



Tchaikovsky Meets Debussy: French and Soviet Musical Diplomacy in Occupied Austria, 1945-1955

Alexander Golovlev

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization
of the European University Institute

Florence, 11 September 2017.

European University Institute

Department of History and Civilization

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List of Abbreviations

AFAA – *Association Française d’Action artistique*

ASM – Assotsiatsiia sovremennoi muzyki, Association for Contemporary Music

BKA/AA – Bundeskanzleramt/Außenamt

BMI – Bundesministerium für Inneres

CGAAA - *Commisariat Général des Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes*

DA – Der Abend

DGRC – *Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles*

DP – Die Presse

GARF – Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, State Archive of the Russian Federation

IF – Institut Français

KLA – Kärntner Landesarchiv

KIZ – Kleine Zeitung

KPÖ – Kommunistische Partei Österreichs, Communist Party of Austria

ISB – Information Service Branch

MAE AOFAA – Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives de l'Occupation Française en Allemagne et Autriche

OeStA ADR – Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Archiv der Republik

ÖNB – Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Austrian National Library

ORF – Österreichischer Rundfunk und Fernsehen, Austrian Radio and Television

öS – österreichischer Schilling, Austrian Schilling

ÖSG Österreichisch-Sowjetische Gesellschaft (Gesellschaft zur Pflege der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion) – Avstro-Sovetskoiie Obshchestvo – Austro-Soviet Society

ÖVP – Österreichische Volkspartei, Austrian People's Party

ÖZ – Österreichische Zeitung

RAVAG – Radio Verkehrs AG

RAPM – Rossiiskaia Assotsiatsiia proletarskikh muzykantov, Russian Association of Proletarian Musicians

RGANI – Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History

RGASPI – Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii, Russian State Archive of Social-Political History

RWR – Rot-Weiß-Rot Funk – Red-White-Red Network (US radio broadcaster)

SČSK (SChSK) – Sovetskaia chast'soiuznicheskoi kommissii po Avstrii, Soviet Part of the

Allied Commission (Allied Control Council) for Austria

SN – Salzburger Nachrichten

SPÖ – Sozialistische Partei Österreichs, Socialist Party of Austria

StLA – Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv

TNA – The National Archives at Kew, UK

TT – Tiroler Tageszeitung

VKP(b) – Vesoiuznaia kommunisticheskaiia partiia (bolsheviki) All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks)

VN – Vorarlberger Nachrichten

VOKS – Vsesoiuznoie obshchestvo kulturnoi sviazi s zagranitse – All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Abroad

WK – Wiener Kurier

WP – Weltpresse

WStLA – Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv

UK – United Kingdom

USA – United States of America

USIA – Upravleniie sovetskim imushchestvom v Avstrii, Administration for Soviet Property in Austria

USSR (UdSSR) – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Musical Diplomacy as a Research Object: *Problematique*, Research Field, Perspectives

Introduction: The Wandering Muse

Music is the universal language of mankind.

Henry W. Longfellow

This [“formalist”] music smacks of the spirit of the contemporary bourgeois modernist music of Europe and America... a total rejection of the musical art, an impasse.

Politburo Decree on Vano Muradeli's Opera “The Great Friendship,” 20 February 1948

Music can illuminate the delicate and often uncomfortable balance that the occupiers sought to establish between coercion and persuasion, between punishment and “reeducation”, in their separate zones of occupation... [We] will then use music to see how keen the competition was between the occupiers as the balance tipped from coercion to persuasion and the struggle developed to win over German hearts and minds.

Toby Thacker, “Music and International Relations in Occupied Germany, 1945-49,” *Music and International History in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 95.

When Beethoven began work on his Third Symphony, the momentous changes brought about by the French Revolution and its first consul inspired him with a sensation of hope and enjoyment, epitomised by the famous dedication to Napoleon. Austria's international relations were seemingly being reshaped in the context of a nascent movement towards peace and liberty, replacing previous discords with a universal harmony, proclaimed for the peoples of Europe by their French liberators. The politics of Beethoven's composition, reflecting the mood of a large proportion of the European population, aimed essentially at magnifying the values of the French Revolution, and an aspiration

towards a pan-European communion of freedom. However, Beethoven was greatly disillusioned when he heard of the imperial coronation of Napoleon, and began to perceive French foreign policy as merely aggressive. In his famous U-turn, Beethoven (physically) erased the original dedication, and wrote the name of Prince Lobkowitz instead, a high-ranking Austrian official who was, in Beethoven's mind, called upon to oppose the new tyranny. A few months later, Beethoven composed another set of pieces that immediately entered European concert rooms, and which have remained in the classic repertoire ever since: the three Razumovsky Quartets, dedicated this time to the imperial Russian ambassador to Vienna, Count Andrei K. Razumovsky, and containing what was claimed to be *Russian* themes. This episode symbolizes the tantalising cultural-political crossroads of Habsburg Austria during the revolutionary era. It also shows the ideological entanglement in which Beethoven was caught when he ushered in a shift in style that eventually led to the musical Romanticism that was to define much of nineteenth-century Western musical history.

Later intersections were often, but not always, less problematic, moving within the ever-evolving frameworks of multifarious cultural contacts and political constellations. In the meantime, the dedications diplomacy continued. Johann Strauss Jr., who toured Russia and rose to immediate popularity among the aristocracy and the concert-going public, dedicated a prodigious amount of waltzes, marches and polkas to members of the imperial family. One of his marches was dedicated to Napoleon III, too. Perceived as a quintessentially Austrian phenomenon, the Viennese operetta was influenced by its Parisian counterpart, and the Russians made an entry later, led by the music of Tchaikovsky, and, in a perfect embodiment of a Franco-Russo-French transnational entanglement, the *Ballets Russes* of Serge Diaghileff. Although they never performed in Vienna, the renewed school of academic dance and daunting musical experiments, such as Stravinsky's *Rite of Spring*, which caused a riot during its Parisian première, sent reverberations throughout Europe. The Russian ballet and musical modernity arrived upon the stage, setting the scene for much of twentieth-century musical development, just as the tectonic shifts that occurred in *fin-de-siècle* Vienna and Paris.

World War I and the subsequent revolutions in Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary swept away the *ancien régime* in the three former empires, and transfigured Central and Eastern Europe into a radically new political arrangement, dominated by the discourses of nationalism, authoritarianism and totalitarianism, particularly following the rise of the Stalinist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Simultaneously, a wide array of different types of musical modernity invaded the soundscapes of Europe – American forms such as jazz and atonal music, stringent academicism, and new forms of alternative musical and dance performance, all of which articulated themselves within a world oscillating between democracy, economic crisis and the looming threat of war.

Finally, following the elimination of an independent Austrian state in 1938, the *étrange défaite* of

France, Nazi rule over most of Europe, and the Third Reich's subsequent downfall, the Soviets and the French as well as Great Britain and the United States all arrived in Vienna. Not only did they set up an occupation regime that was to endure for ten years, owing to stagnant negotiations over Austria's future status, but they also propelled the country to the forefront of the Cold War, and exposed Austria, alongside its greater northern neighbour, to an unprecedented plethora of cultural activities, directed and financed by governments eager to win the hearts and minds of the now denazified, democratised and “de-Prussianised” Austrians. The soundscape of Vienna was almost immediately filled with both classical and entertainment music, first at the behest of the Soviets and later that of other powers. This flow of cultural exchange was indeed unparalleled in Austrian history, concomitant with the country's own economic miracle, and the build-up of a stable, independent democracy. The Second Republic success story was finally confirmed with the State Treaty of 1955, leading Austria into full sovereignty as a democratic, neutral Alpine nation.

Music has always had a particular meaning in Austrian society, given the country's symbolic capital and international standing in Europe and the world. Together with the Habsburg palaces and the Alps, Mozart and the Viennese waltz have come to symbolise what Austria means to the outside world, be it touristic promotion campaigns or popularly transmitted images, such as the *Sound of Music* or the *Great Waltz*. Music thus also became a locus of contested Austrian national identities, becoming highly relevant for Austrians' self-understanding and their relation to the outside world. Likewise, the State Opera, the Viennese *Musikverein* and *Konzerthaus*, and the Salzburg and Bregenz Festivals have become coveted scenes for foreign musicians to establish and reinforce their position within an international hierarchy of prestige: performing and winning recognition in Austria conveys a sense of international quality. Thus, cultural prestige works both ways. It has introduced an international dimension to Austrian musical history, while also projecting Austria's local and national history into the increasingly interconnected world of the twentieth century.

Yet how could music be linked to international relations? Can one discern a parade – or a contest – of nations, comparable to the battle for political sympathies? What does music stand for in international relations, whom can it represent, and how should the same relations be construed and understood? Seeking for an answer to these questions requires consideration of multiple fields of inquiry, concerned with local and national cultural history, public space, cultural nationalism, and inter- and transnational relations. And, in my view, it must eschew simplistic explanations, requiring careful weighing of different factors and lines of thought.

Indeed, such a multifaceted *problematique* addresses the potential of culture to “portray a national

society *in toto*,”¹ and music's ability to “perform the nation”² (as some argue, music in this sense acts as “a form of representation, even though it does not represent anything outside of itself”³). Music, therefore, appears to lend itself to differing interpretations. Indeed, international cultural relations have presented scholars with a number of theoretical difficulties. As Iola Brubeck, the wife of Dave Brubeck, who performed as a US jazz ambassador, put it, “no commodity is quite so strange as this thing called cultural exchange.” Having entered the catchphrase hall of fame of historical research,⁴ the utterance does justice to the immensely complex nature of this research object. In the balancing of material and immaterial means of foreign policy and international contacts, music comes first among the latter, a ghostly object, difficult to catch and to localise. Consequently, this raises a number of definitional questions that feed into the problem of understanding music's role in international history. What is music? What is, indeed, culture? How can this elusive phenomenon be attached to a nation, be it an “imagined community” or a sovereign state, a classic (Realist) actor of international relations?

While the following study will not inquire into the fundamental philosophy and aesthetics of music, and will necessarily keep its distance from the vast discussion on culture in general, I nonetheless believe that it is important to introduce a few definitions that will serve as instruments for analysing the phenomena of musical transmission, which will be at the core of this dissertation. Therefore, following the two-sided approach to culture developed in cultural anthropology, and later transmitted through the new cultural history (Raymond Williams, Lynn Hunt and others) and studies on cultural diplomacy, I understand culture as

“ [a] recognizable set of norms and beliefs by which a society might define itself; secondly, the forms of political culture by which the different political systems define their basic values and the roles of participants; and thirdly, the domain of 'high culture', involving the positions of intellectuals and developments in the arts.”⁵

1

Theodor L. Deibel, William R. Roberts, *Culture and Information. Two Foreign Policy Functions* (The Washington Papers, IV, 40) (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1976), 15.

² Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “The World Is Ready To Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global Performance of America,” *Diplomatic History* 36:1 (2012), 17.

³ Roland Bleiker, “Of Things We Hear but Cannot See: Musical Explorations of International Politics,” Marianna I. Franklin, ed., *Resounding International Relations: On Music, Culture and Politics* (New York, 2005): 179.

⁴ See: Reinhold Wagnleitner, “No Commodity Is Quite So Strange As This Thing Called Cultural Exchange’: The Foreign Politics of American Pop Culture Hegemony,” *Amerikastudien / American Studies* 46:3: Popular Culture (2001): 443- 470.

⁵ Hans Krabbendam, Giles Scott-Smith, “Introduction: Boundaries to Freedom”, *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe: 1945-1960 (=Studies in Intelligence)* (London, Frank Cass: 2003): 3.

The second third part of this definition lies squarely within the field of studies on arts and music, and also captures the narrower approaches to culture transmitted among the educated European middle classes. Moreover, as I will argue, it was also instrumental for the notional convergence between the French, the Austrians and the Soviets.

Moving closer to music as an expression of culture also requires an operational tool, that is, a working definition of music itself. Conceptualising music in a holistic way unsurprisingly reveals a host of ontological problems. Defining music is a daunting, and arguably impossible task, as is the fundamental question underlying every inquiry into the effects music has on human beings: what is the *beauty* of music, what emotions does music provoke in human listeners⁶ and what “objective” foundations, beyond social norms, can be traced in our (or others’) musical preferences? Therefore, recognising these complexities, and taking music’s intertwinement with international relations into account from both from a theoretical and practical perspective, I understand music as the main constitutive element of musical diplomacy, an object of analysis articulated as

“[a] generalised noun for any number of material and social practices or objects of analysis that are sonic, ‘organised’, ‘found’ or sampled sounds of some sort or another that can be created and performed nowadays by any number of instruments, traditional and electronic. Second, we consider that studies of music, broadly defined, can be deployed to consider longstanding questions in the field of IR and can indeed open up new avenues for addressing those elements of social/political/economic relations that are suppressed in international politics.”⁷

Rather than offering ready-made solutions, such working definitions reveal the capaciousness of research perspectives, and, correspondingly, offer significant room for manoeuvre in defining the main avenues to be explored, depending on the specific nature of the questions being asked. Notably, the impact of the world of sounds on the “musical construction of nationalism”⁸ at home,

⁶ A profound, yet concise, introduction to the research on philosophy of music can be seen in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Andrew Kania, “The Philosophy of Music,” Edward N. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition). Accessed 04.02.2017. URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/music/>.

⁷ Matt Davies, and Marianna I. Franklin, “What Does (The Study of) World Politics Sound Like,” *E-International Relations*, June 9, 2015. Accessed 04.02.2017. URL: <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/09/what-does-the-study-of-world-politics-sound-like/>.

⁸ Harry White and Michael Murphy, eds., *Musical Constructions of Nationalism: Essays on the History and Ideology of European Musical Culture 1800-1945* (Cork: Cork UP, 2001). Benedikte Brincker, Jens Brincker, “Musical Constructions of Nationalism: A Comparative Study of Bartók and Stravinsky,” *Nations and Nationalism* 10:4 (2004), 579-597.

“resounding international relations”⁹ abroad, and the role of “music in international relations”¹⁰ has captured the attention of scholars during the last decade (the following sub-chapter will study the historiography of international musical relations and its adjacent fields in greater depth). Music, by its non-verbal and seemingly “non-coercive” nature, seemed to gain additional credibility in the eyes of foreign audiences, thus being ultimately seized upon as a means of foreign policy by governments eager to project their power and influence within an increasingly competitive world. If we take into account the performative character of music, and its shifting interactions with power and identity, then it is reasonable to assume, following Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, that music functioned as “an instrument of hegemony and resistance; a reflection of identity and protest; a means of communication; a forum of encounter; but most of all, as a transporter for atmosphere, mood, and emotion in the making of international affairs.”¹¹ Following this approach, it seems reasonable to regard the cardinal question of the role of music in IR as falling into the categories of non-state and state agency, in particular the divergence of music's perception as a non-political phenomenon, and its entanglements with geopolitics and nationality both on the “sending” and the “receiving” end. In other words:

“[H]ow and why did this transformation of musical diplomacy from non-state to state control happen?

And how does it relate to ideas and perceptions of music as increasingly apolitical and international?

When and how do the national, the geopolitical and the international come into play? Do Asian audiences listening to a European concert consider themselves national beings? Or do they forget their regional identities during a musical experience? Do listeners, musicians and organizers switch identities according to their actions, identifying themselves as national and at other times as non-national?”¹²

Music, thus, does not exist in an ethereal world of international harmony. Whether it be conceived as an “emotions diplomacy”,¹³ or as a form of “nation-branding”, music enters the social practices of production, transmission and reception. It is bound into – and by – the structures of power, and is

⁹ See Franklin, ed., 2005.

¹⁰ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, ed., *Music and International History in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015).

¹¹ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “Introduction: Sonic History, or Why Music Matters in International History,” *Music and International History in the Twentieth Century*: 4.

¹² *Ibid*: 4, 20.

¹³ Mary Einbinder, *Cultural Diplomacy: Harmonizing International Relations through Music* (MA Thesis, New York University 2013).

subject to interpretation, both within and without the limits of different epistemological communities, including local circles of musically interested publics, regions, nations and other societal entities.

Musical diplomacy, a term which I use to describe the employment of music in its various instantiations as a means to represent a country, a nation or a society to a foreign audience, requires a differentiated analysis on all layers of this interaction. It does not necessarily cover all aspects of cultural and specifically musical policies, nor does it ultimately account for all processes of cultural transmission and appropriation. The first limitation concerns those musical policies deployed by states outside of the field of promotion of their own culture. For example, in the German and Austrian context, much of cultural denazification will be left out of consideration, while retaining its relevance as a contextual factor for the reception of foreign music(s). The second limitation bears on the long-term developments of social-political context that occur independently of foreign actors. For instance, the *Rezeptionsgeschichte* of such authors as Tchaikovsky stretches over more than a century, and would necessarily transcend the temporal and political limits of the Soviet cultural presence in Austria, its immediate outcomes and concomitant processes. Musical diplomacy overlaps with, but does not fully cover these two aspects, which, while being addressed to some extent in this study, and factoring into my analysis of Franco-Austro-Russian musical-diplomatic entanglement, nonetheless retain a degree of conceptual and methodological autonomy, and offer future perspectives for further reflection upon musical diplomacy and inter- or transcultural exchange.

The communicative aspect inherent to musical diplomacy also justifies my use of the term *cultural transfer*. For empirical and methodological reasons, this study concentrates on the unidirectional flow from France and the USSR towards Austria, and not the concomitant export of Austrian cultural products to the former countries. However, Austrian feedback, the reception of Austrian music, and the construction of Austrian imageries within the French and Russian/Soviet societies (and, more specifically, among the cultural-diplomatic decision-makers) did impact upon the conceptualisation and conduct of Allied cultural diplomacies, particularly the perspectives of both government officials and musicians. Cultural transfer rightly emphasises dialogue over power projection, using the metaphor of (increasingly) connected vessels. It is remarkable that the notion of cultural transfer has stemmed from studies on Franco-Germanic, but also Franco-Germano-Russian, cultural contacts.¹⁴ Although early post-war Austria did not have the means to launch cultural campaigns comparable to those of the Allies, such *interconnections* – and cultural, educational and discursive *interdependences* – cannot be overlooked, even in a classical occupation context marked by a supposed top-down power projection.

¹⁴ Michel Espagne, *Les transferts culturels franco-allemands* (Paris : PUF, 1999). This has been extensively translated into Russian, and has inspired a number of works on early modern Russian history and European culture.

Thus, musical communication brings forward a number of cultural actors, and the problem of the nature of their relations, beyond the general interstate level. For a more differentiated view on the creators, transmitters and audiences that engaged with music,¹⁵ a sociologically determined perspective can provide a prism through which to consider musical transfers. The sociology of music brings to light the complexity of musical embedded-ness within the politics of self-perception, expression, and representation, the formation of discourse and knowledge-power, the definition of cultural habitus and inter- and transnational flows of objects, as well as cultural standards and ideas generated by and through music. Thus, diplomacy by the means of music – and music itself as a channel of international communication – suggests a vast array of potentialities. In order to provide a systematic overview of the problems discussed here, I will now look more closely into the development of those academic research frameworks into which this study will be inscribed, and will try to elucidate how the present inquiry can be placed within a wider interdisciplinary discourse, and contribute to reflection upon the importance of music(s) in international and global history.

Musical Diplomacy: Theory and Practice from a Historiographical Perspective

The literature brought within the remit of this survey can be broadly divided between several disciplines. National historiographies are represented by Austrian histories that explored the foundation of the Second Republic, and particularly its political and cultural history within the context of its monarchic, republican, corporatist and Nazi past and the Allied occupation. Subsequent developments effectively opened the school of Austrian history to the study of international relations and the Cold War, responding to fears of provincialism and empiricism that had been expressed regarding studies produced before the 1970s-1980s.¹⁶ Furthermore, IR and cold war studies, dominated by the Anglophone research community, provided another conceptual point of departure for studies on post-war regional history from an outside perspective; in particular, the debates between realists and liberals, and the crystallisation of neo-realist and constructivist approaches, had a substantial impact on the study of international policies and transborder processes. The cultural turn of the 1980s-1990s involved both “intra”-social and international dimensions, producing a number of “new” disciplines pertaining to the study of culture. Thus, the role of culture in general,

¹⁵ See Sven Oliver Müller, *Das Publikum macht die Musik. Musikleben in Berlin, London und Wien im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014).

¹⁶ Ernst Hanisch, “Österreich: Die Dominanz des Staates. Zeitgeschichte im Drehkreuz von Politik und Wissenschaft,” *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte. Begriffe, Methoden und Debatten der zeithistorischen Forschung*. Accessed 10.02.2017. URL: https://www.docupedia.de/zg/%C3%96sterreich-%E2%80%93_Die_Dominanz_des_Staates_Zeitgeschichte_im_Drehkreuz_von_Politik_und_Wissenschaft/Text.

and arts, dance and music in particular, within the construction and negotiation of power relations, identities (national, racial, sexual and others), socially transmitted norms, conformism and resistance has been brought to the fore. The new sociology of culture, the new sociology of music, and, indeed, the new musicology and new dance studies, together brought about systematic shifts in the understanding of culture and the social fabric of artistic production, interpretation and performance, effectively de-reifying works of art in favour of a dynamic understanding of culture's existence. A number of these questions will substantially inform the present enquiry, notably music and power, music and ideology, music and foreign policy, music and the other arts, and “national” music in international competition.

These questions, while being highly relevant to the study of twentieth-century music¹⁷ and beyond, have also provided the mainstay of research into historical musicology and musical sociology¹⁸ in the last two decades, as the discipline began to critically engage with the relationship between music and culture in general,¹⁹ and societal influences on musical creation, reproduction and consumption.²⁰ “Musicking”²¹ and musical performance²² became recognised as a remarkably social, and, indeed, political process. As a performance art, it was observed, music requires an agent (musician), a stage and an audience, with a sort of hierarchy and power relation being subtly constructed.²³ The listener therefore becomes a salient figure in analysing instantiations of musical performance and interaction, and listeners' responses become central to the study of music. Thanks to psychologically oriented studies on music's impact within the emotional sphere,²⁴ performing music and writing on music²⁵ are no longer seen as part of an isolated creative process. To the contrary, these phenomena are now

¹⁷ Nicholas Cook and Anthony Pople, *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Music* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004).

¹⁸ Rose Subotnik, *Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). A first general, and extremely valuable, overview has been provided with the recent compendium: John Shepherd and Kyle Devine, eds., *The Routledge Reader on the Sociology of Music* (New York; London: Routledge – Taylor&Francis, 2015).

¹⁹ Martin Clayton et al., eds., *The Cultural Study of Music: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

²⁰ Richard Leppert and Susan McClary, eds., *Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance and Reception* (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987). David Hesmondhalgh, “Towards a Critical Understanding of Music, Emotion and Self-Identity,” *Consumption, Markets and Culture* 11:4 (2008): 329-343. White Rose Research Online. Accessed December 1, 2016. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10253860802391334>.

²¹ Christopher Small, *Musicking. The Meanings of Performing and Listening* (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan UP, 1998 [1987]).

²² Nicholas Cook, “Between Process and Product: Music and/as Performance,” *MTO a Journal of the Society for Music Theory* 7:2 (2001). Accessed 10 February 2017. URL: <http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.01.7.2/mto.01.7.2.cook.html>.

²³ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, „The World is Ready to Listen : 19-20, 28

²⁴ Patrik N. Juslin and John A. Sloboda, eds., *Handbook of Music and Emotion: Theory, Research, Applications* (New York; Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010).

²⁵ Fritz Trümpi and Simon Obert, eds., *Musikkritik. Historische Zugänge und systematische Perspektiven* (=Cornelia Szabó-Knotik and Christian Glanz, eds., *ANKLAENGE – Wiener Jahrbuch für Musikwissenschaft*, Ausgabe 2015) (Vienna: Mille Tre Verlag, 2015). Isabelle Mayaud and Séverine Sofio, “La critique artistique et musicale, un objet de recherches à investir aux croisement des disciplines,” *Sociétés et Représentations* 40:2 (2015): 9-24.

analysed from the perspective of their social framing, before, during and after instantiations of musical production, instead of a traditional approach that emphasised close examination of musical texts. This dynamic field has borrowed much from the social sciences, and relies on theories of socially constructed distinctions in interpretations of style, being particularly influenced by critical theory and French sociologists of power and culture, such as Michel Foucault or Pierre Bourdieu.

The study of music's social implications is traditionally traced back to Max Weber, whose contribution to the field resulted from his theorisation of the rationalisation processes prevalent in modern western societies, and centrally involved what later came to be known as modern-era "classic" art music. The Frankfurt school, stemming from Walter Benjamin, subsequently gained ascendance within music research, particularly due to Theodor Adorno's socially rooted interrogation of the role of classic²⁶ and modern music within the framework of capitalist commodification.²⁷ Lawrence W. Levine's seminal study on the differentiation of high- and low-brow culture²⁸, along with the theory of distinction of Pierre Bourdieu²⁹, have further informed the perspectives and methodologies of research on the role of music within society. These classic works of cultural sociology became the focus of later (and often heated) discussion³⁰ regarding the reception of musical styles by different social groups, and the ways in which social (that is, not inherently musical) meaning is attached to musical production and consumption. Later authors have called into question both Adorno's schematism (notably, on jazz), as well as Bourdieu's seeming determinism. However, the contribution of the latter nonetheless remains a cornerstone for research on music, its social connotations and its forms of existence. Likewise, Jacques Attali's contribution to the study of the *political economy* of music³¹ left a profound impression upon theoretical and applied musicology. In fact, the "critical-deconstructive" philosophy of music,³² having long existed on the margins of mainstream thought, has by now largely subverted the dominant discourses on music, reaping its rewards in the research of the past two decades. However, the sense of

²⁶ Pierre-Michel Wenger, "Y a-t-il une sociologie possible de l'oeuvre musicale ? Adorno et au-delà" *L'Année sociologique* 2/60 (2010): 331-360.

²⁷ Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik* (=Gesammelte Schriften 12) (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1990 [1949]). English translation: Theodor W. Adorno, Robert Hullot-Kentor, transl., *Philosophy of New Music* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).

²⁸ Lawrence W. Levine, *Highbrow / Lowbrow. The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard UP, 1988).

²⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, *La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement* (Paris : Les Editions de Minuit, 1979). English translation : Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction : A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge, MA ; London : Harvard UP, 1984).

³⁰ See the quintessence of criticism of Bourdieu's and Adorno's determinism in: *The Routledge Reader on the Sociology of Music*, 339-367.

³¹ Jacques Attali, *Bruits: essai sur l'économie politique de la musique* (Paris: PUF, 1977) [English translation: *Noise: The Political Economy of Music* (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1984)]

³² Mirko M. Hall, *Musical Revolutions in German Culture: Musicking against the Grain, 1800-1980* (=Studies in European Culture and History) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.)

methodological renovation within musical studies³³ brought about by such authors has not yet lost its novelty,³⁴ partly due to lingering academic conservatism, and partly due to the fact that many themes are yet to be explored within such a multidimensional social framework.

In the field of dance studies, the new dance history and theory have to a large extent followed the new cultural history and new musicology, particularly in their socially contextualised focus. Reflection on dancing – which will feature in this thesis, both in its academic and folk form – has undergone a series of tectonic shifts since the 1990s, owing to an increasingly professionalised analysis of movements practice, and also of the social (group, minorities, gender, sexuality, cultural consumption, low/high-brow), political, economic, and identity factors that dance performance reveals.³⁵ Finally, dancers entered inter- and transnational relations as cultural ambassadors, employed by their respective governments, and representing a complex identity composed of their social background and performing practices.³⁶ Not unlike music history, France's example is striking in its articulation of all these intersecting, and conflicting, tendencies, all of which will figure in this thesis. The politics of the foreign, the construction of the national through an appropriation of a Russian musical product which was itself a blending of French and Italian cultural traditions, discussion of the male and the female body, professionalization, republican values, and shifting attitudes towards ballet's role in the society or the nation³⁷ have wide-ranging implications beyond a single national case or time period.

The international entanglements of music thus presuppose its intra-social and intra-national rooting, an issue which has brought to the fore the question of music and nationalism. The construction of musical identities and the complex relation between music and power cannot be

³³ Jane F. Fulcher, "Introduction: Defining the New Cultural History of Music, Its Origins, Methodologies, and Lines of Inquiry," in: Jane F. Fulcher, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the New Cultural History of Music* (New York et al.: Oxford UP, 2011): 1-14.

³⁴ Carlotta Sorba (ed.), "Per una nuova storia sociale e culturale della musica (forum con interventi di C.Applegate, J.F.Fulcher, W.Weber, C.Newark, M.Traversier, A.Portelli)" *Contemporanea* 3 (2012): 493-528.

³⁵ Susan Leigh Foster, *Reading Dancing: Bodies and Subjects in Contemporary American Dance* (Oakland: UC Press, 1986). Mark Franko, *Dancing Modernism/Performing Politics* (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1995). Jane C. Desmond, ed., *Meaning in Motion: New Cultural Studies on Dance* (Fish, Stanley and Fredric Jameson, eds., *Post-Contemporary Interventions*) (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2003 [1997]). Randy Martin, *Critical Moves. Dance Studies in Theory and Politics* (Durham, NC; London: Duke UP, 1998). Helena Wulff, *Ballet Across Border. Career and Culture in the World of Dancers* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1998). Eiusdem, *Dancing at the Crossroads. Memory and Mobility in Ireland* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007). Alexandra Kolb and Janet O'Shea, eds., *The Routledge Dance Studies Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2010 [1998]). André Lepecki, *Exhausting Dance: Performance and the Politics of Movement* (New York: Routledge, 2006). Gerald Siegmund and Stefan Hölscher, eds., *Dance, Politics & Co-Immunity (Thinking Resistances. Current Perspectives on Politics and Communities in the Arts, 1)* (Zurich; Berlin: Diaphanes 2013). Laure Guilbert and Partick Germain-Thomas, "Editorial: Danse(s) et politique(s). Un état des lieux," *Recherches en Danse* 4 (2015). Accessed December 1, 2016. URL: <http://danse.revues.org/1197>.

³⁶ Clare Croft, *Dancers as Diplomats: American Choreography in Cultural Exchange* (Oxford; New York: Oxford UP, 2015).

³⁷ Ilyana Karthas, *When Ballet Became French: Modern Ballet and the Cultural Politics of France, 1909-1939* (Montreal et al.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015).

understood in simple linear terms. Indeed, the study of European nationalisms³⁸ has shown how music could be entangled in the rhetoric of cultural “awakening” and the self-assertion of a “national body,” both internally as a cohesive community and in competition with other nations.³⁹ For instance, late nineteenth-century France saw a political invasion of music by nationalists, prompting composers (such as Debussy or Erik Satie) to adopt various, and often non-linear, responses of accommodation or subversion.⁴⁰ For their part, the figures of Franz Liszt, Frédéric Chopin and Richard Wagner⁴¹ have been intensively studied from the perspective of a national and nationally connoted public-space. Similarly, the genre of opera has been systematically investigated from the perspective of its social, political and national implications.⁴² The mechanisms of the construction of “French” (*grand opéra*⁴³), “German”, “Czech”, and “Russian”⁴⁴ national musics and operas – as a European phenomenon⁴⁵ – indicate the musical response to non-musical social developments. These non-musical processes were projected onto the international stage of Western art music: modern musical history thus portrays a transnational movement of nationalist ideologies, whereby particular musical styles and genres were given national labels, and increasingly perceived as bearers of a performed national identity.

In a classic case of music-related nationalism, music played a key role in constructing and maintaining a sense of German national identity,⁴⁶ since, due to the extremes of German political nationalism, it had long been considered the “most German of arts,”⁴⁷ from the cultural-political imperialism of *Kulturträgetum* through to the end of the Nazi era. The German musical tradition,

³⁸ Philip V. Bohlman, *The Music of European Nationalism. Cultural Identity and Modern History* (=ABC-CLIO World Music Series) (Santa Barbara, CA et al: ABC CLIO, 2004).

³⁹ Harry White and Michael Murphy, eds., *Musical Constructions of Nationalism...* Ljoep Leersen, “Romanticism, Music, Nationalism,” *Nations and Nationalism* 20:4 (2014): 606-27.

⁴⁰ Jane F. Fulcher, *French Cultural Politics and Music. From the Dreyfus Affair to the First World War* (New York; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999).

⁴¹ Hannu Salmi, *Imagined Germany: Richard Wagner's National Utopia (German Life and Civilization, 29)* (Chicago: University of Michigan Press, 1999). The scholarly debate on Wagner's anti-semitism (Barenboim) can only be indicated here. Wagner's influence on Debussy, being relevant to this thesis, are a commonplace in musical literature.

⁴² Victoria Johnson, Jane F. Fulcher and Thomas Ertman, eds. *Opera and Society in Italy and France from Monteverdi to Bourdieu* (=Cambridge Studies in Opera) (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007).

⁴³ For a differentiated discussion of the role of opera in nineteenth-century French society, and the influence of the state and the public on opera theatres, see Jane F. Fulcher, *The Nation's Image. French Grand Opera as Politics and Politicized Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002).

⁴⁴ Richard Taruskin, *Defining Russia Musically: Historical and Hermeneutical Essays* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton UP, 1997). Marina Frolova-Walker, “On Ruslan and Russianness,” *Cambridge Opera Journal* 9:1 (1997): 21-45. Eiusdem, *Russian Music and Nationalism: From Glinka to Stalin* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2007).

⁴⁵ Philipp Ther, *In der Mitte der Gesellschaft. Operntheater in Zentraleuropa 1815-1914* (Wien; München: Oldenbourg, 2006). Philipp Ther, Peter Stachel, eds., *Wie europäisch ist die Oper? Die Geschichte des Musiktheaters als Zugang zu einer kulturellen Topographie Europas* (Wien: Böhlau, 2009). Sven Oliver Müller et al., eds., *Die Oper im Wandel der Gesellschaft. Kulturtransfers und Netzwerke des Musiktheaters im modernen Europa* (Wien: Böhlau, 2010).

⁴⁶ Celia Applegate and Pamela Potter, eds., *Music and German National Identity* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2002). On the long-term impact of music on German history (from a psychoanalytic perspective), see David Schwarz, *Listening Awry. Music and Alterity in German Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).

⁴⁷ Pamela Potter, *Most German of the Arts: Musicology and Society from the Weimar Republic to the End of Hitler's Reich* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1998).

loaded with legacies from the *Kaiserzeit*, Weimar era and Nazi rule, was subsequently reshaped by the Cold War, and the development of two separate German states.⁴⁸ Scholars have explored the ways in which the construction and perception of “German” music and musical “Germanness,” both by Germans and international cultural actors or publics, reflected various patterns of cultural authority, appropriation, negation and reinterpretation.⁴⁹ Individual genres, such as symphony, have also been critically analysed from the perspective of their political implications.⁵⁰ Music from Germany and by Germans came to be regarded as the yardstick against which other nations would be measured (precisely because of its proclaimed universality⁵¹), and also as a means to establish the supposed cultural supremacy of Germany. Therefore, music can offer a way to understand larger issues of national history (in this case German), despite the fact that it has often been underestimated by historians outside of the field.⁵² The problematic special relationship of Germans to music⁵³ certainly leads to wider considerations, including national self- and foreign imagery, also applicable to France, Russia, the US, and others.

Furthermore, it also relates to the social prestige of music and musicians in countries like Austria, particularly in the wake of the war, and their potential receptivity to and interpretation of foreign musics. Recent research has done much to uncover the links between music and the political sphere, using the telling example of German-speaking Central Europe. The role that German musicians played, the choices they made under National-Socialism,⁵⁴ and the impact of Nazism on German musical writing⁵⁵ had notable repercussions on Austria and Vienna,⁵⁶ as many musicians moved

⁴⁸ Elizabeth Janik, *Recomposing German Music: Politics and Musical Tradition in Cold War Berlin* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005).

⁴⁹ Sabine Mecking and Yvonne Wasserloos, eds., *Inklusion und Exklusion: “Deutsche” Musik in Europa und Nordamerika* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2016)

⁵⁰ Karen Painter, *Symphonic Aspirations: German Music and Politics, 1900-1945* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard UP, 2007).

⁵¹ Celia Applegate and Pamela Potter, “Germans as the ‘People of Music:’ Genealogy of an Identity,” in: Celia Applegate and Pamela Potter, eds, *Music and German National Identity*, 1.

⁵² See Celia Applegate, “Introduction: Music Among the Historians,” *German History* 30:3 (2012): 329-349. Accessed December 1, 2016. DOI: 10.1093/ghis/ghs039. <http://m.gh.oxfordjournals.org/content/30/3/329.full>.

⁵³ Celia Applegate, “Saving Music: Enduring Experiences of Culture,” *History and Memory* 17:1-2 (2005): 217-237. Accessed December 1, 2016. URL: <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/186202>. (This thought runs like a red thread through the majority of works on historical musicology, and its intellectual history has been widely problematised in English-, German- and French-language research.)

⁵⁴ See the classical opus magnum of Fred Prieberg: *Musik im NS-Staat* (Frankfurt a/M: Fischer, 2010 [1982]). Among other literature: Alan E. Steinweis, *Art, Ideology and Economics in Nazi Germany. The Reich Chambers of Music, Theater, and the Visual Arts* (Chapel Hill; London: UNC Press, 1993). Michael Kater, *The Twisted Muse: Musicians and Their Music in the Third Reich* (New York; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997).

⁵⁵ Thorsten Hindrichs and Christoph Hust, “Tagungsbericht zur internationalen Tagung ‚Musikwissenschaft im Nationalsozialismus und in faschistischen Regimen. Kulturpolitik – Methoden – Wirkungen’,” *H-Soz-Kult* 05.04.2000. Accessed December 1st, 2016. URL: <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/beitrag/tagber/musik.htm>.

⁵⁶ Oliver Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet. Künstlereliten im Dritten Reich* (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1991). Manfred Permoser, *Die Wiener Symphoniker im NS-Staat* (Frankfurt a/M; Vienna: Peter Lang, 2000). Carmen Ottner, ed., *Musik in Wien 1938-1945 (=Studien zu Franz Schmidt XV – Symposium 2004)* (Vienna: Doblinger, 2006). Fritz Trümpi, *Politierte Orchester. Die Wiener Philharmoniker und das Berliner Philharmonische Orchester im Nationalsozialismus* (Cologne et al.: Böhlau Verlag, 2011) [English translation: *The*

within the grey zone between ideological commitment and subversion (usually trying to adapt to existing conditions and to extract personal favours from the system⁵⁷), as well as on the outside world, particularly through the presence of exiled musicians.⁵⁸ Emerging from its nationalist past, the classical canons of the nineteenth-century, and a series of shifts in the contemporary period, German post-war music⁵⁹ and musical thinking⁶⁰ had a very complicated relationship to modernity, this overlapping with the quest for a new identity and a means to balance the domestic and the foreign. In a country where music seemed to be naturally summoned to embody the Austrian self, and was indeed propelled to a foremost position in the public space, listeners and critics, schooled in Western art music, participated in the construction of canons of selfness and otherness, the exotic and the distant occupying a non-neutral space in the canon of aesthetic and (cultural-)political values.⁶¹ Indeed, as “the politics of identity is often played out in conversation with an Other, imaginary or real,”⁶² the relevance of foreign music(s) for constructing identities cannot be overestimated. It has, however, been to some extent sidelined in the exploration of musical German as a topos of modern musical thought.

In Russia and the USSR, music and national politics dramatically collided, in another salient case of the construction of musical identity under radically changing regimes. Here, the *problematique* of music and the state has been extensively investigated. A dynamic and fast-developing field of studies, Soviet music history has enabled us to unpick the entanglements of internal debates, and to understand the ultimately detrimental role of growing state pressure on music and musicians. However, it has also demonstrated that ideas imported from other fields may require careful examination before being linearly applied to music. While the socialist-realist canon was being gradually imposed from 1932 onwards, its undoubtedly repressive dynamics ought not to be allowed

Political Orchestra. The Vienna and Berlin Philharmonics During the Third Reich (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2016) Kurt Drexel, *Klingendes Bekenntnis zu Führer und Reich: Musik und Identität im Reichsgau Tirol-Vorarlberg* (Innsbruck: Wagner, 2014).

⁵⁷ Kater, *The Twisted Muse*, 63-4.

⁵⁸ Hannes Krones, ed., *Geächtet, verboten, vertrieben: Österreichische Musiker 1934 – 1938 – 1945* (=Schriften des Wissenschaftszentrums Arnold Schönberg, 1) (Vienna et al: Böhlau, 2013). See also: *Wiener Philharmoniker / Geschichte / Nationalsozialismus*. Accessed December 1, 2016. <http://www.wienerphilharmoniker.at/language/de-AT/Homepage/Orchester/Geschichte/Nationalsozialismus>

⁵⁹ For a thorough examination of an Allied-influenced musical landscape, and its cultural-political developments, see Toby Thacker, *Music After Hitler* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2006), Andreas Linsenmann, *Musik als politischer Faktor. Konzepte, Intentionen und Praxis französischer Umerziehungs- und Kulturpolitik in Deutschland 1945-1949/50* (Tübingen: edition lendemains, 2010), Bernd Bonwetsch et al., eds., *Sowjetische Politik in der SBZ 1945-1949. Dokumente zur Tätigkeit der Propagandaverwaltung (Informationsverwaltung) der SMAD unter Sergej Tjul'panov* (=Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, Beiheft 20) (Bonn, 1997).

⁶⁰ Markus Grassl et al., eds., *Österreichische Musikgeschichte der Nachkriegszeit (ANKLAENGE – Wiener Jahrbuch für Musikwissenschaft)* (Vienna: Mille Tre, 2006). Max Nyffeler, “Mitläufer, Großkritiker und Parteigänger der Moderne. Ein Überblick über die Entwicklung der Musikkritik in Deutschland 1945-1975,” *Beckmesser*. Accessed December 1, 2016. <http://www.beckmesser.de/musikkritik/kritik1945-75.html>

⁶¹ Ralph P. Locke, *Musical Exoticism: Images and Reflections* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009).

⁶² Annegret Fauser, *The Politics of Musical Identity: Selected Essays* (=Ashgate Series of Contemporary Thinkers on Musicology) (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2015): XII.

to obscure the long-term absence of a coherent party line on music, which resulted in specific patterns of negotiations of changing power relations, in which oppression would come hand in hand with privilege.⁶³ Research on the construction of Soviet musical identity (-ies), both from national paradigm(s)⁶⁴ and ultimately federal and global perspectives, has elucidated the crystallisation of a conservative canon oriented towards nineteenth-century classics.⁶⁵ This European canon coexisted uneasily with central Russia's problematic musical relationship to its southern and eastern regions, where exoticism and orientalism factored into the development of Russian music itself,⁶⁶ and, as I will show, was exported abroad complete with its exotic label. Feeding into the socially transmitted ideas of culture and education as important constitutive values of the new "Soviet man" and citizen, these styles of music were later exported abroad with the same high-cultured mindset that characterised all Soviet foreign cultural policies⁶⁷ and their application in different countries and regions. Furthermore, it is important to underline that the successes of Soviet musical exports allowed for a variety of interpretations by foreign publics, which were not always in keeping with the official categories of explicit Soviet cultural propaganda: between the imperial competition (Tomoff) and various other strategies of analysis and appropriation,⁶⁸ the prestige and impact of Russian culture often departed from the binary logic of cold war standoff. Beyond the national framework, the impact of music in inter- and transnational perspectives has been studied in multiple scholarly contexts. Music and power have entered scholarly discourse,⁶⁹ and music in IR, ascendant among scholars from different disciplines and linguistic traditions,⁷⁰ has been slowly gaining public attention.⁷¹ The link between music and power emanation (or representation) within international relations has usually been discussed in terms of its processual, performative character. In addition to the study of performance, music has been integrated into the field of international relations through

⁶³ Kirill Tomoff, *Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2006).

⁶⁴ Marina Frolova-Walker, *Russian Music and Nationalism from Glinka to Stalin* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2007).

⁶⁵ Marina Raku, *Mifotvorchestvo*; Pauline Fairclough, *Music for the Masses: Shaping Soviet Musical Identity under Lenin and Stalin* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2016).

⁶⁶ Locke, *Musical Exoticism*, 225-26.

⁶⁷ Kirill Tomoff, *Virtuosi Abroad. Soviet Music and Imperial Competition during early Cold War (1945-1958)* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2015).

⁶⁸ Christina Ezrahi's analysis of the 1956 tour of London by the Kirov theatre revealed an enormous variety of critical reactions towards the Soviet artists (*The Swans of the Kremlin*, 137-168). This demonstrated the potential of adopting a perspective broader than that of David Cauter's research on east-west confrontation.

⁶⁹ Annie J. Randall, ed., *Music, Power, and Politics* (New York; London: Routledge, 2005). Sabine Mecking and Yvonne Wasserloos, eds., *Musik – Macht – Staat. Kulturelle, soziale und politische Wandlungsprozesse in der Moderne* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2012).

⁷⁰ A recent conference has officially introduced the field into France. See *La musique, un enjeu de diplomatie, Sciences Po*. Accessed December 1, 2016. URL: <http://www.sciencespo.fr/actualites/actualite/C3%A9/musique-enjeu-de-relations-internationales-colloque-musique-et-diplomatie-0/2123>. *Musique et relations internationales: Colloque organisé par la revue Relations Internationales. Fondation Signer-Polignac*. Accessed December 1, 2016. URL: <http://www.singer-polignac.org/fr/missions/lettres-et-arts/573-musique-et-relations-internationales>.

⁷¹ Maria Zawisza, "How Music Is the Real Language of Political Diplomacy," *The Guardian*, October 31, 2015. Accessed December 1, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/music/2015/oct/31/music-language-human-rights-political-diplomacy>. (The interview was given in the run-up to the aforementioned conference.)

reference to discourses of hard and soft power projection. This method has both possibilities and limitations, having been initially pioneered by scholars of IR, then joined by researchers with a specifically musical background. More broadly, the capacity of music to represent (or, indeed, perform) a nation and its cultural achievements, and its possible conjuncture with foreign policy goals, has been shown to be no less problematic, particularly if some doubt is cast on whom music should represent – a government (administration in office), a nation, a people, or social groups.

One traditional way of tackling music's role in IR has been to analyse music as a means to influence others, in keeping with the theoretical distinction between hard and soft power. It was observed that both medieval kings and modern states eagerly introduced music into ceremonies and symbolic structures of association.⁷² Music has thus been entangled with diplomacy and diplomatic ceremonies since at least the early modern period,⁷³ and in fact has been present in procedures of state representation throughout human history. In close relation to hard power and physical violence, music was used in war by armies and governments, including during World War II⁷⁴ and the ensuing occupation of several countries,⁷⁵ creating a distinctive soundscape associated with military rule. In this perspective, music was more often viewed as a by-product of classic power politics, or as part of the lived experience of power projection. In stressing the associative links that music might produce with certain countries, their power and their prestige, this research understood music as part of government (or, later non-government) directed strategies for winning hearts and minds abroad.

As soft power is supposed to produce desirable results not through coercion, but through subtle influence⁷⁶ on behaviour,⁷⁷ particularly through communication and collaboration,⁷⁸ so musical culture was expected to accompany power demonstrations, or to persuade others of one's cultural finesse and, therefore, respectability. These perspectives on international relations, however, were

⁷² Estelle R. Jorgensen, "Music and International Relations," in: Jongsuk Chay, ed., *Culture and International Relations* (New York et al.: Penn State Press, 1990): 56-71.

⁷³ Rebekah Ahrendt et al., eds., *Music and Diplomacy from the Early Modern Era to the Present* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)

⁷⁴ Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonisation und Kalter Krieg : die Kulturmission der USA in Österreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1991): 224-25. English translation: *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1994).

⁷⁵ Sarah Zalfen and Sven Oliver Müller, "Eine Fortsetzung des Krieges mit musikalischen Mitteln? Hegemoniale Funktionen von Musik im Europa der Weltkriege," in: Sarah Zalfen and Sven Oliver Müller, eds., *Besatzungsmacht Musik: Zur Musik- und Emotionsgeschichte im Zeitalter der Weltkriege (1914-1949)* (Bielefeld: transcript-Verlag, 2012): 11-13

⁷⁶ Joseph S. Nye, "Soft power," *Foreign Policy* (Autumn 1990): 160-62.

⁷⁷ Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (London: Macmillan, 1974): 1-20. The recurrent idea of "soft" power, which in fact converges with cultural diplomacy, as a power of seduction, and of influencing behaviour and views, may be traced back to a perspicacious observation by S. Lukes: "To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?" (Lukes: 23)

⁷⁸ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).

not developed with music specifically in mind, and, in extending them to music, it is necessary to take a broader view on how the projection of cultural power abroad has been envisaged and analysed.

Much English-language research has been rooted in the historiography of cultural diplomacy, already fully defined by the time music entered mainstream academic discussion. Despite its inclusion within the discipline of IR, however, the subject remains strongly rooted in national history. Studies of cultural diplomacy mostly concentrated on the history of US foreign relations, since the very concept stemmed from Cold War-era information strategists, and has been to a large extent imbued with the assumptions of the US diplomatic apparatus. The historiography of US cultural diplomacy stretches from its inception during the inter-war period, through the “first” Cold War, and up to the *détente* and the 1970-80s.⁷⁹ The successes of US educational Fulbright exchanges were exceptional, as were the splendid images of American prosperity, so efficient in war-torn Europe. As a democratic culture, the American way of life was also transferred to the secondary literature. Not least, multimedia centres that provided the audience with books, films, music, guest lectures, exhibitions etc. tended to become highly popular, as German- and Austrian-based *Amerika Häuser* demonstrate.⁸⁰ Germany and Austria, exposed to inter-Allied cultural competition,⁸¹ represented successes for the US, particularly in terms of an overall acceptance of Western democracy, modernity and mass culture.⁸² The outburst of cultural activities in Europe coincided with the highest tensions of the early Cold War – artistic exchanges, having languished in the interwar period, now grew exponentially in number,⁸³ reflecting and simultaneously shaping the tendency to expand cultural programmes and exchanges.⁸⁴ This raises the question of how far governmental financing of culture depends on political goal-setting. However, most thinking on cultural diplomacy has generally tended to downplay the autonomy and importance of music.⁸⁵

⁷⁹ Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (Arlington: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of US Foreign Policy* (New York et al.: Oxford UP, 2013).

⁸⁰ Wagnleitner 1991. David Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War* (New York et al.: Oxford UP, 2003): 26. Udo Metzinger, „Hegemonie und Kultur.“ *Die Rolle kultureller soft power in der US-Außenpolitik* (Frankfurt a/M et al.: Peter Lang, 2005): 132; Arndt 2005: 150-160. A critical view on the “cracks” and achievements has been offered by Andrew Falk: *Upstaging the Cold War: American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy 1940-1960* (Amherst: Massachusetts UP, 2011): 86-87.

⁸¹ A few comparative studies on the German situation are quite revealing, to the extent that the collaboration and competition between the Allies, and later the two blocs, re-moulded Germans' own outlook. Gabriele Clemens, ed., *Kulturpolitik im besetzten Deutschland 1945-1949* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994). Hans-Martin Hinz et al., eds., *Die vier Besatzungsmächte und die Kultur in Berlin 1945-1949* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 1999)

⁸² Schönberg 1975, Rathkolb 1982, 1988, Wagnleitner 1991, Manuela Aguilar, *Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: German-American Relations 1955-1968* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996).

⁸³ Cynthia P. Schneider, “Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy That Works,” in: Jan Melissen, ed., *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2005): 147-66.

⁸⁴ Gienow-Hecht 2003: 179.

⁸⁵ R. Arndt, for instance, dedicates only a couple of pages to music in his opus magnum on US cultural diplomacy:

Music was a second-rank activity, even if it was never fully absent from US or British representation abroad.

Again, the American-centred Cold War background played a key role in much of the literature which dealt with explicit links between music and political values. Music was heavily involved in Cold War ideological battles, as exemplified by a number of offensives launched by both sides, such as the Congress of Cultural Freedom's *Oeuvre du XXe siècle*, which raised questions as to how far politics impacted upon music.⁸⁶ Cold War-induced transformations of culture, in both Europe and beyond, effectively re-shaped these societies, bringing about tectonic shifts from the end of the war, through the 1960s, up until the fall of the Berlin wall.⁸⁷ Arts and music remain a problematic issue to the extent that they have often been subsumed into the grand history of political conflict, which, by silently assuming an almost total dimension to this struggle, largely deprived arts of their independent meaning, and put them at the service of propagandists. Historians dedicated a good deal of attention to how both sides used each other's apparent weaknesses to garner support for their own cause. Poignantly, the competition between socialism and free-market democracy was compounded by the challenge launched by the Socialist world, to the effect that high culture and artists were better provided for in the East than the capitalist West.⁸⁸ The struggle between East and West, or state-socialist and liberal-democratic cultural outlooks, thus provided a convenient framework in which to reflect on global musical contacts, out of which western democracies seemingly emerged victorious against the state socialist dictatorships.⁸⁹ While acknowledging the nefarious effects that state regulations had in the eastern block, the latest research has begun to question direct causalities between political and cultural competition, and to look beyond a zero-sum game perspective: some argue that the contacts between Americans and Soviets, or "East" and "West" in general, may defy simple categorisations, and that a deeper, contextualised perspective on the transmission of cultural instantiations and values beyond political frameworks is needed.⁹⁰ The uneasy relationship between music and political frameworks, and the implication of music in social reception and reconstruction patterns, as brought to light by the new musicology, can be illustrated by two notable examples: radical modernity and jazz. The issue of the interpretative power wielded by the public, as opposed

Arndt 2005, 610-12. A classic on culture in IR, John Mitchell, while providing a more systematic view of the subject, did not touch the issue. John M. Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986).

⁸⁶ Mark Carroll, *Music and Ideology in Cold War Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003). Frances S. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2013 [1999]).

⁸⁷ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "Culture and the Cold War in Europe," in: Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd A. Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. I: Origins*. (New York et al.: Cambridge UP, 2010): 398-419.

⁸⁸ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "The World Is Ready to Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global Performance of America," *Diplomatic History* 36:1 (2012): 17-28. Kirill Tomoff, *Virtuosi Abroad...*

⁸⁹ David Caute, *The Dancer Defects. The Struggle for Political Supremacy during the Cold War* (NY; Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005).

⁹⁰ Simo Mikkonen and Pia Koivunen, eds., *Beyond the Divide. Entangled Histories of Cold War Europe* (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015).

to the politically determined goal-setting of official cultural diplomacy, is particularly prominent here. Despite concerted transatlantic efforts, directed in part by the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the CIA, Europeans turned a deaf ear to serialism or dodecaphony,⁹¹ with the exception of a small minority of connoisseurs.⁹² When political pressure subsided, however, Europe would reveal a more differentiated picture, ranging from cultural conservatives (in both blocks) to aficionados of icons of modernity, like Karlheinz Stockhausen or John Cage, and a vivid landscape of experimental music.⁹³ Research on radical modernity thus clearly shows that an inquiry into the eventual success of musical promotion should not be predetermined by a state's economic power or political attractiveness, as the narrative of western victory in the cold war might suggest. It warns against a direct attribution of causality to extra-musical factors, and calls for a thorough empirical investigation, which will help to understand music's impact within society, eventually feeding back into cultural diplomacy, or rather the imaginary struggle for cultural supremacy.

Jazz diplomacy underwent opposing dynamics. It represents another compelling case of the complexities attendant to musical exports,⁹⁴ particularly when cultural diplomats' original expectations failed to meet target audiences' realities. In the middle and long term, jazz turned out to be a new musical language through which to celebrate triumphs all over Europe,⁹⁵ despite having been initially resented by educated white middle-class cultural officers. The protest potential of jazz, as the music of racially oppressed African-Americans, did not sit easily with the American government's pledge to give a "full and fair picture" of America society. Jazz ambassadors recruited by the government entered the scene with their own perspectives as artistic performers, and brought home valuable experience of foreign countries and interaction with foreign audiences.⁹⁶ This ran contrary to the cultural-political directives of the early Cold War, but ultimately helped to create an image of another America, with which younger Europeans could associate themselves. Research on these genres has been stimulated by the new cultural history's critique of the Eurocentrism of

⁹¹ In Germany critics and public were more favourable to Paul Hindemith than to atonal music of Alban Berg, Arnold Schönberg or Anton Webern (Jost Hermand, *Die Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1965-1985* (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlag, 1990): 97).

⁹² Cate 2003.

⁹³ Hermand 1990: 447-61; Amy C. Beal, *New Music, New Allies: American Experimental Music in West Germany from the Zero Hour to Reunification* (Berkeley: California UP, 2006).

⁹⁴ Wagnleitner 1991, 4, 185-88. Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine T. May, eds., "*Here, There and Everywhere:*" *The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture* (Hanover, NH; London: UP of New England, 2000). Toby Thacker, *Music after Hitler, 1945-1955*, 193-97. Falk: 207.

⁹⁵ Wagnleitner 1991, Aguilar 1996. The copious historiography on jazz in Germany and France, its European capital, provides a powerful testimony as to the impact that the transfer of a musical idiom can have on the receiver audience, eventually creating an synthetic and highly original local jazz tradition. Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: UCP, 2000). Matthew F. Jordan, *Le Jazz: Jazz and French Cultural Identity* (Urbana et al.: Illinois UP, 2010).

⁹⁶ Danielle Fosler-Lussier, "Cultural Diplomacy as Cultural Globalization: The University of Michigan Jazz Band in Latin America," *Journal of the Society for American Music* 4:1 (2010): 59-93.

traditional high-culture approaches. Estimating their “efficiency” was empirically more difficult than the market-based methods of many works on popular music. However, the salient point is the discrepancy between the declared goals and the obtained outcomes, the evolving nature of public preferences⁹⁷ and their possible detachment from other cultural-political fields. These provide valuable avenues of inquiry for research on music within international and intersocietal relations, stressing the importance of different perspectives in the cultural communication process, the agency of cultural intermediaries and the interpretative patterns developed by seemingly “passive” audiences.⁹⁸

Can musical diplomacy, as defined in a previous chapter, be viewed as a synthesis of these varying strains of literature? Should it be viewed as a sign of their epistemological unity, or as a possibility for interdisciplinary methodological unity based on renovated research questions? Musical diplomacy (MD), the core concept of this thesis, has been only recently introduced as a term. Initially, it was viewed as adjacent to, and part of, emotional diplomacy, which sought to use emotions as an instrument of foreign policy.⁹⁹ However, as we have seen, the final effect was often very different to the original intention of the state. Nowadays, the literature tends to take a more differentiated view. As J.C.E. Gienow-Hecht has noted, “nonverbal cultural and artistic contacts ... proved much more intense and enduring than political ties, surviving broken treaties, mutual alienation, and even several wars”.¹⁰⁰ Much in the same sense, the constructivist view of musical diplomacy taken by M. Einbinder also tends to bring the role of music to the fore, even if it is not very specific about the modes and assessment criteria of MD.¹⁰¹ The current literature has thus expressed criticism of the over-emphasis on political motivations at the expense of inherent cultural processes and their consequences,¹⁰² and successive attempts have been made to examine how musical exchanges and flows of sheet music or recordings have reshaped the cultural landscape of

⁹⁷ R. Wagnleitner pointed out that the history of Rock’n’Roll to some extent resembles that of jazz, with varying tendencies of resistance and acceptance (Wagnleitner 1991: 250-260, 343-45). Remarkably, Cool Britannia and British rock did not meet with any cultural resistance reactions, as nobody in the US, for instance, would suspect London of attempting to culturally re-colonise the country (Russel A. Berman, “Anti-Americanism and Americanization,” in: Alexander Stephan, ed., *Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005): 1-13).

⁹⁸ A critical and synthetic view of traditional approaches has been notably offered by D. Fossler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy* (Berkeley, CA: UC Press, 2015).

⁹⁹ Todd H. Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2015)

¹⁰⁰ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850-1920* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2009), 5.

¹⁰¹ She considers musical diplomacy to be a means to “harmonize international relations”, as cultural diplomacy can “enhance intercultural dialogue, cooperation and mutual understanding”, so that arts promotion can conduce to “creating ‘sustainable’ relationships across cultures”. Mary Einbinder, *Cultural Diplomacy: Harmonizing International Relations Through Music* (MA Thesis University of New York, 2013), 5.

¹⁰² Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “How Good Are We?: Culture and the Cold War,” *Intelligence and National Security* 18:2 (2003): 279.

receiver peoples.¹⁰³ This shift of focus from government archives to public responses has served to accentuate the reception of influences from neighbouring cultural and social disciplines. The young, and to some extent still burgeoning, field of musical diplomacy lies at the core of my own understanding of the *problematique* of music's role and potential in international relations. However, this perspective nonetheless allows for a considerable degree of academic freedom, since the theory is still developing and undergoing empirical fine-tuning, a process to which this dissertation will seek to contribute.

Allied Policies in the Austrian Context: The Empirical Dimension of Musical Diplomacy in the Case of Early Post-War Austria

In what would soon become a “paradoxical republic”,¹⁰⁴ the Allies were confronted by a particular set of circumstances. While many of these paralleled those encountered in other liberated or defeated countries, others were specific to Austria, differentiating it not only from Hungary or Italy, but also from Germany proper.¹⁰⁵ Exercising direct military power and sovereignty over Austria, the Great Four faced a number of challenges that would require considerable dexterity and delicacy, particularly in dealing with Austrians.

The reconstitution of the Austrian state followed directly from the military defeat of the Third Reich, out of which the Austrian Republic was reconstituted. Despite the rhetoric of liberation, Austria was subject to a quadripartite occupation, as had been agreed by the war-time inter-Allied accords (the Moscow declaration of 1943, which laid ground for the ambiguous *Opferthese* and was skilfully deployed to exonerate Austria from Nazi war crimes and obtain better treatment from the Allies,¹⁰⁶ as well as the Yalta and Potsdam conferences).¹⁰⁷ The war ended in Austria with the Red Army conquering the east of the country, and the Western Allies advancing from the north-west (US), west (US and France) and south (UK).¹⁰⁸ The Allies exercised supreme power and effective

¹⁰³ See Jane F. Fulcher, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the New Cultural History of Music* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011). Colin Lawson and Robin Stowell, *Cambridge History of Musical Performance* (New York et al.: Cambridge UP, 2012). Zalfen Sara, and Sven O. Müller (eds.), *Besatzungsmacht Musik : Zur Musik- und Emotionsgeschichte im Zeitalter der Weltkriege (1914-1949)* (Bielefeld: Transkript, 2012), 192-206.

¹⁰⁴ Oliver Rathkolb, *Die paradoxe Republik. Österreich 1945-2015* (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2015 [2005])

¹⁰⁵ An early Austro-German overview: Michael Balfour, John Mair, *Four Power Control in Germany and Austria, 1945-1946* (New York; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1956).

¹⁰⁶ Günter Bischof, “Die Instrumentalisierung der Moskauer Erklärung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” *Zeitgeschichte* (1993): 345-365.

¹⁰⁷ Michael Gehler and Wolfgang Chwatal, *Die Moskauer Deklaration über Österreich 1943* (Graz: Steirische Verlag-Anstalt, 1987). Gerald Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit: Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs; 1945-1955* (2nd and 3rd ed.) (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 1998). Stefan Karner and Alexander O. Tschubarjan, eds., *Die Moskauer Deklaration 1943: „Österreich wieder herstellen“* (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 2015).

¹⁰⁸ Manfred Rauchensteiner, *Der Krieg in Österreich 1945 (= Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums (Wien), 5)*

sovereignty over the Austrian state through the 1st and 2nd Control Agreements (July 4, 1945; June 28, 1946); the zonal borders, specifically in Vienna, were confirmed on July 9, 1945. French Committee of National Liberation adhered to the Moscow Declaration, and thereafter France received full occupation power status among the Great Four. Austria was subject to the oversight of the Allied Commission, constituted by the Allied Council and the Executive Committee. Each occupying power was represented by a High Commissioner. The Second Agreement weakened Allied veto rights over Austrian legislation, stipulating that only a veto by all occupation powers could block the passage of an Austrian law. Concomitantly, the Allies pledged to allow greater liberties to the “democratic” press and political parties.

The resulting political framework would be overshadowed by the effective partition of the country into four respective occupation zones. Unlike Germany, a universally recognised national government was created under the provisional Chancellor Karl Renner, while the Wehrmacht was still offering resistance to the advancing Soviet troops. Renner made contact with the Soviets in order to form a cabinet, and managed to extend its authority to the western zones. This first tripartite government (the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the People's Party receiving equal representation) was soon transformed into a coalition of the Socialist Party and the People's Party, following the general election of November 1945, in which the Communists obtained only 5% of the national vote. The federal chancellery under Leopold Figl faced a number of challenges on the macropolitical, administrative and economic levels. Austria was caught in a highly ambiguous situation of liberation and occupation, while the “first victim” myth obscured the responsibility of many Austrians for the crimes of the Nazi regime,¹⁰⁹ a fact of which the Allies did not fail to remind the federal government. Differing degrees of rigor in interpreting the Moscow Declaration allowed the Austrian government to manoeuvre between the Allies; both France and the USSR were particularly interested in drawing a sharp discursive line between the Austrians and the Germans (which did not preclude the Soviets from demanding reparations), and thus showed considerable leniency regarding the Austrians' responsibility for the Nazi regime.

Long before the propaganda machines of both sides, East and West, were set in motion, the Allied governments had grasped the strategic importance of the Alpine Republic. Despite its relatively

(Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag 1985). Günter Bischof, Josef Leidenfrost, eds., *Die bevormundete Nation: Österreich und die Alliierten, 1945-1949* (Innsbruck: Haymon Verlag, 1988). Manfred Rauchensteiner, ed., *Der Sonderfall. Die Besatzungszeit in Österreich 1945 bis 1955* (Vienna; Graz: Styria-Verlag, 1991). Alfred Ableitinger et al., eds., *Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung 1945-1955* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1998). Manfred Rauchensteiner, ed., *Stalinplatz 4. Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung* (Vienna: Edition Steinbauer, 2005).

¹⁰⁹ Anton Pelinka, “Von der Funktionalität von Tabus : Zu den «Lebenslügen» der Zweiten Republik,” in: Wolfgang Kos and Georg Rigele, eds., *Inventur 45/55 : Österreich im ersten Jahrzehnt der Zweiten Republik* (Vienna: Sonderzahl, 1996): 23-32. Richard Germann, *Österreichische Soldaten in Ost-und Südosteuropa 1941-1945: deutsche Krieger-nationalsozialistische Verbrecher-österreichische Opfer?* (Univ. Diss. Vienna, 2006).

small size, Austria represented a valuable asset for both east and west, a fact which placed it at the centre of the looming battle for hearts and minds. In the first months after the liberation, there was a general consensus regarding the need for denazification and democratisation. As the Allied entente began to disintegrate, coherent quadripartite policies effectively vanished, owing to constant arguments between the Soviet Element and the three Western Allies. The notorious questions of occupation costs and “German property” (i.e., the property rights to assets allegedly owned by “Altreich” German citizens prior to 1945), pressure on the press, and the political altercations that occurred in the Allied Council significantly complicated the situation, and were particularly detrimental for Soviet prestige, which was already virtually non-existent due to native anti-Communism and the harsh realities of military conquest and occupation. On the macro-political level,¹¹⁰ the differences of the Soviet and the Western positions led to protracted negotiations over an eventual peace – and State – treaty with Austria; the failure to sign a Short Treaty (*Kurzvertrag*) in 1952, for which the Western powers successfully blamed the Soviet Union, was symbolic of rising Cold War tensions. Only after Stalin's death, the softening of the Soviet position, the tactful diplomacy of the Austrian government in Moscow, and changes in the Western powers' position did the end of the quadripartite occupation become possible. The State Treaty between Austria and the four Allied powers was signed on May 15, 1955.¹¹¹ Austrian neutrality was enshrined in parliamentary legislation later in the autumn, although it would be severely tested by the events of 1956 and 1968, and subject to intense Soviet scrutiny.¹¹² Indeed, this policy remained a cornerstone of the Second Republic's international standing, both as a “wedge” between Germany and Italy (particularly welcomed by the USSR as a means to divide NATO defense lines), and as a stage for international events and organisations, with Vienna serving as a headquarters for the UN, and also hosting the Soviet-American summits of 1961¹¹³ and 1979

Disbalances in hard and economic power remained an important factor in the Allies' relative standing and popularity. In this regard, the United States soon established a position of leadership.

¹¹⁰ See an early account: Audrey K. Cronin, *The Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1986), also research by Stourzh, Bischof.

¹¹¹ See Gerald Stourzh, Arnold Suppan et al., *Der österreichische Staatsvertrag: internationale Strategie, nationale Identität, rechtliche Relevanz* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005). Stefan Karner, Gottfried Stangler, eds., „Österreich ist frei!“ *Der Österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955. Beitragsband zur Ausstellung auf Schloss Schallaburg 2005* (Vienna: Verlag Berger, 2005). On the international ramifications of the State Treaty and its impact on the Austro-German relation (partly in opposition to Stourzh): Michael Gehler, *Modellfall für Deutschland? Die Österreichlösung mit Staatsvertrag und Neutralität 1945-1955* (Innsbruck et al.: Studienverlag, 2015).

¹¹² Wolfgang Mueller, *A Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence: The Soviet Union, Austria, Neutrality, 1955-1991* (*Zentraleuropa-Studien*, 15) (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011).

¹¹³ Stefan Karner et al., eds., *Der Wiener Gipfel 1961. Kennedy – Chruschtschow* (Innsbruck et al.: Studienverlag, 2011). US edition: Günter Bischof et al., *Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International Relations* (*Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series*) (Lanham et al: Lexington Books, 2014).

Being the only major power whose economy had not been decimated by warfare, and which had in fact emerged from the war stronger than before, the American government acquired a new sense of determination to settle European affairs.¹¹⁴ Here, the aim was to find a solution that would prevent any potentially aggressive power from dominating Eurasia, destabilising international relations and initiating a third world war.¹¹⁵ American policies in Germany¹¹⁶ and Austria¹¹⁷ were thus initially characterised by rigor, strict non-fraternization, thorough implementation of denazification and democratization (with the notorious *Fragebogen* filled out by thousands of Germans and Austrians), and a strong economic dimension.¹¹⁸ The US military had developed a significant presence in the circumalpine region and had physically occupied large parts of Austria (from Upper Austria to the Tyrol), as the Allied command prepared for heavy fighting over the *Alpenfestung*, as had been promised by Nazi propaganda.

The US administration was able to count on assets, mostly economic, often unavailable to other Allies. The American occupation personnel included a large number of émigré Austrians, mostly hailing from the educated middle and upper classes, who had native-speaker competence in the German language (and the Austrian dialect), and a correspondingly deep knowledge of Austrian and Central European culture. Austria was the only country with Soviet occupation forces deployed on its territory that received US aid under the Marshall Plan. Furthermore, the US quickly managed to foster close relations with the two governing parties. American information officers achieved a dominant position in the media landscape, both in print and on the airwaves, and pursued a vigorous public diplomacy campaign through the network of *Amerika-Häuser* that had been installed in Vienna and the rest of the western zone. American cultural policies¹¹⁹ were energetic too, owing to the presence of dedicated cultural diplomats (such as the pianist Margot Pinter¹²⁰), who embodied the

¹¹⁴ John Killick, *The United States and European Reconstruction, 1945-1960* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1997).

¹¹⁵ See: Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd A. Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010).

¹¹⁶ Paul D. Miller, "A Bibliographic Essay on the Allied Occupation and Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1955," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24:4 (2013): 751-59.

¹¹⁷ Michael Schönberg, *Die amerikanische Medien- und Informationspolitik in Österreich von 1945 bis 1950* (Hauptbd.) (Univ. Diss. Vienna, 1975). Oliver Rathkolb, *Politische Propaganda der amerikanischen Besatzungsmacht in Österreich 1945 bis 1950: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Kalten Krieges in der Presse-, Kultur- und Rundfunkpolitik* (Univ. Diss. Vienna, 1982). Josef Leidenfrost, *Die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht und der Wiederbeginn des politischen Lebens in Österreich, 1944-1947: 1-2* (Univ. Diss. Vienna, 1986). Natalie Schlege, *Die Beurteilung der „US-Kulturmission in Österreich 1945-1955“* (Univ. Dipl-Arb. Vienna, 2008). A number of articles by Oliver Rathkolb and Günther Bischof, which cannot be fully cited here, have dealt with diplomatic, political, economic and cultural aspects of Austro-American relations on different levels.

¹¹⁸ See: Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2005)

¹¹⁹ For Germany see: Konrad Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995* (New York; Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006)

¹²⁰ Anton Voigt, "Nicht Richter, sondern Helfer. Die Pianistin Margot Pinter als Cultural Officer der amerikanischen Militärverwaltung. Zur 'Entnazifizierung von Musik'," in: Birgit Kirchmayr and Arnold Klaffenböck, eds., *„Kulturhauptstadt des Führers“: Kunst und Nationalsozialismus in Linz und Oberösterreich ; ein Projekt der Oberösterreichischen Landesmuseen in Kooperation mit Linz 2009 Kulturhauptstadt Europas (Ausstellung im*

American presence in the country, and took measures to re-start the Salzburg Festival as early as August 1945. By all criteria, the United States enjoyed the greatest popularity among the population, both in the American zone (Salzburg and Upper Austria) and beyond, and could effectively spearhead the ideological onslaught against the Soviet Union, being aware of the apparent weakness of the Soviet position. The stability of American democracy and the economic might of the country drew Austrians closer to the US and the western cause, despite residual cultural anti-Americanism. While jazz diplomacy later enjoyed great success during the mid-1950s, during the immediate post-war years, American cultural diplomats struggled to persuade Austrians (as well as the equally skeptical Germans¹²¹) that the United States also possessed a vibrant high-brow culture, equivalent to that of Europe. Europeans' stubborn "non-perception"¹²² of the American cultural landscape frequently irritated Americans, who could never quite attain parity with Europe, and who were often silently dismissed as a second-rate cultural power. As such, the persuasive power of US cultural diplomacy did have limitations: although it successfully oriented Austria towards the west, its achievements were far more limited in the realm of the "pure" arts.

The British situation, while eventually coming very close to the US, was originally of a very different nature. By 1945, the United Kingdom had seemingly regained its global power status, and Foreign Office diplomats had developed particularly elaborate plans for Austria¹²³ and Central Europe, in conjunction with the Mediterranean basin. The British Army managed to occupy Klagenfurt a few hours before the arrival of Tito's Yugoslavs, and overtook Graz from the Soviets later in July. Paying particular attention to reeducation programmes, the British Element eventually adhered to the American-led economic reconstruction (the United Kingdom, along with Austria itself, being one of the chief beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan), and cultivated local Anglophilia through the British Council, concentrating on language and the British "way of life".¹²⁴ The British

Schlossmuseum Linz vom 17. September 2008 bis 22. März 2009) (Linz: Land Oberösterreich et al., 2008): 261-71.

¹²¹ David Monod, *Settling Scores: German Music, Denazification and the Americans, 1945-1953* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina UP, 2005): 252, passim.

¹²² Joachim Brügge, "Nordamerikanische Musik als 'Hochkultur': Eine 'unbekannte Kulturlandschaft – am Beispiel von Samuel Barbers op. 11 (mit dem Adagio) u.a.," Ulrike Kammerhofer-Aggermann, ed., *Kulturstereotype und Unbekannte Kulturlandschaften - am Beispiel von Amerika und Europa (Erweiterter Tagungsband des gleichnamigen Symposions im Rahmen der Internationalen Sommerakademie, 5. und 6. August 2005, in Kooperation der Universität Mozarteum Salzburg mit der Paris Lodron Universität Salzburg und dem Salzburger Landesinstitut für Volkskunde (=Wort und Musik, 66; Salzburger Beiträge zur Volkskunde, 17)* (Salzburg: Verlag Mueller-Speiser, 2007): 127.

¹²³ Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Großbritannien und die Wiedererrichtung der Republik Österreich* (Univ. Diss. Salzburg, 1975). Siegfried Beer, "Aspekte der Besatzungszeit in Österreich – die Besatzungsmacht Großbritannien," *Beiträge zur historischen Sozialkunde* 2 (1995): 40-44. Accessed December 4, 2016. URL: http://vgs.univie.ac.at/VGS_alt/b952lp.html Alfred Ableitinger et al., eds., *Besatzungszeit in der Steiermark 1945-1955. Bericht über die 4. Geschichtswerkstatt Graz 1991* (Graz: Andreas Schiener Verlags-Atelier, 1994). Siegfried Beer, ed., *Die britische Steiermark 1945-1955 (=Forschungen zur geschichtlichen Landeskunde der Steiermark, 1)* (Graz: Historische Landeskommission für Steiermark, 1995).

¹²⁴ Isabella Lehner, *Anglo-Austrian Cultural Relations Between 1944 and 1955. Influences, Cooperation and Conflict* (Dipl.-Arb. Vienna, 2011).

administration maintained good relations with Austrian civilians, and accumulated considerable cultural capital, second only to the US. With regard to culture,¹²⁵ Britain was represented through theatre, literature, and music, both through support for a native Styrian musical festival (which, while never rivalling Salzburg, eventually gave rise to the highly successful *steirischer herbst* and *styriarte*) and through direct guest tours, both in Vienna and Graz.

From the continental European perspective, France and the Soviet Union were particularly sensitive to the security question, and consistently encountered difficulties in their relations with the local population, above all in the Soviet case. The USSR, having militarily conquered Central Europe, including eastern Austria, had the largest army contingent in the country. As a result, the Soviet role in post-war Austria has been the subject of a vast secondary literature.¹²⁶ An obvious topos of the Soviet Union's Austrian policies was its connections to the Austrian Communist Party, the leader of which, Johann Koplenig, as well as other prominent figures such as Friedl Fűrberg, Ernst Fischer (who would occupy the position of Secretary of State for Culture in the provisional government¹²⁷), Viktor Matejka (the Viennese cultural secretary), and the well-known cultural journalist Hugo Huppert¹²⁸ were highly visible in postwar public debate. Despite the obvious “dependence” of Austrian communists on the USSR,¹²⁹ their relations with the Soviet Element remained lukewarm, as a significant difference of interests was quickly recognised in Moscow. The position of the Soviet Union was also complicated by the complex history of Stalin's relations with Austrian communists, who, despite a large degree of visibility, had eventually been forced into underground and exile by the *Ständestaat* and the Nazi regime,¹³⁰ and his ambivalent opinions regarding Austrian statehood. Despite the USSR's official protests in the wake of the 1938

¹²⁵ Johannes Feichtinger, “Zur Kulturpolitik der Besatzungsmacht Großbritannien in Österreich,” in: *Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung 1945-1955*: 495-529.

¹²⁶ In the USSR and Russia, Prof. Ivan G. Zhiriakov advanced to the chief specialist on Austrian affairs after the first post-war generation, see: Ivan G. Zhiriakov, *Iz istorii avstriiskogo gosudarstva v novoie i noveishee vremia [From the History of the Austrian State in the Modern and Contemporary Period]* (Moscow: MGOPU, 2006). In Austria: Stefan Karner, Barbara Stelzl-Marx, eds., *Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Sowjetische Besatzung 1945-1955* (Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig-Boltzmann-Instituts für Kriegsfolgen-Forschung, Graz – Wien – Klagenfurt, 4) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005) Stefan Karner et al., eds., *Die Rote Armee in Österreich. Sowjetische Besatzung 1945-1955. Dokumente* (=Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig-Boltzmann-Instituts für Kriegsfolgen-Forschung, Graz – Wien – Klagenfurt, 5) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005). Gennady Bordiugov et al., eds., *Sovietskaia politika v Avstrii 1945-1955: sbornik dokumentov* [Soviet Policies in Austria, 1945-1955: Collection of Documents] (Moscow; Saint-Petersburg: AIRO-XXI; Dmitry Bulanin, 2006). [Sowjetische Politik in Österreich 1945-1955: Dokumente aus russischen Archiven (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005)]. Csaba Békés et al., eds., *Soviet Occupation of Romania, Hungary and Austria, 1944/45 – 1948/49* (Budapest; New York: CEU Press, 2015).

¹²⁷ The KPÖ was represented in the first, unelected government, with three State Secretaries and seven under-Secretaries, occupying important positions in education and security. Manfred Mugrauer, *Die Politik der KPÖ in der Provisorischen Regierung Renner* (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2006).

¹²⁸ Hugo Huppert, *Schach dem Doppelgänger* (Leipzig; Haale: Mitteldeutscher Verlag, 1979).

¹²⁹ Heinz Gärtner, *Zwischen Moskau und Österreich. Die KPÖ – Analyse einer sowjetabhängigen Partei* (=Studien zur österreichischen und internationalen Politik, 3) (Vienna: Braumüller, 1979).

¹³⁰ On the complex and controversial history of interwar Austrian communism: Barry McLoughlin, Hannes Leidinger, Verena Moritz, *Kommunismus in Österreich 1918-1938* (Innsbruck et al.: Studien Verlag, 2009).

Anschluss, Stalin had not opposed the “unification” of Austria with Germany on principle, basing himself on the premise that Austrians belonged to the German *Kulturnation*, and could therefore legitimately choose to join the German nation-state.¹³¹ However, during the war, Austro-nationalist ideas were developed by émigré communists, and subsequently taken up and instrumentalised by the Soviet government, which argued in favour of full Austrian independence, and opposed the British proposal for either a Danube confederation or another form of Central European state (such as a union with Bavaria). The General Strike of October 1950 (*Oktoberstreik*¹³²), in which the Communist Party was prominent, led to even wider isolation of the Communists, and to suspicions that the KPÖ aspired to bring about a people's democracy regime in Austria, as was occurring in those neighbouring countries with a Soviet military presence. Despite this, Soviet support for the Communists was not readily forthcoming, and the occupation administration took great care not to provoke the West.¹³³

In terms of their goals with regards to Austria, the Soviets did not consider an eventual partition of the country to be desirable:¹³⁴ Stalin's policies were oriented pragmatically, and, while seeking to exploit any potential for pro-Soviet organisations, in view of the electoral defeats of the KPÖ, his general political line shifted from re-establishment of democratic structures, creation of a federal government and conduct of free elections towards increasing estrangement from the political mainstream and economic spoliation measures, intended to advance internal Soviet reconstruction at the expense of Austria.¹³⁵ The first shock of meeting the “Russians” who often showed little signs of reconciliation, a vast military contingent that exercised considerable pressure on Austrian finances and housing, appalling security conditions of Eastern Austria, often linked to the Soviet military presence, hundreds of thousands of Austrian POWs remaining for years in Soviet camps, the

¹³¹ Stalin's views can be traced back to his Viennese sojourn in 1912, when he had contributed to a pamphlet on the “national question” in Austria-Hungary. Here, Stalin had elaborated his concept of a “nation” as a “historically coherent community”, which could be interpreted in favour of Austrian Germanness; in addition, Stalin's ambiguity towards Austria must have been rooted in his apprehension of the strength of German nationalism in late imperial and interwar Austria.

¹³² Karl Schlögl, *Der Oktoberstreik 1950: die Entwicklung Österreichs und die Auswirkungen der Streikbewegung auf die österreichische Innenpolitik* (Univ. Dipl.-Arb. Vienna, 1991). From the vast literature addressing the subject, the latest publication can be singled out: Peter Autengruber and Manfred Mugrauer, eds., *Oktoberstreik: die Realität hinter den Legenden über die Streikbewegung im Herbst 1950: Sanktionen gegen Streikende und ihre Rücknahme* (Vienna: ÖGB Verlag, 2017 [first edition 2016]).

¹³³ A direct link between a major Austrian concert tour of Soviet musicians and the general strike may not have existed.

¹³⁴ Wolfgang Mueller, „Die Teilung Österreichs als politische Option für KPÖ und UdSSR 1948,“ *Zeitgeschichte* 32:1 (2005): 47-54.

¹³⁵ Walter L. Stearman, *Die Sowjetunion und Österreich 1945-1955: ein Beispiel für die Sowjetpolitik gegenüber dem Westen* (Bonn: Sieglar, 1962). Wilfried Aichinger, *Sowjetische Österreichpolitik 1943-1945* (Univ. Diss. Vienna 1977). Wolfgang Mueller, „Stalin, Renner und die Wiedergeburt Österreichs nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,“ *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 53:1 (2006): 125-154. Walter M. Iber, „Erdöl statt Reparationen: Die Sowjetische Mineralölverwaltung in Österreich 1945-1955,“ *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 57:4 (2009): 571-605. Andreas Hilger et al., eds., *Sowjetisierung oder Neutralität? Optionen sowjetischer Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland und Österreich 1945-1955* (=Gerhard Besier, ed., *Schriften des Hannah-Arendt-Instituts für Totalitarismusforschung*, 32) (Göttingen: V&R press, 2011).

abductions of Austrian citizens by Soviet secret services on accusations of espionage,¹³⁶ and economic exploitation by the Soviet administration effectively devastated the image of the Soviet Union in Austria, reinforcing the profound anti-Communist consensus of Austrian society, along with latent anti-Russian stereotypes. Unsurprisingly, historians have devoted a great deal of attention to this ideological showdown, and to the ultimate demise of the Soviet propaganda system.¹³⁷ Against the backdrop of the European Recovery Program (ERP), the image of the Soviet occupation was extremely negative, as virtually all contemporary testimonies demonstrate.¹³⁸ However, the image of the Russians among the Austrians, and the image of the Austrians (and Germans) among the Soviet soldiers, is highly problematic,¹³⁹ and cannot be reduced to simple demonisation.¹⁴⁰ For Austrians, the positive side of the Soviet presence was epitomised by the soldiers' sympathies for children, who were generally treated better than adults (collectively dismissed as Nazis), and favourable

¹³⁶ Stephan Karner, „Zur Politik der sowjetischen Besatzungs- und Gewahrsammacht; Das Fallbeispiel Margarethe Ottillinger,“ in: *Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung 1945-1955*: 401, 404.

¹³⁷ Rathkolb 1982, Wolfgang Mueller, *Österreichische Zeitung und die Russische Stunde : die Informationspolitik der sowjetischen Besatzungsmacht in Österreich 1945 – 1955* (Univ. Dipl.-Arb. Vienna, 1998). Eiusdem, „Sowjetbesatzung, Nationale Front und der 'Friedliche Übergang zum Sozialismus': Fragmente sowjetischer Österreich-Planung 1945-1955,“ *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs. 200 Jahre Russisches Außenministerium: Herausgegeben von der Generaldirektion* 50 (2003): 133-156. Eiusdem, „Kulturaia politika sovetskikh vlastei i avstriiskie otnosheniia“ [„Cultural Policy of the Soviet Authorities and Austrian Cultural Relations“], *Vestnik MGU Seriia 8: „Istoriia“* 2 (2003): 85-104. Eiusdem, *Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich 1945-1955 und ihre politische Mission* (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 2005) Hannes Leidinger, „Geteilte Wirklichkeit. Die österreichische Besatzungszeit im Überblick,“ in: Karin Moser, ed., *Besetzte Bilder : Film, Kultur und Propaganda in Österreich 1945 – 1955* (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 2005): 17-34.

¹³⁸ These have been assembled in numerous works of oral history – *avant la lettre* – dealing with post-war Austrian *Alltagsgeschichte* in the eastern zone. These include not only the work of Stelzl-Marx, but also a number of diploma and master's theses defended during the 1970-1990s, and sometimes later, dealing with subjects from local history (such as Lower Austrian towns, parts of the Burgenland and the Mühlviertel), and the various aspects of Soviet policies. The secondary literature is unanimous in its highly negative evaluation of Soviet prestige in Austria, which stemmed from the unprecedented wave of violent crimes committed against Austrian civilians, and persisted in the atmosphere of fear and distrust regarding the Soviet Element. The Austrian police's *Stimmungsberichte (Lageberichte)* are also very clear regarding the general aversion towards the Soviet Element. The precise reasons for the extremely tense relations between the “Russians” and the Austrians may nonetheless require further studies; parallels might be established with other former German Allies (see the publications on Austria, Hungary, and Romania), and with Germany proper, see: Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany. A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation 1945-1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1995).

¹³⁹ Assaults on German/Austrian women represent a particularly dark side of the occupation, resulting, as N. Naimark has argued, from the aftermath of racial war, the profound humiliation of previous Russian defeats, and the obvious poverty of the Soviet Union compared to the “suppressed” German peoples. This provoked a degree of violence unprecedented in the liberated Slavic countries, leading to deep German resentment of Russia and the Communists. It also heavily damaged the image of the Soviet “liberators” of Austria. The real scale of the crimes committed by the Red Army against the local population is almost impossible to measure, but has continued to resonate ever since. In general, it is an historiographical commonplace that this ruined the prospect of Red Army soldiers gaining the sympathy of Austrians, and had long-term repercussions for Soviet policies in Austria. See Rathkolb 1982: 209-10. Donald Robert Whitnah and Edgar L. Erickson, *The American Occupation of Austria: Planning and Early Years* (Westport: Praeger Pub Text, 1985): 182, 198-200, 217. Alexander S. Stykalin, “K voprosu ob effektivnosti propagandy sovetskoi kultury za rubezhom v pervyie poslevoiennyie gody (iz opyta propagandy v Avstrii)” [“On the Question of the Efficiency of Soviet Cultural Propaganda Abroad in the Early Post-War Years (With Particular Regard to Propaganda in Austria“], *Rossiisko-Avstriiskii almanakh: istoricheskie i kulturnye paralleli [Russo-Austrian Almanach: Historical and Cultural Parallels]* 2 (2006): 228. Lang 2008.

¹⁴⁰ See: Barbara Stelzl-Marx, *Stalins Soldaten in Österreich. Innensicht der sowjetischen Besatzung* (Munich; Vienna: Oldenbourg; Böhlau, 2012).

stereotypes of Russian culture, matched by Soviet, at times quite ostensible, veneration of Austrian culture and music which imbued both Soviet imageries of Austria and Soviet self-representation strategies within the country. With regard to the latter, Soviet artists had previously been mobilised in the war effort, and, after having worked to sustain the morale of the troops, could easily be redeployed into work with civilian populations, particularly in order to transmit a positive image of their country and its government.¹⁴¹ Thus, the Soviets had an initial cultural advantage, at least until other powers succeeded in establishing stable institutions of occupation. Initially, the Soviets adopted a liberal stance that favoured the reopening of major cultural institutions in Vienna (as was also the case in Berlin¹⁴²), and took a very moderate approach to denazification. Despite subsequent distancing, many Austrian musicians chose not to burn their bridges with the USSR, maintaining a limited level of contact with philo-Soviet organisations, and making occasional favourable references to Russian art; these contacts would later facilitate Soviet musical-diplomatic overtures.

France's occupation,¹⁴³ while diverging widely from the USSR due to radically different political systems and dimensions of hard power, nonetheless revealed some uncanny parallels. The French economy could not compete with those of the USA and USSR, or with that of the more densely populated Germany, and the *étrange défaite* had effectively terminated France's standing as world power. Despite the development of a Cold War framework during the 1940s and 1950s, French diplomats were less concerned with the USSR than with the US, France's chief competitor in the field of language, and the chief challenge to France's vision of modernity and leadership (at least symbolically) in the Western world.¹⁴⁴ The French occupation was acutely aware of its status as the

¹⁴¹ There is abundant evidence that the Soviet authorities required their artists, including musicians, to accompany their concerts with speeches that reiterated the narratives of Soviet propaganda. This took place shortly after the entire Soviet artistic world had been conscripted into an unprecedented campaign to bolster the sagging morale of Soviet troops.

¹⁴² Brewster S. Chamberlin, *Kultur auf Trümmern: Berliner Berichte der amerikanischen Information Control Section Juli-Dezember 1945* (=Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979). Janik, *Recomposing German Music*: 99-106.

¹⁴³ Lydia Lettner, *Die französische Österreichpolitik von 1943 bis 1946* (Univ. Diss. Salzburg, 1980). Margit Sandner, *Die französisch-österreichischen Beziehungen während der Besatzungszeit 1947-1955* (Vienna: VGBÖ, 1985), Klaus Eisterer, *Französische Besatzungspolitik: Tirol und Vorarlberg 1945/46* (Innsbruck: Haymon Verlag, 1991). Friedrich Koja and Otto Pfersmann, eds., *Frankreich-Österreich: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmung und wechselseitiger Einfluß seit 1918* (=Studien zu Politik und Verwaltung, 58) (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 1994). Barbara Porpaczy, *Frankreich - Österreich 1945 - 1960 : Kulturpolitik und Identität* (Innsbruck; Vienna: Studienverlag, 2002). Michel Cullin, "Österreich – aber welches? Eugène Susini und sein Österreichbild," in: Thomas Angerer and Jacques Le Rider, eds., *Ein Frühling dem kein Sommer folgte? Französisch-österreichische Kulturtransfers seit 1945*. (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 1999): 19-38. Verena Zankl, Andrea Unterweger "Frankreichs Feste im Freundesland und was darüber berichtet wurde. Die Aktivitäten der französischen Kulturverantwortlichen in Tirol," in: Sieglinde Klettenhammer, ed., *Kulturraum Tirol: Literatur – Sprache – Medien* (Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft. Germanistische Reihe, 75) (Innsbruck: Innsbruck UP, 2009): 313-334. Éric Dussault, *La dénazification de l'Autriche par la France: la politique culturelle de la France dans sa zone d'occupation, 1945-1955* (Québec: PU Laval, 2005). Eiusdem, "Politique culturelle et dénazification dans la zone d'occupation française en Autriche (Tyrol et Vorarlberg) et à Vienne de 1945 à 1955," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 1 (2006): 83-92.

¹⁴⁴ Michaela Feurstein, "Der verlorene Kampf gegen den Vorrang des Englischen: Die französische Sprach- und Schulpolitik," in: *Ein Frühling, dem kein Sommer folgte?*: 83-98.

“fourth” among the Great Four, and, since France had suffered defeat at the hands of the Germans, its position in Austria and Germany was particularly delicate. In addition, wartime economic devastation precluded any sizeable commitment to Austria's reconstruction, and the beginnings of the retreat from empire signalled French weakness, as exemplified by the Dien Bien Phu defeat in 1954.

France was assigned an occupation zone¹⁴⁵ in Western Austria¹⁴⁶ (having conquered and then retained parts of Vorarlberg¹⁴⁷) and a sector in Vienna¹⁴⁸, and the government consequently reduced its direct military presence in the country, thus helping both to cut costs and to improve relations with the native populations. Like those of the Soviet Union, the French occupation forces did not enjoy a high standing in Austria.¹⁴⁹ French soldiers were linked to acts of violence committed against the native population (and the Austrians tended to be scornful of the relative poverty of the French); widespread Austrian racism also led to problems regarding the presence of France's African (Moroccan and colonial) personnel in Austria.¹⁵⁰

Security issues remained a key element in French thinking about Germany and Austria, and French propaganda vigorously promoted the idea of an anti-German Austrian nation. Influenced by the experiences of the interwar period, French politicians believed that Austria would seek the support of larger neighbouring states,¹⁵¹ which would incentivise France's affirmative action offering itself at least as a cultural counterbalance. Lacking sufficient economic and military means to sustain an independent security policy, the French government adhered to the nascent Western alliance that aimed at isolating the Soviet Union and building a united front against Stalinism (a position shared by the conservative French establishment in Austria); however, the French administration at times relaxed this policy, opting for a softer approach that emphasised bilateral ties through education¹⁵² and culture.¹⁵³ France had been a destination for émigré Russians and Austrians (Marcel Rubin, the

¹⁴⁵ Despite the inevitable out-datedness of its archival basis, Jürgen Klöckler's observations on French policies retain their importance, see: Jürgen Klöckler, *Quellen zu Österreichs Nachkriegsgeschichte in französischen Archiven. Tirol, Vorarlberg und Wien nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Dornbirn: Vorarlberger Verlagsanstalt, 1996). Accessed December 4, 2016. URL: <https://www.vorarlberg.at/pdf/kloecklerquellen.pdf>

¹⁴⁶ Eisterer, 1991. Christian Fornwagner and Richard Schober, eds., *Freiheit und Wiederaufbau. Tirol in den Jahren um den Staatsvertrag* (Akten des Symposiums des Tiroler Landesarchivs. Innsbruck, 27. und 28. Mai 2005) (Innsbruck: Universitätsverlag Wagner, 2007).

¹⁴⁷ Dietline Löffler-Bolka, *Vorarlberg 1945. Das Kriegsende und der Wiederaufbau demokratischer Verhältnisse in Vorarlberg im Jahre 1945* (Bregenz: Eugen Russ, 1975). Ulrich Nachbaur and Alois Niederstätter, eds., *Aufbruch in eine neue Zeit. Vorarlberger Almanach zum Jubiläumsjahr 2005* (Bregenz: Vorarlberger Landesarchiv, 2006).

¹⁴⁸ Stefan Vogel, *Frankreich und die alliierte Besetzung in Wien 1945-1955* (Dipl.-Arb. Vienna 1997). Eiusdem, “Frankreich und die Alliierte Besetzung Wiens von 1945 bis 1955: Motive und Grenzen der französischen Vermittlungspolitik,” Ferdinand Opil and Karl Fischer, eds., *Studien zur Wiener Geschichte. Jahrbuch des Vereins für Geschichte der Stadt Wien* 55 (1999): 173-210.

¹⁴⁹ Rauchensteiner, *Der Sonderfall: Die Besatzungszeit in Österreich 1945-1955*: 195.

¹⁵⁰ See Eisterer; Peter Coffey, *Afrikanische Soldaten im französisch besetzten Vorarlberg 1945/46* (Dipl.Arb. Vienna, 2010).

¹⁵¹ Dussault 2005: 11.

¹⁵² Michaela Feurstein, *Französische Schul- und Bildungspolitik in Österreich, 1945-1950* (Dipl.-Arb. Vienna, 1995).

¹⁵³ Sandra Unterweger et al., eds., *Bonjour Autriche: Literatur und Kunst in Tirol und Vorarlberg 1945-1955 (=Edition Brenner-Forum, 5)* (Innsbruck et al.: StudienVerlag, 2010).

Austro-French composer Alexander Spitzmüller, Rudolf Klein, among others) and, despite personal trajectories and the resulting sympathies taking different paths,¹⁵⁴ it could count on a number of Austrian intellectuals familiar with the country and feeling thankful to it. However, the decision to employ culture as the primary means of occupation was ultimately pre-determined by economic and military weakness, and by the long-standing French tradition of instrumentalising culture as a means to state-led foreign policy objectives.¹⁵⁵

This initial overview does not of course do justice to the entirety of the interactions between Austrians and the Allies in the realm of “immateriality”. The early post-war period was undoubtedly a key period in the construction of an Austrian nation-state, based on specifically cultural premises.¹⁵⁶ Allied politics had manifold effects on Austrian society and culture, such as the overwhelming American influence on the Austrian press¹⁵⁷ and radio,¹⁵⁸ which largely surpassed the limits of direct pro-American propaganda during the occupation, or the subsequent transformations of Austrian lifestyle and culture along Western lines.¹⁵⁹ Even before the war, Austrian culture and music had imbibed influences originating from those countries that would later become occupation powers.¹⁶⁰ Beyond the Cold-War east-west dichotomy, Austria’s relations with its other neighbours, not only Germany,¹⁶¹ but also Italy and Switzerland, were of considerable importance to its cultural renewal. However, despite the significant contribution of music to Allied cultural policies in Austria, the subject has tended to be sidelined in grand narratives of the occupation period, and relatively little is known about it on a systematic comparative level.¹⁶²

Moreover, far from being mere passive spectators, Austria's own institutions played a significant role in Allied cultural diplomacy. A study of their involvement will thus provide further insights into

¹⁵⁴ Michel Cullin and Primavera D. Gruber (eds.) *Douce France: Musik-Exil in Frankreich / Musiciens en exil en France 1933-1945* (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 2008).

¹⁵⁵ See a further sub-chapter.

¹⁵⁶ Ernst Bruckmüller, *Nation Österreich: kulturelles Bewusstsein und gesellschaftlich-politische Prozesse* (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 1996). Rathkolb, *Die paradoxe Republik...*

¹⁵⁷ Schönberg 1975, Rudolf Tschögl, *Tagespresse, Parteien und alliierte Besetzung : Grundzüge der Presseentwicklung in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit 1945 – 1947* (Univ. Diss. Vienna, 1979). Rathkolb 1982, Fritz Plasser, “Assessing the Americanization of Austrian Politics and Politicians,” in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, eds., *The Americanization/Westernization of Austria* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004): 235-254.

¹⁵⁸ Schönberg 1975, Wagnleitner 1991. Reinhold Wagnleitner, “Radio und Kalter Krieg : Die US-Radiopolitik und die Entwicklung des österreichischen Rundfunks zur Zeit der Alliierten Besetzung 1945-1955,” in Theo Mäusli, ed., *Schallwellen: zur Sozialgeschichte des Radios* (Zurich: Chronos, 1996): 181-198.

¹⁵⁹ Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, eds., *The Americanization/Westernization of Austria* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004).

¹⁶⁰ A good example of the problematic nature of musical influences (and interdependences) is Krenek’s *Johnny spielt auf* and its reception in inter- and post-war Austria (Kurt Drexel, “American Jazz in Ernst Krenek’s Opera *Jonny spielt auf*,” in: *The Americanization/Westernization of Austria*: 102-111).

¹⁶¹ Matthias Pape, *Ungleiche Brüder: Österreich und Deutschland 1945-1965* (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 2000).

¹⁶² Doris Graf’s *Die Kulturpolitik der Besatzungsmächte 1945-1955 und die Auswirkungen auf das Wiener Konzertleben* (Dipl.-Arb., Vienna, 1993) consisted mostly of an enumeration of concerts staged by the Allies in Vienna, with some short comments on the repertoire. A deeper, more systematic analysis of this data, alongside other musical activities, has not yet been attempted, let alone from a comparative perspective.

the mechanisms of interaction, the power relations and the forms of collaboration that existed between native Austrians and the Allies. Although Austria had very few opportunities to deploy its own cultural diplomacy abroad during these years – such as through the Austrian Institute in New York,¹⁶³ refugee/émigré circles in the US and Britain (most of them academics¹⁶⁴), and the Vienna Philharmonic tours of 1947 – the silent Austrification of the Allies ought not to be overlooked. The initial period of Soviet liberalism and inter-Allied entente favoured a swift reopening of the most prestigious musical institutions in Austria, and a renaissance of the national soundscape or dance.¹⁶⁵ In Vienna, the State Opera,¹⁶⁶ the *Volksoper*,¹⁶⁷ the Vienna Philharmonic,¹⁶⁸ the Vienna Symphonic,¹⁶⁹ the *Musikverein*,¹⁷⁰ the *Konzerthaus*¹⁷¹ and the *Universität für darstellende Kunst* represented Austrian interlocutors with whom the Allies were obliged to engage, thus tending to promote an Austrification of their own policies and demeanour. Indeed, the symbolic capital of the major Viennese cultural institutions was unparalleled elsewhere. Due to Salzburg's status, its Mozarteum, and its Festival,¹⁷² its directors carried considerable weight in Austria, Europe and beyond. Furthermore, the Styrian Musikverein,¹⁷³ the Graz opera,¹⁷⁴ and the symphony orchestras of Graz¹⁷⁵ and Innsbruck¹⁷⁶ succeeded in carving out a space of manoeuvre for themselves, including a relationship of interdependence with the Allied powers. The agency of Austria and Austrians was also reflected in the Allies' need for local cultural collaborators, and the leverage that the latter thus acquired in Austria's theatres, musical institutions, and press, as well as among the general public. Indeed, the latter often benefitted from tickets that cost little or nothing, due to the financial

¹⁶³ Walter Seidl, *Zwischen Kultur und Culture: Das Austrian Institute in New York und Österreichs kulturelle Repräsentanz in den USA* (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 2001).

¹⁶⁴ Johannes Feichtinger, *Wissenschaft zwischen den Kulturen: österreichische Hochschullehrer in der Emigration 1933-1945* (Frankfurt a/M; New York: Campus Verlag, 2001). Günter Bischof, *Austrian Lives* (New Orleans: NO UP; Innsbruck: Innsbruck UP, 2012). The impact of Austrian-born scientists, such as Friedrich (von) Hayek, Karl Popper or Paul Lazarsfeld, is obvious, and has been discussed in most accounts of twentieth-century intellectual history.

¹⁶⁵ Andrea Amort and Mimi Wunderer-Goesch (eds.), *Österreich tanzt* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2000).

¹⁶⁶ Marcel Prawy, *Die Wiener Oper. Geschichte und Geschichten* (Vienna: Molden, 1978 [1969]). Hubert Hackenberg, Walter Herrmann, *Die Wiener Staatsoper im Exil, 1945-1955* (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1985).

¹⁶⁷ Herbert Prikopa, *Die Wiener Volksoper: die Geschichte eines notwendigen Theaters; zum hundertsten Geburtstag im Dezember 1998* (Vienna: Ibero-Verlag, 1999).

¹⁶⁸ Fritz Trümpi, *Politisierter Orchester...*

¹⁶⁹ Ernst Kobau, *Die Wiener Symphoniker 1945-1955: eine sozialgeschichtliche Studie* (Diss. Vienna, 1990).

¹⁷⁰ Erich Lesing et al., *Der Wiener Musikverein* (Vienna: Ed. Wien Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988 [1987])

¹⁷¹ Erwin Barta, *Das Wiener Konzerthaus zwischen 1945 und 1961. Eine vereinsgeschichtliche und musikwirtschaftliche Studie* (Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 2001).

¹⁷² Gisela Prossnitz, *Salzburger Festspiele 1945-1960. Eine Chronik in Zeugnissen und Bildern* (Salzburg; Vienna: Jund und Jung, 2007). Robert Kriechbaumer, *Salzburger Festspiele 1945-1960. Ihre Geschichte von 1945 bis 1960* (Salzburg; Vienna: Jung und Jung, 2007)

¹⁷³ Erika Kaufmann, ed., *175 Jahre Musikverein für Steiermark, Graz: 1815-1990* (Graz: Musikverein, 1990). Michael Nemeth and Susanne Flesch, eds., *Im Jahrestakt: 200 Jahre Musikverein für Steiermark* (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 2015).

¹⁷⁴ Kornelia Pilz-Slapar, *Die Grazer Oper: 1945-1955* (Dipl.-Arb. Graz, 1986).

¹⁷⁵ Wolfgang Haas, *Das Grazer Städtische Orchester: Chronik und Konzertkalender 1900-1950* (Dipl. Arb. Graz, 1997).

¹⁷⁶ Walter Frenzel, *90 Jahre Städtisches Orchester: eine Geschichte zur Entstehung und Entwicklung des Innsbrucker Symphonieorchesters*: 1 (Innsbruck: Städtisches Verkehrsbüro, 1983); 2 (Innsbruck: Städtisches Verkehrsbüro, 1984).

disorganisation of 1945, and to the Allied desire to attract large numbers of Austrians to musical events; correspondingly, the Salzburg Festival had not yet acquired its elite status during the early post-war years, before it reverted to its usual policies of steep pricing, an international public and increasing media attention during the occupation decade and beyond. So far as the circumstances of post-war Austrian society are concerned, we must be wary of the simplistic assumption that serious music was exclusively targeted at high-brow intellectuals, even if the latter were certainly one target of musical-political discourse; indeed, radio further contributed to the growing outreach of musical imports, far beyond the concert halls of Vienna. The prominence of *E-Musik* instilled a tight acoustic discipline, and established a canon that could not only be enlisted on the Allied side, in order to reinforce their cultural prestige, but that also allowed Austrians to renegotiate their identity, and to recreate a soundscape of Austrian, peaceful and democratic normality. Folk music, as I will show, also appealed to Austrian audiences, who were thus temporarily released from the hierarchic world of European art music, both classical and, even more problematically, modern.

While these complexities reveal parallels between the situation of Austria and that of Germany, or that of liberated-occupied Central Europe more generally, they also testify to those specifically Austrian realities that factored into Austro-Allied interactions. The problematic past and no less problematic present of Austrian relations with the Allies were accompanied by a cultural-political reorientation of the country towards the Western world, a re-positioning that entailed a partial adjustment of Austrian cultural space to the cold war-influenced system. Diplomats and musicians had to balance their domestic power relations, that is, the limitations imposed consciously or unconsciously by their domestic power position and socialisation, with the situation on the ground. Stylistic, social and spatial localisations of Allied cultural (musical) diplomacies exerted a strong influence upon the reception of their work, and served to shape their repertoire and strategic choices. Thus, the practice of musical diplomacy in Austria is closely linked to the country's own prestige, to questions of nationalism, to cultural centres and institutions in Vienna, Salzburg, and beyond, to cultural and public actors, and to performative situations, i.e. concerts, their locations and audiences.

Addressing the Issues of Musical Diplomacy: The Purview of this Thesis

How did these processes take place, and in which contexts should they be understood? What did “success” or “failure” (“flop”) mean in early post-war Austria, how was “artistic quality” perceived or measured, and what did audiences ultimately make of these flows of music (and how, if ever, can we assess this)? I will divide this overarching and multi-layered research question into several sub-inquiries, which together will reflect the constructivist, social communication-based approach I take

to musical diplomacy.

First, this will require studying how and why certain musical products were selected within the transmitter countries. This raises the question of conceptualising and carrying out “cultural diplomacy” (with all its definitional and contextual ramifications). The top-down perspective on cultural diplomacy as part of the state-defined goal-settings of foreign policy – i.e. the French *diplomatie culturelle* and the Soviet cultural propaganda (later people's diplomacy) – needs to be relativized, particularly through attention to the dynamic character of formulation and internal negotiation within cultural exchange. This included, in fact, not only the highest levels of the state bureaucracy, but also allowed considerable leverage to middle-ranking functionaries, who effectively operated as cultural diplomats in the capital cities and abroad, and whose social background (education, received cultural norms and preferences – broadly subsumed under the meta-notion of *habitus*) influenced their choices of the musical repertoire to be sent to Austria. This is no less true of the enormous prestige capital of Austria, which also factored into their decisions. Musicians themselves necessarily had to take into account their countries' political frameworks (such as socialist realism, or the mythification of the “classics” in the USSR), and the desires of cultural diplomats and what they imagined to be Austrian preferences (this again raises the question of cultural socialisation, education and the ideas of Austria that circulated in musical circles abroad). Thus, while the state remains firmly at the centre of this analysis, since it alone could provide the necessary financial and organisational support, it should equally be understood as an object of socio-cultural analysis, in which questions of power and negotiation acquired particular relevance.

When crossing the border, music and musicians entered a cultural communication process. This involved an encounter with interlocutors on the Austrian side, whose positions vis-à-vis foreign music, and whose participation in musical discourse, were very different. On the one hand, cultural diplomacy tends to rely on local partners and collaborators. Indeed, both France and the USSR, as well as the United Kingdom and the United States, established bilateral societies, and, due to the special rights emanating from their occupation status, were able to recruit a number of local actors to promote their music, either through performance or through writing. These actors were far from passive recipients of Allied orders, and brought their own agenda and interpretations, as well as local knowledge, into French and Soviet musical diplomacy. This, as I will show, played an important role in the dynamics of the latter, and in its divergence from other fields of interaction between the Russians, the French and the Austrians.

On the next level, the media require a special analysis, owing to their crucial role in the transmission of Allied musical messages to Austrian audiences. This includes both the printed media and the radio, which were the main media channels through which musical actors could reach

Austrians beyond a restricted circle of concert-goers. Despite the markedly strong formal control of the Allies over the Austrian media, cultural journalists often developed strongly independent, self-conscious critical agency, using their interpretative and discursive power to shape public perceptions of French and Soviet musical exports. Radio, for its part, helped to transmit musical works beyond the large cities and concert venues in which they were usually performed, reaching an ever-increasing percentage of Austrians, many of whom did not fall into the classical *Bildungsbürgertum* for whom high culture was supposedly reserved.

Within the music itself, genres, styles and performative differentiations played a crucial role both in Allied thinking and in the resulting practical application of musical diplomacy, owing to the considerations I have just discussed. Likewise, geographical, spatial and performative settings made a difference when music was being brought to the Austrians. Choosing a violinist, a folk dance ensemble or an opera troupe could lead to very different stylistic accentuations, performative settings and target audiences (although the latter could easily overlap for all these genres). Selecting a small concert room in Vienna, opting for a ballet performance at the Salzburg Festival or an open air concert in larger cities or provincial towns impacted upon the ultimate effect that a musical message was expected to and would eventually have. Therefore, a strong empirical dimension is essential to studies of musical diplomacy, particularly those dealing with musical transfers. Manifold circumstances made themselves felt both in the planning and the practical carrying out of musical diplomacy: contextual factors, as well as internal musical analysis, are crucial to understanding the dynamics and efficiency of musical exchange. Indeed, the present inquiry will attempt to measure these factors against each other, and to establish exactly which aspects of the posited theoretical premises, or indeed qualifications to them, mattered most.

This begs, nevertheless, one final question regarding the causalities and effects of musical diplomacy. Being notoriously difficult to estimate, these do not lend themselves easily to a binary analysis. Like artistic “quality”, artistic or critical “success” was defined according to subjectively constructed categories and discourses, which both the transmitting and the receiving sides exchanged, communicating in this meta-musical language. Political categories of analysis, while retaining their significance as background factors, cannot be transferred directly into the concert room, and as such the intellectual legacy of the Cold War within cultural research will be subject to cautious criticism. Furthermore, the products of musical diplomacy at this point depart from the strictly defined field of international relations, and enter the internal, or “national”, discussion on aesthetic choices, styles and values. In some cases, these were increasingly detached from any foreign-induced musical exchange, or, indeed, diplomacy. Nonetheless, the middle- and long-term prerequisites and consequences of French and Soviet musical diplomacy still offer, as I will point

out, a vast potential for research within the field of sociology and musical discourse analysis.

In order to answer this question, I will analyse the theoretical and empirical background of specifically Soviet and French musical diplomacy. In doing so, I will examine the governmental documents produced by cultural diplomats in Paris, Moscow and Austria. Furthermore, local sources will also play a crucial role in my assessment of the conduct and outcomes of musical diplomacy. Concert posters, photos and other visual sources will be studied alongside the concert programmes of the Viennese State Opera, the *Musikverein*, the *Konzerthaus* and the Salzburg Festival, which will provide further insights into the relative impact that French and Russian/Soviet music had in different Austrian contexts. Concert posters, specifically in Vienna and Graz, will complement these programmes, and also show the ways in which Russian and French music was *visually* represented and promoted to Austrians. Radio materials, as represented by written programmes, reports and analytical documents, produced both by Allied and Austrian actors, will help to elucidate the Allied presence on Austrian airwaves. Newspaper sources from Vienna, Salzburg, Innsbruck, Graz, Bregenz, Linz, and beyond, with a particular focus on the culturally relevant dailies in Vienna, Salzburg and Innsbruck, will furnish the quantitatively largest part of the source base of this thesis. With their political affiliations, generational and social backgrounds, and regional particularities, journalists are the historians' interlocutors *par excellence*, and provide vast amounts of information regarding the fate of Russian and French musical exports outside of cultural-diplomatic structures. Surprisingly, this enormous mass of sources has been hitherto little studied.

Accordingly, this dissertation will be divided into five chapters, plus an extended conclusion. Employing a comparative approach, the first and the final two chapters will deal with musical-diplomatic structures and concert tours as an embodiment of musical diplomacy. The first two chapters will address the issue of agency, particularly its positioning within power structures, political guidelines, financial resources and relations with Austrians, and first and foremost that of the local cultural actors willing to enter into contact with the two Allied powers. The chapters dealing with guest tours will explore the planning, conduct of, and reactions to French and Soviet musicians visiting Austria. Following this story from Moscow and Paris to Vienna, Salzburg, Innsbruck, Graz, and several smaller towns, I will further explore the genre specifications, geographical particularities and patterns of interaction between musicians, critics and, if possible, the publics that built the contents of musical diplomacy.¹⁷⁷ Between these two chapters, there will be a chapter on the Austrian media, providing a link between Allied and Austrian perspectives, in order to

¹⁷⁷ To some extent, these two parts may correspond to the “structural” and “conceptual” approaches to cultural diplomacy, even if the second section is more turned towards performative acts and interactions. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy: Power, Distance, and the Promise of Civil Society,” Eiusdem, eds., *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013): 20-21.

bridge the gap between institutional and process-oriented histories, and to define the characteristics of concerts. Here, the reception patterns characteristic of the public space and its cultural-political entanglements will be addressed. Following these directions of inquiry, I will provide an overview of Allied music's role in Austrian concert life, and examine its impact, and temporal location, within the perspective of twentieth-century history. Finally, in the conclusion, I will return to the original research question, and show how the intricacies of musical diplomacy within the exceptional circumstances of post-war Austria can contribute to our understanding of international musical communication. With regard to the source material, the dissertation is based on documentation from a number of French, Russian, Austrian and British archives. In Russia, the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Russian Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI), the Russian Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) and the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), the only not publicly accessible archive, were consulted. In France, the *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères* at Nantes and La Courneuve provided important sources relating to the French administration and its Austrian partners. In Britain, The National Archives (Kew Gardens) offered an external perspective on French and Soviet activities through detailed reports on political situation both locally and nationally. In Vienna, the Austrian State Archive (*Österreichisches Staatsarchiv*) and the Austrian Radio Archive (ORF Archiv, Liesing, Vienna) furnished documents from the Interior, Culture and Foreign Ministries, and from radio broadcasters; these consisted mostly of reports, correspondence and, to a lesser extent, minutes. The regional archives of Styria, Salzburg, the Tyrol, Carinthia and Vienna (*Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv, Tiroler Landesarchiv, Innsbrucker Stadtarchiv, Kärntner Landesarchiv, Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv*) were instrumental in gathering geographically specific sources regarding Allied activity. The collections of the Austrian National Library in Vienna (*Österreichische Nationalbibliothek*), the Viennese City Hall Library (*Wien-Bibliothek im Rathaus*), the library of the Museum Ferdinandeum in Innsbruck, the Styrian Regional Library (*Steiermärkische Landesbibliothek* at the Johanneum in Graz) and the University Libraries in Vienna and Innsbruck offered numerous sources, first and foremost concert posters and newspapers. The rapidly growing corpus of high-quality online sources is to be signalled here as well, such as the visual collections of the Austrian National Library (*Bildarchiv Austria*), the Vienna City Hall Library, the *Konzerthaus*,¹⁷⁸ the two catalogues of the State Opera repertoire¹⁷⁹ and the Salzburg Festival,¹⁸⁰ and the published

¹⁷⁸ Konzerthaus-Archiv, URL: konzerthaus.at/datenbanksuche.

¹⁷⁹ Spielplan der Wiener Oper 1869-1955, URL: <http://www.mdw.ac.at/iatgm/operapolitics/spielplan-wiener-oper/web/>.
Spielplanarchiv der Wiener Staatsoper, URL: <https://archiv.wiener-staatsoper.at/>.

¹⁸⁰ Salzburger Festspiele – Archiv, <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archiv>.

catalogue of the Viennese *Musikverein*.¹⁸¹

The GARF provided the majority of sources on the structure, operational practices and interactions of the VOKS central office and its representatives abroad with their foreign partners. This was cross-checked against and supplemented with the Central Committee and VOKS collections at the RGASPI and RGANI, and the small, but valuable collection of the Soviet Embassy in Vienna, housed at the AVP RF. The National Archives in Britain shed more light on the British aspect of Austro-Allied interactions, as well as providing observations on the general mood in Austria, and materials regarding Franco-British relations and collaborations. On the French side, the Foreign Ministry archives contain numerous folders pertaining to the Austrian department of the General Commissariat for German and Austrian affairs, which essentially dealt with occupation issues, its correspondence with the Cultural Division in Vienna, and the cultural section and French Institute in Innsbruck. Furthermore, the European affairs collection of the General Directory of Cultural Affairs was instrumental in identifying the highest levels of cultural policy towards Austria. The French consulates in Innsbruck and Vienna deposited their holdings at Nantes, although the quantity of documentation regarding cultural affairs rose significantly after the withdrawal of the occupation agencies in 1955. Some documents from the Ministry of Culture and the French Association for Cultural Action (AFAA) are available at the National Archives at Pierrefitte-sur-Seine (Paris Saint-Denis).

The Austrian State Archive contains valuable materials from the local police departments (*Staatspolizei*), who compiled reports on the activities of the Austro-Soviet societies, as well as on the general sentiment of the population throughout the federal territory. Its Foreign Ministry folders were crucial in tracing the interactions between Austrian and Allied institutions, for instance the initially tumultuous history of the Austro-French society. The Radio Archive holds transcripts of conferences between Austrian radio station directors (including the Allied-led broadcasters), as well as the digitised and machine-readable copies of the *Funk and Film* magazine, which facilitate quantitative evaluation of the French and Russian musical presence on the airwaves. Radio programmes and occasional commentaries were, of course, published in the Viennese and provincial newspapers, although in this case no electronic search was possible. The archives outside of Vienna, the National Library and the Viennese City Hall Library allowed me to consult their (in some cases) incredibly extensive collections of concert posters, which provide an as yet still little-known source on daily concert life in cities like Graz. Concert programmes, whether printed in libraries or provincial archives (Klagenfurt), published in book form (the Viennese *Musikverein*) or digitised

¹⁸¹ Otto Biba, Theresa Hrdlicka, eds., *Die Programm-Sammlung im Archiv der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien, 1937-1987* (Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 2001).

(the *Konzerthaus*, the State Opera, the Salzburg Festival) were essential in situating Allied musical diplomacy within the Austrian scene, and their potential for a longer-term, internally-oriented investigation can hardly be overestimated. Finally, the newspaper press, conserved at the National Library, and the archives and libraries of Innsbruck, Salzburg and Graz, has served as a mainstay for this dissertation, having not been used on a systematic level by most of the previous studies, which either concentrated on institutional history or relied on Allied-affiliated newspapers as a tool of cultural propaganda.

Acknowledgments

Through the years of my research, I have been supported by a number of people at the European University Institute, and in Austria, Russia and France. My wholehearted gratitude goes to my thesis' supervisor, Prof. Dr. Federico Romero of the EUI, and to my second reader, Prof. Dr. Pieter M. Judson, whose advice and unwavering support has made this dissertation possible. I am also indebted to those scholars and colleagues whose insight and expertise have helped me to understand the often tantalisingly complex issues under study in this project, and those archivists and librarians who have facilitated my access to the primary source materials, and guided me through the intricacies of practical research in the archival and library systems of four different European countries. In Austria, Prof. DDr. Oliver Rathkolb, Prof. Dr. Philipp Ther, Prof. Dr. Thomas Angerer, Dr. Wolfgang Mueller, Dr. Maximilian Graf in Vienna, Dr. Barbara Porpaczy, Dr. Peter Ruggenthaler, Dr. Dieter Bacher, Dr. Josef Feichtinger in Graz, Prof. Dr. Klaus Eisterer in Innsbruck, Prof. Dr. Reinhold Wagnleitner in Salzburg, Prof. Dr. Alexander Vatlin in Moscow (who had previously directed my undergraduate thesis), Prof. Dr. Michel Espagne in Paris, and Prof. Dr. François Yon (whom I was able to meet in Padua at a summer school last September) have all provided me with valuable advice, either in personal conversations or via email. While responsibility for the weaknesses of this dissertation is entirely mine, I owe all of these people sincere gratitude for helping me to understand and explore the immensely rich and multifaceted realm of international cultural contacts. My colleagues at the EUI, at the University of Vienna (where I was able to spend an exchange semester), in Moscow and at various conferences in Marburg, Aarhus, Jyväskylä and Potsdam shared with me many an insightful conversation, these having often served as a source of analytical inspiration. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their patience and support during the research and writing process.

Chapter 1. Soviet Cultural Propaganda and its Agents in Moscow and Vienna

Despite contemporary historiographical criticism of state-centred approaches, it remains the fact that in the occupation context, it was only states that had the necessary means and leverage to set up and operate a substantial musical diplomacy (MD). On various levels, state actors were necessary intermediaries for cultural communication between Austria, France and the USSR. By defining the agenda, selecting the programme and securing financial and infrastructural support, cultural diplomats played a key role in musical contacts. Their partners, while seizing on any opportunity to pursue their own agenda, were still bound to follow the state-dominated framework of cultural diplomacy (CD). As independent communication was severely limited, flows of musical materials, arrivals of foreign musicians or even music on the airwaves were channelled through a limited number of institutions, and often depended on a few individuals charged with cultural policies. As a consequence, an officialised and state-centred framework for musical diplomacy came into being in Austria.

Differences between France and the USSR, against the backdrop of US cultural diplomacy, were striking, and provided a cornerstone of MD conceptualisation and enactment. The very logic and structuring of those activities comprised within the category of musical diplomacy were subject to radically divergent political philosophies, producing sharply contrasting approaches. While French governmental theorists had long reflected upon the role of culture in France's foreign relations, in Russia, the formulation of a coherent "cultural diplomacy" did not occur until the post-Soviet period.¹⁸² Consequently, the cultural organs of the various occupation administrations revealed few similarities. Furthermore, the respective bilateral societies, working towards closer cultural ties from the Austrian perspective, did not escape the operational premises of their sponsors. While the activities of the French were carried out in most of the Austrian regions, thus introducing a note of local history, such considerations were less important to their Soviet colleagues. The latter relied primarily on Communist assistance, which brought obvious social and geographical limitations with it. However, some of the day-to-day activities of cultural diplomats may reveal certain parallels, particularly in dealing with comparable materials and tackling comparable problems. Their financial mechanisms were similar in their lack of transparency, but stemmed from radically different economic contexts. In both cases, middle-ranking state bureaucrats and their local partners found some leeway, particularly in cases in which there were no clearly prescribed guidelines: these small, but at times not insignificant, spaces of freedom punctuated French and even Soviet cultural

¹⁸² Nataliia M. Bogoliubova, Iuliia V. Nikolaieva, "Vyrabotka opredeleniia vneshnei kulturnoi politiki v sovremennom nauchnom diskurse [Foreign Cultural Policy Definition in Modern Scientific Discourse]," *Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i iuridicheskie nauki, kulturologiia i iskusstvovedeniie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki* 4:1 (2012): 25-27.

diplomacies. Ultimately, it was the difference in vision and the relative importance accorded to the agenda of cultural representatives themselves that defined the functioning of Soviet and French CD structures.

The Soviet case reveals significant differences from the Western democracies due to inextricable links between party-political goals and diplomacy, thus conflating the interests of a de facto territorial state with the global spread of communist ideology. Since Soviet cultural diplomacy predated World War II, remaining indissociable from propaganda,¹⁸³ cultural propagandists and diplomats already carried a baggage of experience, often negative. In particular, they were conditioned by the internal repressiveness of Stalinism, and by negative external reactions to the Bolshevik dictatorship. Nevertheless, while recognising the full allegiance of Soviet cultural diplomacy to Bolshevik ideological goals, it would be wrong to neglect the prestige that culture enjoyed among the political leadership, the latter being fully aware of culture's potential, and eager to instrumentalise it, and among cultural diplomats, steadfastly maintaining the role of culture in foreign policy.

The contradictory relationship between culture and ideology is key to comprehending Soviet public and cultural diplomacy. From 1921, when the Committee for Foreign Aid was set up (an information policy structure, originally intended to secure assistance to combat the famine in the Volga region), a bias towards political propaganda persisted. This tendency was manifest in the All-Union Society for Cultural Exchange with Abroad (VOKS), established four years later in 1925. On the one hand, cultural diplomats aspired to show that culture could indeed flourish following the Bolshevik revolution. However, a certain inferiority complex continued to haunt Russian decision-makers, leading to an obsession with demonstrating that the country was in fact on par with the most advanced Western nations, particularly in matters of culture.¹⁸⁴ This reinforced the drive to showcase the revolution, and internal political pressures required efficiency, at least on paper, from cultural officials.

Since cultural propaganda drew heavily from an older tradition of Russian arts, encouraged by the generally conservative turn of Stalinist cultural policies after the late 1930s, it was often difficult to justify the superiority of a specifically Socialist culture: obviously, neither Pushkin nor Tchaikovsky could easily be brought under the umbrella of “socialist” realism. This dichotomy in Soviet thinking extended to cultural exports abroad, based on the inherent conflict between the national/territorial

¹⁸³ Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961). Jerome Parks, *Culture, Conflict and Coexistence* (Jefferson, NC; London: Jefferson UP, 1983). Nigel Gould-Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History* 27:2 (2003): 193-214. Michael David-Fox, *Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941* (New York et al.: Oxford UP, 2012).

¹⁸⁴ This was notably exposed by David-Fox.

and the ideological, the past and the present (the former denounced on a political level yet exalted by cultural activists, the latter more convenient for propaganda purposes, but at the same time clearly experiencing difficulties in the realm of culture¹⁸⁵).

Indeed, these difficulties soon assumed enormous proportions. This was partly due to the party effort to impose a unified Socialist-Realist canon: after a period of competition between the Russian Association of Proletarian Musicians (RAPM) and the Association of Contemporary Music (ASM),¹⁸⁶ and the still relatively unrestricted debates of the period up until 1932,¹⁸⁷ an increasing degree of discipline was imposed upon the musical landscape, including through a purge of nonconformist aesthetics.¹⁸⁸ The possibility of a flexible policy, which had been sustained by the intelligentsia during the 1920s and early 1930s, was gradually reduced over the following years, due to the totalising dynamics of the Stalinist state,¹⁸⁹ the introduction of Socialist Realism as the official guideline for artistic creation, and waves of internal repression during 1936/38¹⁹⁰ and 1948 (even if, as some scholars argue, musicians were spared the detailed scrutiny of the regime owing to music's peripheral position in the focus of upper-tier apparatchiks¹⁹¹). Post-war Stalinism tended to further harden restrictions, particularly by forcing through Socialist Realism in the Soviet Union and, after the Prague Manifesto of 1948, in Eastern Europe too. However, ambiguities were to be found in abundance. While writers eagerly denounced each other,¹⁹² composers managed to escape the worst

¹⁸⁵ Walter Obermaier, ed., *Kulturelle Visitenkarten. Die (Re-)Präsentation der Besatzungsmächte in Wien 1945-1955. Katalog der 237. Wechselausstellung der Wiener Stadt- und Landesbibliothek. Gestaltung und Text von Markus Feigl* (Vienna: Sonderzeichen, 1999): 15.

¹⁸⁶ Here, I cannot provide a full overview of the history of Soviet music in the interwar period (its implications within the political framework have been demonstrated by Amy Nelson, *Music for the Revolution: Musicians and Power in Early Soviet Russia* [University Park, Pa: Penn State UP, 2004]). A profound and engaging, although sadly untranslated from Russian and thus relatively little known, analysis of contemporary theory and the later historiography of Russian music in the 1920-40s has been recently provided in: Anna Ganzha, "Sovetskaia muzyka kak ob'ekt stalinskoi kulturnoi politiki" [Soviet Music as Object of Stalinist Cultural Policy], *Logos* 2 [98] (2014): 123-155. Ganzha shows how Stalinist discourse imposed mounting pressure on individual composers, while an unattainable aesthetic goal of "true" Socialist Realism was effectively used to control the artistic guild. Cultural exports reflected these internal political tendencies. Soviet musical life developed an extraordinary degree of complexity in the post-revolutionary era, maintaining an intellectual tradition even under the growing pressure of Stalinism. Wolfgang Mende, *Musik und Kunst in der sowjetischen Revolutionskultur* (Cologne et al.: Böhlau, 2009).

¹⁸⁷ Marina Frolova-Walker, *Music and Soviet Power 1917-1932* (Woodbridge, UK; Rochester, NY: Boydell and Brewer, 2012).

¹⁸⁸ M.A. Moiseeva, "Svoboda tvorchosti i tvorchist' brantsiv" [Freedom of Creation and Creation of Captives], in: *XX stolittia – etnonatsionalnii vymir ta problem Holokostu: zbirnyk naukovykh prats' za materialamy mizhnarodnoi naukovo-praktzchnoi konferencii, 22-23 zhovtnia 2010 r.* [The 20th Century – The Ethno-National Dimension and the Problem of the Holocaust: Collection of Scientific Works on the Materials of the International Scientific-Practical Conference 22-23 October 2010] (Dnipropetrovs'k: Vyd-vo Tsentru "Tkuma", 2010): 47-57.

¹⁸⁹ Detlef Gojowy, "Musik in und seit der Stalinzeit," in: Gabriele Gorzka, ed., *Kultur im Stalinismus. Sowjetische Kunst und Kultur der 1930er bis 50er Jahre* (Bremen: Ed. Temmen, 1994): 117-130. Kerstin Armbrorst-Weihs, "Musik als 'Waffe des sozialistischen Aufbaus': Zum Musikleben in der Sowjetunion zwischen Parteidoktrin und Avantgarde," Sabine Mecking and Yvonne Wasserloos, eds., *Musik-Macht-Staat. Kulturelle, soziale und politische Wandlungsprozesse in der Moderne* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2012): 215-37.

¹⁹⁰ Leonid (Lev) V. Maksimenkov, *Sumbur vmesto muzyki. Stalinskaia kulturnaia revoliutsiia 1937-1938* [Muddle Instead of Music. Stalinist Cultural Revolution in 1937-1938] (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia kniga, 1997).

¹⁹¹ Simo Mikkonen, *Music and Power in the Soviet 1930s* (Newiston, NY: Mellen Press, 2009).

¹⁹² Lev V. Maksimenkov, "Predisloviie" (Foreword), in: Lev V. Maksimenkov, ed., *Kultura i vlast' ot Stalina do*

of party repression. Prokofiev and Shostakovich, two of the greatest contemporary Russian composers, sought an accommodation with the regime, managing to secure official recognition (and favours),¹⁹³ while being simultaneously imbricated in the Soviet state's propaganda campaigns, thus finding themselves in a highly ambivalent position.¹⁹⁴ On the other hand, the dichotomy between oppression and liberation was never absolute, in that artists, while outwardly adhering to party diktats, learned how to navigate the Soviet system in order to pursue their own professional goals, thus ultimately subverting the supposed unity and discipline of cultural-political frameworks.¹⁹⁵ The party line was deliberately blurred, becoming clear only after the scythe of repression had reaped its harvest. Thus, cultural actors found themselves in a situation in which no clear rules of conduct were prescribed, while the risks of falling out of favour with the regime were high. Uncertainty created space for power negotiations within the artistic sphere, where formal and informal connections could substantially elevate or diminish the individual's standing.¹⁹⁶ Physical survival may have been at stake in some cases, while the disciplining measures of the party-state were intended to assure the survival of the regime itself.

Considering the difficult international position in which the USSR found itself vis-à-vis most Western powers, with their predominantly non-communist public opinion, the existence of the party-state tended to hinder the diffusion of Russian and Soviet culture abroad, and to inhibit open discussion, due to mutual suspicions between the Bolsheviks and the majority of the population in the "bourgeois" countries. In central Europe, the course of action adopted by the USSR depended to a large extent on its relative power position, and the degree of competition with which the Soviet authorities were confronted. Germany is a well-studied case,¹⁹⁷ and East German developments were

Gorbacheva. Dokumenty. Kremliovski kinoteatr 1928-1953 [Culture and Power from Stalin to Gorbachen. Documents. The Kremlin Cinema 1928-1953] (Moscow, 2005): 12.

¹⁹³ See: Marina Frolova-Walker, *Stalin's Music Prize: Soviet Culture and Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2016).

¹⁹⁴ Richard Taruskin, "Shostakovich and the Inhuman," in: Richard Taruskin, *Defining Russia Musically: Historical and Hermeneutical Essays* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2000): 468-97.

¹⁹⁵ Christine Ezrahi, *Swans of the Kremlin. Ballet and Power in Soviet Russia* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 6-7, 85, 103. Ezrahi demonstrates both the enforced implication of a formerly aristocratically oriented art in the Soviet project of a socially engaged and responsible art, and the different strategies adopted by choreographers and artists in order to subvert the kind of "dramatical ballet" (*drambalet*) favoured by the Socialist Realist establishment, and to thus pursue their own agenda.

¹⁹⁶ Kirill Tomoff, *Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-1953* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP: 2006)

¹⁹⁷ Gerd Dietrich, "... wie eine kleine Oktoberrevolution": Kulturpolitik der SMAD 1945-1949," in: Gabriele Clemens ed. *Kulturpolitik im besetzten Deutschland 1945-1949* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994): 228, Carroll: 37-49. Michail Semirjaga, "Sowjetische Okkupation und das kulturelle Leben in Berlin," in: Hans-Martin Hinz et al., eds., *Die vier Besatzungsmächte und die Kultur in Berlin 1945-1949* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 1999): 41-50. Jan Foitzik, "Weder 'Freiheit' noch 'Einheit': Methoden und Resultate der kulturpolitischen Umorientierungen in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone. Einleitung," in: Horst Möller, Alexandr O. Tschubarjan, *Die Politik der Sowjetischen Militäradministration in Deutschland (SMAD): Kultur, Wissenschaft und Bildung 1945-1949. Ziele, Methoden, Ergebnisse. Dokumente aus russischen Archiven (= Texte und Materialien zur Zeitgeschichte, 15)* (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2005): 31-57. Maximilian Becker, *Die Kulturpolitik der sowjetischen Besatzungsmacht in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1953. Sowjetische Literatur und deutsche Klassiker im Dienst der Politik Stalins* (Mag.-Arb. Munich, 2007).

indeed seen as increasingly problematic in contemporary Austria. This was further complicated by the immediate relations between Austrians and the occupation forces. Taking into account the recent history of National-Socialism,¹⁹⁸ earlier ideas of Austria as a bulwark of *Kultur* (Soviet officers were at times enraged at being compared to the invading Ottomans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries¹⁹⁹), and the anti-Slavic fallout of nineteenth-century nationalism, the starting position and cultural capital with which the Soviet apparatus could operate were extremely problematic. Moreover, the limited room for manoeuvre within the domestic political framework was not conducive to flexible management of media and cultural productions abroad.²⁰⁰

Another question stems from the imminent debacle of political propaganda: could musical art counterbalance these negative tendencies in its own right? The answer depends on target audiences and on the general framework of political goals within Austria. The Communist Party was necessarily a chief interlocutor of the Soviet Element in the country, and a considerable amount of the expenditure on political and cultural propaganda was dedicated to a communist audience. However, due to the negligible importance of Communists in most of Austria, Soviet cultural diplomats had to extend the social outreach of their cultural message, ideally targeting all major social groups and regions in the country. A general subdivision into “workers”, “peasants” and “intelligentsia” did not apply in Austrian society, particularly as most workers sympathised with the strongly anti-communist and anti-Soviet Socialist party, and were thus in fact a very difficult audience to target. An administrative presence in Eastern Austria, for instance through the various enterprises of the Administration for Soviet Property in Austria (USIA), provided greater opportunities to enroll employees into Soviet-affiliated cultural networks, and this was indeed the case with the Austro-Soviet society and the Information Centres. However, pragmatic considerations required a cultural programme that would address Austrians of all social backgrounds and political affiliations. Likewise, it would aim to show the diversity of the Soviet people and to furnish Austrians with a positive image of the Soviet Union. As such, organised cultural diplomacy employed a multi-genre and multi-style approach, and sought to expand its geographical scope. This involved stressing the complexity and richness of “Soviet civilisation”, from the refined opera houses in Moscow and Leningrad to the popular “musicking” of *kolkhozes* in both Russian and non-ethnic Russian regions, and presenting a positive portrayal of Soviet cultural policies. As such, Soviet

¹⁹⁸ This has remained an uneasy and indeed embarrassing issue. Quite often, the literature would simply refer to the existence of such stereotypes, without deconstructing their essence, structure and chronological development. On Nazi images of the Soviet Union (in Germany) see Werner Wette, “Das Russlandbild in der NS-Propaganda. Ein Problemaufriß,” in: Hans Erich Volkmann, ed., *Das Russlandbild im Dritten Reich* (Cologne et al: Böhlau, 1994): 55-78). Of course, there is a vast literature on Nazi ideology, which includes Slavic- and Russian-related topics.

¹⁹⁹ For instance, an embarrassing episode of this kind, which took place in a local theatre, occurred in the Burgenland village of Güssing, Lang: 392-93

²⁰⁰ See: Mueller 2005.

cultural diplomacy aimed at convincing both communist sympathisers and the non-communist majority of the genuine richness of the culture of the Soviet Union, and the superiority of state-socialist party politics over “bourgeois capitalism.”

Correspondingly, this required a careful balancing of styles and genres on the Soviet side, as well as taking into account the relationship between the internal party line and local circumstances. A repertoire analysis has recently demonstrated that the VOKS, in the Austrian case, invested primarily in three major genres: an academic school subdivided into nineteenth-century classics and contemporary composers, “folk” music, and modern songs.²⁰¹ The latter were in most cases intensely propagandistic, as were a substantial percentage of works by contemporary musicians. In contrast, numerous pieces from the older period were relatively free from overtly Bolshevik admixtures, as were many contemporary and folk compositions. Secondly, the Russian classics were highly appreciated by Austrians, and the propaganda officers quickly seized upon this.²⁰² High culture had been allotted an important role in domestic cultural policies, being instrumentalised in processes of identity formation²⁰³ and the construction of a mythified past, whereby the great authors, emerging from the initial iconoclasm of the 1920s, were integrated into a coherent Soviet cultural-political canon.²⁰⁴ As *kulturnost'* (*kultura*), this sought to convey a positive image of a well-educated, cultured Soviet person, both at home and abroad. Thus, high culture, being part of a Soviet “brand”,²⁰⁵ not least as “opposed” to that of the United States, was frequently brandished during the early Cold War. In this sense, cultural propaganda campaigns,²⁰⁶ cultural conservatism, and a revived orientation towards the Russian classics²⁰⁷ held a firm grip over late Stalinism, including the exercise of foreign musical propaganda.²⁰⁸ Coincidentally, such conservative reductionism tended to intersect with the Austrian tastes of the time. Furthermore, when left to their own devices, Russian cultural officials showed genuine interest in promoting the music of their homeland. Indeed, the literature has frequently underlined the importance of the first period of occupation (1945-46),²⁰⁹ during which Soviet cultural officials made significant contributions to the resurrection of Viennese cultural life,

²⁰¹ Alexander Golovlev, “Zur Kulturpolitik der UdSSR in Österreich 1945 bis 1955: Musik als Repräsentationsmittel und ihre Auswirkungen auf österreichische Russlandbilder,” in: Maximilian Graf, Agnes Meisinger, eds., *Österreich im Kalten Krieg. Neue Forschungen im internationalen Kontext. (= Zeitgeschichte im Kontext, 11)* (Göttingen; Vienna: V&R unipress/Vienna UP, 2016): 231-58.

²⁰² Mueller 1998, 2003.

²⁰³ Pauline Fairclough, *Classics for the Masses: Shaping Soviet Musical Identity under Lenin and Stalin* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2016).

²⁰⁴ Marina G. Raku, *Muzykal'naiia klassika v mifotvorchestve sovetskoï epokhi* [Musical Classics in the Soviet Epoch Myth-Building] (Moscow: Novoie literturnoie obozrenie, 2014).

²⁰⁵ Barghoorn: 13.

²⁰⁶ Caute: 386-9; Gienow-Hecht 2010: 401.

²⁰⁷ Frolova-Walker, *Russian Music and Nationalism*: 338-55.

²⁰⁸ Tomoff, *Virtuosi Abroad*.

²⁰⁹ Parallel developments were observable in Berlin, where the first renewal of cultural life was followed by intensifying Cold War tensions and the dramatic split of the city.

and paraded a number of top-class Soviet musicians, without resorting to overt Soviet propaganda. In this sense, the Russians passed ahead of other Allies, particularly the US.²¹⁰ As such, Russian music made a quick entry on to the Austrian scene,²¹¹ and remained present in Vienna and the rest of the country,²¹² enjoying consistently larger success²¹³ than outright political propaganda. It was based on Russians' own imageries of Austria,²¹³ where musical grandeur and Viennese flair played a foremost role and stimulated prestige advances in the land of music.

However, after the end of 1947, as the common Allied commitment to democratisation disintegrated, cultural diplomats had no choice but to begin launching consistent attacks on the West, seconded by their communist fellow-travelers.²¹⁴ These tensions continued after the Berlin crisis and the Korean war, when both the three Western Allies and the Soviet Union concentrated much of their efforts on attacking each other's position in Austria. Despite this confrontational focus, however, not all cultural diplomacy was dedicated exclusively to assaulting the western powers, and continued to transmit the initial positive image of the Soviet Union. The first signs of *détente* becoming visible around the time of the Allied withdrawal from Austria, minor changes occurred within the cultural-diplomatic framework, notably a reduction of spoken propaganda at musical events, and a few other initiatives outside the Soviet zone. The cautious de-ideologisation of the final period of occupation was a by-product of larger propagandistic battles. Moreover, as domestic cultural life emerged from the ruins of 1945 into the reconstructed, variegated landscape of the mid-1950s, and as exposure to and competition with Western cultural diplomacy became more visible, Soviet propagandists looked for new ways to answer these challenges. Broadly speaking, they expanded the network of existing cultural institutions, sought to augment the overall quantity of their membership and activities, and, for example, introduced nationwide guest tours during the late 1940s, culminating in a few highly successful open-air displays of folk-music, and some academic concerts in Southern and Western Austria.

Therefore, while direct political propaganda represented a liability, rather than an asset, for Soviet cultural propagandists in Austria, small installments of the fine arts and music, due to their relative distance from direct political messages, offered greater potential. The latter could, while eschewing

²¹⁰ Aichinger 258, 401; Rathkolb 1982: 274; Rathkolb 1985: 268-9, 312; Wagnleitner 1991: 208-9; Löffler 388.

²¹¹ Graf: 19; Mueller 2003.

²¹² Mueller 1998, Michael Kraus, «Kultura» : *Der Einfluss der sowjetischen Besatzung auf die österreichische Kultur 1945-1955* (Univ. Dipl.-Arb. Vienna, 2008).

²¹³ Leidinger, Moritz 2004. Julia Köstenberger, "The Great Waltz/Bol'shoj Val's - filmisch transportierte Österreichbilder," in: Karin Moser, ed. *Besetzte Bilder : Film, Kultur und Propaganda in Österreich 1945 – 1955* (Vienna et al: Böhlau, 2005): 303-22.

²¹⁴ Thus, the staging of Simonov's "The Russian Question" in the prominent Communist theatre *Die Scala* in 1948 caused a major cultural scandal, involving the Austrian establishment and the Western Allies, who sought to prevent the theatre from performing this openly anti-western piece. Rathkolb 1982, 410-15. Mueller, OZ und RS, 42-46. Kraus, 88.

an overt, and, under Austrian conditions, repulsive, Stalinist message, still be instrumental in overcoming anti-Russian sentiment, and promoting an image of the Soviet Union as a country of enormous cultural potential, rooted in a distinguished past and dynamically developing under the favourable conditions provided by state socialism. In its stress on classic Russian music, both portrayed and perceived as a vitally important part of Western musical art, Soviet cultural propaganda sought to uphold the equal standing of Russian culture within the European “family of nations”, not inferior, and in fact akin, to Germany and Austria themselves. Folk arts and light music had the potential to reach wider audiences, and to nuance an otherwise one-sided image of the USSR; while light music was soon marginalised as compared to native Austrian and American music, Russian and other folk arts could be used to depict the harmonious coexistence of different ethnicities within the Soviet federation, and the vibrant development of the cultural potential of its people(s). While the relation between defence and aggression has remained a problematic topic in the literature on Soviet foreign policy and the Cold War, cultural propaganda moved uneasily within the power and ideological limits of the party state, losing its independent momentum, but at the same time continuing a near-liminal existence within the Soviet bureaucratic machine. While proclaiming and enforcing full adherence to the norms and regulations elicited by the propaganda state, cultural diplomats kept a low profile, resisting internal and external pressures, and operating within a certain space of manoeuvre (that became larger with growing specialisation and less stringent controls). Parallels in cultural preferences between the official cultural diplomacy and its foreign audiences could, however, be helpful for the Soviet Union's prestige; high culture brought Soviet Russia closer to Central and Western Europe, and favoured a better reception of its cultural output.

“Democratic Centralism” in Soviet Cultural Policies in Austria: Supervisory Organs in Moscow

Musical exchange between Austria and the USSR was integrated into the centralised party-state apparatus. The Central Committee of the Communist Party defined the general guidelines and the framework for all cultural policies at home and abroad. However, it did not usually inquire into the details of practical work conducted in Austria, despite a small number of expensive large-scale tours (such as that of the Voronezh choir in 1951) occurring on this level.²¹⁵ Within the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Third European Department took charge of Austrian and German affairs, and its head,

²¹⁵ The RGASPI documentation available for those cases does not allow for determining the extent to which the Committee members were actually informed of these activities, which remained rather on the margins. However, the Molotov collection has a few lists of Voronezh choir personnel, which may have passed across his desk.

A.A. Smirnov, was kept informed about major cultural initiatives undertaken in Austria. It does not appear, however, that the Foreign Ministry took any initiative in cultural contacts; rather, it acted as a supervisory organ, designed to intervene in formal matters (such as cross-border traffic), while most of the actual workload was carried out elsewhere. Furthermore, the Committee on Arts Affairs (*Komitet po delam iskusstv*) of the Ministry of Culture decided on the possibility and the reasons for sending requested Soviet musicians to Austria at a given time. Moreover, the Committee was also charged with finding those materials that could not be procured otherwise, such as rare pieces of sheet music. Financial issues that involved sizeable subsidies were settled by the Finance Ministry, such as those relating to Soviet-led cultural institutions. It must be emphasised that in the specific Soviet situation, where no free currency exchange existed, every activity linked to spending money abroad or acquiring foreign currency necessitated contact with the Ministry, particularly in order to receive a series of necessary permissions, and to reach an agreement on how to transact liquid currency. In Austria itself, Austrian shillings (*öS*) were reintroduced relatively quickly, but French *francs d'occupation* and American “occupation dollars,” along with proper francs, pounds and dollars, were also used within a system of regulations aiming to maintain the balance of the frail Austrian financial system. Therefore, going to a western zone required having the currency of the zone and / or the shilling, with the effect that the Western Allies had an ability to postpone or forestall extensive and expensive Soviet tours. With regard to direct contacts between Soviet and Austrian artists, a number of important Soviet cultural institutions can be identified, including the Bolshoi Theatre and the Moscow Conservatory. The Union of Soviet Composers was, unsurprisingly, an important venue for Austrian researchers and practicing musicians, particularly those concerned with contemporary Soviet music. Here, power relations specific to the cultural scene came into play. As V. Tolz has shown, the late 1940s were characterised by an exponential growth in the power and influence of the Union's elite over its rank-and-file members, notably through the distribution of resources and the handling of official favours.²¹⁶ Going to Austria was a privilege, and it is no surprise that the Union's president, Tikhon Khrennikov,²¹⁷ was active in the decision-making process, facilitated by his positions in the Union itself, the VOKS (see below) and within the less formal arrangements that existed within the cultural and party establishment. The strong hierarchisation of the world of Soviet music is clearly visible from in the restrictive selection process, and in the absence of substantial debates regarding the choice of musicians to send to

²¹⁶ Vera Tolz, “‘Cultural Bosses’ as Patrons and Clients: the Functioning of the Soviet Creative Unions in the Postwar Period,” *Contemporary European History* 11:1 *Special Issue: Patronage, Personal Networks and State: Everyday Life in the Cultural Sphere in Communist Russia and East Europe* (2002):87-105.

²¹⁷ His role there was heavily contested by many contemporaries and scholars. Subsequently, K. Tomoff has offered a more positive account of Khrennikov's activities, demonstrating that he apparently stopped some persecutions from taking place.

Austria. Even the contemporary purges of formalists were implemented silently, without discussion at the intermediate level, on which practical decisions were made. However, those artists who struck a “big deal” (Vera Dunham²¹⁸) with the Soviet state, and who sat on different commissions and were permitted to travel abroad, were not mere victims, and retained some agency of their own. Personal interconnections with cultural propaganda abroad created an operational space which, while not being altogether free from eventual repressions, led a quasi-independent existence within the set of rules accepted and interiorised by its members, some of whom succeeded in benefitting from the system.

VOKS

As democratic centralism and party-state controls were extended to the contacts between the USSR, its citizens and the world outside its borders, the Soviet propaganda state succeeded in establishing a monopoly not only over “hard exports”, but also over foreign “cultural propaganda”, which aimed at creating a positive image of the country abroad and serving the party-state's foreign policy objectives. Unlike the rather modest attempts of imperial Russia, vying for Allied (and particularly US²¹⁹) public opinion during the First World War, the Bolsheviks created a propaganda machine “hitherto unseen”.²²⁰ Their foreign public diplomacy campaign was supported by a number of Soviet organisations. After the Civil War was decided in the Communists’ favour, and conditions in the newly established USSR were to some extent stabilised, the party elite created a nominally “non-government” All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Abroad (*Vsesoiuznoie obščestvo kulturnoi sviazi s zagranitsej*, VOKS). Its importance is hard to overestimate, since the strategic thinking behind the VOKS fed into the larger scheme of foreign cultural policy – termed “cultural propaganda” – of the USSR, and would later systematically inform Soviet activities in Austria.

Established under the leadership of Olga D. Kameneva,²²¹ the sister of Lev Kamenev, in 1925 by a decision of the Orgburo of the Central Committee and with support from a number of central Soviet organisations,²²² the VOKS had its precursors in the organization for cultural relief set up during the

²¹⁸ Cited in Tolz, 103-04.

²¹⁹ Alexander N. Golubev, “... *Vzgliad na zemliu obetovannuiu*”: *Iz istorii sovetskoj kulturnoi diplomatii 1920-1930-kh godov* [“... A Look at the Promised Land: From the History of Soviet Cultural diplomacy in the 1920-1930s”] (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004), 8.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

²²¹ Yuri A. Gridnev, “Sozdaniie VOKS. Zadachi i tseli,” [“The Creation of VOKS. Tasks and Goals”], *Istoriki razhmyshliayut* 2 (1999), 286-7.

²²² Apart from the Central Committee, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Academy of Sciences, the education commissariat of the RSFSR, the Artistic academy, the Museum of Revolution, and the All-Union Book Chamber, many other individual members were cited by Golubev (102).

Volga famine of 1921²²³ and the United Information Bureau (chaired by the same Kameneva), the first Bolshevik experiment of this kind. Remarkably, some of the brightest intellectuals of the party became immediately involved, and later the new Society could count on the membership of most prominent writers, artists and intellectuals living in the Soviet Union, particularly when it effectively monopolised all cultural exchange flows. VOKS, as the society's Russian abbreviation became internationally known, was charged with "establishing and developing scientific and cultural links between institutions, public (i.e., non-governmental) organisations and particular scientific and cultural workers of the Union of SSR and abroad."²²⁴ Its target audience, as historians have stressed, was not the international working class, but rather the "bourgeois intelligentsia"²²⁵ of the developed Western nations,²²⁶ which appears to have been the priority of Soviet cultural diplomacy.²²⁷ Western Europe represented an area of high interest for the Soviets²²⁸, along with North America and Asia, and the Soviet Union did indeed manage to garner some sympathy among Western intellectuals.²²⁹ Understandably, Berlin would largely outshine Vienna in VOKS planning: while there were contacts during the First Austrian Republic, cultural diplomats focussed primarily on Weimar Germany.

Among historians, there is some difference of opinion regarding the "redness" of VOKS, and the pre-eminence of party-political issues within its activities: D. David-Fox has indicated that VOKS tried to eschew an excessively ideological approach,²³⁰ so that the Society tended rather towards exercising soft, or even softer power, whereas J.-Fr. Fayet has stressed the inexorable political pressure which permeated all VOKS activities, although it was never quite reduced to a second-rate propaganda department.²³¹ However, all authors would agree that the diktats of the party-state laid the foundations of VOKS' work within the Soviet setting, providing the only possible reference framework. Despite the iron laws of Soviet cultural policies, internal debates were still possible until the late 1930s. However, with the decisive strengthening of totalitarian tendencies during the 1930s, the VOKS finally became a run-of-the-mill party-state bureaucratic organisation, gradually losing

²²³ Michael David-Fox, *Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941* (New York et al.: Oxford UP, 2012) ,34.

²²⁴ Gridnev: 286.

²²⁵ Golubev, 107.

²²⁶ Parks, *Culture, Conflict and Coexistence*, 22; Fayet 2003: 115; David-Fox, *Showcasing the Great Experiment*

²²⁷ Schneider, *Culture Communicates*, 157.

²²⁸ Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive*, 226.

²²⁹ Ludmila Stern, *Western Intellectuals and the Soviet Union 1920-1940. From Red Square to the Left Bank* (London; NY: Routledge, 2007).

²³⁰ David-Fox, *Showcasing*, 40.

²³¹ Jean-François Fayet, "La Société pour les échanges culturels entre l'URSS et l'étranger (VOKS)," *Relations Internationales*, 115/automne (2003) : 422, 433. Eiusdem, "VOKS: The Third Dimension of Soviet Foreign Policy," in: Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried. *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013): 33-49. Eiusdem, *VOKS: le laboratoire helvétique: histoire de la diplomatie culturelle soviétique durant l'entre-deux-guerres* (Geneva: Georg, 2014).

what remained of its “public” aspect under Secretary A.N. Arosev²³² (who was arrested in 1937 and executed a year later). In addition, as M. David-Fox has persuasively argued, this liminal existence curbed VOKS's influence in the party-state machine, relegating it to a second league among central institutions, and effectively depriving it of the independence that it claimed before foreign publics. As David-Fox puts it:

*This was a fiction designed for external and internal consumption, but it carried with it important ramifications. It meant that VOKS was something of an orphan in the Soviet bureaucratic hierarchy, since it was deprived of a single powerful oversight agency. This hindered it from rising very high in the councils of the party-state ... VOKS's formally non-governmental status also meant that leading non-Party groups and figures actually joined VOKS and its management. Members of the non-Party intelligentsia made up its various cultural and disciplinary "sections" that for a time achieved importance.*²³³

At the apex of Stalinism in early post-war Russia, ideological screws were further tightened.²³⁴ Far from extending direct oversight, however, the party-state penetrated the VOKS' existence with periodic control commissions. The general move to party controls over artistic creation, clad in the language of artists' responsibility before the “people” and progress, well known to Western audiences since at least the Prague Congress of 1948, tightened the party's grasp over the VOKS as a vehicle of Soviet cultural exports. As was stated in 1947, the goals of promoting Socialist culture required

*Exposing the lies diffused by reactionary bourgeois ideologues about “creative freedom”, about “pure art” and “pure” science, purportedly characteristic of capitalist countries*²³⁵.

While the defensive stance of Soviet cultural bureaucrats against the West, which was apparently taking the upper hand in shaping global cultural discourse, is notable, it is no less true that the

²³² Golubev, 123, 127.

²³³ Michael David-Fox, “From Illusory 'Society' to Intellectual 'Public'. VOKS, International Travel and Party-Intelligentsia Relations in the Interwar Period,” *Contemporary European History* 11:1 (2002), 7-32.

²³⁴ Unfortunately, there is almost no systematic research on VOKS for this period, and my own observations can claim only a limited degree of validity. It would be impossible to suggest that the VOKS operated under different rules compared to other official or semi-official structures, and, while I remain cautious about possible reductionism, there is no available document that indicates divergences from the general party line, to which middle-rank bureaucrats quietly adhered.

²³⁵ An Explanatory Note to the Plan of Preparation of VOKS Materials for Foreign Countries in 1947. (Obiasnitelnaia zapiska k planu podgotovki materialov VOKS dlia zarubezhnykh stran na 1947 god). RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 255, list 167-8.

apparatchiks were increasingly being turned into warriors. With its attitudes ranging from condescending to openly aggressive, the VOKS was forced into a position very difficult to defend outside of the Communist-dominated countries, and had to fight retreating battles against capitalist modernity on the global scale. In this enterprise, it was doomed in all countries where free competition existed – which did not bode well for its activities in Austria, despite the latter being exposed to propaganda offensives on all sides.

Organisationally, the Society had a chairman (*predsedatel'*, which roughly translates as “president”), whose task was to supervise and direct all activities carried out by the VOKS. After O.D. Kameneva, Prof. F.N. Petrov and A.E. Arosev headed the VOKS before the war, Prof. V.S. Kemenov took office in 1941, remaining until 1948, when he was replaced by Prof. A.I. Denisov. Consistently, only intellectuals with outstanding literary, scientific or artistic credentials, and belonging to the senior ranks of Soviet establishment, were appointed as VOKS heads – with academic titles being characteristically held in awe. Kemenov oversaw both the drastic wartime contraction and the subsequent spectacular expansion of VOKS contacts, as Soviet armies advanced through Europe, Communists triumphed in the Chinese civil war, and North Korea secured the conditions for creating a “mass” pro-Soviet society. Bulgaria sported more than a million members of a society for friendship and cultural exchange with the USSR, Romania coming not far behind with its ARLUS association, and the potential of East Asian countries remained enormous. The victories of the Red Army not only enhanced Soviet prestige abroad, but also resulted in a new imperial standing as a superpower, amidst a system of “friendly” people's democracies, and the seemingly eroded capitalist world. This had an enormous impact on the VOKS, which found itself under unexpected pressure to keep pace with the growing influence of the USSR in the world.

This enormous workload was entrusted to a relatively small crew. The VOKS President was aided by a Directory (*pravleniie*), consisting of the heads of the VOKS departments and sections, as well as the President himself. However, the Directory did not meet regularly, and the main administrative burden was left to President Kemenov and his aid L.A. Kislova, who, due to the total centralisation of all cultural exchange, had to answer in person almost all incoming documents of any importance. Little was done to alleviate the gravity of the situation. After 1949, a “Department of Soviet Culture” existed, aiming (despite its official goal of conducting “[t]he propaganda of the advantages of the Soviet state and social order”) at some normalisation of the working environment at the headquarters. Under these conditions, VOKS’s own referents (*referenty*) had necessarily advanced to a position of particular importance, since they had conducted work and all practical correspondence with foreign organisations and individuals, and since the President’s ultimate decisions were

informed by referents' analyses and expertise.²³⁶ A common complaint, from Austria as well as from elsewhere, was that many letters remained unanswered for months,²³⁷ if ever, and that news from the USSR would not arrive on time – delays of more than a month were not uncommon, and editors of (philo-) Soviet magazines abroad were embarrassed by having to publish the “latest news”, for instance on Soviet foreign policy, from several months ago – incoming artistic and scientific delegations would be announced literally a day before departure, leaving no time for promotion campaigns, or even securing a decent venue. So far as VOKS was concerned, in late 1946 Kemenov had asked Beriiia to enlarge the VOKS staff in accordance with the increased workload, referring to a Council of Ministers' decision taken earlier that year.²³⁸

Apart from the central bureau, the Society maintained a complex structure of sections covering all different aspects of culture. For example, there was a section for pedagogical science (school-teaching methods), medicine, visual arts, theatre and music. Judging from the amount of documentation produced, and some favourable mentions on the directorate level, the Musical Section was among the most active in the whole Society. It was headed by a musicologist, Gregory Shneerson, and later by Tikhon Khrennikov, who thus further consolidated his position within the establishment. The tasks of the Musical Section were

*1) distribution abroad of musical works, [...] books on music, the periodical music press; 2) organisation of trips of Soviet musical workers, concert groups, collectives abroad; 3) conducting meetings with musical workers from foreign countries, with their reports on the state of musical culture abroad; 4) reports of Soviet musical workers on their trips abroad, coverage of the state of the musical arts in foreign countries as represented in the press; 5) performance of folk music and of the works of the contemporary composers of the people's democracies; 6) familiarisation with the musical pieces and periodical press of foreign countries.*²³⁹

The Section demonstrated a consistent degree of curiosity regarding foreign developments: a great number of its sessions were specifically dedicated to the problems of contemporary music on a global scale. Furthermore, in the minds of its functionaries, musical contacts had to display a certain

²³⁶ Golubev, 103. However, it should be noted that VOKS letters were signed by persons nominally outside of the referentura, e.g. heads of departments.

²³⁷ Some Remarks on the Work of VOKS (Nekotoryie zamechaniia o rabote VOKS). 10.07.1946. RGASPI, fond 5, opis' 10, delo 83, list 109-10.

²³⁸ A letter from December 6th, 1946. RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 258, list 352-352ob.

²³⁹ Verbatim Account of the Session of the Musical Section of VOKS on March 31st, 1950. Report of T. N. Khrennikov on the Work of the Section in 1949. (Stenogramma zasedaniia muzykal'noi sektsii VOKS 31 marta 1950 g. Doklad T. N. Khrennikova o rabote sektsii v 1949 g.) GARF, fond 5283, opis' 21, delo 140, listy 3-4. Despite its rather late date, this set of tasks can be regarded as relevant for at least all of the occupation period, and quite obviously beyond.

reciprocity. However, as the section traversed the period of the Central Committee's second wave of repressive decrees in music, such curiosity had to be kept in check, lest Soviet musicians and members of the Section incurred the hostile and potentially perilous scrutiny of the party. Unsurprisingly, against the backdrop of the “big deal”, the section fully and rather willingly conformed to the rules and regulations existing both on paper and in the informal sphere, and it is in the details, and often between the lines, that its internal debates were most variegated.

In addition to its professionally oriented structures, VOKS established territorial subdivisions dealing with different parts of the globe – such as North America, the English-speaking Commonwealth countries, the Middle East, the Far East, the Balkans, Western Europe and Central Europe. Austria, together with Germany and Hungary, fell within the realm of the Central European Department. This was chaired by A. Volkov for a short time in 1945, and then by Ie. Meleshko, A. Baluiev and L. Kislova. These officials took charge of correspondence with Austria, and it was rather seldom that the departmental referent and translator Iu. Fedosiuk, who was fluent in German, wrote letters himself. Even if the staff remained keenly mindful of party discipline, the actual conduct of Soviet cultural diplomacy involved a small handful of individuals, who enjoyed a certain space for acting on their own initiative. Despite being deprived of the opportunity to make free decisions regarding content, such as their French colleagues did, they still had the ultimate leverage over planning and executing the cultural line in detail, particularly in the musical case, where the above authorities issued only very vague prescriptions. Since the USSR maintained the accoutrements of a federal state, there were branch offices established in some of the union republics, notably in Kiev (Ukrainian OKS, UOKS), Tbilisi (GOKS), Yerevan (AOKS), Leningrad and Tashkent (Uzbek OKS).²⁴⁰ These had the right to handle issues regarding their territorial competence, e.g. when guiding foreign visitors, or conducting correspondence in the native language with the diaspora (as in Armenia, where AOKS tried to influence the numerous Armenians living in the liberated European countries, Austria included).²⁴¹ Until the mid-1950s, however, direct contacts were not encouraged, and correspondence generally went through Moscow, with foreign correspondents only occasionally being referred to regional branches. Despite this, due to the enormous amount of correspondence that VOKS had to process, repeated instructions were issued during the 1950s, in order to enhance the direct contacts between the republican organisations and foreigners.

²⁴⁰ Alexander Fokin, “Formirovaniie soderzhaniia poiatii ‘vneshniaia kulturnaia politika’ i ‘kulturnaia diplomatiia’v mezhdunarodnoi deiatel’nosti sovremennykh gosudarstv [Formulation of the Content of Notions ‘Foreign Cultural Policy’ and ‘Cultural Diplomacy’ in International Activities of Modern States],” *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta* 6/2:14 (2003): 128.

²⁴¹ These were the branches of which I examined the documentation; arguably, republican archives may shed further light on their competences, and on their real share in VOKS's activities.

The VOKS thus found itself confronted by difficulties regarding its own representation outside of the USSR. In theory, this could be achieved by means of Soviet embassies, or, as was the common practice, the dispatch of a separate cultural envoy. It was during the inter-war period that VOKS launched its system of representatives, often compensating for the lack of an official Soviet embassy in those cases where no diplomatic relations had been established, or serving as liaison officers with local societies for friendship with the USSR, as was the case in Vienna. This offered a useful way to bypass the non-recognition policies of other countries, thus allowing the Soviet state to maintain a minimal level of contact with a number of Western nations. Of course, as normal cultural contacts ended following the Nazi takeover in Austria, and later during the war in most of Europe, the activities of both the VOKS representatives and the first Austro-Soviet friendship society were discontinued, only to be taken up again after 1945, in very different circumstances.

Besides the grand designs of the higher authorities, the Society had to carry out much practical work, solving everyday issues in a down-to-earth manner. For instance, VOKS was responsible for organising guided tours of the Soviet Union for foreigners. As there was no alternative available, this turned out to be an instrument of straightforward propaganda and indoctrination.²⁴² During such closely supervised tours, the achievements of Socialist culture and lifestyle were displayed, and corresponding commentaries provided, with programmes planned well ahead, and somewhat resembling the famous Potemkin villages. In fact, when the direct control of upper-rank propagandists slackened, and VOKS was left to its own devices, it tended to depart from the iron-clad prescriptions of the party line. Apparently, it often became a sort of tourist guide, catering to foreign guests who were to be shown the best sides of Soviet life, or to be won over to the Soviet cause. As one irascible official put it, with some propagandistic fervour:

*The main vice and shame in the work of the VOKS apparatus is the ingrained obsequiousness before foreign countries and foreigners, and the loss of Soviet patriotism.*²⁴³

Thus, fulfilling the real needs of cultural diplomacy while also serving the Stalinist state was often nearly impossible.

The year 1948, fraught with consequences for Soviet musical and cultural life, brought about an earthquake in the VOKS organisation. Kemenov surrendered his post as President to a successor, Professor A. Denisov, and was subsequently subjected to a critical inquiry. As mentioned earlier, the VOKS was beleaguered with a number of difficulties, deriving from substantial shortcomings in its

²⁴² See Stern, David-Fox.

²⁴³ Act of Consignment of VOKS Acts (Akt prijomna-sdachi del po VOKS'u). July-August 1948. RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 463, list 127.

organisation. In addition, the functioning of the Stalinist system necessitated regular rounds of inspections, accusations, self-justifications and purges, in order to keep its various elements in check. A major control commission was set up, delving into VOKS documentation and scrutinising its activities in Moscow and abroad. Considering the weaknesses of the VOKS and the wave of repressions then raging through the country, the final report²⁴⁴ turned out to be devastating, laying into the leadership of the Society, many of whom seriously feared for their position (and, quite possibly, survival). Unsurprisingly, many salvos were fired at the “political mistakes” that permeated all levels and instances of VOKS work. A “low ideological level” was equally attested for many cultural exports, e.g. materials sent abroad, and work with foreign delegations was considered as lacking “perseverance and a firm political line”, while also proving to be quite costly. VOKS exhibitions were described as a “sinecure for money-makers and rascals” (*kormushka dlia deltsov i prokhodimtsev*²⁴⁵), and VOKS was notorious for sending the requested materials far too late, a fact that came back to haunt the propagandists at home and abroad. Most relevantly to the actual state of affairs within the VOKS, it was claimed that out of seventeen sections, nine had effectively ceased to function,²⁴⁶ and that out of forty-four foreign representatives, thirty-nine already had jobs in embassies.²⁴⁷ Furthermore, 35% of VOKS employees were found to be young graduates without sufficient experience, lacking knowledge of the countries in which they worked, and wanting in “ideological-political training”. President Kemenov was shown to be inaccessible for his subordinates, even regarding the most urgent issues (perhaps unsurprisingly, given his enormous workload). At the same time, Kemenov was deemed overly indulgent of the shortcomings of his subordinates. Indeed,

*Kemenov not only permitted the clogging of the VOKS apparatus with dubious characters, not matching their job descriptions... but also entrusted them with important areas of work [G. Ia. Shneerson, head of the musical section, was instanced among others²⁴⁸] ... When these people were unmasked as politically compromised and as embezzlers of public goods, Comrade Kemenov attempted to slur over their faults and to cover up for them, allowing them to escape responsibility as far as possible and to keep their place in the VOKS apparatus.*²⁴⁹

²⁴⁴ Act of Consignment of VOKS Acts (Akt prijom-a-sdachi del po VOKS'u). July-August 1948. RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 463, listy 126-137.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 127.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 133.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 130.

²⁴⁸ The source in question does not reveal any explicit anti-Semitism. However, considering the timing, such an attack on him can be seen as part of the anti-cosmopolitan campaign. Nonetheless, Shneerson was not excluded from the VOKS immediately, and seems to have continued working for the organization for some time.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 135.

While such an attack on Kemenov is unsurprising, it does serve to shed light on the daily working practices of the Society, particularly as Kemenov attempted to defend his position and a special CC decree was in preparation.²⁵⁰ VOKS was found to lack sufficient personnel – a claim not uncommon in early post-war institutions – an adequate building to host its central office, and the means to set up a fully-fledged publishing house. VOKS had difficulties in recruiting more staff, due to wages lower than in the Foreign Ministry or press agencies, where comparable qualifications were required²⁵¹: indeed, university graduates openly eschewed VOKS in favour of other positions. In the central building on Bolshaia Gruzinskaia St. in Moscow, two or three employees had to share a single table, and two shifts were introduced due to lack of space.

More interesting, though, were the spending habits of VOKS officials. In this regard, the criticisms of the investigators appear to be more justified. Frequently, VOKS had either outsourced technical tasks to private self-employed workers, or resorted to mediators. This led to the paying of sums far in excess of what would have been charged by state-run facilities. As the causes were never fully established, it is difficult to know whether this was through urgency, negligence or corruption. After all, getting a copy of sheet music was a technically complicated task, since there were shortages, many pieces of contemporary music had not yet been released, and the main method of copying was still by hand. In any event, the official responsible for editing was fired, and Kemenov resigned in the fall of 1948. Construction of a new building began, printing facilities were added, the aforementioned Department of Soviet Culture was created, and the overall personnel was increased to 271 persons.²⁵² Still, difficulties continued to arise – the overall structure of the organisation remained largely untouched, as did its basic working patterns, with the effect that incoming letters still had to wait for weeks and months to be answered. Of course, little initiative could be expected from a VOKS worker at a time when such initiative could put one's position, or even life, at risk.

VOKS attempted to establish itself in Austria within weeks of the Soviet victory. The earliest Austria-related letters from headquarters date from late May 1945 (Kemenov inquired about the possibility of founding a local Society²⁵³), and correspondence with a VOKS representative began in early September.²⁵⁴ As part of the frontier with the Western world, Austria was considered the

²⁵⁰ Project of a Decree of CC ACP(b) 'On the Measures to Ameliorate the Work of VOKS' (Projekt Postanovleniia TsK VKP(b) 'O merakh po uluchsheniiu raboty VOKS). RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 463, listy 123-25.

²⁵¹ Act... list 136.

²⁵² Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR 'About the Measures to Ameliorate the Work of VOKS' (Postanovleniie Soveta Ministrov SSSR 'O meropriiatiakh po uluchsheniiu raboty VOKS), RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 1196, list 7-19.

²⁵³ President Kemenov to Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Dekanozov, 22.V.1945. AVP RF, fond AV-800 ('referentura' for Austria), opis' 25, papka 120, delo 29, list 1.

²⁵⁴ A letter from September 4th, 1945. Ibid., list 8.

foreground of the ideological and cultural offensive to be conducted by the Communist superpower. As the tasks of VOKS relative to Austria were laid out, it was claimed that the Society had

*to show the accomplishments of Russian culture in its past and present, and also the accomplishments of the developing culture of the peoples of the USSR.*²⁵⁵

Only somewhat later did this document recognise the need of establishing “cultural ties” between the “cultural workers” of the two countries. Indeed, in most comprehensive instructions regarding the cultural work to be conducted in Austria, there were often generic formulas which did little to reveal a clear party line. For instance, the Central Committee recommended charging VOKS with overseeing “an enlargement of cultural ties with Austria.”²⁵⁶ During these years, VOKS inevitably found itself under strong pressure from political propaganda officers, precisely because of the highly sensitive position that Austria occupied in Soviet security policy, and also from “political workers” who actively interfered with cultural matters. It is unsurprising, therefore, that reports and assessments of VOKS activities were dedicated almost exclusively to political issues, with only oblique references to cultural matters proper. This also left a lasting imprint on internal documentation.

The Central European Department established a relationship with an occupation administration officer, Boris Zhuravlev, who was then replaced by Grigory F. Poliakov,²⁵⁷ himself in turn succeeded by Ivan Siomonchuk. Until June 1949, however, when Anatoly Parkaev was appointed,²⁵⁸ there was no full-time VOKS representative in Vienna, as the contact officers had to dedicate most of their time to their duties at the Propaganda Department. This led to severe drawbacks in their cultural work, as confessed in a number of reports in which Zhuravlev²⁵⁹ openly admitted that he had no time for his Austrian partners.

²⁵⁵ Report on the activities of VOKS in Austria in 1946 (Otchiot o rabote VOKS v Avstrii v 1946 g.). RGASPI, fond 5, opis' 10, delo 90, list 5.

²⁵⁶ Resolution of CC of CPSU “On the Work of the Soviet Element of the Allied Commission in Austria and the Measures to Strengthen the Soviet Influence in Austria” (Postanovlenie TsK KPSS “O rabote Sovetskoi Cchasti Soiuznicheskoi komissii po Avstrii i meropriiatiakh po usileniiu sovetskogo vliiania v Avstrii”). 17.10.1951. RGASPI, fond 82, opis'2, delo 117, list 55.

²⁵⁷ List of VOKS Representatives Abroad (Spisok Upolnomochennykh VOKS za granitsey). April 25th, 1947, RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 258, list 363.

²⁵⁸ List of Employees and Their Family Members Staying Abroad on January 1st, 1953, Having Traveled Under Permission of the CC of CPSU, Council of Ministes of the USSR and Commission for Trips Abroad (Spisok rabotnikov i vzroslykh chlenov semey, nakhodiashchykh na 1 ianvaria 1953 g., vyiekhavshikh po razresheniiu TsK KPSS, Soveta Ministrov SSSR i Komissii po vyezdam za granitsu). RGANI, fond 5, opis' 14, delo 13, list 64.

²⁵⁹ Zhuravlev was a Foreign Ministry functionary, and was already overwhelmed with his workload there. It was stressed that he did not often repond to requests, despite being a “tactful, cultured” official, “albeit showing little initiative”. The need for a full-time representative followed from these observations. Report 1946, list 20-21.

Following the partial reorganisation of VOKS, these considerations prompted the creation of a full-time representative position in Austria, among a number of other smaller or previously uncovered countries.²⁶⁰ This representative was also to have an assistant to help with administrative duties and the organisation of events and exchanges with Austrian counterparts. A first assistant, Ivan Vedernikov, accompanied Parkaev, and later replaced him. The VOKS representative in Vienna was the person to contact in all cultural matters, ranging from the latest publications in geophysics to the activities of provincial Soviet theatres. He thus became the pivot of Austro-Soviet cultural relations, his daily chores including reporting on the political climate, working with the functionaries of the Communist Party, cooperating extensively with the local Austro-Soviet Society, managing correspondence with artists, the chief executives of cultural institutions, scientists and other inquirers, and, finally, visiting cultural centres in the capital and the provinces. Representatives' reports provide a substantial part of the sources for this dissertation, as they encompass everything even vaguely linked to Soviet culture. Their initiative was, however, rather lukewarm: it was left to their Austrian counterparts to come up with new ideas, since the Representative was reluctant to bear responsibility for any eventual consequences. Indeed, this explains why many initiatives stemmed from the Austrian partners of Soviet cultural diplomats, since the Austrians were under fewer restrictions compared to their Soviet colleagues, and were only lightly monitored by officials in Vienna and Moscow. This diluted responsibility, and diverted much of it towards Austrians.

A peculiarity of the Austrian situation, the Austrian Ambassador to Moscow, Norbert Bischoff, became one of the most prominent agents of culture exchange, and, in fact, of Soviet cultural diplomacy, in the country. Bischoff's leftist sympathies and "enthusiasm" for developing vivid cultural relations between Austria and the Soviet Union were essential for Soviet cultural diplomats, while isolating him to a certain extent from his superiors and from the majority of conservative and pro-Western political elite in Vienna. However, he nonetheless managed to conserve his position at the embassy, producing papers showing his knowledge of Soviet cultural policies in Austria. For instance, it was Bischoff who reported on the opening of an ÖSG branch in Klagenfurt in 1946.²⁶¹ He maintained personal contacts with the VOKS leadership, discussing the questions of middle- and long-term developments in cultural contacts, as for instance in his talk with VOKS President

²⁶⁰ Austria was placed among the UK, Germany, Hungary, Poland, the US, Uruguay, Czechoslovakia, Japan, India, Italy, Canada, China, and Mexico in the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On Measures to Ameliorate the Work of VOKS" (Postanovleniie Soveta Ministrov SSSR "O meropriiatiakh po uluchsheniiu raboty VOKS"), RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 1196, list 8.

²⁶¹ Einrichtung einer Filiale Klagenfurt der oesterreichisch-russischen Gesellschaft. Moskau, den 17. Mai 1946. OeStA, AdR, BKA/AA, 5 Pol./ 1946. Russland. GZl. 111.431-pol/46. Zl. 154/46, also OeStA, AdR, BKA/AA, 5 Pol./ 1946. Russland. GZl. 113.250 -pol/46. Zl. 485/46.

Denisov in 1955.²⁶²

As no simple vertical structure existed, there was not only considerable potential for conflict, but also for manoeuvring, within the Soviet administration. A considerable burden of assessments and reports meant a slowdown in the actual work, and a diminution of the initiative showed by individual diplomats, who were wary of the consequences this could entail. However, there was no outright power vacuum. Cultural propaganda in Austria did take an institutional shape, even if the existent Soviet apparatus, with its cumbersomeness and near-zero flexibility, was to a large extent ill-suited to meeting such complex challenges and opportunities.

The Situation in Austria: The Propaganda Department and the VOKS Representative

Advancing from Hungary into the Burgenland, the Russians were the first to arrive in Austria, finding a power vacuum, a disintegrating infrastructure, and a pressing need to provide for the needs of the local population, from food and shelter to cultural entertainment. Thus, during the first days following the liberation of Vienna, it was left to the “cultural officers” (propaganda personnel) of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts to take a series of *ad hoc* decisions.²⁶³ Stable structures were created only considerably later,²⁶⁴ with the effect that the early period was rather more spontaneous and liberal.

Both fronts inherited their Propaganda Directories (*politicheskiie upravleniia*) from their wartime infrastructure. These were responsible for political propaganda and cultural recreation for the Soviet troops, and eventually for the populations of liberated – or conquered – territories. Austrian cities and towns were thus provided for by local officers, until the situation was normalised by a decree issued by the Council of People's Commissaries (SNK) on May 29th, 1945. This created the Department of Propaganda of the Soviet Part of the Allied Council (*Otdeleniie Propagandy Sovetskoi chasti Soiuznicheskoi kommissii, OP SChSK*), this being subordinated to the SchSK Headquarters, itself responsible to the High Commissioner, the Council of Ministers, the Politburo, and the political counsellors of the Foreign Ministry.²⁶⁵ In a typical Stalinist intertwinement of

²⁶² The conversation was written down, as was common practice at VOKS, and conserved in its archive. GARF fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 494, listy 54-55.

²⁶³ See Wolfgang Mueller, “Kulturaia politika sovetskikh vlastei I avstriiskii kulturnye otnosheniia”: 85-104.

²⁶⁴ It is worth recalling here that while historians commonly speak of the occupation decade, none of the Allies could foresee the actual duration of their stay in Austria. This uncertainty left a mark on French policies, and was a factor in Soviet thinking too.

²⁶⁵ These administrative structures have been well researched in the contemporary historiography, and I base my description on the works of Mueller, Stelzl-Marx, Karner, as well as the two major source publications (*Die Rote*

responsibilities, this kept local propagandists in check, lest their cultural advances led to digression from the party line, the latter never being clear in advance.

The Propaganda Department was headed by Colonel L.A. Dubrovitsky, and was divided into a number of sections dedicated to different aspects of Soviet propagandist, educational, cultural and political “work.” These included: (1) education; (2) press, cinema and theatre censorship; (3) collaboration with “democratic parties and organisations”; (4) propaganda in the strict sense; (5) information; (6) work conducted in the Soviet enterprises (USIA); (7) the regions of Lower and Upper Austria, and the Burgenland; and (8) the editorial board of the official Soviet organ, *Österreichische Zeitung*.²⁶⁶ In addition to Colonel Dubrovitsky himself, the civil officer P.M. Aristova worked in the censorship branch, and entered into contact with Austrian artists. Other persons who appeared in the correspondence relating to culture were Lieutenant Colonel M.A. Poltavsky, responsible for work with “democratic” organisations, and Lieutenant Colonel I.Y. Gol'denberg (propaganda).²⁶⁷

This Department would eventually spearhead the ideological Cold War on Austrian territory through the *Österreichische Zeitung*, maintaining close contacts with local Communists and other Soviet and philo-Soviet agents, as well as supporting the infrastructure and personnel deployed in Austria. There were some Austrian collaborators inside the department, mostly recruited among Communist exiles. One of them, Hugo Huppert, specialised in cultural affairs, and contributed a number of articles to the *Österreichische Zeitung*. Developing its public presence, the Department hired a number of other journalists, Soviet and Austrian, to work for its cultural column, this being further facilitated by the Soviet monopoly of early 1945. It is not surprising that Colonel Dubrovitsky almost by necessity played a pivotal role in Soviet cultural policies in Austria during the first months of the occupation. His subordinates, notably Major Levitas, managed to achieve spectacular successes in reviving Viennese cultural life, and introducing Soviet artists into it. Officers of the Propaganda department had great leverage in directing flows of cultural output in the capital and throughout Austria, as the Moscow authorities necessarily delegated the actual work to them, and Austrian actors saw in the cultural officers the main, and only possible, liaison to the USSR. However, their agency was heavily restricted by political rigidity at home and the military hierarchy in Austria. In addition, Dubrovitsky and his collaborators were overburdened with actual

Armee in Österreich, Sovetskaia Politika v Avstrii) that elucidate this question.

²⁶⁶ Unfortunately, Soviet financial documentation is very incomplete and opaque. The occupation expenses of the Soviets were the highest among the four powers, and subsidies arrived from Moscow for specifically cultural projects. It is unclear to what extent the revenue from the USIA system was channelled back into the occupation administration, particularly in specific areas of interest. It would be not unreasonable to suggest that the Austrian budget ultimately covered much of the propaganda and cultural work of the Soviet Element, not unlike France.

²⁶⁷ See the detailed account of Soviet propaganda personnel in Wolfgang Mueller's 1998 dissertation.

propaganda, and did not regard high arts, such as music, as a priority. Therefore, most of the correspondence produced by the Propaganda Department bears on working with the Communist Party and providing analyses of the political climate in Austria. This is only moderately informative, due to the fact that its authors had to write in Stalinist newspeak. They could not openly attribute their failures to the unattractiveness of the ideological product they were forced to promote, and thus frequently had recourse to self-recrimination, self-justification and self-castigation. In practice, the propagandists showed relatively little initiative in cultural affairs, being occupied overwhelmingly with approving decisions taken elsewhere, providing an analytical framework in which to operate, and helping to carry out those practical measures that fell within their remit.

The public relations efforts of the Soviet Element were severely hampered not only by domestic restrictions, but also by a generally hostile political climate and the growing isolation of Austrian Communists, widely viewed as Moscow's minions. The electoral disaster suffered by the KPÖ in November 1945 testified to Austrians' dislike of the Soviet occupation. The successive hardening of the political line pursued by the *ÖZ* did not improve the situation, since the editors effectively alienated a predominantly anti-Stalinist public opinion, which was growing increasingly resentful of the language and messages of political propaganda. In cultural affairs, the *ÖZ* editors managed to uphold the usual standards of Austrian cultural reporting until late 1947 / early 1948, when the anti-formalist campaign began to gain the upper hand, leading to intensifying denunciations of the "bourgeois decadence" of the arts in Austria and the West more generally. While some of the vitriolic anti-Americanism may have resounded with certain Austrian circles that prized the cultural superiority of the Old World, these same circles would never accept any form of association with Soviet propaganda, or even actually read the *ÖZ*. Public posters were thus a better option, since they could be placed at prominent locations in the streets.

Interventions by the higher levels of the SČSK apparatus were irregular, but frequent, usually concerning complex issues such as the issuing of permission to travel to Austria or cross from one zone of the country to another. Getting an Austrian visa or customs clearance was problematic due to the occupation, whereas the transport of artists and cultural goods between the zones was complicated by the worsening relations between the Allies. Thus, High Commissioners Vladimir Kurasov, Vladimir Sviridov and Ambassador Ivan Il'ichev made some interventions, as did their deputies Alexei Zheltov, Gueorgi Tsinev, Viktor Kraskevich and Sergei Kudriavtsev. Collaboration with "political councillors", such as Vladimir Dekanozov, Evgeni Kiselev, Mikhail Koptelov and Sergei Kudriavtsev, played a major role in everyday work as well.²⁶⁸ One of them, namely Kiselev,

²⁶⁸ See: Wolfgang Mueller, *Die sowjetische Besetzung in Osterreich 1945-1955*: 252-55

was in regular contact with the Austrian government.²⁶⁹ These officials were normally informed of all large-scale cultural campaigns, such as guest tours, and apparently knew the leadership of the Austro-Soviet Society. Despite the rather secondary role attached to musical matters by the upper and middle levels of the Soviet bureaucracy, they had considerable administrative resources, and were generally kept informed of any serious plans involving Soviet musicians or largescale financial allocations, since these had to be transacted through the Soviet financial system, involving either subsidies from Moscow, or more shadowy operations on the local level (see the finances excerpt in the Austro-Soviet Society sub-chapter below).

Later in the 1950s, the Soviet Element set up a network of Soviet Information Centres (*Sovetskie informatsionnyie tsentry, SITs*),²⁷⁰ the first of which was located in the Porrhaus at the Karlsplatz (near the Karlskirche) in the fourth *Gemeindebezirk* of Vienna.²⁷¹ Despite the initial goal of creating a “centre of Soviet culture”, as stated as early as 1947 by the Soviet High Commissioner Kurasov in a letter to Molotov,²⁷² the Soviet Element did not pursue this plan for almost three years. A surprisingly belated measure, the establishment of these “Soviet Union-Houses” sought to create a stable network of cultural-political institutions, embodying the Soviet material presence, and counterbalancing the already existing Western rivals.²⁷³ This was hardly a real cultural offensive: the Porrhaus opened its doors in 1950, three years after that of Berlin, and at the expressed wish of the higher party,²⁷⁴ while in Austria itself the propaganda officers had already witnessed not only the development of the *Amerika-Häuser*, but also the opening of the British Council, in Vienna and beyond, and the two *Instituts Français*, without offering any commensurate response. The Viennese Porrhaus (“five floors of Socialism”²⁷⁵) hosted a permanent library, frequent exhibitions (mostly featuring photos), and a theatre group. While the Centre apparently strove to maintain a high level of

²⁶⁹ Vladimir Sokolov, “Sowjetische Österreichpolitik 1943/45,” in: Manfred Rauchensteiner et al., ed. *Österreich 1945. Ein Ende und viele Anfänge (=Forschung zur Militärgeschichte – Eine Publikation des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museum/Militärhistorisches Institut)* (Graz: Styria Verlag, 1997), 83.

²⁷⁰ Mueller, OZ und RS, 278-90.

²⁷¹ Wolfgang Mueller, “Leuchtturm des Sozialismus' oder 'Zentrum der Freundschaft'? Das Sowjetische Informationszentrum im Wiener „Porr-Haus“: Ein Instrument der Besatzungspolitik zwischen Volksbildung und Propaganda,” *Wiener Geschichtsblätter* 4 (2000): 261-85.

²⁷² Dokladnaia zapiska o neobhodimikh meropriiatiakh dlia obshchestvennoi raboty po propagande sredi naseleniia Avstrii (A Report on the Measures Necessary for Propaganda Work among Austrian Population). 30.07.1947. AVP RF, fond 850, opis' 28, papka 131, delo 18. No 175 – Austria. List 2.

²⁷³ For Wiener Neustadt (the largest urban centre of Lower Austria) see: Bernd Steiner, *Die russische Besatzungszeit 1945-1955 in Wiener Neustadt, und die Auswirkungen auf Industrie, Kultur, Gesellschaft und Sport* (Univ. Diss. Vienna, 1997), 74.

²⁷⁴ Back in 1947, Andrei Vyshinsky, then Deputy Foreign Minister, wrote an aide-memoire to the President of the All-Union Society of Cultural Relations with Abroad Viacheslav Kemenov that a House of Soviet culture should be planned. An Accompanying Letter of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Ya. Vyshinsky to the President of VOKS V. S. Kemenov about the Measures to Strengthen the Soviet Propaganda in Austria. (Soprovoditelnaia zapiska zamestitelia ministra inostrannykh del A. Ia. Vyshinskogo predsedateliu VOKS V. S. Kemenovu o meropriiatiakh po usileniiu sovestkoiu propandany v Avstrii). 22.08.1947. *Die Rote Armee in Österreich : Sowjetische Besatzung 1945-1955. Dokumente*, 474, 476.

²⁷⁵ Mueller OZ und RS, 279.

cultural-propagandistic presence in the public space, it was virtually invisible in the non-Soviet press, and it is unlikely that its real influence ever extended beyond a narrow circle of philo-Communists. The Centre attracted some noteworthy financial subsidies, however, and part of its equipment almost certainly passed over to the Austro-Soviet society following the Soviet withdrawal in 1955.

Most exhibitions at the Porrahaus concentrated on commemorating important political events (such as the anniversary of the October Revolution), and the literature available in the library, not unexpectedly, was largely dedicated Lenin and Stalin. Children who participated in Soviet pedagogical activities were schooled to be warriors-for-peace, public lectures were mainly delivered by local Communist functionaries and occasional Soviet lecturers, and even the theatre group often concentrated not on the Russian classics, but rather on openly political pieces. This was a self-defeating strategy.²⁷⁶ In music, W. Mueller, who worked extensively on the Soviet propaganda system, and this centre in particular, indicated that there were concerts of the Ensemble of the Central Group of Troops, and some tours, including those of M. Rostropovich and Vl. Ashkenazi;²⁷⁷ in keeping with the tacit press boycott of the centre, these were not promoted outside the *ÖZ* and Communist-dominated circles.

In order to cover the Austrian regions, the Soviet administration expanded the project into the rest of the Soviet zone, creating several smaller centres in Eastern Austria: another one in Vienna, and others in Linz-Urfahr, Wiener Neustadt, Sankt Pölten and Eisenstadt,²⁷⁸ some of which had libraries and showed films on their premises, often relating to USIA enterprises, the Communist Party or ÖSG cells.²⁷⁹ Surprisingly, these institutions did not feature prominently in the correspondence between Moscow and Vienna, nor would they be mentioned during most Austrian tours of Soviet musicians. Based on this evidence, the overall importance of the Information Centres for musical propaganda was in most cases marginal, and was limited to the libraries, where at least some musical literature was to be found.

The Austro-Soviet Society

²⁷⁶ Although it cannot be denied that the native Austrian left had a highly prominent position within Viennese theatrical life, it is striking that its successes occurred outside of the actual Soviet institutions. While in the case of the independent theatres “Insel” and “Scala”, closing them actually required having the Soviets out after the end of the occupation and an unpopular financial crackdown, there is little evidence that the Viennese public was flocking to the Porrahaus.

²⁷⁷ Mueller, *OZ und RS*, 280-9; Eiusdem 2005, 284-5.

²⁷⁸ Mueller 2005, 264; Barbara Stelzl-Marx, *Stalins Soldaten in Österreich*, 236.

²⁷⁹ Mueller *OZ und RS*, 289.

On the basis of its available personnel, the Soviet Union could count on about half a dozen officials in the cultural realm, all of them responsible for a variety of activities, in which music took only a very peripheral position. As these limitations would not allow for the creation of an extended cultural network throughout the country, nor to provide support for Soviet-led or -controlled cultural enterprises, such as artistic tours, the necessity of establishing a local philo-Soviet association quickly became clear. This decision was not exclusive to the Soviet officers, as other Allies were making steps in the same direction, and Austrian cultural circles themselves showed interest in bi- and multilateral contacts, and, if possible, material support from abroad. Soviet cultural diplomats and their Austrian (predominantly, but not exclusively, Communist) counterparts could draw inspiration from the experiences of the interwar period: as mentioned earlier, there had already been an Austro-Soviet Society established in 1924,²⁸⁰ although little if anything remained following the breakdown of Austro-Soviet cultural contacts under the corporatist and Nazi regimes.

When the Society for the Support of Cultural and Economic Relations with the Soviet Union (*Gesellschaft zur Pflege der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion*) was founded on June 2nd, 1945,²⁸¹ the Soviets most likely did not give the initial stimulus. To the contrary, the Moscow authorities originally showed signs of discontent, and requested immediate information regarding these grassroots' activities,²⁸² but were apparently appeased by the composition of the Society (as it became known under the German abbreviation, the ÖSG²⁸³ – *Österreichisch-Sowjetische Gesellschaft*, or its Russian analogue ASO – *Avstro-Sovietskoiie Obshchestvo*). With an old Communist sympathizer and professor of medicine, Hugo Glaser (who had been a POW in Russia during World War I²⁸⁴), the Society secured for itself a president acceptable to both the Soviets and the Austrian establishment. Technically, this Society was declared a “non-political” entity, and most prominent Austrian figures of all political affiliations officially expressed their support for its foundation, or even become members. However, this tendency continued only insofar as ÖSG kept its distance from the local Communist Party, thus fostering an

²⁸⁰ Mueller 1998, 35; 2003, 92.

²⁸¹ The protocol was conserved by the Soviets, see: Abschrift der konstituierenden Ausschusssitzung der ÖSG, 2. Juni 1945. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16. delo 8, listy 287-90. Koptelov from Propagand Department reported on ÖSG foundation almost ten days later, on June 11th (AVP RF, fond 800 (Austria referentura), opis' 25, papka 120. delo 29, list 3). A reference (spravka) was already prepared on June 6th, which strongly suggests that there was more information that VOKS was in disposal of at the time (ibid., list 5).

²⁸² Kemenov to Dekanozov, 22.V.1945: AVP RF, fond 800 (Austria referentura), opis' 25, papka 120. delo 29, list 1; Dekanozov to Kemenov 24.V.1945: ibid., list 2

²⁸³ I will refer to it, though, with its German abbreviation ÖSG (from Austro-Soviet Society), even if this has no historiographic precedent: Russian officials, writing in Cyrillic, translated the Society's name as well.

²⁸⁴ Huppert, *Schach dem Doppelgänger*, 318-19. Apparently, Glaser had been treated better in imperial Russia than many *Heimkehrer* returning back from the Soviet Union after 1945. Hugo Huppert himself was an Austrian communist having sought asylum in the USSR during the war and returned to Vienna in the first post-liberation days, to work in the ÖSG and the pro-Soviet press (see in Mueller 1998).

image of a “national” organisation aiming at all Austrians of “democratic” convictions, regardless of their party affiliation. Soon, however, the contradiction between the cultural and the political spheres came to the surface. While an interest in Russian and Soviet culture was by no means confined to the “reds” – music is a prime example – the supposedly “non-political” character of the ÖSG inevitably, and quickly, became little more than a fig leaf. In addition, the fact that the ÖSG’s personnel was increasingly recruited from the Communist Party served to link it indissociably with the latter. Caught between the millstones of domestic communist politics, the pressure from the Soviet side and growing difficulties with the pro-western majority in Austria, the ÖSG was later diverted into a number of purely political activities, including propaganda for “peace” and defence of Soviet foreign policy,²⁸⁵ and castigation of internal Austrian “reaction” and “Anglo-American imperialism”, all of which had little to do with cultural, let alone musical, diplomacy. This led to the progressive marginalisation of the ÖSG within Austria.²⁸⁶

The ÖSG's secretaries were Communists with firm ideological credentials, often with experience of Soviet exile. Their appointment was, as suggested in some reports, discussed with the leading figures of the Communist Party, and met with the approval of the propagandist wing of the Soviet administration. In assessing the reach and efficiency of ÖSG cultural propaganda, the available sources present certain difficulties. In the correspondence between the Society, the VOKS representative, and Moscow, support for the ÖSG and its successes were mostly measured in terms of political effect. In fact, when the Head of the Central European Department stated the aims of the ÖSG, he did not even mention culture:

*Austria ... represents ... an arena of the most stubborn ideological and political struggle. An important role in this struggle is played by the Society for the Support of Cultural and Economic Relations with the USSR, rallying the democratic forces of Austria.*²⁸⁷

In exercising control over the ÖSG, the Soviet Element could use its financial leverage in order to exert pressure on the ÖSG functionaries. Close attention was continually drawn to the top-level administrators of the ÖSG. As Professor Glaser continued to serve as President, it was generally understood that his secretaries would do most of the work. Among these, Nikolaus Hovorka came to the fore, effectively managing the whole Society and maintaining direct contact with the Soviets. An

²⁸⁵ Memorandum on the Austro-Soviet Society. [Spravka ob Avstro-Sovetskom obshchestve] 1954. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 480, list 2.

²⁸⁶ Doris Graf, *Die Kulturpolitik der Besatzungsmächte 1945-1955 und die Auswirkungen auf das Wiener Konzertleben*, 16. Mueller 1998, 36-7.

²⁸⁷ An Explanatory Note to the Working Plan in Austria for 1947 (Obiasnitelnaiia zapiska k planu raboty po Avstrii na 1947 god). Head of CED Y. Meleshko. RGASPI, Fond 17, opis' 128, delo 255, list 140.

intellectual of firm Communist convictions, but with a strong Catholic background, Hovorka carried out the bulk of everyday work. However, his “enthusiasm”, “fanaticism” and supposed tendency to conceive impracticable projects caused worries within the Austrian Communist Party’s Central Committee. Wary of the eventual consequences, they attached to him the Communist functionaries Rudolf Kende and Ruth Fischer, in order to bring about a sort of balance of power. Dilution of authority, while being politically more secure, resulted in retardation of the administrative process.²⁸⁸ Ruth Fischer, however, did act as a prominent figure in the early ÖSG, actually conducting a great deal of administrative work before stepping down due to pregnancy.

The further development of the Society’s personnel was influenced by eventual purges and the usual mechanism of accusations and self-justification. Starting from late 1945, the central organs in Moscow repeatedly inquired into the “suitability” of the ÖSG apparatus. In 1948, the latter was reproached for having oriented itself towards “restricted circles of intelligentsia” (despite this being a core element of Soviet cultural diplomacy), and for having been “infiltrated by agents of Anglo-American intelligence”.²⁸⁹ This was an ominous sign of the changes that would later follow. Amongst both the ÖSG and its Soviet counterparts, the debilitating effects of internal repression were acutely felt during late 1948 and 1949. Hovorka was subject to a sort of show trial under direct pressure from the Soviet side, with VOKS openly discussing the changes in the ÖSG leadership to be undertaken in the run-up to his removal.²⁹⁰ He was expelled from both the ÖSG and the KPÖ, although he did not face real criminal charges or Soviet prison. Subsequently, in 1950, Martin Grünberg and Otto Langbein took over the administrative duties of the Society. Both were experienced Communists,²⁹¹ and Grünberg had stayed in the Soviet Union during the war years (he claimed to have studied Russian language at the Moscow Pedagogical Institute,²⁹² but the available evidence does not allow us to substantiate this). Vladimir Ruzicka, another formerly exiled cadre of the Communist party, was brought in to “strengthen” the ÖSG structure.²⁹³ By that time any fiction

²⁸⁸ Report 1946, list 10-11.

²⁸⁹ On the State of Soviet Propaganda in Austria [O sostoianii sovetskoi propagandy v Avstrii]. RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 1164, list 116.

²⁹⁰ On the Reorganisation of ÖSG (Reorganisatsiia ASO), a memorandum from Siomonchuk and Dziubin, Deputy Political Representative of the USSR in Austria, 19.07.1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 44, listy 85-7. A letter from Koptelov and Siomonchuk to Kemenov and Smirnov. November 1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 44, listy 92-3. In fact, this was a recurrent topic. Much later, in 1954, Parkayev prepared a memorandum arguing for the total replacement of the ÖSG management. On the Strengthening of ÖSG Leadership [Ob ukreplenii rukovodstva ASO]. 14.08.1954. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 21, delo 480, listy 15-18. Back in 1948-49, Hovorka had come under attack because of his political “mistakes”: Kemenov himself recommended preventing him from delivering the main speech during the upcoming Congress, so that his position would appear compromised. A letter from 26.08.1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 44, list 88.

²⁹¹ Characteristics on O. Langbein [Karakteristika O. Langbeina] 22.12.1949. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 241, list 3.

²⁹² List of Delegates of the ÖSG (May 1951) [Spisok delegatov Avstro-Sovetskogo obshchestva (na mai 1951)] GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 304, list 16.

²⁹³ On Strengthening the Direction of the Austro-Soviet Society [Ob ukreplenii rukovodstva Avstro-Sovetskim

of a non-partisan ÖSG had long been abandoned: the VOKS Representative, the KPÖ's leadership, the Propaganda Department and the central authorities in Moscow openly decided upon who would succeed Hovorka, turning consultation of the ÖSG membership into a mere formality.

Despite this turbulence at the executive level, the Society's practical activities showed a degree of stability. The ÖSG was active in publishing, exchanged delegations with the Soviet Union (VOKS), and organised events. Apart from contributions to the Communist and general press, the ÖSG's magazine *Die Brücke* (The Bridge) was its leading press organ. Its publication was supported by the pro-Soviet, Communist-dominated *Globus* publishing house. As early as the fall of 1945, the ÖSG envisioned a large-scale publishing programme, consisting mainly of translations of Russian literature and works on the Soviet Union,²⁹⁴ by which it hoped to conquer a sizeable share of the Austrian book market. The Society received financial support from the Soviet Element for this purpose – the question having been raised among high ranking Soviet officials,²⁹⁵ a positive response was given.²⁹⁶ The format of *Die Brücke* differed substantially from that of a newspaper, and came closer to the Russian notion of a “thick journal” (that is, a long journal). This gave the ÖSG a space in which to publish materials on the physical, economic and anthropological geography of the Soviet Union, its history, culture and art.²⁹⁷ The latest developments in Soviet cultural policies were reported,²⁹⁸ along with updates on cultural news from the federal and republican capitals. *Die Brücke* went beyond the format of a propagandist paper, and, at least initially, its editorial board attached importance to non-political reporting. Rather lengthy articles written by Soviet academics were accompanied by contributions from artists, critics and musicians²⁹⁹ – *Die Brücke* published a number of translated materials, which were combined with short news pieces, commentaries and illustrations, as well as updates on ÖSG activities in the country, texts by ÖSG functionaries and Austrians who

obshchestvom] February 1954. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 480, list 17.

²⁹⁴ Tätigkeitsbericht der Gesellschaft zur Pflege kultureller und wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion für die Monate November und Dezember 1945. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 8, listy 208-09.

²⁹⁵ Letter from VOKS President Kemenov to the Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky. 04.09.1947. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 62, list 62. An allocation of 230000 roubles was considered.

²⁹⁶ The Soviet Element covered 300000 Sch.; however, the overall costs were not fully clear from the Soviet formulations. Dubrovitsky, Siomonchuk. “Society for Development of Cultural and Economic Ties with the USSR (Short Memorandum)” [“Obshchestvo sodeistviia razvitiu kulturnykh i ekonomicheskikh svyazei s SSSR (Kratkaia spravka)]. 19.07.1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 117, list 159.

²⁹⁷ Gustav Tellheim, “Michail Iwanowitsch Glinka. Der Werdegang eines Genies,” 1948 8, 49-51. Hugo Huppert, “Kulturprobleme der Sowjetunion,” 1946 1-&11, 81-96. Eiusdem, “Ein Theater am Ziel: Erinnerungen an die Stanislawski-Bühne,” 1948 1-/11, 49-56. Rudolph Franz Brauer, “Die zeitgenössische Komponisten-Generation der Sowjetunion,” *ibid.*, 65-9. “Wir haben viel von den Russen zu lernen! Raoul Aslan über das sowjetische Theater,” 1948 12, 56.

²⁹⁸ W. Kucharskij, “Musik für das Volk,” 1949 7, 72-73. (Vassily Kukharski was member of the secretariat of the Union of Soviet Composers.)

²⁹⁹ Georgij Chubow, “Die nationale Oper” (1946 4, 49-54). Josef Tschernij, “Dmitrij Schostakowitsch” (1946 5, 50-63). Wladimir Mljetschin, “Gedanken zur Sowjetkunst,” 1947 7, 25-29. D. Saslawski, “Russische Kunst und internationale Kultur,” 1947 12, 37-41.

had travelled to the USSR,³⁰⁰ etc. A common Austro-Russian cultural history was represented,³⁰¹ as well as the bright future of bilateral cultural contacts.

Its market share, despite promising beginnings, was modest. During its early period, the ÖSG claimed that some distributors in the western zones had contacted it regarding the possibility of selling the magazine outside of Eastern Austria.³⁰² This was not sustainable. *Die Brücke* underwent a major reorganization in 1949, following pressure from Siomonchuk and Parkaev to develop its format, and in the light of problems in finding a market and the growing dominance of pure propaganda. The magazine still did not disappear completely from the book market, and showed sizeable distribution statistics, considering its position. For instance, in 1950 Martin Gründberg could claim 3,000 paying subscribers³⁰³, a number that climbed from 2,375 in May 1950 to 6,650 in June 1951³⁰⁴ – most of them, it ought to be noted, within the Soviet zone. In the 1950s, the Society was printing between 20,000 and 29,000 copies of *Die Brücke*,³⁰⁵ these being available through subscriptions, ÖSG libraries, KPÖ organisations or trade. However, the declining credibility of pro-Soviet organizations was detrimental to the journal and its distribution of cultural information.

Delegations were an integral part of ÖSG work at home and in Russia. As a matter of fact, they were of only moderate importance with regard to music, since their main purpose was political. Those Austrians permitted to travel to the USSR were expected to deliver propagandistic lectures upon their return to Austria.³⁰⁶ The ÖSG and VOKS exchanged suggestions regarding the composition of these delegations – each member was to be approved. A detailed, and highly standardised, programme was elaborated: a number of tourist sites in Moscow and Leningrad, including the great theatres of the two capitals, and some exemplary factories and kolkhozes. Foreign guests were closely monitored by the VOKS functionaries who showed them the country and directed conversations and discussions. There was in fact little specific focus on Austria, although the ÖSG did receive requests from Austrian scientists and artists wishing to see certain places or to contact certain colleagues in the USSR, and its own members had their own personal preferences, depending on their professional occupation and interests.

The situation of Austria became increasingly difficult in this regard, because the VOKS was

³⁰⁰ Josef Krips, “Mein Dirigentengastspiel,” 1947 3, 16-23. “Sowjetische Wirklichkeit – mit unseren Augen gesehen. Österreichische Delegierte schildern ihre Eindrücke von der Sowjetunion,” 1949 5, 31-37.

³⁰¹ Anatolij Lepnin, “Johann Strauss und Russland,” 1949 5, 23-25.

³⁰² Tätigkeitsbericht der Gesellschaft zur Pflege kultureller und wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion für den Monat Februar 1946. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 8, list 185.

³⁰³ Martin Grünberg, Tätigkeitsbericht des Zentralsekretariats an die General-Versammlung. 25.03.1950 1.01.1948-31.01.1949. und 1.02.1949-28.02.1950. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 37, list 209.

³⁰⁴ Information über Abonentenzahl unserer Brücke. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 44, list 119.

³⁰⁵ Anatoly Parkaev, On the Work of the Austro-Soviet Society in 1953 [O rabote Avstro-Sovetskogo obshchestva v 1953 godu] GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 480, list 22.

³⁰⁶ Vorläufiger Bericht über die Auswertung der Delegation vom November/Dezember 1952 (Dr. Beranek. Kotesovec, Dr. Leskoschek, Prof. Strebing). Vienna, 16.03.1953. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 48, listy 39-43.

gradually redirecting its finances towards the people's democracies. Medical professionals had run up against this problem, having been refused support for a special delegation.³⁰⁷ With regard to music, following a tour by Josef Krips, another trip was organised for Joseph Marx, in response to a direct request by the ÖSG in 1949, during which Marx would visit the Moscow Conservatory, the Central Musical School, the Union of Soviet Composers, the Tchaikovsky Museum in Klin (Moscow Region) and the VOKS itself.³⁰⁸ However, the VOKS central office ultimately took a harsh line, informing the ÖSG that a full musical delegation from Austria was not “purposeful”, and that Marx could be invited only as part of a general ÖSG delegation.³⁰⁹ Positive reports by ÖSG-affiliated lecturers, irrespective of the degree of truth contained in them, were increasingly dismissed by conservatives as mere Bolshevik propaganda. In 1947, Josef Krips' positive comments on musical education in the Soviet Union had been reprinted even in the strongly pro-Western *Salzburger Nachrichten*.³¹⁰ But in 1954, Alfred Uhl, a noted Austrian musicologist, complained about the cool reception that his account of his voyage to the USSR received in the Austrian press.³¹¹ During the same year, Werner Tepser of the *Tiroler Tageszeitung* reported positively upon his recent trip to the Soviet Union: he was immediately fired from the *TT*, and the *Salzburger Nachrichten* launched a vitriolic attack against him, reminding its readership that in the USSR, he would have risked being “disappeared”.³¹² In short, the Cold War served to reinforce tensions within Austrian society, exposing philo-Soviet commentators to a growing degree of hostility.

The ÖSG's finances are quite difficult to follow through the occupation period, since the available evidence is at times fragmentary. The Soviet administration paid the piper, though not unconditionally. Thus, the ÖSG was often reduced to begging for money from the Soviet representative, and there is no indication of any kind of fixed monthly subsidy (unlike the Austro-French society). Balancing the books became nearly impossible under these circumstances. For instance, in 1946, Kiselëv and Zhuravlev sent a series of letters attesting to a deficit of 1,825,000 shillings,³¹³ emphasising that the ÖSG treasury was “almost empty”.³¹⁴ Such problems continued for years. By January 1st, 1948, in the absence of Soviet subsidies, the estimated deficit came to 417,900

³⁰⁷ Mueller, OZ und RS: 36-37.

³⁰⁸ On the State of Austrian Culture and the Work of the “Society for Development of Cultural and Economic Ties with the USSR” [O sostoianii avstriiskoi kul'tury i rabote “Obshchestva sodeistviia kul'turnym i ekonomicheskim sviaziam s SSSR”] GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 178, list 84.

³⁰⁹ Report to Kislova (forwarded to Denisov). GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 304, list 54a.

³¹⁰ “Professor Krips reist in die Sowjetunion,” SN 25.09.1947: 6.

³¹¹ Mitteilungsblatt der Musik-Sektion der Österreichisch-Sowjetischen Gesellschaft. Juni 1954: 8.

³¹² Nur noch bei Radio Tirol,” SN 26.02.1954: 4. (Tepser continued to work on the radio, where he apparently steered clear of any Soviet involvement.)

³¹³ On the Financial Basis of ÖSG (O finansovoy base ASO), June 1946. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 1, list 27.

³¹⁴ On the Financial State of ÖSG (O finansovom polozhenii ASO). 25.07.1946. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 1, list 31.

öS.³¹⁵ Later that year, the ÖSG reported an expenditure amounting to 812,440 öS, with an income of only 321,160 – as Siomonchuk wryly observed, even after contributions by “friends” (i.e. the KPÖ), the deficit could not be got down to under 150,000 öS.³¹⁶ The same year, VOKS provided 300,000 öS for the ÖSG and the pro-Soviet, ÖSG-affiliated publishing house “Globus”,³¹⁷ thus saving them from an imminent financial disaster. The ÖSG had to manage its finances locally, and still had to enforce further austerity – for instance, there were almost no paid jobs in the Society. Only in 1950 would Parkaev, rather optimistically and without providing details, claim a financial recovery.³¹⁸ The Society managed to remain active, and continued to forward further requests to its Soviet patrons. When the occupation drew to an end, the ÖSG envisaged a massive programme of material and financial support, amounting to more than 1,000,000 öS (113,000 to be covered by VOKS, 391,000 by the Soviet information service, 255,000 by the Austrian Communist party and 245,000 by “various Soviet organisations”), not to mention gifts of various appliances, and a continuous supply of books, etc.³¹⁹ However, there is little reason to believe that these demands were ever met. Even fewer indications exist regarding the mechanisms and functioning of financial donations. The Soviet Union – very much like France – found itself in a fairly delicate position regarding the Austrian tax authorities. On the one hand, the Austro-Soviet society had to be provided with money, while, on the other, there were numerous taxation issues, and public opinion was highly sensitive to reports of large-scale cash flows from a country that had claimed substantial reparations from Austria, exerted pressure regarding the question of “German property”, and billed the Austrian taxpayer for its occupation costs, which were by far the highest among the Allies. As early as 1946, VOKS officials acknowledged the existence of this problem. Kisselev opined that the

*donation of 178,000 shillings that [the Society] received as a subsidy from the Propaganda Department... cannot be accounted for properly without the risk of publicising the financing of the “Society” by the Red Army Headquarters... we need to [find a solution] as soon as possible, lest the Society be unable to explain its existence with an enormous deficit, particularly if its account books are examined by the tax authorities.*³²⁰

³¹⁵ Letter on financial activities of the ÖSG, fall of 1947. GARF, fond 5283, opis~ 16, delo 15, list 90.

³¹⁶ Half-Year Report of ÖSG Since July 1948 (Halbjahrestätigkeitsbericht der Gesellschaft zur Pflege der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion ab 1. Juli 1948). GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 22, list 10. Remarks of the Plenipotentiary Representative of VOKS in Austria I. O. Siomonchuk on the 'Report...' (Zamechaniia Upolnomochennogo Predstavitelia VOKS v Avstrii I. O. Siomonchuka k 'Otchëtu'). 29.12.1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 19, list 23.

³¹⁷ Letter from Koptelov and Siomonchuk to Kemenov and Smirnov (3rd European Department of the Foreign Ministry). August 1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 117, list 92.

³¹⁸ Report on the Work of the ÖSG in 1950 – Remarks of A. Parkayev (Otchët o rabote ASO 1950 – Zamechaniya A. Parkayeva). GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 200, list 8.

³¹⁹ Vorschläge für die Tätigkeit bis zum Sommer 1955. 15.10.1954. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 54, listy 11-13.

³²⁰ Krome togo, ikh vystupleniia pomogli by “Obshchestvu” vpisat' v kachestve pozhertvovanii te 178000 Sch., kotoryie

The VOKS was the first to suggest financial aid in November 1945, although these 8,399 shillings³²¹ did not suffice for long. More ominously, while confirming the transfer of 500,000 öS for the expenditures of 1947 and 1948, VOKS made it clear that it would not commit to a comparable financial burden in the future.³²² Indeed, the documentary evidence regarding the financial transactions between Moscow and Vienna is extremely scarce. However, it can be assumed that the ÖSG benefitted from money transfers through the VOKS representative, the Propaganda Department, and most importantly from the Communist Party, which was itself dependent on allocations from the USSR. Some costs were covered through membership fees and tickets sold for concerts or other events. The Society managed to survive financially, but only with considerable and consistent difficulties.

Apart from money transfers, VOKS sent large quantities of materials to Vienna, including records, books, films and technical equipment. As was typical for the whole framework of Austro-Soviet cultural contacts, the initiative rested with the ÖSG, which consistently pushed for more materials in its correspondence. Indeed, it went so far as to establish a diplomatic triangle, writing once to the Viennese secretary of culture, Viktor Matejka, with a request to facilitate the sending of more sheet music (featuring, among many others, Tchaikovsky, Rakhmaninov, Prokofiev, and Khatchaturian).³²³

The detailed records of these shipments take up a considerable part of the overall correspondence between the Representative in Vienna, the ÖSG and Moscow. Such imports were crucial to the ÖSG press, lectures, libraries and networking.³²⁴ The Society was thus able to stock its libraries in Vienna, starting with the Central library. This was of no small relevance to musical diplomacy. Indeed, the Society's Musical Section expressed interest in scores, particularly of the new works of those composers that had been criticised by the Central Committee, but also, for instance, Tchaikovsky's first and second symphonies, a request that was clearly forwarded to Moscow.³²⁵ The musical

ono poluchilo v vide dotatsii ot Otdela propagandy I kotoryie ne mogut byt' zaprikhodovany normalnym obrazom bez riska oglaski finansirovaniia "Obshchestva" Komandovaniem Krasnoi Armii. A eto nuzhno sdelat' kak mozhno skoree, inache "Obshchestvo" ne smozhet obiasnit' svoiego suchshestvovaniia pri ogromnom defitsite v sluchaiie proverki bukhgalterskikh knig nalogovymi organami. On the Financial Basis of ÖSG [O finansovoy base ASO], June 1946. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 1, list 29.

³²¹ A letter from Kemenov to Kiselëv, 9.11.1945. AVP RF, fond Av-800 (referentura), opis' 25, papka 120, delo 29, list 13.

³²² Letter from Siomonchuk. 18.11.1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 117, list 128.

³²³ Brief von er Gesellschaft zur Pflege der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion an den Stadtrat Dr. Viktor Matejka. September 1947. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 18, list 34-35.

³²⁴ Characteristically, the Musical Section expressed special gratitude for the materials on Soviet musicians sent during 1951-52 (... sehr begrüßt wurden von unserer Musiksektion die Materialien über sowjetische Künstler (Besrodny, Rostropowitsch). Bericht über die Verwendung des WOKS-Referentmaterials (1952). GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 48, list 80.

³²⁵ Typescript of a Conversation on the Society's Work with the Vice-President of the Austrian Society for Developing of Cultural and Economic Ties with the Soviet Union Nikolaus Hovorka [Zapis' besedy s vitse-Presidentom Avstriiskogo obshchestva sodeistviia kulturnym i ekonomicheskim sviaziam s Sovetskim Soiuзом Nikolaev

collection of the ÖSG library played an important role in bringing Soviet music to Austria. In 1952, 293 private persons borrowed 408 pieces of sheet music.³²⁶ Indeed, it is remarkable that so many individuals should have possessed not only the ability to read sheet music, but also the inclination to perform the works received by the library. In the following year, the Library finally produced a catalogue of its scores,³²⁷ thus facilitating systematic engagement with the professional world: as such, musicians of all political persuasions could have easy access to Soviet music. Books and records, of course, also constituted an important resource. In addition, private persons, mostly affiliated with the ÖSG, received free copies of Soviet magazines and newspapers.³²⁸ The problem was, however, that a considerable percentage of the literature sent from Moscow was not in German, but mostly in Russian, and sometimes in English or French, and it took some time to organise regular deliveries of German-language literature from the GDR, or, indeed, to have it printed in Austria. The projection of Soviet films required Soviet equipment due to the different standards applied in Austria and the USSR, and it was of course a costly enterprise to ship them to Vienna.

Of course, the traditional plagues of Soviet bureaucracy left a mark on written exchanges. The VOKS was receiving numerous requests from Austria: scientists and musicians actually did write to Moscow, since they were not allowed to contact individual colleagues or institutions directly. Because of the monopolies of VOKS and the *Mezhkniga* agency – a governmental authority responsible for the export of books abroad – along with the need to reach agreements with various other authorities, correspondence often continued for months. Quite typically, upon receiving a letter, which had normally taken from a week to a month to arrive in Moscow, VOKS had to look in their own repositories, in case they already had the requested books or sheet music. If this was not the case, then they had to make repeated requests to publishing houses (such as “Muzyka”). Otherwise, Austrians could contact *Mezhkniga* or the Ministry of Culture, depending on the nature of the issue: of course, this must have represented a challenge for members of the public not acquainted with the workings of Soviet bureaucracy.

In fact, the arts and music were spared some of the scrutiny reserved for the hard sciences, regarding which the Soviet leadership was wary of allowing too much information to leave the country. As such, there is no mention of any books or other materials on cultural issues being halted by Moscow. However, political censorship did become relevant during the anti-formalist campaign. VOKS was prudent enough to carry out an attentive pre-selection, excluding music and literature liable to cause any problems. Interestingly, VOKS was not too insistent on lecturing Austrians about

Govorkoi po voprosam raboty Obshestva] 1949. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 241, list 9.

³²⁶ Bericht über die Arbeit der zentralen Bibliothek für das Jahr 1952. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 48, list 72.

³²⁷ Jahresbericht über die Bibliotheksarbeit (13.02.1953). GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 48, list 95ob.

³²⁸ A letter from the ÖSG to Parkaiev, 16.03.1951. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 42, listy 191-97.

the latest CC decisions: articles explaining the new musical policies took up a relatively modest proportion of overall musical exports. Records, particularly music, were often a better choice, because they were less dependent on the language barrier and were also more standardised, making them usable on local record-players. Moreover, playing gramophone records was cheaper than inviting Austrian or indeed Russian artists, particularly for smaller provincial branches. The first request for gramophone records was made as early as July 1945,³²⁹ and VOKS responded with a steady flow of disks. Soirées including music auditions and discussions appear to have been common amongst ÖSGs.³³⁰ Likewise, private persons, such as professional musicians, could participate in discussions organized by the Society on its premises or borrow records. Some of the latter, furthermore, were forwarded to radio stations.

Like VOKS, the ÖSG was divided into a number of sections, including those dedicated to medicine, theatre and music, the latter at times being lauded by its VOKS supervisors.³³¹ The Musical Section was chaired by Boris Stojanoff, a Bulgarian-born former tenor of the State Opera and professor of musicology.³³² In this quality, he also headed the Concert Bureau,³³³ responsible for “house” concerts and collaboration with Austrian musicians. The Musical Section proved the most active of the whole Society, not unlike the situation in VOKS, at least as judged from the prominent position that its activities occupied in correspondence. The Section styled itself as the least politicised, garnering thereby more success with the Austrian public, and building a presence in the Austrian public sphere. For instance, in its first two seasons it claimed no less than seventeen premières of Prokofiev, Shostakovich and Khachaturian,³³⁴ and the latter would certainly not have arrived so quickly without an ÖSG transmission. During the early stages, it featured some genuinely internationalist tendencies: an example was collaboration with the British pianist Moura Lympany, who gave concerts and at least one talk on contemporary Soviet music in England.³³⁵ In addition, due to the high-brow character of Soviet musical offerings, the section could, at least in practice, tacitly eschew working with the “masses” of workers and peasants, concentrating their efforts on the educated middle class, and transmitting a high standard of elite culture. Lacking the financial means

³²⁹ Levitas, Miron (Major). Memorandum on the Work of the Austrian Society of Cultural Relations with the USSR [Spravka o rabote avstriiskogo Obschestva kulturnoi sviazi s SSSR] 15.07.1945. GARF, fond 5283, opis~ 16, delo 10, list 131.

³³⁰ There is a massive imbalance in this respect between France and the Soviet Union. While there are but few mentions of the disks sent from Paris, the USSR authorities managed to transport hundreds of items.

³³¹ Report on the Activities of VOKS in Austria in 1946 ... List 8-9.

³³² A “characteristica” on him was written by Fedosiuk around 1946. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 8, list 64-64 reverse.

³³³ Tätigkeitsbericht der Gesellschaft zur Pflege der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion für die Monate November und Dezember 1945. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 8, listy 209-210.

³³⁴ Muelle, OZ und RS: 38.

³³⁵ Statistisch gekürzter Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. Jänner bis 30. Juni 1947. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 13, list 135.

for a sizeable number of “big” events,³³⁶ the section's board decided in favour of promoting Soviet music through other organisations (such as the “Russian concerts” of the Wiener Symphoniker), organising chamber evenings with Austrian musicians, or staging discussions, notably on the CC's position vis-à-vis Muradeli, whereby “formalism” was firmly opposed.³³⁷ The musical section thus maintained rather balanced relations with the Austrian musical establishment; the Society's partners included not only Josef Krips,³³⁸ but also Joseph Marx, and the Opera director Franz Salmhofer.³³⁹

Furthermore, focus on music was partly facilitated by the ÖSG's presence in the Austrian regions, as the Society quickly embarked on a rapid construction of a network of local offices, most of them in the Soviet zone. The importance of constructing and maintaining a stable network of branch offices was clearly understood in both Moscow and Vienna.³⁴⁰ Unfortunately, there is no consistent record of foundations of new branches.³⁴¹ The archives of the latter have often been lost, so the main sources of information are local police reports, ÖSG congresses and the correspondence between the VOKS Representative and Moscow. However, even together, these do not provide a systematic picture of the Society's cultural presence outside of Vienna. Moreover, branches would come to attention due to a few events, not to a continuous season programme.

While I will later make some observations regarding individual branches, the general dynamics can be established here, thanks to the statistics that the ÖSG sent to Moscow. In late 1946, the ÖSG leadership claimed 60 branches in Vienna and the provinces, with 25,000 members. Out of these branches, 50 were situated in the Soviet zone, 7 in the British, 2 in the American, and 1 (Innsbruck)

³³⁶ Report on the Activities of the Society for Development of Cultural and Economic Ties with the Soviet Union in 1949 [Otcët o deiatel'nosti obshchestva sodeistviia kulturnym i ekonomicheskim sviaziam s Sovetskim Soiuзом za 1949 god] GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 241, list 35.

³³⁷ On the State of Austrian Culture and the Work of the “Society for Development of Cultural and Economic Ties with the USSR” [O sostoianii avstriiskoi kultury i rabote “Obshchestva sodeistviia kulturnym i ekonomicheskim sviaziam s SSSR”] GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 178, list 72.

³³⁸ The ÖSG negotiated his participation in the first concert performance of Boris Godunov, which took place well ahead of the actual première. Levitas, Miron. Spravka ... (15.07.1945), 131. Later he regularly conducted “Russian” concerts, spoke of his guest tour in the Soviet Union in 1947 at a number of ÖSG-related events, and remained in constant contact with the Society, a situation highly untypical for an Austrian conductor.

³³⁹ A letter from Kiselev and Zhuravlev to Meleshko and Smirnov, 04.06.1946. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 1, list 34. Joseph Marx was in fact considered for the chair of the Musical Section, but had to refuse due to his numerous other duties.

³⁴⁰ The “expansion and consolidation” of ÖSG sections in Vienna and branches in Melk, Ybbs and Urfahr were stated as highly important measures undertaken in 1947. See: Organizational Measures in Austria (Organizatsionniie meropriiatiia v Avstrii). RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 255, list 143. This shows that in the Soviet zone, the ÖSG was trying to penetrate even smaller provincial centres, constantly stressing the quantitative aspect of their work.

³⁴¹ There were occasional testimonies from other organs, though. In Klosterneuburg, the local administration registered the opening of a branch office in 1946. This has been preserved. Gesellschaft zur Pflege der kulturellen u. wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion an das Magistrat der Stadt Wien. Vereinsanmeldung. Klosterneuburg, den 28. Mai 1946. WStLA. 203/15/59. A32/565. 1.3.2.119.A32.1946.7204/1946 - 7204/1946 | 1946-.

in the French zone.³⁴² The numbers actually increased from 22 in 1945,³⁴³ through 86 in May 1947³⁴⁴ and 100 later that year, to 114 in early 1949 (42,000 members), moving towards 40,905 members in February 1950, out of which 10,992 were individual members.³⁴⁵

The sources provide good evidence for the years 1948, 1951 and 1952.³⁴⁶ The yearly reports for this period were particularly rich in statistical data, which helps to understand the membership structure on the regional level, revealing the relation between the individual and collective membership, and allowing for some broad generalisations regarding the size of the ÖSG, its branches and its formal structural outline.

³⁴² Report on the Activities of VOKS in Austria in 1946 ... List 6. The same numbers were used in March 1947. This is telling about how Soviet bureaucracy would juggle with statistics without caring much about updating them. Foreign Societies for Cultural Relations with the USSR as for 1.IV.1947 [Zarubezhnyie obschestva kulturnoy svyazi s SSSR po sostoianiiu na 1.IV.1947]. RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 258, list 361. The British quoted ÖZ as claiming 52,000 members as of January 1947, although this digest did not call for any specific measures to counteract the "growing" ÖSG influence. TNA, FO 1004/303, Joint Fortnightly Intelligence Summary No. 50: For Fortnight Ending January 24th, 1947, 6.

³⁴³ Report on ÖSG Activities in December 1945 (Tätigkeitsbericht für Dezember 1945). GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 8, list 210.

³⁴⁴ Statistically Abridged Report on the Activities in the Period from January 1st till May 18th, 1947. (Statistisch gekürzter Tätigkeits-Bericht über die Zeit vom 1. Jänner bis 18. Mai 1947). GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 13, list 135.

³⁴⁵ Grünberg, Tätigkeitsbericht ... 1950, 208

³⁴⁶ The documents used are, correspondingly: Organisationsbericht abgeschlossen per 31. August 1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 19, list 51. Bericht über die Veranstaltungstätigkeit der Österreichisch-Sowjetischen Gesellschaft im Jahre 1952. Orgbericht. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 49, list 268.




Table 1. Membership in Austrian Bundesländer in 1948, 1951, 1952

Drops in 1951 followed a re-issuing of membership cards in 1950, when some sort of control of collective membership was carried out, and “dormant” members were supposedly eliminated from the Society's lists. Unsurprisingly, most members were to be found in the industrial core of the Soviet zone in Vienna, Lower Austria and the Mühlviertel. The relatively low numbers in the Burgenland corresponded to the relative size and population of this region, which did not have large urban centres. The Styrian statistics show the interest of the ÖSG in this region, owing to the industrial areas of Upper Styria. Thus, the ÖSG membership structure overlaps with the Soviet presence and the relative influence of the Communist Party. On the other hand, the Society also maintained a nationwide presence, even if in the rest of Austria branches tended to be concentrated in the regional capitals. The branches’ structure can be seen in the following graph:




Table 2. Branches in 1951 and 1952

Effectively, the distribution of branches largely followed the membership structure. What is more interesting, however, is the fact that there were no branches consisting of a mere handful of members. The statistics allow us to infer some regional disparities: while the national average was well above 300, the lowest number, Carinthia in 1951, amounted to no less than 69. This difference was shaped by the collective membership in the eastern zone. On the other hand, the Communist Party's contribution to staffing the branch offices is not likely to account for the entire membership. As far as we can believe the official ÖSG statistics, most of its organizations were in effect rather numerous, and in most cases probably went beyond the rank-and-file membership of the ACP, which, nevertheless, provided the core of the Society.

Vienna	734	1115
Lower Austria	331	305
Upper Austria	169	143
Styria	298	385
Burgenland	108	128
Carinthia	69	102
Tyrol	250	370

Salzburg	92	97
Vorarlberg	0	220
Austria	326	381
4 provinces	341	391

Table 3. Distribution of members per branch, 1951 and 1952.

Not all these numbers can be easily explained. It is surprising that the Tyrolean organisation managed to muster well over two hundred formal members, whereas Salzburg remained stable at slightly below one hundred, even if we take into consideration the fact that the ÖSG presence was heavily concentrated on the regional capitals. This notwithstanding, the ÖSG was effectively a *Lower Austria-Soviet society*. The eastern zone accounted for 97.6% of its members in 1948, and about 93% in 1951 and 1952. About two-thirds of ÖSG members were workers, and collective membership remained relatively stable, moving from 77.2% to 65.6%, then back to 70.4%. In crude terms, the Society was predominantly staffed by members provided from USIA factories or other facilities dependent on the Soviets, the Communist Party, and a small, very difficultly quantifiable proportion of left-wing intellectuals or other private persons interested in Russian or Soviet culture.

On paper, the Society demonstrated a spectacular growth in its regional outreach, most likely surpassing that of its Western analogues (none of which aimed at mass membership). In 1947, the Society's functionaries attempted to put a positive spin on these membership statistics, arguing that the ÖSG'S 53,000 members, and its branches throughout the provinces, far exceeded the membership of the western societies, which did not number more than 2,000-3,000 members.³⁴⁷ However, this did still not come anywhere near the philo-Soviet societies of the Eastern European people's democracies: for instance, in Romania, the Romanian-Soviet society, ARLUS, numbered more than 2,000,000 people, with 1,300 branches, and its Bulgarian counterpart more than 1,000,000, with 2,500 branches. This shows clearly where the real potential for numerical success lay. While a larger membership and more branches automatically led to an increased presence of the ÖSG in the public sphere, this expansion could only contribute indirectly to the distribution of Russian and Soviet musical culture. It did, however, facilitate the latter, particularly in cases of existing local interest.

In addition, the qualitative aspect of ÖSG membership displays a tendency to instability, and the question of just how active individual branches really were must often be answered negatively. As we might expect, ÖSG expansion was severely hampered by the fairly low esteem in which the Communist Party and the Soviet Element were held. Many of the branches would linger for years

³⁴⁷ Dubrovitsky, Siomonchuk. "Society for Development of Cultural and Economic Ties with the USSR (Short Memorandum)" ["Obshchestvo sodeistviia razvitiu kulturnykh i ekonomicheskikh svyazei s SSSR (Kratkaia spravka)]. 19.07.1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 117, list 159.

without coming up with more than a couple of film showings or lectures, particularly in the lead-up to the ÖSG's yearly congresses, at which they had to deliver reports. Characteristically, in its plans for 1951, the Secretariat set a goal of a “one event per branch per month” at the federal level.³⁴⁸ This was unlikely to happen. Coercive membership had its detrimental effects too, and, despite regular financial subsidies to the USIA enterprises,³⁴⁹ Soviet military governors were often reduced to ordering reluctant Austrian workers to attend ÖSG events:

*The branches in the Soviet zone are in fact directed by the local commandant... Sometimes people are driven together as by order. The results of such work are worthless, if not outright counter-productive... in those localities, where the Soviet Kommandanturen had recently been abolished, the Society's branches immediately started to wither, or to disintegrate altogether.*³⁵⁰

Early in 1950, Martin Grünberg delivered an extensive analysis of what he considered to be the current situation in the provinces. After counting 131 branches, he noted that

*32 exist only on paper without giving any signs of life, roughly 10-20 more sustain only casual activities, but the rest, that is about 80, display more or less regular activity, whereas a year ago this could be asserted... only for 30 at best.*³⁵¹

In spite of a few candid reports, the Society's difficulties were determined by cultural-political factors over which they had little control. The ÖSG managed to evade purges in its provincial organizations, but its space of manoeuver for internal reform was severely limited, and attempts in this direction never amounted to a comprehensive strategy. In 1950, the ÖSG decided to drop the practice of collective membership, thus cutting back on one of its distinctive policies in the Soviet zone. The reasons for this decision are not entirely clear, since it served to slash the formal statistics (even if acknowledging that there were only a few thousand more or less active members during the final occupation years was more accurate and honest).

³⁴⁸ Rededisposition zur Jahresversammlung 1951. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 44, list 285.

³⁴⁹ There the Soviet Element could conduct centralised “cultural work with the masses” – 0.5% of the turnover was dedicated to activities in the oil plants. A letter from Kurasov to Molotov, 30.07.1947. AVP RF, fond 175 Av (referentura, Austria), opis' 28, papka 131, delo 18, list 4.

³⁵⁰ Report on the Activities of VOKS in Austria in 1946... List 7.

³⁵¹ [...] von diesen 131 Zweigstellen stehen 32 einfach auf dem Papier, ohne daß sie irgendein Lebenszeichen von sich geben, ca. 10-20 weitere entwickeln eine nur fallweise Tätigkeit, aber die übrigen und das sind ca. 80 entfalten doch eine mehr oder weniger regelmäßige Tätigkeit, wogegen man dies vor einem Jahr von höchstens 30 mit gutem Gewissen behaupten konnte. Report on Activities of the Central Secretariat to the General Assembly. (Tätigkeitsbericht des Zentralsekretariats an die General-Versammlung). 25.III.1950. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 37, list 207.

Was the cultural life of the ÖSG more than thinly veiled political propaganda? Despite the rigid political framework, ÖSG functionaries did organize events where standard political fare was eschewed in favour of musical concerts. One obvious strategy was to make contact with Austrian musicians, who would then enquire about the possibility of obtaining scores of Soviet compositions. For instance, when VOKS sent sheet music through the ÖSG to Josef Krips, a friendly conductor of the Wiener Philharmoniker, the results were markedly unpolitical – and thus indirectly contributed to the credibility of the ÖSG. The ÖSG's own concerts³⁵² featured Russian classics, although with a far greater emphasis on modern Soviet music than was common in most Viennese concert programmes. Whether on the ÖSG's own premises or via the ÖSG logo at public concerts (including some of the Symphoniker and Philharmoniker *Russische Konzerte*), Russian and Soviet music was actively promoted in the public sphere. Admission prices were kept low – a number of events were free – an important factor for the impoverished cultural public in Vienna and beyond. Many of these concerts were linked to the ÖSG's own congresses,³⁵³ or to Soviet-related anniversaries,³⁵⁴ most typically that of the October Revolution³⁵⁵, or, especially during the early stages, Red Army Day (February 23rd) and Vienna liberation (April 13th).³⁵⁶ A musical programme was deemed essential to creating a festive atmosphere, thus underscoring the importance of the ÖSG's activities: the Austrian “love of music” left a deep impression on a VOKS delegation inspecting the ÖSG in December 1946, the delegates noting that the Society tended to include music in almost all of its events.³⁵⁷

³⁵² Aide-mémoire der Gesellschaft zur Pflege der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion. 04.09.1947. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 18, list 25-25ob.

³⁵³ For the first ÖSG congress in September 1946, the Society obtained the Vienna Symphonics under Karl Etti, performing Mozart, Schubert, Joseph Marx and Hugo Wolf for Austria, plus the Second Symphony of Alexander Borodin, representing Russia. They managed to invite Jacob Flier and Ivan Kozlovsky, who were giving a guest tour. The Programme of the ÖSG Congress, September 26-29th, 1946. [Programma Konressa Avstro-Sovietskogo obshchestva 26-29 sentiabria 1946 g.] GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 12, list 146.

³⁵⁴ When the Soviet Element and the Society opened an exhibition dedicated to the 800th anniversary of Moscow, Shebalin's hymn Moscow was appositely performed at the opening ceremony. Aide-mémoire from 04.09.1947: 25.

³⁵⁵ Bericht zu der Uebersicht über die Oktoberfeiern der Gesellschaft zur Pflege der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 22, listy 15-23.

³⁵⁶ Statistisch gekürzter Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. Jänner bis 30. Juni 1947. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 13, listy 131, 135.

³⁵⁷ Report on a Trip to Austria by a VOKS Delegation [Otchët o poiezdkе v Avstiiu delegatsii VOKS'a] 31.12.11946. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 1, list 61.

Gesellschaft zur Pflege der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion

MITTWOCH
20.
FEBRUAR

GROSSER MUSIKVEREINS-SAAL

BEGINN
18'30
UHR

**II. Russisches
Symphoniekonzert**

zu Ehren des „28. Jahrestages der Roten Armee“

Wr. Philharmoniker **Wr. Staatsopernchor**

Dirigent: **Josef Krips** Solisten: **Hilde Konetzni, Todor Masaroff**

P. J. Tschaikowsky . 6. Symphonie (Pathétique) — Arie des Lensky aus „Eugen Onegin“ — Arie der Tatjana aus „Eugen Onegin“
A. Borodin Polowetzer Tänze (Chor und Orchester)

KARTENVERKAUF AN DER KASSA DES MUSIKVEREINES, WIEN I., KARLSPLATZ 6 / TELEPHON U 47 0 89

Table 4. A concert organised by the ÖSG on the occasion of Red Army day in 1947

Source: Wienbibliothek im Rathaus, accessed 15.05.2016, <http://media.obvsg.at/AC10571130-4201>

Requests for more Soviet musicians were directed to Moscow on numerous occasions. Some of these were never satisfied, for logistical or political reasons.³⁵⁸ In addition to contacting their Soviet counterparts, the Society conducted its own diplomacy, writing directly to high-ranking Austrian officials in the hope that they would raise an issue with their Soviet counterparts. A particularly audacious attempt was made by Ruth Fischer, a Society official and well-known Communist militant, who wrote to the Mayor of Vienna, General Theodor Körner, in 1947:

... in addition, it would be of extraordinary importance that visits of Soviet Russian artists and, if possible, also of scientists and sportsmen... would be again supported by VOKS... these [visitors] should go not only to the Russian zone, but also to the Western provinces. It is precisely from the

³⁵⁸ This happened, for example, when the Society asked for one of the criticised Soviet composers to give a talk in Austria in 1949. Walter Fischer and Hovorka to the VOKS Presidium. 07.12.1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 117, list 190.

*latter that the most urgent requests have been made.*³⁵⁹

This problem remained a recurrent theme in Austro-Soviet correspondence, with ÖSG functionaries repeatedly stressing the “importance” of enhancing personal exchanges between Austria and the USSR. This was due to the need to

*use these seemingly non-political and non-propagandistic tools in order to influence as many Austrians as possible.*³⁶⁰

However, the most important events supported by the ÖSG were the Weeks or Months of Austro-Soviet friendship. These were conducted almost every year, either during the summer months (August), or later in the autumn, around the time of the October Revolution commemorations. The ÖSG dedicated a great deal of attention and effort to organising and staging them, negotiating with the VOKS, the Soviet Ministry of Culture and others regarding tours of the most prominent Soviet artists – the initiative consistently lay almost entirely with Austrians – setting up a calendar of lectures, film showings, or meetings throughout the federal territory, inviting Austrian cultural and political figures, and providing for administrative support for eventual Soviet participation. In this sense, there was a considerable amount of technical work; the Soviet administration persisted in neglecting urgent ÖSG requests, and financial matters were increasingly difficult to manage. Conducting negotiations with the Western administration in the case that artists left the Soviet zone was one of the challenges, and more mundane tasks, such as printing posters and inserting advertisements in national and local newspapers, required time and money. Summer, when the months of friendship took place, had the advantage of allowing the staging of open-air concerts, which had the potential to dramatically increase attendance rates. For example, a largescale “week” in 1950, to which Soviet artists were also invited, featured fourteen concerts and three events involving incoming musicians and composers; the local Ensemble of the TsGV also helped the ÖSG.³⁶¹ Plans for 1951, therefore, included a shift to late September and October, enlarged participation of the TsGV Ensemble, lectures on Soviet music in the local branches and printing of a

³⁵⁹ Weiters wäre es außerordentlich wichtig, daß der Besuch sowjetrussischer Künstler und wenn möglich aus von Wissenschaftlern, Sportlern ... von der WOKS wieder gefördert würde, wobei auch Bedacht darauf zu nehmen wäre, daß diese nicht nur in die russische Zone, sondern auch in die westlichen Bundesländer fahren müßten. Gerade von dort sind dringende Wünsche nach solchen Besuchen laut geworden. Letter from Ruth Fischer to the Mayor Körner. Vienna, 03.09.1947. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 18, list 28.

³⁶⁰ [...] sich dieser scheinbar völlig unpolitischen und unpropagandistischen Mittel zu bedienen, um möglichst viele Österreicher unbemerkt in ihrem [der kapitalistischen Länder] Sinn zu beeinflussen. Letter from Otto Langbein, 18.03.1950. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 37, list 199.

³⁶¹ A letter from ÖSG to VOKS, 30.11.1950. GARF, fond 5283. pis' 16, delo 38, listy 10-11.

Soviet song-book.³⁶² Outside of Vienna, with its oversaturated cultural programme, such concerts had a certain power of attraction. In 1950, the Society rather generously estimated the number of visitors at 300,000, out of which only 590 were ÖSG members.³⁶³ Despite potential doubts regarding the credibility of these reports, they are likely to reflect the effect that the ÖSG could have in local public spaces. Such “weeks” allowed the ÖSG to come out of the shadows in a number of provinces; however, since they were seasonal, regular collaboration with other cultural institutions could be complicated.³⁶⁴ It is difficult to infer with any certainty the reach of ÖSG branches among the population. The simple answer is that it was paltry, as the months of friendship did not amount to a stable presence. On a more differentiated level, it is quite difficult to reconstruct the history of many provincial branches, due to the paucity of first-hand source material. Both VOSK and ÖSG officials did indeed produce some statistics, although their counting methods were far from being transparent, and these thus remain mere claims made by the respective officials. For example, in 1950-51, it was claimed that 408,021 persons had attended ÖSG events (representing an increase of 20% compared to 1949),³⁶⁵ but no explanation was given as to the provenance of this statistic. A more verifiable number was the 3,500 new memberships of the ÖSG following the Weeks of 1955, which the clearly delighted Soviet administration reported back to Moscow.³⁶⁶ In many cases, these could not be easily verified or cross-checked.

The libraries, particularly in Vienna, Linz/Urfahr and Innsbruck, were instrumental in assuring the society’s visibility outside of the concert periods, continually requesting further deliveries of materials. These libraries organised concerts of Soviet music, and stocked gramophone records.³⁶⁷ The cost of provisioning libraries was relatively modest and represented a long-term asset, and was consequently supported by the Soviet Element. By the time that the Soviet occupation ended, there were 29 ÖSG-affiliated libraries left in the country (7 in Vienna, and 11 in Lower Austria).³⁶⁸

³⁶² “Planentwurf der ‘Oesterreichisch-Sowjetischen Freundschaftswochen’”, GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 43, listy 19-21. Parkaiev, Anatoly. Plan of Preparation of Carrying Out of the Month of Austro-Soviet Friendship (September, 30th – November, 9th 1951) [Plan podgotovki i provedeniia mesiachnika avstro-sovietskoi družby (30 sentiabria – 9 noiabria 1951 goda)] Ibid, listy 22-26.

³⁶³ Grünberg, Tätigkeitsbericht 1949-1950, 214.

³⁶⁴ Characteristically, when Anatoly Novikov spent almost two weeks in Austria in September 1950, he complained that he could not visit the Musical Academy (city conservatory of Vienna), the “philharmony” (by which he apparently meant the Philharmonic Orchestra or the Konzerthaus/Musikverein), and even his acquaintance with the ÖSG's own Musical Section was “insufficient.” Report of A.T. Novikov on the Trip on 8-19.09.1950. GARF, fond 5283, op. 16, delo 33, list 74.

³⁶⁵ Report on the Work of the Austro-Soviet Society in 1950 [Otchët o rabote Avstro-Sovetskogo obshchestva za 1950 g.] GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 200, list 18.

³⁶⁶ Report on the Month of Austro-Soviet Friendship in 1955 [Otchët o mesiachnike avstro-sovetskoi družby v 1955 godu] 11.07.1955. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 514, list 117.

³⁶⁷ Letter from Parkaiev to Liudomirski. 04.02.1950. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 35, list 133.

³⁶⁸ Memorandum of the Austro-Soviet Society to the Ambassador of the USSR in Austria I.I. Il'ichëv [Memorandum Avstro-Sovietskogo obshchestva poslu SSSR v Avstrii I.I. Il'ichëvu] (May – early summer of 1955) GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 59, listy 217-218.

Estimating the musical activities of most branch offices of the Austro-Soviet society is partly rendered possible by indirect evidence, obtained from Austrian and Western governmental sources, combined with Soviet and ÖSG reporting. The Austrian political police (*Staatspolizei*) tried to keep its own records of the entertainment provided in local branches. In the Soviet zone, most police reports simply remarked that ÖSG events were “well attended.” ÖSG branches are recorded as organising talks and musical entertainment evenings in a number of Eastern Austrian towns, such as Hollabrunn,³⁶⁹ Horn,³⁷⁰ Krems,³⁷¹ and others. Outside of Eastern Austria, the situation differed, depending on the region, the occupation power, the targets of individual police offices, and diverging degrees of interest in the supervision of cultural life, mostly linked to the relative local importance of the Communist Party. For instance, the British authorities closely monitored Communist activities in Styria, whereas the French element was apparently more relaxed, owing to the safe conservative dominance of Western Austria. Likewise, in the US zone, political life was firmly under the control of the two main parties, and the ÖSG never managed to take off in Salzburg (where the branch finally opened in 1947, after a year of negotiations³⁷²) or Linz. Frequenting ÖSG branches was not viewed favourably by the powerful Socialist and People's Parties, and even less so by the American and British authorities, a fact constantly alleged by the ÖSG leadership in its talks with Soviet officers. In Salzburg, American resistance seems to have occurred. In 1947, Representative Poliakov wrote to Moscow reporting on the opening of a new branch in Salzburg, remarking caustically that

“[...] as you already know, in Salzburg the American military authorities have until now opposed in every possible way the organisation of a branch of the Society.”³⁷³

In the climate of suspicion, fostered by the attitudes of the American and British Element and the local establishment, and shared by the anti-Communist majority, the conditions for ÖSG cultural

³⁶⁹ Ernst Bezemek, “‘Der lange Weg zur Freiheit!’ Ernst Bezemek, ed. Der Bezirk Hollabrunn unter sowjetischer Besatzung, Krieg und Besatzungsalltag in Niederösterreich 1945. Begleitheft zur Sonderausstellung im Stalltrakt. Mitteilungen aus dem Hollabrunner Stadtmuseum Alte Hofmühle 2 (Hollabrunn: Stadtmuseum, 1994) 54-55.

³⁷⁰ Robert Gärtner, “Ein freundschaftliches Fest” *Zeit-Zeugen der Besatzungszeit. 1945-1955. Bezirk Horn* (Horn: Nö. Bildungs- und Heimatwerk und Dorferneuerungskomitee, OSR Erwin Frank, Dir. Leo Nowak im Eigenverlag, 1995), 56.

³⁷¹ Kurt Preiß, *Von der Befreiung zur Freiheit: Krems 1945-1955. Band 2 der zeitgeschichtlichen Schriftenreihe des Vereins für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Krems* (Krems: Verein für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Krems, 1997), 204-11.

³⁷² Statistisch gekürzter Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. Jänner bis 30. Juni 1947. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 13, list 132.

³⁷³ ... kak Vam izvestno, v g. Salzburg do nastoiashchego vremeni amerikaniskii voennyie vlasti vsiacheski protivodeystvovali organisatsii viliala Obshchestva. A letter from 30.05.1947. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 15, list 108.

expansion were undoubtedly unpropitious. In smaller towns the Society made only intermittent appearances. Local functionaries, struggling with internal pressures and outward hostility, managed to operate their branches with varying, but normally modest degrees of success. At the 1952 conference, a local functionary from tiny Bad Ischl desperately stressed the importance of Russian music, this being superior to “Western music”.³⁷⁴ Positive feedback on how to conduct PR work and build bridges with wider society arrived on several occasions: in Leoben (Styria), where a Soviet-themed concert had taken place, a functionary informed local newspapers about it – with some positive reviews published as a result; in Lower Austria, a monastery, while specifically requesting the exclusion of politics, agreed to host lectures on Soviet culture and geography, claiming some public success.³⁷⁵ However, such anecdotal evidence does not testify in favour of long-term commitments, and ÖSG offices outside of the Soviet zone mostly functioned as clubs of occasional CP members, who were automatically taken to constitute an ÖSG branch.

In Carinthia, the provincial branch (founded in 1946³⁷⁶) ultimately remained too insignificant to successfully impose itself upon regional cultural life. By 1948, it may well have grown by 400%,³⁷⁷ and even hosted a “festive” assembly,³⁷⁸ but even so it was of no concern to the British administration. In fact, the only case in which the ÖSG branch did surface, insofar as it related to culture, was during the tour of a Georgian folk song and dance ensemble in 1949, when local functionaries necessarily took on the bulk of organisational work (there was no other Soviet representation in Carinthia), and, of course, eagerly inserted the ÖSG's logo into the concerts.³⁷⁹ After that, it lingered on as something more resembling a traditional *Stammtisch* (“regulars’ table”) than a powerful propaganda weapon. Even the ÖSG leadership had to acknowledge a “crisis” in Carinthian rates of attendance, attributing this to a “fierce anti-Soviet campaign” waged within the province's industrial facilities.³⁸⁰ In 1954, a local policeman revealingly noted that a film showing attracted only four visitors, all of them members of the local KPÖ bureau.³⁸¹ This is a good example of the branch's rather shadowy existence

In Styria, with its relatively strong Communist Party, there were more ÖSG activities on public display, including a small number of musical events that reached beyond Communist circles. For

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Otto Langbein, Report to the 1952 Hallein Conference: 106.

³⁷⁶ Preparation began in February, and there were some formalities to be settled with the British Element, at that point not yet an unsurmountable obstacle. Tätigkeitsbericht der Gesellschaft zur Pflege kultureller und wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion für den Monat Februar 1946. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 8, list 188.

³⁷⁷ TNA, FO 1004/343, Austria: Background Notes No. 106. Vienna, 29th of January, 1948: 13.

³⁷⁸ TNA, FO 1020/625, ISB (Kärnten) activities report for month of November, 1948: 5.

³⁷⁹ TNA, FO 1020/638, ISB (Kärnten) activities report for month of October, 1949: 3.

³⁸⁰ Report on an ÖSG Conference in Hallein (September 6th and 7th) [Otchët o rabochei konferentsii ASO v Galleine (6 I 7 sentiabria)] GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 46, list 81.

³⁸¹ A Report on the Situation in Klagenfurt in June 1954 (Lagebericht für die Stadt Klagenfurt für den Monat Juni 1954). 28.6.1954. OeSTA/AdR BMI Staatspolizei. Zl.: II-Res. 1//1954. GZl.: 30000-2/54. 5.

instance, the posters collection of the Styrian State Archive reveals four ÖSG concerts. On May 7th, 1946, the Society was involved in a concert dedicated to the first anniversary of the liberation, in which Franz Salmhofer's *Befreiungshymne* was played alongside Beethoven and Tchaikovsky's Fourth Symphony.³⁸² Later in October, the ÖSG managed to set up a fairly interesting programme for a chamber concert of Russian music, featuring Arensky, Borodin, Krein, Prokofiev, Rachmaninov, Rimsky-Korsakov, Cherepnin, Tchaikovsky and Shostakovich³⁸³: well-known names were mixed with music that had most likely never been heard before, an interesting example of cultural re-education at the local level. As the Cold War raged on, conditions apparently became more difficult, and ÖSG activities seem to have died down.³⁸⁴ Finally, in 1952, the Styrian branch was mentioned on a poster for a concert by Lev Oborin.³⁸⁵ The branch was undoubtedly helpful to the Soviet officers working on such practical issues, and the ÖSG office at the Jakominiplatz served as a ticket booth, as was the case with many branches in Vienna, thus integrating the Society into the local musical programme.

The Tyrolean branch in Innsbruck was nearly non-existent in the documentation conserved in Moscow, in spite of displaying some cultural initiatives. The branch office was opened in July 1946, with representatives of the French administration present,³⁸⁶ as relations between the Allied powers had not yet deteriorated beyond recall.³⁸⁷ The Society was explicitly mentioned six times in the *Tiroler Tageszeitung* in connection with films or with Soviet concerts, and it earned praise from its Soviet supervisors in June 1948.³⁸⁸ Films, a mainstay of ÖSG activities nationwide, were screened in Innsbruck as well. Characteristically, all these announcements bore little or no sign of direct hard-line propaganda. The films, for instance, were either contemporary artistic productions usually exported abroad (including, however, *Battleship Potemkin*), or showcased daily life in the Soviet provinces, in which case some kind of indoctrination was likely to have been present.

Music featured as well, both in films and live concerts. Like many branches in Austria, the Tyrolean office found itself having to cater to a cultivated “bourgeois” public, almost by definition staunchly conservative and anti-communist. Friedrich Weidlich and the Symphony Orchestra allowed the ÖSG to put their aegis on at least one concert, and even to use their office as a ticket

³⁸² StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1946, 892. The provincial organisation for Styria collaborated with the *Orchester der Städtischen Bühnen* – the city's symphony ensemble – to stage an event rather conventional in its nature, which clearly would have raised little objection from the British.

³⁸³ StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1946, 1291.

³⁸⁴ However, in 1949 film screenings for the “week of friendship” were documented StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1949, 335.

³⁸⁵ StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1952, 565.

³⁸⁶ Tätigkeitsbericht der Gesellschaft zur Pflege kultureller und wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen zur Sowjeunion für den Juli 1946. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 8, list 138

³⁸⁷ Letter from the Innsbruck branch office. 17.08.1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 22, list 46.

³⁸⁸ Letter from Siomonchuk to Shuvalov. 11.06.1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis# 16, delo 19, list 84.

booth.³⁸⁹ This trend was further exemplified by another event organised by the ÖSG alongside the French and Soviet authorities, in which a ballet evening was staged in collaboration with the Soviet repatriation commission.³⁹⁰ Later, they helped to organise the rare Soviet tours that took place in the west, including a Conservatoire ensemble tour in October 1950.³⁹¹

A typical (although untypically well-documented) provincial branch office, the Tyrolean ÖSG, appeared to be quite realistic about its real achievements. In 1952, its functionaries carried out a highly negative self-assessment: in contrast to the “shining” French, American and British centres in Innsbruck, staffed with Allied and Austrian personnel and never lacking money, the ÖSG had only one “barely working” cinema projector. Nonetheless, it could still claim some “successes that [were] larger and more important than the successes of others”.³⁹² As in Graz, however, it is interesting to note that their practical work silently undermined Soviet-Communist orthodoxy, as less direct control from Vienna combined with the reactions of the local population served to foster political moderation, and a shift towards a cultural diplomacy more acceptable to the local public.

The problem of institutional Soviet cultural diplomacy was that its structure was fundamentally inefficient, and this inefficiency stemmed from the very nature of the Stalinist regime. Moreover, it was further exacerbated by Austrian circumstances. While the Soviet functionaries, and later the official historiography,³⁹³ had attempted to externalise these faults, it was really the structural limitations of the Soviet political system, its unattractiveness, and the overall negative experience of Soviet occupation that really hampered the efficiency of cultural exports. However, attempts to expose Austrians to Russian and Soviet music never entirely ended. Generally, this was a uni-directional flow, since, after the Krips tour, no consistent Austrian response occurred until well after the end of the occupation period³⁹⁴. Moreover, this flow was also determined by the inflexible party-political guidelines of the propaganda state. The main product originating from and approved by the Soviet apparatus was simply unappealing to Austrians, even if no VOKS representative or middle-

³⁸⁹ “Russisches Symphoniekonzert,” TT 05.11.1947: 2. The concert was to be held on November 16th and to contain Moussorgsky, Shostakovich and Shelovinsky. It is unclear if it was linked to the 30th anniversary of the October Revolution; in Austria, generally, this was alluded to with polite references, somewhat like the Quatorze Juillet, as a “foreign”, Russian revolution. At this time the allies still tried to maintain a veneer of friendly relations.

³⁹⁰ “Ballett- und Tanzabend der ÖSG zu Ehren des Landeshauptmannes und der sowjetischen Repatriierungskommission,” TT 10.04.1947: 3.

³⁹¹ “Gastkonzert sowjetrussischer Künstlerinnen,” TT 11.10.1950: 5.

³⁹² Western Zones' ÖSG Conference in Hallein, 06.-07.09.1952: 93.

³⁹³ Vladimir M. Polokhov, “Istoricheskaia rol' Sovetskogo Soiuz v osvobozhdenii Avstrii i vrozozhdenii demokraticeskoi Avstriiskoi respubliki [The Historical Role of the Soviet Union in the Liberation of Austria and Reconstruction of the democratic Austrian republic],” *Voprosy novoi i noveishei istorii [Questions of Modern and Contemporary History]* 1958: 229-272. Vladimir N. Beletzky, *Sovetskii Soiuz i Avstriia [The Soviet Union and Austria]* (Moscow: IMO, 1962). Kobliakov I.G. (ed.), *SSSR v bor'be za nezavisimost' Avstrii [USSR in the Struggle for Austrian Independence]* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1965).

³⁹⁴ Wolfgang Mueller, *A Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence*, 192.

ranking official in Moscow could ever admit it openly. The bureaucratic machinery deployed by the USSR was slow, cumbersome and produced little analysis beyond the obligatory newspeak of regular reporting and self-justification. The goal-settings and the propagandistic discourse which framed Soviet cultural diplomacy in Austria, and elsewhere, necessarily remained out of touch with the country's realities and Austrian expectations, which severely compromised its potential for success within a non-coercive, competitive public sphere. Despite this, in musical matters, the outlook was somewhat better, and some ÖSG and Soviet functionaries demonstrated a degree of sensitivity towards public demand, allowing wooden language to give way to "normal human interaction".³⁹⁵ As it has been shown, even in the Berlin case, local cultural officers did not show excessive rigor in imposing the party line (compared to SED officials),³⁹⁶ and the implicit toning down of the most obviously awkward parts of Soviet cultural-political discourse promised some success, diverting the audience's attention towards the more popular aspects of Russian (Soviet) cultural exports. For this reason, the musical sections appeared less politicised than their colleagues in other departments, much to the indignation of supervising officers, and were more acceptable to non-Communist concert-goers. Austrian musicians and Austrian audiences could indeed benefit from the availability of scores, records and other materials imported from the Soviet Union, while often being able to maintain their interpretative liberty, such as during concerts given by Austrian performers who would use Soviet-provided sheet music, or non-Communist listeners at ÖSG-organised events. These islands of cultural programming thus detached themselves from an objectively destructive Soviet cultural propaganda framework, and made their contribution to the amelioration of the public image of the culture of Russia and the USSR.

Chapter 2. Information and Cultural Services in the French Administration: *Diplomatie Culturelle* and its Application in Occupied Austria

France has a long tradition of *étatisme* in cultural affairs, which soon made itself felt in the occupation structures set up in 1945-46. After the disaster of 1940, and the subsequent split of the French administration in two, the Gaullist Provisional Government managed to re-establish most interwar cultural structures, either re-hiring the old officials or appointing new ones. The latter

³⁹⁵ Kurt Preiß, *Von der Befreiung zur Freiheit: Krems 1945-1955* (Krems: Verein für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, 1997), 214.

³⁹⁶ Elizabeth Janik, "Back to the Future: New Music's Revival and Redefinition in Occupied Berlin," Philip Broadbent, Sabine Hake, eds., *Berlin: Divided City, 1945-1989* (New York: Berghahn, 2010): 41. Eiusdem, *Recomposing German Music*: 128, 182.

showed a certain dynamism in handling cultural-diplomatic issues, and, in a period of stark economic scarcity, tenaciously strove to maintain the French cultural presence abroad, including establishing a stronger position in Austria and Central Europe, an area of particular strategic interest. French cultural diplomacy in Austria balanced a vertical hierarchic structure, with a long-standing set of guidelines for activities abroad, and a sizeable space for local initiative by cultural officers deployed to Austria, assisted by their semi-independent local partners from the Franco-Austrian society. A genuine partnership of two cultural nations thus had to be achieved under French governmental control, but without giving the impression that the French were abusing their occupation status, or pulling strings in order to secure preferential treatment for their culture. This structure proved flexible enough to allow for substantial degrees of collaboration with Austrian and Allied cultural actors, showing a potential for multilateral action in a wide array of activities, from lectures to working with local opera houses and symphony orchestras. This broad span of activities aimed at promoting France, and helping Austrians to reconstruct their own democratic, European, de-Nazified and non-German cultural identity. Geographically, cultural action reveals a clear distinction between Vienna, the French zone, Southern Austria, Salzburg and Linz; Soviet partners were consistently avoided. Socially, much activity was oriented towards the educated *Bildungsbürgertum* (though this term is problematic), and outside of Vienna and Innsbruck most French cultural exports reached relatively small audiences. This factor, along with a lack of consistency in the denazification effort (which was supplanted by a consistent exhortation of Austrian national feeling and a distancing from militaristic “Prussia”) drew criticism from contemporaries, and serves as an important qualification to an otherwise well-structured system, whose geographic reach extended beyond the frontiers of hard power.

Compared to the USSR and the Anglo-American allies, France represents a strikingly different example of the ways in which cultural diplomacy (*diplomatie culturelle*) was envisaged and pursued. The conceptual framework of *diplomatie culturelle*, which long predated that of any other country, had its own independent logic. Secondly, *diplomatie culturelle* has always been a subject of intense analysis within the foreign ministry, as well as among historians.³⁹⁷ Thus, the well-developed French

³⁹⁷ Suzanne Balous, *L'action culturelle de la France dans le monde: Préf. de Maurice Genevoix* (Paris: PUF, 1970). Albert Salon, *Vocabulaire critique des relations internationales dans les domaines culturel, scientifique et de la coopération technique: avec index des traductions en allemand et en anglais* (Paris: Maison du dictionnaire, 1978). Eiusdem, *L'action culturelle de la France dans le monde: analyse critique* (PhD diss. Paris, 1981). Bernard Piniau, *L'action artistique de la France dans le monde* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1998). Laurence Saint-Gilles, "L'émergence d'un outil diplomatique: les services culturels français de New York (1944-1963)," *Relations internationales* 121:1 (2005): 43-58. Eiusdem, *La présence culturelle française aux Etats-Unis pendant la Guerre froide* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006). François Roche, *Géopolitique de la culture: Espace d'identité, projections, coopération* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 2007). Anne Dulphy, "La diplomatie culturelle: Introduction," in: Anne Dulphy, Robert Frank and Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci, eds., *Les relations culturelles internationales au XXe siècle: de la diplomatie culturelle à l'acculturation* (Bruxelles et al.: Peter Lang, 2010): 24-47. Pascal Ory, "Introduction," *Les relations culturelles internationales au XXe siècle*: 15-23. François Chaubet and Laurent Martin, *Histoire des*

tradition of reflection on the methods and contents of *diplomatie culturelle* has had important consequences: it has almost no overlap with Anglo-American concepts, in fact constituting a separate research object, which has so far only been moderately contextualised.

The promotion of culture for its own sake has always been at the core of French *diplomatie culturelle*, a fact that undoubtedly distinguishes it from Anglo-Saxon models based on the “way of life” or “democracy”, as well as from the ideologically driven Soviet alternative. The radiating image of glorious France – *rayonnement culturel* – has consistently remained at the core of *expansion culturelle*, along with the messianic belief in *civilisation française* and its world mission. The global projection of French cultural grandeur, a world-view tinged with nationalism, as exemplified by the French language and, after the 1960s/70s, French science as an embodiment of modernity, is a mainstay of Quai d’Orsay thinking,³⁹⁸ continuing to inform the practical and the academic dimensions of the French tradition, and revealing the deep rootedness of *diplomatie culturelle* within the outlook of the intellectual class.

Questions of prestige have therefore been conspicuously present in the conceptualising, planning and execution of *diplomatie culturelle*. The existence of factors that had clearly damaged the standing of France, such as the disastrous defeats of 1871 and 1940, pre-determined a need to compensate for these losses of power and influence. It is no coincidence that the *Alliance française*, the cornerstone of French *diplomatie culturelle*, was founded after the defeat at Sedan,³⁹⁹ followed by a growing network of *Instituts Français*.⁴⁰⁰

The situation in German-speaking Europe posed a challenge to the French administration. A country that had recently been defeated and occupied by the Third Reich now had to justify its military presence on Austrian territory as one of the victorious powers. In this sense, high culture retained paramount importance as the last bulwark of French grandeur.⁴⁰¹ Concomitantly, the involvement of academics was characteristic for both Germany⁴⁰² and Austria.⁴⁰³ France adhered to the logic of prestige diplomacy to assert itself as one of the leading powers, notably by overriding

relations culturelles dans le monde contemporain (Paris: Colin, 2011).

³⁹⁸ See, for instance: France diplomatie. "La politique culturelle extérieure de la France," France diplomatie. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 2014. Accessed May 29, 2014. <<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/diplomatie-culturelle-21822/>>.

³⁹⁹ Chaubet, Martin: 497-98.

⁴⁰⁰ Margarethe Mehdorn, *Französische Kultur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland : Politische Konzepte und zivilgesellschaftliche Initiativen, 1945-1970* (Cologne et al.: Böhlau, 2009): 35. Porpaczy 2002.

⁴⁰¹ Cf. Andrea Oberhuber, “De la musique avant toute chose’: Rezeption, mediale Verbreitung und Distributionsbedingungen des französischen Chansons in Österreich,” in: *Ein Frühling dem kein Sommer folgte?:* 217-218. Also Porpaczy 1999, 2002.

⁴⁰² Emmanuelle Picard, *Des usages de l’Allemagne : politique culturelle française en Allemagne et rapprochement franco-allemand, 1945-1963 : politique publique, trajectoires, discours* (Paris: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2001).

⁴⁰³ Cultural diplomats were routinely recruited from academia, including in Austria. Eisterer: 270; see further the chapter on structures and the work of Emmanuelle Picard.

supposed German domination, and acquiring a larger share of the global musical market, not least by enhancing French national prestige.⁴⁰⁴ In Austria, France refused to be considered culturally inferior, as was the case with Russia, and persevered in winning local appreciation for its cultural brilliance.⁴⁰⁵

As France was created an occupation power by the grace of Churchill, it had few plans and rather vague ideas about how to govern Austria, and this had repercussions on its cultural policies,⁴⁰⁶ resulting in numerous *ad hoc* decisions. The French government had agreed on the need to re-establish an independent and democratic Austria, and consistently collaborated with other Western Allies and the Austrian democratic parties. Austria was considered one of the targets of *rayonnement*, and the message of France's cultural grandeur obviously aimed at displacing pan-Germanic sentiments, thus facilitating the establishment of an independent Austrian democracy, creating a long-term influence independent of electoral fluctuations, and affecting the masses both directly and via elites.⁴⁰⁷ Austria was perceived through a "Conservative-Baroque" and at times distinctively Catholic lens,⁴⁰⁸ and this played a role in structuring French cultural exports, which oscillated between addressing an educated elite with high culture and the broader masses with a greater variety of genres.⁴⁰⁹ The French could hardly count on particular Austrian Francophilia outside of the cultural sphere, due to the strained occupation situation⁴¹⁰ and a rather uneasy past.⁴¹¹ Officially, Paris maintained that both France and Austria had suffered under Nazi occupation,⁴¹² and promoted the theme of commonalities between the two peoples,⁴¹³ even if this had limited credibility among the Austrian population. Overcoming the National-Socialist legacy of anti-French propaganda, "de-Prussianising" Austria and separating it from Germany,⁴¹⁴ and revitalising old contacts was therefore soon established as the cornerstone of France's interests in the country.⁴¹⁵ This approach being built into occupation policy in Austria, the results bore substantial resemblances to France's actions elsewhere: French language and culture were actively promoted by governmental agencies, and high-brow exports carried symbolic capital. The importance of Austria in French cultural policies abroad was further reflected in the fact that one of the first bilateral cultural agreements signed by France after the war was the Franco-Austrian convention of 1947, which made

⁴⁰⁴ Linsenmann 2010.

⁴⁰⁵ Eisterer 1991, Starlinger 1993, Porpaczy 1996, 2002.

⁴⁰⁶ Porpaczy: 74, Dussault 2005, 106.

⁴⁰⁷ Cf. Sandner, Eisterer, Porpaczy, Dussault 2006, 11.

⁴⁰⁸ Starlinger: 26, 144-46; Porpaczy: 122; Eisterer: 262-63.

⁴⁰⁹ Starlinger: 75.

⁴¹⁰ Porpaczy 2002: 15.

⁴¹¹ Dussault 2006: 95-98.

⁴¹² Dussault 2006: 101.

⁴¹³ Raoul De Broglie, *Les souvenirs français dans le Tyrol* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1948), 174.

⁴¹⁴ Thomas Angerer, *Frankreich und die Österreichfrage: Historische Grundlagen und Leitlinien 1945-1955* (Univ. Diss. Vienna, 1996), 195.

⁴¹⁵ *Deux ans et demi de la présence française en Autriche* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1947), 33.

Austria the third country after Belgium and the Netherlands, just before the United Kingdom and Brazil, to institutionalise its cultural ties with the Fourth Republic.⁴¹⁶ These measures assumed additional importance as France was forced out of Eastern Europe by the communist takeover from 1947/48 onwards: while French musicians had been prominent at the Festival of Prague in 1946,⁴¹⁷ harassment by the authorities soon brought Franco-Central and Eastern European cultural relations to a standstill. A continuing presence in Austria thus drove a symbolic wedge between the state-socialist regimes.

Music, while sidelined in most of the secondary literature and contemporary top-level reporting, revealed a significant potential for France's prestige diplomacy. Within France, music and musicians were actively involved in social and political processes⁴¹⁸ and debates on modernity,⁴¹⁹ and did not escape the political entanglements of the Occupation.⁴²⁰ Music from France and French-speaking territories had for a long time enjoyed a standing of European importance, exemplified by the Notre Dame school, the Franco-Flemish school, Baroque composers such as Lully, Rameau or Couperin, nineteenth-century Romanticism, Impressionism and other modern authors. Officials reasonably assumed that the Austrian target audience would know little about contemporary works (which the French considered superior to those of the Germans⁴²¹), and would believe firmly in German-Austrian pre-eminence in music.⁴²² Against these prejudices, France would have to affirm herself as an equally important partner. Thus, recognition of Austria's special relationship with music, evident also in the German case,⁴²³ went hand in hand with a determination to overturn the reductionist cultural habits of Austrians. French cultural diplomats estimated that the expectations of Austrian listeners were very high, and that it would require strenuous efforts to garner praise amongst the Austrian public. Moreover, the cultural diplomats also stressed the importance of introducing contemporary music into Austria, deeming it necessary to musically re-educate those Austrians who were more used to the classics.⁴²⁴ At the same time, this contemporary music ought not to be so radical as to antagonise conservative ears. Thus, a cautious introduction of lesser-known, modern

⁴¹⁶ Balous, 14. France drew attention to signing cultural treaties: if there were 11 agreements, followed by another 11 before 1939, the years 1945-61 saw as many as 60. (Bernard Piniau and François Roche, *Histoire de la diplomatie culturelle des origines à 1995* (Paris: PUF, 1995): 79-80.)

⁴¹⁷ Annie Guénard-Maget, *Une diplomatie culturelle dans les tensions internationales. La France en Europe centrale et orientale (1936-1940/1944-1951)* (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2014):#, 156.

⁴¹⁸ Jane F. Fulcher, *Composer as Intellectual. Music and Ideology in France, 1914-1940* (New York: Oxford UP, 2005).

⁴¹⁹ Barbara L. Kelly, *Music and Ultra-Modernism in France: A Fragile Consensus* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2013).

⁴²⁰ Sara Iglesias, *Musicologie et Occupation. Science, musique et politique dans la France des "années noires"* (Paris: Edition de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2015).

⁴²¹ Linsenmann 2010, 1-2.

⁴²² Applegate and Potter, 2002.

⁴²³ Linsenmann 2010, 92-93.

⁴²⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 192, Le Ministre plenipotentiaire Representant politique de la République française en Autriche à Son Excellence Monsieur Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. 20.05.1946

works alongside more familiar pieces remained a constant principle in French concert programmes. These were particularly visible during the first post-liberation years, and French musical engagement spread throughout the Austrian territories, comprising Vienna, Innsbruck, Salzburg, Graz, Klagenfurt and Linz. Strong institutional support and government backing, plus a growing degree of coherence in CD thinking, assured sizeable advances for French music in Austrian soundscapes, enabling it to return to its pre-1938/44 positions, and to continue its steady progress in the concert sphere.

What did France and the USSR have in common, and why should they be studied in a comparative perspective? Despite the apparent differences in hard power status and political regimes, both countries occupied large portions of the European continent (and territories outside of it, such as Algeria and Central Asia), both had long established themselves as great European cultural nations – particularly in music – both had suffered enormous losses in the conflict with Germany, the Soviet Union narrowly avoiding total defeat and annihilation, and both were equally determined to restore their great power status and to enhance their cultural prestige in Europe.

Whereas the highly problematic relationship between music and politics has become visible already at the level of planning and perception, a closer examination of governmental thinking and action may provide further insights into how music was in fact transferred. In a practical sense, the conduct of musical diplomacy by France and the USSR was carried out through transfers of sheet music, gramophone records and artists, within a context of social anchorage, communication and audience reception. In addition, similar hierarchical policy structures originated from the higher ranks of the Foreign Ministries in Paris and Moscow. Devolution of actual musical diplomacy to middle-ranking actors with an insider understanding of the musical *métier* and specific skills was an inevitable solution, while the higher authorities continued to conform to general CD goal-settings and governmental structures.

Interpreting musical exports was more problematic, since there was some competition between national schools (themselves social constructs within and outside their respective states), including the technical prowess of their musicians (assessed within the common Euro-Western evaluative framework). This cannot be easily reduced to “Socialist” versus capitalist versions of modernity and social order: the imagery of the musical other ought not to be viewed exclusively through a political prism. France aimed at strengthening its own individual image, to which the chasm between Communists and the “free world” was largely irrelevant. The Soviet Union itself absorbed and instrumentalised the culture of imperial Russia, and, under Stalin, effectively abandoned its initial internationalism; characteristically, in contemporary German and English-language usage it was consistently referred to as “Russia”. There is strong evidence to suggest that large cultural capital, such as that accumulated by the USSR, would not immediately translate into sympathy for Soviet

communism or Soviet soldiers, and this constituted a contradiction within the image of Russia and Russians. Assessing the results of French musical diplomacy also requires us to relativise the zero-sum categories of success/failure, since important musical advances in Austria occurred alongside the retreat of France as an individual power from Austria and Central Europe. Austrian audiences, exposed to multiple cultural diplomacies as well as a domestic programme of cultural nation-building, moved in a multi-dimensional space, in which their own positioning and outlook underwent substantial changes, specifically in the middle- and long-term perspectives. The state agenda retains its significance, but in order to apprehend its outcomes in greater depth, the study of its musical transfer component needs to be understood as part of bilateral and multilateral cultural interactions. These emanated from a single centre, but did not display a simple causal relation between input and output.

Parisian Authorities Responsible for Austrian Cultural Affairs

Authorities deployed in Austria had to comply with the centralist principle that permeated French cultural expansion abroad. Within the governmental hierarchy, foreign cultural diplomacy in occupied Germany and Austria was conducted by the *Service des Affaires Intérieures et Culturelles* of the Foreign Ministry's (MAE) *Commissariat Général des Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes* (CGAAA).⁴²⁵ This commissariat was chaired by René Mayer, and, since the summer of 1946, Pierre Schneiter, while René Cannac supervised cultural affairs in the occupied countries, with particular responsibility in financial issues.⁴²⁶ The commissariat acted as the regulatory body for the French military occupation, implementing the general cultural diplomacy framework to the extent that this fell within its remit, and notably supervising the cultural organs that arose from the system of occupation administration. Most of its attention was dedicated to Germany, and, since there were no substantial differences in the opinions of the cultural diplomats involved at different levels, the Parisian central office did not as a rule enforce close day-to-day supervision.

In addition, the Foreign Ministry was charged primarily with diplomatic work, and thus did not regard specifically cultural issues as its primary remit. For this reason, it required partners with artistic and country-specific knowledge in order to carry out projects pertaining to French *rayonnement*. To provide for cultural services abroad, two agencies were set up in Paris: the

⁴²⁵ Ministère des Affaires Extérieures (MAE), Archive d'Occupation française en Allemagne et en Autriche (AOFAA), Autriche, AUT0043, Le Commissaire Général pour les Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes à Monsieur le Général Chérière, Membre du Comité Exécutif Vienne. Paris, 24.07.1946.

⁴²⁶ Linsenmann 2010, 79.

Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles, part of the Quai d'Orsay hierarchy, and the officially independent *Association Française d'Action artistique*. Whereas the AFAA, a formally non-governmental body, was supposed to ensure the consistent artistic quality of what France represented at home and abroad,⁴²⁷ the *Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles*, chaired by Henri Laugier,⁴²⁸ and, after 1946, by Louis Joxe, defined foreign cultural policy and exercised direct governmental authority over the French presence abroad. It settled matters regarding the sending of artists and works of art abroad, and provided organizational and financial support (often through the Finance Ministry). For his part, Laugier favoured an ambitious programme of cultural expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, before the Communists had time to seize the initiative;⁴²⁹ of course, this meant that Austria assumed a position of particular importance. The DGRC had several internal subdivisions, including the *Service des Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes*, led by César Santelli (not to be confused with CGAAA), and the *Direction des Spectacles et de la Musique*, managed by Jeanne Laurent. A cultural official named Spitzmüller is mentioned in the memoirs of M.-A. Béthouart, the High Commissioner of France in Austria: he returned to Vienna, and suggested the idea of renting the Palais Lobkowitz to house the French Institute.⁴³⁰ The DGRC was kept well-informed regarding radio activities, while regularly receiving reports from cultural officers in Vienna. Many large-scale musical events, such as guest tours, which required a justification for the significant financial subsidies involved, were reported to the DGRC as well. On the whole, cultural diplomats in Austria collaborated effectively with their superiors in the Foreign Ministry, and measures or events recommended from Vienna were approved without the need for extensive written discussion.⁴³¹

In 1945, the *Direction Générale* was established in order to overcome the disarray of the war years, and to re-consolidate the role of the state. This attached a premium to *diplomatie culturelle*, notwithstanding the fact that the role of the AFAA remained central to the strategy and tactics of

⁴²⁷ And its recommendations were indeed heeded by officials in Austria. MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 323, Le Commissaire Général pour les Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes à Monsieur le Général de Corps d'Armée, Haut-Commissaire de la République Française en Autriche, Division des Affaires Culturelles Vienne. No 3981/INTER/EDU ; BC/SE/7/12/46. Paris [7 Décembre 1946].

⁴²⁸ Porpaczy, *Frankreich-Österreich 1945-1960*, 62.

⁴²⁹ Annie Guenard, "De la reconstruction à l'éviction. Entre 1944 et 1949, une politique culturelle française en Europe centrale et orientale confrontée à l'organisation du Bloc communiste," *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps* 36 (1994) : 22. Guenard-Maget, *Une diplomatie culturelle dans les tensions internationales...* On a long and complex history of Franco-Hungarian cultural relations: Catherine Horel, "La France et la Hongrie : affinités passées et présentes, de saint Martin à Nicolas Sarkozy," *Revue historique des armées*, 270 (2013): 5-13.

⁴³⁰ Marie-Anthoine Béthouart, *La bataille pour l'Autriche* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1966), 218. It is not clear, however, if it was Pierre Spitzmuller, mentioned once as a "private agent" by the Foreign Ministry's archive, or Alexander Spitzmüller, an Austro-French composer who lived in Paris at the time.

⁴³¹ It is not unreasonable to suggest that, as many cultural diplomats were personally acquainted, potential differences in opinion would be settled in personal or telephone discussions. There are no sources to suggest substantial conflict between Paris and Vienna: whether occasional frictions were settled informally, or an agreement on principle was reached well in advance, the system rarely suffered from disagreements.

cultural expansion. Furthermore, both foreign service agencies collaborated with the ministry of culture (then part of the *Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale*),⁴³² and Cannac attempted to strengthen these ties by creating an inter-ministerial commission in 1947.⁴³³ The Ministry, however, was closely involved with leading French musicians at home, and, while its relative power might have been less apparent in the final stages of cultural export to Austria, it nonetheless constituted an important source of state support for those musicians, continuously active, and having won both national and international renown.

The older institution, the AFAA, had been created as early as 1922, and incorporated an influential *Service des Échanges Artistiques*, a body charged with the conduct and supervision of all artistic *manifestations* outside of France. Its *Commission Musicale* was specifically allocated the task of selecting musicians for purposes of prestige diplomacy.⁴³⁴ High technical ability and previous experience were crucial, and auditions were conducted by the commission, in order to establish which artists would be sent to which countries. With musical policy dominated by professional musicians, there was already a marked emphasis on contemporary music between 1922 and 1939.⁴³⁵ Indeed, musicians appeared to take the upper hand in the whole organization when Philippe Erlanger, himself a historian, but the son of a musician, was named Director of the AFAA in 1939, being re-appointed following the Liberation (Erlanger, a Jew, was forbidden from holding public office under the Vichy regime), and serving until his retirement in 1967.⁴³⁶ As head of the AFAA, he also intervened in DGRC activities.⁴³⁷ The numerous intertwinements between the official Foreign Ministry and the semi-official AFAA functionaries, with their respective areas of responsibility, suggest that this formal division was not reflected in the substance of their work, and was maintained mainly for purposes of representation. As such, the AFAA can be regarded as a governmental body, insofar as its goal-setting and practical activities were not detached from official cultural diplomacy, but rather revealed a continuity of decision-making and bureaucratic structure.

Central bureaus were far from the actual Austrian cultural scene, and, in all likelihood, were aware of their lack of understanding of the local situation in many countries. Institutionalised cultural diplomacy in France had developed into a large-scale structure, which took into account many of the ramifications that cultural proliferation could entail. Despite its bi-centricity (i.e. the fact that the AFAA and DRGC existed as two nominally independent cultures), financial control was firmly

⁴³² Jean-François de Raymond, *L'action culturelle extérieure de la France* (Paris: Documentation française, 2000), 55-57.

⁴³³ Linsenmann, 83.

⁴³⁴ Balous, *L'action culturelle de la France dans le monde*, 95, 98.

⁴³⁵ Piniau, *L'action artistique de la France dans le monde*, 54.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid*, 70.

⁴³⁷ Linsenmann, 79.

lodged in the Foreign Ministry, and the AFAA's "arm's length" status was little more than lip-service to the supposedly "public" roots of cultural diplomacy. Within the general reference framework provided by the established premises of *diplomatie culturelle* – a discourse widely shared by France's cultural ambassadors – the chains of transmission involved in channelling cultural diplomatic exports to given countries worked relatively well, and allowed for a certain flexibility, as will become clear in the following account of French activities in Austria.

France's Military Administration in Vienna and Innsbruck: The Cultural Division and its Director

In Austria,⁴³⁸ the face and structure of the occupation administration evolved in accordance with the general priorities that had been elaborated upon France's acquisition of an occupation zone.⁴³⁹ While the French possessed certain skills in conducting cultural diplomacy, and a general framework in which to do so, their first steps were nonetheless fraught with difficulties, some of them previously unstudied. In 1945, prestige diplomacy faced a series of problems that would have been familiar to the Soviets. The Moroccan divisions were resented among the Austrian population due to their reputation for rape and robbery,⁴⁴⁰ and were soon replaced with the white European 27th Mountain Division. Thereafter, France quickly reduced its personnel from 30,000 in 1945 to around 7,000 in May 1946, this subsequently remaining stable.⁴⁴¹ This laid the ground for a better and more balanced relationship with the Austrians, as France's popularity improved dramatically, owing much to the actions of the politically and culturally sensitive French leadership.

The occupation administration was divided into two sections, one located in Innsbruck and the other in Vienna, due to the existence of two clearly separated occupation zones in Western Austria and Vienna. The French military authority was headed by General Marie-Antoine Béthouart, a personal friend of de Gaulle, and of moderately conservative convictions, who took on the role of French High Commissioner from 1945 to 1950. His leadership proved to be crucial in bringing about

⁴³⁸ A consistent comparison with Germany is not envisaged in this chapter, even though I will remain mindful of the situation to the north. On French cultural diplomacy in Germany, see: Picard, *Des usages de l'Allemagne*.

⁴³⁹ A first published overview of the French administration in 1945-1950 was provided in an appendix to Béthouart's book. Annexe V. Organisation et titulaires principaux des services et forces françaises d'Autriche 1945-1950. Béthouart, *La bataille*, 317-319

⁴⁴⁰ It cannot be overlooked that the supposed propensity to commit crimes against the civilian population revealed parallels with Nazi racial categorisations. It is not unreasonable to suggest that this was partly due to racist sentiment, and partly due to tensions between the "racially inferior" conquerors and Germanic Austrian civilians. White Anglo-Saxon forces faced remarkably less potential for conflict, although this is speculative.

⁴⁴¹ Klaus Eisterer, "Die französische Besatzung in Tirol 1945-1955," in *Tirol-Frankreich 1946-1960: Spurensicherung einer Begegnung*. Tiroler Landesmuseum Ferdinandeum Innsbruck. 12. September bis 6. Oktober 1991. (Innsbruck: Landesmuseum Ferdinandeum, 1991), 109.

a change in the opinions of the Austrian population vis-à-vis the French, these evolving from a rather hostile stance towards obvious sympathy, particularly centering on the figure of Béthouart himself.⁴⁴² Béthouart adapted French policies to the Tyrolean mindset,⁴⁴³ and carried out a series of surprisingly dexterous propaganda manoeuvres. It was Béthouart who succeeded in respecting the memory of Andreas Hofer in a way consistent with French interests, and who understood the symbolic importance of maintaining armed *Schützen* (whose outdated traditional firearms had been confiscated by the Americans). Receiving a level of respect unmatched even among his Western colleagues, Béthouart was recalled to France in 1950 (the *Schützen* organising a guard of honour⁴⁴⁴), and replaced with a civil Ambassador, Jean Payart, who served as the French representative in Austria and on the Allied Council. Béthouart later wrote a reminiscence of his service in Austria, in which he analysed French activities in the country (he attached considerable importance to culture), and expressed his political views regarding the French presence abroad, and particularly the “battle of the Austrians and the Westerners on the one side and the Stalinists on the other”.⁴⁴⁵ Thus, he demonstrated a degree of anti-communism unusual for France at the time.

In recognition of Austrian independence, France sent a Political Councillor with the status of Minister, Louis de Monicault, whose task was primarily to serve as an advisor, since Austria had not yet regained full effective sovereignty. Despite these limitations, Monicault had leverage over French cultural finances, particularly by administering a “special account”, which elevated his power position within the official hierarchy. In Innsbruck, Pierre Voizard, who had vast experience in colonial administration,⁴⁴⁶ was charged with settling the practical issues of French governance in Austria, often lending a helpful hand to the cultural diplomats. Béthouart was assisted in the Allied Executive Committee by General Chérière, and Voizard by Colonel Carolet.⁴⁴⁷ Chérière took charge of those cultural affairs that were to be decided on the inter-Allied level, while Monicault played a consultative role.⁴⁴⁸ In the 1950 reshuffle, Voizard was moved to Monaco, and replaced with Colonel Nadau.⁴⁴⁹ Monicault, whose ambassadorial status was incomplete, was succeeded by Roger Lalouette, who was appointed Vice High Commissioner (Haut Commissaire Adjoint), while Jean Payart, following Béthouart's departure, united the functions of High Commissioner and

⁴⁴² Margit Sandner, *Die französisch-österreichischen Beziehungen während der Besatzungszeit von 1947 bis 1955* (Wien: VWGÖ, 1985), 17.

⁴⁴³ Peter Assmann, “Die französische Kulturpolitik in Österreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg - Das Institut Français in Innsbruck,” *Tirol-Frankreich 1946-1960*, 25.

⁴⁴⁴ Béthouart, 250-1.

⁴⁴⁵ Béthouart, 9.

⁴⁴⁶ Barbara Porpaczy, *Besatzungspolitisches Kalkül oder Beitrag zur Identitätsfindung? Frankreichs kulturelles Engagement in Österreich 1945-1960* (Univ. Diss. Innsbruck, 1999), 78.

⁴⁴⁷ Sandner, 17.

⁴⁴⁸ Porpaczy 1999, 77.

⁴⁴⁹ Eisterer, “Die französische Besatzung in Tirol 1945-1955,” in *Tirol-Frankreich 1946-1960: Spurensicherung einer Begegnung*, 121.

Ambassador.⁴⁵⁰ Thus, French policies in Austria included sudden, and at first sight confusing changes of personnel, although a degree of structure and political coherence was vigorously maintained and upheld, for instance through unification of the two most important posts in Austria in the person of Payart. Despite the seemingly clear-cut division of responsibilities, some cases of overlapping of authority occurred,⁴⁵¹ obviously regarding the ambiguous position of Monicault vis-à-vis the structures of the occupation administration under Béthouart's command. This potential for conflict was latent throughout the first five years, erupting in disagreements between Monicault and the occupation administration's Cultural Division (chaired by Eugène Susini), which will be dealt with later.

During the early stages of the occupation, the chief concern was to formulate a general outline and position for a future cultural department, including the methods by which the practical policies were to be carried out. Here, there were both agreements and disagreements. As to the general aims, everybody agreed on reducing the military presence, and concentrating on, as Pierre Voizard put it, “what the Austrians will think of us when we withdraw”.⁴⁵² The constant stressing of French and Austrian “friendship” posed, in fact, a delicate problem: *pays ami, pourquoi l'occuper?*⁴⁵³ This ambivalence served to move culture to the forefront, while also requiring moderation in political propaganda. Thus, as with other Allies, the initially strict programme of denazification was gradually scaled down, and most artists with problematic pasts were able to continue their work, while publicly professing values of democracy and Austro-French friendship.

Nuances in strategy existed, however, and were linked not only to the different ideas that French officials entertained about Austria, but also to their personal ambitions, their vision of France's cultural mission, and the place of the latter in wider occupation policy. In broad terms, Béthouart entertained for some time an idea of cultural service as an adjunct of political propaganda, serving to facilitate occupation policies by working with public,⁴⁵⁴ whereas the civilian Eugène Susini stood for the total independence of cultural activities from “information” policies and domestic affairs, being keenly aware of the potential for friction with Ambassador Monicault regarding financial matters. Susini ultimately won, and gained additional momentum and personal power in developing cultural diplomacy in Austria.

⁴⁵⁰ Porpaczy 1999, 191.

⁴⁵¹ Myriam Gourlet, *Die französische Medienpolitik in Österreich während der Besatzungszeit* (Mémoire pour la maîtrise de lettres, Université Catholique de l'Ouest, Angers, 2002), 112.

⁴⁵² Eisterer, “Die französische Besatzung”, 110.

⁴⁵³ So Jean-Marc Terrasse as cited by: Porpaczy, 1999, 48.

⁴⁵⁴ Porpaczy 2002, 62.

Eugène Susini

Susini was indeed the central figure of the French cultural presence in Austria, and arguably came to define the whole cultural enterprise. Originating from Corsica (he had been born near Ajaccio in 1900), he had had a distinguished academic career as a Germanist during the 1920s and 1930s, arriving in the intellectual elite of France. Starting out at the prestigious *Lycée Louis-le Grand*, the young Susini received certificates in philosophy and German from the Sorbonne, and enrolled at the prestigious *Ecole Normale Supérieure*. There, he received a qualification in Russian (ironically, Susini never contacted his Soviet colleagues later in Austria), and studied for his *agrégation* in German (1926). After a scholarship at the French Institute in Berlin, and lectureships at the Universities of Leipzig and Berlin, he had his first short sojourn in Vienna, while beginning work on a dissertation on the Bavarian theologian Franz von Baader.⁴⁵⁵ In 1939, Susini was called upon to head the first French Institute in Austria, immediately before the *Anschluss*, and supervised its activities until its forced dissolution in 1939.⁴⁵⁶ He maintained moderately conservative views on culture, being for some time fairly ambivalent regarding the question of Austrian national identity – in part paralleling the tortuous path followed by conservative Catholics in Austria, as Michel Cullin notes.⁴⁵⁷ While he did not actively participate in the Resistance, Susini kept a low profile, living in Lille and keeping aloof from pro-German circles. Upon his return to Austria in 1945, Susini quickly found common ground with the Austrian establishment, namely a vision of a new anti-German, Danube-linked identity, conscious of its great cultural past, and revealing parallels with France.⁴⁵⁸

Susini's was a strong personality, undoubtedly colourful, but with an authoritarian hue. Porpaczy at times referred to his difficult relations with some of his colleagues,⁴⁵⁹ and there existed for a time a certain animosity towards Maurice Besset, the French director in Innsbruck.⁴⁶⁰ Despite such initial frictions in the occupation apparatus, an overwhelming consensus was soon reached: Béthouart was soon “*aisement convaincu*” by Susini's ideas for a long-term reconciliation between the French and Austrians, and tended to respect Susini's opinions regarding the conduct of cultural diplomacy.⁴⁶¹ The *politique de longue haleine* adopted by France⁴⁶² undoubtedly buttressed Susini's position vis-à-

⁴⁵⁵ Michel Cullin, “Österreich – aber welches? Eugène Susini und sein Österreichbild,” in: *Ein Frühling, dem kein Sommer folgte*, 41-2.

⁴⁵⁶ Lydia Lettner, *Die französische Österreichpolitik von 1943 bis 1946*, 314.

⁴⁵⁷ Cullin, “Österreich – aber welches?”, 42-44.

⁴⁵⁸ Cullin, “Österreich – aber welches?”, 45-46.

⁴⁵⁹ Porpaczy 1999, 105. Sandner and Porpaczy could still talk with many retired cultural diplomats, including Susini and Besset, in France, and some of their claims are thus based on interviews. Sandner managed to arrange meetings with Voizard, Susini, and Renate Lichtfuss, among some others.

⁴⁶⁰ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT0043, Béthouart to the Education Minister Nagelen. Vienne, le 11 avril 1946. MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 190, Nagelen to Béthouart a/c Mayer. No 1409 EN/SG. Paris, le 7 mars 1946.

⁴⁶¹ Béthouart, 217.

⁴⁶² Elisabeth Starlinger, *Aspekte französischer Kulturpolitik in Österreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (1945-1948)* (Univ, Dipl.-Arb. Vienna, 1993), 63-64.

vis his collaborators in the occupation administration. Relations with Besset and the Innsbruck division were quickly normalised, as their respective responsibilities and spheres of influence were divided.

Susini's conservative, high-brow views were highly welcome in Austria, as he showed a remarkable capacity to grasp the local situation and adapt his actions to it, while never swerving from the general political line. Some noticeable qualifications apply, however, to his relations with the centre-left, as represented by the Socialist party, and traditionally dominant in Vienna. Politically, Susini clearly tended towards the ÖVP, and some Socialists felt disenchanted by his apparently conservative and aristocratic inclinations. The Left had long constructed another image of France, centred on the axis of Revolution – Paris Commune – Popular Front,⁴⁶³ which did not agree with the dominant mode of thinking within the French occupation administration. As the right gained ascendancy in the cultural politics of Austria, the French administration tacitly embraced their conservative outlook. Nonetheless, Susini managed to maintain good relations with prominent Communist functionaries such as Victor Matejka,⁴⁶⁴ although there is no record of any contacts whatsoever with his Soviet counterparts during the whole occupation decade (despite his working knowledge of Russian). The latter point, and the total absence of France from the Soviet zone, is remarkable, and may be explained by the virulent anti-Communism of Béthouart, and, apparently, the rest of the French administration, in which the left was conspicuous by its absence.

It is important to underline the fact that Susini's extraordinary role in French cultural diplomacy in Austria had both its benefits and limitations. Susini's sheer brilliance seemed to deeply impress those who entered into contact with him, and *Prinz Eugen's* persona left a lasting imprint on France's cultural action in Austria. This was part of a general tendency, since France often chose educated officials with an academic background and remarkable intellectual capacities, as was also the case, for instance, with Susini's counterpart in Germany, René Thimonier.⁴⁶⁵ During the initial period, cultural diplomats struggled to overcome Susini's opinions regarding the standing and importance of French cultural institutions in Austria, although this conflict was eventually resolved in their favour.

This did not come about automatically. There were two lines of attack against Susini's *grand dessein* of a united and powerful French cultural authority in Austria. Béthouart was initially in favour of subordinating culture to propaganda issues, whereas Monicault opposed any personal union between the new cultural department and the revived French Institute.⁴⁶⁶ There was a conceptual difficulty, too: given that much of French propaganda *was to be cultural*, this made it

⁴⁶³ Cullin, "Österreich – aber welches?", 47-48.

⁴⁶⁴ Porpaczy 1999, 102-104.

⁴⁶⁵ Linsenmann, 67-71.

⁴⁶⁶ Porpaczy 1999, 78-79, 101.

more difficult to draw a clear dividing line between the “political” and the purely “cultural.”⁴⁶⁷ After protracted negotiations, Susini gained the upper hand, and persuaded Béthouart to allow a more independent status for cultural diplomacy. A special *Division des Affaires Culturelles*, now detached from Internal Affairs, was established in April 1946.⁴⁶⁸ This was responsible for cultural action outside the French army proper (the latter falling within the remit of the *Service Social*), and thus for the propaganda of French culture among the Austrian population. The Division consisted of three sections: Education (*Enseignement*) under Colonel Ruche, *Expansion Culturelle* under Lieutenant Berard, and *Beaux-Arts* under a civil servant, Rouvier.⁴⁶⁹ In practical terms, the three main lines of activity were provided by the Institutes, cultural expansion and education.⁴⁷⁰ M. Bretagne was assigned to the Cultural Division, with specific instructions relating to the organization of concerts and theatrical events, which were to be conducted under the aegis of the Division.⁴⁷¹ Plans existed for a cultural officer charged with music⁴⁷² (this continued to be performed *de facto* by Susini). Furthermore, in the fall of 1946, André Rivaud was deployed in Paris as the Division’s representative, in order to assist its head, Eugène Susini, with the question of artistic exchanges.⁴⁷³ Finally, colonel de Turkheim served as liaison officer during most of these years, providing an indispensable link between the cultural sections of the Foreign Ministry and the authorities in Austria. However, Susini maintained a tight grip over the overall management, conducting most of the correspondence himself, and jealously guarding his monopoly on decision-making.

Apart from the general instruction of representing French culture and its achievements, the new Division did not have a detailed set of tasks, and could work out its philosophy and practical methods on its own, providing that some activities did in fact take place. Such a degree of liberty was seldom seen in any other Allied bureaucracy. Susini's position was thus very similar to the German situation, in which the French cultural officer, René Thimonnier, had to plan the strategy of French cultural policy himself, having received no detailed guidelines.⁴⁷⁴ In my view, this feature served to define French cultural diplomacy in Austria, being unparalleled by any other occupation power.

The personal union of the Cultural Division and the Institute led to Susini’s effective

⁴⁶⁷ Gourlet, 40.

⁴⁶⁸ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 190, Rapport de la Division Affaires Culturelles (15 avril 1946).

⁴⁶⁹ Rapport de la Division Affaires Culturelles (15 avril 1946)...

⁴⁷⁰ Lettner, 315.

⁴⁷¹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 190, Note de service. 7.12.1945.

⁴⁷² MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 190, Education – Beaux-Arts – Expansion culturelle. Effectifs. 8 March 1946. And at that time there was no appropriate candidate found, which shows how difficult the task of finding a competent person for this task was. Ibid. Demande de personnel [late February-early March 1946].

⁴⁷³ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 2417, Schneitz to Général Chérière. No 4064/INTER/EDU. Paris, le 17 Décembre 1946. Ibid., Note pour M/ Le Directeur du Service du Personnel du Haut-Commissariat de la République française en Autriche. No 13 /SG/A. Vienne, le 3 janvier 1947.

⁴⁷⁴ Linsenmann, 86-87.

subordination to both Béthouart and Monicault,⁴⁷⁵ and had the potential to cause controversy at the higher level. But in reality, Susini was given *carte blanche*. Monicault attempted to challenge his monopoly, and particularly to curb his financial powers, as late as 1950,⁴⁷⁶ but in vain. Initially, there was clearly a period of friction between Susini and the chief cultural diplomat in Innsbruck, Maurice Besset (his subordinate), against the background of difficulties within the local Franco-Austrian friendship associations, for instance in Graz.⁴⁷⁷ Peace was soon re-established though, and, as I will show, the friendship societies were soon brought to heel.

Generally speaking, there is not much evidence of either Béthouart or Monicault trying to prevail over Susini, and, at least outwardly, an *entente cordiale* was established. In my view, Susini's leverage, and his real position of power, have been somewhat underestimated by historians, who have focused on the relatively liberal attitude he demonstrated towards Besset at the French Institute in Innsbruck. However, Susini was in a position to make important decisions, such as when to provide financial support for incoming musicians, which was of crucial importance to the selection process.⁴⁷⁸ On the other hand, Susini easily established a good working relationship with Béthouart, and the Parisian authorities did not weigh too much on him. Susini's role, in light of his productive collaboration with his nominal superiors, proved to be crucial, since he always had the last word in formulating the musical programme in Austria, and the rest of the officials tended to rely on his advice in cultural matters, even those lying beyond the bounds of his official responsibilities. Moreover, he was almost certain to have signed any documents that related to in-bound French artists, musical materials or even radio programmes. During the initial phase of the occupation, Susini and his colleagues concentrated primarily on questions of authority: French officials meticulously required that all French-related cultural initiatives be presented to them in advance, and constantly complained that there were too many events, often second rate, which were being conducted without the consent and supervision of the French authorities (meaning Susini).⁴⁷⁹ In this regard, however, France did not differ substantially from the rigid attitude taken by the United States, and endorsed in the quadripartite control agreements. During later periods, their attitude became more relaxed, and French officials certainly had less reason to worry about cultural affairs taking a sudden anti-French turn, than, for instance, their Soviet colleagues. A large degree of ideological-political continuity between the French apparatus and its Austrian fellow-travellers ensured the

⁴⁷⁵ Gourlet, 112.

⁴⁷⁶ Porpaczy 1999, 204-05.

⁴⁷⁷ Dussault, *La dénazification de l'Autriche par la France*, 2005, 69, 73-75

⁴⁷⁸ It was therefore not a coincidence that he was considered a person to be ultimately entrusted with the organizational and financial matters of French venues in Austria. MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 190, Objet : Venue d'artistes français à Vienne. No 2062 C.C. Vienne, mars 1946.

⁴⁷⁹ Assmann, 28. In fact, Susini's letters were strewn with laments of lacking or insufficient information in the run-up to locally organised initiatives. Secondary literature (Le Rider 1999, Porpaczy) equally concurs on French dirigisme.

relatively smooth functioning of the daily work of cultural diplomats, as well as of their strategic planning.

Susini accumulated considerable institutional and personal power in cultural affairs, standing at the summit of both the Cultural Division, which he had managed to separate from Internal Affairs and Information, and the French Institute. He thus made his desk the crossroads of all cultural-diplomatic activities and correspondence. In the increasingly competitive field of Viennese cultural life, in which both Austrian and Allied cultural offerings were crucial to the construction of a new Austrian identity, Susini made a consistent effort to ensure a French presence on the Viennese scene, and to provide a sufficient degree of visibility for French artistic undertakings. After the busy first two seasons, however, he was forced to take into account France's financial limitations, although still managing to push through a number of small and large-scale events, which would still occupy a prominent place even during the 1950s, when the Austrian cultural programme showed signs of oversaturation.

Who were the main interlocutors of French cultural diplomacy? Susini preferred the society of his Austrian academic counterparts, and had little to do with “the working masses.” When it came to building networks, however, Susini demonstrated consistent ability, operating within the university, and, to a lesser extent, artistic circles. Thanks to his connections in Austria, and his integration into the intellectual universe of French cultural diplomacy, Susini's opinion carried considerable weight with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry. He demonstrated a consistent degree of success in carrying out his musical initiatives, some of which entailed substantial costs, advertising and coordination. Susini himself attached great value to his cultural work, treating it as both an intellectual enterprise and a service to his country. During his years in Austria, Susini attained a prominent position within the Viennese cultural world, even if he never aimed at reaching large parts of the Austrian population, or directly targeted Austrian society as a whole. High quality and a limited number of successful enterprises were his preferred choice, and in this sense he persisted in the social habitudes that he had acquired in academia. Leaving the country unwillingly, he pursued a distinguished academic career in France, teaching and publishing on German and Austrian culture.⁴⁸⁰

The Instituts Français in Innsbruck and Vienna

The Institutes, a cornerstone of French cultural propaganda, provided a permanent framework for France's cultural diplomacy. Ideally, they were intended to be independent of the apparatus of

⁴⁸⁰ This included an extensive tourist guide, *L'Autriche*, published in 1960 and translated into German and English the following year. The BNF catalogue shows several editorships and authored works, cf.: http://data.bnf.fr/11925783/eugene_susini/ (accessed 17 July 2017).

occupation power,⁴⁸¹ at least in the longer term.⁴⁸² Receiving heavy financial support from the French administration, the Institutes were enterprises of considerable size and resonance. As France had accumulated vast experience in running networks of cultural institutes abroad, including in Austria, Germany and Czechoslovakia, cultural diplomats tended to see the institutes as the organisational centre of French expansion. They collected significant amounts of literature in the libraries, organised exhibitions, held lectures, collaborated with theatres, and set up gramophone evenings and concerts. The French government demonstrated particular interest in the Institutes, first and foremost that in Vienna, negotiating a special legal status for it through an agreement signed with Austria in 1947. Despite the eventual closure of the Institute in Innsbruck in the 2000s (and the subsequent reopening in 2012, followed by reorganisation as *Institut franco-tyrolien d’Innsbruck* in 2015), the Viennese institute has continued to function since its opening in November 1947, managing significant resources and serving as a beacon of French *rayonnement*.

Innsbruck: Maurice Besset and His Engagements

The first post-war *Institut Français* was installed, however, not in Vienna, but in Innsbruck, the capital of the French zone. This fact was largely due to the more favourable circumstances of the Tyrolean capital, notably the freer availability of property, and the more relaxed and informal atmosphere. Unlike Vienna, this was the first time that France had set up an organised cultural representation in Western Austria. While Béthouart's claim that all things French commanded the immediate attention of the Tyroleans, then emerging from their isolation, are very plausible,⁴⁸³ it seems that the investment of administrative resources played a more important part. The obvious show of political and administrative will by the French was a *conditio sine qua non* for the creation of a long-term French cultural establishment in the area. Finding an appropriate building took some time, although abundant administrative resources allowed the question to be solved much more quickly than it would have been in the Austrian capital. After a short selection process,⁴⁸⁴ the

⁴⁸¹ The administrative and financial independence (IF were paid directly from Paris) was duly stressed already by Béthouart in his recollections (218). While Susini was head of the French cultural diplomacy in all of Austria and thus Besset's superior, their good working relations allowed for a significant degree of autonomy for Innsbruck, which was called for by the geographic distance between the two cities.

⁴⁸² MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT0043, DGRC and CGAAA to Béthouart and Susini. Paris, le 26 Décembre 1946. Catherine Horel, "Französische Vorstellungen zum Nachkriegs-Österreich 1943-1945," *Österreich 1945. Ein Ende und viele Anfänge*, 69.

⁴⁸³ Béthouart, 222.

⁴⁸⁴ The first candidate, Villa Magda (Falkstraße 18) was refused, because it had been confiscated by the occupation authorities, ideally to be restored later, and in addition had been "Aryanised" by the Nazis, which would have made negotiations with the proprietors very complicated.

Kaferer-Villa in Karl-Kaferer-Straße, 3 (Saggen),⁴⁸⁵ was requisitioned, and designated as French property. Although this large villa offered lots of space for events,⁴⁸⁶ in 1961, the Institute was moved to its final location in Rennweg, symbolically bringing the occupation chapter to a close.⁴⁸⁷ Saggen thus became associated with French culture, and the Kaferer-Villa eventually became a meeting point for local and French artists and intellectuals.

Opening its doors on July 8th, 1946,⁴⁸⁸ the Institute was chaired by Marcel Decombis, with Maurice Besset as his *adjoint*. Besset, like Susini, came from academia, where he had also been an expert on the German-speaking world. After a year, Besset succeeded Decombis as director.⁴⁸⁹ Born in 1921,⁴⁹⁰ Maurice Besset was among the youngest cultural diplomats deployed by France, and belonged to a generation of *normaliens* different from that of Susini and Monicault. Besset managed to organise a collective that played an important role in Innsbruck, and which included Lilly von Sauter, a poet and translator,⁴⁹¹ and Renate Lichtfuss,⁴⁹² who was partly responsible for concerts. The Institute served as a real cultural crossroads in the city, ushering in a new, more international era of contemporary Tyrolean culture.

Thanks to the primary role that the French administration allotted to cultural diplomacy, the Institute had solid financial backing from Vienna and Paris.⁴⁹³ Decombis secured 117,000 öS for Innsbruck in its first year. In 1947, the institute's budget amounted to 130,000 öS, and rose to 250,000 in 1954-1955.⁴⁹⁴ Given its relatively modest workforce and goals, Besset and his subordinates did not experience financial discomfort, successfully developing a cultural strategy that was marked both by Besset's personality and local conditions. During the early stages, since there were almost no detailed prescriptions from Paris, the Innsbruck Institute enjoyed considerable freedom,⁴⁹⁵ *de facto* accorded by Susini.⁴⁹⁶ The *de facto* independence of Innsbruck from Vienna (and

⁴⁸⁵ Assmann, 34.

⁴⁸⁶ Irmgard Plattner, "Tradition – Aufbruch – Konflikt. Kultur und Kulturpolitik in Tirol in der Nachkriegszeit" in *Freiheit und Wiederaufbau: Tirol in den Jahren um den Staatsvertrag*, 74.

⁴⁸⁷ Verena Zankl, Sandra Unterweger, "Frankreichs Feste im Freundesland und was darüber berichtet wurde. Die Aktivitäten der französischen Kulturverantwortlichen in Tirol 1946-1960," in: *Kulturraum Tirol: Literatur - Sprache - Medien*, 332-33

⁴⁸⁸ Béthouart, 221.

⁴⁸⁹ Porpaczy 2002, 75.

⁴⁹⁰ Porpaczy 1999, 106.

⁴⁹¹ "Lilly von Sauter" Lexikon Literatur in Tirol. Accessed 19.05.2016, https://orawww.uibk.ac.at/apex/uprod/?p=20090202:2:15476563869399::NO::P2_ID.P2_TYP_ID:709. Her unwritten legacy is conserved at the Brenner-Archiv, one of the most important collections on Tyrolean literary history, containing a number of materials on French involvement in Tyrolean culture. Lilly von Sauter. Universität Innsbruck: Brenner-Archiv <https://www.uibk.ac.at/brenner-archiv/archiv/sauter.html> (accessed 19.05.2016).

⁴⁹² Zankl, Unterweger, 329.

⁴⁹³ Assmann, 35.

⁴⁹⁴ Porpaczy 1999, 194

⁴⁹⁵ Plattner, 75.

⁴⁹⁶ Assmann, 32.

vice versa) initially led to calls to improve the coordination between the two institutions,⁴⁹⁷ but these appear to have been quietly ignored. Besset, like Susini, preferred to be sovereign in his decision-making, and an overarching structure was ultimately deemed unnecessary.⁴⁹⁸ Instead, France opted for a double-headed structure, with both parts maintaining considerable local agency, this being deemed more apposite to the geographical conditions of the French occupation. The IF concentrated on the teaching of the French language, and its linguistic work was supported by the institute's library, which held 12,000 books in 1955,⁴⁹⁹ and became among the most important in the region.

Certain particularities played an important role in the practical outlook of the Innsbruck Institute. Besset had developed a particular, and very personal, interest in contemporary art.⁵⁰⁰ Possessing remarkable networking skills,⁵⁰¹ he introduced the French painting of the twentieth-century to the Tyrol, despite the fact that French officers were remarkably concerned to avoid radical modernity.⁵⁰² All of a sudden, a once isolated town became a vibrant centre of contemporary visual art.⁵⁰³ Besset's formidable cultural communication skills, his clear vision of his mission in Innsbruck, and his congenial colleagues, along with the good will of local partners, assured the success of cultural transmission. In this sense, as a cultural diplomat, Besset was highly effective, and scored a number of formidable achievements. One French exhibition, for instance, entitled *Music and the Fine Arts*,⁵⁰⁴ combined Besset's "visual turn" with French and European musical history. It contributed to a sincretic vision that promoted both painting and music from France, and which stood out in both its conception and its wide scope of material selection, covering most periods and styles of French art history, within a common European context. Despite little direct data concerning public success, it is almost certain that Besset's enterprise was one of the key events of the season, serving to inform French and Tyrolean musical discourses with a visual dimension.

There was some criticism to the effect that the high-brow direction of the Institute's events had led to the constitution of an "elite" and an "establishment"⁵⁰⁵, although Besset and his collaborators stressed the importance of creating a space for cultural and intellectual exchange with Tyrolean artists. Disputes regarding artistic issues in French and world history were not uncommon, ranging

⁴⁹⁷ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT0190, Note pour Béthouat. Vienne, le 9 mars 1946.

⁴⁹⁸ Sandner, 344.

⁴⁹⁹ Zankl, Unterweger, 315.

⁵⁰⁰ Plattner, 73

⁵⁰¹ The Musée de l'art de Paris had a special relationship with the Innsbruck Institute. Plattner, 75. This shows how individual initiative left its mark on different cases of French cultural diplomacy.

⁵⁰² Sandra Unterweger and Verena Zankl, "Der Einfluss der französischen Kulturpolitik 1945-1955 auf das literarische und kulturelle Leben in Vorarlberg und Tirol," *Universität Innsbruck: Brenner-Archiv. Projektbeschreibung*. Accessed 19.05.2016. URL: <https://www.uibk.ac.at/brenner-archiv/projekte/frzkultpol/kultur.html>

⁵⁰³ Zankl, Unterweger, 313.

⁵⁰⁴ *Musik und bildende Kunst von heute. Ausstellung September 1949. Institut Français Innsbruck* (Innsbruck: Imprimerie Nationale de France en Autriche, 1949). (Catalogue)

⁵⁰⁵ Assmann, 29.

from classic painting to jazz. Diplomats were eager to create an image of a free, modern and dynamic France, which encouraged critical thinking in matters of artistic taste. French cultural diplomats were wary of directly imposing a certain stylistic programme on their Austrian interlocutors. While a generally positive attitude towards France and French artistic excellency was expected, and consistently delivered in the writings of local journalists, criticism of individual works of art was allowed, and contributed to the credibility of French cultural propaganda, since it was perceived to permit free choice. As such, much of its public influence was indirect, and, indeed, was channelled through a local artistic elite, who transmitted the desired image of cultural France, without creating an impression of excessive control by the occupation power. Within this open mind-set, musical collaboration with the Allies and foreign actors was seen to benefit both France and its interlocutors. Just as the French were eager to show their cultural openness,⁵⁰⁶ their foreign partners were keen to reciprocate. The Institute hosted some concerts by French artists, including four appearances by the Pascal Quartet, a concert of Odile Crussard, and an evening of traditional music.⁵⁰⁷ As a rule, the Institute opted for high-brow culture, most of it not contemporary, thus eschewing both radical modernity and “middle-brow” music, such as *chansons*, which only began to advance towards the end of the occupation period. Indeed, this selective production of French art, along with its expectations regarding patterns of perception,⁵⁰⁸ remained a consistent policy.

The primacy of the Institute as the cultural hub of Innsbruck remained unchallenged until the end of the occupation period, when the slackening flow of money from France, combined with growing competition from other institutions in the now internationally open city,⁵⁰⁹ made the IF increasingly *passé*.⁵¹⁰ There is no doubt, however, that the Institute made a crucial contribution to the cultural renaissance of Innsbruck, and that Besset's personality left a lasting imprint on Western Austrian artistic development.⁵¹¹ After years of perceived provincialism,⁵¹² Innsbruck awoke to cultural modernity thanks to French commitment,⁵¹³ which, while initiated in France's own interest,

⁵⁰⁶ Besset himself mentioned the possibility of a Gershwin evening with an American pianist, almost certainly Wallernborn. Maurice Besset, “Erinnerung,” *Tirol-Frankreich 1946-1960*, 14.

⁵⁰⁷ Sandner, 348-350.

⁵⁰⁸ Andrea Oberhuber, “‘De la musique avant toute chose’: Rezeption, mediale Verbreitung und Distribution des französischen Chansons in Österreich,” *Ein Frühling, dem kein Sommer folgte?*, 219.

⁵⁰⁹ Plattner:, 76

⁵¹⁰ Besset, “Erinnerung,” 16.

⁵¹¹ Sandner, 344, 347; interviews in *Bonjour Autriche*

⁵¹² As in other cities, it would be wrong to suggest that the Institute was the first to introduce French culture to the city, as this had of course long been present on the Innsbruck scene. A more nuanced and detailed answer to this question would require a more long-term and locally specific study of the musical life of Innsbruck at least since the nineteenth-century, which cannot be attempted here. Some of the historiography, however, provides valuable insights in this regard, such as the compendium on the musical history of the Tyrol, and the research of Kurt Drexel on Innsbruck's Nazi past.

⁵¹³ “Institut français: Entgiftungskur mit den Mitteln der Kultur” TT 28.12.2015. Accessed 19.05.2016 <http://www.tt.com/panorama/gesellschaft/10929460-91/entgiftungskur-mit-den-mitteln-der-kultur.jsp>

ultimately benefited its Austrian partners as well. The somewhat idealistic picture usually presented in the literature does not usually take into account the eventual possibilities for conflict between the French and the Austrians: both sides of the cultural exchange recognised the peculiarity of the occupation situation, and adopted a soft approach to interaction, which satisfied French expectations of cultural projection, while also contributing to cultural activities within the Tyrolean context. However, French power was crucial in skewing the balance towards French culture, and thus created a propitious climate for French music, which was granted preferential institutional (and journalistic) treatment.

Vienna

Following established tradition, France took steps to re-found the *Institut Français* in Vienna, which thus reassumed its previous position as the focal point of French cultural diplomacy in Central Europe. During the occupation decade, the personnel continuity embodied in Susini implied a *de facto* absence of any dividing line between the IF of Vienna and the High Commissariat. However, the Institute was never a mere department of the occupation administration.

The first Viennese institute was founded as the *Centre des Hautes études françaises* in 1926,⁵¹⁴ and had assumed the status of an Institute since the late 1920s and early 1930s,⁵¹⁵ up until its last flare-up of activities and the eventual closure in 1939.⁵¹⁶ After the war, the Institute was re-opened in the symbolically important setting of the Palais Lobkowitz (where the famous *Eroica Hall* is situated), which had been the seat of the French embassy from 1869 to 1909,⁵¹⁷ and which was ceded by the Soviet Element in a deal negotiated between Béthouart and Konev.⁵¹⁸ Nevertheless, there were considerable renovation costs. Susini furnished the house by purchasing some valuable, and expensive, historical pieces through his connections, to Béthouart's delight,⁵¹⁹ and to the financial services' dismay. The Institute was officially opened on November 10th, 1947.

Susini continued to be “his own master”,⁵²⁰ and could thus take decisions at his own discretion,

⁵¹⁴ Barbara Porpaczy, "Von der Selbstdarstellung zum Kulturaustausch, Die französischen Kulturinstitute in Wien und Innsbruck," *Ein Frühling, dem kein Sommer folgte?*, 122.

⁵¹⁵ Lettner stated that it was first constituted in 1928 (315), whereas Porpaczy (2002, 59) fixes its foundation date at 1931. At any rate, French cultural diplomacy had already acquired some practical experience of working in Vienna before the war.

⁵¹⁶ See research by Jean-Michel Casset and Dominique Bosquelle that illuminates this question in detail.

⁵¹⁷ Lettner, 315.

⁵¹⁸ “Vous ne voudriez pas, Monsieur le Maréchal, me céder le palais Lobkowitz ? ” - “ Pourquoi ? ” - “ Parce que c'est notre ancienne ambassade et que nous y avons des souvenirs”. Béthouart, 220. This tongue-in-cheek story reflected the initially warm relations between the Soviet and Western occupation officers. Assmann, 33. Lettner, 315.

⁵¹⁹ Béthouart, 220-1.

⁵²⁰ Sandner, 309.

working with his *adjoint* Pierre Moisy,⁵²¹ who would later continue as Director. According to the Franco-Austrian cultural agreement, in which a special set of regulations had been negotiated, the Institute received substantial financial privileges from the Austrian state, such as significant tax allowances.⁵²² Financially, the IF was funded by subsidies, amounting to 830,000 öS in 1954,⁵²³ partly provided through the Special Account. Generally speaking, the management of the Institute felt reasonably comfortable throughout the occupation period, and could undertake not only expensive installation works, but also finance a significant array of different cultural and educational activities, which eventually had to be scaled back following the end of this special occupation status.

The Institute was recognised as pertaining to the University of Paris,⁵²⁴ which provided it with an academic anchorage within the French education system,⁵²⁵ and the French administration envisaged a bilateral recognition of diplomas.⁵²⁶ As in Innsbruck, the Institute's library grew to be one of its chief assets, comprising 17,000 books by 1948.⁵²⁷ Courses on French language and literature, some of them taught by Susini himself, stood at the centre of activities. Music was, despite its often peripheral position, also prominent, owing to collaboration with Professor André Espiau de la Maestre, who delivered lectures from early 1949 onwards.⁵²⁸ However, all courses and even access to the library required payment, giving rise to accusations of elitism.⁵²⁹ Another problem came with the “normalisation”⁵³⁰ that followed the initial period of 1945-47, when the quantity of events visibly declined, while other Allies were constantly stepping up their activities. Susini was trying to find a middle way, seeking to assuage his audiences, while also coming to terms with both the oversaturation of the first seasons, and the seemingly bland programming of the advanced occupation period.

The musical engagements of the IF went beyond the literature in the library and Espiau's lectures. The Institute was often chosen for representative events,⁵³¹ and concerts were staged on a regular basis, overseen by Espiau⁵³² and Susini himself. Most of these concerts were given by French

⁵²¹ Porpaczy 1999, 160.

⁵²² Porpaczy 1999, 188.

⁵²³ Porpaczy 1999, 200-201.

⁵²⁴ Sandner, 311-12. Indeed, the IF documentation always bore the University's header.

⁵²⁵ In fact, Susini, who directed and taught at the Institute, could count himself among the most privileged academics of his generation, securing both a distinguished career and a set of benefits and opportunities unmatched by any institution within France. Like Besset, he only reluctantly returned to France, when a personnel change was being carried out in the late 1950s.

⁵²⁶ Sandner, 325. It was regulated as part of the cultural agreement signed by Ambassador Jean Payart and Education Minister Ernst Kolb in 1952. (Ibid, 330).

⁵²⁷ Sandner, 323.

⁵²⁸ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 177, Institut Français de Vienne. Programme des cours – année scolaire 1948/1949 – Deuxième semestre. He also taught French language, as did many cultural officers.

⁵²⁹ Sandner, 323, 330; Porpaczy 1999, 217.

⁵³⁰ Sandner, 331.

⁵³¹ Béthouart, 221.

⁵³² Porpaczy, “Von der Selbstdarstellung zum kulturellen Austausch,” 125.

musicians, or featured a French-related programme. In this vein, the Institute introduced the famous oratory *L'enfance du Christ* by Berlioz, first performed by the Choir of the Volksoper and the Radio Orchestra in February 1947.⁵³³ Later, the Institute hosted or directly supported a number of further concerts.⁵³⁴ Thus, music was not entirely absent from the Palais Lobkowitz, despite being only peripheral to Susini's real priorities, namely language and literature.

1955 marked a "normalisation" in Vienna as well, as money was seemingly running short, and many costly undertakings were no longer possible⁵³⁵. While a new Institute was later opened in Graz, the existing ones were struggling (and Innsbruck was closed). Susini left Austria for Berlin and later for the Sorbonne in 1958 the same year as Besset, entrusting the Institute to Pierre Moisy. Thus, the golden era of French cultural expansion faded away, as soon as the French administration, with its formidable financial machinery and administrative support, had withdrawn. However, many of the seeds of further cultural development had been sown, and French culture undoubtedly found itself in a better position in 1955/58 than in 1945.

Overall, the system functioned well, partly due to the policy of devolution applied to both Institutes. Their directors allocated some resources to musical activities, which contributed to France's promotion of music in Vienna and Innsbruck, even if music was never the priority of the relevant officials. As such, both Institutes offered a welcoming stage to French musicians, a repository for books, sheet music and records, and a space in which Austrian artists and the culturally interested public could socialise. While their direct reach was not large, their influence on musical circles in Austria was far from negligible, and eventually filtered through to larger audiences.

⁵³³ Sandner, 333.

⁵³⁴ These included a reception in honour of Ginette Neveu (with the Austrian Press club and France-Autriche), the folk groups concert in 1948, an evening of French songs (MV and France Autriche) in 1949, a concert by Jeanne Manchon at the Konzerthaus in 1950, a concert by Francois Petit and the First Prizes in 1951, a cello evening by André Huvelin in 1952, another concert by Pierre Fournier (both at the Institute) and Robert Soetens in 1953, and finally an evening with Odette Gartenlaub in 1955. Sandner, 333-37. A list of French concerts in Vienna was provided by Barbara Porpaczy in her dissertation.

⁵³⁵ Porpaczy, "Von der Selbstdarstellung zum kulturellen Austausch," 127.

Financial Backing

Financially, cultural policies had three sources of support: the DGRC, the French Administration's regular budget, and a “special account” in Austrian shillings, which were largely supplied by the occupation expenses reimbursed by Austria. Finances were an enormously contentious issue during the occupation period, and, given that expensive French cultural policies were effectively being financed out of the Austrian federal budget, this situation was very delicate. French officials were aware that the latter could not be disclosed without a scandal; it would thus not be inaccurate to say that they covered it up,⁵³⁶ and were guilty of a lack of transparency in accounting.⁵³⁷ Characteristically, Elisabeth Starlinger and Barbara Porpaczy, who worked extensively on the issue, admitted that much crucial data was missing, a fact that tended to vitiate some of their conclusions. E. Dussault supposed the existence of secret funds,⁵³⁸ not acknowledged in the official documentation, and in fact the available sources, while covering all major venues, are typically vague regarding the provenience of the money involved.

The situation of cultural diplomats was thus by all accounts exceptional. They could easily conduct expensive operations at a time when most of the occupation apparatus was struggling under the severe austerity policies dictated by the National Assembly. Cuts could hit the Cultural Division,⁵³⁹ although ultimately such attacks were fended off, or compensated for by drawing on Austria's contribution to occupation costs. In part, this generosity followed the general policy of the Foreign Ministry, which at times dedicated a third of its overall budget to cultural affairs.⁵⁴⁰ In absolute terms, 750 million Frs were allocated to cultural diplomacy in 1945, 546 million in 1946, 300 million in 1948, and 500 million in 1950. The aftermath of the war, the instability of the political system in France, high inflation⁵⁴¹ and varying exchange rates⁵⁴² could encroach on the capacity to deliver the cultural weaponry designed in Paris.

⁵³⁶

Porpaczy 1999, 193. She elaborated on the financial side, without being able to reach decisive conclusions regarding the provenience of the money. Likewise, the Soviets also exploited local resources in Austria and Germany, and were keen to keep this from the Austrian public, so as not to end up being struck out of the Austrian budget.

⁵³⁷ Elisabeth Starlinger, 86.

⁵³⁸ Dussault 2005: 34, 46.

⁵³⁹ The section Education et Beaux-Arts was faced with a reduction of 75% of its expenditure in 1946. MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT0027, Séance du 20 juillet [1946].

⁵⁴⁰ De Raymond, 49.

⁵⁴¹ It amounted to almost 50% at the time. See: Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE). *Tableau de l'inflation en France avec un inflateur cumulé depuis 1901*. France-Inflation.com. INSEE, 2013. Accessed on 30 November, 2016. URL: <http://france-inflation.com/inflation-depuis-1901.php>.

⁵⁴² Bry, 223-24.

In Austria, where the *Schilling* was stabilised by the financial reforms of 1947,⁵⁴³ and the Allies benefited from a special arrangement under the control agreements, the actual situation was rather favourable to France. Money poured in, owing to the allowances framework, which proved to be extremely generous to cultural diplomats. The sums amounted to millions: in late 1946, the Cultural Division received 7,1 million öS,⁵⁴⁴ and for the second half of 1946, Béthouart himself requested 8 million öS for theatrical and musical tours, out of a total of 80 million for all information and cultural activities.⁵⁴⁵ While purely artistic propaganda accounted for only a modest share of the allocations, it is worth noting that the Cultural Division was confronted with enormous education costs for the families of military personnel, and exchange initiatives for youth. Single installation projects were a heavy burden on the budget, too, such as Susini's lavish installation of the French Institute in Vienna, and the refurbishment of the Institute in Innsbruck. Despite the complaints of some superiors (including Monicault), the allocations arrived regularly: in April 1946, 250,000 öS had been provisionally paid,⁵⁴⁶ until the High Commissioner finally suggested a more stable budget, since by then the occupation apparatus had been set up and a Cultural Division created. Béthouart himself estimated the needs of cultural propaganda at 11.5 million Frs, and confirmed that 5 million were already at his disposition.⁵⁴⁷ After the initial stabilization, a cut in funding came in 1950, this being linked to a sharp reduction in French personnel on the ground. For instance, the overall budget for cultural propaganda in Austria in 1951 foresaw an allocation of 4,000,000 Frs for concerts, theatrical performances and exhibitions.⁵⁴⁸ Most of the Cultural Division's financial records were apparently destroyed, and what little remains, particularly regarding expenditure, does not allow for a systematic overview of finances. Despite the patchy character of the evidence, it still sheds light on some of the limitations and opportunities of musical diplomacy in Austria, which could operate with those funds that were consistently available.

The numbers, however, do not reveal the full situation. The Cultural Division and its adjuncts remained in a relatively privileged position, which left its leadership free to pursue their programmes with little concern for pecuniary factors. While using the Austrian contribution towards occupation

⁵⁴³ The Allies essentially imposed on Austria its conversion laws, and the coordinated efforts of the federal government, notably the reforms of 1947 and the tariff agreements (*Lohnpreisabkommen*), contributed to a relative stability in the national currency. This was, however, a necessary condition envisaged by the Marshall Plan. Among the copious literature dealing with Austrian economic history, see: Hans Seidel, "Währungsreform und Besatzung in Österreich 1945-1947," *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* 1999 (3), 285-312.

⁵⁴⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 198, Note pour Monsieur Cau. 24.04.1948.

⁵⁴⁵ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT0043, Le Général de C.A. Béthouart, Haut-Commissaire Français en Autriche à Monsieur le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat Commissaire Général aux Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes. Objet : Propagande culturelle en Autriche. 3 octobre 1946.

⁵⁴⁶ Porpaczy 2002, 193.

⁵⁴⁷ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 323, Béthouart to Bidault. No 1926/SG/2. Annexe: Exposé des difficultés d'ordre financier et de ravitaillement.

⁵⁴⁸ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, DGRC 91, Budget 1951 – Chapitre 6070 – Dépenses diverses (Exercice 1951).

costs to promote French national culture, cultural diplomats were convinced that this money ultimately served the Austrian people too. As Renate Lichtfuss put it:

*Austrian money, administered by the culturally conscious French authorities, and the great support from France has made things possible of which one could only dream.*⁵⁴⁹

Media Outlets: France's Control and Arm-Length Papers

An obvious opportunity to influence Austrian hearts and minds was that of the press, and it is here that cultural expansion came closest to political propaganda. An Allied declaration regarding the democratic press on October 1st, 1945, conceded the right of post-publication censorship to the Allies, and thus provided them with an opportunity to insert their materials into the Austrian media, particularly in their own zones.⁵⁵⁰ In the French zone, the situation in Vorarlberg was different from that in the Tyrol. In Vorarlberg, only a few local gazettes existed during the first post-liberation period, and were only later supplanted by a more developed system, headed by the “independent” *Vorarlberger Nachrichten*, and the newspapers of the three main Austrian political parties. In the Tyrol, the *Tiroler Tageszeitung* had already been set up by the Americans (initially as the *Tiroler Nachrichten*), who then relinquished control to the French administration. The latter managed to maintain its dominance via the creation of a private joint-stock company, and by keeping 51% of its shares.⁵⁵¹ France did not attempt to maintain day-to-day control over “its” *TT*, imposing only general guidelines, but it did keep control over the two most popular newspapers in the zone – where competition was not large.⁵⁵² The party press followed the general Austrian pattern, and its aggregate circulation was soon surpassed by that of the *TT* (which had a circulation of 75,000); under these circumstances, the guaranteed loyalty of the largest regional organ became an important asset for cultural diplomats.

In Vienna, the main weekly publication edited by the French was the *Wiener Montag*, later renamed as the *Welt am Montag*, supported by the daily *Welt am Abend*, and several other magazines such as *Geistiges Frankreich*, *Europäische Rundschau*, *Plan*, *Wort und Tat*, *Weltecho* and the *Medizinische Rundschau*.⁵⁵³ Most of these were aimed at both Austria and Germany, containing

⁵⁴⁹ “Österreichsches Geld, durch kulturbewußte französische Autorität verwaltet, und die große Unterstützung aus Frankreich machten Dinge möglich, von denen man später nur träumen konnte.” Cited in: Porpaczy, “Von der Selbstdarstellung zum Kulturaustausch,” 123.

⁵⁵⁰ Gourlet, 52-3.

⁵⁵¹ Lettner, 326-27.

⁵⁵² Gourlet, 58-62.

⁵⁵³ Lettner, 328-29.

information relevant to the German South-West. The *Wort und Tat* published some material regarding musical developments in Austria and abroad, including articles and short notices on France, which occasionally promoted French artists.⁵⁵⁴ Since 90% of its market was in Germany, however, the editorial board was moved to Mainz, and the magazine lost much of its Austrian character.⁵⁵⁵ *Geistiges Frankreich* was another high-quality hectographed magazine focussing on literature, which achieved some recognition among Austrian intellectuals.⁵⁵⁶ More independent *Plan* played a similar role,⁵⁵⁷ emphasising French interest in literature and the spoken word, closely associated with linguistic expansionism. In practical terms, American rule in Vienna was supreme, and the French press was eventually reduced to a mere fraction of overall circulation, although it still fared much better than the Soviet-dominated *Österreichische Zeitung*.

Academic Contacts: University Teaching

Among the various ways to “infiltrate” Austrian cultural milieus, France attached particular importance to teaching in local universities, which could vastly improve the students' mastery of the French language, and also, of course, their knowledge of French culture. While this is largely tangential to musical diplomacy, music-related courses did take place. Eugène Susini delivered regular lectures on the comparative history of French and German-language literature at the University of Vienna, in cooperation with the *Institut Français*.⁵⁵⁸ Furthermore, Professor André Espiau de la Maestre taught regular courses on the history of French music at the Conservatory of Vienna (at least since the spring semester of 1949-50),⁵⁵⁹ at the Academy of Music (March 1951),⁵⁶⁰ the Catholic Academy of Vienna⁵⁶¹ and the Popular Urania University.⁵⁶² His most enduring commitments were, however, at the Institute itself, at the Conservatory and at the University, where he taught for the rest of the occupation period, and later well into the 1980s.⁵⁶³

⁵⁵⁴ Such as reporting on the successes of the Marcel Couraud Chamber choir in the French zone in Germany; the choir was in the selection pool to Austria. See: *Wort und Tat* 7 (Oktober 1947), 153.

⁵⁵⁵ Gourlet, 75.

⁵⁵⁶ Cullin, “Österreich – aber welches?” 47. Gourlet, 75.

⁵⁵⁷ Gloria Withalm, “Der 'französische Geist': Die Zeitschrift *Plan* und das Frankreichbild bei prominenten Österreichern im Jahr 1946,” in: *Ein Frühling, dem kein Sommer folgte?*, 51-63.

⁵⁵⁸ Sandner: 324.

⁵⁵⁹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 177, Institut Français de Vienne. Année scolaire 1949/1950 – Deuxième semestre – programme des cours.

⁵⁶⁰ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 177, Institut Français de Vienne. Année scolaire 1950-51 – Deuxième semestre – programme des cours.

⁵⁶¹ Porpaczy 1999, 307.

⁵⁶² MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 177, Institut Français de Vienne. Année scolaire 1950-51 – Premier semestre – programme des cours.

⁵⁶³ Lydia Lettner, for example, was supervised by him while writing a ground-breaking dissertation on French cultural

Fluent in German, Espiau delivered lectures in both French and German, with his subjects ranging from Franco-Flemish mediaeval polyphony, through the Renaissance period and high French classicism, to contemporary authors. The latter included Debussy's Impressionism, Ravel, Poulenc and Messiaen, all of whom were making steady advances on the Austrian musical scene. Espiau is known to have delivered a lecture on Ravel at Linz in 1955,⁵⁶⁴ although it does not appear that such visiting lectures occurred regularly.

France-Autriche

While France managed a network of cultural diplomacy institutions, the need for local partners soon became apparent to the French officials. The path to such cooperation was paved with some difficulties, however, arising from local initiatives that did not meet French standards. In August 1945, a *Fédération France-Autriche* was founded by a group of Austrian intellectuals, during a meeting attended by the Vice High Commissioner, General Chérière.⁵⁶⁵ Raoul Aslan, director of the Burgtheater and one of the most prominent representatives of the theatrical world in Austria, was elected its President (he was also a member of the Austro-Soviet Society), and the federation quickly gained more than 2,000 adherents. Such uncontrolled grassroots activities were not much appreciated by French cultural diplomats. The French Element did not publicly endorse the association, and soon formed a very critical opinion of it.⁵⁶⁶ A rapid reorganisation along with a reshuffle of the management was soon undertaken.⁵⁶⁷

First, Monicault produced a detailed roadmap for the management of the Austro-French association, maintaining Raoul Aslan as its formal head, but keeping ultimate control in French hands.⁵⁶⁸ In the end, the French Element opted for a clamp down. It formally complained to the Austrian authorities about the Federation, withheld all support from it, and finally requested its suspension, prompting references to the Federation's excessive “vivacity” and “personal” rivalries in

policies in Austria.

⁵⁶⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Laurent to Payart. 16.05.1955.

⁵⁶⁵ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 261. Note pour Béthouart, 11.1945.

⁵⁶⁶ « Elle s'est signalée à plusieurs reprises par des initiatives désordonnées et souvent regrettables. » (Note de 16.11.1945)

⁵⁶⁷ The history of the demise of the “first” France-Autriche federation is mostly reflected in the OeStA, BKA/AA, 1946, Frankreich, where it takes up the majority of the folder. The French Element could and would not tolerate the wilfulness of their Austrian partners, with a grassroots society springing up much to their surprise. Much of the correspondence, however, is equally preserved at the Foreign Ministry Archives in La Courneuve.

⁵⁶⁸ « M. Raoul Aslan devrait, à mon sens, être cantonné dans le rôle de Chef de la section artistique. Le nouveau Président serait une personnalité représentative mais qui, elle non plus, ne serait pas un porte-drapeau politique. Il serait souhaitable de trouver un intellectuel de grand renom, et possible ancien déporté politique. » MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 261, Fiche pour Béthouart. Vienne, 19.10.1945: 2.

the internal Austrian diplomatic correspondence.⁵⁶⁹ The governing board had to resign,⁵⁷⁰ whereupon the French began to shape a new organization more suited to their needs.

In early 1946, a revamped *Société France-Autriche* was established. Consisting of a restricted number of individuals, it assisted the French cultural effort in Vienna by bringing French and Austrian cultural actors together. The SFA remained clearly subordinated to the will of French officials, and was in fact largely limited to executing the orders of the latter. As Lydia Lettner observed, from then on, Austrian initiatives were tolerated only insofar as the French administration was comfortable with their content, and with the way in which they were brought forward (according to Lettner, this amounted to an elitisation of the cultural programme,⁵⁷¹ which in my view is not self-evident). By any account, the French officials had taught the Austrians a lesson in deference, and took charge of the new society, which would never be more than nominally “independent”.

Unlike their colleagues in the Austro-Soviet Society, the SFA sections routinely received a reliable subsidy from the French administration.⁵⁷² This was stabilised, however, only towards 1949. Monthly subsidies ranged from 5,000 öS in Vienna to 1,000 in smaller branches like Bregenz. Graz normally received 3,000 öS, and Klagenfurt tended to get as much as 5,000. However, a system of project-oriented financing, that is, the subsidisation of concerts, exhibitions and other events taking place in branch offices, was also implemented, and this repeatedly led to special payments being transferred from the occupation budget, or even larger allocations for certain months (on one occasion, Graz obtained 7,000 instead of the usual 3,000). However, this may not have been perceived as particularly generous, as such subsidies were by no means sufficient to sustain the year-long activities of a functioning Society. At the same time, we have to concede that the Austro-French society was not a large project in quantitative terms, and did not rely on a network of full-time paid functionaries. Therefore, the funding that it received was at least partly sufficient to sustain the intermittent clusters of events that it staged. Constant scarcity did much to underline the dependence of *France-Autriche* on its French donors, and, as we have seen, the position of power that cultural diplomats held over their Austrian partners was thus safe from being compromised.

Despite its concentration on language and literature, the famous Austrian “love of music” was reflected in the Society's many musical and non-musical activities; not unlike the Austro-Soviet society, or indeed any other corporation in Austria, *France-Autriche* included occasional musical numbers at its meetings and other festive events. The documentation is usually scarce, but it does

⁵⁶⁹ Fédération France-Autriche. Auflösung und Neubildung. Wien, 17.04.1946. BKA, AA, Kultur, Frankreich 1946, Zl. 111007.

⁵⁷⁰ Lettner, 321.

⁵⁷¹ Lettner, 322.

⁵⁷² This takes up a considerable part of the abundant financial documentation in MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 198.

allow us to sketch an outline of France's musical presence in the Society, both in Vienna and beyond.

Table 1. A matinée featuring French *chansons*, staged by the Youth Section in 1946 in Vienna



Source: Wien-Bibliothek im Rathaus – Plakatsammlung. URL: http://opac.obvsg.at/opac_help/WBR-bildobjekt.html?AC10604003-4201. Last retrieved 18.05.2016.

Beyond Vienna, the SFA sought to uphold a network of working branches in all provincial capitals and larger cities of the French zone. In fact, with the exception of Soviet-held Eisenstadt in the Burgenland (which was not far from Vienna), the SFA was present almost everywhere, initially even in the Lower Austrian Viennese suburbs, where it met with the benevolent attentions of other Western Allied officers.⁵⁷³ Innsbruck was an obvious candidate, and in Vorarlberg, offices were created as well, starting from Bregenz:⁵⁷⁴ Béthouart later recalled the official opening of a “centre of

⁵⁷³ Cf. WStLA, 1.3.2.119 MA 119 (gelöschte Vereine) – Französisch-österreichischer Verband. 6604/1945. 1945.

⁵⁷⁴ For instance, in July 1947, its branch delivered a conference on Franco-Austrian relations, which read almost like a

intellectual collaboration in Feldkirch” by Voizard on August 25th, 1946, adding that the network of *France-Autriche* branches was considerable in the French zone.⁵⁷⁵ Given the circumstances of the Tyrol, it is unsurprising that *France-Autriche* soon arrived on the cultural scene in Innsbruck; however, its role regarding concerts was rather unsteady, even if it did sometimes provide useful support for local activities. As in Vienna, a French-enforced leadership reshuffle occurred during the spring of 1946,⁵⁷⁶ followed shortly thereafter by a second “foundation”.⁵⁷⁷ Although the Society focused primarily on education (in keeping with the general French interest in the field⁵⁷⁸) and “spoken” events, such as lectures (there were seemingly more on Austrian topics than on French⁵⁷⁹), musical interventions were not uncommon. Some of these did not relate directly to France (such as the provocatively entitled discussion, “Can jazz music be an art?”⁵⁸⁰), but others did – such as “Painting and Saga in the modern music of France”.⁵⁸¹ Combining different art forms, it was possible to show cultural films that featured musical productions⁵⁸² (*Carmen* was thus displayed in early 1948⁵⁸³). A classic approach to bilateral organisation, this strategy does not appear to present any particularities. Having provided an overview of the role that music played in the spoken propaganda of the FFA, I will now seek to establish the importance of concert activities proper.

Indeed, live music had an important presence in the activities of the branch. In late 1945, for example, a concert of international, mostly modern music was organised by an “Austrian cultural community of friends of France” (*Österreichische Kulturgemeinschaft der Freunde Frankreichs*):⁵⁸⁴ international concerts including a strong French flavour were also given by the Symphony under the direction of Friedrich Weidlich.⁵⁸⁵ *France-Autriche* was also helpful in bringing French music to

textbook of French propaganda. It eliminated the *Erzfeind* element, and sought to underline episodes of friendship. “Geschichtlicher Rückblick über die Beziehungen Frankreich-Österreich,” VN 12.07.1946: 2.

⁵⁷⁵ Béthouart, 225.

⁵⁷⁶ The Landesrat Heinz replaced “contested” Bernatzik. “Erste Generalversammlung des Französisch-Oesterreichischen Verbandes,” TT 14.05.1946: 4.

⁵⁷⁷ „Österreich und Frankreich: Empfang anlässlich der Gründung der Französisch-Österreichischen Gesellschaft,” TT 18.07.1946: 2.

⁵⁷⁸ Thomas Angerer, *Frankreich und die Österreichfrage*, 193.

⁵⁷⁹ „Französisch Oesterreichischer Verband (Fédération France-Autriche): Vortrag zu Maria Theresia. TT 01.04.1946: 4. “Vortrag zur Baukultur in Tirol,” TT 09.04.1946: 4.

⁵⁸⁰ Albert Riester, „Kann Jazzmusik Kunst sein?,” TT 30.01.1948: 3.

⁵⁸¹ „Malerei und Sage in der modernen Musik Frankreichs“ (Lecture in the IF by Prof. Mille, Paris), TT 09.02.1948: 3.

⁵⁸² At this point, Honegger entered the scene in Innsbruck, with a film on his Pacific 231 (“Kulturfilmvorführung im IF,” TT 22.11.1951: 5.)

⁵⁸³ „Cerman' (Triumph-Lichtspiele),” TT 30.01.1948: 3.

⁵⁸⁴ „Österreichische Kulturgemeinschaft der Freunde Frankreichs,” TT 20.11.1945: 4. Another concert of French harp music was announced. It occurred only in February, with virtuoso pieces from Marcel Tournier, a Phantasy of Saint-Saens, and Ravel. The Austrian performers could be sure of applause. (Alfred Kiester, “Harfen-Kammermusikabend,” TT 07.02.1946: 5.)

⁵⁸⁵ „Klavierabend 'Europäische Musik,’” TT 11.01.1946: 4. In 1950, in another concert, Ravel was put next to Khatchaturian. Riester, Albert. “Klavierkonzert Germano Arnaldi aus Rom,” TT 06.04.1950: 6.

audiences outside of Innsbruck, such as in Kitzbühel in June 1946,⁵⁸⁶ or in Schwaz in February 1949.⁵⁸⁷ It continued to give occasional concerts,⁵⁸⁸ and to lend its patronage to cultural events. Contemporary music was envisaged for an Austrian Youth Cultural Week – *Österreichische Jugendkulturwoche*.⁵⁸⁹ However, there was no specific French musical propaganda.

In Salzburg, Jeanne-Baptiste Peyrebère de Guillotet, together with a circle of her old acquaintances – almost all of them culturally prominent persons living in the city – maintained a small but lively Francophone milieu, including a branch headed by Baron Puthon. The importance of this particular branch of *France-Autriche* can be described as rather secondary, although it did provide the French with an opportunity to bring the local cultural establishment within the remit of French cultural activities.

The branches at Linz, Graz and Klagenfurt came into being later, and met with mixed success. In Klagenfurt, the branch was effectively a French-language exchange club consisting mostly of elderly persons. In addition, the Carinthian capital, owing partly to its perceived provincial focus, required only limited attention from the centre. However, as was the case elsewhere, this was a story of a few dedicated individuals, who effectively set up a “French” circle catering to the educated public. Headed by Peter Griebichler,⁵⁹⁰ it managed to gain French support in 1947, when Monicault was made aware of the SFA's existence in Carinthia.⁵⁹¹ As the French mission took measures to resume the teaching of the French language in Carinthia, an interest in a corollary cultural institution quickly arose. They managed to stage some concerts in Klagenfurt and St. Veit: there was an observable tendency to organise juxtaposed performances of “French” and “Austrian”,⁵⁹² or “French” and “Italian”,⁵⁹³ music. Purely French music, including popular *chansons*, also came to the fore,⁵⁹⁴ and a “French week” was organised in 1952.⁵⁹⁵ The branch functioned only intermittently, and represents a

⁵⁸⁶ „Violinabend Johanna Martzy in Kitzbühel,” TT 06.06.1946: 5. Works of Ravel (the famous Tzigane) and Debussy were played.

⁵⁸⁷ Albert Riester, „Klavierabend in Schwaz,” TT 07.02.1949: 5.

⁵⁸⁸ „Wort und Klang,” TT 02.09.1948: 3.

⁵⁸⁹ Christine Riccabone, „Zur Entstehung der Österreichischen Jugendkulturwochen“ *Die Österreichischen Jugendkulturwochen 1950-1969 in Innsbruck*. Ton Zeichen: Zeilen Sprünge Eds. Christine Riccabona, Erika Wimmer and Milena Meller (Innsbruck et al.: Studienverlag, 2006), 10-11.

⁵⁹⁰ Griebichler had a long and rather conspicuous career in journalism. A special folder on him is conserved at the Carinthian Regional Archive, however without specific France-Autriche issues.

⁵⁹¹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from Griebichler to Monicault, 08.10.1947.

⁵⁹² MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 69, Kammerkonzert im Rahmen der französischen Woche (Programm). Reports from the *Neue Zeit*, *Kleine Zeitung*, and *Volkswille* were attached to the letter.

⁵⁹³ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Tätigkeitsbericht der Französisch-Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Kärnten für die Zeit von ihrer Gründung im März 1947 bis Ende Oktober 1948. 28.10.1948.

⁵⁹⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, “Frankreich. Ein Querschnitt durch Musik und Dichtung”. SFA St. Veit, Carinthia, 01.1952.

⁵⁹⁵ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne, Kammerkonzert im Rahmen der französischen Woche (Programm). 18.09.1948.

typical case of a provincial Austrian organisation, although those events it organised were by no means negligible in Klagenfurt, the cultural life of which grew more slowly than that in Graz or indeed Vienna.

Graz, the second largest city of the republic, had a university and a circle of Francophile intellectuals as well. Simone Grengg-Porion was active both in the Society and in lecturing on French at the University.⁵⁹⁶ With its office in Herrengasse, 1 (in the very centre of Graz), the Society was initially presided over by Baron Quiqueran, and then by Prof. Schmidt, being placed under the aegis of the three democratic parties. Not unexpectedly, the thrust of the branch's activities would be provided by “spoken” propaganda, such as the organisation of lectures or conferences.⁵⁹⁷ Furthermore, the Graz section's role proved pivotal in providing French concerts and other musical events with venues. In exchange, they received a more or less stable allocation from the French element, being put on an ordinary allowance of 3,000 öS per month. Only the secretary was remunerated,⁵⁹⁸ the rest working voluntarily, including even the artists at the SFA's own concerts.⁵⁹⁹ Even early on, the Society managed to reach an agreement with the British Council,⁶⁰⁰ collaborating on joint events – as such, the branch became adept in organizing joint performances of French and English music, thus earning the approval of the French authorities. In fact, in the British cultural officers' observation reports, some references to Franco-British cultural cooperation can be found.⁶⁰¹ Collaboration with the UK proved to be crucial, owing mostly to the particularly favourable position taken by the British authorities vis-à-vis their French partners.⁶⁰² The *France-Autriche* branch developed a “French centre”, with help offered by the British.⁶⁰³ The branch also set up and maintained a library, requesting musical items and obtaining musical periodicals.⁶⁰⁴ Lectures on artistic and musical issues were an obvious strategy: in February 1948, the branch's president, Professor H. Schmidt, gave two talks on the origins of French opera and on “La Fontaine and Lully”.⁶⁰⁵ A further exhibition on sixteenth-century French music, in collaboration with the IF of Innsbruck, was organised in April 1949.⁶⁰⁶ Furthermore, the SFA worked with the British to promote

⁵⁹⁶ Johannes Feichtinger, “Stimulierung zur Modernisierung. Die Aufnahme moderner französischer Kultur in Graz. Ein regionales Beispiel für Kulturtransfer,” in: *Ein Frühling dem kein Sommer folgte?*, 139.

⁵⁹⁷ TNA, FO 1020/625, ISB (Kärnten Section's) Activity Report for Month of November 1948 (Undated).

⁵⁹⁸ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Décomptes des frais généraux pour l'année 1949.

⁵⁹⁹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Rapport sur l'activité de la Société France-Autriche en 1952/53. Graz, 30.06.1953.

⁶⁰⁰ Feichtinger, Stimulierung, 139.

⁶⁰¹ TNA, FO 1020/638, ISN Klagenfurt: Monthly Activity Report for Month of December 1949. 03.01.1950.

⁶⁰² Manuela Feurstein, *Französische Schulpolitik 1945-1947* (Univ. Dipl-Arb., University of Vienna, 1993), 161.

⁶⁰³ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Note from the British Element (French translation), 5.12.1947.

⁶⁰⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 182, Compte-Rendu d'emploi des périodiques destinés à ce poste. Graz, 29.10.1951.

⁶⁰⁵ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from SFA Graz to Monicault, 10.12.1948.

⁶⁰⁶ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from the SFA (Zweigverband Steiermark) to Monicault, 12.07.1949.

French cultural programmes on the radio, for instance organising talks on Debussy,⁶⁰⁷ and on “French music”.⁶⁰⁸ Concerts were intermittently included in the SFA planning, and were clearly educational in intention. Thus, in 1946, the Society organised a chamber concert of French music in the *Kammermusiksaal*, staging the works of Rameau, d'Hervelois, Debussy, Fauré, Saint-Saens, Ibert, and Roussel, with the collaboration of Ludwig Schmidts, Wolfgang Runsky and Rudolf Stejskal.⁶⁰⁹ Lacking its own concert room (despite attempts to negotiate the issue between the French, the British and the Austrians⁶¹⁰), the Society tried to combine its efforts with those of other bilateral organizations. This helped to lay the groundwork for an internationalist approach, which to some extent characterised cultural activities in Graz and French cultural diplomacy in British Southern Austria more generally. Allied festivities were a natural occasion for such collaboration, such as a Liberation day concert on May 8th, 1947, organised by the four Austro-allied friendship societies, and filled with music from the occupying countries.⁶¹¹

Linz and Salzburg had small, intermittently functioning, but at times useful sections,⁶¹² with the US Element continuing to steer a benevolent course towards the French. Smaller branches were opened in Bregenz,⁶¹³ Schwaz, Kitzbühel, Bludenz, and Klosterneuburg. Their relevance to musical and specifically concert activities is doubtful, but they did represent a potential asset for further territorial advances. In general terms, the Society, being caught up in the economic turmoil of the immediate post-war period, never managed to evolve into a large-scale network comparable to the splendid *Amerika-Häuser*, or to match the membership statistics of the Austro-Soviet society. The Soviet zone, in addition, was out of bounds, thus denying French cultural diplomacy a direct presence in Lower Austria and the Burgenland, which had to be covered from Vienna. Most sections were tiny, and constituted groups of interest, rather than public bodies.

Despite these limitations, *France-Autriche* was relied upon in most questions concerning reciprocity in cultural relations, and contacts with organising bodies and publics on the local level. In the provinces, branches would free the French representative from the need to have his own

⁶⁰⁷ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from SFA Graz to Monicault, 10.12.1948.

⁶⁰⁸ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 182, response from Susini to Laurent, 19.01.1952. The Federation conducted « causeries » on different France-related topics on an irregular basis at the Alpenland station. (Letter from the FFA to Monicault, 19.08.1949 (Vienne 68).)

⁶⁰⁹ Konzert französischer Musik 09.03.1946. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1946, 286.

⁶¹⁰ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from SFA to Monicault, 10.12.1948.

⁶¹¹ Festkonzert zum zweiten Jahrestag der Befreiung. Städtisches Orchester u. Karl Böhm. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1947, 73. The programme featured Beethoven's Egmont overture, works from Randall Thompson and Arnold Bax, the Russian Overture by Prokofiev and Ravel's Bolero.

⁶¹² It was occasionally mentioned in the press, such as a “conversation” in 1948. “Gesellschaft Amitié France-Autriche – Konversationsabend” SN 16.09.1948: 6.

⁶¹³ Roger Vorderegger, “Initiativen, Politik, Identität et les Français: Kulturelle Reflexe in Vorarlbergs Zeitungen der Nahkriegszeit,” in: *Bonjour Autriche: Literatur und Kunst in Tirol und Vorarlberg 1945-1955* Eds. Sandra Unterweger, Roger Vorderegger, and Verena Zankl Edition Brenner-Forum. Band 5 (Innsbruck et al.: StudienVerlag, 2010), 175. The first “Vereinsabend” was documented in July (ibid., 202-204).

secretaries, sharing the daily chores of organising language courses or other artistic events between them. Since the SFA steered clear of any pronounced party-political commitment, and concentrated on “cultural propaganda”, it did not pose any problems to Austrian and other Western Allied actors, while still succeeding in following official French guidelines. Considering the Society's fairly modest dimensions and outreach, it had a limited success thanks to its local knowledge, some pro-French sympathies, and a selection of activities that were at least uncontroversial, and often attractive, in the early post-war Austrian climate.

French Cultural Action in The Regions

Outside of Vienna, Austrian territory can be roughly divided into three zones of accessibility for French culture. The core was obviously constituted by the French-occupied Tyrol and Vorarlberg, where the degree of liberty was the largest. The British and the American zones provided the second subdivision, in which France could not act on its own, and was dependent on the good will of its partners, although this was, however, assured. Finally, French diplomacy did not make any serious attempts to contact the Soviets (or, at least, there is no extant evidence of eventual negotiations), and therefore in Eastern Austria, France's cultural and musical diplomacy was conspicuous by its absence.

French Musical Diplomacy in Innsbruck and Western Austria

As follows from what has been said above, in most of Austria, such as its capital and even more so the zones occupied by the other Allies, France's cultural diplomacy was exposed to significant limitations, arising from the competing presence of other influential actors, such as the US in general, or the USSR specifically in music. However, in their own occupation zone, the French authorities could act at their own discretion. In short, the sheer fact of military occupation would seem to suggest total French control or dominance over Western Austrian cultural life. However, as this was not the case even with the Soviet Union or the United States, such assumptions need to be viewed critically. The French administration had the leverage to impose its presence, but it needed to remain watchful of cultural developments on the ground, to meet local demand, and to cater to the public.

The situation in the Tyrol and Vorarlberg reveals a number of differentiations. French troops marched into Vorarlberg in April 1945, effectively accomplishing the task of military conquest. By

contrast, Innsbruck was occupied by the US Army; therefore, the task of restoring cultural life fell first to the Americans, before the province was taken over by the French in July, without much enthusiasm from American GIs and the local population.⁶¹⁴ Furthermore, it was the United States that established the first printed media in the province, namely the *Tiroler Tageszeitung*, which quickly rose to prominence, and was later handed over to the French. The greater popularity of the US created a very delicate situation for French cultural diplomats, whose main preoccupation was prestige. From the perspective of the Tyrolese, material necessities, and particularly food shortages,⁶¹⁵ initially prevailed over considerations of liberty: while the French might have been more liberal, Americans were more able to assure regular food supplies. After initial tensions, the relations between the local population and the French army were normalised,⁶¹⁶ and further personnel reductions also helped to bring about a better understanding between the Austrians and the French.

The Tyrol was more than twice the size of tiny and isolated Vorarlberg, and was home to the only notable urban centre in the region, namely its capital, Innsbruck. Under American supervision, the cultural milieu of the city made their first attempts to re-open its musical institutions. The French element found itself in a setting that fitted well with their previous ideas of Austria, and their assumptions about the sort of cultural propaganda to be conducted there. Unlike Vienna, most of the city's historic centre had survived the war relatively intact. Innsbruck had all the accoutrements of an Austrian city of culture: a symphony orchestra, a theatre, and a *Musikverein* (later to become a Conservatory). The French and their Austrian colleagues could also use the rooms of Innsbruck's own Hofburg, such as the famous *Riesensaal*. The opulent Baroque *Hofkirche* served as a venue for concerts of church music: its important symbolic standing in Tyrolean history, with the *schwarze Manderl* (the statues of Habsburg sovereigns) flanking the nave, gave a sense of continuity and majesty, fitting perfectly with the French imagery of Habsburguesque, Baroque, Catholic and conservative Austria,⁶¹⁷ at which their cultural propaganda was targeted. Politically catholic and conservative, Innsbruck developed a cultural life that would be marked by the typically Austrian conflict between tradition and modernity.⁶¹⁸ And there was also a “mirroring effect” on the French

⁶¹⁴ Klaus Eisterer, “Französische Besatzungspolitik in Tirol und Vorarlberg im Spätsommer und Herbst 1945,” in: *Ein Ende und viele Anfänge*, 231

⁶¹⁵ Klaus Eisterer, “Französische Besatzungspolitik in Tirol 1945-1955,” 111-12. Even the Landeshauptmann Karl Gruber, who later served as federal foreign minister, did not conceal his concerns during the handover to the French.

⁶¹⁶ Vexing issues included forced requisitions and what was considered *collaboration horizontale* of local women, which brought potential for conflict with the Austrian male population. This complicated the French position at least for a substantial period. Klaus Eisterer, *La présence française en Autriche (1945-1946). Volume II. Relations humaines - questions économiques - Prisonniers de guerre - le problème du Tyrol du Sud?* (=Publication de l'Université de Rouen, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Autrichiennes: 13) (Rouen: Publication de l'Université de Rouen, 2005), 47-56.

⁶¹⁷ Starlinger, 26; Porpaczy 2002, 120-26 and *passim*

⁶¹⁸ Plattner, 61-2, 88. Kurt Drexel, “Das Musikleben Tirols zwischen Tradition und Moderne,” in: Kurt Drexel, Monika Fink, eds., *Musikgeschichte Tirol: 3, 20. Jahrhundert* (Innsbruck: Wagner, 2008), 31-46.

side, since ideas of cultural parallels and the shared past of the two nations implicitly informed the thinking of officials in Innsbruck, Vienna and Paris, finding a ready and thankful echo within the Austrian establishment.⁶¹⁹ In the Alps, this policy resonated particularly strongly.

Geographically, the Tyrol lay closer to France than Vienna, and was connected with the French zone in Germany, the latter bordering on France itself. Equally, railways passing through Switzerland ensured direct connections between Paris, the Arlberg Pass, Innsbruck and Vienna. Due to this special situation, the French Division in Innsbruck operated with a considerable degree of independence from Vienna, further encouraged, as mentioned earlier, by Susini's liberal attitude. For purely logistic reasons, some artists were scheduled to play concerts only in Western Austria, for instance stopping on their way from Italy to Germany, or to Switzerland and France. In many cases, this reflected the relatively provincial status of Innsbruck, whereas Vienna, like Salzburg, was understood to have more exacting requirements.

The French occupation administration generally proved respectful towards the Austrians, and displayed at times a remarkably liberal attitude in the Tyrol. Partly this was due to the fact that France distanced itself from Cold War propaganda, and was indeed under no pressure to engage in the latter within the safe Alpine region. Cultural diplomats hoped to win the genuine respect of the population through the quality of their offerings, having in mind a long-term strategy that would expand beyond the period of occupation. Thus, the generally conservative and Catholic discourse was hardly brought in from abroad or enforced by France, although it was welcomed by the French administration. Compared to Salzburg, for instance, the French-dominated press tended to be more moderate in its coverage of political affairs, and, as for culture, there was a degree of “neue Sachlichkeit” and academic distance observed – despite the constant praise for incoming French musicians. Noticeably, the takeover of the *Tiroler Nachrichten* by the ÖVP and its fellow-travelers in 1950 induced a rapid hardening of propagandistic divides, with violently anti-Soviet passages that had previously not been tolerated by the cautious French supervisors. The *TT's* musical column was mostly provided by Albert Riestler (1906-1975), a professional music critic and composer who taught at the Akademisches Gymnasium.⁶²⁰ Putting great effort into acquainting the Tyrolean public with French musical creativity, Riestler's contributions were congenial to the general French guidelines, and his unwavering support for incoming French musicians was (in my view) crucial in fostering a welcoming atmosphere within the cultural establishment.

The *Institut Français* of Innsbruck also contributed to musical diplomacy. Spoken lectures bore on

⁶¹⁹ Barbara Porpacz, “Die französische Besetzung und die österreichische Nachkriegsidentität,” in: *Freiheit und Wiederaufbau*, 102.

⁶²⁰“Riestler, Albert” Österreichisches Musiklexikon, accessed 06.05.2016, http://www.musiklexikon.ac.at/ml/musik_R/Riestler_Albert.xml.

the problems of French music in particular (such as a series on Hector Berlioz⁶²¹), or on common European developments, such as modern music.⁶²² In addition, the IF could invite French musical personalities, and make use of its technical facilities, such as gramophone records: an *exposé* on Baroque music was held in this manner in 1950, by the director of the prestigious *Revue musicale*, Pierre Bernard.⁶²³ Concerts occurred intermittently, and do not reveal a specific pattern of coherent policies. A chamber evening was organised in late 1950, to which the winners of the Paris Conservatory first prize were invited.⁶²⁴ Foreign musicians were also invited, although they were in all likelihood expected to include French pieces in their programme.⁶²⁵ Austrians played French music at the Institute too; the problem here was that they were bringing French music to a predominantly French audience (as at Hans Höpfel's Debussy concert in 1952⁶²⁶), which did not serve the ends of French cultural propaganda. A second problem was that the audiences at the Institute's small-scale concerts were not large, despite the high quality of the programme.⁶²⁷

A British Council and a US Information Center were also opened in Innsbruck. Their cultural offerings did not exclude French music⁶²⁸, and a number of performers from the English-speaking world thus contributed to multilateral cultural diplomacy. The latter nevertheless represented a by-product of their main cultural focus, rather than a political value in its own right.

However, the purely institutional perspective remains only tangential to the complex realities of concert life. Suffice to say that the network engaged here was crucial to securing the variety and richness of the French musical programme, with a degree of cultural immersion unparalleled in any other province.

⁶²¹ "Institut Francais: 'Hector Berlioz'," TT 10.02.1949: 4.

⁶²² "Vortrag 'Moderne Musik' Im Institut Francais," TT 04.06.1952: 4.

⁶²³ "Rameau und der französische Klassizismus," TT 18.01.1950: 3.

⁶²⁴ TT, 16.11.1950: 5. Free entry should have appealed to the public

⁶²⁵ For example, Rina Sala played Couperin and Poulenc, among others. (TT 28.05.1952; Ernst Meister, "Institut Francais: Klavierabend Rina Sala Gallo," TT 31.05.1952: 14.)

⁶²⁶ Ernst Meister, "Institut Francais: Dr. Hans Höpfel spielt Debussy," TT 05.12.1952: 4.

⁶²⁷ Albert Riester, "Institut Francais: Violinabend Wisata," TT 04.02.1953: 5.

⁶²⁸ Ernst Meister, "US Information Center. Liederabend Ralph Telasko," TT 06.06.1952: 5. He sang Hugo Wolf, Richard Strauß, Ravel and Poulenc, whereby the clarity of his pronunciation in French and German was commended by Meister. Apparently, this was credited to American musical education, and at the same time increased the French presence in Innsbruck's musical programmes. Likewise, Robert Trehy (reported on 13.06.1953) impressed Riester with his "French courtoisie" in rendering Ravel's songs. French pieces remained part of many US concerts, clearly without any direct intervention from the Cultural Division of IF. Albert Riester, "Amerikahaus: Stella Andersen," TT 19.02.1953: 5. Laurence Davis could include Fauré and Milhaud, alongside Rachmaninoff. (Ernst Meister, "Konzerte der Stadt Innsbruck: Laurence Davis," TT 17.01.1953: 12.) Special attention towards Debussy cannot be overlooked. Ernst Meister, "Amerikahaus: Donna Pegors," TT 02.02.1953: 8. Eiusdem, "Klavierkonzert Frederick Marvin," TT 13.05.1955: 2. "Klavierabend R. Wallenborn," TT 24.02.1950: 4. Albert Riester, "Klavierabend Wallenborn," TT 01.03.1950: 5. He played Debussy and Poulenc in 1952 (TT 09.10.1952: 4).

Vorarlberg

The traditional view of Vorarlberg is as the tiny westernmost tip of Austria, largely, and at times willingly, isolated from the rest of the country, and therefore disconnected from the cultural life of the nation. However, this view requires substantial reassessment. Vorarlberg's cultural policies have recently become the subject of historical interest, due to the unique position that the province occupied in the Austrian federation, the internal economic circumstances that favoured an influx of cultural actors from around Austria and other parts of the German-speaking world, and a number of French cultural overtures, such as the introduction of festival culture to the shores of the Bodensee.

Vorarlberg has been an important promotor of Austrian federalism, and equally strove to maintain a strong sense of regional identity, underpinned by language, traditional customs, the role of the Catholic Church, and contacts with their Alemannic neighbours to the west and north-west.⁶²⁹ It also happened to be the only province to be liberated by French troops, who had advanced from South-West Germany, even if the province was soon forgotten by French officials in Innsbruck and Vienna.

Vorarlberg was of particular strategic importance for French radio installations, notably the Dornbirn radio station. Bregenz and Feldkirch also developed their importance as cultural centres. The French Republic was represented by Colonel Henri Jung, who led the military administration in Bregenz, along with a *détachement* in Feldkirch and Bludenz.⁶³⁰ The relations between the local population and the French element were superficially polite (the French troops were perceived more as “occupators” than “liberators”⁶³¹). Vorarlberg became the first Austrian province from which foreign troops withdrew, as the military administration left Bregenz in November 1953, in a gesture of good will, publicly handing over the keys of the Schattenburg Castle to Mayor Märch.⁶³²

The cultural establishment of the province showed continuities with the Austro-fascist and Nazi periods, falling into the general Austrian attitude of oblivion and “business as usual”.⁶³³ As in the Tyrol, cultural life was quickly re-established. After an initial standstill in local printing, caused by the Nazi closure of Vorarlberg's news outlets⁶³⁴ and war-time disruption, the press was restored with the *Vorarlberger Nachrichten*, a non-partisan newspaper under French auspices,⁶³⁵ followed shortly

⁶²⁹ Renate Huber, *Identität in Bewegung: Zwischen Zugehörigkeit und Differenz. Vorarlberg 1945-1965* (Innsbruck et al: StudienVerlag, 2004), 28-29.

⁶³⁰ Löffler-Bolka, *Vorarlberg 1945*, 132, 134.

⁶³¹ Gerhard Wanner, *Vorarlberg 1945: Kriegsende und Befreiung* (Feldkirch: Kaindl, 1996), 105-6.

⁶³² Wanner, 110-11.

⁶³³ Pieter Niedermair, “Kulturpolitik in Vorarlberg nach 1945”, *Bonjour Autriche*, 129-131.

⁶³⁴ The last one, *Vorarlberger Volksblatt*, a propaganda newspaper, ceased its activities on April 24th. Gourlet: 57.

⁶³⁵ It was edited and printed by Eugen Ruß in a family enterprise, with the French state retaining 51% of shares. Gourlet, 58. As in the Tyrol, this was an easy way to allow enough freedom to make the newspaper credible to the population, while also retaining a control mechanism in case of necessity.

thereafter by the press organs of the three main political parties.⁶³⁶ In this sense, the situation was not very different from that of the Tyrol. French authors also made significant advances in theatre⁶³⁷ and radio.

The musical life of the province revived directly after the war, but its development was severely hampered by a lack of basic concert facilities, and it took considerable time to attain the standards that were expected of an Austrian city. A few French performances are registered in Bregenz, and the French administration proved instrumental in setting up the Festival. The French officers' casino at the Villa Claudia in Feldkirch provided some concerts for the local population as well, and the Bezirk governor, Cpt. Pierre de Monneron, apparently took a benevolent attitude towards the renaissance of local music, particularly Alpine folk music.⁶³⁸ *France-Autriche*, which was present in Vorarlberg, also staged concerts at the Villa Claudia.⁶³⁹ Via the radio, occasional performances and news from Innsbruck, Vienna and France maintained a sort of cultural presence, this being particularly remarkable in a province where anything foreign had once been extremely rare. Combined with the stimulus from Vienna, the favourable conditions brought about by the French contributed to the respectable standing that Vorarlberg enjoyed in the contemporary Austrian cultural scene.

Salzburg

Salzburg, following the quadripartite agreements of 1945, became the capital of the American zone. Despite the initial difficulties that awaited the US Element in the area – for instance, a lack of trained officers – the Americans very soon expressed their intention to resurrect the famous Salzburg Festival, along with the wider network of cultural institutions, as soon as possible. Soon after, a US cultural representative and an information centre were established. For a long time, it was silently assumed that Salzburg and Upper Austria simply fell into the remit of American policies. As I will show, however, this assumption needs to be revised. Just as Graz was not fully and completely “British”, so Salzburg found itself exposed not only to the US influence, but also to the cultural diplomacy of other powers. In a series of bold moves, France conquered a position of prominence and respect in the cultural life of Salzburg, due to the endeavours of one particularly enthusiastic

⁶³⁶ Alois Niederstätter, “Vorarlbergs Medien in der Nachkriegszeit” *Aufbruch in eine Neue Zeit. Vorarlberger Almanach zum Jubiläumsjahr 2005*, 105-08.

⁶³⁷ Sandra Unterweger, “Rendezvous mit Frankreich: Französische Literatur in Tirol und Vorarlberg,” in: *Bonjour Autriche*, 261.

⁶³⁸ Christoph Volaucnik, “Feldkirch 1945 bis 1955,” in: *Aufbruch in eine neue Zeit*, 169, 184-5.

⁶³⁹ *Ibid.*, 185.

cultural diplomat.

Before the war, the University of Salzburg was able to count on the services of Jeanne-Baptiste Peyrebère de Guillotet, a somewhat eccentric French marquess, who taught French language and *civilisation*, thus attaining a position of some prominence within the city's cultural circles. Unfortunately, there is no literature on French cultural diplomacy in Salzburg, and I cannot make conjectures regarding her activities during the 1920s and 1930s.⁶⁴⁰ After the war, Peyrebère de Guillotet re-established her contacts with the cultural elite of Salzburg as early as 1946, and, despite her advanced age, showed remarkable ardour in persuading the Austrians, the initially lukewarm Foreign Ministry, and Susini in Vienna that French culture could be effectively promoted in the Salzburg region.⁶⁴¹ Returning to Salzburg, she began lecturing at the local University, and quickly rediscovered her interwar acquaintances, while also making new ones in the American administration. Her swift and energetic actions won the appreciation of Monicault, who stressed the value of her contacts with musical circles, and awarded her an official salary within the French administration.⁶⁴² As cultural diplomacy often depended on a few individuals, it appears that Dame de Guillotet was absolutely central to French cultural action in Salzburg, and that without her, France would probably never have attained such prominence in the US zone. As Monicault recognised, “she is 'the Frenchwoman' of Salzburg” (*elle est “La Française” de Salzbourg*).⁶⁴³

Her letters, all written in a recognisable style,⁶⁴⁴ are interspersed with the names of renowned Austrian and French artists. They were often directed to Susini, thus prompting responses or directions from Vienna. Peyrebère assisted in the run-up to the Salzburg festivals, settling a number of practical issues linked to the arrival of participating French musicians. The Marquess demonstrated undeniable resilience, working in conditions that were far from comfortable, and in which resources were always lacking, living through the loss of her son, who also worked in Salzburg, and suffering a series of setbacks stemming from a lack of personnel and financial subsidies. Her networking skills achieved miracles, and produced a series of unexpected French musical advances, most notably at the Salzburg Festival.

⁶⁴⁰ Peyrebère's interwar correspondence, part of which is conserved at the Festspielarchiv in Salzburg, could shed much light on French cultural diplomacy in the region, and undoubtedly constitutes a subject for a promising local history study.

⁶⁴¹ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, Vienne 201, Monicault to Bidault, 09.01.1946. MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, Vienne 201, Monicault to the Information Division. 10.10.1946.

⁶⁴² MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, Vienne 201, Note de 10.04.1946.

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁴ They take up most of Vienne 201 folder.

Graz

Graz, the second largest city in Austria, underwent a quick and dynamic restoration of its musical life, thanks to the common effort of the British Information Service Branch and the local authorities. Graz had already enjoyed fame as one of Austria's major cultural centres, standing at the centre of Southern Austria. The Styrian Musikverein (*Musikverein für die Steiermark*), the second oldest musical union after Vienna, maintained an outstanding standard for concerts, some of which took place in the Stephaniensaal, one of the most famous concert halls in Europe. After forced nationalisation under the Nazis, the Musikverein was reconstituted as a private corporation during the Soviet interregnum in June 1945,⁶⁴⁵ was consigned to the British Element in July, and contributed thereafter to Styria's cultural restoration. The Graz opera house was badly damaged by Allied bombing in 1944, and its ensemble took to the Stephaniensaal to conduct its first post-war performances; in late June, 1945, a first summer season took place.⁶⁴⁶ Graz was an important centre of musical education (Karl Böhm was among its natives), having established a conservatory under the auspices of the Musikverein.⁶⁴⁷ The *Städtisches Orchester*, directed by Max Kojetinsky, alongside a number of first-class soloists, ensured the rapid development of the city's concert programme.

In collaboration with the benevolent and ambitious British occupation officers, who sought to emulate Salzburg, the musical circles of Graz set up a festival in June, and this quickly became a succession of *jours fixes*, acquiring a status and prestige second only to those of Salzburg and Vienna. Despite the Festival's Austro-centrism, foreign musicians repeatedly visited the Festival: the British element, seizing upon its administrative opportunities, tried to dispel Austrian prejudices regarding "unmusical" England,⁶⁴⁸ particularly by inviting some of the foremost British musicians, such as Sir Malcolm Sargent and Leon Goossens.

Going beyond the other Allies, the British administration adopted a *laissez-faire* approach in cultural affairs – even more so than the fairly liberal French cultural establishment. Thus, the

⁶⁴⁵ Johannes Feichtinger and Eduard G. Staudinger. "Aspekte des kulturellen Wiederaufbaues in der Steiermark zwischen Kooperation und Kontrolle," in: Siegfried Beer, ed. *Die "britische" Steiermark 1945-1955 (=Forschungen zur Geschichtlichen Landeskunde der Steiermark. Herausgegeben von der Historischen Landeskommission für Steiermark, 38)* (Graz: Historische Landeskommission für Steiermark, 1995): 516

⁶⁴⁶ Feichtinger, Staudinger, 513.

⁶⁴⁷ After a rather turbulent history of transformations, mostly due to Nazi reforms, it was finally divided into a Conservatory proper and a High School of Performing Arts (*Hochschule für darstellende Kunst*). Feichtinger, Staudinger, 514.

⁶⁴⁸ The British reaction perfectly exemplifies prestige policy concerns, similar to those of their French colleagues: "[T]he British Council is to be congratulated on obtaining the services of these British musicians, who have upset all Austrians conceptions of the "unmusical British"." A Report by James R. Hands from June 1946, cited in Feichtinger, Staudinger, 519.

National Archives do not contain many sources concerning British involvement in local culture, and only sporadically mention other Allies. The Soviets, however, were closely observed, due to their links with and direction of the local Communist Party, of which Upper Styria had been a traditional stronghold in Austria. France, which entertained no particular ambitions in the political field, and which preferred to maintain friendly relations with the two major democratic parties, was not a matter of concern.

In fact, as Feichtinger underlines, the British and French cultural officers maintained an excellent and highly productive relationship.⁶⁴⁹ As early as October 1946, the High Commissioner, General Chérière, wrote a letter to the British High Commissioner, Major General Winterton, asking for his permission and organizational support for “a number of French artists,” who were due to visit the Styrian capital “upon invitation from Austrian organizations”.⁶⁵⁰ A cultural exchange between France and Britain was followed by the opening of a British information centre in Innsbruck, and, following an invitation from the British, a French centre in Graz, based on the *Fédération France-Autriche*.⁶⁵¹ This, in fact, did much to benefit French cultural action. In addition, knowledge of French language and culture was still valued amongst educated British circles.⁶⁵²

The doors of Styrian (and Carinthian) academic and cultural institutions were thus open to the French, including the Universities. The British representatives almost ostentatiously lent a helping hand to the teaching of French in their zone (English was becoming the dominant foreign language, mostly through the choice of Austrians), and French painting and theatre began to return to Graz and (British) Southern Austria. The British-run radio station⁶⁵³ was also used to broadcast French culture.

At the University, the French element established a lectureship in the French language soon after the liberation and the British takeover.⁶⁵⁴ The first lecturer was Simone Grengg-Porion, and the second lecturer, Henri-Jean Laurent, was made responsible for all cultural activities in Styria.⁶⁵⁵ In this capacity, Laurent was independent of the occupation administration, and subject only to the Foreign Ministry.⁶⁵⁶ At the centre of Laurent's efforts stood French language and literature, including theatre, effectively relegating music to second place. Laurent functioned as liaison officer with the local branch of *France-Autriche*, and supported visiting French artists while they were on tour

⁶⁴⁹ Johannes Feichtinger „Stimulierung zur Modernisierung“, 138.

⁶⁵⁰ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 323, Letter from Chérière to Winterton, 4.10.1946.

⁶⁵¹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Note from the British Element (French translation), 5.12.1947.

⁶⁵² In July 1947, the president of the Styrian chamber of commerce told a French representative in Innsbruck that “a number of persons of that city, belonging to all social backgrounds,” desired to see a “multiplication” of French cultural activities – “exhibitions of paintings, films, conferences etc”. (MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 189, telegram to the Viennese secretary and Ambassador Monicault, 18.07.1947).

⁶⁵³ See the corresponding chapter.

⁶⁵⁴ Feichtinger, Stimulierung, 139.

⁶⁵⁵ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 273, Note pour Monsieur le Directeur du Cabinet Civil. 30.10.1950.

⁶⁵⁶ Feichtinger, Stimulierung, 139.

throughout Austria.

Music, as was the case in other Austrian regions, played a role in the primarily non-musical organisations that revolved around the French representative. When a French library was established, it forwarded a request from the local *France-Autriche* branch for records of Erik Satie and the famous *Groupe des Six*, then *en vogue* throughout Western Europe, which would help with lectures on French music at the local (British-led) radio station (which featured, for example, talks on Debussy, and on “French music” more generally, in April and September 1948 respectively⁶⁵⁷),⁶⁵⁸ and the periodical *Opéra* was also ordered.⁶⁵⁹

The Graz opera itself resumed its activities soon after the liberation, introducing French (and Russian) works into its repertoire, thus largely following the Viennese example. *Carmen* was duly restored to the opera stage,⁶⁶⁰ without direct French intervention. For the next season of 1947-48, Gounod's *Margarethe* and two French ballets – *Coppélia* by Delibes, a repertoire classic, and a ballet based on the music of Ravel's *Bolero* – were included in the programme.⁶⁶¹ Offenbach was also staged in many Austrian theatres, due to his popularity in a country that showed consistent sympathies with, and a long-standing tradition of, the operetta genre.⁶⁶² His most popular operetta, *The Tales of Hoffmann*, thus returned to the stock repertoire in Graz.⁶⁶³

Laurent, working essentially alone, and responsible for a number of courses at the University, naturally turned to local sympathisers for help, as was common practice for Allied cultural officers. The Styrian branch of the SFA could offer support, drawing on their insider knowledge and superior networks. Despite the discussions between the SFA, the French Element and the British,⁶⁶⁴ it appears that lack of money prevented the opening of a French centre in the occupation time.⁶⁶⁵ Eventually, this would be based on the SFA network.⁶⁶⁶

France-Autriche, committed to promoting French culture as a whole, helped to organise several events linked to musical education. The section was mostly staffed by university personnel, which

⁶⁵⁷ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from SFA Graz to Monicault, 10.12.1948.

⁶⁵⁸ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 182, response from Susini to Laurent, 19.01.1952. The Federation conducted « causeries » on different France-related topics on an irregular basis at the Alpenland station. (Letter from the FFA to Monicault, 19.08.1949 (Vienne 68).)

⁶⁵⁹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 182, Compte-Rendu d'emploi des périodiques destinés à ce poste. Graz, 29.10.1951.

⁶⁶⁰ Städtische Bühnen – Carmen von Bizet. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1947, 173. Carmen von Bizet; April 1950. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1950, 175-3.

⁶⁶¹ Städtische Bühnen Graz – Spielzeit 1947-48 – Vorgesehene Werke der Spielzeit. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1947, 1172.

⁶⁶² The opera's programme for 1948-49 features Les Brigands (StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1948, 497). A year later, the Wiener Sängerknaben sang his Le Mariage aux Lanternes in August 1949. (StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1949, 599.)

⁶⁶³ Städtische Bühnen Graz 1945-46. (The first performance on November 25th, 1945). StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1945, 229. This was put in 1949 and 1950 as well. ((StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1949, 147: 1950, 220.)

⁶⁶⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from SFA to Monicault, 10.12.1948.

⁶⁶⁵ The IF Graz was opened only in 1958, and in 2015 replaced Innsbruck as the second IF in Austria outside of Vienna. Ironically, via an intermediary of a Centre Culturel, it supplanted the British Council in the Palais Attems, which had closed due to financial shortages. Feichtinger, Stimulierung, 139.

⁶⁶⁶ Feichtinger, Stimulierung, 139.

sometimes benefitted educational activities. For instance, in February 1948, the branch's president, Professor H. Schmidt, gave two talks on the origins of French opera and “La Fontaine and Lully”.⁶⁶⁷ A further presentation on sixteenth-century French music, in collaboration with the IF in Innsbruck, was organised in April 1949.⁶⁶⁸

From a very early stage, French cultural diplomacy in Styria took on a multilateral dimension, particularly when the four Allied friendship societies organised a Liberation day concert on May 8th, 1947, with music from each of the occupying countries.⁶⁶⁹ In a more private setting, local Francophiles and the French representative collaborated with Anglo-Austrian circles. This provided French culture with British support, as the rooms of the local British Council, at the Palais Herberstein, were successfully obtained for a number of events. In addition, at least one concert was recorded as taking place at the Palais Attems, which also belonged to the British Council.⁶⁷⁰ Other bilateral Anglo-French concerts were staged in November 1948⁶⁷¹ and in February 1949.⁶⁷²

Together with the British and the increasingly active Italian *Società Dante Alighieri*, France engaged in multilateral cultural diplomacy. This international aspect constituted an important part of postwar cultural life in Graz. A Baroque opera evening, with music from Italy, France, England and Germany, was one such multilateral event, in which the Anglo-Austrian Circle, the SFA, the *Società* and the *Musikverein* prepared an international programme, performed at the Palais Herberstein, and at which France was represented by the lesser-known composers, Jully, Grétry and Philidor.⁶⁷³ In April 1949, a concert of French, English and Italian music was given at the Palais Herberstein by the Viennese cellist Senta Benesch; a further concert, the third in the season, followed in June, with Ravel, Ibert, Poulenc and Roussel.⁶⁷⁴ These sometimes audacious transnational juxtapositions became a trademark of collaborative cultural diplomacy in the region, showing that conflicts of interest could be supplanted by strategies of mutual benefit.

Mostly for financial reasons, but also due to a persistent lack of interest from the central authorities, fully independent and purely French concerts were rare, only two or three taking place each season. In this sense, the French element clearly renounced any kind of grand-scale, specifically French public musical diplomacy in Styria, preferring to target a smaller, dedicated audience with

⁶⁶⁷ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from SFA Graz to Monicault, 10.12.1948.

⁶⁶⁸ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from the SFA (Zweigverband Steiermark) to Monicault, 12.07.1949.

⁶⁶⁹ Festkonzert zum zweiten Jahrestag der Befreiung. Städtisches Orchester u. Karl Böhm. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1947, 73. The programme featured Beethoven's Egmont overture, works from Randall Thompson and Arnold Bax, the Russian Overture by Prokofiev and Ravel's Bolero.

⁶⁷⁰ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from SFA Graz to Monicault, 10.12.1948.

⁶⁷¹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from SFA Graz to Monicault, 10.12.1948.

⁶⁷² Ibid.

⁶⁷³ Die Barock-Oper in Italien, Frankreich, England und Deutschland. Stella Stejskal (Sopran), Herbert Klomser (Bariton), Dr. Rudolf Stejskal (Cembalo). 25.11.1948; 28.11.1948; repeated on 5.12.1948. (MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68.)

⁶⁷⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Letter from the SFA Styria to Monicault, 12.07.1949.

regional specialities. Local musicians willingly included French references in their programmes, and these became part of the standard fare of refined post-war Austrian culture. Starting with César Franck, a number of concerts featured Debussy and/or Ravel, followed by Saint-Saens, Milhaud, Ibert, or the Swiss Honegger. Berlioz came to attention for his choral works (*La grande messe*)⁶⁷⁵. However, none of these were performed as frequently as Tchaikovsky, and there were almost no exclusively “French” concerts advertised in Styrian programmes, unlike their “Russian” counterparts. A representative evening of foreign music would include, for instance, Debussy's *Prélude à l'après-midi d'un faune*, César Franck's *Variations Symphoniques* and, apparently as the centerpiece, Tschaikovsky's *Pathétique*.⁶⁷⁶ Among the French, Debussy was played and appreciated most, as was the case with Austrian tastes in Vienna or other provinces.

Effectively, the success of French musical penetration in Styria should be judged not in terms of domination and control, but rather as an attempt to carve out a certain niche in local cultural life, and to attain recognition as one of the major musical powers of Europe. French music was not nearly so often performed as Austro-German or Russians works. However, despite their rather modest means, a few individuals succeeded in maintaining a constant French presence in Styrian concert life. This was facilitated by the benevolence of their British partners, who, instead of entering into competition, shared their rooms and premises with French cultural actors. Joint Anglo-French concerts became a habit, which helped to promote both French music and, arguably, some previously less appreciated English pieces. In addition, a common European sonic space was being created, which augured well for the post-occupation period, and Austrians could feel themselves part of a more general framework, rather than merely the centrepiece of Germanic cultural production.

Linz

Upper Austria was a particular region, in that it had been partitioned between the United States and the Soviet Union, with a border passing directly through its capital, and separating Linz on the southern bank of the Danube from its northern suburb Urfahr. The region was characterised by a relatively high concentration of population and industry, making it a natural target for public diplomacy. Belonging to the historical core of Austria (Upper and Lower Austria, divided by the river Enns, had made two Arch-Duchies, these being in the possession of the Austrian ducal crown),

⁶⁷⁵ Grazer Festwochen 1947 – Chor-Konzert. Die Wiener Symphoniker – Grazer Städtisches Orchester – Domchor. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1947, 462.

⁶⁷⁶ Musikverein für Steiermark – Margot Pinter – Städtisches Orchester unter Rudolf Moralt. Stephaniensaal, 26.11.1945. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1945, 220.

the territories “above the Enns” had played a significant role in Austrian history and culture, despite the sinister role of Nazism and Hitler’s *engere Heimat*, which, as recent research suggests, did not necessarily translate into close involvement of Nazi authorities in Linz cultural life.⁶⁷⁷

French cultural action in Upper Austria commenced relatively late, at least as compared to Styria, Carinthia or, indeed, French Western Austria. Eventually, Linz saw the opening of a French liaison mission under Laurent Giordani, which became active in the early 1950s.⁶⁷⁸ Unlike Vienna, Innsbruck or Salzburg, French musical diplomacy in Linz was limited during the latter part of the occupation decade. Notably, *France-Autriche* frequently assisted with French cultural action. In May 1955, M. Espiau de la Maestre visited Linz to deliver a talk on French music, reported in the local press.⁶⁷⁹ Later, Laurent Giordani, another academic, was appointed as French cultural ambassador and consul to Linz, soon beginning a vivid correspondence with Paris.⁶⁸⁰ In terms of visual propaganda, in 1954, a stand was erected in the centre of Linz (Hauptstraße), featuring, for example, photos of the *Ballet de l’Opéra de Paris*.⁶⁸¹ Collaboration with US officers was also fruitful, as had been the case for France elsewhere: for instance, French films (including *Ballet de Santons*) were shown at the Linz *Amerika-Haus*.⁶⁸² However, Linz remained on the periphery of thinking for central authorities in Vienna and Paris, and Giordani opted for a discontinuous sequence of larger events.

Giordani managed to set up some music-related activities in the realm of education, organising, for instance, a French language contest in July 1954, the award ceremony for which featured Couperin, along with folk dance and song.⁶⁸³ Although seemingly tangential to musical diplomacy itself, “French weeks” in the commercial high schools of Linz and Wels followed suit in February 1955; these included concerts of classic French music (Poulenc, Debussy, Auric, Rameau, Fauré), and, most relevantly, a performance of Bizet’s *Ivan IV*.⁶⁸⁴

Ivan IV was the single most important project that Giordani undertook in the musical sphere, and thus a perfect case of French cultural representation in action. Large-scale musical productions (e.g. opera, ballet, symphonies) accounted for a large proportion of overall French activities, which was due to the good state of relations between the legation and the Linzer Landestheater. The theatre had been revived in 1945, and had already featured Gounod’s *Margarethe* and Bizet’s *Carmen* (whereas

⁶⁷⁷ Regina Thumser, “Dem Provinzstatus entkommen? – Das Linzer Landestheater in der NS-Zeit,” in: Michael Klügl, ed., *Promenade 39. Das Landestheater Linz 1803-2003* (Salzburg: Residenz Verlag, 2003), 91-3.

⁶⁷⁸ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Manifestations prévues par la Liaison pour le mois de Juin. Linz, 2.06.1952.

⁶⁷⁹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Letter from Giordani to Chauvel, 16.05.1955. “Der rätselhafte Ravel,” *Oberösterreichische Nachrichten* 16.05.1955 (MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183).

⁶⁸⁰ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, DGRC 89, Compte-Rendu: Activité de la Liaison de Linz du 1er août 1953 au 1er janvier 1954. 7.01.1954.

⁶⁸¹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to Chauvel, 31.05.1954.

⁶⁸² MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to the Civil Cabinet in Vienna, 29.04.1953.

⁶⁸³ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Preisverteilung; 2.07.1954.

⁶⁸⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 176, Compte-rendu de la Semaine Française à Linz et à Wels dans le cadre des écoles commerciales. (Note to Susini and Monicault)

on the Russian side, only Mussorgsky's *Boris Godunov* was premiered, and Tchaikovsky's *Eugene Onegin* was not performed until 1957⁶⁸⁵) in its repertoire, both of which received good audience numbers.⁶⁸⁶ The management of the theatre made contact with the French, suggesting the insertion of works by Bizet and Milhaud into its repertoire.⁶⁸⁷ This resulted in a surge of French music performed at the theatre, as the season of 1954-55 was marked by three French operas: *Carmen* and *Ivan IV* by Bizet, and *Le pauvre matelot* (in German, *Der arme Matrose*) by Milhaud.⁶⁸⁸ Due to its novelty and the fact of direct French involvement, the staging of George Bizet's *Ivan IV* at the Landestheater particularly stood out, as the opera was effectively re-discovered at that time, and performed for the first time outside of France.⁶⁸⁹ Ambassador Chauvel took a personal interest in the premiere, giving notice to the Foreign Ministry.⁶⁹⁰ The theatre began to prepare a Bizet exhibition in the foyer,⁶⁹¹ at which point a formal invitation was made to French officials by the Director, Oskar Walleck,⁶⁹² and the Governor, Heinrich Gleißner.⁶⁹³

Financial support was provided as well. Leaflets advertising the première had been subsidised by the French mission, which agreed to pay 5,000 öS.⁶⁹⁴ Growing French expertise in media affairs was in evidence during an extensive interview that Giordani gave to Linz Radio on New Year's Eve.⁶⁹⁵ In order to confer on the opera the kind of splendour necessary to a French representative event, a reception was organised, at which a number of personalities from the provincial government, the Mayor of Linz, a representative of the US High Commissioner, cultural journalists from all the leading newspapers of Upper Austria, radio presenters, artists and members of *France-Autriche* participated.⁶⁹⁶ Apart from invitations to the French Embassy, a lecture and contributions to the press (Espiau de la Maestre was the author) were also planned.⁶⁹⁷ All this contributed to underlining the

⁶⁸⁵ Heinrich Wimmer, *Das Linzer Landestheater 1803-1958* (Sonderheft der OÖ Heimatblätter), *Oberösterreichische Heimatblätter* 13, 1-2 (1959), 126, 128.

⁶⁸⁶ Heinrich Wimmer, "Das Linzer Landestheater 1945-1951. Eine theaterstatistische und theatersoziologische Untersuchung," *Oberösterreichische Heimatblätter* 6 (2) 1952: 198, 201.

⁶⁸⁷ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to the Information Division, 31.05.1954. Wimmer, *Das Linzer Landestheater 1803-1958*: 124-126.

⁶⁸⁸ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Spielplan der Spielzeit 1954/55. The also put the famous *Carmen* on stage

⁶⁸⁹ It needs to be said, though, that both the Liaison and the theatre direction, despite being in the US zone, carefully avoided overly political readings of their work. *Ivan IV* did contain a rather glossy, simplified vision of an almost Oriental tyranny; it is unknown if parallels were deliberately drawn to more contemporary history; for sure, the Soviet Element never learned of the performance.

⁶⁹⁰ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Chauvel to Mendès-France, 8.12.1954.

⁶⁹¹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Susini to Erlanger (DGRC), 30.11.1954.

⁶⁹² MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Walleck to Chauvel. 15.12.1954.

⁶⁹³ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Landeshauptmann Gleißner an Botschafter Chauvel, 14.12.1954.

⁶⁹⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Walleck to Chauvel. 15.12.1954; Walleck to Chauvel 23.12.1954.

⁶⁹⁵ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Interview à la Radio de Linz le 31 Décembre 1955 [an obvious misprint, should be: 1954 – AG]. The interview was given in German.

⁶⁹⁶ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Liste des invités à la reception à l'occasion de la première au théâtre de Linz d'Ivan IV.

⁶⁹⁷ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Note à l'attention de Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de France, Haut Commissaire de la République Française en Autriche et Cabinet du Haut Commissaire. (Giordani) Linz, 8.11.1954.

importance of this première,⁶⁹⁸ the first outside of France, even before Paris. Long articles in the Upper Austrian press were highly favourable. The *Volksblatt* dedicated almost an entire page to the première, including a photo of the two main characters, and the history of the composition and its rediscovery. These were followed by approving remarks regarding Bizet's qualities, and the production at the Landestheater.⁶⁹⁹ Max Hilpert from the *Tagblatt*, while conceding that the opera did not have exactly the same format as *Carmen*, argued that it ought not to be underestimated, and also praised the theatre.⁷⁰⁰ Cultural diplomats sent triumphant reports too. Giordani identified the opera as his major achievement.⁷⁰¹ Susini himself referred to the staging of the opera as one of the most important cultural events conducted with the support of the Cultural Division,⁷⁰² and was seconded in his opinion by Ambassador Chauvel.⁷⁰³

When *Carmen* followed a few days later, Giordani provided a favourable overview of the performance,⁷⁰⁴ which symbolised a sort of Bizet season at the Landestheater (capped off by the exhibition⁷⁰⁵). The French presence on the opera stage was further strengthened by France's foremost contemporary operatic author, Milhaud. His *Le pauvre matelot* was produced in 1955, occupying the now obligatory "modern" part of the repertoire at Linz, which prided itself with a new cultural openness.⁷⁰⁶ Milhaud's name helped to boost both French prestige and the new local self-identification as a vibrant centre of contemporary culture, which continued to be important during the succeeding period as well. While French involvement in Austria was scaled down following the withdrawal of the occupation administration, the contacts developed during the first post-war decade were apparently helpful in advancing the French cultural cause: only two years later, and just a year after the re-establishment of the local Linz ballet studio, the *Ballet-Théâtre*, under Maurice Béjart, performed in the Upper Austrian capital.⁷⁰⁷

Generally, the French cultural presence in Upper Austria was at its best in a few large-scale events, such as its exemplary collaboration with the provinces. Linz, developing its own cultural profile, resisted its disadvantageous position between Salzburg and Vienna, with more and more success. Thus, even considering the five years that lapsed between the first cultural overtures and the French arrival in Linz, the Upper Austrian capital was at last discovered by French cultural diplomacy,

⁶⁹⁸ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Letter from Giordani to Chauvel's office. 12.01.1953.

⁶⁹⁹ "Ivan IV, eine unbekannte Oper von Bizet," *Volksblatt* 04.01.1955: 4. (Vienne 183)

⁷⁰⁰ Hilpert, Max. "Iwan IV" *Tagblatt* 04.01.1955. (4) MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183.

⁷⁰¹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, DGRC 89, Compte-Rendu: Activité de la Liaison de Linz du 1er août 1953 au 1er janvier 1954. 7.01.1954.

⁷⁰² MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 176, Susini to Erlanger (Paris) and Monicault (Vienna), late 1954 – early 1955.

⁷⁰³ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Chauvel to Erlanger, 21.01.1955.

⁷⁰⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to Chauvel, 17.01.1955.

⁷⁰⁵ As reported by *Volksblatt* and *Tagblatt* on January 12th.

⁷⁰⁶ "Zwei neue Opern – aber nur eine modern. Erstaufführung einer Milhaud- und einer Menotti-Oper in Linz," *Linzer Volksblatt* 21.06.1955: 6. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183.

⁷⁰⁷ Andrea Amort, "Ballett in Linz: Zwischen Operetten-Aufputz und Eigensinn," *Promenade* 39, 254.

which led to a cultural expansion that found considerable resonance in the surrounding area.

One of the most notable aspects of France's cultural activity in Austria was its sheer coherence. While written guidelines were far from detailed, such coherence was effectively assured by a community of like-minded individuals. It was a policy conducted by very few men, and, ultimately, Béthouart and Susini, the two most important personalities in French cultural policy in Austria, worked reasonably well together.⁷⁰⁸

The organizations charged with French cultural and musical diplomacy in Austria proved to be dynamic entities, directed by committed and culturally aware individuals. Susini and Besset adhered to the general ideology of *diplomatie culturelle*, developed flexible strategies of implementation, and elaborated their individual and geographically-specific goals. Their own educational and social background, as well as that of their Austrian partners, was a key element in the practical work carried out by the Institutes and their auxiliaries in the country. Parallels in Soviet and French cultural officers' understanding of culture (and specifically high culture) were indeed clear,⁷⁰⁹ even if frequently overlooked by contemporaries. Another defining feature of French cultural diplomacy was its specific professional background, since nearly all dedicated cultural diplomats in Austria and Germany were specialists in German culture, and, all of them being relatively early-career researchers, had already developed a distinctive academic record before joining the occupation administration (Susini, to a lesser extent Besset, Thimonnier and René Cheval⁷¹⁰ in Germany⁷¹¹). As in Germany,⁷¹² assignment to Austria contributed enormously to the development of their academic careers. Unlike the USSR, which operated in light of its superpower status, and acted within a coterminous sphere of influence, French cultural diplomats were faced with relatively limited resources, a relative lack of interest in Austria from the Parisian authorities, and the absence of any hard-power, imperial aspirations in Central Europe. Working in two distinctly separated occupation zones, the French diplomats created two corresponding centres of power in Vienna and Innsbruck, embodied by the *Instituts Français* and their directors, Eugène Susini and Maurice Besset. It is less well-known, however (with the exception of Graz) that France also attempted to cover the other two "western" zones, achieving notable successes due to excellent relations with the UK and US Element, and launching several important projects that enhanced French prestige among the cultural

⁷⁰⁸ Cullin, *Österreich – aber welches?*, 45; Porpaczy 2002, 75, 80-85 and *passim*; Dussault 2005: 107.

⁷⁰⁹ Vogel, Diss., 202, 206.

⁷¹⁰ Matthieu Osmont, "René Cheval (1918-1986), itinéraire d'un médiateur franco-allemand," *Relations internationales*, 2 (2006) : 31-49.

⁷¹¹ Academic background, and academic understanding of culture, were singled out as a characteristic trait of French cultural diplomacy in Germany. See: Picard, *Des usages de l'Allemagne*, 51-53.

⁷¹² Picard, 238-270.

public in the respective provinces (notably Salzburg). In Southern Austria, France experimented successfully with multilateralism, providing an interesting example of international musical cooperation.

Nevertheless, balancing “elite” and “mass” appeal was never fully mastered by the French administration,⁷¹³ and there was a marked tendency towards elitism. Specifically, outside of Vienna, most musical activities aimed at very small audiences, which was useful in producing clubs of friends of French culture, but which did not achieve broad coverage amongst local population. This situation was only partly remedied by radio. As such, French musical diplomacy displayed a very good grasp of current Austrian tastes, as far as these were shaped by the educated elites and the accepted cultural code. These tastes did transcend the narrow circles of SFA membership and cultural critics, but did not account for the entirety of musical consumption in Austria (even French chansons, which stood a good chance of gaining popularity with Austrians, were not pursued as a distinct strategy of cultural diplomacy). Therefore, considering the goals and expected results, the structures and persons working in the field of cultural diplomacy were largely efficient, despite a number of opportunities that were never seized, due to their cultural mind-set and the restrictions that applied to the selection and implementation processes.

⁷¹³ Gourlet, 114-116.

Chapter 3. Austrian Cultural Media versus Foreign Musicians: The Fourth Power and Public Reactions

A characteristic trait of Soviet symphonic music is its aspiration to express the essence of the epoch, its thinking and feeling, and simultaneously to maintain an indissociable connection with the traditional Russian symphonic music of the past. It is undoubtedly this common trait that in some sense unites such important composers as Miaskovsky and Glier, Prokofiev and Khachaturian, Shebalin and Balanchivadze, Shaporin and Knipper.

“Masters of Soviet Music: Dmitry Shostakovich on modern Russian composers,” *Wiener Kurier* 04 January 1946.⁷¹⁴

The festive concert began with a bow to Austria, namely the Unvollendete. It was a spiritual handshake, reinforced through the harmony of kindred souls. This most Austrian of all symphonies sounded surprisingly Schubert-esque; it might be that, contrary to our philharmonic experience, the warmth and depth of the tone-picture (Tonbild) is primarily grounded in the sound of the brass, despite the romanticising vibrato sounding at times rather strange... The gentle colourplay of Debussy, the fragrant melodics of Fauré, the Wagnerian sonic richness of César Franck, and, in particular, the extraordinarily ingenious symbiosis of the Viennese waltz with modern French colouring in Ravel's “La valse” were enthusiastically acclaimed.⁷¹⁵

Peter Lafite, “Festkonzert des Colonne-Orchesters,” *Neues Österreich* 17 July 1946.

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“Ein charakteristischer Wesenszug der sowjetischen symphonischen Musik ist das Bestreben, den Gehalt der Epoche, das Denken und Fühlen zum Ausdruck zu bringen und zugleich die unlösliche Verbundenheit mit den Traditionen der russischen symphonischen Musik der Vergangenheit zu wahren. Das ist unzweifelhaft jener gemeinsame Wesenszug, der so bedeutende Komponisten wie Mjaskowski und Glier, Prokofjew und Chatschaturjan, Schebalin und Balantschivadze, Schaporin und Knipper in gewissem Sinne miteinander vereint.” “Meister der Sowjetmusik: Dimitri Schostakowitsch über moderne russische Komponisten”, WK 04.01.1946.

⁷¹⁵ “Es war ein geistiges Händereichen, bekräftigt durch die Harmonie verwandter Seelen. Überraschend schubertisch klang diese österreichischste aller Symphonien: mag sein, dass entgegen unserer philharmonischer Erfahrung die Wärme und Innigkeit des Tonbildes vor allem im Spiel der Bläser begründet ist, wengleich ihr romantisierendes Vibrato mitunter etwas beftremdend wirkt... die zärtlichen Farbenspiele Debussys, die duftige Melodik Faurés, der Wagnerische Klangreichtum César Francks, besonders aber die ungemein geistreiche Symbiose des Wiener Walzers mit moderner französischer Koloristik in Ravel's "La valse" wurden begeistert akklamiert.”

Among the fundamental theoretical premises of this study is the shift of power relations between cultural actors from the respective occupation regimes towards the Austrian public. Instead of being able to simply enforce their preferred cultural orientations, the occupying powers needed to woo the Austrians, and, while attempting to change the musical landscape of the country in their favour, had to rely on the support of local musical elites. This communicative framework naturally placed direct or indirect media influence very high in the pecking order of public diplomacy priorities. The Allied presence in the public sphere was undoubtedly facilitated by the occupation situation, as their prerogatives as stipulated in the Control Agreements created a situation of special preferences, and different modes of media and information control. However, the situation was more delicate when it came to the matter of public taste. While otherwise successful in garnering public sympathy, the US struggled with Austrian reluctance to accept American high culture as equal to that of Europe, and the possible solution of jazz and later pop culture had not yet been seriously considered by American cultural diplomats. Thus, American sensibilities with regards to the media were heightened, receiving further impulses from the cold war. The French and the Soviets walked a tight rope as well, owing to the extremely problematic history of their countries' relationship with the Austro-Germanic region, and the relatively low (in the Soviet case, disastrous) standing of their occupation troops in Austria. Importantly, they could not count on automatic local support, and were reliant on finding allies among cultural critics *en vue*, who would transmit their cultural-diplomatic message for them.

As it appears to be almost impossible to obtain information regarding direct public feedback, particularly due to the absence of systematic large-scale sociological surveys – a few American exceptions will be discussed later – this chapter will necessarily concentrate on radio and written cultural journalism, the two main forms of media present in Austria before the advent of television. These cultural communication channels were mastered to different degrees by the great powers, and the agency of Austrians played a part too.

The cultural press, a powerful force in Vienna and across Austria, represented in effect both a valuable asset and a challenge for cultural diplomacy. On the one hand, Allied-controlled media dominated in the country,⁷¹⁶ owing to the prerogative of censorship and the unlimited access to paper supplies accorded to the Allies,⁷¹⁷ and any kind of independent media without a clear Allied or party affiliation were nearly impossible in Austrian circumstances. On the other hand, cultural critics, in particular in such specific fields as music, were often exempt from close Allied supervision, and thus

⁷¹⁶ See: Ulrich Harmat, "Die Medienpolitik der Alliierten und die österreichische Tagespresse 1945-1955," in: Gabriele Melischek and Joseph Seethaler, eds., *Die Wiener Tageszeitungen: Eine Dokumentation*. Bd. 5: 1945-1955. *Mit einem Überblick über die österreichische Tagespresse der Zweiten Republik bis 1998* (Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang, 1999), 57-96.

⁷¹⁷ Reinhard Mundschtütz, *Die Buch- und Pressenzensur der Alliierten in Österreich 1945-1955* (Hausarbeit Vienna, 1997).

enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom, as long as they adhered to the general denazification and democratisation guidelines, and did not challenge the respective editorial board's policies. When it came to questions of taste, creativity and aesthetic education, the majority of Austrian critics transmitted broadly conservative cultural values.⁷¹⁸ Rooted in a long and elaborate tradition of Viennese musical criticism, and having acquired significant symbolic and cultural capital within the world of the press and musical discourse,⁷¹⁹ this meant that most music writers arrived with considerable baggage regarding nationalism, modernity, taste, and even the method of professional musicological and critical analysis.⁷²⁰ As most of them had been linked to the *Ständestaat*, and, apart from the essential replacements at the upper level, to the Nazi regime, the problematic legacy of Austria's undemocratic past loomed large over the media landscape of the Republic.⁷²¹

In order to deal with these challenges, the Allies and Austrians set up a well-developed cultural reporting network. The major news outlets of the occupation administrations – the soon-to-be-dominant *Wiener Kurier* of the United States, the *Weltpresse* of the United Kingdom, the *Österreichische Zeitung* of the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the *Welt am Montag* of France, hired some of the most respected Viennese music critics, who gave a distinctively Austrian accent to even the overtly propagandistic *ÖZ*. Moreover, cultural magazines such as *Geistiges Frankreich* and *Die Brücke* (USSR-ÖSG) provided additional materials, prepared by contributors from both the Allied and the Austrian sides.

Outside of the Allied-dominated space, independent Austrian newspapers rose to a position of some significance. The *Neues Österreich* was chronologically the first, founded upon the restoration of the Austrian state by anti-fascist groups, initially supported by the Soviets.⁷²² This explains the collaboration of prominent communist and philo-communist functionaries, notably Ernst Fischer und Hugo Glaser,⁷²³ with the newspaper, which, however, essentially collapsed after the resignation of Fischer in 1947. By contrast, more conservative writers, such as Roland Tenschert,⁷²⁴ gravitated towards the *Kurier*. Dedicated to democratic principles and the Austrian Republic, the *NÖ* enjoyed a temporary monopoly in the first months following the liberation. Apart from political affairs, the *NÖ*

⁷¹⁸ Katharina Gsöllpointner, *Alltagskultur und Kulturkritik. Untersuchungen zur Produktion von Kulturberichterstattung in österreichischen Tageszeitungen* (Univ. Diss. Salzburg, 1985), 298-301.

⁷¹⁹ Painter, *Symphonic Aspirations*, 10-11.

⁷²⁰ See: Sandra McColl, *Music Criticism in Vienna, 1896-1897: Critically Moving Forms* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). Kevin C. Karnes, *Music, Criticism, and the Challenge of History: Shaping Modern Musical Thought in Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008). Karen Painter, *Symphonic Aspirations*. Also: ANKLAENGE 2015.

⁷²¹ Fritz Hausjell, *Österreichische Tageszeitungsjournalisten am Beginn der Zweiten Republik (1945-1947). Eine kollektivbiographische Analyse ihrer politischen und biographischen Herkunft* (Univ. Diss Salzburg 1985): 1, 317-25.

⁷²² Rudolf Tschögl, *Tagespresse, Parteien und alliierte Besatzung*, 57

⁷²³ Hausjell: 2, 493.

⁷²⁴ Hausjell: 3, 826.

had its own cultural column, reporting as early as summer 1945, when such information was still extremely scarce. The *NÖ* managed to reach a consistently large readership (up to 400,000 copies were sold⁷²⁵), even in the face of subsequent competition from other, Allied-affiliated and party organs, and its numbers remained important,⁷²⁶ allowing it to retain a place along the top cohort of Austrian newspapers. Another non-affiliated organ, the *Wiener Zeitung*, quickly followed as the official gazette of the Austrian government,⁷²⁷ and included both news and a distinguished, albeit largely irregular, cultural column.

Neues Österreich, acting as a non-partisan newspaper, tried to provide a complete overview of cultural life, mainly in Vienna, and its reviews, while not the most extensive, are of considerable interest, due to their wide scope, which covered almost all the concerts given by the Allies, Austrian performances, and particularly premières of “Allied” music. Its non-partisan counterpart, the *Wiener Zeitung*, did not attain this degree of detail, because its musical column was irregular, appearing roughly once a week. However, the quality of its musical coverage was on par with that of the leading *Wiener Kurier*, with Joseph Marx⁷²⁸ contributing detailed polemical comments regarding Austrian developments, and, indeed, on Allied contributions to Austrian concert life. Marx, owing to his established position as a doyen of the contemporary Austrian school, did not shy away from expressing his independent opinion, even if it conflicted with the musicological mainstream. The editorial board apparently assumed a laissez-faire position, which provided Marx with a tribune from which to mould, and at times to challenge, the musical discourse. His authority and his distance from any side of the Cold War contributed to the credibility of WZ's criticism, and, given the newspaper's significant readership, left a mark on the public sphere.

The Socialist Party was able to return to its prewar media positions, relaunching its traditional organ, the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*,⁷²⁹ undoubtedly one of the most widely read in the country throughout the occupation years, even if its cultural reporting was mostly limited to Socialist activities, and only infrequently shed light on wider affairs. Likewise, the second major political party, the People's Party (ÖVP), also began to print its own newspaper, the *Kleines Volksblatt*, which featured regular, if not exhaustive, concert reviews. During the period of Allied press domination, Allied-affiliated outlets could claim an unparalleled position of strength as public opinion-makers. However, they took remarkably different approaches, and occupied different positions in public discourse. The foremost

⁷²⁵ Marion Mittlmaier, *Die Medienpolitik der Besatzungsmächte in Österreich von 1945 bis 1955* (Dipl.-Arb. Vienna 1992), 85.

⁷²⁶ Sonja Wenger, “Der “Verband Österreichischer Zeitungsherausgeber” 1945-1955. Sozialpartnerschaftliche Medienpolitik am Beginn der Zweiten Republik” (Diss. Salzburg, 1991), 116, 175-6.

⁷²⁷ Tschögl: 68-9.

⁷²⁸ Hausjell: 3, 641.

⁷²⁹ Tschögl: 170-3.

among them, the *Wiener Kurier*, was a political and cultural propaganda weapon of great importance for the US.⁷³⁰ It accounted for almost half of the Viennese market,⁷³¹ and US surveys showed that the *WK* audience did not differ significantly from Austrian society as a whole, thus demonstrating its outreach to all ages and classes. Tellingly, its cultural column was considered important or very important by 68% of respondents in June 1950.⁷³² While the journal always remained under tight American control,⁷³³ the quality and apparent objectivity of *WK* cultural reporting appealed to the Austrian reader, and until the end of the occupation it thus remained unchallenged.

In many respects, the *Kurier* set the standard for post-war Austrian journalism. A vast number of professional Austrian journalists either took Fulbright sabbaticals in the US, or studied American-style reporting and newspaper layouts at home, as exemplified by the *Kurier*. Despite this transatlantic exchange, arts criticism appeared to be one of the most “Austrian” segments of the US-controlled media, due to its greater independence, its rigorous upholding of a distinctively Austrian set of cultural values, and its conservative style of reporting. As in Germany,⁷³⁴ such an orientation was ultimately preferred by the US editors, as opposed to a more thoroughgoing Americanisation. Under American auspices, the *Kurier*'s critics were encouraged, and continued to deliver their high-brow and high-quality contributions to the paper. Indeed, most of the leading Austrian musicologists active in non-academic writing seem to have collaborated with the *Wiener Kurier* at some time or other (a prominent exception was Joseph Marx). Under the leadership of Oskar Maurus Fontana,⁷³⁵ Herbert Mühlbauer⁷³⁶ and Zeno von Liebl,⁷³⁷ the musicological staff expanded its activities on a scale unparalleled by other organs. The public outreach potential of articles published in the *Kurier* certainly outweighed that of any other journal in Austria, and this understandably made the *WK* an attractive workplace, and an important hub of professional-public communication.

However, the editorial board did not abstain from exercising some pressure in politically sensitive areas. This was exemplified by the conspicuously unsuccessful campaign for serial music and other forms of radical modernity, which began during the late 1940s and resulted in hundreds of articles praising Stravinsky⁷³⁸ and the academicising modern composers such as Schoenberg, and in the

⁷³⁰ Oliver Rathkolb, *Politische Propaganda der amerikanischen Besatzungsmacht in Österreich 1945 bis 1950*: 1, 569.

⁷³¹ Michael Schönberg, *Die amerikanische Medien- und Informationspolitik in Österreich von 1945 bis 1950*: Hauptbd., 153.

⁷³² Schönberg, 161.

⁷³³ Tschögl, 154.

⁷³⁴ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “Art is Democracy and Democracy is Art: Culture, Propaganda and the *Neue Zeitung* in Germany, 1944-1947,” *Diplomatic History* 23:1 (2002): 21-43.

⁷³⁵ Hausjell, 2, 480-1.

⁷³⁶ Hausjell, 3, 658.

⁷³⁷ Mittelmaier, 74-75.

⁷³⁸ E.g. Rudolf Klein, “Wertvolle neue und alte Musik : Strawinsky-Erstaufführung und historische Instrumentalwerke,” *WK* 20.03.1950.

attacks on Shostakovich's public standing⁷³⁹ following the 1948 repressions. A large number of articles published over the following years, and the consistent importance attached to premières of contemporary music, such as Stravinsky's *The Rake's Progress*⁷⁴⁰ in Venice⁷⁴¹ and later in Vienna,⁷⁴² could not conceal the fact that the majority of Austrians found little pleasure in this radical break with tradition, marketed as the embodiment of artistic freedom. In fact, the Viennese performance was initially a fiasco; the *Kurier* was forced to react to such embarrassing flops by reluctantly reporting on the cool public reaction, and strengthening their public taste-shaping campaign with regards to musical modernity. Despite this sustained editorial effort, the paeans sung to Stravinsky, Hindemith, Schoenberg and Milhaud fell on deaf ears, just as earlier efforts to popularise American European-style academic music had at times met with marked skepticism in Vienna. While never acknowledging this, the US information services had discovered the limits of their power.

On the other hand, a number of attacks against the Soviet Union⁷⁴³ resonated with anti-communist audiences. Quite deliberately, the musical column repeatedly referred to the issue of the artistic restrictions imposed by the regime. Shostakovich became an emblematic figure during the late 1940s and early 1950s. His predicament was much commented upon,⁷⁴⁴ with the two sides of his artistic development – being subject and yielding to external pressure – being put forward as an argument for the West's cultural-political superiority. The *Kurier* nevertheless maintained a generally sympathetic style of writing, eagerly announcing signs of supposed liberalisation following Stalin's death.⁷⁴⁵ The advance of the official Soviet school, combining high technical quality with full compliance to party-state norms, became a given of international musical life, commonly frowned upon in pro-Western papers, while often being *de facto* accepted by listeners. Among the major

⁷³⁹ E.g. "Schostakowitsch besucht die USA," *WK* 22.02.1949.

⁷⁴⁰ "Strawinsky schreibt neue Oper," *WK* 03.12.1949. "Neue Strawinsky-Oper wird auch in Deutschland uraufgeführt," *WK* 09.06.1951. "Harmann inszeniert in Zürich 'The Rake's Progress,'" *WK* 05.10.1951. "'Strawinskij-Operntheater im Film: 'The Rake's Progress' erscheint als 'Der letzte Sündenfall,'" *WK* 23.01.1952.

⁷⁴¹ "Strawinsky dirigiert selbst Uraufführung seiner Oper," *WK* 07.07.1951. "Strawinsky-Oper wird in Venedig uraufgeführt," *WK* 02.08.1951. "Komponistenkuß für Schwarzkopf: Strawinskij bei den Proben seiner jüngsten Oper in Mailand," *WK* 31.08.1951. "Erlösungsgedanke in neuer Gestalt: Strawinskis 'The Rake's progress' begeisterte Venedig : Sonderbericht für den Wiener Kurier," *WK* 13.09.1951.

⁷⁴² "Staatsoper führt Strawinskis neues Werk 'The Rake's Progress' auf," *WK* 03.08.1951. "Elisabeth Schwarzkopf singt Arie aus 'Rake's Progress,'" *WK* 17.11.1951. "Schöne Stimmen im Kunstgesang : Gäste in den Wiener Konzerthäusern," *WK* 22.11.1951. "Strawinskij-Premiere nächste Woche," *WK* 17.04.1952. "Sensationelle Strawinsky-Premiere : 'The Rake's Progress' kam zur ersten Aufführung," *WK* 26.04.1952. "Die neue Strawinsky-Oper," *WK* 28.04.1952. "Aus Oper und Konzertsaal. Strawinskys Oper 'The Rake's Progress,'" *WK* 12.05.1952. "Neubesetzung in Strawinskys 'The Rake's Progress,'" *WK* 05.06.1951.

⁷⁴³ "Musik gegen Regeln des Politbüros: In Rußland verbotene Prokofieff-Symphonie in den USA uraufgeführt," *WK* 08.12.1949.

⁷⁴⁴ "Schostakowitsch tut Buße," *WK* 27.04.1948. "Schostakowitsch besucht die USA," *WK* 15.02.1949. "Vierte Symphonie+," *WK* 16.06.1953.

⁷⁴⁵ "Schostakowitsch für neue Wege in der sowjetischen Musik," *WK* 29.01.1954. "Auch Aram Chatschaturjan für größere künstlerische Freiheit," *WK* 10.03.1954.

Austrian newspapers, the *Kurier* took charge of launching full-scale campaigns against acoustically less problematic Soviet music, but its efforts met with a success that was qualified by the public's reticence to opt for the “democratic” alternative. Conservative Austrian circles were unanimous in their rejection of Soviet Communism, but they were reluctant to condemn the new, socialist-realist music based on “national” roots, which happened to resonate with the musical-political mindset in Austria itself. Ultimately, the *Kurier* chose to under-report those Soviet activities that were deemed liable to propagandistic interference, including a number of artistic tours and performances of contemporary works: the strong position that US information officers enjoyed in the opinion-making process allowed for this sort of indirect hampering of Soviet propaganda efforts.

In general, the introduction of political affairs into the musical column did not reflect well on the US information department. However, in terms of public sympathies, this unfavourable development was offset by the extraordinarily high quality, and the overall market domination, of the American-led press, which was able to reach a far larger audience than any of its competitors. Maintaining an apparently objective standard of reporting, and conserving the high professional quality of the musical column undoubtedly helped to enhance the *Kurier's* position. This underlines the representativeness of the newspaper for the situation more generally: public communication, while influenced by US power and attraction, was on the one hand allowed a certain leeway, and, on the other hand, could sometimes prove unwieldy for decision-makers.

While losing some of its readers, the British-led *Weltpresse*⁷⁴⁶ nonetheless established a remarkable artistic column led by Franz Tassié,⁷⁴⁷ which tended to adopt a more individualised approach than other journals, and which was often more emotionally involved in its appraisals of particularly successful performances. Unsurprisingly, the *Weltpresse* concentrated to a large extent on informing Austrians of specifically British cultural efforts – including some notable musical events, such as the tours of the Sadler's Wells Ballet, the conductors Sir John Barbirolli and Sir Malcolm Sargent, and the famous oboist Leon Goossens. The paper did not aim to provide a full overview of Viennese concert life. However, many of the most important foreign musicians were mentioned, particularly the French and the Russians. *Weltpresse* was swiftly turned into a Cold War propaganda weapon, its fervour surpassing even that of the US-led press, which it usually tended to emulate.⁷⁴⁸ However, it may have been precisely its staunchly anti-communist stance that allowed its music critics to express their approval of some of the best incoming Soviet musicians. This did not preclude the same critics

⁷⁴⁶ See: Mittelmair, 78-79.

⁷⁴⁷ Hausjell, 3, 823.

⁷⁴⁸ *Deux ans et demi de présence française en Autriche. Haut Commissariat de la République française en Autriche. Division Information. Centre de Documentation. Notes documentaires et études. N° 870 (=Série européenne – CXIV) (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1948), 42.*

from publishing fiery diatribes against the party line, and some of the composers' compliance with it. The tone grew ever more acrimonious, due to the developing Cold War dynamics. However, the *Weltpresse* was not strong enough to challenge US market dominance,⁷⁴⁹ and British information officers preferred to hand over to the Americans the brunt of the propaganda effort. All this notwithstanding, the musical column maintained its high quality and distinctive Austrianness. There was less criticism of Western musicians than in the more free-thinking organs that fell within the French remit, and high quality Russian tours received some straightforward acclaim, in a manner that suggests a considerable degree of independence from the general Cold War framework.

The French Element's efforts in the printed press were less quantitatively successful than those of their Anglo-American partners. Rather counter-intuitively, the *Welt am Montag*, which was led by the French administration, was largely irrelevant for French musical diplomacy after 1947, due to its concentration on sports, and only intermittent cultural reporting. Instead, France relied on cultural journals such as *Wort und Tat* and *Geistiges Frankreich*, which were edited under the aegis of the French administration and the Austro-French society, and on its good relationship with the US and UK, which ensured a consistent degree of favourable coverage of French musical activities in the *Kurier* and *Weltpresse*. Soviet information and cultural officials, being constrained by the rigid framework of the propaganda state, worked both on their own occupation newspaper, the *Österreichische Zeitung*, and the philo-Soviet cultural magazine *Die Brücke*, which was edited by the Austro-Soviet society. A link to *Der Abend* existed through its communist personnel, which, however, allowed the paper to maintain a certain public distance from the Soviet authorities. Stalinist propaganda was most explicit in the *Österreichische Zeitung*.⁷⁵⁰ The *ÖZ* appeared from 1945 onwards, as the official organ of the Soviet administration, and was thus among the first print organs in post-war Austria.⁷⁵¹ Its name came to be known as an ironic misnomer, since the newspaper was clearly not Austrian, despite its crew of native-speaker reporters, many of them Austrian communists recently returned from Soviet exile. Between the first two years and the rest of the occupation period, a discernible shift occurred in the editorial line of the paper. From 1945 until mid-1947, a veneer of diplomatic politeness toward the Austrian government, the democratic political parties and the Western Allies was maintained, since the Soviets still aspired to fully integrate the *ÖZ* into the Austrian national discourse. The *ÖZ* saw its goal as reinforcing Austrian national sentiment, a strategy common to all media at the time, and its editors could still capitalise on the advantage of being the dominant source of printed news in Eastern Austria, alongside the *Neues Österreich*. Matters became more problematic later, as the political landscape of Austria and Central Europe

⁷⁴⁹ Tschögl, 157.

⁷⁵⁰ See: Mittelmaier, 72-73; a more complete history of the *ÖZ*: Mueller 1998, 92-147.

⁷⁵¹ Wolfgang Mueller, "Die 'Österreichische Zeitung'," in: *Die Wiener Tageszeitungen*, 11-56.

underwent a series of tectonic shifts, the US gained dominance over the media of the country, and the two blocs shifted towards an open political confrontation. The hardening party line⁷⁵² led to attacks on the West and the Austrian establishment, which did not eschew open insults, and which occasionally caused controversy within the Allied Council. Correspondingly, and due to the predominantly anti-communist public mood, the *ÖZ*'s market share plummeted to a meagre 1-2%, limited to Communist party members and their sympathisers.

Cultural reporting began in November 1945 under a separate rubric.⁷⁵³ The musical column, marked by the contributions of Desiderius Hajas,⁷⁵⁴ Hugo Huppert,⁷⁵⁵ and Freidrich Wildgans,⁷⁵⁶ initially refrained from political salvos, and strove to maintain a distinctively Viennese style of cultural reporting, familiar and credible to audiences. Despite this effort, and a number of high-quality articles that stretched well into the classic Cold War period,⁷⁵⁷ the column was eventually subordinated to the task of creating a positive image of the Soviet Union.⁷⁵⁸ This of course had consequences for its readership prospects, as musical reporting was overwhelmed by the specific concerns and language of the Soviet Element. Concentrating mostly on Soviet activities, not unlike the tendencies displayed by other Allied newspapers, the *ÖZ* tended to exclude the Western powers' cultural undertakings from its remit, thus relegating itself to the small universum of the Soviet power sphere. On the plus side, a number of tours, in particular that of the Georgian Dance Ensemble in the fall of 1949, were reported only by the *ÖZ*, thus providing information that could not be obtained elsewhere.

Understandably, internal developments in the USSR reverberated within the *ÖZ*, and the anti-formalist campaigns were endorsed in its pages, although admittedly in somewhat softer tones. Qualitatively, the cultural section of the paper began to experience perceivable difficulties, being pressured into admitting pure politics and a fairly blatant Stalinist newspeak. Contemporary music from the West was denounced, if commented upon at all. Even more than in the American case, the terms and goals of the ongoing political battle did not agree with the expectations of Austrian audiences, who by that time had little contact with the *ÖZ* cultural column. Stravinsky, whose music was making a difficult entry onto Austrian stages, was a constant vexation for the Soviet cultural outlets.⁷⁵⁹ Pragmatic considerations at times undermined ideological presumptions, as the regime

⁷⁵² Mueller 1998, 134-41.

⁷⁵³ Mueller 1998, 131.

⁷⁵⁴ Hausjell: 2, 514.

⁷⁵⁵ Hausjell: 2, 548.

⁷⁵⁶ Hausjell: 3, 852.

⁷⁵⁷ Schönberg, 154.

⁷⁵⁸ Mueller 1998, 133.

⁷⁵⁹ In East Germany, he disappeared after the early 1950s. There was, however, at least one direct indication that the Soviet occupation power directly ordered his removal from concert programmes. (Ukazaniie ispolniaiushchego obiazannosti zaveduiushchego Otdela informatsii USVA po zemle Saksoniia-Anhalt M. Vinogradova nachal'nikam

adapted its judgments to external circumstances. Rakhmaninov, another Russian émigré in the United States, who, however, had refrained from making harsh comments about the Soviet Union, thus received the full honours usually lavished upon loyal Soviet composers. Russian internationalism oscillated between these two points. The Parisian Opera ballet, for example, represented another point of embarrassment, because of its roots in Russian academic dance culture (an important export of Soviet cultural diplomacy), and, as a mostly émigré enterprise, clear opposition to Soviet artistic regulations (in contrast, Soviet ballet was actively promoted⁷⁶⁰). This alternative, anti-Communist version of Russianness drew invectives from even the more moderate Communist writers. The hostile attitude of Western-led newspapers to Soviet cultural programmes became on the other hand a major PR problem for Soviet cultural diplomats, and diligently placing more positive articles in the *ÖZ* could do little to alleviate it. The ideological commitment of the newspaper predictably turned out to be a liability, and its association with the Soviet occupation eliminated its chances of gaining public momentum. Nonetheless, the *ÖZ* still represents a valuable and often interesting source, particularly regarding the construction of discourse within the Soviet sphere of influence.

A confrontation that occurred with *Der Abend*⁷⁶¹ clearly reveals the differences between Austrian and Soviet Communism. Whereas the main organ of the Communist Party, the *Volksstimme*,⁷⁶² closely followed the *ÖZ* guidelines in its occasional cultural reporting, *Der Abend* conceived of itself as a far-left, but non-partisan magazine, with a particular focus on cultural matters, which were reported on in a manner deliberately different to that of the conservative mainstream. This included advocating the left-wing theatres in Vienna, which arguably provided the highest quality performances in the city, while clearly antagonising the local government and Western occupation powers, due to their obvious domination by communists, and the benign attitude displayed to them by the Soviet Element. *Die Scala* and *Die Insel*, therefore, received a considerable amount of attention among artistic critics, while being portrayed as Soviet outposts by the rest of the media. In music, *Der Abend* maintained a standard style of academic, critical reporting, while again shifting its focus towards the leftist scene, and being highly critical of the cultural endeavours of the West and

otdelenii informtsii i voennykh komendatur raionov ob iskluchenii iz repertuarov nemetskikh teatrov i kontsertnykh programm proizvedenii I. Stravinskogo (Directions of the Acting Head of the Information Department of the Soviet Administration for the Bundesland Saxony-Anhalt, M. Vinogradov, to heads of information departments and military administrations, on the exclusion from the repertoires of German theatres and concert programmes of works of I. Stravinsky). 06.04.1949: in: Horst Möller et al., eds., *Sovetskaia voennaia administratsiia v Germanii 1945-1949. Politika SVAG v sfere kultury, nauki i obrazovaniia: tseli, metody i rezultaty. Sbornik dokumentov [Soviet Military Administration in Germany. Politics of SMAD in the Sphere of Culture, Science and Education: Goals, Methods and Results. Collection of Documents]* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2006): 832.)

⁷⁶⁰ Iwan Martynow, “Meister des Sowietballets,” *ÖZ* 04.10.1950.

⁷⁶¹ Tschögl classified it as communist “boulevard” press (125). Its difference to the *ÖZ* and hard-line communist propaganda should not be overlooked, however, and *dA* did try to provide entertainment rather than politics.

⁷⁶² Mittelmaier, 95-96.

the Austrian government. As such, *Der Abend* strove to establish an image of critical opposition, which would attract elements of the dissident intelligentsia beyond strictly Communist circles, and its journalists zeroed in on the weak points of Western cultural propaganda, thus providing a dissenting voice that would appeal to Austrian audiences. Radical musical modernity was quite openly dismissed, and reporting on incoming Soviet musicians largely surpassed that of most Western-dominated outlets, the reasons for whose silence were all too obvious. Despite these advantages, *Der Abend* also reiterated substantial parts of Stalinist cultural newspeak, praising the role of the Soviet state in elevating the cultural level of its people, and the rootedness of Soviet arts in popular culture. Some translated texts appeared as well, providing a tribune for official Soviet propaganda, which would be less exposed than the *ÖZ*. These policies indicated links to the Soviet administration, and jeopardised the self-declared critical independence of *Der Abend*.

Die Brücke took a step closer to core Soviet propaganda, being financed by the Soviet element, and soon finding itself under direct Soviet control. Unlike the daily newspapers, it was a monthly cultural magazine, mostly written and put together by Austrians. However, *Die Brücke* functioned increasingly as a relay for official Soviet propaganda, and many articles came to be written by Soviet artists and functionaries. The technical quality proved to be reasonably high: colour pictures and information on the Soviet Union that was difficult to obtain elsewhere resulted in a controversial cultural product, committed to political propaganda, yet surpassing its limits through scope and variety of reporting. While largely failing to turn Austrians into Communists, *Die Brücke*, almost inadvertently, informed them of classic and contemporary Russian culture, geography and history, at least partly fulfilling its declared function as a “bridge” between the peoples. In music, *Die Brücke* published a number of articles on Soviet cultural developments, mostly praising Soviet support for culture in the provinces, and bringing news from stages across the USSR, often without any direct party-political narrative. In doing so, it contributed to a multifaceted, positively charged image of Soviet culture, which could appeal beyond ideologically committed communist circles. This discrepancy, a common feature of the Soviet propagandistic nebula, undermined the overall credibility of its discourse, while at the same time allowing Austrian musical critics to access information on Soviet cultural life. For instance, a number of musicians apparently made use of this information (even conservative reviewers revealed knowledge of current developments in the USSR, thus indicating familiarity with Soviet-led outlets), while remaining dismissive of its political implications. Effectively, Soviet cultural propaganda did contribute to fostering a dialogue between cultures, thus fulfilling the classic goals of cultural diplomacy, even if it obviously failed in garnering support for the communist state.

The Austrian non-communist party press proved less revealing in cultural matters. The mainstream

Socialist *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, under Oskar Pollak⁷⁶³ and cultural editor Otto Koenig,⁷⁶⁴ was heavily engaged in anti-Communist battles,⁷⁶⁵ including in its cultural reporting,⁷⁶⁶ but the latter was never a priority of its editors. Despite this, the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* did publish a number of reviews of Soviet high-culture concerts, and its coverage of French activities was extensive. In their tone and style, most *AZ* reviews do not reveal significant differences from the Viennese standard, remaining in line with the Socialist party's long-held views regarding progressive cultural education, which would include “high-brow” elements, and construct a multi-layered cultural narrative for center-left audiences.

The conservative half of the Austrian political system also promoted a cultural programme, centered on Austrian nationhood, Catholic values and the overcoming of pan-German nationalism, and remaining committed both to “folkishness” (originating in re-constructed peasant culture, particularly relevant for ÖVP strongholds outside of Vienna) and to the high-culture, prestige-based habitus. One of the most interesting examples of upper-tier cultural journalism was the Catholic-oriented magazine *Die Furche*. Dedicated to the cultural restoration of Austria – and education of its people – this set a remarkably high standard for musical reporting, functioning on par with other leading media outlets. Unfortunately, *Die Furche* is most useful only for the years 1945-47, when its reporting was the fullest. In this sense, however, it does provide important insights into the first post-liberation seasons. Unlike most classical newspapers, it did not react immediately to the news, instead publishing a number of editorial and analytical essays. Its spirit of moderate conservatism and its Christian focus reflected its target audience, namely the educated middle class and bourgeoisie, to a large extent in Vienna, but also in Western Austria, and even beyond the Austrian borders (the magazine was also exported to Switzerland). Reviews of cultural life in the Austrian regions, the South Tyrol, Europe and the world combined the political, regional, national and international commitments of the editorial board, which thus espoused an enlightened conservatism appropriate to a democratic Austria. For instance, *Die Furche* incorporated materials regarding Catholic culture in France, thus functioning as a bridge between Austrian and French centre-right organisations, and was also remarkably open towards America and Russia. While the magazine was safe conservative ground, and could not be suspected of any sympathy towards Communism, it did discuss Russian (and Soviet culture) with greater ease than more engaged outlets, thus benefitting “Russian” and other “people-to-people” cultural diplomacies, within a framework of non-

⁷⁶³ Hausjell, 3, 708.

⁷⁶⁴ Hausjell, 2, 578.

⁷⁶⁵ Mittelmaier, 92-93.

⁷⁶⁶ Oliver Rathkolb, “Die Entwicklung der US-Besatzungskulturpolitik zum Instrument des Kalten Krieges,” in: Friedrich Stadler, ed., *Kontinuität und Bruch 1938 - 1945 - 1955 : Beiträge zur österreichischen Kultur- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte* (Vienna: Jugend und Volk, 1988), 42.

governmental, intercultural communication.

The musical column could at times compete with that of the *Kurier*, despite the much larger readership of the latter. Extended reviews of musical developments in Vienna centered not on individual concerts, but rather on characteristic problems of Austrian musical life, as seen by *Die Furche's* chief contributor, Professor Helmut A. Fiechtner. Apart from the Tyrol, articles were regularly sent in from Salzburg and Graz, particularly during the festival season. The cultural preferences of *Die Furche* once again reveal the complexity of the Austrian establishment's views, which often ran contrary to their ostensible pro-Western commitments. Fiechtner himself was remarkably Russophile in his musical preferences: Russian musical history received extensive coverage, and its academic tradition was undoubtedly put among the first in Europe.⁷⁶⁷ A red thread running through all the reporting was the national character of Russian music, which apparently came from the “people's soul”, and was bound to its native soil, from which all Russian classics “found a way ... [to] draw new strength”.⁷⁶⁸ Such music did not stray into the excessive modernity promoted by the US. In an even less veiled example of European cultural anti-Americanism, Fiechtner and other contributors distanced themselves from jazz, and its usage by non-American composers was reprimanded. This position was fraught with ambivalence: *Die Furche* could not adhere to the official Stalinist policies that enforced this kind of nativism and conservatism in Soviet music; however, its cultural column openly delighted in their outcomes, since they *de facto* corresponded to the aesthetic ideals professed by the magazine. Even Shostakovich received praise that would not have featured in the *Kurier*. Incoming Soviet artists fared remarkably well, and the folkloristic element deployed by the Soviets received very favourable mentions in the cultural column. Less charged with political connotations, French music received its share of praise and respect as well, and even more so French performers: in the French case, the ideological proximity of French cultural diplomats and the editorial board assured a large degree of coherence in their artistic choices. Words of unrestrained praise were repeatedly found, for instance, regarding French trios and quartets,⁷⁶⁹ not dissimilar from in other mainstream outlets. *Die Furche* represented one of the most interesting cases of the dichotomy between cultural and “political” policies, whereby public taste followed lines tangential to the expressed preferences of political conservatism. Despite its relatively smaller audience, as compared to the *Kurier*, *Die Furche's* reporting possesses a large explanatory potential with regards to the tendencies and dynamics of Austrian public discourse during the early post-war years, and thus remains a valuable source for understanding the cultural outlook of the nascent Second Republic.

⁷⁶⁷ Helmut A. Fiechtner, “Neue russische Kammermusik,” *DF* (19) 11.05.1946.

⁷⁶⁸ Otto Forst de Battaglia, “Slawische Tonkunst,” *DF* (42) 19.10.1946.

⁷⁶⁹ Helmut A. Fiechtner, “Musik aus Frankreich,” *DF* (21) 25.05.1946.

Outside of Vienna, most *Bundesländer* were characterised by the dominance of a single media outlet, usually independent from political parties, yet displaying conservative pro-western tendencies, in accordance with the general political climate. In Innsbruck, the *Tiroler Tageszeitung* regained its prevailing position in western Austria, supplying local news for a Tyrolean readership.⁷⁷⁰ Initially set up by the American military administration, and then handed over to the French,⁷⁷¹ it soon came under the control of the local conservative establishment, moving relatively near to the governing ÖVP. The *TT*'s cultural affairs column was of great importance to cultural activities west of Salzburg, and, considering the close attention that the French Element paid to culture, the editorial board remained sensitive to French cultural prestige diplomacy. As French cultural diplomats were primarily interested in painting and language (literature), these received substantial coverage. Later, as the Cold War reinforced more confrontational tendencies, the *TT* published a number of editorials denouncing the Soviet Union, mostly in matters of hard power, but also occasionally in cultural affairs. In general, the *TT*'s reporting inscribed itself fairly well into the mainstream Austrian musicological narrative, not differing substantially from other major papers. Where it did differ, however, was in its functioning as an arm's-length tool of French cultural propaganda. Critics had access to new French literature supplied through the Institute (some of them, such as the cultural editor Lilly Sauter,⁷⁷² actually worked there), which allowed them to publish introductory notes to some of the works premiered in Innsbruck. Most French musicians received enthusiastic accolades; occasional dips in artistic quality, however, were not overlooked, and were promptly pointed out. Ultimately, this was not opposed by cultural diplomats, who saw it as a means to enhance the overall credibility of their quality-based cultural expansion. The *TT*'s Vorarlberg counterpart, the *Vorarlberger Nachrichten*, edited by Eugen Ruß,⁷⁷³ followed the same dynamics, remaining a regional, Francophile, and conservative newspaper,⁷⁷⁴ with a cultural column that evolved according to developments in Bregenz and the Bundesland, most notably the Bregenz Festival.

In Salzburg, US information officials launched another high-quality outlet, the *Salzburger Nachrichten*.⁷⁷⁵ While being conservative and staunchly anti-communist in its general outlook, and being often used as a weapon⁷⁷⁶ in Cold War propaganda,⁷⁷⁷ it rapidly established itself as one of the

⁷⁷⁰ Mittelmaier, 125.

⁷⁷¹ Mittelmaier, 132.

⁷⁷² Hausjell: 3, 756.

⁷⁷³ Hausjell: 3, 745.

⁷⁷⁴ Mittelmaier, 131.

⁷⁷⁵ Tschögl, 90.

⁷⁷⁶ The Soviets repeatedly tried to stop it from entering the eastern zone by confiscations. Wenger, 122-3.

⁷⁷⁷ Robert Kriechbaumer, "Lederhose, Mozart, Jeans und Jazz. Salzburg 1945-1955," in: Ulrike Engelsberger, Robert Kriechbaumer, *Als der Westen golden wurde. Salzburg 1945-1955 in US-amerikanischen Fotografien [Projekt in Zusammenarbeit zwischen Salzburger Landesarchiv, Salzburger Museum Carolino Augusteum und Dr.-Wilfried-Haslauer-Bibliothek]* (Vienna; Cologne; Weimar: Böhlau, 2005):20-21.

leading cultural news providers in Austria. Its critics were remarkably demanding as to the technical and artistic standards of Austrian and foreign musicians, openly expressing their discontent with musical offerings, at a time when other newspapers would publish uncritical, laudatory reviews. Despite the Soviets being absent from the province, the French and even the Americans nonetheless faced very tough competition for the approval of the *SN* critics. In addition, the *SN* tried to avoid provincialism, reporting on cultural affairs in other provinces, to a considerably larger degree than the *TT* or other regional newspapers. The Festival was a matter of particular interest, since this provided an opportunity for the *SN* to profile itself as the leading cultural organ, and to extend its prestige beyond the borders of Salzburg and even Austria.

Generally, the *SN* remained a very high-brow, politically conservative paper, propagating what it considered to be Austrian values – including Austrian culture – and was therefore careful to live up to its own expectations. This pronounced Austrocentrism had implications for cultural reporting, implying the unsurpassability of the Austrian artistic heritage, and at times casting a somewhat patronising regard on foreign artists.⁷⁷⁸ The right-wing tendencies of the *SN*, which caused uneasiness within the US administration, also extended to its music criticism: thus, its leading journalist, Maximilian Kaindl-Hönig, sympathised with the far-right *Verein der Unabhängigen*,⁷⁷⁹ an organisation centred on ex-Nazi voters who had been excluded from the first elections, and another cultural editor, Viktor Reimann, was also involved with the *VdU*,⁷⁸⁰ while being considered “lax” in his attitude towards the Nazis.⁷⁸¹ Occasional racist slurs with regards to the against African American GIs⁷⁸² were accompanied by regular caricatures of Russian soldiers, which made the *SN* sound at times dangerously ambiguous. Despite this, musicians were treated in line with the high professional standards set by the editors. Welcomed to the symbolically important city of Mozart, they were subject to the inquisitive and at times uncompromising assessment of the critics, who were acutely aware of Salzburg and Austria's standing. For instance, French musicians performing Austrian music found themselves in a very delicate position. However, if they were deemed to have succeeded, then they would have accumulated considerable cultural capital. Paradoxically, the same Austro-centric attitude led the *SN* to attempt to re-educate Austrians by introducing them to foreign cultures, which also served to re-emphasise the international radiance of cultural Austria. Such reporting included extended analytical articles on American, British, French, Russian and Italian cultural history and current developments, such as news from foreign stages, or excursions into musical history. Many

⁷⁷⁸ Singers were subject to particular scrutiny, since their renderings of German-language songs ran the danger of being evaluated as lacking authenticity. Cf. “Konzert Miro Skala,” *SN* 03.12.1946: 3.

⁷⁷⁹ Hausjell: 2, 560.

⁷⁸⁰ Hausjell: 3, 726.

⁷⁸¹ Mittelmaier, 127.

⁷⁸² *Ibid.*

national schools, composers or works thus received extensive musicological coverage.⁷⁸³ The latter was a particular focus of the *SN*: when a new piece was announced for performance in Salzburg, the organisers could be sure of the publication of an extensive introduction to it, as part of the promotion campaign. This bore all the characteristics of classical Austro-European musicological training: a biographical note on the composer, his artistic background, the stylistic context, and the history of the previous performances.

The *SN*'s music writing was thus highly symptomatic of the Austrian climate of the time, clearly reflecting the social and professional background of musicologists, and the ways in which they tried to shape public opinion. While foreign countries could rejoice at being reintroduced into Austrian cultural life through one of the most prestigious papers in the country, they had to count on being inscribed into a particular canon, with a dominant discourse and particular social rules. An elitist, rigidly conservative stance, framed by the standards of old Austrian academic learning, resulted from the relative freedom that musical critics enjoyed under cautious American liberalism. In their own realm, therefore, the local musical elite used the permitted room for manoeuvre to carry out their own cultural-political agenda. As a necessary sign of respect to the occupation power, US cultural activities, such as those of the America Houses, were duly advertised. However, both Americans and their Austrian partners tried to construe this relationship in such a way that would suggest some semblance of equality, although this was often complicated by the difficult relationship that the American administration had with the leading non-Viennese media outlet. A sister newspaper in Upper Austria, the *Oberösterreichische Nachrichten*,⁷⁸⁴ although less systematically relevant for this study, is equally worth mentioning, in that it constituted another American-style outlet that became rapidly successful on the Austrian market.

Last but not least, musicians in Austria consulted the specialised *Österreichische Musikzeitschrift*, which published musical chronicles from all the *Bundesländer*, and theoretical articles on music from Austria and around the world. Edited by the prominent critic Peter Lafite,⁷⁸⁵ this journal gives a good overview of the most important cultural events in the country, as seen from the perspective of the professional community. Moreover, a number of essays appeared on French and Russian music,⁷⁸⁶ which allows us to trace the origins of many public reactions by Austrian critics. This musical publication, while apparently not widely read outside of the artistic world, helps us to better understand the patterns of semi-public communication among cultural opinion-makers, and the ways

⁷⁸³ E.g.: Otto F. Beer, "Fürst Igor in der Wiener Staatsoper," *SN* 03.06.1947: 4.

⁷⁸⁴ Mittelmaier, 129.

⁷⁸⁵ Hausjell, 2, 605.

⁷⁸⁶ E.g. Andreas Liess, "Die französische Musik nach Debussy," 4 (1946), 123-26; Friedrich Wildgans, "Musik in der Sowjetunion," 4 (1946), 127-32.

in which they formulated the dominant discourse in Vienna and across the country. Committed to its standards of professionalism, and consistently eschewing all politics, the *ÖMZ* avoided proximity to any identifiable political party, and also published contributions by foreign authors, including such celebrities as Stravinsky,⁷⁸⁷ Milhaud⁷⁸⁸ or Shostakovich.⁷⁸⁹ Although this undoubtedly had potential for political debate, the latter appears to have been consistently played down by the editors, as exemplified by their steering away from the controversies around the Soviet decrees of 1948. Instead of flatly condemning these, the magazine explored the musical output produced under the aegis of Socialist Realism, thus feeding into the ambivalent discourse on Soviet modernity that was characteristic of Austria. Contrary to the wider public discourse, a number of experimental Western composers, most notably Stravinsky, came to be widely appreciated by the professional community, receiving substantially better treatment than that meted out in the general media. The *ÖMZ* fulfilled an important function as a forum in which to express their ideas, demonstrating a remarkable openness in a relatively hostile public climate.

While Allied domination and the strong position of the party press would quickly disintegrate following the Allied withdrawal,⁷⁹⁰ the occupation decade itself presents an interesting case of complex discursive relations between different cultural actors, possessing varying degrees of hard and symbolic power. Overall, the Austrian musical press, a previously little-researched *problematique*, played a crucial role in Austrian interactions with the Allies, and, more importantly in the long-term perspective, in the crystallisation of a more open-minded, democratically oriented, while still high-brow and staunchly conservative, post-war canon. The outstanding prestige of Vienna and Salzburg, combined with the high quality of musical criticism in these cities, undoubtedly contributed to a considerable degree of international competition in an increasingly diversified musical market. Conversely, it showed that Austrian musicians remained self-confident, maintained a strong sense of attachment to nationally rooted cultural values, and had no fear of challenging foreign-induced rules of musical preference, even rejecting US-suggested artistic styles. This demonstrates the differing relations of power, and the deep embeddedness of the Austrian musical elite in Austrian societal realities. Just as the supply side, represented by the Allied cultural officers, clearly reflected their social background and educational capital, so did the demand side, namely the Austrian professional audience, reflect their musical training and *Bildungsbürgertum* middle-class roots, particularly with regard to their analyses of foreign music. This dialogue between the educated elites of the three countries formed an important part of the Franco-Austro-Soviet

⁷⁸⁷ Igor Strawinsky, "Über die musikalische Komposition," *ÖMZ* 11-12 (1952), 323-29.

⁷⁸⁸ Paul Guth, "Besuch bei Darius Milhaud", 09 (1952), 265-7.

⁷⁸⁹ Dimitri Schostakowitsch, "Die Union der Sowjetischen Komponisten," *ÖMZ* 01 (1949), 29-31.

⁷⁹⁰ See Rathkolb, Hausjell, Mittelmaier.

musical triangle. By the same token, it entered into Austrian national history, as French and Russian music reverberated through the national press, and, via the latter, Austrian society more generally.

What is most surprising is the degree of homogeneity in Austrian musical discourse, which prevailed over those differences that might have been expected to arise from existing political divisions. From local communists to arch-conservative critics, professional musical journalists tended to operate using the same categories, applying the same methods and reaching the same conclusions; in this regard, only the Soviet-dominated *ÖZ* stood out. Even the register of the German language helped to mark them out, and probably served as a visible indication of social cohesion. Understanding the social rules and norms of this professional universe is essential to analysing the reception patterns of separate musical styles, “national” musics or individual guest performances, all of which eventually inscribed themselves into the Austrian discourse of musical production and consumption. While the question of international parallels and ramifications constitutes an important object of inquiry, the background of cultural journalism in the “land of music” possessed significant relevance for the Allies, both in Austria itself and beyond its borders. In this sense, interpretation itself was power.

Radio Affairs: French and Russian Music on the Airwaves

The rebirth of the Austrian media landscape in 1945 required the Allies to rapidly undertake measures to restore radio coverage for as much of Austrian territory as possible. Other tasks included ensuring communication between the regions, the setting up of information services, and the establishment of a democratic radio and press network. Dealing with these issues meant facing up to the enormous challenges brought about by wartime devastation, and the mountainous terrain of large parts of the country. In broad terms, Austrian radio developed in two directions: first, the reorganisation of national public radio, in Vienna and in the provinces; and second, the setting up and operating of Allied-controlled radio stations, both for their own troops and for the local population. Thus, the RAVAG federal station was again restored, while the Allies experimented with different levels of control over Austrian airwaves. The United States organised the *Rot-Weiß-Rot* network,⁷⁹¹ run by the army, and quickly becoming one of the most popular radio stations in the country. Great Britain, likewise, opted for setting up its own *Alpenland* station in Southern Austria, with its headquarters in Graz, and a local office in Klagenfurt. France, however, concentrated more on restoring and maintaining the technical facilities that lay within its zone, most importantly the powerful Dornbirn transmission station in Vorarlberg. The Soviet administration had to apply another *ad hoc* policy, by which it essentially opted out of owning a separate radio broadcaster, in favour of securing a few hours on the national network. France and the USSR were united by one characteristic trait: they quickly relinquished control over radio stations to local Austrian authorities, retaining only partial leverage. This distinguished them from the Anglo-Saxon powers, since both the United States and the United Kingdom maintained their own broadcast services. However, as the Soviet Element helped to reinstall democratic Austrian self-rule, and indeed was instrumental in restoring an Austrian-controlled national radio service (RAVAG), it maintained the right to broadcast its own transmission, the *Russian Hour (Russische Stunde)*,⁷⁹² which began on June 7th, 1945.⁷⁹³ In addition, late night transmissions from Moscow were also included, dedicated to a variety of topics from the political and cultural life of the USSR

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Another station, the *Blue Danube Network*, broadcast in English for the US Army. Austrian civilians could of course listen to its programmes, which included American popular music and jazz.

⁷⁹² Ernst Glaser, "Die 'Russische Stunde' in Radio Wien (1945-1955): Ein Beitrag zum Problem der sowjetischen Medienpräsenz in Österreich," *Wiener Geschichtsblätter* (46) 1991: 1-12.

⁷⁹³ Viktor Ergert, *Die Geschichte des Österreichischen Rundfunks. Bd. II. 1945-1955* (Salzburg: ORF, 1975): 40.

Owing to Austria's position in Central Europe and its status as a Cold War battlefield, access to its airwaves was coveted, thus ensuring a dynamic history of radio in the country. Indeed, this medium was being seized for propaganda purposes in Europe and elsewhere.⁷⁹⁴ The RAVAG could look back at a position of strength during the 1920s and 1930s, when its network of facilities and audiences was rapidly expanding, at an even higher rate than in Germany. In 1930, for instance, it had around 400,000 registered users and approximately 1.5 million listeners, whereas by 1937 the number of users had grown to more than 600,000.⁷⁹⁵ Musical programmes accounted for 62% of total radio time, while conservative pressure to include more “serious” (high-brow) music was challenged by the popularity of “entertainment” music, which was slowly getting the upper hand.⁷⁹⁶

After the *Anschluss*, the Austrian broadcasting system was incorporated into the German propaganda network, centred on the *Reichssender Wien*. War regulations required strict control over radio receivers, and effectively meant that the population's access to individual radio usage was severely restricted, and ultimately forbidden. The Allies, despite introducing denazification measures, could not bring about an immediate transformation of radio coverage, since the economic capacities of Austrians were still limited, and most households could not be expected to own an industrially produced receiver. However, reconstruction soon began, bringing with it new programming strategies. The Austrian resistance had briefly operated a station in the mountains of the Bad Ausseerland, and in Innsbruck, radio activities were also set up with the help of the local resistance.⁷⁹⁷ The RAVAG was re-established by an Austro-Soviet joint effort. Salzburg, Innsbruck, Dornbirn, Graz and Klagenfurt began operating in early May, and the RWR station on June 6th.⁷⁹⁸ A studio in Linz was added later, functioning as a local RWR branch, since the station was headquartered in Salzburg.

The Austrian radio landscape thus underwent a series of tectonic changes. Firstly, it was never fully united. The RAVAG was not easily received in Linz and Salzburg, where the RWR dominated – a circumstance on which US radio officers commented with almost sarcastic neutrality, and apparent *Schadenfreude*.⁷⁹⁹ Secondly, as it turned out, the radio sphere experienced power shifts that

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Linda Risso, “Radio Wars: Broadcasting in the Cold War” *Cold War History* 2 (2013): 145-152. Accessed 09.02.2017. DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2012.757134.

⁷⁹⁵ Andrea Merighi, *Wandel des Musikgeschmacks der österreichischen Jugend von 1900 bis 1950* (Dipl.-Arb., Vienna 2004): 84-5.

⁷⁹⁶ Merighi, 87. For instance, in 1931 music amounted to 62.5% of total programming. Operettas and light music took up 47.4%, opera and symphony music 10.9%, church and chamber music 4.5% and modern dance music 6.5% (ibid., 91).

⁷⁹⁷ Ergert, 12, 17.

⁷⁹⁸ Ergert, 13-15, 25, 79-84.

⁷⁹⁹ Mueller, OZ und RS, 159-60.

quickly led to US supremacy, at the expense of the Soviet Union, and, in part, the Austrian federal government. This was partly due to the Allied control prerogatives, and partly to American policies whereby a popular political message was combined with entertainment and some “serious” cultural programming.

On the American side, cultural diplomacy was preoccupied with delivering a high-quality product. The ISB claimed that there were 200,000 listeners of the RWR, and also asserted the superior quality of its musical entertainment and educational programmes.⁸⁰⁰ The RWR's unhalting march to market leadership was indeed demonstrated by virtually all statistics collected by the US administration: in 1947, it led the state-run and Soviet-influenced RAVAG by 12% (42% against 30%). However, a year later, it was roughly on par with both RAVAG stations. By 1950, it had reclaimed its 12% lead. Thus, in absolute terms, the RWR continuously maintained the status of the most widely listened to broadcaster.⁸⁰¹ RAVAG audiences tended to be slightly older, more educated, and to have a higher social status than those of the RWR.⁸⁰² Furthermore, they began to pay more attention to musical programming, since the American supervisors had noticed that the “unpolitical” parts of *Voice of America (Stimme Amerikas)* were much more popular than explicit propaganda. In the end, music played a role in converting Austrians to a cultural openness vis-à-vis the United States, which was in itself of political relevance.⁸⁰³

In French-occupied Western Austria, Radio Tirol claimed 46,956 listeners in May 1945, and 44,202 in September 1946, and in Vorarlberg, 24,995 and 25,026 respectively.⁸⁰⁴ The two zones having been united as Radio West, they remained under indirect occupation control – in accordance with Allied prerogatives in the field – and covered territories that were accessible only from the centre with difficulty. Their cultural programming, while clearly favourable to the French element, does not appear to reveal any substantial differences to the rest of the Austrian stations. In one of the few national statistics available, in 1952, radio listeners were distributed as follows (note that many Austrians, of course, listened to more than one station):

RAVAG	867,174	56.6%
RWR	257,066	16.8%

⁸⁰⁰ Purposes and Functions of the Information Services Branch (Draft of remarks by Deputy Chief, ISB at Conference of Newspaper Editors). 20.05.1947. Cit.: Schoenberg: 2: 31.

⁸⁰¹ Schoenberg: 1, 128-131.

⁸⁰² Schoenberg: 1, 137-8.

⁸⁰³ Reinhold Wagnleitner, “Radio und Kalter Krieg: Die US-Radiopolitik und die Entwicklung des österreichischen Rundfunks zur Zeit der Alliierten Besatzung 1945-1955,” in: Theo Mäusli, ed., *Radiowellen. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Radios* (Zürich: Chronos, 1996): 192-6.

⁸⁰⁴ Rundfunkteilnehmerstand. Bezug: Ferngespräch vom 15.6.1946. Landeshauptmannschaft Vorarlberg, Bregenz 18.07.1946. Zl. 23/4. Schachtel 1. Vorarlberger Landesarchiv – Sammlung Vorarlberg im Österreichischen Rundfunkarchiv Wien.

Alpenland	259,194	19.3%
Innsbruck	74,035	4.8%
Dornbirn	39,152	2.5%

*Table 1. Listener Statistics for Viennese and Provincial Stations*⁸⁰⁵

There are some very important qualifications to these statistics, however. The physical accessibility of different networks was highly uneven throughout Austria, and a good quality signal was only gradually established for Vienna and Eastern Austria, through a new installation on the Wilhelminenberg in the Vienna Forest.⁸⁰⁶ Arguably, this may also reflect the technical capacities of many Austrian receivers, which could not capture RWR. This meant that the latter fell behind not only the RAVAG, but also the Alpenland station. On the other hand, public preferences did not necessarily coincide fully with those choices that seem to have been physically predetermined (they might have eschewed the *Russische Stunde*, for example, despite its easy availability).

However, despite the triumphant reports that the US Element was sending back to Washington, and the clearly significant advances that had been made in popularising America, its way of life, and Western democracy, the US-controlled media collapsed almost as soon as the occupation forces had departed from Austria:⁸⁰⁷ the once mighty RWR network was absorbed into the federal public radio, which arose out of RAVAG, and, after the *Proporzrundfunk* period of 1957-64, obtained its current name, *Österreichischer Rundfunk und Fernsehen* – ORF. This did not constitute an ultimate demise, however, since many journalists continued to work at the ORF, and to transmit the values and skills they had acquired under American tutelage. This notwithstanding, the unpopularity of maintaining an independent RWR broadcaster in close relation with the occupation is remarkable, and shows the degree of opposition many Austrians felt towards any foreign propaganda. Generally speaking, the United States emerged as the most prominent foreign power in Austria, at least in media terms, and was able to successfully compete with the state-owned federal radio service. Yet, the picture was mixed, owing to a number of factors (the most important of them being geography), and this underlines the importance of the RAVAG, and, in fact, the Alpenland station still being under indirect British control. In short, in Western Austria, those stations close to the French element had to be considered, while in Southern Austria, it was Britain and the local actors that wielded real power, whereas in the less mountainous areas of Upper and Lower Austria, there was more genuine

⁸⁰⁵ Source: Sendergruppe Rot-Weiß-Rot, Verwaltungsdirektion, an den Sender Vorarlberg – Dornbirn. Hörerzahlsschlüssel 31.12.1952 Wien, 19.03.1953. VbgLA – Schachtel 18 - ÖRfA

⁸⁰⁶ “Radio Wien“ *Österreichisches Musiklexikon* URL: http://www.musiklexikon.ac.at/ml/musik_R/Radio_Wien.xml

⁸⁰⁷ In the press, the *Wiener Kurier* disintegrated very quickly, and had to be reorganised from scratch (whereas the *Salzburger* and *Oberösterreichische Nachrichten* have continued to exist until now).

competition, which the RWR would have been likely to win, if it had not been for the RAVAG's "naturally" inherited advantages. However, the approach of the Americans transcended the simple priorities of the propaganda war against the USSR. In particular, it also took into account the cultural preferences of Austrian audiences. Thus, for instance, in 1947, classical music was listened to by 18.5% (jazz music by 14%, and opera music by 12.5%). In 1948, public preferences, as collected in Vienna, Linz and Salzburg, were divided between native Austrian music, which consistently came first, opera music (9–15%), symphony music (4–6%), and jazz (around 4%); the preferred genres at RWR were Austrian popular music (12%) and Viennese music (11%), dance music (4.5%), opera (4%), "serious" music (3.5%) and jazz (2%).⁸⁰⁸ Despite rather mixed data, US cultural officers were aware of the need to offer some high culture productions on the radio, and particularly "live" music "of high quality".⁸⁰⁹

Furthermore, timing was also important. A US survey revealed that peak listening times in Vienna occurred mostly around 20:30, whereas Linz demonstrated several peaks, particularly at around 14:00 and 20:30.⁸¹⁰ Both France and the USSR also took care to broadcast musical programmes on different Austrian stations. A number of factors were relevant, such as their own broadcasting capacities, their relations with the Austrian central and provincial authorities, and their relations with other Allies. Here, French cultural diplomacy managed to obtain spectacular successes, networking effectively with all relevant actors. (I will look at this further in the sections dedicated to particular French policies.) However, it is important to note that as early as 1949, all the major Austrian broadcasters engaged in discussions concerning the centralised planning of their musical programmes. While the nationality and names of the composers in question were never specified, the directors who participated in the talks looked very closely at stylistic differentiation, the overall quantity of time, and the time slots they would receive. Cultural prejudices also played a role: in late 1949, when the US position was fairly strong throughout the cultural establishment, the *Bundesrat* Leissing told a meeting that jazz music should not be played "under any circumstances" during afternoon music sessions.⁸¹¹ Discussions on the synchronization of musical programming were later pursued further; what emerges from the better documented years 1950 and 1951 is a clear preference for native Austrian music – including light music, such as "folk-pop" and *Wienerlied* pieces – as well as for native high culture and standard European operas and symphonies. The latter was linked to the burning issue of maintaining radio's own symphony orchestras outside of Vienna, which needed to

⁸⁰⁸ Schoenberg: 1, 133-34.

⁸⁰⁹ Red-White-Red Programming Changes and Public Reactions Thereto. Charles K. Moffly, Public Affairs Officer. Vienna, 27.03.1951. 511.534/3-2751 XR 963.40 XR 513.694 NRA – Österreichisches Rundfunkarchiv.

⁸¹⁰ Zwei Jahre Sender Rot-Weiß-Rot. Umfrage. (1947), Schoenberg: 364.

⁸¹¹ Protokoll über die XII. Programmaustauschssitzung am 17. und 18. November 1949 in Graz. Vorarlberger Landesarchiv – Schachtel 8 – Österreichisches Rundfunkarchiv.

be allocated broadcasting time in order to present their work. Despite the pronounced Austro-centrism of the radio managements involved, the classical repertoire featured Italian names, and in early 1950, a proposal was put forward to launch a series of cultural programmes on France and Britain.⁸¹² Broadcasting the American-led Salzburg and French-led Bregenz Festivals was discussed by a number of Austrian stations,⁸¹³ and the RWR took responsibility for broadcasting the Salzburg Festival and Viennese *Festwochen* in 1953.⁸¹⁴

It is difficult to assess the role that music played in the *Russische Stunde*. The programme was fully designed by Soviet propaganda officers, and included information on Soviet geography, history and culture. In line with public announcements made in 1945, it was designed to close the gaps in Austrians' knowledge of Soviet culture, and particularly contemporary developments, which was deficient due to Nazi misinformation. Characteristically, literature and music were cited among the most important, "painfully" endured losses that had been inflicted by previous cultural isolation.⁸¹⁵ Not surprisingly, the programme later became the spearhead of Soviet Cold War propaganda campaigns, leading to repeated Austrian complaints about the abuse of their central radio. The "purely cultural" tone of *RS* was interrupted by shorter, more politically oriented, transmissions,⁸¹⁶ which undoubtedly had consequences for the coherence and the credibility of its overall message, since Soviet political propaganda was resented by the majority of Austrian audiences. Heavy-handed propaganda also had a negative impact on the Radio Wien service of RAVAG.⁸¹⁷ The *RS* could claim slots in primetime scheduling, broadcasting initially every Thursday from 20:20 until 21:30, and then on Sundays from 20:10 till 22:00, the latter time being retained throughout the occupation period.⁸¹⁸ As no clear statistics or complete programmes exist, it can be inferred from circumstantial evidence that the proportion of musical programmes must have dropped after 1947, due to the predominance of political propaganda.⁸¹⁹ A US survey claimed that *RS* had the lowest popularity ratings among all nationally broadcast cultural transmissions.⁸²⁰ In spite of this, cultural propagandists still included substantial amounts of music throughout the occupation period, and particularly classical music, which was more popular with Austrians. The celebration of the fifth anniversary of *RS* in 1950 featured not only Russian classical music, but also a theatrical performance, and even a jazz

⁸¹² 3. Sitzung am 18.01.1950. VbgLA – Schachtel 11 - ÖRfA

⁸¹³ 8. Sitzung – 24.05.1950 – VbgLA – Schachtel 11 – ÖRfA.

⁸¹⁴ Übertragung der Salzburger Festspiele und Wiener Festwochen durch RWR – 1953 – VbgLA – Schachtel 11 – ÖRfA.

⁸¹⁵ Mueller, OZ und RS, 222-23.

⁸¹⁶ Rathkolb 1982: 536.

⁸¹⁷ Purposes and Functions, 31.

⁸¹⁸ Mueller, OZ und RS, 225.

⁸¹⁹ Statistics put up by Oliver Rathkolb, cited in: Mueller, OZ und RS, 246.

⁸²⁰ Mueller, OZ und RS, 160.

orchestra provided by the RAVAG.⁸²¹

However, more than just one hour was dedicated to the broadcast of Russian music. As mentioned above, broadcasts from Moscow featured both “serious” and light music produced in the USSR, albeit followed by the usual propagandistic accompaniments.⁸²² Wolfgang Mueller has calculated that there were about 3.5 hours of Russian programming every week. These were divided between shorter “information” series and full-length cultural transmissions, such as musical and theatrical broadcasts. The latter were usually on Thursdays at 20:20, and often featured premieres of contemporary Soviet compositions, or concerts by leading Soviet artists either in the USSR on tour in Austria.⁸²³ The RS ended in June 1953,⁸²⁴ as the Allies were increasingly transferring control over public media to the Austrian authorities.

The programmes of the major Austrian radio stations clearly indicate that Russian music was played on an almost daily basis. Unfortunately, they often do not specify the items broadcast, since many programmes had titles such as “Music in the Afternoon”, or “Breakfast with Music”, without specifying what was actually performed. In some cases, however, the repertoire was stated, and included many performances of Russian classics by the best soloists and orchestras around the world. Interestingly enough, the US element did not exclude Russians from its cultural offerings, eagerly transmitting concerts of the Boston Symphonic Orchestra and others playing Tchaikovsky or other contemporary Russian composers. This happened very frequently, often in prime time. The British case is far less transparent, due to the tendency to use generic names for cultural transmissions, such as “Musical Afternoon”. However, it is clear that a Russian presence must have been included there as well. Undoubtedly, the RAVAG itself catered to the tastes of both the Soviets and its own listeners; the best of high-brow Russian culture was put on show there too.

France took a different path, deliberately negotiating with its Austrian, American and British partners. The possibility of broadcasting musical programmes from the transmitters at Dornbirn⁸²⁵ and Innsbruck was considered. However, the French element did not wish to see French music prioritised over native Austrian music, given that the local population was particularly attached to the latter, and the occupation officers wished to respect their sensitivities.⁸²⁶ Initial negotiations began almost immediately after the French arrival in Vienna, and concerned both the responsible officers of

⁸²¹ “5 Jahre Russische Stunde” *Österreichische Mediathek*. URL: <http://www.mediathek.at/atom/1336DA8F-23B-00043-00001254-13363EB8/> (20.10.2016).

⁸²² Mueller, OZ und RS, 185.

⁸²³ Rathkolb 1982: 237. Mueller, OZ und RS, 229-30.

⁸²⁴ “Radio Wien” *ÖML*.

⁸²⁵ Annemarie Bösch-Niederer, “Kultureller Aufbruch. Vorarlbergs Musikleben nach 1945,” in: Ulrich Nachbaur and Alois Niederstätter, eds., *Aufbruch in eine neue Zeit. Vorarlberger Almanach zum Jubiläumsjahr 2005* (Bregenz: 2006): 291.

⁸²⁶ Directives générales pour la propagande en Autriche, 7-8, 18. 26.10.1945. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 187.

other occupation powers⁸²⁷ and the RAVAG, whose musical programme drew special interest.⁸²⁸ It appears that France was remarkably interested in a genuine exchange with Austria, both sending French cultural programmes and attempting to obtain Viennese transmissions for French networks.⁸²⁹ Indeed, a number of broadcasts of Viennese concerts followed, arriving in a slow, but steady, flow to France; an agreement with the RAVAG regarding a regular exchange was reached in October 1947.⁸³⁰ Negotiations had taken place throughout the summer of 1947, and, although both parties already agreed on principle, the French had to settle several technical issues, having already conducted lengthy talks with the Swiss regarding eventual retransmissions, and finally opting for a chain running through South-West Germany and Vorarlberg (Dornbirn), which would allow for a land bridge to metropolitan France. Effectively, the French element transmitted fifteen minutes of cultural programmes on Fridays, and thirty minutes on Tuesdays.⁸³¹

A second charm offensive concerned the western Allies. The French element systematically worked with the RWR and the Alpenland to obtain favourable conditions for musical programmes. Allied goodwill, which was demonstrated immediately, helped to establish this important relay of French music, reaching into Southern Austria, and using the increasingly popular RWR for French cultural programmes. Talks with the Alpenland took place mostly during early 1946, and by 1948 a number of regular French cultural broadcasts were in evidence. France was interested in collaboration with the British, owing to the good technical quality of the Alpenland installations in Graz, and the presence of a centre in Vienna, which ensured coverage of a large chunk of Austrian territory. Thanks to good working relations with the British Element and their Styrian and Viennese partners, in 1949, the French Element reported that its contacts with the Alpenland had resulted in the steady inclusion of French cultural broadcasts,⁸³² and this was largely true also of the RWR.

The central authorities in Paris, after initial uncertainties, agreed to dispatch regular cultural programmes to Austria, such as fifteen-minute cultural magazines, and these were used at all major Austrian stations. Parisian *chansons*, while ultimately unable to compete with American entertainment music, took up a significant share of French broadcasts. However, the Cultural Division never showed any considerable interest in transmitting light music from France (even if this was common in French broadcasting), although this was regularly included in series on Paris, and,

⁸²⁷ L'émission radiophonique interalliée hebdomadaire. 24.10.1945. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 328.

⁸²⁸ Informations obtenus par Monsieur Thomas fonctionnaire à la Radiodiffusion Autrichienne (RAVAG) 24.10.1945. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 187.

⁸²⁹ Susini to the French Member of the Executive Committee. Echange radiophonique Vienne-Paris. 23.5.1946. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 2413.

⁸³⁰ J. Manaches, Directeur des Emissions vers l'Etranger et des Echanges Internationaux, Radiodiffusion Française à Ilse Schöbl, chargée de la Section Radio. 11.05.1947. Division Radio à la Division Information, 14.04.1947. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 2413.

⁸³¹ Accord entre la Radiodiffusion Française et RAVAG. (October 1947) MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 2413.

⁸³² MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Europe 229.

apparently, general cultural programmes transmitted through the Sender West, and the American, British and Austrian stations. The monthly reports of the Cultural Division regularly included detailed lists of the cultural programmes that had been transmitted, and this is particularly well documented for 1948 and 1949, and partly for 1946, 1947, 1951 and other years.⁸³³ Generally, these concentrated on well-known French names, ranging from occasional Medieval and Baroque authors to Poulenc, Messiaen and even Milhaud. Choir music and *chansons* took up a significantly larger share than they did in “real-life” concert programming, and several programmes on French musical history, combining spoken and musical parts, were delivered to Austrian radio stations. Occasionally, local branches of *France-Autriche* were charged with handling the musical materials sent from France (or Vienna), as occurred in Linz, Graz and Klagenfurt. Great value was attached to the constancy of the French musical presence; while French music did not account for a high percentage of the overall scheduling, it was included in the programmes of all major Austrian stations on a weekly basis, and many transmissions were broadcast on primetime, between 7pm and 10pm.

Despite this apparent, if limited, success, occupation officials showed a certain anxiety with regards to the French influence over musical programming in Austria, this being described early in 1947 as *nul*.⁸³⁴ However, this was rapidly changing. Apart from transmissions from Paris, local cultural events received growing coverage on the radio. Firstly, some French concerts, and particularly French contributions to Austrian festivals, were often recorded and broadcast through the RWR and other stations, especially in Salzburg. For instance, a performance of Fauré’s *Requiem* was carried by the RWR,⁸³⁵ and one of Debussy’s *Martyre de St. Sébastien*, which had taken place during the 1953 Wiener Festwochen under Jean Martinon, was transmitted by the Americans just two weeks later.⁸³⁶ French cultural preferences remained remarkably conservative compared to shifting consumer tastes, and this did not augur well for the market share of French music. On the other hand, high quality music was conducive to portraying France as a distinctively cultural nation, and at times distinguished it from the ever-growing presence of American entertainment music, let alone the consistently dominant Austrian folk music.

Comparisons may be difficult, and I have already alluded to the notorious indeterminacy of Austrian radio programming. However, there are a few ways to roughly estimate the relative popularity of French and Russian music on Austrian radio, to compare them with contemporaneous developments in concert halls, and to establish their market share in a wider context. In order to do

⁸³³ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 166, 2413, Vienne 102, 113, Europe 229 ; Nantes – 279/PO/1.

⁸³⁴ Compte-Rendu de la réunion tenue à la Legation de France à Vienne le 2 février 1947. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 324.

⁸³⁵ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 201 2503

⁸³⁶ Übertragung der Salzburger Fetspiele und Wiener Festwochen durch RWR – VbgLA...

this, I have made use of the digitised version of the US-affiliated radio journal, *Funk und Film*, searching for the comparative frequency of the names of the five most performed composers, namely, Tchaikovsky, Prokofiev, Shostakovich, Debussy and Ravel. As was the general rule with American media outlets in Austria, there was often a sort of feigned impartiality and sticking-to-the-point attitude, which were conveyed through the articles of the magazine, and aimed at the growing audiences of radio-listeners and cinema-goers. Conserved at the Austrian Radio Archive in Liesing, Vienna, all issues from the years 1945-1948, 1950 and 1952 are available in machine-readable form. *Funk und Film* meticulously covered all those radio programmes that were receivable in Austria; these included RWR, RAVAG (including the late Wien I and Wien II services), Alpenland (UK-Austria), Sender West (France-Austria), Budapest, Prag, SWR (Südwestrundfunk), NDR (Norddeutscher Rundfunk), and, equally, the Swiss broadcaster at Beromünster (German-Swiss radio) and Radio Rome. Strictly speaking, such an analysis includes not only radio programmes, but also the extensive commentaries that were regularly published alongside the timetables. It does not appear, however, that the adjacent reporting was slanted towards some names at the expense of others, since while Prokofiev and Shostakovich featured very prominently in discussions on modernity and Soviet repression, Tchaikovsky and Debussy were seen as great classics, and often commented upon as well.

Composer	Mentions	%
Tchaikovsky	165	46.35
Prokofiev	14	3.93
Shostakovich	12	3.37
Debussy	95	26.69
Ravel	70	19.66

Table 2. The General Overview

In terms of overall quantity, Tchaikovsky is clearly in first place with almost half of all mentions. He was followed distantly by Debussy and then by Ravel, who reached one-quarter and one-fifth respectively. However, contemporary Russians barely made it over 3%, despite their relative popularity among twentieth-century Austrian composers. This is arguably the only sense in which radio statistics differed from the preferences of concert organisers. However, the former reflects more closely the kind of contacts that wider audiences were likely to have with high-brow Russian and French music. Tchaikovsky's dominance appeared to be just as uncontested, since it was distinct from Soviet cultural diplomacy in Austria. On the other hand, it would not be implausible to suggest that the steady and competent networking activities of French diplomats were bearing fruits, as can

be seen from the direct inclusion of French programmes in other Allied-controlled stations. However, the recurring title *Französische Musik*, which could often be found in internal French reporting, did not make its way *en masse* onto the airwaves: in the *FuF* archive, it was documented only 19 times over a five year period, which included Beromünster, SWR and Rome.

Popular music received a consistently greater time allocation vis-à-vis the classics, and certainly captured more attention in the pages of *Funk und Film*. For example, the word *chanson* could easily outperform even Tchaikovsky, as the following table shows:

Year	Chanson
1946	99
1947	78
1948	79
1950	135
1952	140

Table 3. “Chanson” Frequency in Funk and Film (Overall: 541)

Not only did *chanson* overtake Tchaikovsky, but it also achieved a share far superior to that of all the five composers cited above (356), and this effectively referred to just one, albeit leading, and specifically French or at least French-denoted, genre of popular music. The relative success of *chanson* came about with fairly little interference from the occupation power, which concentrated instead on high culture – although *chansons* were included in regular programmes dealing with French culture, since they were indissociably linked to the Parisian soundscape. Ironically enough, like Tchaikovsky, *chansons* had a life of their own, having a substantial degree of autonomy from Allied cultural policies, although in both cases their presence in radio programming did indeed contribute to creating a positive image of the French and Russians.

In overall terms, the results of Soviet and French advances in the radio sphere were ambivalent. Both countries exercised only limited control over the contents of Austrian radio transmissions, which required the Soviet Union to make greater use of the *Russische Stunde* and its remaining leverage with the RAVAG. To some extent, this was detrimental to its cultural diplomacy, owing to the growing presence of political propaganda. The Austrian population reacted against open propaganda, and thus tried to avoid Soviet broadcasts altogether. However, some classical and contemporary music was still broadcast, and, considering the reasonably favourable time slots it occupied, succeeded in reaching certain audiences even during the darker days of the ideological Cold War. Moreover, Russian music was present on the wavelengths of Western-controlled radio

stations, which, while being hardly conducive to the success of specifically *Soviet* efforts, contributed substantially to the reintroduction of the cultural heritage of some contemporary Russian productions. The French Element, on the contrary, aimed at obtaining retransmission of its cultural-propagandistic programmes through the RAVAG and its Anglo-American partners, in which it was largely successful. While not aspiring to a dominant position for French music, the cultural diplomats, as in many other fields, carved out a niche for their country's music on Austrian radio, securing it a respected position, and disseminating knowledge of France's musical creativity. Considering the objective premises and the means employed, this can be characterised as an effective strategy.

Quantitatively, Russian music “prevailed” over its French counterpart, although it would be mistaken to speak of direct competition – and it must be assumed that Austrian music ruled supreme, as was usually the case, and that the radio necessarily followed wider tendencies in performance choices. Classics were constantly present in high-brow cultural consumption, which was, ironically, fully independent of the will of the Soviet Element. However, the latter’s efforts to bring in recordings, notes and retransmissions objectively contributed to Soviet goals, and the more culturally minded agents on both the Soviet and Austrian sides were aware of this achievement. The broadcasting of Russian music was fraught with controversies, in spite of which it continued its near-triumphant march through Austrian airtime. The more unproblematic French offerings gradually increased the French musical presence on the airwaves, achieving substantial progress during the occupation years.

The media presence of music was therefore embedded in a multidimensional network of power, economic, generational and political relations, which unfolded between the Allied powers, government organs, political parties, centres and peripheries, and, ultimately, between the individuals responsible for critical writing. Despite the seeming predominance of the top-down perspective, many *topoi* of the critical response were to a very large extent constructed by cultural journalists themselves, who negotiated their relationships, and attempted to influence public responses, in keeping with their previous professional socialisation. They also negotiated their relations with different political frameworks, and with those free spaces that existed within given censorship regimes and editorial policies. The simple fact of US domination of the Austrian media market, and its monopoly over the newspaper press in the provinces outside of Vienna, does not in itself suffice to explain the various patterns of behaviour displayed in relation to foreign cultural products. Indeed, this was as much determined by the discourses of conservatism and nationalism as by the apparent obedience to the language codes of democracy and western integration. Virtually all critics proved

intractable in maintaining the educational and stylistic foundations of their musical analysis. Throughout Austria, even the style and language revealed a surprising degree of uniformity. This tendency was undoubtedly encouraged by a combination of factors favouring a conservative mood: the high-culture campaigns waged by all the occupation powers in an attempt to restore or establish their position within the “land of music,” the construction of a new sense of nationhood based on traditional “Austrian” cultural values, the educational background of most Allied officers (which came close to the standards upheld in Austria itself), and the unintended consequences of such policies as the Zhdanovian socialist-realist turn. All Austrian newspapers, in Vienna and beyond, remained committed to the idea of musical nationalism and national music, as an expression of the respective peoples' inherent qualities – which factored into the musical representations of the Allies, and the construction of nationally defined musical canons. Likewise, cultural journalists and the vast majority of cultural publics distanced themselves from significant aspects of musical modernity. Radio provided more space for direct exposure of listening audiences to musical products, and the advances of some cultural actors, notably the French, are remarkable for their understanding of the public potential of this medium, and their careful building-up of working relationships with the American, British and Austrian decision-makers. In these cases, the medium, far from being a neutral transmission channel, proved a powerful tool for moulding the intended cultural messages of the Allies, and for interacting with the listening habits of cultural audiences. Aesthetics and power thus went hand in hand, shaping both cultural dialogue and dialogue about culture.

Chapter 4. Soviet Concerts: Red Artists or Old Russia?

Despite the marked difference between the conceptualising and decision-making process in France and the USSR, both occupation administrations were faced with a number of comparable challenges while conducting practical concert diplomacy. More interestingly, the resulting cultural product revealed a significant number of similarities, while the patterns of conduct and erstwhile reception of official cultural diplomacy diverged substantially, owing mostly to the growing gulf between the Austrians and the Soviet power, and the opposite direction that Austro-French relations were taking. The Soviet Element, aware of the complications with which its delicate situation was fraught, sought to infuse an inclusive cultural presence into the Austrian soundscape, which would reflect all facets of Soviet cultural creation, demonstrating the benefits of a firm connection between artists and the people that they served. From world-class soloists performing at the Konzerthaus, to open-air performances by folk dance ensembles, the Soviet selection tended towards mixed groups that

blended together genres and styles.

French musical diplomacy revealed its own particular traits, defining itself in relation to world-leading Parisian academic performance schools, later inchoating on the field of folk art, and putting a particularly strong and publicly visible emphasis on opera and ballet. Moreover, French musical exports also aimed at varied audiences, and recreated a vast array of performing and listening experiences – without mixing them up – and, characteristically, overtook the Soviets more than twice in the overall quantity of tours. Dance diplomacy, while represented only by a restricted number of soloist “swans” from the Soviet Union, came to full fruition in French policies. It is interesting that while the USSR actively engaged in ballet diplomacy elsewhere, notably in France (despite grave political complications),⁸³⁷ Austria was not considered among potential destinations. In other genres, the outlook was more complex, whereby the cream of the crop of the two countries, along with the best musicians from Austria, Britain and Italy, brought about the cultural renaissance of Vienna; the situation varied from case to case, in accordance with genres and temporal frameworks.

Putting the best on show, in a pageant of the most refined musicians produced by France and the USSR, was a pure projection of prestige, and, at the same time, played its role in breaching the stone walls of Austrian cultural supremacism, by showing the excellent standards maintained in other European countries. For this reason, both powers, as well as their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, had to pay close attention to actual Austrian demand, and select those performers and works most likely to go down well with the public. Informed by these considerations, guest tours were therefore the most obvious option, and the most sensible example of cultural diplomacy as prestige diplomacy. As such, they required elaborate strategies, careful planning, substantial financial injections, and advertisement campaigns, as well as necessary infrastructure and supervision following the musicians’ arrival. The occupation administrations, in particular their cultural officers, their headquarters in Paris in Moscow, their bilateral societies and local partners, dealt with these complex and varied challenges, whereby the strengths and the weaknesses of the respective systems soon came to the fore. In this respect, one had to contend with the fixed opinion of the Austrian public, and the Austrian press itself displayed attitudes that were far from servile. Large parts of the following chapters will therefore be dedicated to the responses to incoming tours in Austrian critical writing, and the discourses that were constructed around the musicians, as both representatives of their nations and exponents of their respective styles, directions, and genres. Given the often unpredictable results that a particular tour would produce, and the substantial investments, alongside certain personal and professional stakes, that cultural diplomats made in artistic tours, this side of

⁸³⁷ Stéphanie Gonçalves, “Les danseurs soviétiques à Paris et à Londres pendant la guerre froide : entre travail, tourisme et propagande politique, 1954-1968,” *Les Cahiers Sirice* 2/16 (2016): 69-82. Accessed 04.01.2017. URL : <http://www.cairn.info/revue-les-cahiers-sirice-2016-2-page-69.htm>

French and Soviet artistic exports soon became the crown jewel of musical diplomacy. While it implied some risk, it was a policy conducted by all the powers, and the USSR and France had made a point of doing so earlier than their British and American allies. The Soviet Union arrived first, and could thus reap the harvest of erstwhile Austrian fascination.

Selecting Soviet Artists to Come to Austria

Soviet musicians, arriving in Vienna in 1945, entered a country that had lived through a radical wartime rupture of cultural relations, as well as traumatic liberation experiences. Wary of the internal and external constraints to which they were subject, artists exemplified the Soviet state, the Soviet people, and, at the same time, interacted with existing Austrian preconceptions and expectations, while also contributing to their evolution. Representing genres such as classic European art music, entertainment music and folk music, they addressed different cultural codes, and, to some extent, different audiences. Actual tours were surprisingly rare, compared to other powers, which makes the notion of a constant Soviet musical presence problematic. Rather, these were intermittent occasions upon which to celebrate or debate contemporary Soviet schools of performance (which fed into the discourse of the Soviet Union's cultural superiority, then gaining even greater relevance for the Soviets⁸³⁸), to contrast them with Austrian or other traditions, and to engage in a continuous discourse on musical Russian-ness, and the uneasy entanglement of the political, the cultural, the social, the national and the regional.⁸³⁹

In contrast to the *ad hoc* character of the first post-liberation tours, during subsequent periods, the Soviet bureaucratic machine began to extend its detailed planning schemes to the highly sensitive cultural-political arena of Austrian concert rooms. In its selection of locations and settings, however, the Soviet offering came to be rather inclusive, and extended beyond the most famous institutions, such as the Konzerthaus or the Musikverein, to factories, ÖSG rooms or open air-settings, being dictated by the policy of diversifying genres and target audiences.⁸⁴⁰ Filling the positions was a weighty responsibility. Artists were chosen from a pre-selected pool, which, while in part dependent on individual decisions, was subject to a series of internal party checks on different levels, up to the Cultural Ministry.⁸⁴¹ It also took into account musical skills (such as technique), previous experience,

⁸³⁸ See: Tomoff, *Virtuosi Abroad...*

⁸³⁹ On the fascinating intermingling of these aspects on both the performing and the "receiving" side, see the research of Veit Erlmann, and much of the new ethno-musicology and musical sociology, as well as Gienow-Hecht, *The World Is Ready to Listen...*

⁸⁴⁰ Kraus, 27.

⁸⁴¹ L.M. Sargan, "Kulturnaia politika vlastei: k voprosu ob organizacii poezdok leningradskikh artistov za granitsu v 60-

political loyalty, and the relative position within the power framework of the Soviet cultural establishment. This framework became solidified concomitantly with the party effort to impose a unified Socialist-Realist canon, and, indeed, was part and parcel of that process. Constant pressure on artists was maintained not only under Stalinism, but also after the relative relaxation in subsequent periods.⁸⁴² Ultimately, as paternalistic and clientelistic relations were widespread among both apparatchiks and artists,⁸⁴³ some informal agreements and *ad hoc* decisions can be assumed to have played a significant role, even if this is not recorded in the sources. Such tendencies resulted in a markedly uniform selection, based on a small number of artists deemed worthy of export.⁸⁴⁴

Folk music and dance represented a perfect arena for the Soviet system, combining the “national popular” flavour of local ethnic traditions with relative accessibility – training could start from scratch even with adults – and the programme had a certain emotional charge, due to its collective character.⁸⁴⁵ The organised cultural milieu of the Soviet Union allowed for the creation of a huge number of companies, ensembles, choirs, and trios. Starting from amateur art – *samodeiatel'nost'* – these often stemmed from larger Soviet enterprises, recruiting their performers from among the workers. Participation in concerts, competitions on the regional, republican or federal level, and thorough, often rigorous training, actually brought about a blurring of the line between professionals and amateurs.

Furthermore, as the Land of Soviets was traversed by a network of professional cultural institutions – a national republic was obliged to have a national and a Russian dramatic, an opera theatre, and, of course, a national musical tradition, represented by opera, as well as an Academy of Sciences, a university, and institutions of artistic training.⁸⁴⁶ A provincial (*oblast'*) capital also had to maintain a theatre and to host some musical events. Orchestras and choirs were therefore more or less common

70-e gg. XX veka” [The Cultural Policies of the State Authorities: On the Question of the Organisation of the Trips of Leningrad Artists Abroad in the 1960-70s], *Izvestiia Rossiiskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta im. A.I. Gertsena* 43-1: 17 (2007): 288-89.

⁸⁴² N.V. Beloshapka, “Kulturnoie sotrudnichestvo SSSR s zapadnymi stranami v kontekste ideologicheskogo protivostoianiiia” [The Cultural Cooperation of the USSR with the Western Countries in the Context of Ideological Opposition], *Vestnik Udmurtskogo Universiteta* 35-3 (2011): 40-41.

⁸⁴³ See Kirill Tomoff, *Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers*.

⁸⁴⁴ Parallels with the French situation cannot be overlooked, as the state operated with a restricted number of first-class musicians, who were subject to *épuración*, and who had to demonstrate an artistic record within France, and possibly abroad, and to persuade the powerful cultural diplomats at the Foreign Ministry and ancillary organisations to include them in the programmes of state subsidies. Undoubtedly, the substantially different nature of the political regime in the two countries constitutes a dividing line between the two cases.

⁸⁴⁵ Igor' Narski, “Mezhdu sovietskoi gordost'u, politicheskoi bditel'nostiu i kulturnym shokom. Amerikanskiie gastroli narodnogo ansambliia tantsev 'Samotsvety' v 1979 godu” [Between Soviet Pride, Political Vigilance and Cultural Shock: The American Tour of the 'Samotsvety' Folk Dance Ensemble in 1979], *Cahiers du monde russe* 1 (2013) Cairn.info, accessed 19.11.2015, URL: http://www.cairn.info.ezproxy.eui.eu/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=CMR_541_0329&DocId=328472&hits=8838+8837+8836+8835+8834+8833+8832+8831+8+7+6+5+4+3+2+1+.

⁸⁴⁶ A deeper analysis of Soviet musical politics in the national republics was provided by Frolova-Walker: Marina Frolova-Walker, “‘National in Form, Socialist in Content’: Musical Nation-Building in the Soviet Republics,” *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 51:2 (1998): 331-371.

in major cities, according to their scale and status. After the initial period of sporadic measures of regulation and control during the 1920s, the party-state evolved towards exercising effective cultural supervision over concert activities throughout the USSR.⁸⁴⁷ This was the background against which musicians were commissioned for Austrian tours.⁸⁴⁸ Also relevant were the strategic expectations of Soviet decision-makers with regards to Austria. The Russian performing school was maintained largely intact in the most prestigious conservatories of the country, and its meritocratic character ensured that the ablest musicians were chosen to represent the country abroad. Because Austria was a capitalist country and was perceived as the musical heartland of the world, Soviet officials felt obliged to put high artistic demands on potential candidates, which went beyond the usual security service checks. Much like French cultural diplomats, VOKS and the occupation officers preferred established names, such as Oborin, Ojstrakh or Gilels, who had already “proven” themselves through their previous experience of touring abroad. A. Khoroshko, a scientist who visited Austria as part of a VOKS delegation in 1946, characteristically stressed in a report written upon his return to Moscow, that, with regard to Austrian audiences, “performances of excellent musicians, such as Flier, Gilels, Oborin, Ojstrakh”, would be “the most expedient method” of propaganda.⁸⁴⁹ Indeed, propagandistic infiltration was consistently attempted (e.g. during an Oborin tour in Germany in 1947,⁸⁵⁰ and a number of efforts by the Soviet press in Austria), and the formal artistry of the best Soviet musicians was also expected to serve this purpose, by accommodating both Soviet realism and cultural conservatism.⁸⁵¹ Equally, the programme was expected to concentrate on recognised classics, while also including some less known or modern pieces, which were thereby introduced to the Austrian listener.

For its part, the ÖSG fully supported and indeed demanded further tours, from which the Society could expect an increased number of visitors, considerable publicity and potential growth of its membership base, as musical programmes consistently proved to be among the more popular areas of Soviet cultural propaganda. Attempting to liaise between Soviet and Austrian cultural actors, the ÖSG initially intervened with the Viennese authorities: in 1947, Ruth Fischer wrote in a highly characteristic letter to General Körner, at that time Mayor of Vienna:

⁸⁴⁷ Iu. V. Fedotova. “Tsentralisatsiia kontsernoi sistemy v Rossii (1917-1941 gg.)” [The Centralization of the Concert System in Russia (1917-1941)], *Vestnik IuUrGU. Seriya „Sotsial’no-gumanitarnye nauki“* 13/1 (2013): 71-74.

⁸⁴⁸ In Austria, not much was to be seen of the original *samodeiatelnosti*, although this concept remains relevant as describing the combination of grass-roots activism and political supervision from above that created unique Soviet performing realities, as professional and semi-professional ensembles head-hunted among the amateur pool.

⁸⁴⁹ GARF, fond 6283, opis’ 16, delo 12, list 146.

⁸⁵⁰ Caute, 380.

⁸⁵¹ The topos of conservative modernisation, much discussed in the later literature on Stalinism (Fitzpatrick, David-Fox), acquires both a domestic and a transnational dimension when Soviet performers and Austrian listeners were directly confronted.

*Furthermore, it remains extraordinarily important that visits of Soviet Russian artists and, as far as possible, scientists, [and] sportsmen ... would be again supported by VOKS... [and] that these should not travel only in the Russian zone, but also in the western federal provinces. It is exactly from there that urgent calls have become increasingly loud.*⁸⁵²

Subsequently, the ÖSG and VOKS embarked on a long process of negotiations for further concerts to be held in Austria. In reality, as has been noted in research on Soviet guest tours and foreign cultural exchange,⁸⁵³ the dialogue became more specific, and less loaded with standard party-political newspeak. The respective Musical Sections conducted negotiations that dealt with technical and commercial issues, and this was more constructive than the correspondence of the Propaganda Department. Individual, usually famous, musicians were discussed. Their ÖSG interlocutors managed to secure a number of tours for their Congresses, and thus gave the planned Weeks and Months of Friendship a genuinely Soviet programme, seconded by Austrian contributions from the local ÖSG functionaries – although mostly not of an artistic nature. In almost every year, there were large-scale tours organised more or less in this manner, while ÖSG delegations also visited the USSR quite frequently, mostly around May 1st or November. Another feat was combining individual top class soloists with larger ensembles.

The initiative for these enterprises lay almost exclusively on the Austrian side. The ÖSG expressed increasingly clear wishes with regards to Soviet musicians, and this became particularly visible around the grand friendship weeks of 1950 and 1951. The most characteristic part of the ASC message, however, reflected the chronic illnesses of Soviet bureaucracy: the functionaries almost literally implored their Soviet colleagues to let them know in due time when the musicians would arrive from Russia, so that basic measures of preparation and advertisement could be conducted.⁸⁵⁴ Many of these calls went unheeded. For the Festival of Vienna in May 1952, the Austrians expressed a strong desire for “first class” Soviet soloists, such as Oistrach, Serebriakov or Gilels, to be accompanied by a musicologist delegation.⁸⁵⁵ Disappointed in their expectations, they could only repeat their demands in 1955⁸⁵⁶, this time supported by Parkaev.⁸⁵⁷ In 1954, the ASC again requested

⁸⁵² “Weiters wäre es außerordentlich wichtig, daß der Besuch sowjetrussischer Künstler und wenn möglich aus von Wissenschaftlern, Sportlern ... von der WOKS wieder gefördert würde, wobei auch Bedacht darauf zu nehmen wäre, daß diese nicht nur in die russische Zone, sondern auch in die westlichen Bundesländer fahren müßten. Gerade von dort sind dringende Wünsche nach solchen Besuchen laut geworden.” 03.09.1947. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 18, list 28. (Underlining in the source text.)

⁸⁵³ Beloshapka, 73

⁸⁵⁴ “Wünsche für sowjetische Delegationen zu den “Oesterreichisch-Sowjetischen Freundschaftswochen 1951”. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 44, list 96.

⁸⁵⁵ Internationaler Musik-Kongress in Wien im Mai 1952. 14.02.1952. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 45, list 178.

⁸⁵⁶ Anatoly Parkaev, Typescript of Conversation with the ASC Secretary Grünberg [Zapis' besedy s sekretarëm ASO Grünbergom]. 25.08.1954. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 480, list 38.

⁸⁵⁷ Remarks on the Working Plan of the Austro-Soviet Society for September 1954 – July 1955 [Zamechaniia po planu

Oistrakh, forwarding an expression of interest from the *Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde*. This also requested E. Gilels and L. Kogan, as well as a considerable number of Soviet opera singers for eventual guest performances at the State Opera in Vienna and in the provinces.⁸⁵⁸ The Soviet Ministry of Culture was made aware of the hopes entertained by their Austrian partners, and of their disappointments too:

*In establishing better cultural relations with the Soviet Union, particular importance is attached to music. The successes of guest tours hitherto [...] have proven that once again. Regrettably, the effect of performances by Soviet musicians has been limited by circumstances, particularly the fact that it has not yet been possible for us to conduct their performances through the regular Austrian musical organisations, so that wide circles of the musical public have not yet been reached. This difficulty has arisen from the fact that several months are needed to plan an event within Austrian musical life, whereas [we have generally received] definite confirmations [from the Soviet authorities] only 3-4 weeks in advance, at best.*⁸⁵⁹

The growing inflexibility and inefficiency with which the Soviet bureaucracy conducted PR work abroad created considerable difficulties for ÖSG functionaries, who were increasingly reliant on Soviet musicians to salvage the Society's prestige, and to secure it a place in public discourse. Frustration over unanswered requests was evident. Austria, surrounded by the people's democracies, found itself facing a situation in which the latter were prioritized, since they fell into the Soviet sphere of influence. Sharp open criticism towards VOKS was rare, but even the most loyal Austrian collaborators eventually lost their temper:

over the last year and a half, important Soviet artists, despite us having contacted them in Prague and elsewhere, have been forced to pass by Vienna, because you did not give them permission to go to Vienna (Oistrakh, Spiller etc.). Those Soviet artists who gave concerts for troops stationed in

raboty Avstro-Sovetskogo Obshchestva na sentiabr' 1954 – iul' 1955 gg.]. 11.11.1954. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 480, list 127.

⁸⁵⁸ Letter from the Austro-Soviet Society to the Ministry of Culture of the USSR. 03.05.1954. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 54, listy 77-78.

⁸⁵⁹ "Bei dem Bemühen um die Herstellung besserer kultureller Beziehungen zwischen Österreich und der Sowjetunion kommt der Musik.. besondere Bedeutung zu. Die bisherigen guten Erfolge bei den Gastkonzerten ... haben das wieder bestätigt. Leider war aber die Wirkung des Auftretens sowjetischer Musiker durch die Tatsache beschränkt, dass es uns bisher nicht möglich war das Auftreten durch die normalen österreichischen Musikorganisationen durchzuführen und dadurch breite Kreise des musikalischen Publikums nicht erfasst wurden. Die Schwierigkeit ergab sich bisher daraus, dass für die Zusammenarbeit und den Einbau in das österreichische Musikleben eine monatelange Vorbereitungszeit notwendig ist, wir aber in der Vergangenheit die fixen Zusaten nur höchstens 3-4 Wochen vorher bekamen." Letter from the Austro-Soviet Society to the Ministry of Culture of the USSR. 03.05.1954. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 54, list 77.

*Austria, despite the telegraph calls from us and the VOKS Representative, [were allowed to perform] only in such restricted settings, despite the considerable prestige and sympathy that public concerts would have brought to our Society.*⁸⁶⁰

The ÖSG's relative centrality to musical exchange was increasingly undermined during the 1950s, since the Soviet authorities increasingly dealt directly with foreign organisations, bypassing bilateral societies (e.g., the VOKS Representative would be expected to contact the Konzerthaus, instead of the ÖSG Musical Section). This contradicted the initial policy of strengthening foreign societies, and had the potential to seriously damage the ÖSG's public outreach. When the ÖSG apparently complained to Norbert Bischof, the Austrian Ambassador to Moscow, about the lax behaviour of their Soviet counterparts, the VOKS President Denisov told the Ambassador that when it came to “commercial” tours, the Soviet Union preferred to negotiate with concert organisers directly.⁸⁶¹ While the records of these negotiations appear to be incomplete, the Soviet Element eventually managed to organise concerts at the Konzerthaus and Musikverein in Vienna, and continued to privilege Lower Austria, where its administrative resources made for potential diplomatic difficulties.

Touring Austria

As the Red Army rolled back the German resistance in Europe, it was accompanied by musicians and ensembles, responsible for maintaining the morale of the troops, and also giving concerts for local populations. The ensemble of the Central Group of Troops had already performed in liberated Austrian towns in April-May 1945.⁸⁶² Such conditions allowed the Soviet Union to take the lead among the occupation powers, sending its musicians to Austria long before they did. Realising the importance of this advantage, VOKS inquired about the possibility to launching a first representative tour during the summer, attaching a list which included Galina Ulanova, Lev Oborin, David Oistrakh, and Sviatoslav Knushevitzky.⁸⁶³ The Politbureau acted promptly, deciding on July 11th, 1945, to deploy the artists to Austria, and charging Kemenov and Ivan Solodovnikov⁸⁶⁴ with a 25

⁸⁶⁰ ÖSG Directing Board to the VOKS Director, 25.06.1948. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 117, list 156.

⁸⁶¹ Typescript of the Conversation of the President of the VOKS Directing Board, A.I. Denisov, with the Ambassador of the Austrian Federal Republic [sic] in the USSR, N. Bischoff. [Zapis' besedy Predsedatelia pravleniia VOKS A.I. Denisova s poslom Avstriiskoi Federal'noi Respubliki v SSSR N. Bischoffom] 23.05.1955. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 494, list 54.

⁸⁶² Mueller, OZ und RS, 18-19.

⁸⁶³ A letter from VOKS President Kemenov to the Secretary of CC ACP(b) Malenkov, July 4th 1945. RGANI, fond 3, opis' 35, delo 36, list 27. He referred to a request by the Austrian government to host Soviet artists.

⁸⁶⁴ He was among the powerful functionaries of the Committee for Cultural Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. He never again intervened directly in the Austrian case.

day-long guest tour.⁸⁶⁵

Following these plans, and upon an invitation from the provisional Chancellor, Karl Renner, the first major delegation arrived in August:⁸⁶⁶ this was comprised of the soloists of the Bolshoi Theatre, including Galina Ulanova, the violinist David Oistrakh, the pianist Lev Oborin, and the cellist Sviatoslav Knushevitzky. Together, they represented the best of Soviet music in their respective spheres, and their high-quality classical programme was unequivocally hailed by the Viennese press,⁸⁶⁷ both for political considerations and owing to their undoubted exceptional mastery.

Image 1. David Oistrakh in Vienna in July 1945

⁸⁶⁵ Excerpt from the Protocol N° 46 of the Central Committee Politburo Session – Decision from July 11, 1945 [Vypiska iz protokola N° 46 zasedaniia Politburo TsK – Resheniie ot 11 iul'ia 1945]. RGANI, fond 3, opis' 35, delo 36, list 25.

⁸⁶⁶ See: Kraus, 27-28; Mueller, *Kulturnaia politika...*, Mueller 2005: 96-98.

⁸⁶⁷ “Moskauer Künstler in Wien,” *Neues Österreich* 15.07.1945: 4. “Moskauer Künstler konzertieren in Wien,” NÖ 18.07.1945: 4. “Festempfang in der Hofburg: Zu Ehren der Moskauer Künstler,” NÖ 20.07.1945: 4. “Wir sehen russisches Ballett,” NÖ 21.07.1945: 4. Peter Lafite, “Jubel um große Sänger: Eröffnungskonzert der Moskauer Künstler,” NÖ 22.07.1945: 4. Oskar M. Fontana, “Spitzen des russischen Balletts. Gastspiel der Moskauer Künstler,” NÖ 24.07.1945: 4. Peter Lafite, “Konzerte der Moskauer Künstler,” NÖ 25.07.1945: 4. Eiusdem, “Konzert Natalia Spiller,” NÖ 26.07.1945: 4. Eiusdem, “Klavierabend Leo Oborin,” NÖ 28.07.1945: 4. Eiusdem, “Konzert Alexej Iwanow,” NÖ 29.07.1945: 4. Eiusdem, “Konzert David Oistrach,” NÖ 31.07.1945: 4. Eiusdem, “Tänzerin der edlen Harmonie: Gespräch mit Galina S. Ulanowa,” NÖ 01.08.1945: 4. Eiusdem, “Celloabend Swjatoslaw Knuschewitzky,” *ibid*, 4. Eiusdem, “Instrumentalkonzert der Moskauer Künstler,” NÖ 02.08.1945: 4. “Sonatenabend der Moskauer Künstler,” NÖ 03.08.1945: 4. Peter Lafite, “Denkwürdige Kammermusik: Oborin, Ojstrach, Knuschewitzky,” NÖ 04.08.1945: 4. “Abschiedsabend der Moskauer Künstler,” NÖ 04.08.1945: 4. “Ein Meister des Klavier: Leon N. Oborin, der berühmteste Pianist Rußlands,” NÖ 09.08.1945: 4. Hugo Glaser. “Die Brücke,” NÖ 10.08.1945: 4. Peter Lafite, “Abschiedsabend der Moskauer Künstler,” *ibid*, 4. “Im Walzerrhythmus: Beim Abschiedsabend der Moskauer Künstler tanzten G. Ulanowa und W. Preobraschenski einen Walzer von Rubinstein,” [Foto] *Arbeiter-Zeitung* 01.08.1945: 4. “Moskauer Künstler gastieren in Baden,” *Österreichische Zeitung* 02.08.1945: 2. “Die Moskauer Künstler gastierten in Baden,” *ÖZ* 09.08.1945: 2. “Abschiedskonzert der Moskauer Künstler,” *Volksstimme* 10.08.1945: 4.



Source: Boris Blaha, “Sowjetische Künstler in Wien. Der Violinvirtuose David Ojstrach,” *Bildarchiv Austria*, accessed 14.05.2016, http://www.bildarchivaustria.at/Pages/ImageDetail.aspx?p_iBildID=1488814

This selection aimed to show that Russian artists were second-to-none in performing the classical European repertoire. Moreover, collaboration with Viennese musicians was crucial in persuading Austrian audiences that Russians and Austrians stood on an equal footing. Thus, the first concert, given on July 23rd, featured the Soviet soloists David Oistrakh and Sviatoslav Knushevitzky performing in the Konzerthaus *Großer Saal* with the Vienna Philharmonics, conducted by Fritz Sedlak; their repertoire included four works by Tchaikovsky, and a premiere of Khatchaturian (the Concert for Violin and Orchestra in d-moll, written in 1940).⁸⁶⁸ Further programmes included Pietro Locatelli, Ludwig van Beethoven, César Franck, Ernest Chausson, Piotr Tchaikovsky, Sergei Taneev, Nikolai Miaskovsky, Sergei Prokofiev, Aram Khatchaturian, and Dmitry Shostakovich. These first concerts were celebrated by the Soviet Element and the federal government, with receptions including the Federal Chancellor, ministers, state secretaries and Allied dignitaries. Thus, the climate of inter-Allied entente remained as yet unbroken. Characteristically, though, the artistic elements drew more attention from the press, which vividly discussed the peculiarities of the style and manner displayed by the musicians, far more so than the political framework, at a time when

⁸⁶⁸ Programme, Archiv des Wiener Konzerthauses – Datenbanksuche.

Soviet diplomacy was taking a very careful stance with regards to openly propagandist messages. This first resounding success of sonic diplomacy left a deep impression on contemporaries, being part of a policy of rapid cultural advance pursued in Vienna and Berlin. Standing in sharp contrast with the dire everyday realities of post-liberation Vienna, the tour re-introduced the USSR as a great European cultural power; not surprisingly, many public commentators spoke of musical Russia re-assuming its due place on Austrian stages.

Matters Taking Their Normal Course

Following the spectacular entry that the Soviet Element made onto the Viennese scene, musical Russianness came to be much celebrated during the subsequent seasons. Thus, Soviet intentions met many Austrian expectations. When a representative setting was needed for an official event by the Soviet military administration, the Ensemble of the Central Group of Troops was often responsible for creating an appropriate musical ambience – characteristically, French Commissioner Béthouart was still recalling their excellent performances twenty years later.⁸⁶⁹ In its wideness and characteristically broad scope, the Soviet musical offering consisted not only of general European-style classic music, but also of different layers of folk music, divided into a generically “Soviet” soundscape, based on aspects of Russian folklore, and other elements harnessed to display the multicultural, and yet united, Soviet state.

Academic and folk dance unsurprisingly became one of the key elements of the musical imagery that the USSR projected in Austria. Significantly, no “authentic” dance form was brought to the stage, since Soviet dance theory (much of which, however, was articulated later) clearly differentiated between “genuine” dances and staged performances.⁸⁷⁰ This was exemplified by the enigmatic “Soviet” folk dance, which meant a production by academic ballet companies in major cities, vaguely based on elements from (central or southern) Russian peasant culture, enriched by additions from other regions. Moreover, these ensembles were often linked to the military. The “Russian” folk choirs and dance ensembles, the tradition of which partly predated the Soviet Union, conveyed an image of folkish musical Russianness, which, while standing in a controversial

⁸⁶⁹ Béthouart, 233.

⁸⁷⁰ O.D. Svid, “Narodno-stsenicheski tanets v sisteme russkikh narodnykh ispolnitel’skikh tradicii” [Folk-Scenic Dance in the System of Folk Performative Traditions), in: *Kultura, Iskustvo, Obrazovaniie: Problemy i perspektivy razvitiia. Materialy nauchno-prakticheskoi konferencii s mezhdunarodnym uchastiiem (8 fevralia 2013 g.)* [Culture, Art, Education: Problems and Perspectives of Development. Materials of the Scientific-Practical Conference with International Participations, February 8th, 2013] (Smolensk: Smolenskii gosudarstvennyi institute iskusstva, 2013), 476-8.

relationship with the “Soviet”, delivered a carefully constructed programme that combined exotic elements, such as costumes, with elements of training and musical content that did not enter into conflict with a Viennese public accustomed to European music. Non-ethnically Russian art was brought to Vienna by Uzbek and particularly Georgian music: the State Song and Dance Ensemble of the Georgian SSR, one of the largest sent to Austria, achieved a degree of public success that surpassed even Soviet expectations. While the overall frequency of Soviet tours lagged significantly behind France, almost all Soviet tours received a significant and positive critical response.

Large-Scale Ensembles: Folk Elements and Academic Schooling

The “*generically Soviet*” element was put on show through colourful dances and songs, staged by the local CGT ensemble, such as in a successful performance given in May 1946,⁸⁷¹ and later by musicians brought in from the USSR. Although rooted in a combination of “native” elements, this art often escapes a clear-cut ethnic identification: the Soviet people as a whole was portrayed as a healthy, and hearty, flourishing (imperial) community. These concerts occurred mostly around late 1949, which coincided with the Georgian tour, and led to a relative concentration of Soviet musical presence at this time.

Interconnections between different genres were envisaged, and such performances thus transcended the bounds of purely “musical” diplomacy. Thus, while the Central Theatre of the Red Army was technically a dramatic theatre, their performance of Lope de Vega's *The Teacher* included a display of acrobatic dancing that received laudatory reviews in the press.⁸⁷²

The Ensemble of the Air Force, which came to Vienna later in December 1949,⁸⁷³ also impressed the Austrian public, with a series of concerts performed during the Christmas season.⁸⁷⁴ The repertoire of their five performances at the Konzerthaus ranged from Glinka and Tchaikovsky to Novikov's notoriously propagandistic *Hymn of the Democratic Youth*, and a number of pieces of contemporary Soviet dance music. Together, these constituted a mid-range, relatively unproblematic guest tour, which in general fulfilled its public diplomacy objectives.

In some cases, however, critical reception took into account both the strengths and the weaknesses of such assorted programmes. This mixed, although not always unsuccessful, approach to “all-Soviet” folk art is best exemplified by Igor Moiseev. His State Ensemble of the Folk Dance of the

⁸⁷¹ “Rotarmisten singen und tanzen,” WP 01.06.1946: 6.

⁸⁷² Franz Tassié, “Gastspiel des Zentraltheaters der Roten Armee,” WP 23.08.1949: 6.

⁸⁷³ “Russischer Konzertabend,” WP 19.12.1949: 6.

⁸⁷⁴ Predictably, a short notice from the WK on December 17th, and four announcements in the *Österreichische Zeitung*, were made instead of the usual press releases.

USSR starred in a concert at the Viennese Hofburg in 1946, and earned an ecstatic front-page review in the *Wiener Kurier*.⁸⁷⁵ However, when the Moiseev Ensemble was again invited to Vienna in 1951, performing a programme that combined the various styles of the “different peoples united in the Soviet Union” with classic ballet elements, the press deemed that it did not fulfil the stylistic principles promised by the ensemble, and thus expected by Austrian critics.⁸⁷⁶ However, Soviet planners remained deaf to such calls for stylistic coherence. A 1954 concert of the CGT ensemble, for instance, still consisted of music ranging from Schubert, Strauß (*An der schönen blauen Donau*) and Verdi to the works of Alexandrov and Marcel Rubin, combined in a programme that apparently did not value either chronological or stylistic order.⁸⁷⁷

The main problem haunting these tours, and many other cultural enterprises of the Soviet Element, was the weakness of the preparatory work conducted with the local press, which meant that Soviet performers did not receive coverage comparable to that received by other categories of incoming artists. Secondly, no clear strategy can be discerned (as, ultimately, the total number of concerts is too low to draw far-reaching conclusions), and, apart from the Central Red Army Theatre, there is little evidence that Soviet functionaries ever showed a large degree of interest in these groups. Furthermore, a decidedly militarised outlook, the actual content of which was composite and the coherence of which was elusive, did not bode well for public success, given Austrian sensitivities. However, the feedback they received remained predominantly positive, which attested to the potential benevolence of the Austrian public towards the stylistically eclectic, yet high-quality Soviet Russian programmes, not yet marred by propagandistic excesses.

Apart from academic soloists, the Soviet Union also took the lead among the Allies with regard to classically framed folk art, as exemplified by Russian folk ensembles. These often achieved substantial success with Austrian audiences. Three months after the tour of August 1945, the occupation administration invited the renowned State Sveshnikov Choir of Russian Song, which was universally acclaimed by the benevolent Viennese press.⁸⁷⁸ The choir, certainly familiar to critics, succeeded in leaving a deep imprint on the Austrian scene, which was still relatively isolated, and struggling to resume its full concert activities. The impact made by the Sveshnikov choir was

⁸⁷⁵ “Sensationelller russischer Tanzabend in der Hofburg,” WK 15.01.1946: 1.

⁸⁷⁶ “Sowjetische Volkstänzer in der Scala,” WP 19.05.1951: 7.

⁸⁷⁷ Programme of the concert on October 31st, 1954, in the Großer Saal. (Datenbank)

⁸⁷⁸ “Russische Chormusik,” WK 10.11.1945: 4. “Russischer Staatschor wieder in Moskau,” WK 22.12.1945: 4. “Empfang in der Hofburg: Anlässlich des Jahrestages der Oktoberrevolution,” NÖ 08.11.1945: 2. Peter Lafite, “Der Swjeschnikow-Chor,” NÖ, 11.11.1945: 4. “Die letzten Konzerte des russischen Chors Swjeschnikows,” NÖ, NÖ 23.11.1945: 4. “Russisches Chorkonzert,” AZ 11.11.1945: 4. O. Leupold, “Der Moskauer Swjeschnikow-Chor in Wien,” ÖZ 04.11.1945: 3. Fritzi Beruth, “Russisches Chorkonzert,” WZ 14.11.1945: 3. “Russischer Chorkonzert,” ÖZ 19.11.1945: 3. Iwan Martynow, “Russischer Volkschor,” Die Brücke. Heft 2 (1945), 27-31.

momentous, and showed the vast potential of academically trained ensembles, performing a carefully prepared programme, which united exoticism with the recognisable quality of professional singing.

Despite this success, the propaganda authorities did not immediately capitalise on it, and the export of Russian folk song only resumed during the 1950s, under the changed circumstances of Viennese concert life, which had by then undergone a process of normalisation, and become familiar with the folk art of other Allies. The Piatnitzky-Choir, a second internationally renowned ensemble of Russian folk song, made an appearance at the Konzerthaus in 1950, following an official invitation from the ÖSG. Cultural diplomats chose to present the choir within a classical setting of exotic costumes and native Russian “colourful” songs, representative of the official definition of “folkishness”,⁸⁷⁹ and which had already proved successful in the Sveshnikov case. Unlike the usual Soviet potpourri, the programme did not include a single Austrian piece, even though one of the “kolkhoz” dances was termed *Gstanzl*,⁸⁸⁰ a term occasionally used to translate Soviet folklore into colloquial Austrian language. In general terms, the critical reception followed the same pattern of eulogic, albeit polite, amazement.⁸⁸¹ The choir's “rough” voices, which made no attempt to satisfy western European academic standards, commanded attention, as did the fact that such music was firmly rooted in “native soil.” In this sense, the Viennese press sought to construct a positively laden national stereotype. For instance, the *Weltpresse* was enchanted by the Slavic “*Naturvolk*”, and, unlike other reviews, drew parallels between Russian and Austrian popular cultures. Moreover, like the official programme, it also compared Russian *chastushky* with Alpine *Gstanzl*, thus making such cultural parallels comprehensible to the general public.⁸⁸²

Later attempts at a grand tour of folk ensembles had varying degrees of success. For example, the famed “Berioska” (“Birch-Tree”), which arrived from Budapest in late 1949 (at the time when State Treaty negotiations reached a stalemate and the Soviet Union would benefit from a compensating charming offensive⁸⁸³), along with several soloists,⁸⁸⁴ and greeted with the usual salutations of the

⁸⁷⁹ Marcel Rubin, “Volkskunst mit Lebensfreude,” VS 29.03.1950: 4.

⁸⁸⁰ Programme of the concert on March 27th, 1950, Großer Saal.

⁸⁸¹ “Pjatnitzki-Chor im Konzerthaus,” WZ 30.03.1950: 4. It almost coincided with the Parisian Ballet tour, but, luckily for the Russians, there still was a week between them, and different venues were involved.

⁸⁸² “Der Piatznitzki-Volkschor,” WP 29.03.1950: 5.

⁸⁸³ There is no clear evidence that cultural functionaries deliberately or consistently used popular musicians in order to alleviate prestige losses inflicted by political developments unfavourable for the Soviet Union. This was particularly less likely from the long-term planning perspective; on the other hand, notable concentration of tours in 1949 and later in 1950 happened at the time of the diplomatic crisis and the Oktoberstreik, which, however, were not explicitly cited by cultural propagandists in the run-up to the concerts.

⁸⁸⁴ Interestingly enough, such mobility within the Central Group of Troops generated a large quantity of documentation, and was decided on the CC level. See: Letter from the Chairman of the Foreign Policy Commission of the CC ACP(b) Grigoryan to Comrade Stalin [Zapiska Predsedatelia Vneshnepoliticheskoy Commissii TsK VKP(b) tov. Stalinu, N° 25-B-5067]. 13.09.1949. RGANI, fond 3, opis' 35, delo 37, list 114. (Copies were sent to Molotov, Beriia, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Bulganin.) An excerpt from a Politburo decision confirmed the positive response on September 15th. (RGANI, fond 3, opis' 35, delo 37, list 113).

Soviet and Communist press,⁸⁸⁵ did not attract much critical appreciation from other quarters. Notably, the *Wiener Kurier* found the technique of its members to be inconsistent, particularly criticising the Uzbek soloist Rosa Baglanova.⁸⁸⁶ Undoubtedly, part of the problem stemmed from a potentially unfavourable comparison with the very successful French tours and the Georgian ensemble, against which it was difficult to compete. When “Berioska” visited again in 1953, no longer facing any direct competition, the degree of success attained was certainly higher.⁸⁸⁷ Some improvements in logistics had been made, with classical open-air events, concerts in the industrial hubs of Lower Austria – targeting the audience working in Soviet-held plants and facilities – and, as earlier, performances at the Konzerthaus.⁸⁸⁸ Despite these improvements, Soviet shortcomings in PR work and problematic timing (most newspapers reduced their cultural reporting during the summer) meant that “Berioska” never quite managed to win the favour of the local press.⁸⁸⁹

The public relations of other Soviet ensembles were subject to a similar combination of advantages and shortcomings. For example, the Voronezh choir of Russian song, which gave concerts across Austria in 1951, successfully requested to prolong their stay,⁸⁹⁰ which indirectly testifies to the public success of its concerts. This tour, however, fell in the dead zone between the seasons, and there is little record of it in the local sources. Unlike the French, the Soviet Element visibly struggled due to its worsening relations with the Austrian press, and increasingly failed to attract substantial critical attention. Ultimately, coverage of these events was largely limited to the Communist press, which makes it nearly impossible to assess the reactions of the public towards these Soviet guests.

These problems notwithstanding, the Soviet Element managed to achieve notable, if intermittent, successes in performing non-Great-Russian folk music. The Caucasus was an obvious choice, owing

⁸⁸⁵ “Die Poesie des russischen Tanzes: Von N.S. Nadjeshdina, künstlerische Leiterin und Regisseurin der Tänze des Moskauer choreographischen Ensembles “Die junge Birke”,” *ÖZ*, 01.10.1949: 5. Rudolf Hoffmann, “Völkerverbindende Jugend,” *ÖZ* 04.10.1949: 5. “Zum Auftreten des “Berjoska“-Ensembles,” *ÖZ* 07.10.1949: 5. Hans Hajas, “Sowjetische Volkskunst im Konzerthaus,” *ÖZ* 08.10.1949: 5. “Stimmen zum Auftreten der “Berjoska”,” *ÖZ* 09.10.1949: 5.

⁸⁸⁶ “Im Rampenlicht,” *WK* 10.10. 1949: 4.

⁸⁸⁷ Parkaev prepared a lengthy report on this tour, in which he estimated the amount of Austrians present at 4,000 persons (his counting methods were never clarified)

⁸⁸⁸ Programme of July 16, 1953 (Wiener Konzerthaus – Datenbank).

⁸⁸⁹ The Soviet Österreichische Zeitung stood quite alone, although it produced a remarkable salvo of articles. “Tanzkunst der Lebensfreude : zum bevorstehenden Auftreten der “Berjoska”,” *ÖZ*, 12.07.1953: 5. ““Wir freuen uns aufrichtig, in Oesterreich unsere Kunst zu zeigen“: Gespräch mit der künstlerischen Leiterin der Berjoska,” *ÖZ*, 17.07.1953: 6. Rudolf Hoffmann, “Jugend und Schönheit im Tanz : Zum Auftreten der “Berjoska” im großen Konzerthausaal,” *ÖZ* 18.07.1953: 6. “Der Hauch des Schönen und Frohen: “Berjoska” tanzt auf dem Matteottiplatz,” *ÖZ* 21.07.1953: 6. “Im Geiste des Volkes Neues schaffen: Ausspracheabend mit der Leiterin des “Berjoska“-Ensembles,” *ÖZ*, 28.07.1953: 6. ““Berjoska” morgen in Sankt Pölten... in Bad Vöslau ... in Krems,” *ÖZ* 29.07.1953: 6. “Foto: Die “Berjoska” in einem schwungvollen russischen Tanz,” *ÖZ* 01.08.1953: 6.

⁸⁹⁰ Politburo decision on 28.08.1951. RGANI, fond 3, opis' 35, delo 38, list 102. This time it was the Defence Ministry to resolve financial matters. The prolongation of the term was decided by the Politburo on September 28. On the Undertakings Relating to the Month of Austro-Soviet Friendship [O meropriiatiakh v sviazi s mesiachnikom avstro-sovetskoi druzhby]. RGANI, fond 3, opis' 35, delo 38, 112.

to its long-standing, renowned tradition of folk music, and the existence of a number of highly professionalised ensembles, which were capable of having a considerable effect when deployed on tour abroad. Much in this vein, a tour by the *Georgian State Ensemble of Song and Dance* came to be a major event in the 1949-50 season in Vienna, having secured the support of the Soviet administration at both Politburo and Central Committee level.⁸⁹¹ Georgia, a southern mountainous country not dissimilar to Austria, showed some parallels to the local situation. Indeed, a prominent member of the ÖSG, Prof. Rudolf Bleichsteiner, specialised in Georgian language and cultural anthropological studies, and might have been behind the idea to invite Georgian artists to Austria. It was expected that traditional Georgian polyphonic singing, long famous in Russia itself, and fiery Caucasian dancing would bring a note of diversity to the Viennese soundscape. Insofar as the Soviet planners were concerned, eventual success was clearly expected, particularly by VOKS. The reality, however, required considerable adjustments, in order to fully seize the opportunities created by the triumphant open air concerts of the Georgians. Johann Kopleinig, the head of the Communist Party, recognising the apparent “cultural-propagandistic” impact of the ensemble, personally requested the Soviet authorities to extend their stay in Austria, and to allow them to travel to the Western zones, and this was granted by the Soviet Politburo.⁸⁹² Despite the usual clumsiness of the bureaucratic structures involved, this case represents an exception, in which the transmission chain between the Austrian fellow-travellers and the highest levels of the Soviet state was immediately set in motion, and produced results within a few days.

The Georgian Ensemble successfully toured Vienna and Lower Austria, the Mühlviertel and Upper Austria, American Upper Austria, Styria, and Carinthia⁸⁹³, reaping a rich harvest of praise in the Soviet-Communist press, including the *Österreichische Zeitung*,⁸⁹⁴ *Die Brücke*,⁸⁹⁵ the *Volksstimme*⁸⁹⁶

⁸⁹¹ Excerpt from the Protocol N° 70 of PB CC ACP(b) Session [Vypiska iz protokola N° 70 zasedaniia Politburo TsK VKP(b)]. Decision from 20.07.1949. RGANI, fond 3, opis' 35, delo 37, list 109. They also toured Germany.

⁸⁹² Excerpt N° 71 from a decision taken on 19 September 1949. RGANI, fond 3, opis' 35, delo 37, list 118. The Committee on Arts Affairs of the Culture Ministry was charged with financing the trip.

⁸⁹³ In a unique exchange, the British permitted entry only in return for their own brass orchestra being allowed to visit the Soviet zone. Memorandum on the Conduct of the Cultural Weeks of Austro-Soviet Friendship [Spravka o provedenii kulturnykh nedel' avstriisko-sovetskoi družby]. 31.10.1949. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 28, list 62.

⁸⁹⁴ “Auftreten der georgischen Tänzer in Linz,” ÖZ, October 4, 1949, 5. “Georgische Tänzer in Wien: Aus einem Gespräch mit Iliko Sushischwili und Nino Ramischwili,” ÖZ, September 1, 1949: 5. G. Klimow, “Kunst aus schöpferischer Volkskraft,” ÖZ 02.09.1949: 5. Hans Hajas, “Gastspiel des Staatlichen Georgischen Volkstanzensembles im Konzerthaus,” ÖZ 04.09.1949: 5. “Sowjetische Künstler bei Erdölarbeitern,” ÖZ 07.09.1949: 5. “Das Wiener Publikum über die Darbietungen der Kulturwochen für österreichisch-sowjetische Freundschaft,” ÖZ 08.09.1949: 5. “Kunst von Volk zu Volk” ÖZ 10.09.1949: 5. “Die sowjetischen Künstler in Berrieben” ÖZ 11.09.1949: 6. “Boten des Friedens, der Freiheit und der Freundschaft : Ueber 100.000 bejubelten die sowjetischen Künstler auf dem Rathausplatz,” ÖZ 13.09.1949: 1, 5. “Ein Wunsch, der die georgischen Künstler in ihre Heimat begleitet: “Kommt bald wieder”,” ÖZ 06.10. 1949: 5. “Abschiedsworte der georgischen Tanzkünstler : Ein Gespräch mit Iliko Suchischwili und Nino Ramischwili,” ÖZ 07.10. 1949: 5.

⁸⁹⁵ Dr. Richard Fellner, “Von Volk zu Volk. Die Bilanz der Kulturwochen für österreichisch-sowjetische Freundschaft,” *Die Brücke* 09 (1949): 3-10.

⁸⁹⁶ “Das georgische Staatsensemble in Wien eingetroffen,” *Volksstimme*, August 31, 1949, 5. Marcel Rubin, “Die österreichisch-sowjetischen Kulturwochen. Volkstänze wie noch nie: Georgisches Ensemble begeistert Wien,” VS

and *Der Abend*,⁸⁹⁷ while also receiving occasional, though highly favourable, mentions in the non-Communist press.⁸⁹⁸ Given the growing tensions between the occupation powers (the political climate had been poisoned by the Berlin crisis, the failure to achieve a state treaty for Austria, and the commencing Korean War), this was a predictable journalistic reaction. In addition, the Ensemble unabashedly represented the official hard line of the Soviet party-state, while not being adequately introduced to the Viennese concert season through prior advertisement campaigns. Finally, an advertisement campaign in the non-Communist press seems to have been contemplated by the Soviets,⁸⁹⁹ which suggests an evolving approach in dealing with the Austrian market. Open-air concerts were amply employed in order to attract as large an audience as possible, including a concert in front of the Vienna City Hall together with the Ensemble of the Central Group of Troops. However, their effect was severely compromised by spoken propaganda: Niko Sukhishvili, the Ensemble's director, was obliged to deliver speeches campaigning for “peace” in front of his audience, which was in fact untypical for Soviet performances.

Ultimately, the Georgian tour, while being to a degree passed over in the anti-Soviet mainstream press, represented one of the most large-scale interventions that the Soviet element undertook in Austria. The Ensemble impacted upon the soundscape of Vienna and a number of other towns, staging concerts with a large public outreach potential, ranging from the Burgenland,⁹⁰⁰ where an exceptional Soviet tour was documented, to British Styria⁹⁰¹ and Carinthia,⁹⁰² and Soviet⁹⁰³ and American⁹⁰⁴ Upper Austria. The massive ideological campaign unleashed in the *Österreichische Zeitung* did not resonate in the public sphere, whereas the performances themselves – which included the Rathausplatz and the Karlsplatz in Vienna, two highly visible and audible locations – undoubtedly made the Georgian ensemble known to large audiences. While the extant sources do not

04.09.1949: 5. “Die Amerikaner senden ihre Generäle, die Russen ihre Künstler. Heute und morgen Großveranstaltungen der Georgier auf dem Rathausplatz,” VS 10.09.1949: 5. “Wiener Neustadt im Zeichen der Georgier,” *ibid.* “Interview mit den Georgiern,” VS 13.09.1949: 3. “Die Georgier konzertieren auch in Oberösterreich,” VS 01.10.1949: 5.

⁸⁹⁷ “Tänzer aus Georgien sind da!,” *Der Abend* 31.08.1949: 6. “Tänzer aus Tbilissi treten auf : Georgisches Tanzenensemble morgen im großen Konzerthausaal,” DA 01.09.1949, 6. “Wunderschönes Transkaukasien: Triumph des Georgischen Volkstanzenensembles im Konzerthaus,” DA 03.09.1949: 6. “Georgische Tänzer auf dem Rathausplatz,” DA 07.09.1949: 6. “Monsterkonzerte auf dem Rathausplatz,” DA 08.09.1949: 6. “Georgisches Ensemble beim Engelmann,” DA 12.09.1949: 6.

⁸⁹⁸ “Georgische Volkstänze,” *Wiener Zeitung* 06.09.1949: 4. Rupert Klein, “Oper und Tanzkunst des Folklore : Die ersten Ereignisse der Saison,” WK 06.09.1949: 4. “Gastspiel des Staatlichen Georgischen Volkstanzenensembles,” *Weltpresse* 06.09.1949: 6. “Triumph georgischer Tanzkunst,” NÖ 07.09.1949: 4.

⁸⁹⁹ “Sowjetische Kulturwochen in Wien,” WP 22.08.1949: 6. “Kulturwochen der österreichisch-sowjetischen Freundschaft,” *Die Presse* 19.08.1949: 4. “Österreichisch-sowjetische Kulturwochen,” DP 21.08.1949: 6. “Georgische Volkstänze auf dem Rathausplatz,” DP 09.09.1949: 4.

⁹⁰⁰ “Das Georgische Volkstanzenensemble in Eisenstadt,” ÖZ 15.09.1949: 5.

⁹⁰¹ “Georgisches Ensemble in Leoben” ÖZ 01.10.1949: 5.

⁹⁰² “Ihr helft bei gemeinsamen Kampf um Frieden”: Die georgischen Tanzkünstler in Villach und Steyr” ÖZ 05.10.1949: 5.

⁹⁰³ “Jubel um das Georgische Tanzenensemble in Urfahr,” ÖZ 14.09.1949: 5.

⁹⁰⁴ “Auftreten der georgischen Tänzer in Linz” ÖZ 04.10.1949: 5.

suggest widespread success in the pages of the newspaper press, this does not necessarily mean that the ensemble was unsuccessful with the wider concert public. Indeed, the prolongation of the initial tour strongly suggests that the Georgian dancers found a favourable response among concert-goers.

The folk music ensembles deployed by the USSR faced a certain degree of critical ostracism, while their public success was either mixed or considerable. They thus demonstrate the complexities and contradictions of Soviet musical diplomacy, particularly with regards to showcasing the most recognisably, and specifically “Russian” or “Soviet” music and dance in Austria, and the difficulties that the Soviets had in managing their relations with organised cultural milieus, which were becoming ever more frosty in their attitudes. In a wider perspective, however, it can be deduced that important advances were made, and individual decisions did at times lead to sensational results. In sum, academicised folk art was usually judged as being worth the financial and organizational effort invested in it – this being far superior to that invested in soloist concerts – and, in some instances, can be reliably said to have been welcomed in Austria, where audiences looked for, and found, musical “Russianness.”

Chamber Ensembles and Soloists

In chamber and solo music, the Soviet Union, while never attaining the numbers achieved by France, nonetheless strove to maintain a high profile. To an extent, quality compensated for quantity, and a few top-class artists could assure the prestige at which the Soviets aimed, at least among cultural milieus. This tendency began in 1945-46, and was undoubtedly linked to both cost-efficiency issues and the desire to confirm Soviet Russia’s position in the world of refined high culture. The technical standards observed in the major conservatories of Moscow and Leningrad constituted an important asset for Soviet musical diplomacy, since the Russian academic school was already well known in Austria, and formed part of Russia's “national” brand. Furthermore, Austria's position in central Europe allowed Soviet musicians touring the neighbouring countries to make a brief detour to Vienna, provided that bureaucratic hurdles did not make this impossible. For example, the famous conductor E. Mravinsky, together with Oistrakh and Oborin, arrived in Vienna from Prague in 1946⁹⁰⁵ and gave concerts before embarking on a flight back to Russia.

Both geography and public expectations could pose difficulties too. The symbolic bar for Soviet artists having been set so high, it would prove even more embarrassing if anything fell beneath it.

⁹⁰⁵ Excerpt from Protocol N° 52 of Politbureau Session – Issues of Foreign Policy Department of CC ACP(b) [Vypiska iz protokola N° 52 zasedaniia Politburo – Voprosy Otdela Vneshney politiki TsK VKP(b)]. June 26th, 1946. RGANI, fond 3, opis 3, delo 36, list 74.

Considering the state of Soviet bureaucracy and the extremely delicate conditions under which the Soviets operated in Austria, problems were certain to arise. Sudden indispositions of the invited stars, and, of course, chronic inadequacies in planning on the Soviet side, often aggravated the situation. Managing such unexpected difficulties became the responsibility of the cultural diplomats who supervised Soviet artists in Austria. When the famous singer Ivan Kozlovsky undertook a tour in late 1946, as part of the Month of Friendship, he caught a cold – which could not have been foreseen or cured overnight by any propaganda officer – to the extent that his voice, otherwise considered as being among the mightiest of European basses, appeared weak, and elicited only mild appreciation from the Austrian professionals in the room.

Kiselev and Zhuravlev, clearly disturbed by some of the embarrassing questions they received from their Austrian friends, also took issue with Kozlovsky's performances. Kozlovsky, they claimed, had “hummed” instead of singing properly, and had unnecessarily demanded a full symphony orchestra. Two leading Austrian musicians, Professors Marx and Salmhofer (the director of the State Opera) were allegedly not satisfied with his voice, and, after all, only 40% of tickets were sold.⁹⁰⁶ This testimony allows us to partially cross-check the politely benevolent reviews that appeared in the press. Indeed, the reactions of the public surpassed the usual standards of politeness. Thus, the *Kurier* ran an article entitled “Kozlovsky Enchanted the Listeners”.⁹⁰⁷ The *Weltpresse*, characteristically for the moderate-conservative Austrian milieu, opined that the most valuable parts of the concert had been Kozlovsky's renditions of Russian and Ukrainian folk songs, as well as his collaboration with the CGT ensemble;⁹⁰⁸ thus, academic and folk music proved to be a winning combination. For its part, the *Österreichische Zeitung*, dedicated a eulogy to the famed soloist.⁹⁰⁹ Observance of standards of politeness towards the Allies was thus vigorously upheld, whereas the candour of the official Soviet correspondence is striking in its clarity and detail.

The visits of Soviet pianists were less problematic. The renowned Jakob Flier, to whom the ASC had previously paid attention, made his first appearance in Austria in late 1946,⁹¹⁰ playing the famous b-moll concert of Tchaikovsky,⁹¹¹ as well as Bach, Kabalevsky, Rachmaninov, Chopin and Liszt. This performance was crowned with a number of encores, as the public “repeatedly called the artist [back] to the podium”.⁹¹²

Further concerts were linked to special occasions, such as Soviet festivities or the Months of

⁹⁰⁶ A letter from Kiselev and Zhuravlev to Meleshko and Smirnov. 18.10.1946. GARF, fond 5283, delo 10, listy 8-10.

⁹⁰⁷ “Koslovsky begeisterte Zuhörer,” WK 09.10.1946, 4.

⁹⁰⁸ “Zwei russische Konzerte,” WP 09.10.1946, 6.

⁹⁰⁹ Hugo Huppert, “Iwan Semjonowitsch Koslowski : Konzert im großen Musikvereinssaal,” ÖZ 10.10. 1946, 5.

⁹¹⁰ Peter Lafite, “Österreichische Chronik: Wien,” ÖMZ Heft 10-11 (Oktober-November) 1946: 369.

⁹¹¹ “Zwei russische Konzerte,” WP 09.10. 1946, 6.

⁹¹² Joseph Marx, “Konzerte,” WZ 25.10.1946: 4.

Friendship. For a festive concert celebrating the 30th anniversary of the October Revolution, the Soviet Union managed to organise an event capable of outshining most Austrian programmes, bringing together a distinguished array of musicians. The famed cellist Sviatoslav Knushevitzky performed Khatchaturian's concert for cello and orchestra, and drew much praise for both contemporary Soviet music and his renditions of it. Tatiana Goldfarb, a Moscovite pianist, concentrated her performance on Tchaikovsky. Ironically, the staunchly high-brow academic art offered at the concert clearly departed from the political subtext of the occasion itself, but still won warm critical appreciation.⁹¹³ Folk tunes, and particularly Georgian folk tunes, did not fail to please. Muradeli's *Georgian Symphonic Dance* (in 1947, Muradeli was a safe option) drew a characteristic reaction from Joseph Marx, who admired the “folk”, “popular” (*volkstümlich*) nature of this piece, as performed by the Vienna Symphonic Orchestra under Moralt.⁹¹⁴ The Soviet artists, in fact, earned much praise in general, as the stylistic conservatism of R. Gliere's concert for voice and orchestra, the cello concert of Khatchaturian (mistakenly identified as a Georgian), and, of course, the Symphonic Dance of Muradeli prompted stormy applause.⁹¹⁵ Thus, the classic triangle of Russian classics, contemporary academic music and folk elements came to the fore, leaving the political background of the concert on the sidelines, and allowing professional criticism to concentrate on those aspects of musical Russianness of which it could approve.

The Austro-Soviet society, which provided significant organisational assistance to the Soviets, continued to gain preferential access to Soviet artists, who could be deployed at the Society's own events.⁹¹⁶ The subsequent Months of Friendship produced a hectic mixture of political propaganda and pure high culture, which was constantly undercutting the coherence of Soviet cultural diplomacy and its message. In September and October 1950, a large group of Soviet musicians and musicologists arrived in Austria,⁹¹⁷ touring the country while giving concerts and lectures.⁹¹⁸ Not unlike the Georgian tour, the political authorities attempted to infiltrate this cultural diplomacy with spoken propaganda. This attempt centred particularly on Anatoly Novikov,⁹¹⁹ a composer notoriously

⁹¹³ Peter Lafite, “Österreichische Chronik: Wien,” *ÖMZ* Heft 11-12 (November-Dezember) 1947: 307.

⁹¹⁴ Joseph Marx, “Konzertbericht der Woche: Das russische Festkonzert,” *WZ* 15.11.1947: 4.

⁹¹⁵ “Konzert zum 30jährigen Staatsjubiläum der Sowjetunion,” *WP* 15.11.1947: 6.

⁹¹⁶ “Russische Musik in Wien,” *Volksstimme* 24.11.1947: 4.

⁹¹⁷ “Die Österreichisch-Sowjetischen Freundschaftswochen,” *VS* 28.09.1950: 5.

⁹¹⁸ On the Dispatching to Austria of a VOKS Delegation and a Group of Soviet Artists for Participation in a Month of Austro-Soviet Friendship [O komandirovanii v Avstrii delegatsii VOKS i gruppy sovetskikh artistov dlia uchastiia v mesiachnike avstriisko-sovetskoi družby]. Politburo Decision from 04.09.1950. RGANI, fond 3, opis' 35, delo 38, list 36. Also RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1119, list 35.

⁹¹⁹ He eventually produced a report and gave a talk in the VOKS headquarters upon his return to Moscow. These infallibly conformed to the party line, and thus shed little light on actual Austrian circumstances and Austro-Soviet cultural relations. Notably, he unleashed a verbal attack on Austrian “formalists” (GARF, fond 5283, opis' 16, delo 33, list 77), and delivered a picturesque description of a group of Austrian musicians begging in front of the still dilapidated building of the State Opera, apparently typical of “marshallised” Austria. On the other hand, the people expressed “an enormous interest in the life of the Soviet Union, and the struggle for peace led by it”. (GARF, *ibid.*,

close to the regime, who had authored several works that served as musical propaganda for the party-state. While in Austria, he conducted a number of meetings with Austrian musicians and (philo-) Communist organisations, including a rehearsal of his songs with a choir of the Free Austrian Youth, a Communist-dominated organisation. Consistently adhering to the party line, Novikov presented the image of an exemplary Soviet composer, while being rejected by pro-western circles. His ideological credentials earned him an endorsement from the *Österreichische Zeitung*,⁹²⁰ but he was mostly passed over in silence by the western-led press, only the *Weltpresse* eventually mentioning him (surprisingly, in a neutral tone⁹²¹).

As was typical for “brigades” sent abroad, the rather patchy troupe consisted of a duo of Ballet soloists (thus avoiding the expense of inviting a whole company), two pianists, a singer, a violinist, and a women's quartet. While not stars of the calibre of Oistrakh and Oborin, they belonged to a younger generation of talented musicians, brought up in the contemporary music school; the high proportion of women was also remarkable, as informed by the emancipatory elements of Soviet ideology. A classic performance was delivered in the Konzerthaus⁹²² – by then firmly established as a preferred venue for prestigious tours – and concerts in Sankt Pölten, Krems, and Wiener Neustadt followed. An exceptional trip to Innsbruck and Bregenz, deep in the French zone,⁹²³ compensated somewhat for the total absence of Soviet musicians from Western Austria during previous years, and constituted an important event in local musical life. One of the few reports of a musical event taking place in the Soviet Information Centre in Vienna is equally remarkable. The artistic format of these events was, despite all ideological odds, recognised by musical professionals in Austria.⁹²⁴ The majority of reviews unsurprisingly appeared in the *Österreichische Zeitung*⁹²⁵ and the Communist-

list 78-83).

⁹²⁰ “Anatolij Nowikow - ein Komponist des Volkes und der Völkerfreundschaft” *ÖZ* 01.10.1950: 7.

⁹²¹ “Konzerte sowjetischer Künstler,” *WP* 02.10.1950: 5.

⁹²² Its online database mentions two concerts staged on September 28th and 30th, the programme of which was dominated by 19th-century European composers, stretching, however, from Couperin to Alexander Tsfasman, and not evincing a clear selection strategy.

⁹²³ See the subsequent section on Austrian regions.

⁹²⁴ Peter Lafite, “Österreichische Chronik: Wien,” *ÖMZ* Heft 10-11 (Oktober-November) 1950, 236.

⁹²⁵ “Große Freundschaftskundgebung im Konzerthaus,” *ÖZ* 26.09.1950: 5. “Sendboten einer schöpferischen Musikkultur : Zum heutigen Auftreten der sowjetischen Künstler im Konzerthaus,” *ÖZ* 28.09. 1950, 5. “Zwei Repräsentantinnen der sowjetischen Kunst,” *ÖZ* 29.09.1950: 5. “Die sowjetische Künstlergrippe in Sankt Pölten,” *Ibid.*: 5. “Das erste Wiener Konzert der sowjetischen Künstler,” *ÖZ* 30.09.1950: 5. “Einfache Menschen begrüßen sowjetische Künstler,” *ÖZ* 03.10.1950: 5. Iwan Martynow, “Meister des Sowjetballetts,” *ÖZ*, October 4, 1950: 5. “Die sowjetischen Künstler in Wiener Neustadt,” *ÖZ* 05.10.1950: 5. “Wir wissen. wo unsere Freunde sind’: Begeisterung um die sowjetischen Künstler in Krems,” *ÖZ* 06.10.1950: 5. “Iwan Martynow : So leben und schaffen junge Sowjetkünstler,” *ÖZ* 08.10.1950: 5. “Edle Musik als Geschenk der Freundschaft : Gäste aus der Sowjetunion konzertierten im Sowjetischen Informationszentrum,” *ÖZ* 10.10.1950: 5. Iwan Martynow, “Vier junge Talente : Das Frauenstreichquartett des Staatlichen Moskauer Konservatoriums,” *ÖZ* 11.10.1950: 5. “Heute Auftreten der sowjetischen Künstler in Innsbruck und Bregenz,” *ÖZ* 12.10.1950: 5. “Zwei Solistenabende der sowjetischen Künstler,” *ibid.*, 5. Iwan Martynow, “Im Dienste der Kunst und des Friedens : Der Sänger J. Bjelow und der Pianist A. Dedjuchin,” *ÖZ* 13.10.1950: 5. “Begeisterte Aufnahme der sowjetischen Künstler in Innsbruck und Bregenz,” *ÖZ* 14.10.1950: 5. Hans Hajas, “Galina Barinowa, die hervorragende Geigerin,” *ÖZ* 17.10. 1950, 5. “Klavierabend

led *Der Abend*.⁹²⁶ Characteristically, while *Neues Österreich* honoured the artists with a short article,⁹²⁷ the *Wiener Kurier*, which already reigned supreme in the media landscape of the republic, once again passed over the whole occasion in silence. During the 1950s, the Soviet Element decided to continue on this well-known path, avoiding any kind of radical experimentation. Accordingly, another Month of Friendship tour was organised in November 1951, starring the violinist Igor Bezrodny, the cellist Mstislav Rostropovich,⁹²⁸ the pianist Jury Muravliov and the singer Nina Gusselnikova: thus, as Joseph Marx enthusiastically commented, “the Russians came with their best forces”.⁹²⁹ Their programme choices, which were traditionally eclectic, sought to represent the “best forces” of European music, namely Haendel, Rossini, Chopin, Smetana, Gounod, Grieg, David Popper, the Bulgarian Pancho Vladigerov, and the Russians Piotr Tchaikovsky, Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, Alexander Skriabin and Sergei Prokofiev. In this sense, the programme demonstrated the mastery of Soviet musicians in interpreting works spanning across the last two centuries of European academic music. Furthermore, the “best forces” returned in 1952, when Lev Oborin embarked on a tour of Vienna and Graz, distinguishing himself by his sober, close reading of Skriabin, Rachmaninov, Prokofiev and Shostakovich, which was much approved of by the public and critics.⁹³⁰ Thus, the Cold War did not entirely overshadow music history, and, despite the rigid stance of the *Kurier*, some Viennese critics felt obliged to maintain their high artistic standards. An interesting example of this critical attitude was provided by the *Weltpresse*, which remarked that Oborin’s performance had not quite matched the high standard he had set in 1945: Oborin was a “good pianist”, but not an “absolutely excellent pianist, as he was in our cherished memories of six years ago.”⁹³¹ On the other hand, his decision to eschew showy virtuoso displays pleased other critics, who claimed that his professional quality was outstanding, and praised him for not showing-off.

These peculiar features were, of course, linked to individual choices among modern composers. However, they were for the most part uncontested, and helped to introduce, for instance,

Tamara Gussjewa,” ÖZ 18.10.1950: 5.

⁹²⁶ “Russische und Österreichische Musik : Was die sowjetischen Künstler bei ihrem heutigen Konzert bringen,” *Der Abend* 28.09.1950: 6. “Sowjetische Künstler traten gestern im Konzerthaus auf : Von Herzen, möge es zu Herzen gehen,” DA 28.09.1950: 6. “Lieder vom neuen Leben: Autorenabend Anatolij Nowikow im Musikverein,” *Der Abend* 30.09.1950, 6. “Tamara Gusewa im Mozartsaal,” DA 10.10.1950: 6. “Sowjetische Künstler Sonntag in der Scala,” *Der Abend* 12.10.1950: 6. “Abschlußkonzert der sowjetischen Künstler,” DA 13.10.1950: 6. “Die sowjetische Geigerin Galina Barinowa,” *ibid.*, 6. “Die Moskauer Pianistin Tamara Gussewa,” *ibid.*, 6. “Galina Barinowa erzählt: Ich geigte in Peking,” DA 14.10.1950: 6. “Eine Woche großer Opernpremier und Konzerte,” DA 16.10.1950: 6. Kurt Blaukopf, “Randbemerkungen zu Oper und Konzert,” DA 17.10.1950: 6.

⁹²⁷ “Sowjetische Gäste in Wien,” NÖ 29.09.1950: 4.

⁹²⁸ “Wiener Konzerte,” DP 04.11.1951: 6.

⁹²⁹ Joseph Marx, “Konzertbetrachtungen,” WZ 01.11.1951: 4.

⁹³⁰ “Solisten und Ensembles: Lew Oborin,” WZ 23.11.1952: 4.

⁹³¹ “... Ein besonders hervorragender Pianist, wie er bis vorgestern in unserer seit sechs Jahren behüteten Erinnerung war, ist er nicht.” (This was followed by praise for his balanced, sober and tasteful performance, though.) “Solides Klavierspiel,” WP 20.11.1952: 6

Khatchaturian and Muradeli to Austria, together with their more famous colleagues Prokofiev and Shostakovich. Chamber music attained what it deserved: a sphere of recognition and respect, confined mostly to a restricted public, but projecting itself, via mass media, onto larger audiences. While the conduct of chamber music diplomacy does not show any marked conceptual development over the occupation period, its consistent concentration on the purest classics, with selected contemporary works, in fact satisfied Austrian curiosities, and also paralleled the logic of Viennese musical institutions.⁹³²

Academic Ballet, in which Soviet Russia lagged behind Russian émigrés in France, took some time to establish itself, as the Soviet Element never succeeded in securing an entire ballet troupe for Vienna. This apparent shortcoming was partly mitigated by the inclusion of elements of ballet in mixed programmes. As noted earlier, ballet soloists went to Austria as members of “brigades”, and a high level of academic schooling was represented in “folk” ensembles. Occasional “swans” could produce strong effects on the Austrian scene, as high expectations were satisfied by these rare, high-quality performances. This was exemplified by the duo Shelest-Bregvadze, which came to Austria in 1949,⁹³³ and Maya Plisetskaya, who came in 1954.⁹³⁴ The latter danced as part of a very diverse group, whose repertoire stretched from the classical *Dying Swan* to folk Russian and Uzbek dances. This scatter-gun approach was preferred by Soviet planners, who sought to put the diverse cultural output of the Soviet Union on display, and thus blurred the boundaries between high- and middle-brow culture. However, the close attention with which ballet dancers were followed shows a large potential that was largely missed by the Soviet Union, and, at the same time, attests to the notable successes in prestige diplomacy that these occasional performers could achieve.

For the Soviet administration, it was important to make a powerful closing remark before pulling out of the country in 1955, largely for reasons of prestige and political expediency. Against the backdrop of these strategic considerations, the last significant tour of the Allied occupation was organised in the spring of 1955.⁹³⁵ Austrians saluted the locally stationed Orchestra of the Central Group of Troops (which was soon to depart), along with the Komitas State String Quartet Komitas, an Armenian band of considerable importance. Soviet propaganda officers remarked that substantial preparations had been made before venturing on this parade (including handing out new uniforms).

⁹³² Erwin Barta demonstrated this development in his works on the history of the Viennese Konzerthaus. Both Russian and Austrian choices show full observance of received European canons.

⁹³³ “Sowjetischer Kulturwochen in Wien,” WP 22.08.1949: 6.

⁹³⁴ “Sowjetisches Festkonzert in der Hofburg,” WZ 13.03.1954: 3.

⁹³⁵ “Berühmte Sowjetkünstler kommen. Neue Höhepunkte der Österreichisch-Sowjetischen Freundschaftswoche,” VS 10.05.1955: 4.

Curiously, it was claimed that the musicians had withstood provocations staged by white-Russian émigrés and their Western “curators”, thus displaying the highest degree of political discipline (no dancers defected in Austria). And among the public, it was claimed, they had been greeted by exhilarated crowds in the streets and squares.⁹³⁶

Following years of requests from the ÖSG, Emil Gilels was finally dispatched to Austria, garnering praise among cultural critics not only from the Communist world,⁹³⁷ but even from the staunchly anti-Soviet *Arbeiter Zeitung*.⁹³⁸ His performance style, the quality of which was universally recognised, came under some criticism from Austrian professionals, however: the *Wiener Zeitung* considered his play of the keyboard to have been slightly too “hard” for Mozart, although it found no fault with his renditions of the very gentle music of Debussy and Prokofiev.⁹³⁹ Following the same line, the exhilarated Musical Section of the ÖSG praised Gilels as one of the most successful Soviet musicians during a whole decade of tours.⁹⁴⁰

As musicians toured the Western zones, making a huge curve through all of Austria, they gave a series of concerts, sometimes attended by local and Allied officials,⁹⁴¹ and eventually by many thousands of visitors. A tour of this geographical scope had never been attempted before; not only were all zones covered, but also virtually every urban centre of any importance witnessed a Soviet performance (even Salzburg, where no direct Soviet concert had been envisaged during the occupation years proper, was included in the programme). On their way through Austria, the musicians faced benevolent, though at times stringent critical scrutiny. The relative abundance of source material for this tour is remarkable. The Soviet trumpets of the *Österreichische Zeitung*, as expected, played their usual hosanna to the artists.⁹⁴² The *Wiener Kurier*, while acknowledging the

⁹³⁶ Donesenie nachal'nika Politupravleniia TsGV M.M. Vavilova nachal'niku Glavnogo politicheskogo upravleniia Sovietskoi Armii A.S. Zheltovu o kontsertnoi poiezdke Ansambliia pesni i pliaski po zapadnoi Avstirii [Report of the Head of the Political Directory of the CGT M.M. Vavilov to the Head of the State Political Directorate of the Soviet Army A.S. Zheltov on the Concert Tour of the Ensemble of Song and Dance in Western Austria]. 26.06.1955: in *Die Rote Armee in Österreich*: 596.

⁹³⁷ Marcel Rubin, “Emil Gilels kam, spielte, siegte,” VS 18.05.1955: 6.

⁹³⁸ “Österreichische Chronik: Wien,” ÖMZ Heft 6 (Juni) 1955, 208. He was lauded by Arbeiter Zeitung. “Emil Gilels aus Moskau,” AZ 19.05.1955: 6. In its news brochure for May 1955, the Musical Section of ASC also stressed the striking success of the performance of the famed Soviet pianist. Mitteilungsblatt der Musik-Sektion der Österreichisch-Sowjetischen Gesellschaft. Mai 1955, 2.

⁹³⁹ “Impetuos und spielerisch. Zwei Klavierabende: Emil Gilels und Lisl Sabatin,” Wiener Zeitung, May 19, 1955, 6.

⁹⁴⁰ Mitteilungsblatt der Musik-Sektion der Österreichisch-Sowjetischen Gesellschaft. Mai 1955, 2.

⁹⁴¹ In Carinthia, the police kept their superiors particularly well-informed, providing reports on the two major concerts in Klagenfurt and Villach. Lagebericht für das Land Kärnten für den Monat Mai 1955. 3.6.1955. OeSTA/AdR BMI Staatspolizei. Zl.: I-20/1/55/geh. GZl.: 50000-2/55: 5. In Klagenfurt and Villach, the second largest centre in Carinthia, separate reports were submitted: Lagebericht für die Stadt Klagenfurt für den Monat Mai 1955. 28.5.1955. Zl.: II Res. 1/5/1955. GZl.: 50000-2/55: 4. Lagebericht für die Stadt Villach für den Monat Mai 1955. 23.5.1955. Zl.: Präs-I-271/5/55. GZl.: 50000-2/55: 7.

⁹⁴² “Begeisterung für Sowjetkünstler in Floridsdorf,” ÖZ 05.05.1955: 6. “Ein bedeutender sowjetischer Pianist : Zum bevorstehenden Gastspiel von Emil Gilels in Oesterreich,” ÖZ 06.05.1955: 6. “Wera Firssowa, Solistin des Großen Theaters der UdSSR : Zu dem bevorstehenden Gastspiel in Oesterreich,” ÖZ 10.05.1955: 6. “Begeisterung um Sowjetkünstler in Klagenfurt und Graz,” ÖZ 11.05.1955: 5. “Das Komitas-Quartett : Zum bevorstehenden Gastspiel

already familiar quality of the CGT Ensemble, expressed some discontent regarding the technical level of the Komitas Quartet,⁹⁴³ an opinion which departed from the fairly positive reviews by the *Volkstimme*,⁹⁴⁴ the *ÖMZ*⁹⁴⁵, the *Wiener Zeitung*⁹⁴⁶ and the *Arbeiter Zeitung*.⁹⁴⁷ Positive public feedback can also be attested from official documents. In discussing the performances in the provinces, Soviet officials noted the “exhilaration” with which the public had met the Komitas Quartet.⁹⁴⁸ A local police officer in Innsbruck mentioned a concert attended by roughly 80 people, and the “certain success” with which it was crowned.⁹⁴⁹ Marking the tenth anniversary of the liberation and the signing of the State Treaty, this large tour captured consistent public sympathy, and achieved its goals in enhancing the prestige of the Soviet Union, which was relinquishing its hard power presence in the country.

The ultimate judgement was pronounced by the military. In cooperation with the ASC, the Soviet administration launched the final Month of Friendship. The CGT Ensemble and the Central Ensemble of the Soviet Army gave a series of concerts in July, when the Soviet troops were already heading back to Russia. The CGT Company gave no less than 30 concerts, which were attended, according to the propagandists, by around 200,000 people.⁹⁵⁰ The last concert that fell within the remit of Soviet occupation diplomacy was staged as late as August 30th, in Vienna.⁹⁵¹ The public was allegedly flung into raptures, turning the concerts into “meetings of Austro-Soviet friendship”.⁹⁵² In addition to public acclaim, local administrations repeatedly showed themselves to be very supportive of the incoming Red Army artists, a fact that left an undoubtedly favourable impression on the

in Wien,” *ÖZ* 13.05.1955: 6. “Jubel um Wera Firssowa in Salzburg ... und um das Ensemble der Sowjetarmee in Innsbruck,” *ÖZ* 14.05.1955: 6. “Begeisterung um das Ensemble der Sowjetarmee in Ebensee ... und in Steyr,” *ÖZ* 17.05.1955: 6. Hans Hajas, “Emil Gilels eroberte das musikalische Wien,” *ÖZ* 18.05.1955: 6. “Triumphales Auftreten des Sowjetensembles in Hallein,” *ÖZ* 19.05.1955: 6. “Ein meisterhaftes Kammermusik-Ensemble : Komitas-Quartett im Mozart-Saal,” *ÖZ* 21.05.1955: 6. “Wera Firssowa sang vor Wiener Werktätigen,” *ÖZ* 25.05.1955: 6. “Gastspiel des Komitas-Quartetts in Salzburg,” *ibid.*: 6. “Triumphzug durch Oesterreich,” *ÖZ* 26.05.1955: 1, 2. “Salzburg: Erfolgreiche österreichisch-sowjetische Freundschaftsveranstaltungen,” *ibid.*: 3.

⁹⁴³ Robert Klein, “Musikergäste aus West und Ost,” *WK* 21.05.1955: 7.

⁹⁴⁴ Marcel Rubin, “Das Komitas-Quartett,” *VS* 22.05.1955: 8.

⁹⁴⁵ “Österreichische Chronik...”

⁹⁴⁶ “Musikalische Gäste aus Ost und West. Ein russisches Quartett und ein amerikanischer Dirigent,” *WZ* 25.05.1955: 5.

⁹⁴⁷ “Das Komitas-Quartett,” *AZ* 24.05.1955: 5.

⁹⁴⁸ Report on the Month of Austro-Soviet Friendship in 1955 [Otchët o mesiachnike avstro-sovetskoi družby v 1955 godu] 11.07.1955. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 514, list 116.

⁹⁴⁹ Monatsbericht für die Stadt Innsbruck für den Mai 1955. 4.6.1955. OeSTA/AdR Inneres Staatspolizei. Zl.: Abt.I-Res.Pos.II/86/1-55. GZl.: 50000-2/55: 6.

⁹⁵⁰ Materialy Politupravleniia TsGV k dokladnoi zapiske ministra oborony SSSR G.K. Zhukova o vypolnenii iego prikaza ot 31-go iulia 1955 g. O vyvode sovetskikh voisk iz Avstrii [Materials of the CGT Political Department to the Memorandum of the Minister of Defence of the USSR G.K. Zhukov on the Execution of His Order from July 31st, 1955 Concerning the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Austria]. 24.09.1955: in *Die Rote Armee in Österreich*: 856-865.

⁹⁵¹ Monatlicher Lagebericht für die Stadt Wien für den Monat August 1955. 9.9.1955. OeSTA/AdR Inneres Staatspolizei. Zl.: P 130/f/55. GZl.: 50000-2/55: 8.

⁹⁵² Report on the Month of Austro-Soviet Friendship in 1955 [Otchët o mesiachnike avstro-sovetskoi družby v 1955 godu] 11.07.1955. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 514, list 116.

occupation propaganda officers. The rooms were full, with all tickets sold well in advance, and the resulting triumph was supposedly complete.⁹⁵³

Despite the unverifiable approach to counting the exact number of visitors – which could be reported only in those cases where tickets were sold – the mere fact that Soviet musicians gathered thousands of locals to listen to them is fairly plausible. After all, in smaller towns the cultural agenda was sparser than in Vienna, which was saturated with programmes from Austrian institutions and from all four of the Allies. Likewise, the notion of success is, as already noted with regard to previous tours, highly problematic. There is no direct evidence that musical tours boosted the prestige either of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union or of their comrades in Austria, nor that they served the agenda set by propaganda authorities in Moscow and Vienna. Public reactions to Soviet concerts, which were notoriously difficult to elicit, seem to have been mostly positive, and the professional critical guild, while maintaining silence in the case of the *Kurier*, gave detailed and often remarkably depoliticised accounts of the concerts. Unfortunately for the Soviet Element, persistent incoherencies in its concert strategy, from individual programmes to time-scales, a near total neglect of press relations, and undesired propagandistic interventions left a profoundly negative impact. It is remarkable, however, just how eagerly Viennese criticism embarked on the search for musical Russianness. Consisting of high technical quality, the proverbial “Slavic languor” of academic Romantic music, and native tunes offered by folk music ensembles, this cultural export was accepted with interest and support by the Viennese public, and informed public discourse on Russia in music, although this remained fraught with the political perils linked to Soviet communism, and the general abhorrence of it.

A Regional Perspective? Considerations on the Bundesländer-specific Strategies of Soviet Musical Diplomacy

Following the logic of the territorial expansion of public diplomacy, partly exemplified by major national tours, Soviet cultural diplomats considered plans to extend their influence into Western and Southern Austria. However, the increasingly rigid borders between the zones impeded organised musical action outside of Eastern Austria. In the Soviet Zone, Lower Austria was considered as an extension of Vienna – as can easily be seen from *ÖZ* reporting, many artists were sent to the

⁹⁵³ Memorandum on the Carrying Out of the Month of Austro-Soviet Friendship and the 4th Congress of the Austro-Soviet Society. [Spravka o provedenii mesiachnika avsto-sovetskoi druzhby I 4 kongressa Avsto-sovetskogo obshchestva] 16.07.1955. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 514, list 123.

working-class districts of Vienna (such as Floridsdorf and Favoriten, both in the Soviet sector), and to industrial hubs such as Wiener Neustadt, the *Industrieviertel* between Vienna and Wiener Neustadt, and Urfahr in Upper Austria. Many primary sources and works of secondary literature indicate that Soviet *kommandatury* often contributed to revitalising the cultural scenes of smaller towns. A history of the Eisenstadt Haydn Festival, which began in 1947 and 1948, does not show any particular Soviet commitment, even if Allied representatives were invited, and Tchaikovsky's *Pathétique* was added to a purely Haydn-centered programme.⁹⁵⁴ In addition, it was not until the post-occupation period that the Festspiele became a regular event.⁹⁵⁵ Gaining access to other major cultural centres in Austria, however, proved to be more difficult. The most obvious option was represented by Graz, the second-largest city in the country, and the capital of the British zone. The Communist fellow-travellers of the Soviet Element displayed consistent interest in cultural activities in the region, owing to their relatively strong presence in the industrial belt of Upper Styria. In addition, Graz was relatively close to Vienna, which facilitated cultural contacts.

Innsbruck and Salzburg were nearly inaccessible. As for Salzburg, there were no serious attempts to put down roots in the city, at least to judge from the extant sources: clearly, American hostility was expected to be overwhelming. Only in late 1954 was Soviet musical involvement considered,⁹⁵⁶ and the possibility of Soviet participation in the Festival was never seriously entertained. Linz, divided between the zones, had a larger degree of exposure, and the tour of May 1955 passed through Upper Austria as well. However, on the whole, the Soviet presence in the US zone was close to zero. Innsbruck saw only occasional Soviet-related activities, such as a single tour in 1950,⁹⁵⁷ despite having Russian music in its concert programmes (just like Salzburg and Graz).

The evidence is therefore rather sporadic, since Russian culture was far more present than the Soviet Union. In addition, there were cultural circles that came from the territories belonging to the Soviet Union, but which would never identify themselves as Russian, most notably the Western Ukrainian diaspora in Graz and Innsbruck. Russian emigres made occasional appearances as well, but, overall, most contacts with musical Russia did not reveal any connections with organised Soviet cultural propaganda.

⁹⁵⁴ Gerhard J. Winkler, “*Joseph Haydn - Das Burgenland – "Russenzeit" Russenzeit. Befreiung 1945 - Freiheit 1955. Begleitband zur Ausstellung (=Wissenschaftliche Arbeiten aus dem Burgenland. Band 113)* (Eisenstadt: Burgenländische Landesregierung, Abteilung 7 - Landesmuseum, 2005), 106-07.

⁹⁵⁵ The Festival of Eisenstadt was conducted on a regular basis only from the late 1970s. Horst Knabel, *Organisation in Konzertbetrieben, dargestellt am Beispiel der Burgenländischen Haydnfestspiele* (Dipl.-Arb. Vienna, 1991), 72-74.

⁹⁵⁶ Remarks on the Working Plan of the Austro-Soviet Society for Septmber 1954 – July 1955 [Zamechaniia po planu raboty Avstro-Sovetskogo Obshestva na sentiabr' 1954 – iul' 1955 gg.] 11.11.1954. GARF, fond 5283, opis' 22, delo 480, list 129.

⁹⁵⁷ “Gastkonzert sowjetrussischer Künstlerinnen,” TT 11.10. 1950: 5.

Graz: A Cultural Exception

In 1945, Styria lived through a period of a quadripartite occupation: the foreign troops included the Soviets, accompanied by Yugoslavs and Bulgarians, and succeeded by the British. Therefore, during the first weeks of the temporary Soviet presence, the region witnessed some economic and cultural measures, aiming at creating a positive image of the USSR. The internal British documentation deals extensively with the issue of rather generous Soviet food rations, raising the suspicion that the Soviets intended to leave the British to face the ensuing shortages. In culture, some of the beginnings of post-war Styrian developments stemmed from the Soviet occupation, although the Soviet Element did not aim at constructing long-term relations with local cultural actors.⁹⁵⁸

Making its usual entry into the public sphere, the Soviet administration made use of the locally based Ensemble of the Red Army, which gave a concert in Graz as early as May 1945, becoming the first major foreign collective to perform in the Styrian capital.⁹⁵⁹ The local *Kleine Zeitung* published laudatory reports,⁹⁶⁰ while remarking that a sunny Pentecost day had resulted in visibly empty spaces on one of the performance days.⁹⁶¹ Nevertheless, the departure of Soviet troops meant the departure of Soviet musicians too, and the closing of the zonal border led to a nearly complete silence for the next four years. Ivan Kozlovsky was initially refused entry by the British border control, which found his papers to be insufficient (later, he complained about the odour of petrol in the car taking him to Graz, and demanded another one⁹⁶²). Kozlovsky's presence in the Styrian capital did not attain the degree of success that had initially been counted upon, much to the frustration of the accompanying cultural diplomats, who did not consider any further initiatives for years.

The Georgian Ensemble, which celebrated triumphs throughout Austria, made an appearance in Graz in October 1949. Unlike the propaganda department, they could be sure of success. The reactions to this concert were, expectedly, a mixture of genuine amazement at the artistic level and the exotic beauty of the Georgians' performance, and probably sincere dismay at the havoc wrought by their propagandist supervisors. The reactions in Graz were not dissimilar from those in Vienna. Despite their ethnic background, the ensemble was still described as "Russians" by the Socialist

⁹⁵⁸ Valerie Horrow-Hands, a member of the Styrian Musikverein at the time, evaluated the Soviet activities in strongly negative terms, seeing the Soviet presence as an impediment to free cultural development and constructive collaboration with Styrian musical circles. Valerie Horrow-Hands, "Der Wiederaufbau des Grazer Kulturbetriebes 1945-47" *Die "britische Steiermark"*, 613-14.

⁹⁵⁹ Feichtinger, Staudinger, 514.

⁹⁶⁰ "Freundschaft mit Rußland: Pflege der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion," *Kleine Zeitung* 15.05.1945: 4. "Konzert de Kapelle der Roten Armee unter der Leitung von Oberleutnant Zepluhin," *KIZ* 24.05.1945: 4.

⁹⁶¹ "Wiederholungskonzert des Lied- und Tanzensembles der Roten Armee," *KIZ* 22.05.1945: 3.

⁹⁶² A letter from Kiselev and Zhuravlev to Meleshko and Smirnov. 18.10.1946. GARF, fond 5283, delo 10, listy 8-10.

Neue Zeit, and was even labelled as “Russian melancholy” due to one of its songs; on the other hand, affinities between Austrians and Georgians were implied in the sympathetic portrayal of this “brave people” (“tapferes Bergvolk”).⁹⁶³ On the more conservative side, the *Kleine Zeitung* took issue with propagandistic interferences, launching a frontal counter-attack against such undesired appearances, and questioned the supposed contentment of Georgia with Soviet policies.⁹⁶⁴ While this shows that the Western powers had already realised the political potential of local nationalisms in the Soviet Union, it also testifies to the degree of vexation caused by hard-line Stalinist propaganda, which did substantial damage to the cultural offensives launched by the USSR. With regard to soloists, the pianist Lev Oborin went to Graz in November 1952, during his second tour in Austria. Unlike the exacting critics in Vienna, his critical reception in Graz was unproblematic: the *Kleine Zeitung* was openly enthralled by his powerful performance. The programme selected offered some of the best pieces that Russian musical literature could offer: Mussorgsky (*Pictures from an Exhibition*) was followed by Rachmaninov, Shostakovich and Khatchaturian. Despite the poorly chosen timeslot during the early afternoon, which affected attendance, those who did attend elicited a number of encores from Oborin.⁹⁶⁵ Thus, even given the unfavourable political and organisational circumstances, the Soviet Element still managed to organise a soloist concert that maintained the same standards as French events.

Styria represents a case of consistent Soviet musical effort, no doubt partly prompted by Austrian comrades. While Soviet regional musical diplomacy was normally non-existent, it broke through during nation-wide tours, in which the entire map of Austria was to be covered, so far as inter-Allied relations would allow. Specific interest in individual regions rarely went beyond the Eastern zone (and there was no personnel deployed in Western and Southern Austria). Only in Graz did the musical styles propagated by the USSR make themselves heard, and this contributed to an increasingly vibrant cultural community, which showed consistent interest in Russian music. In its limited outreach, the Soviet Union thus represented a stark contrast with France, which succeeded in operating in all zones except the Soviet one.

To Whose Avail?

Artistic tours represented one of the few positive sides of the Soviet presence in Austria.⁹⁶⁶

⁹⁶³ “Georgische Volkstänze,” *Neue Zeit* 04.10.1949: 2.

⁹⁶⁴ “Georgische Tänzer in Graz,” *KIZ* 02.10.1949: 7.

⁹⁶⁵ “Ein Pianist von hohen Graden,” *KIZ* 18.11. 1952: 7.

⁹⁶⁶ Kraus, 26.

However, in establishing their relative popularity at different times and among different audiences, particularly as compared to the cultural undertakings of other foreign powers and Austrian musicians, the sources present a number of problems, which do not allow for any clear-cut, yes / no answers. The ÖSG was allowed to put its name on most concert posters and programmes featuring Soviet artists, and could thus benefit from the publicity provided by Soviet music. The outlook of Soviet cultural diplomats, and the state they officially represented, was differentiated.

A standard report from the VOKS Representative or the Propaganda Department officers would not typically deal with anything other than the contribution that the tours had allegedly made to the “struggle for peace”, serving as “peace meetings” with the Austrian population. Such reports contain little regarding the artistic contents of the events. In many cases, a substantial set of statistics was presented with large reports – the ÖSG also demonstrated this tendency – although, again, it is unclear how these related to the reality, and which methods were used to calculate the numbers of visitors. The weak analytical quality of late-Stalinist reports reflects the terrorised character of the time, as Parkaev and his colleagues preferred to shield themselves with formal data, without going too deep into the substance. The Austrian press was clearly divided between Soviet propaganda adjuncts and the increasingly hostile anti-communist mainstream, which often passed over Soviet events in silence, as was the policy of the American-led *Wiener Kurier*. In those cases, however, in which guest tours by Soviet artists did receive critical coverage, this was often remarkably positive, as even the most pro-Western newspapers valued their professional standards, and felt obliged to pay due tribute to the high quality of Russian performances. In short, the rarity of Soviet tours was both an impediment and an asset. It reduced the chances of the Soviet administration creating and maintaining a presence in Austrian concert programming, but also created better conditions for attracting attention to the few events that did take place, and which normally featured musicians of world-class standard.

While Soviet concert programmes were broader than those of their French counterparts, they also revealed an eclectic strategy, pursued by musicians and approved of by cultural diplomats. This did not change substantially during the occupation period, despite the increase in pressure on musicians, Soviet cultural propagandists and their Austrian partners between 1947/48 and 1953. Different genres, however, staged in different circumstances and requiring different perception practices, produced different results. Thus, an open-air concert by the Georgian Ensemble of Folk Song and Dance was not only covered differently to a chamber concert by Rostropovich, Flier or Oistrakh, but also purported to demonstrate the diversified nature of musical creation in the USSR. As tamed folk music was successfully instrumentalised to uphold the country’s prestige in Vienna and beyond, it also responded directly to Austrian expectations of the musical Other, arriving in Central Europe

with colourful splendour, while at the same time displaying a “savagery” moderated by academic training. This combination was sure of public success. The Georgian phenomenon stood out, owing both to the unprecedented geographical scale of its tour, and the richness and variety of ways in which Austrians could experience the ensemble. This left an imprint on public perceptions of the Caucasus and the Soviet Union, despite the fact that deficiencies in the written evidence do not allow us to assess its effects in detail.

Outside CPA circles, however, musicians did not serve the cause of Stalinism. While press coverage was increasingly confined to the marginalised communist press, cultural contents and possibilities were by no means limited to those cultural practices commonly associated with Communism. The spoken and written propaganda that was enforced following the cooling of inter-Allied relations during 1947-48 acted as a burden on a cultural export that otherwise enjoyed relative popularity. Soviet (“Russian”) musicians claimed success in spite of Soviet cultural propaganda, not because of it, and this success, feeding into Russo-Austrian cultural transfers, was distinct from the dynamics of political communication. The bodies of Soviet dancers, the hands of Soviet pianists, and the voices of Soviet choruses represented an identity that became increasingly estranged from the immediate goals of official cultural diplomacy in Austria. While Soviet-controlled and -financed tours made an important contribution to the continuation and re-introduction of academic Russian culture and other musical productions of the USSR, its overall impact did not alleviate the negative political situation. Equally, relationships between Austrian civilians and Soviet military personnel remained strained. Despite this, the decline of Nazi racism (despite the quick abandonment of organised denazification, in favour of collaboration with local artists), and the changing attitudes of Austrians towards the “East” and the Soviet Union, were facilitated not only by hard power considerations, but also by cultural exports from the USSR. Soviet musicians were the living proof of a cultured Russia with a “special relation” with music, while the sheer range and usually high quality of musical exports brought about a corresponding complexification and diversification of the imagery of Russia.

Chapter 5. The French Approach: Decision-Making, Budgetary Issues, Organization of Concerts

The physical presence of French musicians constituted the cornerstone of France’s musical diplomacy, since they were deployed to represent both the compositional and the performance schools of Paris and other parts of the country. Indeed, taken in its spatial and temporal dimension,

concert diplomacy was the most obvious public expression of the French musical presence in Austria. Following the first months of 1945, concert programming became an integral part of French strategical planning, which aimed at achieving a high density of concerts, given by the best musicians obtainable at the time. Despite the frequency of French concerts, which only began to ebb down after 1947, the occupation administration and the Institutes continued to pursue a vigorous concert campaign, notably by sending several large-scale ensembles between 1950 and 1954. While these were more expensive than soloists, they allowed for a corresponding increase in status and presence in the public sphere, and assured a high degree of visibility for French prestige diplomacy, right until the end of the occupation.

The most striking feature of French concert diplomacy was probably the variety of styles and genres that were included in French exports to Austria. Cultural diplomats successfully experimented with solo, chamber and symphonic concerts (with conductors), opera and ballet, participation in festivals, middle-brow folk music, and ensembles with transatlantic and colonial backgrounds. The generations of musicians involved ranged from the septuagenarian Alfred Cortot, to recent First Prize winners from the Paris Conservator. Moreover, both sexes were represented. Together, they performed programmes addressing French, Austro-German, Italian, Russian and non-European traditions, and which, in some cases, subverted the rigid national classifications adhered to by the Austrian press. Their stature and technical mastery also differed, and adjustments were made in order to meet Austrian expectations and the circumstances of individual concerts.

In addition, the administration constantly worked on enlarging the geographic scope of its artistic tours, which ultimately comprised most of the Austrian territory, excluding the Soviet zone. From this perspective, the concert offensive organised by the French element largely surpassed the touring activities of the Soviets, the British and even the US administration, at least in quantitative terms. Receiving consistent, and sometimes extensive, press coverage, the French tours were not always unequivocal successes. However, the level of interest, and the ensuing discussions, ultimately placed France at the centre of the debate, turning the French state and its cultural representatives into significant factors within the Austrian musical space.

The following sub-chapters, which deal with finances, special occasions and regular seasons, will be organized according to genre and the corresponding spatial and discursive frameworks of the guest tours, these being divided into those that took place in Vienna, and those that occurred in the provinces. Soloists usually performed in small venues, and became known to a larger public mostly through critical coverage, which was relatively consistent throughout most Viennese newspapers. Performances by individual musicians, or soloists accompanied on piano, were judged according to the professional criteria of their specialization (voice, violin), the programme performed, and the

overall aesthetic impression they made on critics. Chamber ensembles, while playing mostly in the same venues as soloists, received particular attention in Vienna, where an indigenous string chamber tradition (such as string quartets) had obtained a highly prominent position. A balanced, synchronized, congenial style of performance was expected of an incoming trio or quartet, alongside technical accomplishments and liberty of expression. Opera and ballet received particularly intense coverage, and these performances became central events in their respective seasons; the French element dedicated considerable attention to public relations work, inter-Allied diplomacy and financial subsidies, and the press provided an especially full coverage, thus playing its part in the public diplomacy of the French Element, and engaging in Austro-specific debates that existed and developed independently of the French. Insofar as some degree of flexibility was maintained throughout the occupation period, the more characteristic developments in French strategy can be seen in the varying frequency of guest concerts, which peaked during the season 1946-47, before subsequently declining, due to the perceived oversaturation of Viennese concert life, and eventually returning to a relatively high plateau after 1949. In addition, French decision-making moved from a more free and self-conscious approach towards largescale investments, which in turn led to largescale tours during the 1950s, these being a notable characteristic of the French musical presence throughout the occupation period.

The first concerts of French music were given in September 1945: France, seizing on the opportunity to steal a march on its Anglo-Saxon partners, whose policies initially showed little flexibility towards the Austrians, promptly dispatched the Calvet Quartet and the pianist Jacques Février. Like the Soviet artists, their concerts produced spectacular results,⁹⁶⁷ highlighting the initial inter-Allied entente, and the prior knowledge that Viennese critics had already gained during the inter-war period.⁹⁶⁸ A French-only programme, consisting of Ravel, Fauré, Debussy and Franck,⁹⁶⁹ symbolised the changing circumstances in Vienna, and set the standard for further organised French representation, particularly a preference for the classics, well-known works and high-quality interpretations. With these emphases in place, cultural diplomacy quickly established a constant presence in Vienna, and, subsequently, all the other musical centres of the country.

Finances

In financial terms, French concert diplomacy was soon allocated regular, and remarkably generous,

⁹⁶⁷ Porpaczy 1999, 243.

⁹⁶⁸ "Erstes französisches Konzert," *Volksstimme* 20.09.1945: 4.

⁹⁶⁹ Concerts on September 18 and 20 at the Konzerthaus (Wiener Konzerthaus – Archiv-Datenbanksuche).

subsidies. These depended on the dimensions of individual programmes and varied substantially, according to the genre, and, therefore, the amount of musicians involved, the geography and the duration. Taking into account the overall expenditure on cultural affairs, which often included education, and the varied nature of currency exchange, concert diplomacy may not have taken up a large percentage of the total budget. However, the relative generosity of French cultural diplomats towards their musicians is still revealing. In this context, it is worth noting that the annual national average expenditure on *diplomatie culturelle* amounted to roughly 500 million francs, while the financial needs of the Cultural Division in Austria were covered by roughly 11.5 million francs.⁹⁷⁰ The relative exchange rate may have varied, and was not fully recorded; in April 1946, a budget of 4.2 million francs equalled 250,000 öS,⁹⁷¹ which gives an exchange rate of 16.8 francs per schilling. As many entry prices were in schillings, this provides a general context for musicians' bills.

These could be considerable. Not only did the French element have to consider running costs for travel and accommodation; unlike their Soviet colleagues, Susini also had to take into account the royalties to be paid to individual musicians, and to conduct negotiations with their impresarios. Prestige and reputation played a prominent role, and long-established musicians would require larger payments (Jacques Thibaud's impresario, for instance, demanded 55,000 Frs,⁹⁷² while even Francis Poulenc eventually cost 15,000⁹⁷³). Since the French administration took charge of all musical expenditure in Austria, the Cultural Division eventually had to process substantial amounts of financial documentation, and to settle a growing number of various bills. In a telling example, when Robert Soëtens toured Graz and Linz in 1953, his royalties in all likelihood amounted to no less than two-thirds of total expenditure. Soëtens obtained 1,500 öS for a concert in Graz⁹⁷⁴ and 1,200 in Linz; his hotel in Linz cost 222.22 öS.⁹⁷⁵ Thus, the expenditure for Linz came to 1,500 öS for the artist himself. In an almost amusingly detailed list, the rest was calculated as amounting to 476.37 öS, which included the printing of posters (128 öS), their distribution in the city (182 öS), printing of programmes (63.83 öS), renting the concert room (100 öS), services provided during the concert (21 öS), copyright (18.04 öS) and, at last, a hammer (3.50 öS). The tickets and programmes that were sold brought in only 505.20 öS.⁹⁷⁶ While most financial documentation was destroyed, this extraordinarily well-documented example shows that the French administration covered all expenses,

⁹⁷⁰ See the Financial Backing section in chapter 3.

⁹⁷¹ Porpaczy 2002, 193.

⁹⁷² MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, Vienne 192, Monicault to Béthouart, June 1946.

⁹⁷³ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 190, Note à l'attention du Colonel de Tournemire du Capitaine de Turckheim. Ne 283/LIAU JP/MR. Paris 17 avril 1946.

⁹⁷⁴ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, Vienne 198, Receipt from H. Laurent. 16.6.1953 (in handwriting)

⁹⁷⁵ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, Vienne 198, Giordani to Payart, 30.06.1953

⁹⁷⁶ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, Vienne 198, Magistrat der Landeshauptstadt Linz – Kulturamt (Musikdirektion) an die Französische Verbindungsstelle. 30.06.1953.

and ran up a significant deficit on their cultural programmes, which, while entirely predictable, could often become onerous with more important events. It also shows that the Cultural Division paid literally all expenses that arose before or during a tour, and had to maintain considerable reserves in order to quickly cover any further costs that arose unexpectedly.

Large ensembles required larger subsidies, and the settlement and justification of the latter took up a significant share of Susini's efforts. The most characteristic examples documented in the Foreign Ministry archives cover the majority of highly visible representative events staged in Vienna.

Table 1. Costs of individual large-scale tours (1946-47)⁹⁷⁷

Ensemble	Cost
Les Concerts Colonne	200,000 öS
Ballet Füller	100,000 öS
Paris Opera, <i>Pelléas et Mélisande</i>	990,811 Frs
Ray Ventura jazz orchestra	700,000 Frs

The self-confident approach of the cultural diplomats in handling vast amounts of money is worthy of note: even during the first seasons of 1946-47, when the financial situation in France itself was still precarious, Susini could easily secure subsidies even for relatively peripheral events, such as the Ray Ventura orchestra (only half-heartedly supported by high-culture oriented officers).

Characteristically for France, large sums were dedicated to the costs that arose from occasional banquets and invitations to Allied and Austrian dignitaries. For instance, a reception in honour of Les Concerts Colonne, Paul Paray and Ninon Vallin, hosted in August 1946 at the the Hôtel de France,⁹⁷⁸ cost 1,566.95 öS, and a dinner given for Paray and Vallin an additional 850 öS.⁹⁷⁹ Artists' own royalties were expected to be around 1,000-1,500 öS (1,000 for Marie Dubas and 1,117.92 for Concerts Colonne⁹⁸⁰). The considerable costs of French cultural action (which in the year 1947, when the level of activities in Vienna reached its maximum, amounted to 1.5 million frs⁹⁸¹) had to be moderated during subsequent periods, but remained consistently high, drawing on direct subsidies

⁹⁷⁷ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 0043, Le Général de Corps d'Armée Béthouart Commandant en Chef français en Autriche, Commissaire français en Autriche à Monsieur le Ministre des Finances – Direction du Trésor – (sous couvert de M. le Commissaire Général aux Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes). 1055 FR /EM. 5 Juin 1946. MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 323, Versement de la somme de 350000 Frs à M. de Turckheim; pour solde dû aux Théâtres Lyriques pour les représentations de “ Pelléas et Mélisande “. No 3608 CE/Cab. Vienne, le 6 Septembre 1947. MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 323, Deplacement Vienne (Autricheà – Représentations des 7 – 9 et 11 Novembre 1946, “ Pelléas et Mélisande “. MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 323, Manifestations culturelles projetées pour la saison 1947/1948. MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 323, Programme d'Expansion Culturelle pour 1er trimestre 47. Eugène Susini. Vienne, 10.01.1947.

⁹⁷⁸ Property of the French administration in Vienna, letting rooms for incoming persons related to the French Element at moderate rates.

⁹⁷⁹ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 323, Relève du livre de dépenses du 1er au 31 Août 1946.

⁹⁸⁰ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 323, Relève du livre de dépenses du 1er au 15 Octobre 1946.

⁹⁸¹ Analyse de l'action culturelle. 18.05.1947. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 324.

from Paris, and Austrian contributions to the costs of occupation. Remarkably, money transactions were processed relatively quickly, and, despite the lack of detailed accounting documentation, it is clear that the desire of cultural diplomats to stage certain events at certain times generally prevailed over eventual financial shortages. French concert diplomacy was thus well endowed with money, and could afford to finance an important number of musical events, of virtually all formats. That this was still possible despite the difficult financial situation in France itself and large parts of the occupation administration, plus the supposedly peripheral position of concerts as opposed to language teaching, shows that officials on all levels maintained a consensus regarding the high priority of musical diplomacy. Béthouart's aegis was placed on virtually all large events during the first seasons, which further testifies to his interest, and Susini used his power to push through those projects he desired to see realised in Austria.

Planning Issues. Special Occasions

Systematic Austria-specific planning began in early 1946, and was conducted on a seasonal and monthly basis. Susini and his colleagues devised a concert strategy that was divided into regular seasons, exceptional events organised by the French administration, and Austrian festivals (which became particularly important around the 1950s), as well as regional events. Learning from their initial experiences, French officials were constantly improving their public communication networks, including their relationships with other Allies, eventual invitations to Allied and Austrian dignitaries,⁹⁸² strategies of advertisement, and their contacts with the Austrian cultural establishment and press.

Towards the end of 1946, French policies became increasingly coherent.⁹⁸³ One particular feature of these early seasons, which to some extent continued later, were invitations of French musicians during the month when France held the presidency of the Allied Council.⁹⁸⁴ In 1947, Janine Andrade,⁹⁸⁵ Bernard Michelin, Jacques Thibaud, Jean Doyen, Jeanne-Marie Darré, Quatuor Pascal and Pierre Fournier⁹⁸⁶ – representing the cream of the crop of the contemporary French performing

⁹⁸² MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 190, Note à l'attention de Monsieur le Colonel de Tournemire. Vienne, le 4 mars 1946.

⁹⁸³ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 323, Nouveau programme de manifestations françaises. Vienne, 13.09.1946.

⁹⁸⁴ Assmann, Die französische Kulturpolitik, 25.

⁹⁸⁵ Who performed first in December 1946, in four concerts apparently linked to the first month of the presidency (see Konzerthausarchiv – Datenbanksuche, 6.12., 15.12., 18.12., 21.12.).

⁹⁸⁶ MAO AOFAA, Aut 323, Tournées d'artistes français en Autriche; organisées par M. Geiger avec l'aide de la division des Affaires Culturelles. (October 1947 – June 1948.) Fournier and Henriot had already performed during the previous Month.

school – went to Austria. In addition to the enlarged number of musical events staged at the French Institute in Vienna,⁹⁸⁷ their visits contributed to increasing the symbolic status of the French presidency vis-à-vis the other Allies, since the administration aimed at presenting an image of a refined European nation, as opposed to the sheer military might of the USSR, and, to a significant extent, the United States.

Due to the enormous costs and the imminent over-saturation of the musical market, France slightly reduced its cultural output during its subsequent presidencies. As had already been observed in 1946, the problem with concentrating events during a short period was that

*... the month of the presidency is overcharged. The entourage of the high Allied representatives claims that “they don’t have time to catch their breath”...*⁹⁸⁸

After 1948-49, French planning no longer involved extensive public concerts during presidency periods. It is interesting to observe how quickly the French brought culture to the fore, using the fine arts to bolster their position of power, presenting accomplished elegance and artistic and musical discernment as distinctive traits of the French state and nation, and implicitly contrasting this with the other Allies, in order to suggest certain Austro-French cultural affinities.

Another opportunity to showcase the accomplishments of the French school was provided by the revived Festivals of Vienna. However, French participation in the latter was not as regular as in the more appealing Salzburg Festival. This notwithstanding, French cultural diplomats closely observed cultural novelties in Vienna, and made a series of moves to promote French music at the more conspicuous festivities. For the 1948 festival, the Cultural Division, together with their superiors, prepared an exacting programme, in which the Quatuor Pascal, Olivier Messiaen, André Cluytens,⁹⁸⁹ Yvonne Loriod and Ginette Martinot gave three performances in June,⁹⁹⁰ and Alfred Cortot spent almost an entire month in the Austrian capital.⁹⁹¹ The cellist Pierre Fournier gave a series of highly successful concerts, putting contemporary French music on display – for instance, Messiaen and Poulenc, who were consistently appreciated by local critics.⁹⁹² Likewise, at the Bach Festival in

⁹⁸⁷ Nouveau programme...

⁹⁸⁸ «Le mois de presidence est trop chargé L'entourage des hautes personnalités alliées laisse entendre "qu'on ne les laisse pas respirer. » MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 323, Nouveau programme de manifestations françaises. Vienne, 13.09.1946.

⁹⁸⁹ André Cluytens, a French-speaking Belgian, did not receive direct support from the Cultural Division, but he was apparently in contact with the diplomats, and went to Austria a number of times during the occupation decade and beyond.

⁹⁹⁰ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 248, Programme des manifestations culturelles prévues pour les mois de juin et juillet.

⁹⁹¹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 248, Programme des manifestations culturelles prévues pour les mois de mai, juin et juillet 1948.

⁹⁹² “Von Mozart bis Einem,” *Wiener Tageszeitung*, 06.03.1948: 4.

1950, France was represented by its famed organist Marcel Dupré,⁹⁹³ an authority on Bach.

A certain gusto for festivities, initiated during the months of the French presidency, continued during the festivals. Here, cultural diplomats organised a considerable number of contributions, thus enhancing the public visibility of French music and musicians at these events, the importance of which was steadily growing. French contributions carved out a niche for French musicians and music, and established a position of prestige for French classical and contemporary academic music at Austrian international events, a dynamic that was further strengthened by the continuous French effort in Salzburg. As in the Russian case, it would be wrong to assume that no French music or French musicians had been heard in Vienna before the war, or even during Nazi rule. The Musikverein,⁹⁹⁴ the Konzerthaus and the State Opera programmes⁹⁹⁵ clearly demonstrate that composers such as Tchaikovsky and Debussy were consistently performed even during the war. However, the significantly altered power relations in Central Europe during the occupation period led to a spectacular increase in prestige tours from France, which thus stands out against the background of the interwar years and the post-State Treaty decades.

Soloists

With soloists, French cultural diplomacy could benefit from relatively moderate costs, and a number of world-renowned musicians who could immediately be deployed to Austria. Ginette Neveu, Jacques Thibaud, Pierre Fournier, Zino Francescatti, Janine Andrade, Alfred Cortot, Robert Casadesus, Maurice Gendron and many others visited Vienna. In composing soloist programmes, it was important to adjust the programme to the city's existing concert life. Not all musicians from France were sponsored by official diplomacy, as Austria became increasingly open to private initiatives, but it is reasonable to assume that the overwhelming majority of French musicians did receive some kind of government support, and were selected with this in view.⁹⁹⁶

Performing in the most prestigious Viennese concert halls, particularly the Musikverein⁹⁹⁷ and the Konzerthaus (the latter was more inclusive⁹⁹⁸), these artists achieved the ultimate goal of French

⁹⁹³“Internationales Bach-Fest: Menuhin – Schneiderhan – Dupré – Matthews,” *Die Presse* 10.06.1950: 4.

⁹⁹⁴ Otto Biba, Teresa Hrdlicka, eds., *Die Programm-Sammlung der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien 1937-1987* (Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 2001).

⁹⁹⁵ Characteristically, the emblematic Carmen received a new production as late as 1944. See Spielplan der Wiener Oper 1869 bis 1955. <http://www.mdw.ac.at/iatgm/operapolitics/spielplan-wiener-oper/web/opus/87>

⁹⁹⁶ French-speaking Belgians, such as Arthur Grumiaux, are not included in the remit of this chapter.

⁹⁹⁷ Pierre Barbizet, Monique de la Bruchollerie, Odile Crussard, Alfred Cortot, Jeanne-Marie Darré, Marcel Dupré, Marie-Thérèse Fourneau, Pierre Fournier, Maurice Gendron, Monique Haas, Maurice Marechal, Oliver Messiaen, Ginette and Jean Neveu and Jacques Thibaud notably played at the Musikverein.

⁹⁹⁸ The relatively welcoming attitude displayed by the Konzerthaus is explained by its all-in-one format and objectively

cultural diplomacy: a stable concert presence that kept critical and public opinion informed regarding France and French musicians, as significant players on the European cultural scene. Differences in style and ranking mattered considerably, however, particularly in high-culture circles. While Susini and his colleagues were determined to concentrate on classical high culture, they did allow jazz (Ray Ventura), and even Parisian *chanson* of the cabaret variety (Marie Dubas), to be produced in Vienna, owing to the apparent popularity of these genres.

Ginette Neveu, one of the most successful incoming musicians during the entire occupation period, was selected among the leading violinists of the younger generation, and achieved spectacular successes in 1946⁹⁹⁹ and later in 1948.¹⁰⁰⁰ Her audacious ventures into the terrain of Germanic music overwhelmed Viennese journalists, who occasionally deemed Neveu's renditions of Beethoven too individualistic.¹⁰⁰¹ Another musician who visited during this early period, the famed violinist Jacques Thibaud, received similar critical acclaim upon his first concerts in May¹⁰⁰² and October¹⁰⁰³ 1946, and a more mixed reaction in 1947, when, due to technical issues, a hastily recruited piano accompanist apparently jarred with Thibaud,¹⁰⁰⁴ producing some false notes.¹⁰⁰⁵ The deaths of Neveu and Thibaud, in 1949 and 1953 respectively, cut short their careers, and obviously prevented them from performing in Austria in later years. However, they had already attained the highest degree of prestige conferred by the Viennese press on incoming French artists.

Further string seasons included the violinists Zino Francescatti¹⁰⁰⁶, Janine Andrade,¹⁰⁰⁷ and Monique and Guy Fallot,¹⁰⁰⁸ as well as the cellists Pierre Fournier, who visited Austria several times,¹⁰⁰⁹ and Maurice Gendron. Austrian critics were at times irreverent: while the first concerts by

larger concert capacities. In addition, the direction played an important role in the nascent Viennese festival landscape, in which its aspirations overlapped with those of the French Element. See: Erwin Barta 1987.

⁹⁹⁹ "Die Geigerin Neveu," WK 17.05.1946: 4. "Charles Munch dirigiert im Gesellschaftskonzert," WK 20.05.1946: 4. "Eine europäische Geigerin: Gespräch mit Ginette Neveu," WK 21.05.1946: 4. "Violinkonzert Ginette Neveu," WK 24.05.1946: 4. "Französische Gäste bei den Philharmonikern," NÖ 22.05.1946: 4.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Joseph Marx, "Konzerte, Ballett, Solisten," Wiener Zeitung 23.04.1948: 3.

¹⁰⁰¹ "Violinkonzert Ginette Neveu," WK 17.04.1948: 4. "Philharmoniker, Virtuosen, Kantate: Konzertveranstaltungen im Musikvereinsgebäude," WK 20.04.1948: 4.

¹⁰⁰² "Thibaud kommt nach Wien," WK 06.05.1946: 4. "Jacques Thibaud geigt" WK 14.05.1946: 4. Lafite, Pierre. "Violinkonzert Jacques Thibaud" NÖ 15.05.1946: 3.

¹⁰⁰³ "Jacques Thibaud spielte für die Musikakademie," WK 08.10.1946: 4. "Jacques Thibaud spielte in Wien," WK 10.10.1946: 4.

¹⁰⁰⁴ "Musik der Woche," NÖ 12.11.1947: 2.

¹⁰⁰⁵ "Jacques Thibaud," WK 08.11.1947: 5.

¹⁰⁰⁶ "Francescatti erstmals in Wien : Der weltberühmte Geiger im Konzert der Musikfreunde," WK 02.04.1951: 4. Rudolf Klein, "Musikfestabende und Meistergeiger," WK 10.04.1951: 4. "Klavier- und Kammermusik," WZ 12.11.1952: 3.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Peter Lafite, "Sonatenabend Jean Fournier - Ginette Doyen," WK 05.11.1946: 4. "Geigerin mit Koloratursopran: Janine Andrade zum erstenmal in Wien," WK 18.12.1946: 4.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Rudolf Klein, "Guy und Monique Fallot," (Im Rampenlicht) WK 15.11.1951: 4. "Celloabend Fallot - Liederabend Reining," NÖ 19.05.1953: 5. "Monique und Guy Fallot, Tonkünstler," Die Presse 16.05.1953: 6.

¹⁰⁰⁹ "Pierre Fournier," WK 16.12.1947: 3. „Chor- und Solistenkonzerte," AZ 19.12.1947: 4.

Gendron, in 1949¹⁰¹⁰ and 1950,¹⁰¹¹ and later in 1952,¹⁰¹² were received favourably, his subsequent evening with the noted composer Jean Françaix was heavily criticized for technical imperfections, particularly in the virtuoso pieces chosen for the evening.¹⁰¹³ The situation in Vienna thus contrasted with that in Innsbruck, where the local newspaper, the *Tiroler Tageszeitung*, refrained from expressing critical opinions regarding French musicians, thus demonstrating that Viennese critics, partly with the permission of cultural diplomats, aimed to maintain an independent stance. Such patterns of behaviour contributed to the credibility of French musical diplomacy, and did not damage the relationship between Gendron, critics and the public in the longer term.¹⁰¹⁴ Subsequent seasons saw a diversification of the instruments that were represented. The case of Marcel Dupré has already been noted earlier, and it is important to observe that organ solos played a significant part in the concerts of the Strasbourg Cathedral choir, both in Vienna and in Salzburg.¹⁰¹⁵ Among the pianists, Robert Casadesus gave a series of extremely successful concerts in 1949¹⁰¹⁶ and 1952, when the Viennese press was divided over the degree to which Casadesus was still attached to the French national school in his interpretation of Mozart.¹⁰¹⁷ Ultimately, however, the authority of Casadesus in performing Mozart was universally recognised, as he successfully toured Vienna in 1955.¹⁰¹⁸ As was the case with several other French musicians, Casadesus's growing prestige among the critical press served as a basis for further success, as he undertook a series of tours in 1956-1971.¹⁰¹⁹

This shows how a demanding and cautious Austrian press was capable of shifting towards a greater acceptance of previously contentious performances. On the other hand, the growing variety of French programming never compromised technical, artistic and prestige standards, and, while being unable to avoid occasional problems, consistently proved successful. Alongside individual

¹⁰¹⁰ "Ausländische Musik und Musiker in Wien," NÖ 06.03.1949: 6.

¹⁰¹¹ Rudolf Klein, "Maurice Gendron," (Im Rampenlicht) WK 23.01.1950: 4.

¹⁰¹² Rudolf Klein, "Maurice Gendron," (Im Rampenlicht) WK 08.05.1952: 4.

¹⁰¹³ Rudolf Klein, "Junge Musiker mit Ambitionen: Ausländische Gäste und Wiener Liedersänger," WK 25.01.1950: 4. "Cello und Klavier: Sonatenabend Gendron-Francaix," DP 26.01.1950: 4. A milder tone of the Arbeiter-Zeitung could not conceal the general disappointment: "Maurice Gendron – Jean Francaix," AZ 26.01.1950: 5. The Neues Österreich preferred to pass this occasion by polite silence: 3. Konzert des Kammerorchesters, NÖ 25.01.1950: 4.

¹⁰¹⁴ He gave concerts at the Konzerthaus in the immediate aftermath of the occupation time in 1956, 1957 and 1958, and at the Musikverein in 1958, 1961, 1962 and 1977). (Konzerthaus-Archiv; *Programme des Musikvereines*, 655).

¹⁰¹⁵ See the corresponding sub-chapters.

¹⁰¹⁶ Rudolf Tenschert, "Große Musik und große Interpreten," WK 28.10.1949: 4.

¹⁰¹⁷ "Robert Casadesus spielt Mozart," DP 25.10.1952: 4. "Robert Casadesus," NÖ 26.10.1952: 6. "Große Klaviermusik: Robert Casadesus," AZ 28.10.1952: 5.

¹⁰¹⁸ "Robert Casadesus spielte im Konzerthaus: Romantik in höchster Vollendung," WK 14.05.1955: 5. "Erfolgreiche Gäste im Konzerthaus: Klavierabend Robert Casadesus - Bach-Konzert des Stuttgarter Kammerorchesters - Erna Berger im Brahms-Saal," WZ 15.05.1955: 5. Dr. Ruff. "Ein französischer Meisterpianist," AZ 15.05.1955: 5. André Cluytens und Robert und Gaby Casadesus: Gäste aus Paris, Jubel aus Wien," WK 17.05.1955: 6. "Berühmte Solisten - Vorbildliches Ensemble," NÖ 18.05.1955: 8. "Schöne Konzerte am Wochenende: Die Wiener Philharmoniker unter André Cluytens - Das Ehepaar Casadesus im Konzerthaus - Zweiter Abend des Stuttgarter Kammerorchesters," Wiener Zeitung 17.05.1955: 6. Marcel Rubin, "Gäste im Konzertsaal", VS 17.05.1955: 6. "Österreichische Chronik: Wien," ÖMZ Heft 6 (Juni) 1955, 208.

¹⁰¹⁹ Konzerthaus-Archiv – Datenbanksuche.

characteristics, nationality remained important, and the relationship of French styles and artistic attitudes with regard to Austro-German and Viennese music tended to remain in the foreground of critical responses.

The Cortot Case

Alfred Cortot, whose position within the French musical profession had long been established, delivered more Austrian tours than any other French musician. Cortot could already look back at a distinguished history of Austrian guest tours, as he had visited Vienna seven times between 1924 and 1939. In addition, his unquestionable fame as an interpreter of Chopin, and his growing, although at times highly controversial, engagements in French cultural life, had advanced him to a position of prominence throughout Europe. Despite the *épuration* formalities that kept him from extensive international commitments prior to 1947, Cortot came back to Vienna as early as June 1948, prompting an outpouring of eulogies from the Austrian press.¹⁰²⁰ Later concerts followed in February¹⁰²¹ (when he made a detour to Graz¹⁰²²) and November¹⁰²³ 1949, in 1950 (Vienna¹⁰²⁴ and Salzburg¹⁰²⁵), 1954 (Vienna,¹⁰²⁶ Salzburg¹⁰²⁷ and Klagenfurt¹⁰²⁸) and 1955.¹⁰²⁹ The open veneration with which Austrian journalists treated Cortot was occasionally punctuated by remarks regarding his increasingly unreliable technique, which became particularly embarrassing in 1954: despite the great

¹⁰²⁰ Peter Lafite, "Pianist mit romantischem Herzen: Alfred Cortot spielte im Großen Musikversinssaal," WK 10.06.1948: 4. "Zwei Abende mit Alfred Cortot," AZ 13.06.1948: 6. Peter Lafite, "Berichte für Juni: Wien," ÖMZ Heft 7 (Juli) 1948, 218.

¹⁰²¹ Wir sprachen mit : Alfred Cortot," Weltpresse 07.02.1949: 6. Joseph Marx, "Aus dem musikalischen Skizzenbuch," Wiener Zeitung 13.02.1949: 4.

¹⁰²² Rudolf Weishappel, "Alfred Cortot," Kleine Zeitung 08.02.1949: 5. Richard Ahne, "Alfred Cortot," Steirerblatt 08.02.1949: 2. Hellmer, Hans. "Alfred Cortot spielt Chopin und Schumann: Veranstaltung des Musikvereines" Neue Zeit 08.02.1949: 2.

¹⁰²³ Klein, Heinrich. "Gäste in Oper und Konzertsaal: Eine neue Butterfly und ein großer Pianist" WK 24.11.1949: 4. "Klavierabend Alfred Cortot" Weltpresse 24.11.1949: 6. "Konzert Alfred Cortot" Die Presse 25.11.1949: 4.

¹⁰²⁴ "Klavierabend Alfred Cortot" Weltpresse 08.11.1950: 6. Peter Lafite, "Österreichische Chronik: Wien," ÖMZ Heft 10-11 (Oktober-November) 1950: 236.

¹⁰²⁵ See the Salzburg section and: "Solistenkonzert Alfred Cortot," Demokratisches Volksblatt (Salzburg) 14.11.1950: 5. "Klavierabend Alfred Cortot," Salzburger Volkszeitung 11.11.1950: 5.

¹⁰²⁶ Rudolf Klein, "Alfred Cortot spielte Chopin," WK 10.02.1954: 4. "Alfred Cortot spielt Chopin," Die Presse 10.02.1954: 5. Joseph Marx, "Klassisch – Romantisch – Modisch," Wiener Zeitung 14.02.1954: 3. "Cortot spielt Chopin," AZ 14.02.1954: 13. "Chopin-Abend Alfred Cortot," NÖ 11.02.1954: 6. "Von Woche zu Woche: Kulturberichte aus Wien," Tiroler Tageszeitung 13.02.1954: 12.

¹⁰²⁷ "Alfred Cortot - unermüdlicher Geist : Nach dem Chopin-Abend im Mozarteum," SN 15.02.1954: 8. (The islands made their appearance there as well.) The public paid much attention to his concert, so that more chairs had to be brought in, and many encores were extracted from the grey-headed artist. "Alfred Cortot spielt Chopin," Salzburger Volkszeitung 15.02.1954: 3

¹⁰²⁸ "Österreichische Chronik: Klagenfurt," ÖMZ Heft 4 (April) 1954, 133.

¹⁰²⁹ "Klavierabend Alfred Cortot," Die Presse 01.04.1955: 4. "Alfred Cortot und Wolfgang Schneiderhan," NÖ 02.04.1955: 8.

esteem in which Cortot was held by the musical establishment and the educated public, his failing fingers were exposed by the merciless press. Lastly, however, Cortot proved to be instrumental for French prestige diplomacy, being a constant reminder of the grandeur of the French Romantic school; virtually anyone else who performed Chopin in Vienna at that time was measured against the standard already set by Cortot.

Cortot's influence in Austria extended far beyond his immediate performances. Having established an academy in Switzerland, where he lived during his final years, Cortot remained an enduring reference point for younger musicians, and the journalists of the few largest newspapers maintained a constant degree of interest in him. Although Cortot, owing to his enormous prestige, showed little sign of dependence on official cultural diplomacy and largely set his own agenda, the concern with prestige that he shared with the Cultural Division helped establish a mutual understanding. Just as the state was not a monolithic actor, so individual musicians possessed their own space of manoeuvre, and often privileged access to foreign publics.

In overall terms, the deployment of soloists to Austria was a spectacular success for French musical diplomacy. Successfully (re-)establishing themselves on the Viennese and provincial scenes, French musicians reinforced the image of musical France as one of the leading nations in Europe, on par with Austria. The occupation administration prioritised high quality, and achieved notable successes during the first two seasons. Many musicians later returned to Vienna after the occupation period, using the critical capital they had accumulated in 1945-55. Due to the favourable circumstances of the French occupation presence, French violin, cello and piano soloists were able to achieve significant progress in Austria, regaining their pre-1938/44 positions, and further cultivating their prestige, which provided an important building block for French musical diplomacy.

Chamber Ensembles

Becoming aware of the large potential of chamber music in Austria, the French authorities managed to keep up a very high profile, dispatching European stars such as the Trio Pasquier, the Quatuor Pascal, the Quatuor Parrenin and the Quatuor Loewenguth. Here, French cultural diplomacy succeeded in conquering the hearts and minds of Austrian professionals: indeed, Viennese critics viewed France as equal to Austria, an honour not conceded to any other nation,¹⁰³⁰ and certainly not to the Soviet Union, whose musicians at times incurred severe judgments. This was due to a

¹⁰³⁰ The Nuovo Quartetto Italiano might be one of the few exceptions.

particularly happy choice of leading chamber ensembles, in particular the Pasquier Trio and the Calvet and Pascal Quartett, who managed to genuinely astonish Austrian professionals with the level of their performances, and to win considerable cultural capital for French musical representation.

Chamber music pre-dated other genres, in that it was present in Vienna from September 1945.¹⁰³¹ The Calvet Quartet toured Vienna again in 1946,¹⁰³² thus strengthening its reputation as one of the strongest chamber collectives in Europe, and leaving a profound impression among cultural journalists, included such independent-minded personalities as Joseph Marx. Its fame was equalled by the Pascal Quartet, which began performing concerts in February 1947.¹⁰³³ By playing the entire quartet oeuvre of Beethoven, the ensemble made an audacious move, which resulted in astounding critical success.¹⁰³⁴ Performances at the Music Festival in Vienna in 1948¹⁰³⁵ and 1951¹⁰³⁶ confirmed the quartet's position as the best French ensemble then performing a Austro-German repertoire. Ultimately, the Pasquier Trio, touring the Salzburg Festival in 1949 and Vienna in 1950, received enthusiastic acclaim from the Viennese press, which rated the perfectly balanced ensemble above even native Austrian trios.¹⁰³⁷ As one of the most brilliant parts of French musical diplomacy, chamber ensembles helped to dramatically enhance France's standing in the musical world of Vienna. Arguably, their role was crucial to prestige diplomacy during the early period of the occupation, as the Calvets paved the way for further French tours, and set a symbolic accent with arriving second only to the Soviets. Attracting critical acclaim as well as international fame, the chamber ensembles, along with a number of soloists, established France's position in Viennese concert rooms, and indirectly facilitated the subsequent entry of larger musical bodies.

Larger Tours

Orchestre Colonne

¹⁰³¹ "Die Calvet spielen: Debussy, Ravel, Fauré und C. Franck," WK 22.09.1945: 2. Peter Lafite, "Französische Kammermusik," NÖ 22.09.1945: 4.

¹⁰³² They gave concerts both at the Musikverein and the Konzerthaus (programmes). Peter Lafite, "Begeisterung um das Calvet-Quartett," WK 18.10.1946: 4. Joseph Marx, "Konzerte," Wiener Zeitung 23.10.1946: 5.

¹⁰³³ "Das Pariser Pascal-Quartett," WK 12.02.1947: 5. "Interessante Musik - interessante Musiker," NÖ 11.02.1947: 2.

¹⁰³⁴ "Musik der Woche," NÖ 12.11.1947: 2. "Konzerte," Wiener Zeitung 19.02.1947: 4.

¹⁰³⁵ "Das Pascal Quartett," (Im Rampenlicht) WK 21.06.1948: 4. "Kammermusik und Klaviersonaten," NÖ 23.06.1948: 2.

¹⁰³⁶ "Neue Musik und Meisterquartett: Konzertabende der IGNM und des Pascal-Quartetts," WK 31.01.1951: 4. Kammermusikabende: Pascal-Quartett," NÖ 31.01.1951: 5. "Das Pascal-Quartett: Erster Abend," Die Presse 01.02.1951: 4.

¹⁰³⁷ "Seltene Kammermusik und Pianist: Die jüngsten Ereignisse in den Wiener Konzertsälen," WK 08.05.1950: 4. "Opernfragmente in der Staatsakademie und Pasquier-Trio," NÖ 09.05.1950: 6. "Trio Pasquier," DP 07.05.1950: 4. "Gang durch die Konzertsäle," WZ 11.05.1950: 4.

During France's musical advance into the Austrian public sphere, the Orchestre Colonne played an important role in the first July 14th celebrations, and in the foundation of *France-Autriche*. Under the aegis of Béthouart, and receiving regular subsidies from the French state,¹⁰³⁸ the Orchestre gave three concerts at the Konzerthaus, conducted by Paul Paray, and assisted by the soloist Ninon Vallin. These *Festkonzerte* revolved around nineteenth-century French music, including a number of works by Berlioz. Tactfully, the first part of the third concert also included Austrian classics by Schubert, Beethoven and Brahms. Rapturous critics clearly acknowledged the importance of this musical intervention for the French, while at the same time recognising the exceptional quality of the orchestra.¹⁰³⁹ The Colonne contributed significantly to the French position in the field of symphonic music, which was particularly important given that no other symphonic orchestra of comparable stature was deployed to Austria during the occupation period.

Chorale de la Cathédrale de Strasbourg in Vienna

Apart from opera, the vocal offerings of the French administration also included choir music. In particular, the French administration charged the Strasbourg Cathedral Choir with representing France at the Salzburg Festival, and also in Innsbruck and Vienna, where it gave a concert in August 1949. Indeed, this met with undivided approval in all of the major critical columns,¹⁰⁴⁰ which stressed not only the balance of the voices maintained by the conductor, Abbé Alphonse Hoch, but also the organ solos by Jeanne Demessieux. High-level academic choral schooling, combined with a refined selection of classical choir repertoire, assured the success of the ensemble in Vienna, after it had already made its name in Salzburg. However, it is remarkable that, unlike Innsbruck or Salzburg, French choir diplomacy in Vienna did not take on a consistent form. It is not improbable that cultural diplomats considered the level and intensity of local competition to be excessively high, and thus opted for other lines of approach.

“Pelléas et Mélisande” by the Parisian Opéra Comique

¹⁰³⁸ A series of corresponding folders is stored in the collection of the Cultural Ministry at the Archives Nationales.

¹⁰³⁹ “Das Pariser Colonne-Orchester kommt,” WK 08.07.1946: 4. “Das Colonne-Orchester in Wien,” WK 13.07.1946: 4. “Paray und das Colonne-Orchester: Festlicher Abend im Konzerthaus,” WK 15.07.1946: 4. Eric Derman, “Das Orchester Colonne und Paul Paray,” *Weltpresse* 15.07.1946: 6. Joseph Marx, “Französisches Festkonzert”, *Wiener Zeitung* 15.07.1946: 2. Peter Lafite, “Festkonzert des Colonne-Orchesters, NÖ 17.07.1946.

¹⁰⁴⁰ “Straßburger Domchor kommt nach Wien,” *Die Presse* 18.08.1949: 4. “Straßburger Domchor in Wien,” *Weltpresse* 24.08.1949: 6. Peter Lafite, “Im Rampenlicht: Der Straßburger Domchor,” WK 27.08.1949: 4. “Konzert des Straßburger Domchors,” *Die Presse* 27.08.1949: 4.

One of the representative concerts that occurred during the months of the French presidency of the Allied Council was staged by the Paris Opera, which brought Debussy's only opera, *Pelléas et Mélisande*, to Vienna in November 1946. Receiving extensive organisational support and lavish subsidies from the French administration,¹⁰⁴¹ it performed two evenings in the *Staatsoper* at the *Volksooper*. Several Austrian and Allied dignitaries were present at the premiere. Correspondingly, the press commented on the performances in highly positive tones,¹⁰⁴² registering the presence of the prestige offensive undertaken by Béthouart and Susini. As one of the most important foreign contributions to the Austrian operatic soundscape during the occupation period, the Parisian guest tour re-kindled Austrian interest in and appreciation of French opera, and also sparked lively discussions regarding stylistic and national categorisations in music. In particular, the well-known Wagnerian influences on Debussy's operas were routinely touched upon in critical reporting. Unparalleled by the Soviets (the British sent Sadler's Wells to perform Britten's *Peter Grimes*), this French tour stood out for its festive accoutrements, and its immediate and lasting critical impact, particularly with regard to Debussy's music.

Folk music

Folk music and dance groups marked a departure from the high-brow path, and represented a valuable asset for French cultural diplomats in Vienna (and beyond), in that they demonstrated the popular side of French culture, thereby reasserting a Franco-Austrian cultural parallelism, almost amounting to a visible “people-to-people” diplomacy. Despite the initial underestimation of the popular potential of colourful folk music and dance, cultural diplomats soon realised their error, and launched a series of tours in Vienna, Western Austria and beyond, aiming to reach the largest number of audiences possible, and to establish a presence in the critical press.

In Vienna, major tours of folk ensembles occurred in 1948 and 1949. These were linked to celebrations of the French national holiday on July 14th, and were intended to represent different

¹⁰⁴¹ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 323, Versement de la somme de 350000 Frs à M. de Turckheim; pour solde dû aux Théâtres Lyriques pour les représentations de “Pelléas et Mélisande”. No 3608 CE/Cab. Vienne, le 6 Septembre 1947. MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 323, Le Chef de la Division des Affaires Culturelles à Monsieur le Lt Colonel Directeur du Cabinet du Général Haut-Commissaire Adjoint. No 1638 CE/AC/S. Vienne, le 5 Mai 1947. MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 323, Deplacement Vienne (Autriche – Représentations des 7 – 9 et 11 Novembre 1946, “Pelléas et Mélisande”.

¹⁰⁴² “Gastspiel der Pariser Opéra comique in Wien,” WK 11.10.1946: 4. ““Die ganze moderne Musik stammt davon ab”: Zum bevorstehenden Gastspiel der Pariser Großen Oper mit “Pelleas und Melisande” von Debussy,” WK 05.11.1946: 4. “Besuch bei Melisande: Pariser Grand Opera probt für heutiges Gastspiel,” WK 08.11.1946: 4. “Pelleas und Melisande: Gastspieler der Pariser Oper im Theater an der Wien,” WK 09.11.1946: 4. “Heute nochmals Pariser Oper,” WK 11.11.1946: 4. “Gastspiel der Pariser Großen Oper,” WP 09.11.1946: 6. “Pelleas und Melisande,” NÖ 12.11.1946: 2.

regions of France, thus conveying to Austrians an understanding of the size and diversity of the country, and demonstrating that French culture was not confined to Paris and its high-brow traditions. Initially, the enterprise was preceded by a cautious press campaign.¹⁰⁴³ Groups from Normandy, Franche-Comté, the Vendée,¹⁰⁴⁴ and the Basque country¹⁰⁴⁵ seized the critical imagination (Communists not excluded¹⁰⁴⁶), and the French Element immediately decided to capitalise upon this opportunity, planning further tours that would bring about a “mutual understanding” between the peoples of Austria and France.¹⁰⁴⁷ The following year, the dancers were publicly announced as early as June, in order to prepare the Viennese public.¹⁰⁴⁸ Building upon the experiences of the previous season, the directors decided to include more regions. This caused Austrian critics to draw parallels between regions of their own country and those of France, referring to the “Alemannic rawness” of Alsace, and the “Jodls” of Limousin.¹⁰⁴⁹ Alsatian “Mazurka”, which apparently resembled Austrian popular dances, was widely remarked upon, as were “Italian” songs from Bastia (Corsica).¹⁰⁵⁰ Provence, Burgundy, Brie, Toulouse, and Marseilles were also represented. This again led critics to draw parallels with Austrian culture, claiming that a cultural preference towards folk art represented the veritable soul of the people.¹⁰⁵¹ The staging of such “true art” met with both critical and public approval.¹⁰⁵² Clearly, full and uncompromised success was at hand.¹⁰⁵³ The overarching sentiment conveyed by the critical reviews was that of public excitement, and a real sense of “people’s diplomacy”. Moreover, these tours also provided an opportunity for conservative Austrian journalism to develop a discourse regarding the rootedness of musical creation in the national soil. On the one hand, this facilitated the reception of the French ensembles (concomitantly playing into the hands of Stalinist cultural propagandists). At the same time, it was also bound up with the resurfacing of nationalist tendencies inherited from the nineteenth century, and uncritically transferred into the immediate post-war period.

In all likelihood, the Cultural Division was not aware of the problematic character of the ideology that lay behind certain Austrian responses. Even more than the Soviets, the French administration

¹⁰⁴³ “Französisches Trachtenfest wird in Wien abgehalten,” WK 15.07.1948: 4.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Siegfried Weyr, „Kraft und Charme des Tanzes: Französisches Trachten- und Volkstanzfest im Konzerthaus,” WK 24.07.1948: 4.

¹⁰⁴⁵ “Französische Trachten und Volkstänze,” NÖ 24.07.1948: 5. „Französisches Trachtenfest in Wien,” WZ 25.07.1948: 4.

¹⁰⁴⁶ “Französische Volkskunst im Wiener Konzerthaus,” VS 25.07.1948: 6.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Paul Gstöttner, “Volkstanz und Volkstänze Frankreichs” (July 1948, the periodical unclear). MAO AOF AA AUT 193.

¹⁰⁴⁸ “Wien sieht Volkstänze Frankreichs: Folkloristische Gruppentänze werden im Konzerthaus gezeigt,” WK 25.06.1949: 4. Later it was seconded by the Weltpresse (“Französischer Volkstanzabend,” WP 13.07.1949: 6.)

¹⁰⁴⁹ Siegfried Weyr, “Grazie, Lebendigkeit, Bewegung : Französische Volkstänze im Konzerthaus,” WK 19.07.1949: 4.

¹⁰⁵⁰ “Französische Volkstänze im Konzerthaus,” WP 19.07.1949: 6.

¹⁰⁵¹ Orla Barenyi, “Französische Volkstänze im Konzerthaus,” VS 19.07.1949: 4.

¹⁰⁵² “Tanzendes, singendes Frankreich,” AZ 19.07.1949: 5.

¹⁰⁵³ “Französischer Volkstanz in Wien,” DP 20.07.1949: 4.

succeeded in acquainting the Viennese with a wide array of regional French cultures. The folk groups provided a less uniform, less Paris-centered image of France, and this was widely hailed in the press. Austrian curiosity, kindled by the first announcements, was followed by unequivocal critical acclaim, testifying to the admiration of both musical circles and the attending public. The sheer success of the folk groups epitomised one of the most important public diplomacy offensives carried out by the French Element. Being further continued during the 1950s, throughout the Austrian regions, they also put folk art on an equal standing with academic music, in terms of the strategic and financial considerations of cultural diplomats. Differing substantially from classical music, folk provided an independent referential framework, a different set of associations, and, ultimately, another nationally connoted aspect to the image of musical France.

French Academic and Modern Dance: Ballet Tours in Vienna

Traditionally, France and Russia were considered to have produced essentially the same style of classical ballet. To a considerable extent, academic dancing owed its existence to the Versailles court theatre, which had sent reverberations throughout Europe from about the sixteenth century, coinciding with the apex of French cultural *rayonnement* in early modern Europe. The nineteenth century saw the rise of the Russian romantic school at the Imperial theatre in Moscow, and also in St Petersburg, where it attained a position of world preponderance. During the 1910s and 1920s, Diaghilev's *Ballets Russes* caused a Copernican revolution in the European dancing scene, a shift facilitated by the exile of many dancers following World War I and the Russian Revolution. As these were essentially oriented towards France and French-language culture, many of the guest artists and collaborators of the *Ballets Russes* remained in the country, including Leon Bakst and Igor Stravinsky. The latter had helped to revolutionise European music with his first ballets, staged by Diaghilev in 1913, and which had been accompanied by scandals still remembered by the older generation during the first post-war years. Paris, the long-established centre of musical culture in France, saw its Opera and Champs-Élysées theatre dominated by Russian immigrants; the dissolution of the *Ballets Russes* in 1929 led to many artists being absorbed into the French cultural labour market. There was no longer any dividing line between Russian and French elements in the Parisian school of dance: having been brought to Russia mostly by the French, academic ballet was then reinvigorated in France by Russians, who sent waves throughout Europe. Even under the Vichy regime, Slavs could feel safe in France, and Serge Lifar was generally suspected of having benefited

from benevolent German attention, later having to clear himself against charges of collaboration.¹⁰⁵⁴ (The *épuration* caused more problems for Alfred Cortot, and did not interfere significantly with most of the artists who went to Austria.)

Financially, ballet cost much more than soloists, but far less than entire operas. Thus, while officials on all sides were reluctant to send their national operas abroad, they were prepared to send either opera singers or opera ballets. For their part, the French clearly chose the latter option. The Soviets, on the other hand, hoping to capitalize on the immense foreign interest in Russian ballet, chose to send soloists instead of larger groups. This left an impression in Austria, particularly given that the first tour took place in 1945.

Dance was the musical-performative form in which France delivered the largest array of styles and musical-social settings, from folk to Franco-Oriental, and Franco-American to academic Franco-Russian. The three latter genres fell correspondingly into the remits of high- and middle-brow culture, being represented in Vienna at several venues between 1946 and 1952. Starting with smaller groups, such as those of the Franco-Indochinese Nyota Inyoka and the Franco-American Lola Fuller, French policies subsequently moved towards large-scale ensembles, bringing the Paris City Ballet of Roland Petit in 1948, and the Paris Opera Ballet of Serge Lifar in 1950 and 1952. This approach to dance diplomacy effectively brought together several cultural-political discourses: academic dance, transnationality, Franco-Russian classical transfers, Franco-American non-academic dance, colonialism, the changing relation between classic and modern repertoire(s), and (though sadly passed over in silence by virtually all sources) the role of women in contemporary dancing practices.

The Fuller Ballet, arriving first, constituted an artistic event of considerable importance. Continuing the tradition of modern dance developed in the United States during the early twentieth century, the troupe sought to introduce a non-classical element to the scenes of old Europe. Critical reviews suggest that a preparatory information campaign had been conducted by the French Element,¹⁰⁵⁵ and the use of light and coloured fabric demanded particular attention.¹⁰⁵⁶

The tour of Nyota Inyoka was brought to Vienna in late 1946, coinciding with the growing echo of the colonial war in Indochina.¹⁰⁵⁷ The troupe exemplified the harmonious relationship of the European and the Oriental, sporting colourful costumes and exotic East Asian dance styles. Viennese criticism, while paying lip service to French expectations, did not fail to make clear its desire for a

¹⁰⁵⁴ Karthas, *When Ballet Became French*, 306.

¹⁰⁵⁵ "Das Pariser Fuller-Ballett eingetroffen," WK 18.07.1946: 4.

¹⁰⁵⁶ "Fuller-Ballett tanzt im 'Bouquet'," WK 20.07.1946: 4. "Im 'Bouquet': Das Fuller-Ballett," Weltpresse 20.07.1946: 6.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Undoubtedly, this does raise the question of colonial implications in the ensemble's choreography, as suggested by current research, see: André Lepecki, *Option Tanz: Performance und die Politik der Bewegung. Aus dem Englischen von Lilian Astrig Geese* (Berlin: Theater der Zeit/Recherchen, 2003): 29, 31. As I will show, neither gender nor the colonial dimension were articulated by contemporaries.

higher standard of professionalism among the dancers.¹⁰⁵⁸ Thus, the first non-academic dance groups were directed by women of transatlantic origins, the second of whom hailed from the colonial empire, and it is remarkable how quickly French cultural diplomats decided to expose Austrians to these performances. Viennese criticism chose not to problematise these issues, however, and, in reality, the public resonance of both tours remained moderate. Subsequent ballet engagements, whether in connection with these public reactions or not, bore on high-brow academic dance. Demonstrating the growing perception of the need for grand form, the subsequent tours featured full ballet companies, including the two most prestigious in France. In late 1948, Roland Petit's ensemble was invited to Vienna. Arriving two years after the Sadler's Wells theatre, which had given the first full-scale ballet performances in Vienna in October 1946,¹⁰⁵⁹ the Ballet performed on November 8, 9, 10 and 11 on the stage of the Volksoper on the Gürtel in Vienna.¹⁰⁶⁰ An examination of the works selected for performance in Vienna shows that the programme stretched from Russian classics – two ballets based on the music of Tchaikovsky, *The Nutcracker* and *La belle au bois dormant*, a modern ballet by Jean Anouilh (libretto) and Jean Françaix (music), entitled *Les demoiselles de nuit*, and, as a reverence to Austria, a sequence entitled *Suite de Danses du beau Danube*, based on the music of Johann Strauss. These programme choices reflected the commitment of Roland Petit to an academic Franco-Russian tradition – he engaged the choreographer Léonide Massine for *Suite des danses du beau Danube*, and *The Nutcracker* was undoubtedly of symbolic importance. Some immediate reactions were laudatory,¹⁰⁶¹ but several critics offered a mixed response. Singling out the outstanding technical level of the ballet, and usually highlighting *Demoiselles de la nuit* as the most successful piece, the *Kurier* treated *Danses du beau Danube* rather sharply,¹⁰⁶² and the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* missed claimed that the programme lacked stylistic coherence.¹⁰⁶³ The Communist and Soviet press, owing to the hardening of the Cold War front, and their sensitivities regarding a Russian classic repertoire performed by a “bourgeois” ballet, issued critical attacks in both *Der Abend*¹⁰⁶⁴ and the *Österreichische Zeitung*.¹⁰⁶⁵ Despite these discordant voices, it is beyond doubt that

¹⁰⁵⁸ “Indischer Tanzabend Nyota Inyokas,” *WK* 19.11.1946: 4. “Photo: Nyota Inyoka,” *WP* 06.11.1946: 6. “Tanzabend Nyota Inyoka,” *WP* 16.11.1946: 6. Even the Soviet *Österreichische Zeitung* adhered to the narrative of West-East synthesis to an astonishing degree, choosing not to attack French colonial involvement: Hans Hajas, “Tänze des Fernen Ostens,” *ÖZ* 17.11.1946: 7.

¹⁰⁵⁹ See reports in: *Wiener Kurier* 29.09.1946: 11.10.1946: among others.

¹⁰⁶⁰ MAE, AOFAA, Autriche, AUT 61, Division Culturelle – Compte rendu d'activités pour le mois d'Octobre 1948 (28.10.1948).

¹⁰⁶¹ “Grazie aus Paris,” *WZ* 10.11.1948: 4. “Lebendiges Ballett,” *Wiener Tageszeitung* 11.11.1948: 3. “Die Ballets de Paris in der Volksoper,” *WP* 12.11.1948: 4.

¹⁰⁶² Siegfried Weyr, “Die materialisierte Idee des Tanzes: Das Gastspiel des ‘Ballet de Paris’ in der Volksoper,” *WK* 12.11.1948: 4.

¹⁰⁶³ “Das Ballet de Paris,” *AZ* 10.11.1948: 5.

¹⁰⁶⁴ “Französische Tanzkunst,” *Der Abend* 09.11.1948: 4.

¹⁰⁶⁵ “Gastspiel des ‘Ballets de Paris’ in der Volksoper,” *ÖZ* 11.11.1948: 4.

most professional musical journalists were deeply impressed by this first ballet tour from France. Its public success was considerable, and French cultural representatives considered the ballet for further tours in later years.¹⁰⁶⁶ Setting the tone for academic ballet in a city that was struggling to reconnect itself to the high-art European dance tradition, the Roland Petit troupe proved to be of significant importance both for French prestige diplomacy and artistic developments in Austria itself, even if in the latter case its outcomes were not direct, and came about due to a series of first-class British, French, Russian and American ballets that toured Austria after 1945.

In this vein, a further French contribution came less than two years later, as the French Element realised the enormous potential that world-class ballet performances could have in the Austrian context. The Ballet de l'Opéra, directed by Serge Lifar, gave a series of concerts in March 1950, to which members of the federal government (the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor, Foreign Minister and Education Minister) and the Allied Commissionaries were invited.¹⁰⁶⁷ For 1950, the premiering ballet chose *Les Mirages* with music by Henri Sauguet, *Guignole et Pandore* by André Jolivet, *Passion* by César Franck and *Suite en blanc* by Edouard Lalo; the choreography was done by Serge Lifar. This was the culmination of Lifar's efforts to establish dance as an autonomous art form, to assert its independence from music ("Diaghilevism") in favour of rhythm of movement, and to sustain the high technical and academic standards of modern classical ballet.¹⁰⁶⁸ Thus, Austrian critics found themselves having to interpret a cultural product that implied an array of methodological and ideological problems. Being aware of French sensitivities, the native Austrian interest in re-establishing a world-class ballet in Vienna, and the need to situate Lifar within the national discourse, the critics proceeded with caution, and gradually developed a narrative that combined apparent praise with a certain critical distancing from certain elements of the Parisian opera theatre. Most leading Viennese newspapers were unanimous in their praise for the incoming artists and their performances.¹⁰⁶⁹ Politically motivated attacks came from the Communist side, which accused the French ballet of lacking substance, prioritising instead superficial technical perfection.¹⁰⁷⁰ Occasional critique criticisms were voiced regarding Sauguet's music,¹⁰⁷¹ or the difficult balance between the "classic", i.e. already known conservative elements, and the "modern", that is the newer

¹⁰⁶⁶ See: MAE, AOFAA (Nantes), 730/PO/1/1127, letter from Embassy to Foreign Minister Piniau, 15.04.1956.

¹⁰⁶⁷ MAO AOFAA AUT 193, Note au sujet des représentations données par les Ballets de l'Opéra de Paris les 18, 19 et 20 mars 1950. Vienne, 02.03.1950.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Karthas, *When Ballet Became French*, 213-18.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Siegfried Weyr, "Tanz als sublimiertes Weltgemälde: Pariser Opernballett trat in der Volksoper auf," WK 21.03.1950: 4. "Grazie aus Paris: Gastspiel des Ballets de l'Opéra de Paris," Wiener Zeitung 21.03.1950: 3. "Gastspiel des Pariser Opernballetts," AZ 23.03.1950: 5. "Pariser Opernballett in Wien: Gastspiel in der Volksoper," Die Presse 21.03.1950: 4.

¹⁰⁷⁰ "Ballett ohne Inhalt," VS 22.03.1950: 4

¹⁰⁷¹ "Pariser Ballett in der Volksoper," WP 21.03.1950: 6.

choreographic experiments of Lifar and his colleagues.¹⁰⁷² The national importance of Lifar's tour was further highlighted by an extended report in the *Salzburger Nachrichten*, which, true to its tradition of exacting journalism, combined high praise of the dancers with a discussion of the aesthetic problems of Lifar's plotless ballets, which supposedly emphasised the “decorative” over the “dramatic”.¹⁰⁷³ The Parisian opera ballet can thus be qualified as an outstanding public and critical success. However, it also helped to spark a heated critical debate regarding the most recent developments being introduced in Paris, where artistic directors were seeking to underline the pure expressivity of dance over external factors (such as dramatic action).

Invited to Austria at the joint initiative of the French Cultural Division and the Austrian Directory of Federal Theatres,¹⁰⁷⁴ the troupe performed an even more academic and conservative repertoire, which featured *Les Caprices de Cupidon*, based on the music of Couperin, episodes from *Coppelia*, the classical ballet of Léo Delibes, and the *Suite en blanc*. Serge Lifar himself came to Vienna and made a short appearance on the stage, and this was dutifully and respectfully remarked upon by the press. This time, most critics actively engaged with the artistic programme, and showed signs of recognising the ballet's outstanding format, while still rejecting Lifar's most important innovations. Characteristically, the *Kurier* was conspicuous in its absence, with the exception of a short notice,¹⁰⁷⁵ whereas most other newspapers, including the *Salzburger Nachrichten*, published full-length reviews that rigorously questioned both the explicit academicism and the pure dance espoused by the Parisian directors.¹⁰⁷⁶ The Communist *Volksstimme* inveighed against the formalism of Lifar's choreography,¹⁰⁷⁷ while the Soviet-dominated press in general tended to pass by the tour in silence. While Joseph Marx expressed some degree of agreement with Lifar, wishing only for more “change”,¹⁰⁷⁸ the official organ of the musical profession, the *Österreichische Musikzeitschrift*, dryly commented that the tour was more of a social, rather than an artistic, event.¹⁰⁷⁹ These signs of discontent must have worried Susini, who nevertheless allowed the Parisian Opera ballet to perform in Salzburg the following year, apparently more convinced by Lifar's determination than the unusually heated debates that followed his tours.

Still, by all formal criteria, both the 1950 and 1952 tours were a great public success, since they demonstrated state-of-the-art academic dancing, at least by the standards of the world outside Soviet

¹⁰⁷² “Gastspiel des Pariser Opernballetts,” NÖ 21.03.1950: 5.

¹⁰⁷³ “Vier Ballette von Serge Lifar,” SN 23.03.1950: 8.

¹⁰⁷⁴ MAO AOFAA AUT 193, Entretien au Siège de l'Administration des Théâtres Fédéraux. Vienne, le 21 Janvier 1952.

¹⁰⁷⁵ “Pariser Ballett in der Volksoper: Klassischer Tanz an drei Abenden,” WK 01.03.1952: 4.

¹⁰⁷⁶ “Ballett der Pariser Staatsoper,” DP 11.03.1952: 4. “Französisches Opernballett,” AZ 12.03.1952: 5. “Gastspiel des Pariser Opernballetts: Ein historisches Programm in streng klassischem Stil,” SN 19.03.1952: 4.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Marcel Rubin, “Ballett der Pariser Oper: Gastspiel in der Volksoper,” VS 13.03.1952: 4.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Joseph Marx, “Musik und Tanz,” WZ 16.03.1952: 3.

¹⁰⁷⁹ “Österreichische Chronik – Wien,” ÖMZ Heft 3 (März 1952): 100.

Russia. France's ballet commitments also demonstrate the multidimensionality of dance diplomacy: this was harnessed in order to represent the French nation, offered an international setting and transnational contents, and was judged by a predominantly nationalist musical press, within a conservative Austrian setting. The Parisian tours helped re-open Vienna to the international ballet scene, thus restoring the city to its earlier prestige, despite the absence of a commensurate native ballet company. At the same time, Austrian criticism was confronted and engaged with pan-European and transatlantic debates regarding classicism and modernity, and the national and stylistic boundaries and future potential of academic and non-academic ballet. While remaining unresolved in the national public discourse during the occupation years, these debates paved the way for later changes, which have led to today's internationally open, and often experimental, Viennese ballet programme.

French Guest Tours Outside of Vienna

Bearing in mind the threefold structure of Austrian geography (French zone, “friendly” UK and US zones and Soviet Eastern Austria, with the exclusion of Vienna), I will now examine the French tours of Innsbruck, Salzburg, Graz and Linz. Many nation-wide tours occurred simultaneously, and artistic input was largely uniform throughout Austria. Whatever differences there were can be explained through reference to the relative importance attached to different regions. Furthermore, I will also examine the way in which the provincial press responded to the French. Of course, in the Western zone, the press served as an amplifier for French propaganda. However, it still had to remain credible to its reading audience, and thus continued to maintain certain standards of professionalism and critical independence. In Salzburg, the domination of the *Salzburger Nachrichten* further simplified the issue. The outstanding importance of Salzburg to French musical diplomacy is best summed up, however, by the Festival, and the large-scale projects that France contributed to its proceedings. Graz benefited from its status as the second largest city in Austria, its relative proximity to Vienna, and British good will. Finally, Linz received attention during the 1950s, hosting a few highly successful tours.

Innsbruck

The capital of the French zone received the largest share of concert musicians outside of Vienna,

and the French administration, being under less critical pressure in Innsbruck than in Vienna and Salzburg, could be sure of a favourable reception, whether it opted for the standard fare of Austrian programmes, or for more experimental choices. Undoubtedly, the French Institute and Besset played a determining role on the musical scene of Innsbruck. Still, not all French performers were directly affiliated to the Institute, and many of them were announced independently. These performers provide the centerpiece of my investigation, since they reflect the most public aspect of public musical diplomacy, exiting the ivory tower of the *Institut*. In such instances, Besset had to act as cultural representative for the region as a whole. Furthermore, even before the structures of cultural diplomacy had been set in motion, the programmes of guest concerts had already begun.

Despite Besset's avowed interest in painting, he was by no means indifferent to the sounds of music, and sought to promote contacts between Austrians and the French in this field. In his own words,

*In the aftermath of the war, musicians took up the guest tour business again – in close collaboration with the musical director, Professor Weidlich, we were able to bring soloists such as Ginette Neveu, Nicole Henriot, Jacques Thibaud or Pierre Fournier, the singer Gérard Souzay, or the Pascal Quartet to Innsbruck.*¹⁰⁸⁰

The French cultural propaganda was far more explicit in Innsbruck than in Vienna, as it sought to actively strengthen Austrian national identity and construct a discourse of Austro-French cultural parallels.¹⁰⁸¹ The local press in the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, a resource that was always at the French Element's disposition, constituted *de facto* another administrative asset alongside the Institute.

As in Vienna, the French made an effort to make a favourable first impression, beginning with a tour by the pianist Jacques Février and the Calvet Quartet in 1945, which was met with acclaim by local journalists, particularly due to their performance of a mixed Austro-Germano-French repertoire.¹⁰⁸² While the French thus offered tours by artists imported directly from France, French officers stationed in the vicinity also gave concerts, with Captain Jacques Roussel as conductor and Odile Crussard as pianist. Residing in Austria, they could give concerts with far greater flexibility

¹⁰⁸⁰ “Schon bald nach Kriegende hatten die Musiker ihren Tourneebetrieb wiederaufgenommen - in enger Zusammenarbeit mit Musikdirektor Prof. Weidlich hatten wir Solisten wie Ginette Neveu, Nicole Henriot, Jacques Thibaud oder Pierre Forunier, den Sänger Gérard Souzay oder das Pascal-Quartett für Innsbruck gewinnen können” Besset, Maurice. “Eine Erinnerung” Tirol-Frankreich 1946-1960, 13.

¹⁰⁸¹ Starlinger, 67.

¹⁰⁸² “Jacques Fevrier spielte in Alpbach,” TT 05.09.1945: 3. “Französische Kammermusik in Österreich (Innsbrucker Konzerte des Calvet-Quartetts sowie des Pianisten Février am 11. und 13. September),” TT 05.09.1945: 4. “1. Festkonzert französischer Kammer- und Klaviermusik in Innsbruck,” TT 12.09.1945: 2. “Calvetquartett (2-Konzert),” TT 14.09.1945: 2. “Calvet-Quartett (3. Abend),” TT 17.09.1945: 2.

than incoming musicians¹⁰⁸³ (This is also true of the Soviet ensembles stationed in Austria and Hungary). These efforts provided the groundwork for efficient collaboration between French artists / occupation personnel and local musical institutions. In 1946, for example, the Symphony Orchestra of Innsbruck was led by Roussel, with Crussard and Gilbert Schuchter featuring as soloists: their rendition of Bach and Mozart won both public sympathy and critical recognition.¹⁰⁸⁴ Crussard subsequently helped with managing chamber concerts,¹⁰⁸⁵ for instance working with the IF¹⁰⁸⁶ or traveling around Innsbruck.¹⁰⁸⁷ This was a valuable activity upon which to fall back in case of necessity, and occasional concerts outside the regional capital, of course, retained a particular importance on the local level – places like Kitzbühel did not suffer from the same cultural weariness as the Viennese, who had been overwhelmed by the cultural offerings of the competing Allies. Great importance was attached to famous names: in particular, French cultural diplomats strove to maintain a very high standard of soloist, prioritising those of outstanding renown and quality. In keeping with general practice, the first two introductory seasons contained the highest concentration of French musicians. The difference with Vienna, however, lay in the density of advertisement. In particular, thanks to France's dominant position within the Western Austrian media landscape, incoming musicians could be introduced well before their actual arrival in Innsbruck, and also be accompanied by a series of announcements and comments.

On some occasions, French tours almost resembled Soviet “brigades”, such as when Miguel Candéla, Jeanne-Marie Darré and Maurice Marechal performing separately, and then together, during a tour that took place between February and March 1946.¹⁰⁸⁸ They were followed by Georges Thill, one of the most renowned opera singers of the era: like Alfred Cortot, the ageing Thill had already built contacts in Austria during the interwar period and his previous international career.¹⁰⁸⁹ The season of 1945-46 was rounded off with a star performance by Jacques Thibaud¹⁰⁹⁰ and a concert

¹⁰⁸³ Roussel, being active in the army, appeared before the public on charitable occasions as well. For instance, in late 1948 he led a concert given for DPs resident in Innsbruck. (“Chorliederabend für Dps,” TT 11.12.1948: 7.)

¹⁰⁸⁴ Albert Riester, “Capitaine Jacques Roussel dirigierte Bach und Mozart: Großer Erfolg des Symphoniekonzertes,” TT 29.01.1946: 3.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Albert Riester, “Klavierabend Odile Crussard,” TT 09.02.1952: 11. Eiusdem, “VI. Symphoniekonzert,” TT 17.03.1952: 5.

¹⁰⁸⁶ “Chopin-Abend im IF,” TT 23.05.1949: 5.

¹⁰⁸⁷ “Quartettabend in Kitzbühel,” TT 15.06.1950: 5.

¹⁰⁸⁸ “Zum Konzert französischer Solisten,” TT 26.02.1946: 2. “Miguel Candéla heute abends im Musikvereinssaal,” TT 27.02.1946: cover page. “Die große französische Pianistin Jeanne-Marie Darré ist zur Zeit auf einer Gästereise durch Österreich,” TT 12.03.1946: 3. “Meisterkonzert des ‘Französischen Casals’ Maurice Marechal,” TT 05.03.1946: 5. “Besuch bei Maurice Marechal,” TT 06.03.1946: 2. “Meisterkonzert Maurice Marechal,” TT 07.04.1946: 3. “Der berühmte Cellist Maurice Maréchal, der in zwei Konzerten in Innsbruck Proben seiner einmaligen Kunst gab,” TT: 09.03.1946: cover.

¹⁰⁸⁹ “Nur ein Konzert George Thills,” TT 16.03.1946: 3. “Ein großer Sänger erzählt: Interview mit Georges Thill, Tenor,” TT 14.03.1946: 3. “Der erste Tenor der Pariser Oper Georges Thill singt heute um 20 Uhr in Innsbruck im Festsaal des Adambräu,” TT 16.03.1946: 4.

¹⁰⁹⁰ “Änderungen im Konzertprogramm – heute einziges Violinkonzert Jacques Thibaud im Riesensaal,” TT 02.05.1946: 6.

by Frédéric Ogouse.¹⁰⁹¹ Thus, the first post-war season in Innsbruck, which was marked by cultural reconstruction and revival,¹⁰⁹² saw a series of spectacular French contributions, the impact of which greatly exceeded that in Vienna, thanks to the near French monopoly among the foreign powers, the relative position of Innsbruck and, ultimately, the variety and richness of the musical programme. This contributed to the international re-opening of the Innsbruck scene, and thus claimed a place of prominence for France as a musical power.

Subsequently, French efforts to provide soloist concerts were continued. Notably, Innsbruck specialised in hosting musicians who had not yet performed in Vienna, either because they were deemed unready for the exacting standards of the Austrian capital, or because their participation in Viennese concerts was impossible due to timing or geography. Examples include Georges de Lausnay (1946),¹⁰⁹³ Marcelle de Mayo (1947),¹⁰⁹⁴ and Marcelle Henelin (1949),¹⁰⁹⁵ all of whom were thus given a chance to develop their European profiles, thanks to the exceptional opportunities offered by the French presence in Innsbruck. Indeed, all received an expectedly warm critical welcome. However, in addition to France's musical youth and second-best artists, Innsbruck also hosted renowned musicians such as Gilles Guilbert,¹⁰⁹⁶ Ginette Neveu, Pierre Fournier and Gérard Souzay. Pierre Fournier arrived first in late 1947, earning accolades in an advertisement¹⁰⁹⁷ and a report.¹⁰⁹⁸ Fournier's international repertoire included Bach, Beethoven, Debussy, Fauré and Paganini, and the fact that he was accompanied by Professor Friedrich Weidlich, a leading figure in Tyrolean concert life, gave an additional note of prestige to his performance. Fournier, having thus made a name for himself in Austria, was invited once again in 1951, and his concert at the IF elicited a remarkably rapturous review from Riester.¹⁰⁹⁹ Ginette Neveu, with a programme consisting of Tartini, Bach, Beethoven and Szymanovsky, prompted rapturous applause from the public, and a eulogy to her "outstanding personality" subsequently appeared in the *Tiroler Tageszeitung*.¹¹⁰⁰ In academic singing, Gerard Souzay upheld the French standing in the field, arriving in Austria in March 1955.¹¹⁰¹ Exclusively soloist concerts were not numerous, and the dominant strategy was to maintain a constant presence in Innsbruck, through a high-brow soloist programme, which, while allotting a significant share to French composers, was oriented towards a wider European repertoire.

¹⁰⁹¹ "Chopinabend Frédéric Ogouse," TT 10.05.1946: 6.

¹⁰⁹² Albert Riester, "Musikalische Rückschau," TT 12.06.1946: 5.

¹⁰⁹³ Albert Riester, "Drittes Symphoniekonzert," TT 02.10.1946: 4.

¹⁰⁹⁴ "Die französische Klavierkünstlerin Marcelle de Mayo," TT 05.12.1947: 3.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Albert Riester, "Kammermusik im Französischen Institut," TT 01.12.1949: 6.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Othmar Suitner, "Vortrag des französischen Pianisten Gilles Guilbert," TT 09.09.1946: 3.

¹⁰⁹⁷ "Der Violoncellist Pierre Fournier spielt am 15. und 16. Dezember im Musikvereinsaal," (Photo) TT 13.12.1947: cover. "Vorschau: Konzert Pierre Forunier," TT 13.12.1947: 3. "Wohin heute," TT 16.12.1947: 3.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Albert Riester, "Meistercellist Pierre Forunier," TT 18.12.1947: 3.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Albert Riester, "Pierre Forunier," TT 13.04.1951: 4.

¹¹⁰⁰ "Violinkonzert Ginette Neveu," TT 24.04.1948: 5.

¹¹⁰¹ "Gérard Souzay" (photo), TT 24.03.1955: 5.

Chamber concerts were essentially introduced by the Pasquier Trio, which performed in 1946¹¹⁰² and 1950¹¹⁰³; the lesser-known Parisian Chamber Trio, despite not going to Vienna, nonetheless enjoyed certain successes in 1948.¹¹⁰⁴ The Pascal Quartet performed in November 1947,¹¹⁰⁵ December 1948,¹¹⁰⁶ June 1949¹¹⁰⁷ (with their complete Beethoven cyclus) and February 1951,¹¹⁰⁸ to great critical acclaim. Among such chamber music ensembles, the repertoire tended to be heavily Austrified, concentrating to a considerable extent on Mozart, Beethoven and Schubert. French music, nevertheless, played more than a subsidiary role, and a European dimension was equally present in concert programmes: for instance, the Calvets premiered a quartet of André Jolivet, and the Paris Chamber Trio's programme ranged from Leclerc to Hindemith. Albert Riester, who introduced the ensembles to the *TT* readership, often underlined their “French” quality and congenuity, repeatedly associating these with the Parisian school of chamber performance. Thus, the enthusiasm and positive reporting enjoyed by the Pascal Quartet and other French collectives demonstrates their gradual cultural-propagandistic integration into the Tyrolean public sphere. In the Tyrol, France also developed a distinctive approach to choir concerts. During the occupation decade, these were regularly delivered by different choirs of professional or semi-professional status. Vocal ensembles happened to perform relatively often, and clearly came to attain a very prominent position in French concert planning and performance. This was a marked difference from Vienna, partly for the reasons mentioned above, and partly due to the more individual Tyrolean outlook of French musical exports. Church choirs proper rarely visited, however. Learning from the experiences of Salzburg, the French engaged the Chorale de la Cathédrale de Strasbourg, which performed in the Hofkirche in October, and was broadcast by the local radio.¹¹⁰⁹ In 1952, another church choir, this time from Monaco, and directed by the Abbé Henri Carol, performed eighteenth-century French music.¹¹¹⁰ This emphasis on baroque was also represented by the *Nuits des Sceaux* ensemble, which had successfully toured Innsbruck four years earlier in 1948.¹¹¹¹ Bringing a more regional Southern flavour, *Les petits chanteurs de la Cote d'Azur* made a tour of the Tyrol (Innsbruck and Landeck) and Vorarlberg, singing church and lay music from the Renaissance to modern times, ranging from Jannequin to

¹¹⁰² Albert Riester, “Pasquier-Trio,” *TT* 17.06.1946: 3.

¹¹⁰³ Albert Riester, “Pasquier-Trio,” *TT* 04.05.1950: 5.

¹¹⁰⁴ “Konzertvorschau,” *TT* 30.04.1948: 3 (also 03.05., 04.05). Albert Riester, “Pariser Kammertrio,” *TT* 08.05.1948: 7.

¹¹⁰⁵ “Pascal-Quartett,” *TT* 21.11.1947: 3.

¹¹⁰⁶ Albert Riester, “Pascal-Quartett,” *TT* 09.12.1948: 4.

¹¹⁰⁷ “Das Pariser Pascal-Quartett,” *TT* 02.06.1949: 4. “Meisterabende des Pascal-Quartetts,” *TT* 08.06.1949: 3. Albert Riester, “Beethoven-Abende des Pascal-Quartetts,” *TT* 13.06.1949: 5. Eiusdem, “Ludwig van Beethovens Streichquartette,” *TT* 18.06.1949: 9.

¹¹⁰⁸ “Vorschau: Das Pascal-Quartett, 05.02.,” *TT* 31.01.1951: 5. Albert Riester, “Pascal-Quartett,” *TT* 07.02.1951: 5.

¹¹⁰⁹ “Der Straßburger Domchor unter Abbé Hoch: Zur Übertragung des Konchenkonzerts am 8 Oktober, u 17 Uhr in der Innsbrucker Hofkirche,” *TT* 04.10.1946: 3. A eulogy pronounced here was sadly not followed by a quick report.

¹¹¹⁰ Albert Riester, “Domchor von Monaco,” *TT* 15.07.1952: 5.

¹¹¹¹ “Vorschau: Altfranzösische Musik” *TT* 21.07.1948: 3. Albert Riester, “Nuits des Sceaux,” *TT* 27.07.1948: 3.

Debussy and Ravel.¹¹¹² In the conservative Tyrol, risky repertoires could face criticism. Although not in receipt of direct French subsidies, the French-Canadian “Compagnons de la musique” came and sang chansons, American spirituals and musical parodies in Innsbruck, Kufstein and Bregenz in May 1951.¹¹¹³ During the Youth Cultural Weeks of 1951, at which the Compagnons participated in a concert, it was reported that members of the public had expressed sharp criticism of the Compagnons' performance: “neither from the singing, nor from the cultural point of view [did they] fit into the Cultural Week. And not all the texts were morally immaculous!”; “Attention! Not at the best level!”¹¹¹⁴ Arguably, the cautious French administration had been right not to put its aegis on the choir's performances, even in light of the exceptionally positive (“French-style”) review published in the *TT*.

Professionalism, amateurism, youth and a certain degree of experiment were not extraneous to the French policies either. An amateur student choir, “La Faluche”, made an appearance in Innsbruck in August 1951, offering a repertoire of old music, classics and popular songs, with a university flair,¹¹¹⁵ they were acclaimed with warmth far surpassing the usual level.¹¹¹⁶ The student theme, in fact, was seized upon next year with the choir “A Coeur Joie”, which performed in Innsbruck on the occasion of the July 14th celebrations. It is worth noting that the triumphal accolade addressed to them in the *TT* stressed the professional aspects of their rendition, such as discipline and the good quality of the sopranos and altos,¹¹¹⁷ and went beyond what was usually written about amateurs.

In the same vein, there were some other, slightly riskier concerts by younger, less famous and probably less mature musicians. For instance, cultural diplomats repeatedly¹¹¹⁸ invited the winners of the first prize at the Paris Conservatory,¹¹¹⁹ also putting the prestige of Governor Voizard, who was present in the room, behind them – which in the end paid off.¹¹²⁰ Prize winners came more or less

¹¹¹² “Konzerte der Nizzaer Sängerknaben,” *TT* 15.04.1950: 4. Albert Riester, “Les Petits Chanteurs de la Cote d'Azur,” *TT* 18.04.1950: 5.

¹¹¹³ “Die 'Compagnons de la musique',” *TT* 23.05.1951: 5. Albert Riester, “Gesellen der Musik,” *TT* 26.05.1951: 5.

¹¹¹⁴ Cited in: Milena Meller, “Die ersten Jahre in der Musik – 1950 bis 1954” in Christine Riccabona et al., eds., *Die Österreichischen Jugendkulturwochen 1950-1969 in Innsbruck: Ton Zeichen – Zeilen Sprünge* (Innsbruck et al.: Studien-Verlag, 2006), 89.

¹¹¹⁵ As this was a Catholic student union, the French were apparently aiming at conservative circles in Innsbruck, committing both to a laicist cultural diplomacy and to stressing the Catholic commonalities between France and Austria.

¹¹¹⁶ “Der französische Studentenchor 'La Faluche' in Innsbruck,” *TT* 28.07.1951: 5. Ernst Meister, “La Faluche – Gemischter Chor der Studenten der katholischen Universität Paris,” *TT* 04.08.1951: 4.

¹¹¹⁷ Ernst Meister, “Der Pariser Studentenchor 'A Coeur Joie',” *TT* 13.07.1953: 5.

¹¹¹⁸ Assmann, *Institute*: 35.

¹¹¹⁹ “Vorschau: Festkonzert der Preisträger des Pariser Konservatoriums,” *TT* 09.11.1948: 4.

¹¹²⁰ Albert Riester, “Konzert der Preisträger des Pariser Konservatoriums,” *TT* 12.11.1948: 3.

regularly,¹¹²¹ and occasionally even visited the Tyrolean provinces (Kufstein¹¹²²), a valuable source of foreign experience for musical youth. The high level demonstrated by the best conservatory students was consistently praised by the benevolent press, and the French administration was convinced of the prize winners' success with audiences as well.

Colourfulness in Austria meant above all “folk” art, rising from the national “soil” and in fact much valued by the country's cultural circles. Furthermore, folk dance events allowed for targeting larger audiences through summertime concerts, and for portraying a more diversified France beyond the confines of Parisian concert rooms, thus revealing parallels with Austrian society, in which native folk music was also used as an instrument of identity building. This was undoubtedly an asset to seize upon, as one has to think of the Tyrol's distinctive folk music background, which contributed much to its image abroad. The discovery of folk music by the French administration was sealed by a tour of a Marseillaise folk choir, *Lou Calen*, which pleased Austrian audiences, and spurred the *TT* to discourse upon the cultural affinities between Austrian and French folk dances¹¹²³ – which was undoubtedly more than welcome to the French administration. The good use to which colourful songs and dances could be put was thus well understood by the French administration. Not surprisingly, as the southern French Capeline de Menton was touring Austria, its two concerts – the first one in front of Innsbruck City Hall, and the second one in the Landhaussaal – stimulated much interest in the flavours of France's Midi.¹¹²⁴ In this sense, Innsbruck was the only Austrian province already acquainted with a decidedly non-Parisian art. However it was the Capeline that made a *grande entrée*, repeated in a concert the following year.¹¹²⁵ While parallels between Austrian and French art could peacefully coexist on paper, the decision of the organisers to put the Capeline and a Tyrolese folk group together seems to have stimulated an inferiority complex in the *TT*: the Tyrolese, it claimed, could not match the technical perfection of the French, made apparent mistakes, and lacked specifically “French” elegance – claims which would probably would not have been made had they performed alone. A year later, a large-scale international folk show proved to be more balanced; France shone with three groups, the *Lou Calen*, the youth choir of Marseille, and the Burgundy ensemble “Matisconia”: ethnic costumes, rich colours, Tyrolese, German, English, Dutch, and French melodies were mixed into the first truly European musical congress to take place in

¹¹²¹ Albert Riester, “III. Symphoniekonzert,” *TT* 14.11.1951: 4. Eiusdem, “Preisträger des Conservatoire, Paris,” *TT* 29.11.1951: 6. Eiusdem, “Institut Francais: Konzert der Pariser Musikpreistäger,” *TT* 05.11.1952: 6. Eiusdem, “Konzert der Preisträger des Pariser Konservatoriums,” *TT* 04.12.1954: 14. Not only were they young, they could also bring a broad, sometimes more experimental programme, stressing the creative aspect of musical education and initiative in France.

¹¹²² “Konzerte der Stadt Kufstein,” *TT* 03.12.1954: 6.

¹¹²³ Albert Riester, “Volkstanzgruppe Lou Calen, Marseille,” *TT* 17.08.1951: 5.

¹¹²⁴ “Südfranzösische Volkstanzgruppe in Innsbruck,” *TT* 09.06.1952: 7. “Rivierazauber im Landhaussaal” *TT* 11.06.1952: 8.

¹¹²⁵ Albert Riester, “Französischer Volkstumsabend,” *TT* 19.06.1953: 4.

Innsbruck.¹¹²⁶ For the French national holiday of 1953, not only the aforementioned “A Coeur Joie” performed, but also three other folk choirs and ensembles representing the French people.¹¹²⁷

Given the conceptual outlook of French policies, there has been little opportunity to touch upon gender and subaltern discourses. Of course, most of the French programme in Western Austria was planned and carried out by white middle-class men. Women seem to have been rather an exception, and the gender aspect of their performances was much less commented upon in Innsbruck than in Vienna. The colonial empire in fact caused much political embarrassment for France, due to the war in Indochina. The French were able to launch a vitriolic anti-communist campaign concerning the state of Vietnamese affairs, which was helped by the persistent racism of the provincial Austrian press and public mood (Moroccan troops¹¹²⁸ had to be called off duty as soon as possible). Somehow the French presence outside of Europe needed to be justified, and one of the ways to do this was to show rich how inter-imperial exchanges had enriched the culture of white European France, and were now coming to Austria. For the first time, non-white singers came to Austria in 1953, thus overcoming the initial *blanchissement*, when an Arabic choir, “La Baraka” from Algeria, performed in Innsbruck and Hall.¹¹²⁹ Previously, the existence of a colonial empire and *outré-mer départements* had been mostly passed over in silence in the cultural reporting: French culture meant culture from European France, and in fact largely remained so.

How might we summarise the impact that the French cultural presence had on Innsbruck concert life? Renate Lichtfuss, a contemporary member of staff at the IF in Innsbruck, recalled the concerts of Ginette Neveu, Pierre Fournier, Maurice Gendron, the Parrenin and Loewenguth Quartets, the “great bariton” Gérard Souzay, and the First Prize winners from the Paris Conservatory. According to Lichtfuss, such events made a highly important contribution to the cultural scene in Innsbruck during the post-war years.¹¹³⁰ Lichtfuss was particularly effusive about Souzay – which recalls the

¹¹²⁶ Dr. Hardt-Steyr. “Internationaler Volkstanzabend,” TT 14.08.1952: 4.

¹¹²⁷ Dr. Tenschert. “Französische Volkslieder und Volkstänze,” TT 16.07.1953: 4. A photo was published on July, 18th: “Österreichische und französische Trachtengruppen beim französischen Nationalfest” (3, followed by a commentary (11).

¹¹²⁸ Vorarlberg had been liberated in part by the 4th Moroccan Mountain Division. The population feared it because of its alleged “atrocities” against civilians, which were exaggerated beyond measure in gossip. Eisterer cited repeated cases of clearly racist hate-speech, directed at black soldiers (Französische Besatzungspolitik in Tirol und Vorarlberg im Spätsommer und Herbst 1945, 241-2; then repeated in his *La présence française*). It is not unreasonable to draw a parallel with the Soviet troops, who faced a heavy burden of prejudice, which undoubtedly contributed to the spiralling of violence. In the French case, Voizard quickly pushed through a *de facto* white-only presence in the Tyrol, because officials felt the local population would not accept “blacks”, particularly due to the possibility of multifarious sexual contacts between soldiers and native women. Some parts of the Austrian press – including, for example, the *Salzburger Nachrichten* – took up the image of the “Neger”, who was repeatedly portrayed as inferior to whites, and this was clearly more than welcome to the paper’s US supervision board. In recent research on the children of occupation, particularly during the last ten years, the racial issue has been studied in greater depth.

¹¹²⁹ “La Baraká” - erstmals in Österreich,” TT 18.07.1953. “Konzert des Algierchoes in Hall in Tirol (Solbad) heute,” *ibid.*, 13. “La Barakka,” TT 25.07.1953: 5.

¹¹³⁰ Renate Lichtfuss, “Erinnerung,” *Bonjour Autriche*, 13.

enthusiastic critical reviews of his performances – and very optimistic about the French musical programme in general. Another contemporary, Jutta Höpfel, who had worked on the *TT* editorial board, stressed the engagement of French diplomats in musical affairs: the first Debussy evening by Hans Höpfel, at that time an audacious enterprise, the Calvet and Loewenguth Quartets, Jacques Thibaud, the “unforgettable” Ginette Neveu, Pierre Fournier, Maurice Gendron, Robert and Gaby Casadesus, and Odile Crussard all enriched the concert life of Innsbruck,¹¹³¹ and left an enduring imprint on its musical development. Admittedly, these testimonials may be biased in favour of the French cultural effort, but they do show that the French presence was of considerable importance, and was deemed a highly welcome enterprise.

While the first season proved to be almost oversaturated with concerts aiming at attracting public attention, foreign musicians usually attracted higher attendance rates than locals; Maréchal and Thibaud called for especial acclaim.¹¹³² The public received a number of lessons on good taste: it goes to the credit of the French administration that these lessons were respectful in their manner, being handed over to Austrian critics themselves. The amount of detail included in the French programme was, of course, much larger, owing to the French presence, and the relatively provincial position of Innsbruck. In Vienna, the competition between Viennese institutions, the four occupying powers, and musicians and musical institutions (cultural centres) from neighbouring countries was too large.

By this point, an Innsbruck concert-goer would have been well aware that Paris produced a number of excellent musicians, both as soloists and as chamber ensembles. Parallels were often drawn between *Jodl* and *chanson*, Austro-German and French Romanticism. Government-led and governmental-controlled diplomacy came to represent the true object of French MD: the high-brow French cultural establishment, France's classical tradition, and the French regions. Undoubtedly this gave a reductive picture of the French nation (and the target audience as well), but it was fit for purpose, and matched expectations with realities.

French Music in Vorarlberg: An Introduction

The traditional view of Vorarlberg as the tiny westernmost tip of Austria, largely, and at times willingly, isolated from the rest of the country, and therefore disconnected from its cultural life, requires some substantial review. Vorarlberg's cultural policies have recently become a subject of

¹¹³¹ Jutta Höpfel “Erinnerung,” *Bonjour Autriche*, 313.

¹¹³² Albert Riestler, “Musikalische Rundschau”...

historical interest, due to the unique position that the province occupies in the Austrian federation, internal economic circumstances that favoured an influx of cultural actors from around Austria and other parts of the German-speaking world, and French cultural overtures, such as the grafting of festival culture onto the shores of the Bodensee.

Vorarlberg is separated from the rest of Austria by a high mountaineous area, which provides its border with the Tyrol. Unlike the ethnically Bavarian rest of the country, its people speak Alemannic dialects closely related to Switzerland, and maintain a strong sense of regional identity, underpinned by language, traditional customs, the strong role of the Catholic church, and contacts with their Alemannic neighbours to the west and north-west.¹¹³³

The cultural establishment of the province showed demonstrated many continuities with the Austro-fascist and Nazi periods, slipping into the general Austrian attitude of willful forgetfulness and “business as usual”.¹¹³⁴ After an initial standstill in local printing presses, caused by the Nazi closure of Vorarlberg's news outlets¹¹³⁵ and the disruption of the war, the press was restored with the *Vorarlberger Nachrichten*, a non-partisan newspaper under French auspices,¹¹³⁶ this being followed by the press organs of the three main political parties.¹¹³⁷ In this sense, the situation was not very different from the Tyrol. In theatre and radio, French authors made significant advances.¹¹³⁸ Since French literature lay close to the heart of France's officials, its inclusion in local repertoires was deemed an important gesture of good will towards France (Bernanos, Cocteau and Claudel were staged in Bregenz¹¹³⁹). However, music was clearly of secondary importance.

The first documented appearance of a French musician occurred in July 1946, when Frédéric Ogouse gave a concert at the Gössersaal. Unfortunately, his technical prowess was overshadowed by miserable acoustics, and a piano that was “an insult for an artist”.¹¹⁴⁰ Later in August, the Paris choir of St. Laurent sang in Bregenz on its way to the Tyrol.¹¹⁴¹ Unlike Innsbruck, French musicians did not visit Vorarlberg on a regular basis, and a coherent concert policy seems never to have been established.

The most important enterprise undertaken with direct support from the French Element was the

¹¹³³ Huber, *Identität in Bewegung*, 28-29.

¹¹³⁴ Pieter Niedermair, “Kulturpolitik in Vorarlberg nach 1945,” in: *Bonjour Autriche*, 129-131.

¹¹³⁵ The last one, the Vorarlberger Volksblatt, a propaganda newspaper, ceased its activities on April 24th. Gourlet: 57.

¹¹³⁶ It was edited and printed by Eugen Ruß in a family enterprise, with the French state retaining 51% of shares. (Gourlet: 58.) As in the Tyrol, this was an easy way to combine a degree of practical freedom, necessary to maintaining the credibility of the newspaper, with a control mechanism that could be activated in case of necessity.

¹¹³⁷ Alois Niederstätter, “Vorarlbergs Medien in der Nachkriegszeit,” in: *Aufbruch in eine Neue Zeit*, 105-08.

¹¹³⁸ Niedermair, Kulturpolitik in Vorarlberg: 136.

¹¹³⁹ Unterweger, “Rendezvous mit Frankreich: Französische Literatur in Tirol und Vorarlberg,” *Bonjour Autriche*, 261.

¹¹⁴⁰ According to a report written by Johanna Famira in the *Volkswille*. Cited in: Roger Vorderegger, “Initiativen, Politik...: 171.

¹¹⁴¹ “Die Sängerknaben von St. Laurent – Paris,” VN 07.08.1946: 2. They did not perform at the festival, though.

Bregenz Festival, which began in 1946,¹¹⁴² and became an international magnet from its inception.¹¹⁴³ The French governor provided the facilities for the first concerts – in fact, a former training hall used by the French army.¹¹⁴⁴ Later, the famous lakeside stage was erected. Besides massive organisational support,¹¹⁴⁵ and a speech delivered by Susini during the first festival regarding the French cultural effort in Austria,¹¹⁴⁶ France was also directly represented by two guest tours: a concert given by the *Cadets du Conservatoire de Paris* in 1950, and another by the *Ballet Andrade* and the *Chorale de la Cathédrale de Strasbourg* in 1954.

With a purely French programme, consisting of Berlioz, Saint-Saens, Debussy, Fauré, Ravel and Roussel, the young musicians under Claude Delvincourt earned a highly favourable review from the *VN*,¹¹⁴⁷ and the audience, despite being “not so numerous”, was sent into raptures.¹¹⁴⁸ In Vienna, the *Kurier* also took notice of this concert, briefly reporting on the Cadets’ success.¹¹⁴⁹ In 1954, the programme proudly featured two French ensembles,¹¹⁵⁰ as announced at the festival opening.¹¹⁵¹ Janine Charrat's ballet troupe performed two evenings with a varied programme including, for instance, Tchaikovsky's *Black Swan*, and ballet numbers based on the music of Brahms, Chopin, Grieg, and Wiener, as well as two modern pieces.¹¹⁵² Following the first evening, the *VN* published a lengthy article, which presented the Lifar-style elements of academic dance in a remarkably positive light.¹¹⁵³ The second evening was greeted with high praise from the Viennese¹¹⁵⁴ and Eastern Swiss press, concerning both the ballet¹¹⁵⁵ and the individual dancers.¹¹⁵⁶ Although little noticed by the French administration, which of course could be sure of the *VN*'s unwavering loyalty, the introduction of a French, classically trained and decidedly modern *corps de ballet* was, paralleling Salzburg, another successful case of a Parisian ballet performing at an Austrian festival.

Shortly before their withdrawal from Austria, and drawing on the encouraging experiences of Salzburg, French cultural diplomats also attempted to introduce the Chorale, one of their most

¹¹⁴² “Bregenz führt Festwochen ein,” WK 15.07.1946: 4.

¹¹⁴³ Bösch-Niederer, *Vorarlbergs Musikleben*, 294-95.

¹¹⁴⁴ “Die Geschichte der Bregenzer Festspiele,” VN 03.08.1946: 7.

¹¹⁴⁵ Lettner: 319.

¹¹⁴⁶ Susini did mention a number of concerts, but did not allude to a history of direct Franco-Vorarlberg musical contacts. A German translation was speedily published in the VN. “Prof. Susinis Rede anlässlich der Eröffnung der französisch-österreichischen Werbeschau,” VN 07.08.1946: 3.

¹¹⁴⁷ Oswald Lutz, “Orchesterkonzert des Pariser Konservatoriums,” VN 04.08.1950: 3.

¹¹⁴⁸ “Bregenzer Konzerte,” SN 08.08.1950: 4.

¹¹⁴⁹ “Pariser Orchester bei den Bregenzer Festspielen,” WK 15.05.1950: 4.

¹¹⁵⁰ “Bregenzer Festspiele 1954. 24. Juli – 15. August” Bildarchiv Austria. Accessed 20.05.2016. URL: http://www.bildarchiv.austria.at/Pages/ImageDetail.aspx?p_iBildID=15922678.

¹¹⁵¹ Edmund Bär, “Bregenzer Festspiele 1954,” VN 23.07.1954: 7.

¹¹⁵² Edmund Bär, “Ballettabend Janine Charrat Paris,” VN 24.07.1954: 8.

¹¹⁵³ Oswald Lutz, “Janine Charrat: Demonstration moderner Tanzkunst,” VN 30.07.1954: 5.

¹¹⁵⁴ “Pariser Tanzkunst am Bodensee Ballett Janine Charrat bei den Festspielen in Bregenz (Sonderbericht für den ‘Wiener Kurier’),” WK 30.07.1954: 5.

¹¹⁵⁵ “Heute letzter Ballettabend Janine Charrat,” VN 08.08.1954: 4.

¹¹⁵⁶ “Letzter Ballett-Abend,” VN 10.08.1954: 3.

proven assets, to Voralberg. Having been respectfully introduced to local audiences,¹¹⁵⁷ they gave a concert at the end of the Festival. The status of this choir prompted the provincial government to organise a reception in their honour, following hearty applause from the public at the end of the concert.¹¹⁵⁸ The programme of the *Strasbourgeois* stretched from Mozart's *Te Deum* through Berlioz's *L'enfance du Christ* (sung in German) to Mozart's *Requiem*. Cautiously placed between easily recognisable masterpieces by Mozart, Berlioz's introduction to Bregenz was remarkably uncontested, and there were no problematic reviews.

These advances notwithstanding, France did not attempt to enforce a strong Romanic presence at the festival. In fact, it quickly concentrated on the German-speaking cultural community, attracting many tourists from Germany and Switzerland.¹¹⁵⁹ Therefore, as the real influence of French music remained confined to fleeting appearances,¹¹⁶⁰ the main contribution of France was simply the idea of organising a festival of considerable proportions in a previously provincial town. A small number of performances, most of which did not enjoy the same prestige as Vienna, were successfully inserted into French cultural propaganda, not dissimilar from the means employed in the Tyrol.

Salzburg

Regular Seasons

Despite the salient position of the Festival, the regular concert seasons in Salzburg also received diplomatic attention. France's commitment in Salzburg began in September 1945, when the Calvet Quartet, which was touring Austria, made a stop in the city. Arriving with a programme featuring Debussy, Franck, Ravel and Fauré (“a name unknown in Central Europe, but renowned in England and America”¹¹⁶¹), they successfully introduced French music to the hitherto staunchly Germanic stage. (The first post-war performance of Tchaikovsky's *Pathétique* came just a day later – Austrian cultural tastes were uniform throughout the nation.¹¹⁶²) The two performances of this quartet, accompanied by Jacques Février, were commented on in an unusually rapturous register by the SN's Otto Beer,¹¹⁶³ thus creating an image of complete success, and a conquering of the hearts and minds

¹¹⁵⁷ “Straßburger Domchor bei den Bregenzer Festspielen,” VN 10.08.1954: 3.

¹¹⁵⁸ “Konzert des Straßburger Domchores,” VN 12.08.1954: 3.

¹¹⁵⁹ Lettner: 319.

¹¹⁶⁰ Unterweger, *Rendezvous*, 262.

¹¹⁶¹ “Calvet-Quartett in Salzburg,” SN 05.09.1945: 3.

¹¹⁶² Otto F. Beer, “Orchesterkonzert unter Kletzky,” SN 06.09.1945: 3.

¹¹⁶³ Otto F. Beer, “Calvet-Quartett spielt in Salzburg,” SN 07.09.1945: 4. Eiusdem, “Calvet-Quartett” SN 10.09.1945: 4.

of the as yet tiny concert scene of Salzburg.

The rest of the programme for the following seasons was familiar, with the exception of the Festival, which drew larger ensembles than during regular seasons. Soloists and chamber ensembles, however, did appear with some regularity, many of them inserted into concert programmes thanks to their nationwide tours.

Jeanne-Marie Darré and Miguel Candela gave a celebrated concert in March 1946.¹¹⁶⁴ Their programme ranged from Guillaume Lekeu, an early Walloon composer, to Debussy. In their second concert, they performed the great Germanic composers – Bach and Schubert – alongside Saint-Saëns.¹¹⁶⁵ A week later, Maurice Marechal arrived with an extensive repertoire of classical and academic music from contemporary France, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Russia.¹¹⁶⁶ Georges Thill performed Chopin, Schumann and Debussy, with solos by his accompanist, Michelle Marey,¹¹⁶⁷ and Jacques Thibaud performed in May, offering renditions of Beethoven's violin pieces, which were judged to be superior to those of Germanic musicians,¹¹⁶⁸ due to Thibaud's capacity for self-criticism, and his balanced, sober play.¹¹⁶⁹ This first season ended with a conspicuous tour by Gilles Guilbert,¹¹⁷⁰ which met with accolades from the *SN*.¹¹⁷¹ France's prestige diplomacy was thus at its best in Salzburg, as a number of prominent musicians made a detour to the city, thus achieving a high degree of concentration – and saturation – of the local, still re-emerging concert programme with top-quality French guest tours. Subsequent seasons did not, however, demonstrate a coherent concert strategy, witnessing tours by Jacques Thibaud,¹¹⁷² José Torres,¹¹⁷³ Alfred Cortot (in 1950¹¹⁷⁴ and 1954¹¹⁷⁵), and Gérard Souzay.¹¹⁷⁶ The Americans were also willing to include French music in their own cultural activities, as demonstrated by a concert by Margot Pinter in Bad Aussee,¹¹⁷⁷ the performance of French songs at the US Information Center,¹¹⁷⁸ and the contemporary music of Jean Françaix.¹¹⁷⁹

¹¹⁶⁴ Dr. Werner, "Jeanne-Marie Darré – Miguel Candela," *SN* 08.03.1946: 6.

¹¹⁶⁵ Dr. Werner, "Darré – Candela: Zweites Konzert," *SN* 11.03.1946: 6.

¹¹⁶⁶ "1. Cello-Abend Maurice Marechal", "Maurice Marechals 2. Konzert," *SN* 20.03.1946:6.

¹¹⁶⁷ Viktor Reimann, "Konzertabend George Thill," *SN* 25.03.1946: 6.

¹¹⁶⁸ "Jacques Thibaud," *SN* 26.04.1946: 6.

¹¹⁶⁹ Viktor Reimann, "Jacques Thibauds Violinabend," *SN* 06.05.1946: 8.

¹¹⁷⁰ "Gilles Guilbert," *SN* 18.06.1946: 6.

¹¹⁷¹ Franz Xaver Richter, "Gilles Guilbert spielt Ravel," *SN* 24.06.1946: 8.

¹¹⁷² Dr. Werner, "Jacques Thibaud," *SN* 16.10.1946: 6.

¹¹⁷³ "José Torrès," *SN* 21.10.1946: 6. "Tanzabend José Torrès," *SN* 30.10.1946: 6.

¹¹⁷⁴ "Cortot-Konzert vorverlegt," *SN* 07.11.1950: 6. It must be noted that no report on this concert was found.

¹¹⁷⁵ "Alfred Cortot – unermüdlicher Geist: Nach dem Chopin-Abend im Mozarteum," *SN* 15.02.1954: 8.

¹¹⁷⁶ "Gerard Souzay ist der Gast des heutigen Liederabends im Mozarteum," (Photo) *SN* 28.03.1955: 8. "Musik in Salzburg: Monsieur Souzay aus Paris – Kultur der Blockflöte," *SN* 30.03.1955: 4.

¹¹⁷⁷ "Margot Pinter in Bad Aussee," *SN* 10.10.1945: 4. In a characteristic move, Debussy was put next to Mozart and Tchaikovsky and musical representatives of their respective nations.

¹¹⁷⁸ "Liederabend Information Center," *SN* 24.04.1951: 8. "Salzburger Musicalis," *SN* 13.06.1952: 6.

¹¹⁷⁹ "Salzburger Kammertrio," *SN* 17.10.1951: 4.

Salzburg Festival

The startling difference between the French and their Soviet counterparts is encapsulated by their differing stances towards the famed *Salzburger Festspiele* – arguably the most prestigious festival in the world of music and theatre, which had been resurrected through the support of the US Element. Fraught with the complex history of defining Austrian identity¹¹⁸⁰ (in the end, Catholic and *deutschösterreichisch-national*),¹¹⁸¹ the Festival began modestly in 1945, but soon advanced to a position of global prestige, becoming an international tourism magnet. As Slavic music was conspicuously absent from the first festivals¹¹⁸² – subsequent ones would be filled with Tchaikovsky and Stravinsky, and also a tour by the Russo- Italo-French Igor Markevitch – French theatre and music found themselves in a fairly comfortable position, thanks to the initiative of Peyrebère de Guilloutet, and her collaboration with Susini, who was ultimately in charge of overseeing the preparatory activities,¹¹⁸³ along with the Festival's organisers, notably Henrich von Puthon.

In 1946, France sent Nicole Henriot, the Quatuor Calvet with piano soloist Jacques Fevrier,¹¹⁸⁴ and the conductor Charles Munch,¹¹⁸⁵ and the latter returned once again the following year.¹¹⁸⁶ An academic repertoire with references to German music was generally presented: Beethoven, Debussy and Ravel featured in the programme of the Quartet,¹¹⁸⁷ with French music drawing most critical attention.¹¹⁸⁸ Munch concentrated his programme on Berlioz and Ravel. The *Symphonie Fantastique*, then making its re-entry, suited him perfectly, and, unlike the controversy in Vienna, critical reviews were very conciliatory (albeit with some undercurrent of distance¹¹⁸⁹) regarding this manifesto of

¹¹⁸⁰ See the works of Robert Kriechbaumer and Gisela Prossnitz

¹¹⁸¹ Michael P. Steinberg, *Ursprung und Ideologie der Salzburger Festspiele 1890-1938*. Trans. Marion Kagerer (Salzburg; Munich: Verlag Anton Pustet, 2000).

¹¹⁸² In 1949, no other than Marcel Rubin attacked the lack of Slavic music in the programme, deeming it to be “no coincidence”. Gisela Prossnitz, *The Salzburg Festival 1945-1960. An Illustrated Chronicle*. Trans. Alexa Nieschlag. (Salzburg; Wien: Jung und Jung, 2008), 71.

¹¹⁸³ AOFAA MAE DGRC 25, Le Commissaire Général pour les Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, l'attention de M. Le Secrétaire Général. 26.06.1946.

¹¹⁸⁴ Quartett Calvet. Spielplanprogramm 1946, accessed 08.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail/programid/3822/id/546/j/1946>.

¹¹⁸⁵ “Dirigent Charles Muench” SN 24.08.1946: 8.

¹¹⁸⁶ AOFAA MAE DGRC 1, Liste des artistes participants au Festival de Salzbourg (manuscript)

¹¹⁸⁷ AOFAA MAE DGRC 25, [French artists in Austria in August 1946 – January 1947]

¹¹⁸⁸ “Calvet-Quartett spielte in Salzburg,” WK 06.08.1946: 6. Franz Tassié, “Salzburger Festspiele: Konzertbericht,” Weltpresse 09.08.1946: 6. “Kammerkonzert: Calvet-Quartett,” Salzburger Volkszeitung 07.08.1946: 3. Christl Arnold, “Höhepunkte in Salzburg: Calvet-Quartett und ‘Rosenkavalier,’” Welt am Montag 12.08.1946: 8. Peter Lafite, “Salzburger Festspiele 1946, eine musikalische Zwischenbilanz,” ÖMZ Heft 8 (August) 1946, 284. “Meisterschaft der Calvets,” WK 14.08.1946: 4. “Festspiele 1946, Das Calvet-Quartett, das mit größtem Erfolg im Mozarteum spielte (Zeichnung von Harry Müller),” SN 13.08.1946: 2. Dr. Werner, “Erstes Kammerkonzert,” SN 08-09.09.1946: 6.

¹¹⁸⁹ “Sechstes Orchesterkonzert” *Salzburger Volkzeitung* 27.08.1946: 3.

Berliozian romanticism.¹¹⁹⁰ They were also very warm towards Ravel,¹¹⁹¹ with the exception of the *Salzburger Nachrichten*.¹¹⁹²

In fact, it was chamber music – one of the favourable areas for the French – that accounted for many of the visiting French performers. Not only was it cost-efficient, but it also helped to carve out a defined niche in the high-quality musical market – this, of course, not being a mass-culture initiative. Failing to bring the Calvets in 1947 due to entry “difficulties”,¹¹⁹³ the French element made up for this loss over the following years. In 1948¹¹⁹⁴ and 1949, the Trio Pasquier, already having enjoyed success in Vienna, finally came to Salzburg;¹¹⁹⁵ again, they were applauded by Austrian critics.¹¹⁹⁶ Albert Roussel's trio attracted particularly positive attention,¹¹⁹⁷ and the stormy ovations of the public were duly noted. In 1948, Florent Schmitt, by contrast, had been coolly received by the public (as reported by the *SN* and some others¹¹⁹⁸). In addition, it appears that the audience was much larger the second time;¹¹⁹⁹ Austrian ears were certainly cautious. Monique Haas, who played Rameau, Couperin, Debussy, Mendelssohn, Bartok and Ravel in 1951,¹²⁰⁰ brought the non-season, French-sponsored tours to a close, thus adding another critical success to chamber music diplomacy.

Attempts at introducing new genres sometimes met with local resistance. In 1954, the Brass Ensemble of Oubradous was approved for the Festival by the AFAA.¹²⁰¹ However, they had not reckoned with Austrian traditions and standards for brass bands, due to which the French ensemble found itself quite literally playing on a foreign field. Differences between Austrian traditions, deemed superior, and the French style were discussed at length,¹²⁰² as well as occasional technical imprecisions.¹²⁰³ The following day, a concert by the Viennese Brass Ensemble effectively cancelled

¹¹⁹⁰ Viktor Reimann, “Sechstes Orchesterkonzert” *SN* 25.08.1946: 6.

¹¹⁹¹ “Die Salzburger Festspiele gehen zu Ende. Gespräch mit den Philharmonikern. Von E.J. de Guilloutet” *Welt* am Montag 02.09.1946: 8. (Emile de Guilloutet was Peyrebère's son, active with the Festival's organisers.)

¹¹⁹² Sechstes Orchesterkonzert...

¹¹⁹³ They could not obtain the necessary paperwork in time to cross the border into the US zone in Austria. Prossnitz, *Chronik*, 33.

¹¹⁹⁴ Peter Lafite, “Salzburg hörte Festspielkonzerte,” *SN* 02.08.1948: 4. Viktor Reimann, “Trio Pasquier,” *SN* 03.08.1948: 4. “Erstes Kammerkonzert,” *Salzburger Tagblatt* 03.08.1948: 8.

¹¹⁹⁵ Trio Pasquier. Spielplanarchiv 1948, accessed 08.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail/programid/3774/id/535/j/1948>. Trio Pasquier. Spielplanarchiv 1949, accessed 08.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail/programid/3701/id/516/j/1949>.

¹¹⁹⁶ Max Graf, “Salzburger Festspiele: Kammerkonzerte und Serenaden,” *WP* 06.08.1948: 4. *Wiener Zeitung*, 12.08.1949; “Das erste Kammerkonzert,” *OÖN* 3-4.08.1949: 4.

¹¹⁹⁷ Willi Reich, “Trio Pasquier,” *SN* 31.07.1949: 4. “Erstes Kammerkonzert in Salzburg,” *Das Kleine Volksblatt* 31.07.1949: 11. Gustav Pichler, “Salzburger Festspiele: Die Konzerte,” *ÖMZ* Heft 9 (September) 1949: 269.

¹¹⁹⁸ “Erstes Kammerkonzert: Trio Pasquier,” *Salzburger Volkszeitung* 02.08.1948: 3.

¹¹⁹⁹ “Erstes Kammerkonzert,” *Salzburger Volkszeitung* 01.08.1949: 2.

¹²⁰⁰ Willi Reich, “Erstes Solistenkonzert: 'Stupende Kunst' der Pianistin Monique Haas,” *SN* 01.08.1951: 3.

¹²⁰¹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, DGRC 89, Participation au Festival de Salzbourg de l'Ensemble Instrumental d'Oubradous. 31.12.1953.

¹²⁰² Hans Harnig, “Verfrühtes Festspieldebüt französischer Bläser . Drittes Kammerkonzert mit der Bläservereinigung Fernand Oubradous,” *SN* 10.08.1954: 10.

¹²⁰³ “Schöne Konzerte ohne Festcharakter,” *DP* 11.08.1954.

out the public effect of the French performance.¹²⁰⁴ Therefore, the bar of Austrian expectation was raised too high to be adequately met in this case. The Oubradous orchestra, however, was helpful in inciting critical reflection on the usages and styles of brass bands, and some degree of critical clemency allowed it to avoid an outright flop.

La Chorale de la Cathédrale de Strasbourg

La Chorale, one of the foremost vocal ensembles of France, rose to particular prominence during the Festspiele. Directed by Abbé Alphonse Hoch, who had founded the group in the 1920s, it was renowned in France and throughout the world, and represented a valuable musical asset for the French. Salzburg had a tradition of church music at the festival, which made French cultural diplomats desirous of conquering a position of prominence in the field. Despite some initial financial difficulties,¹²⁰⁵ the political will to bring the Chorale to Austria prevailed. It was first invited in 1947, and immediately captured the attention of the local public¹²⁰⁶, being praised for its triumphal come-back to Austria following its first concert in 1937.¹²⁰⁷ That was also the case a year later, when the Foreign Ministry defended the Chorale's value while trying to obtain money to cover its costs¹²⁰⁸, a policy reiterated in 1949.¹²⁰⁹ Ultimately, the Chorale gave performances in 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951, never failing to secure ever growing subsidies, before being finally refused a further instalment in 1952.¹²¹⁰ However, this did not prevent Erlanger from inquiring about another opportunity to dispatch the Chorale to the Festival in 1954¹²¹¹: the conservatism and tenacity of both the Salzburg organisers and their French colleagues, who clearly stood behind the initiative transmitted by Peyrebère, cannot be overstated.

The first performance of the Chorale at the Festival, which took place in August 1947, as part of the closing concerts, received wide and overwhelmingly positive critical coverage. Despite this, all those local critics who reacted to the performance showed a remarkable preoccupation with technical

¹²⁰⁴ “Die Bläuserserenade der Wiener: Ein Mozart-Abend im Carabinierisaal,” SN 11.08.1954: 4.

¹²⁰⁵ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, AUT 323, Note pour Béthouart. L. de Monicault. 08.05.1947.

¹²⁰⁶ Peyrebère de Guillotet stressed the fact that the Chorale had to sing another programme in addition to its original repertoire, much to the enjoyment of locals. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 201, Report of Marquess de Guilloutet, 4.09.1947. She added that Charles Munch and the Wiener Philharmoniker had obtained equally astounding success.

¹²⁰⁷ Strassburger Domchor. Spielplanarchiv 1937, accessed 09.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail?programid=5436&id=0&sid=114>.

¹²⁰⁸ As repeatedly stated in two letters, see: MAE, AOFAA Autriche, DGRC 89, Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Georges Bidault à Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires allemandes et autrichiennes Pierre Schneider, Service des affaires intérieures et culturelles. 02.01. and 21.01.1948.

¹²⁰⁹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, DGRC 89, Bidault to Monicault. 16.11.1949.

¹²¹⁰ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, DGRC 89, Bidault to Payart. 5.12.1951.

¹²¹¹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, DGRC 89, Bidault to Payart. 5.12.1953.

details: while the Viennese *Kurier* published only a short notice of the concert,¹²¹² the *Salzburger Nachrichten* remarked on Abbé Alphonse Hoch's tendency to be overly “expressive”, and the problems of substituting boys' voices with those of adult women, which negatively affected the clarity of the vocal composition.¹²¹³ For its part, the *Salzburger Volkszeitung* remarked on tempo differences, which in its view little became the Choir's style.¹²¹⁴ Together, the positive attitude of Austrian journalists and the strong rapport with the Festival organisers convinced French cultural diplomats to make the choir the cornerstone of France's presence at the Festival, and support for subsequent tours was secured.

The directors of the choir consistently pursued a strategy of repertoire diversification, while also buttressing their programme with a standard classic repertoire already known to the Salzburg public.¹²¹⁵ Thus, the successful 1948 concert¹²¹⁶ entitled “Four Centuries of French Music”, stretched from the Franco-Flemish school to Berlioz's *L'Enfance du Christ*, and provoked an extensive discussion in the newspapers.¹²¹⁷ More critical voices were audible, however, during the following year's tour, particularly due to the conducting style of Abbé Hoch, and the demanding diversity of the repertoire, which included an extensive section of Berlioz.¹²¹⁸

The Choir took a break in 1950, but returned one year later,¹²¹⁹ and once again in 1952.¹²²⁰ Some

¹²¹² “Straßburger Domchor konzertierte in Salzburg” Wiener Kurier, 23.08.1947: 5.

¹²¹³ “Straßburger Domchor,” SN 26.08.1947: 3

¹²¹⁴ “...nach unserem Empfinden lediglich seinem Stil gemäß wenig bekönnliche Tempounterschiede zu teil wurden”. “Der Strassburger Domchor,” Salzburger Volkszeitung, 25.08.1947: 2.

¹²¹⁵ See: Chorale de la Cathédrale de Strasbourg. Spielplanarchiv 1947, accessed 09.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail/programid/3812/id/543/j/1947>. Chorale de la Cathédrale de Strasbourg. Spielplanarchiv 1948, accessed 09.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail/programid/3783/id/537/j/1948>. Chorale de la Cathédrale de Strasbourg. Spielplanarchiv 1949, accessed 09.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail/programid/3712/id/519/j/1949>. Chorale de la Cathédrale de Strasbourg. Spielplanarchiv 1951, accessed 10.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail/programid/3653/id/503/j/1951>. Chorale de la Cathédrale de Strasbourg. Spielplanarchiv 1952, accessed 10.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail/programid/3627/id/497/j/1952>. Chorale de la Cathédrale de Strasbourg. Spielplanarchiv 1955, accessed 10.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail/programid/3527/id/473/j/1955>.

¹²¹⁶ Gustav Pichler, „Salzburger Festspiele 1948: Ein Schlussbericht,” ÖMZ 10 (Oktober) 1948: 276.

¹²¹⁷ “Straßburger Domchor,” SN 24.08.1948: 6. “Straßburger Chor sang in Salzburg: Französische Kirchenmusik bei den Festspielen,” WK 23.08.1948: 4. “Straßburger Domchor,” *Salzburger Volkszeitung* 23.08.1948: 2. “Straßburger Domchor,” *Demokratisches Volksblatt* 24.08.1948: 2.

¹²¹⁸ “Straßburger Domchor singt in Salzburg: Berlioz-Oratorium gelangt zur Aufführung,” WK 05./09.08.1949: 4. “Straßburger Domchor sang in Salzburg,” WK 25.08.1949: 4. “Straßburger Domchor in Salzburg,” Wiener Zeitung, 26.08.1949: 3. “Reigen der Konzerte in Salzburg: Georg Szell und die Philharmoniker – Der Straßburger Domchor,” WZ 28.08.1949. “Straßburger Domchor singt Berlioz: Aufführung des Oratoriums ‘Des Heilands Kindheit’,” Die Presse, 25.08.1949: 4. Erich Werba, “Salzburger Konzerte,” Wiener Tageszeitung 26.08.1949: 4. Wolfgang Scheditz, “Salzburger Festspiele: Straßburger Domchor,” OÖN, 25.08.1949 (AdF).

¹²¹⁹ “Geistliche Musik aus Frankreich” Salzburger Nachrichten 29.08.1951: 4. “Straßburger Domchor sang bei Salzburger Festspielen,” WK 10.09.1951: 4.

¹²²⁰ “Der Straßburger Domchor,” SN 27.08.1952: 3. “Schluß der Salzburger Festspiele,” *Südost-Tagespost* (Graz) 29.08.1952. (AdF)

felt that the programme choice was too wide and lacked coherence.¹²²¹ At this point, the Choir's appearances began to be noted in France, where journalists reflected upon the French cultural presence in Austria.¹²²² Specifically, the 1952 performance attracted official and semi-official attention,¹²²³ testifying to the growing interest that the cultural milieu around French decision-makers had in the choir. The 1955 and 1956 performances, which took place in the wake of the withdrawal of the occupying forces, was able to draw on existing traditions, thus contributing to the reinforcement of a discourse that had already been successfully integrated into the Salzburg public sphere. Being an established representative of French music, the choir achieved notable successes, particularly in securing a stable place for French church music at the festival, and acquainting audiences with the Latin tradition of mediaeval, Renaissance, Baroque and Romantic music. While never contesting the essentially Germano-centric focus of the festival, the Choir managed to carve out a niche for itself, and to make French music a respectable part of the festival's church music repertoire.

Ballet de l'Opéra de Paris: The Sensation of the 1953 Festival?

Following an unsuccessful attempt in 1941, the Festival did not include ballet in its programme. Thus, the French decision to launch a major ballet company tour came as a revolution. In 1953, the *Corps de Ballet de l'Opéra*, already well-known to officials, was finally scheduled to perform in Salzburg.¹²²⁴ Not only was this the first major ballet tour in the festival's history, but it also made the local press acutely aware of the relatively provincial character of Salzburg, and even Austria as a whole. Having thitherto preferred more modest options, such as soloists, chamber collectives and the church choir of Strasbourg, France now opted for a much larger-scale performance format, second only to a full-scale opera tour. The programme¹²²⁵ featured *Les Caprices de Cupidon*, a piece based on the music of Couperin, alongside a more contemporary piece, *Les Mirages*, which was set to music by Henri Sauguet. While the first piece introduced audiences to the French musical tradition and Baroque style, the second piece provided an opportunity to showcase the artistic innovations of Serge Lifar, since Sauguet had worked closely with the latter.

¹²²¹ "Strapburger Domchor in Sankt Florian," *Tagblatt* (Linz), 28.08.1951. (AdF)

¹²²² L. Maurice-Amour, "Salzbourg et la France" *France Illustration* 15.09.1951 (AdF)

¹²²³ "Chorale de la Cathédrale de Strasbourg" *Honneur et Patrie*, 18.09.1952; *Le festival de Salzbourg 1952. Archives Diplomatiques et Consulaires* (1952), 203. (AdF)

¹²²⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, DGRC 89, Foreign Minister to Payart. 29.11.1952.

¹²²⁵ Ballet du Théâtre National de l'Opéra de Paris 1. Spielplanarchiv 1953, accessed 10.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail/programid/4042/id/580/j/1953>. Ballet du Théâtre National de l'Opéra de Paris. Spielplanarchiv 1953, accessed 10.12.2016. URL: <http://www.salzburgerfestspiele.at/archivdetail/programid/4043>.

The immediate reactions, as published in two leading newspapers, the *SN*¹²²⁶¹²²⁷ and the *Kurier*,¹²²⁸ conferred a sense of amazement. The two concerts performances sent shockwaves throughout musical Austria, being reported in all the national newspapers, as well as several provincial organs.¹²²⁹ Not only were the dancers and their directors held in high esteem, but they also provoked very substantial discussions within the Austrian artistic community. While the achievements of the ensemble as a whole were certainly emphasised, particular importance was attached to *étoiles* such as Nina Vyroubova and Christiane Cruassard. The French national style, under the auspices of Lifar and his younger colleague, Albert Aveline, was summed up in the following terms:

*The directing of Albert Aveline, who like Serge Lifar is a choreographer of the Paris ensemble, was thus so French that it had to be entirely modern in its plasticity and forceful expression, and entirely classical in its clarity and exactitude. Thus, for Romanticism it constructed its own historical context and led to a synthesis that one is tempted to call Parisian ballet par excellence. This style unites all elements – musicality, romantic expressiveness, classical austerity, controlled imagery and technique, modern French sensitivity, and transparency.*¹²³⁰

Nevertheless, it was generally felt that the artistic attainments of the individual dancers stood somewhat above the choreography. Most reports, when they went beyond the discussion of musical nationality, concentrated on the degree of modernity, and the repertoire choices of Lifar, particularly *Les Caprices de Cupidon*. According to the *Wiener Zeitung*, the directing strategies of Lifar and Aveline were too “conventional” (“at any rate, the great past today feels dusty, as if it belonged in a

¹²²⁶

¹²²⁷ “Festliches Salzburg: Pariser Visionen : Das Ballett der Pariser Oper im Festspielhaus - Das erste Programm,” *SN* 31.08.1953: 8. “Festliches Ballett und choreographische Tragödie : Der zweite Abschluß der Festspiele : Das Ballett der Pariser Staatsoper und Jean Cocteau's 'Phaedra',” *SN* 02.09.1953: 3.

¹²²⁸ Roland Tenschert, “Pariser Ballett in Salzburg,” *WK* 31.08.1953: 4. “Nachklänge aus Salzburg: Auch das zweite Auftreten des Balletts der Pariser Nationaloper ein großer Erfolg,” *WK*, 02.09.1953: 4.

¹²²⁹ A collection of articles dedicated to this tour, conserved at the Festival Archive in Salzburg, is one of the largest regarding the early post-war Festival. Apart from articles from the *WK* and the *SN*, it also includes critical reviews from the *Volksbote* (Innsbruck, 13.09.1953), the *Kleine Zeitung* (Klagenfurt, 03.09.1953), the *Volkszeitung* (Klagenfurt, 09.09.1953), the *Kleine Zeitung* (Graz, 03.09.1953), the *Südost-Tagesport* (Graz, 01.09.1953), the *Vorarlberger Nachrichten* (Bregenz, 03.09.1953), the *Vorarlberger Volksblatt* (Bregenz, 04.09.1953), the *Steyrer Zeitung* (Steyr, OÖ, 10.09.1953), the *Rieder Volkszeitung* (Ried, OÖ, 03.09.1953), the *Mariazeller Wochenpost* (12.09.1953), the *Österreichische Musikzeitschrift* (09/1953), the *Wiener Zeitung* (01.09.1953), the *Neue Wiener Tageszeitung* (01.09.1953), the *Kleines Volksblatt* (Vienna, 01.09.1953), *Die Presse* (05.09.1953), *Die neue Front* (Salzburg, 05.09.1953), and the *Salzburger Tagblatt* (02.09.1953).

¹²³⁰ “Die Regie von Albert Aveline, der ebenso wie Serge Lifar ein Ballettmeister des Pariser Ensembles ist, war so französisch, dass sie in ihrer Plastik und Ausdruckskraft unbedingt modern und in ihrer Klarheit und Exaktheit klassisch sein mußte. So baute sie um die Romantik deren geschichtlichen Rahmen auf und führte zu einer Synthese, die man als Pariser Ballett schlechthin zu bezeichnen versucht ist. Dieser Stil vereint alle Elemente - die Musikalität, den romantischen Gefühlsausdruck, die klassische Strenge und Beherrschung des Bildes und der Technik, die moderne französische Sensibilität und Durchsichtigkeit.” *Festliches Ballett und choreographische Tragödie...*

museum”¹²³¹). For its part, the *Kleines Volksblatt* was particularly displeased by the mediocrity of *Les Caprices*.¹²³² Apart from ideologically driven attacks from the communist *Salzburger Tagblatt*,¹²³³ even the cautiously positive *Kurier* expressed a desire for greater connection to the present.¹²³⁴ Unsurprisingly, when the *Österreichische Musikzeitschrift* brought the debate to a close, it simply stated the bare facts of the Parisian performances, deliberately eschewing any discussion of the details.¹²³⁵

While the French presence in Salzburg during regular seasons was on par with the Austrian average, the Festival represented an exceptional success story. Driven by initiative “from below”, which was quickly grasped by Vienna and Paris, musical diplomacy in Salzburg consisted of church music (one of the fortes of the French cultural presence), proven soloists and chamber ensembles, as well as a few more risky enterprises. With regard to the latter, the *faux pas* of the French brass band had not been foreseen by cultural diplomats. For its part, the 1953 ballet tour clearly demonstrated the difficulties that the Austrian cultural press faced in responding to these significant, yet problematic, performances. Critics did not refrain from skeptical remarks, although the bulk of contemporary responses still upheld traditional standards of benevolence, and the echo created throughout Austria represented an asset for French prestige diplomacy, owing to its overwhelmingly celebratory character. A small taskforce, essentially restricted to Peyrebère, Heinrich von Puthon and Susini, had thus mounted a formidable musical campaign, which largely contributed to defining the contemporary image of France.

Graz

Drawing on its good working relationship with the British Element and the musical circles of Graz, France managed to stage a quantitatively modest, but qualitatively significant, musical programme. Not surprisingly, French musical output concentrated on high quality, both in terms of the works selected and musicians. The pieces performed by French musicians and their Austrian counterparts generally did not differ substantially from what could be observed in Vienna and elsewhere. In general, Graz thus followed the conservative example of Vienna, and, for this reason, French cultural diplomats extended their high-brow Vienesse strategy into Styria.

The French musical offering consisted almost entirely of soloists and chamber ensembles, even

¹²³¹ “Ausklang der Salzburger Festspiele...”

¹²³² “Salzburger Festspielfinale,” *Kleines Volksblatt* 01.09.1953.

¹²³³ “Französische Ballettkunst in Salzburg,” ST 02.09.1953.

¹²³⁴ “Französische Ballettkunst in Salzburg,” ST 02.09.1953.

¹²³⁵ *Salzburger Kulturbericht* (Kulturreverat der Landesregierung). 19.09.1953. (AdF)

more so than in other Austrian cities. Some of these were less known in Vienna, and thus chose to perform in Graz, which was apparently considered a safer option. Among such musicians was Frédéric Ogouse, who gave concerts at the festival of 1946, alongside the Städtisches Orchester under Karl Böhm,¹²³⁶ a feat that he repeated in October of the same year,¹²³⁷ in both cases offering a programme of French classics and Chopin.

Soloists also received considerable attention. For instance, Alfred Cortot performed in 1949,¹²³⁸ and also in February 1954, as part of a “French week” in the Stefaniensaal, thus making a great impression on the public, and earning praise from the French representative.¹²³⁹ Occasionally, unexpected difficulties arose. In June 1953, when the violinist Robert Soetens was due to give a concert in Graz, it transpired that Dimitri Shostakovich also due to perform the very same day. This served to “draw many musical specialists away” from the French concert.¹²⁴⁰ However, the press was still greatly impressed by Soetens’ performance.¹²⁴¹

As for chamber ensembles, the Calvets performed on October 15th, 1946,¹²⁴² returning once again in 1949.¹²⁴³ Another performance of chamber music was provided by the Pascal Quartet in November 1947,¹²⁴⁴ and again in February 1951.¹²⁴⁵ Their successes in Graz were substantially the same as those they had enjoyed in Vienna.

In Styria, France did not pursue a consistent campaign of folk music. However, French diplomats did bring in one representative ensemble, namely the Capeline de Menton, in order to show that French culture did indeed have a regional aspect (this was similar to the Breton evening at the FFA). Thus, the Capeline de Menton included Graz in its Austrian tour, achieving its usual standard of

¹²³⁶ Symphoniekonzert: Städtisches Orchester, Frédéric Ogouse, 15.07.1946. StLA, Plakatsammlung 1946, 334.

¹²³⁷ Frédéric Ogouse: letztes Konzert. Städtische Bühnen/Opernhaus, 13.10.1946. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1946, 169. It was claimed that the public “demanded” another concert, which was given two weeks later: Im Schauspielhaus spielt am Sonntag, den 27. Oktober 1946, auf mehrfaches Verlangen, Frédecif Ogouse. 11 Uhr. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1946, 740.

¹²³⁸ Posters announced the “unique tour” of Cortot on February 5th. Klavierabend Alfred Cortot aus Paris – Einmaliges Gastspiel! Werke von Frédéric Chopin. Stephaniensaal 19.30. StLA, Plakatsammlung – 1949 – 088. R. Weishappel, “Alfred Cortot,” *Kleine Zeitung* 08.02.1949: 5. Hans Hellmer, “Alfred Cortot spielt Chopin und Schumann: Veranstaltung des Musikvereines,” *KIZ* 08.02.1949: 2. Richard Ahne, “Alfred Cortot,” *Steirerblatt* 08.02.1949: 2.

¹²³⁹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 182, Laurent to Susini, 19.02.1954.

¹²⁴⁰ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 192, Laurent to the Embassy in Vienna, 14.06.1953.

¹²⁴¹ Hans Wamlek, “Französisches Meister-Duo,” *Kleine Zeitung* 14.06.1953. “Konzerte am Freitag,” *Neue Zeit* 14.06.1953. “Soetens,” *Süd-Ost-Tagespost* 14.06.1953. (MAE AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 192). The SFA report singled out the success of Soetens (even if this was overshadowed by a performance by the theatrical Compagnie des Quatres), drawing particular attention to the Tagespost article. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 68, Rapport sur l’activité de la Société France-Autriche en 1952/53. Graz, 30.06.1953.

¹²⁴² Calvet-Quartett (Paris) – Europas beste Kammermusikvereinigung. 15.10.1946. Kammermusiksaal. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1946, 1897.

¹²⁴³ Calvet-Quartett, 23.06. Kammermusiksaal. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 398. They performed Beethoven, Debussy and Milhaud, thus drawing on their standard repertoire.

¹²⁴⁴ Das Pascal-Quartett. Werke von Brahms, Beethoven, Jacques Ibert. Stephaniensaal. Abonnementskonzert Europäische Konzerte – Zyklus A. 11.11.1947. StLA, Plakatsammlung, 1947, 653.

¹²⁴⁵ “Jubel um das Pascal-Quartett,” *KIZ* 03.02.1951: 5.

success.¹²⁴⁶ France's policies in Graz amounted to a middle-scale cultural enterprise, commensurate to the city's growing stature among Austrian cultural centres. With the help of the British, Graz was returning to its position as the main cultural focus of Southern Austria, and the modest, but consistent, musical diplomacy of France sought to establish a presence there, at least when it came to the established concert rooms genres. While not attaining the degree of variety seen in Innsbruck and Salzburg, French efforts nonetheless provide an interesting example of middle-priority cultural diplomacy.

Linz

In Linz, performances by French artists were rare, and, instead of constituting a consistent policy, can be best summed up as a small number of individual projects. In 1952 and 1953, Giordani lent a helping hand to the Capeline de Menton, and also collected the positive reviews that appeared in the press.¹²⁴⁷ The Capeline's artists were thus able to undertake a comprehensive tour of Linz, along with most of the urban centres of Upper Austria. This encompassed Steyr (both in 1952¹²⁴⁸ and 1953), and, in 1953, Wels, Schallerbach, Gmunden, Bad Ischl and Bad Aussee (in American northwest Styria).¹²⁴⁹ As a result, the French succeeded in staging a number of festive concerts, and scoring a degree of public success previously unknown to French cultural diplomacy in the region. Giordani expressed amazement in his report, stressing not only the official presence and the joint concert with a local Austrian folk group, but also the crowds that gathered to attend the Capeline's concerts.¹²⁵⁰ Somewhat later, in 1955, the Soviets also made an entry into the Austrian "Lake District," and this produced much the same euphoria. The French experience is thus valuable, insofar as it allows us to understand how parallels in national folk traditions were capitalised upon, both in the Tyrol and outside of it. The Capeline received high praise from Ambassador Payart,¹²⁵¹ and local newspapers were keen to publish both photos and articles.¹²⁵² In this sense, the tour became almost a lodestar for

¹²⁴⁶ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 193, Laurent to P. Griebichler (France-Autriche Klagenfurt), 07.05.1954.

¹²⁴⁷ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Monsieur Damien J. Giordani, Chef de la Liaison Française de Linz à Monsieur l'Administrateur Directeur du Cabinet Civil Vienne; Linz, 18.06.1952. In the press cuttings, his efforts were gratefully mentioned.

¹²⁴⁸ "La Capeline," Steyrer Zeitung 02.07.1952. (Vienne 183)

¹²⁴⁹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to the civil cabinet in Vienna, 12.06.1953.

¹²⁵⁰ Giordani claimed that around a thousand onlookers had been present at every concert. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to Payart and the Civil Cabinet. 23.07.1953.

¹²⁵¹ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Venue à Linz de Groupe Folklorique "La Capeline de Menton". Payart to Robert Schuman (Foreign Minister), 12.07.1952.

¹²⁵² Giordani's reporting included a prodigious amount of cuttings from Linz and provincial newspapers (with regard to the latter, only the *Welser Nachrichten* is identifiable). Many of these included photos, and it can be safely claimed that throughout Upper Austria, the press was genuinely enchanted with the Provençal musicians. MAE, AOFAA

French diplomacy. As the Allied presence in Austria drew to a close, the French element managed to participate in a display of military music in Linz, sending the orchestra of the 15th battalion of *Chasseurs Alpins*, and thus stressing Alpine parallels with Austria itself. The orchestra performed an almost Soviet-style open-air concert, which was crowned with great success.¹²⁵³

Friendly relations with Linz musical circles bore fruit, as an interest in French music and musicians gradually developed. High-brow soloist and chamber music was a French specialty, and Linz was not dissimilar to the rest of Austria in its share of incoming Frenchmen. Among other artists, Robert Soetens,¹²⁵⁴ the Trio Pasquier and Monique de la Bruchollerie toured Linz in May 1953. They obtained a formidable success, similar to that of their performances in Innsbruck and Salzburg, and were also asked by the Linz concert directors to perform the complete trios of Beethoven.¹²⁵⁵ A year later, the Cultural Department of Linz invited the French conductor Louis Auriacombe, who led the city's symphony orchestra with considerable success.¹²⁵⁶ For his part, Cortot did not fail to visit the Upper Austrian capital, arriving in March 1955. As Giordani noted with some embarrassment, his advancing age was becoming apparent, although this did not prevent the public from giving him an ovation and several encores.¹²⁵⁷ Finally, Yvonne Gessler¹²⁵⁸ also gave a somewhat controversial concert in June 1955, which marked the end of the concert activities of the occupation period.¹²⁵⁹ Even considering the obvious lack of any coherent strategy for Linz, which began to take shape only towards the end of the occupation period, French artists nonetheless made a significant contribution to the internationalisation of the Upper Austrian capital's cultural profile. The difference to Vienna, Salzburg and Innsbruck was remarkable, particularly the greater space for alternative solutions and fruitful collaborations with local and American officials, which ultimately allowed the French to cover the entire northwestern quarter of Austria, from the Alps to the border of the Soviet Mühlviertel.

In effect, French concert diplomacy in Austria came second to none, both in the overall quantity of events staged, and their geographical, genre and performative diversity. In this sense, France maintained a presence in every prominent school and artistic tendency in the country. Although the

Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to Payart, 23.07.1952.

¹²⁵³ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to Chauvel, 23.06.1955. An article with a photo was attached as well. ("Kinder, war das schön!," OÖN 21.06.1955.)

¹²⁵⁴ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to the Civil Cabinet in Vienna, 02.06.1953.

¹²⁵⁵ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, DGRC 89, Direction des Affaires Culturelles: Compte-Rendu de l'activité pour le mois de mai 1950. Vienne, 31.05.1950.

¹²⁵⁶ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to Chauvel, 28.04.1955. Wilhelm Keller, "Ein brillanter Dreiklang: Rossini, Ravel und Haydn im 5. Städtischen Symphoniekonzert," Tagespost 24.04.1954.

¹²⁵⁷ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to Chauvel, 06.04.1955.

¹²⁵⁸ MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183, Giordani to Chauvel, 20.06.1955.

¹²⁵⁹ Ludwig K.Mayer, "Ein französischer Liederabend," OÖN 20.06.1955. MAE, AOFAA Autriche, Vienne 183.

academic music centres of Paris tended to predominate, the French provinces were also brought to Austria, via the (admittedly rather conventional) means of folk music. Covering a wide array of different genres, cultural diplomats deployed classical opera, academic, contemporary and folk dance, two church choirs, leading chamber ensembles, a long list of prominent soloists, and even a few semi-professional and amateur groups. Overall, the diplomats thus made an effort to give a representative overview of musical France, including performers, composers and compositional schools. From the refined soloist concerts at the Musikverein to the folk dance open-air in Alpine towns, and from activities in major urban centres like Vienna, Innsbruck and Salzburg to performances at prominent Austrian festivals (Salzburg, Vienna, Bregenz), French musicians undertook a vast prestige diplomacy project, deployed with elaborate strategic consideration, and achieving often enormous public effect. The sheer number of guest performances speaks volumes regarding the musical power that France accumulated and deployed in Austria. Visiting musicians contributed to the re-construction of the imagery of musical Frenchness, and, through their bold juxtapositions of Germanic and French repertoires (and playing together with Austrians, such as duo Fournier-Gulda who continued their collaboration in the late 1950s producing the famous Beethoven recordings), showed their receptiveness to both Austro-German classics and modern French academic styles. A number of performers received unanimous accolades, such as chamber ensembles, while others sparked heated controversies, such as the *Ballet de l'Opéra de Paris*, one of the most prominent actors in mid twentieth-century academic dance. Not only did French performers contribute to the negotiation of “national” categories, which still loomed large over critical reporting, but they also appeared as individual artists with their own distinctive profile, thus prompting Austrian cultural thinking to consider European and global factors. Further research on the cultural-critical context in the mid- and long-term perspective would no doubt elucidate how these musicians and their genres were embedded in the national and local discourse, beyond the horizon of France's cultural diplomacy. The transnational nature of ballet and the Strasburg programme stands out among these nationally defined repertoires, even if contemporary criticism ultimately “failed” to engage with them, opting instead for conservative discursive strategies. At the same time, self-conscious Austrian critics, wary of their own professional reputation, avoided sounding too servile towards the French occupation power, while cultural diplomats, despite aiming at genuine prestige, did not consider pressuring local journalists into monotonous accolades, even when they could have used the leverage of good inter-Allied relations. Thus, many French concerts appear to have been genuine prestige victories.

A complex French musical identity, embedded in a European high culture context, was thus constructed and transmitted through Austria. While this did not explicitly aim at mass audiences, it

did serve to uphold the position of France among the other nations present in Austria during the post-war decade. Second to none among foreign cultural actors, France confirmed its position as a great musical power, and this had significant consequences for the public imagination of France and the French, and, in many cases, for musical discourse in Austria proper. It would be wrong to overstate the reach and potential of French musical diplomacy in view of its apparent successes, since these remained relatively peripheral, and it was difficult for French thinking to compete with predominantly Austro-centric cultural assumptions. Nevertheless, the French occupation power arguably made the most efficient use of its limited resources, deploying its musical culture throughout the country, achieving a remarkable variety of genres, and earning largely positive reactions from its Austrian interlocutors and public.

When Muses speak, Guns will be Silent? What Can Be Learned From French and Soviet Musical Diplomacy

French and Russian/Soviet music once again became prominent in the Austrian soundscape, and government-led cultural diplomacy had been central to this reignited process of musical transfer. But what role did government-sponsored musical diplomacy, and the concomitant national labelling, play in the increasing intensity of Austrians' exposure to organised flows of musical exports from France and the USSR? How did this coincide with the stated goals of Allied cultural diplomacy? Music, again, is notoriously difficult to inscribe into the usual causality of cultural-diplomatic efforts. Indeed, unlike classical diplomacy, musical exports both consumed financial and administrative resources and produced results, even if the latter sometimes escaped the ideological and semantic fields within which government officials moved.

Undoubtedly, the prerogatives of occupation and ample administrative resources, combined with lavish French financing, provided cultural diplomats with unique opportunities to carry out their work. However, the goals they set for themselves were more ambitious than a usual cultural-diplomatic campaign. Members of the occupation administration had to contribute to the cultural democratisation and denazification of Austria, and operated at what was becoming the forefront of the European Cold War. Finally, they also had to pursue individual strategies of prestige and image-making. To some extent, representation of the best of their music contributed to all of these goals, and its transmission into the Austrian public sphere was necessarily influenced by the cultural re-education effort. More specific goals, such as the propaganda of communism and the assertion of French cultural grandeur, met with varying degrees of success, from the spectacular defeat of the

Soviet propagandistic effort to the drastic reduction in teaching of the French language in Austrian schools. However, both countries fared better in the field of music. In theory, both cultural (and musical) diplomacies had to address the whole of the Austrian nation, persuading it of the value and respectability of the foreign country's culture, which was assured by sending musical materials, "live" musicians and radio transmissions, all of which was made possible thanks to institutional support. Stylistic diversity, including both academic "western art music" and elements of folk music, equally suggests a desire to target various social groups. Nevertheless, in my view, this social logic carries a risk of schematisation, and, in reality, no simple linear answer can be provided. Numerous other factors must also be taken into account, including institutional backing, political liberties and restrictions, geography, interrelations with Austrian actors, the particularities of performing situations, and, ultimately, the diversity of cultural habits exhibited by the public.

Our examination of the institutional history of French and Soviet musical engagement in Austria has elucidated the differing degrees to which the Allies attempted to bring their arts to Austria. Based on long-standing traditions of French *diplomatie culturelle*, cultural diplomats – that is, academics on the payroll of the Foreign Ministry – advanced a prestige-bound, elitist programme of cultural excellence. The two Institutes, situated in Vienna and Innsbruck, epitomised the institutional orientation and power of *étatiste* and *dirigiste* cultural diplomats. Their directors, namely Prinz Eugène Susini, the Director of the Cultural Division in Vienna, and Maurice Besset in Innsbruck, had a degree of leverage that was arguably superior to all their Allied colleagues. Inscribed into the general framework of French DC, Susini and Besset's own agency served to heavily shape French cultural expansion in Austria. Despite a heavy concentration on language and the visual arts, France also brought a remarkable variety of music to Austria, making a substantial financial and organizational commitment to the latter. Considering the mixed results with which it was met in Austria – the ultimate failure to impose a large-scale system of language teaching, even in West Austria – it is remarkable that cultural diplomacy still managed to create spaces for recognised French cultural prestige, particularly around its institutional centres in the Tyrol and Vienna.

Power relations were relevant to cultural diplomacy, as the preferential treatment accorded to French music in the *Tiroler Tageszeitung* clearly shows. However, negotiation, and taking into account the agency and power of other interlocutors, was important in compensating for France's lack of hard and economic power (as well as the resulting lack of prestige). Expanding its cultural action beyond the borders of French Austria, the French administration managed to make important advances in other Western zones, thanks to dexterous use of personal diplomacy (e.g. Peyrebère de Guilloutet) and networking with Austrian, American and British partners (e.g. Salzburg, Graz, Linz, Vienna). Thus, the Salzburg Festival became another locus of musical Frenchness, with notable

emphasis on church music, string soloists, and, in one of the most problematic moves in the history of French musical engagement in Austria, ballet. Graz, the main centre of the British zone, saw interesting attempts at collaboration not only between France and the UK, but also with Italy's Dante Alighieri institute, which potentially opens up interesting perspectives on the city's multifaceted cultural scene (both from the *Lokalgeschichte* and comparative perspectives). Indeed, local cultural actors played an important role in French interactions with Austrians, even in France's own territory around Innsbruck and Bregenz. The fact that the French passed by the Soviet zone in silence is all the more remarkable, and reflects the background presence of the Cold War, from which France ostensibly distanced itself. France's Western leanings are further demonstrated by its near perfect relations with the Americans, which, however, carefully avoided any public display of ideology.

An hierarchical approach to cultural relations was also in evidence. For example, French officials' awareness of their power status was conspicuous in their relations with the Austro-French society, which was largely relegated to a secondary role, while many cultural initiatives were carried out entirely by officials. Likewise, the indirect control that the French maintained over the *Tiroler Tageszeitung* and the *Vorarlberger Nachrichten*, both dominant forces in the media landscape, ensured a privileged position for French cultural propaganda in the region. Nevertheless, the French showed considerable delicacy in operating within Austrian cultural milieus. Genuine criticism of French cultural offerings was encouraged by cultural diplomats, since it lent credibility to their cultural message: for instance, discussions regarding French music were viewed with particular tolerance. By avoiding direct imposition of an official viewpoint, and allowing a large degree of flexibility to Austrian cultural elites, France effectively advanced its cultural interests, as construed within the cultural-diplomatic, academic-Foreign Office consensus.

The Soviets operated within a substantially different cultural-political framework. While the propaganda state marched on with the Red Army, music was often relegated to the rear of the ideological crusade, owing to high-ranking Bolshevik officials' limited interest in specifically artistic affairs. This allowed considerable room for manoeuvre to artists and cultural "workers", both within and without the Soviet Union, even if they ultimately remained subject to the hierarchical discursive structures of Stalinist newspeak. VOKS itself, while being nominally independent, and to some extent keeping a safe distance from its political supervisors (its Musical Section provides a good example of this strategy), still ultimately followed the sinuous course of the party line. In particular, this included keen observation of the ever-changing regulations regarding "socialist realism" and "anti-formalism". The tight-rope of formal and informal power relations that cultural propagandists had to walk significantly hampered their initiative; furthermore, their ideas regarding musical exports were often not articulated in detail. Veneration of the classics was more of a happy coincidence than

a considered decision – although the feedback sent from Vienna was quite clear about Austrian preferences – and many of the records and scores carrying explicit propagandistic messages sent from the USSR would remain forever on ÖSG libraries’ shelves.

The path of Soviet musical diplomats was strewn with contradictions. Their own power and flexibility in responding to local circumstances were severely limited. However, during the intersection between Soviet actors and their Austrian partners, shifts in cultural-propagandistic emphasis did occur, and this could make a difference to public perception. In the first months after the liberation, when cultural officers were not yet subject to systematic control, and had very few guidelines regarding specific cultural policies, they often acted relatively liberally. Combined with the official policy of quickly reopening prestigious cultural institutions, and thus demonstrating Russians’ awareness and appreciation of European culture, this allowed the Soviet Union to take advantage of its position as the first Ally to arrive in Vienna. As in Germany,¹²⁶⁰ they found extensive parallels with the social background, historical traditions (such as tacit acceptance of the dominance of the state), and educational standards of “bourgeois” Viennese cultural circles. Despite the extremely aggressive anti-formalist campaigns within the USSR, Soviet public diplomats in Austria pursued a more cautious line, and the ideological conservatism that had been established during the late 1930s thus persisted within musical-diplomatic practice. Essentially, adopting a cautious attitude towards all contemporary music, and adhering to the well-known classical canon, was a rational strategy of survival within the Soviet system, and also served to garner some public sympathy in Austria. However, despite these qualifications, the situation of Soviet cultural diplomats stands in sharp contrast to the significant leeway enjoyed by their French counterparts. Unlike the latter, the Russians did not have the same liberty of choice, and could not operate with the same variety of genres.

In spite of the top-down perspective of the Soviet occupation power, local cultural partners played a more important role than one might have expected. The Austro-Soviet Society was very active in the country, and its strength was provided to a large extent by the Musical Section, seemingly the most “apolitical” part of the organisation. This subscribed to the socially acceptable repertoire of Russian high culture, and regularly worked with actors outside of the communist microcosm. Indeed, Soviet musical diplomacy carried considerable weight within the largely anti-communist, more conservative and elitist parts of Austrian society. Again, *Bildung* and *Kultur*, not socialist liberation, became the values that both the VOKS Representative and his local partners addressed. In their reports, they struggled to disguise this shift in emphasis behind the usual propagandistic newspeak.

The geographical reach of Soviet cultural propaganda was more limited than that of the French (as

¹²⁶⁰ Janik, *Recomposing German Music*: 100-101, passim.

with the quantity of invited artists), and the Russians were unable to establish a presence in Western Austria, including Salzburg. Only occasionally did Soviet officers take up contacts with Graz, mostly thanks to ÖSG mediation. The hardening political climate of the USSR and Austria, owing to *Zhdanovshchina* at home and the cold war abroad, made it more difficult for Soviet cultural diplomats to diffuse a credible cultural message, and de-Stalinisation did not begin in earnest until Soviet troops had already left Austria. The Berlin crisis and the Korean war created fears of partition among Austrians, the strike of 1950 encouraged suspicions regarding the local Communist party, and the Americans used popular dislike of the Soviet Union to isolate its public diplomacy, and to *de facto* exclude its cultural campaigns from the western zones. The cultural cold war, which was largely irrelevant to French musical diplomacy, had twofold consequences for the Soviets. First, and most negatively, a vigorous counterpropaganda campaign was unleashed against official Soviet cultural diplomacy in the pages of the US-dominated media. Second, and more positively, the West was eager to show its openness towards “free” Russian culture, and thus allowed music from Russia and the USSR to be included in cultural programmes throughout the country. Public reactions to Shostakovich’s yielding to the Soviet apparatus oscillated between compassion and attacks on his new works.¹²⁶¹ Bearing in mind the relatively high standing that Shostakovich and the Soviet academic school enjoyed in Austria, moderation was indeed the best strategy for Soviet cultural diplomats. While this strategy proved successful in those cases where it met Austrian expectations and aesthetic standards, open propaganda in favour of Stravinsky, and the seemingly officially decreed “free” music, soon ran up against the wall of Austrian conservatism. Austrians were most wary of music that had clearly received official Soviet political support, and this explains the rather lukewarm response to Stravinsky's new pieces, including the premiere of his *Rake's Progress*. Musical diplomacy thus had to be distinguished from musical propaganda: the single largest musical-political crusade by the United States, a campaign for musical modernity in Nabokovian terms, in which Russian music was heavily involved, ended in a humiliating retreat, and was brought to an end around 1953. This served to exemplify staunch Austrian and European conservatism, and revealed the limits of American persuasive power, as the public would not part with its liberty of choice or rejection. Soviet and French interactions with the cultural media showed several similarities. In particular, both powers were ultimately confronted with media realities that were largely defined by the Americans and Austrians. Moreover, both countries had only moderate direct leverage over the printed press, following France’s resignation from large-scale printing press operations, and the marginal importance of the Soviet-led *Österreichische Zeitung*. Thus, they both relied on support and

¹²⁶¹ Rudolf Klein, “Das Orchester der Volksoper gab das erste seiner Kammerkonzerte... Schostakowitsch,” WK 11.11.1947: 4.

transmission provided by US-led print organs. While the circulation of the Austro-Soviet Society's *Die Brücke* and the Communist *Der Abend* might have been worryingly large for the Western Allies, it was woefully insufficient for any large-scale Soviet cultural-propagandistic campaign. Despite these limitations, French and Soviet musical diplomacy did receive coverage in the US-led, neutral, party, and local press, and, since both countries concentrated primarily on art music, combined summertime folk tours, they received predominantly positive reviews. Growing Soviet isolation, however, led to many of its cultural offensives being ignored by the influential American dailies, which were wary of the ideological admixtures in Soviet concerts. Moreover, certain French decisions sparked vivid controversy, although, in my view, this ultimately was not detrimental to French prestige. On the radio, the Soviet Union could make use of time slots that had been allocated to it by virtue of the agreement with the RAVAG. However, in its dealings with the RWR network, it was dependent on its relations with the Americans, which were essentially non-existent. France, on the other hand, managed to maintain good working relations with all the major radio broadcasters, Austrian, British and American.

Music also contributed to the ongoing construction of national imageries, and, as the empirical base of this thesis strongly suggests, it is entirely appropriate to use national categorisations to decipher contemporaries' articulations of musical reception. Adopting a high-culture musical strategy, combined with an acceptable degree of exoticism, mostly expressed through folk tours, French, Soviet and Austrian actors revealed inherent continuities within the European inter- and transnational *Bildungsbürgertum*. Both *Bildung* and *Kultur*, although articulated differently according to their linguistic background (i.e., *kultura/kulturnost'* and *civilisation*), played a comparable role on all three sides involved, and thus assured a smoother cultural transmission. The prestige of the high-culture habitus appeared to exert real power both within and without the narrow circles of discourse makers, having a discernible influence at all levels of the decision-making process, and on public reactions and feedback.

Musicians indeed appeared to embody music's universal language of mankind, to use the famous quote from Longfellow. This extended to the semantic fields both within and around music: the musical repertoire offered to Austrians tended to meet their implicit expectations, and the educational context revealed a vast degree of contingency. This established a common communicative space, in which French grandeur was re-interpreted and re-integrated into an Austrocentric, yet internationalised, musical space, and the Soviet propagandistic message regarding the cultural superiority of the socialist order was discarded in favour of an academic Russian heritage, firmly anchored in the nineteenth century. Russia and the Soviet Union, while being geographically coterminous in the Austrian mind, were thus mutually separable. In a more personal perspective,

touring Russian and French musicians represented the pinnacle of musical diplomacy, and often made a significant impact on the media and Austrian discursive space. Their high-culture advances fitted seamlessly into the native Austrian scene; the national imageries of Russia and France were subject to immediate re-negotiation following the performances of their musicians. The high standard of technical skill and nationally balanced programmes, which aimed both to present each country's national music, and to convince Austrians of French and Russian knowledge and appreciation of the European standard repertoire (including the Viennese classics), largely met with genuine critical and public approval. Differences were determined both by external circumstances and by the cultural-political choices of Soviet and French cultural diplomats, alongside their Austrian counterparts.

The majority of soloist and chamber ensemble concerts took place in small- and middle-sized concert rooms, with a capacity of a few hundred seats at best, and the quantitative outreach of these events ought therefore to be described as moderate. However, several important qualifications ought to be made. First, the concert-going public included a number of opinion-makers, an obvious example being musical journalists, who transmitted their evaluation of these concerts to a much broader public. This was what motivated the consistent French policy of introducing first-class chamber ensembles, which received extremely positive reviews in the most widely circulated Austrian newspapers. Second, the concert-going public also included professional musicians, whose impressions and opinions were highly relevant to Austrian musical production and consumption patterns, as well as other musically-interested persons, many of them presumably hailing from the educated middle class, and thus being integrated into the universe of high-culture discourse.

Symphony concerts presumably addressed a somewhat larger audience. Their greater importance was magnified, as with chamber music, by Austrian sensitivities and claims in the sphere of symphonic music,¹²⁶² which had long been established as a constitutive part of high-culture musical consumption. With the Viennese orientation towards the classics, and particularly the Austro-German classics,¹²⁶³ the task of Allies became both difficult and delicate. Given this particular Austrian context, the importance of symphony transcended the small percentage of society represented by the *Bildungsbürgertum*. In some cases of Allied musical diplomacy, symphonic music acquired particular significance, notably the sending of conductors (e.g. the Frenchman Charles Munch, the British conductors Sir John Barbirolli and Sir Adrian Boult, the Russo-Italo-French Igor Markevitch, and the American Leopold Stokowski). The context of this genre allows us to understand the globally shared values and practices of musical diplomacy – globally denoting here

¹²⁶² Painter, *Symphonic Aspirations*, 5.

¹²⁶³ Trümpi, *Politisierete Orchester*, 240-1, 315-330.

the transatlantic Western world. Thus, Charles Munch, on top of the standard orchestra hierarchy, and first to be commented upon by the critics, undoubtedly performed the French nation in the eyes of journalists – and, presumably, the public. On the other hand, a first-class symphonic repertoire could dramatically increase the nation's prestige within Austrian discourse –Tchaikovsky again serves as a prime example. However, it seems that the symphonic aspirations of foreign nations could never successfully vie with the native Austro-Germanic heritage, and the musical scene remained dominated by Beethoven, Brahms, Bruckner and Mahler.

In opera, neither France nor the USSR harboured cultural-expansionist ambitions. Indeed, the overall percentage of French and Russian works performed in Austrian opera houses was never on the same level as the predominant Italian opera. Nevertheless, a few works by Tchaikovsky, Mussorgsky and Bizet were a standard part of Austrian repertoires, and both the management of the State Opera and Austrian critics paid considerable attention to the first post-war premieres of these pieces. In particular, they concentrated primarily on the quality of the ensemble, and the already recognised standing of these classical operas. The development of chamber and solo music followed the traditional European canon, and, as I have shown in the cases of Vienna and Innsbruck, Austrians preferred to stick to a limited number of well-known classical works. Tchaikovsky, Debussy and Ravel represent a prominent triad of the most performed composers from Russia and France. The high degree of repetitiveness with which they were performed served to further strengthen existing knowledge of the Russian and French repertoire. Indeed, it reinforced the national imageries of the musical schools of the two countries, which was essentially articulated in terms of the three composers' respective styles. This further contributed to attaching the labels of musical Romanticism and Impressionism to these two national schools, which was characteristic of Austrian conservative reductionism in the musical sphere.¹²⁶⁴

The relative value attached to high culture, and its position at the centre of both Allied and Austrian attention, did not rule out Allied experiments in the field of lighter, and particularly folk, music. Despite their very different stylistic and discursive framing, French and Soviet choirs and folk dance ensembles enjoyed widespread popularity in Austria. In a sense, they performed their nation (or, in the Russian case, the Soviet transnational community) before the Austrians. The different regions of France, Russian folk songs, and Caucasian songs and dances brought a note of exoticism and colourful otherness, combined with European-style training, to Austria. The Soviet Union deployed this form of culture with more strategic coherence, since it fitted the official “socialist” vision of folkishness at home (that is, showcasing the vitality of the nationally expressed socialist cultures of

¹²⁶⁴ The disciplining of the public, and the gradual reduction of the standard repertoire, occurred throughout the nineteenth century, and this had direct consequences for the situation that the Allies confronted. See: Müller, *Das Publikum macht die Musik*, 105-108.

the Soviet people). Moreover, Soviet officials could also be relatively sure of the success of these already renowned, well-proven folk song and dance ensembles. Folk tours exited the concert rooms of Vienna and traveled throughout Austria, and were, for many smaller towns, the first direct contact with Soviet or French culture. In this sense, they came much closer to the “people-to-people” dialogue that was supposed to be embodied by cultural diplomacy, at least more so than the rigidly organised high culture tours, in which the cultural codes of conduct for both musicians and audiences excluded direct communication, with the exception of applause. In the Soviet case, language barriers and political supervision did not always facilitate such direct contacts. However, it remains the case that open-air folk-dance concerts were much more relaxed, especially compared to the stiff discipline of the concert room.

But what did they achieve in practical terms? Evaluating the impact of French and Soviet cultural diplomacy on Austrian musical practices is not a question that can be answered easily. Performances of French and Russian composers by Austrians are more elusive, and are difficult to integrate into the framework of Allied cultural-diplomatic efforts. As a number of authors had already been integrated into the Viennese and Austrian repertoires, performances of their works transcended the boundary between foreign musical diplomacy and indigenous Austrian cultural history.

With regard to the limitations of musical diplomacy, it is important to define the latter in terms of its relation with – and against – the wider Austrian context. Many Austrian performances, and the Austrian reception of foreign music, were not directed by the French and Soviet administrations, since these cultural transfers had begun long before the start of the Allied occupation, and there had already been several decades of Austrian exposure to music from Russia and France. In many cases, Allied influence was rather indirect, notably through the access to sheet music that was facilitated by ÖSG or French Institute libraries. Indeed, this seems to have been the most reliable means to establish a connection between Austrian performers and the Allied cultural presence, due to the fact that large portions of Vienna's stock of sheet music had been destroyed during the final days of war. Only in a few cases, however, such as through the correspondence conserved by the VOKS central office, can the precise nature of these links be clearly established, as in the case of Josef Krips, who used sheet music sent from the USSR for his performances of Russian symphonic works. Using Allied-sponsored libraries served to enlarge the repertoire of Austrian musicians, and to subtly fulfil the aim of promoting foreign music among Austrians, without making the musicians in question feel as if they had been conscripted into government-led cultural diplomacy.

A brief overview of Austrian concert activities and their general context serves to elucidate the proportion and relative importance of composers from France and Russia on the Austrian scene. In particular, it is important to estimate whether and to what extent their presence was influenced by the efforts of the French and Soviet administrations. In order to do this, I will examine concert programmes from Vienna, Graz, and Klagenfurt. Moreover, in order to establish the connection between administrative resources and preferences for music of a certain provenience, I will analyse the reporting of the Innsbruck-based *Tiroler Tageszeitung*, where France enjoyed a system of indirect control both over cultural institutions and the media.

For the survey of the Konzerthaus (below), several of the most important composers were chosen, including those who performed more than twenty times, both on the Russian and the French sides. Stravinsky is included in the Russian category, as is an earlier émigré, Rachmaninov.¹²⁶⁵ This general overview also includes foreign tours, including those sponsored by the USSR in France, which, in quantitative terms, might favour French authors. Nevertheless, the influence of the tours on overall programming is not of systemic importance, since the absolute majority of concerts were given by non-Russian and non-French musicians; in addition, it needs to be emphasised that both Soviet and French musicians usually did not perform only their native music, but also included works from Austria and other European countries.

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While both musicians resided (or had resided) in the US, Rakhmaninov had not participated in public campaigns against the Soviet government, and, to the contrary, supported the Soviet war effort. Unlike Stravinsky, Rakhmaninov died before the end of the war, the start of the Allied occupation period and the onset of cold war. Thus, he was more tolerated by the Soviet authorities.

Table 1. Russian and Soviet composers at the Konzerthaus

Tchaikovsky	189
Rachmaninov	89
Prokofiev	72
Stravinsky	67
Mussorgsky	51
Rimsky-Korsakov	41
Grechaninov	39
Shostakovich	23
Scriabin	22
Khachaturian	21

Table 2. French composers at the Konzerthaus

Debussy	183
Ravel	138
Milhaud	29
Fauré	27
Massenet	27
Rameau	22
Poulenc	21

Table 3. Russian and French Composers at the Musikverein, 1945-26.10.1955

Tchaikovsky	97
Prokofiev	24
Shostakovich	19
Stravinsky	20
Debussy	35
Ravel	31

These tendencies are partially confirmed by press reviews.¹²⁶⁶ Outside of Vienna, the data collected is of less consistent provenience, being drawn from major newspapers (Salzburg, Tirol), concert posters (Graz) and the programmes of the local Musikverein (Klagenfurt), which together provide an overview of the diversity of the Austrian regions, and enables us to place Viennese developments in a comparative perspective.

Table 4. Tchaikovsky/Debussy/Ravel distribution in the pages of the *Salzburger Nachrichten*

¹²⁶⁶

Tchaikovsky	64
Debussy	69
Ravel	55

Table 5. Distribution of mentions from the Styrian posters collection (*Plakatsammlung*)

Tchaikovsky	19
Debussy	35
Ravel	25

Table 6. Programmes of the Klagenfurt Musikverein

Tchaikovsky	7
Debussy	6
Ravel	1

Table 7. Distribution of several French and Russian composers, as mentioned in the *TT*

Tchaikovsky	49
Debussy	78
Ravel	64

These tables demonstrate a significant degree of conservative uniformity throughout Austria, and seem to confirm the thesis of cultural continuity within the national framework. Notable exceptions, however, are provided by Innsbruck and Graz. The first, being under direct French control, was predictably overexposed to French music, which consistently received extremely positive reviews. The Graz case is more complicated, as neither France nor the USSR had direct leverage over its concert scene. It may be surmised that the smaller proportion of symphonic concerts may have increased the relative weight of Debussy, most of whose works were performed either solo or in chamber concerts. Generally speaking, the Austrian concert scene remained highly receptive to established, classic names, and the good standing of Russian art music was likely to have been consistent in all concert rooms across the country. However, the efforts of the French administration bore fruit, and thus Innsbruck, and arguably also Graz, witnessed a growing proportion of music from France, as compared to Vienna or Salzburg, where Tchaikovsky and Debussy were roughly on par. But what were the long-term trends in concert programming in Austria? At the Konzerthaus, a statistical comparison yields sobering results. In 1918-1938, Tchaikovsky alone had enjoyed a share of 5% (5.04% for the whole interwar period, and 5.22% for 1918-28, the period preceding the Great

Depression and Austro-Fascism). Debussy had equally fared much better among musicians, with 4.69% and 4.25% respectively (a small rise during the 1930s may have occurred at the expense of Russians or modern composers, who were less and less desired by conservative Catholics). Even between the *Anschluss* and the liberation of Vienna in 1945, foreign composers were still being performed (Tchaikovsky 50 times, and Debussy 33). In fact, while Nazi policies might have forbidden “enemy” music from being played by Viennese ensembles,¹²⁶⁷ the music of Russia and even of musicians of Russian extraction were still to be found, even if only occasionally, in Viennese concert programmes.




Table 8. Tchaikovsky, Debussy and Ravel in the seasons of 1955-66

The share of all three composers fell dramatically until 1962/63. In general terms, Tchaikovsky had 1.81%, Debussy 1.86% and Ravel 1.56% of total performances. This shows a clear and sizeable downward trend, as their aggregate share was more than halved as compared to the occupation period, now hovering at just over 5%. By contrast, Mozart, an important staple in Vienna, received 3,076 mentions (11.24%), slightly rising from 10.6% during the period 13.04.1945 - 01.09.1955. In my view, this clearly shows that the Allied occupation did have a short-term direct effect on performances of the works of these leading French and Russian composers, and, once foreign control was over, Austrian directors immediately reduced their presence in Viennese programming. Hitting bottom after five years, they all eventually bounced back (Tchaikovsky a year earlier than the others). The contradictory dynamics that can be observed in the time span between 1959 and 1963 may thus indicate an oversaturation of the musical market. This seems to have been a natural

¹²⁶⁷ Trümpi, *Politisierte Orchester*, 243.

development, as, after a long period of decline, a positive correction took place. It is therefore highly plausible that the scaling-down of the occupation had long-term effects. However, a number of market development factors must also be taken into account, including competition from a growing corpus of contemporary music.

The strong position of the Russians, who came second only to Italian classics (cf. Verdi's 215 mentions in the Konzerthaus archive), reflected the standards of educated western art music consumption; it had parallels in the situation in Berlin, where Russians were performed in both the east and west, while American high brow composers led at best a liminal existence.¹²⁶⁸ The few French names follow essentially the same logic, which reinforces the idea of an arch-conservative return to pre-1938 high culture frameworks. In addition, there are some notable qualitative differentiations that ought to be added to this initial overview. In particular, it would be misleading to interpret each performance in purely quantitative terms. For example, an important première or a festival opening was more significant than an ordinary concert. Moreover, a purely quantitative analysis would tend to overlook specificities of genre, which brought about important differences in terms of impact within the public sphere.

We must therefore ask a number of more qualitatively oriented questions, which bear upon genre specification, performance practices, and the relative public and symbolic importance that was attached to different works. Since “there is no such thing as music”, as Christopher Small put it in his plea for a performative and social turn in musicology,¹²⁶⁹ it is not the quantity of musical works alone that provides answers, but rather their embeddedness in the performative and receptive patterns of Austrian society. Thus, the history of Austrian institutions is important to understanding Allied strategies, particularly in their long-term context. For example, the State Opera, while following a conservative line, could account for a larger share of public attention, due to the scale of its productions and its symbolic standing.¹²⁷⁰ Despite none of the major Russian or French composers being considered as opera classics, as was the case with a number of Italians, musical Frenchness and Russianness came to be concentrated on certain works produced by a few authors, such as Tchaikovsky, Bizet, Mussorgsky or Debussy, the latter three being known for a single opera that occupied a conspicuous position in the repertoire. Stravinsky's *The Rake's Progress*, arguably the most important *cause célèbre* of early post-war operatic history in Vienna, took a commanding

¹²⁶⁸ Janik, *Recomposing German Music*: 308-321.

¹²⁶⁹ Small, *Musicking*: 2.

¹²⁷⁰ The main sources, which allow for a cross-check of information on performances, are the *Spielplanarchiv der Wiener Staatsoper* (<https://archiv.wiener-staatsoper.at/>) and the *Spielplan der Wiener Oper 1869-1955* (<http://www.mdw.ac.at/iatgm/operapolitics/spielplan-wiener-oper/web/>), both of which are part of a major project on the Political History of the Opera in Vienna from 1869 till 1955 (*Eine politische Geschichte der Oper in Wien, 1869-1955*), conducted at the *Institut für Musikwissenschaft* of the *Universität für Musik und darstellende Kunst Wien* under the direction of Prof. Christian Glanz.

position in the heated debate around musical modernity, although there were only a few actual performances. Tchaikovsky's *Pique Dame*, on the other hand, continued in its traditional role as a staple of the Viennese repertoire, with a new adaptation introduced in 1946.¹²⁷¹ Tchaikovsky's *Eugene Onegin* was also played regularly, being performed in 1940, and later in 1950-55.¹²⁷² These performances were usually judged as clear and musicologically unproblematic successes, thus escaping the usual debate reserved to contemporaries. Likewise, Bizet's *Carmen* epitomised the classic nineteenth-century French opera, was played throughout the Nazi period (the last performance prior to the liberation was on May 23, 1944¹²⁷³), and was again restored to the repertoire in 1946.¹²⁷⁴

Symphonic performances were another symbolically charged part of Viennese concert life. Here, Russian music had a remarkably strong position, which, for most of the occupation period, was rather tangential, albeit nonetheless relevant, to the main concerns of official Soviet musical diplomacy. For instance, Tchaikovsky's Sixth Symphony was played 17 times at the Konzerthaus. It was mostly performed by the Symphony Orchestra, which was conducted by Josef Krips, Karl Böhm, Igor Markevitch and Otto Klemperer – thus conferring additional prestige on the piece, undoubtedly one of the most well-known and popular symphonies in the European repertoire. However, it is important to note that on five occasions, only part of the symphony was performed, rather than its entirety. At least two of the performances were closely linked to the Soviet Element: the first rendition under Krips on September 9th, 1945, and also the last one, a celebration of the October Revolution by the Austrian Communist party in November 1954. Beyond those areas of discourse subject to direct Allied control, the more general reception of Russian and French music was heavily shaped by national(-ist) frameworks. Conservative and nationalist reductionism, which was criticised in later German-language, musical-historical writing,¹²⁷⁵ was at this time in full swing in Austria. In this sense, contemporary Austrian critical parlance was strikingly uniform. In the Russian case, numerous allusions were made to Slavic thoughtfulness, melos, “languor,” “soul” and “melancholy”, in newspapers of all regional backgrounds and political orientations. Moreover, musical-historical accounts written by journalists consistently stressed the Russianness of Tchaikovsky's music,¹²⁷⁶ only rarely recognising the fact that his position was relatively

¹²⁷¹Pique Dame – Spielplan der Wiener Oper 1869 bis 1955, accessed 20.02.2017. URL: <http://www.mdw.ac.at/iatgm/operapolitics/spielplan-wiener-oper/web/opus/390>.

¹²⁷²Spielplanarchiv der Wiener Staatsoper, accessed 20.02.2017. URL: <https://archiv.wiener-staatsoper.at/search/person/35/work/51/page/2>.

¹²⁷³Spielplanarchiv der Wiener Staatsoper, URL: <https://archiv.wiener-staatsoper.at/performances/20957>.

¹²⁷⁴Ibid, URL: <https://archiv.wiener-staatsoper.at/performances/21237>.

¹²⁷⁵Anselm Gerhard, “Kanon' in der Musikgeschichtsschreibung. Nationalistische Gewohnheiten nach dem Ende der nationalistischen Epoche,” *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft* 57:1 (2000): 18-30.

¹²⁷⁶Peter Klein, “Musik in großen und kleinen Sälen : Orchesterkonzert und Slistenabend,” WK 04.11.1949: 4.

“westernised”, at least as compared to the nationally oriented Group of Five (“The Mighty Handful”). In part, this fed into the Western reception of Russia’s own nationalist discourse, particularly with regard to the symphony music of the nineteenth century.¹²⁷⁷ As is often the case with “national” musics, this involved a simplified and nationally tinged symphonic canon, the contents of which failed to reveal anything specifically national. It was against this yardstick that other Russian composers were often measured, and the inevitable backdrop of musical Romanticism, a cornerstone of the Russian academic school as understood within the Austrian critical tradition, necessarily influenced local assessments of authors such as Mussorgsky and his Soviet contemporaries. The reductionist conservatism of Austrian critical writing focused particularly on Tchaikovsky, and thus succeeded in maintaining a restricted canon of classical Russianness, radically distinct from other images of Russia and the USSR.

Other Russian figures were clearly divided into classics and contemporaries. Since Austrian educational standards diverged from those professed by the Russo-Soviet school, authors such as Glinka, a symbolic father-figure of nineteenth-century Russian music, received only marginal attention in Vienna. On the other hand, Borodin and Mussorgsky were present both at the State Opera, particularly through with their *Prince Igor* and *Boris Godunov*, and also through a small number of relatively well-known works in the chamber and symphonic programme. Contemporary composers, of course, bore more political relevance, as exemplified by the opposing figures of the staunchly anti-Communist Stravinsky, and the Soviet icon Shostakovich, whose styles differed as radically as their politics. Prokofiev, the oldest among the contemporary Soviet composers, escaped the same degree of scrutiny, continuously receiving positive reviews, particularly in Vienna, where his works were regularly performed. He was also more often portrayed in national categories¹²⁷⁸ than was Shostakovich, and was thus more easily integrated into mainstream discourse. Glier, Khatchaturian and Kabalevsky were all occasionally included in programmes, but there was no consistent critical discourse in relation to them. Even the works of Shostakovich were largely seen as an interesting novelty, although they were more coolly received by the Anglo-American press. Austrian critics thus sought to fully integrate Russian music into the pan-European musical canon, while also maintaining a certain distance with regard to “the eastern” and “the Slavic”. The latter was tinged with an exoticism bordering on alienation, as had been the case with European musical perceptions of Russia since at least the nineteenth century.¹²⁷⁹ This ambivalence was reflected in the corpus of critical texts, which nearly unanimously accorded Russian music a leading place among

¹²⁷⁷ Marina Frolova-Walker, “Against Germanic Reasoning: The Search for a Russian Style of Musical Argumentation,” in: *Musical Constructions of Nationalism*, 104-22.

¹²⁷⁸ May Urgert, “Musikfest in Florenz,” WK 27.06.1953: 4.

¹²⁷⁹ Ralph P. Locke, *Musical Exoticism*, 223.

foreign musics, rivalled only by Italians, and the prestige of academic Russian music clearly outshone all the other Allies.

The French side was dominated by Debussy and Ravel, who largely defined the (notional) features of musical Frenchness: that is, “esprit” and colourfulness.¹²⁸⁰ Instead of the vastness of the Russian steppes, critics conjured up an image of sun-lit Gallic plains and shores. Musical Impressionism was also conflated with French nationality. Again, this tendency was exemplified by a limited number of works, through which Austrian performers and musical writers analysed French music as a whole, such as *La mer*, *L'après-midi d'un faune*, *La fille aux cheveux de lin*, and Ravel's *Boléro* and *La Tsigane*. Musical modernity, as represented by Francis Poulenc and Olivier Messiaen, was both actively promoted by France (as noted in the guest tours section above), and well received by the Austrian establishment,¹²⁸¹ which valued its relatively academic character, its pronounced links to Catholicism¹²⁸² (acclaimed in Salzburg and by politically conservative writers), and the fact that its position had already been established during the interbellum period.

Apparently, it was the mere presence of the Allies that encouraged Austrian performers and critics to show signs of reverence to their music, rather than direct pressure. Combined with the exceptional frequency of Allied-sponsored musical tours, the presence of Russian and French music was greater than during previous periods. However, repetitive patterns of selection and reception demonstrate the continuity of Austrian musical discourse. While the cultural press generally heeded the denazification guidelines, Austrians maintained a degree of independence vis-à-vis foreign music, and educated circles continued to feel attached to well-established authors, who had already satisfied both the Austrian – and, in fact, European – standards of *Kultur* and *Bildung*. In art music, the Allies thus had to adapt to the existing Austrian situation. Total control (which had not come about even under the Nazis, who had allowed for a degree of autonomy in music¹²⁸³) was not and could not be enforced, while flexibility and adaptation were clearly more promising strategies. The Cold War and the occupation situation apparently created short-term quantitative dips (or peaks), while the middle- and long-term importance of both factors should be considered with caution. In the high-brow world of Austria, continental Europe was a relevant category, as highlighted by the much smaller share of art music from the UK and the US, and national categorisations remained extremely important.

Thus, in my view, there is both a degree of contingency and a degree of independence in the Russian and French musical presence in Austria, at least with regards to institutional cultural diplomacy. Importantly, the national canons upheld by mainstream public discourse revealed a large

¹²⁸⁰“Ansermet-Celibadache-Karajan: Wiener Konzerte dreier Meisterdirigenten,” SN 22.11.1949: 4.

¹²⁸¹ “Von Rameau bis heute: Philharmonisches Konzert unter Roger Desormière,” WK 18.02.1946: 4.

¹²⁸² “Olivier Messiaen und das Religiöse in seiner Musik,” *Wort und Tat* 10 (Jg. 2) 1948: 113-120.

¹²⁸³ See Kater, *The Twisted Muse*, 178.

degree of autonomy from, and sometimes resilience against, foreign powers. This has the potential to offer a fascinating research perspective on musical nationality, individual periods and individual authors, and the ways in which they were accepted into, and critically assessed within, Austrian cultural discourse, with its changing circumstances, and its continuous development of musical history and history-writing. History is indeed a watchword, to use Gary Tomlinson's phrase,¹²⁸⁴ for exploring such musical reception. For the period in question, however, the salient point is that the overwhelming majority of Austrian critics remained wholly committed to a conservative and Austro-centric nationalist narrative, which had been inherited from the late imperial period and the republic. Despite the personal continuity with the Austro-Fascist and Nazi periods, however, an obvious difference was represented by the inacceptability of any notion of German superiority, which automatically served to bring the French and the Russian traditions onto a symbolic par with the musical production of the German-Austrian region itself. This was further encouraged by the cultural dissociation of Austria from Germany that was taking place (although this ultimately remained incomplete). Austrian musical culture thus firmly inscribed itself into a democratic and European setting. Remaining concentrated on music produced within Austria and German-speaking Europe, as demonstrated by regular concert repertoires and festivals, this allowed for fluid integration of foreign musics into the same context of prestige and appreciation. The sense of distance maintained vis-à-vis the music of “the Other”, manifestly present in both the French and the Russian cases, articulated itself in ways radically different from the *völkisch* discourse of the years before 1945. While Mozart remained on the throne, he was celebrated as a *genius loci*, not a sonic embodiment of German superiority. This stands in stark contrast to the Nazi period, and constitutes one of the few touchpoints between denazification, democratisation and musical diplomacy.¹²⁸⁵ Together, these served as an example of a kind of musical re-education which was perceived as beneficial by Austrians themselves. During the post-war years, the international opening of Austrian cultural scenes was strengthened by considerations of prestige. The value of Austrian music could be better asserted when juxtaposed against the music of other nations, and the attractiveness of Austria as a prestigious venue for musicians required a greater exposure to foreign music, foreign performers, and, ultimately, foreign tourists. The first international experiences of the post-war era were brought about by quadripartite musical diplomacy, and thus fitted into the prestige policies of Austrian cultural institutions themselves. The Salzburg Festival, which sought to attract French (but also Italian, Swiss, American, British, etc.) musicians, thus staked a claim to global preeminence.

¹²⁸⁴ Gary Tomlinson, *Musical and Historical Critique* (=Ashgate Contemporary Thinkers on Critical Musicology Series) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), XI.

¹²⁸⁵ See Janik's conclusion that the Allies successfully demolished the previously prominent German chauvinism through their cultural programmes (*Recomposing German Music*: 272).

Likewise, the Vienna and Bregenz Festivals also strove to attract first-class foreign musicians, and there was thus a genuine contingency of interests with equally prestige-minded foreign cultural diplomats. Far from a zero-sum game, as the cold war context might tend to suggest, the negotiation and reshaping of public space was defined by such long-term collaborative strategies.

This convergence of interests is another example of the way in which cultural dynamics brought different actors together, despite their initial unawareness of such commonalities. The essential continuity of cultural codes across the space of European high-culture music undoubtedly facilitated the integration of the French and Russian classics, since, unlike their related languages or political cultures, these did not require translation for academically-trained Austrian ears. As we have seen, the elitist stance of French cultural diplomats, and the official doctrine of socialist realism in the USSR, played a defining role in the acceptance of these countries' musical exports in Austria. Such convergences proved a powerful, although ultimately not innocent, instrument of cultural transfer, which, while never acknowledged by contemporaries (such recognition would have been impossible for political reasons), have significant explanatory power for analysis of cultural communication.

Musical diplomacy stood at the crossroads of Allied intentions, finances and organisational leverage, the interpretative power of Austrian critics, and the long-term preferences of the Austrian public, based on received canons and acoustic usage (Austrian ears were undoubtedly trained in a highly classical manner). Thus, the causality of musical diplomacy cannot be reduced to extra-cultural factors, without taking into account the socio-political context of the creation and reproduction of musical works. The aesthetic criteria and interpretative possibilities of music, an object with infinite contextual affordances (to borrow James G. Gibson's term), made an explicit or implicit dialogue with the public a *conditio sine qua non* of a successful musical diplomacy. The processes of musical transfer were characterised by shifting (or subverted) power hierarchies, seemingly omnipotent, yet often contradictory, national imageries, and stark discrepancies between hard power, political persuasion and musical communication. While both cultural diplomacies seemingly failed in their main objectives – to sell Soviet Communism, and to promote the French language amongst Austrian audiences – their effects, many of them collateral, nonetheless left a lasting imprint on subsequent cultural development, thus contributing new dimensions to the images of their mother countries. While the governments paid the bills, the societies ultimately gained the benefits.

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