition for expatriates to be counted as members of the nation, citizenry, and polity of their home-states. Kin-states seem to change their outlook on preferential immigration schemes or irredentist attempts to move the border over their external national populations. The converging tendency of both sending- and kin-states to transterritorialise these two “kinds” of populations has also been reflected in the objectives, as well as discursive and practical means of keeping them out but connected.

Following the suggestion for analysing origin-state engagement through a broader framework of diaspora politics (Bauböck 2010; Waterbury 2010a; Faist 2010), the third section surveyed scholarly analyses examining the objectives, dynamics, rationales and developments underlying origin-states’ enhanced interest in making migrant and non-migrant transborder populations theirs, and keeping them as such. The first three sub-sections separately dealt with economic rationalities, dynamics embedded within foreign policy considerations, and domestic politics. They also highlighted connections between these different domains and the increasing amalgamation of economic, foreign and domestic political rationalities. All aspects feature to varying extents in the majority of state-led diaspora-making projects, and hence should be taken into account. Nevertheless, a broader understanding on economic motivations going beyond resources owned and offered by transborder populations themselves seems to
be needed, particularly for a richer understanding of states’ interest in making and engaging kin populations. A similar need for nuancing emerges also for foreign political aspirations that are increasingly enmeshed with economic rationalities.

In the domestic politics realm, legitimacy- and vote-seeking elites feature centrally in both configurations, while caution is needed in drawing direct lines between democratisation and more inclusive understandings of citizenship and membership involving expatriates. Analysing kin engagement as embedded within processes and projects of ethnocultural nation-building has immensely contributed to our understanding of contingent, contextual, and contested nature of transborder ethnocultural membership politics. Nevertheless, limiting our analytical and empirical lens to ethnocultural membership might fall short of explaining efforts of states claiming kin populations defined beyond more ambiguous and complex criteria for purposes other than instrumental uses of ethnic nationalism. This insight also suggests a need for sensitivity to historical particularities of states through which claimed kin or “related” populations beyond the current state borders became extraterritorial.

Finally, the focus was shifted to scholarship interested in the implications of transformations at the broader political economic structure for the timing of the spread and converging modalities of diaspora-making and engagement projects. Approaches critical of the “hype of diaspora and development” suggest that it has been closely connected to neoliberalisation. Accounts aiming to explain states’ –recently- reconfigured attitude towards dispersed populations point to neoliberal economic restructuring and the predominance of neoliberal ways of governing populations as the underlying mechanism. Scholars highlight how such reconfiguration contradicts presumptions on which the conventional understanding of modern-state sovereignty and authority is based. The lesson to be drawn is to think of the making of diasporas as contingent, variable, and actor-based ‘transnational nationalisms’ (Varadarajan 2010). The emergence of these state-led transnational nationalist projects are embedded within the broader material structure, while particular historical trajectories of statehood and nationhood shape the peculiar ways in which states make and engage their diasporas.
CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATIONS UNDERLYING TURKEY’S CHANGING DIASPORIC UNIVERSE: A CONTEXTUAL MAP

Two crucial developments divide the socio-political and economic history of the country into pre- and post-1980 eras. First, January 1980 marks the start of the alteration of the country’s economic orientation, with implications for the development and growth strategy, the role of the state within the economy, and the relations with global markets. Second, the September 1980 military coup marks the start of a culminating series of political and societal changes. These two developments, in a joint and interacting way, led to changes in the landscape of political actors, and to the emergence of movements contesting the military-led Kemalist power centre. The aftermath of 1980 also witnessed the crystallisation of societal cleavages along a multitude of axes, including laicist versus Islamist, official Turkish nationalist versus Kurdish nationalist, pro-Western versus anti-Western, among others. In addition, the post-Cold War geopolitical and geo-economic structure decisively shaped Turkey’s relations with the West and with its non-Western neighbourhood.

The coming of the power of the AKP in 2002 marked another point of major transformation in terms of the abovementioned societal cleavages, elite-promoted dominant conception of nationhood, and Turkey’s political, economic, and cultural positioning vis-à-vis the world outside. The moderately Islamist, economically liberal, and socially conservative elite led by the AKP and the Islam-sympathetic, outward-looking Anatolian (and increasingly also) urban capital consolidated its power particularly since the second half of the 2000s. The understanding of development based on economic growth and deeper integration into global markets gained absolute primacy. Secularist and to a lesser extent ethnic tones in the Kemalist conception of nationhood and the dominant nationalist narrative were toned down and replaced by references to Ottoman-Islamic references. The shift from Kemalist to post-Kemalist elite had implications also for the political, economic, and identitarian positioning of the state vis-à-vis the West and the non-Western (predominantly Islamic) world.

This chapter provides a comprehensive contextual map on the post-1980 transformative processes in Turkey and serves as a ground for the following chapters of the dissertation. It
focuses on transformations along four dimensions: (i) the transformation of ruling elites and sections of society equipped with political and economic power; (ii) the economic development model and the degree to which political and economic elites aspired to integrate the economy into regional and global market structures (iii) the defining characteristics of nation and the dominant understanding of nationalism promoted by elites; (iv) the political, economic, and cultural-historical self-positioning of the state vis-à-vis the world beyond its borders. I see the period from the inception of the Republic to the 1980s, that between the 1980s and the first half of the 2000s, and from the mid-late 2000s onwards as distinct phases based on their characteristics in relation to the abovementioned four dimensions.

Table 1. Graphic summary of four-dimensional transformation in Turkey (1923-2015)

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<td>Centre of political-economic power</td>
<td>- Military-led Kemalist elites (secular establishment)</td>
<td>- Cont’d dominance of the secular establishment &amp; urban business</td>
<td>- Rise and hegemony of economically liberal, moderately Islamist/conservative AKP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Urban big business close to the secular establishment</td>
<td>- Rising power of traditional political Islam and conservative Anatolian capital</td>
<td>- Cont’d urban business presence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Rise of conservative (Anatolian &amp; urban) capital</td>
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<td>- Rise of conservative (Anatolian &amp; urban) capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic development model</td>
<td>- Inward-looking</td>
<td>- Outward-looking</td>
<td>- Outward-looking</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- State-dominated</td>
<td>- Liberalised</td>
<td>- Neoliberalised</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- ISI-based</td>
<td>- EOI-based</td>
<td>- Based on export/outward investment/overseas contracting</td>
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<td>- Self-sufficiency oriented</td>
<td>- Growth/integration-orientated</td>
<td>- Growth/integration/expansion-orientated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominant nationalist narrative</td>
<td>- Official nationalist narrative</td>
<td>- Official nationalist narrative</td>
<td>- “New Turkey” nationalist narrative</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Monolithic, secular, (predominantly ethnic) Turkish national identity</td>
<td>- Diluted with Turko-Islamic elements</td>
<td>- Less emphasis on ethnicity, heavy use of Islamic-Ottoman references</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Insertion of Turko-Islamic elements since 60s’ anti-communism</td>
<td>- Increasing influence of secular ‘liberal nationalism’</td>
<td>- Civilisational liberal nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positioning vis-à-vis the West and the wider world</td>
<td>- Unequivocal Western political-economic orientation</td>
<td>- Cont’d Western orientation with occasional fluctuations</td>
<td>- Bridge between liberal democratic West and the Islamic world (2002-2008/9)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Rejection of Ottoman/caliphate legacy</td>
<td>- Post-Cold War interest in non-Western n.hood</td>
<td>- Leader of non-Western (predominantly Islamic) civilisational space aspiring to become a global actor (2009 onwards)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Limited interest in and relations with non-Western &amp; Islamic world</td>
<td>- Turkic/neo-Ottomanist attempts in Central Asia, Balkans, Caucasus</td>
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1. NEOLIBERAL RESTRUCTURING, SHIFTING BALANCES OF POWER, CRYSTALLISING SOCIETAL CLEAVAGES IN POST-1980 TURKEY

This section lays out the post-1980 transformations in Turkey with respect to the adopted economic model, the predominant elite-promoted conception of nationhood, shifting balances of power among domestic actors, and the state’s foreign political and economic orientation. It first focuses on the implications of the liberalisation of the economy and the adoption of an export oriented industrialisation (EOI) strategy for changes in the state-business relations, the emergence of new centres of capital. The second part discusses the changing role of Turco-Islamic elements within the elite-promoted conception of nationhood in the aftermath of the 1980 coup and the crystallisation of ethno-sectarian socio-political fault lines. After providing a brief context on the rise of political Islam and the fierce power struggle between the former camps and the secular elite in the 1990s, the last part shifts its attention to Turkey’s political and economic positioning vis-à-vis the West and the wider world, with a specific focus on the post-Cold War structure.

1.1. Export-oriented industrialisation and emerging centres of economic power

One of the main structural changes that had far flung economic, political, and societal effects in Turkey is the neo-liberalisation of the Turkish economy and the export oriented growth and development model that was adopted in 1980. Beginning with the one-party era of the Republic (1923-1946), the development strategy of Turkey was characterised by a high degree of state ‘interventionism and protectionism’, which had significant impacts on the formation of a bourgeoisie and the ‘private-sector development’ in general (Buğra 1998: 523). State-planned economic development was based on the principle of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) with regards to big industries, most of which were owned and run by the state and by a few large conglomerates. The latter secured almost monopolistic positions through their ‘particularistic and informal relations with political authorities’ (ibid.). A large agricultural sector in Anatolia constituted the bulk of economic output, whereas the domestically oriented manufacturing sector remained rather underdeveloped and concentrated in few urban centres. The volume of exports, composed mainly of agricultural products, was

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77 See, Buğra (1994) for a thorough analysis on state-business relations in the modern economic history of Turkey.
quite limited. In general, the country’s economy was rather inward looking and not closely integrated to foreign markets.\footnote{For a detailed account on the pre-1980 Turkish economic structure, see Öniş (1998).}

The depicted economic structure and especially strong state-control over the market meant that owning big businesses and accumulating capital were privileges enjoyed by a few with close ties to the secular Republican state elite. These business elites were mainly concentrated in Istanbul and some of the other urban centres mainly in the West of the country. Transition to a multi-party system and the government change from the Republican People’s Party \textit{(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP)} to the right-wing and pro-business, pro-landowner Democratic Party \textit{(Demokrat Parti, DP)} did not alter the imbalance between “heartlands of Anatolia” and the urban centres regarding ownership of capital. As the economy continued to be characterised by isolation from external markets and strong state control, the nepotistic relationships between the private sector and state elites remained unchanged (Demir et. al. 2004: 168). There were attempts to create employment-generating productive investments in provincial areas of Turkey through channelling migrant workers’ remittances into small enterprises owned by multiple shareholders such as the project of Turkish Workers Companies (TWCs) in the 1970s. However, TWCs failed to generate an alternative economic activity to agriculture in Anatolia and to spread manufacturing out to provincial centres.\footnote{See, Chapter 4.}

Following subsequent economic crises and during the politically chaotic atmosphere of the late 1970s, Turgut Özal, the name to shape Turkey’s political economy, was appointed as the Acting Head of the State Planning Organisation \textit{(Devlet Planlama Teşkilati, DPT)} and the Deputy Under-Secretary of the Prime Minister. Özal, who worked as a technocrat for the World Bank for two years in the early 1970s, and who had a very clear pro-market and liberal approach to the economy was charged with the duty and authority of designing and implementing the 24 January 1980 reform programme (Öniş 2004). Drawing on conventional recipes for economic liberalisation and integration, the programme prescribed reducing the degree of state intervention, protection, and ownership, and the share of the public sector in the economy. It also designated privatisation and free market competition as remedies to
overcome the “efficiency” problem. An EOI model was adopted replacing the decades-long ISI model. Trade liberalisation constituted one of the major changes in the aftermath of 1980.

Özal became the first civilian Prime Minister in the post-military coup era after his centre-right Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) got the majority of votes in the 1983 elections. ANAP governed as a single party until 1989. Hence, Turkey’s neoliberal economic restructuring continued at full pace under the single leadership of Özal and his team of ‘a select group of young, highly trained and internationally oriented bureaucrats’ (Öniş 2004: 121). The 1980s witnessed privatisation of state enterprises, liberalisation of finance and capital, establishment of Istanbul Stock Exchange Market, along with other neoliberal measures. In line with its EOI strategy, Turkey stepped up its search for markets for its exports and attempted to enhance its trade relations with non-European markets. Among the latter, particularly the Middle East and the Soviet Union were targeted in the 1980s (Kirişçi 2009: 44). These attempts bore fruit and in Turkey’s export volume grew from US $ 2.9 billion to US $ 12.9 billion between 1980 and 1989 (Karadag 2010: 14). In addition, the strategy of opening up to external markets through contracting firms in the construction sector targeted the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries and later spread to the Soviet Union from mid-1980s onwards (İçduygu 2009b: 5).

Intensified economic activity towards neighbouring markets substantially contributed to the emergence of an “export-bourgeoisie” in the 1980s (Cizre Sakallıoğlu & Yeldan 2000: 493). Mainly as a result of growing trade connections with these regions, the incipient Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) grew especially in ‘Inner Anatolian towns’ and ‘managed to establish themselves as significant exporters of manufactures to the world market, while at the same time receiving little or no subsidy from the state’ (Öniş 1997: 759). More than 500,000 such Anatolian-based SMEs were established in the period between 1983 and 2000. They constituted almost 90 per cent of manufacturing firms in Turkey in 1990 (Hoşgör 2011: 345). Due to their organisation along familial lines, a tendency to informally employ cheap unskilled labour, and small but adaptable production systems, these firms were highly compatible with ‘the rapidly expanding ‘flexible production system’’ (Cizre Sakallıoğlu & Yeldan 2000: 499). In addition, while being based in inner Anatolia, these enterprises had ‘direct and (indirect) transnational connections’ (Hoşgör 2011: 344).

80 See (Benli Altunışık and Tür 2004: 77-86), for a general overview and a concise account on the neoliberalisation of economy in Turkey starting from the 1980s.
This newly emerging bourgeoisie mainly belonged to the segments of society that benefited least or suffered most from strong state control over the economy. Hence, its members were extremely liberal and pro-market in their approach to market-state dynamics. Apart from their neo-liberal outlook, a considerable section of this emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie also shared a conservative value system and ‘Islamic orientation’ (Öniş 1997: 759). East and South East Asian Tiger economies and their mode of capitalism with communitarian tinges constituted a model for this group (ibid. 760). The Anatolian SME phenomenon was called the ‘Anatolian tigers’, or ‘Islamic capital’, referring to the East Asian Tiger connection, their speedy emergence as a new economic power centre, their geographical location, and their conservative and pro-Islam stance (Hoşgör 2011, Demir et.al. 2004).

The opportunity provided by trade liberalisation and the entry of Saudi capital into the Turkish economy through “interest free banks” facilitated the rather fast capital accumulation of Anatolian Tigers during the late 1980s and particularly the 1990s. Religious orders and communities catalysed these businesses’ growth not only through mobilising the idea of ‘Islamic economic rejuvenation’, but also through providing capital and constituting customer bases (Hoşgör 2011: 344-346). The development of transnational links between Anatolian capital and emigrants was also important. Emigrants, particularly those in Germany provided the Anatolian bourgeoisie with additional financial resources through informally channelling remittances into flourishing SMEs (Öniş 1997: 758; Hoşgör 2011: 345).

These developments contributed to a gradual accumulation of “Anatolian” capital and the emergence of a new centre of economic power apart from Istanbul. Actors around this new economic power centre organised around The Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, MÜSİAD) in 1990. The MÜSİAD was conceived as a challenger and an alternative to the organisation of the urban, hitherto dominant economic elite proximate to secular state elites: the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD), established in 1971. In opposition to the “communitarian” capitalism approach of MÜSİAD and its orientation towards East Asian and Islamic economies, TÜSİAD pushed for Turkey’s

81 While the general tendency has been to categorise the SME-based Anatolian bourgeoisie as ‘Islamic’ or ‘Green’ in its totality, there were large segments that did not have an Islamic orientation (Öniş 1997; Hoşgör 2011). However, the sections that were important for the upcoming political change were those belonging to Islamic business solidarity circles and supporting political Islamist parties.
economic and political integration with Europe highlighting the importance of such integration for ‘economic prosperity and consolidation of liberal democracy’ (Öniş 1997: 760). Both organised business interests became parties to the clash between the secular establishment and political Islam that marked the second half of the 1990s, which will be discussed in Section 1.3.

1.2. Atatürkist nationalism and the changing status of Islam within national identity

Starting from the inception of the Republic in 1923, the nation-building project had difficulties to deal with the demographic and societal legacies of the Ottoman Empire. The founders and elites of the Republic aimed to create a prototypical modern territorial nation-state with its monolithic ‘state-bearing’ Turkish nation (Brubaker 1996: 46). The incongruity between this desired nation and the country’s ethno-linguistically and religiously diverse resident population constituted a challenge. Another major problem stemmed from the minimised public presence and societal influence the Kemalist elite designated for Islam, and its continuing salience for large sections of society. Third, largely as a legacy of the process of the Ottoman Empire’s disintegration, the Republican elite was overly sensitive about territorial integrity and the centralised structure of the state. This focus on “indivisibility” was closely related to the ‘Sèvres syndrome’ (Kirişçi 2006). The syndrome signified the state’s ‘perception of imminent threat’ (Özkırımlı 2011: 98) from foreign states ‘conspiring to weaken and carve up Turkey’ just like they did to the Ottoman Empire with the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 (Kirişçi 2006: 32-33). The state perceived similar threats from internal societal groups that it regarded as potential secret allies of those conspiring foreign states (Özkırımlı 2011). Fourth, while suspicious of foreign “Great Powers”, the Republican elite also strongly adopted the model of Western modernisation for societal change and development, and unequivocally oriented the state towards Euro-Atlantic political and economic alliances.

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82 See, Buğra (1998), for a comparative analysis of MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD in terms of their activities directed at generating cohesion among their constituencies as ‘members of class’ with shared interests and worldview, and their efforts to shape broader social, political, economic development model of the country.

83 The early Republican elite laid the foundations of these principles. They constituted the gist of dominant Kemalist official ideology for almost eighty years and were shared and defended by “the secular establishment”. The Turkish Armed Forces has always been the predominant actor within the Kemalist-official nationalist stronghold. Nevertheless, the ‘secular power elite’ comprised a wider range of political actors and institutions: The CHP, the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), a splinter party from the former with accentuated secularist and Kemalist nationalist tones, the pro-secular big businesses, high-level judiciary and bureaucratic cadres that were educated and socialised in harmony with the laicist-Kemalist value-system (Cizre 2008).
As Keyman (2011: 31) aptly summarises: for the builders of the modern Turkish nation-state, ‘nationalism functioned as a dominant state ideology in linking modernity, security, and Westernization through the construction of a homogeneous and secular national identity’. One of the constitutive pillars of ‘official nationalism’, or Atatürkist nationalism is the non-negotiable principle of ‘the state's indivisible identity with the country and the nation’ (Bora 2011: 64). Secularism, understood not as the reciprocal non-intervention and autonomy of religion and the state, but largely as the state’s control over the content, boundaries, and public visibility of religion is the other constitutive pillar. The top-down creation of a secular state with a secular society was seen as one of the requirements for transforming Turkey into a modern nation-state. However, as far as the society was concerned, it mainly led to the increasingly sharper secular versus religious cleavage and matching ‘deep-seated divisions’ along the lines of ‘modern versus traditional, progressive versus conservative, and rationalist versus religious’ (Yavuz 1997: 64).

As a result of these “sensitivities” and “red lines”, official nationalism traditionally regarded ethnic identities challenging its vision of a homogeneous nation, i.e., Kurds, as threatening the indivisibility of the country and the nation. It also viewed politicised Islamic identity or Islamic interpretations crossing officially tolerable boundaries as threatening the state’s secular foundations. The official understanding of Islam did not leave much room for voicing non-Sunni sectarian identities, such as the recognition claims of the Alevi minority. Within the Cold War context, the “communist threat” was added to the top-ranking sensitivities of the state (Yeğen 2011: 233). When it was faced with rising leftist mobilisation in the late 1960s and 1970s, the communist threat became the primary concern of the Turkish state. As Kurdish movements emerged initially within the general framework of left-wing opposition in the 1970s, their mobilisation was also seen as part of the “communist menace” (Yeğen 2011: 236).

When the military junta took over the control of the country in September 1980, it attacked and repressed all these societal elements, and most strongly those on the left. Who the targeted sections of society were can be clearly discerned from the justification of the coup

84 Ultra-nationalist groups such as the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar) closely affiliated with the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) emerged as the main actors aiming to purge Turkey of communists since the mid-1960s. The whole right-wing spectrum, including ‘conservative Islamic circles’, shared the strongly anti-communist stance (Poulton 1997b: 139), even though the ultra-nationalists served as the main combatant against the Left. The fact that MHP sympathisers dominated the security forces in the 1970s was telling regarding the state’s position (Nell 2008: 126).
d’état that read: ‘destructive and separatist forces … have put the life and property of citizens in danger … promoting reactionary and other perverted ideologies … that have brought us to the brink of division and civil war’ (Pope & Pope 1997: 143). In the aftermath, the junta heavily curtailed political and associational rights, heavily suppressed political activists, and barred the leaders of pre-coup political parties from political activity for five to ten years (Tachau & Heper 1983: 31).\textsuperscript{85}

The generals behind the coup introduced Islam as an accentuated source of identity and cement for the Turkish society. Despite their self-attributed role as the custodians of the secularist Turkish state, the military and its civilian allies injected Islam into society through ‘opening new Qur’anic Schools (Kuran Kurslari), making religious courses compulsory, and employing new preachers (imams)’ (Yavuz 1997: 67). These measures constituted a defence-line against Kurdish nationalism, leftist-Alevi movement and the leftist-communist threat for the state elite. The elite aimed to ‘co-opt socially powerful Islamic movements’, whose advent from the periphery towards the centre was already visible in the 1970s (Yavuz 2003: 38). The core military elite, together with the Directorate of Religious Affairs (\textit{Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı}, DIB) managed to develop the notion of “Turkish nationalist Islam” or an “Islamic Turkish nationalism”, and introduce it into the socio-political domain (ibid.: 69-75).\textsuperscript{86}

On the civilian political front, Önal and ANAP, drawing on both their Islamist roots and neoliberal leaning, managed to develop a ‘hybrid ideology’ based on ‘liberalism, conservatism with strong Islamist connotations, nationalism and welfarism’ (Öniş 2004: 117). This hybrid ideology appealed to both peripheralised conservative constituencies and secular elites with an economically liberal outlook. The Önal period witnessed the integration of religious-conservative businessmen into the economic sphere. It was also marked by the expansion of the social sphere as to include religious orders, Islamic intellectuals, and a growing body of Islam-oriented private associations, educational institutions, and media

\textsuperscript{85} Hence, Önal enjoyed a quite advantageous political atmosphere with no major political rivals to challenge his ANAP until the lifting of the bans as a result of a referendum in 1987.

\textsuperscript{86} The military-engineered Islamic Turkish nationalism largely drew on the ideology of ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’. The latter was developed by nationalist-conservative intellectual circles in the 1960s and 1970s as an ‘antithesis’ that could weaken the damaging effects of communist and socialist ideas on Turkish society (Bilir 2004: 262-264). As the ‘national culture’ suggested by these intellectuals was based on an amalgamation of ‘Kemalism, nationalism and Islam’, the military elites considered it as fit for the state’s secularist sensitivities (ibid. 263).
organs. Consequently, non-state actors of a broader range gained societal visibility and better access to state actors in this period.\textsuperscript{87}

Leading conservative figures of ANAP contributed to the wider adoption of a Turkish-Islamic identity and a rapprochement with the Ottoman socio-cultural legacy in the 1980s and 1990s. Özal and a circle of journalists, academicians, and intellectuals around him, called ‘neo-Ottomanists’ or the ‘Second Republicans’, started to express their discontent with the Kemalist understanding of nation.\textsuperscript{88} This questioning also developed as a response to the rising Kurdish political mobilisation and the Kurdish Workers’ Party (\textit{Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan}, PKK)’s launching of its armed struggle against the Turkish military in 1984. They argued that the official monolithic Turkish national identity needed to be replaced by an understanding that recognises ethnic and linguistic differences that make up the nation, while taking advantage of Islam as the common denominator and as a cohesive factor (Ataman 2002: 129-133). They attempted to ‘de-ethnicise’ (Joppke 2005) the definition of Turkishness by promoting an alternative conceiving it as ‘a construct for and by Anatolian, Balkan, and Caucasian Muslim populations on the basis of their common Ottoman experience’ (Yavuz 1998: 37).

\textbf{1.3. Power struggle in identitarian clothes: The secular establishment versus political Islam}

In the context of the changes in the economic and societal domains, the 1990s witnessed the rise of Islamist actors in conventional politics, both at the local and national level. Other ‘excluded peripheral identities’ (İçduygu et.al 1999: 203) that were denied recognition and pushed out of the public sphere by the official nationalist doctrine, i.e., Kurds and Alevis, also stepped up their organised mobilisation in search for recognition in the 1990s. Mobilisation among expatriates who subscribed to and actively shaped these agendas added a rather strong transnational dimension to the contention between the state and dissident movements.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{87} See, Yavuz (2003: 104-131) for the flourishing of private educational institutions, public theological high schools, and media outlets belonging to various religious communities in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These changes in the realms of education and media played significant roles in the re-entry of Islam to the public sphere and in the development of political Islam (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{88} See, Ataman (2002: 141) and (Ciddi 2009: 104-105) for the major actors within this intellectual movement, their criticisms towards the Kemalist nation-building project, and their arguments for devising a new national identity modeled on the Ottoman millet system.

\textsuperscript{89} The transnational dimension will be further analysed in Chapter 4.
The intensifying conflict between the secular establishment and Islamists, the armed conflict between the military and the PKK, and the draconian measures taken by the state on the Kurdish issue deepened the continuous political crises in the 1990s. Augmented by recurrent economic crises in 1991, 1994, and 1998-99, a total of eleven unstable and short-lived coalition governments were formed in the period between June 1991 and November 2002. As the secular establishment’s attack on political Islam was determinative for the emergence and rise of the AKP in the 2000s, the focus of this section will be on this aspect.

In 1970, the first Turkish political party with an Islamist agenda emerged out of the National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi, MGH) led by Necmettin Erbakan. Its constituency was predominantly based on the small business owners and shopkeepers in inner Anatolian towns (Öniş 1997: 757). The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) was established as the successor in 1983. It had a similar electoral and financial support base, this time among the conservative Anatolian bourgeoisie, organised locally and nationally through the MÜSİAD. The impoverished and disadvantaged sections in both rural and urban areas constituted the RP’s main voter base (ibid.: 748). It also received considerable financial and political support from Islamic organisations set up by the emigrants in Western Europe, such as the Islamic Community Milli Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş, IGMG).

The RP started to gain power initially at local-municipal levels in the early 1990s. It acquired 19 per cent of the total votes in the 1994 municipal elections and won the municipalities of Ankara and Istanbul. A feedback loop between local governments and local capital fed into the gradual scaling up of both Islam-oriented capital and political power from the local to the national level in the early 1990s (Demir et.al 2004: 172-173). At the national level, the RP increased its votes from 4.4 in 1984 to 21.4 per cent in 1995, and won the majority of the seats in the parliament. It formed a coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) in 1996, which made Erbakan the first ever openly Islamist prime minister.

90 The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) established by Erbakan in 1970 was the first one of such parties, closed down by the Constitutional Court as being in violation of the secular principles in 1971. It was re-established as the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) in 1972, which was banned by the junta in 1980.

91 See Chapter 4.

92 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, current President of Turkey, was the RP candidate for the mayor of Istanbul in the 1994 election. His term as mayor between 1994 and 1998 is seen as the first big jump of his political career.

93 See Gülalp 1999, and Yavuz 1997 for analyses on the evolution of political Islam in Turkey, and particularly on the RP. See Öniş 1997, and Birtek & Toprak (1993) for an analysis of the connections between neoliberal
The secular establishment attempted to hinder the rise of Islamist economic and political power centres through a series of measures in the second half of the 1990s, during what is known as the “28 February Process”. The “soft-coup” staged by the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi, MGK), the political instrument of the military, forced the RP-led coalition government to resign on 28 February 1997. The secular power centre attacked Anatolian-Islamic capital and various Islamic communities and foundations. The army and other bureaucratic cadres were cleansed of the blacklisted Islamists. Islamic political identity was stigmatised as ‘reactionary’ and securitised by the joint efforts of secular establishment, business organisations like TÜSİAD, and big media conglomerates close to these circles (Yavuz 2003).94

The involvement of the military in Turkish politics grew further after 1997. As the MGK assumed the responsibility to ‘reconfigure Turkish politics within the secular parameters it ha[d] unilaterally set, democracy [was] reduced to a series of power games devoid of representative or responsive potential’ (Cizre Sakallıoğlu & Yeldan 2000: 497). Within this context, the RP-successor Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) had to moderate its Islamist discourse, and tone down its explicit antagonism against the military, “the West” and the EU.95

1.4. Positioning Turkey in the post-Cold War structure: Foreign policy beyond the West?

The reading of the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution by the early Republican elite left its imprints on Turkey’s foreign policy line in several ways. First, the elite contended that the expansionist attempts of the late Empire caused its territorial shrinking and eventual collapse. Primarily concerned by creating a nation-state on what is left in the Republic’s hands in terms of territory, early Republican elites followed a pacifist, strictly non-expansionist, and rather introverted foreign policy line. A strong commitment to respecting other states’ territorial sovereignty and expecting an equal degree of respect from them constituted the backbone of

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94 On the measures targeting the movement’s organisational power, and particularly aiming at the weakening of the Islamic bourgeoisie, see, Hosgör 2011: 351-353.
that line. Second, the continued prominence of the Sèvres syndrome meant that foreign policy remained as a domain that was largely shaped by concerns about potential threats to “national security”. This one-sided realpolitik lens made foreign policy making a prerogative of a narrow and impenetrable circle of actors from the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (Kirişçi 2006: 32).

In addition to this ‘defensive approach’, Kemalist foreign policy was also characterised by ‘an unequivocal orientation toward the West’ (Öniş 2001: 66). With Turkey becoming a NATO member in 1952, the political-security alliance with the West gained a highly institutionalised form. Turkey applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 in order to integrate its economy with the western markets. The two parties signed the Ankara Association Agreement four years later. The agreement foresaw further economic integration and left the door open for future political integration.

Domestic economic neoliberalisation and the deeply changing international political conjuncture during the last two decades of the 20th century led to changes in certain aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy. First, Özal approached Turkey’s relationship with the European Union (EU) mainly from an economic integration perspective, as he regarded trade liberalisation as a prerequisite for creating a competitive domestic industry. Hence, Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987, while knowing that chances for political integration were scant (Öniş 2004: 119). Although the European Commission rejected Turkey’s full membership in 1989, the Customs Union between the two parties came into force in 1996.

Second, the pragmatic economic liberalism of Özal governments led to a closer linkage between business interests, economic pursuits, and foreign policy formulation (Kirişçi 2006). Özal pioneered the practice of including large business delegations into top governmental officials’ diplomatic visits to foreign states in order to seal business deals (Kirişçi 2009: 44). New bureaucracies such as the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade (Hazine ve Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı) got established. 97 State-business cooperation particularly with regards to foreign trade and investment was institutionalised through newly established bodies

96 Atatürk’s famous saying of ‘Peace at Home, Peace Abroad’ is generally seen as the trademark of the pacifist, introvert, isolationist foreign policy (Murinson 2006: 946).
97 The Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade was established under the Prime Ministry in 1983. The two sections were separated in 1994. For further details, see, http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=tarihce
like the Foreign Economic Relations Board (Dİş Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu, DEIK). These actors and institutions acquired a relatively bigger say in foreign policy making, even though the military and the MFA remained crucial.

Third, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc had significant implications for Turkey’s self-positioning vis-à-vis the Western and the non-Western world. With the end of bipolarity, Turkey found itself in a position of having been stripped from its allure as the geostrategic ally of the West and particularly as an outpost of the US (Sayari 2000). Turkey’s hitherto held conviction as part of the Western state system and as ‘a Western nation’ was shaken as ‘[i]t became bitterly clear that affiliation with the anti-communist alliance in the framework of NATO membership was at the heart of Turkey's perception as part of the West’ (Taşpınar 2005: 89). Its political relations with the EU were rather strained in the early 1990s mainly due to serious democratic deficits of Turkey, its military response to the Kurdish issue, and serious human rights violations (Pope & Pope 1997). The 1993 Copenhagen Summit disappointed Turkey once again, when the Union declared that its priority was the membership of the CEE countries. These developments cast doubts on the political authorities’ perception that Turkey was an integral part of the Western alliance.

The end of the Cold War was also marked by fundamental transformations affecting Turkey’s approach towards the non-Western front. Turkey intensified its economic relations with the MENA region and the Soviet Union already by the late 1980s. This opening was a slight deviation from the predominantly Western orientation in foreign political and economic terms. This economic opening was driven by the need to access additional non-Western markets within the economic liberalisation context. With the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, a massive geography from the Western Balkans to Central Asia, with which the Turkish state had very limited interaction for the most part of the century, opened up in front of it. This geopolitical change created a conviction that Turkey could gain economic and political

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98 DEIK is a specialisation board under the mandate of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB). It was established in 1986 on the directive of Özal, aiming deeper integration of the Turkish economy into global economy primarily through assisting member businesses to reach out to foreign markets and facilitating the inflow of foreign investment into the country. DEIK business councils linking Turkish businesses with foreign counterparts grew numerically and expanded geographically in time. Whereas interest was limited to promote relations with American, Japanese, and European businesses in the initial years, emphasis was placed on Eurasian, MENA, and Gulf regions in the 1990s. For further details, see the DEIK webpage: http://en.deik.org.tr/287/DeikHakkinda.html.

99 See, Hale (2000) on Turkey’s efforts to boost its foreign trade potential, to establish the economy-foreign policy link, and to diversify its trade relations in the period between 1980 and 2000.
influence in these regions, if it could market its Turco-Islamic face in addition to its parliamentary democracy and liberal economy (Öniş 2001: 67-68).

Öniş & Yılmaz (2009: 16) aptly summarised Turkey’s post-Cold War foreign policy orientation as ‘a swing of the pendulum in the direction of Euro-Asianism in periods of disappointment and weakening of relations with the European Union’. Against the background of strained relations with Europe that Turkey read also as a manifestation of its contested Western identity in the 1990s, Euro-Asianism gained heightened importance. This was particularly the case with regards to Azerbaijan and the “Turkic” Republics in Central Asia. The Turkish state tried hard to mobilise the rediscovered “kinship” link in order to gain comparative advantage in accessing markets and acquiring political influence vis-à-vis Russia and Iran. It also attempted to use its moderate Islamic understanding, secularism, and liberal economy as selling points to get the support of the US and Europe in its Central Asian endeavour (Öniş 2001).

The deployment of this complementary strategy of engaging with non-Western markets, states, peoples, and regions aimed at meeting two major objectives of Turkey’s post-Cold War foreign policy: ‘to maintain its geostrategic importance in global politics’ and ‘to fuel its strategy of export-based economic growth’ (Sayari 2000: 180). The entry of Turkish-Islamic nationalist discourses into circulation and the promotion of neo-Ottomanist model for Turkey’s national identity were partly shaped by the aspirations of positioning Turkey as the centre and the leader of a vast “Turkish world” encompassing the Balkans as well as Central Asia. Hence, the state utilised this readjusted narrative of the nation and how it related to the world beyond its borders for these incipient attempts of developing a multidimensional foreign policy. The accentuated emphasis on Islam and the association with Turkey’s Sunni Ottoman roots started to become part of the foreign policy toolbox in the post-Cold War era. Intertwined with his economic opening-out and liberalisation project, Özal particularly promoted the narrative with an effort to project an image of the state for the regional and “Eastern” audiences. Forging connections through the use of Ottoman, Islamic, and Turkic

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100 See, Chapter 5 for a more elaborated examination of these dynamics, and an analysis of the ways in which Turkey attempted to mobilise these links.

101 This “Turkish world” which stretches from ‘the Adriatic Sea to Central Asia’ was a construct of Özal, which became a cliché that was adopted by many other politicians especially in the first half of the 1990s. See Chapter 5, for the use of such constructed discourses in the state’s efforts to identify a wide range of populations as belonging to its transborder kin universe.
references for foreign political and economic pursuits has remained an integral part of the shared imaginary of the conservative-neoliberal elites.

2. CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL NARRATIVE, ECONOMIC ASPIRATIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION: 2002 ONWARDS

This section provides an account of the major changes as regards economic and foreign political orientation of Turkey as well as the conception of nationhood and predominant nationalist narrative during the AKP era. It focuses on the implications of the major elite change for the reconfiguration of the defining characteristics of the nation. The section then examines the identitarian, political, and economic re-positioning of the state vis-a-vis the West, its non-Western neighbourhood, and the wider world. Finally it discusses the ways in which the new elite constructs Turkey as the antithesis of its pro-Western Kemalist version and prioritises Ottoman-Islamic sources of identity as well as neoliberal values in its nationalist narrative.

2.1. The origins and coming of power of the AKP

The AKP emerged from within the MGH-line Islamist cadres following the turbulent political context of the late 1990s. Former Prime Minister and now president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, former foreign minister, and president Abdullah Gül, and deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, the founders and prominent figures of the AKP, represented the pro-reform section within the MGH. The Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP), also established in 2001 as the successor of the FP, continued to follow the mainstream Erbakan line. The divide between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘reformists’ went back to the 1980s. In addition to differences about framing the party ideology explicitly as Islamist, these two wings also diverged on their approach to economy. The traditionalists had a rather statist approach to economic development, whereas the reformists adopted a strongly liberal economic stance (Gümüşçu and Sert 2009).

The party dissociated itself from the traditional MGH line and refrained from presenting itself as a splinter-party. Striking parallels with the Christian democrat parties in Europe, the AKP defined itself as a “conservative democratic” party. The founders deliberately distanced the party from the ‘Islamist’ label. This was done by underscoring its pro-liberal democracy position, its declared commitment for EU membership, and its condemnation of the
homogenising and marginalising elite attitude towards diverse cultural, religious and ethnic identities (Kirişçi 2006: 23-24). Through underlining ‘its socially conservative Muslim-Turkish and economically liberal project’ (Yavuz 2003: 250), the AKP managed to gain wide support among the Anatolian bourgeoisie. Particularly MUSIAD financially and substantially supported the party (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009: 963-966).

Taking place in the aftermath of the worst-ever economic crisis in Turkey’s history in 2001, the 2002 parliamentary elections marked a rupture. Only two parties, the AKP and the CHP managed to surpass the 10 per cent threshold in the elections. Major centre-right parties of the previous period such as the ANAP and the DYP were left out of parliament and disappeared from the political scene in the post-2002 period. The nationalist MHP also remained under the threshold, although it managed to stage a comeback in the 2007 elections. The Kurdish movement entered the election with Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP), but failed to get into the parliament.\footnote{Due to the threshold, 46% of the total votes were completely left out of parliament in this election. Hence, the AKP’s 34% electoral share was translated into 66% of the seats in the parliament, while the CHP won 19% of the votes but acquired 34% of the seats.}

The AKP formed a single-party government in its first term between 2002 and 2007 with an absolute majority in the parliament. It has been ruling as a single party government since then, while increasing its votes to 46.58 per cent in 2007 (corresponding to 62 per cent of the seats) and to 49.90 per cent in 2011 (corresponding to 54 per cent of the seats).\footnote{For the statistics on past parliamentary elections, see ‘General Parliamentary Elections Archive’ of the Supreme Election Board (Yükse Kayıtlı Seçim Kurulu, YSK), available online, at: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/faces/GenelSecimler?_adf.ctrl-state=7qxxtvzw_53&wcnav.model=YSKUsuMenu&_afrLoop=36130431245985727}

It declared democratisation and a full commitment to EU membership as its priorities during its first term in government. ‘Reducing the power of traditional centres of power, spearheaded by the military’ was given utmost importance (Cizre 2008: 1). Thanks to its numerical majority, the government speedily passed reforms for reducing the military’s role in politics, creating a socio-political atmosphere relatively more accommodating towards cultural and ethno-linguistic diversity and religious freedoms. The European Commission concluded that Turkey had made considerable progress in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria in its 2004 Progress Report, and the European Council decided that official accession negotiation process could start from October 2005 onwards (Kirişçi 2006: 24). Turkey’s objective of EU membership has rhetorically remained a top priority item. Nevertheless, foreign policy
analysts distinguished the period between 2002 and 2005, from that between 2005 and 2007. In the former period, the government explicitly declared full membership as its top foreign policy priority and fully committed itself to meet the criteria in practice, whereas reforms slowed down and the commitment faded away in the latter.\textsuperscript{104}

2.2. Expanding Turkey’s economic and political network coverage beyond the West

When the AKP took over the government in 2002, Turkey was already in the recovery and restructuring process after the 2001 economic crisis, under the auspices of the IMF and the WB. The financial system was radically restructured and disciplined, public spending was reduced, privatisation was speeded up, and measures to create suitable conditions to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) were taken.\textsuperscript{105} In the first term of the AKP government, Turkey’s GDP per capita, the level of FDI, and both its exports and imports grew steadily and considerably (\textsuperscript{Öniş} & \textsuperscript{Kutlay} 2013).

Traditionally fragmented business organisations unified in their support for the new government’s commitment for economic and political reforms and its bid for EU membership. As the Anatolian bourgeoisie was specifically interested in Middle Eastern and Central Asian markets due to ‘geographical proximity and cultural factors’, it pressed the government to reformulate its foreign and economic policy vis-à-vis these regions (\textsuperscript{Kutlay} 2011: 76-77).\textsuperscript{106} As the Anatolian-Islamic capital ‘constitutes the backbone of the AKP’ (\textsuperscript{Öniş} 2011: 65), its influence on the government’s economic foreign policy direction was considerable. According to \textsuperscript{Kirişçi} (2009: 43), the role of ‘export-oriented Anatolian Tigers as constituencies seeking markets abroad’ was crucial in the government’s “opening” to new regions on its East, South and North.

\textsuperscript{104} In the meantime, expectations for a solution in Cyprus based on the island’s reunification as suggested by the “Annan Plan” fizzled out following the no vote in the Greek Cypriot referendum in 2004. Cyprus’ subsequent EU accession created the increasingly popular perception that Turkey’s membership will never get realised (\textsuperscript{Öniş} 2007: 254). The fact that Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy continued to emphasise their preference for ‘privileged partnership’ even after the kick-off of accession negotiations and the rather unbalanced representation of these views in the Turkish media added to the increasing disbelief (\textsuperscript{Öniş} 2011: 54). Public opinion support for EU membership was 74 % in 2002; 50 % in 2006-2007 (\textsuperscript{Öniş} and \textsuperscript{Yılmaz} 2009: 14), and around 40 % in 2009 (\textsuperscript{Öniş} 2011: 64).

\textsuperscript{105} See, \textsuperscript{Yeldan} (2007) for a critical examination of the post-crisis restructuring measures within the framework of the IMF stand-by agreement.

\textsuperscript{106} \textsuperscript{Öniş} adds North Africa, Russia, and the broader post-Soviet space to the markets of interest for the Anatolian capital (\textsuperscript{Öniş} 2011: 56).
State and non-state actors from the economic domain became more influential in shaping foreign policy agendas, with the gradual weakening of the military’s say in politics and as a follow-up on the trend that started to emerge during the Özal period. Several bureaucracies such as the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade (Diş Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, DTM) and the ministries of Economy, Energy, Trade, and Transportation gained considerable leverage in foreign policy agenda setting and formulation especially in the last decade (Kirişçi & Kaptanoğlu 2011: 712). This was mainly caused by the prioritisation of foreign trade, outward investment and overseas contracting in Turkey’s growth and development strategy. Semi-private bodies like the TOBB and the DEIK also featured as actors that increased their agenda and priority setting abilities in the realm of foreign policy. Similar dynamics also worked on the advantage of business associations like the TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD, Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu, TUSKON), the Turkish Exporters Assembly (Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi, TIM), the International Transporters Association (Uluslararası Nakliyeciler Derneği, UND) and the Turkish Contractors Association (Türkiye Müteahhîtiler Birliği, TMB) (Ibid). In short, during the 2000s, Turkey’s foreign policy increasingly reflected business and commercial interests and it was geared towards fostering economic interdependence. Drawing on Rosecrance (1986)’s concept of the ‘trading state’, Kirişçi (2009) argued that Turkey’s security-oriented defensive foreign policy was being replaced by ‘the foreign policy of a ‘trading state’’.

While influenced by this multitude of actors, Ahmet Davutoğlu devised the AKP’s main foreign policy lines from the inception of the government. A professor of international relations, Davutoğlu was the chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister between 2002 and 2009. He served as Foreign Minister from 2009 until September 2014, when he replaced Erdoğan as Prime Minister. The main premise of his approach was to diversify the dimensions of Turkey’s foreign policy and to enhance its soft power (Öniş & Yılmaz 2009).

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107 In 2011, the DTM got integrated into the newly established Ministry of Economy as part of an ‘institutional restructuring’ which was explained by the ‘need for Turkey to increase its export market share vis-à-vis its rivals within ever integrating global economy and world trade structure’. See, the ‘History’ section on the Ministry of Economy’s webpage, at: [http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=tarihce](http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=tarihce)

108 Note that the DTM, the Ministry of Trade and that of Economy, as well as TOBB and DEIK are also closely involved in the recent “entrepreneurial diaspora-making” project of the state (See Section 3.2). All these actors emphasise an understanding of economic growth based on global-scale trade and outward looking entrepreneurial activism. A more elaborate discussion on the entrepreneurial dimension of Turkey’s recent diaspora-making project will be provided in Chapter 4.
This formula had the potential to transform Turkey into a ‘benign regional power’ and potentially into a globally influential actor.

In his book entitled the ‘Strategic Depth’, Davutoğlu lays out the main tenets of the foreign policy that Turkey ought to follow to become a central actor (Davutoğlu 2001). Potential sources of its soft power lie in its historical-cultural advantages deriving from its Ottoman past, its face as a Muslim country, its pivotal role in the making of the Ottoman-Islamic civilisation, and its geographical advantage stemming from its peculiar position in the midst of Eurasia and Africa. The former state elites rejected making use of this potential due to their hitherto mono-dimensional Euro-Atlantic orientation both in foreign political and in socio-political and cultural terms (ibid.). Hence, what Turkey needed to do was to ‘rediscover its historic and geographic identity and reassess its own position vis-à-vis regional and global issues’ (Murinson 2006: 953).

Increasing sociocultural, economic, commercial interaction and political dialogue primarily, but not exclusively, with Turkey’s neighbourhood was essential to enhance the soft power. In practice, Turkey tried to increase movement of people and goods through lifting visa restrictions and trade barriers. Activating links with populations identified as belonging to the Ottoman-Islamic cultural space and positioning Turkey as a focal point of attraction in the economic and cultural sense became significant tenets. As opposed to the traditionally reactive and introverted foreign policy, Davutoğlu’s foreign policy highlighted taking a pro-active stance on political developments beyond Turkey’s borders. While taking an active stance in regional issues, the state also needed to demonstrate its benign nature in order not to appear aggressive, mal-intentioned, and imperialistic. Hence, it was crucial for Turkey to establish friendly and peaceful neighbourly relations, take initiative in mediating regional conflicts, and project a morally responsible image through increasing its humanitarian and development aid.109

109 The role of economics did not feature much in Davutoğlu’s 2001 analysis, apart from his statement about the need for countries that changed their economic strategy from IMI to EOI to prioritise economic interests in their foreign policy formulation (Kirişçi 2009: 42). Nevertheless, as a result of close interaction between the abovementioned business circles and the policy-makers, and increasing business influence on regional foreign policy-making, Kutlay (2011: 77) argued that ‘economy and trade’ became the major drivers of this ‘soft power activism’.

110 See, Davutoğlu (2008) for a first-hand account on Turkey’s foreign policy vision in the mid-late 2000s. For a concise account on the ‘zero problems with neighbours’ aspect, see Davutoğlu (2010, May 20). See Kirişçi (2006) for a very elaborate account on Turkey’s foreign policy approach in the early AKP period and its differences from the 1990s’ foreign policy regarding their main goals and means.
Successful results were reached in the economic realm, particularly by increasing the volume of foreign trade. For example, the total value of Turkey’s exports rose from US $ 36.1 billion in 2002 to US $ 107.3 billion in 2007, and to US $ 152.5 billion in 2012 (Öniş and Kutlay 2013: 1413). In addition to an increasing volume, the exports’ regional destination shifted. While the EU’s share in the total volume of exports decreased from 56% to 38% between 2002 and 2012, the share of Asia increased from 15% to 35.3% (ibid.: 1414). The positive economic outcomes contributed to the policy-makers’ conviction that Turkey should continue pursuing its ‘soft-power-driven regional power strategy’ (Öniş and Kutlay 2013: 1415). Political authorities and the mainstream media also regarded the increasing popularity of Turkish TV drama productions in the Middle East (Bilbassy 2010, April 2015) and the Balkans (Emin 2013), and the improved perception of Turkey both at the public and elite level in the Middle East (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012) as evidence to the success of the new formula.

Turkey’s efforts to construct itself as a ‘benign regional power’ in its region should also be considered within the post-9/11 global political context marked by increased Western sensitivity to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. From Turkey’s perspective, promoting an image of Muslim, secular, democratising, and economically growing Turkey bore potential to position it as a mediator between the Christian and Islamic worlds (Öniş 2003). Certain sections in the West also contributed to the development of such an image and the attribution of such an intermediary role. This was the case especially when the reforms resulted in the commencement of accession negotiations with the EU in 2005. A discernible section of the media and politicians in Europe, the US, as well as the Middle Eastern countries promoted the argument that Turkey could be a “model” for Arab regimes’ transformation and assume a role as an “intercultural” or ‘intercivilisational’ interlocutor. However, starting from the second term of the AKP in 2007, the reform process for EU membership stalled to a large extent. Consequently, arguments about the ‘shifting axis‘ of Turkey’s traditionally Western-oriented foreign policy towards a more (Middle) Eastern oriented one started to be voiced.

111 The total foreign trade volume showed a similar distributional pattern: At three measurement points of 2003, 2007, and 2010, the EU’s share decreased from 53.6% to 46.5%, and to 41.6% respectively. The share of Asia corresponding to these years increased from 18.8% to 24%, and to 29.3%, and the share of the Middle East increased from 8.5% to 10%, and to 12.9% (Kutlay 2011: 79).

112 See, Kıriççi (2006: 87-97) for an overview of these reactions underlining Turkey’s ability to be a Muslim, secular, and democratic model country. Most of these arguments highlighted the military’s diminished role, a moderate Islamist party’s ability to be elected and to stay in power, the state’s secular system, and its continuing EU commitment.

113 For an overview of the ‘axis shift’ debates and an argument for the strategic and pragmatically driven ‘Middle Easternization’ of Turkey’s post-2007 foreign policy line, see Öğuzlu (2008).
2.3. Increased assertiveness of the AKP in domestic politics and foreign policy

The AKP constituted a problem, if not a threat for the secular establishment, given the failed attempt of the establishment to “eradicate” political and economic Islamic centres of power. During the AKP’s first term in government, the secular establishment tried to keep the public perception of an Islamist threat alive through pointing at hidden agendas behind the AKP’s conservative democratic face. Çınar (2008: 113) demonstrated that the secular establishment’s strategy was mainly based on ‘immobilizing the government and restricting the political sphere to protect the ‘secularist’ gains of the 28 February process’.

The eve and the aftermath of the AKP’s landslide electoral victory in 2007 witnessed further strains of relations between the AKP and the military, the devout Kemalist president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the CHP, and the high echelons of the judiciary. The first crisis broke out in the context of the parliament’s election of the president in 2007. As the AKP majority in the parliament guaranteed the presidency of Abdullah Gül, the CHP applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the election.114 As the election of the president came to a deadlock, the AKP called for an early parliamentary election. After having increased its votes to 46.58 per cent, the government proposed constitutional amendments, which included the election of the president by popular vote. As the then-president Sezer blocked the amendments through consecutive vetoes, the government called for a referendum on the proposed amendments. The outcome of the October 2007 referendum was 68.95 per cent in favour.115

The second major attack from the secularist front came in 2008. The chief public prosecutor applied to the Constitutional Court for AKP’s closing down, on grounds of the party’s alleged anti-secular activities and declarations.116 While the Court decided in a tight vote not to close the AKP, it stated that this was a ‘serious warning’ to the party, and cut half of its public budget (Hürriyet Daily News, 31 July 2008). Having survived both attacks, the AKP considerably consolidated its power within the domestic realm.

114 Gül won 357 votes out of a total of 550 deputies in the first round. The CHP applied for annulment on the basis of a never-applied constitutional clause seeking a two-thirds majority (367) in the first round. The Court annulled the election, and the subsequent rounds were blocked due to the “367 rule”.

115 See, YSK’s Referendum Results archive, available online at: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/faces/HalkOylamasi?_adf.ctrl-state=k9arpvx4d_40&_afrLoop=36168390642405741&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=k9arpvx4d_46

116 The accusation about “anti-secular activities” was mainly related to the AKP’s proposal to change the constitution to allow wearing headscarves at public universities at the beginning of its second term (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009: 960).
In relation to the international level, the political and economic elites’ assessment of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis had implications for their degree of confidence and assertiveness. As the booming growth rates demonstrated, the conviction was that the Turkish economy survived the crisis with relatively little damage, whereas the BRICs came out of it even stronger. This strengthened Turkey’s conviction to emulate the BRICs in foreign political and economic domains especially after 2009 (Öniş 2011). Both political authorities and business circles increasingly highlighted that the centre of gravity of global economic, and hence political balance of power was shifting towards the East. This shift offered an opportunity for Turkey to realise its stepped up aspirations, that is, to enter the top ten biggest economies by the centenary of the Republic in 2023, and to transform the country into a global power.  

Turkey’s climbing up in the global economic ranking has constituted a highly visible and strongly underlined aspect of the post-2009 discourse. It has become an integral part of the frequently narrated vision of a completely transformed Turkey, to be achieved by meeting the ‘2023 targets’. Öniş & Kutlay (2013: 1420) interpreted the post-2009 understanding of economic development as an industrial strategy embodying elements of ‘a neo-developmental turn’, indicating an ‘implicit agenda of matching and even emulating East Asia’s developmental success’.

In 2009 Davutoğlu became Foreign Minister within this context. This meant that the strategy of capitalising Turkey’s Ottoman-Islamic face in order to augment political and economic power was now represented at the highest level. Turkey increasingly attempted to project a

117 See, for example, the March 2009 issue of the TOBB’s monthly magazine ‘Economic Forum’, and particularly the special report ‘Towards Global Power Turkey’ (TOBB 2009: 20-29), which was prepared within the context of the upcoming “World Turkish Entrepreneurs Congress” in 2009. For discourses specifically focusing on the changing global economic balances, shifting centre of gravity towards the East, and how Turkey can and should seize this opportunity to become one of the biggest ten economies, see, speeches delivered on 31 October 2013 at the Fifth Izmir Economic Congress, by Ali Babacan, Deputy Prime Minister in charge of macroeconomic strategy, available online, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69o2-vxXcZY; and by the then-Prime Minister Erdoğan, available online https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gh4j241Jeis. See, for an example on the diplomatic front, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s address to the young diplomats joining the ranks of the MFA, in which he assigned them the task of transforming Turkey into a global power, 22 April 2013, available online, at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-davutoglu-genc-nesil-turk-diplomatlarinin-misyonunun-turkiye-yi-kuresel-bir-guce-donusturmek-oldugunu-vurguladi.tr.mfa

118 See, the 2011 AKP Election Manifesto ‘Turkey is Ready: Target 2023’ (AK Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı 2015), particularly the section entitled ‘A Great Economy’, pp. 35-108. Making Turkey climb up the ladder from the 16th biggest economy to a member of the top ten (ibid.: 42), and increasing the per capita income from US $ 10,000 to US $ 25,000 (ibid.: 43) feature as the main goals. Other stated objectives were increasing the export volume to US $ 500 billion (ibid.: 43), the number of exporters from 50,000 to 100,000 (ibid.: 87), and the turnover of the overseas contracting companies from US $ 25 billion to US $ 100 billion (ibid.: 89). For the main points of the manifesto in English, see Today’s Zaman (18 April 2011).
self-image as a pivotal actor speaking for aggrieved populations that can boldly criticise the “double standards” applied by powerful states towards injustices and grievances these populations are subjected to. In the government’s discourse of a civilisational divide built on the dichotomies of East versus West, Islamic versus Christian, the defended aggrieved populations were predominantly Muslim, whereas the criticised powerful states were predominantly Western.

The narrative of the just and daring defender found its expression mainly in Erdoğan’s increasingly assertive rhetoric and matching attitude in front of Western audiences. At the conjunction of domestic, regional, and international political moves, these demonstrations also aimed to send messages to domestic and non-Western audiences. The 2009 “Davos outburst” of Erdoğan was exemplary of such rhetoric and attitude, which he has continued to deploy increasingly afterwards. His criticism towards the West has been largely built on pointing at the incompatibility between the Western claim of being the beacon for human rights and liberal democracy, and rising “Islamophobia” in these countries. In the post-2009 era, the AKP’s narrative of a bridge between the Eastern and Western worlds was to a large extent abandoned. It has been replaced by the narrative of Turkey as the inheritor and the leader of the Ottoman-Islamic “civilisational space”, clearly demarcated from and partly in conflict with Western civilisation.

2.4. Accentuating the difference and superiority of post-Kemalist Turkey

The AKP’s consolidation of power in domestic politics, Turkey’s high growth rates despite the global economic crisis, and its relatively increased popularity in the post-imperial cultural and political space boosted the elites’ self-confidence. The new political and economic elite successfully presented these developments as fundamental transformations. This was done by presenting the last decade under the rule of the AKP as a major rupture from the previous eight decades: Turkey under the Kemalist rule was an isolated, solely Western-oriented, peripheral actor with a weak economy and limited political influence. Its post-Kemalist

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119 Erdoğan stormed off the stage at the World Economic Forum after having harshly criticised Shimon Peres for Israel’s Palestine policy, after which he did not attend Davos meetings. The incident gained him high popularity not only in Turkey as the voice of aggrieved Palestinians (Tait 2009), but also diplomatic credibility in the eyes of the anti-American Muslim leaders in the region, such as Iran’s Ahmedinejad (Hale 2009: 157).

120 Criticising the West through objecting to Islamophobia has been increasingly included in Turkey’s rhetorical baggage as a state of origin in relation to its expatriates in Western Europe. This point will be further elaborated in Chapter 4.
version has become an interconnected, politically influential and central actor with a flourishing economy.

The discursive strategy essentially relies on the argument that the Kemalist elite denied Turkey’s socio-political roots in determining the Republic’s orientation and in shaping its identity. This resulted in exclusively orienting Turkey towards the Euro-Atlantic political economic alliance and constructing a purely Western identity for the state and society. The new elite claims that this deliberate choice constituted the basis of Turkey’s alienation from its surroundings, and particularly the Middle East, Asia, and the Muslim world, having led to its international peripherality and docility as an economic and political actor. Therefore, in the narratives of the new elite, the contrast of the Kemalist Turkey with the current regime is sharp, as the latter transformed itself into the global-power-to-be through proudly making peace with its Ottoman-Islamic identity and engaging with the cultural space this identity provides. AKP-led Turkey is presented not only as having recaptured its pivotal position within its civilisational milieu, but also as having strengthened its standing vis-à-vis global powers as demonstrated by its booming economy and political audacity. In other words, the elite associated the success of the “new” Turkey with the new elites’ embrace of the nation’s genuine identity drawn from its Ottoman-Islamic roots, and juxtaposed it to the failure of the west-imitating elites.

By grounding the superiority of the AKP-led Turkey over the Kemalist Turkey on the embrace of the Ottoman-Islamic essence, the elite also embedded the claimed transformation within fault lines of identity politics. As explained before, the secular establishment deepened the secular-conservative, modern-traditional, western-(middle) eastern cleavages and increasingly used these dichotomies in its inclusion-exclusion practices. The AKP enhanced its power through its claim to represent the societal majority that had been excluded on the grounds of not falling onto the secular-westernised side of the dichotomy. The party has benefited from reproducing and deepening these cleavages, this time to the detriment of the secular side. Hence, linking Turkey’s ascent to resorting back to the nation’s

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121 For instance, for Davutoğlu ‘the most essential paradox’ of Turkey had been ‘the discord between the political culture composed by historical and geo-cultural characteristics of a society that had been the political centre of a certain civilisational milieu, and the political system shaped on the basis of the political elite’s decision to adhere to another civilisational milieu’ (2001: 83). See, (ibid.: 79-83) for the elaboration of this argument.
origins, while discrediting the West and the West-emulating domestic political actors has provided considerable ‘cultural resonance and emotional power’ (Brubaker 2000: 17).

In the context of domestic political competition, the new elite refers to the military-dominated Kemalist Turkey before the AKP’s coming to power as the “old Turkey”. These associations have been made in direct association with the CHP, and also to a certain extent with the nationalist MHP. The CHP gets the lion share, as it is still the biggest opposition party and the main electoral rival of the AKP, apart from being traditionally regarded as one of the strongholds of the secular establishment. However, the “old Turkey” in the pro-AKP parlance does not only represent institutionalised political, legal, and economic actors, but also refers to “westernised” and hence “alienated” sections of society that voice opposition to the AKP’s vision of “new Turkey”. Aiming to consolidate its voter base and to maintain its legitimacy, the party has been increasingly constructing its voter base as staunch supporters and the embodiment of the “new Turkey”, and hence as the nation.

Three major aspects constitute the backbone of the “new Turkey” nationalist narrative. The first aspect relies on demonstrating the economic achievements of Turkey and highlighting its decreasing dependence on the assistance of affluent states and international institutions. This aspect is often illustrated by Turkey’s transformation from a recipient of development aid and financial credit to a donor of development aid and a contributor to the IMF’s budget. The second aspect is based on contrasting the two Turkeys’ ability and willingness to embrace the non-Western world. This is illustrated by the post-Kemalist Turkey’s success in gaining sympathy and popularity among a wide range of transborder populations in the Ottoman-Islamic-Turkic milieu and in establishing dense political, economic, and cultural relations with their regions and states. The enthusiasm and success of the AKP-led Turkey in these regards is contrasted to the disinterest and inability of the pro-western elites.¹²²

¹²² It should be noted that these two aspects are generally used in tandem. For example, in one of his presidential campaign speeches, Erdoğan described the “new Turkey” as a state that paid off its US $ 23,5 billion debt to the IMF and will contribute with US $ 5 billion to its budget, that increased its development aid payments from US $ 45 million to US $ 3,5 billion, that is able to raise its voice against Israel to defend its Palestinian brethren, and that acts as the descendants of the Ottoman Empire are supposed to act for the populations in the Balkans, Middle East and North Africa. He contrasted all these achievements of the “new” Turkey to the “old” one that was indebted, needy, and politically insignificant both in the West and in the abovementioned geographies. See, presidential candidate Erdoğan’s speech in Bursa ‘Herkes susar biz susmayız’, 18 July 2014, available online, at: https://m.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/herkes-susar-biz-susmayiz/65131#1
With regards to the first aspect of the “new Turkey” narrative, underlining the rise in per capita income and the growth of the Turkish economy often complements the underlining of its reduced economic dependence. The AKP is not the first government to stress growing prosperity and the economy’s competitiveness as an integral part of national success. What Bora calls ‘liberal nationalism’, which became visible in the 1990s among secular and economically liberal circles, has many commonalities with the “new Turkey” nationalist narrative. Both find the main sources of ‘national pride’ in reaching the standards of developed nations’ economic prosperity and in ‘the degree to which the domestic market merges with the global market’. Both nationalisms also highlight ‘[t]he enterprising energy of the “Turkish people”’ (Bora 2011: 69-70).

However, there are differences in their understanding of what the standards of the developed world contain, and how these standards would be attained. For the secular, 1990s’ version of ‘liberal nationalism’, attaining these development standards meant ‘to attain the level of the West’. The objective of harmonisation ‘with universal standards’ not only implied convergence in terms of prosperity, but also in terms of consumption patterns or art (ibid.: 68). For the AKP version of ‘liberal nationalism’ national pride is largely based on the economy’s further fusion with, and competitiveness vis-à-vis global markets. However, the fusion and harmonisation is meant to be merely in economic terms, while civilisational differences remain intact. In fact, what engenders economic success and competitiveness is sticking to this civilisational identity and to the nation’s genuine value system derived from Sunni-Ottoman roots.

The second aspect of the narrative is based on depicting the country as the inheritor and leader of a distinct non-Western civilisational space. This constructed space extends far beyond the borders of Turkey. It delineates a socio-cultural and political space broader than a border-crossing modern nation defined through ethno-linguistic commonality. The narrative is produced, reproduced, and disseminated on many occasions from party congresses to parliamentary group meetings by the majority of the prominent AKP members. Erdoğan’s post-election victory speeches have been mobilising this aspect of the narrative most explicitly and in symbolically significant ways.¹²³

¹²³ Since the AKP’s electoral victory in 2007, Erdoğan’s “balcony speeches” have become a tradition. In all the subsequent local and national elections, he addressed the crowds in Ankara from the balcony of the AKP headquarters, and the broader public through live-coverage by almost all TV channels. Highly publicised and
From the party’s 2011 victory onwards, Erdoğan started to insert his ‘heartfelt greetings’ to Bagdad, Cairo, Sarajevo, Baku, Lefkoşa (Nicosia) etc. into these speeches. Statements claiming that the AKP’s victory is a victory of ‘the hope of the oppressed and the aggrieved’, that it is ‘the victory of Sarajevo as much as that of Istanbul, the victory of Beirut as much as that of Diyarbakır’ have increasingly featured in these speeches.¹²⁴ In many occasions, the interest and concern of the “new Turkey” for the wellbeing and fate of these populations is contrasted to the inactive and introverted pre-AKP Republic and its ‘indifference towards its friends, its brothers and sisters, and its left-behind relatives abroad’.¹²⁵

Third, the “new Turkey” nationalist narrative, or rather the “new Turkey” civilisationalist narrative distinguishes itself from predominantly ethnically defined Turkish nationalism, on which the Kemalist Turkey was based. The current political elite regards the latter nationalism, still being pursued by the CHP and the MHP, as out-dated and failed. How the AKP’s re-defined understanding of nationalism differed from others’ ethnic nationalism got clearer during recent debates about the conception of nationhood and the definition of citizenship in Turkey.¹²⁶ Then-deputy Birgül Ayman Güler, belonging to the CHP’s hawkish Kemalist ethnonationalist (ulusalcı) wing contended that ‘the Turkish nation’ and the ‘Kurdish ethnicity’ could not be regarded ‘as equals’ (Today’s Zaman, 10 February 2013).¹²⁷

¹²⁴ For the full text of Erdoğan’s 2011 “balcony speech”, see T24 – Independent Online Newspaper (12 June 2011). In his post-presidential election victory speech on August 2014, Erdoğan defined his victory also as the victory of ‘Bagdad, Islamabad, Kabul, Beirut, Sarajevo, Skopje, Damascus, Hamah, Homs, Ramallah, Nablus, Jericho, Gaza, and Jerusalem’. For the full text of the speech, see, ‘Cumhurbaşkanı Balkon Konuşması’nın tam metni’, 11 August 2014, available online, at: https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/12-cumhurbaskani-erdoganin-cumhurbaskanligi-balkon-konusmasinin-tam-metni/66015#1

¹²⁵ For an example, see ‘Erdoğan: Önce 2023, Ardından 2053 ve 2071...’, (TURKISHNY, Leading Turkish-American Web Portal, 6 August 2014) available online, at: http://www.turkishny.com/headline-news/158184-erdogan-once-2023-ardindan-2053-ve-2071#.VMizzkthr8F

¹²⁶ These debates got heated within the context of an overarching democratisation process, and particularly in relation to the “peace process”, signifying the official reconciliation efforts between the state and major components of the Kurdish movement. How to constitutionally redefine the relationship between membership to polity and nationhood in the face of ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity became one of the main areas of contestation. Those who argued for defining the polity on the basis of an equal citizenship principle demanded abolishing the equation of a citizen of Turkey to a Turk, collective cultural rights for not-yet-recognised minorities, and enhanced regional powers. Against these demands, those underlining the indivisibility of the Turkish nation and the state insisted on the overarching character of Turkishness as the cement and the supra-identity of diverse citizenry.

¹²⁷ See, Bora (2011) for an insightful analysis of the version of nationalism labeled ulusalçılık. The term ulus is the modernised, “pure Turkish” term for “nation”. It is used as an alternative to the Arabic-origin word millet. Hence, ulusalçılık signifying the concept of nationalism derived from ulus, is meant to replace milletçilik, the concept of nationalism derived from millet. In a nutshell, ulusalçılık as an ideology has anti-Western and anti-
Following this declaration, Turkish nationalism, the meaning of nation in Turkey, its relationship to the legal status of citizenship, and their “incorporation capacity” for ethno-linguistically non-Turkish populations, and particularly the Kurds became a hotly debated issue.

Within this context, Erdoğan defined the AKP’s understanding of nationalism highlighting its striking difference from Turkish or Kurdish “ethnic nationalisms”. He associated Turkish ethnic nationalism with its Turkish political rivals CHP and MHP, and the Kurdish ethnic nationalism with its Kurdish political rival, the Party for Peace and Democracy (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP). While attacking Kurdish ethnic nationalism, Erdoğan underlined that his government was the main architect of the “peace process” in an effort not to alienate conservative Kurdish constituency by saying that:

‘No one shall confront us in this process by bringing forth Turkishness or Kurdishness. We are a government that stamped on any kind of nationalism. … Do you know what our conception of nationalism is composed of? It is composed of patriotism and humanism. It is composed of standing with the poor and the needy. It is composed of making this beautiful country of ours one of the top ten countries in the world’ (Hürriyet, 18 February 2013).

The “Turkish” opposition parties counterattacked these comments through mobilising still considerably salient sensitivities on “Turkish” nationalism at the societal level. Erdoğan had to clarify that the nationalism his government stamped on is the nationalism based ‘on ethnic origins, which meant racism, and the type of racism that measures skulls (kafatasçılık)’ (Vatan, 24 February 2013).

Instead of the ethnicity-based understanding of Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms, the AKP leadership has developed and promoted an Ottoman-Islamic “civilisationalism”. It has presented contemporary Turkey as the bearer, inheritor, and hence, the “natural” leader of this civilisational socio-cultural and political space. Unlike former pro-western elites that renounced the inheritance and rejected assuming the leadership role it brings with, the AKP claimed Turkey’s inherited civilisational leadership.
According to the “new Turkey” narrative, this shift led to the ascendance of the nation, the state, and the civilisation they represent and lead. Within this new nationalist narrative, economic growth through booming international trade, higher levels of FDI, and growing transborder investment volume feature as centrally as Turkey’s success in re-connecting with its neglected brethren in the Ottoman-Islamic civilisational space. Its achievements in economically, politically, and culturally reviving and leading this space vis-à-vis other civilisations are presented as the primary sources of national pride.

Maximum convergence with global capitalism constitutes one of the sources of national success in this narrative. Maintaining civilisational boundaries intact is also integral to the “new Turkey” nationalist narrative. Narrating Turkey as leading its own civilisation’s empowerment and advocacy vis-à-vis the hitherto predominant Western civilisation aims to highlight its difference from and superiority over the West. The new elite instrumentalises this demarcation for its political and economic manoeuvres beyond the borders as well as for consolidating its power and legitimacy in domestic politics. In that sense, the post-Kemalist Turkey does not only seem to emulate East Asia in its preferred economic development model. It also deploys similar nationalist discourses as those on “‘Asian values’, “the new Islam,” “saying no to the West” (Ong 1999: 7). According to Ong (ibid.), East Asian elites deploy such anti-Western discourses that owe a great deal to a Huntingtonian claim of civilisational differences ‘in the context of fundamentally playing (and competing) by the rules of the neoliberal orthodoxy’. The case of post-Kemalist Turkey seems to follow suit.

3. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter provided a four-dimensional contextual map of post-1980 transformative processes in Turkey. It focused on transformations in four specific domains: (i) the ruling elites and sections of society equipped with political and economic power; (ii) the economic development model and the degree to which political and economic elites aspired to integrate the economy into regional and global market structures; (iii) the defining characteristics of nation and the dominant understanding of nationalism promoted by elites; and (iv) the political, economic, and cultural-historical self-positioning of the state vis-à-vis the world beyond its borders. The period from the inception of the Republic to the 1980s, that between the 1980s and the first half of the 2000s, and from the mid-late 2000s onwards could be
discerned as distinct phases based on their characteristics in relation to the abovementioned four aspects.

Based on this contextual map, I will argue in the following chapters that the ways in which the state related to migrant and non-migrant transborder populations varied in these three periods as a function of: (i) the defining characteristics of the nation promoted by elites, (ii) the desired degree of the “national” economy’s interconnectivity and locations chosen for economic interpenetration, and (iii) the political and cultural positioning of the state vis-à-vis its immediate region and the West. Changes in these factors led to varying degrees of state interest in constructing and engaging transborder populations as “its own”. More importantly, they also led to variation in the overarching scope of the state’s transborder membership universe, in the “types” and geographies of populations making up this universe, and in the state’s hierarchisation practices situating certain populations at the centre and others at the margins of this universe.

The contingent redefinition of the “ideal diasporic subject” led to shifts in the centre of gravity of the overarching universe, and determined which layers and sub-categories moved closer to or farther away from this centre. While the variation in the scope and composition was bigger and more visible in the delineation of transborder kin, the state re-hierarchised and reshuffled layers and sub-categories in relation to both kinds of extraterritorial populations.

These contingently and strategically fluctuating definitional choices at the stage of ‘politics of identification’ had implications for the modalities of rhetorical and practical engagement, that is, discourses and policies through which the state attempted to act upon these populations. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will provide detailed analyses of the interactions between these transformations and the varying scope, composition, and defining characteristics of Turkey’s expatriate and transborder kin categories respectively. They will also demonstrate how these changes in the extent and content shaped the state’s discourses and policies on these two “kinds” of transborder populations.
CHAPTER 4
FROM A MIGRANT SENDING-STATE TO A HOMELAND FOR DIASPORA(S)

This chapter analyses how perceived changes in the expatriate landscape have translated into discourses and attitudes, policies of Turkey as a migrant-sending state since the 1960s. I argue that how the home-state elites’ reading of the expatriate landscape varied due to shifts affecting three major dimensions. Different readings had implications for the ways in which the state elites discursively and practically acted upon this landscape. The first dimension is the predominant understanding of national economic development. The second dimension is the defining characteristics of the nation that the state elites narrated, claimed to represent, and tried to realise. The third dimension is the predominant national narrative’s positioning in relation to the West.

The chapter demonstrates that the discursive and practical content of expatriate engagement has primarily changed as a function of: (i) the shift from inward-looking, self-sufficiency oriented to outward-looking, economic growth oriented development model over the 1980s-1990s, (ii) the Kemalist elite’s and the AKP’s differing assessment of the expatriate landscape as reinforcing or undermining the legitimacy of their respective national narratives (iii) the predominant national narrative’s positioning in relation to the West, and the functions attributed to the expatriates within that relational space.

The first section provides a snapshot of the trajectory of migratory dispersal from Turkey. The second section provides a brief overview of the temporary emigration-development phase of the 1960s and 1970s and focuses on the politicisation of the home-state – expatriate relationship before the 1980s. The third section illustrates the effects of post-coup hawkish official nationalism, economic liberalisation, and the Europeanisation efforts on the state’s attitude towards expatriates. I demonstrate that four different tracks of engagement with partially overlapping target populations emerged in this period. I also show that the dominant logics shaping these tracks interacted both in complementary and in contradictory ways. The final section embeds the analysis in the context of elite change in the 2000s. I argue that this led to major reconfigurations particularly in the second and third dimensions, which were decisive in the changing discursive and practical content of the home-state’s expatriate
engagement. I demonstrate that the AKP saw an overall correspondence between its Islam-sympathetic, post-Kemalist national narrative and the expatriate landscape. Hence, Turkey has been exhibiting a rather offensive engagement strategy. The government increasingly instrumentalised expatriates in Europe as a means of reaffirming the domestically and to a certain extent regionally high-yield anti-Westernerist and anti-Kemalist claims and discourses.

1. WHO IS TURKEY’S ‘CITIZEN DIASPORA’?

The departure of non-Muslims, either actively led, or strongly “encouraged” by the state in the early Republican era constituted the first instance of mass emigration from Turkey.\(^{128}\) The state promoted the “uprooting” of these sections that it regarded as incongruous with its conception of nationhood. Hence, it had no intention of maintaining links with, or keeping the option of return open to them. What made Turkey a migrant sending state with an interest in maintaining links with its emigrants was its involvement in the post-war temporary labour export schemes. Turkey concluded bilateral agreements with Western European countries and Australia throughout the 1960s and 1970s.\(^ {129}\) Between 1961 and 1974, nearly 800,000 workers were sent abroad via the Turkish Employment Service (TES), 649,000 of whom were sent to Germany (İçduygu 2009a: 4). With an annual average of over 100,000 workers in this period, Turkey became one of the major labour exporting countries for these destinations (ibid.).

The reasons behind outmigration to Western Europe diversified in the following decades. Family reunification became one of the main motivations starting from the second half of the 1970s. Outmigration in the 1980s and 1990s was predominantly driven asylum seeking.\(^ {130}\) These new modalities led to the diversification of the emigrant stock both sociologically and politically. Family reunification brought children and spouses to the countries of settlement, while political asylum meant the extraterritorialisation of a growing number of political dissidents.

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\(^{128}\) See, İçduygu et al. 2008, for an analysis of out-migration of the Armenians, Greeks, and Jews, and its relation to, and role within the Turkish-Muslim nation-building project.

\(^{129}\) Turkey signed the first bilateral agreement with Germany in 1961, and concluded similar agreements with the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium in 1964, with France in 1965, and with Sweden and Australia in 1967. Additional agreements were signed with the United Kingdom in 1961, with Switzerland in 1971, with Denmark in 1973 and with Norway in 1981 (İçduygu 2009a: 4).

\(^{130}\) The number of Turkish citizens seeking asylum in Western Europe over the 1980-1995 period exceeded 400,000. Those that went mainly to Western Europe, and to a lesser extent to Australia, Canada, and the USA as asylum seekers between 1981 and 2005 amounted to 664,412 (İçduygu 2009a: Appendix, Table 2).
After European countries unilaterally halted labour recruitment in the mid-1970s, the excess labour force was initially sent to the MENA region and Gulf countries on a temporary basis (İçduygu & Sirkeci 1998). Workers of contracting firms mainly in the construction sector constituted the bulk of these emigrants. Following the relative saturation of contracting markets in these regions and as a result of regional crises’ adverse effects on businesses, these firms turned to the Soviet Union in the mid 1980s (İçduygu 2009b: 5). With the end of the Cold War, contracting firms and their ‘project-tied’ workers spread out to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and Eastern Europe (ibid.). The 1990s and 2000s also witnessed an increase in the out-migration of those with university degrees and higher social capital to the United States, Canada, and Australia (İçduygu 2009a: 22).131

While the number of the receiving countries increased and the geographical width got wider since the 1990s, Western Europe remained as the major destination area for newcomers (İçduygu 2009a). Although the pace of emigration to Europe considerably slowed down, low rates of return, the reunification and formation of families, and the rising birth rates contributed to the growth of the population in Europe.132 Hence, while the share of the population in Europe within the total decreased over time, it still constitutes the major area of settlement (See Table 1). The total size of the population with origins in Turkey composed of citizens, former citizens, and their foreign-born descendants is given as five to six million, corresponding to 7-8 per cent of Turkey’s population.133

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131 See, Köser Akçapar (2009), on the out-migration of young Turkish citizens with educational purposes and their post-graduation settlement in the US.

132 Annual emigration rates to Europe were around 50-60,000 in the 2000s according to Paşalı Elitok and Straubhaar (2011: 109), and less than 50,000 according to Kirişçi (2007: 92). Martin (1991) estimated a total of 1 million returnees over the period between 1960 and 1990, and İçduygu (2009a: 16-17) provided an approximate number of 1.5 million returnees for the five decades since 1961.

133 According to the MFA, this total exceeds five million. See, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens_en.mfa The survey commissioned by the YTB gives the population of those with Turkish origins living in Western European countries as 3,965,150 (YTB 2011: 3). According to İçduygu (2009b: 1) around 4.5 million people born in Turkey live abroad permanently, and the total exceeds 6 million if their foreign-born descendants are included.
Table 2. The size and distribution of Turkish citizens abroad (mid-1980s - 2010) *

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number (x1000)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number (x1000)</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,400.1</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>2,049.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Europe</td>
<td>1,984.6</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>2,841.3</td>
<td>85.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA Countries</td>
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<td>8.5</td>
<td>127.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS Countries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>245.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,359.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3,308.3</td>
<td>100</td>
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Source: İçduygu et al. (2013: 1) and İçduygu (2009b: 2)

* The numbers exclude those that have naturalised and renounced their Turkish citizenship. There were around 800,000 such former Turkish citizens in Europe in the mid-2000s (İçduygu 2009b: 1),

** A more detailed country-based distribution of 2010 numbers is available on the webpage of Turkey’s Ministry of Labour and Social Security, at: http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/divih.portal?page=yv&id=1

2. FROM AGENTS OF SOCIOECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION TO POTENTIAL POLITICAL DISSIDENTS

This section provides a snapshot of Turkey’s post-war labour-exporting experience that led to the emergence of the category of emigrant as well as of the state’s developmentalist policies in the 1960s-1970s. It then demonstrates how the state’s predominantly socioeconomic emigrant perspective gave way to the concern of impeding and containing political dissidence abroad following domestic political developments of the 1970s and their resonance among overseas workers.

The adoption of a planned economic strategy in the aftermath of the 1960 military coup and the official understanding of development largely conditioned the rationale behind and the expectations from Turkey’s participation in labour-exporting schemes. The cadres behind the coup were staunch believers in the modernisation and rationalisation of the military as well as that of Turkey (Hale 2011: 198). The state elite understood socioeconomic development as industrialisation, urbanisation, and modernisation in a fashion similar to Western developed
countries. Reaching economic self-sufficiency and independence was the primary objective of the industrialisation-based development plans.134

Like many other post-war labour exporting schemes, the labour emigration experience of Turkey was a classical example of a ‘safety-valve’ policy (Hirschman 1978). An examination of 1960s’ government programmes reveals that the state unequivocally saw labour-export as a measure to be abandoned once the workforce-employment capacity balance was reached.135 Expressed in terms of Ragazzi (2009)’s typology, state-led emigration was driven by the ‘liberal governmental rationality’. This meant that the state was primarily troubled with not being able to match its population to the resources of its territory. Thus, it tolerated the extraterritoriality of the excess population only on the condition of temporariness (ibid.: 387-389).

In its First Five-Year Development Plan, the DPT envisaged the temporary export of excess low-skilled labour as a solution to unemployment, skill-shortages, and regional economic inequality problems (DPT 1963: 456). With these problems in mind, the state regulated the exit of labour force based on skill-level, region of origin, and sector.136 It took measures aiming to better extract remittances and secure their continued inflow to finance imports needed for the domestic industrialisation strategy.137 Partly thanks to these strategies and partly to the return-oriented individual strategies of the emigrant workers, the absolute value of remittances showed a generally increasing trend in these two decades (See Figure 1).

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134 See Ahmad (1977: 268-288) for a detailed examination of socioeconomic planning throughout the 1960s; see Benli Altunışık and Tür (2004: 73-78) for the 1960-80 planned economy period.  
135 For full texts of all government programmes (in Turkish), see, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/e_kaynaklar_kutuphane_hukumetler.html  
137 For analyses on remittance-attracting measures and remittances’ impact on Turkey’s trade deficit, see Paine 1974 and Martin 1991.
Specifically targeting the regional underdevelopment problem, the Turkish state devised policies aiming to channel remittances to employment-generating small scale productive
Regional development policies largely failed to meet the intended objectives, remittance inflows had a significant role in covering the trade deficit of the economy particularly in the 1970s (See Figure 2).

In addition to transferring their savings, the state also expected workers with ‘agricultural backgrounds’ to become urbanised and to ‘spread their acquired knowledge and skills to their environments’ upon their return. The planners regarded the ‘accelerative effect of their experience abroad on Turkey’s transformation and modernisation’ crucial (DPT 1968: 142). As the temporariness of the workers’ stay was key to realising this transformative effect, those that were overstaying their contracts preoccupied the state (ibid.: 135).

Due to the characteristics of the overseas workers and to the relative political calm in Turkey, in the initial decade, the state perceived the population abroad as an unorganised sum of individuals lacking political consciousness. The guest-worker community in the 1960s was mostly composed of workers between the ages of 23-33, who were either single or left their families behind (Abadan 1964: 65). It was a rather clearly defined population composed of predominantly economically motivated individuals. As the majority of the guest-workers did not either have any intention of settling permanently, the level of political mobilisation and organisation was low in the initial phase (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 46).

Socio-political developments in the homeland and their resonance among overseas workers led to changing home-state perception of and preoccupation with the category of emigrant worker. Leftist political mobilisation thrived in Turkey in the 1960s with the effect of the broader international context and the relatively libertarian and pro-workers’ rights atmosphere created by the 1961 Constitution. The burgeoning on the left was immediately countered by the rise of radical rightist and ultra-nationalist movements. As the tension between these groups escalated in late 1960s, the military intervened in politics again in March 1971. The aftermath of the coup witnessed a widespread offensive against the Left. The scope of rights

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138 See, Martin (1991), Abadan-Unat (1993; 1995); Paine (1974), and Penninx (1982), on assessments of policies attempting to link temporary emigration to regional development, and particularly measures like the Village Development Co-operatives and the Turkish Workers’ Companies.

139 It should be noted that following the 1960 coup, leaders and followers of some Sunni orders migrated to Europe (Adaman and Kaya 2012: 6).

and freedoms granted by the 1961 Constitution were narrowed down, as it was found to be endangering “the integrity of the State with its country and nation, the Republic, national security, and public order” (Ahmad 1977: 293-295). Paralleling the concerns within Turkey, one of the main concerns of the state became containing the spread of political dissidence abroad and keeping overseas workers within the boundaries of “the national”.

The state’s approach based on public order and national security, as well as further left-right radicalisation continued throughout the 1970s.141 Kurdish movements emerged first as part of the broader Marxist-Leninist mobilisation, and the PKK was established in 1978 (Van Bruinessen 1988). The cadres that would later become driving forces behind a specific branch of Alevi political mobilisation were also involved in revolutionary leftist movements (Sökefeld 2008: 50-51). The 1970s also witnessed the transformation of the MGH into a political party. The diversified and highly polarised topography of political contestation in Turkey had its direct ramifications on the mobilisation and demarcation lines among workers abroad.142

For the state, all these developments meant that the official nationalist doctrine, according to which it tried to shape society, was being seriously challenged from several fronts within and outside its borders. Consequently, fighting primarily communism and other “divisive” and “extremist” movements became its primary concern. The “nationalisation of education”, which for the political elite meant the replacement of all ‘internationalist and Marxist influences’ with the ‘Turkish nation’s own genuine history, civilisation, culture, traditions and values’, became a top priority.143 While the state considered officially disapproved Sunni communities as part of the “extremist movements”, it also regarded a state-controlled Islam as an antidote against communism. Thus, Islam gained the status of an integral component of national identity since the 1960 coup (Landau 1974: 175-176; Ahmad 1977: 373-375).

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141 On the political climate of the 1970s in Turkey, see, Pope and Pope (1997: 126-140).
142 See, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b: 46-64) and Ögelman 2003 for detailed accounts on the emergence of organisations along homeland agendas among emigrants in Germany. On the replication of the left-right demarcation in Germany, see, Miller (1981: 57-59). See, Nell (2008) on the transplantation of the radical left to Europe, and particularly to the Netherlands. For the emergence and consolidation of Sunni orders like Nurcular and Sülümançılár, and political Islamist movements like the MGH in these decades, see Yükseklen and Yurdakul (2011).
Regarding the expatriates, the relatively neutral and almost technical “workers abroad” lexicon gave way to a bifurcated discourse. Political authorities distinguished those workers who were abroad only for their bread and butter from other “elements” disseminating their ‘destructive’ and ‘divisive’ propaganda among the former. Hence, the state’s task was protecting its ‘self-sacrificing and patriotic workers abroad from assaults of subversive movements’. This protection required exporting national identity. Starting from 1974, most governments stated among their objectives the provision of national and religious education to children abroad, and sending religious functionaries to cater to the needs of the broader community. The state sent the first cohort of Turkish culture and language teachers to Germany in 1978. Although the DIB sent out functionaries on an ad hoc basis, ‘the Turkish state largely left this realm to the communities of political Islam’ until the 1980s (Schiffauer 2007: 73). In sum, the ideational and discursive foundations of keeping overseas citizens within the boundaries of “the national” were laid in the 1970s. It was the aftermath of the 1980 military coup when the state channelled its organisational and financial resources to put the idea into practice.

3. MULTIPLE EXPATRIATE LANDSCAPES SEEN THROUGH DIFFERENT HOME-STATE LENSES: 1980S-1990S

The 1980s and the 1990s witnessed major political and socioeconomic change both in Turkey and within the contexts of settlement that impacted the homeland-expatriate nexus. How Turkey acted upon these shifts and developments was shaped by the home-state elites’ political and economic concerns, their efforts to respond to changes in the broader conjuncture and to the transnationalisation of hitherto nationally contained issues. This section briefly reviews the political and socioeconomic developments shaping the home-state’s reading of the expatriate landscape, as a result of which it (re)assessed its attitude towards the emigrant community. In the following sub-sections I demonstrate that four different tracks of emigrant engagement with partially overlapping target populations emerged out of such assessment. The dominant logics shaping these tracks of engagement interacted in both complementary and in contradictory ways.

145 Author’s interview with a retired teacher who was part of the first cohort, Berlin, 15 October 2012.
3.1. Political and socioeconomic change in the homeland-expatriate nexus

The post-coup period witnessed tremendous increase in political asylum applications to Western European countries. Political refugees in the immediate aftermath of the coup were mostly composed of leftist activists, trade unionists, and both activists and ordinary citizens that were Kurds, Alevis, and Assyrians (Adaman & Kaya 2012). The number further increased in the 1990s, while this time those seeking asylum were mostly Kurds, due to the exacerbation of the armed conflict between the military and the PKK and human rights violations perpetrated by the state.\(^{146}\)

These decades also witnessed ‘increasing levels of groupness’ (Brubaker 2002: 171) of the Kurds, the Islamists, and Alevis both inside and outside Turkey. The coup’s crackdown on the radical left largely succeeded in delegitimising the movements and depoliticising those with leftist tendencies, which led to a scaling down of leftist mobilisation in home- and host-contexts (Nell 2008: 127-128). The MHP-affiliated “idealistic” ({"\textit{ülkücü}}) movements were weakened in both contexts in the 1980s. They started to augment their activism in the following decade as a response to Kurdish nationalist mobilisation and xenophobic attacks against Turks (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 51-52). Kemalist, official nationalist formations, the Atatürkist Thought Associations ({"\textit{Atatürkçü Düşünce Dernekleri}}, ADD) started to be established both within and outside Turkey in the first half of the 1990s. ADDs positioned themselves as an opposing pole not only to Kurdish, but also to Islamist mobilisation. In short, a multiplicity of demarcations along different axes replaced the leftist-rightist cleavage as the primary dividing line.

In addition to the augmentation and diversification of dissidence, the ways in which overseas citizens responded to four main developments in the European host-contexts had significant implications for the home-state’s reading of the expatriate landscape. First, despite host-states’ schemes incentivising return, repatriation rates remained rather low.\(^{147}\) Second, the turbulence in host-economies during the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s led to increasing unemployment among “guest-workers”, majority of whom were employed in

\(^{146}\) There were 45,620 asylum-seekers destined to Europe in the first half of the 1980s, and 185,797 in the second half. The number for the 1991-95 period was 175,557, and 141, 216 for the second half of the 1990s. The total number for the two decades, including a few thousands that left for non-European destinations, was 553,765 (İçduyuğu 2009a: Appendix, Table-2).

\(^{147}\) See, Kraniauskas (2010: 15-18), for voluntary return initiatives taken by European governments in the 1980s and their rather unsuccessful outcomes.
heavy industries. Most opted to use their savings for setting up small-scale enterprises in their host-countries instead of returning to Turkey (Abadan-Unat 1993: 332). From the late 1980s onwards, an increasing self-employment trend became visible (Şen et. al 2007; ZfT 2007).\textsuperscript{148} Partially caused by the inclination for saving and investing in host-economies, the volume of remittances flowing to Turkey significantly decreased after 1998 (See Figure 1).\textsuperscript{149}

Third, socio-political fault lines around issues, such as the problematic integration of resident aliens, discrimination, and xenophobia emerged. Rather than leading to a mass flight from Europe, xenophobic attacks triggered incipient mobilisation for demanding improved rights and equal treatment in the host-contexts.\textsuperscript{150} Finally, acquiring host-state citizenship became a possibility with changes in host-states’ naturalisation regulations. In the 1990s, the total of naturalised Turkish citizens in nine receiving states exceeded half a million.\textsuperscript{151}

3.2. Safeguarding the Atatürkist Turkish nation-state at home and abroad

The main threat perceived by the official nationalist elite shifted from the “communist” to “separatist” and “reactionary” movements over the course of these two decades. Challenges of the official nationalist doctrine also gained an increasingly transnational character involving expatriates, Turkey, and albeit indirectly, the host-states and publics. Hence, countering dissidence and minimising its influence on all involved parties constituted the main line of state action within the first track.

The 1980s and 1990s marked the official division of the population in Western Europe into the opposing sub-categories of ‘enemy emigrants’ and ‘friendly communities’ (Ragazzi 2009: 386). Seen through the official nationalist lens, those within the state’s “red lines” belonged to the nation even if they ceased to be citizens. Those that were outside these lines ceased to be

\textsuperscript{148} The Netherlands and France followed Germany, which hosted 68 per cent of all such enterprises in the EU-15 (Şen et. al 2007: 59).
\textsuperscript{149} For a concise account on the inflow of remittances into Turkey since 1964, see, İçduygu 2006. For an elaborate analysis accounting for the decreasing pattern of remittances, see, Bettin et. al (2012).
\textsuperscript{150} The killing of Ramazan Avçi in 1985 triggered the establishment of ‘Turkey Union of Immigrants’ (Türkiye Göçmenler Birliği, TGB) in Hamburg in 1986. This initiative evolved into the ‘Turkish Community in Hamburg’ (Hamburg Türk Toplumu), followed by the founding of other ‘Turkish Community’ associations, and the federation ‘Turkish Community in Germany’ (Almanya Türk Toplumu, ATT) in 1995. Author’s interview with the first TGB chairman and the honorary ATT chairman, Berlin, 31 October 2012; and with the ATT chairman, Berlin 10 October 2012.
\textsuperscript{151} A total of 527, 600 Turkish citizens acquired the citizenship of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK between 1991 and 2000. 454,600 of these naturalisations took place between 1994 and 2000 (İçduygu 2009a: Appendix, Table-7).
members of the nation regardless of their belonging to the legal category of citizen. The state surveyed and classified expatriate organisations according to which side of the red line they fell. ‘Divisive organisations’ (TBMM 1995a: 27) and ‘religious organisations engaging in extreme right activities’ (ibid.: 29) were opposed to those ‘whose activities [were] in line with Atatürk’s principles’ (ibid.: 42).

The strategy towards the “foes” centred on hampering their effective organisation abroad, limiting their room to manoeuvre, and minimising their influence on expatriates and host-country political actors. The “friends” needed to be protected from their corrosive effects and to be kept within boundaries of official nationalism. Select individuals and groups that fit the ideal expatriate profile as defined by the Kemalist elite were to be transformed into a force countering the claims and actions of those falling into the enemy emigrant category. Within this track shaped by perceptions of “threat” to the non-negotiable principles of the Republic, the military and particularly the MGK assumed central roles in designing the measures towards both categories. 152

The home-state’s capacity for directly intervening in the agendas, political action repertoire, and inner organisational dynamics of those categorised as enemy emigrants was limited. Hence, constraining their manoeuvring space constituted the main line of action of the home-state. 153 The state put effort in convincing host-states about the illegitimacy and criminality of these groups’ activities. Turkey pressured host-states to categorise the PKK as a terrorist organisation and ban activities of movements affiliated with it. The PKK’s then political violence-based activity style in Europe also contributed to some host-states’ perception that it constituted a threat to their public order. Germany and France listed the PKK as a terrorist organisation in 1993 and banned organisations affiliated with it (Ecarrius-Kelly 2002: 91). According to an interviewee active in the branch of the Kurdish movement that dissociated itself from the PKK, Turkey’s strategy centred on reproducing the discourse equating all

152 Interviewees from organisations with different political stances, and representing various religious, ethnic identities, and a prominent source from diplomatic circles converge on the point that while the diplomatic representations were active in implementation, the military (askerler) was the main actor behind designing and managing the organisational life of expatriates throughout these two decades (Author’s interviews, Berlin, September-October 2012).

153 See, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a), for the Turkish state’s efforts of monitoring, surveillance, and curbing dissidence abroad, particularly vis-à-vis Kurdish mobilisation.
kinds of Kurdish mobilisation to the PKK. Hence, Turkey accused host-states that did not ban
Kurdish organisations of harbouring terrorism.\footnote{154}{Author’s interview with a representative from KOMKAR-Berlin, Berlin, 19 October 2012.}

In an effort to undermine the organisational power of the “foes” as well as their impact on
Turkey, the state attempted to weaken their links to their counterpart organisations in the
homeland. The secular establishment realised that the dense transnational financial, ideational
links between the RP and the IGMG strengthened the movement both within and outside
Turkey.\footnote{155}{The IGMG was established in Germany in the 1970s and spread to other Western European countries. It is
considered as the MGH’s ‘diasporic association’. Political bans and party closures by the secular establishment
in Turkey contributed to the strengthening of the movement in the diaspora (Yükleyen and Yurdakul 2011: 72-
73). For the European and especially German dimension of the MGH, see Schiffauer 2010.}

In order to prevent their transnational empowerment, the MGK prohibited financial
links between political parties in Turkey and ‘organisations installed in Europe like Milli

The state’s control mechanism on the “friends” was mainly based on checking the
compatibility of their organisations’ agendas and activities with the main tenets of the official
nationalist doctrine. The state verified the “national character” of those that were found in line
with these tenets and formalised their continuing loyalty through registering their statutes in
the approved expatriate organisations database of the Ministry of Interior (TBMM 1995a: 24).

Aiming to unite the expatriate forces that were verified as ‘loyal/tied to the state’, Turkey
established ‘Coordination Councils’ within diplomatic representations in 1986-1987 (ibid.).\footnote{156}{See, also Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a: 118) and Ögelman (2003: 179) on Coordination Councils.}

The state attempted to determine the joint agendas, repertoires of political action and the
leadership cadres of the “national” expatriate front through this mechanism.

Agendas “suggested” by the state were geared towards opposing the claims and activities of
“enemy emigrants”, such as the Kurdish diaspora and the PKK.\footnote{157}{This paragraph is based on accounts of interviewees that were involved in Turkish associational life in
Germany in those years and a high-ranked official from the diplomatic representation in Berlin (Author’s
interviews, Berlin, September-October 2012). See, Mügge (2010), for a similar account on the state’s top-down
intervention in the organisational dynamics in the Netherlands.}

It also tried to mobilise the “national” expatriate front to object to host-country political actors’ manoeuvres that
contested Turkey’s officially held stances. The state’s efforts in this regard were primarily
directed at mobilising these sections to block attempts to recognise the Armenian genocide.

Assembling large crowds for street demonstrations or starting petitions to protest such
developments were among the ways of political action encouraged by the home-state. The state elite attributed to certain individuals and associations the role of the key drivers in forming and mobilising the national expatriate front. These sections, selected from staunch believers in the official nationalist doctrine, were presented as “the” representative speaking in the name of the Turkish “community”. Those that wanted to have a more autonomously decided agenda were not as much embraced as the first group, if not ignored. Hence, top-down hierarchisation and “partner” selection took place also within the “friends” category.

Targeting a wider range of expatriates, Turkey developed measures to propagate the orthodox line of thinking about religion, nation, history, culture, and the state itself. Exporting ‘national and religious education’ played an important role in the transmission of the official nationalist doctrine, as stated by the post-coup nonelected government. Overseas organisation of the Ministry of National Education had grown over these decades. The practice of sending out Turkish language and culture teachers continued (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 82).

As explained in Chapter 3, the official nationalist doctrine contained elements of both classical Atatürkist nationalism and the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ in the post-coup context. While warming to the idea of an enhanced presence of Islam, the state tried to establish its dominance in the religious domain. The official interpretation of a tamed and enlightened Islam, whose borders and content were controlled by the DIB, needed to be established as the interpretation. However, ‘the monopoly enjoyed by DİYANET in Turkey was broken’ by Sunni communities with considerable support bases among expatriates (Schiffauer 2007: 75). In an effort to establish the state’s monopoly, the DIB was authorised to extend its organisation abroad through religious counsellors and attachés’ offices in 1984 (ibid.: 13). The Turkish-Islamic Union(s) for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği, DITIB) were founded in the host-contexts throughout the 1980s.

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159 Engaging in retrospective self-criticism in the mid-1990s, the DIB contended that ‘fundamentalist groups filled the void’ mistakenly left by the state in the religious domain abroad (TBMM 1995a: 15).

160 DITIB-Berlin was opened in 1982, followed by the opening of the DITIB federal headquarters in Cologne in 1985. Similar DITIB associations were founded in the Netherlands and Belgium in 1982, in Switzerland and Denmark in 1985, in France in 1986, and in Austria in 1990.
Making DITIBs the “official” umbrella organisation of hundreds of mosque foundations aimed at securing and formalising their links and loyalty to the DIB. The case of Germany was illustrative in terms of DITIB’s growing network coverage. According to the report of the DIB in a 1995 parliamentary research commission report, the Union ‘established organic links with around 700 associations in Germany and took them under its control’ in ten years (TBMM 1995a: 24). DITIBs served a similar purpose in the religious realm to that of the Coordination Councils in the political-organisational realm. With their reach to a large audience, DITIB mosques became crucial venues not only for disseminating ‘a moderate Islam acceptable to the Turkish regime’ (Ögelman 2003: 166), but also for ensuring ‘socialisation as a Turk and transmission of love of the fatherland’ (Schiffauer 2007: 75-76). As stated by the DIB itself, in the 1990s, they played a crucial role in ‘warning citizens abroad against divisive and destructive groups, enhancing unity and solidarity among them, and strengthening the Turkish culture’ (TBMM 1995a: 18).

3.3. Fostering national voting blocks for the promotion of Turkey in Europe

The fluctuation and occasional straining of relations between Turkey and the EU in the 1980s and the 1990s urged the -still- pro-western elites to seek additional support for defending and promoting Turkey in Europe. Home-state authorities saw part of this additional support in national voting blocs of naturalised expatriates. Naturalisation and secure legal statuses were also seen as the first step in protecting overseas Turkish citizens against rising xenophobia. Facilitating expatriates’ naturalisation while tilting them towards pro-Turkey agendas formed the backbone of this track.

The killing of eight Turkish citizens in the xenophobic arson attacks of Mölln and Solingen in November 1992 and May 1993 turned expatriates’ problems in their host-contexts into a hot topic in Turkey. The state’s responsibility for protecting and empowering its overseas citizens

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161 DIB officials contend that as DITIBs are associations founded following the respective host-countries’ rules and regulations, issues pertaining to their registration, monitoring, transactions, and functioning are host-state domestic matters. They argue that the link between the DIB and DITIBs is limited to the former’s provision of functionaries and other kinds of institutional support for the latter (Author’s interview with the Head of the Department for Overseas Turks, DIB-Directorate General of External Affairs, Ankara, 3 May 2012). While DITIB officials also denied organic links between the two, religious attachés sent from Turkey have been acting as DITIB chairmen (Yurdakul and Yükleyen 2009: 217).

162 See, Şenay (2012; 2013) for in-depth analyses of the DITIB’s central role in propagandising of what the author called ‘trans-Kemalism’ in Australia. The practice of sending out the texts of Friday sermons from Ankara to DITIB mosques and their rather Kemalist nationalism-loaded content were illustrative of such role (ibid. 2012: 1623).
occupied public and political debates (Kadirbeyoğlu 2009: 424). Following Solingen, two proposals for setting up a research commission on the problems of overseas citizens were brought by ANAP and RP deputies to the parliament’s agenda in January 1993 (TBMM 1993: 184-215). Deputies from all parties pointed to the significance of Turkish citizens’ acquisition of political rights and secure legal statuses through naturalisation in alleviating these problems (ibid.). The formation of a Turkish voting bloc would urge host-country political parties to factor in the expatriates. Naturalisation or acquiring political rights at the local level would also give them the opportunity for direct political representation. Media reports in the second half of the 1990s report that Turkish government officials actively encouraged Turkish citizens to naturalise and to form an ‘organised political force’ during their visits (Doğan 1996).

Turkey also expected such national blocs in Europe to tilt host-states towards favourable positions on Turkey’s future accession to the EU. A tenacious Turkish constituency had the potential to counter-balance the influence of “other groups” with origins in Turkey who were undermining the home-state’s image in Europe. Even the anti-Westernist RP regarded the possibility of having such pro-Turkey constituencies in Europe as a crucial ‘diplomatic and strategic added value’ (TBMM 1993: 196). Enthusiastic accounts in the print media interpreted a politically empowered expatriate community as Turkey’s ‘magic key to Europe’ (Doğan 1996). At one occasion, the home government bluntly attempted to use “Turkish votes” as leverage in its turbulent EU accession process. Following the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, then-prime minister Mesut Yılmaz “advised” German voters with Turkish origins to take into account Kohl government’s attitude in Luxembourg in the upcoming elections (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a).

In addition to verbal encouragement, Turkey also tried to facilitate its overseas citizens’ naturalisation through taking legal measures. Long before these debates, the amendments made to Turkey’s citizenship law in 1981 enabled naturalisation without losing one’s Turkish citizenship. However, different paces of naturalisation emerged in host-states tolerating

\[163\] Law No. 2383 dated 13.2.1981, Official Gazette, 17.02.1981, No: 17254. Note that the amendment made by the post-coup government also increased the state’s discretionary powers to denaturalise citizens. Arguably, the primary objective was easing the denaturalisation of unwanted citizens, rather than facilitating naturalisation abroad (Kadirbeyoğlu 2010: 5). That in the 1980s political refugees were deprived of their Turkish nationality based on the amended law confirms this argument (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Rumour has it that in 1985 Turkey denaturalised members of the local Berlin football club ‘Kurdenport’ only because of its name. Author’s interview with a representative from KOMKAR-Berlin.
multiple citizenships and those requiring the renunciation of one’s previous citizenship. The latter group included countries like Austria, Denmark, and Germany. Due to the reluctance of majority of Turkish citizens to renounce their citizenship, the rates remained rather low in these host-countries (Avcı & Kirişçi 2008: 136-137). Political authorities in Turkey, also pushed by overseas citizens’ associations, started to seek a formula for safeguarding the Turkey-based rights of those that had to renounce their Turkish citizenship (Kadirbeyoğlu 2009: 424). Consequently, the citizenship law was amended to grant a special legal status to citizens by birth that renounced their Turkish citizenship with the permission of the Council of Ministers in order to naturalise in a state not tolerating dual citizenship.\textsuperscript{164} The newly created category of ‘quasi-citizens’ and their legal heirs were granted the right to reside, travel, work, inherit, and to buy property, but were exempted from the right to vote, run for office, and work in the public sector.\textsuperscript{165}

3.4. The creation of the “Turkish businessmen abroad” category

Attracting FDI, expanding export markets, and integration with global capital became top priorities within the context of continuing neoliberal economic restructuring in the 1990s. An important effect of economic liberalisation had been a significant increase in trade deficit and diversification of foreign currency sources. Hence, even though the absolute amount of remittances increased, their relative significance, expressed as percentage of trade deficit and GNP decreased considerably (See Figures 1&2). The reconfiguration of economic objectives paved the way for the official creation and praising of an “overseas Turkish businessmen” category in the mid-1990s. The novel category was targeted through a set of discursive and practical measures aiming to link domestic producers with a wider range of export markets and to attract investment from expatriate businesses and their foreign partners.

Deeper economic integration with the EU Common Market through the entry into force of the Customs Union (CU) in 1996 was expected to boost bilateral trade, Turkey’s export volume, and the inflow of European investment. However, the CU also posed challenges for the export strategy and particularly for the SMEs. The CU did not foresee the lifting of duties and other restrictions for Turkey’s unprocessed agricultural exports. It also urged Turkey to open its

\textsuperscript{165} On this legal membership status, which was documented by a “pink card”, see Çağlar 2004.
domestic market to third countries with which the EU had free trade agreements, while not granting similar advantages for its exports directed to these countries.

It was within this context that certain state and non-state actors, primarily the DTM and the closely affiliated Turkish Foreign Trade Foundation (Türkiye Dış Ticaret Vakfı, TDV) designated the “business” dimension of expatriate engagement. The TDV was established in 1995 for strengthening connections between Turkish businessmen abroad and their counterparts in Turkey. Its leading members were prominent figures of the export- and foreign trade-related bureaucracies of the Özal era, who also had experience abroad. For instance, the founder and all-time chairman, Ertuğrul Önen, was the Director General of Export under the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade starting from its inauguration in 1983. He served as the trade counsellor in Germany in the late 1980s - early 1990s, during which period he was involved in assisting the setting up of Turkish businessmen associations.166

According to Önen, officials serving at the overseas extensions of these bureaucracies realised that an incipient business-entrepreneurial segment was burgeoning from within what Turkey thought was a predominantly working class population.167 The question of how Turkey could benefit from these businesses found its answer in the idea of organising “World Turkish Businessmen Congresses”. The main goal was promoting Turkey as an attractive venue for investments of these Turkish businesspeople and their foreign partners. This became an urgent need especially after the trade bureaucracy realised that the CU did not lead to high levels of FDI inflow from Europe.168 Additional objectives of these Congresses were neutralising the CU’s adverse effects on SMEs’ export potential through putting them in touch with overseas firms, directly connecting local economies with foreign capital, and creating a communication platform for guaranteeing sustained connections.169

Six congresses were organised by the TDV, the DTM, and the MFA between 1996 and 2006.170 The President officially hosted the Congresses, whereas very high profile

166 For the history of the TDV, see http://www.tdv.org.tr/kurulus.html; for the profiles of the founders and the management board, see, http://www.dutiv.org.tr/yonetimkurul.html
167 Interview with Ertuğrul Önen in Milliyet (2 February 2000).
168 Ibid.
170 This paragraph is based on the review of the coverage of the congresses in the newspaper Milliyet between 1996 and 2007, and congress-related information available on the TDV website, at: http://www.tdv.org.tr/basin.html
businessmen presided them.\textsuperscript{171} Major organisations representing the Turkish private sector such as the DEIK, TOBB, TÜSİAD, the Turkish Contractors’ Union, Overseas Contractors’ Union, and the Assembly of Turkish Exporters regularly attended the congresses in their institutional capacity.\textsuperscript{172} Top governmental officials including prime ministers, foreign ministers, and ministers of the economic domain attended the congresses and invited the Turkish businessmen abroad to invest, transfer technology and know-how to Turkey. In most official addresses, the latter was presented as the ‘leader country of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century’ or as an ‘awakening giant’.

The vocabulary used within the “business” track had quite some parallels to that of other contemporary states trying to create a network of “global entrepreneurs”. Turkish entrepreneurs were depicted as astonishingly active and fluent in the global economy, while “originally” belonging to their homelands and their nation. For instance, in the Congress in 2000, then-President Demirel welcomed the businessmen who ‘have proved that [they] were able to conduct business at a global scale’ to their homeland. Presenting entrepreneurialism and striving for success as natural traits of Turkey and Turks, he expressed his gratitude to the overseas businessmen as they ‘represent[ed] Turkey’s dynamism, its determination for success and progress, its entrepreneurial spirit, and its competitiveness’.\textsuperscript{173}

The media covered success stories of guest-workers turned into big businessmen, who came together at ‘the summit of global Turks’ (\textit{Milliyet}, 1 May 1998). The Congresses became important venues for the reproduction of the 1990s’ ‘liberal nationalist’ discourse built on ‘[t]he enterprising energy of the “Turkish people”’ and on an understanding of ‘national pride’ stemming primarily from the economy’s successful integration with global markets (Bora 2011: 69-70). This discourse has become a trademark of the “business” dimension of expatriate engagement, which has turned into one of the essential platforms of the 2000s’ diaspora-making project.

\textsuperscript{171} Until 2002 the business tycoon Sakıp Sabancı, former chairman of TÜSİAD, and the head of Turkey’s largest conglomerate Sabancı Holding, and later the TOBB chairman Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu presided the Congresses.

\textsuperscript{172} Note that MÜSİAD was left out of the congresses’ scope, reflecting the state elite’s strong anti-Anatolian capital stance. This was the case even though the business-oriented track of engagement was presented as a domain based on maximising mutual benefits both for the homeland economy and the entrepreneurs, where political and ideological differences were left behind.

\textsuperscript{173} ‘The speech of President Süleyman Demirel at the Third World Turkish Businessmen Congress’, 10 April 2000, available online at: \url{http://www.tccb.gov.tr/suleyman-demirel-konusmalari/492/56972/dunya-turk-isadamlariiikurultayinda-yaptiklari-konusma.html}
3.5. Political incorporation of all or only the ideal nation abroad?

As prospects of return disappeared, the terms of the contract between overseas citizens and the home-state needed to be readjusted. The state was urged to address the issue of the place of its absent citizens within the home-polity. Besides, if Turkey was to attract expatriates’ loyalties and resources, it had to attract them through granting rights and some degree of representation. Full incorporation of expatriates into domestic decision-making mechanisms was the primary issue in the fourth track.

This question also posed the biggest challenge for the Kemalist elite, given the latter’s perceived mismatch between the “ideal nation” and the components making up the entirety of the overseas citizenry. On the one hand, it would be a crucial gesture demonstrating that Turkey was genuinely interested in reinforcing its ties with its expatriates. Proving that Turkey considered expatriates as no lesser members of its nation and demos than resident citizens, it could enhance loyalty, and strengthen the state’s hand against alternative ‘group-making projects’ (Brubaker 2002). On the other hand, considering the elite’s perceived mismatch between members of the ideal nation and the entirety of overseas citizenry, ‘opening of the political field’ (Itzigsohn 2000: 1146) to all overseas citizens had the potential to disadvantage the secular establishment.

During the 1993 parliamentary debates on the research commission proposal, all parties agreed that demonstrating interest in expatriates and taking incorporative measures towards them were among the home-state’s duties. Such measures were also necessary to pay back expatriates in return for their constantly inflowing remittances. Above all, they were crucial gestures for instituting strong bonds and trust between the two parties (TBMM 1993: 191-208). Mustafa Kalemli, the name behind the ANAP proposal, emphasised this latter point by saying: ‘if the state takes one step towards these people of ours settled abroad, they take ten steps towards the state, they embrace the state more, they love the state more, and they further sympathise with the state’ (TBMM 1993: 214).

The words of Rifat Serdaroğlu, then-State Minister Responsible for Citizens Abroad, suggest that the state deemed enhancing the allure and projecting a benign image of itself necessary for attracting overseas citizens’ sympathy and loyalty to the state. The failure to do so had been strengthening the hand of the non-state and anti-state competitors beyond and within
borders. In a statement published in the *Hürriyet* newspaper, Serdaroğlu summed up this point, while explicitly naming names of the “competitors”. He said that: ‘since we [the state] have not been able to reach out to them [our citizens abroad] due to some difficulties in the past, the PKK and the reactionaries did so instead; but from now on, we will reach out to them’ (Sarikaya 1997). The minister highlighted this aspect when he announced his ministry’s active “reach out strategy” to the press. The strategy included measures such as compiling an inventory of university students abroad and setting up research centres on expatriates. Forming a consultative high commission for citizens abroad that would bring home-officials together with expatriate representatives was also part of the strategy (Donat 1997).

Despite its embracement and bonding objectives, when the Consultation Commission for Citizens Living Abroad (*Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu, YYVDK*) was established in 1998, it received vocal criticism from various expatriate organisations. The primary criticism was directed at its failure to include wider sections and represent different stances, as its members were not elected, but appointed by the government (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 86). Three interviewees that were members of the 1998 Commission contended that due to the consultative nature of the commission, the main concern was selecting people with expertise and involvement in host-contexts, rather than representativeness. Those informants that expressed proximity to Kemalist-nationalist stances opined that political views were irrelevant in member selection. The other informant that defined himself as a non-Kemalist social democrat contended that there was a selection bias favouring those, ‘who the state thought would defend official arguments of the Turkish state well’.  

External voting, which was seen as one of the primary aspects of political and emotional bonding between the state and the overseas citizens, was introduced in 1986. While Turkish citizens registered as living abroad for a period longer than six months gained the right to vote in general elections and referenda, the method of voting was limited to casting votes at border polling stations. The limited method was justified on the bases that mail voting was breaching the constitutional “voting in privacy” principle. Setting up polling stations abroad met objections of the host-states, particularly of Germany, due to their concerns about public

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174 *Author’s interviews, Berlin, 10 October 2012; 25 October 2012; 31 October 2012.*

order and security (TBMM 1986: 552-553). Hence, the turnout rate among non-resident citizens remained under five per cent in the six general elections since 1987 (TBMM 2012a: 5).

The constitutional amendment in July 1995 opened room for new legislation enabling out-of-country voting. The laws on elections, voters’ registry, and political parties were amended in October 1995. While the law tasked the Supreme Election Board (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, YSK) with organising elections abroad, it also stated that the border ballots method would be maintained, should ‘factual or legal obstacles’ be encountered. The DYP and the CHP, the two partners of the coalition government behind the July constitutional amendment, were heavily criticised by other parties due to their reluctance in negotiating out-of-country-voting solutions with host-governments. The opposition also accused the coalition government of fearing overseas citizens’ influence on domestic politics (TBMM 1995b: 20).

Given the mid-1990s’ political context, the secular elite approached the dense social, political, and financial links between the RP and the IGMG with suspicion. The IGMG adopted a discourse of gradual regime change within parliamentary politics back then. Other Islamist groups like the Kaplan community in Germany aimed to ‘conduct an Islamic revolution in Turkey along the lines of the Iranian model’ (Schiffauer 1999: 4). Reformist or revolutionary, claims for regime change further fed into the secular elites’ ‘perception of threat regarding a possible reinstitution of the Sharia’ (Bora 2011: 65).

The state elite noted the role of expatriates in the rise of political Islam in Turkey in the 1990s. Prominent RP figures regularly visited IGMG branches for campaigning, whereas around six million DM was transferred from Germany for the RP’s election campaign in 1991 (Amiraux 2003: 162-163). Besides, secular media outlets regarded the MGH as the sole actor that had the financial-organisational capacity and the support base to fly voters from Europe. Hence, even under the border ballot procedure, the RP was considered to have the biggest potential to gain electoral advantage (Sirmen 1995). RP deputies confirmed this perception by claiming that the party would have no problem in transferring its supporters

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178 It should be reminded that cutting off financial links between the RP and the IGMG was among of the measures taken by the MGK during the 28 February Process.
that would not mind to travel thousands of kilometres for the sake of voting (TBMM 1995b: 120-121).

It is not far fetched to argue that the overall willingness to overcome the obstacles before enabling out-of-country-voting had remained rather low in the 1990s. Considering the political context depicted in the previous paragraphs, it could be argued that three factors contributed to this reluctance. First, there was a widely held assumption among the mainstream centre left and right that expatriates tend to support religious or nationalist parties (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 89). Second, those parties had much weaker overseas organisation, less developed transnational links, and a limited support base compared to the RP. Third, the inflow of cash or votes from abroad to the RP constituted a major concern for the secular establishment and particularly the military, especially at a time when they accelerated their efforts to undermine political Islam.

No party officially acknowledged such reluctance or hesitance. Most governments put forth Germany’s continuing objection as the hurdle that blocked out-of-country-voting. However, most parties, and above all the CHP upheld their strong resistance against mail ballots. As Section 4.4 will demonstrate, one can find clues about the official nationalist wariness of the expatriate vote in the arguments against mail balloting that the CHP voiced in the 2000s. For instance, one such argument was external voters’ vulnerability to the pressures of religious orders aiming to undermine the Republic’s fundamental principles.

All in all, the elites’ attempts to juggle with courting and incorporate the citizenry, their reluctance to actually grant electoral power to certain sections, and the legal unjustifiability of such partial incorporation resulted in an ambiguous outcome. On the one hand, the state formally and constitutionally incorporated all overseas citizens into the demos, and created official venues for voicing expatriate issues. On the other hand, it delayed taking steps that would enable actual political incorporation of overseas citizens and attributed representativeness only to pro-official nationalist “ideal expatriates”.

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4. POST-KEMALIST TURKEY’S OFFENSIVE DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

This section analyses the shifts in the rationales and modalities of Turkey’s emigrant engagement after major elite change in 2002. The first and second subsections demonstrate that the discursive and practical content of diaspora engagement, particularly towards emigrants in Western Europe, has changed mainly as a function of revisions in elite-promoted conception of nationhood and the home-state’s identitarian and political re-positioning vis-à-vis the West. Reciprocally, the instrumentalisation of absent but connected, and pro-Turkey emigrants plays important roles in the confirmation and legitimisation of the incumbent elite. The third subsection demonstrates that the home-economy’s further neoliberalisation has led the state to step up gear in its efforts to build and mobilise an entrepreneurial diaspora. Turkey during the AKP government has been focusing on demonstrating the willingness as well as the capability of the home-state as a diaspora engager. The final subsection argues that in addition to the state’s effort to demonstrate its genuine care for its emigrants, the dynamics of homeland party politics, the peculiarities of the electoral system, and the AKP’s overall positive expectations from external votes have been decisive for the long-awaited political incorporation of overseas citizens.

4.1. From pluralistic encompassment to reshuffling of friends and foes

The AKP’s attitude in its first term signalled a relative phasing out of the dominant discourse built on threatened security of the state and the nation. The gradual loss of power by the military and the AKP’s sympathetic stance to Islam indicated potential change in the authoritarian laicism of the previous period. Its criticism against the imposition of a monolithic Turkish nation and the relative moderation of the hawkish military approach to the Kurdish question signified a potential softening of those red lines based on the indivisibility of the nation and the state. The government declared its full commitment to democratisation and EU membership, accelerated the pace of reforms, and complemented them with “democratic openings” towards minorities. These developments suggested potential change in the official nationalist practice of sub-categorisation and differential treatment of citizens both at home and abroad.

In addition to changes on the state-front, readjusted stances and forms of mobilisation of “antagonistic” sections also led to a certain moderation of strident official nationalist agendas.
The Kurdish movement revised its goal of secession after the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999. The movement’s European components redefined their main goal as acquiring increased regional autonomous powers and collective cultural rights. They also moved away from political violence and adopted a repertoire of action based on putting pressure on the Turkish state through lobbying European state and non-state actors (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 308). On the Islamist front, the IGMG relatively distanced itself from Erbakan’s hardliner stance as a result of new generations’ increasing say within the movement. Its main objective shifted from establishing an Islamic regime in Turkey to gaining recognition and equal footing as Muslims in Europe (Schiffauer 2010).

The AKP’s position on two former “foe” categories suggested that the government was willing to deviate from the official nationalist stance only with regards to the Islamist category. Eyüp Fatsa, then-parliamentary group deputy chairman of the AKP, submitted a proposal for setting up a new research commission on the problems of expatriates in 2003. Fatsa, also an expatriate for around a decade himself, had been actively involved in the IGMG in Germany (Çakır 2003). During the parliamentary debates on the proposal, he underlined the state’s hitherto hostile attitude towards certain expatriate associations and accused the consulates of upholding the post-coup mentality regarding expatriates as ‘potential criminals’ (TBMM 2003b: 474-475). He criticised the diplomatic representations as they backed ‘minor and marginalised’ organisations without popular support bases, while disregarding ‘associations and federations that have provided services to tens or even hundreds of thousands of people’.

Avoiding naming names, Fatsa praised the patriotism of these hitherto excluded associations. As an example, he showed their joint protest against Germany when the latter put pressure on Turkey not to use German military aid ‘in a specific region’ of Turkey in the early 1990s. Both the example itself and Fatsa’s emphasis on excluding associations with ‘divisive and destructive endeavours’ from the scope of patriotic expatriates were telling about the AKP’s position on the “separatist” sub-category, i.e., the Kurds. His comments suggested that the

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179 IGMG members in Germany amount to 31,000 according to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2013: 19). According to IGMG statistics, the worldwide number of its members amounts to 114,000 (ibid.: 248).
180 Germany restricted Turkey’s use of German military aid in the Kurdish provinces in the early 1990s. It justified the restrictions on the basis of its strong suspicions that the Turkish armed forces’ previously used these arms against Kurdish civilians. The Turkish press showed successful lobbying activities of ‘PKK sympathisers abroad’ and ‘organisations set up by Kurdish asylum-seekers’ as forces behind Germany’s decision (Milliyet, 20 May 1993).
AKP’s criticism was exclusively directed at the implications of laicist sensitivities of official nationalism towards Sunni associations and pious-conservative sections abroad.

As these statements made clear, the highest potential for change was in the home government’s attitude towards previously delegitimized and excluded Sunni organizations. This was particularly the case for the IGMG due to close transnational connections it had with the AKP. The new political elite also became increasingly interested and active in engaging the supra-category of transborder populations from the mid-2000s on. Thus, concomitant with the relocation of expatriate sub-categories on the diasporic map, Turkey also adopted the discourse of an all-encompassing diaspora, within which all citizens and former citizens featured equally.

The official stance is that there is no differential treatment based on political or identitarian criteria in building relationships with civil society representatives and the only criterion is the current or former bond of citizenship. However, the answer given by state minister Faruk Çelik to a BDP deputy’s objection against the exclusive connotation of the name ‘Overseas Turks Agency’ demonstrated the limits of the encompassment. Çelik stated that the YTB was intended as an agency for all citizens, but not for those ‘who do not consider themselves as citizens of the Republic of Turkey or do not have such bonds’ (TBMM 2010: 546-547). This statement resonated with the old formula of equating a citizen of Turkey to a Turk and framing citizenship as a matter of subjective sense of belonging. It also suggested that the government inherited the official nationalist reflex of exclusively embracing the “ideal nation members”, although it redefined the latter as to include pious-conservative sections.

Major elite change, the official redefinition of the “ideal diasporic subject” and its repercussions on the re-hierarchisation of expatriate sub-categories will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 6. For now it suffices to say that the power shift from the secular elite to the AKP has been primarily translated into the legitimisation and valorisation of select “like-minded” expatriate sections and organisations. The AKP government initially adopted a discourse highlighting Turkey’s equal distance to and its pluralistic encompassment of all overseas citizens. There were also some symbolic attempts to approach hitherto excluded minorities and sections. Nevertheless, these demonstrations of change largely remained rhetoric. They

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181 Author’s interview with the Vice President of the YTB, Ankara, 19 April 2012.
were completely abandoned in the aftermath of the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the “17 December Process”, as the crystallising domestic political polarisation resonated also among expatriates.

4.2. From Euro-Turkish bridges to embodiments of post-Kemalist Turkey

During its first term the AKP government approached expatriates as ‘honorary ambassadors and consuls’ of Turkey in Europe and bridges connecting the two.\footnote{From then-prime minister’s Erdoğan’s address to expatriates in France (Hürriyet, 20 July 2004).} This position was in line with the government’s then-declared commitment to EU membership and its depiction of Turkey as the prime example of the compatibility between Islam, democracy, and market economy. Expatriates were reminded to be economically successful and politically active in their host-countries, while never forgetting their “essence”. In that way, they could better function as Euro-Turkish bridges and prove that Islam is compatible with liberal democratic societies and political systems.

The AKP government replicated the pro-naturalisation, pro-integration stance and complemented it with calls for supporting the homeland in its European endeavour. At the same time, anti-assimilationist rhetoric, primarily but not exclusively deployed by Erdoğan, also became more visible. For instance, in one of his speeches in France, Erdoğan reiterated Turkey’s determination for EU membership and encouraged expatriates in France to enhance their political power through naturalisation. Following this introduction, he added: ‘However, you should never allow assimilation. This is your most fundamental human right’ (Hürriyet, 20 July 2004). Drawing attention to rising assimilatory pressures in Europe through advising expatriates to resist such pressures was already part of the AKP’s discursive repertoire at this initial stage. The discursive strategy was mainly deployed to reveal the hypocrisy of the Western claim of being the model in safeguarding human rights and liberties.\footnote{For instance, Eyüp Fatsa claimed that “assimilation” was the ulterior intention behind European host-states’ insistence on “integration”, as illustrated by their intolerance towards teaching Turkish as mother-tongue. This restrictive approach strikingly contradicted their self-ascribed authority in judging other states’ human rights records, based on which they kept ‘lecturing’ Turkey (TBMM 2003b: 476).} This formula has been applied more frequently and assertively since the late 2000s.

As explained in Chapter 3, EU accession process stalled due to reciprocal reluctance in the AKP’s second term. The political and economic elite intensified its efforts to consolidate the
image of a powerful Turkey as the daring defender of aggrieved Muslim populations against the double standards and unfair attitude of the West. The government increasingly used this narrative both in its domestic and international political moves. The elites embedded Turkey within a government-sponsored image of the world divided along civilisational differences. Positioning Turkey at the centre of a certain portion on the non-Western side of the divide has been translated into shifting modalities of expatriate engagement too. I argue that the intermingled factors of re-positioning and the redefinition of the nation led to changes in defining and engaging expatriates, particularly those in Western Europe. These changes have become visible particularly through the ways in which the state defined the ideal diasporic subject and approached target populations and in its style of embrace. The diaspora-making project of the post-Kemalist Turkey, and particularly its discursive strategy differed from before in four major ways.

First, the ways in which top governmental officials addressed expatriates in their host countries and the extent to which these addresses were publicised substantially differs from those of previous decades. From 2004 onwards, official visits of Erdoğan to host-countries almost always included mass meetings with expatriates organised in large capacity sports-halls. Resembling campaigning rallies, these meetings contain strong show aspects. Images and stories showing thousands of expatriates coming from all over in a frenetic support for Erdoğan have gained increased visibility in the Turkish media, European editions of Turkish press, and the host-country media. The visibility of these events in Turkey increased parallel to the increase in opposition against the government and to the deepened polarisation in politics and the media. Over the last few years, several pro-government TV channels simultaneously provided live-coverage of Erdoğan’s “reunions” with expatriates. These rallies almost always convey messages centred on the theme of “a politically and economically more powerful Turkey standing firmly behind its expatriates” as opposed to the previously weaker, poorer, and disinterested Turkey.

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184 A sports-hall meeting with thousands of participants was organised in Cologne in 2004, with the organisational support of businessmen in the Cologne area. It was widely advertised through distributing hand-outs at mosques (Sabuncu 2004). A similar rally took place in Paris the same year. The media reported that a hall accommodating 3000 people was booked at Erdoğan’s request (Milliyet, 17 July 2004).

185 Author’s observation. It is also possible to find the live-broadcasted speeches on Youtube. For Erdoğan’s Cologne Speech on 24 May 2014, see, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiuBkpN7aJw]; for his Lyon speech dating 21 June 2014, see, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=unCspauBEko].

186 See, for instance, Erdoğan’s 2011 address to expatriates in France, where he said ‘a respected country with its powerful economy and foreign policy stands behind you’ (İhlas Haber Ajansı, 12 April 2011). Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s recent address in Belgium iterated the same discourse. He said: ‘the old Turkey that counted on
Particularly the latter aspects demonstrate that these meetings have gained a domestic political dimension. They aim to show that Erdoğan and his project of “new Turkey”, as opposed to the Kemalist vision, receive mass popular support from expatriates. They illustrate that despite the passing of time and geographical distance, expatriates feel a sense of belonging to the “genuine” nation and fully subscribe to its value system, suppressed and denied by the pro-western elites, restored and represented by the AKP. Demonstrations of such popular support resisting time and physical distance aim at proving the “genuineness” of the AKP vision, while highlighting the Kemalist project’s artificiality.

An equally important message is that even though these expatriates have been living in the heart of “developed” and “allegedly superior” Europe for decades, they still adhere to the “new Turkey” vision of the AKP and Erdoğan. The latter is built on highlighting the Sunni-Ottoman civilisational milieu’s difference from and moral superiority over the West. It is also built on giving an appearance that Turkey re-acquired its “natural” political-economic leadership role in this space (and beyond) thanks to the AKP. Expatriates’ resistance to Westernisation and enthusiastic support for the AKP’s vision for Turkey serve as evidence for the incumbent elite’s claims about an irreconcilable difference between the Ottoman-Sunni civilisation and the West, as well as the moral superiority of the former over the latter. By reaffirming the post-Kemalist Turkey’s difference and superiority, and illustrating its essential character resisting long-term subjection to Western contexts, expatriates’ support also helps reaffirming the AKP’s natural role as the representative of the real nation.\(^{187}\)

Second, the strategy of using assertive and at times provocative tones and focusing on issues refuting Western claims of “normative superiority” in relation to expatriates in Europe has become a trademark of the home government. Underlining Western intolerance towards

\(^{187}\) Note that such mass-meetings have always been conducted in the traditional Western European receiving countries, but not in Scandinavian countries, in the UK, or in the US. This is because the AKP’s organisation is much stronger and its support base much bigger in the former countries. The results of the 2014 presidential election confirm this argument: Erdoğan got 15.91% of the votes in the US, and 23.53% of those in the UK, whereas he received 68.63% of external votes in Germany; 80.1% in Austria, 69.8% in Belgium, and 66% in France. See, YSK election statistics, available online at:

[http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/faces/HaberDetay?training_id=YSKPWCN1_4444005790&_afrLoop=809789981529008&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=brnly0jq_37#tab_9%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dbrnly0jq_37%26_afrLoop%3D809789981529008%26training_id%3DYSKPWCN1_4444005790%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dbrnly0jq_49](http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/faces/HaberDetay?training_id=YSKPWCN1_4444005790&_afrLoop=809789981529008&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=brnly0jq_37#tab_9%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dbrnly0jq_37%26_afrLoop%3D809789981529008%26training_id%3DYSKPWCN1_4444005790%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dbrnly0jq_49)
diversity and Islam aims at boosting the AKP’s legitimacy and substantiating Turkey’s claims for benign and robust leadership. Addressing expatriates in Western Europe provides good occasions for deploying this discourse targeting domestic, as well as “Eastern” and Western audiences. This strategy seeks confrontation with the latter. It aims at provoking culturalist reactions that reproduce arguments on the undesirability of multiple loyalties, incompatibility of Islam with European values, or Turkey’s non-belonging to Europe and the EU. These kinds of claims voiced by host-state political actors then feed back into the reaffirmation and reproduction of the AKP’s “new Turkey” nationalist narrative, and particularly to its anti-Westernist dimension.

Erdoğan’s controversial 2008 Cologne address illustrated the abovementioned dynamics well. Addressing an enthusiastically supportive crowd of 20,000 expatriates, he stated that ‘assimilation is a crime against humanity’, which triggered fierce reactions among right-conservative circles in Germany. After the speech, Erwin Huber, then-chairman of the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU) accused Erdoğan of ‘preaching Turkish nationalism on German soil’ (Ataman 2008). Huber added that what Erdoğan did was ‘anti-European’ and confirmed the CSU’s ‘misgivings regarding Turkish EU membership’ (ibid.). Arguments on the negative impact of Turkish-style home-state involvement on “integration” got into wider circulation afterwards. After 2008, every time Erdoğan reiterated this discourse at big reunion spectacles, German right-conservative media and politicians reciprocated with “furious” reactions.188

Turkish authorities exhibited similar assertive and confrontational behaviour during the 2013 “accreditation crisis” that erupted in the context of the NSU trial.189 Until March 2013, Turkey gave rather moderate diplomatic declarations expressing its expectation that Germany should solve the case up and find out the broader organisational background behind the

188 See, Gezer & Reimann (2011) for Erdoğan’s Düsseldorf speech, where he said ‘[n]o one has the right to deprive us of our culture and our identity’, and ‘Islamophobia should be seen in the same way as anti-Semitism’. See, Spiegel Online International (1 March 2011) for a review of how mainstream newspapers, and particularly those on the right reacted to these remarks.

189 Eight people with Turkish origins, one person with Greek origin, and a German police officer were killed in a series of murders committed between 2000 and 2007 in several German cities. The systematic and xenophobic nature of the murders was revealed in November 2011, when the police identified members of the so-called ‘Zwickau cell’, belonging to the National Socialist Underground (NSU) as suspects. For details and analyses of the NSU case and extensive coverage on the trial process by an alternative investigative journalism initiative, see, http://www.nsu-watch.info
murders. The crisis broke out when the court in Munich revealed that there were no Turkish press members accepted among the list of fifty observers. Then-deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ expressed Turkey’s doubts about its hitherto held ‘conviction that Germany is a country based on openness, transparency, and rule of law’ (Ergan 2013). The Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU) deputy and chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, Ruprecht Polenz reciprocated by ‘strongly warning’ Turkish officials ‘to refrain from spinning the wheel of criticism one more time’ (Spiegel Online, 2 April 2013). Some German media accounts interpreted Turkish authorities’ repeated declarations underlining its expatriates’ damaged trust in the German state as part of the home-state’s ‘aggressive diaspora policy’ (Popp 2013). This “aggressive” style of engagement was criticised because it was ‘increasingly driving a wedge between immigrant families and mainstream society’ (ibid.).

The third dimension of the late-2000s’ diaspora-making project is the heavy reliance on the discourse of “our values”, placed in opposition to “their [alien] values”. Such demarcation and implicit suggestions about host-states’ efforts to deprive Turkish people ‘of their culture and identity’ require clear delineations between the two value systems, cultures and identities. It also requires attributing a fixed set of characteristics to bounded and cohesive groups. Reliance on both “national” values and groupism were central also to the official nationalist expatriate “engagement”. However, the new state elites’ expressed core values differ from those utilised by the previous elites. The identity, morality and culture commonly shared by the post-Kemalist Turkey and the expatriates draw primarily on religion, traditional family values, and conservative neighbourhood ethics. As expatriates’ (European) host-societies are alien and not sensitive enough towards this value system, the home-state needs to actively help preserving the nation abroad in its original essence.

A case illustrating the third dimension was the “foster families” debate. Highly publicised in Turkey, the debate centred on the government’s objections to European youth welfare offices’ choice of non-Muslim families for Turkish children whose parents had lost custody. Ministers and other officials brought the issue high up on the expatriate agenda in 2012-2013. Later it turned into a fully-fledged campaign involving the YTB and the Ministry of Family and

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190 Turkey’s level of engagement during this period was even found low-key by some, who claimed that neither the embassy nor Turkish politicians attended any of the 32 meetings of the Bundestag research commission (Author’s interview with the chairman of the ATT, Berlin, 1 October 2012).
191 See footnote 188.
Social Policies. The YTB organized a workshop on ‘Youth Welfare Offices and Turkish Families’ in 2012.

According to the Agency’s chairman, action was needed, because Turkey did not want ‘Hasan to become Hans, or Hans to become Hasan’ (Koyuncu 2012). Defining the problem as ‘gravely dramatic’ and as a case of ‘severe assimilation’, Bekir Bozdağ argued that ‘Turkish children were being Christianised’ through the choices of youth welfare offices (T24, 5 November 2012). In addition to objecting to Christian foster families, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan disapproved of the cases of Turkish children whose custody was given to homosexual couples. In a joint press conference with his Dutch counterpart, Erdoğan contended that such practices were ‘against general moral principles of a Muslim majority society’ and incompatible with Islamic culture (Sabah, 21 March 2013). He added that children ought to be given to ‘families that are suitable to their own culture and values’, and hence ‘a Muslim child should be given to a Muslim family’ (ibid.).

As the above examples also demonstrate, the home government has been defining the collective (national) identity of its expatriate community increasingly through Islamic references. This has been the case particularly for those settled in Western Europe because parts of the party’s pious-conservative support base arguably identify primarily as Muslims rather than Turks or Kurds. Nevertheless, the AKP’s prioritisation of expatriates’ religious identity is also closely related to its strategy of capitalising on the anti-Islamophobia discourse. Highlighting assimilation, discrimination, or xenophobia in Europe on the basis of religious differences rather than ethnicity better fits the narrative of the AKP-led Turkey as the leader and defender of aggrieved Muslims vis-à-vis the West.

This brings us to the fourth and final novelty in the “new” Turkey’s expatriate engagement, which is now embedded in a much broader transborder membership universe, as demonstrated throughout the thesis. Kemalist elites limited their interest in emigrant populations to citizens and former citizens of Turkey. They channelled most of their energies to control these populations and sustain official nationalism among them. However, the Kemalist Turkey never got involved in issues related to Muslim populations in Western

Note that the AKP’s framing of the issue shows striking parallels to that of the RP in the 1990s. For instance, in 1993, RP deputy Kazım Ataoğlu claimed that ‘a systematic assimilation programme was targeting Turkish families’, and churches and youth foster homes pursued Christianisation of Turkish children (TBMM 1993b: 196).
Europe, nor associated overseas Turkish citizens with such populations. On the contrary, the “new” Turkey has been trying to play its self-ascribed leader and protector role not only for its expatriates, but also for Muslims in Europe in general.

The way in which Erdoğan incorporated the “vermisst” campaign in Germany into his interwoven domestic and international political manoeuvres is a case in point. In September 2012, the German Ministry of Interior launched a highly controversial campaign called “missing” (vermisst) for the “early prevention” of Islamist fundamentalism and terrorism through providing a hotline service for those that were worried about the radicalisation of their relatives or friends. Hand-outs and posters bearing pictures of fictitious people named ‘Hassan’, ‘Ahmad’, ‘Fatima’ (with a headscarf), and ‘Tim’ as potential fundamentalists were publicised. Accused of stigmatising all Muslims, the campaign caused backlash among Muslims in Germany (Reuters, 5 September 2012).

Embedding it within a broader discourse on anti-Islamophobia, Erdoğan immediately took the issue up to the domestic arena. At the AKP General Congress on 30 September 2012, he said:

‘To insult and humiliate a religion, members of a religion, sacred values of a religion can never be considered within the scope of freedom of thought. Islamophobia is a crime against humanity. … We cannot accept that the West that recognises anti-Semitism as a crime against humanity, to keep silent when it comes to Islamophobia … I would like to remind that we follow attempts of agitation in the US, in Germany, in France, and in other Western countries, through hand-outs, films, caricatures, and publications with concern.’ 193

Taking it to the international level, he reiterated his suggestion at the UN Forum in Vienna, while adding ‘Zionism’ in addition to ‘anti-Semitism, fascism, and Islamophobia’ to his list of crimes against humanity. Incorporating the controversial “Israeli” aspect to the abovementioned strategy, his remarks were condemned both by Israel and the US, and hence made the international headlines (BBC News, 1 March 2013; The New York Times, 1 March 2013). In the pro-government Turkish print media, the American and Israeli reaction triggered by his comments was announced by headlines like ‘Erdoğan’s speech shook the world’ (Haber Türk, 1 March 2013), or ‘Zionism is racism’ (Yeni Şafak, 2 March 2013).

193 Full text of Erdogan’s speech, available online, at: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-ak-parti-4.-olagan-buyuk-kongresi-konusmasinin-tam-metni/31771
4.3. Transforming the community of migrant workers into global Turkish diaspora

During the 2003 parliamentary debates on the setting up of a research commission on expatriates, deputies from both the AKP and the CHP contended that the expatriate population was going through a visible socioeconomic upgrading. It was transforming from a community of workers to one increasingly composed also of traders, professionals, and entrepreneurs. The two parties also agreed that Turkey had largely not benefited from this upgraded socioeconomic capital (TBMM 2003b: 467-478; 2003c: 26-30). CHP deputy and former ambassador to Germany Onur Öymen gave the example of the success of China and India in attracting billions-worth of FDI from their overseas entrepreneurs, and urged Turkey to tap into the ‘extraordinary potential of Turkish entrepreneurs abroad’ in similar ways (TBMM 2003c: 29). In the final report of the research commission, the DTM, as one of the consulted bureaucracies contended that: ‘It is of great significance that the potential of our businessmen living abroad is channelled to our country’s development. India and China should be taken as examples in this regard’ (TBMM 2003a: 74).

The references to emulate the models of China and India were not limited to the abovementioned examples. They feature in majority of speeches and strategy documents prescribing how the relations between the Turkish diaspora and the home economy should develop. However, compared to these idealised trading and investing diasporas and the level of their economic relations with their homelands, the economic potential of Turkish businesses abroad is rather limited and their structure seems to be different. From the late 1980s onwards, a trend towards increasing self-employment started to become visible in the traditional countries of residence, the overwhelming majority being in Germany (Şen et al. 2007). The case of Germany showed that even though the number of enterprises rose from 25,500 in 1987 to 70,300 in 2007, those of small and medium scale predominate. The majority of these enterprises were family businesses, more than half employing a maximum of three people (ibid. 35-39). Despite differences in size, form, and structure to the Chinese and Indian models, Turkish authorities also seem to believe in the ‘truth regime’ about the

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194 Note that the DTM was not among the consulted bureaucracies in the 1995 version of a similar report on the measures to be taken with regards to expatriates. Its inclusion in the 2003 report confirms Larner (2007)’s point about the moving of states’ ‘diaspora strategies’ to the economic domain.
magic formula of mobilising diasporic investment and trading potential in bolstering the home-economy. 195

As explained in Chapter 3, as Turkey continued to achieve high growth rates despite the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, both political authorities’ and business circles’ degree of self-confidence and assertiveness increased. The predominant conviction was that it was the right moment for Turkey to seize the opportunity offered by the shifting centre of global economic gravity towards the “East”. The “business” dimension of expatriate engagement had been reformulated and reactivated in close relation to the redefinition and scaling up of economic objectives. The home-state’s top priorities have become the growth of overseas Turkish businesses’, the expansion of their operations’ range, and the increase of the share of “entrepreneurial sections” within the overseas population. For instance, then-prime minister Erdoğan, in his 2009 address to expatriate associations in Belgium, urged them to ‘move up the social ladder’ and added: ‘We cannot always remain petty tradesmen; we need to become industrialists and international traders’. 196

The reformulation can be dated back to the end of 2007, when the World Turkish Business Council (Dünya Türk İş Konseyi, DTIK) was established as a specialised subsidiary body under the DEIK. It was established with the aim of bringing Turkish entrepreneurs, professionals at key positions in multinational companies, and business associations ‘under the same roof’. Primary objectives of the DTIK are stated as:

‘to boost the commercial and economical [sic.] relations among the Turkish business community settled outside Turkey, to strengthen and disseminate the Turkish diaspora further, to create one main center for all kinds of problems that the Turkish entrepreneurs face abroad, and to lead the bids to establish a stronger image for Turkey in the World.’ 197

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195 The state’s short-term projections on the numerical growth of Turkish-origin employers confirm that its expectations from the entrepreneurial diaspora were somewhat unrealistic. According to 2012 projections sent by then-Minister of Economy Zafer Çağlayan to Turkish-hyphenated business associations in Germany, the number of Turkish-origin employers was expected to increase from 80,000 to 120,000 by 2015. Expecting a 50% increase in three years was found ‘too optimistic’, if not ‘unrealistic’ by the Secretary General of the Turkish-German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Türkisch-Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammer, TD-IHK) (Author’s interview, Berlin, 27 September 2012).

196 For the 2009 speech of Erdoğan in Belgium, see, the news item on the webpage of the Ministry for EU Affairs: Başbakan Erdoğan, Belçika’dağındaki Türk dernek temsilcilerine konuştu: “Biz, Türkiye’nin dışında olan vatandaşlarımızın, kardeşlerimizin burada alının açık ve dik olması çok önemsiyoruz” http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=42330&l=1

The actors, vocabulary, strategies, and expected outcomes of this reformulated neoliberal modality of engagement have been based on the idea of emulating diaspora strategies of bigger emerging powers. The Ministry of State responsible for Foreign Trade and the DTM featured as the main state actors. The previous non-governmental ally TDV was replaced by the DEIK, presided by TOBB chairman Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu. The first DTIK ‘Executive Board’ included chairpersons of Turkey’s biggest conglomerates, namely, Sabancı and Koç Holdings, representing traditional urban capital. It also had members with “Anatolian tiger origins”. One such profile was that of Ahmet Çalık, who made his breakthrough by exporting textiles to the Turkic Republics in the 1980s, and later expanded his enterprises to the sectors of construction, energy, media, and finance, geographically ranging from Central Asia to the Balkans.198

Muhtar Kent, member of DTIK ‘Executive Board’ and the chairman of its ‘High Advisory Council’, has been presented as the showcase face of the “Turkish diaspora”. Kent was born in New York to diplomat parents, received secondary education in Turkey and studied economics and business administration in the UK. After holding top managerial positions in Turkey, he became the CEO of the Coca Cola Company in 2007. Kent’s professional trajectory that has brought him to the top of the global capital’s paradigmatic multinational perfectly exemplifies the discourse underlining Turks’ capacity not only to become successful but also to lead in global-scale capitalist competition. He has been also volunteering to assume a leading role in making ‘Turkish diaspora one of the most effective diasporas in the world’ to contribute to his homeland’s transformation into a global economic power. 199

Within this dimension valuing neoliberal fluency and an understanding of patriotism based on the homeland’s economic success at a global scale, Kent represents the “ideal diasporic subject”.

198 The crystallising political and identitarian polarisation along the lines of supporters of the AKP’s new Turkey versus the rest seems to have its impact also on the leadership cadres of the entrepreneurial diaspora-making project. Delving into the details of recent changes in the relations between the government and the high echelons of the private sector is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it should be noted that similar exclusion-inclusion practices to those of the 1990s are currently taking place, albeit in the reverse direction. The government has become increasingly hostile towards the urban-secular capital, i.e., the TUSIAD, and explicitly favoured the Islamic-conservative capital that is not anymore only based in Anatolia, i.e., the MUSIAD. These changes in the government’s attitude were reflected in the legal status and the leadership of both the DEIK and the DTIK. The DEIK lost its semi-private status as a subsidiary body under the TOBB, as it was brought under the authority of the Ministry of Economy in September 2014. Objecting to such “statist” intervention, Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu resigned from his position as chairmen of both the DEIK and DTIK. On the details of the “DEIK crisis”, see, Tekin (2014). Following these changes, Ömer Vardan, MUSIAD chairman between 2008-2012 became the DEIK chairman, whereas the current MUSIAD chairman Nail Olpak became the DTIK chairman.

199 Kent’s words uttered on the occasion of his selection to the ten ‘honorary members’ of the renewed Overseas Citizens Advisory Board as part of the YTB, quoted in Anadolu Ajansı (14 January 2013).
While building on the “business” dimension of expatriate engagement developed in the previous era, the format and vocabulary was readjusted to the 2000s’ entrepreneurial diaspora lexicon. “Businessmen congresses” were renamed as the “World Turkish Entrepreneurs Congresses” (Dünya Türk Girişimciler Kurultayı, DTGK). It was at the DTGK in 2009, when Kürşad Tüzmen officially re-baptised the expatriates as the Turkish diaspora (Neylan 2009). The political and economic elite decided that it was necessary to appropriate the category of diaspora in a way that it could be used as a mobilising category within the Turkish context. The DTGK chairman Hisarcıklıoğlu openly declared their intention to dissociate the category from antagonistic diasporas that have caused trouble to Turkey. The category of Turkish diaspora needed to be developed, promoted, and institutionalised in order to mobilise energies and to institute a homeland-diaspora nexus. At the 2009 DTGK, Hisarcıklıoğlu said: ‘For many years, the words “lobby” and “diaspora” carried scary meanings for us. No need to be afraid. We have the capital, strength, energy and intent that we need!’

As one of the main actors shaping the discourse in this dimension of diaspora-making, Hisarcıklıoğlu kept emphasising the end of ‘the age of labour migration’ and the beginning of the era of ‘entrepreneurial mobility’. He reiterated the narrative contending that overseas Turks climbed up from ‘a community of migrant workers’ to ‘global Turks spread to every corner of the world’, whereas their homeland has become a ‘regional power and a global player’. Hisarcıklıoğlu substantiated the latter claim through proof coming from the ‘heartlands of neoliberalism’ (Larner 2007). The president of Columbia University suggested looking at Turkey in order to understand globalisation, the German magazine Stern labelled Turkey as a ‘turbo-power’, an English diplomat called Istanbul ‘the only city that would shape the fortunes of Europe’. Hisarcıklıoğlu argued that the key to enhance Turkey’s competitive power was a ‘sustainable diaspora strategy’. Such strategy would merge the homeland’s globally confirmed economic potential with a connected entrepreneurial-professional Turkish network, and a ‘Turkish middle class that would become the subject, not the object of politics in Europe’. While connecting globally spread and active political and

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202 Ibid.
economic nodes was key to success, it was equally important to ensure the preservation of a sense of a ‘Turkish community’ distinguished through its ‘language, culture, traditions, and beliefs’. ²⁰³

The DEIK and the DTIK have played significant roles also in laying the groundwork for Turkey’s ‘diaspora strategy’. The report of the DEIK entitled ‘Diaspora Strategies in the World: Suggestions for the Turkish diaspora’ is a good example of such role (DEIK 2011). The report surveys ‘successful examples and best practices’ of diaspora engagement by examining strategies of Australia, China, India, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, and Mexico among others. The report sets forth a road map for Turkey’s diaspora strategy ahead through examining these countries’ initiatives for defining diasporas in the widest possible ways while targeting different segments with different policies, attracting diaspora FDI, incentivising joint ventures, transferring know-how and skills, sustaining close links and sense of belonging, and encouraging pro-homeland lobbying. Apart from “nation-state” diaspora engagement projects, the report also heavily draws on increasingly popular “diaspora and development” publications of the IOM and the World Bank (ibid.: 29-32). ²⁰⁴

The main substantial tool DTIK developed has been the ‘online communication platform’ launched in 2009, which provides a sector- and country-based database of member businesses and allows them to find potential business partners. ²⁰⁵ Besides, DTIK regional committees were formed in 2009. These committees are tasked with documenting other Turkish entrepreneurs in their regions, disseminating information on DTIK activities and membership advantages, and facilitating business deals in their regions. They are also expected to act as “brand managers” for Turkey through improving its international image and enhancing communication with political and economic authorities and businesses in their host-contexts (DEIK/DTIK 2009).

²⁰³ Ibid.
²⁰⁴ It is worth noting that the report was prepared with the support of Kingsley Aikins, president of Worldwide Ireland Funds from 1992 to 2011 and the CEO of “Diaspora Matters”, which provides consultancy services to public and private actors aspiring to ‘better harness their diasporas’ in order to increase their competitiveness in global economy. See, http://diasporamatters.com
4.4. Courting and cultivating the citizen diaspora

This section demonstrates that the homeland activism of Turkey during the AKP government has been focusing on demonstrating the willingness as well as the capability of the home-state as a diaspora engager. It is partially based on highlighting the contrast to the distant attitude of the former elites towards large sections of emigrants and the financial incapacity of the home-state. The engagement strategy has prioritised demonstrating that the AKP-led Turkey is actively seeking an “emotional” rapprochement with larger sections of the diaspora, and empathising with their sensitivities. The recent strategy is also about demonstrating the enhanced material capacity of the home-state, which, unlike its 1990s’ counterpart, allocates financial and human resources for the wellbeing of its expatriates. The final subsection analyses one of the most important and tangible aspects of the home-state’s offensive engagement strategy, namely, the practical enfranchisement of overseas citizens in 2012. While having led to democratic inclusion of broader sections of citizens abroad, the logic behind the long-awaited political incorporation cannot be fully understood without taking party political dynamics and the electoral system in the homeland into account.

4.4.1. Closing the state’s distance with “the people”

An important dimension of the AKP government’s migrant diaspora engagement centred on criticising the previously elitist attitude of the state, and particularly that of diplomatic officials towards “common people” abroad. AKP spokesperson Eyüp Fatsa made this point clear in his address in the parliament by calling upon the MFA to stop ‘treating our own people as pariahs at their own state’s embassies and consulates’ (TBMM 2003b: 477). It is indeed a widely held perception among expatriates that consulate officials were not only inaccessible, but also patronising towards citizens abroad. In almost all interviews and informal conversations held by the author in Berlin, there were comments along the lines of: ‘people used to be scared at the idea of having to go to the consulates’; ‘consulates were seen like police stations’, ‘the two scariest places for Turkish immigrants were the foreigners’ offices and the consulates’.

Improving the home-state’s image through enhancing its service provision capacity and ameliorating its treatment of expatriates were crucial for demonstrating that the state cared for and embraced them. Showing that the AKP-led state moved away from the elitist position has also played a crucial role in the party’s effort to demonstrate that it is the “natural” ruling
elite, springing from and close to the people. The frequent underlining of this aspect provided considerable popular legitimacy for the party, especially within the context of its power struggle against the secular establishment.

The discursive part of the strategy draws upon the ‘deep-seated divisions’ of ‘modern versus traditional, progressive versus conservative, and rationalist versus religious’ (Yavuz 1997: 64). This divide finds expression in the popularly used categories of “black Turks” and “white Turks”. The “black Turks” denote ‘uneducated, lower classes or people with peasant backgrounds’, whereas the “white Turks” ‘are considered to be educated, working mainly in the upper reaches of the state bureaucracy, the army, and business world’ (Ferguson 2014: 78). The AKP and particularly Erdoğan have made frequent use of this division, self-identifying with ‘black Turks’. The party heavily relied on presenting itself as the rightful representative of black Turks that ended the decades-long exclusion of and discrimination against this section by the “white” (ibid.).

The MFA and diplomatic circles have been regarded as representing elitist ‘white Turk’ official institutions. Hence, improving the image and attitude of the embassies and the consulates has been one of the areas that the government highly prioritised. Apart from infrastructural improvements that increased the efficiency of service provision at the consulates, there seems to be a deliberate policy of appointing younger, more enthusiastic diplomats as consuls, who in most cases know the language and are familiar with the host context. Even though some find these moves purely driven by domestic political calculations in the context of external voting, the overall perception is that there is a deliberate policy of closing the distance between “the people” and the MFA.206 A striking difference from the older cadres of diplomats is that they also started to demonstrate that the state pays attention to the “sensitivities of common people”, most notably, those about religion. For instance, the embassy and the consulates in Germany included organising iftars - dinner breaking the daily fast in Ramadan - in their symbolic policy repertoire for the first time in 2012. They now

206 This deliberate policy change in the case of Germany was noticed by most of my informants. The following quote summarises the perspective of those that see a deliberate effort and assess it positively: ‘These new diplomats … are among Turkish people, but not only stuck among Turkish people, they do not leave Germans aside… this is a new policy, and it is very visible … you can see this change everywhere in Germany’ (Author’s interview with the General Secretary of the TD-IHK, Berlin, 27 September 2012).
regularly attend the *eid* prayers at mosques besides the commemoration day at the anniversary of Atatürk’s death, or the Republic’s Day celebrations.207

4.4.2. *Dedicating the state’s emotional and financial resources*

Since the 1990s, expatriates had voiced their demands for the establishment of a ministry dedicated to overseas citizens. The home-state authorities also acknowledged these demands (TBMM 1995a: 59). The 2003 parliamentary research report pointed to the establishment of an overseas citizens bureaucracy as the top priority. This agency would coordinate the expatriate-related activities of many official bodies, develop strategies to solve their problems and to benefit from their potential, and coordinate expatriate NGOs in forming an effective Turkish lobby (TBMM 2003a: 146). The YTB was established in 2010 to perform all these tasks, and it was presented as a body similar to diaspora ministries in the world.208 Not only due to its symbolic importance but also with the human and financial resources it has been allocated, the establishment of YTB constituted one of the major dimensions of demonstrating the transformed approach of the home-state in its expatriates.209

The YTB’s mandate covers state - transborder civil society relations, explicitly leaving interstate relations to the domain of the MFA. The Agency is presented as the Ankara-based ally of expatriate NGOs, their mentor or partner if and when they need assistance from Turkey.210 The YTB is positioned as the main state body assuming responsibility regarding the rights, statuses, and the representation of overseas citizens and former citizens in Turkey. It took an

207 Author’s notes from field research in Berlin, September-October 2012.
208 For an overview of the Agency’s officially stated goals, functions, and scope written by the YTB’s first chairman (in English), see, Yurtaş (2012).
209 The Agency’s total budget for 2012 was around 33 million Turkish Liras (TRY) (= US $ 18 million), which was increased to TRY 167 million for 2013 (= US $ 84 million), and to TRY 194,5 million in 2014 (= US $ 85 million). Out of this total, TRY 16 million (= US $ 8,5 million), TRY 148 million (= US $ 74 million), and TRY 167 million (= US $ 73 million) were allocated for current expenditures (composed mainly of payments to NGOs and international students’ grants) respectively. The increase in the current expenditures is explained by the fact that the payment of international students’ grants was shifted from the Ministry of Education to the YTB in 2013 (YTB 2013). TRY 16 million (= US $ 8,5 million) was spent for payments to NGOs in 2012, whereas this number increased to TRY 25 million in 2013 (= US $ 12,5 million). TRY 27 million (= US $ 12 million) was allocated for the same purpose in 2014 (YTB 2012, 2013, 2014b). Data on how much funding was provided for which specific project, or to which specific NGO was not available.
210 Author’s interview with the vice-president of YTB, Ankara, 19 April 2012.
active role in the preparation of legislation on the improvement of the “quasi-citizenship” status, as well as on the external voting amendments.\textsuperscript{211}

With regards to their issues and activities in their host-countries, the Agency’s first chairman Kemal Yurtnaç stated the YTB’s objective as turning expatriates from ‘a mere “crowd of Turkish people” into a diaspora’ (Albayrak 2013). This meant helping them to become ‘an organized force capable of defending its rights, while working at the same time to influence decision-making processes in politics in the countries they live in’ (ibid.). Having realised the futility and counter-productivity of the 1980s-1990s’ excessively top-down approach of bringing associations together, the declared approach seems to be more flexible regarding the concern with umbrella organisations. The expectation is that they become self-sufficient and able to act in a united way ‘when common interests are in question’ (ibid.).\textsuperscript{212}

As part of the home-state’s symbolic demonstration of its embracement of expatriates, the Consultation Commission was revived under the YTB’s roof in 2010.\textsuperscript{213} Members were selected again by appointment among applicants who fulfil the required conditions.\textsuperscript{214} The new Commission covers a wider geographical scope. It is predominantly composed of businesspeople and representatives from civil society organisations mainly working on issues related to Islam and Turkish-language teaching. There are also local politicians, lawyers, and academicians among its members. The inclusion of representatives from organisations like the IGMG and overseas MÜSİADs among members illustrates the partial reversal of the official-nationalist selection bias of the 1990s. However, that majority of the members from Germany are from Sunni Islamic organisations like DITIB, IGMG, German Islam Conference, and

\textsuperscript{211} Amendments in laws covering both the elections and electoral registers and the clauses of citizenship law regulating the quasi-citizenship status were made through the same law. See, Law No. 6304, dating 9.5.2012, Official Gazette, 18.5.2012, No: 28296.

\textsuperscript{212} Awareness raising activities, capacity building trainings for NGOs, theme- or occupation- specific programmes targeting mainly younger generations such as ‘Young Leaders Abroad Programme’ and ‘European Lawyers Training Programme’ have so far constituted the YTB’s main activities. For more recent activities, see YTB (2014a). The Agency also grants project-based funds for NGOs. Funds were offered to either ‘general’ projects or those in priority issue areas determined by the YTB. Since 2011 TRY 53 million (= US $ 28 million) has been spent on more than 547 projects with NGOs falling into both transborder citizen and kin categories. See, http://www.ytb.gov.tr/tr/mali-destekler/847-mali-destekler

\textsuperscript{213} The name of the renewed commission is the Consultation Commission of Citizens Abroad (\textit{Yurtdışt\d{u} Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu}, YVDK).

European Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Centres points to a similar selection bias favouring like-minded partners.\footnote{See, the complete list and the profiles of the members, on: \url{http://www.yvdk.gov.tr/uyeler}}

### 4.4.3. Practically enfranchising citizens abroad, factoring in the external vote

In March 2008, the AKP brought a draft bill to the parliament introducing alternative methods of voting by mail, electronic voting, and out-of-country voting in addition to the border ballots method. The preamble stated that ‘it is the duty of our state to enable our citizens abroad to enjoy their voting rights and to add a political dimension to their relationship with their homeland’ (cited in Çalışır 2010: 37). According to AKP deputies, indications by Germany that it might allow setting up polling stations on its soil paved the way for the preparation of the bill (TBMM 2008a: 447).

The AKP seems to have succeeded in establishing a close relationship with the IGMG. The SP, its potential rival appealing to the MGH electorate, lost considerable power and ceased to pose an electoral challenge for the AKP.\footnote{The SP’s share in the border votes decreased from 3,69% in 2002 to 2,99% and to 1,55% in 2007 and 2011 elections respectively, see, \url{http://www.yvdk.gov.tr/uyeler}} As overseas votes are presumed to be predominantly conservative leaning, the AKP also expected overall positive returns for itself and disadvantageous results particularly for the CHP.\footnote{Bozdağ claimed that ‘there would be no votes coming on the CHP’s way from abroad’ (Bugün, 3 May 2013).} This conviction is not only held by the AKP but also by the media.\footnote{See, Elger & Gezer (2014) for an example in the Spiegel, which claims that ‘Erdogan … became the first to recognize the potential value of these votes. He knew that many of these foreign Turks would vote for him. … Erdogan supporters are in the majority -in Germany as well as in Turkey’.} In the case of Western European countries, the AKP’s electoral advantage seems to be confirmed by public opinion surveys.\footnote{A 2007 survey found out that 31% of Turkish citizens in the EU-15 opted for the AKP and 18% for the CHP (Hürriyet, 1 April 2007). According to a survey conducted by Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre (HUGO) with 2634 Turkish citizens in ten Western European countries, 44% said they would vote AKP, 14% were undecided, 12% would vote CHP, 8% would vote none, while 4% would vote MHP, and 2% would vote BDP HUGO (2013).} The distribution of border votes in the general elections also pointed to an AKP lead (See Table 2).\footnote{Obviously, the sample is far from being random. However, the increasing support for the AKP and the fact that it has been attracting votes from the “other” category and from the MHP is telling.} An additional personal motivation for Erdoğan to expand “his” potential constituency, which also helps explaining the timing of the 2008 draft bill, was the outcome of the 2007 referendum. The referendum gave consent to constitutional amendments including the election of the president by popular vote starting from the end of then-president Gül’s term in 2014.
Table 3. The distribution of the border vote and domestic vote in the general elections (2002-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>AKP Border</th>
<th>AKP Domestic</th>
<th>CHP Border</th>
<th>CHP Domestic</th>
<th>MHP Border</th>
<th>MHP Domestic</th>
<th>Other Border</th>
<th>Other Domestic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from the YSK official election results statistics webpage: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/GenelSecimler.html

While the AKP had strong electoral incentives to incorporate external voters, the positions of the opposition parties, namely, the CHP, the MHP, and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) differed. The external voter profile, on which the AKP based its expectation for positive returns, constituted the gist of the CHP’s reservations on external voting. The latter was particularly resistant against unmonitored methods of voting. The CHP spokesperson claimed that mail or electronic ballots would render voters vulnerable to social pressure by family members, neighbourhood communities, and religious orders. Above all, it would render them vulnerable to pressures by ‘organisations aspiring to abolish constitutionally ingrained fundamental principles of our Republic’, which have been influential among expatriates in Europe (TBMM 2008b: 475-476.) He then asserted that all Turkish citizens, resident or non-resident, were obliged not to challenge and to embrace the non-negotiable principles of the Republic, i.e., laicism, social welfare, rule of law, and the ‘indivisible unity and integrity’ of the state (ibid.). The MHP had similar doubts on the regulation, as it would make it possible for ‘criminal and terrorist organisations’ abroad that ‘pestered the European Turkdom’ to put pressure on external voters (2008a: 453). Both parties’ concerns confirmed their continuing perception of “abroad” as an uncontrollable social space infiltrated by movements threatening the principles of secularism and indivisibility. Besides, while religious-conservative votes would put the CHP in a relative disadvantage, potential Kurdish and leftist votes of “dissident” emigrants are likely to disadvantage both parties.

The DTP’s objections deserve particular attention as they question the AKP’s claim that its draft bill was ‘a very good example of the participatory democracy leg of the AKP-initiated democratisation process’ (TBMM 2008b: 450). To better understand the DTP’s criticism and

221 The DTP was closed by the Constitutional Court in 2009, and was replaced by the Party for Peace and Democracy (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP).
the AKP’s questionable claim of improving the quality of representative democracy, one should first take into account that in 1983, post-coup lawmakers introduced a 10 per cent national-level threshold. Justified on the basis of political stability, the threshold still remains intact. The threshold primarily benefited the ANAP in the 1980s, and the AKP in the 2000s, while constituting a major problem for minor or geographically concentrated parties such as the pro-Kurdish parties. In order to circumvent the threshold, these parties entered the last two elections with independent candidates and formed their parliamentary party groups once in the parliament.  

The DTP interpreted the provision in the draft bill allowing overseas citizens to vote only for political parties as a measure directly targeting itself and its potential voters abroad. Thus, DTP deputies claimed that considering the AKP’s insistence on preserving the threshold, the provision aimed at electorally favouring the AKP and the above-threshold parties, rather than further democratisation through politically incorporating hitherto excluded expatriates. At the same time, it aimed at disadvantaging the DTP by forcing it either to settle for the votes cast only in Turkey, or to enter the election as a party despite the threshold (TBMM 2008b: 455-457).

Despite all these objections, the law passed without changes thanks to the government’s parliamentary majority. The CHP applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the mail voting clause arguing that it breaches the constitutionally inscribed principle of voting in privacy. The Court revoked the clause. Finally an amendment to the law on elections in May 2012 regulated methods of external voting, while it left the mail voting option out. Despite the objections raised by the BDP (TBMM 2012b: 889; 923), the governing party declared that it had no intentions of reducing the threshold, as it was necessary for political stability and strong governments. Neither did it respond to the objection against the independent candidate provision (ibid.: 877).

Even though all external voting regulations since 1986 have had the latter provision, it has become a major issue within the current political context, as it touches upon the parliamentary

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222 DTP managed to form its group with 21 MPs at the 2007 elections, and BDP had 29 MPs after the 2011 elections.
representation aspect of the political solution of the Kurdish question. The AKP’s insistence to preserve both the threshold and the independent candidate restriction illustrates that its enthusiasm on enfranchising overseas citizens largely depends on the maintenance of conditions rendering itself the absolute winner of such incorporation. That the other two above-threshold parties remained silent on the independent candidate restriction demonstrated that they agreed on the “exclusive inclusion” of expatriates as a way to benefit mainstream parties.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter demonstrated that the expatriate landscape seen through Turkey’s lens changed in parallel to shifts in: (i) the predominant understanding of national economic development, and how expatriates featured as socioeconomic subjects in a particular development model, (ii) defining characteristics of the nation that the elites narrated and claimed to represent, and the elites’ assessment of the expatriate landscape as reinforcing or undermining the legitimacy of this narrative, (iii) the predominant national narrative’s positioning in relation to the West, and the functions attributed to the expatriates within that relational space.

The inward looking, self-sufficiency-oriented understanding of national economic development gave way to an outward looking, economic growth-oriented one over the last decades of the previous century. This led to a discursive shift from self-sacrificing workers as agents of Turkey’s socioeconomic transformation to successful entrepreneurs and professionals partaking in Turkey’s rise in the global scene. The discursive shift was accompanied by a change from return-oriented developmentalist policies to dispersion-sympathetic fraternal networking policies starting in the mid-1990s. As ‘neoliberal orthodoxy’ became the rule of the game during the 2000s, Turkey’s entrepreneurial diaspora-making efforts tried to mimic success stories like those of India and China.

The replacement of the Kemalist elite’s hegemony by that of the AKP and its allies led to a reconfiguration of defining characteristics and “core” values making up the elite-promoted narrative of the nation. In both periods, elites’ assessment of expatriates’ overall complementarity or incompatibility with their national narrative significantly shaped the state’s attitude towards the entire overseas citizenry. Hence, the state upheld demarcating sub-categories with different forms and degrees of membership in both periods. As the content of
the narrative changed, the outcome of such assessment, and hence the state’s overall discourse and attitude varied.

The Kemalist elite perceived an overall mismatch between the expatriate landscape and the core components making up its ideal nation definition; namely, anti-communism, laicism, and ethno-linguistic monism. Political and economic incentives drove the state to adopt a more positive attitude in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the overall perception of risk made the secular elites refrain from offering the full package of “embracement”, including the incorporation of the entire overseas citizenry to the demos. Overall, the official nationalist elite pursued a rather defensive engagement strategy, primarily aiming to exclude and constrain the incongruous sections. Such an approach predominated, even when it occasionally worked against including, instrumentalising, and mobilising ideal national subjects abroad.

The AKP offered an Islam-sympathetic, post-Kemalist vision for the nation. Its reading of the correspondence between its vision and the expatriate landscape has been overall positive. The party trusted its morality built on conservatism, piety, and tradition, and its transnational links particularly as far as the sections in Western Europe with guest-worker backgrounds were concerned. The AKP-led state has pursued a rather offensive engagement strategy. The AKP government projected its nationalism beyond the border in an increasingly assertive way, assessing that a majority of expatriates would subscribe to it. Its expectation of overall positive returns in terms of popular legitimacy boosting and electoral consolidation also made the AKP dare incorporating the entirety of citizens in their capacity as legal members and voters.

Finally, pro-western tones in the Kemalist nation-state narrative had implications for the state-envisioned function of expatriates in Europe. Especially in the post-Cold War era, Turkey attributed to them the role of affirming Turkey’s belonging to the West and supporting the homeland’s European endeavour. In order to equip them with the necessary tools, the state tried to facilitate their transformation into political actors and national voting blocs in their host-countries. The EU accession process stalled in the second half of the 2000s. The AKP’s nationalist narrative increasingly relied on the accentuation of the Ottoman-Islamic roots of national identity, and its difference from and moral superiority over the West. It also increasingly used the parallel “genuine and Islamic” versus “alienated and Westernised” dichotomy in the domestic juxtaposition of the “new Turkey” and the “old Turkey”. The
home government increasingly instrumentalised expatriates in Europe as a means of reaffirming the domestically and to a certain extent regionally high-yield anti-Westernist and anti-Kemalist claims and discourses.
CHAPTER 5

TURKEY AS A KIN-STATE: DISCOVERING AND CREATING AN EXPANSIVE FAMILY TREE

This chapter examines the transformation of Turkey as a kin-state in three periods. It demonstrates the variable and contingent nature of the state’s definition and the resulting changes in the scope and composition of its transborder kin universe. It also shows how these “fluctuations” in the extent and content of targeted transborder kin were translated into changing rhetoric and practice of kin-engagement. The first section provides a synopsis of Turkey’s definition of kin and its attitude vis-à-vis transborder co-ethnic and/or kin communities in the period between 1923 and 1990. It first accounts for the largely inactive and disinterested attitude of the “strictly territorial” young republic towards potential - kin communities beyond its borders. Then the section examines which populations, based on what kinds of criteria and links were regarded as Turkey’s kin.

In the second and third sections, the awakening of the state’s interest in transborder kin populations is examined. This is done through contextualising the discourse and attitude shift within the post-Cold War political conjuncture, economic restructuring of Turkey, and incipient domestic questioning of Kemalist conceptions of nationhood. The section demonstrates that the state attempted to draw an encompassing kin map composed of co-ethnics, Muslims in former Ottoman territories in the Balkans and Caucasus, and the re-claimed “Turkic” brethren in Central Asia already in this period. The making and engagement of transborder kin was mainly driven by political elites’ conviction that mobilising Turkish-Muslim connections would contribute to augment the state’s regional economic and political influence in the post-Cold War setting. The foundations of kin-engagement instruments were largely laid in this period, although success in creating a sense of kinship remained rather limited. The third section demonstrates that the shift from territorialisation to “transterritorialisation” of kin communities also occurred in the 1990s.

The fourth section analyses the post-2002 period. The section demonstrates that there have been continuities in terms of the political-economic rationalities that shaped the post-Cold War approach towards kin-engagement. It has remained part of a broader strategy of finding a more central position for the country in regional politics. However, this stage has also been
marked by changes in the state’s political and economic aspirations, in the scope of regions it aimed to interpenetrate with, and its financial capabilities. The governing party has formulated and used new narratives of historical, cultural, religious, and civilisational affinities in drawing an ever-expanding map of transborder kin. The Ottoman-Islamic non-Western and anti-Western civilisational aspects of the AKP’s nationalist narrative led to a shift in the kin-state vocabulary from an emphasis on Turkishness to one that refers to a vague notion of co-civilisation. This deliberate ambiguity allows for an ever-expansive, flexible, and simultaneously pragmatist kin-state approach. The last section discusses different rationales, historical particularities, and kin-engagement modalities of delimited ethnic kin-states and states claiming expansive-malleable kin universes. It is demonstrated that given the vast universe of Turkey’s claimed “civilisational kin”, the state has refrained from providing clear criteria and neat official definitions, on the basis of which rights, statuses, and entitlements could be granted.

1. DEFINING THE POST-IMPERIAL NATION AND DELINEATING ITS TRANSBORDER “EXTENSIONS”

The transition from a multi-confessional non-nationally organised empire to a modern nation-state left its long-lasting imprints on Turkey’s definition of kin and its attitude vis-à-vis transborder co-ethnic and/or kin communities. This section analyses the interactions between early Republican nation- and state-building and Turkey’s conception(s) of transborder kin as well as its disinterested attitude as a transterritorial kin-state until mid-19th century. It then analyses the implications of the Cold War geopolitical context for Turkey’s cautious and moderate kin-state profile until the 1990s.

1.1. Becoming a modern nation-state, refraining from transborder kin-engagement

The founders of the Republic of Turkey aspired to create a prototypical territorial modern nation-state out of a multi-confessional, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual empire. While they desired to make a clean break with the Ottoman Empire, ignoring the latter’s legacy in demographic, societal, political, economic, and identitarian terms proved to be difficult. The outcome was that the new nation-state was ‘both the antithesis and the continuation of the Ottoman Empire’ in many respects (Uzer 2011: 58). The early Republican elites were
determined to strip Turkey from those characteristics of the empire that they considered as having caused its decadence and eventual collapse.

Late Ottoman elites’ expansionist and ‘adventurist’ quests were among those traits. The Republican elite blamed the expansionist pursuits of Enver Pasha’s Committee of Union and Progress for the shrinking of the empire’s territory and dragging of its population into the midst of continuous wars and trauma. Seriously ‘endangering state security’, these unrealistic and risky attempts contributed to the complete collapse of the empire (ibid. 36). Hence, the founders of the Republic rejected any ideology with a “pan-” prefix from the onset, be it pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism. Even before the Republic’s establishment, as early as 1921, Mustafa Kemal stated that: ‘Neither Islamic union nor Turanism may constitute a doctrine, or logical policy for us. Henceforth the Government policy of the new Turkey is to consist in living independently, relying on Turkey’s own sovereignty within her national frontiers’ (quoted in Landau 1995: 74). Although pan-Turkist circles of intellectuals and umbrella organisations such as the ‘Turkish Hearth’ continued to exist after the founding of the Republic, the state kept its distance from them. ‘Pan-Turkist irredentism’ was ‘officially disavowed’ in the 1920s (Tachau 1963: 175).

Mainly concerned with the substantial and symbolic nation-building project within Turkey’s territorial borders, the state elite, i.e., the CHP, confined itself to expressing ‘good wishes

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225 Pan-Islamism, as an “abstract” ideology, aimed at achieving the ‘unity of the world in Islam’ led by a single religious leader. In the Ottoman context, it was Sultan Abdülhamid II that shaped and tried to use pan-Islamism as a basis for his political project aspiring ‘to enhance his prestige and power through emphasis upon his headship of the Islamic world by virtue of the title of caliph’ (Lee 1942: 279). For the use of pan-Islamism as a way of reasserting the shattering empire, see also Landau (1990).

226 The ideology of pan-Turkism originated among the Turkist thinkers in the Russian Empire in the 1880s. The Crimean Tatar Ismail Gaspirinsky is the first and most influential pan-Turkist ideologue (Köksal 2010). Gaspirinsky’s pan-Turkism aimed at achieving the ‘union of all Turkic groups in Russia, under the spiritual guidance of Turkey, based upon a culture rejuvenated by a common language’ (Landau 1995: 10). With Ziya Gökalp’s cultural Turkish nationalism, the idea of an ethno-linguistic political union lost its primacy to a much lighter cultural union of Turkish peoples within the late-Ottoman context (Köksal 2010: 199). Nevertheless, some CUP leaders, including Enver Pasha, supported a pragmatist pan-Turkist expansionism and irredentism, on which they grounded the decision to enter the First World War on the side of Germany (Landau 1995: 51). See, Parla (1985), on Gökalp’s Durkheimian Turkish nationalism. For the entry of pan-Turkism into the Ottoman Empire, its reception, adoption, and development, see Landau (1995: 29-73).

227 According to Turkist-nationalist circles committed to trace the origins of Turkic people, “Turan” was the ‘mythical homeland of Turks’. Since the 1900s, this spatial / ethno-cultural concept was used to refer to an all-encompassing “Türkdom” (Köksal 2010: 205). In later uses, the idea of Turan denoted not only “Turke” people but also ‘Hungarians, Finns, and Estonians’. The Turanist ideology aimed at the unification of all these peoples in a vast geography from Scandinavia to China (Poulton 1997a: 196).

228 Even though the state did not give primacy to embracement of and action towards ‘external Turks’, “nationalist” and increasingly racist movements developing and disseminating “Turkist” propaganda were on the rise in the 1930s and 1940s (Landau 1995: 87-97).
towards and affection for external Turks’ (Uzer 2011: 45). This inward looking approach was also driven by the elite’s aim of reinforcing the Republic’s status as a legitimate member of the international state system through normalising its relations with its neighbours and third states. Such normalisation was also needed for the post-war recovery. Refraining from pan-Turkism was especially important with regards to stabilising and improving Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union (Landau 1995: 75). Thus, Turkey was particularly careful to underline that its approach towards transborder co-ethnics, referred to as ‘external Turks’ or ‘outside Turks’ (Diş Türkler) in official parlance, was based merely on cultural support. Turkey had no political intentions regarding these populations, and it fully respected the sovereignty of their states of residence and citizenship (Oran 1996: 177). Reflecting this very moderate kin-state stance, no clause hinting even slightly at Turkey’s responsibility for external minorities was inserted in the 1924 Constitution.\footnote{Neither did any other Constitution of Turkey (those of 1961 and of 1982) have a clause declaring the state’s responsibility for “ethnic Turks” or “external kin minorities”. Hence, there was no constitutional base for future specific legislation regarding external kin minority protection resembling that of Hungary or other CEE states with similar “Status Laws”.}

1.2. Difficulties of defining who is a Turk

The territory of the late Ottoman Empire shrank gradually at different stages during the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. The establishment of Turkey within its currently held borders signified the last step of a process of gradual disintegration, accompanied with losses of territory and populations. The emergence of new nation-states in the former imperial space reshuffled subjects of the empire into the territories (and nations) of discrete nation-states. This meant that the population resident within the bounded territory of the new Republic was composed of a Turkish-speaking, Sunni-Hanafi Muslim majority, and several ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. The state, like all the other states in the post-imperial space, channelled its energies into solving the problem of incongruity between the desired homogeneous nation and its diverse resident population.

Non-Muslim minorities were regarded as the most incongruous from the onset, and hence their ‘voluntary or involuntary emigration’ was a significant initial step in homogenising the Turkish nation (İçduygu et al. 2008). As the Muslim populations constituted a similar problem for neighbouring states with Orthodox Christian majority populations, bilaterally agreed and regulated population exchanges became official means for national
homogenisation in the region. Rather than aiming ‘ethnic unmixing’ (Brubaker 1998), these exchanges prioritised “religious unmixing”. This was confirmed by the forced removal of Turkish-speaking Christian Karamanlis to Greece, and Greek-speaking Muslim Cretans to Turkey (Aktürk 2009: 896).

Even though non-Muslim populations were exchanged with Muslim populations through these schemes, ethnic and religious heterogeneity continued to be a demographic reality within the resident population and citizenry of Turkey. At the same time, ethno-linguistically Turkish and/or religiously Sunni Muslim populations were left out of the borders. In other words, like in many other states in the region, ‘there were elements from the very beginning both of perceived aliens within and of kin outside’ in Turkey (Poulton 1997a: 196).

The question of defining who is a Turk and who is a Turkish citizen dominated political debates leading to the writing of the 1924 Constitution (Kirişçi 2000: 1). The solution was found in drawing the limits of the nation as to match the borders of the state, and creating an indivisible, homogenous, and modern Turkish nation out of the resident population. Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution stated that regardless of their religious or ethnic origin everyone in Turkey is considered as a Turk in terms of citizenship (İçduygu et.al 1999: 193). Hence, while the initial basis for the entitlement to Turkish citizenship was territorial, the Constitution and the 1928 Citizenship Law created a ‘fabricated and imposed monolithic citizenship identity’ by equating a Turkish citizen to a Turk (ibid.: 203). In a similar vein, Article 66 of the 1982 constitution (which is still in force) states that ‘everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk’.

1.3. Complexities of defining who is Turkey’s transborder kin

In addition to examining state practice of sending out “incongruous” populations, some studies aptly pointed at preferential immigration, settlement, and citizenship policies towards

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230 The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 regulated the large-scale population exchange with Greece. The treaties of ‘Friendship and Good Neighbourhood’ with Bulgaria in 1925, with Albania in 1925, with Greece in 1930, and with Romania in 1936 constituted the basis for future smaller scale migrations aiming homogenisation of the respective nations (İçduygu et.al 2009: 141). See, in general, Hirschon (ed.) 2003, for legal, demographic, political, sociological dimensions of the Treaty of Lausanne and the population exchange between Greece and Turkey.

external populations as fertile areas of inquiry that can give clues about the conception of nationhood and membership in Turkey. Which populations based on which criteria were actively “imported” or accepted as part of the nation is equally telling about how the state delineated its nation’s transborder brethren.

Starting from the initial years of the Republic and actively continuing until 1940, Turkey encouraged large-scale immigration from the former Ottoman territories to its depopulated territory. As part of the state’s substantial nation-building efforts, around 800,000 ‘Balkan Turks and Muslims’ arrived in Turkey as immigrants between 1923 and 1938 (Çağaptay 2006: 82). The principle of allowing the immigration and asylum of only those belonging to ‘Turkish origin/descent’ and those ‘who share the Turkish culture’ gained highest-level official status with the enactment of the 1934 Law on Settlement.

The differentiation between these two categories gave hints about the internal hierarchies of Turkishness. While Turks were those who are ethno-linguistically Turkish, others that did not fulfil this criterion but shared ‘the Turkish culture’ denoted Sunni Muslim communities from former Ottoman territories mainly in the Balkans and the Caucasus (Çağaptay 2006: 93-94). Belonging to Turkish descent without being a Sunni Muslim appeared to be not enough to pass the test of Turkishness of the Republic. Immigration policies and practice favouring non-Turkish Sunni Muslims such as Albanians, Pomaks and Bosnians over Christian Orthodox Gagauz Turks or Shia Azeris illustrated that religious and sectarian criteria played a definitive role (Kirişçi 2000: 6). Aktürk (2009) argues that the preference for those belonging to the former Ottoman Muslim millet over non-Muslim Turks in the ethno-linguistic sense demonstrated that the conception of Turkish nationhood was primarily based on religious-sectarian background rather than ethnicity. Hence, defying the debatable ethnic-civic dichotomy, the conception of Turkish nationhood was ‘anti-ethnic’ or ‘non-ethnic’, and instead drew on the Ottoman Muslim millet as membership criteria (ibid.).

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232 See, Çağaptay 2006, particularly Chapters 4 and 5, and Kirişçi 2000 that exclusively focused on the relationship between nationhood and immigration - citizenship policies.
233 For an elaborate examination of immigration mainly from the Balkans in the period between 1923 and 1945, see, İçduygu et.al (2009: 139-145).
234 Law No. 2510/1934 on Settlement, Official Gazette, No. 2733, 21 June 1934. In line with the accelerated pace of the monolithic Turkish nation-building project in the 1930s, the Law on Settlement also regulated internal migration. Its main aim was to assimilate all the non-Turkish speaking Muslim elements, and particularly the Kurds, into the official Turkish national identity. This was attempted through resettling populations and creating mixed areas inhabited by those of Turkish origin and culture and other incongruous elements. See, Kirişçi (2000: 4-7); Çağaptay (2006: 88-91); and İçduygu et.al (2009:105-130).
It is definitely true that the early Republican conception of nationhood did not fit either a purely civic-territorial or a purely ethnic understanding, and highly prioritized religious-sectarian “compatibility”. However, this interpretation falls short of explaining the active exclusion of non-Balkanic former members of the Ottoman Sunni Muslim millet that were ethno-linguistically non-Turkish, for instance, Kurds and Arabs, from these immigration schemes. Not too strongly affiliating with other ethno-linguistic collective identities and hence being perceived as “assimilable” or “blendable” by the founders of the Republic seemed to have been an additional criterion to differentiate among those transborder Sunni-Muslims.

Çağaptay’s argument about the internal hierarchies or different “zones” of Turkishness incorporates this criterion pointing at differences between non-Turkish Sunni Muslims. He argued that the state regarded Turks by ethnicity and language, the great majority of which were also Muslims, as lying at the centre of the ‘three zones of Turkishness’. Among the non-Turks, preference was given to those members of the former Ottoman Sunni Muslim millet that the elites regarded as easily assimilable to the envisaged Turkish identity. Particularly Balkan and also Black Sea Muslims fulfilled this latter criterion, while Arabs or Kurds did not. Those Muslim non-Turkish (Kurds), and non-Muslim non-Turkish populations (Armenians, Greeks, Jews) that were part of the territory and the citizenry of Turkey from the inception of the Republic constituted the ‘outer circle’ in terms of membership to the nation (Çağaptay 2006: 159-160). These latter groups did not feature in any kind of transborder “kinship” definition either.

The broader scope of “Turkic” populations mainly in the Soviet Union were not included in these descent- and culture-based immigration schemes. Nevertheless, the elites deemed it necessary for the new nation-state to produce and promote an official narrative of a pre-Ottoman history of the Turks. The search for an ancient and glorious history of Turks and their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic “roots” led to the incorporation of many cultural aspects of pan-Turkism into official discourses (Landau 1995: 78). The state elite outsourced the making of an official ‘Turkish History Thesis’ to the historians that traced back the Turks’ geographical and historical origins to pre-Islamic Central Asia. A state-sponsored linguistic-etymologic theory on the “original” Turkish language revealed the purity and the beauty of Turkish before Arabic and Farsi languages corrupted it, and campaigns were launched for
resorting back to “genuine” Turkish. These efforts reached their height in the 1930s and 1940s. The emphases on the concepts of soy, which in the English language corresponds to concepts like descent, lineage, origin, and soydaş, which refers to those that share a common “soy”, were further highlighted in this period.

The re-narration of the Turkish nation’s ancient history resulted in the official depiction of “Turkic” people in Central Asia as populations inhabiting the ancestral lands of the Turks of Turkey, and sharing common descent as well as language with the latter. This reinterpretation of the roots of the nation moved the “core” of the notion of Turkishness closer to an understanding based on ‘ethnicity-through-language and race’ (Çağaptay 2006: 52). While the state continued to refrain from irredentism, the discovery of the Turkic people in Central Asia impacted the scope of populations that were identified as sharing common soy with the Turkish nation. Neither these territories, nor populations in these territories belonged to the Ottoman Empire at any point of time. However, due to the long-lasting effects of the state-sponsored invention and promotion of the new nation’s origins, the Turkic brethren in the “ancestral lands” became a potential component of Turkey’s transborder kin. As we will see in the following sections, this potential has been occasionally and contingently activated by the state.

The early uses of mixed criteria for delineating extraterritorial populations with special links to Turkey constituted the basis for future expansions of the scope of Turkey’s claimed transborder kin. The early Republican hierarchical ordering of components of membership criteria have continued to indicate different types and degrees of kinship, perceived both by the state and by the target transborder populations. Even though they were not demarcated in an explicit and crystal-clear way, three “types” of kin categories based on partly overlapping criteria started to be shaped from the early days of the republic.

The narrower definition based on ethno-linguistic affinity and former belonging to the Ottoman Sunni Muslim millet limits the universe of Turkey’s kin mainly to Turkish populations in Northern Cyprus, in Greece (Western Thrace), and in Bulgaria. Smaller

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235 For an analysis of this re-narration of origins in the 1930s-1940s, see Copeaux 2000.
236 Even though the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) declared its independence in 1983, Turkey is the only state that de jure recognises the state internationally. Hence, internationally it is called Northern Cyprus. As Turkey officially recognises the TRNC as an independent state, Cypriot Turks are not officially considered as minorities within a larger state. However, due to the legal situation of the country, they are probably the most
communities of around 80,000 Turks in Romania and former Yugoslavia also fit the narrow definition (Poulton 1997a: 195). Turkey considered these communities as those that ‘make up the ‘front-line’ of communities that look to the kin-state’ (Poulton 1997a: 195). The category of soydâş, which corresponds to the “co-ethnic” category in the internationally used “kin-state terminology”, has referred to these populations in Turkey’s kin-state lexicon.

The “Turkic” populations mainly in Central Asia, but also those in Eurasia in the broader sense make up an in-between category. They lack Ottoman connections, while exhibiting linguistic commonality to a certain extent, being Muslims, and being regarded as sharing ancestry. Hence, as will be demonstrated, the claims of proximity with these populations have been waxing and waning in line with the interest of Turkey in claiming and engaging them mainly based on political and economic objectives.

Finally, the third category of those ‘who share Turkish culture’ has clearly not been based on commonality in descent and/or language. Within the early Republican repatriation context, this category was limited to “assimilable” non-Turkish Sunni Muslim populations in specific former Ottoman territories. Poulton (1997a: 195) argued that ‘the long ascendancy of the Ottoman empire and the heritage of the Islamic Caliphate’ in those regions as well as the long-lasting effects of the millet system contributed to a somewhat enduring reciprocal sense

stranded of these Turkish minorities. According to the most updated census, its population as of 2011 is 294,396 (KKTC DPÖ 2012).

237 It is difficult to get exact official numbers about the Turkish minorities in Western Thrace, the estimated population ranges between 100,000-120,000 according to the World Directory of Minorities, http://www.faaq.org/minorities/Eastern-Europe/Turks-of-Western-Thrace.html#b Turkey’s MFA objects to the general estimate of 150,000. The Ministry claims that these estimates do not take into account any increase since the 1920s, despite the high population growth rate of the community. The MFA claim is that there should be ‘at least 800,000 Turks in the region’. See, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-minority-of-western-thrace.en.mfa In-between these two extremes, the 1999 report of Human Rights Watch estimated the minority’s population as 291,472 using the 1951 census data as reference, or 444,945 using the 1940 census data, at a 2 per cent annual growth rate. See, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-04.htm

238 The total population of Bulgaria was 7,364,570 according to the 2011 census results. According to the census, ethnic Turks constitutes 8.8 per cent, which corresponds roughly to 650,000 people (NSI 2011). According to World Directory on Minorities and Indigenous Peoples’ overview on Bulgaria, the 2001 census counted the total population as 7,928,901, of whom, 746,664 were Turks (9.4 per cent). http://www.minorityrights.org/2426/bulgaria/bulgaria-overview.html

My interviewees composed of minority representatives and Turkish diplomatic officials provided estimates between the 10-15 percent range, with a corresponding population of 800,000 to 1 million.

239 According to Çağaptay (2006: 94), historically, the category of ‘those belonging to Turkish origin’ included ‘ethnic Turks … from the Dodecanese, as well as Azeris, Balkars, Karaçays, Karapapaks, Tatars, Terekemes, Turkmens, and other Turkic groups in the country’s vicinity’.

240 Bosnians, Pomaks, Circassians, Tatars, etc. were included in this category during the immigration schemes of the republic. However, Muslims from the Balkans were treated in a more privileged way than those from the Caucasus. The main reason behind that was the authorities’ perception that the latter was less assimilable due to their higher national consciousness. In addition, the majority of the early Republican elite, including Mustafa Kemal, were Balkan immigrants themselves (Çağaptay 2006: 94-101).
of kin minority-kin-state connection. The state has kept the ‘cultural’ kin category within the broader universe of transborder kin. However, the degree of the state’s assertiveness in claiming and engaging these populations as well as the latter’s order in the kinship hierarchies varied considerably over time. The category of *akraba* communities, meaning ‘related’ or ‘kin’ communities, has entered the official lexicon from the mid-1990s onwards. The content of the *akraba* category is essentially based on the early categorisation of those ‘sharing Turkish culture’. The category has traditionally and predominantly referred to Balkan-Caucasian former Ottoman Muslims. However, it has also been the transborder membership category that the state contingently and strategically readjusted most through flexing and blurring its definition and expanding its scope.\(^{241}\)

### 1.4. Hibernating kin-state within the context of the Cold War

Until the mid-1940s, Turkey’s approach towards the first and third categories of transborder kin was mainly limited to repatriation and naturalisation. The objective was populating the country with the “right kind” of people that would not pose challenges to the building of the monolithic nation. The members of the nation were expected to speak Turkish, affiliate ethno-nationally as Turkish, and religiously as Sunni Muslim. The state’s need for populating the country started to decrease in the 1940s as it became domestically troubled with unemployment in the 1960s. Thus, the official approach shifted from encouraging kin immigration to ‘preventing any massive influxes of migrants and refugees’ (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu 2006a: 348).\(^{242}\) As most of the countries falling on Turkey’s co-ethnic and cultural kin map became part of the Eastern Bloc, immigration from those regions was reduced to a great extent.\(^{243}\)

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\(^{241}\) For now, it suffices to say that there are parallels and continuities between early Republican notions and hierarchies of transborder kin and those that are utilised by the current kin-state. Uses of these definitional foundations in contemporary Turkey’s categorisation and demarcation practices will be further discussed in Section 3.4.

\(^{242}\) As explained in Chapter 4, the state started to pursue ‘safety valve’ policies (Hirschman 1978) through regulating temporary labour out-migration in the 1960s. The end of kin immigration and the beginning of labour emigration driven by demographic and economic concerns coincided.

\(^{243}\) The sharp decrease in admissions can be seen through comparing the total number of immigrants from Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia in the pre- and post-war periods: In the 16-year period between 1923 and 1939 this number (including the mass population exchanges with Greece) totalled up to 814,993. Between 1940 and 1945, the total number of immigrants from these countries remained at 21,616. Over the five decades between 1946 and 1995, a total of 818,778 persons from these countries were admitted. 74% of the immigrants (603,585) came from Bulgaria during three mass immigration waves, whereas 188,000 (23%) persons arrived from Yugoslavia. (Calculated by the author based on the numbers provided by Kirisci (2000: 8)).
In the post-war period, Turkey allowed *en masse* kin immigration only in cases when assimilatory pressures and minority rights violations in the states of residence and citizenship led to refugee flows. Three instances of large-scale immigration from Bulgaria were the main cases of post-war exceptional transborder kin admission (See Chapter 7). However, one should note that even at the heyday of Cold War polarisation, Turkey did not have an open-doors immigration policy towards “ethnic Turks” or Muslims, similar to that of German Federal Expellee and Refugee Law. Turkey’s lack of economic capacity and political clout vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was a major factor behind not opening the doors of the “motherland” to the transborder kin living under communist regimes. The ideological symbolic value of accepting all ‘ethnic Turks’ or Muslim brethren from the Eastern Bloc was not as high as it was for a divided Germany either (Joppke and Rosenhek 2001). In fact, the rising anti-communist sentiment in Turkey in the 1960s led to an ambivalent position towards the ethnic or religious kin in the Eastern Bloc. The narrative of ‘atrocities’ they were being subjected to in these communist and atheist regimes was used as part of anti-communist propaganda. At the same time, those that managed to immigrate were approached with suspicion, as they were potentially bringing their communist agendas with them (İçduygu et.al 2009: 148).244

For most of the 20th century, the extraterritorial dimension of Turkey’s kin engagement was limited mainly to moderate interest in the communities in Greece, Bulgaria, and Cyprus. Turkey had a legal basis for its kin-state actions regarding the Turks in Western Thrace, who were included within the reciprocal minority protection framework of the Treaty of Lausanne, not as Turks but as part of the Muslim minority. Despite the legal basis, Turkey was quite inactive in assuming its kin-state responsibility towards this population. Apart from minor attempts of providing educational or cultural support, Turkey remained a hibernating kin-state and did not deviate from its general ‘policy of caution’ (Poulton 1997a: 207).

In the case of co-ethnics in Bulgaria, Turkey’s kin-state action did not cross borders either, and it remained limited to opening its borders when the communist regime intensified its

244 Starting from 1960s, nationalist and fiercely anti-communist movements started to actively organise. They formed umbrella organisations such as the ‘Union of the Nationalists of Turkey’ in 1964. The MHP, established in 1969 under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş, monopolised the nationalist movement and the defence of the ‘external Turk’ agenda (Landau 1995: 147-158). Among the political parties represented in the parliament, the MHP has always been the main actor advocating the protection of transborder soydaş, and of further rapprochement with the “Turkic world”. According to Landau, the MHP, “through its organisation and propaganda, has succeeded in introducing Pan-Turkism into the mainstream of Turkish politics” (ibid.: 170).
assimilationist pressures towards Turkish and Muslim minorities. These pressures reached their zenith in the 1984-89 “revival process”, during which Turkey took a relatively more active kin-state stance. The selective admission of different types of kin populations from Bulgaria illustrated the state’s continued internal hierarchisation of its kin, and its prioritisation of the ethno-linguistically defined kin over non-Turkish Muslims. The state exhibited a rather indifferent attitude towards assimilation campaigns targeting the latter in Bulgaria and privileged the admission of the Turks over the Muslim Pomak and Roma populations as refugees in 1989 (See Chapter 7).

A case of hyper-kin-activism on the part of Turkey in this period was its 1974 military intervention in Cyprus. The Turkish state called the intervention ‘Cyprus Peace Operation’, while internationally it was regarded as Turkey’s invasion of the island. Turkey’s hyper-activism in Cyprus is generally regarded as an exceptional, crisis-driven, and contingent instance deviating from the low-key, non-interventionist Kemalist kin-state line. Still, the fact that this exception was made for a ‘front-line’ soydas community perceived and presented by the state at high existential risk also helps illustrating who belonged to the core of the state’s definition of kin in the 1970s. After 1974, Turkey’s already low kin-state activism capacity got further limited, as states with internal Turkish minorities regarded it as an aggressor and a potentially irredentist kin-state. This was the case particularly in Greece (Poulton 1997a: 202) and in Bulgaria (Dimitrov 2000: 12).

2. GEOPOLITICS AND GEO-ECONOMICS OF TURKEY’S POST-COLD WAR KIN-MAKING

As explained in Chapter 3, Turkey’s post-1980 economic reorientation started to have its effects on the state’s approach on its relations with the regions and economies outside its borders already before the end of the Cold War. Özal’s governments put considerable effort into diversifying and increasing Turkey’s trade partners and in stimulating outward looking investments through establishing contacts with the markets in the MENA region and the

245 On a brief examination of the invasion of Cyprus, see Poulton (1997a: 201-203). See, Saideman and Ayres (2008: 216-222), for an analysis of what they called ‘Turkey’s policy of quasi-irredentism’. They argue that this “one-shot” quasi-irredentism was highly related to contingencies, such as responding to Greece’s intensified plans of enosis, and strong public and political support for military intervention ‘in the face of a particular crisis’ (ibid.: 219). See, also Uzer (2011), Chapter 5, for an analysis of the deviation of the Kemalist foreign policy from its “non-interventionist” course.
Soviet Union. The newly emerging Anatolian SME-based bourgeoisie, whose activities largely relied on the export of manufactures, were in full-support of finding new outlets for their exports in the vicinity of Turkey. The Özal period in the 1980s also marked the institutionalisation of state-business collaboration and the merging of foreign policy and economic opening up strategies. These incipient reconfigurations had their implications for the political-economic considerations that would shape the kin-state mentality in the 1990s.

In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, Turkey found itself surrounded by major political, economic, and social transformations. These transformations had the following implications for Turkey: First, a massive geography from the Balkans to Central Asia, with which the state had very limited interaction for the most part of the century, opened up in front of it. Second, the end of bipolarity meant that Turkey’s allure as a strategic ally of the West and particularly as an outpost of the US considerably decreased. Political contacts with Europe were severed mainly due to Turkey’s post-1980 poor record on democracy and human rights. Third, a major part of this new and now accessible geography coincided with its map of potential kin, drawn, but not much used in the course of the last century. The latter correspondence constituted a potential short-cut for establishing close and partially exclusive political and economic relations with the newly independent states in these regions. At the same time, it potentially posed the risks of rising economic and conflict-driven kin immigration and spill-over of conflicts.

Turkey saw these major shifts shaking the geopolitical and economic status quo in the region as potentially offering either instability or a window of opportunity for the state to get out of its relative political and economic isolation and marginalisation. The state needed to pursue a

246 Turkey had practically no access to Central Asia from the start of the Republic due to its refrainment from interfering with the Soviet Union. Particularly during the Cold War, both Central Asia and the Caucasus remained out of Turkey’s reach. This was due to both the Soviet Union’s efforts to cut Turkey’s contacts with these regions driven by its suspicion towards pan-Turkism, and Turkey’s extra-cautious attitude not to give a pan-Turkist impression (Sayari 2000: 173). Contact with the Balkans and the CEE was also quite limited due to the ‘Moscow effect’, even though Turkey managed to develop relatively closer relations with Yugoslavia (ibid.: 176).

247 Secessionist conflicts in Chechnya, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and particularly the Bosnian War nourished concerns about regional instability, spill-over effects and large-scale immigration (Sayari 2000). Turkey traditionally stayed away from officially supporting any secessionist movement, even if those demanding secession were included in some layer of its category of kin. This was mainly caused by the fact that Turkey faced the Kurdish secessionist movement within its own territory, and was hence vulnerable to potential backlash criticism due to its own poor minority rights record. Thus, Turkey did not support the disintegration of Yugoslavia (ibid.: 177). Even though pressured by Caucasian solidarity groups within Turkey, neither did it express too much sympathy for Chechnya, wary of Russia’s potential counterattack by supporting Kurdish secessionism (Winrow 1996: 130).
reconfigured and pro-active political economic strategy towards the West as well as its new neighbourhood in order to seize the opportunity. Seeking rapprochement with these new states in the Balkan, Caucasus, and Central Asia through forging Sunni Muslim, former Ottoman, and Turkic connections was seen as a crucial advantage that Turkey had to use in its reconfigured approach.

Becoming Prime Minister in November 1991, in the midst of the dissolution process of the Soviet Union, DYP leader Süleyman Demirel was an influential actor in incorporating the revival of the Turkic and to a certain extent the Muslim-Ottoman link as part of the abovementioned pro-active approach. His government was the first to voice the ‘linguistic and cultural affinity’ with the Republics in Central Asia and in neighbouring Caucasus in the post-Cold War context. Demirel was also convinced that it was time that Turkey ‘played the Balkan card’ that it had left aside for the last five decades (Milliyet, 31 December 1991). Turkey’s responsibility to prevent ‘any harm inflicted upon its brothers and sisters in Bosnia’ was enhanced in the face of the threat posed by an aggressive Serbia (ibid.).

Then-President Özal, with his economic liberalism, foreign political pragmatic neo-Ottomanism, and Islam-sympathetic stance was crucial in drawing on the Ottoman-Islamic legacy for the making of transborder kin. He referred not only to the commonly shared millet membership but also to the role of Turkey as the successor of the empire. In this way, he associated Turkey with transborder populations in the former imperial territories, while putting forth the suggestion that Turkey had the right and the duty to act as the “origin-patron” state of these populations. He also set the precedents of emphasising the Sunni Muslim component of Turkish national identity in its relations with transborder kin, by suggesting a notion of Turkishness in the ‘religio-cultural sense’ (see the quote below). Özal’s reading of the scope of transborder populations with special relations to Turkey as their common reference and leader gives a clear idea of the transborder kin universe Turkey planned to claim and target in the post-Cold War context:

‘When we look at this geopolitical space from the Adriatic Sea to Central Asia under the leadership of Turkey, we realize that this space is molded [sic.] and dominated by Ottoman-Muslim and Turkic population … The Ottoman-Muslim population shares the same historical legacy and fate as the Turks of Anatolia and they still regard themselves

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as “Turk” in the religio-cultural sense. These groups live in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Western Trace’ (statement made in 1992, quoted in Yavuz 1998: 24).

Such rhetoric was not peculiar to Özal, while being mostly identified with him. Many references to the vast Turkic-Muslim geography, mostly expressed by the use of traditional pan-Turkist terms and concepts such the “Turkish world” (Türk Dünyası) can be found in the rhetoric of political authorities in the early 1990s. For example, in 1992 then-PM Süleyman Demirel interpreted the disintegration of the Soviet Union as the emergence of “a gigantic Turkish world” … stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China’ (quoted in Winrow 1996: 136).

All the following governments highlighted Turkey’s linguistic, cultural, and occasionally religious bonds with the Central Asian countries. They made references to the opportunities offered by these bonds for Turkey to become a central actor, and the “responsibility” and “duty” these bond laid on Turkey’s shoulders for assisting their transition and integration with the world. Mesut Yılmaz, the successor of Özal as the ANAP leader, made the first use of the category ‘kin (akraba) communities’, in his government’s programme in 1996. Subsequent governments took up the term. Yılmaz later differentiated the components of the broader kin universe as ‘Turkish Republics, other Turkish communities, and akraba communities’, the latter mainly referring to populations in the Balkans. In almost all cases, mentioning of Turkey’s affinity with these regions was embedded in statements about Turkey’s increasing trade relations, investment, and contracting services in these regions and the need to further boost this potential.


250 53th Government Programme.

251 55th Government Programme.
Over this decade, it became a rule rather than exception to refer to the need for a readjusted multidimensional foreign policy reflecting Turkey’s geostrategic advantage of being not only a European, but also a Mediterranean, Black Sea, Balkan, and Middle Eastern country. Governments highlighted transborder kin engagement as a priority area in relation to Turkey’s need to take political and economic advantage of these privileges. The state regarded the instrumentalisation of the “kin” connection as offering comparative advantage vis-à-vis other regional actors manoeuvring in these geographical and cultural spaces. The state’s aspiration to propel itself into these potential zones of increased presence and influence was translated into positioning Turkey as a kin-state at the intersection point of the former Ottoman Muslim millet and the “ancestral” Turkic brethren.

3. MODALITIES AND LIMITS OF TRANSBORDER KIN-ENGAGEMENT IN THE 1990S

The broadened scope and mixed composition of claimed transborder kin shaped the modality of Turkey’s practical kin engagement in the 1990s. The efforts of the state focused on forming platforms to increase its connection with these populations. The overall aim was to enhance their “sense of kinship” and hence their identification with Turkey. Light-touch engagement policies and tools were devised in religious, linguistic, cultural, educational domains. Apart from offering privileges within Turkey in the educational domain, most kin-state measures were designed and implemented extraterritorially, aiming to keep the kin in their states of residence.

As explained in section 1.4, since the 1960s the Turkish state tried to keep the immigration of kin populations at a minimum, except for cases of acute refugee crises affecting co-ethnics. The government’s ‘diametrically opposed’ treatment of Turkish refugees from Bulgaria in 1989, Turkmen refugees from Iraq in 1988 and 1991 on the one hand, and Kurdish “peshmerga” fleeing Iraq on the other, demonstrated the state’s ethno-linguistic preferences

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252 See, in general, Makovsky & Sayari (eds.) 2000, on Turkey’s post-Cold War efforts to revise its former moderate, cautious, inward looking, and unidirectional (Western) foreign policy line.
253 The factor of “other” regional actors, i.e., Iran and Russia, was particularly prevalent in the context of the newly independent Turkic states. Against these powerful competitors, in addition to accentuating its ethno-linguistic affinity, Turkey promoted itself as a better example for these states’ transition. This was done through highlighting its attributes as a secular parliamentary democracy with a majority Muslim population, as a NATO member, and as a functioning market economy that started its integration with global markets earlier. The US and to a certain extent the European states supported this option in order to prevent excessive Russian or Iranian influence in the region (Öniş 2001: 67-68).
when it was compelled to let forced migrants in (Kirişçi 2000: 13-14). The privileging of Balkan Sunni Muslims was also reaffirmed when 25,000 Bosnians fleeing the war were granted asylum (ibid. 8). This instance constituted the last large-scale admission of “kin”. Apart from these selective humanitarian admissions, restrictions to entry and residence were introduced in the early 1990s, as was the case with the co-ethnics from Bulgaria trying to come to Turkey after 1989 (See Chapter 7).

While claiming a broad geographical and cultural kin space was fit for the political-economic aspirations of the state, allocating actual resources and special statuses to these populations within Turkey was beyond its capacity. Neither was it in line with its objective of projecting itself outwards through instrumentalising kinship links. The fear of economically motivated or conflict-driven kin immigration flows from the former Soviet Union and the Balkans constituted an additional motivation to prevent kinship-based movement. Small-scale preferential immigration of some populations took place based on ad hoc decisions of the Council of Ministers, which had the discretion in determining belonging to ‘Turkish origin and culture’ (Kadirbeyoğlu 2010: 12).

In addition, Turkey saw the transition to democracy in states of residence and citizenship as providing the legal and political framework to protect kin minorities from major violations of human and minority rights. Hence, the official policy line shifted to supporting the participation of those in a minority situation in the socioeconomic and political life of their countries as equal citizens, discouraging their further immigration to Turkey, and developing friendly bilateral relations with their host-states (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu 2006a: 348-350).

Establishing contact with these populations and trying to institutionalise these contacts and the “kinship link” was the main aim of the state in this initial period. The focus was particularly on the Central Asian Republics while the efforts were more limited in the Balkans, even though they were not non-existent. Creating new institutions, forming official platforms, and adding sub-departments responsible for the overseas operations of existing bureaucracies were the most visible and tangible efforts.

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254 A special law for the immigration and settlement of Ahiska Turks, also known as Meshketian Turks due to their origins in the Meshketi region in contemporary Georgia, was passed in 1992 (ibid.: 13). 150 families were repatriated between 1992 and 1994 within the framework of this law.

255 The Head of Department of the MFA’s Deputy Directorate General for the Balkans and Central Europe confirmed both of these points on the shifting approach in the 1990s. Author’s interview, Ankara, 9 April 2012.
What is now called the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, TIKA) was established as the ‘Agency for Economic, Cultural, Educational, and Technical Cooperation’ under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1992. Its task was defined as establishing and bolstering ties and cooperation in these realms with the Turkish-speaking Republics and neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{256} According to the Vice-President of the TIKA, the establishment of the agency could be seen as an outcome of the changing mind-set during the Özal era. This change meant that the Turkish state started to be politically and economically interested in what was going on beyond its borders for the first time.\textsuperscript{257} The TIKA started to operate abroad through ‘Programme Coordination Offices’ (PCOs), which have been opened within the framework of bilateral technical and development cooperation agreements.\textsuperscript{258} In line with the claim of providing a model for these countries’ transition to democracy and to liberal economy, and assisting their integration to the world, the emphasis was put on the provision of development and technical aid, consultancy, training, running pilot projects, and cultural cooperation. Within this first decade, its budget was rather modest compared to the period of 2002-2012. The aid given by TIKA was predominantly in the form of cash donations instead of development and technical projects.\textsuperscript{259}

In addition to the TIKA, Turkey tried to institutionalise its relationships through organising annual “Turkish-speaking countries” summits starting from October 1992, holding regular meetings of Education and Culture Ministers, and formalising parliamentary friendship groups (Winrow 1996: 136).\textsuperscript{260} The International Organisation of Turkic Culture, with a claim to be the equivalent of UNESCO for Turkic culture, was established in 1993. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, together with Turkey were its founding members.\textsuperscript{261} Finally, the “Great Student Project” of the Ministry of Education was

\textsuperscript{256} Law No. 480, \textit{Official Gazette}, No. 21124, 27 January 1992, Article-1. Note that prior to the establishment of the Agency, there was already an ‘Undersecretariat of Relations with the Turkish World’ under the prime ministry since 1991 (Akçay 2012: 70).

\textsuperscript{257} Author’s interview with the Vice President of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlıgı, TIKA), Ankara, 12 April 2012.

\textsuperscript{258} In line with the regional priorities, the first countries where PCOs were opened were (in chronological order): Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, followed by those in Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Ukraine (Crimea) in the period between April 1993 and July 1997 (Akçay 2012: 73).

\textsuperscript{259} Author’s interview with the Vice President of the TIKA, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{260} In addition to these efforts, the government allocated an initial annual budget of US $ 80 million for establishing and enhancing its relations with these countries in the realms of economics, education, administration, communications, culture and education in 1992 (Landau 1995: 208).

\textsuperscript{261} ‘About us’ section on the webpage of The International Organisation of Turkic Culture, see, \url{http://www.turksoy.org.tr/EN/belge/2-27270/about-us.html} Note that the acronym TÜRKSOY comes from the
launched in the 1992-1993 academic year. The project aimed to provide fully funded secondary and higher education for students from the Turkic Republics and *akraba* communities. While the project initially foresaw 7000 annual scholarships for higher education and 3000 for secondary education, a total of 24,302 scholarships were offered in the period between 1992 and 2000 (Kavak & Baskan 2001: 99).

Central Asian countries and autonomous republics took the lion’s share in terms of the allocation of financial resources through aid and assistance schemes. In the period between 1992 and 1996, 86.5% of a total of around US $ 1.9 billion, allocated for economic, technical, humanitarian, and educational-cultural aid, went to these regions (Akçay 2012: 73-74). Eximbank, the public Turkish Export Credit Bank, established in 1987 to stimulate and diversify exports, issued credits totalling US $ 1.5 billion as economic aid to the Central Asian countries in the 1992-1999 period (Öniş 2001: 68). The efforts to restore linguistic, cultural, religious links with these populations were accompanied by incentivising entrepreneurs, exporters, and contractors from Turkey to channel their business operations towards these areas. Eximbank guarantees and credits were also used for directing Turkish businesses to these liberalising markets. Cabinet members, president Özal, and his successor Demirel increasingly turned their “kin-framed” official visits into opportunities for taking large delegations of businesspeople to these markets (Landau 1995: 208-209). 2500 Turkish investments worth of US $ 8.4 billion were operational in the “Turkic” markets by the end of the decade (Öniş 2001: 68). Turkey’s trade volume with these economies rose from US $145 million to US $ 5.6 billion between 1992 and 1999 (ibid.).

Instrumentalising the kinship link worked to a certain extent for finding new venues for the export-oriented growth strategy and the opening of opportunities for Turkish investments. However, the degree of “exclusivity” that Turkey aspired to attain remained rather limited within the context of fierce competition for political and economic influence in the region and

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262 This sum includes the ‘Grand Student Project’ scholarships funded by the Ministry of Education, which constituted 71.5% of the total aid, while allocations through TIKA only constituted 2% within this period (ibid. 74).

263 This detail and its long-lasting effects on Turkey’s contemporary kin engagement-economic policy nexus was also highlighted during my interviews with the head of the department responsible for ‘co-ethnic and related communities’ at the YTB. *Author’s interview with the Head of Department of Social and Cultural Relations, Overseas Turks and Kin Communities Agency (YTB), Ankara, 7 May 2012.*
the multiplicity of candidates. First, overcoming Russia’s sociocultural legacy proved to be
difficult, as illustrated by the fact that, apart from the Azeris, all of the “Turkish-speaking”
leaders participating at the summits and joint platforms communicated in Russian. Murat
Karayalçın, Turkey’s Foreign Minister in the mid-1990s, later acknowledged the linguistic
barrier among the Turkic brethren and its contradiction with the kinship claims of Turkey
(Karayalçın 2009: 218-219). Second, given Russia’s moves to maintain its predominance in
the “Near Abroad” and Turkey’s ‘initial euphoria’, the Central Asian states tried to develop
balanced and multidimensional relations with the actors in the region. They tried to avoid
giving the opportunity to any single actor to establish a monopolistic relationship (Winrow
1996; 2000). Related to the Russian factor and regional political dynamics, Turkey’s
exaggerated self-confidence and over-assertiveness demonstrated through its “Turkish world”
discourses (ibid.; Landau 1995) and its self-assumed “big brother/patron” role (Öniş and
Yılmaz 2009) proved to be rather counterproductive. Its occasional attempts to meddle with
domestic politics, particularly in the case of Azerbaijan met protest by the target states (Öniş
2001: 73).264

As far as the former Ottoman-Muslim connection was concerned, the kin-state’s activity
remained limited in comparison to that towards Central Asia. The protection and engagement
efforts towards Bosnian Muslims can be seen as an exception. Turkey took an active stance in
this case mainly due to the war in Bosnia and high degrees of domestic public sensitivity.265
Turkey criticised Europe for its inaction, pushed for a NATO military intervention, and
clandestinely provided modest amounts of military aid to the Bosnian Muslims (Sayari 2000:
177). Around 25,000 Bosnian refugees were settled in Turkey (Kirişçi 2000: 13-14). In the
aftermath of the war, it took part in the UN peacekeeping mission, and the TIKA opened its
first PCO in the Balkans in Sarajevo in 1997. Previously, Turkey had got that closely
involved in the protection of transborder kin only for the category co-ethnics, i.e., soydaş.
Hence, Yavuz (1998: 37) interpreted the interest in the Bosnian case as ‘the first time in
Republican Turkish history that Ankara considered the protection of Muslims outside its
borders as an integral duty of its foreign policy’.

264 Consulted officials at the MFA, TIKA and YTB acknowledge that this superior “elder brother” attitude, as
well as the over-assertiveness “despite Russia” caused the backlashing of these attempts. Consequently, the
‘leader of the Turkic world’ discourse and attitude had to be toned down considerably (Author’s interviews in
Ankara, Berlin, and Bulgaria).
265 Yavuz (1998: 33) argued that the Turkish media’s wide coverage of the atrocities committed against Bosnian
Muslims acted as a catalyst in making the public realise that the ‘definition of Turkish identity incorporate[d]
more than Anatolia, and Euro-centric Westernization’.
As an instrument aiming at bonding and engaging the broader scope of re-claimed Muslim communities in the neighbourhood, the ‘Department of Eurasian Countries’ under the DIB External Affairs Directorate General was established in 1992. It was tasked with providing educational personnel and material, contributing to the catering of religious services, constructing mosques, and assisting the institutionalisation of religious affairs in the Turkic Republics and the regions inhabited by Turkish and non-Turkish Muslim minorities. Notwithstanding the efforts to revitalise the Muslim connection through attempting to foster a religious revival alla turca (official Islam of the mid-1990s) among these communities, the religious dimension of kin-state activism remained quite limited and “light” until the late 1990s. The kin-state’s religious engagement remained relatively low-key especially compared to the extent of non-state actors’ activities in these regions. Islamic NGOs, foundations, religious orders and communities from Turkey overshadowed the state-sponsored religious engagement efforts.

Particularly the Hizmet movement, popularly known as the Gülen community, referring to the movement’s preacher-spiritual leader Fethullah Gülen has been very active in Central Asia as well as in the Caucasus and the Balkans from the very beginning. Being ‘first and foremost a Turko-Ottoman nationalist’ (Yavuz 2003: 196), Gülen stated his ‘foreign policy objective’ as creating ‘a powerful Turkey by organizing Muslim communities in the Balkans and the Turkic states in Central Asia’ in 1991 (ibid. 200). The movement expanded its network of private schools and student residences, sent teachers and educational material, and extended

266 A theological high school and a Faculty of Theology were opened in in Baku in 1993-1994, a Faculty of Theology was opened in Kyrgyzstan the same year, a theological high school was opened in Constanta, Romania in 1995, and the funding of the three theological high schools and a higher theological institution in Bulgaria was taken up in 1998 on the initiative of the department and funded by the ‘Turkish Diyanet (Religious Affairs) Foundation’ (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, TDV). The department also started to organise ‘Eurasian Islamic Councils’, bringing together the religious leaders of all these communities and states since 1995. Author’s interview with the Head of Department of Eurasian Countries, DIB External Affairs Directorate General, Ankara, 8 May 2012.  
267 See, Aras (2000) on the kin-engaging activities of these non-state actors in Central Asian Republics.  
268 Drawing on the Turkish–Ottoman-Islamic synthesis, Gülen developed the concept of Türkiye Müslümanlığı (Islam of Turkey). He juxtaposed this “moderate” version of Islam influenced by Anatolian Sufi traditions not only to Salafi-Wahabi currents, but also domestic rival Islamic movements, such as Erbakan’s Millî Görüş. His argument was that this progressive, “tamed” Islam, which Turkey is a representative of, is compatible with democracy, sympathetic to liberal economy, and highly valorises education and inter-religious tolerance, unlike other models. For an elaborate discussion of Gülen’s “Turkey Islam” and its Ottomanist, pan-Turanist, and Turkey-nationalist dimensions, see Bilir (2004: 266-273). For a thorough analysis of the emergence and the rise of the Gülen community in the 1980s, its interpretation of Islam and Turkish nationalism, its relationship with the state, and its position vis-à-vis the secular establishment’s move against Islamic power centres in the mid-late 1990s within Turkey, see Yavuz (2003: 179-206).
the distribution of its newspaper Zaman to these regions in the 1990s. Business circles that were sympathetic to the movement, who established their own bank (Asya Bank) and business organisations, served as the main financiers for the transborder operations of the movement (Yavuz 2003: 193). Gülen declared that the community founded more than 150 schools in Central Asia and the Transcaucasia already by 1995 (Winrow 1996: 138).

Success remained limited in claiming and engaging transborder kin populations as a means to enhance Turkey’s political, economic and cultural influence in these regions. By the end of the decade, authorities acknowledged the counterproductivity of the attitude towards the Central Asian republics, the lack of coordination between bureaucracies dealing with various aspects of kin-engagement, and the limits of financial resources (Akçay 2012: 78-79). In an effort to solve the problem of coordination, the TIKA was put under the authority of the Prime Ministry in 1999. A Ministry of State was made responsible for the coordination of the state’s relations with the Turkic Republics and akraba communities. In the three years until the government change in 2002 TIKA opened PCO’s in Tajikistan, Mongolia, and Albania, while the amount of allocated financial resources remained modest (Akçay 2012: 79-80).

4. TURKEY’S CREATION AND ENGAGEMENT OF A MALLEABLE TRANSBORDER KIN UNIVERSE

As explained in Chapter 3, the political and economic elites were convinced that the high economic growth rates Turkey achieved during the global financial crisis, its post-Kemalist foreign policy based on enhancing and regionally projecting the state’s soft power yielded successful results. The overall conviction was that Turkey already became a regional power at the end of the 2000s, and it was on its way to economically and politically play in the “global league”. Bigger emerging economies such as the BRICs were considered as rivals for Turkey at this higher level of competition.

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269 On the expansion of Gülen community’s “Turkey Islamic nationalism” through educational institutions in Central Asia and the Caucasus in the 1990s, see Balcı (2008).
270 Considering the secular establishment’s position on Islamic movements deviating from the state’s official understanding of Islam, the state took a more active stance in the religious dimension of kin engagement in the second half of the 1990s. That the DIB overtook the funding of four theological institutions in Bulgaria after 1997 revealed the rivalry between state and non-state actors and illustrated the state’s efforts in monopolising the religious engagement domain (See Chapter 7).
271 Official Gazette, No: 23708, 28 May 1999, p. 7. The 57th government was a DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition, and the minister responsible for the concerned communities was from the MHP. The kin-specific activities of the TIKA in this period were largely oriented towards the Turkic Republics, and small Turkish communities in the Balkans, such as those in Kosovo (Akçay 2012: 80-81).
As part of the abovementioned strategy, Turkey has increasingly underlined its image as the inheritor of the Ottoman legacy, and its face as a predominantly Muslim country that not only has links with transborder Muslim populations, but also a responsibility to assist, protect, and defend these populations that history had laid on its shoulders. The elite narrated and attributed this image not only to re-position Turkey within the international arena as the leader of its non-Western civilisational milieu. The AKP and particularly Erdoğan featured centrally as the architects of the national ascent, and as the rightful, legitimate, and successful representatives of the nation especially since the end of the 2000s. The ability to speak in the name of, protect, defend, and embrace these transborder aggrieved Muslim populations became a significant part of the AKP’s discourse vis-à-vis its rivals in domestic politics, and an important source of sustaining its legitimacy.

The efforts of Turkey to create and engage an expansive and multi-register, but predominantly Muslim transborder kin universe should be understood through embedding it within this context. Such kin delineation and the accompanying engagement efforts have been mainly driven by the elite’s aspirations to foment state power through propelling Turkey towards the post-imperial space and beyond. Equally important has been the elite’s strategy to capitalise on this enhanced power for its own domestic political purposes. The outcome was that the Turkish state has been claiming and targeting a wide variety of transborder kin populations stretching over a rather broad geography. Turkey’s kinship claims towards these populations are not only justified on the basis of co-ethnicity or fellow membership to the “Turkic” world. Instead, the transborder kin is identified and targeted on the basis of membership to an ambiguous notion of “co-civilisation”, which is moulded out of a melange of ethno-linguistic, religious, and cultural-historical criteria.

4.1. The political economy of expansive kin-making

Initial changes in the scope and content of the claimed and engaged transborder kin can be discerned in the expanding mandate of the TIKA. In the first term of the AKP government, the TIKA expanded its network of PCOs to cover Afghanistan (2004), Palestine (2005), Kosovo (2004), Ethiopia (2005), Macedonia (2005), Senegal (2007), and Montenegro (2007). Between 2007 and 2011, the number of countries with TIKA PCO’s increased to 25. The
trend of widening the geographical range continued and the TIKA offices expanded in an area stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East and from South Asia to Africa. As of June 2015, there were PCO’s in 41 countries. In addition to the TIKA’s expanding operational reach, there has also been a discernible increase in the total amount of the aid Turkey allocated through the TIKA and other state institutions (See Figure 3).

Officials clearly distinguish the two decades before and after 2002 in terms of the magnitude of the agency’s resources and its level of efficiency and professionalism, and hence its achievements. In addition to its expanding mandate and growing budget, the Agency’s function has also been gradually transformed. It substantiates Turkey’s claims of being an internationally prestigious actor, a rising economic power that is a donor rather than a recipient of development aid, and a benign state that assumes its responsibility stemming from its history and past grandeur. According to the Vice President, the TIKA’s activities are driven by a sense of voluntarism, instead of cost-benefit calculations. Enhanced prestige, improved image, and wider projection of power are ‘side effects’ of, rather than the rationales behind its activities. All consulted officials that opined on the TIKA reiterated this view, which constitutes the core of the morally driven benign power narrative.

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272 PCOs were opened in Ukraine-Kiev (2008), Sudan (2009), Syria (2010), Pakistan (2010), and Serbia (2010) in this period (Akçay 2012: 82).
273 The PCO’s that were opened in the period between 2011 and 2015 (in alphabetical order) were: Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Hungary, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, the Philippines and Yemen. The PCO in Syria is dysfunctional. See, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/overseasoffices
274 TIKA has its own budget. Since it was given the task of coordinating several state institutions’ foreign aid and development-related activities in 2004, it co-funds projects with the Ministries of Culture, Education, and Agriculture, among others. Other important occasional donors for TIKA-led projects have been the Prime Ministry, the DIB, and particularly the TDV. The Prime Ministry was closely involved and provided an additional budget for the humanitarian aid campaign for the famine in Somalia in 2011 (Author’s interview with the Vice President of the TIKA, op. cit.).
275 Author’s interview with the Vice President of the TIKA, op. cit. The AKP makes use of highlighting the TIKA’s growth, international visibility and reputation during its terms in government. The example of this can be found in a special TIKA issue of the bulletin of the party’s “Research and Development Department”. According to this bulletin, the number of TIKA projects in the decade between 1992 and 2002 was 2,241, compared to 11,087 in the following decade (AK Parti Ar-Ge Başkanlığı 2013: 6). The total spending increased from a modest US $ 66 million in the first decade to US $ 755 million (ibid.: 8).
276 Author’s interview with the Vice President of the TIKA, op. cit.
The expected “side effects” from the TIKA’s changed image, enhanced economic capacity, and expanded mandate in select geographies have not been only symbolic and reputational. The trajectory of its gradually expanded scope from Central Asia to the Balkans and the Middle East, and finally to select geographies in Africa illustrates the political economic rationale behind the state’s use of humanitarian and developmental aid measures towards an ever-expanding transborder “kin” space. The move towards Africa and its timing was the outcome of a deliberate ‘Africa opening’ strategy. This strategy was mainly driven by the search for new outlets for exporters and outward looking Turkish investments.277

The foundations of the opening were laid already in the late 1990s. Regarding political integration with the EU, Turkey left the 1997 Luxembourg Summit empty-handed. Economic integration became deeper through the Customs Union in 1996. However, opening of the

277 See, Akgün and Özkan (2010), on the role of the pressure exerted by business circles’ in Turkey’s launching of its opening strategy towards Africa.
domestic market to the EU’s free trade partners had its adverse effects on domestic producers, and particularly on the export-oriented SMEs.\textsuperscript{278} As a result of the search for new and additional export markets, the DTM prepared the ‘Africa Opening Action Plan’ in 1998 (Ipek and Biltekin 2013: 128). The plan remained unimplemented in the immediate aftermath, as Turkey was severely hit by the 1999 earthquake and the 2001 crisis (Wheeler 2011). The African opening was pushed to the backseat also because of the improvement of Turkey’s relations with the EU in the aftermath of its achieving candidate status in the 1999 Helsinki Summit (ibid.).

The plan was taken up again in the aftermath of 2002. The DTM prepared another strategy document in 2003. Shortly thereafter, Turkey declared the year of 2005 as the ‘Africa Year’ (Ipek and Biltekin 2013: 129). The move on Africa gained pace with the organisation of the Turkey-Africa Civil Society Forum, Turkey-Africa Business Forum, and the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in 2008 (Wheeler 2011: 52).\textsuperscript{279} In the period between 2003 and 2009, Turkey’s trade with Africa rose from US $ 5 billion to US $ 15 billion (Wheeler 2011: 51). The number of Turkish embassies increased from 12 in 2009 to 35 in 2013.\textsuperscript{280} The TIKA, together with the generally religiously oriented NGOs, constitute the development and humanitarian aid dimension of this strategy. The DIB has also become increasingly involved in the re-construction and enhancement of the Islamic ties and the faint Ottoman connection from the distant past. It organised African Muslim Leaders Summits in 2006 and 2011 (Wheeler 2011). Together with the TDV, the DIB has also been funding the education of future imams in theological high schools and faculties in Turkey.\textsuperscript{281}

Turkey’s kinship claims are based on being fellow Muslims and the historical affinity stemming from the former Ottoman rule in certain parts of Africa. The Turkish state

\textsuperscript{278} See, Chapter 4, Section 3.2.3.

\textsuperscript{279} It should be noted that non-state actors, particularly a myriad of Islamic ‘faith-based’ humanitarian relief organisations and NGOs were already active in engaging African Muslims. They have been largely incorporated into the state’s efforts as collaborators in humanitarian and developmental aid projects and religious activities after the increasing state interest in the continent (Atalay 2013). The Gülen movement has also been very active in Africa, and especially in countries with Muslim populations. Its network of Turkish schools in African countries has grown in the 2000s, whereas the TUSKON, closely connected to the movement has been organising “Turkey-Africa Trade Bridges” since 2006. See, Alkan and Mercan (2013), on the TUSKON business activism in Africa, and the Turkish state’s cooperation with and support for its activities until the clash between the recently erupted clash between the Gülen movement and the AKP.


\textsuperscript{281} Author’s interview with the Head of Department of Education and Counseling Abroad, DIB Directorate General of External Affairs, Ankara, 2 May 2012.
underlines its clean historical record with regards to past attempts of colonisation together with the Islamic connection. These two aspects give Turkey its competitive edge in the heated rivalry on engaging with Africa, where not only traditional actors like France, but also “newcomers” like China and India have been increasingly active (Economist, 25 March 2010). Interviewed officials at the TIKA and the YTB, who commented on Turkey’s engagement with Africa contended that not being a former colonizer, having a benign image and a humanitarian approach, and emphasizing and revitalising the historical and religious links constitute the main advantages of Turkey vis-à-vis other states. They put Turkey’s interest and activities in Africa in comparative terms with other interested actors like France, in order then to argue that Turkey is culturally and historically closer to African countries and societies, and hence has a sounder and more justifiable basis for its engagement efforts. However, they also acknowledged that the claimed ties are not as close as those with soydaş and akraba communities, and hence state and non-state actors need to make a bigger effort to establish and reinforce these ties and feelings of affinity.

The process through which Turkey started to include Africa into its areas of interest is telling about the mechanisms of the state’s increasingly entangled foreign political and economic pursuits. The state actively constructs religious and historical ties with populations in regions of interest and uses humanitarian and developmental measures in the making and institutionalisation of “kinship” as a basis of closer engagement with these regions, markets, and states. This predominantly economically driven strategy results in the expansion of the scope of transborder kin populations. It also leads to the diversification of the components making up this category and creates different types and layers of transborder kin.

The assessment of the Head of Department of Social and Cultural Affairs of the YTB demonstrates to what extent transborder kin creation and engagement has been increasingly embedded in intermingled economic and political aspirations of the state. According to the official, Turkey now economically competes with big and populous countries like Brazil, China, Russia, and Indonesia. In order to become one of the top ten economies in a decade, Turkey needs to compensate for its relative disadvantage in terms of the size of its population and territory. Hence, the state needs to further open up to new regions and markets, to build exclusive ties with external populations, and to increase mobility. Mobilising cultural,
religious, historical links with populations is one of the ways to gain access to these new regions that are needed for the already saturated capital in Turkey. Thanks to its cultural-historical background, Turkey has the advantage of already having such links, as well as the potential of building new ones or reviving dormant ones.283

4.2. Cultivating and institutionalising kinship links

Compared to Turkey’s rhetorically ambitious but practically moderate kin-state activism in the 1990s, it is possible to observe an increase in the allocation of material and symbolic resources as well as a diversification of kin-making and engagement instruments in the last decade. For instance, the populations of interest to the TIKA has become much broader than the more neatly defined “Turkic brethren” and kin communities as a result of its expanding mandate in the 2000s. The TIKA’s task definition was limited to technical and development aid, and its responsibilities in other areas were distributed to other existing or newly established institutions dealing with different aspects of kin-engagement.284

The cultural-linguistic aspect, which the TIKA had assumed between 1999 and 2007 mainly through the “Turkology Project”, was transferred to the Yunus Emre Institute (YEI), established in 2007. The Institute is modelled on the basis of other cultural institutions such as Cervantes Institute and Goethe Institute. Operational since 2009, its main task is the teaching of the Turkish language and culture at the overseas YEI Culture Centres. The locations of these centres are not limited to the Turkic, co-ethnic, or akraba geography. The YEI Culture Centres in Western European cities mainly aim at catering to the Turkish-language education needs of the “citizen diaspora”. There are centres also in countries like Japan and South Africa. Nevertheless, certain populations and regions are visibly prioritised over others. For instance, there are two centres in Germany, three centres each in Bosnia Herzegovina and

283 Author’s interview with the Head of Department of Social and Cultural Relations of the YTB, op. cit.
284 The Department of Eurasian Countries under the DIB DG for External Affairs, with the financial support of the TDV, continue to be the major state actor in the religious realm with regards to the kin communities and Turkic Republics. A total of 38 countries and regions inhabited by Muslim communities are under the department’s responsibility. The regions are classified as Balkan countries; Russia, Caucasus and Baltic Countries; Turkic Republics and Central Asian countries. Apart from the abovementioned theological schools abroad, the TDV grants scholarships for theological education in Turkey at the high school and university level. The DIB also organises regular ‘Meetings of the Balkan Religious Affairs Presidents’ since 2007. It also sends out Qurans, prayer and Islamic education books, temporary and long-term imams and religion teachers to the regions of kin communities, co-funds mosque constructions with private donations, and through coordinating “Sister City” projects between cities in Turkey and those in “Eurasia” (Author’s interview with the Head of Department of Eurasian Countries, DIB, Directorate General of External Affairs, op. cit.).
Kosovo, and two centres each in Albania, Romania and Egypt. The first Cultural Centre was opened in Sarajevo. Then-foreign minister Davutoğlu explicitly stated that this was not a coincidence, as Sarajevo was the city where ‘Turkish culture was reflected best’; it was ‘the city of our common culture’, and the ‘soul brother’ of Istanbul (quoted in Kaya & Tecmen 2011: 14). Kaya and Tecmen (ibid.) argue that the chosen locations for YEI Centres in the Balkans and the Middle East, as well as the rhetoric used in relation to these centres reflect the current elite’s strategy of contesting the identification of modernisation with Westernisation. Instead, they offer an alternative modernity-civilisation discourse based on a ‘common cultural heritage approach with a neo-Ottoman undertone’. The YEI Cultural Centres, along with other instruments, serve as venues to project this civilisation discourse outwards, as well as tools to construct the civilisational space itself.

Finally, the relatively novel state bureaucracy that is most clearly and explicitly oriented towards co-ethnic and kin communities is the YTB’s ‘Department of Social and Cultural Relations’. The Department covers the soydaş and akraba branch of Turkey’s transborder kin. The Department’s task is defined as ‘engaging in activities towards co-ethnic and kin communities in order to bolster social, cultural and economic relations with these communities’. Türkîc Republics and Azerbaijan are also included within the scope of this department, and hence it covers the Balkans, Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia, while its activities extend as far as Tunisia or Mauritania.

The ‘International Students Department’ under the YTB and its ‘Turkey Scholarships’ scheme replaced the Ministry of Education and its ‘Great Student Project’. This scheme is the most tangible aspect of the YTB’s kin-engagement activities, as it constitutes the biggest spending item. The scholarships are open to citizens of any country. Nevertheless, according

285 According to the webpage of the YEI, there are cultural centres in Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Macedonia, Montenegro, Morocco, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, the UK, at: http://www.yee.org.tr/turkiye/tr/kurumsal

286 Law No 5978 on the organisation and duties of the Overseas Turks and Kin Communities Agency’, Official Gazette, No: 27554, 06 April 2010, Article 1-b.

287 Organising conferences, symposiums, workshops, and trainings that bring representatives of NGOs, associations, or politicians and religious officials from co-ethnic and kin populations together with officials from Turkey and with each other constitute the basis of the department’s activities. It also supports and funds publications that are considered as useful for the minorities, and addressing the general public of their countries. These publications aim to improve the visibility of these minorities and the Ottoman cultural and architectural legacy in the “home” countries. For instance, the books ‘The Turks of Bulgaria’ and ‘A Guide to Ottoman Bulgaria’, printed in English, obviously primarily targets the Bulgarian and international public rather than the Turks themselves. For the Department’s activities targeting co-ethnic and kin communities, also see, http://www.ytb.gov.tr/tr/faaliyetler/938-soydas-ve-akraba-topluluklar
to the statistics of the academic year of 2012-2013, the great majority of both applicants and admitted students were from Asian countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan, from Central Asian Republics, from countries in Africa like Ethiopia, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia, and from the Balkans and the Middle East (YTB 2012/2013: 38; 48-49). With the YTB taking over the funding of the scholarships for international students from the Ministry of Education in 2013, the total budget of the Agency rose from 33 million Turkish Liras (TRY) (≈ US $ 17.5 million) in 2012 to TRY 167 million (≈ US $ 84 million) in 2013 (YTB 2013: 4). Out of this total, TRY 122 million (≈ US $ 63 million) was allocated to the stipends offered to 11,500 students.

4.3. How to claim an expansive transborder kin universe beyond co-ethnicity?

Conceiving and claiming a multi-register and expansive kinship universe by the state requires a different approach than exclusively ethnic kin-making and engagement. This difference in Turkey’s approach is evident in the authorities’ efforts to avoid neat delineations and to replace ethno-linguistic definitions with rather vague civilizational constructs. According to the officials at the YTB, soydaş and akraba communities make up Turkey’s ‘historical and cultural diaspora’. Even though they are reluctant to make a neat demarcation, the category of soydaş necessitates linguistic commonality, whereas that of akraba is based on cultural affinity. Cultural affinity tends to be translated into religious commonality in addition to historical ties. Nevertheless, the populations and the regions, which are of interest for the department, are not strictly and neatly defined and categorised. The lack of clear definitions and criteria is a deliberate choice on the part of political authorities as it allows flexibility. Ambiguity and a general reference to cultural and historical affinity also makes it possible to bring together a broad range of predominantly Muslim, but otherwise rather diverse transborder populations with different kinds of links to Turkey under this category.

288 Interview with Kemal Yurtmaz, the then president of the YTB in the newspaper Today’s Zaman (Albayrak 2013).
289 Author’s interview with the Vice President of the YTB, op. cit. A group that does not fit this generalisation is the Orthodox Gagauz Turks in Moldova, which used to be excluded from the early Republican repatriation schemes. Turkish authorities came to regard these people as belonging to transborder kin already in the mid-1990s (Poulton 1997a: 199). The Gagauz Turks are included also within the current kin universe. This is demonstrated by the YTB officials’ meetings with their representatives, special reports on the Gagauz in the YTB’s magazine, such as the report entitled ‘A gemstone in the necklace of Turkish civilisation: Gagauz Turks’ (Gündüz 2012: 60-63), and a book on the Gagauz Literature published with YTB support.
290 Author’s interview with the Head of Department of Social and Cultural Relations of the YTB, op. cit.
The choice of not neatly delineating the target populations through clear and explicit ethno-linguistic or religious criteria is also the result of the authorities’ awareness of continuing ‘nation-state sensitivities’. Officials acknowledge that states’ engagement with non-citizen non-migrant extraterritorial populations still has bigger potential to provoke inter-state tension due to claims of breaching the “host” state’s sovereignty. Hence, this definitional laxity is also driven by the effort to avoid problems for the concerned external kin minorities and for Turkey’s bilateral relations.\footnote{This deliberate choice for ambiguity and generalness shows also in the name of the department. It was named the department of ‘Social and Cultural Relations’ in a rather unspecified way, unlike other sub-departments that clearly specify their target populations, i.e., the Department of Citizens Abroad, and the International Students Department. \textit{Author’s interview with the Head of Department of Social and Cultural Relations of the YTB, op. cit.}}

The ‘external Turks’ lexicon, and the claims of a ‘Turkish world’ have been abandoned to a large extent, apart from its pragmatic and occasional uses mainly towards the Turkic Republics. Such exclusively Turkic discourse does not fit the civilisational approach attempting to construct a sense of common membership to a broad cultural, historical, religious space with Turkey at its centre. Davutoğlu’s main criticism towards the 1990s’ “Turkish world” approach was ‘the wrong-headedness of this approach based on Turkist sentiments’, and ‘its inability to formulate ‘all-embracing’ policies towards all regional issues’ (Murinson 2006: 953).

Current political elites use co-ethnicity and Turkishness by virtue of descent and language to a much lesser extent in defining, delineating and referring to Turkey’s transborder kin compared to the 1990s. Turkish diplomatic circles in Bulgaria confirm that Turkey’s approach towards transborder populations, particularly those in the Balkans, was relatively recently readjusted. They regard the impact of the general reconfiguration of Turkey’s foreign policy since the mid-2000s as crucial for this changed way of seeing and relating to transborder populations. Turkey views these populations not through a narrow ethnic lens, but from a broader “cultural” perspective, not insisting on dissecting the Turks from the non-Turks. Culture stands for sociocultural affinity and resemblance, attributed to the shared history of having lived as part of the Ottoman state and society, and particularly to past belonging to the Muslim millet. Diplomatic officials consider complementing this new cultural approach with
a constructive, friendly, and respectful attitude towards the “host” states, a very correct policy turn.292

It should be noted that the new expansive and flexible “kin” rhetoric is also characterised by high levels of pragmatism. Turkic, Islamic, or Ottoman dimensions are occasionally highlighted depending on the addressees. The use of definitions based on being fellow Muslims or sharing the “tolerant”, multicultural Ottoman past comes to the fore in the Balkan context. Ancestry-based ‘external Turk’ rhetoric is deployed in contexts where resorting back to definitions of Turkic origins are deemed more appropriate.293 The kin-state elite also lumps together all these different components in the “expansive civilisational kin” notion. The discursive strategy that supports this notion is based on a re-narration of history borrowing elements from the 1930s’ arguments on the Central Asian origins of the Turkish nation, as well as from the Ottoman-Islamic historical baggage. In an effort to hold all these elements together in a single “kinship” narrative, Turkey and its vast transborder kin are presented as ‘the successors of a blessed civilisation that springs from the steppes of Central Asia and then flows into Anatolia, to the Balkans and to Europe’.294

5. DELIMITED ETHNIC KIN-STATE VERSUS HYBRID-ORIGIN-REFERENCE STATE

In line with Turkey’s post-Cold War objective of widening its political and economic outreach beyond borders, the state tried to target an increasingly wider scope of not-only-ethnically defined kin. Consequently the transborder kin map the state envisaged stretched to a geography including bordering as well as remote regions. This approach differs from those of CEE states that proclaim themselves as ‘ethnic kin-states’ (Singh 2006: 305), targeting rather neatly delimited co-ethnic populations that compactly inhabit bordering or nearby

292 Author’s interviews in Sofia and Plovdiv, January-February 2013.
293 For instance, the Central Asian Republics are still being referred as ‘the lands of our ancestors’ on the Turkish version of the TİKA webpage. See, http://www.tıka.gov.tr/tr/sayfa/tıka_hakkında-221
294 Then-Prime Minister and presidential candidate Erdoğan’s speech at the campaigning meeting ‘Yoruk Turkmens Elect Their President’ in Ankara, 6 August 2014, available online, at: http://www.turkishny.com/headline-news/2-headline-news/158184-erdogan-once-2023-ardindan-2053-ve-2071#.VMizzkthr8F This speech contained all the abovementioned discursive uses of depicting Turkey as the “origin-patron” state for its vast kin populations. Erdoğan presented Turkey’s new understanding of and performance in engaging its kin as evidencing the rising new Turkey that leads the civilisational success and backs up the members of this civilisation. He juxtaposed his new Turkey nationalism with the racist, ethnic nationalisms of the CHP and the MHP. He argued that despite the latter’s Turkist discourse, they were disinterested in the well-being of transborder co-ethnics and not capable of providing tangible support for these populations.
regions. These two types of kin-states differ with regard to the predominant motivations driving kin-state activism, as well as in terms of the states’ ability to assert their “kinship” claims through capitalising on aspects of their “historical baggage”.

The major drivers of kin-state activism in the post-communist CEE were political elites’ aspirations to gain and sustain legitimacy and electoral advantage (Verdery 1998). Appropriating and instrumentalising transborder kin engagement and framing it in nationalist-populist ways served these elite purposes (Waterbury 2010a). State-led transborder kin engagement in the region was closely entangled with domestic political competition and political elites’ power and legitimacy-seeking behaviour. Embedded within the triangular configuration of ‘nationalizing states’, ‘external national homelands’, and ‘minority nationalisms’ (Brubaker 1996), claims of protecting the ‘ethnonational kin’ provided the ‘greatest force and resonance’ for competing political actors (ibid. 2000: 4). Slightly deviating from this picture has been Russia’s kin-engagement in the “Near Abroad”, mainly, but not exclusively, driven by its aspirations for dominance in the former Soviet territory (King and Melvin 1999/2000; Zevelev 2001).

In the case of Turkey in the 1990s, the dominant nationalist rhetoric most appealing to domestic audiences was the one of anti-Kurdish-separatism, while the laicist-Islamist divide became the other major socio-political fault line. Public opinion was occasionally moved by dramatic incidents affecting transborder co-ethnics, such as the situation of the Turks in Cyprus in 1974\(^\text{295}\) and of the Turks of Bulgaria in the late 1980s.\(^\text{296}\) They caused widespread popular stir within the “motherland”, demonstrated by mass protests. Political parties and governments used both cases for their own political expediency. Nevertheless, the issue of “next-of-kin” transborder co-ethnics remained secondary compared to the abovementioned nationalist concerns. It largely remained confined to the constituency of explicitly Turkist parties like the MHP. Within that context, rather than an ethno-nationally protective kin-state narrative, a general rhetoric of Turkey’s ascent as the leader of a vast Turkish world matched the narrative of Turkey’s long-awaited ‘pass from relative marginality to centrality’ (Landau 1995: 222). The discourse of leading a vast Turkish world from the Adriatic to China was used to appeal to feelings of national pride and grandeur vis-à-vis the mainstream electorate.


\(^{296}\) For an examination of the galvanisation of domestic public opinion in the case of the assimilation of the Turks of Bulgaria, and the crucial role played by the associations of previously emigrated Turks of Bulgaria in mobilising larger segments, see Özgür-Baklacioglu 2006b: 85-86.
Affected by the AKP’s gradual accentuation of its Islamist discourses both in domestic and foreign politics, the ethno-national aspect of national identity further lost strength vis-à-vis the Islamic umbrella approach. The post-Kemalist nationalism has increasingly relied on the negation of Turkey led by the secular establishment. A key aspect of this “new Turkey” nationalist narrative has been the claim that Turkey has risen to the level of an emerging global power thanks to the AKP’s embracement of its genuine Ottoman-Islamic identity. This discourse has heavily relied on demonstrations of post-Kemalist Turkey’s heartfelt interest in and ability of embracing its transborder kin. A sole focus on co-ethnicity as the basis of kinship would limit Turkey’s political-economic reach to a rather narrow physical and cultural geography. Acting as an ‘ethnic kin-state’ would not substantiate the elite’s bigger claim of being the leader of and the reference for a non-Western, Islamic civilisational space either. Hence, the elite juxtaposed its “civilisational kin” discourse and activism against the timid and cautious Kemalist approach towards populations and geographies beyond the borders, and the latter’s exclusively ethno-linguistic, “Turkist” delineation of kin. While kin-state activism has intensified both rhetorically and practically in the last decade, co-ethnicity has become only one aspect of Turkey’s reconfigured understanding of kin, and arguably not the fundamental one.

In addition to diverging motivations and dynamics shaping the state’s kin-engagement, peculiar “separation” trajectories of the concerned populations’ and the current claimant state also influences the extent and content of the potential and targetable transborder kin universe. At what stage and form of political organisation did such separation happen? Does the claimant state refer to the overnight separation of the “nation” from the “nation-state” in a relatively recent past? Does it refer to a gradual process of a series of multi-phase separations from a political organisation unit preceding the nation-state? How far back in the past does the current claimant state go in order to point out common membership and to shared historical experience in order to justify its current claims of kinship?

In the case of the most CEE states, the basis of delineating target populations is ‘conceptually clear’ (Brubaker & Kim 2011: 66, fn. 53, italics in original). That is to say, these claimant states refer to a rather clear-cut separation of the putative ethno-national majority of the state from its transborder members. In most cases this separation happened through relatively recent changes of the borders of kingdoms with a ‘core nation’ consciousness, even if the
composition of many of these kingdoms was multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious. To put it more clearly, the current kin-state chooses to refer to that specific instance of separation in constructing its transborder kin narrative and in identifying its target ethno-national populations. Contemporary Turkey on the other hand, refers to the gradual disintegration of a multi-confessional empire and to the separation of the Muslim millet, rather than that of the ethno-national Turkish nation. In an effort to pragmatically propel itself towards a wider space and more diversified geographies, it combines historical narratives of Central Asian Turkic origins with those on the Ottoman rule and Islamicisation in Africa dating back to the 16th century. Turkey attempts to capitalise on selected instances from its distant as well as more recent imperial past and the empire’s confession-based social organisation for targeting populations in a wider geography. What is more important than having “material” for such claims in its historical baggage, is the state elite’s decision to narrate historical continuities and construct civilisational spaces out of this material for its project of making and engaging transborder kin. The move to broaden the scope and to Ottomanise and Islamicise the content of the transborder kin is embedded within the elite’s domestic political agendas and as well as its foreign political economic aspirations.

The broadened scope and mixed composition of the claimed transborder kin has also shaped practical kin engagement and policy instruments since the 1990s. The territorialisation of these populations through encouraging repatriation was largely abandoned from 1990s onwards. In addition, as the scope has been rather broad, granting legal statuses, rights, and entitlements that could be enjoyed within Turkey was kept to a minimum. The state aspired to expand its political, cultural, and economic presence beyond the borders. Hence, it directed its efforts to project the kin-state outwards, to increase its exclusive interconnectedness with the regions and states of these populations, and to legitimise the position of Turkey as the hub, centre, and intersection point of this constructed kin space.

As pointed out before, Turkey never had a clause specifying the state’s responsibility towards its transborder kin in its constitutions. Neither did it have a specific “Status Law” delimiting the boundaries of its external kin, specifying the rights of the external kin minorities and the obligations of the state towards these populations. The domain of immigration, and indirectly that of citizenship demarcated categories of those ‘belonging to Turkish descent and culture’. In the post-1990 era immigrants admitted under the Law of Settlement continued to be those regarded within these categories, as the law has remained unchanged.
Until the enactment of the new Citizenship Law of 2009, persons of Turkish origin were still being treated preferentially, mainly by exempting them from the five years residence requirement for naturalisation. However, as gaining the status of ‘recognised immigrants’ was made more difficult in practice, mass naturalisations were also obstructed (Kadirbeyoğlu 2010: 15). The 2009 Law eliminated the exemption of those belonging to Turkish decent and culture from the five-year residence requirement starting from 2010 (ibid.). Considering Turkey’s malleable transborder kin universe, the potential size of the population that could fall under a hypothetical legal kin category would be huge. Taking also into account the state’s wariness of encouraging mass kin immigration, Turkey did not and probably would not officially establish such legal membership status. Nor did it grant a quasi-citizenship status or a set of rights and entitlements resembling the ‘Status Laws’ of ‘ethnic kin-states’, let alone kinship-based full external citizenship.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter analysed the dynamics underlying Turkey’s transformation as a kin-state and the changes in the scope and composition of its transborder kin universe. I demonstrated that the state’s definition of who constitutes its transborder kin based on what kind of kinship criteria varied strategically and contingently over time. These changes at the initial phase of ‘politics of identification’ (Brubaker & Kim 2011) were translated into the discourses, attitudes, and engagement policies of the state.

It is possible to delineate four major phases that Turkey as a kin-state went through. In the first substantial and symbolic nation-building period until the 1940s, Turkey was a kin-repatriating state concerned with populating the territory of its would-be prototypical modern nation-state with the “right kind” of people. The state deemed as fit for repatriation and naturalisation ethno-linguistically Turkish and non-Turkish but nationally “Turkifiable” Sunni Muslim populations. In the second period until the 1990s, the state was economically inward looking, politically and ideologically firmly allied with the West within the Cold War context, and disinterested in further populating its territory due to limited resources. The state differentiated its ethno-linguistically defined “next of kin”, i.e., its soydaş through allowing

297 The only openly privileged group exempt from residency requirements are citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, whose citizens can basically only travel internationally with Turkish passports.
their asylum in the motherland at times of acute assimilatory and persecutory crises in the “host” states. Nevertheless, overall Turkey was a dormant kin-state, as it refrained from any border-crossing engagement attempts in order not to antagonize its Super Power neighbour.

Within the fundamentally changed political and economic conjuncture of the post-Cold War era, the state elite regarded reinforcing both Turkic and Ottoman-Islamic links as offering partially exclusive access to a wide range of regions, markets, and states. Reinforcing those links required going beyond the limited *soydaş* definition, and combining kinship conceptions drawing on Turkism based on ethnic ancestry, as well as Ottomanism based on common membership to the Muslim millet. Finally, in the AKP period in the 2000s, Turkey has been projecting itself as a reference state with a malleable kin universe, defined through a melangé of criteria, while accentuating the Ottoman-Islamic basis of kinship. The elites’ bigger appetite for deeper economic interpenetration and augmented political clout in the post-imperial space and beyond led to the use of deliberately ambiguous, encompassing, and further expandable civilisational kin conceptions. Placing Turkey as the origin-reference state of such a civilisational kinship universe also fits and feeds into the non-Western and anti-Westernist Ottoman-Islamic identity constituting the basis of the elite’s redefined narrative of nation(alism).

Through this examination, this chapter has demonstrated that the elites’ prioritized objectives and assessment of constraints and opportunities shape the way the state defines, claims, and targets kin populations beyond its borders. Rather than a mere waxing-waning of state interest in a “given” transborder kin population, the Turkish state contingently redefined kinship and reconfigured the scope and composition of its transborder kin. The chosen definition of kinship, and the resulting scope and component units of the state’s transborder kin were translated into changes in the rhetoric and practice of engagement. Being a reference state aiming to project itself outwards through targeting a malleable transborder kin universe, the state kept legal statuses and rights attached to transborder kinship at a minimum, while devising “light” engagement measures towards the populations mainly in their regions of settlement.

Different “material” in the historical baggage and particularly diverging historical trajectories through which claimed populations became “extra-territorial” make a difference in the potentially claimable universe of transborder kin. In the case of Turkey, the imperial history,
its non-ethnonational social organisation, and the early Republican elites’ search for a non-Ottoman Turkic history for the Turkish nation have been influential in the making of the expansive and multi-register transborder kin. However, more than the material itself, what determine the claimed kin universe are the ways in which the elites decide to appropriate this material, renarrate historical connections, construct civilisational spaces, and embed their kin-making project within these narratives to match their interests. In the case of Turkey, sticking to a narrow ethno-linguistic definition, and hence moderately targeting a rather limited scope of transborder kin was the choice of the economically and politically inward looking state. The choice of the economically and politically outward looking elites aiming to ‘play in multiple registers’ (Brubaker 2000: 17) was to mould ethno-linguistic, religious, and cultural-historical aspects into an ambiguous notion of “co-civilisation”. These different choices for transborder kinship criteria also reflected the respective conceptions of nationhood and discourses of nationalism narrated and promoted by the respective elites.

Lastly, the examination of the case of Turkey also highlighted that economic considerations might indeed play a major role in states’ transborder kin making and engagement, contrary to what is generally suggested by the (ethnic) kin-state literature. From the 1990s onwards, economic liberalisation and particularly the search for export markets and trade connections have been decisive in Turkey’s transborder kin making and engagement project. This finding suggests that a readjustment is needed in our understanding of what constitutes economic resources offered by kin populations driving states to embrace these groups. The conventional understanding is that kin communities generally lack financial resources of their own. Therefore, as states do not expect to capture remittances or investment from these populations, kin-state action is not driven by economic considerations. However, as the case of Turkey clearly illustrates, state and non-state economic elites highly value the potential for access to and integration with specific regions and markets, offered by and justified through the mere existence of such populations.
CHAPTER 6

IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANSIVE DIASPORA-MAKING FOR MEMBERSHIP POLITICS OF EXPATRIATES IN GERMANY

This chapter aims to shed light on the implications of changing extent, content, and modality of Turkey’s diaspora-making project for the targeted expatriate populations by focusing on the case of the “citizen diaspora” in Germany. It deals with two main questions: (i) How has the state with its claim to an expansive diaspora of “overseas Turks and kin communities” been dealing with its expatriates characterised by high degrees of political mobilisation reflecting the intra-“group” heterogeneity? (ii) How has the new elite’s re-narration of the “ideal diasporic subject” and its accordingly changed attitude impacted forms of relationship with and stances towards the home-state among organised stances in the “citizen diaspora”?

The first section deals with a certain aspect of the first question, that is, the inherent contradictions of embracing ‘Overseas Turks’ and ‘kin communities’ by a state with internal minorities among its resident citizens as well as expatriates. It demonstrates that the aspiration to engage a broad scope of transborder populations, whose “belonging” to the state has been justified through a melange of membership criteria and the claim of equally encompassing the entire “citizen diaspora” is difficult to reconcile. Particularly internal minorities and their “extensions” abroad highlight this contradiction, and object to the home-state’s use of ethno-religious criteria in delineating its transborder membership base.

The second section examines the implications of the change in the content and modality of the home-state’s diaspora-engagement for the dynamics between interwoven and interacting ‘structuring modes of collective experience abroad’ (Dufoix 2008). It demonstrates that, the post-2002 initial courting and all-encompassing strategies led to symbolic inclusion of hitherto marginalised sections and some of the former “enemy emigrant” categories. Full political incorporation of all citizens contributed to substantiate the home-state’s claim for a renewed all-encompassing approach based on the bond of citizenship. At the same time, elite change led to a reshuffling of different sections within the category of diaspora according to the former’s re-narration of the ideal diasporic subject. This resulted in the marginalisation of some sections that have traditionally regarded themselves as belonging to the core of Turkey’s diaspora, the emergence of new centres, continuing peripherality and antagonism of
others, and co-optation of certain sections of the latter group. The findings confirm that changes in ‘antagonistic’ and ‘centro-peripheral’ positions are possible. The home-state’s approach to all expatriates and to different intra-diaspora sub-categories had a significant role in inducing these changes. By showing occasional alliances between the former core and the new centre the section also illustrates that these diasporic stances are neither fixed nor bounded and isolated from each other.

The last section shifts the attention to the crystallising domestic political polarisation and its resonance among expatriates, as well as the home government’s transnationalisation of the polarisation. The section shows that the state’s abandonment of the rhetoric of embracing all expatriates from an equal distance and resorting back to sharply contrasting friend-foe distinctions has led to ‘increasing levels of groupness’ of both centro-peripheral and antagonistic clusters. The level of diasporaness has increased overall, as homeland agendas have gained growing salience on both sides. The transnational political atmosphere, heavily fed by the home government’s moves within home- as well as host-contexts, has engendered the necessity of taking sides. The final section analyses the effects of the introduction of out-of-country-voting within the context of homeland elections. It demonstrates that transnationalisation of electoral politics has been crucial for the incipient institutionalisation and formalisation of alliances and negotiations between homeland political actors and the “clusters” abroad.

1. CONTRADICTIONS OF EMBRACING THE CITIZEN DIASPORA AND THE CIVILISATIONAL KIN

This section demonstrates that Turkey’s aspiration to engage a broad scope of transborder populations, whose “belonging” to the state has been justified through a melange of membership criteria and the claim of equally encompassing the entire “citizen diaspora” is difficult to reconcile. Particularly ethnic and/or religious minorities within Turkey and their “extensions” abroad highlight this contradiction.

As has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, Turkey has been expanding the scope and diversifying the composition of its transborder populations. These populations’ special connection, i.e., belonging to the state has been justified through the use of a mélange of legal, ethnolinguistic, religious, cultural-historical criteria moulded into the notion of “co-
civilisation”. Officially presenting the new diaspora approach, then-foreign minister Davutoğlu conceptualised Turkey’s vast diaspora as an internally ‘orbited’ one in 2011:

“We are changing the term of diaspora. We primarily change its content; what it contains. We conceive as our own diaspora not only our citizens living abroad, but also all kin communities that had been together with us in the past. The first orbit is our citizens abroad. Just outside that is the orbit of Albanians, Bosniaks, Circassians, Caucasians… Azeri people, all Turkic Republics are in the second orbit. The third orbit is composed of everyone who emigrated from these territories in some way and then lost their citizenship”.

Davutoğlu later clarified which populations the rather vague ‘third orbit’ referred to. He stated that ‘every individual that emigrated from Anatolian soil belongs to our diaspora no matter what religion or sect they belong to’ and mentioned Armenians, Greeks, and Jews who were former Ottoman subjects and/or former citizens of Turkey. The practical inclusion of this third orbit could have been quite revolutionary considering conceptions of nationhood and dominant nationalisms in Turkey. However, its inclusion remained purely rhetorical as it was to a large extent part of a diplomatic strategy of co-opting “moderate sections” against the “uncompromising sections” of the Armenian diaspora.

With the establishment of the YTB, citizens, former citizens, and their descendants permanently settled in third countries, as well as co-ethnics and kin communities have been lumped together into Turkey’s diaspora also substantially. The ‘diaspora of citizens’, ‘historical and cultural diaspora’, and the ‘diaspora based on affinity’ have been dealt with through separate subsections. However, the YTB’s human, financial, and political resources are allocated to all types of diasporas. According to the Vice-President of the YTB, there is no contradiction in bringing these populations together. The all-encompassing nature of the definition, including citizens, those with cultural and historical ties, and former subjects and citizens that belonged to ethnic or religious minorities reflects the ‘tradition of the geography inherited by Turkey’. This tradition had always opted for ‘inclusion rather than exclusion,

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300 This “opening” towards the non-Muslim orbit should be primarily considered within the context of Turkey’s rapprochement efforts with Armenia that gained some pace around 2009 with the signing of two Protocols on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Protocol and the Development of Bilateral Relations (Phillips 2012).
embracing differences rather than differentiating’.

Such expansive and further expandable conception mixing criteria based on current or former citizenship and on various kinds of identity-markers was developed as it would potentially allow the state to ‘play in multiple registers’ (Brubaker 2000: 17). However, many issues regarding the recognition and rights of ethnic and religious minorities within Turkey remain unsolved. In addition, a considerable part of Turkey’s ‘citizen diaspora’ is made of people affiliating with these minority identities, whereas politically mobilised sections among them remain involved in minority politics in the homeland. Under these conditions, pragmatic definitional laxities and categories based on descent or co-religiosity become difficult to sustain together with the state’s claim to equally embrace all expatriates regardless of their ethnicity or religion.

Indeed, the pro-Kurdish party BDP criticised the lumping together of citizens and ethnically or religiously defined kin populations starting from the parliamentary debates on the establishment of the YTB. BDP deputies problematized the scope and the types of populations the YTB addresses and questioned the criteria for being counted as the ‘soydaş’ and ‘akraba’ of a multi-ethnic state. They pointed to the inherent contradiction in acting as a kin-state, while being home to a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-sectarian citizenry within and beyond borders.

From an ethnic minority perspective, BDP deputies mostly contested the ethnic bias. They objected to the exclusionary and homogenising nature of naming the Agency’s target populations “Overseas Turks” instead of ‘Overseas Citizens of Turkey’ (TBMM 2010: 546-547). They also pointed out that the term soydaş was only referring to the Turkish ethnicity and it was paradoxical to embrace ethnic Turks abroad while leaving out Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Iran, if the intention was to embrace transborder “kin” of Turkish citizens (ibid.: 566-567). The party underlined the inconsistency of establishing a diaspora agency for Turks and their co-ethnics and kin, while claiming to pursue ‘democratic openings’ aimed at better recognising collective identities and the expansion of minority rights (ibid.: 552). In close relation to the issue of whether or not overseas Turks denoted “ethno-linguistic” monism or pluralism, the BDP also brought up the issue of different emigration trajectories and their

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301 Author’s interview with the Vice President of the YTB, op. cit.
legal and political consequences. BDP deputies asserted that the phenomenon of political asylum from Turkey was closely related to the state’s oppression of ethnic and religious minorities. Given the signs of ethnic and religious bias in the new diaspora concept of the state, BDP deputies asked whether the YTB would also embrace thousands of political refugees and former citizens that were denaturalised by the state (ibid.: 554).

Stated by Faruk Çelik, then-State Minister responsible for overseas citizens, the government response was that the YTB was intended as a body addressing all citizens. Nevertheless, it was not an agency for those ‘who do not consider themselves as citizens of the Republic of Turkey or do not have such bonds’. Çelik also argued that the name ‘Overseas Turks’ was chosen after extensive deliberation, and it was ‘the outcome of a uniting approach rather than a dividing one’ (ibid.: 546). Expatriates are conventionally depicted as guest-workers that left with “wooden suitcases” for their bread and butter, endured hardship, and achieved socioeconomic upgrading through working hard. Alternatively, the citizen diaspora is also narrated as being composed of entrepreneurial Turks making business in every corner of the world. Except for deputies from the BDP and those from the CHP with backgrounds in leftist movements, all political party representatives reproduced these narratives during parliamentary debates on overseas citizens-related issues. The predominant expatriate profile depicted and promoted by a majority of home-country political actors confirms Dufoix (2008: 60)’s argument that ‘the usage of “diaspora” downplays politics while promoting uniformity’. This is more often than not done through assimilating ‘political militants into the diaspora numbers’ (ibid.).

One of the rare occasions where the state gathered both citizen and kin components of its diaspora, was the ambivalently titled Turkish - Co-ethnic and Kin Communities Meeting (Türk - Soydaş ve Akraba Toplulukları Buluşması) held in Istanbul in February 2010. 2500 representatives from both registers came together in this “homecoming” according to the publication of the Ministry of the State that contains speeches from the gathering and information on the soon to be established YTB (Ministry of State 2010). This publication gives clues of the scope and composition of the expansive diaspora, and the ways in which the state reconciles these different “types” of populations. The representatives who gave speeches in the name of their communities can be grouped into three: Expatriates in Europe and the US, co-ethnics and/or fellow Muslims from former Ottoman territories and beyond, Turkist associations from Turkey and associations set up by Turkish citizens with origins in and links
to the *akraba* in the Balkans (ibid.).

Erdoğan, Davutoğlu, and Çelik referred to the commonality between overseas Turks and kin communities in linguistic, ethnic, and/or religious aspects. A combination of shared civilisation, ancestry, history, destiny, culture, religion, and language made these populations a “group” of interest for Turkey in their addresses. Turkey featured as the amalgamation and the origin of these shared attributes and hence the reference for these populations, as it was both a migrant-sending state and the inheritor of the imperial space that once united all these people (ibid.: 9-38). In the part of his speech specifically addressing expatriates, Davutoğlu stated that their priority became ‘the transmission of their culture, their faith, and their language to their grandchildren’ rather than earning money and saving. He continued by assuring them that Turkey would make sure that ‘their children will speak proper Turkish, and perpetuate the strong consciousness of adhering to the same kiblah, to the same flag’ (ibid.: 35).

This rhetoric and the choice of spokespersons representing the central components of the overarching diaspora reflect the elite’s efforts to promote and consolidate a Turko-Ottoman-(Sunni)Islamic notion, both for its pragmatic and ideological-political advantages. At the same time, reflecting the parallel claim of the home-state’s equal distance to all citizens, the state invited Turgut Öker, the chairman of the European Confederation of Alevi Associations (*Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu*, AABK) to this gathering. As we will see shortly, the AABK has a rather critical stance towards the home-state on the status and recognition of Alevism in Turkey. This example illustrates the inherent contradiction between the state’s neutral approach towards expatriates on the basis of current or former citizenship, and its aspiration to expand its coverage area and boost its popularity by resorting to the identitarian

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302 Representing ‘Turkish communities in Europe’ were Mustafa Yeneroğlu, then-General Secretary of the IGMG; Mahinur Özdemir, Deputy in the Belgian Parliament, and ‘third generation member of a Turkish-origin family’ (ibid.: 54); and Kaya Boztele, the chairman of Turkish-American Federation. The co-ethnic and kin populations were represented by Mustafa Abdülcemil Kırımoğlu, Speaker of the Crimean Tatar Assembly; Nazım İbrahimov, Diaspora Minister of Azerbaijan; Hüseyin Özgürün, then-Foreign Minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; Mahir Yaşçilar Minister of Environment of Kosovo (representing Turkish-Kosovars); Hadi Nezir, State Minister of Macedonia and Chairman of the Democratic Party of Turks; Süleyman Uglanin, State Minister of Serbia (representing Sandžak Bosniaks). The speakers from Turkey were Turhan Gencoğlu, the Chairman of the Federation of Rumelian Turks, and Nuri Gürür, the Chairman of Turkish Hearths (ibid.: 44-64).

303 According to first-hand reporting of one of my informants, Turgut Öker, the AABK chairman attended the gathering and found both the crowd and the dominant discourse to be heavily Sunni-conservative. *Author’s interview with the chairman of ATIYAB, Berlin, 1 November 2012. ATIYAB is the Alevi businessmen association in Germany; its acronym stands for European Business and Investment Association (Avrupa Ticaret ve Yatırım Birliği).*
potpourri summed up as co-civilisation. Hence, from some Alevi expatriate perspectives, the Turkish government’s use of ‘pan-Turkist’ concepts like soydaş, based on ‘descent, blood and race’ in identifying its transborder populations sharply contradicts the ethnic, religious, sectarian diversity of Turkey’s citizens beyond borders. Therefore, from such perspective, the home-state’s claim that the post-Kemalist Turkey stays at an equal distance to all expatriates and acknowledges diversity is largely rhetorical, as well as incoherent with the parallel running “kin” discourse.\textsuperscript{304}

The collision of ‘de-ethnicising’ forces defining membership in the polity within the territory of the state, and ‘re-ethnicising’ forces (Joppke 2005) defining extraterritorial membership results in an ambivalent and contradictory state discourse and attitude. In the case of Turkey, the latter force is not limited to ethnicity. Instead, it works through combinations of criteria mixing a restricted interpretation of former Ottoman Muslim millet membership with Turkic elements. This inherent contradiction is noted and contested by actors belonging to minorities living side by side with the ‘core nation’ not only within the state and its resident population, but also among citizens and former citizens abroad. Hence, that collision is not only closely related to ‘external inclusion’, but also to ‘internal exclusion’ (Waterbury 2006). A statement by Selahattin Demirtaş, then-BDP co-chairman summarised this point when commenting on the problematic relationship between the constitutional definition of citizenship and “Turkishness”. Demirtaş highlighted the close connection between ‘internal exclusion’ of citizens belonging to non-Turkish minorities and the ‘external inclusion’ of non-citizen, non-resident Turkish minorities. In his words:

‘The concept of Turkish nation was not able to become an encompassing, supra-identity. Still today, when someone mentions ‘our soydaş abroad’, he or she refers to ethnic Turks. There is still an agency for cooperation with overseas Turks in this country, which establishes relations with only ethnic Turks in the world. Therefore, the state itself is based on an ethnic Turk mentality. The nation itself is also based on an ethnic Turk mentality’ (quoted in Çamlıbel 2013).

2. IMPLICATIONS OF RECONFIGURED DIASPORA-MAKING PROJECT FOR THE TARGETED POPULATION

Under “diasporic” contexts where heterogeneity and contention co-exist, the relationship of the home-state is likely to take a ‘corporatist’ character with some groups, while it is marked

\textsuperscript{304} Author’s interview with the chairman of ATTYAB, op. cit.
by an ‘antagonistic’ one with others (Smith 2003a: 299). As discussed in Chapter 2, the centro-peripheral’ and ‘antagonistic’ structuring modes of collective experience abroad conceptualised by Dufoix (2008: 62-64) are structurally similar to Smith’s dichotomy. It should be remembered that these modes are not clear-cut binary distinctions, but rather two idealised extremes of a continuum. Changes from one to another (and back) are possible, grey zones might exist, and contingent hybridisation and purification of modes might also happen.

From the home-state’s perspective, when the degree of contention, and hence the degree of antagonism is higher, the population abroad is likely to be segmented into strongly polarised categories like ‘enemy emigrants’ and ‘friendly communities’ (Ragazzi 2009: 384-385). This is likely to be the case especially when the state’s primary preoccupation is maintaining control beyond borders over both categories (ibid.). Under undemocratic regimes and securitised approaches towards emigrants (Brand 2006), official differentiation between sections is clear-cut and the state does not refrain from openly taking sides. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the Turkish state’s attitude in the 1980s and 1990s followed along these lines. The state categorically, normatively, and practically distinguished “reactionaries” and “separatists” among current and former citizens from the rest, whom it regarded as belonging both to the nation and the citizenry.

In its initial term, the AKP government openly criticised the criminalising and exclusionary attitude of the Kemalist elite towards resident and non-resident citizens that did not fit its monolithic national vision. The new elite’s emphasis was mainly on the previous exclusion of pious-conservative Sunni sections. The declared official stance vis-à-vis expatriates became relatively more inclusive with the launching of a fully-fledged diaspora-making project. Democratic openings towards hitherto excluded minorities embedded within the bid for EU membership also contributed to the relative phasing out of sharp-edged friend/foe categorisations.

By focusing on Germany as the host-context, this section examines how the shift in the new state elite’s approach towards inherited or reconfigured sub-categories of expatriates impacted the diasporic landscape in practice. In order to conceptually support the empirical analysis of changing transborder membership politics to follow, it first provides a brief theoretical discussion on the ways in which the state of origin might (re)shape and (re)condition different sections’ transborder membership in form and degree. The section then deals with the
implications of post-Kemalist Turkey’s reconfigured diaspora-making project for ‘centro-peripheral’ and ‘antagonistic’ stances and forms of membership respectively.

2.1. How do home-states (re)shape transborder membership politics?

States do not only ban actions and impede organisation efforts of antagonistic groups, while steering and supporting those of friendly communities. An ‘extra-territorially extending state’ still has ‘the power to disburse resources outside its own territory, and … can extend recognition and organisational resources to some and not other migrant groups’ (Smith 2003a: 329). It can allocate material, organisational, and political resources to friendly communities and recognise them as representatives of the whole expatriate population. Through their recognition as such, they are granted access to political authorities and institutions, from which the antagonistic groups remain largely excluded. Preferential treatment comes with the price of a higher degree of dependence on the home-state. Corporate groups with thicker ‘state-institutional’ membership tend to have lower levels of autonomy. Antagonistic groups get lower shares from the state’s recognition and distribution of resources but maintain higher degrees of autonomy (ibid., 302-304).

The degree and forms of membership of specific groups, the ways the home-state attempts to shape membership politics, and hence the nature of the relationship between groups and the home-state are not fixed. Instead, as a result of changes in some or all of the parameters within this dynamic and interactive relationship, former enemy emigrants might replace friendly communities and vice versa. Strongly polarised categorisations might wither away, whereas categorisations along novel lines might emerge. Groups’ bargaining power and claims-making abilities within the community they are addressing, vis-à-vis their host-state and/or the international community might grow stronger or weaker. Such changes are likely to influence the ways in which the group is able to assert its agendas, which in turn has implications on the state’s strategies.

A general shift in the outlook of the home-state towards extraterritorial populations and ‘the ideal function that is attributed to this group’ (Ragazzi 2009: 384) have implications on the

305 Among possible changes in the parameters stemming largely from the home-state side of the equation one can think of: regime or government change, for expatriate populations and their agendas and their mobilisation efforts in relation with the home-state and other non-state actors in the homeland.
ways in which the state deals with the totality of expatriates and its constituting parts. Diasporising states take measures that are symbolically, bureaucratically, diplomatically, legally, politically, and economically more inclusive towards citizens, former citizens, and ‘para-citizens’ (Ragazzi 2014: 2-3). Expansions or contractions in the range of rights and duties attached to citizenship as a formal legal status apply equally to all that hold this status. However, degrees and forms of membership of different groups are more open to be unevenly affected by states’ discretion. This discretionary power might be used for recognising, legitimising, attributing representativeness, and distributing ‘material, symbolic, or political resources based in and controlled by the state’ (Smith 2003a: 302).

The home-state that has a claim to have such an inclusive approach towards the totality of expatriates, could be expected to be more constrained in openly dividing transborder populations into negatively/positively loaded categories, and treating different sections in diametrically opposed ways. Such a renewed outlook can create opportunities for different groups of expatriates to renegotiate their relations with the home-state. This could be the case especially if the state substantiates its incorporative outlook with tangible expansions in the range of rights and channels of participation as well as an egalitarian rhetoric. However, an all-encompassing diaspora strategy, relative expansion in external citizenship rights, and opening up of the political field does not mean that the home-state would completely give up its abovementioned discretionary powers.

Finally, the inclusion of the expatriates into the political decision making processes of the country of origin has been generally the outcome of a ‘global nation’ outlook and more incorporative policy towards the totality of the state’s claimed diaspora. Nevertheless, it can also result in a clearer demarcation of overseas citizens qua overseas voters and involved political actors into categories of supporters and rivals along ideological and party political lines. Such an outcome could be expected especially in sharply divided societies and accordingly polarised politics. In other words, an expansive diaspora strategy on the side of the sending state might lead to an extension of rights and a more inclusive approach towards the totality of expatriates. However, particular political and electoral dynamics could also result in diametrically opposed treatment of different sections of expatriates following the initial “opening”. Such treatment would impact membership practices, agendas, and mobilisation strategies of these sections in different ways.
2.2. Shifting the diaspora’s centre of gravity

Changing hands of power in Turkey and the new elite’s reconfigured offensive engagement strategy led to substantial shifts in the core of the state’s diasporic map. The shift in the centro-peripheral nexus had its implications primarily for the Kemalist and the pious-conservative organised stances. The AKP government initially phased out the sharp Kemalist demarcation of antagonistic versus friendly communities. However, this did not mean that the home-state stopped attempting to shape forms of relationship and the “thickness” of membership of different groups through co-opting and alienating strategies. Instead, a similar system of establishing corporatist relations with selected like-minded sections of expatriates has continued. The new elite has been granting these sections access to various resources, legitimacy, and the almost monopolistic status of representativeness at a consented price of lower degrees of autonomy.

What has changed though, is the ruling elite in the home-state and its conception of ideal citizens abroad and like-minded expatriate organisations speaking in their name. This has caused the switching of roles of two main sections of the diaspora concerning antagonistic-corporatist forms of their relationship to the state and the thickness-thinness of their membership. Friends of the previous ruling elite that based its categorisation of expatriates on adherence to official nationalism, and particularly to secularism have moved from the centre to the margins. Some of those that were regarded as enemy emigrants before, particularly Sunni Muslim organisations, and a recently formed circle of “conservative democrats” have become friends. Nevertheless, the new home-state elite continues to stick to certain aspects of the official nationalist doctrine; above all the effort to refute what the doctrine calls as the “claims regarding the so-called Armenian genocide”. As far as such official nationalist sensitivities are concerned, the former core occasionally recaptures its central position and resorts to ‘centro-peripheral’ forms of relationship. Thus, there are also contingent alliances between the former Kemalist core and the new pious-conservative centre that inherited certain official nationalist sensitivities.

2.2.1. Former centro-peripheral core moving to the margins

Friends of the former secular elite, i.e. Kemalist, official nationalist sections abroad, have been going through a process of becoming the other, if not being directly put in an enemy
category. Their current position cannot be compared to that of “separatists” or “reactionaries” in the previous era, in that there is no open hostility towards them and they are not completely excluded and delegitimised. For instance, they are still included in symbolically significant official activities of diplomatic representations such as the opening reception of the new embassy building in Berlin. While these actors have continuing relations with diplomatic officials in Berlin, their overall access to homeland elites, state institutions and bureaucratic officials decreased to a great extent compared to the previous period.

There is also a simultaneous process of these sections’ self-identification as an antagonistic group based on their evaluation of the situation in Turkey as one threatening the foundational principles of the Republic. The emphasis is on the threat posed to laicism by the AKP’s Islamist policies, and more so on the potential division and disintegration of the Turkish state through what these circles regard as the “so-called solution process”. The Berlin branch of the Union of European Atatürkist Thought Associations (Avrupa Atatürkçi Düşünce Dernekleri Birliği, AADDB) organised a Republic Rally in Berlin in 2007 in order to support the defence of laicism. The rally in Berlin emulated the mass protests that had been simultaneously organised in Turkey. The Kemalist, anti-imperialist, and nationalist youth-university organisation Youth Union of Turkey (Türkiye Gençlik Birliği, TGB), established in Ankara in 2006, has been also spreading to several cities of Germany. The TGBs attend and support these rallies as well as other protests against the AKP government, against US imperialism, and against the partition of Turkey, all of which they see as parts of a connected plan.

Transnational links with those sharing the same concern in the homeland, including some CHP and MHP deputies, have been getting denser too. For instance, the initiative called the ‘National Constitution Forum’, which started as assemblies organised in different cities of Turkey, and turned into a ‘National Centre’ platform, also organised a forum in Berlin

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306 The new building of the embassy was opened with a big reception on 30 October 2012. Among the attendees were then-Prime Minister Erdoğan, then-foreign minister Davutoğlu, then-Deputy Prime Minister responsible for citizens abroad Bekir Bozdağ, and then-minister for European integration Egemen Bağış. Then-German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle represented the German government. Being invited to the reception was highly valued in terms of visibility and the state’s confirmation of their status as representatives by many “Turkish” civil society organisations and/or engaged individuals in Berlin. Being excluded from the list of invitees was seen as a clear sign of the state’s negative attitude towards them. (Personal observation, interviews, unofficial conversations of the author, September-October 2012, Berlin).

307 Author’s fieldwork notes, September-October 2012, Berlin and author’s interview with the chairman of the Berlin branch of the Union of Atatürkist Thought Associations (Atatürkçi Düşünce Dernekleri Birliği, AADDB), Berlin, 22 October 2012.

308 Author’s interview with the chairman of Berlin AADDB, Berlin, 22 October 2012.
together with the AADDB. Prominent Kemalist-official nationalist names from Turkey took part as panellists in the forum. The forum’s main agenda item was safeguarding the indivisibility of the nation and the state in the Constitution of the Republic against possible amendments. The TGB youth, representatives from the Union of Turkish-German Business Associations (Türk-Alman İşadamları Birlığı, TDU), the Berlin Idealist Hearths (Berlin Ülkü Ocakları), and deputies from CHP and MHP attended the forum. The Kemalist newspaper Aydınlik (15 October 2012) reported that the consul general of Turkey in Berlin also attended the forum. This illustrated the grey zone between antagonistic and centro-peripheral stances, and the continuing relations between home-state diplomatic officials and the official nationalist actors.

Culminating in a more institutionalised form of official nationalist diasporic consciousness and organisation, a ‘National Centre Germany’ was established on 14 September 2013. Their motto is ‘We Unite in Atatürk’ and their main preoccupation is the struggle against the partition of the Turkish state and the nation. Their primary agenda item is opposing the peace process between the Turkish state and major political and armed components of the Kurdish movement. The process, according to the National Centre would not ‘put an end to terror but end up in our country’s partition’.

2.2.2. From excluded antagonists to legitimised representatives of overseas Turks

As demonstrated throughout this dissertation, the major elite shift in the homeland has led to the gradual change of the national narrative and the ideal diasporic subject. The ideal overseas Turk adheres to a new set of core values drawn from Islamic ethics and conservative neighbourhood morality and firmly believes in Turkey’s project of becoming a global political and economic power. Hence, changing hands of power, the new elite’s consolidation of its position, and the consequent predominance of its renarrated nation(alism) had direct implications for (Sunni) Islamic expatriate organisations. These organisations were not only excluded and banned by the Kemalist elite, but also delegitimised and to a large extent

309 Sabih Kanadoğlu, the former chief prosecutor of Turkey’s Supreme Court of Appeals and the name behind the “367 rule” that ended in the major political crisis in the 2007 presidential election, Onur Öyemen, former CHP deputy and ambassador of Turkey to Germany, known by his hawkish official nationalist line, and Hüsamettin Cindoruk, former Speaker of the Parliament of Turkey were among the guest panelists. Author’s interview with the chairman of Berlin AADDB, op. cit..
criminalised both in home- and host-contexts. All these developments and the home government’s interventions in the expatriate political-organisational landscape also led to the emergence of a relatively recently formed circle of “conservative democrats” abroad. The elevation of these sections to the status of the representative of the Turks in Germany gained a rather institutional and formal character through their predominance in the renewed Consultation Commission. \[311\]

The case of the IGMG is illustrative of the role played by the new ruling elite in actively transforming an enemy emigrant group into a legitimate and friendly actor. It also shows how membership forms and practices can be negotiated by expatriate groups whose bargaining power vis-à-vis the decision makers can grow depending on the specific context. As mentioned in Chapter 4, before the 2000s, the IGMG was the “reactionary” organisation from the state’s perspective. Thus, neither diplomatic representations, nor the DIB, nor the DITIB ever established any kinds of relationship with it, as they did with ‘loyal’ and registered associations. It has been among the Islamist organisations under the surveillance of the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. In the 1990s, its inclusion to this list was primarily justified on the basis that ‘the abolition of the laicist government system in Turkey and the establishment of an Islamic state and social system are, as before, among its goals’ (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 1999: 165). The Verfassungsschutz recently moderated its stance on the IGMG, while keeping it in the federal surveillance list. \[312\]

The IGMG is now categorised as an ‘anti-constitutional (verfassungsfeindlich), but not violence-oriented legalistic group’ (ibid. 2013: 192). Hence, it belongs to the category of ‘Islamism’, but not to ‘Islamic terrorism’ among the movements to be monitored (ibid.: 206).

As far as the home-government was concerned, the AKP attempted to undo the Kemalist elites’ delegitimising moves towards the IGMG through two major steps in its early months in government. The first instance was about a treaty on collaboration against terrorism and organised crime to be signed between Turkey and Germany in March 2003. The IGMG was listed among the fundamentalist groups engaging in activities against Turkey in the preamble of the treaty. This caused indignation in the IGMG as well as among AKP deputies and cabinet members that continued to have close links with the movement. An IGMG board

\[311\] See Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2.

\[312\] While it is still in the list of ‘extremist’ organisations to be monitored at the federal level, the IGMG was taken out of the list of the Hamburg Verfassungsschutz Office in 2014 (Die Welt, 16 April 2014).
member came to Ankara to demand the IGMG’s removal from the preamble. Consequently, the government withdrew the draft and passed the new version without the IGMG in it (Radikal, 10 April 2003).

Shortly after, it became public that then-foreign minister Abdullah Gül sent a circular to diplomatic representations in Europe. The circular instructed them to remove the IGMG from the list of threatening organisations and to include it in their official programmes (Ntvmsnbc, 19 April 2003). This top-down legitimisation was received with outrage by the CHP. In the report on the party’s 30th General Assembly, it was stated that the government kept ‘encouraging groups that [were] insensitive to secularist principles of the Republic’, which indicated that it was ‘seeking to deviate from the course of the Republic’ (CHP 2003: 29).

Once turned into a legitimate actor and incorporated into the ranks of “friendly communities” by the home government, not only chairmen of the DIB, but also cabinet members and officials from the YTB started to include the IGMG headquarters in their official visits in Europe. This rapprochement did not miss Germany’s attention either. For instance, the Verfassungsschutz report noted that the Deputy Prime Minister and the YTB chairman attended an IGMG-organised ‘Brotherhood and Solidarity Day’ in Hasselt, Belgium (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2013: 255).

The DITIB’s space of movement within the context of Germany was clearly demarcated from that of the IGMG and other Sunni organisations regarded as following and promoting officially unacceptable interpretations of Islam. Hence, it never had contacts or collaboration with the representatives of these “deviant” forms until the mid-2000s (Kortman and Rosenow-Williams 2013: 52). The changing form of relationship was also illustrated by the fact that the DITIB took part in the consortium formed by four Muslim organisations, namely, the Co-ordinating Council for Muslims in Germany (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland, KRM) in 2007.313 The establishment of the KRM was also an outcome of the Germany’s reconfigured outlook on Islam in the post-9/11 context. The host-state paid increasing attention to the “unproblematic” integration of Muslims into German society, whereas it was reluctant to grant the role of the representative of all Muslims in Germany in

313 The KRM consists of the DITIB, the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren, VIKZ), Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (Der Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, IRD) of which the IGMG is a member, and the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (Der Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD).
any one association. Hence, the state insisted on the establishment of a joint platform that the German state could directly address (Rosenow-Williams 2012: 359-361). Nevertheless, the DITIB’s involvement in a common platform like this would have been impossible without Ankara’s consent, even if the political context and Germany’s attitude had catalysed their coming together. Ankara not only consented to the DITIB’s taking part in the consortium, but also publicly demonstrated its approval through then-DIB chairman Ali Bardakoglu’s attendance at the KRM’s official inauguration (ibid. 365).

In addition to the government’s steps replacing Sunni organisations somewhere closer to the centre of the home-state’s expatriate map, the AKP, in its capacity as a homeland political party representing conservative democrats made considerable efforts to organise abroad. Already in 2003, the Turkish media reported that the party was debating the possibility of organising among the Turks abroad through forming ‘unions’ or ‘associations’ on ‘conservative democratic’ lines. Western Europe and primarily Germany were determined as priority areas (Milliyet, 20 April 2003). Then-group deputy chairman Eyüp Fatsa, who had an IGMG background, declared that such conservative democratic unions were envisaged to ‘engage in lobbying activities for Turkey abroad’ and to ‘disseminate our [the AKP’s] views among the Turks’ (ibid.). In 2004, a new NGO entitled the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) was established in Cologne, the headquarters of which was opened by Erdoğan the next year. While neither the UETD nor the AKP publicly recognised direct and organic links, the two have had a close relationship from the very beginning. The UETD is known to have an Islam-sensitive, conservative stance (Kaya 2013: 57), and a membership base consisting of ‘highly educated German citizens of Turkish origin’ (Mügge 2010: 160). Its main goals are ‘to enhance the social status of European Turks’ and ‘to engage in political lobbying activities’, including lobbying for Turkey’s EU membership.314

Since the late 2000s, the UETD has increasingly exhibited characteristics of a classic corporatist relationship with the home government.315 It has publicly taken up the responsibility of organising Erdoğan’s “sports-hall” rallies, such as the one in Cologne in 2008 and that in Dusseldorf in 2011. The Prime Minister, ministers, deputies, and other prominent figures from the AKP cadres have included visits to the UETD offices to their

314 http://www.uedt-berlin.org/uedt/?L=1
315 Such relationship is marked by ‘real benefits in exchange for real loyalty, including channelling and co-opting political dissent’ (Smith 2003a: 314).
programmes. Apart from being a party political relationship, the UETD is granted recognition
and high visibility also by the state bureaucracy. Officials from the DIB and the YTB almost
always include UETD offices to their visits in Europe, and frequently host them in Ankara.

Some other associations in Berlin notice and criticise this exclusively close relationship
between the UETD and those homeland actors that act in their capacity as governmental-state
officials. It is accepted as common knowledge especially among the sections that do not
identify themselves as “conservative”, that the UETD was founded on Erdoğan’s
instruction.316 A commonly held view among these sections is that the home government and
its expatriate-related institutions initially made an effort in elevating the UETD to the position
of the NGO representing Turks abroad in a similar way to the pre-AKP elites’ “coordination”
efforts.317 Another shared contention among these circles is that German authorities and the
media interpret the proximity between the two as the UETD’s lack of autonomy, which
depri ves the latter of effectiveness and power within the host-context. This claim seems to be
confirmed as the German media openly regards the UETD as ‘an AKP-Lobby-Association’
(Popp & Sehl 2011), or as ‘an AKP-off-shoot’ (Siefert 2014) functioning mainly as a political
campaigning tool of the party among expatriates. The centro-peripheral relationship between
the two has become rather explicit within the context of transnationalised political
polarisation since 2013, and particularly on the eve of the 2014 presidential election, in which
the expatriate vote gained relatively higher importance. Section 3 will examine the
implications of the changing host-government attitude within the context of post-2013
intensified political polarisation and the transnationalised nature of the homeland elections for
the diasporic landscape.

2.2.3. Official nationalist alliances between the former core and the new centre

The above picture implies that the former Kemalist core with its pro-home-state stance moved
to the margins of the official diasporic map, while antagonism towards the home government
became a defining characteristic of the “group”. It also suggests that the Islamist strand has
gone through the opposite transformation. However, as I will demonstrate below, the
positions towards, and forms of relationship with the home-state and among these seemingly
opposing stances are not as clear-cut. These diasporic positions seem to have opposing forms

316 Author’s interview with the then-chairman of the ATT, op. cit.
317 Author’s interviews and informal conversations, Berlin, September-October 2012.
of relationship with the home-state, triggered by the elite change in the country of origin and the resulting shifting balances in the laicism-Islamism axis. Put crudely, one has been mobilising for the defence of laicism against the new elite, and the other has been supporting the new elite in the advocacy for a larger public and societal role for Islam. However, the laicism-Islamism axis, which was fundamentally restructured, is only one of the relevant axes. There are also continuities in the home-state positions in spite of the transfer of power and the new elite’s claim of having cleansed the state from official nationalist reflexes through a comprehensive “restoration”.

The home-state’s stance on what it has called “claims regarding the so-called Armenian genocide” constitutes one of the main continuities in both elites’ official national narratives and diplomatic positions. The official position had traditionally been based on complete denial. Lately, the diplomatic strategy has been composed of combining two arguments and strategies. The first is the questioning of these “unfounded” claims and attempting to historically refute them. The second is admitting the killing and deportation of Anatolian Armenians from the Ottoman Empire, while presenting these atrocities as part of war conditions with inevitable casualties on both sides. As mentioned in 4, defending Turkey’s position and preventing the recognition of the Armenian genocide by host-states has ranked very high in the home-state’s list of expectations from overseas Turks. Supporting Turkey in its efforts to weaken the hands of the Armenian diaspora that keeps the issue high up in the international agenda has remained one of the top demands of the home-state from its own diaspora. Turkey expected and encouraged them to influence politics in their host-countries in the opposite direction through forming national voting blocs and efficiently lobbying host-country political and economic actors.

The expectation in this specific regard was also a significant factor feeding into the efforts to transform the ‘crowd of Turkish people’ into a diaspora since the second half of the 2000s. The establishment of the YTB and the DTIK was part of these efforts. Forming a counter-force to the effective Armenian lobbies around the world has remained one of the main motivations. For instance, then-Ministry of Economy, Zafer Çağlayan urged the audience at the World Turkish Entrepreneurs Congress in November 2011 to be as politically involved, economically successful and hence as effective as the Armenian diaspora:
'... if the Head of State of France brings the Armenian issue to the world’s agenda, believe me, the reason behind this is solely domestic political concerns. It is about Sarkozy’s efforts to get the votes of the Armenians in France. ... if there are 500 thousand Armenians in France, there are as many Turkish citizens. What makes the Armenians successful? It is the fact that they acquired French citizenship and that the entire population is involved in trade, in politics there. Our population is 500 thousand but only around 85-90 thousand of our citizens acquired citizenship; and the number of votes cast by them is only around that’ (Hürriyet, 19 November 2011).

The continuity of this aspect of the official nationalist stance and the adherence to it both by the main expatriate allies of the previous home-state elite and the new conservative-pious sections featuring as the new centre of the incumbent elite’s diaspora have been occasionally bringing these seemingly irreconcilable two diasporic stances together. The former core, while having been relatively marginalised in comparison to the new centre, recaptures its central position within this specific issue area.

Actors that fiercely criticise the home government as far as the laicist foundations of the Republic are concerned and take active part in platforms such as the ‘National Constitution Forums’, also join forces with the home-state when it comes to the “Armenian proposal”. For instance, the first and honorary ATT chairman, who also has been personally involved in objecting to the Armenian proposal and defending the Azerbaijani cause, appears as one of these actors. In 2005, he led the organisation of a petition to stop the bringing up of a proposal on the recognition of the Armenian genocide to the agenda of the German Federal Parliament. The petition gained 130,000 signatures. While acknowledging that secularist circles’ relationship with the home-state deteriorated after the elite change in the 2000s, he highlighted that it was the initiative of these sections sensitive to the Armenian issue to organise the petition. Initiatives like these have always been among the kinds of activism the home-state expected from overseas Turks regardless of ideological differences with home governments. The antagonistic stance and marginalised position of the Kemalist sections were contingently replaced by a corporatist stance and rather central positions within the context of the approaching centenary of the Armenian genocide of 1915. For instance, the honorary ATT chairman and the diplomatic representations in Berlin and the MFA officials in Ankara met several times within this context, where they discussed the possibilities of providing the international community with a historical picture that is not one-sided.

318 Author’s interview with the honorary chairman of the ATT, op. cit.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
The draft bill criminalising the denial of the Armenian genocide voted on by the French Senate in January 2012 led to a similar contingent co-mobilisation involving the home-state and diasporic groupings exhibiting otherwise antagonistic relationships. A mass protest march was organised in Paris on 21 January 2012 three days before the voting of the draft bill at the Senate. Media accounts reported that 30,000 Turks not only from France but also from other European countries joined the protest (Karaca 2012). The European editions of the Turkish media attributed the magnitude of the crowd and hence the success of the ‘Big March’ to the full support given by the DITIB, the IGMG, and the ‘Turkish Federation in France’ (Bulut 2012). The AADDB-Berlin mobilised 14 other associations in support of the protest march, and organised the travel of those who went to Paris. The chairman of AADDB-Berlin was content with the magnitude of the crowd in the march, while he criticised the AKP’s instrumentalisation of the issue for its own interests. At the same time, he acknowledged that such a big crowd was possible to a large extent thanks to the mobilisation efforts of mosque foundations close to the AKP.321 Finally, the centenary of 24 April 1915, the uttering of the word ‘genocide’ by the German president Gauck, and debates on another Armenian genocide proposal engendered another “grand coalition”. A press release was issued and a protest march was organised in Berlin, led by the umbrella organisation Berlin Turkish Community (Berlin Türk Cemaati, BTC). The DITIB, the UETD, the VIKZ, the AADDB, and others institutionally supported both the press release and the protest march (Hürriyet Avrupa, 22 April 2015).322

### 2.3. Change and continuity in antagonistic margins of the diasporic map

Besides the shifts at the core of the diasporic map, the elite’s renewed all-encompassing outlook had a claim to correct the wrongs committed against some other segments that did not fit the Kemalist conception of the ideal Turkish nation. Part of substantiating this claim was demonstrating that the home-state had been moving away from its previously homogenising and excluding attitude towards ethnic and religious minorities not only within Turkey but also beyond its borders. Symbolically embracing non-Muslim populations abroad helped

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321 Author’s interview with the chairman of the AADDB-Berlin, op. cit.
322 The BTC chairman defines the association as predominantly working on issues related to the Turkish community’s issues and problems in Germany and Berlin. He describes the sociology of the membership base as ‘patriotic people that love and care about their nation and their religion’. Author’s interview with the BTC chairman, Berlin, 5 October 2012.
highlighting past Kemalist exclusionary practices as well as substantiating the elite’s narrative of post-Kemalist Turkey drawing on the tolerant and multicultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire. These populations featured as part of Turkey’s diaspora mostly in MFA discourses, following their inclusion as the ‘third orbit’ in then-foreign minister Davutoğlu’s expansive and orbited diaspora conception.

Accordingly, bureaucratic, governmental, and diplomatic officials started to visit Assyrian and Orthodox communities that originated from Turkey and settled in Germany or elsewhere in Europe. The symbolic inclusion of these populations was manifested through official messages disseminated at these visits. For instance, meeting Antiochian Orthodox community leaders in Cologne, Davutoğlu said that ‘[t]he Turkish state does not see ethnic differences and does not condone any discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity or language. Turkish consulates are yours and the Turkish state is ready to serve you’ (Today’s Zaman, 4 December 2011). The symbolic inclusion did not only target non-Muslims that migrated to Germany relatively more recently. As part of a general opening to the ‘third orbit’, Davutoğlu also met representatives of the Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans in his official visit to Greece and invited them back to Istanbul. However, these embracement and welcoming gestures seem to have remained merely rhetorical gestures. The Federation of Constantinopolitans voiced tangible demands for the Turkish state to make such return possible and feasible. The “homeland” has not addressed the demands of these sections so far.

In general, most ethnic and religious minorities started to feature in state discourses negating the Kemalist monolithic and homogenising rhetoric and practice. Official messages often refer to the “mosaic of Turkey”, with its Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Laz, Assyrians, Sunni, Alevi etc. Officials also acknowledge that the “mosaic of Turkey” is almost equally replicated among the overseas citizens and former citizens, and that ethnic, religious, political, ideological diversity is a reality that the state does not deny. However, diversity is

323 He was reported to say that: ‘Come back to Istanbul, to Turkey. Turkey is your home. The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey is your home. You are Turkish diaspora’ (Güvenç 2011).
324 In 2012, the Istanbulite Greeks demanded the preparation of the legal infrastructure for their return. These demands included the restitution of their Turkish citizenship; facilitated naturalisation for descendants of former citizens; solutions to their problems of property and inheritance rights; the re-opening of Greek schools, subsidies and orientation courses for those who intend to open their own businesses; and Turkish language courses for the younger generations (Köse 2013).
325 Author’s interview with the YTB Vice President, op. cit.
generally framed in a depoliticised cultural-folkloric language demonstrated by rhetoric not going beyond the “mosaic of Turkey” or the “colours of Anatolia”.326

Despite this rhetorical pluralism and relative softening of the state’s approach on the “Kurdish issue”, Kurdish organisations abroad have never been included in the rapprochement attempts, even at the symbolic level. There has not been an instance of state authorities establishing actual contact with Kurdish associations. The Federation of Kurdish Associations in Germany (Yekitiya Komalên Kurd li Elmanya, YEK-KOM) is one of the two legal Kurdish federations in Germany, and is closely affiliated with the PKK (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 62-63). Establishing relations with organisations under the roof of YEK-KOM is out of question for the Turkish state, as it regards the federation as the European extensions of the PKK, and the PKK as a terrorist organisation. As a matter of fact, if other organisations establish contacts with YEK-KOM or join common platforms together with it, they are accused with being affiliated with violence and terrorism.327

The Confederation of Associations from Kurdistan in Europe (Konfederasyona Komeleyên Kurdistanê li Ewrûpa, KOMKAR) that explicitly dissociated itself from the PKK and an armed solution since its establishment in 1979, was neither included in the “opening” of the Turkish state, even on symbolic terms. At the time of the research, political authorities from Turkey or diplomatic representations never contacted or visited KOMKAR Berlin.328 Neither was it invited to any official all-encompassing gathering such as the 50th Year of Emigration celebrations and symposium in November 2011.329 The KOMKAR representative, after pointing to the example of the Iraqi consulate organising Newroz receptions for its Kurdish expatriates in Germany, argued that both the Turkish state and the Kurds should get familiar with such ideas if normalisation and reconciliation was sincerely pursued.330

326 For instance, the YTB Vice President contended that the all-encompassing orbited diaspora approach had the potential to ‘prevent claims of Pontus or Armenian genocide’, in addition to the claims of ‘other minority communities that emigrated from Turkey, particularly those in Scandinavian regions’. While the Kurds appear as part of the “mosaic” within and beyond, Kurdish political refugees lobbying European governments that are not even explicitly called as such, do not seem to be included in the “all-encompassing” diaspora. Author’s interview with the YTB Vice President, op. cit.
327 According to an interviewee, this was the case for some Alevi organisations that were part of the AABK, which took part in a collective protest against Erdoğan and the Turkish government in Berlin on 31 October 2012, where YEK-KOM was also among the constituent organisations, Author’s interview with the ATİYAB chairman, op. cit.
328 Author’s interview with KOMKAR-Berlin representative, op. cit.
329 Ibid.
330 Ibid.
Authorities from Turkey attempted to initiate a process of symbolic rapprochement with the Alevi organisations abroad in the second half of the 2000s, parallel to the government’s ‘Alevi opening’ process launched in 2008. A brief explanation on the state’s attitude towards Alevism and the European dimensions of the Alevi movement(s) is needed in order to understand the home-state’s overseas “Alevi opening” and the peculiar trajectory it has followed. The evolution of the organisation and mobilisation of Alevis in Europe is beyond the limits of this dissertation. It suffices to say that Alevi mobilisation first in Germany and then in Europe gained considerable momentum after the Sivas massacre in 1993. The movement managed to organise at national and transnational levels and become active in European-level politics.  

The Federation of Alevi Associations in Germany (Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu, AABF) and its European level confederation AABK were established during the course of the 1990s.

Bilici (1998: 72) argued that the position of the DIB, and hence the Turkish state, towards Alevism was based on denying official recognition through regarding Alevism ‘as a type of folklore or subculture’ or ‘as a mere sect or religious order’ within Islam. The state also assumed the role ‘of a referee sifting the good Alevi from the bad on the grounds that Alevism [was] being used as a tool by atheists, materialists, Marxists, Christians or Jews’ (ibid.). These three strategies have also been closely linked. That is to say, the state regarded as “bad Alevi” those that define Alevism as more than folklore, sub-culture, or a religious order within Islam, and ask for broader recognition and neater delineation of their separate identity.

In the expatriate context, the good Alevi - bad Alevi separation has been sharpened. This is because the “bad” Alevi dissidence is ‘also a continuation of the opposition attitude of the exiled radical leftists in the 1970s and 1980s’ (Sökefeld 2008: 230). Even though prominent figures of the movement, and particularly the AABF and the AABK come from leftist backgrounds, it would be mistaken to call the totality of Alevis and the whole range of Alevi

331 See Sökefeld (2008), in general, on the organisation of the Alevi movement in Germany, and the catalysing role of the Sivas massacre. See, particularly pp. 220-252, on the transnational dimension of Alevi mobilisation for the official recognition of a distinct Alevi identity in both host- and home- contexts, and at the European level.

332 According to one informant, during the AKP government there has been a relative relaxation towards Alevism compared to the 1980-90s, when one was not even able to say that he or she is Alevi. Nevertheless, the differences in the Turkish state’s current approach do not go beyond that. The dominant understanding can be summarised as ‘let them be Alevis without engaging in Alevism’ (Alevi olsun ama Alevilik yapmasın!). Author’s interview with the chairman of ATTVAB, op. cit.
associations left-leaning. The landscape is rather much more diversified. The main demarcation line in terms of diasporic organisations of Alevis was drawn between the ‘Alevi Culture Centres’ and the ‘Hacı Bektaş Veli’ associations. Leftist activists that regarded Alevism as a separate ‘culture’ organised the former, whereas those without leftist, anti-regime backgrounds that understood Alevism as religion rallied around the latter. The former camp evolved into the AABF, and the latter into the Federation of Alevi Communities (Alevi Cemaatleri Federasyonu, ACF) (ibid.: 82).

Against such background, the visit made by Faruk Çelik, then-minister in charge of the “Alevi opening” and responsible for citizens abroad, to the AABK headquarters in February 2010 could be read as an important illustration of the changing government attitude.\(^{333}\) Shortly after this visit, the AABK chairman Turgut Öker attended the Turkish Co-ethnic and Kin Communities Meeting in Istanbul, as mentioned before. These reciprocal visits initially suggested that the state’s claim of including all on the basis of citizenship bonds and embracing formerly excluded sub-categories would be potentially substantiated. However, the AABK’s rejection of the DIB’s authority over Alevism, and its demand for the DIB’s complete abolition were out of question from the home-state’s point of view. Disagreeing on fundamental issues, the “rapprochement” was short-lived. The “Alevi opening” within Turkey did not progress well either. The “opening” was further overshadowed when Erdoğan’s comments calling an ‘unlicensed’ Alevi house of worship a ‘freak’ triggered fierce reaction among Alevi organisations, including those abroad (Hürriyet Daily News, 7 August 2012).

The AABF organised a mass-demonstration in Bochum against Erdoğan’s nomination for a “Steiger Award” for tolerance in March 2012. Kurdish and Armenian organisations also attended the demonstration (Deutsche Welle, 17 March 2012). This joining of forces provided Erdoğan with the discursive tool to delegitimise the AABF. He called it an ‘associate’ of ‘the PKK and Armenian organisations’ in Germany, while distinguishing it from his ‘Alevi sisters and brothers’.\(^{334}\) The cancellation of the Prime Minister’s planned attendance at the award ceremony was justified on the basis of a helicopter crash in Afghanistan killing 12 Turkish

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\(^{333}\) On the visit, see ‘Çelik ve Tüzmen AABK’yı ziyaret etti’, 23 February 2010, available online, at: http://www.aleviten.or.at/menuleft/newsdetail/article/celik-ve-tuezmen-aabkyi-ziyaret-etti.html

soldiers. The AABF and affiliated Alevi circles, Armenian and Kurdish groups that joined the protest, and some accounts in the German media interpreted the cancellation as the achievement of the protest.

This event clarified the distinction between the two emerging poles within diasporic Alevi organisations. The AABF and affiliated organisations continued demonstrating their dissidence against the home-regime with similar mass-protests during Erdoğan’s visits to Germany. Some other non-AABF Alevi organisations took a rather friendly and supportive stance towards the home government. The Union of Alevi Islam in Germany (Almanya Alevi İslam Birliği, AAIB), closely affiliated with the Cem Foundation (Cem Vakfı), which considers Alevism as an integral part of Islam, was among the latter. The European Ehl-i Beyt Federation (Avrupa Ehl-i Beyt Federasyonu, AEBF) also stood against the AABF’s protesting Erdoğan and criticising the home government. The official news agency of Turkey headlined this criticism as ‘a warning from European Alevis’ to the rest of the Alevis ‘not to be tricked’ by attempts to ‘engender an Alevi-AKP tension’ (Anadolu Ajansı, 29 May 2014). This instance, as well as the selection of the AEBF chairman Fuat Mansuroğlu to the honorary members of the Consultation Commission in 2012 made it clear that the home-state granted the status of the representative of European Alevis to the latter group.

Defining Alevism and framing its claims-making agenda are still debated between these two groups - and within Alevism in general. As far as the co-opting/alienating strategies of the home-state are concerned, the debate is bifurcated: One party argues that Alevism should be considered as part of Islam with differences in traditions and interpretation. Hence, it should be accommodated as a separate “sect” under the authority of the DIB. The other one contends that Alevism should be understood as a separate collective identity, composed of religion, culture, and ways of life. Hence, it should have cultural and religious recognition within an autonomous sphere outside the DIB. The stance of ‘Alevism is a religion in its own right’, together with its system of values and customs gained further weight in the diasporic context.

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335 Ibid.
336 According to the ATİYAB chairman, ‘that Erdoğan could not come to Bochum’ illustrated that ‘the Alevis are a significant power in the diaspora in Germany’. Author’s interview with the chairman of ATİYAB, op. cit.
This became the case especially after 2003, when the AABF managed to reorganise the association’s relationship with traditional holders of religious authority (*dedes*).\(^{337}\)

The home-state fiercely rejects this claim and those that defend it, namely, the AABF-AABK. For instance, Mehmet Görmez, the DIB chairman, in his visit to the Hacı Bektaşi Veli Cemevi in Cologne in October 2012 said that ‘Alevism is within the path of Islam … whoever claims the opposite, will find us against herself’ (Milliyet, 8 October 2012). Erdoğan himself assumed an active role in refuting this claim and delegitimising its defenders. Directly associating this claim with “certain sections” of Alevis in Germany, Erdoğan has kept calling them ‘Alevis without Ali’ and regarding them as ‘atheists’.\(^{338}\) The home government’s disturbance is also caused by the AABF-AABK affiliated organisations’ ability to influence certain host-state political actors through their increasingly vocal opposition since 2012. After president Gauck criticised Turkey for violating basic rights during his visit to Ankara, Erdoğan accused the ‘Alevis without Ali’ in Germany with deliberately misinforming Gauck and prompting his criticisms (Taştekin 2014).

As reciprocal antagonism between the home-state and the AABF-line diasporic Alevi stance escalated, the state’s efforts of co-opting the rest of the Alevi organisations gained pace. In the last years, officials from the DIB and ministers include visits to non-AABF Alevi associations and Cemevi in Europe to their programmes, where they reiterate that Alevism is part of Islam. Since 2007, the DIB has also been sending *dedes* selected by the Cem Foundation to Europe during the Alevi holy month of Muharrem.\(^{339}\) Starting from 2012, the embassy in Berlin has been organising official dinners to break fast not only during the month of Ramadan, but also on the *Aşure* day, which is the day of fasting during Muharrem.\(^{340}\)

337 The AABF formed an affiliated “council of dedes” through election. The council was presided by Hasan Kılavuz, who argued that Alevism is not a sect or branch of Islam, but a separate religion (Sökefeld 2008: 169-174).

338 For one of these speeches, see, *Today’s Zaman* (30 April 2014).

339 The number of these state-sent dedes, which the critical Alevi circles call *Diyanet dedes*, rose from 6 in 2007 (*Radikal*, 5 February 2007) to 65 in 2013 (*Radikal*, 21 October 2013).

340 It should be noted that the embassy invited Berlin Alevi Community-Cem House (BAT), affiliated with the AABF to the reception in 2012. BAT turned the invitation down arguing that they consider such organisations by state organs conflicting with the laicism principle of the Republic of Turkey, and that it is unthinkable for BAT to attend such an organisation given the continuing lack of recognition and assimilation of Alevi identity in Turkey. AABF Chairman Hüseyin Mat also supported the position. See, ‘Berlinli Aleviler Büyükelçinin “Muharrem Davetini” Reddettiler!’ 20 November 2012, online, available at: [http://www.alevi-fuaf.com/index.php?p=news&area=1&newsid=7640&name=berlinli-aleviler-buyukelci-nin-muharrem-davetini-reddettiler](http://www.alevi-fuaf.com/index.php?p=news&area=1&newsid=7640&name=berlinli-aleviler-buyukelci-nin-muharrem-davetini-reddettiler)

Drawing on Smith (2003a)’s antagonism-autonomy framework, it can be argued that as AABF-line organisations owe their legitimacy mainly to their antagonistic stance and high degrees of autonomy, even if
short, the home-state sub-categorises Alevis based on an assessment of whether or not their assertion of identity and claims for recognition are within officially acceptable limits. Strategies based on counteracting “bad Alevis” and co-opting “good Alevis” show resemblance to those previously deployed by the Kemalist elite vis-à-vis the official versus deviant forms of Sunni Islam.

3. INCREASED DEGREE OF “Diasporaness” ECHOING POST-GEZI HOMELAND POLARISATION

Recent developments in homeland politics since the Gezi Park protests crystallised polarisation between opposition and support for the AKP government and Erdoğan. The former group frames its position as opposing the increasing authoritarianism of the government and the system’s evolution towards a one-man rule. The latter position is based on defending the democratically elected and legitimate government against the assaults of those aiming to weaken it from inside and outside the borders. Societal and political contestation that has Gezi demonstrations at its centre has been predominantly framed along the lines of the secular-conservative, westernised-genuine cleavages. The eruption of the clash between hitherto allied AKP and the Gülen movement added an intra-Islamist dimension to existing polarisation. Polarisation along these respective stances resonated also in the diaspora. This led to the sharpening demarcation between antagonistic and corporatist forms of relationship with the home-state, which shaped the “intra-diaspora” struggles, alliances, and clustering. The clustering of different organisations in their reactions to Gezi Park protests illustrated the new demarcation lines.

At the pro-home government and anti-Gezi end, eight organisations made a joint declaration during the protests, in which they condemned ‘acts of violence’ committed in the name of opposition. They contended that these acts aimed at the disruption of societal peace and order in Turkey and issued a call for sobriety. At the other end of the continuum, clustering of

they are invited by the state to certain events, they refrain from accepting such invitations – especially those with high symbolic political value- as arguably they are seen as attempts by the home-state to co-opt them and lowering their claims-making power.

341 Police operations and prosecution on large-scale corruption and bribery were publicly launched on 17 December 2013. The operations involved four then-incumbent AKP ministers. The government has been claiming that these operations were a civilian coup-d’état attempt by the Gülen movement’s cliques in the police and judiciary.

342 The organisations that signed the declaration were: AAIB, European Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Centres (Avrupa Türk İslam Kültür Dernekleri Birliği, ATIB), DITIB, IGMG, VIKZ, MÜSİAD, UETD, and the
different antagonistic stances including AABF-line Alevi organisations, Kurdish, and leftist workers’ associations has become visible since 2012. After Bochum, AABF organised two demonstrations in Berlin during Erdoğan’s visits in October 2012 and February 2014. These demonstrations differed from the one in Bochum as the participating groups had a much wider range than the AABF constituency. YEK-KOM, as well as leftist workers’ associations such as the Federation of Democratic Workers’ Associations (Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu, DIDF), and the Federation of Workers from Turkey in Germany (Almanya Türkiyeli İşçiler Federasyonu, ATIF) joined the demonstrations, among others.

The latter’s criticism was directed at the Prime Minister and the government on issues related to democracy and the rule of law, including but not limited to the treatment of minorities in Turkey. Making this criticism publicly visible in the host-context was important for putting pressure on Turkey. In addition, these mass demonstrations were also crucial for showing that the home government did not represent the totality of populations with origins in Turkey, neither did its “new Turkey” nationalist appeal to all. The “offensive engagement strategy” of the home-state appeals to many Turks abroad, and rather successfully depicts a picture of widespread and enthusiastic support by the European Turks to their homeland government. The antagonistic diaspora-making project aims at showing that the state’s homeland-diaspora picture is distorted. Hence, a significant aspect of the counter-mobilisation through protesting is refuting the home government’s depiction of Erdoğan as the consented leader (also) of all overseas “Turks”, and challenging its validity particularly in the eyes of host-society and political authorities.343

Occasional collaboration between different oppositional groups evolved into a more concrete body, namely, the platform of Union of Democratic Forces in Germany (Almanya Demokratik Güçbirliği Platformu, ADGB). Established in January 2013 the ADGB defined itself as the joint forces of ‘democratic migrant organisations established by various peoples coming from

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343 On this particular motivation behind mass protests during Erdoğan’s visits to Germany, see, the interview with AABF chairman Hüseyin Mat ‘Bizi güçlü kılan bağımsız çizgimizi korumamızdır’ (‘What makes us powerful is our ability to keep our independent stance’), 27 May 2013, available online at: http://alevi.com/TR/bizi-guclu-kilan-bagimsiz-cizgimizi-korumamizdir/
Turkey that belong to different faith groups and different political groupings’. What brought them together was their shared demands and struggle for democratisation, equality, and freedom. The platform published declarations in solidarity with the Gezi Park protests and the “resistance”, in which they criticised the government and police brutality.

The opposition between the two “blocks” – and which the home-state sides with –, was bluntly revealed after the AABF organised a mass-protest in solidarity with Gezi protests in Cologne on 16 June 2013 (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 June 2013). Immediately retaliating against this demonstration, the UETD organised a ‘Respect for Democracy’ meeting in Dusseldorf on July the 7th. Turkey’s Minister of Culture was present and Erdoğan addressed the crowd via videoconference (Cengiz 2013). The content of Erdoğan’s address to the crowd in Dusseldorf reflected the spirit of the on-going power struggle and legitimacy war in the homeland, now spread to the transnational political space. They contained important clues for the official demarcation line between the new ‘friendly communities’ and “others” within and outside Turkey:

‘They want to subdue us by attacking our mosques, women wearing headscarves, religious people and our values. Do not worry. Turkey is no longer the country it once was. Turkish people protect its country, government, democracy and the future. Our people no longer allow faits accomplis and horribleness. Our citizens all around the world, like in Germany, our relatives and brothers protect democracy’ (ibid.).

The separation of “them”, i.e., supporters of the Gezi protests, and “our citizens all around the world” marked the state’s resorting back to discourses distinguishing the citizens making up the “real nation” within and beyond Turkey from those that are only legally part of the citizenry. In that sense, the Gezi protests clearly marked the complete abandonment of an all-encompassing and equal approach towards expatriates on the basis of citizenship even in rhetorical terms. The abovementioned separation continued within the context of intensification and diversification of challenges to government legitimacy and then-upcoming presidential elections in August 2014. Demonstrating that the AKP represents and defends the “genuine nation with its core values” against attacks by the abovementioned sections, i.e., “they”, became a top priority for the home government. These sections include not only those

344 Among the constituents were AABF, YEK-KOM, KOMKAR, ATIF, DIDF. For the declaration and the full list of constituents, see, ‘Almanya Demokratik Güç Birliği Platformu kuruldu’, available online at: http://www.avrupa-postasi.com/almanya/almanya-demokratik-guc-birligi-platformu-kuruldu-h88255.html
345 Ibid.
whom the government categorises as westernised and alienated, but also those that appeared to adhere to the core societal-moral values.

Within this context, and particularly after the “17 December Process”, the UETD gained further importance as the interlocutor between the AKP and its overseas constituency. The UETD organised the European “tour” of the party and its allies from early 2014 onwards. The main motivation behind this tour was the perception that especially the Gülen/Hizmet Movement posed a threat to the AKP’s hold on power, to its popular legitimacy largely drawn from its Islam-sympathetic stance, and to its voter base within and beyond borders following December 2013. These conferences or talks were entitled ‘Respect for the National Will’, or ’28 February, 17 December and Rising Turkey’. They aimed to explain the “behind-the-scenes” of recent political developments in Turkey and to disseminate the government’s claim that it was under attack from undemocratic “power centres” and their unsubstantiated accusations. Such talks by AKP deputies, consultants, and journalists closely affiliated with the party took place in many European countries where UETD organisations exist. These countries included Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.346

All in all, the initial claim of an inclusive, embracing, and all-encompassing home-state approach gave way to a sharp-edged re-demarcation of friends and foes. The AKP government resorted back to categorisation practices and differential treatment reminiscent of the home-state attitude of previous decades. This has been done within and beyond the borders, and the two domains seem to get increasingly connected within an interacting relational framework. Overall, the degree of diasporaness at either “pole” increased as a result of the resonance of the largely government-led polarisation in the homeland among the diaspora(s). More importantly, the continuous feedback and interaction between the two spheres was made possible by the overseas conduct of domestic politics, as well as the domestic conduct of diaspora politics. Hence, escalation in the homeland was translated to escalation in the diaspora (and back) through a feedback loop. The increased level of diasporaness within such polarised and intermeshed transnational space, also leads to the

spread of diasporic stances, where the room for the option of disengagement and not taking sides gets narrower. In Dufoix’s words;

‘The consequence of the split between those who are “pro” and “anti” régime is the coexistence of people living very close to each other, with some representing the “official country” and others claiming to represent the “real country,” the “other country,” or the “free country.” This politicization, which involves taking a stance on legitimacy, tends to invade all community space, forcing everyone in it to take sides’ (Dufoix 2008: 68).

Effects of such ‘invasion’ can be spotted in the homeland-oriented actions and declarations of those organisations that opt for an exclusively hostland-oriented agenda. For instance, the ATT clearly distinguishes itself from homeland-oriented diasporic associations. It deliberately focuses on issues pertaining to rights, equal participation, and anti-discrimination of Turks and others with migration background in Germany. From their perspective, continuing ties and interaction with the homeland are natural. Nevertheless, sticking to merely homeland-oriented, i.e., diasporic agendas and activities does not help to improve the rights, living conditions, and standing of those with origins in Turkey. Neither does it contribute to the identification of these people with Germany in constructive ways, especially considering that the latter does not make them feel much at home either.

In line with such perspective, then-ATT chairman was critical of such diasporic associations as well as Turkey’s recent over-involved and occasionally controversial diaspora approach. He criticised diasporic associations on the abovementioned grounds. According to the then-chairman, Turkey’s recent diaspora approach stimulated or reproduced merely “diasporic” belongings because it was primarily driven by its domestic and foreign political concerns, rather than by an effort to contribute to the solution of expatriates’ problems largely stemming from and related to their membership in Germany. Nevertheless, within the polarised and politicised context, and particularly reacting to the home government’s harsh response to the Gezi protests, the then-ATT chairman commented to the German media that Erdoğan’s policies were ‘fascistoid’ (Lachmann 2013). Taking a rather “diasporic” stance, he also called the EU to freeze membership negotiations with Turkey (Stern, 18 June 2013).

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347 For the ATT, refer to footnote 148.
348 Author’s interview with the then-chairman of the ATT, op. cit.
349 Ibid.
4. OVERSEAS CITIZENS AS CONSTITUENCY: FORMALISATION AND DEEPENING OF TRANSBORDER MEMBERSHIP POLITICS

The fact that “out-of-country voting” was practically made possible and became a reality starting from the August 2014 presidential election added another crucial dimension to the transnational politicisation, as well as polarisation. As a result of the opening of the political field to the expatriates, not only the AKP but also the opposition parties extended their organisation and campaigning efforts beyond the borders. The CHP expanded its network of ‘CHP Unions’ as to cover twenty-five countries abroad. The BDP, which launched its project of transforming itself from an ethnically and regionally Kurdish party to the Democratic Party of the Peoples (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), defining itself as a progressive and pro-diversity party on the left addressing entire Turkey, also actively organised abroad.

At a more substantial and formal level, the prospects of external vote added a new face to the phenomenon of overseas citizens by turning them into a constituency to be considered by homeland political actors. This new dimension added to the homeland-diaspora political nexus has been crucial in leading to incipient institutionalisation and formalisation of relations, alliances, and negotiations between homeland political actors and the abovementioned “clusters” abroad. It also offered an opportunity for the formal involvement of those sections that have been constantly excluded on the basis of their non-belonging to the “real nation” in homeland politics. In other words, the gap between belonging to the real nation and citizenry abroad, and merely to the citizenry abroad was theoretically closed down within the context of now transnationalised elections.

According to the official YSK results, 2,798,726 external voters were registered for the presidential election. Erdoğan as the candidate of the AKP, and Demirtaş as the candidate of the HDP personally campaigned in Europe, whereas CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu did the campaigning in the name of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, the joint candidate of the CHP and the

350 There are nine CHP Unions only in Germany. See, the list of overseas organisations, at: http://arsiv.chp.org.tr/?page_id=115373

351 The HDP has an HDP-Europe legation that aims both to engage in activities at the EU level, and to coordinate the overseas organisation and campaigning for the elections in Turkey. See, http://en.hdpeurope.eu

352 See, the YSK’s summary of results taken at the overseas ballots and the border ballots in the 2014 presidential election, available online, at: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/HaberDosya/2014CB-Kesin-GumrukYurdisi-Grafik.pdf?_afrLoop=22656611625189210.
Erdoğan’s planned visit to Cologne on 24 May 2014 became a topic of major controversy in the host-country politics, leading Chancellor Merkel’s spokesperson to state that Erdoğan was welcome in Germany, while adding that Germany expects his speech to be ‘sensitive’ and ‘responsible’ (Deutsche Welle, 19 May 2014). Similar host-state – home-state tensions centring on Erdoğan’s holding his presidential campaign in Europe arose also with Austria.

At the end of the first external voting experience, the aggregate external voter turnout remained at 18.94%, whereas the turnout for those who voted in their countries of residence was as low as 8.25%. The rather low turnout rate makes it difficult to reach meaningful conclusions about how the transnationalised political polarisation and the overseas conduct of homeland politics were translated into diasporic electoral behaviour. Nevertheless, that the AKP would be the prime beneficiary of extending the franchise to the overseas citizens seemed to be confirmed (See Table 3).

Table 4. Results at overseas, border, and domestic ballot boxes in the 10 August 2014 presidential election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Overseas Ballots</th>
<th>Border Ballots</th>
<th>Domestic ballots</th>
<th>Domestic+External Aggregate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R. T. Erdoğan (AKP candidate)</td>
<td>62.3 %</td>
<td>62.73 %</td>
<td>51.65 %</td>
<td>51.79 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Demirtaş (HDP candidate)</td>
<td>9.78 %</td>
<td>7.14 %</td>
<td>9.78 %</td>
<td>9.76 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.M. İhsanoğlu (CHP-MHP candidate)</td>
<td>27.92 %</td>
<td>30.13 %</td>
<td>38.57 %</td>
<td>38.44 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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353 See, Bakiner and Baser (2014: 18-21) for a more detailed examination of the presidential campaigning in the diaspora.

354 Erdoğan, not yet officially nominated for president, justified the visit on the basis of his attendance at the UETD’s tenth anniversary celebrations. The CSU Secretary General Andreas Scheuer stated that it was ‘unacceptable’ that the Turkish PM holds a campaigning rally in Cologne one day before the European Parliament elections (Spiegel Online, 16 May 2015). The North Rhein-Westphalia Integration Minister Guntram Schneider increased the tone of criticism and stated that Erdoğan’s visit ‘came close to a misuse of the right to hospitality’ (“Missbrauch des Gastrechts”) (ibid.).

355 For example, on June 5th, die Kronen Zeitung, the largest Austrian newspaper headlined Austrian politicians’ criticisms towards Erdoğan’s planned visit as ‘Erdogan the Sultan is not wanted’ (Münzer 2014). The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Integration Sebastian Kurz also cautioned Erdoğan not to drive a ‘wedge’ into Austrian society with his speech. (Kronen Zeitung, 14 June 2014).

Another significant result that was closely related to the threshold-independent candidate debate explained in Chapter 4 was the near-to-10 per cent vote Demirtaş received within and outside Turkey. These results contributed to the transformation of the BDP by the HDP as a broader left-leaning, pro-democratisation, pro-minorities and pro-workers alliance playing in mainstream parliamentary politics. This organisational and discursive change and the candidacy of Demirtaş paid off within and beyond Turkey in the form of a 3-4 per cent electoral increase compared to the BDP’s traditionally acquired 5-6 per cent. As explained, homeland parties need to enter the elections with a party list to be eligible to attract external votes. This factor and the significance of a potentially populous external HDP electorate for exceeding the threshold arguably contributed to the party’s decision to enter the 2015 election with a party list.

The threshold and whether or not the HDP would be able to exceed it and enter the parliament became the key issue of the 2015 elections. This was the case because a parliament with the HDP most probably meant the impossibility of the AKP’s plan to acquire the majority that would allow it to amend the constitution without the support of any opposition party. As these envisaged amendments foresaw above all the replacement of Turkey’s parliamentary system with a presidential one, a below or above 10 per cent HDP vote indicated completely different political scenarios. On the eve of this highly critical legislative election, the YSK recorded the number of registered external voters as 2,866,979. The addition of this novel and sizeable constituency within this specific political context further increased the political salience of the diaspora(s) for all other homeland political parties, but particularly for the HDP and the AKP (Okyay & Baser 2015). Campaigning activities in the form of meetings, household visits, social media campaigns, and even sending SMSs in the case of the AKP spread to several European cities, and especially to German ones (ibid.: 22). CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu gave the start of campaigning in Germany as well as his party’s election campaign with the meeting in Dusseldorf on 25 April 2015. The MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli held a meeting in Oberhausen one day later (ibid.). Prime Minister Davutoğlu addressed the crowds in Dortmund on 3 May 2015 in front of a stage arrangement decorated with UETD logos. HDP deputies visited major cities in Germany and the Netherlands, and Demirtaş held meetings in Berlin and Marseille, among others.

357 Number of registered external voters granted by the YSK, see, Appendix 96/C of YSK Decision No: 1415, dating 18.06.2015, Official Gazette, 18.06.2015, No: 29390 (1st repetitive gazette).
358 The “news and upcoming agenda” tab on the HDP Europe webpage, at: http://en.hdpeurope.eu
The turning of the diaspora(s) into a constituency has implications also for the dynamics of ‘structuring modes’ a la Dufoix. Crystallising “clusters” of organised stances and diasporic political positions are being transformed into institutionalised and formalised alliances connecting homeland political actors and potential overseas voting blocs. This impacts on the ‘degrees of groupness’, feeds into negotiation of identities, and changing levels of claims-making power vis-à-vis the homeland of various diasporic actors.

For instance, the overseas Alevi vote became a matter of rivalry and contestation between the CHP and the HDP. The Alevi electorate traditionally voted for the laicist CHP as a shield against Sunni majoritarianism. The AABF declared its electoral support for the HDP on 14 March 2015 (T24, 30 March 2015). Shortly thereafter, the European-level confederation AABK seconded the electoral alliance with the HDP through a public declaration. 359 This declaration publicly revealed the efforts of both the CHP and the HDP to institutionalise the electoral support of AABF-AABK, and hence their considerably big constituency among European Alevis. The Confederation based its support for the HDP on the latter’s approach taking Alevi identity and AABK’s institutional standing seriously and its treatment of the Alevi movement as one of the equal components of the party. As opposed to this approach, the patronising attitude of the CHP towards the Alevi movement and its continuing difficulties in internalising pluralism and democracy were declared to be decisive in opting for an alliance with the HDP. 360 In addition to principles and attitudes, tangible conditions in the form of a seat in the parliament were also part of alliance negotiations. AABK chairman Turgut Öker declared his candidacy for nomination from the HDP list, and the HDP placed him on the very top of its list in one of the electoral districts in Istanbul.

The HDP included three other candidates from the diaspora on its list in addition to Öker. Former Member of European Parliament Feleknas Uca, Germany-born daughter of a Yazidi family from the Kurdish province of Batman, ranked fourth in the HDP’s party list in Diyarbakir. Ziya Pir, who, in addition to being the nephew of one of the PKK’s founding names, was also formerly closely affiliated with the UETD, ranked sixth in Diyarbakir. Ali Atalan, also member of a Yazidi-Kurdish family from Batman settled in Germany, was placed on the top of the party’s list in Batman. Some such “transfers” from abroad found their places


360 Ibid.
also in the AKP lists. Despite the ‘corporatist’ relationship with the home government, all seven names from prominent positions within the UETD, including its chairman Süleyman Çelik, who ran as candidates for nomination returned empty-handed (Zaman Online, 8 April 2014). Mustafa Yeneroğlu, the former General Secretary of the IGMG, and one of the members of the Consultation Commission representing Germany ranked tenth in one of the districts of Istanbul. Former SPD-Green MEP Ozan Ceyhun entered the AKP list in one of the districts of Izmir from the fifth rank.

The MHP had no expatriate candidates, while the CHP nominated three names with almost no chances of being elected (ibid.). This picture confirmed the argument that the latter two parties with backgrounds in the official nationalist tradition do not have as dense and close transnational links as the others do. The election results also confirmed official nationalist elites’ “suspicions” regarding the overseas popularity of what these elites considered as threatening movements, i.e., political Islam and pro-Kurdish and leftist positions (See Table 4).

Table 5. Results at overseas, border, and domestic ballot boxes in the 7 June 2015 legislative elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Overseas Ballots</th>
<th>Border Ballots</th>
<th>Domestic Ballots</th>
<th>Domestic+External Aggregate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>50,3 %</td>
<td>46,41 %</td>
<td>40,66 %</td>
<td>40,87 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>21,43 %</td>
<td>11,8 %</td>
<td>12,96 %</td>
<td>13,12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>15,93 %</td>
<td>26,95 %</td>
<td>25,13 %</td>
<td>24,95 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>9,09 %</td>
<td>10,55 %</td>
<td>16,45 %</td>
<td>16,29 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: YSK Decision No: 1415 and its Appendices 96/A-B-C-D, dated 18.06.2015, Official Gazette, 18.06.2015, No: 29390 (1st repetitive gazette).

Turnout rates increased this time to 32.5 per cent for the overseas ballots and 4.34 per cent at the border ballots. The results taken abroad clearly point mainly to the AKP and also to the HDP as the winners of the diaspora vote. In other words, incorporation of the expatriates to the demos in their capacity as citizens benefited most the two politicised identities that the

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361 931, 646 votes were cast at 112 polling stations in 54 countries. 124, 432 votes were cast at the borders (YSK Decision No: 1415, op. cit.).

362 The difference generated by external votes was three seats in total. After the assimilation of the external votes to the distribution of votes cast within Turkey, the AKP won one seat each from the MHP and the CHP, whereas the HDP won one seat from the MHP (Armutçu 2015). All four HDP candidates became deputies, whereas among the AKP candidates only Yeneroğlu entered the parliament.
official nationalist home-state had excluded on the basis of their non-belonging to and incompatibility with the “real nation”. The results also indicated that the expected positive electoral returns for pro-Kurdish parties underlying the AKP’s insistence on, and these parties’ objections against the preservation of the independent candidate-threshold provisions were grounded. The AKP’s main electoral rival in the diaspora appeared to be the Kurdish movement, this time allying with certain segments of the Alevi, and the left-leaning sections abroad. Independently from major changes in the home-state elite and their respective “ideal diasporic subject” narratives, the home-state has placed this latter “group” in the margins of Turkey’s transborder membership map. Transnationalisation of homeland electoral politics as part of the “offensive engagement strategy” seems to have created opportunities for all overseas citizens as formal transborder members to renegotiate belonging and reassert claims.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter examined the ways in which changes in the home-state diaspora-making project influence the dynamics of non-state diaspora-making projects and the transnational sphere involving all actors and projects. It attempted to shed light on the implications of change at the level of state policy and discourse for the dynamics of transborder membership politics “on the field” by looking at the contemporary nexus between AKP-led Turkey and the expatriates in Germany. The chapter first demonstrated that the making and engagement of co-ethnic/kin and expatriate/citizen populations by a single “origin-patron” state might be rather connected, contradictory, and problematic. The contradictions and problems stemming from such expansive engagement are revealed particularly in cases where the resident and non-resident citizenry and former citizenry of the claimant state itself is characterised by politicised ethnic and religious heterogeneity.

The second section examined the implications of shifts in the home-state elites’ national and “ideal diasporic subject” narratives for different politically organised stances among expatriates. It demonstrated that “diaspora”, rhetorically represented and addressed by home-states as a unified, depoliticised and static space, is rather the opposite in all these terms. More importantly, the analysis also showed that the home-state plays a crucial role in engendering division, politicisation, and change for the sake of shaping that space in line with its definition of the “ideal national/diasporic subject”. The case of Turkey demonstrates that sub-categorisation, hierarchisation, and differential treatment might be concomitant to an all-
encompassing and incorporative rhetoric and practice embedded within the home-state’s expansive diaspora-making project.

Such state-led rehierarchisation and reshuffling of ideal diasporans leads to the peripheralisation and marginalisation of those that traditionally regarded themselves as the core members of the state’s diaspora. As the “core” is filled with new meanings and non-state projects claiming to embody and represent these meanings, new centres of gravity emerge. The case of Kemalist versus Islamist non-state diaspora-making projects showed that these shifts might also indicate a complete swapping of corporatist and antagonistic stances towards the home-state. However, these positions defined in close relation to the former or current “core” are neither completely separated from each other, nor are they in a constant state of clash. Instead, occasional alliances occur between seemingly antagonistic sections. These alliances highlight the continuities in certain pillars of the national narrative held by the old as well as the new home-state elites.

Finally, similar continuities have been translated into exclusionary rhetoric and practice towards sections that both the Kemalist and “post-Kemalist” state regarded as incongruous with the definition of the nation. The expansive and all-encompassing logics of the diaspora-making project initially led to symbolic rapprochement with these hitherto marginalised minorities in the diaspora. Nevertheless, the reconfigured core values of the nation and the defining characteristic of the ideal diasporic subject do not include, nor appeal to, politicised non-Turkish, non-Sunni, or non-Muslim identities.

The elite’s national narrative- reproduced, disseminated, and projected transnationally - has been increasingly contested both at home and in the diaspora(s), especially in the post-Gezi context. Having faced challenge and contestation on several fronts, the home government completely abandoned the encompassing aspects of its rhetorical and practical engagement. Further transmitting escalating polarisation at home to the transnational political sphere, it resorted back to categorisation practices, sharply demarcating friends and foes abroad. This, in turn has led to the clustering and crystallisation of multiple sets of centro-peripheral and antagonistic diasporic stances, and to an overall increased level of “diasporaness”. Escalation in the homeland was translated into escalation in the diaspora (and back) through a feedback loop, which was made possible by the overseas conduct of domestic politics, as well as the domestic conduct of diaspora politics. Within such context marked by heightened
transnationalised and polarised politicisation, the actual transformation of expatriates into novel constituencies considerably increased their political salience for homeland political actors. The transnational dimension of electoral politics has been crucial in leading to incipient institutionalisation and formalisation of relations, alliances, and negotiations between homeland political actors and the “clusters” abroad. It also opened channels for the formal involvement of sections of overseas citizenry, excluded by the state due to their non-belonging to the “real nation”, in homeland politics.
CHAPTER 7

TURKEY AS A KIN-STATE THROUGH THE LENS OF THE TURKS OF BULGARIA

This chapter analyses the implications of Turkey’s changing conception of nationhood, revisited transborder kinship hierarchy, and its reconfigured rationality of kin-making and engagement for transborder, intra-“national” membership politics. It examines the changing relationship between Turkey as a kin-state and a prototypical external co-ethnic community, i.e., the Turks of Bulgaria. While the focus is on the bi-partite relationship, this cross-border intra-national interaction is embedded within the minority-specific framework of the host-state, and the inter-state relations between the kin-state and the host-state.

The first section lays out the historical context, within which the Turkish population evolved as an ethno-religious minority in relation to the Bulgarian state under the monarchical (1878-1944) and communist (1945-1989) periods. The effects of the clashing group-making projects of the Kemalist kin-state and the Bulgarian state on the formation of collective consciousness and group identity are highlighted. The analysis then focuses on the ideological confrontation between Turkey and Bulgaria, the former’s kin-state actions, and the latter’s communist national homogenisation project targeting the Turkish community, among other minorities. The second section examines the implications of these contingencies for the Turkish minority’s standing as an internal minority, the intra-minority dynamics, and for its self-positioning as an external kin minority in the post-1989 context. The argument is that both the kin- and host-states prioritised “Turkishness” as a predominantly ethno-linguistic notion in delineating the Turks as a bounded and exclusive group and as a category targeted by special policies. This has largely shaped the population’s collective self-identification on the basis of Turkishness by virtue of descent and language, and its self-positioning at the centre of Turkey’s then-etnonationally defined kin universe.

The third section focuses on the relationship between the Turks of Bulgaria and Turkey within a radically changed context marked by democratisation and restitution of minority rights in Bulgaria, and the relative normalisation of inter-state relations. It demonstrates that Turkey’s post-1989 engagement of the external minority, which replaced the former approach of “territorialising kin in difficulty”, was rhetorically embracing but substantially modest.
This was affected both by low thresholds of host-state tolerance, and limited financial capacity of the kin-state. Within the post-Cold War political economic conjuncture, while Turkey tried to relatively broaden its scope by claiming its “Turkic” relatives and the Balkan Muslims, the state continued to define transborder kinship predominantly through ‘external Turk’ references. Hence, while Turkey’s kin engagement lacked substance, the rhetorical dimension prioritizing ‘external Turks’ seems to have sufficed for the Turkish community to retain its perception of belonging to Turkey’s “next-of-kin”.

The last section examines the implications of Turkey’s reconfigured transborder kin definition and scope in the 2000s for the external kinship perceptions of the Turks of Bulgaria. The dynamics of transborder membership politics between Turkey and the Turks of Bulgaria is analysed in relation to the changes in the state’s kin-making and engagement project. The section demonstrates that the Turkish minority observes that there is an economically more capable kin-state that is allocating symbolic and material resources to its now widened transborder kin. They also perceive that ethno-linguistic “Turkishness”, which previously located them at the core of Turkey’s external kin, has been devalued against the state’s reconfigured kinship criteria. From the perspective of the soydaş, the “devaluation” of co-ethnicity, particularly compared to religion as kinship criteria affecting degrees of belonging, put them at competitive disadvantage in terms of their access to kin-state resources. Perceiving relative marginalisation due to reshuffled kinship hierarchies, the ‘real Turks’ question Turkey’s revised definition of kinship, and relatedly, that of the nation. The soydaş try to recapture their once central position through discourses and arguments that simultaneously contest and try to adapt to the reconfigured notion of kinship. They also flexibly and relationally play various identity cards vis-à-vis their “competitors” within the new context of transborder membership politics.

1. THE “TRIANGULAR CONSTELLATION” IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

This section lays out snapshots of the historical context between 1878 and 1990 that had long-standing implications for the dynamics between the kin-state, the host-state, and the minority at their intersection. The section first examines how the Turkish-Muslim identity (trans)formation had been impacted by post-imperial Bulgarian nation-making and by the clashing group-making projects of the Kemalist kin-state and the Bulgarian nation-state. It
then shifts the attention to the post-war period and focuses on the implications of Turkey’s
kin-state actions and Bulgaria’s communist national homogenisation project for the minority.

1.1. Bulgarian national identity and minorities under the shadow of Ottoman legacy,

The geography of modern Bulgaria was first ruled by medieval Bulgarian kingdoms, and
entered under Ottoman rule from late fourteenth century onwards. It gained the status of an
autonomous Ottoman principality as a result of the 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War and became
an independent kingdom in 1908. Centuries-long Ottoman rule and the processes through
which Bulgaria gained independence from it left imprints on the state’s demographic
structure, its conception of national identity, and the minorities’ place within the nation.

Like many other post-imperial “nation-states” of the time, the Bulgarian Principality was
established with one titular ethno-religious group as its nation in mind. At the time of
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the majority of the Principality’s population was
composed of Bulgarians and Turks. It also contained Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Muslims),
Gagauz (Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians), Gypsies, Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Vlachs and other smaller groups (Neuberger 2004: 27). The state’s approach has
constantly oscillated between homogenisation and allowing a certain level of state-controlled
pluralism. It attempted homogenisation mainly through assimilating incongruous elements
into the ethno-religious mono-nation or through expulsing these elements.

Leaders of the late 19th century ‘Bulgarian National Revival’ movement, nationalist
intellectuals and historians contributed to the depiction of Ottoman rule as a period of
political, economic, cultural suffering of the native Bulgarian nation under ‘the Turkish
yoke’. The definition and constant re-definition of the Turkish and/or Muslim “other”
played a central role in different phases of Bulgarian nation-building throughout the 20th

363 See, Crampton 1997, Chapter 3, 30-45.
364 The category of Muslims in Bulgaria lumps together Turks, Pomaks, and Roma. Pomak identity is
particularly contested. Bulgarian official ideology traditionally regarded Pomaks as forcefully Islamised
Bulgarians, whereas Turkey considered them as Bulgarian-speaking Muslims self-identifying as Turks. While
some sections among Pomaks adopt these interpretations, others self-identify as a separate ethnic group speaking
Bulgarian and belonging to the Muslim faith. On Pomak identity, see, Todorova 1997b; Brunnbauer 1999.
365 Ivan Vazov’s “Under the Yoke” (1971), originally published in 1889-90 is one of the best known and
influential examples of such literature. It is considered as ‘one of the most seminal texts in the elaboration of
Bulgarian national sentiment’ (Neuberger 2004: 37).
The uneasy relationship with the Ottoman past and the identification of the Turks and the Muslims with this past largely shaped the ways in which the state, broader society, and the Turkish minority itself perceived relations between the latter and Turkey. The formation of national identity in negation of the “alien” Ottoman rule was common to most of the states established on the former Ottoman territories in the Balkans (Todorova 1997a). However, unlike some other states, Bulgaria and Turkey share a border and a sizeable Turkish population inhabits the borderlands. Hence, the perceived threat of secession and annexation further reinforced the state’s unease with relations between the Turkish minority and Turkey (Özgür 1999: 335).

1.2. Turk or Muslim? Minority identity in between the kin-state and the host-state

The 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War marks the turning point initiating the dramatic decrease of the Turkish and Muslim populations in Bulgaria, which steadily continued until the 1930s. The pace of emigration slowed down in the aftermath of the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly in 1919. The Treaty incorporated Bulgaria into the League of Nations minority protection regime and recognised linguistic, religious and educational minority rights. Alexander Stamboliyski’s Bulgarian Agrarian National Union government (1919-23) is considered as a favourable period for minorities. It was followed by Alexander Tsankov’s Democratic Alliance government (1923-34), during which some restrictions on the Muslim minority’s educational and cultural rights were introduced (Kanev 2002: 233-234).

Following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the first official document regulating minority issues between the two states was signed in 1925. The negotiation of the 1925 “Friendship and Good Neighbourhood Agreement” could be considered as Turkey’s

366 For an analysis of how the Eastern”, “backward”, and “barbarian figure of the Turk and the Muslim, was used by the founders of the Bulgarian nation in an effort to develop a modern, Western national identity in the pre- and post-liberation era, see, Neuberger 2004, particularly Chapter 1. For a critical overview of the Bulgarian historical writing on the Ottoman Empire, see Todorova 1995.

367 The great majority of my informants from the Turkish community underlined the following factors as decisive for the Bulgarian state’s approach towards the Turks and their relations with Turkey: (i) the Turks have always constituted the most populous minority; (ii) a considerable section compactly lives in the South-Eastern regions (Kardzhali, Momchilgrad, Haskovo) neighbouring both Turkey and areas in Northeast Greece that are densely inhabited by Turkish and Muslim communities (Komotini, Xanthi); (iii) the perception that Turkey has hidden Pan-Turkist and/or Pan-Ottomanist agendas.

368 The population is estimated to have decreased over 1 million through casualties and large-scale emigration to the remaining Ottoman territories until the end of the 1912-13 Balkan Wars (Höpken 1997: 55). Different studies suggest a steady decrease in the post-war period: Turks comprised 33 % of the population in 1875 (Crampton 1997: 116), 22.5 % in 1878 (Köksal 2010: 193), and 14 % in 1900 (Crampton 1997: 116).
first kin-state action in relation to the Turks of Bulgaria. The insertion of the term “Turkish” in reference to the minority made the Agreement significant for future “kin-state” activism. It ‘confirmed the existence of the Turkish minority as a legal entity and recognized Turkey’s connection to this minority’ (Köksal 2010: 196).369

The early Republican elite’s nation-building project aiming to create a secular, modern, Turkish nation without any links to the Ottoman state and societal structures had important implications for the Turks of Bulgaria. First, when Turkey abolished the post of Sheikh-ul-Islam and the institution of Caliphate in 1924, the only direct institutionalised link between the Muslim minority and Turkey ceased to exist. Second, the division of the Turkish community into a secular section mainly identifying with a Turkish national consciousness, and a conservative, anti-Kemalist section primarily identifying with Islam became increasingly clear. Turkey extended its Kemalist nation-building project across the border through funding Turkish schools using the Latin alphabet, sending out education material, and subsidising newspapers disseminating Kemalist propaganda (Köksal 2010: 206-207). The Bulgarian state, disturbed by Turkey’s influence on the strengthening of the “national consciousness” among the community, supported the anti-Kemalist branch, mostly composed of the clergy (ibid.). The transborder connection lasted not that long. Nevertheless, the development of a “Turkish” consciousness and the minority’s identification primarily as Turks and then as Muslims owed a great deal to the establishment of the Turkish nation-state and to the dissemination of Kemalist ideas.370

During the right-wing and increasingly authoritarian Zveno government (1934-1944), rights and liberties, including those of minorities, were heavily curtailed. The government particularly tackled the issue of transborder connections between Turkey and the “Muslims” in Bulgaria. The 1934 report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Public Worship stated that the Kemalist Turkish government ‘aimed to cut the moral ties between Bulgarians and the

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369 One should note that under the minority protection clause (A), Bulgaria guaranteed the protection of the rights of the Muslim—not Turkish—minority. Categorizing minorities has always been a source of inter-state contestation between Turkey and its Western neighbours. Turkey variably and contingently distinguished Turks from other Muslims and claimed only the former, attempted to label all Muslims as Turks, or claimed separate but closely connected groups of Turks and Muslims. By contrast, Bulgaria and Greece refrained from recognising a separate Turkish minority and assimilated it into the category of “Muslim”. Greece’s non-recognition of a separate Turkish category continues to be an issue between the two states. For the MFA position on the issue, see, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/denial-of-ethnic-identity_en.mfa

370 Author’s interview with the former Rector of the Sofia High Islamic Institute (1998-2012) and former Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) Deputy, Sofia, 31 January 2013.
Turkish minority, to ensure that Muslims embraced the ideas of the new Turkish Republic, and to form a political party for Turks’ (Köksal 2010: 196). Consequently, the Arabic alphabet was restored in all schools, Kemalist newspapers and organisations were closed down, and those inspired by the nationalist ideas and Kemalist reforms were silenced (Kanev 2002: 324). The right to have a passport and to exit was restricted during this period. Hence, rates of legal emigration to Turkey considerably decreased in the 1934-1944 era. Finally, the 1940 Nationality Law made the loss of citizenship easier for citizens of non-Bulgarian origin, demonstrating that ‘the state became increasingly paranoid’ about its citizens of non-Bulgarian extraction’ (Smilov & Jileva 2009: 217).

1.3. The curtain between the host-state and the kin-state: 1944-1984

The People’s Republic of Bulgaria (PRB) initially created a more inclusive legal and political framework for minorities. The 1947 Constitution recognised the existence of ethnic and religious minorities. It granted them the right to mother tongue education and to develop their national culture, and guaranteed freedom of conscience and the practice of religion (Myuhtar 2003: 36). The 1948 Citizenship Law reduced the gap between citizens of Bulgarian and non-Bulgarian origin (Smilov and Jileva 2009: 218).

Nevertheless, the PRB simultaneously pursued a “secularisation” policy, which particularly affected Muslim minorities. While legally recognising the right to religious education, practice, and institutionalisation, the regime also aimed to monitor and control the organisation of religious life through the Religious Denominations Act of 1949 (Myuhtar 2003: 38-39). The 1951 ‘Regulation on the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Bulgaria’ made it possible for the state to intervene in the appointment of the clergy, and the administration of financial resources of the Muslim denomination, namely, vakıf (pious foundations’) property. This severely weakened the autonomy of the institutional representative of the Muslims, i.e., the Chief Mufti’s Office (ibid.: 42). By the early 1950s ‘all forms of religious teaching disappeared –not only from state schools but also from public sphere’ (Schnitter & Kalkandjieva 2014: 78).

371 Despite restrictions, according to Şimşir (1988: 166) around 112,000 persons managed to migrate to Turkey during this decade.
With regards to the Turkish community, the regime pursued a policy of creating a select secular, socialist Turkish elite. The policy encouraged the development of education, cultural production, and the press in the Turkish language within ideological limits, while weakening the community’s religious affiliation and modernising its “traditional” ways of life (Höpken 1997: 64-66). As Bulgaria and Turkey were on the opposite sides of the post-war ideological confrontation, the PRB regarded the enhancement of a pro-Turkey collective consciousness and “fifth columnism” as dual threats both to the state’s territorial integrity and to its regime. Within the context of secularisation, socialism replaced Islam in preventing collective identity formation along “national” lines. The regime promoted a socialist conception of Turkishness. Turkish-speaking members of the Bulgarian socialist nation were narrated as being completely different from the Turks in Turkey.372

Georgi Dimitrov, the leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), made it clear in his ‘Directives on National Minorities’ that Turks deviating from this framework were not welcome in Bulgaria:

‘they [Turks] should not be allowed to unite and form Turkish national organisations, because otherwise conditions favourable for Turkey’s intelligence service would be created. … Turks must not be allowed to organise themselves in associations, to be elected to Parliament as a Turkish national group, but only in their capacity of Bulgarian nationals of Turkish origin, … [T]hose wanting to live in Bulgaria, with the Bulgarians, have equal obligations. Whoever does not like that, they are free to go to Turkey.’373

The limited success of creating a secular socialist Turkish community paved the way for the emigration wave of 1950-51 (Höpken 1997: 67). Turkey allowed the entry of 154,000 persons although the PRB urged the Turkish government to accept 250,000 (Dayıoğlu 2005: 282-283).374 The BCP’s April Plenum in 1956 marked the official start of the regime’s strategy of promoting ‘communist nationalism’ (Höpken 1997: 67-69). The strategy aimed at creating a socialist Bulgarian nation, in which no other kinds of collective consciousness or ethnic, linguistic, religious differences existed. Homogenising the socialist Bulgarian nation either through forced “Bulgarianisation” of minorities or urging further out-migration became an

372 The communist party even claimed that the Turks immigrated to Bulgaria from Azerbaijan via the Northern Black Sea coast, and hence they did not have anything to do with Anatolia or the capitalist Turkish nation. Author’s interview with the former Rector of the Sofia High Islamic Institute and former BSP Deputy, op. cit.
373 Georgi Dimitrov’s ‘Directives on National Minorities’ presented in the Central Committee meeting of 6 February 1945, quoted in Myuhtar (2003: 44).
374 For a detailed account of 1950-51 migrations, see, Kostanick 1957.
outright policy in the late 1960s and the 1970s. The state made its first attempt at “name changing” in the early 1960s. That the targeted Pomak population resisted heavily did not stop their complete Bulgarianisation in the period between 1972-74. The changing of all Muslim Roma names by the early 1980s followed this first campaign.\footnote{On the forced name-changing campaign on Pomak communities in the early 1960s and 1970s, see Myuhtar (2003), pp. 55-59; 63-65.}

Turkey remained largely indifferent to the 1972-74 assimilation campaigns targeting Pomaks (Petkova 2002: 42). Dayıoğlu (2005: 289) argued that this was the case because Turkey saw the campaign as an independent event not concerning the Turkish minority, and as it refrained from straining relations with the USSR. Diplomatic officials confirm that Turkey refrained from taking a more active stance on the violation of rights of the Muslims in Bulgaria during the Cold War mainly because it wanted to steer away from a confrontation with Moscow.\footnote{Author’s interviews with diplomatic officials at the embassy and the consulates of Turkey in Bulgaria; Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas, January-February 2013.} Turkey’s inactivity also illustrated that the official definition of kin for the protection of which the state could take risks, was based on the narrower ethno-linguistic criteria. Turkey’s hyper-activism in Cyprus around the same time illustrates the primacy of ethno-linguistically defined Turks within the kin populations. ‘Quasi-irredentism’ in Cyprus (Saideman and Ayres 2008: 219) substantiated the Bulgarian state’s perception of Turkey as a potential aggressor, and the Turks of Bulgaria as a potential excuse for annexation. The PRB saw the invasion of Cyprus as a strong enough proof demonstrating that ‘Turkey's interest in minorities outside its borders was becoming more than purely cultural’ (Dimitrov 2000: 12).\footnote{Turkish diplomatic circles acknowledge that the Cyprus intervention did not help Turkey’s image as a kin-state. Nevertheless, they contend that it served as an excuse for Bulgaria to justify its assimilation campaigns. They claim that Dimitrov’s speeches demonstrated that the regime saw the Turks as an alien element to be gotten rid of already by 1945-46. \textit{Author’s interviews with diplomatic officials in Bulgaria, op. cit.}}

\section*{1.4. The “revival process” and the mass exodus of 1989}

The last emigration wave of the Turks of Bulgaria before the sealing off of the borders in the 1980s took place in the period between 1969 and 1978. A total of 116,521 persons immigrated to Turkey within the framework of ‘Close Relatives Migration Agreement’ (TBMM 2007).\footnote{Turkey limited the scope of the migration scheme only to ‘those Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin whose close relatives immigrated to Turkey before 1953’. Law No: 1180, dating 13.5.1969, \textit{Official Gazette}, No: 13210, 30.5.1969.} In the period that followed, assimilatory pressures increased exponentially

\begin{flushleft}232\end{flushleft}
and connections between the Turkish minority and Turkey were almost completely cut off.\(^{379}\) The regime put its plan to solve the Turkish issue once and for all in practice through the ‘rebirth’ or ‘revival process’. The name changing campaign started on 24-25 December 1984. Some members of the Turkish community were killed during the security forces’ violent repression of protests.\(^{380}\) Between 400-500 persons were sent to the Belene Prison, mainly those that were engaging in political-associational resistance activities (Özgür 1999: 74). By the end of January 1985, the names of the whole Turkish population, estimated to amount 800,000 to 1,000,000 persons, had been changed (Myuhtar 2003: 73).

Turkey’s diplomatic notes of protest, demands for restitution of the status and rights of the Turkish minority and for exit liberalisation, and its unilateral termination of trade and sports agreements with Bulgaria did not yield any results. Aiming to increase international pressure on Bulgaria, Turkey put the issue on the agenda of international organisations, such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the NATO, the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (Oran 2003: 180).\(^{381}\) Finally, on 29 May 1989, starting what the PRB called “the big excursion”, Zhivkov publicly asked Turkey to open its borders. The Bulgarian Ministry of Interior was ordered to expel “all extremists and fanatics” and to “stimulate” the emigration’ of those willing to leave (Myuhtar 2003: 79). Turkey opened its borders on 3 June 1989. Overwhelmed with the excessive numbers of soydaş, it closed them again on 21 August. The Turkish media reported that officials denied entry to thousands of Pomaks and Roma at the border (Milliyet, 27 August 1989). Out of 369,608 people that entered Turkey within this period, 125,248 persons returned after the regime collapsed in November. Around 245,000 persons stayed and acquired Turkish citizenship (TBMM 1997: 147).

The definition of Turkey’s kin in Bulgaria moved between one that included all Muslims, and the other that privileged the Turks as the “next-of-kin”, sifted through descent- and language-
based criteria. The state preferred to act selectively on behalf of the Turks rather than all Muslims when it came to allowing large-scale immigration or raising its voice against the violation of human rights. In other words, the state prioritised the Turks when faced with allocation of limited resources, or running the risk of inter-state tension, that is, when it had to match kin protection rhetoric with substance.  

Turkey’s attitude towards its soydaş during the migration waves, its support during the “revival process”, and particularly the fact that it did not turn its back on hundred of thousands of refugees in 1989 occupy significant places in the collective memory on the “motherland”. The memory of Turkey from the times of collective suffering under harsh communist nationalism seems to be one of flawless, idealized protective motherland. Several interviewees mentioned that in the period of oppression and closure there was a “dreamed of” Turkey in a lot of people’s minds. The comment of an anonymous interviewee illustrates this: ‘In those days … we loved it [Turkey] in such a way that we even kept the wrapping paper of chewing gums that came from Turkey. … And of course it had its mystery. Turkey… The one we always heard of, but never were able to go to’. What they think that the “motherland” had done for the Turks in Bulgaria in this era seems to have contributed to the perception that they belong to the core of ‘external Turks’ unconditionally backed and protected by the external homeland. The prioritisation of Turks over Muslims within Bulgaria arguably was among the factors that reinforced the idea that they pass the test of belonging to Turkey’s “real” transborder kin.

2. COMMUNIST NATIONALISM, EMIGRATION WAVES, AND POST-1989 MINORITY FORMATION

The actions by and relations between the kin- and the host-state during the Cold War period had significant implications for the Turkish minority in the post-1989 context. This section

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382 Some diplomatic officials acknowledge that Turkey was overemphasizing ethnicity-descent-language in the delimitation of soydaş populations before the mid-2000s. Hence, the Turks were occasionally prioritised over Pomak, and particularly Roma communities in kin minority protection. *Author’s interviews with diplomatic officials in Bulgaria, op. cit.*

383 Due to the chosen method of research, representativeness for the whole community cannot be claimed. However, all my interviewees having a claim to represent and speak for the Turkish community had comments along similar lines. *Author’s interview, Sofia, 29 January 2013.*

384 What I gathered from my interviews is that the Turkish community in Cyprus, for the fate of which Turkey has been paying a very high price for a long term, is seen as another major – arguably the most privileged- group lying at the heart of such ‘external Turks’ definition.
examines how the past dynamics of the triangular constellation and the post-communist transition process conditioned the Turks’ standing as an internal minority, their self-positioning as an external kin minority, and intra-minority dynamics. The focus is on political and religious elite formation, the community’s socioeconomic standing, and the implications of post-communist socio-political dynamics and minority-specific legal framework for minority political representation.

2.1. The challenge of creating a Turkish political elite

From 1877-78 until the end of the mass exodus of 1989, the net population loss among Turks in Bulgaria was estimated to amount to 2,687,177 persons (Şimşir 1986: 211). Considerably high numbers of the highly educated, socioeconomically well-off, urban-based, politically active sections of the minority left for Turkey throughout all these migration waves. People with the abovementioned profile were the ones that were immediately expelled in 1989. According to Özgür (1999: 141), a total of 9000 highly educated persons migrated to Turkey in 1989.

What the Turks of Bulgaria call the loss of “intelligentsia” had long-lasting adverse effects on the social and political organisation of the minority in the post-totalitarian era. There was a limited social base, out of which “the elite” that could presume leading roles in the political mobilisation and organisation of the Turkish minority in the post-communist period could be formed. As a result of the BCP’s policy of creating a select socialist Turkish elite, those that were allowed to receive higher education and to climb up professional and bureaucratic ladders during the communist regime were closely affiliated with the party. Hence, most post-1989 minority leaders and political-organisational cadres were educated and socialised within the Bulgarian socialist framework. Some had close affiliations with the party and its organs.

386 The best known of these organs is the intelligence service, namely, the Committee for State Security, commonly referred to as State Security (Darzhavna sigurnost, DS). Following the gradual opening of the DS archives in 2006-2008, one of the biggest political controversies became the revelations of the affiliations of politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats, religious leaders, business people, credit millionaires etc. with the DS as former collaborators or agents. The ‘Dossier Commission’ revealed dozens of such names. For further information on the issue, see: http://sofiaglobe.com/tag/dossier-commission/
Harsh assimilationist measures of the “revival process” led to the emergence of several underground Turkish resistance organisations and networks. Some of the leaders or prominent members of these organisations were either expelled or “stimulated” to migrate to Turkey in 1989. One of these organisations, the ‘Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria’, established in 1985 and led by Ahmed Dogan, transformed into a legal ‘societal-political organisation’ in the post-1989 period. The ‘Movement for Rights and Freedoms of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria’ was formally established on 4 January 1990. The organisation was registered as a political party in April 1990 under the name of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF, Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi).³⁸⁷

There have been three major long-term implications of these developments embedded in this particular historical background. First, political representation of the Turks and the realm of minority politics in general was concentrated in the hands of a relatively narrow circle of people. The MRF became the major actor active dominating the organisation of the societal-political life of the Turkish minority. Second, the party elite, and particularly Ahmed Dogan, faced intra-minority criticisms of being disconnected from the “ordinary” Turkish and Muslim people, i.e., the majority of the party’s voter base. Criticism centres on the MRF’s insensitivity towards Islam and the preservation of Turkish language. Their “communist socialisation” is predominantly seen as the main reason behind these insensitivities.³⁸⁸ Finally, the party elite was occasionally and repeatedly accused of having “secret” connections and alliances with the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and “the state” by its Turkish and non-Turkish political rivals in Bulgaria (See Section 4.1).

2.2. The problematic reinstatement of the Muslim denomination

Due to waves of emigration and the purging of the public realm from religion, there was a lack of core cadres that could reinstate the Muslim denomination’s organisation when post-

³⁸⁷ On the emergence and evolution of the ‘Turkish National Liberation Movement’, see Özgür (1999: 75-84). On its transformation into a legal organisation and into a political party, see, (ibid.: 91-96).
³⁸⁸ The perception that the MRF elite disregards identitarian sensitivities of its voter base seems to be widespread particularly in the regions outside the capital. That MRF politicians do not speak Turkish publicly, do not attend Friday prayers and local cultural events such as folk dance shows, traditional wrestling competitions etc. are given as evidence for such insensitivity. Author’s interviews and informal conversations in Kardzhali and Shumen, February 2013.
communist Bulgaria guaranteed religious rights and liberties.\textsuperscript{389} Even though the Chief Mufti’s office was not formally abrogated throughout the communist period, it was practically dysfunctional and in complete harmony with the regime. Due to large-scale confiscation and/or demolition of \textit{vakıf} property, that is, lands and buildings that used to belong to the Muslim denomination, it also lacked financial resources for reinstating the organisation of religious affairs and education. This made the Chief Muftiate financially dependent on the modest allocation from the state’s budget.\textsuperscript{390} External funding by private foundations and third states was another major source of income. It was no secret that in the beginning of the 1990s various Islamic foundations and orders (\textit{vakıfs and cemaats}) mainly from countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, as well as from Turkey became very interested in the “re-integration” of the Muslims of Bulgaria into Islam. They provided the latter with financial assistance, religious personnel, and the teaching of their particular theological interpretations. All these factors further hampered the Muftiate’s already low degree of autonomy, preventing it from being a powerful representative body for the Muslims, including the Turks.

The post-1989 dispute on legitimate leadership of the Muslim denomination between two “camps” worsened the problems caused by the lack of institutional capacity and the long-lasting subjugation of the Chief Mufti’s office to the state. Nedim Gendzhev, who was the last Chief Mufti of the communist regime, continued to stay in his position immediately after 1989. His close affiliation with the BCP made him a largely contested figure as the leader of Muslims. This constituted the source of the legal controversy over legitimate leadership between Gendzhev and those that opposed his camp, then led by Fikri Salih. The anti-Gendzhev camp managed to win the “legitimacy war”, popularly known as the ‘Chief Muftiate Crisis’ that blocked the proper functioning of the institution from 1992 to 2011.\textsuperscript{391}

\textsuperscript{389} Unless stated otherwise, this section is based on the author’s interviews with the former Rector of the Sofia High Islamic Institute (1998-2012), \textit{op. cit.}; with the Deputy Chief Mufti, Sofia, 30 January 2013; with the Former General Secretary of the Grand Mufti’s Office, Topolitsa, 10 February 2013 and with the then-Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council, Kardzhali, 22 February 2013.

\textsuperscript{390} Representatives contend that what the Muslim denomination receives as state funding is not in proportion to the size of the Muslim population and its share within six recognised denominations. For instance, in 2001 out of a total of 1 million Leva (US $ 485,000), the Muslim denomination received 100,000 Leva (US $ 48,500); which was reduced to 80,000 Leva (US $ 36,800) in 2002 (Myuhtar 2003: 91).

\textsuperscript{391} State organs such as the ‘Council of Ministers’ Religious Confessions Directorate”, which had the authority to officially register religious denominations until 2003, and the Sofia City Court that took over the authority of registration frequently intervened in the crisis. For further details on the legal controversy see, (Ahmed 2011: 94-99); and http://www.grandmufti.bg/en/about.html (Accessed 4 January 2015).
Incumbent and former representatives of the Muslim denomination contend that the degree of religious affiliation of the wider community, their knowledge about the basics of Islam, religious duties, rites and practices were also largely undermined during the communist regime. The weakening of religious affiliation is a common phenomenon throughout all the “Iron Curtain” countries in the Balkans. However, the “secularisation” efforts in Zhivkov’s PRB had been harsher and more successful in achieving their objectives compared to Tito’s Yugoslavia and Ceaușescu’s Romania. This is a widely shared position among the religious authorities, political actors, as well as Turkish diplomatic circles.³⁹²

Religious representatives as well as many members and spokespersons of the community see the understanding of Islam by the majority of Turks as not ‘rigid’. All my informants that opined on the issue stated that there is a ‘moderate’ Islamic tradition in the Balkans, which is also prevalent among the Turkish community in Bulgaria. The rigidity/non-rigidity distinction was generally made through assessing to what extent Islamic rules and obligations shape daily lives, and societal views and values. According to my informants, such values held by the great majority of the ‘ordinary people’ included for instance the disapproval of women’s wearing the niqab or men’s wearing long beards in the ‘Arabic’ or ‘Salafi’ fashion. The great majority do not strictly follow all the Islamic obligations such as regularly performing the daily five times prayer or regularly attending mosques for Friday prayers. The PRB’s “secularisation” project is believed to have largely contributed to further severing the links of large segments of the population to religion.

2.3. Socioeconomic deterioration in the Turkish regions

In 1992, 68.5 per cent of the Turkish population was living in rural areas (Eminov 1997: 82). The regions in the Rhodope region, compactly inhabited by the Turks were among the economically most marginalised ones already during the socialist period (Pickles 2001). A majority of the Turkish population worked in tobacco-producing factories and mines during the communist regime. In the post-communist period, rapid privatisation of the regional

³⁹² For a detailed account on the decreasing trend of religiosity among the Turks since the 1960s, see Eminov (1997: 55-59). Nevertheless, surveys conducted in the early 1990s found out that the belief in God as well as religious affiliation were much stronger among the Turks than the Bulgarians and other ethnic groups. Author’s interview with the Chairman of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC), Sofia, 23 January 2013 (the interviewee conducted these surveys together with collaborators).
industries and closing down of many tobacco factories and mines resulted in drastic rates of unemployment and higher degree of economic hardship among the Turkish community.\(^{393}\)

Those that were unemployed or economically inactive constituted 69 per cent of Kardzhali ’s population in 1992 (Pickles 2001: 8). From 1990 to 1993 the municipality lost 70.3 per cent of its jobs, whereas nationally 21.3 per cent of jobs were lost in the same period (ibid.). The worsening of the regional economic situation triggered more out-migration, either to urban centres or to other countries, and mainly to Turkey.\(^{394}\)

Regional economic “under-development”, the lack of employment generating investments, and the resulting poverty and increasing rates of out-migration have ever since constituted one of the major problems of the minority. These issues were also central in assessing the MRF’s performance in terms of improving the situation during its time as a coalition partner in the government (See Section 4.1). To what extent Turkey helped alleviating the minority’s socioeconomic problems is one of the most important criteria also in assessing whether or not the “motherland” has been genuinely interested in the fate of its soydaş. Many claim that the degree of kin-state support in that specific regard is the indicator of Turkey’s level of interest for its co-ethnics’ continued demographic presence in their habitual areas of residence (See Section 4.2).

2.4. Post-trauma reconciliation: Anxious minorities and nationalist mobilisation

As expressed by the great majority of my informants, cyclical homogenisation attempts by the Bulgarian state, and particularly the memories of the “revival process” generated low degrees of trust in the state and its treatment of minorities. Feelings of insecurity, suspicion towards hidden agendas, and anxiety about potential recurrence of similar homogenisation attempts were particularly strong in the immediate aftermath of the regime change.\(^{395}\) Political actors’ stance on undoing the injustices of the “revival process”, convicting the perpetrators, and

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393 See, Bristow (1996), on the economic transition in Bulgaria in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the regime. On the socioeconomic effects of the post-1989 restructuring on Turkish households in the Southeastern regions, see, Begg and Pickles (1998).

394 As post-1989 migration to Turkey was mostly of undocumented character, the exact magnitude of this movement is unknown. Pickles (2001: 8) suggests an estimate between 200,000-400,000.

395 Suspicion towards the state and particularly towards extreme nationalists is still quite visible. The widespread perception is that although Bulgaria passed legislation, became an EU member, and ‘on paper’ guaranteed rights, ‘in reality’ everything can change from one day to another as far as Bulgarian politics and the state’s attitude towards the Turks and Muslims are concerned (Author’s interviews).
restoring violated rights reinforced this ingrained lack of trust. Particularly the BSP and nationalist sections it mobilised came to the fore of political and societal forces exhibiting resistance against correcting the wrongs of the past in the early 1990s.

Nevertheless, in the period between 1989 and 1991, legal channels to restore Turkish/Muslim names were opened. Citizenship statuses of 1989 emigrants were restored and legal mechanisms for re-claiming left-behind property were created. The state also granted amnesty to those who were imprisoned during the “revival process” and offered financial compensation for their unjust imprisonment. However, all that happened within a context of mass protests and fierce objection by nationalist groups (Rechel 2008: 194-200). In addition, demands for the prosecution and conviction of the perpetrators of the revival process were largely unmet.\(^{396}\)

According to the BHC chairman, the “nationalist sentiment”, reproduced by years of propaganda and education has been feeding into the perception of minorities as potential threats to the unity and survival of the Bulgarian nation in two ways.\(^{397}\) First, the Turks, Pomak and Roma have been seen as threats ‘in terms of demographic growth’.\(^{398}\) This perception is kept alive by sustaining the fear that the majority-minority balance would eventually change because of the latter’s higher population growth rates. Second, and applying particularly to the Turks, is the perception that they constitute a threat to territorial integrity and the unity of the nation. This perception ‘comes from the fact that they are viewed as an alien element, and more aligned to, more faithful to Turkey than to Bulgaria’.\(^{399}\) Domestic political actors, and particularly the BSP, trying to influence voting behaviour, made use of both perceptions in the early 1990s.\(^{400}\) The latter aspect was used for claiming that Turkey was planning to revenge the “revival process”, or to recreate the Ottoman state in the Middle East and the Balkans (Özgür 1999: 334-335).

\(^{396}\) The Army Prosecutor General charged Zhivkov and other party leaders with planning the “revival process”. Nevertheless, no tangible result came out of the process. The attempts of the Public Prosecutor’s Office at preparing a lawsuit against these top officials in the 1993-1997 period also remained inconclusive (Metodiev 2009: 163-167).

\(^{397}\) Author’s interview with the BHC Chairman, op. cit.

\(^{398}\) Ibid.

\(^{399}\) Ibid.

\(^{400}\) Even though there were several minor nationalist movements, the BSP, acted as the ‘mainstream nationalist force’ throughout the 1990s. The nationalist line eroded in the 2000s with its integration into European and international platforms such as the Socialist International. Since the 2000s, the party changed its attitude towards ethnic minorities, which made it possible for the BSP and the MRF to become coalition partners (ibid.).
All these added to the fact that particularly in the 1990s, more active sections of the Turkish community were shying away from engaging in activities, such as forming associations with the word “Turkish” in their name or publishing Turkish newspapers. The majority felt that the potential reaction of the state and sections of society would be negative, and they might get themselves into trouble.  

“Being seen” as establishing contacts and collaborating with official institutions from Turkey, such as the diplomatic representations was also considered potentially “dangerous”.  

2.5. The minority-specific legal framework and minority politics

The rather negative attitude towards minorities had its implications for the process of writing the new Constitution and creating the post-communist legal framework. Refraining from inserting the phrase “national minority” or “minority”, the Constitution referred to ‘citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian’ or ‘who have a diverging self-identification’ (Rechel 2007: 355). Article 11 (4) and Article 44 (2) have been highly relevant for delimiting the political organisation along minority agendas and the ways in which minority-specific demands were framed. Article 11 (4) forbids ‘political parties on ethnic, racial, or religious lines’. Article 44 (2), while guaranteeing the freedom to association, stated that ‘the organization/s activity shall not be contrary to the country's sovereignty and national integrity, or the unity of the nation, nor shall it incite racial, national, ethnic or religious enmity’.  

Article 3 (2) of the 1990 law on political parties banned the establishment of political parties ‘based on a confessional or an ethnic principle’.  

Constitutional and legal restrictions on ethnic and confessional parties directly and primarily affected the MRF. While the great majority of its members and deputies were, and always

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401 This was the case even in regions like Kardzhali, where the Turks constituted the majority and the MRF held most of the local governments. *Author’s interview with the Chairman of the ‘Association for Turkish Culture and Art’ and ‘Kardzhali Omer Lutfi Culture Centre’, Kardzhali, 19 February 2013.*

402 According to Turkish diplomatic officials, this is to a certain extent still the case. One high ranked diplomatic official shared the anecdote that during one of his village visits he realised that people were afraid of being seen next to him during the prayer or to take the Turkish flags he distributed. One of the villagers privately approached him and asked if he would be arrested should he visit the diplomatic official. *Author’s interview, Burgas, 11 February 2013.*


have been Turks, its statute stated that party membership is open to all Bulgarian citizens irrespective of their ethnic or religious self-identification. The statute also set the party’s objective as defending ‘the rights and freedoms of all ethnic, religious, cultural communities in Bulgaria, in line with the laws, the Constitution, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (Özgür 1999: 96).

Nevertheless, both the Sofia City Court and the Supreme Court did not allow the registration of the party before the 1990 elections. Its constitutionality was challenged in 1991 based on its alleged violation of the abovementioned articles. However, in the first case, the Central Election Committee eventually registered the party under ‘international pressure’, whereas in 1991 it was found constitutional (Eminov 1999: 36-37). In fact, the MRF was granted the status of ‘the only party legally capable of representing the Turks’, as other parties, including Turkish splinter parties, were closed down on the basis of being ethnic parties (Johnson 2002: 5). Johnson argued that the Bulgarian state exclusively recognised the MRF on the condition that the latter moderates its minority-specific demands and the degree of its assertiveness to an officially tolerable level (ibid.). This conditionally granted monopolistic legitimacy has partially contributed to the fact that the MRF has become the actor dominating the Turkish minority-scene.

The “conditionality” of this legitimacy has shaped the MRF’s actions and discourse as the defender of rights and freedoms of minorities. The party campaigned for the right to restore Turkish-Muslim names and properties lost during 1989, and the right to have Turkish-language classes in public schools. According to the BHC chairman, ‘those were very modest demands because it was impossible to claim for more’. Having faced the risk of being closed down twice, the MRF considerably toned down its emphasis on defending collective group rights of specific ethnic and/or religious communities. It defined itself as a ‘liberal’ party and put the emphasis on ‘individual’ rights, supporting Bulgaria’s integration into international human rights regimes.

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405 According to MRF sources, its membership in 1991 was composed of 80 % Turks, 4 % Bulgarians, and 12 % other ethnic groups (Özgür 1999: 156).
406 Author’s interview with the BHC Chairman, op. cit. In addition to structural limitations, some of the MRF elite supported the idea that the Turkish community, in order ‘to be perceived by others as good citizens’ should prioritise the Bulgarian language and integrating in the Bulgarian society (Ibid).
407 Author’s interview with the former Rector of the Sofia High Islamic Institute and former BSP Deputy, op. cit.
3. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ‘MOTHERLAND’ AND ITS SOYDAŞ IN BULGARIA IN THE 1990S

This section examines the relations between Turkey and the Turks of Bulgaria in the post-Cold War context. It first looks at the implications of Turkey’s changed take on the territorialisation of its external kin for the soydaş in Bulgaria. It is then demonstrated that the kin-state authorities in the 1990s invested the MRF with the role of the sole interlocutor and intermediary between the “motherland” and the broader community. Finally, it examines the increasing discrepancy between Turkey’s symbolic embrace towards soydaş in Bulgaria and the rather light substance of its kin-state activism.

3.1. Phasing out of kin immigration, long-distance support for “minority formation”

As explained, in the period between 1923 and 1934, Turkey tried to enhance the (modern) national consciousness of the Turks of Bulgaria through transborder cultural, linguistic, and educational engagement. In the post-war context, its kin-state action remained limited to enabling the immigration of its soydaş during acute crises. General Turkish policy vis-à-vis preferential immigration of co-ethnics and/or fellow Muslims from the Balkans and the Caucasus was phased out after the 1940s. Troubled with unemployment, the state started to send out its resident citizens and discourage “kin” immigration from the 1960s. Nevertheless, the “motherland” made an exception and allowed the en masse immigration of Turks of Bulgaria in the 1968-79 period and in 1989 due to the PRB’s assimilationist pressures towards the latter.

In the post-1989 period, the liberalisation of exit regimes of former socialist states reinforced Turkey’s concern of preventing the entry of large numbers of “kin” from its neighbourhood. Due to heavy economic crisis in Bulgaria and the increasing trend of immigration to Turkey, the Ministry of Interior issued two circulars in 1992 and 1996. These circulars introduced a firmer visa regime and strengthened entry controls to be applied to its soydaş coming from Bulgaria (TBMM 1997: 142-143). In addition, the transition to democracy was believed to

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408 The application of these strict entry conditions continued until 1998, after which the government resorted back to the liberal cross-border movement regime of the 1925 Residence Convention. (Özgür-Baklacioğlu 2006a: 350-351). Turkey lifted entry visas for all Bulgarian citizens in 2001. Author’s interview with the Head of Department of the MFA Deputy Directorate General for the Balkans and Central Europe, Ankara, 9 April 2012.
provide the legal and political framework to protect kin minorities from major violations of human and minority rights in their states of citizenship.

Hence, the official policy line shifted towards supporting the participation of soydaş in the socioeconomic and political life of their countries as ‘equal citizens’, discouraging their further immigration to Turkey, developing friendly bilateral relations with their states of residence and citizenship, and supporting these states’ ‘integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures’. Turkey fully supported the membership of Bulgaria in the Council of Europe, NATO, and the EU. The official MFA approach is that membership in these international organisations is expected to lead to a sound human rights protection, which would also positively affect the standing of all ethnic and religious communities.409

In the initial years following 1989 Turkey tried to provide modest support in the process of “minority formation”. Its provision of funded higher education opportunities is regarded as of particular importance, as it helped overcoming the community’s shortage of highly educated members to a certain extent.410 Turkey also tried to be visible as the kin-state. Visits at high governmental and presidential level were frequent, especially when compared to the complete lack of interaction of the previous era. However, almost all kin-state initiatives were immediately met with nationalist backlash and accusations of intervention in Bulgaria’s domestic politics.411

3.2. The MRF as the interlocutor between the motherland and the soydaş

Turkey supported the idea of the Turks and Muslims having a unified stance and political representation.412 Given the low degree of socioeconomic and cultural capital, and organisational capacity of the Turkish population, the MRF, an organised political force that

409 Author’s interview with the Head of Department of the MFA Deputy Directorate General for the Balkans and Central Europe, op. cit.
410 Author’s interview with a former MRF Deputy (1997-2009), Sofia, 31 January 2013. These scholarships were within the scope of the “Grand Student Project” (See Chapter 5), and not specific to the Turks of Bulgaria. The first cohort from Bulgaria was accepted in 1993-1994. Ruşen Rıza, third term MRF deputy, and Korman Ismaïlov from the PPFD within the ‘Reformist Bloc’ in the 43rd National Assembly, belong to this cohort. Şabanali Ahmed, Saliha Emin and Aydoan Ali, first term MRF deputies in the current parliament also received university education in Turkey through the Grand Student Project (Şahin 2014).
411 Author’s interview with the former Rector of the Sofia High Islamic Institute and former BSP Deputy, op. cit.
412 In line with this pro-unity stance, Turkey also disapproved the factionalism in the religious realm, caused by the ‘Chief Muftiate Crisis’. Author’s interview with the former Rector of the Sofia High Islamic Institute and former BSP Deputy, op. cit.
managed to get integrated in Bulgarian political system after 1991, had the biggest potential to emerge as a dominant figure. Hence, Turkey supported “the idea” of the MRF.\textsuperscript{413} The kin-state saw the MRF as the major socio-political force speaking, acting, and building contacts with the motherland on behalf of this unified minority.

Officially, the discourse was that Turkey approached the MRF as any other Bulgarian political organisation formed by Bulgarian citizens. Turkey’s merely ‘moral’ support stemmed from the fact that ‘its membership base was composed of the Turks of Bulgaria’.\textsuperscript{414} However, in practice, the degree to which Turkey intervened on behalf of the MRF, i.e., the representative of the Turks of Bulgaria, constituted a major problem for Bulgaria. When the MRF faced the unconstitutionality challenge in 1991, the Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz sent a letter to his Bulgarian counterpart. The letter asserted that bilateral relations would be adversely affected if the MRF were denied participation in the elections, as it would mean ‘to prevent Turks, who are Bulgarian citizens, from participating in the political life of Bulgaria’ (quoted in Özgür 1999: 336). The letter led to political controversy and indignation on the part of the nationalist circles, and particularly the BSP. The latter raised the issue also in the Bulgarian parliamentary debates (ibid.).

Given the tense political atmosphere, and the low host-state ‘threshold of tolerance’ (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 85), Turkey’s relations with and support for the MRF did not take a highly visible form in the aftermath. The party kept its integrity despite attempts of splinter-parties.\textsuperscript{415} It also managed to gain seats in all the parliaments since 1990 (see Table 5), and hence consolidated its status as the key actor to be addressed with regards to the minority in the eyes of Turkey. Politicians from the MRF deny any attempt by Turkey to exert direct political influence on the party, contrary to what ‘nationalist circles’ have always claimed.\textsuperscript{416} However, the party’s relationship with the kin-state in the 1990s is defined as being ‘warm and close’, and the attitude of Turkish governments towards the MRF as ‘very friendly’.\textsuperscript{417}

\textsuperscript{413} Author’s interview with a former MRF Deputy, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{414} Interview with Yalçın Oral, Ambassador of Turkey in Sofia in 1994, quoted in Özgür 1999: 338.
\textsuperscript{415} Democratic Party of Justice formed by the ex-Chief Mufti Gendzhev, and Party of Democratic Changes, established by Mehmed Hoca, a former MP from the MRF entered the 1994 parliamentary elections. Both parties eroded after failing to cross the 4 % threshold (Eminov 1999: 38).
\textsuperscript{416} Author’s interview with a former MRF Deputy, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{417} Author’s interview with a MRF Deputy, Sofia, 7 February 2013.
Table 6. The electoral performance of the MRF (1990-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Parliamentary Election</th>
<th>Total votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Number of seats won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>491,596*</td>
<td>8,03</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>418,168</td>
<td>7,55</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>283,094</td>
<td>5,44</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>323,429</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>340,395</td>
<td>7,4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>467,400</td>
<td>12,8</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>592,381**</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>400,466</td>
<td>11,3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>487,134***</td>
<td>14,84</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on the data published on the webpage of “The Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe” [http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/electer/bg_er_nl.htm#bg90](http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/electer/bg_er_nl.htm#bg90)
** According to the first election results, the MRF got 610,521 votes. This is the reduced number of votes after the Constitutional Court decision to annul around 18,000 votes cast by dual citizens in Turkey due to fraud and multiple voting. 
***Based on the results published by the Central Election Committee of Bulgaria. [http://results.cik.bg/pi2014/rezultati/index.html](http://results.cik.bg/pi2014/rezultati/index.html)

In sum, the relations between the kin-state and the MRF developed in a way that invested the latter with the role of the sole interlocutor and intermediary between Turkey and the broader community. This contributed to the MRF’s monopolisation of the minority scene. This is a position held especially by those sections that were excluded from directly contacting the kin-state, establishing relations with it, and hence potentially receiving funds and support from it. However, as will be explained in Section 4.1, the Turkish state lately adopted a similar stance on the MRF predominance and started to change its attitude vis-à-vis the party, other minority actors, and the broader community.

3.3. Widening gap between the rhetoric and the substance of kin-state activism

The soydaş continued to be engaged by gestures of symbolic courting throughout the 1990s. However, the extent to which Turkey took substantial measures and allocated resources did

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418 These sections consider the MRF dependency created by such monopolisation and Turkey’s indirect contribution to this process as significant factors underlying the low level of “civil society” activism and associationalism among the Turks.
not meet the expectations of the soydaş, which were raised by the voiced solidarity. The co-ethnics highlight Turkey’s inadequate interest, action, and capabilities as a kin-state particularly in the socioeconomic and religious realms.

Firstly, Turkey is criticised for not taking steps to support socioeconomic development and incentivise employment generating investments in the regions. A former MRF deputy who was actively involved in relations with Turkey during the decade argues that in the mid-1990s Ahmed Dogan personally went to Ankara asking for support to stimulate regional socioeconomic development. He presented an inventory of municipal property to be privatised in predominantly Turkish regions, and asked the Turkish government to provide investment incentives to the private sector for them to take over these enterprises. Turkey did not show any real interest in the topic.419

In the 1992-1995 period, while the MRF participated also in bilateral meetings where Turkey’s potential contribution to regional economic development was discussed (Özgür 1999: 341-342), no tangible results were obtained. The lack of tangible action is supported by evidence from Turkish parliamentary debates in the second half of the 1990s. In 1997, deputies from opposition parties CHP and DSP criticised the government for not paying attention to the extremely dire economic conditions Turkey’s soydaş was facing in Bulgaria. They reminded the government of its moral duty to help revitalising regional economies through public investment or by incentivising private investments (TBMM 1997: 141-146). The government countered the criticism by arguing that it was already overwhelmed with subsidising the housing, infrastructure and integration assistance for the 1989 immigrants (ibid.: 147). The unsatisfactory degree of effort made by Turkey to help revitalising regional economies has been the most frequent criticism among the representatives of the Turkish community in Bulgaria (See Section 4.2).

Second, as explained in Section 2.2, the lack of financial resources, institutional experience, and trained clerics constituted a major problem for the reinstatement of religious services and education in the 1990s. Under Gendzhev’s term, the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia and the ‘nüvvab’ theological high school in Shumen were opened in 1990. Two more theological high

419 Author’s interview with a former MRF Deputy, op. cit. According to Özgür (1999: 340), in 1992, Turkey gave the central government of Bulgaria a US $ 100 million credit, and an additional US $ 50 million through Turkish Eximbank. The Bulgarian government did not redistribute the funds to the abovementioned regions and used them instead for suppressing inflation rates.
schools in Ruse and Momchilgrad were opened in 1991. Financing these schools largely depended on external funds. Owing to his close contacts particularly with Arabic-speaking Islamic countries, Gendzhev managed to get funds mainly from Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Development Bank. However, as he appropriated most of these funds, according to the current Chief Mufti’s Office they were not spent for the maintenance of schools or construction of mosques (Chief Mufti’s Office 2011: 14).

At this initial stage, the DIB was not officially involved in providing assistance to these schools, and the latter barely survived.420 According to the Former General Secretary of the Grand Mufti’s Office, who himself was a student at the Shumen theological high school between 1990 and 1993, it was the various orders and Islamic communities from Turkey that sent teachers and educational material to all four schools, rather than the DIB. These orders and communities included the Gülen movement, the Süleymançilar community, and the Hüdayi Foundation.421

The Gülen movement became particularly active in funding and educational assistance between 1994 and 1997, which was a particularly turbulent period for the Chief Mufti’s Office.422 The DIB got institutionally involved only in 1997 when it started discussions with the Religious Confessions Directorate of Bulgaria on providing support for the schools and other religious activities. The two parties signed a protocol on 17 June 1998. Consequently, Turkey assumed the responsibility of funding all four schools, sending out teachers and educational material, and temporarily providing clerics for the summer Quran-teaching courses and for religious services during Ramadan (Chief Mufti’s Office 2011: 17).423

For understanding this attitude shift, one must consider the secular establishment’s “offensive” against political Islam and “deviant” interpretations of Islam, which reached its zenith with the 28 February Process. It can be argued that the kin-state involvement in the minority formation with respect to religion was initially driven by domestic power struggles. The state’s effort to contain Islam within official limits also beyond borders was decisive,

420 Author’s interview with the then-Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council, op. cit.
421 Author’s interview with the Former General Secretary of the Grand Mufti’s Office, op. cit.
422 Author’s interview with the then-Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council, op. cit.; and with the Former General Secretary of the Grand Mufti’s Office, op. cit.
423 The funding comes from the TDV, a corporate body under private law, affiliated with the DIB. It covers the maintenance of the schools, salaries of the teachers, educational material, and students’ accommodation and meal costs. In 2012 the total cost of these four schools was around US $ 4 million. Author’s interview with the Head of Department of Eurasian Countries, DIB External Affairs Directorate General, op. cit.
rather than a prioritisation of religious aspects within kin engagement or a sudden interest in the religious life of its soydaş. A related factor having contributed to the involvement of the DIB was the rivalry in creating zones of influence among post-communist “emerging” Muslims between different theological schools. Target populations of the Salafi-Wahabi orders from the Arab world and those of the Hanafi orders from Turkey were clearly demarcated in Bulgaria. Especially between 1990-2001, the former were very active in the Pomak and Roma regions in the Rhodopes, and the latter among the Turks. The Bulgarian state always used the strategy of variably tolerating the activities and spread of one section in order to limit the influence of the other.\textsuperscript{424} Vis-à-vis these “radical” non-state actors, the DIB always used the argument that its understanding of Islam is distant from any kind of radicalism and hence finds widespread acceptance among communities, particularly in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{425}

Those that have been active in the affairs of the Muslim denomination consider the support of the DIB crucial and indispensable for the latter’s survival and institutionalisation. However, there seems to be a shared opinion that the DIB was fully in line with the laicist sensitivities of the official Islam approach in the 1990s. Hence, neither the DIB, nor Turkey highlighted Islam as a crucial component of kin engagement in the pre-AKP period.


The analysis in the final section centres on the dynamics of transborder membership politics between Turkey and the Turks of Bulgaria in relation to the changes in the state’s kin-making and engagement project. The section starts with examining the straining of relations between the AKP government and the MRF in the first half of 2010s and its effects on the intra-minority dynamics. It then inquires the ways in which external kinship perceptions of the Turks of Bulgaria, and particularly those of the political elite have been shaped in the face of Turkey’s reconfigured kinship definition beyond co-ethnicity and the resulting reshuffling of hierarchies. It is demonstrated that the co-ethnic soydaş try to recapture their once central

\textsuperscript{424} Author’s interview with the Former General Secretary of the Grand Mufti’s Office, op. cit.; author’s interview with the then-Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council, op. cit.; author’s interview with the former Rector of the Sofia High Islamic Institute and former BSP Deputy, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{425} Author’s interview with the Head of Department of Education and Counseling Abroad, DIB Directorate General of External Affairs, op. cit.
position through simultaneously contesting and trying to adapt to the reconfigured notion of kinship.

4.1. The motherland abandons the MRF?

The MRF became a partner of the coalition government first with the party of the returned Tsar Simeon II, the National Movement for Stability and Progress (NMSP) in the 2001-2005 term. Between 2005 and 2009, it took part in a tripartite coalition with the BSP and the NMSP. Despite being the small partner of the coalition, it became the first political organisation representing and predominantly composed of Turks and Muslims that became part of a government in Bulgarian history. In addition to a total of five ministerial positions held by “ethnic Turks” from the MRF between 2001 and 2009, the party also held the first Deputy Prime Ministry in the 2005-2009 cabinet.\textsuperscript{426} The very fact that “ethnic Turks” became ministers was symbolically very important as it increased the visibility of the Turkish minority. This contributed to a decreasing trend in ethnic prejudice on the one hand, and ‘provoked some nationalistic votes’ on the other.\textsuperscript{427} Being represented at the governmental level for the first time, the Turkish community’ expectations from the MRF were quite high. The MRF was expected particularly to tackle the regional economic underdevelopment problem.\textsuperscript{428}

During and at the end of these eight years, the MRF was criticised by not being assertive enough in demanding rights. Prominent names of the party elite were accused of pursuing their own personal enrichment instead of resolving the problems of the people, bestowing privileges upon their acquaintances, and getting involved in corruption. They also faced allegations of being secret collaborators of the communists.\textsuperscript{429} Finally, the party elite and

\textsuperscript{426} In the first cabinet, the MRF held the Ministry with Portfolio and the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry (Sofia News Agency, 24 July 2001). It got the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, the Ministry of Environment and Water, and the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry in the second cabinet (Today's Zaman, 25 July 2005). The MRF also had 10 deputy ministers, 5 governors, and 14 deputy governors in this period. \textit{Author’s interview with a former MRF Deputy, op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{427} The nationalistic anti-Turkish reaction contributed to the emergence of nationalist parties such as the Attack (Ataka) from 2005 onwards, which filled the nationalist vacuum left by the BSP. \textit{Author’s interview with the BHC Chairman, op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{428} The main expectation was that as the MRF finally had a say in decision-making and access to the state budget and to EU funds, it would channel resources to the regions, generate employment and help increasing the standards of living in the “Turkish” regions.

\textsuperscript{429} This accusation became especially dominant after the controversy caused by the disclosure of a list naming Dogan and other prominent MRF figures as former DS-collaborators in 2007 (Hürriyet, 5 September 2007). Already a controversial political figure, since then the image of Dogan got even more sharply divided between the hero of the liberation and the leader of the Turks of Bulgaria, who has been deliberately “demonised”, and that of the undercover traitor and stooge of the communist regime who has never had any genuine interest in
particularly Ahmet Dogan were criticised for looking down on their voter base and not prioritizing the latter’s religious and cultural sensitivities. These criticisms came both from within the Turkish community and the Bulgarian-origin sections. Intra-minority criticisms came particularly from Kasim Dal and Korman Ismailov, who formed a separate political party after their dismissal from the MRF in 2012.\footnote{Their mostly voiced accusation is that Ahmed Dogan and the core leadership of the MRF, all former DS agents, had a secret deal with the BCP and the DS for being recognised as the post-transition “ethnic Turkish” party, on the condition that it stays under the BCP’s auspices. Hence, the claim is that, the MRF, while seemingly a pro-minority rights party, has actually been the BSP’s ‘satellite party’. \textit{Author’s interview with a top-rank politician from the People’s Party Freedom and Dignity (PPFD), Sofia, 7 February 2013.}}

While the MRF representatives and affiliates acknowledge that inexperience in governing might have led to some defects, they find these criticisms too harsh considering that the party achieved to have “ethnic Turkish” ministers for the first time. They argue that the MRF did its best for the Turks and Muslims given their numerical and “ethnic” disadvantage. As restraining conditions, they point to the general anti-minority and anti-Turkish atmosphere in Bulgaria and to the legal framework that keeps the door to ethnic party banning open.\footnote{Author’s interview with a former MRF Deputy, op. cit.} They contend that having worked with coalition partners that neither empathized with nor prioritized the MRF’s demands contributed to its lower-than-expected performance.\footnote{Author’s interview with a MRF Deputy, op. cit.}

Turkish diplomatic circles acknowledge that the MRF, as a political organisation, has been immensely important for the visibility and standing of the Turkish community through maintaining its position as a legitimate political force that has been part of all parliaments since 1989. However, they also seem to share the idea that the party dominated the “minority sphere” and this adversely affected the independent development of other civil society actors and the degree of non-political mobilisation. Consequently, there has been an attitude change on the part of the kin-state. The new approach is based on diversifying and enhancing the community’s organisational capacity by directly interacting with and supporting civil society initiatives, incipient business organisations, and other not-fully-organised societal actors.\footnote{In the last years, the diplomatic representations have been interacting especially with those actors that have been working on the Turkish language and culture, encouraging them to form NGOs. “The North-East Bulgaria Turkish Language Teachers’ Association” and its “South-East” counterpart were founded with the support of the diplomatic representations in January and February 2012 respectively. \textit{Author’s interview with the Chairwoman of the North-East Bulgaria Turkish Language Teachers’ Association, Shumen, 13 February 2013; author’s interview with the Chairman of the South Bulgaria Turkish Language Teachers’ Association, Kardzhal, 21 February 2013.}}
Hence, the sole interlocutor role attributed to the MRF by Turkey has started to erode. Those sections that acquired partial independence from the intermediation of the party appreciate this change and interpret it as a manifestation of Turkey’s increased interest in the problems of the minority.

What consolidated the MRF circles’ perception of the motherland’s abandonment of the party and indirectly also the Turks of Bulgaria was the change in the AKP’s attitude towards the party, particularly towards Ahmet Dogan. Given the characteristics generally attributed to the MRF elite, (i.e., being social products of the communist elite creation project, having worldviews and life styles matching such socialisation), there is a generally held opinion that the MRF and a political party like the AKP are not exactly a match made in heaven. Still, after 2002, Erdoğan and Dogan continued to hold meetings during Erdoğan’s official visits to Sofia until 2010. In October 2010, the crisis erupted when Erdoğan cancelled his pre-scheduled meeting with Ahmet Dogan during a one-day visit to Sofia. Instead, he met Kasim Dal, then one of the MRF deputy chairpersons and the number two of the party. The MRF circles as well as the wider community saw the “2010 incident” as a deliberate and highly symbolic gesture by the AKP government demonstrating its distaste for Dogan and a MRF led by him. It came as a shock for supporters and non-supporters alike, as Dogan was facing such treatment for the first time in the history of the MRF’s relations with Turkish governments.434

In the aftermath of the 2010 incident, Kasim Dal and Korman Ismailov, then still MRF deputies, intensified their criticisms towards Dogan and publicly expressed the need for change in the party. After their dismissal from the MRF in January 2012, on 1 December 2012, the two established the People’s Party Freedom and Dignity (PPFD), positioned on the right/centre-right of the political spectrum. AKP deputies that were present at the PPFD’s Founding Congress greeted the new party on behalf of Erdoğan (Zaman, 1 December 2012).

The relationship between the MRF and the AKP got further strained, when none of the invited AKP representatives attended the MRF’s 8th Congress on 19 January 2013.435

Ahmet Dogan

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434 For those opposed to Dogan and the MRF, Erdoğan’s move revealed the MRF’s inadequacy and its policies’ fallaciousness, because of which it managed to alienate even the “motherland” government. Author’s interview with top-rank politician from the PPFD, op. cit.

435 Deputies from both the CHP and the MHP attended the Congress. Author’s notes taken at the 8th MRF Ordinary General Congress, National Palace of Culture, Sofia, 19 January 2013
stepped down at this congress and left the leadership to Lutfi Mestan. In his farewell speech, Dogan implied that the prime ministers of Bulgaria and Turkey were jointly working for the weakening of the MRF. He accused Bulgarian PM Borisov of ruling through creating a ‘fear-machine’ and associating the MRF with the ‘virtual Turkish threat’ against the ‘survival of Bulgarians’ (HÖH 2013: 18). Following this comment, Dogan stated that even with this “fear machine”, Borisov

‘… does not feel secure enough and wants to make a second insurance, and therefore addresses his counterpart in Ankara in a friendly way, and asks him to help himself in the best way he could. And of course his counterpart in Ankara replies to this call positively’ (ibid.).

Having lost the favour of the “motherland” government and being challenged by a rival targeting the ethnic Turkish vote, MRF circles adopted a discourse centring on the potential damages of stimulating factionalism for the minority’s political representation. They argue that given the minority-unfriendly context of Bulgaria, the weakening or the complete erosion of the Turkish community’s representative power would have serious repercussions on the already disadvantaged standing of the minority. Disadvantaged minority elites contend that such a consequence cannot and should not be what the “motherland” government desires for the Turks of Bulgaria.

The majority of my informants that were not affiliated with the MRF and were highly critical of the party’s minority politics performance and its top elite cadres also found the ways in which the AKP treated the party out of proportion. These developments arguably contributed to the development of the widely circulating hypothesis explaining Turkey’s shifting attitude towards the MRF and indirectly towards the soydaş in Bulgaria by differing degrees of religiosity and understandings of Islam of the motherland government and the soydaş. According to this hypothesis, this shift happened as the conservative AKP, which gradually

436 HÖH stands for ‘Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi’, which is the Turkish name of Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
437 This comment received a big and long applause particularly from the sections occupied by the MRF delegates and guests from Turkey. Dogan could not complete his speech due to a failed assassination attempt against him. First reactions among the predominantly MRF-member audience of the Congress to this attempt included suspicion towards the Bulgarian state, but also conspiracy theories involving intra-minority MRF dissidents implicitly supported by the Turkish government. Author’s notes taken at the 8th MRF Ordinary General Congress, National Palace of Culture, Sofia, 19 January 2013.
438 Author’s interview with a former MRF Deputy, op. cit.; author’s interview with a MRF Deputy, op. cit.
increased its use of Islamic references, decided to explicitly reprimand the Turks of Bulgaria for their not-so-rigid understanding of Islam.\textsuperscript{439}

Most did not see the PPFD as having any real political future. Thus, some informants seemed surprised that the AKP thought it could have chances of entering the parliament by its own. Kasim Dal’s anti-Ahmed Dogan campaign was mainly based on accusations of the Dogan’s previous DS-affiliation. This was not fully convincing to the great majority of my informants, as Dal had been in the very inner circle of the MRF for almost two decades. However, there was also a general agreement that the emergence of the PPFD in December 2012 and the AKP’s support for it forced the MRF to introduce some changes. Ahmet Dogan’s replacement by Lutfi Mestan in January 2013 was one such symbolically important change, even though Mestan is one of the names closely associated with the well-established core of the MRF. That the new leader started to visit the “regions” beyond Sofia, paid attention to be publicly visible, and spoke in Turkish in public addresses were manifestations of the effort for demonstrating that the MRF was responsive to criticisms.\textsuperscript{440}

In the 2013 election, the MRF somewhat retained its seats while it lost a considerable number of votes (see Table 5). The PPFD got 1,63 of the votes and was not represented in the parliament (OSCE/ODIHR 2013: 28). Following the election, Bülent Arınç, then-Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, stated that they have ‘extremely good relations with the party administration under Lutfi Mestan’s leadership’ (\textit{T-Haber}, 1 June 2014). He also underlined that the AKP had many reasons not to support the leadership of Ahmet Dogan (ibid.). Acknowledging the AKP’s previous support for the PPFD, Arınç said that ‘… it was our political decision at that time, but it [PPFD] was not successful, and it seems that it is unlikely that it will ever be. Accordingly, we support the Movement for Rights and Freedoms’ (ibid.).

Illustrating the kin-state’s decision to resort back to “normal”, a MRF delegation met President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Davutoğlu in Ankara before the early elections in Bulgaria in October 2014. Apart from chairman Lutfi Mestan and Rusen Riza, who has been the name responsible for the relations with Turkey, the two MP candidates in the MRF

\textsuperscript{439} Those informants that openly mentioned or implied this “religiosity” issue, did so especially when explaining why they think the Turks of Bulgaria receive less attention than other Muslim kin communities, and why this bickering between the AKP and the MRF took place.

\textsuperscript{440} Bulgarian law forbids campaigning in a language other than Bulgarian. Mestan received fines for campaigning in Turkish on the eve of the 2013 elections (\textit{Hürriyet}, 12 May 2013), symbolically contributing to the demonstrations of sensitivity to minority language preservation.
delegation were Şabanali Ahmed and Hussein Hafuzov (Kırcaali Haber, 12 September 2014). Both are prominent names of the Muslim clergy in Bulgaria and former high ranked representatives of the Muslim denomination. The fact that the MRF suggested these two names as candidates in the 2014 election is illustrative of its effort to demonstrate its increased religious sensitivity. Furthermore, their inclusion in the delegation to Ankara is telling in itself in terms of the MRF’s efforts to court Erdoğan and the AKP government and to improve its image in their eyes.

4.2. Where do the soydaş fall in Turkey’s reconfigured transborder kin map?

As explained in Chapter 5, starting from the end of the AKP’s first term in government, the strategy of establishing contacts with the Eurasian, Balkan, and Middle Eastern peoples, states, and economies gained pace. Re-discovering, claiming, and establishing contacts with (and via) a broad range of no longer predominantly ethno-linguistically defined kin populations became an increasingly used tool for fomenting power through opening out and repositioning Turkey, while creating its civilisational “niche”. The external Turks lexicon, formerly used mainly in reference to the front-line co-ethnics, has been abandoned to a large extent, apart from its pragmatic uses mainly in reference to Turkic Republics.

From the mid-2000s onwards, the TIKA, the YEI, the DIB, and later on the YTB became the main institutional instruments of the abovementioned policy approach. Particularly the TIKA, with its rather generous budget and through its collaboration with Turkish humanitarian relief NGOs established itself as one of the major resource allocators. Hence, it became one of the most prominent state actors in the expansive kin-making and engagement strategy. The TIKA expanded its network of PCO’s to most of the Balkans except for Bulgaria and Greece. Neither are there YEI Culture Centres in these countries.441

441 The YEI, together with Trakya (Thrace) University in Edirne signed a “Turkology Project Protocol” with the Shumen Konstantin Preslavski University in December 2012. 30 % of Shumen’s population is “ethnic Turkish” (NSI 2011: 24). According to the protocol, the YEI will send books and instructors to the Turkish Philology and Literature Department. See, http://yee.org.tr/turkiye/tr/haberler/bizden-haberler/42-turkoloji-protokolu-imzalandi-317 According to MFA sources, opening a YEI Culture Centre in Bulgaria is a possibility. The reciprocal opening of Bulgarian and Turkish culture centres in Istanbul and Sofia was included in the document on cultural cooperation, signed as part of the bilateral ‘High-Level Cooperation Council’ on 20 March 2012. Author’s interview with the Head of Department of the MFA Deputy Directorate General for the Balkans and Central Europe, op. cit.
The fact that the TIKA does not have a PCO in a country does not mean that it does not fund activities or get indirectly involved in projects. However, the lack of a bilateral agreement that constitutes the basis for the PCO limits its room to manoeuvre. The TIKA was involved in restoring some of the Ottoman architectural heritage, such as mosques and Muslim cemeteries through the intermediary role played by the diplomatic representations in Sofia, Plovdiv, and Burgas. It bought the building of the Chief Mufti’s office in central Sofia in 2002, and funded its restoration. The TDV and the TIKA jointly covered the costs of the new theological high school building in Momchilgrad (Mestanlı), which was opened in July 2012. They are also co-funding the construction of an additional building for the Shumen theological high school.  

The most commonly shared pressing problem of the Turkish minority is the gravity of economic conditions, lack of employment opportunities, and the resulting outmigration which creates further loss of younger and educated generations. This creates a certain level of anxiety about the “extinction” of the Turkish population in Bulgaria. Hence, the “motherland” is mostly expected to take steps for generating employment through encouraging investments in the predominantly Turkish regions. According to most of the interviewed representatives and spokespersons, these steps are urgently needed in order to guarantee the continued demographic presence of the Turks in Bulgaria. As the kin-state is mostly expected to contribute to the socioeconomic standing of its soydaş, the latter highly value the activities and projects of the TIKA. The representatives of the Turkish community take note that the extent of material resources the TIKA is able and willing to allocate

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442 In addition to projects related to restoration and infrastructure, the TIKA granted funds to cultural activities on an individual and ad hoc basis, generally through the diplomatic representations. An example to such kind of support was the TIKA’s granting of a modest “seed fund” to the online daily Turkish newspaper Kardzhali News (Kircaali Haber). Author’s interview with the Chairman of the ‘Association for Turkish Culture and Art’, op. cit.

443 To the best of my knowledge, there are no separate statistics on outmigration from Bulgaria based on ethnic origin. According to MRF representatives, around 150,000 ethnic Turkish persons are estimated to have left in the last 4-5 years (Author’s interview with a former MRF Deputy, op. cit.). According to Turkish diplomatic sources, the major countries of destination have been Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Emigration to Turkey continues, even though to a lesser extent after the EU option became available. A widely observed pattern is that temporary migration of a single (generally male) member of a family has given place to long-term migration of entire families (Author’s interviews).

444 One of the best known two Turkish investments in predominantly Turkish regions in Bulgaria is the glass manufacturing plant of Şişecam in Targovishte. The Şişecam plant started its full-capacity production in 2008, and currently employs 1500 people (Sofia News Agency, 17 February 2011). The other is the aluminium manufacturing facility of Alcomet, which was opened in 1999 in Shumen, and employs 890 people. See, http://www.alcomet.eu/about-the-company/key-figures 35,8 % of the population of Targovishte is of ethnic Turkish origin. This ratio is 30,3 % for Shumen (NSI 2011: 24). According to the MFA numbers, as of 2012, Turkish investments in Bulgaria, including contracting works, reached US $ 2 billion. Author’s interview with the Head of Department of the MFA Deputy Directorate General for the Balkans and Central Europe, op. cit.).
(elsewhere) substantially increased particularly in the last decade. Hence, they see the TIKA projects as one of the most tangible and substantive indicators of the degree of Turkey’s “genuine” interest in a specific kin community.

According to the officials from the TIKA and the MFA, the absence of a TIKA PCO in Bulgaria is not a deliberate choice on the part of Turkey, and hence it cannot and should not be seen as a sign of lack of interest. Rather, it is mainly caused by the fact that Bulgaria has not been very eager to let Turkey have an official presence on its territory. According to the officials, this host-state reluctance stems mainly from centuries-long historical prejudices and suspicions that are being kept alive by some nationalist-populist circles.445

The Turkish state has always regarded the continued Turkish and Muslim populations’ demographic presence in their traditional places of domicile, particularly in the Balkans, as symbolically important. Hence, the dire economic conditions and the high pace of outmigration among the Turks of Bulgaria is a concern for Turkey. Nevertheless, the official position on investment incentives is that the state is limited in its capacity to influence the choices of capital. The argument is that while Turkey would like to see a bigger presence of Turkish investments in the kin-intensive regions, its power to direct investments to particular regions is limited given the global economic structure and profit- and stability-seeking behaviour of entrepreneurs. Priority countries and regions for Turkish investments and hence state incentives are determined by economic considerations rendering specific markets strategic, rather than by the affinity or co-ethnicity of these regions’ inhabitants. Turkey has no special incentives for entrepreneurs planning to invest in Bulgaria, mainly because the Bulgarian market is not a high priority market for Turkey, as for instance Russian and Central Asian markets are.446

Hence, it seems that three conditions have to be met in order for the state to use its kin engagement strategy as part of its objective of opening out to foreign markets. First, specific regional and/or “national” economies should be regarded as priority for the state and its non-state partners representing business interests to enter or to further penetrate. Second, establishing contacts with populations through development aid and “cultural diplomacy”

445 Author’s interview with the Vice President of the TIKA, op. cit.; author’s interview with the Head of Department of the MFA Deputy Directorate General for the Balkans and Central Europe, op. cit.
446 Author’s interviews with diplomatic officials in Ankara (April-May 2012) and in Bulgaria (January-February 2013).
measures should be seen as additional tools that enable or facilitate the kin-state’s entry and penetration to a market in a specific context. Third, the host-states of these transborder populations should be tolerating and receptive, or at least not too resistant towards such kin-state activity in its territory. In other words, kin-state activism and material resource allocation requires the state to regard a region or a market as priority for its exports, trade relations, and investments abroad, and to consider kin-creation and engagement as an introductory step to build closer and denser contacts with these regions.

In the case of the Turks of Bulgaria, none of these conditions seem to be met. Hence, the mere existence of co-ethnicity does not constitute a major incentive for the “motherland” to allocate high degrees of material resources for closer kin engagement. Neither does the state need to spend as much effort for the making of transborder kinship as it does -for instance- in Africa. In other words, the incentives for as well as the expected returns and added value of, material kin engagement are low in the case of co-ethnics in economically less strategic Bulgaria.

From the perspective of the soydaş though, co-ethnic affinity should be a big enough reason for the now economically more resourceful and overall more kin-interested motherland to make a bigger and more tangible effort for their well-being. While realising that co-ethnic affinity alone is not enough to attract the substantive assistance of the kin-state, they also note that the kin-state values the continued existence of Turkish and Muslim populations in the Balkans as a demonstration and reminder of its past grandeur. Hence, the biggest card of the soydaş to enhance their “value” is emphasising the risk of “extinction” and the need for the preservation of a Turkish community in their traditional places of domicile.

Regarding Bulgaria’s resistance towards Turkey’s kin activism, many acknowledge that it is probably more difficult than it is in other Balkan countries due to Bulgaria’s lower degree of tolerance. However, they also point to the official messages given by both states contending that bilateral relations have never been as good as in the last five years.447 The soydaş counterargument is that within such friendly context and particularly given that Turkey’s

447 At the time of fieldwork, Erdoğan was the Prime Minister of Turkey. Boyko Borisov, the leader of the party ‘Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria’, was the PM of Bulgaria. The two governments as well as the two leaders are known to have a very good relationship. In the last years, authorities from both sides state that bilateral relations are at their historical best, as illustrated by close dialogue and cooperation within the framework of initiatives like the bilateral ‘High-Level Cooperation Council’ launched in 2012. *Author’s interview with the Head of Department of the MFA Deputy Directorate General for the Balkans and Central Europe, op. cit.*
economy fares much better than that of Bulgaria, it should have enough leverage to overcome these obstacles, if it is genuinely willing to back them up.

4.3. Contesting the motherland’s kinship definition and hierarchies

In addition to the degree of the motherland’s material support, the soydaş also assess the degree of Turkey’s interest in its co-ethnics in Bulgaria based on the latter’s symbolic demonstrations of kinship and affinity. The extent to which Turkey values its co-ethnics across the border and how this has changed are indicated by the official rhetoric towards kin communities in general, and towards themselves in particular. The frequency of high-level officials’ visits to kin-intensive regions, and the degree of closeness of the relations between minority representatives and Turkish officials are seen as indicators of Turkey’s performance as their “motherland”. Given Turkey’s limited kin-oriented material resource allocation in the pre-2000 era, this aspect featured as the main factor shaping perceptions of proximity, solidarity, and support. As Turkey’s kinship definition to a large extent continued to prioritise ‘external Turks’ in that period, the Turks of Bulgaria retained their self-perception as belonging to the front-line of Turkey’s transborder kin.

As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the scope of claimed and engaged transborder kin has increasingly expanded since the mid-2000s. Connected to the strategic extension of the scope, Turkey’s transborder kinship criteria have become more ambiguous than the previous one prioritizing descent and language. The new elite increasingly incorporated rhetorical and practical kin engagement into Turkey’s foreign policy and the AKP’s domestic political manoeuvres to distinguish itself as the natural elite of the genuine nation. As a result, Turkey has been increasingly underlining its Islamic-Ottoman face and its special links with transborder Muslim populations that predominantly but not exclusively reside within former territorial and cultural Ottoman borders.

As explained in Section 2.2, the Turks of Bulgaria regard the majority of their community as having not a ‘rigid’ understanding of Islam. In addition, their self-identification as a distinct group from the rest of Muslims in Bulgaria is primarily based on “Turkishness”. This ethno-linguistic identity marker has also defined their special connection to the “motherland”, which made the Turks of Bulgaria (and not the Pomaks and the Muslim Roma) Turkey’s “next-of-kin”. However, within “new” Turkey’s civilisational kin universe, ethno-linguistically defined
“Turkishness”, which the *soydaş* regarded as the identity marker having positioned themselves at the core of Turkey’s kin, does not suffice to retain this central position any longer. In other words, facing a reconfigured kin-state attitude highlighting civilisational criteria and a “fellow Muslims” discourse, from the perspective of the external co-ethnic minority, being *soydaş* in Bulgaria (or elsewhere) is not as valorised by the motherland as it used to be. The decreasing value of ethno-linguistic Turkishness and hence the relative marginalisation of the *soydaş* is a source of criticism towards the kin-state, particularly among the ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’.

The perceived “devaluation” of co-ethnicity in the motherland’s transborder kinship definition, and hence the relative peripheralisation of the Turks of Bulgaria is based on a comparative evaluation of material and symbolic support provided by Turkey to different “types” of kin or “related” communities elsewhere. On the one hand, it is widely acknowledged that Turkey has become more interested in the Balkans, and more capable of engaging transborder kin. Hence, it is also acknowledged that the Turks of Bulgaria also benefited from this increased economic capacity and intensified political interest. On the other hand, where the Turks of Bulgaria stand within the hierarchy of this extended scope of kin is being questioned, as there is a perceived loss of primacy of *co-ethnics* in relative terms.\(^4\) This is translated into a questioning of the criteria used by the kin-state to define, delimit, and hierarchically order transborder populations that share various degrees and types of links with its nation. The gradual movement of ethnicity and language from the innermost to the margins in defining extraterritorial membership to Turkey and kinship with the Turkish nation leads to an implicit questioning of how the state has been revising the ways in which it defines the Turkish nation.

Comparison was often made between Turkey’s attitude towards the Turks of Bulgaria and towards other Turkish, and non-Turkish Muslim communities in the Balkans. Turkey’s relations with populations particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia were brought up in these comparisons. The often-used argument is that even though those Turkish populations in Kosovo and Macedonia are much smaller in size, the extent to which Turkey materially and symbolically “backs” them is greater in comparison to the Turks of Bulgaria.

\(^4\) It should be noted that the continuing generous financial support the TRNC gets from Turkey was also mentioned several times, in order to imply that the *co-ethnics* in Bulgaria were disadvantaged rather than an overall devaluation of co-ethnicity per se.
The relative size and hence the importance of a specific community is seen as something that should favour the Turks of Bulgaria in this Turkish-and-Muslim intra-group comparison. Turkey’s closer engagement with non-Turkish Muslim populations is found even more problematic and “unjust”. The majority of my informants made the point that in the last decade Turkey has been much more interested and active in Bosnia, even though ‘there are not even Turks but only Muslims there’. The following comment summarises both points regarding the unease of the soydaş in Bulgaria with the changing hierarchies of “kinship”:

‘The biggest community of Turks is here in Bulgaria but Turkey pays the least attention to here. I don’t know why. I mean, how many Turks are there in Kosovo, in Macedonia? I am talking about real Turks, not Muslims. Those that speak Turkish, those that are of Turkish origin…’

The sense of relative marginalisation of the ‘real Turks’ within Turkey’s broadened kin universe gets further intensified when they compare Turkey’s engagement of communities that do not “even” belong to the former Ottoman geography, polity and culture. If these populations get the symbolic kin-state attention and more so the material kin-state resources that the Turks of Bulgaria do not, Turkey’s understanding of kin and its kin-state “logic” was further contested. For instance, the fact that Turkey, mainly through the TIKA, has been very active in supporting populations in countries like Somali, Djibouti, and Ethiopia was questioned. The fact that these populations receive attention and material support was met with even bigger “puzzlement” and objection by the soydaş. The unease with Turkey’s conceptual stretching of its kinship definition and the marginalised co-ethnic position within this broadened scope is well illustrated in the following comment:

“When we visit officials at the TIKA or the External Turks Agency [YTB], they tell us that they even help Djibouti … Why are you in Djibouti? I mean, you go to Djibouti, but there are no Turks there! Then they say, “well, our Muslim brothers and sisters”… Ok, your Muslim brothers and sisters, but here [in Bulgaria] you have your Turkish-Muslim brothers and sisters!”

449 Author’s interview with a MRF Deputy, op. cit. It should be noted given the particularly strained relations between the MRF and the AKP at the time of the research, a MRF Deputy’s comments might be regarded as additionally biased. However, non-MRF affiliated informants also made claims along very similar lines. This excerpt is chosen because it summarises all these points in a few sentences, whereas others were expressed in a more scattered fashion.

450 Many informants gave the example of Somali. This is probably the case because of the highly publicised Somali famine relief campaign that Erdoğan initiated and led. Particularly his visit to Mogadishu with his entourage composed of ministers, deputies, NGOs, and even pop-stars for the delivery of the relief supplies in August 2011 reached very high publicity not only in the Turkish media, but also internationally. See, for example, BBC News (19 August 2011).

451 Author’s interview with a MRF Deputy, op. cit.
In the face of such perceived loss of primacy, minority representatives and ethnic entrepreneurs attempt to recapture the community’s central position among the kin of Turkey, which they believe they held in an ethnolinguistic understanding of transborder kin within a limited ‘external Turks’ scope. In order to justify why the ‘real Turks’ of Bulgaria should be prioritized among the now amply expanded transborder kin of Turkey, four arguments and types of discursive strategies are used:

First, the relatively bigger size of the community, the added value of Turkishness, and the symbolic importance of the population’s historical rootedness and sedentariness are often used in such legitimating discourses. In order to distinguish themselves from other sizeable extraterritorial Turkish populations such as emigrant communities in Western Europe, the “nativity” of the community was often highlighted. In relation to the historical rootedness argument, the importance of “preserving the Turkish presence” in the former ‘European’ Ottoman territories was underlined. Eventual demographic “extinction” through high paces of economically driven outmigration was often depicted as a potential future scenario if Turkey continues to prioritise other (non-ethnic) populations over its soydaş in Bulgaria and does not take steps to reduce socioeconomic “push-factors”.

Second, the extent of political power and visibility achieved by the Turkish minority in Bulgaria was put forward in stressing their competitive advantage in the hierarchies within the broadened kin universe. Particularly MRF-affiliates underlined the number of seats won and the ministerial positions held by the party when it was part of the government. Party members as well as a significant section of those not institutionally affiliated with the MRF demonstrated the community’s political power by pointing out the fact that the party managed to enter all the parliaments and held the role of coalition maker within the Bulgarian political system. This distinguishing aspect was generally used in comparisons with the relatively weaker Turkish parliamentary political representation in Kosovo and Macedonia. Given the absolute loss of primacy experienced by the MRF at the time of fieldwork, the weaker political standing of the Turks in these two countries was particularly highlighted by the party affiliates. This was also done in order to substantiate their argument on the repercussions of “factionalism” within the minority.

The third line of argument is based on the inevitability of the gradual erosion of the community’s collective national identity and consciousness due to depopulation and the lack
of financial and human resources to be deployed for the minority’s cultural, linguistic, religious self-preservation. This possible near-future scenario of complete assimilation would happen if Turkey would not prioritize the soydaş and adopt a “constant state policy” independent of government changes. While somewhat contradicting the parallel discourse of having resisted all assimilation pressures in the last century, this argument also relies on instilling the “fear of extinction” in the kin-state authorities. The emphasis on a “constant state policy” is largely affected by the perception of being disadvantaged by Turkey’s changing kin-engagement discourse and orientation, and particularly by the AKP’s attitude towards the MRF. The argument frequently put forward was that differently from other Muslim minorities without a kin-state, i.e., the Pomak and the Roma, the Turks of Bulgaria have always relied on the guarantee of their external national homeland and presumed its backing, which the latter provided until recently. Hence, from this perspective, co-ethnicity requires a formalized policy line on the part of the kin-state, the main principles of which would remain intact regardless of changes in the ruling elite and their conception of nationhood and kinship.

Lastly, in an effort to recapture the “next-of-kin” status, some also used arguments highlighting the “indebtedness” of the motherland to the soydaş that opted for staying in Bulgaria despite all the suffering and oppression they have gone through. This argument aimed to emotionally resonate across the border by underlining “victimhood”, “sacrifice”, and “sense of mission” for the sake of protecting Turkish demographic and cultural legacy. Highlighting that they showed strong resistance to heavy Bulgarianisation pressures justifies their greater worthiness for closer kin-state attention compared to other kin minorities that are not as harshly subjected to homogenisation pressures by their host-states. Emphasising that the Turks (still) in Bulgaria opted for staying although they had the chance to go to the motherland accentuates their difference from and implicitly superiority over those that chose to seek refuge in the motherland. That they stayed in Bulgaria is seen as a sign of their commitment to preserve the Turkish, Muslim, and Ottoman legacy in the Balkans, hence their “value” for the kin-state. It also feeds into the “indebtedness” argument by comparing what Turkey did for those who stayed and for those who benefited from the political and socioeconomic security provided by the motherland.452

452 It should be noted that while those “who stayed” use these discourses built on the motherland’s support and sacrifice towards the 1989 immigrants, the latter’s settlement was far from being smooth. The government was
5. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter analysed the implications of Turkey’s changing conception of nationhood, revisited transborder kinship hierarchy, and its reconfigured rationality of kin-making and engagement for transborder, intra-“national” membership politics. This was done through examining the changing relationship between Turkey as a kin-state and a “prototypical” external co-ethnic community, i.e., the Turks of Bulgaria. While the main focus was on the dynamic cross-border intra-national interaction, it was embedded within the minority-specific framework of the host-state, and the inter-state relations between the kin-state and the host-state.

The chapter demonstrated that the clashing ‘group-making projects’ of their host- and kin-states to a large extent shaped the collective identification of the Turks of Bulgaria. The early Republican Kemalist nation-building project had its repercussions also beyond the border. The motherland’s conception of nationhood contributed to the prioritisation of ethno-linguistically defined Turkishness in the formation and preservation of group identity by the Turks of Bulgaria. The prioritisation of ethno-linguistic identity markers by the kin-state as well as by the minority made the state distinguish and privilege the group from non-Turkish Muslims in Bulgaria and elsewhere. This implied that the minority retained a sense of exclusivity and privilege within the transborder kinship universe of the motherland by being Turkish in addition to being Muslim, or rather being primarily Turkish and then Muslim. Hence, it contributed to the perception held by the Turks of Bulgaria that it was Turkishness that positioned the community at the centre of Turkey’s transborder kin.

Turkey confirmed and reinforced the perception of primacy and centrality by its exclusively welcoming and protecting attitude towards the Turks when Muslim minorities were subjected to Bulgaria’s periodically activated homogenisation project until 1989. Turkey made an effort to broaden its transborder scope through slight modifications in the defining criteria to re-claim “Turkic” relatives in Central Asia and Muslims in its neighbourhood in the post-Cold War conjuncture. Nevertheless, descent- and language-based kinship conception in claiming and targeting populations retained its centrality until the 2000s. This was mainly shaped by

accused of accepting excessively large numbers of people even though it was not ready or able to accommodate all these immigrants (Geray cited in İçduygu et.al 2009: 154).
the stance of the laicist elite towards Islam as well as its limited capacity in capitalizing on border-crossing religious fraternity.

Since the mid-2000s, transborder kin-making and engagement has become an important complementary tool in the elites’ policy of politically and economically propelling Turkey towards the post-imperial space and beyond. The invention and further development of a civilisational and predominantly Islamic notion of border-crossing kinship and acting upon this notion through a developmental and humanitarian approach has become an important complementary tool in accessing and connecting with strategic nodes in this space. The narrative of proudly Ottoman-Islamic and globally competitive “new” Turkey as the leader and the centre of such civilisational space also reinforced the AKP’s claim of being its inheritor, bearer, and architect. The limited scope and the “closed-ended” nature of the ‘external Turks’-based notion of kinship fell short of serving the purposes of such rather expansive and flexible approach that was made possible through the Islamic-civilisational narrative. Hence, the emphasis on Turkishness by virtue of descent and language faded, without being fully abandoned. The state delineated, hierarchized, and engaged transborder kin mainly according to the yardstick of “fellow Muslims in the maximally inclusive former Ottoman cultural space”.

The soydaş in Bulgaria note that Turkey pursues policies to demonstrate and to augment its soft power diffusing beyond its immediate neighbourhood, and part of this strategy is allocating material and symbolic resources to its “kin”. Facing a financially more able and politically more willing kin-state, the question for the soydaş in Bulgaria becomes to whom among Turkey’s transborder kin these material and symbolic resources are allocated. Confronted with a “motherland” that has revised its kinship criteria, and accordingly the scope, composition, and internal hierarchies of its transborder kin universe, the Turks of Bulgaria perceive a relative loss of primacy and centrality. From the soydaş perspective, the devaluation of co-ethnicity and the consequent loss of their centrality translate into unbalanced and also unfair distribution of the kin-state’s material as well as symbolic-identitarian resources. That ethnicity was devalued particularly compared to religion as kinship criteria affecting the degree of belonging is perceived as an additionally troubling development for the Turks of Bulgaria. Their ‘non-rigid’ understanding of Islam and “insufficient” degree of religiosity are seen as additional factors that made them lose primacy in the eyes of the “post-Kemalist” motherland.
The co-ethnics and particularly ethnic minority entrepreneurs develop various strategies to recapture their central position in Turkey’s transborder kin universe that could gain them a better share in kin-state resource allocation. These strategies are based on contesting as well as adapting to the abovementioned changes. They contest the motherland’s revised conception of kinship and relationally, that of the nation by trying to reassert ethnicity as the main membership criteria. They point to the normative superiority of ethnicity as kinship criteria by highlighting its essential, static, and primordial nature and comparing these bonds to the “invented” ones with the “related” communities springing up elsewhere. At the same time, observing that prioritizing Islam-based identity markers over ethnicity-based ones in defining one’s kinship with and closeness to Turkey has become a valorised token, an incipient adaptation strategy has been also emerging. Incorporating names from the ranks of Muslim clergy to the cadres of the MRF and bringing these names to the fore in the minority’s relations with Turkey seems to be part of such adaptation strategy. Finally, an important aspect of the soydaş struggle to re-locate themselves at a more central position in Turkey’s transborder kin map is the relational, contingent, and flexible use of “kinship” arguments and discourses. They play the card of size, historical rootedness, nativity, united ethnic political power, or sacrifice in the name of preserving Turkish imprints outside Turkey in shifting ways depending on their “competitors” within the specific context of transborder membership politics.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined why and how Turkey transformed from a state with limited interest in ethno-nationally defined transborder kin into one claiming and engaging an expansive, multi-register, and multi-layered diaspora composed of emigrants and a broadly defined set of external kin populations. The empirical analysis traced this transformation through focusing on the state’s changing categorisation and identification practices and policy-discourse repertoire oriented towards these different types of transborder populations. It also shed light on how changes in the state’s diaspora-making and engagement project impacted on emigrants and transborder co-ethnics.

The thesis singles out three factors in explaining the changing ways in which Turkey defined, (sub)categorised, and targeted both emigrant and transborder kin populations in the 1990s and the 2000s. First, economic liberalisation and the locations chosen for outward economic expansion and interpenetration; second, the state’s foreign political and identitarian positioning vis-à-vis the West and its non-Western neighbourhood; and third, elite-sponsored conceptions of nationhood and narratives of nationalism. It demonstrated that the interaction of these three factors shaped Turkey’s transborder member-making and engagement project over the last two decades. Transformations in the broader structure, particularly economic neoliberalisation and the post-Cold War political conjuncture formed the external frame for such interaction. The ways in which different state elites related to the imperial legacy have been of particular importance for their constructions of identity for the nation and the state, having direct implications for the changing approach of the state towards both kinds of transborder populations.

The thesis has demonstrated that the initial interest in both types of transborder populations was driven by economic expansion and integration efforts and the urge to retain and enhance the state’s power within post-Cold War regional and international political dynamics. The replacement of the Kemalist state elite with the moderately Islamist, conservative AKP in 2002 implied significant changes in the elite-sponsored conceptions of nationhood and the state’s positioning vis-à-vis the West as a political, cultural, and identitarian space. The new elite’s aspirations to turn Turkey into an economic hotspot and regional power house has led
the state to claim and engage an all-encompassing diaspora composed of globally dispersed emigrants and a maximally inclusive set of transborder kin defined beyond co-ethnicity.

Changes in the construction of state identity and narrative of nationalism translated into state practices of selection, prioritisation, and hierarchisation within this broad diaspora. The revised definitions of ideal emigrant and transborder kin groups reflected the new elite’s reconfigured conception of nationhood drawing from Ottoman-Islamic roots of identity and conservative societal values, as well the positioning of the state as the bearer and leader of a civilisation alternative to the West. These definitional and hierarchical reconfigurations taking place at the macro level have restructuring effects on the micro-politics of the targeted co-ethnic and emigrant populations. The state-led reshuffling of the centres and the margins of its diaspora shapes different sections’ stances towards and relations with the home-state, as well as their degrees and claims of transborder membership within both emigrant and co-ethnic configurations.

1. THE MAKING AND MOULDING OF TRANSBORDER POPULATIONS: TURKEY’S EXPANSIVE DIASPORA AS A POLITICAL PROJECT

This thesis argued that rather than coming into play in an isolated manner, the dynamic interaction between economic liberalisation, the state’s positioning vis-à-vis the West, and conceptions of nationhood explains the shifts in Turkey’s diaspora-making project. It also demonstrated that the outcome of state definition practices and policies for emigrants and transborder kin populations have been different. While expanding the economy has been a rather constant objective in both periods, the shift in the state’s diaspora-making project is largely driven by different elites’ conceptions of nationhood and their positioning vis-à-vis the West.

The post-1980 economic liberalisation and the adoption of the export-based strategy in Turkey made the search for new markets and alternative non-Western economic connections a priority for the state. The political and economic elites saw the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and the liberalisation of the former communist economies as an opportunity for economic opening towards and interpenetration with these regions. The relative loss of Turkey’s political significance for its Western allies in the post-Cold War political-military setting led the state elite to search for formulas for retaining the state’s power through new alliances and zones of influence in its broader region. Discovering and reconnecting with culturally
affinitive populations, and hence their states and markets, offered a potential for wider market access and comparative political and economic advantage vis-à-vis other states lacking such links.

The elite’s choice of culturally affinitive geographies for extending its economic and political influence was largely conditioned by Kemalist constructions of a non-Ottoman Turkish national history and identity. Ethno-linguistic kinship definitions rather than Ottoman-Islamic ones prevailed due to the elite’s secularist sensitivities and its ambivalent stance on Islam as a component of nationhood. The contingent combination of these factors resulted in the channelling of the state’s efforts and resources primarily towards the making and engagement of the Turkic “brethren” in Central Asia. My research in Bulgaria suggests that tangible benefits granted by Turkey to transborder co-ethnics remained limited during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the state’s prioritisation of ethno-linguistic traits in its conception of kinship and its symbolic engagement practices led to co-ethnic perceptions of centrality within the slowly broadening transborder kin register.

The urge for enhancing the connectivity of the economy and the continuing efforts of the state elite to politically and culturally position Turkey within the “West” motivated the reach-out strategy towards overseas citizens in the 1990s. The former objective led to the state’s creation of the “Turkish businessmen abroad” category and its efforts to institutionalise their links to the home economy. Overseas citizens in Western Europe gained a foreign political function in the eyes of the Turkish state as potential national voting blocks supporting its bid for EU membership. These political and economic factors drove the state to grant rights attached to the legal status of overseas citizen and to adopt an embracing rhetoric.

The discrepancy between the Kemalist definition of the ideal emigrant and the various collective identities and diasporic stances within the entire overseas citizenry grounded the informal selective practices of the state. The Kemalist elite’s conception of a homogeneous, indivisible ethno-linguistic Turkish nation and its strictly secularist vision for the state and society shaped the state’s sub-categorisation practices. These informal sub-categories conditioned the state’s selective disbursal of symbolic and material resources. Particularly those mobilising for the Kurdish cause and those that organised along Islamist agendas were excluded and delegitimised. Those adopting Turkish nationalist-laiacist stances were attributed representativeness and steered by the home-state. The state perceived a general mismatch
between its ideal emigrant definition and the sociological emigrant reality. Hence, the collision of incorporative and exclusive logics generated ambivalent outcomes. While the state took certain legal measures to sustain the links and loyalty of overseas citizens to the homeland, it refrained from fully incorporating them to the demos.

During the AKP governments, an understanding of development based on economic growth and deeper integration into global markets gained absolute primacy also in Turkey. The new elite assessed the global financial crisis as a window of opportunity to become a globally competitive economy. Following the steps of rising economies like China and India, discovering and connecting with entrepreneurial and professional sections among expatriates became one of the crucial dimensions of the expansive diaspora-making project.

While expanding the economy has been a rather constant objective in both periods, the main change in the state’s outlook has been in the construction of identity for the nation and the state. The AKP’s nation re-building project has largely relied on negating the secularist and pro-Western elements on which the Kemalist elite based its conception of nationhood and state identity. The new elite has increasingly made use of Ottoman-Islamic roots of identity in its construction of the post-Kemalist Turkey as the bearer and the leader of a civilisation alternative to the West.

The ideal emigrant definition has been revised as to stress conservatism and the new Ottoman-Islamic national construct, which led to modifications in the state’s subcategorisation and hierarchisation practices. The elite sought to reaffirm its claim of the post-Kemalist Turkey’s moral superiority over the West through the image of emigrants in Europe that resist assimilation and subscribe to the AKP’s vision. Hence, rather than instrumentalising overseas citizens as a means to improve Turkey’s relations with Europe, the AKP’s diaspora engagement aimed at challenging and confronting Europe through its defence of its emigrants against the wrongs of the West. Seeing an overall correspondence between its ideology and the emigrant landscape, the AKP’s expectation for boosting its popular legitimacy and electoral support translated into full political incorporation of the entirety of citizens in their capacity as legal members and voters.

The late 2000s also witnessed the effort to include a wider range of transborder populations in the state’s various layers of kinship. Kin-making is closely linked to business interests and the
state’s stepped up aspirations for increasing the volume of trade and outward looking investments. Even though these populations do not personally possess financial and economic resources, identifying them as part of the state’s kin beyond borders offers justification for initiating humanitarian projects and sociocultural relations. These first steps are then expected to lead to a bigger presence of Turkish economic actors in the broadened kin geographies.

Shifting and pragmatic uses of a combination of ethno-linguistic, religious, historical, cultural criteria and capitalising on the political and cultural memory of the empire and the caliphate have been the main tools of constructing a maximally inclusive civilisational kin space. While Turkic and co-ethnic elements are not excluded from the scope of the reconfigured kinship universe, common historical membership to a vaguely defined Ottoman-Islamic cultural space constitutes the gist of the state’s kinship definition. Claiming a transborder kin universe defined well beyond co-ethnicity also helps the elite reproduce its narrative of Turkey as the natural leader, the motor force and the guardian of its distinct and non-Western civilisational milieu. This narrative constitutes the backbone of the state’s foreign political aspirations for establishing Turkey as a regional powerhouse. Domestically, by demonstrating that targeted populations in a space ranging from Africa to the Middle East, from the Balkans to Mongolia welcome the post-Kemalist Turkey, the AKP attempts to delegitimise the secularist pro-Western elites.

2. IMPLICATIONS OF TURKEY’S CHANGING DIASPORA-MAKING PROJECT FOR EMIGRANT AND CO-ETHNIC POPULATIONS

2.1. The impact of a civilisational kin notion on the co-ethnic minority in Bulgaria

The main state-led change impacting co-ethnic populations has been the growing scope and diversifying composition of the transborder kin. These two shifts have been interlinked, in that the state broadened the scope through its use of multiple ethnic and non-ethnic membership criteria. Serving the expansion purposes well and fitting in the foreign and domestic political manoeuvres of the new elite, the kinship definition concentrated on Ottoman-Islamic references rather than prioritising ethnicity.

The abovementioned reconfiguration of the transborder kin universe implies a more competitive setting regarding the state’s distribution of symbolic and material resources,
putting the formerly prioritised co-ethnic minorities at a relative disadvantage. As Turkey has exhibited greater ability and willingness to disburse material resources to its transborder kin in the 2000s, the stakes have become also higher. Hence, the co-ethnic minority perceives a relative loss of primacy. This perception was also caused by the fact that ethnolinguistic-Turkic definitions had prevailed in the 1990s, at least symbolically.

Ethnic minority entrepreneurs develop various strategies to recapture their central position in Turkey’s transborder kin universe that could give them a larger share in kin-state resource allocation. These strategies are based on contesting as well as adapting to the abovementioned changes. They contest the motherland’s revised conception of kinship by trying to reassert ethnicity as the main membership criteria, which ought to give them priority over non-Turkish Muslims in the Balkans or Africa. At the same time, observing that prioritising Islam-based identity markers has become a valorised token, they attempt to increase the representation of Islamic elements within their political organisation. Whether this emerging adaptive strategy will be sustained by the minority elites and will have the desired effect on the kin-state remains to be seen. Still, the incipient efforts of the ethnic entrepreneurs to develop such a mixed strategy hints at the kin-state’s ability and power to shape identity (trans)formation across the border.

Turkey’s revised definition of kinship had its political implications particularly for co-ethnic minority elites. The AKP noted a mismatch between its predominantly Islam-based ideal kin definition and the minority’s primarily ethnic self-identification. Such perceived discrepancy led to the kin government’s interventions in co-ethnic minority politics aiming to further align the minority elites with its vision of ideal kin. The strained relations between the AKP and the MRF illustrated these dynamics well.

2.2. Restructuring effects of shifting diasporic centre of gravity on emigrants in Germany

Changes in the extent and content of state-led diaspora making project has important structuring effects on the diasporic stances and mobilisation patterns of emigrants and intra-group politics. The case of Turkey shows that the state’s efforts to construct an all-encompassing mobilised diaspora lead to incorporative rhetoric and inclusive policies oriented at overseas citizens. It also shows that the discrepancy between the supposedly neutral category of citizen and informal membership in the “real nation” underlies the state’s
selection, sub-categorisation, and hierarchisation practices. The definition of the ideal emigrant constitutes the basis for selective practices of diaspora-making and becomes particularly salient in contexts where the state is at unease with ethnic, religious, and political heterogeneity among its citizenry within and beyond its borders.

The shift from the Kemalist elite’s definition built on adherence to Turkish nationalism and secularism to that of the AKP primarily stressing identification with Islam and conservative societal values has led to a reconfiguration of sub-categories and restructured state-sponsored informal hierarchies among the emigrants. However, even though the new home-state elite speaks about a complete rupture with the earlier understanding of nationhood, there have also been several continuities between the Kemalist and the “post-Kemalist” home-state nationalisms. These continuities mean that certain aspects in the ideal emigrant definition of both elites remained constant.

The modified aspects of the ideal emigrant definition have induced a complete swapping of corporatist and antagonistic stances towards the home-state, as the Kemalist and Islamist minority elites’ shifting diasporic positions illustrate. However, as this thesis demonstrated, the aspects shared by the Kemalist and the “post-Kemalist” home-nationalisms have prompted occasional pro-state alliances between these seemingly antipodal corporatist and antagonistic sections of diaspora elites.

Owing to the commonalities in the Kemalist and “post-Kemalist” elites’ definition of the ideal emigrant, the home-state’s exclusionary rhetoric and practice towards certain incongruous sections remained unchanged. The AKP-sponsored reconfigured defining characteristic of the ideal diasporic subject do not include, nor do they appeal to politicised non-Turkish, non-Sunni, or non-Muslim identities, such as Kurdish, Alevi or Armenian ones.

The AKP government adopted an increasingly assertive diaspora engagement style, assessing that a majority of expatriates in Western Europe would subscribe to it. The home government has been projecting its revised ideal emigrant definition to the entirety of the expatriate population, while presenting itself as the primary point of reference for and the representative of the latter. The discourse of the powerful home-state defending its overseas citizens against assimilation, discrimination, and particularly against Islamophobia has resonated positively among wide sections of Turkey’s external populations. Those that do not self-identify with
this constructed image such as the Alevis, the Kurds, and the left-leaning organisations object to the self-proclaimed representative role of the home government.

As dissident voices and challenges intensified, the home government gradually abandoned its all-encompassing rhetoric of equal distance to all expatriates, and resorted back to friend-foe demarcations. The degree of diasporaness among both “friends” and “foes”, and even among those that opt for exclusively hostland-oriented agendas increased as a result of the resonance of the government-led polarisation in the homeland among the diaspora(s). The sub-categorisation practices of the home government directed at the diaspora mirrored the axes of polarisation in the homeland, which became clearly demarcated within the post-Gezi political context. The spillover effects of the on-going power struggle and legitimacy war in the homeland contributed to the structuring of the diaspora into increasingly mobilised opposing blocks. As the home government sharpened the differences between its sub-categories both at home and abroad, diasporic stances have crystallised accordingly. Transnational alliances formed around pro- and anti-government stances have consolidated. Political mobilisation of a certain “pole” aiming to delegitimise the homeland-related claims of its opponent through mass protests and press releases in the host-contexts and its retaliation by the opposite pole led to heightened diasporic politicisation.

The case of Turkey shows that the collision of the encompassing and selective logics of diaspora-making might create ambivalent outcomes for the diasporising state. Full political incorporation of all overseas citizens through opportunities for voting from abroad is driven by the former logic and opens channels for the formal involvement of sections informally excluded by the state in homeland politics.

3. SUGGESTIONS FOR NUANCING THE STUDY OF DIASPORA-MAKING AND THE ROLE OF THE HOME-STATE

The literature analysing home-states’ engagement efforts with their migrants tend to focus on the challenges posed by globalisation as the primary driver of such efforts. Scholars explaining kin-state activism emphasise nation-building efforts of state elites and politically expedient uses of ethno-nationalist agendas, while they tend to underrate economic motivations. This dissertation examined the case of a state with increasing interest in both kinds of transborder populations. It demonstrated that diaspora-making projects of hybrid
origin-reference states cannot be explained merely through focusing either on globalisation or nationalism. Understanding hybrid states’ expansive diaspora-making projects requires studying the interactive dynamics between these states’ responses to challenges of globalisation and their modified and not merely ethnicity-based nationalisms.

Faced with increasing challenges of globalisation and broader political transformations, states that have at their disposal multiple sources of ethnic and non-ethnic identity derived from their imperial past rely on these ambiguous and often intermeshed ties in their diaspora-making projects. In the case of Turkey, the state makes ample use of its historically rooted uneasy relationship with Western civilisation and the claim to offer an alternative to it in converting these ambiguous ties into a diasporic consciousness. This thesis suggests that in order to understand how states attempt to make diasporas out of populations beyond their borders, one needs to take into account particular historical trajectories of statehood and nationhood, while embedding these particularities in the universalistic conditions of globalisation.

Following the suggestion of Brubaker & Kim (2011), this thesis problematized transborder member-making practices instead of presuming a state acting upon a predetermined set of populations. Tracing particularly Turkey’s construction of non-ethnic kin groups, the thesis demonstrated how states forge and institutionalise various forms of transborder membership. The ways in which the Turkish state has gradually expanded the scope of its transborder kin populations through shifting and combined uses of multiple sources of identity illustrated the active role of the state in making diasporas. By going beyond state engagement of transborder co-ethnics and examining also the making of non-ethnic kin populations, the thesis illustrated a form of transborder member-making that has largely been neglected in the literature.

The conventional understanding is that kin communities generally lack financial resources of their own. Therefore, it is presumed that kin-state action is not driven by economic considerations because states do not expect to capture remittances or investment from these populations. However, as the case of Turkey illustrates, state and non-state economic elites highly value the potential for access to and integration with strategic regions and markets offered by and justified through the mere existence of such populations. This finding suggests that a readjustment is needed in our understanding of what economic resources are offered by kin populations that can drive states to embrace these groups. Future analyses of state interest
in kin populations should take into account the fact that some states target kin populations not primarily due to their ethnic or religious links, but rather based on the access and potential connections they can offer. A better connection and further dialogue between the literature on states’ engagement with migrant diasporas and that on kin-state activism offers potential for the latter strand to account for economic factors in a more sustained way.

In fact, unless the mobilisation of ethnic ties supports economic and foreign political objectives of the state, they might lose their centrality in the state’s kinship definition, and hence, their relative strength. As Waterbury aptly pointed out, ‘the strength of ethnic ties’ between states and transborder minorities are treated as remaining static in the literature (Ibid. 2010b: 16). However, the examination of the case of Turkey demonstrated that co-ethnicity might become one, and arguably not the most valorised one, among the identity-based membership criteria determining transborder “kinship”. Hence, this thesis suggests that instead of presuming strong ethnic ties and constantly harmonious relations between transborder co-ethnics and the kin-state, studies can benefit from inquiring the politics, contestation, and changing forms of relationship between the two. Examining these processes offers the potential to escape analytical biases contributing to an “‘overethnicized” view of the social world’ (Brubaker 2004: 12).

This dissertation draws on and contributes to approaches that are sensitive to state capacity to shape transborder membership politics (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Bauböck 2003). Adopting an approach that goes beyond looking at formal diaspora policies and also examining the state’s informal sub-categorisation practices, this thesis has examined the specific mechanisms through which the state structures diasporic stances, organisation patterns, and intra-group alliances in significant ways. These sub-categorisation practices become particularly important in conditioning the selective nature of the state’s disbursal of resources and granting recognition, which lies at the heart of its ability to shape transborder membership. In cases where the target populations are characterised by contestation and mobilisation along ethnic, religious, and ideological lines, examining such informal sub-categorisation practices in addition to formal policies becomes crucial for understanding how the state shapes transnational social action in different ways for different groups.
4. FURTHER RESEARCH

This dissertation focused on the impact of changes in the extent and content of state-led diaspora making and engagement policies on intra-minority politics, and home-state related stances and agendas of various groups within the targeted populations. Hence, the analysis was limited to the bilateral relationship between the home-state and the emigrant and co-ethnic populations. However, the ways in which the home-state identifies and engages its transborder populations has also significant side effects for the “communities” as immigrants, national minorities, and citizens of their countries of settlement.

For instance, some emigrant groups such as the Alevis voice their discomfort with the totalising image of never-assimilating, conservative, pro-homeland Turks promoted by the AKP in Germany. Those that do not self-identify with the home-state’s communal diasporic identity object to be included in that image, and find such acts of the home-state damaging for their perception by the host-state and society. Others that argue for focusing on hostland related agendas find that the assertive diaspora engagement style and the promotion of diasporic identity reinforces German claims about the problematic integration of the Turks. The straining of relations between Germany and Turkey in the face of the Turkish government’s increasingly assertive and confrontational diaspora rhetoric might be damaging for the “Turks” as citizens and residents of Germany.

How do host-states perceive and react to home-states’ active diaspora-making projects, a significant part of which takes place on their soil and targets their citizens of emigrant origin? What are the side effects of totalising diasporic images constructed and promoted by the home-state for the image and standing of the minorities within their host-settings? How do the antagonist/corporatist relations with the home-state translate into the same groups’ relations with the host-state? Similar questions might be asked also for the co-ethnic-kin-state configuration, in which accusations of fifth-columnism are often rife. In order to have a more complete picture of the impact of diaspora-making projects on the targeted populations, further research should take the side effects of such projects in the host-contexts into account.

An interesting phenomenon this project detected but did not pursue further due to the limits of its scope is the role of non-state homeland actors in the making and engagement of diasporas. As the case of Turkey demonstrated, religious orders, humanitarian relief organisations,
business organisations, and other kinds of NGOs seem to take an active part in the making and engagement of ethnic and non-ethnic transborder kin populations. As explained in Chapter 5, in the immediate post-Cold War era, non-state organisations were the initiators and the prime actors of such engagement, while the kin-state was the latecomer. Their relationship with the state in the making and engagement of transborder kin has been collaborative at times and competitive at others. Why are these non-state actors interested in transborder kin-making and engagement? To what extent and through which mechanisms do they shape the state’s kin-making and engagement agendas? What happens if the agendas of the kin-state and these non-state “diasporisers” collide – as it did in the escalating conflict between AKP and the Gülen movement?

This research focused on the implications of Turkey’s changing kin-state attitude, and particularly the expansion and diversification of its tranborder kin universe for one of the ethnic kin populations. Tracing the implications of the change from an ethnic to a religio-civilisational modality of kin-engagement for ethnic kin was considered as offering results potentially challenging our presumed conceptions of kin minorities as well as of the kin-state – kin minority constellation. Indeed, this project found out that co-ethnicity might lose its relative value and importance as a transborder membership criterion conditioning the state-external minority relation. It also demonstrated that within a broader and more competitive kin universe, symbolic and material resource allocation by the state might disadvantage the previously prioritised “next-of-kin”. However, mainly due to time constraint, feasibility and manageability concerns, the “third type” of transborder population detected in this research, i.e., populations claimed and targeted through non-ethnic membership criteria was excluded from the scope of this research. Hence, this study has limitations in terms of examining the implications of kin-engagement by a hybrid state for those populations included in the state’s transborder kin universe through religious, civilizational, and/or political membership criteria.

The project detected increasing disbursal of organisational, financial, and socio-economic resources by Turkey through TIKA offices and projects, as well as YEI culture centres and international scholarships granted primarily to the civilisational kin groups in the broad sense. However, further research is needed to explore and analyse tangible consequences of such hybridised kin-state approach for those unconventional kin populations. Such analyses would also help further illuminating the means and measures of this third type of state-led transborder kin-making and engagement. Research on that path could address questions like
the following: Do states use different discursive and substantial measures to bind these unconventional kin populations to their diasporic universe? Is it more “costly” to create and mobilise unconventional kin populations in the absence of ethnolinguistic commonalities? Does being “diasporised” by a hybrid state have any intended or unintended ‘ethnicising’ effects on non-ethnic kin? How successful/limited is the state in creating and mobilising transborder non-ethnic kinship consciousness?

Studies comparing the outcomes of hybrid kin-state activism for both ethnically and non-ethnically defined transborder kin groups could offer great potential for shedding light on (changing) hierarchies of transborder kinship and inter-kin competition. For instance, are Bosnian Muslims as prioritised and advantaged by the changing kin-state approach as the co-ethnics in Bulgaria claim? Do they perceive and experience such prioritisation in terms of symbolic and material resources they receive from the kin-state? Such impact-oriented comparative studies would also help us nuance our understanding of the tangible content of ethnic and non-ethnic kin-engagement and better differentiate the rhetoric and substance of expansive diaspora-making.

The question of substance of different modes of kin-state activism leads us to another potentially fruitful stream of comparative research. This project discussed in fair detail the differences between motivations and historical particularities of delimited ethnic kin-states such as Hungary as opposed to states targeting expansive and malleable transborder kin universes such as Turkey and Russia. The thesis also hinted at differences in the modalities and tools of kin-making and engagement between these two types of states. It was suggested that states like Turkey aiming at constructing expansive kin universes seem to rely on “lighter” engagement measures when it comes to offer socioeconomic privileges to be enjoyed within the kin-state or to grant legal statuses to a potentially vast kin register, while they disburse symbolic and material resources extraterritorially at the kin-geographies. A systematic comparison between cases of ethnic kin-state engagement and expansive kin-state engagement is needed for better illuminating means and outcomes of different forms of diaspora-making. Such studies could also serve as a basis for developing potential kin-state typologies that would potentially clarify and sharpen our conceptual and analytical tools.

Comparative research on hybrid origin-reference states could potentially offer better insights for understanding divergences and convergences in state-led diaspora-making out of migrant
and non-migrant populations in the broader sense. Even though this thesis examined a single case of a hybrid state, it also pointed to potential similarities of Turkey’s expansive diaspora conception with Russia’s policies towards “compatriots” in the “Near Abroad”. While imperial legacies, multiple (religious, ethnic or linguistic) sources of identity for the nation and the state, anti-Western civilisational constructs, as well as expansive political-economic motivations of these two states seem to have parallels, there are also many differences between the two. For one, Russia can rely much more on its military flex and instrumentalise the compatriot agenda for enhancing its domination and hard power, as its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine have demonstrated. Turkey has to predominantly rely on soft power and uses the expansive diaspora for further enhancing these resources. Russia offered dual citizenship to ‘all Russians in the near abroad’ and to ‘people of other nationalities who had some sort of historic ties with the territory of Russia’ (Zevelev 2001: 133), whereas Turkey does not grant substantial privileges and statuses to its broad kin communities, let alone citizenship. Finally, unlike Russia, which is primarily concerned with kin populations in the territory of the former Soviet Union, Turkey has been much more preoccupied with its emigrant populations and provides thus a clearer case of a hybrid origin reference state. Future comparative research could shed further light on potential reasons and factors behind such differences.

In its capacity as a migrant sending-state, Turkey’s closer engagement efforts show similarities to those of Mexico that intensified around the turn of the century (Fitzgerald 2009; Smith 2003a) and led, as in the case of Turkey, to toleration of dual nationality and external voting rights. State-led outmigration of excess labour to wealthier economies constituted the bulk of emigrant populations in both cases. Primarily concerned by national economic development, the gist of these states’ policies had long been based on capturing remittances. In the 1990s, emigrants in Europe and in the US gained new functions for Turkey and Mexico, as they tried to integrate into the political and economic structure of the host-states. The economic contribution of emigrants continues to be a significant motivation for the engagement efforts of the Mexican state. Attracting investments and economic contacts through emigrants are still important motivations also for Turkey, although the significance of remittances has decreased. Foreign political and economic motivations lead both states to devise similar incorporative policies, such as amending their citizenship laws in order to incorporate emigrants, enabling voting from abroad, or establishing official bodies dedicated to emigrants. However, unlike Mexico, whose relationship with its emigrants has
predominantly been structured by economic motivations, Turkey’s emigrant engagement agenda has been largely conditioned by highly contested conceptions of nationhood and socio-political and identitarian cleavages embedded in the historical particularities of its transformation into a nation-state. Although Mexico also has a significant kin population of “Chicanos” living across its border as a result of annexation of large parts of its former territory by the US in the 19th century, Mexican governments have activated this potential kin-state role only rarely and mostly symbolically. By contrast, its imperial Ottoman legacy has enabled Turkey to establish itself as a hybrid origin reference state. Histories of nation-building and their politicisation in contemporary contexts are therefore crucial for understanding engagement efforts directed at not only emigrants but also kin populations.

Turkey provides a particularly fruitful case for exploring the grey zone between both types of “diasporas”. A systematic comparison with other states’ efforts to create, expand or mobilise extraterritorial populations of either emigrant or kin origin might help to identify general mechanisms that a single case study cannot fully establish. But the case chosen for this thesis is sufficient for challenging assumptions and expectations emerging from the hitherto separate literatures dealing with either one or the other type of diaspora making.
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