Department of History and Civilization

Images of Europe

LUISA PASSERINI
and
MARINA NORDERA (eds)

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Luisa Passerini

Introduction

"Images of Europe", the title of the workshop from which this Working Paper originated, refers to the multiplicity of representations that "Europe" has historically offered. Today we seem to suffer from a dearth of images of Europe, especially in the symbolic field. However, this is less true than currently believed, because many symbols are implicit and many myths are just dormant, so that our researches can re-discover them and re-propose them to public attention. The essays which compose the present collection are contributions to the large effort which is needed in order to dig out and critically bring up to date the vast patrimony of images of the European heritage.

Among the contributors to this collection, both Anthony Pagden and Richard Waswo show how rich antiquity is of suggestions for our conceptualisation of the continent. Pagden starts from the dichotomies between European and non-European worlds, and finds in the development of technology and in real and imaginary travels, which accompanied the European expansion important means by which this separation was challenged. Pagden himself takes us on a vertiginous travel from antiquity to the present, showing that the distinction between Europeans and the others is by no means as clear-cut as it has been traditionally described. Waswo traces the transformation of the image of Europe from ancient Crete to the Euro as shifting from a "dark continent" – as the etymological evidence which shaped the conceptualisation of the continent proposed by Herodotus seems to suggest – to the "state of mind" required by the imminent unification of European currency. In Waswo's understanding of this process, the Euro can produce unity, because money is itself a form of social assent, even if it will not diminish all other forms of cultural difference.

Jan Nederveen Pieterse further elaborates the question of the dichotomies between the Europeans and the others. He maintains that through the centuries, particularly the two last ones, Europe's others were located primarily within Europe and otherness outside Europe was not necessarily as important as otherness within Europe. One impressive continuity in this history is the image of Islam, which has been Europe's main other for so long. In Nederveen Pieterse's words, no threat has compared to the threat of Islam and at the same time no civilisation has been as near to the European one. In his analysis of otherness he suggests that important changes have taken place

in the history of this concept, with the changes in the conceptualisation of identity, no longer conceived as fixed, and the growing concern with hybridity.

Ioanna Laliotou analyses the crystallisation of Balkanist discourses during the first decades of the twentieth century – which rendered the Balkans into an anti-symbol of Europe – and argues that the construction of the Balkans tends to harden in periods when domestic social debates are accentuated. Through case-studies which include reports of women travellers in the Balkans in the 1920s and 1930s, Laliotou shows how the Balkans functioned as a very significant "elsewhere" and played an important role in the elaboration of political visions aiming at social and cultural change and reform. She also proposes an interesting contrast between Europeanism and Americanism in the conceptualisation of the Balkans.

While these four contributions deal mainly with mental representations, the last one, by Sabine Poeschel, presents a series of visual images of Europe. In the course of the workshop, this paper was coupled with my own, which is not included here, but which I will briefly summarise for the sake of completeness. Traditionally, visual images of Europe follow two lines: one is the history of the allegory of the continent, figured as a majestic woman among her sisters representing the other continents; the other follows the tradition of the myth of Europa and the bull, the Phoenician princes who gave her name to the continent. The former field is presented here by Poeschel, whose essay offers a rich selection of prints, paintings, frescoes and sculptures from the middle ages to the eighteenth century, situating them in the iconographical tradition of the allegories of the continents; she analyses in particular the cycle of frescoes by Tiepolo in Würtzburg. Poeschel remarks that the theme of the allegories of the continents evaporated abruptly just after its greatest diffusion towards the end of the eighteenth century, indeed after the triumphant frescoes in which Europe's world-wide authority had been personified. With the American Declaration of Independence and the development of the Enlightenment, the theme lost its sense in European history and art, since Europe was no longer supreme and could no longer evoke its identity through this kind of images.

By contrast, the other visual tradition – the representation of Europa and the bull – has been very alive in the two last centuries. The paper I gave at the workshop focused on the period between the wars, when the distance between Europa and Europe was greatly reduced by the dramatic political events taking place in the continent. The sense of imminent tragedy induced various artists, among whom Max Beckmann and Jacques Lipchitz, to represent the confrontation between Europe and nazism in the form of the violent encounter between Europa and the bull, this last being interpreted as the bearer of the obscure forces of evil. The fact that at the time the myth was understood as an

allusion to the transition from matrilineal societies to patriarchy made it possible to interpret it not only in political terms, but also refers to the great socio-cultural transformations that Europe was undergoing in terms of women's emancipation as well as of great changes in the customs related to marriage and sexuality. Later on, the two images of Europa and Europe separated again. However, even in very recent decades, the image of the myth has been revived more than once in order to represent the situation of the continent. If it can be argued that the revival of the myth is linked with situations of turmoil and anxiety over European identity, then the images connected with it can still have meaning for us today.

A first consideration is that the link between visual and mental images became very apparent during the workshop and from this Working Paper. The two influence each other, suggesting motives and accumulating meanings. At the same time, symbols and experiences intertwine, alternate, and are osmotically connected.

A second important consideration seems to stem out of these various approaches and points of view. All the contributors, in spite of trying to find continuities in the history of the representations of Europe and of the "others", assume a fundamental discontinuity of history, which allows for radical changes and innovation. Therefore there is no European heritage from the past which can be taken for granted and considered as directly linked with the present. The recognition – whether explicit or implicit – of the discontinuity of history is a very important intellectual attitude, which excludes one of the pillars of Eurocentrism, i.e. the presumption of a continuing superiority and an uninterrupted inspiration in European history. Such claims are clearly unfounded, and the continuities must be placed against a background of deep changes and wide gaps. Some of the most interesting discussions that we had during the workshop – such as the one on whether or not it is desirable to talk about genocide in South America using the first person "we" – also showed the cultural changes which intervened in the attitudes of various generations of scholars towards the past and particularly towards European expansion. In fact, younger scholars felt that the detachment from that past makes it very problematic for them today to use the "we" that senior scholars use as a sign of accepting the responsibility of their heritage. This type of discussion is part of a larger enterprise, which consists of understanding Europeanness while rejecting Eurocentrism.

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Anthony Pagden

Techne, Travel and Empire: the Non-European World in the construction of an Image of Europe

I could have called this talk something like 'Forgetting Hegel' for ever since Hegel wrote the passage on the slave/master relationship (shortly after the battle of Jena) in Chapter VI of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* we have become accustomed to think of relationships, and subsequently, of identities into term of oppositions 'slave and master' 'us'/them, us self/ 'the other' Let me remind you what Hegel claims, in Kojève's summary:

> Man was born and History began with the first Fight that ended in the appearance of a Master and a Slave. That is to say that Man – at his origins is always either Master or Slave: and that true Man can exist only where there is a Master *and* a Slave. (If they are to be *human*, they must be at least two in number)... History stops at the moment when the difference, the opposition, between Master and Slave disappears.

Everything about our being, or selves, on this account depends on this relationship of conflict: the Master cannot exist without the Slave nor the Slave (as a Slave at least) without the master. Once the conflict is resolved history will be at an end.

Of course Hegel did not invent this opposition. The fact that it has been repeated in one form or another down the years through later Nietzsche or later still Kojève, or a host of other commentators ending perhaps in Foucault, have made it so persuasive that it clearly resonates with some rather deeply held – if not always very clearly thought through – element of European rationality. Dichotomies of this kind have, furthermore, always been with us. The Greeks – perhaps – invented them (for Europe at least) and in the distinction between the Greek and the barbarian, we have a polarity which is isometrically analogous to Hegel's slave master relationship. One which in our self-lacerating, post-colonial times, has been taken to be the defining feature of the European relationships with the non-European from Hellenistic Athens to – lets us say – at least the late 1960s.

But is this the whole story, or even the most powerful one? True we have the complaint of Plato's Eleatic Stranger that

In this country they separate the Hellenic races from the rest as one, and to all the other races, which are countless in number and have no relation in blood or language to one another, they give the single name 'barbarian'; then because of this single name they think it a single species (*Statesman*, 262d).

And the belief that the Greeks looked upon all 'others' as barbarians, (i.e. persons incapable of true speech and thus of true *logos*) has, over the centuries, been evoked by even their most fervent admirers. As with most aspects of the cultural imagination, the distinction was never quite so simply, nor so stark as even Kant (who believed that it was responsible for the final collapse of Athenian democracy) imagined it to be. For one thing there is an empirical point. When the Greeks spoke of barbarians, they more often than not thought of Persians. Soft and soggy, effeminate and over-refined as the Spartans would have it perhaps; but hardly bereft of speech or true reason. And Aristotle who, in a highly influential passage in the *Politics*, goes so far as to suggest that the *barbaroi* might be slaves by nature had a great admiration for the Persian monarchy. Then Plato's comments are not at all what they might seem. The Stranger is denouncing a certain kind of chauvinism – racism – what you will. But he is doing so in order to illustrate precisely what Plato takes to be a false dichotomy. Peoples cannot be so divided, any more, he goes on to say, than numbers can be divided into 2000 and all the others. Human beings, in Plato's view, should be divided into their only true dichotomy, that is male and female.

Then, briefly, thanks to the work of Francois Hartogh and others, it is becoming clearer that although there was amongst the Greeks – as indeed amongst all peoples – a certain suspicion of outsiders (and Plato was clearly alluding in his critique to a recognised false dichotomy), the characterisation of the 'barbarian' was never so rigid nor so wholly 'other' as it has been supposed.

I want, therefore, to offer a rather different story. It is one based on a different account of the place of travelling, of the technology which makes that possible, and of the domination which the uses of that technology necessary involves.

The Greeks had always been peoples on the move, *poluplanês* – 'extreme travellers'. The Odyssey is, after all, a poem about travel, about movement, about a man who lost his way. And there were other, better-documented, travellers. Pythagoras, for instance, who travelled from his native Samos to Egypt and Crete before settling in Croton, or, the first of the Greek geographers, Hecateus of Miletus who visited Egypt before Herodotus. And it is Solon who is said to have been the first to have made the connection –

which was to have a long history in European thought – between travel (*planê*) and wisdom (*sophia*).

This knowledge of a wider world diminished the importance of race of *genos* as a means of distinguishing between the us and the them. So that Zeno of Citium the founder of the Stoic School, could declare that:

> We should all live not in cities and *demes*, each distinguished by separate rules of justice, but should regard all men as fellow *demesmen* and fellow citizens; and that there should be one life and order as of a single flock feeding together on a common pasture.

It was beliefs like this, which led Isocrates in the 5th century to claim that being a Helene was no longer a matter of blood or racial origin, but one of culture and education.

Such cosmopolitanism was – and largely remains – an aristocratic luxury, the privilege of what the Stoics called 'the wise'. But it is also a foundational element in European identity.

So, let us say that the desire to know 'others' to incorporate them – if only as members of the same inhabited universe, the same *oikos*, as ourselves – and to subsume our differences in something greater than our own little worlds, to erase what Freud called 'the narcissism of small differences' which has sustained the other/self us/them distinction (and lies at the root of most forms of nationalism) is as much a part of Greek, and subsequently European culture, as the desire to 'other' to distance and alienate those we do not know or immediately understand.

This is not, of course, to suggest that the Greek – or indeed nay other world – was a wholly, or even largely relativistic one. Recognising the presence of 'others' and their diversity does not mean recognising anything like an equality amongst them. For even if the Greek/barbarian cannot be made to hold as a distinction in the ancient world in the way it has been described, it remains the case that the Greeks did assume a dichotomy between the wise and the non-wise, between – to use an anachronism – the civilised and the non-civilised. Not all non-Greeks made 'barbarians' into non-beings. But true 'barbarians' might nevertheless exist.

What characterised such peoples might be many things. Perhaps the best known of the non-Greek, non-men were the Cyclopes who eat a number of Odysseus's crew before he escaped. They are cannibals, the supreme form of non-humanity. But they are also described as those who had no agriculture, lived in caves and – crucially for me – knew nothing of navigation.

For navigation, and the possibly for movement which it afforded became one of the defining features of man's unique capacity to transform the world

to suit his needs. (The other – which the Cyclopes also do not have – is, for similar reasons, agriculture.)

Techne – or as we would say technology – and what in Latin – the other dominant language in our cognitive vocabulary – was called, *ars* – is the human capacity to transform the world according to human needs, the power to set in motion, a power which none besides humankind and the gods themselves possessed. "Art itself", as the eighteenth-century Scottish social theorist Adam Ferguson was later to observe, "is natural to man... he is destined from the first age of his being to invent and to contrive". Artificial worlds are as 'natural' to him as the mountains are for the bear. And, in rejecting Rousseau's image of a pre-social, pre-technological state of nature – art had to be included in the description of 'man', as the claw was in the description of the tiger or the talon of the eagle.

Clearly those who are able to transform nature in this way are superior to those who are not, and as Horace said the power to harness the winds and 'furrow the Ocean' while it might be the sources of much of man's misfortunes, was also the reason for his greatness. In that curious collection of third-century texts known as the *Corpus Hermeticum*, supposedly the writings of the magus Hermes Trismegistus, whose wisdom was believed to pre-date even that of Moses, Hermes is shown at work imprisoning the *demiurges* in human bodies as a punishment for their attempt to rival the creativity of the Gods. Even as he does so, the figure of Sarcasm (*Momos*) appears to congratulate him.

> It is courageous thing you have done to have created man – he mocks – this being with curious eyes and a bragging tongue... For he will push his designing thoughts even to the limits of the earth. [These men] will extend their audacious busy hands even to the edge of the sea. They will cut down the forests, and will drive them [i.e. as ships] over the seas from bank to bank, all the way to those lands that are furthest away.

The classical conception of the origins of human technology, and of the link between technology and travel, was further complicated by the Christian concept of the Fall, for this entailed not merely a loss of God's Grace, but also a loss of cognitive understanding. In the Garden of Eden Adam had been empowered to name all the works of creation because their properties had been fixed, and because he – Adam – knew what they were. In the altered world beyond Paradise, that knowledge had to be re-acquired within an environment in which ultimate causes – as Newton insisted time and again – had been hidden and would, in all probability remain forever so. The Basle reformer, Simon Grynaeus, in the preface to one of the earliest attempts to adjust the older spatial understanding of the world to accommodate the

existence of America, the *Novus orbis regionum ac insularum veteribus incognitarum* of 1532 praised the new travellers for having recovered by their action the *dominium* over the natural world once enjoyed by Adam. Travelling into un-charted space had become, in the modern age in which Grynaeus was conscious of living, a manner of overcoming the cognitive damage inflicted by the Fall. The traveller, together with the geographer, the mathematician and the astronomer were Gods' self-fashioning instruments for the subjugation of nature to man's needs. For Grynaeus these are men (and they always are *men* – Eve's role is prompting Adam to make a bid for the knowledge reserved for God, the knowledge as the scholastics would say of first causes, precluded her from any role in *scientia* – the human quest for the attainable understanding of secondary causes) whose mission is comparable, both in its nobility, and the distrust it aroused in the ignorant, to those – the Saints – who had similarly abandoned the settled known-world in order to seek the word of God. The new navigators, the desert fathers, even Christ and his Disciples, themselves, now share something of the same identity. Nearly a century later, the tirelessly punning English geographer, Samuel Purchas, also appropriated the legend of the expulsion from Eden as the source for the transformation of man's condition from the stationary to the migratory. For mankind, "preferring the Creature to the Creator, and therefore is justly turned out of Paradise to wander, a Pilgrime over the world", this act of divine retribution transformed for Purchas all human history – including the story of Christ's passion – "the greatest of all peregrinations", from God to man and back again – into a narrative of human movement. In this narrative, too, the itinerant Evangelists whose task it was to spread the word throughout the world who, like Christ himself had no settled place, whose geography was eschatological rather than, real became the source of all foundation, human and divine. For, it was, of course, they who, finally 'planted the Church and settled on her foundations'.

Movement for humans is natural, foundational, creative. It distinguishes us as much from other animals (who merely wander) as it does from the immobile or omniscient gods. To ensure that mankind fulfilled its place in the natural order, the Gods – or later God – had claimed Seneca, distributed their goods unequally over the surface of the globe so as to drive men to communicate with one another. As the fourth century Greek rhetorician, Libanius expressed it, "men might cultivate a social relationship because one would have need of the help of another". Furthermore the Gods had been thoughtful enough to provide winds which blew in contrary direction so as to make sailing possible. Communication, the need for all the peoples of the world to know all the others became a dominant theme in most humanist discourses on the nature of humanity. In Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*, one of the most popular of the Latin texts which sought to capture some of this

anxiety about the limits of human space – the Roman general Scipio Aemilianus is taken on a tour of the heavens by his adoptive grandfather Scipio Africanus, from which he is able also to gaze down upon the earth.

You see, says Africanus,

> that the earth is inhabited in only a few portions, and those very small, while vast desserts lie between them... You see that the inhabitants are so widely separated that there can be no communication whatever among the different areas; and that some of the inhabitants live in parts of the earth that are oblique, transverse and sometimes directly opposite your own, from such you can expect nothing surely that is glory.

No communication was possible with the peoples who inhabited these other regions, which lay beyond the limits of the 'orbis terrarum' except in dream travel. For Cicero the lesson to be learned from Scipio's dream had been the relatively futility of earthly fame. When, however, Macrobius in the fifth century wrote his Neo-platonic commentary on Scipio's dream voyage, his concern, which would be repeated again and again as the European understanding of the world expanded, was that the human groups which inhabited the world lacked the ability for reciprocal communication, something which Macrobius at least seems to regarded as a violation of the human condition.

This sense that there existed peoples 'out there' of whom Europeans knew nothing, but who yet belonged to the same word, the same *oikos* as that inhabited by Europeans remained a source of anxiety, a perpetual threat to the perceived identity of the species. The Frenchman who asked Montesquieu's fictional Persian traveller Rica, "How *can* one be a Persian" is assuming that there is something monstrous in simply being so unlike him. So, too, was François Vivez, the surgeon aboard one of Antoine de Bougainville's ships, the *Etoile,* on his circumnavigation of the world between 1766 and 1769, when he remarked of the Tahitians that is was wonderful "that so charming a people can live so far from Europe".

Not far beneath the surface of such opinions, however, was a serious theoretical point. To be human – to be 'charming' as Vivez might say – one has to communicate with one fellow being. One of the shocks of the discovery of both American and the Pacific islands, was the recognition that there could exist groups which were wholly isolated from one another (that is, been isolated from Europe). The whole Judaeo-Christian account of the creation and the peopling of the world had argued against such a possibility.

Oceanic navigation – still an impossible conception for the Ancients – had now replaced dream travel. In the narratives of the triumph of the origins of modernity, the triumph of human *techne* over the natural world had been

given many beginnings. But most writers would point to three moments in which a new technology, a new *ars*, could be said to have resulted in the transformation of the understanding of the world: they were the discovery of America and the new sea-route to India, the invention of gunpowder and of the printing press. Each of these (except initially gunpowder – but I shall come back to that) had two properties. They made Europeans more mobile, and they made them better able to communicate with one another, and increasingly with those whom they encountered in the worlds beyond their own.

Since these achievements had been limited to, and broadly shared by, those whom Samuel Purchas described as 'we in the West', they became a collective means of self-presentation, not, merely Portuguese or Spanish or later English and French, but in some broader sense, European. In 1559, the French savant, Louis Le Roy makes "the voice of our common mother Europe" declare "I who in the past hundred years have made so many discoveries, even things unknown to the ancients – new seas, new lands, new species of men: with Spanish help I have found and conquered what amounts to a New World". In Johannes Stradanus' engraving of 1589 it is European science, here embodied by Amerigo Vespucci, which is shown literally drawing aside the curtains upon a new world of which neither Africa nor Asia, nor even Europe's own, now sometimes dubious, ancient ancestors had had any knowledge. In Stradanus' fanciful representation of the first moment of encounter between Old World and New, Vespucci, is shown with an astrolabe, the emblem of his empowering knowledge, in his hand. She, in recumbent allusion to Vespucci's own image of the continent as an ever-available female, is raising herself naked from the long sleep of her ignorance.

From the early sixteenth to the late eighteenth century images of the four continents appeared in the most unlikely places as a reminder both of the newly-acquired vision of a vastly enlarged world, and of Europe's triumph over so much of it, a triumph which only the sciences and the arts had made possible. Take one striking, but representative example. On the ceiling of the stairway hall of the Trappenhaus, the residence of the Prince Bishops of Würzburg, a princely family in no way associated with trans-oceanic navigation, the great eighteenth-century Venetian artist Giambattista Tiepolo, depicted in lavish detail each of the four continents. These are so arranged that no matter where the viewer stands, *Asia Africa* and *America* can only be seen in relation to *Europe*. Here, too, *Asia* is marked by the exotic (the elephant) and the languorous, *Africa* (the crocodile) and *America* by the barbarous. *Europe* – the only one of the allegorical female figures to be seated on a throne instead of an animal – is given the attributes of the arts, of music and painting, of science and of the technology of warfare. Europe is, furthermore, the point from which all the other figures have to be viewed. It is

as if – as Svetlana Alpers and Michael Baxandall put it in their study of Tiepolo's narrative orderings – to look at *Europe* "one should look *from Europe*" for, "*Asia*, *Africa* and *America* are depicted in their relation to *Europe*. *Europe* is the rubric, the initial code". This is why in Cesare Ripa's *Iconologia* of 1603, a work which provided artists with a easy set of iconographic rules, instructs its readers to depict Europe wearing a crown, "to show that Europe has always been the leader and queen of the whole world", which is how she appears in Sebastian Munster's *Cosmographia* of 1588, a Queen.

Most prominent beneath Europe's throne however is a canon. And the presence of gunpowder in the list of significant modern achievements ties, as does Grynaeus' association of navigation with the recovery of *dominium*, travel and the knowledge it provided – indeed all human technology – to possession. (The various uses to which the world dominion itself was put, especially within the Roman juridical tradition makes this clear. For one may have equally *dominium* over a thing, as *dominium* over one's own being, as *dominium* in some field of knowledge.)

The narratives of the progress of the European peoples could thus link the instruments of *communicatio* – the compass and the book – with that of political and territorial dominion – with gunpowder and steel.

The association of art and sciences with movement and communication with possession is, like so many of our assumptions, an Ancient one. The best exemplar of this association of movement and travel with the quest for knowledge and the acquisition of power is the mythological figure of Alexander the Great. Already by the time Arrian in the first century wrote his history of Alexander's life he had also become a figure possessed of an insatiable desire for knowledge, and incorrigible urge to travel. Alexander had been Aristotle's pupil, and that it was for him that Aristotle had written not only what is, in effect, the first treatise on politics, but also one of the earliest studies of astronomy, the so-called *De Caelo*. In the Middle Ages Alexander became a voracious legendary figure whose desire to enslave the entire world is matched only by his ambition to know all its secrets and visit all its parts, for which purposes he went in search of the hidden sources of the Nile, invented a diving bell to reach the floor of the ocean, and was carried upwards to Heaven in a great basket drawn by griffins. In Walter of Châtillon's poem *Alexandreis* he is described as "the prince who had called the earth too narrow and prepared armed throngs to lay open here secret parts" – lines which run together in one erotic image, both the conqueror's desire to possess and the scientist's desire to know. This Alexander, like the figure of Ulysses, whom Dante meets in Hell (a figure who is given many of Alexander's attributes) tries to sail beyond the Pillars of Hercules and dreams of conquering the western sun.

To know a space, therefore, was to acquire *dominium* over it, first in the form of a map, or a description – for *exphrasis*, too, has always conferred ownership – a list of attributes, something which in Bruno Latour's brilliant metaphor can be 'made mobile', and carried back to Europe. Later, reversing the direction of travel would follow the colonies, commerce and conversion. Giovanni Battista Ramusio, in his *Discorso sopra il commercio delle spezie* of 1547, referring to the vast, but yet unknown resources of the 'Southern Continent' (still in the mid sixteenth century a geographical fiction) claimed that the most admirable act which a great prince could perform would be "to get the men of our hemisphere to come to know those of the opposite hemisphere". This he explained could easily to be carried out in the traditional manner first by voyages of exploration, then by "dispatching into diverse places of that hemisphere colonies and settlers. In the manner which the Romans did".

But this again is not the whole story. I began by evoking Hegel. I wish to conclude by evoking Kant. I have tried to link three familiar but also problematical European discourses: travel (or communication), technology, or the ability to exploit or modify nature, and political dominion.

There is a moment in the sixteenth century when these converged in a critical way. In 1539, the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria delivered a now celebrated lecture at the University of Salamanca with the title "On the American Indians." He began with a question: "By what right (*ius*) were the barbarians subjected to Spanish rule?" This question carried with it a very large number of implications. It had of course been asked before, and answered in a number of conscious-saving ways. Vitoria's approach, however, was different from his predecessors in one crucial respect. All mankind, he argued, possess as of nature what he called, "the right of natural partnership and communication" (*naturalis societas et communicationis*). This described a complex set of claims divided into five propositions. In principle, however, it is an allusion to the ancient right of hospitality, which Vitoria transformed from a Greek custom into a right under natural law. "Amongst all nations," he wrote, "it is considered inhuman to treat travellers badly without some special cause, humane and dutiful to behave hospitably to strangers."

In the beginning of the world – he continued – when all things were held in common, everyone was allowed to visit and travel through any land he wished. This right was clearly not taken away by the division of property (*divisio rerum*); it was never the intention of nations to prevent men's free mutual intercourse with one another by its division.

The right to hospitality, and in particular to assistance in moments of danger is, of course, based upon a supposition of a common human identity. You have no need to be hospitable to real barbarians and they – if the

behaviour of the Cyclops is anything to go by – are unlikely to behave hospitably to you.

"Nature," continued Vitoria, now quoting Roman law, "has decreed a certain kinship between men... Man is not a 'wolf to his fellow men' – *homo homini lupus* – as Ovid says, but a fellow." This in turn brings with it an obligation to friendship, for "amity between men is part of the natural law." On this basis, all men are compelled to live in a state of amicability with one another. Vitoria's point is that a right to travel peacefully and to be granted hospitality is precisely a right in the creation of civil society. It was, he insists, "never the intention of nations to prevent men's free mutual intercourse with one another." On these grounds, neither have the Spaniards any right to 'conqueror' America nor do the Indians possess the right to deny them free and peaceful access to their lands. The same law which obliges the Indians to allow the Spaniards peaceful access to their lands, also obliges the French not to "prevent the Spaniards from travelling to or even living in France and vice versa." It was this law which ultimately made understanding between peoples possible, for although there might exist many different kinds of peoples with many different degrees of civilisation (Vitoria, however denied the possibility of the existence of true 'barbarians'), "the whole world ... is in a sense a commonwealth."

Vitoria's 'right of natural partnership and communication' was to have a long history. It passes through Grotius and Serafim de Freitas (and John Selden and Paolo Sarpi's) disputes over whether or not the ocean could be subject to property rights, through Christian Wolff's notion of a world state, what he called the *civitas maxima* whose purpose was "the promotion of the common good by its combined powers", through what the Swiss diplomat Emeric de Vattel in 1758 called the "ties of the universal society which nature has established among men," and which were based "solely on the quality of mankind" *qua species* – until it finally comes to rest in Kant's *Perpetual Peace, a Philosophical Sketch* (1795).

Here Kant sketches out the basic conditions of what he calls (and discusses at length in a number of writings) the cosmopolitan right, the *ius cosmopoliticum*. This right is restricted to what he calls the "conditions of universal hospitality." Kant is quite specific about what he understands by "hospitality." It is, as it had been for Vitoria, the ancient right of all persons to be allowed free access to any part of the world. All citizens thus have the right "to try to establish community with all and, to this end, to *visit* all regions of the world". *Visit*, however not entail settling among, much less conquering, them. This right makes

it possible for [strangers] to enter into relations with the native inhabitants. In this way, continents distant from each other can enter into peaceful mutual relations which may eventually be regulated by public laws, thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan existence.

This, however, is contrasted sharply with

the *inhospitable* conduct of the civilised states of our continent, especially the commercial states, [in] the injustice which they display in *visiting* foreign countries and peoples (which in their case is the same as *conquering* them).

Once, on the other hand, free access to all for the purpose of communication (and trade which in the Kantian calculus plays much the same social and political role) has been established across the globe, then a state will have been reached in which "The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere". Only within a "confederation of peoples" will it be possible for mankind to be a once both a citizen of a nation and a full member of the society of the citizens of the world". "This," he added, "is the most sublime idea which a man may conceive of his destiny".

Kant was reformulating the older international order of competing European states and their overseas empires as a single cosmopolitan federation. But, as he says again and again, the image of a higher political order to which, in time, all societies come to acquire "an archetype, in order to bring the legal constitution of mankind nearer to its greatest possible perfection" was, not a "constitutive" principle, but rather regulative one, which demands only that "we yield generously to the cosmopolitan society as the destiny of the human race". It is, also of course, still a condition of future time, and "unreachable idea", but this fact could not negate its validity, "for no-one can or ought to decide what the highest degree may be at which mankind may have to stop progressing, and hence how wide a gap may still of necessity remain between the idea and its execution". And "Even one single example can be sufficient sign in the course of events that it [a republic constitution] must happen one day. One cannot foresee that it will be accomplished, but only that [men] will try it so often that it must eventually be realised".

It was, of course, never realised. The wise were never wise enough and the signs, as it turned out, pointed in other, more sinister directions. By the mid-nineteenth century, any such alliance of states had become unimaginable, and with the advent of a new nationalism in Europe, cosmopolitanism itself all but

vanished, even as an inspiration. The great nineteenth-century empires, although they employed Roman rhetoric and Roman architectural styles, were the creations not of peoples but of nation-states and as far from Roman ecumenism as they were from Stoic universalism. But for all that there remained the possibility of a language – which is now being used in different ways in the new increasingly multicultural states of which Europe is composed – which attempts to dissolve the slave/master, self/other distinctions on which so much of the debate over the identity of Europe has been based in favour of one which sees Europe as but one part, however distinct and however triumphant in ways which have been noxious for many of the other inhabitants of the globe, of some large human grouping. As Montesquieu – always a reliable guide in these matters – confided to his notebook

> If I know of anything advantageous to my family, but not to my country, I should try to forget it. If I know of anything advantageous to my country but which was prejudicial to Europe and to the human race I should look upon it as a crime.

Richard Waswo

Europe: From Dark Continent to the State of Mind

I. The ancient world

The first image we have of Europe from the ancient Greeks who named it is rather ironic, in the light of what it later became. As the image will be altered and displaced, so the geographical orientation of Europe's place on the planet has never ceased to be somewhat confused. This for the good reason that all categories, divisions, and meanings are relational: they demarcate something from something else; they depend upon contrast and difference (the terms of which are constantly being changed in the course of history). But the people who wish and need the demarcations are likely to be those positioned on some border or other, feeling themselves situated somehow between or among competing interests or attitudes. Such a borderline position could, of course, also be a central one – as it certainly was for the Greeks.

The (now fragmentary) two books of the earliest surviving geographer, Hecataeus (an older contemporary of Herodotus), were called simply 'Europe' and 'Asia.' The central point of the island of the known world (surrounded by the ocean, which flowed into the Mediterranean from the west and into the Caspian from the east) was Delphi, home of Apollo's oracle. Europe was the whole landmass to the north, from Celts in the west to Scythians in the east, and Asia the landmass to the south, from Libyans in the west to Indians in the east. These landmasses divide at the Dardanelles and the Caucasus, both pictured as north/south separations. It is interesting to observe that this earliest division of North from South has, of course, regained currency today – but the terms are now those of economic and political disparity, not those of circular and geographic symmetry. Hecataeus' world picture was simply further divided by Herodotus (4.42): Europe remained the denomination for everything north; but the south was divided at the Nile, to produce Libya in the west and Asia in the east. Herodotus confesses to some puzzlement about how the 'single earth' in these portions received the names of three women. Libya, according to the Greeks, was the name of someone from that part, as was Asia, wife of Prometheus. But the only candidate for Europa – the Tyrian who was abducted to Crete – is unsatisfactory by these criteria: she herself was Asian and never set foot in Europe. Herodotus shrugs, and claims merely to follow 'customary usage' (4.45), in which we

observe that the center is itself a borderline: Crete isn't yet Europe, which seems to commence, according to one commentator (Sayce 1883, on 1.2), on the Theban plains, to extend limitlessly north, east, and west, 'incomparably wider' than the other two, as Herodotus put it (4.42).

The huge extent he attributed to Europe did not, of course, survive in the usage that soon became customary and lasted, more or less, until the end of the Middle Ages. The *mappae mundi* sanctioned by Christianity appear mostly to derive from that of Eratosthenes, a sage at the Alexandrian library in the late third century B.C. Here the main dividing line becomes, perhaps for the first time, east/west, along the Nile as before, but now continuing through the Dardanelles, the Black Sea, and indefinitely north along the Tanais River (the Don). The huge portion east of this line is Asia; the Southwest corner is Libya and the Northwest Europe. The shape of this map, simplified, and rotated so that east is at the top, is that of a T inscribed in an O, well known to medievalists as the TO diagram, in which the three continents have their definitive names (Africa replaces Libya) and are assigned to the three sons of Noah, Japheth, Ham, and Shem. In some of these diagrams, the cross of the T can be placed in the center of the circular world and labelled Jerusalem. Yet once again, the center thus becomes even more visibly a borderline, a tripartite crossroads.

One modern historian of ancient geography (Ninck 1945) reminds us that most of these pioneer geographers – and ethnographers as well – came from Ionian or Dorian seacoast settlements around the Mediterranean: Hecataeus from Miletus, Herodotus from Halicarnassus, Eratosthenes from Cyrene. (The historian of course has a small axe to grind: he is Swiss, and argues that true scientific curiosity is the natural outgrowth of a mercantile, trading culture.) Linguistically and culturally, all the pioneers were Greek; but the places where they grew up were on the other continents, unattached, unlike the Greek mainland, to Europe. On their literal borders they faced alien threats, which, in the case of Herodotus, became the primary subject of his investigations.

He begins his *Histories* by reviewing the causes of hostility between Greeks and Persians, who are of course his most significant 'others', and whose viewpoint he often labours to share and to dramatise. The review consists of myths, euhemerized into history and political allegory. Europa, however perplexing as a toponym, plays an early role in a chain of events that will result in the cataclysmic confrontation between Asia and Europe that Herodotus will chronicle. The abduction of Europa from Tyre by Cretans (not the white bull) offended the Phoenicians, but was only revenge for their (and not Hera) having ravished Io to Egypt. The Greeks' second offence was Jason's rape of Medea from Colchis, revenged in its turn by Alexander's of Helen to Troy, in the next generation. So far, tit for tat, says Herodotus,

reporting the Persian view. But now, by destroying Troy on this pretext, the Greeks become guilty of making full-scale war in Asia before any Asians attacked Europe. [The Persians find the pretext of kidnapping women an inadequate cause of war, 'since it is obvious that they would never be kidnapped if they themselves did not wish it.'] Hence the Persian enmity to all Greek incursions and settlements in Asia, which is their hegemonic territory, as opposed to Europe (1.2-4).

So here is the crucial geographical/cultural division (which we still employ and) which structures the subsequent campaigns and ambitions of Xerxes: the Hellespont and the Bosphorus divide Europe, the West, from Asia, the East. But we shouldn't quite yet forget the 'incomparably wider' extent that Herodotus assigns to Europe – it also includes the northern (coast of the Black Sea) realm of the Scythians, and everything west and east of that. The Scythians, of course, are the other significant 'others' in Herodotus' narrative (Bk. 4), and the farther north you go, the worse they get. On the immemorially ancient scale of civilised beings (it appears formulaically in the *Odyssey*), which descends from settled 'grain-eating men' to barbarous meat-eating nomads, the Scythians cover the range: the southernmost grow grain to eat, their northern neighbours only to sell, and the last not at all. North of them are, of course, the ανθρωποφαγαι, who have "the crudest customs in the world, know no justice and no law and are the only ones who eat human flesh". Cannibalism, usually accompanied by incest, are what the ancient Mediterranean imagination attributed to the inhabitants of unknown spaces, the dark margins of the circular world. In the late 4th century B.C., Pytheas, a native of Massalia, sailed to Cornwall to acquire information about its tin mines, and reported that the people who lived in Ireland ate their own fathers and fornicated with their mothers and daughters (Ninck, 219). These spaces, too, were Europe to Herodotus, and they vaguely began around the Crimea, which in Roman times acquired the name of Cimmeria – proverbial since the O*dyssey* for dwellers in darkness.

With help from the researches of the Swiss historian, we may now make a guess at the solution of what perplexed Herodotus about the name of his enormous continent. For the Tyrian maiden captivated by the white bull was but one incarnation of her namesake: Europa was also 1) a name for Hera, 2) a daughter of Ocean, 3) a name for Demeter in Boeotia (where near Thebes Zeus once hid her in a cave, according to Pausanias). Towns in Macedonia and Syria and a river in Thessaly were named ευρωποσ (Ninck 15-17). The word itself appears to come from ευρωσ – dark mould or decay, or such a colour. Ευρωεισ is a Homeric word for the dark earth-depths of Hades; Pindar uses ευρωπια as an adjective for 'dark, Sophocles and Euripides as a noun both for 'darkness' and the continent. In all her incarnations, Europa is darkness and depth, one of the many avatars of μεγαλη μητηρ,

Demeter/Gaia, the earth goddess who mates with the sky-god to become fertile (Ninck, 18-20). A Cretan coin (V century) nicely fuses the images of the Boeotian cult of Demeter/Europa with those of the kidnapping story: the bull appears on one side; on the other is the lady sitting in a tree with an eagle in her lap (Zeus, naturally, much in the manner of Leda's swan). The tree is a willow, which grows around springs, and was associated with Europa in Arcadia (Ninck, 20-21). Although Herodotus seems unaware of Europa as earth-mother on the Greek mainland, his narrative preserves traces of the continent's reputation for fertility, as when the chief Persian strategist approves Xerxes' plans to attack Athens not merely for vengeance, but in order to possess the extensive orchards of 'Europe' (7.5). Journey on or led by a beast is a typical Mediterranean island foundation story – Europa's sons were Minos and Radamanthus – so Corsica; a cow leads Cadmus to site of Thebes (so Juno's sow indicated Alba Longa to Aeneas); Boeotia meant 'land of cattle' (Ninck, 21-22).

So: from the dark depths of the fertile earth that produces the agriculture that makes cities, hence civilisation, possible, to the dark margins of all those vast northern spaces where no society or law exist because people eat each other – all this is 'Europe' to Herodotus. And all of it remains Europe, even when confined to the Northwest quadrant of the circular world that constituted its picture for the Middle Ages.

II. Europe and later 'others'

This picture, we recall, was drawn by Eratosthenes and subsumed into the Roman, thence into the Christian world, apportioning the continents to the three sons of Noah. The division that made political sense to Herodotus (Greek west vs. Persian east) made very little to the administration of either the Roman Empire or the early Christian Churches. As divided by Constantine, both of these common administrations had their eastern and western portions, in which of course the Greek-speaking part became the east (rich and sophisticated, including Egypt) and the Latin-speaking the west (poor and rustic, including North Africa, west of Tripoli). The collectivity of the Mediterranean οικουμενη during the long transition from late antiquity to the Middle Ages remained the crossroads of the three continents, none of which had more than a notional existence on the maps of scholars. The collectivity that came to matter most, after the fall of the Western Roman Empire, was forming as Christendom, itself divided as the old empire had been. This division, extant for four centuries, was ratified by the formal split between the eastern and western churches at the Synod of Frankfurt in 794. This, in turn, helped to make possible the crowning of Charlemagne as Holy Roman Emperor in 800. So there was Rome, the Christian Latin west, and

Byzantium, the Christian Greek east. The political division that mattered was between both and the lately arisen powers of Islam, containing which had weakened Byzantium to the point of permitting the separation of the churches and being unable to object to the crowning of an 'emperor' in Rome (Herrin, 134, 477).

The short-lived 'empire' of the Franks did not include the Iberian Peninsula, nor Brittany, nor the British Isles, nor Scandinavia. These areas were but the periphery of Christendom in the west – regardless of the crucial role of Irish and Northumbrian monks in the reimportation of classical and Christian learning to continental Europe – as dark as they had been to the ancient Mediterranean center of the circular world. The Greek mainland itself was divided between Slavonic barbarians and the Byzantine Empire. Islamic Caliphates ruled from southern Spain across North Africa to Persia. The subsequent history of feudalism and the Crusades amply demonstrates the numerous divisions within western Christendom, and a fortiori the total lack of any coherent geographical or cognitive or emotional awareness of any entity called 'Europe'.

Such awareness only began to develop, as Denys Hay pointed out forty years ago, in response to two new major challenges to Christendom: one political and military, the other geographical and metaphysical. Both were inaugurated by specific and famous events: the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks in 1453, and the discovery of some unknown landmass in the west by Columbus in 1492. The former was a cause of the latter: the closing of the overland trade routes to Asia obliged the maritime powers of Lisbon, Genoa, and Venice to seek alternative routes by sea. Columbus himself apparently died in the belief that what he had discovered were the Indies and Cathay. It would take a couple of generations to ascertain that the globe contained another hemisphere. But even by the latter half of the fifteenth century, something had occurred in Italy to give new currency to a very old story that provided a way of conceiving the inhabitants of Latin Christendom as related members of a single family. The occurrence was the revival and recovery and fetishization of classical texts called the Renaissance; the story was the legend of the descent from Troy, derived from the *Aeneid*, and hooked on to the biblical geographical genealogy commencing with the sons of Noah.

The merging of the sons of Troy with the sons of Japheth had been accomplished in medieval chronicles and genealogies, compiled by generations of monks usually elaborating on the universal chronologies of Eusebius, Jerome, Isidore et al. Between the seventh and thirteenth centuries, these chronicles had produced lineage for the Franks, the Britons, and numerous Italian city-states that found them all to be descended through Dardanus and Priam from Japheth, the progenitor of all Europe (including

Iceland). The medieval texts, summarised by Prof. Hay, which I have analysed elsewhere in somewhat more detail (Waswo, chapters 6-9), did not, however, make much of the continental localisation of all these peoples. They are rather narratives of emigration and entitlement to a noble ancestry that lays claim to the possession of civilisation and its hallmark, the city: Noah and all the Trojan heroes neatly bring together the ancient Greek criteria – Noah planted vineyards and taught his sons agriculture; Troy is the resultant and resonant symbol of the achieved *civitas*. The lack of any sense of a continental collectivity in all the versions of the medieval legend is exemplified by one episode in the emigration of the Trojan ancestors of the Franks. Their route is overland (unlike that of Brutus in the later, and more literal, take-over of the *Aeneid*'s plot by the *historia brittonum*), across Thrace and the Hungarian plain to the Rhine. At an earlier point in this journey, the Trojan remnant splits up, with one bunch continuing west under their eponymous leader, Francio or Francus, and the other remaining near the Danube (the geography is far from exact) under the likewise eponymous Torcoth or Turcoth. This fellow is of course the progenitor of the Turks – apparently for no better reason than that one of Virgil's names for the Trojans was *Teucri*. That the Turks are happily regarded as the siblings of all the present local dynasties and populations situated between Britain and Bohemia makes clear that all these imaginative genealogies are motivated by something other than any sense of contiguous, actual, present community.

The first evocation of such a sense was a direct response to the Turkish conquest of Constantinople. Pius II (the humanist scholar Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini), who became Pope in 1458, then wrote a politico-historical treatise called, tellingly, *Europa*, in which he dismissed the etymology (teucri = turks) as silly, and adduced ancient sources that claimed the origin of the Turks to be not Trojan, but Scythian (Heath, 455-57). He was also the first to use 'european' as an adjective – in which form it became current in Italian, French, and English by the end of the sixteenth century (according to Hay, 86, 106). For Pope Pius, Europe meant precisely Latin Christendom as threatened by the Turks, against whom he struggled long and vainly to persuade various princes to mount a Crusade. Hence the Turks had to be read out of the legend of descent from the civilised Trojans (now regarded as exclusively the ancestors of Europeans) and identified as bestial barbarians from the beginning. However appropriate this identification appeared in political and religious terms, the power of the old stories was such that it by no means created an immediate consensus among scholars, who continued arguing about it well into the next century. It remained popular to preserve the Turks as Trojans, and regard the fall of Constantinople as just revenge for the fall of Troy (Spencer). Those persuaded by the Pope that they were barbaric Scythians could regard it as savage revenge for their ancient

subjection by Alexander the Great. The latter notion, of course, eventually prevailed as the power and territory of the Ottomans increased.

Meanwhile, the old stories were receiving new and popular embellishment from the fraudulent practice of the new philology, the Renaissance obsession with ancient texts. If you couldn't find them, you could forge them. The two most famous forgers of extended Japhetic genealogies in the period were Annius of Viterbo (the papal theologian to Alexander VI) and Johannes Trithemius (Abbot of Sponheim). For very different reasons, each invented and printed around the turn of the XVI century collections of texts purporting to be those of ancient authorities (Chaldean for Annius, Saxon for Trithemius). Their particular purposes need not detain us, except to observe that the Turks are passed over in silence, and the focus firmly kept on the peoples of what was Europe to Pope Pius. Their texts were immediately disputed by other scholars, but Annius's became widely diffused, abridged in vernacular translations, and provided the inspiration of a vernacular text by Jean Lemaire de Belges that enjoyed similar popularity and spawned similar imitations. Lemaire's triumphant conclusion to his (barely decipherable) demonstration that the Trojans, the French, and the Germans are all fraternal descendants of Japheth is a plea that the latter two unite to recapture their mutual Trojan heritage from the Turks (Lemaire, 473). The net effect of the Renaissance reinforcement of the legend was to have made it "possible to elaborate the Trojan origin of every European people, to account for the dispersion of the arts and sciences, and to provide an etymology of illustrious antiquity for every place name" (Hay, 108). Thus to see Europeans as one big family was the way in which the medieval legends derived from Virgil's epic and the Bible were recycled to respond to a present threat.

The other present challenge was the newly revealed existence of places and peoples unknown to antiquity. One of the first recorded uses of 'european' in English (early XVII century) contrasts it, as 'learned', simply to 'american', as 'ignorant', – meaning, of course (what that word meant until 1776), the native inhabitants of the new hemisphere. As this 'new world' began to be explored, conquered, and settled by Spain, Portugal, France, and England in the XVI century, geography suddenly became the one department of knowledge in which the moderns were indisputably superior to the ancients. Proud allusions to this fact echo throughout the many collections of travel narratives, such as Haklyut's. And, equally suddenly, the 'west' became this other hemisphere – seen now from a Europe progressively less self-identified with the Trojans and more with the Romans, whose empire was the model of its own ambitions. These, of course, provided occasions for the vastly increased number of wars among the would-be imperial European powers, for territory and trading rights, throughout the XVII and XVIII centuries.

The trajectory of what Europeans were now identifying as their civilisation had always been from east to west, and now it simply continued on that path, making the old periphery the new center. From Troy to Rome to Troynovant (Brut's name for the London he founded in the medieval chronicles and Geoffrey of Monmouth) to the twenty Troys that would later be founded in North America. This trajectory was well foretold by Dr. John Donne, the Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, in a famous sermon he preached in 1622 to the "Honorable Company of the Virginian Plantation," in which he identifies investment in this colonial enterprise with the mission of the Apostles. His text is *Acts*, 1:8: "But yee shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you, and yee shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth." These words, says Donne, that Christ "spoke in the East, belong to us, who are to glorifie him in the West." The glory of converting the heathen, Donne promises, will in due course also produce immense profits for the stockholders, whom he thus addresses in his conclusion: "You shall have made this Island, which is but as the Suburbs of the old world, a Bridge, a Gallery, to the new; to joyne all to that world that never shall grow old, the Kingdome of heaven" (Donne, 266, 280-81). The dark north-western edges of the old map, where ancient Greeks fantasised cannibalism and incest, were to become the center of the new, and were fantasising in their turn precisely the same enormities about the folks on the new western edge of the global world. The newly extreme western edge of this now spherical world merged, of course, with its eastern edge – the Cathay that Columbus thought he had found, the Japan and the Indies where St. Francis Xavier led the first great Jesuit missionary effort. "West and East / In all flatt Maps... are one," as Donne (who was fascinated by the new cartography) observed in a poem. And their inhabitants were one, too, in the fantasies inherited from the ancient world. St. Francis found the natives of the Moluccas to be barbarous and treacherous cannibals who were also guilty of sexual sins too abominable to describe in writing (St. Francis 179-80).

III. Europe and itself

So thanks to the Turks and the Indians of both west and east, Europe could now figure out pretty exactly where and what it was. It was the center, no longer of Christendom, but of 'civilisation.' This word, for the thinkers of the Enlightenment who first made it current – Mirabeau, Montesquieu, Adam Ferguson – and theorised it as the mastery of arts, sciences, technology, and manners, came into use in the mid-XVIII century (Staro, pp. 11-59), when the legend of Trojan descent had been expelled from veracious history because it was no longer needed as an entitlement to culture. Europeans had stopped

identifying with the characters in the legend, the culture-bringing Trojans, and now identified with the authors of it, the Romans, whose imperial takeovers they were competing with each other to re-enact (Waswo, chapter 13). The very formation of the new word, 'civilisation,' suggests the nature of the enactment and the process and clinches the Roman identification. It is derived from the transitive verb, 'to civilise' (Eng. 1601, Fr. 1568): not something that merely occurs, or that you can produce for yourself, but something that is done *to* you. The older English antonym to barbarity, 'civility' – attested since 1549 and preferred by Dr. Johnson to the newer term – is simply a condition or state, suggesting nothing about how it is arrived at. 'Civilisation', on the contrary, is imposed, transported from someone and somewhere *else* to the here and now. The word crystallises the significance of all the old legends about the emigration of the sons of Japheth and Troy: the *translatio imperii et studii*, the whole point of the journey. The Trojans imposed their dominion and culture on the Latins, and they became Rome; the Romans imposed theirs on Europeans, and they became in turn the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, and finally, the British Empires – extending over the globe to the farthest west and east become one.

The center of the latter empire, Donne's 'bridge' between old and new worlds, was not quite also the borderline that the ancient Greek center was. For London, after the founding of the Bank of England in 1694, was the center of a new sort of power undreamed of by the ancients: the power of finance, the control of global markets. This power flowed out, and profits and commodities flowed in. In the purely geographical sense, however, this center literally became a borderline in 1765, with the establishment by the Astronomer Royal of the zero meridian at Greenwich, used from then on by mariners, ratified by international convention in 1884, but only capitulated to by the French in 1911 (who had all the while insisted on Paris as the zero, giving positions corrected from and to Greenwich, so they could be understood). This convenience placed practically all of Europe in the east, and made the west the exclusive domain of the Americas. Cultural and political awareness, of course, has nothing to do with navigational calculations. When XVIII century Europeans understood themselves as the civilised center, it was still as the 'west,' with respect to where that civilisation ultimately came from (Periclean Athens replacing mythic Troy), and with respect to Asia, regarded as the vast and despotic 'east'. The only ambiguity here was the place of Russia. Prof. Hay has concisely discussed how this was dealt with, resulting in the general XIX century consensus that 'Europe' did indeed include Russia as far as the Ural Mountains (124-27).

North and South America at this point presented no problem at all – not even after waves of colonial rebellions had produced new countries on those continents. Their native populations were being civilised or wiped out; their

culture, however rustic, was the importation of all the Europeans who had settled them. They were but an extension of the European west, the last fulfilment of the *translatio imperii et studii.* There was even some European admiration for the energetic enactment of this model as the United States expanded itself across the entire continent. The model child, at this moment, was no sort of threat to its mentors. The anxieties of cultural inferiority were on the other side, since they are typically felt by the citizens of former colonies with respect to the European metropolis, which is usually happy to oblige with attitudes of great condescension. The former colony will desperately seek ways to assert its own cultural identity; its thinkers and artists will become obsessively concerned to find something unique that can distinguish it from its historical ancestor. American thought and writing went through this phase in the last half of the XIX century; Australia has been undergoing it in the XX.

Which brings us perilously close to now. Unchallenged as the radiating, imperial center of 'western' civilisation, Europe partitioned Africa in 1884 and by the turn of this century controlled as proprietor or protectorate about 85% of the surface of the planet (Said). What the imperial rivalries, which began in the XVI century, then produced were two global wars between coalitions of European powers, both of which required the somewhat reluctant intervention of the new western power, the United States, to bring to an end. The center thus pretty effectively exploded itself, resulting in what may one day be regarded as the major world historical event of *longue durée* in the XX century: decolonization – precisely the undoing of what began with Columbus. After 1945, much of Europe was physically rubble. Politically it was, again, a borderline: the armed and disputed frontier between the newly dominant and opposing powers of the United States and Soviet Russia, which created a new east/west division within Europe itself. Culturally, it was . . . what? Exhausted? Discredited? Sort of – but not quite, despite the loss, by death or emigration, of large numbers of cultural producers – artists, scientists, professors, musicians, writers – some of whom came back. But the very names given to the newly divided world in the era of the Cold War suggest the residual cultural hegemony now guaranteed by the inheritor, the last translation of the old dominion and learning: the U.S.A. along with 'western' Europe split down the middle of Germany (plus the major nations in the British Commonwealth) was the 'First' World; the 'Second' was the Soviet Union and the now 'eastern' European nations in its control. All other nations became the 'Third' World that began to organise itself (at the Bandung Conference in 1955) simply as not belonging to the first two – the "non-aligned" countries. Most recently, other peoples who do not consider that they belong to any country – the surviving indigenous populations that western civilisation regarded as 'savages' – have begun to organise

themselves (mostly on the Internet) as the 'Fourth' World. Some of these peoples, mainly in Canada, have neatly inverted the numerical hierarchy, holding assemblies ("Survival International Bulletin", 1993) that label themselves the 'First Nations'. But the hierarchy is clear enough, even though the Second World has lately ceased to exist, with its older and newer nations being absorbed into the First or Third. Moreover, the place of Russia in relation to Europe is now again as ambiguous as in the days of Peter the Great. When headlines trumpet Boris Yeltsin's defiance of the 'Occident', it's pretty clear he's not a part of it.

Europe found itself after the Second World War in the position presciently foreseen by Alexis de Toqueville (in the 1820s) – i.e. that borderline and battleground between the two great and contending powers of the US and Russia. De Toqueville foresaw only the political growth of their expanding continental empires, not the bitter opposition of their economic ideologies. With the success of Mao's revolution in China in1949, this opposition was generally encoded as the capitalist west vs. the communist east. It is hard to avoid seeing in this geopolitical opposition an enlarged repetition of the Eurocentric Enlightenment estimate of its own civility as opposed to 'Asian' cruelty, backwardness, and despotism. There was, of course, a crucial difference: the power to preserve this civilisation no longer resided in Europe, but in its offspring and nuclear protector across the Atlantic. Serving its own interest, the US assumed the role of both military protector and civil reconstructor in the rebuilding of (what now counted as) Western Europe. The successful financing of the latter – from Iceland to Turkey (welcome back to the Teucri under the auspices of NATO) – was achieved by the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan, 1947-52). The shoe of cultural anxiety was now on the other foot: more than a few Europeans, especially the French, were torn between gratitude for and resentment against these forms of dependency on their younger sibling – or child. Waves of anti-American protest and preachment broke out sporadically, and continue today – the latest being the efforts of the French to curb American 'cultural imperialism' by limiting the importation of American films and TV programs (but what else can fill the untold hours of air time opened by the hundreds of cable channels distributed by satellites?).

But even at – perhaps because of – that moment of greatest dependency and disillusionment in the 1950s, Europe began to forge a more pragmatic idea of itself, "to turn the name for a region into a political programme" (Hay, 127). This is the concluding sentence of the second edition of Hay's book on the emergence of the 'idea' of Europe, the first edition of which appeared in 1957, along with many similar titles (*Histoire de l'idée européenne*, *The Uniting of Europe*). What intellectuals then wished to imagine was in fact getting underway, the realisation of Europe as an actual, present, contiguous

community. The initial program, of course, was less political than economic, thanks to the wisdom of Monnet, Schuman, and Spaak, who began with a specific, concrete, and therefore possible form of co-operation: the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), the success of which was soon enlarged into the European Economic Community (or Common Market, 1957), and only then expanded into politics proper, with the European Parliament (1962), and thence into the European Union that today is working to incorporate all the nations on the continent that were part of the former Second World. I cannot refrain from observing how the fringes on the map of the ancient circular world remain the fringes on this new one: the Northeast place of the Scythians, Russia, is still dark and ambiguous; the Northwest 'suburbs,' as Donne called them, the British Isles that were bridge, then center, are now marginal again, vexed and reluctant participants in what some call the 'Brussels Empire'.

The European Union was an idea whose time had come, and which was given time gradually to develop, and whose development was aided, as usual, by challenges from elsewhere. These, in the last half-century, as rightly perceived by the likes of Monnet and Spaak, continue to be economic. Organising the economy of Europe to both cooperate and compete with those of its former benefactor, the US, and its new rival, Japan, was the pragmatic task that may yet produce a continent unified in unprecedented ways. Its economic success can in part be measured by the need lately felt by the United States to enlarge its hegemony over its own hemisphere by the (not uncontroversial) creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Or, more concretely, by the fact that Airbus, the European consortium, has sold passenger aircraft to the extent that has obliged Boeing, the virtual monopolist of this market since its absorption or obliteration of American competitors [McDonnell-Douglas; the demise of Lockheed], to reduce production (and lay off 20,000 employees, "Economist", 15 Nov.). The creation of such common enterprises (like the satellite program and CERN) in the last generation has in fact made Europe more of a coherent place than ever it was before.

With the advent of de facto coherence created by economic competition, also comes, however, a new form of cultural anxiety, now focused on the maintenance of cultural 'identities'. Identitarian politics, I should judge, is one of the worst problems of the present moment: local or religious or gender or linguistic or racial or nationalist advocacies, all of which are terrified by the self-inflicted prospect of dissolution in some larger collectivity. The discourse that usually opposes such advocacies is no better (and certainly far less effective): that of universalist claims, principally those of 'human rights'. The discourse of universalism, historically one of the major means by which the Europe of modernity asserted its claim to 'civilise' the planet, is not only discredited – i.e. unable to convince all those victimised by this claim – it is

sterile, unable to stimulate, within Europe, any real motivation to create or conceive of identity on a continental scale. So the fallback position, interminably reiterated by well-meaning intellectuals and journalists of all kinds, is to a discourse of 'tolerance', of 'respect for diversity'. So here is Europe today – a state of mind considerably confused. Its contradictions were admirably expressed recently by a colleague of mine at Geneva, the current president of the *Rencontres internationales*, Prof. Georges Nivat. Asked by a reporter to name the "three major characteristics of European identity", he replied, "Absolute diversity in a desire for unity, continual conflict, and the primacy of art" (*CommUNIcation*, 10/99). I shall refrain from unravelling the mysterious relations among these, but go on to cite his response to the next question, "When will Europe really be constructed?" "On the day", he said (you should know that he is a professor of Russian), "when the obstinate mutual scorn between Catholic/Protestant and Orthodox Europe will be overcome – then Europe will finally breathe with both its lungs". In our long historical perspective, then, when Europe will become the united Christendom that it never, ever, was. This is nostalgia as mythic, as transparent, and as touching as that for our always already destroyed cultural ancestor in all the legends of the descent from Troy. I cannot refrain from observing that the day wished for by my colleague will not be tomorrow: when earlier this month the Pope celebrated a mass, attended by 10,000 people, in the capital of Georgia, the orthodox clergy of the country refused to come ("Le Temps", 10.11.99).

What will be tomorrow I now venture to prophesy – or, less boldly, to interpret. For we know what will be tomorrow, that is, next year: the beginning of the circulation of what will become in 2002 the single currency of the EU, the Euro. The significance of this unprecedented enactment seems to me far greater than merely economic; it is also cultural, social, affective in the highest degree, because money itself is inextricably both material and symbolic. It is both the bottom line and the supreme fiction, the real and the imaginary at once. This is, alas, not my idea, but that of Georg Simmel (*Die Philosophie des Geldes*, 1907). Money can be anything, as Aristotle well knew; its nature is simply its use, and its use is established solely by social assent, the agreement so to use it, the credit and the trust that any human community may place in cows or cowries, in leather or in mulberry bark, in paper or in electronic traces on a piece of plastic or a screen. Money is therefore, as a system of exchange, precisely homologous to language: systems that depend on the establishment of totally arbitrary differences, phonetic or numerical, whose meanings or value are accepted by everyone. When Euros can be spent from Reykjavik to Athens, that's what Europe will be. Grab people by their pocketbooks, their hearts and minds will follow: this isn't cynicism, but realism, or even hope. For a single anything – currency or

language – never obliterates all other diversities. What individuals may wish to spend their money on or use their language for is not limited by the systems that enable them so to express themselves. And the more widely shared the system, the larger the community thus formed, the understanding audience, as it were, of those expressions. It is just because languages and money are, necessarily, the formers of community for their respective purposes, which are far from being all purposes, that I regard the terrors of losing diversity as baseless. Diversity and conflict will always be with us, as, notoriously, they are even within single families. These, indeed, have been the primal sources of hostility and violence from ancient Greek mythology to the majority of police calls – for domestic disputes – in the First World today.

So it may be logical to think that what the old fantasy of family kinship – the sons of Japheth and of Troy – could not do for Europe, money can. Like nothing else, it can produce an omnipresent and geographical unity. At the simplest level, the Euro will make it possible for individuals to travel, to sample the diversities of their neighbours, without the monetary loss to the individual that always accompanies currency exchange – or even credit-card payment. Following the wisdom of Monnet and Spaak, the EU is creating a concrete, specific, therefore possible form of unity in order that other forms may follow – the envisioned 'free' movement of goods, persons, and services within the entire space thus monetarily defined. And the definition will be the more powerful and efficacious, I insist, because money is itself a form of social assent, an enabling fiction, already a part of 'culture.' And it will in no way diminish all other forms of cultural difference, any more than the dollar, or the rouble, or the yuan have extinguished diversity, or eliminated conflict, within the very large nations that use those currencies. So we don't need to wait for the highly doubtful tomorrow when the orthodox churches will follow the Lutherans and the Catholics to the bargaining table; we don't need to fear the loss of local identities and cultures. The real tomorrow will be here soon; it's been painstakingly prepared; it's on schedule; and it's likely to produce a Europe that will be a more distinct reality than ever before. Europe will at long last be something definite – and can then, perhaps, stop worrying about its 'image' and start exercising the forms of tolerance obviously necessary to keep that something working.

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Jan Nederveen Pieterse

Europe and its Others

From time immemorial, peoples have considered themselves as 'the people' and all the rest as 'others'. Familiar examples are the Greeks and the *barbaroi*, the Jews and the *goyim*, the Japanese and the *gajjin*, and China as the Middle Kingdom. Throughout, designating others and emphasising their 'otherness' has been fundamental to the construction of boundaries of identity and community, between and within societies. Over time, otherness has had many different meanings, as many as identity. It has referred to cultural differences along the lines of language, religion, civilisation, 'race', ethnicity, region, nationality, gender, age, and to class, development, ideology, and so forth.

'Europe and its others' is a sprawling theme that involves a variety of historically changing boundaries that share an element of 'difference'. 'Europe' can be taken in two ways: within Europe, i.e. within what is now considered Europe, and in relation to Europe, i.e. problematising the identity of Europe. Both are considered here. While 'Europe' is an old concept it did not gain currency until the seventeenth century and, by and large, only became an active boundary as such in the course of the nineteenth century and particularly from the turn of the century. This treatment opens with a discussion of the different meanings of otherness in relation to Europe over time, including the role of Islam, and concludes with a brief theoretical reflection on otherness.

Europe

'Otherness' has many faces. Below is a schema of the different ways 'Europe and its others' has been viewed over time and what kind of notions of difference and otherness it has given rise to. Several of these markers of difference have been around in one form or other for quite a long time. Obviously over time they have changed meaning and gone through several stages. Also they overlap and interact in several ways. In this schema differences outside Europe are juxtaposed to differences within Europe, considering that differences between Europe and others outside have not necessarily been more important than differences within Europe.

In medieval Europe, Christianity was the major marker of difference, internally and externally. The distinction between Christians and heathens and non-believers served as the main boundary between self and others. One of the root meanings of '*pagan*' is peasant (*paysan* in French). This suggests that Christianity was the umbrella for a wider set of meanings and that the original

difference between Christians and heathens ran *within* Europe. The distinction between Christians and Muslims and other faiths came later. Campaigns of conversion within Europe – first aimed at the countryside and then at Ireland, the Frisians, Saxons, Slavs, etc. – set the framework for the campaigns that were directed outward, such as the *Reconquista* of the Iberian Peninsula and the Crusades overseas. While the Crusades were directed against Islam, there were also Crusades within Europe. Internal Crusades were directed against dissident faiths – such as the Cathars and the Bogomils – and later against 'heretics' and witches (Cohn 1975). The onset of the Crusades overseas also coincided with the persecution of Jews within Europe. Besides, within Christendom there were different centres of power: Greek Christianity centred in Constantinople and Latin Christianity centred in Rome.

Europe and its others over time

Time	Boundaries	External differences	Internal differences
CE-present	Religion	Pagans, non-believers. Christianity vs. Islam and other religions.	Heathens. Heretics, witchcraft. Roman vs. Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism vs. Protestantism.
1790-1950	Race	Race, language.	Class, status. Nation, national character. Ranking among and within European countries
1800-1970	Imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism	Civilisation and savagery, evolution. Coloniser and colonised. Orientalism. Eurocentrism.	'Backward areas' in Europe. Urban jungle.
1950-present	Development, North and South	Developed/ advanced and underdeveloped/ less developed or developing countries	Uneven development within Europe and within countries (underdeveloped and deindustrialising regions)
1900-present	Europe	European civilisation, identity, boundaries, Europeanness	Europe of multiple speeds. Tension between deepening and widening of European Union
1960-present	Cultural difference	Cultural difference	Multiculturalism; cultural difference in life style, sexual preference, age
1980-present	Citizenship, legal status	'Fortress Europe'. Illegal immigrants, asylum seekers.	Citizens, denizens.

Later a rift developed between Roman Catholicism and the Holy Roman Empire in Germany, the medieval power struggle between the Pope and the Emperor, which involved Cologne as a rival centre of faith and power. The subsequent divide between Catholicism and Protestantism (and further differences within Protestantism – Calvinism, Lutheranism, Anabaptism, etc.) built on the old lines of demarcation that ran between the Roman Empire and the 'savage tribes' outside the empire. In the North, the dividing line was the Rhine. During the Renaissance, the distinction between 'Ancients' and 'Moderns' overlaid these differences.

This shows that *'Europe's others' were located primarily within Europe.* The contemporary perspective of 'others' as being located outside Europe, also retroactively, is a recent development of the last two hundred years, if only because the consciousness of Europeanness is recent. Secondly, *otherness outside Europe was not necessarily as important as otherness within Europe*, and was generally conceived along lines first developed in relation to Europe's internal others. Thirdly, 'otherness' refers to a complex *layer* or *web of differences* that ramifies multidimensionally in many directions. If it is coded in cultural terms (in terms of religion, language or ethnicity), it also signifies geographical, historical, political, class and status, urban and rural differences, all mingling within a fluid mosaic. Fourthly, therefore *it is not possible to produce a clear cognitive map of 'others' because there is no stable or fixed notion of 'self' that could inform this.* There is no fixed point or 'view from nowhere' from which this can be conceptualised. The longer the period and the wider the geographical space taken into account the more difficult this becomes. Collective identities are stable enough to generate clear boundaries of difference only over brief periods. The mosaic of difference seems stable enough only in, say, fifty-year segments. Some differences may seem to be of longer duration, but if we examine them closely it turns out that over time their meaning or function changes radically, so that continuity is a superficial impression only. Let us develop some of these considerations further.

'Europe's others' were located primarily within Europe. Medieval Christianity was part of the foundation of the feudal Estates of nobles; clerics and peasants, each occupying their God-given place, like the caste system in India founded in Hinduism. Differences between Christians and heathens overlaid earlier lines of distinction that ran between the Roman Empire and its peripheries: the *Pax Romana* and the world outside. Regional differences in language, food, costume and customs were significant. In the hierarchy of Estates, 'others' were primarily those who did not fit in – Jews, Gypsies, travellers, regional minorities such as the Marranos in southern Spain, heathens and non-believers. The real Other in the Christian world was the Devil – represented by the 'Bogey', the 'Bugaboo', the 'Black Man'. Thus, the main

difference was a metaphysical difference with moral ramifications and other differences were mirrored in this central difference – identity and otherness were essentially measured in relation to God and the Devil. Gradually the emergence of burghers, merchants, and towns with rights began to undermine the feudal hierarchy and so did the development of monarchy and absolutist states.

Otherness outside Europe was not necessarily as important as otherness within Europe. Tales of strange beings outside Europe – such as Herodotus' tales of monstrous beings overseas – were matched by tales of others within Europe, such as the 'Wild Man' and the 'Green Man'. These figures were real enough considering that Europe until the eleventh century mostly consisted of forest and uncleared land, so much of Europe was unknown and mysterious. Pagan practices continued locally long after the imposition of Christianity. Crusader stories, Marco Polo's tales of far-off civilisations, Montaigne's observations on American Indians served as a backdrop of exotic differences in addition to those that were lived close-by. The invasions of the Huns and Mongols into Europe and the siege of Vienna by the Ottoman Turks were experienced as major threats, but if we compare the casualties of these conflicts with those of the Thirty Years War in Germany, they pale to insignificance. Even in later times of imperialism and colonialism, for all the talk of others – racism, Orientalism, the White Man's Burden, etc. – the main conflicts took place within Europe. The major wars – the napoleonic wars, the Franco-German war, and the two world wars – were largely European wars. Imperialism itself, at any rate the 'new imperialism' of the late-nineteenth century, can be understood as the extension of the European balance of power on the world map. Overseas conquests were a way of settling accounts with or keeping other European powers from gaining control – the Dutch against the Spanish and the Portuguese, the French against the English, the English against Russia, etc. If we compare the numbers of casualties in the two world wars with those of the wars of colonialism and imperialism, then where were Europe's others?

Otherness outside Europe was generally conceived along lines first developed in relation to or patterned by Europe's internal others. Thus, *savages* were discussed with quite different emphasis by Montaigne (the noble savage), Thomas Hobbes (among the savages life is brutish and short), Locke (all men are endowed with reason), Daniel Defoe (cannibals), Rousseau (the good savage) or the Romantic poets (paradise lost). In each instance these views were articulated with dramatically different domestic preoccupations and led to profoundly different conclusions (discussed in Nederveen Pieterse 1992: 30-39).

The direct contact between Europe and Asia and the Americas set the stage for much of the vocabulary of difference that occupied the next centuries. In

relation to Asia, the theme of civilisation came to the foreground: here were 'ancient civilisations' that, so it appeared to nineteenth-century Europeans, had stagnated or declined to the level of barbarism. The way this was understood was modelled on the rise and decline of classical civilisations – Greece, Rome and, further in the distance, Egypt and Mesopotamia. Gibbon's account of the rise and decline of the Roman empire followed Tacitus, who had attributed the decline of the Romans to their mixing with different peoples and customs, whereas the Teutonic tribes had remained 'pure'. This view later contributed to 'race' thinking. If European civilisation was not to succumb to decadence and decay, and undergo the same fate as the classical and Asian civilisations, Europeans had to be on guard against mixing with different races and lower elements, for in any combination, the lower element would predominate. This applied primarily to aristocracies in Europe who had to keep their distance from the peasantry and lower classes. Thus in many ways, 'race' thinking started out as status anxiety on the part of aristocracies and upper classes in Europe, who at the time felt threatened and insecure because of the revolutionary changes at the turn of the eighteenth century.

In relation to the Americas, different tropes emerged. Cannibalism (a theme in Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* and stories about Captain Cook in the Pacific) was the flipside of the romantic paradise-lost image of life among the savages. During colonialism the accusation of cannibalism often served as a justification of conquest. Recently it has been argued that cannibalism is basically a myth: while ritual cannibalism (eating a small part of an enemy's body for magical purposes) does occur, gustatory cannibalism (eating humans as food) has nowhere been observed (Arens 1979; Barker, Hulme, Iversen 1998).

With the Enlightenment and its concern with scientific classification came attempts to classify humans based on '*race*' and *language*. In the wake of the French Revolution *nationhood* became a defining element of identity. Through the nineteenth century, the notions of 'race', language and nationality mingled: nations were thought of as races (as in 'Irish race' or 'German race') and races were viewed as language groups. All along, otherness has been an ambivalent notion, a combination of attraction (paradise lost, the appeal of the exotic) and repulsion. Romantic preoccupation with the past and the unknown was yet another face of the Enlightenment. The pathos of the wild, the remote and the unknown may be interpreted as a secular version of pantheism or of the 'hidden God' (*deus absconditus*). 'Others' were embodiments of ideals (the noble or good savage), objects of desire, windows of mystery, or embodiments of fear (monsters, cannibals) and targets of hatred – scapegoats, as in anti-Semitism and the pogroms. 'Nothing but otherness killed the Jews.' Genocide of indigenous peoples – native Americans, Tasmanians, Armenians – and dehumanizing treatment of slaves and 'natives' – are part of the history of

otherness. In nineteenth-century Orientalism and exoticism, all these attitudes are reflected, within a general setting of Western expansion, imperialism and colonialism.

For centuries, Europe's main other has been the world of Islam. Defining episodes in European history – Muslim domination of the Mediterranean during the early Middle Ages, the conquest of Spain, the Crusades, the fall of Constantinople, the siege of Vienna – refer to Islam. No threat has compared to the threat of Islam and no civilisation has been as near either. Nowadays political Islam is often presented as the major outside challenge to Western hegemony. The world of Islam, unlike other challenges, encompasses a worldview, a way of life, a historical formation as well as a geographical space, stretching from Morocco to Southeast Asia. Its scope includes Islamic politics and law (Shari), Islamic geopolitics, Islamic economics and social policy, Islamic science, and Islamic identity and culture. To a varying extent these owe their present salience to government sponsored initiatives, which are made possible by rentier oil economies. Although perceptions and realities are difficult to disentangle, Islamism is a significant movement, which is at times presented as the most significant challenge to the hegemony of the West as Euro-America. The challenge of political Islam stems from civilisational legacies, anti-colonialism, anger and frustration about western double standards, and cultural disaffection. Ever since the Nahda (the nineteenth-century awakening or Renaissance in the Arab world), Islam has been repeatedly held up as an alternative to Western hegemony, at times under the heading of Arab unity. Benjamin Barber captured this under the heading of *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1996). It forms part of Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations*.

But from hereon the story unravels. The real world of Islam is internally fractured; the *umma* is a delta of many streams – Sunni and Shiite, clerical Islam, Sufism and folk Islam. The different forms of Islam in the Arab world, Iran and Turkey, South and Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe are each historically and culturally articulated. "Like other religions, Islam is not a generic essence, but a nominal entity that conjoins, by means of a name, a variety of societies, cultures, histories and polities" (Al-Azmeh 1993: 60). In addition, the distinctive character of Islamic institutions may be more a claim than a reality: what is 'Islamic' in Islamic science may be a matter of packaging rather than content. Just as Europe ignored or downplayed its dependence on Islamic and Arabic influences in earlier times, the current dependency of Islamic modernisation on Western technologies and examples tends to be downplayed in the Islamic world. Without a common opposition to the West, there might not be any *umma* politics, and what is there is largely political fiction. Part of political Islam is a critique of capitalism, which it shares with Roman Catholicism. Both Islam and Catholicism reflect the ethos

of an older, medieval political economy, in which 'community' values prevail over merely commercial and economic interests.

Development is another boundary of difference. This derives from earlier ideas of progress, viewed as a single-track path with less and more advanced peoples and civilisations. The eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment set forth a schema of evolutionary stages, from primitivism, savagery and barbarism to civilisation. These were combined with modes of production: hunters and gatherers, agriculture and crafts, and industrial society. The development gap only arose when the difference in technological capacity between Europe and non-western countries became significant – from the turn of the eighteenth century onward, with the onset of industrialisation. Prior to that time, Europeans had looked up to other civilisations and been inspired by their example (see Nederveen Pieterse 1994). European chauvinism only dates from that period.

The difference between less developed, underdeveloped or backward societies and developed or advanced societies further corresponded with notions of 'tradition' and 'modernity', the 'Third World', and later the difference between North and South. The imagery of backwardness or underdevelopment also applied to peripheral regions or slum areas within Europe. Initially development was looked at solely through Western eyes and modernisation was held to be the same as Westernisation. This biased view was subsequently identified as *Eurocentrism*, in which Europe stands for Euro-America (Amin 1989, Nederveen Pieterse and Parekh 1995).

In the course of time, Europe itself also began to function as a boundary of difference, first in the context of the turn-of-the-century 'Pan' movements (Pan Arabism, Pan Turkism, Pan Europe, etc.), and later after the war, in the context of the making of the European market. Which is more 'European', Northwest Europe or 'Central Europe'? Are Turkey and Russia part of Europe? Is Europe part of Eurasia? The current tension between the deepening (further integration) or the widening (include East European countries and Turkey) of the European Union involves not only economic and security issues but also questions of identity and what constitutes 'Europeanness'.

In the European context, cultural difference is the latest boundary of difference. In the course of the sixties, racism gradually changed to the 'new racism' that focuses on, instead of phenotypic differences, cultural difference. In the context of globalisation with increasing communication, migration and travel, and as societies became increasingly mixed, the older ideas of race and civilisation became increasingly quaint. Within societies, there are many streams and flows of difference, such as differences in life style, sexual preference, age and class. Arguably two major differences remain. One is the gap between less and more developed countries. The other significant

boundary of difference is the question of citizenship or legal status. Whether immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers obtain citizenship rights or whether they are clandestine and deprived from legal rights and social entitlements is a major dividing line. This relates to the image of 'Fortress Europe' and the realities of the Schengen and Dublin Accords. Through all these changes, ideas of others and what constitutes otherness have changed.

Otherness

'Otherness' has been discussed under many headings, such as prejudice, ethnocentrism and racism. The terminology of otherness derives from phenomenology and structuralist anthropology. The theme originates in philosophical queries about the nature of identity. Wherein lies the identity of a thing? Is the difference between same and other a matter of essence or existence? With Hegel, identity and difference refers to the antinomy of being and nothingness, which in turn refers to spirit and matter unfolding in history. What Hegel calls the life and death struggle with the other, for instance between master and slave, is a relationship that changes dialectically over time. Schopenhauer speaks of will and representation, Heidegger of Being and Time, Sartre of Being and Nothingness. Different queries yield various notions of otherness, such as the unthought, the implicit (Husserl), the virtual or unfulfilled possibilities (Herbert Marcuse). Psychoanalysis and the idea of the unconscious as ego's other led to the theme of oneself as an other, which had also figured in Dostoevsky's story of *The Double* and came back in Jung's notion of the 'shadow'. In his book *I and Thou,* Martin Buber addresses the other as a potential partner in dialogue. In a similar way, in the work of the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, 'alterity' becomes a relational concept.

After the war, at the time of decolonisation when imperial identities were decentred, 'the question of the Other' became a critical and prominent theme. In structuralist anthropology, cultures were understood as a system of systems, a structural ensemble on the model of language. This approach uses binary schemas, such as naked and clothed, raw and cooked, and self and other. Claude Lévi-Strauss, the foremost representative of this approach, influenced Albert Memmi, Tzvetan Todorov (1984), Jean-Paul Sartre and others. A different turn came with Michel Foucault's work on knowledge and discourse as the foundation of relations of power and domination (e.g. 1965). Foucault concentrated on those classified as deviant, criminal, heretic, insane or diseased in French society, who were subjected to regimes of 'normalisation' in medical and penal discourses and in prisons, hospitals or asylums. In *Orientalism,* Edward Said applied Foucault's method of discourse analysis to the texts produced by European orientalists about the 'Orient', the colonized world (1978). In this view, the way others are represented in talk or discourse reflects prevailing regimes of knowledge and their truth claims, and in the process

representation itself becomes a form of power. Foucault's poststructuralism broke with the idea of cultures as systemic structures and shifted attention to structures of knowledge within and across cultures instead. Jacques Derrida (1978) rephrases the question of otherness in terms of identity and difference, thereby returning it to the wider terrain of philosophical questioning where it had originated. In Derrida's method of the deconstruction of texts, the disassembly of structures continues infinitesimally.

These influences – idealist philosophy, phenomenology, structuralism, hermeneutics, poststructuralism, deconstruction – are part of the broad stream of cultural and postcolonial studies that now examines how others are represented in discourse and images. The major axis of difference is the 'Big Three' of race, class and gender. Historically representations of racial (ethnic, national) others often overlap with those of women, children and lower class people. Representations of others have been analysed in relation to Europe (Barker et al 1985) and in the context of colonialism (Gidley 1992; Thomas 1994) and race (Sardar, Nandy and Davis 1993), but the terms of analysis are changing. 'The Other' is increasingly left behind as too narrow and static a notion. There are so many different kinds of 'others' that there is little point in generalising about them. Besides, the 'Self' no longer represents a fixed identity, witness postmodern understandings of multiple identity and the 'decentring of the subject'. As the typical Enlightenment subject (who was white, male, middle aged, rational) is no longer being taken for granted as the centre and yardstick of the human universe, also its 'other' loses relevance and meaning. In sociology, cultural and gender studies, the terminology of *difference* increasingly takes the place of otherness. This terminology is more neutral and matter-of-fact and less historically burdened than that of otherness. Difference, of course, comes in many forms: as ontological difference, metaphysical difference, the difference of God, gender, class, geography, development, legal status, and cultural diversity. So cultural difference is but one type of difference among several and not necessarily the most salient or important difference. Another theme is the growing concern with hybridity, mixing, *métissage*. As societies become more diverse, intermarriage also increases, cultural differences are criss-crossing and in the process generating new identities and new differences. Cultural differences are eroding over time, due to globalisation, changing identities and consumption patterns, while local and regional reactions to globalisation are generating new identities and differences. Amidst this flux, the old notions of otherness are increasingly outdated.

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Ioanna Laliotou

Our Fellow Balkanoid Citizens: Europe, Balkans and Visions of Social Change before WW II

In this paper I raise questions about the discursive constructions of the Balkans that emerged around the Balkan Wars and World War I and developed during the inter-war period. I am interested in relating these constructions of the Balkans to contemporary, i.e. early twentieth century images of Europeanness and modernity. The working hypotheses that I elaborate derive both from my own research as well as from readings in contemporary scholarship on Balkan imagology. Some of the questions that I raise have taken form in the context of on-going debates in the fields of post-colonial studies and the wide area of research in the histories and cultures of the Near East and the Balkans. My intention here is to address the productive, although not always happy intersection between post-colonial studies and the emerging field of what we could call post-Ottoman studies.

My main suggestion is that the crystallisation of Balkanist discourses during the first decades of this century rendered the Balkans into a symbol of inherent volatility and in-betweens with both positive and negative connotations attached. I will argue that western [and by that I broadly mean Euro-American] constructions of the Balkans tend to crystallise and harden in periods when domestic social debates are accentuated.

By focusing on very selective examples of westerners' writings on the Balkans in this period I want to suggest that in the beginning of the century this form of symbolism took a particular form: Balkanist discourses provided referents to western conceptualisations of societies of difference. For European intellectuals and political activists this question referred to the process of re-conceptualising nationalism and culture beyond imperialism. For American publicists and intellectuals, the question referred to organising society beyond the model of national assimilation.

Continental Names as Concept-Metaphors

From the point of view of the history of culture continental names (Europe, America, Asia, Africa etc.) operate as concept-metaphors that are used in order to refer to specific cultural, political and economic values.

This signifying operation however is only possible through the interrelation among different continental names. Historically the name America has

acquired its signifying capacity *via* its relation to Europe. On the other hand the name "Europe" has acquired its signifying potential through multiple reliance to "Asia", "Africa", "America". More importantly we could argue that the authoritative narratives of each of these names were written with reference to a global horizon, i.e. through (political, economic, geographic, and cultural) references to the "World".

As Jacques Derrida has noted with respect to the naming of "Europe",

> From Hegel to Valéry, from Husserl to Heidegger, in spite of all the differences that distinguish these great examples from each other...the *traditional* discourse [on Europe] is *already* a discourse of the *modern* Western world. It dates, it is dated... It dates from a moment when Europe sees itself *on the horizon*, that is to say, from its end. This old discourse about Europe, a discourse at once exemplary and exemplarist, is already a *traditional discourse of modernity*.[1]

Since within modernity difference is defined in a superiorist mode, the signifying capacity of continental names lies in their ability to represent different positions in the rich spectrum of shades that connect civilisation to barbarity.

Sub-continental names and the process of perpetual differentiation

In this process of cultural signification sub-continental names acquire a special importance. They are often used in order to suggest the perpetual internal differentiation of the continental names and their meaning and cultural properties. Often sub-continental names, e.g. the Balkans, are used in order to signify elements of self-identification that would be better eradicated from hegemonic narratives of culture and imagination. Elements that do not fit comfortably into hegemonic narratives of self-identification but persist and can never be successfully erased. These elements are projected on sub-continental names, areas of culture and imagination that lie at the borders of the self, both ours as well as radically foreign.

The origin of the name of the Balkans is an example of this type of internal differentiation. The attribution of the name to the southeastern peninsula of Europe was actually a result of mis-naming. The term Balkan was apparently first used by the German geographer August Zeune in his book *Gea* published

[1] Jacques Derrida, *The other heading: reflections on today's Europe*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, c1992.

in Berlin in 1809.[2] The name was chosen through the common geographic practice of naming a region after a prominent mountain range. The Balkan Mountains, now lying in Bulgaria and known as Stara Planina (Bulgarian for 'The Old Mountain') were referred to in Antiquity as Haemus. However, the Turkish noun 'balkan', denoting a mountain chain was assumed by Western travellers to be the name of this specific range. The name itself was apparently the result of misunderstanding. Zeune's naming was part of his effort to divide Europe into nine discrete geographical areas. The name of the Balkans was initially used very sporadically, but became widely accepted during the 1870s and 1880s, when it fulfilled a need for a short-hand reference for the new states crystallising in the territory previously known as 'Turkey in Europe'. A name was then needed in order to conceptualise a geographic as well as cultural and political area that had been part of the Muslim world, but not quite; part of Europe, but not quite; part of the European family of modern nation-states, but not quite. Without an easily definable borderline between the peninsula and 'mainland Europe', and the peninsula and Asia, disagreements about the exact territory of the Balkans have never been resolved.

Thus the name of the Balkans was introduced in order to refer to political and cultural phenomena of ambivalence concerning borders: where does Asia end? Where does Europe begin? The name also signified spatial and temporal spheres of cultural influence: when and where do Islamic (i.e. Ottoman) bearings on European soil end? When does Europe regain control over its cultural borderline?

Imagining the Balkans

During the last decade the ways in which the Balkans have been historically imagined by western Europeans have been studied by historians as well as literary critics. Under the impact of the recent wars in former Yugoslavia, the rise of nationalism in Southeastern Europe and the western European involvement in the conflict resolution efforts the issue of western perceptions of the Balkans has acquired renewed scholarly interest.

Moved by contemporary politics and inspired by readings of Edward Said's *Orientalism*, leading scholars in the field of Balkan studies have undertaken a two-fold crusade:

[2] On the history of the name see: Vesna Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania: the imperialism of the imagination,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998.

a. To uncover the West's misrepresentations of the Balkans and the ways in which these misrepresentations reflect racist intellectual and political attitudes.

b. To point-out what Said got wrong in his *Orientalism*

Maria Todorova's book *Imagining the Balkans* is the most notable representative of this group of scholarship. Todorova describes the itinerary that images of the Balkans have followed in European imagination from the late eighteenth century to our times. She focuses on travellers' literature as well as the work of journalists and publicists of a great variety.

Her basic thesis is that "Balkanism was formed gradually in the course of two centuries and crystallised in a specific discourse around the Balkan Wars. In the next decades, it gained some additional features but these were mostly a matter of detail, not of essence."[3] Another central point in her argument is the difference between Balkanism and Orientalism. Todorova argues that Balkanism evolved to a great extent independently from Orientalism and in certain aspects, against or despite it. The reasons for this distinction concerned the absence of colonial legacy in the Balkans, their Christian character and the emergence of multiple autonomous – even though idiosyncratic – Balkan identities that were "invariably erected against an oriental other."[4] Elaborating on this last point, she juxtaposes textual constructions of the Balkans in the West with Balkan self-constructions that developed mostly in the field of historiographical production – a set of material that she uncharacteristically given the depth of her theoretical sensitivity refers to as the "de hors-texte" territory.[5]

Imagining the Balkans shares with other books that focus on constructions of the Balkans in Western Europe (mainly Britain) a common characteristic. They treat European constructions of the Balkans independently from European constructions of Europeanness. Indeed what connects Orientalism with Balkanism is the fact that they are respectively related to western processes of institutional and non-institutional production of knowledge.

Imagining the Balkans and Todorova's wide knowledge of the literature takes us through a rich repertoire of European mostly derogatory conceptualisations of the Balkans as the land of violence and unrest. The

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3 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997.

4 Ibid., p. 20

5 I will not expand on the distinction between 'text' and 'reality' here. Suffice it to say that the particular application of this distinction in *Imagining the Balkans* is related to the author's decision to let aside the fact that dis-identifying oneself from the negative connotations of the Orient has not been exclusively an element of Balkan identity construction. We can trace similar trends in the histories of other peoples often located within the Orient itself. In any case, Balkan dis-identification from the Orient has always been situational and dialectically related to a parallel dis-identification from the West.

relation of this Balkanist imagination to European intellectual and cultural history however remains un-addressed. It is only in the finale [the actual last paragraph] that the author gives us a hint that she is actually aware of these interrelations and still in an uncanny way it is only through *Orientalism* that the author takes us from the Balkans back to Europe.

> By being geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as the 'other' within, the Balkans have been able to absorb conveniently a number of externalised political, ideological, and cultural frustrations stemming from tensions and contradictions inherent to the regions and societies outside the Balkans. Balkanism became, in time, a convenient substitute for the emotional discharge that Orientalism provided, exempting the West from charges of racism, colonialism, Eurocentrism, and Christian intolerance against Islam. After all, the Balkans are in Europe, they are white; they are predominantly Christian, and therefore the externalisation of frustrations on them can circumvent the usual racial or religious bias allegations. With the re-emergence of East and Orientalism as independent semantic values, the Balkans are left in Europe's thrall, anticivilisation, alter ego, the dark side within.

Taking this last paragraph as a troubled starting-point, I want now to point to some venues of research that could allow us to see Balkanism as a repertoire of images and visions of Europe. There are few main points that this exploration ought to not underestimate.

- The first concerns the weight of the Ottoman as well as Eastern (Byzantine) legacy on western constructions of the Balkans. The interrelation among western Christianity, Greek Orthodoxy and Islam in terms of cultural signification and specificity cannot be reduced to a binary opposition.
- Attention should be given to the intellectual and social circles that were implicated to the construction of discourses on the Balkans and their distinct agendas.
- The different themes of Balkanism should be related to the overall major issues that determined emerging images of Europeanness in that period: globalisation, the crisis of nineteenth century imperialism, war and social unrest and revolutions.

Let us now focus on two case studies that illustrate the intertwining among western views on the Balkans, modern forms of sociality and images of Europe. Although these two case studies are quite different from each other they both indicate how Balkanism overruns binary distinctions between derogatory/positive characterisations, progressive and conservative views, left/right politics. Both cases show how the most derogatory elements of

Balkan culture were appropriated as useful elements for the envisioning of rejuvenated and positive images of Europe.

Case A:
Women in the Balkans and the search for a better European future

There is a long tradition of women travellers to the Near East ranging from 19th century tourism to the resorts of Yugoslavia (Opatija and Bled) to twentieth century political activism and social work. Lured by the images of primitive Balkan character, political strife and primal devotion to national ideals – images that were generated around the years of the Balkan Wars and World War I, a growing number of women, particularly British women, travelled in the Balkans and devoted long periods of their lives to the causes of national struggles in the area.

Altering the stereotypes of gentle-women travellers, women like Edith Durham, Rebecca West, Rose Wilder Lane and others chose the Balkans as an area of political activism, research, social work and military struggle, as in the case of Flora Sandes, an English woman who fought for seven years as an officer in the Serbian Army.[6]

Most of these women published articles, books, memoirs and fiction that recorded in various forms their experiences. This travel literature – for lack of better word – contributed greatly to the formation and propagation of images of the Balkans in Western Europe.

These writings are in general marked by the authors' active desire to commit their lives to political activism often as a way out of the 'dullness' of middle-class women's life in provincial England. The Balkans provided an open territory to political activism. Women like Edith Durham and Rebecca West were often criticised by the English press which often commented ironically on the modern ladies' desire each to adopt a Balkan baby-state and devote themselves to its upbringing and well-being.

It would be very restricting to think of women's travel writing of this period only in this sense. Their writings offer insights into a variety of themes that concern social and international politics, war and pacifism, gender relations and cultural interactions (east/west, Western Christianity/Eastern Orthodoxy/Islam)

Let us take the example of Rebecca West. This was the adopted name of Cecily Isabel Fairfield born in 1892 in County Kerry of a Scottish mother and an Anglo-Irish journalist father. She wrote fiction, poetry, criticism and journalism. Invested in the cause of suffragetism, she contributed articles to

[6] On women travelers in the Balkans, see John Allcock and Antonia Young (eds), *Black Lambs and Grey Falcons: Women Travelers in the Balkans*, Bradford, Bradford University Press, 1991.

the *Freewoman* as well as socialist newspapers of the period. In 1912 she started a passionate love affair with science-fiction author and publicist H.G. Wells, an experience that was formative for her as a writer.

West's love relationship with the Balkans developed in the 1930s, starting from a period of discovery, rising to a generous climax and followed by bitter post-war disillusionment. She travelled extensively in the European Near East and she wrote both fictional and non-fictional accounts of her experiences. Her most important work on the Balkans is her book. The book was first published in 1940, made reprints and it was until recently a necessary literary companion for the western traveller in the Balkans.

The book documents West's return to Yugoslavia in 1937 after an earlier visit that made her fall in love with the country and its people. As she put it to her husband trying to persuade him to return to the Balkans after that first visit,

> "Well, there is everything there. Except what we have. But that is little." "Do you mean that the English have very little," he asked, "or the whole of the West?" "The whole of the West," I said, "here too." He looked at the butter-yellow baroque houses between the chestnut trees and laughed. "Beethoven and Mozart and Schubert wrote quite a lot of music in this town," he said. "But they were none of them happy," I objected. "In Yugoslavia," suggested my husband smiling, "everybody is happy." "No, no", I said, "not at all, but..." The thing I wanted to tell him could not be told, however, because it was manifold and nothing like what one is accustomed to communicate with words. "Really...there is much we have not got which the people in the Balkans have got in quantity."[7]

In the prologue of her book she mentions that all she knew about the Balkans prior to her first visit was violence, a knowledge derived from memories of her "earliest interest in Liberalism". She notes:

> But I must have been wholly mistaken in my acceptance of the popular legend regarding the Balkans, for if South Slavs had been truly violent they would not have been hated by the Austrians, who worshipped violence in an imperialist form, and later by the fascists, who worshipped violence in a totalitarian form. I had to admit that quite simply I knew nothing at all about the south-eastern corner of Europe; and since there proceeds steadily from that place a stream of

[7] Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falkon. A Journey through Yugoslavia in 1937*, New York, The Viking Press, 1940, p. 23.

events which are source of danger to me... that is to say I know nothing of my destiny. That is a calamity.[8]

There are many ways to read into West's *Black Lamb and Grey Falkon*. The title itself is highly symbolic. The symbolism concerns different acts of intercultural exchanges in the context of the Ottoman Empire. According to folk tradition the Black Lamb is offered by Gypsies to Christians at the Eve of St. George just before the Orthodox Easter. The Grey Falkon refers to the epic bird that appeared to Tsar Lazar before the battle between the Serbs and Turks at Kosovo in 1389 offering him the choice between an earthly and a heavenly kingdom. He chose the heavenly kingdom and consequently he lost his earthly one to the Turks.

The symbolic focus of the title instructs us to read the book as a lengthy (i.e. over a thousand pages long) elaboration on the issue of the fate of empires and position of subaltern cultures within imperial political structures.

West is an admirer of the newness and the vitality of nationalism in the Balkans. She confidently notes that "if there is an assurance in the Europe of our day that sometimes life goes well, a promise that some day it may go better, it is offered by these [new Balkan] countries".

In the new Balkan states she sees the possibility of something new being created. New nation-states that do not share the faults of Empires and are formed in opposition to them. She exclaims at the fact that her contemporaries in Europe and the United States did not see that in the same way. She explicitly attacks people on the political left for the failure to recognise the people's right to claim and fight for national independence. As she puts it,

> The left wing, especially, was sharply critical of the new states and all that they did. This was inconsistent in those who believed, often to a point far beyond the practical, that the individual must be free to determine his own destiny, and it was partly due to a theory, so absurd that not even its direct opposite has any chance of being true, that nationalism is always anti-democratic and aggressive, and that internationalism is always liberal and pacific. Yet nationalism is simply the determination of a people to cultivate its own soul, to follow the customs bequeathed to it by its ancestors, to develop its traditions according to its own instincts. It is the national equivalent of the individual's determination not to be a slave...Any discussion of these points was complicated by the tendency of these intellectuals to use the words 'nationalism' and 'imperialism' as if they meant the same thing...As the state of Europe grew worse innumerable people,

[8] Ibid., p. 21.

most of them Americans sighed, 'Ah it's the fault of these small states,' and had not the faintest idea what they meant when they said it.[9]

For West, Yugoslavia represented the fight against the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and the liberation of national feeling. By adopting Yugoslavia she took a stand in favour of political movements against imperialism and she castigated the position of her contemporaries on the left, while point out to the contradictions of western rationalism. Her itinerary through cities, communities, people, relations, friendships and animosities is rich in repetitions of all the stereotypical associations of Balkans with violence, irrationality, primordialism, scarcity and impediments to progress. This imagery however provides her with the language necessary in order to articulate a critique of imperialism and envisage an alternative European future. Not through dis-identification from the Balkans, but through visionary identification with the hypothetical European potential that the Balkans represented.

Case B:
Balkans, Europe and the American polity

American interest in the Balkans in the beginning of the century was triggered by two separate but interrelated events: World War I and immigration from Southeastern Europe to the United States.

During the first two decades of the twentieth century the issue of immigration of millions of labourers from the South-eastern peninsula of Europe to the United States was at the core of heated debates that concerned the content, the form and the future of American national culture and character.

Articulated either from the perspective of anti-immigrant nativism or from the perspective of cultural pluralism the arguments that were supported by policy-makers, intellectuals, scientists and journalists concerned: the racial status of the new immigrants, the compatibility (or not) between their cultural heritage and the principles of proper American culture and the possibility of accommodating and integrating these immigrants in the native national body without altering its basic characteristics.

Both lines of argumentation used predominantly the concept-metaphors of 'Europe' and 'America' (and not so much national terms) in order to define culture and difference, to elaborate on the appropriate ways that societies should deal with difference and to explain what happens at moments of encounter

[9] Ibid., p. 1100.

between culturally different (and possibly socially unequal) groups of people and traditions. Both lines of argumentation used the concepts of 'Europe' and 'America' in order to discuss the need, possibility, form and governing principles of *communities of nations*.

Thus, the American iconography of Europe in this period emerged as a response to the political, cultural and social need to talk about difference and identity in the context of cultural contact and interaction and demographic and social changes. Given the European cultural background of the dominant Anglo-Saxon American polity, the debates over immigration gave rise to a new iconography of Europe that illustrated the differences between South and North, Eastern and Western Europe. Accordingly, the nativist polemics of immigration argued that the South-eastern Peninsula of the Balkans and the immigrants who came from there embodied all the negative aspects of Europeanness and that their racial and cultural traits were radically different from those of the Anglo-Saxon Americans. According to the nativists any racial or cultural mixing between Southeastern Europeans and Anglo-Saxon Americans would constitute an act of miscegenation and would result in the creation of an inferior type of race and culture.

The advocates of nativism became politically dominant to the extent that they were actually effective in persuading the Congress to support legislation that drastically restricted immigration from the South and Southeastern Europe in 1924. Nativism however was politically confronted by different groups of social reformists and activists. Quite often the challengers of nativism were social reformists and workers who devoted their lives to work in the tenements and to the study of the conditions of the immigrants' lives. In a sense social work was the origin of immigration studies as a field of scholarly inquiry. As opposed to the nativists and assimilationists who argued on the basis of the immigrant's essential cultural characteristics, social reformers became interested in the historical and social background of the people who migrated prior to their immigration.

In the same period a number of American feminists who were devoted to the causes of internationalism and pacifism became interested in the possible influence of Balkan culture on American polity. This interest generated research in Balkan culture and history that aimed at providing a pluralistic response to the politically dominant assimilationist and nativist ideology.

A prominent representative of this group of social reformers was Emily Greene-Balch. Balch visited the Balkans in the early 1900s in order to do research and collect material for a book on Slavic immigration to the United States. She was one of the first scholars of immigration who realised that it is impossible to study immigration solely from the point of view of the country that receives immigrants. She acknowledged the need to study the cultural, political and historical background of Slav immigrants in order to be able to

reach to a conclusion concerning their possible impact on American polity. Thus the perspective of her research remained American-centric.

Balch did extensive research and collected material that she analysed in her over one thousands pages book *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens.*[10] In order to respond to the question of how possible it was to assimilate Slav immigrants into American culture, Balch considered it necessary to analyse the type of Slav nationality. With regard to this issue, she mentions:

> Nationality in the Balkans is different from that in the west in the sense that it does not concern political union, but it rests upon union of blood, community of language, and community of culture and ideals.[11]

In general, the non-political and primal nature of Balkan nationalism was considered in this period a negative characteristic that placed the Balkans in a perpetual time-lag in relation to European modernity. However, from an American-centric point of view the non-political and primal nature of Balkan nationalism was a positive characteristic since it was conducive to political assimilation. Slav immigrants in the US should be expected to retain some elements of their national/ethnic background; that however should be in no conflict with their overall assimilation by the American polity, since their ethnic nationalism did not historically have a political character. Even Pan-slavism was perceived by Balch as a movement towards spiritual and not political union. Writing before the years of the Balkan wars Balch commented on the peaceful character of Balkan culture. She wrote:

> In any case it appears to be true that Slavic peoples have not been fitted to play a conspicuous part in the era of bloody struggle which Europe has passed through, during the feudal period and since. In spite of personal bravery which has made Slavs famous fighters, from the Polish Legion to the Cossacks of the Ukraine or the Croats of the military confines, they seem to lack some element of aggressiveness, something of the instinct to retaliate.[12]

Peacefulness was attributed to a version of historical inertia that according to Balch differentiated the Balkans from the rest of the Europe and could be attributed to their Byzantine heritage. She noted:

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[10] Emily Greene Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, New York, Arno Press, 1969.
[11] Ibid., p. 10.
[12] Ibid., p. 20.

They appear to be deficient in the faculty for cohesion and leadership... The inclusion of the major part of the Slavs in the eastern sphere of influence had political and literary as well as religious results. Byzantium as a centre of the world of ideas meant something very different from Rome; something much less vitalising and significant for the future.[13]

The inclusion in the Byzantine Empire followed by the submission to Ottoman control had eliminated the notion of progress from Slavic history.[14] The inability to change, a feature that refuted the Europeanness of the Balkans and for US nativists proved the fact that the Balkans represented the dark side of Europe, was for Balch a positive characteristic that could render Balkan immigrants to the US into model American citizens. Historically separated from the stream of European modernity because of their Byzantine and Ottoman predicament, the Balkans were re-entering the process of progress *via* migration to the United States. America constituted the only historically possible future for the Balkans. In a note that echoes rather late twentieth century discourse on globalisation, Balch commented on the ways in which through immigration the Balkans would get the opportunity to re-join the world.

The change is under way, and the emigration to America is one of its accompaniments. It is also in turn an accelerating cause of the changes. Immigration is thus a part of that great levelling and fusing activity which is one side of the historical process. It owes its ease if not its possibility to the cheapness and speed of modern transportation and communication, and it co-operates with them in wiping out local differences, spreading among distant peoples the reciprocal knowledge of one another, and evening up their levels. As Tarde has said, civilisation of the prevailing type is becoming planetary; it has gone round the globe and come back again.[15]

Closely related to her life-long support to internationalism Balch favoured the elaboration of hybrid civic ideals that would guarantee the conflict-free co-operation between groups of people, ethnicity, races and nations without necessary melting them together or assimilating them to a dominant type. Their Balkan historical and cultural background – so distinct and different from the European background – rendered the Slav immigrants into model

[13] Ibid., pp. 21-22.
[14] Ibid., p. 23.
[15] Ibid., p. 58.

American "fellow citizens", true embodiments of the ideals of cultural and political pluralism that Balch supported.

The outbreak of the Balkan Wars (1912-13) that operated as a prelude to the European Great War surprisingly did not alter the perception of Balkan forms of nationhood as exemplary forms of ethnic consciousness in the context of pluralistic visions of the American polity. For American nativists the war proved the fact that European immigrants were not at all assimilated and that the famous 'melting pot' had obviously malfunctioned for decades. According to them the vigorous nationalist and cultural mobilisations of Bohemians, Greeks, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians during the War only proved the failure of Americanisation and the possible threat that these unassimilated foreigners could pose for American national unity. This type of argumentation was confronted by intellectuals who attempted to re-conceptualise America as a transnational state. One of the first advocates of transnationalism was Randolph S. Bourne.

Bourne was born in New Jersey in 1886 and grew up in a social environment marked by industrial unrest and conflicts between native-born Americans and new immigrants. He studied at Columbia University and his teachers there included John Dewey, economic historian Charles Beard and anthropologist Franz Boas. During World War I Bourne wrote extensively on the war, he became the intellectual hero of WWI. The unifying theme of his articles was his refusal to see the war as a necessary step towards a safer world and democracy. He was also critical of the League of Nations since he saw it as an impediment to change and a means of petrifying the status quo. His articles and reviews in that period reflect his long-range search for a trans-national culture that would offer a fertile soil for the cultivation of democratic ethics.

In one of his most famous essays titled "Transnational America" and published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1916 he harshly criticised those American publicists who blamed the resurgent ethnic nationalisms of Southeastern European immigrants for the failure of the American melting-pot. He mentioned that,

> To face the fact that our aliens are already strong enough to take a share in the direction of their own destiny, and that the strong cultural movements represented by the foreign press, schools, and colonies are a challenge to our facile attempts, is not, however to admit failure of Americanisation. It is not fear for the failure of democracy. It is

rather to urge us to an investigation of what Americanism may rightly mean.[16]

The type of Americanism envisioned by Bourne constituted a type of nationalism very different from the European type.

> We have transplanted European modernity to our soil, without the spirit that inflames it and turns all its energy into mutual destruction... In a world which has dreamed of internationalism, we find that we have all unawares been building up the first international nation. The voices which have cried for a tight and jealous nationalism of a European pattern are failing...What we have achieved has been rather a cosmopolitan federation of national colonies, of foreign cultures, from whom the sting of devastating competition has been removed. America is already the world-federation in miniature.[17]

Of course Bourne did not specify the procedures through which the "sting of devastating competition" had been removed and was overly optimist with regard to the un-conflictual organisation of ethnic difference in the US. The only indication that he gave about the conditions under which his Transnational America would be realized concerns the way in which he considers the Southeastern European immigrants as the model representatives of Transnational Citizenship. For Bourne, transnational movements and return migration from the US to primitive homelands and back does not only represent the essence of true Americanism, but also constitutes Americanism's opportunity to expand beyond the physical borders of the American continent.

> This migratory habit has been especially common with the unskilled labourers who have been pouring into the Untied States in the last dozen years from every country in southeastern Europe. Many of them return to spend their earnings in their own country or to serve their country in war. But they return with an entirely new critical outlook and a sense of the superiority of American organisation to the primitive living around them. This continued passage to and fro has already raised the material standard of living in

16 Randloph Bourne, *Transnational America*, in Carl Resek (ed.), *War and the Intellectuals. Essays by Randolph S. Bourne, 1915-1919*, New York, Evaston and London: Harper Torchbooks, 1964, pp. 107-123.
17 Ibid.

many regions of these backward countries...America is educating these laggard peoples from the very bottom of society up, awakening vast masses to a newborn hope for the future. In the migratory Greek, therefore, we have not the parasitic alien, the doubtful American asset, but a symbol of that cosmopolitan interchange which is coming, in spite of all war and national exclusiveness.[18]

Here again the Balkans function as an anti-symbol of Europe, only with a positive undertone. In a period that proper Europe is locked in the strife of 19th century nationalisms and war, the Balkans exactly because of their backwardness and primitive character are open to American transnationalism a new form of global political organization.

Towards a Post-Ottoman perspective

During the first decades of the twentieth century images of Europe produced by Europeans – or produced by Americans in relation to the American polity – played an important role in the elaboration of political visions aiming at social and cultural change and reform. These political visions often found their conceptual vocabulary through the imagining of regions beyond the symbolic borders of proper Europe; through the development of discourses on other regions. That is to say that the imagination that motivated and these political visions was *heterochtone*, it claimed its origin in the realm of the "elsewhere".

Being at the center of international developments in the beginning of the century, the southeastern peninsula of Europe became a very significant "elsewhere". The significance of this region was mainly due to geopolitics. Bearings the marks of its Ottoman and Byzantine imperial past the peninsula represented the site of foreign penetration, abduction and differentiation. Claiming independence from former Empires the peninsula enabled the re-assertion of the European presence at least in the sphere of imagination. It was in this way that the southeastern peninsula of Europe was transformed – often misnamed – into the Balkans.

For political visionaries, Balkanism offered the conceptual vocabulary for the elaboration of alternative images of Europe – both in the European as well as in the American sphere of politics and culture. Alternative images of Europe that borrowed the vocabulary of Balkanisms responded to the need to re-conceptualise society as diversity and the nation beyond imperialism.

We still need extensive research in order to map the intellectual, cultural and political itineraries that discourses of Balkanism have followed and the

[18] Ibid.

ways in which more often than not these discourses re-enforced what they set out to transform.

We also need more in-depth research in order to understand the ways in which Balkanism overruns the binaries that characterise modernist theories of culture and politics: tradition-progress, civilisation-barbarity, optimism-frustration, development-inertia, Christianity-Islam etc. and to relate it to other discourses that function in similar ways.

Sabine Poeschel

The iconography of the continents in the visual arts from the origins to the age of Tiepolo*

Ever since antiquity, the division of the earth into continents has been customary, and indeed taken for granted, as by Pliny for example: "Terrarum orbis universus in tres dividitur partes, Europam, Asiam, Africam."[19]

The pictorial representation of the parts of the earth is developed in accordance of this concept of the world, and it attains fixed form during the expansion of the Roman Empire. The official art of the Imperium Romanum favoured the depicting of subjugated cities, personified as female forms. The Emperor Hadrian, who set himself the goal of visiting every province of his Empire, had many of his coins ornamented with personifications of conquered territories.[20] These ancient representations were already firmly committed to a political view that assumes European superiority. Significantly Rome or Italy personified the European continent.

Thus the basic characteristics of the parts of the earth, as they should be depicted, became a firm tradition in Roman art. The continents became formally dignified female personifications with attributes that are then adopted, in part, in modern representations, too, so for instance the elephant-head, ears of corn and a scorpion for Africa. As regards content, the pictures of the continents are decisively marked by imperial and economic interests. Though the personifications of Africa and Asia are reproduced with great respect, they never attain the dignity of a figure of Roma or Italia. They are majestic representations of a continent, yet remain subordinate, paying their tribute to Rome.

The conception of the world as divided into three continents is preserved in the Middle Ages. The *orbis tripartitus* becomes a symbol of God's creation or for the power of Christ. Little effort beyond this is made to analyse the picture of the world in the Middle Ages.

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* This paper is based on my dissertation *Studien zur Ikonographie der Erdteile in der Kunst des 16.-18. Jahrhunderts*, München 1985.

19 Pliny the Elder, *Plinii Secundi Naturalis Historiae*, III, 1.

20 J. C. Toynbee, *The Hadrianic School*, Cambridge, 1934.

In contrast, the modern allegories of the continents constitute one of the most important themes of Western art from the late 16th of the early 17th century. As a result of the discovery of America, the number of the known continents was now raised to four, which fitted the prevailing conventions of art dealing with profane themes. For the number four was to some extent canonical for the earthly realm: for compass points, four elements, four times of the day, four seasons – and four continents. As well as this, the number four suited the requirements of pictorial embellishments, especially in churches and palaces, where it now became the practice to decorate the four sides or corners of a ceiling, for instance, with these allegories. In this way the raising of the number of continents to four after the discovery of America, certainly facilitated the diffusion of the theme.

This is, however, only a superficial explanation of the growing importance of these allegories in European art. For it was not Columbus' sensational discovery alone that caused this development, but European expansion and colonisation. The gradual realisation during the 16th century, that Columbus had discovered not a coastal strip of Asia, but a whole new part of the earth, heightened the European awareness not only of the existents of continents, but of the European superiority as well. For this reason artists began, independently of one another in various parts of Europe, to represent the continents anew.

As had the Romans in the Mediterranean so now the Europeans appeared all over the globe as conquerors. This victor-pose characterises most allegories of the parts of the earth. Only in Asia did European come across a power and a culture comparable to their own if not superior to it, yet in this region Europeans argued their primacy as the adherents of the only true religion, which set them apart from Islamic cultures. Africa and America, by contrast, were seen as the territories of savages needing to be civilised. Thus the modern representations the continents are like those of the ancient world, stamped from the beginning by European ethnocentricity, when indeed, not actually caused by this attitude. By emphasising their cultural superiority Europeans legitimised their invasions and glorified themselves at the same time. As in Hadrian's Rome so in the European Baroque and Rococo the principal significance of allegories of the continents is the representation of world-wide power. That is, the newly won position of Europe as the World Power created a new theme in art.

From the outset Europe appears as queen as shown in Adriaen Collaerts engraving from 1585 (fig. 1), and as the site of religion as well as dominatrix of the arts, civilisation and navigation. The inscription of an engraving from the hand of Crispijn de Passe of the early 17th century mentions Athena-Minerva: "The nymph hands me the weapons of Pallas." Indeed Europe is only seldom represented as the beloved of Jupiter, but rather as the intelligent

but also war-like Minerva as can be clearly observed in the motive of Europe's suit of armour. The creators of allegories of Europe could avail themselves the classical figure of Minerva or the regal personifications of cities or lands, characteristic attributes being easily applied. When it came to allegories from foreign continents however, the artists had to depend on information from pictures and texts – a procedure I would like briefly to introduce through the example of the "mundus novus".

The reports of the discoverers and travellers aroused great interest in the educated classes all over Europe, and were printed in many editions as individual works or in compilations as can be observed in Crispijn de Passe's Allegory of America, created in the early 17th century (fig. 2), that is partly based on the engravings of Theodor de Bry's series "America".[21] These early reports from the newly discovered regions beyond the ocean provided the relevant source that would permanently fix the image of America. The Caribbean where the first landings were effected determined the view of the Americas.[22] Columbus' and Vespucci's inspired descriptions of the beauty of the country and the luxuriance of the vegetation spread rapidly all over Europe. In addition the discovery of gold, already mentioned by Columbus provoked an enhanced interest in the land and it's inhabitants much more than it was the case with Africa for instance. Whereas reports from Africa frequently merely distinguished between the light-skinned Islamic North-Africans and the heathen black Central-Africans those from America provided detailed ethnographic observations. As well as the relatively superficial descriptions of the nakedness, colour, hair and weapons of the American Indians, we find reports about the tattooing customs and tribal structures. One essential and for Europeans extremely alienating factor was the cannibalism of some Indian peoples.[23] Vespucci's reports on this quite unemotively while Columbus likens cannibals to monsters.[24] These doubtlessly cruel customs of some Amerindian peoples do not, however, provoke a blanket condemnation. On the contrary, there are a number of very

[21] M. Boehme, *Die großen Reisesammlungen des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Strassburg 1904. The most important travel collections were those by Giovanni Ramusio (Venice, since 1550); Richard Hakluyt (London, since 1582) and Theodor de Bry (Frankfurt, since 1590).

[22] Cf. the contributions by H. Honour in the exhibition catalogues: *The New Golden Land*, New York, 1975; *Amérique vue par l'Europe*, Paris, 1976; *Mythen der Neuen Welt*, Berlin, 1982.

[23] The most famous source to this phenomenon is the authentic record by Hans Staden, *Wahrhaftige Historia und beschreibung eyner Landschaft der Wilden, Nacketen, Grimmigen*, Menschenfresser Leuthen, Marburg 1557.

[24] C. Jane, *Selected Documents Illustrating the Four Voyages of Columbus*, Liechtenstein 1967; A. Vespucci, *Mundus Novus* (1501), Vespucci Reprints, Texts and Studies, Princeton 1916.

positive evaluations, deriving from the notion of the noble savage, as depicted for example by Jan Sadeler the Elder in 1581 (fig. 3). This attitude of a pure, just life-style lived in harmony with nature and untouched by any civilisation was already familiar from antiquity. A description from Sir Walter Raleigh is typical: "We found people most gentle, loving and faithful, void of all guile and treason, and such as lived after the manner of the Golden Age."[25]

This attitude was based on literary witness that had determined the image of foreign peoples since Homer and Hesiod. The Europeans' highly developed culture, itself recognised as such, was contrasted with the "primitivism" of exotic peoples, the term implying an ascetic ideal as well as a life-style in harmony with nature and not socially conditioned.[26]

In opposition however to this attitude one finds the Spanish *conquidadores* in particular harshly condemning the American natives. A typical example of this is the report of Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, official historiographer of the Spanish monarch: "But among the Indians from the areas that I visited there are, to my knowledge, a number of sodomites and many, who eat human flesh, worship idols, conduct human sacrifice and are extremely vicious. They are crude people utterly without compassion... they are rather like merciless beasts."[27] Both of these attitudes were to characterise the allegorical representation of the continent as can be observed in the works of Sadeler and de Passe.

Another idea that had its origin in the traditional attitude of expectancy vis-à-vis foreign regions was the idea of fabulous beasts as noticeable in the motive of a crowned and winged aspis-snake in de Passe's allegory (fig. 2). Dragons in particular, repeatedly described by ancient and medieval cosmographers and travellers, were so firmly anchored in the European image of the world, that they were in fact "sighted" in the foreign continents. Real animals are described as well of course, iguanas, jaguars and the gaudy parrots. These reports provided an impression of a wide land with luxuriant vegetation inhabited by naked men and strange animals. In response to changes in the European Zeitgeist the vision of America varies between cannibalistic cruelty and paradise lyricism.

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25 For the Noble Savage in antiquity see Homer, *Ilias*, XIII, 3-5; Strabo, *Geographica*, VII, 3-9; Vergil, *Georgica*, II, 349-383; A.O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity*, New York, 1965. The quotation is taken from Walter Raleigh, *The First Voyage Made to the Coasts of America*, in: Hakluyt, Vol. II, 731.

26 G. Pochat, *Der Exotismus während des Mittelalters und der Renaissance*, Uppsala 1970, p. 46.

27 G. Fernández de Oviedo, *Historia y natura general de las Indias*, quoted after *Mythen der Neuen Welt*, Berlin 1982, 58. His work is analyzed by A. Pagden, *European Encounters with the New World*, New Haven and London 1993, 56-68.

Alongside with these detailed literary sources an iconographic vocabulary was developed that became steadily more concrete in the course of the 16th century and provided the basic forms of the allegories. In cartography, which progressed in leaps and bounds with the voyages of discovery, the still unknown central regions of Africa and America offered space for illustrations: "So geographers in Africa maps, with savage pictures fill their gaps..." mocked the poet Jonathan Swift. This applied no less for the "terra incognita" of America where, even after the first wave of rapid discovery, it was mainly the coasts that were investigated in order to establish the extent of the continent. Apart from cartography, where the illustrations merely filled out lacunae, the spirit of inquiry into the parts of the earth created a growing need for graphic description, which was met by the development of the techniques of print-making. While the first travel-accounts were but sparsely illustrated, those from the second half of the 16th century were mostly provided with a series of engravings. In 1564 Jacques Le Moyne travelled to Florida. Theodor de Bry produced engravings on the basis of this Frenchman's paintings and published them together with the artist's report on 1591.[28] They convey a positive impression on the life of the American Indians and contain implications of the Golden Age together with the notion of the Noble Savage. The influence of these pictures was considerable, if one bears in mind that as late as in the middle of the 18th century Giambattista Tiepolo in creating his figure of America took his information from the engravings after Le Moyne.[29] Thus during the 16th century a comprehensive exotic vocabulary was assembled that was available to artists from various sources. The information there contained about the continents, even that pertaining to the previously completely unknown so called New World was varied and often relatively accurate, though it concentrated mainly on the sensationally new in conformity to a European point of view. This attitude characterises the first allegorical pictures as well.

A compelling schema for the depiction of the theme was first provided in 1603 by Cesare Ripa's *Iconologia*, printed in Rome (figs. 4 and 5). The compilation of allegorical pictures, based on ancient as well on contemporary literary sources and models, is known to have become the most important work of reference on these matters for baroque artists. In Ripa's version of the parts of the earth the discrepancy of presentation between the three older continents and America is particularly clear. Europe (fig. 4) is of course declared to be the highest ranking continent: "Europa è prima e principale parte del Mondo". In support of this Ripa cites Pliny who described Europe as

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28 Th. de Bry, *America*, Vol. II, Frankfurt 1591.

29 M. Ashton, *Allegory, Fact and Meaning in Giambattista Tiepolo's Four Continents in Würzburg*, "Art Bulletin", 60, 1978, 1, pp. 109-125.

the leading continent despite its small size.[30] Form the numerous attributes listed in the text, only weapons, a horse, cornucopias, crowns and a *tempietto* are shown in the illustrative woodcut. The attributes drawn from art and science as presented by Ripa are omitted in the woodcut, while weapons and the militarily useful horse are inserted to illustrate military dominance: "Il cavallo, le più sorti d'armi [...] dimostrano che è stata sempre superiore à l'altre parti del mondo, ne l'armi."[31]

One new motif in Ripa's allegory of Europe is the temple, a model of a church that the personification presents to the spectator in the way saints or founders usually do. Notwithstanding the classical form of the circular temple it is intended as a Christian church, as Ripa's text makes clear: "Si rappresenta che tenghi con la destra mano il tempio, per dinotare ch'in lei al presente ci è la perfetta, & verissima Religione, & superiore à tutte l'altre." [32]

Thus Ripa considers the Christian religion as the decisive criterion for Europe's leading role. This is shown by the presence, alongside secular crowns, of the tiara, the mitre and the cardinal's hat at the foot of the personification. The other continents are contrasted with this picture of unchallenged hegemony.

Ripa's picture of Asia is determined by contemporary sources whereby the attributes of the continent are represented principally by the much sought-after imports from Asia to Europe. The way she presents incense and spices remind, however, of the regions offering tributes to the Roman emperors. The allegory of Africa is almost wholly determined by the antique iconography. The Hadrianic coins, as noticed in the beginning, seem to have been particularly influential as the source of such attributes like the elephants-head, ears of corn and scorpions. By contrast the allegory of America (fig. 5) summarises the peculiarities of the Indians as normally detailed in the travel-literature of the time. America should have a "volto terribile", an instruction which very few artists were able to follow. She wears a fantastic, ethnographically inaccurate feather head-dress and carries a bow and an arrow. A human head pierced by an arrow represents cruelty and cannibalism. She is accompanied by a small alligator. Only the dress with its decoratively cut hem and embroided band reminds one of an illustration from Theodor de Bry's America.[33] The only figure of the series shown in motion is America, which, together with the arrow she waves in her hand, indicates the savagery of the young continent.

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[30] Pliny, *Nat. Hist*, III, 1; Cesare Ripa, *Iconologia*, Rom 1603; facs. New York and Hildesheim, 1970, p. 332.

[31] Ripa, p. 334

[32] Ripa, p. 333.

[33] De Bry, *America*, II, Frankfurt 1591, *The king of Florida*, Illustration after Jacques Le Moyne.

In Ripa's representations, which became almost obligatory commonplaces for the allegories of the continents the difficulties experienced on grasping which was foreign are plainly to be seen. We find that antique pictorial schemata for the representations of the continents are not extended to include America. The moving figure may, however, at first sight show some degree of relationship to the Amazons in ancient art – witness the hair wound into a knot and the motif of the garment concealing only one breast, both quite contrary to Ripa's indications. Yet a comparison with the other personifications shows that this Amazonian concept is at a far remove from the dignified representatives of a continent.

In this way fixed types and commonplaces developed which however did not stiffen into a formula, but provided the basis of various representational modes for the centuries to come. The new theme, which was integrated into the repertoire of Western art not without some difficulty, became one of the most important subjects of both profane and sacred art in the periods of Baroque and Rococo. The diffusion and popularity of the theme was no longer brought up only with the confrontation between Europe and the overseas continents and the process of the colonisation. Rather the representation of the continents served to express various European ideologies. The consequence of this development was that the allegories of the parts of the earth drifted ever further away from the reality of the continents. Not even in the beginning had they been pure didactic pictures, but constructions, filtered through the fantasies of discoverers as well as trough the criteria of the artists themselves. Once an iconographic canon has been consolidated, these allegorical images were further modified to suit Western visions and the original sources were hardly referred to any more. The decline of interest in the discoveries and the integration or even the subordination of the theme of the continents into programs dominated by different concepts brought about a flattening in ethnographical accuracy.[34] According to the demands made by the commissioner, chief prominence was given to political, religious or decorative exotic aspects to the subject. Ancillary figures or stock objects appear whose sole function is to produce an exotic effect. As the sensation of novelty wore off and the picture of the strange territories was delivered no longer by the visual arts by scientific compilations instead, the allegorical figures ended up by expressing mainly the fantasies of European rulers, religious orders or sentimental thinkers. The theme was no longer a means of expressing a world-vision but of expressing various philosophies of life.

By the time of Ripa's allegory of Europe (fig. 4) at the latest, religion had become a criterion of evaluation. In the context of the profane images, the

[34] Cf. Poeschel, chapter V.

Christianity of Europe was set against the Islam that dominated in Asia, while Africa and America continued to be shown as heathen continents. But from the middle of the 17th century in the wake of the Counter-Reformation, the influence of Christianity became decisive in the now arising religious programmes. The concept of a "virginal" America was of prime importance in promoting a positive picture of the fourth continent and of its relationship to Europe. The papal claim to authority and the missionary zeal of the Jesuit order brought this aspect to the foreground. After the Counter Reformation the idea of a worldwide Christian community became most important for the Roman church. In accordance with Christ's demand: "Go out into the entire world and preach the Good News to all creation" (Mark 16, 15) the apostles' mission became once more one of the principal goals of the Catholic Church. In this sense the allegories of the continents became now in sacred art too an abbreviation for the whole mankind as "all creation".

Rome's claim to religious world domination manifests itself also very prominently in Gian Lorenzo Bernini's famous *Fountain of the four rivers* on the Piazza Navona.[35] At the same time as the peace treaty of Westfalia, which was attacked by Pope Innocent X, was concluded, the pope commissioned Bernini to construct the monument. It was to be unveiled in the presence of the pilgrims in the Jubilee Year 1650. The sun symbol of the obelisk, reinterpreted as "lumen Christi" with the dove of peace on top, the heraldic symbol of Innocent X, is surrounded by the personifications of the principal rivers of the four continents. Their reactions bear the stamp of their religious allegiances. The light of Christ reaches all the parts of the earth but they do not all see it. While the Ganges and the Nile remain unmoved and turn away from the obelisk, the Danube and the Rio de la Plata turn towards it. The Danube, representing Christian Europe, supports the papal coat of arms and looks up the obelisk with its dove, while the Rio, seems, in contrast to the Danube blinded and thrown down like Saint Paul.[36] America's representative sees from heathen darkness the divine light breaking in and enacts by his gesture the victory of Christianity in the New World. The missionary character of the monument stands revealed.

This concept of bringing light to all parts of the world was repeatedly taken up. A prominent example is Andreas Pozzo's famous ceiling fresco in the Jesuit church of Saint Ignatius of Loyola in Rome. The light which shines from Christ is actively transmitted out into the world by Saint Ignatius according to the painter and Jesuit father Pozzo: "Essendo egli stato zelatissimo di propagar la religione Cattolica, e la Luce dell'Evangelio per

[35] R. Preimesberger, *Obeliscus Pamphilius*, in: *Münchner Jahrbuch der bildenden Kunst*, 1974.

[36] Preimesberger, p. 134.

tutto il Mondo." [37] In a contrary movement, the process of salvation is made clear – Jesuits from all parts of the earth ascend to heaven with the converted. In accordance with the engagement of the Jesuit order, Asia and America are the center of interest. Europe and Africa accept the ray of light quite calmly, Asia points out the Saint Francis Xavier among the blessed while America vigorously combats the infidels. The saint is glorified by the reverence shown to him by Asia, for he personifies the missionary zeal of the Jesuit order more than anyone else does. The America figure is distantly related to Ripa's amazon but her aggressiveness has been transformed into a positive quality. Touched by the ray of light from Christ she combats the paganism in her continent. This concept, determined by the sense of mission was to spread out from Rome all over Europe.

These religious representations of the continents are also formally different from profane works and this in ways that once again reflect the special relation of Europe to America. The pictures, particularly those in important churches, do not always renounce exotic pomp even if this is less often present. But as the presentation of the exotic is not in the foreground, the allegories are concentrated on the essential elements of the traditional iconography, where novelty is not to be expected. Sacred art had, besides, no intention of rendering visible military or mercantile achievements and so, of accentuating European superiority in these realms. On the contrary it aimed at reducing differences in evaluation. It was almost exclusively in religious art that the distinction between civilised and uncivilised continents was transcended. Only very occasionally did America continue to be shown as a cruel cannibal. The idea of a worldwide catholic community ruled out the damming of the whole continent. Without significant distinctions Africa and America were received in the community of the converted, their personifications act like those of the other continents or are even emphasised as particularly zealous Christians. And in this process America undergoes an extraordinary transformation. If one recalls the bellicose man-eating Amazon of the 16th century, who then in Pozzo's fresco becomes, inspired by Saint Ignatius, a champion of faith and then lastly, turns into a modestly clad maiden approaching Mary with folded hand as for example in Johann Baptist Zimmermann's fresco of 1731 in Steinhausen or in the wide spread popular engravings like "Christ appears to the parts of the earth" that Bernard Picard created in 1718 (fig. 6), one sees clearly how profoundly the meaning of the figure has changed. In this work America seems less exotic and looks up to Christ in a way that is not at all aggressive. By the 18th century America had – in the eyes of the universal church – lost it's fearsome character. The godless

[37] Andrea Pozzo, letter to the duke of Liechtenstein, 1694, ARSJ, FG 1345, quoted from B. Kerber, *Andrea Pozzo*, Berlin 1971, p. 70.

idolaters were promoted to the status of children of the "mater ecclesia" with almost equal rights.

In profane monumental art the allegories of the continents appeared, one might almost say as expected, in the court of Louis XIV, the sun king, in Versailles. In Charles le Bruns fresco in the stairwell, begun in 1674 and destroyed during a renovation in 1752, Fame and Gloria as well as historical paintings and allegories of the continents glorified the king. Thus the ambassadors, entering by this stairway saw a bust of the sun king together with the European and the American continents, where his territories lay.

This concept was repeatedly taken up in the second half of the 17th century. The allegories of the continents almost belonged to the standard program of castles and royal seats. They were used to decorate monumental stairwells, throne-rooms, conference chambers, festive knightly halls, anti chambers, guardrooms and castle gardens. They did not necessarily render visible the actual domination of territories as in the case of the French kings, but rather the claim to universal authority. In the time of colonial empires and absolutism the theme of the continents was widely diffused, especially in such imperialistic contexts. It was not only monarchs that considered themselves world-rulers. The princes of dwarf-states also saw themselves as integrated into a comprehensive conception of the world and had themselves painted accordingly.

To some extent it continued to be the real goal of the allegories of the continents to depict the hegemony of the own European continent, as can be seen in Tiepolo's famous fresco in the Würzburg residential palace as well (figs. 7 and 8).[38] The inclusion of the inhabitants of foreign territories in the triumphal procession of a ruler goes back to antiquity and was given its fixed form in Rome. The ritual of displaying representatives of subjected peoples in a triumphal procession was taken up again, in modified form, in the renaissance.[39] The subjects were no longer presented as manacled barbarians and slaves of triumphant Rome, but rather as people enjoying the benevolent rule of the good regent. In the following period it was no longer the individual peoples that were associated with the triumph of the ruler, but the personifications of the continents as a sign of worldwide authority – even at Wuerzburg. The idea is the legitimisation of the ruler's power through the excellency of his governance, which makes him world-famous. In this context Europe is accorded absolute priority as in Tiepolo's fresco, painted from 1749-1753.

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38 Cf. exhibition catalogue *Der Himmel auf Erden*, München 1996.

39 J.M. Masson, Le monde luso-brésilien dans la joyeuse entrée de Rouen, in: J. Jacquot and E. Konigson (eds), *Les fêtes de la Renaissance*, vol. 3, Paris 1975.

The personification of Europe is a queen but appears also as the beloved of Jupiter from classical mythology, for a bull stands near her, adorned with flowers, which is an unusual feature (fig. 7). Typical, on the other hand, is the direct connection of the continent with the ruler, shown here with the building if the Würzburg residence in the background. In the front of it the architect Baltasar Neumann is portrayed as artillery officer with cannon, besides him the stucco artist Antonio Bossi in a cloak, to the left Giambattista Tiepolo with his son Domenico.

Thus, Europe appears here as a guardian of culture. The three visual arts of architecture, sculpture and painting are introduced through their representatives at the court, Neumann, Bossi and Tiepolo and represented at the same time through works of art and allegory – the painted architecture of Würzburg, the real stucco sculptures on the sides and the allegory of painting, venerating Europe and as well as her, the princely bishop von Greiffenclau above. Europe's cultural supremacy is then completed by the introduction of music in the motif of a concert. Only in second place, aspects of religion are recognisable in the Episcopal insignia. The previously so important aspects of military powers are here relegated to the background. An antiquated suit of armour lies in front of the globe that belongs to the figure of painting, behind we see an officer with the war-horse. Some military motives must however remain to symbolise the power of Europe. Above all the commissioner of the Work, Carl Philipp von Greiffenclau in a laurel-wreathed medallion. Fama broadcasts his fame to the admiring parts of the earth as patron of the arts and than as a guardian of Religion.

In the political allegory of absolutism the continents pronounced the highest dignity of the ruler who was equated with the sun shining upon the world. Christian Weise made a comparison very precisely in his work "Political orator" from 1681, saying: "Therefore let everyone say with full justification, that just as the sun in the sky, so is the loving and merciful prince in our fatherland."[40]

These overarching programmes that repeatedly showed the prince as Apollo or a ruling family celebrated by Fama and accompanied by the virtues, increasingly took on a life of their own. It was after the international significance of the principalities was well past its zenith, that the theme attained its widest diffusion in the imperial context. Soon it was enough that one belonged the European nobility to emphasise one's merits by means of the allegories of the continents that paid homage. What was required to this

[40] Ch. Weise, *Politischer Redner*, Leipzig 1681, p. 766, quoted from F. Buettner, *Die Sonne Frankens*, in Münchner Jahrbuch der Bildenden Kunst, 30, 1979, p. 173.

end was no longer the accurate depiction of a continent but rather exotic splendour and above all homage and tribute.[41]

However, the Enlightenment brought a perceptible alteration to the view taken of the continents in the middle of the 18th century. Contemplating nature from the cosiness of a fireside, European thinkers yielded to a sentimental Utopia of a better World, in which the ancient myth of the Golden Age and the Noble Savage were revived and transformed to the continents, imagined as still being in the state of nature. Jean Jacques Rousseau and others described the noble savage in his original unspoilt condition and the demand "back to nature" had of course its effect on the representation of the "savage" continents Africa and America.[42] Indeed this attitude is perceptible in Tiepolo's portrayal of America in the Würzburg palace (fig. 8). The personification of the continent, one of the artist's most impressive creations, is an extremely dignified and self-conscious presence. She does not look up to the European ruler, but down upon her subjects, to whom she presents her extensive territory in its unspoilt state of nature. In the gigantic alligator she rides the old notion of the dragon in the foreign worlds returns to life. The majesty of the figure, the calmness of her gesture, the wealth of her country, represented by cornucopias and beasts and the untouched beauty of a magnificent natural scenery, all indicate the almost enthusiastic notion of a free mankind in a natural paradise, which is exactly the fantasy of the noble savage.

In the second half of the 18th century the theme is taken up again by Tiepolo on a monumental scale, although with perceptible limitations. This is the beginning of the end. In 1762 to 1764 the painter portrayed the territories subjected to the Spanish crown in the throne room of the palace at Madrid. At a time, when the might of the country had long past its peak, the idea of a glorious and unchallenged Spanish monarchy was once again conjured up. An apotheosis of Spain is placed in the centre. Fama hovers above Hispania and bears her glory to the overseas continents of Africa and America. The picture includes further representations of the Spanish provinces.

In depicting Africa, Tiepolo in most parts picks up motifs from the Würzburg fresco. For America however he abandons an allegorical depiction for an historical painting, choosing one of the most triumphant moments from Spanish history – the return of Columbus (fig. 9). The discoverer is shown in the moment of landing. He gives the order for the treasures of the unknown continent to be unloaded. In this representation of a historical moment just as much emphasis is given to the Spanish crown's encouragement of the

41 Poeschel, pp. 213-238.

42 J.J. Rousseau, *Discours sur l'origine et les fondaments de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1754), in *Oeuvres complètes*, III, Paris 1964, p. 159.

discoverer as to the goods imported from the colony which lent Spain her wealth. The fact that Tiepolo confined himself to representing the areas that were actually under Spanish rule gave the picture greater credibility. This was the only way to present the country in the second half of the Eighteenth century as great and important to the eyes of the visitor entering the throne room.

The offering of goods, especially from America emphasises once again the tribute paid to the ruler in the original sense of the theme. America the "ultima pars mundi" without its own history is here accorded a place in European history. In Tiepolo's fresco Columbus orders the Indians to unload the treasures of the continent. Yet despite the homage here paid to glorious Hispania, the reverse side of the coin is allowed to appear. The same Tiepolo who had in Würzburg so brilliantly portrayed a free and proud America allows himself a sharp critical moment. The celebrated figure of an enslaved Indian hiding his face in his arms in a gesture of desperation, is scarcely a mere capriccio of a famous artist. Also in other places Tiepolo's sympathy with the tragedy of the peoples conquered by Europe is made clear. In contrast of many other Rococo artist he never depicted Africans or Indians and clownish servants or smiling beauties. The glorification of the great Columbus is perceptibly disturbed by the despair of the anonymous and faceless "savage". The figure remains only a detail in a triumphal program, yet it makes two fundamental changes clear. Here for once the element of cruelty that accompanied the allegory of America is shown as aggression not committed, but suffered. And it shows, besides, that the Spanish crown and so one of the most important ruling houses of Europe no longer receives unqualified reverence. The whole edifice of the European world power has hereby reached its limits.

The theme of the allegories of the continents evaporated with surprising abruptness just after its greatest diffusion towards the end of the eighteenth century. After the creation of the most triumphant frescoes, in which the continents had been pressed to personify in various ways, Europe's worldwide authority, the end now suddenly came. The theme disappeared with the factors that had called it into existence. At the end of the eighteenth century Europe as world power was shaken. An annihilating blow was delivered from that very colony that Europe had "civilised", christianised and "pacified" – namely America. The Declaration of Independence in 1776 rocked a system of government that had been consolidated over centuries and which then came apart with the French revolution. The Jesuit order, whose goal had been the conversion of the savages, had already been dissolved in 1773. Thus the bearers of the theme had become powerless. No ruler could any longer claim to worldwide fame. No nobleman would receive honours of this style again and the Catholic Church, put under pressure by the

enlightenment, revolution and the secularisation of society could no longer claim to worldwide homage. The theme had lost its sense in European history and art. The continent was no longer supreme and could no more evoke its own identity through this kind of pictures.

Fig. 1



Fig. 2



Fig. 3



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

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

Fig. 6

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Fig. 9

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