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Ordoliberalism beyond Borders:
The EU and Algeria's Human Capital

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Challenging the notion of Fortress Europe, the BORDERLANDS research project investigates relations between the European Union and the states of North Africa and the Mediterranean Middle East (MENA) through the concept of borderlands. This concept emphasises the disaggregation of the triple function of borders demarcating state territory, authority, and national identity inherent in the Westphalian model of statehood. The project explores the complex and differentiated process by which the EU extends its unbundled functional and legal borders and exports its rules and practices to MENA states, thereby transforming that area into borderlands. They are connected to the European core through various border regimes, governance patterns, and the selective outsourcing of some EU border control duties.

The overarching questions informing this research is whether, first, the borderland policies of the EU, described by some as a neo-medieval empire, is a functional consequence of the specific integration model pursued inside the EU, a matter of foreign policy choice or a local manifestation of a broader global phenomenon. Second, the project addresses the political and socio-economic implications of these processes for the 'borderlands', along with the questions of power dynamics and complex interdependence in EU-MENA relations.

Funded by the European Research Council (ERC) within the 7th Framework Programme, the BORDERLANDS project is hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, and directed by Professor Raffaella A. Del Sarto.

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Abstract

This working paper studies the Euro-Algerian relationship through the lens of investment in human capital and looks at how European interventions encourage the transformation of Algerian governmentality. In addition to the various policies implemented since the signing of the Association agreement in 2002, the article also interrogates the agendas of local institutions and actors who support or resist this transformative influence. After an introductory section that presents the concept of human capital and its relevance for the Euro-Algerian context, the following sections show how the Euro-Algerian cooperation draws on technologies of standardization, securitization and responsabilization in order to shape a socially integrated, politically and economically moral subject. This empirical analysis serves to understand the ordoliberal character of this intervention. Indeed, the goal of the European Union is not merely to propose a technical intervention in order to promote a stable environment for the modernization of the economy. Instead, the shaping of Algeria's human resources, with the support of diverse segments of the ruling elite, shows the depth of a restructuring that is also political. The relationship between the nation-state and its population is thus affected, as the former is associated with an anthropological process that must foster both economic efficiency and civic awareness.

Keywords:

Algeria, Cooperation, European Neighborhood, Ordoliberalism, Governmentality

Introduction*

The influence of the European Union (EU) on Mediterranean countries has been widely discussed since the Arab uprisings of 2010-2011. The Maghreb is often portrayed as a region that requires intervention in order to foster regional integration and to stabilize a new political economy (Biad 2013; Escribano 2016). European intervention in the South promotes both normative models and self interest, which are sometime expressed through the same concept, such as the free market economy. Consequently, the EU has been presented as a “normative empire,” a notion that bridges the divide between normative and interest-based actions and is especially useful in studying the EU's influence in economic matters (Del Sarto 2016). Despite the widespread use of techno-managerial practices, European involvement in the economic restructuring of its Mediterranean neighbors is far from being a neutral process. As recently shown in the Egyptian case, these interventions result in local and international competition, tensions and rejections (Roccu 2015). In order to better understand these dynamics, this working paper studies the Euro-Algerian relationship through the lens of investment in human capital.

This paper draws on Algerian newspapers, European and Algerian think tanks and documents produced by institutions associated with the European Neighborhood Policy¹, to look at how European interventions encourage the transformation of Algerian governmentality. By governmentality, we refer to a fragmented form of power that targets the population, and relies on political economy and security technologies (Foucault 2004a). Framed by the Association Agreement signed in 2002, the Euro-Algerian cooperation implements several programs aimed at transforming the local population, employees and civil servants in accordance with the needs of a modern economy and the polity. This paper examines the ordoliberal character of this undertaking. It also analyzes the changing forms of governmentality in Algeria, the strategies of the EU as well as the reactions of local actors to these transformations.

The first part of this paper introduces the concept of human capital and its relevance in the Euro-Algerian context. It allows us to highlight the ordoliberal genealogy associated with projects of social engineering in Europe. Given the fact that the EU's “external governance” is differentiated in its forms and largely depends on domestic structures (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009), this introductory section also presents the debates and actors associated with the notion of human capital in Algeria. The second section studies the ways in which cooperation programs aim at empowering and responsabilizing the population. Here, we notably investigate attempts to raise the environmental awareness of local actors. Following, the third part of this working paper focuses on the technologies of securitization associated with Euro-Algerian cooperation, which are viewed as a way to promote stable environment for the modernization of the economy. From this perspective, we look at programs that target “at-risk” populations, such as the unemployed youth. Finally, the fourth and last section investigates the EU's involvement in the standardization of Algeria's “human resources” by examining the trainings provided to local private companies and the reform of higher education. Overall, the paper show that these transformations of local governmentality aims at shaping a particular ordoliberal subject.

* This paper benefitted from the support of the BORDERLANDS Project, funded by the European Research Council under grant agreement number 263277. The project is hosted at the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, and directed by Raffaella A. Del Sarto.

¹ Mainly the European Commission, the European Investment Bank, the Delegation of the European Union in Algeria, the European External Action Service and the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union.

1. Human Capital in a Euro-Algerian Perspective

1.1 Human Capital, Development and European Ordoliberalism

The notion of human capital was theorized after WWII by neoclassical economists such as Gary Becker (1964), who proposed an understanding of the concept based on individual rationality. In the late 1980s, a greater emphasis was placed upon society, both as a collective actor and a beneficiary of the development of individual skills. As neoclassical economic theory started to account for the influence of governmental spending, human capital became a matter of public policy. This evolution came with an important paradigm change in the way economic development was conceptualized. This shift was at the core of the Washington consensus, a term that coined the establishment of a set of prescriptions for the economic restructuring of indebted countries. An important feature in these prescriptions was the development of human capital in a market-friendly environment in order to “enable individuals to plug themselves into the world economy” (Williamson 1996: 20). This resulted in the adoption of a newly hegemonic paradigm by international organizations. For instance, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) funded its own “human capital project” in order to provide policy-makers with quantitative tools and comparative statistical data.²

The importance given to the notion of human capital in development policies has been criticized. One of the most common critiques of this concept denounces the commodification of labor-power and the reduction of individuals to a quantifiable human resource (Holborow 2015). More broadly, so-called “post-development” approaches present development economics as a set of technologies of power that objectifies target countries and subjects individuals to a techno-economic rational (Escobar 1995). These critiques echo Foucault's discussion of “human capital” as a key feature in the “extension of economic analysis” to a new realm in order to reconfigure state policies (2004b: 215-233). These critiques were answered by the formulation of a human development theory. Merging post-development critique and human capital, it proposed a theoretical frame that emphasized social justice, economic growth, environmental concerns and individual capabilities (Sen 1999). Nevertheless, despite the incorporation of pro-welfare policies, approaches based on human capital echoed a neoliberal narrative that focuses on individual responsibility and entrepreneurial behavior (Ferguson 2009: 176-177).

From a European perspective, the notion of human capital can be situated in a longstanding tradition of social engineering in order to create a common market and to foster integration (Addison & Siebert 1993). Top-down interventions aiming at transforming social and economic structures were at the core of the early Common Agricultural Policy, as the contentious Mansholt plan proposed a radical transformation of the European peasantry drawing on trainings and helps to reconversion (Bourrigaud 2013). Contemporary EU policies continue to merge economic and social goals. Thus, the promotion of gender equality in public policies also serves to foster social progress and fair competition in labor markets (Jacquot 2006). These interventions reveal the specificity of European “neoliberalism,” which – as Foucault suggested - is indebted to the influence of German ordoliberalism. A specific subset in the broader neoliberal spectrum, ordoliberalism draws on the technicization of monetary politics, budgetary equilibrium, rule of law and ordered competition in the frame of a “social market economy” (Pessin & Strassel 2006). The ordoliberal state must be strong because it is in charge of ordering freedom, as public interventions shape the behavior of individuals and companies (Bonefeld 2012). Moreover, ordoliberalism views the ideal subject as not only a rational economic agent but also a citizen who is responsible for the polity.

While still drawing on ordoliberal principles, European governmentality has evolved from a high-modern style -based on top-down policies- to a post-modern style -based on a fragmented governance.

² OECD (2011), “Measuring the Stock of Human Capital for Comparative Analysis,” *Statistic Directorate*, Working paper n°41, STD/DOC(2011)6.

This evolution implied the enlargement of the decision-making process, the diminution of the economic relevance of the nation-state and the increased relevance of the market both as a tool and an objective (Walters & Haahr 2005: 58-63). As we will see with the Algerian case, the switch from high-modernism to post-modernism is far from being definitive. In addition, this evolution does not invalidate the ordoliberal demand for a strong public involvement to order the market. Thus, the economic weight of public sector remained more important in Europe than in other OECD countries, a difference that was praised by the European Commission in 2005.³

1.2 Managing Human Resources in the Mediterranean Space

The EU appropriated the concept of human capital in the 1990s. The investment in human resources was mentioned explicitly in the Maastricht Treaty as a way to shape the new supranational entity.⁴ As the European Investment Bank (EIB) has sometimes been criticized for blurring the limits between intra-European and extra-European development (Hachez & Wouters 2013: 297), its activities allow us to understand how a European focus on human capital has permeated the Mediterranean space. At the beginning of the 1990s, the EIB focused its actions in the South on sectors of transportation, industry, energy and the environment. After the European councils of Amsterdam (1997) and Cologne (1999), the Bank was given the ability to finance projects in the sectors of education and health in Europe in order to “promote and preserve human capital.”⁵ This evolution was soon extended to the periphery, with the creation of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) in 2002. According to the EIB, social investment (in health and education) was now necessary to ensure the stability of the region.⁶ As the question of the human capital became central beyond the European frontiers, one can see how the single market's rationality extended beyond the limits of the economic space.

This focus on human capital also expresses a desire to manage flows of labor-force, as migration is understood as an investment both for the individuals, the private sector and the authorities (Foucault 2004b: 230). In a recent study conducted by the Parliament's Directorate-General for External Policies, the EU's action in favor of human capital in the Mediterranean was described as including a range of initiatives “favoring the qualification of peoples” in association with private companies.⁷ The related process of commodification is obvious in the discussion of the positive and negative “externalities” associated to the “circulation of human capital” proposed in a working paper for the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs.⁸ At the same time, the hostility regarding migrations from the South remains patent, notably in the name of cultural differences, and results in the framing of this issue as a matter of security (Gabielli, 2014). The joint commodification and securitization of human flows serves to create a space of qualification and disqualification. The related geography of mobility and exclusion underlines the geopolitical tensions in the Mediterranean.

These tensions are also related to the colonial genealogy that has characterized European development policies (Davis 2016; Dimier 2003). This historical legacy fuels a resistance in the South,

³ European Commission, “European Values in a Globalised World,” *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions*, Brussels, COM(2005) 525 final, 4.

⁴ Treaty on European Union, 1992, 197.

⁵ BEI-Rapport_Annuel-1999-(FR)

⁶ BEI- Rapport_Annuel-2002-(FR)

⁷ Chevreau, A. (2014), “Impacts politiques, sociaux et économiques des politiques de l'Union Européenne avec ses partenaires méditerranéens,” *Study from the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union*, (EXPO/B/AFET/2014/05).

⁸ Kahanec, M. & Zimmermann, K. J. (2009), “Migration in an enlarged EU: A challenging solution?,” *Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs*, Economic Papers, 363.

especially in a country such as Algeria, where the rejection of dependence and foreign interference remains especially strong. Consequently, the management of human resources in the Mediterranean space occurs within a broader context of mistrust. The construction of a free-trade zone illustrates these difficulties. At the beginning of the new millennium, the EIB estimated that the free-trade zone in the Euro-Mediterranean space would be completed around 2010.⁹ A few years later, the Association Agreement between the EU and Algeria stated that the free movement of goods and capital would be effective within a period of 12 years (2017).¹⁰ But these predictions were again overly optimistic, and the Algerian government soon concluded that the agreement should be renegotiated and the establishment of a free-trade zone was pushed back to 2020. In order to understand this series of frustrations, we should look not only at the goals and visions of the EU, but also at the agency of local actors.

1.3 Algerian Perspectives

The project of transforming the Algerian population has its own local history. After the war of Independence, the revolutionary elite viewed the investment in the education of the masses as a condition *sine qua non* for the construction of a modern national identity (Lacheraf 2006: 273-302). Human development was to ensure class emancipation and bolster the socialist orientation of the Revolution. Moreover, the economic reforms implemented in the 1960s sought to erase traditional solidarities and create modern consumers (Redjimi 2001). These policies were implemented in the framework of a centralized governmentality, as the Algerian government aimed to transform its population by relying on planning – a strategy adopted by many other developing countries from Egypt to India. In Bouteflika's Algeria, the state remains the primary force that manages the economy and the society, by relying on its hydrocarbon rent. Key actors in the ruling coalition are agents of the state (army officers, technocrats) and their domination is dependent on this top-down configuration. This explains their reluctance to accept a full economic liberalization that would threaten their ability to manage both the economy and the society.

Yet since the end of the 1980s, Algeria has progressively abandoned its “specific socialism”, and the ruling coalition has become increasingly heterogeneous. The rise of a liberal rhetoric is obvious when it comes to transforming popular behaviors, both from a political and economic point of view. Rather than speaking of raising class awareness or creating a national culture of emancipation, Algerian officials now speak the language of democracy and human capital. For example, during the United Nations' conference hosted by Algeria in 2003, the influential Minister of Investment, Abdelhamid Temmar, quoted Gary Becker before explaining that democracy was an “extremely important element for human resources.” He went on to analyze the fall of communism and its link with human capital and to argue in favor of the development of “creativity” and “managerial capacity.”¹¹ Changes in Algerian governmentality also imply that crony capitalists have become privileged interlocutors of the government regarding economic policies. A prominent figure such as Ali Haddad illustrates the double commitment of Algerian businessmen toward economic change and political *status quo* (Boubekeur 2013). The CEO of the construction company ETRHB is one of Bouteflika's most active supporters. At end of 2014, he became the head of the business owners' union (*Forum des Chefs d'Entreprise* – FCE). As such, he asked for structural reforms and an increased role for private companies in the development of human capital.¹²

⁹ BEI-Publications-Evenementielles-AccordsHorsUE-Mediterranee-Partenariat-(FR1) (2000)

¹⁰ Association Agreement, Article 6, 2005, 3.

¹¹ Redig, A. (2003), “Actes du Symposium international sur le capital humain et le développement en Afrique du Nord,” *UN Economic Commission for Africa*, Algiers.

¹² *L'éconews*, January 4th 2015.

The question of economic reform is now at the nexus of contradictory agendas, from the efforts of state elites to preserve a centralized governmentality to attempts by crony capitalist to intervene in the decision-making process. In their attempt to reshape Algeria's political economy, successive governments have also opened a space for reformist claims. Many of these critiques are expressed by activists, trade unions and political parties situated at the left of the political field. The dominant egalitarian culture is translated in denunciations of the spoliation of national wealth and social injustice that are echoed by private newspapers (*El Khabar, El Watan, Liberté...*). At the same time, while these organizations defend the socialist legacy of the Revolution, other groups advocate for a liberal reform of the polity and the economy. Among these actors, one can find entrepreneurs, journalists and economists who are often privileged interlocutors of foreign partners.

The think tank Nabni exemplifies the growing visibility of pro-business reformists in Algerian debates. While some of its prominent members are related to international finance, such as Lies Kerrar,¹³ its spokesman Abdelkrim Boudra is the head of a company specialized in professional training based in Algiers. Both Kerrar and Boudra have also worked with state institutions, such as the national tax council and the national agency for the development of small businesses. These actors, situated at the crossroads of state and business interests, critique and support, policy-making and consulting, embody the contradictory dynamics that are transforming Algerian governmentality. In 2013, the report published by Nabni provoked extensive commentary in the press and democratic circles.¹⁴ The authors insisted on questions of education and health and claimed that human capital should represent a priority for public investment in order to improve the country's competitiveness. While giving suggestions for Algeria to adapt to the global economy, they also underlined the necessity of support for low-income housings. This report illustrated the ways in which an ordoliberal discourse on human capital and social spending can be welcomed in a political context marked by a strong egalitarian culture. According to its authors, the financial power of the state was to be used to improve the economic environment, for the benefit of the people.

Nevertheless, in times of budgetary scarcity, the social dimension of ordoliberalism tends to vanish. In 2015, following the fall of hydrocarbon prices, Nabni published an emergency plan in which the investment in human capital was no longer mentioned. The think tank proposed a program that focused on the re-establishment of a balanced budget, the implementation of investment-friendly economic reforms, the strengthening of the rule of law, and a style of governance based on a strict evaluation of performance.¹⁵ The authors also argued that some unpopular decisions should be made, including the progressive end of subventions for goods and services. This ordoliberal diet focused on the reform of the state rather than on social engineering. Finally, one can see here that the promotion of an ordoliberal agenda in Algeria is not merely an external imposition, despite local resistances. Many actors in the government, in the economic field, in think tanks or even in the academic system, are associated with this process. Thus, they often provide expertise and support in order to orient the European intervention.

2. Responsibilization

2.1 Changing the Regime and the Masses

European interventions in Algeria can be divided into two categories. On one hand, the cooperation implies a direct partnership with public institutions to improve the "quality of governance." This meets the demands of the Algerian government that favors a cooperation based on transfers of knowledge

¹³ See the portrait of Kerrar proposed by the business-friendly newspaper *Liberté*, September 10th 2014.

¹⁴ Nabni (2013), "Cinquantenaire de l'indépendance : enseignement et vision pour l'Algérie de 2020."

¹⁵ Nabni (2015), "Plan d'urgence ABDA, 2016-2018."

and seeks assistance in the implementation of reforms.¹⁶ To reinforce the Algerian state's capability, the EU draws on the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange program (TAIEX). Algeria's involvement with TAIEX has constantly increased since 2009; in the last six years, more than 2000 individuals have participated in their training programs.¹⁷ In this case, investment in human capital aims at enhancing state capabilities and standardizing public practices in accordance with globalized norms. The second form of intervention is based on programs directed at different segments of Algerian society in order to improve the individual and collective capabilities. These programs notably draw on and support non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which conduct training programs and benefit from the enhancement of their employees' skills. In the next three sections, we will study the ways in which the EU tries to change Algeria's human capital, from the education of concerned citizens to the promotion of an entrepreneurial spirit.

Many technologies of power that are characteristic of European governmentality seek to shape citizens in accordance with ideal moral, economic and political skills (Walters & Haahr 2005: 75-76). Coherent with the paradigm of capability that has become central to transnational development policies, these technologies enhance the individual's ability to act as an autonomous subject and concerned citizen. This top-down approach, which seeks to improve the behavior of the population, appears as a technology of responsabilization (Lemke 2001). The fact that this responsabilization is both economic and political is a key feature of ordoliberalism. Moreover, the targeting of public servants echoes the ordoliberal focus on the strengthening of the state.

When offered opportunities for self-improvement, subjects are held singularly responsible for their persistently "uncivil" behavior or their inability to adapt to new economic conditions. Here, one can recognize a central assumption of human capital theory: individuals are supposed to act rationally to maximize their benefits. As such, this approach tends to isolate the individual from his or her social, political and economic environment (Block 1990: 25). For example, according to the Algerian press and various experts on both sides of the Mediterranean, the capacity of Algerian peasants to export their crops on the European market depends on their ability to adapt to European norms and techniques, which implies the evolution of local mentalities.¹⁸ Consequently, DIVECO, the program aiming at diversifying the Algerian economy and favoring exports, provided hundreds of public servants, engineers, local officials and farmer representatives with trainings aiming at similar objectives.¹⁹ The ambiguity of any technology of responsabilization is that it provides local actors with tools to act by themselves, while ignoring the global structures that impact their choices and the results of the investment. In short, this discourse centered on subjects rather than structures, overlooks the fact that the ability of Algerian farmers to export to the European market will also be considerably impacted by elements beyond their control, such as speculation or European protectionism.

In the neoliberal era, it often seems that the deficiencies of the developmental state can be compensated through an increased involvement of local "civil society" (Ferguson 2006). In the Algerian case, the problem of corruption is especially telling. The issue is constantly underlined by reports and statistics produced by the European Commission, where it is presented as a consequence of economic liberalization, the weakness of the rule of law, and the lack of political will of the government.²⁰ In this context, a survey ordered by the EU illustrates the shared belief that the most

¹⁶ European Commission, "Algérie. Programme Indicatif National (2011-2013)," Brussels, 2010, 5.

¹⁷ Directorate-General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. "Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA within the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries. 2013 Activity Report," Brussels, 2013.

¹⁸ *Liberté*, April 12th 2005; *Le Midi Libre*, September 11th 2014.

¹⁹ Delegation of the European Union in Algeria, "Dossier de Presse. Appui à la diversification de l'économie – Secteurs agriculture, agroalimentaire et tourisme (DIVECO 1)," Algiers, March 23rd 2015.

²⁰ See European Commission, "Memo: ENP Package Algeria," Brussels, March 27th 2014, 2 ; European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Implementation of the European

important duty of Algerian “civil society” organizations is to fight corruption.²¹ Yet, as the question is limited to its national dimension, its global causes remain unaddressed; one might cite, for example, the responsibility of European companies and fiscal paradises in widespread corruption and embezzlement in African countries. Rather, the responsabilization of local actors allows for increasingly culturalist explanations, as the Algerian press often insists on the necessity to change the mentalities via education in order to cure the “disease of corruption.”²²

The need to transform the masses is inseparable from the need to improve the “quality of governance” in Algeria. For many years, liberal critiques have maintained that any comprehensive reform must start by changing the people. A former liberal minister, now critical of the regime and an occasional participant in Nabni's conferences, Nouredine Boukrouh, has been especially active in promoting the idea that Algeria can only be reformed by changing both the masses and the regime (2013). The question of Algeria's human capital remains intrinsically linked to a postcolonial configuration, where culturalist narratives turn Escobar's “defensive localization” (2001: 149) on its head, in order to explain a difficult political and economic situation. As the place of the nation-state is threatened by transnational economic dynamics, national culture is held responsible for the lack of competitiveness. As a counterpoint, while the European model is not praised unanimously, both due to historical reasons and its concrete performance, it remains pertinent when it comes to specific domains related to human capital, such as rural development or higher education.²³

2.2 Making Responsible Citizens

The EU is especially committed to encouraging the civil involvement of the Algerian population. One of its classic interventions aims at promoting popular participation in the various electoral consultations. Indeed, the final report published by the observation mission sent in 2012 to monitor the legislative elections underlined the authorities' lack of commitment to encouraging popular participation. It therefore recommended a long-term strategy of civic education.²⁴ Between 2011 and 2012, the annual programs of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights allocated 1.5 million euros to the country. Most of these funds served to encourage popular participation via the mediation of local associations.²⁵ As is often the case, the notion of “civil society” was a palliative to the state's deficiency. Nevertheless, while criticizing the Algerian authorities, these European interventions also echoed the declarations of members of the government who often underscores the lack of civic culture of the “people.”²⁶ Each electoral campaign witnesses state officials advocating for electoral participation, sometimes even claiming that voting is a religious duty. Here, one can see how local agendas intersect with European commitments to democracy promotion and to improving popular civic culture.

Most of the actions taken in favor of human capital remain market oriented. From this perspective, raising the environmental awareness of local actors is another form of responsabilization, which mirrors the ecological concerns of modern ordoliberal figures who promote the notions of “sustainable

(Contd.) _____

Neighbourhood Policy Statistics,” *Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions*, Brussels, SWD(2015) 77 final , 7.

²¹ TNS Opinion – EU Neighbourhood Barometer, “Algerian civil society fact sheet,” Spring 2013.

²² *Le Quotidien d'Oran*, April 18th 2015; *L'Expression*, December 12th 2011.

²³ See respectively, *Le Maghreb*, December 11th 2007 and *El Watan*, January 1st 2016.

²⁴ Mission d'observation électorale de l'Union Européenne, “Rapport Final. Élections législatives Algérie 2012,” 17 & 39.

²⁵ European Commission, “Annual Action Program 2011 for the European Instrument for the promotion of Democracy and Human Rights worldwide,” Brussels, 2011, 26 ; European Commission, “Annual Action Program 2012 for the European Instrument for the promotion of Democracy and Human Rights worldwide,” Brussels, 2012, 7.

²⁶ After the urban riots of January 2011, the head of the ruling FLN denounced the lack of civic education of protesters whom he compared to football hooligans.

development” and “eco-social market economy” (Riegler 2003; Maucher, Malik & Farschtschian 2012). Ecology has become a way to shape the market and to secure economic results, as the European Commission stated in its strategy document for Algeria:

“Future growth prospects also depend on controlling economic costs and the effects on public health of environmental degradation. This degradation has an immediate impact on health, natural capital, productivity and the efficient use of resources. The impact of this degradation has been conservatively estimated at 5-7 % of GDP.”²⁷

As is often the case, the EU's intervention started by targeting public authorities. Beginning in 1992, the EIB has financed the assistance and training of local actors through the METAP (*Mediterranean Environmental Training and Assistance Program*), which was co-financed by the World Bank. In Algeria, it intervened in order to “strengthen the local capacity to plan and manage the coastal zone” in Tlemcen and to “improve the protection and management of resources” in Blida²⁸. After the signing of the Association Agreement, the systematization of twinnings allowed the expansion of these transfers of expertise to encourage local authorities to shoulder their responsibilities. For example, the twinning program implemented for the National Research Center for the Development of Fishing and Fish Farming (CNRDPA) was designed to shape its institutional and legal framework and to “bolster its human resources.” The twinning program financed by the EU mobilized 1.1 million euros and relied on the expertise of the Italian and French administrations.²⁹ Improving public “managerial and scientific capacities” of the CNRDPA aimed at influencing the conceptualization of local policies and allowing a “responsible management” of the environment.³⁰ From 2011 to 2013, the cooperation program dedicated 34 million euros to the protection of the environment in Algeria.³¹ These projects were conceptualized in relationship to “civil society.” In the Mediterranean space, Europeaid financed the transnational program REMEE (Rediscovering together the water heritage in the Mediterranean region), which aimed notably at “increas(ing) awareness among citizens, particularly youth, of the water heritage protection,” via the organization of educational workshops and exhibitions. REMEE involved several North-African associations, such as the Algerian AREA-ED (*Association de Réflexion d'Echanges et d'Action pour l'Environnement et le Développement*). This association based in Tipaza has about thirty members and belongs to an international network of NGOs working against desertification. Its budget over the last decade has been constantly supported by European funding for various activities such as providing training programs, raising environmental awareness, and organizing youth campus. During the last period (2011-2015), AREA-ED provided trainings to other NGOs drawing on its own expertise and was directly associated to the integrated management of the coastal zones.³² Drawing on its cooperation with the EU, the Algerian NGO has become an integrated component of this transnational apparatus of governmentality that brings together local associations, nation-states and global institutions (Ferguson & Gupta 2002).

Responsabilization implies the systematic transfers of expertise to Mediterranean partners in order to improve local capabilities. A study from the Directorate-General for External Policies suggested that transfers regarding energy efficiency should rely on the involvement of private companies,

²⁷ European Commission, “Algérie. Document de Stratégie (2007-2013),” Brussels, 2007, 17.

²⁸ BEI-Publications-Evenementielles-Environnement-EPM-Mediterranee-1992-EN

²⁹ See the website of the French agency involved in the program : Url: <http://www.adecia.org/projets/jumelage-renforcement-des-capacites-du-centre-national-de-recherche-et-de-developpement-de-la-peche-et-de-laquaculture-cnrdpa/> (consulted on April 12th 2016)

³⁰ P3A, “Fiche de Projet de Jumelage classique. Renforcement des capacités du Centre National de Recherche pour le Développement de la Pêche et de l'Aquaculture (CNRDPA),” 2012, 23.

³¹ European Commission, “Algérie. Programme Indicatif National (2011-2013),” Brussels, 2010, 9-12.

³² Url:<http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/fr/members/association-de-reflexion-dechanges-et-dactions-pour-lenvironnement-et-le-developpement-area> (consulted on April 12th 2016)

training institutes and research centers.³³ The process of responsabilization is at the crossroads of government, society and economy. It shapes the actions of local population, public and private organizations, and the environment broadly defined. From this point of view, the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation favors a post-modern fragmented governmentality. At the same time, the ordoliberal approach relies primarily on the strengthening of public capacities. Tellingly, the example of AREA-ED shows how the responsabilization of the citizens results in their association to a top-down process directed by the state.

3. Securitization

3.1 Securitizing Culture

A second category of the technologies of power implemented in the Euro-Algerian is comprised of technologies of securitization. Securitization – which refers to the framing of issues as security concerns to ensure they are prioritized (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998) – is common in the neoliberal era. It cannot, therefore, be seen as specifically ordoliberal. From this perspective, the EU is a space where transnational agencies manage diverse social, economic and political insecurities. Each risk must meet a specific form of power, and each issue is managed in order to ensure minimal safety (for the consumer, the investor, the patient...) (Walters & Haahr 2005: 92-106). One of the examples that demonstrates how issues are securitized beyond Schengen's limits is the externalization of border controls and the criminalization of illegal migration. While certainly relevant regarding the question of human capital, the question of immigration will be bracketed in this paper, as it has received extensive attention elsewhere (Rodier 2012; Gabrielli 2014). Instead, we will focus on the ways in which the Euro-Algerian cooperation answers to certain forms of human risks that have been identified in the Algerian context.

Among the issues related to stability in the South is the question of cultural insecurity and national identity (Amar 2013). While linked to the postcolonial configuration -that is to say the legacy of colonial acculturation - and the process of globalization, this issue is also informed by the civil war of the 1990s in Algeria. Algerian actors often portray the Black Decade as the moment when the polity lost itself, and ceased having any political and social cohesion.³⁴ After the shock of the violence, the debates were especially oriented toward questions of reconciliation and memory. Similarly, the “enrichment of the memory of the Algerian society” was one of the goals of the cooperation programs for the valorization of patrimony implemented by the EU from 2011 to 2013. One of the visible consequences of these programs was the funding of a “memory center” in Blida where peoples impacted by the civil war could seek help “that they would not or could not get from the government” (Mundy 2015: 157)

The question of culture is also linked to a second category of risk: the intercultural tensions in Algeria and in the Mediterranean space.³⁵ In the Algerian political discourse, certain Berber populations and regions have often been portrayed as a risk for national unity. This was the case in Kabylia following the uprising of 2001, and more recently in the region of the Mزاب, following a series of intercommunal clashes. In response, the regime has at the same time promoted a unique

³³ Orjebini-Yousfaoui C. (2014), “Politiques de gestion et de valorisation des ressources naturelles et renouvelables de l'Union européenne avec ses partenaires méditerranéens,” *Study from the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union*, EXPO/B/AFET/2014/3, 22.

³⁴ The thematic appeared in many interviews related to a previous project (Managing crisis in Algeria).

³⁵ The question of intercultural dialog is mentioned in the Association Agreement, which must serve to promote “climate of understanding and tolerance between cultures.” Association Agreement, Article 3, 2005, 2.

“Algerian culture” and advertised a folkloric diversity.³⁶ As cultural mosaics has been viewed as a risk for the unity of postcolonial nations, transnational institutions intervened to propose an enchanted vision of cultural diversity as an opportunity for polities during periods of uncertainty. Similarly, in a preparatory report on Algeria, the promotion of “cultural and human diversity” was presented as a necessary element in the EU’s strategy, given the demands of both the government and the population.³⁷ *De facto*, cultural diversity appears as a risk for a young polity, though it can also represent a chance for human development as long as it is correctly managed and appropriated by local actors.

Concretely, the cooperation report released by the Delegation of the EU in Algeria in 2013 offers a complete overview of the different programs -both national and regional- that foster cultural diversity and intercultural dialog in Algeria. They rely heavily on training programs, transfers of expertise to Algerian institutions and NGOs, in order to facilitate the “appropriation by populations of their own cultural patrimony.” The organization of festivals dedicated to “musical dialog” and “reflections on identity” illustrates the importance of cultural policies as a way to promote mutual understanding. In the Algerian case, this strategy is at least partly a response to the risks of communitarian division and the specter of a clash of civilizations.³⁸

3.2 Stability and Social Cohesion

Broadly stated, security is the dominant lens through which the region is viewed by Europe. After 2011, the Algerian government promoted the international image of a pole of stability in a troubled Arab world. At the same time, this narrative of Algerian stability is contested by local commentators. While some express their concerns regarding the manipulations of foreign enemies, others accuse the regime of being incapable of effective governance due to its divisions.³⁹ Moreover, many observers point to the risk posed by social unrest and the lack of dialog between the protesters and public authorities.⁴⁰

The necessity to ensure social cohesion has been noted repeatedly by European actors since the signing of the Association Agreement. In 2007, the strategy document released by the Commission underlined the dangers linked to social unrest, especially given the high unemployment rate among the youth and women.⁴¹ The statistics produced by the EU confirm these observations. In 2015, the final report of the European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion (ESPON) pointed to a series of social risks including the gender gap in education and employment, the demographic “time bomb” resulting from higher birth rates in the South, and the pervasive lack of social services and education in rural regions.⁴² This report again highlights how social cohesion has become a security concern, and how this results in the designation of target populations for policies: namely the unemployed, youth and women, especially in southern zones. Indeed, the youth and rural populations are also under the scrutiny of the Algerian government and benefit from its timely shows of generosity.⁴³ Here, we can see how the transnational development apparatus produces client

³⁶ *El Watan*, September 19th 2014.

³⁷ Helly, D. (2014), “Algeria Country Report,” *Preparatory action – Culture in EU External Relations*.

³⁸ Delegation of the European Union in Algeria, “Rapport sur la coopération UE-Algérie,” Algiers, July 2013.

³⁹ In the context of the Presidential election of 2014, see L. Hanoune, the head of the Workers' Party (*Ennahar*, March 28th 2014) and former Prime Minister M. Hamrouche (*Maghreb Emergent*, March 23rd 2014).

⁴⁰ *La Tribune*, April 17th 2011; *Ennahar*, April 20th 2013.

⁴¹ European Commission, “Algérie. Document de stratégie (2007-2013),” Brussels, 2007, 15-16.

⁴² ESPON, “Integrated Territorial Analysis of the Neighbourhoods. Scientific Report – Part II,” March 11th 2015, 452-456.

⁴³ For example, by announcing the cancellation of their debts (*Ennahar*, May 15th 2009) or a massive wave of hirings in the public sector (*Echourouk*, June 22nd 2014).

categories that are targeted by various programs in order to integrate them to the market economy (Escobar 1995).

The European use of the notion of “inclusive growth” exemplifies this focus on precarious social categories.⁴⁴ Once a specific issue becomes a security concern, it is only a matter of time before policies are designed to address the risk that has been posed. On a regional scale, the strategy document for the Sahelian space released by the European External Action Service linked human development to questions of counter-terrorism. One of the strategic actions listed was to “offer to socially marginalized groups, especially the youth prone to radicalization, basic social services and economic and employment perspectives.”⁴⁵ In regard to Algeria, the 2007 strategy document suggested improving the business environment and the education system as well as increased opportunities for professional training, especially in rural areas, in order to reduce unemployment and fight inequalities.⁴⁶ More recently, in a report for the European Training Foundation, an economist based in Algiers suggested developing a micro-finance system and involving the private sector in the conceptualization of policies, in addition to a reform of public services.⁴⁷ In other words, the prevailing wisdom posits that social risks can be minimized through a combination of economic modernization and investment in human capital.

Concretely, several Euro-Algerian programs have addressed the issue of social and economic precariousness by reforming the country's labor market. Following a well-established pattern, the ordoliberal intervention develops local public capacity to manage populations. One of the first programs implemented was directed at the Ministry of Professional Training. From 2003 onwards, it drew on private training companies such as the French Demos Group to produce a skilled labor-force in accordance with the requirements of international competition. According to the website of the Ministry, one of the objectives of this cooperation was to “provide the Algerian population with better opportunities for insertion and recycling on the labor market.”⁴⁸ Similarly, the more recent PASEA program offers training programs to the employees of the National Agency for Employment (ANEM), to enhance its statistic tools and management capacities. PASEA relies on the participation of the German company GOPA Worldwide Consultant as well as agencies of different member states. Launched in 2014, this project is part of a broader Euro-Algerian initiative to engage the youth population. More broadly, the program expands the reach of the ANEM by increasing the number of local agencies.⁴⁹ Finally, the securitization of social precariousness results in a European intervention aiming at improving the local labor market and reinforcing the Algerian techno-structure with the help of private companies specialized in transnational training. An ordoliberal understanding of socio-economic equilibrium shapes a changing Algerian governmentality, most notably by enhancing the public management of “at-risk” populations in accordance with the market's needs.

⁴⁴ European Commission, “Memo: ENP Package Algeria,” Brussels, March 27th 2014, 2.

⁴⁵ European External Action Service, “Stratégie pour la sécurité et le développement au Sahel,” Brussels, 2011.

⁴⁶ European Commission, “Algérie. Document de stratégie (2007-2013),” Brussels, 2007, 26-28.

⁴⁷ Saïb Musette, M. (2014), “Employment policies and active labour market programmes in Algeria,” *European Training Foundation*, Torino, 2014.

⁴⁸ Url: <http://www3.mfep.gov.dz/Appui.htm> (consulted on April 12th 2016)

⁴⁹ *PASEA Actions Emploi*, n°1, May 2014 ; *PASEA Actions Emploi*, n°4, August 2015 ; See also the job offers published by EuropeAid: EuropeAid/131639/C/SER/DZ, “Restructuration de l'offre de service de l'ANEM” & “Réaménager l'organisation des structures locales de l'ANEM (Algérie) et leurs relations.”

4. Standardization

4.1 What Knowledge for the Market?

The “Spring Program” implemented by the EU in response to the Arab uprisings made “sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development” one of its top priorities. It encouraged a larger focus on employment policies and the strengthening of labor market institutions in partner countries. At the same time, the Spring Program also suggested that the “regulatory framework for business” should be reinforced and advocated for the development of a “good quality vocational education and training” answering to the labor market needs.⁵⁰ The standardization of skills allows for the commodification of the Mediterranean labor-force. It serves to increase the competitiveness and attractiveness of southern countries and, to a lesser extent, bolster the adaptability of southern workers to the European market.

Nevertheless, it would be simplistic to limit market-oriented knowledge to a formal understanding. As Elyachar notes, early neoliberal thinkers based their criticism of economic planning on the impossibility of meeting economic challenges by relying on an academic or professional education. Opposed to any centralized and rational management, they rather promoted a tacit knowledge that would allow the individual to act as an independent economic agent (Elyachar 2012). This promotion of tacit knowledge is echoed by development programs that insist on the necessity for Mediterranean countries to “give an access to critical thinking” to their populations in order to answer to a global economic context that requires “energetic, creative and autonomous individuals” (Blanc & Abis 2007: 36). Similarly, the former Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry developed exchanges between North African and European states in order to promote an “entrepreneurial spirit”. In addition to technical and financial assistance, European experts suggested that this promotion relies on the educational system as much as advertising on TV and on the Internet.⁵¹ The terms of the Euro-Mediterranean charter for enterprise leave no doubt regarding the systematic dimension of this program:

“We will nurture entrepreneurial spirit from an earlier age. General knowledge about business, entrepreneurial attitudes and entrepreneurship skills need to be taught and developed at all school levels. Specific business-related modules should be made an essential ingredient of education schemes at secondary schools, colleges and universities.”⁵²

This passage illustrates the tension between two conceptions of knowledge that coexist in neoliberal thought: a managerialism based on the responsabilization of an individual who relies on his/her tacit knowledge and a more structural approach that draws on a formal and standardized training. Yet, this seeming contradiction is resolved by the moral dimension of ordoliberalism, which is translated into ethical norms that must be internalized by individual economic agents. Consequently, managerial programs can also be coercive for those who must learn the codes of “good” entrepreneurialism (Le Goff 1996). Beyond the image of a tacit, autonomous and spontaneous knowledge, there is also a formal and ordered relationship to market economy. This cohabitation is already present in Foucault's understanding of homo economicus both as an entrepreneur of himself and as a subject in a new regime of truth (Foucault 2004b).

⁵⁰ Action Fiche for the southern Neighbourhood region programme Support for partnership, reforms and inclusive growth (SPRING), 2011.

⁵¹ Directorate-General for Enterprises and Industry, “Recommandations du groupe d'expert concernant l'éducation à l'esprit d'entreprise,” Brussels, 2006.

⁵² Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise, 2004.

4.2 Supporting SMEs and Creating Good Businessmen

Over the last decade, the EU has implemented various programs for the modernization of the Algerian economy, such as PME/PMI (supporting small businesses), DIVECO (diversification of the economy) or FACICO (facilitating trade). In accordance with the so-called principle of “think small first,” the development of SMEs in Algeria was encouraged in order to diversify the economy and decrease the country's vulnerability to a potential drop of hydrocarbons prices. The second part of the PME/PMI program was launched in 2009. With an approximate budget of 40 million euros, it was the main large-scale project in Algeria for the period 2007-2013.⁵³

The primary objective of PME/PMI was to provide technical assistance to Algerian SMEs and to foster the mutation of the productive sector toward a more competitive model. In order to respond to a series of challenges for local enterprises (modern management, capture of new market, adaptation to standards of quality...), the program provided small businesses with direct training. In so doing, PME/PMI aimed at improving the practices of the employees and conforming local SMEs to the use of quality control. On its website, the program keeps publishing handbooks presenting the expected good practices regarding general topics (financial management, communication, hygiene) and more technical topics (rules for adding food additives to juices), in collaboration with public institutions (ANDPME – National Agency for the Development of SMEs) or industry associations (Algerian Association of Beverage Producers).⁵⁴

This direct intervention offers concrete opportunities for local businessmen who want to upgrade their employees' skills and adapt their production methods to the European market. One of the most telling examples is surely Slim Othmani, the CEO of the food company NCA Rouiba. In the framework of PME/PMI, the company has benefited from training programs for its employees regarding hygiene practices to develop its export activities. Eight members of the company have also been trained in order to perform internal audits.⁵⁵ The case of NCA Rouiba provides a good example of the way in which the EU can provide a formal knowledge that meet the requirements of the global market.

The case of Othmani is interesting for other reasons as well. An unconventional figure in the Algerian economic field, he left the FCE in 2014 in order to protest against its endorsement of Bouteflika's candidacy. A firm defender of the Association Agreement, the CEO is also an interlocutor of the European Union when it comes to the modernization of the Algerian economy. Thus, it is not surprising that his company benefited from European programs. In return, he has worked with various European institutions, such as the EIB for which he gave a presentation in Luxembourg in 2008, dedicated to the challenges of human capital in the South of the Mediterranean.⁵⁶ Moreover, Othmani is also the founder of CARE (*Cercle d'Action et de Réflexion autour de l'Entreprise*), a think tank that works with the Delegation of the European Union in Algeria. Since 2014, they have organized a series of debates on various issues related to the modernization of the Algerian economy.

It is especially telling that CARE insists both on its commitment to democracy and to its promotion of good corporate governance in Algeria. From this perspective, the question of standardization is not limited to commodities but also encompasses a series of “good” social behaviors. As it was once put by Wilhelm Röpke, one of the founding figures of ordoliberalism, a wealthy free market economy draws on a “stable framework of political, moral and legal standards” (1959: 255). The new subject is not merely economic. It is also shaped by the EU's promotion of standards of democratic governance

⁵³ European Commission, “Algérie. Document de stratégie (2007-2013),” Brussels, 2007, 35-39.

⁵⁴ <http://www.algerie-pme2.dz/?Les-publications-du-PME-II> (consulted on April 12th 2016)

⁵⁵ Hafid, T. (2014), “Un passeport pour l'export,” *EU Neighbourhood Info Centre*, Reportage n°120.

⁵⁶ Othmani, S., “Adapter les compétences aux besoins du marché: le défi du capital humain dans la région méditerranéenne,” *BEI/FEMIP*, Luxembourg, November 18th-19th 2008.

at the sectoral level (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 808). Here again, we find the particularity of the EU's ordoliberal approach to human capital, as the moral dimension of this anthropological intervention appears. Standardization and responsabilization join to shape the ordoliberal subject, both as a model citizen and an entrepreneur who will act for the joint benefit of the polity and the market.

4.3 The LMD crisis

Unsurprisingly, attempts at social engineering are accompanied by forms of contestation since the adaptation to a free market society is far from being a neutral process. At the end of 2015, during a conference organized by CARE, the former Algerian ambassador in Brussels criticized the implementation of the Association Agreement. He underlined the inability of Algerian producers to meet the requirements of the European market and he denounced the administration's resistance to enforce the required norms.⁵⁷ This episode illustrates the opposition to change in local governmentality. In Algeria, a combination of local and foreign pressure threatens the traditional model of bureaucratic domination and the social categories that depend on the state's redistribution of national wealth. Meeting the required globalized standards challenges a protectionist model that answers to the needs of the ruling elite as much as to those of the more precarious classes.

In order to understand that these transformations do not only threaten the position of crony capitalists and corrupt bureaucrats, one can look at the reform of the Algerian higher education system that was implemented with the support of the EU. In 2007, the European strategy document presented governmental reform as a priority in order to “enhance the level of training of human capital.” The goals listed were: increasing youth employment, limiting migration, upgrading economic competitiveness and proving a more qualified labor force.⁵⁸ In 2010, the PAPS-ESRS (*Programme d'Appui à la Politique Sectorielle de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique*) was implemented with funds provided by the Algerian government (17,1 millions EUR) and the EU (21,5 millions EUR). While the training of referring public managers started, journalists in the business-oriented press, technocrats from the Ministry of Higher Education, and academics associated with the reform echoed the European wish to see the emergence of a business-oriented university.⁵⁹

This reform implied the standardization and subsequent commodification of formal knowledge. For example, the creation of technological platforms that met European standards in three Algerian universities aimed at facilitating exchanges with the private sector. On a larger scale, one of the main undertakings of the program was the creation of a License – Master – Doctorate (LMD) system similar to the structure existing in Europe according to the Bologna Process. The LMD was gradually introduced in Algeria since 2004, officially in order to improve the international integration of its academic system and the mobility of the students. It has also been criticized as a European experiment that would decrease the value of academic diplomas by student unions and nationalist politicians.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the process of standardization continued as the EU monitored the reform of the Algerian higher education system in 2010, focusing on the enhancement of “the management and development of human resources.”⁶¹

Nevertheless, the transformation of the Algerian academic system implied massive organizational complications, increased territorial inequalities and introduced a growing confusion regarding the

⁵⁷ Benattallah, H., “A propos de l'Accord d'Association: Passé, Présent, Avenir,” *Les Matinales de Care with the support of the Delegation of the European Union in Algeria*, Algiers, November 17th 2015.

⁵⁸ European Commission, “Algérie. Document de stratégie (2007-2013),” Brussels, 2007, 48-49.

⁵⁹ Press clipping relating a seminar organized by the PAPS-ESRS gathered and released by a public relations agency “Retombées. Séminaire de visibilité à Alger,” PAPS-ESRS & TBWA/DJAZ, November 14th 2014.

⁶⁰ Executive decree n° 04-371, November 21st 2004. *L'Expression*, March 13th 2007; *Liberté*, December 11th 2007.

⁶¹ Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, “Higher Education in Algeria,” *Tempus Programme*, Brussels, October 2010.

value of different diplomas. Despite a shared desire to improve mobility and gain better access to the global system, the material and institutional shortcomings revealed the general discontent in higher education (Ghouati 2012). Among academics, there was a sharp divide between those who actively participated in the conceptualization and the implementation of the reform, and those who denounced the LMD system for being pedagogically inefficient, materially unfit and politically unacceptable given the resulting subjection to the European system.⁶² Student strikes and protests started at the end of February 2011, with the joint mobilization of specialized elite schools and public universities. While denouncing a ministerial decree related to the LMD reform,⁶³ this movement also echoed growing denunciations of the precariousness of life in campus and the insufficiencies of pedagogical means. Moreover, in the context of the recent uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, some of the student protests briefly incorporated a more radical rhetoric that challenged the entire political order (Baamara 2012). The LMD crisis demonstrates how standardization processes can fuel popular discontent in a highly contentious situation. Far from being understood only as a policy in favor of human development and competitiveness, the reform was also portrayed as an unfair and disorganizing intervention that favored private companies and foreign interests.

Conclusion: The Making of an Ordoliberal Borderland?

In 2015, the EU launched its new program in favor of economic and political reforms in Algeria in order to “build new mentalities (and) teach human resources the international norms regarding public affairs and institutions.”⁶⁴ In so doing, it reaffirmed the anthropological nature of its intervention. As this paper has shown, the Euro-Algerian cooperation draws on technologies of standardization, securitization and responsabilization in order to shape a socially integrated, politically and economically moral subject. Adapting to the requirements of the single market is not merely a technical or economic undertaking, since the construction of the market itself draws on normative claims that are inherently linked to a moral and political order (Mitchell, 2002). In our case, the promotion of standards of human rationality, responsibility and capability distinctly echoes the ordoliberal conception of an ideal “civil middle-class providing the humus for all things” (Röpke, 1959: 236). The peculiarity of the EU's intervention lies in this attempt to streamline and moralize the dominant mindset in the Algerian society.

The EU's involvement in the transformation of Algeria's human capital also illustrates the changes in local governmentality. The high-modernist tradition in Algeria resulted in the prioritization of the improvement of state capability, most notably via trainings provided to public servants. Yet there is a discrepancy between this logic and the inherently post-modern practices of the EU. Given the widespread rejection of foreign interference and the ruling elite's ability to impose its own agenda, the role of local public institutions remains crucial in managing the population. Despite the influence of transnational actors, the Algerian case illustrates the persistent relevance of the state and national sovereignty (Mann, 2015: 244). At the same time, the nation-state is necessarily involved in multiscale processes and relies on a variety of partners, from transnational organizations such as the EU to companies and NGOs. While remaining committed to a centralized governmentality, Algerian officials demand external interventions in order to manage their territory and reach precarious populations. Consequently, the Euro-Algerian cooperation illustrates a process that sees the joint restructuring of economy and state spatiality (Brenner, 2004: 111-112).

The making of an ordoliberal borderland implies a restructuring that is at once economic, political and anthropological. From this perspective, the relationship between the center of the “normative

⁶² See the articles of Boumediene Moussa Boudjemaa (*Le Quotidien d'Oran*, November 28th 2010) or Ahmed Rouadjia (*Algerie-focus.com*, March 8th 2011).

⁶³ Executive decree n° 10-135, December 13th 2010.

⁶⁴ *Le Quotidien d'Oran*, April 30th 2015.

empire” and its periphery draws on the promotion of ideas as well as concrete practices. Intervening in Algeria's human capital is foundational as it impacts students, public servants, employees, businessmen. It seeks to systematically transform the ways of behaving and thinking of a whole population. It is a deep and potentially contentious undertaking that generates support and produces tensions. While the European influence faces resistance both from the core of the state and from various social groups opposed to the reforms, it also draws on local elites -in the academy, the administration and business circles- who appropriate the “civilizing mission” (Del Sarto, 2016: 227). These actors take advantage of the pluralization of the center, that is to say, the growing involvement of fractions of the “civil society” in the conceptualization and implementation of policies in order to solve the problems that remain unsolved by the state (Donzelot, 1991: 178). In a context of a growing economic emergency, the transformation in an ordoliberal borderland remains one of many solutions proposed to respond to the challenges faced by the Algerian society. Changing a country's governmentality is an open process. The place of the state and the founding principles of the polity are at stake, and the population has already demonstrated that the conformation to the needs of the market is a project that is far from enjoying unanimous support.

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