Treading Diverging Paths

Donor proliferation and aid transparency in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates

Martin Neil Lestra

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, 07 December 2017

European University Institute
Department of Political and Social Sciences

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« Je me rappelle m'être souvent alors fait la réflexion que jamais plus, sans doute, après l'inévitable départ, je ne vivrais dans un lieu aussi beau, que le spectacle en fût éclairé par la lumière blanche des printemps ou par le vermeil des fins d'après-midi d'octobre ».

Jean-François Revel, *Le voleur dans la maison vide*, 1997.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation explains the diversity of multilateral paths followed by similar small rentier states in the international realm. Why do some states commit to multilateralism by signing legally binding treaties, participating in institutions and contributing financial resources?

Amongst small state theorists, common wisdom has long held that small states are more likely to act multilaterally because of structural needs to bandwagon with bigger actors within existing frameworks. Liberal scholars reach a similar conclusion by arguing that states are progressively "socialized" within international organizations. On the other hand, political economists indicate that when a rentier state enjoys preferential trading terms thanks to its hydrocarbons exports, it has little incentive to engage multilaterally. "Branding" scholars in particular consider that small rentier states have a preference for costly and visible initiatives and little interest for the nitty-gritty aspects of international cooperation. The predictions outlined by these two research strands are completely antagonistic: while small state theory and liberalism predict more multilateral cooperation, rentier state theory predicts less of it. These opposite views fail however to explain the diversity of approaches to multilateral cooperation of small, resource-rich states like the Gulf emirates of Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – but also Norway, Venezuela or Brunei, for instance.

Against this background, this dissertation endeavours to understand better this discrepancy with a case study approach of two similar oil and gas exporting small states, Qatar and the UAE. These follow significantly different multilateral approaches in the field of foreign aid, a key component of their foreign policy for which they are increasingly important globally. The two city states diverge on two major items of the international community's aid agenda – donor proliferation and aid transparency. On the one hand, the UAE has in the past decade opened its doors to most Western international organizations of foreign assistance and become an active member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee on sensitive issues such as aid transparency; and made exceptional efforts in the region and among emerging donors at large, to streamline its aid landscape. On the other hand, Qatar has favoured bilateral frameworks and shut out the United Nations Development Program in Doha. Its attempt to streamline aid, despite reforms initiated fifteen years ago, has not as yet been fruitful.

Building on an alternative domestic approach, this thesis argues that the international behaviour of these states is better understood by looking at the impact of rentier and dynastic dynamics on the development of their aid bureaucracies. The growth of the rentier state creates a fragmented aid landscape in which performance is secondary, and where both reform-prone and reform-averse aid actors coexist. The need to accommodate members of the ruling dynasty and close allies concurs in forming and fossilizing aid fiefdoms. In other words, contrary to a widespread assumption, Gulf autocrats do not form a fully autonomous or cohesive leadership. Thus, even in the small centralized and autocratic state of Qatar, the fragmentation of the aid landscape undermines the leadership's reforms on donor proliferation and aid transparency. Conversely, decentralization of power in the UAE between rentier Abu Dhabi and non-rentier Dubai makes domestically negotiated agreements costlier and "stickier". Decentralization tempers the rentier and dynastic dynamics in Abu Dhabi and enhances reforms on donor proliferation and aid transparency.

If autocratic rulers cannot always act the way they want to, they also do not necessarily want to abide by the rules. Problematically, rentier and dynastic dynamics say little of actors' preferences. To complement the previous findings, I trace the evolution of aid preferences in Qatar and the UAE and underline the overlooked role of foreign advisers. While rentier state scholars assume that "rulers rule", I show that the growth of idle rentier state bureaucracies has given foreign experts more leverage. I identify the extent to which the divergent formation of three generations of aid experts has led Qatar and the UAE onto divergent multilateral pathways. I conclude by showing that there is a two-way relationship between the rise of pro- or anti-multilateralism foreign experts and the rentier state. If rentier dynamics weaken multilateralism by fragmenting autocrats' public policies, they nonetheless help consolidate foreign expertise in the face of inefficient rentier bureaucracies. Conversely, rivalrous foreign experts participate in the further segmentation of the bureaucracy.

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TABLE OF ACRONYMS

OEEC: Organisations for European Economic Cooperation

AAAID: Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development

ADFD: Abu Dhabi Fund for Development

AFESD: Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development

AL: Arab League

AMF: Arab Monetary Fund

BADEA: Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa

EAD: Environment Agency – Abu Dhabi

EEA: Education Above All

ESCWA: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

FAO: UN Food and Agriculture Organisation

FCSA: Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority

GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council

Global Fund/GFTAM: Global Fund to Fight Aids Tuberculosis and Malaria

GONGO: Governmentally-Organised Non-Governmental Organisation

IHC: International Humanitarian City

IMF: International Monetary Fund

INGO: International Non-Governmental Organisation

IRENA: International Renewable Energy Agency

IsDB: Islamic Development Bank

MB: Muslim Brotherhood

MBR: Mohamed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai, Prime Minister of the UAE

MBZ: Mohamed Bin Zayed, Ruler of Abu Dhabi, President of the UAE

MDG: Millennium Development Goal

MDPS: Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics

MICAD: Ministry of International Cooperation and Development

ML-TF: Money laundering and terrorist financing

MoF: Ministry of Finance

MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFAIC: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

ODA: Official Development Assistance

OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OECD-DAC: OECD Development Assistance Committee

OECD-DCD: OECD Development Cooperation Directorate

OFCA: Office for the Coordination of Aid (UAE)

OFID: OPEC Fund for International Development

OIC: Organisation for Islamic Cooperation

QACA: Qatar Authority for Charitable Affairs

QC: Qatar Charity

QDF: Qatar Development Fund/Qatar Fund for Development

QF: Qatar Foundation

QNRF: Qatar National Research Fund (Qatar)

QRC: Qatar Red Crescent Society

RACA: Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities

ROTA: Reach Out To Asia

SDG: Sustainable Development Goal

SSC: South-South Cooperation

UAE: United Arab Emirates

UAERC: United Arab Emirates Red Crescent

UN: United Nations

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

UNESCO: UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency

UNRRA: United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

USAID: US Agency for International Development

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INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGES OF FOREIGN AID AND MULTILATERALISM

Aid multilateralism is a daunting challenge. If in the "age of plenty" all countries grant that alleviating poverty is a priority,[1] not all agree that it is better done collectively. Since the aftermath of the Second World War, major multilateral aid organizations like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) or the club of Western donors of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD–DAC) have tried to convince donors of the benefits of burden-sharing for them to relinquish control over their funds,[2] have attempted to reconcile aid priorities with political and economic agendas, and have suggested objectives and ways in which aid could be best disbursed.[3] To prove their added value, and maintain themselves to this date as consequential providers of aid,[4] these multilateral organizations have evolved.[5]

Acting collectively is proving to be increasingly unnerving for Western aid donors as non-Western donors rise to challenge the aid system as it stands. Coordination between Western

[1] For Murphy, "just as 'government' was part of the solution to the problems of the Neolithic Agricultural Revolution 'development' is part of the solution to the problems of the Industrial Revolution". See Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 28.

[2] Milner and Tingley, 'The Choice for Multilateralism'.

[3] Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 32–36.

[4] Since the Cold War, multilateral aid has remained quite stable around 30% of total Official Development Assistance. See OECD, *Multilateral Aid 2015*, 22. The UN and its agencies, the European Union and the World Bank account for 60% of multilateral aid flows in 2013 – meaning about US$35 billion. See 'Multilateral Aid 2015: Better Partnerships for a Post-2015 World'.

The OECD measures multilateral aid in the following way: Multilateral ODA are only core resources to multilateral organizations. All resources that are provided to multilateral organizations and are tied to specific projects/regions/purposes are "earmarked funding" (or non-core), and these are counted as part of bilateral ODA. In recent reports however, the OECD has covered both core resources and earmarked funding to have a more comprehensive picture of the financing to multilateral organizations – this is called "total use of the multilateral aid system". See 'OECD Statistics'.

[5] For instance, there has been a move both in the realm of humanitarian and development aid to "bilateralize' multilateral aid through the earmarking of funding, i.e., funding attributed to specific projects, rather than the core budget of international organizations. See Eichenauer and Reinsberg, 'What Determines Earmarked Funding to International Development Organizations?'

and emerging (or re-emerging)[6] donors has occupied the centre-stage of the global agenda for aid since the 1990s.[7] It has been enshrined in the landmark manifesto of the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness, in the guidelines of the Accra Agenda for Action, or in the program of the (former) UN Millennium Development Goals and the (incumbent) UN Sustainable Development Goals.[8] The OECD underlines that "multilateral organizations will need to demonstrate and enhance their comparative advantages and reinforce co-operation and information-sharing with others in order to reduce risks linked to increased competition, volatility of funding to developing countries and possible funding gaps."[9] This shows that to this date, cooperation between Western and non-Western donors on aid, is still to be achieved.

How emerging donors are to be integrated into the existing aid framework remains an open question. Will these players abide by the rules and join existing organizations, or challenge those instead with alternative frameworks?[10] Among the non-Western donors that are "sitting on the fence" of multilateralism is an understudied, increasingly important, and suspect group of states: the wealthy petro-monarchies of the Gulf. These are better characterized as re-emerging donors. As indicated by Espinoza et. al, "throughout decades, GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries have provided large amounts of foreign aid, with Saudi Arabia being the top Arab aid donor, followed by Kuwait, the UAE, and more recently, Qatar."[11] Though often presented as a homogeneous whole,[12] Gulf donors do not act as a coherent block. Oman's aid is historically modest and discrete, Saudi Arabia is one of the leaders of alternative, religiously motivated frameworks of aid, and Kuwait has been transparently reporting aid to Western multilateral aid organizations since its independence in 1963. In other words, their attitudes towards the existing aid system diverge.

Regional cooperation is also limited. For instance, the Gulf Co-operation Council's role is nascent. It has reacted strongly to the Arab Springs, when "GCC's Secretary General, Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani, announced in December 2011 the creation of a $5bn fund, which increased later to reach $10bn, for Jordan and Morocco in support of development

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[6] Manning rightfully notes that non-Western donors have always been present in the global aid landscape, but have become more salient after the end of the Cold War. See Manning, 'Will "Emerging Donors" Change the Face of International Co-Operation?'
[7] Hulme, 'The Political Economy of the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals]', 296.
[8] 'Millennium Development Goals'; 'Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action - OECD'.
[9] OECD, *Multilateral Aid 2015*, 22.
[10] 'China Launches New Asia Development Bank'; Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp, 'New Donors', 409; Verschaeve and Orbie, 'The DAC Is Dead, Long Live the DCF?', 576.
[11] Espinoza, *The Macroeconomics of the Arab States of the Gulf*, 10.
[12] Walz and Ramachandran, 'Brave New World'; Ross, 'What's So Special about the Arabian Peninsula?'

projects".[13] Furthermore, some undeniable progress on coordination for humanitarian affairs has been made by the regional organization – notably in natural disasters, with the opening of an emergency centre in Kuwait.[14] For humanitarian actions in conflict zones, the GCC has upgraded its coordination policy. To quote its Assistant Secretary General for Foreign Affairs:

> "There exists at the level of the GCC the Aid Coordination Committee which is attached to the Ministerial Council. This Committee is active and designs policies, as well as makes sure that states follow up on their commitments (…).Pledges are first made – these are not legally binding, but rather political acts. At the political level leaders do very much agree on what is to be done. Of course there are political motives, but on certain issues, notably humanitarian, it is rare that there is any kind of disagreement. The pledges are then followed by commitments, where are binding. Then disbursements should follow. This process is a lengthy one and takes place through the Arab Coordination Group, which deals with three pillars: policies, oversight, and evaluation. Most aid is given through bilateral means, which does not mean that consultations do not take place" (ad1).

While the GCC forum does show remarkable consensus at the leadership level, "less coordination exists at the level of implementation" (ad1). This means for instance that the GCC is "unable to deliver assistance to Yemen in a manner similar to that of the European Commission".[15] Scholars also speak the lack of GCC unity on foreign aid and of "inter-Gulf Cooperation Council rivalry" more broadly.[16] Foreign aid decision-making is increasingly "bilateralized" in the region as aid delivery is increasingly militarized according to diverse dividing lines.[17] The case of Yemen is significant: the GCC as a group regularly meets within the formation of the GCC Coordination Committee on Aid to Yemen is dwarfed by the relative importance of Saudi Arabia.[18] Symbolically, the office of the GCC is housed by the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre there.[19]

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13 Isaac, 'Explaining the Patterns of the Gulf Monarchies' Assistance after the Arab Uprisings', 416.
14 'Training on GCC Regional Emergency Response Plan Begins in Kuwait'; 'GCC Emergency Management Centre Kuwait'.
15 Burke, 'One Blood and One Destiny?', 21.
16 Young, 'The Interventionist Turn in Gulf States' Foreign Policies', 16.
17 Itani, 'The Promise and Perils of Gulf Aid'; Young, 'A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft'; Isaac, 'Explaining the Patterns of the Gulf Monarchies' Assistance after the Arab Uprisings'.
18 Burke, 'One Blood and One Destiny?', 14.
19 'GCC Coordination Office Holds 8th Meeting with King Salman Centre for Relief The Official Saudi Press Agency'.

In this context, two very similar countries – Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – offer a striking contrast. Despite similar roots in a non-Western, anti-colonialist, informal and charitable approach to aid, despite being small states subject to similar international constraints and incentives, the UAE has progressively chosen the multilateral, development-oriented track advocated by the Western aid community. It is said to have become the most "globalized" of all the countries of the Arabian Peninsula.[20] Meanwhile Qatar has maintained a more informal, reactive and bilateral approach to foreign aid. Why two very similar countries would take diverging paths in the international realm of foreign aid is the puzzle that this work addresses.

Working with Arab donors, a story of disregard and suspicion

Gulf aid is gaining momentum. A 2008 US diplomatic cable underscored the US's increasing interest in Gulf states' "foreign assistance".[21] A year later, in 2009, the OECD-Arab Coordination Group of Institutions, a platform for exchanges between Western and Arab donors, was reconvened on an annual basis, after a long leave of absence.[22] In the world of non-governmental organizations also, Western donors have gradually recognized the need to engage better with "South" aid providers such as the Red Crescent.[23] Some aid workers underline their Arab counterparts' laudable and complementary initiatives, such as the aid they disburse for infrastructure.[24] Generically, Gulf donors are said to be redefining the ways in which aid, in particular humanitarian, is being envisaged.[25] These developments should not however obscure decades of reciprocal disregard and suspicion between Western and Arab donors.

Western policymakers' interest in Gulf donors has been volatile. Proposals for engagement with Arab donors emerged in the 1970s in the midst of the oil boom, only to remerge recently during the financial crisis and the global fight against terrorism.[26] In the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, small Gulf donors have not been ignored, but often mocked

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[20] Abdulla, in Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, *Globalization and the Gulf*, 182.
[21] 'Engaging Gulf States on Foreign Assistance'.
[22] Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience', 13.
[23] Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*, 37; 91.
[24] Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp, 'New Donors', 408.
[25] Abu Sa'ada, in Makdisi and Prashad, *Land of Blue Helmets*, 373.
[26] There is paradoxical given that Gulf donors' contribution to the overall aid effort peaked at 30% of total aid in 1978 and has been decreasing since. See Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience'; Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp, 'New Donors', 403; Barakat and Zyck, in Held and Ulrichsen, *The Transformation of the Gulf*, 314.

as lenient cheque-writers.[27] Attitudes towards small Gulf donors overlook their important contribution to foreign aid. In figures 1 and 2 below, the (reported) foreign aid of Qatar and the UAE is estimated both in absolute numbers and as a share of their Gross National Income (GNI).

[27] Egyptian President Sisi allegedly mocked Gulf donors in a leaked recording. See Hearst, 'Sisi Tapes Are Genuine, British Forensic Lab Finds'; Kingsley, 'Will #SisiLeaks Be Egypt's Watergate for Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi?'

Figure 1. Gross concessional financing for development of selected "emerging donors", 2014 (in US$ billion)[28]



[28] Figure taken from OECD, *Development Co-Operation Report 2016*, 281. The selected emerging donors appear in the dark colour.

Figure 2. Official Development Assistance as a Share of Gross National Income, 2016 (%)



In absolute terms, Qatar and the UAE supersede many Western donors. In 2014, Qatar's aid compared to that of Ireland, while the UAE gave more than Norway or Canada (see figure 1). Tellingly, the UAE's contribution also trailed that of the big regional player, Saudi Arabia, and both countries declared contributions that surpassed that of another major regional donor, Kuwait.[29] Measuring Arab donors' Official Development Assistance (ODA)[30] as a share of the country's GNI confirms that these principalities matter. Figure 2 shows that after ranking amongst the most generous donors with Norway and Sweden since 2013, the UAE topped the

[29] Although the latter is only reporting aid disbursed through its main aid arm, the Kuwait Fund.

[30] The OECD–DAC defines ODA as "those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)." See 'Official Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage - OECD'.

charts in 2016.[31] Though absent from figure 2, Qatar also ranks among the most lavish aid contributors of the non-Western world. For example, it exceeded the internationally set benchmark of 0.7% of the GNI in 2013.[32]

While Western donors have disregarded the increasingly visible contribution of Arab donors to the global aid agenda, they are wary of its *invisible* part. The case of the *zakat* illustrates this well. A mandatory Muslim almsgiving,[33] it is increasingly used for humanitarian purposes. Because it is often collected through informal mechanisms, it remains hard both to evaluate its scope (from the tens of billions of dollars to the hundreds of billions of dollars), as well as the extent to which it is used for humanitarian purposes (between 23% and 57% according to some estimates).[34] After 9/11, money laundering and terrorism financing have become buzzwords regularly attached to Gulf donorship by Western policymakers.[35] They join a series of grievances formulated in the past half-century against Arab donors' political, economic or religious motives when disbursing aid[36] that is in large part fuelled by Gulf states' aid opacity and "invisible and quiet" diplomacy.[37] Only recently has the charge been pressed against Qatar's – or rather isolated public persons' - alleged infatuation with terrorist groups through its foreign aid assistance.[38]

Adding to an already complicated relationship, Arab donors also question Western donors' motives.[39] In the aftermath of the Second World War, most in the Arab world considered international development institutions as part of a "rich men's club".[40] Fundamentally, Gulf donors do not feel that they belong to Western institutions such as the

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[31] 'Development Aid Rises Again in 2015, Spending on Refugees Doubles - OECD'; ODA%GNI from 2007 to 2016. Figures taken from 'OECD Statistics'.
[32] 'Tracking Underreported Financial Flows | AidData'.
[33] *Zakat* is one of the five pillars of Islam. "An act of social solidarity and an affirmation of faith", it is considered a compulsory contribution to the poor. In practice, this is never automatic, and though the categories of *zakat*-eligible recipients, or the way to calculate *zakat* are relatively contingent. For a historical perspective on *zakat*. See Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*. See also Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies*.
[34] Stirk, 'An Act of Faith. Humanitarian Financing and Zakat', 3.
[35] Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*; IMF, 'United Arab Emirates: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism'; IMF, 'Qatar : Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism'.
[36] 'Rogue Aid'.
[37] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 202; Villanger, 'Arab Foreign Aid', 224; Khafagy, 'Gulf Philanthropy: Structural, Domestic and Global Challenges', 2.
[38] England, 'Qatar Blockade Is "golden Opportunity" to Halt Terrorism'; 'Qatar's Charity Funding in Gaza Dries up as Gulf Crisis Continues'; 'Entretien Avec Jean-Paul Burdy – La Crise Qatar-CCG de Juin 2017 (1/2) - Les Clés Du Moyen-Orient'; Kerr, 'US Sanctions Prominent Rights Activist for Alleged Al-Qaeda Links'; 'Qatar Clamps down on Charities That Send Funds Abroad'; 'Treasury Designates Al-Qa'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen'; 'Qatar Intervening in Northern Mali?'; 'Is Qatar Sponsoring Al-Qa'ida in Mali?'; Keatinge, 'Why Qatar Is the Focus of Terrorism Claims'.
[39] There is also an increasing contestation of the neutrality Western philanthropy and development in the academic literature. See Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century*, 5; Stamatov, *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism*.
[40] Dahi, in Makdisi and Prashad, *Land of Blue Helmets*, 393.

OECD. In Doha, a sceptic Qatari official opposed to my questions the following statement: "we can never be part of it, so why bother to write about it?" As figure 3 shows below, Gulf states' for instance do not make a difference in their practice between development – as identified by Western institutions like the OECD - and humanitarian aid. Indeed, Gulf donors consider that both development and humanitarian aid rest "on the same core values, use many of the same discourses and practices, and depend on the same economic structures".[41] The UAE therefore reports religious and cultural assistance as charity aid, in deviation from OECD standards. Additionally, critical of aid that they saw as an improbable disguise for a Western imperialist and secularist project, Arab donors have since their independence tainted their aid with anti-colonialist, pan-Arab and anti-secularist accents.[42] Associating multilateralism with Western donorship, Gulf countries perceived it as a constraint placed upon their free will, an unwanted display of benevolence, and a likely waste of money in cumbersome administrative procedures.[43]

Figure 3. Differences between ODA as reported by the OECD–DAC and the United Arab Emirates' reported foreign assistance[44]

Official Development Assistance (ODA) Reporting	**UAE Foreign Aid Reporting**
Reports official flows only	Reports official and private flows
Reports loan repayments	Does not report loan repayments
Does not report religious and cultural assistance	Reports religious and cultural assistance as charity aid
Reports on ODA eligible countries only (based on Gross National Income)	Reports on all recipient countries (irrespective of income level)

The puzzle

[41] Petersen, 'For Humanity or For the Umma? Ideologies of Aid in Four Transnational Muslim NGOs', 65.
[42] Verschaeve and Orbie, 'The DAC Is Dead, Long Live the DCF?', 572; Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience'.
[43] Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*.
[44] 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2011', 14.

In the context of a working relationship riddled with mutual deprecation, the city states of Qatar and the UAE face similar international incentives and constraints to abide by the rules of foreign aid multilateralism. On the one hand, the generic problems of acting multilaterally are hard-felt in the small autocratic states. Given their size, it is unlikely that they can be game-changers (in distinct contrast to Saudi Arabia) or that their interests will be reflected in the work of international organizations.[45] Additionally, Western-led aid multilateral organizations offer only dire prospects for monarchs accustomed to disbursing funds as they wish. Multilateralism begets transparency through aid reporting and the contribution to multilateral organizations' core budgets. Multilateralism also increases the likelihood of adding intermediaries between donors and recipients,[46] a culturally rejected feature in the Gulf Islamic aid giving. Being also recently independent and small states, Qatar and the UAE are likely to hold on to foreign aid, which is a "primary tool of statecraft".[47] Exempt of voter accountability or party politics, they should favour the unconstrained channel of aid bilateralism[48] or regional organizations better tailored to autocrat rulers' taste for consensus and secrecy.

On the other hand, multilateralism may endow its members with prestige;[49] namely, the recognition of one's contribution to the global aid agenda. This is a prospect surely not lost on these small and newly independent states. Western multilateral aid organizations also supply the two city states with exit routes from regional aid multilateralism dominated by the likes of Saudi Arabia.[50] With multilateral organizations, Qatar and the UAE can press aid projects on a scale unattainable on their own.[51] Last, multilateral organizations help share best aid practices and may contribute to the reform of the nascent Qatari and Emirati aid bureaucracies.

In contrast to conventional wisdom, small Gulf donors do not act as a coherent block. The UAE is a better multilateral aid player than Qatar. Faced with similar incentives and constraints, both countries have attempted since the 2000s to take on pro-multilateral reforms. Only the UAE however has become a recognized player in Western-led multilateral

[45] Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.
[46] Milner, in Hawkins.
[47] Milner, in Hawkins.
[48] I reverse the line of thought of Helen Milner. See Milner, in Hawkins.
[49] Ingebritsen, *Small States in International Relations*, 3; Kelly, in Müller, *The Gloss of Harmony*, 152.
[50] This is the function of autonomy of international organizations described in Abbott and Snidal, 'Why States Act through Formal International Organizations', 1 February 1998, 17.
[51] This is the centralization function of international organizations - Abbott and Snidal, 'Why States Act through Formal International Organizations', 1 February 1998; Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.

organizations. This cross-national and longitudinal variation is the puzzle motivating this inquiry. It is empirically outlined in the next chapter.

Chapter 1: How Qatari and Emirati Foreign Aid Diverge and Why This Puzzle Remains Unexplained

In this chapter, I present empirical evidence for the puzzle by explaining how Qatar and the United Arab Emirates differ in their approach to foreign aid. I focus primarily on their attitude towards aid multilateralism, notably on two major issues: donor proliferation and aid transparency. I also examine similarities and differences in their geographical and sectoral distribution of aid. I review and assess the main arguments presented in the literature to answer the puzzle and advocate thereafter for a domestic reading of Qatar and the UAE's foreign aid divergence. Finally, I present this dissertation's main argument and structure.

The outcome: Treading divergent paths in foreign aid multilateralism

The UAE is a better multilateral aid player than Qatar. At first sight, though, this is not evident. Qatar has opened more embassies, is a member in more international organizations, and has been more active in the UN Security Council Missions than the UAE.[52] However, to this day the UAE has signed more legally binding multilateral treaties than its neighbour.[53] This is significant. Indeed, it is costlier to revoke an international legal obligation than to close down an embassy or to terminate a bilateral aid project in the Gaza strip[54] than to suspend a pluri-annual contribution to the multilateral core budget of the Islamic Development Bank.

In the next sections, I assess comparatively Qatar and the UAE's cooperation with multilateral organizations along a continuum. In short, a country may choose first to join or not a multilateral organization, and then to participate financially and institutionally in the multilateral setting. In other words, cooperation is a categorical ordinal variable. It encompasses different categories that have a natural ordering – non-adhesion, adhesion, adhesion and participation;

[52] These indicators are compiled in the KOF Index of Globalization at the ETH Zurich - 'KOF Globalization Index'.
[53] Data retrieved from Ross and Voeten, 'Oil and International Cooperation'.
[54] 'Qatar's Charity Funding in Gaza Dries up as Gulf Crisis Continues'.

reflexive, reactive or active - however undefined interval distances exist between the values taken by cooperative outcomes.

In the field of foreign aid, the UAE's stronger multilateral commitment manifests itself first in terms of financial participation, second as regards institutional participation.[55] Indeed, it has notably fared better on major aid challenges such as curbing donor proliferation – to avoid the fragmentation of the aid landscape into multiple small-scale contradictory initiatives - and enhancing aid transparency.

Financial contribution

According to available figures, the UAE's financial commitment to foreign aid multilateralism is higher than Qatar's in both regional multilateral aid organizations – the Islamic Development Bank and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development, among others (see figure 5 below) – and in international organizations.[56] This difference is not due to the size of the two countries' economies. Nearly half of Qatar's aid (40%) is dedicated to humanitarian purposes, an intrinsically volatile and traditionally bilaterally oriented channel. Conversely, Qatar "provides very little aid to multilateral organizations that have steady, predictable demands".[57] Between 2012 and 2014, it disbursed about 1% of its reported aid through multilateral channels.[58] Meanwhile, the UAE's total use of the multilateral aid system often exceeded 10% in the past decade.[59] The UAE also distributed more aid to Western-led multilateral institutions than Qatar. Between 2011 and 2013, for each dollar spent for UN agencies, Qatar spent eight on the Islamic Development Bank, while for every dollar spent on the Islamic Development Bank, the UAE spent nearly two for UN agencies.[60] Similarly, the UAE contributes to the UNDP's core budget, while Qatar does not.[61]

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[55] I consider both financial and institutional participation to make sure that the Gulf states are not just "throwing money at problems" in answer to international requests. For a review of qualitative and quantitative measurements of cooperation, see Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy*, 56.

[56] Figures for UAE and Qatar multilateral aid vary. Some extreme and unlikely estimates present multilateral aid as representing nearly 40% of total UAE aid in the past 30 years. See 'UAE Approach to Foreign Assistance'.

[57] Kharas, 'Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid', 8.

[58] 'Qatar Becomes Participant in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - OECD'.

[59] Without earmarked funding,, the UAE's multilateral contribution remains in relative terms thrice that of Qatar. See 'United Arab Emirates' Development Co-Operation - OECD'; 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2014', 114.

[60] Data for the UAE is taken from UAE core contributions through multilateral system 2011–2013, "AidtoThru". See 'OECD Statistics'. Data for Qatar is taken from contributions through multilateral channels 2011–2013. See OECD, 'Estimated Development-Oriented Contributions to and through Multilateral Organisations, 2011-13 (Three Year Average)', 302.

[61] Data for 2015 and 2016. See 'Contributors to Core Resources'.

Focussing on *how* the UAE and Qatar give (bilateral or multilateral aid) provides insights into *where* and *what* they give. There is first a correlation between geographical distribution of aid and proneness to use the multilateral sector. Indeed, the use of Arab multilateral donors, where the UAE is more present – AFESD, IsDB or OFID (see Figure 4) – makes it more prone to give regionally. There is also a correlation between multilateralism and the sectoral distribution of aid. Typically, giving via Arab regional aid organizations means giving aid for infrastructure in particular.[62] Comparing the geographical and sectoral distribution of Qatari and Emirati aid more broadly supports that the argument that the UAE has a strategy for foreign aid that Qatar is still formulating.

Qatar and the UAE are usually meshed together in the category of "Arab donors". Part of this is due to lacking data, which has often led scholars to rely less on bilateral giving from these countries, than on data provided by Arab regional aid organizations – thereby erasing the possible differences between donors. For instance, time series data provided by the OECD on net disbursements from Arab donors by recipient countries covers from 1973 to 1989 seven countries (Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE) and from 1990 to 2008 only three countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE). Part of this is also due that to the fact that Arab donorship has been rather cohesive when it came to geographical distribution - Morocco, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Yemen and Sudan, have been Arab donors' main beneficiaries;[63] and sectoral distribution, notably aid for infrastructure and humanitarian aid.[64] However, Gulf donors like Qatar and the UAE embody increasing in-group divergences as regards the geographical and sectoral distribution of aid.

In his extensive description of Emirati foreign aid, Al Mezaini argues that the UAE's aid demonstrates its Arab solidarity – a continuity he traces from UAE founder Sheikh Zayed, to today's ruler Sheikh Khalifa.[65] As Shushan and Marcoux confirm for the period 1973-2007, "of the three major Arab bilateral donors [Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE], the UAE has given the highest percentage of its aid to fellow Arab states, at 62%."[66] While some argue that the UAE is lacking, under Sheikh Khalifa, a geographical strategy for aid,[67] Al Mezaini already noted that the

[62] Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp, 'New Donors'.
[63] Villanger, 'Arab Foreign Aid'.
[64] Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp, 'New Donors'; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*.
[65] Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 43.
[66] Shushan and Marcoux, *The Rise (and Decline?* footnote n°10.
[67] Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*; Abdalla, cited in Kanna, 'Emirati Foreign Aid: Overview and Foreign Policy Implications', 41.

UAE was reinforcing its presence in its broader neighbourhood, notably by providing aid to countries such as Pakistan.[68] This intuition for an Emirati regional strategy for aid has been increasingly asserted under the influence of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Zayed in the aftermath of the Arab Springs.[69] Increasingly, the UAE appears to be tying aid with security concerns in its immediate neighbourhood. As Young argues in a case-study of Emirati aid in Egypt after 2011, "the Emirati approach to Egypt presents a new form of conditionality, less interested or invested in the implementation of fiscal reform or political inclusion, and more concerned with advancing the twin goals of state-led capitalism and a regional vision of secular Arab leadership."[70] For various scholars therefore, the UAE's foreign aid is a building block for its regional status.[71]

It is strenuous work to compare the UAE's and Qatar's geographical aid distribution. Qatar is not mentioned in almost all of existing scholarship on Gulf foreign aid.[72] Based on the few foreign aid reports published by Qatar for the years 2007-2011, World Bank analysts note that "over two-thirds (69%) of Qatar's aid was directed to North Africa, with Egypt accounting for nearly half. Recipients, mostly non-African, account for 44% of its aid with Sub-Saharan Africa receiving 8%."[73] Qatar too, therefore, concentrates aid in its neighbourhood: in 2013, the main beneficiaries of Qatari aid were Syria, Morocco, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Egypt and Yemen.[74] The extent to which Qatar is planning its aid in its neighbourhood remains unclear. Contrarily to the UAE, which has acquired more say in regional fora such as the African Development Fund, Qatar has not clearly invested in African (nor Asian, for that matter) regional development banks. Instead, Qatari aid on the African continent is left in the hands of para-public organizations, which focus on relief, rather than in the more developmental outlook of the Qatari governmental aid.[75] Kharas, in a 2015 contribution using unpublished aid data from the Qatari government and para-public organizations, underlines the "disconnect" between governmental and charity aid in Qatar.[76]

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[68] Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 6; 157. Between 2010 and 2014, after Al Mezaini's writing, Pakistan was the fourth beneficiary of Emirati aid, 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2014', 117.

[69] Kanna, 'Emirati Foreign Aid: Overview and Foreign Policy Implications', 44.

[70] Young, 'A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft'.

[71] Shushan and Kanna, "'Emirati Influence: Foreign Aid in the Service of Regional Status?'"

[72] Data for Qatar aid provided by international organizations for the years 1974-1989 does not include country nor sectoral allocations, 'Forty Years of Development Assistance from Arab Countries', Annex 2.

[73] Rouis, 'Response of the Arab Donors To the Global Financial Crisis and the Arab Spring', 2.

[74] 'Qatar Foreign Aid Report 2014'; Kharas, 'Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid', 13.

[75] 'Members'; Kharas, 'Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid'; Manjang, 'The Arab Spring and Changes in Qatar Foreign Aid Architecture: The Case of Qatar Foreign Aid to Africa'.

[76] Kharas, 'Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid', 16.

In spite of lacking data,[77] sectoral differences between Qatari and Emirati aid are on the rise. If in the 1970s and 1980s Gulf aid was essentially supporting infrastructure development, defraying petroleum import; both countries have been increasingly active supporting agriculture and natural resource management, or providing emergency relief. According to the World Bank, the diversity of aid targets is increasing in the region.[78] While Qatari foreign aid reports stress that most aid is allocated went to humanitarian relief and reconstruction, security, and economic infrastructure development, the emirate is a rising donor in education reform.[79]

The UAE is more straightforward still when it comes to defining sectoral strategies for its future foreign aid. In its foreign aid strategy for 2017-2021, the government wishes to "create three global thematic programs in transport and urban infrastructure, government effectiveness, and empowerment and protection of women."[80] Already, available data for the years 2010-2014 show that aid is allocated aid for commodity aid and general program assistance - support to recipient countries' budget or to macroeconomic reforms (about 35% of total foreign aid); 20% went to commodity aid (food or oil); about 13% to infrastructure development.[81] This focus on general program assistance, under which fall budget support, support for macroeconomic reforms, follows the line of thought presented by several scholars arguing that Emirati approach to aid is increasingly commercial in its approach."[82] This argument is corroborated by the UAE's foreign aid strategy, which is quoted extensively below:

> "Economic growth generated by the private sector is essential to truly sustainable development. No country has escaped poverty through development assistance alone. Development depends in large part on the success of businesses, including international companies: they provide jobs, train workers, introduce new technologies and stimulate the creation of other businesses. From its own development as a nation: over the past

[77] For instance, the OECD does not provide disaggregate data by country on sector allocation, OECD, 'Official Bilateral Commitments by Sector'.
[78] 'Forty Years of Development Assistance from Arab Countries', 14.
[79] 'Qatar Commits $10 Billion to Humanitarian Causes Worldwide'; 'Forty Years of Development Assistance from Arab Countries', 9–10; 'The Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development', in Khedr, 'A Guide to Qatar's Legal System - GlobaLex'.
[80] 'Summary of the UAE Policy for Foreign Assistance (2017 – 2021)', 3.
[81] 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2014', 113; 'The List of CRS Purpose Codes and Voluntary Budget Identifier Codes', 26.
[82] Young, 'A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft'; Isaac, 'Explaining the Patterns of the Gulf Monarchies' Assistance after the Arab Uprisings'.

thirty years, foreign trade and investment have helped transform the UAE into a prosperous and diversified economy."[83]

In short, both geographical and sectoral aid distribution tend to show that while the UAE and Qatar have shared historical features of Arab donorship, the UAE is progressively using aid in strategic ways, while Qatar is still to formulate an aid strategy. Combined with the other elements discussed in this section, it appears that the development-oriented[84] and stable nature of the UAE aid increasingly converges with that of Kuwait, the regional multilateral champion,[85] and diverges from Qatar's unenthusiastic approach.[86]

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[83] 'Summary of the UAE Policy for Foreign Assistance (2017 – 2021)', 5.

[84] Between 2010 and 2014, humanitarian aid represented 8% of the UAE's total foreign assistance. See 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2014', 113.

[85] In absolute terms, between 2011 and 2015, the UAE disbursed more core contributions to UN agencies than Kuwait. Kuwait however disbursed more funds more to the World Bank Group. Overall, Kuwait remained comparatively more "multilateralist" when considering the ratio of core contributions to earmarked contributions. See OECD, *Development Co-Operation Report 2016*, 286; 'OECD Statistics'; Stafford, 'An Emerging Philanthropic Superpower? Kuwaiti Humanitarian Efforts in Syria and beyond'. The Kuwait Fund , the largest Kuwaiti aid organization, even committed 17% of its funds multilaterally in 2014. See OECD, *Development Co-Operation Report 2016*, 286.

[86] One exception to the rule is Qatar's recent pledge – still to be enacted - of several million dollars to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, while the UAE has not made any contribution. See 'Qatar Pledges $10 Million to the Global Fund'; 'UAE Participates in Global Fund Conference in Canada'.

Figure 4. Financial contributions of Qatar and the UAE to regional aid organizations (compiled by the author)

Institution / Country	**Islamic Development Bank** (% shares, 2011)[87]	**Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development** (number of grants - total value of extended grants, 2014)	**Arab Gulf Program for Development**[88]	**Arab Monetary Fund**[89]	**Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development**[90] (% shares, 2015)	**OPEC Fund for International Development**[91] (paid-in contributions, 2015, US$)	**Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa**[92] (% shares, 2015)
UAE	7,54 (5th donor)	7 - US$700,000	3rd donor	6th donor (2003), 5th donor (2015)	10.08% (3rd donor)	US$175,987,000 (8th donor)	12% (5th donor)
Qatar	7,21 (6th donor)	1 grant – US$180,000	*Recipient of 4 projects for a total of US$150,000 (1996-2000)*	10th donor (with Sudan, 2003 and 2015)	5.04% (6th donor)	US$96,375,000 (10th donor)	8% (6th donor)

87 Islamic Development Bank, *Islamic Development Bank Group in Brief* , 4
88 Represents about US$ 209,000,000 (1996–2000). See Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 84–85.
89 Represents about US$ 8,200,000,000 (loans, 1978–2015). See AMF, *Annual Report 2015*, 2; AMF, *Arab Monetary Fund - The Lending Activity*, 36.
90 Paid-up capital – AAAID, *Annual Report 2015*, 114.
91 Paid-in contributions in 2015 (includes the International Fund for Agricultural Development) - OFID, *Annual Report 2015*, 68.
92 Represents about US$ 4,800,000,000 (1975–2015) - BADEA, *Annual Report 2015*, 86.

There are two problems with defining the dependent variable according to levels of foreign aid. First, one can easily draw large conclusions from small variations when working on countries like Qatar and the UAE. These fall to the fallacy of the law of small numbers. Financial contributions are not enough to differentiate the multilateral stance of Qatar and the UAE. These financial contributions may seem to vary highly because they remain small in absolute terms than for the largest Western donors. For instance, it seemed that in recent years the UAE's development contribution was falling. As stated by the OECD, "In 2014, the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) total net ODA reached US$ 5.1 billion, representing a decrease in real terms of 6% over 2013. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI also fell in 2014 to 1.26%, down from 1.34% in 2013". While one could already speculate on the impact of hydrocarbon prices on aid, the simple explanation is that "the UAE's exceptional support to Egypt decreased from US$ 4.6 billion in 2013 to US$ 3.2 billion in 2014, which explains the decrease in total ODA".[93]

Second, are we dealing with known unknowns or unknown unknowns? An immediate criticism is that it is hard, in the absence of data, to know the exact provision of multilateral and bilateral aid by either country. Some aid organizations provide Official Development Assistance without knowing it. Others conceptualize aid differently to the standards set by Western organizations. A first argument is that because multilateralism requires some degree of transparency (except for specific aid branches of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation), we can safely be assured that the UAE is indeed a greater multilateral contributor than Qatar. The second issue is to assess how much multilateral aid represents in UAE compared to its bilateral aid. On that issue, the UAE is again much more transparent than Qatar in recent years. In short, even if Qatar's undeclared bilateral aid is much higher than what is declared, this would only decrease the multilateral-bilateral aid ratio and reinforce the UAE's stance as a better multilateral player.

Yet, institutional participation also distinguishes Qatar from the UAE. After a rapid overview, I explore their international cooperation to attain two crucial targets of the global aid agenda: curbing donor proliferation and enhancing aid transparency.

Institutional participation

[93] OECD, *Development Co-Operation Report 2016*, 291. Aid figures should be used with caution, not only because Qatar and the UAE are autocratic states, but because their programs are new (more volatility in reporting is expected) and smaller than major Western powers. For an overview of the fallacies associated with the law of small numbers, see Mlodinow, *The Drunkard's Walk*, 110.

In this section, I assess comparatively Qatar and the UAE's cooperation with multilateral organizations along a continuum on two topics: donor proliferation and aid transparency. Donor proliferation is concerned notably with the internal coherence of donors' aid policies; while aid transparency is concerned with the better measuring and reporting of aid. Both dimensions are interlinked. Limiting donor proliferation is facilitated by better transparency between various country donors. Together with the harmonisation of standards, the inclusion of private aid actors in in foreign aid policies, they are priorities of the global donor community has set as its agenda.

The UAE has opened UN offices and developed new multilateral aid partnerships, such as Dubai's International Humanitarian City (2003) or Abu Dhabi's International Renewable Energy Agency (2011).[94] In 2016 it was the first Arab country to co-host the Tidewater Development Cooperation Meeting – a platform for aid-policy brainstorming – with the OECD–DAC.[95] Meanwhile, Qatar has shut down most UN agencies in Doha. Most of its domestic multilateral cooperation boils down to the hosting of aid-related international conferences – the most important of which is the biennial World Innovation Summit for Education.[96] Abroad, the UAE is an active member of the OECD – it was the first non-Western donor to be bestowed with "participant status" in its DAC Committee – and of UN agencies.[97] These elements are only the visible part of the iceberg. The nitty-gritty of Gulf donors' cooperation on two major items of the global aid community - donor proliferation and aid transparency –[98] further confirms the UAE's singular pro-multilateralism.

Donor proliferation

Aid fragmentation is one of foreign aid's old hats and a threat to effective aid disbursement. Fragmentation is the result of the increasing number of actors, bilateral or multilateral, public or

[94] The Abu Dhabi government supports energy-related projects in the framework of the ADFD-IRENA Project Facility. See 'About the IRENA/ADFD Project Facility'.
[95] 'UAE Co-Hosts the Tidewater Development Cooperation Meeting in Abu Dhabi'.
[96] 'Qatar International Cooperation'; 'About WISE'.
[97] Within the UN's humanitarian arm – the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – the UAE was the first non-Western actor to join the agency's Donor Support Group. Similarly, in the UNESCO, it was the first (and only) Gulf state to push "its" candidates to sit on the organization's executive board, and the most active of the region in financing and hosting three UNESCO chairs. See UNESCO, *UNESCO and the United Arab Emirates* ; '2012 Qatar Country Profile'.
[98] See 'Better Aid. Managing Aid. Practices of DAC Member Countries', 28; Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 10; 'Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action - OECD'.

private, generalist or issue-specific, which intervene in the field of aid.[99] At the level of donor countries, fragmentation occurs through *donor proliferation,* measured in the number of sectors or countries where the donor is active – the higher the number, the more likely it is that aid is ineffectively disbursed.[100] It may also be measured in the number of aid actors *within* the state.[101] If a donor works in a single country with, five, ten, or twenty different national organizations, or in one sector with five, ten, or twenty organizations, this may lead to contradictory or redundant aid policies, and thwart the state's overall aid objectives.[102] For the international community, donor proliferation is one the greatest aid challenges.[103] It requires that countries delegate aid functions to multilateral organizations and set up coherent and functional domestic aid systems.

The available data suggest that UAE outperforms Qatar when it comes to limiting donor proliferation. A smaller donor in absolute terms, Qatar has provided aid to 100 countries on six continents, according to its administration.[104] Conversely, the Emirati donor recognizes disbursing aid to 40 recipients since 2010.[105] Domestically as well, the UAE is in the vanguard of streamlining aid. One out of three Gulf countries (with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) to have a formal and governmental donor agency – the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development[106] – the UAE initiated a phase of rationalization of its aid program unprecedented in the region in the last decade. First it set up the Office for the Coordination of Aid (2008), then upgraded aid to the ministerial level in the form of the Ministry of International Cooperation for Aid and Development (2013).[107] Conversely, though Qatar's aid actors emerged for the most part in the 2000s,[108] it has as many, if not more, foreign aid entities than in its Kuwaiti[109] or Emirati

[99] Klingebiel, Mahn, and Negre, *The Fragmentation of Aid Concepts, Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation*, 6.
[100] From the recipients' viewpoint, it examines the number of donors, sectors and projects implemented in recipient countries, and the extent to which recipient country administrations are able to cope with different aid flows. This thesis focusses on donor countries, but recipients' perspectives are explored elsewhere. See Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*.
[101] Bracho and Grimm, in Klingebiel, Mahn, and Negre, *The Fragmentation of Aid Concepts, Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation*, 126.
[102] Seabright, in Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*, 13; 57.
[103] 'Better Aid. Managing Aid. Practices of DAC Member Countries', 24; Bürcky, 'Trends in In-Country Aid Fragmentation and Donor Proliferation An Analysis of Changes in Aid Allocation Patterns between 2005 and 2009'.
[104] 'Qatar International Cooperation'. 13 recipients are mentioned in the AidData dataset, which focusses on a small span of time (2011–2013) and only examines project-level aid. See 'Donor Datasets | AidData'.
[105] 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2014', 111.
[106] Barakat and Zyck, 'Gulf State Assistance to Conflict-Affected Environments', 10.
[107] Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 1.
[108] Abdul Fatah S. Mohamed, "The Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA) from Commencement to Dissolution (2005–2009)," in *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond,* ed. Jonathan Benthall et al. (Gerlach Press, 2014)

neighbours – though the latter's population exceeds that of Qatar threefold.[110] More strikingly, fragmentation runs counter to the emir's 2002 policy establishing the Qatar Development Fund,[111] a government entity meant to centralize and strategically deploy Qatar's foreign aid. In 2017, the Qatar Development Fund is still in the making.

Adding to governmental efforts, the UAE's para-public aid organizations[112] are more active on the issue of donor proliferation and aid effectiveness than in Qatar.[113] The UAE has "established itself as a hub for regional dialogues on Arab philanthropy and corporate social responsibility".[114] Emirati philanthropic actors have investigated, unlike Qatar, the aid-organization network of the Arab Foundations Forum[115] or of the OECD Global Network of Foundations, where coordination and policy dialogue are advocated.[116] Qatar, on the other hand, with limited results, backs the revival of regional initiatives that have often a poor aid record.[117]

Aid transparency

The global aid community also underlines the importance of aid transparency, considering that diffusing results and enhancing mutual accountability are key to greater aid effectiveness.[118] On this matter, if Arab donors in general are regarded with circumspection, the UAE is once again a

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[109] The Kuwaiti government records nine Kuwait-based charities, while these are at least fourteen in Qatar: "Charity In Kuwait," accessed January 7, 2017, https://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/Pages/CitizensResidents/IslamicServices/InfoCharity.aspx.

[110] This is based on a comparison between the number of charities operating on behalf of the UAE and Qatar. I reproduced the selection criteria set by Ridge and Kippels in 2016. They find eleven state-sponsored philanthropies in the UAE, of which three only have international activities (Dubai Cares, the Mohamed Bin Zayed Species Conservation Fund and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. In 2017, the UAE Water Foundation must be added to this list. Applying the same criteria in Qatar, I identify six such organizations: the Sheikh Thani Bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services (RAF Foundation), Sheikh Eid Bin Mohamed al-Thani Charitable Foundation, Qatar Foundation, Qatar Development Fund, Qatar Friendship Fund and Qatar Katrina Fund. See Natasha Ridge and Susan Kippels, "What is the Status of State-funded Philanthropy in the United Arab Emirates?", *Sheikh Saud Bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for PolicyResearch*, Policy Paper no. 15, 2016, 4.

[111] 'Contributor/Partner Factsheet - Qatar Development Fund'.

[112] Rulers are tightly enmeshed in the aid sector in the Arabian Peninsula. The line between the public and private is very thin. Para-public organizations, such as the Red Crescent Societies or most charities named after members of the ruling family, are therefore often referred to as "Government-Organized Non-governmental Organizations". I prefer to this Orwellian vernacular the term used by Al Mezaini, "para-public organizations". See Almezaini, The UAE and Foreign Policy, 127.

[113] Some indicators are not conclusive. For example, the number of Qatari or Emirati aid organizations with consultative status with the UN ECOSOC is similar – and low (four organizations for Qatar, three for the UAE). See 'UN DESA NGO Branch'.

[114] Sherif, in Ibrahim and Sherif, *From Charity to Social Change*, 2008, 172.

[115] In Arab Foundations Forum, two organizations from the UAE participate (the Emirates Foundation and the Sheikh Saud Bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation), and none from Qatar . See 'Members of the Arab Foundations Forum'.

[116] 'Members and Associates - OECD'; 'Engaging with Arab Providers of Development Co-Operation - OECD'.

[117]'HE Deputy PM Discusses Establishment of Darfur Development Bank'.

[118] 'Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action - OECD'.

regional outlier. Abroad, it has started to report its aid at the disaggregate level as early as 2009 - a unique instance in the realm of emerging donors.[119] More generally, it has been the first non-Western donor to be recognized with "participant status" in the Western club of the OECD–DAC (2014) – subjecting itself to the "critical scrutiny" of its peers,[120] a procedure originally conceived as a mechanism of control of voters over their democratically elected governments.[121] Its activism there on transparency and aid reporting is unmatched by any other non-Western donor.[122] Regionally, the UAE has also spearheaded the improvement of aid data systems.[123] Thanks to its activism, some Arab regional development organizations have found their way back to be internationally recognized organizations eligible to aid.[124]

Qatar, for its part, remains quite opaque. Its administration has published a few reports including disaggregated aid between 2010 and 2013 only.[125] In short, "while Qatar has begun to release more aid information, it still has a long way to go to meet international standards".[126]

The research question

Qatar and the UAE's diverging paths are an empirically grounded entry into a better understanding of the drivers of the international cooperation of rentier states.[127]

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[119] Kuwait also provides disaggregated data, but only for the Kuwait Fund.

[120] Carroll and Kellow, *The OECD*, 8;31.

[121] Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.

[122]The UAE co-organized with the OECD a number of seminars on aid management (2011 and 2013) and statistical management for aid (2010 and 2011) with the OECD. Qatar followed suit in 2014 with its first seminar (another is organized in 2017). Additionally, in 2015, the UAE participated in the DAC Senior-Level Meeting, as well as the meetings of the DAC Network on Environment and Development Co-operation (ENVIRONET) and the DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics (WP-STAT). The UAE also participated, as an observer, in the DAC Peer Review of Germany and in the 2015 Arab-DAC Dialogue on Development held at the OECD. The DAC Chair visited the UAE in January 2015 to speak during the launch of the Emirate's annual report on foreign aid". See OECD, *Development Co-Operation Report 2016*, 292; 'Members and Associates - OECD'; 'Engaging with Arab Providers of Development Co-Operation - OECD'.

[123] The UAE hosted two Arab Monetary Fund ARABSTAT meetings in 2015 to "develop balance of payment statistics". See AMF Annual Report 2015 : 32

[124] 'OECD Statistics'.

[125] 'Qatar's Development Co-Operation'.

[126] Kharas, 'Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid', 4.

[127] In its simplest form, a rentier state refers to "any state that derives a substantial part of its revenue from foreign sources and under the form of rent". See Beblawi and Luciani, *The Rentier State*. Rentierism focusses on the impact of rent on politics, when this is a substantial governmental revenue that requires little work to be generated. Whether stemming from hydrocarbons' extraction or from other means (external aid is also a form of rent), rentier administrations face the challenge of distributing wealth. Rentierism consider ruling families to be pivotal in the distribution of the rent, which they use it to withhold power. Rentierism has strengthened rulers over other actors, including merchants, foreign powers, the clergy, and citizens. In short, rentierism predicts that the rentier state is authoritarian, not necessarily that it is stable. See Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 28; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 12; Espinoza, *The Macroeconomics*

Why despite a shared sacralized, anti-colonialist and pan-Arab approach to aid; despite similar incentives and constraints in cooperating with the global aid community on crucial challenges such as donor proliferation and aid transparency; despite similar attempts to reform their aid landscape accordingly,[128] is the UAE, rather than Qatar, more committed to foreign aid multilateralism?

Literature review

Policymakers' disregard for Gulf donors is reflected in the academic literature. There is a profusion of contributions on the "emerging donors" of the BRICS,[129] but few studies engage with Muslim or Arab foreign aid, let alone the foreign aid of the small rentier city states.[130] Pioneer work on these opaque systems was undergone in the 1970s and the 1980s -[131] during the first wave of interest for Arab donors' newly formed hydrocarbon wealth. Since then however this scholarship has produced only scarce[132] and often descriptive single-case studies.[133]

Conventional wisdom provides two contradictory yet insufficient claims to the puzzle of Qatar and the UAE's international cooperation. Small state and liberal theorists predict more cooperation; while rentier state theorists, branding theory and Third World views predict less of it. The failure of these systemic approaches to explain why two similar, small and resource-rich states follow diverging paths, makes the case for a third, domestic approach to the divergence

of the Arab States of the Gulf; Herb, *All in the Family*; Herb, *The Wages of Oil*; Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia*.

128 That both countries have attempted to formulate strategies on donor proliferation and aid transparency indicates that I can reject the null hypothesis according to which the divergence between their multilateral commitments is a result of randomness.

129 A non-exhaustive list of contributions includes Vickers, 'Towards a New Aid Paradigm'; Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp, 'New Donors'; Felix Zimmermann and Kimberly Smith, 'New Partnerships in Development Co-Operation'; 'Charity and Philanthropy in Russia, China, India, and Brazil'; Bräutigam, 'Aid "With Chinese Characteristics"'; Zimmermann and Smith, 'More Actors, More Money, More Ideas for International Development Co-Operation'; Rowlands, 'Individual BRICS or a Collective Bloc?'; Grimm et al., 'Transparency of Chinese Aid: An Analysis of the Published Information on Chinese External Financial Flows'; Six, 'The Rise of Postcolonial States as Donors'.

130 Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan focus on Jordan and Palestine; Petersen on Saudi and Kuwaiti parapublic aid organizations. See Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*; Petersen, *For Humanity Or For The Umma?*

131 Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*; Demir, *Kuwait Fund and the Political Economy of Arab Regional Development*; Achilli and Khaldi, *The Role of the Arab Development Funds in the World Economy*.

132 Neumayer, 'What Factors Determine the Allocation of Aid by Arab Countries and Multilateral Agencies?'; Villanger, 'Arab Foreign Aid'; Barakat and Zyck, 'Gulf State Assistance to Conflict-Affected Environments'; Tok, 'Gulf Donors and the 2030 Agenda'; Lestra and Tok, 'A Fragmented Aid? The Institutionalization of the OIC's Foreign Aid Framework'.

133 Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*; Ibrahim and Sherif, *From Charity to Social Change*, 2008.

between Qatari and Emirati aid. Both Qatar and the UAE are aid systems that experience problems of power delegation from the principals (the royal members and wealthy patrons) to their agents (the aid administration and para-public organizations). Conceptualized as such, the issue is to understand why the larger decentralized setting of the multi-dynastic UAE is more capable of curbing donor proliferation and enhancing aid transparency than a smaller cohesive state like Qatar, where so many aid organizations are present. To adapt this principal–agent problem, I present a historical-institutionalist answer to the puzzle that places *path dependency* at the core of the divergence between Qatari and Emirati aid cooperation.

Failing systemic explanations

Four generations of small states literature[134] predict that to ensure their survival, the Gulf principalities of Qatar and the UAE, but also of Bahrain or Kuwait, are more likely to behave multilaterally than others, either to align with hegemons, to prevent their territorial threat, or to be able to increase their leverage towards aid recipients (a weight they would not have bilaterally).[135] Either way, existing multilateral alliances and multilateral aid should be small states' favoured cost-effective foreign policy option.[136] In practice, small states should diversify the risk by dispersing their aid in various multilateral frameworks.

The small state literature does not satisfactorily answer the empirical puzzle. On the one hand, it identifies rightly that small Gulf states have sought multilateral recognition to counteract predatory claims from Iranian, Saudi or Iraqi neighbours.[137] It also predicts that Qatar and the UAE have been spectators (and cheque writers) rather than drivers behind the creation of alternative multilateral aid organizations.[138] On the other hand, the correlation between a

[134] Rickli considers the first generation of small state scholarship to focus on geographic, demographic or economic size, the second to focus on the influence of small states in the international system, the third to focus on "smallness' as a self-perception, and a fourth to consider small states' relation to power. See Rickli, 'European Small States' Military Policies after the Cold War', 308–9. See also Wong and Kieh, 'The Small Powers in World Politics', 16; Hey, *Small States in World Politics*, 3; Keohane, 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas', 296; Ingebritsen, *Small States in International Relations*.

[135] Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy*; Vogel, in Ingebritsen, *Small States in International Relations*, 11; Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes'; Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 99; Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.

[136] Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 1984, 50; Keohane, in Ingebritsen, *Small States in International Relations*, 66; Hoadley, 'Small States as Aid Donors'.

[137] Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966-1971*, 661; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 49. An extensive literature deals with the small state dilemmas of the Gulf principalities and the emergence of the Gulf Cooperation Council – Salamé, "Les pétromonarchies du Golfe et la guerre du Chatt el-Arab,"

[138] Regional aid institutions in the Gulf, bar the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, are driven by Saudi Arabia. In line with small state theory, Kuwait 's Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development came about when Kuwait was predominantly under British protection. See McKinnon, *Friends in Need*; Demir, *Kuwait Fund*

country's size and the level of multilateral aid has not been deemed significant in recent studies.[139] In contrast to small state theory, one does not observe, in the face of the regional Saudi hegemon's demise,[140] a *systematic and decreasing* multilateral participation of either country, notably the UAE, to the global aid agenda.[141] Nor does one observe that these small donors diversify risk by dispersing aid through a large number of multilateral organizations. The concentration of their multilateral use of aid follows larger Western donors' benchmarks. The UAE provides funds through the UN system, regional development banks and other multilateral organizations such as the OPEC Fund for International Development (figure 6).[142] Qatar follows suit: between 2012 and 2014, it disbursed roughly half of its multilateral aid through the UN system, and the other half through the regional Islamic Development Bank.

Figure 5. United Arab Emirates Use of the Multilateral System 2011–2015 (US$ millions, constant prices 2014)



and the Political Economy of Arab Regional Development. Moreover, while the BRICS have voiced opposition to existing Western settings by creating alternative frameworks, from the Non-Aligned Movement's milestone Bandung Conference, the G77 and UNCTAD, to the Development Cooperation Forum, the small Gulf donors have been by and large silent participants to those platforms. See Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience'; UN ECOSOC, 'DCF Global Preparatory Meeting'; Walz and Ramachandran, 'Brave New World', 3.

139 Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.

140 Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 206; Pinfari, 'Of Cats and Lions'.

141 Ross and Voeten, 'Oil and International Cooperation'; 'KOF Globalization Index'.

142 For the UAE, comparisons are made based on OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System for the period 2011–2015. See 'OECD Statistics'; OECD, *Development Co-Operation Report 2016*, 295.

For a different reason, liberally inspired scholars and optimist policymakers predict the same positive outcome. Considering that states are increasingly socialized in international organizations,[143] they predict that Qatar and the UAE's multilateral cooperation will increase with time.[144] In their view Qatar's multilateral transformation is only belated: the peninsula will follow in the steps of the UAE, which itself trails Kuwait, the historical regional champion of multilateralism. Aren't Qatar's recent and positive gestures towards Western multilateral aid organizations not evidence of such a trend?[145]

Optimist liberals have with reason pointed to Qatar's and the UAE's learning curve in the world of aid, a valuable reminder of an often-overlooked fact: both Qatar and the UAE, in spite of their wealth, are "states in the making".[146] Where these indulgent accounts are mistaken is to conceive of the UAE or Qatar as of any other emerging donor with respect to aid multilateralism. Historically, there is no reason why the UAE should precede Qatar in becoming a multilateral player on aid.[147] On donor proliferation, Qatar's incapacity to streamline aid is exceptionally enduring. Other emerging donors are moving towards more centralization, albeit with bureaucratic hiccups. An incomparably larger bureaucracy, Brazil, established the Brazilian Cooperation Agency as early as the 1990s.[148] Thus, Qatar seems to be faring only a little better than China or India when it comes the internal coordination of its aid.[149] The same may be said about aid transparency, on which Qatar is faring little better than the Chinese giant.[150]

There is no linear progression either towards aid transparency in the world of Gulf para-public aid organizations. For instance, in the UAE organizations of the 1970s like the Abu Dhabi Fund Development promoted transparency and aid reporting in line with Western standards.

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[143] Johnston, 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environments'.

[144] Kharas, 'Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid'; Tok, 'Gulf Donors and the 2030 Agenda'; Barber, *Blinded by Humanity*; Zimmermann and Smith, 'More Actors, More Money, More Ideas for International Development Co-Operation'; Shushan and Marcoux, *The Rise (and Decline?*, 1973.

[145] Qatar was notably granted "participant status' in the OECD–DAC in April 2016. See 'Qatar Becomes Participant in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - OECD'.

[146] Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*.

[147] It is a recurrent argument that the UAE and Qatar behave differently because Qatar has only developed later thanks to Liquified Natural Gas. This is highly debatable on economic grounds given that public spending and oil exports started in Qatar before they did in the UAE. Regarding aid, in the early days, Qatar had opened a development office in Dubai, not the other way around. See Confidential note, 1970, in Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 41.

[148] Bracho and Grimm, in Klingebiel, Mahn, and Negre, *The Fragmentation of Aid Concepts, Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation*, 126; 'Presentation - Director of ABC'.

[149] Grimm et al., 'Transparency of Chinese Aid: An Analysis of the Published Information on Chinese External Financial Flows'; Agrawal, 'Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The India Case'.

[150] Walz and Ramachandran, 'Brave New World', 22.

However, more recent organizations, like the Khalifa Foundation (2007), are overtly opaque when disbursing aid. More problematically, liberal scholars have made little use of the existing literature on the agency of international organizations, the socialization of states and of elites, to provide clear mechanisms under which the autocratic rentier states socialize in multilateral settings. Without clear outlined mechanisms, the perception of Gulf states as it stands now is that "they first join international agreements and then seek solutions to fulfil commitments".[151] This is hardly satisfying theoretically.

In a competing explanation, rentier scholars posit that the rentier nature of states, irrespective of their size, is detrimental to multilateralism.[152] With high hydrocarbon prices and favourable trading terms, international cooperation is ancillary for rentier states.[153] What matters most is the price of oil and gas, already a highly volatile matter,[154] which not only determines the level of foreign aid, but also the degree of use of the multilateral channel for aid.[155]

Rentier "internationalists" strength is to have established clear causal relationships between hydrocarbon prices and aid: the higher hydrocarbon prices, the greater the volume of aid and the lower the multilateral share of aid.[156] These scholars nonetheless face two pitfalls. First, they overwhelmingly focus on aid volumes. They use Gulf aid as a regression variable and disregard it as a policy outcome. Whether Gulf countries disburse aid in line with the international community, or in isolation from it, is not tackled in rentier internationalists' work. Yet the sheer reporting of aid, for instance, which these scholars take for granted, is a process to be studied in its own terms, not least because it underlines a significant divide between very similar countries like Qatar and the UAE. Second, facts often contradict the general law established by rentier scholars. There are numerous instances in which we observe the reinforcement of aid multilateralism - in financial and institutional terms - in the UAE *in the*

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151 'Climate Change Threats, Opportunities, and the GCC Countries', 9.

152 The rentier nature of the state is also negatively correlated with peaceful cooperation according to Nasser Al-Mawali, 'Do Natural Resources of Rentier States Promote Military Expenditures?'; Colgan, 'Fueling the Fire Pathways from Oil to War'.

153 Ross and Voeten, 'Oil and International Cooperation'. This argument corroborates the hypothesis made by Milner that wealthier countries "would be expected to rely on bilateral means more often". See Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.

154 In brief, oil prices (and their consequences) are not subject to the usual type of randomness associated with social events. Oil prices do not follow the Bell curve, but evolve in a Mandelbrotian type. This debate far exceeds the scope of this work, but for an overview, see Taleb, *The Black Swan*; Taleb and Mandelbrot, in Diebold, Doherty, and Herring, *The Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable in Financial Risk Management*.

155 Johnson, 'Royals Flush?'

156 Barakat and Zyck see a strong correlation between hydrocarbon prices and aid volumes, while Walz, Ramachadran and Rouis, consider that this trend is less apparent since the 1990's. See Barakat and Zyck, 'Gulf State Assistance to Conflict-Affected Environments'; Rouis, 'Arab Development Assistance: Four Decades of Cooperation'; Walz and Ramachandran, 'Brave New World', 12.

context of an increasing rent.[157] In short, rentier internationalists explain rather why Gulf states are less inclined than non-rentier states to commit to multilateralism, not why divergences exist amongst Gulf states.

Though with a different twist, the branding literature,[158] which area specialists have used to coin the UAE's and Qatar's newsworthy aid activities (or sports, or culture, etc.), supports rentier predictions. Branding theory establishes that small state autocrats, poor in human resources but empowered by hydrocarbon rent, attempt to gain international prestige through economic means, notably the production of a specific common good – environment, culture, humanitarianism – to resist the soft power of overbearing neighbours,[159] assert their credibility as independent sheikhdoms[160] and, ultimately, co-opt allies.[161] Bluntly put, the rulers of the UAE and Qatar engage with aid multilateralism because they want to put the "[UN] logo on to their conference brochures"[162] and brand themselves as responsible donors of the international community.[163] Conversely, they are not interested in the nitty-gritty aspects of international cooperation on donor proliferation or aid transparency and wish to avoid signing any legally binding multilateral treaty.[164]

Branding underlines how autocrats, empowered by hydrocarbon rent, may *choose* bilateral or multilateral means to gain international visibility, regardless of domestic or international constraints.[165] In biological terms, the city states resemble "small organisms [with] a far greater possibility of a large range of radically different morphologies".[166] However, branding advocates tend to misrepresent wealthy petro-monarchies as "throw[ing] money at problems".[167] This claim

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[157] The UAE's share of multilateral ODA was at its highest in the past decade between 2010 and 2012, when oil prices where both very low (2010) and high (2011–12). Similarly, two of the UAE's largest multilateral advocates, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (1971) and the Ministry of International Cooperation and Development (2013), were created during oil booms. See 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2014', 114; 'OPEC Crude Oil Price Statistics Annually 1960-2017'.

[158] Peterson, 'Qatar and the World'.

[159] Kazerouni, 'Musées et soft power dans le Golfe persique', 2 December 2014. On the use of economic diplomacy by small states, see Handel, in Ingebritsen, *Small States in International Relations*, 25.

[160] Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*; Dorsey, 'The 2022 World Cup'; Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*.

[161] Branding – or investing in some global good is one pathway. According to Peterson, the two others are accommodating powerful neighbours and having a powerful protector. See Peterson, in Ulrichsen, *Qatar and the Arab Spring*, 41.

[162] Official, UNESCO. Interview by author. Doha, February 25, 2016. In the remainder of the thesis, interviews will be referred to according to the table of interviews (see appendix). For instance, this interview is then referred to as 'q6'.

[163] Walz and Ramachandran, 'Brave New World', 21.

[164] McGeehan, in Kymlicka and Pföstl, *Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in the Arab World*, 184.

[165] Jones, 'Seeing Like an Autocrat', 25; Hertog, 'How Oil Enables Anti-Hegemonic Populism in International Relations', 36 forthcoming.

[166] Bonner, *Randomness in Evolution*, 41.

[167] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*.

overlooks the great self-understanding in Qatar and the UAE, as in other small states, of the limited availability of human resources that cannot be diluted into short-term, dispersed initiatives; as well as the short-lived reliance on hydrocarbon revenues.[168] Branding assumes - but does not demonstrate - that Qatar and the UAE are characterized, unlike the "bloated and ossified bureaucratic structures of Cairo and Riyadh", by a narrow circle of highly autonomous decision-makers[169] and the capacity to personalize their projects.[170] If branding provides a powerful explanation as to why aid organizations mushroom with little transparency when hydrocarbon rent is high, it cannot explain why these organizations survive, in Qatar rather than in the UAE, under conditions of financial austerity or of ruler-led reforms on donor proliferation and transparency. Last, branding cannot explain the rationale for the nitty-gritty aspect of multilateral commitment, such as aid reporting, curbing donor proliferation, or contributing to multilateral organizations' core budgets, that increasingly characterizes the UAE's international cooperation.

Last, Third World studies consider that the Gulf donors should reject Western-led multilateral system. Politically and religiously-motivated aid forms an alternative "Arab" model and a counterpoint to the Western standards of transparency, accountability and neutrality.[171] This trend predicts that both Qatar and the UAE would be highly committed to Arab forms of aid multilateralism and reject Western-led fora.[172] These views however fail to account for Qatar and the UAE's diverging paths. These studies detail the context of decolonization, pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism that characterized Qatar and the UAE's early days as donors. They overlook the fact however that Gulf regional or faith-based multilateralism has been as divisive as the adherence to Western aid standards and organizations. Gulf donors have never been able to fully agree on common aid objectives or instruments.[173] Additionally, Gulf donors have never been capable of forming a Third Worldist sentiment among recipients. Aid provided by OPEC donors, notably the OPEC Fund for International Development, has never convinced the least developed economies that Gulf donors were there to help, nor economists that this aid could

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[168] Bunglawala, 'Young, Educated and Dependent on the Public Sector', 7.
[169] Peterson, in Ulrichsen, *Qatar and the Arab Spring*, 40; Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 25.
[170] Ulrichsen, *The Gulf States in International Political Economy*, 76–77.
[171] Régis Soubrouillard, "Quand le Qatar achetait la France," *Outre-Terre* n° 33-34, no. 3 (December 1, 2012): 517–21, doi:10.3917/oute.033.0517; Johnson, 'Royals Flush?'; Villanger, 'Arab Foreign Aid'.
[172] Khafagy enumerates these accounts in her work on Gulf philanthropies. See Khafagy, 'Gulf Philanthropy: Structural, Domestic and Global Challenges'.
[173] Lestra and Tok, 'A Fragmented Aid? The Institutionalization of the OIC's Foreign Aid Framework'; Hossain, 'The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)'; 'Can the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Resolve Conflicts?'; Tadjbakhsh, in Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory*, 189.

compensate for the negative impact of rising oil prices on the poorest developing states.[174] Even in Muslim-majority countries, Gulf philanthropies "hardly coordinate with local partners".[175] Third World scholars cannot explain, once again, the UAE's pioneering foreign aid multilateralism – on transparency and donor proliferation – that seemed unlikely a few decades ago given the "Arab" model of aid.[176] In short, the limitation of Third World studies' is that *multilateralism* seems to be as problematic as *Western-led multilateralism* for the small Gulf donors.

State-level explanations have contradicting views on the reason why when facing similar international incentives and constraints, the small rentier states of the UAE and Qatar tread diverging multilateral paths. None fully explains why one country, rather than the other, has become "more multilateral". Not only have these studies treated the Gulf states as a coherent block. They have also assumed, along with area-studies, these states "as unitary rational actors". Others have suggested rather that states are "better analysed as collective entities composed of rational actors with different preferences".[177] The next section will point to domestic explanations that may explain the two emirates' different multilateral cooperation. It shows that a principal–agent approach to Qatari and Emirati international cooperation bridges the foreign aid scholarship and Gulf studies in a productive way.

Going domestic

Against the pitfall of systemic explanations, some of the theories outlined above have granularized their analysis with domestic inputs to explain international cooperation outcomes.[178] The small state literature increasingly echoes the concerns of Gulf area specialists that Middle Eastern administrations' limited capacities may hinder their international cooperation.[179] Conversely, rentier scholars have toned down deterministic approaches towards oil prices and international cooperation and recognized that some states simply do not abide by the rule - that higher hydrocarbon prices command lower multilateral cooperation.[180]

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174 Hallwood and Sinclair, 'OPEC'S Developing Relationships with the Third World'.
175 Khafagy, 'Gulf Philanthropy: Structural, Domestic and Global Challenges', 3.
176 Walz and Ramachandran, 'Brave New World'.
177 Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.
178 Leveau and Charillon, *Monarchies Du Golfe - Les Micro-États de La Péninsule Arabique*.
179 Anderson, 'The State in the Middle East and North Africa', 2.
180 Norway shows simultaneous high cooperation and high oil prices. Conversely, Oman displays both low oil revenues and low multilateral cooperation. Ross and Voeten do not account either for the residual difference in the respective multilateral adherence of Qatar and the UAE. See Ross and Voeten, 'Oil and International Cooperation'. .

This turn to domestic explanations is subject to caution. First, the great similarities between Qatar and the Emirates disqualify certain domestic variations as explanations. This point is developed further in the theoretical chapter and research design. Second, the rare domestic approaches to Gulf states' foreign aid remain partial.[181] Because they assume that Gulf autocrats have a complete grasp over foreign policy, Gulf studies provide limited insight into the role of domestic dynamics in shaping international cooperation.[182] When they have placed domestic actors into the study of Gulf foreign aid, scholars have focused overwhelmingly on the role of the clergy.[183] Others focus on the impact of Gulf aid on the domestic politics of recipient countries- at the other end of the aid chain.[184] Closer to the inception of aid policies, Petersen presents an interesting typology of the different aid cultures present in the Gulf states. She does not explain however how these diverse actors fit in with the small autocracies' overall aid strategies.[185] Third, the small state literature and mainstream liberal understandings of foreign aid focus on a different problem than area specialists: they are used to studying democracies.[186] Consequently, their analyses do not square with Gulf politics. While in democracies for instance, public opinion affects the choice of aid multilateralism,[187] in the Gulf, though not entirely absent, it is negligible.[188]

Where mainstream foreign aid studies suggest an interesting angle into the divergences between Qatar and the UAE, is when they formulate conditions for the success or failure of aid reforms according to the characteristics of aid bureaucracies. Indeed, a fact that should not go unnoticed is that both countries have attempted to formulate *strategies* on donor proliferation and aid transparency: it is therefore unlikely that the divergence between their multilateral commitments is the result of sheer randomness – but rather of successful or failed policies.[189]

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[181] On domestic accounts of Qatar's foreign aid landscape and other Gulf donors, see Khali Al Mezaini's forthcoming book *Politics of Aid: Foreign Aid Programs of the Arab Gulf State*.

[182] Khafagy, 'Gulf Philanthropy: Structural, Domestic and Global Challenges', 11.

[183] For instance, the most well-known studies deal with the large and organized Saudi clergy, which has no equivalent in Qatar nor in the UAE. See Baskan and Wright, 'SEEDS OF CHANGE'; Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*; Mouline, in Haykel, Hegghammer, and Lacroix, *Saudi Arabia in Transition*.

[184] 'The Case Against Qatar'; Touati, 'L'Islam et Les ONG Islamiques Au Niger'; 'L'aide Arabe et Musulmane Face Aux Occidentaux'; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*; Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*.

[185] Petersen, *For Humanity Or For The Umma?*

[186] Thorhallsson, *The Role of Small States in the European Union*. This remains a limited input because contrarily to small democratic states, Gulf states' administrative systems are extremely vertical – and decisions thus taken differently.

[187] Milner and Tingley, 'The Choice for Multilateralism'; Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*.

[188] Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*.

[189] I can therefore reject the null hypothesis. The null hypotheses serves the purpose of a theoretical-check to make sure that what is observed is indeed theoretically puzzling and may not be explained by sheer randomness or intervening forces unaccounted for. The null hypothesis in this case may be formulated as follows: the degree of commitment of Gulf states to multilateralism is the result of random decision-making – a combination for instance

Aid economists identify the risk of paralysis within *democratic* donor administrations when multiple actors are involved in the aid process.[190] In the cases of the UAE and Qatar, principal–agent theory considers that the more agents or principals are involved in the process, the less likely is it that either country will be able to meet the requirements of the multilateral aid community. This is puzzling given that the larger decentralized and inter-tribal setting of the UAE is more capable of curbing donor proliferation and enhancing aid transparency at the federal level, than the smaller cohesive state of Qatar, where many aid organizations are also surprisingly present. Rather than a generic problem with principal–agent theory, this caveat suggests that this framework should be adapted to the context of the autocratic and rentier states of Qatar and the UAE.

In short, domestic approaches to the interaction between the international level – multilateral aid organizations in this case – and rentier autocracies, require further development.

The argument

A domestic and historical-institutionalist approach brings a new insight to the diverging trajectories of Qatar and the UAE in the world of aid multilateralism. Its focus on *path dependencies*,[191] explains the divergence between Qatari and Emirati aid over time. It supports the main argument of this work: the UAE is not only better integrated into the multilateral aid system because it wants to, but also because Qatar can't.

The UAE may cooperate with multilateral organizations in a way that Qatar cannot because of two related and complementary reasons. One is the intrinsically fragmented nature of growing *rentier bureaucracies*.[192] The other is the fragmentation stemming from power-sharing among Gulf families, also known as *dynastic monarchism*.[193] These two dynamics obstruct reforms even when those are called for by the leadership. They guarantee the stability of the ruling family and of its close allies but de-incentivize bureaucrats and aid workers; and endow powerful patrons with substantial autonomy to enact or obstruct reforms. Both dynamics coalesce to

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of irrational mood from the Prince and ignorance of bureaucrats. On the null hypothesis, see 'Null Hypothesis - The Commonly Accepted Hypothesis'.

[190] Seabright, in Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*.

[191] Path dependency means than "an event has much more important ramifications if it occurs early in a process than if it does so later". See Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia*.

[192] Hertog.

[193] Herb, *All in the Family*.

fragment the aid landscape. This favours donor proliferation and also hinders system-wide reforms on aid transparency.

These two dynamics are operating in the rentier state of Qatar and in the rentier emirate of Abu Dhabi, despite both leaderships' attempt to streamline aid and increase aid transparency within their borders. The UAE *as a whole* however performs differently in multilateral settings because of its "federal" decentralized power setting. Specifically, the working relationship between Abu Dhabi and Dubai – a different expression of dynastic monarchism – has favoured the reform of the aid sector to meet the international community's requirements on donor proliferation and aid transparency.

After testing these two theoretical frameworks, this work argues that bureaucratic rentierism and dynastic monarchism have another unintended consequence besides fragmentation: the rise and endurance of foreign experts in decision-making. This also has implications for the multilateral or bilateral paths chosen by the two states. Because rentierism and dynastic monarchism create uncertainty as to the success of policy reforms, they have reinforced the influence over time, of rulers' foreign advisers in the case of foreign aid. Foreign experts are a notable group often mentioned but always disregarded in Gulf studies. However, they are crucial to understanding why the UAE, rather than Qatar, may *want* to become a multilateral foreign aid player.

In brief, autocratic Gulf rulers do not have the indifference attributed to them by branding and rentier internationalists, nor the all-encompassing power attributed to them by small state theory and area-studies. Furthermore, the fact that these states face small states constraints does not mean that they escape rentier or dynastic dynamics. Therefore, rentierism and dynastic monarchism serve to explain the different capacity for both states to follow the requirements of donor proliferation and aid transparency; while the importance of domestic stakeholders – notably foreign experts - is important to understand the extent to which these states have wished to overcome these barriers.

Results

Rentierism and dynastic monarchisms are both operating in the rentier state of Qatar and the rentier emirate of Abu Dhabi, despite both leaderships' attempt to streamline aid and increase

aid transparency within their borders. Fifteen years after the Emiri decree establishing the centralized Qatar Development Fund, the Qatari reform of the aid landscape is still underway. The legal and administrative patchwork that constitutes Qatari aid also prevents a homogenous aid reporting, which has been only marginal so far. In Abu Dhabi also, aid streamlining is limited. Different, sometimes redundant, aid fiefdoms continue to coexist in spite of the leadership's reformist agenda.

The UAE *as a whole* however performs differently in multilateral settings because of its "federal" decentralized power setting. Specifically, the working relationship between Abu Dhabi and Dubai – also an expression of dynastic monarchism – has favoured the reform of the aid sector to meet the international community's requirements on donor proliferation and aid transparency. Dubai, unaltered by rentier constraints, is also tasked by its neighbour to conduct reforms. Reforms are more likely there because a double pressure is applied to aid workers to reform. Commitments to international aid standards are more durable there because being negotiated between two emirates makes them costlier. What Dubai undertakes on aid transparency in particular also compels Abu Dhabi to follow suit.

On top of the incentives and constraints of rentierism and dynastic monarchism, the study of foreign advisers' role in Qatar and the UAE shows that from pre-independence onwards, foreign experts have helped shape the two emirates' attitude towards multilateralism. For long the difference between the two emirates has been ideological. While reformist-oriented experts have quickly taken hold over key aid fiefdoms in the UAE, traditional aid has developed in Qatar. These differences have pervaded to this date, but are narrowing thanks to the emergence in both emirates of a younger generation of pragmatic aid experts.

Contribution of the thesis

Theoretically, this thesis expands historical-institutionalist findings on the rentier state to the foreign policies of small Gulf petro-monarchies. In so doing, it counters four generations of small state literature, and of its latest iteration, "branding". It also develops the first comprehensive and comparative account of the ruler–expert nexus in the context of rentier dynastic states. Empirically, it provides new insights of the dynamics of donor proliferation and aid transparency in relatively undocumented and increasingly important, emerging donors.

Outline

The next chapter presents in more detail the building blocks of rentierism and dynastic monarchism, as well as the methodological tools used to assess my theoretical claims. I justify there the importance of foreign experts in understanding Gulf foreign policies and how their role articulates with the dominant rentier lenses used to analyse the region. I then develop two case studies – one for Qatar, one for the UAE - of the impact of rentier and dynastic dynamics in donor proliferation and aid transparency. Afterwards, I provide a comparative analysis of the influence of domestic coalitions – with specific focus on foreign experts - on the multilateral trajectory of both city states. I conclude by examining the implications of these various findings for the latest developments in, and the future of Gulf donorship.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter, I revise the principal–agent approach by adding two complementary mechanisms developed elsewhere in the Gulf literature – rentierism and dynastic monarchism – to the model.. With these, I show that Qatar follows the logic of the *multiple principals* to the detriment of its multilateral cooperation. I explain how these multiple principals emerge in the first place. Conversely, I show that rentierism and dynastic monarchism shape the UAE (in particular the relationship between its main components, Abu Dhabi and Dubai) into a *principal–intermediary* structure that benefits reforms on aid transparency and donor proliferation. Last, I show that both rentierism and dynastic monarchism say little about elite preferences and overlook the consequences of their own unravelling – that is, the reinforcement of foreign experts' influence in aid decisions. This chapter provides thereafter building blocks for the conceptualization of the role of experts in autocratic rentier states. It then explains why Qatar and the UAE are fitting cases to test these theoretical frameworks, before elaborating on the methodology and data collection strategies used to compare and contrast these two Arab donors.

Why do Qatar and the UAE, despite a shared sacralized, anti-colonialist and pan-Arab approach to aid; despite similar incentives and constraints in cooperating with the global aid community on the crucial challenges of donor proliferation and aid transparency, and; despite similar attempts to reform their aid landscape accordingly, follow diverging paths in the realm of multilateral aid?

The previous chapter argued that principal–agent theorists have made the most elaborate propositions on the domestic predictors of aid multilateralism (and its opposite, aid bilateralism). These contributions are generically insightful because they consider the complexity of the domestic setting and its impact on the choice for aid multilateralism. Principal–agent theory contends that the greater the number of *agents* involved in the aid chain, the greater is the risk of deviation from the original aid objective.[194] An elected executive acting to disburse aid raised by

[194] Seabright, in Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*, 57; Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.

taxpayers will probably rely on an aid agency, which itself might act with the recipient country's government, while devolving the implementation of the aid project to a foreign non-governmental organization or to a consulting company. Each time one agent delegates tasks to another (and becomes that agent's principal in the process), this increases the risk of deviation from the original policy objective.[195]

Another – rather uncharted – principal–agent conundrum is the instance in which multiple principals are involved in the aid process. If multiple principals impose conflicting objectives on an aid agent, this increases the likeliness that the agent stops acting altogether. Indeed, either the agent wants to avoid that any principal finds itself worse off than in the initial *status quo* or the agent, overburdened by multiple tasks, focuses on the most mundane to the detriment of policy output.[196]

Conversely, multiple principals may lead to more positive outcomes *if one principal acts as the other's intermediary*.[197] This requires that a clear hierarchy is established between the principal and his intermediary.[198] The consequences of this principal–intermediary structure are two-fold. First, in-depth reforms are more likely because two principals apply twice the pressure for agents to comply. Second, because aligning the principals' interests is costly,[199] it is more likely that reforms will endure, to avoid the transaction costs of undoing the deal.

Principal–agent accounts of aid are however problematic in practice because they focus on the transparent democratic members of the OECD. For Milner or Martens, the choice for multilateralism depends on the relationship between the voters (the principal) and the executive (the agent). Public opinion, party politics, or interest groups from the private sector,[200] are constraints placed upon democratically elected governments that do not apply to the Gulf. Gulf

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[195] There are two ways agents may encourage slippage from the original aid objective. The first is moral hazard i.e., when the agent promotes its own goals rather than those of the principal. The second is adverse selection: when the agent manipulates private information unknown to the principal to reach outcome "adverse to the principal's interests". See Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.

[196] Seabright, in Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*, 13; 57; Nielson and Tierney, 'Delegation to International Organizations', 242.

[197] On the one hand, an intermediary adds to the chain of delegation, leading to efficiency-losses. The intermediary may also change agents' incentives for his own interest and manipulate information to make himself indispensable to the principal. In both cases we then revert to the first scenario outlined above. See Seabright, in Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*, 47–48.

[198] Seabright, in Martens, 47.

[199] Martens, 12.

[200] According to Milner the interest groups "prefer aid for commercial reasons; that is, they want aid given in such a way that maximizes their profits". See Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.

rulers are not elected and dominate the private sector. In other words, in the Gulf, the rulers are the sole principals.

Seemingly, Gulf rulers' delegation of aid tasks to agents leads to varying performance on aid transparency and donor proliferation in the small rentier states of Qatar and the UAE. This is puzzling for principal–agent theory. According to the principal–agent model, reforms to enhance aid transparency and curb donor proliferation fail because of the multiple principals and/or multiple agents intervening in the aid chain. Yet, the larger, decentralized setting of the UAE, where multiple principals (the ruling families) cohabit, is capable of curbing donor proliferation and of enhancing aid transparency in ways that the smaller Qatar cannot. To identify the principal–agent model "that best reflects the real-world delegation relationship under study" in Qatar and the UAE and avoid "faulty interpretation of empirical results",[201] I rework principal–agent modelling with two complementary mechanisms – rentierism and dynastic monarchism – developed elsewhere in the Gulf literature. With these, I show that Qatar follows the logic of the *multiple principals* to the detriment of its multilateral cooperation. I explain how these multiple principals emerge in the first place. Conversely, I show that rentierism and dynastic monarchism shape the UAE (among which Abu Dhabi and Dubai) into a *principal-intermediary* structure that benefits reforms on aid transparency and donor proliferation. Last, I show that both rentierism and dynastic monarchism say little of elite preferences and overlook the consequences of their own unravelling - that is, the reinforcement of foreign experts' influence in aid decisions.

Princely principals and risk-averse agents

Scholars wrongly assume that when the small autocratic states of Qatar and the UAE unilaterally decide to work with international organizations, they follow the *single-principal* model.[202] Rentierism shows how the relationship between rulers (principals) and agents (aid bureaucrats or para-public aid workers) in rentier states leads to the emergence of multiple principals and to risk-averse attitudes amongst agents. Dynastic monarchism shows how family relations in the Gulf states reinforce the multiple principals model, albeit with different outcomes in Qatar than in the UAE.

[201] Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, in Hawkins.
[202] Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, in Hawkins.

Rentierism

A rentier economy has bureaucratic characteristics that affect the way foreign aid is mobilized and disbursed. With respect to principal–agent theory, rentierism underlines that Gulf polities are not made up of voters or taxpayers, but of individuals co-opted by the state, notably thanks to the provision of public jobs. A rentier dynamic enables the proliferation of multiple autonomous principals and strengthens the risk-averseness of agents. This dynamic is caught in Steffen Hertog's *Princes, Brokers and Bureaucrats*, which explains why decrepit and first-class departments coexist within the Saudi economic and fiscal administration. Hertog argues that the more the rentier state co-opts society through the rentier contract – notably by providing stable, well-paid public jobs – the heavier and reform-averse the bureaucracy becomes. As the state bureaucracy grows "into large public sectors heavily resistant to reform",[203] the harder it becomes to "re-engineer" the state. In other words, as the literature on bureaucracies hints, albeit not in rentier contexts, "the bureaucratic machine takes on a life beyond its creator".[204] Therefore, according to Hertog, distributional choice at the earlier stages of the growth of hydrocarbon-related wealth, to co-opt society by providing well-remunerated public jobs, has a significant impact on later attempts to reform the administration. This is in itself a marker of path dependency, as conceptualized by Pierson, according to which "the costs of switching from one alternative to another will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time", and for which what matters to explain social phenomena is not only "what happens, but when it happens".[205] In short, path dependency generated by the emergence and consolidation of the rentier state becomes an obstacle to reform.

More specifically, the multiple-principals model arises for three reasons. First, pressure to reform dysfunctional services is blocked at the mid-level as low-tier bureaucrats are *de facto* protected by their patrons, usually eminent members of the ruling family or their close relations. Put simply, you cannot fire a local. Second, reforms are also blocked by the vertical nature of autocratic decision-making, which impedes the circulation of information and the swiftness of decision-making. Every minor decision takes time because it has to be validated at the very top. Third, some reforms may simultaneously be supported by some entrepreneurial patrons and their staff. Fragmentation is thus paradoxically a result of power centralization in the hands of a few.

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[203] Bunglawala, 'Young, Educated and Dependent on the Public Sector', 11; Richards and Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*.
[204] Waters and Waters, *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society*, 75.
[205] Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', 251.

Opportunities to defuse the multiple-principals model are limited, and only bring partial results.[206] Nevertheless, change may take place under the following conditions. First, there can be pressure from the central government when it reassigns jurisdictions. Just as segmentation blocks through-and-out reforms, it deters the emergence of administrative coalitions promoting the status quo and facilitates the swift implementation of partial reforms. Reform may also result from outside pressure applied by powerful allies and/or international organizations. Successful reforms are therefore more likely when the interests of the international organization and of rulers are aligned in favour of reforming the rentier bureaucracy.[207]

At the end of the day, those who decide to reform and those who decide to hold on to their bureaucratic fiefdoms, increasingly segment the bureaucracy. In the aid landscape, this allows for the indifferent coexistence of different, and often redundant, organizations.[208] In consequence, bureaucratic segmentation – or donor proliferation in the case of foreign aid–is characteristic of the rentier bureaucracy. Furthermore, rentierism predicts that because the bureaucracy is increasingly difficult to re-engineer, one can only expect systemic transformations on aid transparency to fail.

Rentierism pushes the fallacies of principal–agent theory to their extreme. It creates risk-averse agents. It also follows the logic of *multiple principals* because the growth of the rent-fuelled administration enables multiple patrons to segment it. Why these patrons manage to act autonomously from one another is explained partly by their use of rent and – fundamentally–by their privileged position in the ruling elite of these small autocracies. Patrons indeed benefit from the logic of dynastic monarchism.

Dynastic monarchism

Interacting with rentierism is another characteristic of the Gulf states – the fact that politics there are "all in the family".[209] According to Michael Herb, dynastic monarchism is a mechanism of elite accommodation: the institutionalized – yet informal – dispute settlement mechanism used by members of a ruling autocratic family.[210] It became increasingly important as the ruling

[206] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*.
[207] Hertog.
[208] Hertog, 30.
[209] Herb, *All in the Family*.
[210] Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 132–33.

families of the Gulf took control over the hydrocarbon rent in the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, with the increasing concentration of power within the ruling families came increasing weariness among them that some members might defect or, worse, attempt to overturn the ruler. Accordingly, the distribution of public jobs, ministerial offices, real estate or rent, helped maintain the ruling family's cohesiveness and prevent coups.[211] Dynastic monarchism became a vector of dynastic stability.[212] Conflicts are therefore resolved within the family (or families) in ways that entirely exclude outsider actors or influences.[213]

Unsurprisingly, such effort to mediate intra-family conflict often comes at the expense of the efficient functioning of the state.[214] Because it favours regime survival over political reform, dynastic monarchism often leads to non-optimal policy outcomes to accommodate the interests of various members of the dynasty. Conversely, the ruler can only impose wholesome reforms on aid if other principals – family members and close allies – agree to it. If they don't, then dynastic monarchism reinforces the logic of the multiple-principals model. If they do, members of the dynasty may act under an accommodating principal–intermediary structure as the ruler is supported by other powerful principals acting on its behalf.

In short, dynastic monarchism usually embodies the logic of multiple principals because it reinforces the autonomy of potent members of the ruling family and of their close allies. In the field of foreign aid for instance, dynastic monarchism rewards members of the ruling family and their close allies by allowing them to partake in foreign aid with little oversight.[215] For instance, the ruler must accommodate the whims of competing members of the royal family, or of its close allies, when these want to set their own (often redundant) aid organizations. This enhances donor proliferation and strains the state administration. Conversely, the success of any reform, such as systemic regulations on aid transparency, is conditional upon the cooperation of the relevant family members.

Both rentierism and dynastic monarchism show that even in the most autocratic states, rulers are also faced with internal principal–agent constraints that impact the likelihood of policy

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[211] Hertog, 'Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States'.
[212] Herb, *All in the Family*.
[213] Herb, *The Wages of Oil*; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 98; Hertog, 'Two-Level Negotiations in a Fragmented System'. Almezaini, in Hertog, *Business Politics in the Middle East*, 44; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 137; Achcar, *The People Want*, 95–96
[214] How can a state focus on policy output, when as in Saudi Arabia, more than five thousand royal princes have to be accommodated? See Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 403.
[215] As in business, foreign aid is another element of the particular patrimonial capitalist system in place in the Arab Gulf. For a broader application to business and economic reform, see Schwarz, 'Introduction'.

reform. Rentier fragmentation operates between rulers and bureaucrats and creates risk-averse agents, while dynastic fragmentation operates amongst the rulers' inner circle and creates multiple principals. Both dynamics are reinforced by the increasing centralization of power in the hands of one ruling family. On the one hand, the growth of the rentier state inflates an ever-segmented and unproductive bureaucracy. On the other hand, the need to accommodate all family members takes increasing precedence over political reform as the family becomes increasingly powerful. Ultimately, in line with a principal–agent reading of foreign aid, both dynamics impede the multilateral cooperation of states. They obstruct the reforms necessary to curb donor proliferation and to enhance aid transparency that make such cooperation possible. This is because they favour the profusion of various principals without a clear hierarchy, and create multi-speed aid systems that are unpredictable and cannot be read by international organizations. From these two elements, I formulate the central hypothesis of this work.

Hypothesis 1: ***The more power is centralized in the rentier state, the more fragmented the aid landscape becomes, and the less reforms on donor proliferation and aid transparency are likely to succeed***

To test this hypothesis, I use a most-similar case design including Qatar and the UAE. Usually applied to a small number of cases, the most-similar case design assumes that the more similar the cases being compared, the more possible it should be to identify the elements responsible for differences between them.[216]

Case selection: A structured, focused comparison of the foreign aid of two small rentier states

I select countries that share many characteristics but diverge on the degree of concentration of power. Qatar is a rentier autocracy ruled by a single family, the Al Thani. The UAE is a decentralized state made up of seven emirates. Central to its existence is the relationship between its two major emirates, rentier Abu Dhabi, and non-rentier Dubai.[217]

Two similar rentier Gulf emirates

[216] Bennett and Elman, 'Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield', 175.
[217]Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 12.

My work focuses on two actors: Qatar and the UAE. Thanks to these actors' many similarities, I can control for some possible intervening factors and thus exclude several hypotheses presented in the theoretical review. In many ways, Qatar and the UAE are similar. In general terms, they are small hydrocarbon-rich rentier states and rank amongst the richest states in the world per capita.[218]

[218] Espinoza, *The Macroeconomics of the Arab States of the Gulf*, 20.

Figure 6. The universe of cases of rentier states[219]



Both are autocratic states where power is "all in the family"[220] and vertical decision-making the rule of thumb.[221] Rulers are tightly enmeshed in the public, the private and para-public sectors.[222] In the aid sector, para-public organizations are therefore better defined in the Orwellian vernacular as "Government-Organized Non-governmental Organizations."[223] State-building is at work in both countries, and both Qatar and the UAE were aid recipients before they became aid donors.[224] As emerging donors, their statecraft has been challenged by similar international incentives and constraints. Former British protectorates,[225] they regained control over foreign policy during decolonization. At the time of their independence, in 1971, they only marginally engaged in multilateral settings and international affairs.[226] As small states, the development of their aid programs has continuously been constrained by regional politics – notably the support

[219] To draw this universe of cases I used the categories provided in Ross and Voeten, 'Oil and International Cooperation'; Hertog, 'How Oil Enables Anti-Hegemonic Populism in International Relations'; Espinoza, *The Macroeconomics of the Arab States of the Gulf*; Herb, *The Wages of Oil*; Rauch and Kostyshak, 'The Three Arab Worlds'.
[220] Herb, *All in the Family*.
[221] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*.
[222] Hertog, *Business Politics in the Middle East*, 11.
[223] Hasmath, Hildebrandt, and Hsu, 'Conceptualizing Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations'.
[224] Qatar and the UAE received aid notably from Kuwait in the mid-1960's. See Abdulghani, 'Culture and Interest in Arab Foreign Aid', 86; Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience', 4.
[225] Crouzet, *Genèses Du Moyen-Orient*.
[226] According to the KOF Index of Globalization database (updated in 2016), in 1970 (first Index entry), variance among the UAE and Qatar was under 10 points on a scale of a 100. See 'KOF Globalization Index'.

to the "Palestinian cause", Saudi-led regional aid multilateralism, and the need to accommodate aggressive neighbours.[227]

In recent years, they have been called upon by the international donor community to engage more and reform their foreign aid sector, which displays common roots in the Islamic culture of aid and charity.[228] In both countries, aid actions were originally domestically oriented and developed by local notables, not by a clear-cut and autonomous clergy as in neighbouring Saudi Arabia. In the UAE for instance, the Beit Al Khair charity was founded by a group of Dubai businessmen in 1989 and continues to have an exclusively domestic focus.[229] In Qatar as well, the first generation of formalized Qatari aid actors – such as the Qatar Charity (1978) or the Qatar Red Crescent (QRC) (1982) –developed around local groups of (non-professional) notables. Consequently, the sizeable foreign aid programs of these city states were scarcely institutionalized at the time of independence, whether in the form of an aid bureaucracy or of an aid industry.[230] For both countries, disbursing foreign aid according to multilateral standards,[231] or being in multilateral aid fora, as for any other policy, has put a great strain on their limited administrative capacities.[232]

In short, Qatar and the UAE share international and domestic characteristics. While these elements control for some analytical biases, one difference between both countries stands out: the degree of centralization of power within the ruling family.[233]

Degree of power centralization

[227] For a fascinating account of their financial support to contenders of the Iran–Iraq war, see Salamé, 'Les pétromonarchies du Golfe et la guerre du Chatt el-Arab'.
[228] Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*; Benthall, 'The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Islamic Societies, with Special Reference to Jordan'; Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies*; Petersen, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*.
[229] 'Beit Al Kheir Society - Overview'.
[230] Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*; Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*.
[231] 'Flagship Uae Charities Focused on Aid, Not Ideology'.
[232] Danyel Reiche, "Energy Policies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries—possibilities and Limitations of Ecological Modernization in Rentier States," *Energy Policy* 38, no. 5 (2010): 2398; Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 212; Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," 10; Peter Carroll and William Hynes, "Engaging with Arab aid donors: the DAC experience", IIIS Discussion Paper 424, April 2013, www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/ discussion/pdfs/iiisdp424.pdf , 7.
[233] Herb, *All in the Family*; Herb, *The Wages of Oil*; Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia*; Hertog, 'How Oil Enables Anti-Hegemonic Populism in International Relations'; Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*; Ross and Voeten, 'Oil and International Cooperation'; Ross, 'What's So Special about the Arabian Peninsula?'

The two Gulf city states are characterized by different degrees of centralization of power that should explain their divergent pathways. Qatar is a rentier autocracy ruled by a single dynasty, the Al Thani.[234] The UAE is a decentralized state made up of seven emirates. The UAE therefore differs from all of its neighbours[235] because power is decentralized *and* remains within an inter-tribal structure of ruling families.[236] On the one hand, Abu Dhabi and Qatar being two small rentier and dynastic emirates, we should observe the same outcomes in both. First, if centralization causes fragmentation, we should observe, over time, the emergence of a multi-speed system composed of some unproductive and redundant aid organizations, whether public or para-public, as well as some "islands of efficiency" led by pro-reform patrons. Second, if fragmentation occurs due to dynastic monarchism, we should observe the multiplication of para-public or public aid organizations falling under tutelage of royal family members and close allies – notably the creation of new charitable organizations under royal names.

On the other hand, Abu Dhabi being part of the broader UAE, we should observe an intervening factor, decentralization, that brings to the different, positive, abidance of the UAE to the multilateral standards on donor proliferation and aid transparency.[237]

Figure 7. Variations in the domestic characteristics of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates

	United Arab Emirates	**Qatar**
Rentierism	Mixed (Abu Dhabi extreme rentier, Dubai non-rentier)	Extreme rentier
Dynastic monarchism	Inter-tribal – multiple families	Single family

[234] I understand the Al Thani dynasty to be extended to its close allies, which comprise the Al Khalifa and the Al Attiya. These have frequently married into the family. In addition, the Al Kuwari share an ancestor with the Al Thani and are closely associated with the rulership.
[235] In his book, Michael Herb analyses the dynasties of the Al Sabah (Kuwait), the Al Saud (Saudi Arabia), the Al Thani (Qatar), Al Khalifa (Bahrain), Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi), Al Maktum (Dubai), and Al Said (Oman).
[236] In each emirate, as in Qatar, the rulers accommodate their close allies. In Abu Dhabi, the Al Nahyan's close allies are the Al Qassimi, Al Dhaheri, Al Mazroei, Al Qubaisi, Al Suwaidi, Al Khoury, Al Rumaithi, Al Muhairi, Al Shamsi and Al Hosani. In Dubai, the leadership's allies are the Al Ghurair, Al Mulla, Al Futtaim, Al Sari, Al Jallaf, Al Kazim, Lootah, and Al Mazrouei. See Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 25; 'Gulf's Most Influential Families Revealed'; 'Tribal Families in Qatar'.
[237] A point on methodology. It is very likely that some degree of endogeneity affects the multilateral cooperation of Qatar and the UAE. Indeed, in such a small region, the behaviour of one actor is likely to affect the decision-making process of another. I capture the influence that the "Dubai model' may have both on Qatari and Emirati foreign aid with this research design. Secondly, I try to capture endogeneity of Qatari and Emirati foreign aid by focussing, in the theory-building part of the dissertation, on the influential circulation of foreign experts in the Arabian Peninsula.

Theory building: the role of foreign experts in Gulf foreign aid

Despite often using rentier lenses, Gulf scholars recognize that rentierism says little "of the influence of personal preferences, interests and choices of individual leaders."[238] It is now an accepted fact that rentierism alone cannot fully explain policy outcomes.[239] In his monograph on economic reform in Saudi Arabia, Hertog does not systematize the reasons why some princes favour reform or the status quo. Hertog recognizes that international pressure and leader support for these reforms enhances the prospect of effective reform. This says little about how leaders come to recognize the value of aligning with international standards. The same may be said about dynastic monarchism, which describes the accommodating strategies within ruling families, but does not explain how members of the ruling cast come to favour some policies over others. Neither framework explains why some principals favour reform on donor proliferation and aid transparency, or oppose them. They indicate how these reforms are likely to fail.

I argue that because rentierism and dynastic monarchism usually fail to achieve reforms, they increase the reliance of princes and emirs on foreign experts. It goes without saying that these are neither risk-averse bureaucratic agents, nor competing princely principals. First, Gulf rulers have historically relied on foreign expertise. Foreign policy in Qatar and the UAE is not the invention of small rich states of the oil era. It existed before under the heavy influence of British administrators and Indian Ocean merchants.[240] Yet for both Hertog and Herb, the growth of the rentier state has marginalized these historical figures. Problematically, these scholars do not say who, if any, fills the policy void when rulers are busy taking care of their own survival and agents are reluctant to work. I argue on the contrary that rentierism and dynastic monarchism, because they have disastrous policy implications, give greater leverage to foreign experts, when those experts manage to legitimize their claims over time. In short, in addition to rentierism and dynastic monarchism, there is a need to understand rulers' preferences towards multilateralism and how these have been influenced by foreign experts.

The following section outlines the theory-building part of this dissertation, and how the role of expertise should be better conceptualized in the realm of rentier and dynastic politics.

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[238] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 17.
[239] Herb, *All in the Family*; Herb, *The Wages of Oil.*
[240] Crouzet, *Genèses Du Moyen-Orient*; Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965*; Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966-1971*; Burdett and Great Britain. Public Record Office, *Records of Kuwait, 1961-1965*.

Foreign experts

I argue that the growth of idle rentier state bureaucracies has given foreign experts more leverage and that foreign experts can use their role as international brokers to maintain their influence in policymaking.

Though Gulf studies have recognized the importance of focusing on high-skilled migrants[241] and despite historical evidence of their relevance in the region,[242] the impact of foreign experts in rentier contexts is undertheorized.[243] High-skilled migrants are usually explored in single case studies[244] or through anecdotal evidence.[245] The gap in the literature is due to two reasons. The first, which I have already explored, results from the macro-level analysis of Gulf foreign policies that often leaves out domestic actors. The second – discussed below– is that the rentier lenses dominant in Gulf studies deny foreign experts' influence in the policymaking process. As a consequence, the existing literature is inconclusive on this topic.[246]

The rentier state paradigm downplays the role of foreign expertise in small autocratic rentier states. For rentier scholars, the condition of receiving oil rents precludes foreign influence. According to this branch of literature, wealth isolates Gulf elites from the influence of foreign experts. First it provides autocrats with the financial capacity to substitute undesirable

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[241] Kamrava, *Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf*, 19; Davidson, "Expatriates and the Gulf Monarchies"; Michael Herb, *The Wages of Oil : Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE* (Cornell University Press, 2014), 197; Françoise De Bel-Air, "Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar," 2014, http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/32431.

[242] John Duke Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates: Dynamics of State Formation* (Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2002), 13.

[243] Barring the forthcoming contribution by Calvert Jones, Outsourcing the State: The Expert-Ruler Nexus and Implications for Governance in the Arab Gulf, forthcoming

[244] Ulrichsen, *Qatar and the Arab Spring*; Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*; De Bel-Air, 'Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar'; Lacroix, 'L'Arabie saoudite'; 'Lebanese Migration to the Gulf (1950-2009) | Middle East Institute'; Dargham, 'How Do Lebanese Expatriates in GCC Perceive the Implications of Their Expatriation of Their Expatriation on Career Success?'; Yates, 'Western Expatriates in the UAE Armed Forces, 1964–2015'; Vora, 'Unofficial Citizens'; Kanchana, 'Qatar's "White-Collar" Indians'; Pelican, 'Urban Lifeworlds of Cameroonian Migrants in Dubai'.

[245] Achcar notes the Sheikh Qaradawi's influence over former Sheikh Hamad policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar; Hertog the influence of Arthur Young on Saudi King Abdulaziz in setting up the Saudi Central Bank ; Nonneman the influence of an Egyptian director on policies taken by the Sultan of Oman, Al Yahya and Fustier the role of a foreign advisor at the Saudi court which "takes care of foreign assistance"; Coates Ulrichsen the importance of foreign gatekeepers to the ruler's close circle, etc. The list is endless. See Gilbert Achcar, *The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 153; Steffen Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Library, 2010), 17; Gerd Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East* (London; New York: Routledge, 1988), 56; Al Yahya and Fustier, in Jonathan Benthall and Robert Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond* (Gerlach Press, 2014), 175; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, *The Gulf States in International Political Economy* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 3.

[246] Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 100; Fargues and Venturini, *Migration from North Africa and the Middle East*, 1.

candidates with other non-nationals.[247] Second generous rent-derived wages co-opt foreign experts, turning them into risk-averse, depoliticized courtiers of the state.[248] Conversely, foreign experts pursue their individual well-being and personal gain.[249] Uncommitted to the organization for which they work,[250] these "serial migrants" are likely to follow the rules (even more so when they are young and unexperienced) and thus legitimize autocrats' – often irrational – reforms.[251] When these experts do attempt to enhance reforms, they are unable to impact Gulf administrations beyond the senior levels. Usually isolated in the segmented administration, they are unable to constitute a political force with Western-leaning senior bureaucrats.[252]

It is worthwhile presenting rentier predictions, because these tend to dominate other subfields of the social sciences when it comes to the Persian Gulf. Small state theorists and area specialists all recognize that "rulers rule" and that rulers' preferences shape small Gulf states' international cooperation,[253] but then leave it at that. Migration, transnational and diaspora studies also refer to the autocratic grasp of rulers,[254] consider foreigners as flows rather than agents,[255] and point to the spatial and social marginalization of foreign experts in Gulf

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[247] Roberts, 'Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood', 89; De Bel-Air, 'Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar'; Achcar, *The People Want*, 101; Herb, *All in the Family*, 63–64.Daniel Jendrissek, "Brain Drain and Brain Gain: The Global Competition to Attract High-skilled Migrants / The Cultural Politics of Talent Migration in East Asia," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 40 (2014): 2055–2057; Kazerouni, "Musées et soft power," 87–97; Edward J. Malecki and Michael C. Ewers. "Labor Migration to World Cities: With a Research Agenda for the Arab Gulf," *Progress in Human Geography* 31 (2007): 467–84.

[248] Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 19; Collectif et al., *Le règne des entourages*, 74; Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*; Davidson, 'Expatriates and the Gulf Monarchies'; Barber, *Blinded by Humanity*, 180.

[249] Gardner, in Kamrava, *Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf*, 57.

[250] Rodriguez and Scurry, 'Career Capital Development of Self-Initiated Expatriates in Qatar', 1047.

[251] Davidson, 'Expatriates and the Gulf Monarchies'; Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 6; Lazar, *Qatar, une Education City*, 44; Achcar, *The People Want*, 31; Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 147; Collectif et al., *Le règne des entourages*, 78.

[252] Hertog, 'Two-Level Negotiations in a Fragmented System', 652–57.

[253] Jones, "Seeing Like an Autocrat"; Soubrier, in David B. Des Roches and Dania Thafer, eds., *The Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States: Trends and Implications* (Berlin, Germany: Gerlach Press, 2016), chap. 8; William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 5th edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012); Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 16; Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*; Achcar, *The People Want*, 150–51; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, *The Gulf States in International Political Economy* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 69.

[254] Ilias, in Gorman and Kasbarian, *Diasporas of the Modern Middle East*.

[255] When they are considered as agents, foreigners are considered as shaping the foreign policy of their country of origin, not of their host country. See Ossella and Ossella, in Kamrava, *Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf*, 103; Andrew Gardner et al., "A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar," *Journal of Arabian Studies* 3, no. 1 (June 1, 2013): 1–17, doi:10.1080/21534764.2013.806076; Ganesh Seshan, "Migrants in Qatar: A Socio-Economic Profile," *Journal of Arabian Studies* 2, no. 2 (December 1, 2012): 157–71, doi:10.1080/21534764.2012.735458; Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9780511558818; René Daniel Gorenflo, "Seizing Layers within a Multi-Layered Structure: How the EU Deals with Security and Where the GCC Could Fit In," Working Paper, (2008), 1, http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/7874.

societies.[256] For numerical reasons, white collars are considered to have even less influence on Gulf polities than the blue collars that wash, drive and clean their cars.[257] Thus, many consider that if foreign aid has anything to do with foreign expertise, it is because financial aid to specific countries recognizes the role played by the masses of their migrants working in the Gulf, as well as the guarantee that these expatriates will display due diligence to Gulf authorities.[258] Additionally, globalization studies consider that rising levels of education and human development in the Arab region phases out the influence of these experts.[259] Finally, epistemic scholars themselves consider epistemic communities as non-operative in autocratic settings or in developing countries.[260] They focus on experts in Western democracies as a result.[261]

In short, the rentier paradigm – and its derivatives – treats Gulf countries and economies "as mere epiphenomena of the world trade in hydrocarbons, where in fact these economies sustain an important part of citizens' income, and themselves are sustained in part by on-shore non-citizen labour."[262]

While numerous arguments negate the role of foreign experts in the Gulf, this contribution argues that the *homo economicus* vision displayed above is short-sighted. Other

[256] Longva, in Paul Dresch and James P. Piscatori, eds., *Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf* (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 119; *Walls Built On Sand: Migration, Exclusion, And Society In Kuwait by Anh Nga Longva (10-Sep-1999) Paperback* (Perseus, 1999); Lazar, *Qatar, une Education City*, 29; Bristol-Rhys, in Kamrava, *Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf*, 59; Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 120; De Bel-Air, "Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar," 10; Hélène Thiollet, "Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf: Transnational Dynamics of Migration Politics since the 1930s," *IMI Working Paper Series* 131 (July 6, 2016): 11; Ahmed Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011); Laure Assaf, "La Corniche d'Abu Dhabi : espace public et intimités à ciel ouvert," *Arabian Humanities. Revue internationale d'archéologie et de sciences sociales sur la péninsule Arabique/International Journal of Archaeology and Social Sciences in the Arabian Peninsula*, no. 2 (September 9, 2013), https://cy.revues.org/2625; Rodriguez and Scurry, "Career Capital Development of Self-Initiated Expatriates in Qatar"; Nasra M. Shah, "Second Generation Non-Nationals in Kuwait: Achievements, Aspirations and Plans.," Monograph, (August 2013), 41, http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/kuwait/home.aspx; Andrew M. Gardner, "Strategic Transnationalism: The Indian Diasporic Elite in Contemporary Bahrain," *City & Society* 20, no. 1 (2008): 63, doi:10.1111/j.1548-744X.2008.00005.x; Dresch, in John W. Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed Al Mutawa, eds., *Globalization and the Gulf* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2006), 204. Such strategies meant to administer in a country where nationals are a minority are reminiscent of earlier practices, such as the criteria of "Arabness" used to administer under the Umayyad. See Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 14.

[257] Abdoulaye Diop et al., "Attitudes Towards Migrant Workers in the GCC: Evidence from Qatar," *Journal of Arabian Studie*s 2 (2012): 173-187 ; Shahid Bhuian et al., "Work-Related Attitudes and Job Characteristics of Expatriates in Saudi Arabia," *Thunderbird International Business Review* 43 (2001): 21–32.

[258] Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 154; Bel Air, in Fargues and Venturini, *Migration from North Africa and the Middle East*, 140; Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 16.

[259] Achcar, *The People Want*.

[260] In the case of developing countries, epistemic scholars consider that the limited administration offers little grasp for epistemic communities' ideas. See Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 35.

[261] Collectif et al., *Le règne des entourages*.

[262] Dresch, in Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, *Globalization and the Gulf*, 202.

incentives, both for monarchs and advisers, are also at play. Fundamentally, foreigners are structurally present in the Gulf.[263] Once they are recruited, it is hard to get foreign administrators out,[264] and even harder to get foreign experts' *ideas* out. An individual is easily replaced, but an a group is not. Thus, foreign experts, also, are part of path dependent institutional dynamics that trump the implementation of rulers' will in the autocratic states of the Gulf.[265] The next section systematizes the ruler–expert nexus in the rentier context and argues that foreign expertise complements rentierism.

First, even if Gulf leadership is small, powerful and autonomous from domestic and international constraints, it is not omniscient.[266] Foreign experts play a *technical* role, by restraining and reframing the list of rulers' policy options, to mitigate the uncertainty over reform payoffs.[267] Who better than a Somali expatriate, for instance, to advise Gulf rulers on how to disburse aid in the war-torn country? In this respect, systemic analyses of the key position of foreign experts between domestic and international settings are missing.[268] Foreign experts are particularly intertwined with multilateral aid organizations, for their coordination skills are particularly required to navigate these complex arenas.[269]

Second, while autocratic settings may hamper the role of foreign experts, they also limit popular participation in the public sphere and the administration in decision-making. For this reason, foreign experts can be expected to enjoy more, and not less, proximity with rulers than they would have in a democracy.[270]

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[263] Dresch, in Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, 201.

[264] Véronique Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy : Recycling Empire.* (Palgrave, 2014); Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires : European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957-1985* (Oxford University Press, 2012); The entrenchment of migrants under harsh migration policies is a paradox underlined by - Alejandro Portes and Josh DeWind, *Rethinking Migration : New Theoretical and Emperical Perspectives* (Berghahn Books, 2007), 7.

[265] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats.*

[266] Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy*, 29; Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 132; Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*; Collectif et al., *Le règne des entourages*, 90. It is notable that Gulf rulers repeatedly desire to be the sole instigators of prescient visions for their countries - "Le Golfe Par Ses Mots, Par Akram Belkaïd (Le Monde Diplomatique, Août 2013)"; Al-Kuwārī, "The Visions and Strategies of the GCC Countries from the Perspective of Reforms."

[267] Culpepper, *Creating Cooperation*, 9; Luciani and Hertog, in Held and Ulrichsen, *The Transformation of the Gulf*, 249; Chwieroth, *Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets*; Müller, *The Gloss of Harmony*, 7; Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 21.

[268] Hertog, who conceptualizes "brokers", gives them a domestic, not an international or transnational role. Significantly, in his contribution on two-level games between Saudi Arabia and the World Trade Organization, brokers are absent. See Hertog, 'Two-Level Negotiations in a Fragmented System', 657–58.

[269] Devin, *Sociologie des relations internationales*, 49.

[270] Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 82; Jones, 'Seeing Like an Autocrat', 28; Collectif et al., *Le règne des entourages*, 19.

Third, it is reductionist to argue that foreign advisors say what is expected of them. Previous research has shown, including in authoritarian settings,[271] that experts hired to legitimize *a posteriori* rulers' preferences may deviate from their original mandate.[272] This is possible thanks to the strategic mobilization of their material and immaterial resources, to overcome institutional constraints and weigh ideologically on policymaking.[273] Experts, in particular, may mobilize networks external to the organization – international organizations for instance – to defend their interests.[274] For some, even, experts "are able to create markets when they successfully define new problems using their own language and expertise."[275]

Fourth, it is because of the *rentier* state that foreign experts flourish. Alongside the growing rentier state both inflated and inefficient bureaucracies emerge – characterized by "phantom employment" of highly mobile and uncommitted national civil servants[276] – but also the financial means to outsource expertise through external technical assistance.[277] Demand for foreign experts has continued undisturbed where competent and willed nationals have been lacking. The failure of most nationalization programs and education reforms in the Gulf peninsula to sustain an effective administration is further proof that foreign expertise is sustained by the growth of the rentier state.[278] More often than not, rulers are dependent on the cooperation of foreign experts to fulfil their goals.[279] Conversely, foreign experts' lack of initiative is not as clear-cut as rentierism suggests. Their precarious status as advisers to autocrats, rather than taming their reformist zeal, might instead multiply it to please their patrons[280] or their future employers outside the Gulf.[281]

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[271] Chwieroth's sample includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
[272] Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid.*
[273] Jabko, *Playing the Market.*
[274] Galtung, in Pitt and Weiss, *The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies*, 17; Sending, *The Politics of Expertise*, 96; Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 233; Demir, *Kuwait Fund and the Political Economy of Arab Regional Development*, 17; Abbink and Salverda, *The Anthropology of Elites*, 21.
[275] Dezalay and Garth, *The Internationalization of Palace Wars*, 43.
[276] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*, 29; Hertog, 'Arab Gulf States'; Demir, *Kuwait Fund and the Political Economy of Arab Regional Development*, 15.
[277] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 24.
[278] Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 23.
[279] Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 84.
[280] Jones, "Outsourcing the State", 3.
[281] This is the logic of the shadow principal. See Adolph, *Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics*; Collectif et al., *Le règne des entourages*, 79.

Fifth, the *homo economicus* rationale behind rentier arguments is simplistic. Misled by asymmetries in offer and demand on the huge blue-collar labour market,[282] rentierism overlooks rulers' difficulty in finding fitting shoes on the small market of white-collar expertise. As early as 1963, the (Egyptian) head of the Qatari administration complained that high salaries could not compensate for the difficult working conditions in unproductive Gulf administrations.[283] Also, Gulf autocrats do not evolve in a social vacuum: they make path dependent choices. With the growth of the hydrocarbon industry,[284] Gulf rulers formed an enduring view that Westerners were simply 'better' at policy advice. Thus, despite the higher cost and available alternatives, they developed the habit of appointing Westerners to the highest managerial positions.[285] This stereotype, whether true or false, endures.[286]

The reasons that foreign experts arrive in the Gulf are also more complex than the *homo economicus* model suggests.[287] Foreign experts are conventionally characterized as a highly mobile workforce with no longer-term commitment to their host country.[288] Yet other factors are at play in the migration decision. Long-term economic stagnation, lack of integration,[289] or conflict in the country of origin[290] may push to seek long-term residence in the Gulf. The increasing number of mixed marriages between nationals and non-nationals;[291] births of Gulf-born foreign children;[292] or the (limited) ability for foreigners to purchase Gulf real estate,[293] all indicate the blurred lines between transnational circulation and diaspora settlements.[294] They challenge the assumption that the sense of belonging is only correlated with one's legal status,[295] and sit

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[282] James M. Dorsey, "The 2022 World Cup: A Potential Monkey Wrench for Change," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 31, no. 14 (September 22, 2014): 1739, doi:10.1080/09523367.2014.929115.
[283] Confidential note, 1963, in Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965*.
[284] Thiollet, 'Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf'.
[285] Ariss, 'Voicing Experiences and Perceptions of Local Managers', 1990.
[286] Thiollet, 'Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf', 8.
[287] Kamrava, *Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf*, 5; Vora, in Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 176; Gardner, 'Strategic Transnationalism', 61.
[288] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 9; Cesari, 'Religion and Diasporas'.
[289] Martin Lestra and Elyamine Settoul. 2017. "`Outsiders' In France, 'Westerners' in the Gulf. Motives For Expatriation in the Professional Trajectory of Second-Generation French Graduates of North African Descent," in R. Bertelsen, N. Noori and J-M. Rickli (eds), *Transnational Knowledge Relations and Researcher Mobility for Building Knowledge-Based Societies and Economies in the Gulf*, Berlin, London: Gerlach Press.
[290] Gardner, in Kamrava, 'Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy', 57; Babar, *Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC*.
[291] Ahmad, in Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 34; De Bel-Air, 'Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar'.
[292] 'The Demographic Profile of the Arab Countries'.
[293] Al Shehabi Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 105; Ulrichsen, *The Gulf States in International Political Economy*, 181.
[294] Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 202; Shah, "Second Generation Non-Nationals in Kuwait," 43; Di Bartolomeo and Fargues, in Fargues and Venturini, *Migration from North Africa and the Middle East*, 27; Kamrava, *Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf*, 10; Gardner, "Strategic Transnationalism," 56.
[295] Soudy, 'Home and Belonging'.

uncomfortably with Gulf rulers' policy of "immigration without inclusion".[296] What this implies for foreign experts' influence is two-sided. On the one hand, these "long-term" non-national residents may be more likely to support the *status quo* in order to retain their residency in the Gulf. On the other, they may be better equipped over time to propose reforms and influence rulers, given their better knowledge of Gulf rulers and societies.

In other words, the ruler–expert nexus in the rentier context is more complex than often assumed. Qatar and the UAE provide an interesting comparison to understand under what conditions some experts, rather than others, have been able to impose their ideas in both city states; and how has this impacted the city states' multilateral paths in the realm of foreign aid.

Case selection

On top of their multiple shared characteristics, another unacknowledged feature unites Qatar and the UAE: these countries' *reliance on non-national white-collar experts in the realm of foreign aid.*

Gulf nationals strikingly distinguish the *muqeemeen* (high-skilled) from the *ommal* (low-skilled) migrant workers.[297] This has to do with historic presence of migrants in the region.[298] Gulf white-collar cosmopolitanism was established long before oil by foreign merchants along the region's trading routes.[299] Successive layers of nationalities, social groups or professions, missionaries, civil servants and military attachés have since then landed on the Gulf's shores.[300] Today, Qatar and the UAE continue to host the highest relative presence of non-nationals in the working population in the world (see figure 10)[301] and since 2002 they have experienced the highest migration rates in the region.[302]

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[296] Fargues, *Immigration without Inclusion*.
[297] Diop et al., 'Attitudes Towards Migrant Workers in the GCC'.
[298] Commins, *The Gulf States*, 12.
[299] Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 26; Crouzet, *Genèses Du Moyen-Orient*; Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*; Hurewitz and Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*; Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*.
[300] Clarke, in Mazawi and Sultana, *World Yearbook of Education 2010*, 150; Roberts, 'Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood', 89.
[301] Gulf states are not unique cases in which large numbers of non-nationals operate. Cities in Africa and Asia would also fill some conditions for inclusion in this chapter. However, considering the case of foreign policy is best served if focussing on a sovereign state, I limit the analysis to the Gulf city states. See Philippe Fargues, in Luigi Narbone and Martin Lestra, *The Gulf Monarchies beyond the Arab Spring: Changes and Challenges*, 2015, 15, http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/37734.
[302] 'The Demographic Profile of the Arab Countries'. Between 2005–2010, the countries with the highest net migration rate include Qatar (with 133.4 migrants per 1,000 population), followed by the United Arab Emirates (121.1 migrants per 1,000 population)

Figure 8. GCC: Percentage of non-nationals employed in GCC countries (national statistics, 2009 – latest year or period available)



Source: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration Programme

To understand the importance of foreign experts in the Gulf, one has to rule out some conventional wisdom. First, scholars underestimate the number of foreign white-collars working in the Gulf. At first glance, skilled expatriates indeed seem to be very few, hidden by the massive size of the blue-collar migrant cohort. In Qatar, for instance, foreigners with a master's degree represent 1% of all migrants employed in the principality.[303] Yet, absolute numbers reinstate the importance of foreign white-collars in the Gulf economies. For each Qatari with a university diploma there are five non-national university graduates;[304] for each Emirati white-collar, eight non-national graduates exist.[305] Second, foreign experts are not only employed in the private sector,[306] but in the public sector as well. Nearly eight out of ten people working in senior positions in Qatar's public administration are foreigners – this also holds true for the UAE (see figure 11 below).

[303] 'Economically Active Population Aged 15 and above by Nationality (Qatari/ Non-Qatari), Sex and Education Level (2013) » GLMM'.
[304] 'Population 15 Years and above by Nationality (Qatari/ Non-Qatari), Sex, Age Group and Educational Level (2012) » GLMM'.
[305] 'UAE', 17 December 2014, 10.
[306] Davidson, 'Expatriates and the Gulf Monarchies', 273.

Figure 9. Non-nationals in senior positions in the public sector of Qatar (in percentages, 2014, left) and the United Arab Emirates (in percentages, 2008, right)[307]



Third, most white-collars are not Westerners. In the UAE, nearly nine out of ten people working with a university degree are from non-Western countries, notably from the Indian subcontinent.[308] Similarly, the *circa* one million Asians working in the Emirati construction business obscure the fact that more than half of UAE legislators, senior officials and managers are Asian as well.[309]

Foreigners do not populate alone Gulf administrations. In Qatar and the UAE in particular, nationals are very much prone to being employed in the well-paid public sector; in fact, more so than in any other Gulf state.[310] This provides a fertile terrain to examine the interaction of foreign experts with the rentier state bureaucracies and the tensions that may arise from the cohabitation between different policy orientations.[311] Indeed, bureaucratic competition among nationals and non-nationals in the Gulf may stem from purely self-interested reasons, such as differentiated wage-earning;[312] or the attempt to capture the foreign aid financial windfall

307 'Qatar'. 'UAE'.
308 Thiollet, 'Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf', 16; De Bel-Air, 'Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar', 10; Shah, 'Labour Migration from Asian to GCC Countries'.
309 The corresponding category is "Legislator, Senior Official and Manager". See "UAE: Employed Population by Nationality Group and Major Occupation Group (2008)", GLMM.
310 In 2009, around 9 out of then employed Qatari or Emirati national worked in the public sector. See Hertog, *Business Politics in the Middle East*; Bunglawala, 'Young, Educated and Dependent on the Public Sector', 11.
311 Gordon L. Clark and Ashby H. B. Monk, "Modernity, Imitation, and Performance: Sovereign Funds in the Gulf," SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, March 2, 2011), 131, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1775353; Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of "Experts" in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 33; Ewers and Dicce, in Micheline van Riemsdijk and Qingfang Wang, *Rethinking International Skilled Migration* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2016), 198. Though some consider, like Kanna, that a *khaleeji* public opinion exists on specific concerns, it is assumed not matter in foreign policy-making.
312 Elisabeth Longuenesse, *Professions et Société? Au Proche-Orient : Déclin Des Elites* Crises des Classes Moyennes, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2007), 87; 198.

in administratively limited states.[313] It may also stem from professional, national,[314] cultural or religious oppositions as to foreign aid's technical or normative aspects.[315]

Thus, Qatar and the UAE both provide solid grounds to test whether the emergence of certain favourable policies on donor proliferation and aid transparency, as opposed to opaquer ad-hoc forms of bilateral aid, is to be found in the outcome of competition between different foreign experts within each country's aid landscape. In short, the issue that I will explore is the extent to which the quantity and quality of the foreign expertise they have imported varies.

Hypothesis 2: ***The more pro-multilateral foreign experts are appointed in the rentier state, the more reforms on donor proliferation and aid transparency are likely to be implemented.***

Expert networks "are hierarchical not flat":[316] I hypothesize that the UAE, but not Qatar, has become more multilateral because *different* experts have successfully been appointed to manage foreign aid issues thanks to their resources and favourable ruling appointment strategies. Core to this hypothesis is the argument that rentierism and dynastic monarchism do not preclude the role of foreign experts, but on the contrary reinforce their influence by fragmenting and impoverishing the state administration.

This claim would be proved wrong under the following conditions. First, if it appears that isolated individuals are more influential than groups of experts, then influence cannot be said to stem from a collective belonging. Second, if foreign experts are as easily dismissed as they are named then – notwithstanding their resources – they are unable to mitigate rulers' appointment strategies. Third, the claim is dismissed if it appears that pro-multilateral experts do not generate more multilateral commitments, or conversely, that pro-bilateral agents have led to more multilateral commitment.[317] In all three cases this would confirm that a strict rentier and dynastic reading of Gulf politics suffices to explain the outcome.

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[313] Anderson, 'The State in the Middle East and North Africa', 20.
[314] Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*, 27; Clark and Monk, 'Modernity, Imitation, and Performance'.
[315] Technical aspects of aid may be the choice between grants or loans; normative aspects the choice between providing aid to Muslim or non-Muslim populations - Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*, 55; Petersen, *For Humanity Or For The Umma?*
[316] Faul, 'Networks and Power'.
[317] Conversely, my claims would be supported by evidence showing that pro-multilateral experts have taken hold of the UAE's foreign aid policy, while anti-multilateral experts have taken hold of Qatar's foreign aid.

In short, this thesis claims that the UAE is a more committed multilateral player because it is decentralized among rentier and non-rentier actors, and is host to a larger reformist cohort of experts. Qatar is a more traditional Arab donor because it is a more centralized rentier state and is host to a smaller reformist group of experts.

Methodology

The use of foreign aid

The slice of the "cooperation cake" that I analyse[318] – foreign aid– is a pillar of the foreign policy of Gulf petro-monarchies.[319] I focus on two specific aspects of foreign aid. Donor proliferation (or policy coherence) is an important issue for foreign aid policymakers and international civil servants wishing to improve global governance in foreign aid. Aid transparency and aid reporting, as well as the use of foreign aid to support terrorist organizations, are issues that have spilled-over into the security realm. To use both cases provides a more comprehensive test of the aforementioned theoretical framework in both the security and non-security realm – and avoids the cherry-picking of cases suitable for the theoretical claims.

Generally, foreign aid is the legacy of several centuries of charitable practice in the Arabian Peninsula that pre-dates both the oil economy and the state.[320] Specifically for this work, foreign aid is an important dimension of foreign policy. For rulers, it is a tool of statecraft helping to establish the recently independent city states of Qatar and the UAE.[321] For powerful businessmen or patrons, it is a channel for external representation in societies where civil society is highly constrained.[322]

In contrast to what diehard Cold War theorists claim, foreign aid is not strictly an instrument of soft power.[323] In the Gulf, it has been a costly practice for the sheikhdoms, which out of goodwill or peer pressure, have sacrificed early hydrocarbon resources to assist their

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318 Ross and Voeten, 'Oil and International Cooperation'.
319 Andresen, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 121.
320 Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*; Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies*; Duffy Toft, in Shah, Stepan, and Toft, *Rethinking Religion and World Affairs*, 684.
321 Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.
322 Gandhour, cited in Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 6.
323 Nye, *The Future of Power*, 52–54.

immediate neighbourhood and beyond.[324] Donor proliferation and aid transparency have increased these costs. Gulf rulers, used to manoeuvring aid in discretionary ways,[325] are faced with increased demands for accountability, to which are added security concerns, as the aid agenda mingles with the global fight against terrorism.[326]

For the last chapter on foreign expertise in particular, foreign aid is relevant as it is usually assumed to be under the tight control of rulers and of banning foreign interference.[327] Yet, it is also an outward-looking policy in which one might expect to find numerous foreign experts. Thus, while previous contributions have focused on likely cases of foreign interference in Gulf politics (i.e., economic globalization),[328] foreign aid is convenient to test whether foreigners may influence its direction at all, and how they deal with suspicious nationals or with competing experts.

If donor proliferation and aid transparency are theoretically relevant because they are particularly demanding on Gulf states, they are also methodologically useful to limit the scope of my investigation. Indeed, there are many international organizations – 200 – dealing with foreign aid. It is a fragmented area, fraught with conventions and more or less formalized organizations.[329] To facilitate the understanding of this complex network of actors and avoid introducing a selection bias into this work, I maintain constant the institutions that will be under study.[330] I focus on the UNDP, the central node of the UN aid system, one of the largest multilateral aid sources.[331] I focus as well on the OECD–DAC, which is in charge of collecting data and setting the influential standards of what stands or not as Official Development Assistance. Both the UNDP and the OECD are donor-driven formalized organizations rooted in the same Western genesis – the creation of the Marshall Plan – and have worked jointly in the

[324] Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*; Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*; Lestra and Tok, 'A Fragmented Aid? The Institutionalization of the OIC's Foreign Aid Framework'.
[325] Petersmann, *Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law*; Meunier, *Trading Voices*.
[326] Money-laundering and terrorist-financing have become two additional parts of the debate on aid transparency. See Medhora, 'Charitable Donations Could Be Diverted to Support Terrorism, Regulator Warns'.
[327] Another sensitive issue-area where foreign interference is problematic is that of education. It is tackled in Jones, 'Seeing Like an Autocrat'.
[328] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*; Herb, *The Wages of Oil*.
[329] Abbott and Snidal, 'Why States Act through Formal International Organizations', 1998, 5;10.
[330] Abbott and Snidal, 'Why States Act through Formal International Organizations', 1998.
[331] The UN and its agencies, the European Union and the World Bank account for 60% of multilateral aid flows in 2013 – meaning about 35 billion dollars. See 'Multilateral Aid 2015: Better Partnerships for a Post-2015 World'.

past half-century.[332] They embody the multilateral principles of donor proliferation and aid transparency on the ground (UNDP) and in policymaking circles (OECD–DAC).

The UNDP (1965) is the oldest development-centred body of the UN.[333] At approximately US$5 billion annually, donor contributions to the UNDP represent about one-one-fifth of all contributions to the United Nations development system. It is crucial to the the general aid framework of the UN because it works with and coordinates many different different specialized agencies that have received funds to focus on development at the country-country-level, such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Office of the United United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or the Food and Agriculture Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).[334]

The OECD–DAC is one of the two-hundred plus committees, subcommittees and working groups under the umbrella of the OECD. Originally an exclusive club of Western donors, the DAC soon after the Cold War extended its reach to become the international agenda-setter for measuring aid. It first established the standard Official Development Assistance indicator in 1969, before refining its definition in 1972.[335] Aid transparency and policy coherence are central to the OECD–DAC's work, which provides analysis, guidance and good practice on development cooperation.[336] Rather than a mere think tank whose reports lie on the shelf collecting dust, the OECD's unique peer-reviewing mechanism, established in 1962, provides information to governments' constituencies about the results of national aid programs.[337]

Over the years, both the UNDP and the OECD–DAC have moved from a strict "insider–outsider" type of organization to one advocating jointly for dialogue with donors that

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[332] Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 40; Carroll and Kellow, *The OECD*, 63. For instance, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation is jointly conducted by OECD and UNDP and advocates in favour of inclusive development partnerships and aid transparency. See 'Principles'; 'UNDP-OECD Report Finds Strong Commitment to Improve Development Co-Operation'.
[333] Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 51.
[334] Murphy, 55.
[335] Hynes and Scott, 'The Evolution of Official Development Assistance', 2; Verschaeve and Orbie, 'The DAC Is Dead, Long Live the DCF?', 572. As a reminder, Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprises "flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: (1) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and (2) each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)." See 'Official Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage - OECD'.
[336] 'Development Co-Operation Directorate (DCD-DAC) - OECD'.
[337] Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*; Carroll and Kellow, *The OECD*, 5.

do not necessarily agree with the principles they advocate. Notable among these are policy coherence and aid transparency. The UNDP has advocated for further engagement with Islamic actors[338] and South donors in general. The OECD–DAC also has entered dialogues with non-DAC donors, and Arab donors in particular, since the 1970s.[339] In addition to the Arab–DAC Dialogue then established, these efforts have built-up in recent years, notably in the field of aid transparency. Identified as key partners of the organization, Gulf donors are to be engaged with notably through "policy dialogue, collaboration on statistics and managing of development co-operation, and analytical work, including on triangular co-operation."[340]

In brief, I seek explanations for the divergent multilateral pathways of two similar rentier states. Foreign aid – and donor proliferation and aid transparency in particular –define the scope conditions of this work and provide two relevant cases to test the hypotheses at hand. Discussing foreign aid enables me to focus on Gulf states' relations with the UNDP and the OECD–DAC, two advocates of better engagement with non-Western donors and advocates of better aid standards on the matters of donor proliferation and transparency. Second, foreign aid is a telling case to assess the pitfalls of principal–agent theory in the context of a policy under tight executive control in some of the most autocratic states of the world. Relatedly, foreign aid is convenient to test whether foreigner experts may influence Gulf foreign policy; considering that it is both a sensitive and sovereign part of foreign policy; as well as a sector in which one is likely to find foreign experts – for the simple reason that these have "foreign" expertise.

Tracing donor proliferation and aid transparency policies

Central to the framework I adopt is the notion of path dependency. In general terms, path dependency means than an event has more weight if it occurs early in a process than if it does so at a later stage.[341] The more specific implications of this are several: "specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting from similar conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large consequences may result from relatively "small" or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse".[342] These factors have been examined by Hertog and Herb in their assessment of economic policies in the Gulf states. I

[338] Brenner, cited in Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*, 92.
[339] Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience'; Verschaeve and Orbie, 'The DAC Is Dead, Long Live the DCF?', 576.
[340] Luijkx, 'Development Co-Operation by Countries Beyond the DAC', 2.
[341] Hertog, *Princes*, 16; Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics'.
[342] Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', 251.

apply the same lenses to show how the growth of the rentier state has affected differently two similar states that differed in their degree of centralization and in the quantity and quality of foreign experts present in their administrations.

The growth of the rentier state and the increasing power of the ruling family create an inertia that impedes the performance of the Gulf aid sectors. They also reinforce, as I will show, the role of foreign expert in the formulation of these policies. To underscore this path dependency in the Qatari and Emirati aid landscapes, I pay close attention to the inherited institutional aid designs, including the role of experts prior to these countries' independence and rentier development, and how these have been impacted by the development of the rentier states and the rise of the Al Thani in Qatar and of the Al Nahyan and Al Maktoum in the UAE. This means that I do not only look at how "specific institutional systems are resilient over time", which is not enough to be considered as a path dependency.[343] Rather, I look at different sequences of the progression of the rentier state and of power concentration within the royal families and how they impact the quality of aid reforms.

With these elements in mind, the study utilizes both a synchronic and a diachronic approach. How did the aid landscape emerge in Qatar and the UAE? How has it been reformed or remained unchanged as the rentier bureaucracy has grown and the ruling families have become more powerful? And to what extent these developments have differed in the two city states?

In this work, I trace the evolution of Qatar's and the UAE's aid landscape over time, from independence to the initiation of system-level reforms on donor proliferation and aid transparency in particular from 2002 to 2016. The dissertation takes a comparative approach – a most-similar design with two different explanatory factors, power centralization and the nature of epistemic communities – to explain the differentiated emergence of foreign aid in Qatar and the UAE. It tests whether the mechanisms of rentierism, of dynastic monarchism, and of epistemic communities hold across countries and across time.[344]

[343] Breznitz, 'Slippery Paths of (Mis)Understanding?', 14.
[344] The diachronic perspective, or within-case analysis, checks that some unobserved features do not correlate with both the explanatory and dependent variables. See Culpepper, *Creating Cooperation*, 26; Brady and Collier, *Rethinking Social Inquiry*. The diachronic approach is also adequate to account for the slow shifts that often characterize development aid, as argued in Dahi, in Makdisi and Prashad, *Land of Blue Helmets*, 390.

In operational terms, I establish the functioning of the aid landscape in both countries prior to independence and in the early days of independence (1960s to the early 1970s). I then assess how the landscape has evolved with the parallel growth of the rentier state and concentration of power in the hands of the ruling families (1970s to the early 2000s). I then assess the impact of reforms in both countries starting from the early 2000s, when donor proliferation and aid transparency have become key items of the global aid agenda.

For each of these time periods I focus on the evolution of both the state administration and of the para-public aid sector. For instance, on donor proliferation I examine the extent to which competences on foreign aid have been centralized or increasingly dispersed. For that purpose, I detail the circumstances of the creation of Ministry of International Cooperation and Development (MICAD) in the UAE and of the Qatar Development Fund (QDF) in Doha. I also examine the number of para-public organizations created by royal family members or their close allies and the extent to which they have increased the policy coherence of each aid system. On aid transparency, I examine the extent to which each country's statistical and reporting system has evolved and which actors led this policy change. In particular, I examine the extent to which money laundering and terrorist financing legislation has been implemented prior to and after the global fight against terrorism, which domestic actors have promoted such legislation, and which have resisted it.

Measuring the degree of fragmentation and inertia affecting policymaking in rentier and dynastic states is quite straightforward because Hertog and Herb have already established process-tracing strategies and indicators to test these claims. Both scholars examine over time the formation of specific administrations and the degree of involvement of royal members in that process. I rely on the same archives and similar elite interviews to gather data. The role of foreign experts, which I develop in the last chapter of thesis, requires more methodological elaboration. Process-tracing, by systematically documenting the status of foreign experts at different times of the Gulf emirates' contemporary history, enables to disentangle if foreign experts did matter in shaping aid reforms in both countries; and if there importance is the result of historical contingencies or intrinsically linked to the growth of the rentier state.

Measuring expert influence

How to measure the influence of foreign experts in the Gulf petro-monarchies? Previous studies

point to the difficulty of measuring expert influence,[345] in particular when focusing on foreigners in a non-national context.[346] I argue in this section that a process-tracing strategy is appropriate to assess how the interaction between foreign experts' resources and autocratic rulers' preferences explains Qatar's and the UAE's divergent multilateral paths. To make the case for process tracing, I first delineate the scope conditions; namely, what is meant by influence. Second, I provide indicators to assess foreign experts' collective preferences. Third, I explain what foreign experts' means of influence are and how rulers think when naming experts. Fourth, I explain why process tracing helps to overcome some methodological obstacles, such as endogeneity.

Expert influence is often measured in three ways: output (rules and regulations and programmes adopted), outcome (change in behaviour) and impact (the extent to which a problem is solved).[347] I focus here on output and outcome. I am interested in the fact that some experts make *better* aid than others only insofar as this increases their influence over autocratic rulers.[348] Relatedly, assessing expert influence on one issue-area – foreign aid – undercuts the analytically weak (and increasingly derelict) argument that expert influence depends on the degree of technicality associated with the issue-area.[349]

Second, epistemic scholars warn of the tendency for scholars to confuse expert beliefs and expert influence.[350] I inductively identify foreign experts dealing with foreign aid, their preferences and resources. There are innumerable approaches that help create typologies of experts.[351] However, this work does not explore *in extenso* their relative merits.[352] Instead, it builds on Davis Cross' four-pronged "cohesiveness" to establish experts' preferences with respect to the standards set by multilateral foreign aid organizations. I then confront experts' preferences

[345] Chwieroth, *Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets*.
[346] Østergaard-Nielsen, 'The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices', 775–77.
[347] Andresen, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 107–10.
[348] For an introduction to debates on aid effectiveness, see Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*.
[349] Haas, *Saving the Mediterranean*, 52; Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 26–27.
[350] Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 36.
[351] Collectif et al., *Le règne des entourages*, 29.
[352] Two approaches – epistemic communities and policy networks – are relevant to this chapter. Epistemic communities, on the one hand, have a transnational focus. They examine links between domestic settings and international organizations. Policy networks, on the other hand, pay particular attention to informal ties existing between experts - an adequate reminder in the Gulf, where the organigram seldom reflects the true distribution of power. For a substantial discussion of these elements, see Cross, 'Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later'; Sending, *The Politics of Expertise*; McLean and McMillan, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*; Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 21;29;35; Abbink and Salverda, *The Anthropology of Elites*, 4; Collectif et al., *Le règne des entourages*, 31; Kenis and Schneider, in Marin et al., *Policy Networks*, 26.

and resources with rulers' appointment strategies. According to Chwieroth, rulers name experts for three reasons. Experts are either tools of external legitimation (the "credibility' model), instruments to further their patrons' political agenda and career (the "political" model), or influential and authoritative experts helping rulers cope with uncertainty (the "uncertainty" model).[353]

Problematically, studying the interactive relationship between foreign experts' cohesiveness and rulers' appointment strategies raises the issue of endogeneity. Experts are not selected randomly. It is difficult to know whether experts have an influence that is *independent* from the rationale behind their nomination.[354] Relatedly, history is usually recalled by winners. When studying competing foreign experts in Emirati and Qatari aid history, the risk is to focus only on winners and to say little of the impact other experts might have had.

To mitigate these biases, I use process tracing – a method suggested by epistemic scholars,[355] Gulf scholars[356] and demographers alike[357] – to test across the cases and within the cases of Qatar and the UAE, the four resources of epistemic influence and the three rationales for experts' appointment in the realm of foreign aid in Qatar and the UAE from independence (1971) to this day.

Process-tracing is a qualitative analytical tool "for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena".[358] It documents with non-standardized observations (using a wide variety of data) a single unit of analysis – in this instance, foreign experts in Qatar and the UAE - at any point in time during the sequence of events.[359] It analyses sequences to determine causal relationships, paying heed in particular to different competing explanations at specific historical critical-junctures.[360]

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[353] This ruler-expert nexus sits comfortably with the epistemic arguments according to which experts are more effective if their ideas line-up with existing norms (the "political" model); if they share professionals' norms (the "credibility" model), or if they advise during episodes of crisis (the "uncertainty" model).
[354] Chwieroth, *Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets*, 445; Werner, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 49.
[355] Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 34.
[356] Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 67.
[357] Leroy, *Population and World Politics*, 9.
[358] Collier, 'Understanding Process Tracing', 824.
[359] Collier, 824; Waldner, 'Process Tracing and Causal Mechanisms', 58. I address data collection issues in the next section.
[360] Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 64.

Process-tracing mitigates the issue of endogeneity of studying Qatar and the UAE foreign expertise – indeed experts circulate between both countries; and what Dubai does for instance is examined in Doha (and in Abu Dhabi) : this might interfere with another type of analysis. Indeed, process-tracing adds strength to a theoretical argument within-case analysis to this small-N research design.[361]

Across cases, process tracing also enables us to understand where and how both similar countries' multilateral pathways have departed. The requirement is that a within-case analysis is carried out, before a between-case is then assessed based on common critical-junctures.[362] Specifically for this work, process-tracing is relevant to build on previous theoretical contributions. Given that both Herb and Hertog have used process-tracing to discard foreign experts' influence over time, I chose to use similar material (archives and interviews) to "re-evaluate prior explanatory hypotheses"[363] on the role of foreign experts. Alike to other instances of process-tracing,[364] I then try to identify the extent to which the variable I am interested in, foreign experts, stands against the existing contradictions formulated in rentierism. In short, process-tracing is useful to disentangle the extent to which the influence of experts may be the sheer result of chance or "historical accidents"[365] that could've left enduring traces on the aid administrations of Qatar and the UAE; or if they are indeed a systematic consequence of the development of a rentier bureaucracy.

For the purpose of tracing the relevance of foreign experts in the Gulf emirates, I divide Qatar and the UAE's migration policies into three sequences considered as relevant by Gulf area-studies:[366] pre-independence (1960–1971), consolidation of the rentier state (1971–1990), and the post-Gulf war (1991–2016). This periodization takes stock of common external shocks such as the end of the Maritime Truce agreements[367] and the British retreat from the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf war(s), 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror, or the great fluctuations in hydrocarbon prices that have been a constant over time.

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[361] Collier, 'Understanding Process Tracing', 824.

[362] Bengtsson and Ruonavaara do such a comparative process-tracing in their analysis of divergences in housing policies of different Nordic countries, Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, *Comparative Process Tracing.*

[363] Collier, 'Understanding Process Tracing', 824.

[364] Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo.*

[365] David, 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY', 332.

[366] Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, *Globalization and the Gulf*, 8; Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 130.

[367] "The Pax Britannica in the Gulf was established through a series of maritime defense treaties, collectively known as the Maritime Truce, which Britain signed with the rulers of the Trucial States in 1835, Bahrain in 1861, Kuwait in 1899 (*de facto*), and Qatar in 1916", in Onley, *Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971*, 1.

I then compare the macro-level of migration policies, the human resources in comparable aid-related public and para-public organizations, and the policies that these have enacted in favour or against foreign aid multilateralism. At each critical-juncture, I provide data showing *which rationale* rulers were following in naming foreign experts across specific time periods, as well as *which resources* each epistemic community was mobilizing to stay in the sovereign's closest circles.[368] It tracks path dependencies within cases, notably helping identify whether experts have more agency over time.[369] By process-tracing at these critical junctures, I provide evidence that foreign experts do not lose relevance as the rentier state grows - on the contrary. I also find evidence that the consolidation of pro-multilateral experts in the UAE has benefited aid reform in ways greater than in Qatar.

In other words, process tracing confront at each specific time the rationale for ruler's appointment and the ability of each epistemic community to mobilize its resources to continue "steering" both countries' foreign aid. It is one feasible way to understand how epistemic communities have formed, endured or disappeared in the Gulf autocracies;[370] and the extent to which their preferences ultimately contributed to bringing Qatar and the UAE on to divergent multilateral pathways.

To summarize, I compare the evolution of the degree centralization of power in Qatar and the UAE. I examine how the aid landscape – both public and para-public – has evolved in both countries. I compare in a separate chapter the evolution of foreign experts in aid organizations of the two sheikhdoms. I compare how organizations fare with or without experts, how those who have hired experts evolve. Again, comparison across time and countries enables me to draw some lessons on the role of experts in rentier states".

Data

Feasibility concerns largely guided this research. Studying the international cooperation of the UAE and Qatar is a precarious endeavour. Data are scarce and often flawed. For instance, in the course of assessing the role of foreign experts in Gulf foreign aid, I came to realise that foreign experts are difficult to identify, because they are (1) not necessarily resident in the country and

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[368] Dunlop, in Cross, 'Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later', 146.
[369] Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 41; Abbink and Salverda, *The Anthropology of Elites*, 6.
[370] Sending, *The Politics of Expertise*.

(2) not necessarily transparently appointed.[371] Furthermore, fundamental data – such as the disaggregated job position of experts according to their nationality/ethnic group – is lacking in both Qatar and the UAE. Overall, the lack of reliable statistics determined the qualitative course of this inquiry.

I did not randomly select case studies from among the universe of small rentier cases available for testing my hypotheses. Instead, considering that the information I had to gather was sensitive, I chose a feasible research field tailored to my timeframe and schedule, background knowledge, and linguistic skills.[372] I progressively built my research agenda following an internship at the European Union Delegation in Cairo in 2010, a research visit in Oman in the winter of 2014, and a linguistic program followed in Lebanon in the summer 2014. These provided me with the basic linguistic and cultural tools to approach the *khaleeji* fieldwork without too much weariness.[373] Additionally, while some researchers are often concerned with "learning more and more about less and less", I chose to define a limited empirical puzzle to gain an in-depth comparative across (and within) knowledge of the aid landscape and history of the Gulf principalities, as well as some quality material for additional cross-country comparisons.[374]

Furthermore, studying the foreign aid policies of Qatar and the UAE was not only relevant theoretically, but also practically feasible. In the introduction, I showed the strong limitations attached to the focus on aid volumes in the Arabian Peninsula. Conversely, interacting with aid administrations in Gulf is an enriching experience. Whereas it would be unlikely for the author to gather information on negotiations between Abu Dhabi and Dubai on the future of the Emirati military, on Qatar's positioning in Yemen, or on the role played by foreign mercenaries in the Gulf militaries,[375] it was easier to research the aid activities of most aid actors in Qatar and the UAE. Yet, some difficulties arose for the theory-building part of this thesis – the role of foreign experts in foreign aid. The next sections detail how I attempted to triangulate elite interviews, archival work and other primary sources with the existing literature

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371 Kechichian, in Yi-Chong Xu and Gawdat Bahgat, eds., *The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds*, International Political Economy Series (Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 88; Clark and Monk, "Modernity, Imitation, and Performance."

372 Lieberman, 'Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research', 447.

373 English is one of the two working languages in the Gulf. On only two occasions (at the UAE Red Crescent, and at the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, Qatar), did I have to use a mix of Arabic and English to conduct the interviews.

374 I discuss the case of Kuwait at the end of the second empirical chapter.

375 These sensitive topics are documented elsewhere. See Roches and Thafer, *The Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States*; Yates, 'Western Expatriates in the UAE Armed Forces, 1964–2015'; Gause, *Oil Monarchies*; Droz-Vincent and internazionali, *A Return of Armies to the Forefront of Arab Politics?*

on the Gulf emirates and their foreign aid. I highlight the data I have gathered to build the chapter on the role of foreign experts in Gulf foreign aid.

Elite interviews

I conducted sixty-five elite interviews (see appendix) in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Doha, as well as Paris[376] and Geneva,[377] between June 2015 and December 2016 with both national and non-national experts working on foreign aid or related issues (see appendix for the complete list of interviewees). These were of three types: Gulf officials and foreign experts across the public and para-public aid sector (national ministries, diplomatic missions, foundations); international organization representatives – notably of the UN aid system and of the OECD (department of external relations, department of statistics and knowledge management); and sources loosely tied to the field of aid.

The list of expert interviews arises from a diversity sampling including a snowballing procedure.[378] It probes both in time and space because interviews involved different generations, professions and nationalities working (or having worked) on foreign aid in Qatar and the UAE. The number of interviews was based on the principle of saturation.[379] Data collection continued until new interviews showed only minor thematic variations from earlier ones. This was coupled with snowballing sampling especially of high-level personalities, to whom I was only introduced after prior contact was made with other interviewees. Interestingly, and reflecting rentier states' working culture, senior officials were often more open to discussion than lower "implementing" officials, who tended to refer to the top constantly. Because representatives of traditional Islamic organizations were underrepresented in the interviews (five out of a total of sixty-five),[380] I have also consulted nine interviews collected by Dr Marie Juul Petersen for her doctoral thesis. These were conducted with officials working in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation between 2009 and 2011.[381]

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[376] Paris hosts the headquarters of the OECD.
[377] Geneva hosts the Gulf Research Council, Europe's largest Gulf-related think tank.
[378] 'Snowball Sampling'.
[379] 'Data Saturation'.
[380] The aid organizations were often unapproachable even to foreign consultants or state officials themselves. In an attempt to stop the flow of my doctoral tears, an aid consultant in Abu Dhabi confided that members of Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince Court themselves could not schedule an appointment with the Khalifa Foundation.
[381] Petersen, 'For Humanity or For the Umma? Ideologies of Aid in Four Transnational Muslim NGOs'.

All of the interviews I conducted have a similar structure. The first step was to collect facts concerning the organization's activities and the context of its creation the number of staff. In other words, all things mundane that are however rarely available through other means.

The second step was to assess the organization's degree of integration within the national, regional and international aid landscape. This enabled me to situate organizations within that landscape and assess the degree of fragmentation at stake, whether horizontal (i.e., if they worked with one another) or vertical (i.e., who, if any, were the powerful patrons helping manage the organization). It also allowed me to compare and contrast the decision-making leverage inscribed in organigrams and enacted in practice. In short, it was as important for me to understand what actors knew or did not know, facts that I could later hold up against other interviews, primary and secondary sources.

In a third step, I asked interviewees about their perception of other national organizations; the status of national reforms on the issues at hand – donor proliferation and aid transparency; the perception of multilateral aid organizations, whether regional or international, and notably the UNDP and the OECD–DAC. Conversely, UNDP and OECD officials were asked in this third step to provide their views of their Gulf interlocutors. The last, less formal, step of the interview was to gather information on the profile of the interviewees – where they had studied, how they came to work in the aid sector, what they liked and didn't like about their job, etc. This "relaxed" part of the interview was nonetheless crucial to establish aid profiles for the last chapter on foreign aid experts in Gulf foreign aid.

Figure 10. Interview with two representatives at the Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation (Abu Dhabi, 17 November 2015)

Being a *wafid* (expatriate), I faced two different types of biases. On the one hand, foreign aid is a sector in which I considered most likely to be able to make some observations, as the small Gulf emirates are currently upgrading and reshaping their aid institutions. Not only out of a desire to showcase their success did Gulf aid actors open their office to doctoral students. There was also a genuine interest in exchanging information and the state of the art on foreign aid with external observers, specifically in a time of transition of that landscape. In addition, being an external observer detached from the administration, I was the eager collector of complaints and criticisms.

On the other hand, I had limited access to some (traditional) charities. It was hard to establish, beyond international consultants, any sustained relationship with interviewees. In particular, the post 9/11 and international fight against terrorism complicated my work in that suspicion aroused by the contribution of some Gulf charities to funding of terrorism has diffused a climate of scepticism and distrust between Gulf administrations, charities and Westerners. Notable was the fact that my interlocutors, often of their own initiative, decided to discuss the issue of money laundering and terrorism financing of their own accord, assuming that this was my only research interest.

Other sources

Relying on elite interviews alone is problematic. Given the poor record of Gulf aid organizations on transparency, I decided to diversify as much as possible data sources to be able to triangulate the information. I examined several dozens of digitalized and non-digitalized policy-documents, conference presentations and institutional brochures, in English and Arabic, published by the various Qatari and Emirati aid actors. I also consulted national archives at the UAE Federation Library as well as at New York University Abu Dhabi to provide historical depth to the ruler–expert nexus in Qatar and the UAE. Additionally, I made extensive use of Qatari and Emirati national news reports, to understand what these states say about themselves.

Further, I drew on various databases. The OECD database, and specifically, the Creditor Reporting System, includes a measure of the use of the multilateral system by some non-DAC members.[382] The KOF Globalization Index at ETH Zurich; the Ross and Voeten Legal Globalisation Dataset kindly shared by Erik Voeten; the AidData Initiative at the College of William and Mary, all enabled me to consolidate the intuition that Qatar and the UAE were indeed treading diverging paths. For the chapter on foreign experts, I used databases first to assess the distribution of non-national white-collars in Qatar and the UAE (Gulf Labour Markets and Migration database; UN International Migrant Stock; SESRI; the Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority, UAE; Wikileaks); second to assess the perception of multilateralism in different countries, age categories, professions; and third to assess the working and non-working relationships between nationals and non-nationals (HSBC Expat Explorer database; UN World Population Series).

For this last chapter, I also examined the professional trajectories of more than 750 white-collar nationals and non-nationals so as to check the robustness of the interview material.[383] The profiles were collected online through a snowballing procedure. Individuals

[382] The objective of the Creditor Reporting System Aid Activity database is to provide a set of readily available basic data that enables analysis on where aid goes, what purposes it serves and what policies it aims to implement, on a comparable basis for all DAC members. Data are collected on individual projects and programmes. Focus is on financial data but some descriptive information is also available. 'Technical Guide to Terms and Data in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activities Database - OECD'.

[383] The 750 profiles corroborated the evidence found elsewhere that (a) reformists' and performers' circulate globally; (b) that reformists and performers are co-opted from international organizations, multinational consultancy companies and international non-governmental organizations into the national aid apparatuses; (c) that performers' careers are more open-ended – they usually hold responsibilities in the aid sector only temporarily. Additionally, the 750 profiles enabled me to check the "credentials" of approximately two-thirds of the interviewees and, through snow-balling, identify additional interviewees.

identified are working, or have worked, in major aid-related institutions in Qatar and the UAE, or in international aid organizations with working relationships with these countries (UNDP, UNESCWA and OECD).[384] For instance, to assess *selection and training*, I examined individuals' nationality (when possible), degree and country of study, as well whether they have past working experience in the private sector, in the public sector or in international organizations. Finally, I utilized an extensive secondary literature on Gulf migrations and Gulf foreign aid and charity.

The next two empirical chapters test the impact of rentier and dynastic dynamics in donor proliferation and aid transparency in Qatar (chapter 2) and the United Arab Emirates (chapter 3). As a complementary explanation, chapter 4 then provides a comparative analysis of foreign experts on the multilateral trajectory of both city states. I conclude by examining the implications of these various findings for the latest developments and the future of Gulf donorship, as well as for other dimensions of the city states' foreign policies.

[384] For this purpose, I used in particular LinkedIn, Facebook, ResearchGate.

CHAPTER 3: THE MORE IT'S CENTRALIZED, THE MORE IT'S DIVIDED

THE FAILURE OF REFORMS ON DONOR PROLIFERATION AND AID TRANSPARENCY IN QATAR

Abstract

This chapter argues that the growth of the Qatari rentier state and the need to accommodate powerful members of the Al Thani family and close allies have made it increasingly difficult for the leadership to re-engineer a fragmented and opaque aid landscape. Despite the country's autocratic regime and its small aid landscape, multiple principals have led parallel initiatives and "turf wars" for control over the aid portfolio. This leads to duplications, incomplete reforms and ultimately, to the enduring coexistence of an eclectic and opaque ensemble within the petro-monarchy.

Introduction: "The new kid on the block" – Qatar's contentious foreign aid

Qatar is one of the smallest and most generous states in the world. Upon arriving in Doha in January 2016, I knew about some of its recent, rich and complex history as an aid donor. Evidently, the Islamic notions of *zakat, sadaqat,*[385] or *waqf*[386] were not wholly lost on me. Neither was Qatar's success story: once one of the poorest regions on the globe, it had become one of the most generous and visible emerging donors[387] – the "new kid on the block".[388]

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[385] As opposed to the compulsory nature of *zakat*, a voluntary redistribution to the poor.

[386] Religious endowments in Islam. Often the channelling of material resources (mostly infrastructure) for charitable means. Originally a private initiative, religious endowments were progressively taken over by state administrations under the rule of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839). See Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*.

[387] Ramesh, 'Charitable Giving by Country'.

[388] Western donors were not always so keen to discuss aid with Gulf donors. Until the recent financial crisis, Western donors showed little interest in Gulf states' aid programs. Observers of the OECD-DAC note the feeling of embarrassment described by a former DAC Chair when observing that Members' representatives "had little knowledge of Arab aid programmes', and were "not in position to put precise questions to the Arabs', at the meetings, causing disappointment on the part of Arab participants". Embarrassment went crescendo when Western representatives

Thanks to hydrocarbons and an early commitment to charitable affairs,[389] Qatar has become a sizeable donor, following the lead of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. According to the OECD, Qatar's reported Official Development Assistance (ODA) nearly doubled between 2011 to 2013, from 734 million to US$1.3 billion.[390] Its aid spans various continents. An Arab donor, it engaged mainly through regional organizations such as the Islamic Development Bank; and disbursed aid mainly within its region – to Syria, Morocco, Palestine, Egypt and Yemen.[391] Yet to the surprise of the aid community, Qatar is increasingly spearheading aid initiatives towards developed, Western countries, such as with the Qatar Friendship Fund–Japan (supporting relief efforts after the 2011 tsunami and earthquake in Japan) or the 2005 Qatar Katrina Fund (for victims of the hurricane in the United States).

Qatar foreign aid is also charismatically represented by royal personalities such as Sheikha Moza, who has most strikingly taken special leadership in the promotion of education throughout the world.[392] I also became aware of the importance of *foreign aid* in Qatar's foreign policy. Emblematically, a few days after my arrival, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Assistant for International Cooperation became the new Foreign Minister.[393]

Fundamentally, Qatari aid is highly debated. Its failure since the 2000s to streamline its fragmented aid landscape is evident. Though Qatar's aid actors emerged for the most part in the 2000s,[394] its aid landscape is more dispersed than in neighbouring Kuwait[395] and the UAE.[396] Striking

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decided not to show up at all to these meetings. See Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience', 12.

[389] Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*.

[390] 'Qatar Becomes Participant in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - OECD'.

[391] 'Qatar Becomes Participant in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - OECD'.

[392] correspondent, 'Sheikha Moza'.

[393] This nomination might be introducing an informal yet enduring practice: the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, now Minister for Defence, was himself Assistant for International Cooperation beforehand. As reminded by an advisor to the Government of Qatar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ranks fourth in order of importance in the ministerial hierarchy (q9).

[394] Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, chap. Abdul Fatah S. Mohamed, "The Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA) from Commencement to Dissolution (2005–2009).

[395] The Kuwaiti government records nine Kuwait-based charities, while these are at least fourteen in Qatar. See 'Charity In Kuwait'.

[396] A reminder. This is based on a comparison between the number of charities operating on behalf of the UAE and Qatar. I reproduced the selection criteria set by Ridge and Kippels in 2016. They find eleven state-sponsored philanthropies in the UAE, of which three only have international activities. I identify six such organizations in Qatar. See Ridge and Kippels, 'What Is the Status of State-Funded Philanthropy in the UAE?'

is the fact that different sources in Qatar did not even seem to agree on the number of Qatari aid organizations operating internationally;[397] were they nine[398] or fourteen?[399] At any rate, the different Qatari charities seem to be working in parallel, sometimes fulfilling very similar tasks. Even more apparently, the proliferation of aid organizations runs counter to the emir's 2002 policy establishing the Qatar Development Fund, a government entity meant to centralize and strategically deploy Qatar's foreign aid. In 2016, the Qatar Development Fund was still being structured and various aid organizations continued to register with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. This eclectic ensemble is quite puzzling given how uniquely cohesive Qatari society is, even by Gulf standards.[400] In Qatar, proliferation comes under three different forms.

1. **The legal dimension**. Aid organizations in Qatar do not work under a single legal structure. Most organizations fall under state regulations: they are subject to oversight from Qatar's Regulatory Authority for Charitable Affairs. Others, like Qatar Foundation and its aid affiliates (Reach Out to Asia, Silatech and Education Above All) enjoy legal exemptions (q4). Being set up by a royal family member, they "resort to special Emiri decrees to ensure [their] independence" as well as "the international nature of [their] operations."[401] They can act without oversight beyond that of their *alma mater*.[402]

2. **The financial dimension**. Lack of transparent data cannot obscure the enormous differences in wealth amongst different organizations. Four organizations dominate the scene and monopolize most of government funding (Qatar Charity, QRC, Sheikh Thani Bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services, and Sheikh Eid Foundation). One expert differentiated Reach Out to Asia from Education Above All, as "comparing a giant and a dwarf" (q4).

[397] By Qatari aid organizations dealing with foreign aid I imply that activities must take place abroad. This excludes organizations that are pursuing only domestic-oriented activities in Qatar, such as the Qatar Society for the Rehabilitation of Special Needs for instance. See Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 127.
[398] Kharas, 'Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid'.
[399] "lncrease and develop awareness of charity work within the community", Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities, 2016.
[400] Roberts, 'Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood'.
[401] Khalaf, "The State of Qatar," 160.
[402] Mohamed, "The Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities", 263.

3. **The policy dimension**. In Qatar, a wide spectrum of "aid cultures" exists.[403] Schematically, one can identify two generations of aid organizations in Qatar between 1978 and 2016. Most first-generation Islamic charities in Qatar adopted a "sacralized" conception of aid. Qatar Charity, established as early as 1978, or other foundations built on the Islamic concept of the *waqf*, such as the Eid Foundation, embody this trend. Newer entities, while not secular, have a more professional and specialized approach to aid. The rules that these aid organizations follow (degree of compliance with *sharia* law), their objectives, the way they conceptualize their aid work (charity or long-term programming), vary significantly (see figure 16 below). The two generations share little, if any, information amongst themselves and with international organizations.[404] If punctual activities are organized horizontally (such as the partnership between Qatar Foundation's Silatech and one of the "first-generation" organizations, Qatar Charity),[405] this is rather the exception than the rule. For instance, while the different organizations working under Qatar Foundation's umbrella share information internally, in a bid for more complementarity, information often is not diffused outside of the foundation. Thus international organization representatives in Qatar claim to have little knowledge of what Qatar Foundation is doing (q6).

Figure 11. Aid organizations in Qatar[406]

Type of organization	**Operating Civil Society Organizations**	**Grant-making foundations**	**Charitable CSOs**	**Corporate philanthropy**
Example of organization	Qatar Foundation	Sheikh Eid Foundation	Qatar Charity; Qatar Red Crescent	Qatar Telecom
Characteristics	Richest, most professionally managed and most visible abroad	Based on the model of the *waqf* and originally designed for	Are involved both domestically and internationally	Often give to already existing foundations

[403] Marie Juul Petersen, "Sacralized or Secularized Aid? Positioning Gulf-based Muslim Charities," ," in *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond,* ed. Jonathan Benthall et al. (Gerlach Press, 2014), 26.
[404] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*.
[405] 'Silatech, Qatar Charity Partner to Support Youth Development'.
[406] Mahi Khalaf, "The State of Qatar," in Ibrahim and Sherif, *From Charity to Social Change*, 2008.

		domestic needs		

Western donors often criticize the opacity of Qatar's foreign aid. Its administration has not produced more than a few annual reports on foreign aid between 2010 and 2013.[407] According to a domestic observer, Qatar "still has a long way to go to meet international standards" on aid transparency."[408] The failure of its first attempt to centralise reporting within the Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities in 2009 has aroused renewed suspicion over the purpose of its aid activities.

Qatar's limited results on donor proliferation and aid transparency give way to two dominant opinions. The first is an optimism concerning Qatar's ability to abide by the multilateral standards on policy coherence – limiting donor proliferation – and aid transparency. Had a leading aid organization – the OECD – not welcomed Qatar as a participant in April 2016 in its aid organ, the Development Assistance Committee?[409] A forward-looking policymaker argued that "after the expansion phase there is the phase of rationalization" (q9). In short, Qatar was depicted Qatar as an Arab donor opening to the West.[410] Others considered Qatar to be dispersing aid because it was "throw[ing] money at problems".[411] They also highly criticized the opacity of Qatari aid during the political reshuffling of the Arab Springs[412] which was only reminiscent of the opinion formulated in 1984 by an official of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, for whom "either Arab aid agencies do not know themselves how much finance they provide or (…) their monitoring agencies are incompetent."[413] In short these observers see in Qatar the characteristic failure of Arab donors to abide by the standards of the international development community.[414]

Structure of the chapter

Applying the lenses of rentierism and dynastic monarchism, this chapter argues that donor proliferation and the failure to provide reliable aid transparency is thus – paradoxically – a result of power centralization in the hands of a few. Over the years, Qatar has become dominated by the

[407] 'Qatar's Development Co-Operation'.
[408] Kharas, 'Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid', 4.
[409] 'Qatar Becomes Participant in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - OECD'.
[410] Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 144.
[411] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*.
[412] Soubrouillard, 'Quand le Qatar achetait la France'.Johnson, 'Royals Flush?'
[413] Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience', 10.
[414] Villanger, 'Arab Foreign Aid'.

logic of *multiple principals*, by which powerful individuals create their own aid fiefdoms and have a veto power over attempts to reform the aid landscape. To demonstrate this, the next sections provide the context of the emergence of aid actors in Qatar and how the growth of the rentier state in Qatar has enhanced donor proliferation (section 1). I then build on these preliminary findings to show how state-led reform to centralize and rationalize the Qatari aid community, through the Qatar Development Fund, has had limited effects (section 2). Last, in line with the rentier and dynastic logic, I illustrate how the aligned interests of Qatar's leadership and international demand in the tense context of the War on Terror has had only limited impact on Qatar's commitment to aid transparency (section 3).

Section 1: How donor proliferation developed in Qatar

Let us recall a well-known yet often dismissed fact about Qatar: it is a *state-in-the-making*. Aid pre-dates the Qatari state, and consequently, the Qatari *rentier* state. For instance, there are early mentions of forms of *zakat* in Qatar under the rule of the Mehmet Ali Pasha in Egypt during the nineteenth century.[415] Charity in Qatar was first *given* to Qatar by its neighbours before its independence. If Qatar experiences double-digit growth rates today and appears among the richest nations in the world,[416] it has nonetheless known bitter times. Historians have largely documented how the merchant economies of the Gulf in the early twentieth century, based in great part on the pearling industry, were immensely affected from the late 1920's onwards by Japanese competition.[417] Added to the Second World War's disruption of trade in the region, the situation of economic frailty was such that Qatar was by the 1950's one of the poorest and most famished places on the globe. Thus, before becoming a donor, Qatar was a recipient of aid that was embroiled in regional politics. Qatar was assisted by Kuwait in particular, whose first recorded aid was provided "for the financing of teachers and construction of schools" before 1953.

Regionalism continued to dominate after Qatar's independence and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources. Thus, despite the relative domestic leeway to engage in a "branding" behaviour with global reach, Qatari state-sponsored aid institutions did not emerge after 1971. Rather, Qatari aid was shaped by and embedded in regional politics. Qatar participated, albeit

[415] Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, vol. 2, 95.
[416] Espinoza, *The Macroeconomics of the Arab States of the Gulf.*
[417] Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*; Crouzet, *Genèses Du Moyen-Orient.*

discreetly, alongside other Gulf and Arab states in establishing various aid-oriented organizations. Over three years (1974-1976) for instance, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Islamic Development Bank and the OPEC Fund for International Development flourished.[418] Needless to say, Saudi Arabia dominated – and continues to dominate – these arenas. Second-gun Qatar was known to be "invisible and quiet", taking the lead from its bigger neighbours.[419] Qatar was essentially a financial contributor, rather than a full-fledged actor. In practice, the only state administration reinforced in this phase was Qatar's Ministry of Finance. As in most of its *khaleeji* counterparts, the Ministry was the designated interlocutor in these regional aid institutions.

Charity was organized at the individual and group levels. Prior to the discovery of hydrocarbons, "citizens banded together to provide much-needed social services on an ad hoc and reactive basis" and relied on "tribal loyalties and individual acts of charity."[420] Qatari aid was not, albeit being inspired by religious principles, a clear-cut monopoly for the clergy as in neighbouring Saudi Arabia.[421] Indeed, no native and organized class of *ulama* existed in Qatar's early days[422] and Qatari leaders made sure that no organized foreign class of *ulama* would form in the midst of their nascent bureaucracy.[423] Without any organized form of aid within the clergy or social groups, it is no surprise that formalized aid in Qatar was a late-comer. Most professional Qatari aid actors, such as the Qatar Foundation, were founded after 1996.[424] Conversely, the first generation of Qatari aid actors – such as Qatar Charity (1978) or the QRC (1982) – developed around local groups of (non-professional) notables.

If the initial presence of Qatar *as a state* in the field of foreign aid was not striking, its capacity to provide aid throughout the region – and now the world – has increased concomitantly with the state's capture of the hydrocarbon wealth. Qatar's bureaucracy, set up by the ruling Al Thani family, progressively nationalized and formalized what was initially an unregulated social practice. The state established supervisory oversight over some of Qatar's major aid organizations

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418 Ibid., 5.
419 Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*., 202.
420 Khalaf, "The State of Qatar," 155; 149.
421 Nabil Mouline, "Enforcing The State's Islam: The Functioning of The Committee of Senior Scholars," ed. Haykel et al.Haykel, Hegghammer, and Lacroix, *Saudi Arabia in Transition*.
422 Baskan and Wright, "Seeds of Change."
423 Roberts, 'Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood', 85–86.
424 Mohamed, "The Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities", 206.

with the law 2 of 1974 (updated in 2004 and 2014)[425] under the Ministry of Civil Service and Housing Affairs. Organized religious practices such as the *zakat* or the *waqf* were taken up by the Qatari state in the forms of the Zakat Fund (2003) and the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs.[426] Recent additions have also consolidated an embryonic form of para-public Qatari civil society.[427] The state also progressively integrated aid as part and parcel of its foreign policy. In 2002, the Qatar Development Fund was established. It also created a ministerial post for international cooperation in 2008, replaced in 2011 by the position of Assistant Minister for International Cooperation Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[428]

After the first generation of charities was established, a second generation of aid organizations was added. Rather than replacing existing initiatives, this new wave of organizations from the 2000s onwards often simply expanded the number operating. Organizations like Qatar Foundation pursued reformist and ambitious aid objectives in parallel to – and not in replacement of – the previous fossilized aid fiefdoms. This second generation did not reach out to its first-generation counterparts through the mediation of state administrations. Rather, characteristically for the rentier dynamic at play, it bypassed the existing bureaucracy and laid down parallel tracks for aid management.[429] Rather than a "culture of Islamic aid", the new organizations' approach to aid was performance-based and inspired by private sector methods of management. Thus, Qatar Foundation's Education Above All claims more than a billion beneficiaries and works exclusively on education enrolment – a focus one of its employees considers remarkable within the Qatari aid landscape.[430] Rather than hiring former civil servants or volunteers, these second-generation charities recruited smaller, cohesive and professionalized teams – a feature noted by Hertog in his analysis of performing Saudi administrations.[431] Thus, while the Eid Foundation employs about 370 people, Education Above All employs about 60 people; Reach Out To Asia 50. Qatar Foundation's *modus*

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425 Khalaf, "The State of Qatar", 155.

426 The continuity between the informal and the formal, the pre-independence and post-independence period in Qatar's aid landscape is common in the history of Qatar's state-building. It could be applied to other sectors, other policies, other issues. See Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*, 4.

427 A recent draft law was proposed for instance to enable foreigners to take part in civil society organizations. See 'Foreigners Can Start Institutions for Public Benefit'.

428 "International Cooperation, accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/InternationalCooperation/Pages/History.aspx

429 Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*., 268.

430 An aid worker thus considered that his employer "compares with a project management company if we were part of the private sector" (q4).

431 Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*., 3.

operandi illustrates this mechanism. Rather than drawing on state resources, Qatar Foundation hired international consulting companies or worked hand-in-hand with international charities to develop their strategies in a matter of weeks, if not days.[432]

With this second generation a streamlined state-organized foreign aid did not emerge in Qatar. On the contrary, foreign aid fiefdoms sprouted due to the increasing stronghold of powerful personae of the Al Thani family (and their close allies), made rich thanks to the redistribution of hydrocarbon dividends. As described by a domestic observer: "There are plenty of billionaires in Qatar who set up their own foundation […] with only one CEO, one agent, and that's it" (q19). Whereas notables created the QRC and Qatar Charity, the emergence of multiple princely principals is responsible for the proliferation of aid actors of the past two decades, as shown in figure 17 below.

[432] Qatar Foundation's Reach Out To Asia thus worked jointly with Mercy Corp to develop its aid model (q12).

Figure 12: Qatar aid landscape 1974-2016 (compiled by author, various sources)



Patron support, rather than aid performance, determined the life expectancy of these aid organizations. Indeed, the redistribution of wealth through the public and para-public employment of nationals in state aid administrations and charities did not encourage productivity, nor compliance with top-down reforms. Some organizations "die[d] out as soon as they [were] founded" (q14). Many more remained present in the landscape despite their blatant inactivity. Such low-profile behaviour is observable for three charities established by ministerial decisions in 2013. The ATAA Charity Foundation (Said Bin Salem Al Bineid Al Muhanadi Charity Foundation), the Nasser Bin Jassem Al Thani Charity Foundation (Dar Al Ber) and the Faisal Bin Fahad Al Thani Charity Foundation have not publicized any of their activities since and are unknown to most aid observers.

Positive examples also exist. For instance, the billionaire Ibrahim Asmakh's Al Asmakh Charity Foundation, founded in Doha in 2011 with a paid-up capital of approximately US$27.5 million,[433] has helped consolidate the activities of traditional Qatari charities.[434] Yet, for these well-faring organizations, the importance of patronage was also highlighted. Rather than mentioning the results of her organization as a predictor of its sustainability, a Silatech employee stated that "Silatech is an initiative of Sheikha Moza and hence is unlikely to disappear" (q2).[435]

Thus, from the 1970s to the 2000s, the growth of the hydrocarbon rent favoured the dispersion of organizations of the aid sector. All organizations adopted idiosyncratic rules: both the manager of a traditional charity, and a Qatar Foundation representative, pointed to the autonomy they enjoyed in setting their reporting rules (q8; q12). Despite their very different forms, objectives and working cultures, they coexisted in relative indifference. However, it became uniquely difficult for the Qatari state to re-engineer itself, as the successes and failures of the QDF illustrate.

Section 2: Re-engineering the state: the case of Qatar Development Fund

The gradual proliferation of para-public aid fiefdoms has tested the strength of the Qatari state.

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[433] 'Ibrahim Al Asmakh | Wealth-X'.

[434] "Afif", as it usually called, has signed new partnerships with more established aid donors such as the Qatari Red Crescent; or within the Qatari Alliance for the Relief of the Peoples of Somalia and the Philippines, with Qatar Charity and the Sheikh Eid Charitable Association. 'QRC, Al-Asmakh Charity Partner to Establish Charitable Hospital in West Bank'; 'Al Asmakh Charity Foundation | Arab.org'; 'QC and Afif "Asmakh Charity Foundation" Sign Madaya Relief Agreements'.

[435] Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*.

The central role of the ruling Al Thani family in making the state of Qatar[436] has had ambivalent effects. Dynastic monarchism and rentierism have empowered multiple princely principals and risk-averse agents in the aid landscape. The QDF has been only partially successful in the endeavour to rationalize Qatar's aid landscape because the entrenchment of the rentier state and the autonomy of powerful members of the ruling family enabled: (1) reform-adverse aid actors to resist change and; (2) reform-prone actors to act regardless of QDF's formal authority.

Contrary to assertions of some branding academics, donor proliferation is undoubtedly known to, and a concern for, Qatari decision-makers. The ruler's close circle has taken stock, as in other small states, of the limited availability of human resources that cannot be diluted into short-term, dispersed initiatives. Tellingly, since 2011 the emirate has strongly advocated, at the level of the regional Gulf Cooperation Council, for the creation of a Gulf Development Fund to ease the burden of its limited human resources (q13). Domestically, the decision to counter donor proliferation by creating the QDF was a turning point for the country. The leadership stated its intention to reform the aid system into a more efficient whole. One high-ranking official indicated then, the need to "boost the 'productivity' of [Qatar's] aid activities" (q9). Considered as the government's instrument, QDF was to become the central decision-maker and coordinator of Qatari aid. In practice, it was meant to take over the executive competence of the International Development Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and develop a strategic component for Qatari aid.[437] QDF was also to put into place more precise aid objectives than the relatively loose framework of the broad Qatar National Vision 2030 policy document, for instance by setting benchmarks for aid (q16; q21).

On the whole, Qatari aid actors welcomed the QDF as an effort to enhance and support their work abroad. As put by a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Finance, "development is old in Qatar as you know and QDF and MOFA took over foreign aid competencies because they can do it better than we can" (q3). QDF also decided to "adopt leading global practices" on aid,[438] notably by documenting it, following the work of the International Development Department at the Qatari Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Thus, according to Kharas (2015), the

[436] Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*., 18.
[437] According to one interviewee, the strategic aspect had been dealt with in 2015 and required to be implemented in 2016 and onwards (q19).
[438] 'Qatar Fund for Development | Arab.org'.

government now withholds project-level data for both governmental and non-governmental aid for the years 2010 and 2011.[439]

Since its legal establishment in 2002 however, the process of structuring of QDF has progressed at a snail's pace. In 2008, the head of the Emiri Diwan observed the ongoing "proliferation" and "fragmentation" of Qatar's aid system (q20; q21). And fourteen years later, QDF's implementation is still underway. Some of its realms of competence remain unclarified. In the words of a UN agent in February 2016: "I don't understand who those people are, what they do, and how to situate them within the landscape" (q6). The historical-institutionalist approach provides an explanation for this fundamental reform's *partial* impact.

On the one hand, QDF's creation was swift because it added to, and did not supersede, existing institutions. Similar to the inception of Qatar Foundation, QDF's creation symbolizes in itself the possible circumventions that the rentier dynamic leads to, in the name of reform, even *within* the state administration. Rather than create a full-blown ministry, or associate different ministries[440] to the launching of the new administration, QDF was the work of a small team of professionals working around a powerful patron, with the approval of the Emiri Diwan; and nested within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The state again associated with external stakeholders to build its national instrument. For instance, consultations with the RAND corporation preceded the creation of QDF's *alma mater*, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' International Development Department in 2008–9.[441]

On the other hand, QDF experienced difficulty in acting on its fragmented environment. It emerged in the context of a state administration that was as fragmented as the para-public charitable sector described in section 1.[442] QDF has not to this day taken over all of the competencies that one could expect in this move towards more centralized and coordinated aid in the Qatari landscape. These include the licensing of charities – managed within the Ministry of

[439] Kharas, 'Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid', 11.
[440] Such as the related administrations of the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, or the Ministry of Planning and Development Statistics.
[441] Hertog's side-argument that reform may be facilitated by brokers, experts that circulate between different organizations, both private and public, is illustrated here. One of the main figures of the IDD is himself a former employee of the RAND corporation assigned to the Qatari government (q21). See Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats.*, 26
[442] A UN representative listed the number of its interlocutors: "we work with the Qatar government – and we report to the Ministry of Education. We also work with a national commission. […]. On top of that of course, are also involved the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, anytime something has an international dimension – they have to be part of the process. Then you also have the Ministry of Finance and of course the Emiri Diwan" (q6).

Social Affairs – and the representation of Qatar in important forums such as the Islamic Development Bank, which remains a competence of the Ministry of Finance (q3). More importantly, the extent to which QDF will exert its authority over certain key actors remains unclear. Here, we can speak of the organizations of the Qatar Foundation working under special Emiri decrees. Similarly, the isolated Zakat Fund of the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs only works tightly with the QRC. It does not collaborate with second-generation aid organizations and remains obscure to most state officials (q12; q16; q21).

QDF's partial success is in line with this contribution's central argument. While "branding" scholars assume the all-encompassing power of the leader to implement policies from one day to the next, rentierism and dynastic dynamics underline the principal–agent obstacles that leaders confront when delegating to the mid-level management of the bureaucracy.[443] Reformers are faced with the tendency in "for risk-averse bureaucrats to refer to the top and not make voluntary moves."[444] The extremely vertical design of organizations around patrons protects lower-level implementers from the leadership and gives no incentive for employees to take risks – why should they if they cannot be fired by the rentier state (q14)?[445] Rentierism creates risk-averse foreign aid agents in ways that are more extreme than in other aid bureaucracies around the world. Dynastic monarchism doesn't help, because as an aid expert explained, "the leadership cannot force onto other resourceful individuals any significant changes" (q5).

Bureaucratic habits and fiefdoms enshrined within the state may thus obstruct the full-fledged role earmarked for QDF if they conflict with pre-existing interests. First, QDF's mandate to represent the entire Qatari state in international fora may be undermined by domestic oppositions. In Qatar, the domination of regional politics in the early days of Qatar's independence (see section 1) has granted the Ministry of Finance's a representative role in regional organizations - such as the Islamic Development Bank - to this day (q13). Though not specifically mentioning Qatar, a GCC official mentioned Ministries of Finance's power to oppose rulers' will during the (failed) negotiations to create a Gulf Development Fund:

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[443] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats.*, 11.
[444] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats,* 24.
[445] Readers should not be misled by such dramatic press articles appearing now and then. One such article asserts that since his crowning as emir, "Sheikh Tamim has [taken …] austerity measures. He has consistently stressed fiscal discipline since his first speech as emir, and has aggressively sought to reduce the size and reach of government. The emir has already reduced the number of government ministries, slashed state institutions' budgets by up to 40%" – see government et al., 'The Young Emir'. In practice, no one except for expatriate workers, is fired among civil servants.

> You'd expect this opposition to come from the leadership – that is not the case. At the strategic level, there is great consensus among regional leaders for commitment to development aid in future years, as well as agreement on the sectors and recipients of such aid. The difficulty lies at the administrative level, where a turf war is taking place. [Some ministries] in particular are reluctant to give over oversight, when this is fundamental to their competences. It's a sovereignty issue within the state. We have thus seen a Minister of Finance […] walk out of a meeting without even hearing other participants' propositions (q13).[446]

Second, QDF's domestic role as *primus inter pares* in foreign aid – to introduce a strategic component in Qatar's aid landscape (q9; q20; q21) – may also prove to be an illusion. As noted by the manager of Qatar's Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities, "most aid agencies, save for some who are really results-oriented, are not focusing on results, but on procedures" (q19). Even within the government, the strategic component that QDF members consider to be putting into place is still being debated within the International Development Department, between those proposing a "business approach" or a "charitable approach" to foreign aid (q9; q20). Conversely, QDF has limited legal and material resources to impose any form of guidance, let alone control, on the largest organizations of the second generation of aid actors.[447]

This section underlined the value of rentierism and dynastic monarchism. Rather than assuming Qatar's foreign stance is as flexible as its cheque book is thick, as branding scholars do, I show that that there is an inherent inertia within the state administration itself inherited from the institutional designs of Qatar's early independence days, and reinforced by the rentier state. Despite the goodwill expressed in the creation of the Qatar Fund for Development, the latter also succumbs to the dynastic and rentier dynamics and participates in the fragmentation of Qatari aid administration. QDF adds to, rather than replaces, what existed prior to it. Its long gestation period suggests that the emir's reforms are tricky to implement. QDF's emergence is likely to somewhat curb donor proliferation, but without creating an integrated aid system. Its attempt to rationalize Qatari aid is likely to face two obstacles. While less efficient organizations will resist its functional approach to stamp out aid duplications and increase transparency, results-oriented organizations, encouraged by a favourable legal framework, will have little

[446] I do not question here the Ministry of Finance's competence, which is contingent upon the personnel working there, but rather *counterfactually* what would happen if the Ministry *was not considered competent anymore*.
[447] Qatar Foundation for instance "exceeds by far on the ground the delivery that [ministries] can provide" (q21).

incentive to work under its authority. In contrast to aid optimists, donor proliferation in Qatar seems *enduring* rather than *temporary*. As the manager of a major Qatar charity indicated to me, there was no sign that duplications between the major Qatari providers of aid – Qatar Charity, the Sheikh Thani Bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services, and the Sheikh Eid Foundation– were likely to cease (q8).

Section 3: Aid transparency in Qatar after 9/11 – resisting aligned state and international interests

In the last chapter of his book, Hertog argues that the fragmented nature of the rentier bureaucracy favours the adoption of external reforms, if the interests of external parties and rulers are aligned.[448] Indeed, if fragmentation blocks unreserved reforms, it also allows for very quick partial reforms when the central state power decides to reassign jurisdictions. Indeed, fragmented interests within the state cannot coalesce to form a coherent opposition to reform.

Post-9/11, the rulers of Qatar and the international community, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, had "really a reason to cooperate" (q5). Suspicions as to the participation of Qatari aid personalities in the financing of terrorist activities pushed the government to regulate the aid landscape more stringently. In April 2002, the Ministry of Civil Services and Housing forbade funds to be wired to charities abroad.[449] After 9/11, the law of 1974 was revised in 2004 and increased the surveillance of the newly established Ministry of Social Affairs over existing civil society organizations.[450] Moreover, a specific agency was put into place in 2004 to supervise any Qatari aid disbursement abroad, so as to track any possible financing of terrorism.[451]

The Qatar Authority for Charitable Affairs (QACA) – shaped after the UK Charity Commission and with the help of an international development consultancy, ACME Corp[452] – was the first to scrutinize more thoroughly the international activities of Qatari charities. Yet again, its role was not clearly outlined. Some of its competencies overlapped with those of the

[448] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*, 32.
[449] Khafagy, 'Gulf Philanthropy: Structural, Domestic and Global Challenges', 9.
[450] The law of 2004 states that "The ministry reserves the right to inspect documents and records". See Khalaf, "The State of Qatar," 155.
[451] Tracking in practice is done through various means: screening of external partners and of banking through the FTS put into place in Paris; the regulation of the charities that want to operate from Qatar abroad; and a word check with Word Check 1 by ThomsonReuters, which identifies names that could be blacklisted. See International Monetary Fund. 2008. *Qatar: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism*, Country Report No. 08/322
[452] 'Acme Strategies - QACA'.

Ministry of Social Affairs.[453] A noted weakness of QACA was also the inclusion of article 24 in the Emiri decree which gave the ruler the possibility to grant exemption to oversight "to any organization at any time."[454] Despite ongoing terrorism in the region and globally, QACA disappeared in 2009. Rather than the little concern that some conferred to Qatari authorities because of that decision,[455] the Qatari state appears to have acted in the face of QACA's poor results, which unequivocally laid bare its incapacity to manage the different Qatari charities. A leaked diplomatic cable from Secretary Hillary Clinton in 2010 termed Qatar as the "worst in the region" in terms of counterterrorism.[456] Strikingly, the leadership then redistributed QACA's competences to more trusted state administrations, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (q19).

The leadership did not leave this matter to rest. Pressed by international partners, the Emiri Diwan issued a strategy, with the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of a team of international consultants (notably Deloitte Middle East) to establish the Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities (q19).[457] This independent state institution, nested within the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs,[458] has oversight over the creation of any private charity association that may want to raise donations and the transfer of aid abroad.[459] Significantly, the state was then able not only add to the existing administration but also to subtract from it. In this case, it retrieved the responsibility over Qatari charities from the Associations Department of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (q19).

Despite the alignment of Qatar leadership's and international stakeholders' interests, reform of Qatar's regulatory framework is again slow and partial. RACA's task is limited. Legally, its mandate covers only the external activities of Qatari charities.[460] It is thus for instance impossible for its top officials to indicate how important the external activities of big players such as the QRC activities are, compared to their domestic commitments (q19). Relatedly, RACA has not introduced standard procedures on aid reporting, which continue to differ

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453 Mohamed, "The Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities," 266. In practice, this could cause two different sets of problems. First, the risk of duplication, as both agents attempting to take control of oversight could possibly overburden charities with regulations with which they'd be forced to comply twice. Conversely, if both agents "passed the buck" to one another this would create *de facto* a legal loophole.
454 Blanchard, *Qatar*.
455 Matthew Levitt, 'Qatar's not-so-charitable record on terror finance'.
456 'Follow the Money'.New York Times, 9/12/2010.
457 See Law no. 15 2014; Emiri Decree no. 43 2014; Emiri Decree no. 55 2014; Ministerial Decision no. 5 2015.
458 "lncrease and develop awareness of charity work within the community", Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities, 2016.
459 Hukoomi, 7/11/2016'Charity Work - Hukoomi - Qatar E-Government'.
460 RACA however is also responsible for providing licences for domestic fundraising activities, whether these have domestic or external goals. These fundraising campaigns should not exceed three months (RACA social media, 6/07/2015, translation by the author).

according to the various segments of the aid administration. The case of the collection of *zakat* is telling, as explained by a MOFA official:

> Some things are within our competence, some are not. Zakat is a complicated question [….] the criteria for zakat may have overlapping ones with Official Development Assistance – zakat for hunger, for health, etc. But it is up to each NGO, who has its own group of scholars, to decide how these criteria apply. Should it be this, or that? This is not up to us (q21)

Legally also, RACA does not have oversight over one of the major actor of Qatar's foreign aid, the Qatar Foundation. Materially, the supervisory work is not given the full-blow importance one would expect for such a sensitive task. Implementing "a regular audit on all the managerial and financial operations related to all entities involved in the charity field in the State of Qatar"[461] is an immense effort for a small staff to manage; and was still expressed as a "wish" by one of its senior officials in February 2016 (q19).

Hence, if reforms are adopted with ease when state interests and international demands match, their daily implementation is often still partial.[462] Thus while no aid actor has been able to resist the implementation of QACA and its successor, RACA, the regulatory agencies have never benefited from full-fledged mandates, nor from the automatic acquiescence and cooperation of all national stakeholders. These manage to neutralize one another (q4).

Conclusion

A principal-agent reading shows how the growth and consolidation of the rentier state and of the Al Thani family enabled aid initiatives to flourish and prosper to the detriment of aid cohesion. The more the rentier state grew, and the ruling circle consolidated, the more its aid actors fragmented along the different lines set by the multiple princely principals. In the case of foreign aid, the traditional versus professional; the isolated versus the connected, the indolent versus the proactive, were always two sides of the same rentier-dynastic coin. Dysfunction is intrinsic to bureaucratic designs. That they endure to such a degree in an autocratic country of 300,000 people employing about 45,000 civil servants,[463] is more surprising.

[461] "Increase and develop awareness of charity work within the community", Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities, 2016.
[462] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*., 225.
[463] 'Qatar'.

The rentier state locked in initial institutional designs in ways that continue to resist rulers' reforms and international pressure. Overall, therefore, if the bright side of Qatar's foreign aid is that (contrary to "branding' accounts) there is impetus within the principality for a more integrated aid system, the downside (again in contrast to branding accounts) is that small states like Qatar cannot escape the constraints of the ossified bureaucracies of their larger rentier neighbours. Such bureaucratic change, despite the state's size and autocratic regime, is bound to come at "a much slower pace than the rise of the skyscrapers."[464] This is an impediment to multilateral cooperation by Qatar. One of my interlocutors recognized that working with the Qatari donor was "honestly a nightmare" because "it is impossible to know […] if all these partners will still exist or not in the near future" (q6).

This chapter tested whether the dynamics of rentierism and dynastic monarchism hold true in the small arena of Qatar and for the sensitive issue-area that is foreign aid. In particular, it applied the findings of Hertog's conceptual argument to a more unlikely case than his Saudi experience. Indeed, it examines foreign aid – first – as a subcategory of foreign policy. Foreign policy is an issue-area in which executive control is presumed to be stronger than in any other domains (bar the competences of the central bank and the ministry of interior) and hence fragmentation less likely to be found. Qatar is a relevant case for a second reason – its bureaucracy being much smaller than Saudi Arabia's, it is presumably easier to reform.

If Qatar has increasingly embodied the logic of the multiple principals, and if these have hampered reforms on donor proliferation and aid transparency, how can it be that the UAE has fared better in abiding by multilateral principles when multiple principals – the Al Nahyan, the Al Maktoum, the Al Qassimi, and others – exist in its decentralized political system?

[464] Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*.

Chapter 4: Forced to Tango

How federalism reinforces the United Arab Emirates' reforms on donor proliferation and aid transparency

Abstract

This chapter argues that the power centralization associated with the growth of the rentier state is a double-edged sword. In Qatar, power centralization fragments the aid landscape and obstructs sustained international multilateral cooperation on foreign aid. In the UAE however, power *decentralization* creates a different dynamic. While fragmentation is at play within the rentier and dynastic emirate of Abu Dhabi in comparable ways to its Qatari neighbour, the loose federal structure of the UAE – and notably the balance reached between the two most powerful emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai – stabilizes the country's commitment to foreign aid multilateralism. I demonstrate this argument with the UAE's attempt to curb donor proliferation and enhance aid transparency.

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I examined how power centralization associated with the growth of the Qatari rentier state and the rise of the Al Thani family was detrimental to its multilateral cooperation. Qatar boasts a remarkably fragmented aid landscape for such a small authoritarian country. Its neighbour, the UAE, also offers a striking variety of aid actors.[465] A UNDP civil servant said that "working in the UAE is a bit like working in the Balkans – you need to take into consideration the different levels that matter for your work" (ad7). This thought reflects the Gulf scholarship, which has underscored the historical rivalries between the seven emirates of the UAE,[466] and notably the competition between Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the international

[465] Barber, *Blinded by Humanity*, 174.
[466] Crouzet, *Genèses Du Moyen-Orient*; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 72–95; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 29.

realm.[467] Yet the UAE has proved to be a surprisingly stable participant in foreign aid multilateralism in the past decade. For instance, it was the first Gulf country to set up a Ministerial interlocutor on foreign aid and to document and report aid nationally.

Why, despite multiple actors pursuing diverse objectives, has the UAE managed to reach such a degree of international cooperation on donor proliferation and aid transparency? More to the point, how have its two rival principals – Abu Dhabi and Dubai – managed to overcome cooperation pitfalls and establish the UAE as a committed multilateral aid player in the international realm?

Structure of the chapter

The chapter first presents existing arguments and caveats on the impact of power decentralization in autocratic regimes. It then unfurls its theoretical justification. Here, it argues that dynastic monarchism, or the negotiation between the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, creates a principal–intermediary structure of governance in the UAE that benefits its commitment to foreign aid multilateralism. I first look separately at Abu Dhabi and Dubai's domestic preferences regarding foreign aid multilateralism and the extent to which dynastic and rentier dynamics affect their aid reforms. I then examine the impact of their iterative relationship on the federal government's overall multilateral commitment. The chapter finally discusses the importance of power decentralization in explaining the UAE's relatively more stable and intractable multilateralism with respect to its Gulf neighbours; namely, Qatar, but also Kuwait. In so doing, it shows the usefulness of rentier lenses and dynastic monarchism to explain bureaucratic impediments to multilateral cooperation in the Arabian Peninsula.

The argument

This chapter argues that because power is shared among different Emirati families, the fragmentation of the UAE landscape is limited, and its multilateral cooperation consistent. While previous contributions consider power decentralization through the lenses of "tribalism", which is assumed to undermine the functioning of the formal bureaucratic apparatus, this chapter defines under what conditions the decentralized structure of Emirati decision-making strengthens and stabilizes its multilateral commitment.

[467] Kazerouni, 'Musées et soft power dans le Golfe persique', 2 December 2014; Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*; Herb, *The Wages of Oil*; Lazar, *Qatar, une Education City*; Davidson, 'The Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai'; Davidson, *Dubai*; Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*; Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 45.

In the UAE, fragmentation is at play within the rentier and dynastic emirate of Abu Dhabi in comparable ways to its Qatari neighbour. Yet, within the loose federal structure of the UAE, the balance to be reached between the two most powerful emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, creates a productive interaction in the multilateral arena.

These two principals' divergent objectives – the strengthening of the federal bureaucracy for Abu Dhabi;[468] autonomy and economic diversification[469] for Dubai – are mediated by dynastic monarchism, a set of informal tribal practices[470] that pacify intra-group relations (see chapter 1). Forced to tango, the Abu Dhabi and Dubai rulers accommodate one another and work under a specific *principal–intermediary* relationship. This means that Dubai supports Abu Dhabi-led reforms to promote its own interests while maintaining its autonomy; and that Abu Dhabi assents to Dubai-led initiatives even when those were not taken jointly. Incidentally, because reforms are negotiated between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, they are more difficult to annul once adopted. In other words, more stable multilateral aid commitment stems from the fact that in the UAE the "internal need to domesticate conflict has been far more difficult than to lead external relations".[471]

The relationship between Abu Dhabi, Dubai and the Northern Emirates

How Abu Dhabi and Dubai, despite diverging interests, manage to act together and support a common foreign policy is a standard problem in game theory.[472] It also resonates with a key debate among foreign aid policymakers: how to better coordinate the disbursement and implementation of foreign aid.[473] Using principal–agent theory,[474] economists have thus established that when foreign aid agents work for multiple principals – as they do in Qatar for instance – foreign aid is less effective.[475] Principal–agent theorists also recognize that multiple principals may lead to better reforms if one principal acts as the other's intermediary – if it acts

[468] Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 124–25.
[469] Herb, 125.
[470] Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 97.
[471] Young, 6.
[472] Culpepper, *Creating Cooperation*, 11.
[473] 'Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action - OECD'.
[474] It examines how the mandate entrusted by an authority (the principal) to a subaltern (the agent) affects decision-making.
[475] Seabright, in Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*, 43.

on its behalf to disburse foreign aid.[476] If the idea of multiple principals corresponds to the decentralized setting of the loose Emirati confederation, the outcome that principal–agent theory predicts – bureaucratic paralysis –sits uneasily with the UAE's relative success in reforms concerning donor proliferation and aid transparency. In the UAE, despite multiple principals – six royal families coexist within the seven emirates of the loose federal state[477] – foreign aid coordination and aid transparency are stronger than in neighbouring Qatar.

The puzzle is not answered more conclusively by the literature on federalism in foreign policy. This literature focuses largely on democratic contexts.[478] Save for Iraq,[479] little interest has been shown in other decentralized forms of domestic governance in Gulf states. When authoritarian federal states are explored, it is usually without consideration of the international impact of domestic configurations of power.[480] Gulf scholars generally see decentralized power as obstructing policymaking. Scholarship on Kuwait's constitutional monarchy underlines the paralysis stemming from the diverging interests of the ruling family and the parliament.[481] Studies of the UAE present power decentralization as an obstacle to the formulation of federal policies[482] that may only be overcome in times of security crisis.[483] Others point to the rivalry between Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the fields of museum and cultural policies,[484] environmental branding,[485] knowledge management, and education.[486] In foreign aid, as in other areas,[487] Dubai's

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[476] They assume however the role of intermediary to be held by international organizations rather than by domestic stakeholders. See Seabright, in Martens, 47. This line of thinking has been notably applied in Gulf studies with Steffen Hertog's analysis of the role of the World Trade Organization on economic reform in Saudi Arabia. See Hertog, 'Two-Level Negotiations in a Fragmented System'.

[477] The Al Nahyan royal family rules Abu Dhabi; the Al Maktoum, Dubai; the Al Qasimi, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah; the Al Nuaimi, Ajman; the Al Mualla, Umm Al Quwain ; the Al Sharqi, Fujairah.

[478] Dehousse, 'Fédéralisme, asymétrie et interdépendance'; Meunier, *Trading Voices*.

[479] Dawoody, *Public Administration and Policy in the Middle East*; Gunter, 'Kurdish Future in a Post-Saddam Iraq'; Romano and Gurses, *Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East*.

[480] Xu, "The Institutional Foundations of China's Reforms and Development"; Lankina, "Regional Developments in Russia"; LeVan, "Analytic Authoritarianism and Nigeria"; Gervasoni, "A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces"; ROSS, *Federalism and Democratisation in Russia*.

[481] Kazerouni, 'Musées et soft power dans le Golfe persique', 2 December 2014, 96; Herb, *The Wages of Oil*.

[482] Renaud, in Sadik and Elbadawi, *The Global Economic Crisis and Consequences for Development Strategy in Dubai*, 115; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 100. Al Mezaini's view is dumbfounding: he supports both opposite ideas in the same book – even in the same sentence. See Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 29, 35, 50, 114.

[483] Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 14.

[484] Kazerouni, 'Musées et soft power dans le Golfe persique', 2 December 2014.

[485] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 25.

[486] Lazar, *Qatar, une Education City*.

[487] Abu Dhabi's quest for visibility when "buying off" IRENA and the IRENA/ADFD followed Dubai's baiting of international organizations with the creation of the International Humanitarian City. See Reiche, 'Energy Policies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries—possibilities and Limitations of Ecological Modernization in Rentier States', 2399.

visibility attracts Abu Dhabi for reasons of "profit and vanity".[488] Dubai's economic success, including through foreign aid multilateralism, is imitated in Abu Dhabi, putatively without any form of direct collaboration. These studies echo the findings of tribalism, a dominant scholarship in the study of Gulf domestic governance.

According to its proponents, tribal structures,[489] even when they are mythologized,[490] are more important to the understanding of Gulf politics than reading constitutions or administrative organigrams.[491] The lineage-based organization of tribes is "meshed with an ideology of egalitarianism, in which each kin group considered itself of approximate coeval status to the other groups."[492] For instance, seniority is important and members of the family show respect "for members older than [themselves], even by a few weeks or months",[493] irrespective of other power resources. Herb illustrates the egalitarian nature of tribes within the context of the UAE and of the consolidation of its federal level, opposed by the weaker tribes.[494] Hence, tribalism embeds cooperation dilemmas into broader structures of meaning that affect the rules of the game.[495]

For Gulf scholars, tribalism undermines the state administration to various degrees.[496] In the case of the UAE, Young argues that though tribalism generates inefficiencies and nepotism, it is an enforcement mechanism that enhances domestic stability.[497] Herb's "dynastic monarchism" also considers that by mutually accommodating one another, members of the

[488] Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 127.
[489] Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*, 7.
[490] Achcar, *The People Want*, 105; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 34.
[491] Gause, *Oil Monarchies*, 3; Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*, 7; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 97; Baabood, in Nonneman, *Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe*, 2005, 148; Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 215; Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 29; Abdulghani, 'Culture and Interest in Arab Foreign Aid'; Montigny, 'Les représentations du changement dans la société qatarie, d'un émir à l'autre (1972–2013)', 18; Sater, in Seeberg and Eyadat, *Migration, Security, and Citizenship in the Middle East. New Perspectives*, 32; Thiollet, 'Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf', 4. For critics of tribalism, see Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*, 7; Achcar, *The People Want*, 105; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 34.
[492] Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, *Globalization and the Gulf*, 20. This tribal structure differentiates for instance the Gulf monarchies from other monarchies in the region – such as the Shah's in Iran. See Salamé, 'Les pétromonarchies du Golfe et la guerre du Chatt el-Arab', 375.
[493] Herb, *All in the Family*, 32.
[494] Herb points to the dynamics of accommodation rom the demand for more consultation of other emirates in the decision-making process formulated in 1979 within the Federal National Council. See Herb, 144.
[495] For an in-depth debate on the rational versus constructivist approaches to cooperation dilemmas, see Culpepper, *Creating Cooperation*.
[496] Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 141; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 24; Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 38.
[497] Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 5, 24.

ruling autocratic family maintain their cohesiveness and prevent coups,[498] at the expense however of the efficient functioning of the state.[499] Despite briefly reflecting on the relationship between the Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi) and the Al Maktoum (Dubai),[500] Herb does not extend his identification of accommodation strategies *within* the families to accommodation strategies *across* them.

There are therefore various compelling elements in both the principal–agent literature and Gulf studies to account for the UAE's surprising commitment to foreign aid multilateralism. Principal–agent theory suggests that multiple principals may coordinate if a clear division of labour between principal and intermediary is set up, but ignores domestic intermediaries. Gulf studies suggest that tribal relations impact negatively institutional outcomes. In the following section, I bring these two threads together to clarify Abu Dhabi and Dubai's working relationship and its impact on the international cooperation of the UAE. To explain the UAE's multilateral commitment, I study how dynastic monarchism, against all odds, addresses the pitfalls of principal–agent relationships and strengthens the UAE's commitment to foreign aid multilateralism.

For principal–agent theory, multiple principals have mixed effects on the formulation of foreign aid strategies. Usually, multiple principals will impede reforms.[501] On the other hand, multiple principals may lead to more positive outcomes *if one principal acts as the other's intermediary*.[502] As I argue is the case in the UAE, multiple principals may better enact reforms if a clear hierarchy is established between the principal and his intermediary.[503] The consequences of this principal–intermediary structure are two-fold. First, it is more likely that reforms are in-depth because two principals apply twice the pressure for agents to comply. Second, because aligning the principals' interests is costly,[504] it is more likely that reforms will endure, to avoid the cost of undoing the deal.

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498 Hertog, 'Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States'.
499 One can only guess at how a state may focus on output tasks when, as in Saudi Arabia alone, there are more than 5000 royal princes. See Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 403.
500 Herb, *The Wages of Oil.*
501 Seabright, in Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*, 57.
502 A reminder. On the one hand, an intermediary adds to the chain of delegation, leading to efficiency losses. The intermediary may also change agents' incentives for his own interest and manipulate information to make himself indispensable to the principal. In both cases we then revert to the first scenario outlined above. See Seabright, in Martens, 47–48.
503 Seabright, in Martens, 47.
504 Martens, 12.

This leaves one unanswered question. How is it that the UAE falls under the principal–intermediary structure rather than the multiple principals structure, and can commit increasingly to foreign aid multilateralism? In other words, why don't the diverging interests between Abu Dhabi and Dubai forestall policymaking, as is the case in the decentralized power setting of neighbouring Kuwait?[505]

There would be many reasons to conclude that the UAE falls under a multiple-principals structure. The UAE varies from Qatar in one significant respect: it is a *decentralized state* with a loose federal and tribal structure.[506] Its constitution recognizes the uneven distribution of hydrocarbon resources across the territory, making Abu Dhabi oil-rich[507] and the others oil-poor.[508] Each emirate also has its own production base,[509] energy policy, and sovereign wealth fund;[510] in short, its own domestic preferences.[511] The different emirates composing the UAE have different rationales towards its foreign aid. The poorer Northern emirates – Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah, Umm Al Qawain – have plugged into Abu Dhabi's financial windfall.[512] Abu Dhabi, on the other hand, considers rent as something increasingly best put to good use in multilateral arenas. For its leadership, multilateralism strengthens the UAE federation thanks to international prestige, alliance-making, but also through the best practices that multilateral organizations may bestow upon the UAE's federal administration (ad21).[513] Lastly, Dubai pursues economic diversification and the development of a commercial aid industry: the "business of hope".

That the UAE has held together despite Abu Dhabi and Dubai's rivalry already isn't self-evident. While 147 unification or federation agreements were attempted in the Middle East between 1956 and 1988, only the UAE and the Gulf Cooperation Council still stand today.[514] Dynastic monarchism across the families of the Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi) and Al Maktoum

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[505] Herb, *The Wages of Oil.*
[506] Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 14.
[507] 95% of Emirati fossil fuel reserves are located in Abu Dhabi. See Reiche, 'Energy Policies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries—possibilities and Limitations of Ecological Modernization in Rentier States', 2399.
[508] Reiche, 2399; Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 412; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 87; Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 12.
[509] Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, *Globalization and the Gulf*, 21.
[510] Kechichian, in Xu and Bahgat, *The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds*, 88.
[511] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 14.
[512] Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 119; Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 108; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 29.
[513] Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 123; Renaud, in Sadik and Elbadawi, *The Global Economic Crisis and Consequences for Development Strategy in Dubai*, 88; Seabright, in Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*, 65; Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 59.
[514] Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 119.

(Dubai) has operated as a vector of dynastic stability.[515] In foreign policy, Abu Dhabi has had to accommodate Dubai[516] while "the one institution that has the political power to constrain the Dubai development is the ruling family of Abu Dhabi".[517] Such accommodation is reflected in the UAE Constitution also: it states that "each individual emirate has the right to have an independent foreign policy so long as it does not clash with the federal foreign policy."[518]

Because it favours regime survival over political reform, dynastic monarchism often leads to suboptimal public policy outcomes to accommodate the interests of various members of the dynasty. In the field of foreign aid, for instance, the ruler must accommodate the whims of competing members of the royal family, or of close allies, when these want to set their own aid organizations. This produces fragmentation, strains the state administration, and hinders multilateral cooperation. In this respect, dynastic monarchism reinforces the logic of the *multiple-principals* model.

As a case of dynastic monarchism, the UAE is different from all its neighbours[519] because power is decentralized *and* remains within the ruling families. It is different from Qatar or Saudi Arabia because it is at work twice – *within* each family and *across* the families. It is also different from Kuwait because power, though decentralized, remains in the ruling families, and notably the two most powerful, the Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi and the Al Maktoum of Dubai. It is different from both Qatar and Kuwait because the UAE is not a family regime, but an inter-tribal one.[520] The three elements converge to support the idea that dynastic monarchism embeds Abu Dhabi and Dubai's rivalry into larger policymaking considerations[521] and stabilizes the UAE's international cooperation.

To ensure their respective survival, Abu Dhabi and Dubai accommodate one another. They produce a foreign aid policy that is minimal because it is not meant to solve international problems, but to segregate the political from the economic[522] and the international from the

515 Herb, *All in the Family*.
516 Ulrichsen, *Qatar and the Arab Spring*, 62; Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 40.
517 Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 198.
518 'The Constitution' articles 120; 123 and 214. A largely documented expression of this autonomy is the respective relationship of Abu Dhabi and Dubai with their Iranian neighbour. See Salamé, 'Les pétromonarchies du Golfe et la guerre du Chatt el-Arab', 373.
519 In his book, Michael Herb analyzes the dynasties of the Al Sabah (Kuwait), the Al Saud (Saudi Arabia), the Al Thani (Qatar), Al Khalifa (Bahrain), Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi), Al Maktum (Dubai), and Al Said (Oman).
520 Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 25.
521 Culpepper, *Creating Cooperation*, 20–21.
522 Echagüe, 'Oman: The Outlier', 3.

domestic,[523] and enable both actors to pursue their respective interests unhindered.[524] Abu Dhabi is supported by Dubai to legitimize and implement reforms to strengthen the federal administration, while Dubai's autonomy remains unquestioned. For two different domestic-oriented reasons, and thanks to the degree of institutionalization, however informal, of the relationship between the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the competing actors cooperate. As a result, the UAE's multilateral cooperation is stable because reforms are negotiated between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and henceforth are more difficult to annul once adopted.[525] In other words, the UAE's stable multilateral commitment is typically a domestically driven policy.[526]

The next sections show how the UAE's foreign aid policy works according to a principal–intermediary structure facilitated by dynastic monarchism. I first observe that the rentier and dynastic dynamics of fragmentation are common to Qatar and the rentier emirate of Abu Dhabi, which confirms my previous findings on rentierism's impact on multilateralism. Then I argue that the two sides of Dubai's post-rentier economy are that the emirate is unhindered by rentier bureaucratic impediment and that it develops a business-oriented approach to foreign aid as part of its economic diversification projects. Last, I demonstrate that the principal–intermediary structure triggered by dynastic monarchism has benefited the UAE's multilateral cooperation as a whole, with illustrations of these mechanisms enacted in the cases of donor proliferation and aid transparency.

Multiple principals: foreign aid in Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Behind the project of the confederation of the United Arab Emirates lies Abu Dhabi's will to maintain a cohesive ensemble supported by the redistribution of wealth.[527] Conversely, non-rentier Dubai strives for greater autonomy and economic diversification. More importantly, if the two emirates are driven by dynastic dynamics, only Abu Dhabi succumbs to the fragmenting impact of rentierism.

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523 Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy*, 4.
524 Smith, 49.
525 It would be far-fetched to argue, as Meunier does for the European Union, that the negotiation between the two emirates increases their bargaining power abroad. The UAE does not have the size to be even *physically* well represented in different international negotiations. It is of little interest thereof to see how domestic negotiation between Abu Dhabi and Dubai affects the UAE's bargaining power in the context of this chapter. See Meunier, *Trading Voices*.
526 Nonneman, *Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe*, 2005, 17.
527 Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 88; Confidential note B1/2 - 23219, 27 January 1967, in Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*.

Section 1: Rentier dynamics in Abu Dhabi

On 27 January 1988, after fourteen years as a party to the innocuous Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the United Arab Emirates unexpectedly decided to defect. More strangely still, it backpedalled two years later and joined the convention once again.[528] According to one observer, the Ministry of Fisheries' inaction led to the UAE's automatic defection. Unhappy with the outcome, Abu Dhabi rulers took up the issue and entrusted another Ministry - Environment and Water – to manage the issue. This anecdote is revealing of two aspects of Abu Dhabi politics. First, "it was not the ministry which was trying to take over and centralize but rather Abu Dhabi […] which was pushing for the federal level" (ad13). In other words, Abu Dhabi rulership's prime objective was – and is - to strengthen the federal level of the Emirati bureaucracy.[529] Second, as predicted by a rentier reading of bureaucracy, the growth of the rentier state in Abu Dhabi led to bureaucratic fragmentation – a new ministry was created - and undermined the UAE's multilateral cooperation (ad13; ad19). This anecdote is generalizable to Abu Dhabi's fragmented foreign aid landscape.

In the autocratic emirate of Abu Dhabi, various public or para-public aid actors coexist in relative mutual indifference, of weak communication and cooperation. As in Qatar, fragmentation in Abu Dhabi has three faces:

1. **The legal dimension**. Aid organizations in Abu Dhabi do not work under a single legal structure.[530] The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) has the legal competence not only to disburse its funds but also to administer part of the Abu Dhabi government's funds. Similarly, the UAE Red Crescent (UAERC) enjoys a special legal status, namely the ability to raise funds throughout the Emirate and to have oversight over all the aid disbursements of Abu Dhabi aid organizations (ad11; ad15; dub3).[531]

2. **The financial dimension**. There are enormous wealth disparities amongst various Emirati aid organizations. In 2009 the ADFD worked with about 100 times the means of another of

[528] 'Member Countries | CITES'.
[529] The fear of dissolution of the UAE is at the core of Abu Dhabi's rationale. Qatar and Bahrain were included in the original design of the federation but later dropped out. See Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 124–25; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 56–95.
[530] "UAE Assistance to Iraq from 2003-2006."
[531] IMF, 'United Arab Emirates: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism', 140.

the largest Abu Dhabi charities, the Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation.[532] Charities also mobilize a wide span of financial resources: the Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation disbursed 215 times more funds than the Mohamed Bin Zayed Species Conservation Fund in 2014.[533]

3. **The policy dimension**. In Abu Dhabi, a wide spectrum of "aid cultures" exists.[534] There is little in common for instance between the ADFD, which spear-heads development-oriented aid in infrastructure since 1971, on the one hand; and the Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation (1992) and Zakat Fund (2003),[535] which promote a more "sacralized" conception of aid, such as support to the production of an Islamic Encyclopaedia (ad15).[536]

Dynamics fragmenting aid in Abu Dhabi are identical to those at play in Qatar. All Abu Dhabi aid organizations are tied to powerful patrons that belong to, or have close ties to, the ruling family. These patrons sit both on the board of powerful para-public aid organizations as well as at the higher posts of the Abu Dhabi administration. Sheikh Hamdan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, one of the brothers of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, chairs the UAERC and has had multiple responsibilities within the federal Cabinet.[537] Within the *same* organization, the Sponsorship Department works directly with Sheikh Hamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who simultaneously chairs the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Court (ad10).[538] Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi Ruler's half-brother, chairs the boards of both the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development and of the Khalifa Bin Zayed Charity Foundation.[539]

As part of its broader agenda to streamline its bureaucracy,[540] Abu Dhabi's autocratic leadership has attempted to re-engineer its aid landscape by centralizing it, notably with the creation of the Office for the Coordination of Foreign Aid in 2009.[541] Yet, the combination of the hydrocarbon rent and of dynastic monarchism has provided autonomy to numerous aid

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532 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2009'.
533 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2014', 8, 104.
534 Marie Juul Petersen, "Sacralized or Secularized Aid? Positioning Gulf-based Muslim Charities," 26.
535 "صندوق الزكاة" 2017
536 Why first-generation aid organizations like the ADFD are more modernist than later creations like the Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation (1983) is a puzzle that I answer in the next chapter.
537 'Emirates Red Crescent || Establishment and International Recognition'.
538 'CPC Management'.
539 'Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation - About the Foundation'; 'Board of Directors'.
540 'Abu Dhabi Government Unveils Its "Policy Agenda 2007-2008" -- Steps Toward "Transparency"'.
541 Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 98.

patrons, fragmented the aid landscape, and undermined Abu Dhabi's consistency in multilateral aid organizations.

An illustration of dynastic monarchism and the financial leverage of hydrocarbon rent, several royally sponsored aid organizations, like the Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation (2007), the Ahmed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation (2010) and the Sultan Bin Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Humanitarian and Scientific Foundation (2010) have continued to mushroom in the past decade. Characteristic of rentierism's counterproductive and fragmenting dynamic, these organizations add to an aid landscape laden with poorly specialized and redundant aid programs. Most charities focus on similar tasks, such as mosque construction, literacy programs, or relief. Also symptomatic of rentierism is that despite patrons' close family ties, there is scant communication between aid organizations at the implementation level (ad14; ad15; ad19; ad23). Information is compartmentalized and powerful organizations work in parallel, with little or no oversight from the official state administration (ad7; ad10; ad11; ad13; ad14; ad15; ad23).[542] The aid administration has also segmented progressively in the 2000s. Multiple offices – the Presidential Office, the ADFD, but also the more unexpected Abu Dhabi Department of Municipalities and Agriculture, and the UAE Armed Forces[543] – were disbursing aid concurrently.

In short, with the growth of the rentier state and the strengthening of the Al Nahyan family, a multi-speed aid system has emerged in Abu Dhabi. Rentier dynamics (by providing patrons financial leeway) and dynastic monarchism (by giving them political acquiescence) enabled redundant aid organizations to proliferate. Rentier dynamics also impeded aid streamlining. If some "islands of efficiency" like the MBZ Foundation supported change, reforms were also stopped in their wake by idle bureaucrats working under protective patrons (ad3; ad5; ad13; ad21; ad23). At times reformist and risk-averse bureaucrats even quarrelled within the same organization (ad11; ad23).[544] Ultimately, fragmentation undermined full-fledged multilateral cooperation. Abu Dhabi aid organizations, despite the ADFD's early lead in multilateral fora, and auspicious declarations on international cooperation (ad1)[545] are not well

[542] 'UAE President Deploys Personal Charity Foundation'.
[543] 'UAE Joins Un Ocha Donor Support Group (Odsg); Uae Assistance Profile'; 'UAE Assistance to Iraq from 2003-2006'.
[544] Within the MICAD there was a policy opposition between the Multilateral Partnerships and the Bilateral Partnerships departments. One the one hand, some favoured contributions to the core resources of multilateral organizations, while others preferred the direct bilateral engagement with recipient countries (ad23).
[545] 'Emirates Red Crescent || Establishment and International Recognition'; 'Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation - About the Foundation'.

integrated in foreign aid multilateralism (ad7; ad12; ad13; ad14; ad23; oecd5).[546] The UAERC, for one, still opposes cooperation with UN agencies in complicated terrains where it is present (ad7; ad15; oecd5).[547]

The aid landscapes in Abu Dhabi and Doha are similar. Hydrocarbon wealth and intra-family accommodation have progressively fragmented the aid bureaucracy and major para-public charities. Conversely, the neighbouring *post-rentier* state of Dubai provides an interesting counterexample of aid centralization.

Section 2: Economic diversification and the post-rentier economy – Dubai and the "business of hope"

It is a well-known fact that Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum calls himself the CEO of Dubai.[548] A post-rentier economy[549] like Dubai does not face the same set of rentier constraints, within the same federal state, as Abu Dhabi. If the Al Maktoum family does lend itself to dynastic monarchism by accommodating its close allies, powerful personae have limited means to create autonomous spheres of influence and patronage. Conversely, because Dubai cannot rely on hydrocarbon rent, it seeks to broaden its sources of income.[550] Foreign aid multilateralism and the "business of hope" contribute to this state-led economic diversification.[551]

Centralization in a non-rentier context

The variety of aid cultures one can find in Abu Dhabi or Doha is also present in Dubai. There is little in common between Dubai Cares, the lean organization that sets a "golden standard throughout the region" in aid for education (ad23); and the Al Maktoum Foundation, a traditionalist charity, whose purpose is to "rais[e] the level of the Islamic nation with science and

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546 Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*.

547 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2014', 36; 'UAE Aid - a Top 20 Donor Plans to Get Bigger'; Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 14.

548 Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 139.

549 Whereas around 70% of Abu Dhabi's current government revenue comes from oil and natural gas, it is already less than 5% in Dubai". See Reiche, 'Energy Policies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries—possibilities and Limitations of Ecological Modernization in Rentier States', 2398. See also Abdulla, in Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, *Globalization and the Gulf*, 184. Luomi considers Dubai to at the bottom "extreme in the GCC states' oil wealth continuum". See Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 12.

550 Davidson, 'The Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai', 38.

551 Hertog, in Narbone and Lestra, *The Gulf Monarchies beyond the Arab Spring*, 8; Al Mezaini, in Hertog, *Business Politics in the Middle East*, 45.

knowledge through schools, colleges and Islamic centres."[552] Yet Dubai's aid landscape is different in that aid fiefdoms do not proliferate there as they do in Abu Dhabi. Rich patrons do exist – notably successful businessmen close to the Al Maktoum family. Some have created their own charity, as evidenced by the Sultan Bin Ali Al Owais Foundation (1992) or the Abdulla Al Ghurair Foundation for Education (2015). This is a predictable feature of dynastic monarchism: the ruling family accommodates its close allies.

In contrast to Abu Dhabi however, Dubai's aid landscape is centralized rather than fragmented. All aid actors in Dubai must report to the Ruler. In particular, the MBR Global Initiatives (2016) is a transversal conglomerate of twenty-eight aid- or development-related entities, under the ruler's direct authority. It seeks to "achieve integration and coordination among the humanitarian, developmental and social initiatives that His Highness [Al Maktoum] has sponsored and launched over the past years" (dub2).[553] If the aid landscape remains highly hierarchical – most interviewees did not know about the why and wherefores of the new MBR Global Initiatives (dub2; dub5; dub6) – information does circulate horizontally through the central node of the Ruler's cabinet. Aid specialization is also commonplace: Noor Dubai focuses precisely on the prevention and curing of blindness and seven related diseases (dub6), while Dubai Cares works on a specific Millennium Goal for Development set by the international community – achieving universal primary education.[554]

The absence of rentier dynamics in Dubai tempers the perverse effects of dynastic monarchism. On the other side of the non-rentier coin is Dubai's need to compensate for the lack of hydrocarbon resources by pursuing economic diversification, including through the "business of hope".

Business in a non-rentier context

Developing a "business of hope" arises both from the opportunity for Dubai to exploit economic opportunities without the pitfalls of rentierism, as well as the necessity for the emirate

552 'Al Maktoum Foundation | Objectives'.
553 Interactive, 'Mohamad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Global Initiatives'.
554 A further indicator of its speciaization, Dubai Cares underwent a relevance test when the Millennium Development Goals were replaced by the Sustainable Development Goals and is now to focus on another specific development issue, maternal health (dub2).

to prosper without relying on hydrocarbon rent.[555] Though critical observers often underline Gulf rulers' reformist missteps – aborted cultural or real estate "white elephant" projects and the like (ad21)[556] – state-led economic diversification "cannot be dismissed as simply cosmetic".[557] Dubai, in particular, is a "brand" known all over the world.[558] Foreign aid contributes to this effort. The ruler's cabinet has built a consistent strategy to associate foreign aid with "the business of hope"[559] and to broaden its sources of income.

First, the ruler strives to produce performing aid organizations. To do so, it follows two steps. The cabinet first serves as an incubator: it creates charities[560] through personal endowments made by the ruler, as well as forceful contribution fundraising campaigns typical of autocratic Middle Eastern states.[561] The cabinet then encourages aid organizations to become autonomous and value-generating entities by diversifying their resources, accounting for every penny spent, and producing results (dub2; dub5; dub6). There is hope that these organizations may become "national aid champions" capable of reaping the benefits of working with multilateral aid organizations (q9). This differs from the usual lack of competition associated with ruler-driven business in the rentier states.[562]

Second, the emirate breaks with the long-lasting inability for Gulf states to benefit economically from their aid disbursements. Most loans and grants emanating from Gulf donors have usually benefited - through tenders - non-national organizations specialized in aid procurement.[563] Even in the case of the ADFD, which has stakes in different companies,[564] aid multilateralism was not conceptualized as potential economic revenue. Al Mezaini thus concludes that "the aid provided by the UAE [did not] request or force its aid recipients to give

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555 That Dubai is a non-rentier state does not make it automatically a successful economy. In spite of depleting hydrocarbon resources, Oman and Bahrain have not experienced the same outcome. I return to the type of leadership in Dubai in the next chapter to explain why there, especially, innovative strategies regarding foreign aid have been put in place.

556 'Why Do Middle East Construction Projects Fail?'; Goldenberg, 'Masdar's Zero-Carbon Dream Could Become World's First Green Ghost Town'; Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*; Herzberg, 'Golfe Persique'; Dahi, in Makdisi and Prashad, *Land of Blue Helmets*, 404.

557 Jones, 'Seeing Like an Autocrat', 28.

558 Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 3.

559 Interactive, 'Mohamad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Global Initiatives'.

560 Dubai Cares (2007), the Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation (2007) or Noor Dubai (2008) were created in its midst.

561 Hertog, *Business Politics in the Middle East*, 8. In Dubai indeed, fundraising campaigns have to be sponsored by the ruler. The recent Dubai-led campaign for UAE Water Aid raised about 28 million US$ in ten days. See 'UAE Water Aid Campaign Raises Dh103 Million | The National'.

562 Luciani, in Hertog, *Business Politics in the Middle East*, 272.

563 Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 127.

564 'Annual Report 2014', 27; 'UAE Aid - a Top 20 Donor Plans to Get Bigger', 20.

any economic benefits in return."[565] Dubai revolutionizes this practice. To begin, Dubai is the regional pioneer of an "events-based" economy. It is a central conference centre on all matters, including aid and development.[566] It welcomes on a regular basis international organizations, global philanthropies and multinational companies to discuss issues pertaining to aid; public–private partnerships against poverty, aid effectiveness, among others (dub3; q6; ad3; ad20; ad21).[567] Moreover, but less visibly, Dubai philanthropies often develop a parallel business branch to support their aid activities. This commercial streak is left in the shadows – business branches seldom use the same name as the foundation – to avoid any liability being attached to the ruler's name, in the event of commercial failure (dub4; dub5). For instance, at the time of my fieldwork, an important Dubai foundation was discreetly approached by the Saudi Ministry of Education to assist in the reform of its curriculum (dub4).[568]

In both of these aspects multilateralism is important because it anchors the "business of hope" to global economic networks and anticipates the possibility of decreasing regional markets.[569] Nowhere is this more explicit than in Dubai's International Humanitarian City (2007). The second largest dispenser of aid in the country,[570] it reflects Dubai's geographical strategy in becoming a warehouse between the East and West -[571] alike to the strategy behind Dubai Airport's. The International Humanitarian City (IHC) offers logistical and other aid-related services to international aid actors and UN agencies in particular. The IHC indirectly generates wealth because it enables, in exchange for a rent, the private sector (twelve commercial aid-related firms to this date) to access ten UN agencies and nearly forty not-for-profit organizations.[572] The leadership also hopes to provide aid markets for the seven Dubai-registered aid commercial firms that are members of the IHC.[573]

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565 Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*.

566 'Sheikh Mohammed Sets up New Global Endowment Consultancy Centre | The National'.

567 'Lubna Al Qasimi'; 'UAE Presents Innovative Programme Initiative'; 'Sheikh Mohammed Sets up New Global Endowment Consultancy Centre | The National'; 'Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation and UNDP Explore Ways to Develop Arab Knowledge Index | WAM'; 'Oic Special Envoy Sada Cumber Stresses Uae/Us Cooperation During Dubai Visit'.

568 Interestingly, the commercial services of the Foundation are bypassing the bureaucratic inertia of rentier Saudi Arabia – another illustration of the institutionalist approach of the rentier paradigm defended throughout this work.

569 Hertog, in Narbone and Lestra, *The Gulf Monarchies beyond the Arab Spring*, 8.

570 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2014', 25.

571 Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 110.

572 Members Directory, 'IHC'.

573 In troublingly similar way to Dubai's IHC, Abu Dhabi is trying to develop a green industry around IRENA and the showcasing of the green city, Masdar, is designed to develop a business material (ad18; ad21). Projects under the ADFD Partnership Program with Pacific Ocean Islands, funded by the ADFD and promoted by the United Nations, for instance, are thought to be meant to create contracts for Abu Dhabi business. While the United Nations mentions that these projects use competitive tender procedures, an ADFD leaflet states that projects falling under the Fund are to be implemented by Masdar, a subsidiary company of the Abu Dhabi-owned Mubadala company. See 'UAE-Pacific Partnership Fund - United Nations Partnerships for SDGs Platform'; 'Masdar Special

In these endeavours, the Dubai leadership has not faced the same rentier dynamics as Abu Dhabi or Qatar. For the same reason, it has pursued economic diversification, including through foreign aid multilateralism. Dubai's non-rentier structure is crucial in developing a foreign aid business fabric. More importantly, it has political implications for the UAE's foreign aid policy as a whole.

Abu Dhabi and Dubai: a principal–intermediary relationship that strengthens the UAE's foreign aid multilateralism

To preserve the fragile balance of the UAE confederation, dynastic monarchism plays an important part not only *within* Abu Dhabi and Dubai[574] but also *across* them.[575] Forced to tango, the Al Nahyan and the Al Maktoum have established a principal–intermediary relationship that strengthens the UAE's multilateral cooperation. I illustrate this mechanism in two aspects of the UAE's multilateral cooperation on foreign aid: donor proliferation (and the federalization of aid coordination) and aid transparency (multilateral cooperation on aid statistics and multilateral cooperation on aid transparency with respect to money laundering and terrorist financing).

Section 3: Aid coordination: one phone number in the UAE

The UAE has consistently centralized it aid diplomacy in the past decade. The Office for the Coordination of Foreign Aid (2008) was then further substantiated in the form of the Ministry of International Cooperation and Development (2013). Recently foreign aid coordination was further integrated as a central foreign policy tool through its integration within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (2016). Such a centralized structure does not exist in other Gulf countries.

Though this is a moving target, the Abu Dhabi-Dubai principal–intermediary working relationship has helped set "one phone number" for UAE aid. In the context of the 2008 financial crisis, during which Abu Dhabi came to Dubai's financial rescue, Dubai could hardly

Projects: UAE - Pacific Partnership Fund'; ADFD, 'ADFD's Partnership Program With Pacific Ocean Islands'; 'About the IRENA/ADFD Project Facility'; 'Why the UAE Is Pressing for Irena HQ'. Business and aid are also becoming increasingly the norm in Abu Dhabi, where for instance the concept of aid innovation services is making its way (ad11; ad23).

574 Herb, *All in the Family*, 136–44.

575 The UAE constitution reflects this mutual accommodation: Abu Dhabi's ruler is the President of the UAE, and the ruler of Dubai is the Prime Minister.

refuse to oppose its neighbour's federalist project for aid.[576] It was asked to participate. While the initial and modest OFCA was largely Abu Dhabi's – it was headed by UAERC Chair Sheikh Hamdan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan – Dubai became increasingly involved in the process. The OFCA merged with the Dubai-led Ministry of Foreign Trade to become the MICAD.[577] Sheikha Lubna Al Qassimi, a Sharjah-born, Dubai-based professional, was thereafter appointed at the head of MICAD,[578] a trend confirmed by today's Dubai-national Minister of State for International Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Reem Bint Ibrahim Al Hashimi.[579] Not only administrators were brought in from Dubai. Dubai charities played the role of Abu Dhabi's intermediary. Dubai Cares for instance, was highly influential in setting up the MICAD (dub2). Dubai officials were also brought within Abu Dhabi charities themselves to improve their performance.[580]

Dubai's participation has galvanized the horizontal circulation of information between aid organizations – absent in the rentier bureaucracy of Abu Dhabi. Dubai charities stood along MICAD in trainings and meetings that involved both reformist actors – the ADFD – and traditionalist charities such as the Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation (ad15). Sheikh Mohamed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum paved the way for further inter-organizational cooperation with a letter of intent sent following the creation of the MBR Global Initiatives, giving notice of his intent to "work with this vision and engage with [them]" (ad15). New aid charities were also increasingly connected across both emirates. While the boards of former institutions, like the UAE Red Crescent Authority or the Al Maktoum Foundation, are dominated by state nationals,[581] recent aid institutions like Noor Dubai or the UAE Water Aid are better connected with representatives from both emirates (dub6).[582]

In none of these events is Dubai's cooperation wholehearted. An aid manager at one of Dubai's largest foundations confided: "I am not working with others to share best practices

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576 Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 7.
577 'United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2014', 122.
578 Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi was in fact trained and promoted to governmental positions in Dubai at the early stages of her career. In the 2016 ministerial reshuffle she has been named Minister of State for Tolerance. See 'Members Of The Cabinet'; Issitt, *Lubna Al Qasimi*.
579 "Members of The Cabinet."
580 Interestingly, much of the management team of the Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan Humanitarian & Scientific Foundation are Dubai professionals, notably with close ties with the Dubai Health Authority, which is also close to Noor Dubai. See 'Management Team | About Us | H. H. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan Humanitarian & Science Foundation'.
581 "Al Maktoum Foundation | Board of Trustees"; "Emirates Red Crescent || Establishment and International Recognition"; Report, "New Board of Directors for Emirates Red Crescent."
582 'Suqia Board of Trustees'.

unless I am asked to do so" (dub4). Another executive spoke of "competition" between her organization and its Abu Dhabi counterpart (dub5). It is thus clear that accommodation comes from the top ruling circle, not from higher management (ad23). Communication is not systematic either: no one in Abu Dhabi, not even at ministerial level, knew of the establishment of the multi-billion MBR Global Initiatives (ad12; ad15; ad23). This does not undermine the fact that the outcome is that reforms are stickier than in a non-decentralized context. Though unaware of the MBR Initiative, Abu Dhabi supported it.[583] As an aid consultant remarked: "there is a crucial lack of communication between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, but that is different from rivalry" (ad23).

These various elements confirm that Abu Dhabi and Dubai's cooperation is restricted but not negligible. Ultimately, Dubai legitimized the authority of MICAD's guidelines over most UAE aid actors, whether the latter follow them or not. Out of eight aid actors interviewed from different organizations, only an UAERC representative (ad10) had no knowledge of cooperation with MICAD, despite his organization's working relationship with the Ministry (ad1; ad7; ad12; ad13; ad15; ad16; ad17).

The interviews I conducted with representatives of multilateral organizations also confirmed their belief that the new leadership within MICAD materialized a unique interlocutor on foreign aid affairs in the UAE that could represent the federal government, unlike the segmented representation of the Kuwait Fund and the Saudi Fund in other instances.[584] As one OECD official recalls, "we [the OECD–DAC] met after UAE joined with two people of the ministry, and they told us that they were the two people who had taken care of the issue" (oecd2). Indeed, Dubai has also played the role of intermediary, or broker, between the federal ministries and international organizations. While the ADFD was the first to spearhead Emirati aid abroad in the 1970s, it only represented the emirate of Abu Dhabi within the Arab Coordination Group, a unit that progressively fell into oblivion (oecd6).[585] Dubai's leadership created new momentum. Prior to heading MICAD, Sheikha Lubna (then Minister of Economy) deepened the UAE's cooperation with organizations such as the OECD (ad23), working ties that she maintained in the wake of her new post as the UAE's aid representative (ad23).[586] In short,

583 'MBR Foundation Expands Initiatives'.
584 Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience', 10.
585 Hynes and Carroll, 10.
586 'Mena - Oecd Investment Ministerial Feb 13-14, 2006'.

Dubai's international recognition in the field of aid (dub4; dub 6; oecd1; oecd3; oecd4; oecd6; oecd7; oecd8) spilled over into the entire Emirati federal government (oecd1; ad7).

That Dubai has enhanced the UAE's multilateral aid cooperation by strengthening the federal level is undeniable. As the concept of multiple principals dictates however, Dubai's success is limited. Dubai-led reforms are hindered by Abu Dhabi's patronage system. For example, to date the representation of the UAE in regional aid organizations like the OPEC Fund for International Development has remained in the Ministry of Finance's back pocket (ad16; ad18). This inertia is more striking in the case of the ADFD. A transparent and pro-multilateral entity that supports reform, it nonetheless resents any third party's oversight and undertakes unilateral multilateral initiatives like the IRENA–ADFD Project Facility autonomously from the federal administration (ad12; ad23).[587] Finally, and despite Dubai's good offices, some Abu Dhabi aid organizations continue to act autonomously abroad. The UAERC still turns a deaf ear to cooperation with multilateral organizations in complicated terrains such as Palestine (ad7; ad15; ad23; oecd5).

Section 4: Aid transparency

Aid statistics

Since 2008, the UAE has veered from aid opacity, characteristic of Gulf donorship and emerging donors at large, to unattained levels of aid transparency in the developing world. Only recently Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for International Organizations, Yousouf Al Qoubani, reiterated that "the UAE believes in the vital importance of developing and building responsible, effective and transparent institutions capable of delivering the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda."[588] Dubai again has a role in driving one of the world's most autocratic regimes work to attain this objective.

Dubai has not been the first to promote transparency for aid in the UAE. Both the ADFD and the Ministry of Finance (through the OPEC Fund for International Development) developed best practices with regards to transparency as early as the 1970s.[589] Yet as in Qatar,

[587] 'About the IRENA/ADFD Project Facility'; Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 11.
[588] 'At Nairobi Global Partnership Meet, UAE Highlights Role of Transparent Institutions in Realising Sustainable Development Goals | WAM'.
[589] To understand why two such institutions would promote transparency at a time when opacity characterized the Gulf landscape, one should read the following chapter.

Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, no systematic statistical assessment was made of aid disbursements by the emirate. Traditional charities did not want, or did not know how or what to collect aid data (ad14; ad15). Federal institutions set up by the Abu Dhabi leadership, such as the National Bureau of Statistics, were unable to impose certain standards upon the various federal- and state-level organizations for producing statistics (dub8).

Conversely, Dubai systematized transparency within its borders. First, Dubai's largest philanthropies – the MBR Al Maktoum Foundation, Noor Dubai, Dubai Cares – established state-of-the-art reporting practices and actively cooperated with international organizations to promote this approach (dub4; dub5; dub6; ad23).[590] Second, Dubai's government and Dubai charities also represented the UAE in international fora on governmental accountability, efficiency and transparency and actively cooperated with international organizations on aid transparency (oecd1; oecd4).[591]

Domestically, Dubai's role strikingly illustrates its role as an intermediary in promoting transparency throughout the federal administration. Not only did it structure MICAD, but it also named in the last cabinet reshuffle (2016), another Dubai civil servant at the head of the Ministry for Community Development (former Ministry of Social Affairs) in charge of charitable affairs.[592] A confirmation of this trend, and a sign of Dubai's role as intermediary, Dubai's Cabinet served as an incubator for the reform of the UAE statistical system. The Emirates Competitiveness Council (2009), a tight team essentially composed of foreigners, was created in its midst. It was to develop in parallel to the mandate of the National Bureau of Statistics, a better statistical system so as to produce reliable data and promote transparency. The EEC embodied the difference between the paralysis of Abu Dhabi's bureaucracy and the velocity of Dubai's reforms. One senior EEC adviser reported that "[Sheikh MBR Al Maktoum] wanted to have the EEC because he did not trust the reports made by the ministries on the state of things" (dub8). Nurtured by the Dubai Cabinet, it was then merged with the National Bureau of Statistics into a Federal Competitiveness and Statistical Authority (ad1).[593] A clear sign of cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the new institution illustrated the division of labour

[590] Hos, "OECD-DAC Survey on Global Private Philanthropy for Development."
[591] Amongst other examples, Ahmad Bin Humaidan, Deputy Director of Dubai's Court, chaired the MENA-OECD regional working-group on E-Government and Administrative Simplification to develop more accountable and performing government institutions. See 'Progress in Public Management in the Middle East and North Africa: Case Studies on Policy Reform', 166.
[592] Though caution is warranted, this possibly indicates that upcoming administrations will be more lenient and coordinated regarding the reporting of aid in the UAE.
[593] 'About Us'.

between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Yet again, the EEC could not request cooperation from all aid actors in Abu Dhabi, an indication that the patronage system also hindered reform (dub8).

The issues of aid coordination and aid transparency show that when acting as an intermediary, Dubai can strengthen the federal level in ways that Abu Dhabi cannot alone - though it cannot reform Abu Dhabi itself. In a principal–intermediary structure, there remain nonetheless two principals, one of which plays the role of intermediary.[594] In other words, though Dubai acts on Abu Dhabi's behalf, it continues to pursue its own interests – autonomy and economic diversification. When Abu Dhabi and Dubai's interests collide, Dubai's autonomy is supported by its non-rentier characteristics and by dynastic monarchism. Because Dubai's aid bureaucracy is hierarchical and united, it is capable of uniformly opposing externally induced reforms. Similarly, because Abu Dhabi wishes to avoid federal conflict, it provides its neighbour with institutional leeway. Ultimately, the empirical data corroborate the argument made in the chapter – that Abu Dhabi and Dubai's cooperation *a minima* is counterintuitively productive, because dynastic monarchism prevents institutional paralysis. Indeed, the federal level continues to consolidate while Dubai is left with institutional manoeuvre. The last section illustrates this aspect of the principal–intermediary model with another dimension of aid transparency - money laundering and terrorism financing.

Aid, money laundering and terrorism financing

Fighting money laundering and terrorist financing (ML–TF) is a priority shared by the international community and the UAE which spills over in to aid financial flows. The UAE, like its Gulf neighbours, encounters strong pressure by the international community to strengthen aid oversight.[595] Emirati leaders wish to appear at the vanguard of counterterrorist cooperation. They remain particularly wary of foreign infiltrations by terrorist organizations – notably from Saudi Arabia – that they have seen enacted only again recently with the terrorist attacks in Kuwait (ad21).[596] So far, the UAE has made spectacular moves on counterterrorism. As early as 2003 it has opened the financial accounts of some charities to members of the US Congress.[597]

[594] Otherwise, Dubai would simply be Abu Dhabi's *agent*, not its intermediary.
[595] Challand, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 68.
[596] Hubbard, 'Suicide Bombings Hit 3 Cities in Saudi Arabia, One Near a Holy Site'; 'Saudi Brothers Arrested over Kuwait Mosque Bombing - Al Jazeera English'.
[597] Khafagy, 'Gulf Philanthropy: Structural, Domestic and Global Challenges', 8.

They continued in that vein, by shaming certain NGOs (including European ones),[598] by partaking in international initiatives such as the Abu Dhabi-based Sawab (2015) or Hedayah (2012) expert centres for counterterrorism,[599] or by terminating aid partnerships deemed problematic by its Western partners, as with the Northern Emirati Human Appeal International organization.[600]

In Doha and Abu Dhabi, as in Riyadh, rulers may implement – partial – reforms in line with international priorities with ease, because from a fragmented landscape cannot emerge a solid coalition.[601] In the UAE however, Dubai's internal unity enables it to coherently enhance *or oppose* top-down reforms. With respect to ML–TF, Dubai has adopted a double-approach. If on the one hand it supports aid transparency at the federal-level, it preserves oversight over its own charities, and incidentally, over its deregulated financial system.

In the UAE, there is a differentiated commitment to ML–TF. Abu Dhabi illustrates the partial implementation of reforms when rulers and international organizations' interests are aligned. Contrarily to Qatar, where a legal framework was absent, the UAE's charitable system was already governed by successive laws and ministerial resolutions prior to 9/11.[602] After this date, it continued to become more centralized, albeit with partial success. On the one hand, the reformist-minded staff of the Central Bank and of the Ministry of Finance was inclined to comply.[603] The UAE's central bank undertook training sessions for not-for-profit organizations with the UK Charities Commission and the UAE's first Anti-Money Laundering legislation was taken in 2002.[604] On the other hand, the Ministry of Social Affairs,[605] responsible for supervising

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598 'UAE Cabinet Approves List of Designated Terrorist Organisations, Groups | WAM'; 'Outrage over UAE's New Terror List'.
599 The Sawab Centre is an operational branch staffed with members of the coalition against the Islamic State, while the Hedayah centre is a platform for experts and policy-makers that produces reports on radicalization and counterterrorism. See 'US and UAE Launch Centre to "Counter Terrorist Propaganda"'; 'Strategic Significance | Promote Tolerance, Stability and Security | HEDAYAH'.
600 'Mbr Charity Establishment Promises to End Cooperation with Human Appeal International'.
601 Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*, 224; Hertog, 'Two-Level Negotiations in a Fragmented System'.
602 Those are listed in the IMF 2008 report : Federal Law 6/1974 ; Cabinet Resolution No. 386/5 of 1994 regarding-fund raising for charitable purposes; Ministerial Resolution No. 348 of 1993 regarding fund-raising from the public; Ministerial Resolution No. 538 of 1994 regarding the amendment of the resolution on fundraising from the public; Ministerial Resolution No. 193 of 1999 regarding the unified financial system governing NPOs; Central Bank Circular No. 14 of 1993 regarding current accounts; and Central Bank Regulation 24/2000 regarding opening accounts and reporting suspicious transactions. See IMF, 'United Arab Emirates: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism', 140.
603 'Top Abu Dhabi Banker Becomes New Chairman of UAE Central Bank | Reuters'.
604 Federal Law No. 4 of 2002. It was revised in 2014 to expand its scope to actors other than the central bank. See 'UAE Enhances Battle Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism - Al Tamimi & Company'; 'The Updated UAE Federal Anti-Money Laundering Framework'.
605 The Ministry was topped by conservative Mariam Mohammed Khalfan Al Roumi from 2005 to 2016. See 'Cabinet History'.

the creation and functioning of Emirati charities, still had not, by 2008, "undertaken an outreach program to raise awareness in the non-profit organisation sector", nor "articulated the UAE's overall policies and objectives for combating ML and FT".[606] This echoes Abu Dhabi's difficulty in consolidating the federal level. Rather, the rulers relied on a strong domestic actor with close ties to the Al Nahyan inner circle, the UAE Red Crescent (UAERC). Alike to other Gulf charities that "have capitalized on […] 9/11 to become bigger",[607] the UAERC strengthened its grasp on collecting and disbursing aid (ad15; ad23; dub6).[608] While a 1994 ministerial resolution stated that "all licensed charities interested in transferring funds overseas must do so via the Red Crescent Organisation [or] the Zayed Charitable Foundation",[609] after 9/11 the UAERC was *de facto* the only institution in Abu Dhabi approving the transfer of funds abroad (ad15).

To support ML–TF reform, and in addition to all its accomplishments regarding aid transparency, Dubai officials were likely to be paramount in promoting an agenda for ML–TF. Indeed Dubai personalities held high federal offices in the financial sector – notably the reform-prone Ministry of Finance.[610] However, Dubai was also capable, being less inherently fractured than Abu Dhabi, to resist reforms demanded by the international community. It is not that Dubai opposed legislation on ML–TF per se – it had already enacted in 1969, long before any federal structure, the Dubai Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities (IACAD) (dub3), to regulate fundraising and aid disbursement within its borders.[611] Rather, Dubai resented externally induced reforms, especially federal oversight, that would hinder its financial fabric.

Aid transparency and accountability in Dubai are incomplete and display some *laissez-faire*. The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) benchmark 2008 report and a 2014 US State Department report focused specifically on legal loopholes in Dubai's financial framework, not on Abu Dhabi.[612] Both pointed out to impediments to the tracking of ML-FT flows in the

[606] IMF, 'United Arab Emirates: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism', 142; 19.
[607] Petersen, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 34.
[608] Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*, 85; 'UAE Joins Un Ocha Donor Support Group (Odsg); Uae Assistance Profile'; Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 3.
[609] IMF, 'United Arab Emirates: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism', 140.
[610] Sheikh Hamdan Bin Rashid Al Maktoum headed the Ministry of Finance since 1990. See 'Cabinet History'.
[611] The IACAD was revised with Dubai Law No (2) of 2011. In 2016 the Dubai Police detained a British–Australian citizen for raising 500 US$. See 'Potential Fundraisers Warned over Dubai's Strict Charity Law | The National'.
[612] 'United Arab Emirates'.

Dubai's offshore financial zones and free zones.[613] To attract foreign capital, Dubai also allowed for the creation of trust funds in its International Finance Centre with little supervision from the responsible body – the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA).[614] The IMF thus recommended that "the relevant authorities should review the trust law […] which allows the creation of charitable trusts in order to clarify the possible implications of such vehicles under this recommendation".[615] Overall, Dubai has supported Abu Dhabi and the international community's fight against ML–TF at the federal level while maintaining its autonomy.[616] Strikingly, Dubai still has the capacity to transfer funds abroad through its own channels (ad11).[617] Similarly, it continues to supervise its "own" charities.[618] Eight years after the IMF's report, and the current international alliance against terrorism, "the application of FATF recommendations has not met the standards expected".[619]

The case of ML–TF shows that if Dubai is capable of playing the role of intermediary, it remains an autonomous principal.[620] Its non-rentier features, and Abu Dhabi's respect for its autonomy, enable it to continue hindering the application of ML–TF reforms. There is indeed, in line with the initial argument, a minimal cooperation between both emirates to avoid that pressure from the international community affect their daily business.

Conclusion: The UAE, an outlier in the Gulf region

In the UAE power decentralization and dynastic monarchism play an overall productive role for multilateral cooperation. Abu Dhabi and Dubai's cooperation is minimal: the UAE's foreign aid, thanks to dynastic monarchism, work under a principal–intermediary structure. Increasingly, Abu Dhabi and Dubai have reached some internal, informal, division of labour by which Abu Dhabi focuses on diplomatic functions, while Dubai supervises domestic reforms, including in Abu

[613] A free zone is meant to attract foreign investment thanks to swift procedures being taken on tax, immigration or labour. The International Humanitarian City operates in such a free zone in the Dubai suburbs - Cherian, '45 Free Zones in the UAE'.
[614] 'The Updated UAE Federal Anti-Money Laundering Framework'.
[615] IMF, 'United Arab Emirates: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism', 144.
[616] There are for instance limits to Dubai's autonomy. It cannot for instance raise funds in Abu Dhabi or other emirates (dub3). No indication was given to the author however, that this was a reform adopted after 9/11.
[617] Mathiason, 'Dubai's Dark Side Targeted by International Finance Police'; IMF, 'United Arab Emirates: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism', 140.
[618] A 2008 IMF report noted that "while most NPOs in Dubai are jointly supervised by both the MSA and DIACA, 12 are only supervised by DIACA". See IMF, 'United Arab Emirates: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism', 138–39. Today the IACAD continues to "supervise charitable establishments and centres administratively, financially and culturally". See 'Mandate'.
[619] Bin Belaisha, 'Money Laundering and Financial Crimes in Dubai: A Critical Study of Strategies and Future Direction of Control', 84–90; 103.
[620] Bin Belaisha, 177; Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 113.

Dhabi (ad11; ad23). This commitment to multilateral aid principles is only the by-product of dynastic monarchism. *In fine*, both ruling families want to preserve stability within the federation and pursue their daily business and their respective objectives – state-building for Abu Dhabi, economic diversification for Dubai - undisturbed. Because one emirate is characterized by rentierism and not the other, their working relationship may lead to more positive outcomes than in Qatar. Dubai may strengthen the reformist agenda of Abu Dhabi leaders without having to accept the same constraints in its own constituency.

The UAE is a regional outlier. In Qatar, power centralization and dynastic monarchism lead to aid fragmentation (see chapter 2). The case of Kuwait supports the reverse effect: power decentralization may also paralyze political reform.[621] There, the aid landscape has remained largely unchanged and segmented since 1961.[622] The Ministry of Finance – by delegation of the Prime Minister – administers the Kuwait Fund in complete autonomy; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes care of humanitarian aid;[623] and the Kuwait Awqaf Public Foundation[624] acts of its own accord.[625] Additionally, parliament may hamper aid disbursements, international cooperation[626] and hinder the better coordination of Kuwaiti aid through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notably by protecting individual benefactors under a lenient framework to guarantee civil society.[627] Consequently, the fewer number of aid actors in Kuwait (than in the UAE)[628] have been unable to merge into a more coherent whole. In short, while being one of the earlier

[621] Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 50; Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 206; Kazerouni, 'Musées et soft power dans le Golfe persique', 2 December 2014.
[622] Among the major changes, the evolution of the Kuwait Fund's mandate, which originally was limited to assist Arab countries only, before being broadened by Law No. 25 of 1974 to all developing countries. See Saliba, 'Regulation of Foreign Aid'.
[623] Demir, *Kuwait Fund and the Political Economy of Arab Regional Development*, 5; 20; OECD, *Development Co-Operation Report 2016*, 286; Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*.
[624] Formerly known until 1993 as the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs.
[625] Ibrahim and Sherif, *From Charity to Social Change Trends in Arab Philanthropy*, 134.
[626] It has done so in the past, by blocking budget support to Syria in the 1980's, before being overrun by the Cabinet, and also recently. See Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 99; 146; 'UN Labor Conference in Kuwait in Doubt, May Move to Uae or Saudi'.
[627] Khallaf, in Ibrahim and Sherif, *From Charity to Social Change Trends in Arab Philanthropy*, 140–44; 'Playing with Fire'.
[628] This is again based on a comparison between the number of international charities operating in the UAE and Kuwait. I reproduced the selection criteria set by Ridge and Kippels. They find eleven state-sponsored international philanthropies in the UAE. According to these criteria there are five in Kuwait today, and there were only three "totally outward oriented" in 1990. See "What is the Status of State-funded Philanthropy in the United Arab Emirates?", *Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research*, Policy Paper no. 15, 2016, 4; Abdulhad, 'The Kuwaiti NGOs: Their Role in Aid Flows to Developing Countries'; 'Kuwait Charitable Foundations | Kuwait Cultural Office'; 'Charity In Kuwait'; Stafford, 'An Emerging Philanthropic Superpower? Kuwaiti Humanitarian Efforts in Syria and beyond'; 13th, Analysis, 2015, and Comments, 'Kuwait's Economic "Toolkit"'; 'KUNA :: Experts, Diplomats Praise Kuwait"s USD 100 Mln Decent Life Fund 10/05/2008'; 'Amiri Initiatives'; 'Playing with Fire'; Ridge and Kippels, 'What Is the Status of State-Funded Philanthropy in the UAE?'

regional multilateral players for foreign aid,[629] Kuwait has also been one of the most intractable ones.

What this chapter teaches us is that the domestic foundations of the state matter for the stability of multilateral cooperation. Ultimately, a multiple-principal structure leads to more stability (or inertia), which a principal–intermediary structure may avoid.

[629] Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*; Hossain, "The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)"; Barakat and Zyck, "Gulf State Assistance To Conflict-Affected Environments"; Hynes and Carroll, "Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience," 9.

Figure 13. Summary of the findings on the impact of rentierism and dynastic monarchism

	Dynastic monarchism	**Rentierism**	**Concentration of power**	**Type of principal–agent model**	**Impact on foreign aid**
Qatar	One dynasty	Extreme rentier	Centralized	Multiple principals	High donor proliferation and reform paralysis
United Arab Emirates	Several dynasties	Extreme rentier (Abu Dhabi) and non-rentier (Dubai)	Decentralized (federal structure)	Principal–intermediary	Limited donor proliferation (Dubai) and reform activism
Other Gulf states					
Kuwait	One dynasty	Extreme rentier	Decentralized (parliamentary monarchy)	Multiple principals	Low donor proliferation but reform paralysis
Saudi Arabia	One dynasty	Rentier	Centralized	Multiple principals	Donor proliferation and reform paralysis

TRANSITION

In the first two empirical chapters, I tried to demonstrate how different models of domestic governance affect international cooperation. Abu Dhabi and Qatar, two very similar actors with a common history, now tread diverging multilateral paths. Qatar's is full of zig-zags, two steps forward, one back. The UAE, for its part, is walking the line. I have argued that the rentier nature of the state has led to similar dynamics in Doha and Abu Dhabi. There, greater power centralization has led to internal institutional duplications and overall undermined multilateral cooperation. In Qatar, the multiplication of interlocutors, the frequent (yet partial) merging of public authorities, the circumvention of existing rules by powerful patrons close to the ruler all coalesce to make it an unpredictable interlocutor. In the UAE however, ruler-driven collaboration between rentier Abu Dhabi and non-rentier Dubai has paved the way for a more productive and stable commitment to foreign aid multilateralism. In the country of the "triumph of the status quo",[630] change is also more sustainable because costlier to undo. In short, rentierism and dynastic monarchism may reinforce one another and lead to fragmented aid landscapes and undermined international cooperation; while power decentralization may lead to paralysis. In this respect, the UAE is walking a fine line.

What the two chapters leave unexplained is the reason(s) why the UAE decided to go multilateral – and Qatar bilateral – in the first place. Neither rentierism nor dynastic monarchism indulge leaders' preferences.[631] At first sight, there is no intuitively logical pattern to account for each country's multilateralism trajectory. Why has Abu Dhabi wished to develop its multilateral cooperation since the early 1970s; and why have Qatari leaders also favoured this option when they did - in 2002? What has led Dubai to promote foreign aid multilateralism when this has not been the case in other of its rentier-decreasing neighbours of Oman or Bahrain? There is also a great variety of attitudes within each country. Why were Qatar's traditional first-generation charities followed by the multilaterally inclined Education Above All or Silatech when the opposite occurred in Abu Dhabi, were subsequently to the multilaterally inclined ADFD

[630] Numerous examples show that when negotiating with the UAE, international organizations anticipate that the process will be secretive and long, given the confederal organization of the country. See Ibid., 126–29; 'Unesco Convention on Cultural Expressions Update and Information Request'.
[631] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 17.

followed the traditionally oriented charities of the Zayed Bin Sultan (1992), the Khalifa Foundation (2007) and the like? Why did the most "internationalized" charities of Dubai and Doha unexpectedly show limited interest for foreign aid multilateralism (dub2; dub4; dub8)?

In other words, understanding what makes cooperation constant or volatile does not explain leaders' motives, nor why the UAE and Qatar – with such a shared history – have moved along different multilateral paths.

CHAPTER 5: WHITE-COLLAR EXPATRIATES IN FOREIGN AID

THE CASE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND QATAR

> In fact, we can only advise, coax and cajole, not compel, and modernisation has thus been slower than we should have wished. Nevertheless, I think that, taking the long view, our actual position has been more satisfactory than if we had been in executive authority, especially as it has enabled Rulers and their advisers to develop confidence in our advice, without having to fight against it (British diplomat, Abu Dhabi, 1970).[632]

Abstract

This chapter aims to shed light on the role of foreign experts in shaping the variations observed in the commitment of Qatar and the UAE to the international standards on donor proliferation and aid transparency. I argue that the conjunction of foreign experts' influence, on the one hand, and autocratic rulers' appointment strategies on the other, affect the international cooperation of Qatar and the UAE. I show that the ruler–expert nexus is characterized by more interdependence than often assumed. Strikingly, Gulf autocrats' appointment strategies are sticky: advisers are easier to name than to repel; and nominations are driven not only by efficiency, but also by habit. More importantly, I find that as a consequence of the rentier and dynastic nature of the Gulf bureaucracies, different foreign experts have prospered and coexisted, despite intrinsic ideological divergences, in the Qatari and Emirati foreign aid landscapes.

Introduction

In his trips to the Orient, Tintin first encounters Europeans, not Arabs. According to Louis Blin, the figure of the European serving the Arabian prince is part of our folklore and makes this

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[632] Confidential note, 1970, in Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971.*, 27.

comic book hero's adventures authentic.[633] Indeed, the labour markets of the small petro-monarchies have, even prior to their independence, relied increasingly on foreign human resources.[634] The structural presence of swaths of foreign experts in all sectors, public and private, in Qatar and the UAE, is matched only by the lack of consideration for their role in policymaking in academic research.[635] Despite area specialists recognizing the importance of studying these high-skilled migrants,[636] the dominant rentier paradigm in Gulf studies – in the absence of a systematic conceptualization of its interaction with foreign expertise – neglects the importance of foreign experts in policymaking.

Against this background, I demonstrate the usefulness of studying foreign experts. For the epistemic scholarship, experts "share knowledge about the causation of social or physical phenomena in an area for which they have a reputation for competence, and a common set of normative beliefs about what actions will benefit human welfare"[637] and are believed to play a role in policymaking, thanks to their claim to expertise. The chapter makes two contributions. Empirically, it shows that three competing categories of experts are common to the aid landscape of Qatar and the UAE: the anti-multilateral *traditionalists*; the pro-multilateral *reformists*; and the pragmatic *performers*. Usually conceived of as instruments of the ruling autocracies, these three overlapping generations of experts in aid affect the international cooperation of Gulf states. In practice, the consolidation of *reformists* in the UAE, unlike in Qatar, has increased the country's multilateral cooperation; while the progression of *performers* in both cases is likely to temper multilateral cooperation.

Theoretically, this chapter questions dominant rentier lenses that consider Gulf petro-monarchies immune to foreign input.[638] Instead, I argue that the growth of the rentier state, reinforced by dynastic dynamics, have made uncertainty central to policymaking and created the conditions for the greater influence of foreign experts. Whether some foreign experts have been influential depends on their capacity to mobilize specific resources, which I identify. In other words, foreign expertise and the rentier state paradigm work complementarily to explain the divergent international cooperation of the small Gulf petro-monarchies.

[633] Blin, *Le monde arabe dans les albums de Tintin*, 141.
[634] Fargues, *Immigration without Inclusion*; Thiollet, 'Migration as Diplomacy'; Kamrava, *Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf*.
[635] For an exception, see Jones, 'Outsourcing the State: The Expert-Ruler Nexus and Implications for Governance in the Arab Gulf'.
[636] Kamrava, *Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf*, 19; Davidson, 'Expatriates and the Gulf Monarchies'.
[637] Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 29.
[638] Ross and Voeten, 'Oil and International Cooperation'.

Structure of the chapter

As a brief reminder to the map set out chapter 1, this chapter compares the UAE and Qatar's commitment to foreign aid multilateralism from pre-independence (1960s) to the present day. I examine whether the quantitative and qualitative differences in the composition of foreign expertise in the field of foreign aid[639] in the UAE and Qatar may explain diverging adherence to multilateral pathways.

This chapter tests the hypothesis that the more pro-multilateral foreign experts are appointed in the rentier state, the more reforms on donor proliferation and aid transparency are likely to be implemented. This translates into two related claims. The first is that pro-multilateral experts have taken hold of the UAE's foreign aid policy. The second is that anti-multilateral experts have taken hold of Qatar's foreign aid.

The claim would be proved wrong for three reasons. First, if it appears that isolated individuals are more influential than groups – then influence does not stem from a collective belonging. Second, if foreign experts are as easily dismissed as they are named. Third, if pro-multilateral experts do not generate more multilateral commitments (or conversely, if pro-bilateral agents do not generate more bilateral commitments).

In the first section, the different foreign experts common to Qatar and the UAE's aid landscapes are identified. In the second section, the formation and consolidation of these groups of foreign experts throughout the history of Qatar and the UAE as donors is examined, and their correlation with the pursuit of divergent multilateral pathways assessed. The third section then confronts these findings with alternative explanations, before concluding with a discussion on the relevance of foreign experts' influence to explain the diversity of adhesion to multilateralism of small, hydrocarbons exporting states.

Section 1: Mapping of foreign aid experts in Qatar and the UAE

To test the hypothesis I have set out, I first need to identify the preferences of experts with respect to internationally set standards of aid, which comprise donor proliferation and aid

[639] Studying foreign aid complements the body of literature on Middle East administrations, that have essentially focussed on military, rather than civilian, bureaucracy. See Anderson, 'The State in the Middle East and North Africa', 8.

transparency. Thus, before explaining how experts influence states, it is important to understand what experts' preferences are.[640] I inductively identify foreign aid experts, their preferences and resources. Though there are innumerable approaches that help create typologies of experts this chapter does not explore in detail their relative merits.[641] It builds on Davis Cross' four-pronged "cohesiveness" to establish experts' preferences, in favour or against foreign aid multilateralism. Though questionable, Davis Cross's idea of "cohesiveness" captures not only collective preferences, but also the resources that experts may mobilize to win over the field of foreign aid.[642]

Selective education and early training help experts form a tightly-knit group that enjoys an elitist legitimacy.[643] Shared professional norms, particularly transnationally, hold a group of experts together even when internal disagreements arise, preventing loss of influence that results from internal disaggregation.[644] The frequency and quality of non-professional meetings binds experts and provides them with informal access to decision-makers. A common culture that includes an "esprit de corps" but that also expands to geographic, ethnic or religious ties, may also determine the internal cohesion of a group of experts and mediates rulers' positive or negative perceptions of it.[645]

Common to Qatar and the UAE, as for the wider Gulf region, is the aid continuum along which aid foreign experts work.[646] I identify three generations of foreign aid experts competing in the field of aid: anti-multilateral *traditionalists* of the Islamic aid culture; pro-multilateral *reformists* who have socialized in international organizations and favour the abidance

[640] Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 2005, 56; Culpepper, *Creating Cooperation*, 32; Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 36.
[641] For a substantial discussion of these elements, see Cross, 'Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later'; Sending, *The Politics of Expertise*; McLean and McMillan, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*; Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 21;29;35; Abbink and Salverda, *The Anthropology of Elites*, 4; Collectif et al., *Le règne des entourages*, 31; Kenis and Schneider, in Marin et al., *Policy Networks*, 26.
[642] Davis Cross' approach firstly underlines that epistemic communities no longer arise nationally, but globally. Secondly, she notes that globalization of education leads to more standardized practices and threatens with irrelevance the epistemic analyses that focus on professions rather than on broader expert networks. See also Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 98; Sending, *The Politics of Expertise*, 3. On the downside, Davis Cross' four criteria overlap: selection and training influence professional norms; while there is common culture and the frequency and quality of meetings are correlated. On the issue of correlated variables, see how Daniel Kahneman selects officers into the Israeli army - Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*.
[643] Abbink and Salverda, *The Anthropology of Elites*, 13.
[644] A UN bureaucrat and a consultant may disagree on whether to conduct aid bilaterally or multilaterally. Both however abide by the criteria of transparency in disbursing aid.
[645] Cross, 'Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later', 150; Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 60; Diop et al., 'Attitudes Towards Migrant Workers in the GCC'.
[646] Petersen, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 26.

by internationally set standards on donor proliferation and aid transparency; and *performers* who heed a corporate culture and consider the bilateral–multilateral debate to be ancillary. I also assess the relative strengths and weaknesses (in terms of cohesiveness) of each category of foreign expert.

I speak of generations of aid actors because the aid praxis to which the informal charitable practices of the Gulf have gradually been exposed has also changed.[647] Early professional economic planners of the post-Second World War were affected by the new "Chicago School" economic doxa of the late 1970s,[648] by the concepts of "human development" present in the work of 1998 Nobel Prize Amartya Sen; but also by contestation of Western-led foreign aid of the 1990s.[649] What is fascinating is that in the short time-span in which these changes took placed, the three aid generations have overlapped.

The traditionalists

The English don't pray; the chickens are better than they.[650]

First-generation Qatari and Emirati charities – and the foreigners working for them – constitute a core, opaque and overlooked segment of foreign aid. Traditionalists embody a specific part of GCC migration history: its regionalization from the 1950s to the 1980s.[651] Alongside rulers, and sometimes independently from them, they were involved in the first proto-models of charities in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Qatar Charity, the UAE Red Crescent and Qatar Red Crescent).

Selection and training

Present throughout the Middle East,[652] Gulf traditionalists are residents (often naturalized)[653] who have entered the field of foreign aid of their own accord. They came to work in the nascent

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647 Epistemic scholars are often criticized for assigning intangible views to experts. The analysis shows that, on the contrary, different generational conceptions of aid have been put into place in Qatar and the UAE. Epistemic communities adapted to new knowledge and changed their speech accordingly. I therefore do not observe in traditionalists, reformists or performers, transnational advocacy networks, which "simply rephrase but maintain the same objectives". See Ruggie, cited in Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 30; Werner, in Ambrus et al., 61.

648 Hulme, "The Political Economy of the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals]," 301.

649 Lewis, 'Anthropology and Development', 4.

650 Children songs overheard by American missionaries in the streets of Kuwait City in 1956. See Volume 243, 1956, Arabian Mission, *Neglected Arabia*.

651 Thiollet, 'Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf', 9.

652 Hertog, *Business Politics in the Middle East*, 7.

ministries of education, religious affairs, health, or in business, and acted as bigwig aid volunteers (q8).[654] In Qatar, traditionalists often came from the ranks of Muslim Brotherhood Palestinians or Egyptians employed in the nascent administrations.[655] They have claims to traditional forms of knowledge, or know-how, rather than university degrees. Additionally, they act as brokers between their country of origin and Gulf rulers (ad10).[656] Therefore, it is more adequate to speak of self-selection of these foreigners into foreign aid. Though they were strictly "selected" by Gulf countries to be able to reside and eventually be naturalized, they entered the field of foreign aid of their own accord.

Meeting frequency and quality

Foreign traditionalists are those who have stayed for the longest period in the Gulf – quite commonly for more than twenty years. If they do not necessarily appear on institutions' organigrams, they nonetheless meet regularly in informal fora.[657]

Professional norms

Traditionalists oppose multilateralism because they oppose visibility and aid intermediaries. They share a "sacralized" conception of aid.[658] They organize charitable actions in the wake of religious festivities (Ramadan, the Eid). When institutionalized, their organizations often adopt the model of the *zakat* fund or *waqf*.[659] Traditionalists also favour discretion over visibility and accountability; face-to-face working relationships governed by consensus over formalized – let alone multilateral – channels; and charitable acts over developmental goals (q3, q9).[660] They oppose transaction costs associated with the delegation of aid to an external intermediate, be it a multilateral organization, or even the state itself (ad23; q8).[661] The manager of a major Qatari charity explained that "all these administrative costs, this waste, is not something that is culturally

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653 Despite naturalization, it makes sense to treat traditionalists as a non-national epistemic community given that though being, "nationals in the official sense", they remain "ethnic outsiders". See Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 160.
654 Bahry, in Kadhim, *Governance in the Middle East and North Africa*, 252.
655 Roberts, 'Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood', 84–85.
656 Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World* (I.B.Tauris, 2003), 156.
657 This is correlated with a stronger cohesive culture. See Cesari, 'Religion and Diasporas', 6.
658 Petersen, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 31.
659 Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 108.
660 Abdulghani, 'Culture and Interest in Arab Foreign Aid', 39; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*, 108.
661 Al Yahya and Fustier, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 185.

accepted" (q8). Traditionalists work in parallel to, rather than in cooperation with, other aid actors in recipient countries (q8; oecd5).[662] Because they are not professionals, and because they interact with more or less conservative recipients, their working methods vary when it comes to define what sacralized aid is in practice (q8).[663]

Common culture

While their working methods vary, traditionalists' form a "communitarian"[664] group. This includes a common understanding of certain core Islamic texts and of charity as part of the Islamic culture.[665] Above all, they share an "Arab" identity and language.[666] They are the most favourably looked upon group residing in the Gulf by nationals, even in the more open global city of Dubai.[667]

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662 Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*, 67.
663 Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, 18–26.
664 Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, 81; Thiollet, 'Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf'.; Longva, in Dresch and Piscatori, *Monarchies and Nations*, 123
665 'Arab and Muslim Aid and the West - "two China Elephants"*'.
666 Thiollet, 'Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf', 10; Hudson, *The Middle East Dilemma*, 292.
667 Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 145.

The reformists

> On aimait beaucoup les projets spécifiques au Secrétariat. On ne savait pas trop ce que "spécifique" ajoutait à "projet" mais un projet spécifique faisait plus sérieux et plus précis qu'un simple projet.[668]

"Practical-idealists",[669] development "planners"[670] and reformists embody the "hybridization" of an Islamic aid culture and international organizations' working methods[671] and the professionalization of the field of foreign aid in the 1970s.

Selection and training

Reformists symbolize the professionalization of aid in the 1970s.[672] Fifty- or sixty-year-old Arab or Western professionals, they share a Western education and specialized skills in foreign aid often gained in international organizations' training centres and in other countries of the Arab world.[673] For instance, many of the reformist UNDP staff working in Arab world came from the (British) Middle East Supply Centre, which during the Second World War was engaged in the planned transformation of Middle East developing world economies.[674] Typically, reformists have degrees in development economics, public health, statistics, or other relevant fields for the pursuit of development programs. They have often been co-opted by Gulf states from international organizations themselves (ad5).

Meeting frequency and quality

Reformists typically socialize transnationally in formal professional settings, such as the UNDP's regional headquarter in Beirut or the coordination meetings of the Arab Coordination Group.[675] Outside of work, some reformists hold Gulf residency (usually Arabs rather than Westerners)

[668] Cohen, *Belle du Seigneur*.
[669] Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 42.
[670] Easterly, cited in Klingebiel, Mahn, and Negre, *The Fragmentation of Aid Concepts, Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation*, 2.
[671] Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*, 126.
[672] Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, 79.
[673] Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*; Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia*, 99,106.
[674] Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 38.
[675] This group encompasses a number of multilateral-prone organizations. See 'Islamic Development Bank - Who We Work with'.

and may add informal gatherings to professional ones. For instance, the Abu Dhabi corniche is a well-known space of socialization for these Gulf residents. In Doha, a Lebanese restaurant on Salwa Road is famous for welcoming the former (reformist) emir of Qatar and his interlocutors.[676]

professional norms

Reformists are advocates of international standards of aid. Fundamentally, whether Westerners or non-Westerners, they shared in the 1970s a common idea of progress.[677] They place common standards of accountability, evaluation, policy coherence and transparency, set by *some* Western and Arab regional or international organizations, such as the UNDP or the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic and Social Development (ad23), above what they consider to be inefficient informal networks. Technocrats, they typically embody bureaucrats' focus on procedure rather than on results.[678] They claim that their approach to foreign aid is functional and non-politicized, a trend typical of the post-Second World War and increasingly amplified in the 1970s.[679] They are supporters of planned development and of a central role for the state in this process.[680] In short, aid multilateralism is their motto and their horizon.

common culture

Bonds within the reformist group have developed professionally. Hindered by their professional mobility and late-coming to the Gulf, their common culture might be in the making, as an increasing number settle (and retire) in the Gulf (q7). In the UAE for instance, they are among the 15,000 over-50-years-old employed non-nationals with more than 30 years of residence in the country.[681]

[676]Assaf, 'La Corniche d'Abu Dhabi'..
[677] Halliday, in John W. Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed Al Mutawa, eds., *Globalization and the Gulf* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2006), 191.
[678] Galtung, in David C. Pitt and Thomas George Weiss, *The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies* (Westview Press, 1986), 6; Bertin Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 13.
[679] MacDonald, *The League of Arab States*, 5; Lewis, 'Anthropology and Development', 8.
[680] Hulme, "The Political Economy of the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals]."
[681] This number does not take into consideration foreign nationals who are *only* volunteering in charities, or retired traditionalists. It is therefore likely to be higher. See 'UAE'.

The performers

As opposed to the reformist "planners", performers are development "searchers"[682] with an entrepreneurial approach that has inherited the move from planned development to its more liberal variants, as well as the increased critique waged against the dominant reformist Western mindset in foreign aid. They also reflect the geographical diversification of high-skilled labour in the Gulf that turns "Western elites into a minority within a minority."[683] Symbolizing the performers are the Lebanese – flexible, language-savvy young professionals with multiple experiences in the private sector as well as international organizations.[684] But a performer may also be a young Westerner with an Oxbridge degree in political science, a Sudanese–American with experience at the US Agency for International Development (USAID), a Filipino with a degree in management from a private university in Singapore, a Gulf-born Yemeni educated at a private university in Dubai. In the name of aid effectiveness, performers place the bilateral–multilateral quagmire on the backburner.

Selection and training

Performers contradict the assumption that expertise arises nationally.[685] On the contrary, they reflect the internationalization of education – they are graduates of Western and non-Western universities, or decentralized Western campuses in the Global South. They also mirror the general elevation of education levels in the Gulf states. Many performers, born or raised in the Gulf, have attended delocalized Gulf-based Western universities following the major elite educational plans of these states' turn towards knowledge economies from the 1990s to the 2010s.[686] They often lengthened their stay in the peninsula.[687] Among them are an increasing number of female graduates.[688] Many performers are "generalists": they have graduated in marketing, engineering, or finance and combine early experiences in international organizations

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[682] Easterly, cited in Klingebiel, Mahn, and Negre, *The Fragmentation of Aid Concepts, Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation*, 2.
[683] Vora, in Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 172; Davidson, 'Expatriates and the Gulf Monarchies'.
[684] Dargham, 'How Do Lebanese Expatriates in GCC Perceive the Implications of Their Expatriation of Their Expatriation on Career Success?', 2.
[685] Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*.
[686] The most well-known are New York University Abu Dhabi and Georgetown-University in Qatar ; but one could also mention many other American, Australian or British decentralized campuses in the region. See Espinoza, *The Macroeconomics of the Arab States of the Gulf*, 27.
[687] In Qatar a non-national student may receive a scholarship or interest-free loan but in return must work five years in the country. See Lazar, *Qatar, une Education City*, 290.
[688] Derbal, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 152.

and in the private sector.[689] Most however, have specific country expertise through their early education or their involvement in trans-local projects between Gulf states and their country of origin (q2).[690] Consequently, their strength lies both in their professional skills as well as their "foreignness".

Meeting frequency and quality

If sometimes isolated in the aid landscape, performers are extremely well-connected transnationally through professional social-media platforms, alumni networks, and a common past in large multinational companies.

Professional norms

Performers symbolize the professionalization of Islamic relief in the 1990s and its critique against what is seen as the imperialism of a Western cultural mindset in foreign aid.[691] Paradoxically however, they embrace a Western neoliberal corporate culture.[692] They are influenced by market-based solutions to end poverty promoted by the work of Mohammad Yunus and Grameen Bank as well as the focus on measurable indicators for human development developed in the work of Amartya Sen.[693] In short, they embody and further the convergence, in the name of aid effectiveness, of both Western and Muslim charities (q9; q12).[694] In practice, this means that they work in small teams close to decision-makers rather than in larger bureaucratic settings (q4); promote work ethics and a culture of audit and creativity; focus on efficient spending and results rather than on procedures (dub2; q4).[695] Performers navigate the Western development aid culture and the Islamic aid culture with ease.[696] Weary of the long story of failed attempts to create hybrid Western and non-Western institutions,[697] they resemble the nineteenth-century Young Ottomans who wished to adopt Western institutions while

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[689] Jones, 'Outsourcing the State: The Expert-Ruler Nexus and Implications for Governance in the Arab Gulf'.
[690] Venturini and Nazarani, in Fargues and Venturini, *Migration from North Africa and the Middle East*, 66.
[691] Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*, 76.
[692] Clark and Monk, 'Modernity, Imitation, and Performance'.
[693] Hulme, "The Political Economy of the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals]," 301; Klingebiel, Mahn, and Negre, *The Fragmentation of Aid Concepts, Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation*, 2.
[694] Barylo, 'Neo-Liberal Not-for-Profits'; Challand, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 64.
[695] 'Philanthropy in the UAE | Al Qasimi Foundation'; Peter Bille Larsen, in Müller, *The Gloss of Harmony*, 96; Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 147; Espinoza, *The Macroeconomics of the Arab States of the Gulf*, 73–78.
[696] Petersen, *For Humanity Or For The Umma?*
[697] Attempts to fuse "sharia' with French civil law are mentioned in Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 366.

reviving Islamic roots, who wish to enlarge the understanding of philanthropy in Gulf societies to include development, and not only charity (q8; q16; ad15).[698] They are digitally connected while often maintaining religious-oriented values.[699] They are pragmatic towards multilateralism, rather than ideological: fourteen interviewees thus indicated that when faced with bilateral or multilateral options, they would always favour the most effective one (ad13, ad14, ad23, dub2, dub3, dub4, dub5, dub6, dub8, q2, q4, q12, q15, q21).

Common culture

Performers share a cosmopolitan culture because they are diverse. Indeed, performers have outgrown the recurrent cliché that portrays them as young Westerners suffering from an acute form of social anomia and considering the Gulf as a temporary professional springboard (ad23).[700] For instance, if aid performers include more non-Muslims,[701] they are rarely, alike to older aid actors, secularists.[702] Muslim performers carry neo-orthodox claims about aid, according to which modernization is not less tradition, but new ways to express it, such as in religious tolerance and intercultural dialogue.[703] They resemble in that the challenge of the rise of new actors who incorporate political Islam in this personal and professional life in new ways.[704] Performers are found in the increasing number of non-Western first-generation or second-generation of Gulf-born, or Gulf-raised immigrants[705] - a trend observable in the broader Middle East since the 1990s.[706] Though they very seldom acquire Gulf citizenship, they develop nonetheless multiple forms of self-identification, including with the global level,[707] the Gulf

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[698] Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 19–26; Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 77; Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 41; 79; Jones, 'Seeing Like an Autocrat', 35; Mathur, in Pitt and Weiss, *The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies*, 180; Khafagy, 'Gulf Philanthropy: Structural, Domestic and Global Challenges', 6.

[699] Khallaf, in Ibrahim and Sherif, *From Charity to Social Change*, 2008, 145.

[700] Bristol-Rhys, in Kamrava, *Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf*, 69; Vora, in Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 181; Ariss, 'Voicing Experiences and Perceptions of Local Managers', 1987; Walsh, '"It Got Very Debauched, Very Dubai!" Heterosexual Intimacy amongst Single British Expatriates'.

[701] Petersen, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 35.

[702] A remark made by Almezaini during his fieldwork in the UAE. See Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 108.

[703] Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 109; Clarke, in Mazawi and Sultana, *Education and the Arab 'World'*, 154; Limbert, in Dresch and Piscatori, *Monarchies and Nations*, 201; Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*, 15.

[704] Roy, *Whatever Happened to the Islamists?*

[705] Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 180; Thiollet, 'Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf', 17; De Bel-Air, 'Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar'; De Bel-Air, 'Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in the UAE'; Kanchana, 'Qatar's "White-Collar" Indians'. In Qatar, despite limited data, this is visible in the number of non-nationals enrolled in Gulf universities in Qatar: notably Palestinians, Sudanese, Egyptians, Jordanians. In the UAE, this is even clearer. A 2005 census shows that about 10% of young professionals of 24-9 years of age had lived at least 10 years in the UAE. See 'UAE'. This was also mentioned in interviews ad3, ad9, ad23, q5 and q8.

[706] Sater, in Seeberg and Eyadat, *Migration, Security, and Citizenship in the Middle East. New Perspectives*, 30.

[707] Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 138.

region,[708] their host country,[709] down to their working environment (ad9), not least because of the deplorable economic or political situation in their country of origin that impedes their return.[710]

This brief outline indicates first that reformists display greater cohesiveness in terms of selection and training than the non-professional traditionalists; second that reformists and performers professional connections cannot match the quality and frequency of informal meetings between traditionalists; third, that professional standards of all three groups are shared transnationally, but that the professional norms of reformists and performers are stronger because they are standardized; and fourth, that traditionalists and performers show the greatest identification with the Gulf, its culture and religion.

Section 2: A short story of the consolidation of foreign aid experts in Qatar and the UAE

Ruler appointments and expert cohesiveness is a two-way street. In this section, I compare across countries and across time, the extent to which Qatari and Emirati rulers' appointment strategies (political, credibility and uncertainty), from independence to this day, have encouraged or discouraged the formation of groups of foreign experts. Conversely, I examine the extent to which foreign experts have challenged and outspanned their initial mandate. The process-tracing strategy helps confront at each specific time the rationale for ruler's appointment and the ability of foreign experts to mobilize resources to continue "steering" both countries' foreign aid.

The qualitative research confirms previous quantitative findings on the possible coexistence of several motives when nominating foreign experts.[711] The uncertainty rationale has pervaded ruler's appointment throughout and foreign experts, namely reformists and performers, have acted as "brokers" between Gulf states and international organizations even in the event of unfavourable traditionalist domination in the domestic realm. Beyond foreign experts' strategic mobilization of their specific resources, I also find stickiness in Gulf autocrats' appointment strategies. The stronger and earlier placement of reformists in the UAE has had

[708] Ahmad, in Kamrava, *Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf*, 35; Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 151.
[709] Shah, 'Second Generation Non-Nationals in Kuwait'; Kanchana, 'Qatar's "White-Collar" Indians', 36; Gardner, 'Strategic Transnationalism', 58; Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 180.
[710] Dargham, 'How Do Lebanese Expatriates in GCC Perceive the Implications of Their Expatriation of Their Expatriation on Career Success?', 2; Pelican, 'Urban Lifeworlds of Cameroonian Migrants in Dubai', 268. For a contradictory view on second- and third-generations' sense of belonging, see Sater, in Seeberg and Eyadat, *Migration, Security, and Citizenship in the Middle East. New Perspectives*, 34–35.
[711] Chwieroth, *Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets*.

lasting effects. With the transformation of the market of foreign aid expertise and the rise of performers however, it is likely that Qatar and the UAE will converge towards a more selective multilateral approach. Ultimately, studying foreign experts provides some leverage, albeit in conjunction with the rentier paradigm, in explaining the UAE's and Qatar's diverging paths.

From protectorates to newly independent states (1960s–1970s)

Pre-independence Qatar and UAE were more often aid recipients than aid donors.[712] Though there was no foreign aid policy to be formulated, expert nominations, a mirror of political tensions between the Gulf sheikhs and the retreating British protector, placed expatriates within specific segments of the nascent administration (finance, education, foreign affairs). These departments would later have influence over foreign aid policymaking. Because the British Crown was very active in the UAE during this post-colonial transition, reformists – a mix of Westerners, Western-trained Arabs and Asians – were more often placed there than in Qatar. These experts were influential because they acted in a context of high uncertainty due to the decolonization process at work in the city states. However, reformists often isolated within a field dominated by traditionalists, they did not have yet the collective resources to establish a monopoly over foreign aid policies.

Foreign aid did not exist as a formal practice in Qatar and the UAE before independence. The "foreign" part of "foreign aid" was *de facto* inexistent: the nineteenth century "Trucial Peace" agreements signed with the British protector had appropriated foreign policy matters from Gulf tribal leaders. Aid was instead a domestic, low-key, traditional, and informal practice.[713] It was not organized by bureaucrats – only a few were then working in the lower Persian Gulf[714] nor by a class of clerks – these made up an organized class of *ulama* in neighbouring Saudi Arabia but not in Qatar nor the UAE.[715] Rather, aid was dispensed by merchants[716] or by rulers – the latter forking out cash and cheques informally and spontaneously during neighbourly visits.[717]

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[712] Qatar, the UAE and the Lower Persian Gulf received aid notably from Kuwait in the mid-1960's. See Abdulghani, 'Culture and Interest in Arab Foreign Aid', 86.

[713] Khallaf, in Ibrahim and Sherif, *From Charity to Social Change*, 2008, 155; Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 117; Lekon, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 103; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*, 31.

[714] 'The State in the Middle East and North Africa', 3.

[715] Baskan and Wright, 'Seeds of Change'; Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*; el-Aswad, 'The United Arab Emirates (Religious Practices)'; Mouline, in Haykel, Hegghammer, and Lacroix, *Saudi Arabia in Transition*, 32.

[716] Lekon, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 113.

[717] Confidential note, 1961, in Ibid; Confidential note, 1963, in Burdett.

In this context, there was space for foreign experts to occupy, in countries like the UAE, where only two persons had a university degree upon independence.[718] Though there was no foreign aid to formulate, in retrospect, the political strife over the placement of foreigners in strategic segments of the nascent administration – finances, foreign affairs, education and social affairs – mattered, because these departments later were involved in the formulation of foreign aid programs. The British protector weighed on this process more markedly in the UAE, where the Trucial States Development Office operated,[719] than in Qatar. The British were still in the Gulf, although in the midst of withdrawal. Their "imperialism of interference without responsibility"[720] introduced some bureaucratic elements – not well-functioning administrations.[721] This half-hearted effort, though characterizing all small Gulf states to different degrees,[722] was particularly severe in Qatar. There leaders complained that "their country was the Cinderella of the Gulf states" – the most ignored of all.[723]

British influence over expert appointments in the nascent bureaucracy remained acute and politicized. More than specific policies, the protectors impose on the nascent bureaucracies the norm typical of any colonial administration – planned change.[724] In practice, they frequently imposed pre-selected and reliable Western advisers or Indian administrators onto the Emirati and Qatari sheikhs, and opposed Communists and Nasserists alike.[725] Conversely, Gulf sheikhs, in an anti-Western streak characteristic of postcolonial transitions, increased the nomination of Arabs, often politicized Palestinians, already present in other Gulf bureaucracies, among their closest circles.[726] In Qatar the administration was run by reformist, pan-Arab and Western-trained Egyptian diplomat Dr Kamel.[727] In Abu Dhabi, the ruler was surrounded by a group of Egyptian

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[718] Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, *Globalization and the Gulf*, 21.

[719] Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 5.

[720] Lewis, quoted in Anderson, 'The State in the Middle East and North Africa', 5.

[721] Achcar, *The People Want*, 105.

[722] The British were quite active in the UAE, and even more so in Bahrain. See Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 28; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 1; Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 82.

[723] Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965*, 220.

[724] Lewis, 'Anthropology and Development', 3.

[725] Anthony and Markaz al-Imārāt lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Buḥūth al-Istirātījīyah, *The United Arab Emirates*, 1; Confidential notes, 1963 and 1965, in Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965*; Gardner, "Strategic Transnationalism," 54; Confidential note, "Organisation of Government in Abu Dhabi", 1971, in Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*; Steven D. Roper and Lilian A. Barria, "Understanding Variations in Gulf Migration and Labor Practices," *Middle East Law and Governance* 6, no. 1 (April 10, 2014): 38, doi:10.1163/18763375-00601001.

[726] Confidential note, 1963, in Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965*; Confidential note, 1970, in Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*.

[727] Dr. Mustafa el-Fiqi "Almasry Alyoum," accessed January 17, 2017, http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=191946; Note 10213/4, 6 June 1964, Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965;* Confidential Note, 1964, Ibid; Confidential note, 13 December 1965, in Burdett.

constitutional advisers who often ran counter to British interests.[728] Though British and Gulf nominations politically clashed, nominees were in fact very similar, having undergone training in the same imperial universities.[729] One Arab civil servant was thus coined as "being more English than the English."[730]

The political opposition between Gulf rulers and the British was asymmetrical. Gulf rulers' political nominations were tempered by the lack of "national" human resources. Early attempts to replace non-nationals in domestic administrations were short-lived: the traditionalist Deputy Ruler of Qatar, for instance, could not find a "Sunni Moslem Arab who could speak English" to replace reformist Dr Kamel.[731] Monarchs' opposition to Nasserism or colonialism did not prevent them from hiring anti-monarchy or British experts.[732] In fact, experts were hard to recruit and even harder to maintain in the context of "continuing maladministration and financial chaos."[733] Foreign experts who did stay in the Gulf – like Dr Kamel – obtained influential managerial positions.[734]

Overall, the British brought more reformists to the UAE than to Qatar and to the strategic port of Dubai than in Abu Dhabi.[735] In the UAE, foreign experts supervised the construction of wells, irrigation systems and airports.[736] Anglo-Saxon technicians or companies took on important domestic tasks where foreign aid was soon to be formulated – such as financial affairs - in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi.[737] A symbol of the continuity between foreign experts' domestic and international tasks, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) was created prior to the UAE's independence by double-hatted reformists:[738]
"Well I think that at the time there was a presence at ADFD of very highly qualified PhD graduates that were very competent. It was even a time when the ADFD was asked for help on issues, notably domestic, that were not even part of its scope." (ad17)

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[728] Confidential note, 26 July 1971, in Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*; ibid.; Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 100.
[729] Demir, *Kuwait Fund and the Political Economy of Arab Regional Development*, 15.
[730] Note, Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*.
[731] Confidential note, 6 June 1964, in Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965*.
[732] Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 196; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 13.
[733] Confidential note, 1963, in Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965*.
[734] Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 110.
[735] Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 28; Pelican, 'Urban Lifeworlds of Cameroonian Migrants in Dubai', 263.
[736] Are recorded the role of the Canadian consulting company CANSULT and British firm ARABICON to create Abu Dhabi's airport and the bridge linking Abu Dhabi to the mainland. See Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*; Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 329.
[737] Telegram no. 319, 1966, in Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*.
[738] Sheikh Zayed's Iraqi advisor, Dr Adnan Pachachi, was unsurprisingly sitting on this board. See Barber, *Blinded by Humanity*, 174.

In Qatar, the British were less active. Reformist Dr Kamel progressively concentrated "duties far beyond those which strictly belong[ed] to his position as legal adviser"[739] and tainted Qatar's foreign policy with a pan-Arab tinge that humoured both Qatar's Deputy Ruler and the British.[740] Instead of consolidating a domestic reformist group, he himself blocked the nomination of Western consultants.[741] Thus while the UAE were already under certain forms of domestic Westernization, Qatar was doing otherwise: most government directors were Arabs.[742]

On top of their domestic activity, reformist foreign experts claimed authority to mediate Gulf states' international cooperation. They guaranteed Gulf rulers' credibility when liaising with international organizations in the run-up to independence in 1971.[743] They mitigated uncertainty associated with Gulf rulers' return to foreign affairs by brokering accession of pre-independence Qatar and UAE to the UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Universal Postal Union (UPU).[744] They enlarged the range of foreign programs that these small states could benefit from thanks to their professional networks established during the pre-decolonization era in the aid-disbursing organizations of the Middle East Supply Centre and of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).[745] Qatar's Dr Kamel operated rapprochements with the United Nations Technical Assistance Bureau, the Arab League, or the FAO.[746] In the UAE, reformist and former Iraqi Minister Dr Adnan Pachachi interceded in Abu Dhabi's Sheikh Zayed's favour in the UN.[747]

From the start, the composition of foreign expertise varied in degrees across Qatar and the UAE. The British imposed reformists in the UAE more than in Qatar – and the country took on a more favourable stance towards aid international standards, notably with the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. Within each case, whether a majority or a minority, reformists were able to navigate and outspan their original mandate, notably by acting as brokers with international organizations. Foreign experts remained however clusters of individuals more than

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[739] Confidential note, 1965, in Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965*.
[740] Confidential note, 13 December 1965, in Burdett.
[741] Confidential note, 1963, in Burdett.
[742] Albaharna, *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States*, 12.
[743] Anthony and Markaz al-Imārāt lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Buḥūth al-Istirātījīyah, *The United Arab Emirates*, 51; Confidential note, 1970, in Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*.
[744] Confidential 2222/238, 12 November 1962, in Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965*; Introduction to volume, Burdett, vii.
[745] In 1960 the OEEC became the OECD. After its dissolution in 1945, the staff of the Middle East Supply Centre was placed in the nascent United Nations Development Program. See Carroll and Kellow, *The OECD*, 59.
[746] Letter BQ 1102 ; Confidential note, in Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965* vol. 2.
[747] Confidential Note, « Meeting with Shaikh Zayed », 1971, in Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*.

organized groups yielding systematic political influence.[748] In short, they could not satisfy the claim that collective belonging leveraged more influence. The growth of the rentier state changed that.

The growth of the rentier state to the Gulf war: consolidation and polarization of foreign experts (1970s-1990s)

Neither independence,[749] nor the bureaucratic changes induced by rentierism fundamentally changed the UAE's multilateral tinge or Qatar's isolationism. From the 1970s onwards, mass and politicized migration in the broader Gulf barred reformists from *domestic* managerial positions,[750] promoted traditionalists to the head of the first national charities, and polarized the aid landscape. If traditionalists benefited from a cultural proximity to rulers and professional norms that suited their aid ideology, reformists' transnationally shared professional norms enabled them to consolidate their grasp over nascent *regional* multilateral aid organizations. In short, the growth of the rentier state did not change the balance between the traditionalists and reformists, but consolidated what existed beforehand.

The oil-driven expansion of Qatar and the UAE's economies led to mass and politicized immigration. In the 1970s and 1980s, Gulf migration policies became a vector of regional integration.[751] Syrians, Lebanese, Egyptians, Palestinians but also white-collars from the Maghreb, were awarded senior positions in Gulf states.[752] Many came for economic reasons, as well as in response to political turmoil in their countries of origin. In parallel, the first educational reforms in the city states of Qatar and the UAE gave birth to a local intelligentsia which also promoted "a counter discourse to British colonialism."[753] These regional, Arab, networks influenced the politics of the Gulf for a long time. In 1987, Ghassan Salamé could thus safely write that "public opinion in the Gulf remains under the influence of what is thought and said in Beirut, Damas or Cairo."[754]

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[748] Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 100.
[749] Anderson, 'The State in the Middle East and North Africa', 2.
[750] Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 110.
[751] Hudson, *The Middle East Dilemma*, 292; Thiollet, "Migration as Diplomacy"; Thiollet, "Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf"; Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 117; Onn Winckler, "The Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States," *Middle Eastern Studies* 33, no. 3 (July 1997): 483, doi:10.1080/00263209708701165.
[752] For the UAE, see Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 119. For Qatar, see Lazar, *Qatar, une Education City*, 44. For both, see Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 8.
[753] Kazim, *The United Arab Emirates A.D. 600 to the Present*, 417–18.
[754] Salamé, 'Les pétromonarchies du Golfe et la guerre du Chatt el-Arab', 371.

Despite shared objectives – notably support to the Palestinian cause[755] – divergences remained between traditionalists and reformists. Traditionalists' "culture of Islamic aid" hit reformists in both countries, notably when stimulated by the import of Muslim Brotherhood ideology.[756] With the growth of the rentier state, rulers gradually co-opted these diverse conservative segments of society – Bedouins[757] and clergymen – into the public sector to replace expatriates who had initially staffed it - "with little regard to what new appointees should or could do".[758] In the UAE, Sheikh Zayed co-opted the Northern Emirates (who were sceptical of the federal idea) by providing public jobs, notably to traditionalists from ultra-conservative Sharjah (ad5).[759] These new civil servants were reluctant to delegate and cooperate on reforms suggested by foreign experts.[760] Both states also enacted stringent rules to prevent foreigners from meddling with domestic charities.[761] Traditionalists shaped nascent national charities, such as Qatar Charity (1978), Dar Al Ber Society (1978), the Red Crescent societies (1982 and 1983), or like Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi, the Qatar Islamic Fund for Zakat.[762] These followed the traditionalist professional norms of communitarian and informal aid.[763] While aid organizations had been formalized before in the region,[764] some of aid initiatives in either country at the time were never recorded[765] and others were only to be formally institutionalized after the Gulf War.

Yet not unlike past postcolonial transitions, where former colonial administrators had stayed on as international experts, path dependencies were also at play in both countries.[766] In Qatar, the isolated Dr Kamel was easily overturned when his patron Emir Ahmed was deposed in 1972 by the conservative Deputy Ruler Khalifa.[767] After him, more traditionalist Arabs were appointed to managing positions in the administration, which followed a chaotic course.[768] Emir

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755 Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, *Globalization and the Gulf*, 9.
756 Petersen, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 26.
757 Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 52;79.
758 Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 19,22.
759 Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 77–81; 87.
760 Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 83.
761 Ibrahim and Sherif, *From Charity to Social Change*, 2008, 155;173.
762 Petersen, *For Humanity Or For The Umma?*; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*, 40; Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 14.
763 Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 63.
764 Already in 1826, Sultan Mahmud II had incorporated the waqf in the state administration by creating the Ministry of Religious Endowments. See Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 73.
765 For the UAE, see Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 52.
766 Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy*; Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 77.
767 Confidential note, 3 January 1962, in Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965;* Michael Field, « Three of Al Thani » ; Chan, 'Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani, Former Emir of Qatar, Dies at 84'.
768 Confidential note, 1962, in Burdett, *Records of Qatar, 1961-1965*.

Khalifa, until his deposition in 1995, continued to personalize aid by drawing on the state's financial reserves and signing "all major cheques himself".[769]

In the UAE however, reformists' stronger anchoring continued to play out. Symbolically, UAE national and reformist Ahmed Bin Khalifa Al Suwaidi, trained by Dr Pachachi, became the UAE's first Foreign Minister and sat on the ADFD's board.[770] In Dubai, reformist and entrepreneurial experts continued to flow in to develop the city's business fabric.[771] In Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed was sympathetic with the modernization paradigm and to the (irreplaceable) role reformists should play in that state-led agenda,[772] notably to liaise with the growing number of international providers of technical assistance of the 1980s.[773] The confidence that modernization was a mere technical adjustment was fed by reformists (ad7).[774] They were often keen to raise unrealistic expectations and keep rulers under "artificial respiration".[775] In aid they sought Gulf rulers' financial largesse for large-scale infrastructural projects.[776]

The 1970s also revealed another resource used by foreign experts. If traditionalist influence grew in both countries, it waned at the regional level. Indeed, traditionalists were seldom professionals. The sometimes conflicting views on aid procedures often prevented successful multilateral cooperation, even regionally (q8),[777] though sizeable traditionalist public (Ministries of Endowment) or para-public (Qatar Charity, the UAE Red Crescent) actors continued to feed in a network of outward-looking aid organizations infused with traditionalist Muslim Brotherhood exiles.[778] For their part, reformists' hold over the regional level was stronger because they transnationally shared professional norms.[779] Regional meetings brought together similar professionals – they had often populated the various Ministries of Finance –

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[769] Michael Fields, "Al Thani Tree"; Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*, 126.

[771] Kanchana, 'Qatar's "White-Collar" Indians', 13; Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 47.

[772] Confidential Note, in Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*; Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 82; Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 5,13.

[773] Müller, *The Gloss of Harmony*, 13; Werner, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 56; Pitt, in Pitt and Weiss, *The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies*, 24; Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 80.

[774] Nonneman, *Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe*, 2005, 79.

[775] Jones, "Outsourcing the State"; Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*.

[776] Martens, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*, 16.

[777] Hossain, "The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)"; Sharqieh, "Can the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Resolve Conflicts?"; Tok, "Gulf Donors and the 2030 Agenda"; Barakat and Zyck, "Gulf State Assistance to Conflict-Affected Environments," 12.

[778] Petersen, *For Humanity Or For The Umma?*; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*, 88; Roy, *Globalised Islam*, 67.

[779] Haas, in Ambrus et al., *The Role of 'Experts' in International and European Decision-Making Processes*, 25.

better informed about the whys and wherefores of regional cooperation.[780] Even when suspect domestically, they were recognized as legitimate brokers internationally and engaged Gulf countries in aid programs with multilateral organizations.[781] In Qatar, Dr Kamel's domestic demise did not prevent him from continuing to act in OPEC (not least to assist the intellectually inept, newly nominated Minister of Oil).[782]

In the UAE, foreign reformists were often attending international negotiations alone (ad5). These "small armies of technocrats" enjoyed frequent and personalized contacts within their small tightly-knit network of the Coordination Secretariat of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development or OPEC.[783] Onto regional ties were added international networks: the Arab League, the Islamic Development Bank, the ESCWA, connecting Gulf officials with aid consultants and researchers worldwide.[784] Reformists' multilateral and functionalist ideology transpired in the design of regional aid institutions such as the OPEC Fund for International Development or the Islamic Development Bank.[785] Created in the "extremely contingent circumstances [of] the oil embargo and the Yom Kippour war",[786] these were remarkably professional and transparent, and sometimes institutionalized. They consistently advocated for the harmonization of domestic aid practices.[787] In short, reformists across cases, albeit more strikingly in the UAE, were capable to mobilize their shared professional norms and networks to build both countries' multilateral stance.

To summarize, traditionalists vetoed reformists at the domestic level, while reformists barred traditionalists from the regional multilateral aid system.[788] Traditionalists' domestic bloom

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[780] Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 87; Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience', 5; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 42.

[781] Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 166.

[782] He was known to be taking drugs. See Michael Fields, "Al Thani Tree".

[783] In the 1970's the Kuwait Fund employed 35 people, and the ADFD 45 in 1988. See Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 13; Barakat and Zyck, in Held and Ulrichsen, *The Transformation of the Gulf*, 320; Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 155; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 42; Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 205.

[784] Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 20; 120; 122.

[785] Another pro-multilateral organization, the Arab Gulf Program for United Nations Development Organizations (AGFUND) was founded in 1980 by reformist Saudi Prince Talal Bin Abdul Aziz. See Shushan and Marcoux, *The Rise (and Decline?*, 1971.

[786] Carroll and Hynes, "Engaging", 5.

[787] Kropf, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 122; Barakat and Zyck, 'Gulf State Assistance to Conflict-Affected Environments', 39. For the case of the OFID, see Almezaini, *The UAE and Foreign Policy*, 89. The case of the Islamic Development Bank is interesting : it started to resemble Western development institutions to such an extent that one IsDB vice-president called for the reassertion of the organization's Islamic identity. See Meenai, *Islamic Development Bank*, 202.

[788] The Islamic Development Bank for instance did not encourage geographical representation of staff if it was to lower the standards of the organization; while the Kuwait Fund did not work with local NGOs, only through

and reformists' regional flourish illustrate how the expansion of the rentier state consolidated and polarized foreign experts in the event of mass migration.[789] Foreign experts played a role in their own survival and expansion – notably when occupying, as reformists did, the regional level of aid.[790] The segmented nature of the rentier bureaucracy enabled however both categories of experts to coexist under the protection of traditionalist or modernist patrons without ever wholesomely taking over foreign aid.[791] In other words, rentierism consolidated into groups what had before been powerful individuals, without changing the balance between a multilaterally inclined UAE and a multilaterally sceptical Qatar. The growing and diverging foreign experts – traditionalists and reformists – created a multi-speed aid system. Multilateral aid was on the rise at faster rates than bilateral aid[792] and observers criticized the "corruption" or "ineptitude" of Gulf domestic administrations.[793] This trend was not productive overall. Domestic polarization between reformists and traditionalists impeded the transformation of Qatar and the UAE into full-fledged donors[794] and thus of the UAE as a full-blown multilateral player.

After the Gulf War: renegotiating global aid governance (1992-2016)

Post-Gulf War, Qatar and the UAE were not characterized, as is often argued, by the dramatic restructuring of their migration policies. If rulers did progressively replace Arabs with South Asian nationals throughout the spectrum of blue-collar and white-collar occupations, this trend pre-dated the outbreak of war.[795] Similarly, the foreign aid sector was not radically transformed. Appointments to mitigate credibility and uncertainty concerns continued unabated and Gulf rulers' past foreign aid policies continued to stick. Rather than limiting foreign expertise in foreign aid, and despite numerous disappointments with reformists, the rulers relied increasingly on the most recent generation of performers, who instilled corporate culture in the aid "business" and undermined the polarization between traditionalists and reformists.

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national development banks. See Meenai, *Islamic Development Bank*, 186; Demir, *Kuwait Fund and the Political Economy of Arab Regional Development*, 36.

789 It is quite usual that groups tend to be more radical than individuals. See Culpepper, *Creating Cooperation*, 47–48.

790 In 1962, Dr Kamel had already pre-emptively moved to consolidate the role of reformists by signing legal acts to send Qataris abroad to further their technical education. See Confidential note, 30 May 1962, Burdett, n.d.

791 Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia*.

792 Evaluation Office, 'Assessment of Development Results Evaluation of UNDP Contribution: United Arab Emirates', xxxvii.

793 Clark and Monk, 'Modernity, Imitation, and Performance', 121.

794 Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 128; Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience', 7–8.

795 Hanieh, in Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 68; Roper and Barria, 'Understanding Variations in Gulf Migration and Labor Practices', 33; Dresch, in Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, *Globalization and the Gulf*, 201.

Prior to and after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, "politically risky"[796] Arab nationals, the largest recruits in the 1970s and 1980s, were increasingly replaced with cheaper and "more docile South Asians".[797] This juxtaposed with another evolution within the aid landscape. In foreign aid circles, disillusion with the work of traditionalists and reformists followed the expansion of aid programs in the 1970s and 1980s. The bad press international organizations received in the Gulf mirrored a global trend of disaffection with multilateral aid organizations. Reformists in particular had not met the high modernization expectations they had raised with developmental policies.[798] Gulf autocrats had grown weary of Western consultants' patronizing attitude, of multilateral aid organizations' Western bias, lack of engagement, byzantine organization, and the role of "cash cows" they felt that they had been assigned (q7; q13; q20; dub2; dub4).[799]

Of course, aid unproductivity was largely attributable to rentier dynamics and the proliferation of "turf wars" between redundant and unproductive bureaucracy (q13; q14; q17;q18; q20; q25; ad5; ad13; ad21; ad23), which Gulf rulers recognized during the post-Gulf war introspection (ad3).[800] But foreign experts and international organizations shared the responsibility for policy failures, and were easier targets to bear its brunt.[801] Because reformists had been more active in the UAE, they were met with higher criticism.[802] Because they were also present in greater numbers, they also had greater capacity to renegotiate the Emirati leadership's stance towards foreign aid multilateralism. In Qatar, where reformists were less present, a more abrupt rejection of foreign aid multilateralism took place, and the UNDP closed its Doha office

[796] Some brutal migratory decisions were taken. To punish the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Yemeni government for opposing international intervention against Saddam Hussein in 1990, 400,000 Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait and more than the double of Yemeni from Saudi Arabia. See Achcar, *The People Want*, 101.
[797] Dorsey, 'The 2022 World Cup', 1739; Bel Air, in Fargues and Venturini, *Migration from North Africa and the Middle East*, 137; Kapiszewski, 'Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries', 9; Roper and Barria, 'Understanding Variations in Gulf Migration and Labor Practices'.
[798] Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 5.
[799] Al Yahya and Fustier, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 185; 'G/Tip'; Evaluation Office, 'Assessment of Development Results Evaluation of UNDP Contribution: United Arab Emirates', 63–65; Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 294; Barber, *Blinded by Humanity*, 181; Hynes and Carroll, 'Engaging with Arab Aid Donors: The DAC Experience', 9,12,14; Pitt and Weiss, *The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies*, 153; Lewis, 'Anthropology and Development'; GUQatar, *5th Annual MESSA Conference*.
[800] Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 100; Ulrichsen, *Qatar and the Arab Spring*, 55; Lazar, *Qatar, une Education City*, 63.
[801] UN agencies' self-criticism, expressed as early as 1969 in the Jackson Report, took a few more years to reach the Southern shores of the Persian Gulf. This policy "lag" characterizes the Gulf's peripheral role in global aid governance. See Kaufmann, 'The Capacity of the United Nations Development Program'; Neumayer, 'Arab-Related Bilateral and Multilateral Sources of Development Finance. Issues, Trends, and the Way Forward'.
[802] UNDP, *Evaluation Report*, 63-65.

in 1999 (q26).[803] In both countries, these changes promoted a third type of aid expert – the performers – that was emerging as the result of the transformation of aid paradigms.

The political rationale behind reformists' demise did not mean the end of foreign expertise in the small petro-monarchies, merely its evolution. Despite disillusion with foreign experts and the emergence of more qualified nationals, Gulf rulers and managers continued to (over)prize foreign experts.[804] Gulf citizens continued to consider that, in contrast to blue-collars, migration restrictions should not apply to foreign white-collars.[805]

First, foreign experts were still deemed necessary to ensure the credibility of projects undertaken in the international arena.[806] As the "branding" literature has shown, Western brokers helped Gulf states seek prestige with international audiences.[807] In a bid to appear as leading regional interlocutors, Qatar with aid for education,[808] and Dubai with knowledge management and aid logistics,[809] recruited costly high-flying former Western international civil servants and NGO directors and stood close to UN agencies that they were so prone to criticize (q6).[810] Western brokers also were pivotal in mitigating reputational risk in turbulent times, whether to signal commitment to reform during the financial crisis,[811] or to aid transparency during the war on terror.[812]

Naming foreign experts was not only about "chequebook diplomacy", but also about mitigating uncertainty. Gulf rulers continued to deem foreign experts necessary to legitimize and

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803 'UNDP "keen to Open Doha Office"'.
804 Ariss, 'Voicing Experiences and Perceptions of Local Managers', 1990; Jones, 'Seeing Like an Autocrat'; Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 94.
805 Dito, in Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 99; Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 62; Winckler, 'The Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States', 488; Davidson, 'Expatriates and the Gulf Monarchies', 282. ; See UN World Population Policies Survey, country reports for Qatar and the UAE (1996–2015), https://esa.un.org/PopPolicy/cprofile_report.aspx
806 Luciani and Hertog, in Held and Ulrichsen, *The Transformation of the Gulf*, 248.
807 Kazerouni, 'Musées et soft power dans le Golfe persique', 2 December 2014, 94; Peterson, 'Qatar and the World'.
808 Khallaf Ibrahim and Sherif, *From Charity to Social Change*, 2008, 155.
809 Sherif, in Ibrahim and Sherif, 172.
810 Sherif, in Ibrahim and Sherif, 177; Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 83; 141; Barber, *Blinded by Humanity*; 'Education Above All'; Evaluation Office, 'Assessment of Development Results Evaluation of UNDP Contribution: United Arab Emirates', 62; Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 235. ; UNDP, *Evaluation of UNDP Partnership*, 62.
811 Dorsey, "The 2022 World Cup"; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 1.
812 Anonymous source. Interview by author. Doha, February 1 and 10, 2016. See also'The Case Against Qatar'; Dorsey, 'Gulf Proxy War'; Petersen, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 43; Mohamed, in Benthall and Lacey, 267.

support domestic reforms in the face of dysfunctional and reform-averse rentier bureaucracies.[813] Despite heavy education planning investments from the 1990s to the 2010s, *qualified* nationals have remained lacking. This is both the case in philanthropic institutions, as well as in postings liaising with international organizations (q20).[814] Most graduates aspire to stable public jobs and concentrate in the humanities, disregarding the technical training increasingly demanded of foreign aid specialists.[815] As a result, foreigners have continued to occupy *specialist* postings.[816] Foreign experts often shadowed unproductive administrations in parallel agencies not bound by regulations of nationalization programs (ad13; ad21; ad23; dub4; dub5; dub6; dub8; q2; q17; q20; q21).[817] Wrongly accused of being short-time agents,[818] they often guaranteed some continuity in aid administrations characterized by the high-turnover of upwardly mobile and uncommitted nationals (ad5; ad11; ad13; ad22; q20; g1).[819] Thus, on the matter of aid transparency, they helped rulers centralize aid statistics and develop transparency and accountability; a feat that not only sent credible signals to the international community, but which simultaneously gave rulers more oversight over aid activities (q9; q19; q21; ad1; ad13; ad23).

Finally, there is also an element of habit to this. Despite available cheaper human resources alternatives, rulers and patrons pursued with the habit of appointing Westerners to the highest managerial positions.[820] In short, what existed continued to endure. In 2013 for instance, reformists at the regional level continued to advocate for more commitment on behalf of Gulf states to Arab multilateralism to support Arab and Muslim communities worldwide.[821]

Foreign experts' resilience also stemmed from structural changes in the expertise on offer in Gulf states. Within the realm of foreign aid, the "planners" of the reformist period were under severe criticism for using "old and failed models of the past: the "financing gap", the "poverty

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813 Espinoza, *The Macroeconomics of the Arab States of the Gulf*, 67; Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 28; Davidson, 'Expatriates and the Gulf Monarchies'; De Bel-Air, 'Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar', 9.

814 Stasz et al., "Post-Secondary Education in Qatar"; Espinoza, *The Macroeconomics of the Arab States of the Gulf*, 14–15; Khafagy, "Gulf Philanthropy: Structural, Domestic and Global Challenges," 5; Note, 20 December 1971, in Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1966–1971*, 295.

815 Bunglawala, 'Young, Educated and Dependent on the Public Sector', 7–15.

816 Kamrava, 'Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar'.

817 Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 213; Rodriguez and Scurry, "Career Capital Development of Self-Initiated Expatriates in Qatar," 1052; Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 122.

818 Clark and Monk, 'Modernity, Imitation, and Performance', 131.

819 Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 21; Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 83; 141; Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 32; 'Non-Profits "losing out on Talented Emiratis" | The National'; Barber, *Blinded by Humanity*, 181.

820 Thiollet, "Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf," 8; Ewers and Dicce, in Riemsdijk and Wang, *Rethinking International Skilled Migration*, 201; Ariss, "Voicing Experiences and Perceptions of Local Managers," 1990; Kapiszewski, "Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers », 5.

821 OECD, *Multilateral Aid 2015*, 178.

trap", a "government-to government aid model", and an "expenditures equal to outcomes' mentality".[822] The post-Gulf war coincided with the continued professionalization of the aid sector and the turn towards more private-inspired organizational culture in international organizations.[823] In the Gulf, this was paralleled by the coming of age of a new entrepreneurial generation of Gulf leaders with a strong national identity – a youth bulge of more educated citizens and of Gulf-born and Gulf-grown non-nationals[824] – as well the oil revenues to promote their new ambitions. In parallel, Gulf states' embeddedness in the global capitalist system resulted in the increase of the participation of Gulf states to the global competition for high-skilled labour traditionally the preserve of the most developed economies, as well as the rise of corporate financial profiles – a transnational capitalist class – coming to work in the burgeoning financial industries of the Gulf – be it in sovereign wealth funds, banks or consultancies.[825] Private sector workers had already worked in the region's aid organizations,[826] but they were able to capitalize on the international discredit brought by 9/11 to traditionalists, and the demise of reformists, to support the proliferation of aid organizations in the region.[827]

In aid as in other fields, these performers challenged reformists and traditionalists alike.[828] They were *de facto* a likeable option for rulers: they were neither non-nationals with little knowledge of society, nor incompetent nationals promoted through nationalization policies.[829] While many performers were belittled – by virtue of their junior status – to administrative implementation tasks (q25; ad23), many others entered directly rulers' *diwan*. In Abu Dhabi and Dubai, efficient, performance-oriented GONGOs and ministries emerged under the patronage of performers Sultan Al Jaber and Ahmed Al Sayegh,[830] business-oriented Sheikha Lubna,[831] Dr Mohammed Gergawi,[832] and Dubai Ruler Mohamed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum's performance-oriented leadership (dub8; dub2; dub4; dub6). In Qatar, albeit in smaller numbers, performers

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822 Easterly, cited in Klingebiel, Mahn, and Negre, *The Fragmentation of Aid Concepts, Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation*, 2.

823 Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 297; Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 6.

824 Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*; Jones, 'Seeing Like an Autocrat', 29–31; Montigny, 'Les représentations du changement dans la société qatarie, d'un émir à l'autre (1972–2013)', 9; Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, *Globalization and the Gulf*, 22; Bunglawala, 'Young, Educated and Dependent on the Public Sector', 7.

825 Bazoobandi, *Political Economy of the Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds*; Clark and Monk, 'Modernity, Imitation, and Performance'; Khalaf, AlShehabi, and Hanieh, *Transit States*, 10; Docquier, *Skilled Migration*; O'Byrne and Hensby, *Theorizing Global Studies*, 163–65; Ortiz, in Abbink and Salverda, *The Anthropology of Elites*, 185–86.

826 Demir, *Kuwait Fund and the Political Economy of Arab Regional Development*, 21.

827 Petersen, in Benthall and Lacey, *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond*, 34; 'Philanthropy in the UAE | Al Qasimi Foundation'.

828 Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 1; 96.

829 Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 82.

830 Luciani and Hertog, in Held and Ulrichsen, *The Transformation of the Gulf*, 251.

831 Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 20.

832 'The New Mohammad Bin Rashid Foundation'.

populated newly established organizations like the Qatar Development Fund or of Qatar Foundation (q2, q4, q5, q9, q12, q15).

Particularly in the UAE, where disillusion with reformists was greater, performers have eroded the reformist leadership, particularly since the 2010s.[833] They renegotiated the Emirates' multilateral stance by introducing a selective approach towards aid multilateral organizations, based on equal partnerships, triangular cooperation, and earmarked funding (ad1; ad7; oecd3; oecd8).[834] They turned progressively towards the OECD and the OECD–DAC, a "lean" organization since the budgetary constraints imposed on it in the 1990s – in particular compared to UN agencies.[835] In Qatar, where the layer of performers remains thinner, there has been no sign of progress in renegotiation with the UN aid system. Only the UNESCO remains in Doha, a sign of habit rather than of sustained engagement (q6; q9). While the UAE is operating a rapprochement with the Western aid community, Qatar continues to "act sectarian" when disbursing aid and when naming foreign policy officials; and to favour traditionalists to top administrative functions.[836] In both countries however, performers are bridging the religious orientation of traditionalists with reformists' results-oriented line of thinking. Organizations created in the past decade, like Noor Dubai and the Ewa'a Shelters for Women and Children, demonstrate that a religious outlook is not mutually exclusive with an entrepreneurial mindset.[837]

In short, despite severe crises in the market of foreign expertise in the Gulf after the Gulf war, added to the multiple failures of traditionalists and reformists alike, the figure of the expert has not subsided, but has mutated. Foreign experts' resilience is another unintended consequence, with fragmentation, of the development of the rentier and dynastic state.

The rationale of uncertainty continues to legitimise foreign experts, who themselves continue to mobilise their transnational networks to stay in place. The field of aid expertise has its own dynamics: today, expert performers challenge traditionalists' and reformists' hold on foreign aid programs as they do elsewhere.

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[833] Indeed, until that date, the foreign relations of the UAE had been under the grasp of 50-60 year-old reformist ministers. See Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mutawa, *Globalization and the Gulf*, 23.

[834] The Al Maktoum Foundation and Dubai Cares have been proactive in this regard. See Evaluation Office, 'Assessment of Development Results Evaluation of UNDP Contribution: United Arab Emirates', 34; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 136; Kanna, *Dubai, the City as Corporation*, 151.

[835] Carroll and Kellow, *The OECD*, 3.

[836] Barakat and Zyck, 'Gulf State Assistance to Conflict-Affected Environments', 2; Luciani and Hertog, in Held and Ulrichsen, *The Transformation of the Gulf*, 253; Montigny, 'Les représentations du changement dans la société qatarie, d'un émir à l'autre (1972–2013)', 30.

[837] 'Ewa'a Shelter for Women and Children'; 'Noor Dubai - Annual Report'.

Figure 14. Summary of the findings on foreign aid foreign experts in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (1960s–2016)

	Traditionalists	**Reformists**	**Performers**
Examples	Clergy, Muslim Brotherhood affiliates	Former Western-trained Arab or Western international civil servants	Young multilingual professionals with private sector experience
Selection and training	Self-selected; country expertise	Aid professionals	Generalist profile with country expertise
Meeting quality and frequency	Strong, intense and informal	Weak and limited to professional arena	Digitally connected
Professional norms	Weak and anti-multilateral	Strong and pro-multilateral	Strong and pragmatic
Common culture	Strong, communitarian and Arabic	Weak	Cosmopolitan
Pre- and early independence	Benefit from shared common culture and historical presence in the Gulf	Benefit from uncertainty during decolonization context.	Not applicable
The growth of the rentier state	Benefit from politicization of aid and communitarian ties with rulers	Benefit from transnationally shared professional norms	Not applicable
Post-Gulf War	Lose relevance because lack professional norms in a professionalized aid world. Continue to operate thanks to rentier state inertia	Lose credibility after failed policies. Continue to operate thanks to rentier state inertia	Emerge with transformation of the aid field. Combine both strengths of reformists (weathering uncertainty) and traditionalists (cultural sensitivity)

Section 3: Discussion of alternative explanations

In light of the findings on foreign experts, it is worthwhile reflecting once more on other explanations that might be deemed to account for Qatar and the UAE's diverging multilateral paths.

First, it has been argued that differentiated socialization in international organizations may explain divergent outcomes. The more Gulf states socialized in international arena, the more, in this view, they would favour multilateralism.[838] That is why the UAE, thanks to its long-term established relationship with the UNDP, would be more committed to the international organization's work[839] and why Qatar will become more and more multilateral also. While socialization in international organizations may explain reformists' ideology, it has limited explanatory power beyond aid generation. Performers' multilateralism *à la carte* – symbolized by the rise of earmarked funding in the aid world – is based on pragmatism rather than ideology (ad7; dub4).[840] Though these young professionals are extremely savvy regarding international organizations, they are not necessarily multilateral enthusiasts.[841] International organizations are important because they some international experts have been trained there at a specific time. Generically however, they are important because they are avenues that some experts may exploit to gain leverage over others. There is therefore no liberal horizon to reach for, and the age of the flamboyant international organization expert is over.

Second, this chapter contradicts the rentier argument that states necessarily become more multilateral when oil prices decline.[842] The reformists thrived in the 1970s under high oil prices, and performers' "bilateralization of aid" under declining oil prices both contradict the mechanic ties between oil and multilateralism.

A third alternative argument suggests that it is because Qatar and the UAE are first and foremost rentier states, not small states, that foreign experts have endured in their midst. Small

[838] Tok, Calleja, and El-Ghaish, "Arab Development Aid and the New Dynamics of Multilateralism," 601.
[839] Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 330.
[840] OECD, *Multilateral Aid 2015*, 12.
[841] Being trained in Western universities and organisations does not make one automatically pro-Western. Rather it makes one rather prone to use Western methods of policy planning. This argument runs counter to usual findings that cosmopolitan and younger individuals place more trust in international organizations. See Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia*, 105; Torgler, 'Trust in International Organizations', 69–74.
[842] Ross and Voeten, 'Oil and International Cooperation'.

Gulf states' extremely vertical administrations do not resemble that of other small states.[843] Of course, because of their small size, their foreign aid has been somewhat driven by bigger and more aggressive states in their immediate region after independence. But more important has been the uncertainty arising from the growth of the rentier bureaucracy. Akin to their large Saudi neighbour, it is not personnel that small Gulf states have lacked, but *skilled* personnel. That nationalization programs or education planning have failed and that foreigners have continued to shadow nationals, not only in the private sector – as many contend[844] – but in the public domain also,[845] is not a result of their size, but of their rentier characteristics.

Conclusion

Running counter to rentierism's *homo economicus* model of foreign expertise, this chapter studies foreign experts in the history of Qatar and of the UAE as aid donors. It underscores the importance of path dependency in shaping the ruler–expert nexus. Though foreign experts have not (yet) changed the social structures of Gulf societies,[846] rulers' migration policies, as demographers increasingly suggest, have unintended consequences[847] that are also reflected in the formulation of foreign aid strategies.

I have drawn on various sources (from archival work to labour market surveys) to trace the role of foreign experts working in Qatar and the UAE from pre-independence to this day. Process-tracing has helped to uncover path dependencies, by studying sequences and critical-junctures. Dr Kamel's role in Qatar serves as a good example of process-tracing's contribution. His decision not to recruit reformist foreign experts in the early days of Qatar's independence, is a choice that is independent of rentierism – at the time, there was only an embryonic form of administration in the peninsula. However, this decision did have consequences on later developments of Qatar's administration. Without this archival evidence at the critical-juncture of Qatar's independence, we would be left to think that experts were simply more or less present because of historical reasons (commercial development in Dubai with the support of the British protector). We would not think that experts themselves weighed on future developments.

[843] Thorhallsson, *The Role of Small States in the European Union*.
[844] Herb and Herb, *The Wages of Oil*, 18; 22; Davidson, "Expatriates and the Gulf Monarchies"; Kapiszewski, "Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers", 5.
[845] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats*, 229; Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 29.
[846] Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 89; Longva, in Dresch and Piscatori, *Monarchies and Nations*, 128; Fromherz, *Qatar A Modern History*, 4; Anthony, *The United Arab Emirates*, 36.
[847] Fargues, "International Migration and the Nation State in Arab Countries"; Thiollet, "Managing Migrant Labour in the Gulf"; De Bel-Air, "Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar"; De Bel-Air, "Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in the UAE."

At another critical-juncture in Qatar's history, following the Gulf War, applying process-tracing shows that Dr Kamel continued to enjoy some responsibilities in limited administrative "islands" such as the OPEC and OFID. This suggests that experts could draw on their expertise to maintain some degree of influence in a context where the growth of the rentier state was matched by the rise of weak administrations. In the 1990's therefore, a new phenomenon is identified by process-tracing: the endurance of foreign experts in the rentier states.

In both cases, Dr Kamel's earlier choice not to recruit potentially rival reformists was consequential. It killed reformism in the bud, but also meant that later on, Qatari authorities would continue to rely on Dr Kamel's technical aptitudes for complex tasks at the regional level. In other words, Qatar's traditionalist track thereafter "cannot be explained by general causes but only by the sequence of events in their specific history".[848] Earlier decisions made before the growth of the rentier state had lasting repercussions on the two countries' foreign aid.

By examining common critical junctures in both young states' contemporary history – independence, the Gulf War, or the onset of the War on Terror, I provide evidence that foreign experts do not lose relevance as the rentier state grows; on the contrary. I also find some evidence that the consolidation of pro-multilateral experts in the UAE has served to implement more reforms on aid transparency and donor proliferation than in Qatar."

Indeed, foreign expertise in Qatar and the UAE has shown remarkable resilience to political trends. From the 1960s to this day, none of the rulers' three appointment strategies– political, credibility and uncertainty – has exclusively dominated. For different reasons, different categories of foreign experts have blossomed in the Gulf. Traditionalists have exploited a cultural proximity with rulers to explore the nascent administrations and create both basic welfare services (education and health) and the first generation of charities. Reformists have utilized pervasive uncertainty - an outcome of the dysfunctional rentier bureaucracies – and transnationally shared professional norms to influence decision-makers.[849] The ideological battle between traditionalists and reformists has structured from the early 1960s Qatar and the UAE's abidance by international aid standards. Today, aid discrepancies between Qatar and the UAE may phase out in the long-term with the rise of performers. These, through the progressive exposure of Gulf states to international financial networks and globalized firms, continue to

[848] Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, *Comparative Process Tracing.*, 48.
[849] Dezalay and Garth, in Boschi and Santana, *Development and Semi-Periphery.*

exploit uncertainty (albeit with more cultural savvy). They support the trend towards earmarked funding to international organizations and the "bilateralization of multilateral aid".[850]

The impact of the foreign aid expert has differed also because the field of aid has changed. The planning doxa of the post-Second World War, rejected by the Chicago School, in addition to the rejection of Western models of aid, the focus on performance on multiple indicators of human development, as well as the development of tailored market solutions to end poverty based on experimental economics, are all significant debates that have transformed the market of foreign aid expertise. In this respect, Hertog's take on brokers – that their profession matters little compared to their capacity to act between different segments of administration and vertically to filter the information that arrives to princely ears – is refined.[851] Profession did matter at some point for the influence of foreign experts – in the golden age of aid specialists. It was less so before with traditionalists. It is also less so today, when proponents of market-led solutions for poverty have such varied professional profiles.

Throughout, rentierism consolidated every category of foreign experts – from the legal and financial performers in Dubai's free zones[852] to the traditionalist Arab-speaking businessmen in Doha's Zakat Fund[853] – and enabled all to coexist despite their intrinsic divergences. In other words, there is feedback loop between the ruler–expert nexus and the bureaucratic dynamics of the rentier state that rentierism has by and far ignored.

[850] Sagasti, cited in Tok, Calleja, and El-Ghaish, 'ARAB DEVELOPMENT AID AND THE NEW DYNAMICS OF MULTILATERALISM', 594.
[851] Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia*, 26.
[852] Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 96.
[853] 'Playing with Fire'.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Summary

This work has argued that reasons for the international behaviour of small rentier states may be found in their domestic politics. *In fine*, these dynamics determine not only what these states *want* to do, but also what they *can* do. To illustrate these mechanisms, the thesis has explored the dynamics of donor proliferation and aid transparency in the relatively undocumented and increasingly important Arab donors of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Hypothesis 1 stated that *the more power is centralized in the rentier state, the more fragmented the aid landscape becomes, and the less reforms on donor proliferation and aid transparency are likely to succeed*. This work has confirmed that centralization of power in a rentier and dynastic context decreases the probability of successful reforms. I have illustrated this in the field of foreign aid. Hypothesis 1 however is confirmed partially. Indeed, the opposite argument – that decentralization favours reforms, is validated only under certain conditions. Indeed, the UAE's inter-family structure leads to specific dynastic reciprocities that shift decision-making from a multiple principals to a principal-intermediary dynamic. This is rather the exception than the ruler. In other decentralized contexts, such as Kuwait, this dynastic element is not at play (the royal family works with the Parliament) and lack of reform can also be seen.

Hypothesis 2 stated *that the more pro-multilateral foreign experts are appointed in the rentier state, the more reforms on donor proliferation and aid transparency are likely to be implemented.* The use of process-tracing has indeed shown the pre-requisite for this hypothesis: different categories of foreign experts endure in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Just like fragmentation, the endurance of foreign expertise, and its differentiated development (reformist vs. traditionalist) in Qatar and the UAE, is inherent to the growth of the rentier state. It has been more arduous to measure the specific influence of foreign experts in shaping foreign aid programmes within these countries' opaque administrations. However, the early trends of reformism found in the UAE; and of traditionalism in Qatar have stretched into the 21st century, in spite of ruler changes and several notable crises (including the Gulf War and the post-9/11 War on Terror).

Theoretically, this thesis advances principal–agent theory with insights from Arab authoritarian regimes as the main explanation for Arab donors' international behaviour. It shows that even in the case of these small autocratic states, the state's relationship to multilateralism does not follow a single-principal model. It expands previous findings on rentierism and dynastic monarchism to the foreign policy of small Gulf petro-monarchies, which is assumed to be a malleable policy under the tight control of autocrats. While macro-level approaches have described rentier states' propensity for political isolationism, this work explores the striking case-residuals of this model. One of these is the pro-active stance of the UAE on donor proliferation and aid transparency. In so doing, it counters the dominant small state and branding literatures. Indeed, the rentier and dynastic characteristics matter more for Qatar and the UAE than their size and the international constraints they face.

This thesis has shown that rentierism and dynastic monarchism are both operating in the rentier state of Qatar and the UAE, despite the leadership's attempt to streamline aid and increase aid transparency. Fifteen years after the Emiri decree establishing the centralized Qatar Development Fund, the Qatari reform of the aid landscape is still underway. The legal and administrative patchwork that constitutes Qatari aid also hampers full-fledged reforms to monitor and report aid from all Qatari donors. The recent crisis regarding some Qatari personalities' alleged financing of terrorism through aid is an indicator that the Qatari state is not a unitary actor. Rather, it is one in which the leadership must contend with the shared power and the private fortunes of eminent members of the family or close allies, as well as dysfunctional aid monitoring mechanisms. It is not Qatar *per se* that is supporting terrorism through foreign aid, but specific personae in Qatar.[854] In the UAE, aid streamlining and transparency is limited in the emirate of Abu Dhabi. Different, sometimes redundant and opaque aid fiefdoms continue to coexist despite the leadership's reformist agenda.

The UAE *as a whole*, however, performs differently in multilateral settings because of its "federal" decentralized power setting. Specifically, the working relationship between Abu Dhabi and Dubai – also an expression of dynastic monarchism - has favoured the reform of the aid sector to meet the international community's requirements on donor proliferation and aid transparency. Unaltered by rentier constraints, Dubai is also tasked by its neighbour to conduct reforms in the entire federation. Reforms are therefore more likely to succeed in the UAE because double-pressure is applied to aid workers to comply, because commitments to

[854] 'Entretien Avec Jean-Paul Burdy – La Crise Qatar-CCG de Juin 2017 (1/2) - Les Clés Du Moyen-Orient'.

international aid standards negotiated between two emirates makes them costlier; and generally because both emirates' interest in maintaining cordial relations is higher than the cost of following suit when the other abides by multilateral principles.

In addition to rentier and dynastic developments, this work has developed the first (tentative) comprehensive and comparative account of the ruler–expert nexus in the context of rentier dynastic states. Indeed, the study of foreign advisers' role in Qatar and the UAE shows that from pre-independence onwards, foreign experts have also shaped the two emirates' attitude towards multilateralism. Rather than a mere historical contingency, foreign experts have gained ground in the city states, in spite of, and because of, the negative impact of rentierism on policymaking.

For long the difference between the two emirates' pool of foreign experts has been ideological. While reformist-oriented experts have quickly taken hold over key aid fiefdoms in the UAE, traditionalist views of aid have dominated in Qatar. This divergence has pervaded to this date, but is narrowing thanks to the emergence in both emirates of a younger generation of pragmatic aid experts.

In short, the institutional development of rentierism, and the ideational component of foreign expertise are not at all mutually exclusive, but work together in the cases of Qatar and the UAE. To evaluate the solidity of these claims, I apply the same framework to other Qatari and Emirati policies. I also test the correlation between rentierism and foreign experts in other rentier states.

Discussion: Beyond foreign aid, beyond the Gulf

This thesis focuses on specific, if crucial, aspects of foreign aid multilateralism – donor proliferation and aid transparency. The external validity of the theoretical claims may be briefly established by examining other multilateral and bilateral policies in Qatar and the UAE. To pursue on the distinction between soft (donor proliferation) and hard (aid transparency, money-laundering and terrorism financing) issues used throughout the thesis, I first apply the framework to the environmental diplomacy of Qatar and the UAE. Then I replicate the analysis with the Qatari and Emirati military. Last but not least, I put to the test the theory-building part of this work, the role of foreign experts, in other rentier states.

Rentierism, dynastic monarchism and foreign experts in environmental diplomacy

Environmental diplomacy is an issue on which Gulf states are historically opposed to Western democracies and which is assumed to be under the ruler's control. In this sector, the UAE's cooperation has again progressed in ways impossible in Qatar. Despite evident domestic pressures on water and energy consumption in the city states, the city states have long defended their fossil fuel economies under the umbrella of the Organization of the Petrol Exporting Countries (OPEC) and of the G77+China Group, supported in that by the indifference of *khaleeji* citizens.[855] As late as the 2000s for instance, Gulf states still did not carry out the basic cooperative tasks of collecting data on the environment and the effects of climate change.[856] For most observers therefore, though the Qatari and Emirati foreign ministries picked up the issue in the late 2000s,[857] and though the incorporation of "sustainable development" in the UAE Vision 2021 and the Qatar Vision 2030 announced the transition away from hydrocarbon-based economies, these efforts are by and large "branding" that are not followed by significant cooperation.[858]

I argue below that Qatar and the UAE's international cooperation on environment and climate change once again diverges in line with the predictions of rentierism and dynastic monarchism. Foreign experts, imported for the creation and betterment of the fossil fuel industry in the 1970s, play a rather conservative role in both countries' environmental diplomacy. The older generations of oil experts are slowly giving way to younger generations of pro-environmental advocates, in the UAE rather than in Qatar. However, in neither country can these experts' be said to support a turn to a full-fledged environmental diplomacy.

In line with the conjunction of rentierism and dynastic monarchism, the Janus-faced environmental cooperation of Qatar reflects its bureaucratic rivalries and familial arrangements. In 2012, building on its spectacular hosting of COP18 in Doha, the leadership created the Directorate for Climate Change (DCC) within the Ministry of Environment. If the DCC was to become the international interlocutor on data collection and mainstreaming of environmental practices, this ruler-led reform failed. The Ministry has not consolidated because it has grown out

[855] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 13; Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates*, 88.
[856] Reiche, 'Energy Policies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries—possibilities and Limitations of Ecological Modernization in Rentier States', 2396.
[857] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 199.
[858] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*; Ulrichsen, *The Gulf States in International Political Economy*.

in the shadows of other administrations. It continues to have little means to collect its own data regarding Qatar's progress on diverse environmental indicators. In practice, the DCC's competence on climate change is divided among the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, which collects primary data; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the production and the gathering of environment-related indicators for the former Millennium Development Goals, the Ministry of Energy; as well as non-administrative actors, such as the research branch of Qatar Petroleum. The DCC has never been able to impose a direction to other actors, nor of taking over their data-collection tasks.

Adding to bureaucratic rivalry is the characteristic rentier inertia that plagues the Ministry of Environment. Out of an already small team of fourteen people, only three are dedicated to multilateralism and international partnerships (q18). For matters of international cooperation, the DCC relies on young inexperienced graduates, a sign of the limited interest in the issue, as well an indication of the limited experienced human resources available domestically. Indeed, the Ministry of Environment is home to older generations of civil servants that lack fundamental knowledge and interest in the topic of climate change (q10; q17). In early 2016, I discussed Qatar's environmental achievements with a young Palestinian engineer of twenty-four years old, freshly graduated from university, who had coordinated alone the action of all Qatari ministries in preparation of the Paris COP21 (q18).[859] At the end of the day, it is hardly surprising that most consider the DCC's record to be appalling (q14; q27).

The Ministry of Environment and the DCC is only one of several actors that have shown little commitment to the environmental cause.[860] In line with rentierism and dynastic monarchism, some "islands of efficiency" remain afloat in the Qatari environmental landscape. The most notably initiatives are that of the former emir's first wife, Sheikha Mouza and of the Qatar Foundation. Independent from the Qatari administration, the Foundation is credited with initiatives such as research on environmental systems (the Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute), or the promotion of new environmental standards in the construction sector (Musheireb Properties) at the national level.[861] Similarly, Qatar General Electricity and Water

[859] Unsurprisingly, Qatar was one of the last MENA countries to submit their preparatory report for the Paris Conference.

[860] Other passive actors include the Abdullah Bin Hamad Al Attiyah International Foundation for Energy & Sustainable Development. It is an empty shell directed by one eminent member of the Al Attiyah family. The Al Attiyah family has married into the Al Thani family. See 'Tribal Families in Qatar'.

[861] If Qatar Foundation has had the leeway to initiate policies in many different fields (including on environmental issues), this has not always been with a great managerial success. At the time of my visit in Doha early 2016, Qatar

Corporation (Kahramaa), a state-owned company led by Essa Bin Hilal Al Kuwari,[862] and specialized in the distribution of electricity, took further importance in Qatar's environmental diplomacy. Recently, it substituted the officially designated Ministry of Environment for the Qatar's public relations campaign in preparation for the Paris COP21 (q17).

Less visible are the accomplishments of a private engineering organization of young Western-educated experts protected by a reformist patron. According to an interviewee, they are "tasked by the emir to implement projects in a short span of time – and that duplicates the work that Ministries should be doing themselves" (q14). These elements illustrate how dormant rentier bureaucrats of the Ministry of Environment, and patron-led para-public experts of Qatar Foundation (and the like), coalesce to fragment Qatar's environmental diplomacy. Overall, these parallel patron-led initiatives add to the confusion. Remarkably, while all criticize the Ministry of Environment, it has yet to be dissolved. Instead, it has been buried under additional ministerial layers in early 2016, when it merged with the Ministry of Municipality and Environment.[863]

The accumulation of redundant competences is likely to endure, in line with the progression of rentierism and dynastic monarchism. For instance, collecting and mainstreaming environmental data under the prevailing UN Sustainable Development Goals, requires for a total of 169 indicators, many new in Qatar, to be monitored. If this task is considered – yet again – as a governmental priority in Qatar, a clear hierarchy between the different actors involved in this task is not yet established. In its place, an ill-defined new institutional layer, the "High Committee", will coordinate the work of different ministries (q10).

In the UAE, one must once again distinguish the emirate-level – Abu Dhabi, on the one hand, and Dubai on the other – and the federal level. At the emirate-level, Abu Dhabi's inability to impose comprehensive reforms to enhance its prestige abroad as a responsible environmental player is paralleled by Dubai's engagement in the "green business".

Similar to Qatar, the UAE's Ministry for Environment and Water (MOEW) is not central to the production, collection and mainstreaming of data regarding climate change. Initially

Foundation was being restructured and some costly projects abandoned (q14). See also 'Qatar Foundation Annual Report 2013-2013'.

[862] The Al Kuwari family is a close ally of the ruling Al Thani family, with which it shares a common ancestor. See 'Tribal Families in Qatar'; 'Qatar General Electricity & Water Corporation - المؤسسة العامة القطرية للكهرباء والماء'.

[863] 'Ministry of Municipality and Environment'.

created to back an increasing interest in the UAE for climate change after the 1992 Rio Summit, the ministry was soon reduced to a mere rubber-stamping role and a poor policy entrepreneur. It continues to depend on the *bon vouloir* of the Ministry of Energy – the successor to the Ministry of Petroleum, of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Petroleum Operations (ADCO), and the Environment Agency Abu Dhabi, to collect its data. Climate change and environment are by large, still considered as derivatives of energy production, rather than a field of interest in their own right. Thus, most initiatives are taken within the research programs of major energy actors in the country that are more "focussed on rules than on real impact" (ad3; ad8). While the environmental competences of the Ministry of Environment and Water are increasing, its autonomy is contested by its predecessors, such as the Ministry of Energy. The latter also hires trained environmental-savvy experts within its (replicated) Directorate of Clean Energy and Climate Change (ad9). In addition, the Ministry of Energy still supplants *de facto* the MOEW in the preparation and negotiation of international conferences, as in the case of the last COP21. The MOEW adds inertia to these unfortunate rivalries. According to a member of the Environment Agency Abu Dhabi, "they don't care!" (ad13).

Conversely, Abu Dhabi's environmental cooperation may be summarized under one name, that of Sultan Al Jaber. This policy entrepreneur, building on his multiple hats (a reformist Minister, a diplomat and a businessman) has been able to influence Abu Dhabi's stance on climate change. As a reformist Minister first, Al Jaber has successfully set up the Masdar Institute, a research and education centre specialized in renewable energies. This is a platform for alternative proposals to the dominant oil industry, as well as for the training of future domestic environmental specialists. Importantly, the Masdar Institute is also an official interlocutor of the UAE's environmental diplomacy since 2006.[864] Al Jaber also successfully promoted within the overweight Emirati administration small teams of young, educated and pro-active followers. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Al Jaber imposed a Directorate for Climate Change. Then once the small team had proven its worth, it took over the leadership of the Ministry of Environment.[865] As a diplomat, Al Jaber brought these different elements together – the Masdar Institute, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Energy climate change diplomacy – in the successful diplomatic bid to host the International Renewable Energy Agency in Abu Dhabi. Third, as a businessman, Al Jaber promoted renewable energy business in the UAE by setting up

[864] The Masdar Institute is a pillar of the Designated National Authority for the Clean Development Mechanism, a precondition for participation in the mechanism. See Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 213.
[865] 'About the Ministry | About Ministry | UAE Ministry of Climate Change and Environment'.

Mubadala, a state-owned company largely tied to the diplomatic action of IRENA and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for Climate Change. In brief, Al Jaber impersonates the reformist patron close to ruling circles and capable of adding active organizations to the already existing, though this unavoidably leads to a multi-speed bureaucratic system.

Adding to the active leadership of Sultan Al Jaber, Dubai's has helped *lock-in* the UAE's more favourable environmental diplomacy. Dubai promotes the "green economy" and allows a proto-form of a "green civil society" to develop and spill-over to its hydrocarbon-rich neighbour (ad8; ad22; dub1; dub7). Adding to this business and lenient approach to environmental issues, Dubai also participates in federal affairs. A fundamental weakness of the UAE's international cooperation, data quality and transparency, has been at the forefront of the emir of Dubai's domestic reforms. While the federal Ministry of Environment was incapable of providing detailed data to the UNFCC in the early 2000s, the ruler of Dubai not only decided to reform first the dysfunctional federal agency for the collection and mainstreaming of data (see chapter 3). In the specific case of environmental cooperation, the emir pressured the MOEW into monitoring the application of international requirements on the collection of environmental data. As indicated by a civil servant:

> We are in charge and responsible of the work of […] six working groups, which we do under the direct authority of the Prime Minister. […] Performance is key here. It all cascades from the international level to the local level. For each different thing we have a series of indicators that are very, very precise, and we need to respond to these" (ad19).

Foreign experts contribute to the forced tango between rentier Abu Dhabi and non-rentier Dubai. In both states, the import of experts to build and manage the hydrocarbon industry, has given little manoeuvre for more environmentally driven advocates to set foot in policymaking. Ministries of Energy and energy specialists in both countries continue to dominate Gulf delegations to climate change summits. Far more experienced and connected than emerging pro-climate change technicians, these bureaucrats weighed on negotiating positions, often to the detriment of pro-climate change policies.[866] Conversely, environmental advocates have always been, of their own accord, extremely isolated. A former representative of the UAE in international negotiations, with a doctoral degree in biotechnologies, recalls:

[866] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 206.

> I was working both as a technician and a diplomat. Just for the COP, I attended three meetings as expert for the UAE. When I worked for the UAE, at the end, there was what we could call a delegation. But when I started out with them, there was not anyone but me. I went alone. […] I had some know-how that was quite rare in the Arab world (ad5).

However, while Qatar's environmental diplomacy is obstructed by "the strong ownership of external climate policy by the country's energy sector",[867] the UAE may be treading a divergent path. The Emirates are increasingly tapping into the foreign expertise brought for instance by the Masdar Institute, and its partner, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. These young professionals' influence is yet to develop in the upcoming years. They are still tied to the reformist figure of Al Jaber, and have not emancipated and diffused beyond his control, as the reformists in foreign aid have done in the 1970s and 1980s. In other words, pro-environmentalism is still patron-led according to a Qatar-based environmental journalist:

> For influence you need to get back to the emir's cabinet and I don't think that they have anyone there who has any particular views on climate change, the way they have with Sultan Al Jaber in the UAE. Here if you want to change, you have to have the approval of the emir's office (q27).

In short, though not as striking as in the case of foreign aid, the UAE's cooperative environmental diplomacy is facilitated compared to that of Qatar. Since 2008, external observers have perceived a change in the international stance of the UAE in the international partnership for climate change.[868] Not only did it successfully campaign to host the International Renewable Energy Agency. Among its neighbours, the Emirates have also ratified the most international conventions on environment and climate change[869] and are increasingly active in the framework of the GCC or of the UN. Nevertheless, Emirati cooperation is still plagued by rentier and dynamics. Despite Al Jaber and Dubai's reformist efforts however, the UAE's legal representation, for instance, remains divided between the Ministry of Energy and the Environment Agency Abu Dhabi.[870] Meanwhile, if Qatar has hosted COP18,[871] it still opposes

[867] Luomi, 199.
[868] Luomi, 212.
[869] For instance, it was the only state in the region to have acceded to the subsidiary Nagoya Protocol on the fair use of genetic resources. See Raouf, 'Climate Change Threats, Opportunities, and the GCC Countries'.
[870] Luomi, *The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change*, 213.
[871] Indeed, in 2009, a report published by the Arab Forum for Environment and Development stated that "virtually no work is being carried out to make the Arab countries prepared for climate change challenges". See Reiche,

having a UNEP office in Doha and is characterized by a fragmented and inconsistent international environmental cooperation (q6).

After the examination of a multilateral and "soft" issue, environmental diplomacy, I now test the theoretical framework on a bilateral and "hard" issue: the professionalization of the military in Qatar and the UAE.

Rentierism, dynastic monarchism and foreign experts and the *khaleeji* militaries

In no other sector of the sheikhdoms is small state theory as dominant as when discussing the development of a performing professionalized army.[872] Crucial to the defence policy orientation of the city states are the ways in which the monarchs articulate their limited human resources with the historically predatory roles of Saudi Arabia and Iran and the protective role of the British and of the United States.[873] In short, both Qatar and the UAE have little option as small states but to rely, as they have done for the past two centuries, on Western protection.[874] For scholars who go beyond the small state reading of Gulf defence policy,[875] limiting the development of a professional army could in fact be a coup-proofing strategy. By limiting the development of a strong military segment, including by dividing it among different fiefdoms, rulers decrease the probability of being overthrown.[876]

I support and complement this last argument with the idea that this limited professional development is not only a voluntary top-down strategy, but also a rentier and dynastic constraint imposed on rulers. Backed by rent, parallel military segments emerge "for the purpose of satisfying the ambitions of different members and factions of the ruling family".[877] In both

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'Energy Policies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries—possibilities and Limitations of Ecological Modernization in Rentier States', 2396.

[872] Professionalization is understood as increasing the "military's corporate identity and its sense of efficacy, militarily and politically". See Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East', 70.

[873] Rickli, 'The Political Rationale and Implications of the United Arab Emirates' Military Involvement in Libya'; Almezaini and Rickli, *The Small Gulf States*; Pinfari, 'Of Cats and Lions'; Khatib, 'Qatar's Foreign Policy'; Boulanger, 'Les défis géopolitiques d'une nouvelle puissance régionale'; Mongrenier, 'La politique étrangère du Qatar'.

[874] Davidson, 'Dubai and the United Arab Emirates'.

[875] I consider for instance that Kamrava arbitrarily discriminates for no other reason than size, the UAE and Kuwait. Indeed, both countries have a similar population – about 1.4 million nationals.

[876] Droz-Vincent, 'From Fighting Formal Wars to Maintaining Civil Peace?', 393–94; Hertog, 'Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States'; Kamrava, 'Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy'. This argument is also made in the case of Latino-American rentier states such as Venezuela. See Cornell and Lapuente, 'Meritocratic Administration and Democratic Stability', 1293–94.

[877] Hertog, 'Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States', 400.

countries, military reform is a "family matter".[878] In Qatar, the Al Attiyah family is "historically associated with the military".[879] Hamad Bin Ali Al Attiyah for instance founded the Qatari Special Forces in 1982, commanded Qatari units in Desert Storm in 1991, was appointed Chief of Staff of Armed in Forces 1997. After his position as State Minister for Defence affairs, he was appointed in early 2016 as Advisor to the Emir for Defence Affairs, and replaced in the Ministry by Khaled Al Attiyah – also a former member of the Qatari armed forces.[880] In the UAE, the Bin Fatima, a clan of the Al Nahyan family, and their leader, Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, has hold over the security sectors and arms procurement.[881]

On the one hand, the military fiefdoms encourage hazardous defence policies. In spite of the seemingly unlimited availability of military spending in either country, it is evident that both sheikhdoms have an inchoate arms procurement strategy.[882] Qatar's military – navy, land and air forces – is characterized by enormous spending on armaments, despite its small human resources (of about 12,000 individuals), to such an extent that observers note that it "presents support and sustenance problems, even when based near its peacetime barracks".[883] In the UAE, the Abu Dhabi-led policy is one that, in line with rentierism, has some "well-trained officers" and an "impressive military capability, but one it cannot man, sustain or transform into an effective overall war-fighting capability".[884]

On the other hand, military fiefdoms encourage inertia. At the high end, segments of society co-opted into the military themselves "are characterized by a mix of unwavering loyalty, caution, and resistance to change".[885] At the low-end, Qatar and the UAE have only set up a (limited) mandatory military service in 2014, and leaders fear that because of their privileged situation as rentier citizens would encourage military misconduct or defection in the event of combat.[886]

Again, decentralized power in the UAE policy has led to inter-dynastic accommodation between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Although the newly federated emirates first relied on their own

[878] Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East', 91.
[879] 'Tribal Families in Qatar'.
[880] Field, 'Tree of Al Attiyah'; 'Qatar Emir'.
[881] Ardemagni, 'United Arab Emirates' Armed Forces in the Federation-Building Process', 47.
[882] Solmirano and Wezeman, 'Military Spending and Arms Procurement in the Gulf States'.
[883] Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars*, 150.
[884] Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, 285.
[885] Droz-Vincent, 'From Fighting Formal Wars to Maintaining Civil Peace?', 393.
[886] Gause, *Oil Monarchies*; 'UAE Introduces Compulsory Military Service - Al Jazeera English'; 'Qatar's National Service Program Puts New Emphasis on Military Training'; Davidson, 'Dubai and the United Arab Emirates', 435.

defence policy – the Dubai Defence Force of 500 men for instance – negotiation between commanders of the various forces in the late 1970s led to the progressive integration into the UAE framework of the different defence components. Again, Dubai's performance on defence matters exceeded at the time that of Abu Dhabi's – notably with its well-organized structure, its superior hardware, and its lightly armed task force for rapid deployment purposes. The absorption into the federal UAE Armed Forces took place in the mid-1990s and was negotiated with Abu Dhabi after Dubai "opted to disband its own military" after years of partial autonomy.[887] Despite the subsequent problems resulting from the different procurement strategies in both emirates – this meant that the federal force worked with often incompatible weapons and ammunitions - the need to integrate different elements into one federal force kick-started an ambitious military program in the early 2000s.[888]

Dubai specifically again played a positive role in the country's defence. I can only present here one indicator that supports this hypothesis. It is suggestive that since its mutualization, the UAE military has adopted a more business-like approach to procurement. Notably, and "unlike most other militaries in the developing world, the UAE Armed Forces has committed itself heavily to purchasing custom-made equipment manufactured by joint ventures between Western arms companies and domestic enterprises. With the reasoning that such products will be better suited to combat conditions in the Middle Eastern theatre, while also promoting the diversification of the economy and generating employment across the federation, the strategy would seem to have found much favour in both government and industry circles".[889]

Abu Dhabi and Dubai's forced tango is again at work. As with foreign aid, the army is a vector of federalism for Abu Dhabi, "the foreign policy master".[890] In Dubai, participation in defence policy is necessary to accommodate its powerful neighbour.[891] The working relationship established between Dubai and Abu Dhabi leaders – namely MBR Al Maktoum, on the one hand, and Khalifa and MBZ Al Nahyan, on the other – is reflected in the organization of the Emirati armed forces.[892] While operations in peace time are divided into three commands – Abu

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[887] The fact that Dubai continued to rely on its armed forces after a 1976 Federal Decree established the federal armed forces further underlines its autonomy as a separate principal. See Hertog, 'Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States', 401; Ardemagni, 'United Arab Emirates' Armed Forces in the Federation-Building Process', 45.
[888] Ardemagni, 'United Arab Emirates' Armed Forces in the Federation-Building Process', 48; Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars*, 290.
[889] Davidson, 'Dubai and the United Arab Emirates', 434.
[890] Ardemagni, 'United Arab Emirates' Armed Forces in the Federation-Building Process', 44.
[891] WAM, 'Mohammad Bin Rashid Hails the Role of UAE Armed Forces'.
[892] Ardemagni, 'United Arab Emirates' Armed Forces in the Federation-Building Process', 58.

Dhabi, Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah; in wartime, Abu Dhabi General Headquarters centralises command.[893]

In the formation of the military, the role of foreign experts is far from anecdotal.[894] For sceptics, it is again the city state's "small geographic and demographic size [that] compels them to rely on foreign mercenaries".[895] Similarly, efforts to improve military have been hindered by demographics.[896] This is true, but other factors – namely rentierism and dynastic monarchism – have again hindered reforms and reinforced foreign influence. In populated Saudi Arabia, the military is also underdeveloped – and foreign experts have been hired repeatedly to reform it.[897] Thus, it is not only the lack of manpower, but of *competent* manpower, noted in both armies,[898] which has brought foreigners in the professionalization of Gulf armies.[899] Undoubtedly, the failure of domestic efforts to recruit nationals into the armed forces has *de facto* outsourced defence tasks to various foreign contingents – Indians, then Pakistani, Jordanian, Omani or Yemeni military – on a rotating basis.

At the doctrinal level, historical studies show that both in the UAE and Qatar foreign experts have shaped the military administration. The idea of the military in the sheikhdoms originates rather in British initiatives taken between the 1920s and the independences of 1971. The British meant to secure the borders of the Gulf throughout alternative means as it lost its capacity to project military power throughout the region.[900] The influence of foreign experts endured the growth of the rentier state. For instance, the decision in the UAE to unify armed forces was based on "a technical report elaborated by Saudis, Jordanians and Kuwaitis officers".[901] Also important is the infatuation of the *khaleeji* elite with Western doctrines when igniting military reforms. The will in the 1990s to develop military spending in the UAE is thus considered by Ardemagni to "be probably due to the raising power of a new generation of princes' and the ascendance of a new, Western-educated elite of technocrats".[902] With the elevation of education levels in both countries, and with the increased military spending, dependence on foreign experts, had increased, not the opposite. In the UAE, the current

893 Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars*, 285.
894 Yates, 'Western Expatriates in the UAE Armed Forces, 1964–2015'.
895 Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East', 68.
896 Hertog, 'Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States', 402.
897 Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East', 87; Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia*, 89; Ramazani and Kechichian, *The Gulf Cooperation Council*, 85.
898 Davidson, 'Dubai and the United Arab Emirates', 435.
899 Gulf spending on arms also increases the city states' reliance on the expertise of foreign partners that sell them.
900 Rossiter, 'Britain and the Development of Professional Security Forces in the Gulf Arab States, 1921-71'.
901 Ardemagni, 'United Arab Emirates' Armed Forces in the Federation-Building Process', 45.
902 Ardemagni, 46.

importance of former Blackwater chief executive Erik Prince has surfaced in the formation of counterterrorist strategy in the region, notably in Yemen.[903] In Qatar, the British influence is widely felt with the UK MoD's Defence Co-operation Agreement with the State of Qatar, which produced a Joint Command and Staff College for Qatar's armed forces.[904]

In short, and despite its complex domestic structure, the UAE has achieved more in military terms than its Qatari neighbour, whose military remains largely untested.[905] With its sustained efforts since the 1990s to improve its military capabilities,[906] the UAE has established what is for some "the second most advanced [air force] in the Middle East, after Israel".[907] Indeed, the ongoing war in Yemen has served to illustrate that "UAE pilots in Yemen are as good, if not better than any Spanish or Italian" (ad21) and that the Emirates have a unique experience, according to Gulf standards, in counterinsurgency.[908]

Foreign experts in other rentier states

Another way to consolidate the findings of this work is to apply its theoretical framework to other rentier states. I adopt for that purpose a selective approach. Indeed, dynastic monarchism's scope conditions have been outlined by Herb to include Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and exclude other Arab or rentier states like Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq or Iran.[909] Similarly, Hertog has compared and contrasted rentier bureaucracies in other regions in the world. This work corroborates his findings on rentier bureaucracies in the more striking cases of the smaller Arabian city states.[910] The theory-building part of this thesis however is concerned with the role foreign experts play in the formulation of foreign policy in rentier states. Its novelty requires further empirical corroboration.

As a preliminary probe into foreign experts' influence in other rentier contexts, I examine their role, based on the existing secondary literature, in other case studies – Kazakhstan,

[903] Entous et al., 'Blackwater Founder Held Secret Seychelles Meeting to Establish Trump-Putin Back Channel'; Mazzetti and Hager, 'Blackwater Founder Forms Secret Army for Arab State'.
[904] 'Serco to Deliver Qatar Armed Forces Staff Training'.
[905] Bahgat, 'Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf'.
[906] Hertog, 'Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States', 402.
[907] Davidson, 'Dubai and the United Arab Emirates', 434; Black, 'UAE's Leading Role against Isis Reveals Its Wider Ambitions'.
[908] 'Uae's Military Priorities in Yemen'.
[909] Herb, *All in the Family*.
[910] Other examples specifically illuminate the fragmentation of rentier state foreign policy. For instance, Indonesia is said to have a strikingly split foreign policy machinery characterized by "sluggish, inept responses to diplomatic disputes", and a civil service that has often ignored presidential or ministerial instructions. See Fealy and White, 'Indonesia's "Great Power" Aspirations', 97.

Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Brunei, Mexico and Nigeria. Unlike the Gulf sheikhdoms, none of these countries are "extreme" rentier states. Therefore, if the influence of foreign experts is reinforced by rentierism, it should decrease in these less "extreme" rentier cases. These cases also vary in size, geography, or colonial history. This preliminary survey is general. Indeed, in addition to making this probe feasible, it does not matter theoretically that I do not focus on foreign experts *only* in foreign aid. On the contrary, that foreign experts matter in other policies where they are usually absent would provide additional support to my claim.

In brief, I find partial support for this theoretical argument. The critical juncture of independence, rather than the size of the state, is the first element that matters to explain foreign experts' influence. Nigeria (1960), Brunei (1984) or Kazakhstan (1991) have relied on the work of prior colonial civil servants to build their own capacities. Specifically, it is the level of educational attainment prior to independence that conditions foreign experts' subsequent role. For instance, save for the specific development of its oil industry, Norway has not relied on the inflow of foreign expertise to conduct its own affairs.[911] Similarly in Venezuela, though rentier dynamics have hindered development, sufficient competent national human resources existed to fuel reform. Conversely, Nigeria's lack of early investment in education has maintained the reliance on foreign expertise.[912] However, I do find support in all cases of the protective impact of the rentier state on established foreign experts. Once established, foreign experts (or their ideas) seem harder to disband.

In Venezuela, hydrocarbon wealth exploitation since the early 1920s has consolidated a bureaucracy characterized by personal loyalties and a "spoils system". Significantly, attempts to reform the public administration with merit-based laws never succeeded, "probably because the government thought purges of civil servants would jeopardize political stability".[913] However, there is no immediate evidence in the area-studies literature that foreign experts prospered in this favourable institutional environment. Yet, their influence may be read in the hollows of the Venezuelan bureaucracy's policy failures. For instance, skilled Venezuelans in the extractive industry were trained in the early 1970s by foreign companies, before the oil industry was nationalized.[914] Meanwhile, increasing education spending by twenty times in the 1980s[915] only

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[911] Bayulgen, *Foreign Investment and Political Regimes*, 37–38; 'The Iraqi Who Saved Norway from Oil'.
[912] Evans, *Journal of the International Relations and Affairs Group, Volume V, Issue II*, 302.
[913] Cornell and Lapuente, 'Meritocratic Administration and Democratic Stability', 1293–94.
[914] Ironically, many among this "oil diaspora" have since then been employed in the Gulf states. See 'Brain Haemorrhage'.
[915] Dunning, *Crude Democracy Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*.

made the administration "bigger, not better".[916] The discrepancy between imported and domestically available expertise was unearthed, decades later, in 2003. Then, the government decided to fire "the majority of the management and technical experts [of the national oil company][…] following the political conflict that led to a strike".[917] Such mismanagement – 18,000 people were fired, from board members to marketing – is considered as having deteriorated the performance of the company to this date.[918] In short, Venezuela contradicts the claim that foreign experts may endure in rentier states, but not that their authoritative knowledge is increasingly important in these reform-averse states. As for the removal of reformists in Qatar in the 1970s, the eviction of foreign experts in Venezuela appears to have worsened the quality of reforms.

In Mexico, where a sizeable non-oil economic sector exists, the oil rent has enlarged an overweight bureaucracy to the detriment of merit-based public employment. If reforms to streamline the public sector in the 1980s and 1990s have reduced the number of civil servants, those remaining in office have nonetheless become costlier.[919] In line with rentier predictions, the Mexican system failed in training officials and in ensuring "policy consistency and continuity".[920] Conversely, the dysfunctional bureaucracy increasingly accommodated, over time, Western-oriented experts. For instance, while US-trained Mexican economists were domestically isolated in the 1960s and 1970s, they became increasingly influential in the 1980s despite administrative downsizing.[921]

In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan a post-colonial continuity with the Soviet era has bequeathed a pool of educated personnel and an established bureaucracy to the independent states.[922] The debate on foreign experts in these countries is inconclusive. For some, the role of foreign experts is limited to the signing of contracts with the Western-led extractive industry.[923] Others, though without systematic and conclusive findings, argue that foreign advisers had an immediate impact, for instance on monetary policy, in the aftermath of independence, which then quickly waned.[924] Last, more promising accounts underline a reinforcement of experts

[916] *Educational Reform and Administrative Development*.
[917] Igor Hernandez and Francisco Monaldi, 'Weathering Collapse', 6.
[918] Kott, 'Assessing Whether Oil Dependency in Venezuela Contributes to National Instability', 79.
[919] Farfán-Mares, 'Non-Embedded Autonomy', 205–11.
[920] Farfán-Mares, 241.
[921] Schwegler, 'Take It from the Top (Down)?', 684.
[922] Passholt, in Ayazbekov, 'Independent Kazakhstan and the "Black Box" of Decision-Making', 41; Franke, Gawrich, and Alakbarov, 'Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States', 133.
[923] Franke, Gawrich, and Alakbarov, 'Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States'.
[924] Ayazbekov, 'Independent Kazakhstan and the "Black Box" of Decision-Making', 66.

thanks to the increasing number of Western-trained personnel.[925] If it cannot be firmly established that failing bureaucracies have increased the post-Soviet republics' dependence on foreign expertise, it is nonetheless striking that these bureaucracies have often resorted to foreign consultancies (Merrill Lynch and PricewaterhouseCoopers in Kazakhstan), notably during the oil privatization programs of the 1990s, to bypass the reform-adverse, mid-level management of the state industry.[926]

In Brunei, reforming the administration has shown the capacity for inertia of rentier bureaucracies. Public management reforms have led to "strategic resistance" and "institutional maintenance of the bureaucracy".[927] By contrast, the recently independent state continues to rely on foreign consultants and experts to propose, implement reforms, as well as act for the state in postings as crucial as the judiciary.[928] Finally in Nigeria, though scholars stress the fragmentation of Nigerian bureaucracy, none refer to the increasing role of foreign experts – these are simply not considered.[929] This is problematic, considering that observers considered as late as 2015 that, as in many Western African states, Nigeria's lack of early investment in education has maintained the reliance on foreign experts in the extractive industry.[930]

These brief insights should be considered with caution. Given the lack of data, it would be rash to view them as sufficient to confirm or falsify the findings of Chapter 4. However, it already appears in these accounts that a country's size does not matter as much as its educational fabric; and that foreign expertise may continue to matter long after the (often reductionist) critical-juncture of political independence. Having elaborated on the possible empirical extensions of this work, I now conclude on its theoretical and policy implications.

Theoretical implications

Confronting rentier lenses, which have originated in Gulf studies, with more "mainstream" political science contributions – principal–agent theory for instance – is productive. The Arabian Peninsula has too often been studied with preconceived ideas of "exceptionalism" which have

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[925] Olcott, *Kazakhstan*, 133.
[926] Ostrowski, *Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan*, 46.
[927] Said and F, 'Implementing Performance Management in Brunei'.
[928] Thambipillai, 'Brunei Darussalam', 93;99.
[929] Oparah, 'The Foreign Policy Process of Nigeria', 254–88; Asobie, *Domestic Political Structure and Foreign Policy The Nigerian Experience 1960-1974*.
[930] Evans, *Journal of the International Relations and Affairs Group, Volume V, Issue II*, 302.

isolated it from the constructive input of other subfields of the discipline.[931] The sheikhdoms are for instance interesting embodiments of the multiple principals model, whose application has until now been limited to Western democracies.

Using a simple principal–agent model has served to uncover how the Gulf politics have lent themselves to several misrepresentations of "exceptionalism". Indeed, there is more logic and continuity in Gulf policymaking than the apparent "randomness" or "experimentation" that is usually associated with it. Rulers and their foreign advisers have laid down long-term objectives in foreign aid, as in other sectors. Many discontinuities observed during the implementation of these reforms are not the result of sanguine royal U-turns but of the characteristic intra-familial accommodation and administrative deficiencies of rentier and dynastic states. In principal–agent terms, these are common delegation problems, only made more acute in rentier contexts. Put simply, wealth does not necessarily make one half-witted or almighty. Gulf administrations, and even Gulf leaders, may only impose policies on certain aid organizations, not all, and certainly not on those that are too large and too autonomous for the limited administration to control.

This thesis also supports the emerging idea that rentier lenses must be combined with other explanatory factors to provide a satisfying explanation to social phenomena in the Gulf states.[932] The segmentation of the Gulf bureaucracy reinforces the influence of foreign experts. In turn, the coexistence of different ideas, of different policy orientations, may further the divisions within the aid landscape. In short, there is a feedback loop operating between rentier and dynastic dynamics on the one hand, and the role of foreign experts on the other. In both countries for instance, foreign have taken hold of domestic institutions and regional institutions in the 1970s and increased the divergence between each level in terms of aid standards. Reformists of the Islamic Development Bank have followed the toolkit of Western multilateral institutions on donor proliferation and aid transparency. Meanwhile, first-generation organizations have continued to operate without governmental supervision - if even with a proper website. In both countries also, some experts are bringing different organizations closer to one another – as has been the role of MICAD in the UAE to connect the first and most recent generations of aid actors in common seminars. In short, rentierism and foreign experts are not mutually exclusive, but complementary, explanations.

[931] Lawson, 'From Here We Begin'; Mazawi and Sultana, *World Yearbook of Education 2010*, 2.
[932] POMEPS, *POMEPS Conversations 43 with Michael Herb ~ 12/29/14*.

Policy implications

In addition to these theoretical contributions on the foreign policy of rentier states, policy implications may also be derived from this work. Several questions may be left under consideration regarding the future embedding of non-Western donors in the existing multilateral aid system. For Gulf donors, a series of challenges lie ahead.

First, evidently, the future of hydrocarbon reserves is important. How will the Qatari and Emirati donors fare on multilateralism under increasing economic diversification and therefore increasing economic interdependence? Milner argues that countries that are more involved in international trade should be more likely to be bilateral "so that they can more directly influence their trading partners, actual and potential."[933] Oil is only a limited entry into international trade as it creates a unilateral commercial dependency that enables the political isolation of fossil fuel exporters.[934] With economic diversification therefore, as the case of Dubai shows, it might be so that more and more of the contributions are directed towards bilateral projects, or earmarked funding. There is support for Milner's argument in the latest iteration of the UAE's foreign aid strategy, which states that commercial interests should become more important in the decision to disburse Emirati aid.[935] If in Qatar such an economic orientation might take precedence in the long run, in the case of the UAE, how would a bilaterally oriented foreign aid policy square with Abu Dhabi's wish to be recognized as a solid federation through its participation in multilateral endeavours?

Second, the issue of informal politics will become increasingly problematic for Gulf rulers. If this thesis has shown the contrasted effects of informal and institutionalized practices in the Gulf – such as dynastic monarchism - in no way should it be understood as sympathetic to informal institutions. Indeed, overall, whether in failed Qatari or successful Emirati reforms, the private circulation of information in the country, that often disregards transparency when the different emirates negotiate, does not facilitate international organizations' work: these are often informed at the last minute of projects or initiatives and do not necessarily know where the decision-making power lies.

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[933] Milner, in Hawkins, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*.
[934] Ross and Voeten, 'Oil and International Cooperation'.
[935] 'Summary of the UAE Policy for Foreign Assistance (2017 – 2021)'.

Relatedly, as Gulf donors engage increasingly in Western platforms, the problematic nature of their civil society, arranged around governmental-organized aid organizations (GONGO's), will be opposed to them. This weakness is already noted, even if in vague terms, in the various Arab Human Development Reports produced by the UN.[936] Even for the UAE, which is gaining respectability as a donor, the degree of control over civil society is still strikingly higher than in neighbouring Kuwait. There, a legal environment provides stability for civil society that is yet to be found in Abu Dhabi, Dubai or Doha. If Gulf rulers justify limitations to charitable and philanthropic activities with the fight against terrorism, they ultimately risk hindering the expansion of the philanthropic sector.[937]

Last, Gulf leaders will increasingly have to articulate their image as Islamic donors with the practice of their most active aid actors. The convergence of Islamic and European charities is already operating. This is a somewhat surprising development. In the 1990s, seeing the inefficient imitation by reformists of Western institutions in the Arab world, critics have argued that Arab aid institutions would be more efficient if more tailored to the socio-cultural context in which they operated. Performers in the Gulf are doing the exact opposite. They are advocating Western-type slim corporate structures that they dress in neo-orthodox clothes. For instance, Qatar Foundation entities – Education Above All, Silatech, Reach Out to Asia – are deemed very cost-efficient because the Qatar Foundation *alma mater* covers all administrative expenses. The funds raised are thus completely disbursed to recipients, in accordance with the Islamic culture of aid. In other words, Qatar Foundation's corporate structure – an incubator for aid organizations – enables charities to advertise their costless, Islamic-compatible working methods. Other organizations, like Dubai Cares, have also unabashedly adopted Western-defined semantics and objectives.[938] This has not escaped critics who see in this liberal engineering a form of Western imperialism.[939] How these emerging donors will avoid complete assimilation in Western donorship will also entertain scholars and policymakers for years to come.

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[936] Dahi, in Makdisi and Prashad, *Land of Blue Helmets*, 397; 'Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR)'.
[937] Khafagy, 'Gulf Philanthropy: Structural, Domestic and Global Challenges', 4.
[938] Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 17.
[939] Al-Omar, *Bureaucracy State and Development in Kuwait and Arab Gulf States*, 19–26; Nonneman, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, 77; Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition*, 41; 79; Jones, 'Seeing Like an Autocrat', 35; Mathur, in Pitt and Weiss, *The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies*, 180; Khafagy, 'Gulf Philanthropy: Structural, Domestic and Global Challenges', 6; Troit, 'Histoire et Enjeux de l'Aide Internationale Des Emirats Arabes Unis: Une Stratégie de Bailleur Fédérale, Entre Pluralité et Unité', 15.

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Appendix: Table of interviews

Qatar				Abu Dhabi			
q1	18/02/2016	Program manager	Tarsheed consultancy	ad1	02/12/2015	Sub-regional Coordinator for the GCC States and Yemen	FAO
q2	28/02/2016	Program manager	Silatech, Qatar Foundation	ad2	22/11/2015	Director	DECC, MOFA
q3	24/02/2016	Director	Ministry of Finance	ad3	01/11/2015	Advisor	Representation of Pakistan to IRENA
q4	24/02/2016	Advisor	Education Above All; Qatar Foundation	ad4	29/10/2015	Trade Counsellor	EU Delegation
q5	22/02/2016	Professor, former UN officer	School of Foreign Service - Georgetown University Qatar	ad5	05/11/2015	Advisor	ADNOC
q6	25/02/2016	Official	UNESCO office in Doha	ad6	12/11/2015	Official	Emirates Diplomatic Academy
q7	22/02/2016	Advisor to general manager	Sheikh Eid Charitable Association, charity	ad7	09/12/2015	Resident Coordinator	UNDP
q8	22/02/2016	General manager	Sheikh Eid Charitable Association, charity	ad8	19/11/2015	Project Manager	Renewable energy company
q9	17/02/2016	Advisor	Qatar Development Fund	ad9	19/11/2015	Engineer	Directorate Clean Energy and Climate Change, Ministry of Energy
q10	17/02/2016	Head of Population Statistics Section	Ministry of Development Planning and	ad10	09/12/2016	Manager	Sponsorship Department, UAE Red Crescent

			Statistics				
q11	17/02/2016	Advisor	Population and Social Statistics Department, Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics	ad11	13/12/2015	Director	Multilateral Partnerships Department, MICAD
q12	15/02/2016	Youth and Education Projects Manager	Reach Out to Asia, Qatar Foundation	ad12	14/12/2015	Officials (3 people)	Policy Planning Department, MOFA
q13	11/02/2016	Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs	Gulf Cooperation Council	ad13	25/10/2015	Advisor/Executive Director	Environment Agency Abu Dhabi/MBZ Foundation
q14	10/02/2016	Assistant Director, Economic Service	French Embassy	a14	15/12/2015	Head of Information and Reporting Section	Aid Coordination Department, MICAD
q15	09/02/2016	Technical advisor, Program Education in security and conflict	Qatar Foundation	ad15	17/11/2015	General Manager Office team (3 people)	Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation
q16	04/02/2016	Director of International Relations	Qatar Red Crescent	ad16	17/11/2015	Official	Operations Department, Abu Dhabi Fund for Development
q17	03/02/2016	Advisor	Conservation and Energy Efficiency Department, Tarsheed, Kahramaa	ad17	14/12/2015	Team Advisor & Financial Officer	Abu Dhabi Fund for Development
q18	03/02/2016	Environmental engineer	Directorate for Climate Change, Ministry of	ad18	29/11/2015	Director & Advisor	International Financial Relations, Representative to OFID, Ministry of Finance

			Environment				
q19	03/02/2016	General Manager Advisor	Regulatory Agency for Charitable Affairs; Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs	ad19	19/11/2015	Director of Biological Diversity	Ministry of Environment and Water
q20	02/02/2016	Director	International Organisations and Conferences Department, MOFA	ad20	30/11/2015	Director, Office of Sponsored Programs	Masdar Institute
q21	02/02/2016	Advisor	International Development Department , MOFA	ad21	30/11/2015	Diplomat	French Embassy
q22	30/01/2016	CEO	Estedama	ad22	19/11/2015	CEO	Green company
q23	22/01/2016	Journalist and activist	ENKA; Qatar News Agency	ad23	24/10/2015	Partner	Development aid consultancy
q24	21/01/2016	Environmental engineer	Directorate for Climate Change, Ministry of Environment	**Dubai**			
q25	21/01/2016	Adviser	Diplomatic Institute, MOFA	dub1	19/11/2015	COO & project manager (2)	Green company
q26	21/01/2016	Senior Official	Department of International Technical Cooperation, MOFA	dub2	16/12/2016	Programs Director	Dubai Cares
q27	15/01/2016	Founder and board member	Arab Youth Movement for Climate - Qatar	dub3	16/12/2016	Researcher	International Humanitarian City
Paris				dub4	29/11/2015	Director Human Capital	large Dubai-based foundation
oecd1	10/01/2017	Official	Middle East and	dub5	17/11/2015	Director	Mohammed bin Rashid

			Africa, Global Relations Secretariat, OECD
oecd2	20/12/2016	Official	Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
oecd3	14/12/2016	Analyst	Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
oecd4	13/12/2016	Researcher	Global Private Philanthropy for Development Survey, OECD
oecd5	7/12/2016	Policy Analyst	Fragility, conflict, humanitarian aid, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
oecd6	7/12/2016	Analyst	Development Finance and Statistics, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
oecd7	7/12/2016	Senior Policy Analyst	Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
oecd8	7/12/2016	Advisor	Multilateral Aid, Development Co-operation

			School of Government
dub6	23/11/2015	Marketing Specialist	Noor Foundation
dub7	18/11/2015	Chairperson	Emirates Environmental Group
dub8	11/11/2015	Senior Adviser	Emirates Competitiveness Council
Geneva			
g1	16/06/2015	Director	Gulf Research Foundation

		Directorate, OECD