Migration Profile: Lebanon
Françoise De Bel-Air, Research Consultant

In 2014, an estimated 885,000 Lebanese migrants, (i.e., first-generation, born in Lebanon) resided abroad. Meanwhile, in early 2016, it was said that “Lebanon hosts approximately 1.1 million refugees from Syria which amounts to around one in five people in the country”\(^1\), or “one in four” according to other estimates.\(^2\) However, and notwithstanding the large scale of population movements to and from Lebanon throughout the country’s history, these figures are at best, educated guesses: the size and structure of Lebanon’s resident population (as well as that of the Lebanese population) remain “an enigma”.\(^3\) For example, at the time of writing, late 2016, the UN population data estimated the total population in Lebanon to stand at 5,988,000,\(^4\) while Lebanon’s Central Administration for Statistics’ homepage was displaying gave 3,759,100, for 2007!\(^5\)

The reasons for this lack of data is primarily political.\(^6\) The Lebanese political system distributes political functions according to sectarian affiliation.\(^7\) Therefore, the numbers (hence, definitions) of the Lebanese resident population, of Lebanese expatriates, of foreign citizens qualifying for Lebanese citizenship, etc. are all fraught with huge political implications: they would affect the country’s sectarian structure, hence, sect-based power-sharing arrangements. For example, the size of the Lebanese diaspora is usually estimated at between four and thirteen million.\(^8\) This is because the actual holders of Lebanese nationality only make up a fraction of the descendants of the Lebanese migrants, who left the territory under Ottoman rule, before 1920 (the creation of Lebanon) or 1924 (the Lausanne Treaty of 1924 that is the basis for the definition of Lebanese citizenship). However, the criteria applied for selecting those qualifying for the Lebanese citizenship, among all foreign citizens of Lebanese descent worldwide
has always been controversial among Lebanon’s various political actors. The potential size of the Diaspora has been so controversial as it might upset the sectarian structure of the population, hence tilting the balance of power. Therefore, while “the norm of transmission of nationality is patrilinear affiliation, naturalisation [was] almost always subject to the discretionary power of the State”, and ultimately depended on sectarian, clientelist or financial interests. In a similar manner, the numbers and sectarian profiles of foreign residents, the rights they should, or should not, be entitled to, and their access to citizenship, are extremely delicate in political terms. The politics of number explain why Lebanon has not organised any population census since the one conducted in 1932, which defined the numerical domination of Christians (and among them the Christian Maronites) over Muslims. Later, “the Ta’ef Accord enshrined in the Constitution the confessional basis of power sharing in the Lebanese state.” Consequently, the production of population data, has relied on extrapolations from earlier data and on sample surveys, the validity of which cannot be fully assessed. 

Emigration from the Mount Lebanon region started in the middle of the nineteenth century, in the period of Ottoman domination. Early Lebanese migrants headed mainly to the USA, Mexico, and to Latin American countries, and often performed commercial activities there. At the end of the Great War, it was estimated that a third of the Mount Lebanon population had emigrated. After a slowdown in the 1930s, emigration from Lebanon resumed following the Second World War. Previous migration destination diversified. Migrants now also went to Australia, New Zealand, France and West African countries. Migration to the Arab Gulf States also intensified in the late 1950s and after the Six-Days War in 1967, as growing political instability was acting as a push factor and skilled workers were increasingly needed in the Gulf states. However, the waves of Lebanese emigrants who left Lebanon to go to the USA, to Australia and to Canada before the 1980s, were predominantly composed of low-skilled workers. Migration chains, organised and sustained on the basis of kinship and sectarian ties, characterised Lebanese migration flows and destination patterns, with high geographical concentrations in specific world regions. Migration chains allowed Lebanese migrants to overcome the progressive closure of receiving countries to Lebanese or to low-skilled immigrants.

The outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1989 compelled some 990,000 people, or 40 percent of the total population, to flee the country. The various phases of the armed conflict, as well as the destruction of the economy, of infrastructure and housing and ensuing high rates of unemployment, poverty and health deprivation, spurred emigration. These migrants came from all sectors of the population, relying on networks previously established in various parts of the world. However, Australia and Canada set up special programmes that allowed Lebanese migrants to obtain visas to these countries on humanitarian grounds. The new migrants who arrived in the late 1970s in Australia, for instance, were low-educated and poor rural villagers from North Lebanon. Their socio-cultural and professional insertion in the host country proved difficult. In the late 1970s, Germany and Scandinavian countries also became destinations for Lebanese migrants who had no qualifications and no migration networks. These organised humanitarian migration channels mostly benefited Palestinians and populations in South Lebanon, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the “war of the camps” between 1985 and 1988. However, the refugees faced obstacles in accessing education and professional insertion in these host states, and even encampments.

Since the end of the civil war in 1990, Lebanese emigrants have been increasingly skilled and educated, especially those who emigrated to Western countries and the Gulf States. Young generations benefitted from the generalization of higher education in Lebanon: in 2009–2010, UNESCO data indicated that above 50 per cent of Lebanese 18–23 year olds were enrolled in the forty-one universities operating in the country in 2015, a record high in the Arab world. Yet, the concentration of economic activities in the tertiary sector (trading, tourism, banking and finance); the increasing commitments to neo-liberal economic policies since 1990, which concentrated opportunities in low productivity, low-paid sectors; the high prevalence of informal employment; and, above all, the limited size of Lebanon’s labour market compelled many tertiary-educated to leave the country for job opportunities. Economic and political clientelism, and the widespread corruption plaguing the country, also prevented many from finding rewarding employment opportunities in Lebanon.
Meanwhile, South Lebanon had become the main migrant-sending region in Lebanon in the early 2000s, due to a combination of demographic expansion in the region and political tensions. Indeed, since 1990, Lebanon has experienced a Syrian military presence, in addition to periods of political instability punctuated by several political assassinations and civil strife. Lebanon also witnessed increased confrontations with Israel, culminating in the war of July 2006, which pushed many young Lebanese men and women to emigrate, in addition to deterring them from returning after the conflict ended. Since then, regional political developments are said to have affected Lebanese migration patterns, especially to the Gulf. Two hundred Lebanese families were deported from Saudi Arabia in February 2016, and several waves of Lebanese expatriates have also been expelled from the UAE since 2009, some having been accused of sympathy with Hezbollah. Although no official reason was given by the UAE for the deportation of Lebanese families; most of those affected were Shiites, and were accused of carrying out “illegitimate activities in the Gulf nation.” These obstacles to Lebanese emigration to GCC countries, added to the negative consequences of the economic recession in the oil-producing States, may deepen socio-political tensions in the country. The war in Syria and the presence of one million or more refugees was also said to have intensified emigration pressure on all sectors of the Lebanese population.

Emigration clearly has a structural role in Lebanon’s economy and politics, and political leaders praise the role of the diaspora in their rhetoric (“Lebanon, a bird with two wings”). However, it is worth noting that Lebanon’s successive governments since 1990 have not set up strong policies aiming at strengthening ties with the Lebanese diaspora, beyond creating a Ministry of Emigrants in 1994. Only recently did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants launch an array of initiatives, such as organizing yearly national Diaspora conferences, mostly to attract expatriates’ investments. Yet, so far, the channeling of investments to the country, and local development actions have been left to private initiative and to confession-based, transnational networks, in addition to UN-sponsored initiatives such as Live Lebanon UNDP.

Furthermore, after the enactment of the 2008 Parliamentary Elections Law, which guaranteed the right to vote while residing abroad for Lebanese expatriates, the Lebanese Government has been engaging with the Diaspora and encouraging them to register and vote in the 2013 elections. These elections did not, in the end, take place. However, the issue of expatriates voting from abroad for the next legislative elections, scheduled for May 2017, is a point of controversy among Lebanon’s political actors. Proposed reforms to the current electoral system are hotly debated, and some also call for allocating seats to representatives of the diaspora. Whether the new voting system becomes proportional, or hybrid with provisions from the proportional and winner-takes-all systems, or if the current disputed majority system is kept, the political consequences of incorporating expatriates into the electorate would indeed differ. The sectarian distribution of Lebanese abroad, and/or their political leaning, may affect the current distribution of political functions.

Lebanon is a major migrant-receiving country too. Labour migration to the country is, in theory, strictly controlled. Foreign labourers must be sponsored by a resident in Lebanon to receive residency. The sponsor/employer applies for the labour permit and must pay fees; the profession has also to be opened to non-Lebanese (cf. below, on Palestinian refugees). Since 1990, the country has received growing numbers of Asian, African and other Arab workers, predominantly Syrian. Syrian workers were estimated to number around 400,000 before the onset of the war in March 2011. Most of these Arab and non-Arab workers operate in the informal sector, without labour permits, in the agricultural and construction sector, as well as in domestic and cleaning services; many women are to be found in these last two. The dire conditions and abuses endured by many of these workers, especially female domestic workers, have led to awareness campaigns by several Lebanese NGOs and there has been particularly controversy over the sponsorship system.

Lebanon is no party to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 or its 1967 Protocol and has not adopted any domestic legislation addressing the status of refugees. Refugee status is at present determined mainly by the provisions of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between Lebanon and the UNHCR in 2003. Attempts have been made to renegotiate the terms of the MoU in recent years, with no success to date. Besides the Armenian refugees who arrived in Lebanon in 1918, 1922 and 1939, an estimated 130,000 refugees from Palestine arrived in Lebanon after 1948, of whom 105,000 were registered with UNRWA in 1951.
400,000 refugees were registered with UNRWA in 2010; however, a survey conducted that year estimated that the number of Palestinian refugees effectively residing in the country was only 260,000 to 280,000.\textsuperscript{53} Given the Lebanese context, the issue of Palestinian resettlement in the country has remained the most controversial point of the refugee debate: granting citizenship to Palestinians, who are mostly Sunni Muslims, would upset the delicate sectarian and political-demographic balance in Lebanon. Economic competition with Lebanese workers is also a potential problem: the rise of unemployment levels among the Lebanese themselves would also stoke discontent, with the preferential hiring of cheap Palestinian labourers. This would compel more Lebanese citizens to emigrate and further skew the sectarian structure of the country.\textsuperscript{52} Therefore, Lebanon's official stance was always to defend the Palestinians' right of return, in line with UN resolution 194.\textsuperscript{53} More discriminatory policies were applied soon after Ta'ef. On 15 December 1995, the Labour Ministry issued decree 621/1. This decree, in addition to the more than seventy jobs banned since 1962,\textsuperscript{54} added another forty-six salaried jobs and independent professions that Palestinians could not participate in. The text of the decree also stressed how the principle of national preference should be employed in all professions. In 2001, Parliament passed a law prohibiting Palestinians from owning, or from selling and bequeathing property, a right that they had had for decades; Palestinians were also confined to UNRWA and private health and education facilities. Yet, debates on the issue of tawtin (resettlement) may slowly incorporate “the Palestinians into the mould of the Lebanese sectarian system”.\textsuperscript{55} In 2005, Lebanon partly lifted the ban on Palestinians holding most clerical and technical positions, provided that they obtain a temporary work permit from the Labour Ministry; the consequences of this new opportunity were, however, limited.\textsuperscript{56} On 19 August 2008, the Lebanese authorities and the Palestine Liberation organization (PLO) finally agreed to give temporary ID cards to non-ID Palestinian refugees.

Non-Palestinian refugees in Lebanon suffer a similarly precarious status in the country, due to Lebanon's “no-asylum policy”. The MoU signed between Lebanon and the UNHCR, in 2003, grants only limited guarantees to refugees recognised by UNHCR. It guarantees none to the ones who arrived before 2003, or who were rejected by UNHCR. These become \textit{de facto} irregular, undocumented residents, facing imprisonment, if taken in.\textsuperscript{57} Around 10,000 Iraqi refugees were registered in Lebanon between 2003 and 2011; yet, tens of thousands more are believed to reside in Lebanon, unrecorded.\textsuperscript{58} Syrian refugees benefitted from Lebanon's open door policy towards Syrians until January 2015. Unlike Jordan and Turkey, Lebanon did not open camps for the refugees, who settled in urban and rural host communities. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), which makes up the Lebanon chapter of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), is co-managed by the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon, represented by the Minister of Social Affairs. The latter, together with several local and international NGOs, implements the assistance schemes. Arrivals to Lebanon grew at a prolonged pace through 2013 and 2014, with 47,000 refugees on average being registered by UNHCR per month.\textsuperscript{59} The influx of Syrians into Lebanon has resulted in economic, political, social and religious tensions in the country. Curfews have been put into place in some cities and villages in the name of public safety,\textsuperscript{60} following attacks on police and members of the military by Syrian religious extremists. Many Lebanese fear that the Syrian Civil War will spill into Lebanon, especially after radical Syrian Sunni Islamist factions executed Lebanese soldiers in August 2014 as part of the battle of Arsal.\textsuperscript{51}

The Lebanese government eventually took steps to limit access to Lebanon. Palestinian refugees from Syria had been first denied entry\textsuperscript{62} and were also targeted by deportations following a change of policy in May 2014.\textsuperscript{63} In October 2014, the government finally announced that it would limit entries of Syrians to “extreme humanitarian cases”; single women fleeing with their children, those needing urgent medical care and children separated from their families. Since then, Lebanon has turned away as many as 60 percent of people attempting to cross the border, according to the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{64} Moreover, Syrian refugees are prohibited from re-entering the country if they go back for a visit to Syria, one of the several new entry and exit regulations applied since 2014.\textsuperscript{65} New residency rules were also introduced in January 2015. Syrian nationals were barred from entering Lebanon unless falling under specific and defined categories of limited duration visas: “tourism”, “work”, “shopping”, “transit”, etc. A visa for the “displaced” could only be issued, but “under exceptional circumstances to be finalized by the Ministry of Social Affairs”. Those failing to fit any of the pre-set categories were required to be sponsored by a Lebanese citizen. To renew their legal residency in Lebanon, refugees were instructed to pay $200 for each family member above 15
years of age. Additional certificates, such as a certified housing commitment, notarised pledges not to work and proof of financial means, were added to the list of necessary documents. These are often impossible to produce and are making renewal of legal residency increasingly difficult for refugees. In May 2015, the Lebanese government instructed UNHCR to suspend the registration of Syrian refugees in the country altogether.

The residency renewal fees were eventually waived in February 2017. Yet, the waiver only concerned the refugees registered with UNHCR before January 1, 2015, and those who obtained residency through their UNHCR certificate at least once in 2015 or 2016. The waiver thus excludes Syrians not registered with UNHCR, estimated to be around 483,000 persons, registered refugees who renewed their residency through sponsorship by a Lebanese national, as well as Palestinian refugees from Syria.

In 2012, refugee students gained access to public schools. The Education Ministry subsequently added a second shift to enable more children to attend. Yet, as of 2015-2016, only 157,984 refugee children (from KG to grade nine) were enrolled in formal public education, while over 472,000 Syrian refugee children between the ages of 3 and 17 were registered with UNHCR in Lebanon. Syrian refugees are seeing deteriorating conditions in Lebanon. With their savings depleted, and with few or no employment opportunities, more than 70 percent now live below the national poverty line of $4 a day, an increase from 49 percent in 2014. Moreover, due to lack of funds, the World Food Program had to lower its monthly food tokens from $30 to $13 per person, per month in July 2015.

At the same time, a World Bank report suggested that Lebanon's GDP growth is projected to remain sluggish through 2016 due partly to the Syrian crisis. This is in spite of a boom in Syrian investments and economic input since 2011, which boosted demand, increased bank deposits and added 36 million US$ to the economy paid by refugees to the Lebanese property owners every month. As of March 2016, the World Bank support for Lebanon consisted of fifteen active projects representing a total commitment of $900 million. These projects cover several sectors, including education, social protection, health, urban development, transport, water, environment, finance, the private sector and social services. Of the US$ 4.7 billion requested for January to December 2017 in the

2017-2018 3RP, US$ 2 billion were pledged for Lebanon. Meanwhile, the EU has designated Lebanon as one of its six “priority countries” for migration management and development projects. In November 2016, the EU and Lebanon adopted the partnership priorities for the coming four years, as well as a compact, whose objective is to improve the living conditions both of refugees temporarily staying in Lebanon and of vulnerable host communities. The EU-Lebanon compact foresees an EU allocation of a minimum of €400 million in 2016-2017, in addition to the bilateral assistance of more than €80 million for those two years. In turn Lebanon commits to easing the temporary stay of Syrian refugees, especially regarding their residency status.

Yet, for Syrian and Palestinian refugees, the future is bleak. The Lebanese government has repeatedly stressed that Lebanon is neither a country of asylum, nor a country of resettlement. In mid-September 2016, the then-Labour Minister Sejaan Azzi announced a plan to ship refugees back to Syria over a two-year period starting in January, while Lebanese Prime Minister Tammam Salam defended a similar plan at the United Nations Summit on Refugees and Migrants in New York. In a speech after his election, President Aoun also addressed the issue of Syrian war refugees, saying that no "solution should be made in Syria that does not include" their return from Lebanon. This discourse echoes similar discourses, as well as policy-shifts in Turkey and in Jordan. Since 2015, the three-major refugee-receiving countries in the region increasingly felt a sharp contrast on the ground. They were hosting the bulk of the refugees from Syria, yet this contrasted with Europe's at best, tepid response to accommodating refugees.
OUTWARD MIGRATION

Stock

In 2014, an estimated 885,000 Lebanese migrants, (i.e., first-generation, born in Lebanon) were residing abroad. Lebanese nationals stand out among other Arabs, for the scale of their worldwide emigration: 41 per cent migrated to the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia and in the UAE; 23 per cent were in North America and 21 per cent in Europe (Table 1). Lebanese communities have also been established in Australia (92,000 Lebanese migrants), in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in West Africa.

INWARD MIGRATION

Stock

Estimating the total population of Lebanon is, as explained in the introduction, a challenge. The 2007 figure of 3,759,100 residents was estimated to have grown to around 4.2 million in 2015, based on different surveys. The figure includes Lebanese, as well as foreign residents and workers. It excludes Palestinians and other refugees, as well as Syrian refugees who have arrived since the outbreak of the war in 2011. Syrians make up 98 percent of the refugees and persons in refugee-like situation placed under the responsibility of UNHCR is Lebanon (Table 2).

Registered Syrians numbered 1,017,433 in September 2016. Females slightly outnumbered males (52 percent in total), 27 percent were younger than 18 and 43 percent were in the 18-59 age category. The average number of persons per household was 4.2. However, survey figures show that Syrian households may reach 10 to 15 members in case of extended family displacement. Because of Lebanon’s “no camp” policy, Syrian refugees are scattered in more than 1700 localities across the
Between 2005 and 2014, 31,483 Lebanese citizens were naturalized in the US and 20,423 in Canada. About 43,000 Lebanese were also naturalized in European countries during the same period, of whom 68 percent were in France and Germany. In that country, about half of resident Lebanese migrants were recorded as German citizens as of 2015. This indicates that Lebanese nationals were granted better access to German nationality than other foreign nationals.80

Lebanese expatriates in the Gulf have a relatively balanced sex ratio: 114 males for 100 females (53 percent of males) in Kuwait in December 2012, for instance.81 Of the 42,586 Lebanese residing in Kuwait that year, 44 percent were workers and 55 percent were family dependents. Women make up a sizeable share of Lebanese workers in Kuwait in 2012 (25 percent).82 However, the high proportion of family dependents among Lebanese expatriates there also indicates that these are mostly highly-skilled: the level of income and skills, indeed, determines the right to family reunion in Gulf countries. These nationals, then, occupy professions in the upper income bracket, which offer the best possibilities for family reunion.83 Witness accounts, for example, stated that “35% of the directorship positions in the Gulf countries are occupied by Lebanese” in the late 2000s.84 A survey conducted in 2013 on Lebanese migrants in the region85 also confirmed the assertion: the overwhelming majority of interviewees were found to be involved in managerial as well as in professional occupations, mostly in the ‘business and administration’ field of both categories.86 Most interviewees were employed in the ‘Financial and insurance’ and in the ‘Information and communication’ sectors. The ‘Construction’ (for men) and ‘Human health and social work’ sector (for women) came next.87

The socio-demographic profile of Lebanese migrants in other destination countries is much more diverse than in the Gulf. Most Lebanese migrants in OECD countries are males (56 percent) and 86 percent are in working age groups (15 to 65 years and 43 percent in the 25 to 44 age category). Yet, Australia and the US, as well as, to a lesser extent, Canada and France, host older age groups: between a third (in Australia) and a quarter (in France and in Canada) of the Lebanon-born, there, are 55 and above, and 16 percent are in the 65 and above age group in the US and in Australia. Child migrants (aged below 15) are rare everywhere. This indicates that Lebanese family migration is uncommon,88 except, to a certain country where they live in apartments, collective shelters, tented settlements, unfinished houses, garages, warehouses and worksites. At the beginning of the conflict, while wealthy Syrians settled in Beirut, most initially came to the Northern region of Lebanon, especially Wadi Khaled and Tripoli where cross-border ties with Syria were strong. Syrian families seeking shelter from the later battles in Homs, Quseir, Zabadani and Hama progressively settled in the Beqqa region.89 These two locations are said to host increasing number of Syrians who cannot afford the more expensive central region and towns.

It is difficult to know how many of these registered refugees from Syria were in Lebanon before 2011, since before the outbreak of the war, Lebanon was a major destination for Syrian labourers, working primarily in construction, agriculture and other low-skilled activities. Their number was estimated to stand at between 300,000 and 400,000 in 2011.90 It is, therefore, likely that the one-million registered refugees from Syria includes some former labourers who found themselves unable to return to Syria after the outbreak of the war, and consequently brought their family into Lebanon. These newcomers registered as refugees with UNHCR upon arrival, while pre-2011 residents remained unrecorded. As a matter of fact, as of June 2013, government figures for Syrian nationals in Lebanon gave 500,000 Syrians registered with UNHCR and waiting registration; 300,000 migrants; 200,000 “unregistered” and over 54,500 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS).91 In 2016, the Lebanese government widely used the figure of 1.5 million Syrian refugees in the country.92 As no comprehensive, country-wide counting is available to sort all categories of migrants (labourers, refugees, undocumented resident, etc.), it is difficult to assess the figure and to conclude whether the estimates of registered refugees from Syria actually incorporate the Syrian resident population as a whole, or if some have remained in administrative limbo. The new rules imposed on Syrians by the Lebanese authorities since January 2015, and the suspension of the registration of new refugees from Syria forced on UNHCR by the Lebanese government in May 2015 have been forcing increasing numbers of refugees into a clandestine life. These are refugees unable to renew their residencies due to the high fees due (200 US$ per adult aged 15 and above), as well as newcomers who have not been able to access UNHCR or other support.
extent, in Canada where 5 percent of all migrants are children. The age structure of Lebanese migrants in North America, Australia and France, added to the relatively balanced sex ratio there, is indicative of well-established migrant communities. Yet one that is still attractive to new, young and middle-aged professionals, to students as well as, to a lesser extent, to families. In France, for example, the diversity of Lebanese migrants’ profiles was reflected in their residency patterns: as of December 2015, 33 percent of Lebanese residents were holding family-related permits, 22 percent education-related residencies; 16 percent were in “remunerated activities” and 29 percent held other types of permits, including some for “residence only”. Among newcomers (those granted first permits), students made up 65 percent of all permit holders. This suggests that tertiary education is the main entryway into France: next comes joining the labour market and founding a family.

Table 2 also indicated that non-Syrian registered refugees and other persons of concern numbered only 23,264 on 31 December 2015. Among these, Iraqis made up the largest group with 7,234 refugees and 9,929 asylum-seekers. Yet, it is estimated that Lebanon also hosted “several thousands” of unregistered Iraqis, most of whom suffer from great legal and socio-economic precarity. As indicated in the table, refugees were also from Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, with smaller numbers from various African, Arab and Asian countries.

As of February 2016, over 504,000 Palestine Refugees were registered by UNRWA in Lebanon. These included about 42,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria, the only migrants in that category of residents. However, as the number of Palestinian refugees residing in the country in 2010 likely stood at around 260,000-280,000, the total number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in 2016 would, therefore, stand between 300,000 and 350,000. A survey conducted in 2015 showed that 63 percent of Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon (PRL) live in the twelve UNRWA-run refugee camps, compared to 54.8 percent of Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS), while the rest of the population lived in areas outside the camps. The largest concentration of PRL (52 percent of the total) was in South Lebanon, namely in Saida and Tyre, especially in Ein El Hilweh camp in Saida and in Rashidieh camp in Tyre, where respectively 15 and 12 percent of PRL were residing. The smallest share of PRL were in the Beqaa region (4 per cent). Fourteen percent of the PRS were also located in Ein El Hilweh and more generally in South Lebanon (53 percent of all PRS), and 14 percent were housed in the Beqaa region. As for their demographics, the PRS population with a mean age of 25.6 years was five years younger, on average, than the PRL population. PRS households were also larger in size (5.6, members on average, as compared to 4.5 household members for PRL). For the reasons indicated in the introduction, poverty prevailed among the two populations, with 9 per cent of the PRS “in extreme poverty” (3,500 were estimated to be unable to meet essential food requirements), while 89.1 percent were generally poor (35,000 could not meet their basic food and non-food needs). The PRL unemployment rate stood at 23 percent (a significant increase from the 2010 rate of 8 percent); this rate was around 31 percent for women. The PRS unemployment rate, stood, instead, at
purposes. Those in refugee-like situations and family members made up a sizeable share of Lebanese nationals in Sweden: respectively, 21 and 69 percent of all permit-holders. Among Lebanese newcomers to these countries, family-related and humanitarian permits also stood out.91

In the UK, the predominance of the 25-44 years’ age group is noticeable; yet, most Lebanese there held education-related permits in 2015 (45 percent of all permits; 48 percent of new permits). This is consistent with the high level of education of Lebanese migrants in Britain (Figure 2).

In Lebanon, as elsewhere, migration is a selective process: migrants are almost twice as educated as non-migrants as indicated in Figure 2. Yet, the receiving countries’ policies and socio-economic setup also strongly select migrants. The UK’s and Canada’s points-based immigration system mostly channel highly-educated, post-graduate students and young highly-skilled professionals to these countries, while France’s emphasis on student migration also channels highly-educated migrants.92 In Australia, as well as in Sweden and Germany there are, meanwhile, more less educated family members and refugees. This is consistent with the profile of Lebanese migrants in these countries as described in the introduction. The low-educated and poor rural villagers who arrived in Australia in the early 1980s experienced difficulties with their socio-cultural and professional insertion in the host country. Palestinians and migrants from South Lebanon who

52.5 percent: 48.5 percent for men and 68.1 per cent for women. Around 80 per cent of employed PRL were self-employed and wage labourers, while 53.4 percent of the employed PRS were paid on a daily basis, and held no employment contract.115

In 2015, a total of 209,674 labour permits were issued to foreign labourers by Lebanon’s Ministry of Labour; 60,814 were first permits and 148,860 were renewals of permit. Added together,116 the figures indicate that the largest national group among legally-registered foreign workers were the Ethiopians who numbered 73,419 (Figure 7): these are often females, employed in domestic services, like the Filipinas (23,606), the Sri Lankans (8,867), and Madagascans.

Bangladeshis were the second largest group among legal labourers with 49,136 nationals; field evidence suggests that these are mostly employed in construction, like Indian and Nepalese nationals. The agriculture and the hospitality sector are the other major employers of the foreign workforce, but the vast majority of permits were delivered for “female housekeeping” (75 percent) that year; 84 percent of permits pertained to housekeeping and cleaning activities alone.

However, irregular employment is very common in Lebanon. The numerous Syrian and Palestinian labour force works mainly in the informal sector, as do the many Asian and African labourers. In the late 2000s, the commonly accepted figure for the FDW was around 200,000,117 while the number of permits delivered for these activities was around 100,000 at
benefited from organised humanitarian migration channels to Germany and to northern European countries faced obstacles in accessing education and professional insertion into the host states. This explains the low level of education of Lebanese migrants in Northern European countries. As regards new migrants to these countries, migration networks and migration chains linking expatriate communities abroad with their region or village of origin in Lebanon may have later attracted less educated young migrants from these regions: these are regions which continue to be deprived. Meanwhile, migrants’ privileged access to nationality in Germany, noted earlier, may have been, above all, for Palestinian refugees, who were carrying UN travel documents.93

As expected, most Lebanese migrants in France, the UK and Canada were in highly-skilled professions: the three top categories of professions (the “managers”, “professionals” and “technicians and associate professionals”) employ 69 percent of them in France; 57 percent in the UK; and 53 percent in Canada. By contrast, 38 percent of employed Lebanese migrants in Australia;94 and 35 percent in Sweden were in the three lowest categories of occupations. Skilled professions, however, employed 36 percent of Lebanese migrants in Australia, and 24 percent of those residing in Sweden. There, another third worked in “services and trade”-related professions.

Flows

The propensity to migrate is high in Lebanon: 36 percent of young men and women there, aged 15 to 29, expressed their desire to emigrate in 2010.95 A third of young graduates wanted to leave their country in 2008.96

A survey conducted in 2009 by Lebanon’s Central Agency for Statistics97 indicated that, out of all emigrants recorded between 2004 and 2009, 21 percent had left the country in 2005 and 26 percent in 2007, following the war with Israel in 2006. In the 1990s, 15,000 to 20,000 people emigrated every year, around the same number as there were net new entrants to the labour market.98 Later, border crossing statistics reveal that following the Summer 2006 conflict, departures of Lebanese went up and largely outnumbered their returns. Yet, after 2010, and perhaps due, in part, to the long-lasting effect of the 2008 financial crisis on Western and Gulf economies, departures (as well as returns) dropped significantly. The time. Registered female domestic workers (FDW) numbered 154,773 in 2015. If we consider that demand for such professionals has probably increased since the late 2000s, and if we assume a similar, high rate of irregularity among these workers in 2000 and in 2015, there could be 300,000 female housekeepers in Lebanon. This is a very high number, for a total active population of 1.2 million (2011 data).118

Flows

Despite a brief stalling in 2006 and in 2012-2013, the total number of work permits given to foreign labourers in Lebanon119 almost trebled in fifteen years, from 71,991 to 198,452 permits (Figure 8).
Net migration flows also decreased, from -161,102 in 2010 to -67,884 in 2011. Nonetheless, they remained strongly negative up until today.

This apparently contradicts statements pinpointing an upsurge in departures of Lebanese citizens since the beginning of the war in Syria in 2011 (see introduction). However, seen from the main receiving countries hosting Lebanese migrants, a significant increase in Lebanese inflows seem to have occurred, yet only in 2013-2014. Figure 4 shows that since 1990, the general trend of emigration to major OECD receiving countries (the USA, Germany, France, and Australia) has been stable, or even decreasing, with Canada the exception. Flows of Lebanese nationals to Saudi Arabia, by contrast, have consistently risen since the late 1990s. A setback can, however, be observed in 2011, before a new rise after that year.

Does this indicate that Lebanese migrants started emigrating en masse to the Gulf, and less to other destinations during the 2000s? Data on inflows by nationality are unfortunately missing for the UAE, the other main receiver of Lebanese expatriates in the GCC region.

The outflow of Syrian refugees to Lebanon started after the onset of the war in March 2011 (Figure 9). Refugees intended to stay close to their original locations in order to commute or to return easily. The free circulation between the two countries, the cross-border networks based on family and community ties (the Druze for instance) intermarriage, and of course seasonal employment and business bonds initially provided income, as well as short-term accommodation and assistance. New arrivals during 2012, 2013 and 2014 due to heavy fighting in the Damascus suburbs, in Homs and its region and in the Qalamoun mountains may explain the consistent increase in the numbers of registered refugees. However, the change in registrations (for instance the peak observed around March 2013) may also reflect the late registration of refugees already present in the country. 

The first informal limitations introduced after October 2014, i.e. limiting entries to Syrians deemed “urgent cases” was felt in the registration numbers as illustrated in Figure 9. The total numbers of registrations stalled in the first
Field evidence confirms the growing attraction of the Gulf States to Lebanese nationals through the 2000s. Yet, recent political developments in the region have had some repercussions on the flows of Lebanese to these countries. Seen from Saudi Arabia, the biggest receiver of Lebanese migrants (Figure 5), entries to and exits from Saudi Arabia effectively went up steadily between 1990 and 2011.

Do refugees had to leave Lebanon and go back to war-torn Syria due to these new measures? To answer this question the trend in registrations with UNHCR was compared to the number of foreign births declared in Lebanon, of whom we assumed Syrian children made the largest share. After a relatively good correlation between the two number sets until the end of 2014, it was troubling to notice that foreign birth registration figures started collapsing after May 2015. This could suggest that, either refugees have returned to Syria, or that they have commuted, perhaps to give birth in the homeland, or that the registration of Syrian births ended in 2015.

Their going back to Syria in large numbers is unlikely, as regions neighbouring Lebanon are not safe, especially for expectant mothers. Moreover, the dire conditions endured by many Syrians in Lebanon signal the impossibility of returning. Moving to a third country (for instance going to Europe through Turkey), was envisaged by many during the large waves of emigration to Europe in 2015; however, it remained unaffordable for

months of 2015, after new visa rules restricting the entry of Syrians were implemented, which dropped the number of new refugee registration with UNHCR by 75 percent. New registrations were totally interrupted after 6 May 2015.
Net flows sky-rocketed in the 1990s, in spite of the Saudi and other Gulf economies’ contraction during the period, following the First Gulf War and a fall in oil prices. The economic and socio-political context in Lebanon,\(^{100}\) was indeed pushing Lebanese labourers out while preventing “older” expatriates from returning to Lebanon. Net flows started decreasing in the mid-2000s, while inflows and outflows continued rising: this may indicate a growing circularity of migration movements between Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and other countries. The negative net migration for 2008 may, meanwhile, be a consequence of the economic crisis.\(^{101}\)

Yet, the brutal fall in the in- and outflows recorded in 2011 are striking. As are the negative net migration to the country (more Lebanese leaving than entering Saudi Arabia) in 2013.\(^{102}\) These might suggest a disruption in Lebanese patterns of migration to the Gulf. Lebanese migrants are mostly skilled and highly-skilled; it is thus unlikely that they left because of the massive crackdown campaigns conducted that year by the Saudi authorities against foreigners in an irregular situation. However, it is possible that some Lebanese nationals there had, first, repatriated their families, and explored new business opportunities in more politically-stable environments like Western countries. Yet, some categories of Lebanese nationals have been targeted by security crackdowns in some Gulf States since the late 2000s, and the UAE carried out deportations of Lebanese Shiites in 2015, as indicated in the introductory section. No such selective deportation was publicised in Saudi Arabia, but numbers show that some Lebanese have been effectively sent back, and/or prevented from migrating to Saudi Arabia since 2011.

Patterns of Lebanese migration to the Gulf may thus have shifted since the end of the 2000s. This is the result of the economic uncertainties ongoing since the 2008 financial crisis and more recently, the drop in oil prices, which led to the contractions in public expenditure and in subcontracting (in construction, infrastructural projects especially), coupled with the constraints in employment posed by the numerous labour reforms (the new policies of Saudisation of the workforce especially). Another important factor are the political tensions between Lebanon and the Gulf States, especially following the Arab uprisings. This may explain the very recent upsurge (post-2013) which can be observed in Lebanese migration to the US, to Canada and to Germany, visible on Figure 4. In most.\(^{123}\) Moreover, refugees in countries neighbouring Syria either do not always possess the necessary resources for long-term international migration and a radical overhaul of their lifestyle,\(^{124}\) or they do not want to resettle outside the region; Syrian migrants to Europe, in any case, were mostly first-time migrants.\(^{125}\)

Therefore, the fall in the number of foreign births after January 2015 is probably due to a delaying of the registration of the new-borns. Already before that date, UNHCR estimated that 70 percent of the 42,000 refugee children born in Lebanon since the start of the Syrian conflict in March 2011 did not have birth certificates. Syrian refugees in Lebanon can register the newly-born at their embassy in Beirut, but many fear doing so because they are from opposition areas or because they have fled military service or arrest. The children can also be registered with the Lebanese authorities. But the process is administratively complex and requires documents that not all parents could gather as they often had to flee their homes very quickly.\(^{126}\) Since the new residency rules were implemented in January 2015, the vast majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has fallen into irregularity. Although, in theory, expired residency documents should not be an obstacle for parents in declaring their children, aid agencies report that lack of reliable information and inconsistency in applying rules on the part of the Lebanese authorities mean that in practice, this rarely happens.\(^{127}\) Irregular Syrians fear arrest, or even being deported, by the Lebanese security forces if they approach Lebanese administrative units to declare their child’s birth. Several tens of thousands of Syrian children have thus been born stateless.\(^{128}\)
Germany, for instance, net migration figures shot up in 2014 with 3,067 migrants from Lebanon, up from 263 in 2010. Although no data is available to confirm the hypothesis, one could imagine that these are migrants from South-Lebanon, who faced difficulties accessing Gulf markets. They hence reactivated older networks in order to reach Germany.

Meanwhile, the flow of remittances sent back by expatriates continued to rise, after a brief stall in the aftermath of the financial crisis between 2009 and 2012 (Figure 6). This confirms the sustainability of migration flows from Lebanon. Remittances constituted about 16 percent of the country’s GDP in 2015, down from about 25 percent in 2008.103 Against the backdrop of increasing remittances, this drop in their relative share of the GDP could be due to fluctuations in Lebanon's GDP over the same period. Notwithstanding the fact that they are private assets, expatriates' remittances still play a major role in supporting household income and the Lebanese economy, more generally.
Under Ottoman domination, political power in Lebanon was decentralized and granted to religious community leaders. The French Mandate "ossified" the sectarian-based system, with religious communities as the basis for public order. According to the 1926 Lebanese Constitution, the State delegates to communities or sects the registration of events and the legal settlement of matters pertaining to personal civil status and to family issues (marriage, filiation, custody and inheritance). Second, "political sectarianism implies a distribution of political and administrative posts according to confession". These two types of sectarianism "are at the base of Lebanese politics and define the way it is exerted in independent Lebanon" (Sfeir, 2008: 74-75). The National Pact of 1943 re-formalised the sectarian balance of the country by granting the Presidency to Maronites and the Parliament's Presidency; Shi'ites, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers; Shi'ites, the Parliament's Presidency; and the Greek-Sunnis, meanwhile, were given the Presidency of the Council of the Republic and the Command of the Army to Maronites.

Second, “political sectarianism implies a distribution of political and administrative posts according to confession”. These two types of sectarianism “are at the base of Lebanese politics and define the way it is exerted in independent Lebanon” (Sfeir, 2008: 74-75). The National Pact of 1943 re-formalised the sectarian balance of the country by granting the Presidency of the Republic and the Command of the Army to Maronites. Sunni, meanwhile, were given the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Shi'ites, the Parliament's Presidency; and the Greek-Sunnis, meanwhile, were given the Presidency of the Council of Ministers; Shi'ites, the Parliament's Presidency; and the Greek-Sunnis, meanwhile, were given the Presidency of the Council of the Republic and the Command of the Army to Maronites.

"restoration" of Lebanese nationality to descendants of Lebanese migrants living abroad, in order to have them participate in Lebanese elections and maintain the sectarian balance between Christians and Muslims. This was strongly affected by emigration (Dorai, K. and Hily, M.-A. Article “Liban”, in: Simon, G. (ed.). Dictionnaire géo-historique des migrations internationales, Paris : Armand Colin, 2015, pp. 267-272, p. 271).

11. As stated by R. Maktabi, "Political representation and power was to be distributed according to the proportional size of each confessional sect as rendered in the census. The census therefore provided the demographic as well as the political cement that molded and legitimized the principle of power sharing under Christian dominance" (Maktabi, R. "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, n°26 (2), 1999, pp. 219-241, p. 220).
13. Because the population of reference is not known. Since the end of the civil war, two demographic surveys published, respectively, by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) in 1996 and by the Central Administration for Statistics (CAS) in 1997, gave a resident population of less than three million (MSA), and nearly four million (CAS). A survey was also conducted by CAS in 2004, on the basis of which two other surveys were carried out, in 2007 and 2009 (Verdeil, E.; Faour, Gh. and Velut, S. "Chapitre 3", in: Atlas du Liban: Territoires et société, Beyrouth, Liban : Presses de l’IFPO, 2007). Yet, there operations have raised a lot of controversies among Lebanese demographers (see for instance: Vloobergs, W. "Sociologie d’une communauté scientifique : le cas des démagraphes libanais", Mémoire de DEA, Université Saint-Joseph, 2004, available online: http://publications.usj.edu.lb/weblink7/ElectronicFile.aspx?docid=5022, p. 38).
15. Mount Lebanon was the scene of several regional and international conflicts that led to civil wars, notably between Maronite Christians and the Druze in 1840 and 1860 (Issawi, Ch. "The Historical Background of Lebanese Emigration: 1880-1914," in Albert H. Hourani and Nadim Shehabi, eds., The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration, London: I.B. Tauris, 1993, pp. 13-31). Later, demographic expansion coupled with economic difficulties in the region, as well as the desire to avoid conscription intensified emigration from Mount Lebanon (Fersan, E. “Syro-Lebanese Migration (1880-Present): “Push” and “Pull” Factors”, Middle East Institute, 19 April 2010).
16. West Africa attracted most South Lebanese migrants. Migrants from North Lebanon made up most of those in Australia, for instance. Some villages and towns had even larger communities settled abroad than in the original location in Lebanon such as Bint Jbeil in Dearborn, Michigan, USA (See: Beydoun, A. *Bint Jbeil-Michigan* http://www.lorientlitteraire.com/article_details. php?cid=78&nid=6159).


23. Of which, one public university and 28 private universities have licenses from the Ministry of Education and Higher Education. Most have international curricula and accreditation.

24. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/04/11/worldbank-lebanon-needs-to-create-23-000-jobs-per-year. CAS data indicated that in 2011, the unemployment rate was 11 percent. It was higher for females (18 percent), and for the young (34 percent). Moreover, 14 percent of university graduates were unemployed, as compared to 7 percent of the holders of primary education, according to the World Bank (quoted in: Chehade, D. *L’impact de l’exode syrien sur le marché du travail libanais*, n.d. https://img.usj.edu.lb/pdf/a1815.pdf).


26. Lebanese who left the country between 1991 and 2000 seeking work abroad were primarily from South Lebanon (including Nabatieh) (39.2%), followed by Mount Lebanon (27.5%), the Beqaa Valley (12.8%), North Lebanon (11.1%) and Beirut (9.4%) (Information International. *Facts about Lebanese Emigration* (1991-2000), 2001).

27. Israel’s occupation of South Lebanon lasted from 1982 to 2000. Economic recovery has been slow since then, especially due to the destruction wrought by the 2006 conflict; the militarisation of Hezbollah also intensified security concerns.


35. It is said that the sudden influx of Syrian job seekers created competition for low-skilled jobs with low-skilled Lebanese workers, hence increasing unemployment and poverty. As a result, low-skilled Lebanese workers are said increasingly to seek emigration (see for instance: http://magazine.com.lb/index.php/fr/component/k2/item/14717-les-d%C3%A9parts-des-libanais-ont-quadrupl%C3%A9-depuis-2011-le-ch%C3%A9mage-provoque-%E2%80%9CI-amigrationissue_id=219).


38. It merged with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2000, and became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants.


40. For the role of expatriates in Lebanon’s development process, see Tabar, 2009.


42. MPC team. Migration Profile: *Lebanon*, June 2013, p. 6.

43. Between (1) A proportional system in which Lebanon would become a single district that will introduce pluralism; (2) A hybrid system that will include both winner-takes-all and proportionality; and (3) The Orthodox Plan in which one only gets to vote for a member of one’s confession. (Kechichian, J. “Why can’t Lebanese elites agree on a new electoral law?”, *Gulf News*, 1 March 2017 https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/story/Why_cant_Libanese_elites_agree_on_a_new_electoral_law-GN_01032017_020315/).

44. https://www.pressreader.com/lebanon/the-daily-star-lebanon/20170203/281560880525050

45. I thank one of the reviewers of the paper for drawing my attention to this. Any error or misinterpretation is mine. On the new election law debate, see Dakroub, H. “Hariri upbeat on new vote law”, *The Daily Star*, 5 April 2017 https://www.pressreader.com/lebanon/the-daily-star-lebanon/20170405/281487866198522.

46. For instance: https://www.facebook.com/fishighalat/

47. See Ruwad-Frontiers report (p. 3) https://frontiersruwad.files.
48. All were naturalised Lebanese nationals. They number between 150,000 and 200,000 today (Doraï and Hily, 2015: 268).

49. Sfeir, 2008: 130; 159.

50. Apart from (1) Palestinians registered as refugees with UNRWA, as well as with the Lebanese government there were two additional Palestinian categories in Lebanon: (2) Palestinian refugees registered with the Lebanese authorities (holding ID cards), who are not registered with UNRWA: some refugees of 1948 and others 1967 displaced persons; and (3), the non-ID Palestinian refugees, who moved to Lebanon in the 1970s after the events of Black September in Jordan or because of the civil war in Lebanon and who neglected at the time to register themselves. They have, therefore, been counted as illegal immigrants, but later registered with UNRWA in other fields of operation (El Sayed-Alli, "Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon", Forced Migration Review, Issue 26, 2006, pp. 13-14, p.13)


52. This “economic”, migration argument remains in vogue among those who oppose the settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon (Sfeir, 2008: 103; 125).

53. UNGA resolution 194 (III), voted 11 December 1948.


55. (Meier, D. « ‘l’implantation’ comme construction de la présence palestinienne au Liban durant la tutelle syrienne (1989-2005) », Revue des Mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, n°226, nov. 2009, pp. 223-242, p. 240). It is worth noting, however, that the political forces now facing each other on in Lebanon are no longer strictly sectarian. Indeed, the two loose political coalitions federate various parties including Christian ones, around two principal parties: the main Sunni-based movement Future Current; and Hezbollah.

56. More than twenty high-level professions remain off-limits to Palestinians; those occupations are governed by professional syndicates, such as engineering, medicine and pharmaceutics. Few Palestinians benefited from the 2005 reform: in 2009, only 261 of more than 145,679 permits issued to non-Lebanese were for Palestinians. Civil society groups say many Palestinians choose not to apply because they cannot afford the fees and see no reason to pay a portion of their salary toward the National Social Security Fund, since Lebanese law bars Palestinians from receiving social security benefits. Many Lebanese employers are also unwilling to support Palestinian workers in getting a work permit (HRW. Lebanon: Seize Opportunity to End Discrimination Against Palestinians, June 18, 2010 https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/18/lebanon-seize-opportunity-end-discrimination-against-palestinians).

57. In 2011, about 10 percent of the 11,391 prisoners in Lebanon had been charged with irregular entry or sojourn (Migreurop. Fiche Liban, 2013 http://www.migreurop.org/article2507.html#nb16).


59. UNHCR. Refugees from Syria: Lebanon, March 2015, p. 3.


63. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/05/lebanon-palestinians-barred-sent-syria

64. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/redaily?pass=52fc6bd8&itd=54494e498


68. Gol and UN, 2017: 8. The last LCRP also found out that 60 percent of those aged 15 and above were without legal residency as of August 2016, compared to 47 percent reported in January 2016 (p. 12).


70. January 2016 figures (http://www.refworld.org/country,UNHCR,LBN,,578361a84,0.html).


80. For example, only 22 percent of Turkish migrants were recorded as German citizens that year (DESTATIS Statistisches Bundesamt. Foreign population: Ausländische Bevölkerung - Fachserie 1 Reihe 2 – 2015 https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/AuslaendBevoelkerung.html).

81. All ages. Egyptians for instance have a much more skewed sex ratio. 335 men for 100 women among Egyptians residing in Kuwait that year. Kuwait is the only country with Bahrain which offers demographic data disaggregated by nationality, based on figures of residency permit holders by category / purpose of residency (worker, family dependent, student, etc.).

82. As compared to only 7 percent among Jordanian and Egyptian workers, for instance.

83. By comparison, only 28 percent of Egyptians in Kuwait were registered as family dependents, and even fewer among mostly low-skilled professionals from Asian countries: 13 per cent of Indians, for example, are family dependents.


85. Online questionnaire survey conducted during the summer of 2012, of 382 highly skilled Lebanese migrants worldwide, who left Lebanon for the first time in 1990 or later, having earned their first tertiary degree in Lebanon before leaving and who were employed abroad at the time of the survey. The survey was undertaken by F. De Bel-Air and Rita Yazigi (Department of Sociology, Saint-Joseph University), as part of a project that CEDRE (French-Lebanese Scientific and Educational Cooperation) funded entitled ‘Highly-skilled migration, professional circulations and relations to the country of origin: the case of Lebanon’, conducted by the French Institute for the Near East (IFPO), Beirut. MIGRINTER/Poitiers University, France, and the Sociology Department of Saint-Joseph University, Beirut, in 2011–13.

The present data are taken from the subsample of the respondents living in the GCC states (108 men and 36 women). For more, see: De Bel-Air, F. "Arab Female Highly-Skilled Migrants to the GCC Countries", in: Babar, Z. (Ed.). Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC, London: Oxford University Press/Hurst, forth. 2016.

86. "Administrative and commercial managers" and "Business and administration professionals".

87. Economic activities are categorised according to ISIC (Rev. 3) international classification of industries.


89. Eurostat data, as of 31 December 2015: All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year [migr_resvalid]. The data on residency permits concern all Lebanese nationals, i.e., whether born in Lebanon or not.

90. Even if our CEDRE survey of Lebanese migrants suggested that highly-skilled young Lebanese professionals were highly mobile worldwide.

91. Eurostat data: All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year [migr_resvalid]; First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship [migr_resfirst] and First permits issued for other reasons by reason, length of validity and citizenship [migr_resoth].

92. Throughout history, France also traditionally attracted “students of better socio-economic background as well as Christian Lebanese who culturally identified more with this country because of its decisive role in the formation of Grand Liban” (Tabar, 2009: 15).

93. Hence, these were migrants from Lebanon and not Lebanese migrants. Palestinians in Germany were recorded as stateless in the country. Until 1985, Palestinians sponsored by UNRWA were denied the right to asylum in Germany. Social mobilisation forced the German government to reverse its position and all Palestinians who had been living in the country for five years or more were granted full citizenship in 1990. (Palestine International Institute. Aspiring to Bind Palestinians in Diaspora and Expatriates to the Homeland. The Palestinian Community in Germany, n.d., p. 10. http://www.pii-diaspora.org/uploads/2/6/2/0/26209737/germany_country_study_-_updated.pdf); Abi Samra, 2010: 63-64.

94. According to the ISO 08 classification, in the categories of “craft and related trades workers”; “plant and machine operators and assemblers,” and “elementary occupations”.


During the period 2004-2010, the workforce available on the Lebanese labour market was increasing at a regular rate of 2.2 percent yearly, under the effect of the demographic growth of the working age groups (1.7 percent annually), and due to the increase in female labour participation. Consequently, every year 23,000 new entrants to the labour market were recorded during the period (Chehade, n.d.: 13). This is much less than annual emigration from Lebanon.

99. For example, the Observatoire Universitaire de la Réalité Socio-Economique (OURSE) at Saint-Joseph University (Beirut), conducted three surveys during the 2000s that focused on migration patterns and aspirations among young Lebanese men and women. The most recent survey, published in 2009, looked at 5,695 migrants, aged between eighteen and thirty-five, who emigrated between 1992 and 2007 and had family members in Lebanon. It highlighted their growing attraction to the Arab states, namely the Gulf countries, over the period. On average, more than one-third of these expatriates settled in the GCC region, with similar proportions for males and females. The survey also emphasised that, over the period studied, family reunification was losing importance as a spur for female migration (in general), as compared to job seeking abroad (Kasparian, 2009: 16, 25).

100. During the period of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon (1990-2005), corruption, inflation, an increase in public debt, and political persecution prevented many Lebanese from returning and prompted many among those who had stayed to leave. Unemployment gutted the middle class, which adversely affected the Lebanese economy as a whole." (Fersan, 2010). Business in Lebanon, was relying on a cheap, low-skilled and disposable workforce, mostly composed of Syrian labourers.

101. The Lebanese are known to often work in the financial sector in the Gulf States (see "stocks" section). This sector was especially hard hit in the economic crisis in the Gulf.

102. No data on entries and exits by nationality was available after that date in Saudi statistics.


109. This figure may yet be an overestimation as it includes asylum applications pending recognition.


112. Since most Palestinians in Lebanon arrived after 1948, those aged below 68 in 2016 were born in Lebanon.


116. New permits granted were added to the renewed permits.


119. New permits granted added to the renewed permits.

120. Especially in the Akkar and in northern Beqaa where
most Syrian refugees were hosted in Lebanese houses (Naufal,
2012: 2).


122. Foreign births are not disaggregated by the child’s
nationality, or his/her parents in publications.

123. http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/faced-
with-mounting-debts-syrian-refugees-have-no-way-of-leaving-
lebanon.

124. For instance, “OECD data from 2014 suggested 14% of
refugees in Lebanon were illiterate, and just 4% had a degree.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the refugees returning to
Syria from Jordan and Lebanon are focusing on their day-to-
day survival rather than following a strategy to ensure their
flows – and ebbs”, European Union Institute for Security Studies

125. A survey conducted by UNHCR of 1,245 Syrian refugees
who arrived in Greece between April and September 2015
indicated that the majority (63 per cent) were first migrants,
having fled directly from Syria during 2015. They had only
transited through a third country before migrating to Europe.
Over 62 per cent originated from Damascus and Aleppo. See:

126. http://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-born-syrian-
refugees-risk-stateless-legal-limbo.

refugees-stateless/.

128. It is estimated that the number of unregistered births among
Syrian refugees in Lebanon had reached 50,000 by May 2016
(http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/syria-
refugees-stateless/). The crude birth rate calculated for 2014 for
the Syrians registered with UNHCR that year (14.7‰), is largely
underestimated because of unregistered births. However, if we
apply that birth rate to the populations of registered Syrian
refugees for 2015 and 2016 (largely underestimated, too, for the
reasons stated in the text), we estimate that unregistered births
during the last eighteen months (2015 and the first six months of
2016) could number around 12,613.
Migration Policy Centre
Robert Schuman Centre
for Advanced Studies

European University Institute
Via Boccaccio, 151
50133 Florence
Italy

Contact:
email: mpc@eui.eu  website: www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/  twitter: @MigrPolCentre

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world.

Migration Policy Centre

The Migration Policy Centre (MPC) conducts advanced policy-oriented research on global migration, asylum and mobility. It serves governance needs at European and global levels, from developing, implementing and monitoring migration-related policies to assessing their impact on the wider economy and society.