Europeans
Norwegian Diplomats and the Enlargement of the European Community, 1960-1972

Haakon A. Ikonomou

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization of the European University Institute

Florence, 29 April 2016
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EUROPEANS
Norwegian Diplomats and the Enlargement of the European Community, 1960-1972
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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

**AC**
*Comité d’Action pour les États-Uni d’Europe (Monnet’s Action Committee)*

**ANIC**
Association of Norwegian Insurance Companies (*Norges Forsikringsforbund*)

**CAP**
Common Agricultural Policy

**CC**
Consultative Committee (*Det Rådgivende Utvalg*)

**CFP**
Common Fisheries Policy

**CIEC**
Council for International Economic Cooperation (*Rådet for int. øko. samarbeide*)

**CoE**
Council of Europe

**CPP**
Christian People’s Party (*Kristelig Folkeparti*)

**CY**
Conservative Youth (*Ung Høyre*)

**DA**
Diplomatic Academy

**EC**
European Community

**ECA**
Economic Cooperation Administration

**ECFA**
Enlarged Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs

**ECSC**
European Coal and Steel Community

**EDC**
European Defence Community

**EEA**
European Economic Area

**EEC**
European Economic Community

**EFTA**
European Free Trade Association

**ELEC**
European League for Economic Co-operation

**EMN**
European Movement in Norway

**EU**
European Union

**FCO**
United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**FNFO**
Federation of Norwegian Forrest Owners (*Norges skogeierforbund*).

**FNI**
Federation of Norwegian Industries (*Norges Industriforbund*).

**FO**
United Kingdom Foreign Office

**FRG**
Federal Republic of Germany

**FTA**
Free Trade Area

**FTC**
Free Trade Committee (*Frihandelsutvalget*)

**GATT**
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade

**HoN**
Head of Negotiations

**KEIZ**
Komite für Europäische und Internationale Zusammenarbeit

**LMCB**
Labour Movement Central Board

**LMIC**
The Labour Movement’s Information Committee against Norwegian membership in the EEC

(*Arbeiderbevegelsens Informasjonskomité mot norsk medlemskap i EF*)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Market Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Multilateral economic diplomat (diplomacy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>(Norwegian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>(Norwegian) Ministry of Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoCS</td>
<td>(Norwegian) Ministry of Commerce and Shipping</td>
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<td>MoF</td>
<td>(Norwegian) Ministry of Fisheries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoF</td>
<td>(Norwegian) Ministry of Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>(Norwegian) Ministry of Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBA</td>
<td>Norwegian Bankers’ Association (<em>Den Norske Bankforening</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTU</td>
<td>Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (<em>Landsorganisasjonen i Norge</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Norway’s Export Council (<em>Norges Eksportråd</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>Norwegian Commerce Association (<em>Norges Handelsstands Forbund</em>)</td>
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<td>NCEM</td>
<td>Norwegian Council of the European Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Negotiation Delegation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>Norwegian Employers’ Confederation (<em>Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFO</td>
<td>The Norwegian Fisherman’s Organisation (<em>Norges Fiskarlag</em>)</td>
</tr>
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<td>NFSO</td>
<td>Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales Organisation (<em>Norges Råfisklag</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Negotiation Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>Norwegian Shipowners Association (<em>Norges Rederforbund</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NS-ELEC</td>
<td>Norwegian Section of the European League for Economic Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>Norwegian Students’ Society (<em>Det Norske Studentersamfund</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Economic Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>People’s Movement Against Membership in the Common Market (<em>Folkebevegelsen mot norsk medlemskap i Fellesmarkedet</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCFA</td>
<td>Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Socialist Electoral Alliance (<em>Sosialistisk Valgforbund</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEI</td>
<td>Social Economic Institute at the University of Oslo (<em>Sosialøkonomisk Institutt</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>Statistics Norway (<em>Statistisk Sentralbyrå</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Socialist People’s Party (<em>Sosialistisk Folkeparti</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCMI</td>
<td>Working Committee on Market Issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>Working Group on fishery questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>WYL</td>
<td>Workers’ Youth League (<em>Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTE</td>
<td>‘Yes to the EC’</td>
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Introduction

“We were quite a big clique of Europeans in the MFA back then (...) who had distinct opinions about where Norway was supposed to go when it came to integration.”

September 25, 1972, marked the end of the most bitterly fought political struggle of Norwegian postwar history. With a slight majority (53.5 per cent), those opposed to membership in the European Community (EC) prevailed in a popular referendum, which was the crescendo of an unprecedented mobilisation of voters on both sides of the issue. With the Norwegian ‘no’, the date also marked the first non-enlargement of the EC, assigning Norway a peripheral role in the process of European integration.

On three different occasions the Norwegian government encountered the Community. The first time (1960-63) the hegemonic Labour government was forced to follow as Britain, Denmark and Ireland applied for membership negotiations with the young European Economic Community (EEC) in the summer of 1961. Both the fear of losing out on export markets and traditional foreign policy ties to Britain (and the US) pulled them in this direction. The Community had ambitious plans for cooperation both in the economic and political field, but was unprepared for the daunting task of negotiating an enlargement. The Norwegian government spent most of the first round coming to terms with the fundamental reorientation an application entailed, hesitantly applying ten months after the applications were made by Britain, Denmark and Ireland. Norway did not enter real negotiations until French President Charles De Gaulle gave his first veto to the British, and consequently the Irish, Danes and Norwegians.

The second time (1967), a divided Centre-Right coalition headed by Prime Minister Per Borten from the Eurosceptic Centre Party (agrarian) reluctantly applied for membership a full month after the other three countries. At the time, the EEC was recovering from several internal crises and had lost much of its supranational momentum. Still, the young coalition – which had broken 20 years of Labour rule – made domestic compromises that would have been difficult to uphold in real negotiations (such as permanent exemptions from the Community’s Common Agricultural Policy, CAP). There was great relief, therefore, when de Gaulle came to the rescue with a second veto.

The same coalition would not survive when the issue of membership returned in 1969-1970. The closer the coalition came to real negotiations with the EC, the more internal divisions came to the fore, and in March 1971, it fell apart on account of a minor indiscretion regarding the EC-case from the Prime Minister. The newly appointed Labour Party government, headed by the staunchly pro-European Trygve Bratteli, was clearly in favour of membership. The Labour Movement, however, was torn, and the EC-sceptics were well organised in an extra-parliamentary ad hoc organisation which transcended political divisions. Moreover, the Community’s push for deepening, widening and completion, accelerated the integration project and diluted the frail domestic compromises the negotiations rested upon. The Labour government signed the accession treaty in January 22, 1972, after tough and prolonged negotiations with the EC and other applicants on fisheries, and failed to take Norway into the Community after a referendum eight months later. Fear of loss of sovereignty – deeply rooted in historical traditions, rural population, language and symbols, and effectively exploited by the ‘no’-side – was cited as the number one reason for voting ‘no’ among the electorate. This is a short recap of the traditional narrative of Norwegian-Community relations in the 1960s and early 1970s.

This thesis, on the other hand, investigates the diplomats at the centre of those twelve years of encounters, who worked continuously with the EC-case, and who developed a strong pro-European sentiment: the Europeans. The term European is both a category that this thesis uses to capture this group of diplomats analytically, and a name they used to describe themselves in interviews and contemporary sources. The present thesis asks two fundamental questions:

1) Who were the Europeans? And,

2) How did the Europeans work with the EC-case?

As we shall see, being a European denotes the development of an emotional and professional conviction that membership in the EC is a good thing in itself. But it also carried a certain displacement: the Norwegian Europeans would never follow the careers of their colleagues in the other applicant countries into the European machinery, and in the Norwegian context they would be discursively marginalised. Who the Europeans were and how they worked with the EC-case was determined by their in-betweenness – being a European meant being caught in the middle.

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As will be argued, the Europeans profoundly shaped Norwegian European policy between 1960 and 1972, helping to redirect the Norwegian postwar foreign policy in a fundamental way. They produced an entirely new political rationale, which tied Norway’s traditional Atlantic outlook to the new European policy, and which connected continued prosperity and security to the necessity of membership. Through their work, moreover, the Europeans altered and challenged established diplomatic norms and practices, common in most of postwar Western Europe, in untraditional ways. Due to their personal commitment to membership, they used informal, transnational and non-governmental arenas – particularly the European Movement in Norway – and administrative power and expertise, to defend a particular membership line, which they had been crucial in developing themselves.

Furthermore, they were at the heart of the government and pro-Europeans’ information campaigns leading up to the referendum, and were discredited for their involvement afterwards. The most hard-hitting critique – attacking the core of civil servant norms and diplomatic self-perceptions – was that they were ‘unfaithful servants’, working out of personal conviction, rather in service to the government or the good of the country. Neither the validity of these accusations, which were posed by contemporary EC-sceptic social scientists, nor how the Europeans ended up in a position were they could be accused of this from scholars (albeit in a deeply politicised way), has been properly investigated. As this thesis shows, these issues can only be understood by investigating, first, the deep changes diplomatic practices underwent in the 1950s, 60s and 70s (particularly multilateral-economic); second, the distinct historical and social role of the ‘diplomat’ in the Norwegian context; and third, the profound normative commitment of the Europeans. Last, the Europeans also changed the Community itself. In the negotiations of the 1970s, the most contested item on Norway’s agenda was fisheries. The Europeans created a communitarian negotiation strategy that would, through a string of multilateral adaptations; end up altering the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy.

The Europeans were forged into a community and received their political potency (and weakness) from their in-betweenness: between being professionally and personally invested in the membership issue; their actions lay between traditional diplomacy and politics; their ideas, practices and spaces were constituted between ‘Europe’ and ‘Norway’ in multiple ways, and their ultimate task remained to bridge the division between the two entities. In brief, this thesis tells the story of a handful of Norwegian diplomats who became passionately pro-European in the 1960s, and who worked to get Norway on the inside of the EC – a failed elite, shaped in

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the middle, which nonetheless made a lasting, yet untold, mark on Norway, Europe and the diplomatic trade.4

**Locating the Diplomat**

The *Europeans*, then, are at the centre of this thesis. In order to “bring the diplomat back in” as historian Karen Gram-Skjoldager puts it5, this thesis focuses on two elements. In dialogue with other disciplines, it seeks to understand diplomacy, and the diplomat, in their own right. This means distinguishing diplomacy from, for example, politics, as we traditionally understand it. Since historical studies placing the diplomat at the centre are few and far between, it means that we are also in the business of creating an epistemology of diplomacy and a broad conceptual framework with which to analyse it. Second, “bringing the diplomat back in” means to centre on diplomatic practices; what diplomats do, how they do it and where they do it. The thesis is answering the call of political scientist and social anthropologist Iver B. Neumann: “[diplomacy] should be studied concretely, as a specific practice which is carried out by human beings acting inside a web of historically emergent norms and organizations.”6 The two elements mentioned above are clearly connected and, in some ways, inseparable.

Diplomatic history, and later International History (IH), are marked by a tenacious traditionalism, focussing predominantly on formal functions and powers, interstate bargaining and policy outcomes.7 In this tradition, academics have long taken for granted the classic Weberian distinction between the professional, knowledge-based, rational-legal bureaucracy and the charismatic politician, guided by the electoral process, as an unquestionable and unarticulated division when writing about diplomacy and/or foreign policy.8 Weber argued that a bureaucrat who disagrees with a political decision should nonetheless “carry it out as if it corresponded to his innermost conviction.”9 British interwar diplomat Sir Harold Nicolson

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4 They are, for example, not mentioned in Rune Slagstad’s massive *De nasjonale strateger*, Oslo: Pax Forlag (2001), otherwise a veritable ‘who’s who’ of administrative elites shaping Norwegian society and politics the past 200 years.
in his oft-quoted book, noted that the diplomat’s “duty is to place [his] experience at the disposal of the Government in power” and to “execute his instructions without further question.”

Weber tried to capture the ideal bureaucrat while Nicolson offered a guide to the traits of diplomacy, yet neither of them studied the concrete unfolding of diplomacy at any given time in history.

In IH, taking this distinction for granted has often led to the peculiar outcome that while one may encounter diplomats negotiating on every page, they remain faceless conveyers of national interests. The diplomat is the politicians’ mute henchman, leaving him “an actor without any independent political quality,” ready to negotiate “everything from the price of butter to security and policy issues.” Thus, while many historians implicitly operate with a very clear distinction between the diplomat and the politician – the Weberian distinction – and thereby deface the diplomat, they also portray the two as one and the same – the diplomat being the silent extension of the politician’s reach.

In diplomat-turned-historian Stephen Wall’s *The Official History of Britain and the European Community*, volume II, for instance, the intended subject matter is high politics, but most of the book is in fact filled with meticulous studies of diplomatic practice. Take, for example, this reflection on the famous May 1971 Heath-Pompidou summit, a bilateral meeting between the British Prime Minister and the French President, which in many ways secured a successful outcome to the British negotiations for membership in the EC:

> “The meeting which in due course did take place between Heath and Pompidou has rightly been seen since as a turning point in the negotiations for British entry. But it is interesting to note, not just the realization of the need for preparation, so that a success could be anticipated, but also the degree of contrived theatricality which was envisaged from the outset.”

What Wall notes, but then leaves without further reflection, is a specific diplomatic ‘way of doing things.’ Distinguishing it from politics, he describes how diplomats prepare sites for successful negotiations to take place. Diplomats, in fact, spend much of their time preparing

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11 As Neumann notes, some diplomatic practitioners turned scholars, such as Adam Watson (1984) "understand the work of a state’s diplomats taken together as no less than a state’s 'national interests’" Iver B. Neumann: *At home with the Diplomats – Inside a European Foreign Ministry*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (2012), p. 3. In international history, however, this has led to the diplomat being ‘swallowed’ by the nation state.
13 In *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon and Schuster (1994), Henry Kissinger makes no real distinction between foreign policy, diplomacy or statesmen and diplomats. Diplomats proper are, however, left to carry out the statesman’s orders.
sites: from ‘informal’ dinners, meticulously planning everything from the menu to seating arrangements, to multilateral summits.\textsuperscript{15} Wall, in fact, touches upon how to ‘emotionally prepare’ a site through ‘contrived theatricality.’ Preparing sites, such as meals or meetings, are among the oldest diplomatic practices.\textsuperscript{16}

Another insight one could extract from the book is that the diplomats who prepared the Heath-Pompidou summit by no means acted as ‘mute henchmen’ – they shaped policy. French and British diplomats exchanged notes on themes to be discussed and those that should be left out, decided how many people should be present at the meeting, the order of business, prepared arguments for their respective sides, and shared viewpoints prior to the meeting to assure smooth talks and avoid unpleasant surprises.\textsuperscript{17} They did this in close coordination with diplomats from the other five EC countries while remaining in touch with the Americans and others of interest.\textsuperscript{18} In this light, diplomacy is a “key institution of global politics.”\textsuperscript{19}

This is precisely what the thesis aims at: by shifting the analytical focus away from the state(sman) to the diplomat, it gives agency back to the diplomat. But, if diplomatic practices are of such importance, and diplomacy is a key institution of global politics, why then is it so often neglected? One answer is found in the traditional (self-)perception of diplomacy: the diplomat erases himself. He talks on behalf of the state, thinks along the lines of national interests, suggests solutions carried out by others, facilitates sites where others meet – he is to be a medium, placed between entities to ensure frictionless interactions.\textsuperscript{20} Heroic feats, big words, emotional moments and epic conflicts – all the exciting things when taken at face value – are left to the statesman.\textsuperscript{21} After spending months preparing the Heath-Pompidou summit, for instance, diplomats naturally left the dramatic climax (the meeting itself) and the “wildly exciting” and “historic” joint press conference following the summit, to the statesmen.\textsuperscript{22}

Thus, the fact that much of “everyday policy formation (...) is in the hands of diplomats” – as illustrated by the Heath-Pompidou summit – is easily lost in traditional international


\textsuperscript{17} Wall From Rejection to Referendum (2013), p. 386.

\textsuperscript{18} In fact, Wall spends 21(!) pages on the preparations of the Heath-Pompidou summit without analysing the diplomacy of it. Wall From Rejection to Referendum (2013), p. 386-407.

\textsuperscript{19} Neumann, At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 3.

\textsuperscript{20} Those looking into the diplomacy of the 21st Century still highlight the role of diplomats as frictionless mediators. Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan and Paul Sharp Futures of Diplomacy – Integrative Diplomacy in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, Clingendael Report No1, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (2012).

\textsuperscript{21} Again Kissinger’s Diplomacy (1994) is a splendid example of this.

The seemingly dry diplomatic landscape of callous memos, notes, dispatches and telegrams is mistaken for the simple, mechanical execution of decisions taken elsewhere. However, while contemporary IH has mostly described states’ or statesmen’s rational political choices, it has done so by ploughing through an almost endless amount of the detailed remains of diplomatic practice – the archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs.), the archives of international and regional organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), business organisations, trade unions and many others. All are filled to the brim with diplomatic conduct. A rich variety of archival material is at our disposal, then, but in order to escape the ‘soft variant of realism’ that has underpinned the work of most IH historians (and perhaps also the logic of the diplomats themselves), this thesis draws inspiration and borrows heuristic tools from bordering academic disciplines and other historical fields.

Three sources of inspiration should be mentioned. First, the ‘durosellienne’ history of international relations, in the tradition of l’École des Annales, which focuses on both the ‘forces profondes’ shaping international relations (demography, economic systems, collective mentalities etc.) and the events and individuals. As Gram-Skjoldager has noted, historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle in L’homme d’état dealt with the decision-making individuals, their social background, their ideas and resources, and with how they were influenced by structural forces and with how they were, in turn, capable of modifying and bending these forces.” To understand who the Europeans were and how they worked with the EC-case, we need to map out and situate their social, educational and prosopographical traits. A second important source of inspiration is the so-called ‘English School’ of international relations. Starting out in the 1960s, they were among the first to formulate general reflections on the nature and development of diplomacy, and they placed diplomacy, as an institution, at the centre of international politics. By the 1980s, a third generation of English School scholars had turned increasingly to the social practice and historical forms of diplomacy.

Following the end of the Cold War, which had been dominated by the realist school, more studies started to appreciate the significance of diplomacy in shaping politics and the international arena. Last, there is a broad range of newer studies from the social sciences, and increasingly also history, that combine elements of what has been labelled the transnational or global

28 For a recent example exploring the constitution of world politics through diplomatic practice, see: Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Neumann (eds.) Diplomacy: The Making of World Politics, Cambridge: CUP (forthcoming).
governance turn with a socio-cultural focus on the make-up and changes in diplomatic norms, identities, loyalties and practices. The sociological ‘turn’ centres “the making and shaping of the ideas and norms that inform the ‘rules of the game’” and how beliefs about national identity, ideology, professional roles and much more shape the exercise of power. This perspective therefore removes the strict divisions between formal and informal politics often found in traditional international history, a distinction – as we shall see – that makes very little sense when investigating the Europeans, whose professional and personal convictions and networks are increasingly conflated. The sociological ‘turn’ has also greatly influenced research on institutions. Sociological institutionalism understands institutions as “a web of interrelated norms – formal and informal – governing social relationships”.

Following recent developments in the field of International History, and what has been labelled New Diplomatic History, this thesis studies the social and professional practices of the Europeans as part of an institutional web of norms (particularly the MFA and diplomacy as a profession) shaped by social, educational and prosopographical traits.

What remains is to have a clear epistemological framework to understand the way in which the Europeans produced knowledge. The 1960s and early 1970s were times of profound and rapid change: the collapse of the ‘Bretton Woods’-order, the challenge against established hierarchies following ‘1968’, détente and globalisation gave the latter part of the period a sense of increased fluidity (and for some, uncertainty). However, the 1960s and 1970s were also the years in which the postwar welfare state, and the Keynesian order, peaked. Equally, the 1970s saw a marked shift from government to governance, though as has been noted, this was not as sudden as described by social scientists. Many of these developments had been a

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32 For an introduction, see: Dino Knudsen and Haakon A. Ikonomou (Eds.) New Diplomatic History – An introduction, Copenhagen: PubliCom, University of Copenhagen (2015).
For diplomats, the postwar years saw increasing multilateralization, economification and specialisation, within a growing number of diverse international, regional and non-governmental organisations - developments that challenged former distinctions between domestic and foreign spheres. On the other hand, “the state and its representatives constitute[d] a crucial and persistent element of the postwar era’s international organizational reality”.

In the professional field of the Europeans, both these developments were present, and to grasp this we need to properly situate their knowledge production in this field.

Diplomacy has been described as having a Janus-faced character: one side rooted in the national and the other based in the international. On the one hand, the diplomat represents the state, defending national interests and acting on behalf of the government; on the other hand, he is part of a transnational, cosmopolitan corps of diplomats, with a common set of rules and a deeply ritualised set of norms and practices. As Jozef Bátor contends, the tension between the two faces of diplomacy has been “accommodated through the emergence of diplomats as a specialized group of professionals recruited and socialized precisely into the dual role that the enterprise of diplomacy requires them to fulfil”.

Neumann suggests that the diplomat ‘abroad’ and the diplomat ‘at home’ are engaged in different forms of knowledge production. At the core of knowledge production abroad is the gathering and dissemination of information, the dispatch being the end product. Hedley Bull described the diplomat abroad as someone who was “uniquely skilled in gathering a particular kind of information that is essential to the conduct of international relations.” Neumann builds on this and contends that “[i]nformation gathering is a key category of practices anchored by permanent diplomacy. What Bull describes is nothing less than the diplomatic mode of knowledge production.”

At home, the diplomat is concerned with producing policy documents. Through memos he structures an endless stream of information coming into the MFA – a continuous

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production of text, shaping a response to any given situation. Neumann stresses that this bureaucratic mode of knowledge production socially integrates the diplomats:

“As a result, the writing up of a diplomatic text is not primarily a question of communicating a certain point of view to the outside world, or producing a tight analysis. It is rather an exercise in consensus building. One effect of this mode of knowledge production is that texts emanating from a foreign ministry are all, at least ideally, in the same voice.”

Since this is simply ‘an exercise in consensus building’, he claims that the diplomat at home “when not interfered with by politicians, (...) produce nothing new”. This is fiction, for when is a diplomat at home not in contact with politicians or diplomats abroad? Seeing the two modes of knowledge production as interlinked, this thesis concludes the opposite: diplomats always produced something new. Diplomacy could be described as a ceaseless ‘real-time interpretation’ between the international and the national. It was through such connected practices that the Europeans produced policy and constituted their worldview. Thus, the very core of their diplomatic practice – the knowledge productions combined – broke down the inside-outside barriers.

How are we then to understand the concept of national interests? In the field of diplomacy, Rebecca Adler-Nissen suggests to “move away from seeing the state as a unitary actor (...) and look to those who act in the name of the state.” Instead of dealing with “the peculiarities of some national character”, she looks at “the particularities and patterns of different strategies in concrete negotiations.” In her study of how national diplomats deal with the Danish and British opt-outs in the Council of Ministers, she shows how notions of ‘national interests’ or ‘sovereignty’, and processes of inclusion and exclusion, “are continuously constructed and reconstructed in diplomatic practice”. This move towards empirical studies of practice among political scientists is important, because it is able to grasp the transnational and national sides of diplomacy simultaneously.

On the one hand, therefore, we might place the Europeans within the boundaries of different political entities. Rather than understanding the boundary as a final, thick line, with

38 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p.7. Neumann thus refutes both realist and institutionalist claims.
a definitive outside and inside, political scientist Brian Hocking suggests conceptualising it as a hotly contested area of continuous mediation. On the other hand, as many scholars have made clear, diplomats do in fact act in the name of the state. In fact, very often they are the state, as when an Ambassador says, “Norway believes”. Bátor points to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 as a defining moment when such practices were codified and formalised as “routines for future relations between states”. A consequence of this ‘institutionalised interaction’ – where states categorised their policy as domestic and foreign – is that diplomats (like academics) presuppose this division. And as Neumann convincingly argues, “all people who presuppose this dichotomy, and make it the basis of their actions in the social world, by that very presupposition are reproducing the division between inside and outside”. Following this line of argument, national interests could be studied as historical and spatial discourses that are reproduced and altered through diplomatic practice. This is also significant for the field of enlargement history.

Recent trends in the interdisciplinary field of diplomacy studies enable us to construct an epistemological framework: engaging with the mountains of written material produced by the Europeans related to the EC-case, this thesis – apart from incorporating the prosopographical and institutional aspects – understands their practice as structured by two important elements. On the one hand, a diplomatic practice that ipso facto breaks down the barriers between insides and outsides. On the other hand, a worldview and notion of a professional self that upholds a clear distinction between the two. Analytically, therefore, diplomats could be seen as institutionalised and inbetweeners, placed within the contested borders of different political entities. Only by reading the sources through such a lens may we locate the diplomat as an historical actor.

**Enlargement – entangled and embedded**

To understand what this thesis has to offer to integration history, one has to deal with two struggles within the field: that of its ‘end point’, and if there should be such a thing, and that of the role of the nation state. Unsurprisingly, the two are inseparable.

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46 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 41, 42.
47 It is important to remember that ‘interests’ are historical and spatial constructions informed by norms, identities, and values. If interests are constructed, then it follows that what is deemed to be rational is also historically contingent. Ben Rosamond “History, Political Science, and the Study of European Integration” in Fernando Guirao Frances M. B. Lynch, and Sigfrido M. Ramírez Pérez Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change. pp. 389-404 New York: Routledge (2012), p. 403.
Early integration history had a normative underpinning that historians of European integration have had to reconcile with ever since. Walter Lipgens – first holder of the Chair in European Integration History at the EUI (1976-79) – headed this historiographical tradition. He was an active member in the European Movement, a strong supporter of Konrad Adenauer’s Westpolitik, and a committed federalist. Integration – as federalists generally hoped – was a way to supersede the discredited nation-state. Accordingly, Lipgens found the roots of the European idea within the resistance movements and various pro-European movements of the war years.

As historian Wolfram Kaiser notes tongue-in-cheek, Lipgens describes European integration as the “linear ascendancy of federalist idealism over the nation-states”.

British economic historian Alan S. Milward (who took over the chair at the EUI), however, wanted to kill the myth of the “fundamental antithesis between the nation-state and the Community (...) set in circulation by academic discourse.” Surrendering sovereignty only when gaining support and stability at the domestic level, nation-states drove integration. Postwar Europe’s path was not one of ever-deeper integration, but marked by nation-states “embarking on unprecedented programmes of intervention in economic and social life with the express purpose of shaping and controlling their national destinies”. After a period marked by collapse (1929-1945), the nation-states re-emerged with a conscious policy of binding the electorate to the state once again. Integration preserved the nation-state, harnessed interdependence, and allowed it to support social and economic policies aimed at securing economic growth, full employment and welfare for its citizens. In setting up the supranational institutions, nation-states defined and limited their loss of sovereignty and aimed to preserve maximum national influence for themselves.

Both Milward and Kaiser criticise Lipgens for not establishing any causal links between the ideas of Europe within resistance movements and European movements and the actual setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). While Kaiser, after a rather reductionist reading, scorns Milward for making nation-states the “only relevant and apparently cohesive actors (...) with material interests as the only motivating forces that have

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53 Anders Thornvig Sørensen “European Integration as the Rescue of the Nation-State? The CAP” pp. 85-99 in Rasmussen and Knudsen (Eds.) The road to a united Europe, p. 86.
ever mattered in the integration process”. In Kaiser’s opinion, Milward came close to writing transnational actors and ideas out of the history of integration altogether.

Kaiser does indeed bring ideas and transnational networks back in (as seen in his study on Christian democracy and the origins of the European Union (EU)). Much of Kaiser’s work, however, as Walter Lipgens’ before him, is trapped in the trajectory of its analysis. Both Kaiser and Lipgens have clear ‘end points’. Kaiser’s is the transnational political networks that shape political processes of the present-day EU. Looking through the lens of today’s multi-level governance European Union, Kaiser, and others like him, trace the existence and influence of political networks, informal politics and non-governmental actors in the formative years of European integration. This is a valuable contribution to the field, and an important correction of earlier state-centred studies. But its inherent teleology is reminiscent of some histories of globalisation: it offers another chronology of events, but buys into the same progressive logic.

The ‘transnational turn’ has been one of the most widely debated historiographical directions in the past decade. However, as Karen Gram-Skjoldager and Ann-Christina L. Knudsen have argued, there is a tendency of essentialising the transnational paradigm, much in the same way the nation-state paradigm was cultivated before. Just as Milward, from the vantage point of postwar reconstruction and the rise of the welfare state, puts the nation-state at centre-stage and perhaps marginalises transnational and ideational forces, Kaiser, from the vantage point of today’s multi-level governance, runs the risk of essentialising the transnational networks and pushing the powerful postwar states out of history.

Curiously, the ‘transnational turn’ has not influenced the sub-field of enlargement history in any significant way. Until the 2000s, the predominant approach was to analyse an applicant country’s official policy towards the Community, weighing economic and political

pros and cons, balancing domestic demands and intergovernmental bargaining, on the road towards membership. Whether there was a Milwardian or diplomatic history tendency, the state remained firmly at the centre. The European Community Liaison Committee of Historians is perhaps the most obvious exponent of such an approach, particularly in mapping the two failed enlargement rounds (1961-63 and 1967). The only comprehensive anthology on enlargement, as such, also ends up comparing different member states’ ‘road to membership’. This holds true for most of the literature on Norway’s road to ‘non-membership’ in the 1960s and early 1970s. Inspired by Alan Milward, historian Hans Otto Frøland analyses the socioeconomic reasons for the ambivalent Norwegian policy towards the EEC. Knut Einar Eriksen, Helge Pharo and Rolf Tamnes, describe the domestic political considerations regarding the Community in response to shifting geopolitical pressures, while historians Dag Axel Kristoffersen and Geir Almlid dissect the strategies and considerations of the Centre-Right coalition and Bratteli’s Labour Government towards the EC. Building almost exclusively on governmental sources, they all focus on Norway’s official policy towards the EC. Such meticulous studies of national policies – with parties, personalities, press, public and the past – are valuable as they give detailed insight into both material and non-material consideration of the applicant countries and their day-to-day political struggles. However, they do not, as this thesis does, explore the crucial learning processes between the different


applicants (Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway), or how non-governmental networks influenced governmental policies (for example, the European Movement in Norway (EMN)), or how the Europeans and other civil servants learned and adapted to the communitarian language of the Six through pro-longed interactions and shaped Norwegian foreign policy accordingly.67

Historian Piers Ludlow pioneered a shift away from state policies towards the Community, focussing instead on the intra-Community negotiations of the Six during the first, failed, enlargement.68 Moreover, Michael J. Geary recently offered the first monograph on the Commission and the enlargement process of the 1960s.69 Others, like Emma De Angelis and Daniele Pasquinucci, have offered some of the first enquires into the political and ideational discourses around enlargement within the European Parliament in a longue durée perspective.70 Both the multiarchival and the institutional analyses give important insights to the goals and priorities of the Six and the Community.71 Still, transnational studies of enlargement are few and far between. One of the few explicitly transnational studies of enlargement focus on Socialist party networks in northern Europe working towards the EEC application in 1967.72


In the Norwegian context, historian Robin M. Allers has produced the most comprehensive multi-national, multi-archival and transnational study of the enlargement talks of the 1960s and 1970s. His monograph on the unusually close German-Norwegian ties while Willy Brandt was Foreign Minister and Chancellor, and the implications it had on the enlargement negotiations, brings to the fore the informal transnational network of Social Democrats and personal ties between leading politicians and civil servants in the two countries and beyond. Coining the phrase Europa-experten, Allers also offers the, until now, only proper conceptualisation of the administrative key-role the diplomats played in enlargement negotiations.73

This thesis draws on these less essentialising multi-archival and transnational studies, going beyond networks and personal ties to conceptualise foreign policy formation itself as a transnational endeavour. It places the diplomats and Norway at the centre, but understands its boundaries and recognises the lines between foreign and domestic affairs as blurred.74 Rather than deconstructing or surpassing the nation-state completely, it interprets it as changeable, interwoven with its surroundings, and part of a continuous circulation of ideas, people, goods and institutions.75 Rather than discarding the concept of national interest altogether, it views such interests as products of a continuous interaction between a variety of political entities, both within and beyond the nation-state.

Transnational circulations – renegotiating the boundaries of the state as well as the diplomatic profession – accelerated in the 1960s. However, that same decade also marked the zenith of the postwar state. Crucially, diplomats stood at the intersection of these developments, and were among their most important interpreters. National interests – a predominant concept in the mode of thinking within the administration – were partly transnational constructs. Rather than being fixed and purely material, they were steeped in the ideas and discourses of their time and place.76 Only through such an approach are we able to understand, for example, how the Europeans – following Britain’s first application (1961) – slowly re-interpreted membership of the EC (and its goals and ambitions) as a continuation of Norwegian postwar aims.

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76 Rosamond “History, Political Science, and the Study of European Integration” (2012).
The challenge is to capture this analytically. To overcome the dominant IH approach, and its ‘‘realist’ assumptions about the autonomy of foreign policy-making elites in defining and negotiating ‘national interests’’, Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, Morten Rasmussen and others, have used social science concepts and theories as ‘heuristic tools’. This has been important, as a way “to clarify and discuss the often too implicit epistemological assumptions underlying (...) more empirically-driven research”.77 Or, put differently, to capture and make more explicit the dynamics of political action. ‘Soft realism’ is not enough to master the complex entanglements between local, national, European and international levels – and between the governmental and non-governmental – that were in play in the enlargement negotiations of the 1960s and early 1970s.78 Did the Europeans keep a strict division between foreign and domestic policy or continuously renegotiate the boundaries between the two traditional policy realms? How did the Europeans interact with the plethora of actors involved in the decision-making processes? What kind of traits did the Europeans possess as a group and what does this tell us about them? In what way did the MFA, as an institution, and diplomacy, as a profession, shape, constrain and enable their actions? By using social science concepts as ideal types, such important questions can be addressed with a certain conceptual clarity.

Now, to return to the first ‘struggle’ within the field of integration history: in different ways, both Lipgens and Kaiser – as has been noted – operate with an explicit or implicit teleology. But they are not alone. At the threshold of the economic crisis, and in the aftermath of the Constitutional defeat in the mid-2000s, Mark Gilbert pioneered an important rethink. Scholarship on the EC/EU was steeped in a teleological language, Gilbert argued, with a historical thrust toward more integration (non-integration being hurdles on that path), blinding us to alternative narratives of European integration.79 It was as if he thought the enduring crises since the mid-2000s ought to jolt historians and social scientists out of a long stretch of couched ‘Euphoria’.80

One way for historians to overcome such progressive interpretations is to embed and connect integration historiography with other bordering historiographies. Giuliano Garavini, Wolfram Kaiser, Morten Rasmussen, Lorenzo Mechi and Antonio Varsori have all argued that European integration should be “understood in the context of the political, socio-economic and cultural history of contemporary Europe more generally”. Though this might seem obvious, and in some ways represents a continuation of Milward’s approach, it has invigorated the field of integration history. Varsori, for example, is among the first to embed the post-de Gaulle Community into the wider perspective of the 1970s as a research field, and to connect the first enlargement and The Hague Summit in 1969 with the social and cultural turmoil of ‘1968’. Along the same lines, Piers Ludlow has pointed to the unfortunate tendency of separating Cold War and European integration history, and seeks to reconnect the two in an edited volume on the emerging détente of the late 1960s and 1970s.

The Cold War plays a prominent part in the much of the literature on Norway and Western European integration. Typically, however, the literature explores Norway’s policy towards the EEC in a Cold War context. Specifically, Norway’s reluctance to engage with the continental integration project in the postwar period has been understood in the context of its traditional Atlantic security ties. ‘1968’ also plays a major role in the Norwegian enlargement historiography, but mostly as a domestic phenomenon (with global roots) that shaped the referendum. There is little reflection on how the changes connected with ‘1968’ influenced foreign policy formation, let alone diplomatic work with the EC-case. It is perhaps overstating the point, but realism, geopolitics and statesmen prevail in the foreign policy realm, while all the ‘softer’ factors are left for the domestic sphere. The two need to be integrated: the Europeans’ practices – and thus Norwegian-Community exchanges – were embedded in broader discourses in contemporary Europe. By educating essential elements of the

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82 Part of this literature differs from Milward’s approach in that it has absorbed the call for a less Euro-centric or west-centric focus.


social, ideological, cultural, political and economic landscape of the 1960s and early 1970s, the experiences of the Europeans can be interpreted into this broader context. It is, for example, impossible to understand both the limited popular reach of the Europeans’ dense public diplomacy and the public sanctions they received from EC-sceptics round the referendum, without an idea of the paradigmatic capabilities of ‘1968’.

A second important contribution to this debate came with Kiran Klaus Patel’s call for “a less EU-centric form of writing European integration history”. Drawing on postcolonial theory, Patel wants to ‘widen the canvas’ and ‘provincialise’ the EC (EU). By stressing the exchange between ‘centre’ and other alternative sites as an entangled two-way process – one is able to critically assess and properly place the EC/EU in connection with its surroundings. As Patel argues, this two-way process is important in order for historians to escape the language of success that surrounds the European project. In this spirit, Giuliano Garavini has challenged the myopic narrative of the EC of the 1960s and 1970s by telling the parallel and entangled history of the “births and initial interaction (or lack thereof) between the Global South and the European Economic Community (...”)”. By decentring the EC, Garavini is able to explore the “profound impact” the rise of the Global South had “on the nature of western European integration itself”. Such decentred approaches enrich our understanding of the Community.

Again, these changes in perspective have had little impact on enlargement as a field of research as reflected in the ‘road to membership’- literature predominant in its historiography. The two fundamental questions remain: why did [insert country] apply? And why did it fail/succeed? These questions can be seen as a natural response to enlargement itself: if successful, it entails the EC getting bigger. Also, the structured steps and negotiation chapters that bring the applicants towards membership – towards the EC – characterise the negotiations of enlargements. Where does this leave Norway?

In a strange twilight zone it seems. On the one hand, Norway is marginalised: in the broader literature on enlargement – even when focussing solely on the first enlargement –

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Norway is peripheral, or is ascribed a ‘failure’ narrative. Progressive narratives of integration easily become one of progress or stagnation; integration or non-integration; success or failure; membership or non-membership. Applicants that did not join – such as Norway (or Turkey for that matter) – hardly fit into such a “Christmas story of European integration”.

On the other hand, Norway’s non-membership spurred a rich Sondereveg-literature devoted to the question of why Norway didn’t join. Some focus on material explanations, for example, arguing that Norway’s corporative system, which gave a great deal of political influence to primary economic sectors such as fishery and agriculture, explains the eventual negative referendum. Spearheaded by political scientist Stein Rokkan, others found answers to the Norwegian ‘no’ by analysing electoral behaviour, geography and history. A range of scholars dove into the organisation, resources and connections of the successful “no”-campaign. And several critical and contemporary social scientists dissected the government, civil service and the yes-campaign. To this is added a whole body of work assessing the role of the divided Norwegian Labour Party in the failed campaign and negative referendum. Finally, there are several historical-ideational and constructivist studies. Neumann, in his seminal study _Norge - en kritikk_, for example, convincingly argues that the ‘no’-side won the referendum by successfully defining it as a struggle between the _people_ and _parliament_ for

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92 Dülffer “The History of European Integration” (2009), p. 22, 29. Think for example of the terms ‘awkward partner’ and ‘reluctant Europeans’. They are, in many ways, accurate descriptions, but still leaves out the possibility of the awkward and reluctant countries shaping the EC/EU as something less than non-members. Stephen George _An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community_, Oxford: OUP (1990); Sieglinde Gstöhl _Reluctant Europeans – Norway, Sweden and Switzerland in the process of integration_, London: Boulder (2002).


continued sovereignty, and the state and bureaucracy in favour of union. The predominant focus in the broader and Norwegian literature makes it difficult to see how those on the outside shaped the EC, to understand and narrate the history of the range of ‘memberships’ that have developed since the 1970s, or address matters of non-integration in the context of enlargement. The main interest of this thesis is not ‘why Norway failed to join’, but rather how the diplomats, on behalf of the Norwegian government, worked with the EC-case. There is no implicit ‘end point’ to the question.

This thesis, therefore, contributes to the enlargement historiography in three ways. First, it offers a decentred and non-teleological analysis of a failed enlargement. It is not a ‘road to (non-) membership’ analysis, but deals instead with encounters, learning and interaction. Second, it transcends – or rather does not acknowledge – the apparent division between state-centric and transnational approaches within the field of integration history. To grasp the significance, contribution and working environment of the Europeans, one needs to understand their construction and representation of national interests in a non-state-centric and transnational way. Last, it embeds the Europeans and their work in broader discourses that formed important elements of their worldview: notions of Europe and Norway as historical, cultural and political units, postwar concepts of prosperity and security, and the changing political culture in the 1960s, impinged on and shaped the Europeans’ professional calculations and choices. The third contribution is therefore to bring ideas back in to the enlargement process, not as something abstract or outside of the bargaining process of diplomats and politicians, but as a crucial component of it.

**Approach, Sources and Structure**

As the previous discussion reveals, the challenge of this thesis is to answer the two overarching research questions of who the Europeans were, and how they worked with the EC-case in a way that captures the institution(s) and in-betweenness of diplomacy and the entangled and embedded nature of enlargements. To attempt this through a mono-casual approach is – in the words of George Benson – like “trying to write a love song with just a single note”.

Nonetheless, a singular view of humans and human interaction underpins the entire thesis, which in fact addresses both the practice of diplomacy and the entangled processes of enlargement. This view is best captured by Norbert Elias’ attempt at analytically reconnecting

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the artificial division between ‘individual’ and ‘society’ through the notion of the dancer and the dance:

“One can certainly speak of a dance in general, but no one will imagine a dance as a structure outside the individual or as a mere abstraction. The same dance figurations can certainly be danced by different people; but without a plurality of reciprocally oriented and dependent individuals, there is no dance.” ¹⁰⁰

Elias understands the dancers and the dance as “networks of interdependent human beings, with shifting asymmetrical power balances”.¹⁰¹ This is his way of transcending the “image of man which tacitly underlies many historical studies (...) an image of single human beings each of whom is ultimately absolutely independent of all others – an individual-in-himself, a homo clausus.”¹⁰² There is no homo clausus in this thesis, the Europeans are studied as interconnected, their individuality collectively shaped and embedded in institutions and discourses, and as shaping and becoming shaped by diplomatic practices. With these two insights in mind, the current thesis answers the research questions through a three-level analysis:

1) The anthropo-institutional investigation
2) The discursive framework, and
3) The study of the Europeans’ diplomatic practice regarding the EC-case.

The aim is that the reader gets to know the Europeans and their material, institutional and discursive environment, with each layer acting as a filter through which the next layer can be understood. There are no ‘linear’ links between the three levels, but rather a criss-cross of references and connections that swirl the layers together.

To address the approach and answer the research questions, multi-archival, multi-sited and eclectic sets of sources have been chosen. Unsurprisingly, the most important source to the Europeans’ practice has been the Norwegian MFA’s series (UD) on Norwegian-EC relations. This has been complemented with governmental sources from Norway’s two most important co-applicants, Britain and Denmark. The United Kingdom’s Foreign (and Commonwealth) Office’s (F(C)O), the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) and the Danish MFA’s archives (UM) give us the opportunity to trace ideas, concepts, reactions and shared practices across borders. Moreover, it is true what they say: the FCO’s reports and dispatches are rich, insightful and

full of good gossip. To trace the impact of the *Europeans*, their administrative powers and internal disputes, the thesis draws upon the archives of the Norwegian Prime Minister’s Office and the transcripts of the Government (Cabinet) Conference’s (RA/S-1005) together with the Minutes from the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs (SA).

To understand the *Europeans*’ informal practices and the MFA’s institutional connections, and to map the corporative spaces and the complexities of the information campaigns, the Norwegian Shipping Association’s (NSA) well-kept archives have been of the utmost importance. The European Movement in Norway’s (RA/PA-0092), Federation of Norwegian Industries’ (RA/PA-0636), YES to the EC (RA/PA-0673) and the Conservative’s Political archives (RA/PA-0965), have been chosen for similar reasons. The private archives of Trygve Bratteli (AA/A/044), Per Kleppe (AA/A/079), Haakon Lie (AA/A/053), Per Borten (RA/PA-1451), John Lyng (RA/PA-0672), Arne Skaug (AA), Rakel Seweriin (AA), Terje Wold (RA/PA-1493) and, especially, Halvard Lange (S-6173) were chosen to tie together official politics, informal networks, personal considerations and the role played by the *Europeans*. These archives have been particularly valuable in the exploration of a vast transnational, social democratic network. Both the negotiations and the organisational connections of the *Europeans* have been explored in the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU). The archives of the Commission’s DG1 Relations extérieures (BAC) proved somewhat disappointing. However, the European Movement’s archives (ME), Franco Maria Malfatti’s private archives (FMM), the European League For Economic Co-operation’s archives (LECE) gave glimpses into the Community, and put the *Europeans*’ non-governmental activities in a broader framework.

Capturing the roles, norms and practices of the *Europeans* in an institutional framework, the anthropo-institutional investigation draws extensively on laws, reports, state calendars and organisational maps. Moreover, simple statistics – based on memoirs, state calendars, obituaries and Internet sources – provide an aggregate knowledge of the *Europeans*’ educational backgrounds, career paths and generational traits. For an in-depth understanding of the discourse engaged in by the *Europeans* regarding the EC-case, newspaper articles, dispatches and memos, speeches, contemporary scholarly writings, literary fiction and poems, and biographies and memoirs, have been carefully selected with an eye towards the foreign policy elite in Norway. The discourses have also been structured ‘backwards’, if you will, as the study of the *Europeans*’ diplomatic practices (Part III) revealed which concepts they ‘spoke into’, which in turn informed the shape and content of the discourses.
Last, throughout the thesis, and particularly in the epilogue, oral sources in the form of interviews conducted by the author are cited. Five of the fifteen Europeans have been interviewed. The former diplomats were between the ages of 77 and 92 at the time of the interviews, all of which were semi-structured, open-ended and conducted at the diplomats’ homes. Interviews with many Europeans made it possible to map biographies, practices, work-environments, friendships and quarrels, self-perceptions, personal reflections and personalities, and not least how memories themselves were shaped. The methodological challenge is to analytically capture the Europeans’ memories and anecdotes while connecting them with the historical relevance of the EC-case, in a way that gives a greater understanding of both. As famous poet and novelist Emanuel Litvinoff noted, memory is a literary exercise that “shapes our yesterdays into narrative form, an inevitably fictionalizing process”. In an interview situation, therefore, the historian must be aware that memory is not “a passive depository of facts, but an active process of creation of meanings”. This ‘fictionalizing process’ is continuous: as one moves forward, the past is continuously altered to fit one’s new ‘location’ and this creation of meaning happens throughout one’s life. Moreover, emotionally charged memories, though temporally disconnected, might be blurred together and given “a shared significance”.

Through a critical comparison of various sources, we are able to untangle what shaped a particular diplomat’s worldview and self-understanding at a certain time in history, and how these are interpreted in the present. It is here that the combination of oral history and archive-based history is of value: narratives evident in the interviews – that link events to a specific ‘location’ – tease out important aspects of thoughts and ideas that are nearly impossible to extract from the archival material of the 1960s. In contrast, archival material helps us trace how narratives, ideas, and chronologies are constructed and change over time, how they are riddled with ‘inconsistencies’, and shape present interpretations and worldviews.

103 Europeans interviewed: Eivinn Berg, Arild Holland, Tancred Ibsen Jr., Terje Johannessen and Arne Langeland. Furthermore, the author has interviewed: Conservative politician and Minister of Commerce and Shipping (1965-1970) Kåre Willoch; Daughter of European Asbjørn Skarstein, herself an Ambassador, Tove Skarstein; daughter of Labour Party Secretary (1945-1969) and EMN member Haakon Lie, Gro Dragland (worked at the European Movement in Norway in the early 1970s); and then diplomats Håkon W. Freihow, Thorvald Stoltenberg (also state secretary) and Sverre Jervell.


107 I’m aware of the methodological hazards here, for one runs the risk of reading things into documents from the past, simply because this is something the interviewed person emphasises today. There is no easy way around this, the historian must read both sources carefully, and be aware of the weaknesses and strengths of both.
The anthropo-institutional investigation (Part I) comprehensively describes the Europeans by mapping their biographical, social and educational background, their institutional spaces and roles, and their connections and practices.108 Who the Europeans were, studied as an interconnected whole, rests on the presumption that people change institutions (and discourses) and vice versa. This, in turn, rests on another presumption: individuals and groups of individuals are shaped through practice—one is what one does.

The anthropo-institutional investigation is not void of time, but it studies the formation and composition of the Europeans as a process – in a certain time and space – beyond neat chronology. Processes and connections are at the centre, but not exactly when they occurred. It is a qualitative exploration, which will end up defining the Europeans as a community. The research is based on a set of criteria or key questions109:

1) What were the social, educational and generational traits of the most centrally placed diplomats working with the EC-case?

2) How did the MFA and Foreign Service organise in relation to multilateral economic issues in general, and the EC-case in particular, and who were the most centrally placed diplomats working with the EC-case?

3) How did those diplomats communicate and interact with each other and their surroundings in relation to the EC-case?

In this sense, Part I is a prosopography: by establishing a ‘universe’ to be studied and asking a set of uniform questions, it examines the common background characteristics of a group, and is concerned with connections between individuals in a group. As the individual is constantly considered with reference to his links to the whole, this approach dovetails with the notion of the ‘dancers and the dance’.110 Moreover, by investigating who the Europeans were as a collective, we are able to make sense of their political action and social reality111, and how “they operated within and upon the social, economic and other institutions of their time”.112 This explicitly links the question of who the Europeans were to the question of how they worked with the EC-case.

108 Anthropo in this context means human (as the Greek word), and institutional means both the institution of the Norwegian Foreign Service and that of diplomacy as such.


To analytically capture the *Europeans* as interconnected in the broadest sense, the anthropo-institutional investigation – informed by the inter-disciplinarity of both NDH and integration history – uses a set of concepts from the social sciences as heuristic tools:

- Chapter 1 maps the *Europeans’* social, generational and educational background, uses two sociological ideal type diplomats as distinguished by social anthropologist Iver B. Neumann to categorise the *Europeans*.\(^{113}\) Also, it combines the concept of ‘generation’, as negotiated and fluid, with a discussion of their professional careers, to distinguish the coming of a certain type of multilateral economic diplomats.\(^{114}\)

- Chapter 2 explores the *Europeans’* place in the changing institutional framework and diplomatic spaces of the postwar era, and how these created new diplomatic norms. It rests on the view from the field of sociological institutionalism, that “an institution is a web of interrelated norms – formal and informal – governing social relationships.”\(^{115}\) Moreover, to describe the ‘new’ diplomat that emerged in the 1960s, it draws upon British political scientist Brian Hocking’s concept of ‘boundary-spanners’.\(^{116}\)

- Chapter 3 shows how the *Europeans* communicated with each other and their surroundings by both mapping institutional connections and looking into the mundane practices of the *Europeans* in order to “uncover the systems of feelings” that bound them together.\(^{117}\)

- Last, the Conclusion uses three ideal types of communities - epistemic communities, communities of practice and emotional communities\(^{118}\) – as a way to explore the fringes of the *European* community and, through this, distinguish some of its core characteristics and values.

Part II (Chapter 4) constructs a discursive framework through which we can understand the statements and diplomatic practices of the *Europeans*. The actions of the *Europeans* were not only shaped by their social background, professional outlook and institutional surroundings. They were also embedded in the shifting social, ideological, cultural, political and economic

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\(^{113}\) Neumann *At home with the Diplomats* (2012).


landscape of the 1960s and early 1970s, shaped by the historical developments leading up to it, and the symbolic language drawn from these developments. Part II seeks to “cut into the discursive webs” to provide meaning to concepts such as postwar Norway, continental Europe, foreign policy and national interests, and the EC-struggle as seen from the MFA and foreign policy elites.119

Discourses could, in all simplicity, be understood as groups of statements that form certain ways of speaking about the world, and – since language is constitutive – certain ways of understanding the world.120 For analytical purposes the framework is divided into three parts:

1) Europe as the Other
2) Prosperity and Security and,

Such a framework gives an outline of the ‘legitimate’ normative space for actions – of what was recognised as true or meaningful in a given political arena121 – and gives the thesis a way of relating the everyday ‘doings’ of the Europeans to broad and important historically and spatially constructed norms, identities, values and ideas.122 The approach therefore addresses and gives content to the epistemological solution of engaging with diplomatic practices and national interests. Moreover, it embeds the EC-struggle in broader narratives of national identity, the postwar state and the countercultures of the 1960s. In this sense, then, the thesis also transcends the homo clausus. For while part II outlines the structure of discourses, part III turns to the agency of the Europeans within these discourses. In their diplomatic practice, the Europeans shaped and were shaped by the meanings of the three concepts listed above.123

Part III: The Europeans and the EC-case (Chapters 5-12 and epilogue), makes up the main part of the thesis and is a detailed study of the Europeans’ diplomatic practices as rooted in the epistemological structure discussed above. It answers the question of how they worked with the EC-case between 1960 and 1972. And, in turn, how these twelve years shaped and constituted


them as Europeans. Though Part III has a chronological set-up (1960-1963; 1962-1971; 1969-1972) following the three encounters with the E/E/C, it is also structured thematically. The first section (Ch. 5-7) explores how the Europeans were forged into a community by their own creation and defence of a new European strategy. The second section (Ch. 8-9) analyses how the Europeans became embedded in non-governmental, pro-European networks, and increasingly politicised – operating as boundary-spanners for the European cause. The third part (Ch. 10-12) traces three diplomatic practices that were rather unique in the Europeans’ work with the EC-case, and that broke with traditional diplomatic norms: an elaborate public diplomacy strategy; a communitarian negotiation strategy in the fishery sector; and a massive information campaign, which they took part in personally. The three sections can also be read as (1) How diplomatic practice constituted the Europeans, (2) How diplomatic practice ventured into new arenas and created new patterns of conflict and cooperation (3) How diplomatic practice changed and challenged the institution of diplomacy itself.

Equally, however, Part III is about how the Europeans shaped the enlargement process. With a multiarchival approach combining governmental and non-governmental sources from several countries and institutions, it explores transfers of ideas, strategies, values and norms across political borders through the knowledge production of the Europeans. With this approach we see that not only Norwegian European policy, but also British, Danish and Irish negotiation strategies and the Community’s own common policies, were transnationally shaped through the in-betweenness of the Europeans’ practice and all foreign policy formation. Just as there is no homo clausus, there are no definitely bordered political entities.

Last, the epilogue – based on the Paul Ricoeur’s concept of emplotment124 and Neumann’s three ingrained diplomatic stories of what it means to be a good diplomat125 – investigates how the Europeans created a meaningful narrative from the professional and personal failure of the negative referendum. Drawing heavily on the Europeans’ memories of the past as articulated in the interviews, and tying it in with their anthropo-institutional make-up, discursive surroundings, and diplomatic work in the 1960s and early 1970s, the epilogue is a meta-reflection on who the Europeans were and how they worked with the EC-case. It shows how the Europeans reinvented their diplomatic story to fit the defeat narrative, and discerns a fourth discourse about Europe, born out the Europeans and their pro-European surroundings, which never resonated with the Norwegian public, but which to this day holds the community

125 Neumann: At home with the Diplomats (2012).
of Europeans together.

The study of the Europeans and how they worked with the EC-case offers important contributions to several fields. First, it is the first archive-based historical monograph on Norwegian-Community relations that covers the entire first enlargement, with all three rounds of negotiations (1960-1972). It is also the first in-depth study entirely devoted to the highly contested and influential Europeans. Second, it will be among the first monographs that draw upon important, inter-disciplinary insights from New Diplomatic History to critically engage with integration history and enlargements. It demonstrates that studying foreign policy formation from the diplomat’s point of view enables us to trace transnational learning and transfers of ideas and concepts between diplomacies and polities. Opposite, it will be a detailed study of how enlargement as a political process shaped not only foreign policy, but also the MFA as an institution and diplomatic practices as such. This duality in approach and aim is unique. Third, the methodology of this thesis offers a possible model through which one can study enlargements beyond the traditional ‘road to (non-) membership’ narratives; foreign policy beyond the traditional distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’; and human action beyond the clinical distinction between ‘individual’ and ‘society’. Last, the thesis will combine the ‘soft’ elements of biographies, norms, values, discourses, memories and identities, with the ‘hard’ elements of economic and national interests, high politics, negotiations and foreign policy in a way that is fruitful for both: through the detailed study of the Europeans’ diplomatic practice we see that identity and belief were important elements of policy formation, and that geopolitics and economic and institutional ties shape values and norms.
There were many diplomats working with Norwegian European policy between 1960 and 1972. If we include every high-ranking diplomat specifically assigned to the EC-case, including those appointed to the two negotiation delegations (1962-63 and 1970-72), the Market Committee (1966-70) and the Negotiation Secretariat (1970-72), diplomats stationed in Brussels, Paris, Bonn, The Hague, Rome, London and Copenhagen, and those representing Norway in the most relevant multilateral organisations, we arrive at 94 diplomats. They can all be characterised as experts on European policy, and many of them as experts on European integration. But not all of them were Europeans.

The following three chapters define and investigate who the Europeans were as individuals and as a group. Three questions will be investigated:

1) What were the social, educational and generational traits of the most centrally placed diplomats working with the EC-case?
2) How did the MFA and Foreign Service organise in relation to multilateral economic issues in general, and the EC-case in particular, and who were the most centrally placed diplomats working with the EC-case?
3) How did these diplomats communicate and interact with each other and their surroundings in relation to the EC-case?

126 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Euratom, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Council of Europe (CoE).
Chapter 1

*Europeans – elite and expert*

“They are very much alike. They look alike too (...) because they think the same way, and they had the same wavy hair – handsome men, when they were young.

They were the product of the same political generation, and the same political tradition.”

Terje Johannessen on similarities between Arne Langeland and Per Martin Ølberg

This chapter explores the social, educational and generational background of the most centrally placed diplomats working with the EC-case. It studies who the *Europeans* were by investigating where they came from – and argues that they were understood and understood themselves as elites based on their social, educational and institutional position. Elites could be defined as individuals holding disproportionate amounts of resources within a field, or as having a high position within hierarchical power structures and possessing the potential to shape decisions of major importance. But it can also be seen as a social practice where those belonging recognised and interacted with each other. The *Europeans* belonged to one of two co-existing, and oft-overlapping, elites: the old civil servant families and the new Labour-era top. Moreover, they were recruited to an exclusive and prestigious education – the diplomatic academy, and formed part of a highly specialised group of diplomats: Multilateral Economic Diplomats (MEDs). To their understanding, this was the cutting-edge of the diplomatic field, and MEDs were experts. This layered elitism was important for their self-perception, and crucial for the role the *Europeans* got in the Norwegian EC-discourse.

Last, the chapter shows that the *Europeans* were part of a ‘young war’ generation populating the MFA (1960-1972). This generation of Norwegian diplomats demarcated itself from the previous in many ways. For one, they were much more specialised, and received a far more structured and diverse diplomatic training. But there were other differences too: the ‘young war’ generation was not as emotionally tied to Britain as the previous generation (the so-called London generation). And their view on Norway’s place in Europe was different. On the other hand, the two generations dominating the MFA in the 1960s shared the memories of war, which – as we shall see – deeply shaped their ideas of international co-operation.

Well established and well connected

Iver B. Neumann distinguishes two sociological types of Norwegian diplomats still prevalent in the 1960s and early 1970s based on their social background. The first ideal type was the diplomat hailing from the old civil servant families. The second ideal type emerged with the rise of the Labour Party hegemony.¹³¹

The first ideal type finds its historical roots in the old civil servant families dating back to the Danish-Norwegian union. *De facto* dominated by Denmark from the thirteen hundreds, Norway officially came under the Danish crown in 1536, and became a real union, composing a whole state ruled by an absolutist monarch from Copenhagen in the 1660s. Denmark-Norway endured until ending up on the losing side in the Napoleonic War, and the Norwegian territory was given to Sweden through the Treaty of Kiel in January 1814. In the absolutist era, the governance of the Norwegian territory was done through a group of civil servant families, who increasingly developed a distinct, and later 'national' understanding of politics. From the 1600s onwards a self-aware, self-recruiting class with both the will and ability to administer the state grew out of a heterogeneous group of immigrant families.¹³² These families constituted the state, societal and economic elite of the 1600-1800s. Making up about one per cent of the population living on Norwegian territory, they were the undisputed 'ruling elite' of Denmark-Norway. Typically, they were lawyers, priests, officers or successful merchants. As they made up both the state elite and the *bourgeoisie*, the all-encompassing elite was simply referred to as *øvrigheten* (the upper stratum; in German: *Obrigkeit*).¹³³

With Norway in a personal union under the Swedish crown (1814-1905), in the words of the famous Norwegian historian Jens Arup Seip, "the potential for unity and firmness among a people that was scattered and without tradition lay with one singular societal class, the civil servants of the country (...) spread like a thin film across the land".¹³⁴ Seip maintained that this tiny and decreasing part of the total population, remained culturally and economically isolated, self-recruiting, and largely of Danish ancestry. The civil servant class dominated the

¹³¹ Neumann *At home with the Diplomats* (2012).
government—placed in Sweden—the parliament (Storting), its committees, presidency and commissions, and the administration, uniting bureaucratic implementation and political innovation. Until the mid-19th century this elite was hegemonic, and historians simply refer to the period between 1814 and 1884 as the era of the civil servant state.

From the 1840s onward the monopoly of the civil servant families was gradually challenged and opened up by nationalistic, democratic and later socialist political currents. 1884 was a turning point, in this respect, as parliamentary rule was introduced in Norway: with this change in constitutional practice an accelerated move away from the Juristenmonopol commenced. Following Norway’s independence from Sweden in 1905 and the completion of a national administration, the civil servant elite adapted to the professionalisation of the interwar years, and reluctantly absorbed the principle of neutrality and the apolitical role of the ‘new’ bureaucrat. By the 20th century this segment of society was not a confined stratum, but arguably still a distinct class inhabiting many of the top posts in Norwegian society. It is not surprising, therefore, that many, perhaps most convincingly sociologist and intellectual historian Rune Slagstad, have pointed to the strong continuity between the civil servant state (1814-1884) and the Labour Party state (1945-1981) as embodied by the politically charged civil servant.

Looking to the diplomats working the closest with the EC-case, many of them fit this ideal type. Søren Christian Sommerfelt (born 1916), for example, was of a civil servant family dating back to the early 1700s. He was the cousin of Johan Georg Alexius Ræder – Secretary General until 1965 and then ambassador to Rome – Ræder being from another old civil servant family of German descent dating back to the late 1600s. Following the war he was one of the leading figures of the Economic Department. Between 1960 and 1972 he was first Director General for the Economic Department (1960) and Ambassador to the EFTA delegation in Geneva (1960-68) and Ambassador to Bonn (1968-75). In 1970 Sommerfelt was selected as head of negotiations at deputy level between Norway and the European Community.

136 The term "civil servant state" (embetsmannsstaten) was coined by Jens Arup Seip Fra embedsmannstat til ettpartistat og andre essays, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (1963).
139 Slagstad De nasjonale strateger (2001).
140 Per Sundig “Søren Christian Sommerfelt 1”, Store norske leksikon (SNL), http://nlb.snl.no/S%3C%3Bren_Christian_Sommerfelt_-_1 (08.05.2014).
A more curious example was Tancred Ibsen Jr. (born 1921). He was the son of a famous movie director, and former officer, Tancred Ibsen; grandson of Sigurd Ibsen, one of the founding fathers of the Norwegian MFA in 1905; and great grandson of world famous playwright and author Henrik Ibsen. Ibsen Jr. came into the service immediately after the war, as his mother sat next to MFA Secretary General Rolf Andvord at a costume carnival, and recommended Andvord take on her unemployed son. Later, at the after-party, Andvord called Ibsen Jr. over and simply remarked that he “belonged with us. He is of the family that founded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”. The following Monday Tancred Ibsen Jr. was enrolled as a trainee. Ibsen Jr. first finished a degree in economy (1943) and then a degree in law (1946) and entered the service in 1947. In 1961-62 he was the Head of the 4th/5th Economic Office and temporary counsellor to Brussels (1962-63), permanent delegate to EFTA (1963-65) and Assistant Director General for the Economic Department (1966-67). In 1968 he stopped his career as a multilateral economic diplomat and became Ambassador to Budapest. Ibsen Jr. was a specialist in treaty revisions and worked closely with the FTA negotiations in the late 1950s and the Stockholm Convention (EFTA treaty) in 1959/60.

Tim Greve (born 1926) is a third example. The Greve family had emigrated from the Netherlands to Bergen in the late middle ages or early modern period. His father, Arent Wittendorph Greve, was a third generation Consul. Greve came into the MFA in 1951, and soon became one the ‘young and bright’ people foreign minister Halvard Lange worked with closely. Between 1960 and 1972, he was first Press Counsellor to Bonn (1961-62), then became the secretary of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, and returned to the MFA as Head of the Press Office (1966) and Director General for the Press Department (1967-73). He had a vast network of contacts and friends in many circles and was one of the most active diplomats in the information campaign leading up to the referendum.

With their background and education, Sommerfelt, Ibsen Jr. and Greve capture the roots of ‘old’
diplomacy and the structure of ‘new’ diplomacy that was still present in the Foreign Service of the 1960s and early 1970s.\textsuperscript{147}

The second ideal type emerged with the rise of the Labour Party hegemony (1935-1981). Following the Second World War, and the merger of the parts of the MFA that had fled to London with the government-in-exile with the small remains of the MFA in Oslo, there was an acute need for qualified personnel for the MFA. The Labour Party, returning to power in 1945, was ideologically inclined to ‘democratise’ the Foreign Service. It ran counter to the socialist rationale not to open up the service. Moreover, further professionalisation of the service resonated with their highly technocratic social democratic ideology, building a bridge of continuity between the reforms of the interwar and postwar years. The MFA had administered a Trainee Program since 1922, but it had not functioned as intended. It had been poorly funded, and as a result trainees had to finance their own education until after the Second World War. This obviously favoured those who were well off, and perpetuated the recruitment from the old elite.\textsuperscript{148}

After the war, a new Diplomatic Academy (DA) was introduced, heavily influenced by earlier British and US reforms.\textsuperscript{149} The selected trainees were now given a year of paid training and practical work. As of the immediate postwar period, therefore, “men from rural or working-class backgrounds were accepted by the Diplomatic Academy.”\textsuperscript{150} Thus, in general, more people from the middle and working class, and a greater geographical diffusion marked the Foreign Service of the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{151} Besides the egalitarian aims of the Labour Party, there were also political considerations. ‘Opening’ and ‘democratising’ the Foreign Service was indeed a way of challenging the hegemony of the conservative civil servant elite mentioned above. Many of the new diplomats already had, or developed, ties to the Labour Party. And not a few of them jumped between administrative and political positions. This constituted a well connected, if not necessarily well-heeled, diplomatic type: The Labour-era diplomat.

Per Martin Ølberg (born 1933) was a typical Labour-era diplomat. Ølberg was the son of a Labour Party leader from Lier, and soon formed the Labour Youth Section of his

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{147} Interview – Håkon W. Freihow – 16.05.2013; Lars Roede “Fritz Holland”. SNL, There were many other diplomats central to the EC-case with similar backgrounds. Håkon W. Freihow, for example, came from “a typical civil servant family, where the majority belonged to the clergy”. Arild Holland too descended from Germany, his family coming to Norway during the house-building boom of the 1870s. His father was a famous architect and curator of many local museums in Oslo. \texttt{http://snl.no/nbl_biografi/Fritz_Holland/utdypning} (05.05.2013); Interview – Arild Holland – 16 February 2013.
\bibitem{148} Neumann and Leira \textit{Aktiv og Arventende} (2005), p. 340
\bibitem{149} UK: Proposal for the Reform of the Foreign Service (1943); US: Reorganization of the Foreign Service (1946).
\bibitem{150} Neumann \textit{At home with the Diplomats} (2012) p. 151-154.
\bibitem{151} Neumann and Leira \textit{Aktiv og Arventende} (2005), p. 345.
\end{thebibliography}
hometown. He later became state secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and Shipping for two Labour Governments, between 1976-1981. Ølberg was considered one of Labour Party secretary Haakon Lie’s ‘boys’ – that is subordinates that Lie trusted and called upon to do all sorts of political work. Olberg finished his degree in political science in 1957 and went straight into the service in 1958. He was attaché (1961) and 2nd Embassy Secretary (1962-63) to Copenhagen; Press attaché to Bonn (1965-66); Junior Executive Officer (1967) and Executive Officer (1968-70) and Head of the 1st Economic Office (1971-73). Ølberg was secretary of the Market Committee and member of the negotiation secretariat.

Similarly, Knut Frydenlund (born 1927), from a middle-class background, was both politically active and pursuing a diplomatic career. He started in the Foreign Service in 1952, and was posted both to Brussels and Bonn. His early experiences with political work were as political secretary to Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, and as permanent representative to the Council of Europe (1963-1965). From the mid-1960s he became more of a politician than a diplomat. He came to hold central positions within the Labour Party, crucially as member (1967-69) and later chairman (1969-73) of the International Committee. In 1969 he was elected to parliament and also became a delegate to the NATO parliamentary assembly (1969). By 1970, Frydenlund was one of the Labour Party’s most respected foreign policy experts, and was, among other things, vice chairman in the ECFA. He later became foreign minister in all Labour Governments between 1973 and 1987, holding the position for a total of 11 years. In many ways, Knut Frydenlund acted as a diplomat and a politician simultaneously, belonging to a new kind of polito-administrative elite.

Many of the diplomats working closely with the EC-case, then, matched one of two ideal type elites. Some belonged to both. Thorvald Stoltenberg (born 1931) was one of the many diplomats who became Labour Party politicians, inhabiting a polito-administrative role. Stoltenberg’s family was of German origin and came to Bergen during the times of the Hanseatic League (13th-17th Century), and later moved to Tønsberg, Drøbak and finally Oslo.

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153 Interview – Arild Holland – 20.02.2013. The 'boys' were not confined only to Labour Party affiliates, Arild Holland, a known Conservative affiliate, was also one of the 'boys'.
154 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012; Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012; Redaksjonen “Per Martin Ølberg” http://snl.no/Per_Martin_%C3%98lberg (19.05.2014). He was considered extremely effective, honest, professional, knowledgeable and very dynamic. Some regarded him as rather cold, but he was known as a trusted companion and friend for those who knew him.
It was an old civil servant family, whose members were mostly merchants, clergy and/or politicians (one of which was present at Eidsvoll in 1814 when the Norwegian Constitution was negotiated and signed). His father, Theodor Emil Stoltenberg, was an officer of the army.\textsuperscript{156} Stoltenberg came into the diplomatic service in 1958. He was part of Foreign Minister Halvard Lange and John Lyng’s political secretariats (1965-1970) before working as international secretary for The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (NCTU) until 1971. Stoltenberg then held the crucial position as state secretary in the MFA under the Bratteli government between 1971 and 1972 up until the referendum. Though he did not work specifically with the EC-case while being a diplomat, Thorvald Stoltenberg was heavily involved with the issue as MFA state secretary.\textsuperscript{157}

Looking beyond the diplomats, the quintessential character inhabiting both ideal types was Foreign Minister Halvard M. Lange (1945-1965). Lange – foreign minister for nearly twenty years (1946-1965) – was a highly educated academic and a typical ’social democrat’, well to the right within the Labour Party. Lange’s father – Christian L. Lange – was a famous internationalist politician, intellectual and parliamentarian in the interwar period, and a member of the Norwegian delegation to the League of Nations. Christian L. Lange, in fact, received the Nobel Peace Price in 1921 for his work in keeping the Inter-Parliamentary Union together during the First World War.\textsuperscript{158} At the helm of the MFA for most of the postwar years, therefore, was a man that captured the peculiar mixture of elites populating his ministry. Put simply, the leading diplomats working with the EC-case were either well established, well connected, or both. The two ideal types embodied two kinds of ruling elites that co-existed within the diplomatic service of the 1960s and 1970s.

\textit{Crème de la crème}

An important part of the postwar-MFA was its recruitment and education system – the Diplomatic Academy (DA). The academy was the standardised way of getting in to the MFA: an applicant would be accepted to the program after a set of written and oral exams, and then given a year of education and practical experience with pay. The education consisted of courses in diplomacy, economy, international law, modern history, French and English, and was concluded with a final exam. Following the final exam the Foreign Service Trainees would be placed one or two years abroad as ‘juniors’. The best of each cohort were given the chance to choose where to be posted. At the end of the placement, if considered fit, they

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\textsuperscript{156} http://snl.no/Riksforsamlingen_p%C3%A5_Eidsvoll_1814%2Frepresentanter (15.05.2014).
\textsuperscript{157} SalvesenThorvalds Verden (1994); Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014.
\textsuperscript{158} Redaksjonen “Christian L Lange” http://nbl.snl.no/Christian_L_Lange (09.05.2014).
\end{flushright}
would be hired.\textsuperscript{159} This educational system was one of the elements that set the MFA apart from other government institutions, and diplomats apart from other civil servants. Through the course of the education, a group of individuals would first be forged together by the shared experience of courses and exams, and then introduced to ‘life as a diplomat’ by being scattered across the globe as ‘juniors’ as “a kind of expenditure for the future that the system was prepared to take.”\textsuperscript{160}

Being chosen to the academy, set them apart from others, it marked the initial step towards the development of an \textit{esprit de corps}.\textsuperscript{161} It was, and still is, portrayed and conceived as one of the most prestigious educations in Norway.\textsuperscript{162} Arild Holland recalled when he was admitted to the academy: “well, I applied for the MFA program, and was admitted. It was a feather in the cap, because there were perhaps 150 applicants and only six were admitted. So you felt like someone proclaimed you a genius right off the bat.”\textsuperscript{163} Thorvald Stoltenberg sardonically remarked that there was a certain arrogance on the part of the MFA because it had ‘the divine advantage’ of being the only department with entrance exams. With several hundred applicants, and perhaps only six or eight being accepted to the Academy, Stoltenberg went on, “you’re bound to become a bit haughty”.\textsuperscript{164} Daughter of Asbjørn Skarstein, Ambassador Tove Skarstein, recalled how her father told her that there was “a queue almost out into the streets” of applicants, and how he got in because he had “excellent results from his exams”.\textsuperscript{165} This was not uniquely Norwegian. In most postwar Western European countries, being accepted to the Foreign Service was reserved for the best and the brightest. Describing British diplomat John Robinson’s way into the FCO, Hugo Young asserts, “in 1949, he sat the Foreign Office exam, and was one of eight applicants, out of 400, selected for entry: those were the days when the brightest and the best still saw public service as a career-option of unrivalled fascination.”\textsuperscript{166}

As Iver B. Neumann notes, the cohort and the academy year (class of 1953 etc.) was “the yardstick of how one’s career progresses”.\textsuperscript{167} This process started already with the

\textsuperscript{159} Neumann and Leira \textit{Aktiv og avventende} (2005), p. 343-246.
\textsuperscript{160} Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012.
\textsuperscript{161} On the creation of an \textit{Esprit de Corps} within the ECSC High Authority and the Commission: Seidel \textit{The process of politics in Europe} (2010).
\textsuperscript{162} NRK – Kveldsnytt – 12.04.2014 https://tv.nrk.no/serie/dagsrevyen/NNFA19041214/12-04-2014#t=14m29s (27.07.2015). In this news segment from 2014, typical of how the DA is portrayed in the media, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation talks of the hardships of the applicants, how hard and prestigious it is to get in, and how they have to be the best and brightest to be chosen.
\textsuperscript{163} Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012.
\textsuperscript{164} Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014. Stoltenberg is comparing the MFA with the MoCS.
\textsuperscript{165} Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014.
\textsuperscript{166} Hugo Young \textit{This Blessed Plot} (1998), p. 174.
\textsuperscript{167} Neumann \textit{At home with the} (2012), p. 130.
ranking of trainees at the end of the DA. Based on how they did, the trainees were allowed to choose their first postings. Many of the *Europeans* did very well and could thus choose where they wanted to be stationed as ‘juniors’. Terje Johannessen (class of 1961, born 1936) recalled being “number one in my year, so I asked if I could be stationed in Brussels, because that was the big issue at the time, and I got the posting of course, because I was number one.”

Johannessen, a political scientist by training, was junior attaché (1962-1964) and 2nd Embassy Secretary (1965-66) to Brussels, then served two years as Executive Officer to the 1st Economic Office (1967-69) before he became a member of the Norwegian Export Council (1970-73). Johannessen was a member of the Market Committee (1966-70).

Seen from the outside and experienced from the inside, the DA set the diplomats apart from the rest of the administration and established an internal hierarchy among them. However, even if they were not number one in their cohort, as many of them were the only economists of their cohort, the *Europeans* were needed as ‘juniors’ where the workload was the heaviest and were drawn to the stations where multilateral economic policy was central. Their career paths became increasingly specialised.

**Experts: Multilateral Economic Diplomats**

In the interwar and immediate post-war period, the vast majority of diplomats in the Norwegian Foreign Service held degrees in law, came from the best parts of Oslo or the areas around, and belonged to the upper classes of society. By the late 1940s and 1950s the recruitment patterns had changed to fit both the shifting international environment, and the egalitarian norms of the Labour Party. One of the consequences was a greater variety in education. Together with the political scientists, the economists gradually broke the hegemony of the lawyers. In the 1930s, professor of economics Ragnar Frisch set up a five-year ‘social economist’ education at the University of Oslo specifically intended to meet the state’s need for civil servants trained in economics. In 1947, a new magister degree in political science was introduced at the University of Oslo. Professor Dr. Frede Castberg’s reason for creating the degree was to qualify people “for the Foreign Service and the press

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169 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012; UM GS 108 B2/-17 – 02.03.1966, Brussels – Memo. Norwegian-Danish contacts. Johannessen was very interested in history and came to see the question of membership in broad geopolitical terms as an important way to anchor Norway firmly to the Western camp. Early on he was recognised as extremely effective and laborious diplomat. He was shortly involved in the EMN, and was one of the diplomats who were sent on tour to advice and inform on the negotiation result.
171 Neumann *At home with the Diplomats* (2012), p. 132, 142-143.
Already in 1944, Head of Office Aage Bryn, recommended increased diversity in recruitment and more specialisation during the DA and afterwards. The road was open for a more diversified educational background. As a rule-based multilateral system of trade took shape in the postwar era, the need of the MFA to recruit ‘the best and the brightest’ economists grew.

Eivinn Berg, for example, felt he “very much enjoyed the benefits” of his economic education when he joined the MFA because, “at the time, trade policy was very central”. His career, working with the EEC, GATT and EFTA for ten years straight in Brussels and Geneva (1962-1973) was emblematic for this new generation of diplomats.

Take, for example, Gunnar Rogstad (born 1916). Rogstad was an economist and served as Assistant Director General (1960-65) and Director General (1965-67) for the Economic Department, ambassador to Haag (1968-1971) and director for the Norwegian Export Council (1971-2), between 1960 and 1972. As one of the older multilateral economic diplomats – together with Skarstein and Halvorsen – the younger diplomats looked up to him, and he was known to be an expert on the technical aspects of trade politics. For twelve years, Rogstad dealt almost exclusively with multi- and bilateral European economic issues.

Again, such career paths and specialisations were a general trend among Western European MFAs. Economic multilateralisation and later globalisation turned multilateral economic diplomacy into an increasingly significant factor in foreign policy.

Diplomat in the British FCO John Robinson, for example, was part of a new generation of diplomats, and was “allowed to become a real European expert” by working uninterruptedly with Community affairs for fifteen years in Paris, Brussels and London. Likewise in Denmark, a new generation of multilateral economic diplomats with similar educational backgrounds was allowed to pursue long careers working solely with European economic matters. The

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175 The demand to open up the administration for alternative generalist educations was older. Already late in the 19th century Dr. Sigurd Ibsen had called for an economics and social science education for civil servants. Sigurd Ibsen in Samtiden (1896), p. 205.
Danish so-called cand.polit generation (a degree similar to the master in political economy many of the Europeans held), historian Johnny Laursen points out, shared values and concepts and were among the core decision makers regarding Danish European policy. As in Norway, the new generation of diplomats came to break the dominance of lawyers and was an expression of how the multilateral economic diplomacy gained significance both in foreign policy and domestic economic-political issues. In the British and Danish case, these diplomats would end up with splendid careers in the EC – the Norwegian Europeans would not. As we shall see below, this new specialisation, answering the major shifts occurring on the international scene, also challenged established diplomatic norms.

For obvious reasons the economists became dominant within the Economic Department of the Norwegian MFA and were stationed at the newly created multilateral economic organisations. There is a clear trend if we turn to the education of the 94 diplomats that could be considered experts on European policy. Throughout the period (1960-1972), some 30 percent of the diplomats were educated economists. The percentage of lawyers decreased distinctly from about 40 percent during the early 1960s to ca. 30 percent in the early 1970s. Political scientists made up ca. 10 percent of the experts during the first two rounds of enlargement talks (1960-1967), and they grew to 17,5 percent in the last period (1969-1972). These trends are softened a bit with the inclusion of those posted abroad. Within the Economic Department of the MFA, the percentage of lawyers decreased to some 17 percent, and the economists increased to about 40 percent by 1967. By comparison, the percentage of lawyers in the whole MFA was around 40 percent for the period 1960 to 1964. And economists made up some 16 percent. The diplomats working the closest with the EC-case were a much more homogenous group: counting the fifteen that we will label Europeans, half of them (7) were economists. Five of the fifteen core diplomats were lawyers – three were political scientists.

“[P]artially because they played such key roles, partly because they represented a powerful area of expertise that wielded great authority among politicians and the general public”,

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184 The category ‘other’ remained 20 per cent throughout the period, and consists of philologist, officers, naval officers, a variety of other degrees and those who did not have any higher education. Attachment 1 – Statistics.


187 Attachment 1 – Statistics.
economic historian Einar Lie argues, the economists of the civil service were seen as ‘the powerful servants’. Lie continues, “in the early 1970s these economists were probably also at the zenith of their influence and understanding.”188 Only those who graduated from the University of Oslo and the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in Bergen were generally accepted as ‘economists’. Thus, the number of Norwegian economists was relatively small, and economy was perceived as an elite education.189 Though the number of economists working in ministries increased from around 20 in 1938, and about 100 in 1950, to 257 in 1972, economists were still few and far between in Norway during the postwar years.190 The first fifteen postwar years were marked by an enormous surplus demand for professionals (of all sorts) – which heightened the prestige of economists. The mid-1950s and 1960s, moreover, were marked by a slump in graduated economists. Thus, those who did graduate were even more sought after by the government. Put simply, economists were highly valued and in demand.191

Eivinn Berg and Arild Holland, for example, were the only economists of each of their cohort of six trainees. Holland’s 1953 cohort consisted of four lawyers, one philologist and himself; Berg’s 1956 cohort consisted of two lawyers, two political scientists, one philologist and himself. Eivinn Berg recalled that there were simply too many lawyers and political scientists, and that the MFA hungered for economists: “and that was all well, because there were people from the business sector on the [Diplomatic Academy] board, and they thought ‘luckily we now get a man that knows a bit about the business community and economy’.”192 Equally, Arild Holland and Asbjørn Skarstein both felt to be sought-after, “and especially [for] these giant trade negotiations and such, economists were needed, they needed people that could do the math”.193 The notion that they were better equipped than lawyers and political scientists to handle and understand multilateral economic negotiations, seems to have been quite common. Eivinn Berg reflects:

“It isn’t easy for a political scientist to conduct negotiations regarding customs unions (...) Quite complex issues. Not that I had any particular qualifications for those particular matters, but I had, we [economists] had a lot of international economy and trade policy at the Norwegian

190 Lønns- og sysselsetningstatistikk fr statens embets- og tjenestemenn (Wages and Employment Statistics for Central Government Employees), Annual issues, The Central Register of State Employees.
School of Economics, seminars and such, so I was geared towards following a career within trade policy.”

Captured in Berg’s statement is a duality: he was at once a specialist and a generalist. In fact, 80 percent of the experts on European policy were educated as generalists and 100 percent of the most centrally placed diplomats working with the EC-case were educated generalists. Political scientist Nils Ørvik surveyed several ministries in the late 1960s and found that half of the civil servants in two of the expert ministries, Defence and Commerce & Shipping, regarded themselves as generalists. The diplomats of the Economic Department of the MFA “notoriously the most generalised of them all – categorized themselves as experts!” Ørvik, it could be argued, got the answers he asked for. The question was: “Would you regard yourself as a ‘specialist (expert) on the tasks assigned to your office?’” And this they did, because they were specialised within certain fields of diplomacy, and often certain sectors within a field of diplomacy.

The diplomats considered themselves as experts on multilateral economic diplomacy, and experts on negotiations. This was how, for example, Foreign Minister Halvard Lange often referred to them; this was how they referred to themselves. On the other hand, Eivinn Berg would remember how – during the negotiations in 1970-1072 – they had “loads of experts on tariffs and customs coming down to Brussels” to help them out with the technical deliberations. The linguistic distinction was clear: technical experts (tekniske eksperter) came from the expert ministries (fagdepartementer) and if they were sent to Brussels, it was to have technical deliberations (tekniske drøftinger).

There was a well-cemented perception among the Europeans that they were working with the most important and complex issue of the 1960s, the EC-issue, and that they enjoyed a privileged position within the Foreign Service. This might be another reason why they considered themselves experts: they considered themselves more expert than the Political Department of the MFA. Arild Holland reveals this when he says:

195 Ørvik et al. (1977), p. 97 quoted from Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 68.
“There was the Economic Department and the Political Department. They kept on writing memos on what was going on down in Eastern Europe, and what not. But the Economic Department was the substantial part of the MFA, you know. And as an economist, the only one, I was placed there.”

Holland connected the superiority of the Economic Department with the exclusivity of being an economist, distancing the Economic Department from the rest of the MFA. As will be seen below, this was reflected in their communication patterns as well: the Economic Department was secluded – horizontally and vertically – from the rest of the MFA.

Holland went on to argue that the Political Department lacked the expertise to understand that the EC-case was more than economic policy. As many of the interviewed diplomats recalled it, the Political Department was uninterested, and more concerned with security issues, Eastern Europe, and the United Nations (in what they used to call the “Hallelujah-office”). One can sense the notion of MEDs conducting the ‘substantial’ diplomacy, and a distinct ‘trivialising’ of purely political diplomacy. Terje Johannessen contended the Political Department saw the EC-issue as ‘purely commercial policy’, and “did not recognise that economy, commercial policy, foreign exchange issues, was really security policy.”

Arne Langeland added that diplomats from the Political Department, “couldn’t get involved with the negotiations” as they were too complex and technical. There were only “a handful of people who dealt with these matters”.

Again exclusivity and superiority marks the language. In this sense too they perceived themselves as part of an elite. To their mind they were experts dealing with cutting-edge diplomacy, and the most complex issue of the 1960s: the EC-case. The Europeans, then, were almost exclusively part of this wave of specialisation within the field of diplomacy, belonging to the first generation of MEDs.

The ‘young war’ generation

Most Europeans belonged to a generation that entered the Foreign Service following the Second World War and understood and articulated itself in relation to other generations (notably the foregoing). One of the most significant markers was the aforementioned specialised education and work with multilateral economic organisations. The ‘young war’ generation of multilateral economic diplomats expressed its conscious ‘we’ in a definite junction with their understanding of the preceding generation of diplomats, the so-called

201 Hallenstvedt Utenriksdepartementets (1968), p. 131.
203 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
London generation. However, the distinction made between the two generations was not clear cut: as will be explored below, education, expertise and the understanding of the new diplomatic issues at hand blurred the line between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ generation.204

As the Second World War came to an end, the MFA administration that had operated in exile in London was reunited with the small remains of the MFA in Oslo. The London MFA was sizeable, and in fact comparable to the entire MFA before the war. As it were, those taking part of the Norwegian-London government would play a crucial role in shaping postwar Norway. Neumann and Leira note that “[t]he young men that landed political and bureaucratic positions during the war, could surf the ‘war-capital’-wave for the rest of their lives.” This holds true for the first generation of diplomats in the Foreign Service after the war. It is striking, for example, that all three Secretary Generals between 1945 and 1971 had spent their war-years in London. Even Lange, when he took over as Foreign Minister in 1946, considered it a weakness that he had not been in London during the war.205

The London generation occupied much space between 1945 and 1972. Still, with the multilateral and economic foreign policy developing in the postwar era, and the decolonisation process gathering speed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, new career paths and positions were created.206 What Tancred Ibsen Jr. complained about as being a “definite distortion in the age distribution” leading to a slow rate of advancement in the early 1960s was largely normalised by the creation of international organisations and the disintegration of colonial empires by the late 1960s.207 As the first 15 years after the war showed an increase of 22 employees in the MFA, the next ten showed an increase of 56 employees.208 The 1960s was thus a decade of an emerging new generation of diplomats in an expanding service.

The 94 experts on European policy were largely young adults during the Second World War. Most of them were too young to have been in London with the government. Over 40 percent of them were between 17 and 26-years-old during the war. During the first EC-round (1960-63) some 30 percent were aged between 27 and 36 during the war; this had fallen to just shy of 13 percent in the third round (1969-72). The share of people that were 16 or younger during the war rose from roughly 14 to 33 percent from the first to the third round. By the last EC-round, thus, roughly 76 percent of the experts on European policy were between 7 and 26

204 Derrida “*Différance*” (2000), pp. 87-93.
during the Second World War. For the 15 core MEDs, the numbers were similar, but more focused. For the entire period (1960-72) 73 percent were aged between 7 and 26 during the Second World War. Nine out 15 (60%) were aged between 16 and 27 during the war.\footnote{Attachment 1 – Statistics.} The Europeans were part of a ‘young war’ generation populating the Foreign Service in the 1960s.\footnote{In 1967, the average age of the Economic Department was 39 years, making the average age in 1943 15 years. Hallenstvedt Utenriksdepartementets (1968), p. 164-165.}

The ‘young war’ generation shaped its identity in relation to the London generation. Arild Holland, for example, described the London generation as being too attached to Britain:

“\textit{If you look at the Economic Department and the Political Department after the war – they had all been to London. Ræder, Thore Boye, all of them, well almost all of them. Skylstad, Secretary General for 13 years, he was there for way too long. They were all influenced by the British [and] thought the British had the answers. And that’s why we didn’t wake up.}”\footnote{Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012.}

Holland highlights the Norwegian government’s loyalty towards, and willingness to follow, the British. This was an enduring aspect of Norwegian foreign policy that was challenged precisely in the 1960s.\footnote{Olav Riste Norway’s foreign relations – A history, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (2001).} Holland recalled such generational reflections were discussed and shared in the mid-1960s together with, especially, Asbjørn Skarstein and Per Martin Olberg.\footnote{Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012.} Much in the same way, Thorvald Stoltenberg reflected on the shift from following Britain on foreign policy issues, to – increasingly – looking to Germany:

“To them [the London-generation] Britain was the great power in Europe, and for many of those who still live, Britain is still the one they look to. But the British chose (...) to focus on the Commonwealth. Fair enough, but this compelled the small and medium-sized countries in Europe – in need of a great power to associate with – to increasingly relate to Germany, who, in fact, conducted a small-state [friendly] policy.”\footnote{Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014.}

Stoltenberg’s reflections reveal how generational outlooks were shaped by political realities. In this case, there is little doubt that his ‘replacement’ of Britain with Germany as the European great power was influenced to a large extent by the strong links between Willy Brandt’s \textit{Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands} (SPD) and the Norwegian Labour Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s.\footnote{See especially: Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009).} This coincided with the climax of the EC-struggle in Norway, and

The Europeans’ distancing from the London generation’s emphasis on the British was also informed by an increasingly strained relationship between the UK and Norway within EFTA and, especially, in the EC-negotiations of the early 1970s regarding fisheries. In 1964, following the EFTA surcharge crisis, British ambassador to Norway, Sir Patrick F. Hancock reported on “a crisis of confidence” between the two countries, and that the Norwegian public reactions against the British had been stronger “than at any time since the war”. Equally, the bitter and intense negotiations on fishing rights and fisheries during the fall of 1971 left a big impression on them: “Our biggest problem: Britain. They absolutely ruined the whole thing for us (...). They demanded that every concession given to Norway in the fishery sector, should be given to the UK as well - the EC-countries wouldn’t have it. They said: ‘no way’, and we were left high and dry.” The MEDs dealing with the EC-case’s relationship with Britain was different than that of the London-generation due to specific political incidents, and broader geopolitical shifts. But they came to understand and articulate it as a generational shift, and thus ascribed it importance in shaping their own generational identity. Keenly aware of the former generations’ trust in Britain, Holland concluded: “there’s nothing wrong with it, and I would’ve probably been one of them, had I been in London during the war. Can’t run from your past anyhow.”

The generational understanding was related to the war experience, but also to the specific education of the young generation of MEDs. There was no clear line, and people could be included or excluded from the ‘generation’ based on criteria that had little to do with age. The complexity of the generational understanding of the ‘young war’ generation is exemplified by diplomats Sommerfelt and Skaug, the eldest of the 15 core MEDs and the only ones who had worked for the London government. Søren Christian Sommerfelt, a lawyer by training, had been an attaché in London in 1941 and personal secretary to Foreign Minister Trygve Lie the following two years. Sommerfelt’s admiration for the British stuck with him throughout his career. In his memoirs he recalled their “stoic calm, their incredible resistance

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to letting anything caused by the enemy commove them. What truly made me admire them—as it did for many Norwegians—was the civil courage of the British.”

The second, Arne Skaug (born 1906), had led the Governmental Welfare Office in New York from 1942 and been Economic Counsellor to Washington from 1943. Skaug was one of three Norwegian representatives at the Bretton Woods conference. In 1944 he came to London to work for the Ministry of Supply. Skaug was one of the most promising economic academics in Norway, but after the Second World War he became increasingly involved in politics (Labour) and in the emerging multilateral economic diplomacy of OEEC. Skaug was Minister of Commerce and Shipping for three consecutive Labour governments (1955-62); and Ambassador to London (1962-68) and to Copenhagen (1968-74). He was also a member of the first negotiation delegation (1962-63). Both, in a way, approached the task of Norwegian membership in the EC slightly differently than their younger colleagues.

Sommerfelt was chief negotiator, at the deputy level, setting up EFTA. He was one of the strongest proponents of EFTA as a permanent solution, and afterwards a common EFTA approach towards the Community in the early 1960s. It was not until later that he abandoned this view. But he was also perceived differently. Some of the younger diplomats viewed him as an ‘old school’ diplomat. By this, it seems, they meant two things: that he was a ‘lord-like’ character who wanted to play a leading role in the negotiations and fix things through heroic feats of diplomacy. This did not square with the nitty-gritty of multilateral economic diplomacy, which left little room for heroism. But they also meant that he was not an expert on multilateral economic issues. This opinion, shared by many of the younger MEDs, consisted of subtle generational considerations: Sommerfelt was a lawyer by training, not an economist. He could thus easily be interpreted as being part of the older, lawyer-dominated, generation—not sufficiently equipped for the challenges of GATT, EEC and EFTA.

During interviews, both Berg and Holland juxtaposed Sommerfelt and Halvorsen/Skarstein.

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223 Bjerkholt, Olav. “Arne Skaug – utdypning”. SNL, http://www.snl.no/.nbl_biografi/Arne_Skaug/utdypning (01.05.2013); FCO 9/700 – 25.06.1968, London – A. E. Davidson, Central Department - Norway. Background Note; FCO 9/700 – Mr. Arne Skaug; Olav Bjerkholt Kunnskapers Krev – Om opprettelsen av Forskningsavdelingen i Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Sosiale og økonomiske studier, Oslo/Kongsvinger: Statistisk Sentralbyrå (2000). Arne Skaug came from a middle-class family, his father a businessman. Skaug was known as a though negotiator, serious and knowledgeable, and a great orator. As the British FCO noted: “He is a skilled economist with an unusually wide experience of the work of international economic bodies. He is a strong supporter of NATO and of the Western connection generally. He tends to become emotional when he feels that Norway’s interests are being overlooked.”
Berg described Sommerfelt as a “driving” negotiator, but Halvorsen as the real expert, the one who “knew the EC”.\textsuperscript{225} Equally, Holland described Sommerfelt as a “tough” and “difficult” negotiator, but went on to opine, “he didn’t know anything about the EC”.\textsuperscript{226} Sommerfelt had, so Holland claims, to lean on Skarstein and himself for the real expertise.\textsuperscript{227} This could, however, just as easily be interpreted as an educational distinction: since Skarstein, Halvorsen, Berg and Holland were economists, Sommerfelt – as a lawyer – was not deemed a ‘real expert’ on multilateral economic negotiations. A third aspect could be that Sommerfelt, as opposed to those from the ‘young war’ generation, had not gone through the new DA. As seen above, the academy programme was essential in creating an \textit{esprit de corps} among the new generation of diplomats. This set them apart, not only from other ministries, but also from earlier generations of diplomats within the MFA. Most likely, these views on Sommerfelt reflect generational, educational and personal divisions, and show how they were all intertwined.\textsuperscript{228}

Arne Skaug, too, approached the EC-question slightly differently than his younger colleagues. Skaug, together with Erik Brofoss, was the most predominant politician and civil servant shaping Norway’s external economic policy between 1947 and 1962.\textsuperscript{229} He was initially an academic, one of the brightest and best students of economy under famous Norwegian economist Ragnar Frisch at the University of Oslo in the interwar years.\textsuperscript{230} Following the Second World War he became the director of the influential \textit{Statistics Norway} (SN), one of the main hubs of economic knowledge production for the new social democratic order. Skaug saw the new generation of economists as the state’s ‘social entrepreneurs’, uniting science and society in a higher order – the modern mixed-economy welfare state. As director of \textit{Statistics Norway}, he increasingly represented the government at international economic conferences. Skaug took part in the Geneva conference in 1947, negotiating the establishment of an international trade organisation and the following tariff talks; the Havana conference of 1947-48; and all meetings and negotiations concerning the Marshall plan during the first Paris conference in July 1947. He was subsequently appointed as state secretary to the MFA and in May 1948 he was made minister, and later Ambassador, to

\textsuperscript{225} Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012.
\textsuperscript{226} This is clearly an exaggeration.
\textsuperscript{227} Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012; Interview – Tove Skarstein – 16.04.2014. Asbjørn Skarstein’s daughter, Tove Skarstein (also diplomat), recalls conversations at home about it being “unfair and bitter that my father did all the work, and that Søren [Chr. Sommerfelt] as negotiation leader took all the credit”
\textsuperscript{228} Neumann \textit{At home with the} (2012), p. 150; Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014.
\textsuperscript{229} Eriksen and Pharo \textit{Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering} (1997), p. 345.
\textsuperscript{230} He received a Rockefeller Foundation Grant and exchanged to the US and to London School of Economics.
Norway’s permanent representation to the OEEC (1949) and the North Atlantic Council (1952) in Paris.\footnote{Bjerkholt Kunnskapens Kraw (2000), p. 15, 27-31, 63, 67.}

In 1955, Skaug was summoned to take over for Erik Brofoss as Minister of Commerce and Shipping. Labour Party secretary Haakon Lie and Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen both thought Skaug would strengthen the newly elected third Gerhardsen government. Skaug was initially unwilling to take the job, but eventually gave in after persistent courtship and pressure by party secretary Lie. Gerhardsen wanted Skaug for the post due to his excellent track record as an economist and social entrepreneur; Lie required Skaug because of his undying support of Western cooperation in general, and NATO in particular.\footnote{Hans Olav Lahlum Haakon Lie – Historien, mytene og mennesket, Oslo: Cappelen Damm (2010), p. 349.} This made him prone, as much of the Labour Party leadership, to prefer Atlantic solutions to international economic problems. He was a strong supporter of OEEC, and later OECD, as a framework for future economic cooperation. Similarly, as chief negotiator at the ministerial level, he became Norway’s strongest proponent of the eventually failed Free Trade Area (FTA, 1956-1958).\footnote{Eriksen and Pharo Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering (1997), p. 296.}

Even after the first British application for membership (1961), Skaug still considered a joint OECD solution to the market schism in Europe the best answer. As a result, the younger Europeans also perceived Skaug slightly differently. In short, he was seen as being above them and a part of them. Tancred Ibsen Jr., during his OEEC-years in Paris, remembered Skaug as “hovering in the background”. Skaug was, to his mind, the minister “coming down every now and again”.\footnote{Interview – Tancred Ibsen Jr. – 23.11.2013.} Similarly, Arne Langeland, during his OEEC-years, described Arne Skaug simply as “the big boss”.\footnote{Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.} As a leading Labour Party politician and member of another generation, Skaug was viewed as a superior rather than a co-worker, at least in the 1950s. On the other hand, both Eivinn Berg and Arne Langeland consistently described Skaug as a professional (diplomat) – he was one of them.\footnote{Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012.} Even in his days as Minister of Commerce and Shipping, he was seen as an expert on multilateral economic diplomacy. In contrast, Langeland described O. C. Gundersen, who took over the Ministry after Skaug, as a ‘typical Labour Party politician’.\footnote{Sommerfelt Sendemann (1997), p. 74; Interview – Arne Langeland – 22.01.2010.}

Berg and Langeland considered Skaug similar to them because he was a politician that also filled the role of diplomat and expert. But it was also due to his particular education and his postings – he too was an expert in multilateral economic diplomacy in a way the ‘previous’
generation could not match. Such interpretations reveal the fluent, discursively negotiated and renegotiated, borders between the two generations, and that education was a crucial component. However, we should not exaggerate the divisions between the two generations: both had first-hand experiences and memories of the Second World War, both were instrumental in the postwar reconstruction of Norwegian society, and both would have much more trouble in understanding the next generation that would rebel in the late 1960s.

**Concluding remarks**

The social, educational and generational background of those working the closest with the EC-case criss-crossed to create a layered pattern of elitism. Many had ties back to the old civil servant or newer Labour Party elite. Such ties denoted status and echoed their high institutional position within the MFA and administration in general – status often facilitated position. Beyond the prestige of belonging to the few chosen for the diplomatic trait, the *Europeans* were part of a certain segment of diplomats: the MEDs. They defined themselves as apart from and above other diplomats through educational, career and generational markers. Without being too categorical, it seems a background in economics and/or belonging to the younger generation that had gone through the DA was particularly important. To this was added the long, almost exclusive, careers within multilateral economic diplomacy rendering them experts (as well as generalists). Their self-perception as ‘something new’ was often articulated in a generational language that perhaps concealed a much more complex set of ruptures and continuities. That they had a different view on Britain than the previous generation, for example, had more to do with their concrete experience of the EC-case and the decline of Britain, than anything inherent in the new generation of diplomats. Still, the *Europeans* did mostly belong to a new generation of diplomats who perceived themselves and were perceived by others as both elite and expert in a distinct way – a notion that would play a very important part in the emotional EC-struggle.
Chapter 2

Europeans – in a changing diplomacy

“You know they talk of politicians being in charge, they come marching in, and they talk as if the administration doesn’t exist – 80 per cent of all decisions made, at least, come from us.”

Arne Langeland’s slightly exaggerated claim to decision-making power

One of the trademarks of the postwar era – between 1945 and 1973 – was the development of a rule-based multilateral system of trade, built on a network of arrangements, such as GATT, OEEC (OECD), EC and EFTA. Norway became deeply embedded in this system, starting with the Labour Party’s reluctant acceptance of the Marshall Aid. As these new international and regional organisations came into existence, following the Second World War, the responsibilities of the MFA and Foreign Service grew. As Western European postwar MFAs responded to the changing patterns of economic, technical and political cooperation, the boundaries of foreign policy, and with them, the role of diplomacy, were glacially shifting.

The Norwegian MFA and Foreign Service responded to these structural changes by mapping its institutional adaptation, also in relation to the EC-case, which created new spaces of interaction, roles and patterns of co-operation within the Norwegian administration. As exemplified by leading multilateral economic diplomats (MEDs) who worked with the EC-case, these structural changes and organisational adaptations challenged the traditional role of the diplomat. The Norwegian MFA’s adaptation to the growing multilateralisation and economification of foreign policy blurred the borders between foreign and domestic politics, bureaucracy and politics, and between governmental and non-governmental actors and arenas. In tracking down who the Europeans were, we see that they were among the centrally placed MEDs whose role changed from a traditional Weberian gate keeper to that of a boundary spanner with a significantly altered potential to create foreign policy. Without recognising this new diplomatic role, it is difficult to understand how the Europeans worked with the EC-case, and how this in turn put them on a collision course with a critical press and those opposed to membership in parliament and public.

238 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
Institutional Adaptation

While the Foreign Service changed, its relatively strict functional division remained, which helps us understand how only a handful of MEDs actually ended up working with the EC-case. Shortly after the Second World War, the Foreign Service in its entirety underwent a thorough revision by the so-called Reform Committee of 1946. The newly appointed Foreign Minister Lange believed that the experiences of the war had revealed the necessity for an “alert and vigorous Foreign Service”.242 An updated version of this law was adopted in 1958, but the organisational and administrative framework remained largely the same.243

As seen in the organisational map of the MFA between 1960 and 1972244, the core of the institution remained relatively stable. At the same time, the MFA adapted according to an east-west axis, focusing on security and defence policy, a western and increasingly global development of economic multilateralism, and from the mid-1960s onwards along a north-south axis focussing on economic assistance and aid. Moreover, the combination of a

242 Kolsrud Rekonstruksjon og reform (2008), p. 171. The restructuring of its system of recruitment, organisation and aims was finalised with the new Law for the Foreign Service of 13th December 1948.
flourishing cultural diplomacy and a growing interest from the press in foreign policy meant that a distinct press service took shape. What marked the Norwegian MFA and Foreign Service of the postwar era, as so many other Western European MFAs, was a combination of institutional consistency and flexibility, but first and foremost growth.245

The MFA at home was divided into departments with a particular area of responsibility (Fig. 1), and it was the Economic Department that had the overall responsibility of the EC negotiations.246 Between 1960 and 1972 four men held the position of Director General, heading the Economic Department: Søren Christian Sommerfelt (1956-1960)247, Jahn Halvorsen (1960-1965)248, Gunnar Rogstad (1965-1967)249, and Asbjørn Skarstein (1967-1973). Together with Halvorsen, Skarstein would be the most influential Director General working with the EC-case.

Asbjørn Skarstein (born 1922), an economist with a background in banking who joined the MFA in 1948, was a highly respected specialist on multilateral economic diplomacy, and a skilled and popular mentor for many of the younger MEDs. Between 1960 and 1972 he was Counsellor to the EFTA delegation in Geneva (1960-61) and Brussels (1962-65); Assistant Director General (1965-67) and Director General (1967-73) for the Economic Department and member of the Market Committee and both negotiation delegations (1962-63 and 1970-72). Skarstein was among the earliest to realise that Norway needed to apply for membership, and became one of the most enthusiastic pro-Europeans in the service.250

A closer look reveals several important institutional adaptations in response to the EC-case. The Economic Department, established in 1934, was divided into six offices between 1960 and 1972, each led by a Head of Office who reported directly to the Director General.251 Each office’s responsibility was based on a mixture of geographical and field criteria.

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246 The Secretary General was the highest-ranking permanent administrative leader at home.

247 After being the chief negotiator at the deputy level in the EFTA negotiations, he was moved to Geneva as ambassador to its permanent delegation.

248 From 1965 to 1973 he was ambassador to Brussels, with the dual responsibility for Belgium and the European Communities.

249 From 1967 he landed the position as Ambassador in The Hague.


251 From 1957 onwards, it became increasingly common to have an Assistant Director General placed ‘between’ the Deputy General and the Head of Office. Neumann and Leira Aktiv og avventende (2005), p. 314.
Fig. 252 – depicting the various offices responsible for EC-matters between 1960-1972 – captures both the rigidity and flexibility of the MFA. Until March 1962 – one month before the Storting voted in favour of an application for membership in the EEC – the 4th Economic Office had a wide range of responsibilities. The EEC was listed together with EFTA, OEEC, economic matters within NATO, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which reflects the government’s aim of finding a broad Atlantic solution to the market challenges (or its lack of direction). The 5th Economic Office, responsible for EC-matters from March 1962 until 1966, was more focused, with a narrower field of responsibility. It also incorporated the ongoing GATT-negotiations (the Kennedy round). Lastly, the 1st Economic Office was narrower still in its focus. Significantly, the bit “including Nordic” was added in the 1969 description. This was due to the on-going Nordek-negotiations (1968-1970) for a Nordic customs union.

Also, by 1968, EFTA was delinked from EC-matters and placed in a separate office – a late, though revealing, recognition of EFTA’s dwindling importance.

Each office, then, had clearly specified assignments. The dossier in the MFA archives following the EC-case throughout the 1960s and early 1970s reveals how rigidly this division of labour was followed: it was almost exclusively the 4th, 5th and 1st Economic Office, respectively, that dealt with EC matters. The Administrative, and especially the Press and Legal Department would be involved, but only on an ad hoc basis concerning their highly specific area of expertise. Six Heads of Office were in charge of the office dealing with EC-matters between 1960 and 1972. Of these, four were significant contributors to the shaping of Norwegian European policy: Tancred Ibsen Jr. (1961-62); Arne Langeland (1962-65); Arild Holland (1967-70); Per Martin Ølberg (1971-73). And, of these four, two could be described as fundamental drivers and designers of Norwegian European Policy in the 1960s and early 1970s, namely Arne Langeland and Arild Holland.

Arne Langeland (born 1928), a trained lawyer entering the service in 1954, was initially the only official specifically placed to follow EC-matters, as an Executive Officer and later Higher Executive Officer in early 1961, and arguably the first diplomat who reported that Britain contemplated membership negotiations with the EEC. He was then Head of Office in the crucial years from 1962 to 1965, becoming a leading member of the first negotiation delegation, organising much of the apparatus, as well as developing large parts of its tactics (1962-63). Between 1965 and 1970 he was Counsellor at the permanent delegation to EFTA in Geneva (1965-70). Langeland was strongly in favour of membership from the minute Britain applied, and was one of the few diplomats that wrote about, and actively engaged with, the public during the first round of membership debates.

Arild Holland (born 1926) was an economist, and entered the service in 1953. Between 1960 and 1972, he was first embassy secretary at the permanent delegation to EFTA in Geneva (1961-63); Executive Officer (1964-65); Head of 5th Economic Office (GATT and EFTA, 1966) and Head of 1st Economic Office (EC, 1967-70); and then Assistant Director

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253 Hallenstvedt Utenriksdepartementets (1968), p. 85. This was a way of assigning accountability.
254 UD 44.36/6.84 – Norway. Relationship with the EEC.
255 Under the position of Head of Office followed, respectively, the Higher Executive Officers, Executive Officers, Junior Executive Officers and Secretaries (I and II). The Higher Executive Officers and Executive Officers usually had a speciality or area of expertise, and followed specific issues or cases. The Norwegian word for these positions was ‘førstekonsulent’ and ‘konsulent’, i.e. first consultant and consultant.
General of the Economic Department (1971-73). As member of the Market Committee (1966-1972) and the negotiation secretariat (1970-72), Holland was ‘at home’ for an unusually long period of time and became one of the leading experts and organisers of the EC negotiations from Oslo. Unafraid of confrontation, he was also one of the strongest supporters of diplomats actively informing the public prior to the referendum.258

There was, one could say, a striking degree of consistency in the MFA’s organisational structure: offices might be given new instructions, or would sometimes be opened or closed down, but the elementary parts would remain unaltered. As will be seen below, the trend towards increased specialisation, and different recruitment patterns, was a response to multilateralisation, economification and decolonisation—a gradual adaptation to changing circumstances.259 However, the MFA as an institution also changed dramatically. This happened in the ‘outer’ parts of the MFA apparatus: the elements connecting it with the international environment (embassies, permanent delegations, consulates etc. i.e. the Foreign Service Missions) and with the domestic environment (committees, councils, boards etc.). Most Western European ministries responded similarly. All four applicants for membership in the EEC (the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway), for example, managed what amounted to a lasting blurring of domestic and foreign policy by bringing domestic actors onto the international scene and by inviting themselves into the domestic arenas.260

As a response to the explosive growth in international and regional organisations, Missions traditionally assigned the responsibility of one or more countries would be given the additional task of managing relations with an organisation.261 The Ambassador to Brussels, Nils Anton Jørgensen (1959-1965), for instance, was appointed as Norway’s permanent representative to EURATOM and EEC (1960), and the ECSC (1962).262

Brussels, of course, developed into the most important hub of communication regarding the EC-case. Britain’s first application (summer 1961), however, caught the government off guard. Until the UK application, the MFA had placed its most trusted MEDs in either Paris

258 Arild Holland "Utenriktstjenestens historie" Unpublished memoires Oslo (1997); Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012; Interview – Arne Langeland – 22.01.2010. He was known as competitive, energetic, somewhat impatient, candid and enthusiastically engaged in the EC-case.
262 UD 44.36/6.84 B.-1 – 04.06.1963, Oslo – Dear Andreas, Halvard Lange.
(OEEC) or Geneva (EFTA). Ambassador Jørgensen, though a respected diplomat with a long career behind him, was close to retirement and dispassionate towards multilateral economic policy. Accordingly, not long after Britain applied, Asbjørn Skarstein was transferred from Geneva to Brussels, and soon became chargé d’affaires of all EEC matters.263

Jahn Halvorsen (born 1916), after serving as Director General of the Economic Department for five years, followed Jørgensen as ambassador to Brussels (1965-1973). In Brussels he soon became well connected, close with the corps of permanent representatives, and an important asset for the government in the membership negotiations.264 Together with Skarstein and Langeland, he was one of the first diplomats to become convinced of the necessity of a Norwegian membership in the Community, and later became an ardent pro-European “burning almost religiously for the cause”.265 Halvorsen, and economist by training, was seen as one of the leading MEDs, and his opinion was respected throughout the ministry.266

Increasingly, though, international and regional organisations were not covered by embassies but represented through permanent delegations. With the creation of EFTA, for instance, Norway placed a permanent delegation consisting of three to five diplomats at its headquarters in Geneva (1960-1972).267 Between 1960 and 1968, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt was ambassador to Geneva and permanent representative not only to EFTA, but also the United Nations European Office and other international organisations. On the domestic front, a host of corporative and cross-departmental committees were created, as foreign policy and domestic policy intertwined. For instance, The Committee for matters concerning the Free Trade Association and Nordic Economic Cooperation (The Free Trade Committee, FTC), set up by the Gerhardsen Government in 1960, was a direct response to the creation of EFTA, but came to serve as a general advisory body on foreign economic issues.268 Through the committee, officials from several ministries were linked to foreign policy issues, and MFA officials became involved in domestic policies. A decision made in the Free Trade Committee, therefore, signified a broad, and cross-departmental, agreement within the administration.

266 Aftenposten – 15.05.1976, Jahn Halvorsen, by Helge Seip. Helge Seip (Liberal), who studied economy together with Halvorsen, wrote of him in his obituary: “He had the entire register, from thorough knowledge of the most serious problems of professional and personal character, and a great ability to assess independently in different situations, to the jester’s joy of celebration in good company.”
268 The Free-Trade Committee was cross-departmental and corporative; Director Generals from the Ministries of Commerce and Shipping (MoCS), Agriculture (MoA), Industry (MoI), Finance (MoF) and Foreign Affairs, and representatives from the business sector, met to discuss and decide on international economic matters. The MFA was represented by whoever was the Director General of the Economic Department.
With such an agreement, further work with the issue was backed by a united milieu of experts.\textsuperscript{269} The FTC was crucial during the first application and negotiation round with the EC (1961-63), but afterwards its significance faded.

Another important cross-departmental committee was the Council for International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), headed by the Minister of Commerce and Shipping.\textsuperscript{270} As with the FTC, the Director General of the Economic Department represented the MFA together with the Head of Office from the office concerned. Its significance fluctuated greatly, depending on the Minister in charge. Arne Skaug (Labour, 1955-62) was very fond of using CIEC as an arena to discuss EC-matters; O. C. Gundersen (Labour, 1962-63), who replaced Arne Skaug, however, did not make much use of it\textsuperscript{271}, and it was a ‘sleeping’ body until Kåre Willoch (Conservative, 1965-70) took over and revived it in 1965.\textsuperscript{272}

A third, cross-departmental committee of importance was the so-called Market Committee, established in March 1966.\textsuperscript{273} Foreign Minister John Lyng (Conservative, 1965-70) proposed the creation of the Committee with the task of preparing material on the developments of the Community and updated analyses of Norway’s relationship with the EC.\textsuperscript{274} Unlike similar committees, the Prime Minister Office headed it, through state secretary Emil Vindsetmo.\textsuperscript{275} Among its most central MFA-members were Asbjørn Skarstein, Arild Holland, Per Martin Ølberg and Terje Johannessen. Holland and Ølberg stayed throughout the period, while Johannessen was moved to the Norwegian Export Council from 1970.\textsuperscript{276} The Market Committee would be central in the second and third rounds of negotiations, and the Nordek negotiations, acting as a hub where much of the early planning took place, and from which negotiations and secretariats sprang out.

As seen above, the inner parts of the MFA consisted of clearly defined Departments and Offices, some of which worked with multilateral economic issues related to the European Communities. To this was added a growing number of permanent representations abroad and committees and councils at home. A handful of diplomats populated top positions within the relevant embassies, representations, departments, offices and committees. Unsurprisingly,
therefore, the delegations in charge of the enlargement negotiations came to be largely composed of these specialised MEDs: Jahn Halvorsen, Asbjørn Skarstein, Arne Skaug and Arne Langeland, who were part of the first negotiation delegation (1962-63). Tancred Ibsen Jr. and Knut Frydenlund (press attaché) were sent to strengthen the embassy in Brussels during the negotiations, and William G. Solberg (embassy in Brussels) was placed as observer with the EEC. In the negotiations of the early 1970s, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt headed, and Asbjørn Skarstein and Jahn Halvorsen joined, the negotiation delegation. While Holland and Ølberg were placed in the secretariat in Oslo, Eivinn Berg served as Industrial Counsellor to Brussels and Søren Chr. Sommerfelt’s right hand.

**New spaces of diplomacy**

The structural changes that occurred with the growing number of multilateral organisations dealing with international or regional economic and political issues in the postwar era created new spaces of diplomacy that interlinked domestic and foreign policy, and blurred the lines between politics and bureaucracy. A common response to multilateralisation and economification among Western European state administrations was to set up interdepartmental committees that integrated expertise from a variety of organisations at home and put representatives from organisations and officials from other ministries onto the international scene. The diplomatic field became more crowded, which both challenged and created opportunities for the MEDs.

The EC negotiations included almost the entire Norwegian state administration. The most heavily involved ministries were Commerce and Shipping, Agriculture, Fisheries, Industries, Finance, and the MFA. These were drawn into the preparations and negotiations through various committees, councils and advisory boards. During the first round of negotiations, for instance, officials from the implicated ministries were represented in the FTC, which gave advice to the CIEC, which in turn advised the government. CIEC was composed of representatives from the same ministries, and often the very same members, as the FTC. Similarly, during the third round of negotiations, a preparatory committee charged with the task of preparing the negotiations and giving advice on the composition of the

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277 UD 44.36/6.84 – 07.06.1962 – H. K. Engen and A. Skarstein – Appointment of the Norwegian Negotiation Delegation to the EEC. Speech to the Council of State. Order in Council, 08.06.1962; Bjørn Dynna Fiskeri sektorn i de norske utvidelsesforhandlingene med EF (1970-72), Unp.. Master thesis, Oslo: Inst. for Statsvitenskap (1973), p. 86. The secretariat was staffed by officials from the Six and the applicant countries, and was informally attached to the Council of Ministers.

278 Underdal "Forhandlingene om Norsk medlemskap (1972).

negotiation delegation consisted of “pretty much the same people (...) as the CIEC”. The Negotiation Secretariat (NS) and Negotiation Delegation (NG), proposed by this preparatory committee, was also composed largely by members of CIEC. What took shape in the Norwegian administration in relation with the EC-case, was a network of committees and councils - each body a node of cross-departmental and (often) corporative expertise - populated by the same handful of officials.

Moreover, interest organisations were increasingly drawn into political decision-making processes. For one they were part of the corporative organs and committees related to foreign economic issues. Similar adaptations to internationalisation occurred across Western Europe – though some developments were more similar than others. For instance, the Danish and Norwegian Market Secretariat, bore the same name, had very similar work descriptions, and were established the same year (1966). Still, the Norwegian state administration was comparatively small, and the MFA relatively young, and therefore it drew extensively on the expertise of interest organisations. Several social scientists and historians have described the Norwegian corporative system, either highlighting the state’s influence over the organisations or the other way around. But few dispute the historically unmatched and comparatively uniquely close ties developed in Norway during the postwar era – also in the field of foreign policy.

It was recognised, for example, that organisations such as the Federation of Norwegian Industries (FNI) and the Norwegian Shipping Association (NSA) had extensive experience working within international organisations, and possessed expert knowledge that the administration needed. Through their participation in a multitude of committees within the OEEC from the 1950s onwards, such governmental/non-governmental co-operation within international organisations was institutionalised. Since the 1950s, it also became commonplace to strengthen embassies with sectoral attachés. Brussels, for example, was

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283 Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen “Den fleksible og robuste forvaltning”, in Martin Marcussen and Karsten Ronit (Eds.) Internationaliseringen af den offentlige forvaltning i Danmark – forandring og kontinuitet, Århus: Århus Universitetsforlag (2003). For example the Danish Market Secretariat, dealing with EC-matters, which bore the same name and was established the same year in Norway.
287 Slagstad De nasjonale strateger (2001).
strengthened with agricultural and fisheries attachés from 1962 onwards, reflecting what the Norwegian government saw as two of the most important and problematic areas of negotiation with the Community.\(^{289}\) These attachés were often from the private sector: the fisheries attaché in the 1960s and early 1970s, Otto Hansen, was recruited from Frionor, a Norwegian sales conglomerate for processed fish.\(^{290}\)

On the other hand, the FNI and Norwegian Export Council opened its own ‘representation’ in Brussels to promote Norwegian export interests in the European Community. The Norwegian Export Council was a corporative consulting organ established in 1945 giving advice to the MFA on export-related matters. Following postings at the EFTA delegation in Geneva and the Embassy in Brussels, Martin Huslid (born 1931) was given leave from the MFA to work for the new ‘representation’ in Brussels (1966-1969), and returned to the MFA to work with the membership negotiations in 1970.\(^ {291}\) As a testimony to the duality of his role, he interchangeably reported back to the FNI and MFA while on leave. From 1970 onwards this ‘representation’ was placed under the Brussels Embassy, where Eivinn Berg became industrial counsellor.\(^ {292}\)

Epitomising the intermeshing of domestic and foreign politics, and how new expertise was tied in, ambassador Otto Kildal (Ambassador to The Hague), the FNI, the NSA, and the Ministry of Salary and Price, set up an educational programme in international economic co-operation. In a letter to Director General Rogstad in 1967, young Martin Huslid estimated that Norway would need 100 people, one third from the administration and two thirds from the business organisations, to fill different positions and represent Norwegian interests in Brussels after a membership.\(^ {293}\) The aim of the programme was to educate domestic civil servants and representatives from business organisations who were expected to partly work in Brussels. The course included a series of lectures in international political economy by several prominent experts, among them several of the leading MEDs, and 50 hours of French – a

\(^{289}\) The Norwegian embassy in Brussels was not (1960-1972) turned into a permanent representation specifically dealing with the EC, and did not – as say the Danish permanent representation – develop into a ‘mini version’ of the entire administration, but it did acquire many of the same traits. For the Danish embassy in Brussels: Erling Bjøl Heem bestemmer? Studier i den udenrigspolitiske beslutningsproces, Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag (1983); For an analysis of the Norwegian embassy in Brussels in the 2000s, see: Unni Clausen Den norske EU-delegasjonen. Et lydig instrument eller en autonom aktør? Masteroppgave Statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo: Oslo (2007).
\(^{291}\) UD 44.36/6.84 B.–1 – 17.03.1967, Brussels – M. Huslid – Dear Rogstad. Need for personnel in the Commission and other Common Market institutions.
crash course version of the Diplomatic Academy.\textsuperscript{294}

Clearly, the multilateralisation and economification of foreign policy in general, as exemplified through the membership issue, blurred the lines between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’, ‘politics’ and ‘bureaucracy’, and ‘governmental’ and ‘non-governmental’ in many ways. On the one hand, the diplomats were accompanied, helped and sometimes challenged by a variety of actors in the field of foreign policy – a field where they had traditionally held a monopoly. On the other hand, the young MEDs entered the domestic political arena through the backdoor of a network of policy creating committees.

\textit{A new diplomat emerges}

With the emergence of new diplomatic spaces followed new diplomatic practices, which slowly altered the role of the diplomat. Until the 1960s, and in many ways to this day, classic Weberian ideals governed the Norwegian postwar civil service: structural traits such as a hierarchical organisation, specified lines of instruction and responsibility, division of labour, advancement based on merits, and the rule of written procedure, governed the MFA. Furthermore, diplomats, as all civil servants, were hired for life and not elected.\textsuperscript{295} The sociologist Max Weber saw professional independence and political neutrality as core elements of a functional bureaucracy. The ideal civil servant, in his opinion, would obey the impersonal and formal rules, and not necessarily the person in charge of the Ministry. This was the ideal.\textsuperscript{296} Weber’s argument that a bureaucrat who disagrees with a political decision should nonetheless “carry it out as if it corresponded to his innermost conviction”\textsuperscript{297}, is echoed in famous British diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson’s classic, \textit{Diplomacy: A Basic Guide to the Conduct of Contemporary Foreign Affairs}, a publication widely read by diplomats to this day:

“The civil service, of which the diplomatic service is a branch, is supposed to possess to politics. Its duty is to place its experience at the disposal of the Government in power, to tender advice, and if need be to raise objections. Yet, if that advice be disregarded by the Minister, as


\textsuperscript{295} Dag I. Jacobsen \textit{Administrasjonens maktløyfer mellom politikk og administrasjon}, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget (1997).


\textsuperscript{297} Weber “Politics as vocation” (1948 [1919]) quoted from Neumann \textit{At home with the Diplomats} (2012), p. 86.
representative of the sovereign people, it is the duty and function of the civil service to execute his instructions without further question.”

Terje Johannessen’s reflections on the role of diplomats in the 1960s reveal the consistency of this definition of the civil servant:

“[The] first task is to ensure that governments' policies are implemented. And on this there is almost no exception, you must implement. (...) But, at the same time, it must be equally clear that if you perceive that what the government is doing is, shall we say, obviously contrary to the interests of the nation, then you must be allowed to speak up (...).”

Weber’s analysis from 1919, Nicolson’s guide from 1939, and Johannessen’s reflection from 2012 reveal inherent tensions surrounding the role of civil servant and, more specifically, the diplomat. Since both professional independence and political neutrality was needed, and the balance between them depended on the circumstances, any clear rule would be unsatisfying. As political scientist Knut Dahl Jacobsen suggested, analysing the Norwegian civil service in the early 1960s, potentially contradictory norms could be balanced through explicitly vague role expectations. Arne Langeland’s thoughts on the balance between professional independence and political neutrality, or between bureaucrats and politicians, echoes this: “[T]he first thing you need to do is to smell the air – how is this new guy? They are all different. We just have to – as civil servants, as the bureaucracy – accept, within limits. And where this limit is, I do not know.” In fact, Norwegian diplomats of the 1960s and 1970s had very few written rules limiting their actions. The only written rules delineating the outer perimeter of the norms governing the diplomat’s participation in public debates, for example, were § 62 of the Norwegian Constitution stating that civil servants should not be electable to the Storting, on the one hand, and § 100, which secured the general freedom of expression, on the other.

One reason for the lack of rules was the ambition for a flexible Foreign Service. Too many rules would hamper the institutional elasticity, rendering it unable to adapt to shifting
situations. As seen above, the structural changes of international politics and the Foreign Service and administration’s organisational adaptations created new diplomatic spaces that challenged the traditional Weberian role of the diplomat. Or, put differently, the MEDs’ changed responsibilities and tasks brought out inherent tensions in the role of the diplomat. Arne Langeland might have exaggerated when claiming that some 80 percent of the policy responses in relation to EFTA were hammered out within the Free Trade Committee – reducing CIEC, not to mention the Cabinet, to ceremonial bodies – but the statement reflects the changed understanding of role expectations among the young multilateral diplomats. In response to changed responsibilities, the young MEDs had a more ‘activist’ interpretation of the boundaries of a diplomat’s political engagement. Eivinn Berg thought it “depended on your position, your strength, compared to the pressure coming from the outside”. If a diplomat was in a position to do so and it felt right, he should shape policy; and if he was not in position he should do it anyway, but “with a little less force, and a bit more moderation.”

Norwegian political scientists were grappling with these changes in diplomacy in the late 1960s. Jens A. Christophersen maintained that Norwegian diplomats operated along the lines of the ideal Weberian bureaucrat – they executed decisions made by others, and did not have a substantial role in the decision-making process. Abraham Hallenstvedt, on the other hand, made the exact opposite point: for him the administration (and especially the MFA) and business organisations combined were the drivers of foreign policy, introducing the term Corporacy. To his mind the government was simply modifying policy initiated by the Corporacy. This renewed academic interest in the role of bureaucracy was part of a broader trend, and dovetailed with a more systematic critique of the establishment by the critical press and the general public in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the critique of a bureaucrat lay the recognition of his political potential: “[p]ublic bureaucracies, staffed largely by permanent civil servants, are responsible for the vast majority of political initiatives taken by government”, wrote Robert D. Putnam in 1973.

At the highpoint of the EC-debacle, the critical press in Norway pinpointed the potential politicians hidden in the highflying multilateral economic diplomats. In an

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304 Hallenstvedt Utenriksdepartementets (1968), p. 61.
305 Interview – Arne Langeland – 20 January 2010.
interesting passage describing Søren Christian Sommerfelt, just as he had been appointed deputy head of the EC-negotiations in 1970, Dagbladet captured the tensions between the ‘classical’ and ‘new’ diplomat:

“He is a civil servant of the classical type, loyal to his minister and his government, but at the same time capable of making assessments independent of preconceived political perceptions. He makes an effort portraying himself as a civil servant, and not as a politician, but is surely aware that the borders are tremendously fluid, and that a ‘neutral’ civil servant most definitively can play a political part more significant than most politicians.”

The changes in the role of the MEDs had happened gradually, then, but it was the bitterly fought EC-struggle in the 1960s and early 1970s that brought it to public attention. Grasping this new role, therefore, is crucial to understanding how the Europeans worked with the EC-case.

**Boundary-spanners**

As a way of conceptualising the role of diplomacy and diplomats in the late 20th and early 21st century, British political scientist Brian Hocking coined the term ‘boundary-spanners’:

“Rather than that of gatekeeper, an alternative image more suited to the contemporary environment might be termed that of the ‘boundary-spanner’, recognizing that boundaries between organizations and policy arenas, far from being irrelevant, are fluid and continually reconstituting themselves, thereby becoming sites of intense activity which demand a special role for those capable of acting as linkage points. In such an environment, diplomats can assume significant roles as mediators or brokers, facilitators and entrepreneurs.”

Studying Danish MEDs in the 1950-70s, Gram-Skjoldager and Knudsen have argued that the foreign economic policy field was one of the first in which the traditional boundaries and norms of diplomacy eroded. The distinction between bureaucracy and politics, and foreign and domestic policy – fundamental assumptions of the Danish and Norwegian interwar diplomacy – remained largely intact coming out of The Second World War, but gradually adapted to the changing international environment. The most significant new feature of the Danish MEDs was the close collaboration between them and the civil servants from other parts of the administration on the domestic and international scene. Drawing on Hocking’s

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311 Hocking et. al. Futures of Diplomacy (2012), p. 69. This shift happens simultaneously as diplomacy moves from being state-centered to being integrative.
term, they argue that these diplomats “not only defined and communicated national interests, but also administrated and mediated between a growing number of bureaucratic actors and interest organisations in an increasingly complex and integrated political environment.”

This description is applicable to developments in Norway at the same time. Well into the 1960s, diplomats, academics and the general public alike, understood the Norwegian diplomat as exceptionally ‘well behaved’, and close to the Weberian ideal type bureaucrat. In fact, it was the Europeans’ work with the EC-case, especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which brought to the fore the changes in multilateral economic diplomacy that had taken place since the 1950s. Leading Norwegian MEDs mediated between the Cabinet, interest organisations, Brussels, EFTAns, the public, other ministries and bordering diplomacies through a multitude of new diplomatic spaces, surpassing any neat conception of foreign and domestic policy as separate spheres.

**Concluding remarks**

This chapter has explored who the Europeans were through a sociological institutional inquiry into how structural changes and institutional adaptations changed the role of multilateral economic diplomacy. The Europeans were among the MEDs who transcended the traditional Weberian ideal diplomat. As seen, leading multilateral economic diplomats who worked with the EC-case, such as Skarstein, Halvorsen, Langeland and Holland, served in a multitude of overlapping positions, which gave them the possibility to create foreign policy. As MEDs entered new diplomatic spaces, their responsibilities and tasks changed, which in turn created a more activist diplomat operating “outside and within the organisation [MFA], assuming a diversity of forms in both the governmental and non-governmental arenas”. These policy-shaping MEDs bore the traits of Hocking’s boundary-spanners. Analysing how these boundary-spanning capacities came into play in the EC-case is crucial to understanding how the Europeans’ worked with the EC-case.

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313 Gleditsch, Østerud and Elster (Eds.) *De Utro Tjenere* (1974).
Chapter 3

*Europeans – secluded, connected and likeminded*

"Well, I can only speak for myself, but I think that it’s true for all of us. When you’re already an MFA-man, and you’re stationed abroad, you get a knowledge and an understanding that makes it natural to be in favour of things - and not place yourself on the outside, but to join in where the big things are happening."

Håkon W. Freihow on why he became a supporter of membership in the EC.

This chapter is, in all simplicity, concerned with patterns of interaction and connections. It explores how the multilateral economic diplomats working with the EC-case interacted with their surroundings and with each other. First, we will turn to the interaction and connections between the MEDs and their administrative surroundings. The Economic Department and the different Economic Offices were secluded from the rest of the MFA. This, combined with the increasing workload of the MFA and the level of specialisation, meant that MEDs enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, potentially giving them much decision-making power, but also creating a secluded room for them to coalesce in different groups. At the same time, the Economic Department and the MEDs cooperated closely with the Ministry of Commerce and Shipping (MoCS), which was marked by brotherly competition, overlapping responsibilities and close contacts. The previously discussed boundary-spanning capacities of the MEDs and intermeshing of foreign and domestic policy in their areas of expertise brought them into contact with different parts of Norwegian society. The second aspect of this chapter is to explore the diplomats’ connections with, in particular, political and business circles. What becomes clear is that the MEDs were embedded in dense networks of membership-positive diplomatic, economic, political and administrative elites.

Last, we will explore the emotional and professional ties between the MEDs. The importance of such ties should not be underestimated as they shaped careers and opened channels of influence. As will be seen, the Europeans formed a particular community among the MEDs, based on criteria such as likeability, admiration and shared beliefs. They were brought together through simple situated practices of inclusion and exclusion, such as mentoring/being mentored, recruiting/being recruited, travelling together, sharing lunch or

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316 Rosenwein “Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions” (2010), p. 11. In line with what Rosenwein calls investigating ‘Emotional Communities’: “largely the same as social communities (...) but the researcher looking at them seeks above all to uncover systems of feeling, to establish what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them (for it is about such things that people express emotions); the emotions that they value, devalue, or ignore; the nature of the affective bonds between people they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore".
sharing diplomatic sites.\textsuperscript{317} What is revealed is a closely-knit group of multilateral economic diplomats, sharing a common set of values centred round the EC-issue.

**Departmental seclusion**

At home, the multilateral economic diplomats were remarkably secluded, both vertically and horizontally, from the rest of the MFA. With seclusion came autonomy. And with autonomy followed decision-making power.

The vertical lines of interaction within the MFA during the 1960s and early 1970s were extremely hierarchical. The secretaries and different officers communicated directly to the Head of Office. He, in turn, communicated mostly with the Director General, who took matters up with the State Secretary or Secretary General, who would then bring things to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{318} The State Secretary was meant to be a sort of filter between the administrative and political arms of the MFA. From 1951 onwards, the State Secretary was given transcripts of all political reports, and the responsibility of deciding whether or not the reports should be shown to the Minister.\textsuperscript{319} Terje Johannessen made a telling comparison: “It was like being in the army, you know, if you’re a colonel you’re not mingling with the sergeants.”\textsuperscript{320} This general impression is backed by numbers: political scientist Abraham Hallenstvedt’s 1967 study of the Economic Department showed that over half of the total interactions took place within each office, with departmental leadership involved only around 13 percent of the time. In turn, roughly 12 percent of this information was given to the political leadership.\textsuperscript{321}

General information and guidelines the administration had to follow within specific policy areas trickled down from the political leadership. “If the system is going to work”, prominent official Knut Getz Wold noted in a widely read article on civil servant norms from 1968, “there has to be close, continuous contact between the minister and the civil servants”. To remedy the growth of the MFA’s workload, which tended to distance the leadership from


\textsuperscript{318} Hallenstvedt *Utenriksdepartementets* (1968), p. 100, 141-144.


\textsuperscript{320} Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012.

\textsuperscript{321} Hallenstvedt *Utenriksdepartementets* (1968), p. 131. As the 1960s saw a break in the waves of institutional reform (1957-1972), it is safe to assume that the patterns of 1966-67 are quite representative of the period. Kolsrud *Rekonstruksjon og reform* (2008), p. 29.
the administrative branch, the minister had to call regular meetings to give “general orientations on guiding principles on how to assess current policy problems”.

This was the way the MFA absorbed, sorted and structured the information that was gathered. Only the essentials concerned the Foreign Minister, and with an ‘explosive’ increase in the workload in the postwar era, fewer issues ever reached the Foreign Minister and, thus, more and more important decisions were made further down the chain of command.\footnote{Getz Wold “Administrasjon og politikk” (1974), p. 34.} As Ibsen Jr. humorously reflected:

“As I’ve claimed, the entire Norwegian state administration, is actually governed by the secretaries: The secretaries get the ideas; the Heads of Offices fine tune them a little; the Director General looks at it – inserts a comma perhaps; and then its at the Minister’s desk, who thanks the administration, trusts it, and accepts. I’ve seen it many times.”\footnote{Interview – Tancred Ibsen Jr. – 23.11.2013.}

With the new international organisations and growing multilateralisation, Neumann and Leira argue, diplomats did most of the concrete work and day-to-day decision-making at home and abroad.\footnote{Neumann and Leira Aktiv og avventende (2005), p. 315, p. 277.}

The stations received general instructions on what to report on and, occasionally, detailed instructions to convey certain messages or impressions, but they generally enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. Terje Johannessen reflects: “in those days there was less control from ‘home’ than today, we were pretty much left to ourselves to figure out what was important and what to spend our resources on.”\footnote{Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24 April 2012.} As journalist and Stoltenberg-biographer Geir Salvesen noted, “Heads of Offices and secretaries [and embassy secretaries and attachés abroad] were given assignments that would’ve been handled on a much higher level today”.\footnote{Salvesen Thorvalds Verden (1994), p. 39.}

This impression is strengthened when we look at the leadership style of the different Foreign Ministers. Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister between 1946 and 1965,\footnote{With the exception of three weeks in 1963.} has been described as weak on economic policy and administration.\footnote{Neumann and Leira Aktiv og avventende (2005), p. 256.} Lange was an esteemed international figure, but did not interfere with the day-to-day running of the MFA. Lange mostly travelled by train to Paris and other continental capitals, and by boat to the US, which gave him time for political reflection. When travelling to the US, he might be gone for weeks, leaving the daily administration of the MFA to the Secretary General. “[S]ince Foreign
Minister Halvard Lange was rather disinterested in economic politics”, Neumann and Leira contend, the MEDs, in particular, were “left with much room for initiative”.  

Lange’s successor, Lyng, was much more involved in the daily political life in the parliament. He was also more engaged in the organisational structure of the ministry. This led to slightly decreased freedom of action for the administration, though Lyng did not represent any kind of rupture in leadership style. However, like his predecessor, Lyng was not particularly interested in economic issues. In fact, as Terje Johannessen recalled it, none among the four Foreign Ministers between 1960 and 1972 – Halvard Lange (Labour Party, 1946-63); Erling Wikborg (CPP, 1963); Halvard Lange (Labour 1963-65); John Lyng (Conservatives, 1965-70); Svenn Stray (Conservatives, 1970-71); Andreas Cappelen (Labour Party, 1971-72) – were “genuinely concerned with foreign trade policy as such”, but saw it as a tool to reach general foreign policy aims. According to Johannessen, “trade policy is often the sum of many small details, especially package deals: going from agriculture, fish, research, industry, transport, if you look at all these different element, you get a total package, and in that respect I thought Stray was very good, and Lyng too.”

Their horizontal interactions with the rest of the MFA were even more limited. Hallenstvedt’s study shows that the Economic Department’s written communication with the Political Department was less than two percent of its total written communications. The departments were like “watertight compartments”, as Johannessen expressed it. The MFA was, as discussed above, geared towards specialisation, and diplomats who became MEDs dealt almost exclusively with such matters. Ibsen Jr. remembered “a clear division between three groups [political, economic and legal department] and if you ended up in one of the departments and made an impression, you were likely to be tied in”. The Political Department was scarcely involved in the EC-case but it did, of course, stay in touch with the other departments. Langeland emphasised the distinction between informal talks and actual involvement in the case during the first round (1960-1963):

“We’re in the same building, right across the hall. (...) We talked about these issues openly, but they couldn’t meddle in the negotiations. [And how about the preparations?] No, not those either,

though they were permitted to express themselves. They weren’t the ones who dealt with it – the system is straightforward that way. We were a handful of people who took care of it.”

Other than informal consultations, though, the patterns of interaction reveal that the Economic Department was highly secluded from the rest of the MFA.

Diplomats looking back might exaggerate their autonomy and influence (clearly Norwegian foreign policy in its entirety was not governed by secretaries alone) but the patterns of communication, developments within the field of multilateral economic diplomacy, and leadership styles of the different foreign ministers point in the same direction: the MEDs were vertically autonomous and horizontally secluded within the MFA. Opposite, the MFA was almost equally connected with the Ministry of Commerce and Shipping.

Ministerial cooperation

Throughout the postwar years the norm had been that the MoCS coordinated domestic efforts while the MFA conducted the negotiations and communicated with the international community with regards to multilateral economic issues. In reality the two ministries often had overlapping responsibilities, and cooperated and competed for influence. The diplomats and civil servants from the MoCS often wrote memos, travelled and negotiated together in groups, and often accompanied the Minister of Commerce and Shipping on visits abroad. They were also part of the same interdepartmental committees, such as the Free Trade Committee and the Market Committee. These could be officially established by the MoCS and headed by the MFA, or the other way around. Hallenstvedt’s analysis clearly indicates the Economic Department’s close connection to the MoCS.

In fact, many working in the Economic Department saw both the Minister of Commerce and Shipping and the Foreign Minister as their political leaders. Søren Chr. Sommerfelt remembered, from his time as Director General of the Economic Department, that he seldom submitted cases to Lange: “and if I did, usually got the reply: ‘You should ask Skaug about this’. It made my job easier that Arne Skaug was acting foreign minister when Lange was abroad, which was often. Few hours passed after [Lange’s] departure before Skaug came over from his office in the MoCS, some buildings away, and sat in the Foreign Ministers

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336 Interview – Arne Langeland – 1.05.2012.
338 Especially the Economic Department of the MFA and the Department of Foreign Trade of the MoCS.
340 UD 44.36/6.84 – File 1-23.
Sommerfelt was not alone. Langeland referred to Arne Skaug as “my minister in practice”. Equally, Holland reflected on how it was “a strange thing that the Economic Department, in reality, was headed by the Minister of Commerce and Shipping”. Most of the diplomats interviewed, distinguished Arne Skaug and Kåre Willoch as the two ministers with whom they cooperated the closest. This is confirmed in the archives.

Their relationship and interactions with the civil servants of the MoCS can be compared to that of two competitive brothers, the MoCS being the younger. Terje Johannessen remembered it being “a lot of ‘katzenjammer kids’” fighting with each other “about personal positions and such”. Such quarrels could intensify when the Minister of Commerce and Shipping had ambitions to take over matters of foreign policy and “the annoyance trickled down the MoCS system”. The rivalry would also increase when MEDs were given leadership roles within the many joint committees and working groups. One of the reasons why the coalition government chose Vindsetmo to lead the Market Committee, for instance, was to avoid competition between the MoCS and the MFA.

Indeed, the MoCS was the little brother: the MFA increased from 178 to 234 employees, while the MoCS decreased from 275 to 149 employees, between 1960 and 1970 – a major loss of institutional significance. In the early 1970s, at one of the government conferences, Per Kleppe (Labour) complained that his ministry did not have enough to do, and wanted to transfer several tasks from the MFA to his MoCS. Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli was increasingly annoyed, and the third or fourth time Kleppe complained, Bratteli reputedly responded: “well, if the Ministry of Commerce and Shipping doesn’t have enough to do, we could just shut down the whole ministry.” This was in fact what happened – in 1987 the whole ministry was incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Despite the overlapping areas of responsibility and the rivalry, all of the MEDs interviewed described their working relationship with the MoCS as ‘very close’ and ‘very good’. One of the reasons for this was that they leaned in the same direction regarding the EC-issue. Arild Holland, for example, explained his close working relationship with MoCS official Gudmund Saxrud, much as he did with Ølberg and Skarstein, by simply stating that

343 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012; Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012.
344 Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012. Reflecting on why the MEDs cooperated especially close with Skaug and Willoch, Eivinn Berg remarked that they were “distinctly economic politicians” – that is they had expertise.
he was a pro-European. The employees of the MoCS, as those of the MFA, were overwhelmingly in favour of membership.

**Networked diplomats**

As seen above, the multilateral economic diplomats were increasingly embedded in a dense network of political, economic, diplomatic and administrative connections — diplomats entered the domestic scene, just as domestic actors entered the international scene. This section explores with whom the MEDs working on the EC-case were connected. For analytical purposes, we will divide the connections into corporate and political. As will be argued, they were embedded in a wholly membership-positive network of elites.

It is often claimed that MFAs cannot compete with other ministries because they lack the support of a specific domestic interest group. The MFAs, therefore, cannot harness the political power of so-called iron triangles between the ministry, the parliamentary committee and the interest group. This was not the case in Norway: during and immediately after The Second World War, the MFA formed a close and institutionalised cooperation with the Shipping sector.

The shipping sector grew into a major industry from the mid-1800s onwards, and by 1875 Norway was the third largest; since the late 1930s until the 1960s it was consistently the fourth biggest shipping nation in the world. Between 1945 and 1965, the shipping sector contributed to two-thirds of new jobs created in Norway, and by the late 1950s it shipped in roughly one-third of the Norwegian import. It was, as the Norwegian Shipping Association (NSA) claimed:

“As a currency-creating industry that shipping occupies the most prominent position in the Norwegian economy. The value of Norwegian imports has, for well over a hundred years, normally been considerably higher than the export. This imbalance of trade has only been possible to maintain because the shipping sector, by sailing in currency, has raised the means to pay the for a big part of the import.”

The merchant fleet was, with much justification, known as “Norway’s floating empire”. Hence, the MFA enjoyed the support of “one the strongest economic interest groups in the country”.

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The issue of separate consular services was of major importance to the shipping sector and it led to the dissolution of the Union between Sweden and Norway. Shipping and trade was a major reason for the move towards neutrality, with silent security guarantees from Britain, following Norway’s independence in 1905. Historian Olav Riste goes as far as to claim that the Norwegian MFA of the early 20th century went a long way towards being “the handmaiden of trade and shipping”. Since the creation of a department of shipping under the MFA in 1913, after pressure from the Norwegian Shipping Association (NSA), ties between the two grew even closer. By the 1950s, the cooperation was institutionalised further. 

The most significant corporative organ of the MFA, where the NSA took part, was the board of the Diplomatic Academy. With the support of the MFA, the reform committee of 1946 suggested creating a board consisting of five members: one from the MFA, the university, the NCTU, a joint representative from trade and industry, and one from the Norwegian Shipping Association. In the end, a representative from the fishery sector and another from the Norwegian Federation of Industries joined the five representatives. As Neumann and Leira point out, the MFA “gave away its right to control its own recruitment”, and of all the economic interest groups, the shipping sector had the closest ties to the MFA.

This obviously affected the recruitment patterns of the Foreign Service: Eivinn Berg, Arne Langeland and William G. Solberg – all central MEDs that worked with the EC-case – had close ties to the shipping industry. Eivinn Berg (born 1931), for example, who came from a shipowner-family and was raised in the traditional shipping city of Sandefjord, recalled how he was recruited to the service in 1956 after studying economics, in part, because the businessmen on the board approved of him. In 1962, on the request of Arne Langeland, Berg worked with the Economic Office handling the EC-issue. Between 1963 and 1965 he was placed in Geneva to work more closely with GATT and EFTA. Between 1967 and 1969, Berg was the office director of the EFTA secretariat. From 1970 to 1972 he served as Industrial Counsellor to Brussels and the special attaché to head of negotiations Søren Chr. Sommerfelt. Berg was passionately concerned with the membership issue. After the negative referendum in 1972, he immediately took a job as director in charge of international issues in the Norwegian Shipowners Association (1973-78). After five years on the job he returned to

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the Economic Department of the MFA, and later became state secretary of the MFA for the Conservatives (1981-84).\footnote{Aftenposten – 01.10.2013, Eivinn Berg; Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012; Kåre Dæhlen "Eivinn Berg – utdyping". SNL, http://nbl.snl.no/Eivinn_Berg (08.05.2014). Berg was a very ambitious and career-minded diplomat, determined to work with multilateral economic diplomacy already in his youth. Berg is described as having an infectious positive mood, a natural authority and an extraordinary work capacity.}

The institutionalisation of ties between the MFA and NSA took place during the Labour Party rule (1945-1965). To understand the peculiarity of the MFA-NSA connection, we need to briefly revisit the ambivalent alliance between the shipping sector and the hegemonic Labour Party in the postwar era – an alliance that continued during the EC-case. Throughout the postwar era, the NSA fought the authorities on what they perceived as “rigid management of regulations and distinctly Norwegian rules”. Animosity peaked in the immediate postwar years: the shipping sector believed it was disproportionately penalised through import and contracting restrictions imposed by the government due to an acute currency shortage.\footnote{Norges Rederiforbund. “En reise i Rederiforbundets historie” http://www.rederi.no/nrweb/cms.nsf/pages/historie (05.2.2013).}

Entering into the 1960s, the NSA contended that it suffered from the “heaviest shipping-taxes in the world”, and called for “changes in the government’s policies” so that “restrictions could be kept to an absolute minimum”.\footnote{Norges Rederiforbund Norges Rederiforbund, 50 år (1959), p. 88-89.} It is perhaps not surprising that Norwegian shipowners were staunch supporters of private enterprise and opposed governmental interference, and less surprising still that every sitting government had to consider the demands of the NSA. Successive Labour governments, therefore, tried to balance their interventionist inclinations with measures to keep Norwegian shipping competitive. One way of securing the interests of the shipping sector was to press “continuously, in every intergovernmental forum available, for maximum freedom of international shipping.”\footnote{FCO 33/1267 – 08.10.1970, Oslo – T. F. Brenchley – Norway: The Shipping Industry. For instance by setting up the tax system that made profits earmarked for payment for new vessels escape any substantial tax deduction.} Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the NSA was fuelled by one overarching goal: a global and liberal shipping sector. After the first British application, the NSA saw membership in the Community as a way of weakening Norway’s statist economic policies. Specifically, it was seen as a way of pressuring the government to loosen its contracting restrictions on shipbuilding, and for the government to revise its ‘taxation-mentality’.\footnote{FCO 9/697 – 1967 - Visit by Secretary of State.} But an EC-
membership was also understood in long-term, ideological conditions that marked “a very important step towards a return to liberal views and a liberal policy.” Membership was thus seen as a step towards breaking with the almighty interventionist postwar state.

Moreover, the NSA feared that the Community would become too regional, namely that the Six would develop their own shipping policy under the umbrella of a Common Transport Policy. This would run counter to a more global outlook, and the NSA worried that a Community solution would, in one way or another, discriminate against those left on the outside and be driven by regional priorities. “As a full member of the EEC, Norway would”, the shipowners argued, “together with other shipping nations, be able to influence the Community’s view on shipping questions – the relationship between the member states and to the world at large.”

With the strong ties between the NSA and the MFA, the MEDs working with the EC-case were keenly aware of the interests of the shipping sector. William G. Solberg, who was one of the contact points between Brussels and the NSA, recognised the dangers of a regional shipping policy early on. Solberg (born 1922) was a lawyer by training and was 1st embassy secretary to Brussels (1961-62). In October of 1962 he was made the Norwegian representative to the EEC’s negotiation secretariat. Together with Langeland, Halvorsen, Berg and Skarstein, Solberg was among the first proponents of a Norwegian membership in the EEC. As early as July of 1961, he told the NSA it was “dangerous for Norway to not participate as a full member of the EEC because we would be without the right to vote in similar situations in the future. If we become full members, we would de facto be able to veto this kind of [regional] shipping cooperation between the EEC-countries if we would want to”. This was written nearly a year before the government made its decision to apply for membership negotiations.

For both the reasons mentioned above, the NSA and the entire shipping community’s view was that Norway “should apply for full membership, as soon as possible.” The MFA as an institution, and the MEDs in particular, had close ties and formalised corporative connections with the NSA and the shipping sector. Eivinn Berg pointedly summed up the

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365 Head of 6th Office (EFTA) (1966-68); Director for the GATT secretariat in Geneva (1969-72).
relationship between the MEDs and the shipping sector as, “there was nothing but applause from the NSA for what we did.”

Just as the MEDs involved with the EC-case had close ties to the highly pro-European business sector, they were closely affiliated with two predominantly pro-European political parties: the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. More noteworthy is the fact that many of the MEDs held political and administrative positions interchangeably, giving them an enormous potential for influence. Per Martin Ølberg, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Arne Skaug and Knut Frydenlund all ended up as ministers or state secretaries in Labour governments. Furthermore, Ølberg, Stoltenberg and Skaug returned to diplomacy after having held political positions. This tendency was less marked among the core-MEDs who were affiliated with the Conservatives. Of Søren Chr. Sommerfelt, Eivinn Berg, Arild Holland, Arne Langeland, only Berg crossed over from diplomacy to politics and back.

In matters of domestic politics, the Conservative and Labour Parties – the major parties of the right and the left wing, respectively – were adversaries. But a remarkable consensus prevailed between the two parties throughout the Cold War era in regard to foreign policy matters. Two reasons should be mentioned: first, the reality of the Cold War, and the perceived Communist threat, both domestically and internationally, facilitated an unparalleled discipline and conformity of foreign policy between 1950 and 1972. Second, as Thorvald Stoltenberg – who followed Frydenlund as Foreign Minister in 1987 – explained, the job of the MFA was to uphold domestic consensus. Paraphrasing Frydenlund, Stoltenberg contended that Norway, as a small country, did not have the privilege of having two or three foreign policy positions. Foreign Ministers, therefore, sought the middle of the parliament, often at the expense of the full backing of their own parties.

Consensus was reflected in personnel as well. Between 1945 and 1972, the only foreign minister not coming from the Labour or Conservative Parties was Erling Wikborg (Christian People’s Party), who sat for three weeks in 1963. Furthermore, Labour and Conservative

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foreign ministers had no problem recruiting from each other’s parties. After the change from a Labour government to a centre-right coalition in 1965, for example, Foreign Minister Lyng (Conservative) kept Thorvald Stoltenberg as political secretary. “Lyng needed close contacts with the Labour Party regarding foreign policy”, Salvesen explains, “and Stoltenberg would be one of the links”. The same consensus was evident among multilateral economic diplomats. Consider this reflection by Arild Holland:

“The MFA, and particularly the Economic Department, where I worked, was never characterised by party politics. So, my right hand in the EC-case, Per Martin Ølberg, was a Labour Party man, while I was Conservative. In fact, there was very little difference between us, and we sometimes wondered why one of us ended up in Labour while the other ended up with the Conservatives.”

Holland believed this was because party politics were completely irrelevant in foreign policy issues. But it was actually more a reflection of the nearly unanimous, highly party specific, agreement among the MEDs, and the MFA at large, on the policy of membership in the EC.

The corporate and political networks, of which the diplomats were a part, pulled in the same direction: towards membership. This became particularly evident when they all conjoined within the European Movement in Norway (EMN). As we shall see, the EMN became the main hub for pro-European efforts, particularly in the early to mid-1960s, with a remarkably strong presence from the MFA, the NSA, the Labour Party and the Conservatives.

**The emotional connections between the Europeans**

Among some of the autonomous diplomats, centrally placed to work with the EC-case and embedded in wholly membership-positive networks, there evolved distinct emotional bonds. It was these emotional and professional ties that distinguished the Europeans from other MEDs. They came to form a community based on criteria such as likeability, admiration and shared beliefs. Most important was how the ‘members’ related to the EC-issue: it required being pro-European in a certain way to gain acceptance into the group as a whole. A community was forged through the diplomats’ work with the EC-case, and it took its shape and size through a range of mundane practices surrounding exclusion and inclusion.

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Mentor-apprentice relationships were one way diplomats became cemented as a group and across cohorts. Formalised versions of these relationships existed between trainees, when sent out on their first junior postings, and the mentors in charge of their on-site education. This was how many of the Europeans came to know each other. Many of the younger MEDs carried out their junior postings at one of three sites: Paris (OEEC/OECD), Geneva (EFTA and GATT) or Brussels (EC). In these multilateral economic settings, young diplomats were taught by older MEDs. Junior postings were formative experiences, and often forged long-lasting friendships, feelings of admiration and, crucially, possibilities for later advancement.

Tancred Ibsen Jr., Arne Langeland, Jahn Halvorsen, Asbjørn Skarstein and Arne Skaug were all stationed in Paris in the mid-1950s.375 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate the environment of the OEEC-delegation of the mid-1950s, but it is safe to assume that the diplomats were socialised into the world of intergovernmental and multilateral economic diplomacy, and that many of the strong links between the Europeans can be traced to Paris.376 Arne Langeland, for example, reflecting on how his cooperation with Jahn Halvorsen began, recalled his junior posting: “I was very fortunate, because I was sent to the delegation in Paris, dealing with OEEC and NATO matters, and I worked a bit with both as a ‘junior’. Arne Skaug was my boss, the big boss, and the Counsellor, that was Jahn Halvorsen.”377 Halvorsen trusted Langeland’s judgement and respected his skills and therefore handpicked him to be the Head of the 4th Economic Office.378 The Administrative Department had initially regarded Langeland as too young for the job. But Halvorsen, after appealing to Foreign Minister Lange and State Secretary Engen, forced it through.379

The youngest multilateral economic diplomats had similar experiences as Langeland, through ‘junior’ postings at the new hub of economic integration – Brussels. Terje Johannessen remembered his first stint in Brussels like this:

“I was fortunate enough to be placed in Brussels (...) and it was ‘number two’ [at the Embassy]
who was the mentor, and that was Asbjørn Skarstein (...) As I would say to anyone, there’s not

376 Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014. Asbjørn Skarstein, his daughter explained, remembered the days in Paris as a big adventure, with new and exciting work, and new friends and acquaintances.
377 Interview – Arne Langeland – 1 May 2012.
378 UD 44.36/6.84 B.-1 – 27.06.1962, Oslo – J. Halvorsen – Memo. Staffing problems with regards to the negotiation in Brussels.
379 Interview – Arne Langeland – 1 May 2012. This caused some bad blood between Langeland and some of the older diplomats, who had been passed by.
a single person that I have learned so much from, about international trade policy, or international monetary policy, as Asbjørn.”

Several of the younger diplomats were mentored by Skarstein, who was seen as one of the leading experts of the service’s economic diplomacy. While working with EFTA in the early 1960s, Skarstein was Holland’s senior at the 4th Economic Office. Holland recalled him as “amazingly articulate. When I had to ponder the issue before I saw a solution, he had it right away. He was absolutely superb, I was speechless sometimes, at how quickly he perceived situations”. Equally, Berg recalled the admiration he had for the older MEDs:

“[Skarstein], he was a dynamo. I think he was the economic diplomat that I admired the most when I came into the system. I really looked up to him. And he had an excellent reputation. He and Langeland were good friends. (...) I was a younger man in all of this, and I had the same admiration for Skarstein as all the other younger economic diplomats.”

Jahn Halvorsen was another respected and admired senior among the younger diplomats. Håkon W. Freihow came to know Halvorsen as a young press attaché to Brussels. Ambassador Halvorsen and the young press attaché frequently travelled together and became friends, sharing long walks together. Freihow described Halvorsen as “unsurpassable” as Ambassador, and as “very knowledgeable, very hardworking”.

Such feelings of respect or admiration went the other way as well: older diplomats recruited and promoted young diplomats in whom they saw potential, liked personally, and felt embodied the same ethos and fundamental beliefs as their own. This was part of the informal norms of recruitment and advancement. Eivinn Berg, for example, went from being an attaché to Chicago – dealing with security policy issues – to becoming a secretary at the Economic Department in 1960. Berg recalled how this came about:

“It is a strange process. I don’t know why, but I had a very good relationship with Langeland. I had read many reports from Brussels and Geneva and round about. I have myself picked people in this way, and it has something to do with you standing for the same things. You need to be a bit enthusiastic, and you need to have a good chemistry, and I always had a good chemistry with Arne Langeland (...) it was thanks to him picking me up, and making me one of his closest

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381 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012.
When Arne Langeland was looking for a skilled economist for his office, he likely enquired at the Administrative Department, and was informed that there was one who had just finished the academy. Langeland spoke to the young Eivinn Berg, immediately liked him, and asked if he wanted to start working for him. Berg was interested, but was not in a position to make the decision. Langeland then asked his superior, Director General of the Economic Department, Jahn Halvorsen. Halvorsen took the request to the Director General of the Administrative Department, but it turned out that Eivinn Berg was to be placed somewhere else. Langeland refused to accept this answer so Halvorsen asked again – more emphatically – and Berg was allowed to transfer to the 4th and later 5th Economic Office.

As Berg recalled, “everyone wanted to pick associates that they had a good relationship with, and there is no doubt that there exists a dominant principle in the entire administration: if you want to have a career, you have to stick with someone you’re sure is going to move up the ladder.” Hopes of personal benefits went hand in hand with social considerations. Much to the same point, Langeland reflected on how advancements came about, and how offices and committees were put together: “it’s about cooperation, things should run smoothly. We’re supposed to thrive together.” Through such mechanisms people were included into communities and cliques. To this point, Eivinn Berg concluded: “so that’s how I became part of the gang led by Arne Langeland, and partly Holland. They were older, they were Heads of Offices, I came in as a secretary (...) but I was very engaged in the team.”

Among the Europeans, practices of social inclusion and exclusion contained a strong normative component, which was simultaneously a process of creating consensus. Such inclusion/exclusion and consensus building happened through mundane practices. In the case of the Europeans, it seems that those who did not share some core traits and, more importantly, a set of normative and principled beliefs, were blocked from strategic interaction and involvement, marginalised, pushed to the fringes of the group, or simply ignored. Tancred Ibsen Jr. experienced this. He took part in the formation of Norwegian European

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386 Interview – Arne Langeland – 1.05.2012.
388 Etienne Wenger and William Snyder “Communities of practice: the organizational frontier” in Harvard Business Review, January-February (2000); Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012). p. 16. This is also much in line with Iver B. Neumann, when he argues, for example, that text production within the MFA is “in the name of the social integration of the MFA itself”.
389 de Certeau “General Introduction to the practice of everyday life” (2002), pp. 63-75
policy – as Head of the EC-Office between 1960 and 1962, counsellor to Brussels in 1962, and permanent representative at the EFTA delegation in Geneva between 1963 and 1965. He was also one of the early MEDs at the OEEC delegation in the mid-1950s. Ibsen Jr. arguably bore many of the traits of a European, and also conceived of himself as one.\textsuperscript{390}

Still, the broader group did not perceive Ibsen Jr. as a ‘proper’ European. Eivinn Berg remembered Ibsen Jr. as “very knowledgeable, but he wasn’t predisposed for these practical foreign economic policy matters”. Moreover, he recalled that Ibsen Jr. saw “other aspects of this, he wasn’t too concerned with us getting in [to the Community]”.\textsuperscript{391} Another example is how Asbjørn Skarstein had disliked the way Ibsen Jr. had been accepted into the diplomatic service. Ibsen Jr., Skarstein thought, got in on his name and not his merits.\textsuperscript{392} As explained above, one of the ways the MEDs set themselves apart was by recruitment into the Diplomatic Academy. Because of the way he was recruited, Ibsen Jr. was \textit{elite} in the wrong way. Berg and Skarstein, therefore, distinguished Ibsen Jr. from the rest of the group by highlighting three core self-perceptions of the Europeans: they were experts on multilateral economic diplomacy, they were elite due to their merits, and they believed in Norway’s membership in the Community.

Two incidents serve to illuminate how practices of exclusion/inclusion worked. First, Ibsen Jr. and Langeland did not get along.\textsuperscript{393} As a practical joke with deeper implications, Langeland placed Ibsen Jr., whom Langeland believed didn’t like practical economic matters, on a special assignment. Ibsen Jr. was asked to prepare highly technical and detailed economic calculations for the agricultural sector during the first round of negotiations.\textsuperscript{394} Ibsen Jr. recalled how he came ‘home’ to the MFA in 1960 and became the Head of Office. But, as seen above, Jahn Halvorsen wanted the young, trusted and ambitious Arne Langeland as the Head of Office. “There was some intrigue surrounding the matter”, Ibsen Jr. remembered, “Langeland was supposed to become the Head of Office, and they needed to do something clever with me (...) Langeland took over the Office, [and] I was placed in the attic to study Norwegian agriculture.”\textsuperscript{395} Tancred Ibsen Jr. was marginalised, though he kept important positions until 1965. In 1968, he became Norway’s ambassador to Budapest: “and thus ended

\textsuperscript{390} Interview – Tancred Ibsen Jr. – 23.11.2013.
\textsuperscript{391} Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18 December 2012.
\textsuperscript{392} Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014.
\textsuperscript{393} Interview – Arne Langeland – 22.01.2010.
\textsuperscript{394} UD 44.36/6.84–21 – 09.01.1963 - Memo. Expert working committees for the negotiation delegation.
\textsuperscript{395} Interview – Tancred Ibsen Jr. – 23.11.2013.
my carrier in economic diplomacy”, he explains. “I was to a certain degree, one could say, voluntarily sent into exile”.

Equally revealing is this incident of inclusion: Eivinn Berg remembered how then assistant Director General of the Economic Department Ibsen Jr., in around 1967 or 1968, tried to make Berg Counsellor of the Embassy in Morocco. “That seemed to me, to be the worst thing I could imagine”, Berg explains, “I would have been stuck there for three or four years just as things were starting to happen back home, it would have been fatal!” It didn’t happen because the community the young secretary belonged to, intervened: “I fought it the best I could, and both Rogstad and Langeland got involved – and Skarstein too – and saved me from Tancred’s grasp.”

The academy, stations, departments, offices and committees were all sites of socialisation and forging of friendships. Håkon W. Freihow and Eivinn Berg became the best of friends as they went to the DA together. They kept in touch while they were posted in different places, and ended up working together between 1970 and 1972 at the Brussels Embassy when Freihow was press attaché and Berg was industrial counsellor. Knut Frydenlund and Thorvald Stoltenberg’s long lasting friendship (and Stoltenberg’s habit of following in Frydenlund’s footsteps) began when the two shared an office together just after Stoltenberg arrived at the MFA. Similarly, locations abroad became sites of learning and consensus building. Consider for example how Håkon W. Freihow describes the Embassy in Brussels around 1970-72:

“No, we were all supporters [of membership]. Remember, we were in this job to contribute to Norway securing the best possible basis for negotiations, which in turn would give us the opportunity to get inside the EC, or EEC as it was called back then. So, we were all ardent pro-Europeans, no doubt about it. (...) The Embassy staff was led by Jahn Halvorsen, and we had morning meetings every day, you know, where we went through this. There was no need for him to interfere, and animate us to become pro-European, because we already were, it was natural.”

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399 Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014; Salvesen Thorvalds Verden (1994). Stoltenberg entered the service in 1958; became a member of the Labour Party in 1963; followed Knut Frydenlund as political secretary to Halvard Lange, as Frydenlund had to retreat due to a bleeding ulcer; he then became a part of Foreign Minister John Lyng’s secretariat; he then took over and developed NCTU’s international office as secretary; when Labour took over (March 1971) and Trygve Bratteli became Prime Minister, Stoltenberg was given the post of state secretary of the MFA. Stoltenberg took over the post as Foreign Minister from Frydenlund, when he passed away in February 1987.
Freihow explains how diplomats, already positive to membership, worked with a case that inclined them to take a positive stand, and how they confirmed this attitude through daily rituals. The Embassy in Brussels was a site of consensus building, where Freihow and the rest confirmed and reinforced their pro-Europeanness.

Such sites of friendship and consensus building existed at home as well. Terje Johannessen was the youngest member of the secretariat of the Market Committee, working together with Arild Holland and Per Martin Ølberg. Johannessen recalled Ølberg as “very effective, very professional, knowledgeable as few, and very dynamic”, and had “great respect” for him. The two had studied political science together, with Ølberg three years ahead of Johannessen. While working together on the Market Committee, Johannessen was “inspired by [Ølberg’s] work methods” and “tried to the best of [his] abilities to copy it”. 401

Per Martin Ølberg, in turn, had an apprentice-like relationship with Arild Holland. Ølberg and Holland had offices right next to each other, and they “talked continuously about negotiation issues” throughout the second and third EC-round. 402 As seen above, Holland considered Ølberg his “right hand”, and put him in charge of fishery policies during the third round. 403 Arild Holland, as already mentioned, worked under Asbjørn Skarstein and admired him greatly. These mentor-apprentice relationships evolved into close friendships. The four, Skarstein, Holland, Ølberg and Johannessen, worked closely together on the EC-case for many years. They shared “the [traditional] Norwegian packed lunch” together “every day.” 404 Asbjørn Skarstein, Arild Holland, and their families, had been close since the diplomats’ days together in Geneva (1960-62), so close in fact that Skarstein’s wife was the godmother of Holland’s youngest daughter. 405

The emotional ties between the Europeans were partly forged through shared beliefs. Holland, for example, explained his close friendship with Jahn Halvorsen in the following matter:

“Jahn Halvorsen [...] he was formidable, and we became damn good friends, he was also an economist. And we became very good friends. We had everything in common, and a shared view on this [the EC-issue]. And Jahn, he understood the meaning of the whole thing. We saw eye to eye on this matter.” 406

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The sheer complexity of the answers to why and how they became friends is illuminating. Holland greatly admired Halvorsen; the two had a common educational background, they were colleagues, and they shared a set of principled beliefs regarding the EC-issue. Holland described his close friend, Per Martin Olberg, in a similar matter, and added that he was “one of the few who understood”. Equally, Skarstein – perhaps Arild Holland’s closest friend – was described by Holland as “one of the first in Norway that understood the background for the EEC-cooperation”.

Similarly, Langeland and Halvorsen’s work relationship was the beginning of a close friendship, which was strengthened during the first round of negotiations by a common belief in Norwegian membership in the EC. Describing their friendship, Langeland recalls how Halvorsen became “the one who believed together with me”. Understanding the essence of what membership entailed, therefore, was a crucial component in the emotional cobweb that demarcated the inside and outside of the group of Europeans.

Concluding remarks

The interactions and connections among the leading multilateral, economic diplomats working with the EC-case reveal that this group of MEDs bore the traits of an emotional community in which agreement about the positive value of Norwegian membership in the EC was at the very centre. Believing strongly in a Norwegian membership was at the core of what it meant to be a European. The possibility to enforce and uphold such a community of belief was strengthened by the Europeans’ seclusion from the rest of the MFA, a dominant connection with the MoCS, and wholly pro-European corporative and political connections. There was little resistance. An array of other markers have been explored throughout the previous chapters, which played larger or smaller roles in defining the group as a whole depending on the person in question. Background, education, career, generation, connections and beliefs were all woven into the tapestry that made up the Europeans.

409 Interview – Arne Langeland – 1 May 2012. This caused some bad blood between Langeland and some of the older diplomats, who had been passed by.
Conclusions: *Europeans* – a community of likeminded MEDs

The overarching aim of the previous three chapters has been to answer the question: who were the *Europeans*? The conclusions will hold the group up against three ideal types of communities – *epistemic communities, communities of practice* and *emotional communities* – and explore the fringes of the group. What will become clear is that the *Europeans* were, what this thesis calls, a community of likeminded MEDs (see Fig. 3 at the end of the conclusions).

One of the more basic criteria for belonging to the *Europeans* was that one had to be a diplomat. This could be exemplified through someone who was not: Einar Løchen (born 1918) was one of the first in Norway to be genuinely concerned with European integration and supranationalism. In the 1950s he published several articles and books on the subject, and was rather alone in sympathising with the continental European integration project.\(^{410}\) He was a lawyer by training and employed by the MFA between 1949 and 1963. In the early phases of the EC-case, Løchen was the leader of the committee publishing the so-called Løchen-report on the implications of the Treaties of Rome, and he was used as an expert on European integration until 1962. Løchen was also a long-standing board member of the Norwegian Council of the European Movement (NCEM).\(^{411}\) Though Løchen was a proto-*European* of sorts, he did not belong to the group. First, he was not a trained diplomat, though he was employed by the MFA for 14 years. He was first and foremost a legal expert with academic knowledge of the EEC.\(^{412}\) Second, Løchen was only involved with the EC-case in its first two years, and then went on to pursue a career as a lawyer, and later, Chief Justice. One reason Løchen left the MFA was a personal rivalry, where he was seen to step on the turf of the specialised diplomats handling the EC-case.\(^{413}\)

More specifically, the *Europeans* were among the centrally placed diplomats working closely with the EC-case. The MFA was organised in a way that opened up and connected the international and domestic political spheres. Through this institutional adaptation, which happened largely in the outer parts of the ministry, new diplomatic spaces for the emerging multilateral economic diplomats were created. Exploring these spaces in relation to the EC-case, we find that a very limited group of diplomats inhabited overlapping positions domestically and internationally. The range of new tasks and positions the MEDs possessed –

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\(^{411}\) RA – S-1275/Db/Box 277/Folder 2.

\(^{412}\) Interview – Arne Langeland – 22.01.2010; 01.05.2012.

and not least the continuous interaction between them – changed their roles. The MED broke away from the traditional Weberian norms and showed his political propensity.

These boundary-spanning diplomats, populating the MFA from the 1950s onwards, came to understand themselves, and were understood as, experts within the multilateral economic field. This ‘expert’ role apexed a layered, elitist background accentuated by the prestige of their trade. The *Europeans* were, for the most part, specialised diplomats (many of them educated economists) – a fact that revealed itself in their patterns of communication and connections. A unique role was complemented by departmental seclusion, much room for manoeuvre, and a strong connection with other bodies engaged in international trade (the MoCS and the NSA). It was for these reasons, it seems, that the *Europeans* did not count Thorvald Stoltenberg as one of their own. Stoltenberg had many traits that overlapped with the *Europeans*, and shared their cause, but he was not an expert MED and had not worked on the EC-case specifically while serving as a diplomat. This was an important criterion: having multilateral economic career paths (stints in Paris, Brussels or Geneva) not only forged many personal links among the *Europeans*, but it also set them apart from other diplomats. Even the Ambassador to Brussels (1960-65), Nils Anton Jørgensen (born 1911), was excluded from the group.\textsuperscript{414} Jørgensen joined the service in 1939 after serving as unpaid consul to Havana since 1937. An educated economist, he was very much involved in the early stages of the first round of the EC-case (1960-63), but became, in essence, superfluous after the posting of Asbjørn Skarstein to Brussels in 1962. Jørgensen was not considered part of the ‘young war’-generation of multilateral economic experts, and according to several of the *Europeans*, he was relatively uninterested in the EC.\textsuperscript{415}

On the contrary, people like Jahn Halvorsen or Arne Skaug, educated before or during the war (and without having gone through the new DA) were considered part of this ‘generation’, revealing the plasticity of an imagined generation that absorbed a range of non-age-related markers (such as career, like-mindedness, social background and education). Halvorsen and Skaug – both economists – were included because they were recognised experts in multilateral economic diplomacy. However, being experts on multilateral economic diplomacy did not necessarily mean that they had to be educated economists, and many *Europeans* were not. Sigurd Ekeland (born 1921), for example, was a lawyer by education and came from the position as Counsellor to Moscow to become Jahn Halvorsen’s second in command at the Embassy in Brussels between 1966 and 1971. In 1972, Ekeland became

\textsuperscript{414} Following his posting as Ambassador to Brussels went on to serve in Bern (1965-70) and Teheran (1970-75).
\textsuperscript{415} Hvem er Hvem “Nils Anton Jørgensen” \url{http://runeberg.org/hvemerhvem/1973/0295.html} (25.05.2014); Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014.
Minister to Brussels. After his passing away in 1973 the obituary read that “hardly any Norwegian” had a deeper knowledge of the legal aspects of the European Communities.416

The recognised expertise of the Europeans, which became a sought after commodity with the first British application in 1961, gave them traits similar to that of an epistemic community, defined as a “professional network with authoritative and policy-relevant expertise”.417 Moreover, the Europeans, in line with the definition of an epistemic community, came to share the principled belief that Norwegian membership in the EC was for the good of all.418 This belief was in fact the most important criteria separating the Europeans from other MEDs (how it developed over time, will be discussed in the third part of this thesis).

Tim Greve, for example, was not a multilateral economic diplomat, but could still be included among the Europeans (and was described by others as a European) due to his extraordinary commitment to the European cause. He was a long-standing board member of the European Movement, together with Halvorsen, Skarstein, Rogstad, Frydenlund and Løchen.419 By contrast, Håkon W. Freihow (born 1927), Press Counsellor to Brussels in 1971-72 and a convinced pro-European, was not necessarily understood as a European. He had close ties with Berg and Halvorsen but became involved in the EC-case only at a late stage and was not an expert on multilateral economic diplomacy. As Freihow explained in an interview, Freihow also kept a low profile, and stayed out of the EMN, and therefore belonged more to the margins than Greve.420

The exclusion from, and inclusion into, the group of Europeans happened through mundane, situated and recognised practices within the diplomatic domain. Such developments are difficult to grasp, but one gets the sense of a community being brought together through practices that constituted like-mindedness. These are developments similar to what Wenger, Adler, Pouliot and others see occurring within communities of practice: “a community of people that ‘creates the social fabric of learning’, and a shared practice that embodies ‘the knowledge the community develops, shares, and maintains’.”421 Its members continuously renegotiate the community of practice and through this a certain belief in how

419 RA – S-1275/Db/Box 277/Folder 2.
things are and should be done is upheld.\textsuperscript{422} As we shall see, it was the \textit{doing} – the actual work with the EC-case – that bound the \textit{Europeans} together.

It is clear that the \textit{Europeans} developed affective bonds with each other through their work, with a common outlook on the EC being an important component. Both the \textit{practice} and the \textit{episteme} (belief) of the \textit{Europeans} forged them into something akin to what Barbara H. Rosenwein has called an emotional community.\textsuperscript{423} They shared a very specific assessment of what was valuable (membership) and what was harmful (staying on the outside of the Community), and it seems they encouraged and valued certain emotional bonds in relation to the EC-matter more than others. Tancred Ibsen Jr., for example, was marginalised because he had a different, though wholly pro-European, conception of Norway’s relationship with the EC. It was a matter of belonging to those ‘who understood’.

As the discussion above makes clear, none of the markers that defined the \textit{Europeans} were absolute. And to complicate matters more, the composition of the group changed over time, though its core-members remained largely the same between 1960 and 1972. By exploring the fringes of the group of \textit{Europeans}, and holding them up against three different concepts of community, we are able to define them as a highly autonomous, emotionally tight-knit, and elite group of multilateral, economic diplomats with recognised expertise on European integration, and who defined themselves through their passion for, and belief in, a Norwegian EC-membership – a community of likeminded MEDs.

\textit{Fig. 3} below serves as a representation of the \textit{Europeans} and its fringes, including some of their main traits and their connections with each other (1960-1972). The level of involvement in the EC-case (going from pale yellow to red) is based on a source-based qualitative assessment of their practices in the twelve years this thesis investigates. The coloured lines around the name-box (green, turquoise and blue) indicate their education\textsuperscript{424}, and the yellow square in its upper-right corner denotes they were board members of the European Movement in Norway. Last, the lines between the different names indicate the personal and professional connections between the different diplomats. This can never be a hundred percent accurate. Nonetheless, it is valuable to have a representative image of these connections, based on a careful reading of a wide range of sources, not least because they often were decisive in the policy formation regarding the EC-case.

\textsuperscript{422} Wenger and Snyder “Communities of practice” (2000), p. 139, 142; \url{http://www.ewenger.com/theory/}.
\textsuperscript{424} Attachment 1 – Statistics.
PART II
Norway and Europe in times of transition

Chapter 4
Norway and Europe in times of transition

This chapter explores and distinguishes discourses that shaped the Europeans’ world and the society around them in relation to the EC-case. The first section gives a broad historical grounding to the discourse of ‘Europe as the Other’ related to the nation-building process and foreign policy outlook of Norway in the 1800s and 1900s. It traces perspectives and ideas of this process that were still relevant in the 1960s. The next section goes more into detail, and reconstructs the discourses of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ as they developed in the postwar era until the 1960s. The last section deals with some of the fundamental forces that challenged the postwar order in the late 1960s as seen from the perspective of the state in general, and the Europeans in particular.

Three things will become clear: first, the discourse of ‘Europe as the Other’ was deeply ingrained in Norwegian nation-building of the 19th century and the Norwegian foreign policy outlook after its independence. Norway’s postwar foreign policy orientation was greatly influenced by scepticism toward the continent. This discourse came into play in a variety of ways in the EC-case, not least as a rhetorical arsenal for the ‘no’-side. As we shall see in Part III, this was something the Europeans were submerged in, and tried to confront throughout the EC-case. Second, postwar concepts of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ played an important part in the Europeans handling of the EC-case. The importance of interpreting membership in the Community in terms of a continuation of what had essentially been the backbone of Norwegian postwar foreign policy was never lost upon the Europeans. In fact, these discourses were so deep-seated in the MFA that the Europeans were unable to understand how anyone could disagree with their reasoning. This lay at the heart of the failed information campaigns that took place prior to the negative referendum. Third, the referendum in 1972 was a distinctly Norwegian version of the rebellious spirit of ‘1968’. It was a revolt against elites, and a defence of Norway’s historically earned right to ‘self-determination’. This concept united national conservatives and left wing radicals in the struggle against membership.

As this thesis argues, one way to understand how the Europeans worked with the EC-case is through the way they navigated in and engaged with these three discourses.
Europe as the Other

Late spring 1972, a British diplomat thought it amusing to show a list of humorous characteristics that made continental Europeans and Norwegians different, taken from the funny pages of a Norwegian newspaper, to one of his Norwegian colleagues in Brussels:

“Arguments against EEC: They are Catholics; they are capitalists; they are swarthy; they are authoritarians and beat their children; they drive like madmen; they are all gigolos; they are megalomaniacs; they pollute the environment; they oppress the working masses; they are scared to death of Communists; the only thing they know about Norway is that the girls are blonde and serve coffee in bed the day after; they are one great slum; they are indulgent, sell contraceptives under the counter and persecute unmarried mothers; half of them are policemen; they talk funny; they are bureaucratic and do not permit divorce; they manufacture miserable goods; they have double standards; they are always on strike.”

To counter these unbeatable Norwegian arguments against membership, the piece produced a corresponding number of good arguments for the EEC against Norwegians. This list started with, “they are protestant”, and ended, “they are not European.” After having read the piece, the Norwegian diplomat nodded thoughtfully and replied: “both lists seem to fit. As I see it, we ought to have every chance of getting along with each other.”

This was a joke, of course, but it is true that European identity is usually seen in relation to national identity. Bo Stråth argued that, Europe might appear, “as the Other from within, that is, from within what others consider to be Europe, as a kind of self-imposed exclusion. This is the case, for example, when Europe is referred to as ‘the Continent’ in Great Britain and parts of Scandinavia. It is this internal demarcation in particular that we mean by Europe as the Other.”

In fundamental ways, the meaning and identity of ‘Norway’ was constructed and understood in opposition to ‘Europe’, and this discourse was the most fundamental hurdle the Europeans had to overcome in the EC-negotiations. It manifested itself in their strategies and communication; it was evident among the EC-sceptics in parliament; it was equally evident among those within the Community that doubted the Norwegian government’s Europeanness. Most importantly, the ‘no’-side – drawing a direct historical line from 1814, 1905, 1940 to 1972 – won the referendum by successfully defining it as a struggle between

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425 The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten (08.05.1972, evening Ed.) had simply taken a satirical piece from the funny pages of the Swedish newspaper Veckans Affärer, and replaced ‘Sweden’ with ‘Norway’.

426 FCO 30/1472 – Aftenposten, ev. Ed. 8 May.


428 The year the Constitution was adopted, and Norway broke free from Denmark (1814); the year Norway peacefully left the personal union with Sweden and elected to be a Monarchy (1905); the year Norway was invaded.
the concepts of *people, parliament* and *sovereignty*, on the one hand, and *state, bureaucracy* and *union*, on the other. An effective and historically loaded definition of ‘Norway’ and accompanied *othering* of ‘Europe’ lay at the heart of the successful no-campaign. These binary oppositions were not simply constructions – they were powerful symbols that resonated with earlier interpretations and realities of Norwegian history. Much of the explanation, as Danish historian Uffe Østergård succinctly states, is to be found in “the kind of nation-building process Norway went through”. 430

In this respect, 1814 marked a starting point. In the turbulent times following the peace treaty of Kiel in 1814, the Danish Crown Prince Christian Fredrik (resident viceroy in Norway) and the governing elites in Norway – the civil servants – along with some distinguished farmers, convened a National Assembly at Eidsvoll and wrote the first Norwegian Constitution. The Constitution ensured that Norway, handed from Denmark to Sweden as part of the peace settlement, could negotiate with Sweden regarding its role within the new union on a proper legal basis. After some struggle, the Swedish king recognised an amended version of the Norwegian Constitution, and in November 1814 the Norwegian parliament (*Storting*) elected King Charles XIII of Sweden as King of Norway, creating a personal union between Sweden and Norway that lasted until 1905. 431

As Norwegian historian Jens Arup Seip argued, “the national movement was not a prerequisite for ‘1814’, but a product of what happened at that time” 432 The nation did not ‘awake’ one day and articulate itself through a national movement, but was created through a nationalistic ideology carried out by the intellectual and political elites. 433 In short, the construction of a distinct Norwegian identity and political nation in the 19th century happened in cultural opposition to Denmark and political opposition to Sweden – both were defined as foreign and ‘European’. According to political scientist Øyvind Østerud, national distinction was partly found, rediscovered and reinterpreted in the popular culture, and partly postulated by the nation-building intellectuals. 434 This process of redefining political and cultural identity and tying it in with the territorial boundaries of the nation - cultural nation building – manifested itself in many different arenas: language, geography, folklore, educational policies and, not least, historical research.

and occupied by Nazi Germany (1940); and last, of course, the referendum to stay out of the European Community (1972). All are stories of resisting foreign rule, and in particular ‘unions’ of any kind.


Two historians, Rudolf Keyser and P.A. Munch, for instance, distinguished a racially pure and distinct Norwegian genealogy, which was kept alive by the Norwegian free holding farmers, who unlike the Swedish and the Danish, were untainted by European feudalism. The 19th century poet, patriot and ‘historian’ Henrik Wergeland claimed that Norwegian history was made up of two parts – the Viking Age and the time following 1814 – the intermediate 400 years under Danish tutelage was an illegitimate soldering of these two half circles, that historians ought to remove. In the late 19th century, historian Ernst Sars wrote four volumes on Norwegian history (Udsigt over den norske historie) that were important building blocks in the nation building project. One of his lasting contributions was the interpretation of ‘1814’ as a result of the slumbering national spirit of the Norwegian people that was reawakened by the political events of the day. Common in all of the historical interpretations was the centrality of the Norwegian people. “The claim that there existed a separate and subordinate Norwegian subject, with a culture distinct from the Danish”, Neumann sums up by quoting historian Odd Arvid Storsveen: “maybe the most important result of Norwegian historical research in the 1800s”. In this struggle against Danish cultural hegemony “Norway’ and its history [was] created in a conscious and direct opposition to ‘Europe’ and its history”.435

There were, of course, many conflicting representations of ‘Europe’ and Norway’s place in it, but a popular and romantic nationalist movement – represented through the political alliance and party Venstre – increasingly united a cultural struggle, which was mainly directed against Denmark, with a political, democratic struggle waged from the parliament (Storting) and directed against Sweden. The internal enemies, in this struggle, were, among others, the civil servants that clench to their administrative and political powers. Venstre successfully fought for increased democratisation and self-determination marked by two decisive political victories: the establishment of Parliamentarism in 1884 and the successful and peaceful dissolution of the Union with Sweden in 1905. In this, arguably, very European struggle to become a recognised European nation-state, Neumann claims, ”the European Other was not only, not even primarily, seen as an external, continental unit, that stood side by side with the Norwegian. On the contrary, it was deemed as something internal, ‘Danish-Norwegian’ and with extensive control over Norway through the control of the state apparatus. The popular

nationalist’s essential slogan: ‘Out of the union!’ brought up political independence from Sweden and cultural independence from Denmark as equal aims”.  

With the introduction of Parliamentarism in 1884, majority rule and political parties replaced the old civil servant state. Venstre (1884), which had first fought for an equality of nations within the Union, began pushing for Norwegian independence. The restrictions placed on Norway’s independence within the Union were first and foremost in the realm of foreign policy, where Sweden jealously defended its prerogative to have unbridled freedom to act. It was the issues of Norway’s independent right to enter into treaties of international arbitration, trade and shipping treaties – the kind of neutrality that Norway and Sweden should adhere to – and, most importantly, Norway’s right to an independent foreign and consular service that in the end broke up the Union in 1905.  

In foreign policy terms Norway, an independent nation from 1905, formalised its distanced relationship with Continental Europe. As Norway’s first Foreign Minister Jørgen Løvland famously announced, Norway’s foreign policy was to have no foreign policy, and to “keep us from participating in combinations and alliances that can drag us into war-like adventures together with any of the European warrior states”. The aversion of European ‘warrior states’ obviously lay in continuation of the experiences of 1814, in which the Norwegian province (as part of Denmark-Norway) had been drawn into the Napoleonic War, only to be given as a peace settlement to the Swedes. In 1905, however, an implicit British ‘guarantee’ backed the new formal neutrality and strong isolationist streak. Strong Norwegian trade and shipping interests informed this British connection, and the second element of Løvland’s foreign policy was indeed “to secure to the utmost possible our international material relations”. Already here we see the contours of Norway’s postwar foreign policy.  

As Norwegian historian Olav Riste explains, this Atlantic outlook and contempt of the continent was subsequently strengthened:

“(…) the public’s reaction to German submarine warfare against Norwegian merchant ships during the First World War had produced a wave of anti-German feelings, subsequently re-awakened and magnified by the emergence of Nazi Germany. The image of Britain and the United States as the champions of democracy and national self-determination on the other hand, had been strengthened by their victory and by their lead in creating the League of Nations”.  

438 Riste Norway’s foreign relations – A history (2001), p. 75.
439 Riste Norway’s foreign relations – A history (2001), p. 112.
The interwar years saw Norway embarking on a ‘new internationalism’ side by side with its formal neutrality, stressing the rule of law and arbitration of conflicts, with the League of Nations as the main vehicle. Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the League’s failure to act as an instrument of collective peace, however, left the Norwegian government wondering whether its obligations under the sanctions paragraphs of the League Covenant did not pose a direct threat against Norwegian neutrality “as they risked involving Norway in a war between great powers.” With this, and the growing threat of Nazi Germany, Norway slowly returned to isolationism. This attitude, Riste concludes, strongly resembled George Washington’s rhetorical question to the people. ‘Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, humor [sic], or caprice?’ Europe was “foreign territory (...) sinking into barbarism”.

The German onslaught of April 9, 1940, was a rude awakening for the government, which together with the king, managed to escape to Britain and continue its business in exile. With this, neutrality ended: the government now put its faith in the Grand Alliance it had joined, and its “foreign policy became to all intents identical with its alliance policy”. The experiences of the government in exile during the war shaped the strong Atlantic outlook that would mark the Labour Party in the postwar era. In a famous passage from The Times on November 14, 1941, Foreign Minister Trygve Lie gave this shift a geo-historical underpinning: “the sea does not divide but links us together [...] We are an Atlantic nation, and we do want, above all, a strong, organised collaboration between the two great Atlantic Powers”.

A “radical – not to say revolutionary – change of foreign policy direction”, then, lay the foundation for what historian Magne Skodvin has labelled Norway’s ‘functional western connection’ in terms of security, first with Britain, as a continuation of the cooperation during the war, and second with the US in an Atlantic Community that eventually culminated with NATO membership in 1949. To this development Rune Slagstad notes the industrial and ideological western connection that followed:

“America was ‘the free world’ after 1945; the international arrangement with the World Bank, the IMF, GATT OEEC etc. was based on American leadership. But the American hegemony was, with Geir Lundestad’s words, an ‘empire by invitation’. The reconstitution of the Marshall aid to the European Recovery Program took place after a strong initiative from the Europeans,

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441 The Times – 14.11.1941 – Trygve Lie.
not least from the British. (...) What was peculiar was that the Norwegian Labour Party, one of the most Soviet-minded of all the social democratic parties in the interwar period, in the 1950s became perhaps the most American of all”.  

A new ideology – Atlanticism – had become hegemonic. Combined with this were very close ties to Britain, an inherent and historically rooted reluctance to be involved with Continental Europe, and a strong desire to protect its national sovereignty and self-determination, making Norway a somewhat ‘reluctant European’.  

In a speech with the telling title, “European union. False hopes and realities”, which was given to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in December 1949, Foreign Minister Halvard Lange pointed out the direction Norway would follow until the 1960s:

"The Norwegian people, in so far as they take an active interest in the problem, are definitely sceptical towards integration plans, which once more place our economy at the mercy of continental cartels. (...) Much rather than envisaging such a development, most Norwegians would tend to favour the idea of expanding Scandinavian regionalism in the direction of a North Sea and a North Atlantic community, working in, that is, more closely with Great Britain and with the United States. (...) The problem of European union is our common problem. It is one problem among many that we are faced with within our North-Atlantic community. And I’m convinced it can only find its solution in the wider context of Atlantic cooperation.”

We will return to aspects of Norwegian postwar security and prosperity below. Here it suffices to observe that Lange’s guiding words were echoed in Norway’s dismissal of any participation in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Norway’s relationship with the Continent in the last half of the 1950s was increasingly shaped by a tension between the continents and especially Germany’s growing significance for Norway in the military, economic and political field on the one hand, and Norway’s Atlantic policy on the other.

But the ruling Labour government’s aloofness and scepticism towards purely continental endeavours also reflected another aspect of the postwar distance to ‘Europe’. “Distrust of more conservative regimes and policies on the continent was probably a main motive force when the Norwegian government took its position in response to US pressure and joined the British side of the dividing line between federalists and functionalists” in the Council of

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444 Gstöhl Reluctant Europeans (2002).
Europe and within the OEEC”, as historian Helge Pharo concludes. A sense of opposing ideological orientations fed into the Labour Party’s initial reactions to European integration in the 1950s: participation was out of the question due to the continental economic and social policies. It is not entirely unreasonable to see the Norwegian thinking as an expression of self-complacency, and an understanding of the Anglo-Scandinavian welfare model as superior and, to a certain extent, exceptional. Norway’s political elites, therefore, “saw no need to participate in an endeavour that involved a loss of sovereignty to supranational bodies dominated by countries adhering to doctrines ‘inferior’ to their own welfare model.”

Underpinning this social democratic aversion of ‘Europe’ was the ideational opposition between what historian Thorsten B. Olesen has labelled the Continental triple-C – Christian Democrats, Catholicism and Capitalism, on the one hand, and Nordic Social Democracy, Protestantism and mixed-economy, on the other. Nordic cooperation was also interpreted within this framework: as an ideological platform the Nordic countries could serve as the protectors of the social democratic welfare system. Large parts of the Norwegian Labour Party shared this ideological understanding of Norden.

At a European Movement convention in 1963, Halvard Lange – also a trained historian – reflected on what he perceived as the Norwegian detachment from the continent. Norway being a young sovereign nation had come out of the Second World War with its national pride intact and its national unity strengthened, he said, and continued:

In reality it was the 1930s with the rise of Nazism and fascism in Europe that created a barrier between Norway and Europe’s mainland, and provoked the one-sided orientation towards the west, towards the Anglo-Saxon world, that became even more pronounced due to our encounters and experiences during the Second World War.

Britain’s application for membership negotiations in 1961 ended this strict separation between the Anglo-Saxon world and the European mainland in Norway’s foreign policy outlook – “the foundation of our hitherto European policy is about to disappear, and we have to re-orientate ourselves”. Lange ended his speech with an honest reminder: “Norway is a part of Europe, a

part of Western Europe, of the free Europe. Whether we like it or not, this is where we geographically belong, and we have all our cultural roots in this part of the world”.

The constructed meanings of ‘Norway’ and ‘Europe’ changed significantly for each time the matter of membership in the EC was brought up in the 12 years between 1960 and 1972. But the debates – and the two concepts – were always loaded with historical interpretations and realities of Norway’s relationship with the continent. In fact, interpretations of Norway’s historically constructed identity in relation to Europe gave validity to claims and political arguments in an unprecedented manner in the emotionally charged EC-struggle. The *Europeans* were aware of this, and sought to navigate these waters carefully.

**Prosperity and Security**

The *Europeans* belonged to a generation that grew up with early memories of the interwar period and the Second World War, was educated in the early postwar years of reconstruction, and spent most of their careers until 1972 serving a Labour Party government, and, in fact, a single foreign minister. This generation dealt with foreign policy and foreign economic policy in multilateral settings and in the corporative and political system at home. The *Europeans* represented the political order - they embodied, applied and changed the Norwegian postwar state’s understanding of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’. It was these distinct postwar discourses that were challenged through the EC-case.

The period between 1945 and 1973 has many names, one being ‘the age of Social Democracy’. On a Western European, and indeed Western scale, it was a time of mixed economies, social engineering and welfare regimes, under the protective umbrella of Bretton Woods (or more accurately a system of international economic interdependence) and NATO. In the Norwegian domestic context, historian Berge Furre saw ‘the social democratic order’ (1952-77) as dominated by a strong state, economic redistribution, aims of economic growth and full employment with the emphasis put on the industrial sector, a ‘corporative’ system of negotiations between the state and organised interest groups, a regulated and protected market in the primary sectors (agriculture and fisheries) and public

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452 RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 - 10.06.1962 – Chairman: statement nr. 56 - Speech by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange at the European Movement’s meeting in the Old Ballroom of the University, 11.04.1962. The geo-political map of Cold War Europe actually left Norway, Sweden and Finland an island north of the European mainland.


health care, education and cultural services.\textsuperscript{455} It was a period marked by unprecedented growth, remarkable domestic political stability, and sustained peace.

From the outset, the Gerhardsen government’s postwar reconstruction efforts constituted a ‘scientific-industrial’ vision of the future where the state would “develop and exploit rationally and completely all of the country’s productive forces in accordance with the manufacturing techniques made possible by modern science”. The initial aim was “a socialist Norway”, through planned industrialism – a socialist industrialism that would be realised through the democratic institutions and benefit the entire populace.\textsuperscript{456} Prosperity, then, would come through state governed industrialisation. The aim was “to produce oneself into socialism”.\textsuperscript{457} However, social democracy was the result of convergence. The Labour Party reclaimed power in 1945 with elaborate plans of a socialist society, but ended up heading a capitalist welfare state. Tamed by the Cold War’s call for political stability and alignment with other western countries, and shaped in its dialogue with the bourgeois parties at the \textit{Storting}, the Labour Party moderated or left behind its more radical plans. From the mid-1950s, the ruling Labour Party, and indeed the political system as such, had ‘found its shape’ and centred its attention on what became universally ‘good’ goals: prosperity for the many, security for the citizens, and labour for all.\textsuperscript{458}

In Norway, political stability manifested itself through an almost unrivalled political hegemony. The Labour Party was in power from 1935 to 1965, except for the five years of German occupation (1940-45) and three weeks of John Lyng’s (Conservative) centre-right government in 1963. In 1963, historian Jens Arup Seip polemically described the Norwegian postwar political order as ‘the one-party state’, just as the Labour Party’s dominating position was challenged both from the left and the right.\textsuperscript{459} The year 1961 saw the creation of the Socialist People’s Party (SPP, \textit{Sosialistisk Folkeparti}) and the Labour Party’s loss of absolute majority in parliament; 1963 saw the first non-socialist coalition in power, albeit for just three weeks; and 1965 saw the definitive end of the long streak of Labour governments, as a centre-right coalition headed by Prime Minister Per Borten took office. However, the Labour Party returned to power in March 1971 to see the era to its end.

\textsuperscript{456} Labour Party’s “Working Programme” 1945.
\textsuperscript{457} Slagstad \textit{De nasjonale strateger} (2001), p. 264.
\textsuperscript{459} Seip \textit{Fra embedsmannstat til ettpartistat og andre essays} (1963).
The universality of the social democratic order was evident when the Centre-Right coalition (largely continuing the policies of the Labour government it dethroned) put the cherry on top of the welfare cake and introduced a universal social security system (*Folketrygden*) with unanimous support in the *Storting*. Both the Labour Party and the Conservatives (1949) recognised the need for a universal social security system: the welfare state put social equality at the centre of its operational rationale. Danish social scientist Gøsta Esping-Andersen, in fact, has argued that social equality was the cornerstone of the Nordic welfare state. In addition to the universalist social security system, came a strong, redistributive state and public financing through taxation. According to Esping-Andersen, the Nordic welfare state – as opposed to other welfare regimes – sought to minimise the volatile forces of the market on the lives of regular people, and thus reflected distinctly social democratic values. This formed an important part of the feeling of Nordic exceptionalism discussed above.

The 1960s and early 1970s, then, marked both the zenith of the social democratic order and a time of political transformation. A transformation symbolically and physically marked by the end of the last restriction on buying cars, and thus the definitive end of the austerities of reconstruction, in its beginning in 1959, to the oil findings of 1969 and 1970 at its end. However, this domestic perspective conceals the duality of ‘prosperity’ in the postwar era. For it was, in the words of Eric Hobsbawm, the “marriage between economic liberalism and social democracy”, that drove economic expansion.

The liberalisation of trade and the many international and regional organisations facilitating it tamed the Labour Party’s immediate postwar ideas of radical socialism in one state. Pressure came both from the inside, as industrialists and shipowners threatened to rebel, and the outside, as the US and the logic of the Cold War forced Norway to fall into line with the rest of the West. As argued by Milward, postwar reconstruction, the emergence of the welfare state and twenty years of uninterrupted growth throughout Western Europe – a “reassertion of the nation-state as the fundamental organizational unit of political, economic and social existence” – rested on the construction of an elaborate system of an

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463 As Judt notes “merely by removing impediments to international commerce, the governments of the post-war West went a long way towards overcoming the stagnation of previous decades”. P. 325-326.
institutionalised pattern of economic interdependence under American auspices. This intricate system, able to balance the widely different domestic policies of the Western European countries with the strategies and aspirations of the United States, shaped the Norwegian postwar conception of prosperity.

Although the Norwegian government would have preferred a global liberal economic solution, on par with the global scope of the United Nations, this soon seemed an impossible aspiration due to the development of the Cold War. The long-term goal of liberalising trade and the urgent need for hard currency left few options. With the acceptance of Marshall Aid in 1947, the Labour Party agreed to remove restrictions on trade, and entered the OEEC. From 1949 onwards, the Norwegian regime of export and import regulations was gradually removed, and one of the cornerstones of the Gerhardsen government’s initial planned economy crumbled. Through participation in the OEEC, the Labour Party’s planned capitalism, stressing full employment and social policies, was confronted by continental solutions and US pressure. As Ambassador to the OEEC, Arne Skaug wrote of the Continental policies in 1950:

“So-called financial stability, which seems to mean slight depression and reluctance against control and regulations, is what matters to them. They are largely against equalising incomes, and often against public investments. They see trade liberalisation as a goal in itself (...) and do not seem to worry too much about the commitment to full employment.”

Liberalisation was not a goal in itself, but a means to an end, as MoCS Erik Brofoss warned in 1952. On this point, they butted heads with the Americans too, who had a different view of the balance between liberalisation and growth, on the one hand, and full employment, on the other. As a prerequisite for its generous treatment of Norway, the Economic Cooperation Administration (the US government’s agency set up to administer the Marshall Aid, ECA) expected Norway’s government to deregulate its economy. The ECA also pushed for increased productivity. America helped change European capitalism by launching an array of Productivity Councils. In 1950, the ECA wanted productivity centres in all OEEC-countries. “‘Productivity’ was hymned as an ideological alternative (...)”

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469 Pharo ”Utenriksøkonomi og europeisk integrasjon” (1999), p. 3
and company profits”, writes historian Mark Mazower. Soon the NCTU, the FNI and the Labour Party all had their own productivity centres. The OEEC monitored levels of productivity in the different member countries, and the term ‘economic growth’ was first used in 1956. By the time the OEEC was transformed into the OECD, the aim of achieving the ‘highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living’ had made its way into Art. 1 of its founding charter. Here the Americans pushed on an open door, and the notion of planning and engineering to increase productivity resonated with the social democratic ideology. “What is remarkable with the Norwegian development after 1945”, Slagstad notes, “was that it was the Labour movement and its government that was the avant-garde of the productivity-ideology (...) an Atlantic modernisation of capitalism under social democratic direction”.

Still, the Norwegian blend remained a peculiar one. According to historian Hans Otto Frøland, Norway’s political economy had a ‘dual character’:

“On the one hand, Norway aimed for export markets for industry and the merchant navy as well as the importation of capital from abroad. From this it followed that Norway was willing to collaborate in international markets. On the other hand, it sought to shield the primary sector from foreign competition, which implied that Norway would not participate in any preference area that included the primary sector.”

Export-led growth, then, would provide the income to finance a deep modernisation of the country – epitomised by the welfare state. The Labour government pursued this strategy of reconstruction from the outset: “the strategy was exploited within the context of the Marshall Plan. It nourished the failed talks on a Nordic preference area through the 1950s and led to Norway joining EFTA in 1960”.

Apart from the merchant fleet, growth would come through capital intensive ‘industrial modernism’ propped up by Norway’s comparative advantage of cheap hydroelectric power. Energy intensive industries, such as the wood and aluminium processing, grew exponentially in the 1950s and 1960s, hand in hand with the development of hydroelectric power. The

473 Slagstad De nasjonale strateger (2001), p. 316-317, 322. Slagstad notes a radical increase in labour productivity. Productivity was estimated up by 70 per cent in 1960 compared to 1948.
475 Frøland “Choosing the Periphery” (2001), p. 82.
industrial outlet quadrupled between 1946 and the early 1970s. The problem with this strategy, Frøland argued, “was always lack of capital and the danger that international preference areas got in the way of export revenues”. This, among other things, made both the failed OEEC-wide industrial free trade area of 1957-58, and the membership in EFTA, attractive solutions. The same logic meant that Norway could not ignore the EEC.477

This was the ‘open’ economy. The ‘closed’ economy was first and foremost the primary sector, and also a large ‘home industry’ protected from foreign competition and producing for domestic consumption. There was a strong social component to the ‘dual’ economy, which included modernising the fishery and agricultural sector (and the home industry) slowly, without causing social discontent and without depopulating large parts of Northern Norway. Prosperity was meant to benefit all. In the 1950s, for example, parliament decided that the income of farmers should follow the average wage of industrial workers. This gradual shift, Frøland explains, meant vast transfers from the ‘open’ economy to the ‘closed’ through “an ambitious credit and investment policy, and herein we find the explanation for the fear of liberalising the movement of capital.”478 The protection of the primary sectors, of course, also had a hint of Cold War to it, since a depopulated north meant easy access for the Soviets, should they invade. This delicate balance haunted Norwegian negotiators in every international and regional market negotiation in the postwar era.

So what about ‘security’? In the negotiations with the Community and the domestic debates on membership in the EC in the 1960s and early 1970s, economic arguments were at the forefront. A rash reading of sources might lead to the conclusion that foreign and security policy played little part in the decision making process. This is wrong. As we shall see, issues of Norway’s position in the Cold War landscape shaped the Europeans’ economically-founded arguments supporting membership application. Prosperity and security, then, had become inseparable.479

Norwegian foreign policy in the first postwar years was marked by an attempt at ‘bridge building’. In the words of Halvard Lange, Norway was to “cooperate with everyone” through the United Nations (UN) “without taking part in any blocs”. Allied cooperation from the war

477 Frøland “Choosing the Periphery” (2001), p. 87
479 Frøland rejects “the idea that security policy and even foreign policy structured the approach to the EEC membership issue, and even less, determined policy options”, and ‘proves’ this by arguing: “had this been the case, foreign policy and security-policy issues would have been far more conspicuous in perceptions and debates than what they actually were.” Accordingly, Frøland believes Pharo’s argument that “when the Government finally applied for membership rather than association [in 1962], the North Atlantic connection was decisive” is inadequate. Frøland’s claim is exaggerated: for one, it is quite clear that the lack of foreign and security policy debates regarding the EC was a deliberate choice from the Labour leadership in order not to link it with the NATO and nuclear issues that divided the party. Frøland “Choosing the Periphery” (2001), p. 83-84.
had to be maintained, and Norway’s task would be to “do what we can to strengthen the trust between the countries”. 480 Norway had good reasons to avoid alienating the Soviet Union, an overwhelmingly powerful neighbour “in a part of the world that might become an area of East-West confrontation (...).” 481

A string of international events brought the bridge building to an end. In January, 1948, British Foreign Secretary Bevin proposed a Western Union. Then came the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, which by many was regarded as a ‘bridge-builder’ between East and West. The coup deeply influenced a reorientation of Norwegian security policy towards alignment with the West. Last came the Soviet offering of a friendship and cooperation pact to Finland, and rumours that Norway was about to get a similar invitation. Both Minister of Defence Jens Chr. Hauge and Foreign Minister Lange enquired of the Americans how they could support if Norway should be attacked. Shortly thereafter, Riste explains, “Bevin made an urgent request to Washington for negotiations about trans-Atlantic security cooperation ‘before Norway goes under’. The case of Norway thus became one of the triggers for the process which began with the so-called Pentagon talks, continued with the Washington security talks, and ended up with the formation of the Atlantic Alliance.” 482

Foreign Minister Lange had first half-heartedly pursued a Scandinavian solution to the defence issue, an idea that enjoyed strong popular support, not least among Labour Party politicians. 483 When these talks failed, Lange gave a basic explanation for the breakdown: “[i]t was the difference in foreign policy considerations regarding the West that was decisive.” 484 The Ministry of Defence argued, and Lange agreed, that a Scandinavian defence alliance would be an insufficient deterrent. In fact, as Pharo sums up, the German invasion of 1940, the closeness to the Soviets, and the hardening of Cold War hostilities “made it mandatory to seek protection within a Western framework”. 485 The Swedes thought the US and UK would intervene if the neutral Scandinavian alliance was attacked by the Soviets. Minister of Defence Jens Chr. Hauge and Lange, however, doubted the Swedish assumption. 486

Moreover, the Norwegian economy was weak, and in 1949 reconstruction was still the government’s number one priority. In a speech given to the national convention, Lange maintained that if Norway were to commit to rearmament without help from the US, the economic strains would be so great that “we risk creating the foundation for a Communist mass movement in Norway”. 487 This notion, that a weak economy – soon marred by depression and mass unemployment – created fertile ground for totalitarian ideologies, was rooted in the experiences of the interwar period, and was a fundamental part of the MFA’s institutional outlook, from Lange and downward in the system. The rhetoric changed slightly with Foreign Minister John Lyng, but Foreign Minister Svenn Stray reasserted the principle with vigour. Equally, the Europeans would see the increased prosperity they argued would be secured within the Community in this light.

There was also another ‘security-prosperity’ link. A main ingredient in the ‘security’ concept, especially in the early Cold War, was deterrence through the “enormous resources of the United States and its atomic bomb”. For all the European signatories, Riste concludes, “the North Atlantic Treaty had served its purpose by giving them the necessary confidence to go on re-building their economies and strengthening their political stability without fear of being undermined or overwhelmed by the threat of communism.”488 In the midst of the final discussions regarding the Scandinavian solution, another twist was added when the Soviet Ambassador to Oslo asked whether Norway intended to join the Atlantic alliance and if this would entail bases in Norway for foreign forces. The government replied by formulating the so-called ‘bases policy’ – a unilateral declaration that Norway “will not open bases for the armed forces of foreign countries unless attacked or threatened with aggression.”489 With the government’s proposal, Storting’s approval, and Halvard Lange’s signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, most of the basic ingredients of the Norwegian postwar concept of ‘security’ were in place.

Supporters saw the Treaty as a continuation and affirmation of Norway’s wartime Atlantic policy, and ties to Britain, dating back to 1905. Those opposed, on the left, regarded it as giving up the global solution and peaceful bridge building by joining a war alliance that unnecessarily provoked the country’s Soviet neighbour. Until the late 1950s, it was the national-conservative centre-right opposition, and those Lange called the ‘farmers’ of his own party, that worried the foreign minister the most: “in their hearts they have never come to

terms either with the fact that we must pursue an active defence policy or that we have left isolationism behind.”

The resistance against the Atlantic alliance among the communists and the left side of the Labour Party, however, proved more lasting. And from the late 1950s, especially after SPP was created on an anti-nuclear programme, it would be a recurring theme increasing in intensity through ‘1968’. Many of the forces opposed to NATO, both on the left and the national-conservative centre-right, were also opposed to the EEC.

However, both the alliance and Norwegian policy developed. With the outbreak of the Korean War came “the impulse for transforming the political treaty into a mutual security organisation for collective defence, with a high degree of military integration as the ultimate purpose”. This development, among others, formalised the balanced Norwegian approach to Soviet ‘Deterrence’, obtained through membership in the Atlantic Alliance and softened by continued efforts of ‘reassurance’ that the membership was purely a defensive measure. With the alliance, as Rolf Tamnes has argued, the government accepted ‘integration’ into NATO’s defence system to secure allied assistance, balanced against careful ‘screening’, or self-imposed restraints, on Allied military activity in Norway during peacetime. “These measures – not very popular in NATO – were part of a broader Norwegian security calculus, which were aimed at reassuring the Soviet Union and reducing domestic opposition against NATO.” With this balance, the government hoped to maintain NATO’s northern flank as a low-tension area.

The most famous, and hotly contested, self-imposed restraint came towards the end of the 1950s. Following US President Eisenhower’s 1954 announcement of the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’, NATO brought nuclear weapons into its arsenal. With the development of medium- and short-range tactical nuclear weapons, fears of a nuclear war involving Norway were enhanced. In several European countries anti-nuclear weapons movements were demanding a stop to nuclear tests and an all-out ban on nuclear weapons. Fear of a nuclear arms race, or even war, made its way into the Labour Party’s national convention in 1957. Here the so-called nuclear-paragraph was adopted. Together with the ‘bases policy’ of 1949, this was “one of the mainstays of the Labour Party’s - and also Norway’s – foreign policy”. Lange was embittered by the adoption of this “procedural monstrosity” because it

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removed the government’s decision-making responsibility. He likely wanted to keep other options on the table as well.\textsuperscript{495} Even more angered was party secretary Haakon Lie, who thought Gerhardsen let the proposal pass because of a personal preference for adoption – a clear example of a rift between the party’s right wing and Gerhardsen that would increase in strength.\textsuperscript{496} The right-wing believed their fears were confirmed a year later when Einar Gerhardsen, at a NATO summit meeting, surprisingly urged a postponement of the issue of placing medium-range missiles in Europe, and stating that Norway had no intention of storing nuclear warheads or building missile bases on its soil.\textsuperscript{497}

There was, as Tamnes has stated, “a striking continuity in the way Norway [...] looked to the United States for leadership and military assistance.”\textsuperscript{498} Apart from the screening and reassurance Norway was by and large a loyal ally, contributing especially with its merchant fleet and intelligence, always eager to make the Americans take the Northern flank seriously. The built-in dilemma of this balancing act became “acute from the late 1960s onwards as the Northern Flank assured greater importance for the allies.” With the expanding Soviet Kola base and northern fleet, the Northern flank was significantly strengthened as part of NATO’s shift to \textit{flexible response}.\textsuperscript{499} Last, the balanced approach to ‘security’ included the entire Nordic region – what came to be known in the 1960s as ‘Nordic balance’. This was initially an analytical tool, used by journalists and academics to describe the relatively stable security situation in the North as a result of the balance between the different foreign and security policy orientations among the Nordic countries. In turn, the concept became a part of the foreign policy vocabulary.\textsuperscript{500}

This complex balance was part of the MFA’s outlook, and part of the \textit{Europeans’} vocabulary, in the 1960s and early 1970s. Political scientist and policy adviser Johan Jørgen Holst introduced the concepts of deterrence and reassurance in his 1967 publication \textit{Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv}, which was aimed more towards policy-makers than academics.\textsuperscript{501} Holst had close ties with the MFA and the foreign policy leadership throughout his tenure as Head of Research (1970-76) of the Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs

\textsuperscript{495} Nyhamar \textit{Einar Gerhardsen II} (1983), p. 186.
\textsuperscript{496} Haakon Lie \textit{...Slik jeg ser det}, Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag (1975).
\textsuperscript{497} Riste \textit{Norway’s foreign relations} (2001), p. 215.
\textsuperscript{498} Tamnes “Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy” (2014), pp. 47-70, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{499} Pharo ”Post-Cold War Historiography in Norway” (2004), p. 113.
member of the Labour Party’s International Committee, and as member (1967), board member (1973) and later chairman (1982-86) of the EMN. Apart from this, and even more importantly, Lange embodied, and Lyng and Stray continued, this balanced approach and subsequently shaped the MFA in its image.

As explored below, the balanced concept of ‘security’ played out in a number of more or less subtle ways during the EC-case. To foretell two examples: the Europeans’ and the government’s rejection of an association with the EEC in 1961 was, apart from tactical considerations, rooted in the fact that the US saw it as natural for NATO-members to apply for full membership. Norway, the Europeans argued, had to apply for membership – otherwise the Soviet Union could interpret it as a step towards neutrality. However, applying for membership, negotiating, and then choosing some sort of association or trade agreement in the end, would not send the same signals of neutrality to the mighty neighbour in the east. Equally, the Europeans relentlessly shot down Nordek, the Danish proposal for a Nordic customs union following de Gaulle’s second veto, because it upset the frail Nordic security balance.

Since the introduction of Marshall Aid, Norway’s foreign economic policy was formed at the intersection of the preferred Atlantic and global solutions, and the European integration process that actually took place, as noted by historian Helge Pharo in is summary of the years between 1947 and the British application for membership in the EEC in 1961. The OEEC united Nordic countries in a single organisation, including non-aligned countries such as Sweden, without any supranational elements apart from a strong Atlantic connection, which fitted nicely with the Norwegian government’s philosophy. However, both the US and continental states wanted closer, supranational co-operation, accelerated liberalisation of trade and a possible customs union. The US persistently supported Western European economic integration, Franco-German rapprochement and federalist solutions, especially under President Eisenhower. Initially, such plans were not to the liking of Britain and the Scandinavian countries, which instead pursued a loose consultative arrangement through the so-called UNISCAN – a forum that lasted until the creation of EFTA in 1960.

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502 NUPI was a governmental research institution established by the Storting in 1959. Holst later became its Director (1981-86). Neumann and Leira Aktiv og avventende (2005), p. 263.
503 Olav Fagelund Knudsen “Johan Jørgen Holst”. Norsk biografisk leksikon https://nbl.snl.no/Johan_J%C3%B8rgen_Holst (12.08.2015). Holst also had strong personal ties to Stoltenberg, as he was married to his wife’s sister. When Frydenlund became foreign minister in the mid-1970s, Stoltenberg and Holst became two of his closest collaborators in forming the Labour Party’s foreign policy.
504 RA/PA-0992-D/L0015/0013 – To the EMN. From Johan Jørgen Holst.
506 Frøland “Choosing the Periphery” (2001).
chosen by the Norwegian government, then, reflected its traditional closeness to Britain and hopes of global, or at least Atlantic, solutions to economic co-operation. However, as Lundestad has noted, throughout the 1950s all British attempts for “unambiguously Atlantic solutions” were opposed in Washington. The long-term commitment of the US government towards European integration would direct future developments.\(^{507}\)

With an Atlantic orientation, export interests that were either more global (or included Britain and Sweden as important markets), a deep-seated aversion of supranationalism, and a view of Europe as the Other, the Norwegian government dispassionately observed continental integration efforts from afar until they threatened the established Norwegian postwar strategy of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’.\(^{508}\)

When French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed the pooling of coal and steel resources in Western Europe, those who took an interest in Norway considered it a positive development towards peace in Europe, but did not envision any direct Norwegian involvement. The Schuman Plan, drafted by Jean Monnet, sprang out of the conviction that rapprochement between West Germany and France, and closer economic and political integration, could be made possible by sectoral functional integration, rather than lofty federalist schemes. It was also a French answer to the American demand that West Germany be economically integrated. The Norwegian government rejected participation \textit{en principe} (also it was not invited to take part), due to the \textit{a priori} principle of a supranational authority, and in any case the plan had little economic interest for Norwegian businesses.\(^{509}\)

However, foreign policy elites, and particularly Halvard Lange, recognised both the symbolic significance of the two former archenemies co-operating over the two war industries, and the geo-political importance of tying West Germany to Western Europe, and in turn the Atlantic Community. Already in 1949, Lange made it clear to a US audience that, “the only possible solution, as we see it, is to bring the Western German Federal Republic into the family of democratic Western Europe.”\(^{510}\) With the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in the six respective capitals of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg during the winter and spring of 1952, a new, dynamic integrationist centre had been established in the heart of Europe.

The Pleven-plan for a European Defence Community, connected to common European political institutions, was a French response to American demands that West Germany had to be remilitarised, sparked by the outbreak of the Korean War. When the Pleven-plan was presented in 1950, the Norwegian government had scarcely broken away from its policy of neutrality and taken a big leap into NATO. The government would not go against the creation of a European Defence Community, but could not envision Norway participating. The northern flank of NATO could not be under the command of a future continental army, but had to be closely tied to the US command. “Norway rejected direct military co-operation with the continent and confirmed its place in the Atlantic circle”, concludes historian Nils Rohne.511

Following the death of the EDC at the hands of the French parliament, the resurgence of European integration at the Messina conference in 1955, the subsequent creation of a common market (EEC), and a sectoral atomic energy community (EURATOM) through the treaties of Rome (March 25, 1957) forced the Norwegian government to confront continental developments. The Six agreed to create a customs union by mutually reducing tariff and quantitative restrictions in three turns each 4th year, while simultaneously building an outer customs wall. This would constitute a customs union within 12 years (with the possible extension to 15 years). As the negotiations of the Six appeared to be successful, Great Britain launched an alternative solution: a larger free trade area (FTA) including all of the OEEC countries.512 The British proposal aimed to engulf, or possibly block the creation of, the EEC.513 As Milward points out, the FTA served a dual purpose of confronting the emerging common market while cooperating with the Six and bringing them into a multilateral non-discriminatory world.514 The Norwegian government feared the consequences of a continental economic bloc: a closed customs union would raise barriers that could threaten the government’s strategy of export-led growth. As MoCS Skaug stated early in 1958: “the best alternative for us would be that the Six never reached an agreement. We would then be able

to continue our efforts on the basis we had through GATT and the OEEC, and in other ways.”

The other Norwegian concern was the US’s warm embrace of the EEC. Although initially welcoming the FTA, the Americans firmly stressed that it should include the EEC as a unit, and only come into existence after the ratification of the treaties of Rome. They did not want to jeopardise the overriding policy of rapprochement between France and Germany and further developments towards a European federation. Washington gave priority to the plans of the Six over the British Atlantic schemes. For the Norwegian government, however, the FTA could possibly ensure open markets while linking Norway – at a safe distance – to the integration project the US supported. In many ways, the FTA was very close to an ideal solution and the government was willing to go far to reach an agreement. However, in November 1958, the FTA stranded on French aspirations, and soon the EEC developed into the most significant market-political centre of Europe. The creation of EFTA in 1960 – comprising Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal – must be seen in the context of the failed FTA-talks. It was a British backup solution, but would, in the end, prove unsatisfactory. The long dreaded closed continental preference area was now a reality, with the EEC and EFTA seemingly “determined to go their separate ways, and to regard each other as a rival, not a partner”.

In March of 1960, Halvard Lange maintained that he still preferred “broader integration within an Atlantic framework”. While the Danish MFA and British Foreign Office made elaborate plans for every eventuality, including membership in the EEC, no such plans existed – nor were even considered – at the Norwegian MFA at the turn of the decade.

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518 Clive Archer and Ingrid Sogner Norway, European integration and Atlantic Security. Oslo: PRIO (1998), p. 19-22. The Labour governments response to the FTA was carefully optimistic, and it chose to shelve the Nordic negotiations, on-going since the early 1950s, in favour of the FTA negotiations.
521 Richard T. Griffiths “A slow one hundred and eighty degree turn: British policy towards the Common Market, 1955-60 in Wilkes (Ed.) Britain’s failure to enter the European community (1997).
524 Olesen and Villaume I blokopdelingens tegn (2005), p.405-409
The political elite and enlightened opinion makers were blind to the possibility of applying for negotiations with the EEC until Britain turned towards the Continent in 1961. If anything, the government hoped Britain would make sure that any solution to the market split was open, intergovernmental and somewhat Atlantic. The diplomats in the MFA were no exception – the only deviant being proto-European Einar Løchen. Eriksen and Pharo sum up:

“There were no proponents in the government, in the Storting there was a handful of politicians (...) sporadically interested in European matters. Neither Norwegian participation in continental co-operation, nor the relationship with the continent as such was placed on the agenda by the press or the research community of social scientists. Public polls confirm the impression of scepticism and indifference”.

This is significant, in order to understand the massive shift in policy and entrenched perspectives a Norwegian bid for membership negotiations with the EEC entailed. Through their work with membership negotiations, the Europeans drew on, defended, shaped and tried to mediate with the concepts of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’, which were challenged in a variety of ways in the face of an EC that in key areas had fundamentally different solutions. Another, more fundamental, challenge came with ‘1968’, the youth, and the new radical left who considered growth in itself as harmful and as a manmade menace, and who rejected the security that the postwar period was founded upon as ill-concealed neo-imperialism.

‘1972’ – a Norwegian ‘1968’

In Norwegian history, ‘1972’ marks the biggest political earthquake in its time as a sovereign state. As Gleditsch and Hellevik write, the membership issue was experienced as a battle over “Norway’s future in totality” and “no section of society was left untouched”. The struggle between the respective ‘no’ and ‘yes’ campaigns represented a clash between the young, radical left, primary sectors, periphery and grass roots movements, on the one hand, and the old, conservative, social democracy, export industries, centre and the elites, on the other. In many ways it was a distinctly Norwegian ‘1968’.

“1968 did in fact not come to Norway in 1968”, as historian Tor Egil Forland eruditely notes; the year merely represents changes in behaviour and worldview occurring around that time. Feeding into the question of joining the EC was a rebellion against ‘the Establishment’ – the Labour Party elite and its corporative state apparatus – and its alleged

525 Eriksen and Pharo, p. 139-140. My translation.
allegiance with continental capitalism. The winds of ‘1968’ and its anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, anti-bureaucracy, anti-establishment and anti-war, therefore, carried much of the spirit of ‘1972’. It was a revolt against the embedded dogmas of the postwar era. ‘1968’ in Norway, as in Paris, Washington, and most of the West, came to be a symbol of the fight for individual freedom and self-determination. This paradigmatic shift – in sexual behaviour, music, drugs, art, sub-cultures, ecology, women’s and educational rights, to name a few areas – had many similarities across Europe, and in some ways also transgressed the East-West divide. The link between ‘1968’ and the question of membership in the European Communities was, however, peculiarly Norwegian.

Even more important was, if you will, the ‘Norwegian’ element of the no-movement. Mainly the primary sector – but also certain trade unions – played to deep-rooted national sentiments and historically loaded scepticism of Europe as explored above. This, many political scientists argue, reinvigorated longstanding divisions between the traditional political centre and the peripheries. Analysing electoral behaviour, geography and history, Stein Rokkan’s influential 1967 study holds that one of the fundamental divisions in the Norwegian electorate was between the centre and periphery, which was rooted in the slow liberation, modernisation, and democratisation processes that took place between 1814, through 1905 and The Second World War, and the 1960s.

Political scientist Henry Valen argued that the EC-issue cut across ‘normal’ patterns of political conflict, and brought into play many historical cleavages, particularly the urban-rural and the centre-periphery conflicts explored by Rokkan. The dominating conflict in the referendum, then, was between periphery and centre, in both a regional and socio-cultural context. The pro-Europeans held the majority in and around Oslo, and some of the major cities and in municipalities with export industries, but opposition dominated the rest of the country. At Røst – a small fishing community on the outer part of the Lofoten islands – 93.5 percent voted against membership. “For the coastal fisherman”, Tamnes explains, “the national traditions were connected to the peripheral perspective, woven into the prevailing

530 Denmark had similar, though less earthshattering, protests and movements against joining the EC. Opposite Norway, the first Danish anti-Common market movements belonged to the right, and was mainly anti-German and anti-Catholic. If anything the flow of ideas went the other way in this instance. The Danish radical left was inspired by the success of the grassroot organisations in Norway. Bjørklund *Mot strømmen* (1982), p. 100-101, 208-212.
531 Rokkan “Geography, Religion and Social Class” (1967).
circumstances. For the coastal fisherman, the EC was a foreign, continental project. He feared that membership would force upon him deep and fast societal changes threatening his livelihood and his way of life.\textsuperscript{533} One of the two most cited reasons for voting against membership in the EC was the perceived negative effect on the primary sector.\textsuperscript{534}

These conflict patterns led to unfamiliar alliances and conflicts within the political system, demonstrated by the marked shifts in the national elections that followed. The Labour Party lost 12 mandates and 11.2 percent of the vote (going from 46.5 percent in 1969 to 35.3 percent in 1973), while the newly formed Socialist Electoral Alliance (SEA, Sosialistisk Valgforbund) took the elections by storm, gaining 11.2 per cent of the votes, and 16 mandates out of a total of 155. The Liberals were split into two different parties over the issue and took a beating from the electorate.\textsuperscript{535} However, it was the combination of the two forces, epitomised by the creation of an extra-parliamentary ‘People’s Movement Against Membership in the Common Market’ (PM), that worried the pro-Europeans and eventually also secured a majority vote against membership in the EC. A ‘grassroots’ resistance against membership in the Community had been in place since 1961, but remained divided between national conservative and leftist groupings until 1970.

‘Action against membership in the Common Market’ was created in the autumn of 1961 starting with a petition signed by 143 public personalities. The group consisted largely of Labour Party members and former communists, many of them with close links to the “Protest against nuclear weapons” movement organised in 1960-61. There was some tension between the Labour Party faction and those belonging to the newly established SPP. An independent, though similar, organisation was created in Bergen, coining the slogan: ‘No to the sale of Norway’. The Bergen Committee was more successful in reaching out to the non-socialists. The information committee of 1962, created in late December, was the bourgeois counterpart to ‘the 143’. At this stage, extra-parliamentary opposition was divided, though attempts at cooperation were made. In late January of 1963 – after de Gaulle’s press conference – a ‘national conference’ was called uniting leftist and bourgeois forces. In fact, a national council was created with former Minister of Salaries and Prices, Gunnar Boe (Labour), as chairman. Boe had left the government due to disagreements over the membership issue.

In 1967, there was little organised extra-parliamentary campaigning on either side. But by 1970, the anti-membership movements united to become the ‘People’s Movement’

\textsuperscript{533} Tamnes \textit{Ofteelder} (1997), p. 158-159.


(initially many had fought for the name ‘independence movement’). Barrister Arne Haugestad became the daily manager of the organisation. He had already prepared a legal study of the EC for the agricultural organisations. Hans Borgen – Centre Party parliamentarian (1950-69) with many leading positions within the agricultural organisations – was elected as chairman, while leading trade unionist Ragnar Kalheim was elected deputy chairman. The alliance between left and right was thus complete. The committee also had strong connections to the Workers’ Youth League (WYL). The WYL, working with two unions, was instrumental in the creation of ‘The Labour Movement’s Information Committee against Norwegian membership in the EEC’ (LMIC) in January 1972, which legitimised resistance within the Labour Party. The People’s Movement covered 60 percent of the LMIC’s expenses. At its height, the People’s Movement had roughly 130,000 members (roughly one in every ten Novotes), 510 local divisions, 5,000 local officers and a strong central secretariat with 13 people on full salary. The PM’s efficiency and impact was also fuelled by volunteerism.

For the established elites, this was a cultural revolution. EMN campaign manager and former Labour Party secretary Haakon Lie had “never seen such a strange alliance between ardent communists and reactionary farmer politicians”. Lie was horrified that “for two years the agricultural sector pumped who knows how many millions of kroners into a communist guerrilla warfare”, which rendered “the political parties more or less helpless.” This ‘left wing’ of the ‘no’-side consisted of a substantial number of people from Lie’s own Labour Party – an opposition with roots that went far back: the old left that felt that the leadership, in supporting membership in the EC, had left its socialist principles behind. Many also wanted Norway to pull out of NATO. The old left was joined by a new generation of politicians (after 1950) who were deeply concerned with foreign and security policy issues, especially the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They too, fought to bring ‘proper’ socialist ideology back into the party, and loathed the bourgeois tendencies of the leadership. Last, in the late 1960s, even younger WYL politicians brought a marked ‘anti-capitalism’ and spirit of ‘1968’ into the mix. The slogan ‘Socialism or the EEC’ captured the essence of the struggle.

The battle within the Labour Movement was especially hard because of generational divisions, and divisions between its right and left wing. At an extraordinary national

538 Gleditsch and Hellevik Kampen om EF, p. 170-183.
convention of the Labour Party in April 1972, Einar Gerhardsen made a remarkable speech. Trying to keep the party from breaking in two, he stated: “We know that a not insignificant part of the Labour Party voters will vote ‘no’. (...) As I’ve said, if the party does not have any leading members and officials against membership, we should get some, to make it clear that everyone can belong to the Labour Party, including those who vote ‘no’ in the referendum”. Elder statesman Einar Gerhardsen effectively sanctioned the EC-sceptics of the Labour Party, giving them the ultimate stamp of approval.541 In the end, roughly 40 percent of Labour voters in the 1969 election went against the advice of the party leadership and voted ‘no’. So did almost half of the members of the NCTU.542

Another challenge emerged to the left of Labour. Since the late 1950s there was increasing opposition to the dominant right wing within the Labour Party, especially with regard to foreign policy. In the so-called ‘Easter Rebellion’ of 1958, a WYL division (Socialist Students) adopted a resolution against NATO membership, and demanded that West Germany should be denied nuclear weapons. During the Easter holidays, the Socialist Students gathered signatures in support for their resolution from over half of the Labour Party’s parliamentary group. Following a string of protests from the young politicians, the party leadership, headed by Haakon Lie, excluded several party members and the Socialist Students division as a whole.543 These developments were at the root of the creation of the SPP in 1961, which had the explicit aim of taking Norway out of NATO, to ban nuclear weapons, and to end the ‘block mentality’. The immediate reason for its creation was debates within the Labour Party about pre-stocking nuclear arms on Norwegian soil. However, SPP also captured the disappointment among many in the left wing of the Labour Party who thought it had moved too far from its socialist roots. SPP worked for a planned economy, an extensive social security system and economic democracy.544

In 1961, the SPP was elected to the Storting with two representatives, ending the Labour Party’s absolute majority. In 1963, the non-socialist parties and the two SPP representatives toppled the government after its clumsy handling of a tragic mining accident in Svalbard. The SPP kept their two mandates in the 1965 elections. They lost them in 1969 due to internal divisions, only to return as the main force behind the 16 mandates of the SEA in the 1973 elections. During the EC-struggle in the 1970s, the SPP collaborated not only with the rest of

543 Bergh Storhetstid (1987), 428ff. Also marked by strong anti-German feelings and many protests against German rearmament, stationing of German officers in Norway and German access to Norwegian weapon storages.
the left wing but also with the bourgeois forces within several of the extra-parliamentary organisations working against membership. The SPP, together with the communists, were crucial in the early mobilisation phase of the People’s Movement. Polls showed that they made up 32 percent of the members of the PM and 17 percent of those opposed to membership.1968’ and ‘1972’ was, in this context, as much a critique of “the hegemonic narrative of social democratic modernity” as about the EC itself. And the negative referendum was seen as a rejection of this modernity. Famous social realist writer Dag Solstad – in a novel following two worker families between 1945 and 1972 – captured this feeling: “it was a victory of the people, oppressed by Capital and unfree, which moreover had been half-destroyed by the social democratic class treason”.547

In 1964, the EMN reported that the first round of membership debates in Norway (1961-63) had revealed “a pleasing support for European cooperation” among the youth. In fact, all youth sections of the parties in parliament, except the socialist people’s and agrarian youth, were in favour of a membership application in 1962. In 1967, pro-European sentiments prevailed, though there was little enthusiasm. In the WYL, for example, issues concerning the war in Vietnam and NATO-membership took precedence. The issue remained unimportant, in fact, until de Gaulle resigned and the Community reopened membership negotiations with the Hague Summit in December 1969. From then on, the WYL would fight for a Nordic solution, and in April of 1970, a unanimous national convention “strongly opposed the attempts at getting Norway in to the EEC”. At the turn of the decade, therefore, the European Movement’s reports were rather more alarming:

“Contrary to 1962, we may expect that several youth organisation will take a negative stance to Norwegian membership. This is true of the Workers’ Youth League and the Young Liberals. The Christian People’s Party Youth seem to be divided. It is likely that the resistance among the Centre Party Youth will be stronger than 7-8 years ago. After the elections to the Board of the Norwegian Students’ Society [NSS] in Oslo, we may assume that this will be a centre of opposition (...)”

545 Bjørklund Mot Strømmen (1982), p. 292-293. Polls for 1973. To this was added the Maoist anti-EEC front organisation AKMED (Arbeiderkomiteen mot EEC og dyrtid, Workers’ Committee Against the EEC and Inflation) PM and AKMED did not cooperate well, and had many disputes.
550 NSA–7B–30– Regarding information efforts about the EEC.
By June of 1970, the WYL, the Liberal Youth, the Centre Youth and the Christian People’s Party Youth joined forces in a petition against the centre-right government’s Market Report and demanded the membership application be withdrawn. In August they were joined by the SPP and Norwegian Communist Party’s youth in the so-called ‘contact committee’. When the accession treaty was signed in January of 1972, those same groups – now joined by ‘Norwegian Rural Youth’ and ‘Norway’s Youth Society’ – started the ‘Youth Front against the EC’.551 By the time of the referendum, then, all youth parties, except the Conservative Youth, were firmly against membership, and they contributed greatly to the PM’s campaigns, where they served as the volunteers: the ‘foot soldiers’ of the different anti-membership movements.552

“The power elite got their verdict”, read the front page of WYL’s journal ‘Fritt Slag’ after the negative referendum.553 “The big breakup’, as Olstad calls the period in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was carried by a new generation. The world was reinterpreted with different results. “The revolts and protests of the youth gave new impulses and spurred a renegotiating and revaluation of a range of established hierarchies (...) In this way it became possible to defeat the established political machinery in the EC-struggle”, Olstad concludes.554 Equally, historian Terje Halvorsen maintains: “the youth revolt was in full motion and it was easy to portray and perceive the EC as the prototype of the Establishment they turned against”.555 The calling into question of established truths also meant breaking down old hierarchies of authority and power, between the youth and the older generations, students and pupils and teachers, employees and employers, women and men. And rebelling against the elites – as Norwegian poet Harald Sverdrup wrote in 1969.

“Fucking office men, stamp-lickers, silky-slim dandy-hands, fat jobs, do nothing, go out to restaurants, eat smoked salmon with scrambled eggs and grouse in sauce, chug down red wine and whisky, goddamn Oslo-sneaks, sissies, wash themselves everyday, smooth-talking with the girls, pour port on them, string them along, put kids on them and flee the scene

Goddamn,
Chop their heads off,
Throw them down the garbage chute, the lot of ‘em!”556

Sverdrup, though he was 46 at the time, perfectly captured the rebellious mood of the era. ‘1968’, as Forland writes, was not least “a skirmish against the structures of authority, with

their ideals of obedience and ethics of duty, dominating in Norway as in other Western societies in the postwar years.”

This entailed a substantial dose of mocking and provocation.

With the EC-case, in particular the Europeans’ authority – as servants of the government and, by extension, the people – would be challenged and called into question. What had, for the most part, been regarded as professional recommendations from unbiased experts, was now openly called propaganda. With the EC-case, a fundamental renegotiation of the meaning of such concepts as ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ took place. The biggest challenge for the Europeans was that their arguments, and the very logic they were founded upon, carried less validity among many of those who opposed membership. Youth (20-27 years) were the only age segment with a clear majority of No-votes. A survey showed that no less than 64 percent of those between the age of 20 and 24 were against membership in the EC. Another showed that over half of the Labour Party voters (from 1969) under the age of 29 voted against membership. Without the radicalised youth, Finn Olstad concludes, the referendum in 1972 could very well have ended with a victory to the yes side.

The No-movement was built on the enthusiastic participation of many volunteers, but also the generous contributions of the primary sectors. It was easy to create grassroots movements under such circumstances. Opposite what one might think, Bjørklund writes, the movement started as ‘a head without a body’ – that is with a centralised leadership and plenty of resources, and information being distributed out to an increasing number of local branches. Funds were, as the leader Hans Borgen said, used to discipline the members. In this way it was grassroots ideology and top-down management all at once, ensuring not only a well-oiled and far-reaching organisational apparatus, but also unity in its communication. Incorporating a wide variety of political colours and creeds, this was absolutely necessary.

At the centre of the PM’s campaign was the call for ‘self-determination’ (sjølråderett) tied to national symbols and historical traditions. “Here was a mobilising potential, not aimed at any particular class. Essentially it concerned everyone”, Bjørklund notes. Numbers confirm this:

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558 Lahlum Haakon Lie (2010), p. 529-530. Haakon Lie, for example, discovered that a young party member – EC-sceptic, former leader of the Norwegian Students’ Society (NSS) and now parliamentarian Einar Forde – had given a very unflattering recap of Lie’s appearance at the NSS some time back, describing it as: “one of the most pathetic generational meetings imaginable”. Lie was furious: it was outrageous that a book with contributions from party members and published by the Labour Movement’s own publisher should portray a leading figure of the Labour Party in this way.
44 percent of those opposed to membership mentioned self-determination and polls showed that it transcended social class and geography. ‘Loss of sovereignty’ was one of the two most frequent answers to why those who voted against membership had chosen to do so.563 The biggest rally against membership, in Oslo June 7, 1972, counted 12,000 participants marching under the slogan: “Protect the Constitution. Yes to self-government! No to the EC-Union!” In the ‘no’-side’s demands – protection of Norwegian self-determination – national and democratic aspects melted together. Patriotism was mobilised: it was a matter of defending Norwegian sovereignty against foreign rule from Brussels. Norwegian sovereignty was threatened and ipso facto its democracy.564

How sovereignty and democracy – self-determination – was threatened, depended on the outlook. For fishermen and farmers, the PM’s slogan “we want to govern ourselves” might mean the continued right to decide their own wages as they had until now with the agricultural and fishery settlements under the Labour Party.565 Certainly, the agricultural organisations’ main aim was to protect the benefits of the postwar settlement. The campaign was heavily financed by the agricultural organisation. “[W]ithout the primary sector’s self-interest in preventing membership”, Hillary Allen contends, “the outcome could well have been the same as in Denmark”. Again the centre-periphery struggle was evident: Oslo was already a distant centre, and the EEC was too far away, too centralised, and even less likely to take the Norwegian primary sector into account when decisions were made.566

When the Centre-Right coalition left office in March 1971, the agrarian Centre Party entered the no-campaign with full force. Its policy built on two pillars – protection of rural Norway, and the primary sector and the national ideology, and their entry reinforced national conservative arguments against membership. The opposition within the Centre Party, latent since the first application in 1962, was released, and they pulled large parts of the Liberal Party and the Christian People’s Party with them. Accordingly, the foundation for a strong

564 Bjorklund Mot Strømmen (1982), p. 179, 187; Marianne Sundløseether Skinner “Norwegian Euroscepticism: Values, Identity or Interest” in Journal of Common Market Studies, 50:3, Oxford: Blackwell (2012), o, 422-440. Skinner, surveying reader’s letters to Aftenposten between 1960 and 1972, concludes that Norwegian Euroscepticism was concerned with post-materialist values, political culture and rural society. However, she gives no explanatory value to ‘national identity’ in mobilising no-voters. This is because she, in her content analysis of the reader’s letters, rather awkwardly cuts out aspects of national identity in her categories of ‘political values’ and ‘rural society’. The discussion above should prove that this is a pointless exercise. Moreover, she does not mention ‘1968’ or ‘youth’ or ‘the radical left’ once when discussing ‘post-material values’ or ‘political culture’, neither does she mention the possibility of ‘path dependency’ with regards to argumentation between the 1960s and the 1990s. Youth politicians in 1972 were well-established politicians in the 1990s – which makes ‘path dependency’ all the more relevant.
mobilisation of the Norwegian peripheries was laid 18 months prior to the referendum.\textsuperscript{567} Centre Party members and politicians now entered the PM and became the backbone of many local branches, especially in agricultural communities. The Centre Party was, in the end, the party with the highest percentage of ‘No’-votes.\textsuperscript{568} In the PM’s local newspaper from Lærdal – a municipality in Sogn og Fjordane with a strong agricultural sector – the connection between democracy and sovereignty was described in this way: “we were taught to believe that self-determination, tied to the power and influence of our elected representative organs, had always been to the benefit of the every man”. This connection was now under threat, and as one PM slogan read: “the question is whether our political democracy will continue to function as it has developed since 1814, and if our national independence will be preserved as the people decided in 1905”.\textsuperscript{569}

For the left wing, ‘self-determination’ might mean something more radical. The referendum became the most important single event to launch a critique of social democratic modernity. As historian Thomas Ekman Jørgensen explains, “increasingly, the heated debate transformed the arguments of class struggle into nationalist rhetoric regarding Norwegian independence”, connecting it with the tension between centre and periphery – the joint theme being a conflict between official Norway and the ‘Norway of the people’.\textsuperscript{570} By merging the concept of the working class and the people, the communist left could proclaim such things as: “only the working class and the people defend the national sovereignty today. The monopolist bourgeois and their state spearhead the attempts to sell it”, and “the EEC-struggle has revealed who the patriots of our day are, who defends the nations interests against imperialism, and who’s at the front trying to sell our sovereignty.” Patriotism and class struggle was one and the same – the Norwegian capitalist bourgeois were now in alliance with its likeminded on the Continent, and threatened both.\textsuperscript{571}

Also the socialists mixed a fundamental criticism of the Labour Party’s capitalist ‘sell-out’ with a language of nostalgic patriotism. EC-sceptic Sigbjørn Holmebakk, previously active in the anti-nuclear movement and initiator of the SPP, made this clear: “and the truth is, that faith in the Labour Party, is faith in the Conservatives, because they want the same. To trust Bratteli is to trust Willoch.” He ended his speech by stating that power elites now

\textsuperscript{568} Troite and Vold \textit{Bønder i EF-strid} (1977), p. 141.
\textsuperscript{569} Bjorklund \textit{Mot Strømmen} (1982), p. 180, 184.
\textsuperscript{570} Jørgensen “Scandinavia” (2008), p. 246.
\textsuperscript{571} \textit{Klasskekampen} – Årg. 4, Nr. 9 1972: “Forsvar norsk sjøråderett. Stem nei til salg av Norge!”
experienced what they did not believe was possible, “that the power of the people was stronger than the power of capital”.

Ragnar Kalheim, second in command in the PM and longstanding Labour Party member, also cloaked his socialist arguments in national historical sentiments:

“Our political democracy was not the result of the rulers policies, but that of the oppressed. It was the farmers, the intellectuals, together with the national bourgeois that completed the Eidsvoll Constitution. If you haven’t understood it before, you should now, as they plan to incorporate Norway in the Common Market.”

And with that the circle was completed: for the oppressed, free-holding farmer – the bearer of Norway’s distinct national character in much of the history writing of the 19th Century – was indeed one of the most powerful symbols of sovereignty and self-determination in the EC-struggle.

“When we see the foundation for the resistance against the EEC, it appears hopelessly naive to believe that this resistance would vanish if only enough information about the EEC was disseminated”, Gleditsch and Hellevik concluded in a comprehensive study of the respective ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigns. The Europeans, heavily involved in the pro-European information campaigns throughout the decade, knew this. Already by 1961, European Jahn Halvorsen warned of what he thought would be one of the great challenges of the EC-debate:

“Examples from our history, our traditions – think about how our democracy blossomed under the proud years of Venstre in the previous century – make it easy to play on great emotions. Words like ‘national sovereignty’ carry within them a timbre that makes our hearts warmer. If someone can make the claim that someone wants to ‘give up’ some of the national sovereignty, it is easy to gather in opposition to that person. Registering the real world and the actual situation will easily give way to a purely emotional point of view.”

While they were quick to recognise the great mobilising potential of the arguments of the ‘no’-

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575 Gleditsch and Hellevik Kampen om EF (1977), p. 265. Translated by Froland “Choosing the Periphery”, p. 82.
side, the *Europeans* could neither accept their arguments as having any kind of legitimacy nor figure out how to counter them. However, the biggest challenge was perhaps that this was not supposed to be their job at all.
PART III
The *Europeans* and the EC-case

The First Round

Becoming *European*, 1960-1963

“Except for a small number of experts, there weren’t many of us who had acquired much knowledge regarding the practical development of the Community arrangements.”\(^{577}\)


The British application for membership negotiations with the Community in the summer of 1961 was a dramatic change of the UK’s postwar foreign policy and it forced an equally dramatic rethink for the Norwegian government. The three chapters of the first application round centre around the dilemmas and challenges of a Labour government headed by Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen, who suddenly had to carve out a policy towards the EEC. In this entirely new situation, a group of MEDs – those working closest with the EEC – would claim substantial decision making power and meticulously recalibrate Norway’s postwar strategy to fit a choice they came to see as inevitable: a Norwegian application for membership in the EEC. The three years of the first round – from the creation of EFTA to the aftermath of de Gaulle’s veto in January 1963 – turned these diplomats into a relatively cohesive group of *Europeans* who shared a passion for and belief in the Community project, and who had adopted and internalised aspects of the Communitarian logic and language.

As we shall see in the following three chapters, the reinterpretation of Norwegian postwar foreign policy, the partial adoption of the Communitarian logic, and the forging of the community of *Europeans* all evolved through diplomatic practice. In the contested borders and the mediation between the domestic and foreign (political) entities, the *Europeans* shaped Norwegian European policy and, subsequently, themselves.

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Chapter 5
Dealing with Britain

“It is still my opinion that it would be easier for us Norwegians to accept broader integration within an Atlantic framework than within a purely European one. This is naturally connected to our entire traditional cultural and political orientation, and also our economic and security policy situation”.

Halvard Lange, March 1960, on the market schism.

The time between the inception of EFTA and the British, Irish and Danish application for membership negotiations with the EEC was marked by uncertainty: would EFTA and the EEC find a common solution within the OEEC? Would EFTA build a bridge or negotiate en bloc with the EEC? Or would each EFTA member deal with the Community alone? As the preferred solution of the Norwegian government – an intergovernmental Atlantic free trade area – slipped away, the Europeans, dealing with Britain’s changing policy towards the EEC, came to the professional conviction that the only option open for the government was to follow Britain and apply for a full membership. Domestic decision makers, in the meantime, were unable or unwilling to react to the changing circumstances. Thus, many of the policy recommendations and, indeed, choices, emanated from the Europeans themselves. They convinced Foreign Minister Lange and Minister of Commerce and Shipping Skaug, and by the time of the British application in July 1961, an important segment of the foreign policy elite had decided that membership was the only viable option. However, the government had not decided on the issue, the parliament had not debated the matter, and the public was generally unaware of the new situation. What followed, therefore, was a domestic battle that only strengthened the Europeans’ belief in a policy that was largely of their creation.

False EFTA-security

From 1960 onwards the Norwegian Government found itself in a new situation, seeking to continue its established foreign economic policy of creating a large free trade area within an Atlantic framework. Norway was now a part of a free trade area with the articulated long-term aim of uniting the two market constellations in Europe. Throughout 1960, EFTA sought to keep up with the EEC’s tariff reductions. At the same time, it pursued an agreement between the two trading blocs. Though it soon became clear that a purely economic arrangement between the Six and the Seven (EEC and EFTA) within a larger OEEC/OECD

578 The title is borrowed from Ludlow Dealing with Britain (1997).
framework was unlikely, the Norwegian government – long into the fall of 1960 – held on to the vague promise of such a solution.\textsuperscript{580} By the spring of 1961, it became clear to the Europeans and the MFA that the British would seek solutions to their difficulties in solitude. Joint EFTA solutions, or coordinated negotiations, now became the government’s preferred strategy. In July 1961, however, all such hopes were dashed when the British applied for membership negotiations with the EEC, together with Denmark and Ireland. The government now faced the choice between membership and association with the EEC. July 1961, thus, marked the end of a period of time characterised by probing for possible solutions between EFTA and the EEC, and dealing with the re-orientation of Britain.

The Norwegian MFA had two main tasks in this period: first, to get a general overview of the Treaty of Rome, and its implication for the Norwegian Constitution. Assuming that any deal between the Six and the Seven would have to take the Treaty of Rome into consideration, the government now ordered a substantial analysis. The other main task was to carve out a Norwegian stand towards the Six.\textsuperscript{581} The Norwegian government’s response to the EEC’s creation was late considering that the British and Danish administrations had contemplated such strategies since the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{582}

One reason for the late reorientation was that the government, and the diplomats working on their behalf, were quite pleased with the EFTA solution. With the establishment of the EFTA-delegation in Geneva, Søren Christian Sommerfelt was accredited as ambassador, and joined by Counsellor Asbjørn Skarstein and two Embassy Secretaries, Arild Holland and Martin Johannes Huslid. Already by May of 1958, Sommerfelt claimed that the future would not look bright for Norwegian export industry if they could not gain access to the Continental markets, especially those in West Germany.\textsuperscript{583} After the French put an end to the FTA negotiations, in November of 1958 Sommerfelt was one of the first within the administration to bring up the earlier Swedish and Swiss idea of alternative solutions.\textsuperscript{584} Sir Peter Scarlett – British ambassador to Oslo – reported in early December 1958:

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{581} UD 44.5/85 – 6 –11.03.1960 – Records from 1\textsuperscript{st} meeting in the Free Trade Committee, 5 March 1960. In addition, some administrative steps were taken. The earlier mentioned Free Trade Committee held its first meeting in March 1960.
  \item \textsuperscript{583} Røhne De første skritt inn i Europa (1989), p. 40-41.
  \item \textsuperscript{584} Olesen and Villaume, I Blokoppdelingens tegn (2005), p. 424.
\end{itemize}
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Sommerfelt has been cogitating over possible tactical moves by non-Six. One possibility would be the formation of a rival grouping of all non-Six, or alternatively UNISCAN plus Switzerland, which would exchange mutual tariff reductions but maintain unchanged their present tariffs vis-à-vis Common Market powers. He made it clear this was his own personal idea, but the Norwegian delegation may possibly propose something like this when OEEC Council meets.585

Sommerfelt, like his political leadership, thought EFTA (created in January 1960) served Norwegian interests well because it suited Norwegian commercial interests and would force through a necessary modernisation of the Norwegian industrial sector (the so-called home industry).586 The uncompetitive agricultural sector was kept out of the agreement, while the export oriented fishery industry gained lucrative, though limited, access to the British market without having to alter domestic fishery regulation (opening up the waters for foreigners).587 In March, Sommerfelt joyfully told his British colleagues, “the whole idea of the European Free Trade Area had captured the imagination of Norway in the most extraordinary and unprecedented way.”588 EFTA was also supposed to bridge the gap between the two market blocs in Europe:

The aim of the EFTA-countries is first and foremost to create an institution to negotiate an organised cooperation with ‘the Six’. Our hope is that EFTA will prevent the disintegration in Europe that would be the consequence, if each of the ‘outer’ countries were to seek solutions to their economic cooperative problems towards the Six on a bilateral basis. Presuming that there is a political will, it is - in our opinion - wholly possible to work towards a solution that would serve Western Europe as a whole much better than the division that is threatening to solidify now.589

Foreign Minister Lange and the government saw EFTA as a vehicle for a joint solution to the market schism, and as a first step towards an Atlantic solution.

Not everyone was as invested in EFTA as Norway. Denmark’s strong, export-oriented agricultural sector preferred a membership in the EEC, and was deeply disappointed that the government chose EFTA.590 Moreover, much like the Norwegian export industry, the Danish

586 Sommerfelt Sendemann (1997), p. 111. The export and home industry grew to accept, and in the end, fully embrace this limited industrial free trade area. The export industry was initially sceptical because it preferred the larger Free Trade Area, and the home industry was sceptical because they thought the competition would be too tough. Eriksen and Pharo Kald krig og internasjonalisering (1997), p. 309-311.
588 FO 371/150189 – 01.03.1960, Paris – P. H. Gore-Booth (United Kingdom Delegation to OEEC) – Conversation with Mr. Sommerfelt: Norwegian and U.K. attitudes to the European Free Trade Association.
590 Though different parts of the agricultural sector had diverging views, and the critical course may have been chosen for tactical reasons, hoping for compensation.
industrial sector would have preferred a larger European free trade area (though it came to accept EFTA). Consequently, the ‘bridge-building’ aspect of EFTA was of great importance to the Danish government, and a priority in the short and intense negotiations leading to its creation. Denmark needed a market for the agricultural sector (not included in EFTA) to capitalise its industrial sector. The interdependence of the two sectors made Denmark a much more uneasy and anxious EFTA-partner than Norway.  

More importantly, the UK was never content with EFTA. It was, from a British point of view, a viable way to strike a deal with the EEC while still maintaining a free trade area, which had been preferred by British officials since 1955. EFTA would give rise to real trade advantages, stop the other EFTAns from reaching separate deals with the EEC, and hinder the possibility of the UK facing two trading blocs - the EEC and the Nordic customs union. It was a short-term solution: flawed, because the ‘bridge-building’ initiative was little more than words, and weak, as it did not take the plans of the Six or the United States into consideration.  

Why then, was the Norwegian government caught off guard by the British application for membership negotiations? One reason was the UK’s concern with timing. Harold Macmillan (Conservative Prime Minister) was set on applying early in 1961. However, he had to time the announcement so as to avoid a blunt rejection from the French, and to gain broad support in the government and Parliament. Macmillan did not, for example, give an official statement of intention after talks with the new Kennedy administration early in 1961 – talks where the US Government made it clear that a British membership in the EEC was a political necessity. Though the EFTA partners could speculate about British intentions with increasing accuracy, they could not be sure.

Another factor was that the Norwegian government simply didn’t like what they heard – a kind of refusal to accept the drastic changes in British European policy that was taking place. This again would go a long way to explain why the Danish government was not surprised. Already by March of 1961, Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag saw two possible outcomes of the British exploratory talks with the Germans and the French: one was that the

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UK settle their problems with the EEC alone, and the other was a general market solution emerging over time. As a leading Danish diplomat to EFTA stated in May of 1961, the goal for the Danish government had been to secure British access to the EEC as soon as possible, so that Denmark could join and avoid harmful discrimination, especially in the agricultural sector. A third contributing factor could be that British officials were reluctant to fully commit to the emerging new policy themselves. This, combined with the fact that EFTA was an unbalanced organisation dominated by Britain as its greatest power, might have left the policy shift under communicated.

The Europeans, however, did not miss these signs, and came to openly question the sincerity of Britain’s commitment to EFTA, to a Six-Seven solution, and their position in the upcoming GATT negotiations.

**Sticking to the plan**

As the Norwegian government knew all too well, any solution between the Six and the Seven had to be compatible with a larger GATT agreement. On the one hand, they wanted to protect weak industries through special arrangements within the EFTA framework. However, EFTA’s need to keep up with the EEC’s tariff reductions, thwarted Norwegian hopes of a slow pace of tariff reductions, giving the home industry time to adapt to competition. On the other hand, the EECs emerging tariff wall – the Common External Tariff (CET) – would hurt major Norwegian export industries. This wall could partly be overcome through a new round of multilateral tariff negotiations through GATT: the upcoming ‘Dillon Round’ aimed at 20 percent tariff cuts across the board. The EEC, however, had a list (List G) of products of special importance to one or more of the member states, and thus benefited from a degree of protection. The EEC’s Common External Tariff (CET) for List G products was set unusually high. This solution hit Norway especially hard, since 60 percent of Norwegian trade with the Common Market was with List G products. Aluminium, for example, of which Norway was a major producer, had provoked major differences between France (producer) and Germany and the Benelux countries (importers), the end result being a high CET of 10 percent. In

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601 Named after Douglas C. Dillon, Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
short, the Norwegian government was stuck between a rock and a hard place trying to protect some industries, while fighting for the EEC member states to drop their protection on others.

The problem would be tangible by July 1, when the Six would conduct their second internal tariff reduction of 10 percent, and EFTA would respond with its first reduction of 20 percent. As Minister Skaug made clear on an official visit to the Federal German Republic, it was of vital importance to get a speedy solution to the problem of discrimination after July 1, 1960, and the biggest problem in this respect was the List G tariffs.603

Accordingly, Norwegian officials had endorsed a Swiss proposal of a solution between the Six and the Seven following GATT’s so-called most favoured nation basis.604 This proposal was adopted at the EFTA-meeting in Vienna in March. EFTA would reduce its tariffs by 20 percent by July 1, 1960, followed by an OEEC reduction of 10 percent. Furthermore, the Special Economic Committee set up in Paris was given the task of “examining, as a matter of priority, the relationship between the EEC and the EFTA with due regard to the commercial interests of third countries and the principles and obligations of the GATT (...) It should also provide a vigorous impulse to the GATT negotiations and give concrete expression to the determination of the members of both groups to encourage progress beneficial both to Europe and to world trade as a whole.”605

Soon thereafter, however, the Swiss proposal “drowned in exasperation”. The Six, with the support of the US government, passed a proposal to accelerate the implementation of the common tariff. This would widen the market schism.606 The so-called Hallstein proposal (after President of the Commission Professor Walter Hallstein), aimed to reduce the internal tariff by 20 percent instead of 10, and another 20 percent by January 1, 1962. The CET was to start already on July 1, 1960, and not January 1, 1962, as was originally envisaged.

The proposal frustrated the EFTA countries. Responding to a joint communiqué from Eisenhower and Adenauer stating that the Hallstein proposal was “an important contribution to a general lowering of tariff barriers in world trade”, the Norwegian government wrote an aide-mémoire to the Canadian and American Governments availing its frustrations:

In the opinion of the Norwegian Government, an accelerated establishment of the common tariff would not facilitate negotiations aiming at an effective reduction in the level of protection. (…)

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603 FO 371/150266 – 26.02.1960, Bonn – K. B. A. Scott – European Free Trade Association + EEC: discussion with Commercial Counselor in Norwegian Embassy about Mr. Skaug’s visit to the Federal German Republic.
604 UD 44.5/85–6 – 11.03.1960 – Minutes: 1st meeting in the Free Trade Committee, 5 March 1960.
605 FO 371/150189 – 12.03.1960, Vienna – Sir J. Bowker - Communiqué issued by European Free Trade Association Ministers at the close of their meeting on March 11-12 in Vienna.
The establishment of a multilateral association embracing all Western-European countries within the framework of close cooperation with the North American countries is the declared objective of the Norwegian Government. (...) On the other hand, a continuing schism in the economic field in Europe will undoubtedly have repercussions on the political cooperation.\textsuperscript{607}

The British Foreign Office agreed with the Norwegian point of view, and found the aide-mémoire “well argued”.\textsuperscript{608} Through personal diplomacy, Macmillan still pursued a deal between the Six and the Seven, trying to persuade de Gaulle and the US administration to reconsider their positions. Within the British administration, though, a shift was occurring. In the so-called Economic Steering Committee, talks of possible policy options had been going since 1959. By March of 1960, the Foreign Office concluded that all alternatives had been exhausted. Any arrangement “between the Six and the Seven would not meet United States anxieties, and would not meet the protectionist ambitions of the French and possibly others.”\textsuperscript{609} The recognition of this deadlock, led the Committee in mid-April of 1960 to recommend association with the EEC as a policy.\textsuperscript{610} “The experts”, the Prime Minister was told in April, “are increasingly coming to the view that in the end we shall have to come to terms with the Six, in some form of association which would be very close to accepting full membership of a common market.”\textsuperscript{611}

When Macmillan met with Lange and Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen in early June of 1960, he was not yet convinced of the ‘close association’ line carefully explored on a diplomatic level. To his mind, the political costs were too high. In a conversation with Lange, Macmillan reassured him that “the United Kingdom belonged to the European Free Trade Association and would stand by their fellow members.” He confided that he thought they had “a difficult hand to play in trying to reach a settlement with the Six and that patience would be needed. The important thing was to show ourselves friendly and ready to establish a bridge with them.” Lange agreed and was reportedly “very glad to be reassured that the United Kingdom Government would not take any steps towards joining (...) without full consultation with the Seven.” On a question from Lange about the attitude of the US, Macmillan replied, “they were coming round a little to realising that they should not favour the Six at the expense

\textsuperscript{608} FO 371/150268 – 24.03.1960, Washington – Personal for Sir. Frank Lee from Lord Cromer.
\textsuperscript{609} FO 371/150268 – 23.03.1960 – EEC and European Free Trade Association; Draft paper for Economic Steering (Europe) Committee: European Trade problems: possible solution.
\textsuperscript{610} Milward The Rise and Fall of National Strategy (2002), p. 325.
of the Seven.”  Though Macmillan had received many signals from the US government that they preferred solutions in keeping with the Six, the situation with the newly elected President Kennedy was unclear. It seems Macmillan’s hopes were going in several directions. Lange and Gerhardsen, therefore, had no reason to suspect a sudden change of policy from Britain.

**Growing concerns**

Long into the autumn of 1960 the government operated with a vague conception of some sort of arrangement between the EEC and EFTA, preferably within the OEEC/OECD framework. The Europeans within the MFA, on the other hand, became gradually more open to other solutions.

In November 1960, for example, Commission President Hallstein visited Norway to have informal, exploratory discussions with Lange, Skaug and Director General Jahn Halvorsen, and to give a lecture to the Oslo Student’s Association. Hallstein was content with the ongoing British talks with the Federal German Republic regarding the market issues, but ascertained that the Commission wouldn’t suggest any solutions before reviewing the results of these talks. Junior Executive Officer at the Economic Department, Arne Langeland, thought this attitude corresponded with both the first and second Hallstein-memorandums of 1959. The aim of the Commission was, as he saw it, to create a community among the Six through the CET, and not to initiate any common European solutions. Nevertheless, Hallstein brought up what he believed were the three biggest issues if the British were to approach the EEC: the Commonwealth, the agricultural system, and its relationship with the US. Skaug’s answer was that Norway still considered an Atlantic solution, based on reciprocity, within the OEEC/OECD as a minimum solution, and to his surprise, Hallstein concurred.

Following the outrage over the earlier Hallstein proposal, the Commission President had a tough time selling his European visions in Oslo. In what would become one of the most pro-membership Norwegian newspapers, *Aftenposten*, was a report on Hallstein’s visit under the headline “The Common Market is dangerous”. During the Q&A-session, following his lecture to the Student’s Association, leading Norwegian officials and civil servants charged

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616 UD 44.36/5–1 – 05.11.1960 – K. Christiansen – Memo. Professor Hallstein’s visit to Norway – informal talks.

617 *Aftenposten* – 5.11.1960 – ”Fellemarkedet er farlig”.

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him with critical questions. Leader of the Free Trade Committee (FTC), Knut Getz Wold, for example, wondered why a solution within the OECD could not be found, or why the Six couldn’t join the Seven. Jahn Halvorsen followed suit and questioned whether it was true, as Hallstein claimed, that difficult technical problems prevented bridge building between the Six and the Seven. That no solution had been found to the Six-Seven problem, following the French blocking of the FTA-process in 1958, was, Halvorsen maintained, due to a lack of political will and not to technical difficulties. Hallstein, not surprisingly, wholly disagreed. On the other hand, Halvorsen told British diplomats that in his opinion personal contacts with Hallstein were of great importance. Norwegian politicians and officials, he claimed, knew too little of the personality and the beliefs of one of the main architects of the Community, and tended to attach undue importance to the very different and much more favourable views and pronouncements of Dr. Erhard.618

Norwegian officials clearly resented the EEC’s accelerated plans, which, they thought, would hit Norway unreasonably hard. Jahn Halvorsen’s attitude, nonetheless, marks a slight shift in attitude among the diplomats who followed the issue closest. Though he was utterly critical of Hallstein, Halvorsen’s hope that Norwegian politicians would acquaint themselves with the ‘foreign’ views of Hallstein pointed towards a slow, though painful, reorientation. Langeland’s analysis, that the EEC never would initiate any common European solution, pointed in the same direction. It was dawning on who would become the first two Europeans that the government’s chosen strategy might be in need of revision. From this perspective, Halvorsen saw Hallstein’s visit as a way for Norwegian ministers to get to know a possible future partner.

The constant British manoeuvring also fuelled Halvorsen and Langeland’s reorientation. By October of 1960, Halvorsen wrote, “the British bureaucracy, apparently, are getting in the mood for a special settlement between the UK and the Six.”619 De Gaulle’s visit to London in April of 1960, the failed British exploratory talks regarding a possible membership in the ECSC and EURATOM in the early summer of 1960, and talks with the Federal German Republic in August of that same year, confirmed these suspicions. The outcome of the talks between Macmillan and Adenauer led to expert discussions and investigations into which problems they would face with a possible solution between EEC and

618 FO 371/150165 – 12.11.1960, Oslo – Mr. Paterson – Professor Hallstein’s visit to Oslo: lecture given to the Oslo Student’s Association and conversations with Norwegian Officials.
EFTA. These discussions ended up with the Müller-Armack plan, which aimed for a European customs union for industrial products based on the CET minus 20 percent, excluding the agricultural sector and the Commonwealth. However, the French scrapped this plan in January of 1961. Also in October, Arne Langeland had indicated that the British, in the long run, feared losing out on the increase in production level, commerce and economic integration between the Six, which in turn would threaten their leading political position in Europe. Simultaneously, the French, under de Gaulle, added an element of uncertainty. His vision for a closer cooperation among the Six, Langeland stressed, aimed at reaffirming France’s position as a Great Power.

The Europeans had difficulties reading signals from London. This was evident when Halvorsen met with Deputy Secretary to the Foreign Office, Patrick Reilly, in November. In a preparatory memo to the meeting, Reilly was given clear advice: “[u]ntil we have made more progress in our talks with the Germans, there would seem to be little to be gained by discussing with Mr. Halvorsen the more difficult aspects of future relations with the Six, such as the extent to which the Seven might envisage different types of relationship with the Six. (The Norwegians said at the EFTA meetings in Bern that they were in favour of the same relationship for all EFTA countries.)” This secrecy reflected a lack of agreement within the British administration: while some regarded any solutions between the Six and the Seven as unattainable and aimed for an association of sorts, Macmillan still pursued an ambiguous ‘political’ solution with the Germans, hoping to bring the French into tripartite negotiations. Tactical consideration also called for secrecy: as British ambassador to Sweden, John E. Coulson, admitted during the early talks of a Six-Seven solution within the OEEC framework, “[i]f we give the Seven the impression that we are letting them down, we shall have the worst of all possible worlds.”

It was official British policy to keep its EFTA partners fully informed. Nevertheless, the British Government waited until April, at an unofficial EFTA meeting, to confess that they

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620 Alfred Müller-Armack was the State Secretary to Minister of Economy Ludwig Erhard. Thus, he belonged to the circle within the FGR wanting British participation in a larger Free Trade Area. Opposing them were the conservative circle around Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who wanted to maintain a good relationship with the French and entertained a sceptical attitude towards the Scandinavian social democracies. Thomas Rhenisch and Hubert Zimmermann “Adenauer chooses De Gaulle” in Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward (Eds.) Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community 1961-1963, London: Lothian Foundation Press (1996), p. 87-90.

621 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting Thursday 27.04.1961 9 AM, Halvard Lange.


623 FO 371/150326 – 08.11.1960 - F. G. K. Gallagher - Iceland and European Free Trade Association: Mr. Halvorsen’s meeting with Sir P. Reilly; brief on Bonn EEC/EFTA talks, C.P.S.’s visit, frozen fish fillets, acceleration.


were in fact contemplating joining the Community and accepting the Treaties of Rome. To a Norwegian government unwilling to realise the change coming about, this was precisely the problem: since the Labour government, so used to following Britain in foreign policy matters, had the impression that things were as ‘normal’, no new Norwegian policy was contemplated. Furthermore, unlike the Danish government, the Norwegian government was perfectly content with EFTA until the better option appeared. The Europeans, on the other hand, started to prepare for a rather different scenario.

*The contours of a brand new policy*

Early in 1961, several incidents made the Europeans take the British movements more seriously. First, the new Kennedy administration, inaugurated in January 1961, was clearly positive towards a British membership of the EEC. The Kennedy administration was prepared to shoulder the economic burdens of a large discriminatory European customs union, for the furtherance of a strong Atlantic framework, as long as the UK became full-fledged members of the Common Market with all its political implications. Second, Macmillan had continued his high-level talks with President de Gaulle in January, and subsequently President Kennedy in February, and again in April. Third, Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath, the later head of negotiations at the ministerial level, gave an astounding speech regarding British European policy during a meeting in the Western European Union (WEU) between the Six and the UK in February. Norwegian ambassador to Brussels, Nils Anton Jørgensen, dispatched that the speech was received with “unconcealed satisfaction” and that it was characterised as “a complete reorientation of British European policy” among the Six. Last, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville answered Heath with a warmly inviting speech in the Council of Europe in the beginning of March. Though the Europeans could not know this exactly, Macmillan had become convinced over Christmas break that the only remaining choice was for Britain to apply for membership negotiations. Seemingly the French and Americans now took a more favourable position towards British membership in the Community, and the UK was prepared to give concessions in a prospective negotiation. A palpable fear was spreading among the EFTA-countries that Britain would act on its own.

At an EFTA meeting in February of 1961, Edward Heath revealed that the UK was conducting bilateral talks with the Federal German Republic, Italy and France concerning

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British problems. But any special problems that other EFTA-members might have, Heath made clear, would be taken into consideration. Foreign Minister Lange could only take notice. The Norwegian government had no concrete propositions on hand, but was prepared to be flexible if new negotiation came about. At this point the government had no strategy.

In this situation, the Europeans started concrete analytical work: “Could we omit following Britain when they – one way or the other – force themselves into the Community?”, Arne Langeland wrote in a memo, and went on to list the government’s interests if the situation should occur:

To secure ourselves against discriminatory arrangements on ferrous alloy, aluminium and processed wood products in a wide Western European market; to secure that this Western European organisation does not weaken the Atlantic cooperation, economically within the OECD, and politically within NATO; and to fit the Nordic cooperation within this frame.

It was the contours of a brand new policy, the Europeans now tried to fit in with the established postwar outlook of the Labour government.

By April, the Economic Department prepared material on the increasingly probable negotiations. Three things seemed clear, Jahn Halvorsen wrote to Lange. First, Norway now had to choose between membership and a looser association. Second, the UK was aiming at full membership. The US supported this endeavour, and maintained that all non-neutral (i.e. NATO) countries should do the same. Last, he wrote, time was of the essence: the Norwegian bargaining strength would be greatly improved if they could negotiate simultaneously with the UK. Moreover, an association could possibly lead to discriminatory arrangements against the expanding Norwegian industry, and probably also to rights of establishment for foreign businesses in Norway. “We, of course, do not have any guarantees”, Langeland wrote, “but the possibilities of avoiding discriminatory arrangements seems greater [with membership negotiations] than with negotiations for association.” This was echoed from Brussels: with an association negotiation Norway would, as experienced in the FTA negotiations, have to give “significant bilateral concessions to France”. In the trial of strength that would take place in these kinds of negotiations, the Six would be “tremendously strong”.

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632 UD 44.36/6.84–1 – 07.03.1961 – A. Langeland – Memo. The relationship with the Six.
634 UD 44.36/6.84–1 – 20.04.1961 – A. Langeland – Memo. The relationship to the EEC.
635 UD 44.36/6.84–1 25.04.1961, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – CEE. The question of joining the Community.
While Langeland and Halvorsen – together with the Embassy in Brussels – were preparing for what seemed inevitable, Sommerfelt wrote a personal letter to Lange, Skaug and Halvorsen from Geneva, in which he expressed increasing annoyance with the situation. EFTA had always been “the Board of Trade’s baby”, he noted. The UK Foreign Office might sabotage a possible Six-Seven agreement as a way of torpedoing EFTA in favour of full membership in the EEC, Sommerfelt speculated. Civil servants in the Foreign Office, he bitterly remarked, “see it as degrading that a former great power such as Britain today is part of a grouping of small, European ‘peripheral’ states”. Though intra-departmental rivalry might have played a role, this was clearly an exaggeration. Still, the letter epitomises the disappointment felt by many officials and politicians. Sommerfelt, moreover, was especially fond of EFTA: “I only hope (...) that the British do not rush matters. If de Gaulle gives them his infamous cold shoulder, we have only achieved to demonstrate for the world that EFTA is ‘for sale’.

Following this internal discussion, Halvorsen prepared a memo to be discussed in the FTC, which in turn would serve as the preparatory memo for Foreign Minister Lange’s statement in the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs (ECFA). The memo confirmed that the British were now aiming at something far beyond an economic arrangement. It also stressed that EFTA countries had been promised consultations, though these probably would be of secondary importance to the British. Furthermore, it said that solution between EFTA and the EEC was highly unlikely because it did not take into consideration all of the political aspects. Overall, the memo struck a much more positive note than the mere avoidance of discrimination, while it listed the constitutional problems and challenges connected to the free rights of establishment. Towards the end, Halvorsen turned to the core issue: could Norway be seen standing together with the neutral European states, outside an organisation that had to be considered as an economic and political union within the framework of NATO?

A couple of days before his meeting with the ECFA, Lange received a confidential dispatch from Minister Skaug and Halvorsen. They had spoken with Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs to be, George Ball, who had confirmed the Europeans’ thoughts concerning the attitudes of the US and the UK. Skaug and Halvorsen gave clear advice: it is time to get into a negotiation position, for it is no longer evident that the British


have our best interests at heart.\textsuperscript{638} The conclusion reached by two of the leading Europeans, Halvorsen and Langeland, six months before, had reached the political level.

With these statements, and the support of the FTC, Lange met with the ECFA. The parliamentarians of ECFA were deeply divided as to what road Norway should take. Opinions diverged from unbridled enthusiasm to dark pessimism.\textsuperscript{639} Moreover, the domestic situation concerned them profoundly. The Storting and the public were in need of “proper psychological preparation”, according to Conservative parliamentarian Bernt Ingvaldsen. Due to the government’s secrecy, he claimed, the public was lagging behind.\textsuperscript{640} This was soon repeated in the Conservative press: the public and parliamentarians were totally unprepared for what was about to happen.\textsuperscript{641} The ECFA agreed that the government should aim for highly coordinated EFTA behaviour. The government, for its part, was willing to discuss the Common Agricultural Policy with “the greatest caution”, but it was still “profoundly in doubt” as to what would serve Norwegian interests best.\textsuperscript{642} The day after the ECFA-meeting, Foreign Minister Lange wrote to Skaug in Washington:

\begin{quote}
The assessment from the MFA and the MoCS is that we, whether we choose association or membership, scarcely will evade the economic obligations of the Treaties of Rome (...) I am therefore in accordance with your judgement that we need to get into a negotiation position.\textsuperscript{643}
\end{quote}

Lange was officially on board. He had tested the conclusions of the Europeans, the FTC and Skaug with a political audience, and gave his Ministry a cautious green light.

\textbf{Green light given}

In creating a new Norwegian policy, Langeland started to weigh association against membership: not only would Norway be left in an isolated economic position with an association, but more seriously, Norway would also be politically adrift, lumped together with the neutral countries. Such a development could in the long run effect Norway’s relationship with NATO and lead to “a tendency towards returning to the neutrality line that we left in 1949.” Langeland had, in effect, dismissed association as an option with an argument that appealed heavily to Lange’s belief in the Western alliance. Furthermore, he stressed that the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[638] UD 44.36/6.84–1 – 25.04.1961 – A. Skaug and J. Halvorsen – Confidential dispatch from the Embassy in Washington to the MFA.
\item[640] SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting Thursday 27 April 1961 9 AM.
\item[641] Morgenbladet – 02.05.1961.
\end{footnotes}
Six would only reach association agreements with ‘underdeveloped’ countries, such as Greece, or neutral countries, such as Switzerland. Membership, on the other hand, was portrayed as almost inevitable: international economic cooperation already restricted the national use of economic steering instruments, and the question was “if it wasn’t, in reality, illusory to discuss trying to stand on the outside of a long-term development pushed through by strong forces.”\textsuperscript{644} The thrust of the argumentation was so evident and one-sided that the Embassy in Brussels felt the need to warn that the issue of choosing between membership and association should be handled with the greatest care.\textsuperscript{645}

Following consultations with the British in which MFA State Secretary, Hans Kristian Engen, together with Langeland, had urged London to support coordinated and simultaneous negotiations “regardless of what kind of affiliation to the EEC each EFTA-country sought”, Engen told the ECFA in early June that the British aimed to make their intentions known by the end of the month.\textsuperscript{646} UK officials had expressed an interest in a coordinated EFTA-conduct as long as it made sense for the negotiations, but did not want to make any commitments.\textsuperscript{647} They had also told Engen of Macmillan’s upcoming talks with President de Gaulle taking place within the month,\textsuperscript{648} talks in which the British would try to “smoke de Gaulle out”, according to Foreign Minister Lange.\textsuperscript{649} At the end of the meeting, discussions turned to whether Norway should visit the Community countries to examine their possibilities. Though Jahn Halvorsen had recommended such visits in May, Skaug and the government wanted to wait until the EFTA-meeting in London at the end of June.\textsuperscript{650} As Conservative representative Erling Petersen dryly remarked: “it isn’t expedient to send people on the highest level to present a Norwegian standpoint, when in fact no Norwegian standpoint exists in the main question”.\textsuperscript{651}

After the visit to London, Langeland had no illusions and did not believe that any coordinated EFTA-conduct would come out of the EFTA-meeting in London on June 27-29. There was no consensus on what could be achieved through negotiations with the EEC, and there were highly divergent opinions on what kind of negotiations should be chosen.

\textsuperscript{644} UD 44.36/6.84–1 – 12.05.1961 – A. Langeland – Memo. The relationship to the new economic and political cooperation in Western Europe.
\textsuperscript{645} UD 44.36/6.84–1 – 20.05.1961, Brussels – Memo. From the Embassy in Brussels to the MFA.
\textsuperscript{646} UD 44.5/85–9 – 17.04.1961 – Minutes from meeting, April 12, 1961 13.00, in the CIEC. These discussions were suggested by the Free Trade Committee; UD 44.36/6.84–1 – 27.05.1961 – A. Langeland – Memo. Points for State Secretary Engen’s conversations in London regarding the relationship with the EEC.
\textsuperscript{648} UD 44.36/6.84–2 – 31.05.1961 – A. Langeland – Memo. Conversation with Sir Roderick Barclay.
\textsuperscript{649} SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting Friday 9 June 1961 6 PM, Halvard Lange (Labour).
\textsuperscript{650} UD 44.36/6.84–1 – 30.06.1961 – J. Halvorsen – To Skaug. Relationship with EEC – British timetable.
\textsuperscript{651} SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting Friday 9 June 1961 6 PM, Erling Petersen (Conservative).
thought of ‘choosing along the way’ between membership and association, strongly supported by the FTC, was illusory.\textsuperscript{652} Neither the US nor the UK would secure their political interests through such an arrangement.\textsuperscript{653} Though Lange stressed the importance of a unified EFTA front in the first Norwegian parliamentary debate on the EEC-issue (June 5), the Europeans at the core of the events did not believe this to be possible anymore.\textsuperscript{654}

\textit{Declaration and Application}

Nevertheless, the government stuck to its initial plan of a coordinated EFTA-conduct and ‘choosing along the way’, and the ministerial EFTA-meeting at the end of June in London proved to be a disappointment. Its outcome - the so-called London-declaration – stated that EFTA would continue to function until all its members had found satisfactory solutions to their legitimate interests.\textsuperscript{655} It was the Danish government that had gotten the crucial word ‘legitimate’ into the London-declaration. This ensured that each country had room for manoeuvre, and that they could, if necessary, contest the legitimacy of the other EFTA-countries’ interests. A Swedish proposal, backed by the Norwegians, to bind EFTA to conduct negotiations as a group, was left out of the declaration. EFTA “\textit{should} coordinate their actions”, what this meant in practice was not specified.\textsuperscript{656} However, as Frøland points out, in agreeing to the declaration Foreign Minister Lange had “clearly worked from the premise that Norway would seek some kind of formal relation with the EEC, a mandate which, however, only implicitly had been given by Parliament.”\textsuperscript{657} Just shy of a month later – July 25, 1961 – the British government, without further notice, unilaterally decided to apply for membership.\textsuperscript{658} Even as a short-term solution, EFTA had proved dissatisfactory to the UK. British trade was shifting towards the increasingly successful Community despite the tariff barriers. But political changes made the matter more pressing. A Franco-German axis – apparent after the Bonn-declaration in the middle of July – paved the way for a Bonn-Washington axis, bumping Britain down from the ‘second place’ in western power politics.\textsuperscript{659}

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\item[652] UD 44.36/6.84–2 – 02.06.1961, Oslo – Free Trade Committee – Preliminary statement on the European market problems.
\item[653] UD 44.36/6.84–2 – 10.06.1961, Geneva – G. Saxrud and A. Langeland – Memo. EFTA-CEE. Attempt at an analysis of the negotiation situation.
\item[654] UD 44.36/6.84 – MFA statement to the Storting nr. 19/1961. The European market problems. Foreign Minister Lange’s statements to the parliamentary debate 5 June 1961.
\item[655] UD 44.36/6.84–2 – 31.06.1961 – The European market problems. Statement to the ECFA.
\item[659] Gustav Schmidt “‘Master-minding’ a new Western Europe: the key actors at Brussels in the superpower conflict” in George Wilkes (Ed.) Britain’s failure to enter the European community 1961-63, (1997), p. 76.
\end{footnotes}
The Norwegian government was informed of the application by the British embassy in Oslo the day after it was recorded, and was concurrently invited to a new EFTA-meeting at the end of July. At this meeting, the United Kingdom informed its EFTA-partners that exploratory talks would not take them further. The British also gave unequivocal reassurances that they would not take on any commitments without consulting the EFTA-countries and the Commonwealth. Minister Skaug reported on the recent events to the ECFA at an extraordinary meeting on July 31: the UK and Denmark had applied for membership under § 237 of the Treaties of Rome. The Storting was on summer break at the time, but the government had approved of the London-declaration. “With this declaration”, Skaug declared to the ECFA, “the roads ahead are either ‘membership’ or ‘association’.” The ECFA agreed almost unanimously that the government could not go any further before the Storting reconvened after the general election in September. This would not be a problem, Lord Privy Seal Heath reported to Norwegian officials, as the continental summer break was about to start. The first meeting of the Council of Ministers would be in late September. The Gerhardsen Government had time, and certainly needed time. Meanwhile, the London-declaration denoted that Norway could not sit on the fence forever.

**A professional conviction**

By July of 1961, the core of personalities among the Europeans were convinced that the only option available for the government was to apply for full membership. This analysis developed largely because events out of the hands of the Norwegian government changed the game: Britain, Norway’s guiding star in matters of European policy, applied for membership negotiations with the EEC. It is safe to argue that the Norwegian government, by July of 1961, had no policy at all, except a strong fear of abandonment.

The Europeans, however, had slowly abandoned the postwar strategy of intergovernmental free trade within a broader Atlantic framework. Minutely following Britain’s slow reorientation, they turned towards what had been largely ignored by official Norway throughout the 1950s – the Community of the Six. Jahn Halvorsen and Arne Langeland were early to realise the changes in British European policy, and both were early defenders of a Norwegian membership application. Through a mixture of discontent in dealing with Britain, and learning the intentions of the Community and the US, they came to see a membership application as the next logical step. Arne Langeland and Jahn Halvorsen learnt through their work and developed a professional conviction that membership was the

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660 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, Friday 31 July 1961 11:30 AM.
best, and possibly only, solution. Through continuous argumentation, Halvorsen and Langeland, together with Sommerfelt, convinced a small circle of leading ministers of the political necessity of this application. Three arguments produced by the *Europeans* reached Lange and Skaug: first that the British reorientation necessitated Norway formulating its own strategy and that this should be done sooner rather than later. Second, that association - unwanted by both the US and the Community – was a poor choice that would undermine both political and economic interests. The sheer weight of the evidence made this point difficult to ignore. Still, association turned out to be a seductive alternative for all doubters and sceptics in parliament as well as the public well into the early 1970s. Last, membership was a *political* necessity. This resonated with Skaug’s, and especially Lange’s, foreign policy views. Being on the outside of an enlarged Community could mean political marginalisation. This line of argument convinced them to support the membership application in a more fundamental way than simply a method of weighing economic pros and cons. Historian Nils Rohne maintains that Foreign Minister Lange realised relatively early that Norway, for general foreign policy reasons, needed to choose membership.\(^{661}\) This chapter has shown that this happened partly as a result of Halvorsen and Langeland’s reasoning in April and May of 1961.

This major, though slow, revaluation of Norwegian foreign policy happened largely out of the spotlight of both the Norwegian public and parliament. In this vacuum, Halvorsen, and Langeland in particular, were allowed to shape foreign policy in an unprecedented manner. Not only were they professionally convinced, but they also had an ownership in the new policy – membership application. As we will see, these professional convictions would become hardened after meeting domestic criticism. After the general election of September 1961, a whole new struggle started for the *Europeans.*

\(^{661}\) Rohne *De første skritt inn i Europa* (1989), p. 70.
“It’s even doubtful whether the Six will be able to give the neutral countries the possibility to reach far-reaching association agreements. (...) The civil servants the embassy has been in contact with have without exceptions expressed their wish to see Norway starting negotiations for a membership in the Community as soon as possible.”


The British, Danish and Irish applications for membership negotiations in July forced the government to forge a new European policy, or at least make a principal decision on whether to apply or not. At the same time it was quite clear that no decision could be taken until the Storting was reconvened after the summer break, and in effect would have to wait until the parliamentary election in mid-September. On the other hand, the Europeans and the MFA as such, raced against the clock: the London declaration and the joint EFTA decision in Geneva necessitated a certain synchronicity. Through a string of unofficial sounding trips to the Six and the other applicants, the Europeans sought to square the diverging timelines. These unofficial soundings, together with an updated report on the Treaties of Rome, a survey of the different policies of the EEC and a recommendation from the FTC, would serve as the background material for the two parliamentary white papers concerning the Community. Preparing these was among the main tasks of the Europeans.

During the autumn of 1961, opposition to membership within the ruling Labour Party increased: Gerhardsen’s initial position was to apply for an association, because he considered this the option most likely to keep the party united, but there were also those who opposed any kind affiliation with the Community. After a forceful call for uniformity made by Arne Skaug, Halvard Lange and Party Secretary Haakon Lie, loaded with arguments and demands for rapid decision-making from the Europeans, the Labour Party leadership decided that membership was the ‘preferable form of negotiation’ in November 1961. At the same time, a

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664 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting July 31, 1961, Friday, 11:30 AM.
666 UD 44.36/6.84–2 – 23.08.1961 – A. Langeland and A. Skarstein – The governmental white paper about the EEC; UD 44.36/6.84–3 – 06.09.1961 – A. Gunneng – Memo; Parliamentary White Paper nr. 15 and Parliamentary White Paper nr. 67 (the so-called additional white paper).
Parliamentary White Paper was presented. After a long time of uncertainty, the Labour Party came down on an active membership line from February 1962 onwards. In the spring of 1962, the *Storting* first voted to change § 93 of the Norwegian Constitution and thereafter, on April 28, it voted in favour of applying for membership negotiations with the EEC. Within the first months of 1962, the massive opposition and scepticism in the *Storting* decreased to a minority. No such change of heart came about in the general public.

The *Europeans* feared that the prolonged decision making process would leave the government without the possibility to influence the negotiations of the British and Danish, and would be faced with ready-made compromises and deals. The balance between the timetable at home and in Brussels troubled the *Europeans* right up to the *Storting’s* vote in favour of a membership application in April. For ten months, therefore, the *Europeans* were shaped between the diverging pressures of the impatient applicants and the Community and the divided domestic scene. The *Europeans*, already professionally convinced of the need for a membership application, tried to guide the domestic decision making process towards this goal. EC-sceptics, both inside and outside parliament, heavily criticised the *Europeans* for this active guiding. With much reluctance, the MFA was, for instance, forced to reassess the association alternative after having decided at an earlier stage that it was not in Norway’s interest. Through several hard fought domestic battles, the *Europeans* together with the pro-European political leadership strengthened their resolve and conviction in the membership application, and eventually won through.

**Tour de Six**

In August, the *Europeans* planned the government’s unofficial soundings among the Six. They recommended keeping it as informal as possible. The radical newspaper *Dagbladet* had already headlined that “the people should have the final word”, and these were early signs of the growing attention the *Europeans* would have to pay to public opinion. The aim of the informal discussions was to understand how the different member states interpreted the Treaty of Rome, including its political aims, and in which direction — federal or intergovernmental — they thought the Community was heading.

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670 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting October 28, 1961, Saturday, 10:00 AM; SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting November 25, 1961, Saturday, 10:00 AM.
671 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting July 31, 1961, Friday, 11:30 AM.
672 *Dagbladet* – 01.08.61.
On their tour de Six, Einar Løchen, Arne Langeland and Johan Skutle (MoCS) argued that the Norwegian government would have to make clear why it hadn’t yet taken a stand. They suggested highlighting the constitutional challenges. The Constitution, for example, had to be changed for the parliament to be allowed to give up sovereignty to an international organisation. For the Constitution to be amended, a proposal had to be submitted within the first three years of the Parliamentary term. This, the chairman of the ECFA Finn Moe (Labour Party), had done. But the treatment of the proposal could not take place before the first three years of the next Parliamentary term, which would open after the parliamentary election in September of 1961. The procedural problems were real enough, though they did not tell the whole story.

Already at this early stage the Europeans played down the association alternative. Løchen, Langeland and Skutle, who on their own recommendation took part in the soundings, interpreted signals from the Six, other applicants and the US to mean that association was unattainable. This was not an unreasonable interpretation. However, the association alternative had major domestic appeal, and the Europeans, together with Skaug and Engen, thus reluctantly had to set out “the terms and conditions for an association”.

As part of the preparations for the parliamentary white paper, co-ordinated by Arne Langeland and the Economic Department, a revised edition of the so-called Løchen-report was printed. The Løchen report – an assessment of the implications of the Treaties of Rome if Norway should join – was co-written by Einar Løchen, Arne Langeland and Johan Skutle. It bore the name of Einar Løchen, but was not written by him, according to Arne Langeland. Løchen made a first draft, but Langeland thought it was “so poor” that he “rewrote the whole thing”. This is difficult to prove, but it is clear that Langeland wrote much of the actual text with good help from Embassy Secretary William G. Solberg in Brussels. The revised report contained several interesting conclusions. First, it established that the Treaties of Rome did not hinder a Norwegian application that aimed to “clarify the conditions for a membership in the Common Market”. Furthermore, the report concluded, “the experiences of economic cooperation within OEEC have shown that the difference between cooperation between

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675 Løchen and Langeland took part in the Tour de Six with Engen and Skaug respectively.
676 UD 44.36/6.84–2 – 18.08.1961, Oslo – J. Skutle, E. Løchen and A. Langeland – Memo to Minister Skaug. Draft plan for soundings about the European Economic Community.
677 UD 44.36/6.84–2 – 23.08.1961 – A. Langeland – The Parliamentary White Paper about the EEC.
678 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
679 UD 44.36/6.84–1 – 21.09.1960, Oslo – A. Langeland – Private note to Embassy secretary William G. Solberg, about the Løchen-committee’s report.
governments with veto powers and a so-called supranational cooperation, as is the aim of the Treaties of Rome, is – in reality – not as big as it might appear to be.” Last, it was established that close economic cooperation between Western European countries would facilitate closer economic ties with Atlantic powers.\textsuperscript{680} The Europeans were clearly preparing the ground for what they already saw as a political necessity – membership. It was also part of the meticulous process of interpreting, and discursively placing, membership as lying in continuation of Norwegian postwar foreign policy. The document was made for domestic consumption – specifically for an audience of parliamentarians. Langeland himself had suggested that the report should be an appendix to the white paper, and the report was printed and published for general distribution.\textsuperscript{681}

September was full of trekking. From Christian Calmes, Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers, Skaug, accompanied by Løchen and Ambassador Jørgensen, heard that there was much disagreement between the Six about the formal procedure of the negotiations. Norway, therefore, should not worry about the time schedule.\textsuperscript{682} In conversation with French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville and high-ranking diplomat Olivier Wormser, Engen, accompanied by Langeland, enquired about their view on association, membership and the time-schedule. Couve de Murville thought the attitude of the Americans had made association an undesired option. As for the time-schedule, he believed British negotiations would take at least a year, with a ratification process following afterwards.\textsuperscript{683} At the end of September, Skaug finished his hectic round of visits with a meeting with West German minister of economy Ludwig Erhard, and state secretary of European Affairs Alfred Müller-Armack. Skaug initiated the talks by warning the Germans that the Norwegian application would take some time because the public needed information, and the government needed to “clear up some misconceptions”. The application, Skaug thought, would not be ready until the end of November. Erhard answered that the Community wanted simultaneous, but bilateral, negotiations with applicants for full membership. Britain would be prioritised before Denmark, and if the Norwegian government made a decision by the end of November,


\textsuperscript{681} Dagbladet – 12.08.1961.

\textsuperscript{682} UD 44.36/6.84–3 – 07.09.1961, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – Minister of Commerce and Shipping Skaug’s visit to Brussels and Luxembourg, September 12-13. Skaug met with Agricultural Commissioner Sicco Mansholt, Economic Commissioner Robert Marjolin, Secretary-General of the Council Christian Calmes, Commission President Walter Hallstein; Commissioner for External Relations Jean Rey, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, President of the High Authority of the ECSC Piero Malvestiti, Vice-President of the High Authority Dirk Spierenburg, Foreign Minister of Luxemburg Eugène Schauss.

Erhard estimated, this would leave enough time for Norway. Skaug then asked about the difference between an associated and full membership. Erhard replied that associated membership meant that one could not participate in the Community institutions and therefore could not take part in decision-making. Erhard recommended that Norway apply for full membership because it would be easier to accommodate Norway’s specific problems if it were a full member.684

The ministers and the Europeans had learnt three things from the tour de Six. First, all of the Six and the British expected a Norwegian application for full membership. Director de Schacht went so far as to opine, “not under any circumstance would Norway politically and economically part ways with Britain and at the same time place themselves on the outside of cooperation between all the other democratic countries in Europe.”685 Second, all of the Six argued that Norway would have a stronger negotiation position by applying for membership rather than association. Erhard and most of the Commissioners stressed that Norway, with its special problems, would be met with understanding during future membership negotiations. Couve de Murville argued negatively, by making clear that associated membership was not an option. Either way, the end result was that a membership application looked the most appealing. Last, the time-schedule was unclear. Most officials thought the negotiations with Britain would be long, while some – like Malvestiti and Spierenburg – thought that they would be unproblematic and short.686 Importantly, the reports from the Six and the Community echoed the tentative conclusions of the Europeans, and pushed alternative solutions even further to the background.

**Guiding the process**

Engen and Skaug’s conversations served as the background for the FTC’s discussion. On September 15 it concluded:

> “Since the membership alternative serves as the best basis for negotiations, and to specify and discuss the Norwegian reservations, the Committee considers that the negotiations should be based on this alternative. By recommending this procedure, it has not taken a position in the question of membership or association. The results of the negotiations will serve as a basis for the government


685 UD 44.36/6.84–3 – 31.08.1961, Brussels – W. G. Solberg – Possible Norwegian membership in the EEC.

and Storting’s future assessment of whether membership in the Community is pertinent or if we should seek a looser connection through an association”.

The informal soundings, the Løchen-report, and the FTC’s recommendation, together with statements from interest organisations and reports on the Community produced by the MoCS and the MFA, would serve as the foundation of Parliamentary White Paper nr. 15. It was the Europeans’ job to write it.

But the Europeans also saw it as their responsibility to inform and prepare the Storting and the public for the decision ahead. Søren Chr. Sommerfelt, Arne Langeland and Einar Løchen contributed with information lectures, articles, publications and books about Norway and the Common Market. Efforts peaked in late September and early October of 1961, right before the Parliamentary White Paper was submitted. The Europeans understood the perils of the situation: on the one hand, the only option open, to their professional judgement, was to apply for membership; on the other hand, the domestic situation was entirely unresolved. Meanwhile, the public was undecided. Even after the Parliamentary White Paper was published on October 13, polls showed that just over 50 percent of those who had heard of the Community had taken a stand.

More alarmingly, the Labour Party was divided on the issue. Up until the parliamentary elections in September 1961, the government postponed discussions regarding the EEC. In the parliamentary election, to the “general astonishment” of the Labour leadership, the Socialist People’s Party – formed by those excluded by the Labour Party and in opposition to the government’s foreign and security policy – took two seats in the Storting, leaving Gerhardsen with a minority government.

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687 UD 44.36/6.84–3 – 15.02.1962 – Memo. Norway’s position to the European Economic Community and the European market endeavours; Parliamentary White Paper nr. 15 ”About the European Economic Community and the European market challenges.” Attachment 1 “Recommendation to the Minister of Commerce and Shipping regarding the European market challenges from the Committee for matters concerning the Free Trade Association and Nordic Economic cooperation, September 15, 1961.”

688 Parliamentary White Paper nr. 15.

689 Interview – Arne Langeland – 22.01.2010.


Up until the election, the Labour leadership had not given any statements on the EEC-issue, and it was generally acknowledged that those who favoured membership were in the majority. The preparatory work of the Europeans had, therefore, gone silently ahead. A week after the election, Prime Minister Gerhardsen – deeply concerned with keeping the party united – came out in favour of an associated membership. A ‘half-membership’, Gerhardsen thought, would get a majority in the Storting and keep factions within the party content. The challenge, for Gerhardsen, was that he held a minority opinion within the almighty Labour Movement Central Board (LMCB). Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (NCTU) chairman Konrad Nordahl, and vice party leader Trygve Bratteli spearheaded the majority within the LMCB. After coming out in favour of an associated membership and realising that he was in minority, Prime Minister Gerhardsen forcefully engaged himself to secure a long and detailed decision-making process within the party, involving the entire apparatus down to its very grassroots.

In this situation the Europeans actively engaged with the public to clear up any ‘misunderstandings’. Søren Chr. Sommerfelt, for instance, thought that Norway should “as a participant in future negotiations about a European solution, at least mentally prepare for the development that most likely will come about during the 1960s (...) political thinking should be awoken through the debate that will take place.” But not any political thinking; the Europeans wanted to guide public and parliamentary opinion towards the conclusion they had already reached. They did not, for instance, use the Press Department, which would have been the traditional way to communicate the MFA’s opinion to the public. Instead the Europeans themselves first engaged in an uncoordinated effort to educate and inform the public.

Their work with the parliamentary white paper pulled in the same direction. The internal division of the Labour Party led the government to decide that the white paper would be without a conclusion. That is, without a clear recommendation from the government for or against a membership application. The purpose was to inform the Storting, and let it discuss the issue on a ‘free basis’. In light of the parliamentary debate, the government would propose its preferred form of application. Preparing the white paper, CIEC had discussed the issue many times, and it was recommended that even though the government did not chose between association and membership, the FTC’s statement – which recommended

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693 Svein Dahl “Den skjulte pakt”. Manuscript, Historical Institute, University of Trondheim, p. 5. While the Labour Party held absolute majority, historian Svein Dahl strikingly asserted that when the LMCB ”(...) had spoken, it had decided what the government, the majority of the Storting and the trade unions should mean”.
695 UD 44.5/85–9 – 07.03.1961, Oslo – S. Chr. Sommerfelt – Lecture at Polyteknisk Forening.
membership – should be attached to the final document. Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, this statement was sent to the different interest organisations for their opinion. The Europeans exercised considerable administrative power, for they had recommended that the statement became a part of the white paper, and they had decided to send it to the interest groups. The end result, therefore, was a parliamentary white paper that, even without a clear conclusion, was wholly membership positive. Before the government decided to ‘leave the ending open’, the Europeans had written extensive parts of the white paper, and even prepared an alternative conclusion that in the end was left out:

“On the background of the statements from the above-mentioned advisory committees and the employee/employer organisations and the business community, and considering the information gathered through consultations with other EFTA-countries and the European Economic Community, the government is of the opinion that the significant Norwegian interests that are concerned, are best safeguarded by Norway, at an early stage, applying for negotiations with the EEC based on membership.”

Gerhardsen and his supporters pushed for a prolonged decision-making process and an association alternative through party channels; the Europeans worked for a quick decision and a membership line through corporative channels.

When discussed in the ECFA, sceptics in parliament did not fail to comment on the underlying message of the parliamentary white paper. With both Jahn Halvorsen and Arne Langeland present at the meeting, Trond Hegna – belonging to the left wing of the Labour Party – claimed, “in much of the material prepared and crafted by different groups of experts, there has been an obvious tendency towards facilitating the material with the aim of membership.” In the next ECFA-meeting, Hegna resentfully remarked, “[w]ell, the thought [behind the white paper] is evident, there’s a purpose – an objective one seeks to obtain without saying it directly. Some of the expressions used, I would say, are of a more propagandistic character.” Equally, Centre Party representative and former ambassador Erik Braadland accused the Europeans of having “done incredibly little” to clarify the association alternative, saying they had displayed “a form of diplomacy, in this case, which seems unconvincing”. Braadland also wrote a hostile article for the Centre Party paper Nationen. The obligations of the Treaties of Rome were too far-reaching, he argued, and drew

698 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting October 28, 1961, 10AM, Trond Hegna.
699 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting November 7, 1961, 9AM, Trond Hegna.
700 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting November 7, 1961, 9AM, Erik Braadland.
historical parallels to the Danish-Norwegian union and the Constitution of 1814.\textsuperscript{701} Those in favour of an application tried, much the same way as the Europeans, to play down the significance of choosing between different forms of applications. “The British kept on travelling for 1 and \(1/2\) year, trying to test the terrain”, Skaug contended, “[t]hey came to the conclusion that the only way to find out anything, was to start negotiating. I think we are in the exact same situation.”\textsuperscript{702} It was, in other words, a matter of choosing the preferred starting point; one could still choose along the way.

By late autumn of 1961, therefore, the public, parliament and government was divided and undecided. The Europeans had worked extensively with preparations at home, their conclusions shaped by the intersection of their talks with the Six and applicant countries, and their perceptions of the domestic situation. Lange and Skaug, together with the Europeans, knew that an associated membership was all but impossible to obtain. Moreover, both foreign policy and economic considerations, as analysed by the Europeans, spoke in favour of applying for full membership. There were also tactical considerations: Norway’s bargaining strength, the argument went, would increase considerably by negotiating together with Britain and Denmark. Moreover, signals sent to the international community by applying and failing, were fundamentally different than those sent by not applying at all. A non-application would put Norway in the same category as the neutrals, and open up the possibility of Soviet pressure.

The Europeans’ strategic documents and public engagement went beyond what one would expect from diplomats in service of a government that had yet to reach a final decision. The sense of policy ownership was strong.

**Diverging pressures**

Envoys wrote back with their different assessments of the postponement of the principal decision by the government. To Ambassador Sommerfelt in Geneva, the situation was not dramatic: the government could wait until February 1962 without hurting Norway’s chances. Britain and Denmark were negotiating things that would not affect Norway negatively, he contested, and either way, the EFTA-countries had agreed to wait for one another.\textsuperscript{703} Sommerfelt was rather alone in his opinion. The Brussels embassy, for one, wholly disagreed: February would be too late, it said, and would decrease the government’s bargaining strength.

\textsuperscript{701} Nationen – 20.10.1961.
\textsuperscript{702} SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting October 28, 1961, 10AM, Arne Skaug.
\textsuperscript{703} UD 44.36/6.84 – 09.10.1961, Geneva – S. Chr. Sommerfelt – Deadline for Norway’s start of negotiations with the EEC.
and room for manoeuvre. Moreover, Ambassador Jørgensen complained, “when we, after all, have left the impression in the six capitals that a decision would be reached after a parliamentary debate about the issue in October, I believe that a long postponement would be unfortunate and seem very inappropriate.”

Skaug chose Jørgensen’s, and not Sommerfelt’s, dispatch to make his point to the ECFA. A decision, one way or the other, would make the diplomatic process much easier, Skaug contended. It was easier to get information and establish contacts if Norway had a formal connection with the Community, whether that was through a membership or association application.

It seems both the Europeans, and the Foreign Minister and Minister of Commerce and Shipping were a bit puzzled by the situation. Lange, for example, asked Director General Halvorsen whether it was possible to apply without specifying if it was for membership or association. This was not an option, Halvorsen replied; one had to choose. If membership was chosen, Norway had to accept the principles of the Treaty of Rome. Two days later, Lange laconically summarised the situation at the opening of the Storting debate: “If we choose to start negotiations on the basis of membership, many reasons seems to speak in favour of us not waiting too long with the decision.”

At the same time the MFA, MoCS and the FTC continued indefatigably with what would become the next parliamentary white paper – an addition to the already existing white paper. It would, unlike the first white paper, present a clear conclusion. Responding to the critique, the government charged the MFA and the MoCS with assessing the association and trade agreement alternatives more thoroughly. The option of ‘remaining on the outside’, as the trade agreement was called, was quickly rejected because it would “lead to stagnation in our exports”. The association alternative was, on the other hand, dealt with in an extensive report written by Arne Langeland. The report was entirely negative with regard to an associated membership: there would be limited access to a major market; Norway would be kept from influencing common policies; it would be detrimental to the wishes of the US; special demands and reservations on the part of Norway would be met with counterclaims from the Six; and association negotiations would only begin after the British and Danish

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705 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting October 28, 1961, 10AM, Arne Skaug.
706 UD 44.36/6.84–4 – 18.10.1961 – Jahn Halvorsen – Memo to the Foreign Minister.
707 UD 44.36/5–4 – 24.10.1961 – Foreign Minister Lange’s statement in the debate opening the Storting. The market problems.
708 UD 44.36/6.84–4 – 20.10.1961 – Addition II to Parliamentary White Paper nr. 15 “overviews and reports regarding the European market problems.
709 UD 44.36/6.84–6 – 27.11.1961 – Draft from the MFA and MoCS. A general assessment of the consequences of Norway standing completely outside the European Economic Community.
negotiations were completed.\textsuperscript{710} Langeland, as before, based his assessment on what had transpired on the \emph{tour de Six}. There was no need to dwell on an alternative that, to his mind, didn’t exist. Those parliamentarians sceptical to membership had demanded a thorough analysis of an association alternative – but this was hardly what they hoped for.\textsuperscript{711}

Not surprisingly, the Norwegian postponement was not well received in the Community. Vice President of the Commission Robert Marjolin said that a delay until February would be unfavourable as the British might find solutions to their problems that were detrimental to Norwegian wishes.\textsuperscript{712} Paul-Henri Spaak was unsure – he would repeat many times – about whether Norway showed the will needed to take part in the Communities political cooperation. And, as Jørgensen reported, “all of the Six” were now waiting for the Norwegian application.\textsuperscript{713} And it also caused reactions among the EFTAns. In particular, the British were growing increasingly impatient.\textsuperscript{714}

Following many dispatches conveying disappointment among the Six, the frustration among the Seven, and how the government was pressed for time, Lange and Skaug, together with Minister of Industry Kjell Holler and Party Secretary Haakon Lie, tried to unite the party behind the membership line, wanting the additional parliamentary paper (nr. 67) ready by December 8.\textsuperscript{715} The ECFA held a total of five meetings to discuss the EEC at the end of November. Minister Skaug informed the ECFA that the government wanted a decision from the committee before Christmas.\textsuperscript{716} At a later meeting, Skaug handed out a report prepared by Halvorsen to make his point: Sweden, Austria and Switzerland would apply for an association in mid-December, and Portugal would apply for something similar to the agreement the Community had reached with Greece in January. With no decision before Christmas, Norway would be the only EFTA-country yet to take a stand.

Furthermore, Skaug estimated that a Norwegian application after Christmas meant real negotiations in April. By that time, Denmark would negotiate issues concerning Norway, such as rules of establishment and capital transfers. If these issues were settled, they would be difficult to reopen as every negotiation position taken by the Community had been negotiated between the Six first. Thus, reopening issues would mean an entire new round of intra-

\textsuperscript{710} UD 44.36/6.84–6 – 22.12.1961 – A. Langeland – Memo. The question of connection with the EEC in the form of association.

\textsuperscript{711} The report was sent to Skaug, Lange, the Free Trade Committee, CIEC and all the embassies concerned, and served as a basis for Parliamentary White Paper nr. 67 (1961–62).

\textsuperscript{712} UD 44.36/6.84-6 - 09.12.1961 - J. Halvorsen - Conversation with M. Marjolin, vice president of the Commission.

\textsuperscript{713} UD 44.36/6.84–6 – 27.10.1961, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – EEC. The political cooperation.


\textsuperscript{715} Nils Ørvik (Ed.) \emph{Fears and Expectations. Norwegian attitudes towards European integration}, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (1972), p. 11. 29.11.1961, Skaug speaks in favour of full membership at a trustee meeting for Oslo Labour Party.

\textsuperscript{716} SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting November 16, 1961, 10AM. Arne Skaug.
Community negotiations. Last, the Six were planning to create a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Norway would only be invited to take part in the preparatory work, said Commissioner of Agriculture Sicco Mansholt, after they had applied for membership.\(^ {717} \)

Several parliamentarians reacted to the strong pressure applied by Skaug. Kjell Bondevik (Christian People’s Party), for example, thought that, “to rush through, despite everything, would be the worst thing to do in this situation”.\(^ {718} \) The ardent anti-Common Market man, Hans Borgen (Centre Party), moreover, complained that the FTC was given too little time, and in any case was composed of the wrong people. To this Skaug answered that even though the FTC was not specifically created for the Common Market issue, the same experts would most likely have inhabited it.\(^ {719} \)

Still, the Labour Party ended up postponing the issue again. On December 1, the matter was sent through its entire organisation, including regional and local divisions.\(^ {720} \) The postponement led to the strange situation in which the leadership came out in favour of membership before the grassroots organisations had given their recommendations. On November 22, the NCTU came out in favour of applying for membership, and on November 30, the LMCB unanimously recommended, “it would be for the best for Norway to apply for negotiations on the basis of membership”.\(^ {721} \) The government had first aimed to propose the white paper on December 8, and also ask for authorisation to start negotiations on the basis of full membership. When the parliamentary group met on November 29, the Prime Minister presented a new, more thorough, procedure. The end result was something in between, with leadership making their recommendations in favour of full membership negotiations, while a final decision would have to wait until the national convention on February 15, 1962. Before the national convention, the government would abstain from making a final decision.\(^ {722} \) The rest of the parliamentarians and the ECFA were informed of the decision through the newspapers\(^ {723} \), and later by the Labour Party’s parliamentary leader, Nils Honsvald:

“It was, as you know, the government’s intention to present the additional white paper some time next week as a step in the treatment of this case. The Labour Party’s parliamentary group have now asked the government to postpone the white paper, with the aim of delaying the final evaluation until after New Year. The background for this [choice] is the public debate [...] It has

\(^ {717} \) SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting November 25, 1961, 10AM. Arne Skaug; On the point of agreements between the Six being difficult to revise, exemplified with the British case, see Ludlow *Dealing with Britain* (1997).

\(^ {718} \) SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting November 25, 1961, 10AM. Kjell Bondevik.

\(^ {719} \) SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting November 25, 1961, 10AM. Hans Borgen and Arne Skaug.


\(^ {721} \) AA – Labour Movement Central Board Meeting 30.11.61.

\(^ {722} \) Haakon Lie ...Slik jeg ser det, Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag (1975), p. 227.

\(^ {723} \) Arbeiderbladet – 01.12.1961
not at all been possible to have a factual debate. Those against, have served – I have to say – the simplest sort of demagogy...”

Nils Hønsvald’s reasoning was that those opposed to membership had muddled the decision making process. Gerhardsen, for his part, aimed to “get as much support for the decision we will reach as possible”. On the other hand, the unanimous LMCB’s decision meant that Gerhardsen supported the decision to apply for full membership. To this, Gerhardsen commented that he had wanted to make a well-informed decision, and that he therefore “had waited for a long time to make his final decision”. The unanimous decision of the LMCB, he unenthusiastically remarked, “covered his view as well”. Strong forces within the Labour Party worked against a membership application. And outside the official political circles, the left wing of the Labour Party, and those to the left of Labour, were organising extra-parliamentary demonstrations against any kind of membership, with slogans circling around ‘sovereignty’, anti-NATO, anti-capitalism and anti-German sentiments. These were the demagogues Hønsvald referred to.

From December onwards, therefore, the Europeans began countering the ‘demagogy’. When a Centre Party parliamentarian held that their Swedish sister-party claimed a Norwegian association would be in the interest of Sweden, for example, Halvorsen immediately wrote to Lange and requested permission to gather evidence to the contrary and send it to ECFA. Equally, Langeland wrote a letter to the editor of Arbeiderbladet to correct what he felt to be incorrect and simplified statements made by leftist Health Director Karl Evang regarding the rules of voting within the Community. Following the Community’s of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on January 14, Nationen (Centre Party) contended that it opened up “frightening perspectives for Norwegian agriculture”. The following day, Arne Langeland responded by sending a secretary to the Norwegian Farmers’ Union to debunk the false claims made in Nationen. This was, one could argue, simply a matter of informing the public of factual matters, but it was done with much persistency and considerable conviction.

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724 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting December 1, 1961, 12AM. Nils Hønsvald.
725 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting December 1, 1961, 12AM. Einar Gerhardsen.
729 UD 44.36/6.84–6 – 08.12.1961 – A. Langeland – Mr. Editor.
730 Nationen – 05.02.1962.
731 UD 44.36/6.84–6 – 06.02.1962 – A. Langeland – Memo. Very likely Eivinn Berg
Towards an application

In anticipation of the final ‘go-ahead’ from the government, the Europeans finished the additional white paper and prepared for two parliamentary debates to take place before the application could be sent: one debate regarding the amendment of § 93 of the Constitution and a second debate on whether and how to apply for negotiations with the Community.

Apart from preparing the white paper and debates, the Europeans continued to defend the membership policy. This was done either by engaging in polemics with newspapers such as Nationen, or by creating extensive documents in favour of membership - this was especially important in order to secure support within the Labour Party. One of the last things Arne Skaug did as minister before becoming ambassador to London\textsuperscript{732}, was order a political document from the Europeans. Cabinet members used the highly polemical document in lectures or discussions in order convince doubters within the Labour Party prior to the National Convention on February 15. The document followed a strict format of objections to membership on one hand, and counter-arguments on the other. One headline, for example, read, “Bourgeois or social-democratic economic policy”, with the first sentence, “Some people have claimed that the Treaties of Rome binds the member states to a bourgeois or private-capitalist economic system. But this is a misunderstanding, or even worse a deliberate misinterpretation”. The scepticism towards surrendering sovereignty was countered with the argument that the labour movement had never been nationalistic or isolationist. It had always sought solidarity and cooperation across borders, to harness the capitalist powers and secure peace. It was “against this background we have to understand the question of national sovereignty”.\textsuperscript{733} Foreign Minister Lange received another document, prepared by secretary Eivinn Berg, to be used at the Convention. The Foreign Minister was to give a speech on the special economic arrangement Norway needed, and the conclusion read: “a Norwegian membership in the EEC can not be seen as preventing the creation of industrial democracy giving influence and participation to the workers in the workplace”.\textsuperscript{734} That a conservative diplomat from shipping circles such as Eivinn Berg could engage in classical socialist scholasticism, showed the rhetorical limberness of the Europeans.

The Labour Party came out in favour of membership. The first draft of parliamentary white paper nr 67 “About Norway’s position to the European Economic Community and the European efforts of cooperation”, was completed on February 21. The white paper was now

\textsuperscript{732} January 13, 1962. O. C. Gundersen took over as Minister of Commerce and Shipping.
\textsuperscript{733} UD 44.36/6.84−7 – 18.01.1962, Oslo – Problems in connection with Norway’s relationship with the EEC.
\textsuperscript{734} UD 44.36/6.84−7 – 02.02.1962 – E. Berg – Talking points for the Foreign Minister (draft).
to be discussed by the government and the FTC, before being debated and voted on in the Storting. Foreign Minister Lange, joined by Halvorsen, met with the ECFA in late February to give his account of the situation. Lange could finally declare that the government was intent on applying for full membership. On the other hand, Lange thought the presentation of the white paper would have to be postponed for another week in order to include the remaining comments from the FTC. He stipulated that a debate in the Storting could take place at the end of March or beginning of April. The news of yet another delay, and the strong opposition among EC-sceptics, caused an outburst from the Embassy in Brussels. Jørgensen, or at that time perhaps more likely Asbjørn Skarstein (moved to Brussels to take care of EEC matters), demanded a certain level of realism in the Norwegian negotiation strategy.

The government discussed the draft of an additional white paper nr 67 at the end of February and sent it back to the Economic Department, where secretary Berg edited it. One of the changes made was to substitute the word ‘union’ with the word ‘community’. ‘Union’, in the heated debates over loss of sovereignty and fear of continental powers, elicited historical memories of Danish-Norwegian and Swedish-Norwegian unions. Every detail was streamlined in order to secure a majority. Based on the white paper, the ECFA then gave its recommendations to the Storting in March. Soon thereafter, the Storting adopted a new § 93 of the Constitution: a ¾ majority in the parliament was needed in order to pool sovereignty with an international organisation within a limited area. The constitutional obstacle to membership had been removed.

From a rather heated parliamentary debate regarding the constitutional amendment, the Europeans created a register of arguments used against the government and the membership application. Some of the accusations were directly aimed at the Europeans. The harshest allegation was that they had done a poor job in translating the word ‘union’ to ‘community’. Parliamentarian Trygve Bull (Labour), for example, thought that the original German word ‘zusammenschluss’ had to serve as the basis for translation.

In the now deeply divided ECFA, accusations against the Europeans were equally harsh. The Committee’s recommendation was soon ready, and it was already evident that there would be at least one minority statement. Chairman Finn Moe was frustrated by the process, and complained that they couldn’t even agree on simple factual matters. The minority feared

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735 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting February 21, 1962, 15:10PM. Halvard Lange.
736 UD 44.36/6.84–8 – 21.02.1962, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen (A. Skarstein) – Norway’s position in relation to the economic and political Community in Europe.
738 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting March 1, 1962, 09:30AM.
739 UD 44.36/6.84–9 – Register of arguments against the Common Market.
that an application under § 237 – that is for full membership – was not only a matter of choosing the preferred basis of negotiation, but bound the government to membership. With much justification, they argued against the rather weak argument that applying only meant choosing a starting point, and that Norway could change to an association along the way. This notion stemmed from “The Free Trade Committee’s fatal misunderstanding”, Trond Hegna (Labour) claimed, and it was this misinterpretation that had created bitter divisions within the ECFA. Hegna also accused the Europeans and others, in their selection of statements from interest organisations’ statements in parliamentary white paper nr 15, of hiding the differences of opinion that were expressed. Finn Moe replied that the MFA and MoCS had to withhold a lot of information, for example a discussion regarding special arrangements, in order not to weaken Norway’s negotiations position. Furthermore, Langeland’s document on the association alternative was heavily criticised for being “significantly polemic with the aim to show how impossible this [option] is”.740 Last, the Europeans translation of the word ‘union’ to ‘community’ was once again condemned for being deliberately mistranslated. Berg had indeed chosen the word ‘community’ as he felt ‘union’ had an unfortunate historical ring to it.741 In the newspaper Dagbladet, journalist Alf Rølfsen wrote about it under the headline “The binding text of the Treaties of Rome and the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Norwegian twist”.742

It is worth noticing that much of the criticism and distrust was aimed specifically against the Europeans. It was of course due to the fact that they had produced much of the material available for scrutiny. But there were also two underlying assumptions in the criticism: first, that the Europeans were wholly intent on membership, and second that they pursued this policy regardless of ‘real’ Norwegian interests. These first, and one must assume unpleasant, encounters with parliamentarians, the press and public, proved the explosiveness of the issue to the Europeans, and clearly show that they were keenly aware of the historically loaded connections between the foreign domination of Denmark and Sweden and the imagined domination of ‘Europe’.

The parliamentary debate regarding Norway’s possible negotiations with the Common Market commenced on April 25. The MoCS had prepared much of the material for the debate, but Arne Langeland had prepared a long memo for the Minister of Commerce and Shipping regarding the minority statement from the ECFA. Here he nuanced and refuted their arguments. Among other things, he argued against the minority’s understanding of the

740 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting March 29, 1962, 10:00AM, Finn Moe, Trond Hegna.
741 UD 44.36/6.84-8 – 24.02.1962, Oslo – E. Berg – Draft Parliamentary White Paper: “About Norway’s position to the European Economic Community and the European efforts of cooperation”.
742 Dagbladet – 04.04.1962.
use of a qualified majority in the Community. For Langeland, this was not a matter of exploiting small countries, as he felt the minority claimed, but a design that protected smaller countries. Furthermore, he wrote that it was “pure demagogy to claim that foreigners can buy Norwegian mountain ranges as long as they have enough money.” The whole document went on like this, and was meant as an arsenal of arguments to be used by Minister Gundersen during the debate.

After 40 hours of debate over four days, where almost every parliamentarian and minister participated, the Storting first rejected a proposal by Finn Gustavsen (SPP) not to apply for any kind of membership at the present time, but instead ask for a purely commercial trade agreement after Britain’s membership had been secured, with 148 votes to two. Then votes were cast over the minority proposal of applying for associated membership negotiations (§ 238). There were two different statements proposing this, one tabled by Johs. Olsen and Trond Hegna (Labour) and one prepared by Per Borten, Erik Braadland, Hans Borgen (Centre Party) and Kjell Bondevik (Christian People’s Party). The proposals were defeated by 112 votes against 38. Last, the Storting approved the proposal of the majority to apply on the basis of article § 237 of the Treaties of Rome. Thirty-seven parliamentarians voted against, among them seven from the Labour Party.

“Can it be defended (…) to contemplate an alternative that places our country outside the development that is taking place, and which will lead to a new constellation (…) for the first time in recent history will include Britain?” Lange asked in the debate, “[m]y judgement is that such an alternative is out of the question, and I cannot understand the arguments underpinning such a point of view.” To Lange and the Europeans, Norway could not, in this situation, remain on the outside. After ten months of intense domestic debates the government was ready to apply for membership.

**Shaped in the Middle**

The Europeans came into the domestic debate with a ready-made professional conviction: Norway needed to apply for full membership negotiations. Through their diplomatic connections and travels they came to the conclusion that association was out of the question, as it was unwanted by the Six, the other applicants, and the US. They shared this opinion

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745 UD 44.36/6.84–12 – 28.04.1962, Oslo – Telegram.

746 UD 44.36/6.84–12 – Foreign Minister Lange’s statement in the Storting. Common Market debate.
with Lange and Skaug. The Europeans worked with the membership issue through two parliamentary white papers, two parliamentary debates and several domestic battles. Faced with growing domestic resistance, the Europeans sought to guide the debate. This was especially the case with parliamentary white paper nr 15, in which the Europeans wanted enough positive statements to make the argument in favour of membership evident, even without a conclusion. The reactions were strong: the Europeans were accused of deliberate misinformation and forced to revisit the association alternative. In this domestic climate, their resolve and conviction hardened and they increasingly engaged in debates against those opposed to membership.

From 1962 onwards, the government officially came out in favour of membership, the Europeans task was therefore to prepare for the upcoming parliamentary debate. Ministers, such as Arne Skaug, drew extensively on the Europeans expertise in order to counter the many arguments against membership.

But the Europeans were equally influenced by the attitudes and reactions from the Community. Not only was their timeline largely structured to meet the expectations among the Six, Langeland and Skarstein, among others, internalised Communitarian arguments. Langeland’s argument that supranational institutions and majority voting would protect the smaller countries was a typical example.747 Another example was when Skarstein (or possibly Jørgensen) wrote that the EEC was a peace movement on par with the League of Nations or the United Nations.748 These new arguments became part of the domestic debate. As will be seen, the Europeans’ negotiation strategy was also increasingly shaped by Communitarian logic.

747 UD 44.36/6.84–11 – 16.04.1962, Oslo – A. Langeland – Statement nr. 165 (1961-62) from the ECFA.
748 UD 44.36/6.84–8 – 21.02.1962, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen (A. Skarstein) – Norway’s position in relation to the economic and political Community in Europe.
Chapter 7
A matter of trust: ‘embracing’ the political implications

“When you’re on the inside, you are taken care of.
Substantial problems would be solved, as turned out to be the case.
But no one believed.”

Arne Langeland, May 2012, on trusting the Community.

By the end of September 1962, the newly appointed Norwegian Minister of Commerce and Shipping, O. C. Gundersen, confronted Jean Rey, commissioner responsible for the EEC’s external relations, about rumours of the EEC giving Norway and Denmark some sort of limited membership, while giving the UK a full membership. Rey replied evasively: countries that did not want to participate in political cooperation could get such an arrangement, but for countries that accepted the Treaty of Rome and wished to take part in political cooperation, this “would probably be the development”. The background was a memorandum produced by Rey himself, before the summer recess, proposing a new doctrine on enlargement enabling the EC to ‘close the door’ after Britain. The challenge Norway faced was twofold. First, the government had not been successful in convincing the Six of its political will to secure membership. It had not, in full, accepted the *acquis communautaire*, that is, the Treaty of Rome and its political intention, and the Community’s existing body of legislation. Second, and explicitly linked to this, the government had not accepted or shown a positive will to take part in the ongoing and future plans of a political community that were taking shape amongst the member states. Norway needed, as seen from the Community, to embrace the political implications of membership.

Within a month of the conversation between Gundersen and Rey, the *Europeans* reassessed the entire Norwegian negotiation strategy. This reassessment was, in many ways, a return to the preliminary plan as envisioned by leading *Europeans*, before it was scrapped for domestic reasons. Now that it seemed the EEC would ‘close the door’ after Britain, and after frenetic reporting and proposals to revise the strategy made by the *Europeans*, the government slowly altered its approach. After the government’s reluctant nod of approval, the *Europeans* – dominating the negotiation apparatus – were quick to implement drastic changes. In short, the plan was to fully accept the Treaty of Rome and its political intentions, radically cut the

749 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
750 UD 44.36/6.84 – 01.10.1962 – A. Langeland – Minutes from Gundersen’s conversation with M. Rey.
list of demands for special arrangements, and postpone difficult and intricate questions until membership was secured.\textsuperscript{752} It was too little, too late. With President de Gaulle’s veto on January 14, 1963, the new approach was never tested and the only ones who had truly embraced the political implications of membership were the Europeans and a small circle of politicians surrounding them, first and foremost Foreign Minister Halvard Lange. De Gaulle’s veto, the subsequent prolonged silence on the membership issue, and the fact that the strategy of ‘embracing’ the political implications went largely untested, have led historians to disregard the implications of this policy shift.\textsuperscript{753}

However, the Europeans’ swift change of strategy demonstrates how they had accepted a Community-thinking based on political trust. Rather than trying to obtain clear legal exemptions in advance of membership, the Europeans argued that the government should accept the policies of the Six and ‘work through the Community’. Moreover, a clear show of political will, and readiness to participate in the formation of a political community, could pave the way for successful negotiations. The right attitude would create goodwill among the Six, making it easier, in turn, to obtain special arrangements within certain sectors, so the argument went.\textsuperscript{754} The Europeans’ internalisation of ‘Communitarian logic’ is crucial to understand their politisation in the mid-1960s and also puts the Bratteli government’s pro-European policy in the early 1970s in a different perspective. Many of the Bratteli government’s policy choices emanated from the Europeans, and the lessons learnt by the end of the first round were reintroduced and reinterpreted in the early 1970s.

Since Norway was the last country on the applicant-wagon, the Europeans learnt these lessons second-hand. The concept of ‘working through the Community’ had been borrowed directly from the Lord Privy Seal, and British chief negotiator Edward Heath, as Britain struggled with the agricultural negotiations during the fall of 1962. The ability to create goodwill while embracing overarching political implications was an emulation of Danish policy. Accordingly, the strategic shift was a result of the Europeans’ interpretation of Community, and British and Danish attitudes and actions.

\textsuperscript{752} Eriksen and Pharo \textit{Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering} (1997), p. 346. First and foremost of these intricate questions was the issue of fishery policy.

\textsuperscript{753} Eriksen and Pharo bring up the change of strategy in their account, but since their volume on Norwegian foreign policy stops in 1965, the ideas and strategies born in the late months of 1962 are not properly brought into play in the next volume written by Rolf Tamnes.

\textsuperscript{754} N. Piers Ludlow “A mismanaged application: Britain and the EEC, 1961-1963” in Anne Deighton and Alan S. Milward (Ed.) 1999 \textit{Widening, deepening, acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957-1963}, Baden Baden: Nomos Verlag (1999). This is very much the argument of Ludlow regarding the British application. It should of course be noted that Norway would not and could not have entered the Community without a successful entry of Britain – regardless of tactical assessments.
Diverging views on political cooperation

As Frøland argues, the mandate given by the Storting to the government in April of 1962 neither excluded nor assumed membership.\textsuperscript{755} An application under § 237 was merely “the best starting point for our country [will be] to seek negotiations on the concessions Norway can achieve, on the basis of full membership”.\textsuperscript{756} Just as the British application, it was a choice to clarify its relationship with the EEC.\textsuperscript{757} Furthermore, the application for membership negotiations was approved by 113 votes to 37 in parliament. This meant that a single vote changing from ‘yes’ to ‘no’ would give parliament the necessary one quarter needed to block entry into the Community (as stipulated by the newly adapted § 93 of the Constitution). The mandate given to the government was wafer thin and explicitly conditional.

Most arguments in favour of membership were, in reality, arguments against remaining on the outside.\textsuperscript{758} If Norway did not join, she would loose out on an enlarged EEC, including Britain, Denmark, Sweden (under § 238) and a booming German market. An enlarged EEC would comprise about 70 percent of traditional Norwegian export markets. Remaining on the outside would hit Norwegian exporters hard. Furthermore, it would be increasingly difficult to attract foreign capital. In sum, staying “outside the EEC would jeopardise [the] (...) modernisation policy and negatively affect economic growth, employment and ultimately national welfare.”\textsuperscript{759} Equally, with Britain and Denmark on the inside, and the EEC strongly supported by the US, membership had to be interpreted as a continuation of the government’s Atlantic profile, because an explicit choice of not applying for membership could be interpreted as a drift towards semi-neutrality.\textsuperscript{760}

The costs and benefits of membership were uncertain. There would certainly be major restructuring costs for the highly protectionist and uncompetitive agricultural system and most likely for the fishery sector as well (though this was counterbalanced by the fact that an enlarged Community would take roughly 50 percent of the unprocessed fish produce and 36,1 percent of the processed and canned fish).\textsuperscript{761} Seemingly, the government was willing to accept some restructuring costs for the Norwegian agricultural sector within the newly established CAP. A majority of the political parties and agricultural organisations, though, warned that

\textsuperscript{755} Frøland “Choosing the Periphery” (2001).
\textsuperscript{756} S.tid, 7b, 1961-62, p. 3010.
\textsuperscript{758} Frøland “Advancing Ambiguity” (1999), p. 69-70.
\textsuperscript{760} See also Eriksen and Pharo Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering (1997), p. 338.
both the income level of farmers and the country’s level of self-sufficiency had to be safeguarded.\textsuperscript{762} The latest parliamentary white paper estimated that participation in the CAP would lead to an immediate income loss for farmers of some 20 percent.\textsuperscript{763} With regards to fisheries, no established common policy existed.

To this was added uncertainties regarding rights of establishment and the so-called free movement of capital. Both would challenge the Labour Party’s established policy of funnelling money to selected industries with competitive advantages. The party hoped to accept the principles of the Treaty of Rome while simultaneously avoiding its consequences through special rules and demands.\textsuperscript{764} Last, the governments feared a weakening of the Nordic identity. Sweden and Finland would not become full members of the EEC, so a Danish and Norwegian entry would therefore challenge the Nordic ‘foreign policy solidarity’. Moreover, membership could endanger the Nordic labour market and the process of harmonisation of social policies. This Nordic argument, though, was substantially weakened by the Danish willingness to seek membership on its own.

However, “the most significant generalised cost”, in the words of Frøland, was “the danger of drifting into a supranational structure”.\textsuperscript{765} None of the political parties had ever spoken in favour of federalist concepts of Europe. Neither had any Norwegian NGO. Not even the Norwegian Council of the European Movement (NCEM) displayed an inclination to federalist ideas.\textsuperscript{766} Few politicians were enthused by the political intentions of the Community. Skaug and Lange, for example, neither believed in nor wanted a development towards a political federation. They hoped, with some right, that the new members – together with France – could steer this process towards more intergovernmental waters.\textsuperscript{767} Producing documents for domestic consumption, the Europeans argued along the same lines: British, Danish, Irish and Norwegian participation in the emerging political community would significantly alter its character and further development.\textsuperscript{768} Once convinced by the Europeans, both Skaug and Lange would trade certain steps toward supranationalism and some sort of political community for keeping in step with US and British foreign policy and remaining at the core of the Atlantic Community.

\textsuperscript{762} Trøite and Vold Bander i EF-strid (1977), p. 20-29.
\textsuperscript{763} Parliamentary White Paper nr. 67, 1962.
\textsuperscript{765} Frøland “Advancing Ambiguity” (1999), p. 69.
\textsuperscript{766} RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 – 20.02.1957 – Statement from the Chairman nr. 41. In a questionnaire distributed by Robert Schuman to every national section of the European Movement, the NCEM answered that it wanted a “confederation between wholly sovereign states”.
\textsuperscript{768} UD 44.36/6.84–10 – 02.04.1962, Oslo – H. K. Engen and A. Skarstein – The Common Market.
Gerhardsen, on the other hand, who had accepted the application with great reluctance, was less prepared for such a trade. Throughout the post war era, Gerhardsen had been sceptical towards the process that tied Norway closer to Western cooperation. This had been evident during the NATO debate, and throughout the 1950s he repeatedly demonstrated that he wanted Norway to distance herself from, or not whole-heartedly subscribe to, Western cooperation. Gerhardsen’s wish for an association was, therefore, more than a tactical consideration; it also reflected which position he wanted Norway to have in the world.769 Lange reflected in the early 1950s that Gerhardsen was “in his heart against NATO and a supporter of [Norway having] a similar position as Sweden, but his intellect tells him that it is impossible to propose such a policy at the moment”.770 At the first governmental conference following the election in September of 1961, Lange felt that Gerhardsen’s association line would leave Norway in a skewed position to NATO (i.e. semi-neutral).771

Supposedly Gerhardsen, after the first government meeting on the EEC, told Skaug that the MFA should emphasise economic aspects.772 The long internal debate (September 1961 – February 1962) had led Gerhardsen to accept the need for a membership application, but he would have no talk of political implications. In fact, Gerhardsen ascribed the Labour Party’s loss of absolute majority in the parliamentary election of 1961, in part, to “people who disagree with our foreign and security policy”, remarking bitterly in December, “[i]f the SPP didn’t have the Common Market issue we would have endured this”.773 His reaction to the creation of the SPP, and the brewing rebellion within Labour towards postwar foreign policy embodied by Halvard Lange, was to appease. One way of doing this was to discuss the EEC in purely economic terms, thus disentangling it from security policy, and consequently the combustible issue of NATO. Subsequently, in the final parliamentary debate before the application was handed in, Gerhardsen argued that the Treaty of Rome did not “provide the legal basis for political cooperation”. Norwegian membership in the EEC, he went on, was “not, at the same time, a decision to take part in political cooperation”.774 As Eriksen and Pharo maintain, this interpretation of what membership would entail, reflected a mixture of shrewd strategy and wishful thinking.775

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772 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
774 Einar Gerhardsen, S.tid 1962, p. 2750.
Actually, the fact that the Six were discussing political cooperation was an important factor in the British government’s decision to apply.\textsuperscript{776} Since the spring of 1961, two consecutive Committees (Fouchet and Cattani) had worked to formulate proposals for organising cooperation in the political field. After a summit in July of 1961, the Six signed the so-called Bonn Declaration. Though vague on a number of points, it represented an advance towards formalised political cooperation. Following a draft treaty for a ‘Union of States’ tabled by the French Government in November of 1961, and reflecting the Gaullist concept of nation states as the only important units within international politics, talks of political cooperation stalled.\textsuperscript{777} Talks were re-launched with several bilateral meetings between President de Gaulle, Chancellor Adenauer and Italian President Fanfani, respectively, during the spring of 1962. Finally, on April 17, the Foreign Ministers of the Six met in Paris. Significant progress was made, but in the end the Belgians and Dutch “refused to sign any treaty until the British had joined the European Economic Community and could take part in the political discussions”.\textsuperscript{778}

Schematically, one could say that there were at least three intertwined conceptions of what a political union should look like: a Gaullist, a European and an Atlantic view. Depending on how they regarded the orientation (who would be involved) and the depth of the political community (how supranational it would be), decision makers would subscribe to different aspects of the three conceptions.

The Gaullist political community was to be intergovernmental in its institutional layout and independent of US influence. In his press conference on May 15, 1962, President de Gaulle made this abundantly clear: After stressing that the Fouchet plan, and following French elaborations of it, served as the best way to build a political union – he went on to demarcate the Gaullist vision from both the supranational ‘European’ vision, and the British (or American) ‘Atlantic’ vision. First of all, any supranational political union would be unrealistic and impracticable. “[S]ince no one policy could be imposed on each of the six states”, de Gaulle warned, “one would refrain from making any policies at all”. The Community would be paralysed. This in turn would force Europe to “follow the lead of some outsider who did have a policy”, he said. “There would perhaps be a federator, but the

federator would not be European”. Thus, by way of supranationalism, Europe would be led by the US. This threatened the French conceptualisation of Europe.  

The Atlantic vision – shared by the British, leading politicians among the Benelux countries, the Monnet Action Committee and the Kennedy administration, amongst others – saw the US and Europe in an equal and interdependent partnership within the framework of NATO. Washington, initially welcoming the Fouchet Plan, had by the spring of 1962 come to the conclusion that it ran counter to deeper political integration, a policy the US had long supported. A cornerstone of President Kennedy’s Grand Design was a strong Atlantic framework, “an outward-looking Europe with a strong American connection”. Part of this plan was full British membership of the EEC.

The British version of the Atlantic vision differed from the American vision in regard to the level of supranationalism. Here, Washington was closer to the ‘Europeans’ than to the British. Kennedy supported the Benelux countries’ wish to establish political cooperation within the institutions of the Treaties of Rome. The Benelux countries had, ever since the French ‘Union of States’-suggestion, pushed for a political community that would eventually introduce majority voting and increased powers to the parliament. The Monnet Action Committee, and its supporters, shared this view. In a joint declaration on June 26, 1962, the committee argued, “the ‘true federator’ was not some outside power, as General de Gaulle had implied, but the ‘new method of collective action, which operated within the European Community.’” The Six now had to rapidly conclude a treaty setting up a political union along similar lines, while also negotiating a British entry to the Community. The British government, on the other hand, had much sympathy for the Gaullists’ emphasis on intergovernmentalism. The general concerns were that supranational institutions would lead to ‘government by bureaucracy’, without parliamentary control. Opposite the Gaullists, however, they shared the Atlantic orientation of the ‘Europeans’ and the Kennedy administration.


However, on April 10, 1962, in a statement to the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU), Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath came out strongly in favour of a political union where member states would “marshal the collective resources, energies and skills (...) in a position of leadership – an aggregate of power within the free world, standing shoulder to shoulder with the United States.”

Though never committing the government to anything, Heath’s “acceptance of the logic of extension of the Community to the fields of foreign policy and defence, and his open-mindedness about future institutional development” was fundamental, and something new in British politics. Still, it was not the first time he had conveyed such opinions. Already at the opening of negotiations between the Six and the UK (October 10, 1961, Paris), Heath stated that Britain “fully share the aims and objectives, political and otherwise, of those who drew up this [Bonn] Declaration and we shall be anxious, once we are members of the Community, to work with [you] in a positive spirit to reinforce the unity which [you] have already achieved”.

As historian Piers Ludlow notes: “The most striking feature of Lord Privy Seal’s speech in Paris was the warmth of its pro-European rhetoric”. This was a deliberate tactical choice, for they had been “repeatedly urged by their continental colleagues to present the British decision to approach the Community in the most pro-European fashion possible.”

The Danish MFA had also picked up on signals from its continental colleagues. In late October of 1961, at the first meeting at the Ministerial level between Denmark and the Community, Danish foreign minister Jens Otto Krag made it perfectly clear that he did not come to Brussels to negotiate the Treaties of Rome. Denmark wanted “to fully take part in the Community, and whole-heartedly and without reservations accepts the aims and intentions of the Community.” Krag went on to specify that “[w]e share, not only, your economic aims. We are just as ready to take part – fully and actively, and on equal terms with the other member states – in a closer political cooperation with the intention of strengthening European unity, as determined by the Bonn Declaration of July 18 this year [1961].” At the second ministerial meeting between Denmark and the Community, Krag repeated the message:

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786 Ludlow Dealing with Britain (1997), p. 70-76.
“behind the Danish application for membership (...) was a clear political desire to take part in the EEC’s efforts for European unity”.789

By the early summer of 1962, many diverging, interlinked and competing ideas of a European political community had surfaced. Both the British and Danish governments understood that a show of political intent, full acceptance of the acquis communautaire – though this was not a formal aspect of the opening of negotiations at the time – and display of readiness to take part in further political integration was vital for the negotiation atmosphere. Certainly, an unwillingness to display commitment to any of the ideas for a political community, after a markedly delayed application, could be ruinous to the Norwegian government, and Lange and the Europeans were, of course, fully aware of this.

**The initial negotiation strategy**

Various members of the government, and more evidently, several sections of parliament, would emphasise elements on the list of pros and cons differently – but essentially the Europeans were faced with the challenge of balancing and presenting these domestic demands in a way that was palatable to the Six and the Commission. Already in January of 1962, Arne Langeland produced a document that was meant as a blueprint for the Norwegian negotiation strategy. A crucial component of his approach was the acceptance of the political implications of the Treaties of Rome.

The EEC, Langeland argued, did not have any economic reasons for wanting Norway to become a member. In fact, he later wrote, “our entry into the Common Market and our exports will almost exclusively create new problems for the six current member states”, while many of the Norwegian problems were socio-economic in nature.790 Langeland reasoned that the Community’s willingness to let Norway become a member rested on geopolitical considerations, such as Norway’s NATO membership and close proximity to the Soviet Union. As the years 1961-62 were marked, not least, by the Berlin and Cuba crisis, it is fair to assume that the Europeans’ persistent emphasis on geopolitics was not just a matter of tactics. It was “against this general political background”, Langeland assessed, “that we have any hope of getting their understanding for our economic problems”.791

789 UM GS B 2/−7 − 10.02.1962, Brussels – Minutes: ministerial meeting, Denmark and the EEC 02.05.1962.
790 UD 44.36/6.84 − 18.04.1962, Oslo − A. Langeland − Memo. Norway’s relationship with the European Economic Community. Certain remarks. Especially the French saw many Norwegian export industries as problematic. This is true for the energy intensive production of aluminium for example, where France had strong interests and argued that Norwegian aluminium production benefitted unfairly from the cheap hydroelectric power. During the FTA negotiations and the Dillon Round these issues came to the fore.
791 UD 44.36/6.84/7 − 17.01.1962 − A. Langeland − Memo. Prospect for discussion about Norways placement in the enlarged European Economic Community.
If the Community’s understanding for the need to keep Norway as part of the western camp could be secured, the next step would be to link the government’s regional policy with the strategic need to keep the northern part of Norway (the one closest to The Soviet Union) populated. Regional policy was to be understood as security policy. If this political need of keeping the north populated was accepted, the need to protect and secure the incomes of small and traditional fishing communities and uncompetitive farmers working under harsh conditions could be seen in a different light. Langeland thought these solutions could be recognised and possibly accepted as de facto permanent, against the background of Norway’s everlasting disadvantages: it’s geographical placement to the north, its topography (roughly 45 percent of Norway could be categorised as mountains), its climate, and the adjoined structural challenges. Second, as Ambassador Skaug later learned from his British colleagues, the Norwegian challenges should be presented as “regional problems in the Western European context”.

The third component of the initial negotiation strategy was to keep the discussions about Norwegian economic problems ‘open’. The negotiators should avoid pressing for specific solutions. A response to the fact that the Community would deal almost exclusively with Britain, it was also an assessment of how the government – conceivably – could turn its late application into an advantage. With Norway as the last applicant, and by keeping options open until the last minute, the negotiators could secure satisfactory solutions for ‘insignificant’ Norway without setting off a landslide of compensatory claims from the other applicants. For this to work the domestic organisations would have to keep an open mind, and not press for ‘hard core’ demands within their specific sectors.

The last, least tangible, but perhaps most important aspect of the strategy was to create political understanding and goodwill through a two-fold strategy. First, as we will see below, to invite officials from the Community and the Six member states to Norway and show them the unique structural challenges faced by Norwegian fishermen and farmers. Second, by publicly and openly accepting the political intentions of the Treaty of Rome, and expressing Norway’s “wish to take part in this political cooperation”. The idea was that if Norway could get into a negotiation position as fast as possible, display a firm political will to participate, create

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792 UD 44.36/6.84 - 16.04.1962 - A. Langeland, KV & E. Berg – Minutes: information meeting, 11.04.1962, regarding Norway’s relationship with the EEC; UD 44.36/6.84 – 08.03.1962, London – E. Ribu – Memo to the Ambassador.

793 Ludlow Dealing with Britain (1997), p. 64. An a priori choice of the Community, and soon the order of the day.

794 Underdal “Forhandlingene om Norsk medlemskap” (1972), p. 46, 68.

795 UD 44.36/6.84 – 05.02.1962, Oslo – A. Langeland and A. Skarstein – Memo to the Foreign Minister. The relationship with the EEC.
understanding through public diplomacy, and ‘keep an open mind’ as to the shape of the prospective solutions – the chances of successful negotiations would increase.  

As the Europeans knew, the procedure ran as follows: after the official application had been handed to the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, a statement would be made by the Foreign Minister, elaborating on the reasons behind the application and the specific problems membership would pose. This would be followed by an explorative phase of negotiations, where the point was to define the problems at hand and reach a *vue d’ensemble*. It was during this phase that Norway would let its general views ‘mature’ in Brussels, while creating goodwill and understanding. Accordingly, as secretary Berg put it, Norway had to acknowledge “the political character of the Community, and proclaim their willingness to cooperate to reach these political objectives, that is the foundation of the Treaty”. For Langeland, as for Berg, this ‘embrace’ was crucial. After what the Europeans hoped would be a long explanatory phase, real negotiations could commence. However, the negotiations would not unfold as anticipated.

*Between strategy and trust*

The Europeans’ initial strategy was a fine, if not impossible, balancing act: on the one hand, there was strong opposition in parliament and government to discuss, or even mention, the political implications of membership. On the other hand, show of political will and stressing political aspects was at the heart of the strategy for securing membership.

Langeland’s early considerations received strong backing from General Director Halvorsen and ambassador Jørgensen (or Skarstein) in Brussels. Furthermore, both Gundersen and Lange understood the need to create political goodwill and understanding among the Six. Nonetheless, Gundersen’s report to the ECFA at the end of March, though following many of Langeland’s recommendations, fell short of ‘embracing’ the political implication. In his long and thorough presentation of the government’s declaration, political aspects were not mentioned once. Equally, at a meeting of the Norwegian ambassadors to

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796 UD 44.36/6.84–7 – 17.01.1962 – A. Langeland – Memo. Prospect for discussion about Norways placement in the enlarged European Economic Community.
797 UD 44.5./88–14 – 24.01.1962, Oslo – E. Berg – Memo. The European Communities (CECA, CEE and EURATOM). Political and institutional aspects of a membership or association.
798 UD 44.36/6.84–8 – 21.02.1962, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – Norway’s position concerning the economic and political Community in Europe; UD 44.36/6.84–10 – 22.03.1961, Oslo – J. Halvorsen – Notes regarding Draft of presentation to the Committee on Foreign Affairs; Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014. At this point it is probable that Asbjørn Skarstein had taken over the day-to-day running of the Embassy in Brussels.
799 UD 44.36/6.84–9 – 12.03.1962 – O. C. Gundersen – Memo to the cabinet from the MoCS. Our negotiations with the European Economic Community; UD 44.36/6.84–10 – 26.03.1962 - Minister Gundersen’s report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs; SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting March 26, 1962, 10AM – O. C. Gundersen. Langeland was also present at the meeting.
the EEC countries, London, Copenhagen and the EFTA delegation, Lange asked for the application and declaration to be worded carefully. Although there was a slim majority in the Storting, “several objected strongly to the political cooperation between the Six”. Domestic considerations prevailed. However, Lange’s speech to the European Movement around the same time, leaves little doubt that he was frustrated with the restrictive line:

“The debate here in Norway regarding closer affiliation with the other countries of Western Europe, has thus far largely been concerned with the economic aspects of this cooperation, and we have experienced that those opposing (...) are stronger than many believed. (...) Even amongst those who are convinced that we need to find our place in this new Western European cooperation, many see affiliation with the expanded European Economic Community as a necessary evil, and they are almost exclusively concerned with how to guard the country against the adverse effects they assume this will have.”

Though the Europeans and the foreign policy leadership were frustrated, little could be done.

Following Gundersen’s presentation and the meeting of the ambassadors in mid-April, Langeland renewed his efforts at creating a negotiation strategy; the parliamentary debate deciding if and how Norway should apply was only weeks away. Once again Langeland stressed that membership in the EEC had to be presented as a continuation of the Labour government’s foreign and security policy of the postwar era. It was in Norway’s best interest to become a full member, not least to avoid exclusion from a dynamic community that included all the countries that guaranteed Norwegian security, save the US. In this light, association was not an option. It was necessary, therefore, to create understanding by making political arguments:

“It is hardly realistic to try to create a kind of ‘European enthusiasm’ in Norway. It would run contrary to profound traits in the Norwegian mentality. [...] But, we have to be able to create an understanding for the fundamental foreign and security policy interests we have to protect, in this world of which we are a part.”

Langeland clearly resented the way Norway’s relationship with the Community was discussed solely as an economic issue. If, on the other hand, a political argumentation could be established this would have positive “repercussions for our negotiation strategy vis-à-vis the

802 UD 44.36/6.84–11 - 18.04.1962, Oslo – A. Langeland – Memo. Norway’s relationship with the EEC. Certain remarks.
Common Market and for the *external presentation* of our case.” It was important to avoid pushing purely economic questions to the fore, and show a certain level of trust and that Norway wished to take part “as a loyal member”. Already in the application, therefore, the government should accept not only the Treaties of Rome, but also the political community, as stipulated in the Bonn Declaration.803

Langeland’s remarks reveal a blurring of trust as strategy, and plain trust, as he increasingly came to see the Community, not as a necessary evil, but as a force for good. Thus, he believed outstanding problems could be solved once on the inside. Only weeks later, discussing the declaration, he would state this plainly, “personally, I don’t consider it wise to strain our negotiations with such reservations [on rights of establishment and capital movements]. We are, after all, joining a Community.”804 To Langeland, Europe – in the shape of the EC – was no longer the ‘Other’. This shift in thinking was emblematic for Langeland and Halvorsen, and they were soon followed by Solberg, Skarstein, Frydenlund, Berg and Ibsen Jr., and later still by Holland, Halvard Lange and Arne Skaug.805

Among them all, Lange’s shift was the most incremental, yet profound. Throughout the 1950s, Lange had seen continental integration as problematic to the Atlantic Community. Cooperation in Western Europe had to be “a part of the bigger unit that we call the Atlantic Community. One thing is certain: cooperation between democracies in Europe must never become exclusive, never lead to isolation”, he told the *Storting* in 1950.806 In the spring of 1960, he still regarded broader integration within an Atlantic framework as “naturally connected to our entire traditional cultural and political orientation”.807 With the British and Danish application, strong US support, and the adoption of the *Europeans’* interpretation of membership as a *continuation* of the Atlantic strategy – the barriers between ‘Atlantic’ and ‘continental Europe’ broke down. Following strong, and bitter, domestic opposition to membership, it seems Lange developed a similar understanding as the *Europeans*, simultaneously juxtaposing and trying to reconcile ‘Norway’ and ‘Europe’:

“[W]e have often been hesitant, yes, even sceptical to proposals and projects of supranational cooperation between Western European countries. (...) One important reason for this is probably that Norway is relatively young as a fully sovereign state. Another reason is that we are in the

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803 UD 44.36/6.84–11 - 18.04.1962, Oslo – A. Langeland – Memo. Norway’s relationship with the EEC. Certain remarks.
804 UD 44.36/6.84–12 – 02.05.1962 – A. Langeland and A. Skarstein – Memo to state secretary Engen. EEC – time schedule and negotiation strategy.
805 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
806 S.tid, 7b 1950, p. 1722.
fringes of Europe. A third factor is that, unlike many of the countries on the European mainland, Norway came out of the war with its national pride and unity, its coherence strengthened, and not weakened. (...) One could say, that we have – somehow – come to overlook the simple fact that when all is said and done, Norway is a part of Europe, a part of Western Europe, of free Europe. Whether we like it or not, this is where we geographically belong, and we all have our cultural roots in this part of the world. Actually, the 1930s, with Nazism and fascism advancing in Europe, created a barrier between Norway and Continental Europe, and created the one-sided orientation towards the West, towards the Anglo-Saxon world, which became even more pronounced as a result of our experiences during the Second World War. The consequence has been that we have given far too little attention to what has been going on in mainland Europe the last 17 years. And the scepticism, one could even use as strong an expression as anxiety that has surfaced during the last months of debate – is a manifestation of the lack of knowledge of contemporary Europe.”

In this speech to the European Movement, Lange explained the tectonic shift of mentality he had gone through, and how deeply his perception was rooted in historical narratives of Norway’s place in the world. The speech is not without self-criticism: it was, after all, ‘his’ foreign policy that had prevailed for the last 17 years, but now it was time to realise that Norway was, in fact, a part of Europe.

**A half-hearted declaration**

The morning of May 2, 1962, Ambassador Jørgensen delivered the Norwegian membership application to the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers Christian Calmes. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, who was present at the ceremony, immediately asked Jørgensen if Norway was ready to join the political union taking shape. Jørgensen replied cautiously by referring to the wording of the application, where the government accepted the aims of the Treaty of Rome. An explorative phase of negotiations would commence as soon as Lange presented the government declaration, following the application in Brussels. This declaration was the task ahead for the Europeans.

Langeland was quick to pinpoint agriculture and fishery as the main issues that negotiators should push for special solutions. If the government could obtain passable solutions in these two fields it would have a deep psychological impact domestically, and it was “the domestic impact and the relationship with the parliament that must be the yardstick of

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808 RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 – Speech by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, 11.04.1962. My translation.
809 UD 44.36/6.84–3.5.1962, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – CEE. The delivery of the Norwegian application.
our negotiations”, he argued. Furthermore, the Europeans hoped satisfying results for the primary sector could be traded against the ‘embrace’ of the political aspects of the EEC. The newly appointed Head of the 5th Economic Office, Tancred Ibsen Jr., for example, stressed the importance of underlining Norway’s willingness to participate in the political cooperation of the enlarged Community:

We must, already in the government declaration, uphold the political framework for the negotiations without consideration of the domestic hesitations that I clearly see are present. The other option, namely to give a politically careful declaration, due to domestic considerations, and then, in the course of the negotiations, expand the framework, would be harmful for the entire atmosphere of the negotiations.

The Europeans completed the first draft of the government declaration in the beginning of May. The Treaty of Rome and the Bonn declaration were explicitly mentioned, and the draft stressed Norway’s wish to participate in both economic and political cooperation. The rest of the document emphasised the distinct Norwegian geography, climate and topography and the structural challenges they created. The language of the declaration aimed to create an ‘emotional’ understanding of Norwegian problems, underscore how Norway was ready to join the political and economical cooperation and show that special solutions to Norwegian problems, due to geographical, social and structural peculiarities, would have minimal effects on the Community as such. Thus, it communicated what was to become the mantra of the Europeans: Norway was a natural and distinctive part of Western Europe.

Now followed intense debates on the wording of the declaration. Rumours were already spreading that the French government was negative to the Norwegians’ applying in the first place. Chancellor Adenauer confirmed these rumours in a meeting with Foreign Minister Lange. Equally, such rumours surfaced at a Nordic civil servant meeting in Copenhagen. Apparently, the French had decided to let the Danish join the community regardless of the British negotiations, while “they had not decided if Norway qualified for membership or not.” These early warnings made Ambassador Skaug (London) and Ambassador

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810 UD 44.36/6.84-12 – 02.05.1962 – A. Langeland and A. Skarstein – Memo to state secretary Engen. EEC – time schedule and negotiation strategy.
811 UD 44.36/6.84–12 – 07.05.1962, Oslo – T. Ibsen Jr. – Memo. CEE. The Norwegian Government’s declaration. My Italics.
812 UD 44.36/6.84–12 – 08.05.1962, Oslo – First draft of the Norwegian government declaration to the European Economic Community (prepared by the MFA).
813 UD 44.36/6.84–13 – 10.05.1962, Oslo – J. Halvorsen – Memo for acting Foreign Minister, minister O. C. Gundersen. The Norwegian government declaration to the CEE.
814 UD 44.36/6.84-13 - 19.05.1962 – Memo. The Nordic Chief of Trade meeting in Copenhagen10-11.05.1962.
Sommerfelt (EFTA, Geneva) adopt Langeland, Halvorsen and Ibsen Jr.’s logic: Skaug wanted to embrace the positive factors of a membership, while Sommerfelt wanted to play down the parts about tariff rates for the home industry, arguing that the experiences from EFTA had shown that the Norwegian home industry had sustained the tariff reductions among the Seven much better than first feared, making it “unrealistic and essentially unnecessary” to try to get special arrangements.815

At the same time, domestic forces pulled in the opposite direction. The Ministry of Agriculture had prepared a memorandum demanding “permanent special reservations” from the CAP within the Community.816 Equally, the fishery organisations wanted “permanent reservations” from a future Common Fishery Policy (CFP). Obviously, making demands for reservations from a policy that did not exist was problematic. Receiving a memo that had incorporated the demands, Director General Jahn Halvorsen, who had strongly supported Langeland’s strategy, crossed over all such references with a red pen. In a second revised draft of the declaration, Jahn Halvorsen reported that he had removed all “diverging opinions to the road we should follow.”817 In the face of rumours from abroad and hardening demands domestically, Ibsen Jr., Skaug, Sommerfelt and Halvorsen gathered in support of Langeland’s initial negotiation strategy.

July 4, 1962 a delegation consisting of Foreign Minister Lange, Minister of Commerce and Shipping Gundersen, and 9 diplomats travelled to Brussels to read the government declaration. Detrimental to the initial negotiation strategy, engineered by the Europeans, the declaration was half-hearted. The reservations were many, not only in the field of fishery and agriculture, but also concerning capital movement and rights of establishment. The Europeans had successfully negotiated explicit demands of “permanent reservations” out of the declaration. Still, this was the badly concealed aim.818 However, the most striking feature of the Norwegian declaration, as opposed to the Danish and British declaration, was the absence of support for the political objectives. Lange could defend not mentioning the Bonn declaration with the changed circumstances since last summer819, but the declaration was cleansed of words like “union” and “supranationalism”. The government was only willing to

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816 UD 44.36/6.84–13 – 19.05.1962 – Ministry of Agriculture – The negotiations with the EEC.
817 UD 44.36/6.84–14 – 14.06.1962, Oslo – The Norwegian government declaration to the EEC.
819 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting June 13, 1962, Halvard Lange. “One talks of the forms of political cooperation in an enlarged economic community, but no one talks about the Bonn declaration.”
“develop closer economic and political cooperation among Europe’s countries and peoples”.

The bottom had fallen out of the *Europeans* grand strategy.

**Rumours**

Due to the workload created by the British negotiations, President of the Commission Walter Hallstein envisioned the next meeting at the ministerial level at the end of October. Following the continental holiday the Community did not intend to reopen the negotiations with Norway, and Denmark, until considerable progress had been made in the UK negotiations, especially regarding agricultural issues.

The *Europeans* considered the French unwilling to give any admissions to the British on agricultural issues, but considered the British more flexible. Conversely, the Danish MFA feared the British government would present a long list of demands for the adaptation of British farmers to the CAP. The truth must be sought somewhere in the middle, and as Ludlow contends:

> “Domestically Macmillan could not give ground on British agriculture without risking Labour Party abuse and, more damagingly, sniping from his rivals amongst the Conservatives; but internationally, French obstinacy on the CAP was almost impossible for the five other EEC states to overcome without a much greater readiness to compromise on the part of the British. With movement possible in neither direction, deadlock was the inevitable result.”

Either way, one effect of this ‘deadlock’ was that the latecomer Norway was pushed even further down on the Community’s ‘to do’-list. This endangered the subtle, or even timid, approach of letting Norwegian demands ‘mature’ in Brussels. Another effect was that forces within the Community, fatigued by lengthy negotiations, started contemplating whether one, or possibly two, difficult new members would not be enough.

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820 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meetings March 30, 1962; April 04, 1962; April 9, 1962; April 11, 1962; June 13, 1962. See also Eriksen and Pharo *Kald krig og internasjonalisering* (1997), p. 342. In the ECFA discussions the strange situation occurred that sceptics pushed to include passages on the political intent of the Treaties of Rome; moderate supporters of membership (the majority) wanted to tone down these aspects, and portray it as a purely economic community in anticipation of the parliamentary debate and referendum; and strong supporters of membership wanted to talk of the long-term political goals of the community in lofty statements.

821 In some ways, the Norwegian government was faced with the same problem as the British. Strong sectoral demands and a very conditional language hampered the application. As their British colleagues, the *Europeans* had initially recommended that the Norwegian application for membership should be based on the full acceptance of the *acquis communautaire*. Ludlow “A mismanaged application” (1999), p. 276.


824 Rasmussen *Joining the European Communities*, p. 133-136.

The reactions from the Commission, several of the Six, and the US following the Norwegian declaration were more than reserved. The Commission asked the, by now familiar, question, if Norway really wanted a full membership and to take part in the integration process.\textsuperscript{826} Not surprisingly though, the most negative reactions came from Paris. In late August, French foreign minister Couve de Murville, in conversation with Lange, brought up the lengthy Norwegian application process and the obvious scepticism towards the EEC the Norwegian parliament and people harboured. Lange could only concur that these attitudes existed, but stressed that “the attitude of the Norwegian people towards Europe was about to undergo a profound change […] Increasingly the public realised the very strong political reasons for Norway to bind it self to the European Community.”\textsuperscript{827} This was the intended effect of the Europeans strategy, though not necessarily an accurate description of the actual situation.

The French foreign minister was not convinced: in the Gaullist optic Norway would be “some sort of British ‘satellite’ within the Community.”\textsuperscript{828} In a conversation with the Danish Ambassador to Paris Eyvind Bartels, Couve conveyed how he saw the enlargement issue in connection with the plans for a political union: the chances for multilateral political cooperation, as envisioned by the ‘federalists’, was “non existing”. France, therefore, intensified their bilateral discussion with West Germany. Indeed, since July, de Gaulle had courted Adenauer to secure a ‘core’ political union between France and Germany, which could be expanded upon later. In September, de Gaulle embarked upon a successful two-week visit to West Germany, which had a lasting effect on Franco-German relations.\textsuperscript{829}

In this light, Couve was concerned by the Scandinavian attitude towards political cooperation and “in the case of Norway there was nothing to be done.” He mentioned his talk with Foreign Minister Lange as an example: Lange had declared that Norway felt quite safe under the American nuclear umbrella, “it is, however, clear that, sooner or later, the US will ‘lâcher l’Allemagne’ [release Germany], and therefore, France had to build its connections with Germany well in advance.”\textsuperscript{830} On ambassador Bartels’ question of the possibilities of an integrated European nuclear force, Couve fretted and replied that underneath President Kennedy’s colourful rhetoric was the unchanged power politics of the US. Lastly, Bartels mentioned that Denmark wanted to be a part of the political cooperation. Couve replied that

\textsuperscript{826} UD 44.36/6.84–16 – 06.06.1962 – A. Langeland – Memo. EEC. Presentation of the Norwegian government declaration July 4, 1962; Eriksen and Pharo Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering (1997), p. 342-343.

\textsuperscript{827} UD 44.36/6.84–17 – 30.08.1962, Oslo – Memo.

\textsuperscript{828} UD 44.36/6.84–19 – 11.101962, Paris – The Common Market and Norway.


Denmark was the most Continental of the Scandinavian countries, and that Danish policy in the last couple of years had been realistic and characterised by common sense. But, he recalled, Denmark is also connected to the Nordic countries. Bartels’ recommendation home was that the government should stress its will to join Europe “for better or worse”.831

Clearly, the French government saw Norwegian and Danish membership as problematic, but for different reasons. The Danish government was near desperate to gain access to the Community’s agricultural market. Herein lay the main reason why France would want to keep Denmark on the outside: for every year on the outside of the newly established CAP, Danish farmers would lose market shares to French (and Dutch) farmers, especially on the all important German market. On the other hand, France wanted to maintain a good relationship with Denmark as a possible way to drive a wedge in the Anglo-Scandinavian relationship. Either way, Denmark had immediately followed the British application, and compellingly embraced the political aspects of the Treaty of Rome. As a result of their eagerness it was much more difficult to rebuff their application.832

Norway was in a slightly different position to the French. Despite Lange’s recent conversion, he, as the rest of the government, could only accept membership in the EEC as part of a wider Atlantic framework. On this there was a general political consensus – no one contemplated joining the Community without Denmark and Britain.833 Furthermore, since the Second World War, Norway had a strong tradition of following Britain in most major foreign policy issues, and even the most pro-European politicians hoped that an enlargement would ‘open up’ the Community, and tie it more closely with the US and NATO. President de Gaulle’s plans of a European ‘third force’ ran counter to this outlook. When it came to broader foreign policy issues, therefore, the French fears of Norway being a ‘British satellite’ were not unfounded. The hesitant and cautious Norwegian approach, in turn, made it easy for the French to point out the lack of political will. General Director Halvorsen knew that the argument about ‘lack of political will’ was “quite a rationalisation”. But he also knew that the application and declaration of the Norwegian government had played into the hands of those who wanted to keep Norway on the outside.834

Soon negative reactions were accompanied with rumours of decision-makers wanting to offer some sort of limited membership. At the end of September, Per Federspiel – Danish

833 There was no strong economic sector (as for example the Danish farmers) in favour of a solo membership.
delegate to the advisory assembly of the Council of Europe—confronted West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder with the rumours:

To my surprise, Schröder answered by posing two questions: 1) What would you say, in Denmark, if the Community first accepted Denmark and the UK as full members, and gave all the others, i.e. Norway, Ireland, the three neutrals and Turkey either different or the same association deal? 2) How would you respond, in Denmark, if only Britain was accepted, and all the other applicants became temporarily associated? (...) These thoughts were, according to Schröder, “hanging in the air”. (...) Shortly thereafter I met the Norwegian minister of Commerce and Shipping, O. C. Gundersen, and I told him of the incident. He had just returned from Washington, but he stated that these thoughts were not foreign to him.

Following Federspiel’s report, Minister Gundersen confronted Commissioner Jean Rey. As mentioned in the introduction, Rey, a convinced federalist, drew the line between membership and association, as between wanting to participate in the emerging political union or not. Rey’s wish to ‘close the door’ after Britain, was motivated by fear of a heterogeneous and slow Community. The more federalist inclined, such as Jean Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak, feared that too many new half-hearted member states would block the plans for the kind of political integration they envisioned (after the retirement of de Gaulle).

For entirely different reasons, de Gaulle pondered the same ideas: in October both the Norwegian and Danish EFTA ambassadors reported that de Gaulle might be willing to accept a British entry “mais pas tous ces scandinaves [but not all these Scandinavians]”. The plan, according to the rumours from Quai d’Orsay, was to give the remaining applicants a satisfactory association. It should not be difficult to convince the Norwegians to chose this alternative, it was reported, while the Danes might be bought off with promises of satisfactory deals in the agricultural sector.

The plans for a ‘small enlargement’ also tempted the Dutch, as they hoped a speedy British entry could counter the Paris-Bonn axis, and simultaneously keep their main competitor in the agricultural sector, namely Denmark, out. On the other hand, tales were told of a Danish membership being given, regardless of British, Irish and Norwegian negotiations. Danish Prime Minister, J. O. Krag, was quick to deny that Denmark would join the Six without the United Kingdom. Last, Chancellor Adenauer’s scepticism towards

835 Federspiel was member of the Danish parliament and representative of the Agrarian Liberal Party (Venstre).
838 UM GS 108 B 2–6 – 07.08.1962 – Aktuelt.
enlargement had long been common knowledge. Adenauer exhibited what Eriksen and Pharo calls “the mirror image of Norwegian euro-scepticism”. An enlargement would strengthen the social democratic and protestant influence on the Community, and he feared that “Britain and several of the Scandinavian applicants might soon be governed by left-wing administrations totally out of sympathy with the goals of European integration.” Once again, such fears were not totally unfounded. It was suggested, for example, that one reason why Prime Minister Gerhardsen had chosen a long internal decision-making procedure was that he “expected the future to bring a coalition government in the Federal Republic and a Labour Government in the United Kingdom (...) on the vague premise that the more Socialist governments there are in Europe, the better”. However, the biggest concern of Adenauer was that a British-Scandinavian entry might prolong the process towards a political union or unsettle Franco-German rapprochement. As a result, he increasingly came to see enlargement as disruptive to what had been his overriding foreign policy goal since the early postwar years, and consequently warmed to de Gaulle’s ideas of political unity à deux.

Thus, by October 1962 – as the British negotiations were about to move into their final stage – several ideas of ‘limited’ enlargement circled. The British, as Ludlow puts it, were “opposed by the two most powerful statesmen in continental Europe”. Denmark, Ireland and Norway, therefore, faced the same opposition. But there were also plans of letting Britain join, and possibly Denmark, while keeping Ireland and Norway on the outside, and other rumours of letting Denmark join, regardless of the other applicants. The government was now faced with the possibility that the door could be closed after the UK, and that Denmark might ‘slip in’ before it was thoroughly shut.

At the EFTA ministerial meeting in Oslo, late October, Minister Gundersen laconically concluded that “nothing of significance” had happened in the Norwegian negotiations since July. The negotiations with the British had taken up most of the Community’s time: Combined with the hesitant declaration and the evasive attitude to the political integration, the Norwegian strategy was ‘mistaken’ for passivity and lack of political will among the Six. In

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841 FO 371/171814 – 07.08.1963, Oslo - Mr. P. F. Hancock – Norway and the Brussels Breakdown.
this situation, the question was how to convince the Community that Norway still wanted a full membership?

**Reassessment**

To counter the rumours of a ‘limited’ enlargement, the Danish government was quick to launch a diplomatic offensive. Danish ambassadors made enquiries to the governments of the Six, and they responded unanimously: Denmark would be allowed to join the EEC. In fact, they all welcomed a more or less simultaneous accession of Denmark and the United Kingdom. However, the Danish diplomats heard different things about Norway. Belgian Vice Foreign Minister Fayat, for example, while stressing that there were “no talks of association” for Denmark, brought up the considerable problems regarding both fishery and agriculture in regards to Norway.

Despite all the reassurances, the Danish government wanted to make sure they were on the right track. To convince the Six that Denmark should be “full and legitimate members and at the same time as Britain” the government restated its interest in participating in the political cooperation in Europe through a concerted effort. Jens Otto Krag and Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup increasingly stressed the political aspects of a Danish EC-membership both internally and publicly. At a ministerial meeting between Denmark and the Community, on November 12, 1962, Foreign Minister Hækkerup reiterated Krag’s political embrace of October 1961. This diplomatic effort, historian Morten Rasmussen writes, “was supplemented by a European round-trip by Per Hækkerup to the capitals of the Six and Britain to explain the Danish attitude to the political dimension of the EC.”

Around the same time, the British negotiations seemed to regain their momentum. The limited support given by the Commonwealth countries, in September, was for a moment forgotten, after a surprisingly pro-European Conservative Party conference in October 1962. Simultaneously, Macmillan opened the long-awaited Conservative campaign to gain the

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846 UM GS 108 B 2–7 – 04.10.1962, Brussels – H. Tabor – Conversations with president Hallstein and vice Foreign Minister Fayat regarding the negotiations for Danish and British membership in the EEC.
849 Rasmussen Joining the European Communities (2004), p, 135.
electorates support for joining the Community. Furthermore, Heath, after travelling Europe in September and early October, was reaffirmed that “substantial goodwill towards British membership remained among the Six” and that many of the Five wanted to press ahead with the negotiations as fast as possible. The positive tone of Heath’s discussions in Bonn, for example, was therefore interpreted as very promising. At the EFTA ministerial meeting in Oslo, therefore, Heath proclaimed that Britain and the Six would meet every fourteenth day, and that this was a clear sign of the EEC’s wish to intensify negotiations to secure a rapid conclusion. Days after the EFTA-meeting, such prospects faded as the Community and Britain entered the quagmire of British domestic agriculture.

Still, throughout October, the Europeans must have had the clear impression that Denmark and Britain were on the move; that they were both responding to the rumours amongst the Six; and that Norway was the only country lagging behind. From Copenhagen the Europeans learned that the Danish had successfully disclaimed the rumours about their possible association. But it was still “doubtful if Norway could fulfil the demands of a full membership.” A few days later Director General Halvorsen painted a gloomy picture to Foreign Minister Lange:

“What may happen is that the United Kingdom (and Denmark) become members of the EEC and Norway will be left outside, possibly in cooperation with Sweden, trying for some sort of association with the EEC. We will, not only be politically isolated, we will lose the certainty of getting within the tariff barriers of a Common Market that will include the UK.”

Halvorsen urged the Foreign Minister to bring it up in his account before the parliament, and make “an unambiguous statement”. Three days later Halvorsen, together with Langeland, drafted Lange’s account to the parliament: the government should, as Denmark, underline its intention to obtain a full membership and will to participate in the future political cooperation of Europe. Ambassador to The Hague, Otto Kildal, recommended the Foreign Minister to declare these intentions to Paul-Henri Spaak and Commission President Hallstein at the next

854 UD 44.36/6.84–19 – 12.10.1962, Copenhagen – R. Andersen – Denmark and CEE. Rumours about association for Denmark and Norway.
855 UD 44.36/6.84–19 – 17.10.1962, Oslo – J. Halvorsen – Memo. The negotiations with the EEC.
856 UD 44.36/6.84–19 – A. Langeland and J. Halvorsen – Draft of the Foreign Ministers account to the parliament 25.10.62.
Council of Ministers meeting, set for November 12. The same advice came from Paris: Norway now had to convince the Six that it wanted full membership, with all its consequences, through “some sort of propaganda effort.” From Stockholm the MFA was advised not to mention the agricultural problems, but instead, for tactical reasons, embrace the CAP. The same message came from Washington: The US still welcomed a Norwegian membership, but it was Norway, not the Community, that needed to show flexibility.

The British advice, Halvorsen reported, was to reduce the list of demands for special arrangements. As Langeland and Skarstein wrote to the Parliamentary Liaison Committee, Norway had to learn from the British negotiations. The Community was not inclined to discuss matters of principle: if Norway adhered to the Treaty of Rome practical solutions would be found. As Ludlow notes, the Six had repeatedly urged the British “to put their trust in the CAP, not simply as it was, but as it would develop once Britain had a strong voice within the Community”. This was precisely Langeland and Skarstein’s point: the applicants had to drop conflicting national solutions and adopt and work within the Community policies. This view they shared with several of the British negotiators. Heath – and many with him – hoped that the UK could “work through the Community machinery”, and Langeland and Skarstein urged the Norwegian government to follow suit.

Both the Danish political embrace and Heath’s notion of ‘working through the Community machinery’ substantially shaped the reassessment of the Europeans. Moreover, it was created in a climate of overwhelmingly negative reactions to the government’s declaration, from the Six, the US and the other applicants. The new strategy, to be implemented from November 1962 onwards, resonated with the communitarian thinking adopted by Langeland, Halvorsen, Skarstein and the rest of the Europeans, that now enjoyed the support of large part of the Foreign Service together with the political leadership of the MFA and the MoCS. By early November Foreign Minister Lange’s views were in perfect sync with the Europeans’ reassessment.

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859 UD 44.36/6.84–19 – 13.10.1962, Stockholm – A. Gunneng – Discussion with cabinet secretary de Besche about the development of the negotiations in Brussels.
861 UD 44.36/6.84–19 – 26.10.1962 – J. Halvorsen – Memo. Impressions from discussions, 23 October, with the British about the relationship with the EEC.
863 UD 44.36/6.84–20 – 07.11.1962, Oslo – A. Langeland & A. Skarstein – Memo to the State Secretary. The State Secretary’s trips to Bonn, The Hague, Brussels, Copenhagen. Points for the report to the Liaison Committee.
865 RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 – Statement by the Chairman nr. 59, 05.11.1962. ”I. Foreign Minister Lange: The negotiations in Brussels.”
Implementation

With the support of Foreign Minister Lange, the Europeans implemented a major strategic shift. This came about quickly as the Europeans overwhelmingly inhabited the negotiation apparatus: State Secretary Engen was appointed as deputy chief negotiator, and the MFA and the MoCS shared the responsibility of coordinating the negotiations. On the recommendation of Engen and Skarstein, the MFA was given the authorisation to appoint representatives from within the MFA and from other ministries as they saw fit.866 Skarstein, Ibsen Jr. and Knut Frydenlund were sent to the Embassy in Brussels, while Solberg was placed as an observer with the EEC’s ad hoc secretariat created to handle the negotiations, and housed in the Council Secretariat in Brussels. At home the negotiation secretariat was established with Gudmund Saxrud and Paal Djonne (both MoCS), Arne Langeland (MFA) and Arne Lie (Bank of Norway, Norges Bank).867 Their assignment was, as Langeland wrote, to secure “as uniform as possible a view on questions of interpretation and presentation”.868 Furthermore, Halvorsen, Skarstein and Skaug were part of the negotiation delegation. In short, the Europeans enjoyed much freedom to appoint and compose the apparatus, and held most of the key positions within it.869

As a first measure, Langeland suggested to set up four working groups in Brussels, as fast as possible. “A separate apparatus in Brussels would force a certain pace”, he argued, and “would in turn act as a catalyst and incentive for our own internal preparations.”870 In a meeting with Jean-François Deniau (director of external relations for the Commission), Engen aired the idea to set up a separate apparatus in Brussels. Deniau thought it to be a good idea, and went on to inform that the Commission intended to give the Norwegian government a questionnaire regarding the declaration of July 4.871

The second measure was, as the Europeans had forcefully argued, to give a carefully balanced ‘embrace’ of the political implication of membership. On November 12, following Danish foreign minister Hækkerup’s convincing reaffirmation, Foreign Minister Lange,

866 UD 44.36/6.84–14 – 07.06.1962, Oslo – H. K. Engen and A. Skarstein – Appointment of the Norwegian negotiation delegation to the European Economic Community. Presentation by Minister.
868 UD 44.36/6.84–18 – 04.09.1962 – A. Langeland – Memo to the members of government. Preparation and implementation of the Norwegian negotiations with the EEC.
869 UD 44.36/6.84–16 – 20.06.1962 – K. Holler – Dear Lange. Best Regards Kjell Holler. As minister of industry Kjell Holler complained, the delegation “was one-sided in its composition. They are all economists except Head of Office Haugen from the Ministry of Agriculture.”
balancing domestic constrains and demands from abroad, stated: “…Norway wished to participate in the cooperation that was on-going on the basis of the Treaties of the European Communities and contribute to the development of ever closer integration of the national economies.”

Lange went as far as the Norwegian government could go in officially ‘embracing’ the political implications. Already before the statement, when Lange discussed Norway’s acceptance of the political implications of the Community in the Storting, it had caused quite a stir and rumours of a non-confidence motion. Discussing the Council of Minister’s meeting with the ECFA, Lange explained that his statement was a clarification of Norway’s position and that it was ready to participate in the integration process, and “that we of course were aware that such a process had a political content.”

He went on to echo the view of the Europeans:

“I don’t think there is any doubt that it was favourable for the atmosphere of the negotiations, that Norway stated this in Brussels. Because it is evident that the reactions after a closer study of our declaration of July 4 (...) have been that we listed so many and such fundamental problems that they had to question whether the Norwegians really wanted a full membership, and wanted to participate in the integration process. At this point in Brussels, I though it was important and right that this misunderstanding was cleared up.”

The negotiation strategy had come full circle: Lange officially supported and fought for what the Europeans had maintained throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. Lange’s shift was well received in both the Commission and the by the US administration. However, it had not been cleared with the Storting in advance, and domestically he was now on thin ice. “The wish for membership had almost disappeared in all the problems we had listed”, he told ECFA, and this was what he had corrected. The MoCS soon shared Lange’s support of the ‘new’ strategy. In December, Minister Gundersen informed the CIEC, that the rumours of a ‘limited enlargement’ “were now buried”. Gundersen went on to explain that the experiences from the British had taught the Norwegian negotiators that a “Community approach”, as he called it, gave satisfactory results. It was:

874 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting November 21, 1962, 10AM. Halvard Lange.
875 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting November 21, 1962, 10AM. Halvard Lange.
“probably not possible to demand all sorts of imaginable and unimaginable matters resolved in advance. We had to keep this in mind, and we should view these questions from within, as members of the Community. The solutions to the problems that may occur, would be prepared by the Commission, that is an impartial European bureaucratic unit, where we will be represented.”

These were, looking back at the rhetoric up until the autumn of 1962, new and surprisingly strong statements in favour of negotiating with the EEC on the basis of trust. The source of this reassessment was, as we have seen, the Europeans. And in this case, Gundersen’s statement can be directly traced back to Langeland. In late November, Langeland suggested that the negotiation apparatus already prior to the entry “tried to assess the negotiation result that we can realistically hope for, then try to get political support in advance for a negotiation strategy that aims at this.” To ease the negotiations, the rule had to be – despite the expert ministries wish to have “guarantees for this and that” – not to bring up problems of future harmonisation. Langeland restated that he wanted the Norway to ‘work through the Community machinery’, and finished his memo by warning that if the government wanted to reserve themselves to details in the EEC already in the negotiations, “the EEC were justified in saying that we haven’t understood the point of joining a community”.

When de Gaulle gave his press conference, January 14 1963, unofficially closing the door on Britain, and therefore Denmark, Ireland and Norway, the government, spearheaded by the Europeans, were in the process of changing the entire negotiations strategy. The new approach, informed by the reactions from the Six and the US, inspired by the approaches of the Danish and British, and constructed by the Europeans – was based on trust. Forged through diplomatic practice, the notion of ‘working through the Community machinery’ or following a communitarian approach was internalised and became a part of the government’s strategy, at least in the two ministries dealing with the EC-case.

Regarding Denmark, historian Morten Rasmussen counterfactually concludes that it seems unlikely “that Denmark could have been excluded from the EC if the enlargement negotiations had succeeded after such a display of European enthusiasm.” This does not necessarily hold true for the Norwegian case. Though the embrace of the political implications of membership for the Europeans was based on a real internalisation of trust in the Community, and though this notion of ‘working through the Community machinery’ was adopted by the

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879 As we shall see in chapter 11, this is especially palpable in the case of fishery.
880 Rasmussen Joining the European Communities, p. 133-136.
MFA and MoCS – the ‘new’ strategy was largely untested, and Lange’s balanced statement in November, though a big step in the domestic context, was only seen as a small and necessary first step in Community circles.

**Silence**

The day after de Gaulle’s infamous press conference, State Secretary Hans Engen wrote to Foreign Minister Lange that Norway should stick to their plan – Britain would try to continue their negotiations, and so should Norway.881 Halvorsen, trying to analyse the situation, suggested that, if the negotiations stopped completely, the government should state publicly that it had lost its the best option. In the mean time Norway should strengthen the EFTA cooperation and coordinate trans-Atlantic economic policies within the OECD framework.882 Langeland argued along the same lines. His main concern was the domestic mood:

> “Internally in Norway it must be equally important to try to intercept any reaction to the European policy and channel a possible unrest into new endeavours to expand Western cooperation in one shape or the other. (...) We must avoid any sense of disaster or calling into question of the economic arguments we have used regarding the benefit of membership in an expanded EEC.”883

The plan, as envisioned by Engen, Halvorsen and Langeland, was to keep European cooperation on the agenda in order to seek solutions to short-term trade issues *and* in order to keep the membership option present domestically until a new situation occurred. In short, the idea was to return to the ‘old’ Atlantic rhetoric and practical cooperation within EFTA, while waiting for the ‘new’ solution to become attainable.884

Lange was not overly optimistic regarding the reopening of negotiations. The only one able to bring President de Gaulle back to the table was Chancellor Adenauer. Lange rightly assessed that Adenauer was “too anxious to consolidate the Franco-German alliance to be willing to expose the relationship with France to any strain”. But he agreed with the rest of the analysis of the *Europeans:* should the negotiations officially stop, Norway had to return to

882 UD 44.36/6.84–22 – 18.01.1963 – J. Halvorsen – Memo. The breakdown of the negotiations with the EEC.
884 FO 371/171357 – 25.01.1963 – From Oslo to Foreign Office. This was also communicated to the British: “If the United Kingdom negotiations are suspended Norway, while remaining member of EFTA, would continue to work for European unity in cooperation with the Atlantic Community”.

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EFTA, and – importantly – find forums and ways to maintain contact with the EEC. For the time being the government could do little but to wait and see.

As of January 29, after a last meeting, the negotiations between the British and the Six were suspended indefinitely. Enduring pressure and accusations from the other Five and the British, Couve stood his ground and could only repeat his President’s conclusion: Britain did not fulfil the requirements of the Treaty of Rome, and could therefore not join. This was a conclusion that none of the other parties, except perhaps for an increasingly isolated Chancellor Adenauer, agreed with. The last efforts ended on a bitter note.

With the membership issue officially out of the picture, the Central Committee of the Labour Party and the NCTU issued a joint statement that unequivocally re-established the Atlantic strategy. The Norwegian government would work for the “widest possible cooperation with a united Western Europe in close contact with North America and all peace-loving nations”. There seems to have been general agreement on this return. What it meant for the long-term prospect of membership in the EEC, on the other hand, was both unclear and disputed. On the one hand, Prime Minister Gerhardsen held a press conference to disarm the ‘no’-side: there was no need for an anti-membership campaign, he argued, because Norway now “must see what Britain does”, and make cooperation in EFTA as effective as possible. For Gerhardsen, the EC-debacle had first and foremost been an internal party problem and his main concern now was to heal the wounds.

Foreign Minister Lange, on the other hand, struck a slightly different chord. Lange wanted to “maintain the opportunity to resume real negotiations for a solution that unites Western Europe (...) on the broadest possible basis”. In the foreign policy debate in the Storting, following the counsel of Halvorsen, Lange held that, “the best solution, and the lasting solution, which we had hoped to find through an enlarged EEC, we now have to forego, at least for the indefinite future”. While Lange, and the Europeans with him, may have hoped

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888 FO 371/171357 – 02.02.1963, Oslo – Mr. P. F. Hancock - Statement issued by a joint-meeting of the LANDSORGANISASJON and the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the LABOUR PARTY, called to discuss the breakdown of the negotiations.
889 FO 371/171357 – 14.02.1963, Oslo – Mr. P. F. Hancock – Points made by the Prime Minister about Norway and the Common Market at a press conference on February 11.
that membership of the EEC would continue to be the long-term aim of the government, it was apparent from the speeches of the various parliamentary leaders, that this aim was now generally regarded as unattainable. Indeed, the Prime Minister’s appeal to the ‘no’-side to ‘call off the fight’ gave the impression that membership was no longer a live issue for the Labour Party.\textsuperscript{893}

With the membership issue now off the political agenda, the Europeans moved on to the next battle: to try to retain as much of the diplomatic apparatus as possible. At the last negotiation delegation in February, Engen argued to keep “a core of EEC-experts” and the apparatus at home more or less intact.\textsuperscript{894} Both the diplomats and the political leadership of the MFA had come to terms with the fact that a Norwegian presence in the Community had to be slightly downscaled, but as Halvorsen said: “it is not satisfactory to have a representation so small that what we manage to cover is more or less random. We should also be up to date with regard to possible future negotiations with the EEC.”\textsuperscript{895} Halvorsen gathered supporting statements from the Ambassadors Jørgensen (Brussels) and Sommerfelt (EFTA), and sent the memo to Engen who immediately sent a memo to Lange. Repeating what Halvorsen wrote he added that both the Danish and British delegation in Brussels was to be expanded. He could agree to cut two positions at the Norwegian Embassy, further cuts would be “irrational” and the remaining five positions was “the absolute minimum”.\textsuperscript{896}

But the MFA had to retreat further still.\textsuperscript{897} End of March, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) demanded that all extra appointments in Brussels were to be recalled, all assistants were to be relocated and that the expense account of the Embassy in Brussels was to be set at the same level as before the negotiations.\textsuperscript{898} The situation frustrated many of the Europeans. Chargé d’Affaires to Brussels, Asbjørn Skarstein complained that the cuts were “hardly defendable” and maintained that it would be “an invaluable benefit” to have more people employed.\textsuperscript{899}

\textsuperscript{893} FO 371/171357 – 19.02.1963, Oslo – Mr. P. F. Hancock – Account of the debate in the Storting on the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations: views of the Norwegian Government and public.
\textsuperscript{894} UD 44.36/6.84 N. – 09.02.1962, Oslo – E. Berg – Minutes: Meeting in the Negotiation Delegation, February 6, 1962.
\textsuperscript{895} UD 44.36/6.84 B.-1 – 28.02.1963 – J. Halvorsen – Memo. Organization of our representation in the EEC and EFTA.
\textsuperscript{896} UD 44.36/6.84 B.1 – 01.03.1963 – H. Engen - Memo. The personnel situation in Brussels.
\textsuperscript{899} UD 44.36/6.84 B.1 – 08.04.1963, Brussels – A. Skarstein – The Embassy Personell. The Embassy Secretaries.
Since the abrupt French *de facto* veto, the remaining five had sought to keep channels open to ensure that Britain did not rethink their entire European alignment. Four months later, however, remarkably little had materialised of the contacts between Britain and the friendly five. Essentially, the problem faced by the Benelux countries, West Germany and Italy was to strike a balance between marking a properly measured dissent from the French position; keeping the British as close as possible; and reviving the Community. By June all parties, including the French, were keen to settle the issue, which threatened to keep the EEC from regaining its vigour. Rather than settling on a consultation mechanism between the Six and the UK *within* the Community, which – as the French and the Commission argued – could endanger the solidarity and working methods of the Six, a solution *outside* was chosen. July 11, the Six and Britain agreed to quarterly meetings within the framework of the Western European Union (WEU). Headquartered in Brussels, the Commission would also take part in the discussions. Thus, a compromise – satisfactory to all – had been reached.  

News of the links in the making sparked a renewed effort from the *Europeans* and the political leadership of the MFA to maintain its manpower in Brussels. Late in May, Lange and Skaug (now Ambassador to London), met with Heath. In direct opposition to the position taken by the majority of government, Lange stated that Norway would be interested in consultations through the WEU. Heath, acutely aware of the delicate balance found regarding their own consultations, replied that “the best approach would be to try to secure consultation for the United Kingdom first and slip the Norwegians and the Danes in gradually”.

With this Skarstein and Engen jointly drafted a long memo to the Foreign Minister. It was a point-by-point rebuttal of the flawed strategy of low-key presence chosen by the government. First, they argued that both the fishery and agricultural attaché had to stay in Brussels. Keeping the fishery attaché, for example, was essential since the planned common fishery policy of the Community would be of “the utmost importance for Norway”. Second, Skarstein and Engen pointed to the fact that the Commission had expressed the importance of solid contacts between themselves and the applicant countries. Third, the other EFTA

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901 FO 371/171383 – 22.05.1963 – Meeting with Mr. Lange, Norwegian Foreign Minister and Norwegian Ambassador, May 15. Opting for a solution within the WEU, which was limited to the Six and the UK, it is probable that Heath knew that there was scant hope of delivering upon his promises. The British were in effect admitting that the issue of on going relations between the Community and its neighbours was to be solved by Britain and the Six, leaving the London declaration and other possible EFTA-solutions well behind.

902 UD 44.36/6.84 B.–1 – 28.05.1963, Oslo – Chr. Brinch and T. Stokke – To the MFA. The foreign economic work by the Embassy in Brussels; UD 44.36/6.84 B.–1 – 29.05.1963, Oslo – H. Engen and A. Skarstein – Memo to the Foreign Minister – Manpower in Brussels. Beforehand, they had secured the backing of the Ministry of Fishery, the Ministry of Agriculture and the MoCS.
countries had all strengthened their delegations to the Community. “[W]e are dealing with Norway's representation to a European major power [and] our absolute biggest and most important trading partner”, the memo ended, “[t]he evaluation of our representation must be viewed in this light, and not in the light of the shifting situation with regard to our negotiations with the Community.”

In a rare personal letter, Foreign Minister Lange took the European's point directly to the Minister of Finance Andreas Cappelen: "I think it is clear, on the basis of what is stated above, that a reduction of staff in Brussels as proposed by the MoF, will not satisfy the legitimate demands of a Norwegian representation in Brussels necessary for our commercial interests.”

In fact, Lange – clearly angered by the line chosen by his government – now suggested adding personnel to the Brussels Embassy. Prime Minister Gerhardsen and the majority of the cabinet were highly critical of the approach taken by Lange, and in the end he was forced to retreat from his stance.

By the summer of 1963, Britain had greatly expanded its representation in Brussels and formalised its contacts with the EEC through the WEU. Sweden had increased its presence in Brussels (almost matching the UK) and Denmark was expanding too. By contrast, the British ambassador to Oslo could report that, “no effort has been made to establish a so-called permanent contact with the EEC on a ministerial level”, and later concluded: “there seems little doubt that, as regards contacts with the EEC, the Norwegian Government will be content to let other people make the running. There are no indications that the Norwegians are in the least unhappy about our new arrangement with WEU”.

The MFA and MoCS complaints that “Norway was the only one of [the EFTA] countries that had not established any form of contact beyond diplomatic representation in Brussels” fell on deaf ears. Almost a year after de Gaulle’s veto, and only after prolonged discussions, the Government could barely agree to “establish some contact with the EEC in the not too distant future”. Only a month thereafter hopes of such contacts vanished as state secretary to the MFA, Jens Boyesen regretfully noted that contacts at the ministerial level should be kept to a minimum to avoid agonising debates. The official policy was silence.

903 UD 44.36/6.84 B.–1 – 29.05.1963, Oslo – H. Engen and A. Skarstein – Manpower in Brussels.
904 UD 44.36/6.84 B.–1 – 04.06.1963, Oslo – H. Lange – Dear Andreas.
907 FO 371/171357 – 22.06.1963, Oslo – P. F. Hancock – Question of a permanent contact between Norway and the EEC is very unclear so far.
910 Eriksen and Pharo Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering (1997), p. 349-350, 459. Again Langeland, Huslid and Halvorsen argued against it, again they were not heard.
Conclusions: the *Europeans* and their policy

Within three years, the *Europeans*, and through them the political leadership of the MFA and MoCS, had fundamentally changed their attitude towards European integration – from distrust, via acquiescence, to eagerness. Their rethink of the entire Norwegian negotiation strategy in the autumn of 1962, and the passionate appeals to retain manpower in Brussels after de Gaulle’s veto, revealed the normative and emotional ties with the cause.

It is evident that the shift started when the Norwegian government’s *only* strategy disappeared and left a massive decision-making vacuum to be filled by the *Europeans*. They were professionally convinced that membership was the only available option, but also gained an unusual ownership of the policy choice. A nucleus of *Europeans* managed to convince the foreign policy leadership of the need for membership, but after, the British, Danish and Irish applications followed nearly a year of indecision from the government. This prolonged decision-making process only hardened the *Europeans’* resolve, as they staunchly defended a policy that, in large part, they had created. In the pre-negotiation contacts between the Community and the Norwegian government, following a reserved Norwegian declaration, the *Europeans* learned to embrace the political implications of membership. This marks the last stage in the consolidation of the *Europeans*: what began as a *strategy* of trust became – through their diplomatic practice and adaptation of ideas from the Community via the Danish and British – actual trust. By the fall of 1962, the *Europeans* had adopted important elements of the Communitarian language, – and juxtaposed themselves against displays of Norwegian distrust in ‘Europe’.

The reason the *Europeans* recommended *membership* (and not association) was essentially political, and it was shaped by interactions with diplomats, politicians and officials from the Six, Denmark, the UK and the US. Norway’s traditional ally, the USA, informed the *Europeans* that it hoped Norway – as a NATO-member – would apply for full membership. The British informed them that Norway could only rely on Britain’s bargaining strength if it applied for full membership. And the Community informed them that it only accepted requests for associated memberships from underdeveloped or neutral countries. Confronted with this, the *Europeans* started a meticulous recalibration and reformulation of Norwegian foreign policy and created a narrative and line of argumentation, which placed membership in the EEC in continuation of Norway’s postwar policy. This stand was perhaps only a rhetorical manifestation of the geo-political changes that had taken place but, apart from fears of loss of markets, the explicit weight put on continuity – that it was not a break with the past
– became one of the most important arguments in the referendum 10 years later. Indeed, continued ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ were the main mantras of the Europeans and the foreign policy elites in the campaigns of 1971-72.

What we see, therefore, is that the Europeans themselves and the government’s foreign policy were transnationally constituted by their continuous interpretation and mediation of ideas, ideologies, language, positions and material concerns through diplomatic practice. With de Gaulle’s veto of January 14, 1963, the membership issue was soon ‘actively forgotten’ by the majority of the Norwegian political elite, and the path chosen by the government was one of silence. It is against this background we need to understand the Europeans’ increasing participation in informal and non-governmental pro-European networks.
The Second Round

Politicised Diplomacy, 1962-1971

“The combination of working for a Movement and engaging in information efforts regarding European matters, is not always beneficial.”

Tim Greve speaking to the Working Committee of the EMN (December 1967).

The two chapters of the second round explore the politicisation of the Europeans between de Gaulle’s first veto and the Centre-Right coalition’s demise in March 1971. Politicisation happened in two ways: first, through the involvement in pro-European networks and organisations with efforts to keep membership on the agenda in the mid-1960s, and second, in administrative and political battles with EC-sceptics, particularly Prime Minister Borten of the Centre-Right coalition. As will be argued, overwhelmingly pro-European forces crowded the new diplomatic spaces where the Europeans operated. And it was with these forces that the Europeans became entangled, via information campaigns, most importantly through their entry into the European Movement in Norway (EMN) in 1965-67. This gives a whole new dimension to how the Europeans worked with the EC-case in the 1970s, particularly in relation to public diplomacy and information, which were coordinated through these networks. In the mid-1960s, the Europeans became boundary-spanners for the European cause.

The Europeans’ political affiliations were instrumental in these processes of politicisation. The social democratic connection shaped early information efforts and the Europeans’ entry into the EMN. Their professional and personal links to Foreign Minister Lange and to the foreign policy orientation he represented, pulled them into official participation in the EMN, as Lange left the MFA in 1965 to become chairman of that very organisation. Equally, the Conservative-Labour alignment on this issue, and their dominance within the MFA and among the Europeans, was crucial to their resistance against the so-called Nordek negotiations that took place between 1968 and 1970. The growing tensions between Borten and the Europeans, in particular, would reveal just how politicised they had become, and how much the EC-sceptics distrusted them.

The MFA, EMN, Labour and the Conservatives all helped produce the same discourse the Europeans had been instrumental in articulating in the early 1960s: membership was an economic necessity. But even more important was the political orientation, continued Atlantic anchoring, and peace and security as it had been established in the late 1940s.

Chapter 8
Boundary Spanners for the European cause

“As you may know, the ‘European activities’ in this country have experienced a slump during the last half-year. However, we are now reorganising this committee, and there will be a new office in Oslo from new year.”

EMN secretary Erik Hoff to Mr. Zöldi (December 1963).

The time between de Gaulle’s first veto in January of 1963, and Britain’s second attempt at joining the EEC in 1966-67, is often described as an eventless period in Norwegian-Community relations. In political terms, this is true: the government, the Labour Party and the Storting on the whole took the French 1963-veto calmly, and most politicians were, as historian Helge Pharo puts it, “greatly relieved” that the EEC-debacle was over. Furthermore, as seen above, any form of dense diplomatic contact with the EEC was effectively shut down in 1963 – Norway returned to its Atlantic outlook.

Just as Gerhardsen had before, the Centre-Right coalition – taking office in 1965 – moved very carefully as the EC-issue re-emerged in 1966-67. They hoped for a long period of peace concerning the European question, and when the divisive issue reappeared, a policy securing coherence was chosen. Accordingly, there was little public debate and few suggestions of intensified official connections with the Community. Membership was not discussed in any detail in the foreign policy debates in the Storting between 1963 and 1966, and it was a non-issue during the election campaign of 1965. The issue was “not only put on ice, it was placed at the bottom of the deep-freezer.” Due to this political silence, this period is also gravely understudied in the Norwegian historiography.

However, based largely on hitherto unexplored archives, this chapter will argue that it was precisely during this period of inaction on the shifting governments’ part, that a broad pro-European network – which the Europeans became a part of – took shape, expanded and formalised its links. As will be argued, the Europeans went from being passive and peripheral participants in the early attempts of an information campaign (1962-63), to centrally placed contributors – interlinking the Norwegian Council of the European Movement (NCEM, by 1965

915 Kristoffersen “Norway’s Policy towards the EEC” (2006), p. 211.
916 Troite and Vold Bender i E-Førård (1977), p. 82.
917 Three of the major contributions on the issue in fact skip these years: Eriksen and Pharo Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering (1997); Tamnes Oljealder (1997); Allen Norway and Europe (1979).
918 RA/S.1275; NSA; F(C)O; AA - Haakon Lie, Arne Skaug; RA/S-6173; RA/PA-0992; HAEU – ME & LECE.
renamed the European Movement in Norway (EMN)); the MFA and administrative apparatus; the various foreign connections; the economic interest groups; and the membership positive political parties. The combination of the Europeans’ boundary-spanning diplomatic capacities and wholly pro-European connections, and their frustration with the government and conviction that membership was the right solution, made them take on new and important roles within these networks. The transition culminated, and this chapter ends, with the Europeans enrolling en masse in the EMN, and the MFA officially funding its activities (1965-67). The immediate repercussions of this development were not dramatic. But it is impossible to understand how the Europeans worked with the subsequent Nordek and EC negotiations, and the referendum campaign, without first exploring how they became boundary-spanners for the Europeans’ cause.

**The European Committee (1962-1963)**

Early attempts to coordinate an information effort directed towards the public, grew out of four interlinked concerns. First, the long internal decision-making process of the Labour Party preferred by Prime Minister Gerhardsen, from the summer of 1961 to the early spring of 1962, had revealed considerable and growing scepticism towards Norway applying for membership in the EEC.919 Second, the parliamentary white paper presented in October 1961 had, even without a clear conclusion, created much opposition in the Storting and the ECFA. Specifically, there was strong criticism of the Europeans for downplaying the negative effects of membership, and not investigating the association alternative seriously. The early and uncoordinated efforts of the Europeans to inform the public and parliament on the matter did little to change this perception.

Third, a call for a referendum by the radical liberal newspaper, Dagbladet, and the Liberal Party (Venstre) – difficult to ignore once it was on the table – made public opinion much more important.920 Important segments of society had organised – academics, trade unionists, artists, parliamentarians, teachers, farmers and fishermen – and were actively working against membership. Movements like ‘De 143’ and ‘Opplysningsutvalget av 1962’, though still not organised across the right-left axis, had mass appeal; the response from the public both surprised and scared the administrative, economic and political elites.921 Last, after many years of general disinterest in the European question, polls conducted as late as March 1962

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919 Ørvik (Ed.) (1972) *Fears and Expectations*, p. 11.
920 Already the day after the British decision to apply for membership July 1961, the newspaper *Dagbladet* called for an advisory referendum, and got vague backing from the Liberal Party leader Bent Røiseland. Tor Bjørklund *Hundre år med folkeavstemninger: Norge og Norden, 1905-2005*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (2005), p. 100.
revealed that a considerable segment of the electorate could not name the six member states of the EEC, and that 16% had never heard of it.\textsuperscript{922} This was unsettling, as the whole issue could be settled by a referendum in the not too distant future.\textsuperscript{923} In this climate, those in favour of membership saw the urgent need for a flow of positive and illuminating information.

In the spring and summer of 1962, therefore, business organisations, pro-European forces within the government, and the NCEM started planning for a “ceaseless information campaign” to counter the “false propaganda regarding the Common Market going on” and “get talking with ‘the common man’”.\textsuperscript{924} By early June a number of meetings and conversations regarding the need for an information campaign took place. The Labour Party’s parliamentary group and ESCFA’s decision in favour of a consultative referendum, on April 10 and 12 respectively, fuelled the spike in activity.\textsuperscript{925} Immediately thereafter, at a meeting held in the University’s Old Ballroom, Foreign Minister Lange gave clear advice to NCEM: “We have a significant and unmet need for an unbiased and objective information service, and the Norwegian Council of the European Movement have a mission that I hope it will commence with full force in the coming months.”\textsuperscript{926} The NCEM acted on Lange’s encouragement.\textsuperscript{927} During the following months, the board decided to create a ‘coordinating body’ for the upcoming information campaign and to create a committee “with the aim of Norwegian membership being accepted through a referendum”.\textsuperscript{928} Chairman of NCEM Chief Justice Terje Wold – a senior Labour politician and former Minister of Justice – then called several meetings to find people willing to take part in, and a chairman to head ‘The European Committee’, as it was to be called.\textsuperscript{929}

In order to find future members and get the Committee up and running, Wold contacted the MFA for help. Soon, secretary Magne Reed was given leave from the MFA to work as secretary for The European Committee for one year.\textsuperscript{930} More importantly, future private secretary to Lange, Knut Frydenlund did “quite a lot of work to bring the original

\textsuperscript{922} Eriksen and Pharo \textit{Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering} (1997), p. 333
\textsuperscript{923} As seen above Minister of Commerce & Shipping, Arne Skaug, had noted the need for information to the public as early as September 1961, in a conversation with Ludwig Erhard. UD 44.36/6.84-3 – 22.09-1961 – E. Løchen – Memo. Conversation between Ministers Skaug and Erhard in Bonn.
\textsuperscript{926} RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 – Statement from the chairman, no. 56, 10.06.1962. Speech by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, EMN’s meeting at the University’s old Ballroom, 11.04.1962.
\textsuperscript{927} The NCEM was also encouraged by Chief Justice Jens Chr. Hauge.
\textsuperscript{928} RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 – Summary.
\textsuperscript{929} The full name was 'The Committee for Norwegian membership in the European Communities'.
members together”. In July of 1962, Knut Frydenlund was sent to Brussels as permanent press attaché. From the MFA: “in connection with the necessary information campaign here at home, it would be helpful to have a man in Brussels with the responsibility of getting material for this work”. Apparently Frydenlund did much more. With his excellent connections as part of the Labour Party’s polito-administrative core, he helped bring together a powerful group of Norway’s political, legal and economic elite for the institutive meeting of The European Committee. These were early signs of the Europeans’ boundary spanning for the cause.

Though they were not members of the Committee, powerful figures such as Asbjørn Petter Østberg, Konrad Nordahl, Sjur Lindebrække, and Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen were all involved in shaping it into a broad committee, “established on its own”, and without clear ties to any one particular organisation. The NCEM’s direct participation, for instance, would make the ‘neutral’ organisation too blatantly pro-European. It would smack of supranationalism and federalism – not a very helpful combination for Norwegian domestic politics. Wold, as it turned out, agreed. He opened the institutive meeting by stressing that the NCEM “should not have anything whatsoever to do with the information campaign directly”. Then all of NCEM’s participating members withdrew their names from the European Committee once it had been established.

Moreover, the European Committee could only have hidden government backing, as it was meant to be a ‘non-party affair’. However, Gerhardsen and Lindebrække’s first suggestion for a ‘neutral’ chairman – famous nuclear physician Gunnar Randers – was

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932 UD 44.36/6.84 B. - File 1 – June 27, 1962, Oslo – Tor Myklebost, Presseavdelingen – Notat til Utenriksministeren.
933 The August 2 institutive meeting was attended by Chief Justice Wold, Secretary Eivind Berdahl (National Committee for International Youth Work), Chief Justice Jens Chr. Hauge, shipping director Per Hegnæ, Labour Party secretary Lie, secretary Kåre Norum (Chairman of the Norwegian Union of Teachers, active in the resistance movement during the war), director Randers, secretary Reed (MFA), and Chief Justice Wikborg.
934 Leader of the Norwegian Employers’ Confederation (NEC), Leader of the NCTU and Conservative Party Leader, respectively.
937 NSA–7B–16 – 06.08.1962, Oslo – A. P. Østberg, Director NEC – Regarding the Common Market.
The Prime Minister’s brother, Rolf Gerhardsen, had warned that Randers, a strong protagonist of nuclear power, would provoke “a nuclear struggle” within the Labour Party. As the anti-nuclear and anti-EEC movements on the left overlapped, Randers would be a poor choice as chairman. The Prime Minister took action, calling on Trygve Lie to become the Committee’s chairman instead. This choice was obviously less party-neutral. But with Trygve Lie, the Government had secured an elder statesman with considerable foreign policy capital who was loyal to the Prime Minister, and who was not too obviously linked to any of the factions within the Labour Party.

At a funding meeting in late October 1962, a budget of “no less than 2 million” was secured with sizeable contributions from various business sectors. The business sector, however, wanted to keep a low profile as it already dominated the funding. A high-profile role would be counter-productive when trying to reach ‘the common man’, they argued. In fact, all the powerful segments of society wanted the European Committee to be established, but few wanted to be explicitly linked to it.

Following a careful strategy, then, to avoid provoking EC-sceptics unnecessarily, it was decided that the European Committee should go public when it was reasonably certain that British negotiations would succeed. Following several meetings between Wold and Haakon Lie, and coinciding with the opening of the final phase of British negotiations with the EEC on October 27, 1962, the European Committee felt certain enough to proclaim its establishment in a leading newspaper:

“Just as our foreign policy’s fundamental principles up until now have gathered support from an overwhelming majority of the people, cutting across party boundaries and interest conflicts that..."
create divisions in other questions, the Committee for Norwegian membership in the European Communities [European Committee] has gathered supporters and co-workers representing different political views, professions and interests.”

As agreed, the Committee portrayed itself as a broad coalition working in favour of membership in the EEC, and framed membership as a continuation of Norwegian postwar foreign policy. As the British negotiations moved into its final stages, the Committee hoped it could finally start its ‘ceaseless information campaign’.

Yet the campaign never got off the ground. Before the European Committee could agree on its course of action, the membership negotiations were brought to a definite halt by de Gaulle’s veto. Still, it was remarkable that a Committee of such esteemed people, with solid funding and a common aim, were unable to organise any sort of campaign for almost three months. A dispatch from the UK embassy in Oslo gives a clear indication of why this was the case: “on establishment it had great difficulty in getting itself organised internally and suffered from being too large and top heavy, with too many important people with half thought out ideas, and too few to work these out to their proper conclusions and put them into practice.”

Though it was meant to be a broad ‘people’s movement’, the European Committee was dominated by big names from the political, legal and economic elite and had only vague plans for a general information campaign. Cutting out the NCEM, who had expert knowledge in planning such events and producing information material, and with very limited involvement by the Europeans, who were the most knowledgeable people regarding the negotiations and the EEC, the Committee could lay claim to very little actual expertise. Furthermore, the British reported that the European Committee “found some difficulty in persuading the institutions with which they wished to co-operate, that they were non-political and only wished to present the facts about the Common Market.” This seems very plausible, and indeed not too surprising. The image of ‘neutrality’ was clearly difficult to maintain with so many Labour politicians involved. It would take almost ten years for the government and pro-European forces to recognise that no amount of general information or so-called political neutrality would address the problems raised by those opposed to membership.

The most important reason for the Committee’s impotence, however, was Prime Minister Gerhardsen’s manoeuvring. He kept the Committee from ever being an effective organisation. This is evident from an argument between Trygve Lie and Gerhardsen at a top brass meeting of the Labour Party in November. Lie complained that the Committee had “plenty of funds, but few ideas or organisations through which they could work, and would be glad to trade the former for the latter”. He had hoped for close collaboration with, and much help from, the Labour movement. Gerhardsen intervened and forcefully emphasised that the Labour Movement “must not compromise [itself] by accepting material, and least of all money from the Committee”. The Committee should not expect to pick up speed until it was clear that Norwegian membership in the EEC was imminent. This left Lie, and many others present, “fretfully wondering why the government had encouraged the formation of the Committee, and what the latter was expected to do with itself for the time being”.953

In a sense, the European Committee was a product of the Labour Party State’s corporate machinery. Personnel, money and ideas flowed freely between parties, organisations and ministries. Still, the membership issue was divisive, both within the Labour Party and among the general public. Wary of the reactions from both the left wing and ‘the common man’, neither business circles nor the government wanted to get their hands dirty. Instead, a not very convincing ‘neutral’ profile was chosen.

The Europeans were not actively and directly participating in these early attempts at an information campaign. This is important because it shows that although leading multilateral economic diplomats, such as Langeland, Halvorsen, Berg, Solberg, Ibsen Jr. and Skarstein had become professionally convinced Europeans, they were not politicised to such a degree as to break with established diplomatic norms. Engaging with the public through organised campaigns was still uncharted territory for diplomats in the early 1960s. Reed and Frydenlund’s partaking in the European Committee were early signs of the Europeans playing the role of ‘boundary-spanners’ in the information campaign. Terje Wold had requested help from the MFA, and Foreign Minister Lange had nudged the two diplomats in this direction. However, Reed was only a secretary and Frydenlund kept a safe distance. Perhaps direct involvement was unnecessary within the Labour Party State. They could, as Frydenlund did, help out the Committee from afar. In fact, the Europeans first got directly involved as a consequence of the enduring passiveness of the Labour Party and the tensions within the Centre-Right coalition: as sand was gathering in the governmental machinery, and tacit

norms broke down, the *Europeans* chose – and were chosen to – the informal arenas.

**The merger: 1963-1964**

After de Gaulle’s veto, it seemed like the EC-issue vanished just as fast as it had appeared. The European Committee, though, did not cease to exist. As a lack of general information regarding the EEC was evident; the respective No-movements had decided to continue their work; and Norway’s relationship with the Community was important regardless of the membership issue, the Committee informed, on February 22, 1963, the public that it would:

“[C]ontinue its work, in close contact with the Norwegian Council of the European Movement [NCEM], to give unbiased information about the further developments, and, together with the democratic forces in other countries, work for the realisation of the fundamental ideas of the Community, in a united Europe in close contact with the North American democracies.”\(^{954}\)

With immediate membership off the table, and more long-term European cooperation back on the agenda, the NCEM re-entered the stage. Reed sought the advice of his MFA colleagues, *Europeans* Eivinn Berg and Arne Langeland. Berg was sceptical about the merger because the European Committee and the NCEM served fundamentally different purposes. The Committee was a typical action committee, viewed by the public “as a propaganda committee linked with the referendum”. The NCEM, on the other hand, had a longer history, and had largely stayed away from the membership debacle. “For these reasons, the EMN is probably better equipped [...] to head an active and productive education and propaganda effort in the current situation”. Berg thought the work of the NCEM could be “compromised by this statement of formal cooperation”. Langeland, the more senior of the two, thought it was a tricky question: yes, the NCEM was probably more ‘objective’ in the eyes of the public, but did they have the manpower and the means to carry out systematic and long-term work?\(^{955}\)

In a letter to Jahn Halvorsen inviting him to a meeting on the merger issue, Reed argued that since the NCEM and the Committee had overlapping members, and since the Committee had managed to establish a far-reaching network of regional offices, the Committee should be absorbed by the NCEM. Once membership negotiations were back on the table – the thinking was – the Committee could be resurrected to take on the propaganda efforts directly linked with the referendum. To Reed’s mind the Committee would have

\(^{954}\) *Aftenposten* – 22.02.1963. At the same time the chairman, Trygve Lie, resigned and left it to Gunnar Randers to lead the Committee. *Aftenposten* – 29.03.1963.

\(^{955}\) UD 44.36/6.84 P.–1 – 18.04.1963, Oslo – E. Berg – Memo to Langeland. The European Committee. Remarks to Reed’s memo.
“betrayed its mission” if it did not “make use of the intermediate time to build a nation-wide organisation”.956

While there were few written records of communication between the Europeans and the Committee until January 1963, the memos and letters appearing after the veto had a distinct familiarity and ‘matter of courseness’ to them. With Lange, Frydenlund and Reed957 involved in setting up the Committee, it is highly probable that the remaining Europeans such as Halvorsen, Langeland, Skarstein and Berg kept in touch with Magne Reed during the Committee’s short-lived and unsuccessful campaign. It is equally likely that this connection was kept largely ‘off the books’, as formal connections with the MFA would send the wrong signals.958 Once the membership issue was out of the public eye, Halvorsen, Langeland and Berg were formally drawn into the discussions. All the Europeans recommended continuing the information campaign while being cautious not to unnecessarily taint the NCEM. By March of 1964, the NCEM leadership could present the amalgamation of the European Committee and the NCEM to its board members:

“To avoid that our established contacts and the material gathered would be lost, and to keep the organisation that was created from withering away – keeping it intact for the struggle that will come sooner or later – the Committee has been merged with the Norwegian Council of the European Movement, whose chairman, Chief Justice Terje Wold, was the one who took the initiative of establishing the Committee in the first place.” 959

The NCEM was strengthened with the inclusion of the apparatus and resources of the European Committee, and could boast new offices in Oslo and the hiring of a new permanent secretary.960 While advising on the merger, most of the Europeans still kept their distance. But even with official silence, they had clear opinions on the matter: information was needed.

**The Social Democratic Connection**

Between 1962 and 1965, a dense network of ‘enlargement positive’ German, Norwegian and other Social Democrats took shape. This Social Democratic Connection was partly facilitated

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956 UD 44.36/6.84 P.–1 – 02.04.1963, Oslo – M. Reed – Memo. The European Committee. Aims and tasks.
957 RA/PA-0992/A/Aa/L0006/0001 – 22.05.1963, Oslo – M. Reed – Summary from the meeting of the working committee, 15.05.1963. Reed returned to the MFA during the summer of 1963.
958 UD 44.36/8–1 – 26.07.1962, Oslo – Chief Justice E. Wikborg, Lawyers Wikborg og Rein – Visit from president A. M. Donner of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The only trace of these connections in the MFA archives is a meeting between Chief Justice Wikborg, Chief Justice Wold, State secretary Engen and Director General Halvorsen discussing a visit from President of the ECJ Andreas Matthias Donner (1958-1964).
959 RA/PA – 0992/F/1.0002 – 03.1964, Oslo – P. Hegnar, G. Randers, E. Wikborg – The European Committee.
by the *Europeans* via the NCEM and the German organisation *Komite für Europäische und Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (KEIZ), headed by Albert Zöldi.961

Via Knut Frydenlund, Zöldi’s organisation and the NCEM established “a productive cooperation”, arranging student trips to the EEC-countries and getting speakers from the Community to visit Norway already by 1962. On the insistence of Frydenlund, the NCEM formalised its cooperation with Zöldi and KEIZ in late 1963.962 By 1964, information trips to the Community for parliamentarians, press, fishermen, foresters, civil servants, students and the business community, were “a permanent part of the European Movements activities”.963 By 1965, permanent secretary of the NCEM, Erik Hoff, took part in the board meetings of the German organisation. Within three years, then, the Social Democratic KEIZ-NCEM connection had been thoroughly institutionalised as a valuable part of the European Movements information campaign.964

The cooperation between the MFA and KEIZ seems to have happened almost by chance. During the first EC-round in early May of 1962, Alfred Mozer, the *chef de cabinet* of the Commissioner of Agriculture Sicco Mansholt, had suggested that he and Mansholt pay an official visit to Norway.965 Alfred Mozer was a socialist and, surprisingly, one of the few officials in the Commission who had been active in groups and networks furthering European integration, such as the European Movement. Mozer had an impressive network of contacts, especially among the Social Democrats of Europe, such as Olof Palme, Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky.966 In late May, however, Mozer told the Norwegian Embassy in Brussels that he was invited to another event in Norway taking place at the same time as the planned tour of Norway. The organisers of this other event were Albert Zöldi and KEIZ.967 Trying to straighten out the double booking, the MFA suggested that the official visit could be coordinated with the second event in September.968 By way of coincidence, then, the *Europeans*

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961 That this was a Social Democratic endeavour is evidenced by the fact that the vice chairman of the NCEM and member of the Christian Peoples Party (*Kristelig Folkeparti*), Erling Wikborg, as late as 1965, was poorly informed regarding the cooperation between KEIZ and his own organization. RA/PA-0992/D/L0015/0004 – 12.04.1965, Oslo - E. Wikborg - The relationship between the NCEM and other organisations with similar aims.


964 RA/PA-0992/D/L0015/0004 – 12.04.1965, Oslo - E. Wikborg - The relationship between the NCEM and other organisations with similar aims.


967 Together with the Norwegian National Committee for International Youth Work (NIU).

968 UD 44.36/8-1 – 17.08.1962 – W. Fredriksen – Memo. Visit to Norway by Mansholt, Mozer and Rey. In the end, the Commissioner responsible for external relations, Jean Rey, attended the event instead of Mansholt.
came to know of the KEIZ and soon learned that Zöldi had already arranged seminars in Vienna, Bern and Copenhagen.\textsuperscript{969} According to Eivin Berg it “operated as an intermediary between the Norwegian organisers and the Commission in Brussels”.\textsuperscript{970}

The ties between the \textit{Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands} (SPD) and the Norwegian Labour Party had grown increasingly stronger since the end of The Second World War. Leading Norwegian Social Democrats, such as Haakon Lie, Halvard Lange and Trygve Bratteli had offered their services for the reintegration of the SPD in the Socialist International and were responsible for the pragmatic attitude of Norway to the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into the western camp. Young Social Democrats such as Knut Frydenlund, Reiulf Steen and Per Kleppe also nurtured close connections with German Social Democrats after participating in socialist exchange programs to Germany early in their careers.\textsuperscript{971} As historian Robin Allers has explored, ties to Willy Brandt were especially close.\textsuperscript{972} In September of 1963, after Norwegian-Community connections had ground to a halt, Brandt contacted Halvard Lange via the Norwegian Ambassador to Bonn, Hersleb Vogt, to propose the following:

“To possibly alleviate the current difficulties in the relationship between Norway and the Common Market, and with a view for a better future, contacts should be established at expert-level between the Labour Party and SPD. Of course, these conversations between experts would have to be completely informal (...) through such contacts [we] could possibly prevent adverse effects which would otherwise manifest themselves.”\textsuperscript{973}

It is highly likely that at least part of these expert meetings were arranged via the NCEM-KEIZ connection, or at least that the two arrangements formed part of the same whole. Albert Zöldi belonged to the transnational network of European Social Democrats and Socialists. Furthermore, Zöldi had direct access to the Commission, and could arrange meetings, lectures and trips with high-ranking civil servants and officials on short notice.\textsuperscript{974} According to Allers, it was member of the \textit{Bundestag} and Social Democrat Erwin Lange, who

\textsuperscript{969} UD 44.36/8-1 – 24.05.1962, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – Seminar in Norway and possible visit by Mansholt.

\textsuperscript{970} UD 44.36/8–1 – 30.05.1962, Oslo – E. Berg – Notat. CEE. Seminar in Norge. Visit to Norway by representatives of the Commission.


\textsuperscript{972} Brandt emigrated to Norway in 1933/34, was given a Norwegian citizenship (1940) and learnt to speak Norwegian fluently, he married first the Norwegian Anna Carlotta Thorkildsen (1941-1948) and then Norwegian Rut Brandt, to whom he was married almost to the very end. He regained his German citizenship in 1948.


had established KEIZ. Moreover, Zöldi had met Labour Party Secretary Haakon Lie as early as August 1960. Haakon Lie, who had cultivated valuable links with many German Social Democrats ever since the war, entered the NCEM in the mid 1960s.

After Brandt and Lange’s communications, the KEIZ-NCEM cooperation intensified: Frydenlund and Zöldi planned three large-scale information trips to the Community for Scandinavian civil servants and parliamentarians in 1964. Moreover, the NCEM planned an information trip for the industry organisations to the EEC and three or four trips of Community experts to the North of Norway. After facilitating and planning ahead, Frydenlund left most of the planning and execution of events and trips to the NCEM. In the following years Haakon Lie, among others, would initiate numerous study trips for Norwegian politicians, trade unionists, journalists and students to Bonn and Brussels via the NCEM-KEIZ channel in the years ahead.

In these times of official silence, the informal connection suited the right wing, pro-NATO, pro-European Labour Party politicians well. From their point of view, Gerhardsen’s policy of domestic appeasement was detrimental to Norwegian interests and Norway’s relationship with the Community. Moreover, as Knut Frydenlund enthusiastically wrote to Secretary Reed: “the advantage with the ‘Zöldi arrangement’” was that it would “not become an EEC thing, but would include OECD, the CoE etcetera”. Put differently, events arranged by Zöldi would not be interpreted as membership propaganda. By outsourcing and diversifying the information effort it was possible to keep up a steady flow of information and visits without spurring too much domestic debate.

**Consolidation: 1965-1967**

The *Europeans’* participation in the *European Movement in Norway* (EMN, 1965) materialised in the

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976 AA - Haakon Lie - Df/A/053/4/1 – L0003. At the time Zöldi was the leader of the Europäische Bildungsgemeinschaft, which perhaps explains how he got in touch with NIU.
977 Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), p. 109; S-1275/Db/Box 277/Folder 2.
980 Between 1964 and 1969, the NCEM via Hoff, and later General Secretaries S. K. Eriksen (early 1967) and E. M. Bull (late 1967), planned most of their trips and conferences, in Norway and the Community, with KEIZ.
983 RA/PA – 0992/D/L0015 - 15.05.1964 – E. Hoff – Dear Frydenlund. The pro-European Labour backing had to be indirect. In a letter to Frydenlund, May 1964, Hoff complained that since it had been difficult for the Labour Party and NCTU to contribute financially to the European Committee and the NCEM, the least they could do was to pay their own travel expenses, as an indirect way of supporting the European cause.
boundaries between the EMN itself, the Social Democratic Connection and their diplomatic environment. Yet, there was no direct or official link between the *Europeans* and the EMN until 1965. Director General Jahn Halvorsen broke this barrier by becoming a deputy board member of the EMN early in 1965.\(^{984}\) The symbolic significance of a leading *European* officially joining the organisation must have been strong.\(^{985}\) But the real breakthrough, that officially ‘legitimized’ the link between the MFA and the EMN, was the election of former Foreign Minister Halvard Lange as chairman of the EMN in November 1965. To understand this, one needs to consider that most of the *Europeans*, a generation of diplomats who entered the service after the war, had spent their entire career with Lange as their captain. The *Europeans* simply felt a strong personal loyalty to Lange. As Halvorsen wrote in a personal letter to Lange after the Labour Party had lost the 1965 election: “[I]t is not only the foreigners that will now lose an institution – for a while (?). Many of us, including me, have never worked for any other Foreign Minister. You have shaped our entire way of thinking and our attitudes, and this influence will stick with us.”\(^{986}\)

And Lange himself, so used to the apparatus and people surrounding him, did not shy away from drawing on the *Europeans’* expertise after he had left office. In November 1965, he wrote to Jahn Halvorsen:

> “I have agreed to replace Terje Wold as chairman of the Norwegian Council of the European Movement and in this capacity I hope to initiate a fairly informed discussion about our relationship with Europe and the challenges of European integration. I can not exclude that I will ask for you help in this regard.”\(^{987}\)

The lines between formal and informal, politics and administration, and indeed, personal and professional convictions, had become blurred after 20 years of Labour Party rule.

With Lange’s election, it seems that the EMN was further professionalised. In an interview where he looked back on his career as Foreign Minister, Lange readily admitted that the government had “made a mistake in not preparing the public opinion in Norway” for the membership issue.\(^{988}\) Consequently, Lange once again put information activities on the top of the list of priorities. By November of 1965, the EMN’s information efforts were explicitly linked to the prospects of enlargement, as it appealed to “the governments and people of the

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\(^{984}\) RA/S-1275/Db/Box 277/Folder 2.

\(^{985}\) RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 – Memo. Halvorsen had met with the NCEM regularly since February 1961.


Six member states of the European Economic Community to make possible the negotiations to enlarge the Community, in order for a united and democratic Europe to contribute, with renewed strength, to peace and economic growth to the peoples of the earth.”

The informal Social Democratic connections up until 1965, and Lange’s entry into the EMN, should be understood in connection with the emerging ‘Social Democratic alternative for Europe’, developed by the Labour Party in opposition (1965-1971). In fact, the Social Democratic connection explored above was in some ways a prelude to this rethink. From 1967 onwards, supported by the newly elected Party Chairman Trygve Bratteli (1965), a small policy-planning unit (Arbeiderbevegelsens utredningskontor, “Tenkeløftet”) headed by future Minister of Commerce and Shipping, Per Kleppe, created the Labour Party’s European Policy. Knut Frydenlund was one of its most influential members. In close cooperation with German, British and Scandinavian Social Democrats, the Norwegian Labour Movement created a positive and politically charged European policy that aimed for a more egalitarian, less ‘capitalistic’ EEC, with stronger democratic institutions (such as the European Parliament). It was a way for the Labour Party to launch a positive vision of how to change the Community as a member state. With the change in leadership from Gerhardsen to Bratteli, the Labour Party leadership no longer penalised being openly pro-European.

Also, the business and non-socialist sectors of the EMN consolidated their efforts. The Norwegian Section of the European League for Economic Co-operation (NS-ELEC), one of the founding organisations of the International European Movement, was set up in 1965. The names of the original members and business sectors taking part were familiar. Rolf Roem Nielsen, director of the Federation of Norwegian Industries (FNI), headed the establishment. The secretariat of the NS-ELEC was the same as the EMN. Indeed, as Director Roem Nielsen explained in a letter to the Secretary General of the ELEC, Yvonne de Wergifosse: “We have a lot of committees and bodies dealing with European and international economic questions, and to some extent the same persons are in and behind most of them. We would like now to try to concentrate the administration, the secretariats, of some of the

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992 https://snl.no/Knut_Olav_Frydenlund (Last visited 19.01.2015).
994 HAEU – LECE-0208_04 – 31.08.1965, Oslo – R. Roem Nielsen – ELEC. The other original members were Rolf Østby, Director General of Norsk Hydro; Alf Ihlen, Managing Director of A/S Strømnes Værksted; Johan Melander, Managing Director of Den norske Creditbank; and Chief Justice Erling Wikborg. Chief Justice Terje Wold was also involved in the setting up of the NS-ELEC.
committees.”

This was certainly true: the NS-ELEC had almost the exact same members as, say, the working committee of the EFTA Action Committee, and from 1965 onwards both were to be administered by the EMN. There were financial reasons for the consolidation as well: the same business sectors financed all three of the organisations and, according to Chief Justice Wikborg, they wanted to rationalise the cooperation. A complex network of pro-European organisations redoubled their efforts in Norway in the mid-1960s, and the Europeans took part in different capacities. For example, Martin Huslid – while on leave from the MFA, working as a representative of the Norwegian Export Council in Brussels – joined ELEC in the mid-1960s. As he returned to Norway and the MFA in 1970, he remained a member of ELEC and joined the Norwegian Section.

With the Centre-Right government taking office in 1965, the EMN and the MFA re-evaluated their ties. The coalition government consisted of the highly pro-European Conservatives, the highly membership sceptic Centre Party, and two parties split on the EC-issue. This constellation spoke in favour of loose ties. However, in February of 1966, the Working Committee of the EMN could report: “The secretariat has received a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it has, after the change of Government, evaluated its cooperation with the European Movement in Norway. The Ministry has concluded that this cooperation should continue, and, if possible, be expanded.” With this rubber stamp of approval, Conservative Foreign Minister John Lyng (1965-1970) formalised the ties between the MFA and the EMN.

It was thus in a climate of consolidation and formalisation, that the Europeans officially entered the EMN en masse. Jahn Halvorsen – the first to join in early 1965 – remained a board member until 1966, and an active part of the EMN until the referendum. Gunnar Rogstad, the Director General of the Economic Department after Halvorsen became Ambassador to Brussels, became a board member in 1966. Tim Greve, former chef de cabinet for Halvard Lange and future Director General of the Press Department, was present at the

995 RA/PA-0992/D/L0001/ - 17.02.1964, Oslo – E. Hoff – Dear Sir (Director of Information, The EFTA-organisation). The EMN also strengthened its ties with the EFTA information service.
999 HAEU - ME-906 – 24.11.1965, Oslo – E. Hoff – To the members. Annual meeting, 1965. Prior to the official memberships, Huslid, Rogstad, Holland and Halvorsen often presented issues or gave speeches at the EMN.
1000 RA/PA – 0992/G/L0002. Jahn Halvorsen became the Ambassador to Belgium and the Communities in mid-1965, and it seems that diplomats living abroad did not maintain their membership of the EMN-board, although they often remained affiliates.
November 1965 meeting, and became, together with Knut Frydenlund, a board member in early 1967. In November 1967, Director General of the Economic Department at the time, Asbjorn Skarstein, joined them. In 1967, Haakon Lie also tried to headhunt European Terje Johannessen to replace Erik Hoff as EMN secretary. But Johannessen chose to be an informal contributor to the EMN, while continuing to work for the MFA.

By 1967, the MFA’s political ties to the EMN had also grown remarkably strong: Erling Wikborg (Foreign Minister for three weeks in 1963); Halvard M. Lange (Foreign Minister, 1946-1965); Svenn Stray (Foreign Minister, 1970-1971); and Knut Frydenlund (Diplomat and politician at the time, and Foreign Minister, 1973-81 and 1986-87) were all board members. In late 1967, as an ultimate sign of the formalised ties, the MFA secured extra funding of 25,000 NOK under chapter 190 (unforeseen conferences), with the remark that it wanted to give financial support to the EMN, enabling it to take part in meetings abroad. It was a clear sign that the MFA did not intend to hide its support.

**Boundary-spanners for a cause**

The Europeans’ gradual entanglement in different pro-European networks between 1962 and 1967 is crucial in order to understand the unusual role they came to play in struggles within the Centre-Right coalition over the membership issue, and the Labour government’s membership campaign of 1971-72. Four major developments explain how the Europeans took on a new role as boundary spanners for the European cause:

First, the Europeans belonged to a new generation of multilateral economic diplomats, with a broad domestic and international network of contacts, expert knowledge of complex foreign economic issues that through their mere placement and tasks came to challenge the traditional Weberian norms. Second, these networks came into play in the non-governmental arenas as the persistent and deliberate official silence, chosen by both the Labour Party and coalition governments left the Europeans frustrated by trailing behind other applicant countries and fearful that the entire membership issue might slip away. Third, the shift of government in 1965, which ended twenty postwar years of Labour Party rule, was a litmus test of the entire administration. Much evidence points towards the right wing of the Labour Party being instrumental in drawing the Europeans into the EMN – particularly Halvard Lange, Haakon

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1001 RA/PA – 0992/A/Aa – L0010 – Annual meeting, Monday, 29.11.1965.
1002 S-1275/Dh/Box 277/Folder 2; HAEU - ME-906 – Suggestions for a new board with deputies for the EMN, Annual meeting, 14.02.1969.
Lie and the young European, Knut Frydenlund – precisely at the moment of flux when Gerhardsen stepped down. To these developments should be added the fourth and most important ingredient, the Europeans’ growing commitment to the European cause. Nothing in the two governments’ policies could be interpreted as a call for the Europeans to take part in pro-membership campaigns or organisations – they participated, therefore, out of personal conviction.

It was this set of circumstances that made the Europeans into ‘boundary spanners’ for the European cause. As part of the pro-European campaigns and organisations, the Europeans operated outside and within the MFA, assumed a diversity of roles in both the governmental and non-governmental arenas, and mediated a growing number of actors and organisations in an increasingly integrated and complex political environment, with the intent of securing a Norwegian membership. Through their work with the EC-case, not only did domestic and foreign policy issues, and politics and diplomacy, become blurred, but so did personal and professional convictions. In the Europeans work with the membership issue and the Nordek negotiations under the Centre-Right coalition, headed by the increasingly membership sceptic Per Borten, personal convictions would become a recurrent bone of contention.

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Chapter 9

The Europeans and the Centre-Right coalition

“Suddenly the question of Europe has been revitalised. It’s like the floodgates have been opened (...) Now the question is: what do we want?”

Jahn Halvorsen to Halvard Lange in October of 1969 as the issue of enlargement returns.

This chapter explores the differences of opinion, and political and administrative battles, between the Europeans and the pro-Europeans, on the one side, and their own Prime Minister Per Borten (Centre Party) and the EC-sceptics, on the other. In the years of political silence and after the Labour Party hegemony had definitely been broken, the Europeans became engaged in non-governmental, pro-European networks as a way of keeping membership on the agenda. It was almost a protest against the official policy of non-engagement. And it was certainly one of the repercussions of the administration being passed on from the Labour Party to the Centre-Right coalition in 1965. With the new coalition, the Europeans would face the challenge of a divided cabinet, double communication, and shadow boxing over the membership issue. By defending the membership line – the official policy of the government – against a Prime Minister and Centre Party that increasingly looked for alternatives to membership, the Europeans became deeply politicised. Following the reasonably cordial experience of the second application (1967), the Nordek negotiations (1968-1970) witnessed the Europeans trying to stop what they saw as a dangerous step towards a more unclear security profile and a definite distraction from the preferred path to membership in the Community. When the prospects of membership arose again, following de Gaulle’s sudden retirement and the relance of the EC in The Hague in December 1969, pretences were set aside. Soon the Europeans were in the middle of a bitter clash between the pro-Europeans and EC-sceptics of the government, and were in fact decisive in its demise. In March 1971, when the Labour Party took over the government offices with the unequivocally pro-European Trygve Bratteli as Prime Minister, he was joined by a deeply politicised group of diplomats.

An application without friction

As in the previous round, the issue of membership was sparked by the British application, and motivated by the fear of remaining outside an enlarged market, rather than any desire for membership. Most historians agree that the Norwegian 1967 application had a

‘hypothetical’ hue to it, due to de Gaulle’s continued resistance against British entry. The second round was a gentle breeze compared to the flare-up that preceded it and the storm that would follow.

This is not to say that the Centre-Right government or the administration calculated another veto. They prepared to apply as the Labour government had done before them. Even following de Gaulle’s press conference in mid-May, where he listed a great many reservations to a British entry into the Community, the conclusion was that “whether these reservations will turn out to be a major obstacle can only be made clear in the coming negotiations”. As late as October of 1967, Vice President of the Commission Sicco Mansholt told Borten that he did not anticipate another veto from de Gaulle, but feared that Paris “would do its utmost to prolong the negotiations”. The general mood, then, was that any negotiation would be long and difficult. Leaving for Brussels with the application, Terje Johannessen, for instance, let the press know that he doubted the possibility of real negotiations. The matter was less urgent both for those opposed and those in favour.

The combination of a change of government in Norway and a tamer version of the EEC – particularly following the Luxembourg compromise – produced a rather different political debate in the second round compared to the rounds that came before and after.

On paper it looked like the Centre-Right government might split on the issue at an early stage: five of the fifteen ministers had advocated for an association agreement in 1962, including Borten and Kjell Bondevik (Christian People’s Party (CPP) chairman). Two ministers – Dagfinn Vårvik (Centre Party) and Helge Seip (Liberal) – had opposed membership as editors of the newspapers Nationen and Dagbladet, respectively. All six Conservative ministers, on the other hand, were firm supporters of membership, including Foreign Minister and father of the coalition John Lyng, though he often acted as an arbiter between the opposing groups of ministers. Most ardently pro-European was MoCS Kåre Willoch. On balance, the government was in favour of membership in the EEC.

In the Storting the majority was clear: the Conservatives and the Labour Party – with well over half of the seats between them – maintained their position from 1962. Since the early 1960s, Labour Party leadership had tried to carve out a socialist vision of Europe. And

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1009 UD 44.36/6.84–27 – 06.06.1967, Oslo – The MFA’s draft for Summary and Conclusions.
1010 UD 44.36/8–3 – 16.10.1967, Oslo – A. Holland – Memo. EEC. Vice President Mansholt’s visit, talks with the Prime Minister 13.10.1967.
1012 Allen Norway and Europe in the 1970s (1979), p. 51
with pro-European Trygve Bratteli taking over from Einar Gerhardsen as party leader this vision became much more pronounced. In opposition, the Labour Party had more space to zealously proclaim the Party “the pioneer of a new era and a new order in Europe”. Accordingly, the Centre-Right government could only survive the membership issue if the minority opposing membership abandoned their position. The Liberals were quick to fall into line, but for the Centre Party and the CPP it took several months of soul searching. Instead of breaking up the coalition over a question that might never arise, a slow, meticulous pace was chosen. When British Prime Minister Harold Wilson (Labour) called a meeting in December 1966, to inform his EFTA partners of British intentions, the government made no principled statements. This made good sense as the British continued probing well into the spring of 1967, and the government lived well with a deliberate policy of non-decision.

On April 28, 1967, the British formally announced to its EFTA partners that it intended to apply for membership and the government began rapidly hammering out a time schedule: the Market Committee was to submit its report by May 12; the business organisations would give their opinions by May 25; the MFA would complete a draft of the white paper by the same time, which would then be discussed by the cabinet in early June, and presented on June 16. On July 24, the Norwegian application was submitted in Brussels, but no real negotiations commenced, and on November 27, de Gaulle issued his second veto to the British.

Developments within the Community also helped ease the tensions within the coalition. French policy under de Gaulle had led to a slower pace of economic integration and halted the introduction of general majority voting. With the Luxembourg compromise – which ended a dispute between France, the five and the Commission over financing the soon unified Community and the powers of the Commission vis-a-vis the member states – France retained her right to veto when issues of national importance were at stake. It was a compromise the other member states could live well with as few among them shared Commission President Hallstein’s federalist visions. This made the ‘loss of sovereignty’ argument less convincing,
and those ambivalent towards membership were more inclined to explore the option. Borten’s objections to the Treaty of Rome remained, as in 1962, that membership was unconstitutional as it could erode the legislative powers of the national parliament.\textsuperscript{1018} However, the weakening of the Commission, to the advantage of the Council of Ministers made it “less difficult” for Borten to argue in favour of negotiations: “I assume that many, like me, would feel safer when the development of this kind of cooperation takes place at a pace set by the governments of each member state, without pressure from a built-in supranational institution”.\textsuperscript{1019} There was not a full-blown federalist to be found in political Norway, and Borten’s argument that any closer, supranational, political cooperation would need a separate treaty to be ratified in the Storting was accepted across the board. The parliamentary white paper reflected this, and stated:

“Through membership of the EEC Norway today assumes no political obligations. By the weakening of the supranational element which has taken place in practice (...) the individual member states will have crucial influence on the formation of further cooperation within the EEC.”\textsuperscript{1020}

Structural and economic patterns pulled Norway closer to the continent as well. Close economic ties with Britain were slightly weakened, while the Nordic countries (as a result of EFTA) and the EEC both surpassed Britain as Norway’s most important export markets. In Norden, Sweden was by far the largest market, while West Germany was the largest receiver of Norwegian goods within the EEC. With Britain, Denmark and possibly Sweden participating, Norway could not remain outside a customs union that would receive 75 percent of its exports and deliver 70 percent of imports.\textsuperscript{1021} If Norway remained on the outside, while Britain, Denmark and Sweden entered, its EFTA preferences would all but disappear. This was, Borten told the Storting, “the strongest argument in favour of Norway taking part in the new Common Market in Europe”.\textsuperscript{1022}

Also, in foreign policy terms, the EEC appeared more positive. With Willy Brandt’s emerging Ostpolitik, West Germany became a more appealing partner. This, combined with the incipient détente between the two superpowers shaped Norway’s European outlook; it led to the government into being slightly less focused on American military guarantees. At the

\textsuperscript{1018} Kristoffersen “Norway’s Policy towards the EEC” (2006), p. 213.
\textsuperscript{1021} Rohne De første skritt inn i Europa (1989), p. 77, Stortingsmelding 86. In 1970 the EEC received 26.9 per cent of Norwegian exports, with West Germany taking 17.9 per cent alone.
\textsuperscript{1022} Quoted from Bernsten Stauttersen (2007), p. 228.
same time, many politicians and others became more critical towards the US due to their involvement in the Vietnam War. In Norway, Foreign Minister John Lyng (1965-1970) would capture this sentiment by endorsing both détente and Ostpolitik, and – at least in rhetoric – by distancing himself from what was seen as the strict Americanism of his predecessor Halvard Lange.¹⁰²³

All of these developments enabled the coalition to apply without too much friction. Even so, the application itself was full of reservations and conditional in nature. The compromise reached in the agricultural sector, for instance, was ambitious or even improbable: with the muttered acceptance of the Conservatives, the government aimed to get the EEC to accept the entire Norwegian agricultural sector as protected under the common regional policy of the EEC.¹⁰²⁴ Like the Gerhardsen government before them, the coalition made entry conditional on British membership, promised a consultative referendum before parliament made its final decision, and only submitted the application “as the best means of clarifying the basis for Norway’s relations with the EEC”.¹⁰²⁵ When parliament debated the government’s recommendation in July of 1967, only 13 voted against it (compared to 37 in 1962).¹⁰²⁶ After de Gaulle’s veto, the application remained in Brussels along with those of the other three applicant countries. When the issue arose again in late 1969, it would have more similarities with 1962 than 1967: the EC reinvigorated, with plans for economic and monetary integration and political co-operation.

**Subtle political battles**

The creation of the Market Committee was one reason for the lack of open confrontation between the Europeans and Borten and the EC-sceptics at this stage. In February 1966, Foreign Minister Lyng proposed the Market Committee as a long-term planning unit that would prepare the coalition for the difficult choices ahead and possibly produce some common ground. It issued a yearly report on developments within the Community (until 1971), produced much of the material for the white papers on the EC during the years of the coalition government, and consisted of civil servants from the MFA, MoI, Ministries of

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¹⁰²³ Røhne De første skritt inn i Europa (1989), p. 77-78.
Fisheries and Agriculture and the MoCS. On the suggestion of Borten, his own state secretary – Emil Vindsetmo – was chosen to head the Committee. Ahead of the second round, the Market Committee was charged with the task of exploring how the Community had evolved. Vindsetmo soon proposed it expanded its scope to “describe how current rules and regulations in Norway diverge from the Treaty of Rome and the common policies and agreements reached within the EEC”. In April 1967, the Prime Minister gave him the additional task of assessing the advantages and disadvantages of membership and non-membership.

The leading role given to Vindsetmo, until the coalition government left office in March 1971, reflected the general trend of the Prime Minister’s Office gaining more control in foreign policy issues, and the interconnectedness of foreign and domestic policy, especially with regards to the EC-issue. But it also reflected a more specific tension within the coalition, in which the Prime Minister sought to control knowledge production, and keep an eye on the pro-European Conservatives and officials within the MFA. Borten effectively kept out the MoCS and Willoch (officially also the Minister in charge of Nordic affairs) by making Vindsetmo head of the Market Committee, the Nordek negotiations and the early preparation for the EC-negotiations. However, it was broadly recognised that Vindsetmo, both due to his role and his character, was well placed to smooth out differences within the government, and both Willoch and Lyng, who might have felt their territory invaded, characterised him as a hard-working, able and amicable man. Vindsetmo, then, was at once a symptom of the distrust within the government and a remedy for the same.

For the Europeans working closest with him – Holland, Ølberg and Johannessen – Emil Vindsetmo would remain the ‘sphinx’, ‘the great riddle’ and ‘a formidable poker player’. None of them could tell if he was placed in the Market Committee as a way of getting Borten on board with membership, or as a way of checking the Conservatives and the Europeans. Neither did anyone seem to know where he stood politically: did he belong to the CPP and

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1028 Berntsen Staurberaren (2007), p. 195. Vindsetmo came from the position as editor of Næringsrevyen Norsk Handel, the official journal of the Norwegian Commerce Association (NCA), and had advised Borten on how to compose the coalition. Borten in turn appointed him his state secretary in charge of foreign economic affairs.
was a hesitant pro-European, as Holland thought, or, as Lange speculated, one of Hans Borgen’s men (Centre Party) and more fiercely against membership than Borten himself. In his years as Borten’s state secretary, Vindsetmo built up a position as the link within the government. “Without him”, Arbeiderbladet claimed in early 1970, “it would hardly be possible to overcome the differences within the government.” He was the éminence grise of the market issue: “towards the politicians he appeared as an expert and towards the civil servants as a politician (...) a double-role which has given him great influence.” In the 1970s, however, this double-role would create tension rather than smooth things out.

Still, already in 1966-67 there were several minor collisions. As during the first round, the pro-Europeans and Europeans were worried about timing and tone. Already when Wilson was invited to the December meeting in 1966, Ambassador Skaug had underlined that the Prime Minister should give “maximum positive support to Wilson’s initiative”. Willoch supported this arguing that Norway should avoid giving the impression that it was half-hearted. Borten simply replied that he didn’t think anyone expected Norway to make a decision before the British had submitted their application in Brussels. When Britain applied in May, Willoch and Lyng argued that Norway should follow as soon as possible as this would strengthen its bargaining position. To make his point, Lyng brought forward a dispatch from Ambassador Halvorsen saying that a Norwegian postponement could lead to a psychological backlash in Brussels. The sooner the application was handed in “the clearer Norway’s political commitment to wholeheartedly take part in the EEC would stand”, the Embassy in Hague wrote days later. Ambassador Kildal complained that Norway would end up in “a splendid last place”, just as in 1962. However, it did not change the government’s position, which gave priority to a thorough domestic political process.

There were also disputes regarding the white paper, particularly the agricultural chapter, which aimed for “permanent special arrangements” for Norwegian agriculture. Jahn Halvorsen worryingly wrote to Willoch asking whether the term ‘permanent special arrangements’ was compatible with the Treaty of Rome, to which Willoch replied with a vague formulation from the white paper: “it must be assumed that special arrangements,

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1042 Stortingsmelding 86, p. 52.
though permanent in their character, may be subject to revision by the institutions of the Community at certain intervals.” The government would only seek “permanent arrangement” that it “thought the Treaty of Rome provides the basis for”, Willoch reassured Halvorsen. This could, for example, mean deficiency payments via the regional policy funds, something Mansholt had told Borten while visiting Norway. However, those more sceptical towards membership wanted a permanent exemption from CAP as such. Aware of these differences, the government avoided going into details in the white paper.

Moreover, several ministers thought the MFA’s first draft, and particularly the summary and conclusions, was too pro-European. Borten complained that the whole paper needed to be totally restructured. The government therefore agreed to appoint a working group consisting of state secretary Vindsetmo, Ambassador Rogstad and Director General Skarstein to revise the draft. The Prime Minister and Minister Bondevik wanted the conclusion of the revised draft to say that the EEC’s political aims were now firmly in the background, and they wanted the ‘Nordic aspects’ brought more to the foreground. Moreover, Borten wanted to remove statements about association not being a good solution for Norway. In fact, in the final version of the paper, association or other solutions were mentioned explicitly as viable options should membership prove undesirable or unattainable.

For the Europeans who understood membership in the context of the broader foreign policy outlook of Norway, this was disappointing. In a letter to Lyng, Halvorsen complained that the white paper “does not contain much about the political aspects”. To remedy this, Halvorsen offered to write an article in Aftenposten in which he would explain the political aspects of the Community. He was in doubt, however, since “everything can be misunderstood by those who want to misunderstand”. Instead, Halvorsen gave a speech about membership and security policy. Implicitly talking about Norway too, he argued that Europe’s responsibilities towards the developing countries, détente between east and west and North Atlantic cooperation was “much more important for British membership in the EEC than her economic situation (...).” This was also reflected in the MFA’s first draft of the

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1048 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 04.06.1970. This issue returned in the third round.
1049 RA/44.37/6.84–27 – 13.06.1967 – J. Halvorsen – Dear Lyng
1050 RA/PA-0992/G/L0002/0001 – Section of Ambassador Jahn Halvorsen’s lecture at the fall conference in Bergen 1967: ‘Utviklingen i EEC – idéer og resultater. Mulighetene for økning fra 6 til 10?’
parliamentary white paper: “greater Western European unity would increase the possibilities of further détente” and make the Atlantic partnership more equal.\textsuperscript{1051}

Last, while in support of the membership application, Borten also made several moves that proved otherwise. In May, for example, Borten, to the particular dismay of Willoch, called for a Constitutional analysis made by legal experts outside of the administration. The end result was that three esteemed legal scholars reaffirmed that § 93 of the Constitution covered membership in the EC.\textsuperscript{1052} And at the last minute – on June 12 – Borten, after conferring with his political hinterland, asked if Norway could not send an application similar to the Swedish application. Sweden wanted to apply for negotiations and choose along the way. The proposal was unacceptable to the majority of the government: the entire white paper was built up around an application for membership under article 237.\textsuperscript{1053} However, such double-communication would become part of Borten’s standard repertoire regarding the EC-case.

Most of the issues that had been settled rather amicably in 1967 would return in full force in 1970. Many of the ‘subtle political battles’, as Frøland called them, not only revealed the distance between the Centre Party and the Conservatives, but also Prime Minister Borten’s deep-rooted scepticism towards the Europeans.\textsuperscript{1054} His suspicion was perhaps not without reason, for while the administration prepared for a possible membership application, people like Lange, Bratteli, Haakon and Trygve Lie, Aase Lionæs, Frydenlund, Finn Moe (all Labour), and Greve, Skarstein, Skaug, Sommerfelt, Jens Boyesen (all MFA) and Conservative Svenn Stray, to mention a few, met for the annual meeting of the EMN in the Storting to listen to a speech by Ambassador Skaug about the problems facing Europe.\textsuperscript{1055} For a man who trod water in hope of a better solution, it was important to keep track of the obviously pro-European diplomats. And their differences of opinion would be revealed in subtle and less subtle battles – not least during the Nordek negotiations.

**Opposing Nordek**

The Danish invitation to create an elaborate customs union modelled on the Treaty of Rome at the February 1968 Nordic Council meeting in Oslo took its Nordic partners by surprise. Nordek, as was its name, was meant as a ‘Danish Design for EEC Membership’, and was

\textsuperscript{1051} UD 44.36/6.84–27 – 06.06.1967, Oslo – The MFA’s draft of Summary and Conclusions.
\textsuperscript{1053} RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0025 – Government Conference – 12.06.1967.
\textsuperscript{1054} Berntsen \textit{Staurberaren} (2007), p. 270. What Berntsen calls, “an old farmers scepticism towards bureaucracy which was thriving in the Centre Party”.
\textsuperscript{1055} RA/PA – 0992/A/As/L0010 – Minutes from Annual meeting in the Storting, 13.03.1967..
never intended as a substitute to membership in the Community. As in all Nordic negotiations, ‘the friendly language of Nordism’ framed the political discourse. As Frøland argues: “in principle, no one opposed stronger Nordic co-operation, as opposition would prove to contradict Nordic identity.” Accordingly, none of the governments wanted to be seen as breaking off the negotiations.

Opposite of Danish intentions, Norwegian Prime Minister Per Borten and the Agrarian Party in Norway – who had up until then shown little interest in Nordic solutions – enthusiastically pursued Nordek as an alternative to membership in the Community. With Finland’s de facto dependency on Soviet acceptance, and Sweden’s armed neutrality, such cooperation might block Norwegian entry into the Community. By circumventing the EC-issue, Borten saw the possibility of keeping the coalition together. Borten and the Agrarian Party, thus, put Norden first. The Conservatives, together with segments of the Liberal Party, however, placed Europe first. Nordek was a dangerous step towards neutrality, and the suggested customs union would be dominated by Danish agriculture and Swedish industry, they argued. Furthermore, Nordek risked blocking the road to EC-membership. Somewhere in between, the Labour Party contended that the best strategy was to work for Norden in Europe. This approach – which the pro-Europeans, in the end, chose to abide by – was seen as a way to avoid the membership issue becoming a choice between Norden and Europe.

In May of 1968, the Storting accepted that Norway take part in the Nordek negotiations on the premise that it did not complicate Norway’s relationship to EFTA or future negotiations with the Community. Following de Gaulle’s resignation (April 1969) and The Hague Summit (December 1969), the EC opened its doors to applicants and the entire thing fell apart: Denmark lost interest and turned its gaze to the continent, and Finland started to postpone further negotiations in fear of Soviet reactions. Still, for much of the spring of 1970, the Nordek- and the EC-option co-existed, and the increasingly divided Norwegian Government wobbled along this twin-track. In April of 1970 it was clear that enlargement

negotiations with Denmark and Norway would commence over the summer, and Finland finally broke off negotiations. The Nordic interlude had come to an end.  

The entire Nordek debate “worked as a dummy for the pending EEC issue in Norwegian politics”. A mirror image of the EC-struggle, Borten and other EC-sceptics pushed for concluding the Nordek negotiations, while the Europeans together with other pro-Europeans raised concerns, delayed and contested it. The Europeans argued that the government should put Europe first as a continuation of Norway’s security and foreign policy since the war, and embedded the policy in Norden-in-Europe-rhetoric. In an increasingly antagonistic environment, the Europeans opposed Nordek through policy advice, administrative resistance, and pro-European non-governmental networks.

**Slipping into neutrality**

Most of the Europeans were intuitively unenthused by the initial Danish plan. Drawing on the extensive experience of failed, exclusively Nordic plans, and the evident success of creating a Nordic industrial common market by way of EFTA, the reactions to the Danish plan were not surprising: “if we’re to agree to anything based on a Nordic foundation, it has to happen within a bigger framework (...) the easiest path towards intimate Nordic co-operation today, must be canalised through EFTA”, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt concluded days after the Danish proposal. Equally, Willoch was advised by the Free Trade Committee in early March to strengthen EFTA and ignore Nordek. Even Emil Vindsetmo concluded that it was only “within EFTA that the Nordic region [could] achieve its identity and try out its abilities and possibilities to act as a unit.” The first reaction was therefore bewilderment and frustration. As Holland later reflected, Danish domestic politics were now complicating Norwegian foreign policy matters.

Throughout the negotiations, the Europeans dealt with Nordek much the same way doctors deal with epidemics – damage control. An outbreak of unwanted Nordism somehow had to be squared with the meticulously planned road to membership in the EC. As historian Dag Axel Kristoffersen has argued, although Nordek “did not have any explicit ambition in dealing with foreign policy issues the Foreign Ministry rather early in the process pointed to

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1062 Frøland “Norway’s Policy towards the Nordek Negotiations” (2009), p. 65.
1065 Quote (13.02.68) from Kristoffersen “Between Nordic Co-operation and European Integration” (2009), p. 83.
the difficulties raised by the Nordic countries different orientations in external policy.”

More specifically, the Europeans, with Jahn Halvorsen and Arild Holland at the head, argued against a Nordic customs union by consistently drawing attention to the negative effects on Norwegian security- and foreign policy.

The most persistent argument was that if Norway joined a Nordic Customs Union dominated by Sweden, it risked ‘slipping back to neutrality’. Several Europeans voiced this concern early on. This lay in direct continuation of Langeland’s arguments during the first round of negotiations: if Norway stayed on the outside of the EEC, it risked becoming, or being perceived as, a more neutral part of Western Europe. This, in turn, would fundamentally weaken the Northern flank of NATO. Thus, EC membership would anchor Norway more firmly to the Western alliance, while Nordek would loosen those ties.

These concerns were particularly timely in 1968: in June a major Soviet military exercise on the Kola Peninsula “climaxed in a sudden demonstrative deployment of an armoured division along the Norwegian border, guns pointing westward.” Also in 1968, came the first of many major Soviet fleet exercises in the Norwegian Sea. Moreover, anti-Americanism and anti-NATO sentiments were on the rise: Swedish Minister of Education Olof Palme’s active participation in a public demonstration against the US war in Vietnam in February 1968 had caused outrage within the American administration. In Norway too, a strong leftist resistance to the Labour Party’s Atlantic Alliance as embodied by Halvard Lange, was picking up momentum. This, coupled with the upcoming renegotiation of the Norwegian NATO membership in 1969, inherently bringing it back into public discourse, was seen as a potential threat to Norway’s postwar foreign policy. Short term, Nordek might lend credibility to the anti-NATO factions. Long term, Nordek would create an image of a neutral Nordic bloc, threatening Norway’s position within NATO.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968 was seen as a concrete manifestation of abstract fears. Sigurd Ekeland, Halvorsen’s right hand in Brussels, thought that the events in Prague signalled a new period of East-West-tensions, and warned that Nordek could disrupt a fragile balance in the region. In the spring of 1968, an almost

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1067 Kristoffersen “Between Nordic Co-operation and European Integration” (2009), p. 77.
1068 In Kristoffersen’s chapter Arild Holland, Jahn Halvorsen, Sigurd Ekeland, Gunnar Rogstad and Per Martin Ølberg feature prominently, together with Egil Winsnes and Hersleb Vogt from the Embassy in Paris, and Georg Kristiansen from the NATO delegation in Brussels.
1070 Kristoffersen “Between Nordic Co-operation and European Integration” (2009), p. 84.
1072 Clearly a fear of Party Secretary Haakon Lie ...Slik jeg ser det, Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag (1975), p. 379, 381.
1073 Kristoffersen “Between Nordic Co-operation and European Integration” (2009), p. 85. Dispatch to Skarstein.
united front of diplomats stationed in the EC capitals, particularly Jahn Halvorsen, warned against the repercussions of Nordek. In August of 1968, these diplomats joined forces in a large internal MFA-meeting to repeat these warnings. Several prominent Conservative representatives, such as parliamentary leader Svenn Stray, raised the same concerns. Kristoffersen asserts that this “possibly influenced the decision to explore [foreign policy] aspects of Nordek.” Without prior discussions with the Cabinet, Foreign Minister Lyng charged his ministry with the task of evaluating foreign policy issues related to Nordek. The report presented to the government in January of 1969 had evaluated “whether and in what way Nordek may entail difficulties for the achievement of our European goals and affect our foreign and security policy”. Not surprisingly, it concluded that it was detrimental to both.\footnote{Kristoffersen “Between Nordic Co-operation and European Integration” (2009), p. 84-86. He argues that Halvorsen “immediately opposed Nordek, and would soon be joined by most of his colleagues”.
\footnote{UD44.36/6.84E-3 - 30.11.1967 - A. Holland - The negotiation situation and internal Norwegian preparations.}}

**Quick – Slow – Quick**

Arild Holland’s role in managing the Market Committee (MC) and as the Foreign Ministry’s chief negotiator on Nordek, serves as an example of the eagerness of the *Europeans* in the EC negotiations, as opposed to in the Nordek negotiations. After the second veto by de Gaulle, the *Europeans* were very much in the same place as after the first veto: keen to keep working on EC-matters while headed by a government that preferred political silence. Holland addressed the situation, and stipulated two options: To await further developments and put all preparations on halt, or to keep on preparing, setting up the negotiation delegation and establish working groups. Referring to the closing down of all activities after the first round (January 1963), Holland thought the first option would prove “regrettable”. But he also understood that marching ahead as if nothing had happened would be politically impossible.

He therefore suggested that the MC resume its work, as it had done since 1966, and be given a further mandate to study the problems that could appear should Norway join the EC. There was a semantic difference: the Committee would “not prepare a negotiation scheme”, but simply “make sensible use of the time of waiting we have ahead of us”. Since the Committee would simply continue its work, Holland remarked, it would have the additional benefit of sparing the government from officially appointing a new committee. In the end, the government did not give the Committee its additional mandate, but it continued producing reports on developments within the EC. Thus, some of the machinery and knowledge production was kept intact.\footnote{UD44.36/6.84E-3 - 30.11.1967 - A. Holland - The negotiation situation and internal Norwegian preparations.}
However, as the Nordek negotiations demanded more resources, the MC was given fewer. In 1967, the MC had a budget of nearly 100,000 NOK, by 1969, the budget was cut in half; it only managed to spend 24,031 NOK, and in 1970, it had a budget of 25,000 NOK. One of the reasons for the meagre spending of the Committee was that the manpower needed for its work was busy with the Nordek negotiations. A tangible example of how the Nordek negotiations took the momentum out of the EEC preparations, Holland complained that it was challenging to muster enough manpower for the EEC work, and, not surprisingly, argued to keep the reports coming even though membership was not on the horizon.

Arild Holland, Asbjørn Skarstein and Gudmund Saxrud (MoCS) formed the core of the Nordek negotiation delegation, which was headed by Emil Vindsetmo. In his memoirs, Holland describes how the Nordek negotiations seemed surreal, since everyone knew that Denmark would join the EC as soon as the door opened, and de Gaulle only had a few years left as President. After de Gaulle’s resignation in April of 1969, Holland told Vindsetmo, “in reality Nordek was now doomed to fail”. But long before de Gaulle’s resignation, Holland argued that a Nordic customs union would not be beneficial to Norway in economic terms. Swedish industrial and Danish agricultural goods would flood Norwegian markets, and the *quid pro quo*, for example, in the fishery sector, would not be enough to counter this. More importantly, however, these economic imbalances would work to Norway’s disadvantage in future enlargement negotiations with the Community. To negotiate *en bloc* would prove difficult, if not impossible, and was not preferred by the EC in any case. The Danish steppingstone would be a Norwegian stumbling block. Arild Holland had in fact concluded *a priori* – that is before the Danish Nordek-proposal - that a “Nordic solution would complicate future negotiations with the EEC, as the problems facing each country are different (...) a Nordic cooperation would thus only weaken Norway’s negotiation position vis-à-vis the EEC, instead of strengthening it”.

Early in the Nordek negotiations, Saxrud and Holland were sent as the Norwegian representatives to the first Nordic civil servant’s talks following the Danish proposal. They resisted any political commitment to the Nordic project, and instead insisted on further exploratory talks. Holland stresses that they did this without instructions from home.

1077 UD 44.36/6.84E–3 – 27.03.1969 – A. Holland – The Market Committee’s reports.
1081 Kristoffersen “Between Nordic Co-operation and European Integration” (2009), p. 84.
But it is clear that their conduct was in line with the sceptical attitudes within the coalition government: there was unilateral distaste for both the suggested agricultural common market and the initial supranational set-up. Not least due to Norwegian resistance and foot-dragging, the negotiations were prolonged and the final treaty approved a customs union with many loopholes, underpinned by weak institutions.\textsuperscript{1083} Holland, however, went further still: there was no need to set up study groups and have expert talks. Norway should instead make its scepticism known from the start to avoid walking backwards into a Nordic solution. Or, put differently, since Nordek negotiations actually might succeed, Norway should decline from the outset in order to avoid future obstacles to EC membership – this opinion was not shared by the majority of the government.\textsuperscript{1084}

Holland’s recollection of the last Nordek negotiation speaks volumes of how uninspired he must have been by the whole endeavour:

“In my heart of hearts I thought the whole thing was nonsense, but we had to... We were civil servants you know, so we just had to do the job. But I wasn’t exactly passionately interested, no, because I thought it was nonsense. (...) The last Nordek meeting was to take place in Reykjavik, with the Prime Ministers and such. I wasn’t bothered. I told Per Martin Ølberg: ‘You go to this nonsense’. And Skarstein went [too], and Skarstein returned shaking his head. Deals were struck with slippery Danes in the staircases and what not. Skarstein was appalled. I stayed at home, went skiing.”\textsuperscript{1085}

It is important to keep in mind that the government was committed to not let Nordek disrupt possible membership negotiations with the EC. Holland, therefore, was not acting against the advice of the government; rather, he was simply convinced that Nordek was an obstacle to EC negotiations. The reactions of the Six mostly confirmed this view. Even the Germans, though they publicly endorsed Nordek, were concerned, and the German Foreign Ministry could not understand how Denmark and Norway could be part of two customs unions.\textsuperscript{1086} The French – not surprisingly – were unequivocal in maintaining that Nordek would obstruct EC accession.\textsuperscript{1087} Also the Commission warned that a Nordic customs union would be “the perfect alibi” for the large, though relative silent, part of the Community who still wanted a

\textsuperscript{1083} Frøland “Norway’s Policy towards the Nordek Negotiations” (2009).
\textsuperscript{1084} Kristoffersen “Between Nordic Co-operation and European Integration” (2009), p. 84.
\textsuperscript{1085} Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012.
\textsuperscript{1086} Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), p. 203.
\textsuperscript{1087} Kristoffersen “Between Nordic Co-operation and European Integration” (2009), p. 91.
small enlargement. What Holland did do, however, was to display a striking disinterest in constructive engagement with the Nordek issue: this could be labelled administrative resistance. From the outset, Nordek was seen as “creating a massive headache” and something that needed to be ‘contained’ and ‘handled’.

Opposite, only days after The Hague Summit, Holland wrote an extensive memo drawing up an elaborate and accelerated administrative game plan for the EC-negotiations. In mid-December, Skarstein, Holland and Ølberg consulted each other, and Holland suggested that Skarstein – now Director General of the Economic Department – step out of the MC, as he was likely to become a part of the negotiation delegation, and possibly its leader. Holland nominated himself as the new member of the Committee, and Ølberg as its new secretary. And so it went. As he envisioned negotiations beginning in the summer/fall of 1970, Holland argued that there was an urgent need for appointing a negotiation delegation, to create a negotiation strategy and to get in touch with the Commission and the Six. Already before Christmas, however, Holland received signals from Vindsetmo that things would not move ahead as quickly as he hoped.

While the Nordek negotiations were met with reluctance and inertia, the upcoming EC-negotiations spawned a collective humming among the Europeans. The spring of 1970, therefore, was marked by an increasing tug of war within the government, and between the Europeans and Prime Minister Borten.

**Co-ordinated efforts**

Kristoffersen convincingly argues that the diplomats feared Nordek would risk “undermining years of well-prepared strategy on the EEC question and would disrupt the overarching goal of joining the Six.” However, he does not find traces of any co-ordination, and sees their efforts as “the sum of individual opinions that coincided with each other”. This conclusion seems to overlook the strong ties that had developed between the Europeans since the early 1960s, and also their connections beyond the MFA. Arguably, the last piece of the puzzle, which gives the Europeans’ efforts an element of co-ordination, can be found within the EMN.

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1094 Kristoffersen “Between Nordic Co-operation and European Integration” (2009), p. 91.
The Hague Summit of December 1969 rejuvenated the Europeans, but also instilled in them a sense of decisive urgency. “We’re closing in on Christmas – a Christmas out of the sign of frustration”, Halvorsen wrote to EMN chairman Halvard Lange, and continued, “[i]t will be exciting to see what we will land on in Norway. The EEC is no straight path to salvation, but it is the only chance we got. If we slip – if the whole thing slips – I think there will be troubled times ahead.”1095 Or, as Industrial Counsellor Huslid wrote in December 1969, “our mission has to be to become a full member of a united Europe”. The government should therefore not tie itself to Nordek, which was of “doubtful economic significance and value” and would “make the Swedish – and perhaps also the Finnish – neutrality problem our own”.1096 The Europeans – together with many of the Conservatives – were now wholly intent on shifting focus towards the EC.

They all found it perplexing when the Prime Minister argued that, “[o]ne should keep a balanced attitude in relationship between Nordek and the EC, but hold on to the intention of Nordic cooperation.” While Foreign Minister Lyng wanted to keep the ‘European perspective’ in mind while swiftly finishing the Nordek negotiations, Prime Minister Borten, together with many of his EC-sceptic colleagues in the Cabinet, could only agree to gradual internal preparations for EC-negotiations – secretly hoping the Nordic solution would make them redundant. While Minister Willoch suggested that he should travel to Brussels to start sounding out the Six, Prime Minister Borten wanted to keep contacts with the EC to a minimum, referring to the Finnish Prime Minister, who had stated that “travelling to Brussels would complicate Finland’s position vis-à-vis Nordek”.1097

A report from Dutch vice-foreign minister de Koester’s visit to Oslo confirmed the confusion: in a private conversation with the Norwegian Prime Minister, Borten had not mentioned membership in the EC a single time. Instead, he spoke of ‘solutions’ and ‘arrangements’. He also made it clear that younger people in Norway in general were strongly opposed to membership. De Koster then visited the MoCS and MFA, and found that the two Ministries, contrary to the impression Borten had given, were well underway with a negotiation scheme for the upcoming enlargement talks.1098 Borten tried to steer the process – for example by keeping Minister of Commerce and Shipping Kåre Willoch away from

Nordek, and by making Emil Vindsetmo head of the negotiations, but this became increasingly difficult in the face of frustrated Conservatives and ‘rebellious’ diplomats.

At the same time, fears were mounting among the pro-European Labour leadership: the WYL started to turn against EC membership. Even after Finnish President Urho Kekkonen’s definitive rejection of the Nordic plans, AUF “strongly opposed attempts made to get Norway into the EEC and demanded that all efforts were put into the work with the Nordek-agreement”.1099 And in June, the WYL – for the first time – joined the Young Liberals, the Centre Youth and the Christian People’s Party Youth in signing a petition that demanded the Centre-Right government withdraw its application in favour of Nordic cooperation.1100 Such sentiments found sympathy among the more senior politicians within the Labour Party. Though Nordek was buried, the EC-sceptics needed an alternative, and gathered around Norden as a symbol of everything the Community was not. As one prominent EC-sceptic noted: “I think we will have to chose. We have to prioritise. And for me the answer is obvious: Norden first.”1101

In this climate, the government’s twin-track was seen not only as a tragic waste of energy, but potentially dangerous. Halvorsen probably captured the despairing mood among the Europeans quite precisely in letters to Lange in January 1970: “The current lack of stance is not only generally unfortunate, we are also unable to defend concrete interests since we no longer know in which light to interpret them. Obviously, we still stand by our membership application. But who can honestly say that it is still valid?”1102 As the Finns had created an ‘either-or’ situation, Borten’s twin-track risked diluting the membership issue.1103 The Europeans’ fears were not unfounded, only days before Halvorsen’s letter to Lange, the Prime Minister told the Swedish journal Veckans Affärer that he was doubtful about the EEC for two reasons. First, because Norway had a different legal tradition and social structure than the EEC countries. Second, because the EEC had a bureaucratic superstructure, which for Norway would mean a step towards authoritarianism. Borten, therefore, warned the Swedes that cooperation with Norway should “not be seen as a bridge to the EEC”, and that Nordic cooperation had “an intrinsic value”.1104

1099 National Board of the WYL, April 11-12, 1970. Quoted from Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 144.
From the spring of 1970, the *Europeans* sought to counter tendencies of Nordic isolationism among Norwegian politicians, lend their expertise to disseminating a *Norden in Europe* alternative, and protest against the government’s inaction by way of non-governmental networks.

An interesting example of the first was Halvorsen’s attempt at getting major Norwegian political parties to apply for membership in Jean Monnet’s *Comité d’Action pour les États-Uni d’Europe* (Action Committee, AC). In late May of 1969, Halvorsen reported to the MFA that the AC was wholly against a Nordic bloc entering the Community, and suggested that the enlargement should be limited to the UK.\(^{1103}\) Important political and technical issues were discussed in the AC, and it wielded real power, Halvorsen warned. “All of this passes our political parties by”, Halvorsen wrote in a letter to Lange, “the consequence being that we become increasingly isolated. A contributing factor is, of course, that the close Nordic party connections draw us into Nordic isolation.”\(^{1106}\) Despite repeated efforts by Halvorsen, none of the parties had “showed the slightest interest” in the Action Committee, but with Nordek looming as an alternative to the Community he was intent on trying again.\(^{1107}\) Ultimately these efforts failed, but Halvorsen’s understanding of the situation and suggested solution is worth noting: connecting Norwegian politicians to broader transnational pro-European networks was seen as a way of extracting them from purely Nordic networks and drawing them closer to Europe.

Another, more successful, effort was co-ordinated through the EMN. Spurred by pro-European Conservative and Labour Party politicians, the *Europeans* helped counter the *Norden first* alternative that was about to catch the popular imagination. In April of 1970, former Labour Party Secretary and EMN board member Haakon Lie contacted Ambassador to Copenhagen Arne Skaug: “Halvard Lange has asked me to prepare some material for the debate on Norwegian membership in the EEC which we will soon have.”\(^{1108}\) The EMN planned to publish a series of 15-20 pamphlets that would deal with different aspects of the Community in relation to Norway.\(^{1109}\) Arne Skaug was asked to argue against Nordek being an alternative to EC-membership, while stressing how Nordic co-operation could easily continue after a potential Norwegian entry into the Community. Haakon Lie continued:

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\(^{1103}\) Kristoffersen “Between Nordic Co-operation and European Integration” (2009), p. 91.
\(^{1109}\) NSA–7B–30 – Regarding information efforts about the EEC. With a budget of 150.000 NOK. Arne Skaug’s piece had the title ”Norden og EEC”.
“Norden should contribute considerably to the EEC a) by democratising the Community b) through work which aims to control international business, by establishing a new distribution of welfare and social policy, a European environmental policy, and a coordination of research- and technology resources.”

This was in line with the positive social democratic vision for Europe. Before taking the assignment, Skaug – as a good civil servant – conferred with Foreign Minister Svenn Stray (Conservative), who had taken over after John Lyng in May 1970. Not surprisingly, Stray – also the vice chairman of the EMN – approved. Skaug then wrote to Lie: “I’ve talked a bit with Stray and he understands that I am working on this case. However, it is quite clear that I need to be totally anonymous, and we therefore have to find someone else that can be listed as the author to what I possibly write.” Lie agreed.

Skaug was motivated by the same fears of a Nordic alternative as Halvorsen, Holland, Ekeland, Skarstein and Olberg. In June of 1970, Skaug reported that Danish officials were puzzled by the continued Norwegian support of Nordek, as that would mean a Nordek without Denmark. The Danes had for long distanced themselves from the Norwegians as they thought it would harm their negotiation position vis-à-vis the EC. Skaug contemptuously wrote to Lie, “[the] agitation in favour of Nordek as an alternative to EEC-membership is a quaint, distinctively Norwegian phenomenon”.

In preparing his manuscript, Skaug drew on the expertise of his fellow Europeans. Skaug thought “Holland or Olberg at the MFA, or possibly Per Kleppe” could write about how Norden together could shape the Community. He proposed that he and Ambassador Jens Boyesen “produce something about what representatives of small states can accomplish in international organisations, based on the experiences we have”. Furthermore, Skaug wanted to draw on an old MFA-report concerning what “could be ‘saved’ of the Nordek-plan should Norway and Denmark join the EEC”, and suggested: “Olberg can take care of this issue”. Olberg, moreover, was to lead an EMN correspondence course with the title “Norway’s place in Europe”. In the EMN’s production of pro-European material, the

113 UD 44.36/6.84–34 – 30.06.1970 – A. Skaug – Memo.
114 UD 44.36/6.84–32 – 09.03.1970, Copenhagen – A. Skaug – Memo.
115 AA – Arne Skaug – Box 40 – 08.06.1970, Copenhagen – A. Skaug – Dear Haakon Lie.
116 Boyesen had been head of the NATO delegation and Skaug head of the OEEC delegation in the mid-1950s.
117 AA – Arne Skaug – Box 40 – 08.06.1970, Copenhagen – A. Skaug – Dear Haakon Lie.
118 NSA–7B–30 – Regarding information efforts about the EEC.
Europeans now served as ‘the brain trust’, ready to lend their expertise to a pro-European coalition consisting of politicians both in government and opposition.1119 Clearly, Stray, Lie and Skaug all knew that they were operating in the normative grey areas of what a diplomat should be doing. As will be discussed below, this was one among many steps the Europeans took towards redefining and challenging the boundaries of diplomatic norms.

Last, the Europeans were disconcerted by what they saw as the government’s insufficient sense of urgency. As many times before, a comparison was drawn with the eagerness of the Danes. Danish Minister of Economy and Markets Poul Nyboe Andersen’s activity was contrasted with the lack of any Norwegian ministerial visits to Brussels.1120 These views were shared and articulated within the framework the EMN, as at a conference of the European Movement held in February:

“[S]everal big guns were brought to bear on the same target, notably Ambassador Halvorsen and Skaug from Brussels and Copenhagen respectively, Director Roem Nielsen of the Norwegian Federation of Industries and Mr. Halvard Lange, now Chairman of the European Movement in Norway. The first two named took full advantage of the remarkable freedom senior Norwegian officials enjoy to express their opinions in public. They emphasised the need for realism, that events (and the Danes) were on the move, that if Britain and Denmark were admitted to the EEC there would be little left of EFTA or Nordek, that the Community were not begging the Norwegians to join and that Norway could not have all the advantages without paying the full price of membership.”1121

To this Lange added that there was ‘great confusion in Europe’ and demanded that the government contacted the Commission and Council to ensure the credibility of the Norwegian application.1122 The British diplomat who wrote the report referred to the remarkable freedom senior Norwegian officials enjoyed, but it is more precise to speak of the remarkable degree of consensus among political and administrative elites under the postwar Labour hegemony. During the tumultuous years at the turn of the decade, both under the coalition and Labour government, this consensus eroded.

Prime Minister Borten soon countered these demands and accusations at a press conference at the beginning of March. Ambassadors ought to be discreet in airing personal opinions, he warned, clearly thinking of Halvorsen and Skaug. There was no need to send a delegation to Brussels to make the Norwegian position more thoroughly understood, he

1119 Lahlum Haakon Lie (2010), p. 533. The membership issue bridged the political divide between Lie and Stray.
continued, while parrying questions of whether this was a unanimous decision by the
government. He underlined that it would be the main objective of Norwegian negotiators to
ensure that Norwegian interests were provided for in a satisfactory way, but if it appeared that
negotiations for membership were not making progress, the government would have to
examine the question of an association agreement or other arrangements which might as far
as possible satisfy Norwegian interests. As a British diplomat present at the press conference
dryly noted: “this formula derives from the Storting proceedings of 1967, but to pin ones fall-
back position to the mast before the first shot has been fired, suggests a lack of stomach for the
fight.”1123 Surely, the Europeans would have agreed.

Distrust and Downfall
As mentioned, The Hague Summit reopened the door for British, Danish, Irish and
Norwegian membership negotiations. The official invite came in the spring of 1970. But The
Hague was meant as the beginning of much more: the EC planned to extend its
responsibilities to foreign and monetary affairs (as suggested in the Davignon and Werner
reports respectively), and completed and found solutions for the long lasting problems of
agricultural financing, the EC’s own resources, and the budgetary powers of the European
Parliament.1124 This, combined with the retirement of de Gaulle and Chancellorship of
Brandt (October 1969), signalled a much more ambitious Community. With the prospect of
membership in this revived EC, distrust between the Europeans and Prime Minister Borten
flared up and eventually was at the centre of the coalition government’s downfall.

On March 12, 1970, chargé d'affaires at the Brussels Embassy Sigurd Ekeland, along with
his Danish and Irish counterparts, was invited to meet the leader of the political committee
Belgian Étienne Davignon. Davignon informed them of the progress of his report, and offered
to keep them informed of future developments. The applicants would be asked to declare their
acceptance of the decisions made by the EC on the matter, Davignon said, and handed a
memorandum to Ekeland and the others. Ekeland sent Davignon’s invitation and a
Norwegian translation of the memorandum (originally in French) to the MFA. The
memorandum referred to paragraph 15 of The Hague Communiqué which stated that the
foreign ministers would prepare a report before the end of July with “[...] suggestions sur la
manière de faire progresser l’unification politique”, which Ekeland translated to “suggestions
of how to progress towards a political unification (politisk samling)”. After having translated the text

1124 Jan van der Harst ”The Hague Summit: A new start for Europe?” in Journal of European Integration History, 2
(2003), pp. 5-9.
from French to Norwegian, Ekeland wrote that it was important to find a Norwegian expression that captured the meaning of ‘unification’, which had, he maintained, become an expression of closer political cooperation more generally.1125

The answer to be given to the EC was cleared with Foreign Minister Lyng and Secretary General Thore Boye, but not discussed in the cabinet. It was sent to the Embassy in Brussels in a Norwegian version, and confirmed Norway’s positive attitude towards “political unification in Europe” and “political cooperation in Europe”. The two words (unification/cooperation – samling/samarbeid) were used interchangeably by the MFA as a translation of unification. Jahn Halvorsen then translated the Norwegian answer back into French. This time “political cooperation” in Europe was translated as “l’unification politique en Europe” and “union politique”.

The dispute that followed was a symptom of a much larger problem. Going through the MFA’s and the Market Committee’s two separate drafts for a parliamentary paper at a government conference in June, Borten noted that the letter sent by the MFA on March 25 to the Council of Ministers referred to the drafts. In the letter, Borten said the Norwegian government reaffirmed its positive attitude to political unification in Europe. This had not been discussed by the cabinet, and was regrettable since people would now ask whether “we presuppose, not only economic cooperation, but also political. In our application for membership [from 1967] nothing is said of political aspects.” Svenn Stray, who had taken over for John Lyng as Foreign Minister only weeks before, was not aware of why these words were chosen, and admitted that they might be exaggerated. However, political coordination beyond consultations, Stray assured Borten, would entail an entirely new treaty.1127 Just as Ekeland had suggested, the MFA were streamlining the language. They wanted the ‘l’unification politique’, which was translated to ‘political unity (politisk enhet)’ in the Market Committee’s fifth report (April 7, 1970) to be translated as “political unification”. This was a politically weaker word than ‘unity’, the MFA maintained, and left the ‘end point’ of the unification process open. The MFA and the Foreign Minister kept the phrase in the parliamentary paper, thus overriding the suggestion of Vindsetmo to remove it.1128

1125 Knut Erling Landet En rapport til besvær? Norske, danske og svenska reaksjoner på Davignon-rapporten, Unpublished MA thesis, Oslo: University of Oslo (2011), p. 42. All of the material was sent to the Prime Minister’s Office, the Minister of Defence and MoCS, and chairman of the SCFA, Bent Røiseland (Liberal).
The Europeans also wanted to refer to the political aspects of the Treaty of Rome in the opening declaration to the Community (June 30) that they were preparing. In a way they were back to the discussions of 1962. The Europeans’ first draft read: “we also want to take part in the future political cooperation (...) with the aim that Europe will play a role in securing international peace and security”. But this section was deleted. After consulting with Davignon, Halvorsen recommended that the declaration say political cooperation would be discussed at a later stage, but also that “we are aware of the aims of the Treaty of Rome (finalité politique)”. This was too much for EC-sceptics inside and outside the government. In a separate statement within the ECFA, Centre Party leader John A. Austrheim reminded members that parliament had not agreed to the political finality of the Treaties of Rome, and that new developments within the EC now “pointed towards a political unification”. This could be in violation of the Constitution. Arild Holland, preparing a memo for the Foreign Minister, wrote that a new institutionalised political cooperation would have to be agreed to by the separate member states. But by accepting the Treaty of Rome, and the finalité politique, there would be “indirect political ramifications”. “One cannot, in a modern society, isolate economic factors from other factors, for example the political ones”, Holland concluded.

Discussing the draft in a government conference, several ministers strongly opposed Norway’s seeming approval of Community plans that were not yet clearly defined. Borten asked whether the Market Committee and Vindsetmo had reviewed the draft, as was the established procedure. Stray said that the draft was prepared in the Economic Department, but sent to the MC for comments. The plan, under the previous Foreign Minister, had been that the MC would take part in the drafting. This had not happened. Instead, the Economic Department handed the draft straight to the Foreign Minister who in turn asked the Market Committee for comments. “The spirit and the tone of the draft had not been discussed by the whole Committee”, Vindsetmo concluded. Borten was clearly aggravated and said that “for the future tasks that belong to the committee should not be taken out of their hands”.

In that same government conference, Borten again brought up Ambassador Halvorsen’s French translation in which ‘cooperation’ was translated as ‘union’. This time, Stray admitted there had been a mistake. The mistranslation was Halvorsen’s responsibility, but the matter of

1129 UD 44.36/6.84–33 – Draft opening declaration at the EEC-meeting in Luxembourg, 30.06.1970. Produced by the MFA, to be discussed at the Government Conference, 18.06.1970.
not bringing it to the cabinet was Lyng’s.\textsuperscript{1133} At a press conference the following day, Borten held Lyng personally responsible for the ‘unfortunate’ administrative and political oversight. The letter translated by Halvorsen did not represent the government’s view, and the MFA had no mandate to make such a statement, he said. Lyng responded that the letter was a ‘routine answer’, and that he was unaware of the erroneous translation.\textsuperscript{1134} At the next government conference, Stray said that the MFA would enforce more firmly the rule that instructions from the MFA should be followed unless explicit permission to the contrary had been given.\textsuperscript{1135}

The Europeans were now under supervision, which led to stricter routines. When Ekeland, for instance, wanted to add some ‘goodwill’ sentences after the government had approved the final version of the declaration, Holland immediately called Halvorsen and “asked the Embassy to avoid such supplements”.\textsuperscript{1136} Increasingly, Stray and the Europeans came to see Vindsetmo as Borten’s can opener of the usually hermetically sealed Economic Department. Opposite, after having experienced the Europeans’ strong political commitment to the European cause during the Nordek discussions, Borten was adamant in keeping Vindsetmo and himself inside of the MFA and close to the Europeans.

The issue with the ‘mistranslation’ was a storm in a teacup, but illustrated the lack of trust between Borten and the Europeans.\textsuperscript{1137} The MFA and the Europeans worked to avoid stirring up domestic debate over an issue that could easily get out of hand and tried to keep the matter in house. In any case, they concluded, it seemed highly unlikely that the European Political Community (EPC) would move beyond consultations.\textsuperscript{1138} At the same time, they worked to keep references to the Community’s political goals in the opening declaration of Stray. This had to do with the need to accept the acquis communautaire – the legal foundation, current functioning, and future intentions of the Community\textsuperscript{1139} – and to create goodwill. However, as in 1962, the end result was a vague proclamation that made no reference to planned political cooperation and did not explicitly accept the acquis.\textsuperscript{1140} When real negotiations opened on September 22, 1970, Stray, responding to a direct question from the


\textsuperscript{1135} RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 22.06.1970.

\textsuperscript{1136} UD 44.36/6.84 – 25.06.1970, Brussels – S. Ekeland – No title.


\textsuperscript{1138} Landet \textit{En rapport til besvært} (2011), p. 45.


EC delegation, had to declare that the Norwegian government accepted the *acquis* and the *finalité politique.*\(^{1141}\)

Also, the choice of who should head the negotiations at the deputy level revealed tensions between the EC-sceptics and the *Europeans.* Actually, disagreements were already evident in 1967 when Lyng suggested Jahn Halvorsen as the Head of Negotiations (HoN) and Borten pushed for Sommerfelt.\(^{1142}\) In early January of 1970, the MFA drew attention to the fact that during the 1967 negotiations the HoN was meant to be found among the diplomats and report to the MFA, but that Vindsetmo, under the Prime Minister’s Office, headed the Nordek negotiations. Simultaneously, the MFA suggested that Halvorsen be appointed to the MC, which they assumed would turn into the future Negotiation Delegation (ND).\(^{1143}\) It is not unlikely, therefore, that the MFA thought of Halvorsen when highlighting the need for a diplomat with broad international experience.\(^{1144}\)

It was at this point that Vindsetmo asked to be released from his position as state secretary.\(^{1145}\) To Vindsetmo’s mind, the difficult job of holding the sceptics and enthusiasts together had only been possible because he represented the whole of the government (while reporting to the Prime Minister). Now he feared that he would become another piece in the MFA apparatus, answering to the Foreign Minister. But his relationship with Borten had also soured. As far as the sources give a clear answer, Vindsetmo was not against membership in the EC, but fearful of supranationalism. Most of all he was a strong supporter of the bourgeois coalition, and might have thought Borten was gambling with its future existence.\(^{1146}\) The government feared, however, that by giving up Vindsetmo they would remove the single bolt that held it all together. For four years the Conservatives had accepted Vindsetmo’s position above the MFA on market issues for precisely that reason.\(^{1147}\) After being persuaded by Borten and a unanimous cabinet asked him to stay on, Vindsetmo agreed to continue as state secretary.\(^{1148}\) The Labour Party Press (*Arbeiderbladet*) speculated on what Vindsetmo might have asked for in return: “Vindsetmo has probably gotten his way when it comes to the

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\(^{1144}\) UD 44.36/6.84 – 05.01.1970 – Suggestions for the negotiation delegation and negotiation secretariat etc.

\(^{1145}\) He had applied for the job as county governor in *Telemark.*

\(^{1146}\) Borten and Vindsetmo had also disagreed on a tax reform.


composition of the negotiation delegation and who it should answer to.” Behind this sentence Arild Holland put a big exclamation mark.1149

In the following months, the initiative slipped out of the hands of the MFA and into Vindsetmo’s. In February, Vindsetmo – and the EC-sceptics of the coalition – won approval for the Nordek Committee taking charge of preparing the EC negotiations, and that this could begin in mid-March.1150 Renamed the Working Committee on European Market Problems (a telling name), it was headed by Vindsetmo,1151 Stray and the MFA responded. The MFA wanted to appoint the HoN already in early April, but was instructed to wait until Norway had been positively invited to negotiations.1152 In mid-June, the MFA tried again and recommended the appointment of Director General Asbjørn Skarstein.1153 Foreign Minister Stray also made it clear that the HoN should head the negotiation delegation at home, and that they “shall report directly to the Foreign Minister, if the government agrees that the Foreign Minister will have the primary responsibility for the negotiations”. Borten asked what would happen to Vindsetmo’s committee, to which Stray replied that he presumed it would be dissolved. Stray had suggested Skarstein instead of Halvorsen because “he had the impression that not everyone in the coalition trusted Halvorsen”. If trust was the issue, Borten replied, he would want Vindsetmo or Governor of the Central Bank in Norway (Norges Bank) Knut Getz Wold as HoN. This, of course, could only mean that if trust was the issue, it could not be Halvorsen (or Skarstein for that matter). After some back and forth, the government asked Vindsetmo, who said he would have to think about it.1154

The decision was made following two government conferences on July 30 and 31 – a full month after Norway had given its opening statement in Luxembourg. There was agreement on the delegation and HoN, but Vindsetmo refused to report directly to Stray and the MFA. Rather, he wanted to report to the government’s so-called EEC-committee.1155 Stray could not accept this. He had political responsibility for the negotiations and would not share it: “if Vindsetmo’s solution will prevail, we will have a ‘half-minister of markets’”. Whoever acted on behalf of the government would have to be a minister. The HoN on the other hand had to be

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1151 UD 44.36/6.84 E.4 – 03.03.1970 – Speech to the cabinet regarding the appointment of a civil servant committee for the preparation of Norway’s negotiations with the European Community.
1152 UD 44.36/6.84 E.4 – 03.03.1970 – Memo; UD 44.36/6.84 E.4 – 14.04.1970 – Memo.
1153 UD 44.36/6.84 E.4 – 16.06.1970, MFA – Memo. The MFA was sure that Skarstein would be chosen and made this known to their British counterparts. FCO 30/697 – 17.06.1970, Oslo – K. A. West – Norway’s Application for EEC Membership. Halvorsen and Sommerfelt were considered less likely candidates.
1155 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA – 27.08.1970 – Svenn Stray. Prime Minister Borten (Chairman), Foreign Minister Stray, Minister of Commerce and Shipping Grieg Tidemand (Conservative), Minister of Finance Ole Myrvoll (Liberal) and Minister of Church and Education Kjell Bondevik (Christian People’s Party).
a civil servant. Vindsetmo agreed that he outwardly had to appear as a civil servant (to the EEC) but “at home he had to be something more than a civil servant”. He also thought the negotiation secretariat, to be headed by Holland and placed under the MFA, was a bad solution. With no agreement reached between Stray and Vindsetmo, the cabinet moved on to other candidates. After some deliberation, Foreign Minister Stray suggested Ambassador to Bonn, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt. The cabinet agreed; Sommerfelt was not as pro-European as the MFA’s previous recommendations. In a hurry and unable to get hold of Sommerfelt, who was on holiday at his cabin in Hallingdalen (which shows how little he expected to be named HoN), they flew in with a helicopter in order to get his consent.

The ND was appointed that same day, July 31, 1971. In the end it was dominated by officials from the MFA and remained under its direction. Four out of nine civil servants in the ND; seven of the ten appointed advisors, and all six of the negotiation secretariat were from the MFA. In what amounted to a vote of confidence Stray got his way with the rest of the cabinet.

Trust continued to erode during the fall. In November, during a conversation with West German state secretary von Braun, Stray claimed that Norway’s application was primarily politically motivated because “we had a feeling that we belonged in Europe”. Those opposed were mostly anti-NATO people, with neutralist tendencies, and those who feared the economic consequences of membership and “for their existence” (farmers and fishermen). However, the latest polls (which Stray had gotten from the EMN) showed that 51 percent of the Norwegian electorate favoured membership.

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1157 Sommerfelt did not think that he could continue as Ambassador to Bonn, while heading the negotiations. And the solution did create some communication problems. However, he would remain in both positions, with the added benefit of having Willy Brandt’s ear. Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012; Sommerfelt Sendemann (1997), p. 143-144; FCO 30/698 – 06.11.1970 – J. A. Robinson – Sir C. O’Neill.
1159 Negotiation Delegation: Svenn Stray (Foreign Minister, Conservative), Otto Grieg Tidemand (Minister of Commerce and Shipping, Conservative), Søren Chr. Sommerfelt (Ambassador, MFA), Emil Vindsetmo (State Secretary, PMO), Asbjørn Skarstein (Director General, MFA), Tor Stokke (Director General, MoCS), Odd Gothe (Director General, MoI), Hermod Skånland (Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Norway), Gunnar Gundersen (Director General, MoA), John Ringen (Director General, MoF), Erik Dons (Ambassador, MFA), Jahn Halvorsen (Ambassador, MFA).
Advisors: Sigurd Ekeland (Counsellor, MFA), Arild Holland (Assistant Director, MFA), Gudmund Saxrud (Assistant Director, MFA), Håkon Skaarer (Assistant Director, MFA), Ottar Bergflødt (Assistant Director, MoA), Carl Bjørge (Assistant Director, MoF), Per Martin Ølberg (Head of Office, MFA), Martin Huslid (Head of Office, MFA), Bjarte Solheim (Head of Office, MFA), Johan Skutle (Head of Office, MoCS).
Negotiation Secretariat: Holland, Saxrud, Skaarer, Ølberg, Huslid, Johan Dahl (Consultant, MFA).
1160 That this was leaked to the press did not help the atmosphere within the Centre-Right coalition. Dagbladet – 03.08.1970 – ”Kabinettsporsmal” by Per Vassbotn.
officials, Sommerfelt had repeated these arguments almost verbatim. Borten sent Sommerfelt’s report to his press secretary and state secretaries, and responded vigorously to Stray’s conversation. “Members of the government would be wise to stick to the government’s own white paper”, Borten wrote to Stray, “I cannot help but express my disagreement with such statements (...) being made to leading representatives of an EC-country. This will hardly make the government’s work with the market problems any easier.”

Borten’s response revealed the core of the disagreement: for while the Europeans and Stray were eager to convince the EC-representatives of Norway’s European credentials, and trusted that they could find good solutions together, Borten saw those same representatives as opponents and not people to share personal thoughts with. His greatest concern was the perspective of Norway being absorbed by a continental union.

Nonetheless, for his Centre Party, permanent special solutions for the primary sectors was a sine qua non and it is a fair to say that coalition’s demands for special solutions, which had survived since 1967, would have never been approved by the EC. This fact was at the root of the coalition’s demise. In a conversation with Ambassador Halvorsen in February 1971, Jean-François Deniau, Commissioner in charge of coordinating the enlargement negotiations with Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway, jokingly asked if Norway wanted the entire country to be given a special solution in the agricultural sector. To this Halvorsen could only answer that the government would soon present its position on agriculture and fisheries, for it was, in fact, what the coalition wanted. This prompted Deniau to say that many had come to the conclusion that “Norway was so different from the conditions in Europe (...) that it was questionable whether Norway could become a member of the EEC”. He then suggested that Norway might be better suited for a ‘Swedish solution’. This would not safeguard Norwegian interests in any way, Halvorsen replied. Norway did not have any foreign policy reservations, only two very specific problems: agriculture and fisheries. “It is the first time I have heard such statements (...) from people that are directly involved in the negotiations”, Halvorsen reported home.

Holland immediately instructed Halvorsen to investigate whether these statements were

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1166 UD 44.36/6.84 – 08.02.1971, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – EC. Norwegian negotiations. Conversation with Commissioner Deniau. As both Halvorsen and Deniau said, several others, such as the French (including Monnet) had made similar noises. Even Willy Brandt would at a later stage suggest this.
broadly representative. Halvorsen reported that the general mood was positive: Norway was a welcome member, but many permanent representatives believed that “everlasting exemptions for an entire country would be something entirely new for the EC”. They were ready to find solutions that had “a hint of compatibility with the Treaty of Rome and later provisions, and that did not appear to openly break with established principles”. Without draping the solutions in the language of acquis, no agreement could be reached.\textsuperscript{1167}

At this stage, the coalition was worn. Borten had threatened to resign already in May of 1970, and the Centre Party had contemplated pulling out of the government over the EC-issue several times. While the Conservatives had sought to keep the coalition going, Stray had been much more confrontational than his predecessor Lyng. It was like pulling at a loose thread, therefore, when Halvorsen’s Deniau-report was leaked to Dagbladet on February 19, 1971, under the headline “Member of the EEC Commission excludes Norwegian membership”.\textsuperscript{1168} In fact, Halvorsen’s confidential report had first been shown to two leading figures in the People’s Movement by Prime Minister Borten himself on a flight to a Nordic Council meeting in Copenhagen. His motivation is unclear, but it might have been a way of saying that they needn’t worry too much – Norway would not obtain membership in any case.\textsuperscript{1169} Neither Borten nor the People’s Movement was the original source for Dagbladet.\textsuperscript{1170} However, “through a series of indiscretions and inaccurate disclaimers Borten was caught in his own web”, Tamnes sums up the intricate events that followed, and this eventually led to the government’s resignation on March 17, 1971.\textsuperscript{1171}

\textsuperscript{1167} UD 44.36/6.84 – 11.03.1971, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – EC-Norway.
\textsuperscript{1168} Dagbladet – 19.02.1971 – “Medlem av EEC-kommisjonen utelukker norsk medlemskap” by Per Vassbotn.
\textsuperscript{1169} This was one of the reflections of Arne Haugestad, who together with John Lager received Halvorsen’s report from Borten, according to Berntsen Staurberaren (2007), p. 365.
\textsuperscript{1171} Tamnes Ofjeldet (1997), p. 173-174. In a Press Release, Borten finally admitted that he had shown the report to Lager and Haugestad, but not that he was Dagbladet’s source. Borten’s two press associates Bye and Hoemsnes and Director General of the Press Department Tim Greve (MFA) drafted the statement. Haugestad later noted that the statement was so poorly written that it almost seemed that whoever wrote it wanted a government crisis. Without much evidence, Berntsen speculates: “to this we can note that Tim Greve was not one of Borten’s usual advisors, but that he, as an ardent EEC-supporter, probably wanted a crisis”. Berntsen Staurberaren (2007), p. 377.
Conclusions: politicised Diplomacy

When the *Europeans* entered the EMN it marked a definitive step towards privileging the cause of membership as a goal in itself. This nuances the traditional impression among historians that the civil service stood up well to the change of government in 1965. Calling it “the first serious post-1945 test of the political loyalty of the civil service”, Trond Bergh, for instance, describes Norwegian civil servants at the time as “extremely apolitical”, with ‘very few’ leaving their job for political reasons.1172 While the *Europeans* did not leave their jobs, the change of government prompted them to follow their political convictions through informal and non-governmental connections and organisations. Increasingly they would take on roles as boundary-spanners for the European cause.

The repercussions were not immediately evident as the level of conflict in the second application was softened by several factors. However, the *Europeans* openly questioned the purpose of the Nordek negotiations, effectively prolonged it through administrative resistance, and organised and expressed their opposition through the EMN. The *Europeans* were exploring uncharted territory with regards to diplomatic conduct, and Borten confronted them. The placement of Vindsetmo inside the MFA, and the string of conflicts that erupted after The Hague Summit should be understood in this light: Borten and the EC-sceptics were directly and indirectly calling the *Europeans’* loyalty into question.1173 The preceding two chapters, therefore, casts the conflict between the civil service and those opposed to membership leading up to the 1972 referendum in an entirely new light: the *Europeans’* political engagement in 1971-72 was the product of a glacial shift in diplomatic practice, the demise of the Labour Party hegemony, the distrust of Borten and the EC-sceptics, and their personal and professional engagement in pro-European networks.

The networks of the *Europeans* were, not surprisingly, overlapping with the MFA’s connections and coincided with their political affiliations. But as the previous two chapters have shown, early information campaigns, the social democratic engagement in the EMN, and the resistance against Nordek saw a great deal of cooperation (hitherto unexplored by historians), which broke with traditional barriers in foreign policy formation. Transnational social democratic networks, the close collaboration of the Labour Party in opposition, and the Conservatives in government; and the coordinated efforts of business sectors and political parties all shaped the membership issue.

The arguments produced by the *Europeans* in favour of membership showed a great deal of consistency. Just as in 1962-63, membership was placed in the broad context of postwar prosperity and security. Particularly during the Nordek negotiations, when tensions regarding NATO membership ran high and resistance against the postwar order was mounting, the *Europeans* adamantly argued that Norway risked slipping into neutrality with a Nordic solution. At the same time, membership in the EC was seen as a way of anchoring Norway to the western alliance. New elements were entering the discourse, too: membership was increasingly understood in the context of pooling resources to help developing countries, and as a way of reaching a balanced partnership with the US. We see, therefore, the continued process from the *Europeans* to discursively fit new elements into the overarching and established concept of security and prosperity.

The concept of trust was at the heart of the coalition’s demise. The more the Conservatives and *Europeans* trusted the Community, treating them as potential partners and not adversaries, the more they based their negotiation tactics on trust. Whereas the more they shared information with EC officials or engaged in the communitarian jargon, the less the EC-sceptics trusted them. This lack of trust, and the conflicts that followed, further politicised the *Europeans*. Not only was it the government’s official policy to apply for membership, it was also a policy in which the *Europeans* took a great deal of ownership. In March of 1971, when the Labour Party took over the government offices with the unequivocally pro-European Trygve Bratteli as Prime Minister, Bratteli was joined by a group of diplomats who were used to moving beyond established norms, eager to reach an agreement with the Six, and ready to convince the voters of the need to join.
The Third Round
Between Europe and Norway, 1969-1972

"The government fought, you know, and we were supposed to be on the government’s side, as civil servants. So, we were the faithful servants, we were not the disloyal servants, it was the other way around."\(^1\)\(^\text{174}\)

Arild Holland on accusations that the *Europeans* believed too much in the cause.

In the early 1970s, the trajectory and entanglements of the Norwegian debates and policies towards Europe since the early 1960s, the emerging convictions and networks, the politisation of the *Europeans* since the first application and the specific potentials and capacities of diplomatic practice connected to the EC-case (and more generally in the development of multilateral economic diplomacy) manifested themselves in a series of innovative and norm-breaking diplomatic activities by the *Europeans*.

The next three chapters explore three ways in which the *Europeans* worked with the EC-case in the early 1970s, by tracing ideas, practices and tensions that had developed throughout the 1960s, and which gained a peculiar shape in the intense negotiations until the signing of the Treaty of Accession (January 1972)\(^1\)\(^\text{173}\) and the heated debates and campaigns leading up to the referendum (September 1972). All three were innovative attempts at bridging the gap between ‘Europe’ and ‘Norway’. All three displayed the in-betweenness of their diplomatic practice. And all three of them exploded the traditional diplomatic norms. In exploring these practices, we will see just how important the developments in the diplomatic field were in the formation of Norwegian European policy, as both negotiation results and campaigns bore the mark of the *Europeans* boundary-spanning capacities. Moreover, we see that the *Europeans* were as concerned with changing Norwegian perceptions and positions as they were in changing those of the Community. To find the middle ground, they translated and interpreted ideas across borders; particularly in the fisheries negotiations, the *Europeans*’ foreign policy formation was a truly transnational endeavour, which ended up changing the EC itself.

None of this made Norway a member of the EC. The *Europeans* would play a crucial role in the campaigns prior to the negative referendum, both as a ‘symbol of Europe’ for the ‘no’-side and as inspired facilitators and educators touring the country for the European cause. The shock of the ‘no’, and how the *Europeans* made sense of it, is discussed in the epilogue: integration as a vehicle of peace, a pro-European political discourse, lives on today as a shared memory affirming that the *Europeans* fought for a just cause.

\(^{174}\) Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012.

\(^{173}\) Eighteen months: ten ministerial meetings, seventeen at deputy level and countless expert consultations.
Chapter 10
The Public Diplomacy of Physical Connectivity

“The best bargaining chip we had was to be ourselves.”\textsuperscript{1176} Arne Langeland on how Norway and the Europeans could get their message across.

To this author’s knowledge, no studies of the public diplomacy practices of the applicants during the first enlargement exist. This chapter, therefore, explores an under-studied and important aspect of the enlargement process: in fact, by 1971, according to the Commission, information trips to the EC from applicant countries had increased significantly, and Norway was number one both in increase and frequency of visits.\textsuperscript{1177} Public diplomacy, then, represented one of the few arenas in which Norway was leading.

As will be argued, one of the most consistent and enduring aspects of the Norwegian negotiation tactic – in, and between, all three rounds – was what this thesis calls the public diplomacy of physical connectivity. Simply put, this entailed arranging extensive excursions, conferences and trips between Norway and the Community. For the Norwegians coming to Brussels, Bonn, The Hague and Luxembourg, the aim was familiarisation with the institutions and inner workings of the Community. In regard to the Community’s representatives, the idea was that they should \textit{travel} the distance, \textit{experience} the climate, the steepness of the mountains, and \textit{feel} the cold.

The EC case ending in a referendum, there was a direct link between multilateral negotiations and public opinion, and on the most contested topics of negotiation such as agriculture and fishery, the EC and Norway stood far apart. Bridging this gap, the Europeans recognised that they had to move beyond material give-and-takes. For the negotiations to succeed immaterial things such as ‘understanding’ and ‘trust’ needed to be built up – long term – on both sides. Public diplomacy, in this context, was an instrument to create understanding, and build and manage the relationship between the EC and Norway, and through this, influence thoughts and mobilise actions to advance their interests and values.\textsuperscript{1178} Importantly, this was a distinct kind of public diplomacy, which was aimed, on the one hand, at the domestic electorate and, on the other, at the policy elites of the Six and the Community institutions. Last, it was a way of promoting Norway’s soft power in what the Europeans treated

\textsuperscript{1176} Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
\textsuperscript{1177} UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–4 – 05.05.1971, Brussels – H. W. Freihow – EC. Visitors from Norway.
as a ‘Community space’. As will be seen, the MFA’s public diplomacy was largely planned and executed in the already established MFA-EMN-KEIZ triangle. In this triangle, the Europeans coordinated, facilitated and, as experts, contributed to the content of continuous encounters between the EC and Norway.

The Europeans wanted to connect and overcome the mental distances between Norwegians and Continental Europeans, in the broadest sense. This could be understood as an example of what political scientist Costas M. Constantinou has labelled *homo-diplomacy*. The aim being to make both parties accept that Norway was a natural part of Europe, and to make the EC representatives understand that Norway was also a distinct part of Europe – in need of special arrangements. The most important medium to get this last message across was Norwegian nature. But the Europeans’ efforts could also be understood as the production and maintenance of diplomatic sites – Norwegian nature but also the Embassy in Brussels and other sites – for encounters they hoped would create the much-coveted understanding and trust. From this point of view, the strategy was, in the most profound way, an attempt to make others see the membership issue through the Europeans’ eyes. By materialising both the closeness and the distance between the two entities – travelling between them – the Europeans reproduced their in-betweenness and diplomatic gaze.

**The Evolution of Physical Connectivity**

Arne Langeland and Asbjørn Skarstein were the first to articulate the need to invite officials from the Community and the six member states to Norway and show them the unique structural challenges faced by Norwegian fishermen and farmers. Equally, they called for Norwegians to visit the Community institutions. This formed part of the strategy envisioned during the first round of enlargement talks, and was born out of the dual recognition that the EEC did not need Norway as a member state for economic reasons, and that the Community officials knew very little of Norway (and *vice versa*). This educational process, it was argued, could best be secured through ‘personal experience’. In other words, Norwegian students,

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1180 Costas M. Constantinou “Diplomacy, Spirituality, Alterity” in Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian (Eds.) Sustainable Diplomacies Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2010), pp. 67-85, p. 68. What Constantinou describes is a mental shift in encountering the Other, altering the Self, and thus enabling the Self to understand the Other in a new way. For this to be successful one needs both to embrace Otherness, and to engage in mediation of Sameness.

1181 Neumann Diplomatic Sites (2013), Pp. 4-7.
journalists, parliamentarians, businessmen and organisations were to physically come to Brussels. Equally, representatives from the Community, and politicians, parliamentarians and journalists from the six member states were invited to see and experience Norway.\textsuperscript{1182}

In 1963, following de Gaulle’s first veto, Frydenlund – press attaché to Brussels during the first round – put his thoughts on future public diplomacy efforts to paper. He reiterated the importance of getting key officials and influential people in Norway interested in Europe, and to nurture relations with key personnel in the Community. As an example, Frydenlund mentioned how members of the Monnet Action Committee – who had often floated the idea of a ‘small enlargement’ – could be ‘worked on’ by the embassies and invited on trips to Norway.\textsuperscript{1183} Thus, public diplomacy through ‘personal experience’ remained one of the important tools of the MFA. However, the actual number of MFA-organised trips was kept to a minimum following the first round of enlargement talks.

Instead, as cooperation between the MFA and the NCEM (EMN, 1965) developed between 1962 and 1965, an increasing number of visits between the Community and Norway were planned and arranged jointly, with the MFA playing the role of co-ordinator at arm’s length. Only gradually did this joint venture become an integral part of the MFA’s public diplomacy. As late as February 1965, Ambassador Jørgensen wrote from Brussels: “quite frequently groups and delegations of Norwegians come to Brussels to study the European Communities”. As far as Jørgensen knew, the trips were often organised by Zöldi in Bonn, whose Norwegian contact he assumed to be the EMN, and the expenses were covered partly by the Commission. The embassy had been informed of the Norwegian delegations coming to Brussels “only by chance and last minute”. Jørgensen therefore requested Holland in the Ministry to contact the EMN and ask them to inform the Embassy of up-coming visits as early as possible.\textsuperscript{1184} Though such visits were “of the highest priority to the embassy”, the planning was rather haphazard until the Europeans entered the EMN from 1965 onwards.\textsuperscript{1185}

As seen above, after the formalisation of co-operation between EMN, KEIZ and the MFA, and especially in connection with the second round (1967), the number of trips

\textsuperscript{1182} UD 44.36/6.84 – 05.02.1962, Oslo – A. Langeland and A. Skarstein – Memo to the Foreign Minister. The relationship with the EEC; UD 44.36/6.84–12 – 02.05.1962 – A. Langeland and A. Skarstein – Memo to State Secretary Engen. EEC – Time schedule and negotiation tactic; UD 44.36/6.84–12 – 08.05.1962, Oslo – Draft. The Norwegian Governments declaration to the European Economic Community. (Prepared by the MFA); UD 44.36/6.84 – 14.06.1962, Oslo – MFA. The Norwegian Governments declaration to the EEC.

\textsuperscript{1183} UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.– 16.03.1963, Brussels – K. Frydenlund – Dear Hans Engen! As an example of the importance of Norwegians visiting the EC-Six he mentioned how the Liberal Youth where pro-European thanks to Magne Lerheim’s stay at the College of Europe in Bruges. Lerheim later became a part of ‘Yes to the EC’-campaign.

\textsuperscript{1184} Which Holland quickly sorted out: UD 44.36/8–1 – 20.02.1965, Oslo – A. Holland – To the EMN. CEE. Visits from Norwegian delegations and study groups.

\textsuperscript{1185} UD 44.36/8–1 – 16.02.1965, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – Visits from Norwegian delegations and study groups. Jørgensen’s very limited knowledge of KEIZ reflects the fact that he was not a part of the inner circle of Europeans.
exploded, and the ties between the three grew stronger.\textsuperscript{1186} Illustrative of this was the EMN’s wish to hire Junior Executive Officer Terje Johannessen from the MFA as their new permanent secretary.\textsuperscript{1187} Another indicator was the increasing use of Europeans as speakers at EMN events, and the use of MFA material for EMN publications. Already in 1966, Asbjørn Skarstein went on a lecture tour to Trøndelag (central-Norway), and Tim Greve – before he entered the EMN – was sent to Gjøvik on behalf of the MFA and EMN to give a lecture bearing the telling title ‘Towards European unity’.\textsuperscript{1188} Ambassador Jahn Halvorsen’s speech at Statsøkonomisk Forening in 1966 was – after arrangements between Director General Rogstad, EMN secretary Erik Hoff, and Tim Greve – printed and issued in 2500 copies jointly by the EMN and the MFA.\textsuperscript{1189} A last and significant development was Director General of the MFA Press Department Tim Greve’s entry into the working committee of the European Movement. This was the engine room of the EMN, and Greve remained part of the working committee until the referendum in September 1972.\textsuperscript{1190}

This led to a further professionalisation of the joint public diplomacy efforts from 1968-69 onwards. In October of 1968, Halvorsen wrote an extensive memo to the EMN: “in the first, formative years of the EEC, before the co-operation had the depth it has today and while Norwegian knowledge of the Community was very limited”, Halvorsen maintained, “it was natural that the exchanges first and foremost aimed at general information.” Now that the continuous exchange had “found a certain form” it was time to move beyond general information. Halvorsen now suggested that they invite more limited groups of representatives from different economic sectors, such as the agricultural, fisheries or industrial sector, and give them targeted information. The groups should, Halvorsen continued, systematically be sent to the embassy in Brussels for orientations, and participants should give feedback to the EMN in order for them to continuously improve the trips.\textsuperscript{1191}

Early in 1969, the EMN and the embassy in Brussels planned to arrange special excursions to Norway for Community representatives and Commission civil servants for the MFA. Tim Greve assured that “it would be possible that the MFA could finance the

\textsuperscript{1186} RA/PA/0992/A/As/L0010 – Summary: board meeting, February 21, 1967.
\textsuperscript{1190} RA/PA/0992/A/As/L0010 – Summary: board meeting 03.05.1967.
\textsuperscript{1191} RA/PA-0992/D/L0001/ - 15.10.1968, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Visits to the EEC (EMN).
remaining costs even though the European Movement was listed as the organiser (…).” As seen above, the MFA had just secured the EMN an extra funding of 25,000 NOK under chapter 190 (unforeseen conferences). Such a conflation of roles and finances was problematic, and became one of the peculiar aspects of the Europeans’ part in the information efforts leading up to the referendum.

By 1970, co-operation was tried and tested. In June of 1970, for example, Haakon Lie and the EMN would set up a trip to Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany for Norwegian representatives of the fishery sector. The programme consisted of visits to ports, producers and organisations. The whole trip was planned and organised by the EMN, the Ministry of Fisheries, the embassies in Brussels and The Hague. The EMN, through funds from business organisations, paid for most of the trip, while the MFA gave a one time contribution of 10,000 NOK. For other trips, the KEIZ would be involved, and the embassies in Brussels and elsewhere would contribute with lecturers. This, more targeted effort, was complimented by other kinds of information: Greve printed and distributed a French and German version of a manuscript on the Norwegian economy and the EC – ‘L’économie Norvégienne et l’Europe’ – written by Counsellor to Brussels Sigurd Ekeland. Another strategic effort was to get a special issue focussing on Norway into the Revue du Marché Commun – a small, monthly journal with 4000 subscribers, mostly to be found within the inner circles of the Community.

The Embassy in Brussels was the main hub of the trips, but other embassies played a crucial role as well. The embassy in Bonn, for instance, hosted five parliamentary committees, three expert groups of civil servants, five groups invited by KEIZ and Zöldi, and no less than 10 groups from the Labour Movement and NCTU, totalling 364 people in 1971 (105 from committees, 19 civil servants, 130 via KEIZ, 110 via NCTU). The embassy had co-arranged all of the trips, and briefed all of the visitors on EC-matters. The Zöldi trips (“our own

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1195 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf. – 14.10.1970 – H. Lie, EMN.
1196 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf. – 08.05.1970 – T. Greve – Memo to the Administrative Department. Additional funds, 1970, for information efforts in the EEC-countries.
1197 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf. – 19.08.1970, Brussels – S. Ekeland – Norwegian application. Information efforts. If the issue was good, Norway would have reached precisely the ‘right people’ in relation to the negotiations: “on the editorial board sits, among others, Jean-François Deniau, member of the EEC-Commission, Jean-Pierre Brunet, Quai d’Orsay’s key person regarding EEC-matters, and also Director General [for industrial, technological and scientific matters] in the Commission, [Robert] Toulemon”, Ekeland wrote enthusiastically.
1198 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf. – 04.02.1972, Bonn – Memo. Groups and delegations on EC-info trips to the FRG, 1971.
Zöldi-group” as Lie wrote) were, of course, planned via the EMN, and the ten Labour Movement trips were partially paid by the EMN. By the last round of negotiations, the public diplomacy of physical connectivity was one of the most established, and widely used, parts of the MFA’s tactical arsenal. Press attaché to Brussels, Håkon W. Freihow, could report that 35 groups totalling 659 people would visit the embassy during the first six months of 1971 – leading among the applicants both in increase and frequency of visits.

This important, continuous and growing part of the MFA’s public diplomacy was coordinated and executed through a dense web of pro-European forces that came into place in the mid-1960s. In fact, it is impossible to grasp the full veracity of the MFA’s public diplomacy, or the Europeans work with the EC-case, without recognising and exploring both the formal and informal aspects. In this pro-European web, the Europeans played many roles. They were co-ordinators through the overall coordinative responsibilities of the MFA. Trips, material, money, contacts were knitted together in the MFA machinery. Here the Economic Department, the Press Department and the Market Secretariat were crucial. They were also facilitators, or connectors: through their vast network of contacts both on the domestic and international scene the Europeans gathered information, invited guests, and put people in the same room as each other. As explored above, the intermeshing of the domestic and international spheres, particularly in the field of multilateral economic diplomacy, made the Europeans’ in-betweenness even more important in this respect. They were of the few actors that mastered both scenes, and the interphase between the two. Here those from the Economic Department who took part in inter-departmental and corporative organs, the Europeans within the EMN, and the embassies (especially Brussels) played the most important role. Last, they were experts. The embassies briefed everyone visiting from Norway, and Europeans accompanied visitors from the Community to Norway on extensive trips. The information became more and more targeted and tailored to speak to trade unionists, parliamentarians, fishermen, continental journalists or civil servants from the Commission.

The rationale behind physical connectivity

A crucial element of the public diplomacy of physical connectivity, which remained constant throughout the three applications, was to create a certain level of trust in ‘Europe’ among Norwegian officials and the public, and a genuine understanding of Norway’s peculiar problems on the Community side. In doing this, the Europeans produced, maintained and

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1200 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–4 – 05.05.1971, Brussels – H. W. Freihow – EC. Visitors from Norway.
performed in particular diplomatic sites that they thought would create the desired result: the most important site being Norwegian nature.\footnote{This was especially important regarding the fishery and agricultural sector – it was in these sectors that Norway demanded special (and permanent) exemptions from the Treaty of Rome.}

Commission President Malfatti’s visit to Norway in late February 1971, right before the Centre-Right coalition collapsed, was a one of those opportunities ‘to create a realistic impression’. Sommerfelt wrote of how he mediated estrangement between Malfatti and Norwegian nature, by facilitating a site that educed understanding:

Yes, Signor and Signora Malfatti experienced our northern winters, with clear weather and cold. One day we were standing on the pier of one of Tromsø’s local dignitaries, Alfons Kræmer, and saw one of his fishing boats coming in from the Arctic Ocean. It had been out in some rough weather, and both the deck and the windows were covered with ice. The boat docked – everything was lifeless until the hatch opened on the front deck, and out crawled a creature that had to be human, as it walked on two. Everything was wrapped in something black, including the hat with long flaps. Inside, behind the scarf one could see a couple of narrow eyes – that’s all. It was a miracle how this creature managed to claw his way from the icy deck down towards the pulpit. It was then that our Italian guests, especially she, understood that fishing in Northern Norway was something special and required special arrangements.\footnote{Sommerfelt Vendemann (1997), p. 149. My translation.}

The meeting was between the harsh Norwegian nature and the Malfattis – Sommerfelt merely made it happen.\footnote{Constantinou: “Diplomacy, Spirituality, Alterity” (2010), p. 68; James Der Derian: On Diplomacy: A Geneology of Western Estrangement, Oxford: Blackwell (1987).} It is clear that Sommerfelt here engaged in active othering. He describes a rough and exotic Norway, and the plot was that the Malfattis changed their perception of Norway by experiencing, and accepting, its sheer otherness. But it is also a mediation of sameness: Sommerfelt is apparently just as astounded by how the fisherman could survive as the Malfattis. They share the experience of being impressed by the stamina of ‘this creature’ – and therefore share an understanding.

Malfatti himself was well aware of both the perceived cultural distance between ‘Norway’ and ‘Europe’, and also the ambivalence of the centre-right coalition. In preparing for the visit, the Commission produced several analytical memos on the general political situation in Norway. One memo listed the many reasons why Norwegians were sceptical of the Community, and simply concluded that “to understand this attitude it is necessary to keep in mind that the Norwegians, who for many years were isolated from the European continent, first of all feel proudly ‘Norwegian’, then ‘Nordic’, and only in the final analysis,
The first question Head of the European Commission delegation for negotiations on enlargement of the European Communities, Edmund Wellenstein, asked Malfatti to consider prior to his trip to Norway, for instance, was whether “another solution than membership is conceivable for a country like Norway?” It was a general challenge, therefore, to balance this physical manifestation of distance and otherness, with a continuous embracement of being ‘European’. This challenge was especially pronounced while Per Borten was Prime Minister. The balance of sameness and otherness was also at the core of fostering understanding for the Norwegian fishery claims. Ambassador Jahn Halvorsen, for example, ferociously and continuously argued for more visits to Norway in order to stop the Community from creating a Common Fisheries Policy detrimental to Norwegian interests.

When Vice President of the Commission, Sicco Mansholt, visited Norway in 1967, the Europeans had prepared a speech for Foreign Minister John Lyng: “Your stay in Norway – even if it is a short one – gives us the opportunity to show you some parts of Norway, and to present to you and discuss with you certain problems in the field of agriculture and fisheries.” One of the objectives of the visit was therefore to physically display otherness. At the same time, however, the speech highlighted sameness:

“Although Norway is the northernmost country in the European continent, we are part of it. Through our application it is not our intention to become European, but to stay European, and to share in the responsibility for the future of Europe.”

This might seem like pleasantries, but it was seen as crucial for the possible success of the negotiations. Recognising the display of otherness and sameness, Mansholt responded, “[i]t was in the interest of all of Western Europe that there would remain people in Northern Norway.” Mansholt’s response was partly due to geo-strategic considerations – considerations the Europeans had made a vital part of the Norwegian negotiation strategy already in 1961-62. The geo-strategic and emotional appeals therefore complemented each other, and were repeated again and again (also when Malfatti discussed the matter with MFA

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1206 44.36/8 CEE–4 – 15.05.1968, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Visits between EEC and Norway.
1208 UD 44.36/8–3 – 17.10.1967 – P. M. Ølberg – Vice-president Mansholt’s visit. Statements regarding agricultural policies, after conversations with the agricultural organisations.
officials). The argument that a depopulated north would weaken NATO’s northern flank, and therefore was a European concern, was particularly important in relation to the fishery and agricultural sector. Thus, in a deputy meeting between Norway and the EC, Sommerfelt maintained, “if Norway joined the Community it had to be a Communitarian responsibility to prevent depopulation of the Northern most coastal areas of Europe.”

The leading role in the public diplomacy of physical connectivity was played by Norwegian nature. As EMN secretary Einar M. Bull said the aim was to “show our barren north to create a realistic impression: that Norway within a European economic community will depend on special arrangements”. Both the embassy in Brussels and the EMN agreed that, “such trips would be of major importance to create the necessary understanding for our problems among caseworkers in the Commission”. From the time Frydenlund was made press attaché, the role of the embassy in Brussels remained to “take care of the planning of visits to Norway by representatives of the Common Market.” Håkon W. Freihow, press attaché to Brussels between 1971 and 1972, remembered the embassy as constantly trying to “highlight the Norwegian topography so as to make them understand Norway’s distinctive character, and thus the fairness of our negotiation position.” Holland, co-ordinating the visits from Oslo, remembered the tactic this way:

The ‘tactical assessment’ – if you were to call it that – was to show Norway, to the continental Europeans in the EC, as a country they didn’t have any knowledge about. So, we arranged extensive trips for leading representatives of the Community to all parts of Norway. They couldn’t begin to comprehend the vast distances, the scattered settlements etc. and that Norway was a special country in Europe, until they had visited. (...) I can’t even begin to count how many times I have accompanied EC representatives to Kirkenes and even Grense Jakobselv [the border to Russia]. They had then travelled thousands of kilometres from Brussels and seen for themselves. And they were convinced of the legitimacy of our problems.

The aim was, as stated in the intro, for them to travel the distance, experience the rough climate and the steepness of the mountains, and feel the cold. As Geoffrey Allen Pigman notes, public diplomacy is “an essential component of the soft power resources employed by

1209 UD 44.36/6.84–38 – 12.03.1971, Oslo – T. Johannessen – Summary: conversation at the MFA, 25.02.1971. Visit from President of the Commission, Franco Maria Malfatto.
1210 UD 44.36/6.84–40 – 10.06.1971 – Neg. Del. – Memo. Summary: Deputy meeting, EC-Norway, 08.06.1971.
1212 UD 44.36/6.84 B.–1 – 27.06.1962, Oslo – T. Myklebost, Press Department – Memo to the Foreign Minister; UD 44.36/6.84 B.–1 – 16.08.1962, Oslo – O. C. Gundersen – To the Royal Wage and Price Ministry. Necessity of personnel in regards to the negotiation of Norway’s possible affiliation to the EEC.
This was true of the Norwegian MFA’s strategy towards the EC in the 1960s and 1970s, too. In this light it seems the *Europeans* relied on the soft ‘persuasive’ power of Norwegian nature.

The rationale behind facilitating physical connectivity between Norway and the Community was twofold: on the one hand, the *Europeans* wanted to connect and overcome the mental distances between Norwegians and Continental Europeans, in the broadest sense. It was a project of making Norway a natural part of the Community, by making both known to each other. On the other hand, it was a way of showing Norway’s uniqueness to representatives of the Community. It was a way of materialising the distance, and thus the differences between Norway and Continental Europe. Accordingly, and deliberately, the *Europeans* communicated two things at once: ‘Norway is a natural part of Western Europe’ and ‘Norway is a distinctive part of Western Europe’. Essentially, they regarded this as a vital – and perhaps only – way of bridging the distance between the Norwegian negotiation position and what the Community could offer.

**The diplomatic gaze**

By exploring how the *Europeans* and others evaluated the practice of physical connectivity, we see that the aim was to mediate estrangement between Norway and the Community by changing both. Nature, as we have seen, played a crucial part in this, in addition to other sites such as the Embassy in Brussels, Community institutions, and the actual travelling. The public diplomacy of physical connectivity could be understood as the creation, performance and maintenance of a wide diplomatic site, which reproduced the in-betweenness of the *Europeans*, and therefore also aimed to reproduce their understanding of the encounter.

Terje Johannessen took part in many of the trips to the north of Norway, and remembered them as counterproductive: “they came to Norway with certain expectations, after we had described the terrible conditions, and then they came to Finnmark [northern most region of Norway] and there they found impressive barns and automatic irrigation systems that they could only dream of – and they said ‘why should they have more money?’”

Opposite, Jahn Halvorsen was convinced that ‘field excursions’ made a lasting impression on Community representatives and served Norwegian interests. Martin Huslid’s reflections

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1217 UD 44.36/8 CEE.–4 – 15.05.1968, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Exchanges between the EEC and Norway.
following a visit to Norway from three civil servants of the Commission’s DG industry, however, captures the complexity of such exchanges:

“Of course, it is difficult to assess the ‘usefulness’ of such a visit. The gentlemen undoubtedly revised some of their preconceptions and got a truer image of the conditions under which Norwegian industries (...) operate. For example, they got a vivid impression of the huge distances (both to raw materials and markets) and the substantial investments in infrastructure that is needed. (...) I therefore think that such a visit has contributed to the creation of more awareness of, and understanding for, our problems among men that work with economic questions that directly concern us. (...) Finally, the visit has contributed to personal contacts that might come in handy. For me, and I suppose others at the embassy here [in Brussels], the visit will have made our access to these men and their field of work easier”.1218

It was only natural that any measurable success depended on many other factors out of the Europeans’ control, what is interesting is why they felt the strategy succeeded/failed: a significant turn in the Community’s attitude towards Norway occurred in the summer of 1971. At this point the EC realised that Norwegian fears of not being able to ratify an agricultural or fishery agreement unanimously rejected by the interest groups were real. According to Allers, the Norwegian negotiators intended to turn the question into a political one, among other things, through a string of visits to Norway: from the Foreign Ministers of France and Italy, several Ministers of Agriculture, and Commissioner Deniau. Allers concludes, “the Norwegians took them to the Northern coast and flew them in small planes over the mountainous landscape in order to illustrate the conditions under which the farmers had to work. This strategy certainly had an effect on German representatives”. The Dutch Minister of Agriculture Pierre Lardinois, however, remained “unimpressed by the mountainous landscape that was meant to change his view on Norwegian special rights. Presumably the weather was too good and the scenery too idyllic to drive home the argument”, Sommerfelt bitterly recalled.1219 In both examples, how Norwegian nature was experienced was perceived as the defining factor. It is the site that educes understanding.

The public diplomacy of physical connectivity was part of a broad range of diplomatic (and non-diplomatic) efforts co-ordinated by the MFA. The MFA arranged exchanges and trips for almost all organisations, sectors, and businesses. Through the embassy in Brussels, groups of Norwegians met Commission officials, leading politicians, and their ‘opposite

numbers’ in the different EC countries. The shipping sector and the NSA, for example, shaped their policies and responses through “a close and continuous contact with the Norwegian embassy in Brussels”, with Eivinn Berg being their point of contact in the early 1970s.  

Opposite, the MFA and EMN invited “Europeans to Norway”. This was not only for them to experience Norwegian nature, the EMN secretary once wrote to the Information Service of the EC, but also because Norwegians in the districts “need to receive impulses from abroad to pose questions, discuss, learn to know others and express their own opinions (…)”.  

A fundamental trait of this practice, then, was as much about changing the Norwegian outlook as it was about changing the position of the EC. More fundamentally, the Europeans sought, as political scientist James Der Derian phrased it, to mediate estrangement. That is, to create or sustain understanding of the Self and the Other. As seen above, Constantinou, building on this, describes a mental shift in encountering the Other, altering the Self, and thus enabling the Self to understand the Other in a new way. For this to be successful, Constantinou maintains, one needs both to embrace Otherness, and to engage in mediation of Sameness. The Europeans, negotiating on behalf of Norway, engaged in something similar to such homo-diplomacy: the physical, interpersonal dealing between Community officials and Norwegians was meant to foster both recognition of Sameness, and respect for Otherness. In the broadest sense, and for the Europeans to succeed, ‘Norway’ had to change its self-perception when encountering ‘Europe’, and thus change its understanding of ‘Europe’. If they all accepted that they were, in fact, Europeans – then the differences could be understood on another level.  

Seen from another angle, the Europeans produced and tried to maintain a diplomatic site that could mediate estrangement. In a deeper sense, then, the recognition of ‘sameness’ and ‘otherness’, of Norway being both a natural and distinctive part of Europe, physically manifested through actually travelling between the two entities, locating the experiences in Brussels and Norwegian nature, the continuous meeting of the international and the domestic scene through the Europeans, all of this, reproduced their point of view – their diplomatic gaze.

1224 Constantinou “Diplomacy, Spirituality, Alterity” (2010), p. 68, 72. His analysis is situated in the Cyprus conflict.
Chapter 11
Communitarian Boomerang

Holland said there was no logic in this situation. (…) unbelievable though it seemed, the Norwegian candidature for EEC membership was in danger of foundering over this issue. It was a political and emotional problem.\textsuperscript{1225}

Arild Holland referred by British officials (July 1971)

The fishery issue was one of the most difficult and important in the whole negotiation. Following the Pompidou-Heath summit (May 1971) where political agreement on most major outstanding issues had been agreed between France and Britain, the last remaining issues were fisheries. It prolonged Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway’s signing of the accession treaties several months, to January 1972, and threatened to dislodge the entire enlargement.

There were three reasons for this. First, fishery was the most important singular issue for the Norwegian government, and acquired, apart from the economic dimension, a political and historical-emotional dimension, which made it the litmus test for ‘membership’ as such. Second, at the core of the fisheries negotiations was a longstanding and oft-bitter dispute about access to Norwegian waters between Britain and Norway. This dispute became entangled in the enlargement negotiations, and made both parties change strategies several times. Third, on the eve of the opening of negotiations, the EC launched its own Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aiming at Community-wide equal access to national waters. This infuriated the applicants who all had fish rich waters, and not least Norway whose coastline would become the food basket of the enlarged Community’s fishery fleets.

This chapter follows the Europeans’ work with the fisheries issue from the early 1960s as they designed and defended an alternative communitarian fishery policy (the establishment line), got it through the domestic machinery, and operated it in the complex multilateral negotiations between the applicants and the EC. The way the Europeans negotiated the fishery issue took shape from the many overlapping roles they, as MEDs, inhabited in the domestic and international arenas and their personal conviction. As we shall see, at the core of the negotiations was the use and interpretation of the \textit{acquis communautaire}. The paradoxical end result was that the Europeans’ communitarian strategy failed to bring Norway into the Community, but greatly shaped the final fishery agreement between the Six and the other three applicants who joined the EC in 1973. Through the combined pressure of the four applicants the Community withdrew and revised its own common policy.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1225} FCO 30/1026 – 08.07.1971, Oslo - G. A. Crossley – Dear Norman.}
The establishment line

As we recall, the Europeans orchestrated, and were well on their way to implement a fundamental rethink of the Gerhardsen government’s negotiation strategy in the autumn of 1962. At that time the Europeans had adopted elements of the communitarian logic, and shaped Norwegian policy and strategy accordingly. The establishment line, which would reappear in the 1970s, was born under such circumstances.

It was clear from the wording of the Treaty of Rome that some form of common policy for fisheries was to be developed within the Community to complete and complement the common agricultural policy. The Six had very diverse national systems of duties on fish products, with France having by far the highest levels of protection, with duties up to 50% on certain types of fish. The harmonisation of the different regimes and liberalisation of intra-Community fish trade began on January 1, 1962, slowly dismantling the French system of protection. Threatened by competition from other member states and non-EEC countries, the French government and fishery industry lobbied the EEC for a CFP. The Commission responded and proposed a conference of the Six in order to develop a CFP as soon as possible. Third countries that had applied for membership would be allowed to submit written statements to be taken into consideration by the Community.

These developments, in the midst of the first round of enlargement negotiations, created a serious challenge for the Norwegian negotiators. The Six had not settled on a common fishery policy, but it was clear that they aimed for a policy of ‘equal access’ for all member states to each other’s fishing waters. As Norway had very rich fishing waters and was a major exporter of fish products, the dilemma, it seemed, was to find a balance between protecting domestic waters and gaining access to a major market: more than 20 percent of total fishery export went to the Six. An enlarged EEC would, in 1962, receive roughly 50 percent of the unprocessed fish produce, and 36.1 percent of the processed and canned fish. However, the social, cultural and socio-economic importance of the fishery sector was even greater: the Norwegian fishery industry consisted of a fishery population scattered all along the coast,

1227 Opposite, the Benelux had no protection on imports of non-processed fish.
1229 To develop guidelines for a future CFP, the Commission was required (§ 43 of the Treaty of Rome) to convene a conference. MFA, Rapport om De Europeiske Felleskap. Fra et utvalg nedsett av Regeringen 29. Mars 1966. (Markedsutvalgets rapport VI) (1971), p. 93.
1230 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECF, meeting 25.11.1961, 10AM. Arne Skaug.
owning or sharing ownership of relatively small fishing vessels. Roughly 50 percent of the fishery population lived in the north of the country, and as late as 1970, 40 percent of employment in that region came from the fisheries sector. The existing fishery regime prioritised small vessels, a national concession and landing system, and rigorous routines for rights of establishment, not only to protect an economic infrastructure, but as part of a postwar policy of regional development. Moreover, in a Cold War context, keeping the north populated had geostrategic importance too. As it turned out, the conference of the Six never materialised. The French refused participation of third countries. But in late 1962, the fishery conference – set for January 1963 – was an important reality. Norway had been invited to present a memorandum, and the Europeans and the Ministry of Fishery (MoF) worked hard to develop a response. The ambitious aim was to “work through the Community machinery” and shape the CFP from the inside. Norway being Western Europe’s biggest fisheries nation, they imagined they would be heard.

In discussions with British officials in Oslo, October 1962, Director Generals Halvorsen and Gundersen (MoF) presented “an outline of what they thought should be the common fisheries policy of an enlarged Community, taking into account the basic fisheries problems of Western Europe”. With the Treaty of Rome as their starting point, the Europeans and the MoF had prepared a memorandum they thought would “help not only Norway but the Six also”. To Halvorsen and Gundersen’s mind, the Treaty of Rome took no stand on the extension of territorial waters: each country should be able to maintain their territorial and fishery limits. Moreover, as they interpreted the Treaty of Rome, the ‘rights of establishment’ (Articles 52-58) were applicable. A foreign person or company could establish business in the territory of any member state, but would have to abide by the laws of that member state. “[T]he Treaty provided for equal but not free access to waters within fishery limits”, Halvorsen concluded, therefore citizens of other EC states would be free to fish within Norwegian fishing limits provided they were residing in Norway. This was the establishment line. Back home the Europeans had high hopes: “the strength of the memo”, it was claimed at a negotiation delegation meeting in November 1962, was that it had “succeeded in getting the fishery

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1235 UD 44.36/6.84 – 20 – 23.11.1962 – A. Langeland and E. Berg – Memo. EEC.
industry to look at the issues from a *common European*, and not just a *Norwegian*, perspective". After persistent advice from the *Europeans* and the MoF, Foreign Minister Lange and Minister O. C. Gundersen seriously contemplated postponing the fishery negotiations until membership was obtained, and shape the CFP from the inside. De Gaulle’s veto in January of 1963 meant that the establishment line was never tested, though it seems unlikely that this strategy would have succeeded. What is curious, however, is how the establishment line survived for a full decade to be reintroduced in the third round of negotiations.

One reason was that while the Community’s CFP started to take shape from 1966 onwards, Norwegian hopes of being able to shape the process were never outright rejected. In October of 1967, vice president of the Commission Sicco Mansholt, for instance, thought it “very plausible” that Norway join intra-Community fishery negotiations on a consultative basis as long as Norway was in membership negotiations at the time. Likewise, as late as the end of April 1970, Dutch MFA state secretary de Koster had argued that since the Community had not established a fishery policy, Norway could simply “veto any decision that the Norwegians could not accept”, once on the inside. Thus, the notion that Norway could shape the CFP once membership negotiations commenced, survived and became an explicit part of the governments reasoning.

During the second round, therefore, the establishment line survived in ambiguous terms. Avoiding explicit statements on the issue, the parliamentary white paper of 1967 concluded that whether Norway needed special arrangements or not could only be assessed when the CFP took shape. As in 1962, the government wanted to be consulted, and in these consultations the negotiators would present the establishment line. The conclusions from 1967 were largely repeated in the parliamentary white paper of June 1970. Based on material from the Market Secretariat, and in large part written and coordinated by the *Europeans*, it concluded: “The adverse effect of a possible access for foreign fishery vessels to fish within our fishery zone could be limited by the implementation of regulations for access to fishing on a non-discriminatory basis.” The *Europeans* had helped build the boat, but had no idea if it could stay afloat in multilateral waters.

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1237 UD 44.36/6.84 N. – 09.11.1962 – E. Berg – Minutes. Meeting of the Negotiation Delegation, 07.11.1962.
1239 UD 44.36/8–3 – 19.10.1967 – P. M. Ølberg – Summary, discussion with Vice President Mansholt at the Foreign Minister’s office, Friday, 13.10, 14.45-16.15.
Special status

Seemingly, the establishment line was sunk the very day the negotiations commenced. In the mid-1960s, after a period internal strife, France resumed its pressure on the Commission to develop proposals for a comprehensive CFP – including a Community funding mechanism beneficial for the French fishing industry. Accordingly, in 1966 the Fisheries Division of the Directorate-General for Agriculture of the Commission set up a package of proposals with a common organisation of the fishery market, and a structural policy incorporating the principle of “equal access to and use of fishing grounds in maritime waters coming under the sovereignty or within the jurisdiction of member states”. Two years later, a modified proposal to the Council added exceptions to the principle of equal access: certain waters could be reserved for the local population of the coastal region concerned if that population depended primarily on inshore fishing. After a series of uninspired negotiations between the Six and amendments by the Commission, the CFP (1968-1970) remained a low priority.

It was rather abrupt, therefore, that the Six reached an agreement on the CFP on the eve of the re-opening of negotiations with the four applicants, on June 30, 1970. Several developments contributed to breaking the deadlock. First, the French – hitherto opposed to the principle of equal access – shifted their focus from inshore fisheries to distant water fisheries, aligning with the Dutch and Germans, who wanted access to other member states’ waters for its deep-water fleet. Also, with enlargement back on the agenda, the Six, and especially the French, wanted to make the CFP part of the acquis communautaire before negotiations started. Third, “by linking the issue of equal access to fishing waters and the CFP structural fund”, as historian Michael J. Geary explains, the Commission was able to “reconcile French and German objections to the original Commission plan for the fishing industry.” Only hours after Foreign Minister Stray read the Norwegian government’s opening statement in Luxembourg on June 30, 1970, a combination of structural changes, classical intra-EC horse-trading, and the very anticipation of new member states, secured a

1245 Geary Enlarging the European Union, (2013), p. 164. Reflecting the low priority, the Fishery Division was staffed by 5 or 6 persons. It was led by the French M. Simonnet.
deal on the CFP. With Western Europe’s biggest fishery nation knocking at the door, the hurried settlement resembled “a wedding without a bride”.1249

The Centre-Right government would remain divided on the fishery issue until its disintegration in March of 1971. On one side, the Conservatives supported the establishment line. On the opposite side, the Centre-, Liberal- and Christian People’s Party, together with the fishery industry, demanded permanent and exclusive Norwegian fishing rights within the 12-mile zone – a ‘national line’.1250 This division shaped Foreign Minister Stray’s opening statement. Following the established recipe, it was a detailed description of the special problems Norway would face inside the Community due to its geography, nature and socio-economic structure.1251 As a high-ranking Dutch official remarked, “if the British had made the opening statement Norway did, we wouldn’t even have opened negotiations”.1252 However, the aim in the fishery sector had remained “to take part in all negotiations which touch upon questions relating of fishery policy”.1253 Ambiguity was maintained.

The Council’s adoption of the resolution on the CFP, therefore, was nothing short of a ‘symbolic catastrophe’.1254 Sceptics in the government, parliament and public were confirmed in their fears that a small country like Norway would have little influence within the Community, even on issues of vital national importance. Moreover, the resolution hardened the fishery sector’s opposition to membership, which would remain “a wall of hostility and suspicion” throughout the negotiations.1255 The decision infuriated the Europeans: Halvorsen told Mansholt that the Community’s statement had felt like “a cold shower”, and left the impression that the resolution was “aimed especially at us”. Mansholt admitted that the timing was ‘awkward’, but stressed that the Community was open to innovative use of rules of establishment and concessions that did not discriminate based on nationality. The resolution did not “challenge the validity of the fishery zone” Mansholt said. Though it laid down the principle of equal treatment it was the “coastal state’s right to establish which rules that should apply for fishery”. Mansholt went on to list concrete measures that could be taken, and generally left the impression that the Commission would be very accommodating if the Norwegian proposal was given the ‘right language’. This was encouraging, but Halvorsen feared that the Community’s ill-timed announcement would lead the government to adopt a

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1249 UD 44.36/6.84-35 – Rhein-Zeitung – No date found.
1253 Quoted from Dynna Fiskerisektoren (1973), p. 103.
1255 Allen Norway and Europe (1979), p.: 99
tough defensive position, “whatever people like Mansholt (...) might say about the Community’s preparedness to adopt a flexible attitude in their relations with the new member[s]”. And he was right.

Discussing the matter in late August, the government now chose an alternate path to the establishment line. Against the recommendation of the Market Committee, Minister of Fisheries Einar Hole Moxnes secured a majority for “negotiating on the basis of continued prohibition for foreign fishermen to fish within the national fishery limits. Our negotiators should actively work to create understanding for this view in the up-coming negotiations and among the applicant countries”. The primary aim of the memorandum presented at the first proper ministerial meeting on September 22, 1971, was to convince the Community that Norway needed a permanent and total exemption from the future CFP:

“As regards the resolution adopted by the Council on the same day on the common fishery policy, we are aware that this is a fishery policy designed for the Community as it exists today. In its decision the Council and Ministers drew up certain guidelines for the common fishery policy. The enlargement of the Community will bring about substantial changes within the fishery sector, which, in our view, must lead to other solutions for the fishery problems in certain important fields”

With this statement, the government rejected large parts of the CFP as unacceptable in an enlarged Community. On the other hand, the Community had asked the Norwegian government for full and formal acceptance of the acquis communautaire, which Norway had failed to present in the opening statement. The government tried to balance two strategies that, in their pure form, were logically incompatible: to accept the CFP as a future part of the acquis, and to refuse it.

Only on the firm insistence of the German presidency could the Six agree not to leave the Norwegians completely empty-handed. The Community was “prepared to recognise in due course, the attention which it will be appropriate to ascribe to the problems faced by Norway in the fisheries sector”. After long and heated discussion, a statement drafted by the

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1258 UD 44.36/6.84–35 – Statement by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Svenn Stray, at the meeting between Norway and the Council of the European Communities, Brussels, 22nd September, 1970.
1260 Dynna Fiskerisektoren (1973), p. 93
1261 Allers “Norges mann i Europa” (2009), pp. 291-292.
Norwegian delegation was annexed to the ‘Summary of Conclusions’: “It is the Norwegian point of view that the common fishery policy for the enlarged Community should be negotiated between the EEC and applicant countries.” The conclusion of the meeting was to agree to disagree, but the Norwegians had accepted the full *acquis communautaire*, and any complete redefinition of the CFP had been firmly rejected by the Six.

In a conversation with Permanent Representative of France to the EC Jean-Marc Boegner, Halvorsen was told that the government should try to “get the Norwegian casus isolated, and solve it at the end of the negotiations, so as to not set precedence for the British.” This was the reason why the French urged the Community to establish a CFP, he maintained. Boegner assured Halvorsen that there was “French willingness to solve the Norwegian fishery problem”. From October onwards, then, the fisheries issue was discussed in technical deliberations between Norwegian and Commission experts. This was, in reality, a stalling technique to keep fisheries off the official negotiation agenda until substantial progress had been made with the British, but also to postpone real negotiations until the CFP was implemented and became an official part of the *acquis* on February 1, 1971. The government could (and had to) accept this postponement, since the Community had already granted Norway special status in the September meeting.

**The establishment line resurrected**

These developments did not mean that the *Europeans* gave up the establishment line: “we are not a special problem”, fumed Ambassador Halvorsen in September of 1970, “with Norway as part of the EEC, the fisheries would be given a completely new dimension”. The CFP as it was “would be incomplete if Norway joined”. The ambition remained therefore, and with the combination of administrative ingenuity and the downfall of the Borten government, the strategy would be resurrected by the Bratteli government.

From December onward, as the coalition government was crumbling, internal discussions intensified. A strategy on market organisation, including fishery zones, and a memo on the economic consequences of membership for the fishery industry were prepared by the end of January. Regarding the fishery zones “further elaboration on the establishment line” had to be ready for a government conference by the end of January. At the centre of

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the domestic preparations was the negotiation secretariat: situated in Oslo, and headed by Arild Holland, it functioned as the coordinative hub, filtrating and harmonising the recommendations from ‘below’ and the strategies from ‘above’. Before the negotiation delegation would make a recommendation to the government, technical deliberations would take place in a Working Group (WG) on fishery questions.\textsuperscript{1268} Earlier in the preparations, Holland had made his right hand Per Martin Ølberg the secretariat responsible for fishery questions, and he was the obvious choice as the MFA’s representative to the WG.\textsuperscript{1269}

In January 1971, the WG discussed four, by then, well-known options: the national line; the establishment line; dividing the coast in two in order to get regional exceptions from the CFP for the Northern part of Norway (the regional line); or to fall back on the agreements of the London Convention of 1964 (the status quo line). The WG was in full agreement that the existing structural regime of the EC was unacceptable. Furthermore, the last two options were unanimously rejected as undesirable. This left the WG, much like the government itself, discussing the national and establishment lines.\textsuperscript{1270}

The representatives from the fishery industry, who dominated the WG, backed the national line, maintaining exclusive fishing rights for Norwegian fishermen within the 12-mile zone, and exclusive rights to land fish. They feared that rules of establishment would either not be accepted as part of the CFP’s structural regime, or be too difficult to enforce.\textsuperscript{1271} The representatives of the government in the WG wanted the “more communitarian” establishment line.\textsuperscript{1272} Ølberg emphatically defended this view:

“The issue must be understood in a wider context. (...) The explorative talks [with the EC and other applicants] had shown that the establishment line sufficiently secured Norwegian interests (...) The two alternatives (...) are therefore, in practice, very similar to each other regarding their possibility to secure the interests of Norwegian fishermen. The establishment line, furthermore, has the presentational advantage of adhering to the non-discrimination principle. The solutions we reach for the fisheries cannot be seen in isolation from other sectors. A tough stance in the fishery sector will reduce our chances of getting satisfactory solutions in other problematic areas. Last, Norwegian membership in the Community will offer the benefits of big markets for Norway, which is a strong argument for the EEC to oppose a Norwegian demand for exclusivity

\textsuperscript{1268} WG: representatives from the fishery industry, and headed by Director General Gundersen of the MoF.
\textsuperscript{1269} Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. As Holland recalls it, he recognised that the experts from the MoF were “totally dictated by the Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales Organization [NFSO]. (...) so we had to get some expertise from within the MFA”.
\textsuperscript{1270} Dynna \textit{Fiskerisektoren} (1973), p. 104.
To these arguments was added the fear that if the negotiators presented the national line in Brussels, the Community would immediately counter with the regional line, dividing the Norwegian coast in two. Once the regional line was on the table, it would be almost impossible to back-peddle and introduce the establishment line. Hard lining on the fishery issue could jeopardise the future membership of Norway. In the end, however, the representatives of the fishery industry and organisations prevailed, and the WG recommended the strict national line.

Normally, the procedure would be that the WG’s recommendation went straight to the negotiation delegation, which in turn made its recommendation to the government. Once the WG’s recommendation reached the negotiation delegation, substantial changes would be very difficult. There can be little doubt that Ølberg warned Holland that the establishment line was under threat. The only way to save it, as Arild Holland saw it, was to intercept the recommendation from the WG before it went to the negotiation delegation. Holland therefore brought the so-called Consultative Committee (CC) – consisting of government officials and representatives from the major business organisations – into the decision-making procedure. Representatives from the fishery and agricultural sectors had “been consulted quite thoroughly”, he argued, while the other business sectors “who are directly affected by the outcome of the negotiations, have not been brought into the picture whatsoever”:

“I will therefore recommend that the Consultative Committee is brought directly in to the matter in advance, before the Negotiation Delegation sends its proposal to the Government. As for the fishery approach, this could be done so that the report from the Working Group for fishery questions is sent to the Consultative Committee for an opinion.”

By involving the representatives from the pro-European export industries of the CC, the demands of the fishery sector would be placed in the ‘wider context’ Ølberg spoke of. It was last minute – the report of the WG had already been sent to the negotiation delegation – but they had not given their final recommendation. Not surprisingly, the CC produced a different recommendation than the WG:

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1274 The Government would then consult CIEG, and thereafter opt for a policy.
1275 UD 44.36/6.84-37 - 28.01.1971, Oslo - A. Holland - The Norwegian negotiation preparations and the CC.
"The General Secretary and Chairman of the Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales Organisation [NFSO] were especially invited to take part in the meeting, and they staunchly defended upholding the status quo [national line]. This view did not find resonance with the other members of the committee, who all thought that the alternative the government-side had presented was a good negotiation strategy.”

Through innovative use of administrative power, Holland secured the establishment line. In February, the strategy was finalised by the negotiation delegation and sent to the government. Signs pointed to the government leaning towards the ‘national line’, but it disintegrated and was replaced by a pro-European Labour government before it reached a final conclusion. The Europeans’ strategy would live to fight another day.

Heated discussions within the Bratteli government would follow. The Chairman of the influential NFSO who had staunchly defended the national line in the CC-meeting in January – Knut Hoem was now the Minister of Fisheries of Bratteli’s government. Though we do not know for sure, Bratteli probably appointed him in an effort to win over a man with a strong standing within the fishery community. On April 14-15, the government would meet for an extraordinary conference on the two key questions of agriculture and fisheries. Arild Holland hoped it would result in decisions on broad policy lines, enabling the negotiation delegation to make statements on both subjects at the next meeting of deputies. Although the new government had not yet taken any decisions, it did “have a clear understanding of Community thinking”, he told British officials.

The morning before the extraordinary government conference, Foreign Minister Andreas Cappelen hosted an ambassador’s conference to listen in on the tactical considerations from all the different capitals, before real negotiations started. The ambassadors thought that the government could count on support from the Germans and the quite possibly the Dutch and French. The German position was ambivalent since they, together with the Dutch, had pushed for the CFP to be concluded only a year earlier. The Norwegian government did, however, have an unwavering ally in Chancellor Brandt. Brandt

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1279 FCO 30/1024 – 21.04.1971, Oslo – G. A. Crossley – Dear Adam. Holland told British officials that state secretary Vindsetmo had supported the involvement of the CC.
1282 Hoem had worked as secretary in the MoF (1951-1955) before he started working for the NFSO. In 1964 he became Chairman of the NFSO, a position he held until 1987, apart from just shy of one year as Minister.
1283 Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 162.
did not understand why the German delegation had voted in favour of the CFP, he had told Sommerfelt. Accordingly, the Germans would be flexible, he thought. Ambassador to Paris Hersleb Vogt thought the French might support the establishment line. They had been lukewarm towards the CFP since the beginning, and faced similar problems with their inshore fishermen as Norway. In fact, they had suggested a similar establishment solution in the internal discussions and might welcome a total reconstruction of the CFP.

Ambassador Halvorsen said that as it looked, every applicant had a different view of how the fishery issue could be solved. Norway was not without possible allies, but the other three applicants had in common that “they waited for Norway to make the first statement, and thus bear the brunt of the burden”. He still believed, however, that the establishment line would be the easiest to defend. Commissioner Mansholt, among others, had told him that if Norway chose the establishment line, the EC could hardly object as it was based on communitarian principles. Gundersen (MoF), while he warned that the Commission was “strongly attached to the current solution”, agreed with Halvorsen’s assessment. The two main designers of the establishment line in the early 1960s thought it was the only possible solution that could gain traction in the Community while satisfying the fishermen at home.

At the extraordinary government conference, Sommerfelt presented the recommended strategy. Hoem rapidly made it clear that he still preferred the ‘national line’ – the CFP as it was now would be “a disaster” for Norwegian fishermen. He argued that, “it should be possible to make the EC accept a regional special arrangement for [the whole of] Norway, whereupon the right to fish within the Norwegian fishery zone would be permanently reserved for Norwegian fishermen”. Hoem’s was a minority opinion. Based on the advice of the negotiation delegation, strongly supported by the ambassador’s conference, while responding to Hoem’s concerns, the government agreed to adopt a strict ‘establishment line’.

**Multilateral Flip**

On March 30, Foreign Minister Cappelen informed the Community that expert talks had revealed that the CFP would raise substantial problems for Norway, and requested the issue be brought up in the main negotiations. At the meeting of deputies on May 4, the Norwegian delegation handed over a memorandum on fishing within fishery zones and gave a statement underlining the “grave problems” the existing provisions of the EC on access to

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1287 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0030 - Government Conference (Staur Gård) – 15.04.971.
1289 Dynna Fiskerisektoren (1973), p. 98.
national fishery zones would create for Norway. On the other hand, it clearly emphasised that the government wanted **communitarian** solutions, and expressed the desire that fishing within the fishery zone should be anchored in the rules of establishment of the Treaty of Rome. “The principle must therefore be that only those who are established in the coastal state, will have the opportunity to fish within the country’s fishery limit”, it concluded. As chief negotiator Sommerfelt told his EFTA partners shortly thereafter this “applied to the whole of the enlarged community”. However, the combination of the proposed new legal order in the fishery sector and the Community’s recognition of Norway as a ‘special case’ created unforeseen multilateral dynamics. Most important was the change in the British negotiation position.

Throughout the negotiations the UK government tended to ‘suffer from schizophrenia’ on the fishery question and changed its course several times. The British inshore fishermen opposed the equal access provisions of the CFP just as fiercely as the Norwegians. However, the distant-water fishing industry held the opposite view, and it was the latter view that initially won through. The first official British reaction to the CFP was that its equal access provision could be accepted in some restricted form, to gain access to the rich Norwegian fishing waters. This initial British position must be understood in the context of the many fishery negotiations throughout the postwar era, where Britain’s main concern had been to secure access to Icelandic and Norwegian waters. Ever since Iceland had warned that it contemplated a unilateral expansion of its fishing zone to 12 miles in 1956-57, the Norwegian fisheries organisations had pushed for a similar move. The government had long been rather sceptical to such a move, and sought instead to reach an international agreement. But after a string of failed conferences in the late 1950s, the government turned and unilaterally expanded its fishery zone to 12 miles in 1961. The British responded by calling for a fisheries conference to find a common solution. At the London Convention of 1964, the UK proposed dividing national waters between an inner six miles reserved for local fishermen, and an outer six miles accessible to foreign fishermen. The London Convention – signed by all participants except Norway – caused much bitterness. Then Foreign Minister Halvard Lange complained, “the main intention of the British by convening this conference was to launch a fundamental

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1292 UD 44.36/6.84–39 – Brussel Liaison report on negotiations with the EEC. Norway. Meeting at the United Kingdoms Delegation’s Offices Brussels, 4th May 1971.


attack against the Norwegian 12-mile zone.” In October of 1970, Britain’s transitional access to Norwegian waters ran out. Moreover, the British feared a further extension of the Icelandic fishery zone to 50 miles (which Norway could duplicate). These developments made equal access within an enlarged Community appealing to the British government.

On the one hand the Norwegians tried to develop an entirely new CFP, and as a back up they clung to ‘special status’. British negotiators felt this “led the Norwegians to adopt until the very last a somewhat reserved and highly individual attitude which made progress by anybody harder to achieve.” British chief negotiator at the deputy level Con O’Neill argued: “There can be little doubt that, in the early stages, the Community believed they would be able to settle fisheries by fobbing us and the Irish off with very limited concessions, and then proceeding to offer much more generous treatment to Norway (...)” Norway’s ‘special status’ gave the fisheries negotiations – already a sensitive issue in which it was easy to compare and visualise zones and exceptions – a marked distributive streak. This created a problem for the British, Danish and Irish, as it became difficult to accept deals that gave noticeably worse terms than Norway.

The British negotiators had been aware of the establishment ideas since the early 1960s, but it became a problem only from February 1971 onwards as the Europeans fought the policy through on the domestic scene. The UK would gain nothing by supporting equal access, if Norway consistently with the CFP could effectively exclude them from Norwegian waters. Learning the full details of the Norwegian proposal in May, British Minister in charge of the negotiations Geoffrey Rippon, quickly dismissed it as unacceptable to the UK. The British response was the ‘6+6’ proposal: balancing demands from the inshore and deep-water fishermen, this entailed that “waters within a 6-mile limit only (...) should be reserved for vessels genuinely belonging to the ports from which such waters are being fished”, while the outer six-mile zone would be accessible for Community vessels.

Both now tried to persuade the other to abandon her position. On hearing rumours of a tactical shift, Director General Gundersen told British officials that the “‘6+6’ initiative was politically impossible”. Gundersen instead thought the Community would accept the strict Norwegian establishment line. Since the degree of national discrimination involved in the

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'6+6' proposal “made it a non-starter with the Six”, Gundersen hoped that the UK and Ireland would be prepared to go along with the Norwegian proposal. British negotiators did not want to commit. When Rippon travelled to Oslo on May 25-26, he was explicitly instructed “not to discuss [their] negotiation position, since this is at present still in the process of formulation”. If asked about the Norwegian proposal on establishment, Rippon “should not commit himself to supporting the Norwegians, and he should say that it is being studied carefully by Her Majesty’s Government.”

The British hoped that they could get the Norwegians to abandon their ‘special status’, and instead join the other applicants in multilateral talks with the Community (proposed for July 12). On the advice of the Norwegian negotiation delegation, the government decided to decline the invitation, and not be “played out on the sidelines (...) through multilateral negotiations”. Ambassador Halvorsen therefore briskly rejected the proposal in a conversation with Minister of the UK Delegation to the EC Christofas, adding, “the choice facing Britain was to either let Norway join the EC on our own terms, or that we remained outside. Not under any circumstances would British trawlers be given access between 6 and 12 miles.” In fact, in late June Norwegian officials spent an enormous amount of energy trying to persuade the British not to ask for too much, since “the Six might grant concessions to Norway as a small country which would be withheld if Britain started asking for the same things as well.”

The Norwegian diplomats also stressed the security policy implications. If Norway remained outside of the EC due to a bad deal on fisheries, Arild Holland told British officials, “in the long term there would be a drift towards Scandinavian neutrality and thus towards a situation in which the whole of Scandinavia would increasingly come under Soviet influence and later control.” “This was a real concern, which we accepted and felt ourselves”, O’Neill later maintained “and which had its effect on most members of the Community also, especially perhaps on the Germans”.

The British were indeed torn, and the British embassy in Bonn urged the government to fall into line with Chancellor Brandt, a close ally and friend of Norway, and look at the

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1305 UD 44.36/6.84 – 26.06.1971, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Norway-Britain/ the fishery zone.
situation “from the broad political point of view of West European unity and defensive strength.” Britain had tried to “beat the Scandinavians back from their twelve-mile limit”:

“The policy of the big stick has been tried and tried again in these fishery questions since the late 1940’s: and it has never worked against the Scandinavians. It would be against all experience if it worked now. But by trying it yet again (...) we might perhaps end up by keeping Norway out of the EEC.”

However, public concerns and political pressure about fisheries became so great by the spring of 1971 that the cabinet decided, late in May, to attempt an agreement before the continental holidays. The time factor, combined with the knowledge of the establishment line and the Norwegian government’s hardlining nudged the British towards finally settling on the ‘6+6’ proposal.

The proposal was presented at the deputies meeting June 1. Significantly, it incorporated elements of the Norwegian establishment line (for the inner 6 miles) with the objective of getting access to the outer six miles of the Norwegian fishery zone. As O’Neill would later admit, the British found the Europeans’ establishment-line “ingenious” and “quite a shrewd approach”, and thus “borrowed part of their concept for our own proposals of June 1971”. British officials could report an outburst by the Norwegian Foreign Minister. The British proposal, he was reported to say, ‘would in effect be working directly against Norwegian membership in of EEC’.

But the British were not the only ones concerned with Norway’s negotiation strategy: so were the Irish. In the spring of 1971, as fishery negotiations picked up speed, alarm bells sounded in Dublin: if Norway received special treatment from the Community, would Ireland get the same? In the words of historian Michael Geary, “Ireland’s position evolved from concerns over the equal access provision to include the question of equal treatment among the applicants. Irish negotiators decided to raise their demands even higher by adopting the main strand of Norway’s negotiations strategy.” Over the following months, the Irish pushed for similar concessions as the Norwegians. The Community was unwilling. This prompted Ireland to propose a new solution – the ‘status quo’ line – at a ministerial meeting with the

1309 FCO 30/1026 – 02.07.1971, Bonn – Minister (Economics) D. D. Brown - Dear Tom. Norway, Fishing Limits, the EEC and NATO. (To Tome Brimelow and John Robinson)
1311 The British informed the Norwegian, Danish and Irish Government very shortly before.
Community on June 7. The proposal aimed at maintaining the status quo of the European fishery regime – as agreed in the London Convention of 1964 – until a Community of ten could agree upon a suitable fishery regime to replace it. At a meeting of deputies, Sommerfelt had immediately responded that the Irish proposal was “totally unacceptable”.

The Danish government followed a slightly different course, seeking regional exemptions for the Faroe Islands and Greenland, something they made clear already in September of 1970. In the spring of 1971, they were frustrated to find out that the Community would link their demands to the Norwegian fishery memorandum. Danish negotiators, therefore, made it clear to the Community that “special arrangements regarding access to fishery zones given to other applicants would have to be applicable to Denmark too”.

Thus all three applicants had edged in on the Norwegian position: Britain and Ireland emulated different parts of the Norwegian proposal; and Denmark opposed it, but demanded the same ‘special arrangements’ as Norway should it succeed. If the EC were to engage with these proposals it would amount to a new legal order in the fishery sector and equal access as the Community understood it would cease to exist.

**Abandoning the CFP**

At a deputy meeting between the EC and Norway on June 8, the Norwegian delegation was informed that the Commission would study proposals from the applicants in order to propose a common solution to the Council of Ministers. The Commission’s task force, headed by Deniau and Mansholt, soon produced a preliminary proposal. The Commission maintained any compromise needed to accept the principles and objectives of the existing CFP, including an equal access provision. Still, the Commission proposed postponing the CFP for a ten-year period, which would be divided into five years of exclusive, and five years of conditional, six-mile limits, with 12 miles for certain areas throughout all ten years. Remarkably, the Commission offered these terms to the enlarged Community, including the Six, thus completely altering its own policy.

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1316 FCO 30/1025 – 09.06.1971, Brussels – Christofas – Norwegian enlargement negotiations. Meeting of Deputies: 8 June.
1320 UD 44.36/6.84–40 – 10.06.1971 – Neg. Secr. – Summary: Meeting of Deputies, EC-Norway, 08.06.1971.
1321 O’Neill *Britain’s Entry* (2000), p. 264. The UK delegation also urged the EC to put forward their proposals.
With the fundamental challenge of the CFP by applicants, France, with its own uncompetitive inshore fleet, saw an opportunity to renegotiate the terms of the CFP after the Germans and Dutch – with little fish of their own and large distant water fleets – had pressed for the all-inclusive and liberal version of equal access. The British ‘6+6’ proposal gave an opportunity to reintroduce some protective measures. As we recall, this was exactly the intention of the Norwegian establishment line: to lure the French into abandoning the CFP. We cannot conclude with certainty, but the Norwegian proposal might have been too one-sided to gain general acceptance in the Community, and Norway alone would possibly be too ‘light’ to bring about such substantial changes in a common policy. The ‘6+6’ proposal, a direct reaction to the Norwegian proposal, on the other hand, opened up such a possibility.

In June, France, as the first member state, asked for the derogations available under the existing CFP (exclusive 3-mile limits for 5 years) for parts of its waters. And in intra-Community discussions, French Permanent Representatives would maintain the position that derogations given to applicants should apply to all member states, until the other five gave way at a Council of Ministers meeting on September 21. With this, for the first time, the Community agreed to overturn one of its own existing policies.\(^{1322}\) As historian Morten Rasmussen argues, France’s changed position created a strange alliance between Britain, Ireland, Norway and France “that had intense interests in abandoning the acquis”. Moreover, this alliance was confronted by countries that “perhaps supported the original CFP but that eventually gave priority to the successful conclusion of the enlargement negotiations”.\(^{1323}\)

Initially, the Germans and Belgians reacted strongly against the proposal. As the German press bitterly claimed, the French wanted to ‘cash in twice’ by accepting the British proposal for an enlarged Community, without reopening the issue of the lucrative support mechanisms of the CFP.\(^{1324}\) But it was equally important to maintain the CFP as part of the acquis so as to remove the possibility for the four applicants to find special solutions in the fishery sector, which in turn would open the possibility to alter the CAP. Undermining the acquis meant undermining Community compromises that had been largely favourable to the French. In protecting the acquis they shared certain interests with the Commission. Before the CFP was settled, Deniau rejected Norwegian consultations on the grounds that widening could not come at the expense of deepening. The CFP was seen as the last piece of the CAP-


puzzle. Confronted with internal differences of opinion, and strong resistance from the four applicants, the Commission radically changed the CFP in order to save the last shreds of the *acquis* and therefore the possibility of it becoming a proper community policy again after the transitional period. Eventually the other five gave way.

In November, therefore, a revised version of the Commission’s June proposal was presented, which maintained a transitional period of five plus five years with equal access as the *finalité*. In addition, the Commission proposed a ‘special exception regime’ for ‘strictly limited geographical zones’. These areas were: Norway, north of Trondheim; the Faroe Islands and Greenland (Denmark); and the Orkneys and Shetland (Britain). At the end of the 10-year transitional period, the Commission would report to the Council of Ministers on the social and economic situation in the fishing regions and the state of the fish stock. If the report maintained that introducing equal access would produce unfavourable developments in certain regions, the Council would take appropriate measures. If not, equal access would be implemented. As O’Neill notes, the Community’s proposal “was based on the United Kingdom’s proposal of June 1971 for 6-mile fishery limits” and would prove to be “the basis on which, after much amendment, agreement was eventually reached.”

Before agreement was reached, however, the British and Norwegian position changed several times. Following the British ‘6+6’ proposal, the Norwegian government made it explicitly clear that a common solution for Norway and the UK was impossible. To be sure, the Norwegian government introduced a law that forbade all trawlers over a certain size access within the 12-mile limit. Minister of Commerce and Shipping Per Kleppe warned the British of this in May as a way to force them over to the ‘establishment’ line, and the law came into force on July 1 effectively excluding the entire British distant water fleet from Norwegian waters regardless of the equal access provisions.

With Norwegian waters out of reach, the British focus shifted. For a while it seemed that any course would either raise considerable domestic difficulties or bring Britain into direct conflict with the Norwegians. “In these circumstances”, Foreign Minister Alec Douglas-Home wrote, “the best course both from the point of view of our own domestic political problems and from the point of view of our relations with Norway seems to be to take up a position with

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the Community which cannot be called unreasonable by anyone, namely maintenance of the status quo pending reconsideration". The British had now adopted the Irish position.

As no good alternative was available, the British government tried to avoid further discussions on fisheries with the Community until the Parliament had voted for a ‘decision in principle’ at the end of October. By that time it had become abundantly clear that ‘status quo’ was unacceptable to the Norwegians, the French, the Commission, and the rest of the Community. The parliamentary vote had also revealed ‘rebel votes’ both on the Labour and Conservative side, which made parliamentary support less predictable. At this late stage, British negotiators realised that the principal interest lay in protecting inshore fishermen – whose votes weighed in the balance in many coastal constituencies – rather than in using the CFP to gain access to Norwegian waters.

With this last change of strategy, British and French views aligned: the aim was to accept the CFP in principle, but to get a special exception regime for as much of the coast line as possible, and to reduce the ‘automatism’ of the reintroduction to equal access. In other words, de facto scrapping of the CFP, while leaving the aura of the acquis intact. The British now started working with the French to reach a bilateral understanding on the matter. One of the major challenges was to get a ‘comparable’ deal to that of the Norwegians, without driving them from the negotiation table.

**Pressure**

The Community’s November proposal was, therefore, a de facto hollowing out of the CFP, but still received uniformly hostile reactions from the applicants for not going far enough. However, the British, Irish and Danish governments were ready to accept the regime in principle, while getting as much of the coastline as possible accepted under the special regime. The Norwegian government, on the other hand, still wanted a completely different regime. It flatly rejected the principle of equal access, any transitional measures and solutions dividing the coast. On what grounds they rejected it is also worth noting: the Norwegian delegation had replied that the establishment line put forward in May, which still, in their view, satisfied...

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1334 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0030 - Government Conference – 01.11.1971; UD 44.36/6.84–42 – Norwegian statement at the Ministerial Meeting on 09.11.1971 concerning the common fishery policies. However, they were generally satisfied with the market arrangements.
the requirement for non-discrimination as expressed in the Treaty of Rome. Due to the length of the coastline it would be impossible to control fishing in their waters unless the fleets involved were established in Norway. As late as November, then, the Europeans’ interpretation of the acquis lived on as the fundamental rationale behind Norway’s strategy.

The reason why the Europeans and the negotiators maintained the establishment line was quite peculiar. By late October, the MFA, MoCS and the MoF called for a change of strategy. “The negotiations with the EC would grind to a halt if one did not give new instructions to our negotiators”, Kleppe maintained in a government conference. The civil servants, including the Europeans, unanimously agreed that time was of the essence. “There will be no talk of changing the common fishery policy at this stage. One had to fall back on the declaration of September 22, 1970, giving Norway ‘special status’”. However, at this stage Minister of Fisheries Knut Hoem – who had initially fought the establishment line tooth and nail – wanted to maintain it because “tactically, both with regards to the negotiations in Brussels and considering domestic opinion, it would be unfortunate to make concessions from the Norwegian side before one could see the contours of a proposal that was acceptable”.

More substantially, Hoem feared the Community’s proposal would lock Norway to a 12-mile zone as it seemed Iceland, and therefore possibly Norway, would expand their zones to 50 miles. The negotiators were therefore instructed to stick to the original position, but to avoid a breakdown in the negotiations.

Both Britain and Norway had demanded some clarification of what would follow after the 10-year transition period. It was unacceptable that equal access would become the fundamental principle of the CFP after this. The British government, backed by a ‘decision in principle’ from the parliament back in October, could accept that the arrangements were ‘more than transitional’ but ‘not necessarily permanent’, thus avoiding openly defying the acquis, but the Norwegian government could not accept such ambiguity and needed something that looked unmistakeably permanent.

With everyone, except the Norwegian negotiators, ready to horse-trade their way towards a final agreement, Britain, together with the other applicants and the Community put serious pressure on the Norwegian government to change course: first, they had to recognise that the exceptions granted to them could not be explicitly permanent. Second,

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1338 UD 44.36/6.84 – 42 –10.11.1971, Brussels – Minutes of Moro’s statement, evening meeting, 09.11.
1339 FCO 30/1027 – Record of Meeting between the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Norwegian Ministers. Palais Charlemagne, Brussels, 09.11.1971, 17:30 hs.
the 12-mile limits could not be applied to the entire Norwegian coastline, as it would amount to a national exception and look disproportionately favourable when compared to the other applicants.

Before negotiations would resume in late November, British officials used every opportunity to drive home the message. O'Neill warned that if Norway was unable to resolve its problems by the end of the year, “the United Kingdom might be obliged to sign a Treaty with an escape clause allowing us to return to the question of fisheries.” And later in the month, Rippon warned that it was “no good asking for what we would never get”, it was a matter of making “an arrangement that was satisfactory in substance, and then leave the conference room looking happy and saying that we had won.” On the morning of November 29, Heath sent a personal letter to Bratteli, letting him know that if Norway did not show a “limited degree of flexibility and willingness” on the issues of permanency and the extent of the 12-mile zone, it would be left behind. In his view, the Six would concede the substance of what Norway wanted – but they could not give it an explicit legal form, as this would openly break with the acquis communautaire. Norway would be able to protect its fishing interests once it was a member, he claimed – it was a matter of political trust.

This was the fundamental problem, the government rightly feared that no such trust existed in political and electoral Norway – something visibly permanent was needed. The Norwegian position, therefore, remained unchanged at the next ministerial meeting with the Community. While the Norwegian delegation gave a slight opening on the issue of the extent of the 12-mile zone by stating that they accepted a solution that secured that “a sufficient area should be reserved for the fishermen of the coastal state”; they still maintained that “the arrangement should not be limited in time, and should apply as a general rule embodied in the structural regulation”. After studying the Community’s statement, the Norwegian delegation found that there was still “a substantial difference between your suggestions and what we need.” As Halvorsen reported after the meeting, Norway maintained its initial strategy: fishing within the national limit should be reserved for

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1341 FCO 30/1027 – Meeting between the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Norwegian, Danish and Irish Ministers: Brussels, 28.11.1971 at 22 30 hours.
1343 FCO 30/1027 – Record of Meeting between the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Norwegian Ministers. Palais Charlemagne, Brussels, 09.11.1971, 17:30 hs.
fishermen residing in the member state, and should not be based on coastal divisions. With this slight alteration, the negotiators had actually opened the door for a division of the coast and, following the ministerial meeting, Hoem gave way and agreed to a division of the coast on condition that the northern parts of Norway receive permanent exclusive fishing rights for the full twelve miles. Accordingly, the negotiation delegation received new instructions.

Next, trying to force the Norwegian position and gain concessions from the EC, Rippon put a counterproposal to the Community that demanded a special 12-mile exemption covering 95 percent of the British coast. By demanding the same ‘maximum’ special treatment as the Norwegians, it aimed to hollow out Norway’s ‘special status’. The Community, however, rejected the British proposal, and maintained that the final objective of the CFP was equal access to fishing grounds, without national discrimination.

The British delegation also fought for a new review clause asking that transitional arrangements continue unless and until the Council unanimously voted to alter them. This would amount to a *de facto* veto power for each member state. Five of the Six could go along with this, while the French resisted. When the UK and Community delegations met again on November 30, the Community – on the insistence of French Foreign Secretary M. Schumann – proposed the exact opposite: after 10-years the enlarged Community would have to unanimously agree for the *continuance* of transitional measures. At this point, Rippon lost his temper. Enraged by endless legal nit picking, he tried to put the fishery negotiations in ‘the right perspective’. First of all, negotiations would now have to take into account the ‘real’ situation, and not be bogged down by *communitarian* principles. Furthermore, he firmly reminded the Six that the CFP was not “part of the real *acquis communautaire*”. Everyone knew that it had been rushed through before the enlargement negotiations started. Its moral fibre was therefore weak.

Still, some progress was made. The UK demand for a single ten-year transitional period was adopted and the 12-mile exception was extended to coastal areas in Ireland and certain regions in Britain. Furthermore, as seen, the British had pressed hard for a reformulation of the review clause. Prior to the negotiations, Skarstein had told the British that the only change Norway would want to see made in the review formula was the omission of the words

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1346 UD 44.36/6.84-43 - 01.12.1971 - ND – Memo to members of the government. Negotiation situation.
1347 UD 44.36/6.84-43-01.12.1971, Oslo – ND – Memo for members of the government.
‘by qualified majority vote’. This was, in fact, what the British aimed at and the Commission informally agreed to omit these words. On November 30, the Community agreed that after December 31, 1982, the Council could by unanimity introduce ‘any measure’ to help inshore fishing after the transitional period. This concession implied that national fishing zones could be maintained. “I do not believe the Norwegians gave us much credit for all this”, Foreign Minister Douglas-Home remarked a few days later, and he was right, for no review clause was acceptable to the Norwegian government.

The other three applicants would wait no longer. After a surge of bilateral diplomacy between the French and the British in early December, a final agreement was reached between the EC and the three other applicants on the 12th. At such a late stage in the negotiations, the risk of endangering the entire enlargement ensured that the negotiating parties took the last steps necessary to find a middle ground and an acceptable level of ambiguity on the contentious issues. As domestic demands to get comparable treatment with Norway intensified, the British and Irish requests for a 12-mile special exception increased and the Community accepted. One third of the British coast (estimated to include 95 percent of the fish stock), and 70 percent of the Irish coast became part of the special exception regime. More interestingly, France – the most ardent defender of the equal access principle – also obtained exceptions for parts of its northwest coast. Acknowledging that access to fish rich waters would be minimal, the French, in negotiations with the British, insisted on re-establishing a 12-mile limit in the regions where inshore fishing was a major activity. The Community also softened the formulation of the applicability of equal access after the transition period – the enlarged Community would ‘examine’ what provisions ‘could’ be introduced after 10 years. Still, though modified, the equal access principle would remain a fundamental part of the CFP. Crucially, agreement between the ‘Nine’ was reached with the understanding that Norway would not obtain a substantially better agreement.

Cas special

The developments for the other three applicants, and the stalemate between Norway and the EC forced a new strategy. If a rapid solution was not found, Halvorsen wrote in mid-

1356 FCO 30/1504 – The Prime Minister’s meeting with Mr. Bratteli. EEC/Fisheries: Background. Annex A to brief No. 2; O’Neill Britain’s Entry (2000), p. 277. According to British reports the Irish, at their final meeting and with obvious reference to Norway, asked if they could presume that the review clause represented the Community’s final position, to which Moro replied ‘yes’. Hillary also made statements to this effect afterwards.
December, Norway might not conclude its negotiations together with the other applicants, and all momentum would be lost. This might lead the EC to treat Norway with a “take it or leave it” attitude.\textsuperscript{1357} Moreover, the other applicants would become part of the information and consultation procedure, which meant that the three applicants had a legal right to be heard on Norwegian fishery issues, giving them “much greater” influence on the final agreement.\textsuperscript{1358} To deter the British from opposing a Norwegian special solution, therefore, they were categorically informed that if Norway did not join the Community they would extend their fisheries limits to 50 miles (excluding British trawlers).\textsuperscript{1359}

The idea of treating Norway as a ‘cas special’ had been discussed several times. Already by June of 1971, Brandt suggested – upon the British proposal for multilateral talks – that Norway decline the British invitation and maintain its status as ‘cas special’.\textsuperscript{1360} The idea had never left the negotiation delegation entirely, but was difficult to combine with a strategy of changing the entire CFP. Either Norway was a major European fishery power, which sought to shape the Community in its image, or it was a peculiar case in need of special arrangements. In December, Sommerfelt revitalised these thoughts after a discussion with Brandt. Brandt had recently tried to convince Pompidou and Schumann that Norway needed assurances that the 12-mile zones would remain unchanged after 1982, and had even given the French two alternative texts in an effort to solve the problem. Brandt’s evaluation was that the French would not accept a general change in the common structural policy. Sommerfelt wrote home that the time had come to try for a status as ‘cas special’.\textsuperscript{1361}

Informal talks with several politicians and officials of the Community revealed that the majority recommended a special solution.\textsuperscript{1362} Halvorsen informed the Head of the European Commission delegation for negotiations on enlargement of the European Communities, Edmund Wellenstein, that the Norwegian government would want a special protocol added to the accession treaty recognising the particular Norwegian conditions.\textsuperscript{1363} It was expected that a special protocol would be hard to obtain both because it would be a \textit{de facto} circumvention of the \textit{acquis}, and because the other applicants might resist such a settlement.\textsuperscript{1364}

\textsuperscript{1357} UD 44.36/6.84–43 – 14.12.1971, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Norway – EC.
\textsuperscript{1360} UD 44.36/6.84–40 – 27.07.1971, Bonn – S. Chr. Sommerfelt – Conversation with Chancellor Brandt.
\textsuperscript{1361} UD 44.36/6.84–43 – 05.12.1971, Bonn – S. Chr. Sommerfelt – EC - Negotiations.
To secure support for the new approach, Kleppe suggested that the Prime Minister pay a visit to the most important EC countries and the UK. After discussing the matter with Wellenstein, Halvorsen reported that the idea was received positively. Following the many battles between Britain and Norway, it would be “psychologically favourable” to meet with Heath, as Norway’s ‘cas special’ rested on the goodwill of Britain and Ireland. Speaking to the Six, Halvorsen said the government made it clear that it did not owe the other applicants any equal treatment, and that Norwegian membership depended on a special solution. “In the current situation”, Halvorsen warned, “we may assume that the UK is working to obstruct our ‘cas special’.”

Bratteli, Cappelen, Hoem, MoF state secretary Sven Olsen and Per Martin Ølberg left for Rome on January 4 for a six-day tour of the Community and Britain to impress upon the political leaders the need for special fisheries arrangements in Norway in an enlarged Common Market. The tour, with stops in Rome, Paris, Brussels, Luxembourg and The Hague, would end in London with talks with Heath at Chequers. The aim of the trip was to acquire the necessary political commitments from the Ministers of the member states, for a drafted special protocol based on an oral statement made by Norwegian negotiators on December 12, which de facto recognised Norway’s lasting, i.e. permanent, problems. Such commitments would secure success at what everyone hoped would be the conclusive ministerial meeting set for January 10.

Details of the draft protocol were soon leaked. Community officials were unimpressed, British diplomats reported, as it was “an old text which the Norwegians had hawked round the Community before Christmas”. They had not been willing to accept it then and there was no reason to suppose that they would now. Deniau and the Commission maintained that they could not put in writing that “coastal fishing will remain a vital interest for Norway” as it went against the Community’s working methods and philosophy. In Paris, the French Foreign Minister told the Norwegian delegation that he could accept a protocol in which Norway was mentioned – but not with its current wording, which was identical to the clause presented before Christmas. President Pompidou repeated that no permanent exception would be accepted both for principal reasons and because it could

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1370 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0031 - Government Conference – 08.01.1972.
1371 UD 44.36/6.84–45 – 06.01.1972, Paris – Prime Minister’s tour. Conversation with Schumann.
jeopardise the agreement that was already reached with the other three applicants. The government had not received the political commitment it needed.

The last stop was London. The British were not opposed to the Community treating Norway generously with regard to the 12-mile limits. The sticking point was the review clause: if Norway were to get a guarantee of special treatment after 1982, already strongly criticised in the British Parliament, the British review clause “would undoubtedly appear to have been devalued”. A preparatory memo for the Heath-Bratteli talks stated, “[c]onsiderable doubt will inevitably be thrown on the government’s case if the Norwegians clearly obtained better arrangements than we got”. Though the British Fisheries Department resisted, the FCO considered, as a last resort, “to avoid the UK being held responsible for Norwegian exclusion from the Community”, the government should be prepared to accept arrangements for Norway which gave her a special position after 1982. Accordingly, Heath told Bratteli that Britain was prepared to go a long way, but urged the Norwegian negotiators to avoid any statements implying that the British deal did not give a satisfactory guarantee, for it had 30 constituencies along the coast, mostly Conservative, ready to go against the government’s recommendation.

The dying hours

In the ECFA discussions the day before the tour, the majority had emphasised that though the protocol was provocatively worded, it should not come across as an ultimatum to the Community. In light of this, and the reactions from the Six (especially in Paris) and the British, the negotiation delegation formulated a new protocol. On Bratteli’s suggestion, the majority of the cabinet authorised the negotiation delegation to formulate the final protocol as long as the ‘reality’ of what it obtained was the same. Hoem, however, could only accept a legal guarantee. The delegation, therefore, continued its preparations fully aware that the government might split on whatever decision was reached.

At the ministerial meeting on January 10-11 between Norway and the Community, the Norwegians sent an extremely powerful negotiating team and were met by a somewhat feeble delegation, headed by land-locked Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Gaston Thorn. “The imbalance between the two sides could hardly have been greater”, Wise contends, “and, one

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1372 UD 44.36/6.84–45 – 07.01.1972 – Conversation with President Pompidou – Summary.
1373 FCO 30/1504 – 07.01.1972, Brussels – EEC: Visits by Norwegian Prime Minister.
1374 FCO 30/1504 – The Prime Minister’s meeting with Mr. Bratteli. EEC/Fisheries: Background.
1375 UD 44.36/6.84–45 – 10.01.1972 – Brussels – Conversation with Prime Minister Heath, 09.01.1972.
1376 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0031 - Government Conference – 08.01.1972.
suspects, more deliberate.” The Norwegian delegation continued to insist on their special interests being recognised in a protocol stating that the Norwegian fishing zones would continue after the ten-year transition period. The Community only agreed to a protocol that granted Norway the most positive interpretation of the existing agreement between the Nine. Deniau was the middleman, running between the two delegations with proposals. Though the parties moved closer, in the morning hours Thorn regretfully announced that no agreement had been found on the division of the coast or the issue of what would happen after the ten-year transition.

The following day, both Sommerfelt and Halvorsen stated that they “deplored that the Norwegian delegation could not go any further on the basis of the Community’s proposal”. Upon hearing this, Hoem argued that he had agreed to the ‘cas special’ on insufficient grounds and that the Norwegian Fisherman’s Organisation (Norges Fiskarlag, NFO) was against it. “To relinquish exclusive rights to one of Norway’s largest natural riches would mean that we would have to share it with all the major industrial states of Europe.” Hoem found it impossible to go further than the last Norwegian proposal. This was a “fateful decision which could not be made by a singular sector”, Bratteli warned. And Cappelen added that, in reality, domestic support for the negotiation result now depended on Hoem’s reaction. The following day, after receiving a démarche from the French saying that they would go no further, Sommerfelt strongly recommended, “that we now focus on formulating something within the framework of the Community’s proposal, which amounts to a political declaration of intent”. In a CIEC meeting that same day, NCTU chairman Aspengren suggested that this protocol be supplemented with a unilateral statement clarifying the Norwegian reading of the protocol. Again Hoem objected, and again the government chose to continue, not knowing what his reaction would be if the negotiators reached an agreement. Prior to the decisive deputy meeting, Sommerfelt was given the proposed unilateral Norwegian statement for comments. Sommerfelt thought it was too provocative. In fact, the negotiation delegation recommended not giving a unilateral declaration, and Bratteli agreed. However, the government as a collective had written the recommendation, and Bratteli clearly hoped that it would bind Hoem to a possible solution. Hoem, however, did not want his name attached to the Community’s proposed revision clause, and wanted to know how he should formulate a

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1378 UD 44.36/6.84-46 - 11.01.1972 - Memo. Summary: Ministerial meeting, Norway - EC, Brussels, 10.01.1972.
dissent in ECFA. Solving this Gordian knot, Halvorsen drafted his own version of the declaration, which after minor changes was approved by the government.1379

From the outset, therefore, it was clear that the agreement between the EC and the other three applicants would apply to Norway as well. What remained was settling where the Norwegian 12-mile special exception zone would begin. In the end, it was agreed that it would stretch from the Soviet border in the north to Egersund in the south, which was halfway between the Norwegian proposal of Lindesnes (the southern most point of Norway) and the Community’s proposal of Stavanger, made a few days earlier. Second, an agreement had to be reached regarding the wording of the special protocol. In exchange for Norway’s acceptance of the equal access principle, the EC recognised “the very great importance that fishing represents for Norway” and agreed to “take special account (...) of the problems faced by Norway in the fisheries field”. “[T]hese provisions could include, among other measures, a prolongation beyond 31 December 1982 of the exception regime to an appropriate degree and according to rules to be determined.”1380 To make it abundantly clear for the domestic audience, the Norwegian government added its unilateral declaration, based on Halvorsen’s proposal, stating that “[t]he Community has just given to Norway the solemn assurance that it will take special account of the Norwegian inshore fishing industry after 1982. My Government considers this to be a real guarantee.”1381

The meeting dragged on into the early hours of January 15, with Wellenstein scurrying between the two delegations with new formulations. Eivinn Berg recalled the late winter weather, the Norwegian delegation keeping warm over a primus in the Charlemagne building, taking turns sleeping on folding beds. They were in direct telephone contact with Bratteli, Kleppe and Cappelen at Cappelen’s home. Berg called on the ministers close to midnight with the proposed solution.1382 After long consultations – with his state secretary, Bratteli, Cappelen and Kleppe – Hoem said that he “did not oppose” concluding the negotiations, but that he “could not accept the solution found on the fisheries question”. The authorisation was given to the delegation to conclude the negotiations, as no other option existed.1383

The government was now ready to approve the negotiation result and sign the treaty of accession. Hoem, as the rest of the ministers suspected, would not go along with this. On

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1380 UD 44.36/6.84–46 – Protocol for the Norwegian fisheries adopted at the meeting of deputies between the EC and Norway, 14-15.01.1972.
1381 UD 44.36/6.84–46 – Summary of meeting of deputies, Norway-EC, 14.-15.01.1972.
January 17, after the NFO had rejected the agreement on fisheries, Hoem decided not to recommend the negotiation result. At the end of the Labour Party National Delegate’s Meeting, which overwhelmingly approved the negotiation result, Hoem handed Bratteli a letter recognising the approval and the repercussions this had for his position. Sustained pressure from the other ministers did not change his mind, and Hoem left the government just days before Bratteli flew to Brussels to sign the Treaty of Accession on January 22, 1972.1384

**Concluding remarks**

Though in highly distributive negotiations, states may seem to act like solid billiard balls bumping each other into position, we can see by studying the fisheries negotiations from the vantage point of the Europeans, their ideas and practices, that this is not the case. The establishment line was born out of communitarian notions of the Europeans in the early 1960s. Picking up ideas from the Six and the other applicants, the Europeans believed Norway could change Community policies. Norway was Western Europe’s biggest fishery power, and until late 1971, the government and the Europeans thought an enlarged EC had much to learn from Norway.

Through a strange transfer of ideas, and hard multilateral bargaining, the Europeans did in fact change the CFP, though not the way they had anticipated: the multilateral flip of the other applicants in reaction to the combined establishment line and special status of Norway led to the Community’s abandonment of the CFP. The British borrowed part of the concepts from the establishment line in their own counterproposal (6+6), which survived in modified form as paragraph 1 of article 100 in the treaty of accession for the other three applicants, which allowed each “to restrict fishing in waters under their sovereignty or jurisdiction” within the six-mile and special 12-mile limits until December 31, 1982.

Two unique aspects may be discerned from the way the Europeans worked with the fishery issue: what we should understand from the Europeans’ interpretation; Stray’s reluctant acceptance; the French strategic use; the Commission’s defence; and Rippon’s heated late-November attack on the moral fibre of the acquis communautaire, is that its legal, political and moral layers were performed in concrete settings and that its different meanings varied greatly.1385 As seen, mastering the use of the acquis was in fact crucial for the outcome of the fisheries negotiations. Second, the Europeans’ use of administrative power and conceptual ingenuity to create Norwegian European policy, interchangeably defending and shaping it in

domestic and international arenas, testified to how important their boundary-spanning capacities were, and how they were inseparable from their personal commitment and agency. None of this, however, would help in the public information campaign they involved themselves in prior to the referendum.
Chapter 12

Information campaigns

"I hope and believe that you are not bitter, but remain firm in your conviction that what you strove for was for the best of the country. And if you want to continue the fight, and think that I can contribute, you should know that I am prepared."

Personal letter from Søren Chr. Sommerfelt to Trygve Bratteli, 28.09.1972.

Norway’s relationship with the EC would be decided *de facto* by a consultative, popular referendum in which the electorate would simply choose ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in regard to the membership issue. From the signing of the Treaty of Accession in January 1972, therefore, a divisive, bitter and unusually heated political struggle between the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ sides began in earnest. Political parties collapsed and split (the Liberal Party), governments left office (Bratteli’s government) and even families were divided right down the middle. The events of ‘1972’ revealed tensions between urban and rural areas, between the centre and periphery, and between the ‘elite’ and ‘grassroots’. The peripheral forces coalesced with the countercultures represented by ‘1968’, the rise of the new left, and the generational revolt against the postwar order. ‘1972’ was a political and cultural earthquake with long-lasting aftershocks. The battle culminated in the referendum of September 25, 1972 in which 46.5 percent voted for membership and 53.5 percent voted against membership.

There is no comprehensive, archive-based historical study of the composition, coordination and actions of the different pro-European campaigns. Since they failed, the various yes-campaigns have been written off as toothless, weak or disorganised. Compared to the resources the ‘yes’-side had at their disposal, this is essentially true. However, in disregarding the coordination, ideas and resources that did go into the pro-European campaigns, one misses important aspects of the political discourse in general. This chapter will therefore start by retracing the fleeting and frail, formal and informal, coalitions, organisations

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1387 Interview – Gro Dragland – 25.07.2013. The most prominent example would be Vesla Vetlesen who worked as a journalist for the European Movement and her brother-in-law Ragnar Kalheim who became deputy chairman of the People’s Movement Against Membership in the EEC.
1388 There are some archive-based historical studies that focus on particular parts of the pro-European campaign: Nyhamar *Nye utfordringer* (1990); Arve Husbø *J-A til EF-aksjonen*, Unpubl. Master thesis, Trondheim: Historisk Institutt, Universitet i Trondheim (1988). A comprehensive study of pro-European forces, though not the campaigns in particular, which includes reflections on the ‘Europa-Experten’, is: Allers *Besondere Beziehungen* (2009), pp. 143-175.
1390 Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ottar Hellevik *Kampen om EF*, Oslo: PAX forlag (1977) gives a thorough analysis of the unequal distribution of resources during the EC-struggle. Both social scientists and the book written in 1977, it lacks sources, and analyses the end result rather than the processes leading up to the referendum.
and networks that campaigned in favour of membership, and discuss the various roles the Europeans played in these pro-European efforts. It will first explore the Europeans’ role in extra-governmental information efforts, before turning to the official information campaign of the government. As will become clear, distinctions between the two became blurred, and among the most important reasons for this erasure of borders was the many roles played by the Europeans, among which two were of particular importance: that of the boundary-spanning facilitators operating as the strings holding together different pro-European nodes, and that of experts and public educators who gave the public official, authoritative versions of the facts. The two roles were incompatible with each other, and broke established civil servant norms. The Europeans’ participation in the different campaigns spurred massive critiques from the ‘no’ side, which brought their practices, developed over a decade, to the fore.

Scattered beginnings

Following The Hague Summit, the issue of information campaigns and pro-European organisations reappeared on the political agenda. In January 1970, Ølberg and the NSA discussed the need for an organised effort. The occasion was a rather unfortunate statement to the press made by the Federation of Norwegian Industries (FNI). Ølberg complained that such solo-efforts were counterproductive. As a response, the NSA started to feel out different business organisations with the hopes of setting up an informal working group.1391 Some months later, on the initiative of the FNI, five big business organisations1392 agreed to set up a committee and pool resources for a budget of 500,000 NOK to stimulate the creation of an information organisation.1393

At about the same time, the EMN contacted the NSA to avoid “jumping into the debate as unprepared as we were in 1962”. They, too, felt that efforts should be coordinated. The EMN suggested a broad range of initiatives that they could organise. The main focus would be to “facilitate material for other organisations to use in their work for a Norwegian membership in the EEC.” Among other things, they aimed to distribute a series of booklets, (also the one produced by Skaug in connection with the Nordek negotiations) and arrange a series of correspondence courses in which, among others, Ølberg would contribute.1394 The EMN’s Working Committee would organise and decide on major activities. Between 1970

1392 NEC, NSA, FNI, NBA, ANIC.
1394 RA/PA/0992/A/As/L0011 – Summary working committee, 04.02.1970, at parliamentarian Svenn Stray’s office; NSA–7B–30 – Regarding the information work about the EEC. Skaug contributed with the booklet ”Norden og EEC”, and Ølberg with the courses ”Norges plass i Europa” and ”Økonomiske virkninger”.

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and 1972, Lange (until his death in May of 1970), Stray, Roem Nielsen, Haakon Lie and, significantly, Tim Greve were its most active members. As early as April 1970, the Working Committee decided that Haakon Lie would act as ‘campaign manager’ and head the information efforts of the EMN, and that Rolf Roem Nielsen would head the financial side of this campaign, functioning as the contact point between the five business organisations and the EMN. As Lie said, the EMN would prepare a campaign and “should the official course be in danger, the European Movement must be ready to counteract.”

Apart from the fact that negotiations proper started with the Ministerial meeting between the EC and Norway on September 22, several other events seemed to have spurred a more vigorous effort among the pro-Europeans. The combination of the establishment of the ‘People’s Movement against Membership in the EEC (People’s Movement, PM) in August, growing polarisation in the Norwegian public, and increasing tensions within the government that hindered it from coming out with authoritative statements in favour of membership created an unpredictable situation. In addition, the Labour Party had chosen an internal campaign directed against its own party members.

The Europeans grew restless. At an Ambassador’s meeting in late August several Europeans warned against these developments. Ambassador Skaug complained that the Norwegian press and the ‘no’-side were spreading misleading and demagogic information. Ambassadors Halvorsen and Rogstad thought public polarisation resulted from constant discussions over nitty-gritty economic issues regarding tariffs, fisheries and agriculture. There was an urgent need for seeing the bigger political picture. Rogstad also thought that the government needed to provide factual information to the country’s youth organisations.

The government was utterly divided. While Stray was contemplating becoming the chairman of the EMN, Borten and EC-sceptics within the coalition successfully cut the EMN’s annual financial support. Opportunity came when the PM applied for state funding (500 000 NOK) for a broad information campaign. The Prime Minister argued that the government already supported extra-parliamentary organisations: the EMN received funds via the MFA’s budget, and the PM could claim precedence. If the government rejected the

1395 RA/PA – 0992, Europabevegelsen – A/As – L0011. 
1397 RA/PA/0992/A/As/L0011 – Summary: joint meeting of the EMN’s working committee and the board of the EMN’s parliamentary group, 16.04.1970. The business organisations supported the idea of letting the EMN head the information campaign, rather than setting up a special business organisation. NSA–7B–31 – 03.06.1970, Oslo – Memo for Director Malterud. Norwegian affiliation with the EEC. Meeting in the FNI, 04.06. 
1398 UD 44.36/6.84 A.–3 – The debate following the Minister’s account at the meeting of envoys, 24.08.1970. 
1399 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 04.091970, Oslo – A. Haugestad – Application for state funding for information efforts regarding the Common Market.
PM’s application, Borten argued, then it should also stop funding the EMN.\textsuperscript{1400} This view found support, and the government’s majority decided to deny the PM’s application and to stop funding the EMN. At the end of the meeting, MFA state secretary Colding noted that Stray, who was not present at the conference, would have preferred ongoing support for the EMN.\textsuperscript{1401}

The MFA had strongly argued against supporting the People’s Movement financially, comparing it to the Campaign ‘Norway out of NATO’ of 1968.\textsuperscript{1402} Furthermore, it held, the European Movement worked in favour of European co-operation on democratic grounds – not Norwegian membership in the EC explicitly. Accordingly, the EMN could not be considered as the antitheses to the PM.\textsuperscript{1403} Following the government’s decision, Holland bitterly wrote that the European Movement, after all, was spreading information about an issue that the government and parliament supported: “[d]oubt will arise whether our negotiations are meant seriously”.\textsuperscript{1404} The growing frustration among the Europeans and within the MFA leadership drove them to seek co-ordinated information efforts. In November of 1970, Greve, Holland and Ølberg met informally with Rolf Roem Nielsen (EMN, FNI) and Asbjørn Larsen (NSA) to discuss the matter. They were alarmed by the PM’s vigorous activities. The FNI, together with the Norwegian Export Council (where ambassador Gunnar Rogstad became director in 1971), wanted to set up a broadly based counter-organisation to the People’s Movement. Holland immediately supported the idea, while Greve and Ølberg were a bit more sceptical. They feared, quite rightly, that a ‘broad’ organisation established by business organisations would lose the support of the Labour Movement. Instead, they argued in favour of a broad campaign headed by the European Movement, to prevent a ‘big business’ image.\textsuperscript{1405}

However, the EMN had been without a chairman since May of 1970, when Halvard Lange passed away. By December, the EMN was still looking for a new chairman – preferably a unifying character from the Labour Party as most of the undecided voters were found here.\textsuperscript{1406} Rolf Roem Nielsen and Haakon Lie, the EMN’s most active members, did not have a broad enough appeal: the former because of his business profile, the latter because it “would

\textsuperscript{1402} UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 10.09.1970, Oslo – Memo to members of cabinet. Application for state funding for information efforts regarding the Common Market; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 17.09.1970, Oslo – A. Holland – Memo. Application for state funding for information efforts regarding the Common Market.
\textsuperscript{1404} UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 17.09.1970, Oslo – A. Holland – Memo. Application for state funding for information efforts regarding the Common Market.
\textsuperscript{1406} RA/PA–0992/A/As – L0011 – Summary: Board meeting, 05.11.1970.
seem very provocative for the younger generations”. The EMN was desperately looking for a uniting figure – a respected politician or a scientist – only to discover that “most of the people [they were] interested in [were] against the EEC”. In the end, therefore, the EMN ended up with dark blue conservative Svenn Stray as chairman, after he stepped down as Foreign Minister. The triumvirate of Stray, Roem Nielsen and Lie gave the EMN the exact opposite profile of what it had sought, and made it difficult for the EMN to uphold an image of a broad, and not too polemic, organisation. For instance, the EMN enjoyed the support of 120 out of 150 parliamentarians, through a parliamentary group (est. 1949) headed by Knut Frydenlund since December of 1969. Heading up a tough propaganda campaign with a new and provocative leadership could erode such broad support. Equally, the Labour Movement now found it difficult to be closely affiliated with the EMN, and increasingly distanced itself from the organisation.

Rather than a broad effort fronted by the EMN, therefore, a so-called ‘knife-throwing’ organisation (an organisation that could do targeted propaganda) had to be established outside the EMN. Politicians from all parties, and other respected personalities, were to head this organisation. This did not mean that the EMN would stop campaigning – it would continue with broad, objective educational campaigns, while the ‘knife-throwing organisation’s purpose was to challenge the PM. Much of the overall planning would continue to take place between the MFA, the business organisations, and the EMN.

While plans for pro-European information campaigns were taking shape, they were still rather uncoordinated. There was a “propaganda-void”, one NSA representative complained, due to the government’s lacking commitment and because the EMN “for the most part have chosen to ‘lay low’ until the negotiation result is clear”. The EMN could never, as Haakon Lie noted, become a nationwide campaign organisation because it would reveal itself as predominantly bourgeoisie. The business organisations were organising and funding, but could not force political events. Among the few that held the different plans together were the Europeans. This they did with the unspoken support of the political leadership of the MFA,

1408 RA/PA-0992/A/Aa/L0008/0006 – 24.04.1969, Oslo – E. M. Bull – Appeal. Peder P. Næsheim (Labour) and Erling Petersen (Conservative) were appointed the chairman and vice-chairman of the parliamentary group; RA/PA-0992/A/Aa/L0008/0006 – 02.01.1970, Oslo – T. Gabrielsen – Summary from board meeting of the EMN’s parliamentary group, 12.12.1919.
1410 NSA–7B–32 – 19.02.1971, Oslo – Memo. CY’s EEC information campaign. The CY, with the support of the mother party, were the only ones actively campaigning at this point. Party leader Kåre Willoch warned that the government’s ‘wait and see’-line was too risky, and that an active information campaign was urgently needed.
1411 NSA–7B–33 – 19.04.1971 – Norway’s relationship with the EC. The role of the business organisations.
though not the entire government. Before the change of government, the *Europeans* mostly worked to bring people and organisations together. They could do little else than keep the conversation going, as there was no agreement within the government as to how and if a broad pro-European campaign should be established. Meanwhile, another important challenge was the internal Labour Party’s opposition to membership, which intensified when Bratteli took office in March of 1971. Here, too, the *Europeans* played an important role.

**The family feud – the Labour Movement**

The chief designers behind the Labour Movement’s information campaigns for membership in the EC were Minister Per Kleppe, parliamentarian Knut Frydenlund, party secretary Ronald Bye, international secretary to NCTU and, from March 1971, state secretary of the MFA Thorvald Stoltenberg and Foreign Minister Andreas Cappelen. The division of labour was clear: Kleppe was the ideological mastermind, Frydenlund and Stoltenberg took care of foreign and security policy issues and some of the strategy. Bye had much of the organisational, and some of the strategic, responsibility. No one had a bigger apparatus and more members than the NCTU and the Labour Party. Their campaign was, however, constrained by two aspects: the Labour Movement’s long tradition of not co-operating across party lines and second, the crippling effect of the organised opposition to membership within their own rank and file. For the Labour Movement, the EC-struggle was the climax of a festering family feud.

Most of the leading figures of the Labour Movement’s information campaign (Frydenlund, Stoltenberg, Cappelen and even Kleppe) had strong connections with the MFA. Frydenlund and Stoltenberg were diplomats-turned-politicians, and Frydenlund one of the early *Europeans*. By 1970, Frydenlund was one of the Labour Party’s most respected foreign policy experts, and was, among other things, vice chairman in the SCFA. Moreover, the Labour Movement campaign intertwined with the government’s ‘YES to the EC’ (from 1972 onwards) and the EMN-campaigns. *Europeans* worked within, and between, all of these units.

The first challenge for the Labour Movement was to articulate a positive socialist argumentation in favour of membership. As we recall, from the mid-1960s, Per Kleppe, among others, had been instrumental in developing the idea of a ‘social democratic Europe’. One of the core ideas was that foreign policy was to be understood as an extension of domestic politics – there were no ‘objective’ national interests on the international scene, only political

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1413 He was also delegate to the NATO parliamentary assembly (1969); delegate to CoE parliamentary assembly (1970-73) and member (1967) and then chairman of the Labour Party’s international committee (1967-73).
and ideological battles as everywhere else. Foreign politics should also be shaped by party ideologies, and formulated across borders to shape the international society to their liking.1414 During the whole of 1970, in anticipation of the EC-campaigns to come, Kleppe researched how a ‘social democratic Europe’ would work in practice, and how it could possibly overcome the defensive Norwegian attitude towards the EC.1415 For his visits to Brussels, Ambassador Halvorsen had lined up an impressive list of people, and Kleppe developed and ‘tested’ his social democratic vision in conversations with socialists and social democrats within the Commission.1416 Kleppe also spoke several times with John Lambert, editor of Agenor (a transnational socialist group based in Brussels).1417 Lambert was about to “set out a coherent programme for an alternative Europe to the one which is developing in and around the Communities”, and was, together with Frydenlund, planning to introduce Agenor to Norway.1418 Lambert was an old and personal friend of Knut Frydenlund, and they had arranged many transnational social democratic events together through the MFA and the EMN.1419

In December of 1970, Kleppe launched the ‘socialist European-programme’ through the party press, with off-set in the Labour Party’s working programme for 1970-73 that explicitly stated that the Party initiate co-operation with social democratic parties in Western Europe to develop a European-programme. The EC of today, Kleppe claimed, was “bureaucratic and single-minded in its drive to transfer national authority to supranational organs”. What was needed was a strong European Parliament, elected by the peoples of Europe, and a platform from which social democratic forces could work together. To counter criticism from within the party that the EC was conservative and capitalist, Kleppe’s responded, “to realise democratic socialism in Norway alone is the most utopian thought of

1415 Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), p. 156.
1418 AA – D/A/079/3/5/L0044 – 09.03.1970, Brussels – J. Lambert – Agenor. European Review. Agenor was first a transnational European magazine and then socialist political group aiming to change the EC with its roots in the College of Europe, Bruges, and deeply influenced “the ideas of 1968”. Agenor no. 50 (1975), p. 5.
This became part of the ideological foundation of the information campaign. At the same time, developments on the ‘no’ side alarmed the Labour leadership. As noted above, the PM and its professional committee became a hotbed for trade unionists and the Workers’ Youth League (WYL), and legitimised resistance against the official line of the Labour Movement. In 1970, prospects of such developments made the NCTU and the Labour Party to take a more active role, and a broad internal information campaign was planned for the autumn. In October, the NCTU and Labour Party established a co-operation committee. Its composition aggravated EC-sceptics: Ronald Bye (leader), Bjartmar Gjerde, Knut Frydenlund, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Per Kleppe, Olav Brunvand and Knut Ribu were all known as pro-Europeans. Negative reactions, especially from the WYL, forced the leadership to restructure to include some EC-sceptics and rename it in January of 1971. However, the new Working Committee on Market Issues (WCMI) – as it was renamed – was still dominated by Kleppe, Frydenlund, Stoltenberg and Bye.

The campaign, until the Labour Party’s national convention in May of 1971, consisted of three phases. First, information material would be planned and prepared until January of 1971. Leading officials would be registered across the country, creating a list of a thousand speakers, and potential audiences were to be targeted. The second phase involved 17 large regional conferences, 31 educational lectures and 68 local information courses. In phase three, “the members shall be informed on a broad basis” stimulating meetings in “the trade unions the local party divisions, in the lunch rooms at the workplaces”. The message was that “only through planned and organised co-operation between the progressive forces of an enlarged European Community, will it be possible to realise a future Europe shaped by democratic socialist principles.” Stoltenberg, Frydenlund and Kleppe wrote most of the

1420 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0004 – P. Kleppe – Arbeiderbladet “Et sosialistisk Europaprogram”.
1422 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf–4 – 02.02.1971 – Kristelig Dagblad – “Der er liv i EEC-debatten”. Thorvald Stoltenberg, it wrote, was “the man behind the practical development of the NCTU’s EEC-campaign”.
1427 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0004 – Date Unknown (Late 1970?) – T. Stoltenberg – No title.
speeches, lectures, Q&A-booklets and brochures for officials. One of the reasons why the Labour Movement did not co-operate with other pro-European organisations was this elaborate plan, which was aimed inwards and geared towards securing majorities within the Party and NCTU. Party secretary Bye would later call this “organisational self-annihilation”, with an “‘embarrassing’ weight put on abiding by ordinary, legal, organisational forms”. They absolutely did not want to legalise participation in cross-party and extra-parliamentary organisations.

The other side of this strategy, followed at least from December 1970 onwards, was to ‘wait and see’ until the negotiation result was clear, before committing to a Norwegian membership in the EC. Kleppe was the architect of the ‘wait and see’ strategy. Prime Minister Bratteli supported it because it resonated with his meticulous nature and wish for a correct procedure. It became official policy at the May 1971 national convention of the Labour Party, when a proposal by Kleppe to postpone a final decision until the negotiation result was clear and all sides of the market issue had been discussed through a broad, democratic procedure in all party organs, and were adopted. Clearly, there was a genuine belief in the persuasive powers of the ‘Social Democratic vision’, but there were also tactical considerations: they hoped the ‘no’ side would run out of steam and that the negotiation result would convince the undecided.

Things changed dramatically during the spring. The Labour Party formed a government in March of 1971, and in May it secured a comfortable majority in favour of continuing negotiations for membership at the national convention. This coincided with a breakthrough in the negotiations between Britain and the EC. In the autumn of 1971 these factors were joined by polls showing a clear majority against membership in the EC – especially within the trade unions. The information efforts grew in size and intensity. As a result, the ‘broad democratic procedure’ gave way for a blatantly pro-European campaign.

Knut Frydenlund’s strategic memo, which Bye sent to Bratteli with the recommendation that it should “be the foundation of the Party and the Movement’s political and organisational

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1433 212 voted in favour of continued membership negotiations, and 71 voted in favour of negotiating for Nordic economic co-operation.
scheme”, was instrumental in this reorientation. Until the negotiation result was clear, the government should actively prevent people from making a decision, Frydenlund suggested, while also tearing down the anti-membership argumentation. The government had to use the ‘wait and see’-period to undermine the claims made by the ‘no’ side “so thoroughly, and repeatedly, that people will start to distrust the material the People’s Movement have distributed. Members of Cabinet must play a central part in this process”.1436 From when the negotiation results were in until the Labour Party and NCTU congress in the spring of 1972, the focus would have to be to secure a majority at the two congresses in favour of membership.1437 The information campaign had to be aimed at those within the Labour Movement that opposed the EC for ideological reasons. The goal was to convince them that membership was not “a capitulation to capitalism”.1438

The decisive phase, lasting until the referendum, was based on three main themes: Security, trust and continuity.1439 ‘Security’ was tied to the issue of employment and growth, particularly the NCTU’s argument that was built on the premise that membership in the EC would secure full employment and continued growth.1440 ‘Trust’ in this context meant loyalty to the Labour Party. The aim was to tip the undecided voters to the ‘yes’ side out of sheer devotion to the party. In the last stages of the campaign, for instance, party secretary Ronald Bye launched the slogan ‘A Labour-voter is a Yes-voter’ to drive this message through.1441

Frydenlund’s third theme – continuity – was the product of the Europeans. To not join would be a radical break with the course Norway had followed since the Second World War. To join would be “a continuation of the co-operation of which we have been a part of until now”. The aim was to “mow down the resistance to its hard core of 10-12 percent” and to “break up the alliance between anti-NATO-people and (...) fishermen and farmers”.1442 Though the campaign avoided bringing up security issues and NATO-membership explicitly, this was clearly what Frydenlund had in mind. This aspect of the Labour Movement’s campaign was a direct descendent of the strategy created by Arne Langeland and Jahn

1437 Bergh Kollektiv Fornuft (2009), p. 108. The NCTU were quick (January 25) to announce that the negotiation result was ‘acceptable’, and that all of its members should support it.
1441 Bye Sersjanten (1987), p. 137; Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 187. Bye explains that the campaign was based on his interpretation of the Labour Party Congress decision. In hindsight, both Bye and Nyhamar thought the campaign was psychologically unwise. Nyhamar claims it worked against its intentions.
Halvorsen in the early 1960s, interpreting membership as a continuation of the Atlantic profile of Norwegian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{1443}

This was important, as Bye warned in June 1972, because “we are also attacked from within. Behind the Labour Movement segment of the organised EC-resistance, Bye saw “a core that has, throughout the years since the war, had been in opposition to Norwegian security and foreign policy, those who zealously fought NATO and Norway’s connection with the Western world.”\textsuperscript{1444} Many of the leading figures on the right wing saw the Labour Party anti-membership faction as part of an organised power grab by an alliance of young and old left-wingers. This was why Gerhardsen’s legitimisation of the party’s ‘no’ side at the extraordinary national convention in April 1972 was particularly aggravating. Bye could do little but remind the audience that he expected that no one actively hindered the realisation of the government and party’s official line of membership.\textsuperscript{1445}

The political leadership had expected the negotiation results of January 1972 to bring about a major shift in public opinion. The shift that did occur, from 19 to 33 percent in favour of membership from December 1971 to January 1972, but it was not marked enough. Moreover, from January to March the percentage in favour actually dropped to 29 percent, while those against had only declined from 50 to 43 percent from December to March. The undecided made up 31 percent in December and 28 percent in March.\textsuperscript{1446} As most of the undecided voters were Labour Party voters, they would determine the outcome of the referendum.\textsuperscript{1447} This situation worried many within the party and government, especially the political leadership of the MFA, and lay at the heart of the decision to create the ‘YES to the EC’ campaign (YTE).

The creation of the ‘Yes to the EC’-campaign

YTE held its first press conference in late February when chairman Reidar Carlsen casually announced, “we were some people that had the feeling that we should come together”.\textsuperscript{1448} It operated from March 1972 until the referendum in September 1972 – setting up some 1450

\textsuperscript{1443} AA/Dc/A/044/6/7/L0005 – 02.02.1972, Oslo – R. Bye – Plans for the discussion of the EC-case in the Labour Movement; Bergh \textit{Kollektive Fornuft} (2009), p. 106; Nyhamar \textit{Nye utfordringer} (1990), p. 178-179. The last phase would be run like a major election campaign with an effective division of labour. The NCTU hired some 60, and the Labour Party 18, short-term secretaries to visit workplaces, local party offices, and unions and inform them about the choice ahead. This was made possible by the extraordinary funds allotted by the Parliament to information campaigns, where the Labour Party received 2,3 of the 12,5 million NOK.

\textsuperscript{1444} AA/Dc/A/044/6/7/L0008 – 06.06.1972, Hankø – R. Bye – The EC case. Perspectives and measures.

\textsuperscript{1445} Nyhamar \textit{Nye utfordringer} (1990), p. 164-165.

\textsuperscript{1446} NSA –7B–39 – 05.06.1972 – Kj,H. – Memo. \textit{Gallup}’s poll on the EC.

\textsuperscript{1447} Nyhamar \textit{Nye utfordringer} (1990), p. 187.

stands to hand out brochures and material about the EC. YTE produced LPs, movies, their own newspaper, 50,000 copies of the book ‘Why Yes to the EC’, 600,000 folders with information material for households, and 16 buses and several boats travelled all across the country to hand out flyers and buttons. All together, some 11,000 volunteers worked on the campaign. Though it is difficult to measure, the YTE and Labour Movement campaigns must be given credit for bringing 340,000 undecided or negative voters to the ‘yes’ side during the year September 1971 to September 1972. In the last months of campaigning, the ‘no’ side lost ground quickly, but managed to stay ahead until the referendum. The road to the YTE’s establishment was long and complex.

Before the signing of the Treaty of Accession in January of 1972, the NSA and many business organisations had come to the conclusion that a broad pro-European campaign “had proved impossible to establish”. This was closely related to the Labour Party’s internal situation. In 1971, the five business organisations had established a Co-ordination Committee to set up a campaign, but faced resistance from the Labour Party and the NCTU. In a meeting between the two parties, Bratteli and NCTU leader Tor Aspengren made it perfectly clear that a new campaign should only consist of, and receive financial support from, individual persons. Concerned with the campaign’s profile, the Labour Movement wanted the business organisations to keep some distance. Moreover, the Labour Party and the NCTU would run their own campaigns: a broad pro-European campaign would formally have to manage without the organisational infrastructure of the Labour Movement. Throughout the year, the government sent mixed signals regarding the establishment of a campaign. However, the government would not resist low-key financial support. Trying to address this, the business organisations set up a Policy and Finance group to raise money for the ‘yes’ campaign. To keep the business organisations from direct contact with the campaign,

\[1449\] Nyhamar, Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 178.
\[1453\] NSA–7B–35 – 17.08.1971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Memo. EEC information. Meeting between NEC chairman Kaare N. Selvig, FNI president Jens-Halvard Bratz, NCTU leader Tor Aspengren and Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli. Aspengren was much more enthusiastic about the idea than Bratteli.
Roem Nielsen became the “special link with the European Movement and to head the work with the possible establishment of a new European Committee”.\textsuperscript{1456} They could not, however, make the political decision to establish it.

Neither could (or would) the EMN. The EMN expanded it activities, setting up a press service, working very closely with the Conservative Youth and with the establishment of a pro-European youth movement.\textsuperscript{1457} The EMN had felt forced to act because of the passivity of the Borten government and the “rather ruthless” campaigning of the People’s Movement.\textsuperscript{1458} However, they still hoped to avoid a direct confrontation with the PM, which would legalise its activities. Contact between the pro-European organisations “should be kept informally”, the EMN maintained.\textsuperscript{1459} The initiative, therefore, had to come from somewhere else.

This somewhere else was the MFA, and the process was shrouded in secrecy. According to Andreas Cappelen – in an interview he gave in 1988 – ‘YES to the EC’ came about when state secretary Stoltenberg – together with head of the Minister’s secretariat Arne Arnesen – urged young diplomat and Labour Party member Sverre Jervell to enter Foreign Minister Cappelen’s political secretariat to help them set up a pro-European campaign organisation.\textsuperscript{1460} Cappelen could only name journalist Gidske Anderson, but recalled that several people had asked him to do something to strengthen the pro-European forces. Arild Holland was surely one of those people. When Cappelen took over as Foreign Minister, Holland immediately told him that an information campaign was needed. He also remembered bringing up the question with Bratteli on the airplane to Brussels for the signing ceremony in January of 1972.\textsuperscript{1461} However, the specific ‘YES to the EC’ plan was only discussed within a very limited circle. Stoltenberg had deliberately chosen an unknown diplomat straight out of the Diplomatic Academy and placed him in the political secretariat. This way Jervell would not be a civil servant while setting up YTE, and therefore free of civil
servant norms. Jervell tried to keep a low profile, but was called out by the EC-critical daily newspaper Dagbladet already in late 1971. Echoing Magne Reed’s journey in 1962, it was then decided that Jervell should take a leave of absence and work as a political consultant to YTE, while de facto continuing to work for Cappelen.

It was Cappelen that made the final decision after conferring with Labour Party secretary Ronald Bye and Prime Minister Bratteli. With Cappelen, Bratteli, Bye, Stoltenberg, Arnesen and Jervell involved, a social democratic project designed to win over the undecided within their own ranks was put in place. The choice of chairman confirmed this profile: Einar Gerhardsen unsurprisingly declined to head the campaign, so Trygve Bratteli chose Reidar Carlsen, who was Minister of Commerce and Shipping in Gerhardsen’s first government (1945-46) and Minister of Fisheries in the second (1946-1951). However, Cappelen’s decision to establish YTE was part of a much broader process that had been going on for over a year. The Co-ordination Committee, for example, claimed that YTE was created “partly as a direct result of initiatives from [their] side”. Haakon Lie had also been active.

Nonetheless, YTE was quite deliberately kept from both the business organisations and the EMN. The reason to keep away from the EMN was its conservative slant and the provocative figure of Haakon Lie. Stoltenberg later recalled that they feared the EMN would struggle to attract new supporters of membership in the EC. The reason to keep the campaign away from the business organisations was the same as in 1962-63: it would smell too much of narrow self-interest and high finance. If this was to be a ‘people’s movement’ on par with the anti-membership organisation, close links with shipping or industry would be detrimental to its image.

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1462 Interview – Sverre Jervell – 11.06.2015; Interview – Sverre Jervell – 12.06.2015.
1464 Interview – Sverre Jervell – 11.06.2015.
1466 NSA–7B–35 – 17.08.1971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Memo. EEC information; Husby JA til EF-aksjonen (1988), p. 18-19; Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 178; Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 160. It was Selvig and Bratz, in discussions with Bratteli and Aspengren, who first suggested Gerhardsen as chairman. While Cappelen recalls that he was the first to suggest Gerhardsen as chairman. It is likely that many had this idea around the same time, and also that they discussed it with each other. Bratteli did not think Gerhardsen would accept, but did indeed contact him. It was Cappelen and Stoltenberg that approached Reidar Carlsen. Carlsen came from the north of Norway, was director of the Regional Development Fund and chairman of the Nordic Association. He represented the periphery and the primary sector, and was a strong supporter of Norden. It is not unlikely that Bratteli thought Carlens’s name in some small way could make up for the fact that Minister of Fisheries Knut Hoem had resigned in January 1972.
1468 Interview – Gro Dragland – 25.07.2013. However, Haakon Lie, as many of the EMN members, was annoyed by the way the ‘Yes to the EC’-campaign came about. Husby JA til EF-aksjonen (1988), p. 25, 105.
1470 NSA–7B–33 – 21.05.1971, Oslo – Memo. Meeting between business org. about the EEC, 24.05.
However, its most striking feature, in our context, was the almost complete lack of official involvement from the Europeans. In fact, the only European signing the ‘YES to the EC’ petition in January 1972 was elder Ambassador Arne Skaug. Their absence is even more noticeable given the very strong involvement of the political leadership of the MFA. This was, of course, deliberate: it would go against all established norms for high-profile diplomats to take part in such a campaign. Moreover, as we shall see, the MFA was already under increasing fire for its information efforts, and it was important to keep it separated from YTE’s campaign and they were seen as two different things.¹⁴⁷¹

Though YTE was officially detached from the Europeans and the MFA, the EMN, the business organisations, and even the Labour Party, co-operated closely. For one, Jervell continued to be the MFA’s watchdog and link to YTE. Historian Arve Husby goes as far as to claim that, “all the power was gathered in the hands of Carlsen, Metliaas [former chairman of the Liberals in Oslo and the Liberal Youth, and vice-chairman in YTE] and Jervell”.¹⁴⁷² Moreover, Jervell gathered information and analytical material from the Europeans and developed arguments for ‘YES to the EC’. They needed professional expertise, which they got from the MFA. The Europeans had been told not to get directly involved, but could contribute with expert advise and interpretations.¹⁴⁷³ The YTE campaign’s focus seems to confirm that the content was shaped between the Labour Party government on the one hand and the Europeans and the MFA on the other. First, the EC and European integration was a vehicle for peace in Europe, something Bratteli fundamentally believed in, and it was strongly supported within the EMN and among the Europeans. Second, membership would be a natural and safe continuation of Norway’s political course.¹⁴⁷⁴ Both arguments were a shift away from the technical and economic discussions that had dominated the Norwegian debate for so long – this was also something the Europeans had argued for earlier.

Jervell also functioned as the contact point between the YTE and the business organisations. In April 1972, for example, he visited the NSA to warn them that the organisation would soon run out of money for their ambitious campaigns. The costs were high because YTE suffered from “an almost total lack of organisational sub-structure” – the local contact groups, supposedly in every commune, were “pure paper tigers”, one NSA official noted. Since the government had made it clear that YTE should not receive appropriations

¹⁴⁷¹ Interview – Arild Holland – 18.07.2015.
¹⁴⁷³ Interview – Sverre Jervell – 11.06.2015, 12.06.2015; Interview – Arild Holland – 18.07.2015.
from companies or institutions, Jervell suggested setting up multi-stage operations, funneling money to the EMN, which in turn could give money to the YTE campaigns locally. From the spring of 1972, therefore, Roem Nielsen entered the Policy and Finance group due to “his close connection with the European Movement and the ‘Yes’ campaign”. The business organisations would continue to “trigger as much activity organised by others as possible” through practical assistance, material support, lecturers and financial support, “with a minimum of formal structures and fixed organisational patterns”. Soon, however, the Co-ordination Committee warned that YTE had “an almost unimpaired need for practical assistance”, and in June 1972, NSA Director Malterud wrote to all his members that YTE was ‘a special problem’ that needed to be solved: “today it operates with a deficit of major proportions. For it to be able to do a [proper] job, funds must come from persons/businesses. There will soon come a request for support from our members, and I can warmly recommend that we all see to this.”

The business organisations and the Co-ordination Committee had long known that they had to “pay most of the party (...) whichever way it is organised and whoever runs it”. Now they did.

It is only part of the story therefore when historian Rolf Tamnes, building on Husby’s unpublished master thesis, highlights the antagonism between the business organisations’ Co-ordination Committee and YTE, and the fact that they did not receive any direct economic support from them. It was a much more complex relationship: in silent understanding, one depended on the other, and – importantly – this was known and accepted by the Labour Party government. The main contributors were found within the NSA and FNI, with some of the contributions going via the EMN. It seems much of the financial co-ordination was supervised by the MFA, through junior diplomat on leave Sverre Jervell.

As Party Secretary Ronald Bye wrote in his biography, “there was never any organised and legalised connection between ‘Yes to the EC’ and the Labour Party leadership”. However, the informal co-ordination was close, and Bye was the contact point. For example,

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1475 NSA–7B–38 – 05.04.1972, Oslo – K. Hansen – Memo for Director Malterud. Financing the YTE campaign; NSA–7B–41 – 29.08.1972, Oslo – Kj.H. – Memo. Overview of important measures in the shipping sectors EC information. Director Roem Nielsen had also found another loophole, giving a 1 million NOK credit, under the tacit agreement that ‘someone else’ would officially cover it. The NSA was more reluctant, but gave financial support to the regional offices of YTE through local businesses.


1478 NSA–7B–33 – 19.04.1971 – Norway’s relationship with the EC. The role of the business organisations.

1479 Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 160. Jervell remembered that YTE avoided contact with the Committee, as they were ‘political amateurs’, but at the same time needed their economic support. Interview – Sverre Jervell – 12.06.15.

1480 Gleditsch and Hellevik Kampen om EF (1977), p. 189. The informal financing procedures makes it difficult estimate how much the business sector contributed, and the books of YTE remain unavailable. However, in an interview from 1977, Carlsen said that YTE spent around 20 million NOK.
Knut Frydenlund, Labour official Arne M. Olsen and Bye met in secrecy with YTE-leaders Magne Lerheim and Ola Metliaas in a cabin in the outskirts of Oslo to plan co-ordinated events in the autumn of 1972.1481 It was here that the idea of inviting Willy Brandt to Norway for a large pro-European rally materialised. The massive mid-September YTE-rally at Youngstorget was the biggest pro-European event organised during the campaign by far.1482

Another major issue the Labour Movement and YTE most likely co-ordinated was Trygve Bratteli’s decision to make the referendum a vote of confidence for the Labour government. On August 23, Bratteli announced to the press and public that the government had “asked the people for its support in an important question, should the answer be ‘no’, the government will have to take the consequence of this”.1483 Bratteli had been in doubt. The government was divided right down the middle, and the decisive pressure in favour of a vote of confidence came from Aspengren, Bye and Cappelen, who met late in the summer of 1972. Bye recalls the rationale: “time was of the essence (...) and ‘yes’ was still way behind ‘no’ in the polls. All ammunition had to be used, and the vote of confidence was a joker.”1484 According to journalist and author Jostein Nyhamar, the original plan was to shock the electorate by announcing the vote of confidence the same week as the referendum. Nyhamar refers to a strategic memo from ‘Yes to the EC’ and mentions LMIC chairman Bernt H. Lund’s statements in August – given a week before Bratteli’s announcement – and insisting that Bratteli indeed had to go should a majority against membership botch these plans.1485

What was the role of the Europeans in all these pro-European campaigns? Before the change of government the Europeans acted, as they had done since the mid-1960s, as boundary-spanners for the European cause. They were instrumental in managing the relationship between the government and MFA, and the extra-parliamentary information efforts. T

Their involvement happened with the consent of MFA leadership, not with that of Prime Minister Borten, which gave it a clear streak of personal conviction. However, they did not act in a private capacity, they acted as diplomats bound by civil servant norms. This was defendable in the sense that it was official government policy to obtain membership. In any case it was an ambivalent role: that they continuously considered their position and level of

1481 Bye Sersjanten (1987), p. 128-129. “We hid in a cabin in the forest when we thought we were close to breaking the rules (...) the EC-struggle was an organisational cultural revolution for the Labour Movement.”
involvement is clear from their official ‘absence’ from YTE. This was a deliberate choice, which reflected that the Europeans and the MFA were very aware of the grey areas of civil servant norms. Whether they facilitated contacts, or delivered policy advice as with the Labour Party, NCTU and YTE campaigns, the Europeans kept in the background. It was the Labour government’s official information campaign, administered by the MFA’s Press Department that, for the first time, brought them into direct and persistent contact with the Norwegian public. It was this meeting that called the many new roles the Europeans had taken on since the early 1960s into question. It was an institutional shock for the MFA, where the diplomat’s status, expertise and norms were fundamentally challenged.

**Europeans into Battle**

In the early stages of the third EC-round, the MFA was mostly concerned with information about Norway aimed at the Community. Norwegian journalists demanding more information were simply referred to the existing parliamentary white papers and the Market Committee’s yearly reports. The government, the MFA and the Europeans, at this point, had few elaborate plans to involve the Press Department in an information effort directed at the Norwegian public. However, after the establishment of the People’s Movement and increasing tensions within the government, such plans surfaced. In November 1970, for example, Tim Greve contacted the daily press and instructed the editors to take on pro-European pieces and answers to the EC-sceptics as soon as possible. Soon, the Labour Party in opposition pushed for the MFA as a whole to take a more active role in the information efforts. At a meeting in the ECFA, Labour leader Bratteli raised concerns about the “low information level of the Norwegian debate”. There were “myriads of misleading information” and Bratteli suggested that the MFA set up a list of 15-20 important themes that it could inform the public about. Not surprisingly, Foreign Minister Stray jumped on this invitation, and admitted that the MFA had contemplated such information efforts for a while. In fact, Stray had wanted an expanded press service headed by Greve’s Press Department, to give ‘correct information’ and ‘responsible assessments’ regarding membership. Chairman of the committee, Helge Seip (Liberal) concluded that the MFA should be “more active in the day-to-day information” of the public. The negotiation secretariat and the Press Department were instructed to come up with suggestions for how the MFA should organise its information efforts in early

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1486 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 25.06.1970 – Aftenposten – Publication about Norwegian economy in French; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 07.06.1970 – A. Skarstein – Memo. Information material about the EC.
1488 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting December 9, 1970, 9.45AM.
January. \(^{1489}\) Efforts by the Market Secretariat were also added to take care of the long-term organisational planning. \(^{1490}\)

However, in February, Greve wrote to the state secretary that the Press Department was already planning a series of booklets, but before it could continue it was “necessary for the government to establish a budgetary framework for the information efforts” \(^{1491}\). As the Centre-Right government was falling apart, Greve wrote to Bratteli in opposition that he did not have the impression that the coalition had made any decision on the matter. Greve’s clear advice to Bratteli, whom he assumed would be in power soon, was to “get funding for the thematic booklets”. \(^{1492}\) The Labour Party, in fact, anticipated a major information effort from the government’s side. Their internal information strategy presupposed that the government would initiate a “new and more powerful information scheme”, so that the two campaigns “comprises a whole (...) our internal campaign is complemented by the government’s external information”. \(^{1493}\) It seems that this was the reason why Bratteli pushed the coalition to let the MFA start up an information campaign.

The new Labour government proposed, and parliament approved, an additional 1.500.000 NOK to the MFA’s EC-information budget, now totalling 2.000.000 NOK, to do something about the ”strong need for public information” and provide a ”broad range of educational material (...) as soon as possible.” But as the negotiations dragged out until early 1972, and domestic debates became increasingly heated, more resources were needed. Following the signing of the Treaty of Accession, parliament decided to allot 12.500.000 NOK to information efforts related to the EC-case. Five million went to the political parties, divided according to the number of representatives in the parliament. The PM and the new YTE-campaign got 1.250.000 NOK each. Finally, the MFA received 5.000.000 NOK for the government’s information campaign, of which 3.737.158 NOK was spent. \(^{1494}\)

Between June 1971 and June 1972, the MFA published a series of thematic booklets. In total, 21 were produced, many of them printed in several hundred thousand copies. \(^{1495}\) Greve

\(^{1489}\) UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 17.12.1970, MFA – K. Colding – Memo to the NS. Information from the MFA.

\(^{1490}\) UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 29.12.1970 – P. M. Olberg, NS – Memo. EEC. Information material for the public; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 08.01.1971 – Memo. Preparation of necessary background and information material.

\(^{1491}\) UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–4 – 12.02.1971 – T. Greve – Memo. The Press Department’s booklets about the EC.


\(^{1495}\) Distributed through Statens Informasjonstjeneste (The State’s Information Service). Gleditsch and Hellevik Kampen om EF (1977), p. 132.
drew on expertise he trusted, and commissioned work from, for example, the NSA. The material handed in would be anonymous and edited by the Press Department with the help of journalists.\textsuperscript{1496} The Market Secretariat authored and sent out targeted information packets to opinion makers. The MFA also informed the public of negotiation results through ads in the national daily press. Moreover, the MFA aimed to produce leaflets explaining the negotiation results in a straightforward language for mass proliferation.\textsuperscript{1497}

This written information brought the \textit{Europeans} into direct contact with the public and created many negative reactions. Greve and the Press Department had their hands full correcting so-called factual errors made by critics of the MFA’s information, or what they considered misinterpretations of the MFA’s intentions. The \textit{Europeans} were clearly frustrated: they felt restricted by civil servant norms of thoroughness, objectivity and reliability, while the extra-parliamentary ‘no’ organisation agitated freely. Greve was therefore continuously engaged in disputes in the press, trying to counter what he called “prophecies (...) not based in reality”, and “fantasies”.\textsuperscript{1498} Shortly before the referendum in 1972, parliamentary leader for the Liberal Party Gunnar Garbo claimed the parliament’s appropriations to the MFA’s information campaign had been squandered away on “spreading shallow, unreliable and unfounded information”, referring specifically the booklet \textit{100 questions and answers}, he claimed that “the Ministry’s statements [were] clearly misleading”.\textsuperscript{1499} This developed to a longer exchange of views in the press between Garbo and Greve.\textsuperscript{1500}

There were many such accusations that the \textit{Europeans} together with the government manipulated or construed information, or made decisions detrimental to the real interests of ‘Norway’ and ‘the people’\textsuperscript{1501}. One of the most dramatic accusations against the \textit{Europeans} came when parliamentarian Erling Engan (Centre Party) in the \textit{Storting} claimed that

\textsuperscript{1496} NSA–7B–33 – 30.04.1971, Oslo – Memo. The MFA’s information booklets about the EEC.
\textsuperscript{1497} NSA–7B–35 – 23.09.1971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Plans for EEC information; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–7 – 29.05.1973
\textsuperscript{1498} T. Greve – Researcher Nils Petter Gleditsch, PRIO. 1.9 million NOK was spent on this.
\textsuperscript{1499} UD 44.36/6.84 Inf. – \textit{Arbeiderbladet} 31.07.1972, “Spørsmål og svar”.
\textsuperscript{1500} UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 19.08.1972 – \textit{Arbeiderbladet}, Gunnar Garbo – “Usåldigheter fra UD”; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 22.08.1972, Oslo – T. Greve – Editor \textit{Arbeiderbladet}.

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negotiators had deliberately mistranslated Article 9 of Norway’s Agriculture Protocol. Engan’s argument, which he based on accusations made by the PM and Dagbladet, was that the Norwegian language text of Article 9 opened up the possibility of continued milk subsidies once Norway joined the EC, while all the other texts said the contrary.1502 “Some of the Norwegian negotiators were aware of this inconsistency well before the agreement was signed in Brussels”, Engan claimed.1503 Engan’s accusations were thoroughly dismissed by Foreign Minister Cappelen who rightly pointed out that each text was an independent and authentic legal document with the same validity as the others. Cappelen also warned against libellous accusations against Norwegian negotiators and other civil servants. Still, Engan proposed that the government should re-examine the real interpretation of Agriculture Protocol with all the different negotiation partners. After a very heated debate Engan withdrew his proposal.1504 This was not the end: Arild Holland, together with Head of Office Bjarne Solheim, waited for Engan to exit the plenary chamber, and dared him to repeat his accusations outside of parliament and therefore not covered by parliamentary immunity, so that they could take him to court for defamatory statements. Engan refused, referring instead to Dagbladet.1505

Even if the Europeans did not intend it, engaging in polemics in the press or outside parliament with EC-sceptics framed the MFA as their counterpart.1506 Thus, information became conflated with pro-European propaganda. The MFA would never escape this.1507

**Institutional battles**

Through the EC-issue, foreign policy intertwined with domestic policy. At the height of the information campaigns, this became evident when the coordinative ministries on the domestic and foreign scene, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the MFA and MoCS, respectively, locked horns over issues of growth and economic instruments.

The viewpoints of the Norwegian economists inhabiting and governing the main institutions of political economy, the so-called iron triangle1508, were largely incompatible with

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1503 Arbeiderbladet 17.03.1972.
1504 St.t. 1971/72, pp. 2540-2560.
1505 Arbeiderbladet 17.03.1972, Nationen 17.03.1972. UD 44.36/6.84–8 – 15.03.1972, Brussels – B. Solheim – Memo to the Foreign Minister.
1506 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.-6 – 01.08.1972, Oslo – T. Greve – Tromsø (For tilhengere er alle midler tillat).
1507 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf. – File 4-6.
1508 ‘Iron Triangle’ of economic competence: the Social Economic Institute (SEI) at the University of Oslo (UoO), under Ragnar Frisch, the MoF and Statistics Norway (SN). These economists formed, compared to most other
those prevailing in the EEC at the beginning of the 1970s. The Werner Plan – with its ambitious three-stage plan for an Economic and Monetary Union – proposed strong economic and financial integration.1509 Moreover, a raft of political measures that hindered competition – what the MoF would call economic instruments – were to be abolished, so that commercial activity could unfold within the entire Common Market.1510 In the Community’s view, “[i]t was the market, rather than economic policies and instruments, that created wealth and prosperity”, economic historian Einar Lie contends.1511 It is safe to say that this was not a legitimate part of the Norwegian ‘prosperity discourse’ and it was met with almost unison resistance from postwar Norway’s technocratic elite par excellence: the economists.

These economists fundamentally disagreed with the Europeans on the membership issue. Already during the first round (1960-63), the MoF economists were angered by what they conceived as propaganda from the Europeans. Norwegian membership in the EC was not the best solution, as they felt the Europeans argued, as it would obstruct the realisation of a wider transatlantic free trade area. When the Europeans tried to sell what they saw as the best available option, the economists of the MoF defended the ideal postwar solution.1512 The government had therefore bypassed the MoF in the early 1960s and given the task of evaluating the economic effects of membership to the MoCS. In the 1970s, the MoF economists would become a major resource on the ‘no’ side. They reacted strongly, for instance, when the MoCS used ‘an example’ in Parliamentary White Paper no. 50 (1971-72), which estimated a 1 percent decrease in growth should Norway decline full membership in the EC. Director of Statistics Norway dismissed the numbers, and claimed that the decrease would be as little as one-tenth of a percent, and economists at the MoF wrote in formal protest to their minister.1513

Another dispute erupted when the Negotiation Delegation charged Hermod Skånland1514 to head a commission that would evaluate the long-term implications of membership in the EC for Norwegian monetary policy. This was meant to be an attachment
to the White Paper. However, the conclusions were highly critical and contended that membership in the EC, and the implications of the Werner Plan, would challenge Norwegian credit and interest rate policies. As Lie explains: “[t]his meant, the commission concluded, that the Norwegian system of channelling large volumes of inexpensive loans to certain long-term industrial investments and housing through a number of State Banks would by and large have to be abandoned. These instruments were all at the core of the Norwegian system of economic management.”

The Market Committee recommended, and the government decided, not to attach the Skånland-report to the White Paper. Instead the study ended up as an appendix in a Counter-White Paper by the People’s Movement. The MoF economists also provided drafts and suggestions for the rest of the Counter-White Paper. “The decisive factor”, Lie argues, “was the threat to Norway’s power to shape its own economic policy”. The free-market ideology of the EC would remove economic instruments from the MoF, and thus endanger the state intervention needed to secure full employment and economic growth, so the argument went.

The Europeans’ dense network of pro-European forces, on the other hand, held opposing views to that of the ‘iron triangle’ economists. These ranged from hoping that membership in the EC would somehow dismantle the postwar state and pull Norway in a liberal direction, to visions of an active, international social-democratic economic policy. The NSA was part of the first category, which already in 1961 saw membership as a way to get rid of the economic ‘instruments’ of the government and harmonise tax regimes so that Norway would appear more like others on the continent, and open up capital markets – a general return to liberal policies.

At the other end of the scale were people like Arne Lie, who was in the same generation as the Europeans, an economist by training, and a civil servant and politician for the Labour Party. On the recommendation of Halvorsen and Langeland, who knew Lie from his days in the OEEC, Lie would be part of the influential negotiation secretariat during the first round of negotiations, and also a close economic advisor of Bratteli. As opposed to the

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1520 http://runeberg.org/hvemerhvem/1973/0340.html (27.09.2015). In the late 1950s he had a stint at the OEEC Embassy as secretary (1956–1959), before serving as assistant secretary at the MoCS, office manager in the Bank of Norway (1960), Head of Department in the OECD (1968), and state secretary to Prime Minister Bratteli (1970–71).
1521 UD 44.36/6.84 B.-1 – 09..07.1962 – A. Skarstein and H. Engen – Memo. Composition of the negotiation machinery; Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
NSA, Lie, in a 1962 article, argued for a process of adaptation to, and influence on, European economic policy. In an assault on the reigning economists he concluded, “I believe that the Norwegian organs engaged in social-economic research have been so absorbed by their own excellence, that they often have not taken the time to try to understand other countries economic research and policies.” He also said, “[e]conomic welfare policy is not solely a Norwegian invention”. On the other hand, he thought membership in the Community could lead to “a European welfare policy in the Norwegian image”. This was the economic rationale of the Social Democratic vision of Europe.

Like the *Europeans*, the NSA and Arne Lie were heavily involved in the EMN. Lie, also part of the polito-administrative Labour elite, was a board member and took part in the information efforts, among other things, by writing a booklet (“The Europeans that created the Common Market”), which was printed and distributed to EMN members and the Labour Movement via Frydenlund. The NSA was the most consistent contributor to the European Movement, covering roughly 20-30 percent of the yearly budget. As they did for the MFA, the shipowners arranged and held the yearly dinner of the EMN. In this way, the EMN represented an arena of strange alliances.

The *Europeans* embodied and represented these different views. Already in the early 1960s, Langeland, for instance, argued that since international economic cooperation would restrict the use of national economic instruments, it was “illusory to discuss trying to stand on the outside of a long-term development pushed through by strong forces.” Also in the early 1960s, Halvorsen criticised professor Frisch at the University of Oslo, father of the dominant economic school who had described the EEC as ‘an unenlightened plutocracy’, for advocating state-subsidised isolationism in violation of GATT, because he could not accept the market developments in Europe. “For a country with the economic structure such as Norway’s it is difficult to believe that such a system of trade [as suggested by Frisch] is best equipped to obtain the economic goals we have had so far: full employment, rising standards

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1523 RA/PA–0992 A/As/L0010 - 03.05.1967 – Minutes: Board Meeting; S-1275–Db/Box 277/Folder 2.
1525 UD 44.36/6.84–1 – 12.05.1961 – A. Langeland – Memo. The relationship to the new economic and political cooperation in Western Europe.
of living and economic growth”.\textsuperscript{1527} Though the goals were the same, the Europeans represented an alternative concept of ‘prosperity’ shaped by the networks in which they took part.

Accordingly, the Europeans, the MoCS, the NSA and others, did not necessarily analyse the Werner report or the economic consequences of membership in the 1970s, in light of the state’s ability to govern economic politics. The MoCS, for instance, criticised the Skånland report for not assessing viable policy options, given the plans laid out by the Community for the years ahead. And even more fundamentally, the commission had failed to consider the fact that Norway’s “economic policy in many areas is dependant on economic interaction with the western European countries”.\textsuperscript{1528}

The Europeans argued that the plans for an Economic and Monetary Union would affect Norway no matter what. This was, they contended, an argument in favour of membership. In a consultative committee meeting in January 1971, Sommerfelt acknowledged that the government’s formal freedom of movement would be limited by an Economic and Monetary Union. However, referring to how Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Pierre Werner thought his country had increased its sovereignty – also in economic matters – through membership in the Community, Sommerfelt argued that the applicants should hurry to get on the inside and that close coordination of national economic policies was a necessity. “This did not entail that the national economic policy would be of any less interest. On the contrary, it was important that every country continued to be able to master their own peculiar national problems”.\textsuperscript{1529} Jahn Halvorsen was even more direct. Coordination of economic policies was a prerequisite for a functional monetary union. Harmonising taxation policies, for example, was a consequence of the wish to establish an effective, functioning common market.\textsuperscript{1530}

In the end, few of the government’s white papers or official statements emphasised free-market arguments – instead they downplayed the four freedoms of the EC. This conceals the tensions. The first draft of the opening declaration in Luxembourg on June 30 1970, for instance, stated the government “look[ed] forward to taking part in the cooperation and [was] in agreement with the principle guidelines and the planned stages stipulated for the future in area of economic and monetary policies”.\textsuperscript{1531} However, the government revised the draft and believed the diplomats had gone too far in embracing the Community’s economic and

\textsuperscript{1527} 	extit{Aftenposten} – 05.12.1961 – “Universitetsøkonomene får nytt svar på tiltale”, by Jahn Halvorsen.

\textsuperscript{1528} UD 44.36/6.84 E.–6 – 15.12.1971 – MoCS, Department of foreign trade – Meeting of the Market Committee, 13.12.1971, item 1: discussing the Skånland commission’s report on the EC’s plans for EMU.


\textsuperscript{1531} UD 44.36/6.84–33 – Draft of Norwegian opening declaration, Luxembourg, 30.06.1970.
monetary plans. The official line was to silently accept the economic policies of the EC, and speak instead of export markets and sustained growth.

The conflict outlined above, however, reflected a deeper socio-political struggle: what was to be the role of the state and planning in the economy? The answer to this question also reflected a battle for the soul of the Labour Party: was EC-membership a natural continuation of the social democratic ideas of ‘prosperity’, as developed since the 1940s, or was it the ultimate capitalist sell-out of the Labour Party elite, as argued by the ‘no’-side?

**Tour of Norway**

One of the most peculiar involvements of the *Europeans* up until the referendum was their travelling across the country to inform people about the EC and the negotiation result. The *Europeans* were not prepared for this physical and direct meeting with the public, and it triggered a more substantial discussion about the norms of civil servants in general.

Already in September 1971, MFA officials had informed the NSA that “a team of civil servants” would “present the negotiation results at meetings for local officials within the labour and business organisations all across the country”. Some, like Arild Holland, wanted to start touring the country before the negotiation results were in. Meanwhile others, like Sigurd Ekeland, thought lecture tours would be more effective after the results were clear, and suggested the first two weeks of 1972 as a good time to start. It was, however, state secretary Stoltenberg that made the decision with the approval of Cappelen. He recalled the MFA getting piles of requests from all over the country, from people who wanted to be informed about the negotiation result or other aspects of the EC: “we had to answer this, so we had to move out.” Following the signing of the Treaty of Accession, Greve systematised these efforts, requesting all offices to list “people that can be used as lecturers” on EC-matters and “able to travel to different parts of the country to give such

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1533 The pro-European liberal forces and their economic ideology are understudied in the context of the failed Norwegian bid for membership. The topic deserves thorough research.
1536 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 05.10.1971 – S. Ekeland – EC/Norway. Information efforts in Norway.
1537 Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014; Interview – Sverre Jervell – 12.06.2015; Interview – Arild Holland – 09.01.2014. Arild Holland claims it was due to his ‘constant badgering’ of the MFA’s political leadership, though it is clear that many of the *Europeans* supported the idea.
lectures”.\textsuperscript{1538} The use of travelling lecturers increased greatly in the last months before the referendum.\textsuperscript{1539}

As Cappelen told parliament, what people wanted was sober information about the negotiation result and the implications of membership: “we have in Norway over time developed a group of civil servants with special expertise regarding Nordic and European integration issues. Common for all of them is that they have worked with EC-questions daily for years”. These were primarily the *Europeans*.\textsuperscript{1540} Many of the requests for lecturers went to Greve, whose Press Department had coordinative responsibility.\textsuperscript{1541} The most common procedure would be that when Greve received a letter from an organisation or group of people, he would ask Holland to find a suitable diplomat or civil servant to send.\textsuperscript{1542} Holland recalled often asking the young diplomat Haakon Skaarer or Per Martin Ølberg. Ølberg, with his broad knowledge of the agreement on fisheries, was often sent to the north of Norway.\textsuperscript{1543} The delegation in Brussels also took part. While in Norway, press attaché Freihow, Ambassador Halvorsen and counsellor Ekeland, were often invited to provide information about the negotiation results.\textsuperscript{1544}

A delicate balancing act was clear from the beginning: the diplomats and civil servants were asked to provide information about the negotiation result in a neutral way, and avoid recommending an outcome or making normative statements about aspects of the Treaty of Accession.\textsuperscript{1545} One of the first comprehensive complaints regarding this practice came from the board of WYL to Prime Minister Bratteli. The WYL had noted that civil servants in the central administration had often made “forceful and enthusiastic statements in favour of Norwegian membership”. These “direct, outward political activities to promote a point of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 08.02.1972 – T. Greve, Press Department – Departmental circular. Information work regarding the EC.
\item UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 14.04.1972 – St.prp.nr. (1971-72) Om tilleggsbevilgning på statsbudsjettet for 1972 under kap. 108, Forhandlinger med De Europeiske Fellesskap, post 26, Informasjonstjeneste. Of 7.000.000 NOK the MFA received in April 1972, 275.000 NOK was set aside for a so-called ‘ambulatory information secretariat’ travelling to cities and towns across the country to answer questions from the public ‘on site’, and distributing official publications.
\item Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014. For example: UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 13.03.1972, Sofiemyr – G. Granne – Application for lecturer for meeting about the EC.
\item Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. For example: UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 16.03.1972 – B. Braathen – Director General Tim Greve; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 28.03.1972, Oslo – K. Breunig – Lecturers for information meetings about the EC for Buskerud Conservatives.
\item Interview – Arild Holland – 09.01.2014; AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – April 19, 1972 – Andreas Cappelen – 19.4.1972: Foreign Minister Cappelen’s answer to interpellation by representative Gunnar Garbo.
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view which there is strong disagreement about in our country” created an image of the entire administration being in favour of membership, they complained. In their view, the only solution would be to allow civil servants to participate in campaigns against membership.1546

In April, the issue was raised again, this time in Parliament by Liberal representative Gunnar Garbo. Garbo asked if the Foreign Minister believed “that it is in accordance with Norwegian administrative practice that MFA officials are engaged to participate in the political debate on whether Norway should join the EC or not?”.1547

The critical reactions prompted Bratteli to ask his staff to look into the matter. They were in their right to use the administration to inform the public, they said, referring to a 1968 article by the Governor of the central bank of Norway Knut Getz Wold, and added, “there are no determined rules and the view put forward by Getz Wold is by and large what the civil service tries to follow”.1548 Getz Wold’s article stated that civil servants were free to participate in political activities and placed Norwegian norms somewhere between those of the very strict British, and the more relaxed Swedes. He was, for instance, quite clear that “the individual civil servant is assumed to implement the policy-decisions made by parliament, government and department loyalty and with interest”. This was a classic Weberian norm. His overall view was: “great caution regarding public expressions of ones own opinion on issues one is directly involved with. Great freedom expressing ones own opinion on other areas in politics and society.”1549 Both the answer to WYL and the answer to parliamentarian Garbo were based on Getz Wold’s article.1550

However, the Prime Minister was genuinely surprised by, and quickly dismissed, the WYL’s request that civil servants opposed to membership could express themselves freely. Equally, Cappelen reminded the press that the government had, in fact, been encouraged to inform the public. “If civil servants in the MFA are asked to give lectures regarding this issue, they are permitted to do so.” The Foreign Minister had made it clear, however, that “civil servants working with the EC-case could not openly argue against the governments

1546 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 21.03.1972, Oslo – B. T. Godal – Statement to the government by WYL’s central board about the involvement of civil servants in the EC case.
1549 Knut Get Wold “Administrasjon og politikk” in Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift (1968), pp. 68-100, p. 72, 87.
position”.\textsuperscript{1551} In parliament, Cappelen’s answer to Garbo was that administrative norms required a civil servant to be loyal to the sitting government and to be cautious with public statements on issues of a purely political character within his own area of responsibility. Beyond these limitations, civil servants were free to participate in public debate and in political organisations, just like any other Norwegian citizen. The Foreign Minister saw no problem in civil servants presenting the government’s view.

However, Cappelen admitted that there had been some problems regarding the lecture tours. For one, those who requested lectures had created events in which “the civil servants were meant to play the role as someone who argued in favour of membership, while someone else [was invited] to argue against, so as to create a clear duel.” Another complicating factor was that civil servants and diplomats also took part in public debates as private citizens: “some civil servants have participated in the debate in favour of Norwegian membership. This has happened in more internal forums, like internal meetings of different parties”, Cappelen maintained. A last problem, that Cappelen did not mention, was that the PM often followed civil servants on tour, and deliberately turned their lectures into pro-con debates.\textsuperscript{1552} Cappelen concluded that if the government should chose not to use its administration to inform the public for fear of its civil servants making normative statements, “we will have lost a source of enlightenment and information, which we in this case cannot afford to do without”\textsuperscript{1553}

Essentially, the government’s position was that official and factual information could be distinguished from personal and normative opinions. The problem was that with the boundary spanning efforts of the Europeans since the early 1960s, the lines between personal and professional, between information and propaganda, and between official and informal, had become completely blurred. It was difficult to expect sober, factual information from Arne Skaug, when he stated in the newspaper Bergens Tidende, “the EC goes further than the UN” with regards to securing peace in the world, for example.\textsuperscript{1554} Or to expect objective lectures from Sigurd Ekeland, who answered Verdens Gang’s question of whether Ekeland believed Norway would become a member of the EC, with, “yes, because in reality we have

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\item[1551] RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0031 - Government Conference – 23.03.1972. This was in line with calier statements made by Trygve Brateli and Halvard Lange. Wold “Administrasjon og politikk” (1968).
\item[1552] Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012.
\item[1554] UD 44.36/6.84–49 – Bergens Tidende Si JA nr. 1/1972 – Arne Skaug: “EF går lenger enn FN”.
\end{footnotes}
no alternative”. Such statements framed the *Europeans* in a certain way, regardless of how thorough, objective and reliable their lectures were.

Equally, it must have been hard for the MFA to uphold the view that they were only concerned with factual information when their representatives held regular informal meetings with the business organisation’s Coordination Committee to ensure that their work did not overlap. Many of the *Europeans* had several overlapping, and in this context contradictory, roles. Accordingly, head of the Labour Party’s pro-European press efforts Ole David Koht Norbye wrote in an official letter to the MFA and Asbjørn Skarstein: “I write to you partly in your capacity as board member of the European Movement. As you may well know, I’m writing a third brochure for Haakon Lie (...) It would be great if I got the opportunity to read the government’s new white paper before I put the finishing touches to it.”

Ideas for campaigns were also shaped in these fuzzy borders. Early in 1970, when the *Europeans* were combating the Nordek plans, Arne Skaug – at an EMN meeting – warned that people seemed to forget that EFTA as they knew it would disappear the moment Britain entered the EC. This was something he repeated in private letters to Haakon Lie, And something Ølberg and Lie discussed with the NSA. In June of 1972, the European Movement conducted a poll questioning how people would vote in September if both Britain and Denmark would become members: 42 percent answered that they would vote ‘yes’, while 40 percent said ‘no’. By posing the question differently, the EMN had polled a rare ‘yes’ majority. State secretary of the MFA, in turn, recommended that this aspect of the choice ahead be communicated to the public. These thoughts ended up in a 20x32 cm ad in several major newspapers only days before the referendum. In it, the MFA reminded the electorate that the referendum was about whether Norway wanted to join *Denmark, Ireland and Britain* into the Community.

The general public must also have found it hard to see any clear distinction when Sverre Jervell (‘YES to the EC’), Haakon Skaarer and Arild Holland were sent to the same event co-

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1558 UD 44.36/6.84–39 – 27.05.1971, Velleches – O. D. Koht Norbye – Dear Skarstein.
ordinated by the MFA. The other pro-European actors did not make the distinction either: Arild Holland recalled how Haakon Lie once called Tim Greve and instructed him to send Holland to Odda in Western Norway to hit some ‘goddamn communist bastards’ in the head.

All this made for an almost impossible balancing act and many unpleasant encounters. Terje Johannessen remembered constantly censoring himself, trying not to overstep any boundaries while giving lectures, but that he found it nearly impossible not to give his personal opinion when people asked him questions after the lecture. Arild Holland recalled how he could not resist talking about the broader political implications of membership and how the EC secured peace in Europe when speaking about the negotiation results. One of Ambassador Sommerfelt’s punch lines to a lecture was, “not being a member is not only wrong but stupid”. Other scripts indicate a dry and factual tone. Haakon W. Freihow had agreed to give a lecture in Vinje (Central Norway) to a small pro-European group in an area known as a ‘no’ bastion. Prior to the lecture, a local police officer had warned him not to go alone, and offered to escort him to the venue. In the last stages of the campaign, the MFA also chose to set up a telephone service. This was modelled on a similar Danish solution, in operation since December 1971, and was explicitly recommended by MFA officials as a way of avoiding constant accusations of false propaganda.

**Beyond diplomatic norms?**

Ambassador Halvorsen probably summed up what many of the Europeans thought in a personal letter to Prime Minister Bratteli right after the negative referendum:

> Dear Trygve! (...) The room for manoeuvre that the government has bestowed on its civil servants is in reality a necessity for our entire system and our political debate. With Norway having such a small milieu, we would lose something essential if the civil servants could not present and explain the government’s policies. We now run the risk of civil servants not daring to

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1565 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 28.03.1972, Oslo – K. Breunig – Lecturers for information meetings about the EC for Buskerud Conservatives.

1566 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. There was a sharp increase in meetings between Haakon Lie and Tim Greve from 1972 onwards. AA/Df/A/053/4/1/L0004.


1568 Interview – Arild Holland – 09.01.2014.


give their opinion, not even internally, if it should run counter to the opinion of shifting governments. Partly because they may feel that they become unpopular, partly because leaks and other channels to the press might be used. Then we’re truly in danger.\textsuperscript{1573}

The problem was that many of those opposed to membership no longer trusted the expertise of the civil service. As the People’s Movement wrote to Bratteli, “even if the administration commits itself to giving factual orientations, there is an evident danger that their information campaign will be affected by the fact that the same administration is intensely engaged in reaching an agreement about Norwegian membership in the EEC”.\textsuperscript{1574} The Europeans’ and other civil servants’ personal motives were called into question, also by academics. Social scientists Gleditsch and Hellevik highlighted that civil servants were socialised through international contacts and tempted by splendid international careers.\textsuperscript{1575}

Political scientist Knut Dahl Jacobsen’s article from 1960 highlights the two oft-conflicting role expectations of civil servants: loyalty and professional independence. Knut Getz Wold dived into another aspect: neutrality in politically sensitive matters. Interpreting Getz Wold, the government chose to make a very strict division between ‘information’ and ‘personal opinion’, thus allowing civil servants to inform the government’s position on the politically sensitive EC-matter. Moreover, it emphasised loyalty to the government as being more important than professional independence.

Tim Greve’s answer to an angry complainant at the height of the information campaign, for example, followed this view: “you mention that employees of the state are servants of the people, and I can without reservation agree with this point of view. As an expression of this, the parliament has requested the government to inform the public about the EC.”\textsuperscript{1576} However, the boundary spanning efforts of the Europeans made it questionable whether loyalty was with the membership cause or the government. Sommerfelt’s reaction to the hypothetical scenario of an EC-sceptic coalition following the Bratteli government is telling: “it would have to have a twisted sense of humour if it instructed me to negotiate a trade agreement with Brussels”.\textsuperscript{1577}


\textsuperscript{1574} AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 01.1972 – Referendum about Norwegian membership in the EEC. The People’s Movement against Norwegian membership in the Common Market.

\textsuperscript{1575} Gleditsch and Hellevik Kampen om EF (1977), p. 142. Making a point about Norwegian civil servants, they rather misleadingly refer to an op-ed in The Times (09.01.74) by Labour Party politician Richard Crossman about British Parliamentarians.

\textsuperscript{1576} UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 21.08.1972 – T. Greve – Mr. Sylfest Rosseland. The Press Department thanks you for your letter dated 15.08.

\textsuperscript{1577} Quote from Lie “Masters and Servants” (forthcoming 2015), p. 23.
The *Europeans* were overwhelmed by the negative reactions. This development can be traced through Greve. In January of 1971, he confidently answered a complaint that *Europeans* gave biased information by saying that civil servants could not be completely nondescript, and that it was natural that they emphasised what they thought to be important.\(^{1578}\) In November of 1971, he admitted that the “critical surveillance” of the MFA’s information booklets, forced them to either be incredibly precise or to be deliberately vague.\(^{1579}\) By August of 1972, a clearly strained Greve wrote: “[t]his assignment is both very demanding and ungrateful. (...) Not everyone is equally content with the information they get. Some claim that it is incomplete; others that it is misleading.”\(^{1580}\)

In 1967, political scientists could – without much dispute – claim that the MFA had seen few instances of diplomats politically engaged through the press. But that had changed. In the past, the Press Department secured a unified and coherent flow of information.\(^{1581}\) Following the negative referendum – in the publication, ‘*The Unfaithful Servants – The Civil Service in the EC-struggle*’, three young political scientists and EC-sceptics argued that the *Europeans* working with the EC-case had disrupted the Weberian norms of civil service through public political engagement, and had undermined democratic values of Norwegian society: “central parts of the foreign policy oriented civil service (...) can be said to have entered the EEC already in the early 1960s.”\(^{1582}\) The fierce resistance against the involvement of civil servants in the referendum campaign and the negative referendum had shocked the *Europeans* and ultimately resulted in a loss of prestige.\(^{1583}\)

Following the negative referendum, the Bratteli government was replaced by a parliamentary weak government consisting of the EC-sceptic Centre Party, the EC-ambivalent Christian People’s Party and the EC-sceptic remains of the divided Liberal Party, which was headed by Lars Korvald (Christian People’s Party). Its only mandate was to negotiate a trade agreement with the EC, a job it completed in the spring of 1973. The Korvald government deliberately avoided placing the most enthusiastic pro-Europeans in leading positions in the trade negotiations. The relationship was particularly strained between

\(^{1578}\) UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 12.01.1971 - Dictated by phone from Bergens Arbeiderblad. Accusations by Arne Haugestad against the Embassy in Brussels.

\(^{1579}\) UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 26.11.1971, Oslo – T. Greve – The language in the MFA’s booklets about the EC.

\(^{1580}\) UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 21.08.1972 – T. Greve – Mr. Sylfest Rosseland. The Press Department thanks you for your letter dated 15.08.

\(^{1581}\) Hallenstvedt Utenriksdepartementets handelspolitiske avdeling (1968), p. 88.

\(^{1582}\) Gleditsch, Østerud and Elster (Eds.) *De Utro Tjenere* (1974), p. 79.

the new negotiation leader, Director General of the MFA’s Legal Department Jens Evensen, and Ambassador Jahn Halvorsen.\textsuperscript{1584}

The criticism, the negative referendum and the trade negotiations deeply affected the Europeans. In fact, a remarkable number of Europeans changed their career paths following the referendum. Eivinn Berg left the service for many years, and worked as a director in the NSA. Arild Holland was asked to stay on for a while, to negotiate the trade agreement, but left the service in 1974 to become head of the Association of Pulp and Paper Industries. Asbjørn Skarstein was transferred to Ottawa, and Tim Greve became director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute in 1974.

Concluding remarks

The boundary-spanning efforts of the Europeans were new and challenged traditional diplomatic norms. Operating and mediating the boundaries of several different domestic and international arenas seems to have been part of a broader development that was particularly noticeable among multilateral economic diplomats. However, the Europeans were doing this for the European cause – under a government that was not able to speak with one voice. The distinction between private convictions and professional practices were blurred. As seen in previous chapters, it sparked many reactions from EC-sceptics within the government and parliament. However, it happened largely out of the public’s eye.

With their involvement in the Labour government’s official information campaign, the Europeans were brought into direct and persistent contact with the Norwegian public. Due to their conviction, expertise and boundary spanning efforts, and because of the impossible balance between unbiased information and pro-membership propaganda, many of the changes in their diplomatic norms that had been implicit now became explicit. Their ‘policy shaping’ capacities, their expertise and, not least, their participation in public political debates were called into question. There is no authoritative judge of whether the Europeans went beyond civil servant norms, except to say that they had changed and that many reacted to these changes. However, the defeat of established elites at the hands of the electorate followed a deep discrediting of the Europeans. This defeat and discrediting at the hands of the public was experienced as an institutional shock for the MFA, and a personal defeat for many Europeans.\textsuperscript{1585}

\textsuperscript{1584}Tamnes Oljeadler (1997), p. 179-180.
More fundamentally, the *Europeans* lost the diplomatic hegemony to voice ‘Norway’s interests’ on the international scene. The constant polemics between the *Europeans* and the public burst the image of the diplomat (and one could argue the state) somehow being above the people in such matters. Suddenly everyone felt allowed to define and question foreign policy, as it had become domestic policy too. The power to define the facts was dispersed. When the MFA booklets wrote of growth, the organised ‘no’ side would respond with, “What kind of growth?” and “Do we even want it”? This was the real impact of ‘1968’ and the referendum. The *Europeans’* comparison of the ‘People’s Movement’ and ‘Norway out of NATO’ was not by chance. Neither was Frydenlund’s slogan of *security, trust and continuity* in a situation where the Labour Party leadership saw the social fabric of their postwar hegemony eroding in front of their eyes. In an essential way, the postwar concepts of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ were opened up and redefined in the hectic years leading up to the referendum of 1972.
Epilogue

How the Europeans narrate(d) themselves

“The end of the story is what equates the present with the past, the actual with the potential. The hero is who he was.”

Paul Ricoeur on remembering.

The Norwegian electorate’s ‘no’ to entry into the EC was a kick in the teeth for the established political, economic and administrative elites of Norway. And few felt it more acutely than the Europeans – it meant professional and personal defeat. Indeed, many of them left the service following the referendum. How did the Europeans create a meaningful narrative from the professional and personal failure of the negative referendum?

As will be argued, the Europeans have reconciled the ingrained and institutionalis ed understanding of ‘the diplomat’ as a heroic character with the traumatic experience of the Norwegian ‘no’ by recasting and narrating themselves as martyrs, professionally sacrificed for a just cause: continued peace in Europe. Memories of the Second World War, their role as diplomats, the membership issue, and the failed referendum, all form part of the same narration. This narrative was profoundly shaped by the historically loaded discourses of the victorious ‘no’ side. In fact, as we shall see, the Europeans’ particular rationale in favour of membership could be labelled a fourth discourse in relation to the EC-case, which never captured the public’s imagination, and therefore became marginalised.

Making sense of memory

The epilogue analyses the interviews with the Europeans through a two-pronged approach. First, it builds on French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of meaning and narratives, and combines it with new insights on memory and interviews from the field of oral history. Ricoeur viewed self-understanding as constantly interpreted and defined through a

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1587 Ricoeur’s conceptual framework offers two benefits in relation to collective memory studies and oral history. Maurice Halbwachs, upon which much collective memory studies build, saw memory as inherently social and collective, as something that moved beyond memories of lived experiences (historical memory), and as a process through which social cohesion was achieved. Ricoeur, on the other hand, bids a crisp analytical tool to understand narration as it creates meaning for the individual, but does not exclude the collective cohesion that could come from sharing such narratives. Oral history does give heed to individual memory. Some adhere to the postmodernist or poststructuralist notion that language and discourse do not reflect the social and material world, they construct it, while others are more concerned with given voice to the voiceless. In this landscape, Ricoeur offers a hermeneutical middle way: for while there is certainly a ‘fictionalizing’ or creative element to remembering, there is a bond to the social reality of lived experiences of the past. Maurice Halbwachs On Collective Memory, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press ([1925] 1992); Anna Green “Can Memory be Collective?” in Donald A. Richie (Ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, Oxford: OUP (2011), pp. 96-111; Kathleen Canning “Feminist History after the Linguistic Turn: Historicizing Discourse and Experience”, in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 19:2 (1994).
hermeneutical narration of the self. Things that happen to us, Ricoeur argues, are given meaning through a narrative ‘emplotment’ in which events are ordered to uphold the plot. Thus, narratives do not necessarily operate with a linear understanding of time – instead events are connected to create a meaningful ‘self’ in the present. This ‘emplotment’ twirls together important life events, such as experiences of war or death, and major victories or defeats. Accordingly, the epilogue understands the Europeans’ narratives from the point of view of the conclusion, and the ‘chain of meaningful events’ as being narrated and pushed ‘back in time’. At the same time, it tries to incorporate the fact that this creation of meaning has happened continuously throughout their lives. Memories of the Second World War were structured, and structuring, for the Europeans in the 1960s, as well as today. Their thoughts on war, peace and integration are ‘put into play’ in different ways depending on time and context.

Second, the epilogue builds on Neumann’s notion of diplomats adhering to three ingrained, professional ‘stories’: the bureaucratic, heroic and mediator story. Neumann argues that when young and promising aspirants enter the Norwegian Foreign Service, they are “exposed to a diplomatic discourse that offers various stories of how to be a diplomat”. These stories of what makes a good (and bad) diplomat, are embedded in the discourses and practices of the diplomatic field and the MFA as an institution. Diplomats acquire, adhere to, and interpret these stories through diplomatic practice – this way they subscribe to the stories ‘to which they are supposed to subscribe’. As opposed to roles, which are context specific, Neumann argues that stories are relevant and meaningful in several contexts, and make up truly ingrained and internalised understandings of self. Thus, stories can be understood as collectively accessible, and institutionalised, diplomatic narratives. Or, put differently, stories are ‘templates’ of the core of what it means to be a good diplomat. Using Neumann’s stories as ideal types, we may explore the Europeans’ understanding of what made a good (and bad) diplomat, and how they redefined their professional self post-referendum.

1588 Mads Hermansen and Jacob D. Rendtorff (Eds.) *En hermeneutisk brobygger, tekster av Paul Ricoeur*, Århus: Klim (2002).
1593 Boudon *The Logic of Social Action* (1979), p. 40. This is a twist of Boudon’s definition of what a role is.
The Europeans and the ‘no’-side’s discourse

The ‘no’ side, with their effective grassroots movements, won the referendum. As seen above, one reason for the win had to do with their ability to successfully ‘tap into’ historically and culturally loaded discourses of ‘Europe’, being something different than ‘Norway’. Membership would entail a loss of Norway’s hard-won sovereignty, they argued, and was therefore a threat to Norway’s future existence. This was captured in the slogan, ‘self-determination’. The referendum was cast as this generation’s opportunity to protect the right to self-determination. The choice was effectively portrayed as a struggle between binary oppositions: ‘State’ vs. ‘People’, ‘Bureaucracy’ vs. ‘Parliament’, ‘Constitution’ vs. ‘Treaty of Rome’, ‘Sovereignty’ vs. ‘Union’, ‘Norway’ vs. ‘Europe’.\(^{1594}\) It was a linear and rhetorically powerful interpretation of history, already well developed in the first no-campaign in 1961:

“When big decisions were taken in our country's history – in 1814, 1905 and 1940 - a united people stood behind the choices. These decisions form the basis for our country's social, economic and cultural progress in recent times and obliges our generation to lead in the same direction.”\(^{1595}\)

The Europeans could not escape this discourse. As a bureaucratic elite with historical ties to the unions with Denmark and Sweden, they were constrained by how they were perceived. For example, CPP parliamentarian Asbjørn Haugstvedt argued, “as far as I can tell, full membership in the EC represents an open break with traditional Norwegian democracy (folkestyre). Ever since 1814, we have fought for the people’s right to govern the country, often against the civil servant regime.”\(^{1596}\) And Bjørn Unneberg of the Centre Party maintained:

“If we look at our history, we see that pro-union parties existed both in 1814 and 1905, which argued that Norway was best served by joining bigger [political] entities. Those days it was the right side in Norwegian politics and the civil servants. Today it is the Federation of Norwegian Industries, Norwegian Bankers’ Association, civil servants and party officials.”\(^{1597}\)

In this discourse, the diplomat – the quintessential civil servant – was a foreign element in cahoots with continental capitalists and great powers. Leftist writer, political activist and EC-sceptic Sigbjørn Hølmebak eloquently captured this sentiment when he spoke about the


\(^{1596}\) Asbjørn Haugstvedt, *St.t.* (1972), p. 3286-3287.

\(^{1597}\) Bjørn Unneberg, *St.t.* (1972), p. 3291.
MFA’s information campaign at a PM rally in 1972:

“I thought it would be best to begin with the MFA’s brochures. I don’t know if I did this because I had helped to pay for them, or because I still held on to the childish, innocent belief that the MFA wouldn’t lie. So, I sat down and read, as the lilies of the valley blossomed and the mackerel started to seep into the Lista fjord. It was the stupidest thing I could have done. Because slowly I realised that this was not information. It was propaganda. It was not clarifying, it was concealing. There was no attempt to shed light on dark and unknown places. The lighting was muted and soft, so as to make it intimate and pleasant, in order to create sweet music about cooperation and community in our hearts. This was the elegant rape in morning dress and pin stripes. So, I put the brochures down and went on the fjord.”

The elegant, smooth-talking and well-dressed MFA-men were contrasted with the pure, unspoiled and innocent fjord: civilised Europe versus natural Norway. In this dichotomy, ‘the diplomat’ was an agent of civilised Europe.

Throughout the EC-debacle, those opposed to membership continuously accused the Europeans of propagating for membership. Already during the first round, the EC sceptic newspaper Dagbladet claimed that full membership would mean “the gradual dismantlement of the Norwegian nation state”, and that the MFA tried to conceal this. This distrust was embedded in the discourse of the ‘no’ side, and given validity through historical imagery. With the end of the EC-struggle, then, the Europeans had challenged the traditional norms of diplomacy, through political agitation fuelled by personal conviction. The ‘no’ side, in turn, effectively condemned them to an existence outside of Norwegian political discourse as a foreign (European) element. It was this challenge to their professional lives combined with the shock of the negative referendum that would lead to a reinterpretation of the ingrained understanding of themselves as heroic diplomats.

**The heroic diplomat**

In his study of Norwegian diplomats, Neumann distinguishes a bureaucratic, a heroic and a mediator story, and argues that juggling them successfully is what constitutes a good diplomat. The three stories, Neumann argues, resemble Western society’s stories of what it means to be a good human in general. Philosopher Charles Taylor identified (at least) two such scripts or stories. One concerns the decency of everyday life. Neumann explains it as “doing all the little things that are expected of you in a wide range of different contexts (...) this

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1599 Dagbladet 04.04.1962, 28.10.1962.
1600 Neumann *At home with the Diplomats* (2012), p. 125.
story celebrates low-key, monotonous labouring life. It has no place for heroics in the sense of exceptionalism”. Rather, it is heroism in the shape of endurance. The image is the silent and admirable suffering of Christ, and makes up the bureaucratic story of the diplomat. The other story Taylor unveils concerns the good deed. “This is a hero story”, Neumann assesses, involving exceptional individual feats and spurts of creative genius. Here we are dealing with warrior ethics and turning water into wine. Such imagery underlies the heroic career diplomat. The face of the hero diplomat when at home is that of an adviser, “as close to the action as possible”, thriving in pulsating secretariats and mixing strictly diplomatic work with political actions. The face of the hero diplomat when stationed abroad is that of the masterminding field diplomat. The last story, which Neumann educes from his studies of the Norwegian MFA, is the self-effacing mediator. This story is specific for diplomacy, he argues, and is central to their understanding of what constitutes a good diplomat. One of the most important tasks of a diplomat is to successfully prepare sites (of negotiation) for others. When the negotiations are concluded, politicians – not diplomats – will put their name to the papers. Diplomacy, Neumann points out, “is about easing communication by turning yourself into an optimally functioning medium between other actors”. In a sense, all three stories are heroic, albeit in different ways.

The Europeans’ understanding of what made a good diplomat was narrated along the lines of these three stories. Håkon W. Freihow captured the bureaucratic story of the enduring character that does what is expected of him, no matter what, for instance, in his story of how Jahn Halvorsen reacted to the negative referendum in September 1972:

“I remember right before the referendum, I had bought a lot of champagne to the Embassy. We were supposed to give toasts. And then it happened – we did not become members – we were all very surprised. (...) We were, of course, very disappointed. But I remember Jahn Halvorsen, he was a passionate pro-European, had worked for it with his information back home, and through his broad network in the Commission (...) So, when the results were in, he disappeared up to his office, and then he called a meeting, and stated: ‘The decision has been made, and our task, in these circumstances, is to work to obtain the best terms possible. The decision is made, and we must adhere, as we always do, to the instruction from ‘home’.’ He was an exceptional civil servant. The ambassador, and I’ve had many good ones, but I rank him the highest.”

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1601 Iver B. Neumann “To be a Diplomat” in International Studies Perspectives 6, 2005, p. 73.
1603 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 98.
1605 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 121.
Freihow, when referring to Halvorsen’s enduring and loyal characteristics, explicitly labelled him ‘an exceptional civil servant’, thus highlighting the bureaucratic traits of a diplomat.

The heroic story was also part of the Europeans’ self-perception. The belief that as diplomats, they were practitioners, out in the real world, as opposed to many other experts and civil servants, was fundamental. The heroic story entailed being ‘a man of action’, as captured in this reflection by Arne Langeland: “I just did what I thought to be right. No, I didn’t have any philosophical reflections.”\textsuperscript{1607} The diplomat was not trapped behind a desk, but someone who engaged with people. Arild Holland clearly made a distinction between being ‘book-smart’ and being a heroic diplomat: “everything concerning diplomacy, all negotiations, is about personal chemistry, the ability to socialise with people – it’s everything. You can be dumb as a bag of hammers – but if you’re able to win the hearts of those you negotiate with, you can go very far.”\textsuperscript{1608} Arne Langeland also juxtaposed the two when he reflected on how the proto-European Einar Løchen differed from career diplomats: “one thing is to have read and written about it. You know when you are in negotiations, when you negotiate, all that, that’s what we know. (...) You don’t get that through reading.”\textsuperscript{1609}

Last, the Europeans also adhered to the mediating story. The notion of being able to build bridges between people, institutions, or negotiating standpoints was an essential part of their professional identities. As Neumann notes, it is the “negotiating itself, the doing that is seen to be of key importance”, where the diplomat becomes an “optimally functioning medium” to the point of being self-effacing.\textsuperscript{1610} Terje Johannessen used the same imagery of a medium or channel: “You get, either consciously or subconsciously, a sense of what the receiver wants.”\textsuperscript{1611} Similarly we may recall, from chapter 10, how Sommerfelt facilitated a meeting between Norwegian nature and Commission President Malfatti.\textsuperscript{1612}

All of these deeply ingrained stories of what it meant to be a good diplomat were templates that the Europeans drew upon when they remembered and narrated themselves in the interviews. Moreover, they were present in their diplomatic practice – how they worked with the EC-case – in the 1960s and early 1970s. Following the negative referendum, the juggling diplomat hero had to be reinvented for the Europeans to remember the EC-debacle in a meaningful way.

\textsuperscript{1607} Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
\textsuperscript{1608} Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012.
\textsuperscript{1609} Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
\textsuperscript{1610} Neumann \textit{At home with the Diplomats} (2012), p. 120-121.
\textsuperscript{1611} Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012.
\textsuperscript{1612} Sommerfelt \textit{Sendemann} (1997), p. 149. \textit{My translation.}
Memories of War

To understand how the diplomat hero was reinvented following the negative referendum, we need to explore how memories of the Second World War play(ed) an important part in their work with the EC-case, their interpretation of the negative referendum, and personal narratives of who they are today.

The Second World War is omnipresent in the Europeans’ memories, works, and publications. Being kids or young adults during the war, most of them have unadorned and childish memories of life during the occupation, often free of intricate political analysis.\(^{1613}\) Thorvald Stoltenberg, 12 years old in 1943, experienced the war from a cottage north of Oslo. He kept track of the progress of the allied forces through two sisters living nearby who delivered illegal news – and drew the frontlines with needles and threads on a giant map of Europe in his room.\(^{1614}\) Arne Langeland described the German occupation of a small, unnamed town in Norway, in his semi-fictional novel, My little town (1988), based partly on his memories from the war:

“The 11th April the Germans marched into the town. They had stayed in the outskirts for twenty-four hours or so – the boys had seen them. A small detachment of Norwegian soldiers was sent towards them but was quickly withdrawn. People fled from the city, they got away in cars, busses and lorries. The farms in the area took them in, all kinds of rumours spread. Young boys and men poured into the police station and the district sheriff’s office to be mobilised – to no avail. Nobody knew anything; nobody knew what he or she was supposed to do, or where to enquire. Men cried overtly, they felt debased.”\(^{1615}\)

Langeland vividly describes how the adults around him reacted to the occupation, seen from a young boy’s perspective (Langeland was 12 years old in 1940). Even though they did not take active part in the war, their experiences of it were often dramatic. Many of the Europeans remember, for example, how their fathers were taken as prisoners by German troops.\(^{1616}\)

Those a bit older had more concrete confrontations with, and memories of, war, and perhaps more articulated resentments. Arild Holland, for example, voiced such resentments:

“I have experienced war: my mother’s home town, Kristiansund, was bombed to the ground in April 1940; my father was severely injured in 1943; two, slightly older, school-mates of mine were

\(^{1613}\) The average age of the Europeans was just shy of 17 years in 1940. Attachment 1 – Statistics.
\(^{1615}\) Arne Langeland Min lille by, Oslo: Grondahl & Son Forlag (1988), p. 43; Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
\(^{1616}\) Salvesen: Thorvalds Verden (1994), p. 15. His father was sent to the concentration camp Luckenwalde, outside of Berlin, in 1943. Similarly, Ibsen Jr., Skarstein, Holland and Freihow’s fathers were imprisoned by the Germans.
tortured to death; my closest friend and neighbour was imprisoned for nearly a year (17 years old) and suffered from it afterwards; and I was on Gestapo’s list, but got away by sheer luck”  

At the age of fourteen when the war came to Norway, Holland remembered hiding on the rooftop of a building until night came – afraid to go home – while the Gestapo arrested many of his friends. Many years later, he thought he was dreaming away the war while he was hiding up there. Asbjørn Skarstein, 21-years-old in 1943, had just started his degree in economics in Bergen when he was tipped off that German troops would be arresting students. Skarstein, with friends, fled Bergen on bikes, crossing the mountains from Western Norway to Eastern Norway. Afraid that Gestapo would find him in his hometown at Oslo, Skarstein sought refuge at his grandfather’s cabin in Southern Norway. 

The youngest Europeans, like Terje Johannessen (five-years-old in 1940), had vague memories of wartime Norway. Growing up during the war he recognised that war “was a bad thing”. Johannessen, on the other hand, had clear memories of the immediate postwar years, and came to link the years of occupation with Soviet annexations in the early cold war:

“Our generation, we will never be entirely free from what we grew up with. First you had the war itself and the occupation of a small, peaceful country, as we were; then, even more significantly, what happened in Eastern Europe, with those countries, especially with Czechoslovakia. It has left a mark that is always a part of our mind-set.”

Only the oldest Europeans had direct experience with the war: Jahn Halvorsen, 24-years-old in 1940, participated in the battle of Narvik, where allied forces first pushed back the Germans and then capitulated. Working in London during the war, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt (24-years-old in 1940) recalled, “sometimes, when the bombs were raining down, I volunteered as a fireguard”. Even during the worst times of German bombing, he goes on, small bottles of milk would be delivered to his doorstep in London every day. “As long as the milk was delivered”, he said, “I knew victory would be ours, sooner or later.”

Thousands and thousands of contemporary Norwegians and millions of contemporary Europeans shared such experiences. Memories like those of the Europeans were common to a whole generation who had felt the horrors of war first hand. The point here is not the veracity

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1619 Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014.  
1621 Aftenposten 15.05.1976: "Ambassador Jahn Halvorsen", by Helge Seip.  
of these experiences and memories, but rather how the Europeans came to explicitly link them with European integration. Through their work with the EC-case, the Europeans’ memories of The Second World War were given a new meaning. The concept of peace was practiced and narrated into the integration project – and eventually came to serve as an enduring and emotionally charged rationale for why membership was necessary.

**Peace and Integration**

It is unsurprising that the Second World War and notions of European integration as a peace project were prominent in the minds of the Europeans in the 1960s, following the negative referendum, and even today. After all, the devastating experiences of the Second World War was at the heart of why the six original member states of the ECSC chose to pool sovereignty. What is interesting, however, is how memories, events and professional stories were reconfigured – or re-emplotted – at different times.

The Europeans’ linkage between ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ can be traced back to their work with multilateral diplomacy in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. With the EC-case – ‘integration as a vehicle of peace’ became a strong political discourse among the many pro-European forces. In these environments, the Europeans’ memories of war were given new significance. Since then, the relationship between ‘war’, ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ has been an important aspect of the Europeans’ narrative. Today the Europeans inextricably conjoin experiences of war, the quest for peace, and their support of Norway joining the EC. So much so, that all three aspects often appear in the same sentence. Håkon W. Freihow, for example, explains that the arrest of his father during the war and his own need to go into hiding “contributed significantly in shaping my view of Europe in the future. I became a warm supporter of the EC”. Similarly, Thorvald Stoltenberg links the three: “what preoccupied me, what preoccupied many of us, was ‘never again war’, and how to build peace. In the 1950s I didn’t know of, and still today I don’t know of, a better way to do it than by making people mutually dependent on each other (...) and the necessity of supranationalism, it’s deeply rooted within me, and has been with me since my days as a student.” These are clear examples of what Ricoeur called the threefold mimesis, in which the narrative created to order one’s experiences in turn becomes an integrated part of one’s identity.

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1624 Interview – Håkon W. Freihow – 16.05.2013: “Håkon W. Freihow”.


This mantra of ‘never again war’ is something all of the Europeans uttered during interviews. It makes clear the important link created between peace and integration, but also evidences how many times this link must have been retold as a story. Consider, for example, Arild Holland’s memories of how he, immediately after de Gaulle’s first veto, understood the significance of the EC:

“And then I remember that I, one weekend, took all the papers we [the MFA] had on the Communities with me home and sat a Saturday and Sunday late in January 1963 and read and studied, studied and read, and then I understood the whole thing. This wasn’t bloody economy – that was just a means to an end. It was about abolishing war in Europe, just like I had dreamt when I was sitting on the kerb during the war. That’s when I became Norway’s biggest EC advocate.”

Arild Holland’s defining moment is described with literary features (‘read and studied, studied and read’) often found in Norwegian fairy tales. The linearity of his memories is also striking: The dreams from his childhood were about to become a reality. Two major life events have been narrated together. Arne Langeland also draws a direct line between war, peace and integration: “yes, because it was after the war (...) and when we spoke with each other, it was about keeping Europe together. It was something fundamental within us.”

Equally, Terje Johannessen instinctively link the two: “I saw it as an instrument to create peace, keep in mind it was only 10-12 years since the war, and I had grown up with the war.”

The conjoining of ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ was something that slowly developed through their work with the EC-case in the 1960s and early 1970s. In a Norwegian setting, it came to be their unique ‘take’ on the membership issue. Large parts of the political and administrative elite involved with the EC, and earlier in OEEC and other organisations, were convinced of the benefits of peaceful multilateral cooperation. This conviction was shared by anyone from hard-boiled federalists to cautious intergovernmentalists. The Europeans took part in the discourse of integration as an instrument of peace in Paris of the 1950s, or Brussels of the 1960s, as evidenced by Asbjørn Skarstein’s dispatch in February 1962, in which he reminded the politicians back home that the EEC was not only about economics: “the Treaty

1628 It is a ‘way of speaking’, that clearly draws on the genre qualities of the fairy tales of Per Chr. Asbjørnsen and Jørgen Moe Norske Folkeventyr I-III, Oslo: Aschehough (2012).
1629 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
of Rome is therefore – in its consequence – a peace movement that, with its effective measures, could possibly be compared with the League of Nations or the United Nations. This, at least seems to be true if one looks at the movement in a historical perspective.”

Moreover, the Europeans became increasingly involved with the EMN in the 1960s. The EMN had, since its creation, explicitly linked peace and integration, and the Europeans came to adhere to this language and rationale. For instance, soon after de Gaulle’s first veto, when Magne Reed discussed the EMN’s future with European Jahn Halvorsen, Reed proclaimed: “the basic idea of European cooperation is to clean out the last vestiges of historical conflicts, power struggles and economic troubles in Europe, thus making a new war unthinkable and impossible.”

Peace, war and the EC were also the major elements in the newspaper ads of the EMN leading up to the referendum:

“‘Mind your own business’, they said in the Europe of the 1930s. ‘We do not want any meddling in internal affairs’. Each country had enough with their own, without community and cooperation. One by one, they fell at the hands of an aggressive dictatorship. During the war two things became clear to the Norwegians: first, that Norway had to become free again. Second, that countries now had to cooperate, if freedom was to prove lasting. (…) This was why the EC was created.”

Furthermore, as seen above, in negotiating with the Community, the Europeans came to develop and articulate an explicitly political rationale for membership in the EC. Thus, the tactical considerations of the Europeans linked Atlantic security, and therefore the avoidance of war, with membership in the EC in a Cold War setting. “It was foresight that lay behind the Norwegian London-Government’s Atlantic policy, while country and people lay ridden by the German occupants”, Sommerfelt wrote in his 1997 memoirs, continuing, “for me membership in the EC was a continuation of the economic and political line followed for 25 years since the victory and the peace.”

Last, the Europeans helped facilitate the Labour Party’s social democratic vision of Europe in the mid to late 1960s. This vision explicitly linked ideas of ‘solidarity’ and ‘world peace’, with the political project of a more socialist Europe. The Labour Party leadership developed this vision together with a dense pro-European social democratic network that spanned across Europe. Bratteli, for example, consistently understood and articulated the membership issue as a matter of perpetuating

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1632 UD 44.36/6.84–8 – 21.02.1962, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen/A. Skarstein – Norway’s position in the economic and political Community in Europe.
1633 UD 44.36/6.84 P.-1 – 02.04.1963, Oslo – M. Reed - Memo. The uropean Committee. Goals and tasks.
Terje Johannessen recalled how Bratteli, echoing the lessons of the interwar period, often said: ‘the day commodities stop crossing the borders, the armies will come instead’.1637

Already in the 1960s, then, the Europeans drew a rather direct line between their memories of war, European integration, and the prospect of peace. The combination of the Europeans’ generational understanding, education and work with the EC-case, and with it, their connections abroad and at home, created a specific link between peace and integration. It was within this context that the Europeans tried to convey a particular understanding to the electorate up until the referendum.

The inaugurated few

During their work with the EC-case, the Europeans contrasted their unique understanding of why membership was necessary with what they understood as the lack of knowledge among the Norwegian electorate. The fundamental task was to make the voters understand what they, the Europeans, already knew. Successive governments chose to discuss the membership issue almost exclusively in economic terms, and there was no official information campaign until the last months before the referendum. The Europeans, therefore, often displayed a tension, between their wish to bridge the gap between ‘Norway’ and ‘Europe’, and feelings of resignation over what they saw as a misguided debate, and the general ignorance and the inward-looking nature of Norwegians.

During the first round (1960-1963), Langeland stressed that membership of the EEC had to be presented as a continuation of the Labour Government’s foreign and security policy throughout the post-war era. We recall how he thought it impossible to create “a kind of ‘European enthusiasm’, but instead hoped to convince the electorate that membership was a political necessity.1638 His comments on ‘European enthusiasm’, taking part ‘as a loyal member’ and ‘joining a Community’, are riddled with tension. Langeland placed himself on the outside of what he understood as a Norwegian mentality, and simultaneously revealed that he, as opposed to others, had adopted a Community-thinking. He thus extracted himself from the Norwegian discourse of ‘Europe as the Other’, and spoke of himself instead as a European. But he did not only distance himself from the Norwegian mentality, he juxtaposed it to ‘trust’ in the outside world – the Norwegian mentality was therefore portrayed as myopic.

Similarly, when Otto Kildal retired in 1967 after serving as ambassador to Brussels and The Hague, he felt the need to comment upon what he thought was a derailed and parochial

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1638 UD 44.36/6.84 – 18.04.1962, Oslo – A. Langeland – Norway’s relationship with the EEC. Certain remarks.
membership debate in the Norwegian Parliament: “the Community is both a common market and a political idea of peace and cooperation, and we have to strive towards membership even though there will be obstacles along the way.” Asked by the journalist what he thought of the membership-sceptics’ argument that Norway would loose its sovereignty, he answered: “are there no limits to the small-town mentality and inferiority complexes? Shouldn’t Norway be able to raise its independent voice just as well as the Dutch within the Community, or the Belgians?”

Likewise, Egil Winsnes, at the Norwegian embassy in Paris, received complaints about his lectures on Norway and the EC to visiting Norwegians, and wrote back to MFA State Secretary Thorvald Stoltenberg:

“I usually touch upon what I jestingly call the “long live Toten [a part of the agricultural inland in Norway], to hell with Norway”—mentality. A mentality in which the feeling of solidarity stops a few meters past the living room door, and which is the biggest obstacle to building a communitarian solidary Europe.”

Though it is abundantly clear that the Europeans thought Norwegian attitudes towards the Community was a problem, the aim was to overcome this hurdle. Still, feelings of being outside, or above, are easy to detect. In 1962, Asbjørn Skarstein, for example, complained – after underlining that the EEC was “a peace movement” – that “it’s difficult to understand the Norwegian opposition to the European Communities – seen from the outside. It’s almost as if it’s from another time.”

We are only able to appreciate the significance of these feelings of frustration and resignation in light of the role they played in memories of the Europeans after the negative referendum. For it was these feelings of being among the inaugurated few that became cemented after the ‘no’. “In Norway”, 50 years after the referendum, Langeland reflected, “there was a fundamental distrust of Germany; and of France, and the Italians, all these southern Europeans. The level of distrust was immense. (...) Here we touch upon something fundamental: Norwegians didn’t understand the first thing about this. Even the most educated people didn’t understand it. There was a fundamental scepticism, which exists to this day.”

When I tried to press him on why they didn’t understand, Langeland replied: “the country is far to the north, middle of nowhere.”

\[1640 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf. – August 2, 1972, Paris – Egil Winsnes – Kjære Stoltenberg.
\[1641 UD 44.36/6.84–8 – 21.02.1962, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen/Asbjørn Skarstein – Norway’s position in the economic and political Community in Europe.
\[1642 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
the way I did because I didn’t have any objections. It was perfectly fine with me that the world turned out like this. I had no preconceived notions. And I thought it was exciting.”

Arild Holland, too, gives a tangible example of the differences between being among those who understood, and those who didn’t. Holland’s old teacher at the University, famous economist Ragnar Frisch, who he respected deeply, called the EEC the ‘unenlightened plutocracy’. “Everybody wrote and spoke of economy”, Holland remembers, “no one – absolutely no one – understood that this was about permanently ending war in Europe”.

Equally, Arild Holland’s obituary of Asbjørn Skarstein is illuminating:

“In Brussels too [1962-63], Asbjørn Skarstein was the right man in the right place. He was one of the first in Norway that understood the background for the EEC-cooperation. Even though it was about economic cooperation, it was also a comprehensive peace initiative – making a new war in Western Europe impossible. EEC’s peace aspect was decisive in Skarstein’s positive attitude towards Norwegian membership.”

The inextricable link between ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ defined what it meant to be among the inaugurated few.

Holland, as Langeland, portrays Norway as myopic and provincial, when explaining the enthusiasm for the Danish Nordek proposal: “it fit the Norwegian parliamentarians like a glove, most of them do not know any languages, but they loved ‘Norden’, because then they could speak their mother tongue [said in a broad dialect] you know”. Tancred Ibsen Jr. makes the same distinction, contrasting himself to the Norwegian mentality, when explaining why he became so invested in the membership issue: “you could say I’m a European. I come from a segment of the people that has had just as many contacts abroad as at home. So, I’m a Norwegian European (...) And I thought that Norway should find its place in Europe...” He remembered talking to Jahn Halvorsen after the negative referendum: “Jahn was distraught and angered. Absolutely. We were distraught. (...) But there was nothing you could do. The Norwegian people didn’t want to. We are... Norwegians are isolationists and difficult.” Illustratively, he corrects himself in the last sentence, and places himself outside the discourse.

After the negative referendum, the need to bridge the gap disappeared, and the bitter EC-struggle cemented the elements of conflict. The negative referendum thus led to a subtle, but important, shift in the Europeans’ narrative. They were among the inaugurated few who

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1643 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012.
1644 Interview – Arild Holland – 09.01.2014.
understood what the EC really was – namely a political project to prevent war. To their mind, neither the organised ‘no’ side, nor the broad majority of the people, understood this. More fundamentally, Norway was, and is, fundamentally detached and different from Europe. One may note, therefore, that both the Europeans and EC-sceptics placed ‘the diplomat’ outside of Norwegian political discourse. Moreover, the political discourse of Europe, as a vehicle of peace, which failed to capture the electorate’s imagination, is transmuted into a private narrative among the Europeans.

Reading the quotes above one gets an image of a few heroic diplomats fighting against a dominant force – their memories highlight how they were a discursive minority. Nowhere is this imagery more clear than in Arild Holland’s retelling of the day they travelled to the ratification ceremony:

“Saturday January 22, 1972 I was, together with some other civil servants, supposed to travel together with [Prime Minister] Bratteli and [Foreign Minister] Cappelen, both with spouses, to Brussels to take part in the ratification ceremony. Already at Fornebu [Airport] the drama started (...) When I arrived in a taxi at Fornebu, a crowd had gathered outside the entry. To my stupefaction I saw Bratteli and his wife surrounded by protesters, preventing them from the entry. I was able to get Randi Bratteli under the arm, and together we forced our way through the crowd. At the entry I met a SAS-employee and I asked him to take care of Mrs Bratteli who exclaimed: ‘Take care of my husband’! I ran back. Bratteli was still surrounded by squawking protesters, which he tried to keep away by swirling a couple of travelling bags around. I was able to guide Bratteli out, as his driver came to help as well. Luckily, it didn’t come to violence. When we had broken out of the circle, the protesters began to sing ‘Ja, vi elsker’ [the Norwegian national anthem]. It struck me as rather grotesque, when I thought about what Bratteli had been trough as a prisoner in Germany”.

Rather than the diplomat heroically building bridges across landmasses almost impossibly far apart, the story became one of the Europeans being among the few who fought for a morally just cause, but were defeated at the hands of the unknowing and unwilling masses. Widespread misconceived nationalism prevailed over righteous, peace-seeking cosmopolitanism. The personal and professional defeat of losing the referendum, being discredited by the ‘no’ side and, in some instances, leaving the service, was thus squared with the story of the heroic diplomat in order to create meaning. In this imagery, it is clear that both the warrior-like, and the self-effacing mediator hero, faded to the background, leaving a

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suffering and enduring hero. Thus, a new character rose from the ashes of the EC-struggle: the martyr.

**Retelling Stories**

Tamnes rightly noted that, “no two scenarios are alike, but some are more alike than others. The EC/EU-cases, as they developed up until to the critical decisions of 1972 and 1994 have many noticeable similarities.”\(^{1649}\) In both instances, Norway was forced by external events to apply for membership negotiations before it was politically prepared, and the government was dragging its feet, negotiating a difficult dossier and demanding special treatment. And both times, the primary sector and loss of sovereignty were the two major stumbling blocks in the negotiations, and the whole endeavour ended with the Norwegian electorate voting against membership.\(^{1650}\) However, while 1972 was a defining generational experience, a landmark for an entire people, 1994 will first and foremost be remembered for the Winter Olympics in Lillehammer.\(^{1651}\) There is no doubt the *Europeans* today feel the same way: 1994 was a pale repetition of 1972, which confirmed that Norway would continue to be referred to “the sidelines and marginalised from the economic and political integration in Europe” as Eivinn Berg puts it. Berg returned to the MFA as chief negotiator at the deputy level both in the European Economic Area and the enlargement negotiations with the EU in the 1990s.\(^{1652}\)

The second negative referendum also strengthened the *Europeans’* feeling of belonging to the inaugurated few. Although retired from the MFA, Arild Holland engaged in the membership debate in the 1990s, giving interviews and lectures, but explained that he ‘gave up’ when he understood that the government once again focused exclusively on economic matters.\(^{1653}\) Terje Johannessen agreed: “Trade policy is security policy, and that is the politics of peace. And that dimension was completely missing – wasn’t even on the horizon in the Norwegian debate, neither in 72’ nor in 94’”.\(^{1654}\) “Now, finally, the peace perspective is starting to come to the fore with the handing out of the Nobel Peace Prize”, Holland mused in 2013, a year after the European Union had received it, as if to say that the mistakes repeated since the 1960s might still be rectified.\(^{1655}\)

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\(^{1650}\) 53.5 % and 52.2 % voted against entry in 1972 and 1994 respectively.


\(^{1655}\) Interview – Arild Holland – 20.02.2013.
“He’s been very preoccupied with the political aspects lately” Eivinn Berg noted about Holland, “he never brings something up in our group – the European Movement’s senior group – without giving a flaming lecture on the Coal and Steel Community and Schuman and all that. Like hearing a new Peace Prize speech. And I fully agree with him, it was neglected.” The argument that the EC/EU has contributed to peace and stability has never gained popular appeal, or even significantly coloured, the Norwegian debate, former editor of the bourgeois newspaper Aftenposten Per Egil Hegge reflected in 2013. Hegge adds: “for the ‘yes-people’ the Peace Prize (...) was a just and well-founded appreciation”.

In later life, the process of ‘life review’ – involving the time and desire to remember one’s life – strengthens the importance, and sometimes the accuracy, of long-term memory. Such a tendency helps to structure temporally ‘long’ plots, and gives a cohesive meaning to one’s life. It is clear today that the Europeans make little distinction between the EC and the EU, or 72’ and 94’ – they are all part of the same narrative. When they meet and share these experiences, they retell and remodel the story of themselves and Europe, and it seems that they strengthen the causal link between war, peace and Europe. By ‘reliving’ the experience of 1972, in 1994 they have confirmed their belief that they are rather alone in understanding what European integration is really about. “Looking back from the conclusion to the episodes leading up to it”, Ricoeur wrote, “we have to be able to say that this ending required these sorts of events and this chain of actions”.

It is this fictionalising process that has created a meaningful experience out of the professional and personal failure of the negative referendum. Today, the remaining Europeans are retired, and live in the wealthy and esteemed western outskirts of Oslo. In fact, most of them live within walking distance of each other – a village, so to speak, of former diplomats. With few exceptions, they remain very close friends: they are ‘best friends’, or at least ‘close friends’, they are godfathers to each other’s children and served as ‘best man’ in each other’s weddings. Many of them meet regularly in the EMN offices. Alone in sharing this unique experience of working with the EC-case so closely, they retell and uphold the narrative of the diplomatic martyr. To this day they refer to themselves as Europeans.

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1658 Thompson “Memory and remembering in oral history” (2001), p. 82.
Norway, in the end, did not join the Community – the journey the Europeans helped navigate was incomplete. Jahn Halvorsen, for instance, – recognised as the most influential, knowledgeable, and ardently pro-membership European in a Norwegian context – would remain in a European context, as a Danish official teased, “the everlasting student”.1661 As we have learned throughout this thesis, being a European meant being caught in the middle. Who the Europeans were and how they worked with the EC-case, therefore, is best understood by unpacking the criss-cross of norms, diplomatic space, discourses and practices that made up their layered in-betweenness.

Between Europe and Norway

As this thesis has argued, it makes good sense to study foreign policy as both transnational and national, and as shaped in-between (political) entities through transfers and translations of ideas, strategies and concepts. Norwegian European policy was shaped in the middle, through the Europeans’ practice. In formulating policy, they adopted a communitarian language and logic: the radical, trust-based, negotiation strategy created in late-1962, the establishment line in the fisheries negotiations, and the emphasis on embracing the political finalité and the adoption and performance of the acquis, were all products of this. The enlargement process, therefore, disciplined Norwegian politics via the Europeans (and others) – an embryo of the pre-accession logic that the EU operates with today. However, the flow went the other way too: the communitarian fishery policy developed by the Europeans would, in the end, contribute to the downfall of the EC’s own Common Fisheries Policy. Moving past the ‘road to membership’-narratives, then, this thesis has uncovered an important instance of the ‘outside’ shaping the ‘inside’, and showed that the non-membership of Norway should be understood and studied as an integral part of the first enlargement.

The Europeans were between Europe and Norway in another way, too. The combination of the role of the diplomat, and the connotations attached to him in Norwegian society, the ‘no’ side’s historically loaded rhetoric of ‘Europe as the Other’, and the personal conviction of the Europeans and their norm-breaking participation in the information campaigns, led to ‘the diplomat’ being discursively pushed outside the concept of ‘Norway’, which was synonymous

1661 UM GS 108 B 2–17 – 02.03.1966, Brussels – Danish-Norwegian contacts. It was Bartels who called Halvorsen “evighedsstudenten”.

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with ‘the People’. The *Europeans* contributed to this by juxtaposing their trust in the outside world (the EC) with what they conceived as the myopic distrust displayed by ‘the People’ – they were among the few who understood why membership was a good thing. However, EC officials, representatives and politicians of the member states, Monnet’s Action Committee, and others, continuously questioned Norway’s ‘Europeanness’, and placed ‘Norway’ outside ‘Europe’.

At the heart of the *Europeans* work with the EC-case, therefore, was a continuous effort to bridge the gap between ‘Europe’ and ‘Norway’. One way of doing this was through an elaborate and unique form of public diplomacy, which entailed flying Norwegians to Community sites and the Embassy in Brussels, and Community and member state officials to Norway to encounter its unique nature. The public diplomacy of physical connectivity was *as much* about changing the Norwegian outlook as it was about changing the position of the EC, and sought to communicate that Norway was at once a distinct and a natural part of Europe. It aimed at reproducing the *Europeans*’ experience of the two entities – from in-between – within a position of trust and understanding. Equally, the creation of a communitarian fishery policy intended to shape Europe in the Norwegian image displayed their in-betweenness. It was at once an acceptance of the communitarian logic and the superiority of the Norwegian model. The efforts at bridging the gap, we have seen, were driven by both personal and professional convictions.

*Between personal and professional*

The *Europeans* were a community of likeminded MEDs: a highly autonomous, emotionally tight-knit, elite of multilateral economic diplomats with a recognised expertise on European integration, and who defined themselves through their passion for, and belief in, a Norwegian EC-membership. This community coalesced and defined itself through the first round of negotiations (1960-63). Within three years, the *Europeans* and the foreign policy leadership fundamentally changed their attitudes to European integration: from distrust, via acquiescence, to eagerness. The membership line was *their* policy and starting point, in the sense that the *Europeans* had been fundamental in shaping it, and defending it became their *modus operandi*. It underpinned why the *Europeans* defended a *certain kind* of application in all three rounds, why they entered the EMN in the mid-1960s, opposed Nordek in the late 1960s, and engaged in public information campaigns in the early 1970s. By the time of the referendum, the *Europeans* were engaged in several different pro-European networks, most importantly the EMN, and operated between these entities as boundary-spanners for the
European cause. There was a deep sense of intimacy and trust among the Europeans, and their pro-European surroundings, precisely because they shared the cause.

The reasoning behind the membership line, produced by the community of Europeans, circled around the discourses of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’. They were produced in the middle, and were shaped by ideas from the Community and other applicants, and from the experiences and expertise of the Europeans themselves. The core argument was that EC-membership lay in continuation of NATO-membership – it was another layer in the Atlantic Community. This argument, the Europeans thought, would be appealing both in a European and domestic context. In the European context, it was used as a warning of the consequences if Norway remained on the outside, together with the neutrals and within the reach of the Soviets. But also as a way of signalling that Norway, indeed, was a natural part of Western Europe. In the domestic context it failed to gain prominence. Gerhardsen feared it would split the Labour Party and Borten would have no talk of political implications of membership. Only from 1971 onwards, when Bratteli took over and carried with him elements of the social democratic vision of Europe, did this reasoning become part of the government’s rhetorical arsenal, but by that time it was too late – the question of sovereignty and economic arguments dominated the domestic debate.

However, the Europeans belief in, and ownership of, a particular membership line had deeper roots. At the time, and even more so after the referendum, the Europeans developed a normative and emotional rationale, seeing European integration as a vehicle of peace. This view was formed by their generational experiences and memories of war, their multilateral diplomatic environment, their participation in the European Movement and their connections with the transnational Social Democratic networks. In the dying days of the information campaigns, ‘peace’ was pushed to the fore as the ‘yes’ side’s last emotional plea. These convictions were instrumental in their work. Between the personal and the professional, the Europeans helped to create and uphold a certain discourse of Europe, which after the referendum remained central in keeping them together as a community. But the ability to create policy, to such a degree, was also determined by developments within their particular diplomatic field.

**Between diplomacy and politics**

Most international history gives character, memories and agency to great statesmen while leaving diplomats as the silent facilitators: their job is to prepare the ground for others, one assumes, without predispositions or influence. Not so. Centring the diplomats, their norms,
backgrounds, spaces, discourses and practices, this thesis has uncovered plenty of agency: the *Europeans* belonged to a young war generation of multilateral economic diplomats who gained new capacities, more room for policy formation, and entered new international and national spaces. They were experts and boundary-spanners, and their practices and field of diplomacy blurred the distinction between foreign and domestic politics. The EC-case is an extreme example: multilateral negotiations concerning the very social fabric of Norwegian society were directly tied to a consultative referendum.

The *Europeans* held key positions in-between the various arenas, and through their expertise they created politics and articulated a political foundation to Norway’s application for membership negotiations in the early 1960s, which profoundly shaped the outlook, policies and arguments of the pro-European political and economic elites up until the referendum. They created a communitarian fishery policy, which the Bratteli government defended in negotiations until late 1971, and were instrumental in the organisation of the information campaigns and the formulation of its argumentation.

Administrative and diplomatic power is different from political power. This thesis has disentangled the diplomats as the silent extension of politicians and analysed their practice through the lens of their norms, institutions and knowledge production. This has, ironically, made it possible to understand the political potential of the *Europeans*. The way Langeland adopted elements of the Danish and British negotiation strategies, to make Norway “work through the Community machinery” in the first round; the way Halvorsen and Skaug publicly denounced their own government’s indecisiveness in the second round; how Greve instructed newspaper editors to counter those opposed to membership and how Holland and Ølberg reversed the decision of the WG on fishery questions thus profoundly changing what would have been Norway’s future fishery regime; all were ways in which the *Europeans* entered the realm of politics by way of their diplomatic capabilities.

In the end, the *Europeans’* political engagement in 1971-72 exploded established diplomatic norms – they were not the silent mediators, the loyal servants, or the ‘objective’ experts anymore. As this thesis has shown, this was the product of a glacial shift in diplomatic practices on-going since the Second World War, the demise of the Labour Party hegemony in the mid-1960s, the distrust of Borten and the EC-sceptics, and the *Europeans’* personal and professional engagement in pro-European networks. In this context, the breakdown of the Labour Party hegemony was a turning point, for this led the *Europeans* to become explicitly engaged with the EMN, which in turn cemented their new role as boundary-spanners for the European cause. The new role was exposed during the information campaigns, through the
fundamental criticism of the victorious ‘no’ side – a distinct manifestation of the 1968 ‘system’ criticism. The Europeans were discredited, and, at least at the time, the MFA lost its legitimacy in voicing ‘national interests’. The fate of the Europeans was an aborted trajectory towards careers as part of the technocratic elites of the Community. Nonetheless, their practices capture the many ways in which such an elite wielded its power upon entry.

Between continuity and change

The 1960s and early 1970s were times of rapid transition – placed between the postwar order and the tumultuous globalising 1970s – and the Europeans embodied both change and continuity. On the one hand, their arguments, negotiation strategies and advice with regards to membership in the EC were anchored in the well-established postwar concepts of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’. In fact, the Europeans work with the EC-case was in many ways an unremitting attempt at placing membership as a continuation of the course followed up to that point. It was with this argumentation that Halvorsen and Langeland won over Lange and Skaug in the early 1960s, and it was with this argumentation Frydenlund hoped to win over the electorate in 1971-72. In terms of ‘security’, membership was interpreted as being the next logical step anchoring Norway to the Atlantic alliance. And, perhaps more importantly, that active exclusion from the EC would be a step towards neutrality, and therefore an open break with Norwegian post 1949 foreign policy. Here the Europeans and the MFA found common ground with the Conservatives and the right wing of the Labour Party, and they all helped to produce this rhetoric through the hub of the EMN. In terms of ‘prosperity’, membership meant maintaining access to vital export markets. Every sitting government, and the Europeans too, realised that this access had to be balanced with special arrangements for the agricultural and fishery sector. The strategy chosen aimed at maintaining the socio-economic postwar balance between access and protection.

However, as we have seen, this conceals the fundamental, and known, changes that membership entailed. In the early 1960s, the Europeans and the government first left its strategy of a wider transatlantic free trade area behind, then the aim of bloc negotiations between EFTA and the EEC, and was left with the option of applying for membership or negotiating a trade agreement with the Community. Faced with this choice, the influential ‘iron triangle’ economists argued that the free-market ideology of the EC would strip Norway of its economic instruments, and thus endanger the balanced state intervention needed to secure full employment and economic growth. Opposite, the dense network of pro-European forces that the Europeans were a part of, were not opposed to change. They held views that
ranged from hoping that membership in the EC would somehow dismantle the postwar state and pull Norway in a liberal direction (NSA), to visions of an active, international social democratic economic policy (Labour Party right wing). The **Europeans** represented these views. They saw international economic change as inevitable, the maintenance of past economic instruments as futile, and coordination of economic policies, tax harmonisation and eventually a monetary union, as natural consequences of a functioning common market. The **Europeans** represented an alternative node of economic competence within the administration – closer to the view that markets, not economic policies and instruments, created prosperity.

On another level, however, this was still continuity. Frydenlund’s campaign of security, trust and continuity is emblematic for the way the **Europeans** emphasised that change was potentially dangerous, and that membership meant sticking to the winning recipe of the past. In meeting with a radical extra-parliamentary alliance of right and left, and their peculiar mix of ‘1968’, and ‘Norwegian’ arguments captured in the slogan of self-determination, the **Europeans** and the established political elite’s concepts of continued ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ became stale remnants of a postwar order, which, in 1972, seemed to be eroding in front of their eyes.

**The legacy of the Europeans**

As much as Norwegian European policy was formed by the ‘no’ side, EC-sceptics, the People’s Movement, the primary sectors and the Norwegian ‘no’, it was shaped by the pro-European alliance between parts of the administrative, political and economic elite. The **Europeans** were the glue and the brain trust of this alliance. A historiography of Norway and Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, without a study of the **Europeans**, therefore, is incomplete. It leaves a blind spot to processes through which Norwegian domestic and foreign policy was shaped by Europe and vice versa – something which is all the more relevant given the Norwegian participation in the European Economic Area (EEA) from 1994 onwards.\(^{1662}\)

Today, with Norway excluded from the EU’s decision-making processes, the Norwegian EU delegation in Brussels is among the government’s most important sources of expertise, analysis and information – a policy shaping, semi-autonomous actor in the midst of Europe.\(^{1663}\)

The **Europeans** helped institutionalise a way of speaking about and dealing with Europe in official Norway. This did not disappear with the electorate’s ‘no’ in 1972, and would

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\(^{1662}\) Signed and ratified in 1992.

continue in a low-key version with Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund’s\textsuperscript{1664} ‘active European-policy’. In the 1980s and early 1990s, moreover, the Europeans returned: Langeland became director of the Norwegian Export Council between 1982 and 1988, and served as Ambassador to Paris (until 1993) and The Hague (until 1996). Olberg was Ambassador to Bonn between 1987 and 1993, and then served as Ambassador to the Norwegian OECD delegation in Paris. Eivinn Berg returned as Ambassador to Brussels and Norway’s permanent representative to the EC in 1988, and was appointed head of the EEA (1989-1993) and EU membership (1993-94) negotiations. Thorvald Stoltenberg was Foreign Minister in the crucial years (1987-89 and 1990-93). The Europeans therefore represent an elite, with deep historical roots, broad networks, and the ability and will to create foreign policy, which would continue to hold important positions in-between ‘Europe’ and ‘Norway’.

Mapping the community of Europeans and how they worked with the EC-case in the 1960s and early 1970s, therefore, should prove important for historians engaging with Norway’s second attempt to join the EU in the 1990s – as an integral part of the enlargement problématique, process and policy – and who try to understand Norway’s depoliticised semi-membership in the EU of today.

\textsuperscript{1664} Frydenlund was Foreign Minister from 1973 to 1981, followed by Svenn Stray between 1981 and 1986, and returned as Foreign Minister from 1986 until his death in 1987, when he was replaced by Stoltenberg.
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 attachments 1 - Statistics

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