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Abstract

The redistribution of fiscal resources from richer to poorer European Union (EU) member states has taken on a new quality in the wake of the Euro crisis. With the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), fiscal redistribution in the EU has become a particularly contested aspect of European integration. We seek to uncover how ideological orientations shape citizens' attitudes towards international redistribution. In a multi-level analysis of the European Elections Study 2014 we find that voter positions on a cultural ideology dimension are strongly linked to their preference on EU redistribution. At the same time we find that a link between voters' location on an economic left-right scale and their preference for EU redistribution is conditional on whether they expect pecuniary gain from domestic redistribution. Among low-income citizens – those who tend to be the natural beneficiaries of domestic redistribution – a left-leaning position on the economic dimension does not translate into support for EU redistribution. It is only among the subgroup of high-income citizens that a left-leaning disposition translates into support for EU redistribution.

Keywords

Fiscal resources, EU, Euro crisis, European Stability Mechanism, voter positions, ideological orientation.

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Introduction

In the wake of the 2008 international financial crisis, European elites devised a financial transfer program to avoid the economic and financial meltdown of a number of European countries. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which is funded by member states' contributions, has been identified as the largest international transfer program in history since World War Two (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014; Beramendi and Stegmueller 2016). The backlash against this transfer program was strong, with a majority of voters in most EU member states strongly opposing the idea of financially assisting other member states to help restore their public finances (Schmitt et al. 2015).

The public divide over transfers eludes a simple explanation. Since the ESM was a response to events that revealed the vulnerability of modern capitalism, it might have reinforced economic left-right divisions among voters and political parties. Yet, recent studies suggest that it created a cross-cutting cultural division instead, pitching centrist pro-European parties and their voters against extremists on both sides of the left-right spectrum (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014).

This article seeks to understand the determinants of voter preferences on international transfer programs using the case of the EU. We draw on three strands of literature to develop a set of theoretical explanations for the divide over transfers. The first strand focuses on individual differences in cultural openness and cosmopolitanism (Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014). The second account emphasizes the transfer program's distributional consequences and predicts the strongest opposition to come from left-leaning, low-skilled workers and welfare dependents whose economic well-being might be negatively affected. The third approach stresses

differences in individual beliefs about distributive justice typically associated with the left-right divide (Picketty 1995, Fong 2001).

We examine our hypotheses using data from the European Election Study (EES) 2014 which surveyed roughly 1000 individuals in each of the 28 EU member states (Schmitt et al. 2015). The EES includes a broad range of survey items on respondents' economic situation as well as questions on the extent to which respondents find it desirable to financially assist EU member states facing severe economic and financial difficulties.

A core finding in our study is that the conflict over EU transfers – aside from generating a cultural division - also reflects an economic left-right divide. This sheds new light on previous research, which found left-right orientations to be of little explanatory value. Our analysis reveals the association between left-right orientations and preferences over EU transfers, by taking into account well-established subcomponents of the left-right dimension, notably material self-interest and belief and value systems (Margalit 2013, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). We show that the way in which the divide over EU transfers relates to the economic left-right orientations depends on whether material self-interest or beliefs about distributive justice are evoked.

Among high-income individuals a left-leaning orientation is associated with a more favorable position towards EU transfers, even when accounting for cultural values like cosmopolitanism. Left-leaning high-income voters are able to transfer beliefs and values about fairness, equality, and distributive justice typically associated with the Left to a European level. A left-leaning orientation among low-income voters, by contrast, is associated with a strong opposition to EU transfers. These voters are likely to be cross-pressured, since their material self-interest could be

negatively affected by the transfer program's potential downward pressure on domestic welfare programs.¹ Their material self-interest and belief systems are pointing in contradictory directions.

We further examine a large variety of macro-economic contextual factors and find that support for EU redistribution is lowest among left-leaning, low-income individuals in poorer countries. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the prospects of leftist political parties, who should find it increasingly difficult to position themselves on issues of international economic integration, including immigration, foreign aid and international financial rescues.

EU redistribution

The ESM is financed by the contributions of Eurozone members and provides financial assistance to struggling European economies, notably Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus and Greece. It gained more visibility and created a more sharply divided public than distributive programs in the EU budget, such as the European Structural and Investment Funds. A common currency zone might not be feasible without some sort of permanent redistributive program to alleviate economic inequalities, yet public support for transferring national resources to assist other countries is low (Schmitt et al. 2015).

Existing efforts to understand the public divide over EU transfers (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014, Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014, Daniele and Geys 2015) have drawn on work that examines voter preferences on international economic integration, including trade policy, immigration, foreign aid and previous fiscal rescues. More recently studies on international economic integration have begun to

¹ One could of course contend that high income voters also fear higher taxation associated with EU transfers but previous literature finds very little evidence that rising taxes tend to be a major concern (Broz 2005; Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014).

focus on non-economic cultural factors, whereas the traditional mainstream economic integration literature emphasizes the distributional impact of these policies on material well-being (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 2001b; Broz 2005; Moravcsik 1998).

The Case for GAL-TAN

Recent studies on international economic integration argue that individual preferences on international economic issues are best predicted by differences in cultural openness. They find that explanations centering on economic self-interest hold little explanatory value. Voters who are culturally open and cosmopolitan tend to show more support for immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007, 2010), international trade (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006) and European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2009, McLaren 2004, Risse 2010, Risse 2014, Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014) than voters who are culturally closed and who harbor nationalist sentiments. Culturally open voters seem to hold a more encompassing definition of national community and borders, which allows them to perceive of international economic integration as less of a threat to their identity (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004).

Current studies about EU transfers are strongly influenced by these cultural explanations of preferences on economic integration. Based on two large-scale surveys conducted in Germany, Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit, for instance, find that more cosmopolitanism voters tend to view EU bailouts more favorably (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014). In a similar vein, Kuhn, Solaz, and van Elsas (2015) find that voters with a stronger European identity – as opposed to an exclusive national identity – are more supportive of EU solidarity.

These findings have important consequences for domestic political contestation. Given the importance of cultural as opposed to economic attitudes the divide over EU transfers would be unlikely to merge with the economic left-right dimension of political conflict, which structures citizens' positions on issues like domestic income redistribution (Huber and Inglehart 1995, Marks and Steenbergen 2002, Kitschelt 1994, 2004, Kriesi et al. 2006). Instead the divide would be more likely to reinforce a new non-economic cultural dimension of domestic political contestation (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002, Hooghe and Marks 1999, Kriesi et al. 2006, Kriesi et al. 2012, Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014, Risse 2010, 2014). The cultural or authoritarian–libertarian dimension (Kitschelt 1994) pitches green, alternative, and libertarian parties and voters against more traditional, authoritarian and nationalist ones (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014: 836), for example, point out: "...support for these financial transfers exhibits a cross-cutting ideological pattern rather than a left-right divide, attitudes differ most significantly between supporters of centrist parties and extremist parties, whereby the latter are significantly less supportive of bailouts". In line with this strand of literature, we therefore expect that voter preferences on EU redistribution are best predicted by individual differences in cultural openness and will be integrated into a cultural dimension of political contestation.

The Case for Left-Right

Economic Self-interest

The traditional literature on international political economy assumes that voters evaluate international economic policies based on how they will affect their economic well-being. It emphasizes economic self-interest and predicts that opposition to economic integration will be strongest among globalization losers and

weakest among globalization winners (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 2001b, Broz 2005). Although empirical evidence is mixed, low-skilled workers in capital-rich countries are usually assumed to be among the globalization losers because of an intensified labor-market competition that result from international trade and immigration (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a). Following a similar logic, domestic welfare dependents are seen as potential losers given the potential downward pressure these policies exert on domestic redistributive programs (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Burgoon 2014; Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014).

Empirical work examining preferences on immigration (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, Mayda 2006), free trade (Scheve and Slaughter 2001b) and international financial rescues (Broz 2005) does indeed find that low-skilled workers and welfare dependents form the strongest opposition to international economic integration. A real or perceived resource conflict between redistributive policies at home and international financial obligations seems to be a particularly strong driver of opposition to international economic policies (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010).

In addition to culturally closed voters it might therefore be the typically left-leaning low-skilled labor and welfare dependents who become more defensive, protectionist and eager to preserve their domestic welfare system in the light of international economic integration (see Kriesi et al. 2006). This could imply that the divide over economic integration will be subsumed within the traditional left-right dimension (Kriesi 2006 et al., Moravcsik 1998, Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). We expect voter preferences on EU transfers to be explained by self-interest and to map onto a left-right dimension of political contestation, with left-leaning low-income voters being more strongly opposed to EU transfers than right-leaning voters.

Beliefs in redistributive justice

A shortcoming of most accounts on the relationship between international economic issues and domestic political contestation is that they tend to assume that left-right orientations are solely about material self-interest. Yet, left-right orientations are most likely a mixture of individual self-interest and political values regarding fairness, equality, distributive justice and the appropriate role of government, where values are understood as abstract beliefs about desirable end states. A vast literature on preferences over domestic redistribution – an important left-right issue – for example finds that support for redistributive programs is best explained by both self-interest and individual belief and value systems (Margalit 2013, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Corneo and Grüner even argue that individuals primarily support the distributive program “which conforms with their vision of what constitutes a good policy for society as a whole” (Corneo and Grüner 2002: 1) rather than the program that maximizes private benefit. Aside from beliefs about fairness and equality, a stronger belief that economic hardships are due to external rather than individual factors, increases support for redistributive policies (Picketty 1995, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, Petersen et al. 2011, Margalit 2013).

Like material self-interest, leftist values and beliefs are likely to be associated with preferences on EU transfers, although not necessarily in the same way. A stronger belief in a fair and more equal society at home could for instance be associated with a more favorable position toward international redistribution, although the first is about redistributing between individuals and the latter is about redistributing between territories (Marks and Steenbergen 2002). Recent work on bailout support in Germany does not directly examine values and beliefs about

distributive justice, but it shows that altruistic dispositions are related to greater support for EU redistribution (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014)).

Expanding the current discussion about EU transfers, which has focused on material self-interest and cultural values, we include values and beliefs about distributive justice as an additional explanatory variable. We predict that how the divide over EU transfers relates to the economic left-right dimension will ultimately depend on whether material self-interest or beliefs about distributive justice are evoked. The contrasting effect of these two underlying components of the left-right dimension is brought out when we examine individual differences in income or occupation. We expect a left-leaning orientation among high-income earners with a low risk of unemployment to be associated with a favorable position toward EU transfers, since their material well-being is unlikely to be compromised. Low-income, high-risk supporters of left parties are, by contrast, cross-pressured. Their leftist values and beliefs may clash with considerations of self-interest, seeing that their economic well-being could be adversely affected by a potential downward pressure on domestic resources for redistribution. Among this subgroup, we therefore do not expect left-leaning orientations to be associated with a higher degree of support for EU transfers. In fact, when motivated by a perceived resource conflict between domestic and EU redistribution left-leaning, low-income voters might be even more strongly opposed to EU transfers than right-leaning voters.

< Figure 1: Preferences for EU transfers >

We further hypothesize that the perceived resource conflict between domestic and EU redistribution intensifies as a country's macro-economic situation worsens.

When economic performance is poor, voters might be even more inclined to perceive a trade-off between domestic and EU redistribution which is likely to result in overall lower levels of support for transfers in poorer countries.² Indeed, recent research suggests that support for EU-wide solidarity is higher in richer countries (Lengfeld et al. 2015; Kuhn, Solaz, and Elsas, 2015). We expect the support for EU transfers to be lowest among left-leaning low-income voters in poorer countries. By contrast, we expect support to be highest among left-leaning, high-income voters in richer countries.

4 Data and Measurement

Our empirical analysis draws upon the EES 2014. This survey offers data for all 28 EU member states and includes about 1000 respondents per country. The field work took place shortly after the European elections in 2014. In order to operationalize our dependent variable, we rely on a survey item that asks respondents about their agreement with the transfer of fiscal resources between their own country and another EU member state.

“To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: In times of crisis, it is desirable for [respondents’ country] to give financial help to another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties?” [Response categories: 1: “totally disagree”, 2 “tend to disagree”, 3 “tend to agree”, 4 “totally agree”]

This question does not ask whether respondents generally support a transfer mechanism between member states or whether they expect a net-benefit from it. It

² Our survey item asks about the willingness to contribute to such a transfer program, not whether redistribution in general is desirable. It does not directly tap into expectations as to whether voters will benefit from such a program.

asks about the extent to which the respondent's country of residence should contribute to such a mechanism, thereby making the costliness of transfers salient.

We measure economic left-right orientations with a question about support for domestic redistribution. This question asks whether respondents are fully opposed (0) to “the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor” in their country, fully in favor (10), or somewhere in between. An economically right-leaning position – that is, little support for domestic redistribution – implies low values on this measure. A left-leaning position is associated with high values on this economic ideology scale. This question captures a respondent's economic left-right orientation more accurately than a left-right self-placement question, which is likely to evoke both economic and cultural considerations

We use two measures to capture citizens' location on the cultural dimension of political conflict. First, we include a dummy variable that equals one if individuals hold an exclusive national identity and zero when respondents identify with their own nation and with Europe (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2010, 2014, Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014). Second, we construct a gal-tan ideology scale that includes attitudes towards a) immigration, b) same-sex marriages, and c) restraints on privacy rights. We combine these three items using a principal component analysis; low values represent a culturally open position and high values a culturally closed position.³

Our expectations regarding the association between left-right orientations and support for EU transfers require us to examine conditions in which respondents will perceive a resource conflict between domestic welfare programs and EU transfers. Unfortunately, the EES does not measure respondents' income directly. We use a number of alternative measures. First, we use a self-reported measure of social class

³ Left-right and gal-tan orientations constitute distinct dimensions (see online Appendix Table A9)

membership with three social classes following Iversen and Soskice (2006): low-income, middle-income, and high-income social class. Secondly, we test the robustness of our results by employing a measure on financial troubles: respondents are asked if they had trouble paying their bills in the last twelve months “most of the time”, “from time to time”, or “almost never/never”. Thirdly, we use occupational categories in the EES in order to group respondents according to the social class scheme developed by Oesch (2016). We reanalyze all results using these categories as dummy variables.

We also control for citizens’ level of support for European integration. Citizens differentiate between the political and economic integration of EU member states (Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014). Individuals might support European integration, but oppose transfers between richer and poorer member states; or they might oppose a transfers between EU member states because they are Euroskeptics to begin with, which is a confounding factor we want to account for. Moreover, we control for education, age, and gender.

Since our theoretical model predicts that a country’s economic performance shapes citizens’ views on EU redistribution, we include a number of economic performance indicators, namely a country’s logged GDP per capita, its budget deficit, and its accumulated debt.⁴ Additionally, we control for the share of social expenditure

⁴ The results also hold when we additionally control for net-contributions to the EU budget (as percent of a country’s GNI and using data from the 2013 EU budget). The notion behind this control variable is that citizens might oppose EU level redistribution because their country is already a large contributor to the EU budget (in which case we would expect that being a net-contributor is associated with less support for EU level redistribution). Alternatively, citizens in countries that receive transfers from the EU budget – i.e. individuals living in net-recipient countries – might oppose “their country” helping other member states in economic troubles because these citizens do not think of themselves as being in a position where they could or should help other EU member states (in this case we would expect being a net-recipient to be associated with less support for EU level redistribution). Inserting net-contributions to the EU budget into our models, we find: (1) that all other results still hold and (2) that individuals in net-recipient countries are more opposed to EU level redistribution. However, whether an EU member state is a net-contributor or net-receiver has much to do with its GDP. Hence net-contributions correlate highly with our GDP variable; in order to prevent multi-collinearity to affect the

as a percentage of GDP. On the one hand, citizens in countries with a larger welfare state could be more opposed to EU redistribution since they have more resources to lose. On the other hand, a larger welfare state that provides a significant safety net, might alleviate the conflict between resources used for domestic purposes and for international purposes. Hence, low-income citizens in countries with a larger welfare state might be less concerned about how a potential downward pressure on domestic resources affects their material well-being.

We also include a dummy for countries that are Eurozone members. Although redistribution through the EU budget concerns all EU member states, recent and salient steps towards a more redistributive EU – like the ESM – concern only Eurozone member states. Thus, redistribution is more salient and costly for citizens of Eurozone member states.

The EES 2014 data reveal a significant amount of variation in support of EU transfers within countries and across the EU-28.⁵ Support for EU transfers is highest in Sweden (3.1) and lowest in Cyprus (2.0), with a mean of 2.4. However, about 91 percent of the variation in support of EU transfers is at the individual level.⁶

< Figure 2: Mean support for EU transfers by country >

We begin by examining descriptive statistics in order to understand how preferences for EU transfers are structured. Figure 3 reflects mean levels of support for EU transfers (1 = low support, 4 = high support) for three groups: voters who

results we excluded net-contributions. Moreover, we believe that the mechanism relating net-contributions and views on EU level redistributions is essentially the same as that which relates GDP and EU level redistributions: it is the fact that scarce resources (at the macro level) decrease citizens' willingness to help other EU member states.

⁵ All analyses are conducted based on the EU-28. However, the results are similar in all substantive respects when we restrict the sample to Eurozone member states.

⁶ The intra-class correlation coefficient is .087

prefer limited domestic distribution, voters who prefer moderate domestic redistribution, and those who prefer substantial domestic redistribution. Respondents expressing a preference for substantial domestic redistribution – our measure for a left-leaning orientation – exhibit slightly lower levels of support for EU transfers than respondents who prefer limited or moderate levels of domestic redistribution.

If our theoretical expectations are accurate, we should only see a negative association between support for domestic redistribution and support for EU transfers among individuals who face a perceived or real “resource conflict”. Figure 4 therefore presents voters with a preference for substantial domestic redistribution by different levels of income. As theorized, individuals who support substantial domestic redistribution in the low-income social class are the ones most strongly opposed to EU transfers, while individuals supportive of substantial domestic redistribution in the high-income group have a much more favorable view of EU transfers. The expected pattern is also confirmed when looking at different occupational groups (Figure 4, bottom). Voters who prefer substantial domestic redistribution and who are either unskilled or unemployed express the lowest level of support for EU transfers. Managers and professionals who support substantial domestic redistribution express much higher levels of support for EU transfers.

< Figure 3: Support for EU transfers by levels of support for domestic redistribution >

< Figure 4: Support for EU transfers by class and occupation >

5 Results

The summary statistics presented in the previous section suggest that our expectations about individual preferences on EU transfers are supported by the data.

We now analyze the same data using a multilevel regression model (Steenbergen and Jones 2002), which allows us to include both individual level and country level predictors while also accounting for the clustered structure of the data. We are primarily interested in two-way and three-way interactions, which can be understood more intuitively in the framework of a linear model. The results of an ordered logit, multilevel model and a hierarchical model with a linear link function are very similar and can be found in the appendix (Table A4).

The results support our expectations regarding the association between cultural orientations and attitudes towards EU transfers. The two variables that capture citizens' orientations on the cultural dimension of political conflict – the cultural ideology scale and (exclusive national) identity – have strong effects on support for EU transfers (Table 1, Models 1-3). Citizens who are culturally closed are more likely to oppose transfers in Europe, whereas culturally open individuals tend to be more supportive. Individuals who hold an exclusively national identity are less supportive of EU transfers than individuals who simultaneously hold a European identity.

Coming back to our key question: do the results also suggest that economic left-right orientations are important in explaining the divide over transfers? Table 1 presents the results of three multilevel regression models that help us answer this question. Model 1 shows that a left-leaning orientation alone, measured as support for domestic redistribution, has neither a statistically significant nor a substantively discernable effect on support for EU redistribution. This is in line with our expectations and previous research (Bensak et al. 2006: 25).

Yet, as we predicted, the way in which economic left-right attitudes are related to support for EU transfers depends on whether respondents' material self-interest or

their leftist beliefs and values are evoked. Model 2 includes an interaction between support for domestic redistribution and social class. The marginal effects plot (Figure 5) shows that support for domestic redistribution is negatively related to support for EU transfers among individuals in a low-income class, whose material well-being might be negatively affected by EU transfers. In contrast, support for domestic redistribution is positively associated with support for EU transfers among individuals in a high-income social class. That is, left-leaning, high-income voters tend to view EU transfers more favorably than right-leaning, high-income voters, even when controlling for cultural orientations. We believe that these high-income voters, more so than low-income voters, are able to transfer their left-leaning values about a fair and more equal society to the European level, leading them to be more supportive for EU transfers.

Figure 6 helps us interpret these findings; it shows predicted values of support for EU transfers for individuals in a low-income social class (straight line) and for individuals in a high-income social class (dashed line). Low-income social class respondents exhibit less support for EU transfers the more they support domestic redistribution. In contrast, support for domestic redistribution is associated with higher support for EU transfers among the high-income group.⁷

< Figure 5: Marginal effect of support for domestic redistribution on EU transfers by social class >

< Figure 6: Support for EU transfers by social class >

< Figure 7: Support for EU transfers by social class and GDP p.c. >

⁷ The results also hold when we use dummy variables for social class (and respective interaction terms) instead of the continuous measure with three levels displayed here.

Our alternative measures – an indicator for the financial troubles of the respondent and the occupational status categories proposed by Oesch (2016) – support these conclusions (see Tables A3, A6, and A7). Among respondents having incurred financial trouble within the last 12 months, a left-leaning orientation – measured as support for domestic redistribution - is associated with lower support for EU transfers. This is not the case among respondents who have not faced such financial trouble. Similarly, among the unemployed and the low-skilled, a left-leaning orientation produces lower support for EU transfers, whereas it is associated with higher support for EU transfers among highly-skilled labor, professionals, and managers

These results lend support to our theory: left-leaning, high-income citizens are significantly more supportive of EU transfers than right-leaning, high-income citizens. They combine a strong support for domestic redistribution with a strong support for international redistribution. Left-leaning, low-income individuals, by contrast, are strongly opposed to EU transfers. We believe them to be cross-pressured. Their leftist belief and value system might lead them to support EU transfers, but they also perceive their material well-being to be adversely affected by an EU transfer scheme that could take resources away from domestic programs.

< Table 1. Multilevel regression model results >

< Figure 2. Marginal effect of ‘support for domestic redistribution’ on EU transfers by social class >

< Figure 3. Predicted support for EU transfers for individuals in a low social class and in a high social class >

Does a country’s macro economic situation matter for the extent to which its citizens support transfers in the EU? Model 1 and Model 2 include levels of (logged) GDP per capita, deficit, debt, and social spending as a percentage of GDP. Only the

coefficient for GDP per capita is positive and significant, suggesting that individuals in richer countries exhibit more support for EU transfers and individuals in poorer countries exhibit less support for EU transfers. In short, citizens in poorer countries are less inclined to contribute to a European transfer scheme.

Our results also show that a country's macro-economic condition has an impact on the way in which support for domestic redistribution relates to support for EU transfers. To analyze this relationship, we include a three-way interaction in Model 3 (support for domestic redistribution*social class*GDP per capita). Following Dawson and Richter (2006), we evaluate the average marginal effect of support for domestic redistribution on support for EU transfers for four distinct groups while holding all other variables constant: citizens in a low-income class in poor countries (1), citizens in a high-income class in poor countries (2), citizens in a low-income class in rich countries (3), and citizens in a high-income class in rich countries (4). We define a poor country as one with a GDP per capita that is one standard deviation below the EU-28 mean (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria, and Latvia) and we define a rich country as one with a GDP per capita that is one standard deviation above the EU-28 mean (e.g. Luxembourg and Sweden).

Figure 4 shows predicted levels of support for EU transfers for each of the four groups. Support for EU transfers in poorer countries (1, 2) is lower than in richer countries (3, 4). Individuals who support domestic redistribution in a poor country exhibit the lowest level of support for EU transfers. In contrast, individuals who support domestic redistribution in a high-income social class in a rich country are expressing the highest levels of support for EU transfers.

We further evaluate whether the average marginal effect of support for redistribution on support for EU redistribution is different for the four groups

described above (Dawson and Richter 2006). Table A2 in the appendix reveals that five of the slopes of the six lines are statistically different from one another ($p < .05$ or less) with the only exception being the slopes for individuals in a high social class in a poor country and for individuals in a low social class in a rich country. These results support our predictions on the role of a country's economic situation.

< Figure 4. Predicted support for EU transfers
for four groups of citizens >

Among the control variables, we find that individuals with more education and those who support European integration are more likely to support EU transfers, while women are less likely to support EU transfers. Individuals in Eurozone countries show less support for EU transfers than individuals who live in EU member states outside of the Eurozone.

6 Conclusion

Most experts consider that a transfer program offering financial assistance to Eurozone countries facing adverse economic shocks is necessary to restore the stability of the region (Krugmann 2011). Yet, instruments like the European Stability Mechanism have provoked fierce public debate. Many voters strongly oppose a transfer of resources to assist other countries and in a number of European countries public dissatisfaction gave rise to new challenger parties. A long-term policy solution will need to be based on a better understanding of what explains voter preferences on redistributive transfers in Europe.

Current research understands the divide over EU transfers primarily as a cultural conflict that pitches culturally closed political parties and their voters against

culturally open parties and voters (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Kuhn, Solaz, v. Elsas 2015). While our analysis of the 2014 European Election Study (EES) confirms the importance of cultural orientation, we find that economic left-right orientations are fundamental to a fuller understanding of voters' preferences on international redistribution.

Our analysis shows that among high-income voters, an economically left-leaning orientation is associated with significantly higher levels of support for EU transfers than a right-leaning orientation, even when controlling for cultural openness and European identity. Among voters in a low-income class, by contrast, a left-leaning orientation is associated with a strong opposition to EU transfers.

What explains these diverging responses? We argue that a left-right orientation has multiple components and that the association of each with support for EU transfers differs. Voters might be motivated by self-interest and take a left-leaning position because they depend on domestic redistributive policies for income support, or they might be left-leaning because it resonates with their idea of distributive justice. Among low-income, left-leaning citizens these two considerations clash when it comes to support for EU transfers. Seeing that they might be among the losers of a mechanism that redistributes a country's fiscal resources to other EU member states and potentially exerts a downward pressure on domestic redistribution (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Burgoon 2014), their material self-interest leads them to take a less favorable position towards EU redistribution than their otherwise leftist values about equality and fairness would predict. Left-leaning individuals in high-income classes, on the other hand, do not have the same conflicting pressures and can more easily apply their leftist value and belief system to the international level.

Our analysis further shows that citizens in poorer EU member states are less willing to contribute to a European redistributive mechanism than citizens in richer member states. In fact, low-income citizens in poor EU member states who are very supportive of domestic redistribution exhibit the strongest opposition to EU transfers. This leads us to believe that poor macro-economic conditions can aggravate a perceived “resource conflict” between domestic redistribution and international redistribution.

Our findings are consistent with a growing number of studies that find non-economic cultural considerations to be important factors in explaining voter preferences on international economic issues like immigration, trade, financial rescues and European economic integration (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, 2007, 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2010, 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014). These studies suggest that the complexity of international economic policies makes cultural frames more appealing while the distributional consequences are less easily evaluated. Our findings, however, show that cultural accounts are incomplete and that individuals’ economic left-right orientations are necessary for a fuller understanding of mass attitudes on international economic issues. High-income, left-leaning individuals in EU member states are consistently more supportive of international fiscal transfers than right-leaning individuals, irrespective of their cultural orientation. Arguably, low-income, left-leaning citizens are equally as opposed or more opposed than right-leaning citizens to EU transfers. This preference pattern is likely to apply to other economic issues, for instance the extension of welfare benefits to immigrants or trade relations with the developing countries.

It is clear that the multidimensionality of left-right orientations makes it problematic for leftist political parties to position themselves on the issue of international redistribution. Arguing in favor of assisting economically struggling EU members may earn leftist parties the endorsement of left-leaning, high-income voters, but it could cost them their traditional working-class clientele. Our analysis provides a useful framework for understanding the electoral struggles of leftist parties in an era of economic integration and their failure to delay a shrinking of their traditional socio-economic support basis. With working-class voters being among the real or perceived losers in a globalized society, leftist parties' stance on pro-economic integration is increasingly likely to be viewed as a betrayal.

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Table 1: Multilevel regression model results, dependent variable is support for EU transfers

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Individual level variables</i>			
social class	0.060*** (0.009)	-0.042* (0.020)	0.167 (0.611)
support for domestic redistrib.	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.291* (0.113)
exclusive national identity	-0.310*** (0.013)	-0.309*** (0.013)	-0.307*** (0.013)
cultural ideology	-0.108*** (0.006)	-0.108*** (0.006)	-0.106*** (0.006)
education	0.104*** (0.009)	0.104*** (0.009)	0.104*** (0.009)
sex	-0.053*** (0.011)	-0.053*** (0.011)	-0.054*** (0.011)
age	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
EU support	0.064*** (0.002)	0.064*** (0.002)	0.064*** (0.002)
<i>Country level variables</i>			
Eurozone member	-0.220** (0.080)	-0.219** (0.079)	-0.223** (0.080)
GDP p.c. (logged)	0.481*** (0.129)	0.480*** (0.129)	0.285 (0.151)
Deficit	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)
Debt	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Social GDP	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.010)
<i>Interaction terms</i>			
social class × support for domestic redistrib.		0.017*** (0.003)	-0.070 (0.089)
support for domestic redistrib. × GDP p.c. (logged)			0.027* (0.011)
social class × GDP p.c. (logged)			-0.019 (0.061)
support for domestic redistrib. × social class × GDP p.c. (logged)			0.008 (0.009)
Constant	-2.667* (1.207)	-2.546* (1.201)	-0.597 (1.440)
Observations	22645	22645	22645

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure 1: Theory on preferences for EU transfers




Figure 2: Mean support for EU transfers by country




Figure 3: Support for EU transfers by levels of support for domestic redistribution




Figure 4: Support for EU transfers by class and occupation (only respondents with high support for domestic redistribution, i.e. left leaning voters)




Figure 5: Marginal effect of support for domestic redistribution on EU transfers by social class




Figure 6: Support for EU transfers by social class (two-way interaction)




Figure 7: Support for EU transfers by social class and GDP p.c. (three-way interaction)

Online Appendix A

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

variable	count	mean	sd	min	max
support for EU transfers	28796	2.45	0.95	1.00	4.00
social class	29220	1.01	0.69	0.00	2.00
support for domestic redistr.	28483	6.23	2.93	0.00	10.00
exclusive national identity	29624	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
cultural ideology	26226	-0.00	1.08	-2.83	2.52
education	29511	1.22	0.73	0.00	2.00
sex	30064	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
age	30064	51.06	17.92	16.00	99.00
EU support	27362	4.66	3.11	0.00	10.00
GDP p.c. (logged)	30064	10.09	0.33	9.38	11.16
ppp	30064	25452.66	9197.29	11900.00	70100.00
Deficit	30064	-3.52	3.44	-14.90	0.90
Debt	30064	72.41	36.73	10.10	175.00
Social GDP	30064	17.29	4.13	11.30	25.10
net contributions 2013 as percent of GNI	30064	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.06

Table A2: Analysis of three-way interaction effects following Dawson and Richter (2006)

	slope difference	standard error
Low class in poor country vs Low class in rich country	-0.018*	0.007
High class in rich country vs Low class in rich country	0.034***	0.008
High class in poor country vs Low class in rich country	0.004	0.008
High class in rich country vs Low class in poor country	0.051***	0.006
High class in poor country vs Low class in poor country	0.022**	0.008
High class in poor country vs Low class in poor country	-0.029***	0.007

rich country: GDP p.c. 1sd above mean, poor country: GDP p.c. 1sd below mean,
low social class: class = 0, high social class: class=2

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3: multilevel regression analysis that uses financial troubles to operationalize income, DV: support for EU transfers

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
financial troubles	0.044*** (0.009)	-0.037 (0.020)	-0.176 (0.664)
support for domestic redistrib.	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.005)	-0.217 (0.155)
exclusive national identity	-0.310*** (0.013)	-0.310*** (0.013)	-0.308*** (0.013)
cultural openness	-0.108*** (0.006)	-0.107*** (0.006)	-0.106*** (0.006)
education	0.113*** (0.009)	0.113*** (0.009)	0.113*** (0.009)
sex	-0.048*** (0.011)	-0.049*** (0.011)	-0.049*** (0.011)
age	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
support for European integration	0.065*** (0.002)	0.065*** (0.002)	0.065*** (0.002)
Eurozone member	-0.221** (0.081)	-0.221** (0.081)	-0.224** (0.081)
GDP p.c.	0.497*** (0.131)	0.497*** (0.131)	0.253 (0.173)
deficit	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.012)
debt	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
socialgdp	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)
financial troubles × support for domestic redistrib.		0.012*** (0.003)	-0.103 (0.092)
financial troubles × GDP p.c.			0.016 (0.066)
support for domestic redistrib. × GDP p.c.			0.020 (0.016)
financial troubles × support for domestic redistrib. × GDP p.c.			0.011 (0.009)
Constant	-2.834* (1.220)	-2.709* (1.220)	-0.281 (1.659)
Observations	22780	22780	22780

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4: multilevel ordered logit regression results, DV: support for EU transfers

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
support for EU transfers			
social class	0.138*** (0.020)	-0.113* (0.044)	0.560 (1.379)
support for domestic redistrib.	0.000 (0.005)	-0.043*** (0.008)	-0.675** (0.259)
exclusive national identity	-0.668*** (0.029)	-0.664*** (0.029)	-0.662*** (0.029)
cultural openness	-0.245*** (0.013)	-0.244*** (0.013)	-0.240*** (0.013)
education	0.231*** (0.020)	0.230*** (0.020)	0.231*** (0.020)
sex	-0.122*** (0.025)	-0.124*** (0.025)	-0.124*** (0.025)
age	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
support for European integration	0.152*** (0.005)	0.151*** (0.005)	0.151*** (0.005)
Eurozone member	-0.493** (0.181)	-0.492** (0.181)	-0.501** (0.182)
GDP p.c.	1.038*** (0.294)	1.037*** (0.293)	0.612 (0.344)
deficit	-0.002 (0.028)	-0.002 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.028)
debt	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)
socialgdp	-0.011 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.023)	-0.010 (0.023)
social class × support for domestic redistrib.		0.041*** (0.006)	-0.152 (0.202)
support for domestic redistrib. × GDP p.c.			0.063* (0.026)
social class × GDP p.c.			-0.063 (0.137)
support for domestic redistrib. × social class × GDP p.c.			0.018 (0.020)
cut1			
Constant	9.559*** (2.740)	9.275*** (2.729)	5.046 (3.272)
cut2			
Constant	11.040*** (2.740)	10.758*** (2.729)	6.531* (3.272)
cut3			
Constant	13.482*** (2.741)	13.201*** (2.730)	8.977** (3.272)
Observations	22645	22645	22645

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A5: Oesch (2016) based coding of occupations in EES 2014 data set

Oesch category	European Election Study occupational category
Category 0, Lowest status class	3) Unemployed; Excluded: 1) Houseperson; Responsible for shopping, etc. 2) Student 4) Retired, explains loss of N=10000] *previous occupation: too much missing data, unreliable estimates.
Category 1, Low-skilled working class	18) Unskilled (low-skilled production workers)
Category 2, Skilled working class	craft workers, clerks and skilled service workers, 13) Employed position working at desk, 15) Employed position not working at desk but in service 16) Supervisor or skilled craft worker 17) Skilled manual worker 14) Employed position, not at a desk but travelling
Category 3, Small business owners	5) Farmer 6) Fisherman 8) Owner of a small shop
Category 4, Lower middle class	12) Middle management (semi-professionals and associate managers)
Category 5, Upper and upper-middle class professionals, managers)	9) Business proprietor 7) Professional 10) Employed Professional 11) General Management (large employers, self-employed and employed)

Numbers refer to occupational codes of the EES 2014 data set

Table A6: multilevel regression analysis that uses Oesch (2016) based occupation coding to operationalize income, Models 1 & 2, DV: support for EU transfers

	Model 1	Model 2
support for domestic redistrib.	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.013* (0.006)
unskilled	-0.055 (0.039)	0.067 (0.100)
skilled	0.012 (0.022)	-0.070 (0.054)
farmer, fishermen	0.013 (0.034)	-0.058 (0.078)
semi-professional	0.121*** (0.029)	-0.043 (0.066)
professional, management	0.096*** (0.029)	-0.042 (0.062)
exclusive national identity	-0.310*** (0.017)	-0.309*** (0.017)
cultural openness	-0.111*** (0.008)	-0.110*** (0.008)
education	0.075*** (0.013)	0.075*** (0.013)
sex	-0.040** (0.015)	-0.040** (0.015)
age	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)
support for European integration	0.068*** (0.003)	0.068*** (0.003)
Eurozone member	-0.256** (0.078)	-0.255** (0.078)
GDP p.c.	0.577*** (0.127)	0.575*** (0.127)
deficit	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.012)
debt	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
socialgdp	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)
unskilled × support for domestic redistrib.		-0.018 (0.014)
skilled × support for domestic redistrib.		0.012 (0.007)
farmer, fishermen × support for domestic redistrib.		0.010 (0.011)
semi-professional × support for domestic redistrib.		0.027** (0.010)
professional, management × support for domestic redistrib.		0.023* (0.009)
Constant	-3.517** (1.188)	-3.419** (1.188)
Observations	13419	13419

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A7: multilevel regression analysis that uses Oesch based occupation coding to operationalize income, Model 3, DV: support for EU transfers

	Model 3	
support for domestic redistrib.	-0.325	(0.218)
unskilled	-2.839	(2.827)
skilled	-1.821	(1.746)
famrers, fishermen	3.822	(2.736)
semi-professional	0.037	(2.177)
professional, management	0.078	(1.986)
unskilled × support for domestic redistrib.	-0.105	(0.397)
skilled × support for domestic redistrib.	0.047	(0.246)
famrers, fishermen × support for domestic redistrib.	-1.183**	(0.416)
semi-professional × support for domestic redistrib.	-0.327	(0.327)
professional, management × support for domestic redistrib.	-0.310	(0.301)
GDP p.c.	0.234	(0.200)
support for domestic redistrib. × GDP p.c.	0.031	(0.022)
unskilled × GDP p.c.	0.289	(0.281)
skilled × GDP p.c.	0.176	(0.174)
famrers, fishermen × GDP p.c.	-0.388	(0.273)
semi-professional × GDP p.c.	-0.004	(0.216)
professional, management × GDP p.c.	-0.009	(0.198)
unskilled × support for domestic redistrib. × GDP p.c.	0.009	(0.039)
skilled × support for domestic redistrib. × GDP p.c.	-0.004	(0.025)
famrers, fishermen × support for domestic redistrib. × GDP p.c.	0.119**	(0.042)
semi-professional × support for domestic redistrib. × GDP p.c.	0.034	(0.032)
professional, management × support for domestic redistrib. × GDP p.c.	0.033	(0.030)
exclusive national identity	-0.306***	(0.017)
cultural openness	-0.108***	(0.008)
education	0.075***	(0.013)
sex	-0.041**	(0.015)
age	0.002***	(0.001)
support for European integration	0.068***	(0.003)
Eurozone member	-0.259***	(0.078)
deficit	-0.009	(0.012)
debt	-0.000	(0.001)
socialgdp	-0.006	(0.010)
Constant	-0.005	(1.946)
Observations	13419	

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8: Multilevel regression model results, additional control: net contributions to the EU budget, DV is support for EU transfers

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
support for domestic redistrib.	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.290* (0.113)
social class	0.060*** (0.009)	-0.043* (0.020)	0.169 (0.611)
GDP p.c.	0.335* (0.143)	0.335* (0.143)	0.135 (0.163)
exclusive national identity	-0.311*** (0.013)	-0.309*** (0.013)	-0.308*** (0.013)
cultural openness	-0.108*** (0.006)	-0.107*** (0.006)	-0.106*** (0.006)
education	0.104*** (0.009)	0.104*** (0.009)	0.104*** (0.009)
sex	-0.052*** (0.011)	-0.053*** (0.011)	-0.053*** (0.011)
age	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
support for European integration	0.064*** (0.002)	0.064*** (0.002)	0.064*** (0.002)
Eurozone member	-0.236** (0.075)	-0.235** (0.075)	-0.239** (0.075)
deficit	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)
debt	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
socialgdp	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)
net contributions 2013 as percent of GNI	-5.102 (2.663)	-5.083 (2.649)	-5.225* (2.662)
support for domestic redistrib. × social class		0.017*** (0.003)	-0.071 (0.089)
support for domestic redistrib. × GDP p.c.			0.027* (0.011)
social class × GDP p.c.			-0.019 (0.061)
support for domestic redistrib. × social class × GDP p.c.			0.008 (0.009)
Constant	-1.016 (1.425)	-0.901 (1.417)	1.094 (1.624)
Observations	22645	22645	22645

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A9: Correlation between support for domestic redistribution (left-right ideology) and gal-tan ideology

country	correlation
Austria	-0.0757*
Belgium	-0.0394
Bulgaria	0.0916*
Croatia	0.031
Cyprus	0.0717
Czech Republic	0.222
Denmark	-0.0947**
Estonia	0.0318
Finland	-0.0244
France	-0.1931***
Germany	0.0023
Greece	0.0111
Hungary	0.1115***
Ireland	0.0411
Italy	-0.0314
Latvia	0.0909**
Lithuania	0.0072
Luxembourg	-0.0652
Malta	0.0609
Netherlands	-0.1596***
Poland	0.1139**
Portugal	0.0305
Romania	0.0316
Slovakia	0.0746*
Slovenia	0.0641*
Spain	-0.0916**
Sweden	-0.1237***
United Kingdom	-0.1248***

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Online Appendix B: Variable Coding

Dependent variable (from EES 2014):

Support for EU transfers: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? In times of crisis, it is desirable for Germany to give financial help to another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties. Four response categories, coded in the following way: 1= totally disagree, 2= tend to disagree, 3= tend to agree, 4= totally agree

Independent variables (from EES 2014):

Social class: Could you please tell me where you would place yourself on the following scale? Where '1' corresponds to "the lowest level in society" and '10' corresponds to "the highest level in society. Responses are coded in the following way, as offered by D61r of the dataset: 1-4= low social class, 5-6= middle class, 7-10 upper social class.

Support for domestic redistribution: We would like to ask you to position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means that you "fully agree with the statement at the top" and '10' means that you "fully agree with the statement at the bottom". Then if your views are somewhere in between, you can choose any number that describes your position best: [0] You are fully in favour of the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in (OUR COUNTRY), [10] You are fully opposed to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in (OUR COUNTRY). Recoded: 0= low support for domestic redistribution; 10= high support for domestic redistribution

Exclusive national identity: For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion: You feel you are a citizen of the EU. Yes, definitely = 1, Yes, to some extent = 2, No, not really = 3, No, not at all = 4. Recoded: exclusive national identity = 1 (no European identity present: No, not really = 3 & No, not at all = 4), exclusive national identity = 0 (European identity present: Yes, definitely = 1, Yes, to some extent = 2)

Cultural ideology: We combine three variables using their common factor: a question on same-sex marriages, a question on civil liberties, and a question on attitudes towards immigrants. The range of the common factor is -2.8 (culturally closed position) to 2.5 (culturally open position). Question wording: We would like to ask you to position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means that you "fully agree with the statement at the top" and '10' means that you "fully agree with the statement at the bottom". Then if your views are somewhere in between, you can choose any number that describes your position best. 1) same-sex marriage: [0] You are fully in favour of same-sex marriage, [10] You are fully opposed to same-sex marriage; 2) civil liberties: [0] You fully support privacy rights even if they hinder efforts to combat crime, [10] You are fully in favour of restricting privacy rights in order to combat crime; 3) immigration: [0] You are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration, [10] You are fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration.

Education: How old were you when you stopped full-time education? Replies coded in the following way: education low (0) = education until the age of 15 or less; education medium (1) = education until the ages 16-19; education high = education until the age of 20 or more & still studying

EU support: Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means unification "has already gone too far" and '10' means it "should be pushed further". What number on this scale best describes your position? [0] European unification has already gone too far, [10] European unification should be pushed further

Financial troubles: During the last 12 months, would you say you had difficulties to pay your bills? Replies recoded into a dummy variable: 0=almost never/never, 1=from time to time & most of the time.

Occupation: What is your current occupation? Replies recoded according to Oesch (2016) scheme displayed in Table A5.

Age: How old are you

Sex: 0= male, 1=female

Independent variables from other sources:

Eurozone dummy: 0 for all EU member states that are not part of the Eurozone and 1 for all EU member states that are part of the Eurozone

Debt: General government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP (Eurostat 2013), <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>

Deficit: Net lending (+) /net borrowing (-) of the general government as a percentage of GDP (Eurostat 2013), <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>

Social GDP: General government expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP (Eurostat 2013), <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>

Gross Domestic Product per inhabitant in Purchasing Power Parity, (Eurostat 2013), <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>

EU net budget contributions: net contributions to the EU budget of each EU member state as a percentage of this country's Gross National Income (Source: EU Budget 2014 Financial Report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg 2015, p.145.