
# The Aftermath of Turkey's Gezi Protests
## How Political Parties Respond to Social Movements

Jonas Bergan Draege

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, 05 September 2017

European University Institute
**Department of Political and Social Sciences**

# The Aftermath of Turkey's Gezi Protests

## How Political Parties Respond to Social Movements

Jonas Bergan Draege

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

**Examining Board**

Professor Donatella Della Porta, Scuola Normale Superiore (EUI Supervisor)
Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute
Professor Ali Çarkoğlu, Koç University
Professor Katrin Uba, Uppsala University

**Researcher declaration to accompany the submission of written work**
**Department of Political and Social Sciences - Doctoral Programme**

I Jonas Bergan Draege, certify that I am the author of the work work "The Aftermath of the Gezi Protests" I have presented for examination for the Ph.D. at the European University Institute. I also certify that this is solely my own original work, other than where I have clearly indicated, in this declaration and in the thesis, that it is the work of others.

I warrant that I have obtained all the permissions required for using any material from other copyrighted publications.

I certify that this work complies with the Code of Ethics in Academic Research issued by the European University Institute (IUE 332/2/10 (CA 297).



I declare that this work consists of 54,629 words.

**Statement of inclusion of previous work:**

I confirm that a small part of Chapter 6 draws upon an earlier article I published: Bergan Draege, Jonas, Daniela Chironi, and Donatella della Porta. "Social Movements within Organisations: Occupy Parties in Italy and Turkey." South European Society and Politics (2016): 1-18.

**Statement of language correction:**
This thesis has been corrected for linguistic and stylistic errors. I certify that I have checked and approved all language corrections, and that these have not affected the content of this work.

Signature and date:



Jonas Bergan Draege, 31.07.2017

# Abstract

This thesis explores how Turkey's political parties responded to the Gezi Park protests in 2012. I assess how four political parties framed the protests, whether the latter were accompanied by changes in the parties' platforms and priorities, and whether politicians in office adjusted practical policies to accommodate protest demands. In this research I draw on original data of parliamentary interventions, budget allocations, semi-structured interviews, and secondary sources, to answer these questions.

The Gezi protests received a great deal of attention from politicians, especially from the two opposition parties closest to the protests, the CHP and the BDP. However, both parties responded to the demands that aligned best with their pre-existing agendas, and with different loci of attention. The protests were also met with practical concessions on a few specific demands. Yet these policy responses were narrowly targeted at the object and symbol of the initial protests rather than at their underlying grievances. Consequently, I argue that the responses from the CHP and the BDP were supportive, but limited. There was a policy response, but it did not go very deep. There was a platform response, but it framed the demands in the direction of pre-existing platforms. There was an organisational response and a response in terms of electoral strategies, but many of these were symbolic, and not accompanied by major changes in party platforms.

In this sense, it may be useful to talk about the institutional response to the Gezi protest as a creative process for these two political parties. When party representatives spoke about the protests, they highlighted those issues where their party already had ownership. Furthermore, while the BDP supported several of the protesters' demands, the CHP was more supportive of the protest actors themselves. I use this finding to suggest an extension of the concept of the protest paradigm in the social movement literature. Until now the protest paradigm has mainly been used to describe how antagonists of protests delegitimize protests, whereas I suggest that it is also is a possible strategy for supportive actors. This novel use of the protest paradigm is a main contribution of this thesis. More generally, the thesis combines the literature on social movement outcomes and party politics, and contributes to an expansion of studies of social movement outcomes to cases outside the area of Western liberal democracies.

# Acknowledgements

This thesis is my biggest and most ambitious project to date, and I am very proud of having reached the finishing line. I would never have been able to write my dissertation without the support, critique, and advice of a great number of people. First and foremost, I am indebted to my supervisor, Donatella Della Porta for her encouragement and constructive criticism, from our very first meeting in September 2013 until the final stretches of thesis writing. Donatella has provided me with valuable lessons, not only regarding social movement research, but also in how to supervise students to let them reach their full potential.

Furthermore, a number of people have been instrumental in improving my research, at different stages of the research process. I want to thank Juan Masullo Jimenez, Francis O'Conor, Kıvanç Atak, Hanspeter Kriesi, Swen Hutter, and Diego Gambetta for helping me shaping my research question and design. During the course of data collection and the first analyses of my results, I received important feedback from Bengi Gümrükçü, Enrique Hernandez Perez, Macarena Ares Abalde, Kerem Tınaz, and Ecem Oskay. Felix Dwinger helped out with the analyses of budget data, and together with Sebastian Nickel he deserves a thanks for helping with visualising my findings. In the course of writing the thesis chapters, I received very helpful feedback from Kıvanç Atak, Ruth Carlitz, Ann-Kristin Jonasson, Elin Naurin, Martin Nygaard, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Hans Joseph Skjong, Jonathan Polk, Stefan Walgrave, and Abby Peterson. During my fieldwork in Turkey, I talked to a large number of people, who I would like to thank for taking time from their busy schedules to talk to a nosey Norwegian researcher with stuttering Turkish. I especially thank Ayşe Ürün Güner and Ekin İlgün for introducing me to their broad network of politicians and civil society actors.

There are many great things about being affiliated with the European University Institute, but for me one of the best things was the opportunity to play for the football team, EUI Calcio. Playing there helped me stay in shape, gave me the opportunity to see new parts of Tuscany, but most importantly it enabled me to become friends with a fantastic group of people. In the final year, I spent much of the time at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. The impulses and feedback I received there were extremely helpful in the final stretches of completing the thesis. I particularly want to thank Jonathan Polk and Ellen Lust for following up on my progress during this time, as well as the CERGU, PAPP, and Party Politics research groups, for the opportunity to present early drafts of my chapters. The year in Gothenburg

would never have been so enjoyable without the frequent (but necessary) fika breaks with office neighbours, Moa Frödin Gruneau, Felix Hartmann, Felix Dwinger, Maria Tyrberg, Love Christensen, Valeriya Mechkova, Anne-Kathrin Kreft, Marcus Tannenberg, and Mattias Agerberg. For all their love, support, and encouragement, which gave me the curiosity and self-confidence necessary to write a PhD, I thank my family, Ingrid Dræge, Erling Bergan, and Simen Bergan Dræge.

Finally, I would like to thank my partner, Silvia Aiuvalasit. In the course of my PhD work, and following the trends of political science, I have become humble in the face of the obstacles to establishing causal relationships of the social world. However, regarding the role of Silvia in shaping my life at the European University Institute, I feel confident in taking a leap of faith and assert a causal link. My time here would not have been as creative, productive, well-balanced, and enjoyable, had I not had the good fortune to have Silvia in my life. From when we first met, a month into my PhD programme, and through the intense months of completing the thesis, she has been a source of stability in my life. For that, I am very grateful.

# Table of Contents

**LIST OF FIGURES**


1. INTRODUCTION ..... 2
- INTRODUCTION ..... 2
- METHODOLOGY ..... 7
- PARLIAMENTARY CONTENT ANALYSIS ..... 7
- MEASURE OF PROTEST MAGNITUDE ..... 9
- INTERVIEWS ..... 10
- CHAPTER OVERVIEW ..... 11

2. LITERATURE REVIEW ..... 14
- THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN PARTY POLITICS ..... 14
- RESPONSE TYPES ..... 17
- CONDITIONS FACILITATING PARTY RESPONSES TO MOVEMENTS ..... 19
  - *Movement-factors* ..... *19*
  - *Party- and contextual factors* ..... *21*
- DISCUSSION ..... 23

3. A DESCRIPTION OF THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM ..... 26
- INTRODUCTION ..... 26
- DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL CONFLICT ..... 27
  - *The AKP* ..... *30*
  - *The CHP* ..... *31*
  - *The BDP/HDP* ..... *34*
  - *The MHP* ..... *36*
- CONCLUSION ..... 38

4. THE GEZI PROTESTS AND THEIR DEMANDS ..... 40
- PRELUDE TO THE PROTESTS ..... 40
- DEMONSTRATIONS IN TAKSIM AND THE REST OF TURKEY ..... 41
- THE ACTIVISTS AND THEIR DEMANDS ..... 42
- DISCUSSION ..... 47

5. THE INTERPRETATION AND FRAMING OF THE GEZI PROTESTS ..... 51
- INTRODUCTION ..... 51
- THE PARTIES' IMMEDIATE RESPONSES TO THE GEZI PROTESTS ..... 52
  - *The AKP* ..... *52*
  - *The MHP* ..... *53*
  - *The CHP* ..... *55*
  - *The BDP* ..... *56*
- PARTY DEPUTIES: WHO WERE THE MOST RESPONSIVE? ..... 58
- HOW PARTY DEPUTIES FRAMED THE PROTESTS ..... 59
  - *Actor-centred versus issue-centred responses* ..... *61*
- DISCUSSION ..... 67

6. PARTY CHANGES FOLLOWING THE GEZI PROTESTS ..... 72
- INTRODUCTION ..... 72
- PARLIAMENTARY REACTIONS ..... 73
- ELECTORAL (RE-)ORIENTATIONS AFTER THE GEZI PROTESTS ..... 76
  - *The BDP becomes the HDP* ..... *76*
  - *The HDP strategy for the 2014 local elections* ..... *79*
  - *The HDP's presidential campaign* ..... *80*
  - *The CHP strategy for the 2014 local elections* ..... *81*

*The 2015 elections* ... *86*
A NEW CHALLENGER ON THE LEFT? ... 90
*The Gezi Party* ... *91*
*The Haziran movement* ... *94*
DISCUSSION ... 96
7. POLICY CONCESSIONS TO TURKEY'S GEZI PROTESTS ... 100
INTRODUCTION ... 100
IMMEDIATE INDICATIONS OF CONCESSIONAL RESPONSES ... 102
BUDGET ALLOCATIONS - PUTTING THE MONEY WHERE THE MOUTH IS ... 104
*National level indicators* ... *105*
*Local level indicators* ... *105*
*Dependent variables: budget allocations to green spaces and cultural institutions, and total spending* ... *106*
*The treatment variable: protest magnitude* ... *108*
*A closer look at Istanbul* ... *113*
*Municipality level change: Beyoğlu, Istanbul* ... *115*
DISCUSSION ... 116
CONCLUSIONS ... 120
BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 126
APPENDIX 1: DEMANDS OF THE GEZI PROTESTS ... 153
APPENDIX 2: CODING DICTIONARY ... 157
APPENDIX 3: DID PARTY DEPUTIES SPEAK EQUALLY MUCH? ... 162

# List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Interviews conducted for the study

Figure 2.1: Outcomes of challenges (Gamson 1990, 29)

Figure 3.1: Positioning of four political parties on three dimensions of political conflict (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2010)

Figure 3.2: Most important issue, AKP (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2014)

Figure 3.3: Most important issue, CHP (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2014)

Figure 3.4: Most important issue, HDP (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2014)

Figure 3.5: Most important issue, MHP (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2014)

Figure 4.1: Estimated number of participants in the Gezi protests in Turkey, by province

Figure 4.2: The demands raised in the Gezi protests

Figure 4.2: How respondents in Istanbul identified themselves politically, Gezi Park Profile 2013

Figure 4.3: Which party Gezi protesters in Istanbul reported to have voted for in the 2011 election

Figure 5.1: Interventions on the Gezi protests per deputy

Figure 5.2: Policy issues referred to in interventions on the Gezi protests, %

Figure 5.3: Ratio of interventions on the Gezi protests in which "youth" was mentioned

Figure 6.3: Mean age of parliamentarians for all oral interventions, by party

Figure 6.4: Mean age of parliamentarians of the CHP on four issues

Figure 6.5: Quasi-sentences about environmentalism in four party platforms over three general elections

Figure 6.6: Quasi-sentences about democracy in four party platforms over three general elections

Figure 6.7: Quasi-sentences about human rights in four party platforms over three general elections

Figure 6.8: Quasi-sentences about socially liberal issues in four party platforms over three general elections

Figure 7.1: Percentage of national budget spent by three ministries in Turkey

Figure 7.2: Turkey's Metropolitan Municipalities

Figure 7.3: Difference-in-differences models for budget allocations in Turkish metropolitan municipalities

Figure 7.4: Allocations to cultural activities in the budgets of protest-intense and not protest-intense Metropolitan Municipalities in Turkey

Figure 7.5: Allocations for green spaces in the budgets of protest-intense and not protest-intense Metropolitan Municipalities in Turkey

Figure 7.6: Total spending in municipalities run by AKP, compared to other municipalities

Figure 7.7: Municipal Environmental Income (environmental protection services not specified elsewhere)

Figure 7.8: Total annual budgets, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality

Figure 7.9: Budget allocations to two directorates in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality

Figure 7.10: Budget allocations for recreational facilities, Beyoğlu Municipality Istanbul

# 1. Introduction

## Introduction

This thesis deals with the aftermath of the biggest wave of protest in modern Turkish history. I attempt to answer the question of whether and how political parties in Turkey responded to the so-called Gezi protests. These protests began in late May 2013 as a reaction to the planned demolition of Gezi Park and the Atatürk Cultural Centre (AKM) in Istanbul. The demolition was part of the government's Taksim Transformation Project, which included the creation of underground roads beneath a revamped Taksim Square, and the reconstruction of the Artillery Barracks which dated back to 1896–1940 (Yildirim 2012). By early June, the demonstrations had grown substantially, with tens of thousands of protesters on the streets in many of Turkey's largest cities. The demands raised in the protests broadened too, covering a wide range of issues on which activists disagreed with government. Demonstrations continued throughout June and into early July in many Turkish cities, before tapering off in mid-July and August.

The Gezi protests attracted massive interest both domestically and internationally, but to date no study has systematically assessed the consequences of the movement. That is precisely what this study remedies. I draw on two different trends in the literature on social movement outcomes when looking for party responses to the protests. First, *promotional* responses are based on parties' motivation to maximise their share of the vote. Parties endorse and promote issues based on electoral characteristics - they support movements in order to be on the same wavelength as new voters, and without alienating their existing electoral base (e.g. Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995; Tarrow 2011). Second, *concessional responses* are based on incumbents' interests in preserving territorial integrity, and the smooth functioning of their administrative area (e.g. Gamson 1990; Piven and Cloward 1993; DeNardo 1985; Passarelli and Tabellini 2013). Movements may represent a threat to this, prompting parties to trade "concessions for tranquillity" (DeNardo 1985, 35), regardless of whether or not the party agrees with a movement's demands. That is, parties concede to movements simply to reduce the probability of future protest. In this study, I analyse responses in line with both these traditions. More than a fundamentally new way of conceiving party responses to movements, my use of these concepts is mainly a way of organising the subsequent discussion. The empirical chapters are based on these two logics, and therefore draw on somewhat different bodies of literature.

To assess promotional responses, I use quantitative content analysis of parliamentary interventions, supplemented by interviews, media sources, and an analyses of party manifestos. To date, much of the literature on social movement outcomes suggests that the two opposition parties with the most overlap in terms of identity and ideology, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrası Partisi,* BDP), were the most supportive of the protests (Kriesi et al. 1995; Piccio 2011, 31; Wouters and Walgrave 2017). However, the way the two parties responded to the protests differed. First, it appears that representatives from the two parties cherry-picked the demands they responded to, based on pre-existing agendas. Second, the main locus of attention also differed: the CHP gave an *actor-centred* response, and the BDP an *issue-centred* response. The demographic profile and voting records of most activists in the protests pointed in favour of the CHP, but the demands these activists raised had a better overlap with the BDP's ideological profile. I argue that it was this difference between identity and ideology overlap which led to different responses from the two parties. CHP representatives therefore focused on who the activists *were* (mainly young urban middle-class youth opposing the AKP government), and less on the various demands raised by the protesters. The BDP, on the other hand, focused more on the demands *in* the protests (e.g. anti-capitalism and socially liberal issues, such as feminism and anti-militarism) than the CHP representatives, but they were sceptical about who the activists were (potential coup-makers). A similar distinction has already been noted regarding the media framing of protests. The *protest paradigm* (Chan and Lee 1984) observes that right-leaning newspapers emphasised social order and the status quo, whilst the left-leaning media paid more attention to the perspective of the protesters. In this framework, antagonists to protest avoid talking about the substance of the issues raised by activists, but focus instead on the negative aspects of the actors themselves. Supporters of the protests, on the other hand, focus more on the demands raised by protesters, and present them to a larger audience (Boyle, McLeod, and Armstrong 2012). I argue that the CHP response to the Gezi protests represents a "positive" manifestation of the protest paradigm. This paradigm can also be used to classify responses of actors *sympathetic* to the movements.

The selective response to the protests also continued over time. Party representatives from the CHP and the BDP were responsive to some of the demands raised in the Gezi protests. Yet, when the dust had settled, the policy issues underlying these demands had not climbed any higher on their political agendas in Parliament. Certainly, both parties faced internal changes and reactions following the protests yet the events seem to have contributed to the BDP's transformation into the HDP in Autumn 2013, and to its electoral strategy of appealing to a broader non-Kurdish segment of voters. The CHP leadership openly disregarded the Gezi

protests in the 2014 elections, and faced an internal wave of discontent from its younger and more leftist elements. Furthermore, when it came to the 2015 elections, both the HDP and the CHP were fielding candidates with links to the protests, and who made explicit reference to the protests in their campaigns. However, their party platforms generally did not follow suit. As with parliamentary interventions, the protest demands were generally not prioritised. The HDP dedicated more space to human rights and democratisation issues in the two 2015 elections than in 2011 and 2007, but not to other issues raised in the protests. For the CHP, there was no visible change in their platform at all. Therefore, the Gezi protests did not stimulate parties to discuss the issues raised by activists, and instead parties claimed ownership of the Gezi protests, but framed the protests in terms of their own preferred policy issues. In this sense, it may be useful to talk about the institutional response to the Gezi protest as a creative process for parties. Rather than be forced by protesters to respond to a specific set of issues, parties seemed to feel free to respond selectively to the issues they wanted.

To assess concessional responses, I explore whether practical policies changed in favour of the Gezi demands following the protests. At first glance, the Gezi protests appear to be successful in obtaining concessions on their specific demands, at least in Istanbul. The Taksim Transformation Project, which sparked the initial mobilization, was modified and then postponed. Local incumbents in protest-intense cities, from both the AKP and opposition parties, indicated that they would be cautious when presenting similar urban transformation projects, and even that they would increase the size and number of green spaces in urban areas. To investigate how deep such concessional responses went, I compare budget allocations on all administrative levels in Turkey, and thus attempt to measure whether these incumbents "put their money where their mouths are", quite literally. The budget data do not reveal any systematic changes in resource allocations favouring the protesters' demands. I find no in-depth traces of incumbents changing policy priorities on a deeper level, by committing the deployment of resources differently. While this is only one possible measure of practical measures responding to the protests, I argue that it is indicative of a concessional response that only went skin deep. Some concessions seemed to have been made to the protests, but this only occurred in the most visible, and least costly, ways.

Overall, responses to the Gezi protests from the two parties with the most overlap were supportive, but limited. There was a policy response, but it did not go very deep. There was a platform response, but it framed the demands in the direction of pre-existing platforms. There was an organisational response and a response in terms of electoral strategies, but many of these were also symbolic, and were not accompanied by any major change in party platforms. One

reason for the selective responses may be the wide range of demands raised in the Gezi protests. Studies have indicated that movement success is related to having specific and limited goals (Steedly and Foley 1979; Giugni 1998; Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992; McCammon 2012; Gamson 1975). Movements with multiple and diverse issues, such as the Gezi protests, may get a strong response from parliamentary representatives, but the more diverse their demands, the more freedom parties have to be selective in their responses.

To paraphrase Giugni (1998), was it worth the effort? Considering the size and outcome of the repression on the movement, we may be tempted to answer in the negative. However, the consequences of mobilisation may be long-term in nature. Chapter 6 explores the indications of a stronger and more united civil society following Gezi. The events may also have set the precedence for future mobilization. These societal effects could, combined with the heightened awareness of the mobilising capacity of the population and their demands among politicians, also produce longer-term effects favouring the activists' demands.

This thesis combines the academic literature on social movement outcomes and party politics, to explain and analyse the responses to a wave of protests. As such, it deals with a single country case, and I do not claim to reach generalizable conclusions for when political parties respond to social movements in other contexts. However, the in-depth nature of this study, allows an analysis of mechanisms through which political parties respond to movements. That is, my findings of *how* the parties responded to the Gezi protests are also worth considering within the social movement and party politics literature more broadly. As mentioned above, I find that responses to the Gezi protests were piecemeal and selective. Some of the literature on social movement outcomes already suggests that institutional actors can be engaged in a creative process when responding to events. Rather than being forced to comply to movement demands, parties cherry-pick issues they agree on, and thus frame movement demands to fit with their pre-existing agenda. One way in which parties do this is by focusing on actors rather than issues, as a co-optation strategy. I thus propose to expand the concept of the *protest paradigm* not only as a delegitimisation strategy from antagonists, but also as a possible strategy for supportive actors. This also provide insights for the literature on party systems and issue ownership, from party politics research. The literature reveals that parties are slow to change their platforms, at least as long as no new challenger party threatens their positions (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016; Hooghe and Marks 2017; De Sio, Franklin, and Weber 2016). My findings suggest some of the ways in which parties manage to endorse and link themselves to a movement, without altering their political positions. When movement demands do not fit with the direction the party

leadership had planned, they can endorse the identity and legitimacy of the actors involved in the protests, rather than what those actors are calling for. This thesis thus provides an insight into a mechanism through which the co-optation of a social movement may occur. Particularly in Latin-America and Southern Europe, there are a host of similar cases, in which a centre-left party is accused of betraying its roots to neoliberal economic policies, and faces a dilemma in how to respond to left-wing mobilisation (e.g. della Porta 2015; Roberts 2015). The extension of the protest paradigm that I suggest in this thesis should be helpful for understanding comparable cases of relationships between movements and parties.

Moreover, the study provides a closer insight into the functioning of politics in an illiberal democracy. Much of the literature I draw on for this thesis has been developed in pluralistic and liberal Western democracies. My thesis analyses an atypical case in the light of this literature, and may serve as a springboard for similar studies of other country cases with constrained democratic liberties. In some ways, the Turkish case appears particularly "hard" when it comes to responses to protests. Turkey is generally considered an illiberal democracy, with a highly majoritarian electoral system. The 10-percent threshold for entering Parliament in Turkey may have made the established parties less afraid that new parties will enter the party system. At the same time, the high threshold means that a single bad step, and a loss of some voters, could have potentially grave consequences for these established parties. That is, just as the threshold may have deterred new parties from entering the political scene, it may also have served as an incentive for institutional insiders not to rock the boat, and therefore respond less to protests. This may have been a consequence of the majoritarian, and illiberal, aspects of Turkish democracy, and this thesis may be considered a rather unlikely case for observing party responses to protests.

Finally, the thesis contributes to our understanding of contemporary Turkey, and the functioning of protests and party competition in an illiberal democracy, at a crucial point in history. The Gezi protests occurred in a period which is likely to be debated extensively in all future analyses of Turkish politics. Were politicians in office, nationally and locally, open to changing their practical policies to accommodate protest demands? Did the opposition parties accommodate such bottom-up initiatives? And if so, how did they support them? Finally, were there any attempts to sustain the momentum of this unprecedented mobilising force, by channelling it into a new political party or civil society organisation? These are key questions for understanding contemporary Turkish politics, and I attempt to provide answers to these questions in this thesis.

## Methodology

This thesis draws on an extensive amount of original data sources. I have created an original dataset based on parliamentary interventions before, during, and after the protest. I have collected and analysed budget data from thirty metropolitan municipalities, fifty-one provinces, and at the national level in Turkey, before and after the protests. I have also conducted two rounds of fieldwork, with a total of fifty-five interviews with activists, party representatives, and other civil society actors in ten different cities in Turkey. Finally, I complement these sources with Turkish and international secondary sources. In this section, I discuss the data collection and coding of the parliamentary dataset. Then I examine the measure of protest size, which I draw on in the overview of the Gezi protests in Chapter 4, and in the budget comparisons in Chapter 8. Finally, I provide an overview of the interviews conducted for this study.

## Parliamentary content analysis

Much of this thesis draws on an original dataset of oral interventions in the Turkish Grand Assembly. To create this dataset, I coded interventions on the Gezi protests, as well as eight policy issues related to the protest demands, from all 230 parliamentary sessions in the period 28.05.2013-13.07.2013.[1] Three parties were elected directly to Parliament in this period: the AKP, the CHP and the MHP. Additionally, thirty-five independent deputies were elected in the joint electoral alliance Labour, Democracy and Freedom Block, thirty of whom formed the BDP parliamentary party group. I thus coded interventions from deputies from all four party groups in the period.

I only coded oral interventions, which I argue best reflect deputies' priorities. In the first trial sample, I included the summary of written questions, but discovered that some deputies used the opportunity to ask an unlimited number of questions. In one case, an MP asked an identical question regarding the Gezi protests on twenty-six occasions, with the minor variations insofar as each question addressed a different city. I argue that this potential limitlessness of written parliamentary questions runs the risk of massively over-representing a few MPs who are particularly fond of copying and pasting questions. For oral interventions, on the other hand, deputies had to prioritize the issues that were most important to them, and limit themselves to the speaking time (for most intervention types, five minutes) ("Rules of Procedure" 2012).

[1]The minutes for all parliamentary sessions are available on the Assembly's website: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/tutanaklar.htm. I translated quotes from parliamentary interventions and Turkish language sources myself, unless otherwise stated. I am thus responsible for the accuracy of the translations to English.

I coded semi-automatically, using the software Atlas Ti, based on an extensive dictionary of keywords relating to the eight issue areas from the Gezi protests, as shown in Chapter 4.[2] The dictionary included a large variety of synonyms and similar expressions to cover the concept at hand. For every match with an oral intervention through the search engine, I read the intervention and decided whether or not to code the intervention in a particular category. Any one single intervention could be classified into any number and combination of categories. I included all oral questions, proposals, and responses, but excluded irregular interventions and exclamations made without the permission of the President of the Assembly. Some categories were coded as either positive or negative, based on whether the speech in question takes a clear stance in favour, or against, the demands of the category. It is important to remember that interventions were coded based on whether the statement argued in favour of, or against, the general grievance raised in the protest, and not on whether the deputy admitted any guilt to their own policies, or was critical of their own party's conduct. For example, in one case where an AKP representative talked about his concern for deforestation and dedication to this issue, it was coded as a statement in support of the environment demand, even though the representative also denied any wrongdoing on the part of the AKP.[3]

This coding procedure comes with certain trade-offs. There is a risk of overestimating the number of interventions on the eight policy issues after the protests, as parties could start to use the specific phrases of the movement, without necessarily being more interested in the underlying policies. An alternative categorization approach, which would have solved this potential problem, is a standardized set of policy categories, such as those developed in the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP). This would give a more comparable categorization of ideological strands. However, I argue that the coding procedure I chose also provides some comparative advantages. It more accurately pins down whether deputies responded to the exact demands raised by the movement. The categorization provided here thus provides a genuine attempt to understand the movement demands on their own terms, not least helped by the feedback given by activists themselves.

In addition to the dataset of interventions on the protests and their demands, I created a "control" dataset of *all* oral interventions in one day selected at random from each of the eighteen months of coding.[4] This sample gives an overview of the "normal" behaviour of deputies in Parliament, even when they did not speak about the Gezi protests or the eight policy issues

[2] For the dictionary see Appendix 2.
[3] See the intervention by Karabük MP Osman Kahveci on 04.06.2014: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/ham/b09701h.htm
[4] I am grateful to Bengi Gümrükçü for her assistance with coding the control dataset.

coded in the parliamentary dataset. I draw on this dataset in the discussion of ages and gender balance among the deputies, and I show the ratio of interventions by party in Appendix 3, to justify my use of seat numbers as a common denominator in Chapter 5.

## Measure of protest magnitude

In Chapter 4 and Chapter 8 I provide an overview of magnitude and regional variation of the Gezi protests. In Chapter 8, the measure of protest magnitude is very important. I use protest magnitude as the treatment variable in the difference-in-differences estimator, dividing Metropolitan Municipalities into two groups - protests and no protests. I chose this estimation due to its advantages in mitigating extraneous factors, and thereby strengthening the basis for a causal argument. I base my data on Atak's (2017) dataset of the Gezi protests. In this dataset, information was collected through media outlets, and size estimates were coded on a logarithmic scale from 1 to 5.[5]

The Gezi protests extended across many cities in Turkey, and setting the threshold for the occurrence and non-occurrence of protests is bound to be arbitrary at some level. There is no consensus among social movements scholars regarding which factors should be weighted the most in protest event analyses. Most often, either the size of protests or the number of events are given precedence (Olzak 1989; Rucht and Niedhardt 1999; Barranco and Wisler 1999; Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch 2007; Biggs 2016). Some have convincingly argued in favour of size as the principal factor of interest. Biggs (2016) shows that, as events are aggregated over time and space, there is not a strong correlation between event frequency and total participation. He therefore argues that the focus of protest event analysis should be on large events, and to report these accurately. In the analysis in Chapter 8, I follow this approach, and give protest size precedence. I set this threshold at 3 (protests of at least 1,000 participants). I allocate the provinces to the treatment and control categories based on the largest number of participants registered in that province. Additionally, I ran the regressions in Chapter 8 using a different protest measure, for the *total* estimated participation, accounting for the number of events. In that alternative measure, I order size of protests first by the size of the province's biggest registered protest, and then secondly by a measure that takes the number of days and average protest size into consideration. This did not alter the results.

[5] Measured as 1=10-99 participants, 2=100-999, 3=1000-9999, 4=10 000-99 999, 5= 100000+

## Interviews

The research for this study also included two rounds of fieldwork, in which I conducted interviews with fifty-five activists, party representatives, civil servants, and analysts (listed in Figure 1.1). Most of the interviews were conducted in Turkish, and extensive notes were taken. I followed up many of these, with email and social media communication. Not all interviewees are quoted directly in the text, but all provided information on different aspects of the study. When quoted in the text they are cited with their interview number (see Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Interviews conducted for the study

| **Interviewee** | **Date of interview** | **Interview number** |
|---|---|---|
| Political advisor, HDP | 23/08/2014 | 1 |
| CHP Vice-chairman | 25/08/2014 | 2 |
| AKP volunteer | 25/08/2014 | 3 |
| Vice-chairman, MHP | 27/08/2014 | 4 |
| Leading member, Gezi Party, Ankara | 28/08/2014 | 5 |
| CHP Member of Parliament, Istanbul | 28/08/2014 | 6 |
| Analyst, SETA | 28/08/2014 | 7 |
| Activist 1, Plaza Eylem Platformu (white-collar union) | 30/08/2014 | 8 |
| Activist 2, Plaza Eylem Platformu (white-collar union) | 30/08/2014 | 9 |
| Activist 3, Plaza Eylem Platformu (white-collar union) | 30/08/2014 | 10 |
| Political advisor, CHP/Civil society activist | 31/08/2014 | 11 |
| Rank-and-file member, Gezi Party, Istanbul | 01/09/2014 | 12 |
| Leader, LGBTT Solidarity Association | 01/09/2014 | 13 |
| Leading member, Gezi Party, Istanbul | 01/09/2014 | 14 |
| Representative, Anti-capitalist Muslims | 03/10/2014 | 15 |
| Journalist, 140 Journus | 07/03/2015 | 16 |
| Head of Youth wing, CHP Beyoğlu | 07/03/2015 | 17 |
| Candidate, 2015 elections, CHP Istanbul | 07/03/2015 | 18 |
| Former head of CHP Beyoğlu municipality, Istanbul | 07/03/2015 | 19 |
| Former head of CHP Beyoğlu, Istanbul (1995-1999), congress delegate in Istanbul | 07/03/2015 | 20 |
| Co-chairman, Istanbul HDP | 08/03/2015 | 21 |
| Rank-and-file member, CHP Eskişehir | 09/03/2015 | 22 |
| Candidate, 2015 elections, HDP Eskişehir | 09/03/2015 | 23 |
| Civil Servant 1, Eskişehir Metropolitan Municipality | 09/03/2015 | 24 |
| Civil Servant 2, Eskişehir Metropolitan Municipality | 09/03/2015 | 25 |
| Vice-chairman, AKP Eskişehir | 10/03/2015 | 26 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Rank-and-file member, Eskişehir MHP | 10/03/2015 | 27 |
| Rank-and-file member 2, Eskişehir MHP | 10/03/2015 | 28 |
| Activist, OccupyCHP | 10/03/2015 | 29 |
| Vice-chairman, AKP Çankaya, Ankara | 11/03/2015 | 30 |
| Vice-chairman, Ankara CHP | 11/03/2015 | 31 |
| Civil Servant in Department of Urban Aesthetics, Ankara Municipality | 12/03/2015 | 32 |
| Head of Haziran movement | 12/03/2015 | 33 |
| Rank-and-file member, CHP Ankara | 12/03/2015 | 34 |
| Chairman, Konya CHP | 13/03/2015 | 35 |
| Co-chairman, HDP Konya | 13/03/2015 | 36 |
| Vice-chairman, AKP Konya | 13/03/2015 | 37 |
| Civil Servant, Park and Culture Department, Konya Metropolitan Municipality | 13/03/2015 | 38 |
| Rank-and-file member, CHP Adana | 15/03/2015 | 39 |
| Civil Servant, Department of Parks and Gardens, Adana | 16/03/2015 | 40 |
| Rank-and-file member, CHP Adana | 16/03/2015 | 41 |
| Activist 1, Haziran movement, Adana | 16/03/2015 | 42 |
| Activist 2, Haziran movement, Adana | 16/03/2015 | 43 |
| Vice-chairman, MHP Adana | 16/03/2015 | 44 |
| Civil servant, Adana Metropolitan Municipality | 16/03/2015 | 45 |
| Civil Servant 1, Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality | 17/03/2015 | 46 |
| Civil Servant 2, Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality | 17/03/2015 | 47 |
| Civil Servant 3, Department of Financial Services, Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality | 17/03/2015 | 48 |
| Civil Servant, Şanlıurfa Metropolitan Municipality | 17/03/2015 | 49 |
| Head of Department of Economy, Mardin Metropolitan Municipality | 18/03/2015 | 50 |
| Co-chairman, HDP Diyarbakır | 19/03/2015 | 51 |
| Vice chairman, HDP Diyarbakır | 19/03/2015 | 52 |
| Activist, Eskişehir (interview through social media) | 20/02/2017 | 53 |
| Activist, Eskişehir Direniş Forumları (interview through social media) | 21/02/2017 | 54 |
| Activist, Izmir (interview through social media) | 22/02/2017 | 55 |

## Chapter overview

In Chapter 2 I present the theoretical framework on which the study is based. This combines insights from studies on political parties and party systems on the one hand, and studies on social

movements and the impact of non-institutional actors on institutional politics, on the other. I discuss the ways in which parties may respond to movements, and present some of the factors that facilitate party responses according to former studies in this field.

In Chapter 3 I introduce the Turkish case. I discuss the dimensions of conflict dominating Turkish politics and how they relate to the four parliamentary parties in the period examined. In Chapter 4 I present the chronological development, the demographic characteristics, and the demands proposed in the Gezi protests.

I then try to answer the research question, and turn to the original data collected for this study. In Chapters 5 and 6, I assess promotional responses. Chapter 5 examines how the political parties framed the Gezi protests. It shows both the extent and character of party responses to the protests. Chapter 6, on the other hand, is concerned with the extent to which the Gezi protests prompted change within the parties. In other words, while Chapter 5 looks at what the parties did to the protests, and Chapter 6 looks at what the protests did to parties. Chapter 7 explores concessional responses to the Gezi protests. I discuss the fate of the objects of some of the specific demands in the protests, such as Gezi Park itself. I also compare budgets at different administrative levels in Turkey before and after the protests, to detect how deep any concessional responses went.

# 2. Literature review

This chapter discusses the literature on party competition and movement outcomes used by this study. I first introduce some studies of party competition, and place the role of movements in that literature. I then discuss the ways in which parties may respond, and to draw on Gamson's (1990) two dimensions of responses to movements. I suggest labelling the response types of interest *promotional* and *concessional*. Finally, I present some of the conditions facilitating party responses according to former studies in this field. The section is divided into the movement-related and context-related factors that facilitate party responses. This distinction also reflects subsequent trends in the social movement literature, from resource mobilisation models to political process approaches. I borrow insights from both traditions, and argue that resource mobilisation models may be more conducive to concessional responses, while political process approaches are better for predicting promotional responses.

## The role of social movements in party politics

Different models have been developed to explain how competition between political parties works, and why parties are expected to accommodate social movement demands in some situations. Lipset and Rokkan (1990) argued that West European societies had been profoundly shaped by a series of social and political 'revolutions' which resulted in a limited set of entrenched conflicts. The presence and strength of these and other cleavages differed between countries, based on their particular historical trajectory as a nation state. Political parties were then instrumental in translating these social and cultural cleavages into demands and pressures for action or inaction. Scholars later used this positional framework of conflict cleavages in a more dynamic way, theorising about how political elites shift their positions based on the changing demands made by voters. As elected officials are vote-maximisers with an interest in remaining in office, they are expected to monitor public opinion, and to adjust their positions accordingly (Downs 1957; Miller and Stokes 1993; Weaver 1986; McGraw 1990; Herbst 1998; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002).

A useful addition to such positional models is the valence framework. This stresses how political parties place selective emphasis on issues where they have higher credibility than their opponents, thus claiming ownership of those issues, whilst ignoring issues that are disadvantageous to

themselves (Stokes 1963; Petrocik 1996; van der Brug 2004; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Stubager and Slothuus 2012). The valence framework of political competition was originally proposed in contradiction to spatial models, but the two perspectives can also be seen as complementary. For instance, we can argue that political competition basically occurs over certain dimensions or cleavages of conflict, which serve as the basis for issue ownership. As Schattschneider (1960) noted, politics is a constant struggle between conflicts. The job of political candidates is then to make sure that the issues they have ownership of — those that make them look good in the eyes of the public — gain as much attention as possible. Looking at the party system in Turkey, De Leon, Desai, and Tuğal (2009) illustrate how vital the articulation of cleavages is for giving them political valence. In Turkey, a voter may be an oppressed Muslim, an unemployed person, a proletarian, and a Kurd, and the appeal to each of these groups would produce different results. Parties cannot create cleavages from scratch, but they can integrate identities and hold groups together. For example, as we will see in Chapter 3, the AKP drew on both the economic right and the religiously conservative in their political platform.

The competition for the scarcity of public attention is the basis for the study of agenda-setting. This research tradition looks at what issues end up on the political agenda, and how much attention they receive (Dearing and Rogers 1996; McCombs 2004; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). As Schumaker (1975: 494) observed, social movements can be instrumental in setting the political agenda. In Tilly's (1978) conceptualisation, social movements can be treated as "challengers", which seek to signal their preferences and priorities to the institutional world of "polity members". From this perspective protest activities are a signal to parties, and this is potentially both an opportunity and a threat. When challengers protest, they show a high level of commitment to certain issues, thereby providing decision-makers with information about problems in society and their own chances of re-election (Lohmann 1993b; Burstein 1999; Andrews and Edwards 2004; Uba 2009; Gillion 2013; Hutter and Vliegenthart 2016; Vliegenthart et al. 2016; Wouters and Walgrave 2017). These signals can help parties alter their electoral strategy enabling them to capture a larger segment of voters.

Beyond simply redirecting their focus, however, movements may also provide parties with the opportunity to re-direct movements' attention towards themselves, and to frame movement demands in line with their pre-existing platforms (Kriesi 2015). Thus, protests do not only provide parties with the opportunity to place more emphasis on certain issues, but also allow them to frame these issues in ways that are advantageous to themselves. Chong and Druckman (2007) define framing as a process of development and reorientation of how we think about an

issue. Frames are the ways in which an issue is created; the essence of the problem, and how it should be perceived (Nelson and Oxley 1999). In this sense, protesters do not often have the power to affect policy priorities for the elites, but they can create political opportunities for the elites to defend their cause within the political system as it stands (Tarrow 1994; Wolfsfeld 1997). Chan and Lee (1984) first formulated the *protest paradigm,* as a concept based on media framing of protests. They examined the extent to which journalists supported, politicised, or moralised protests, and found that right-leaning newspapers emphasised social order and the status quo, whilst the left-leaning press gave more attention to the perspective of the protesters. In this framework, antagonists to the protests avoid talking about the substance of the issues raised by activists, but focus instead on the negative aspects of the actors themselves. Supporters of the protests, on the other hand, focus more on the demands raised by protesters, and present them to a larger audience (Boyle, McLeod, and Armstrong 2012). In short, protest critical parties focus on the actors, and protest sympathisers focus on the issues.

In this study, I argue that this distinction between actor-centred and issue-centred responses separated critics from sympathisers, but it also distinguished between parties that were supportive of the Gezi protests — the CHP and the BDP/HDP. Representatives of the latter tended to relate the Gezi protests to issues pertaining to the economic left, as well as post-material leftist issues such as feminism and pacifism — in line with the party's existing political platform. CHP representatives, on the other hand, tended to focus on the activists themselves when speaking about the Gezi protests. They were motivated to do so, I argue, based on a greater overlap with the identity of Gezi activists and a weaker overlap with the issues raised in the protests than the BDP/HDP. Thus, the CHP response to the Gezi protests represents a "positive" manifestation of the protest paradigm: supporting protest actors, and de-emphasising their demands.

A selective response is nothing new and it is a common complaint among social movements themselves that political parties use them for instrumental purposes (Piccio 2017). These studies may not all agree on how and under what conditions parties respond to movements as challengers. What many of the above studies do have in common, however, is the underlying assumption that parties respond to movements in order to appear more attractive to voters. The logic of vote maximization implies that parties amplify movement demands for their own electoral gains. I will refer to responses based on this vote-maximising logic as *promotional.*

On the other hand, movements do not only represent opportunities for political parties, but also a potential threat. A different part of the literature on social movement outcomes also notes that incumbent parties are interested in the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the territories

over which they have administrative control, and that disruptive action from challengers, such as social movements, threatens this stability (Gamson 1990; Piven and Cloward 1993; DeNardo 1985; Passarelli and Tabellini 2013). This strand, focusing on movements as an agent of social disruption, implies that politicians are more concerned with appeasing the crowds by conceding a minimal level of demands to cool the level of unrest. This literature thus considers elite responses as trading "concessions for tranquillity" (DeNardo 1985, 35). In contrast to the logic of vote-maximization, where parties respond positively to amplify movements, in the logic of social disruption parties respond positively to dampen them. I will refer to responses based on this logic as *concessional* responses. In short, parties in office also have the responsibility of preserving territorial integrity, and of preserving the calm and well-being for the people in the territory. This is a concern that ultimately also linked to elections, as perceivably poor leaders lose elections. However, the main concern is about a larger part of the population. A movement that creates a lot of attention, and possibly provokes clashes with the police, is a risk for any ruler, *regardless* of whether their constituency is involved in the protest.

As I discuss later in this chapter, these two motives for party response are to some extent prompted by different factors pertaining to the movement, the party system, and the broader political context. The most important reason for this distinction between promotional and concessional responses, however, is that they manifest themselves differently. In the next section, I discuss the *ways* in which party responses may manifest themselves.

## Response types

The literature on social movement outcomes has come up with an array of different terms for elite responses to protests. Despite the diversity in terminology however, the content of these response types is to a large extent overlapping. Most broadly, Tilly (1978) distinguished *facilitation* and *repression* as state responses. While facilitation means finding purposive or non-purposive ways of tolerating or supporting the activities of the challengers, repression consists of the selective or generalized acts of suppression of such challengers. Similarly, Franklin (2009) considers four governmental responses to contentious political challenges: offering concession (with no repression), repression (with no concession), tolerating the challenge (no concession or repression), and repression *and* concession.

While parties may respond positively to issues raised by movements, a part of the literature on party systems argues that parties are unable or unwilling to change, even in the presence of incentives to do so. Some have argued that political parties are programmatically inflexible, and that party system change tends to happen through new parties entering the party system (De Sio,

Franklin, and Weber 2016; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016; Hooghe and Marks 2017). A more likely effect of challengers on the party system than changing the existing parties could therefore be to develop new parties, which in turn change the party system. The strongest example of this is the labour movement in West European party systems, but there are also examples of green, and right-wing populist challengers which have successfully entered the institutional arena (Kriesi 2015; Bartolini 2007). Creating such spin-off parties is however much more difficult in majoritarian democracies, where political power is concentrated, than it is in consensus democracies, where it is divided (Kriesi 2015; Lijphart 1999). Although a multiparty system, Turkey has a largely majoritarian institutional environment, not least represented by the 10 percent electoral threshold (Lord 2012). This inhibits the creation of a new parties based on social movements, and it also means that established parties are less threatened by potential new entrants.

In this study, I focus on parties' facilitative responses, in Tilly's (1978) terminology this means supportive acts or statements for the Gezi protests. I thus follow the tradition initiated by Gamson (1990), which formulated a typology of positive responses to challengers. Gamson categorised the success of contentious challenges as twofold: that antagonists accept the challenger group as a valid spokesman for a legitimate set of interests ("acceptance"); and that the group's beneficiary gains new advantages during the challenge and its aftermath ("new advantages") (Gamson 1990, 29). This provides four potential response types to contentious challenges, as displayed in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: Outcomes of challenges (Gamson 1990, 29)

| | | **Acceptance** | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Full | None |
| **New Advantages** | Many | *Full Response* | *Pre-emption* |
| | None | *Co-optation* | *Collapse* |

Along the same lines, Kitschelt (1986) proposed "*procedural*" and "*substantial*" impacts, corresponding to Gamson's dimensions, while adding a third type, "*structural impact*", measured as changes to the structural conditions in which movements act. The distinction between acceptance and new advantages corresponds to the difference between promotional and concessional responses introduced above. In Chapter 5 and 6, I look at promotional responses, namely, what Gamson calls "acceptance". In Chapter 7, I look at concessional responses,

corresponding to Gamson's "new advantages". In this thesis, I draw on Gamson's distinction, but I choose to use the terms *concessional* and *promotional*. While Gamson's work has been highly influential, the labels of response types have not been used frequently in subsequent scholarly research. I therefore take the opportunity to use two labels that I think best describe the response types. Some have also used organisational survival as a measure of movement success, acknowledging the incremental nature of many social movement goals (Cress and Snow 2000; Minkoff 1993; Zald and Ash 1966). Although this study does not measure this sort of survival in a systematic way, I discuss the creation of lasting networks through the Gezi protests, and thus the longevity of a broader opposition coalition in Turkish civil society, towards the end of Chapter 6. In the next section I discuss some of the factors that facilitate both types of responses.

## Conditions facilitating party responses to movements

### Movement factors

The "first wave" of studies that systematically explored the outcomes of social movements came within the resource mobilization approach popular in the 1970s. This perspective was primarily concerned with how social movements could acquire resources and mobilise people to obtain the movement goals, and as such, studies of movement outcomes tended to examine movement-centred variables. Gamson's (1990) systematic study of contentious challenges in the U.S. between 1800 and 1945 is a prime example of this, but later empirical studies cited below have also found support for a number of factors internal to the movement.

First, some of the research to date has emphasized the importance of causing disruption to obtain concessions from political leaders. Gamson (1990) argued that "unruly groups, those that use violence, strikes, and other constraints, have better than average success". Later studies agree with the idea that a level of disruption furthers the challengers' cause, at least temporarily, but that such disruption (through goals, levels of participation or tactics) is also associated with repressive governmental responses (Piven and Cloward 1978; DeNardo 1985; Gurr 1986; Apodaca 2001; Davenport 1999, 1995, 1996; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Gartner and Regan 1996; Poe and Tate 1994; Franklin 2009). Tarrow (2011) argues that disruption is the most efficient strategy for social movements, because demonstrations and strikes are too easily ignored, and violence divides potential supporters and increases the risk of repression. On the other hand, Tilly (2004) theorised that protests that signalled *worthiness*, gave the impression that they were good, law-abiding citizens who behaved appropriately, and this facilitated a positive response from political elites. From this perspective, the advantages of violent action may be offset by the opportunity to be recognised as respectable players. Different dependent variables

may partly account for the lack of consensus regarding the effectiveness of disruptive strategies. Studies that argue that disruption is efficient, have looked at concessional responses, in policy outcomes. Other scholars have argued that disruption makes activists illegitimate in the eyes of politicians, and therefore leads to marginalisation (Tarrow 1994; della Porta and Diani 2009). Disruptive strategies may therefore seem more efficient if we look at policy concessions to the movement, whereas it is less efficient if we seek support from political elites in public debates.

Second, studies of both promotional and concessional responses to movements do appear to agree on another factor. Modest and specific demands have been found to increase the likelihood of concession, and to lower the likelihood of repression, because they carry a lower cost for the government and have a larger backlash potential in the case of repression (Snyder and Kelly 1976; Kowalewski 1987; O'Keefe and Schumaker 1983; Gamson 1990; Franklin 2009; Gartner and Regan 1996). Similarly, for promotional responses, Tilly (2004) argued that *unity* within the movement was pivotal for receiving attention and support from political elites. Movements receive more support from parties when the movement presents limited and specific demands that are generally considered legitimate by a large part of the electorate (Kriesi et al. 1995, 59; Steedly and Foley 1979; M. G. Giugni 1998; Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992; Wouters and Walgrave 2017; Fassiotto and Soule 2017), as well as when they have a co-operative approach to elites (McCammon 2012; Piccio 2011). However, positive association of limited and specific demands may be exaggerated in the literature, due to the methodological difficulties involved. Limited demands make it easier for the researcher to look for concessional responses in the relevant policy area, but when the demands are broad, concessional responses may appear in many different fields, making it more difficult to identify in research. This is particularly problematic in studies based on relatively superficial research on each case of contention.[6]

Third, scholars have pointed to the "power in numbers" or the importance of size for contentious politics in attaining government concessions (DeNardo 1985; Lohmann 1993a; Tilly 2004; della Porta and Diani 2009; Wouters and Walgrave 2017). On the one hand, scholars expected high participation to lead to increased repression due to the threat it creates (Gurr 1986; Lichbach and Gurr 1981). On the other hand, such repression could be more difficult to carry out due to the large numbers involved, and it may also carry a higher backlash potential (Franklin 2009).

[6] Franklin's (2009) study, for instance, argues that in his random sample of 832 cases of contention in Latin America limited demands is associated with more concessions. Yet his study of these cases is limited to news reports, making the validity of his findings dependent on whether journalists responsible for each of news report knew where to look for a concessional responses. It seems likely that these concessions were better reported when it was obvious where to look for them.

Finally, a few other factors have been proposed as facilitating concessions or support for movements, but with mixed empirical evidence. First, there has been a debate among scholars, primarily between Gamson on the one hand, and Piven and Cloward on the other, about whether it was advantageous for movements to have a strong organisational structure. Gamson found that challengers who were organised were more likely to succeed than those that were not. Opposing this, Cloward and Piven (1984) argued that mass-membership social movement organisations could subdue, rather than facilitate, the effect of protest (Piven and Cloward 1978; Cloward and Piven 1984). Cloward and Piven contrasted formal, membership-based organisation to the *disruption* that movements could create. What was more efficient, they argued, was a leadership for "organizing demonstrations and confrontations", rather than a membership organisation (Cloward and Piven 1984, 592). Second, scholars have also noted that stronger commitment, operationalised as the frequency of protest, facilitates elite responsiveness (Popkin 1991; Hunt and Benford 2008; Wouters and Walgrave 2017). However, this factor is only partly supported empirically, and some studies have found no effect of protest frequency (M. Giugni 2007; Olzak and Soule 2009).

The first period of systematic studies of social movement outcomes was therefore dominated by a search for movement-related factors that helped them succeed. In this tradition, success was often measured through direct policy effects — what Gamson (1990) called "new advantages", and what I call "concessional responses". In the ensuing periods however, this tradition of scholarship was regarded as insufficient for understanding how and when social movements influence institutional politics.

### Party factors and contextual factors

In the 1980s and 1990s, a second wave of scholarship on social movements, known as the political process approach, criticised the resource mobilisation approach for underestimating the importance of structural context (Goldstone 1980; Kitschelt 1986). This literature typically emphasised the aspects of the political system that provided chances and risks for social movements (Koopmans 2004b, 65; McAdam 1996; M. Giugni 2009). Studies of social movement outcomes within the political process framework thus typically found that movement success was contingent on political opportunity structures such as institutional allies and state structures (for an overview, see Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016, 11). In the political process perspective, protests can be successful when they exploit weaknesses in the state and political authorities (Kriesi 1995, 208). As an early proponent of emphasising political opportunities, Goldstone (1980) reanalysed

Gamson's original dataset, and argued that the latter had overestimated the effect of organization and tactics of the protest group, and underestimated timing and the broader political context.

The literature on social movement outcomes in the political process tradition thus provided another set of factors conditioning movement support and concessions, based on contextual opportunities — factors external to the movement itself. First, it has been argued that ideological or identity-based overlaps between the social movement and the political party are likely to increases the probability of a supportive response from the party. After all, as Key (1967, 464) noted, parties must weigh potential gains of appealing to a particular group against the risks of alienating another group antagonistic to the first. Ideological and cultural overlap with a social movement therefore increases the likelihood of parties wanting to accommodate the movement's demands. Empirical studies from Western European democracies seem to confirm this (Kriesi et al. 1995; Piccio 2011, 31; Wouters and Walgrave 2017). Second, movements seem to be more successful in obtaining support and concessions when the platforms of several parties overlap with theirs, and are thus contested. Hutter and Vliegenthart (2016) found that not only ideological proximity, but also whether other parties had already responded to the issue raised in the protests, affect party response to protests. More generally, studies have found that whether parties respond and adapt to movement claims is contingent on how vulnerable parties are in their competitive environment (Kriesi et al. 1995; Kriesi and Wisler 1999; Goldstone 2003; Amenta 2006; Tarrow 2011). Third, incumbent or opposition status may affect how elites approach movements. Looking at new social movements in Europe, Kriesi et al. (1995, 59) observed that leftist political parties were more likely to openly support the movements when they were in opposition. This is supported by Walgrave and Vliegenhaart (2012), who note that parliamentary members of the opposition in liberal democracies tend to react more strongly to cues from protest activity than the government. Fourth, some scholars have argued that timing is an important factor. Studies from the agenda-setting effect of protests in the U.S. indicate that protests are more effective early on in the policy cycle (King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005; Soule and King 2006). Parties generally only pay attention to movements during election times, and in times of high levels of mobilization, only to discard them soon after (Piccio 2017). However, the empirical evidence for the importance of timing is mixed. Gamson (1990) argued that time did not matter much, but that political and economic crises did. Finally, some have argued that media coverage is a decisive factor conditioning party responses (Koopmans 2004a; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012). Hutter and Vliegenthart (2016) find that protest coverage in the media is a very important factor affecting whether or not political parties respond to them.

Much of the literature referred to in this chapter has been developed based on liberal democracies. While Turkey fulfils a minimum democratic standard of competitive elections, there have also been clear limitations to its democratic quality ever since its transition to democracy in 1950. For instance, the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem) estimates Turkey's score on liberal democracy to be below 0.5 on a 0–1 scale since 1950, with a reduced score from 2003 to 2015.[7] Similarly, other indicators of democratic quality rate Turkey as a highly illiberal democracy in recent years (Corke et al. 2014; Meyersson 2015). Throughout this study, it is important bearing in mind the illiberal aspects of governance in Turkey, and its shift towards authoritarianism in the last fifteen years. However, I argue that most studies from other competitive democracies discussed in this chapter are also relevant for the Turkish case. There are indeed limits to effective checks and balances, and the political playing-field in Turkey has always been uneven. Yet the political game is still being played among parties, which, I argue, compete with similar motivations as their counterparts in liberal democracies. Nevertheless, one aspect of the Turkish political system should be noted for the sake of this study, namely the 10 percent threshold for entering Parliament. As already noted, majoritarian environments are adverse to new parties entering the political scene. Such a high parliamentary threshold punishes parties that come close to the 10 percent mark severely if they make an electoral miscalculation. This is important to keep in mind when evaluating the Turkish parties' reactions to the Gezi protests. As I discuss more thoroughly in Chapter 6 and in the Conclusion, the institutional environment in Turkey may have urged political parties to maintain a status quo in their political platform. It also makes new political parties less of a threat to the four parties under review, thus acting as a disincentive to making changes to their platforms.

## Discussion

This study is concerned with the extent and ways in which political parties in Turkey responded to a wave of protest mobilisation. In doing so, I am concerned with two dimensions of responses: promotional and concessional. I label the two response types in this way based on the underlying motivation parties have to respond to movements. These underlying motivations have already been discussed in the literature on social movement outcomes, but the *distinction* between the two motivations for responses has not always been clear. In this chapter I have tried to show how these two traditions are based on different underlying assumptions, and, to some extent, on different expectations of conditions facilitating responses. The main difference between the two is that factors external to the movement, related to the party system or the broader political

[7] V-Dem defines liberal democracy as "the intrinsic value of protecting individual and minority rights against a potential "tyranny of the majority." This is achieved through constitutionally protected civil liberties, a strong rule of law, and effective checks and balances that limit the use of executive power" (Lindberg et al. 2014).

context, are emphasised more in the literature on promotional responses than in research on concessional responses.

The above discussion provides an overview of some of the factors that condition such responses. In this study, I explore promotional responses through parliamentary interventions, party manifestos, and interviews, and concessional responses through budget data, and supplementary interviews. As the discussion above shows, there is no consensus as to precisely which factors affect party responses to movements, or whether different conditions facilitate promotional and concessional responses. One general difference seems to be that the literature on concessional responses often highlights internal movement factors, whereas studies of promotional responses highlight the party's ideology, historical identity, and the broader structural context. This may be partly due to the historical evolution of the field of social movement studies, from the resource mobilization approach to the political process approach. Yet it also makes sense intuitively: party and contextual factors matter more for promotional responses. When political parties respond promotionally to movements, they do so at least partly as a strategy to attract voters. The context of the political competition there matters more than in low-key concessional responses, which are made to regain tranquillity. The two types of responses can also be sequential. Promotional responses may be cheap talk at first, but later on they become binding. Indeed, backing from institutional insiders has been indicated as a condition facilitating subsequent practical concessions (Lipsky 1968; Bunce and Wolchik 2011).

As a single case study, this research cannot assess these factors systematically. The purpose of this chapter is instead to situate this study in the existing literature on similar cases. In the next two chapters, I introduce the Turkish political system and the Gezi movement, and I examine some of the factors emphasised by the existing literature as affecting the likelihood of promotional and concessional responses.

# 3. A description of the Turkish party system

## Introduction

In this chapter I discuss the lines of conflict in Turkish politics, and how they relate to the four parliamentary parties in the period examined. I first discuss the dimensions around which political conflict revolves, and then place the four major political parties in their historical context, and along the main dimensions of conflict in Turkey. The aim of this chapter is not to provide an extensive analysis of Turkish politics and history, but to introduce the most relevant elements of Turkish politics for this particular study. I focus particularly on the structure of political conflict, and on an overview of each party's trajectory and most important issues.

Turkey is a republic, with a Prime Minister who serves as the head of government, and a President who is head of state. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President, and approved through a vote of confidence in Parliament. General elections are held every five years with a party-list system of proportional representation. There are 550 Members of Parliament who are elected from eighty-five electoral districts. Since the general election of 2002, parliamentary seats have been divided between four political parties, representing the conservative right, the nationalist centre-left, and the pro-Kurdish left, and the ultra-nationalist right. In this study, I examine all these major political parties. Turkish Electoral Law No. 2839 stipulates that a political party must obtain at least 10 percent of the vote in a national election to be admitted to Parliament. This threshold has generated substantial criticism among politicians and civil society actors in Turkey, and from foreign observers, due to the high number of "wasted" votes, and the underrepresentation of alternative perspectives, and regional and minority parties (e.g. Toker 2008; Alkin 2011). Indeed, Çarkoğlu (2002) notes that about 45 percent of voters were not represented in Parliament after the 2002 election.

## Dimensions of political conflict

In this section I discuss the most salient lines of political conflict in Turkey. I then introduce the four current parties in the Turkish Parliament, and estimate their positions on these conflict lines. The academic literature on the Turkish party system does not agree on which social cleavages are most salient in the country, yet most do agree that the traditional right-left axis over economic redistribution has been less salient than in most Western European countries (Çarkoğlu 2007). An early and influential work in this field is Mardin's (1973) *Centre-periphery Cleavage*. In Mardin's view, the centre constituted secular, urban, and nationalist values oriented towards the West, whereas the periphery was religious, agricultural and traditional. Scholars on Turkish politics have long accepted Mardin's centre-periphery cleavage (Sayari 1978; Özbudun 1981; Tachau and Heper 1983; Kalaycioğlu 1994). It is this distinction that underlies the identity labels such as Black and White Turks, still used in Turkish political discourse, and by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself. The Black Turks are the poor agricultural workers of the periphery, and the White Turks represent the upper class urban secularists (J. White 2014, 47; *Cumhuriyet* 2015).

However, while centre-periphery may represent a social cleavage in Turkey, it is a problematic distinction when it comes to systematic analysis. The main problem is that the centre-periphery framework is more tied to identity politics than to any specific political issues. It simply does not produce a lot of real specific issues on which political parties differ. We may benefit from distinguishing the general terms for political division from the use of political cleavages here (Zuckerman 1975). A dictionary distinction between the two is that 'to cleave' is defined as 'to split or sever (something) along a natural line or grain" (*Oxford English Dictionary* 2010). This also reflects a common distinction in the literature: political cleavages are seen as divisions that have a strong basis in society, whereas 'political divisions' may also include more superficial differences, or divisions between political elites that do not reflect major divisions in society. Divisions are more likely to develop into full cleavages when they win convincing victories (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Deegan-Krause 2007). For the purposes of this analysis in a study analysing party responses to the demands raised in a protest, it is arguably more useful to concentrate on the *dimensions* that separate the political parties on concrete issues than to focus on underlying cleavages in society.

How can we classify the dimension(s) of political conflict in Turkey? Can we reduce political competition to a left-right divide similar to that found in Western democracies, or do we need to consider several dimensions? Various attempts have been made to answer these questions, often with conflicting answers. Aydoğan and Slapin (2013) try to translate the Turkish party system into a Western left-right divide. The centre-left parties have a history of being close to the military and

the elites, while parties that define themselves on the right appeal to the poorer classes. The authors note that the CHP is associated with some issues typically associated with the left in the West, such as 'liberal issues', 'women', and 'inequality', but that the party also espouses nationalist, populist and conservative concerns, particularly pertaining to war and the military. Aydoğan and Slapin thus argue that the Turkish left-right party system is reversed. While the premises of their argument are valid, I argue that their conclusions of simply reversing the left-right divide, is not very helpful. If we understand the Turkish party system unidimensionally, we end up with contradictory categories. Instead I argue that the contradictions of the Turkish left and right vis-à-vis Western party systems call for an understanding of Turkish politics which considers several dimensions of conflict. Furthermore, as I am concerned with four parties which all have a distinct ideological profile, it is advantageous to include several dimensions that reflect these unique profiles. While not all dimensions of political conflict develop into fully-fledged cleavages, they dominate the competition between the four parties dealt with in this study. While there is no scholarly consensus on the number of dimensions that dominate party competition in Turkey, some dimensions recur in much of the existing literature (Öniş 1997; Çarkoğlu 1998; Secor 2001; Baslevent, Kirmanoglu, and Senatalar 2004; Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006; Özbudun 2006; Wuthrich 2015). For the purposes of this study, I draw on some of them, but emphasise that the three lines I argue are important for the period and phenomenon of interest:

- secular-Islamist
- pluralist-nationalist
- left-right

This distinction between the three dimensions particularly overlaps that of Baslevent, Kirmanoglu, and Senatalar (2004) and Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006). Secularism is one of the six arrows of *Kemalism*, the ideology espoused by the national foundational figure Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The concept of secularism, known as *laiklik* in Turkish, was inspired by the French term *laïcité,* and evolved as a strict state policy that was anticlerical, but not antireligious (Akan 2012; Göle 1997). The pluralist-nationalist dimension of conflict reflects an ethnically based national cleavage, dividing Turkish and Kurdish identities (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006). This line included issues such as the acceptance of diversity versus unity of the nation, and, more concretely, defending military aggression towards the Kurds versus blaming the military for exaggerated aggression (Secor 2001).

Finally, I consider a left-right dimension, based on both economic and post-material issues. The economic left-right dimension has been acknowledged as, while not as salient as the other two

above, at least relevant to both voters and political parties in Turkey (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006). But what about the post-material left? In Western European party systems, niche parties have emerged in recent decades, often with origins in the New Social Movements. In Turkey, women's movements started organising in the 1960s and 1970s, but were merely a sub-group of the socialist and anti-imperialist movements (Şimşek 2004). The repression of these leftist groups following the September 1980 coup allowed those involved to disentangle the feminist and leftist movements, and in the ensuing years women's movements and organisations strengthened as autonomous parts of civil society (Şimşek 2004). In 1990, the Directorate General on the Status and the Problems of Women was created under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and occasionally featured in the political debate between parties (Y. Arat 1998). Other post-material issues, such as environmental conservation, and peace activism, did not give birth to niche parties dedicated to these issues, and did not figure prominently in the political debates. Yet as we will see below, there have been indications in recent years that the BDP and (to some extent) the CHP are making these issues a central part of their party identity.

In Figure 3.1 I use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey wave from 2010 to indicate the spatial difference between the parties on the three most important dimensions of political conflict in Turkish politics. The Survey is well-suited for this overview, as it has a clear range in its estimates from 0 to 10, and facilitates comparisons between parties and across issues. Although based on a different type of measure, the Party Manifesto Project dataset mostly supports the Chapel Hill Survey's order between the political parties presented in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Positioning of four political parties on three dimensions of political conflict (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2010)



## The AKP

The roots of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) lie in a tradition combining the religiously conservative and the economic right-wing, which arguably started already in the second democratic elections in 1950, with the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Partisi*, DP). The AKP was founded in 2001 and led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül as a less conservative and more pro-Western version of its immediate predecessors: Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi,* RP), and then the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP), which were banned in 1997 and 2001, for violating the secular articles of the Constitution. The AKP leaders downplayed the role of Islam in the first years of the party's existence, and emphasized democratization and bringing the country closer to EU accession. By doing this, the AKP secured broad electoral support among Turkish conservatives and right-of-centre market liberals. As Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit declared, Turkey was in a serious crisis in 2001, and voters subsequently punished the coalition parties, the AKP picked up many of the votes that had previously been divided among these coalition parties, and won the 2002 general elections. The 10 percent threshold meant that 45 percent of the vote did not lead to any seats in the Parliament, and the AKP obtained a two-thirds majority based on only 34 percent of the vote (Çarkoğlu 2002). It subsequently formed Turkey's first single-party government since 1987, with Gül as Prime Minister. In 2003 Erdoğan took over the post as Prime Minister, and Gül became Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.

During and after the economic crisis, serious structural reforms were implemented to enable Turkey to take up IMF loans, and the stabilization process was mainly over by the time the AKP rule had settled. The ensuing positive turn was commonly attributed to the AKP's rule, and seemed to have spurred the party's growth, at least until 2007, when the AKP gained 46.5 percent of the vote (Çarkoğlu 2012). The party grew again in the 2011 general elections, receiving almost 50 percent of the vote. The first years of AKP rule were characterized by its struggle to break the army's hold over politics. Furthermore, in 2009 the AKP introduced its so-called "democratic opening", to end the vicious cycle of violence between the state and the PKK. There was an opening of increased Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights in Turkey, and in March 2013 the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan called for the removal of PKK arms from Kurdish soil. The party's opening towards ethnic diversity indicated that it was a party towards the pluralist end of the pluralism-nationalism dimension. Yet from around 2006, the AKP government noticeably started showing increasingly authoritarian attitudes (Meyersson and Rodrik 2014). The freezing of talks with the EU on Turkish accession in 2006, coupled with the European debt crisis three years later, removed many of the incentives for the AKP's previous democratic reforms. By the

time the Gezi protests broke out, for a large part of the electorate the image of the AKP was that of an authoritarian rather than a democratic party (Özbudun 2014).

The AKP thus captured much of the segment of Turkish voters on the religious end of the secular-Islamist dimension, and to the right on the economic left-right division. The AKP was favourable towards ethnic diversity, compared to most previous incumbent parties, and took a critical view of the military. The party was also the second most favourable party of decentralisation in 2010, after the BDP (Bakker et al. 2015). While the two most important issues for the AKP were considered the defence of religious principles and promoting a conservative social lifestyle, the third was anti-elite rhetoric. This plays into the distinction of "White" and "Black" Turks described above. The AKP has claimed to represent the historically marginalised part of the Turkish population, and continued to do so well into their third period in government.

| **Figure 3.2** | **Most important issue, AKP (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2014)** |
|---|---|
| **1.** | Religious principles |
| **2.** | Social lifestyle |
| **3.** | Anti-elite |

## The CHP

The Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) was founded during the Sivas Congress in 1919, four years before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. It was Turkey's ruling party for the entire single-party period, between 1923 and 1946. The party's early republican is central to its self-perception as Turkey's founding party, loyal to Kemalist values and principles (CHP Seçim Bildirgesi 2011; Ciddi 2009b). The party lost the second multi-party general elections in 1950. In the following decade, it profiled itself as social democratic and left-of-centre. Emre (2014, 227) links the CHP's shift towards social democracy to the emergence of a strong socialist movement in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s. In order to distinguish itself from the contentious labour organisations, the Turkish Workers Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi,* TIP), and the Turkish Communist Party (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*, TKP), the CHP placed itself to the left of centre to capture voters from these far-left organisations and parties. The Chapel Hill Survey deemed that both the AKP and the CHP considered "social lifestyle" as one of the three most important issues, but the CHP was placed on the liberal end of this spectrum. However, the importance of the Kemalist legacy would never wane within the party, and both nationalism and

strict secularism remain prominent issues for CHP members today. While the CHP's core identity is derived from nationalist nostalgia, the official self-assessment is social-democratic. The oxymoronic nature of identifying both as a leftist and nationalist party has not escaped the CHP leadership. In order to make its nationalism more coherent with its social-democratic identity, the party leadership has highlighted the distinction between two types of nationalisms. One, known as *milliyetçilik,* represents the strict and exclusive nationalism often associated with the far right. The other, *ulusalcılık*, which the CHP prides itself in espousing, is a more moderate form of nationalism (Uslu 2008; *Gerçek Gündem* 2013). The CHP's nationalism is evident in three issues: its negative attitude towards accommodating the country's Kurds, its denial of the Armenian genocide, and its support for the military in general.

The CHP, as all other Turkish parties at the time, was shut down by the military in the 1980 coup. When political parties were allowed to reopen, the membership had split into two. The former leader, Bülent Ecevit, formed the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Partisi*, DSP) in 1984, while most former members rejoined the CHP when it reopened under the same name in 1992. In the 1990s the Turkish left was divided between Ecevit's DSP, the Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti,* SHP), and the CHP. The party experienced a string of bad elections in the 1990s, failing to pass the threshold to enter Parliament in 1999. This bad fortune changed with the collapse of the DSP-led coalition government in 2002. In the ensuing elections, none of the former governmental parties managed to win a seat in Parliament, and only the CHP and the newly formed AKP passed the 10 percent threshold. The CHP won 178 seats, and thus re-established itself as the main opposition party in Turkey. However, this position was generally considered to be a result of votes against the government coalition parties, rather than in favour of the CHP's popularity. The CHP leadership, and its leader Deniz Baykal in particular, were criticized for stifling young blood in the party, and exacerbating voter apathy among large segments of the population. In 2010, the election of Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu as party chairman raised the hopes that the party would undergo a process of leadership renewal. Yet despite the optimistic expectation of a youth revolution in the party, younger elements were still kept away from the most important posts. Observers have noted that there have been few structural changes to create any large-scale reform of the party (Kömürcü 2011).

Conceptions of the left-right distinction in Western democracies tend to treat pro-military positions, and an appeal to rich voters as being typical of right-wing positions (e.g. Budge and McDonald 2006; Budge 2013; Klingemann, 2006). In Turkey, however, the CHP nurtures a close relationship with the military, both in its involvement in Northern Cyprus and its intervention in

Turkish politics (Uslu 2008). The CHP's support for the Turkish military in repressing Kurdish groups in the South-East has meant that the party has little credibility on human rights issues. Yet in the early 1990s the CHP was collaborative regarding the Kurdish cause, and even ran a joint electoral platform with the pro-Kurdish party in 1991 (Ciddi 2009a, 169). Furthermore, the CHP draws most of its share of the vote from the richest areas in Turkey, unlike the typical voter profile of leftist parties in Western Europe (Elff 2007). Ciddi (2008) analysed the vote shares in different electoral districts, and found that the poorest districts had a larger share of the vote supporting the centre-right than the centre-left. Ayata and Ayata (2007) note that the CHP has been strong with the new middle class (professionals, bureaucrats, and managers). It had some support from the urban working classes in the 1970s, but since then, the working-class has mainly voted for the religious and nationalist right. Ayata and Ayata suggest that the gap between the poor and the CHP can largely be explained by the party's reforms during the single-party period, which alienated masses from the periphery in the country. The CHP also epitomises the centre of Mardin's centre-periphery dimension. A major segment of its electorate has been found among the urban middle, and upper middle classes (Ozbudun 2015; Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006). Indeed, the CHP was perceived as highly favourable of centralisation by the Chapel Hill Survey in 2010, scoring 8.2 on a scale from 0 to 10.

The defence of secularism has been one of the CHP's core issues throughout its existence. Ever since its ideological restructuring in the 1950s, the party's self-labelling as leftist has remained, but there has been considerable disagreement on what this leftism should consist of. Is it defined by the classic cleavage on state intervention in the market, or does it also encapsulate progressive civil rights? In the Chapel Hill Survey and Party Manifesto Project the party was placed to the moderate left on a left-right dimension, but far from the pluralist side of the pluralism-nationalism dimension. The CHP's identity crisis would continue to haunt it: at its heart lies a struggle between the traditional versus the modern, the conservative versus the progressive, and the nationalistic versus the liberal (Keyman and Öniş 2007; Öniş and Grigoriadis 2010).

| **Figure 3.4** | **Most important issue, CHP (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2014)** |
|---|---|
| **1.** | Corruption |
| **2.** | Civil liberties |
| **3.** | Social lifestyle |

## The BDP/HDP

The Peoples' Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP) is the newest version of a long list of short-lived pro-Kurdish parties. While in most cases the change of name has been prompted by a shut down by the constitutional court, the most recent change occurred voluntarily, following the Gezi protests, from the Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrası Partisi*, BDP) to the HDP. I discuss this in Chapter 6.

The history of the Kurdish struggle in Turkey dates back to the creation of the Republic of Turkey. While the 1920 Sevres Treaty had envisaged "interim autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey with a full independence if the inhabitants of these areas want this", by 1924 the Turkish constitution equated citizenship with "Turkishness", and denied the opportunity to run for parliamentary deputy to anyone not identifying themselves as a Turk (Z.F.K. Arat 2011, 52; Yavuz 2001). The early Republican period witnessed several Kurdish rebellions which put up strong resistance to the strictly homogenous interpretation of nationhood, in particular the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion, the 1930 Ağri Revolt, and the Dersim Revolt in 1937–1938. With the electoral victory of the DP in 1950, increasing liberal freedoms were introduced, allowing Kurds to express their grievances. In the 1960s, many politically active Kurds threw their lot in with the Turkish left. Leftist intellectual debate flourished at all the major universities in the 1960s, and due to their claims for equality, and their challenging of the Kemalist state, the far-left parties attracted many young Kurds (Zurcher 2004, 285; Bozarslan 2008, 345). By the second half of the 1970s however, the Kurdish question was played down by the Turkish left to something that could wait until after the socialist revolution. Consequently, an increasing number of Kurdish leftists looked to an alternative, and small underground Kurdish parties emerged (Zurcher 2004, 269; P.J. White 2000, 134). Adding to state suppression of the Kurds was a general shift towards political violence and chaos in the 1970s. Shaped by this, radicalized Kurds founded the PKK in 1974. With the 1980 coup, in 1984 the PKK escaped repression by moving to Syria, from where it launched guerrilla warfare against Turkey. Marcus (2009, 175) notes that, by 1992, in cities such as Diyarbakir, the PKK could shut down the whole city with just a few days' notice, and in towns such as Nusaybin, Cizre, and Idil, the PKK had created parallel systems of competing governance. The Turkish state responded by destroying entire Kurdish villages to halt the guerrilla warfare (Nigogosian 1996).

Parliamentary deputies of Kurdish origin and leftist parties wanted to discuss the problem in a peaceful way, but they were largely excluded from the political process. With increased international, and some national, pressure for an increase in human rights and the liberalization

of national politics, a pro-Kurdish agenda was established. In June 1990, the People's Work Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*, HEP) was created, only to be shut down in 1992. It was followed by similar parties under different names; the DEP, HADEP, DEHAP, and DTP replaced each other when one was closed by the government (Watts 2010, 10–17). These parties insisted that they were for "all of Turkey" rather than merely for Kurds, and that they rejected armed action (Watts 2010, 62–64). In 1999, Öcalan was captured in Kenya and sentenced to death for treason. This weakened the PKK, and forcing it to limit their goals, calling for increased autonomy instead of an independent state. His capture also caused a stronger tilt towards the institutional part of the Kurdish movement, Kurdish parties were also bolstered by the EU candidate country classification in December 1999, which incentivised Turkey to improve its human rights record, and allow regions to apply for pre-accession grants as well as funding assistance from the EU (Watts 2010, 90–93). When DEHAP dissolved in 2005, The Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi,* DTP) was created as its successor. Similar to its predecessors, the DTP insisted on its pro-democratic identity, rather than simply being a pro-Kurdish rights party. The party incorporated gender equality and ecological sustainability as central parts of their discourse (Gunes 2011, 169–70). In 2009, the Turkish Constitutional Court banned the party due to its alleged links with the PKK, and the Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*, BDP) was founded as its successor. The broadening of the agenda continued in the BDP, championing the emancipation of religious and sexual minorities, as well as an economic leftist ideology.

In the last two decades, the pro-Kurdish parties have gradually given more prominence to the broader issues of democratization (Celep 2014). Its representatives have endorsed LGBT rights and have called for official Turkish recognition of the Armenian genocide (*Hurriyet Daily News* 2013, *TimeTurk* 2012). While "social lifestyle" (a measure for social values, e.g. homosexuality) was not considered one of the three most important issues for the party in 2014, the BDP was placed furthest to the liberal end of the four parliamentary parties, in both 2010 and 2014 (Polk et al. 2017). The ideological base of the pro-Kurdish parties have been linked to its strong pluralist position in the nationalist/pluralist cleavage (Secor 2001). Indeed, the Chapel Hill Survey considers civil liberties and decentralisation to have been the two most important issues for the party in 2014, and the party was estimated to hold the most extreme positions favouring both decentralisation and the protection of ethnic minorities in 2010. Moreover, a study of the agendas in the Turkish Parliament from 2002 to 2013 shows that justice and crime were the most salient issue for the BDP (Bulut 2016). The high priority for justice and crime could be due to the proximity of the BDP to the PKK. Since Turkish prisons are full of Kurds accused of having

links to the PKK, the BDP may be more eager to push legislation for better prison conditions and changes to the criminal law (Bulut 2016). Part and parcel of its pluralist position, and in contrast to the CHP, the BDP also supported the right to conscientious objection (Altinay 2004, 110). Similar to the CHP, the BDP holds a secular position, but this has not occupied a prominent space on their agenda (Secor 2001).

| **Figure 3.5** | **Most important issue, HDP (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2014)** |
|---|---|
| **1.** | Ethnic minorities |
| **2.** | Decentralisation |
| **3.** | Civil liberties |

## The MHP

The roots of the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi,* MHP), and Turkish ultra-nationalism more generally, date back to the foundation of the Republican Peasants' Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi,* RPNP) in 1948 (Arıkan 1998). The ultra-nationalist turn of the RPNP in 1965 was mainly the work of one man, Alparslan Türkeş (Landau 1974, 205). Along with thirteen of his colleagues, Türkeş took over the chairmanship of the RPNP, and in 1969 changed its name to the National Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP). As the 1960 constitution permitted ideological politics for the first time, the far-right was alarmed by a leftist awakening, and began to mobilise its forces against communism. The MHP's primary strategy was thus a mobilisation of the masses around a primitively defined anti-communist ideology (Arıkan 1998). The party's youth-wing, the Grey Wolves (*Bozkurtlar*) were instrumental in this persecution which Türkeş acknowledged were set up to assist the party in defending Turkey against communism (Landau 1974, 216). The Grey Wolves started campaigning to intimidate leftists in 1968, and received paramilitary training in special camps (Zurcher 2004, 270). With the 1971 coup, the witch-hunt against the left expanded and was conducted by the state. The restoration of law and order was now equated with the repression of any leftist group. Indeed, a slogan during the Nationalist Front coalitions of the 1970s was "Demirel in Parliament, Türkeş in the street", reflecting the division of labour as the Grey Wolves put into practice their terrorism to destroy the left's electoral potential (Ahmad 1993). In the massacre of Kahramanmaraş in South-Eastern Anatolia in 1978, thirty-one were killed and hundreds wounded. The Grey Wolves disrupted the funeral of two murdered school teachers, declaring "no funeral for Communists and Alevis", attacked the procession, and painted the MHP emblem on shops and houses not

targeted for attack (Ahmad 1993, 172).[8] In response Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit declared martial law in thirteen provinces.

Despite its prominent presence in Turkish political history, however, the radical right has never achieved an electoral breakthrough. Türkeş was the only MHP representative in Parliament in 1972, and the party only saw modest gains in the 1973 elections, from 3 percent in 1969 to 3.4. In 1977, the MHP won sixteen parliamentary seats, but received only 6.4 percent of the vote. In spite of this, the party gained positions in two governments in the 1970s. After the military coup in 1980, the MHP was banned, along all other active parties at the time. It resurfaced as the Conservative Party (*Muhafazakâr Parti*, MP) in 1983, and by 1992, it had changed its name back to MHP. After the death of Türkeş in 1997, Devlet Bahçeli assumed leadership of the MHP and moved the party towards the centre (Çınar and Arıkan 2013, 37–38). At the same time, he has made the party more centralized than ever, and party members and parliamentarians are expected to comply fully with decisions and directives from the party leadership (Çınar and Arıkan 2013, 38).

The strongest position-identity of the MHP pertains to the nationalism/pluralism cleavage, on which it is placed firmly at the nationalist end of the spectrum. In contrast to the CHP's self-proclaimed identity as *ulusalcılı* (nationalist), the MHP espouses the more militant form of nationalism, known as *milliyetçilik,* which is also part of their name.[9] The MHP has been strongly against recognizing the Armenian genocide, and granting the right to conscientious objection of military service. In April 2013, Tokat Resat Doğru stated in a parliamentary intervention, "Those who accused our nation of genocide, used to be valued through freedom of thought. Yet our nation has never, at any point in time, been guilty of genocide" (Resat Doğru, 16.04.2013). The focus on nationalism, and conversely, scepticism of foreign powers, is also reflected in the Chapel Hill Survey's assessment of the most important issues for the MHP in 2014. Nationalism is considered the most important, and international security ranks third (corruption being the second most important issue, according to the Survey). Probably as a result of its nationalist attitudes and violent legacy, the MHP has not claimed any ownership of human rights issues. On the secularism/Islamism cleavage, the MHP has moved away from the traditional Kemalist notion in recent decades, and drifted towards religious conservatism (Çarkoglu and Toprak 2000, 23).

[8] Note that there is no agreement on the Grey Wolves' *involvement in the* Kahramanmaraş massacre. Some claim there is no evidence supporting their involvement at all (Mango 1995, 624).
[9] See (Bora 2009, 15–22) for an overview of the different forms of nationalism in Turkish political thought.

**Figure 3.6** **Most important issue, MHP (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2014)**

| | |
|---|---|
| **1.** | Nationalism |
| **2.** | Corruption |
| **3.** | International security |

## Conclusion

In this chapter I have provided an overview of the dimensions of conflict in Turkey that are most relevant to this study. I then introduced the four main political parties, and placed them on these dimensions of conflict. The chapter has thus prepared the groundwork for Chapters 5–7, where I analyse these political parties' reactions to the Gezi protests. Before that, however, we need to understand what these political parties would react to. The next chapter therefore introduces the context, the profile of activists, and the demands raised in the Gezi protests.

# 4. The Gezi protests and their demands

## Prelude to the protests

The Gezi protests began in late May 2013 as a reaction to the planned demolition of Gezi Park and the Atatürk Cultural Centre (AKM). The demolition was part of the government's Taksim Transformation Project, which included the creation of underground roads in a renewed Taksim Square, and the rebuilding of the historical Artillery Barracks (Yildirim 2012; "IBB Faaliyet Raporu" 2013). The barracks had been built by Sultan Abulhamid II in 1896, but was only used for thirteen years, until the European-based soldiers and intellectuals of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) forced Abdulhamid II to re-open Parliament during the Young Turk Revolution. Religious scholars, allied with conservative soldiers, then used the barracks at Taksim Square to plan a counter-coup against the CUP, but were brutally crushed by the latter. The barracks were then left untouched until 1921, when they were converted into a football stadium, and they were demolished in 1940 (Czajka 2017). The rebuilding project of the artillery barracks therefore carried a larger symbolic meaning, based on the historical distinction between the central elite and religious periphery, the so-called Black Turk/White Turk distinction, as described in the previous chapter. The AKP had shown its dislike of the CUP and the Young Turk Revolution, and Erdoğan had praised Abdulhamid II for his role in institution-building (Danışoğlu 2015; *Al Jazeera Turk* 2016). Taksim Square also had a strong symbolic weight thanks to its history of political rallies and labour demonstrations (Farro and Demirhisar 2014; Gül, Dee, and Cünük 2014).

The AKP-led Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality did not immediately specify what the artillery barracks would be used for when restored. In February 2013, the mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Kadır Topbaş, denied that the new project would include a shopping mall. "They ask us 'are you going to build a mosque, or a hotel instead of the AKM [Atatürk Cultural Centre]?' Everyone is talking based on their own fears or dreams. There is no such thing. Again, I say it clearly; there will be no shopping [mall]." (İnce 2013). In April, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan contradicted this and stated that the artillery barracks would become a shopping mall or residence area (*Milliyet* 2013). Due to both the symbolic weight of the artillery barracks, and the perception of an incumbent party which prioritised private enterprise over public areas, the Taksim Transformation Project came under fire from the very beginning (El-Kazaz 2013). The

High Council for the Preservation of Cultural and Natural Heritage (*Kültür ve Tabiat Varlıklarını Koruma Yüksek Kurulu)* approved the pedestrianisation project in 2012. The Chamber of Architects and Chamber of Urban Planners formed the Taksim Solidarity Group (*Taksim Dayanışması*) with other environmentalist activists and professional associations, and filed a lawsuit in an Administrative Court in Istanbul, calling for the cancellation of the High Council's decision. Without waiting for the court's decision, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality gave Kalyon Construction the go-ahead to carry out the project in October 2012. In January 2013, the Regional Board for the Preservation of Cultural Assets supported the appeal, and declared the project illegal. At this point Erdoğan intervened and responded "we are rejecting the rejection" (*T24* 2013a; İnce 2013). In March 2013, the national High Council for the Preservation of Cultural and Natural Assets, which has the final word in such matters, reversed the regional board's decision, and gave the transformation project the green light (Gürcan and Peker 2015; Brennan and Herzog 2014, 180).

## Demonstrations in Taksim and the rest of Turkey

As the municipality began the work on the pedestrian pathways of Gezi Park, the wall between the park and the road was demolished on 27 May 2013, and some trees were uprooted (Gül, Dee, and Cünük 2014). Environmental activists from the Taksim Solidarity Group created a human chain to block the work. Within a few hours, a tent village had been erected in the park. The municipal workers and police responded heavy-handedly, which attracted the attention and involvement of more activists (Aytaç, Schiumerini, and Stokes 2017). In the days and nights that followed the demonstrations grew and spread, with tens of thousands of protesters in Istanbul and in other big cities in Turkey. Demonstrations continued throughout June and into early July in many Turkish cities, before tapering off in mid-July and August. Figure 4.1 shows a map of Turkey, with an estimate of how many activists participated in the largest demonstration in each province.[10] Importantly for this study, the geographical concentration of demonstrations coincided with voting patterns in these parts of the country, and demonstrations were more concentrated in areas where the CHP had a strong electoral base (the Aegean and Mediterranean coast), to some extent in areas where the AKP received a lot of votes (Central Anatolia), whereas they were smaller or completely absent from areas where the MHP and the BDP had most of their voters (the Black Sea coast and South-Eastern Anatolia, respectively).

[10] The data for this map were collected by Kivanç Atak. See the methodology chapter for a full discussion of the dataset and measures of protest size.

Figure 4.1: Estimated number of participants in the Gezi protests in Turkey, by province




Estimates of the total number of participants ranged from 2 million to 3.5 million (Alessandrini, Üstündağ, and Yildiz 2013; David and Toktamış 2015; Amnesty International 2013; *Hürriyet Daily News* 2013; Yeşil 2015). The police intervened in the protests and clashed with activists in several cities. Over 5,000 people were taken into custody. Five protesters and one police officer lost their lives during the events, and over 4,000 were injured (Şardan 2013; Gül, Dee, and Cünük 2014). The protests themselves were largely peaceful, although there were reports of violent clashes with the police, and of some acts of vandalism against public and private property (Gül, Dee, and Cünük 2014; interview 32). Many Gezi activists saw themselves as part of a global wave of discontent. "Occupy" slogans and hashtags were taken directly from the global Occupy Movement, starting in New York City. Furthermore, graffiti stated that "Taksim will become Tahrir", and graffiti saying "Syriza" over the gates of the Greek Consulate (Ertür 2014). When protests erupted in Brazil during the same period, Brazilian flags appeared in solidarity protests (Ertür 2014). Finally, the post-material and left-wing profile of the Gezi protests followed the trends from Western European countries in recent decades, where such values have been positively linked to organised public protest (Gundelach 1998; Inglehart 2008; van der Meer, van Deth, and Scheepers 2009; Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon 2010; Hutter and Kriesi 2013)

## The activists and their demands

While the Gezi protests started with an environmentalist basis, a wide variety of groups came together, ostensibly with few common denominators apart from their opposition to the AKP.

Religious and ethnic minorities, leftist political parties and organisations, Kemalist and nationalist groups, LGBT, and Marxist pious Muslims participated in the same events, and often engaging in acts of reciprocal solidarity (Acar and Uluğ 2016; Farro and Demirhisar 2014). Some attempts were made to create a joint platform between these disparate groups. Taksim Solidarity, which had been created when the Taksim pedestrianisation project was announced in 2012, included 128 different associations, parties, labour unions, and professional associations (Karasulu 2014). It organised several of the initial protests, and its representatives met with the government a few days into the events. However, Taksim Solidarity did not work as an umbrella for all the groups involved in the protests. For instance, the white-collar group Plaza Eylem Forum, participated in some of the meetings, but did not sign the final platform, as they did not want to be tied to "such a symbolic gesture", and remained in command of a centralised group (interview 8; interview 10). Similarly, the Anti-capitalist Muslims did not get involved with the common platform, although they kept in touch with several of the other groups that participated in the protests (interview 15). The demands that the Taksim Solidarity group proposed to government were also much narrower than those raised in the protests as a whole: the cancellation of the artillery barracks project, the release of protesters taken into custody, the punishment of police officers responsible for violence, and the withdrawal of the police from the city's main squares (Karasulu 2014).

For a systematic categorisation of demands from the Gezi protests, I use an activist-driven database of concrete demands observed on protests throughout the country, containing 66 points (Subjektif 2016). I categorised these demands into eight broader categories, listed in Figure 4.2, and cross-checked the validity of the eight points with activists from the protests in several cities with major protests.[11]

Figure 4.2: The demands raised in the Gezi protests

| Demand | Content | Line of conflict | Ideological overlap |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Environmental protection** | Protection or creating public spaces and green areas in cities, protecting the country's forests, halting the building of nuclear or thermal power plants, and defending animal rights. | Left-right | BDP (CHP) |
| **Democracy** | Defence of basic democratic rights, such as the right of assembly, freedom of information, the rule of law, and resistance against authoritarianism and censorship. Support to lower the electoral threshold, and stopping the planned reform to allow digital voting. | Pluralist-nationalist | BDP (CHP) |

[11] For the full list of demands and how I categorised see Appendix.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Human rights** | In defence of basic human rights | Pluralist-nationalist | BDP |
| **The economic left** | Against capitalism or neoliberalism, and in favour of workers' unions and a socialist form of economic governance | Left-right | BDP (CHP) |
| **Secularism** | Defence of the secular nature of the Republic of Turkey and against interference in individual choices toward what has been framed by the opposition as the Islamisation of the state, such as issues of abortion, family planning, and alcohol consumption. | Secular-Islamist | CHP |
| **Culture** | Defence of cultural institutions such as libraries, theatres, cultural centres, and opera houses. | Left-right | BDP (CHP) |
| **Feminism and LGBT issues** | Gender equality, and the rights of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender individuals. Against gender-based discrimination. | Left-right | BDP (CHP) |
| **Peace and pacifism** | Against military aggression, compulsory military service. In favour of recognizing the Armenian genocide. | Pluralist-nationalist | BDP |

The first and second columns of Figure 4.2 report these eight categories of demands and their contents. The third and fourth column show how these demands relate to the lines of conflict in Turkish party politics, as discussed in the preceding chapter. Some of the demands fit neatly into the social dimensions around which political party competition revolves in Turkey. The demands pertaining to the economic left, in favour of gender equality and LGBT rights, and against increasingly religious policies, all fall to one side of one of the axes in Turkish politics (the left-right dimension and the secular-Islamist dimension, respectively). Other demands were more ambiguous. In some party systems democracy and human rights would probably be considered a valence issue, as they are issues most political parties would claim to support, regardless of their position on other issues. However, due to the troubled democratic history of the Republic of Turkey, and its handling of Kurdish minorities, these issues are highly politicised. Historically, revisiting Kitschelt (1992) and Mardin (1972) above, the pro-democratic parties would be the "Black Turks" from the periphery, while the central elite-party CHP represented the "White Turks" of the ancient regime. However, due to the AKP's increased dominance and increased authoritarian tendencies since it first won an election in 2002, the CHP and the BDP have raised their voices in defence of the protection or expansion of democratic rights, on liberal grounds. I therefore consider these opposition parties as having an ideological overlap with democratisation, bearing in mind that this may be a temporary state of affairs. Human rights issues in Turkey have to a large extent revolved around the Kurdish minority, and granting them cultural rights. The

attention from international human rights organisations on this issue ensured that this linkage grew even stronger (Amnesty International 2016; Human Rights Watch 2015). I therefore consider that human rights belong partly to the pluralist end of the nationalist-pluralist dimension. The same goes for the peace and pacifism category. As discussed in the preceding chapter, nationalists in Turkey generally support a strong military, and tend to avoid any critique of the role of the military in society, or its actions earlier in history, such as the Armenian genocide during the First World War, as a conspiracy designed to weaken the Turkish nation.

All the categories exclusively reflect the demands raised in the protests, and not other issues which otherwise could fit into the category. For instance, in the category "the economic left" I only include the demands that were observed in the Gezi protests, such as the defence of labour unions and resistance to neoliberal policies, and not other issues of the economic left which were not raised in the protests, such as tax policy or defence of the minimum wage. The only category which is not based exclusively on protest demands is that of human rights. This is because issues of human rights abuses became particularly visible after the protests had started, with the police's rough handling of activists. Human rights issues therefore became highly significant in the protests, but were not included in the original demands. Figure 4.2 is based on the demands made during the protest. These are to a large extent centred on the demonstrations in Istanbul, and we could argue that this risks neglecting regional variation in the demands and it is true that some local demands outside Istanbul were not captured in the 66 points referred to above. I return to these in Chapter 7, on policy concessions. Generally speaking, however, the overarching demands, and the eight policy areas in Figure 4.2, also seemed to dominate the protests outside Istanbul (interview 53; interview 55).

Most surveys of the activists in the Gezi protests indicate a dominance of the young, urban middle classes. The survey agency Konda (2014) found an average age of twenty-eight among activists in Istanbul. Almost two-fifths of their respondents were students, and over half had an undergraduate or master's degree. Özgür Kavım Kivanç of the Anti-capitalist Muslims, saw the middle-class dominance as disappointing from a class perspective,

> The people who participated tended to be those in a comfortable situation. Everyone in the Gezi protests lacked a bit of perspective […] The proletarians in a Marxist perspective did not come, but instead there were mostly people with a Kemalist secular background. It was the resistance of the secular upper classes ...

Prior to the protests, some activists had been active in political parties. Eylem Akçay from the Plaza Eylem Forum noted that the BDP had been the closest party to many activists, as it was the

most clearly leftist party, "protesting is a leftist thing to do, so it becomes a natural association" (interview 8). However, surveys on the activists do not indicate a strong relationship with the BDP, or with the pro-Kurdish left. A large segment of respondents in another survey reported that they had not voted in the previous elections (Ete and Taştan 2013b). Among those who had voted, the CHP was clearly the favoured party, supported by nearly half the respondents, while the BDP came second, enjoying the support of 10 percent of the respondents. Furthermore, around two-fifths of the protesters identified politically primarily in Kemalist terms (either as Kemalists or secularists). Taştan (2013) refers to the dominant segment in the Gezi protests as "atypical CHP-voters". These were young people, raised in a family of CHP voters, but with low level of trust in all political parties. Their decision to vote for the CHP despite this low level of trust is typically due to a lack of alternatives, or as a strategy to support the only party close to challenging the AKP (Taştan 2013). Regardless of how typical these voters were, it is probable that the CHP support indicated in the surveys on the Gezi protests, although numerically dominant, masked a level of dissatisfaction with the CHP among their own voters. Indeed, this dissatisfaction would become evident less than a year later, with the OccupyCHP movement, as we have seen in Chapter 6.

Figure 4.3: How respondents in Istanbul identified themselves politically




Source: GENAR, Gezi Park Profile 2013 (N=498)

Figure 4.4: Which party Gezi protesters in Istanbul reported to have voted for in the 2011 election




Source: GENAR, Gezi Park Profile 2013 (N=498)

Based on these indications of demands and voting behaviour, the party with the most ideological overlap is assumed to be the CHP, followed by the BDP, and finally the MHP. However, as the above-cited surveys are likely to be biased in several ways, we need to take their validity and generalisability with a pinch of salt. First, as most of them were conducted in Istanbul, they may not give an accurate indication of the identity and demands in other cities. Second, the way the questions in these surveys were phrased, with non-mutually exclusive categories in questions of political identity or reason to protests, may have skewed the results. These are critical points that are important to keep in mind when thinking about the Gezi protests. For the purposes of this study however, I allow myself to remain somewhat agnostic on this point. This study is mainly concerned with the responses to the protests. What is important to know about the protests is therefore not only the *actual* profile of the activists and their demands, but also what the political parties, and the Turkish public at large, *thought* were the characteristics of the protests. Indeed there is good reason to believe that some of these surveys were used as the basis on which politicians and the media understood the protests. When the Gezi protests were referred to in the Turkish media or in Parliament, the above-cited studies were often used (e.g. *TimeTurk* 2013a, *TimeTurk* 2013b, *T24* 2013b, *Hürriyet* 2013).

## Discussion

The next three chapters present the findings from the original data in this study. The chapters so far have provided information on the research literature on social movement outcomes, on the party system, and on the protests at hand. This is enough to form expectations of how the four political parties would respond to the Gezi protests. Some characteristics of the protest and its environment lead us to expect supportive and concessional responses from political parties. First,

as noted earlier, protest size is considered an important factor for being granted both promotional and concessional responses (Wouters and Walgrave 2017; Lohmann 1993; Burstein and Linton 2002). The Gezi protests were the single biggest protest event in the history of the Republic of Turkey, with an estimated participation rate of between 2.5 and 8 million people (Şardan 2016; Yörük 2014). Second, the protests were only relatively disruptive, thus threatening the interests of elites but without losing public support. Indeed, on several occasions institutional elites highlighted that the protests directly threatened their interests. For example, the centre-left opposition party, CHP, called on the government to organise a meeting to restore stability, as the events were having a destructive effect on the economy and the international perception of Turkish democracy (CHP Brussels 2013). The mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbaş frequently indicated the destructive results of the protests, and hinted that they were the result of a political plot. He pointed to the loss of revenues of city tradesmen during the protests, and lamented that Istanbul's chances of hosting the 2020 Olympic Games might be undermined (*Hurriyet Daily News* 2013). Finally, the district mayor of Beyoğlu, Misbah Demircan, tweeted during the protests that he was worried for shopkeepers around Taksim who were affected by the barricades (Bayhan 2013). On the other hand, scholars have noted the importance of movements having modest and specific demands for receiving both concessional and promotional responses (e.g. Gamson 1990; Franklin 2009; Tilly 2004; Kriesi et al. 1995; Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999). As this chapter shows, activists put forward a lot of different demands during the protests, both vague and specific, ambitious and limited. These characteristics of the Gezi protests thus lead us to expect *some* sort of response from political elites. After all, the protests were too big and disruptive to be ignored. However, the broad diversity in demands would give the elites some flexibility as to which issues to respond to.

Furthermore, the impact of social movements on political parties tends to be stronger when parties are vulnerable in their competitive environment (Kriesi and Wisler 1999; Goldstone 2003; Amenta 2006). As we have seen in this chapter, all three opposition parties had fallen victim to the very volatile nature of Turkish elections after the 1980 coup. We might suspect the two parties on the left, the CHP and the BDP, of having become particularly responsive to the protests due to their competition for sympathisers on the left (Kriesi 1995), and that the three opposition parties were particularly responsive to the protests precisely *because* they were in opposition as both Kriesi et al. (1995, 59) and Walgrave and Vliegenhaart (2012) have suggested. My findings corroborate this argument: the CHP and the BDP were particularly supportive of the Gezi protests in Parliament, in the media, and in their electoral platforms. However, I argue that the supportive positions of these two parties differed in quality. On the one hand, in terms of

identities, the profile of the activists in the Gezi protests matched best with the CHP. As we have seen, a large portion of protesters were middle-class youth living in urban areas, much like a large segment of CHP voters. Furthermore, we have seen that almost half the protesters voted for the CHP in the preceding elections, and that almost as many identified primarily with the CHP's political outlook. These observations of identity proximity lead us to expect that the CHP would be the most likely to respond to the Gezi protests.

On the other hand, when we look more closely at the demands raised in the protests and the estimated party ownership of these issues, the BDP has the political outlook which is most in line with the demands raised in the Gezi protests. The BDP could claim partial or full ownership of five of the eight categories of demands raised in the protests, while the CHP had overlap with three of the categories. Thus, the CHP had the strongest interest in responding to the protesters based on who the protesters *were*, whereas the BDP highlighted protesters' demands more than the protests themselves. This is my main contention in the next chapter.

# 5. The interpretation and framing of the Gezi protests

## Introduction

The following two chapters assess promotional responses and the reaction of the four main Turkish parties to the Gezi protests. How much attention did they give to the Gezi protests, and how did they interpret the demands and what the activists represented? I identify both the extent and character of party responses to the movement. I compare the four parties using an original dataset on parliamentary interventions,[12] and supplement the findings with qualitative assessments of how party representatives framed the protests in parliamentary interventions, the media, and interviews.

The observations of overlap between the political platforms and the Gezi protests lead us to expect that the CHP and the BDP paid most attention to the protests. The chapter will therefore focus on these two parties, and the ways in which they framed the protests. The CHP and the BDP were supportive in different ways. First, I suggest that institutional actors have considerably more flexibility in the way they respond to movement demands than is recognised in much of the literature on social movement outcomes. I show that when the different parliamentary parties in Turkey spoke about the Gezi protests, they highlighted the issues that their parties already agreed to. I quote some of the interventions following the protests to illustrate this point, and I argue that institutional actors can be engaged in a much more creative process when responding to events than has been recognised in the social movement literature. Rather than being forced to comply to movement demands, parties cherry-pick issues they agree on, and thus frame the movement demand to fit with their pre-existing agendas.

Second, CHP deputies supported the protesters mainly for what they perceived them to be (urban middle-class youth opposing the AKP government), but they addressed the protest demands less frequently. The BDP deputies, on the other hand, supported the protesters' demands (economic leftism and socially liberal issues), but were more sceptical about what the protesters were perceived as being (Turkish nationalists and potential coup-makers). As we saw in Chapter 4, the Gezi protest started mainly as an environmentalist movement, but it soon

[12] The parliamentary interventions, and thus the parliamentary quotations in the following chapters, are all available at the Turkish Parliamentary website: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/tutanaklar.htm (last accessed 16 March, 2017)

broadened its scope. Thus, there was flexibility for politicians to interpret the movement and its goals according to what suited them the best. First, the findings point to the importance of drawing a distinction between responses to movements that focus on the protest actors, and responses that focus on the demands made by these activists. I argue that this distinction, noted in the literature on protest paradigms to play a role in delegitimising strategies, is also relevant when looking at responses of actors *sympathetic* to the movements. In the case of Turkey, the demographic profile and voting records of most activists in the protests pointed towards the CHP, while the *demands* raised by these activists had a better overlap with the BDP.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide a short overview of how the leadership of each of the four parties immediately reacted to the protests when they erupted. Second, I give a more comparable and systematic picture of the magnitude and type of party responses, by presenting the dataset of available interventions in Parliament following the protests. Third, based on the indications from these data, I explore the different responses of the CHP and the BDP, and relate these differences to the literature on social movement outcomes.

## The immediate responses of the parties to the Gezi protests

### The AKP

The immediate reaction of the AKP leadership to the eruption and spread of the Gezi protests was dismissive, both towards the activists and their demands. In the wake of the first protest, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other AKP leaders, including Istanbul's mayor Kadır Topbaş, hinted that the protests were the work of foreign conspirators, or at the very least directed by the CHP (*Hürriyet* 2013; Shrivastava 2015; *Hurriyet Daily News* 2013b; *Sabah* 2013b). Erdoğan referred to the protesters as "just a handful of 'çapulcular' [roughly translated as 'looters'], and insisted that the Gezi Park redevelopment project at Taksim Square which had sparked the initial protests, would go ahead as planned (*Radikal* 2013). Erdoğan met leading members of the Taksim Solidarity umbrella group, but no compromise was reached (*BBC News* 2013). Indeed, and as elaborated on in Chapter 7, this position was soon overturned, and the demolition of Gezi Park was postponed. Furthermore, some AKP representatives took a more accommodating position towards the activists. President Abdullah Gül called for "moderation" from other AKP leaders, and noted that democracy should be open for popular expressions of protest (*Aksam* 2013; *Hurriyet Daily News* 2013a). However, the AKP's first general response to the Gezi protests was to reject both the protesters and their demands.

## The MHP

The MHP leadership's immediate reactions to the Gezi protests were ambiguous, ranging from active participation in the demonstrations, to strong condemnation. During the first days of the protests in Istanbul, MHP General Secretary Advisors, Celal Adan and Atilla Kaya, as well as the party's Istanbul representative, Abdurrahman Başkan, went to Taksim Square, the centre of the protests, to support the protesters (*Taksim Gezi Parkı Eylemine MHP Desteği* 2013). They read a public statement which denounced the "massacre on nature", and the fact that Istanbul was being sold off for profit. Furthermore, in the parliamentary discussions of 11 June 2013, a week and a half after the protests started, party Chairman Devlet Bahçeli (2013) stated that he supported what he called "innocent young Turks", and expressed his support for much of the feeling in the protests,

> As you know, on Wednesday morning 30 May a violent and disproportionate intervention using teargas and batons took place against those resisting Gezi Park's opening to business partners. Those who voiced their opinion in Gezi Park, spending the night in tents, were met with sudden and disproportionate attacks. [...] Everyone should also know that the MHP has been on the same side, the same axis, as these events since the very beginning. (Devlet Bahçeli, 11.06.2013)

Bahçeli went on to stress that illegal and violent organizations had infiltrated Gezi Park protests and protests in other parts of Turkey. He claimed that these looters and saboteurs were the *real* çapulcu ('looters'), and that Erdoğan had been mistaken in identifying all protesters as such,

> Whatever the circumstances, we have to keep our respectable brothers and fellow citizens who show their democratic reaction strictly separate from these villains, and not put them in the same category. Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement of "çapulcu" was an exaggeration [because he] put everyone in the same boat. […] To us, it is a shame to treat our youth and honourable citizens who show their innocent reactions in the same way as anarchists and urban outlaws. There is only one person who has done this; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Bahçeli went on to stress that it was crucial that the "divisive terror organization, the PKK" did not appropriate the peaceful pro-democratic demands. Indeed, the involvement of pro-Kurdish elements, not least BDP politicians such as Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Sebahat Tuncel, in the protests seemed to have made the party particularly sceptical about the events as a whole. Bahçeli hinted that the protests were the result of a conspiracy. He frequently referred to the involvement of the "butcher of Imralı", the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, imprisoned on the island of Imralı since 1999,

> The divisive terror organization, the PKK, must not appropriate, or make an insurrection and rebellion out of this protest. The deployment of illegal leftist organizations at Taksim, the simultaneous display of posters of the butcher of Imralı, and the shouting of slogans in support of this baby-killer in various places in our nation has revealed their objective […] I wonder if the butcher of Imrali and his organization have planned to appropriate Gezi Park in order to split it? Or, perhaps their goal is to destroy the enthusiasm and confuse our young fellow countrymen who have struggled for democracy and freedom? [...] I warn you [Prime Minister Erdoğan]: do not touch the nation of the Muslim Turk. Do not make the nation of the Muslim Turk collapse. (Bahçeli 2013)

Finally, and in line with what we would expect from a party espousing Turkish nationalism and law and order, Bahçeli encouraged young people in Turkey to demobilize and to work against Erdoğan through the ballot box rather than on the streets,

> I want to give voice to our youth from this chair: Turkish youth is our pride and future hope. Continue with your humour, paint your pictures, play your guitars, express yourselves as much as you can, using information and communication technology. Use all your opportunities as young people. But also think about your future, and do not jeopardize it. You are aware of your strength. Young people aged from 18 to 25 who are at the age to choose and to be chosen, and who form 13.2 percent of our entire population. That means that 10 million of our young people are of voting age. If you want, you can push the AKP out of power, and replace it with any [other] party. You can also do this at the ballot box by using your vote. The streets are dirty , the streets are dangerous, the streets are dark and the streets are open to everything. Rather than suffering water, gas and other types of force at Taksim, you must voice all your desires, expectations and dreams at the ballot box in an early or any upcoming election. You must kick out Prime Minister Erdoğan and demonstrate your democratic desires. As such, I invite Turkish youth to teach the AKP a lesson at the ballot box. […] There is no democracy, and will never be any democracy, without elections. Democracy is the biggest guarantee for all of us. The destinies of nationalism [*milliyetçilik*][13] and democracy cannot be separated, and for our party there is no other way and no other cure. The place where political power will change is at the ballot box, it needs to be at the ballot box […] We did not find this nation on the street. Let us not give in to what Erdoğan wants and take to the streets, let us not accept this analysis. I say to Turkish youth: sweep the ballots clean, push out his party […]

However, after the initial conditional support for the protests and opposition to the government reaction, the party seemed to become increasingly sceptical of the movement. Over the summer,

[13] See Chapter 3 for the distinction between *milliyetçilik* and *ulusalcılık*.

MHP flags and posters were seen in counter-Gezi rallies held by AKP supporters, prompting Erdoğan to thank the MHP for its respect for the "national will" during the events (*Sabah* 2013a). Thus, the Gezi protests was difficult for the MHP to handle coherently. On the one hand, the party leadership sympathised with the protesters' negative opinion of the Erdoğan government. It did not take issue with the principal concern that sparked the protests, namely the environment and resistance against an oppressive government. However, the participation of pro-Kurdish groups, and the open sympathy for ethnic, religious and sexual minorities in much of the protests, ran counter to the party's positions. A year after the events, the MHP's vice-chairman Emin Haluk Ayhan, claimed the party had had no reaction to the protests whatsoever,

> I can tell you what the MHP reaction was to the Gezi protests in one sentence: there was no reaction at all […] You have to look at how these protests arose, how they erupted. Who were behind them? Who was the first political actor behind the protests? It was the BDP. So, as you understand, we could not support this. (Ayhan 2014)

## The CHP

The CHP supported the Gezi protests unequivocally as soon as they erupted. Leading members were quick to meet with activists in the streets in major Turkish cities (Türk and Kaçmaz 2014; Geziparkitaksim 2016). Indeed, the party even opened its local offices in Istanbul and Ankara to give shelter to protesters and to protect them from the police's pepper spray. A few days after the protests erupted, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu held a press conference where he presented his party's preliminary observations on the protests (CHP Press Agency 2013). He commended Erdoğan for having met eleven representatives of the Gezi Movement, but criticized the Prime Minister's claim that the protests had been violent,

> Make no mistake. Violence started when, on the first morning of the demonstrations, police ambushed the peaceful demonstrators in their sleep with tear gas and water cannon. Let me repeat, this attack was on peaceful demonstrators and took place at 5 a.m. in the morning while they were asleep in their tents! […] If the government is sincere about being democratic and accountable, then serious investigations should be initiated to examine police brutality […] I see these events as an opportunity to bring unlawful police actions in Turkey to an end once and for all.

Kiliçdaroğlu promised that his party would continue to work for a "truly democratic and free Turkey", and that they believed that the first step to achieve this would be to resolve the Gezi protests with a

compromise, and follow up with work towards a democratic constitution. He also offered a list of recommendations for Erdoğan and the AKP government,

> 1. Listen to the young and listen to the people; democracy is much larger than the ballot box.
> 2. Try to understand what it means to be a democracy, what it means to be pluralistic and inclusive
> 3. Try to understand the culture of compromise; encourage open and free public debate on issues regarding all citizens.
> 4. Do not marginalize any part of the population; civil liberties and freedoms are the right of every Turkish citizen regardless of their particular identity.
> 5. Do not interfere with the lifestyles of citizens; work for the people, not in spite of the people; remember that no autocrat in the history of civilization has stayed in power forever; everybody needs democracy; you need it just as much as the next person.

Over the summer of 2013, the CHP issued a more elaborate statement underlining its position on the protests, which stressed that the party too had been a victim of the government's aggression,

> The unwarranted and indiscriminate use of pepper gas against peaceful demonstrators is clearly a violation of Art. 3, since the gas was used in closed spaces such as the CHP headquarter in Ankara or inside houses. (CHP 2013)

The party leadership thus supported the protests with no reservations. The impression from Kiliçdaroğlu's statements was that the party viewed the protests as a youth movement, as a call for democratic expansion beyond elections, and that it was against state interference in people's lifestyle choices. In the context of the debates over the secular-Islamist line of conflict in Turkey, the final point can be read as a defence of secularism against the perception of AKP's Islamist intentions.

## The BDP

While the CHP leadership reacted with undivided sympathy, there was some ambiguity in the BDP's immediate official reaction to the protests. On the one hand, the protest demands fitted well with the party's profile, which favoured the economic and post-material left. Furthermore, some BDP deputies played a central role in the protests in the first days of mobilisation. Istanbul deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder even intervened physically to block bulldozers from demolishing trees in Gezi Park, and was hospitalised after having been hit in the shoulder by a tear gas canister. A few days into the protests, the BDP co-chairman Selahattin Demirtaş commented,

> People are putting up a response not only for the trees in Gezi Park, but also to the negative politics of the government. I value the citizens' reaction. The BDP stands by the Gezi Park protesters. I condemn the government for every gas bomb thrown, and for every baton struck against a citizen. I strongly condemn the attacks on our deputies, and the women and young people there. This is not acceptable. But as I have already said several times, this goes beyond the case of just cutting down a few trees. (Yavuz 2013)

On the other hand, the BDP's official response to the protests also revealed scepticism. After the protests had tapered off a little, in an interview with CNN Türk on 31 July 2013, Demirtaş gave the impression of being lukewarm towards the demonstrations,

> The democratic demands set out in Gezi Park are democratic demands which the BDP can adapt to and stand behind. On this aspect we put ourselves on the side of the Gezi resistance. We defend it in Parliament. In fact, these demands are not unrelated to the [Kurdish] solution process. We want the same things. But it also became this kind of a movement: 'In this way, can we create a popular movement that topples the government and that leads to a coup? Or, can we canalize this popular movement into a coup?' There was this kind of aim [among the protesters]. We can confidently say this based on our own observations and those of our friends on the streets. It is not mere speculation. We strongly oppose this part [of the protests]. That's why we distance ourselves [from the movement]. We are not among those who want to provoke a coup. (*Solhaber* 2013)

Thus, there was a certain degree of scepticism, based on the fear that the Gezi protests could divert attention away from the Kurdish peace process. Activists perceived Demirtaş's statement as a surprising critique of what had been the largest grassroots movement in the history of the Republic (*Doğruhaber* 2013; *Odatv* 2015). They prompted him to clarify his statement on Twitter later the same day, "It is not the Gezi resistance we distance ourselves from, but those who say 'let's turn this popular resistance into a military coup'" (Demirtaş 2013). Demirtaş also commented on the active role that Önder took in the protests, "Mr. Sırrı was there for the trees, but then the events grew in magnitude, and Sırrı was cautious. He did not attempt to serve those wanting a coup, he was rather there for the sake of awareness" (*Solhaber* 2013). One Gezi activist and party member, Ahmet Saymadı (2015), later defended the party's immediate reaction to the protests, noting that it had been necessary for the party to distance itself from the "nationalists and racists" among the activists. Thus, the BDP leadership seemed to be in two minds about the protests. The AKP government had been more collaborative regarding a peace process with the PKK, and for granting cultural rights to Turkish Kurds than the two other parties in Parliament. The BDP leadership may have been worried that protesting too strongly against the AKP

government could bring the peace process to a halt. Furthermore, knowing the close affiliation of the Turkish military to nationalist and Kemalist principles, the fact that many activists defined themselves as Kemalists or nationalists, and that the CHP (and initially the MHP) took a supportive position, may have heightened fear of a military coup.

Ironically, therefore, the ambiguity of both the MHP and the BDP leaderships immediately following the protests, was rooted in the same duality: endorsing (some) of the issues raised in the protests, but being sceptical about what the protesters themselves represented. The BDP feared anti-Kurdish elements, while the MHP feared Kurdish involvement in the protests. Finally, the BDP leadership's immediate reaction may have been coloured by the overall reaction of Turkish Kurds to the protests, jaded by decades of their own protests against an oppressive government. Why, the thinking went, did urban, middle class Turks only protest now, and not in the preceding decades when Kurds were protesting *their* oppressor (Bozcalı and Yoltar 2013; Krajeski 2013; interview 50)?

## Party deputies: who were the most responsive?

Having established the official position taken by the four major parties in Turkey on the Gezi protests, I now delve deeper into each party's response, and look at how the elected representatives of these parties reacted to the movement. The remainder of this chapter concentrates on the reactions to the Gezi protests in the Parliament. I try to identify both the magnitude of responses, and the extent to which elected party officials addressed the issues raised in the protests. The CHP deputies made by far the most interventions (227) on the Gezi protests. Deputies from the three other parties mentioned the Gezi protests with similar frequency (59 interventions by the AKP, 58 by the BDP, and 57 by the MHP). However, as the number of elected representatives differs widely between the parties, these raw figures do not do justice to the attention each of the deputies paid to the protesters. In order to give an idea of proportionality when comparing party responses, I divide the number of interventions made by the number of deputies in Parliament for each party (311 for the AKP, 125 for the CHP, 29 for the BDP, and 52 for the MHP). In order to control for differing number of days in Parliament for each party, I divide the number of interventions each month by the number of days in Parliament that month. The *y* axis in Figure 5.1 therefore represents the number of interventions from each deputy in the four parties, per day in Parliament.

Figure 5.1: Interventions on the Gezi protests per deputy




Figure 5.1 shows that the CHP and the BDP talked more about the protests than the two other parliamentary parties. The AKP was by far the least responsive, and the MHP was somewhere in between. Both parties had a response rate of around 0.1 in June 2013. This indicated that in ten days in Parliament, as many interventions were made on the Gezi protests as there were deputies from each party. The CHP and the BDP continued to be the most responsive for the rest of 2013, and into the first months of 2014. Unsurprisingly, the attention dedicated to the Gezi protests waned over time, into early 2014. However, even in February 2014, eight months after the peak of protests, they were still a relatively hot topic; CHP representatives talked about the protests in thirty-seven interventions that month, and the BDP and the MHP talked about them in eight of their interventions. It therefore seems fair to conclude that the BDP and CHP representatives were most responsive to the protests in this period. Consequently, the following sections will focus mostly on those two.

## How party deputies framed the protests

While Figure 5.1 tells us something about the extent to which each of the parties' deputies spoke about the protests, it does not tell us much about the *ways* in which they spoke about them. Did the four parties frame the Gezi protests differently? In order to get an answer to the question, I dug further into my dataset on parliamentary responses. Using the eight categories of demands raised in the protests, I assess the extent to which parliamentarians from each party addressed

each of these in their intervention on the Gezi protests. I argue that there was not only a difference in the responses of the pairs of sympathetic and unsympathetic parties, but also a quantitative and qualitative difference between the CHP and the BDP.

Figure 5.2: Policy issues referred to in interventions on the Gezi protests




Figure 5.2 shows the discrepancy between the parties regarding the issues they spoke about in their parliamentary interventions. The AKP, the MHP, and the CHP mostly spoke about the Gezi protests without referring to any of the demands raised by them, while BDP deputies linked the protests to one or more protest demands in over two-thirds of their interventions on the protests. In 78 percent of interventions by AKP and MHP deputies regarding the Gezi protests, they did not explicitly refer to any of the demands in the protests. Frequently, these deputies spoke about the damage done by protesters, and the interruption of business. As noted above, the AKP and the MHP kept a critical distance from the movement from the outset. As such, it is not surprising that their deputies did not relate their interventions on the protests to any specific

policy issues in the majority of their interventions. Furthermore, as a law-and-order party, the MHP would be expected to be more worried about the chaos created by contentious manifestations of politics than to appreciating the demands raised by these events. In line with the expectations from the literature on the protest paradigm (Chan and Lee 1984) discussed in Chapter 2, both parties' deputies repeatedly underlined the negative aspects of the protests themselves, and tended to ignore the specific issues raised by activists. What is more striking about Figure 5.2 is the fact that in 52 percent of their interventions on the Gezi protests, even the CHP deputies failed to explicitly address any of the eight policy issues raised in the protests. After all, we have seen that the CHP deputies were very supportive of the Gezi protests. By contrast, the BDP deputies tied the Gezi protests to at least one of these policy issues in most of their interventions on the protests. Only in about 25 percent of the interventions on the protests did deputies not also address at least one of the protest demands. I argue that this difference between the BDP and the CHP could be seen as actor-centred *vs.* issue-centred responses. While both the CHP and BDP deputies were supportive of the Gezi protest, the former focused more on the protest actors, and the latter more on the issues raised in the protests.

## Actor-centred *vs.* issue-centred responses

The issues that deputies *did* raise in the protests reflected the pre-existing agendas of their respective parties. BDP deputies frequently focused on issues pertaining to the economic left, as well as post-material leftist issues such as feminism, peace, and pacifism. CHP deputies rarely associated the Gezi protests to the traditional economic cleavage of politics. On one of the few occasions when they did, Istanbul deputy Abdullah Levent Tüzel linked the Gezi protests to economic privatisation, in addition to democratisation and environmentalism,

> The [government's] rhetoric of "this is a great game, a great conspiracy, a counterrevolution, a coup" is futile. This is no coup, it is a movement for freedom and democracy. People who are rebelling against capitalism and the attacks of neoliberalism, and against oppressive authorities - in Greece this is what it's like, in Brazil too. It's a rebellion against transportation expenses, the looting by monopolies, environmental plunder, and a tightening of labour conditions. Everywhere, this is the common trend ... (Abdullah Levent Tüzel 27.06. 2013)

A couple of weeks into the protests, Istanbul deputy Sebahat Tuncel said on behalf of the entire BDP party group,

> We have stated this since the beginning, but we salute the resistance of Gezi Park. There are those resisting in Gezi Park, those who prevent [them from] cutting down the trees, and who

> say, "Gezi is ours, it belongs to the people, and should remain public." … as the Peace and Democracy Party [BDP], we support a democratic, ecological, and gender liberal paradigm and to protect our ecological life against cutting down trees, the creation of dams, hydroelectric power plants, and nuclear power plants. (Sebahat Tuncel, 11.06.2013)

Tuncel's statement also indicated a concern for gender issues, as she established the BDP's dedication to a "gender liberal paradigm". CHP deputies, on the other hand, tied the Gezi protests to issues of secularism in 7 percent of their interventions on the protests — almost as frequently as the association to environmental issues. In one intervention, the Antalya deputy for the CHP, Gürkut Acar, even claimed that the Gezi movement was primarily a reaction to the AKP's Islamist agenda,

> The AKP has erased the principle of secularism from the Republic of Turkey. With your rhetoric saying that "we'll raise a pious new youth", and the case of the 4+4+4,[14] we see the dissolution of secularism. The Prime Minister does not refer to secularism when he justifies the prohibition of alcohol as a "religious requirement". In a secular country, religious requirements cannot be written into the law. The response is this rebellion. (Gürküt Acar, 12.06.2013)

In a similar intervention CHP's Mersin deputy, Aytuğ Atıcı, responded to Prime Minister Erdoğan's description of the protesters as "*çapulcular*", or looters, and humorously emphasised what he thought the word stood for,

> Çapulcu stands for the following:
> Ç: Çağdaş [modern].
> A: Atatürkçü [Kemalist]
> P: Politika üstü [above politics]
> U: Uzlaşmacı [reconciliatory]
> L: Laik [secular]
> C: Cumhuriyetçi [republican]
> U: Ulusunu seven [nation loving] (CHP Aytuğ Atıcı, 12.06.2013)

Although tongue-in-cheek, Atıcı's intervention reveals how a CHP deputy interpreted the Gezi protests. Of the seven letters, five of them (Kemalism, secularism, modernism, republicanism, and nationalism) are central pillars of the CHP's ideology. It is also interesting that Atıcı categorised the protesters as "above politics". The statement seems to indicate that the protesters

[14] The so-called 4+4+4 is a school reform passed in 2012, which was widely criticised for making it easier to send children to religious schools at an early age (Zeldin 2012).

were perceived as apolitical youth who still sympathised with traditional Kemalist values. It also indicates that Atıcı looked at the events, first and foremost, as a question of who the activists were, rather than what they wanted. This does not seem to be an isolated case. As we saw above, the CHP leader, Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu, also emphasised the youthful profile of the activists in his reaction to the events. Furthermore, in an interview a year after the events, the CHP's vice-chairman, Osman Faruk Loğoğlu, indicated a similar interpretation of the protests. On the question of what impact the protests had had on the party, Loğoğlu replied, "I think the protests changed the whole paradigm of Turkish politics. They reminded us of the critical importance of youth. You don't have to be part of a political party to *be* political [...]" (interview 2). The CHP representatives, therefore, seemed to focus on the fact that the activists were young, perhaps as a substitute for focusing on the specific demands of the protesters. If this proposition holds, we should expect the interventions by CHP deputies on the Gezi protests to contain more frequent descriptions of the activists themselves. Figure 5.3 shows the proportion of interventions on the Gezi protests in which deputies spoke of "youth", when they spoke of the Gezi protests.

Figure 5.3: Ratio of interventions on the Gezi protests in which "youth" was mentioned

| Political party | % |
|---|---|
| AKP | 6.6 |
| CHP | 9.4 |
| BDP | 3.0 |
| MHP | 2.4 |

Figure 5.3 confirms the suspicion that CHP deputies were more likely to speak of "youth" when talking about the Gezi protests. Furthermore, in 40 percent (106 out of 270) of interventions CHP deputies spoke about the Gezi protests but did not link them to any of the eight policy issues. Instead, they mentioned the activists, either by characterising them as youth or activists, or referring to the number of people who were injured or had died in the protests. That is, just under half of the Gezi interventions which made no additional reference to issues involved a direct reference to at least one of these topics.[15] As noted above, the literature on the protest paradigm has generally addressed delegitimisation strategies for protests. This, however, may be a "positive" manifestation of the protest paradigm: supporting the actors in the protests, but neglecting their demands. The emphasis on the young age of activists could be a way to derail the debate from what the activists actual demands were. After all, "young" in the political context symbolises energy and ideological thrust, rather than maturity. Aykan Erdemir, the CHP deputy from Bursa, made an intervention two weeks into the protests which illustrates this point,

> [...] Half of our society is under the age of thirty. The most valuable resource in this country is our young people; of course not only the biologically young, […] but our young-minded. Turkey's only chance to exit from our middle-income trap, is our youth, Turkey's only chance for sustainable growth is young people, Turkey's only chance for the transition to liberal democracy from authoritarian regimes is young people, and, most importantly, our best chance for sustainable social peace in Turkey is youth. Undoubtedly, our biggest source is youth. I'm sure we all agree on this, but that alone is not enough: we should offer training opportunities, and improve social policies with no young person left behind, but most importantly, we have to offer pluralistic, democratic values, and not hatred and prejudice. [...] Dear deputies, let us not beat, bruise, blind, or use pepper spray, water cannon, truncheons, or plastic bullets on our youth, let us not beat our youth, let us not torture them, let us not insult them [...] let them realise politics too, let them use their rights and freedoms too. It is not enough to simply lower the voting age. In my opinion voting age should be sixteen, and

[15] The BDP deputies *also* spoke of these topics in just under half of the interventions on the Gezi protests, but with no issue reference, but there were much fewer of these cases (46 interventions, compared with the CHP's 270).

> the minimum age to be elected should be eighteen. Come on, let us get all four parties together in Parliament and lower the age for voting and being elected for the sake of our youth. [...] Let us also get rid of the shame of being the only country without a national youth council. [...] Only in this way can our youth learn by trying out their rights, freedoms, duties and responsibilities, and by making mistakes and improving can they learn by experience. Yes, they can learn by experience. Do not kill our youth. Let them live, and do not kill them. You are now crushing youth in Gezi Park in Istanbul, in Taksim, In Kuğulu Park in Ankara, and in Izmir. Do not crush youth, do not crush Turkey. Do not make the youth pay for your political fortune and future. No career is worth the lives of young people. (Aykan Erdemir, Bursa, 12.06.2013)

We can certainly argue that Erdemir takes young people seriously in this quotation. After all, he proposes to lower the minimum voting age, and to create a youth council in Parliament. Yet, he does not enter much into the essence of the protester's demands, but limits himself to expressing praise for what the actors represented. Furthermore, his only policy proposal in the intervention, lowering the age threshold for election to Parliament, has a hollow ring to it, coming from the CHP. As I discuss in the next chapter, the mean age of CHP deputies in the period 2011–2015 was almost fifty-three years, four years more than for AKP deputies. The CHP only had three deputies under the age of thirty-five, while the AKP had sixteen, and the CHP's age profile remained largely unchanged in the 2015 elections (Vardar and Tahaoğlu 2016; *Dağ Medya* 2015). I am certainly not suggesting that the eight issues raised by the protests were completely neglected in the interventions made by CHP deputies. After all, in over a third of the interventions on the Gezi protests, CHP deputies mentioned at least one of the eight policy issues raised by the protests. In one such intervention, Istanbul deputy Sedef Küçük spoke of both environmental protection and concerns for democracy,

> Dear MPs, as you know by this time, the world has witnessed two different sides of Turkey from 31 May until now. First, Turkey has witnessed the rise of youth. The world has witnessed a youth which responds to insults with humour, to sticks with books, to TOMAs [armoured water cannon vehicles] with guitars, and to pepper spray with Tweets. On the other hand, [the world] has witnessed authorities which try to pulverise this youth with pepper spray and police batons. [...] As the world is witnessing the youth in Taksim for the sake of freedom and against repression, you could not read the demands in that square, and you did not hear the cry for freedom rising from Taksim Square. Instead, you bombarded the children who have taken the cities into their own hands with pepper gas. You thought there were three to five youngsters trying to protect three to five trees, but now there are tens of thousands; the entire world has now heard the calls for freedom, only you have not heard

> them [...] We need to understand how this resistance, this movement, started: these people said "respect my life style", "do not insult me", "do not use authoritarian language against me", "do not cut down my tree, and do not make a shopping mall of my park", "do not impose a certain life style on me", "you are not in charge of my body and my choices", "you do not speak in my name", "let me say what I want freely without fear and without worrying about what will happen tomorrow", "I am in the square for this reason, because you tried to take this away from me, because you intervened in my freedom". (Sedef Kücük, 06.19.2013)

This quotation is an example of one of the interventions by the CHP which was also coded on secularism, environmental issues, and democracy, but we can still see the tendency to emphasise actors rather than their demands. Even though Küçük referred to several of the issues raised in the protests, he first strongly emphasises the youthfulness of the activists, and the way the AKP handled the protests, before making any reference to the demands raised by these protestors. Furthermore, when Küçük *did* raise issues made in the protests, the reference to environmental issues was miniscule compared to the focus on the protection of lifestyles and personal freedoms. In short, one of the issues dearest to the CHP, the crackdown on the liberal lives of the secular urban part of the population, appears to colour how this Istanbul deputy from the CHP spoke of the protests. The generational dimension was underlined as a crucial element in the protests. The *act* of protesting was taken as central to how CHP representatives interpreted the protests. Conversely, BDP deputies seemed sceptical about the nationalist aspect of the protests, and the potentially detrimental consequences that this could have for the plight of Turkish Kurds. As already noted, the BDP co-chairman, Selahattin Demirtaş, had speculated that the Gezi protests could be exploited by Turkish nationalists to launch a coup. This sentiment was later echoed by the Şırnak deputy Hasip Kaplan when he called for democratic reform of the press, on the grounds that the lack of such reforms could provoke a coup,

> Dear MPs, if a country wants to be protected against coups d'état, the press needs to be free, and the obstacles facing it must be removed. We proposed an investigative motion on this. Why did we do that? The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have all been signed and accepted. But when it comes to practice in Turkey, unfortunately, we see that the press is not free. (Hasip Kaplan, 04.07.2013)

What about the BDP and interventions that did not raise any of the eight issues? After all, thirty-two interventions on the Gezi protests by the party's deputies did not raise any of the policy issues. I argue that even in the interventions with no issue reference, we can detect a difference between CHP and BDP deputies; the latter had less praise for the activists, and their

interventions hinted more at the demands rather than the identity of the activists. In one such intervention, with no coded issue reference, Istanbul deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder (04.06.2013) commented on his own condition after having been hospitalised during the protests. He criticised the decision-making process of the restructuring of the Taksim area, questioning the validity of the license of the company that started the demolition of Gezi Park. As Önder did not refer to broader issues or principles of environmentalist policies, but simply spoke about the restructuring plans in Taksim, the intervention was not coded for anything other than its mention of the Gezi protests. Two weeks into the protests, Idris Baluken spoke about the Gezi protests in an intervention that mainly criticised the AKP for promoting the same centralised and statist policies that they themselves had criticised before taking up government,

> [...] You used to say that the Kurds did not exist, and now you say they do. You accept the existence of Kurds, but with the threat to the right for Kurds to live, the right to education, and the right to opposition [...] The AKP government has in recent decade been caught by the same disease as any other government. A conception which sanctifies the state and imposes a divine state [standing] against the individual, has unfortunately increased in a dangerous and sick way until today. Look, we see the same thing with the Gezi resistance: 'Foreign-domestic outbreak', 'I will not cave in to pressure', and 'the police have only done their duty.' Look, we say this now because you have claimed that "we have changed our mindset. We are transforming a country ruled by a coup mentality." Had Tansu Ciller been here, she would have said exactly the same. If you look at the period of Mehmet Ağar, the classic, state-protective, statist reflex response to social events. You have captured this statist reflex malady. (Idris Baluken, 12.06.2013)

Here Baluken connected the Gezi protests to the BDP's conception of an over-centralised and repressive state tradition in Turkey. In addition to the direct reference to the Kurdish issue, he referred to the former Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, and the General Director of Security, Mehmet Ağar, both involved in the Susurluk scandal and the escalation of a military combat against the PKK in the mid-1990s (Barkey 1998; Gunter 2000). Referring to these two representatives of the centralised, militarised state, Baluken framed the protests as a reaction not only to the AKP, but also to the historically centralised and statist policies in Turkey in general.

## Discussion

The results of this chapter echo several of the theoretical propositions presented in the literature on social movements and their impact on institutional politics. First, Walgrave and

Vliegenhaart (2012) have noted that opposition parliamentarians in liberal democracies tend to react more strongly to cues from protest activity than the government. The results in this chapter support this finding, as the AKP had by far the lowest share of interventions per representative talking about the Gezi protests. Second, the findings support the general trend that parties are more responsive to movements when the identities of parties and movements overlap (Kriesi 1995; Piccio 2011). This is indicated by the higher response rates of the two ideologically closest parties. However, we see a clear difference between the four parties, both in magnitude and types of response. Not surprisingly, the CHP and the BDP were most responsive, yet the way they responded to the protests differed. While BDP parliamentarians spoke of the protest demands in most interventions they made on the protests, the other three parties referred to them much less frequently. Furthermore, CHP and BDP deputies promoted the issues that they had already established on their political platforms. I suggest that the diversity of demands during the Gezi protests gave the parliamentary political parties freedom to choose demands according to their pre-existing agendas.

One reason for this divergence in party response may be the wide range of demands raised in the Gezi protests. As noted earlier, studies have indicated that movement success is related to having specific and limited goals (Steedly and Foley 1979; Giugni 1998; Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992; McCammon 2012; Gamson 1975). This study shows that a movement that raises multiple and diverse issues, such as the Gezi protests, can get a strong response from parliamentary representatives (at least in the short term). However, the *way* in which parties respond may differ significantly based on whether or not the movement has limited and specific demands. That is, the more diverse the demands proposed by the movement, the more freedom there is for political parties to respond in the way they want. The fact that the Gezi movement demands were so diverse gave parties a lot of leeway to cherry-pick which demands they wanted to respond to. The results presented in this chapter also support some of the findings in the literature on the *protest* paradigm. Some actors only spoke about the protesters and the damage they caused, thereby avoiding addressing the issues raised by activists. We see this dismissive tendency with the incumbent AKP, and to some extent the MHP. What is particular about this case is that we also see this tendency from a party *sympathetic* to the protests, namely the CHP. CHP deputies wholeheartedly supported the protesters for what they *were* (mainly urban middle-class youth and *de facto* opponents of the AKP government), and they were quite interested in listening to the various demands raised by protesters. For BDP deputies, on the other hand, the situation was the opposite. They wholeheartedly supported most demands in the protests (anti-capitalism and post-material social issues, such as environmentalism, feminism and anti-militarism), but were

more sceptical about the protesters themselves (potential coup-makers). By extension, we should be cautious when equating *party response* to *party change* when we look at the response to social movements from within institutional politics. Political parties may give a movement a lot of attention, and even support some of its demands, but this may equate to an attempt to amplify already established positions, rather than reconsidering and changing them. This also implies movements profit from being specific in their demands — not only because the message is more easily perceived by parties, but also because it gives parties less leeway to cherry-pick demands and shape them according to their pre-existing agendas.

# 6. Party changes following the Gezi protests

## Introduction

In this chapter I assess the extent to which the Gezi protests were associated with changes within Turkey's main political parties.[16] While the previous chapter dealt with how the parties spoke about and framed the protests, this chapter examines whether the parties changed their outlook on the issues raised in the protests. In other words, Chapter 5 analysed what parties in Turkey did in response to the protests, whereas Chapter 6 analyses what, if anything, the protests did to the parties. I assess trends in the party behaviour, based on parliamentary interventions, party manifestos, interviews with activists and party representatives, and media sources. As in Chapter 5, I focus mainly on the two opposition parties that were supportive of the movement and its demands, namely the CHP and the BDP. Towards the end of the chapter I also discuss the potential and actual attempts to create a new political party which would draw on the movement's demands. Building on the preceding chapter, I find that the political parties addressed some of the issues raised in the Gezi protests, but that long-term patterns continued as before. Yet when parliamentarians *did* speak about some of these issues, they frequently referred to the protests. Deputies generally talked in equal measure about any given issue over time, and the pattern did not change dramatically when the first heat of the Gezi protests had cooled off. The Gezi protests had now become a point of reference, and deputies frequently referred to the events when they defended their position on that given issue.

I also evaluate the electoral strategies of the CHP and the BDP for local and presidential elections in 2014, and two general elections in 2015. The Gezi protests seem to have contributed to the BDP's transformation into the BDP in Autumn 2013, and to its electoral strategy of appealing to a broader non-Kurdish segment of voters. The CHP leadership openly disregarded the Gezi protests in the 2014 elections, and faced an immediate new wave of protests — this time from within. By the 2015 elections, both the BDP and the CHP were fielding candidates with explicit ties to, and even visible scars from, the Gezi protests. However, their party

[16] A small excerpt from this chapter was also used for: Jonas Bergan Draege, Daniela Chironi, and Donatella Della Porta. "Social Movements within Organisations: Occupy Parties in Italy and Turkey." *South European Society and Politics* (2016).

platforms did generally not follow suit, in terms of prioritising issues linked to the demands raised in the Gezi protests. The BDP dedicated more space to human rights and democratisation issues in the two 2015 elections than in 2011 and 2007, but not to other issues raised in the protests. For the CHP, there was no visible change in their platform at all. This slow rate of response from the existing parties begs the question of whether there were opportunities for a new entrant in the Turkish party system, based on the movements active in the Gezi protests. Two such cases of spin-off organisations indicate that the institutional environment in Turkey, notably the 10 percent electoral threshold, was a deterrent for a potential new entrant. An attempt to create a 'Gezi Party' was met with a lukewarm response and simply fizzled out. In another attempt, the Haziran movement chose to not support any political party, but to function as a pressure group. In the next section, I assess whether the Gezi protests were accompanied by a change in parliamentary discourse over time.

## Parliamentary reactions

Drawing on the same parliamentary dataset used in Chapter 5, I compare the average number of interventions per deputy per day in Parliament for each six-month period following the outbreak of protest (June 2013–January 2013), to the same period the year before.[17] Figure 6.1 summarises the findings. The "magnitude" column for each party refers to the change in the mean number of interventions per party per day in Parliament, and the "Gezi reference" refers to the percentage of interventions on each issue that also mentioned the Gezi protests.

Figure 6.1: Changes in interventions on issues raised in the Gezi protests, before and after the events

| | AKP | | CHP | | BDP | | MHP | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Magnitude | Gezi reference % | Magnitude | Gezi reference % | Magnitude | Gezi reference% | Magnitude | Gezi reference% |
| Environment | 0.07 | 38 | 0.22 | 65 | 0.15 | 56 | 0.08 | 43 |
| Democratisation | 0.28 | 14 | 0.11 | 55 | -0.05 | 46 | -0.16 | 20 |
| Human rights | 0.05 | 21 | -0.52 | 67 | -0.05 | 41 | -0.16 | 0 |
| Economic left | -0.09 | 0 | -0.99 | 39 | -0.48 | 35 | -0.13 | 20 |

[17] I choose this mode of comparison to control for potential seasonal effects. An alternative would be to compare the means of the four months after the protests broke out (June to November), to the four months prior to the protests (February to May). I also ran this comparison, and the results did not differ significantly from those presented in Figure 6.1.

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Secularism | 0.05 | 40 | 0.34 | 53 | 0.00 | 50 | 0.00 | 0 |
| Culture | 0.09 | 11 | 0.1 | 57 | 0.09 | 73 | 0.08 | 17 |
| Feminism & LGBT | -0.07 | 0 | -0.07 | 25 | 0.01 | 75 | 0.00 | 0 |
| Peace & pacifism | 0.02 | 0 | -0.09 | 100 | 0.00 | 20 | 0.05 | 0.00 |

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

As Figure 6.1 shows, there was no major change in how often deputies from the four parties referred to issues after the Gezi protests. The largest change we observe is, curiously, a reduction in how often CHP deputies spoke about issues on the economic left, by about one intervention per day. Apart from this, most changes were miniscule, and none of these changes were statistically significant in a two-tailed t-test of the means of the two samples. In short, the Gezi protests were not accompanied by a greater attention to its demands in Turkey's Parliament, as deputies from all four parties appear to have continued with a similar agenda as before. To illustrate the typical tendencies, I show the trend in the interventions on environmental issues in Figure 6.2. After a short increase in the focus on environmental issues following the Gezi protests, the effect soon tapered off to pre-protest levels.

Figure 6.2: interventions on environmental issues, per deputy and day in Parliament




In Chapter 5 we already observed that parliamentarians frequently addressed environmental issues when they spoke of the Gezi protests. Figure 6.2 shows that all four parties spoke more

about environmental issues in the immediate wake of the protests, that is, in the first months following the initial protest. BDP deputies spoke most frequently in support of environmental protection throughout the period studied, followed by CHP and MHP deputies. The BDP were also the most responsive immediately following the protests. By the late autumn and winter following the protests, when MHP deputies again gave more attention to these issues, they made no explicit reference to the protests at all. It therefore appears that the Gezi protests were not accompanied by an increase in the focus on certain issues over others in Parliament. Party deputies talked in roughly equal measure about a given issue over time, and the patterns did not change dramatically when the dust had settled. However, as Figure 6.1 shows, when parliamentarians from the CHP and BDP *did* speak about the issues that had been raised in the protests, they frequently referred to the Gezi events. At times these references even contradicted demands made by the Gezi protests. In December 2013, the Ankara CHP deputy Ayşe Gülsün Bilgehan spoke out against one of the demands in the protest, namely, that Turkey come to terms with the Armenian genocide, but still made a reference to the protests in the same intervention. Bilgehan lamented that not enough resources were put into publishing books on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey's early Republican history, and the Treaty of Lausanne. She then argued that this was particularly important to protect the nation against accusations from the Armenian diaspora,

> [...] As you know, 2015 is the year of the 100th anniversary of the event which is claimed to be the Armenian genocide. We know that in this regard the Armenian diaspora have made very serious preparations. Has the Supreme Council started to work against this? It is difficult to know because even the members of the High Authority Advisory Board which is connected to the Supreme Council are not even familiar with the ongoing studies. [...] Related to the Language [Turkish Language Society], another friend of mine reminds me of the only event on my mind last year, the change in the meaning of the word 'çapulcu' [looter] as a result of the Gezi protests. So, if the institutions which Atatürk protected do not even protect Atatürk, then what's left of it? This is what happens: in this country, the intellectuals who still have the courage live and write books which give a lesson to those who distort history; when disrespect is shown to heroes, millions of women and men, young and old, show their reactions by taking to the streets. These are the true heirs of Atatürk. (11.12.2013)

Bilgehan's statement suggests that she attributed certain political attitudes to the Gezi activists, based on the fact that many of them identified themselves as Kemalists. Even when arguing against what had been one of the demands raised by many in the Gezi protests, namely recognition of the Armenian genocide, Bilgehan linked the issue to the Gezi protests. Her

statement indicates that parliamentarians not only cherry-picked the demands raised in the protests based on their pre-existing positions, but that they also used the Gezi protests as a reference point to increase legitimacy when presenting their policy positions.

## Electoral (re-)orientations after the Gezi protests

This section assesses changes in the choice of candidates for the subsequent elections, as well as changes in the party platforms, primarily in the CHP and the BDP.[18] Although the deputies in the 2011–2015 parliamentary period did not change significantly in their parliamentary agenda, we may expect the central party leaderships to stake out a new direction for the party. If this was the case, we would expect to see changes in the programmes and choices of candidates prior to the elections in 2014 and 2015. I argue that the CHP and the BDP not only responded differently in Parliament, but also organisationally, in the period following the Gezi protests. In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on the choices the two most responsive parties made in the local elections in March 2014, the presidential elections in Summer 2014. First, I examine the BDP's transformation into the People's Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP), prior to the local elections, and its attempt to recruit candidates involved in the events. The CHP leadership also approached some of the activists, but eventually put forward candidates that represented a different political trend. The party then faced an internal uproar, inspired by the Gezi and Occupy Wall Street movements. The internal protests came mainly from the young members of the party, as a reaction to the party leadership's resistance to change. The argument here is therefore a continuation of the points raised in the Chapter 5. While both the CHP and the HDP paid a great deal of attention to the protests, the HDP expressed more interest in several of the issues raised in the protests.

### The BDP becomes the HDP

Five months after the outbreak of the Gezi protests, in October 2013, the BDP called for an extraordinary congress, in which they decided to merge with the People's Democratic Congress (*Halklarin Demokratik Kongresi*, HDK). This was a platform of socialists, feminists, greens, and minorities, which officially became a political party in 2012 ("HDK Bileşeni Kurumlar" 2016, *Milliyet* 2012). The new party, the HDP, ran for the following local elections, in March 2014.

[18] This chapter is mainly concerned with the CHP and the HDP, it does not say much about the changes in the MHP and the AKP in this period. However, one important change that should be kept in mind for this study is the AKP's shift in a more nationalist direction (e.g. Kilinç 2016). Particularly in the 2015 electoral campaigns, the AKP turned away from the Kurdish peace process, and towards the confrontational position traditionally held by the MHP. This was probably to steal MHP votes and to facilitate cooperation with the MHP in parliament.

From the very outset, the central leadership of the new HDP made the link with the Gezi Park protests explicit.

In the extraordinary congress which led to this party merger, the Gezi protests were explicitly cited as one of the motivations for the move. Istanbul deputy Sebahat Tuncel described the Newroz and Gezi resistance in 2013 as the starting point of a new process, and said that the HDP could be an option for that process (*Sendika.Org* 2016). The head of one of the member parties, the Socialist Democracy Party (SDP), Rıdvan Turan said,

> The concept of marginality has lost its meaning after the Gezi protests. Those who are worried, the Gezi looters ("*çapulcular*") and Kurds in the mountains stand side by side. We have set out on a path and we are growing like a snowball. The enemy is attacking. That means we are on the right path. (Işık 2013)

The Istanbul deputy Sirri Sureyya Önder noted that the HDP represented a movement that had started in 1978, and which had continued with the Gezi resistance.[19] Önder went on to state that the HDP was based on strategic interests in order to advance the case of trade unions and workers. He later described the party as peaceful, ecological, and pro-LGBT rights. "Whether we call it the third way or revolutionary, we will win this war", Önder said in his speech at the congress (Budak 2013). Istanbul deputy, Levent Tüzel, was even more explicit in linking the formation of the HDP to the Gezi protests, stating, "We will not wait for democracy at the ballot boxes. We will follow the Gezi resistance, and we will be the ones who support the Gezi struggle" (Alp 2013). Finally, "Everywhere Taksim, Everywhere resistance" was reportedly used as a slogan in the congress, and the HDP logo depicting a tree, was a striking visual linkage with the events in Gezi Park (Rubin and Sarfati 2016, 183). A broadening of the HDP may already have been in the offing, and we cannot know if the merger, or its timing, would have occurred without the Gezi protests. Indeed, Abduallah Öcalan, still with a clear grip on the party from his prison cell in Imrali, had reportedly called for the creation of a broader political party, and released a statement that was read aloud at the start of the congress. In the statement, Öcalan claimed to have called for a new combination of forces of the Kurdish and leftist movement, reminiscent of that in the 1970s (Stevenson 2016; Hayatsever 2013). Indeed, BDP deputies called for legalisation on same-sex marriage in the constitution in May 2012, a year before the protests (*TimeTurk* 2012). The proposal was backed by the CHP, but rejected by the AKP and the MHP. Furthermore, in February 2013, Ertugrul Kürkçü supported a motion proposed by the CHP

[19] The reference to 1978 was for the establishment of the Kurdistan Revolutionaries, subsequently the PKK

deputy Binnaz Toprak, which called for a parliamentary inquiry into the problems of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual people in accordance with Article 98, and standing rules 104 and 105 (Engin 2015). He argued that the state was morally obliged to protect the rights of all groups,

> When we said, we are Kurds in Sisli and gays in Taksim during gay pride, media outlets propagandized against this and said, "they are homos too". In fact, it would not have mattered even if I were; however, the issue here is to ask for the protection of homosexuals' rights even if a person does not identify as one. The day we protect the rights of those who are not like us, then we are going to see a real change in this country (…). Otherwise, things will stay the same. You will continue to stone homosexuals, and in places where you cannot stone them, you will insult them and leave the assembly room. (Engin 2015)

The Gezi protests may therefore have been more of an affirmation of existing ideas and tendencies in the BDP, than a first move in a new direction. As co-chairman of the HDP in Istanbul, Cesim Soylu, noted,

> The HDP was not basically transformed because of the Gezi events. The BDP was 99 percent Kurdish, and we wanted to broaden our platform. That is why we created the HDP. Rather than being a strictly Kurdish party, the HDP was set up in order to democratize the whole country, and to include other marginal elements apart from the Kurds in this democratization process. But Gezi was definitely a helpful event, because it gave important support to the observations we had already made, and enabled what we call "radical democracy. (interview 21)

It therefore seems fair to assume that at least the timing, if not the entire idea, to create the HDP was inspired by the Gezi movement. However, as Çarkoğlu (2014) notes, there was an inherent contradiction between the positions adopted by the HDP on labour, women's issues, the environment and the conservative segments of the Kurdish community. Indeed, the party transformation received criticism from within, and some of the leftist parties that were approached to form the HDP were sceptical about the dominance of the Kurdish movement. Several radical left parties did not join. The leader of one of them, the Freedom and Solidarity Party (*Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi*, ÖDP), Alper Taş, argued that the HDP was too fragmentary, and that its platform was too focused on identities rather than on anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism (Aktan 2016, 18). Other members of the smaller leftist parties expressed concern that the balance of power would tilt heavily in the favour of the Kurdish movement, and leave the leftist parties with little leverage in internal decision-making (Ayman 2014). Diyarbakır deputy

Altan Tan was an outspoken critic of the project, and claimed that the religious and conservative values of most Kurds could not be combined with the far left, and that even liberal Turks would have problems with the far left activism of parts of the party leadership (*Solhaber* 2013). Tan noted the importance of maintaining ties with the predominantly conservative Kurdish population in Turkey, as they made up the party's largest block of voters (Samatyali 2016). Sebahat Tuncel, on the other hand, defended the transformation, and argued that the pro-environment, pro-equality, and pro-democratic platform of the HDP would attract the so-called "White Turks" (see Chapter 2) in addition to Kurdish voters (*Kurdistan Tribune* 2014).

**The HDP strategy for the 2014 local elections**

On 30 March 2014, a few months after the party's transformation in the HDP, local elections were held in Turkey. Several paragraphs of the HDP's election platform pointed to the main demands raised in the Gezi Park protests. The platform rejected the conception of democracy only being about elections every four years, and announced that the HDP believed in direct democracy,

> The HDP regard the democratic and autonomous local governments as a level of governance in which people can have a say and make decisions regarding their everyday lives, their present, and their future. The struggles and resistance that are aimed at protecting living spaces and strengthening local democracy, backed up by the slogan "another life is possible", and which are led by young people and women, show how democratic local governance is supposed to be. The Gezi Resistance is a striking example of this, in terms of its demands for living space and for local democracy. (HDP 2014)

In addition to the official statements made in support of the protests and their demands, the HDP leadership invited representatives from some of the most prominent groups during the Gezi protests, to join their ranks. Several movement organizations interviewed in this study, from white-collar trade unions to LGBT groups and Anti-capitalist Muslims, had been approached by the HDP and invited to stand as candidates for both local and national elections (interview 13; interview 15; interview 8). The party had a 50 percent quota for women candidates, and a 10 percent quota for LGBT and youth members (Krajeski and Fehrman 2014; Vardar and Karaca 2013). İlker Çakmak, the leader of the LGBTT Solidarity Association, noted that they spoke with the HDP before every election, and had agreed to promote LGBT candidates in the 2014 local

elections from the HDP.[20] Eylem Akçay, head of the White-Collar Workers' Union in Istanbul, confirmed that they had been approached by the HDP to include a representative from their group in the electoral lists, but that they had decided not to run,

> We were asked by the HDP to run with some candidate for them in the local elections in Istanbul, but we refused. You know, for them it is a bit of a symbolic thing. If they run with people from Gezi, they become *the* Gezi party. For us, getting into the institutional arena is not our main priority at this point. [...] It is a stage we will get to later. Gezi helped us getting some momentum behind our project of making people meet each other, but getting our demands heard at the institutional level is not our main priority now. Our demands are about fair working hours and so on, and for these things it is better to negotiate directly with employers. We might not get so much out of running for Parliament and local institutions. (interview 8)

The HDP also nominated Sirri Sureyya Önder, the most prominent Gezi activist in the party leadership, to stand in the elections for mayor in Istanbul.

**The HDP's presidential campaign**

While the HDP had formed, and characterized itself as a broader party in the 2014 local elections, the presidential campaign the same year was arguably the first time the party had made its ambitions and potential appeal known. Indeed, the HDP's presidential candidate, Selahattin Demirtaş, ended up with the best nationwide result ever for any pro-Kurdish candidate at the national level, with 9.8 percent of the vote. It became clear during the campaign that the HDP had developed a broader political platform that went beyond its traditional focus on the Kurdish issue. The link between the HDP's broad electoral strategy and the Gezi protests became clearer in the campaign for the presidential elections. Demirtaş toned down his initial scepticism in the media and on Twitter, and denied that he had called the activists coup-makers. "I never said 'coup' about the Gezi protests. Gezi was not a coup; it was a resistance and a regime-transforming event. I said that too. Gezi could have overthrown the government, and that would be most legitimate and right", Demirtaş said (*Radikal* 2014b). He conceded that his statements were open to interpretation and even manipulation "As the co-chairman of a party, I should have spoken in a way which would not leave my message open for manipulation. When I look back on

[20] It is curious to note that an electoral survey in the LGBT network Gabile indicated that only 2.5 percent of the members had voted for HDP in the local elections (against 6.3 percent nationally) *(Gabi*le 2014*)*. As many as 20 percent of the participants reported to have voted for the AKP, a behaviour Çakmak described as "resulting from a sort of Stockholm Syndrome".

it, yes, I opened it up for distortion, and it was distorted". Demirtaş reminded the journalist that his party had been firmly committed to the Gezi protests, and would have been supportive of regime-transformation with the Gezi events, but that he was against any form of military coup.

Demirtaş' presidential platform, entitled "Yeni Yaşam" ("New Life"), appealed to the economic left in its criticism of the AKP government's "neoliberal" policies, and its call for improved labour rights (Demirtaş 2014). Thus, the platform Demirtaş ran on for the presidency seemed to reflect the broadening of the party. He emphasised issues pertaining to the economic left, such as the resistance to neoliberalism and strengthening trade unions, but also put postmaterial leftist issues on the agenda, such as feminism, environmentalism, and pacifism. Yet the link with the Kurdish movement, and specifically to the PKK, could still be perceived in the platform. In addition to having a separate section for the need to peacefully resolve the state's conflict with the PKK and references to the need to protect minority rights, the concept of "radical democracy" was taken from the PKK's post-2000 political project (Akkaya and Jongerden 2012). The platform made no explicit reference to the Gezi protests. In an interview with Middle East Eye, Mersin deputy Ertuğrul Kürkcü argued that the presidential election was a turning point in the HDP's process of broadening, albeit not acknowledged by its opponent parties at the time,

> Demirtaş was a new face with new ideas. He won the hearts and minds of many. For the first time a Kurdish political figure won almost 10 percent of the vote. But Erdogan and the AKP still didn't take him seriously. The HDP was still supposed to be a fringe phenomenon they could use as a way to get out of the conflict with the PKK. (Stevenson 2016)

**The CHP's strategy for the 2014 local elections**

While the HDP had restructured itself to appeal to a broader segment of the Turkish left for the 2014 local elections, the CHP leadership went in the opposite direction. In Ankara, the CHP fielded Mansur Yavaş, a candidate known for his nationalist and conservative views. In February 2014, in the months leading up to the election, Yavaş criticized the Gezi activists for being too confrontational, and said that they should have sat down and negotiated with the government instead (*Radikal* 2014a). Yavaş did, however, support some of the local demands in the protests. In a press release in March 2014, he said that the Gezi protests would not have occurred if not for the absence of cultural spaces in the city. He complained that the local authorities had not preserved and cultivated the unique cultural heritage of the city, nor made it appealing to its citizens. "The city is a civilization. It is not only a place where you go to work in the morning, and where you go to do your shopping in malls at the weekends. There should be spaces to

socialize in the city", Yavaş was quoted as saying. In his campaign video he vowed to make a more carbon-efficient and cleaner city, as well as creating a greener city environment, as two of his six main priorities ("Mansur Yavaş - Projeler" 2015). In other cities the CHP mayoral candidates were more supportive of the Gezi activists and their demands. In Istanbul, the party put forward Mustafa Sarıgül as candidate. Sarıgül had been outside the CHP for a while, and had created his own movement in 2008, but rejoined the party in November 2013. Shortly after the outbreak of the protests, Sarıgül made a public statement where he said that the project in Taksim should be cancelled, because the "demands of the people" were clear. He also noted that good leaders were needed to channel such demands, and that he would be a good candidate to do so (*Ensonhaber* 2013). In the run-up to the elections, Sarıgül promised that he would make sure Gezi Park remained a park (*Anadolu Agency* 2014). In Eskisehir, the long-standing mayor and CHP candidate in the 2014 elections, Yılmaz Büyükerşen, had a highly supportive profile during the Gezi events. During the protests, Büyükerşen made a speech where he addressed the crowd as "my dear young people", and declared his full support for them. Moreover, the mayoral candidate in Izmir, Aziz Kocaoglu, expressed his public support for the protesters, and participated in the marches during protest events (*Bugün* 2013).

The overall picture, however, was that the CHP had chosen not to move in the leftist, socially progressive direction that Gezi activists had called for. This impression was strengthened by the CHP choice of candidate for the presidential elections in Summer the same year. The CHP and the MHP converged on a joint candidate, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu. Unlike the HDP's candidate, Selahattin Demirtaş, İhsanoğlu clearly represented a more socially conservative and nationalist position than that promoted in the protests. In November 2013, the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* asked İhsanoğlu for his opinion on the Gezi protests, to which he replied,

> Did you watch the Gezi protests? Where does this fit in with the world of Islam? The starting point was environmental sensibility, and this was fair. People have the right to express an opinion on the environment and how the city is regulated. I am personally against cutting down the trees, but I support the reconstruction of historical buildings. We have already destroyed a lot in Istanbul. I understand the point of departure of the Gezi events, but the shape they later took disturbed me. To burn cars, and to plunder and to set shops on fire; that is unacceptable. (*Cumhuriyet* 2014b)

Çarkoğlu (2014) argues that the CHP's strategy of announcing candidates with little former experience in the CHP tradition, was a strategy to appeal to voters from the centre-right since the 2011 parliamentary elections, which they continued to pursue in the 2014 local elections. A party

officer later justified these electoral choices by suggesting that they facilitated an electoral upswing: 'We have to get a strong candidate, first of all […] and we stole many votes from the MHP in that election' (interview 31). The result was a clear loss: 38.4 percent for İhsanoğlu, against the 51.8 percent for Erdoğan. As one senior analyst noted, "The CHP is very isolated. It is not challenged on the right or the left, and cannot capture many more votes" (interview 7).

### *The OccupyCHP movement*

On 30 March 2014, a loose constellation of young party members and CHP sympathizers declared an internal rebellion against their own party. Disillusioned with the failed promises of internal reform after the Gezi protests, the final straw was the party's failure to promote young and progressive candidates, and to have provoked the ensuing electoral defeats. As one activist from Ankara recalled,

> After the Gezi protests, we had great expectations, also for the CHP. But the CHP chose a mayoral candidate for Ankara who had been in the MHP before, Mansur Yavaş [... Protests] took place everywhere, against local candidates. We were not happy with the CHP candidates in general, because they did not accept any leftist candidates. And this impression was strengthened and confirmed with the presidential election, when İhsanoğlu was the joint candidate for the CHP and the MHP. (interview 29)

As some of the CHP leaders picked up on the dissent, the disillusioned CHP sympathizers were invited to 'occupy' the CHP's headquarters in Ankara. They were well received by the CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu, who offered two floors of the building for discussions, and they were even provided with food and drink (interview 29). The first event, which lasted two days, was publicized with the Twitter hashtag #OccupyCHP. The occupation was repeated a few weeks later, this time with significant press coverage (e.g. *Cumhuriyet* 2014a; Kanal 2014; *Daily Sabah* 2014). Afterwards, the occupations quickly spread to other cities (interview 6; interview 29).

The OccupyCHP movement never formalized any core principles through a central leadership or membership-based voting, but centred on demands for increased shares of young people and women in the party's central positions and as candidates, as well as a more open and non-hierarchical organisational structure. The Gezi protests had ostensibly been a turning point for the CHP, but the activists felt frustrated with the electoral choices that indicated the opposite. As noted in Chapter 5, vice chairman Loğoğlu claimed that thanks to the protests, the CHP had "finally understood the critical importance of the young" (interview 2). Yet a rejuvenating reform of the party did not occur. As a young CHP voter and later OccupyCHP activist noted,

> During Baykal's time, the idea of democracy was very closed. Atatürk's ideas were the only way to look at politics, and there was no discussion. Kiliçdaroğlu is different in this regard. He is more open, but the problem is that he lacks charisma. So, young people have grown frustrated with him too. (interview 29)

It took a personal scandal to remove the leader Deniz Baykal in 2010. The CHP leadership had long been criticized for stifling the inflow of young blood to the party, causing increased voter apathy among large segments of the population. The election of Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu as party chairman in 2010 raised the hopes of many that the party would undergo a process of leadership renewal. However, despite the optimist expectation about a youth revolution in the party, younger elements were still kept away from key posts. One activist lamented that the average age of CHP parliamentary deputies in the period 2011–2015 was fifty, much higher than in the other three parliamentary parties (interview 11).

What the OccupyCHP activists reacted to, therefore, was relative rather than absolute deprivation. The CHP may not have turned more to the right, or promoted more senior candidates than before, but the young party members' expectations were much higher in the wake of the Gezi protests. The negative campaigning and lack of proposals of the CHP leadership annoyed OccupyCHP activists. While the HDP had emerged as a fresh, new leftist party, with constructive solutions and an optimistic tone, the CHP was seen as the negative mirror image of the AKP: whatever the government introduced, the CHP be against it, without any alternative to suggest (interview 11; interview 29; interview 33; interview 7). Instead the OccupyCHP activists demanded a party that addressed the organisational problems through tangible reforms. Some of the organisational innovations the movement brought forward involved raising the quotas for women and young people, making the party more transparent, and forcing representatives and deputies to be more approachable and open to their needs and demands.

The OccupyCHP activists were certainly right that their party had more senior representatives than the other parties. As noted in Chapter 3, the CHP had very few young deputies in Parliament in the period 2011–2015. Only nine deputies were under the age of forty, and their average age was slightly over fifty-two — four years more than the average age of AKP deputies (Vardar and Tahaoğlu 2016). My own data of parliamentary interventions confirm the impression that the CHP was particularly geriatric — the CHP deputies who made interventions in Parliament were on average three years older than those of the AKP and BDP (Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3: Mean age of parliamentarians for all oral interventions, by party




Moreover, as Figure 6.4 shows, there seemed to be ideological differences interacting with age. The deputies who spoke of secularism were older than the average for all interventions, as well as those who spoke of issues on the economic and post-modern left. This supports the impression of an ideological schism, paralleling the generational divide. The older deputies seemed more concerned with traditional Kemalist values (secularism), while the somewhat younger deputies were more interested in pluralist and leftist issues, as well as the Gezi protests. However, as the OccupyCHP activists lamented that there were too few young deputies in Parliament to begin with, these differences may be understated in these statistics.

Figure 6.4: Mean age of parliamentarians of the CHP on four issues



There was no doubt that the message from the OccupyCHP participants had been received in the higher echelons of the party. A party advisor in Ankara noted that he was aware of the frustration over the unresolved division in the CHP's ideology, but that party activists needed to be patient,

> It is true that the CHP in Ankara has not shifted much to the left, and I understand that [OccupyCHP activists] are considering leaving the party. We do not respond to all their demands, and we did not give them everything they wanted. In any case, changes cannot happen that fast in our party. We need time to change the party; it cannot change as fast as the movement wants. We cannot fulfil everyone's wishes straight away, the way the movement wants. (interview 31)

Following the defeat of the joint CHP-MHP candidate Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu in the 2014 Presidential elections, Kılıçdaroğlu's chairmanship was challenged, and the party held an extraordinary conference the following month, September 2014. The Yalova deputy Muharrem Ince ran against Kılıçdaroğlu, and appealed to the disenchanted elements of the CHP that mobilised in the OccupyCHP campaign. Ince called himself "the voice of the outcry", and listed eight points that he considered urgent for the party, one of which targeted the Gezi protests and the grievances directly: "we have to make our party and country reflect the Gezi spirit and the dynamism of the Gezi youth" (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2014, *Radikal* 2014c). He then went on to criticise the party for lacking internal democracy, and promised to restore that as a chairman of the party (*DailySabah* 2016). However, Kiliçdaroğlu retained the trust of the majority of the CHP party members in the end, securing 740 votes against İnce's 415.

## The 2015 elections

The CHP's strategy for the 2015 general elections seemed to target Gezi activists and sympathisers to a greater extent than the 2014 local and presidential elections, and candidates made a central point out of their affiliation to and suffering during the Gezi events. One such candidate was Hasan Aslan. An activist without previous affiliation to the CHP, Aslan was hit between the eyes by a pepper spray canister, and still carried the scar. In his speech of presentation held at the party offices in Istanbul's Beyoğlu district, and subsequently in his campaign video, he stressed that he had intimate knowledge of what the Gezi protests were all about, having experienced it himself (CHP İstanbul 2nci Bölge 2015). Another candidate in Istanbul, Oğuz Kaan Salıcı, declared in his campaign poster "Gaz yedik, cop yedik, haram yemedik ("We were exposed to gas, we were exposed to truncheons, but we did not expose ourselves to immorality!"). Furthermore, the CHP mentioned the Gezi protests explicitly in their

party platform for the 2015 elections, linking them to the right to demonstrate and the trend towards authoritarianism in Turkey,

> Measures to limit the right of assembly and the right of demonstration have gained intensity in Turkey, especially after the Gezi. Our citizens have been relegated to a status of "reasonably suspicious", and all kinds of social sharing has come to mean a potential crime. [...] By taking all necessary legal and administrative measures, the CHP will ensure that our citizens' freedom of assembly and demonstration will reach the level of advanced democracies. (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* 2015)

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey adjusted the CHP's score on "social lifestyle" — the party's position on liberal policies — from 2010 to 2014. While the party scored a conservative 7.1 (on a scale from 0 to 10) in 2010, it was altered to 5.1 in 2014 (Polk et al. 2017). The CHP did not seem to change much in terms of the age of their deputies, with an average age of fifty-one after the November elections, while the average age of HDP deputies was forty-six (*Dağ Medya* 2015). The HDP also mentioned the Gezi protests once in their platform for both the first and second general elections in 2015, relating it to the struggles of the Kurdish movement,

> A call for a new life is growing, together with the struggle of the young who work in harsh conditions, who study and are pushed out of working life, who are alienated, but holding on to a belief in life despite all this; who in Gezi and in Rojava took a role in the revolutionary process, and resist the policy imposed by the hegemons all over the world. The youth revolt, the new political language, the democratic political culture, the emancipatory attitude, have the potential to make our new politics for life a real alternative to the politics of the country, and organize [a] new life. In the face of the ruling mechanisms that try to make decisions about the lives of young people and the politics that adults talk about and design for young people, young people will struggle to become equal and free citizens, who will raise their desire for freedom everywhere. (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi* 2015)

In the ensuing elections the CHP received 25 percent, one point less than in 2011. The HDP more than doubled its electoral share from 2011, winning 13.1 percent of the vote and eighty seats in Parliament. Some speculated that the HDP electoral success was somehow linked to the Gezi protests and how the HDP had branched out following the protests. Some argued that the HDP succeeded because they now also appealed to some of the so-called "White Turks" - urban middle class ethnic Turks (Türkmen 2015; *Al Jazeera* 2015). Indeed, an opinion poll in the run-up to the elections, conducted by the A & G research company, showed that the HDP was the

second most popular party among young voters, with support from 23.8 percent of voters under the age of twenty-three (Balkan 2015). While this may have played a role in the HDP's electoral success, the most important factor contributing to its success was the fact that it increased its share of the vote among Kurdish voters in the South East (*Konda* 2015). While these votes had been shared with the AKP in the preceding elections, the AKP lost much of this support to the HDP in the 2015 elections. The elections ended the AKP's parliamentary majority, with 40.9 percent of the vote and 258 seats in the 550-seat Parliament. A series of failed coalition talks between the AKP and the CHP and MHP resulted in snap elections in November the same year. In these2015 general elections, the HDP promoted Mustafa Sarısülük, the brother of one of the activists killed by the police during the Gezi protests, and they fielded him as the Ankara candidate for the second elections. In a televised speech announcing his candidature, Sarısülük called on everyone "to say 'no' to those who want to make Turkey a repressive country under one party's rule and against one man's dictatorship" (Benli 2015).

The November elections resulted in the AKP regaining a parliamentary majority with 49.5 percent of the vote and fifty-nine additional seats. The HDP and the MHP lost twenty-one and forty seats respectively compared to the earlier election that year, while the CHP gained two seats. Figure 6.5 shows the trends for the central issues over general elections from 2007 to the second 2015 elections, based on data from the Party Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2016).[21] The HDP dedicated a larger proportion of their platform to promoting human rights and democracy in the 2015 elections than in 2011, but for most other issues there was no visible change in trends. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017) also estimates that the HDP had become more environmentally-oriented from 2010 until 2014.

[21] The Manifesto Project provides a content analysis of parties' electoral manifestos. The coding units in the Manifesto Project are quasi-sentences, defined as one argument (full sentences can contain more than one quasi-sentence).

Figure 6.5: Quasi-sentences about environmentalism in four party platforms over three general elections




Figure 6.6: Quasi-sentences about democracy in four party platforms over three general elections




Figure 6.7: Quasi-sentences about human rights in four party platforms over three general elections



Figure 6.8: Quasi-sentences about socially liberal issues in four party platforms over three general elections




## A new challenger on the left?

So far in this chapter, I have shown that the Gezi events seemed to have prompted some electoral changes, particularly in the HDP. The CHP was slower in responding. Both parties promoted candidates with links to movements which were active in the Gezi protests, yet their political platforms did not change to a large extent. Nor, as I showed in the beginning of the chapter, did the deputies from these two parties seem to redirect their focus, incorporating more of the protests' demands into their own agendas. As other scholars have noted, parties are generally slow to change their platforms based on changing preferences in the electorate, and changes in a party system tend to follow the arrival of a *new* party entrant (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016; Hooghe and Marks 2017; De Sio, Franklin, and Weber 2016). This leads to the question of whether there were any attempts to create a new party based on the Gezi demands. There is reason to believe that the situation in Turkish politics has been ripe for a new challenger party on the left, both in economic and post-material terms. Considering the tension described above in the two self-proclaimed left-of-centre parties, the CHP and the HDP, we might expect there to be popular demand for a party with less commitments to positions on any of the other two dimensions, and a more purist left-wing programme. Indeed, the observations of the OccupyCHP movement strengthens such speculation. When a transformation of the CHP proved to be harder to impose than first expected, the OccupyCHP activists started looking for alternatives. One protester noted, "By now, many former CHP supporters are thinking about voting for the HDP instead, and I must admit I am one of them" (interview 29).

In the final section, I address this question with two case studies. More than an assessment of all such attempts, or a prediction of whether similar initiatives might succeed in the future, I try to illustrate some of the obstacles to new entries. In turn, I argue, these obstacles may have deterred

activists from initiating such challenger parties along the lines of Indignados in Spain or Syriza in Greece. The obstacles also may have assured politicians in the existing parties that their positions in the party system would not be easily threatened by a new party on the left, and thus that it was better not to make major changes in the party.

**The Gezi Party**

In October 2013, some activists, lead by the heavy metal guitarist Reşit Cem Köksal, set up a new party, the Gezi Party, with headquarters in the Çankaya district of Ankara (Kızılkoyun 2013; *Today's Zaman* 2013). One of the founding members of the Gezi Party, and vice president of the party's disciplinary board, Simay Ulgun, noted that one of the party's priorities was to establish themselves legally in order to be able to run for elections. Ulgun noted that there was no direct link between the groups that had been most active during the Gezi protests and the Gezi Party,

> There is no relation between the movements and our party. There definitely should be some coordination between us, and I was at a meeting where we talked about this with other Gezi organisations this morning. (interview 14)

The founding statement by the Gezi Party, dated to October 2013, stated,

> We, the founders of the Gezi Party, are individuals who think that they have understood correctly the reasons for the events that started in Taksim Gezi Park and [which] spread all over Turkey, who believe that these reasons can only be removed politically, and who come from completely different parts of society. The Gezi protests have made us question why we have been unresponsive for years. We looked to the parties that have the same mentality. We always said that somebody would come and fix it. But those people never came, and were never going to come. Then we realized that those people were us. Now we all know that if we stay away from politics, it leads to the distorted and unjust order we now live in. We have not taken responsibility; we have not held the elected accountable. We all have different political and ideological thoughts. This is a requirement of libertarian democracy, and it is only normal. What brings us together, despite these differences, is our belief in freedom, democracy, and human rights, and we need to create a political force that unifies our political identities around common values. The Gezi Party is, just like our country, an "epicentre" party, in which different cultures and different thoughts coexist. Our opponent is a distorted political structure and system. There is no power, capital, lobby, institution or organization behind us. We do not have a leader. Our party is governed by a Party Assembly, not by a president. Our Party president's duties and authorities are limited to implementing and

> serving as the spokesperson for the decisions made at the Party Assembly. It suffices to look at the party statutes in order to understand the structures of all parties that claim to be democratic. It is an illusion to expect democracy from non-democratic parties. We have also set out a party statute which is not comparable to any existing party. In the future, all party members will have the chance to participate in the decisions made by the party assembly, by using technological facilities, and direct democracy will be the basic philosophy of the whole system. We will work to make this model the management style of the country [...]("Gezi Partisi Kuruluş Bildirgesi" 2013)

The founding statement was soon supplemented by a slightly more detailed party programme, which also emphasised the need for a deliberatively democratic party and shied away from showing ideological inclinations, although we can speculate about the inclinations of the founding members, based on their programme. This underlined the need to consider "gender, religion, language, race, thought, ethnicity and other innate differences as strengths", pointing to a pluralist position on the nationalist-pluralist dimension of Turkish politics ("Gezi Partisi Özet Programı" 2016). The programme also stressed the need to "provide foreseeable legal arrangements for just and favourable working conditions, and defend the right to form and join trade unions to protect everyone's interests," pointing to the left on the economic dimension. Finally, another principle in the programme was "the preservation of biodiversity with environmental legislation, and the improvement of animal rights", pointing to an environmentally-friendly position in line with the post-material left. Apart from these points, however, the programme did not explicitly engage with the dimensions of political conflict in Turkish politics, as described in Chapter 3, be it on the left-right, nationalist-pluralist, or Islamist-secularist axis.

Based on this, we might argue that the Gezi Party established itself in line with single-issue parties in Western Europe, such as the Greens or the Pirate parties. The Gezi Party's single issue was deliberation and participatory democracy, and all other issues came secondary, or were not expressed at all. Indeed, there seemed to be demand for a new type of institutional representative, at least among some of the groups active in the Gezi protests. Özgür Kazım Kıvanç, from the Anti-capitalist Muslims, noted that the group had been approached by both HDP and CHP representatives, particularly in the run-up to the 2014 local elections. The group had however rejected any collaboration, "we never wanted such a relation. We want to work for social change, and we do not support the current system of representative democracy" (interview 15). Kıvanç noted that he had heard of the Gezi Party, and saw it as a positive initiative. "We need to get rid

of representative democracy, change politics from the inside and create a different type of politics. There is a long road ahead, but the squabbling in Parliament clearly does not bring us any closer." Simay Ulgun emphasised that the Gezi Party's main priority was to broaden popular participation, and strengthen the link between representatives and the electorate,

> We are very local in that we have meetings a few times every month for the [different] parts of the city. Here we discuss the issues that come up until we have a uniform decision. Then there is a discussion and voting between the different city regions. If an issue only regards one city region, then of course none of the other regions are involved. [...] – we want to create surveys for members, where they can say yes or no to proposals, and can come up with alternatives if [their response is] no. We want this [form of decision-making] to be the norm for all parties in Parliament. (interview 5)

Pelin Çınar, another active member of the Gezi Party in Istanbul, had been active in NGOs before, but never in a political party. The deliberative democratic approach of the party was what drew her to the Gezi Party rather than to established parties,

> They [CHP and BDP] have a more traditional structure. I know that our ideas are a bit Utopian, but it's the right way to start a party: without a leader, and being able to have our voices heard from the ground up. We want to gather people from various different strands. We have some red lines, like religion, ethnic differences, languages and so on. On the contrary, we believe that having many diverse views *within* a party guarantees better representation. We even have people who have been AKP voters [...]. I admit that it is difficult to make our system work. We don't have a spokesperson for instance, anyone can go and talk to the press. Every local organisation (e.g. Bakırköy) makes decisions. There is a confrontation if one region says no to something. Every time someone says no, they have to explain why, and come up with an alternative. (interview 12)

Çınar lamented the preference for hierarchical structures in Turkey's political culture, noting that "generally in Turkey people want a shepherd to guide them, and they fear any individual independence. People are also apolitical in Turkey, even though Gezi improved this." Havva Reyhan Kasirga, an active member of the Gezi Party in Ankara, hinted that a perceived failure of the CHP leadership to listen to the party's left wing was a main reason for her joining the Gezi Party,

> Traditionally my family supports the CHP, and has always been on the left. But now the CHP is not the same as ten years ago. They are no longer a leftist party. They thought they

> could strategically move to the right, but it didn't work. People on the left didn't like it, and they stopped voting for the CHP. Before Gezi, leftists no longer liked the CHP, but continued to vote for them. After the Gezi protests, people have become even clearer in opposing the CHP. The CHP hoped that Gezi could save them. But it can't. (interview 5)

The Gezi Party did not run for office in either of the 2015 elections. Its website was updated regularly, promising expansion and progress for the party, until September 2015 but then a ten-month silence ensued, until June 2016, when a post was published on their website. This announced that the party had focused on overcoming the bureaucratic obstacles to be registered as a political party, and had succeeded in doing so in September 2015. However, they had problems of paying rents and had to close all offices apart from their main office, in the Kadiköy District of Istanbul ("Nerede Kalmıştık?" 2016). No further updates had been posted on the party website since May 2017 and the project seemed to have run out of steam.

## The Haziran movement

Another political alternative that emerged from the Gezi protests did not take the shape of a party, but of a sustaining social movement organisation. The Haziran movement (short for *Birleşik Haziran Hareketi* or United June Movement) formed in October 2014, in order to carry on several of the demands raised in the Gezi protests (*Ileri Haber* 2014). Its founding member and editor of the leftist magazine *Redaksiyon*, Önder İşleyen, noted that the movement had first been established in response to the Gezi protests, following several months of deliberation between various forums, groups and political parties that took part in the movement. By January 2015, the movement had drawn up a working list of 200 points, established a popular council for the internal rule of the organisation, and organised a first national meeting for the movement. The Haziran movement was organised loosely with no formal membership structure, but an estimated 160 active participants (interview 33).

The movement focused mostly on contentious forms of activism. They held school boycotts for their children, protesting against the erosion of secularist principles in Turkey's educational system. İşleyen noted that they had decided to stay outside party politics partly in order to carry on the "Gezi spirit", which they perceived as being based on civil resistance. The Haziran movement summarised the main points of the Gezi protests as follows,

1. Against neoliberalism
2. In favour of freedom of religion and against state Islamism

3. In favour of freedom of choice, and individual liberty
4. Against capitalism, and in favour of a democratic leftist revolution
5. In favour of a more ecological, environmentally friendly, and urban development based party
6. Against imperialism and the Western and American interests in the Middle East, and in getting involved in countries' internal affairs (interview 33)

The founding statement of the Haziran movement also highlighted socialism, secularism and anti-imperialism, alongside gender equality, a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question, and environmentally friendly policies in their sixteen-point call to action (*Ileri Haber* 2014). Although the Haziran movement declared itself independent of political parties, it initially received support from the far left parties such as the Communist Party (*Komünist Parti*, KP), the Freedom and Solidarity Party (*Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi,* ÖDP), the Labour Movement Party (*Emekçi Hareket Partisi,* EHP), and the Turkish Communist Party (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*, TKP), as well as CHP deputies Ilhan Caner, Hüseyin Aygün, and Gökhan Günaydın (Cansu 2014). For the June 2015 elections, HDP deputy Ertuğrul Kürkçü approached the Haziran movement to form an electoral alliance. Kürkçü said that he had invited the movement to join the HDP in an alliance rather than simply supporting the party, but did not state clearly under what name such an alliance would run for elections. Kürkçü argued that the electoral system made an increase in votes for the HDP more detrimental for the AKP than a similar increase for the CHP, and speculated that Haziran would not be interested in collaborating with the CHP following its promotion of nationalist candidates in the local and presidential elections in 2014 (Kuray 2015). Yet the following month, the movement published a statement in which they announced that they would focus on their extra-parliamentary work against the AKP government, and therefore not actively back any of the parties (*Radikal* 2015). The statement noted, however, that the Haziran leadership would themselves vote for the CHP and the HDP in the elections. İşleyen argued that despite great ideological overlaps, there was a scepticism of HDP's conservative side and electoral base,

> [The HDP] has both liberal and conservative elements within the party. They are closer to us in that they want a more tolerant society with broader-based democracy, but they are also partly responsible for the AKP's strength, as they have cooperated with them in the Kurdish agreement in the East of Turkey. The main reason we have not created any agreement with the HDP is that they have been accommodating more conservative religious voters among the Kurds, who previously voted for the AKP. (interview 33)

İşleyen said indignation with the existing parties was a central driver for people's participation in the Haziran movement,

> There are quite a lot of people who participate in both [party politics and in the Haziran movement]. We have several CHP deputies in our movement. But in the central party structure of the CHP, the main problem is that they are not able to present any real alternative. Their only role as it is now, is to oppose and criticize whatever the AKP proposes. In addition, their own political outlook is quite neoliberal. Therefore, we cannot endorse the CHP. [...] many people have come to join us after having been activists in OccupyCHP. We think they have done this because they have lost hope with the existing parties in general. Most of them are disillusioned with the CHP's refusal to turn to the left. As a result, there are many young Turkish citizens who find nothing for them within the existing party system. They are searching for an alternative outside the system instead, and that is what we represent. We are organizing events, creating a cooperative, and create social networks. We are trying to make civil society grow stronger in this country. But this does not mean that we are not going to support any political parties in the future. We just exclude it for this election. (interview 33)

Işleyen argued that because the internal movement-strategy had not worked, the best way to force a change on the CHP would be to mobilise outside the party,

> I do not think the CHP will do anything of its own accord now. But if the Haziran movement becomes stronger, it will put enough pressure on the CHP to turn to the left, as we want them to. I think our events work [could] achieve this quite well. For instance, when we boycotted schools on the secularist issue, we forced the CHP and the HDP to put this issue on the agenda; we forced them to talk about it. (interview 33)

One of the member parties in the Haziran movement, the Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP), revealed they would not run in the 2015 elections because of a "system that does not allow for free competition, with a type of elections that do not really allow for change" (interview 42; interview 43).

## Discussion

A common thread in the responses of movement activists emphasise how the events had made previously disparate groups come together and create networks with each other. For instance, LGBTT leader İlker Çakmak noted that after the protests, a broader range of groups had started to attend their meetings — from party representatives to the Anti-capitalist Muslims. The events

had spurred the opening of new LGBT-support groups in cities in Eastern Turkey. Similarly, Anti-capitalist Muslims representative, Özgür Kazım Kıvanç, noted that he now occasionally went to Maçka Park in central Istanbul to meet with forums and groups that the Anti-capitalist Muslims had bonded with during the events. He summarised the legacy of the Gezi protests as follows,

> [t]he events were good in the sense that they brought a broad range of groups together, such as the LGBT, Anti-capitalist Muslims, secularists, nationalists, socialists, Kurds, and social rights movements. By bringing these groups together, Gezi created an important unit. However, workers' movements were not much present. And in my opinion that was a great shame. We see that the AKP is continuing in the same way as ever, and the people's movement has been marginalized. Their flag needs to be raised again, and I want their voice to be heard. Nonetheless, protests like the Gezi are important displays of unity ... (interview 15)

This observation is supported by Budak and Watts (2015), who show that the groups involved in the Gezi protests became more closely connected to each other on Twitter in the wake of the protests. A socio-psychological study also indicated that acts of solidarity among activists during the events had reduced prejudice between previously disparate groups (Acar and Uluğ 2016). Furthermore, there are indications that the Gezi protests set a precedence for later mobilization, as a common point of reference for both political parties and activists. One example of this is the Cerattepe protest. Cerattepe is a hill and a natural resort with great biodiversity close to the city of Artvin in North-East Turkey. The area also has large amounts of copper, gold, silver and mercury, giving rise to a long-standing conflict between mining companies and local environmentalists (MacDonald 2017). As the Özaltın construction company received the final go-ahead from the Ministry of Environment to start excavating in June 2015, activists arranged a sit-in to block the company from starting (*Zümrüt Rize* 2015). Oğulcan Küçük, an Izmir-based activist, argued that the Gezi protests had set the precedent for future acts of resistance, particularly the Cerattepe protests. Küçük was adamant that activists now fought "more courageously" when facing similar situations (interview 53). President Erdoğan accused the Cerattepe activists of trying to "create a second Gezi Park atmosphere", and later referred to the protestors as "junior Gezi" (*Hürriyet* 2016). We can even speculate that the unifying force of the Gezi protests served as a basis for a stronger civil society in other opposition campaigns against the AKP government, such as the 2017 referendum (Karakaş 2017). Indeed, as the final section

of this chapter has shown, the Gezi protests sparked off new initiatives in Turkish politics, either as a new challenger party, or as civil society organisations.

Despite all this changes within the party system were slow and piecemeal. The first part of this chapter argued that there was a limited response in the discourses of the HDP and the CHP, although the Gezi protests continued to serve as a reference point, both in Parliament and in their party programmes. Yet both parties faced internal change and reaction. The events probably accelerated the broadening of the BDP platform, and its transformation into the HDP. They were probably also a catalyst for the subsequent promotion of candidates from movements involved in the events. The CHP, on the other hand, did not consider the Gezi demands much in the 2014 local and presidential elections, and faced an internal uproar as a result. The CHP leadership's reaction to the OccupyCHP movement was similar to its reaction to the Gezi protests. Here too it was positive and accommodating towards the actors, but generally neglected the content of the protest. Nonetheless, in the 2015 elections, references to the events were more explicit, and the party promoted some candidates with direct links to them.

One overall conclusion from this chapter supports the argument in Chapter 5. Both the CHP and the HDP were selective and partial in responding to the protests, but the HDP was a little more attentive to the issues raised in the protests. One way of understanding the difference between the CHP and the BDP/HDP responses seen in this chapter is to conceive of them as mainstream and peripheral parties (Kriesi 2015). Mainstream parties are accustomed to being in government, and are exposed to an increasing tension between being accountable and responsive to their voters, and responsible to a government with its many veto players in a multilevel institutional setting (Mair 2009). While the HDP was a peripheral party with no government experience at the national level, the CHP was the main opposition party in Turkey, with a long and recent experience in government. This status, as a responsible, rather than a responsive, party may according to activists have deterred the CHP from making changes in its internal organisation and political platform, both in the Gezi protests and in the OccupyCHP movement.

# 7. Policy concessions to Turkey's Gezi protests

## Introduction

This chapter explores whether there was any sort of practical change in favour of the Gezi activists' demands. At first glance, the Gezi protests appear to have been successful in obtaining concessions on their specific demands, at least in Istanbul. The Taksim Transformation Project, which sparked the initial mobilization, was modified and postponed, and in July 2017 the Gezi Park and the Atatürk Cultural Centre still stand untouched. Furthermore, activists from several protest-intense cities pointed to both specific local projects being changed following the protests, and a more general policy change favouring public urban spaces and cultural institutions. Finally, local and national incumbents indicated that they would increase the size and number of green spaces in Istanbul and other cities. The chapter tries to assess whether these politicians put their money where their mouths were, quite literally, as I search for traces of differences in budget allocations at all administrative levels in Turkey.

The budget data analysed in this chapter do not reveal any systematic changes in resource allocations favouring protesters' demands. The quantitative part of the chapter consists of budget data for the national, provincial, municipal and municipality levels. Examples of project reversals and symbolic measures seem to be credible as causally linked to the protests, yet I find no deeper traces in the budget data in terms of differing money allocations following the protests. The qualitative part of this chapter consists of interviews with social movement activists, civil servants, and party representatives from ten different cities, together with a review of the media. I argue that the response in the policy dimension was similar to that of discursive responses. The protests were given a great deal of attention by politicians, and apparently, there was a response in both discourses and policies. Yet these actual responses only went skin deep. As this chapter indicates, the parties did respond in policy concessions, but only in the most visible, and least costly ways.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on the impact of contentious politics emphasized several factors facilitating concession to the movement's demands. First, "power in numbers" or the importance of size for contentious politics to attain government concessions, is associated with

both concessions and repression (Lichbach and Gurr 1981; DeNardo 1985; Lohmann 1993; Gurr 1986; Franklin 2009). The Gezi protests score high on this factor. It was the single largest protest event in the history of Turkey, with an estimated participation rate of 2.5–8 million people, that is, 3–10 percent of the entire Turkish population out on the streets (Şardan 2016; Yörük 2014). Second, research on concessional responses emphasizes the importance of medium levels of disruption in the protests, balancing between so little disruption that the challenge is simply ignored, to so much disruption that governments respond with repression (Sharp 1973; Piven and Cloward 1978; DeNardo 1985; Gurr 1986; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; Davenport 1996; Gartner and Regan 1996; Davenport 1999; Apodaca 2001; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Franklin 2009; Tarrow 2011; Huet-Vaughn 2013). The Gezi protests caused quite a high degree of disruption, at least in the more protest-intense cities. Most protest events took the shape of demonstrations, which are not as disruptive as for example, a general strike. However, the occupation of Gezi Park to stop the excavators, was a form of civil disobedience. Indeed, institutional elites highlighted the disruption caused by the protests to both domestic and international economic and political relations (Bayhan 2013; CHP Brussels 2013; *Hurriyet Daily News* 2013).

Third, scholars have found that modest and specific demands increase the likelihood of concessions (Kowalewski 1987; O'Keefe and Schumaker 1983; Snyder and Kelly 1976; Franklin 2009; Gartner and Regan 1996). As discussed in Chapter 4, most demands in the Gezi protests were quite the opposite, both vague and ambitious (e.g. "The sexist education system must be reformed" and "Income inequality must be remedied"). Yet others, notably the halting the Gezi Park project itself, were very specific. Furthermore, many of the demands made the Gezi protests addressed national rather than local issues. This attitude to preserving nature through city planning also figured frequently in the more general demands "City councils must take an active role in decisions related to the city and citizens' opinions must be taken into account"; "The destruction of nature across the country must be stopped"; "Environmental and animal rights must be protected by law"; "Anatolia's cultural heritage must be protected"; and "Local referenda must be held in the regions where the construction of nuclear plants, thermal plants or dams, are planned."

Nevertheless, a great number of the demands raised by Gezi protesters in Istanbul were specific, such as "Gezi Park, Taşkışla, İnönü Stadium, Dolmabahçe Palace and Maçka Park must be preserved as public spaces"; "The Atatürk Cultural Centre (AKM) must not be demolished"; "The State Theatres and the State Opera and Ballet must not be shut down"; and "Once the new

airport is opened, the existing airport at Yeşilköy should be made into a public park." Additionally, as we already saw above, both symbolic concessions and promises of concessions seemed to be focused on trees, urban spaces, and green areas. Protests in other major cities raised similar local demands along much the same lines, against local projects to erode open and green public spaces in favour of shopping malls, with the slogan "Everywhere is Gezi Park" (Ete and Taştan 2013, 18; Tahaoğlu and Yöney 2013; interview 53; interview 54; interview 55). Some activists also claimed that they could observe how local politicians had become more sensitive to the issue of increasing the green profile of cities (interview 53).

In short, by all accounts a major component of protesters' grievances was directed at the consequences of an increasingly privatized Turkey, with the construction of roads and shopping malls rather than citizen-friendly urban planning with green spaces and cultural institutions (Taştan 2013). Insofar as we would expect concessional responses to the protests, we should expect them to be directed at the most specific demands in the protests. Finally, some top-down factors have also been found to have an impact on concessional responses, such as backing from third-party elite groups (Lipsky 1968). As I show in Chapter 5, there was disagreement within the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) regarding the protests. President Abdullah Gül took a more moderate stance than the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and called for toleration (*Akşam* 2013).

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I examine the immediate and visible policy concessions, based on media analyses and interviews carried out with movement activists and politicians. Second, I introduce the budget data analysis, and the methodological choices linked to it. Third, I present the results of the budget comparisons at the national and local levels. Finally, I discuss the implications and limitations of this study.

## Immediate indications of concessional responses

On the face of it, the Gezi protesters succeeded in obtaining much of what they wanted, at least as regards their specific demands. A couple of weeks into the protests, the AKP mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Kadir Topbaş, said that uprooted trees from Gezi Park would later be replanted elsewhere in the city, and that a city museum would be built there, and not a shopping mall or hotel (*Sabah* 2013; *Emlak* 2013). Topbaş framed this statement as a clarification, and not a reversal, of his former policies. Yet given the fact that Prime Minister Erdoğan had proposed building a shopping mall in Gezi Park just over a month earlier, the

statement may be read as a concessional response to the protests (*Milliyet* 2013a). Topbaş later promised to plant more trees in Taksim Square, and a month after the beginning of the Gezi protests he promised to take the public's opinion more into consideration before any major urban project was initiated (Today's Zaman 2015a; *Hürriyet Daily News* 2015). Furthermore, on 13 June, Erdoğan met members of the Taksim Solidarity Group, and promised not to go ahead with the Taksim project before the court case filed against it had been decided, and to hold a referendum on the plans if the court did not object to the plans (*Milliyet* 2013b; Erbil 2013; Hall 2013). As of January 2017, other public spaces the Gezi protesters feared would be privatised or altered, remain unchanged. Maçka Park continues to be an open public space, Dolmabahçe Palace is still a museum, and the Taşkışla neighbourhood continues to be the location for the Department of Architecture at Istanbul Technical University. Yet some of the policy decisions were not reversed regardless of the protesters' demands. Indeed, the major building projects the activists were unhappy with, went on as planned. The İnönü Stadium was demolished and replaced with the Vodafone Arena. The third bridge over the Bosphorus Strait, the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge, went ahead as planned, and was opened to traffic on 26 August 2016 (*TRT Haber* 2016). The third airport in Istanbul is scheduled to open in February 2018, amid speculation that the current Atatürk Airport will be transformed into a shopping mall or a residential area, although no decision had been made by January 2017 (*Sözcü* 2016; *Haberturk* 2016). Yet the overall picture of policy responses is that some of the main claims, at least in Istanbul, were responded to and that, as we would expect based on the literature discussed above, it was the specific and limited demands that were responded to. The Gezi Park and Ataturk Cultural Centre demolitions were halted, but major projects such as the Third Airport and Third Bridge in Istanbul, continued as planned.

Yet these policy concessions also appeared to run deeper than simply postponing an urban transformation project, and allowing nearby institutions to continue to exist. There were subtle indications that in the wake of the events policymakers and city planners were more attentive to environmental aspects of urban planning in Istanbul. When the chairman of Beşiktaş Football Club, Fikret Orman, announced plans for a new stadium in early 2014, he emphasized that it would be Turkey's first "environmental stadium", using sustainable energy from its own photovoltaic panels (*Akşam* 2014). Another source of dissatisfaction among protesters was the planned demolition of the historical Emek Cinema, in order to replace it with a shopping mall, a week before the Gezi protests erupted (*NTV* 2013). In late 2015, the municipality of Beyoğlu had restored parts of the cinema, and it was opened for use in early 2016 (Uştuk and Özdemir 2017; "Emek Sineması Açılışı İçin Geri Sayım Başladı" 2015). Furthermore, politicians also

seemed to promise policy changes in response to the events. In Chapter 5, I demonstrated how parliamentarians tended to link the Gezi protests to environmental issues. For instance, the Kocaeli deputy from the CHP, Mehmet Hilal Kaplan noted a few weeks into the protests,

> Let us (…) look at why young people engaged in the protests that day at Taksim Gezi Park: 1. There is no longer any space to breathe for the high buildings in a giant metropolis like ours. Our mission is to protect the remaining green areas ... (Mehmet Hilal Kaplan, 18.06.2013)

Furthermore, candidates seemed to use the Gezi protests as a basis for environmental electoral promises in the 2014 local elections. As noted in Chapter 6, the mayoral candidate for the CHP in Ankara's Metropolitan Municipality, stated during the electoral campaign in 2014 that the Gezi protests would not have occurred had it not been for the shortage of cultural spaces in the city. Yavaş promised to create a greener and more carbon-efficient city, with public spaces rather than shopping malls ("Mansur Yavaş - Projeler" 2015). Along the same lines, the CHP mayoral candidate in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Mustafa Sarıgül promised that he would make sure Gezi Park would remain a park if he were elected (*Anadolu Agency* 2014). Furthermore, AKP politicians also tried to appease activists by offering to replant any trees uprooted in Gezi Park to elsewhere in the city (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2013). Kadır Topbaş promised that his municipality would "strive to increase the number of trees around Taksim to 600" (*Sabah* 2013). Finally, Ahmet Aydin, Deputy Speaker of the Parliament for the AKP, also defended his party's record in maintaining green areas following the protests, noting that his party was "on the side of our people who are sensitive to green areas (…) In eight years we have turned thirty million square meters of green space in Istanbul into fifty million square meters. Are you aware of this?" In the next section, I try to assess whether these reversals of urban projects and promises to protect and increase green spaces were followed up by a commitment to actually allocate resources differently. In other words, did the concessions to the protests run deeper than what met the eye?

## Budget allocations — putting your money where your mouth is

In order to assess whether cheap talk on policy concessions was followed up with resource allocations, I assess trends in budgets on all administrative levels in Turkey, from 2011 to 2015. I analyse budget changes at the national, provincial, and municipality levels in Turkey.

## National level indicators

To get a general overview of these allocations to the relevant budget posts in the national budget, I first look at any striking shifts in the national budget posts on green spaces and culture. Although the causal link with the protests cannot be established based on the time trend of one variable, a clear shift from 2014 onwards could be a straw in the wind indication of whether there was a governmentally-led concessional response to the protests. Figure 7.1 shows the percentage of the Turkish national budget that the Department of Environment and Urban Planning and the General Directory of Forestry, spent in the period 2008–2016. There is no noticeable shift in budget allocation from 2014 onwards.

Figure 7.1: Percentage of national budget spent by three ministries in Turkey




## Local level indicators

There are four administrative levels in Turkey — national, provincial, metropolitan municipal, and municipality. The eighty-one provincial administrations are administered by central government. They are headed by a governor, who is appointed by a Council of Ministers, with the approval of the President. However, as the Province administrations are appointed by central government, they are not considered part of local governance. This includes 957 municipalities, covering 75 percent of Turkey's territory, and spending around 90 percent of its sub-national expenditure.

Municipalities with over 750,000 inhabitants enjoy a special status as Metropolitan Municipalities (*Büyükşehirler*). These work as an umbrella organisation for the various municipalities within their territories, and are headed by a mayor and a municipal council. The main executive powers in these municipalities are held by the mayor. In the last twenty years, the number of metropolitan

municipalities has expanded rapidly, from three in 1990 to thirty in 2012, and they cover an estimated 77 percent of the Turkish population (Kapucu and Palabıyık 2008, 152–55). The metropolitan municipalities are headed by a mayor, who is elected for five years in local elections. The mayors and general assembly in Turkey's municipalities are elected directly in local elections, and their administrations are responsible for local infrastructure, water, sewage, waste disposal, and fire protection. The metropolitan municipality administrations are responsible for municipal services that are transferred to them, co-ordination between the municipalities within their territory, and as large urban projects (Kraan, Bergvall, and Hawkesworth 2007; interview 25). The metropolitan municipality mayor is considered to exert strong influence over the annual budget (interview 40).

Most of the major protest events during the Gezi protests occurred in metropolitan municipalities, and only two non-metropolitan municipalities (Bolu and Sivas) had protests with a thousand protesters or more. More importantly, there are fundamental differences in both budgeting responsibilities and accountability between the Metropolitan Municipalities and Provinces. Mayors of Metropolitan Municipalities are in charge of the overall planning and general policy of the major cities, while the municipalities under them are responsible for smaller areas of competence, such as street-cleaning (Kraan, Bergvall, and Hawkesworth 2007). I therefore compare Metropolitan Municipalities in this chapter.[22]

Preparations for the annual budget start in May or June, and the mayors present their directives later on, in the early autumn. It is therefore reasonable to expect any concessions to the protests in 2013 to show up in the 2014 budget. Sub-national governments are funded through a combination of tax-sharing, central government grants, and their own non-tax revenues. Together the municipalities receive 6 percent of centrally collected taxes, allocated on the basis of population size. Moreover, Metropolitan Municipalities receive 5 percent of the tax revenue collected in their territories (Kraan, Bergvall, and Hawkesworth 2007).

## Dependent variables: budget allocations for green spaces and cultural institutions, and total spending

Chapter 4 makes it clear that the Gezi activists presented a wide range of demands, with different levels of ambition and straightforward policy implications. The literature on concessional responses to contentious politics often emphasises that movements need specific and modest

[22] I have however collected the data and run the analyses for all the provinces. These analyses did not yield significantly different results to those presented here.

demands so that governments can concede to them. Most demands were both vague and ambitious, and many of the demands collected regarding the Gezi protests addressed national rather than local concerns. Nevertheless, a great number of the specific demands raised among Gezi protesters in Istanbul were specific, and, as we saw above, both symbolic concessions and promises of concessions seemed to be centred on trees, urban spaces, and green areas. Protests in other Metropolitan Municipalities raised similarly locally directed demands along the same lines, against local projects of the erosion of open and green public spaces in favour of shopping malls, with the slogan "Everywhere is Gezi Park" (Tahaoğlu and Yöney 2013; Ete and Taştan 2013, 18).By all accounts a major component of the grievances were directed at the consequences of an increasingly privatized Turkey, with the construction of roads and shopping malls rather than citizen-friendly urban planning with green spaces and cultural institutions (Taştan 2013). Turkey has generally (at least between 2008 and 2013) spent a smaller part of its budget on environmental preservation than the average for both developed and developing countries. The same goes for spending on cultural, religious, and recreational services (Ataer and Efe 2016). I use three dependent variables to look for deeper traces of practical changes.

- First, I assess budget allocations for green areas and recreational facilities.
- Second, as activists also noted how cultural and youth centres seemed to be given extra attention following the events, I also investigate for deeper changes here. Some of the specific demands in the Gezi protests pushed to preserve cultural institutions that the national or local governments had decided to demolish. We already have qualitative indications of this type of response in Istanbul, for the Atatürk Cultural Centre and the Emek Cinema. There is also a "bread and circuses" logic to the resource allocation to cultural institutions. Seeing that the average age of protesters was estimated at twenty-eight, we can speculate that a strategy politicians would use to appease them would be to open new youth centres. I therefore also use allocations to cultural facilities and activities as a dependent variable.
- Finally, as predictions on where the money goes may not be accurate, I also search for changes in total spending per year. I look for systematic changes in the *total annual budgets* of municipalities. I do this to capture any potential change that did not occur within the green spaces or cultural institutions I principally analysed.

Turkey enjoyed strong economic growth from 2002 onwards, and was classified by the World Bank as a middle-income country in 2012 ("Economic Outlook of Turkey" 2016). Since then,

growth has slowed, warning signs of more volatility have appeared, and unemployment has risen (*The Economist* 2016; "Turkey - Overview" 2016). In the years examined in this study (2011–2014), the growth rate was between 3.4 and 5.4 percent. Warning signs of a volatile growth record appeared from 2010 onwards (*The Economist* 2016). Yet although growth in Turkey had slowed down and was volatile in this period, Turkey was by no means in a financial crisis similar to that of 2001. I thus assume that the government, both nationally and locally, had sufficient financial leeway to reprioritise on the posts in question, if they wanted to do so.

I use my budget data collected from twenty-nine of Turkey's thirty Metropolitan Municipalities, from 2010 to 2015.[23] Where available, I used the budget for the Park and Garden Departments of the Metropolitan Municipalities (*Park ve Bahçeler Müdürlüğü*) for the green spaces category, and the Culture and Social Work Departments (*Kültür ve Sosyal İşler Müdürlüğü*). Some of the Metropolitan Municipalities provided details of what they spent money on. In these cases, I collected the amount reported on parks and green areas, as well as on cultural and youth activities. In addition, I use some of the budget statistics available at the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜIK) at the local level. TÜIK only has some data relevant for our research question of interest: "pollution abatement services", "the protection of biodiversity and landscape", "research and development on environmental protection services", and "other non-specified environmental expenditure" for funding allocated to the environment, and the number of theatre performances per year for cultural issues.

## The treatment variable: protest magnitude

I use the dataset introduced in the chapter on methods, and allocate the Metropolitan Municipalities to the treatment and control categories based on the biggest number of participants registered in a Metropolitan Municipality. Those twelve Metropolitan Municipalities that had thousands of participants at any one time during the events (that is, scoring 3–5 in the dataset), are placed in the treatment group, whereas the other eighteen Metropolitan Municipalities (with either had no registered protest, or protest with less than a thousand participants) are allocated to the control group.

[23] Muğla Metropolitan Municipality did not publish coherent statistics on their website, and did not respond to my requests.

Figure 7.2: Turkey's Metropolitan Municipalities (yellow = low levels of protest, red = high levels of protests, white = not metropolitan
municipality)




I use a difference-in-differences model to compare Metropolitan Municipalities in their budget allocations, where the dependent variables were measured from both treatment and control groups in the period 2011–2013 prior to the protests, and 2014–2015 following the protests.[24] The difference estimator thus estimates the "normal" difference between the two groups, and the difference between this and the observed outcome.

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(protests_i) + \beta_2(time_t) + \beta_3(protests_i \times time_t) + \epsilon_{it}$$

where $\beta_0$ is the constant, *protests* is a dummy variable which is 1 if $i$ is a treated unit (municipalities with protests), and 0 otherwise, and *time* is a dummy which is 1 for 2014 and 2015, and 0 for 2011-2013. The interaction effect between protests and time ($\beta_3$) is the coefficient of interest for the difference estimator. Figure 7.3 shows the result of the difference-in-differences estimator for the three dependent variables.

Figure 7.3: Difference-in-differences models for budget allocations in Turkish metropolitan municipalities

| | Park and Green Spaces | Cultural Budget Allocations | Total Budget |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time | -0.193 | 0.274 | 0.625*** |
| | (0.135) | (0.185) | (0.093) |
| Protests | -0.078 | 0.596* | 1.178*** |

[24] As the Gezi protests occurred in Summer 2013, and budget allocations for the following year were decided in the autumn, I consider 2014 the first post-protest year.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.343) | (0.319) | (0.354) |
| Difference estimator | 0.239 | -0.619** | -0.111 |
| | (0.241) | (0.231) | (0.116) |
| Constant | -3.076*** | -4.128*** | 19.247*** |
| | (0.268) | (0.224) | (0.126) |
| Observations | 102 | 107 | 129 |
| $R^2$ | 0.006 | 0.074 | 0.350 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | -0.024 | 0.047 | 0.335 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the Metropolitan Municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All dependent variables are logged.

The time estimator of Figure 7.3 shows that the allocations to green spaces and cultural institutions did not change significantly over time, whereas the total spending increased significantly on average for all Metropolitan Municipalities from 2011 to 2015. The protests estimator shows the difference between the twelve protest-intense Metropolitan Municipalities and the seventeen non-protest-intense Metropolitan Municipalities in terms of these allocations for all years. Unsurprisingly, when protests occurred in the larger protest-intense we find higher overall spending. The main row of interest, the difference estimator, shows there was no significant change between protest-intensive Metropolitan Municipalities and the other Metropolitan Municipalities in their allocations to green areas or in their total spending following the protests. There was a difference in the allocations for cultural activities, significant at the 95 percent level, but the direction of this change is the opposite of what I expected, in the negative direction. In Figure 7.4, we can see the surprising negative result regarding allocations to cultural activities. As the figure shows, this change was driven by an increase in this allocation in the control group between 2013 and 2014, and not a decrease in the treatment group.

Figure 7.4: Allocations to cultural activities in the budgets of protest-intense and not protest-intense Metropolitan Municipalities in Turkey




Figure 7.5 below shows the same statistic for the allocations to green areas in protest-intense and non-protest-intense Metropolitan Municipalities. We see that there are indications of an increase in allocations among the protest-intense Metropolitan Municipalities, but with such big confidence intervals that the results are not statistically significant.

Figure 7.5: Allocations to green spaces in the budgets of protest-intense and not protest-intense Metropolitan Municipalities in Turkey




I also ran the same regressions for the province-level indicators provided by TÜIK (pollution abatement services, protection of biodiversity and landscape, R&D on environmental protection services, and other non-specified environmental expenditure on green areas, the number of theatre performances per year for cultural issues), and found similar, non-significant results.

We could speculate that there would be differences between municipalities in their allocations based on which party ran these municipalities. Indeed, some of the respondents in interviews hinted at such differences (interview 40; interview 53). One claim was that AKP-lead municipalities were treated preferentially, and could have a higher level of total spending than the other municipalities. Based on these indications, Figure 7.6 shows total spending trends for Metropolitan Municipalities run by AKP mayors, compared to those with mayors from other parties.

Figure 7.6: Total spending in municipalities run by AKP, compared to other municipalities




Figure 7.6 shows that while AKP-run Metropolitan Municipalities had a higher total budget spending on average than other Metropolitan Municipalities, this gap did not widen after the protests. In fact, the other Metropolitan Municipalities caught up with the AKP-run municipalities in 2015. I also ran the analysis for allocations to green spaces and cultural activities based on the party membership of the mayor, but the results were not significantly different. It thus seems that the Gezi protests were not associated with a change in total budget spending, or specific allocations, regardless of which party was in control of the Metropolitan Municipality.

## A closer look at Istanbul

One anomaly does emerge from TÜIK local indicators. One post assigns the income to the provinces and Metropolitan Municipalities from the national government, registered per Province and Metropolitan Municipality, under which there is a post for "non-specified environmental incomes".[25] For Istanbul, this post increased massively, by 217 percent, from 2013 to 2014, as

[25] The post was denoted as "non-specified environmental income". The content and direction of allocations were clarified in an email exchange with TÜIK, 31.01.2017.

seen in Figure 7.7. While any judgement regarding the intention (and specific allocation) is speculative, a change of such magnitude, the year after the Gezi protests, and in the city with the largest protests, may indicate a governmental concession in Istanbul. The increase in income to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, was however not matched by an increase in expenditure in the same year.

Figure 7.7: Municipal Environmental Income (environmental protection services not specified elsewhere)




The anomaly above, albeit speculative, calls for a closer look at Istanbul's Metropolitan Municipality since Istanbul was the centre of the Gezi protests, and had by far the biggest demonstrations. Yet budget trends in Istanbul's Metropolitan Municipality (Figures 7.8 and 7.9), do not indicate any changes following the protests. The overall budget, shown in Figure 7.8 below, did increase more than in preceding years from 2014 to 2015, that is, a year after the protests. Yet this is not matched by an increase in allocations to the Directories of Parks and Gardens and Cultural affairs, shown in Figure 7.9. Thus, the municipal budgets for Istanbul do not support the speculation of a concessional response to the protests through allocations.

Figure 7.8: Total annual budgets, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality



Figure 7.9: Budget allocations to two directorates in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality




## Municipality level change: Beyoğlu, Istanbul

Considering the fact that the visible concessions to the Gezi protests occurred within a relatively limited territory, the provincial and metropolitan municipal levels may be too large to capture potential changes in resource allocations. Perhaps such a change would be better captured in some of Turkey's 957 municipalities instead. Unfortunately, budget data with allocations are not available for all municipalities, making systematic collection of municipality level budget data difficult. I therefore made a close analysis of the one municipality in which most of these concessions had occurred. As a final investigation of budget changes responding to the Gezi protests, I zoom in even closer, to the municipality that hosted the main protests in the centre of Istanbul, Beyoğlu. If any change in response to the protests occurred, we would expect it to be here. Centrally located in Istanbul, and hosting Taksim Square, Beyoğlu is a transportation hub and the location of Gezi Park and the Atatürk Cultural Centre. In Figure 7.10, I assess the budget allocations to three policy areas which correspond to the environmental demands in the Gezi protests.

Figure 7.10: Budget allocations for recreational facilities, Beyoğlu municipality

Istanbul




Figure 7.10 does not indicate any increase in the allocations to these activities. As with the national and provincial levels, there is no clear indication of changes at the municipality level, where the Gezi protests were at their most intense.

## Discussion

In this chapter I have investigated traces of concessional responses to the Gezi protests, primarily through budget data. I find no clear indications of systematic policy changes in favour of the demands in the Gezi protests. If anything, at the Metropolitan Municipal level, allocations to cultural activities increased more in municipalities with little or no protest. It is important to underline, however, the limited scope of this chapter, both in the reliability of the sources, and in terms of the limited scope of the investigation. I by no means claim to have the last word on the policy responses to the Gezi protests with this chapter. What I attempt to do, is to identify whether the local and national politicians dedicated themselves to deploying resources to follow up on the demands. After all, as we have seen in this chapter, politicians from both the AKP and the opposition indicated that they would consider policy in favour of demands for green spaces and environmental protection. Even so, there is reason to be guarded in the conclusions of this study. First, we cannot know whether the budget allocations for each year reflect the actual spending in each municipality. Perhaps extra spending did occur in the immediate wake of the Gezi protests, without being reported in the annual budget plans. Indeed, as we saw in Figure 7.7, I identified a striking jump in the government allocations to Istanbul's Metropolitan Municipality

without this being reflected in the expenditure of the Metropolitan Municipality in the following years. Alternatively, changes in the allocations may have occurred in other budget posts than those I have measured. Unfortunately, most Metropolitan Municipalities do not provide more detailed budget plans than those used in this chapter, so the data do not allow for a more fine-grained analysis. Neither were data on actual *spending*, rather than allocations, available for all Metropolitan Municipalities for all the years analysed. Even if data points were available, they may not have helped in identifying concessional responses. After all, extra spending may include necessary expenses, such as the repair of public property damaged in the protests, and which does not necessarily indicate a change in the intended policy of each municipality. Indeed, a civil servant in the Urban Aesthetics Department of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality noted the damaging effects of the protests on the local administration, and estimated an additional cost of 30 million TL for the destruction of public spaces, buildings, and buses (interview 32).

Second, we could question of the sources of information used to look for concessional responses. The postponement of the Gezi Park transformation and the demolition of the Atatürk Cultural Centre, as well as renaming a park in Eskişehir, did not cost the state or municipalities much. If anything, they probably *saved* money on these concessions. Indeed, the most specific and modest demands in the Gezi protests, were those we would expect to be met by concessional responses, and called for local and national governments *not* to do things. In this perspective, the Gezi protests could also be successful in stopping projects, thus saving money for politicians. This is a valid critique, and perhaps an indication that the results presented in this chapter underestimate the magnitude of concessional responses. Finally, there is probably significant local variation in the extent to which green spaces and cultural institutions already exist, and how much need there was to expand these. As one activist from Eskişehir noted, protesters viewed the city as already being quite green, so that was not such an urgent protest demand (interview 54). I do not account for such local variation in this analysis. Activists from Izmir and Eskişehir — two of the largest Metropolitan Municipalities with a CHP mayor — noted that the local CHP mayors put themselves on the side of the activists, and against the national AKP government. Local politicians in both cities provided activists with water during the protests, and in Eskişehir the Metropolitan Municipal mayor Yılmaz Büyükerşen even overrode a district mayor in naming a park in honour of Ali Ismail Korkmaz, the nineteen-year-old killed by the police during protest in the city. A statue of Korkmaz was also erected in the park, with the active support of the metropolitan mayor Yılmaz Büyükerşen (*Hürriyet* 2015; *Posta* 2014).

The budget analysis did not identify any systematic differences between Metropolitan Municipalities based on the party of the mayor. However, there are qualitative indications of different local reactions from incumbents. Thus, although we do not identify systematic differences in the budgets, there could be a symbolic difference between municipalities based on partisanship. The main difference seemed to be based on whether politicians combined (limited) concessional responses with self-promotional measures (i.e. endorsing the protests). Concessions were made sparsely and symbolically by mayors from both the AKP and the opposition. Yet when CHP mayors made concessions, they were keener on promoting them.

Observers of the Gezi protests and their aftermath may have reached negative conclusions due to the lack of any systematic change in the *broader* demands regarding the direction of national policy in several policy fields (such as environmental protection and democratisation). In most cases, however, these negative conclusions have been based on anecdotal evidence. This chapter has substantiated the claim, at least regarding budget allocations. As such, the results of this chapter illustrate the critique some scholars directed at Gamson's (1990) criteria for new advantages (Amenta, Tamarelli, and Young 1996, 3; Cress and Snow 2000). While some of the demands made by the movements may be responded to, this may not benefit the group that the movement represents as a whole. In this case, the demolition of a relatively small park and a cultural centre was postponed, but the broader issue underlying the protection of that specific park (the general protection of public spaces, and environmental protection) did not seem to have changed.

In conclusion, this chapter is a first attempt to systematically assess direct policy responses to the Gezi protests. It finds that some of the demands seemed to have an effect in reversing the most visible projects. However, and despite promises from politicians from both government and opposition parties, I found no systematic traces of resource allocations favouring the demands raised in the Gezi protests.

# Conclusions

This thesis has examined the responses of Turkey's political parties to the 2013 Gezi protests. I have investigated both promotional responses, namely the extent to which political parties endorsed and promoted the protests and their demands, and concessional responses, and the extent to which politicians in office granted practical concessions in line with protest demands. The Gezi protests were given a lot of attention by politicians. As much of the literature on social movement outcomes would lead us to expect, the two opposition parties with the most overlap in identity and ideology, the CHP and the BDP, were the most supportive of the protests (Kriesi et al. 1995; Piccio 2011, 31; Wouters and Walgrave 2017). However, the two parties responded to the demands that aligned best with their pre-existing agendas, and with different loci of attention. The demographic profile and voting records of most activists in the protests pointed in favour of the CHP, but the demands they raised overlapped better with the BDP's ideological profile. I argue that it was this difference between identity and ideology overlap, which led to different responses from the two parties. The CHP gave an *actor-centred* response, focusing on who the activists were, while the BDP gave an *issue-centred* response, de-emphasising and even distancing itself from some of the protest actors. I suggest an extension of the concept of the *protest paradigm* (Chan and Lee 1984) to include responses of actors sympathetic to movements. In this framework, the CHP's actor-centred response was a "positive" manifestation of the protest paradigm.

The selective response to the protests also continued over time. Although party representatives from the CHP and BDP were responsive to some of the demands raised in the Gezi protests, the policy issues underlying these demands did not climb higher on their parliamentary agendas. Both the BDP and the CHP faced internal changes and reactions following the protests. The events seem to have contributed to the BDP's transformation into the HDP in Autumn 2013, and to its electoral strategy of appealing to a broader non-Kurdish segment of voters in subsequent elections. The CHP leadership openly disregarded the Gezi protests in the 2014 elections, and faced an internal wave of discontent from its young and leftist segments. The CHP leadership reacted to this internal wave of protest in a similar way to how it had reacted to the Gezi protests — by praising the actors for their engagement, but neglecting the issues they raised. By the 2015 elections, both the HDP and the CHP presented candidates with links to the protests, and who explicitly used the protest reference in their campaigns. However, their party platforms generally did not follow suit. As with parliamentary interventions, the two parties' election platforms did

not reveal any major change in policy priorities. In the two 2015 elections the HDP dedicated more space to human rights and democratisation issues, but not to other issues raised in the protests, compared to the elections in 2011 and 2007. The HDP often linked the Gezi protests to feminism, the environment, and democratisation, but they did not subsequently reposition any of these issues higher up on their agenda. For the CHP, there was no visible change in their platforms at all.

There were also indications of practical policies responding to the movement demands. At first glance, the Gezi protests appear to have been successful in obtaining concessions on their specific demands, at least in Istanbul. The Taksim Transformation Project, which sparked the initial mobilization, was modified and postponed. There were also indications from local incumbents that they would be cautious with similar urban transformation projects, and even that they would increase the size and number of other green spaces in their urban centres. Yet there is no trace of the incumbents changing policy priorities on a deeper level, by committing the deployment of resources differently. As discussed in Chapter 7, the policy responses seemed to be narrowly targeted at the object and symbol of the initial protests, but not at the grievances underlying those protests (Amenta, Tamarelli, and Young 1996). The demolition of a relatively small park and a cultural centre was postponed, but the broader issue underlying the protection of that specific park (the general protection of public spaces, and environmental protection) did not seem to change.

I therefore argue that the responses of the CHP and the BDP were supportive, but limited. There was a policy response, but it was superficial. There was a platform response, but it framed the demands in the direction of pre-existing platforms. There was an organisational response and a response in terms of electoral strategies, but many of these were symbolic, and not accompanied by major changes in party platforms. In the sparse literature on the outcomes of the Gezi protests, the protests have been seen as a failure, at least in the short term (e.g. Özen 2015; Altıok-Karşıyaka and Yıldırım 2015; Onbaşi 2016). This study thus partly supports that conclusion. While the events received a great deal of attention, and lead to the reversal of a few urban projects, it did not seem to produce deeper changes in the existing parliamentary parties, either in their local policies or broader policy priorities.

Considering what we have seen in this thesis, that even sympathetic parties responded piecemeal, and based on pre-existing platforms, we might expect a new party to enter the political system, and capitalise on the electoral potential opened up by the large-scale mobilisation of the Gezi protests. Through the case of the Gezi Party, discussed in Chapter 6, I pointed to deterrents to

success for a new party. The 10-percent threshold for entry to Parliament hampered enthusiasm for a new challenger, even though its mobilising potential seemed substantial. When coupled with the indications of a deeply divided society, there was very little space of manoeuvre for challengers or room to carve out electoral space. This may also have discouraged the CHP and the HDP from responding with greater force to the Gezi supporters. As noted in Chapter 2, majoritarian democracies are less conducive to the entry of new parties in the party system (Lijphart 1999). The high electoral threshold reduced the perceived threat from new parties on the one hand, while on the other hand it exacerbated the consequences of losing parts of the electorate, as they would risk losing all seats in Parliament. The fate of the OccupyCHP movement, discussed in Chapter 6, is also indicative of this. Instead of exiting and creating a new party, the young CHP members voiced their critique of the party, but largely chose to remain loyal even though the CHP leadership had not changed much. That is, just as the threshold may have deterred new parties from entering the political scene, it may have also served as an incentive for institutional insiders to not rock the boat, and to limit their responses to the Gezi protests. These factors probably contribute to making Turkey and the Gezi protests a particularly "hard" case.

Another particularity of this case is the breadth and variety of demands that activists raised. This diversity of demands gave institutional representatives the opportunity to interpret and frame the protests according to their own agendas. A movement with fewer and more coherent demands and slogans could probably have limited the flexibility of parties in how they could respond to the protests (Snyder and Kelly 1976; Kowalewski 1987; O'Keefe and Schumaker 1983; Gamson 1990; Franklin 2009; Gartner and Regan 1996). In other words, the leeway parties had when responding to the Gezi protests was substantial, allowing for a response based on pre-existing agendas, as described in Chapters 5 and 6.

On the other hand, although the breadth of movement demands might have been an unfavourable condition for influencing the agendas of existing political parties, it was advantageous in a different way. As I discussed in Chapter 6, the Gezi protests may have set a precedence for future mobilization, such as the Cerattepe protests in 2015, and the no-campaign in the 2017 constitutional referendum (interview 53; *Hürriyet* 2016; Karakaş 2017). From an organisational perspective, the legacy of the Gezi protests was seen in spin-off organisations such as the Haziran movement. Finally, there are even indications that the protests reduced levels of prejudice between previously disparate groups (Acar and Uluğ 2016). These effects may modify the course of Turkish politics in the long term, by inspiring a new challenger party, facilitating a

new wave of mass protests, or even reducing levels of prejudice and polarisation between civil society actors in Turkey. In any case, it is too soon to conclude regarding the long-term legacy of the Gezi protests. This thesis does, however, provide an important step towards understanding how the protests were received and reacted to in the four years following their eruption.

# Bibliography


Acar, Yasemin Gülsüm, and Özden Melis Uluğ. 2016. "Examining Prejudice Reduction Through Solidarity and Togetherness Experiences Among Gezi Park Activists in Turkey." *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 4 (1): 166–79. doi:10.5964/jspp.v4i1.547.

Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London; New York: Routledge.

*AK Parti Haberi*. 2013. "Başbakan Erdoğan'ın Demokratikleşme Paketi Basın Açıklamasının Tam Metni," September 30. http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-demokratiklesme-paketi-basin-aciklamasinin-tam-metni/52596#1.

Akan, Murat. 2012. "Twin Tolerations or Siamese Twins: Kemalist Laicism and Political Islam in Turkey." In *Problems Confronting Contemporary Democracies*, by Douglas Chalmers and Scott Mainwaring, 381–423. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame. https://www.academia.edu/25875087/Twin_Tolerations_or_Siamese_Twins_Kemalist_Laicism_and_Political_Islam_in_Turkey.

Akkaya, Ahmet Hamdi, and Joost Jongerden. 2012. "Reassembling the Political: The PKK and the Project of Radical Democracy." *European Journal of Turkish Studies. Social Sciences on Contemporary Turkey*, no. 14 (June). http://ejts.revues.org/4615.

*Aksam*. 2013. "Gül'den Gezi Parkı Açıklaması: Demokrasi Sadece Seçim Değildir Mesaj Alınmıştır - Akşam," June 3. http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/gulden-gezi-parki-aciklamasi-demokrasi-sadece-secim-degildir-mesaj-alinmistir/haber-212133.

Aktan, Irfan. 2016. "Kurdish Movement Restructures Itself." *Perspectives Turkey 9: Turkey's Democracy between Two Elections*. Accessed November 8. https://www.boell.de/en/2014/07/19/perspectives-turkey-9-democracy-between-two-elections.

*Al Jazeera Turk*. 2016. "Erdoğan: Sultan Abdülhamid Iftiraların Muhatabı Olmuştur," July 22. http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/erdogan-sultan-abdulhamid-iftiralarin-muhatabi-olmustur.

*Al Jazeera*. 2015. "Kurds Celebrate Gains amid Blow to Turkey's AK Party," June 8.

Alessandrini, Anthony, Nazan Üstündağ, and Emrah Yildiz. 2013. "'Resistance Everywhere:' The Gezi Protests and Dissident Visions of Turkey." *Jadmag* 4 (1). https://www.academia.edu/15550271/_Resistance_Everywhere_The_Gezi_Protests_and_Dissident_Visions_of_Turkey.

Alkin, Sinan. 2011. "Underrepresentative Democracy: Why Turkey Should Abandon Europe's Highest Electoral Threshold." *Washington University Global Studies Law Review* 10 (2): 347–69.

Altinay, A. 2004. *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey*. Springer.

Altıok-Karşıyaka, Birce, and Kerem Yıldırım. 2015. "Characteristics of Prolonged Social Movements: The Case of Gezi Park Protests." In *Contentious Politics in the Middle East*, edited by Fawaz A. Gerges, 415–35. Middle East Today. Palgrave Macmillan US. doi:10.1057/9781137530868_18.

Amenta, Edwin, Robin Tamarelli, and Michael Young. 1996. "The Old Folks at Home: Political Mediation Theory and the Impact of the Townsend Movement in California." *Unpublished Manuscript* (as cited in Cress and Snow, 2000).

Amenta, Edwin. 2006. *When Movements Matter: The Townsend Plan and the Rise of Social Security*. Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press.

*Anadolu Agency*. 2014. "Istanbul's Mayoral Candidates Promise More Railways," March 17. http://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/302325--istanbul-s-mayoral-candidates-promise-more-railways.

Andrews, Kenneth T., and Bob Edwards. 2004. "Advocacy Organizations in the U.S. Political Process." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (1): 479–506. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110542.

Anisin, Alexei. 2016. "Repression, Spontaneity, and Collective Action: The 2013 Turkish Gezi Protests." *Journal of Civil Society* 12 (4): 411–29. doi:10.1080/17448689.2016.1239607.

Apodaca, Clair. 2001. "Global Economic Patterns and Personal Integrity Rights After the Cold War." *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (4): 587–602. doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00215.

Apodaca, Clair. 2001. "Global Economic Patterns and Personal Integrity Rights After the Cold War." *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (4): 587–602. doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00215.

Arat, Yesim. 1998. "Feminist Institutions and Democratic Aspirations: The Case of the Purple Roof Women's Shelter Foundation." *Deconstructing Images of the Turkish Women*, 295–309.

Arat, Zehra F. Kabasakal. 2011. *Human Rights in Turkey*. Philadelphia (PA), University of Pennsylvania Press.

Arıkan, E. Burak. 1998. "The Programme of the Nationalist Action Party: An Iron Hand in a Velvet Glove?" *Middle Eastern Studies* 34 (4): 120–34.

Ataer, Müge Yetkin, and Gözde Nalbant Efe. 2016. "The Evolution of Social Expenditures in Turkey and Comparative Analysis with Selected Countries." In *Institutions, Society, &*

*Economic Development*, by İsmet Göçer, İzzettin Önder, Sedat Alataş, Aynur Uçkaç, M. Nergis Ataçay, Ömer Faruk Batırel, Aysel Arıkboğa, Müge Yetkin Ataer, Kaan Yiğenoğlu, and Gözde Nalbant Efe. IJOPEC Publication.

Atak, Kıvanç, and Donatella della Porta. 2016. "Popular Uprisings in Turkey: Police Culpability and Constraints on Dialogue-Oriented Policing in Gezi Park and B Arat, Zehra F. Kabasakal. 2011. *Human Rights in Turkey*. eyond." *European Journal of Criminology* 13 (5): 610–25. doi:10.1177/1477370816636902.

Atak, Kıvanç. 2017. "The Spirit of Gezi: A Relational Approach to Eventful Protest and Its Challenges." In *Global Diffusion of Protest: Riding the Protest Wave in the Neoliberal Crisis*. Amsterdam University Press. http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/G/bo26267282.html.

Ayata, Sencer, and Ayşe-Güneş Ayata. 2007. "The Center-Left Parties in Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 8 (2): 211–32. doi:10.1080/14683840701314126.

Aydoğan, Abdullah, and Jonathan B. Slapin. 2013. "Left–right Reversed Parties and Ideology in Modern Turkey." *Party Politics*, June, 1354068813487280. doi:10.1177/1354068813487280.

Ayman, Zekeriya. 2014. "Turkey: 'We Know What You Did Last Summer' – A Year on from Gezi Rising." *Green Left Weekly*, June 15.

Aytaç, S. Erdem, Luis Schiumerini, and Susan Stokes. 2017. "Why Do People Join Backlash Protests? Lessons from Turkey." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, January, 22002716686828. doi:10.1177/0022002716686828.

Bahçeli, Devlet. 2013. *TBMM Meclis Grup Konuşması*. Türk Büyük Millet Meclisi.

Bakker, Ryan, Catherine De Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2015. "Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–2010." *Party Politics* 21 (1): 143–152.

Balkan, Arif. 2015. "Gençlerin Tercihi Muhalefet Oldu | Gündem Haberleri." *Haberturk*, June 10. http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1089006-genclerin-tercihi-muhalefet-oldu.

Barkey, Henri J. 1998. "The People's Democracy Party (HADEP): The Travails of a Legal Kurdish Party in Turkey." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18 (1): 129–38.

Barranco, José, and Dominique Wisler. 1999. "Validity and Systematicity of Newspaper Data in Event Analysis." *European Sociological Review* 15 (3): 301–22.

Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stability of European Electorates, 1885-1985*. Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press.

Bartolini, Stefano. 2007. *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980: The Class Cleavage*. Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press.

Baslevent, Cem, Hasan Kirmanoglu, and Burhan Senatalar. 2004. "Voter Profiles and Fragmentation in the Turkish Party System." *Party Politics* 10 (3): 307–24. doi:10.1177/1354068804042461.

Bayhan, Bahar. 2013. "Ahmet Misbah Demircan'ın Gezi Parkı Yorumları." *Arkitera*, June 10. http://www.arkitera.com/haber/14922/ahmet-misbah-demircanin-gezi-parki-yorumlari.

*BBC News*. 2013. "Turkey Protests: Erdogan Meets Gezi Park Activists," June 14. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22898228.

Benli, Mesut Hasan. 2015. "Gezi Victim's Brother to Address Public for HDP." *Hürriyet Daily News*, October 24. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/haber-detay.aspx?pageID=238&nid=90279.

Biggs, Michael. 2015. "Size Matters: The Perils of Counting Protest Events." *Under Review*. Accessed February 19. http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfos0060/sizematters.shtml.

Biggs, Michael. 2016. "Size Matters: Quantifying Protest by Counting Participants." *Sociological Methods & Research*, February. doi:0049124116629166.

Bilgiç, Esra Ercan, and Zehra Kafkaslı. 2013. "Gencim, özgürlükçüyüm, ne istiyorum?: #direngeziparkı anketi sonuç raporu." İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Bora, Tanıl, ed. 2009. *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 4: Milliyetçilik*. İletişim.

Bosi, Lorenzo, Marco Giugni, and Katrin Uba, eds. 2016. *The Consequences of Social Movements*. Reprint edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Boykoff, Jules. 2006. "Framing Dissent: Mass-Media Coverage of the Global Justice Movement." *New Political Science* 28 (2): 201–28. doi:10.1080/07393140600679967.

Boyle, Michael P., Douglas M. McLeod, and Cory L. Armstrong. 2012. "Adherence to the Protest Paradigm The Influence of Protest Goals and Tactics on News Coverage in U.S. and International Newspapers." *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 17 (2): 127–44. doi:10.1177/1940161211433837.

Bozarslan, Hamit. 2008. "Kurds and the Turkish State." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, edited by Reşat Kasaba, 1 edition. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bozcalı, Fırat, and Çağrı Yoltar. 2013. "A Look at Gezi Park from Turkey's Kurdistan." *Cultural Anthropology*, October 31. http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/396-a-look-at-gezi-park-from-turkey-s-kurdistan.

Brennan, Shane, and Marc Herzog. 2014. *Turkey and the Politics of National Identity: Social, Economic and Cultural Transformation*. London, I.B. Tauris.

Brug, Wouter van der. 2004. "Issue Ownership and Party Choice." *Electoral Studies* 23 (2): 209–33. doi:10.1016/S0261-3794(02)00061-6.

Budak, Ceren, and Duncan J. Watts. 2015. "Dissecting the Spirit of Gezi: Influence vs. Selection in the Occupy Gezi Movement." SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2610055. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2610055.

Budak, Ishak. 2013. "Gezi, HDP ve Sırrı Süreyya Önder." *Milliyet Blog*, October 28. http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/gezi--hdp-ve-sirri-sureyya-onder/Blog/?BlogNo=433974.

Budge, Ian, and Michael D. McDonald. 2006. "Choices Parties Define." *Party Politics* 12 (4): 451–66. doi:10.1177/1354068806064727.

Budge, Ian. 2013. "The Standard Right-Left Scale." *Working Paper*, Colchester, University of Essex. https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/down/papers/budge_right-left-scale.pdf.

*Bugün*. 2013. "Aziz Kocaoğlu, Gezi Parkı Eylemlerini Değerlendirdi," June 5. http://www.bugun.com.tr/son-dakika/aziz-kocaoglu-gezi-parki--haberi/652893.

Bulut, Alper T. 2016. "Measuring Political Agenda Setting and Representation in Turkey." *Party Politics*, January, 1354068815625232. doi:10.1177/1354068815625232.

Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2011. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*. Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press.

Burstein, Paul, and April Linton. 2002. "The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns." *Social Forces* 81 (2): 380–408. doi:10.1353/sof.2003.0004.

Burstein, Paul. 1999. "Social Movements and Public Policy." In *How Social Movements Matter*, by Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, 3–21. University of Minnesota Press.

Cai, Yongshun. 2008. "Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China." *British Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 411–32. doi:10.1017/S0007123408000215.

Cansu, Burcu. 2014. "Haziran'ın Izinden Yürüyüş." *Bir Gün*, October 20. http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/haziran-in-izinden-yuruyus-70236.html.

Çarkoglu, Ali, and Binnaz Toprak. 2000. "Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey." Istanbul: TESEV.

Çarkoğlu, Ali, and Melvin J. Hinich. 2006. "A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences." *Electoral Studies* 25 (2): 369–392.

Çarkoğlu, Ali. "Economic Evaluations vs. Ideology: Diagnosing the Sources of Electoral Change in Turkey, 2002–2011." Electoral Studies, Special Symposium: Economic Crisis and Elections: The European Periphery, 31, no. 3 (September 2012): 513–21. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2012.02.005.

———. "Ideology or Economic Pragmatism?: Profiling Turkish Voters in 2007." Turkish Studies 9, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 317–44. doi:10.1080/14683840802012074.

———. "The Nature of Left–Right Ideological Self-Placement in the Turkish Context." Turkish Studies 8, no. 2 (2007): 253–271.

———. "The Rise of the New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey: The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the November 2002 Elections in Turkey." South European Society and Politics 7, no. 3 (September 1, 2002): 123–56. doi:10.1080/13608740708539636.

———. "The Turkish Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change." Political Studies 46, no. 3 (August 1, 1998): 544–71. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00154.

———. "Turkey Goes to the Ballot Box: 2014 Municipal Elections and Beyond | Brookings Institution." Brookings, 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-goes-to-the-ballot-box-2014-municipal-elections-and-beyond/.

Celep, Ödül. 2014. "Can the Kurdish Left Contribute to Turkey's Democratization?" *Insight Turkey* 16 (3). http://www.insightturkey.com/can-the-kurdish-left-contribute-to-turkeys-democratization/articles/1458.

Cengiz, Orhan Kemal. 2013. "What Does Erdogan's Democratization Package Offer Kurds, Minorities?" *Al-Monitor*, September 30. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/democratization-package-kurds-turkey-minorities.html.

Chan, Joseph M, and Chin-Chuan Lee. 1984. "The Journalistic Paradigm on Civil Protests: A Case Study of Hong Kong." In *The News Media in National and International Conflict*, by Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake, 183–202. Boulder: Westview.

Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. "A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments." *Journal of Communication* 57 (1): 99–118. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00331.x.

CHP Brussels. 2013. "CHP's Call to Turkey in Connection with the Events of Gezi Park / Taksim Square 11 June 2013." *CHP EU Representation - Brussels*. June 13. https://chpbrussels.org/2013/06/13/chps-call-to-turkey-in-connection-with-the-events-of-gezi-park-taksim-square-11-june-2013/.

CHP İstanbul 2nci Bölge. 2015. *Hasan Aslan: CHP Istanbul 2nci Bölge Aday Adayı - Haziran 2015 Milletvekili Seçimi*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szVagmS6p1I.

CHP Press Agency. 2013. "Observations on Gezi Events." Press statement. Ankara.

CHP Seçim Bildirgesi. 2011. "Özgürlüğün ve Umudun Ülkesi. Herkesin Türkiye'si."

CHP. 2013. *CHP's View on Taksim Gezi Park Process*.

Çınar, Alev, and Burak Arıkan. 2013. "The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists?" In *Political Parties in Turkey*, edited by Barry Rubin and Metin Heper. London, Routledge.

Clauset, Aaron, Maxwell Young, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2007. "On the Frequency of Severe Terrorist Events." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (1): 58–87.

Cloward, Richard A., and Frances Fox Piven. 1984. "Disruption and Organization." *Theory and Society* 13 (4): 587–99. doi:10.1007/BF00156904.

Corke, Susan, Andrew Finkel, David Kramer, Carla Anne Robbins, and Nate Schenkkan. 2014. "Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey." Freedom House Special Report. Freedom House.

Cress, Daniel M., and David A. Snow. 2000. "The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing." *American Journal of Sociology* 105 (4): 1063–1104. doi:10.1086/210399.

*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*. 2015. "CHP Seçim Bildirgesi." http://secim2015.chp.org.tr/.

*Cumhuriyet*. 2015. "'Zenciyim' Edebiyatının Karşılığı Yok," June 25. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/307005/_Zenciyim__edebiyatinin_karsiligi_yok.html.

Czajka, Agnes. 2017. *Democracy and Justice: Reading Derrida in Istanbul*. Routledge Advances in Democratic Theory: London, Routledge.

*Dağ Medya*. 2015. "Milletvekili Yaş ve Cinsiyet Dağılımı," November 4. https://dagmedya.net/2015/11/04/milletvekili-yas-ve-cinsiyet-dagilimimeclis-yas-ortalamasi-50i-genc-vekillerin-orani-ise-yuzde-1-6/.

Dahl, Robert Alan. 1973. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven CT, Yale University Press.

———. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven CT, Yale University Press.

Dalton, Russell, Alix Van Sickle, and Steven Weldon. 2010. "The Individual–Institutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour." *British Journal of Political Science* 40 (1): 51–73. doi:10.1017/S000712340999038X.

Danışoğlu, Bülent. 2015. "AKP ve İttihat Terakki'nin Aşk ve Nefret İlişkisi." *Bianet*, October 17. http://www.bianet.org/biamag/toplum/168383-akp-ve-ittihat-terakki-nin-ask-ve-nefret-iliskisi.

Davenport, Christian. 1995. "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions." *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (3): 683–713. doi:10.2307/2111650.

———. 1996. "The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression." *Political Research Quarterly* 49 (2): 377–403. doi:10.2307/448879.

———. 1999. "Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 (1): 92–116.

David, Isabel, and Kumru F. Toktamış, eds. 2015. "Introduction Gezi in Retrospect." In *Everywhere Taksim: Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi*, 15–26. Amsterdam University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt18z4hfn.

De Leon, Cedric, Manali Desai, and Cihan Tuğal. 2009. "Political Articulation: Parties and the Constitution of Cleavages in the United States, India, and Turkey*." *Sociological Theory* 27 (3): 193–219. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9558.2009.01345.x.

De Sio, Lorenzo, Mark N. Franklin, and Till Weber. 2016. "The Risks and Opportunities of Europe: How Issue Yield Explains (Non-)Reactions to the Financial Crisis." *Electoral Studies* 44 (December): 483–91. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.06.006.

Dearing, James W., and Everett Rogers. 1996. *Agenda-Setting*. SAGE.

Deegan-Krause, Kevin. 2007. "New Dimensions of Political Cleavage." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*, 538–556. Oxford University Press. http://www.academia.edu/download/32036754/Deegan-Krause_New_Dimensions_of_Political_Cleavage.pdf.

della Porta, Donatella. *Social movements in times of austerity: Bringing capitalism back into protest analysis*. John Wiley & Sons, 2015.

della Porta, Donatella, and Mario Diani. 2009. "Forms, Repertoires and Cycles of Protest." In *Social Movements: An Introduction*, by Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, 165–92. John Wiley & Sons.

Demirtaş, Selahattin. 2013. "Gezi Direnişiyle Değil, Bu Halk Hareketini Askeri Darbeye Kadar Götürebilir Miyiz Diyenlerle Aramıza Mesafe Koyduk. Çarpıtanlara Duyurulur." Microblog. *@hdpdemirtas*. July 31. https://twitter.com/hdpdemirtas/status/362482986161152000.

Demirtaş, Selahattin. 2014. "Call For a New Life." *Peoples' Democratic Party in English*. August 5. https://hdpenglish.wordpress.com/call-for-a-new-life/.

DeNardo, James. 1985. *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*. Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press.

Diamond, Larry Jay. 2002. "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes." *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 21–35.

*Doğruhaber*. 2013. "Demirtaş`tan Erdoğan`a Gezi Eleştirisi," June 11. http://www.dogruhaber.com.tr/haber/85466-demirtastan-erdogana-gezi-elestirisi/.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper.

Draege, Jonas Bergan, Daniela Chironi, and Donatella della Porta. "Social movements within organisations: occupy parties in Italy and Turkey." *South European Society and Politics* (2016): 1-18.

Earl, Jennifer, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy. 2003. "Protest under Fire? Explaining the Policing of Protest." *American Sociological Review* 68 (4): 581–606. doi:10.2307/1519740.

"Economic Outlook of Turkey." 2016. *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/prospects-and-recent-developments-in-the-turkish-economy.en.mfa.

El-Kazaz, Sarah. 2013. "It Is About the Park: A Struggle for Turkey's Cities." *Jadaliyya*, June 16. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12259/it-is-about-the-park_a-struggle-for-turkey's-citie.

Elff, Martin. 2007. "Social Structure and Electoral Behavior in Comparative Perspective: The Decline of Social Cleavages in Western Europe Revisited." *Perspectives on Politics* 5 (2): 277–294.

"Emek Sineması Açılışı İçin Geri Sayım Başladı." 2015. *Beyoğlu Belediyesi*. September 3. /beyoglu-belediyesi/haber-detay/Emek-Sinemasi-Acilisi-Icin-Geri-Sayim-Basladi/300/3371/0.

*Emlak*. 2013. "Topbaş: Gezi Parkı'na AVM Yapılması Imkansız!," June 12. http://emlak.haber7.com/emlak/haber/1037789-topbas-gezi-parkina-avm-yapilmasi-imkansiz.

Emre, Yunus. 2014. *The Emergence of Social Democracy in Turkey: The Left and the Transformation of the Republican People's Party*. London, I.B. Tauris.

Engin, Ceylan. 2015. "LGBT in Turkey: Policies and Experiences." *Social Sciences* 4 (3): 838–58. doi:10.3390/socsci4030838.

*Ensonhaber*. 2013. "Mustafa Sarıgül'den Gezi Parkı Açıklaması," June 3. http://www.ensonhaber.com/mustafa-sarigulden-gezi-parki-aciklamasi-2013-06-03.html.

Erbil, Ömer. 2013. "Gezi Davalarında Son Durum Ne?" *Radikal*, June 14. http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/gozler_yargi_kararinda-1137511/.

Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. Mackuen, and James A. Stimson. 2002. *The Macro Polity*. Cambridge University Press.

Ertür, Başak. 2014. "The Gezi Uprising and Particularities of Discontent." *Law and Critique*, no. 25: 1–13. doi:DOI 10.1007/s10978-013-9131-3.

Esen, Berk, and Sebnem Gumuscu. 2017. "Turkey: How the Coup Failed." *Journal of Democracy* 28 (1): 59–73.

Ete, Hatem, and Coşkun Taştan. 2013. *Gezi Eylemleri: Kurgu ile Gerçeklik Arasında*. SETA.

Farro, Antimo L., and Deniz Günce Demirhisar. 2014. "The Gezi Park Movement: A Turkish Experience of the Twenty-First-Century Collective Movements." *International Review of Sociology* 24 (1): 176–89. doi:10.1080/03906701.2014.894338.

Fassiotto, Magali, and Sarah A. Soule. 2017. "Loud and Clear: The Effect of Protest Signals on Congressional Attention." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 22 (1): 17–38. doi:10.17813/1086-671X-22-1-17.

Franklin, James C. 2009. "Contentious Challenges and Government Responses in Latin America." *Political Research Quarterly* 62 (4): 700–714.

Frey, R. Scott, Thomas Dietz, and Linda Kalof. 1992. "Characteristics of Successful American Protest Groups: Another Look at Gamson's Strategy of Social Protest." *American Journal of Sociology - AMER J SOCIOL* 98 (2). doi:10.1086/230012.

*Gabile*. 2014. "Yerel Seçimlerle Ilgili Üyelerimize Sorduk," March 18.

Gamson, William A. 1990. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. 2 Sub edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub. Co.

Gartner, Scott S., and Patrick Regan. 1996. "Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 33 (3): 273–87. doi:10.1177/0022343396033003003.

*Gerçek Gündem*. 2013. "Kılıçdaroğlu: Hepimiz Ulusalcıyız," January 27.

"Gezi Parkı Protestoları: Zaman Çizelgesi ve Sokağın İstekleri | Subjektif." 2016. Accessed September 11. http://subjektif.org/2013/06/gezi-parki-protestolari-zaman-cizelgesi-ve-sokagin-istekleri/#Sokak_Ne_stiyor-2.

geziparkitaksim. 2016. *Yılmaz Büyükerşen Gezi Park Konuşması Eskişehir Belediye Başkanı*. Accessed May 28. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mx8N10ohI8Q.

"Gezi Partisi Kuruluş Bildirgesi." 2013. *Gezi Partisi*. October. http://www.gezipartisi.org.tr/gezi-partisi-kurulus-bildirgesi/.

"Gezi Partisi Özet Programı." 2016. *Gezi Partisi*. Accessed November 17. http://www.gezipartisi.org.tr/gezi-partisi-ozet-programi/.

"Gezi Report: Public Perception of the 'Gezi Protests' Who Were the People at Gezi Park?" 2014. *Konda*, June.

Gillion, Professor Daniel Q. 2013. *The Political Power of Protest: Minority Activism and Shifts in Public Policy*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Girit, Selin. 2015. "AKM: Türkiye'nin Ilk Opera Binası Çürümeye Mi Terk Edildi?" *BBC Türkçe*, March 27. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/03/150326_akm_ilk_opera_binasi.

Gitlin, Todd. 1980. *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking of the New Left*. University of California Press.

Giugni, Marco G. 1998. "Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24: 371–93.

———. 2007. "Useless Protest? A Time-Series Analysis of the Policy Outcomes of Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in the United States, 1977-1995." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 12 (1): 53–77.

———. 2009. "Political Opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly." *Swiss Political Science Review* 15 (2): 361–67. doi:10.1002/j.1662-6370.2009.tb00136.x.

Giugni, Marco, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly. 1999. *How Social Movements Matter*. .University of Minnesota Press.

Goldstone, Jack A. 1980. "The Weakness of Organization: A New Look at Gamson's Strategy of Social Protest." *American Journal of Sociology* 85 (5): 1017–42.

Goldstone, Jack A. 2003. *States, Parties, and Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Göle, Nilüfer. 1997. "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites." *Middle East Journal* 51 (1): 46–58.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Peter B. Mortensen. 2010. "Who Sets the Agenda and Who Responds to It in the Danish Parliament? A New Model of Issue Competition and Agenda-Setting." *European Journal of Political Research* 49 (2): 257–281.

Güçlü, Yücel. 2015. *Historical Archives and the Historians' Commission to Investigate the Armenian Events of 1915*. Lanham, Maryland MD: UPA.

Gül, Murat, John Dee, and Cahide Nur Cünük. 2014. "Istanbul's Taksim Square and Gezi Park: The Place of Protest and the Ideology of Place." *Journal of Architecture and Urbanism* 38 (1): 63–72. doi:10.3846/20297955.2014.902185.

Gundelach, Peter. 1998. "Grass-Roots Activity." In *The Impact of Values*, by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Güneş-Ayataş, Ayşe. 2013. "Republican People's Party." In *Political Parties in Turkey*, edited by Barry Rubin and Metin Heper. London, Routledge.

Gunes, Cengiz. 2011. *The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance*. New York: Routledge.

Gunter, Michael M. 1997. *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gunter, Michael M. 2000. "The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Öalan's Capture." *Third World Quarterly* 21 (5): 849–69. doi:10.1080/713701074.

Gürcan, E., and E. Peker. 2015. *Challenging Neoliberalism at Turkey's Gezi Park: From Private Discontent to Collective Class Action*. Springer.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1986. "Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research." In *The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis*, by Michael Stohl and George A Lopez, 45–71. London, New York, Greenwood Press.

*Haberturk*. 2016. "Atatürk Havalimanı 2018'de Yolcu Taşımacılığına Kapanacak | İş-Yaşam Haberleri," April 23. http://www.haberturk.com/ekonomi/is-yasam/haber/1229486-ataturk-havalimani-2018de-yolcu-tasimaciligina-kapanacak.

*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*. 2015. "Büyük İnsanlik: Biz'ler Meclise." http://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/HDP%20Se%C3%A7im%20Bildirgesi%20Tam%20Metin.pdf.

Hall, Richard. 2013. "Gezi Park Protesters Win a Concession, but Erdogan Insists They Must." *The Independent*, June 14. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/gezi-park-protesters-win-a-concession-but-erdogan-insists-they-must-still-leave-8659227.html.

Hayatsever, Hüseyin. 2013. "PKK Leader Öcalan Hands over Legacy to Umbrella Party of Leftist-Kurdish Alliance - POLITICS." *Hürriyet Daily News*, October 27. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nID=56908&NewsCatID=338.

Hazama, Yasushi. 2003. "Social Cleavages and Electoral Support in Turkey -- toward Convergence?" *The Developing Economies* 41 (3): 362–87.

"HDK Bileşeni Kurumlar." 2016. *Halklarin Demokratik Kongresi*. Accessed October 24. http://search.proquest.com/openview/32061c70adb6a1c883e78a27ce0983a5/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=54734.

HDP. 2014. "Yerel Seçim Bildirgesi." *HDP*. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/materyaller/yerel-secim-2014/yerel-secim-bildirgesi/5425.

Herbst, Susan. 1998. *Reading Public Opinion: How Political Actors View the Democratic Process*. University of Chicago Press.

Heywood, Andrew. 2007. *Politics, Third Edition*. 3rd edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2017. "Cleavage Theory Meets Europe's Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage." *EUENGAGE Working Paper Series*. http://www.euengage.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Euengage_WP2_Hoghe-Marks_.pdf.

Huet-Vaughn, Emiliano. 2013. "Quiet Riot: The Causal Effect of Protest Violence." SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2331520. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2331520.

Human Rights Watch. 2015. "Turkey: Mounting Security Operation Deaths." *Human Rights Watch*. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/22/turkey-mounting-security-operation-deaths.

Hunt, Scott A., and Robert D. Benford. 2008. "Collective Identity, Solidarity, and Commitment." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. John Wiley & Sons.

*Hurriyet Daily News*. 2013. "2.5 Million People Attended Gezi Protests across Turkey: Interior Ministry," June 23. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/25-million-people-attended-gezi-protests-across-turkey-interior-ministry-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=49292.

———. 2013. "2020 Olympics Will Be Just a Dream If Protests Continue: Istanbul Mayor," June 24. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/2020-olympics-will-be-just-a-dream-if-protests-continue-istanbul-mayor.aspx?pageID=238&nID=49415&NewsCatID=341.

———. 2013. "BDP Urges Turkey to Offer Apology to Armenians," April 24. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/bdp-urges-turkey-to-offer-apology-to-armenians.aspx?pageID=238&nID=45534&NewsCatID=338.

———. 2013. "Museum instead of Mall, Hotel or Residences at Gezi Park, Says Istanbul Mayor - LOCAL," June 8. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nid=48457.

———. 2014. "Kılıçdaroğlu Re-Elected as the CHP Chief," September 5. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/haber-detay.aspx?pageID=238&nid=71353.

———. 2017. "Erdoğan Vows to 'rebuild' Ottoman Military Barracks in Istanbul's Gezi Park - POLITICS." Accessed January 22. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nID=100645&NewsCatID=338.

*Hürriyet*. 2013. "Başbakan'dan Süre Pazarlığı," May 29. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/23390554.asp.

———. 2013. "İstanbul'un Parklarında Doğrudan Demokrasi," June 19. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/istanbulun-parklarinda-dogrudan-demokrasi-23539188.

———. 2015. "Ali İsmail Korkmaz, Eskişehir'deki Heykelinin Önünde Anıldı," July 10. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ali-ismail-korkmaz-eskisehir-deki-heykelinin-onunde-anildi-29518890.

———. 2016. "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'dan Cerattepe Çıkışı: Bunlar Da Yavru Gezi'ciler," February 27. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/video/embed/?vid=127772&resizable=1&autostart=scroll&v_utm_source=haber_detay/.

Hutter, Swen, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2013. "Movements of the Left, Movements of the Right Reconsidered." In *The Future of Social Movement Research: Dynamics, Mechanisms, and Processes*, by Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, Conny M. Roggeband, and Bert Klandermans, 281–98. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hutter, Swen, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2016. "Who Responds to Protest? Protest Politics and Party Responsiveness in Western Europe." *Party Politics*, July, 1354068816657375. doi:10.1177/1354068816657375.

"IBB Faaliyet Raporu." 2013. *İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi*. http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/BilgiHizmetleri/Yayinlar/FaaliyetRaporlari/Documents/2013/ibb_faaliyet_Raporu_pdf/ibb_faaliyetraporu2013.pdf.

*Ileri Haber*. 2014. "Birleşik Haziran Hareketi Kuruluş Çağrısı," October 20. http://www.birlesikhaziranhareketi.org/belgeler32/.

İnce, Elif. 2013. "Kışla Nasıl AVM'ye Döndü?" *Radikal*, April 30. http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/kisla_nasil_avmye_dondu-1131566/.

Inglehart, Ronald F. 2008. "Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006." *West European Politics* 31 (1–2): 130–46. doi:10.1080/01402380701834747.

*Insan haber*. 2013. "Ahmet Misbah Demircan'dan Gezi eylemleri değerlendirmesi haberi," August 23. http://www.insanhaber.com/guncel/ahmet-misbah-demircandan-gezi-eylemleri-degerlendirmesi-h20426.html.

Işık, Tarik. 2013. "HDK'dan 'Aşkım Aşkım'lı Kongre!" *Radikal*, October 26. http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/hdkdan_askim_askimli_kongre-1157515/.

Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2005. *The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems*. University of Chicago Press.

Kalaycioğlu, Ersin. 1994. "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey Changes and Continuities in the 1990s." *Comparative Political Studies* 27 (3): 402–24. doi:10.1177/0010414094027003004.

Kanal. 2014. "Kılıçdaroğlu'nun Yeni Oyunu: Occupy CHP Haberi." *Ulusal Kanal*, April 14. http://www.ulusalkanal.com.tr/gundem/kilicdaroglunun-yeni-oyunu-occupy-chp-h25895.html.

Kapucu, Naim, and Hamit Palabıyık. 2008. *Turkish Public Administration: From Tradition to the Modern Age*. USAK Books.

Karakaş, Öznur. 2017. "Hayır'ı Örgütlemek: Gezi'den Hayır'a Temsil Siyasetine Aşağıdan Müdahaleler - Öznur Karakaş." *Başlangıç*, February 12. http://baslangicdergi.org/hayiri-orgutlemek-geziden-hayira-temsil-siyasetine-asagidan-mudahaleler-oznur-karakas/.

Karasulu, Ahu. 2014. "'If a Leaf Falls, They Blame the Tree': Scattered Notes on Gezi Resistances, Contention, and Space." *International Review of Sociology* 24 (1): 164–75. doi:10.1080/03906701.2014.894337.

Key, V.O. Jr. 1967. *Public Opinion and American Democracy*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Keyder, Caglar. 1987. *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London; New York: Verso.

Keyman, E. Fuat, and Ziya Öniş. 2007. "Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery: Paradoxes of the Turkish Experience." *Globalizations* 4 (2): 211–28. doi:10.1080/14747730701345226.

Kilinç, Ramazan. 2016. "Turkish Islamism 2.0: Hegemonic, Nationalist, and Populist." *Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs*. August 30. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/turkish-islamism-2-0-hegemonic-nationalist-and-populist.

Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1986. "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 16 (1): 57–85. doi:10.1017/S000712340000380X.

———. 1992. "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe." *Politics & Society* 20 (1): 7–50.

Kızılkoyun, Fevzi. 2013. "Gezi Partisi Kuruldu." *Hürriyet*, October 24. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gezi-partisi-kuruldu-24968096.

Klingemann, H.-D. 2006. *Mapping Policy Preferences II : Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990-2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kömürcü, Derya. 2011. "'Kılıçdaroğlu Sonrası CHP' (The CHP after Kilicdaroglu)." *İktisat Dergisi*, June, 515–516 edition.

*Konda*. 2015. "June 7 Election and Electorate Analysis," June 18. http://www.konda.com.tr/en/raporlar/KONDAJune7ElectionandElectorateAnalysis.pdf.

Koopmans, Ruud. 2004a. "Movements and Media: Selection Processes and Evolutionary Dynamics in the Public Sphere." *Theory and Society* 33 (3/4): 367–91.

———. 2004b. "Political Opportunity Structure: Some Splitting to Balance the Lumping." In *Rethinking Social Movements*, by Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, 61–73. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kowalewski, David. 1987. "Asian Strikes Against Transnationals." *Comparative Political Studies; Beverley Hills, Calif.* 19 (4): 508–524.

Kraan, Dirk-Jan, Daniel Bergvall, and Ian Hawkesworth. 2007. "Budgeting in Turkey." *OECD Journal on Budgeting* 7 (2): 7–58.

Krajeski, Jenna, and Craig Fehrman. 2014. "Loud and Proud." *Slate*, March 28. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/roads/2014/03/lgbt_rights_in_turkey_after_gezi_park_lgbt_candidates_are_now_running_for.html.

Krajeski, Jenna. 2013. "In Taksim Square, Where Are the Kurds?" *The New Yorker*, June 11. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/in-taksim-square-where-are-the-kurds.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Dominique Wisler. 1999. "The Impact of Social Movements on Political Institutions: A Comparison of the Introduction of Direct Legislation in Switzerland and the United States." In *How Social Movements Matter*, edited by Marco Giugni, Doug Mcadam, and Charles Tilly. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni. 1995. *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2015. "Party Systems, Electoral Systems, and Social Movements," November. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199678402.013.24.

Kuray, Zeynep. 2015. "Kürkçü: We Are Prepared to Contest the Elections Together with the United June Movement." *ANF News*, February 16.

Kurban, Dilek. 2013. "Not a Roadmap for Peace: Erdogan's Democratisation Package Defies Kurdish Expectations." *SWP Comments*.

*Kurdistan Tribune*. 2014. "'BDP Has Solution to All Turkey's Problems, but That's Not Understood': Sebahat Tuncel on BDP-HDP Merger, The Kurdistan Tribune," April 21.

http://kurdistantribune.com/bdp-has-solution-all-turkeys-problems-but-that-was-not-understood-sebahat-tuncel-on-bdphdp-merger/.

Landau, Jacob M. 1974. *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*. BRILL.

Layman, Geoffrey C., and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002. "Party Polarization and 'Conflict Extension' in the American Electorate." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (4): 786–802. doi:10.2307/3088434.

Letsch, Constanze. 2014. "Turkish PM Offers Condolences over 1915 Armenian Massacre." *The Guardian*, April 23. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/23/turkey-erdogan-condolences-armenian-massacre.

Lichbach, Mark Irving, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1981. "The Conflict Process." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (1): 3–29.

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.

———. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven CT, Yale University Press.

Lindberg, Staffan I., Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, and Jan Teorell. 2014. "V-Dem: A New Way to Measure Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 25 (3): 159–69. doi:10.1353/jod.2014.0040.

Lipset, Seymour, and Stein Rokkan. 1990. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments." In *The West European Party System*, by Peter Mair. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lipset, Seymour. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books.

Lipsky, Michael. 1968. "Protest as a Political Resource." *American Political Science Review* 62 (4): 1144–58. doi:10.2307/1953909.

Lohmann, Susanne. 1993. "A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action." *American Political Science Review* 87 (2): 319–33. doi:10.2307/2939043.

Lord, Ceren. 2012. "The Persistence of Turkey's Majoritarian System of Government." *Government and Opposition* 47 (2): 228–55. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01360.x.

MacDonald, Alex. 2017. "'Environmental Massacre': Turkey Accused of Using Coup Powers to Crush Mine Protest." *Middle East Eye*, February 4. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/mining-dispute-turkeys-artvin-province-exposes-rifts-1337225532.

Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Stanford University Press. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=RLUJ7_YEacIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR17&dq=info:6oGqZPD-rVEJ:scholar.google.com&ots=_fmpv9EctG&sig=f0M6MPtvV4WlYw_EpwH5uVHp234.

Mair, Peter. 2009. "Representative versus Responsible Government." *MplfG Working Paper*. http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/12533.

Mango, Andrew. 1995. "Turkey in Winter." *Middle Eastern Studies* 31 (3): 620–52. doi:10.1080/00263209508701071.

"Mansur Yavaş - Projeler." 2015. *Belediye.tv*. Accessed February 22. http://www.belediye.tv/aday/mansur-yavas-9290/projeler.

Marcus, Aliza. 2009. *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*. New York: New York University Press.

Mardin, Şerif. 1973. "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus* 102 (1): 169–90.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven CT, Yale University Press.

McAdam, Doug. 1996. "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, 23–40. Cambridge University Press.

McCammon, Holly J. 2012. *The U.S. Women's Jury Movements and Strategic Adaptation: A More Just Verdict*. ., Cambridge University Press.

McCombs, Maxwell. 2004. *Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion*. Cambridge UK, Polity.

McGraw, Kathleen M. 1990. "Avoiding Blame: An Experimental Investigation of Political Excuses and Justifications." *British Journal of Political Science* 20 (1): 119–31. doi:10.1017/S0007123400005731.

Meer, Tom W. G. van der, Jan W. van Deth, and Peer L. H. Scheepers. 2009. "The Politicized Participant: Ideology and Political Action in 20 Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (11): 1426–57. doi:10.1177/0010414009332136.

Mete, Can. 2015. "Taksim'de Beton Kaplı Olan Zemine Parke Taşı Döşeniyor | Gündem Haberleri." *Haberturk*, May 23. http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1081876-taksimde-beton-kapli-olan-zemine-parke-tasi-doseniyor.

*Metropoll*. 2013. "Türkiye'nin Nabzı 'Gezi Parkı Protestoları VeTürkiye'nin Otoriterleşme - Özgürlük Sorunu'," June.

Meyersson, Erik, and Dani Rodrik. 2014. "Erdogan's Coup." *Foreign Affairs*, May 26. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141464/erik-meyersson-and-dani-rodrik/erdogans-coup.

Meyersson, Erik. 2015. "Which Country Has the Most Illiberal Democracy in the World?" *Erik Meyersson Blog*. June 18. https://erikmeyersson.com/2015/06/18/which-country-has-the-most-illiberal-democracy-in-the-world/.

Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. 1993. *Constituency Influence in Congress*. Irvington Publishers.

*Milliyet*. 2012. "HDK Partileşti HDP Oldu," October 18.

*Milliyet*. 2013. "Erdoğan: Topçu Kışlası AVM Olacak," April 29. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-topcu-kislasi-avm-olacak-siyaset-1700406/.

Moreno, Alejandro. 1999. *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, And The Consolidation Of Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Nefes, Türkay Salim. 2017. "The Impacts of the Turkish Government's Conspiratorial Framing of the Gezi Park Protests." *Social Movement Studies*, 1–13.

Nelson, Thomas E., and Zoe M. Oxley. 1999. "Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance and Opinion." *The Journal of Politics* 61 (4): 1040–1067. doi:10.2307/2647553.

"Nerede Kalmıştık?" 2016. *Gezi Partisi*. June 13. http://www.gezipartisi.org.tr/nerede-kalmistik/.

Nigogosian, Aram. 1996. "Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Recent Trends." In *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East*, by Robert W. Olson. ., University Press of Kentucky.

*NTV*. 2013. "Emek Yıkıldı!," May 21. http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/emek-yikildi,uE4GCgcoVE-pJa37I7gLYA.

O'Keefe, Michael, and Paul D. Schumaker. 1983. "Protest Effectiveness in Southeast Asia." *The American Behavioral Scientist; Princeton, N.J.* 26 (3): 375–394.

*Odatv*. 2015. "Selahattin Demirtaş O Sözleri Söylerken Hiç Utanmadı Mı," May 25. http://odatv.com/selahattin-demirtas-o-sozleri-soylerken-hic-utanmadi-mi-2505151200.html.

Olzak, Susan, and Sarah A. Soule. 2009. "Cross-Cutting Influences of Environmental Protest and Legislation." *Social Forces* 88 (1): 201–25. doi:10.1353/sof.0.0236.

Olzak, Susan. 1989. "Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action." *Annual Review of Sociology* 15 (1): 119–41. doi:10.1146/annurev.so.15.080189.001003.

Onbaşi, Funda Gençoğlu. 2016. "Gezi Park Protests in Turkey: From 'enough Is Enough' to Counter-Hegemony?" *Turkish Studies* 17 (2): 272–94. doi:10.1080/14683849.2016.1165615.

Öniş, Ziya, and Ioannis N. Grigoriadis. 2010. "Europe and the Impasse of Centre-Left Politics in Turkey: Lessons from the Greek Experience." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12 (3): 259–74. doi:10.1080/19448953.2010.506823.

Öniş, Ziya. 1997. "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective." *Third World Quarterly* 18 (4): 743–66. doi:10.1080/01436599714740.

*Oxford Dictionary of English*. 2010. 3rd edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Özen, Hayriye. 2015. "An Unfinished Grassroots Populism: The Gezi Park Protests in Turkey and Their Aftermath." *South European Society and Politics* 20 (4): 533–52. doi:10.1080/13608746.2015.1099258.

Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992. *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

*PanArmenian*. 2006. "Peaceful Co-Existence of Armenia and Turkey Possible," October 16. http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/19638/).

Passarelli, Francesco, and Guido Tabellini. 2013. "Emotions and Political Unrest." *CESifo Working Paper Series*, no. 4165. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2243459.

Patton, Marcie. 2006. "The Economic Policies of the AKP Government: Rabbits from a Hat?" *Middle East Journal* 3 (30): 513–36.

Petrocik, John R. 1996. "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study." *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (3): 825–50. doi:10.2307/2111797.

Piccio, Daniela Romeé. 2011. "Party Responses to Social Movements: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s." Florence: European University Institute.

———. 2017. "Party Support to Social Movements: An Electoral-Oriented Strategy?" *Representation* 52 (2–3): 179–89. doi:10.1080/00344893.2017.1287772.

Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard Cloward. 1978. *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. Unknown edition. New York: Vintage.

———. 1993. *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*. Updated ed. edition. New York: Vintage.

Poe, Steven C., and C. Neal Tate. 1994. "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 88 (4): 853–72. doi:10.2307/2082712.

Polk, Jonathan, Jan Rovny, Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Jelle Koedam, et al. 2017. "Explaining the Salience of Anti-Elitism and Reducing Political Corruption for Political Parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data." *Research & Politics* 4 (1): 2053168016686915. doi:10.1177/2053168016686915.

Popkin, Samuel L. 1991. *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

*Posta*. 2014. "Başkanlar Ali İsmail Korkmaz Tişörtü Giydi," December 9. http://www.posta.com.tr/baskanlar-ali-ismail-korkmaz-tisortu-giydi-haberi-257739.

*Radikal*. 2013. "Erdoğan: AKM Yıkılacak, Taksim'e Cami de Yapılacak," June 2. http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan_akm_yikilacak_taksime_cami_de_yapilacak-1135947/.

Roberts, Kenneth M. *Changing Course in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Rohrschneider, Robert, and Stephen Whitefield. 2016. "Responding to Growing European Union-Skepticism? The Stances of Political Parties toward European Integration in Western and Eastern Europe Following the Financial Crisis." *European Union Politics* 17 (1): 138–61. doi:10.1177/1465116515610641.

Rubin, Aviad, and Yusuf Sarfati. 2016. *The Jarring Road to Democratic Inclusion: A Comparative Assessment of State–Society Engagements in Israel and Turkey*. Lexington Books.

Rucht, Dieter, and Friedhelm Niedhardt. 1999. "Methodological Issues in Collecting Protest Event Data: Units of Analysis, Sources and Sampling, Coding Problems." In *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*, by Ruud Koopmans, Friedheim Niedhardt, and Rucht, 65–89. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

"Rules of Procedure." 2012. *The Grand National Assembly of Turkey*. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/yayinlar/arastirma_merkezi.pdf.

Samatyali, Elif Petek. 2016. "HDP's Tan: Conservative Kurds Unhappy with Party." *Daily Sabah*, June 13. http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/06/14/hdps-tan-conservative-kurds-unhappy-with-party.

Şardan, Tolga. 2016. "2.5 Milyon Insan 79 Ilde Sokağa Indi." *Milliyet*, June 23. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2-5-milyon-insan-79-ilde-sokaga/gundem/detay/1726600/default.htm.

Sartori, Giovanni. 2005. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Colchester, ECPR Press.

Sayari, Sabri. 1978. "The Turkish Party System in Transition." *Government and Opposition* 13 (1): 39–57. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.1978.tb00536.x.

Saymadı, Ahmet. 2015. "HDP Gezi Direnişi'nde 'Yok' Muydu?" *Radikal*, June 27. http://www.radikal.com.tr/yenisoz/hdp_gezi_direnisinde_yok_muydu-1366787/.

Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Secor, Anna J. 2001. "Ideologies in Crisis: Political Cleavages and Electoral Politics in Turkey in the 1990s." *Political Geography* 20 (5): 539–560.

*Sendika.Org*. 2016. "HDP Olağanüstü Kongresi Tamamlandı: Yeni Eşbaşkanlar Tuncel ve Kürkçü," October 26. http://sendika11.org/2013/10/hdp-olaganustu-kongresi-tamamlandi-yeni-esbaskanlar-tuncel-ve-kurkcu/.

Sharp, Gene. 1973. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Porter Sargent Publishers, Incorporated.

Shrivastava, Sanskar. 2015. "Inside Story: Occupy Gezi Movement in Turkey; Development Is Not Always Good." *The World Reporter*. Accessed March 3. http://www.theworldreporter.com/2013/06/inside-story-occupy-gezi-movement-turkey.html.

Şimşek, Şefa. 2004. "New Social Movements in Turkey Since 1980." *Turkish Studies* 5 (2): 111–39. doi:10.1080/1468384042000228611.

Snyder, David, and William R. Kelly. 1976. "Industrial Violence in Italy, 1878-1903." *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1): 131–62. doi:10.1086/226273.

*Solhaber*. 2013. "Altan Tan: HDP Kadük Bir Proje," October 23. http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/altan-tan-hdp-kaduk-bir-proje-haberi-81434.

*Solhaber*. 2013. "Selahattin Demirtaş: 'Gezi Ile Aramıza Mesafe Koyduk,'" July 31. http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/selahattin-demirtas-gezi-ile-aramiza-mesafe-koyduk-haberi-77251.

*Sözcü*. 2016. "Atatürk Havalimanı AVM Mi Olacak? Yoksa…," April 25. http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/ekonomi/ataturk-havalimani-avm-mi-olacak-yoksa-1201366/.

Steedly, Homer R, and John W Foley. 1979. "The Success of Protest Groups: Multivariate Analyses." *Social Science Research* 8 (1): 1–15. doi:10.1016/0049-089X(79)90011-5.

Stevenson, Tom. 2016. "The Rise and near Fall of Turkey's pro-Kurdish HDP." *Middle East Eye*, February 16. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/rise-and-falter-turkeys-hdp-1149857874.

Stokes, Donald E. 1963. "Spatial Models of Party Competition." *American Political Science Review* 57 (2): 368–377. doi:10.2307/1952828.

Stubager, Rune, and Rune Slothuus. 2012. "What Are the Sources of Political Parties' Issue Ownership? Testing Four Explanations at the Individual Level." *Political Behavior* 35 (3): 567–88. doi:10.1007/s11109-012-9204-2.

Taagepera, Rein. 1999. "The Number of Parties As a Function of Heterogeneity and Electoral System." *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (5): 531–48. doi:10.1177/0010414099032005001.

Tachau, Frank, and Metin Heper. 1983. "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey." *Comparative Politics* 16 (1): 17–33. doi:10.2307/421593.

Tahaoğlu, Çiçek, and Yüce Yöney. 2013. "Every Park Become Gezi Park in Turkey." *Bianet*, June 19. http://www.bianet.org/english/youth/147740-every-park-become-gezi-park-in-turkey.

*Taksim Gezi Parkı Eylemine MHP Desteği*. 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-p48vLh58co&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2011. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. 3 edn. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Taştan, Çoşkun. 2013. "The Gezi Park Protests: A Qualitative Field Research." *Insight Turkey* 15 (3): 27–38.

*The Economist*. 2016. "Erdoganomics," February 6. http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21689874-turkey-performing-well-below-its-potential-erdoganomics.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. McGraw-Hill.

———. 2004. *Social Movements, 1768-2004*. Paradigm Publishers.

*TimeTurk*. 2012. "BDP'nin Eşcinsel Evlilik Isteği Tartışılıyor," May 15. http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2012/05/15/bdp-nin-escinsel-evlilik-istegi-tartisiliyor.html.

*Today's Zaman*. 2013. "Inspired by Summer Protests, 'Gezi Party' Established - Today's Zaman, Your Gateway to Turkish Daily News," October 26. https://web.archive.org/web/20131026145611/http://www.todayszaman.com:80/news-329536-inspired-by-summer-protests-gezi-party-reportedly-established.html.

Toker, Cem. 2008. "Why Is Turkey Bogged Down?" *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 7 (1). https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/19507027/why-is-turkey-bogged-down-cem-toker.

Torcal, Mariano, and Scott Mainwaring. 2003. "Individual Level Anchoring of the Vote and Party System Stability: Latin America and Western Europe." *Seminario de Investigación de Ciencia Política* Working paper.

*TRT Haber*. 2016. "Yavuz Sultan Selim Köprüsü'nde Geri Sayım Başladı," August 20. http://www.trthaber.com/haber/turkiye/yavuz-sultan-selim-koprusunde-geri-sayim-basladi-267209.html.

Türk, Ümit, and Yaşar Kaçmaz. 2014. "CHP'li Gürsel Tekin'den Gezi Parkı'nda Açıklama." *Hürriyet*, November 20. http://webtv.hurriyet.com.tr/embed/?vid=132137&w=300&h=188&autostart=true&vup=false&ss=true&st=hurriyetsmallwidgetplayer&v_utm_source=hurriyet.

"Turkey - Overview." 2016. *The World Bank*. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview.

Türkmen, Buket. 2015. "From Gezi Park to Turkey's Transformed Political Landscape." *Open Democracy*, July 7. https://www.opendemocracy.net/buket-t%C3%BCrkmen/from-gezi-park-to-turkey%E2%80%99s-transformed-political-landscape.

Uba, Katrin. 2009. "The Contextual Dependence of Movement Outcomes : A Simplified Meta-Analysis." In *Mobilization*. Vol. 14:4, s. 433–448. Mobilization San Diego, Calif. : Dep. of Sociology, San Diego State Univ. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-128155.

———. 2016. "Protest against School Closures in Sweden: Accepted by Politicians?" In *The Consequences of Social Movements*, by Lorenzo Bosi, Marco Giugni, and Katrin Uba, 159–184. Cambridge University Press.

Updegraff, Ragan. 2015. "Turkish Politics in Action: Enter Kilicdaroglu: Toward a New CHP?" Accessed March 2. http://www.turkishpoliticsinaction.com/2010/05/enter-kilicdaroglu-toward-new-chp.html.

Uslu, Emrullah. 2008. "Ulusalcılık: The Neo-nationalist Resurgence in Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 9 (1): 73–97. doi:10.1080/14683840701814018.

Uştuk, Hilal, and Saliha Özdemir. 2017. "Emek Sineması Yakında Hizmete Açılıyor." *Anadolu Ajansı*. Accessed January 26. http://aa.com.tr/tr/kultur-sanat/emek-sinemasi-baharda-hizmete-aciliyor/503490.

Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2006. "Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce?" In *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, by Andreas Schedler. Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Vardar, Nilay, and Çiçek Tahaoğlu. 2016. "Mecliste En Genç AKP, En Yaşlı MHP." *Bianet*. Accessed October 7. http://www.bianet.org/bianet/genclik/130718-mecliste-en-genc-akp-en-yasli-mhp.

*Vatan*. 2013. "Son Seçim Anketi!," July 29. http://www.gazetevatan.com/son-secim-anketi--557785-gundem/.

Vliegenthart, Rens, Stefaan Walgrave, Ruud Wouters, Swen Hutter, Will Jennings, Roy Gava, Anke Tresch, et al. 2016. "The Media as a Dual Mediator of the Political Agenda-Setting Effect of Protest. A Longitudinal Study in Six Western European Countries." *Social Forces* 95 (2): 837–59.

Volkens, Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel, and Annika Werner. 2016. *Manifesto Project Dataset (Version 2016a)*. The Manifesto Data Collection. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/datasets?archived=yes.

Walgrave, Stefaan, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2012. "The Complex Agenda-Setting Power of Protest. Demonstrations, Media, Parliament, Government, and Legislation in Belgium, 1993-2000." *Mobilization* 17 (2): 129–56.

Watts, Nicole F. 2010. *Activists in Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey (Studies in Modernity and National Identity)*. University of Washington Press.

Weaver, R. Kent. 1986. "The Politics of Blame Avoidance." *Journal of Public Policy* 6 (4): 371–98. doi:10.1017/S0143814X00004219.

White, Jenny. 2014. *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks*. Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press.

White, Paul J. 2000. *Primitive Rebels Or Revolutionary Modernizers?: The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey*. Zed Books.

Wouters, Ruud, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2017. "Demonstrating Power." *American Sociological Review* 82 (2): 361–83. doi:10.1177/0003122417690325.

Wuthrich, F. Michael. 2015. *National Elections in Turkey*. Syracuse University Press. https://muse.jhu.edu/book/41566.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2001. "Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 7 (3): 1–24. doi:10.1080/13537110108428635.

Yavuz, Ramazan. 2013. "Demirtaş: Süreci Baltalamak Isteyenlerle Yanyana Olmayız." *Milliyet*, June 1. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/demirtas-sureci-baltalamak/siyaset/detay/1717345/default.htm.

Yeşil, Bilge. 2015. "Civic Media Project: Social Media Use and Political Activism in Turkey: 140journos, the Post of Others, and Vote and Beyond." *Civic Media Project*. http://civicmediaproject.org/works/civic-media-project/uptakecitizenjournalism.

Yildirim, Birge. 2012. "Transformation of Public Squares of Istanbul between 1938-1949." https://www.coursehero.com/file/p6hth0o/Y%C4%B1ld%C4%B1r%C4%B1mB2012-Transformation-of-public-squares-of-%C4%B0-stanbul-between-19381949-In/.

Yörük, Erdem. 2014. "The Long Summer of Turkey: The Gezi Uprising and Its Historical Roots." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 113 (2): 419–26. doi:10.1215/00382876-2644203.

Zeldin, Wendy. 2012. "Turkey: Controversial Education Reform Legislation Passed." *Library of Congress*, April 17.

Zuckerman, Alan. 1975. "Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (2): 231–48. doi:10.1017/S0007123400008140.

*Zümrüt Rize*. 2015. "Cerattepe'de Katil Şirkete Karşı Nöbet Başladı," June 26. http://web.archive.org/web/20160224181740/http://www.zumrutrize.com/17109_cerattepede-katil-sirkete-karsi-nobet-basladi.html.

Zurcher, Erik J. 2004. *Turkey: A Modern History*. 3rd ed. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

# Appendix 1: Demands of the Gezi protests

The following list is a compilation of issues raised by individuals who posted tweets tagged #OccupyGeziManifestosu, or who made comments on other social media outlets (from the website subjektif.org)

1. Taksim Project must be cancelled.
2. The Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Draft Law must be withdrawn from the National Assembly's agenda.
3. The right to assemble and demonstrate must be secured under the constitution.
4. Democracy must not be practiced only at election times: A democratic process based on community participation must be adopted.
5. City councils must take an active role in decisions related to the city and the citizens' opinions must be taken into account.
6. Electoral threshold must be lowered (which is 10% in Turkey).
7. Safety of elections must be ensured; an e-voting system must be implemented.
8. Internet filters must be removed and Internet access should not be restricted.
9. Bans affecting people's lifestyles, including the ban on alcohol and the ban on headscarves in state-owned buildings must be lifted.
10. Freedom of information must be raised to international standards.
11. Media censorship must be considered illegal.
12. Compulsory military service must be repealed.
13. Military courts must be abolished.
14. The US military bases in Turkey must be closed.
15. Students in custody must be released.
16. All discrimination based on nationality, ethnic origin, skin colour, gender, sexual orientation and sexual identity must be prohibited.
17. The destruction of nature across the country must be stopped.

18. Environmental and animal rights must be protected by the law.
19. Local referendums must be held in the regions in question for building nuclear plants, thermal plants or dams.
20. Environmental Impact Assessment reports for future dam projects must be prepared by independent scientific institutions, not by companies certified by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.
21. Gezi Park, Taşkışla, İnönü Stadium, Dolmabahçe Palace and Maçka Park must be preserved as public spaces.
22. Science, universities and the arts must be liberated.
23. Anatolia's cultural heritage must be protected.
24. Religion section must be removed from government issued identification cards.
25. Natural history museums, botanical gardens, art galleries must be prioritized over shopping malls.
26. Taksim is a symbol: Taksim must be open to all peaceful assemblies and demonstrations.
27. The Law of Police Powers, the Civil Code, the Criminal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedure must be democratized.
28. Freedom of expression must be ensured at international standards.
29. The Atatürk Cultural Centre (AKM) must not be demolished.
30. Turkey must come to terms with the Armenian genocide.
31. The government must investigate the assassination of Hrant Dink, the massacre in Roboski and the Reyhanlı incident.
32. The State Theaters and the State Opera and Ballet must not be shut down.
33. The State must be impartial to all religions and sects.
34. Individual and group lifestyles and lifestyle choices must be respected and protected by laws.
35. Turkey must stop threatening Syria. Syrian refugees must be moved to safe locations away from the border.
36. Police violence must stop.

37. Civil organizations must be liberated, and unionization must be facilitated.
38. Income inequality must be remedied.
39. The wage ceiling must not be more than ten times the minimum wage.
40. The Prime Ministers' discretionary funds must be regulated.
41. Political transparency must be ensured. All political immunities must be repealed.
42. Instead of making a new constitution, the 1961 constitution must be modernized.
43. The rule of law must be unconditionally upheld, unlawful detention of people must be stopped.
44. Mining activities must be nationalized.
45. The Turkish Petroleum Corporation must be the only institution authorized for exploring and drilling oil.
46. The Prime Minister's Office must be chaired in rotation.
47. Basic sciences must be supported.
48. Soldiers and journalists under arrest must be given a fair trial. Extrajudicial imprisonment for months and years must be stopped.
49. The abortion law must be withdrawn.
50. Once the new airport is opened, the existing airport at Yeşilköy, İstanbul should be made into a public park.
51. Education at all levels must promote scientific and up-to-date content.
52. Indicative labels must be mandatory on GMOs.
53. Demonstrators taken into custody since May 27th must be released immediately with no legal ramifications.
54. All barriers to active political participation must be removed.
55. All bans on assemblies, rallies, parades and demonstrations must be lifted; the right to assembly and to demonstrate must be fairly implemented.
56. The people must be actively included in the control mechanism of civil society organizations.

57. The Prime Minister's Office in the Beşiktaş must be relocated, and the pier must be opened to public.
58. Journalists imprisoned for expressing their thoughts and contributing to people's freedom of information must be released.
59. Active participation of professional associations must be ensured in the processes involving the legal arrangements in their respective fields.
60. Unsolved murders must be resolved, assailants must be prosecuted.
61. The sexist education system must be reformed.
62. Concrete steps must be taken towards securing children's rights to education, healthcare and justice.
63. The exploitation of labour must be stopped: permanent measures must be taken to protect workers' rights and freedoms such as occupational health and safety measures, and flexible working hours.
64. Domestic and small-size capital must be supported, monopoly must be prevented.
65. Astronomic taxes on gasoline, alcohol and tobacco must be reduced.
66. Access to safe and effective birth control methods must not require prescription; basic protection methods should be available at all at regional healthcare centres.

# Appendix 2: Coding dictionary

The following terms were used as the basis for coding of parliamentary interventions. The categories that were coded in both positive and negative directions, are indicated as such in parentheses.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Democracy** | | |
| | Right of assembly (positive) | Gösteri hak*<br>toplantı yapma hak*<br>toplantı ve gösteri*<br>Gösteri yapma hak*<br>toplantılar yapma hak*<br>gösteriler yapma hak*<br>toplantılar ve gösteri* |
| | Participative democracy (positive/negative) | Katılımcılı demokra*<br>müzakereci demokra*<br>çoğulcu demokra* |
| | Tyrannical | baskı yapmak<br>acımasız<br>gaddar*<br>zalim*<br>zulüm* |
| | Authoritarian | otoriter*<br>yetkeci* |
| | Autocratic | zorba*<br>müstebit<br>otokra*<br>despot* |
| | Dictatorship/dictatorial | diktatör*<br>saltıkçı*<br>dikte eden*<br>buyrukçuluk*<br>istibda* |
| | Repressive/oppressive | baskı rejimi*<br>baskıcı rejim* |
| | Electoral threshold (in favour of lowering/maintaining at 10%) | Seçim baraj* |
| | Safety of elections (positive) | Seçimlerin güven*<br>seçim güven* |
| | Digital voting (positive/negative) | Dijital seçim*<br>Elektronik seçim*<br>dijital oy* |
| | Internet filters (positive/negative) | İnternet filtre*<br>Filtreli internet* |
| | Freedom of information (positive) | Haber alma özgür*<br>bilgi edinme özgür*<br>haberleşme özgür*<br>haber alma hür* |
| | Censorship (negative) | Sansür* |
| | Freedom of expression (positive) | İfade özgür* |
| | Civil society (positive) | Sivil halk*<br>Sivil toplum* |
| | Transparency (positive) | şeffaf*<br>saydam*<br>Kürsü dokunul* |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Chair immunity (positive/negative) | |
| | Rule of law (positive) | hukukun egemen*<br>hukuk egemen*<br>hukuk kaide*<br>hukuk kuralı*<br>yasal hüküm<br>hukuk prensi*<br>kanuni hüküm*<br>kanunun hakim*<br>hukukun üstün*<br>hukuk devlet*<br>yasa egemen* |
| | Local referendums | yerel referendum*<br>bölgesel referendum*<br>plebisit* |
| | Democratic Culture | demokrasi kültür*<br>demokratik kültür* |
| | Law number 2911 (against it) | *2911* |
| | Political participation | Siyasi katılım*<br>Katılımcı demokra* |
| **Human Rights** | | |
| | Detained journalists (negative) | Tutuklu gazeteciler<br>tutuklanan<br>tutuklanmış gazete*<br>tutuklanmış olan gazete*<br>hapisde bulunan gazete* |
| | Extrajudicial imprisonment (negative) | Yargısız tut*<br>hukuka karşı tut*<br>hukuka aykırı tut*<br>haksız tut* |
| | Police violence (negative) | Polis şiddet*<br>polis vahşet*<br>polis istismarı<br>polis zulmü<br>tecavüz |
| | Political prisoner (negative) | siyasi tut*<br>siyasi mahkum*<br>siyasi suçlu* |
| | Human Rights | İnsan hak*<br>özgürlük hak |
| | Disproportionate (use of force) | orantısız*<br>fazlasıyla*<br>nispetsiz* |
| **Environment** | | |
| | Nature and biodiversity law (positive/negative) | Tabiat Kanunu<br>doğa kanunu<br>doğal hukuk<br>tabii hukuk<br>Tabiatı ve Biyolojik Çeşitliliği Koruma Kanun* |
| | Nature rights (positive) | Çevre hakları<br>Çevre hakk* |
| | Animal rights (positive/negative) | hayvan hakları<br>hayvan hakkı |
| | Nuclear plants (positive/negative) (excluding the term when talking about foreign policy) | nükleer santral*<br>nükleer güç* (excluding the term when talking about foreign policy)<br>nükleer enerji* (excluding the term when talking about foreign policy)<br>termik* |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Thermal plants (positive/negative) | ısıl güç santrali<br>ısıl özek |
| | Environmental impact (worried/downplaying) | Çevre Etki*<br>çevreye saygı*<br>çevresel etki*<br>Çevresel saygı* |
| | Shopping malls (positive/negative) | AVM*<br>alışveriş merkez* |
| | Parks (positive) (in the plural as we want to find cases of politicians talking about the general expansion of parks and gardens, not issues regarding to a certain park) | Parklar*<br>Bahçeler*<br>Yeşil* |
| | City esthetics (positive) | Kent esteti* |
| | Public spaces (positive) | kamusal alan<br>halka açık alan<br>Yaşam alan* |
| | Botanical gardens (positive) (minus bitkisel yag, bitkisel uretimler etc) | botanik*<br>Bitkisel* (minus bitkisel yag, bitkisel uretimler etc)<br>Bitkibilim*<br>Nebati |
| | Forest | Orman |
| | Ecologic | Ekoloji* |
| **Culture** | | |
| | Art | Sanat |
| | Museums (positive) | müze* |
| | Theatre (positive) | Tiyatro* |
| | Opera (positive) | Opera* |
| | Art galleries (positive) | Sanat galeri*<br>sergi salon*<br>resim sergi* |
| | Artists (positive) | sanatçı*<br>ressam*<br>artist*<br>heykeltıraş*<br>resimci<br>şarkıcı*<br>müzisyen* |
| | Recreation | Rekreasyon* |
| | Culture | kültür* |
| | Cinema | Sinema* |
| | Library | kütüphane* |
| **Secularism** | | |
| | Religion (+ identity card) | Din + nüfus cüzdan* |
| | Equal to religions (positive) | dine eşit*<br>mezhebe eşit*<br>mezheplere eşit* |
| | Abortion law (positive/negative) | Kürtaj* |
| | Birth control (positive/negative) | doğum kontrol*<br>gebeliği ön*<br>gebelik ön* |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Alcohol laws (positive/negative) | Alkol*<br>içki* |
| | Headscarf laws (negative - should be allowed to wear headscarf everywhere) | Türban yasağı* |
| | Life style (more individual freedom) | yaşam tarzı*<br>yaşam biçim*<br>yaşam stil*<br>Hayat tarz* |
| | Secularism (positive/negative) | Laik* |
| | Non-Muslims | gayrimüslim |
| **Feminism and LGBT** | | |
| | Gender equality (positive) | cinsiyet eşitli* |
| | Discrimination (negative) | cinsiyet ayırım* |
| | Gender issues | cinsiyet mesele* |
| | Feminism | kadın hak* |
| | Kiss (against the kissing law) | öpüş*<br>öpücük* |
| | LGBT rights (positive) | eşcinsel*<br>lgbt*<br>gay*<br>homoseksüel*<br>lezbiyen*<br>sevici*<br>cinsiyet değiş*<br>transgender* |
| **Peace** | | |
| | Compulsory military (positive/negative) | Zorunlu asker*<br>askerlik mükellef*<br>askerlik yükümlü* |
| | Military courts (positive/negative) | Askeri mahkeme* |
| | US military bases (positive/negative) | ABD askeri üs*<br>ABD askeri esas* |
| | Armenian genocide (in favour of acknowledging it as such) | ermeni soy*<br>ermenilere karşı soy* |
| | Threat to Syria (negative) | Suriye'ye tehdit |
| | Imperialism (used in a military sense) (negative) | emperyalizm |
| | Imperialistic | yayılımcı |
| | Imperialist | sömürgeci |
| | Conscientious objection | vicdani re* |
| | Pacifist | pasifi* |
| **Economic left, anti-capitalism** | | |
| | Capitalism (positive/negative) | sermayeci*<br>ana malcılı*<br>*kapitaliz*<br>*kapitalist*<br>piyasa* |
| | Socialist (positive/negative) | toplumcu*<br>sosyalist* |
| | Leftist (positive) | solcu* |
| | Resistance | Direniş<br>sendika* |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Unions (positive/negative) | |
| | Imperialism (used in an economic sense) (negative) | emperyalizm |
| | Neoliberal | Neoliberal* |
| **Gezi protests** | | |
| | Gezi protests (positive/negative) | Gezi (with reference to the protests)<br>Taksim<br>protesto* |
| | Protest (+reference to Gezi protests) | ayaklan*<br>Eylem* |
| | Events (+reference to Gezi protests) | olaylar* |
| | Looter (used satirically) (termed during Gezi) | çapulcu |

# Appendix 3: Did all party deputies speak to the same extent?

One possible concern with the way I compare the interventions of deputies from the four parties is that I use the number of seats as the common denominator when comparing interventions on the Gezi protests. This assumes that deputies from the four parties normally had equal numbers of oral interventions in parliament. A random sample of eighteen days, in which all interventions were coded, gives us an indication of whether this assumption holds. Figure 1 compares the ratio of intervention from each party, and the ratio of seats in parliament. It thus indicates whether the number of seats is reflected in how often deputies from each party made an oral intervention. Figure 1 shows that this is not the case.

Figure 1: Difference in ratios, seat allocation and actual speech in parliament




We see from the figure that the AKP deputies had much fewer interventions than their number of seats would indicate. While the party had almost 60 percent of deputies in parliament, these deputies were responsible for only 20 percent of the interventions. Conversely, the three other parties' deputies made more interventions than their numbers in parliament would indicate. This difference was biggest for the MHP and the CHP. The MHP deputies represented 10 percent of the seats in parliament, but its deputies made 23 percent of the interventions. The CHP had around a quarter of the seats in parliament, but its deputies were responsible for almost half of the interventions. This discrepancy was smaller for the BDP, whose deputies occupied around 5 percent of the seats in parliament, but spoke in less than 9 percent of the interventions. This

information is useful to keep in mind in Chapter 4, where I compare the responses of the four parties to the Gezi protests. I still use the number of seats obtained by each party as the denominator for comparison. I argue that the number of seats makes for a neater and more intuitive *y* axis (the number of interventions *per parliamentarian* for each party) than it would be if I used the normal ratios of parliamentary interventions. Yet, it is worth noting, as I do in Chapter 4, that the number of seats per party does not accurately reflect the number of interventions per party. What the figure above shows however, is that some party deputies spoke more in parliament in general, and any comparison between them might overstate one party reaction compared to another. It suffices to note here that the AKP will be severely underestimated, the CHP and MHP reactions will be grossly overestimated, and the BDP will be somewhat overestimated.