The Political Ecology of Regionalism.
STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN NINE EUROPEAN REGIONS

by

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Preface and acknowledgements

Most of the empirical research for this work was undertaken at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) of Mannheim University where I was co-coordinator of the project on Regionen als Handlungseinheiten in der europäischen Politik from 1993 to 1996. The project was funded by a generous grant from the Volkswagen Foundation. Some of our external teams also managed to raise substantial resources for field work. One could say that the results presented in this study are a by-product of the main project. Beate Kohler-Koch, who directed it, gave me an opportunity to pursue an idee fixe that had obsessed me for quite some time -- to undertake a comparative network analysis with a maximum number of cases. Although not all members of the Mannheim team shared my enthusiasm for the structural perspective, I succeeded in getting two network questions placed within the framework of the general questionnaire and thus finally could satisfy my old addiction. Many people helped me in putting this work together. At the Centre, Michele Knodt, Fabrice Larat and Santo Umberti of the project team were always available for discussion. Franz Urban Pappi, then director of the MZES and Christian Melbeck, director of the institute's computing centre, provided invaluable inputs both in conceptual and in methodological terms. Without Christian's help I would have gotten lost in the intricacies of my networks.

Many other members of our associate teams assisted in the collection of the data and ensured that the data was complete. These were Emmanuel Négrier and William Genieys of Montpellier University (CEPEL), Bernard Jouve of Lyon University (ENTPE), Francesc Morata and Neus Gómez Matarán of the Autonoma in Barcelona, Angela Airoli of Bocconi University and of Gruppo Clas (Milan) and, finally, Sean Loughlin and Jörg Matthæs of the University of Wales/College of Cardiff. To all of them I owe a great deal of gratitude, not least because they did not hesitate to ask their respondents obscure questions without having any idea what I intended to do with the answers. Many thanks also go to Giuliano Bianchi of Siena University, the then president of IRES Toscana, who encouraged me to undertake a first test of the method in an admittedly exotic political environment (Sicily). In the end, it turned out that the exotic nature of this case actually served to sharpen my understanding of the potentials and the limits of network analysis.

These thanks would not be complete without mentioning those who guided my endeavours over a longer period of time. These were, first of all, my professors, Colin Crouch and Philippe Schmitter, who have set me on the track of corporatist and, perhaps more importantly, comparative research. Due, in part, to their restlessness and, in part, to my own moves, this was no easy apprenticeship and more often resembled long-distance learning than anything else. Nevertheless, before he left for Oxford, I had a chance to attend Crouch’s research seminar on political economy and social stratification at the LSE. Some time later, just after my first arrival at the EUI more than ten years ago, Schmitter left for Stanford University and left me alone with all the PIGs, BIAS and other animals of the European zoo I intended to study originally. Fortunately, others were still around and willing to discuss problems of the organizational fauna of capitalist societies. Volker Schneider was one of them. I am not sure whether he would accept responsibility for this study but he is surely responsible for both the method applied and its title. The dissertation he submitted at about the time I had just started at the Badia, haunted me. It took a long time of homework -- there are autodidacts in network analysis -- before I became familiar with the method and found the resources to apply it. These moves and changes in others' lives as well as my own, substantially changed the focus of my work which, originally, had been on the European Union. Although the regions did not replace this entirely, over time, they became my major field of concern. Not being a regionalist myself and not driven, hence, by motives of territorial distinctiveness or by
the (short-sighted) hope for a Europe of the Regions, this may not seem a self-evident move. In fact, most of the academic output in the regional business seemed utterly boring to me and I am not sure whether I would have stayed with the subject if it were not for Carlo Trigilia. Trigilia’s early work opened up new and exciting horizons and, since then, has remained a compass in the endless sea of literature on economic and political space.

If Colin Crouch, Philippe Schmitter, Volker Schneider and Carlo Trigilia now form the jury which has to evaluate the quality of this work, this is not by accident. There is nobody who would know better which of its parts have been worth the effort and which not.
The stance adopted here - at the cost of economy of explanation - is that nothing can be taken for granted, everything needs to be explained.


1

Introduction

The president of the regional employers’ associations had a glance at the briefings one of his assistants was frequently preparing on the most recent policy events being reported by the press that are of relevance to the concerns of the group’s members. He got quite upset, when picking up the note on the last environmental committee’s deliberations about an improvement of water quality standards in the region. As a result of package deals during the formation of the regional coalition government, environmentalists of various political factions had acquired the majority in the committee. Following “the polluter pays principle”, the body’s proposal - due to be voted upon by the assembly within the following week - foresaw the installation of costly filter equipment to be made binding to all firms using adjacent rivers for the emission of industrial sewage. It took the president less than one morning at the phone to mobilize not only his own group’s membership but also that of the six or seven equally affected associations. He also contacted a number of consultants, habitually employed by the association to prove that the benefits of decisions of that kind stood in no relationship to the costs. At the end of the day, the president was assured by leading members of the other associations that the proposal would not be voted upon by the assembly and, instead, be returned to the committee, with the recommendation to soften the obligatory prescriptions according to the cost-benefit analysis meanwhile undertaken by a number of highly reputable experts.

As if this would not suffice, the firmly established machine of interorganizational relations triggered yet another initiative: when the secretary general of the region’s chamber of industry heard of the environmentalists’ attack, he immediately contacted the responsible official of one of the affiliated provincial chambers. This latter, according to an intraregional agreement among the other five chambers operating at that level, had been given the task of dealing with environmental issues that affected the entire territory of the region. The official of the provincial chamber needed a couple of days until he was able to present the public a code of conduct negotiated among the representatives of various professional categories, according to which the matter would be solved by the affected groups themselves, i.e. by way of self-regulation.

At a first glance, this story may not be worth a mention. To many, it might have had more appeal if it had been the unions or the environmentalists benefitting most from this type of collective action. Yet, this would not have changed the significance of the general pattern to be explained. The initiative taken by the industrialists’ president saved the various professional categories millions of investments without, as one might have expected, completely dissatisfying the region’s environmentalists: the network of regional associations, in concert with a number of leading political figures and with the chamber responsible for environmental issues, had managed to receive a major EU subsidy for the installation of filter equipment that, together with the additional funds paid out by regional authorities, reduced costs to individual entrepreneurs by about eighty percent. The above example represents an attempt to turn a public bad into a public good. This is a particularly complicated procedure requiring network structures likely to exist in only a small number of regions. Many public goods at the regional level do not need to be produced by way of coming to grips with external diseconomies. The conditions for producing them may just lie untapped and represent under-utilized resources in principle being available, if the system of interorganizational relations were
less fragmented, ideologically split, and encapsulated in a multitude of territorial and functional parochialisms.

It is reasonable to believe that, where private actors are not even in a position to unite in defense against private bads, i.e. to get organized in the interest of demanding special treatment for their category, it is very unlikely that they will manage to combine in the mutual interest of contributing to their territory's supply with public goods. By way of pointing to the most important ingredients necessary for the emergence of a concerted response to top-down regulation and, more important in the present context, of regional strategies pursuing self-propelling growth, the following is worth mentioning: the existence of near-to-monopoly representation of each industrial sector or branch by just one association; the epicentre of territorial collective action by organized interests at the regional as opposed to sub-regional, provincial or municipal levels; high degrees of political entrepreneurship and organizational intelligence among the interest group leaders; above average levels of trust among the representatives of various groups that information exchanged among them is reliable and not held back in the interest of unilateral advantages, i.e. mechanisms controlling opportunist behaviour and free-riding; (network) consciousness about organizational interdependencies and capacities for other-regardingness; the existence of a chamber system with compulsory membership being endowed public or semi-public status; high degrees of functional differentiation and job-sharing among the chambers affiliated to their regional level representation; and, last but not least, excellent relations to DG XVI of the EU-Commission or to other branches of the European bureaucracy, either by activating the region’s “fifth column” within the Commission’s services or by making use of a representational office in Brussels. Good relations to national and to transnational peak or sectoral associations operating in the national capital and in Brussels may, of course, also be of importance.

Many other, less obvious conditions could be added to that. For example, the very fact that there has been an issue on the political agenda of the regional assembly, so encompassing and far-reaching as represented by binding environmental regulation, makes it likely that we have to do with a political system in which regional government is endowed substantial political capacities. Equally likely is a high representational power and reputation held by each single association, i.e. a high inclination of individual firms to act collectively through their association or, alternatively, the existence of highly valued selective or categorical benefits resulting from group membership. An attitude of problem-solving -- as opposed to bargaining -- would promote this type of response. The list is probably not complete. It merely represents one possible scenario -- not necessarily an ideal-type -- and many variations among individual elements may be imagined which would equally support collective group responses of this kind. What is more important is the fact that if, as can be assumed, the presence across Europe’s territories of organizational capacities of the sort just mentioned is dramatically diverging, then this will have significant implications for territorial competition in a Europe of the Regions and, equally, for the design and implementation of European regional policies. Disparities of this kind are likely to be at least as decisive as is the endowment of regions with natural resources, human capital, and industrial sites. While this would call for more and better comparative research, most of the work published so far lacks the methodological devices necessary for an investigation of the kind of non-economic disparities that are not exclusively grounded in political constitutions or in otherwise formalized rules.

Traditional studies on regions have focused on the history of decentralization in different countries or on the competences and, occasionally, the performances of regional governments in these countries. An alternative approach, limited, however, to only a handful of cases, focuses on regional mobilization, i.e. on the ethnic, linguistic and historical specificities, for example, of various regional nationalisms. Although these are interesting studies in themselves, their major shortcoming is the lack of a truly comparative approach based on empirical analysis and aimed at the collection of data that could be subjected to verification and help building up a body of literature being cumulative and not contradictory in the evidence provided for individual cases. The
approaches above are limited, also, in terms of the actors and institutions being analyzed. In most cases, these remain public actors, i.e. the representatives of regional government agencies. More recently, this constraint has been tried to overcome, namely by a number of regional policy analyses. These approach their analytical targets -- habitually the implementation of EU structural policies at the regional level -- by adopting a policy network perspective. Policy networks, by definition, are not restricted to any one particular category of actors. However, these studies remain as descriptive as the traditional approaches. They hardly ever compare systematically, focus on highly specific policies, and limit attention to one or, at best, a couple of individual cases. They are not able to test the far-reaching claims that are frequently made, a propos the structuring of regional networks, in a comparative cross-regional perspective. In this study, I am mainly concerned with contributions by the latter school of thought.

Many scholars of that school would not hesitate to ascribe the hypothetical region presented in the above narrative rather specific labels. For example, the business response to regional environmental regulation would probably be labelled corporatist, or enterprise-driven corporatism. The story would then be presented to the readership in terms of a typically corporatist policy network, characteristic of state-society or of public-private relationships in that region. The important point to be made here, is that the story merely represents a response to one particular policy event. It may well be that this response has been contingent on the prominence environmental issues happened to occupy on the agenda of regional policymakers at that time. How would the organizations react if a similar event were to occur at a different point in time, i.e. when environmental issues were less salient? What would happen if the issues at stake were not of a regulatory kind, but would concern the distribution of public resources, for example, for R&D or for product and process innovation? Would the industrialists' response be equally cohesive then? Would they split up in various factions or professional categories? A completely different scenario may emerge if we were to shift to another policy, say, social policy. Similarly, who would be the main actors if the issue at stake were industrial restructuring, or the announced closure of the regional branch of the multinational's automobile plant? Would it be trade unions, then, which would occupy the network's center or, as before, the industrialists? Would there be a joint-response, including representatives of different social classes, or would it be a scenario of "corporatism without labour"?

These are important questions hardly ever addressed in the existing literature. We shall try to answer them by widening the scope of analysis. This study focuses on interorganizational relations among key actors of territorial networks in nine European regions. Not individual policies are being analyzed but, rather, a wider area, or policy domain, called regional development. Making use of a term recently introduced by Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider (1997), I argue that this domain is likely to reflect the general pattern of state-society relations characteristic of a region, i.e. its political ecology. The first claim made in this work is, indeed, that differences in the structuring of these relations, on the one hand, in individual policies and, on the other hand, in more encompassing domains such as the one studied here, are less pronounced than, for example, in functional networks at the national and supranational levels. Territorial networks, because of their boundedness, are less differentiated and less flexible than, for example, supranational or multilevel networks dealing with the definition of emission standards in the European automobile industry. This means that actors being centrally placed within the organizational space of one policy are likely to be centrally placed in the space of another policy as well. Indeed, they are likely to be centrally placed within the political ecology of the region altogether. With a view to the example introduced above, this would imply that the group of employer organizations that resulted to be so extraordinarily active in the field of environmental policy initiatives would also dominate and control policies in other areas, for example, industrial restructuring, professional training, social policy. Trade unions are likely to be marginalized in this political ecology, and this would concern even those areas most of concern to their members.
The second claim is directly linked to the first. Territorial networks cannot easily be ascribed political attributes such as corporatism, pluralism, statism, clientelism. At least, such attributes cannot be derived from the study of individual policies. In order to come up with unambiguous descriptions, one would need to consider the entire organizational ecology, not just one policy event or policy issue. Not less of importance, political attributes of territorial networks cannot be derived from those characterizing the polity of a country as a whole. Although regions of one country operate with the same set of institutions and organizations, variety in the way how these merge to form territorial networks is extremely pronounced. The ascription of political properties to regions, or to regional systems of action, therefore, is an empirical question. There is, also, no logic, or functional imperative, able to dictate "members" of an interorganizational network how to structure their relations in order to arrive at desired outcomes. The narrative above remains particular to the structure of the hypothetical region imagined. In this specific form, no other region is likely to react to internal pressure.

Behavioral attitudes, of course, can change and so can structures. However, and this is the third claim, the latter are less likely to change in a short to medium-term perspective than the former. This is true, in particular, for the structures of political ecologies. For example, I strongly doubt that the provisions that form part of the EU's structural funds reforms, i.e. partnership and subsidiarity, will have major impacts on the ways how regional actors structure their relations. These provisions may convince public authorities to set up formal joint monitoring committees that also include representatives of the private sector. The implementation of specific EU programmes or projects may jointly be undertaken by regional government divisions and members of regional employer associations, but this is not likely to indicate major changes in the set-up of the ecology as a whole. Where they were marginalized before the event of the structural funds reforms, interests groups are likely to remain marginalized for a long time to come. Or, as David Knoke et.al. (1996:8) have put it, "policy domains develop fairly stable power structures dominated by a core of peak associations and governmental actors."

The results of our study suggest that even changing political majorities have only marginal influence on the division of power in an ecology of actors. Institutional inertia is very pronounced and "role incumbents [may] come and go, but the power configurations among the positions remain fairly stable" (Knoke 1990a:7).

The forth claim made in this study has to do with the second. The literature is full of the most exotic attributes given to what is usually termed a regional policy network. Such a network, according to the literature studied for this work and presented in Chapter Three, may be corporatist, techno-corporatist, staged-corporatist, pluralist, statist or etatist, enterprise driven, clientelist, institutionally saturated or unsaturated and so forth. It frequently happens that these attributes are said to rest on specific configurations of networks such as, for example, density, centrality, redundancy and multiplexity. While all of these are properties taken from the tool box of sociological network analysis, they are usually operated in a highly metaphorical fashion. In other words, there is not a single study, so far, that has set out to scrutinize the structure of territorial networks empirically. I strongly doubt that any of the political properties could sui generis be ascribed structural properties that were typical of it. There is nothing justifying the belief that, for example, a corporatist network is more or less hierarchical than a pluralist network. A clientelist network, with high degrees of unilateral dependence, can as much rest on collaboration as can a network of a country or a region characterized by the rule of law, by transparency in interorganizational relations, and by highly autonomous but interdependent organizations.

All this must make this study highly unsatisfactory for those who expect far-reaching generalizations and elegant models for the conceptualization of regional networks in an emerging scenario of multilevel governance. No rule of thumb could be identified in this study according to which actors would, or even should, behave and structure their contact portfolios in the face of internal or external pressures. The general message is and, I guess, remains diversity. Everything needs to be explained and hardly anything can be taken for granted. That, admittedly, makes the reading of this text quite
cumbersome. However, I have found no alternative to this present way of representing and interpreting my data. I would have liked, of course, to write all this down in a more elegant manner, commenting, for example, on laws of motion, on general logics, functional needs and structural constraints to territorially bound activity.

Unfortunately, the data prohibited such a more enjoyable presentation of arguments. I was continuously confronted with results that contradicted standard assumptions, run counter to my own expectations, and did not seem willing to submit themselves to the elegance of generalizing models. This explains why, occasionally, I hardly managed to resist the temptation of resorting to military terminology. My relationship to the targets under study, in fact, is anything but unequivocal. On the one hand, I am firmly convinced of the reliability and strength of the data presented in the following chapters. On the other hand, the very fact that the material behaved so obstinate and stubborn when subjected to specific types of elaboration, made it become a threat and hostile force driving me close to despair. My attitude, therefore, frequently became that of a commander riding attacks against a resistent enemy and trying to convince it, in a rather unfriendly manner, to surrender and submit itself to interpretation. The succession of chapters, therefore, could also be read in terms of a succession of attacks employing increasingly sophisticated arms. Imagine the following set up. Two front lines are opened successively. At the first, the enemy was attacked from a political science perspective. The arms employed are policy network concepts and concepts of regional governance. Unfortunately, our own divisions did not turn out to be particularly cohesive at that front. Fortunately, the attack was limited to patrolling the grounds of the battlefield. These divisions were not used for more far-reaching endeavours. At the second front line, opened after having gained an initial impression of the enemy's strength, more sophisticated weapons were deployed. We borrowed them from sociological network analysis and used them for the purpose of two major attacks. The first was intended to soften and disintegrate the battle lines of the enemy. It supplied us with strategic knowledge regarding the overall properties of the allied armies. Having identified their overall structure, the second attack then aimed at disintegrating the army's individual components and only stopped short of single combats and duells with individual members.
For those who like it less aggressive, the succession of chapters is as follows. In Chapter Two, I start with outlining the conceptual context within which I am moving. It is an appeal to not abandon a perspective having been declared outdated and inappropriate by many, not least by adherents of the policy network approach -- corporatism "writ large". In reality, I guess, its downswing was due to overdrawn generalizations, to conceptual inflation, and to assumptions that did not form part of the genetic code, so to speak, of the original research agenda. The dealing with territory of scholars working in the corporatist tradition is not at the end but, rather, had just started to show its strength before it was substituted by a general paradigm shift in social sciences. This shift cannot be said to have substantially enriched our knowledge. It is the, already mentioned, policy network approach. I do not myself operate this approach but shall build part of my hypotheses about the network structure of individual regions on the results of scholars that have used it. The chapter is introduced with a state of the art review of work done in the context of territorial interest intermediation. I then turn to the policy network paradigm, not only because it is this which has guided most analytic endeavours in territorial politics over the last years but, also, because the approaches to which I refer later, and which are used for analysis, have hardly ever made reference to this tradition of research. My main argument is that policy network approaches are inappropriate tools for the comparative study of networks in an international perspective. The next section introduces what I call the political ecology view on territorial networks. The notion of ecology is presented together with some necessary remarks on policy domain and on structural analysis. In a concluding section, I present and discuss a couple of suggestions aimed at the construction of models for the analysis of state-society relations. The model finally selected as the most appropriate one, is then used to guide us through most of the arguments presented in Chapter Three.

Chapter Three is an attempt to build both political and structural hypotheses for each of the nine organizational ecologies. It consists of a comprehensive literature review on regional networks and specific forms of governance in particular regions but includes also basic information on the competences of regional government and, as far as possible, the format of regional interest systems. This latter point is particularly problematic. Neither the corporatist research tradition nor pluralist or other approaches have managed, so far, to generate reliable data on the structure and representativeness of regional and other subnational interest associations. This is and remains a gap which cannot easily be filled. In a sense, therefore, we take the second step before the first -- a noteworthy disadvantage whose inherent risks have to be taken in account and accepted in the absence of other empirical information. In the case of some regions, I have tried to derive such information from studies on national interest groups. However, this cannot provide but very superficial information and, essentially, remains unsatisfactory. The chapter is organized in five country sections, a fact, already indicating that I give a lot of weight to national determinants of regional network structure. Drawing from existing literature and placing its results in one of the cells of the contingency table introduced in Chapter Two, I first try to elaborate political hypotheses for each case before, secondly, translating these into structural hypotheses of networks. The consultation of case studies is warranted to the extent that the purely structural information presented in subsequent chapters is very hard to interpret in the absence of qualitative material. In this way, I hope to have given adequate attention to Adrienne Heritier's warning who once located the dilemma of comparative network analysis to lie in the navigation between "the Skylla of idiosyncratic, highly detailed 'thick descriptions' of single cases and the Charybdis of highly aggregated cross-national data" (Windhoff-Heritier 1993b:150).

The first part of Chapter Four is methodological. Its first section presents the research design, explains the procedure of boundary specification, and provides general statistical information on the empirical networks. Section Two introduces the analytical measures used for the analysis of overall network structures: density, centrality, reciprocity and multiplexity. This is done with frequent references to the empirical cases. In the second part of the chapter, I discuss an issue having assumed much relevance in the more conceptual dealings with territorial networks: redundancy (Section Three).
present the "structural hole" argument, discuss the issue of institutional saturation and of redundant capacities and then turn to the relevance of weak ties and of relational redundancy. These arguments are then substantiated by empirical evidence drawn from an overall analysis of network properties and presented in Section Four. Here, we encounter a number of quite surprising paradoxes. For example, what seemed to be an organizational ecology typical of a northern European corporatist type, turned out to be an ecology of a clientelist southern European region and vice versa. These paradoxes notwithstanding, the chapter manages to identify two major patterns of relational structuring of territorial networks: a northern and a southern European.

Chapter Five is the main part of the analysis. After a brief introduction into the method used for disaggregating the networks (blockmodelling), each empirical ecology is presented case by case. I first start with Sicily. This is the region for which two data sets were available that enabled a diachronic analysis over time. The fact that the results of the two analyses turned out to be almost identical, substantially increased my confidence in the type of data used for this study and also corroborated the claim made by structural analysis in general, namely that networks as social systems tend to behave very conservatively and do not easily change their structure. The example of Sicily is also used to explain the entire procedure of structural equivalence analysis. Accordingly, the space given to the description and interpretation of this case is substantially wider than the space dedicated to the other regions. As in Chapter Three, the regions are presented in different national sections. Our original guess, that there were country-specific variables influencing their "structural behaviour", had indeed been supported by the evidence presented in Chapter Four. To a certain extent, that facilitated their comparison in this chapter. While Chapter Three had identified highly dichotomous descriptions of regional networks for almost each individual case, it is now possible to substantiate the claims made by the qualitative case studies presented in that chapter. With few exceptions that escaped straightforward categorization, we are now in a position to ascribe the networks particular political attributes and, secondly, to describe their underlying structures. The main result is that the types of structures hardly ever conform to conventional hypotheses that link specific structures to specific types of political systems.

The analysis does not end here. The organization lists that had been presented to the 1246 actors participating in this survey also included a number of national and EU-level organizations. That made it possible to analyze the networks' external relational performance. Chapter Six, however, is not a network analysis in the proper sense of the word. The data presented there exclusively rests on the responses given by regional and subregional organizations. There was no possibility to check the reliability of their answers by, for example, interviewing members of national government divisions or of specific directorates of the EU Commission. Nevertheless, the data is reliable to the extent that the responses by network members (274 cases) largely corresponded to the responses given by members of the overall sample (1246 cases). The chapter is introduced with references to some recent empirical studies working in the conceptual framework of multilevel governance. One of the most interesting results is that the internal structure of territorial networks has only marginal impacts on these networks' external performance. Very specific conditions need to be met to make a network become a good performer in either the national or the European dimension. One of the most conspicuous conditions is territorial distinctiveness. It results that dense and fragmented networks tend to perform better than sparsely populated and hierarchically ordered networks. This leads us to speak of an "advantage of heterarchy". While, until this point, the analytical perspective adopted has exclusively been bottom-up, in the last section of the chapter we change the viewpoint and adopt a top-down perspective. Seen from this angle, the advantage of heterarchy may also be a disadvantage, but this is very much up to the preference of individual regions and, of course, to the reader's.

Chapter Seven, finally, provides some very cursory conclusions while Chapter Eight presents a comprehensive data appendix, including the organization lists of the nine regional networks. Individual organizations can easily be identified and their relational
Introduction

properties be studied. The appendix also provides information on block densities of both the communication contact and the influence reputation relations, on the cohesion and self-esteem of central network members, and on the number and types of actors placed in specific equivalence classes.
Theoretical considerations

Contrary to the study of transnational relations or of supranational politics, there is no theory about the structuring of the state and of society at the subnational level. Although both the concepts of regimes and of transnational relations could be used in this area\(^1\), they would only cover a fraction of what regional actors are able to do and how they structure and institutionalize their relationships. The disciplines that have come closest to developing a coherent and comprehensive approach to the regional problematique are probably regional economics and economic geography. However, these disciplines shall not concern us here. Neither is this work concerned to fill the regional gap in political science and come up with yet another general account of “the networked region”. Its aim is to compare available information about state-society relations in subnational space with the empirical evidence gained from a cross-regional network analysis and, in a second step, to compare these results with the behaviour of regional organizations in the national and the European dimensions. This is not to say that the arguments were developed from scratch. On the contrary, they have strong conceptual foundations.

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\(^1\) Think at the Rhine Commission, at interregional travel to work areas and labour markets, or at INTERREG, the EU programme for interregional cooperation.

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Although to some this may seem strange, anachronistic, or altogether inappropriate, the approach that turned out to be most conducive to this endeavour was the corporatist one - writ large. This needs some explanation. This chapter presents first a brief history of the generally unfortunate but, in single cases successful, attempts of corporatist scholars to come to grips with territory. We then turn to a paradigm shift which was partly responsible for the decline in corporatist research not only in the area of territorial politics. This is the so-called policy network approach. It is argued that this shift substituted corporatism’s far-reaching analytical focus on the management of conflict, on power differentials and on antagonistic cooperation, with a focus on the management of consensus in amicable circles of like-minded bureaucrats and representatives of organizations. We will then be concerned with the problem of identifying and describing state-society relations at a level where the state is often hardly more than an administrative machine and where society is no more than a “Gemeinschaft” or an aggregate of (local) communities, before finally looking for a model capable of accommodating our analytical needs.

TERRITORIAL INTEREST INTERMEDIATION

The research programme on corporatism started with an extremely ambitious agenda. Besides measuring cross-national variation in associability, interest systems and logics of collective action, the programme also included both a sectoral and a territorial dimension right from the start (Schmitter and Streeck 1981). While most comparative contributions to the debate were on macro-economic issues such as the effects of incomes policies and labour quiescence on economic performance over the 1980s, more and more energy was subsequently being put into the study of meso-level arrangements and, in particular, of specific sectors and policy domains\(^2\). This tradition of inquiry later became

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\(^2\) Most meso-corporatist research was initially on sectors and policy domains that the programme had defined as core targets of analysis (chemicals, construction, food processing, machine tools and, of course, industrial relations) but scholars then increasingly turned to growth sectors such as telecommunications and high tech industries and to domains partly governed by self-regulation (craft, health, etc.).
Theoretical considerations

institutionalized under the label of "the governance of sectors" (Schmitter 1990; Campbell et al. 1991; Hollingsworth et al. 1994). When scholars finally started to turn to the issue of territory in a more systematic way, the central idea had already peaked and corporatism had begun sloping downwards towards a less conspicuous equilibrium point. Probably due to both the demise of corporatist practice in a number of countries that had previously formed part of the research agenda, and to the concept's lack of appeal for those not directly concerned with analyzing government-industry relations, scholarly engagement in the study of territorial interest intermediation never really managed to get off the ground.

This type of research was made more difficult by the almost complete lack of reliable data on territorially organized business and labour organizations -- a problem that, to date, has not been solved. In addition, there also had been a paradigm shift in social science attracting more sympathy among students of territorial politics than the rather narrow focus on business interest associations (BIAs) and their organizational formats. Since the late 1980s, at least, there has hardly been a contribution to the regional problématique that does not, in one way or the other, resort to the concept of network. Drawing from the most diverse conceptual roots, scholars of territorial politics tended to operate rather idiosyncratic versions of the various network approaches. This diversity in approach made it difficult to subject their results to systematic comparison. Although completely different in perspective, the network concept gained additional influence through the assistance of other disciplines. Much of the economic literature inspired by neo-institutionalist approaches to governance (transaction cost economics) actually found networks to be spatially bound phenomena. In addition, the re-discovery, by the flexible specialization school, of Marshallian industrial districts, with competitors operating in networks of high trust and belonging, ensured the concept's attractiveness -- and contributed further to the fuzzy use made of it.

There have been some exceptions to what has been argued until here. Apart from the already mentioned early contributions, most of the following appeared in the late 1980s. They can be grouped under three categories: the study of sectoral (or domain-specific) variation in a territorial perspective, case studies of individual regions, and systematic comparison of territorial variation in a sectoral (or domain-specific) perspective. Bill Coleman's and Henry Jacek's collection of essays (1989) belongs to the first group. They were also the first to bring the issue of territory and interest to the fore. Most of the contributions to the book were by-products of the OBI project (Schmitter and Streeck 1981) and therefore carried a strong sectoral bias. Although interesting in themselves, they were too diverse both in their coverage of spaces and of sectors to be able to contribute anything new to the study of territorial politics -- an area that, in any case, was not the primary focus of the book and was only marginally addressed. For example, the notion of region is underspecified and embodies virtually anything below the level of nationally organized sectors. This, together with the high diversity of sectors that were up for analysis, made it impossible to include the study of potential interlocutors of business interests into the project -- a sine qua non if forms of interest intermediation were to be discovered. As hard as it was to compare highly diverse sectors from a territorial perspective, it must have been close to impossible to analyze the political reference points of organizations populating these sectors. In some cases, these were regional and in others local administrations, with highly different competences and

\[1\] There had been a number of individual contributions before which, however, did not manage to address the issue in a more systematic way. For example, Hernes and Selvik (1981) found that, as a result of social security being financed partly at the level of the municipality, "corporate systems are now rapidly growing at the local level" at least in a number of Scandinavian countries (ibid.:104).

\[2\] While this is not much of a problem in countries (and regions) with comprehensive interest systems and encompassing associations with obligatory membership, information on associational density, organizational resources and interest group representativeness are hard to get hold of in countries characterized by high degrees of organizational fragmentation. See, for the first case, Streeck (1989) and Mayntz (1990a; 1990b) and, for the second, Grote (1992)

\[3\] The most comprehensive account of the network concept as used in industrial economics and in the study of territorial politics is by Sydow (1992). For the best collection of articles on networks in organization sociology and in politics see Kenis and Schneider (1996).

\[4\] German Handwerk organized at Land level, freight rates in the Canadian maritimes, textiles in the Spanish comunidades autononas, food processing and chemicals in the US and the dairy industry of a country without regions (UK) guaranteed high variation and provided interesting individual insights but were hard to compare with.

\[5\] German Handwerk organized at Land level, freight rates in the Canadian maritimes, textiles in the Spanish comunidades autononas, food processing and chemicals in the US and the dairy industry of a country without regions (UK) guaranteed high variation and provided interesting individual insights but were hard to compare with.
powers. The main message of the authors, therefore, was "diversity", which largely corresponded to their original expectation "that structural arrangements for regional activities, i.e. organizational formats of individual associations. The specification of administrative boundaries around the territories to be studied facilitated comparison, went beyond the study of BIAs, and helped to consider regional government and trade unions as other important members of the triad. Most of the contributions demonstrated that this latter did not need to be a priori corporatist in nature, despite the perspective adopted by the authors. Tornoss Mass even showed that the Spanish regional government tried to de-structure the entire interest system in order to make it fit its own political needs.

The two most important and truly comparative contributions to the subject were individual works. Jeffrey J. Anderson (1988) set out to compare the territorial networks of interest in two British regions (North-East and West-Midlands) with those in two German cases (Saarland and Northrhine-Westphalia). At about the same time, Leonardo Parri began work on innovation networks in Rhone-Alpes and Emilia-Romagna (1990). Both contributions belong to the third category of studies mentioned above. They were cross-regional comparisons with a strong domain-specific focus. Anderson focused on regional responses to economic decline, i.e. on structural and on regional development policies and Parri on services to enterprises, i.e. on industrial infrastructure for innovation and diversification.

The results of both endeavours were first presented as doctoral dissertations at Yale University and at the EUI Florence, but revised versions soon followed (Anderson 1994; Parri 1993a) as well as a great number of articles on specific aspects of regional cases, in many respects, went beyond what had been achieved by the other volume. The essays, written by students of administrative science, of comparative politics and by legal scholars, adopted a European perspective, enabling them to analyze the regional level proper. Secondly, they focused on the intermediation of interests rather than on the organizational formats of individual associations. The specification of administrative boundaries around the territories to be studied facilitated comparison, went beyond the study of BIAs, and helped to consider regional government and trade unions as other important members of the triad. Most of the contributions demonstrated that this latter did not need to be a priori corporatist in nature, despite the perspective adopted by the authors. Tornoss Mass even showed that the Spanish regional government tried to de-structure the entire interest system in order to make it fit its own political needs.

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governance and forms of territorial political exchange (Anderson 1990a, 1991; Parri 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1991). Both authors later turned to "experimenting with scale" (Schmitter). Without altering the scope of analysis which remained as wide as possible, they moved up and down on the vertical axis of territorial complexity. While Anderson moved upwards and included the EU dimension in his studies (1990b, 1996), Parri turned in the opposite direction and now focused on collective action problems in industrial districts (1993b, 1993c). Although, for good reasons, as we shall see, both tended to avoid the notion of multilevel governance, their work demarcates the space that any research programme on this emergent political order would need to address to justify the use made of the label.

It also influenced my own dealings with territory, interests, and the European Union both in the guiding questions and in the comparative perspective (Grote 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1995). Many references to both Anderson’s and Parri’s work are also made in this present study, especially in the chapters and sections where I discuss regional cases that overlap partly with theirs -- in Italy, France, Germany and Britain. In the majority of cases, their early results are confirmed by the present network analysis on the political ecologies of regionalism. At least, our results are closer to theirs than to those of the hundreds of contributions that have appeared over the years on several of the cases studied. Does this mean that this coincidence could be attributed to the common perspective adopted by us, i.e. "corporatism writ large", and, therefore, to a bias in favour of some and in disregard of other aspects in the analysis of regional governance? Does it mean that sociological network analysis better fits the corporatist approach to problems of governance or the organizational state perspective, than what is habitually understood with policy networks? As to the first question, the answer is no, but I leave it to both the reader and his/her reading of the data to come up with a final judgement in that respect.

As to the second question, the answer is yes. Let us consider this question in a more detailed manner.

POLICY NETWORKS

The contributions referred to in the previous section are the last to have adopted the perspective of territorial interest intermediation in the proper sense of the word. Most of what has been written since then has turned to variants of the so-called policy network approach which has become a standard instrument in territorial policy research. I shall argue in this section that this approach is quite inappropriate for a study that tries to conceptualize and to investigate varieties of state-society relationships across different regions. It is self-evident that this cannot be done by an exhausting critique of all approaches available on the political science market. The literature on policy networks is as overwhelming as it is confusing. Of the 150 references cited in Tanja Börzel's useful overview (1997), 58 carry the term network in the title and this does not even consider conceptually related titles contained in that list, for example, on governance, guidance, Mehrebenenverflechtung, Verhandlungssysteme, policy communities and so forth.

Before turning to the perspective adopted in this work -- the policy domain and political ecologies -- I shall try to explain why the so-called policy network approach is inappropriate and why this is the case, in particular, for the purpose of comparative research. This is done by focusing on a small number of individual contributions that have guided many efforts to apply the concept to concrete empirical cases. The bulk of these contributions have been developed in the realm of policy analysis. The following remarks are not, of course, a critique of this discipline which has contributed significantly to an understanding of meso and micro phenomena within larger political arrangements and polities.

Policy network analysis can be traced back to early contributions in the field of organization theory and interorganizational research (Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Aldrich and Whetten 1981; Crozier and Friedberg 1984; Rogers and Whitten 1982) before it was
taken over by political scientists. In the course of this assimilation process, the approach gained widely in importance and prominence. However, it also became increasingly subject to normative reasoning, a priori assumptions, and a conceptual inflation that have not necessarily contributed to making it either a viable tool for analysis or a clear-cut theoretical alternative to more traditional institutionalist approaches. Given the unavailability of an overarching and authoritative definition to which most scholars could agree and considering that each individual contribution, therefore, tends to come up with highly idiosyncratic visions of what a policy network is, classifying these approaches is a sisyphian task.

This is not what Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider (1991) had in mind when they published their state of the art article in the early 1990s. The very fact that they were rather reluctant to provide their own definition of policy networks and that they did not actually classify but, rather, restricted themselves to outlining the hermeneutics of the paradigm, made their contribution one of the most often cited in the debate. While essentially agreeing on almost everything argued in that article, there is one point which today would seem to need re-formulation. Later in this chapter, I shall argue that the authors themselves may presently have second thoughts on the matter, stunned by the spectres the network boom has evoked since that early summary article. Kenis and Schneider argued that the term network matched a growing need for the de-mystification of complexity in society and that, indeed, it was on its way to become the new paradigm. Complexity, it seems to me, has increased and rather than reducing it, policy networks have further mystified European state-society relations.

But let me come back to the issue with which we began this chapter: interest intermediation. I believe that this is the crucial issue separating the chaff of policy network reasoning from the wheat -- at least in a perspective that is interested in more than the study of single and highly idiosyncratic policies. In her review article, Börzel rightfully suggests making a distinction between interest intermediation on the one hand and guidance/governance on the other. These are two of the major preoccupations of current political analysis. The point I cannot agree with, and this is far from being marginal to my argument, is that these issues are said to represent two different schools of the policy network debate. Let us consider this in more detail.

Interest intermediation has been and continues to be one of the central concerns of authors working in the corporatist tradition -- writ large. The term is related to state-society relations at the macro-political level, but may also be applied to individual sectors or policy domains. Systems of interest intermediation are contingent on the structure of interest systems and on degrees of (de-)differentiation of state-society relations at the national, sectoral or domain-specific levels. All of the above are strongly path-dependent and emerge in long historical processes. Interest systems both in the functional and the territorial dimension develop in relative autonomy from the polity surrounding them, but certainly in near-to-complete independence from individual policies. No less important, they include all major actors that have managed to achieve a sufficient degree of organizational cohesion and stability within a polity or within a sector or domain.

Börzel assigns a whole number of authors to the “intermediation school” of policy network analysis which, in my view, have little to do with either policy networks or with interest intermediation. The former -- little or no elective affinity with policy network

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12 Adopting a rather post-modern stance, Liebert seems to suggest that network analysis was the conceptually and methodologically appropriate answer to the lack of clarity and lack of comprehension (Unübersichtlichkeit). Yet, in my view, the method helps to structure reality and to reduce complexity. It is not easily understandable, then, what is meant by Liebert’s warning that „attempts to conceptual simplification of societal complexity may actually turn into the latter’s violent negation” (1994:17). I believe that this is an overstatement.
reasoning -- certainly applies to authors such as Hanspeter Kriesi, Michael Atkinson, Bill Coleman, and Frans van Waarden. Their work is essentially political science with a strong orientation towards macro-sociological problems and with a strong emphasis on sectors, domains and state-society relations. It is concerned mainly with problems of interest intermediation but this concern, undoubtedly, is driven by the type of questions once raised on the research agenda of the OBI project, and not by policy network reasoning. Although occasionally using a similar terminology, Atkinson and Coleman have strongly criticized the underlying logic of mainstream policy network approaches, a fact clearly distinguishing them from this school of thought. Van Waarden’s previous work is very much embedded in the intermediation school as well13, while the article quoted by Börzel is little more than a critical literature review which, as the author himself admits, does not add anything new to the concept -- a fact which also distinguishes this author from this school of thought. Finally, Kriesi operates entirely at the macro-political level with a strong background of sociological network analysis14, something quite different from policy network reasoning.

However, there are other authors listed under the heading of interest intermediation. Unlike those already mentioned, these, indeed, would seem to have little to do with interest intermediation in the sense outlined above15. Many of them, however, have been active at the academic front line dividing the corporatist from the pluralist camps in the mid-1980s. At that time, the policy network concept was developed in explicit opposition to the corporatist paradigm16. For example, although it may be interesting for

13 Gerhard Lehnhbruch, also presented as a prominent member of the policy network community, is a similar case. He is of course one of the fathers of the corporatist approach and his specific concern for administrative interest intermediation does not imply that his work could easily be subsumed under the label of policy network.
14 The same applies to Pascal Sciarini, another author included in the interest intermediation branch of policy network approaches.
15 This critique cannot but be very superficial. Full justice cannot be done to each individual author mentioned by Börzel. It is merely meant to prepare the ground for the more comprehensive perspective introduced later.
16 For example, Rhodes (1985a, 1985b) has argued that "corporatism provides a rigid metaphor of government-interest group relations and that it cannot be extended to sub-central government" (Rhodes 1988:44). Large parts of this author’s otherwise highly interesting elaborations of the policy network concept have been developed in a critical distance to the questions posed by the corporatist research agenda. Unfortunately, this implied that interest intermediation got lost in that approach. Much of the heavy attacks of the policy network school against so-called "corporatist theory" must be accredited to the infant phase of that school at that time. Corporatist reasoning itself was not free of exaggerated statements. Moreover, Rhodes can hardly be criticized when he says that corporatism "has not fared well when applied to policy-making in British government" (1988:81). All this, however, documents that the approach has developed within the framework of highly idiosyncratic institutional settings. This ethnicentric bias is found not only among British protagonists of the debate but is, perhaps, even more pronounced in the German and, later, French variant. Unfortunately, this limitation has not yet been addressed in the discussion. Most adherents seem to work as if there were one coherent policy network approach.
17 This business of labelling different arrangements according to the relevance of groups of actors for decisionmaking in a specific policy, it seems, is the funny but useless counterpart to hard core equivalence analysis in the absence of hard data. What in sociological analysis is a central position, here turns out to be the policy community (or network) within the wider context of a loosely coupled issue network.

understanding the intricacies of Whitehall and Westminster, Roderick Rhodes’s work entirely misses the issue of interest intermediation. It is very much an intergovernmental approach to policymaking. If private interests are mentioned at all, they do not show up in policy networks but in externalized special containers which Rhodes has created especially for them17. These containers are called professional networks and producer networks and hardly possess significant relations to the tightly knit policy communities and networks where the real action is supposed to be. Much of the British discussion on policy networks that followed, remained entrenched in battles over how to label the different containers18, without substantially departing from the overall perspective outlined by Rhodes. With respect to territorial politics, this type of approach necessarily remains incomplete. Research on territorial networks, in my view, would be better advised to build on the concepts and results of the authors presented in the first section of this chapter.

Finally, Börzel turns to the American tradition which, together with the British, "mainly focuses on works of the interest intermediation school" (Börzel 1997:10). One of the few authors mentioned under this rubric is David Knoke19. Knoke published a book entitled "Political Networks. The Structural Perspective" (1990) which must have led Börzel to include him in the policy network community. In reality, the book is anything
but an invocation of this perspective. I would even go so far as to argue that it has hardly anything in common with this perspective. Rather, it is an appeal in favour of an approach that focuses on exactly what the policy network perspective lacks -- empirical information about the structure of policy domains, not just policies. In this sense, it is of course concerned mainly with interest intermediation. In my view, the book presents an approach and a method best suited to substantiate the claims made by the interest intermediation school which, ultimately, rests on the guidelines of the corporatist programme and remains part of it. This present work on the political ecology of regionalism tries to join the traditions of interest intermediation and of network analysis and takes the two into the territorial dimension.

As regards Börzel’s useful but also problematic distinction, it would seem, then, that we can discard one of the two branches of the policy network approach and turn to the other, "the governance school focusing on the less known German literature" (Börzel 1997:11). Again, there are many problems with the ascription of individual authors to this branch of the network "business". It is futile to comment on these case by case. The present remarks are designed, not least, to demonstrate the inappropriateness of policy network concepts for measuring variety in territorial interest intermediation and of network analysis and takes the two into the territorial dimension.

In what follows, I shall first comment on two key contributions to the debate by Renate Mayntz to demonstrate why I believe this approach is ethnocentrically biased and, therefore, inappropriate for comparative analysis. While quite some space is given to the treatment of this specific aspect, comments on other, but not less constraining, biases are added in a more cursory manner. Although Mayntz’ suggestions deserve a more detailed handling, I shall not be concerned with the rationality and consistency of the German Steuerungsdebatte in toto, whose value-added and sophisticated arguments need not be questioned. Instead, I shall limit these comments to those parts of Mayntz’ work where the concept of policy network is introduced and defined. Representing, undoubtedly, the most authoritative point of reference in that debate, her definitions have influenced an entire generation of scholars. The generalizations drawn from these definitions and their application to cases for which they were not originally designed, are the main reasons for conceptual inflation in the study of territorial politics at least in the German literature.

Two things are needed, in Mayntz’ view, for networks to come about. One is an objective factor, namely the degree of modernization of society or, in other words, the extent to which society is functionally and (why not?) territorially differentiated into autonomous subsystems (Mayntz 1991:8-9). These subsystems, in turn, need to be populated by “corporate actors capable of making strategic decisions” (ibid:11). The second ingredient, or prerequisite, of networks is subjective. Only where organizations come together in interorganizational arrangements and when they are able to produce collective outputs intentionally, through interaction, and in spite of the diverging interests of their members, is it possible to speak of networks (ibid:14). In other words, while societal modernity is a prerequisite of networks, it is only where this condition is transformed into intentional action by groups of interdependent organizations that is it also possible to say that “the existence of policy networks (...) is an indicator of societal

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21 Most authors would agree with Renate Mayntz that we are not witnessing a retreat of rule and power by the state but, rather, a change in the modes of how rule and power are exercised (Mayntz 1996:163).

22 Reference to these contributions is made in the relevant sections of Chapters Three, Four and Five.

23 In what follows, the term network is used in the highly idiosyncratic sense as being operated in the Steuerungsdebatte. 

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moderization” (ibid:11). Networks, therefore, not only require (specific degrees of) modernization but also reflect (specific degrees of) modernization. Mayntz’ crucial definition reads as follows: “only in societies which are modern in a structural sense, where functional subsystems and within them, relatively autonomous corporate actors exist, can interorganizational networks with a potential for voluntary and deliberate collective action form” (ibid:10).

Contrary to much that has been written on policy networks, this is very clear. To translate the statement into a strategy for the identification of networks, one would first have to look for degrees of functional and (why not?) territorial differentiation, secondly for specific types of corporate actors populating the functional and territorial subsystems of a polity or of a society and, finally, the latter’s capacity to pool resources in the interest of achieving common goals. In a comparative research perspective, it all would boil down to the question of identifying premodern, modern, and postmodern societal structures or state-society relations across European countries or, more precisely, across subsystems of European countries. At the same time, however, and this is the important point for this present context, it would also narrow the scope of analysis. One would probably end up with a handful of northern and central European countries possessing the necessary objective requisites for network-building and network governance and, then, one could go on to check the subjective capacities of these countries’ individual organizations to join sectoral, domain-specific or, indeed, policy networks. Southern Europe would completely disappear from of the analysis. This is the first reason why I believe this approach is problematic for more comprehensive comparative purposes.

If we now consider Mayntz’ second contribution (1996) which is a more complex and revised version of the first paper, we learn that the analytical range of application of “modern political and societal guidance” is actually far narrower than we believed. Of course, our critique would not do justice to the author if we did not underline the absence of any claims in her work as to the arguments’ validity beyond a specifically German context. Taking this into account, our comments, then, would seem to be redundant. However, there are a couple of minor remarks in this second text suggesting that Mayntz must have envisaged the possibility of exporting this German-made political science product to other national contexts. Mayntz’ main concern lies with a paradigm shift in theories of political guidance (Steuerungstheorie). This is a shift from a focus on hierarchical control and the capacity of the state to provide control and guidance (Steuerungsfähigkeit) towards the question of the extent to which objects in the target field of public policies are maneuverable or steerable at all (Steuerbarkeit). In a sense, it is a shift from the subjects of guidance towards the objects of guidance. Under the first perspective, she argues, it would have been impossible to address "issues that regard a possible exploitative relationship between the political class and society like the ones having been discovered and raised, for example, in the debate on ‘manipolite’ in Italy" (Mayntz 1996:149). Since the state and central political rule (in Germany) are backed by high legitimation and are uncontested as agencies in their capacity to supply central control and guarantee public welfare, the question of the rationality (Vernünftigkeit) of this form of guidance was never an issue in that early approach.

Mayntz presents this example only en passant, without addressing the question whether more recent developments in the theory would capture analytically pathological deviations such as the one represented by the Milan Tangentopoli affair. I do not think that this is possible. Indeed, the inherent normative elements in the paradigm of guidance a priori exclude pathologies of this kind. Most importantly, they exclude them both in the empirical manifestations of forms of modern governance and in the critical reflexions on forms of modern governance. This is because modern governance not only rests on a highly precarious equilibrium between state and society but, also, on quite specific properties of these dimensions. Changes in the forms and the modes of political rule only come about as joint-effects and as a combination of societal self-regulation and of political guidance. Mayntz argues that "such a combination rests on specific conditions that are not sufficiently developed in all modern states to equal extent. The crucial

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24 The "territorially” has been added by me.
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precondition is an equilibrium between state and society -- an amalgam of a 'strong' state and of a 'strong' society. France, she continues, 'does not fulfil this requirement to the extent that Germany does' (ibid:163)\(^{25}\). This assertion, of course, must lead to the query of how other, more traditional and, in particular, southern European cases would have to be handled, if even an advanced political system such as France does not measure up to the standards set by the author?

The German mainstream version of the policy network concept, therefore, turns out to be as ethnocentric in its guiding assumptions as, for example, the British one. Discounting here the US tradition of issue networks, belief systems and epistemic communities (Heeley 1978; Sabatier 1988) and more recent French contributions on the referentiel and on "forum" and "arena" types of political arrangements (Jobert 1995; Le Gales and Thatcher 1995; Négrier and Jouve 1998), there is not much left in terms of policy network reasoning if one were to scrutinize the entire European political science literature on this and on related topics. It is not by chance that the majority of political scientists from southern Europe have not come up with their own versions of the paradigm. I only see two alternatives that can explain this silence on the matter: either southern European societies are structurally premodern, i.e. find themselves on a different point on the continuum along which state-society boundaries are continuously re-arranged\(^{26}\), or we are dealing with a different, specifically southern, type of modernity which does not fit the northern concepts.

In any case, it is the ethnocentric bias of most of what has been written in the policy network tradition which is the most important reason, amongst others, why I decided to drop the approach from this present analysis. In what follows, I shall give less attention

\(^{25}\) Before making this far-reaching verdict, Mayntz referred to the work of Padioleau (1982) and Papadopoulos (1995), the only authors that come up with a similar diagnosis a propos the state’s deficits in societal guidance in France.

\(^{26}\) I am aware of the problematique of using the image of a continuum here. It presupposes that there were something like an endpoint of full-blown societal modernity or post-modernity towards which all political systems will ultimately be driven. If we leave the continuum open-ended, however, then one may imagine an endless process of differentiation, de-differentiation and subsequent re-differentiation of state-society relations. I shall come back to this in the following section.

to these other biases and limit myself to a brief outline of their main shortcomings. The second limit becomes apparent when concepts elaborated for a highly specific context are used by others to study sectors, territories or polities of countries that are placed on a different point of the continuum. The problem, here, is that scholars tend to neglect Mayntz’ objective factor accounting for the emergence of policy-networks. Where modernity is assumed to exist a priori, one can immediately turn to the subjective factor and look for specific properties of organizations and policy networks. Identified in a somewhat random manner, these latter, in reality, are often quite accidental aggregations of organizations. Ignoring the issues of interest intermediation, of functional differentiation and of structural embeddedness, the issue for investigation then becomes the extent to which these aggregations reflect, or do, one of the following: reduce transaction costs, improve efficiency, increase legitimacy, strengthen action capacity, represent flexible responses to complex problems, facilitate adaptation, be subsidiarity-conforming and partnership-friendly, contribute to a flattening of hierarchies, produce consensus and reduce conflict -- in short, to overcome zero-sum situations of the most diverse kinds. Where none or little of the above can be traced, policy networks are declared to be absent\(^{27}\) or, alternatively -- a contradicio in adiecto by the standards of the German definition -- are said to operate according to a logic of hierarchy\(^{28}\). This is a further constraint on comparative analysis which I shall call the normative bias of policy network approaches.

There is another constraint which has to do with the paradigm’s disregard for patterns of interest intermediation and structural embeddedness and with its over-emphasis on function and task performance. One of the earliest sociological contributions to problems

\(^{27}\) In a recent study on the structural funds policies in the UK, Burton ad Randall Smith (1996) were not able to identify policy networks. Similarly, for Held and Sanchez-Velasco (1996), there was no evidence for policy networks in the structural funds area of Spanish policymaking.

\(^{28}\) This seems to be the case in the UK. According to Rhodes (1988:82), "within a unitary structure, the centre is the fulcrum of policy networks. It [central government] cannot be treated as one or more group, its role is constitutive. It can specify unilaterally substantive policies, control access to the networks, set the agenda of issues, specify the rules of the game". See also Balme and Jouve
of interorganizational policymaking that makes reference to the network paradigm is the one by Howard Aldrich and David Whetten (1981). The problem is spelled out so lucidly in this contribution to an authoritative handbook of sociological research that it is quite surprising how little attention has been paid to the authors’ warnings in the subsequent debate on policy networks. Aldrich and Whetten distinguish between three concepts that serve "to set meaningful limits to the scope of an interorganizational aggregate" (ibid.386). These boundary-setting concepts are organization-sets, action-sets, and networks. An organization-set "consists of those organizations with which a focal organization has direct ties" (ibid.). It is "neither a corporate body nor a coordinating association and thus by definition cannot act in ways that organizations (...) can" (ibid.). This is different for an action-set which is "a group of organizations that have formed a temporary alliance for a limited purpose" (ibid.387). The concept refers to an interacting group of organizations, whereas the concept of organization-set is explicitly centered on a single focal organization. Research done in this tradition "examines the purposeful behaviour of an entire aggregate of organizations" (ibid.). Finally, a network is neither the first nor the second of these but may embody both of them. The extent to which it does that is an empirical question. In any case, a network is defined as the "totality of all the units connected by a certain type of relationship" (Jay 1964:138). In other words, the two main types of aggregates are organization-sets and action-sets, while the network primarily adds the perspective as to how to approach the two aggregates within the realm of a larger population of actors. Virtually the entire debate on policy networks deals with action-sets and not with networks or with networks only in so far as they are action-sets. Purposeful behaviour, enlightened political entrepreneurialism and the potential to overcome "short-termism" in the interest of achieving collective, long-term goals are a priori taken for granted. The debate tends to over-emphasize the degree to which the functions accredited to action-sets are actually performed and tends to disregard the possible constraints imposed by structural embeddedness. The action-set itself then becomes a collective actor whose main raison d’être is the formulation and implementation of public policies (Mayntz and Marin 1994:16). It becomes a quasi-organization, held together by an unwritten statute and membership code (trust and other-regardingness), and endowed with options for entry and exit. Rather than configurations and compositions of organization-sets or action-sets being the main issues under consideration, task performance, efficiency and legitimation become the focus of attention. In its most radical manifestation, represented by the Dutch branch of policy network analysis (Kickert et.al. 1997), the issue boils down to a pure management problem, i.e. to the question of "how can a government realize its objectives in networks" (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 1995:162). I shall call this the functionalist bias of policy network approaches.

This is closely related to what I would call the paradigm’s over-socialized bias. In much of the political science-based applications of the concept, one encounters a kind of inversion of the critique once advanced by Granovetter with regard to mainstream economics. While Granovetter accused economic theory of under-socialized assumptions, political science tends to adopt an over-socialized perspective. A great deal of emphasis is given to the network-building properties of voluntarist agreements, of norms of reciprocity, of mutual trust and so forth while the role of central enforcement agencies appears to be marginal to the argument, if not disturbing. The more idiosyncratic the targets of analysis and the more disaggregate the policy-analytic perspective, the more difficult it becomes to re-aggregate the pieces at the level of the polity (see Pappi, Konig and Knoke 1995:279). The state remains a disparate collection of subunits and is treated, at best, as a primus inter pares. Atkinson and Coleman (1992)

(1996:251) on France for whom "the central state is clearly dominant in all networks", or Bache et al.

(1996) who characterize British center-periphery relations in terms of ‘hierarchical policy networks’.

In the index of the book edited by Kickert et al. which contains ten contributions to problems of network management in the public sector, the issue of power shows up just seven times. What we learn in these seven pages is that power is a relational concept, while the issue of power differentials and of power disequilibria is avoided.

"The more specific a network, (...) the higher its cultural specificity" (Pappi, Konig and Knoke 1995:279). One might add here, the more culturally specific, the higher the degree of idiosyncrasy and the more difficult cross-national, cross-sectoral and cross-regional comparison.
have observed that this, actually, leads to a renaissance of traditional pluralist images of society\textsuperscript{31}. Hence, the pluralist bias of policy network approaches.

The final constraint on both comparative analysis and the paradigm's application to territorial politics concerns the particular character of regional as opposed to national or international networks. Territorial networks, I believe, are less flexible than most of the ones dealt with in the mainstream literature. The relations connecting a regional network are more over-determined culturally, more stable institutionally -- if not altogether sticky and viscous -- less densely populated, less capricious, more ideologically cohesive, less competitive and more encapsulated in relation to external contenders. They also tend to exclude or, at least, severely limit, the exit option -- and often also voice. Thus they remain constrained largely to strategies such as loyalty, if not suffrance (Schmitter 1985). Abandoning a network and seeking entry elsewhere is less likely to happen as actors are considerably less footlose than organizations that are part of national and supranational functional policy circuits. A further limit, related directly to the territorial dimension of state and society, concerns the demystifying claims made by policy network analysis. Many of these emerged in the context of "disenchancing the state" (Willke 1983), trying to identify trends towards "rationalization and mundaneness of state activity coming about via a rapprochment of sovereign acts and the logics of non-hierarchical, principally equal, reticular and interdependent exchange relations between subsystems" (ibid:144). This may be an appropriate description of what we are witnessing in some societies, but it misses some noteworthy exceptions to the secular trend towards de-differentiation. In a number of territories (Catalunya, Lombardia, Wales, etc.), the regional state has yet to be enchanted by nationalist myths and folkloristic ideologies. Policy networks, under such retrogressive circumstances, are likely to take a quite different shape (hierarchical, unequal, vertical, dependent).

In any case, in addition to the reasons mentioned above (the ethnocentric, functionalist, normative, over-socialized and pluralist bias), it is the relative un- or under-

differentiatedness of territorial networks which has led us to renounce a study of individual policies and policy networks and to prefer, instead, a broader perspective to the issue in question. In a comparative approach, which necessarily includes both highly developed and relatively underdeveloped interorganizational arrangements, one needs to identify the lowest common denominator of organizational differentiation. At the level of this common denominator, it is very likely that differences in the organizational set-up of individual policies and in the set-up of more comprehensive actor systems are much less pronounced than in the highly complex arrangements of, say, the regulation of the emission standards of the European automobile industry. Territorial networks, even within individual policies, tend to reflect relational patterns that characterize entire policy domains, if not the political ecology of the entire region.

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Despite their diversity in perspective and their idiosyncratic definitions, policy network approaches would be expected to have at least one thing in common -- a focus on relations as basic units of analysis. Whether it was trust relations, deals struck in the interest of solving common problems or pooling resources for mutual gain, this would distinguish the approach from, for example, what in German is the discipline of Regierungslehre -- a perspective concerned mainly with the formal division of competences within single or across multiple sets of public institutions. In reality, the relational focus, albeit continuously evoked and reiterated, is absent from most of the studies that adopt that perspective. One occasionally even encounters scepticism as to whether a focus on empirically observable relations is actually worth the effort\textsuperscript{32}.

\textsuperscript{31} See, for example, Marsh and Rhodes' (1991) "elite-driven interest group pluralism".

\textsuperscript{32} Some time ago, Kenis and Schneider (1991), underlining the importance of this unit of analysis, recognized that "large-scale investments in empirical political analysis" aimed at measuring the relational properties of actor systems "is not accepted by everybody within the scientific community". A standard argument against systematic structural inquiries is that it "confirms more intuitive and 'soft' observations of qualitative analysis which also can be obtained by low-budget research" (ibid:48). However, the authors are convinced of sociological network analysis' great potential, a potential that "has not yet been systematically and comprehensively explored. The tools are there but the community of craftsmen is still very small" (ibid:40).
preceeding section, we also observed a certain aversion shared by many contributions towards the use of comparative analysis.

The approach has been criticized by many on various accounts. We shall not be concerned here with providing a comprehensive list of these criticisms. For the purpose of this study, three points are important. First, the critical literature often restricts itself to a negative de-construction of the approach. It fails to suggest positive guidelines for "saving", at least, its general perspective and aims, to represent an appropriate response to growing complexity both in politics and society. Secondly, those who operate in the most firmly established branch of the network perspective, sociologists and political scientists working with quantitative network-analytic methods, tend to ignore the entire debate, probably because of its conceptual weakness. Instead they go on to measure networks as social systems as if nothing had happened over the last decade outside their own realm of hardcore analysis.

Thirdly, the few exceptions that are aware and do take account of the debate, identify its shortcomings but also come up with positive suggestions as to how they could be overcome. Most of these contributions are by authors who, in one way or the other, continue pursuing questions that had once been raised by research on corporatism -- writ large.

Atkinson and Coleman's critique has already been mentioned. In a similar vein, Patrick Kenis has recently pointed to the crucial importance of re-aggregating policy networks at the level of the polity, but has also underlined the relevance of embarking on comparative research. While, according to him, the policy network approach, at first sight, might look quite promising, a second glance at the concept reveals important limits. "Only when studying networks of co-operation within a comparative politics approach these limits can be overcome" (Kenis 1996:7). Similar to our own critique, the approach in its present form is said to be reductionist and this reductionism is expressed in four main ways. First, the political system is reduced to the analysis of a number of policies, secondly, these policies are analyzed only internally, while the role of the broader political context is underestimated, thirdly, the political system is reduced to its output dimension (ibid.) and, finally, traditional political institutions do not need to be treated as obsolete but, rather, "are still around (...) active and alive" and "provide the organizational prerequisites for networks of co-operation to exist" (ibid:13). What is needed, therefore, "is research on [their] existence and [on the] cross-national variation and regularity of complex systemic configurations" (ibid:11). This corresponds perfectly to what we had in mind when we started with this study of interorganizational relations in different European regions.

Interestingly, the other author that opened the "analytical toolbox" of relational analysis in the early 1990s, has the same problem today as his co-author. In a programmatic essay written together with Karsten Ronit, Volker Schneider sets out the framework for an internationally comparative research agenda on interorganizational relations of actors, policy arenas, and policy domains. The aim is to capture the complex and dynamic unity of different political systems by simultaneously considering three major arenas: government and administration (the executive); parliament and political parties (the legislative); and functional interest groups and associations (Ronit and Schneider 1997:30-31). In theory, the authors argue, this configuration of connected arenas could easily be imagined as policy networks, if it were not for the neo-institutionalist understanding of the term that reserves its use for the identification of specific forms of societal guidance and political governance. As this would necessarily create confusion, the authors suggest the alternative term "political ecology" as being...
more appropriate for their purpose. A political ecology view on political systems connects the three macro-knots, or arenas, and, at the same time, implies a focus on both their structural configurations and their evolution over time.

We can also fully subscribe to this. Not only have we adopted Ronit and Schneider's perspective for the title of our analysis, we have also tried to take account of the need to integrate a multi-arena and an evolutionary perspective. However, there have been a number of important constraints on implementing their programme fully in our own research design. Essentially, these were resource and logistic constraints. For various reasons spelled out in Chapter Three, we only work with two of the three macro-knots, while we are only able to present diachronic material for one single case.

Despite the usefulness of the approach, the political ecology perspective presents a number of problems when applied to the territorial dimension. In general it is concerned with the identification of state-society relations. At the regional level, the notion of statesociety relations is not unproblematic. They do not, as at the national level, emanate from what could be called a "regional polity". In addition, in non-federal contexts, the very notion of a regional polity would appear to be highly artificial. The main determinants of the ways in which public institutions and private actors structure their relations within a region may be, but do not need to lie at the regional level. Although in many cases, decentralization has been demanded and initiated by regionalist interests at the grassroots, it itself has predominantly been a political strategy pursued by national parties, parliaments and institutions. Similarly, a few exceptions apart, interest associations have either formed at the local level or are creatures of their national headquarters. Autonomous regional politics now exist almost everywhere in Europe and even where they do not, the European Community has undertaken major steps to institutionalize them. Yet, at the same time, regional politics itself is comparatively young, certainly younger than the regions themselves.

These limitations notwithstanding, we assume a relatively consolidated and irreversible state of territorial politics being designed and carried out by different types of actors within the regions. At the same time, we have to take into account a degree of diversity and variation -- both within states and across states -- in what Mayntz would call the functional differentiation of societal subsystems being unmatched by the level of national polities. Contrary to the nation state, regions are relatively consolidated political units. The same applies to the actors populating them. Degrees of organization at the regional level vary considerably and actors may have their "organizational epicenters" at the most diverse levels within a region. As was argued in Section One, they may copy the structure of the state or may compensate for it, but, contrary to national organizational ecologies, there is no logical imperative that would justify the assumption "that BIAs [or trade unions] will adapt their organizational structures accordingly" (Schmitter and Lanzalaco 1989:217-18). A similar observation has been made by Colin Crouch. He argues that interests have a base point in political space and that "the further an interest moves from its base point across the space, the more difficult it finds it to forge effective relationships". Most importantly, "irrespective of 'distance travelled',

36 Our macro-knots are the executive, interests groups, and para-state agencies. Including parliaments and political parties, I believe, is a general problem of this type of research because respondents would need to provide information about their political preferences -- even if the questions were phrased in a rather discrete manner. In any case, including political parties in the research design appeared to be particularly problematic in the southern European context of partitocrazia.

37 The fact that we are able to present relational time series material on the Sicilian ecology was a fortunate coincidence and not actually planned when the project was designed. However, future research in the area may easily repeat the type of investigation in other regions as well. Claims like the one made by Knack et al. (1996:8) may be checked then, namely that "policy domains develop fairly stable power structures" or, as noted by Windhoff-Héritier (1993a:117), structures which only change "in drastic processes of transformation such as, for example, major technological revolutions, outbursts of social unrest, economic crisis, or war".

38 The term "autonomous regional politics" refers to those areas where regional authorities are endowed with a sufficient amount of concurrent, dividing, exclusionary, etc., competences to carry out policies under their own discretion -- not the traditional regional policies operated by national institutions.

39 The authors add that the structure of the state and the territorial differentiation of interest groups "is much more complex (...) and much less significant" (ibid:210) than most regionalist authors would be prepared to admit. With respect to business interests, they argue that regionalism "may be over-ridden by the need to engage in collective bargaining with trade unions or to promote international trade at a quite different level" (ibid:217-18).
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there may be institutional barriers inhibiting the formation of certain relationships and therefore entry into certain parts of the space" (Crouch 1993:51).40

This is, indeed, the case for many territorial interest associations and a number of studies provide ample evidence for that.41 Independently of the strength, competence, and power of "their" regional governments, interests may primarily act at the enterprise, the department, the Kreis, the province, the municipal, the district and, of course, at the regional level.42 This simple but important fact would make comparison almost impossible. Despite this high diversity, we have decided, therefore, to define the regional level of policymaking and associability as the most appropriate one to be studied. In part, this was a subjective and normative decision, influenced by personal preferences and, admittedly, by a functionalist belief in what the region is all about and able to achieve.43

More objectively, it also had to do with the similarity of problems defined and solved at that level across most European regions. Regional development policy is a well-established domain. Somewhat in contrast to what has happened to other levels, this is mainly concerned with the design of regional development strategies. Interest groups either participate in that exercise at a relatively early stage or are drawn into the policy process during the phase of implementation. Although regional associations proper may not always represent the most important ones in terms of associability, action capacity, and Konfliktfähigkeit (the capacity to voice), in the normal case, it is they that will participate in regional development initiatives. In other cases, their efforts at influencing regional decisions will be joined by associations organized at lower levels of complexity.

The extent to which it is either subregional or regional associations representing the private dimension within a regional organizational ecology is an empirical question. The results of this study, for the first time ever, provide empirical evidence for concrete configurations emerging in a large number of regions.

The most important point to be made here, however, concerns the general perspective adopted in this study. Regions are approached here as macro-political units, not in terms of representing a meso-level between the nation state and the locality. The political ecologies up for identification, then, are state-society relations typical of each region. In order to do this, a view is needed that goes beyond a focus on individual policies. This study presents the configurations of political ecologies in the policy domain of regional development.

40 Interests "are constrained by their capacity to bring people together at a certain vertical level and around a certain set of (horizontal) issues, and their ability to take effective action at the point in question" (Crouch 1993:50-51). In macro-corporatist arrangements, it is the state and its politics itself which encourage interests to establish extensive networks or relations at the national level. It is there that they have access to the variables giving them some measure of control, predictability, and information (ibid:52).

41 We shall come back to this issue in Chapter Three. Suffice it to say that the traditional epicenter of organizational activity in the German Länder (Streeck 1989), in the Italian regioni (Trigilia 1991), in the French régions (Le Gales 1994) in the Spanish comunidades autónomas (Tornos Mass 1990) and in "regions without government" (for Wales, see Albers 1995 and Grant 1989) has for a long time been at the subregional level.

42 To these institutionalized levels with formal administrative boundaries, one may add less institutionalized aggregations such as, for example, industrial districts, Stadtregionen, metropolitan areas, or the planning regions within some of the German Länder (e.g. Regionalverband Stuttgart).

43 On this point I would not fully agree with Philippe Schmitter (1997:8) who has argued the following: "While there is no a priori reason why the largest scale solution should always be the most productive, with substantial increases in the amount of resources available to regions in need. Although this study is in no way concerned with this specific transnational policy, the European structural funds and their reforms have played an important and stimulating role in the consolidation of the regional policy domain.44 It is regional government which is mainly concerned with the design of regional development strategies. Interest groups either participate in that exercise at a relatively early stage or are drawn into the policy process during the phase of implementation. Although regional associations proper may not always represent the most important ones in terms of associability, action capacity, and Konfliktfähigkeit (the capacity to voice), in the normal case, it is they that will participate in regional development initiatives. In other cases, their efforts at influencing regional decisions will be joined by associations organized at lower levels of complexity.

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44 Today, there are incidents suggesting that the Commission is revoking parts of the regional focus that had characterized decades of policymaking in that domain. Whether this is due to resource constraints within the institution itself, to opposition on the part of national governments, or to over-stretched ambitions during an early phase of elaborating its strategies cannot be answered here. However, it now seems clear that the Commission increasingly favours interventions at the subregional level (see McAleavy and De Rynck 1997). In Chapter Six, I call this the "politics of heterarchy", a politics with many negative implications for the regions themselves. It would corroborate localism and parochialism and would strengthen the "paradox of the region" (Trigilia 1991).
A focus on domains as opposed to single policies has a number of advantages. One of the best definitions of a domain-specific perspective to problems of political complexity was given by Paul Burstein (1991). A policy domain is a "component of the political system that is organized around substantive issues" and that is both socially and culturally constructed by those active in politics (ibid:327). Burstein argues that the corporatist approach is in many ways essential to a domain-specific analytical perspective (ibid:345). It is this approach which guarantees the link between the analysis of political subsystems and the global polity within which domains are embedded. It is very useful, therefore, "to analyze the relationship between domain-specific interest associations and those transcending particular domains, and how both influence political representation and policy change" (ibid.).

In one of the most recent large-scale comparative network analyses presented by Knoke et. al. (1996:9), a domain is defined as a complex social organization in which collectively binding decisions are made and implemented by consequential actors with common interests in a policy (but not necessarily identical preferences), and who are concerned with formulating, advocating, and selecting (not necessarily the same) courses of action and, therefore, need to take one another into account. A policy domain has no formal boundaries, i.e. it is not synonymous with formal state ministries (ibid:10). Rather, the boundaries are more or less fuzzy and porous and their identification is primarily a social construction whose meaning results from its participants' collective symbolization and negotiations." At its most abstract conceptual level, the internal structure of a policy domain is constructed from four basic components: policy actors, policy interests, power relations, and collective action" (ibid.). A policy domain

45 "The issues that define a domain are seen as sharing inherent substantive characteristics which influence how they are framed and dealt with. Domains such as energy, health, transportation, or agriculture (...) arguably have a certain logic and coherence, and most specific issues fit relatively unambiguously into" them (ibid:328).

46 Because it is socially constructed, a domain includes organization-sets and action-sets of consequential actors: "concerned about a set of substantive problems, which take each other into account as they formulate policy options and work for their adoption" (ibid.).

47 In developing policy options and deciding which other organizations to deal with, actors "are strongly
The only possible alternative to using material not directly concerned with territorial politics or resorting to idiosyncratic descriptions of individual cases, would be to claim that the field was unexplored. This would allow highly original hypotheses to be made without running the risk of meeting previous contenders and claimants or their conceptual legacies. This, it seems to me, is the option chosen by the bulk of hard-core network analyses of political systems. Both the guiding questions (not whether, but “how does structure determine action and policy events”) and the research targets (interorganizational “relations as units of analysis”) differ to such an extent from what has previously been done in the field by more traditional work, that testable hypotheses are being raised on a kind of conceptual tabula rasa. While previous theoretical work is recognized as being stimulating and interesting, because of its attributive bias and analytical focus on qualitative, i.e. non-relational properties of political systems, it is marginalized and can, at best, provide background material for the more substantive insights achieved by structural analysis proper. As a result, many of the available network studies on national policy domains, industries, sectors, etc. are rather eclectic and ad hoc in the use they make of concepts such as the state, society, market, hierarchy, pluralism, corporatism, clientelism and so forth. The most conceptually diverse properties are combined to form analytical hybrids which only conform to the specific case being studied, but cannot be subjected to any systematic comparison.

The so-called ‘organizational state perspective’, originally elaborated by Laumann and Knoke (1987) and subsequently refined in a number of empirical applications (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996) and theoretical contributions (Knoke 1990a, 1990b), is certainly an interesting way of avoiding the problem by declaring scientific pluralism to be the most appropriate response to increased empirical complexity. The approach is particularly helpful for relational analysis but, I guess, will only reveal its usefulness in the future, when a sufficient amount of cumulative evidence is generated, and systematic comparison can be made, relying on a large number of comprehensive national, sectoral, and territorial data sets. We are far from such a situation at present. In conceptual terms, the “organizational state perspective” hardly provides anything new and some have argued that its scientific pluralism is nothing but a reflexion of an essentially pluralist view of society (Coleman 1997). In any case, it remains so inconsistent theoretically because structure determines action and policy events). The most conceptually diverse properties are combined to form analytical hybrids which only conform to the specific case being studied, but cannot be subjected to any systematic comparison.

The argument that neither the state nor society can be analyzed as if they were self-sufficient units belongs to the standard repertoire not only of corporatist but, as shown by Persson (1996), of pluralist, neo-liberal and marxist approaches alike. The blurring of the borderline separating the two spheres and the trend towards de-differentiation of the state-society division, is hardly questioned anywhere. Where this distinction is completely dismissed, as seems to be the case in certain manifestations of system theory, policy network approaches and, not least, in the ‘organizational state perspective’ itself, the validity of conceptual distinctions between pluralist, corporatist, liberal, interventionist, etc. forms of organization of policy domains, sectors and territories is becoming equally futile. For example, in Knoke, Pappi, et al.’s most recent work, the national policy domain ‘work’ is studied in cases as different as the U.S., Germany and Japan. We learn that the approach is wide enough to accommodate all of these cases. Each of them possesses a bit of everything: more or less pluralism, more or less statism, more or less corporatism, more or less interventionism and so forth. It has often been noted in organizational research that there is no such thing as ‘pure cases’ that would reflect only and exclusively the properties being ascribed, for example, to forms of corporatist governance. The organizational state perspective, conceptually, appears to represent the opposite: a case of ‘pure impurity’—quite easy to handle, but not very helpful for a type of systematic comparison that does not want to renounce to conceptual sobriety. In a sense, the critique of the policy network approach made above to some extent also concerns the ‘organizational state perspective’. There is an excess of interdisciplinarity in both approaches. They would both gain a lot in terms of conceptual rigour, if scholars would take a step back, try to disentangle partly contradictory concepts, and concentrate more on the essentials of their own original disciplines (organization theory, state theory, industrial...
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that we shall employ it only on occasion, namely in situations where traditional concepts are hard to apply to problems of regional governance.

With Lauman, Knoke, et.al., we believe we have entered new ground with the present study, especially with regard to the empirical results. Yet, conceptually, problems of regional governance and of governance in general are not unexplored territory and have been addressed by a great many authors before. In order to arrive at reasonable hypotheses, we have to turn, therefore, both to established conceptualizations and to case study material at least in those instances where such material is available. Comparative analysis, first of all, requires yardsticks against which to compare the properties of different cases. At best, models are available, or can be more or less derived from already existing models, that allow for an attribution of various cases to distinct typologies. This chapter scrutinizes some of the available models, argues in favour of a particularly appropriate one, and tries to come up with a working hypothesis for each of the nine regional cases by applying the model to the evidence resulting from individual case studies.

Finally, a third point needs to be addressed before turning to the empirical part of the study. Hardly any of the models introduced in this section contain structural hypotheses about the interorganizational ordering of relations between public institutions (the state) and interest associations (organized society). We learn a lot about modes of governance in rather generic terms, i.e. about whether a sector, a domain, an entire nation-state are predominantly organized according to principles of hierarchy, markets or, indeed, of networks. We also learn a lot about organizational attitudes (encapsulation, openness, etc.), behavioral norms (trust, distrust, consensus, conflict), patterns of exchange (authoritative imposition, bargaining, problem-solving, etc.). What we do not learn, not least because such properties cannot directly be derived from abstract conceptualizations, is, how interorganizational relations are empirically structured under conditions of various modes of governance. I shall argue, that there is no such thing as a typical structuring that could be found in empirical reality and that would satisfy the claims made by even the most complex conceptualizations. Markets may adhere to a logic of competition, networks to one of mutual adjustment and exchange, and states to one of unilateral imposition and coercion, but the very same mechanisms may exhibit the most diverse relational properties, i.e. they may exhibit both hierarchical or balanced, dense or sparsely populated, multiplex/reciprocal or one-dimensional/unilateral structural patterns.

Logics only furnish information about the general context and the atmosphere, so to speak, within which interaction is taking place. They represent the default option from which concrete interaction itself may drastically diverge as soon as variables are inserted which largely escape the sophistication of conceptual efforts. Removing the "bars" of the contingency tables behind which the logics are kept imprisoned, and allowing the "modes of operation" and "laws of motion" to float freely around in empirical situations, can result in the most unlikely hybrids. For example, how would a market logic operate under conditions of centralized and unitarian government and how would it operate under conditions of a federal state structure? How would a network logic manifest itself under conditions of strongly competitive markets - assumed that this is possible at all? Is trust possible under conditions of hierarchy and is distrust an interorganizational property reserved for market-like exchanges? Our empirical results demonstrate that general ascriptions of that kind are hard to verify without placing the logics of governance in concrete social, institutional and political contexts. This is the case, in particular, for structural attributes of actor systems such as, for example, structural hierarchy, center-periphery patterning, network density, extents of reciprocity, relational redundancy and so forth. Since most of the models introduced in this section and, especially, the one chosen as a guideline for analysis, are producing information about the qualitative properties of political systems and about whether these can be ascribed pluralist,
Let us turn to the first task, the identification of an appropriate model. In general, more recent approaches to the study of the state and of society seem to have overcome the limitations of earlier conceptualizations, in particular, those which claimed that the essence of modern politics was represented by policies formed within one sphere and applied to or shaped by the other. The emphasis given to the role and the activities of the state may still continue to differ and may range from "governed interdependence", i.e. institutionalized cooperation under state leadership (Weiss and Hobson 1995:244), over the "denationalization of domains by the state" (Offe 1987), up to an outright decomposition of the state (and, of course, of society) suggested by system analysis of the Luhmannian type. Overall, however, it is recognized that "linkage is the critical ingredient" (Weiss and Hobson, ibid) of analysis and the production and reproduction of the dividing line between state and society (Pierson 1996:95). As a result, in most attempts that present models for the identification of distinct patterns of policy-making, the societal dimension is placed on one axis of a contingency table and the state dimension on the other. Various combinations of the properties along the two dimensions are then taken as pointing to specific characteristics of the state and of the way it relates to society. Although none of these concepts take account, explicitly, of the territorial dimension of policy-making, and although all are strongly nation-state biased, some of these shall be mentioned briefly.

51 The original German phrasing is hard to translate. Offe speaks of staatssiche reits entstaatlichte Sachbereiche und of a staatliche Politik der Staatsentlastung (Offe 1987:317) - a non- or post-marxist variant of the Rücknahme des Staates in die Gesellschaft which, paradoxically, as noted by Offe, would seem to be feasible only under conditions of strong states.

52 Interestingly, but misleadingly in my view, Weiss and Hobson mention that the modes of linkage represented by "governed interdependence may be particularly pronounced in (...) Germany and Italy, particularly at regional level" (ibid 245).

53 The shortage of conceptualizations of territory within the broader context of state theory and of state-society discussions is astonishing. Indeed, there is no reason why decentralization should not be ascribed the same prominence in discussions of state-society relations as, for example, privatization or the attribution of a public status to organized interests. Although they may come in the most diverse mixtures, decentralization, privatization and the use of societal intermediaries for the achievement of public functions are all expressions of the same subsidiary logic. A particularly curious case is the United Kingdom, which not only has resisted moves towards decentralization but has "embarked on a centralization of the state (...) on a heroic scale" (Sharpe 1993:16) while, at the same time, embracing privatization with the greatest enthusiasm. Territorial and functional decentralization or "territorial and functional subsidiarity" (Grote 1993) are distinct but strongly interrelated attempts by the State to cope with societal discontent and increasing functional complexity. That regions have been created to provide for new bargaining areas based on territory rather than sector, in order to correct some of the distortions generated by universalistic egalitarianism and corporatism alike has been argued by Meny (1986) and by Cassee and Tarchia (1993) with regard to the creation of the Italian regions. Finally, Perez-Diaz (1990) sees the creation of comunidad autonomia as an extraordinary attempt by national and subnational corporatist institutions as being strongly interrelated. In his view, it reflected a necessary tactic by the nascent Spanish democratic state to generate its own legitimacy by delegating extensive authority to two different kinds of meso-arrangements, thus creating "instrumental consent" in relation to two critical and potentially destabilizing issues: regional nationalism and industrial unrest. Other models, in some way representing more elaborate versions of Oliver Williamson's market-hierarchy dichotomy (most importantly, Streeck and Schmitter 1985 and Schmitter 1989) are clearly industry or sector biased and hard to apply to units such as regions or regional governance. The most interesting attempt to use Schmitter's model of "modes of sectoral governance" for studying problems of territorial politics is Parri (1993a, 1993b). Parri applies the concept to the study of industrial districts, i.e. to an agglomeration of enterprises bearing some similarity with a sector, albeit territorially entrenched.

UNfortunately, the one model used here as a conceptual guideline, namely Ronit and Schneider's argument in favour of an organizational ecology perspective on state-society relations, remains rather descriptive and does not develop clear typologies to work with. Following the authors' suggestion to look out for the roles and positions of interest systems and individual interest groups in macro-political ecologies, we still need a model that would in some way be able to accommodate the complexity of interorganizational patterns at the subnational level. Kriesi's (1994) suggestion, perhaps, is the most intriguing one, not only because of its simplicity but also because the author himself and other, subsequent research efforts (Sciarrini 1994, 1995, 1996) have already made use of it for network-analytic purposes. Indeed, the results generated by Kriesi's contingency table represent specific policy network configurations, i.e. "a specific mode of the functioning of policy processes in the administrative arena" (Kriesi 1994:393). In the state dimension (the horizontal axis), Kriesi distinguishes between strong (left hand) and weak (right hand) states, and in the societal dimension (the vertical axis) between highly...
Theoretical considerations

(upper hand) developed and weakly developed (lower hand) interest systems. In the unlikely event that the regions of our sample should fit perfectly their respective national images, three of the four boxes could be filled. Following Kriesi, Wales and the two Italian regions would be weak on both dimensions. Their policy networks would be populated by a "high number of actors". There would be "open access for new actors", the networks would be "decentralized", "fragmented" and "unstable" while exhibiting, at the same time, a rather "equilibrated and symmetric pattern of relations". The two French regional networks would be populated by "few public and many private actors" and would be "relatively closed", with "access being granted to few actors only", in a "highly selective" fashion. They would, of course, be "centralized", "relatively unstable" and "asymmetric" in terms of relational patterning. Finally, the German Länder would fall into the weak state/strong interest system category. Their networks would possess "many public actors and few private actors", would be "closed" as in the case of France, and "decentralized" and "fragmented" as in the cases of Wales and Italy. Finally, and contrary to the other cases, they would have a "high stability" and would exhibit "decentralized" and "fragmented" as in the cases of Wales and Italy. None of our regions would occupy the strong state/strong interest  system box. Albeit "symmetric features", albeit only at the level of individual sectors (sectoral concertation). They would, of course, be "centralized", "relatively unstable" and "asymmetric" in terms of relational patterning. Finally, the German Länder would fall into the weak state/strong interest system category. Their networks would possess "many public actors and few private actors", would be "closed" as in the case of France, and "decentralized" and "fragmented" as in the cases of Wales and Italy. Finally, and contrary to the other cases, they would have a "high stability" and would exhibit "decentralized" and "fragmented" as in the cases of Wales and Italy. None of our regions would occupy the strong state/strong interest system box. Albeit interesting, this model suffers from a lack of complexity and is too biased towards the analysis of national patterns. It shall, therefore, be dropped from the list of possible candidates.55

There are other models that also operate with two dimensions. For example, Franz Lehner's (1988:90) dimensions envisage relational properties more explicitly (cohesive and fragmented structures of interest associations in the one and the same characteristics for administration in the other dimension), but generate rather poor typologies. The "cohesive on both dimensions variety" is characterized by "cooperation in decision-making" and "immobility", while the opposite box would assemble cases characterized by "spontaneous decisions" and "uncontrolled development". Fragmented interest systems under conditions of cohesive administrative structures generate a high number of "obligatory regulations" and tend towards "over-regulation", while fragmented administration and cohesive interest systems produce intensity in "private bargaining" and a certain degree of "sectoralization". Lehner's model, then, also suffers from under-complexity and shall also be dropped. There is no empirically significant data on the amount of regulation/legislation and the extent of sectoralization in the nine regions. Phil Cerny's (1990:166-177) represents a further attempt to come to grips with differentiation, de-differentiation, and re-differentiation of state-society relations by forming typologies along the two dimensions. Curiously, the six typologies generated by his contingency table

Other conceptual efforts tend to reflect exact the opposite characteristics. For example, while not actually representing a model in the strict sense of the word, van Waarden's typology, clearly suffers from over-complexity. The types of policy networks (eleven) suggested go far beyond the number of cases at our disposal. However, the contribution is of interest because it explicitly addresses the problem of diversity of policy networks across countries and sectors. More importantly, van Waarden uses proper network-analytic empirical measures to distinguish his cases and also addresses state-industry relations quite explicitly. This is one of the reasons why Pappi (1993), for example, has exempted this contribution from his critique of descriptive policy network approaches. We shall not make use of van Waarden's typologies, at least not as a possible model. References to his work are included, however, in some of the following attempts of to develop hypotheses for the different regional cases.

The most appropriate model of state-society relations for our specific purpose is the one offered by Michael Atkinson and William Coleman (1989). Their model, to some extent, laid the ground for van Waarden's contribution as well. Quite similar to the latter's work, Atkinson and Coleman's model is an attempt to ascribe policy networks a number of typical attributes relative to specific properties of state structures and of the interest systems within which the latter operate. Most importantly, this model has not only been used with some success for network-analytic application (Jansen 1995) but the authors themselves, in a more recent contribution (Atkinson and Coleman 1992), have taken up their earlier arguments and have refined them, in an attempt to limit the...
usefulness of policy-network approaches to quite specific ends. In essence, state-society concepts presented in policy-network forms are believed to be useful only to the extent that the disaggregation of the state, of its societal context, and of the dividing line between the two for the purpose of empirical analysis, is followed by their successive re-aggregation in the interest of retaining the possibility of comparing patterns of policy-making at the macro-level. Macro-political structures cannot be dismissed in the study of subsystems and cross-national differences cannot be explained by referring to sectoral (or, as in our case, territorial) variables alone (Atkinson and Coleman 1992:164). State-society relations, in most cases, are derived from macro-political arrangements which provide the context in which networks are formed (ibid:165-66). Any approach that dismisses the importance of re-aggregation and the role of system-level norms and macropolitical units runs the risk of revitalizing and reinforcing "an image of the state traditionally found in pluralist theory" (ibid:163).

These remarks are important for our context, to the extent that they declare comparison at the macro-level to be of at least the same importance as comparison at the decomposed level of sectors, domains, territories, etc. Our study of the policy domain "regional development", is, indeed, conceived of in terms of a study of macro-political interactions. It is not a policy network analysis in the narrow sense. Accordingly, we do not see the need for a re-aggregation of our analytical units. Regions themselves are conceptualized in terms of macro-structures and are analyzed in terms of the properties of their interorganizational relations59.

59 Pappi recognizes the value of van Waarden's conceptualization to the extent that the author takes policy network to be "a generic term for different types of relations between interest groups and the state" (Pappi 1993:89).

58 Regions can, of course, be conceptualized in terms of what Sharpe (1993) has called the "continetal meso". They are meso-units of analysis if the nation state is chosen as the main focus, but there is no reason why a case such as, for example, Northrhine-Westphalia which was tenth on an international rank ordering in terms of export performance, ranking close to Japan and, incidentally, bigger than Denmark, should not merit the label of a macro-unit, even if it has no defense policy proper and is lacking sovereignty over its borders.

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A slightly modified version of the Atkinson/Coleman model is represented in Table 3.1. The information used in what follows, to fill the cells of this contingency table with regional cases, is exclusively of a qualitative-descriptive type. It results entirely from case study material collected for each of the nine regions. We shall see that it is not as much of a problem to come up with hypotheses concerning state capacity. If regions are ever subjected to comparative analysis in political science, it is almost exclusively in terms of administrative units. What is described are their institutional assets and capacities, and the national constitutional environment within which they are embedded. This should allow for a precise placement of cases along the horizontal dimension of the table. More serious is the constraint represented by the almost complete absence of empirical information on attributes of subnational interest systems (representativeness, encompassingness, numbers of associate members, degree of sectoral specialization, power in terms of impacts on regional decision-making, etc.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY CAPACITY OF STATE AGENCIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coordination capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTEREST SYSTEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>STATE DOMINATED</td>
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<tr>
<td>strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>NETWORK STRUCTURE</td>
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<td>(1)</td>
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Theoretical considerations

It is quite difficult, therefore, to come up with detailed hypotheses about the solidity/robustness and degree of fragmentation of territorial interest groups without turning to material available for the national level. Occasionally, parts of the case study literature addresses that problem, although mostly in a quite unsystematic way. In general, what Table 3.1 is not able to show is that properties concerning the interest system include both a territorial and a functional dimension. An interest system would be characterized as being extremely fragmented if this property could be found in both dimensions, i.e. in cases of territorial fragmentation (the organizational epicentre is at the subregional level) and of organizational fragmentation (political-ideological divisions expressed by the existence of two, three, four, or more interest associations representing the same category).

The modification of the model follows the suggestions made by William Coleman made in a communication with the author (February 1997). These suggestions also took account of the critique made by van Waarden (1992a). The horizontal dimension of the table reflects the policy capacity of the state both with regard to activities within its own administrative borders ("to coordinate its activities across a variety of departments and agencies") and with regard to activities in its external environment ("the capacity ... to formulate policies on its own").

Emphasizing, in what follows, the main properties of the two dimensions, we shall see that the descriptions derived from existing literature are not uncontroversial in any of our territorial cases, and do not converge on any single typology of the table. Almost all of the regions have been described as strongly etatist and state-centered by some authors and, at the same time, balanced, egalitarian, and network-like by others. Even labels such as corporatism, pluralism, consociationalism are not uncontested. There is, therefore, hardly any acquired and widely shared knowledge on which to build our own analysis. Advancements in the study of territorial politics do not seem to be accumulative. Most authors are working within the limits of rather narrow conceptual approaches and do not take account of research in adjacent fields, even if this would substantially enrich their own visions and contribute to less generalizing approximations to reality. Despite these constraints, opposing views, of course, also help to sharpen one's own analytical judgements. Therefore, the existence of contradicting views may also be an advantage, at least for those regions for which there is sufficient evidence. Unfortunately, sufficient information on the regional ecologies especially of Southern European regions can in no way be taken for granted.

This latter, the lack of evidence, is the second major constraint and, at the same time, lends further support to our type of analysis. More than a decade ago, Philippe Schmitter has drawn attention to the fact that "the countries on the northern rim of the Mediterranean have long been the 'stepchildren' of the study of Western European politics and society. With the notable exception of Italy, "they have been routinely placed outside the mainstream of inquiry and generalization about political developments in that part of the world" (Schmitter 1986:3). The same applies to the ascription of these cases to specific typologies. Schmitter goes on to note that "classification systems assigned them the status of 'exceptions', or simply placed them in the ignominious category of 'other' (...)" (ibid.). Ten years from that startling observation, the situation has not changed significantly. In hardly any of the models that we have mentioned, do we find references to Spain, and Italy continues to be treated in a rather undifferentiated manner -- the classical case of clientelism. More seriously, the problem becomes exacerbated as soon as one moves to dimensions other than national political systems. We shall see that, while some of the regions of the present sample are over-researched60, others continue to be analytical no-man's land, even if they do not belong to the Mediterranean rim. Niedersachsen, for example, could claim the 'stepchild status' as much as Andalucia or

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60 Specific regions seem to attract the attention of only some disciplines, but not of others. Baden-Wurttemberg, for example, is the favorite case of the flexible specialization school and of those working in the tradition of the "industrial district" approach. Sicily, on the other hand, is over-researched by anthropologists, "mafiosiologists" and "amoral familists" of the most different provenience. Wales and Catalunya, finally, are the most preferred targets of scholars working in the civic culture tradition (regional mobilization). The findings of these approaches do not add up to a genuine concept with which to undertake cross-regional research.
Sicily. Having pointed to these uncomfortable, though necessary caveats, let me now turn to the first task, the building of hypotheses.
3
Tentative hypotheses

THE STRUCTURING OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SPACE

While it is difficult to come up with clear-cut typologies for forms of subnational interest intermediation in Europe, it presents less a problem to group regions into various categories with respect to the competences of their governments and to the institutional/constitutional environment under which these governments are operating. Broadly speaking, our regions represent four rather distinct forms. According to a survey by Engel (1993), the following four typologies can be identified: regions belonging to unitarian states (Wales), regions belonging to decentralized states (Rhone-Alpes and Languedoc-Roussillon), regions belonging to regionalized states (Lombardia, Sicilia, Catalunya and Andalusia) and, finally, regional states proper (Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachsen). Apart from the latter category, the other cases cannot be accredited stateness in the narrow sense. Such is the autonomy of the German Länder, that in many accounts of regionalism in Europe, they are not even mentioned.

With respect to the societal dimension of regional governance, the only property that could eventually be derived from cross-national surveys and serve as a proxy for the format of territorial interest systems, is the degree of the latters' fragmentation and differentiation. Where a national interest system is highly fragmented ideologically, professionally and/or sectorally, it is reasonable to expect that fragmentation to be reflected at the subnational level. It is not possible, however, to derive from that indications about the relative power of interest groups in specific regions. Based on previous research in the neo-corporatist tradition, Bernhard Wessels (1996) has recently undertaken a large-scale empirical comparison of interest systems in 24 OECD countries. Trade union organizations and business interest associations are seperately plotted in his study along the two dimensions of fragmentation/differentiation and associational power. Selecting only the five countries represented by our nine regions and combining the information for both of the two dimensions and for both types of interest associations in one single table, the following rather impressionistic pattern would emerge.

The countries of our study would occupy four different extreme positions and one intermediate position. While both would exhibit a close to average degree of fragmentation/differentiation, interest groups in decentralized France (case 1) would rank relatively low and interest groups in federal Germany (case 2) relatively high on power. On the contrary, interest groups in regionalized Italy and in unitarian Great Britain would rank close to average in terms of power, with the UK occupying a relatively low (case 3) and Italy a relatively high (case 4) position on a scale measuring associational fragmentation and differentiation. Regionalized Spain, finally, would rank slightly below average on both dimensions (case 5). The only valid information for our purposes deriving from that picture, may be the following. The regional interest systems of both Lombardia and Sicilia clearly are the most fragmented and differentiated of our sample while that of Wales would represent the opposite case. Territorial interest groups in France probably are the least powerful in terms of their capacity to get access to public authorities and co-direct decisions concerning regional development while the opposite would seem to be the case for their counterparts in Germany. This, of course, does in no way take account of regional specificities. Moreover, there is no correlation whatsoever between the type of state and the type of interest system. Yet, the above information may be taken as a rather solid indicator of the general patterns of interest intermediation in the nine regions. All further information needs to be derived from case study material and, of

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European University Institute

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Tentative hypotheses

course, from the outcome of the comparative network analysis in the subsequent chapters.

Turning back to the issue of the format of the regional state, at least four conditions need to be satisfied in order to speak of regions in a politico-administrative sense. First, regions have to represent territorial units lying in between the level of the municipality and that of the central State. Secondly, there must be decision-making units at that level which are not merely field offices of the central State and which carry out important functions in a relative autonomy. Thirdly, regional decision-makers must be elected and legitimized by a regional assembly, or by a composition of various subregional electorates and, finally, the units need to possess the legal status of regional administrative bodies. The probably best shorthand for defining the units in question is the one used by the Assembly of European Regions. According to the Assembly, regions represent those administrative bodies immediately below the level of the central State apparatus which, at the same time, are furthest removed from the local level. Regions may be one or more of the following. The can represent historical, economic, cultural or linguistic units or all other characteristics that have played a role in the original decision of dividing the national territory. To these belong, of course, also units having merely been created by rather arbitrary criteria of administrative efficiency, without possessing any clearly visible relation to cultural, ethnic, or otherwise natural boundaries.

In what follows, each regional case shall briefly be introduced by references to its most distinctive politico-administrative features before more far-reaching comments are made about the predominant pattern of interorganizational relations characterizing each individual case. In general, we distinguish between general structures and the process of regionalization, secondly, the legal status of the units and intergovernmental relations linking them to their respective central State authorities, third, their competencies in lawmaking, jurisdiction and administrative affairs and, finally, their specific institutions. Competencies and functions are of particular importance in the present context. Besides the so-called SHEW functions2 (social, health, education and welfare) mentioned by Sharpe (1993:10), the most important for our purpose is regional planning. The original rationale for regional planning hardly went beyond rational-functional institutional changes in design, introduced by central government to cope with the specificities of particular problem areas and to secure support for national planning. Yet, in the course of development, "the regional machinery came to be seen by some as embryo governments which could be the engine for (...) the decentralization of the state, the enhancement of popular participation and the modernization of the economy" (Sharpe 1993:13). The planning euphoria of the 1960s and 1970s came to an end during the 1980s - not least due to the recognition of "specific context structures in implementation target fields" that often hampered the successful implementation of policy programs and that had not been taken into consideration by the "behaviorist scientific methods" having dominated the early technological and methodological optimism. (Kenis and Schneider 1991:37). It may be asked, however, whether Community initiatives aimed at diffusing the idea and at institutionalizing the practice of "integrated planning" and, moreover, the successive reforms of the EU's structural funds have not substantially altered and off-set this decline in planning euphoria, thereby reinforcing and supporting the emergence of a new, but now proper regional form of governance of the economy.

We cannot give a complete account of regional planning for each of our cases. This is not the objective of this work and would require the study of an enormous number of

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2 Sharpe identifies two general rules or rationales lying at the roots of the institutionalization of the territorial meso, the externality rule and the rule of indivisibility. According to the first, communal government should be responsible for those collective consumption tasks that had few externalities beyond the boundary of the community on behalf of which the tasks are performed. The second rule concerned core tasks and represented pure public goods such as public order, law enforcement, defense, foreign relations, currency issues, the judicial system, economic management, nationwide communications and so forth. "Via these two rules (...) most of the major governmental tasks of the pre-welfare unitary state were allocated" (Sharpe 1993:10). After the war, a new set of public functions emerged that did not easily fit this duality - the SHEW functions. Although in some cases, some of these were retained by the centre, many of these were performed by newly created regional administrative bodies. The reluctance of central government to overload itself with SHEW functions had been such that by the early 1970s "in 12 of the 22 so-called advanced industrial democracies (...) the sub-national system had (...) grown beyond the point of overtaking the centre in terms of its share of total public expenditure" (ibid:11-12).
documents in five different languages. Yet, the recent Community initiatives have triggered off and attracted a new interest in the issue of regional planning among political scientists and it is, essentially, the literature produced in that context to which we shall turn when now presenting nine different regional tableaux. On the basis of these tableaux, we shall try to advance a number of structural hypotheses that will then be checked in the subsequent analysis of different regional ecologies.

ITALY

The following general description of Italian regions largely draws from previous work covering the period up to the early 1990s (Grote 1996). Since, in pure institutional terms, little has changed since then, the overall pattern continues to be valid. On a superficial level, Italy is a regionalized unitary state along Napoleonic lines. However, there is a crucial difference between the French model and the Italian one. France introduced regionalisation in a political system which was thoroughly centralized and unified (Cassese and Torchia, 1993). In Italy, the regionalisation process started when unity was not yet fully achieved, at least not in cultural and economic terms. This may explain the unusual amalgamation of regionalisation and centralization.

According to the 1948 constitution, Italy is a regional state. Art. 114 defines the Republic as being composed of regions, provinces, and communes: Regions are declared to be “autonomous bodies with proper powers and functions according to the principles laid down in the Constitution”. However, constitutional rules were only enforced for the regions of Sicily, Sardinia, Valle d’Aosta and Trentino-Alto Adige, by a special statute in the 1950s. These four regions were joined, in 1963, by Friuli-Venezia-Giulia. The special statute regions remained an exception in a highly centralized and unified system until the coming into force of art.117 of the Constitution in 1970, which allowed for the creation of the other fifteen ordinary statute regions. These views developed, in part, as a result of the events of 1968, and the subsequent recognition that active participation of subnational actors and of societal forces had to be sought. Despite this, central government has never given up control over the territorial redistribution of resources and over its prerogatives in most policy areas. Only a central authority, it was argued, could adjust the dramatic disparities between north and south. Hence, the central government remained in charge of overall economic planning, albeit in consultation with the regions (Cassese 1984), and controlled all administrative acts of the new regional institutions formally started to work, represents the cut-off point from which it is possible to speak of Italy as a regionalized state proper. The most important of the subsequent decrees fleshing out the devolution process in the following years was the presidential decree, Dpr. 616 of 24 July 1977, which re-orders and streamlines the competencies of normal statute regions and which, to date, is the basic norm for both regional legislation and the implementation of policies. It came into force on 1 January 1978 -- the date referred to by most authors as the cut-off from which any evaluation of the new institution would have to start (Putnam et al. 1985; Leonardi 1993; Putnam et al. 1993; Hine 1993, Cassese and Torchia 1993, Onida 1990).

Regional reform in Italy took off during a phase of strongly centralized planning, and had, therefore, originally a strong top-down bias. This centralized bias clashed with views on the left of the political spectrum that planning should be more democratic. These views developed, in part, as a result of the events of 1968, and the subsequent recognition that active participation of subnational actors and of societal forces had to be sought. Despite this, central government has never given up control over the territorial redistribution of resources and over its prerogatives in most policy areas. Only a central authority, it was argued, could adjust the dramatic disparities between north and south. Hence, the central government remained in charge of overall economic planning, albeit in consultation with the regions (Cassese 1984), and controlled all administrative acts of

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1 The 15 normal statute regions were pure ‘paper tigers’ from 1947, when they were first mentioned as purely statistical units, until 27 December 1963, when a new article was added to the Constitution which formally mentioned them, at least by name. However, the process of decentralization did not

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the regions. For example, all regional laws have to be submitted to the respective
Commissario della Repubblica (Article 124 of the constitution).

Problems also occurred with regard to the regional competencies Ordinary statute
regions have competencies in three broad areas where they are allowed to legislate
within the norms set by central framework laws: social services, economic development,
and spatial and environmental planning. They were expected to legislate in an ‘organic
manner’ in each of these three sectors (Nanetti, 1988). Yet, very soon a highly complex
model of central-regional relations developed, which was largely caused by two factors
(Cassese, 1984). The reason lies first of all in the financial structure of the regional state.
Most fiscal transfers from the national government to the regions were earmarked for
specific programmes or projects, which gave central government the ability to insist on
joint management of these resources.

The regions’ own resources are currently less than 15% of total regional spending
(Hine, 1993; Cassese and Torchia, 1993). Resource transfers from the centre’s special
funds account for more than 80 per cent, and all resources are earmarked, i.e. they cannot
be spent at their own discretion by individual regions. Two domains, health and
transport, account for 75 per cent of the central transfers. The remaining 25 per cent are
then divided across a total of more than 100 individual posts and sectors - each of which
is accompanied by specific criteria and procedural rules for their use (Buglione et.al.,
1994: 1350). In addition, state authorities have always operated the regional budgets like
an accordion: stretching and squeezing it according to the exigencies of the national
purse. That left the regions without a guaranteed minimum income for medium- to long-
term planning. Regional policy autonomy with regard to the design of their own projects

is extremely limited; they have to follow strictly the criteria laid down by state
authorities, otherwise the state can step in directly (substitution). As noted by Cassese
and Torchia (1993), the contradiction between extending regional functions and reducing
regional financial autonomy is indicative of the Italian practice of mediating between
centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. Furthermore, the central State maintained the right
to issue administrative guidelines and provisions for policy co-ordination, which allowed
it to remain the dominating agency, even in areas of exclusive regional competence.

The financial prerogatives of central government and the lack of clarity in areas of
responsibility have blurred the distinctions between national and regional policy areas,
and a complex system of mixed regional-central bodies has emerged. This has given rise
to significant inter-institutional conflicts, as exemplified by the number of legal
proceedings initiated by the regions with the Constitutional Court against incursions by
the national government. Efficient policy making is made more difficult by the unanimity
rule in the mixed bodies. Finally, the presence of private interest group representatives in
about half of them seems to have made them less legitimate in the eyes of many (Sorace,
1982). As a result, co-ordination costs are extremely high, non-decision-making is the
rule, and joint-decision traps are built into the system, to an extent unmatched by other
European experiences. The terms of territorial political exchange (Parri, 1990) continue
to be highly unequal, but at the same time, “there is a degree of conscious acquiescence
by many regional governments” (Hine, 1993). As shown by Buglione et.al. (1994: 1354),
the pay-offs seem to be sufficiently high for the regions to justify "sufferance" as a
strategy, non-activity and, eventually, the obstruction of regional reform itself. This is
because reform would force regional politicians and bureaucrats to face directly the

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More specifically, these areas are: the organization of regional administration, municipal boundaries,
municipal and territorial police forces, exhibitions and trade fairs, health and social protection,
professional/vocational training in the craft sector and public schooling, museums and libraries,
territorial planning and land use, tourism, public transport of regional interest, construction,
agriculture, craft sector. Only in areas where there are no central framework laws, can these concurrent
legislative powers actually become exclusive ones. A great many additional activities are carried out
by regional governments by way of a delegation of central State legislation to regional administration.

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A Tuscan study group under the directorship of L. Berlinguer (Consiglio Regionale della Toscana,
1982) counted about 100 mixed bodies per region, i.e. more than 1000 in the entire country, and about
183 provisions for mixed legislative procedures, i.e. almost 2000 in Italy. This ever-growing number
makes the description of centre-periphery relations difficult. There are no systematic figures for more
recent times. The Council president of Emilia-Romagna, Castellucci, estimated the number of bodies

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demands made by the regional electorate and by regional interest groups. To date, it has been possible to manage the budget without major disturbances, often, in a clientelist mode without any accountability. Responsibility for failure or for inefficient use of resources could always be shifted to the centre.

The second aspect of regional "action capacity" concerns the poor quality of its administration and political forces. The politicians and bureaucrats, as well as the administrative culture, stemmed from a centralized state apparatus without any inclination towards decentralization. The regional administrative machines, in most cases, appear to be even less efficient than those of the central State\(^8\). They have usually copied the central format, without adjusting it to local circumstances. Likewise, the relations between regional and sub-regional authorities have often assumed the same dominating character as between the centre and the regions (Onida, 1990)\(^9\). Weak regional identities in Italy, and the absence of regional party organizations and political constituencies, have certainly played a role in that respect. However, it is not only external factors that account for the regions' lack of success. A major factor is the regional administration itself.

Party affiliation continues to be the most important route to a job in the public administration (Cerase, 1992)\(^12\). Clientelist patterns of this kind work even better in regional administration than in the more distant structures of the central State. Moreover, the political parties control not only recruitment, but the entire career path (Cerase, 1993). In these circumstances, networks of political affiliations are continuously reinforced. Participants are expected to demonstrate loyalty towards these networks rather than towards the civil service as an institution. Thus regional politicians constantly invade the administrative sphere, deprive the civil servant of discretionary powers, and force her to become a mere executor of administrative acts. Regional planning, in circumstances such as these, is destined to fail, as planning as such is impossible (Bianchi, 1993).

The above may already tell us a lot about the general structure and performance of regional government in Italy. Positioning the two Italian regions along the horizontal axis of the Atkinson/Coleman model would not seem to represent a major problem. Since both the room for manoeuvre and the coordination capacity of regional state agencies are low, Italy would have to be placed in the right-hand column of the table. Given that the "supply" of regional governance is underdeveloped, policy networks and state-society relations would oscillate between the two typologies of parentela pluralism and an interest dominated pattern, with Lombardy probably falling into the latter and Sicily into the former typology. Before considering in more detail the vertical axis of the table, to verify this hypothesis, the generalizing picture drawn above would seem to need some qualification. Indeed, it is unlikely to be shared by all specialists working in the field.

Robert Putnam (1993), for example, has studied the supply side in terms of institutional performance differentials of regional government across the country's territory over a period of about two decades. According to that study, these differentials are extremely pronounced and would suggest a strong variance in state capacity across the country's regions.

On practically all accounts, Lombardy and Sicily appear in two opposite clusters. Although not individually representing the extreme cases within the sample, Lombardy

\(^8\) Suffrage, according to Schmitter (1985) is an option being alternative to both "exit" and "voice".
\(^9\) This is the unfortunate translation of the German "regionale Handlungsfahigkeit" - a property which has been examined by the Mannheim project of which this study represents an off-shot. For a critique of "regionale Handlungsfahigkeit", see Voelzkow 19xx.
\(^10\) The central State bureaucracy is described by Keating (1993:231) as "slow, ponderous and inefficient (...) Inefficiency is rife and favouritism, shading into corruption, common, especially in the south - the bustarella, an envelope filled with money, is often the best way to clear a bureaucratic blockage. Since the bureaucracy is so inefficient, political intervention and recommendations are required for the most routine matters, providing yet more opportunities for patronage."
\(^11\) In principle, the 95 Italian provinces are not directly controlled by the regions but, rather, by central authorities. This has changed in 1990 (Law no.42/1990), where the regions have acquired considerable competencies with respect to the coordination of activities by local and provincial authorities.
\(^12\) Cassese (1993) estimated that in the period from 1973-90, about 350,000 people were recruited (into public office) without entrance exams, compared with 250,000 with entry exams. These recruitments were made permanent by twelve special laws.

\(^13\) Putnam's most important indicator of institutional performance is a composite measure including empirical information on twelve properties as diverse as: the amount of reform legislation, the number of day care centres, housing and urban development, statistical and information services, legislative
always ranks close to the group of most developed, and Sicily close to the group of least developed regions. This concerns not only institutional performance but also the most diverse political, social, and cultural indicators. One does not need to agree with the generalizations drawn by the author from this evidence, to accept the empirical results on institutional performance differentials.

The problem is, rather, whether institutional performance is the same as state capacity. For a number of reasons, we do not believe this to be the case. The regional state's room for manoeuvre, i.e. its relative autonomy versus both societal forces and central government agencies, must be considered to be low even in those regions ranking comparatively well on institutional performance. This is even more the case, if state capacity is placed in the wider context of an international comparison. At most, some variance may occur with respect to the second dimension of state capacity of Table 3.1, i.e. the coordination capacity, or 'Verwaltungskraft' of different divisions of regional government. 'Il buon governo' has been said to be particularly developed in some of the regions of the Third Italy, but it is less clear to what extent Lombardy could easily be put into the same category. In any case, even if this variance were admitted, it would not change very much with respect to the resulting typologies. It would place Lombardy in the third column of the table, with a network structure oscillating between pressure pluralism and clientelist pluralism and leave Sicily in the fourth column.

Considering now the vertical axis of the table, that is, the axis representing variance in the societal dimension, let us again turn to Robert Putnam’s work. We now see that the real problem with his model is that it is not linked to state capacity at all. Both politics and the state are absent in this analysis and neither the institutional solidity of regional government nor its policy output are related in any significant way to the legal and constitutional arrangements under which regional actors perform their tasks. This is because they are thought to be determined by, and rooted in, a completely different analytical dimension, namely society. The argument that the quality of supply, i.e. institutional performance, is determined by societal demand is certainly an interesting idea and may help overcome the limitations of traditional administrative approaches (Regierungslehre) which only look at competences and regional statutes. However, we shall see that the notion of societal demand, as conceptualized by Putnam, is itself quite limited and of little use for the purpose of the present analysis.

In Table 3.1, a distinction was made between fragmented and solid formats of interest systems as properties appropriately characterizing the societal dimension. In making this distinction, account was taken of the fact that 'societal performance differentials' are extremely hard, if not impossible, to identify without recourse to the organized expression of citizen demands, i.e. to organized interest intermediation. Although this is the main focus of Putnam’s work, one looks in vain for such a distinction, or even for a single reference to the role of organized collective action. Putnam’s regional society is an atomized one, with levels of civicness deeply rooted in dyadic, bilateral exchanges among individuals. These exchanges tend to converge around two stable situations of social equilibrium. One, represented by Lombardy in our study, is characterized by "always cooperate", the other (Sicily) by "always defect".

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14 The least developed region is Calabria and the most developed Emilia-Romagna - according to Putnam, the most civic of regions not only by Italian standards.
15 Other indicators used by Putnam which confirm the opposite positioning of the two regions in different clusters are citizen satisfaction, community leaders’ satisfaction, economic modernity, referendum turnout, preference voting, civicness, republicanism, clericalism, and so forth.
16 Focussing on Putnam’s institutionally most developed and most civic region, Emilia-Romagna, Grote and Garmise (1990) have demonstrated that things turn out to be quite different if a European perspective is being adopted. Emilia-Romagna, then, rather occupies an intermediate position (24 European Community regions formed part of the sample). Parri (1993), who has compared the industrial policies of Emilia-Romagna and Rhone-Alpes, has also ascribed a relatively low state capacity to the case of the Italian region.
17 In other words, it takes account of Philippe Schmitter’s observation that civil society alone can neither monopolize the interaction between individuals and the state, nor express all lines of cleavage in a society. In reality, it operates everywhere "alongside direct contacts and uncivil actions in efforts to influence the course of public policy. However, the more these efforts are channelled through formal intermediary organizations, the greater is the degree of civil society". (Schmitter 1997, Essay on Democracy, Chapter 6:18, typoscript, EUI-Florence).
18 Putnam's book was published in the midst of the Tangentopoli turmoil. Surprisingly, it does not take account of the anticipatory shocks that announced the crisis. According to Keating (1993:247), the...
Both equilibria are said to be achieved without public coercion\textsuperscript{20} and, secondly, without inputs on the part of organized collective action by interest associations\textsuperscript{21}. The only associations ‘admitted’, in Putnam’s model, as being able to reflect ‘societal performance differentials’, are leisure associations and sport clubs. Yet, this does not prevent the author from drawing a number of prohibitive inferences from his data or from advancing the most heroic claims about the role of networks of collective action in the various regional ecologies. It is for this reason, and because of the large amount of publicity that Putnam’s network arguments have achieved both in academic and in political discourses, that his contribution is being commented upon in a rather more detailed manner. The supply of regional governance is not determined, or in any way constrained, either by constitutional provisions or central government interference, or by organized citizen demands. It is rather a function of certain ‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated action’ (Putnam 1993:167).

This touches upon state-society relations - an area with regard to which Putnam lacks any evidence. The shift in emphasis from working with rather traditional empirical material -- for example, the quantity of leisure groups and sports clubs\textsuperscript{22} -- to suddenly emphasizing the proper relational assets of regions, i.e. the ties connecting the private to the public sphere, in reality is nothing but "an artefact of data collection constraints: information on the number of civic associations per capita is easier to collect than data on social networks" (Boix and Posner 1996:11). One of the objectives of the present work is, by overcoming that constraint, to provide exactly that type of evidence absent in Putnam’s work. An important caveat must be added at this point, however, and this does not only concern Italy. It is one thing to accuse the author of inappropriate generalization, it is another to actually fill the gap and provide more reliable information about the dominant structures of civil society in Italy and in other countries. As far as the subnational dimension is concerned, the terrain represented by collective action, associability, interest intermediation, and state-society relations continues to be dramatically under-researched everywhere.

In order to know more about that area, we therefore need to turn to how things are described in more general interest group literature. The most characteristic feature of the country's interest system is its high degree of organizational fragmentation. Until recently, and certainly at the time of our analysis, this fragmentation has also been an ideological fragmentation. Within each economic sector, an average of between three to five interest associations claimed to represent the entire category of both enterprises and workers, and each of these groups competed for recognition by public authorities. Industry is divided between Confindustria, Italy's most powerful peak association of larger enterprises, Confapi, the representative of small and medium sized firms, and Inter Sind, the association of public enterprises. The craft sector assembles at least four important associations (CGIA, CNA, CASA, and CLAAI), although in some parts of the

\textsuperscript{20} Central enforcement is an "inadequat solution" (Putnam 1993).

\textsuperscript{21} The regional branches of national interest associations are explicitly removed from Putnam’s research agenda ‘on the assumption that ‘imported’ associations may be a flawed indicator of local associational propensities” (ibid:222; endnote 35).

\textsuperscript{22} Turning to work undertaken by Trigilia (1995) and by Diamanti (1995), I have shown that even the simple statistical information provided by Putnam on associationalism in Italy is largely outdated and can hardly be taken as evidence for the propensity (Lombardy) or the incapability (Sicily) to engage in collective action and build more encompassing interorganizational networks. For Trigilia, the absence of collective action in the south is a myth of the past, and Diamanti counts as many as 2000 associations in Sicily which is ranking forth among the Mezzogiorno regions in terms of associationalism. Moreover, in open contradiction of Putnam’s results, more recent empirical research confirms that “it cannot be said that Southerns, with the exception of sports clubs, have a significantly lower propensity to join secondary associations of any kind with respect to people living in other regions of the country. Indeed, compared to the industrial Northwest [i.e. including Lombardy], they show a higher propensity to join political parties, trade and professional organizations” (Maraffi 1998:3).
country, there are further region-specific groups without clear-cut national reference points. Commerce is divided between Confesercenti and Confcommercio, while farmers and land-owners have a choice between CIA, Coldiretti, and Confagricoltura. The same variety pertains to the cooperative sector, where we encounter the LEGA cooperative, the Confcooperative and UNCI. Although the three labour unions are often referred to in one composite acronym (CGIL, CISL, UIL), they continue to be divided not only organizationally but also with regard to major strategic and political objectives. Surprisingly, most authors dealing with Italy's interest groups do not actually pay much attention to this high multiplicity. It is so strongly ingrained in the historical evolution of interest representation that hardly anyone feels a need to question its viability, or to envisage the eventual emergence of a more functional patterning of interorganizational relations. Interestingly, while the interest system is fragmented, the chamber system is largely unified. Industry, agriculture, craft and other professions are not grouped into different types of chambers, but all have one single point of reference, la Camera per l'industria, agricoltura, commercio, artigianato e pesca (CCII).

Competition for representation is extremely high under these circumstances both among trade unions and employer associations and interorganizational relations are poorly institutionalized (Regini 1997:110-111). At the same time, pressure applied to government agencies with a view to capturing rent positions is equally pronounced. Contrary to the case of France, however, where the interest system has often been described in similar terms (Zariski 1993:355-360), associations are encountering an "available state" (DiPalma 1980) in Italy, especially in the legislative arena where "they have found the powerful standing committees, with their ability to enact minor bills directly into law, a most rewarding site for their endeavors" (Zariski 1993:355). While, as we have seen, Italy can be characterized in terms of a weak state (low autonomy and low capacity of coordination), this state, at the same time, is a "pervasive [one], colonized by the political parties and extensively penetrated by interests linked to the parties. The autonomous sphere of civil society is correspondingly small" (Keating 1993:233). Even where parts of society are organized in groups, these "membership bonds are weak and voluntarist" (Regini 1997:110).

Cooperation between public and private agents, nevertheless, follows a rather consensual pattern. While Italy may be characterized by "polarized pluralism" in the electoral system and in its interest system alike (Fabbrini 1995:69), its government system operates according to a logic of "bargained pluralism" (ibid.). By some, this peculiar mixture of open conflict and hidden consensus has been described as a specific form of consociationalism (Pizzorno 1994), distinctive normally of countries with ethnic-cultural cleavages so profound as to rule out recourse to the majority principle. Yet, while Pizzorno stresses the invisibility of obscure consociationalist practices (politica oscura) behind the facade of a highly competitive and antagonistic public discourse (politica palese)23, Golden underlines elite cooperation as a form of "competitive symbiosis" (Golden 1988:293), in which "cooperation was more symbolic than real, and what actual cooperation did occur was irregular, unpredictable, and fragile, outside any framework for consensual policymaking" (ibid). Participants remained "deeply distrustful" of each other.

Most of what has been argued above, equally occurs at the subnational level. There, the general pattern may be more or less pronounced relative to the degree of hegemony of a particular party or party coalition governing a region, and relative to the degree of fragmentation of the region's interest system. The most obvious deviations from the national norm have occured in parts of what has come to be known as the Third Italy, i.e. the area of North-East-Center regions characterized by both distinct patterns of flexible specialization layered around industrial districts in the economic dimension, and strong political subcultures in the socio-political dimension25. Both Lombardy and Sicily...

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22 See also Keating (1993:238) who argues that..., (...), behind the strident tone of partisan debate, much policy making takes the form of consensual negotiation among organized interests, governments and political parties.

23 The area most characteristic of red subculturalism is Emilia-Romagna, a region having consistently been governed by communist or communist coalition governments. The associational landscape of that region, accordingly, is strongly determined by interest groups of left-wing origin or inclination such as, in particular, CNA, Lega delle cooperative and CGIL. The region of Veneto is the case most...
conform to the national pattern. Despite many differences on almost all accounts, these regions' governments have most often been carbon copies of the political coalitions governing in Rome, under the hegemonic control of the Christian-democratic and, in part, the Socialist party. This control made for a quite specific type of access to public authorities obtained by interest groups. As observed by Lanzalaco (1993:128), in most territorial policy networks "(...) only interest groups of the political colour of the governing party are admitted" and "public administration committees are not open to new interests". Given that situation, one may reasonable ask then whether the early characterization provided for by one of the first students of Italian interest groups may not still retain validity. In LaPalombara's terms, "Italy's interest groups are isolative and essentially non-bargaining. Antagonistic groups that rarely communicate with each other and go in search of legislators of like ideological predispositions are ill-equipped to bargain democratically" (LaPalombara 1964:249).

Other authors question even the existence of the type of party-political regional alliances among hegemonic actors suggested by Lanzalaco. According to Cammelli (1989:153), consultation of private interest associations by regional government has generally operated in a rather "rhapsodic manner" everywhere in the country. The most

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conspicuously representing a white, i.e. catholic, subculture. Here, it are associations such as CGIL, Coldiretti, and CISL which dominate the scene. The associations mentioned, at least until some time ago, come close to possess a monopoly position in their respective regions. For both the economic and the socio-political dimensions of flexible production patterns, see Trigilia (1982, 1985, 1989, 1991). The formal prescriptions for joint policy making as resulting from the different regional statutes are usefully assembled in Tuccari (1974). Most of this may now be subject to change. The events accompanying the regime transition in Italy, may substantially modify the rhapsodic pattern of public-private relations even, if not especially, at the subnational level. Yet, most of these changes only departed after we had terminated field work, and most of them may need some time before actually becoming manifest. Grote (1997) describes a whole range of innovative initiatives aimed at a restructuring of interorganizational relations at the regional level. The most significant are: the 'patti territoriali' (territorial pacts) -- an exercise of territorial concertation between public authorities, interest associations, local chambers and individual entrepreneurs that mainly concern the subregional level (provinces and inter-provincial areas); (tripartite) management committees of formally established 'industrial districts' being configured in a similar way; the reform of the chamber system (Zan 1997) which, for the first time in Italian history, explicitly empowers representatives of interest groups to run the chambers; the enti bilaterali -- a new form of associative action best described by Perulli and Catino (1997) and Perulli and Sabelli (1997); and, finally, the various accordi e intese di programma described by Hoffmann (1996).

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systematic work on state-society relations at the subnational level confirming that rhapsodic pattern of interaction, has been undertaken by Trigilia. Regions in Italy are described in terms of a paradox (Trigilia 1989, 1991). This paradox is characterized by the contradiction between, on the one hand, the functional need to follow a strategy of resource pooling, including all important organizations operating within the region and aimed at the supply of public goods (and the management of dis-economies) that benefits the entire regional territory and, on the other hand, a political and organizational situation largely fragmented both on the demand and on the supply side. The supply-side, i.e. regional government and its various agencies, is a badly organized and uncoordinated bureaucratic apparatus largely void of qualified personnel that would be able to assume the task of territorial management and planning (Cammelli 1989, Dente 1990, Parri 1993, Grote 1996). Regional administration and its staff are hardly able to design and follow strategies that envisage more than short-term or individualized-fragmented interventions -- for example, resource transfers to individual entrepreneurs following the logic of ‘intervento a pioggia’ -- aimed at the entire regional territory. According to Trigilia, this fragmentation on the supply-side is met largely by a fragmentation on the demand-side, that is, in particular, by a fragmentation of the interest system which continues to be split politico-ideologically and, at the territorial level, continues to be concentrated around sub-regional localism. The uncoordinated supply also corresponds to preferences, on the part of the regional business class, in favour of suboptimal, i.e. essentially localist and highly individualized economic interventions which do not commit entrepreneurs to conform to mutually agreed or publicly imposed contracts and programmes. Such interventions are less visible and, hence more easily appropriateable. From a purely functional point of view, at least, this must appear quite paradoxical. In my view, the real paradox, at least in a comparative perspective, is to be found elsewhere. Compared to other cases in the Mediterranean area, but also to the

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24 Grants are being fuelled to individual entrepreneurs to modernize their machine parks and hardly any attempt is made to envisage more systematic interventions aiming at groups of enterprises or at the relations connecting them (industrial districts).
Tentative hypotheses

French and British case studies in our sample, Italian regions are able to control a significant amount of resources and are endowed with highly developed regional institutions of rather long standing. Similarly, the fragmentation of the interest system notwithstanding, regional interest associations, when looked upon in their entirety, are very powerful in a comparative perspective. Discounting the lack of ‘Verwaltungskraft’ (administrative capacity) and the competitive structure, not the organizational strength, of their interest systems, Italian regions would easily measure up at least to their Spanish neighbours, if not to the German Land. At the same time, most observers have underlined the low action capacity of regions both internally (regional development) and externally (i.e. on a domestic or European scale).

Fortunately, we are in the possession of some evidence for our two regions which facilitates the raising of structural hypotheses proper. The share of public employment in administration in total employment is comparatively low in Lombardia (Porträt der Regionen 1994). Regional government employs between 3000 and 4000 officials. Most of the divisions of the Giunta are hosted in offices in or around the Palazzo Pirelli in Milan, a thirty floor sky scraper first having served as the administrative headquarters of the Pirelli tire conglomerat. This physical adjacency may facilitate inter-departmental coordination - a fact that is not entirely trivial, if you think of the spreading of ‘regional ministries’ all over the town’s territory in the case of Palermo, Sicily. Being the industrial and the financial heart of Italy, Milan and the other provinces of Lombardy should also be expected to have more robust interest systems than most of the southern regions. Yet, cooperation between the public and the private is unlikely to be well developed. In part, this must be accredited to the paralysis both in public offices and in private organizations triggered off by the corruption scandals. Rather than improving cooperation between representatives of the two spheres, people shied away from joint agreements that might have attracted the attention of the public and, of course, of public prosecutors.

Contrary to Robert Putnam’s hypothesis of highly cooperative networks in the north, a study commissioned by the Lombardy section of the Cavallieri del Lavoro, an elite association of local businessmen, carries the title "The costs of non-collaboration in Lombardia - Analysis and evaluation of some emblematic cases” (Gruppo CLAS 1993). We believe this study to be a more reliable source than the generalizing claims made by external observers. Among other things, it is argued there that "situations of non-collaboration are observable at any territorial level” in Lombardy (ibid:12-13). However, it is the regional implications of this widely diffused attitude of distrust and non-decisionmaking which makes the study of individual incidents so interesting. Three effects of non-collaboration are identified as being especially damaging for project elaboration regional policy-making. First, the inefficient implementation of projects, secondly, the delay of project implementation and, finally, the total or partial lack of project realization (ibid:14)\textsuperscript{27}.

In another general work on Lombardy published towards the mid-1990s, Giuseppe Gario of IReR, the region’s social and economic research institute, also speaks of a „crisi della progettualità” (Gario 1994:7) in Lombardia. Interestingly, in his view, it is the persistent domination by central government which makes for this crisis. Although legitimated from below, regional administrators are increasingly constrained in their choices by central government agencies and politicians\textsuperscript{28} -- a process leading to losses of design capacities and autonomous action, with politics essentially assuming the form of

\textsuperscript{27} The authors argue that it would hardly be evitable to ignore the need of collaborating with representatives of the regional administration, in particular, (...) per realizzare i grandi progetti. Yet, this collaboration would occur (...) quasi per forza, per mancanza di alternative: è un soggetto con cui difficilmente si deciderebbe di operare se le condizioni fossero libere e con cui è comunque difficile avere un rapporto paritario” (ibid:15).

\textsuperscript{28} Gario claims that, political party links to the center notwithstanding, the traditional ‘notabile locale’ of the pre-1971 period has been more responsive to the needs of the locality and more autonomous from higher order politics than the region has ever been since its institution. This relative independence has then been replaced by a highly dependent body, the region, with far-reaching consequences for both the design and implementation of policies.
Tentative hypotheses

redistribution. In this way, "la progettualità ha cominciato a morire (...) correttivamente al crescere del vuoto politico" (ibid:11). The regression of a political culture, originally aimed at project design and management, towards a culture of pure 'rent seeking' has been responsible for the degradation of politics in Lombardia. (ibid.). With regard to public-private relations in the region, the problem is "not too little collaboration (...) but, rather, too much commissione", i.e. a pathological mix of largely intransparent patterns of interaction and distributive coalitions where none of the actors involved seems prepared to assume responsibility for policy outcomes.

In 1994, I had the opportunity to carry out a network analysis of interorganizational relations in the province of Varese both Lombardy's and Italy's most highly industrialized province (see Bramanti e Grote 1995). If the results of this analysis also have validity for the structuring of relations at the regional level, then Lombardy would clearly conform to the interest-dominated typology suggested by Atkinson and Coleman. The provincial network did, in fact, turn out to be strongly dominated by interest associations²⁹. None of the ten public institutions (various divisions of the provincial government plus a number of municipal administrations) figured among the most central actors. The center of the network was made up of the provincial branch of Confidenziaria (Univa), of the association representing small and medium sized enterprises (API Varese), of CNA, the artisan association, and of another grouping representing the same category of firms. Immediately layered around the center were the provincial chamber of commerce and the provincial branches of the three labour organizations CGIL, CISL, and UIL.³⁰ When

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asked, which of the 26 organizations making up the network was the most relevant and most efficient with respect to eight major policy initiatives underway in the province since the early 1990s, the respondents clearly identified the provincial employers' association UNIVA.

If the Lombardy network is interest-dominated, what then about the Sicilian network? Would it not be reasonable to expect a similar pattern in that case as well, especially given the well-known problems with public sector management in the south? Superficially, the situation in Sicily is quite different from the one encountered in Lombardy. Differences are most pronounced in the structure and organization of regional administrative services. Sicily's various 'assessorati regionali' employ more than 22,000 officials, of which 2,586 alone hold functions such as director and head of division (Bellavia 1996:23). According to information provided by a 'Comitato per la riforma della pubblica amministrazione' (Comitato 1993), the total number of employees on the payroll of the Giunta Regionale amounts to between 70,000 and 100,000. This would make regional administration the biggest employer in Sicily. In theory, then, one would expect certain branches of regional administration to control the organizational ecology of the region and to occupy the most central positions in the network. One would further expect interest groups to be marginalized, with access to public administration restricted to those associations connected either directly or indirectly to one of the parties forming the government coalition. As the coalition, at the time of interviewing, still represented a pattern that had just started to disappear at the national level, i.e. the pentapartito of the late 1980s, made up of Christian-Democrats, Socialists, Republicans and other laic parties³¹, it was likely to be more open to these parties' political allies among the interest group community -- an interorganizational format of long standing which also characterized the Lombardy case.

²⁹ The network included 26 organizations, ten of which were public bodies. Network density figured at 0.32 -- rather normal for this type of data (Bramanti e Grote 1995:272).
³⁰ Albers’ (1995) comparative study of regional trade unionism would confirm the importance of CGIL, CISL, and UIL also for the regional level. Regarding the three most important unions in Lombardia, the author underlines that the high representational degree of the unions, the high amount of financial resources they are able to control, and the very high number of officials employed by the various associative structures clearly indicate “the high relevance of activities at the regional level” (ibid:271). With their decision of spring 1994 to merge the territorial branches of the three unions to form a unitarian structure, the Lombardy's trade unions clearly have assumed an “avant-garde position in Italy” (ibid:228), although, as must be emphasized, this decision has not yet materialized so far. Anyway, with 33.7 per cent of workers unionized, the representational power of trade unions in Lombardy, nevertheless, is slightly ranking below the one of regions with strong political subcultures

³¹ For a short period, i.e. precisely after the bomb attacks against Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, the Giunta regionale was joined by the PDS -- a kind of regional emergency government.

such as, for example, Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany. At the same time, the Lombardy unions have the highest membership share of all Italian regions, with 1.5 million members being represented by them (ibid:265).
However, these hypotheses turned out to be largely falsified by the results of a first attempt to scrutinize the organizational landscape with the help of network-analytic tools (Grote 1992, 1995, 1997). Government did not, as expected, occupy the center of the organizational ecology, but actually appeared in a completely marginalized position. At the same time, the center was entirely controlled by the region's trade unions, with a number of business interest associations layered around them (Confindustria, CNA, CGIA, API, Concommercio, Confesercenti). These results shall be commented in a more detailed manner in Chapter Five. For the time being, it is sufficient to point to the same, unexpected domination of the network by interest associations that we already encountered in the case of Varese.

All this presents us with a number of paradoxes. The first paradox could be cast in the following way: the fact that the most central space of Sicily's organizational ecology is dominated by interest groups and, in particular, by trade unions, does not imply that these actors are the most relevant ones in decision-making within the domain of regional development. They may govern the organizational space of the region, but the organizational space does not necessarily need to be identical with the political space.

Indeed, the two spaces may not actually overlap at all -- a quite peculiar situation which we shall return to on several occasions in this work. With respect to decisions regarding territorial development, the region is politically over-determined to such an extent that some commentators speak of a generalized absence of the market and, accordingly, a weakness of actors representing market forces (Rossito 1988). Rossito rules out the existence of options other than "loyalty" vis-à-vis the governing political elite. There is an underdeveloped capacity for voicing decisions and an "impossibility of manifesting dissent" (ibid:21). The consensus emerging from such a situation is a type of obligatory and binding consensus32. Actors populating the Sicilian network, then, even if occupying central positions within it, can hardly be expected to have the sufficient degree of autonomy and of 'Konfliktfähigkeit' for doing anything more than simply approving the faits accomplis of political authorities.

The second paradox becomes apparent when considering the claims made in much of the policy network literature a propos the structuring of networks. Measured by these standards, the most underdeveloped region of the sample turns out to conform fully to even the most modernizing relational pattern. Its ecology is characterized by flat hierarchies, centralization is relatively low, and the center is made up of jointly acting representatives of both the public and private spheres. As we shall see, this is only one of the many misconceptions of the traditional debate. In reality, relational properties such as those just mentioned, may also represent just the opposite of modernization -- indeed, they may be found in situations characterized by relatively low degrees of state-society differentiation.

In general then, although the two Italian regional networks can be expected to exhibit essentially similar configurations, the Sicilian network conforms more to the "parentela pluralist" variety of Table 3.13. The possibility of a dissociation of the organizational from the political space, as was argued above, is suggested by additional results from the first, i.e. the 1992, analysis. Cammelli's thesis of rhapsodic encounters between regional policy style may actually indicate the exact opposite. Appropriately disaggregated in such a way that only responses by interest group leaders were being considered, the results demonstrated the opposite of what was later published by Putnam (who did not perform this kind of disaggregation): a conflictual policy style appeared to be more pronounced in Emilia-Romagna than, for example, in the Mezzogiorno regions. See, for the capacity of conflictual attitudes to account for more rather than less development, the critique by Grabher on territorial expressions of "neo-tribalism", "regional autism" and "folkloristic self-description" (Grabher 1994).

32 The possibility of a consensus being 'imposed' top-down is a mechanism often neglected by students of territorial politics who regard high levels of consensus as representing an asset conducive to economic development, and high levels of conflict as representing economic decline and non-decision making. Based on parts of Putnam's (1993) original data (the last interview wave of 1989), Garmise and Grote (1990) have shown that the propensity of a region for a conflictual or consensual
governments and territorial interest groups is fully confirmed by these results: 79 per cent of the respondents indicated that relations between the regional interest system and public administration were either insufficiently developed or entirely unsatisfying (Grote 1992, 1997). More than half of the respondents reported contact frequencies of less than once per month. This is clearly different in the case of Lombardy. Although in decline (Peruli e Catino 1997), its interest system is clearly more solid than the Sicilian one, a fact that would move the region into the upper row of the table. Given the results of the Varese and of the first Sicily study, we would expect the Lombardy network to be more industry-dominated while in Sicily we would expect trade unions to be among the most prominent actors. In both cases, a significant number of public institutions may be expected to occupy rather marginal network positions. At least, this characteristic is likely to be more pronounced in the two Italian cases than in those of the rest of the sample.

**Germany**

The second case to be considered is Germany and the two Länder of Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachsen. Presenting them next to the Italian regions, is warranted by the contrasting positions which, at least, the southern German case is likely to occupy in comparison with Sicily. Contrary, however, to the two Italian regions presented, there is no empirical material available with regard to the two German

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34 To some extent, an alternative interpretation is available for the case of clientelist networks. Although Italy is a “stepchild” and, therefore, mentioned only occasionally in van Waarden's comparative work on policy networks, its networks can reasonably be expected to oscillate somewhere between “clientelism” (the case most typical of this pattern of state-society relations being the US) and “parentela relationships”, with some inclination towards the latter. The problem is that the characteristics distinguishing the two types of networks only converge on two out of a total of eleven relational indicators. The boundaries of both, according to van Waarden, are “relatively closed”. “Symmetric relations” and “reciprocity” are said to be “low”. “Intensity of contacts” (density), however, is “high” in clientelism but “low” in parentela structures and the linking pattern characteristic of clientelism is “horizontal consultation”, but “hierarchic authority” in the other type of network. Also, “centrality is average” in the clientelist and “high” in the parentela network, while the two typologies completely diverge on the other indicators. Clientelist networks are highly stable and cooperative, while parentela networks are unstable and conflictual. State autonomy and domination by state authorities are low in clientelist networks but high in parentela ones. The above would be

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35 At least from the perspective of economic sociology and political science, Streeck’s (1992) and Grabber’s (1993, 1994) contributions certainly belong to the most interesting ones in that respect. They are made subject of more detailed analysis in chapter four.

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36 The second major case being, of course, Emilia-Romagna. A content analysis of the existing literature dealing with flexible specialization in industrial districts would probably come to the result that more than half of the evidence supporting the evolution of post-Fordist production patterns in Western Europe is being drawn from these two cases -- cases being widely known, yet often misunderstood as we shall see (Bellini 1990; Patti 1993; Grote 1992; Garmise and Grote 1990).
The division of regions into sub-regions is of particular importance. Indeed, as they are essentially artificial creations of the Allies, the politically defined regions lack any cultural identity or, for the large part, historical traditions. Germans, in general, "feel more as members of a nation or of a local community than as members of a Land" (Mayntz 1995:135). Social identification with regions exists and is rather strong -- however, this is an identification with sub-regions such as, for example the Rhineland, the Palatinate, Badenia, Franconia, etc. These, at the same time, are also the areas with more homogeneous structures in economic terms. In particular, from the point of view of European structural fund interventions, "the definition of regions is far from being clear (...) and there are ongoing debates about which regions are the adequate Euro-regions" (Benz 1995:2) in Germany. Thus, while there are islands of territorial identity and of economic activity, these islands, at the same time, remain institutionally underdetermined and are "rather weak compared to both the Länder and local governments" (ibid:5).

Regarding the sharing of competencies, the Basic Law divides functions between the federation and the Länder according to three lists. One of these lists sets out exclusive federal functions. A second list contains concurrent functions, according to which both levels are competent to legislate but federal laws take precedence in case of conflict. The third list concerns matters in which the federal level may pass framework laws laying down basic principles within which the Länder can then make their own detailed provision. The Basic Law places a great emphasis on the sharing of powers, responsibilities and resources (Abromeit 1992; Hesse and Benz 1990), and it has been noted that, in the practice of "cooperative federalism", "the demand of economic

were subject to far-reaching administrative and territorial reforms, whereby small, sparsely populated, poor units were amalgamated or federated into larger, financially viable units capable of providing a broad range of modern services to their increased populations. The total number of local governments has, as a result, come down from over 24,000 to 8,426.

In another work, Mayntz (1989:3) quotes an Eurobarometer survey of 1978, according to which only 12.1 per cent of German respondents identify primarily with the Land in which they reside -- a percentage even lower than that found in Italy with respect to identification with the regions (13.3 per cent).
management and social intervention (...) have since the 1960s rendered the formal division of powers largely redundant" (Keating 1993:302). Since the joint tasks (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) were introduced by a constitutional amendment in 1969, the federal government has extended its legislative powers and the Länder legislate very little within their areas of responsibility, instead concentrating on implementing the law. At the same time, the governments of the Länder gained influence at the federal level via the Bundesrat, which has a veto on federal legislation in about sixty per cent of all cases. From the above constraints imposed by "cooperative federalism" follows an obligation to co-operate even in areas previously under the responsibility of the Länder such as, for example, regional economic policy, agriculture and planning of universities. At the same time, this system of joint decision-making or "interlocking politics" (Scharpf et. al. 1976) is supported by "strong commitments to maintaining a 'uniformity' or 'equivalence of living conditions'" (Benz 1995:7).

This has not always worked out well and there are instances of a growing north-south gap at least since the early 1980s. Southern regions like Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg attracted much of the new high-technology industry and older industrial and agricultural areas in the north (for example, Niedersachsen) faced severe problems of adjustment. This is tried to be solved by an extremely complex system of joint financing which tries to combine the requirements of accountability and fiscal responsibility with the need to share resources between richer and poorer regions (clause 106 of the Basic Law). Interestingly, in terms of contributions to fiscal equalization, it has been our two regions which have both contributed most and received most. Keating (1993:304) quotes from a German Ministry of Finance report (1993) according to which Baden-Württemberg contributed DM 2.600.000.000 to the equalization fund, while Niedersachsen received about DM 1.900.000.000 (1991 figures). He notes that "the system of fiscal equalization has come under increasing stress as the north-south division in Germany has forced prosperous southern Länder to contribute more to the older industrial areas" (ibid:305).

Of particular relevance for our purpose are the figures concerning employment in public administration. The share held by the Länder is impressive and none of the regional units of the other countries is able to measure up to the German level. Of 3.573.308 full-time civil servants employed in Germany, 310.119 are working in federal ministries, 1.535.908 in the institutions of the Länder, 1.002.228 in the municipalities and 516.369 in special purpose bodies such as postal service, railways, etc (Keating 1993:303). While, between 1960 and 1986, the federal level has not increased its employment share, and the local level only insignificantly, the Länder administrations have almost doubled their stock of civil servants from, initially, 949.600 to 1.559.500. While the collective weight of the Länder administration is larger than that of the federal administration, the same also applies to the Länder budgets which easily compete with federal expenditures. In 1987, public expenditure by the federal government and the Länder governments was almost equal, with DM 270.864 million in the first and DM 262.615 million in the second case (Wirtschaft und Statistik 10/1988:358). Generalizations are always a problem. However, in the interest of contrasting the professional ethos of German administrators with that of those managing government elsewhere, consider Keating's description. He claims that the "German system provides for an impartial and permanent civil service, with appointment on merit and no spoils system. Officials for the most part act according to legal norms and procedures rather than political leadership. Accountability is to law rather than, as in Britain, to a minister and thence to parliament" (Keating 1993:295).41

41 The figures are reported in Mayntz (1989:5) and are taken from the Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, Fachserie 14 'Finanzen und Steuern', Reihe 6 'Personal des öffentlichen Dienstes', Jahrgang 1986, Stuttgart/Mainz:252.
42 This is very similar to van Waarden's (1995:362) summarizing characterization of policy styles in Germany. "German corporatism, legalism, consensualism and formalism are associated with German legal positivism, judicial and administrative review, federalism and vertical 'Politikverflechtung', strong party discipline, the relative importance of christian democracy, low external and low internal

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Given these features of the German federal structure, it is not surprising that governmental positions at this level are hardly less attractive than those at the federal level. Members of the national parliament, ex-federal ministers included, often switch to one of the highly prestigious positions of Ministerpräsident (prime minister) of one of the Länder. We should expect, therefore, a similar attitude in the domain of interest politics. The Land administration is likely to be of great importance to organized interests. Before commenting, more specifically, on the cases of Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachsen, let us consider some of the essential features of Germany’s associational landscape.

Given that interest groups in Germany have developed into some of the most unified in Europe (Wilson 1990:257), this section can be kept rather brief. Wilson speaks of a neocorporatist pattern of decision-making where groups join government officials in directly shaping public policy. This system has developed further in Germany than in any other of the countries studied here. There is an extensive number of consultative committees drawing interest groups into collaboration with government officials at all levels of government, and the greater relative autonomy of local and state governments provides significant incentives for such organizations. Although the so-called Konzertierte Aktion -- in the past often taken by observers to indicate the specific pattern of German corporatism -- ended in the late 1970s when the labour unions withdrew, and despite the fact that such arrangements tend to bypass parliament and to shift policymaking to inter-elite bargaining behind closed doors, the practice in general "remained popular in Germany" (Wilson 1990:258). The main target of organized interests are of course the federal and the Land ministries and their various divisions. The rules of procedure in German ministries require officials to consult with the leading representatives of interest groups when drafting legislation that relates to a groups’s area of concern (Conradt 1993:243). However, strong ties also connect interest associations and members of the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, and the various Lanđ parliaments. For example, employment by interest groups is second only to the civil service in listings of the federal deputies’ occupations (von Beyme 1983:85).

The most important individual associations are the following. The German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) is composed of sixteen different unions with a total membership of over 8 million in West-Germany and 3.6 million in the former East Germany (1992 figures). The DGB has over nine thousand full-time officials and represents close to 85 per cent of the 35 per cent of eligible unionized workers. German business also appears to be better organized and more unified than in the other countries of this study (Wilson 1986). The business community is represented by three peak associations: the Federation of German Industry (Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie, BDI) speaking for the interests of industry; the German Industrial and Trade Conference (Deutscher Industrie und Handelsrat, DITH) protecting the interests of small businesses and craftsmen; and the Federation of German Employers’ Associations (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, BDA). The interests of these three are usually, but not always, complementary. The BDI has been the most important of the three, not least because of its wide coverage of economic and social interests. While the BDA organizes approximately 80 per cent of German employers, the various constituent associations of the BDI organize approximately 95 per cent of firms in each sector (Patterson and Southern 1991:233).

All of the above associations possess regional branches at the level of the Länder and these, of course, have all been included in our organization lists for network analysis. The general rule is that, whenever it is important for effective interest representation to

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43 Colin Crouch (1993:14) lists eight contributions that appeared between the late 1970s and the late 1980s which all try to measure degrees of corporatism among a total of about twenty OECD countries. In these rank orderings, Italy, France and the UK always show up in that half of the respective samples representing "relatively low corporatism", while Germany is consistently ranked among the group of countries exhibiting "relatively high levels of corporatism". In some cases, it occupies the dividing line between the two groups.

44 Between 1982 and 1987, overall DGB membership dropped by two hundred thousand, i.e. from a unionization rate of 35 to 32.3 per cent. This drop was much less than in Britain or France and in more recent times, trade union officials report upraising figures.
deal with Länder governments, national interest organizations tend to have regional subdivisions. At the same time, this does not mean that existing national organizations have subsequently formed regional sub-divisions as they came to recognize the importance of the Länder for the promotion of their interests. The multi-level structure of the large regionalized interests is rather the result of a historical process that went from the smaller to the larger scale, i.e. bottom-up rather than top-down. In some cases, for example in the craft sector (see Streeck 1989; Grote 1992) represented by the Chambers of Artisans (Handwerkskammern, HWK) the formation of organizational epicentres has stopped short of the regional level. Generally, most of the present structures, especially at the bottom end of organizational hierarchies, date back as far as the last century. Most of what had become consolidated during the Weimar Republic, was preserved after the Third Reich. This happened despite the strong opposition by the Allies and, in particular, the American Forces, for whom the resurrection of private interest governments, for example in the craft sector, must have looked „like one giant conspiracy to restraint of trade“ (Streeck 1989:66). Yet, this also explains why territorial associations in Germany had managed to gain influence even before the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949.

Many of the general organizational concerns of industrial and artisan firms are dealt with according to the principle of self-governance -- the state uses interest associations and, in particular, the industrial (IHKS) and artisan chambers (HWKs)\(^{45}\) "as intermediaries and ‘assistants’ in policy formulation and implementation (...) The state also actively supports the emergence and existence of interest associations and their mutual agreements. It leaves room for, and sustains, interest associations as important principles of allocation and coordination in society" (van Waarden 1995:339)\(^{46}\). There is a vast literature on the importance of regional and subregional associations representing both capital and labour interests in areas such as vocational training and industrial relations. Much less research has been carried out on their relevance for decision-making in the more general area of regional development. When addressing problems of territorial collective action, authors often do not distinguish between associationism at the Gemeinde, Kreis, Regierungsbezirk or Land level strictu sensu\(^\). Mayntz (1989), for example, mentions associationial involvement in the implementation of national policy, the distribution of funds, development planning, and crisis management, but it is not always clear which level is actually meant. Her general conclusion is that "both neo-corporatist structures of decision-making and ‘private governments’ exist at the regional level in the FRG" (ibid:24). We shall try to verify that claim with regard to the case study material available for the two Länder in our sample.

The only contributions systematically addressing the problem of regional (as opposed to local, or generally territorial) interest intermediation in Germany are the ones by Anderson (1988, 1990, 1992). The essentials of Anderson’s work are of particular relevance for the purpose of comparing different regional political ecologies and are presented here for at least three reasons. First, although the author mainly deals with Northrhine-Westphalia and the Saarland, he comes to a number of general conclusions

\(^{45}\) There were as many as 69 Chambers of Industry and Commerce (IHKS) in the old Federal Republic. They carry an independent legal status, membership in them is obligatory and regulated by law, and they fulfill a number of functions, especially in the area of vocational training, delegated to them by the state. By giving the chambers obligatory membership, the state has helped to overcome two crucial obstacles to a unitary organization of territorially defined economic interests which result, firstly, from large numbers and the ensuing free-rider problem and, secondly, from the heterogeneity of member interests increasing the costs of achieving consensus (Mayntz 1989:12).

\(^{46}\) This feature of state activity is of particular interest in comparison to France, where the state is equally interventionist -- yet with completely different objectives from the ones in Germany, namely to protect itself from societal influences. In Germany, organizations of civil society are used by the state to achieve public tasks, in exchange of course, for control over the selection of associational leadership and over the acquiescence of the associations’ rank and file. Streeck’s description of this mechanism is almost identical with van Waarden’s: “It is through state-enabled collective action and quasi-public, ‘corporatist’ group self-government that the German political economy generates most of the regulations and collective goods that circumscribe, correct and underpin the instituted markets of soziale Marktwirtschaft (...); widespread organized cooperation among competitors and bargaining between organized groups, conducted through publicly enabled associations, is probably the most distinctive feature of the German political economy” (Streeck 1997:39).

\(^{47}\) This analytical indetermination also characterizes most contributions to the otherwise highly interesting volume on territorial interest intermediation edited by Coleman and Jacek (1989) and has led Allen (1989:147) to criticize recent meso-corporatist approaches as being insufficient because looking “only at private interests and neglecting the regional dimension proper of industrial adjustment.”
that may provide valuable guidelines for the study of our two cases. In particular, Anderson’s results help developing hypotheses about Niedersachsen’s political ecology. This would otherwise have proved difficult given the general neglect of the region in the relevant literature. Secondly, a type of network metaphor is employed in that work which is both less policy-specific and less industry-specific than most of what has been written on the German regions. Anderson explicitly addresses problems of regional interest intermediation and this fits perfectly our own analytical requirements. Thirdly, the study is of a broad comparative character and thus avoids the risk of ethnocentric confinement and the temptation to over-emphasize and generalize from highly idiosyncratic phenomena.

In short, Anderson’s results may be summarized as follows. From a comparative perspective, regional policy networks in the Federal Republic are characterized by “the unparalleled role of state government ministries” and, in particular, “of the Economics Ministries [which] have taken the lead in defining the issues related to regional economic problems, and in organizing related private and public responses” (Anderson 1988:231). It is this department, “occasionally accompanied by other state institutions, like the Interior Ministry [which] stands at the apex of the informal and formal networks that overlay regional economic and policy issues” (ibid.). German network patterns differ on virtually all accounts from Anderson’s British case studies48. Although interest group activity is evident, “it is fragmented and unintegrated, and takes place at the local or occasionally the subregional level. Interaction between actors rarely assumes the outline of a formal network structure” (ibid:234). Yet, this would seem to be the case also for less formalized initiatives, since “efforts by non-state public and private actors to cooperate on the basis of the regional political unit (i.e. the Land) were noticeably absent” (Anderson 1993:2). Most of the Länder appear strongly divided among various subregional and municipal parliamentary coalitions, a fact that contributes to the emergence of competitive, pluralist patterns of interaction and, if further exacerbated by the intensity of party politics, encourages “zero-sum competition between subregional coalitions” (ibid:2)49. According to Anderson, it is the central position and etatist attitude of the Economics and other Ministries which accounts for the “fragmentation of regional network structures”. “At the state level in a federal system, the imperative to form broad-based networks of interaction is largely absent. The presence of state institutions, enjoying legitimacy and authority to act on behalf of the region-state’s interest, eliminates any incentives to form stable, formal networks” (Anderson 1988:256). What others have claimed to be the case at least for a number of regions both in Germany and in Europe, namely that EU policies would have contributed to an opening up and pluralization of regional development networks, has not changed very much in the structural rigidity of the Länder’s organizational ecologies (Anderson 1996:163). On the contrary, EU initiatives in most cases are perceived as threatening the autonomy of the Länder governments which, then, turn to the Federal government and to their own control capacities in Brussels in order to avert further intrusion by the Commission (ibid:188).

This description forms an excellent background against which to assess the evidence supplied by the individual case studies of Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachsen. Although they are a useful guideline, Anderson’s results do not represent the “default hypothesis”, so to speak. On the contrary, they represent a minority view largely

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48 Employing an illuminating metaphor, Anderson states that “the king of the regional hill in Germany is state government; in Britain, there are no kings, only suspicious, parochialist barons” (ibid:232).
49 Even where such more formalized development networks exist as, for example, in the Ruhr area of Northrhine-Westphalia; “the hand of state government is visible” since most of the initiatives launched “were or are the products of state institutional action (...) organized by state government and the parties in power” (ibid:234).

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neglected in the mainstream discourses that dominate, in particular, most descriptions of the southern German case. Let us first turn, therefore, to Baden-Württemberg. If one work has influenced most of the recent literature on flexible specialization in that region, it is Herrigel’s long and extensive analysis of small firm networks and their institutional infrastructure. Herrigel’s work represents the “default hypothesis” and shall be used, in a rather cursory manner, to introduce the case of Baden-Württemberg.

Herrigel claims that a major shift has taken place throughout the 1980s, from Fordist production patterns and their underlying institutional, structural and attitudinal properties, to a new pattern of decentralized flexible production in industrial districts (Herrigel 1993:235). While the micro-economic part of his analysis shall not concern us here and, indeed, can hardly be questioned, it is the description of an alleged transformation of the institutional infrastructures and patterns of interorganizational relations between public authorities, intermediaries, and interest associations which makes his contribution relevant for our purpose. According to Herrigel, “by now there seems to be consensus in the literature on Baden-Württemberg as an industrial district that the success of the firms in the region cannot be attributed to the firms alone: that is, the organizational field of the small- and medium-sized firm industrial order extends beyond the firms themselves and forms a system that socializes risk across a broad array of public and private organizations (...) Four (...) organizations are especially important: educational organizations, business associations, banks, and regional government” (ibid:229). This is exactly what we were looking for: an attempt to describe the organizational ecology of industrial governance at the regional level.

Note the curious assignment of industrial district status to an entire region. This is unique in the literature, which normally emphasizes the local anchoring of districts in highly specific sectoral clusters and social attitudes. The notion of “organizational field” around small firms and consisting of the most different public and private organizations is important. We prefer the notion of “organizational space” and most of what follows in the empirical chapters is, indeed, an organizational space analysis. With respect to this organizational space, Herrigel refers to the following: first, the region has “the largest and thickest network of universities and training centres in Germany”, of which all “engage in some form of exchange [of know how, personnel, information, and services] with local producers” (ibid:230). Secondly, business associations, represented by the Industrie und Handelskammern, do not only inform firms “of different varieties of local, regional, and federal-level public and private technological development programmes”, but also “coordinate relations among firms in particular industries and engage in setting standards” (ibid:230). Third, there are large networks of local credit institutes (Sparkassen and Volksbanken, supported by the Landesbank and the Bürgschaftsbank), where “heads of local firms often sit on the boards of these banks, so that banks themselves are well attuned to the technological and financial situation of small producers” (ibid:231). Finally, the Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Technologie (MWMT) “provides direct subsidies to firms for specific technological development projects”, and the Landesgeschäftsbeirat “plays the important role of coordinating the infrastructure of institutional resources” (ibid:231). These are exactly the types of organizations we are interested in. Indeed, all of the ones mentioned, together with other equally important actors, form part of our Baden-Württemberg sample.

However, there is a major problem with Herrigel’s vision of post-Fordist institutional settings. This, to a large extent, is the same as the widely known scenario, presented by Charles Sabel, depicting the emergence of a generalized and new pattern of production in regional economies progressively replacing Keynesian models of macro-regulation (Sabel 1989). The problem is that Fordism is associated with a number of characteristic properties (institutional, structural, attitudinal, etc.) that are thought to be entirely replaced by an alternative set of properties characteristic of the post-Fordism of today, for example, the pattern of production under which firms are operating in Baden-Württemberg. One of the typical Fordist properties is the “non-reciprocity of ties”. People at the bottom of hierarchies or those outside them, i.e. workers, bureaucrats as individuals and families, SMEs, regional governments, trade associations, educational institutions, women, minorities, and migrant workers, simply were “without power in this system” (Herrigel 1993:239) and barely had a chance to contact those dominating the network. Fordism, therefore, was characterized by „non-reciprocal ties” (ibid.).

A second property was (bureaucratic) "hierarchy" -- the organizational principle of Fordism par excellence. Hierarchy "fragments information by forcing it to flow through concatenated, specialized offices from the top and the centre (...) downwards and outwards" (ibid:240). The properties mentioned concern not only the corporate structure of firms but, also, the (regional) organizational space around the firms. This is not a general description of Fordism, but, rather, a description of the Fordist phase of industrial
production in Baden-Württemberg. In any case, hierarchy also had strong impacts on the attitudes characterizing interpersonal and interorganizational communication. In fact, the third property of Fordism is "obedience" -- the institutionalization of power interests by shaping incentives (ibid:240). "Obedience [was] systematically rewarded while openness to the outside [was] disparaged" (ibid.) . Finally, and quite logically, "a mistrusting attitude was part and parcel of this habitus" (ibid.). Most of the above is thought to be gone forever and to belong to the infant phase of Baden-Württemberg’s political and economic culture. It is Herrigel’s "claim (...) that changes in the current world manufacturing environment have given rise to a crisis in the [above] structure of power" (ibid:241).

Today, the situation is said to be radically different. Given its relevance, Herrigel’s argument may be quoted at length. The author claims that "the main holders of power within the industrial district [sic] in Baden-Württemberg are the firms themselves, the educational organizations, the trade associations, the banks, and the various government agencies" (ibid:231). This, in itself, does not actually present a problem. It is quite obvious that regional economies and regional politics are generally governed by specific combinations of the actors listed. However, Herrigel is very explicit as to the specific configuration of power in the region. "None of the organizations dominates (...) final decision-making authority [and] responsibility for the reproduction of the system is not located in any single organization within the system. Rather, power is negotiated and control is diffused", and this pattern of regional governance manifests itself in form of "formal and informal networks" (ibid:232).

Although it is not explicitly stated, it is possible to infer from this -- with a slight exaggeration in the interest of achieving bolder alternative patterns -- that the region’s organizational ecology is today characterized by the following factors: reciprocal ties, high levels of interpersonal and interorganizational trust, flat hierarchies, mechanisms for joint problem-solving and, finally, behavioral attitudes that depart, quite significantly, from the slavish obedience of the past. To this, "high levels of redundancy" are added by the author, which result from a duplication in the supply of services by government and educational institutions, chambers, trade associations, and agencies such as the Steinbeis Foundation or the Landesgewerbeamt (Herrigel 1993:232). "The fragmented, overlapping, and seemingly redundant character of the public and private organizational network in Baden-Württemberg is, paradoxically, the most efficient way to provide services to decentralized production" (ibid.).

Herrigel’s work has influenced a wide range of subsequent work carried out on Baden-Württemberg. Even authors who do not refer to this work, often come to similar conclusions. The Land appears as the the prototype of a networked region. Although, as was said before, most work in that tradition is concerned with inter-firm networks, joint-ventures and strategic alliances, in most cases public institutions, private organizations and para-state agencies are said to represent an important institutional infrastructure for the region’s "extremely well-developed capacity to networking" (Cooke and Morgan 1994:427). The emergence of a regional innovation strategy based on a "networking ethos of the region" (ibid.), and grounded in the disposition of all kinds of actors to collectively capitalize on cooperation, is also observed by authors analyzing the macro-political structures of the region. For example, following Grabher (1994:107-112),

53 "The principle of nonreciprocal ties, by stressing obedience and specialization, shaped actors’ understandings of their work environment in ways that ensured the continued reproduction of nonreciprocity -- and ultimately, then, of the structure of power that benefited from it" (ibid:240).
54 Contrary to Anderson’s characterization of territorial networks at the level of the Länder, Herrigel argues that network governance in Baden-Württemberg is organized in the following way: "industrialists, bankers, trade association officials, and government people hold official positions on the governing boards and advisory councils of the Fachhochschulen, banks, small and medium-sized firms, and industry associations. Industry associations regularly communicate informally with the government (...) These overlapping network ties basically organize a permanent conversation between important organizational actors over the evolution of the system they constitute" (Herrigel 1993:232-233).
55 This capacity is said to be represented, in particular, by the compact network of business associations the most important among these being the chambers of industry and commerce (Cooke and Morgan 1994:427). With a view to regional business associations, the same authors also maintain that these "are the medium through which all manner of commercial and technical information is collected and disseminated and they are actively involved in the provision of public goods, especially with regard to technology transfer" (Cooke and Morgan 1990:41).
Baden-Württemberg’s success not only results from structural and information redundancies at the level of single enterprises or of inter-firm alliances but, also, from more comprehensive relational redundancies spanning the entire socio-political space and including public institutions and interest associations. For Boyer (1997:89), Baden-Württemberg is a prime example of the 'Rhineland model'. This model depends "on a dense network of intermediary institutions between central government and individual economic agents (professional associations, strong unions, large firms, and financial groups". Streek (1992:6-7) underlines the significant degree of "institutional saturation" in Baden-Württemberg and points to the existence of "redundant capacities" supposed to account for the astonishing export performance of the region. Similarly, what distinguishes Baden-Württemberg from regional governments elsewhere, at least in Allen’s view, "is the dense interpenetration of policy networks among the Land government economic ministry, the organization of employers (...), the trade unions (...), the regional banks, and the vocational education system" (Allen 1989:159). Benz finally argues that the "cooperative planning and decisional processes propagated by the Land government and including actors such as comunes, state administration, chambers and associations" is reflecting a model of policymaking "according to which regional policy is breaking away from the institutions genuinely being responsible for that area, thus positioning itself close to the interfaces between public institutions and private organizations" (Benz 1996:27).

This is very strong evidence indeed. Authors virtually converge in their characterization of the Baden-Württemberg case to the point of using the same terminology. We should expect a network structure, therefore, diametrically opposed to that of the two Italian cases. However, before placing the region in one of the boxes of our model, we need to, first, consider further evidence that corrects some parts of the impression gathered so far. Secondly, we also have to consider the sparse evidence available for the case of Niedersachsen.

Anderson’s analysis apart -- which did not in any case consider this specific region -- there are some significant, albeit minority positions, diverging from the emphatic statements made in the earlier studies. Dealing with more specific aspects of regional, industrial and technology policies, some of these clearly run counter to the "default hypothesis". Similar to Andersen’s general description of territorial networks in Germany, Baden-Württemberg, in fact, represents a relatively inflexible, rigid and vertically structured region, organized essentially in the form of hierarchies. For example, Heinze and Schmidt (1994:66) describe the region as a typical case of "enterprise-driven corporatism" characterized by a strong marginalization of the
associational factor, in particular, of trade unionism, in all decisions concerning regional and technological development. The "dominant position of capital in 'enterprise-driven corporatism'" (ibid:75) is characterized by the absence of interest associations in the respective networks and by "the presence of large corporations such as, for example, the Daimler-Benz conglomerate" (ibid:82)62. Despite the vanguard role performed by the North-Baden metalworkers and their function as "Tariflokomotive" (i.e. pacesetter in collective sectoral agreements) for the entire Federal Republic (Albers 1996:230), the unions, if at all, are only "junior partners" (Heinze and Schmidt 1994:75) in the "Zukunftsdialog"63 launched by the Minister for the Economy, Small Enterprises and Technology (MWMT). The absence of the unions in the network is not only a repercussion of Baden-Württemberg's specific variant of "late capitalism"64 which was rather exclusionary in that respect65. It is also due to to the fact that "the political competence of trade unions in regional policies had not yet reached the maturity of unions operating in the traditional industrial core areas of the Federal Republic" (Albers 1996:423). Krumbein (1991) describes the "classic triangle of state, science and business" in terms of a "selective corporatism" and strongly questions the existence of a network that could be structured according to egalitarian lines of representation in which the state, as claimed by the "Zukunftskommission" (1993) itself, would merely occupy and perform the role of a "talk master" (Moderator)66. As to the actual content of politics, "the role of the state in Baden-Württemberg is more likely to be exceptionally strong" (Krumbein 1991:43) and, as regards the formal dimension of policymaking, "the state has not given up and delegated as many competences to non-state actors as is being claimed in literature" (ibid.). 

Despite the centralizing pattern emerging from this type of description, Krumbein does not actually believe that the Baden-Württemberg model can be accredited an "etatist core, or forms of authoritative etatism" (ibid:44). As we have seen, it was exactly this ascription of an etatist core to regional governance in Germany that resulted from Anderson’s comparative study of British and German territorial networks. In essence, then, the situation today would seem to be rather indeterminate. Some have always argued that hierarchy is the distinctive feature of territorial networks in Germany while, at the same time, even those who had contributed to what we have called the "default hypothesis", are now prepared to qualify some of their earlier statements. It would not do justice to these latter authors, if we failed to mention their more recent scepticism a propos the state of the economy and the state of networks in Baden-Württemberg.

Philip Cooke, for example, has emphasized the weaknesses of the model, characterized as it is, by conservatism, rigidity, and an unwillingness to experiment (Cooke 1994). Despite the strength of the region in skill production, most firms continue to be organized hierarchically, lack transparency in their internal structures, and do not

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62 The weak influence of the interest system in Baden-Württemberg’s industrial policies is also stressed by Bernschneider et.al. (1991:57 and 60). They emphasize the fact that "the main participants are banks, the chambers of industry, universities and polytechnics, municipalities, Kreise and, in part, the more relevant regional enterprises". Considering that more than 34 per cent of the employment of member firms of Gesamtmetall, the regional branch of the BDI, is accounted for by the automobile industry, "one can estimate the influence a few large companies such as Daimler-Benz and Bosch have in the politics and on the policy of the association" (Semlinger 1995:24) and, it could be added, outside the association, as individual actors.

63 The "Zukunftsdialog", or dialogue for the future, has been one of the most noteworthy initiatives taken by the Social-democratic Minister for the Economy, who replaced the old Christian-democratic leadership in the MWMT after the election of 1992.

64 During the 1980s, Baden-Württemberg’s economic strategy was termed "Späth-kapitalistisch", in obvious allusion to the name of the region’s paternalistic "Landesvater", as Lothar Späth, the Ministerpräsident, liked to call himself. The meaning of "spät" in German is "late". Späth had to resign from his position after it became obvious that "the fine line between legitimate industry-institution links and illegality was transgressed". He was accused of a "too-ready acceptance of favours from, among others, the Bosch concern" (Cooke and Morgan 1995:99).

65 Even an author such as Philip Cooke had to admit that "the Späth government eschewed any formal relationship with the Land-level organizations of the DGB and IG Metall" (Cooke and Morgan 1994:423).

66 According to the study by Albers, responses to "regional and structural policy initiatives by the German trade unions, and not only by the ones of Baden-Württemberg, are generally reactive and are missing proactive elements" (Albers 1996:274-275).

67 Similarly, for Semlinger (1995:24), buyer-supplier relationships, albeit frequently cast in terms of strong cooperation, often "look rather quite chummy and [are] fairly different from a consensual and balanced partnership."
engage in regular consultation. In particular, there is a marked division of labour in terms of skills, with the Meister reinforcing hierarchies and sometimes hindering the development of multi-skilling. Studying firms in Baden-Württemberg, this latter aspect has led Kern and Sabel (1994) to their decree of the "end of the German model". At the level of the firm, at least, their catastrophic prediction is rooted in the blockages and lock-ins caused by hierarchies in qualification requirements which, in turn, have led to strong competence conflicts both horizontally, between different professional qualifications and vertically, between formally divided levels of qualification. In a sense, this contribution by sociologists of work could be read as the micro-economic counterpart to Herrigel's concluding observation concerning a power struggle, in Baden-Württemberg, between "transformers" and "traditionalists". While, in his own view, it is the transformers which have won this power struggle, it seems to us, not least on the basis of the information previously provided, that the traditionalists still have quite a lot to say.

A very recent work on regional policy styles in that region (Knodt 1997) confirms that impression. In Knodt's view, the governance structure of the southern German region "was given a long-lasting shape by the policy of Lothar Späth", who acted as CDU prime minister between 1978 and 1991. Späth's vision could be summed up as a mixture of "more market", "individualism", and "technological modernization through technology transfer". Since there was supposedly a technology gap between the demand and the supply side, the state had to bridge that gap by acting as a modernizing agent. To be able to fulfill that task, the regional state was submitted to a radical reorganization and supported by a network of para-state agencies such as the Fraunhofer Gesellschaften, the Max Planck Institutes and, in particular, the Steinbeis Foundation. In Knodt's words, "during the Späth era, Baden-Württemberg government and administration developed into one of the most hierarchical and most centralized ones in the Federal Republic" (ibid:8).

After the elections of 1992 which brought the SPD into a coalition government with the Christian-Democrats, there have been some initiatives in favour of a more cooperative policy style. However, apart from a major reorganization within the Land administrative offices which led to partial substitution of the Staatskanzlei -- under the new, traditionalist, prime minister Teufel (CDU) -- by the Economics Ministry (MWMT) -- under the reign of the "transformer" and deputy Prime Minister Spori (SPD) -- little seems to have changed. The institutional and attitudinal inertia of the Späth era was strong enough to prevent major deviations from "the hierarchical, centralist and selective policy style of the administration and political leadership" (ibid.) of the previous phase.

It is not easy to draw clear conclusions from the above. The two established approaches contradict each other on virtually all aspects of the organizational format of Baden-Württemberg's political ecology. There is agreement on only one point: the regional state is described as possessing both a high potential for autonomous action and a high capacity of interministerial coordination. Atkinson and Coleman's model only offers two options for this type of configuration: either a state-dominated (or etatist) policy network, or a network based on large-scale policy concertation. Corporatism would appear to be ruled out for the case of Baden-Württemberg. Having started the description of the southern German case with the aim of developing two types of hypotheses, concerning the general relational properties of the region's ecology and the positioning of certain actor categories within the organizational space, this leaves us in an uncomfortable situation. Considering the attributes of the region's interest system (bargaining strength, strong membership base, etc.), we would have to do with a typical

168 In my view, it indicates more the end of a specific vision of what the German, and the Baden-Württemberg models were supposed to be -- not what they really were (and still are).

169 All of these agencies form part of our Baden-Württemberg sample for network analysis. Their functions and endowments are being described in a more detailed fashion in chapter five.

170 References to attributive (as opposed to relational) properties of actors and actor systems are made throughout this text. This is because an organization which performs well in attributive terms need not automatically belong to the group of most powerful actors in relational terms.
case of "concertation". However, as we have seen, there is a substantial amount of evidence pointing to the irrelevance of interest groups in industrial, technology, and regional policies. The only way to solve this paradox, before turning to the empirical material, is to allow for the existence of something that could be called "nested concertation", i.e. the (selective) incorporation of specific interest groups into public policy deliberation under conditions of a strong etatist domination. This would merge both the "default hypothesis" and the counter-hypothesis. Also, it may give a more realistic and accurate interpretation of the empirical situation than is delivered by those who approach the region within the narrow conceptual limits of specific schools of thought (flexible specialization, regulation approaches, corporatist policy-making, etc.).

However, what about the other German case? There is no way of drawing information from the kind of controversial debate that characterizes the case of Baden-Württemberg. Moreover, there is hardly any debate at all on the case of Niedersachsen. We then end up with the same kind of indeterminacy as in the case of Baden-Württemberg. However, rather than oscillating between state-domination and concertation, Niedersachsen would be another hybrid, somewhere in between pressure pluralism and corporatism, with a slight inclination towards the latter typology. The region's interest system, of course, is as solid as that of the other German case. However, given the relatively early change in political majorities from a Christian-Democratic towards a red-green coalition and, later, a Social-Democratic government, and considering the comparative stability, strength, and hegemony of this government, we would expect more consensus-oriented and participatory patterns to evolve. There is another reason that leads us to place Niedersachsen in the second column of Table 3.1. It concerns the coordinating capacity of its government as compared with Baden-Württemberg.

The scarce literature available for this region generally underlines the absence of an autonomous industrial and regional policy at least until the end of the 1980s (Pollmann 1989; Jurgens und Krumbein 1991; Sturm 1991; Krumbein 1994). The various governments preceding Gerhard Schröder's government, limited themselves to adopting certain aspects of the regional strategies followed in Baden-Württemberg (until the change in government) and in Northrhine-Westphalia (after the change in government). Regional political strategies have frequently been "reoriented under uncertainty" and were applied by "trial and error, in a tool box-like fashion" (Knodt 1997a:9). The region did not have the kind of charismatic leader who, like Späth, could have pushed both the administration and economic actors in the visionary and mission-oriented direction of the Musterland -- a fact not completely irrelevant to the absence of a strong corporate identity and organizational clout in administration. In general, Knodt speaks of a lack of stability in the region's institutional logic and self-perception, a difficulty that could not be immediately overcome following the political change in the early 1990s. While the "default option" under the Christian-Democratic party rule had been an ordo-liberal, non-interventionist orientation, the really decisive factor accounting for and establishing the lack of administrative coordination was the policy of decentralized regionalism followed by the various governments.

The 1974 revision of the law of 1966 on regional planning (Niedersächsisches Gesetz über Raumordnung und Landesplanung) introduced a unique element in the German federal context. The main responsibility in regional and development policies was given to the Regierungsbezirke and to the municipalities. This meant a complete decentralization of the policy domain which has had continuing consequences to the present day. The strategy of decentralized management reached its peak with further legal reforms in 1977/78 withdrawing competences even from the Regierungsbezirke. This left regional policies entirely in the hands of Landkreise and kreisfreie Städte (counties) -- an arrangement that conformed perfectly to the conservative vision of

71 The CDU under prime minister Albrecht had a sound majority throughout the period 1976-90.

72 As already mentioned, Späth liked to present himself as the Landesvater (the benevolent father figure) of "his" Musterland (model region) Baden-Württemberg. Schröder's star was just beginning to rise when we concluded our field work. He was part of the so-called "Troika", the national leadership of the SPD and, after the last Land elections in March 1998, is now the candidate for chancellorship for the coming national elections.
subsidiarity, i.e. self-initiative and non-intervention. In the words of Knodt (1997b:156-57), "after about 1976, an effective regional policy was made impossible." Territorial decentralization, at the same time, was linked with a strong ordo-liberal political orientation.

Interestingly, what had changed after the demise of fourteen years of CDU hegemony, were the general economic guidelines, not the decentralized approach to region policy-making. On the contrary, the latter was re-inforced and the left coalition government remained as passive and hesitant as its conservative predecessor. There were no clear initiatives or models to follow and, in contrast with the southern German government which set up an impressive (public and semi-public) infrastructure for technology transfer and high tech, the government of Niedersachsen left these tasks to the market. While decentralization was previously linked with non-intervention, the Social Democrats today combine decentralization with externalization. Consultancy, project management, cooperation with public development agencies and even the international representation and "marketing" of the region, are all run by private firms (Knodt 1997b).

The government made a number of attempts to modernize administration, to overcome resort particularism, and to change the general attitude of non-collaboration at higher levels. In the early 1990s, a new concept called "Strategie 95" was launched. It sought to establish a "dialogue-oriented economic policy". Participatory policies incorporating the representatives of firms and workers actually seem to work only at the sectoral level and, particularly, in the automobile sector. This is understandable given that about thirty per cent of employment in Niedersachsen is in the automobile branch and that the Volkswagen concern, Europe's biggest car producer, is the most significant private employer, with five different production plants on the region's territory. Trade union representatives here have relatively easy access to the so-called Branchengespräche (sectoral talks), organized by the prime minister and bringing together members of IG Metall and the branch organizations of industry. At an

intersectoral and regional-territorial level, however, most attempts to create new forms of public-private partnerships remain merely symbolic. Krumbein (1994:367) notes that those in the administration who promote the idea, often remain prisoners of traditional images of state-society relations and, therefore, have problems marketing the strategy effectively. Partnership has been imposed, so to speak, by Community authorities, but remains a rather empty concept which is seen as interfering with and disturbing a pattern of relationships entirely defined by public authorities. Corporatist features of policy-making in Niedersachsen are confined to the acceptance, by representatives of business associations and trade unions, of faits accomplis.

This is confirmed by Staeck who analyzes the implementation of the EU's philosophy of partnership and subsidiarity in the region. (1996:92) According to her, "an incorporation of the social partners has not been considered to be of importance" in the context of policies dealing with structural funds from the EU (Staeck 1996:92). Following representatives of the Land ministries, consultation and concertation of policies would "merely aggravate the anyway difficult task of coordination" (ibid:93). Staeck identifies political attitudes of that kind to be grounded in the "desperate attempts of safeguarding the autonomy of ones own division" (ibid:94). This would have resulted in a "relative closure of policy networks" whose core actors remain the ministries and where, occasionally, some limited access is conceded to functionally legitimated organizations (ibid:104).

Most of what has been argued so far, confirms the findings of Anderson's work on territorial politics in Germany. As in Baden-Württemberg, Niedersachsen's organizational ecology exhibits strong etatist elements. However, it is less centralized in its administrative organization and, therefore, characterized more by subregional competition between municipalities, counties and, of course, interest associations operating within the borderlines of these administrative units. Para-state agencies of the type encountered in Baden-Württemberg do not seem very significant in this region. As a result, organizations seeking advice and information need to contact the divisions of the
Land government directly, and do not have the possibility of turning to intermediaries. In the absence of more detailed material for the case of Niedersachsen which, probably, would reveal even more substantial differences between the two regions, the following conclusions can be drawn.

In a broader European perspective, and that is the one taken up here, the two Länder assume rather similar structural configurations. Both organizational ecologies are dominated by public actors and regional interest intermediation is either strongly fragmented, i.e. territorially diversified in the form of a multitude of subregional coalitions or, at least, overdetermined politically. While interest associations may be core actors in collective bargaining, in sectoral policies, and in policies concerning vocational training, their role in the wider field of regional development remains insignificant. The organizational format and resources of territorial interest groups in Germany are extremely well developed. Also, there is likely to be some form of concertation, but this concertation is deeply embedded into etatist and state-dominated structures leaving little room for initiatives from the bottom-up. The power centers of both networks, contrary to what was happening from the Sicilian ecology, are most likely to be occupied by public institutions alone. Despite their general organizational strength, interest associations do not form part of these centers. If we consider industrial policy in Baden-Württemberg as being organized predominantly in the form of R&D policies, some of the important para-state agencies operating in that domain may also be expected to occupy prominent positions. Thanks to current political majorities in Niedersachsen, trade unions may be better placed there while they remain completely marginalized in Baden-Württemberg.

As in the case of Italy, let us conclude the German section with a reference to van Waarden and his hypotheses a propos the structure of policy networks. Van Waarden does not explicitly ascribe specific attributes to German policy networks, but from his general discussion it becomes clear that this case would either belong to the "sectoral" or to the "macro-corporatist" variant. The relational properties of sectoral and macro-corporatism are: "closed boundaries", "relations ordered by horizontal consultation", "high intensity" and high density of contacts, "high multiplexity", "high symmetry and reciprocity" of relations, "average centrality" achieved by a "balanced pattern of relations" in which "neither the state nor organized interests are dominating" in any significant way, "high autonomy of the state vs. society" but, at the same time, "guaranteed access" of private actors to public institutions. Most of these hypotheses have been questioned in this section (horizontal consultation, high density of contacts, no unilateral domination, etc.). Those that could not be examined here will be dealt with in Chapter Five.

FRANCE

There is even less literature available on the two French regions chosen for our study than was available for our previous case-studies. Most of the hypotheses about the structure of political ecologies in Rhone-Alpes and Languedoc-Roussillon has to be derived from work on regional government in general, on general patterns of interest intermediation in France, and on territorial networks in other French regions. As we shall see, this latter area is particularly under-researched, probably because of the administrative science and legal bias in most French political science departments.

Let us start with the issue of decentralization in general. Like Italy and, as we shall see later, unlike Spain, decentralization in France has set in as a joint-response to political pressure and to the need to enhance the traditional exercise of rigid top-down planification nationale. After a first and unsuccessful attempt by De Gaulle who, pushed by the events of 1968, had tried to establish a specific corporatist variant of regionalism, the issue was taken up again at the beginning of the 1980s before finally

73 Meny (1987:63) mentions a third factor, namely a movement of a number of intellectuals and subnational politicians that aimed at a "decolonization of the regions" of central State authorities.
74 That this had been a major issue at that time is demonstrated by the termination of De Gaulle's political career after his loss of the 1969 referendum which failed to sanction his decentralization proposals. Indeed, there has been a kind of negative double contingency behind the critical attitude on the part of the people. The revolutionary and republican traditions in France have been hostile both towards the region as a political unit and towards functionally organized interests as participants in policy making (Meny 1989). Corporatism, at that time, was equated with authoritarian state
materializing in the form of the so-called Loi Defferre (Loi du 2 mars 1982 relative aux droits et libertés des communes, des départements et des régions).

Regions had always been foreseen by the Fifth Republic's 1958 Constitution (Article 72). However, it was only after the passing of Law no. 692/1985 of 10.7.1985 that the conditions for the election of Conseils Regionaux were created, and only after the passing of Law no. 16/1986 of 6.1.1986 could these new units begin their tasks as autonomous administrative bodies. The first election to the Conseils took place on 16.3.1986. Until that date, the French regions had been merely public law bodies and planning units (law of 5.7.1972) exclusively made up of representatives of central administration.

Apart from political pressure, decentralization was also been triggered by increasing implementation problems encountered by national planning. In that respect, an experiment was launched in 1984 within the framework of the ninth national plan 1984-88. It came to be known as planification contractuelles decentralisée (decentralized contractual planning), according to which each region -- parallel to the general medium-term orientation of the national plan -- defined its own economic development strategy. These strategies were then formalized in a joint contrat de plan l'État-region according to which both partners had to make financial contributions to the objectives set out. These concerned all aspects of the economics and social welfare of a region, "including roads, urban development, training programmes for technical and scientific initiatives to assist firms, rural development, tourism, and cultural or social programmes" (Debischop 1989:73).

Yves Meny (1987) has warned against over-emphasizing the importance of the Defferre reforms, the so-called grande affaire du septenat. In reality, they were not as revolutionary as might have seemed. "Defferre did not try to introduce the kind of revolution announced by the autogestion programme of the Socialist Party (...). In some aspects, the law was a simple codification of the practices of many left municipalities, departments and regions before 1981" (ibid:57). On the other hand, for Leonardo Parri, the laws have "brought about a clear mutation in the central-local power (im-)balance in France" (Parri 1990:229). Parri mentions that the region abandoned its inferior status of établissement public and became a collectivité territoriale, just like the communes and departments. According to him, the most relevant change caused by the laws was that the Préfet de la Region was now renamed Commissaire de la République thus losing his a priori "tutelle" administrative sur les actes of subnational government. Today, this image needs to be corrected. Most observers take it for granted that, in practice, the tutelle continues to exist (Engel 1993). All decisions by the region have to be submitted to the state commissioner (Chapui 1990:270) who has power to intervene. Unlike the a priori control above, this is now an a posteriori "controle de legalite" (Meny, Hayward, and Hoffmann-Martinit 1988:44).

In general, any account of decentralization that only looks at the increasing power of the Conseils Regionaux, without also considering the powers of other governmental layers within the regions, is misleading. For example, the 96 Départements which co-exist with the 22 regions, have a much longer historical tradition and are better protected by national law. They also possess their own competences and powers. The Conseils Généraux of these départements are elected from constituencies, called cantons, more or less the same constituencies that are used for regional elections. This, and the system of proportional representation, tends to "reduce regional elections to a series of departmental contests, with a downplaying of region-wide issues and a weakening of regional consciousness" (Keating 1993:177).

No less important are the 36,000 communes, or municipal governments. Neither the communes nor the départements possess or control an administrative apparatus of their committees and councils which would form part of formally institutionalized regions must have appeared to many as a "Jacobin nightmare". 55 The Départements' boundaries are unchanged since the French revolution and may "no longer correspond to the facets of contemporary social and economic geography" (Keating 1993:177).
own” and continue to remain under the influence of Jacobin traditions. However, considering that they are administered by 1.600.000 "deconcentrated" state officials, of whom only 32.000 work in Paris, and given that these officials are assisted by a "veritable army of elected officers" (36.000 mayors plus 500.000 communal councillors, 96 presidents of the departmental Conseils Generaux, and 3000 members of these Conseils), "the Girondins political potential of subnational governments has always remained high" (Parri 1990:225).

The role of the central State in this overall picture of territorially fragmented power and authority is not uncontroversial in literature. According to scholars of the Centre for the Sociology of Organizations (Crozier e Friedberg 1977)76, the process of decentralization has led to an interpenetration of influence rather than to an unilateral penetration by the center (Meny 1987:63). Similarly, Parri speaks of a "negotiated hierarchy", where subnational governments maintain considerable "possibilities for action" (Parri 1990:227). Territorial political exchanges (TPEs) are today "more balanced, explicit and formalized" (Parri 1989:206). This concerns both relations between different subnational governments and the center and infra-regional relations between, for example, the departmental and the regional Prefets (or Commissaires de la Republique) and the presidents of the Conseils Generaux and the Conseils Regionaux.77

This functional imperative in favour of joint decision-making is particularly evident in the field of regional competences. They are defined in Law no. 8/1983 of 7.1.1983, Article 3 which determines the division of competences between governments of different territorial levels. In theory, each area of responsibility is assigned to either the central State, the municipalities, les departements, or les regions78. In practice, however, these four have been allocated competences on a very ad-hoc basis. None of the subnational authorities is able to act autonomously, i.e. in disregard of the others. They are bound "to engage in a dense network of interdependence and collaboration" (Engel 1990).

Parri's functional and Engel's administrative account of interdependence may both miss important power disequilibria across different levels of territorial complexity79. More recent work underlines the persistent influence of central authorities in all matters regarding regional development or amanagement de territoire. This has been labeled by Balme and Jouve (1996:252) as a retour or a "regionalization of the [central] state", i.e. a process according to which administrations deconcentre have persistently gained in influence, particularly since the first reform of the European structural funds, from whose management "the region was practically excluded" (ibid:251)80. The Conseils Regionaux merely occupy an observer status in structural fund management and are generally characterized by an "unsatisfying organizational performance" (Rondin 1996:207), by "dysfunctions in administrative organization" (Balme and Jouve 1996:249), and by a "lack of administrative and political capacities" (ibid:250).

The chronic understaffing of the Conseils Regionaux also accounts for their inability to establish relations with their societal environment and to become the reference point for regional interest groups. Decentralization notwithstanding, societal

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76 They are autonomously administred collectivites territoriales but, at the same time, administrations deconcentre of the central State. The Conseils Generaux have been elected since 1848 and were regarded as soundly republican institutions, as long as they were kept under tight central supervision.

77 In presenting these figures, Parri does not take into account the administrative staff of the regions which, according to Meny (1989) amounted to about 3000 in the country as a whole towards the end of the 1980s.

78 For Rondin (1985:80), the center only has a "negotiating power" and is characterized "more by interdependence than by hierarchy" (Crozier et Thoenig 1975:14).

79 For the Ministry of the Interior in Paris and for Leonardo Parri, "a good prefect is not a Jacobin hardliner imposing the letter of the formal regulations, but a pater familias who prevents the emergence of histories within the department [or the region] and to rendre vers Paris of unresolved peripheral problems (Parri 1990:227)."

80 In Article 59 of Law no. 213/1982 of 2.3.1982, regional competences are defined as follows: economic planning and management -- i.e. elaboration of regional plans, participation in the design of national plans, signature of the contrats l'etat-region -- aid to enterprises, employment initiatives, land planning, professional education and vocational training, public schools and research, environmental protection, cultural policy, transport and agriculture (Engel 1993).

81 The obligation of different administrative units to cooperate does not imply that actors would control equal power resources. Similarly, Parri's picture may result from the equality condition of normative work on social and political exchange. Exchange theories tend to take for granted a relative balance of power among partners to the deals. Hence, the "norm of reciprocity" (Gouldner 1966) and the drive towards an equilibrium in the allocation of influence and relational resources -- either at the optimum point, i.e. widely-shared, or suboptimal, i.e. hierarchically imposed.

82 Interestingly, in their study, the authors explicitly refer to the Rhone-Alpes case.
groups find it more effective to link up with state field services -- represented in our sample by les Prefets de la Region, les Prefets de Departement, le SGAR (Secretariat General aux Affaires Regionales) and the various territorial offices of the central State, les Directions pour l’Industrie, pour l’Agriculture, etc. -- or with the elected members of departmental and municipal councils. Moreover, most local leaders remain reluctant to admit the possibility of regional leadership in any of the relevant policy areas (Balme and Jouve 1996:251). Partly because of the above deficiencies, LeGales (1994:72) is convinced that “regional economic policies are not a viable alternative to the economic strategies based on the traditional dirigisme of French central authorities.” Activities initiated by the institutions genuinely responsible for policies at the regional level, i.e. the Conseils Regionaux, generally remain symbolic in nature and lack any substance (ibid:85-86). At the same time, and contrary to what was suggested by the results of the 1992 analysis of the Sicilian political ecology (Section 3.2; Grote 1995b, 1997a, 1997d, 1998a), it would be wrong to expect this institutional vacuum to be filled by actors of the societal dimension.

Our review of inter-governmental relations at the regional level would have to end, therefore, on the same note as Parri (1993). In his comparative study of industrial policies in Rhone-Alpes and Emilia-Romagna, he concluded that policy making in France, at the national and the sub-national levels alike, belongs to the “imposing-voluntaristic” variety, and it is the deconcentrated agencies of the central State which create this voluntarism. As argued by Wilson (1993:123), as long as key political figures possess some imagination about their preferences, it can be taken for granted that this policy is being implemented or, if necessary, will be imposed authoritatively. Prompt and unconstrained implementation is guaranteed and does not require reliance on a broad societal consensus. Contrary to Emilia-Romagna’s reactive and consensus-seeking policy style, the French and the rhonalpine policy styles are proactive.

This leads to a situation where France drops out of the image of multilevel governance (MLG) suggested by Gary Marks (1993; 1995; Marks et.al. 1996). Two reasons are responsible for this. First, governance is more than just government and, to justify the use of this analytical category, some form of incorporation of societal interests into public decision making would be required. As we shall see later, this cannot be taken for granted either for the county as a whole or for development policies in individual regions. Secondly, governance is not multilevel but essentially one-dimensional. Policymaking is dominated by central State agencies -- whether at the level of the French State, or at the regional, departmental, or municipal levels. The region may represent a “space or a scale for multi-level public policy”, but it is not a distinct level of self-government in Mark’s sense (Balme and Jouve 1996:252). Generally, the role of the Conseils Regionaux remains a subordinate one. At best, it may vary to some extent relative to the degree of a region’s internal political and territorial fragmentation or cohesion. Such a distinction between different regional polities has been suggested by Bruno Jobert (1995). In the first typology, which the author calls “forum”, the region is a political space for societal macro-representation and the regulation and definition of rules addressing actors of all administrative layers. In the second typology, called "arena", the region is a political space for the exchange of resources and the representation of highly specific and essentially departmental interests, without any level assuming superiority over any other and without any significant coordinating capacity on the part of the Conseils Regionaux. This is a useful distinction which does not generally question the role of the central State. Later in the text, we shall try to assign Rhone-Alpes and Languedoc-Roussillon to one of these typologies.

Contrary to the well-documented, though controversial area of inter-governmental relations, there is hardly any material on subnational forms of interest intermediation -- at least not for our two regions. Some words, nevertheless, need to be said on the general role of interest groups in France. Otherwise, our empirical results would not hold much meaning. The most important employers’ association is the Conseil National du Patronat Francais (CNPF), a peak association of more than 80 manufacturing, banking, and commercial organizations representing more than 800,000 firms. Because of this high
variety of interests, "tensions between different sized enterprises or between rival industrial or commercial sectors often surface" (Wislon 1993:166). Disagreement is particularly strong with respect to the CNPF's strategy vis-à-vis government. This often leads to an inability to take positions on controversial matters thus empowering the representatives of industry-specific organizations which seek access to decision-makers on an individual basis and establish bilateral relationships with public administration.

Our French samples include a number of industry- and branch-specific organizations. For example, in Rhone-Alpes, we selected the regional branch of CNPF, the Union Patronale Rhone-Alpes, the Union des Industries Metallurgique et Electrique, the Federation Regionale des Trauxaux Publics, and the Union Interentreprises Textiles de Lyon et Region (UNITEX). In Languedoc-Roussillon, the following business and agricultural associations are network members: the Confederation General P.M.E. Union Languedoc-Roussillon, the Syndicat de Transformation des Matieres Plastiques, the Syndicat General des Industries Chimiques, the Federation Regionale des Travaux Publics, and the Federation Regionale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricole Languedoc-Roussillon.

Apart from these interest associations, various chambers are also included in our empirical survey. Like their counterparts in Germany, the French chambers of industry and commerce are "in an intermediate situation between the public and the private sectors. Their public law status is not simply a formal matter" (Meny, Hayward, and Hoffmann-Martinit 1988:435). They operate a wide range of public services (airports and, in Languedoc-Roussillon, maritime ports and oil platforms, etc.) and play an important part in industrial and commercial training. Again, like Germany, but unlike Italy, there are chambers for different sectors of activity: the Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie, the Chambre des Metiers, and the Chambre d'Agriculture. Each of these are

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83 The first chamber in France was set up in Marseille in 1599, and the first in the Languedoc area was set up in Montpellier in 1704. After the revolution, chambers were abolished by law and were then re-created in the south in Nimes and Carcassonne (1862), in Narbonne (1870), in Sete (1872), Perpignan (1881), Mende (1899), Beziers (1902) and in Ales (1909).
84 Training accounts for about 30 per cent of the expenses of the chambers in Languedoc-Roussillon.

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Turning now to the workers' movement, the French situation is quite similar to the Italian one -- at least in terms of organizational fragmentation, not in terms of representativity. Only the most important of these associations are considered. These are the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT), the Confederation Francais Democratique de Travail (CFDT), and the Force Ouvrier (FO). Membership figures for the unions are quite disparate and it is hard to verify any one set of figures. However, a rather clear impression can be gained if the findings of different authors are considered simultaneously. The CGT, an organization with strong affiliation to the Communist Party, is a federation of constituent unions (automobile, chemical, metal, and transport workers' union) for which Safran reports a figure of 900,000 members (1993:152). Three years earlier, Wilson (1990:164) estimated that the CGT had a membership of 1,500,000, representing a loss of forty per cent in less than half a decade. This may be an exaggeration, however the figures reported by Andolfatto (1991) about shifts in representativity between the years 1967 and 1989 largely confirm a dramatic landslide for the CGT whose share dropped steeply in that period from 45 per cent down to 25.1 per cent.

The CFDT, during the same period increased its share from 17.7 per cent to 21 per cent. This union was originally inspired by Catholicism, though it split from the

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85 Even the figures for the mid-1980s reported by Denis Segrestin (1990:106-108), a specialist in the field, are largely estimates. He assigns 1 million members to the CGT, 700,000 to the CFDT, 600,000 to the FO, 150,000 to the CGC, and 200,000 to the CFTC (1985 estimates).
86 The author takes as an indicator the voting patterns in professional elections for the social security committees, the Conseils des Prud'Hommes, and the Conseils d'Entreprise.
Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens (CFTC) in 1960, "deconsecnized" itself, and is today close to the Socialist Party, the PS.\textsuperscript{87} The third union, the FO, has also increased in strength from 7.6 per cent to 11.2 per cent in work councils' elections or, in terms of its membership base, from 900.000 in 1990 (Wilson) to 1.100.000 in 1993 (Saffran).\textsuperscript{88} According to Keating (1993:170), French unions now represent 11 per cent of the labour force, down from 30 per cent in the 1970s. Trade unionism in France has entered a general crisis due, in part, to the privatization of many industries, especially under the Chirac government of 1986-88 (Friend 1995:153).

The reduction of union power is particularly pronounced in Rhone-Alpes, the only region for which some, albeit limited, information could be collected. Albers' comprehensive study on regional trade unionism in the European Community (Albers 1995:226) reports dramatic membership losses in rhonealpine trade unions, losses that were stronger than in most other French regions. The unions continue to be divided along ideological lines, even in respect at the more technical aspects of regional development. In addition, their membership includes a disproportionately high number of pensioners. At the regional level, the CFDT is clearly the most significant organization. While it has set up a regional intersectoral peak association, the CGT and FO both operate poorly staffed and financially under-resourced regional committees (ibid:267).\textsuperscript{89} As regards regional development policies, none of the regional union organizations seems to have a well-developed and autonomous overall strategy. They are more or less excluded from policy-making in that domain (ibid:274). As claimed by LeGales with regard to business interests, trade union activity in Rhone-Alpes is dominated by the unions' departmental branches. More importantly, the relations between these latter and the unions' regional branches have worsened throughout the course of the last decade (Albers 1995:271).

Considering the relative weakness of subnational and, in particular, regional collective action by either business associations or trade unions, one of the essential hypotheses raised by Parri a propos the logics and modes of operation of TPE and of FPE circuits remain unconfirmed. Parri argued that subnational government would have gained, and would gain further, by continuing decentralization, not least because it would now be able "to develop circuits of functional political exchange (...) with a clientele not longer being bound to resource transfers from the center" (Parri 1989:206). A consolidation of FPE circuits at the level of the region and the department, therefore, would contribute to the coming about of more equilibrated forms of TPE both between the subnational level and Paris and between the regional and other subregional government agencies. On the basis of the above evidence, which clearly pointed to the relative irrelevance of the Conseils Regionaux and to the weakness of the subnational interest system, increases in importance of subnational government, anchored in the functional policy dimension, must be put into question. Moreover, considering the general pattern of interest intermediation in France, the existence of fully-fledged FPE at the regional level or, more precisely, within the boundaries of the regional political ecology, is quite unlikely. The strongest hypothesis in that respect has been advanced by Hans-Peter Kriesi (1994). Kriesi argues that "les relations entre l'Etat et les associations d'intere in France sont ouvertement discriminatoire" (ibid:414). He continues that "l'administration francais ne negocie pas avec les associations d'intérets. Son rapport avec elles est asymetrique: le gouvernement les consulte. En outre, cette consultation n'est souvent que symbolique". Symbolic consultation seems to be the rule also for the Conseils Regionaux et Economiques et Socials which are hardly ever mentioned in the relevant literature on regional and industrial development policies.\textsuperscript{90} In a well-known,

\textsuperscript{87} Wilson counts 740.000 members in 1990 (Wilson 1990:164) and Saffran (1993:152) 800.000 members three years later.

\textsuperscript{88} Apart from the CFTC which continues to exist and even doubled its influence between 1967-1989, from 2.1 to 4.6 per cent, other unions not completely irrelevant but not included in our sample, are the Confederation Generale des Cadres (CGC) and the Federation d'Education Nationale (FEN).

\textsuperscript{89} To give an example, the regional committee of CGT employs three political secretaries on a permanent contract basis, four free-lance collaborators (mostly retired members) and one scientific adviser (Albers 1995:267).

\textsuperscript{90} With respect to their national counterpart, the Conseil Economique et Social, Wilson argues that this body's opinions are frequently ignored by parliament and that its overall policy impact is very limited: "The social consensus and group unity necessary for this kind of institutionalized cooperation between
and often quoted, work of the 1970s, Suleiman (1974) reports a French haute fonctionnaire as having said: „nous consultons toujours. Ceci ne signifie pas que nous écoutons (…). Nous ne dévoilons que nous jugeons nécessaire“

Much of this has to do with how societal interests are perceived both in public opinion and by state officials. Authors often underline that these interests, whether organized or not, are rarely believed to be sérieux. In fact, they risk undermining the volonté générale (Wilsford 1989). Wilson argues (1990:165), that more than in other democratic nations, "the government draws a distinction between 'good' (...) and 'outside' interest groups [the latter being] seen as excessively preoccupied with their own privileges and with resisting needed social evolution." The exclusion and marginalization of societal groups from decision processes often result in outbursts of discontent, in "exit from normal politics"\(^1\), and in "voting with one's feet". This brings us directly to the most central issue: state-society relations at the subnational level and territorial policy (domain) networks in Rhône-Alpes and in Languedoc-Roussillon.

There is little controversy a propos state-society relations in France. For van Waarden (1995), France is a clear case of "the differentiation of the state out of civil society" (ibid:352). Etatism, the legitimacy of state authority and state interventionism are bolstered by the country's legal system. This would be in line with a paternalistic approach to policy networks and with the informal nature of state-society relations. Etatism, activism, paternalism, contempt for interest associations, and informality in state-society relations are all linked to "the limited possibilities for legal review of administrative decisions, the weakness of parliament and the concentration of power in the executive, monocratic decisionmaking, a relatively specialist public administration, and groups and government are simply not present in France" (Wilson 1990:165). The existence of "highly developed forms of partnership (...) between business and the public authorities both at the national and local levels" as argued by Meny, Hayward and Hoffmann-Martinot (1988:462) seems to concern the format but not the substance of interorganizational relations.

\(^{11}\) As quoted in Kriesi (1994).

\(^{12}\) Whether this attitude of "voting with one's feet" is relevant also for territorial politics is not entirely clear. However, "une stratégie de rupture" (Crozier et Friedberg 1977) is certainly not amenable to a strengthening of regional networks.

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The only noteworthy exception to the strong state/weak society image of the French polity is the interpretation advanced by Vivian Schmidt (1996). She seeks "to avoid the language of strength and weakness altogether" (ibid:49) and presents the country in terms of a "statist" model. "Statism", in Schmidt's view, is a pattern shaped by history, culture and institutions which may appear strong from certain vantage points and weak from others (ibid:47). State-society relations, then, would be both strongly differentiated and strongly de-differentiated -- always relative to different phases of the policy process. At the formulation stage, the state is Jacobin. Government is the direct expression of the desires of the people and embodies Rousseau's volonté générale without the intermediation of interests or the "mischief of faction" (ibid:49). This is heroic policies where governments with solid majorities and visions are able to move ahead and where public leadership remains paramount and consultation is minimal (ibid:50). Yet, at the same time, the state is also Girondin, i.e. decentralized and responsive, and this, according to Schmidt, would apply to policy implementation. This is called "everyday policies", which ensures that the General Will does not drift too far from the particular one and where private interests may have a great deal more influence. In general, however, although "everyday policymaking may look more corporatist or pluralist on the surface than statist (...), such policymaking nevertheless remains definitionally part of a statist pattern because the government retains the upper hand, to invite outside interests in, or freeze them out" (ibid:57).

These different accounts of state-society relations do not dramatically diverge from each other. Nonetheless, from our particular point of view they are not entirely
unproblematic. While the state-society literature hardly ever refers to the differential role of different types of state agency at different territorial levels, the literature on territorial and/or policy networks hardly ever mentions state-society relations as the underlying determinants of network-building. It is almost exclusively restricted to an investigation of intergovernmental relations which connect various national, regional, and subregional government agencies. From this literature, only one relevant minority view was identified. It is worthwhile mentioning for two reasons. First, it presents an alternative vision of state-society relations and, secondly, it does that by explicitly addressing problems of subnational governance. Before turning more specifically to the regional case-studies of the French sample, this position shall be mentioned briefly.

In his work on "the functionality of paradox structures", Benz (1996) argues that regional governments in France try to offset their lack of formal competences by way of informal cooperation (ibid:35) -- a strategy that would reach far back into the pre-decentralization period. Benz quotes Gremion (1976) who demonstrates that regional policy networks were already present in the 1950s, in the form of so-called Comités d'Expansion Regional which, in a rather loose manner, assembled politicians, members of the administration, and economic actors. The Defferre reforms inserted these networks into a more institutionalized context (ibid:25) and led to an increase in their density (ibid:26).

Overall, and contrary to a vision of interest groups as being subordinate to state institutions, Benz claims that "public and private interests are strongly interconnected in regional development policies, namely by bargaining systems that are organized in a network-like fashion" (ibid.). The rigid state-society division, at least at the regional level, is an image that is deliberately promoted by public actors. Below the surface of clear-cut differentiation, "policy is de facto taking place in form of networks that cut through the edges of the public and the private and are always present, although in a hidden and latent form, ready to be activated should the need arise" (ibid:35).63 According to Benz, politicians and bureaucrats at the subnational level manage to maintain this deceptive state-society division, because the weak regional institutions do not represent a threat to strong, though informal networks. He calls this the "functionality of paradox structures" (ibid:38).

This clearly runs counter to what was argued previously. At closer inspection, however, it does not really contradicts our hypothesis of a marginalization of interest groups in the France's regional political ecologies. What Benz is describing, in reality, are highly particularistic relations among individual representatives of the state apparatus and the business community, i.e. what is widely known under the label of pantouflage. Benz does not explicitly refer to that phenomenon, but it is evident from his description that this is what he has in mind, and not necessarily policy networks or policy domain networks in the narrower sense of the word. Pantouflage, however, is anything but an indicator for modernizing networks. Hans-Peter Kriesi has described it in the following way: "Les hauts fonctionnaires sont entrés dans les directions des grandes entreprises privées. Une sorte de ‘technostructure’ s’est développée en France, c’est-à-dire un groupe de dirigeants dans les secteurs privés et publics qui partagent les mêmes origines et les mêmes visions de la politique à suivre. Au cours de ce processus, le secteur privé s’est graduellement politisé, alors qu’une grande partie du secteur public s’est privatisée“ (Kriesi 1994:417). While, in the past, this specific French variant of clientelism mainly concerned senior representatives of the public sector who, after decades in public service, had accumulated significant amounts of "social capital" which could more profitably be invested in the private sector, today the phenomenon takes place with increasingly younger people. Friend has observed that "fifty-nine per cent of managers between 25

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63 To support this argument, Benz refers to François Dupuy (1985:96-97), who describes local networks in France as follows: "There is a great deal of communication within this milieu, but it is a different kind of communication from the one generally being understood by this term. Face-to-face contact and interpersonal relations are infrequent, and communication does not take on a particularly expressive form. However, members of this world are easily able to recognize one another, to identify others and to evaluate problems, without needing to talk to each other. They are known and trusted -- by a collection of signs linked to their social origins, their occupation, and so forth.”
Tentative hypotheses

and 40 years old responded to a survey by saying that they plan to leave the civil service. It is now commonplace for big companies to recruit talented young people immediately after their graduation from a grande école, assuming the cost of reimbursing the government for their tuition" (Friend 1995:99). It would be incorrect, therefore, to perceive pantouflage in terms of an explicit strategy of resource pooling in the interest of building regional networks. Benz may be right in so far as he points to the hidden character of these relations and to the embarrassed attempts of state officials to divert public attention from a phenomenon which, although slightly different, is called Filz in German and which, in Italy, was among the causes of the First Republic's collapse at the beginning of the 1990s. Calling this a policy network, however, is clearly misleading.

We have now presented some of the essentials of decentralization, of interest groups, and of state-society relations in France. However, we do not know yet how these trends are actually materializing in Rhone-Alpes and in Languedoc-Roussillon. Let us first turn to the first and probably more developed case, both in economic and in institutional terms. Rhone-Alpes is often described as if it were a tenth part of la Grand Nation: ten per cent of the French population, ten per cent of gross domestic product, ten per cent of industrial production and research (Colletis and Colletis-Wahl 1993:16). In reality, this description underestimates the importance of the region. Rhone-Alpes is second only to Ile-de-France in terms of GDP (28.3%) and in terms of industrial research (54%). At the same time, however, the budget of the Conseil Régional (figures for 1992) amounts to no more than 2.5% of the budget of Baden-Württemberg.

When the 22 French planning regions were defined, Rhone-Alpes did not exist as a region. There was a ‘région du Rhône’, consisting of the départements of l’Ain, l’Ardèche, la Drôme, la Loire, and Rhone, and a ‘région des Alpes’, consisting of the départements of l’Isère, la Savoie, and la Haute-Savoie. Traditionally, there has been a decision achieved thanks to a political alliance between Lyon and Chambéry, the two traditional

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strong competition between Grenoble and Lyon. The decision to make Lyon the regional capital, was initially perceived as “impérialiste” among local elites in other parts of the territory and, in particular, in Grenoble (Jouve 1998:108). The borders of the region did not match those of the old provinces, making it more artificial and heterogeneous than many other regions, for example, Alsace, Lorraine or Bretagne (Kukawka 1992:10). As there was no pre-existing territorial identity, this had to be achieved and built up in a process of an „échange politique contemporain“ among actors from different departments and municipalities (Jouve 1998:106).

These recent and enduring political exchanges seem to have been quite successful and to have had a stabilizing effect. Otherwise, Rhone-Alpes could not be understood as a „cas particulier: elle n’est pas une région comme une autre, et pas seulement par sa taille: Rhone-Alpes, c’est la région, le modèle“ (ibid:107). Most of this has to do with the way in which the Conseil Régional managed to insert itself into pre-existing exchange circuits. According to Jouve, the region's highly modernizing political entrepreneurs and innovative power brokers have transformed the council into a „siège d’une ‘élite solidaire’ caractérisée par l’ouverture de son mode de recrutement ainsi que par sa cohésion en termes de ‘valeurs communes’, ‘d’éthos moral’ et de ‘conscience de cette solidarité’“ (ibid:106-107). They have in common “de vouloir remettre en question les modes dominants de médiation territoriale qui sanctionnent le poids des départements et des grandes villes“ (ibid.). Today, the council cannot be ignored by anybody, not even by the most powerful departmental notable or by the commune. It has become “une instance que certains ‘entrepreneurs politiques’ intègrent dans leur carrière“ (ibid:132). This is a major achievement, given that Rhone-Alpes, like most other French regions, was initially characterized by a very strong departmentalization until at least the late 1980s and by an ‘arena-type pattern’, in Jobert's (1995) terminology. In the 1990s, “le Conseil Régional se transforme peu à peu en ‘forum’ (...)” (Jouve 1998:132). In other words, „l’échange politique ne s’établit pas dans un jeu à somme nulle où ce qui serait

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If the Baden-Württemberg annual budget (194 billion francs) is set to 100, then Lombardia’s would amount to 66.5 per cent (129 billion francs), the Catalan one to 28.9 (56 billion francs), and Rhone-Alpes to 2.5 per cent (4.4 billion francs). Source: Lettre de la Région Rhône-Alpes, Conseil Régional (1993).

A decision achieved thanks to a political alliance between Lyon and Chambéry, the two traditional
perdu au niveau local serait gagné au niveau régional. Il est davantage question de créer les conditions du remplacement d’une classe politique avant tout départementaliste par une autre plus favorable au Conseil Régional.\textsuperscript{66} (ibid:132). Since the 1992 regional elections, the Council has become an important vecteur for the recomposition of the local political landscape. The new political class is determined to modernize .\textquoteleft\textquoteleft l’action publique, d’efficacité du partenariat et de démocratie locale, d’introduire de nouvelles modalités et de nouveaux principes d’action afin de remplacer une classe politique départementaliste.\textsuperscript{7} (ibid:114).

Although Jouve's work does not touch upon the issue of territorial interest intermediation\textsuperscript{67}, it is quite helpful for building hypotheses about the structure of the region's political ecology. If his account is true, then we should expect the Conseil Régional to occupy a relatively prominent position in the network -- more prominent, at least, than in the case of Languedoc-Roussillon. Representatives of the traditional departmentalized political class, accordingly, may have less influence here than in the south. This is confirmed by additional evidence supplied by another author. Like Jobert (1995) and Jouve (1998), Smyrl (1995) distinguishes between two patterns of regional policy styles in France -- a northern and a mediterranean style -- reflecting general differences. His cases for comparison are Bretagne and Provence-Cote d’Azur (PACA).

Interestingly, Smyrl explicitly refers to our two cases as being largely comparable to the regions studied by him. Bretagne and PACA are “respectively catholic and secular, corporatist and clientelistic, consensual and conflictual” (ibid:11). The first region is characterized as being "consensual", "pro-active"\textsuperscript{97}, "united versus vis-à-vis the outside world", and exhibiting "high degrees of mutual trust" among representatives of regional and subregional institutions and organizations. PACA, on the other hand is described as a "fragmented" and "reactive" region, with "open divisions being exposed in external relations" and a "total lack of trust among regional and subregional actors" (ibid:33).

Like most recent work on regional networks\textsuperscript{98}, Smyrl's is an attempt to scrutinize the impact of EU structural fund interventions on possible modifications in intergovernmental relations both within national and regional polities. If we were to accept Smyrl’s parallelism generally and take for granted that most of the properties observed by him for the case of Bretagne would equally apply to Rhone-Alpes, then, we should expect this region to have benefited from the EU's political initiatives. Nota bene, however, that these latter “are not sufficiently important to serve as the stimulus for the creation of a territorial policy community (...) if one does not already exist in the (...) field of regional economic planning” (ibid:38), i.e. in the policy domain under investigation in this present context. Where such a community exists, “it proved relatively easy (...) to take on this new task [structural fund management], expanding and transforming itself in the process” (ibid.). Because of its successful attempts to build up a comprehensive network for technology transfer, high tech and information exchange, Rhone-Alpes' regional council's position have been further strengthened in the process of structural funding\textsuperscript{99}.

Apart from the Conseil itself, it would be reasonable then, to expect agencies in the center of the network to be performing two different tasks simultaneously -- serving as a link between Brussels and Lyon and connecting the territorial business community to the main sources of financing and technological know how within the region. As in the case of Baden-Württemberg, such an expectation is warranted for the following reasons. The high share of the region's industrial research and R&D expenditure in France as a whole

\textsuperscript{66} This is surprising, as the theoretical reference point of his description of Rhone-Alpes is Parri’s model of territorial and functional political exchange (Parri 1989, 1990). According to Parri, the two circuits cannot exist without each other. They are interdependent, intertwined, and re-inforce each other.

\textsuperscript{67} An attribute, we already encountered in Parri’s comparative study of Rhone-Alpes and Emilia-Romagna (1993).

\textsuperscript{97} An attribute, we already encountered in Parri’s comparative study of Rhone-Alpes and Emilia-Romagna (1993).

\textsuperscript{98} The article that was most influential in triggering off this type of investigation is the one by Anderson (1990).

\textsuperscript{99} In a more recent publication, Smyrl shows that it is not necessarily the Conseil Régional alone which has been empowered by EU policies. The region as a whole has benefited, and this is a result, not of the Conseil going it alone but, rather, of a close collaboration between the Conseil and the Prefet de la Region: “The prefer and his technical staff were active participants in the regional planning process; they mobilized the services of the state in defense of regional interests and became the active allies of the region and its spokesmen vis-à-vis the outside world” (Smyrl 1997:7).
has already been mentioned. In part, this is due to the large number of small- and medium sized enterprises operating on the territory. Only 1.6 per cent of the enterprises employ more than 500 workers and these firms’ share in overall employment lies at 18 per cent. Since SMEs have considerable problems in organizing their own research and development activities, we should expect, as in Baden-Württemberg, that some technology transfer and development agencies will figure prominently among the region’s most important organizations. One of these agencies, ERAI (Entreprise Rhone-Alpes International), was reported by our respondents as being of particular importance and has been included among the members of the regional network. The case of ERAI is paradigmatic. It is not just an enterprise support structure. More than that, it is a typical reaction of the Conseil Régional against its own legitimacy deficit and an attempt to widen its “opportunities for action” (Larat 1996:10). Unlike other agencies which exist in all French regions and are coordinated by the Ministries in Paris, ERAI is a unique organization in France.

Much of the above is clearly different in Languedoc-Roussillon. Again, this is attributable not only to economic and geographic factors but, also, to cultural and political traditions and the resulting institutional manifestations of these traditions. The region consists of five departments -- l’Aude, le Gard, l’Herault, la Lozere et les Pyrenees Orientales -- and regroups 1545 communes. As in most other French regions, the department is the most important governmental level and dominates policymaking, together with the SGAR (Secretariat General aux Affairs Regionales), the department’s operational arm. Unlike Rhone-Alpes, however, this departmentalization seems to persist. This is because it is not only anchored in the general set-up of France's intergovernmental relations but, also, in a strongly fragmented cultural and territorial environment which reinforces localism and discourages the emergence of broader regional identity and action strategies. According to Negrier (1998), Languedoc-Roussillon has "une identité politique fragmentée" (Negrier 1998:86), and is "inscrit durablement dans une culture politique hétérogène: protestaire dans le ‘Midi rouge’, particulariste dans sa partie catalan, mais aussi dans la zone de Lozère. Chacun de ces sous-ensembles a longtemps disposé de sa propre stabilité politique et sociale." (ibid:97).

Far from being weakened by increased competences on the side of regional government, by a newly emerging political class, and by European policy initiatives aimed at strengthening the regional level, the departmentalization and "filiation du dispositif s’est au contraire reproduite. Ici, l’action conjointe de l’État et des départements, mais aussi celle des intérêts privés organisés, contribuent à vider de substance la ‘régionalisation’ des programmes.” (ibid:92). In terms of Jobert's distinction between a forum- and an arena-type regionalism, Negrier places Languedoc-Roussillon within the second category: "Le niveau régional peut y etre en effet considéré comme un espace d’échange politiques parmi d’autres, sans réelle capacité supérieur de coordination et de négociation entre intérêts territoriaux." (ibid:96). By the same argument: „On constate la faible consistence politique de l’action publique, marquée par une combinaison de principes généraux et d’individualisation de la programmation, et

301 The comparative figure for Baden-Württemberg is 69 per cent (Colletis and Colletis-Wahl 1993:21).
302 For example, ARST (Agence Régional pour l’Information Scientifique et Technique), ANVAR (Agence National pour la Valorisation de la Recherche), CRITT (Centres Regionaux d’Innovation et de Transfer de Technologies) and others.
303 The SGAR in Languedoc-Roussillon has declined to respond to our questions. This organization represents one of the very few really relevant “holes” in our nine networks. If it had responded, then this “deconcentrated” State agency would have been one of the most central network participants. The central State would generally seem to be more important in this region than in Rhone-Alpes where we have pointed to a restructuring of power relations instigated by a new political elite around the Conseil Régional. Indeed, as was argued by Balme and Jouve (1996) for France's regional ecologies in general, Negrier speaks of a „retour en force de l’etat” in Languedoc-Roussillon (Negrier 1998:89): „Loin d’etre le partenaire neutralisé et extérieur aux processus d’échange politique auquel certains veulent croire (...), en est bel et bien l’un des protagonistes.” (ibid:96).
304 This fragmented reality is essentially a result of the region's dualistic economic structure. It is characterized, on the one hand, by the wine-growing tradition in a large fraction of the territory and with a strong cultural identity and a specific form of political representation and, on the other, a number of industrial poles with distinct political attitudes and a consistently strong Communist Party. To this needs to be added the Lozere, a depopulated and essentially rural area in the north of the region, which is more similar to certain central territories in France than to this, otherwise, typically mediterranean region.
305 Negrier refers to the the Plan de Développement des Zones Rurales 1989-1993 (PDZR) -- a genuine regional plan -- where the Conseil originally had considerable influence both in design and implementation. In reality, this type of planning has come to be controlled by the préfets de région and the préfets départementaux, the SGAR, and the Conseils Généraux (Negrier 1998:90).
Tentative hypotheses

Administrative departmentalization, territorial fragmentation, (party-) political incompatibilities and ideological frictions\textsuperscript{105} could not be overcome by the region's strong and public commitment to European policies. After 1986, Languedoc-Roussillon took the lead in organizing the French regions participating in the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (Bianchi and Grote 1991). Jacques Blanc, the president of the region, was also appointed the first president of the new EU Committee of the Regions. Although interesting in itself, especially from the point of view of Languedoc's external contact portfolio (see Chapter Seven), a large part of these efforts remained rather symbolic. According to Smyrl (1995), this is because "the socio-political context in which this activity has unfolded (...) is more reminiscent of PACA than of Bretagne. Like its southern neighbour, Languedoc-Roussillon is the site of fragmented and conflictual infra-regional politics. There is a long-standing rivalry (...) between the region and its component departments" (ibid:35) and "despite the efforts of its powerful and energetic president, the regional council of Languedoc-Roussillon remains one actor among others in the territorial politics of the region, and not necessarily the strongest" (ibid:38). Smyrl explicitly denies the region the attribute to represent a “regional-level policy network for territorial development”.

By way of concluding, the following points need to be considered. Given the apparently strong determination of regional political circuits by national authorities, it must be assumed that the differences between the two French cases are differences in degree, not in kind. The regional government is likely to be better placed in Rhone-Alpes' political ecology than in that of its southern neighbour, but both ecologies are overdetermined by the deconcentrated agencies of the central State and, in particular, by the \textit{ prefectures regionaux}. Given the strong technology orientation of regional politics in Rhone-Alpes, one would also expect those \textit{ prefectures} divisions which deal explicitly with R&D policy to be quite centrally placed -- assisted by para-state agencies such as \textit{ANVAR, ERAI}, etc. In Languedoc-Roussillon, these latter would be substituted by agencies operating in the orbit of the prefect's agriculture divisions or of the \textit{Direction pour l'agriculture} of the central State. In any case, the presence of subregional organizations and institutions in central network positions should be more pronounced in these two regions than in most of the other cases under investigation.

Where, however, would Rhone-Alpes and Languedoc-Roussillon have to be placed in terms of state-society relations, i.e. in terms of the typologies of Table 3.1? Considering the high degrees of associational fragmentation, the low degrees of representativity, and insufficient expertise in questions regarding regional development, it can be taken for granted that the positions of interest groups in the organizational ecologies will be quite marginalized. Interest associations are so insignificant in this policy domain that none of the case studies presented above felt the need to mention them. As to the two regions' public institutions, we should expect high levels of organizational and of strategic autonomy, little delegation of public tasks to private bodies and, as a consequence, no risk of agencies being captured by organized interests. Yet, at the same time, the coordinating capacity of governments at various territorial levels is clearly underdeveloped. Regional policy circuits in France are populated by manifold and competing actors which are "forced to collaborate in a dense network of contractual relations, incapable of acting autonomously" (Engel 1993:75). This has also been called the "hierarchy deficit" in French intergovernmental relations (Portelli 1993). We have to work, then, with a configuration that corresponds perfectly to the mix of high autonomy/low coordination represented by the first row and second column of Table 3. In other words, "(...) the state is weak (...) when authority is dispersed and no one group can take the lead in formulating policy. Under these circumstances, \textit{authority is typically diffused} among several bureaux and between levels of government resulting in "

\textsuperscript{105} The regional capital, Montpellier, is a stronghold of the Socialist Party, while the region and a number of relevant départements and cities are governed by conservatives. At the same time, in some industrial poles and maritime ports, the French Communist Party, PCF, continues to be a relevant...
overlapping jurisdictions and bureaucratic competition" (Atkinson and Coleman 1989:51). Both Rhone-Alpes and Languedoc-Roussillon, therefore, are typical cases of "pressure pluralism" although, at the same time, leaning towards "statism", or a "state-dominated" network typology.

Translating this political hypothesis into a structural one, we again turn to van Waarden's explicitly relational typologies. According to van Waarden, France is a clear case of 'statism'\(^{106}\). 'Statist policy networks' are characterized by the following attributes: "limited number, low intensity" and, hence, low density, "strictly closed boundaries, unordered relations, low multiplexity, no symmetry, high centrality and hierarchical imposition of rules by a few specific actors" towards the command end of the network structure. The "autonomy of the state vs. society is high", "state agencies are dominating" the network and are "not accessible by other actors". We are not in a position to substantiate van Waarden's claims, at least not with respect to multiplexity, symmetry, and accessibility. However, density is more likely to be high in the country's territorial networks. This is because of the quasi-obligation to collaborate in intergovernmental relations and the formal provisions for consultation laid down by the Conseils Economiques et Sociales. At the same time, while the imposition of rules by a logic of hierarchy can hardly be questioned, this does not imply that the networks are necessarily very centralized. Van Waarden's hierarchy refers to state-society relations but not to intergovernmental relations within a given polity. Where interest groups are marginalized, and central network positions occupied by a group of public actors with no single institution able of assuming the task of network management, centralization is likely to be low.

**SPAIN**

\(^{106}\) By van Waarden's definition, "statist" policy networks are a sub-variety of the broader category of "statism/pantouflage" (van Waarden 1992:39 and 41).

We will now turn to the two Spanish cases, Catalunya and Andalucia. However, before continuing, one caveat must be made. This concerns the timing of Spanish decentralization and the resulting difficulties in assessing the two regions' experiences within such a short span of time. As noted by Pérez-Diaz (1990:78), for the time being, "the Spanish example contradicts all simplistic theories about the positive or negative effects of mesogovernments for the governability of a democracy." We shall see that this concerns both the territorial and the functional dimensions of governance. Despite considerable progress made towards both a federalist-like and a corporatist-like project, Spain continues to be absent from most comparative accounts of territorial politics and interest intermediation. It is not ascribed corporatist, pluralist, etatist or other such attributes with the same conviction and rigour as is the case for other European countries.

Regionalization in Spain started just twenty years ago. In 1977, Suárez initiated the "pre-autonomous" phase by recognizing, and acknowledging, a wide-spread desire for self-government in virtually all regions of Spain. National elites understood that the process of democratic transformation had a chance of succeeding only if the sting was taken out of Basque terrorism and nationalist Catalan feelings\(^{107}\). This, it was felt, could only be done by establishing a general system of decentralized government throughout the country.

The Constitutional drafting Commission inserted a far-reaching section on regional autonomy (section VIII), laying the grounds for a *de facto* federal state system and going far beyond similar provisions in the Italian Constitution. While in regions such as Catalunya and the Basque countries the desire for full-scale autonomy could not be questioned, in most other regions local feelings of that kind had been less obvious and even less so was the wish for self-government. This led to a highly differentiated approach to regional autonomy and to the drafting of regional statutes. Article 2 of the Constitution of 29 December 1978 grants autonomy to "nationalities" and "regions" and, ...
hence, differentiates between the historic regions of the Basques, the Catalans and the Galicians on the one hand and other areas that were defined more in functional and/or economic terms. At the same time, "the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation" is not put into question. Article 137 (section 1, subsection 1) now explicitly identifies municipalities, provinces and comunidades autónomas as being the constituent units of the Spanish nation state. It is not necessary for our purposes to describe the entire process by which different types of regions achieved their respective autonomous status. Suffice is to say that Catalunya received its status in accordance with article 148 (section 2) of the Constitution -- a status that was later sanctioned by a popular referendum -- while Andalucia achieved autonomy by following the procedure laid down in article 151.1 of the Constitution. Spanish regionalization resulted in one of the most complex and complicated structures of subnational government in Europe. Although none of the 17 comunidades possess the same rights and competences, it is possible to identify, roughly, four regional models or typologies.

The statutes are neither genuinely regional constitutions (like, for example, the German Landesverfassungen) nor are they central State laws risen up to constitutional rank. They can only be understood as a result of joint agreements between national and subnational legislation and administrative practise. While for those regions that did not follow the rapid or exceptional route to autonomy, one would need to distinguish between, first, exclusive, second, divided, third, equal and, forth, concurrent legislative competences. The four special regions (Basque, Catalunya, Galicia and Andalucia) managed to include all of these competences in their respective statutes. They are quite comprehensive and include, apart from those enumerated in the case of Italy, competences in the areas of work-place legislation, civil law, environmental policies, mass media, education and professional formation, research and technology, and cultural policies.

While in all other European states jurisdiction is a task entrusted exclusively to central authorities, the Spanish comunidades have some competences in the organization of the judicial sector and are responsible for the staffing and the resources of courts. Also, since 1988 (Law no. 38/1988 of 28.12.1988) each comunidad possesses a "superior court". With regard to the regional institutions, the situation is quite similar to Italy. Following article 152 of the Constitution, each comunidad elects a regional assembly (consiglio) with executive functions which, in turn, elects a President. Once elected, the President has to be nominated by the King. In order to understand the empirical material presented later, it should be noted that most regional governments in Spain are called Juntas, while the Catalan government is the Generalitat de Catalunya. Accordingly, the Economics "Ministry" of Andalucia is the Consejería de Economía y Hacienda, while the same division in Catalunya is called the Departament d’Economia i Finances de la Generalitat de Catalunya.

Other important units of subnational government are the provinces, the municipalities and, in some cases the comarcas or mancomunidades (associations of municipalities). The provinces were originally established as the main units of administracion periférica through which the central government hoped to be able to impose its policies more easily. The provinces have a dual role, bringing together several municipal authorities, while at the same time functioning as outposts of central government. The number of provinces (50) is significantly below the number in Italy.

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* This is spelled out in Engel (1990). He gives a comprehensive comparative description of regional statutes, legal competences and degree of autonomy/ flexibility of regional governments in Spain, Italy, France, the UK, and Belgium.
* The other two regions taking this 'rapid route' towards autonomy were the Basque country (País Vasco or Euskadi) and Galicia (see Donaghy and Newton 1987:101).

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108 Andalucia, while not qualifying as a historical nationality, could still claim widespread popular support for full autonomy and was the only other region that was allowed to take an exceptional route.
109 The 1981 agreements on autonomy established that most regions would have no more than ten ministries. Since neither the Constitution nor the autonomy statutes specified which ministries are to be created, the most diverse combinations of functions emerged which, at the national level, appear to be separate.
110 There have been 8022 municipalities in Spain towards the end of the 1980s (Donaghy and Newton 1987:121).
The Catalan government has on several occasions tried to abolish the provinces in accordance with article 42 of the Constitution (Keating 1993:357) and to re-install, in their place, the old traditional unit of comarcas. During Francoism, this latter unit had been mothballed (see Donaghy and Newton 1987:133). At the time of field work in Catalunya, the administrative re-organization of the sub-regional space had not yet been fully consolidated.

We will now look at the interest system in order to identify the present state of differentiation and/or de-differentiation of state-society relations in Spain. Interest associations in Spain are in general said to be rather weak. This is not actually true, at least not for the two regions of our sample. For example, the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional (FTN) in Catalunya and the Confederacion de Empresarios de Andalucia (CEA) are the two most important territorial branches of the country's peak association of industry, the CEOE (Confederacion Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales). CEOE was founded in 1977 as the peak association of a large number (165) of sectoral groupings most of which formed part of the compulsory syndicats of the Franco regime. CEOE claims to have 1.300.000 members and to represent 80 per cent of the labour force in the private sector (Donaghy and Newton 1987:202)\(^\text{113}\). This includes, however, the membership base of CEPYME, the Confederacion Espanola de Pequenas y Medianos Empresas which was integrated into the CEOE in 1980. In terms of political preferences or affiliation, CEOE is equidistant from both the Popular Party and from the Socialists. While the PP traditionally supported the free market line of the association, the PSOE adopted most of CEOE's policies, at least from the late 1980s.

Catalunya is a particularly fertile ground for associability. In a study on Spanish business associations operating offices in Brussels (without having their headquarters in Madrid), Mehlich (1988) calculated that 20 per cent of these have their national headquarters in Barcelona\(^\text{114}\). In general, business interest associations have been major centripetal forces tending towards the integration of the national community (Perez-Diaz 1990:42). The market and industrial development have been important binding forces throughout Spanish territory. Even in Catalunya, many associational leaders "believed that a united market must take precedence over Catalan nationalist sentiments, however sincere these might be" (Sole 1989:118). Historically, even the FTN openly favoured the state-defined vertical organization which was later run by the Francoist Falange -- "a fact well-remembered [by the Catalan nationalists] when associations were re-constituted in the post-Franco period" (ibid:116)\(^\text{115}\).

Kraus notes that the process of Catalan autonomy has not met with particular sympathy among the Fomento (Kraus 1996:244). Since democratization, FTN has consistently underlined its Spanish credo. The organization has been among the most important forces among the founders of the CEOE, with its general secretary, Carles Ferrer Salat, becoming the first president of CEOE. Maintenance of Spanish unity is a sacrosanct principle and some leading members of the association even criticized the re-foundation of the Generalitat on the grounds that this would lead to further increases in public expenditure and to fiscal pressure. Attempts by the Generalitat to create an autonomous framework for industrial relations and an own economic and social policy regime have been met with fierce opposition by the FTN (Kraus 1996:245-46).

A strong orientation towards their national centers has also been the rule for the trade union movement. "The unions as much as, if not more than the employers, have wished to ensure the supremacy of central organizations within the corresponding confederations" (Perez-Diaz 1990:42). Overall, however, trade unions possess a less stable position in Spain's associational landscape. The two most important organizations are divided on political grounds. The UGT (Union General de Trabajadores) was

\(^{113}\) Six years later, Keating (1993:340) reports a figure of 75 per cent.

\(^{114}\) 70 per cent of the 189 national interest groups represented at the level of the EU have their central offices in the capital. Of the remaining 30 per cent, two thirds (38) are Barcelona-based (see Mehlich 1988:59).

\(^{115}\) Accordingly, some FTN leaders have come to occupy leading roles in the national association CEOE (ibid.).
founded in 1888 at the same time as the Socialist Party PSOE and, since then, has continued to have close links with the party. The CCOO (Comisiones Obreras) began as a clandestine and disparate way of workers’ representation, an alternative to the official vertical union organization. They had already grown in strength under the Franco regime when, for a while, they seemed to be tolerated (Donaghy and Newton 1987:181).

In the early years of the transition, the CCOO gained in strength, totaling 34 per cent of the votes in the first works councils’ election in 1978, against 21 per cent for the Socialist UGT (Keating 1993:339). Towards the end of the 1980s, the picture appeared to be reversed. According to Perez-Diaz, this was in large part due to the self-exclusion of the communist workers’ commissions from the practice of macro-level bargaining and pacting: “Those unions which excluded themselves completely from negotiation (...) have either disappeared, or are now in a very precarious situation” (Perez-Diaz 1990:66)\(^\text{114}\). Compared to the high degree of representativity of business associations, the unions are clearly weaker. Towards the mid-1990s, they represented about 17 per cent of the workers in employment (Keating 1993:267).

At the regional level, the only two subnational unions in Spain which have gained sufficient support to qualify for negotiating status have been the Basque ELA-STV and the Galician Intersindical Galega (INTG). In 1982 both unions gained more than the fifteen per cent regionally, to give them a formal place on negotiating bodies under the provisions of the Trade Union Act (Donaghy and Newton 1987:188). In Catalunya, the Solidaritat d’Obrers Catalans (SOC), a former affiliate of the Spanish CCOO, has not yet reached the required quota (Albers 1995:225) and CONC (Comissio Obrera Nacional de Catalunya), the Catalan branch of CCOO, has not broken away from its national organization and seems to have little interest to establish an autonomous union. Although Catalunya is the only Spanish region where the CONC/CCOO has managed to hold the highest share in works council elections (ibid:267), with 17 per cent in 1994 (against 13 per cent of the UGT), the representativity of both CONC and UGT is below the national average.

This relative weakness, together with the increasing problems between the PSOE leadership and the unions towards the late 1980s\(^\text{117}\), have been among the main reasons for the emergence of regional pacts and other forms of meso-concertation in Catalunya. The regional level had become an attractive alternative for achieving concessions from the part of public authorities. A second reason promoting regional negotiation was the fact that the Generalitat, meanwhile, had gained considerable competences in the social policy domain. The volume of issues potentially open to negotiation and beyond the reach of central authorities had grown significantly and supported region-oriented trade union activities (Kraus 1996:247-48). Finally, the unions themselves had widened the scope of their activities from originally sectoral to more encompassing social policy issues (ibid.)\(^\text{118}\). In practical terms, this led to the signing of a bilateral acuerdo between CONC, UGT, and the Generalitat in 1990 which foresaw the introduction of a minimum income (Renda Minima d’Insercio) and was followed by a tripartite pact with FTN in 1993 on a “new industrial model for Catalunya” that was “widely seen as an important step towards a more consensually-oriented policy among the region’s associations” (Albers 1995:274-75). Overall, however, the general political attitudes of both UGT and CONC towards nationalist autonomy remain ambivalent and largely instrumental to their aims as class organizations. As Kraus concludes (Kraus 1996:251), both employers’ associations and trade unions would switch to the regional level only to the extent that national pacts and agreements are becoming increasingly difficult.

Looking simultaneously at the major events both of the territorial and the functional dimension since 1977, it could be argued that Spain is a particularly relevant case of “experimenting with scale” (Schmitter) of authority, interests, and identity. The country

\(^{114}\) The following figures are reported by the author for successive works council elections: in 1980, UGT 29 per cent and CCOO 30 per cent; in 1982, UGT 36 per cent and CCOO 33 per cent; and, finally, in 1986, UGT 40 per cent and CCOO 34 per cent (ibid.).

\(^{117}\) In 1988, the PSOE’s traditional partner UGT openly broke away from the party due to the latter’s liberal economic strategy.

\(^{118}\) According to Jose Maria Fidalgo of the CCOO headquarters in Madrid, the autonomous communities are the most appropriate level for engaging in social policy objectives (see Kraus 1996:249).
can be viewed as a large scale experiment in mesogovernance, both territorially and economically. Not only did the regions achieve formal legal autonomy during the country’s transition from authoritarian rule, economic and social policies also depended on a series of pacts between the state and interest associations. This form of "functional pacting" has continued without significant interruption from 1977 at least until the late 1980s. In Pérez-Díaz words (1990:79), "the constitutional contract, the regional contracts and the social contracts (...) make up a set of pacts that collectively form the basic social and political contract of democratic Spain" (ibid:79). Unfortunately, the author addresses social "pact fever" and the "obsession with [territorial] consensus" (ibid:82) seperately without looking at the extent to which these two trends overlap at the subnational level. For us, it is the functional meso within the territorial one that is of particular importance or, to put it differently, the territorial meso around the functional meso. In the following analysis of Catalunya and Andalucia, we see that both dimensions are strongly interlinked. Rather counter-intuitively, we also see that this link is rather more of a zero-sum type, making the simultaneous strengthening of both mesos an unlikely option -- at least in the short term.

Catalunya is one of Europe’s most entrepreneurial regions with respect to external, outward-looking activities. However, this must be qualified immediately. This external performance, indeed, almost exclusively concerns the region’s contacts with other European regions and EU institutions and not its contacts with other Spanish comunidades or the central government in Madrid. The entrepreneurial image, largely sustained and promoted by the governing Catalan nationalists, has created an impression in public opinion that is not necessarily supported by hard evidence. For example, Held (1992:18) argues, that the "specific Catalan avenue to regional autonomy" is historically finished. He refers to a number of problems which suggest a region that is an unstable and crisis-shaken economic and social space both in the wider European context and even within the national Spanish boundaries. All this would seem to undermine the image of a region where the partial disconnection from the central State in Madrid is viewed almost exclusively in positive terms.

Catalan nationalism and the strong political hegemony of the ruling party also had negative effects on the region’s interest system and on forms of territorial interest intermediation. The regional pacts mentioned above are rather recent exercises and, as we have seen, remain largely instrumental for both the interest groups and regional government. The Generalitat has consistently tried to control and modify the region’s associational landscape. It is not only the "central pivot of internal mobilization" -- a fact that has impeded forms of "virtuous interaction with socio-economic actors" (Morata et.al.1998) -- it has also tried, more or less systematically, making use of both positive and negative (financial) incentives, to shape the region's interest system so as to rule out any resistance to its political hegemony by organized social forces (Tornos Mass 1990). In organizational terms, the strong links between territorial interest associations and their national headquarters are, essentially, links between the associations’ national and their sub-regional, i.e. provincial, branches. It are these latter which have been and still are the traditional epicentres of associational activity at the subnational level and, therefore, the territorial strongholds of the national peak associations both of employers and workers.

110 Starting with the "foundational" Pacto de la Moncloa in 1977 (Schmitter and Grote 1997:9), this was followed by a number of "managerial" pacts such as the Acuerdo Marco Interconfederal (1979), the Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo (1981), the Acuerdo Interconfederal (1983) and, in 1985 and 1986, the Acuerdos Economico y Social (Keating 1993:342). In subsequent years, "these negotiations collapsed completely -- ironically, during the protracted hegemony of the Socialist Party (PSOE) in government" (Schmitter and Grote 1997:9-10). The executive acquired more autonomy in the design of liberalisation which, successively, "provoked after 1989 the complete divorce between PSOE in the government and the socialist union UGT" (Molina 1996:3).
As shown above, the risk of externally enforced societal control by central peak associations in Madrid led, on the part of the Generalitat, to attempts to de-legitimize the provincial level and to excavate and re-activate a traditional administrative unit, the Comarcas. Because infraregional collective agreements achieved at the level of the traditional epicenters were difficult to control, the Generalitat tried to strengthen both the Comarcas and the region as more appropriate layers for trade union and other associational activities. In this way, regional-nationalist politics contributed to a disarticulation of those social forces that would have been able to threaten the Generalitat’s legitimacy in its own territory. An already weak regional trade unionism was thus further deprived of organizational power.

In a sense, similar arguments can be made in respect of business interests. Although it would be an exaggeration to limit this organization’s role to that function, the politically motivated project of a Patronat Catalan Pro Europa must also be understood as a deliberate attempt to create incentives for business interests to re-structure their mode of operation and to broaden their horizons beyond the boundaries of the provinces and, at the same time, beyond the level of the central State. If there was a need to become active outside of regional territory why not opt for Europe rather than for Madrid? The Generalitat has been the (...) main initiator of the creation and strengthening of functionally organized interest associations at the level of the region and the Comarca.

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121 Note, however, that the Comarcas are far from being fully consolidated administrative units. As mentioned by Tomos Mass (1990:249), “the fact that this territorial level would advance to become the focal point for interest associations of all kinds is more likely to reflect the wishful thinking of the Generalitat rather than the real situation”. See also Philippe Schmitter (1995:289) who observes that “regionalism brought little more than symbolic satisfaction to most class, sectoral, and professional interests, since the core issues of economic management and social policy that most affect them tended to remain firmly in the hands of central authorities”.

122 The Patronat is presided by the president of the Comunitat Autonoma, Jordi Pujol, and was set up by the Generalitat in 1982 with a view to assume tasks in the areas of documentation, communication and consultancy which were expected to arise as a consequence of Spain’s accession to the European Community. Its board of directors assembles members such as Gaston Thorn, an ex-president of the EU, university professors and representatives of the regional branch of the Spanish business association CEOE. Meanwhile, the organization is also performing para-state functions, for example, in the area of monitoring the transfer of EU directives into Catalan law. Four years after its creation in 1982, the regional authorities set up a representational office of the Patronat in Brussels - a kind of functional equivalent to the German ‘Vertretungsburos’ most of which already existed at that time.

123 In a situation where Catalonia continues to depend on the national Spanish market and, of course, on national funds redistributed to the regions, this may easily lead to territorial “encapsulation”. In any case, it is the kind of regional nationalism which Grabher has given the attribute of “iconographic self-description” (1994), something that in extreme cases could lead to “folkloristic autsim” and “neo-tribalism”, i.e. to an uncoupling from existing environments “at the expense of diminished adaptability” (ibid:15) and hence in atrophy.
To some extent, the above patterns are reflected in the literature on policy networks. Although the remarks that follow in most cases address the specific issue of the European Structural Funds and the role of public and private actors in the management of the Funds, they are of relevance also for the patterning of relations in the domain of regional development in general. For example, Morata (1998) describes the Catalan policy (domain) network in terms of a politically overdetermined and strongly personalized configuration essentially grouped around the region’s two leading figures, the President of the Comunidad, Jordi Pujol, and the Mayor of Barcelona, Maragall. The network is also characterized by a vertical structure and by the absence of public-private development coalitions of all sorts. Morata and Munoz (1996:211-12) identify the complete absence and lack of participation of economic and social target groups in structural fund-initiated projects. Finally, Held and Sanchez Velasco’s (1996) diagnosis of the Comunidad Valenciana demonstrates that the “exclusion of societal groups” (ibid.:262) and the open “disregard of the principle of partnership” (ibid.:265) is indicative of the general structure of interest intermediation in the bulk of Spanish regions. The authors conclude that “socio-economic organizations [are] totally marginalized” in the policy process and that “Spanish policy-making in the area of EU structural funds [would] embody only weak network-like elements” (ibid.:272).

It is this absence of de-differentiation of state-society relations that we sought to illustrate by pointing to the interrelationship of the functional and the territorial meso. The example of Catalunya shows that the way in which this linkage is organized may actually run counter to widely popularized visions of partnership and subsidiarity. Functional and territorial subsidiarity do not have to go hand in hand. In a number of cases, the move towards territorial decentralization may actually run counter to an empowerment of society and its secondary associations with the type of public tasks and (semi-) public status having so forcefully been proved in much of the neo-corporatist literature. In other words, establishing a strong regional meso, may take away the raison d’etre of associative forms of governance, at least initially, when more traditional forms of governance have not yet been fully consolidated. It may take the holders of public offices in newly created state agencies some time to recognize that achieving modern forms of governance may require more than the incidental top-down consultation of societal interests or staffing of the management boards of para-state agencies with business representatives. In exceptional situations such as the Spanish one, where decentralization went hand in hand with the transition to democracy, public interests seem to have gained precedence over private ones, especially when backed by strong feelings of regional-nationalist identity.

Victor Perez-Diaz has made a similar argument with regard to Spanish meso-governments in general. The further growth of regional administration and of increases in these bodies’ decision making authority could lead to a partial dissociation of state agencies from their societal environment. According to him, decentralization in Spain has led to “a great widening of activities, powers and resources given to the political system as a whole, and taken normally from the social sphere” (Perez-Diaz 1990:44). This problem has only just begun. Further progress towards a consolidation of regional governments will increasingly interfere with “private activities, watching over and guiding them, and of extracting even more resources from society”. Pérez-Díaz speaks of “takeover attempts” by regional politicians and bureaucrats and of a “double strategy of widening public space at the expense of civil society, and of using it for party-political ends”. This may ultimately promote “the alienation of civil society with regard to the political system” (ibid:46-47). All this must be seen in a context, where civil society has traditionally been rather weak, and where policy making has always been seen “almost exclusively in terms of the state, which is given an exalted role in Spanish political culture” (Keating 1993:341). Accordingly, for Keating, the success of the Spanish transition to democracy in creating the institutions of a civil society are rather limited (ibid:342).

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124 “The state’s role has been enhanced by the weakness of civil society, of private institutions and groups” (ibid.).
Most of what we have argued so far has been concerned with the case of Catalunya, although, it would eventually apply also to other special statute regions such as the Basque countries and Galicia. But what about Andalucia? Do we find the same kind of state domination in the country’s "Mezzogiorno" (Held und Sanchez Velasco 1996:253)? Is this region’s interest system the target of the same kind of attempts at institutional design as we saw in the case in Catalunya? There are, indeed, incidents for a similar kind of political over-determination in Andalucia as well. Yet, contrary to the first case, state-dominination is not driven by regional-nationalism but, rather, by party-political motives and strategies, namely on the part of the region’s politically omnipotent party, the PSOE.

Information on state-society relations is rather scarce for the case of Andalucia. One of the most important aspects distinguishing the two regions relates to the degree of dependence on the center, both in terms of general policy making and of interest politics. Andalucia is “the cradle of Spanish socialism” (Linz 1981:699). Politically, the majorities in the Andalucian regional assembly always reflected the situation in Madrid up to and throughout the period of investigation. Most of the organizational and electoral support for the governing socialist party of Felipe Gonzalez has historically come from that region. Gonzales, as well as many other prominent leaders of the PSOE (for example, Alfonso Guerra), is himself of Andalucian origin. In purely demographic terms, the political importance of the region is significant. 18 per cent of the Spanish population lives they belong to the lowest income groups of the country. For many local politicians, regional autonomy was just a means of advancing their political careers; it was domination is not driven by regional-nationalism but, rather, by party-political motives and strategies, namely on the part of the region's politically omnipotent party, the PSOE.

With regard to the region’s public institutions, it could be argued that what Andalucia lacks, in terms of territorial identity, nationalist myths and a sense of mission, is in no way paralleled by the region’s endowment with administrative, personal and financial resources. The various divisions of regional government "employ a total of 176,413 officials - a figure being unimaginable in Great Britain, France or Italy" (Held and Sanchez Velasco 1996:253). To this we could add a further 40,000 officials of central administrative services employed in the "deconcentrated" field offices of central government. The latter, indeed, operates "a whole range of administrative units (...) which represent a parallel structure to those of the regional bureaucracy" (ibid:255). In extreme cases, this may lead to a substitution of democratically legitimized territorial governments by national state agencies and, hence, "to a subordination under centralist rule" (ibid:259). Contrary to Catalunya where the provinces, as the main manifestations of central government control, have been under threat, Andalucia is (...) plus localiste et provinciale que regionale“ (Genieys 1996:6). In a situation which, in political terms, reflects the governing majority at the center, there is hardly any incentive to question the legitimacy of representatives of the center’s traditional outposts, at least as long as these are fellows of one’s own political party. Indeed, as mentioned by Genieys, "les députés socialistes andalouse insistent pour la plupart sur la légitimité des institutions étatiques“ (ibid:19). Political hegemony by one party, together with the specific variant of Andalucian neo-localism may contribute and support the "naissance de nouvelles formes de rapport clientele” (ibid:8).

126 While “in Catalunya the desire for autonomy cannot be questioned (...) in the rest of the regions, local feelings may have been obvious, but the will for self-government was much less so” (Perez-Diaz 1990:37).
127 If this were true, then the share of Andalucia in the total of officials employed in the 17 Spanish comunidades autonomas would figure at about 31 per cent. Keating reports an overall figure of 565,460 civil servants employed by the autonomous communities (1993:357).
128 Similar to the manifestations of neo-localism in Italy (Trigilia 1981), provincial authorities and interest groups at that level maintain strong connections to institutions and organizations in Madrid (Genieys 1996:6). It is at these provincial levels, and not at the level of the region, that distributional conflicts emerge and are solved.
Given the relative importance of the provincial level, therefore, we should expect subregional authorities to play a much more decisive role in the regional ecology of Andalucia than has been the case in the other Spanish region. The same would be likely to apply to interest representation traditionally organized at that same level. We might expect a high number of both subregional authorities and subregional interest associations to occupy relevant positions in this network, while, in the Catalan case, these would be replaced by the respective regional counterparts. Accordingly, as forms of ethnic and cultural regionalism are much less pronounced, and with deconcentrated state agencies continuing to play important roles, we would also expect divisions of the Andalucian Junta to be less prominently placed in the ecology than those of the Generalitat in Catalunya. Taking account of the strong hegemony of the PSOE, another reasonable expectation would be that the socialist trade union, UGT, would be placed amongst the most relevant actors of the network. This expectation would be further supported by the evidence we had gathered for the Sicily case-study. Rather counter-intuitively at first sight, we had argued that representatives of the labour movement may be better placed in networks of de-industrialized or under-developed regions than in the high-tech growth poles of the North. We had expected this to be the case at least in the wider area of regional development policies, due to the fact of the high costs of unemployment for the entire population of the territory -- a public "bad" par excellence - - which would draw trade unions into the overall management of territorial politics almost by default. It is not their strength in industry but, rather, their relevance in the management of social policy measures, re-training programmes and schemes for the unemployed which may account for the prominence of trade unions in the regional ecologies of the Mediterranean south. At the same time, and this again was suggested by our description of the Sicilian network, such a position would not necessarily imply more power in influencing regional policies in general. We need to consider, therefore, the more general issue of state-society relations in Andalucia.

In the absence of alternative material, this shall be done by examining a recent description of the effects of Socialist government on civil society in Spain. The (left-wing) critique of the PSOE advanced by Petras may go too far in some respects. However, given that Andalucia is a carbon-copy of the national political arena and that the national socialist majority has to a certain extent been anchored in the political subculture of Andalucia, his critique is, nevertheless, quite instructive. In Petras' view, the PSOE is a party which had promoted "an ideology promising to extend the power of civil society against the state and that in power witnessed the extension of state power over civil society" (Petras 1993:95). Socialist government is described by the author as a regime held together by a couple of Socialist families and by nepotism (ibid:96-97), based on strongholds in state bureaucracy (ibid:100), and assisted by both private groups which are "state-manipulated organizations of civil society" (ibid:101) and by "an army of ex-leftist intellectuals [having] provided the ideological mystification of this process of social regression" (ibid:104). It is a "socialism for the rich [and] a socialism of ideological mystification, of private accumulation, and state clientelism" (ibid:105) that has led to a subordination of "the organizations of civil society to the state apparatus" (ibid:106) and to a general "decline of civil society" (ibid:107).

If what Petras claims is only partly true of more than a decade of PSOE government in Spain, then Andalucia, more than any other Spanish region, has endured the politicization of civil society by an overwhelming political majority\textsuperscript{128}. While representing the same kind of party-political hegemony, Jordi Pujol's Convergència i Unió (Coalition for Unity and Democracy) is a party which had promoted "an ideology promising to extend the power of civil society against the state, and that in power witnessed the extension of state power over civil society" (Petras 1993:95). The fact that state power is essentially the power of a political party, is confirmed by José María Maravall, an ex-member of the national executive of the PSOE. Maravall speaks of an extraordinarily weak relationship between the party and civil society. In a letter (8 July 1987) written to the party's president, Felipe Gonzales, he warns of increasing clientelism and ideological weakness within the party, some sectors of which are described in terms of "too much mafia" and "too little principles" (Maravall 1997:347).

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\[129\] Blakeley (1997:1) has made the interesting observation that an elite focus (election studies, etc.) in the study of transition may be inappropriate and that, as soon as state-society relations are being considered more seriously, the picture may dramatically change. In a pure elite perspective, the country’s civil society was “overpoliticized” in the 1930s, which ultimately led to the breakdown of democracy, while it became “depoliticized” in the course of the 1970s. What we have argued, would
Tentative hypotheses

*Unió (CiU)* in Catalunya rules less by leaning on clientelist and nepotist relations with the center but, rather, by a combination of assertive nationalism and centre-right Christian Democratic politics. In the short term, the effects on societal governance may be similar\(^\text{130}\). In the long run, however, the re-creation of a fully-fledged Catalan interest system may help to establish a more balanced situation to be used as an asset by Catalan nationalists in their strategies of territorial competition both within and beyond the borderlines of the Spanish state.

What does all this imply in terms of assigning the two regions to specific policy (domain) network typologies? A more or less well-established autonomy of the state versus civil society can be taken for granted in both cases. However, in Catalunya, this autonomy is further supported by a strong action capacity of the *Generalitat* and by an extremely well-developed capacity for policy and administrative coordination. The administrative machine, strengthened by its orientation towards the consolidation of nationalism, is rather compact and is kept together and controlled by a numerically small network of leading political figures. Given that this region’s interest system, although relatively strong and compact by Spanish standards, has been the target of manifold interferences on the part of public authorities, the most reasonable option would be to classify this case as being of the state-dominated variety. The most central positions in the Catalan network are likely to be occupied by departments of the *Generalitat.* However, it is more difficult to judge the precise placement of private sector actors and associations. In any case, the network, determined by strong political guidance, is very homogeneous, the density of interorganizational relations is low, and hierarchical patterning very pronounced.

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suggest that Spain’s civil society became at least re-politicized throughout the 1980s, with consequences not necessarily beneficial to societal governance as a whole.

\(^{130}\) Although civic culture and associationalism in Catalunya are generally regarded to be more developed than in other regions of the country, “the self-organizing feature in the Catalan system has been and still is quite poor” even in areas such as industrial innovation and technology policies (Borràs-Alomar 1993:23).

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In Andalucia, the picture would clearly be different, despite the similar, though differently rooted, dominance of state agencies. Due to the over-staffing of regional administration, the less-developed propensity for self-government, and the enduring and strong presence of “deconcentrated” state agencies, the coordinating capacity of the *Junta de Andalucia* is likely to be weak. The *Consejerías,* much more than their Catalan counterparts, are rather dependent on both the “deconcentrated” agencies and on societal interests, particularly the trade unions, whereby these latter, not least because they kept strong ties with their national headquarters, are also much more effective than their Catalan companions. The more important network positions, therefore, are probably occupied by a relatively high number of organizations representing a rather heterogeneous actor set (*Consejerías de la Junta, provincies and municipalities*). These are, eventually, joined by representatives of the trade unions. Whether the political -- not the organizational -- strength of the *UGT* and of other “quiescent” unions is sufficiently developed to make this a case of regional corporatism, must be left undetermined. As everywhere in Spain, the associational landscape is essentially fragmented. This would tend to support bilateral, or particularized, contacts between individual groups and the administration and suggest a pattern typical of pressure pluralism. High territorial and organizational fragmentation, on the other hand, is likely to result in attempts to offset this disadvantage by making recourse to a high number of contacts among actors both vertically (*Junta, provincies, municipalities*) and horizontally. In other words, the network is highly heterogeneous, with low hierarchy and relatively high density.

**Wales**

The United Kingdom is quite distinct from all the other cases considered here. It is a unitarian state, i.e. it is neither federally organized nor in any way decentralized. Sharpe notes that, apart from Germany, there is a clear north-south divide in Europe in terms of how central authorities have faced the problem of territorial politics. In the north, most countries did not turn to decentralization in the form of a creation of a completely new
level of government, but rather concentrated on reforming and modernizing their systems of local government. In contrast, in the south, “where the resistance of the local government system to modernization was compounded by other factors peculiar to the napoleonic, or fused-hierarchy, mode of central-local relations (France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal), the region became an attractive option” (Sharpe 1993:9). While Italy, for example, could be characterized in terms of the existence of “regions without regionalism”, the United Kingdom could be ascribed a “regionalism without regions” (Engel 1993:24).

The UK is subdivided in four larger units (Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and England), two of which are home to strong regionalist movements (Scotland and Wales) which have as one of their objectives the creation of an autonomous state\(^\text{111}\). In fact, the literature usually speaks of Welsh nationalism and not of regionalism in the narrow sense (Adamson 1991, Morgan 1981, Osmond 1985). Wales is not an autonomous territorial unit but is “governed”, at least since 1964, by the Welsh Office (WO) - a regionalized ministry of the central State\(^\text{112}\). It is questionable to what extent the terms of “administrative devolution” (Norton 1984) or of “devolution” (Bogdanor 1979, Johnson 1990) are actually adequate to characterize the configuration of territorially deconcentrated national state agencies. The term “territorial manager” (Kellas 1991) would seem to be more appropriate for officials/members of the Welsh Office.

The current pattern of territorial politics in the UK is deeply rooted in the long tradition of local government. The system created by the Local Government Act of 1888 in the early 1960s. Between 1963 and 1973, territorial management underwent a number of legal reforms, the most important of which was the Local Government Act of 1972. It came into force on 1 April 1974 creating a total of 53 territorial units for both

\(^{111}\) Demands for the creation of a Welsh national state are today regarded as being rather out of step with popular preferences. See, for example, the lack of support in the 1979 referendum for the creation of a Welsh national assembly and, more twenty years later (1997), the rather unspectacular victory in favour of such an assembly.

\(^{112}\) The creation of the WO, under Harold Wilson’s Labour government in 1964, to some extent implied the recognition of some, albeit limited cultural differences and particular needs (Loughlin und Matthias 1996:2).

...
possess some autonomy in agriculture, education and professional training, economic planning, regional development, health, tourism, commerce, environment and road construction. The Welsh Office has less autonomy than either the Scottish or the Northern Ireland Office with regard to these functions.

We have not been able to collect more detailed information on territorial interest intermediation in Wales. While the British Trade Union Congress (TUC), despite sharp membership losses throughout the 1980s, is still a powerful organization at the national level\textsuperscript{134}, Albers emphasizes the "weak endowment of the Welsh branch of the TUC with staff and financial resources" (Albers 1994:268). Our sample also includes UNISON, another Welsh trade union which was reported to be quite relevant in our preliminary interviews. However, we lack any information concerning UNISON's collective action capacity and the incorporation of the two unions in local development networks. Describing the British situation in general, Steve Martin (1996:228) has argued that, "to date the involvement of key players such as trade unions in local economic and industrial strategies has been minimal." The same also applies to the local branch of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). Case study material on Welsh economic strategies and development networks hardly ever refers to the relevance of private interest associations. If it is true that the "weakness of the [Welsh] private sector (...) does in no way represent an alternative to the existing power configuration" (Garmise, Morgan and Rees 1995:32), then we should expect interest groups to occupy rather marginal positions in this region's political ecology. In a situation where employer associations have lost their role even in the area that concerns them most, i.e. industrial

relations\textsuperscript{138}, it can be taken for granted that they are even less significant actors in the area of territorial development.

The organizations consistently mentioned as the most relevant and powerful organizations in Wales are the WO, the Welsh Development Agency (WDA), and the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs). The County Councils do not seem to be particularly prominent actors. With an annual budget of 170 million pounds sterling and a staff of around 300 officers, the WDA "belongs to the group of most experienced regional development agencies in Europe" (Garmise, Morgan and Rees 1995:15).

The seven Welsh TECs are relatively new. At the national level, there are 82 of them. Replacing the Manpower Services Commission (MSC)\textsuperscript{139}, they were set up by government in 1991 in an attempt to overcome the negative results of short-termism and under-supply of collective goods in vocational training that had been accumulating throughout the 1980s. The Welsh TECs, albeit almost financially autonomous, continue to be coordinated and co-financed by the Training, Education and Enterprise Department (TEED) which was itself founded by the WO in 1992. They are public-private joint-ventures with enterprise status and a board of directors drawn from among local key figures. Two thirds of its members are individual representatives of industry and the rest is supplied by the educational sector, local governments, trade unions, and social voluntary organizations (Cooke, Davies, Kilper, Morris, Plake and Wood 1995:14). According to Crouch et.al. (1998:168), local authority, trade union and business association participation is a relatively recent phenomenon, as the TECs were originally "consistent with [central governments] aversion to local government involvement" and,  

\textsuperscript{134} Figures about the TUC's membership base are slightly contradictory. According to Guy Peters, the organization counted about 11.5 million members in 1992 (Peters 1993), i.e. 45 per cent of the total labour force. Wilson (1990:64) mentions that the TUC experienced a decline in membership from a peak of over 12 million in 1979 to 9 million in 1987, i.e. a loss from 51 per cent to 37 per cent of the total labour force.

\textsuperscript{138} Colin Crouch, David Finegold and Mari Sako (1998:144) put it in the following way: "Any significant level of industrial relations activity above the level of the company having become minimal, employers' associations have lost much of their raison d'être -- certainly nearly all their authority in the business community -- and in some cases they have disappeared altogether."

\textsuperscript{139} Prior to the TECs, the only institution managing vocational training in the UK was the MSC, "a piece of surviving neo-corporatism, including the participation of trade unions". The MSC spent money "on interfering with the free market and managerial autonomy" and was "in many respects out of kilter with the neo-liberal orthodoxy that has dominated British policy in all areas since 1979" (Crouch, Finegold and Sako 1998:143-44).
of course, to trade union and business association involvement\textsuperscript{137}. The authors call this a "charismatic hero model of policy imitation" (ibid.). Cooke et al. (1995:20) have argued that if they were to succeed in building up regional infrastructures proper, "the TECs could in principal assume the guidance in coordinating national and local development initiatives." Garmise (1995:22), however, identifies a number of serious obstacles to the assumption of such a role. The relations between the TECs and the WDA would become highly competitive, and their functions would overlap in a number of areas\textsuperscript{138}.

What, then, about state-society relations in Wales and the general configuration of this region's policy domain network? As in most of the other regional cases considered previously, there are various and partly contradictory positions here. They boil down to essentially two alternative views, one pointing to a generally high propensity for network-building among the United Kingdom's subnational organizations, and the other strongly opposing such a picture at least in the case of Wales. As in his account of territorial networks in the German Länder, Anderson is the most important representative of the minority view with regard to the UK. His analysis is not directly concerned with Wales. However, his study of the North-East and the West-Midlands enables him to develop a number of generalizations about the configuration of territorial networks typical of the British case. According to Anderson (1988, 1990a, 1990b), British network structures follow a standard pattern. First, "they possess the attributes of a formal organization," secondly, "they are region-wide in scope, integrating various individual and institutional interests throughout the region" and, finally, "they are non-public, bringing together a mix of public and private local and regional actors under a single umbrella of voluntary association" (Anderson 1988:234). Unlike Germany where policy

\textsuperscript{137} TECs are local, but with no necessary relationship to local government" (Crouch, Finegold and Sako 1998:166); "representatives of business associations quite explicitly have no role" (ibid:168).

\textsuperscript{138} In a more general account of local economic development in Britain, Steve Martin demonstrates that competition also characterizes the contacts between County Councils and TECs which more and more resort to "go it alone" strategies. The relationships between County Councils, District Councils and TECs is often "fractured" and "locked in an increasingly hostile battle for survival." For example, "in 1994, Nottinghamshire County Council and TEC sponsored a separate Brussels Office from that
problems associated with the lack of a regional tier of government” (ibid:223). These strategies may in part result from the hostile attitude of the Tory government towards the autonomy of subnational government. Despite this attitude, according to Martin, local authorities continue to play a key role in promoting local economic strategies not least because they are the only agencies with a local democratic mandate and the professional and managerial expertise required to formulate and implement economic regeneration strategies (ibid:225).

Of course, there are also constraints on any further consolidation of local government activity in economic matters. Apart from the lack of resources, these particularly concern the ability of local political entrepreneurs to embrace new roles based on enabling rather than providing economic development. They are advised to "stand back from short-term measures, such as provision of social and economic 'safety nets', [and] to develop a longer-term, more integrated, holistic approach" (ibid:228). Although concerned with a completely different institutional and political situation, Martin, in his conclusions, suggests an image of the British political ecology that is almost identical to the image we painted for the French case. As in Balme and Jouvé's (1996) hypothesis, there are clear signs of a "retour de l'Etat" and "few signs (...) of the emergence of Mark's (1993) 'multilevel governance' whereby continuous negotiations occur among 'nested government at several territorial tiers'" (Martin 1996:228).

This is, exactly, what is suggested by case studies of local economic development in Wales and represents the alternative view mentioned previously. While Anderson's work consistently underlines the absence of hierarchy in British territorial networks, a closer look at Wales reveals a situation actually conforming much more to this author's description of the German case: a very pronounced vertical organization and orientation towards a single player sitting on top of the region's hierarchical political ecology. That this latter is the Welsh Office, despite "this agency’s less significant role in comparison to both the Northern Ireland and Scottish Offices" (Engel 1993: 78-79)\(^{140}\), is confirmed by virtually the entire body of literature on the subject. A recent study (Bache, George and Rhodes 1996:306) argues that the WO is following a hard confrontation strategy vis-à-vis all other actors in so-called 'partnership' arrangements and quotes a Welsh district council official to have said that "the relationship between the Welsh Office and the other partners is like the relationship between a brick wall and anyone who throws their head at it" (ibid:305)\(^{141}\).

According to Garmise (1995:20), this hostile attitude towards societal and local interests is a relatively recent development. Prior to the nomination of the then Secretary of State, John Redwood, all other conservative ministers had sought to establish an acceptable working relationship with representatives of the dominating Labour culture in Wales. Contrary to that mutually acceptable situation, the main interest of Redwood has been to draw a rigid line of division between the state and the market and to reduce all forms of state interventionism. Considering that, like in the US, "[territorial] planning is synonymous with socialism" (van Waarden 1995:341), it does not come as a surprise that a neoliberal hardliner would resort to such more drastic measures. We should expect this to be reflected somehow in the positioning of the WO in our empirical analysis of the Welsh political ecology.

Clearly contradicting the results of Anderson’s analysis of territorial network structures in Britain, Burton and Randall Smith (1996:152) speak of a generalized „absence of policy networks in everything regarding structural funding by the EU”\(^{142}\).

\(^{140}\) Wyn Grant (1989-96) underlines that „Wales came under the jurisdiction of the Westminster Parliament in 1536, and, despite the survival of the Welsh language, is more effectively integrated into a London-based system of administration than either Scotland or Northern Ireland.”

\(^{141}\) In a similar vein, Christiansen (1994:12) who identifies the crucial question to be "(...) one of hierarchy: does the organization respond primarily to the interests formulated at the state or at the regional level? In the case of the Welsh Office, the answer is clear: while some local input through consultative policy-making is possible, the ultimate authority lies with autonomous state elites in London.”

\(^{142}\) As was demonstrated in the section on France, there is a relationship between networks built around the EU's structural fund interventions and networks in the general area (or policy domain) of regional development policies. Since networks of the first kind, essentially, are an expression of networks of...
This is a curious position which we had already encountered in accounts of, for example, the Spanish cases. It is understandable only in as far as resulting from a misconception of policy networks typical of the functionalist tradition where they are perceived as ‘action-sets’, or quasi-organizations, with easy options for entry, exit, enlargement and so forth. More appropriate, therefore, would seem another description of the Welsh case according to which „economic development and business service networks in Wales” do exist, but are likely to be „characterized by vertical structures, strong ties, and a scarcity of formal, wide-reaching (...) partnerships” (Garmise, Morgan and Rees 1995:32). Following this description, the policy domain ‘regional development’ would appear to be structured quite similar to the German one -- at least in terms of the account given by Anderson. Indeed, as argued by Garmise et.al. (ibid:38-39), „the presence of regional institutions in Wales presents us with an uncomfortable paradox. Although it clearly has the potential to better promote development, particularly at the subregional level, the hierarchical networks which the Welsh Office has fostered in its orbit may have, instead, disempowered local actors from building effective networks both within and across counties.” The most decisive element distinguishing Wales from the cases of Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachsen, then, would be represented by „the great irony (...) that the Welsh Office truly does not have the staff or other organizational resources to sufficiently fulfil many of its allotted functions” (ibid).

An attribution of this case to one of the cells of Table 3.1, hence, is no easy task. Thorough and uncontroversial knowledge is available only for the region’s interest system. Despite the British interest system occupying an average position in terms of power and exhibiting relatively low degrees of fragmentation and differentiation in Wessels’ large-scale international comparison (Wessels 1996), the picture at the subnational level is clearly different and most authors, in their accounts of territorial networks and regional development policies, do not even consider worthwhile a special mention of interest associations in Wales. This would put the region in the bottom row of the Table 3.1.

More difficult is Wales’ placement in the horizontal dimension where more reliable information would be required on the relative autonomy of the state, as well as more detailed knowledge about the coordinating capacity of government and different government divisions. As we have seen, controversies are particularly evident with respect to the point of intersection of the two dimensions, i.e. with respect to a description of state-society relations in Britain. Katzenstein (1977:210), for example, has claimed the public sector in that country to be extremely autonomous. „The clear differentiation between State and society is the (...) feature characteristic of Britain’s policy networks (...) Throughout Britain’s system of interest group representation, a ‘single-minded attention is paid to the maintenance of jurisdictional boundaries’ between state and society”. Supposed, this were the case in Wales as well, close-to-zero connections and communication contacts between public and private organizations should be expected. The political ecology of the region would assume a dualistic feature with a public sub-network made up of WO and WDA-related organizations and, eventually, some County Councils, and a purely private one on the other. Due to resource constraints and lacking political clout, the latter would likely be rather marginalized, with interest associations and other private actors occupying positions in the periphery of the organizational space.

Katzenstein’s definition, however, would not only put into question Anderson’s results a proposito the network propensity of subnational actors, it would also run counter to more recent findings about different (national) policy styles such as the one presented, for example, by Frans van Waarden (1995).

With respect to the British part of his comparison, and diametrically opposed to Katzenstein, van Waarden maintains that the representatives of the judicial state power are recruited and still tied to civil society and that the same holds for the representatives of the executive state power, the civil servants. This would indicate “(...) the weak
Tentative hypotheses

differentiation of the British state out of its civil society” (ibid:357) and that the state “is still closely tied to that society” (ibid:348). Although relations to interest groups would be highly selective and thus lead to relatively closed network boundaries (ibid:344), British authorities and their civil servants are believed to be flexible in rule formulation and application, open to negotiations with business over the observation of rules (ibid:341), pragmatic, cooperative and consensual, and largely inclined to follow persuasion rather than coercive strategies (ibid:343). The main principle of allocation and coordination remains the market, and British authorities at best provide a legal framework for associationalism, without at the same time drawing too rigid borderlines between the public and the private. This, then, would again corroborate Anderson’s hypothesis of relatively well-developed territorial networks in that country.

A more serious problem is linked to the ‘coordinating capacity’ of public agencies in Wales. Would we take, as suggested by Engel (1993), the Counties to be the functional equivalents of regional government, then coordinating capacity would be low and the region could immediately be grouped under ‘pressure pluralism’. Alternatively, would we follow Garmise (1995) and take the democratically unlegitimated Welsh Office to represent a regional institution proper, then we would clearly have to do with a ‘state dominated’ typology with little interference by societal actors. For the time being, it is hardly a possibility to solve the puzzle. The Welsh case is therefore left indeterminate until we are in a position to draw first conclusions at least from a preliminary inspection of the empirical results. What can be said with some certainty is that Wales’ organizational ecology is likely to oscillate somewhere between a County-driven structure with rather strong involvement by relevant interest associations and a WO-dominated pattern hardly leaving any space for societal inputs. Given this indeterminacy, it is impossible to make reasonable judgements a propos van Waarden’s claims about the relational attributes of policy networks in Britain. We shall come back to them in Chapter Five.

143 Summarizing the British policy style, van Waarden argues that “(...) British liberalism, reactivism, pragmatism, consensualism and informalism are related to the common law tradition, the absence of judicial review, weak separation of the state functions, concentration of political sovereignty in parliament, a first-past-the-post voting system, relatively strong parties, strong majority party governments, high internal and low external mobility within the administration (...), the preference for generalists in the civil service, a self-image of civil servants as interest intermediators, a ban on political activity of civil servants, relatively great public trust in the administration, a tradition of secrecy, extensive discretionary authority for civil servants, and a relatively well, albeit somewhat informally organized civil society.”

144 According to Garmise (1995:20), “the presence of powerful regional institutions (WO, WDA) provide considerable institutional capacity for economic governance.”

145 In terms of van Waarden’s typologies, Britain -- just as France -- would be a specific variant of statism/pantouflage (van Waarden 1992:39 and 41). The characteristics of this type of network had already been listed in the section on France (limited number, low density, strictly closed boundaries, low multiplexity, no symmetry, high centralization, etc.)
4

Approaching the empirical targets: an analysis of the overall configurations

In the previous chapter, on the basis of partly convergent and partly divergent descriptions of state-society relations in different subnational settings, each of the nine regional cases was classified according to the modified contingency table originally presented by Atkinson and Coleman. This turned out to present a number of problems, in particular, in those cases in which no first class case study material could be identified (Andalucia, Niedersachsen) or where supposedly existing organizational configurations did not fit the crude and dichotomous divisions suggested by the table.

Nevertheless, having been ascribed different political attributes (pluralism, corporatism, etatism, etc.), these qualitative descriptors themselves have been translated into relational or structural hypotheses about the organizational ecologies of each region. In doing this, I followed the suggestions given by Atkinson and Coleman, but also included parts of van Waarden’s classification of policy networks as well as the limited and partly contradictory evidence emerging from individual case studies and from the analytically more encompassing literature on state-society relations at the national level.

The task of the present chapter will be to put these theoretically informed structural hypotheses to an empirical test. The purpose of this test is to check the extent to which the empirical networks’ overall configurations actually match the expectations drawn from the qualitative literature. For those cases that were left indeterminate in the preceding chapter, the empirical results will either verify one or the other of the alternative interpretations presented or, alternatively, will lead to completely different and largely unexpected results. For example, are the German Länder prime examples of networked socio-political systems with flat hierarchies and with ecologies reflecting the prevalence of problem-solving rather than bargaining strategies, or are they organized in a typically etatist fashion with civil society relatively far removed from the organizational power centre of the network? Alternatively, would the emergence of a completely different and, possibly, intermediate configuration not equally be conceivable - a configuration whose existence would hardly be possible to identify with the help of traditional research methods?

Again, to employ the military metaphor referred to in the beginning, this chapter is an attack with heavy artillery. The position of the guns had to be carefully chosen and the same care needed to be taken with respect to the adjustment of the gun barrels. Only in this way, was it possible to avoid outcomes that resembled a scenario of burned earth. As might be suspected, these allusive remarks are related to, first, the research design and the interview strategy chosen and, secondly, to the empirical measures employed for the overall analysis of the cases. Burned earth, then, alludes to possible interpretative disasters that cannot be ruled out, particularly in areas where network analytic methods have never been used before. Contrary to research on national policy domains where the present state of art has reached a critical mass such that even comparisons across different and largely unrelated studies are in principal conceivable1, and may thus guide the interpretation of new results, this is not the case for the type of data presented here.

1 Without wishing to provide a complete listing of applied network-analytic work, the following references to some of the most recent publications may suffice. Schneider (1988) has carried out research on chemical control networks in a national and a European perspective. This was followed by further research carried out by the same author and, in part, applying the same methodology, on large technical systems, on telecommunications and other policy domains. Almost simultaneously with Schneider’s first study, a comprehensive research project on the policy domains “health” and “energy” in the US first established the organizational state perspective (Laumann and Knoke 1986). This was taken up later and applied to the study of the policy domain “work” across three advanced capitalist societies (Knöke, Pappi, Broadbent, Tsujinaka 1996). Jansen (1995) has investigated superconductivity research in Great Britain, Scarni (1994, 1995, 1996) has employed network analytic tools for the study of GATT negotiations, and Lazega (1992) has studied professional networks of business lawyers. In Italy, Grote has tried to capture the structural specificities of a number of territorial networks (Grote 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997), Diani (1995) has submitted an environmental policy community in the province of Milan to network-analytic investigation, and Lippaerini and Lomu (1996) have studied inter-firm networks in a biomedical district around Modena in Emilia-Romagna. Although representing completely different cases, comparison across most of these
It should be mentioned that the calculations undertaken in this study are based only on a limited number of possible indicators, leaving untouched dozens of alternative procedures for elaborating the data. One of the results of these preliminary procedures was the recognition that network-analytic tools, probably because of the strength they are expected to possess in areas where they have never previously been employed and, consequently, because of the exaggerated intrinsic values and promises they embody, may easily lead to temptations, on the part of the researcher, to invest time and energy in the most heroic types of elaborations which, in the end, turn out to be extremely difficult to interpret. After much fatigue and frustration, a decision was taken, therefore, with respect to the overall analysis, to concentrate on only some of the most basic procedures and empirical measures (density, centralization, reciprocity, multiplexity) representing the minimum ingredients of network analysis. More complex and elaborate procedures are then presented and discussed in subsequent chapters.

However, positioning and fine-tuning/adjustment of the analytic armament are not sufficient. I shall go one step back and re-discuss these measures in the wider context of concepts relevant to the analysis of territorial development. These are concepts related to the role of redundancy and of the strengths of ties. Only after this substantiation of otherwise conceptually rather naked indicators, shall the weapons be deployed. Before first encountering the enemy and analyzing its battle formation, a presentation of its armies would seem to be necessary. The following section demonstrates that we do not only know the identity of its different regional divisions but, moreover, the names of each of the latter’s individual members.

No general claim is being made in the following about an eventual determination of regional action strategies by the structural configuration of systems of action. Nor do we intend to raise far-reaching hypotheses about the role of structure on policy event outcomes such as, for instance, legislative acts or contracts signed by groups of actors in terms of overall indicators such as network density and network centralization is to some extent possible. This is more difficult for the cases presented in this present study. Regional networks are of a rather different species. No comparative data on them is available at all.

Both within and external to the regional territory. The only reasonable claim that can be made is that the structural configuration of territorial networks represents an important constraint and, at the same time, opens up significant opportunities for both political and economic development and, secondly, that this concerns the entire range of policies forming part of the domain “regional development” as well as all actors participating in that domain.

This work, then, essentially belongs to the first, descriptive typology of studies of interorganizational relations mentioned by Laumann and Knoke (1986:346). The second type of approach, preferred by the authors, would be explanatory in character. While the former type is “concerned with mathematical elaborations of descriptive measures of network structures, including indices of multiplexity, connectedness, centrality, the detection of cliques or structurally equivalent actors, and the depiction of proximities among sets of actors”, explanatory studies, by contrast “use these descriptive measures to predict behavioral characteristics of the members of the network or to explain systematic characteristics of the network as a whole” (ibid.). The choice of a descriptive approach was not only due to our scepticism regarding any form of unilateral structural determinism but, in particular, to the nature of the data at our disposal.

In particular, we had to discard the idea of comparing individual, and highly specific, policy events. Controlling the range of independent variables potentially able to influence event outcomes in each regional case, would simply have gone beyond our analytical capacities. A decision was taken, therefore, to focus on the general contours of regional political ecologies that somehow embraced the entire range of policies relevant to collective actors at the regional level. No doubt, it would have been desirable, and theoretically possible, to collect higher quality information even for an entire domain rather than limiting attention to a study of interorganizational contacts and influence reputation among network members. For example, one might have asked questions about the exchange of resources such as information, goods, personnel or, more in general, about the exchange of ‘possibilities for action’ (Friedberg 1990). An opportunity would
then have arisen for an application of concepts and techniques such as the ones presented by Michael R. Emerson (1972), Karen S. Cook (1987) or Toshio Yamagishi et.al. (1988) to a territorial context. One might also have thought of a possible empirical operationalization of Parri’s (1989, 1990) notions of functional and territorial political exchange. It would have been particularly interesting to ask questions about general cleavages frequently dividing regional policy communities, i.e. questions related to the forming of advocacy coalitions, political alliances and of groups of adversarial actors.

Unfortunately, this was impossible, essentially for two reasons. First, the questionnaire, already at the edge of being indigestible, would have become unmanageable. For each structural question to be added to the questionnaire, other questions forming part of it would have had to be dropped. Although this would, in principle, have been possible, it presented a problem in so far as the questionnaire was the result of a bargaining process among different members of the team, each one with a strong interest in a specific field of analysis. Interest in the analysis of the structural configuration of territorial networks represented a minority view. A full-blown analysis of interorganizational exchange relations was therefore ruled out. Yet, despite this inconvenience, this study demonstrates that the comparative properties of the data represent an empirical richness able to fully off-set the disadvantage of working with a rather limited type of information. Empirically grounded knowledge about patterns of communication which flow from the need to exchange strategically important information and about the influence reputation of individual network members already allow for quite robust conclusions about the power structures of regional networks.
actors, i.e. public institutions, private organizations, interest associations and, finally, para-state agencies, private consultancies, banks and universities which were grouped under the label of "finance and technology brokers". All of these were organizations having their organizational headquarter at either the regional or the subregional level. The high number of organizations having originally been identified, was determined by the fact that most of these represented subregional actors, i.e. organizations operating at the provincial, communal, departmental, Kreis, county, or comarca level. It could be taken for granted that those organizations forming part of the more narrowly defined regional domain networks, would somewhere figure among that larger population of actors. Yet, identifying them, would clearly require a more detailed procedure of selection. In other words, we already possessed the names and addresses of our potential network members and also knew the identity of these organizations’ key figures (presidents, directors, secretary generals, etc.), but we did not know who exactly belonged to the domain networks.

Although possessing an impressive number of names of representative organizations, their addresses and phone numbers, we still needed to solve the problem of boundary specification of regional domain networks - a procedure without which structural analysis is simply not feasible. Just identifying a representative sample is not sufficient for network-analytic purposes. Apart from being representative, the sample needed to fulfil further important requirements, namely the ones of including consequential actors, i.e. crucially important organizations that mutually considered each other to be of relevance for everything related to regional policy processes. Secondly, it also needed to fulfill the requirement of closeness and completeness, i.e. all organizations of the type above had to be identified without exception, and none of them could be omitted in the final list used for the construction of a relational data bank.

The boundedness of social relations and the possibility of drawing relational data from empirical samples are issues which, for some significant reasons, tend to occupy little space on the agendas of available network-analytic manuals. While network analysis itself is rather transparent and is following procedures that are strictly prescribed by a number of standard operations, boundary specification largely escapes being unambiguous and, ultimately, is a matter of subjective preferences. It may be understandable, therefore, that this issue is given only marginal treatment in the scholarly texts of network analysis. Indeed, confronting it with more conceptual rigour, would imply the risk of having to admit that most analytical fallacies are being committed during the phase of defining a closed and complete group of consequential actors and, moreover, that the absence of any one of these may substantially alter the results and negatively influence their reliability. There are, of course, scattered comments on boundary specification everywhere, but hardly any of the analyses I know of has ever made use of the extremely strict prescriptions by Knüke and Kuklinski (1982) presented by the authors in the first systematic introductions to social network analysis.

The most reliable, yet most difficult, method is a reputational approach, also called "realist sampling strategy" (Lauman, Marsden and Prensky 1989) which is making use of snowball sampling techniques. First, an expert group would need to be identified by the researcher which would form part of the envisaged network and, secondly, possess the capacity of making reliable judgements about this network’s internal structure. Members of that group would need to identify those organizations, on a closed and complete list of actors, that are standing out by particularly high degrees of reputation and influence. They would also need to add to that list all those organizations which the researcher was not able to identify by himself. The next step would then consist in contacting all these

4 In most of the nine regional cases, use had been made of handbooks and administrative manuals either published by the regional authorities themselves or by national institutions. In some cases, i.e. where such institutions existed, we also consulted the membership lists of regional economic and social councils and the lists of organizations habitually invited to hearings before the regional assemblies.

5 In some cases, this residual category of ’finance and technology brokers’ also included larger firms, representing consequential actors within the domain. This was the case, for example, for Daimler-Benz and Bosch in Baden-Württemberg; VW and Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter in Niedersachsen; IBM, Falck, Pirelli and Montedison in Lombardia; Keller, Cynamid and Averna in Sicilia; Rhone-Poulenc in Rhone-Alpes; IBM and Cacharel in Languedoc-Roussillon; or Compania Sevillana de Electricidad and Hijos de Andres Molina in Andalucia.

6 See the definition for consequential actor, for example, in Lauman, Marsden et.al. (1989), and Knüke, Pappi, et.al. (1996).
other organizations and asking exactly the same questions. The interview rounds would terminate only if only few or no additional nominees were identified and added to the list. This, then, would represent the final organization list to be used for actually starting with the analysis proper. For comparative research, such a strategy is prohibitively costly.

One alternative is the "positional approach" described by Scott (1991:58). Sampling is done in this case by drawing names of actors from among the occupants of particular formally defined positions or group memberships. The problem with the positional approach is - and most policy network studies of the type referred to in the first chapter suffer from this inconvenience - that the identification of network members tends to overemphasize the "top" positions in institutional hierarchies, especially "when the researcher offers no real justification for the cut-off threshold used to distinguish the 'top' from other positions in the institutional hierarchy" (Scott 1991:58). Meanwhile, Wasserman and Faust (1994:32), somehow disregarding these problems, seem to advocate the so-called "nominalist approach" which is essentially based on the theoretical concern of the researcher. The most important criterion here would be familiarity with the case under investigation. An intensive period of ex-ante research would be required before lists could be drawn up for conducting the interviews.

Fortunately, and in a sense exceptionally, very few problems of the kind mentioned were encountered in our research. This was due to the organization of field work as representing a collective enterprise of different researchers and research sites. This requires some more detailed explanation. The project was made up of different national and regional research teams all being linked to the core group at the University of Mannheim (MZES). This core group was coordinated by me and directed by one of the then heads of division of the MZES, Beate Kohler-Koch. Beyond coordinating the project, I also have been responsible for both the network-analytic part of the study and for the organization of the two Italian case studies. Regarding these latter, I could draw from some expertise in the field and from previous exercises in structural analysis made 1

with both cases. At least initially, the Italian studies could also rely on the collaboration of a Milan-based research institute (Gruppo Clas) and, in particular, on the assistance given by Angela Airolidi who helped with identifying the right people to be contacted and with the fixing of interview dates. In the Sicilian case, a group of experts could be reactivated that had already been of help in previous research in the same area. These people were basically located within the services of the planning division of the regional government's presidential office and centred around one of its directors, Alessandro Hoffman.

Organizing the Andalucian sample and the field work in that region had been the task of Santo Umberti, a Spanish colleague and associate member of the Mannheim core team, while coverage of the two German cases also fell under the responsibility of the Mannheim group. It was undertaken by Michele Knödth, a doctoral fellow of the institute writing her dissertation on a comparison of these two cases. Field work on the Catalan case was carried out by a research group based at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. The team was directed by Francesc Morata and further included Neus Gómez-Matarán and John Etherington. The Welsh study largely draw from the expertise of John Loughlin and Jörg Mathias both of the University of Wales College of Cardiff. Finally, the most dedicated assistance was given for the French case studies. Bernard Jouve of E.N.T.P.E, Lyon, arranged both organization lists and interviews in the region of Rhone-Alpes and a group around Emmanuel Négrier at the C.E.P.E.L. of the Université de Montpellier 1 (William Génieys and Olivier Dedieu) covered the case of Languedoc-Roussillon. Further help with the French cases and, in particular, with

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1 A first systematic attempt to scrutinize the organizational ecology of the region of Sicily was made in the early 1990s (see Grote 1992, 1995). This early data, essentially based on the same types of actors that have been identified for the purpose of this study, has later been used for comparative purposes (Grote 1996a, 1996b). For the case of Lombardy, use could be made of experiences gathered in the context of a network-analytic experiment in the province of Varese, the most affluent area of the entire country (see Bramanti and Grote 1995). These cases apart, networks have also been studied in other parts of the country, for example in the upper Valdarno area (Grote 1993). Several MA theses have been produced under my co-supervision at the economics department of the University of Siena. These essentially aimed at identifying small-firm networks in a number of industrial districts in Tuscany (Santa Croce sull’Arno, the Val d’Elsa area, Poggibonsi, etc.).
Rhone-Alpes came from Fabrice Larat, an associate member of the Mannheim team and distinguished “Rhone-Alpinist”⁸.

These colleagues had an established reputation not only in questions concerning territorial politics in general but also, in particular, in issues regarding the specific regions in which they were living and working. In this way, an otherwise very relevant problem of boundary specification was avoided, i.e. lacking familiarity with the research target and rather abstract knowledge derived from second-hand sources. Based on a mutually agreed scheme for the selection of relevant actors and, of course, on the expertise of members of the different regional teams, no significant organization escaped our attention, and even where respondents initially declined to participate in the survey, constant and insistent reminders sent out to them directly from their respective regional capital, ultimately guaranteed both the closure and completeness required for by network-analytic techniques and resulted, therefore, in a rather high quality and reliability of the data.

Table 4.1 contains the statistical information necessary for getting acquainted with the material used in all subsequent elaborations. Of the 3087 questionnaires diffused by the Mannheim and the other regional teams, 1250, that is, 41 per cent were sent back in a form that allowed for complete statistical treatment⁹. This was the overall sample of organizations whose responses were then inserted into a unified data bank used for the most diverse calculations. The results of these elaborations, most of which were aimed at the identification of cognitive aspects of regional action systems, have been published early in 1998 (Kohler-Koch 1998). In this study, hardly any use shall be made of this information, apart from a couple of occasional references for purely illustrative purpose.

### Table 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall sample and network statistics</th>
<th>overall questionnaire</th>
<th>information relevant for structural analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sent out</td>
<td>received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhone-Alpes</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languedoc-Roussillon</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardia</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicilia</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Wurttemberg</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niedersachsen</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalucia</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalunya</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3087</strong></td>
<td><strong>1250</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 43 questions contained in the overall questionnaire, only two were designed so as to allow for proper structural analysis. Based on regionally specified organization lists comprising the names of potential network members and consisting of subregional, regional, national, and European organizations, just two questions were submitted to the respondents. They were asked, firstly, to indicate those organizations on the lists that were thought to possess a particularly high reputation and influence on everything regarding regional development matters. The information provided by the responses to this question has been used for computing individual influence reputation scores obtained by each of the organizations listed. The wording of the second questions was as follows: “would you please indicate those organizations on the list with which your own organization usually maintains frequent contacts with a view to exchange information

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⁸ The fact of being a native of the respective region did not always and not everytime turn out to have beneficial effects. The exact opposite also occurred in some cases and somehow confirmed the observation made by Knolle, Pappe et al. (1996:75) a propos problems of field research in culturally quite idiosyncratic contexts such as, for example, the Japanese: “Ironically, more than half the organizations (...) probably would have refused to be interviewed by a Japanese academic but relented or were even quite solicitous of a foreign investigator.” The same type of experience was made in the case of Sicily where interviews have been carried out by a German, and similar attitudes among respondents were reported by Etherington in Catalunya and Mathias in Wales.

⁹ Both the attributive (case by event or case by affiliation) and the relational (actor by actor) types of data have first been inserted into a SPSS data file. The relational data has later been exported and transferred to a relational data bank management system (UCINET 4).
(and/or other resources) of strategic importance for making decisions in the area of regional development? This information was used for the construction of networks of communication contact and represents the core part of the present analysis.

On average, the two structural questions and organization lists occupied between two and three pages of the five language versions of the overall questionnaires themselves consisting of roughly eighteen pages. Three pages could easily be diffused with the help of fax machines in those cases where organizations that were indispensable for structural analysis had not sent back, or had declined to send back, the required information. This had to be done for a total of fourteen cases and explains the slight divergence between the numbers of total responses received (column 2) and those being taken as valid for structural analysis (column 3).

As to the latter, 138 organizations per region (average) gave valid information about the structural patterning of contact relations connecting them to other members of this larger sample. Respondents consisted of both regional and subregional organizations (municipalities, provinces, departements, Kreise, comarcas, counties including interest associations and "brokers") and were asked to give information about all other organizations mentioned on the different "regionalized" lists. These lists themselves included regional and subregional organizations but, in addition, a number of actors operating at both the national and EU-levels. Only those national and European organizations were selected for inclusion which were supposed to be particularly relevant for the concerns of regional development (national ministries and other public institutions, the peak associations of business and labour, several directorates of the EU Commission, the Council, Coreper, the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, UNICE, ETUC, etc.). Columns five and six of table 4.1 contain information about the quantity of these different types of organizations belonging either to the regional level or to one of the extra-regional political dimensions (national and European).

Imagining the above information in matrix format, i.e. the format in which relational data is actually being stored, the following configuration would then result for, say, the case of Rhone-Alpes. 148 organizations, the majority of which belong to the subregional category, would occupy the rows of the matrix. The rows hence would consist of two categories of actors: regional and subregional ones. The columns of the matrix would be made up of three types of altogether 72 organizations: 51 of which being Lyon- and departement-based, 10 Paris-based, and 11 Brussels-based. Overall, there would be two by three, i.e. 6 sub-matrices for each type of relation (communication contact and influence reputation), i.e. a total of 12 sub-matrices per region10. In theory, it would have been possible to submit to analysis a total of 108 data sets containing different types of information. Yet, only one of these actually contains data on bilateral, or two-way-flow information. This is sub-matrix 4 (see footnote), i.e. the one representing that particular situation where the names of actors listed on the organization list and the names of members of the interview sample are identical. It is from here that we drew the final members of the networks. The diameters of the the different matrices, i.e. the number of their rows and columns and, hence, the quantity of organizations they contain, are reported in column 4 of the table. The sub-matrices 5 and 6, including the relevant data about the regional actors’ external relational performances, are subjected to analysis in a subsequent chapter11. Some more detailed comments need to be made on sub-matrix 4, since it is this one that represents the empirical and theoretical focus of the present work.

10 Unilateral relations between subregional actors and regional actors (1); unilateral relations between subregional actors and national organizations (2); unilateral relations between subregional actors and EU-level organizations (3); multilateral relations among regional actors (4); unilateral relations between regional and national organizations (5); and, finally, unilateral relations between regional and European organizations (6).

11 Following some variants of the multi-level governance approach (Marks 1993: Jachtenfuchs und Kohler-Koch 1996), it would theoretically have been possible to construct proper adjacency matrices containing bilateral information for multilevel network analysis. Practically, this was made impossible by the fact that it would have implied the identification, within different national and European institutions and organizations, of respondents potentially able to provide precise information regarding the contacts of their own organizations with the ones on the regional organization lists - an unsurmountable task with regard to our limited resources. The external performance of network members, therefore, is exclusively being analyzed with respect to “choices made” (outdegrees) and not to “choices received” (indegrees).
As already mentioned, some of the actors included in the lists did not represent individual organizations but, rather, specific categories or aggregates of organizations. This, in particular, applied to some subregional institutions. It would have been an unacceptable burden for the respondents to skip through lists that contained each single provincial government and most of the more relevant municipal governments being present within a specific region and, then, to indicate with which of these there would exist either a contact relationship or one represented by esteem or reputation. It was decided, therefore, to list just the generic name of the respective institution, i.e. "the" province, "the" municipality, "the" departement, and so forth. This enabled us, in a second step, to aggregate responses from provincial, local, and other subregional institutions to form composite categories which were then analytically treated as if it they were one single actor. In other words, when we talk of the relational properties of provinces, we are not referring to any particular province but, rather, to the aggregate total of all provinces within a specific region -- nine, for instance, in the case of Sicily. The rule of thumb for the building of such subregional composite categories was that at least 70 per cent of the answers given by respondents representing any one of the categories (departements, municipalities, Kreise, provincie, etc.), would need to coincide with respect to the quality of ties reported with any other of the listed organizations (contact and reputation, no contact but reputation, reputation but no contact, neither contact nor reputation). This procedure made possible the inclusion and consideration of subregional actors, within the analysis of regional ecologies, especially in those contexts where they could be expected to possess particular relevance, for example, in France and in Germany.

Table 8.1 in the Appendix gives the names of all organizations per region that form part of the networks. An 'x' in the subscript behind the names of subregional network members indicates which one exactly has been formed by way of operating this composite procedure. In some cases, the very same practice needed to be applied to proper regional actors as well. For example, in Baden-Württemberg, we had received responses from three divisions of the same Landesministerium, the Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Technologie (MWMT). In order to treat the ministry as one single collective actor, a composite answer had to be constructed from the responses given by these three divisions. In general, capital letters in the organization lists indicate regional organizations, and small letters subregional ones. The letters "A" (or "a") are used for public institutions of various types, "P"s are interest associations and chambers, and finally, "B"s indicate different organizations of the "broker" category.

Looking at these lists, another significant characteristic of the networks becomes immediately apparent. This is the high divergence in the composition of actor categories. On average, 41% of the organizations belong to the category of public actors, 37% are private associations, and the remaining 22% are financial or technology brokers. Due to national specificities in the set-up of interest systems, the public-private ratio may vary considerably. For example, in the two Italian regions, we have a ratio of 29% to 49% (Lombardia) and of 31% to 46% (Sicilia) for public and private actors respectively. The high ratio of associations in these regions is due to the very high degree of associational fragmentation. However, similarly high shares of private actors also exist in Languedoc-Roussillon and in Andalucia - a fact that would conform to the hypothesis of high interest group diversity and fragmentation in the South of Europe (Schmitter 1994).

Just for the sake of giving an impression of the complexity of information and of the number of units of analysis that had to be processed for each of the eighteen networks individually, the following may be worth mentioning. The networks contain a total of 274 organizations with an average number of participants of 24. Of the 8402 (i.e. n(n-1) for each network seperately) possible relations of the contact network, 27.7 per cent (i.e.

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12 Later, we found out that, in order to avoid contrasting responses, a lead unit had been formed within the ministry which convoked the different heads of division having received a questionnaire to brief them in giving appropriate, and that meant "official" answers. With few exceptions, the responses were completely identical.

13 In comparative network analysis, there is nothing like an overall or master data set which could arbitrarily be aggregated or disaggregated according to the particular research question one has in mind. Every procedure needs to be run separately for each regional case - quite a painstaking exercise that multiplies the risk of faulty elaborations.
2329) are actually "realized". 12.7 per cent of the theoretically possible and 45.9 per cent of the "realized" contact relations are of symmetric and, hence, in a certain sense, of a "strong" character (i.e. 1068). 1261 relations, i.e. 15 per cent of the possible and 54.1 per cent of the "realized" relations are of unidirectional or "weak" character. Of the 2329 communication contacts, 17 per cent (i.e. 396) are contacts with organizations that were accredited high influence reputation. In other words, 17 per cent of the realized contacts are positively multiplex in regard to influence. Yet, this does not tell us very much about the properties of individual networks. Comments on these are left to subsequent sections of this chapter.

In general, then, we can conclude with regard to boundary specification that successive attempts of contacting and re-contacting the respondents, first by letter, then by phone or by personal visit or, in the case of some technologically well-networked organizations, by electronic mail, finally resulted in a response rate that was sufficiently high to fulfill the requirement of closeness and completeness and, hence, to allow for network-analytic treatment. Only a couple of really serious gaps, or "network holes", remained in the end. All this has been possible thanks to the large number of collaborators that could be activated in the context of the Mannheim project and, of course, to these scholars’ expertise in the field. It is with respect to this invaluable assistance that use has been made of the military metaphor introduced in the beginning, namely that of a "positioning of guns". Contrary to most research of this type, we did not need to deploy far-distance missiles, that is, we did not need to send out questionnaires or approximately identical relations with other members of the group. Positional analysis is useful when studying individual actors, or groups of individual actors both within networks and across different networks. In this chapter, we shall turn to the first variant in order to find out whether the overall patterning of relations in the nine networks is sufficiently clear to allow us to draw preliminary conclusions about the hypotheses raised in the previous chapter.

There is a large variety of available measures that can be taken for this purpose. Given the rather modest properties of our data, and considering that more detailed information is going to be derived from the positional techniques presented later, a decision was taken to focus only on some of these measures which, at the same time, are the most commonly used and the easiest to get acquainted with: density, centrality and centralization, reciprocity and, finally, multiplexity. Given the large number of manuals on network analysis meanwhile available on the market, further excursions into graph-theoretic techniques and algebraic equations are rather superfluous. However, some cursory comments on these indicators are nevertheless required.

After a rather prosaic but indispensable methodological introduction in the interest of underlining the strength of these measures, in particular, for the purpose of comparative research, it will be noted that, this strength notwithstanding, they remain strangely indistinct and vague with regard to the potential meanings they may assume in concrete

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23 These were, in particular, the operational arm of the regional prefecture in Languedoc-Roussillon (SGAR) and, secondly, the Secretary of State running the Welsh Office (WO). It is possible, however, to make inferences regarding the role of SGAR, from the position this organization is occupying in the other French region. Regarding the role of the Welsh Office, two divisions of this figure among the organizations of the Welsh network sample, namely the WO’s Economic and Training Group and the Transport, Planning and Environment Group. Although these cannot substitute for the lack of the Secretary of State, we have used them as proxies for the network position of the latter.
The overall configurations

social situations. In a second step, we try, therefore, to give more flesh and explanatory power to these measures, by turning to a couple of issues of direct relevance to the study of territorial development networks, namely those of redundancy and of to the strength of ties. Both issues are, implicitly or explicitly, related to the type of properties described in what follows.

Network density

Density is a measure describing the general level of linkage among points in a graph or among vertices in an adjacency matrix. It is usually taken to indicate the overall level of cohesion in a network. In a complete graph, each point would be adjacent to one another, i.e. each point would be directly connected to every other point. In empirical situations, this is very unlikely to happen, even in very small networks. Using models of random choice, Mayhew and Levinger (1976) have argued that the maximum value for density likely to be found in real social situations is about 0.5, i.e. direct connectedness in any concrete social network will not go beyond fifty per cent of the theoretically achievable relations. Density then is an attempt "to summarize the overall distribution of lines in order to measure how far from this state of completion the graph is" (Scott 1991:73). There are two further parameters of network structure responsible for density. These are inclusiveness of the graph and the sum of the degrees of its points. The first parameter is of little significance for our purposes since the networks of the present sample are all perfectly inclusive, i.e. they possess no isolates or disconnected actors and components. The second parameter concerns the degree of connection of the points of a graph. Some points may be connected to many other points, while others will be less well connected.

This latter aspect has some implications for the comparison of networks across countries. It is possible, at least in theory, that a similarly high density value encountered in two different regional or national situations would be determined, in the first network, by an extremely strong concentration of ties within a particular region of the network (local density) while, in the other, it may result from the existence of a widely dispersed and rather equilibrated structure. As we shall submit our networks to a high number of different analytical procedures, this limit to comparison can be easily held under control and does not, therefore, represent a serious constraint. Moreover, there is always the case-study material as a "resort of last instance" able to correct eventually dubious outcomes.

There is another point which may impinge negatively on the comparison of networks in terms of their density. This limit is represented by significantly different diameters or sizes of networks. Indeed, taking the formula for the maximally achievable number of undirected ties or arcs, i.e. \( \frac{g(g-1)}{2} \), with \( g \) indicating the number of network members, it is easy to see that the number of lines increases at a much faster rate than does the number of points. For example, a graph with three points can have a maximum of three undirected lines connecting its points; one with four points can have a maximum of six lines; and one with five points can have a maximum of ten lines.

Comparing those two networks of the sample exhibiting the relatively greatest (Sicily with 39 points) and smallest diameters (Wales with 20 points), the maximum number of undirected lines in the first case would amount to 741, and in the second to only 190. While these potentially or theoretically achievable numbers would indicate quite substantial differences between the two cases, this does not actually represent a problem as far as the numbers of ties of individual actors are concerned. To arrive at the approximately same level of overall network density of, say 0.30, individual actors in Sicily would need to sustain more than five ties each to other members of the network while, in Wales, a number of ties slightly above three would already suffice to that end - a rather insignificant divergence if one considers that the actors studied here are not individuals but organizations\(^{15}\).

Organizations are, of course, equally subject to constraints in terms of transaction costs incurred by their relational performance as are individuals, but nobody would make

Grote, Jurgen R. (1998), The political ecology of regionalism : state-society relations in nine European regions European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/6951
the claim that an average number of five or six relations in the contact portoflios of single organizations would represent a maximum beyond which any further extension would be prohibitive. Considering, in addition, that Sicily and Wales are the two extreme cases of the sample in terms of size, and further taking account of the relevant literature which, when discussing the issue of "significant differences" in network diameters, normally refers to differences as large as between 25 and 100 members, the constraint represented by different sizes can actually be disregarded in the present context. As we shall see, some of the larger networks actually carry a higher density index than some of the smaller ones and this is unlikely to result from transaction costs or time constraints, as is argued by Scott (1991:78). It, rather, has to do with the communication exigencies of organizations under different institutional and constitutional settings.

In general, apart from a few calculations undertaken on reciprocal relations, only directed ties will be considered in this analysis. Directed ties form directed graphs, or digraphs. The formula for the calculation of density in a digraph is: \( \Delta = \frac{L}{g(g-1)} \), where \( L \) is the observed number of arcs or of ties, and \( g \) indicates the number of actors in a network. The tables presented in the following sections that contain the results of the overall analysis of our cases, either refer to the absolute density values of the different networks, or to variations of these after the completion of various transformations undertaken on the original matrices. These variations are indicated by plus (+) and minus (-) signs in front of the figures.

15 For individuals, it may be expected that there is an upper limit of ties beyond which connectivity becomes physically unsustainable. For organizations, this limit is obviously far less restrictive.

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Centrality and network centralization I (degree-based)

Centrality is, first of all, a measure indicating the prominence of individual points or actors in a network. However, the idea of centrality can be taken further and be converted into a measure indicating the overall level of centralization found in different networks. This is called a "group-level index of centralization". This latter is of particular relevance to the arguments of the present chapter. What has been referred to above as "local density", i.e. the concentration of ties in a particular region of a network, is another way for saying that that region is characterized by a strong "local centralization". Indeed, density and centralization are to some extent complementary measures. While density is an indicator of the general level of cohesion in a network, centralization is an indicator of the extent to which this cohesion is organized around particular focal points. Using Freeman’s (1979) standardized centrality measure, centralization would be 0.00 in a complete network where everybody is connected to everybody else, and would arrive at a value of 1.00 in a star-type structure, i.e. where actors are unconnected among themselves, apart from one centrally positioned point attracting ties from all the others. In general, group-level indices of centralization tend to be larger, the more the network is dominated by one, two, or a few more particularly central actors with the others remaining considerably less central. The index will be lower, the flatter the hierarchies in the network, to borrow a term from the market and hierarchy debate, that is, the more balanced the relations among the actors.

Concrete empirical situations, of course, lie somewhere in the middle between the extremes of complete networks and star-like configurations. In the most general terms, an overall or group-level centralization index for an entire network reflects the differences between the centrality scores of the most central actor and those of all other actors. It is the "ratio of the actual sum of differences to the maximum possible sum of differences" (Scott 1991:93). As mentioned above, our networks contain directed relations, i.e. they can be represented as digraphs. A digraph comprises two distinct elements, called "indegrees" and "outdegrees". The indegree of a point is the total number...
of other points which have lines towards it, i.e. it reflects the adjacency towards a node or the number of arcs terminating at that point. The outdegree of a point is the total number of other points to which it directs lines, i.e. the adjacency from a node or the number of arcs originating from that point. Translated into a matrix structure, indegrees are shown by the column sums in the matrix of a digraph and outdegrees by the row sums. The indegrees and outdegrees of the rows and columns of our matrices, hence, quantify the tendency of actors occupying these rows and columns to "make choices" and to "receive choices" on both the relations of communication contact and of influence reputation.

Although both outdegrees and indegrees are considered to be of importance for the calculations carried out on the networks, the latter are taken to be more reliable indicators of centrality than are the former. In social situations of the kind studied here, outdegrees may turn out to give rather inflated information. For this reason, only the column sums of the eighteen adjacency matrices containing the data on contacts and reputation are considered for the calculation of centrality and centralization. It is one thing, indeed, if the relatively insignificant regional branch of the French CGT in Rhone-Alpes reports relations to, say, eighty per cent of that region’s network members, and it is quite another, if the Rhone-Alpine Chambre Regionale de Commerce et de l’Industrie "receives the choices" of eighty per cent of the same group, possibly in terms of both contact and reputation. Nota bene, with regard to the tables presented in the following, that overall centralization indices may range from 0.00 to 100.00 and not, as is the case for densities, from 0.00 to 1.00. Variations, relative to the centralization indices obtained by the raw data matrices, are expressed by plus (+) and minus (-) signs in front of the figures.

Centrality and network centralization II (betweenness-based)

Although not easily applicable to the study of networks which essentially reflect contact relations, a further centrality measure is being used here for both the relational (overall) and the positional (individual) analysis of regional groups of actors and individual members of these groups. This is "betweenness centrality"16, a measure closely related to the idea of social or path distances seperating any pair of actors. Path distance itself, an otherwise very strong analytical instrument, is not further considered in this work17 - apart from a brief excursion into spatial analysis serving purely illustrative purposes, where some of the networks (Baden-Württemberg, Languedoc-Roussillon and Sicilia) are being submitted to a procedure of multidimensional scaling (MDS).18 The phrasing of our interview question originally aimed at the identification of contacts that guarantee the flow of strategically important information. The responses given to that question did not furnish any knowledge concerning the actual manifestation of such information flows. Only where this latter is really materializing and, possibly, where in addition, questions concerning the origin of these flows (e.g., ego initiates, alter initiates, both are active) are being asked, can more far-reaching claims be made about the relevance of distances in a network.

Nonetheless, betweenness in contact relations may furnish information about the potential, not the real, brokerage capacity of individual network members - without doubt an interesting property. Knoke and Pappi et.al. (1996:118) argue that "the higher an organization’s betweenness score, the greater its potential for mediating or disrupting policy communications". Betweenness measures for individual organizations shall be considered in the positional analysis presented in a later chapter. They are listed in

16 In reality, the range of options to measure centrality is too large to be discussed in the present context (see Wasserman and Faust 1994:167-220, Scott 1991:85-103). For our purposes, it is believed that degree-based and betweenness-based indicators are largely sufficient.
17 Having contact, does not necessarily imply something in terms of the content of the relation or in terms of eventual alliances or conflicts among actors. A contact relation may be or may not be a container for substantive contents and, moreover, these contents may be of completely different character and may include both benevolent and hostile attitudes and the exchange of both goods and bads. Only where an exchange of tangible or intangible resources occurs, does the consideration of path distances actually make sense. One could then, as demonstrated, for example, by Yamagishi et.al. (1988), follow the flow of the resource along the arcs of a network and try to determine its increasing or diminishing value to different actors relative to its position in the network at any given time.
18 The plots have been produced by way of a multidimensional scaling procedure (MDS). As input to MDS-plots, researchers habitually employ social distance matrices. In our work, the path distances of minimum symmetrized, i.e. of reciprocal relations have been used.
Chapter Five and in Table 8.2 in the Appendix. In terms of an overall or group-level indicator as defined above, betweenness "allows a researcher to compare different networks with respect to the heterogeneity of the betweenness of the members of the network" (Wasserman and Faust 1994:191). In more qualitative terms, Knoke and Pappi et al. (1996:118-119) have taken group-level betweenness centralization to point to different degrees of integration of networks, so that one could distinguish between "highly integrated" and "modestly integrated" networks, i.e. between situations in which a small number of organizations - in the extreme case, just one - are the targets of narrowly focussed communication and, on the other hand, in which communication is far more diffused.

Yet, how is betweenness measured? One of the most transparent and most straightforward definitions was supplied by Shimbel more than forty years ago: "Suppose that in order for [actor] i to contact [actor] j, [actor] k must be used as an intermediate station. [Actor] k in such a network has a certain 'responsibility' to [actors] i and j. If we count all of the minimum paths [geodesics] which pass through [actor] k, then we have a measure of the 'stress' which [actor] k must undergo during the activity of the network" (Shimbel 1953:507; quoted from Wasserman and Faust 1994:189)\(^1\). To summarize, individual betweenness reflects brokerage and/or disruptive capacities and group betweenness reflects degrees of network integration. As to the format or style of the figures contained in the tables, in particular in Table 4.2, the same applies here what was already mentioned with respect to degree-based centrality, i.e. the figures are expressed as ranging on a scale between 0 and 100.

\(^{19}\) The Help-facility of the programme we have used for these calculations (UCINET 4), furnishes a rather more technical definition: "Betweenness is a measure of the number of times a vertex occurs on a geodesic. The normalized betweenness centrality is the betweenness divided by the maximum possible betweenness expressed as a percentage" (UCINET 4.1, see Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 1994).

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Mutual choice or reciprocity

As with the previous indicator, care needs to be taken when using this measure for the purpose of analyzing contact networks. Mutual choice is the probably more appropriate term for this type of situation, although references to reciprocity are rather tempting, especially if one considers this concept's long tradition in anthropology (Lévi-Strauss 1957; Homans 1961), sociology (Gouldner 1960; Ekeh 1974), political science (Pizzorno 1978, Marin 1990) and even international relations theory (Keohane 1985, Schmitter 1985). In most of these theoretical frameworks, reciprocity refers to the exchange of material resources such as gifts, goods or, occasionally, women, or to the exchange of intangibles such as behavior, esteem, or regulatory provisions. With regard to contact, reciprocity would seem to be a redundant, if not altogether absurd property. It may be taken, however, to indicate the reliability of responses and, in particular, as a proxy for the existence of 'strong ties', namely in those situations where it overlaps with mutual esteem or mutually expressed relevance and reputation. Given its intrinsic theoretical properties and references, we shall operate the term of "high reciprocity" as a short hand for "strong ties" and, conversely, "low reciprocity" as one for "weak ties" for all those cases, where information resulting from the contact matrix is identical to the one contained in the influence matrix.

In general, we expect reciprocal ties to be characterized by a higher durability. They are probably more stable and, hence, reflect a higher importance within the overall network than do unilateral choices. Unfortunately, given the limitations of our data, it is difficult to distinguish between what could be called "the demand and the supply of contacts" (see next section). It is equally difficult to derive from that data, if only implicitly, insights into the demand and supply of information. Yet, in the interest of improving the quality of content of the otherwise rather blunt contact measure, it may not seem unreasonable to make the following type of assumption. If a network member, being an important public institution, i.e. one being formally endowed with the task of diffusing a vast array of information and other resources of various types, turns out to be
among the group of most centrally positioned actors in a network, with a great many degrees pointed towards it, then we will consider that organization to be, first of all, a source of information. Its indegrees, then, would reflect the demands advanced by more peripheral actors of the network and most of its outdegrees would indicate that the requested information is actually being supplied. In a sense, such a supposition would seem to violate the most basic logic underlying any theory of political exchange which in fact assumes two-way flows of resources. Yet, we do not say that the above necessarily applies to every single relation that occurs between the most central actors and the other members of the network. It is likely to apply, however, to the majority of those cases where public institutions controlling the bulk of resources (i.e. mainly financial aid) occupy particularly central network positions. In situations of that kind, high reciprocity would then reflect that demand and supply are actually intersecting. Moreover, it also would indicate a high "responsiveness" of public institutions to the demands advanced in their political environment.

In order to measure reciprocity, a minimum symmetrization of the respective matrices has been undertaken. The resulting binary matrices then contain '1'-entries only for those relations where both \( x_{ij} \) and \( x_{ji} \) give identical answers on the two relations measured. In the tables presented later in this section, values for reciprocal ties are expressed as percentages of the numbers of ties contained in the raw data matrices.

Quite evidently, this rule of thumb would not affect relations connecting any two organizations possessing similarly high indegree centrality indices, especially not if both are public institutions. In this particular case, the appropriate assumption would be that the relation is related to administrative coordination, for example between two divisions of a regional government. In order for this general hypothesis to retain validity, there must be one particularly centralized (public) actor forming the target or being the focal point of the network (or a sub-network) on the one hand, and a large number of rather peripheral and, possibly, irrelevant others that chose this target in terms of both contact and reputation.

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**Multiplexity of ties across networks**

Multiplexity relates to "chained" relations across several networks, i.e. it indicates the simultaneous occurrence, or absence, of relations measured on two or more different properties such as, in the present case, communication contact and influence reputation. We shall operate this measure both with regard to the raw data and with regard to recoded versions of the original matrices that contain mutually confirmed choices.

Combining two matrices to build a new one in which two different types of relations appear to be overlaid, produces four different values as cell entries. Various combinations of multiplexity are possible. The absence of either of the two relations is, of course, denoted by '0'-entries. Situations indicating the absence of the first and the presence of the second relation (i.e. reputation but no contact) are coded as '1'-entries. The opposite case (i.e. contact but no reputation) would appear as a '3'-entry and the simultaneous occurrence of both relations results in '2'-entries. In Table 4.2 which contains the density values obtained by these different indicators, these situations are abbreviated as \( mpx\) -zero, \( mpx\) -one, etc. \( mpx\) -two and \( mpx\) -three relations are also referred to in terms of contacts to important and of contacts to unimportant organizations. With regard to the latter, contacts to unimportant organizations, the figures express the respective values as percentages of the overall densities obtained by the original adjacency matrices. As will be shown later, \( mpx\) -three relations are supposed to contain particularly indicative information in the wider context of a discussion of structural redundancy. Redundant capacities and structural or information redundancy are shown to possess far-reaching implications for the evaluation of development potentials of territorial networks. It is to a discussion of this issue that we shall turn now, before finally presenting the results in the context of a, hopefully, more enlightened and better informed understanding of the importance of structural properties in the analysis of interorganizational relations across different regions.

**Reflections on the role of redundancy in territorial networks**
There are a number of quite singular problems with regard to the study of social and political relations within networked systems of action. The first concerns the analytical currencies used to describe these relations and systems. While even the empirically most uninformed social scientist working on issues such as, for example, class divisions, social exclusion, affluence, poverty, domination or power would, at one point or another, turn to available statistical material to authenticate his arguments, this does not necessarily hold true for those who raise hypotheses a propos the structure of interorganizational networks. In fact, the reliability of statistical tools for the treatment of attributive data such as frequencies, correlations, cluster analysis, etc. is widely taken for granted. Hardly anyone would doubt, for instance, that there is a significant correlation between poverty and levels of education, or between social power and class adherence. On the other hand, in the relational perspective of mainstream policy network studies, the analytical currencies employed are largely operated in a highly subjectivist and metaphorical fashion, despite the availability of quite unambiguous and clearly defined empirical measures such as those introduced above. This may in large part be due to the shortage of empirical material to refer to when describing sectoral, territorial, or policy networks of various types. Yet, it also reflects the fear of many researchers either of getting involved in rather tricky algebraic calculations or of slipping, unwillingly but supposedly in an unavoidable manner, into a kind of structuralist determinism which would leave hardly any space for the consideration of autonomous action, individual preferences, or the role of ideas and world views in processes of political change. We shall demonstrate that this does not need to be the case. Network analysis is a methodological tool just like any other and the only thing one can hope to achieve by employing this tool is, to broaden the body of knowledge about matters of inquiry that, so far, have never been subjected to more detailed empirical analysis.

The second problem, more particularly, concerns the meanings attached to relational descriptors. Affluence, which is an attributive type of information, would seem to be rather unambiguous in its meaning regardless of whether it refers to an entire society, to a particular territory, to an enterprise, or to an individual manager of that enterprise. This is not necessarily the same for relational indicators such as, for example, density. In a chameleon-like fashion, the meaning expressed by that measure may completely change relative to its functional properties in different social contexts. High density rates in the relations connecting mafia bosses to their rank and file may be quite detrimental to the maintenance of secrecy and _omertà_ and may easily lead to a dismantling of illegal networks (Gambetta 1992). At the same time, the very same property may turn out to be decisive if present among the security officers of a nuclear power plant in the case of a major accident (Perrow 1984). These are quite simple and instantly convincing examples. Yet, what about high density in the relations connecting public, private, and other actors within the context of a territorial network? Can it _a priori_ be ascribed a positive and beneficial value in terms of development prospects? Are high density rates sufficient indicators for the propensity to act collectively, to negotiate freely and embark on joint problem-solving strategies? Does high density stand for structural configurations characterized by flat hierarchies and does it indicate that there would be easier access to public decision-making than in the case of less dense configurations? What are the attributive characteristics of parts of the network (i.e. the status of organizations in legal, institutional, and constitutional terms) that would, in addition, have to be consulted to find out under what conditions network density unfolds its beneficial, detrimental, or indeed zero effects? There is no straightforward answer to these questions, not only regarding the specific measure chosen for illustrative purposes but, generally, the entire range of available alternative indicators (centrality, multiplexity, reciprocity, etc.). It is reasonable to assume that all of these will reveal their analytic value only in a comparative perspective, when one is working with different networks that are largely

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21 The term is used here to indicate attributes of individuals, or of social groups such as, for example, profession, gender, ethnic belonging, etc. and to distinguish it from relational data such as, for example, strength of ties, directionality of exchange contacts, etc.
compatible in terms of the number of actors, the categories of actors, and the functions carried out by their actors.

In the absence of available material with which to compare the empirical results, let us turn, therefore, to a couple of theoretical considerations that may help to give more flesh to the measures and may furnish guidelines for the interpretation of otherwise rather bare and empty indicators. The problem of subjectivist and metaphorical visions notwithstanding, we shall consider, in particular, those two analytical currencies having attracted most of the attention in current network studies particularly among scholars who, otherwise, tend to avoid the tiring task of submitting their hypotheses to empirical verification. These currencies are, firstly, redundancy - or redundant capacities - and, secondly, arguments related to the relative strength or weakness of ties in interpersonal and interorganizational settings. Policy networks are the qualitative and political science-based analogue to networks studied with the help of sociological methods in the same way that the property of redundancy is the metaphoric analogue to empirical measures such as density, centrality, etc. Since, as we shall see, redundancy has been ascribed quite important functions for the institutional and economic performance of regions, it shall be taken in what follows as a theoretical container in need of operationalization, substantiation and enrichment with empirical evidence. The main task consists, therefore, in attaching to the various notions of redundancy the appropriate empirical measures in order to verify some of the claims that have been made with regard to the beneficial or detrimental effects of that property on development differentials of all kinds, including regional ones. Presenting and interpreting the above network-analytic measures in the more general framework of redundancy-related arguments may increase their analytical weight in the study on interorganizational relations and of regional ecologies.

In its most general meaning, redundancy is a term first made popular by information science. It is a property of information and exists, if the sum of signs necessary for the articulation or the transfer of information can be reduced such that there is no subsequent loss in its quality. Redundancy, hence, is first of all a quantitative property, indicating the existence of excess resources that are superfluous for the achievement of specific tasks. In economics, redundant capacities would be ones that do not directly serve the productive function and hence would require disactivation in the interest of efficiency improvements. In as far as redundant capacities are attributed to single entities such as firms, agglomeration of firms, industrial districts, or to entire regions, one could speak of attributive forms of redundancy. In the interest of extending the analytical scope of the argument with a view to making it compatible with the study of multiple entities and realtions among these, the above information science argument could also be used for the hosts of information, i.e. individuals, communication media, or organizations. One would then speak of proper structural or relational redundancy in interorganizational networks, namely if the sum of linkages or ties connecting different organizations to each other could be reduced in a way that would not result in manifest losses of information travelling through them.

There is one inconvenient, however, with respect to employing the notion of redundancy in the present context, and this would seem to affect the analytical measure of density as well. It derives from the everyday use made of these words. Although being intrinsically relational in character, both terms are habitually used merely to indicate quantities of single entities per specified measure, i.e. square meters, kilometers, enterprises, sectors, territories, and not relations between these entities or, more importantly, between these entities and other, qualitatively different second or third types of entities. The fact that there are correspondences of the latter kind and relations, connections, ties that somehow emerge from a dense supply of specific resources, is often a priori assumed to be the case but is hardly ever studied explicitly. The point could be exposed more clearly in the context of an argument related to the demand for a good or a resource and the supply for it. Only where demand and supply actually intersect, would one be able to speak of a proper relationship between any two entities. Conversely, only where there were be many entities demanding a specific resource and many others supplying it, could one speak of structural, systemic, or relational density -

Grote, Jurgen R. (1998), The political ecology of regionalism : state-society relations in nine European regions
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/6951
at least in contexts where the term is being used by social scientists to underline the beneficial effects that saturation with particular properties, goods, endowments, etc. may have on specific systems, i.e. territories, sectors, industries and economies.

For example, the sheer quantity of centres for technology transfer in a particular region -- an attributive type of density -- does not automatically enable the raising of hypotheses about these centres’ effective use. We do not know the extent to which they are functional to the needs of entrepreneurs in that region, and there are cases, indeed, where their existence basically reflects the desire of local political entrepreneurs and of public administration to "market their territory" or to out-compete adjacent municipalities, provinces, districts, and regions in terms of images of modernity or of a promising industrial location. In a case like that, these centres would be redundant not because there are many of them but, rather, because there is no demand for them. Density and reciprocity, hence, at least when being operated in a collective action or development related discourse, would always have to be assessed in regard to both numbers or quantities of entities and the relations connecting these to each other or to third entities.

Analytical pitfalls of all kinds may result from a disregard for these double parameters. One such pitfall has recently been committed in a prominent study on regional development differentials in Italy and shall briefly be mentioned. In order to give more weight to the importance of that particular variable that, essentially, accounted for these differentials and that, therefore, was taken to represent the key proxy for the endowment of regions with civicness and civic communities, Robert Putnam (1993) has tried to measure the density of associationalism in different parts of the country. Without wishing to comment any further on Putnam’s operationalization of notions such as social capital and civicness (see, for critical remarks, Boix and Posner 1996, Levi 1996a, 1996b, 1998; Grote 1997a, 1997d, 1998a, 1998b), what is important here is to underline that measuring associationalism is something different from measuring the number of associations. A simple head count of associations from a national census that, moreover, appears to be rather outdated, does not tell much about "networks of civic engagement", as is claimed by Putnam. The density of associations, understood in purely quantitative terms, does not say anything about the functioning, stability and, indeed, civicsness of networks, and it has rightfully been pointed out by Boix and Posner (1996:11) that the whole argument "is largely an artefact of data collection constraints: information on the number of civic associations per capita is easier to collect than data on social networks."

If we were to use the same kind of argument for professional, rather than cultural or leisure associations -- something that would in principal be possible, notwithstanding Putnam’s negative attitude in this respect -- then Italy and indeed the two Italian regions of our sample would rank highest in Europe in terms of the intensity of interest intermediation or in terms of an equilibrated and modernizing pattern of political networks. It was shown in the beginning that the high number of interests groups in that country can neither be taken to reflect modernity nor a particular propensity of Italians engaging in collective action. In any case, Putnam’s analytic fallacy is a significant one and reveals a short-circuit quite common to other studies as well. As long as hypotheses about the relevance of institutional thickness, whether related to associations, to infrastructure endowment, or simply to rules and mechanisms guaranteeing the compliance of rules, are exclusively derived from traditional statistics, attempts at empirical verification will remain futile.

By way of summarizing, then, redundancy, as much as density, can be discussed both in attributional and in relational terms. Beyond that, they can also be approached from different theoretical perspectives, for instance, from the economical angle of rational

22 Almost simultaneously to the publication of Putnam’s results, a group of Italian scholars (Trigilia 1995, Diamanti 1995) has found that rates of associationalism in the south are actually rather high, in some instances coming close to the ones observed in other parts of the country. This completely undermines not one, but the main argument on which Putnam’s generalizations are resting.

23 Putnam explicitly drops professional associations from his head count on the "assumption that 'imported' organizations may be a flawed indicator of local associational propensities" (ibid.:222; endnote 35). Although territorial associational structures may originally have been created "top down", either by national headquarters of organizations or, as argued by Marco Maraffi (1998), by political parties, there is no reason for assuming that they are entirely alien to the territory and not able to reflect local collective action capacities.
choice and from the more socio-politically inspired perspective of territorial development theory and studies of institutional performance. They then acquire a quite different flavor not only relative to the units chosen for analysis (attributes of single entities vs. relations among multiple entities) but also with respect to the disciplinary context within which they are operated. The narrow, economistic vision of redundancy may include both its attributive and relational properties. The general, efficiency-oriented rule would have it that capacities or relations need to be dropped or abandoned as soon as it is recognized that they fail to provide for returns or benefits that are immediately appropriable. A less narrow-minded interpretation being interested in the latent and not directly visible potential of redundant capacities and structures to provide for security nets and adaptive capacities in regional development would argue exactly the opposite. The higher the level of redundancies, the more likely the stability in social, political, and economic relations and the more promising the prospects for development. At a first glance at least, both notions possess some plausibility so that we cannot a priori opt for or against any one of them. The main problem is, rather, how to operationalize the term empirically so as to confront different realities in terms of the extent to which they have generated such capacities and structures. The following excursions, in the best of all cases, might help with developing a definition of redundancy that would both fit the specific empirical material in our possession and reflect significant differences across the cases.

### The structural hole argument

The most straightforward answer to the problem of operationalization has been provided by the sociologist Ronald S. Burt, a network analyst of the first hour. In one of his most recent contributions, he investigates supplier relations among populations of entrepreneurs (Burt 1992). A relational version of redundancy belongs to the main arguments of the book. Unfortunately, form our point of view, his focus on individual enterprises and their relations makes him adopt a quite narrow micro-economic perspective. Burt is not interested in analyzing the overall patterning of markets or sectors. His analytic targets are not networks understood as social systems of production but, rather, ego-networks built around individual entrepreneurs who face the problem of efficiency-enhancing choice under conditions of scarce resources. The key problem of his theoretical setting is of how one would have to take decisions either in favour of or against the maintenance of redundant contacts to one’s suppliers.

In one respect, redundant contacts are characterized by the strength of ties and by the cohesion (i.e. density) between any one, two or more actors of a network24. Yet, strength of ties and cohesion alone are not sufficient conditions for the presence of redundancy. In order for this type of relation to come about, cohesion needs to be met by structural equivalence25, a measure which we shall introduce in a later chapter. In other words, “if cohesion and structural equivalence conditions are considered together, redundancy is most likely between structurally equivalent people connected by a strong relationship” (ibid:19). The most important implication of this for our purpose of comparing networks across countries is that, firstly, redundancy can be measured empirically and, secondly, that the most appropriate measures seem to be the relative strength of ties connecting any two or more actors and the degree of structural equivalence between members of positions or of sub-networks within an overall structure. Keeping this in mind, this claim shall be verified in a later section of this chapter where we discuss parts of the empirical results.

There is another point in Burt’s work on structural holes in entrepreneurial networks, however, which is hard to join to our analytical target, i.e. the study of territories as social systems of action. Strangely, indeed, while drawing a lot from Granovetter’s argument on the strength of weak ties (Granovetter 1974)26, Burt does not seem to consider this author’s second important contribution to the neo-institutionalist debate, the

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24 In Burt’s view, “cohesion is an empirical indicator of redundancy” (Burt 1992:47) and strength of ties is indicative of redundancy “to the extent that they lead to the same people, and so provide the same information benefits” (ibid:17).

25 “Regardless of the relation between structurally equivalent people, they lead to the same sources of information and so are redundant” (ibid:19).

26 For a discussion of Granovetter’s contributions, see later in the text.
argument about the embeddedness of economic activity in social relations (Granovetter 1985). In that latter work, Granovetter accuses economics of adopting an under-socialized perspective on the functioning of markets that does not take account of rules, systems of norms, and obligations which may put constraints on the choices of individual entrepreneurs and of other actors within a system of production. Burt does not seem to consider constraints of that kind to be of much relevance and rather tends to take an alternative view. According to him, embeddedness is so strongly related to redundancy that a socially embedded market would appear to be a non-market altogether and, hence, not worth being studied at all: "high-obligation relations, with obligation enforced by authority or convention, allow neither negotiation nor the strategic replacement of partners" (Burt 1992:6) - a crucial condition for the identification and occupation of niches in competitive markets. In very general terms, the argument could be summarized as follows. Since high contact redundancy represents low efficiency (ibid.:53), try to maximize the number of nonredundant contacts in your ego-network. Only then can you reallocate the time previously spent on maintaining redundant contacts in expanding the network to include new clusters and hence occupy structural holes (ibid.:20).

This type of conceptualization, valid, if at all, only for unbound competitive markets and the hyper-rational entrepreneurs populating them, has recently been employed by Perulli and Catino (1997a) who apply it to the study of business interest associations at the regional, provincial, and at the level of industrial districts - an area being quite close to the one studied here. Territorially organized interest associations in Italy representing small firms and craft enterprises, are advised to diminish their efforts on representation in favour of or against the maintenance of redundant contacts to their organizational environment, does seem to be quite an overstatement. If the social embeddedness argument should have any relevance for economic actors, then even more so for the representatives of interest associations that operate on political markets, such as the regional one, which are heavily conditioned by obligations, constraints, dependencies, and organizational viscosities of all sorts. The argument would make sense only to the extent that the existence of a great number of structural holes could a priori be postulated to exist for the case of regional political systems - a claim which, as we shall see, turns out to be particularly inappropriate in the Italian case. Regional interest groups in that country are more deeply involved in their regional ecologies than anywhere else in our sample. If there is a hole to fill at all, then, it would concern the groups themselves. Their increasing loss of associate members may ultimately lead to a situation where interest associations themselves in the end would represent little more than hollow cores in the relations linking individual entrepreneurs to public institutions. As is argued elsewhere (Grote 1997b), rather than investing resources and energy in an improvement of their influence potential, they would be better advised to fuel these into the membership interface where organizational inadequacies are particularly evident.

As to the interpretation of our regional ecologies, account shall be taken of Burt’s version of redundancy, especially in respect of it’s easy empirical operationalization. However, we shall also keep in mind this view’s conceptual limitations which become obvious the more one moves from the study of standard economic to institutionally embedded or to political markets. In this latter respect, there is indeed an alternative conception of redundancy representing exactly the opposite and concerning the role of redundant capacities for the emergence and solidity of what Wolfgang Streeck has called

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27 In that perspective, interest associations "would govern both the absence of relations (structural holes) between associate members on the one hand, and political institutions and other organizations on the other - as well as the asymmetry in information flows resulting from that absence. Structural holes, hence, represent entrepreneurial opportunities for interest associations to the extent that they may become intermediaries (bridges), able to control information flows and to coordinate the activities of actors which occupy positions on either side of the hole" (Perulli e Catino 1997:243).
systems of diversified quality production. Contrary to Burt’s conceptualization, this is an attributive type of redundancy that refers to single entities such as firms or systems of production and not to relations connecting firms or other actors to their organizational environment. Most importantly, it is a type of redundancy that represents a positive asset and not a constraint on the coming about of diversification, flexibility, responsiveness and adaptability.

Institutional saturation and redundant capacities

In this view, which has been elaborated in a number of publications over a wide period of time (see Streeck 1992, 1997; Sorge and Streeck 1988), redundancy is one among other central requirements (the requirement of a congenial organizational ecology, the requirement of collective production inputs) giving rise to an institutional exoskeleton which would prevent both market and hierarchy failure with regard to diversified quality production. Ultimately, Streek is interested in identifying the institutional conditions that may rescue redundant capacities from falling victim to the hyper-rationality and short-termism of narrow economic considerations. The problem with redundant capacities is that they are difficult to build in markets and through, or against, hierarchies. Therefore, they are more likely to be provided through collective institutional obligations than through individual-rational calculations (Streeck 1992:16). Four examples are mentioned by the author that, in essential ways, are thought to represent this property. These are (i) broad and high skills, (ii) a polyvalent organizational structure, (iii) decentralized competence and, finally, (iv) social peace (ibid.:16-21).

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Studying capacities of that kind, is not actually part of our task. Yet, in the interest of verifying their existence, in particular, for social realities such as the one of Baden-Württemberg -- a case consistently referred to by Streek as a prime example of a region with high levels of institutional saturation -- it would seem reasonable to ask for possibilities of operationalizing these capacities in empirical terms.

According to this perspective, there appear to be two problems with most of the ingredients of redundancy listed by Streek. These concern both their location and their generation/production. The first is, that they are located in-house, i.e. within or across the divisions of individual enterprises. They do not concern the overall structure of regional economies or political systems, although the ubiquitous “shadow of hierarchy” thrown on the micro-economic space, i.e. coercion by legislation and the imposition of rules that actually serve to generate, maintain, and enlarge redundant capacities, somehow adds this wider public dimension to the argument. For example, while the supply of broad and high skills generally tends to be suboptimal for DQP to come about, formal obligations imposed on firms to train by public intervention in industrial skill formation are said to offset this undersupply (ibid.:17). Similarly, the trend of entrepreneurs organizing their firm into narrowly specialized departments may be countered by “legislation or industrial agreements mandating employers to enlarge and enrich job definitions” (ibid.:19) and thus contribute to operational flexibility and polyvalent structures within the enterprise. Decentralized competences in decision-making, are equally difficult to sustain individually, not least due to the perverse incentive to keep, rather than diffuse, *Herrschaftswissen* in the sense of Karl Mannheim. Such competences may nevertheless be built up “in industrial relation procedures obligating managements to communicate
their strategic thinking to workers representatives (...) on a current basis and in advance of action being taken" (ibid.:20). Finally, social peace is of course a property largely being generated external to the firm. In an environment of high obligations, there will be constraints to firms to chose their own "social peace equilibrium". Co-determination rights, i.e. an asset safeguarding high levels of social peace industry-wide, or region-wide, "had to be imposed on employers by law so as to make it impossible for individual firms to 'cheat' on social peace in order to improve their competitive position" (ibid.:21).

As mentioned above, while most of the capacities mentioned by Streeck would seem irrelevant for the purpose of identifying more encompassing structural redundancies in the region, it is not unreasonable to believe that where micro-economic assets of this kind are so widely diffused as is claimed for the case of Baden-Württemberg, some of these should actually trickle through, or be reflected in the macro-political organizational ecology of the entire territory. The very notion of "institutional saturation" or of "institutional thickness", especially where used for a description of concrete cases such as the one of Baden-Württemberg, implicitly suggests the existence of many redundant ties in the wider interorganizational context. Consider, for example, the high amount of discretion in decision-making and of coercive power needed by political authorities for actually implementing and policing what Streeck has called "beneficial constraints" (Streeck 1994:185-213). If we were to take the divisions of regional government or the Landesministerien of Baden-Württemberg to be the guardians of redundant capacities, then we would expect very high density rates and many strong ties connecting capital and labours' representatives and other private organizations to various divisions of the public sector. Concerning interest groups, such an expectation would be warranted to the extent that they need to obtain access to institutions being endowed with quite significant regulatory powers. Vice versa, the latter themselves would need to make use of interest associations as additional implementation structures and policing agencies that guarantee the compliance with rules. Successful economic activity and redundant capacities at the

institutionally rich society, where markets are deeply embedded in an array of cooperative,

firm level would find their analogues in thriving government agencies and interest associations and, in part, in an organizational ecology of the region expressed in form of a large number of redundant ties30 - something which, given the data at our disposal, could then immediately be put to an empirical test.

Unfortunately, and this is the second problem with Streeck’s conceptualization, even this cannot be taken for granted. We did not consider the fact, and the author himself is not very explicit in that respect, that most of what he refers to as an 'institutional exoskeleton' (labour laws, co-determination acts, the dual training system, etc.), is actually provided for and protected by national, not by regional institutions and legislation. Regional government, at best, can control the implementation of these laws more or less vigourously, but it cannot modify them. In order to study redundant capacity differentials across regions and countries, one would obviously have to turn to the legislative material enacted by national laws and constitutions - a quite unsatisfying outcome for our research interest. Regional politics and organized collective action at that level remain rather unspecified in Streeck’s argument about redundant capacities. In particular, local or regional government is as much absent in that conceptualization as it is in most of the literature on industrial districts in Italy and, as we have tried to demonstrate earlier, in the bulk of literature on territorial interest intermediation. The only interlocutor, then, between the individual firm where redundant capacities are located, created, stored, and becoming manifest, and the (beneficially) constraining forces that make their accumulation possible and stable over time, is national legislation. Since every region can in principal draw from that source, it remains unclear then, what actually has set a region as Baden-Württemberg on a development track which, the

redistributive and regulatory institutions" (ibid.).

30 That there is a positive feed-back of this kind, has been argued by Pred (1967/69) with regard to the cumulative effects of regional economic strength and regional tax revenues. As shown by Peck (1994), this is further supported by regional labour market market effects such as, for example, the "brain drain" of peripheral areas which mostly benefits successful regions.
third contribution to the debate, namely Gernot Grabher’s work on "redundancy in regional development" (Grabher 1994).33

Weak ties, structural redundancies, and regional development

While Streeck did not explicitly relate the concept of redundancy to that of institutional saturation, i.e. to the institutional thickness of economies and of societies31, and while redundant capacities, in his view, essentially appear to be intangibles supplied by encompassing legislative provisions and put to work within the context of individual firms, Grabher takes the concept into a broader environment and translates it into guidelines for a research programme on structural redundancies in interorganizational networks. Redundancy is directly related to concrete regional institutions and organizations and, in particular, to the interorganizational ties connecting them. This then would seem to perfectly fit our own analytical exigencies and may provide the missing link between the conceptualization and the operationalization of the idea.

In a first attempt to address the problem in question, Grabher describes the history of a heavily industrialized area, Northrhine Westphalia, starting from the "golden days" of Fordist mass production, over a phase of subsequent de-industrialization, towards the current pattern of highly diversified quality production (Grabher 1991, 1993). Paraphrasing Granovetter, this region’s problems are depicted in terms of the "weakness of strong ties". Economic decline has set in, it is said, as a result of a number of functional, cognitive, and political lock-ins with far-reaching consequences for the adaptability of the region to its internal and external environments. Northrhine Westphalia’s territorial encapsulation was characterized by, first, extremely close and

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This is a topos traditionally being addressed by regional development theories and largely dominated by economics. Social science continues to have problems with it, especially in cases where social, political, and cultural disparities are not as pronounced as, for example, between Sicily and Lombardia. If we reject the path-dependent logic of primordial economic endowments with civicness to account for development differentials - having grown up in the flat and stormy but not necessarily uncivic environment of Niedersachsen, I myself have problems to believe in dramatic differences in civicness between the Northern and Southern parts of the Federal Republic - and if we further reject the path-dependent logic of primordial economic endowments which is so diffused in the Italian and international literature on industrial districts, then we end up with very few possible variables indeed. Largely unnoticed by the discussion on the subject matter, Parr (1993:240-244) has raised an interesting explanation. In his view, it are neither the administrative capacity (Verwaltungskraft) of a regional government nor the level of economic development that make for divergences but, rather, the cognitive-strategic attitudes of regional elites - not along a left-right axes but along the endpoints of a continuum marked by interventionism/liberalism on the one side and voluntarism/subsidiarism on the other. We shall come back to that argument later.

31 A full translation of the book’s title would read as follows: “In praise of excess capacities. Redundancy in regional development: A socio-economic appeal”. This does not leave any doubts as to where Grabher’s argument would have to be placed conceptually. The author, indeed, is a former colleague of Streeck’s at the Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin and has taken the latter’s concept to apply it to the domain of regional development.

33 Degrees of institutional saturation rather seem to be a function of the other two requirements mentioned above, namely those of a "congenial organizational ecology" and of "collective production
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stable links between the region’s core firms and the supplier sector that resulted in losses of the so-called boundary-spanning functions (functional lock-in), second, by personal ties of long standing that led to "groupthink" attitudes and the inability to perceive innovation opportunities (cognitive lock-in) and, finally, by cooperative relationships between industry, the Land government, regional and local planning authorities, unions, and professional associations that "petrified to a pre-perestrojca consensus culture (...) shaped by rather conservative Social Democrats, conservative unions and patriarchal industrialists" (Grabher 1990:11) and remained unchallenged for decades (political lock-in).

From this, the author deduces that strong ties in the functional, cognitive and political domains of regional systems of action would be detrimental to territorial development, ultimately leading to "neo-tribalism" and forms of "regional autism" and obstructing any possibility to diversify and innovate. This seems to be of direct concern to our research question, although we still do not know, apart from the impressionistic description of strong ties as being close, stable, and consensus-oriented, how to translate these properties for the purpose of comparative empirical analysis.

Let us see, therefore, whether by turning to the original source of these arguments the problem may be resolved. Granovetter himself is quite explicit with regard to the properties in question. He believes "most multiplex ties to be strong" (Granovetter 1973: note 3 on p.348) and further asserts that "mutual choice indicates a strong tie" (ibid.:351). While we would have to lean on descriptive and largely qualitative material to compare Grabher’s indicators across our regional cases, Granovetter’s measures can more easily be put to an empirical test -- multiplexity and reciprocity representing standard indicators in network analysis. To arrive at statements concerning the strength of ties, one would then have to assess the relative quantity of non-reciprocal and non-multiplex ties among members of a network. Yet, Granovetter goes further in his definition: an additional qualification of weak ties is that they "are more likely to link members of different small groups than are strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups" (ibid.:363). Transposing this general remark into concrete social settings, one may deduce from that that strong ties would be of a rather more formal character (i.e. family relationships or rules for obligatory consultation within an organization set) and would connect actors perceiving themselves as being mutually important. Weak ties, on the other hand, would then be of an informal character with relatively less importance attached to them. What is less clear is to what extent the strength of ties is related to redundancy. For example, can redundancy be identified only with respect to any one individual actor, i.e. in so-called ego-networks, or is it rather a function of overall network properties such as, for example, density?

In the interest of solving that puzzle, let us go back to Grabher where the problem is explicitly addressed. As in Streeck’s contribution and in the writings of many others working on territorial development networks and on their institutional preconditions in a specific German context, Grabher turns to the example of Baden-Württemberg to corroborate his arguments. In the absence of competitive market signals, he argues, that indicate where redundant capacities are best developed, "their generation and allocation calls for regional policy redefining incentives and disincentives of regional actors or the making of a context, in which the desired social outcome of individual action - networks

\[\text{As already mentioned, although the weak tie argument, in its original version, refers to the flow of resources through a network and not necessarily to communication contacts, parts of it are relevant for our research as well. For example, Granovetter asserts „that whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse greater social distance (i.e. path length), when passed through weak ties rather than strong” (ibid.:353) and that „(...) weak ties, often denounced as generative of alienation (...) are here seen as indispensable to individuals’opportunities and to their integration into communities; strong ties, breeding local cohesion, lead to overall fragmentaition.‟ (ibid.:365). We keep}\]

\[\text{inputs”. They are no expressions of redundant capacities but rather add to these the wider institutional infrastructure.}^34\]

34 Tribalism and autism are two strong expressions for realities which Grabher, borrowing from Luhmann, also interprets in terms of “folkloristic self-description”. Situations of that kind would require high levels of historical-cultural-linguistic identity and a strong sense of belonging. We shall see later that the two regions of our sample where properties of that kind are most developed (Catalunya and Wales), are also the ones being most active in terms of their external, extra-regional performance. This could be taken as an argument against the reliability of even the most sophisticated and appealing conceptualization which, while appearing sound and logical in itself, does not need to be valid in empirical situations.

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with redundant capacities - is achieved by individuals in their pursuit of personal interests and social values" (Grabher 1991:73). Such a context is identified as existing in the case of Baden-Württemberg where economic policies are said to be consensus-based (Dialog-orientierte Wirtschaftspolitik) and formally anchored in commonly agreed upon strategic documents such as that by the Zukunftskommission Wirtschaft 2000 (Grabher 1994:125). Quoting from Herrigel (1993:232) Grabher asserts that it is the fragmented, overlapping, and redundant character of public and private networks in that region which makes for the most efficient form of supplying decentralized production with service facilities. Redundant implementation structures, it is said, are particularly efficient where representative political institutions are characterized by relatively weak positions within the regional network such as in the case of Baden-Württemberg (Grabher 1994:123).

In other words, what we had derived from Streeck’s micro-economic notion of redundancy, namely that this, where it exists, would most likely possess an analogue in the configuration of interorganizational relations at the level of the region, is now being made explicit. It is all the more disappointing then that Grabher, having identified that property to be particularly well-developed in the Southern German case, feels immediately constrained to qualify his assertion in a most unexpected way. He says that "the capacity for action and the strategic ability of Baden-Württemberg (...) cannot simply be ascribed to this region’s specific institutions, particularly the ones in which regional attitudes are, so to speak, institutionally 'frozen': i.e. the Steinbeis Foundation and the Landesgewerbeamt." Equally questionable, he continues, is the supposition "that regional action capacity would proportionally grow with the density of institutional contacts" (ibid.:97).

Grabher refers to cases where "a high degree of institutional thickness coincides with a low level of regional action capacity"; as described by authors such as Hudson (1994) or by Amin and Thrift (1992) who identify the North-East of England as having fallen into a kind of apathy, despite being "over-burdened by development corporations, proactive local authorities, business-related training initiatives, development agencies, government industrial bodies, small-firm promotion ventures and other institutions engaged in the business of promoting economic regeneration." 36

We are caught, it seems, in a circular trap of reasoning of a kind that assumes redundancy in regional networks to be a decisive factor for development and to be expressed essentially by the density of contacts, a property which itself, however, is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of redundancy. Indeed, taking the argument all back, Grabher demonstrates "that there is hardly any difference between the institutional infrastructure of Baden-Württemberg and of Northrhein-Westphalia with regard to the density and the scope of public institutions - something obviously not the case for the development dynamics of the two regions" (ibid.:98) and, as might be added, for those of the two regions of our sample, i.e. Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachen. What we have here is something we had already encountered earlier when referring to Robert Putnam’s networks of civic communities. Although explicitly operating relational metaphors such as, for instance, the "density of institutional contacts" (see above), the argument ultimately ends up in basically qualitative and attributive descriptions. Grabher’s work, although hitting the core of our problem and furnishing extremely interesting ideas about the organizational ecology of regional systems of action, expresses the general dilemma of research which, while arguing in relational terms, is not able to provide for more than just quantitative evidence of the attributive kind.

Close to the point from where we started, we are left, therefore, with a handful of network-analytic measures that continue, as before, to be rather bold and difficult to interpret in the context of concrete socio-political settings. On the one hand, we possess a couple of "atmospheric" (Streeck) and "attributive" (Grabher) definitions of the role of redundancy in territorial networks that perfectly fit our research target, but have the disadvantage of escaping attempts at empirical verification. On the other hand, we possess a definition of redundancy perfectly applicable to the type of data we are working with (Burt) but, at the same time, rather useless for the study of regional ecologies. The danger of idiosyncrasy of the cases and of their subjective interpretation notwithstanding, the only feasible answer to the problem in question -- i.e. reconciling the conceptual with the empirical facets of relational indicators -- seems to lie in
comparative case-studies from scratch. Somehow embarrassingly, Grabher admits that “reflexions on the relevance of redundant capacities (...) are likely to make sense only in concrete regional constellations” (1994:113; emphasis added by me).

COMPARING THE ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGIES OF REGIONS

Now that we know that redundancy is a relevant asset in territorial development, but hard to measure, and that density is an important facet of redundancy, but in itself not yet sufficient as an indicator, let us see whether it is possible to arrive at more substantial insights by confronting the results achieved by an application of the above measures to the nine regional cases. To really assess the validity of the structural hypotheses raised towards the end of each section in Chapter Three, one would need information about the roles and positions of individual actors within each organizational ecology. Before turning to a more detailed analysis of that kind, it might be enlightening to look at the cases from a perspective that disregards individual actors and tries to come up with judgement about eventual pluralist, corporatist, etatist, etc. by exclusively considering the overall structures of the networks. This is what is being done in the present section.

First the overall properties of the networks are being submitted to analysis. In a second step, an attempt is made to evaluate the distinct patterns of interest intermediation present in each case. To do this, actors belonging to the group of finance and technology brokers are dropped from the data sets. We shall look exclusively at communication contacts and influence reputation of public institutions and interest associations.

The measures being used for comparison have all been introduced in Section Two of this chapter and are not made the subject of further comments. They concern the density, centralization, reciprocity, and multiplexity of the overall structures and are all contained in Table 4.2. The table, admittedly, is rather complex and not easy to assimilate. This complexity is warranted as it allows for a quick view on the aggregate results. The indicators will be discussed step by step and only the final synopsis will try to evaluate the extent to which they are actually compatible and reinforce each other.

Row A.1 contains information about the units of analysis that had to be processed both for the cases of the contact and the reputation networks. While these are made up of an average of 934 possible relations, the Welsh network figures rank lowest with 380 potential ties and the Sicilian one ranks highest with 1,482 potential ties. Altogether, 8,402 relations had to be checked with a view to establishing whether ties were absent, of unilateral character, or linking any two actors in a reciprocal way. Considering that this had to be done for two networks per region, the overall number of units of analysis then is 16,804. Of the 8,402 possible relations, only 2,329 have actually been “realized” in the case of the contact networks, that is, on average 259 per individual network (row A.2). Again, we see that the contact portfolios of organizations in Sicily are most developed (453 ties reported), while Welsh organizations rank last in terms of the absolute number of contacts connecting any two of the British network members.

While this is, in itself, not yet significant, this is different for the proportional expression of these values represented by the density values for the contact network in row A.3. The average network density of 0.27 indicates that 259 relations of an average total of 934 are present. Since the values for each individual network are normalized, this allows for a first straightforward comparison across the networks. We now see that it is not the organizations of the British region which are least well connected (density 0.22) but, rather, those of the two German Länder (density 0.21 and 0.17 respectively in Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachsen). Let us first consider the two most basic indicators, density and degree-based centralization. Recall that the latter reflects the extent to which a network is dominated by one or a few other individual organizations, that is, the extent to which the network is focussed around a specific region of the network.
To facilitate comparison, the two measures are combined and then plotted in a two-dimensional space\(^{57}\) as shown in figure 4.1. The picture is quite astonishing. The first thing that becomes immediately apparent, is the rather well-pronounced national patterning of cases. The two German *Lander* on the one hand, and the Italian *regioni* on the other, are not only particularly close to each other, but also occupy identical boxes in their respective plot area. The result is slightly different for the case of the Spanish *comunidad autónomas* and the French regions. In the first case, closeness might be considered strong enough to speak of a national cluster. Languedoc-Roussillon and Rhone-Alpes, however, although both being placed in the upper half of the figure, appear to be too far apart from each other to speak of a national pattern. They would seem to represent cases being different in kind, not in degree.

The second peculiarity is the obvious north-south divide. Regional ecologies in Southern Europe (apart from Andalucia) all appear in the upper half of the plot area (high density) and also occupy positions opposite to the two German *Lander* plus Wales when measured in terms of centralization (apart from Rhone-Alpes). Rhone-Alpes is the only region of the Latin and of the Northern groups figuring high on both indicators, with Andalucia representing the opposite extreme. Both these regions are approaching the Northern pattern in terms of at least one of the two relational properties.

Yet, given their history, constitutional set-up, and institutional environment, it seems more reasonable to view them in terms of deviations from the Southern rather than of deviations from the Northern group. In any case, the north-south divide is an intriguing outcome. It evokes many possible interpretations. We shall see, that many of them do not hold what they are promising and that, on the contrary, the positioning of the cases is actually counter-intuitive. The most interesting aspect inherent in the two clusters is the fact that Southern Europe, quite obviously, does not anymore pop up "(...) in the off-cell, adhering to the wrong cluster" (Schmitter 1986:3). Due to the sample consisting of (at

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### Tab. 4.2: Overall properties of networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RA</th>
<th>LR</th>
<th>LO</th>
<th>SI</th>
<th>BW</th>
<th>NdS</th>
<th>AN</th>
<th>CT</th>
<th>WA</th>
<th>mean</th>
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<td><strong>A.1 all categories (n)</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. dyads (contact)</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1190</td>
<td>1486</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>1332</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. dyads (contact) <em>realized</em></td>
<td>309</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>259</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. density contact $\Delta_{reg}$</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. [no contact] $\Delta_{reg}$</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. density reputation $\Delta_{reg}$</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. [no reputation] $\Delta_{reg}$</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. centralization contact $C_{reg}$</td>
<td>52.80</td>
<td>30.54</td>
<td>35.47</td>
<td>37.13</td>
<td>63.55</td>
<td>48.00</td>
<td>37.14</td>
<td>38.57</td>
<td>63.16</td>
<td>45.15</td>
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<td>9. reciprocal contacts (%)</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. $\text{mpx - zero (}x_0 = 0\text{)}$</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. $\text{mpx - one (}x_0 = 1\text{)}$</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. $\text{mpx - two (}x_0 = 2\text{)}$</td>
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<td>0.17</td>
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<td>0.25</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. $\text{mpx - three (}x_0 = 3\text{)}$</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. ties in row 12 as prop. of row 2 (%)</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>37.9</td>
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</table>

**B.1 most central actor extracted (n) *\(^*\)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>34</th>
<th>38</th>
<th>31</th>
<th>26</th>
<th>36</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. contact density $\Delta_{reg}$ - cat 1</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. centralization contact $C_{reg}$ - cat 1</td>
<td>-13.3</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-22.4</td>
<td>-16.7</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-8.1</td>
<td>-27.9</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B.1 category 3 extracted (n) \(^*\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>24</th>
<th>27</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>32</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. contact density $\Delta_{reg}$ - cat 1</td>
<td>+0.06</td>
<td>+0.03</td>
<td>+0.02</td>
<td>+0.04</td>
<td>+0.02</td>
<td>+0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>+0.02</td>
<td>+0.04</td>
<td>+0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. centralization contact $C_{reg}$ - cat 1</td>
<td>-6.13</td>
<td>+4.64</td>
<td>+8.38</td>
<td>+8.93</td>
<td>-4.98</td>
<td>+3.96</td>
<td>-4.02</td>
<td>+3.54</td>
<td>+0.05</td>
<td>+1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. centralization contact $C_{reg}$ - cat 2</td>
<td>+1.12</td>
<td>-8.00</td>
<td>+4.41</td>
<td>+2.73</td>
<td>-2.13</td>
<td>+7.50</td>
<td>+7.47</td>
<td>+0.35</td>
<td>-4.96</td>
<td>+0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. reciprocal contacts (%) $\Delta_{reg}$ - cat 1</td>
<td>+4.60</td>
<td>+4.73</td>
<td>+4.96</td>
<td>+5.70</td>
<td>+4.40</td>
<td>+3.17</td>
<td>+4.52</td>
<td>+2.86</td>
<td>+4.27</td>
<td>+4.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. contact density (cat 1 $\rightarrow$ cat 2)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. contact density (cat 2 $\rightarrow$ cat 1)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. mpx - three (}x_0 = 3\text{) cat 1 $\rightarrow$ cat 2</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. mpx - three (}x_0 = 3\text{) cat 2 $\rightarrow$ cat 1</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. ties in row 8 as prop. of row 6 (%)</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>45.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. ties in row 9 as prop. of row 7 (%)</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{57}\) Note that no computer programme has been used for this plot. The two dimensions intersect at their respective median values while the lengths of the axes have been achieved by normalizing the values across both dimensions.
least) fifty per cent of southern regions, we finally have an opportunity to avoid that kind of residual treatment of Southern Europe and analyze the cases in their own right.

FIG. 4.1
overall density and centralization indicies

By the standards of mainstream policy network analysis, the above pattern would appear to represent a paradox. As was outlined above, the typical "networked region" - take the case of Baden-Württemberg as presented in Chapter Three - is consistently described in terms of dense contacts and exchanges between public administration, para-state or development agencies, and the system of interest associations. Networked regions, moreover, are also thought of as possessing flat hierarchies, i.e. a vast number of mechanisms making for consensual patterns of policy-making, joint-problem solving, and so forth. Territorial cases belonging to the category of unitary or of regionalized states, on the contrary, are usually described as being fragmented both in the administrative and the private dimensions, with public agencies behaving in an exclusionary manner as regards access to decision-making, and in a hierarchical and unilateral manner with respect to policy implementation.

Nowhere has this been made more explicit than by Philip Cooke (1997). The author places five of our regions, namely the Four-Motor regions (including Wales)\textsuperscript{38}, in a contingency table that tries to take account, simultaneously, of two substantially different properties: the specific institutional setting of the respective nation state and, secondly, the specific characteristics of the five subnational units, representing "systems of collective social order" (ibid:364). The two dimensions of his table, i.e. territoriality (high and low sovereignty and hierarchy) and functionality (strong and weak cohesiveness and heterarchy) generate four distinct patterns: (i) regions in a nightwatchman state with an active civil society but weak regionalism (Lombardia)\textsuperscript{39}; (ii) regions of unitary states with an active civil service but weak regionalism (Rhone-Alpes and, to a lesser extent, Wales)\textsuperscript{40}; (iii) homogeneous regions based on associationalism and networking (Catalunya and, to a lesser extent, Wales)\textsuperscript{41}; and, (iv) finally, heterogeneous regions characterized by high levels of competition and pluralism (Baden-Württemberg)\textsuperscript{42}.

In our picture, Wales appeared to be not too far away from both Rhone-Alpes and Catalunya - at least in regard to centralization. Yet, it is definitely closest to Baden-Württemberg.

\textsuperscript{38} The regional presidents of Baden-Württemberg, Catalunya, Rhone-Alpes, and Lombardia have signed a cooperation agreement that is formally recognized by the European Union. Wales is an associate member of this Four-Motor Initiative.

\textsuperscript{39} "Lombardy is a very powerful region in a weak state" (ibid:355).

\textsuperscript{40} "Rhone-Alpes is a politically (though not economically) weak region in a strong, centralized state" (ibid:355).

\textsuperscript{41} Catalunya is a strong region "in a relatively low-hierarchy state" and "is both rich in cultural, political and economic associationalism and well networked internally and externally" (ibid:355). Wales "seems to be closest to Rhone-Alpes, in being set within a strongly centralist sovereign state which does not even allow it the weak regional assembly that French regions enjoy" (ibid:356). However, Wales "is also quite close to Catalunya with its distinctive language and cultural institutions" (ibid). It is "definitely unlike Lombardia or Baden-Württemberg" (ibid).

\textsuperscript{42} According to Cooke, regions in Germany are rather strong, with centralized sovereignty and hierarchy being low. They are "competitive though pluralistic rather than, say, ethnically differentiated" (ibid:354).
The overall configurations

Württemberg on both indicators. Rhone-Alpes and Catalunya may be adjacent, or similar in terms of network density, as suggested by Cooke’s contingency table, but Wales can certainly not be ascribed an intermediate position between the two. In any case, by Cooke’s definition, relatively high density in the cases of the French and the Spanish region would result from high degrees of associationalism and societal networking in the latter case and from a proactive regional administration seeking to draw private actors into its policy deliberations in the former one. The fact that organizational activities are focussed around public agencies in France (active civil service operating under unitary state conditions) and more evenly distributed among an array of different actors in Spain (associational networking) would explain the relatively high and relatively low centralization indices of the two cases respectively. The one case, where Cooke’s classification would appear to be most appropriate, is Catalunya. It seems logical to assume that a politically and ethnically homogeneous region with strong propensities for associative action and networking should be characterized by high density and rather flat hierarchies. To some extent, the same characterization may then also be made for some of the other members of the southern cluster, for example, Lombardia and Languedoc-Roussillon. Yet, the hypothesis does not hold for Wales and, in particular, for the two German Länder. As we have seen, Baden-Württemberg is consistently described by other authors in terms of a networked political economy with high propensities for all kinds of joint activities between the private and the public - a characterization that the very same author applied in a number of previous publications (Cooke and Morgan 1994; Cooke et.al. 1995).

Not very different from Cooke’s intentions, Figure 4.1 could also be discussed in terms of state-society boundaries or, more precisely, in terms of differentiation and de-differentiation of state-society relations. The message deriving from such a conceptualization would be substantially different, however. It would touch upon the redundancy issue discussed above, and would somehow reflect the fact that southern European regions are relative late-comers in terms of state-society differentiation. This, accordingly, would explain the low degrees of hierarchization and a dense web of interorganizational relations. High density, in such an interpretative scenario, would appear to be a substitute for an absence of guidance by state authorities. On the other hand, the two regions representing the German case would be characterized by highly differentiated state-society relations, while the manifold hypotheses raised, a propos their subsequent de-differentiation, would hardly seem to be confirmed. Statism would continue to be pronounced, with little room for a mutual penetration of the public and the private - a possibility that had not been discounted in the hypothesis-raising chapter above. Wales would fit perfectly the same picture, at least by Katzenstein’s standards. It would represent a country whose policy networks are characterized by a “clear differentiation between State and society [where] a single attention is paid to the maintenance of jurisdictional boundaries” (Katzenstein 1977:310).

An alternative, but somehow related interpretation of the two German cases would run as follows: De-differentiation has indeed taken place, yet this does not lead to the type of strong intermingling of public and private organizations and, hence, to the high network density one might have expected. The ministeries of the two Länder, being highly efficient and conforming perfectly with their institutionally defined task of diffusing all kinds of information, habitually fulfill that task, so to speak, by default (standard operating procedures). Certain types of contacts that are guaranteed anyway and that are partly formalized, have simply been taken for granted by the respondents and, accordingly, were not thought to be worth mentioning. In other words, the German regional ecologies would be characterized by high redundancy, but this would be so deeply entrenched in routine procedures that it hardly shows up in our analysis. On the other hand, competence problems, coordination deficits, complementarity, competing decision structures, lacking resources, and modest degrees of efficiency of public authorities in some of the southern regions would lead to a situation where organizational disadvantages of this kind would need to be substituted by strong efforts of all network members to maintain and secure the maximum number of contacts possible. Hence,
weakly pronounced state-society boundaries and high density as a substitute for a lack of guidance and control by public authorities. At a first glance, these speculative thoughts would seem to run counter to our results. We shall come back to them later when discussing further network properties.

There is another and rather recent contribution to the problem of state-society boundaries. In his work on different industrial relations traditions, Colin Crouch has attempted to draw "the borderlines of the political and who are to be counted as legitimate political actors" (Crouch 1993:viii) for a great number of European and non-European countries. Crouch identifies France, together with the UK and the USA, as representing cases of rather strong state-society borderlines (ibid:ix) but, also, as being completely differently organized than, for example, Germany: "The French and the German are two very different political traditions; there is as yet no European synthesis between them. It is possible, with some distortion, to regard the various other continental European traditions as being of either the French or the German type" (ibid:4).

Crouch's remarks, of course, refer to national cases and to national political-institutional traditions. However, considering that these traditions are thought to be reflected in specific state-society boundaries and, secondly, that our cases exhibit some rather clear national patterns as well due, most probably, to exactly those traditions, his statement would also be relevant for the present context. To some extent, the French-German antipode is indeed emerging from our figure, with Germany represented by Baden-Württemberg and France by Languedoc-Roussillon. These are the two cases furthest apart from each other. Yet, the problem remains that one would rather have expected a reverse image, with Wales, as in Cooke’s imagination, being much closer to the French extreme, while Italy and Spain could then be interpreted as intermediate cases. Moreover, if we were to take high density and low centralization as proxies for weak and the opposite pattern as proxies for strong state-society boundaries, we would expect the whole image to be reversed, with the two German Länder alone occupying the upper-right area of the figure, all the other cases the bottom-left space, and Wales coming close to France.

At this point of analysis, there is as yet no single and unambiguous answer to the counter-intuitive pattern of network structures of Figure 4.1. The following possibilities would need to be considered. First, state-society boundaries at the subnational level are obviously diverging from those characterizing national societies in their entirety. For example, where corporatism has been identified to be the general pattern of interest intermediation at the macro-level, this type of governance arrangement can in no way be taken as a yardstick for evaluating the manifestations of policy-making at the subnational level of the same national state. It may, at best, provide a guideline for analysis. National corporatism cannot be used as a proxy for regional corporatism. Varieties of governance arrangements at the subnational level are wide enough to allow for substantial fluctuations along a corporatism-pluralism continuum even for countries whose general patterns are clearly corporatist in nature. All this would add to the need to spend more energy in research of meso-level arrangements that are not just sectoral in nature.

Secondly, although qualitative-political properties of systems of governance such as corporatism, pluralism, etatism, etc. are thought to possess very distinct relational features, this may not actually be the case when looking at them through empirically informed and structurally aligned lenses. The guiding organizational principle of

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43 As argued by the author, this is “many respects (...) what the whole debate about neo-corporatism has turned out to be about” (ibid.). Crouch, who studies one particular area of political practise, namely the organization of employers and workers and the relationships of these organizations to government, recognizes that the patterns identified may not be capable of generalization. Yet, “it is an area of importance (...) and one where political practise does seem to correspond to what is often presented as being generally representative of a particular society” (ibid:4).

44 Take, for example, van Waarden’s (1992) classification, or the model suggested by Atkinson and Coleman (1989, 1992). Even schemes such as the one by Streeck and Schmitter (1985:5 and 9) may not perfectly reflect empirical realities. Why, for example, should an “associative model of social order” not also be able to function according to a logic of “hierarchical control” rather than to one of “inter- and intra-organizational concertation” or, better, why should such concertation not be over-determined by “hierarchical control” without the entire scenario necessarily assuming the characteristics of traditional “state corporatism”?
The overall configurations

The overall configurations

corporatism may be the hierarchical imposition of rules\textsuperscript{45} or it may be one of pluralism, but both may equally be organized in the form of flat hierarchies and consensual structures. There is nothing that could, \textit{a priori}, establish how the various corporatism, pluralisms, and etatisms are ordered in interorganizational terms. Unfortunately, the fact remains, that we do not possess any empirical relational material with which to compare our data.

Finally, there is the intriguing but somewhat hazardous option of interpreting the data in terms of a reversed image, as mentioned above. Structural redundancies would then appear to be hidden, so to speak, behind a veil of standard operating procedures, so that the organizational contact portfoglio of some regions (especially in Germany) would merely reflect the minimum ingredient of what is required to hold the network together. The much celebrated redundant capacities of a region such as Baden-Württemberg would then be likely to be expressed by alternative measures which have not been considered so far. On the other hand, the coupling of high density and low centralization in regional ecologies would appear to stand for a situation where public administration is lacking competences, void of authoritative powers, and suffering from all sorts of resource constraints, with interest associations trying to compensate for these disadvantages by way of over-investments into their relational capital stock (Schmitter and Lanzalaco 1989). Since none of these speculations can be taken for granted at this point of analysis, let us postpone the question of why it is that the above counter-intuitive pattern emerged and instead turn to the question of how the overall network structures could be described further.

The next candidate to be considered is betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality was said to indicate the extent to which (potential) information flows, or flows of other resources, are determined and "controlled" by one, or a few more centrally positioned actors or brokers. Knoke, Pappi et.al. (1996) take this centrality measure as a proxy for network integration (see Section 4.2). A widely diffused handbook of sociology (Hillmann 1994:377) defines the degree of integration within a social whole in terms of the "extent to which the system is being organized in a consensual manner, i.e. the extent to which there is stability in the recognition of commonly shared behavioral norms." The meaning of our indicator for integration should not be stretched too far in that direction. It would be excessive, for instance, to ascribe to networks, with relatively high degrees of betweenness centralization, properties such as social cohesion, consensus, or high levels of territorial identity. Yet, even without assuming such far-reaching qualitative characteristics, betweenness measures may further enrich the understanding of the overall patterning of relations.

The result is most significant. As was the case for degree-based centralization (i.e. hierarchy), the southern German regional ecology outperforms the rest in terms of network integration, while the Sicilian network ranks lowest on this indicator. This assumes particular importance if one considers the very high and the relatively low degrees of density of the two networks (0.21 and 0.34 for the German and the Italian case respectively). Quite obviously, a network may be extremely dense in its contact portfoglio without necessarily being well-integrated, but it may also exhibit a rather neat integration with low degrees of density.

The picture gets more interesting if the two centralization measures are considered simultaneously. Imagining, as before, the regional cases plotted along two axes with one indicating degree-based (hierarchy/heterarchy) and the other betweenness-based centralization (integration/disintegration), the following patterns would appear. Baden-Württemberg, Niedersachsen, and Wales would again form a rather clear-cut cluster ("high integration by hierarchy") and Rhone-Alpes would, as before, be the only occupant of the second plot area ("hierachy with low integration"). The only group of Figure 4.1 which would now split up into two distinct clusters is the southern European one. Lombardia and Sicilia would be the only cases to occupy the "low integration by heterarchy" area of the figure, while the two Spanish regions plus Languedoc-Roussillon action if interest associations refuse, or are not able to arrive at mutually agreeable solutions.

\textsuperscript{45} A situation, where, as mentioned by Schmitter and Grote (1997), the state threatens with unilateral
now show up in an area that could be labeled "high integration by diffusion, or by heterarchy". As in Figure 4.1, national patterning would remain rather pronounced with the noteworthy exception of the French cases which would now appear in two diametrically opposed areas.

A composite view of the three measures considered so far shows the following five combinations. The two German cases plus Wales are characterized by relatively low degrees of density, are highly integrated, and exhibit rather strong hierarchical patterns. Their networks exhibit the strongest degrees of structural dependency on the most centrally positioned actors⁶⁶. Rhone-Alpes and Andalucia are the only two cases that do not form groups with other members of the sample. The French network, despite its high density, is hierarchically organized, but not well integrated. The Spanish network exhibits low density values with relations widely diffused (heterarchy) within an overall setting of high integration. The two Italian regions represent cases diametrically opposed to the first, the German-British group. Their organizational ecologies are densely knit, modestly integrated, and lack forms of hierarchical superimposition or control by any one singularly well-placed organization. Finally, Languedoc-Roussillon and Catalunya are most similar to the Italian cases, with the only difference that their networks appear to be better integrated. Whether this is due, at least in the Spanish case, to strong territorial identity and culturally-ethnic characteristics, cannot be answered here.

Let us now turn back to the weak tie and redundancy arguments introduced earlier. Drawing from authors such as Granovetter, Burt, and Grabher, these properties were said to be partially reflected in the relative number of reciprocal ties present in a network and, secondly, by the occurrence of multiplex relations across different types of networks. Relatively high levels of reciprocity (row A.9) are achieved by the two French and the two Italian regional ecologies. Close to fifty per cent of relations connecting any two actors of these networks are of a strong character, with values in Sicily figuring as high as 57 per cent of all contacts realized. This may not be astonishing if one considers that these four regions are the ones with the highest density values, and that density can be expected to be positively correlated with reciprocity (see the remarks made by Burt on these two indicators). Baden-Württemberg is the only case where a negative correlation occurs. Its network is the only one to exhibit low density and relatively high reciprocity values. This region, together with Catalunya, forms an intermediate group with reciprocity oscillating slightly above or below the average value of 42.7 per cent. Clearly below the average are Niedersachsen (31.7), Andalucia (35.0), and Wales (28.6) where the vast majority of communication contacts are of a unilateral and weak character, thus confirming the positive correlation hypothesis above.

We now see that the weak tie argument should not be taken too literally. Adopting Burt’s perspective, the only thing that could be said, would be that opportunities for political entrepreneurs to occupy niches in the institutional and political markets of their respective ecologies are most pronounced in the structurally unsaturated and non-redundant regions of Niedersachsen, Andalucia, and Wales. If any gains could be achieved by occupying the structural holes of networks, then these three regions would appear to represent the perfect conditions for administrators of regional and subregional government bodies, for chamber presidents, and for the key figures of territorial interest associations, to improve the endowment of their own organizations with relational assets or, for those cases possessing a strong inclination towards the achievement of public goods, the endowment of their entire territorial environment with these same assets. One could also say that these cases are structurally "underdeveloped". Although, in purely relative terms, Andalucia and Niedersachsen also represent the economically less developed regions of their respective national groups, this does not allow for the drawing of easy conclusions a propos eventual correlations between relational and economic and/or institutional underdevelopment. In any case, most of the other regions turn out to

⁶⁶ Structural dependency on particularly hegemonic actors has been calculated by extracting these actors from the networks and then measuring their densities and centralization indices after extraction. As was expected, density only slightly increases in all nine cases (see row B.2 of Table 4.2). This is different with respect to centralization (row B.3) which dramatically decreases in Baden-Württemberg (-22.4), Niedersachsen (-16.7), and Wales (-27.9). Note, that in the Welsh case, two actors had to be extracted from the matrix, since both were carrying identical indegree centrality values.
be structurally saturated in one way or the other, i.e. either because of strong reciprocity (Baden-Württemberg), or because of a simultaneous occurrence of reciprocity and density (Rhone-Alpes, Languedoc-Roussillon, Lombardia, Sicilia, Catalunya).

But what about redundancy? In the absence of other indicators, let us try to answer that question by turning to multiplex ties occurring between the communication contact and the influence reputation networks. By overlaying the respective matrices, four different density values are achieved for each of the possible combinations. These figures are contained in rows A.10 through A.13 of Table 4.2. Zero entries represent the absence of relations on both properties, i.e. neither contact nor reputation. The two German Länder rank highest on that indicator; the Italian regioni, Catalunya and, to some extent, Languedoc-Roussillon rank lowest; and Wales, Andalucia, and Rhone-Alpes represent intermediate cases.

The values of row A.11 (mpx - one) indicate the densities for a relational situation characterized by the presence of reputation and the absence of contact. With some imagination, satisfaction or dissatisfaction indices could be derived from that information. For example, organizations in Lombardia, Sicilia, and Wales, all clearly above the average density value of 0.11, would obtain the strongest dissatisfaction indices with regard to their respective contact portfolio. 15 per cent of the dyads in the northern Italian case are of a type indicating that the organization chosen is very important (high influence reputation) but that no contact exists with this organization. Since the desire to establish contact to high reputation organizations can be taken for granted, one could then argue that the absence of contacts somehow reflects the inaccessibility or closure of these organizations versus their environment. This dissatisfaction or frustration index is lowest in the case of the French (0.08 and 0.09) and the German regions (0.08 and 0.05). This could be taken to indicate that, in the cases of Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachsen for example, general satisfaction with the

47 Note that the column sum of the values contained in rows A.10 - A.13 adds up to 100. Hence, the figures could also be read as percentages obtained by specific types of relations (e.g. contact to contact situation is relatively high, and this despite the existence of rather rigid hierarchies and of poor network density 48.

The more interesting values are contained in row A.12 (mpx - two) and A.13 (mpx - three). The first indicates the presence of contacts with important organizations, i.e. a '1'-entry in each of the two binary adjacency matrices for any specific cell. The second is the reverse of row A.11 and indicates the presence of contacts with organizations that have not been accredited high reputation or, the shorthand for this situation, "contact to unimportant organizations".

Network images

Based on a combination of reciprocal ties and of ties to organizations reporting mutual relevance, we are now in a position to exhibit the structures of some of the networks in the form of graphic representations. This shall be done only for three of them, namely for Baden-Württemberg, Languedoc-Roussillon, and Sicilia. The first two of these have been selected because of the strong diversity in their overall network properties, especially in regard to density and centralization (degree-based). In Figure 4.1, these were the two cases furthest apart from each other. The expectation, therefore, was that a graphic representation of the two networks should allow for an immediate understanding of the network structures that is more difficult to gain by simply consulting the figures contained in Table 4.2. Sicily has been chosen because it represents an extreme case on a number of indicators (reputation density in row A.5, contact betweenness centralization in row A.8, and contact reciprocity in row A.9) and, secondly, because of my own "familiarity" with this specific case.

48 Interestingly, albeit not easy to interpret, low dissatisfaction indices co-vary with a consensual policy style in five cases. In Sicily and Lombardy, 56 per cent and 52 per cent of respondents of the overall sample had indicated the dominant policy style of their region to be conflictual. At the same time, 72 per cent in Rhone-Alpes, 68 per cent in Baden-Württemberg and 85 per cent in Catalunya characterize their respective region’s policy style to be consensual. This data is taken from the results of the overall project (see Kohler-Koch 1998) and shall not be made subject of further comments.
In principal, it would have been possible to present all of the networks in form of two-dimensional plots with organizations occupying central and less central positions in an organizational space. Visual representation has the advantage of getting an immediate impression of the network structures. Yet, it does not produce any indicators that could be submitted to comparative analysis. The centralities and peripheralities of individual organizations are discussed in the subsequent chapter where use is made of more reliable procedures and indicators. The option of graphically representing the information contained in the raw matrices has also been dropped. The multitude of ties that would have criss-crossed the space would have made a reasonably easy consultation of the resulting pictures almost impossible. This is different, if only reciprocal ties are chosen for representation. As we know from Table 4.2 (row A.9), this substantially reduces complexity to less than fifty per cent of ties "realized" in the overall network (Sicilia being excluded) and facilitates a visual consultation of the figures.

As mentioned in Section 4.2, path distances have been taken as inputs to the multidimensional scaling procedures (MDS). Although path distance tells us little in the case of contact networks, their graphic representation allows for instantaneous insights in a number of properties such as network density, relative centrality of individual actors, and the distance between any two actors. For the purpose of MDS plotting, we first need to symmetrize the original adjacency matrices in such a way that only mutually confirmed information was taken to be valid (reciprocity). In other words, only "strong" relations are being considered in the following figures, i.e. relations based on "1"-entries in the matrix cells both for "choices made" and "choices received" for the same pair of actors. In all three cases, there were a number of organizations that only possessed unilateral ties to other members of the network. These now appeared as "isolates" and had to be extracted from the matrices before submitting them to the path distance procedure. The Baden-Württemberg network was reduced in that way from 32 to 27, Languedoc-Roussillon now only possessed 28 rather than the original 30 organizations, and Sicilia dropped from 39 to 34. The path distance matrices of these reduced data sets were then taken as input for the MDS procedure. The algorithm used for multidimensional scaling in UCINET IV is based on the MDS(X) MINISSA program. It finds for matrices of proximities - in this case dissimilarities, or distances - among sets of items a set of points in two-dimensional space such that the Euclidean distances among these points correspond as closely as possible to their input proximities49.

The resulting coordinates, together with the now reduced original adjacency matrices were then exported from UCINET and inserted into KrackPlot (Krackhardt et.al. 1993, 1994, 1995), a specific network drawing program. The most recent version of KrackPlot allows for a procedure called "annealing". Simulated annealing is an optimization routine that maximizes certain positive features of the graph layout. For example, nodes are not too close to each other, edges are not too long, and nodes do not go through edges. No use has been made of this option, since we did not want to distort the spatial information contained in the plots in any way. Only a number of manual modifications have been undertaken in some cases that, however, do not dramatically change the general picture. Euclidean distances are more or less maintained. The graphic representation of networks in Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 exhibits only strong, i.e. reciprocal ties among organizations. Relations among organizations that perceive themselves to be mutually relevant appear as boldfaced ties.

Let us first inspect the Baden-Württemberg pattern. On the general indicators, this region was characterized by relatively low network density, strong hierarchical "domination", and rather strong network integration. This appears to be confirmed even if only reciprocal ties are being considered. The following network properties are most apparent when consulting Figure 4.2. The network is clearly divided in a region towards the bottom-right of the plot area occupied only by public institutions ("A"s and "a"s), and in a second region occupied by finance and technology brokers ("B"s) and interest associations ("P"s). Three of these latter (P3, P6, and P3), representing the trade union community of the region, appear to be disconnected from the other members of the

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49 For further information on multidimensional scaling see Kruskal and Wish (1978) and the relevant
The overall configurations

private sphere and, instead, maintain strong ties to the Land’s Minister for Social Affairs (A7). Unions and ministry also perceive each other to be mutually relevant.

Fig. 4.2:
Baden Württemberg
Multidimensional scaling of path distances

The eight most central organizations (measured in terms of their betweenness centrality scores):

A1: Staatsministerium
A3: Ministerium für Wissenschaft & Kunst
A5: Ministerium für Wirtschaft & Technologie
A7: Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit & Soziales
P6: Industrie und Handelskammer BW
B2: Steinbeis Foundation
B3: EU Liaison Office
B7: Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftskooperation

Notes: The MDS plot only represents reciprocal ties (minimum symmetrization). Five of the network actors which did not result to possess reciprocal ties to any of the other organizations had to be extracted from the original matrix. Ties linking organizations that perceive each other to be mutually relevant are boldfaced. Graph has been slightly changed manually so that distances do not exactly represent euclidean distances. A’s are divisions of regional government (or of subregional public authorities, i.e. ‘A’s), P’s are interest associations, B’s are finance and technology brokers. For codes of individual organizations see appendix. Software used: KrackPlot 3.1 (Krackhardt et al. 1993, 1994, 1995).

In general, interest associations, the unions included, occupy rather marginal network positions. They form the network’s periphery. The center is clearly dominated by one single organization, the Economics Ministry (Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Mittelstand). It attracts twelve of the mutual ties of the reduced network, with more than half of these indicating mutual relevance. Two thirds (10 out of 15) of the mutual relevance ties are connecting public institutions and para-state agencies such as the Steinbeis Foundation (B2), universities (B9), and polytechnics (B10). Interest groups are chosen by public actors, and themselves chose these actors in terms of reciprocal contacts and mutual relevance, in only three cases: the Social Affairs Ministry (A7), the Economics Ministry (A3), and the Landesgewerbeamt (A10).

A second important feature of the network concerns the control capacities and disruptive power of the three ministries A1, A3, and A4 and of the universities (B9). The network would fall into two unconnected subnetworks if these four actors were extracted, or their ties to A2, B2, and B3 removed. Although only strong ties are considered here, this makes the overall structure of the Baden-Württemberg ecology a rather fragile one. The public sector of the Land appears to be organized like an enterprise, with a strong division of labour among the various ministries. With some imagination, the picture could be re-arranged in form of an organization chart. The Staatsministerium (A1) is obviously fulfilling the function of interministerial coordination. The Ministry for Science and Research (A3) coordinates the supply and diffusion of scientific research, technological applications, and information concerning EU initiatives, while the Economics (A3) and the Social Affairs Ministries (A3) are dealing with the wider societal context (business interests and trade unions).

Another characteristic feature of this case is the prominence of an institution such as the Steinbeis Foundation. This corresponds perfectly to what has been argued in the bulk of descriptive literature on the case of Baden-Württemberg, where the Foundation is ascribed the most important functions for technology transfer and know-how of all kinds.

Its position is probably unmatched by any other comparable institution in the remaining eight cases of the regional sample. Whether the science and high-tech orientation of the Land, being expressed by the position of Steinbeis within the inner circle of power of the network, should therefore be accredited the label of "tecno-corporatism" (Weber 1986) is another question and cannot be answered in this context. In any case, the Foundation is not only well-placed but also maintains noteworthy contacts to other "finance and technology brokers" such as B3, B7, and B8.

On the other hand, the organizations forming the Land’s interest system strongly depend on single ministries to arrive at more central positions of the network. P1, the Regional Chamber of Artisans (HWK) and P8, the Regional Chamber of Industry and Commerce (IHK) apart, there is no other interest association able to employ one of the para-state agencies (B3 and B7) to reach other areas of the network. At the same time, the system seems to work and obviously manages to accomodate the needs of all participants involved. As shown above, there is little evidence for discontent, and dissatisfaction indicies in the Land are comparatively low (0.08 compared to the sample mean of 0.11).

The Land now clearly exhibits its etatist side. The hypothesis raised in the beginning, in particular with reference to Anderson’s work (1988), namely that of an "unparalleled role of state government ministries" and, in particular, of "the Economics Ministries [that] have taken the lead in defining the issues related to regional economic problems, and in organizing related public and private responses" (ibid:231) appears to be fully confirmed. At the same time, this does not mean that there were no incidents of corporatism and of cooperative strategies at all in that region. The fact that, the two chambers apart, there is only one other private actor directly connected to the network’s most centrally placed organization, namely the Daimler-Benz grouping (P3) might even be taken to corroborate Heinzé and Schmid’s hypothesis (1994: 71-75) according to which Baden-Württemberg would be a case of "enterprise-driven corporatism". At the same time, the Land would also seem to exhibit a pattern which the authors originally reserved for the description of an alternative case: Northrhine-Westphalia. That region
was accredited the label of "staged corporatism" (inszenierter Korporatismus), a characterization first introduced by Heinze and Voelzkow (1991). The term refers to a situation where, as in Northrhine-Westphalia, the regional state tries everything to activate dormant organizational resources, including the ones by the private sector, to establish new forms of regionalized structural policy and crisis management. Regionalized structural policy in a German Land normally refers to subregional units, i.e. communes, groups of communes, specific crisis areas (the Ruhr area), and so forth. Something of that kind also applies to the case of Baden-Württemberg. The so-called "dialogorientierte Wirtschaftspolitik" and the setting up of the "Zukunftskommission Wirtschaft 2000" (1993) reflect the same kind of logic, although when compared to the case of NRW, these initiatives had a much more symbolic character, that is, they were more "staged" than "corporatist" in nature.

In any case, what seems to escape most qualitative descriptions of territorial forms of governance is the fact that the attribute of corporatism, for example, does not always and only combine with properties such as flat hierarchies and, secondly, that cooperative, or problem-solving strategies are possible also under conditions of hierarchical guidance and control. In a sense, we seem to be prisoners of normative prescriptions that do not allow for the identification of cases that appear to be conceptually paradoxical but, nevertheless, that find expressions in empirical reality. It is not surprising that debates such as the German "Standortdebatte" (debate on locational advantages) and pressures to adapt to dramatically increased internationalization has triggered off responses by public authorities. It was the Länder ministries and, in Baden-Württemberg, the Economics Minister which started designing cooperative plans for the future. Interest associations were then eventually "invited" to take part in these initiatives which often hardly went beyond "open fire talks" among friends and friends of friends, without necessarily resulting in widely diffused and societally organic forms of crisis management. The trade unions, if at all, continue to be "junior partners" (Heinze und Schmid 1994:75) in the future initiatives of the Land government, and despite their role as "Tarifkomotiven" in the German metalworking sector, Albers (1996:230) accredits them less competences and expertise in regional development matters than those of traditional industrial areas. Indeed, in Chapter Three, the enterprise-driven and state-driven pattern of state-society relations in Baden-Württemberg has been called "corporatism by intent" (Korporatismus als Absichtserklärung).

Turning now to the Languedoc-Roussillon picture (Figure 4.3), we immediately see etatist patterns to be much less pronounced - a fact corresponding to the original hypothesis raised in Chapter Three. As in the German case, the network is dominated by one single public institution, the Conseil Régional (A₁). Yet, although A₁ clearly possesses a higher number of degrees (14 instead of 12) in terms of contacts and also more in terms of mutual choices (12 instead of 7) than does A₁ in Baden-Württemberg, this essentially reflects local, not global centrality. The Conseil is certainly central also in global terms, but this global centrality is much less pronounced than in the other case. The institution remains a "local hero", mainly controlling contact activities in the upper half of the picture. Most other organizations are able to reach actors on the diametrically opposed regions of the plot area without having to make A₁ part of their geodesics (shortest paths linking any two actors). As regards other members of the category "public institutions" (A’s and a’s), these are much more evenly distributed across the organizational space which also means that information emanating from them is more diffused network-wide. They are less concentrated in a particular area and appear to be more deeply embedded in their societal environment. This goes at the expense of the type of corporate identity that was found in the case of regional administration in the southern

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51 At the beginning of the 1990s, the NRW Land government suggested the establishment of 15 sub-regions ("Zukunftinitiative für die Regionen Nordrhein-Westfalens"). Representatives of business interests, trade unions, and public authorities then regularly met in conferences -- so-called "Regionalkronferenzen" -- within these 15 sub-units to elaborate innovation strategies that would be mutually acceptable. Heinze and Schmid solve the tricky issue of selectivity between their analytical typologies in the following way: "Our analytical objective is less oriented at an empirical-descriptive discourse (...) Openness is characteristic of the meso-corporatations identified here. They cannot be understood in terms of institutional structures that would be fixed once for ever (...) This also implies a certain blurring of the conceptual borders dividing the different models" (Heinze und Schmid 1994:66).
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German region. The lack of compactness and coordinating capacity becomes particularly evident if these public actors are looked at individually. They represent four different types of institutions, all dealing with territorial development, all having their own views and preferences, and all possessing different competences to fulfill that task. In fact, the Conseil Régional has to share its central position with several Conseils Généraux (a10) - i.e. departmental assemblies - , with the communes (a11), with various Directions Régionales (A4, A5, A6, A7) - controlled by the Prefet de la Region - and, finally, with some Directions Départementales (a8 and a9) - controlled by the Prefets des Départements. The latter two types of institutions are all dislocated branches of national ministries coordinated by the respective Préfectures which continue, the reforms of 2 March 1982 notwithstanding, in an attempt to exert (central state) tutelle over the elected regional and departmental bodies. The decentralization laws may have led to a decrease of the role of the Préfets in respect to their control capacity vis-à-vis local government, but they have increased it in terms of the coordinating power over the activities of the various Directions Départementales and Régionales. In other words, the French public sector is highly fragmented and, at the same time, much more dependent on inputs from the private one than is the case in Germany.

While, in Baden-Württemberg, a number of public institutions have been the focal points for chambers and interest associations, in France the pattern turns out to be reversed. Interest associations and chambers do not only chose public institutions as partners for communication contact but are equally often chosen by them. For example, the departmental Chambers of Agriculture (P13) and of Industry (P11) are focal points for several of the a11, a9, a10, A1, and A7; the regional Chamber of Industry (P1) and the regional Chamber of Artisans (P2) are the focal points for several of the A1, A2, A3, and A7; and the Federation Régionale de Travaux Publics (P9) is the focal point for A1, A2,

52 The norms concerning the conditions under which the Préfet is able to exert its prerogative functions vis-à-vis the regions are established in law no.82/623 of 22 July 1982.
53 Compare, for example, the degrees obtained by A4 and A7 in BW to the ones obtained by the various ’P’s.

FIG. 4.3:
Languedoc-Roussillon
Multidimensional scaling of path distances

The eight most central organizations (measured in terms of their betweenness centrality scores):

A1: Conseil Régional
A2: Conseil Economique et Social
A7: Direction Régionale du Travail et de l’Emploi
B1: Sodler/Soridec
P1: Chambre Régionale Commerce & Industrie
P2: Chambre Régionale des Métiers
P11: Chambre Départemental Commerce & Industrie
P9: Federation Régionale de Travaux Publics

Notes:
The MDS plot only represents reciprocal ties (minimum symmetrization). Two of the network actors which did not result to possess reciprocal ties to any of the other organizations had to be extracted from the original matrix. Ties linking organizations that perceive each other to be mutually relevant are boldfaced. Graph has been slightly changed manually so that distances do not exactly represent euclidean distances. A’s are divisions of regional government (or of subregional public authorities, i.e. ’a’s), P’s are interest associations, B’s are finance and technology brokers. For codes of individual organizations see appendix. Software used: KrackPlot 3.1 (Krackhardt et.al. 1993, 1994, 1995).
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and A₇. The Conseil Régional apart, private bodies and associations possess equally important broker functions in the network than do the public actors. They also are less marginalized and pushed into the periphery of the organizational space than in the first case.

Languedoc-Roussillon has been mentioned in the beginning of this chapter to represent one of the few regional cases whose networks had a gap, or a "hole", i.e. where one particularly relevant actor has failed to provide for an answer and, therefore, could not be included in the organization sample. The absence of SGAR (Secrétariat pour les affaires régionales), the operational arm of the regional Prefet, can hardly be expected to have a dramatical impact on the network configuration. From the Rhone-Alpine network we know that SGAR would probably have occupied a position quite close to the one achieved by the regional council. Yet, with the latter remaining the most central actor, this would not have changed much in respect to density and overall network centralization. The Directions Régionaux (A₁, A₅, A₆, A₇), all coordinated by the regional Prefecture and by SGAR and, hence, connected to that rather prominent actor, would then have shown up in slightly more central positions, but this would probably be the only difference in the results achieved. Overall, almost all of the points representing public authorities could be removed without threatening the communication flows in the network. Due to its high density, which also comes to the fore when considering reciprocal ties exclusively, the regional ecology would not decompose into two or more subnetworks as was the case for Baden-Württemberg.

While the presentation of the above cases may seem to suffice for pointing to the most characteristic relational patterns of two diametrically opposed regional ecologies, a third case shall be presented. Indeed, when selecting Baden-Württemberg and Languedoc-Roussillon for graphic representation, the information guiding this selection was exclusively based on some overall network properties (density and centralization) drawn from the raw data. What we did not consider, was the fact that once this raw data was elaborated, rates of contact reciprocity and of multiplexity may strongly diverge across the nine regional cases. Although the French and the German cases clearly exhibit a number of characteristic features, differences between the two remain contained within the general pattern of state-society relations which essentially express different constitutional frameworks and political traditions. The clearest example of the fact that constitutions and formal institutional settings are not the only and, maybe not even the most important, factors accounting for differences in interorganizational ecologies, is provided by the case of Sicily.

In purely formal terms, the Italian regions can be cast in terms of soft versions of the French, Napoleonic model. As in France, they have retained structures of "deconcentrated" (central) state agencies on the territory, represented by the Prefetture Regionali e Provinciali and by so-called control commissions over legislative acts by regional and other local governments. Yet, regionalization has set in in the immediate post-war period, particularly in the case of those regions having been assigned a special status. Sicily, probably, is the most important subnational territory belonging to that latter group. It stands out among the other special status regions not only with respect to its territorial extension and its demographic situation -- with a population roughly equaling that of Denmark -- but, most importantly, with respect to the early consolidation of a regional bureaucratic machinery that easily outperforms all other Italian regions, Lombardy included (see Chapter Three). The enormous number of staff of the regional administration and the resources controlled by the different government divisions, should posit these Assessorati Regionali in rather central areas of the organizational space. Since the Sicilian government apparatus could be regarded as a state within a state, with competences reaching far beyond those obtained by its French counterparts, it would be reasonable to expect the organization of the region’s public sector to be quite different from the one represented in figure 4.3 - with the overall organizational ecology, however, more or less reflecting similar patterns.
Consulting the path distance representation of Figure 4.4, this expectation is immediately falsified. Two features are particularly striking. First, the extraordinarily high

**The eight most central organizations (measured in terms of their betweenness centrality scores):**

A1: Assessorato alla presidenza (rapporti extraregionali)  
P17: CISL  
A4: Assessorato cooperazione, artigianato & commercio  
P18: UIL  
A5: Assessorato lavoro, previdenza sociale & formazione  
P16: CGIL  
P15: Sicilcassa Spa  
P1: Banco di Sicilia

**Notes:** The MDS plot only represents reciprocal ties (minimum symmetrization). Five of the network actors which did not result to possess reciprocal ties to any of the other organizations had to be extracted from the original matrix. Ties linking organizations that perceive each other to be mutually relevant are boldfaced. Graph has been slightly changed manually so that distances do not exactly represent euclidean distances. A's are divisions of regional government (or of subregional public authorities, i.e. 'a's), P's are interest associations, B's are finance and technology brokers. For codes of individual organizations see appendix. Software used: KrackPlot 3.1 (Krackhardt et al. 1993, 1994, 1995).
density of both reciprocal contact and mutual relevance ties. Only a small minority of reciprocal ties are connecting organizations which do not consider each other to be important actors. Such a pattern could not be expected from an evaluation of matrix density alone. High reciprocity in the case of the Sicilian network also clearly contradicts van Waarden’s (1992) hypothesis about both clientelist and parentela networks. Moreover, contrary to the above expectation, the Assessorati, with very few exceptions, appear to be driven towards the network’s periphery. In addition, most of these are not concentrated in any specific region of the plot area but, rather, are strung like pearls along an outer circle embracing and circumscribing almost the entire network. At the same time, interest associations are also quite evenly distributed across the space but occupy slightly more central positions, with three of them (P₁₆, P₁₇, and P₁₈) actually forming part of the very center³⁵.

A special section is reserved in the subsequent chapter for a discussion of the Sicilian case. The description here, can, therefore, be limited. It concerns only the network’s overall patterning, while comments on individual actors are left for later consideration. With a view to reciprocal ties and ties of mutual relevance, it now appears to be Sicily, and not Languedoc-Roussillon, which represents the counter example to Baden-Württemberg. This, then, completely reverses conventional expectations. The economically most developed region of the sample is the one with the most underdeveloped organizational ecology, and the one region that figures the worst on all kinds of indicators (economic, political, institutional, cultural, etc.) appears to possess the most highly developed organizational culture. If this were really the main result of our analysis, then we would either have to modify the entire conceptual framework or, alternatively, drop the methodological tool that has been used, namely network analysis and its application to territorial politics.

Fortunately, our confidence in the reliability of the data is high enough to avoid analytical short-circuits of that kind. We shall argue that the paradox referred to above is nothing but an apparent one and, in reality, positively reflects the very distinctiveness of both developed and underdeveloped organizational ecologies. What is needed, however, is a re-definition of the notion of redundancy. It is obvious that those definitions supplied by the authors referred to above, as well as their applications to concrete empirical situations, are not sufficient to come to grips with the type of material we are working with. Either there are different types of redundancy, with only some specific variants of these being conducive to development, stability, flexibility, and so forth, while other variants reflect the exact opposite thus pointing to structural inadequacies and other shortcomings, or, different indicators are required that are better able to reflect redundant capacities but which are probably not at our disposal. What we shall try to do is envisage both of the above possibilities: a re-definition of structural redundancy under conditions of high and low levels of institutional-organizational development and the employment of alternative indicators.

The first thing we shall argue is that the Sicilian network does not exhibit a higher extent of structural redundancy than, for example, that of Baden-Württemberg. Indeed, the contact relations connecting the various public, private, and para-state organizations of the island are not redundant at all. Interest group representatives crucially depend on a high number of contacts with other interest groups in order to overcome the disadvantage of organizational fragmentation. The removal of any one of these contacts would seriously threaten the flow of information necessary for arriving at common positions within sectors, branches, or domains, for example, vis-à-vis public administration. Also, a high number of contacts between interests groups and representatives of the most diverse divisions of regional government is equally indispensable to the extent that these

³⁵ Contrary to the previous cases, ‘A’s in this region almost exclusively represent Assessorati Regionali, i.e. divisions of regional government. The only exceptions are the Presidency of the Regional Assembly (A₉) and the assembly’s committee for Attività Produttive’ (A₉). The State Commissioner (A₁₀), the Prefetture Provinciali (a₁₀) and the Provincial Governments (a₁₁) had to be extracted from the original matrix since no reciprocal ties between these and other organizations could be identified. The resulting pattern, hence, also reflects the distinctiveness of the specific regional (as opposed to multi-level, i.e. regional, provincial, municipal, etc.) mode of policy-making in Sicily.
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latter obviously are not able to provide for and guarantee the routinized diffusion of information, not least as a consequence of their own disorganization and lack of internal coordination. In other words, low degrees of institutional guidance and reliability trigger-off an explosion of relational activities among network actors, while high degrees of it contribute to a containment of these within reasonable limits.

Regarding administrative disorganization and lack of coordination, there is an interesting observation by an Italian organization theorist on the density of ties and functional overlaps within the administrative system that may help to understand the Sicilian picture. According to Cerase (1992:514), public administration in Italy is today characterized by a multiplication of offices, tasks, and roles; by increasing decomposition of the organizational structure; and, finally, by a fragmentation of functions. All this has not contributed, as would in theory be possible, "to a scenario of creative and vital disorder" or "to useful redundancy" but, rather, "to an increase of complexity in decision-making ultimately coupled to decreases in efficiency and effectiveness of public administration" (ibid). What would seem to count, therefore, are not relations alone but something more like a "cooperative spirit". Where this is lacking, "each administrative division called upon to intervene in the implementation of provisions appears to be driven (...) by the need to safeguard its own prerogatives thus blocking and vetoing the deliberations of other actors" (ibid:515). This affirmation can be translated perfectly into the present and more encompassing interorganizational context. It is not "useful redundancy" that is generated by a lack of political guidance, structural overlaps and interorganizational density but, rather, noise and disorder that hardly contribute to increasing flexibility and responsiveness of representatives of the regional political elite and the latter's organizational ecology.

We identified hierarchy as the dominant principle explaining how Baden-Württemberg was organized. Quite unexpectedly, this rigid type of organization turned out to be linked to relatively low dissatisfaction indices. The opposite is the case in Sicily. That region’s ecology is structured heterarchically but, at the same time, carries the highest dissatisfaction index of all sample members (0.15) - almost double as high as the German case (0.08). The apparent redundancy of the Sicilian organizational structure reflects a pattern of connectedness that substitutes for the lack of hierarchy and coordination. It is "redundancy by substitution", or "substitutive redundancy". It probably also reflects the absence of trust in organizational relations -- a fact, consistently mentioned in the relevant literature on social relations in the Mezzogiorno (in particular, Gambetta 1992)55. It is significant, and may in large part explain the Sicilian network’s peculiarity, that "declining trust in the existence of long-term exchange relationships increases transaction costs, because people must engage in self-protective actions and the 'continually making provisions for the possibility of opportunistic behavior' by others" (Tyler and Kramer 1996:4).

A European north-south divide?

This opens up a completely new perspective on this and the other networks. The higher the presence of "substitutive redundancy", the lower the probability of high trust relations, and the lower that presence, the higher the endowment of the regional ecology with trustful and rather stable connections among all types of actors. In Baden-Württemberg, for example, the marginal position of the trade unions, which were connected to one single ministry alone, can now be interpreted in terms of a high inclination to delegate workers’ interests to an institution that is accredited full

55 Although, in the absence of hard data, the argument should not be stressed too far in this context, it is enlightening that Gambetta speaks of an "omnipresence of distrust in the mezzogiorno" (ibid:98) having built up over centuries and strongly determining all expressions of social life. In part, this is explained as a consequence of the divide et impera mode of governance introduced in Sicily by the Spanish conquistadores in the fifteenth century. "La fede pubblica", as a result, declined and what was left was "la fede privata", i.e. a reliance on family and friendship contacts that offset for the dominance of generalized social unreliability and forms of aggression and injustice (ibid:96). Although this certainly represents an important argument, we do not think that the determining forces at work here are of an unilateral character. Distrust may determine inefficiency of public administration, but "policy performance can [also] be a source of trust, not just a result" (Levi 1996b:50). The marginalization of regional government divisions in the Sicilian network, therefore, not only results from the absence and fragmentation of demand for regional governance, but also an offspring of fragmented and unsatisfactory supply of government services.
trustworthiness. The Labour Ministry is trusted to take labour’s interests into account in its own policy deliberations and is entrusted to represent them vis-à-vis other internal (other Land ministries) and external (national and EU authorities) institutions. This could then be called "substantive redundancy". If "substitutive redundancy" is characterized by the absence of trust, "substantive redundancy" requires high levels of trust. Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck must have had something similar in mind when arguing that "the high trust that can be established through associational networks may also increase the speed of decision-making, by reducing the need for formal transactions, avoiding costly trial and error, and accelerating the diffusion of best practice" (Crouch and Streeck 1997:7). Resorting to notions of both generalized distrust and high trust in order to substantiate two properties that are already difficult to verify, may be unsatisfying in the context of a work that has set out to come up with empirical evidence for network typologies. In the absence of other material, however, this may be the only viable option to take. In any case, even if the Baden-Württemberg type of redundancy would really be rooted in a high trust ecology, this would not take away anything of its state-driven and hierarchical qualities.

The argument just introduced relates not only to properties such as density and reciprocity. It concerns equally multiplexity, namely in the form of reciprocal contacts among organizations that perceive each other to be of mutual relevance or importance. Indeed, the Sicilian network is organized in such a way that clear distinctions between important and less relevant actors are made impossible for any individual member of the ecology. The incapacity to make reliable judgements about the value of ties spanned between any two actors makes each single contact important and indispensable. It leads to an inflation of density and an inflation of esteem and results in extremely high search costs. Sicily is of course the one region of the sample representing an extreme case in that respect. Yet, we now also see that, in a comparative European perspective, it is not very different from the other Italian sample member, Lombardia. With an even higher overall network density than Sicily (0.34 against 0.31), the northern Italian region ranks second on reciprocity (49.6) and occupies the leading position on "mpx-two", i.e. on the property of "contacts to important organizations". If there should really be a north-south divide on a European scale in terms of (inter-) organizational properties and organizational attitudes and preferences as argued, for example, by Jouve and Négrier (1998:52-56), then the southern cluster would be led by Sicily and Lombardia, with Rhone-Alpes occupying a position on the borderline between the southern and the northern cluster. Languedoc-Roussillon and the two Spanish regions would occupy intermediate positions in the former.

The hypothesis of a north-south divide is largely confirmed by the results of a joint elaboration of the data presented in Section A of Table 4.2. Before commenting on Section C of the table, these results shall be presented briefly. What we have done is to subject the figures contained in Section A to a procedure of hierarchical clustering. Our initial expectation was that clear-cut national clusters should emerge from such a procedure, an expectation warranted by a simple visual inspection of the data contained in the table. If one were to take a difference of about 0.07 points as a cut-off below which cases would be characterized by similarity and beyond which by dissimilarity for all measures presented in Section A, then, a quick glance at the table would indeed suggest strong national patterning. It would indicate the existence of factors (nation-wide constitutional provisions, the general status of regional government in a country, endowments with legal and material resources, etc.) that are equal for each region within a specific national context and over-determine each individual ecology such that similar patterns are being strengthened despite otherwise rather different political and economic performances.

The result, although not as clear as expected, is quite illuminating and confirms the existence of national patterns within an overall north-south divide. Two of the national cases are splitting along this divide. The first two regions forming a cluster at relatively early a stage are Sicilia and Lombardia. They are followed by Andalucia and Languedoc-
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Roussillon which cluster at a somewhat longer interval and join the first two cases at the level of 8. In the northern group, it is Baden-Württemberg and Wales that cluster first, joined later by Rhone-Alpes. Niedersachsen forms a group with Catalunya and both then merge with Wales and Baden-Württemberg at a level of, roughly, 12. The northern and the southern clusters remain distinct for a considerable length of time and only merge at about the level of 25.

Let us now come back to the redundancy issue and try to assess whether "redundancy by substitution", all other disadvantages notwithstanding, does nevertheless allow for a higher ability of adaptation to changing conditions in organizational environments. This was the general argument presented by Grabher with respect to properties such as density in interorganizational relations although, as we have seen, the author later qualified this to some extent when comparing the case of Baden-Württemberg to the one of Northrhine-Westphalia. The data on strong ties among important organizations presented in Table 4.2 and in Figure 4.2 and 4.4 would suggest high adaptability in the case of

The fact that density slightly increases (C.2) in almost everywhere after category 3 having been extracted from the networks, does not come as a surprise. It could be expected that public and private organizations are more strongly interconnected than either of the two to development agencies and technology transfer centers. More interesting is the stronger variance among networks on degree-based (C.3) and betweenness-based centralization (C.4). Generally, where centralization decreases, in particular in regard to the values in row C.4, brokers occupy quite prominent positions in the original networks. This is the case for Baden-Württemberg (-2.13) and for Wales (-4.96). Where, on the other hand, this value clearly increases, brokers hardly possess much relevance. This is the case for the two Italian regions (+4.41 and +2.73), for Niedersachsen (+7.50), and for Andalucia (+7.47).

The second important indicator is the density of relations connecting members of the public and the private sector. For calculating these values, the two actor categories have been taken to form two distinct blocks. These "theory blocks", or "category blocks", have

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Sicily and structural fragility and stickyness in the case of Baden-Württemberg. Is this really true?

Let us try to answer this question by turning to patterns of interest intermediation in a more narrow, but also more appropriate sense. So far, only overall relations have been considered, i.e. relations connecting points that form part of the entire set of actor categories present in the nine networks: public institutions, interest groups (including chambers) and, finally, so-called "finance and technology brokers" (mostly para-state agencies, including universities and polytechnics). On the contrary, the figures in rows C.1 to C.11 of Table 4.2 only contain information about ties connecting public institutions and interest associations. The broker category has entirely been extracted for these calculations. Most of the figures are rather self-evident and do not require more extensive comments. Before coming to the main argument hopefully providing an answer to the question that was raised above, let us briefly mention some of the characteristic features of the regions’ interest systems and of their relations to the public sphere.

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The following ten rows of Section A have been considered for the purpose of identifying clusters: 3, 5, and 7 through 14.
then been submitted to a procedure (blockmodel analysis) that calculates the densities of each individual block and the densities of relations across the blocks\(^5\). Aside from three cases -- Baden-Württemberg, Niedersachsen, and Wales -- all other networks exhibit rather similar performances on this measure. The contact intensity of relations from public authorities and government bodies to interest groups is consistently below the one of the respective original networks. For example, in Rhone-Alpes, of the potentially possible directed ties originating in the public and oriented towards the private sector, only 25 per cent are actually “realized” (C.6). Overall, this is a comparatively high figure, given that it is dropping to 0.02 and 0.04 per cent in Wales and Niedersachsen. Yet, compared to Rhone-Alpes network’s own original density (0.31), this represents a loss of 0.06 per cent. On the other hand, while public actors consistently tend to underinvest in relations to interest associations, the exact opposite applies to these latter. Again, the two German cases and Wales apart, contact densities of relations originating in the private and oriented towards the public sphere consistently rank above the original matrix densities. Hence, there is a strong disequilibrium in the ways in which public institutions and interest groups are perceiving their contact portfolios vis-à-vis the respective other dimension and this applies to almost the entire sample of regions.

The three cases clearly diverging from that pattern all exhibit quite distinct features. For example, Baden-Württemberg is similar to Wales in that it is not only public institutions that report below network average contact densities towards the respective other dimension, but interest groups as well. Yet, while there is hardly any disequilibrium in the contact portfolios of public and private actors in the German case - with 0.15 and 0.17, the densities are almost identical - this disequilibrium is extremely pronounced in the case of Wales. Indeed, Wales and Niedersachsen are very similar in that respect with ratios reaching 1:8 in the first and 1:7 in the second case. While there are close-to-zero relations from public authorities towards their societal environment in Niedersachsen and Wales - a fact indicating very strong state-society boundaries - the pattern is quite balanced in Baden-Württemberg. Contacts between the two spheres are rather scarce and it is difficult to establish with precision which of the two is likely to represent the supply and which the demand side.

The most important information contained in the third part of the table relates to degrees of multiplexity in interest intermediation. As before, indices of multiplexity have also been calculated for the reduced matrices. For the rows C.8 to C.11, only “mp3-three” situations have been selected for inclusion, i.e. “contacts to unimportant organizations”. This has been done, because of a strong suspicion that these may contain information of particular relevance to the argument of redundancy. The circle, initially having been opened with a discussion on the relevance of redundancy in territorial networks, is now being closed. The following comments will also be the last ones of this chapter, before we embark on an in-depth analysis of individual ecologies.

It had been argued that transaction costs tend to be high in networks characterized by a lack of guidance and coordination and, secondly, by high densities and mutual choices. We also have tried to demonstrate that the regional ecologies of southern Europe clearly diverge from the rest of the sample on these indicators, with Sicily representing a particularly extreme case. Now, high transaction costs also imply high search and opportunity costs. If the activities of interest groups alone are considered, the following argument could be raised: where many resources are being invested into other-regarding activities, especially under conditions of high uncertainty as to whether investments of that kind are actually paying (vedi “the indistinct search for important partners” mentioned above), these resources are actually diverted from alternative uses, for instance, services to members and other self-regarding organizational matters\(^6\). Yet, they are also lost for investments in the building-up of a “weak-tie” environment. As is

\(^5\) This is a quite complex procedure. Since we shall make use of blockmodel analysis in the subsequent chapter, any methodological comments on this method are postponed at this point.

\(^6\) There is as yet no comparative European data on that aspect of associability. It was shown above that the comparative study of subnational forms of interest aggregation and interest intermediation has generally remained extremely underdeveloped. Yet, from Italian sources we know that the undersupply with high quality services to members is particularly pronounced in situations of high associational fragmentation (Lassini 1989, Preti 1991, Viviani 1990, Zan 1992, 1997, Grote 1995, 1996) - a characteristic probably also concerning other southern European areas.
known, weak ties are ascribed the most impressive properties. Reassuming the argument, they are supposed to be at least one, or more, of the following: they protect networks from misadaptation, they are bridges between different areas or subnetworks, they secure information flows and prevent from sticky ties and incestuous situations, they are very often redundant, but can easily be de- and re-activated according to the needs of changing environmental conditions -- in short, they represent flexible structures as opposed to the inflexibility and, hence, weakness of strong ties.

Yet, again, how would the presence of weak ties have to be measured in the precise context of our analysis? We had strong ties reflected by both mutual choices and the ascription of mutual relevance. By the same token, weak ties would then be reflected by the opposite: unilateral choices directed towards actors being denied the attribute of relevance. Looking now at the two last rows of Table 4.2, we have exactly this type of information both for the percentage of weak ties originating in the public and targeted at the private sphere (C.10), and vice versa (C.11). That public actors would chose private ones as contact partners to a lesser extent than the other way round, was demonstrated with respect to the results in rows C.6 and C.7 and did not seem very surprising. What is surprising, is the degree to which some regional groups of public actors make use of weak ties to maintain contact with their different interest systems.

The extreme case is Wales with 100 per cent. Yet, here, the really significant information is not the fact that state and societal actors are interconnected by weak ties but, rather, that they appear not to be connected at all (vedi the density of 0.02 in C.6). As regards public actors, Wales is immediately followed by Baden-Wuttemberg with 87.6 per cent of the choices by public administration indicating weak linkages to the Land's interest groups. The third and the fourth above average cases on this indicator are Catalunya and Andalucia. Despite the high variation across the values of this row, it might be argued that public institutions probably tend to characterize their relations to interests groups as being less important and less frequent than is the case for relations going into the opposite direction. Indeed, it was shown that the contact density of relations from the "theory block 2" (associations) with the "theory block 1" (institutions) almost consistently ranked above overall matrix density. It would also seem logical to expect interest groups to attach more weight to their relations with the public sphere than the other way around. This is what results from the figures contained in the last row of the table. The occurrence of weak ties here is generally rather low - with two noteworthy exceptions. Only in Rhone-Alpes (71.2 per cent) and in Baden-Wurtemberg (76.6 per cent) do interest groups report the vast majority of their ties to the public sector to be of a weak character. Again, Baden-Wurtemberg is outstanding in as far as both private and public actors are converging on this characterization of their respective contact and esteem portofoglios. Around eighty per cent of the ties connecting actors of the two spheres are clearly of a weak character. The image painted of Baden-Wurttemberg in industrial economics, in the flexible specialization school, in the literature on diversified quality production, and, finally, by authors like Grabher who explicitly focus on issues of industrial governance of regional economies in structural-relational terms, would appear to be "saved" - despite the region's hierarchical organization and despite its modest density in interorganizational relations.
Comparative results case by case

The cannonade against the regions’ organizational cohorts carried out in Chapter Four has succeeded in mixing up their battle lines and has supplied a lot of interesting and hitherto unexplored information. At the same time, it has raised more questions than answers. In this chapter, therefore, we shall fine-tune the analytical armament and employ a focused case-by-case offensive. Each political ecology will be analyzed separately. Once the ecologies are disaggregated in different groups, individual representatives of these groups will then be submitted to an analysis of their relational properties. The results of these procedures will enable us to control the networks from all possible points of view. To add more flesh to the interpretation of the results, frequent recourse will be had to the qualitative case studies presented in Chapter Three. The indeterminate position in which a number of regions were left in that chapter, will now be addressed more thoroughly. Relatively clear-cut patterns can be expected to emerge from this type of analysis.

STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENCE AND BLOCKMODELLING

Methodologically, the same procedure is followed for each individual case. This, admittedly, may give rise to some boredom on the part of the reader. The lack of elegance in presentation, I hope, will be fully offset by the unconventional and illuminating results presented. A preliminary outline of the patterning of interorganizational relations has already been given by the spatial representation of path distances of three of the regional ecologies. Spatial representation, however, is not the most appropriate way of comparing a high number of different networks and, in particular, fails to provide information on individual actors. To achieve this, structural equivalence analysis is employed here. The concept of structural equivalence has a long tradition in anthropological and sociological research.

In algebraic terms, structural equivalence among actors and sets of actors is identified with the help of blockmodels. Blockmodel analysis is best described in terms of a method that reduces the complexity of relations (here, communication contacts) and of perceptions (here, influence reputation) in multiple networks of actors. Starting with multiple actor-by-actor binary networks that contain information on these two properties, a blockmodel analysis either clusters actors into positions or clusters their relations into roles. Although roles, i.e. the relations connecting positions (or equivalence classes), will be considered to some extent, we mainly focus on a comparative analysis of positions both within individual networks and across the nine regional cases.

In other words, we shall look for structurally equivalent organizations, that is, organizations that maintain the same or very similar patterns of ties to the other organizations across the two types of networks. Although, superficially, the concept may seem rather abstract and obscure, in reality, it is quite straightforward. Two people, having direct connections with totally different individuals may, nonetheless, be similar to each other with respect to the type of relations that they have with these others. One need only refer to the simple example presented by Scott (1991). Two fathers have different sets of children to whom they relate, "but they might be expected to behave, in certain respects, in similar ‘fatherly’ ways towards them" (ibid:126). The two men are then "structurally equivalent" to the extent that they occupy the same social position -- that of father -- and are so interchangeable as far as the sociological analysis of fathers is concerned. The idea behind the concept is, therefore, to identify those uniformities of action which define social positions. Once that task is completed, members of these positions can then be analyzed individually.

The objective is to identify, first of all, the “fathers” of the nine regional ecologies. Ironically, some of these are self-acclaimed Landesväter, for example,

1 Details of the technical procedures are contained in the handbooks of network analysis to which reference has been made on several occasions: Knoke and Kuklinski (1982); Pappi (1987:101-129); Scott (1991:126-149); Faust and Wasserman 1992; Wasserman and Faust 1994); Lomi (1991:115-137).
Baden-Württemberg's Lothar Späth before the 1991 elections. Many of the self-acclaimed roles -- Späth is not the case in our study -- may be just wishful thinking and not correspond to the functions and positions of these "fathers" within their respective regional families. Avoiding the allusion to a family, this leading position could also be labelled a "benevolent dictator", a "patron", the "headquarters", or the "board of directors", and so forth -- always depending on the underlying political situation. In general, we shall abstain from the use of such value-loaded metaphors and resort, instead, to the more neutral attribute of "center" or "most central position".

Our networks, then, possess central, less central and peripheral positions and each of these may be occupied by either fathers or sons or by both together and by other relatives.

The analytically most intriguing configurations are those, of course, where children turn out to be better positioned than their fathers. The more a family, or organizational ecology, deviates from the socially or politically expected "default" pattern, the more interesting the case is and, not less important, the more justified is this specific type of analysis. Of more interest, still, are situations where the emergence of new roles, or the substitution of the roles of one category of actors by another, goes unnoticed both by external observers and by the previous incumbents of positions. Convinced that they govern the interorganizational space at the top of the hierarchy, these actors may in reality become subordinates of those they believe they control. We shall see that there are a number of instances among the nine regions where this turns out to be the case. Those organizations that occupy peripheral network positions will be structurally subordinate. This raises the question of how many positions there are in the different ecologies. Determining an optimal number of positions or blocks is one of the most tedious tasks in network analysis and requires a brief explanation.

Partitioning algorithms are a divisive procedure which progressively splits the universe of actors into more and more subgroups, each containing fewer and fewer actors (see Breiger et al. 1975; Schwartz 1977). For our calculations, a version of COBLOC was used, a program that supplies a goodness of fit measure. After each division, measures the discrepancy between the resulting within- and between-block densities and an ideal-typical pattern where some block densities are 1.00 and all others are 0.00. Because the fit to the ideal-typical pattern improves as the number of blocks increases, the change in fit relative to the matrix size can serve as a criterion for selecting an optimal number of blocks. In seven of the nine cases, a four-block solution turned out to be the most appropriate one. Probably due to the smaller diameter of their matrices, both the Catalan and the Welsh networks achieved optimal fit after the second partition, i.e. at the level of a three-block solution. Both for aesthetic reasons and in the interest of comparability, the program was asked to perform a further split, so that we were able to work with four-block solutions in all of the nine cases.

Finally, it is important to distinguish between different degrees of equivalence. The strictest version is the one of complete equivalence. Imagine an adjacency matrix containing information about contact between actors where "1"s represent the existence and "0"s the absence of contact. In the case of perfect structural equivalence among subsets of actors, both the rows and columns of the original sociomatrix are permuted so that actors who are assigned to the same equivalence class are now adjacent to each other. The submatrices corresponding to the ties between and within positions would then all be filled with either "1"s (oneblocks) or "0"s (zeroblocks). These binary values could then, without any problems, be transferred into a reduced version of the original matrix, i.e. into an image matrix or blockmodel.

Unfortunately, in empirical network data of our type, it is very unlikely that actors will be exactly equivalent. Procedures partitioning empirically grounded sociomatrices into different positions will hardly ever contain perfect oneblocks or zeroblocks. We should expect that oneblocks might contain some "0"s and zeroblocks

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1 A more conventional, but also less understood procedure is CONCOR (see, for the risks involved in using CONCOR, Wasserman and Faust 1994). COBLOC, in this case executed by SONIS, a relational data bank management system developed by Franz Urban Pappi and his colleagues at the University of Kiel and the University of Mannheim, is a program that optimizes on zeroblock solutions, i.e. that tries to re-arrange the original matrix in a way such that a maximum of blocks is filled with zeros and the rest with ones.

2 Jordi Pujol in Catalunya and Jacques Blanc in Languedoc-Roussillon are other cases in point.

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might contain some "1"s. Most empirical applications of network analysis, therefore, work with what could be called measures of approximate equivalence. What is needed is a measure of the extent to which actors are equivalent. In order to reduce the matrix to take the form of an image matrix or become a blockmodel, one needs to specify a criterion by which "1" and "0" cell entries in the original matrix can be assembled to blocks. A density criterion is the most straightforward way of achieving this. In other words, we need to calculate the densities of each individual block and then specify a cut-off value below which densities are coded as zeroblocks and above which they are coded as oneblocks.

In general, the density $\Delta$ of ties within a block $B_{klr}$ is the proportion of ties being present, i.e.

$$\Delta_{klr} = \frac{\sum_{i \in B_k} \sum_{j \in B_l} x_{ij}}{g_k g_l}$$

where $g_k$ is the number of actors in position $B_k$ and $g_l$ the number of actors in position $B_l$. More specifically, the density of ties within a position, for example of block $B_{kkr}$, is equal to:

$$\Delta_{kkr} = \frac{\sum_{i \in B_k} \sum_{j \in B_k} x_{ij}}{g_k(g_k - 1)}$$

where $g_k (g_k - 1)$ indicates the number of ties among actors in position $B_k$.

The resulting values can then be reduced to blockmodels in the following way. Block 1 ($B_1$) will be a oneblock (i.e. $b_{klr} = 1$) if $\Delta_{klr} > \alpha$ and it will be a zeroblock (i.e. $b_{klr} = 0$) if $\Delta_{klr} < \alpha$. The cut-off value $\alpha$ is the overall mean network density.

The blocks of an image matrix may be represented as digraphs (directed graphs), in which the links between any two positions $[B_k ... B_l]$ are depicted by arrows emerging from the sending block and pointing at the receiving block. A tie between blocks, indicating a powerful relationship between the organizations of these blocks, is considered to exist only if the density of relations within or between positions exceeds the overall mean density of the respective network. A block with a high density of ties among its own members is represented by a circle with an arrow pointing to itself. Apart from the first Sicilian network, where some more time is taken to explain these procedures, all other networks are first presented in the form of a graphic representation of their respective image matrices, before the blocks are "opened" and their individual members introduced.

The last situation, i.e. high block cohesion represented by a circle in the graphic image, is one of the most often misunderstood configurations in network analysis. Such misperceptions are often used to support critiques of network analysis in general. As most of our arguments rest on blockmodel analysis, some of this critiques shall be mentioned briefly. It was argued recently that it would be tempting to interpret positions in blockmodels as if they reflected more than just structural properties of networks. According to Piselli (1997:306), blockmodel analysts would often claim that "structurally equivalent actors possess the same attitudes and opinions and also behave in similar ways." This critique is out of place. To my knowledge, nowhere in serious network analysis has such a claim ever been made.

One of the essentials of network analysis is that high block cohesion cannot be taken as reflecting, for example, the existence of "corporate identity", "strategic alliances" or "development coalitions". At best, high cohesion may be taken to indicate the existence of a "clique" -- a structural property quite different from the political notion of coalition. In this work, only occasional use is made of the clique concept. It is used where a specific position is exclusively, or predominantly, occupied by one
single category of actors, for example, organizations pertaining to the policy domain “work” (trade unions, ministers of social affairs, etc.) or by several ministries of a regional government. Such cliques may, in exceptional cases, be treated as if they were coalitions if such a claim is clearly supported by the descriptive case study material in Chapter Three.

ITALY

For a number of reasons, the two Italian cases are used to introduce the structural comparative results of the case by case analysis. First, most of our initial attempts to study territorial politics with the help of network-analytic tools were undertaken in Italy (Grote 1992a, 1992c, 1993, 1995b; Bramanti and Grote 1995). Secondly, Italy is also the case we are most familiar with and this, in particular, regards issues such as regional development and the social and institutional embeddedness of economic development differentials across the country (Grote 1992b, 1996, Garmise and Grote 1992). Third, and most importantly, we are able to present diachronic empirical material for one of the two Italian cases, namely for Sicily (Grote 1997a, 1997b, 1998). As the comparative results of the two Sicilian case studies are almost identical, this adds an explanatory power to the entire study of our organizational ecologies that would not have been available otherwise. Let us first turn, therefore, to Sicily.

Figure 4.3 has shown Sicily’s organizational ecology to be characterized by relatively high density rates. The network also appeared to be very “thick” in terms of reciprocal ties and of overlaps between influence reputation and communication contact. Equally evident has been the relative marginality of public institutions in the network, a fact which clearly ran counter to what one might have expected on the basis of available qualitative material on the role of politics and of public administration in the region. These general characteristics of the second, the 1995 network, largely confirmed the results of the earlier analysis carried out about three years prior to this one. Before presenting this comparative evidence in more detail, a few words are required on the context within which the first study was undertaken and, also, on the general properties of the two data sets that were used for analysis.

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First, field work terminated early in 1992 in the case of the first network analysis and in late autumn 1995 in the case of the second one. The period of three to four years in between, could be expected to be sufficiently long to allow for structural deviations from the pattern first observed in 1992 — deviations which could reasonably be hypothesized to have occurred as a result of the general, macro-political crisis taking place in Italy at that time. Secondly, it should be noted that the first analysis was exclusively concerned with one specific policy. Both the contact and reputational questions addressed to the representatives of organizations which were identified as forming a closed network, were related to policy-making in the field of financial incentives, service supply, the creation of enterprise zones (aree di sviluppo industriale or ASI) and of other initiatives of interest to actors concerned with small and medium sized enterprise issues. The first network, therefore, represents the “policy network SMEs”, while the second embodies organizations active in the broader “policy domain of regional planning and development”. Thirdly, due to the particular research design and thanks to the fact that I have had the chance to direct the first and coordinate the second project — which also implied the personal conduct of interviews — the data is perfectly comparable over time. Only a small number of organizations that had been included in the first analysis, could not be re-contacted a second time in 1995. In a number of cases, this was due simply to the disappearance of certain actors from the region’s organization set.

The first project formed part of the process of elaborating the regional development plan (Piano Regionale di Sviluppo della Regione Siciliana or PRS) for

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6 On the other hand, the possibility that changes such as the one from the First to the Second Republic were likely to occur with substantial time lags at the regional level, could not be ignored. For example, Sicily did not change its electoral system in that period. The old proportional electoral system was still working there and the failure to adopt a new one, and generally re-organize the regional administrative system, may explain the disastrous verdicts such as the one by Leoluca Orlando, the mayor of the regional capital Palermo. Asked whether it would be of any help in local development policy, Orlando answered that the region “does not exist. There is the risk that the [opportunity] space we are taking away from Mafia influence, the Mafia is recuperating with the region” (L’Unità, 26 agosto 1997:4).

7 In particular, some of the brokers ceased to operate during the three year period. Other structures suffered from organizational paralysis as a result of involvement in corruption causes. In a few extreme cases, organizational key figures that had been interviewed in 1992 could not be got hold of because they had meanwhile been imprisoned or otherwise disappeared. In any case, this only
the period 1992-94. The study served as background material for that purpose (Grote 1992a). According to Palumbo (1994:276), from a political and technical point of view, the PRS 1992-94 represented "l’espressione più alta della ‘risposta’ [elaborata] dalla Direzione regionale della programmazione ai sensi della legge regionale n.6 del 1986". One of the most decisive points distinguishing this plan from its predecessors was the emphasis placed on the management of interorganizational relations between key actors at the regional level, especially in the field of "small and medium sized enterprise policies". The central section of the guidelines to the plan (Regione Siciliana, 1991) was entitled the "governance of interdependence" and introduced issues such as development interdependencies, institutional interdependencies, and social interdependencies. With regard to these latter, the guidelines distinguished between self-equilibrating (the market, the community) and externally enforced (the state, large enterprises, and other public hierarchies) modes of economic governance and identified social networks, representing an intermediate category between the former two extremes, as being the most appropriate instruments for combatting both market and hierarchy failure in the allocation of resources.

According to the "guidelines", social networks may be either of a purely private type (inter-firm alliances, joint ventures) or may represent the kind of interorganizational relations between the private and the public which also interest us in this context, namely associational interest systems and their links to public administration8. Where none of the principal governance mechanisms, i.e. (formal) administration in this context, namely associational interest systems and their links to public administration8. Where none of the principal governance mechanisms, i.e. (formal)

8 Palumbo refers to the regional government’s response to the manifold challenges represented by the increasing constraints on redistributive policies, secondly, the new focus, by EU authorities, on countries such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and on the new claimants for entry and, finally, the emigration of private capital to Eastern Europe and the failure, by Sicilian authorities, to attract capital investments. He also mentions that the PRS, despite being strongly endorsed by the Presidency of the regional government, "e tuttavia mai stato approvato dell’Assemblea regionale" (ibid.). Further reasons for this non-approval can be found in Bianchi, Grote e Pieracci (1995).

9 Philippe Schmitter may recognize this as representing a modification of some of the essentials of his work on the "governance of sectors" (Schmitter 1990). Whether it was reasonable to apply such an advanced concept to a case as remote as Sicily must be left unanswered. Anyway, among those involved in drawing up the plan, the general strategy was met with great enthusiasm. There was little awareness, among the members of the team, of the fact that networks, conceptualized in terms of innovative forms of governance, may not only result in the production of social, institutional, and political "goods" but, equally, in that of "bads", as observed by Schmitter in a more recent contribution (Schmitter 1998). That is, a number of situations are imaginable which can be detrimental to the coming about of modernizing networks. In some cases, the very attempt to create such structures may lead to a further deterioration in the initial situation and, hence, be counterproductive.

10 Today, we know that, where public hierarchies are discredited and private markets underdeveloped, networks may not, actually, represent the most appropriate answer to the various government, market, and community failures they are thought to correct.

Case by case comparison

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Case by case comparison

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as being the most appropriate for the case of the 1992 network. The blocks of Table 5.1 are ordered by a combination of their status values and by the indegrees (columns sums) and outdegrees (row sums) achieved in the reduced image matrix on the right hand side.

To facilitate further description, the following labels are being attached to the five positions. Block 1 (B₁) shall be called the “center”, block 2 (B₂) the “extended center”, block 3 (B₃) the “semi-periphery”, block 4 (B₄) the “periphery” and, finally, block 5 (B₅) the “extreme periphery” of the network. Consulting Table 5.1, it can be seen that the majority of actors are positioned in the “periphery” (5 organizations) and the “extreme periphery” (12 organizations), while both “center” and “extended center” hold a total of 15 organizations. Table 8.5 and Table 8.6 in the Appendix provide more detailed information about the composition of blocks in terms of the presence of public institutions, interest associations, and finance and technology brokers. It appears that 52 per cent of the interest associations of the 1992 “policy network SMEs” (SIC-2) occupy both “center” and “extended center”, while 80 per cent of the regional government divisions show up in the “periphery” and “extreme periphery” of the network.

The “center”, which holds two divisions of regional government and four interest groups, is also the internally most cohesive position, with a block density of 0.67. The block density table demonstrates that several positions, including these positions' occupants, are completely disconnected from each other. This is represented by what is called a “perfect zero-block” situation and concerns the following relations: B₁ ↔ B₃ and B₄ ↔ B₅ (both characterized by mutual unreachability), B₂ → B₁ and B₅ → B₁.

In order to reduce complexity and facilitate the interpretation, an image matrix can be derived from the block density table. Matrix reduction of that type is habitually done by specifying a criterion by which ’1’ and ’0’ cell entries of the original adjacency matrix can be assembled to blocks. Most procedures use a density criterion (α), i.e. the extent to which individual block densities (∆k) are above or below overall matrix density. Since matrix density, in this case, is Δ = 0.20, each block density value (∆k) equal to or above that cut-off value is coded as ’1’ in the image matrix (B₁ = 1 if ∆k > 0.20), and each value below 0.20 is turned into a ’0’ cell entry (B₁ = 0 if ∆k < α).

The image matrix now allows for proper structural evaluations of the network. It more or less perfectly conforms to a center-periphery pattern as suggested, for example, by Mullins et al. (1977). A typical center-periphery structure normally consists of “a core position which is internally cohesive, and one or more other positions with ties to the core position, but not to each other (...) The peripheral positions may or may not be internally cohesive” (Wasserman and Faust 1994:419). A perfect example of this type of patterning would be an image matrix containing oneblocks only in the first row and the first column. The Sicilian pattern, just like the other networks analyzed in this chapter, diverges slightly from such a perfect model.

For example, B₂ and B₄ both attract choices from two other positions and the rows and columns of B₁ are not entirely filled with oneblocks. Yet, overall, the patterning is rather clear and, in general, conforms more to a center-periphery structure than to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>B₁</th>
<th>block densities</th>
<th>status</th>
<th>B₁</th>
<th>image matrix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0.25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of equivalence analysis (1992 network)

As bein

11 Occasionally, we encountered cases where certain individual positions clearly diverged from the center-periphery structure. For example, both in Lombardia and Niedersachsen, a number of positions only contained oneblocks in the rows and zeroblocks in the columns of the image matrix. Positions like these have been labelled by Burt (1976) to be “sycophants” – a term not entirely unproblematic if applied to public actors. Overall, however, these networks were also dominated by a powerful center and exhibited rather clear peripheries. We have treated them, therefore, as representing center-periphery structures with some insignificant deviations from the default pattern.
any other of the possible models suggested by Wasserman and Faust (1994: 419-24) and by other authors (Burt 1976; Marsden 1989).12

It is the "center" (B1) which attracts the highest number of indegrees (4), while the occupants of the "extreme periphery" (B5) appear to be contacted exclusively by members of B1 and by no other position. At the same time, the "center" is also the position with the highest number of outdegrees (i.e. 3, self-choices excluded) - a fact underlining the important broker capacity of this position's organizations. Most information travelling through the network is "controlled" by members of B1.

The configuration of the image matrix can now be transformed into a graphic representation in the following way. Cell entries ‘1’ are represented by directed arcs and ‘0’-entries by the absence of arcs. Self-choices, i.e. one-blocks along the main diagonal, are called "reflexive ties" and are evidenced by rings around the respective position. It now becomes evident that members of B5, although more closely tied to the dominant position B1 and, hence, seemingly more important than, for example, members of the "periphery", are in reality also more dependent on that single connection. Occupants of B5, on the other hand, are able to lean on two different paths to link up to the center. This slightly better positioning of B5 occupants is reflected by the respective block status value (17.50) achieved by that position.

Table 5.2 lists the members of B1 and provides for individual indegree centrality measures both for communication contact and for influence reputation13. The Consiglio Regionale Economia e Lavoro attracts the highest number of indegrees on the contact relations14. Yet, the institution can easily be dismissed from B1.

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12 Alternative ideal images for blockmodels are "cohesive subgroups", "centralized structure", "hierarchy", and "transitivity" (Wasserman and Faust 1994:423). None of these emerged as being the dominant pattern in our analysis.

13 Information about the composition of the other three positions, including information about the network members’ individual properties are contained in Table 8.2 in the Appendix for each regional case separately.

14 At the time of interviewing, Sicily was the only Italian region to possess such a body. It is modelled following the example of the national Consiglio Nazionale Economia e Lavoro (Cnel).
membership for several reasons. Although CREL should in theory be in constant face-to-face contact with members of the region's interest system, this assumption, based on the formal functions ascribed to the institution, must strongly be qualified. The CREL had just been set up shortly before embarking on field work, and most respondents declared it to be ineffective and, in part, paralyzed organizationally. The high centrality accredited to CREL, hence, must be read in terms of expectations its formal institutionalization had raised among representatives of the region's interest system. An inspection of the original raw data matrix confirms this hypothesis. The Council is contacted exclusively by interest associations and, although itself forming part of the regional administration, it is not contacted by the divisions of the Giunta.

A more reliable indicator for an evaluation of the role of the Council would seem to be the reputation score totalized by this body. With 0.31 points, CREL's influence reputation is far below that of other members of the center position and, in particular, far below the average density of the reputation matrix (0.37).

We remain then with one Assessorato (social and labor affairs) and four interest associations, three of which are trade unions. Apart from API, the association representing small and medium sized enterprises, all other members of the "center" are related to the labor domain. Interestingly, it is not the "ministry" for labour affairs (Assessorato Lavoro) that scores highest on centralization but, rather, two of the trade unions, namely CGIL and UIL. The same applies to the influence reputation achieved by the latter. CGIL arrives at a score of above 80% and hence ends up as the most important organization of the region within the field of SME policies.

As demonstrated above, the "center" is also the organizationally most cohesive position -- a fact that would justify the assignment of the label "social clique" or, more precisely, "labour clique"15 to that group of actors. It arrives at a block density of \[ \Delta b_1 = 0.67 \] -- considerably above the one immediately following, i.e. the "semi-periphery". Whatever the reasons for this high prominence of trade unions in the area of enterprise policy, the most important result to be drawn from the picture is the absence of public administration from the "center" of the network's organizational space.

In a related work, presenting the results of the Sicily study in a more detailed way (Grote 1997a, 1997b), a path distance plot (MDS) had been used as evidence of the peculiar pattern of the 1992 network.16 The result was that, with few exceptions, the divisions of regional government were not only removed from the central space of the figure, but they all showed up in a specific corner close to the borderline of the plot area. We had hypothesized (Grote 1997a, 1997b) that the concentration of public actors at the margins of the organizational space would indicate the existence of another, and eventually more relevant network. It was one that was difficult to get hold of because it was essentially populated by individuals and not by collective actors and organizations. We had argued this was a network of bilateral and interpersonal exchanges of favours, where political entrepreneurs, i.e. the representatives of public administration, were directly connected to individual firms and other private actors. On both sides, we hypothesized strong preferences for unmediated contacts and a strong aversion to the more transparent procedure of open interorganizational bargaining and policymaking. In Robert Putnam's (1993) terms, this then would represent a perfect example of "particularized contacting". If it really made sense to take for granted the existence of such a second, largely invisible, and empirically unconfirmed network, then, this would have strong implications for the political relevance of the one studied above, i.e. the visible, interorganizational network. It would suggest that major political decisions were being taken within the first setting, following a logic of politica oscura (Pizzorno 1994), while the second setting (politica palese) would essentially serve to keep up the appearance of democratic

15 Note, that the results achieved by multidimensional scaling and by equivalence analyses are comparable only in part. In MDS procedures, it is relational properties such as adjacency and closeness which are emphasized. These are relatively irrelevant for equivalence analysis. Blockmodels emphasize the structural similarity of actors in a network. Two or more actors, then, may be very similar structurally, even without directly being connected to each other. The two procedures are somewhat correlated and produce similar results with respect to the overall patterning of relations. Yet, they are never perfectly identical. Note, moreover, that modified versions of the original raw data matrices (symmetrization) have been used as inputs for MDS, while the raw data matrices have been used for the equivalence analysis. These remarks, obviously, also concern the two other cases submitted to the same procedure, i.e. Baden-Württemberg and Languedoc-Roussillon.

bargaining. In any case, interest groups in Sicily are neither being consulted, nor are they in any form incorporated into private-public joint arrangements in the "policy domain regional development". The central positioning of the "labour clique", then, would indicate a high importance of these organizations in a network which itself could hardly be accredited with much relevance in regional decision-making. In other words, we would have studied a network, and measured its structural properties, which, in reality, was anything but central to policymaking in the region.

This, in itself, would not be insignificant. The interorganizational network that formed the target of analysis, simply would not overlap with what policy-analytic approaches would call a policy network. Differing from other, more modernizing cases, structure and function in this organizational ecology would be dissociated. It should be noted that the constraint represented by the difficulty of describing the obscure structure of particularized contacting is a constraint not typical of network analysis alone. We, generally, have to live with it, and this may explain why most studies of clientelism and corruption in the Mezzogiorno (but not only) have adopted a qualitative approach, with much space given to story-telling and to the presentation of court cases (Boussevain 1989; Gambetta 1992; della Porta 1992; della Porta e Vanucci 1994). The results would suggest, therefore, that clientelist networks of the type above are simply not accessible to any form of empirical analysis.

The results for the "policy domain network regional development", for which information was collected three years later in 1995, appear to be almost identical to the ones presented above. Compared to the graphic representation presented in Chapter Four, the structure of the network is now much more evident. As in 1992, we again end up with a center-periphery pattern, with $B_1$ largely dominating the organizational space. The fact that a four-block solution was suggested as the most appropriate one in this case, was due to the specific fit value produced by the COBLOC algorithm and is explained in more detail in the introduction to this section. As shown by Table 5.3, the seven members of the "center" are extremely well connected to each other.

### Table 5.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>block densities</th>
<th>status</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>image matrix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>E_{ij}</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high block density of 0.83 is shared only by the respective positions in Languedoc-Roussillon and Niedersachsen. Given the high number of organizations (18) occupying that position, the cohesion of the "extended center" (0.53) is equally remarkable. The resulting image matrix, this time, comes close to being a perfect center-periphery structure and, again, the "center" turns out to be an important broker for the flow of information in the network. Interestingly, as is more easily discerned from the graphic representation of the image matrix (Fig.5.2), it turns out that members of the "semi-periphery", although representing 42 per cent of the public institutions and 22 per cent of the finance and technology agencies (see Table 8.6 in the Appendix), are exclusively contacted by members of the "center", without themselves reporting significant contacts to members of other positions. The fact that the "periphery" is not chosen by members of any other position, however, is characteristic of most of the other eight networks and underlines these organizations' marginality for policy-making in the domain.

### Figure 5.2

`graphic representation of image matrix`
Although not as pronounced as before, we still find a large fraction of public institutions in the two "peripheries" (50 per cent), while both "center" and "extended center" are strongly "controlled" by interest associations (83 per cent). In general, then, it is clear that the overall configurations of the two networks studied in Sicily are very similar to each other. Changes in the surrounding political environment both nationally and regionally had hardly any impact on the way the regional organizations structured their relations throughout the period under study. Interorganizational ecologies such as the one analyzed here seem to be very conservative, not to say, sticky and viscous, even in the face of major political turmoil. This becomes particularly apparent when consulting the composition of the second network’s most central position in Table 5.4.

**Table 5.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>members of most central position ($B_1$) and their relational properties (1995 network)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

As in the case of the previous analysis, the composition of the "center" is extremely mixed. It contains divisions of regional administration and a number of important interest associations, but no representative of the "broker" category. Contrary to the earlier case, however, it is a public institution, namely the Presidency of the Giunta Regionale, that scores highest on indegree centrality (0.66). It is by far the organization most intensely contacted by all the others. With an indegree score of 0.61, the second organization, in terms of centrality, turns out to be the Federazione degli industriali della Sicilia, the regional branch of Confindustria (P2), Italy’s most important employers’ association. Due to its highly specific contact portfolio, the federation is not like those in $B_1$ and, hence, shows up in the "extended center".

Overall, the composition of the "center" comes close to being a carbon copy of the one encountered earlier. As indicated in Chapter Four (Fig.4.5), the trade union community is fully present, although now slightly less prominent both in terms of reputation and contact indegree centrality. At the same time, however, with a betweenness centrality score of 0.11, it is again the CGIL, which is the most important interest associations, but no representative of the "broker" category. Contrary to the earlier case, however, it is a public institution, namely the Presidency of the Giunta Regionale, that scores highest on indegree centrality (0.66). It is by far the organization most intensely contacted by all the others. With an indegree score of 0.61, the second organization, in terms of centrality, turns out to be the Federazione degli industriali della Sicilia, the regional branch of Confindustria (P2), Italy’s most important employers’ association. Due to its highly specific contact portfolio, the federation is not like those in $B_1$ and, hence, shows up in the "extended center".

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### Table 5.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>code</th>
<th>block density</th>
<th>global density</th>
<th>global centralization</th>
<th>indegree centrality</th>
<th>between centrality</th>
<th>network (mean 0.40)</th>
<th>overall sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta B_1$ = 0.83</td>
<td>$\Delta_C = 0.31$</td>
<td>$C_D = 0.37$</td>
<td>$n_c = 39$</td>
<td>$n_c = 39$</td>
<td>$n_c = 39$</td>
<td>$n_c = 108$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tab 5.4**

**Note the slightly more elaborate format of the table compared to what is contained in Table 5.2. It is this format by which the structural results of the other eight networks are presented in the following sections. Besides the block density of the "center" ($\Delta B_1$), the table also contains information about global network density ($\Delta$) and global centralization ($C_D$) on the contact relations. This is then followed by individual indegree and betweenness centrality indices and by the power reputation score achieved by each organization. The subscripts to $n$ (numbers of actors included) relate to the rows ($r$) and columns ($c$) of the matrices. While these are identical for the networks themselves (39 in Sicily), they differ from each other in the last column of the table referring to the overall sample. There, $r$ indicates the quantity of respondents of the overall sample having supplied complete information on the network members, and $c$ indicates the quantity of actors listed on the organization list that was presented to the respondents. A figure of 86, then, indicates that 86 respondents of regional and subregional (provincial and municipal level) organizations have filled out a questionnaire which contained 108 organizations in the organization list. Of these latter, the great majority were regional organizations. Yet, among the total of 108, there have also been 16 national-level and 10 EU-level organizations.**

### Case by case comparison

As this is a peculiarity of the Sicilian network, will become evident only after an analysis of the other cases whose "centers" turn out to be more homogeneous with respect to the actor categories occupying them. Members of other positions, as well as their different relational attributes, are listed in Table 8.2 in the Appendix.
goes through this central knot of the network. API, the association of small enterprises, now appears to be replaced by another business interest group which represents, however, almost the identical category of firms. Indeed, CNA has recently been renamed the Confederazione nazionale dell’artigianato e della piccola impresa which puts a lot of competitive stress on API, the group that originally started representing the interests of the small enterprise domain.

The only really significant difference between the central positions of the two networks is that, in the latter, the "labour clique" is joined by three out of a total of twelve Assessorati Regionali which also possess slightly higher centrality scores both on contact and reputation. One of these is the division responsible for the cooperative sector, for commerce, and for craft enterprises (Assessorato per la Cooperazione, per il Commercio e l’Artigianato). The Assessorato scores third on indegree and second on betweenness centrality while being the fifth important organization in terms of influence reputation -- an importance largely confirmed by the responses of the 86 members of the overall sample (last column of Table 5.4). The prominent position of this institution does not come as a surprise, given the relevance of the small firm sector in the region’s economy. More difficult to interpret is the presence of that division, within the regional Presidency, which deals with external relations, i.e. contacts with other regions, with national authorities, and with Community institutions (Dipartimento Rapporti Extraregionali). This is particularly surprising if one takes account of the fact that this division hardly employed more than a handful of administrators (one director and four assistants) at the time it was interviewed. These few, but noteworthy, differences apart, we have the same general patterning in the “policy domain regional development” that was already encountered in the analysis of the “small enterprise policy network” of 1992: the bulk of public actors is absent from the “center” in the same way as has been the case before, and this “structural hole” is filled by the three regional trade union confederations together with a few other organizations.

Although not being relevant to the interpretation of the overall results, a few comments should be made on some important organizations whose relational performance was not sufficient to bring them into the center. Two of these have already been mentioned, the Assessorato per il Lavoro and the Federazione degli Industriali. Both form part of the “extended center” where they exhibit the highest values of all the other sixteen organizations forming part of that position. Interestingly, the only representatives of the category “finance and technology brokers” also appearing in that position, are the Finanziarie Regionali and some banks. IRCAC (Istituto regionale per il credito alla cooperazione), IRFIS (Mediocredito della Sicilia), Sicilcassa, and Banco di Sicilia belong to that group and all score average in terms of the various measures.

The regional chamber (P1) occupies a less significant position in the “extended center”. With 0.24 and 0.31 points, it remains far below average both on indegree centralization and reputation. The organizations representing the commercial (P6 and P7), the agricultural (P11, P12, P13), and the cooperative sector (P14, P15) all form part of that same position, with values below or close to the averages of the various measures. Apart from CNA which is part of the “center”, the other three craft associations are divided between the “extended center” (P1 and P11) and the “semi-periphery” (P5). The only two private associations completely marginalized are Intersind (P9), the representative of public enterprises, and ANCE (P8), the regional branch of the construction sector’s business organization. The “periphery” also includes the Commissario dello Stato (A10), while both provincial prefects (a11) and provincial governments (a122) show up in the “semi-periphery”.

Let us briefly summarize these findings. The majority of public institutions appear to be marginalized to an extent that suggests the likely existence of another network where “the real action is going on”, i.e. where most of the financial means available above that of most of the center occupants (0.53). It is also very relevant with respect to its brokerage capacity (betweenness centrality of 0.06) and its influence reputation (0.56).

Conversely, the “labour clique” this time appears to be deprived of one of its original members, namely the branch of regional government dealing with labour matters (l’Assessorato per il Lavoro e gli Affari Sociali). This Assessorato has now “emigrated” to the “extended center” (see appendix), where it continues to play an important role with an indegree centrality score lying between the “center” and the “semi-periphery” (0.06).
for structural interventions in the region is concentrated. The first network, then, being short of material resources, looks more like an interorganizational playing ground for interest associations that promote and defend the interests of their respective clientele, vis-à-vis a public target which has retreated from the organizational space24 and which is, seemingly, neither willing nor able to deal with these types of organized demands.

In any case, contrary to our expectation, drawn, in part, from empirical evidence a propos other networks of a similar type25, only a very small fraction of regional government divisions are drawn into the "center". Yet, at the same time, the "center" is not a "structural hole" (Burt 1992) or "hollow core" as suggested by the results of yet another analysis of a clientelist and party-dominated organizational ecology (Heinz et.al. 1990)26.

All this adds support to a number of statements that have been made a propos problems of interest intermediation, and not only in Italy’s Mezzogiorno regions. There seems to be a general lack of properly organized forms of "demand" for regional government. At least in Sicily, the maintenance of this underdeveloped status quo in interorganizational relations seems to be a deliberate strategy of public administration: it is less likely to threaten its discretionary power and control over the allocation of resources. Demands for the latter and for other types of special treatment as are disorganized and an ad-hoc nature as is the supply of these resources (interventi a pioggia or "slicing the cake")27. In other words, preferences for

24 The Italian state may well be an “available state” in Giuseppe DiPalma’s (1980) terms -- yet not necessarily for organizations as the ones forming part of our analysis.

25 For example, in their analysis of interorganizational relations in the policy domains “health” and “energy” in the US, Knoke and Laumann (1987) come to the following conclusion: “the core is dominated by those governmental actors with the most broad-reaching policy mandates; the first circle is dominated by the major special interests of particular sectors, and the peripheries are occupied by the minor claimants” (ibid:245). While our results are similar as regards the first circle (or “extended center”), they do not correspond at all to the authors’ findings a propos the most central position.

26 Heinz et.al. (1990), who studied the patterning of relations between private organizations and public office holders in Washington, identified an empty center (hollow core) in the middle of the organizational space. Due to strong party affiliations and clientelist exchanges, communication in that network mostly occurred between adjacent and politically compatible groups which maintained ties to their allies, but not to their adversaries (ibid:372).

27 Although elaborating more specifically on the role of business service centers, Martinelli (1989) confirms that the demand and supply of such services at the regional level intersect at extremely low levels. She speaks of a “vicious circle which links scarce demand with low supply of business services” (ibid:14). Martinelli also points to the shift that occurred throughout the 1980s, from a centralized, direct type of intervention towards a more decentralized, project-oriented approach. This would put a strong responsibility upon regional governments which “done or together with business associations and firms themselves, (...) must mobilize, organize, and cooperate, in order to formulate, promote, and even manage projects” (ibid:23). While this would emerge only very

individual transfer payments on the part of single entrepreneurs correspond to preferences on the part of political entrepreneurs for immediate benefits and returns in terms of votes and legitimacy (Trigilia 1991). It is the strange amalgamation of political and economic markets that pulls public administration away from the centre of interorganizational relations.

Looking at these results through the lenses of policy network approaches, as introduced in the beginning, state-society relations in Sicily would seem to reflect typical post-modern patterns: state agencies suffering from governmental overload and desperately trying to come to grips with constantly increasing complexities, are compelled to draw interest groups into the center of the public space, with whom they then engage in joint decision-making and forms of problem solving where each participant is accredited an equal status. We should seem to have a new form of societal governance based on “other-regardingness” and the recognition of mutual interdependence which is aimed at achieving improvements in flexibility, efficiency, and democratic accountability.

We now know, that this is far from being the case. Regional government is dramatically underloaded with organized demands, but not with demands advanced by individual actors and single entrepreneurs. State-society relations are managed by direct and unmediated brokerage at the margins of interorganizational life. The more this second, obscure and individualized network is developed, the less are public institutions likely to be found close to the center of the visible, interorganizational network that has been studied here. Vice versa, the less it is developed, the more likely will individuals have incentives to make recourse to associational channels for promoting their interests and approaching the offices of regional government. In such a situation, there is little left for interest groups to intermediate at all. In policy networks of this type, there is little room for modernization. Even the most
entrepreneurial of presidents of any of the regional business interest associations is bound to follow the established channels of political exchange if he wishes to increase the status of his organization or to obtain selective goods for this organization’s membership.

Yet, what about the curious position of the trade unions? No unambiguous explanation can be offered here with regard to their obvious prominence in the networks. One possible reading would look as follows. In a situation characterized by the country’s highest unemployment figures, there seems to be hardly any policy domain not directly concerned with measures in favour of employment creation. The unions, therefore, are almost naturally drawn into enterprise policies and decision-making even in more broader policy domains such as regional development.

Although the role of trade unions in national policies and policy domains can not be taken to lend support to the findings of an analysis carried out at a completely different level of territorial complexity, Compton’s (1995) figures a propos union participation in national economic policy making are quite illuminating. Of the four most important founding members of the European Community, union participation in that domain has been ranked highest in Italy (6.7 points on average) -- more than double that of France (3.0) and Britain (3.6), and considerably higher than in Germany (4.5) -- over a period of about a quarter of a century (1970-1993). In Compton’s words, there has been a continuing pattern "of broad but informal political exchange" in that country (ibid:322) which, to some extent, may have had repercussions at the subnational level as well.

Another possible reading would have to point to the extremely high concentration of employment in the service sector and, in particular, in the area of public or non-market services. Regional administration is a union stronghold in Sicily and this may in part account for the high reputation accredited to these organizations. For example, Cerase (1992) notes that the impact of the specific mode of trade union organization and representation within the services and divisions of public administration would significantly "contribute to make the Italian case different from other European countries" (ibid:517). Trade unions have an important role to play in the all-encompassing practise of lottizzazione, i.e. access to public office through specific organizational affiliations. Lottizzazione does not just represent a spoil system as known in other Western democracies, but a "generalized mode of control embracing all dimensions of the public sector" (ibid:521). The "networks of belonging" to whose creation trade unions would actively contribute, would be extremely pronounced and would have particularly severe consequences in the country’s Mezzogiorno "where local labor market demand is essentially absorbed by employment in public administration" (ibid:523).

Finally, strongly related to the previous interpretation but more far-reaching, not to say daring in its implications, would be a reading in terms of the role of trade unions not just, as before, as a constraint on administrative innovation but, rather, as an instrument of the emergence and the persistence of clientelist practices. Taking into account the relevance of the Sicilian branches of CGIL, CISL, and UIL within the regional bureaucracy, their centrality in the interorganizational network would then assume a completely different flavour. In a comparative research project on "Clientelism in Southern Europe", it was found that, contrary to the initial expectations of the authors according to which trade unions would "serve, if not as guardians of meritocracy, at least as bulwarks against clientelism" (Mavrogordatos 1996:21), in reality "they have served as Trojan Horses of (...) clientelism instead" (ibid.). Or, in the words of another project member, "trade unions proved to be the most powerful lever for the persistence of clientelism, more than party deputies or government ministers" (Papadopoulos 1996:4). While the above mainly refers to the case of Greece, the results for Spain largely confirmed that pattern: "trade unions were (...) important agents in patron-client relations, and some of the interviewees attributed to them an even more central role than to the parties" (ibid.). There are

slowly even in the more advanced regions of the North-East-Center, "it is not certain that the same should occur in the Mezzogiorno."

28 The author identifies an important deviation between, on the one hand, "the enunciation of principles, strategic declarations, and behavioral norms explicitly aimed at improvements in the responsiveness of administrative action vis-a-vis societal demands" and, on the other hand, "the unions’ concrete activity within the administration [which] is more often aimed at the protection of proper particularistic interests." This, together with an increasing fragmentation of union structures has ultimately led unions to become "a formidable obstacle to the introduction of organizational innovation" (ibid:518).
indications that a similar logic operates in parts of Italy and, especially, the Mezzogiorno.

Given the highly idiosyncratic pattern of the southern Italian network, Lombardy clearly should exhibit a more standard feature. In Chapter Three, we had argued that this region's ecology, due, in particular, to the more solid structuring of its interest system, would have to be placed in the bottom row of Table 3.1. Relative to the coordination capacity of its regional state agencies, Lombardy's network structure would then oscillate between the interest-dominated typology and, alternatively, the typology of clientelism/pluralism. In any case, it are not only interest associations which are likely to be better organized here but, also, public administration. It is not by chance that Lombardy frequently figures among the group of most entrepreneurial regions in Europe in most accounts dealing with trans-frontier and inter-regional cooperation. It, moreover, is a founding member of the most successful agreement of that kind, namely the Four-Motors-Initiative, in which it is associated with Catalunya, Rhone-Alpes and Baden-Württemberg. At the same time, and somewhat relativizing that positive picture, we have found indications for a strong national patterning of network properties in the case of Italy. In Figure 4.2, Lombardy and Sicily were the first two regions to form a cluster -- a prime example of a typically southern political ecology.

Turning now to the empirical results for Lombardia, we find that, in fact, its network structure does not diverge dramatically from the Sicilian one even with regard to the composition of the different positions. The most noteworthy difference, perhaps, is the peculiar behaviour of members of the "extended center"\textsuperscript{29}. Not only is this position’s internal cohesion (0.84) significantly higher than the one achieved by the "center" (0.75), despite the relatively high number of "incumbents" (8), these latter are also extremely active in maintaining contacts with the other three positions (outdegree 4 of B\textsubscript{2} in image matrix)\textsuperscript{30}. The graphic representation (Fig.5.3) demonstrates that the connectedness of the network is generally better than in the case of the Sicilian network, especially with respect to relations among the first three positions, B\textsubscript{1}, B\textsubscript{2}, and B\textsubscript{3}.

\textbf{FIG. 5.3}

\textit{graphic representation of image matrix}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node (B1) at (0,0) {$B_1$};
\node (B2) at (1,1) {$B_2$};
\node (B3) at (1,-1) {$B_3$};
\node (B4) at (2,0) {$B_4$};
\draw [->] (B1) -- (B2);
\draw [->] (B2) -- (B3);
\draw [->] (B3) -- (B1);
\draw [->] (B2) -- (B4);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

B\textsubscript{2} is not only more cohesive internally, but also depends less on B\textsubscript{1} than has been the case for the respective position in the Sicilian network. Apart from their direct connection, its members are able to reach the "center" by making use of the additional path B\textsubscript{2} $\rightarrow$ B\textsubscript{3} $\rightarrow$ B\textsubscript{1}. Also, they form a "bridge" through which information can travel to the "periphery". At the same time, while being extremely active themselves, members of the "extended center" are chosen only by B\textsubscript{1} and by no other position. B\textsubscript{2}, therefore, is not a "transmitter" but, rather, would seem to correspond to the typology of "sycophant" described by Burt (1976)\textsuperscript{31}. Let us now turn to the block composition of this network and, in particular, to an analysis of the "center" position.

\textsuperscript{29} For more detailed information about the composition of this and of other positions, see Table 8.7 in the Appendix.

\textsuperscript{30} Note, that the block densities indicating the social "role" of B\textsubscript{2} belong to the highest of the entire network. B\textsubscript{2} $\rightarrow$ B\textsubscript{1} arrives at a value of 0.88, B\textsubscript{2} $\rightarrow$ B\textsubscript{3} of 0.80, and B\textsubscript{2} $\rightarrow$ B\textsubscript{4} of 0.54.

\textsuperscript{31} With values of 0.16 and 0.19, the average densities of the indegrees B\textsubscript{2} is receiving from both B\textsubscript{1} and B\textsubscript{3} are far below the matrix overall density of 0.34. These relations, therefore, are insignificant. In general, as regards different types of positions, the following four are distinguished by Wassermann and Faust (1994:413): "isolates" (nodes with neither indegrees nor outdegrees), "transmitters" (nodes with only outdegrees), "receivers" (nodes with only indegrees) and "carriers" or "ordinary points" (nodes with both indegrees and outdegrees). The typology of "sycophants" comes from Burt (1976).
The most significant difference between the Sicilian and the Lombardy network is the following. Those organizations having jointly occupied the most central position in the southern case, now appear to be divided between the "center" and the "extended center". One category of actors (public institutions) occupies the first and another category (interest associations) the second position. A glance at Table 5.5 shows that, as in Sicily, the most important actor of this region's organizational ecology is the regional government's presidential office -- la Presidenza della Giunta Regionale. The president's centrality is particularly evident with respect to the indegree (0.67) and betweenness measures (0.12), less so in terms of reputation. There, the institution is outperformed by the second government division making up the position, the branch responsible for industrial and labour affairs (Sezione Occupazione, Formazione, Industria e Artigianato). This latter Assessorato scores highest also in terms of reputation ascribed to it by the 174 respondents of the overall sample (0.72) and comes second in terms of indegree centrality (0.59).

The other two members of the "center" are, first, Finlombarda, the regional finance and credit institute and, secondly, the universities. Finlombarda arrives fifth on indegree centralization and sixth on both betweenness and reputation. This is quite significant in as far as Lombardia is unique among the nine regional cases in having a financial agency to rank among the most important organizations. According to a special volume edited by Italy's economics newspaper 'Il Sole - 24 Ore' (1991), territorially based credit and finance institutes can be grouped in two large categories: finanziarie di finanziamento and finanziarie di servizio. While the best known example of the second category is ERVET, a network of development agencies operating in Emilia-Romagna, Finlombarda belongs to the first type. It is not, or in any case only marginally, concerned with the supply of servizi reali (business services) and is mainly occupied with fuelling credits to the region's small and medium sized enterprises. The issues of financing, of resources for business start-ups, and of risk capital are among the most seriously felt issues for small entrepreneurs in the region, and of risk capital are among the most seriously felt issues for small entrepreneurs in the region.

Another important factor accounting for this actor's centrality is the fact that 75 per cent of its shareholders are public institutions, i.e. the region, the provinces, and various municipalities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>LO</th>
<th>Block density</th>
<th>Global density</th>
<th>Global centralization</th>
<th>Indegree centrality</th>
<th>Between centrality</th>
<th>Network size</th>
<th>Overall centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>0.67 (1)</td>
<td>0.12 (1)</td>
<td>0.71 (2)</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>0.59 (2)</td>
<td>0.08 (8)</td>
<td>0.77 (1)</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>0.50 (5)</td>
<td>0.04 (6)</td>
<td>0.54 (6)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Counting the universities among its most central actors is a property which Lombardia only shares with Andalucia. Universities, of course, are relevant institutions in that region in terms of employment, in terms of students being registered, and in terms of the assistance they provide to public and private organizations (consultancy, technology transfer, etc.). For example, of the 1.288.881 Italian university students (1990 figures), close to 200,000, i.e. 15 per cent, were registered in one of Lombardy's universities of which 165,933 alone were registered in Milan. Although certainly of importance, this alone does not explain the prominence of universities in a network that assembles organizations concerned with regional development. It must be something else, then, that accounts for these

32 This branch of government was restructured and divided up into various sections shortly after the time of field work. Nevertheless, it is interesting that domains as different as labour market, professional formation, industrial development, and craft-related policies had been managed by one single "ministry" until about 1994.

33 Note, that universities in Lombardia belong to the category of composite actors in our study, i.e. responses from different universities (Università Bocconi, Università Statale, Politecnico di Milano, Università Cattolica) have been combined to form one single "synthetic" organization. The procedure is explained in Chapter Four.
institutions’ importance. In the absence of othercontext, the followinginterpretation maybesuggested.

The economic structure of theregion-- and of the province hosting theregion’scapital-- is such that a high demand for all types of services mayreasonably be taken for granted. This demand is far from being met by the supply of these services, at least insofar asthey are aimed at addressing clients of the entire regional territory and not just those of Milan and a couple of other growth poles. There is a vast number of individual agencies operating in the areas of technology transfer, professional formation, R&D, marketing, certification and evaluation, quality control and so forth, but most of these only address their immediate environment, i.e. groups of localities, provinces, industrial districts, etc37.

The only really significant region-wide agency is CESTEC, the Centro Lombardo per lo sviluppo tecnologico e produttivo delle piccole e medie imprese38. CESTEC often passes as the equivalent in Lombardy of the Steinbeis Foundation in Baden-Württemberg39 and, indeed, has established a formal partnership with the Southern German agency which, however, does not seem to work very well40. That this equation is a dubious one can be shown simply by comparing the numbers of staff employed by the two institutions41. But it is not only with respect to its organizational resources that CESTEC seems to have problems. It, also, “still has difficulties innmaking effective linkages with the local context of smallfirms” (Martinnelli 1989:17), a fact also confirmed byLassini’s detailed study (Lassini 1985). More seriouslystill, the agency seems to have problems with its own shareholders. Quaglia (1988:71) speaks of strong ideological and economic problems and points to the “delicate relationship between the center and the region’s business and artisan associations”42.

This somehow indicates the general problems of service supply in Italy and also explains the considerable “costi della non collaborazione in Lombardia” (Gruppo Clas 1993) to which reference was made in the preceding chapter. CESTEC, accordingly, only shows up in the “semi-periphery” of the network (B3), with a considerable indigerecentiality of 0.50, yet, with a reputation (0.37) fallingbelow the network’s mean of 0.38.

This rather detailed excursion on an otherwise quite irrelevant organization has been necessary not only to contrast the case of Lombardy with that of Baden-Württemberg where certain service suppliers are performing extremely well on all important instrument of the region for the supply of technological advise to small and medium sizedfirms and of technology transfer.”

38 Source: Elaborazione ReR su dati ISTAT per l’Italia (ISU-Regione Lombardia per la Lombardia).
39 Milan is not only Italy’s economic and financial capital, it also dominates its regional environment on virtually all accounts and, what is more important, it does so to an extent that is unmatched by any of the other regional capitals of our nine cases -- apart, perhaps, from Barcelona. Of the nine provinces of the region, Milan has the highest number of enterprises in all NACE groups excluding agriculture (NACE categories 2 to 9), both in absolute and in relative terms. This dominance is reflected also in the organizational power of its interest associations. For example, Assolombarda, the Milan branch of Italy’s employers’ association, is usually presumed to be more relevant, even in issues concerning the entire region, than is Federlombarda, Confindustria’s regional branch.
40 For example, the Centro di Cultura Scientifica “A. Volta” in Como, the Tessile di Como, or the Centro Tessile Cotoneiero in Varese. The latter, Centrocot, forms part of the network (B3), but occupies a relatively marginal position in the “semi-periphery”. According to Quaglia (1988), 50 per cent of the shares of this agency are controlled by the region, 10 per cent are held by Federlombarda, and 30 per cent are jointly held by the four most relevant associations representing the craft sector (CNA, CGIA, CASA and CIIA). Other agencies with aregion-wide mission, in part being up-shots of CESTEC, are the Consorzio Lombardo tecnologie industriali avanzate (Clita), the Consorzio Milano Ricerche, and Lombardia Risorse. The latter (B3) forms part of the network and shows up in the “periphery” with relatively modest values on all of the measures. Having been involved in Milan’s Tangentopoli affair, CESTEC was paralyzed in organizational terms for quite a time. Concerning these organizations’ relevance, account should be taken of the fact that, for example, Milano Ricerche only employed four specialists in 1990, while Clita exclusively worked with external collaborators.
41 For example, in Albers’ (1995) comparative study on territorially organized trade unionism in Europe, CESTEC is said to represent “the center for technological innovation (...) and the most cooperation between the two institutions in the context of their partnership agreement. CESTEC’s primary interest is the organization of commercial and industrial exhibitions, an area where Steinbeis is hardly present (Becher and Colletis 1993). While CESTEC was reported as permanently employing 12 experts and technicians (1990 figures), the Steinbeis Foundation, with its 16 technical consultancies and 171 transfer centers, had an overall employment figure of 3319 officials in 1994 (Steinbeis-Stiftung 1994). “Figuring among the founding members of CESTEC, it was widely believed that the presence of business associations would contribute to a functioning of the agency primarily in two ways. First, they were expected to communicate the exigencies of their associate members and, secondly, they would in turn inform their members of the initiatives and programmes envisaged by the Center. In reality, the opposite turned out to be the case. Due to the fact that craft and industry associations, meanwhile, had invested considerable resources in the setting-up of proper, and autonomously run, service centers, this created enormous rivalry between CESTEC and the associations” (Quaglia 1988:71). All this has contributed to the inefficacy and indeterminacy of the agency, which has not yet managed to define a precise mission for its operations, or to elaborate a strategy as to “whether to delegate management functions to highly qualified technicians or, alternatively, to political or interest group representatives.” (ibid.79).
kinds of measures used in this context but, in particular, to explain the high centrality of universities in the region. Where private or public suppliers of information, advice, consultancy and technological know-how are either absent or work insufficiently\textsuperscript{41}, it seems logical that customers turn to alternative institutions, especially if these are prepared to accept payment in a form of other than purely political currency and, moreover, if they are able to offer their services below market prices. Although this would need further verification, it is tempting to interpret the universities’ presence in the “center” in terms of a substitution for agencies that, actually, should assume the task of innovation diffusion and of technological development if the institutional infrastructure were better organized.

One of the most conspicuous differences between the organizational ecologies of the Sicilian and the Lombardy network was represented by the fact that what had been in the “center” in the first case, now appears in two different positions. The composition of the first position has been discussed above. Yet, what about the second one, the “extended center”? One “technology broker” apart\textsuperscript{42}, it turns out to be exclusively occupied by interest associations. Equivalence class $B_2$ is “headed” by Unioncamere ($P_1$), the regional branch of the Chamber of Industry, Commerce, Cooperatives and the Artisan sector. In terms of indegree centrality (0.56), betweenness centrality (0.08), and of reputation (0.63), the chamber even outperforms two of the members of the “center”, namely Finlombarda and the universities. Yet, in terms of structural equivalence, it is more similar to the interest associations and, hence, not drawn into the “center”.

The second important actor is Federlombarda ($P_3$), followed by Apilombarda ($P_1$); small enterprises), LEGA ($P_{13}$), the powerful organization representing the cooperative sector and, most noteworthy, the regional branches of the three trade unions CGIL ($P_{13}$), CISL ($P_{18}$) and UIL ($P_{13}$). The position assembling these organizations exhibits an extremely high cohesion (0.84). Although certainly not forming an alliance, the eight organizations have established a great number of strong and frequent contacts among themselves. Federlombarda, Apilombarda and LEGA represent different, albeit in part overlapping, fractions of the region’s business class and, therefore, are likely to be competitors for members drawn from among the same category of enterprises. Yet, in terms of regional development policies, they may equally have similar visions. This is certainly the case for the three trade unions. Their regional branches, unique in Italy, have been considering the creation of an unitarian structure since the late 1980s. That this event has not materialized yet, is likely be due more to obstacles at the national rather than at the regional level.

Members of $B_2$, then, are strong contenders for the central position. If we were to conceptualize members of $B_1$ to form the “government” of the regional network, those of $B_2$ would turn out to represent its “shadow government”. Although there is no reason for doubting the validity of the algebraic procedure having suggested a bi-partitioning of the twelve organizations, if we consider the types of actors and their individual relational properties, it would make sense to treat both groups (“center” and “extended center”) as if they were one. In that case, we would end up with a structure very similar to the one encountered in Sicily: a very heterogeneous “center” dominated by private interest associations, with the bulk of public institutions (80 per cent) appearing in the peripheries of the network. National clustering, in the case of Italy, would then be pronounced not only with respect to the general properties of the network (see Chapter Four) but, moreover, with respect to the composition of equivalence classes - a very strong result indeed.

**Germany**

As in the case of Italy, the picture emerging from the preliminary study of the two German cases in Chapter Three suggested analytical hybridism. Baden-Württemberg’s political ecology oscillated somewhere between state-domination and concertation, while Niedersachsen’s was placed between the typologies of a pluralist and a corporatist network. At the same time, it was also argued that both cases...
exhibited strong etatist features, characterized by a centralized, regional pattern in the first, and a decentralized, subregional pattern in the second case. For the first case, this expectation was confirmed by the organizational space analysis carried out in Chapter Four. We argued that this region’s political ecology were structured similarly to an organization chart of a large enterprise, with clear-cut structural divisions and divisions in responsibility between different categories of actors. These, we claimed, were essentially determined by formal properties such as legal status, public legitimation, etc. A number of public and para-state agencies occupied the central spaces of the plot area, while interest associations resulted to be largely marginalized.

Let us now consider the results of the equivalence analysis of the two networks.

A first, superficial consultation of Figure 5.4 does not reveal significant differences from the patterns already encountered in Italy. As in Lombardia and Sicilia, the center-periphery structure is clearly visible. There is, however, one specific linkage that clearly diverges from the earlier patterns. This shall immediately be considered. Baden-Württemberg is the only region of the sample with strong and reciprocal ties connecting members of the center (B1) to those of the periphery (B4). Also of interest are the high block density values achieved by the first row of the density table (see Table 8.3 in the Appendix) which reflect a marked activity of members of the most central position. Apart from Wales, no other of the first rows of the respective image matrices is entirely filled with 1’s. Considering that this position is also the target of communication contacts by a significant number of organizations (column sum 2, self-choices excluded), we see that it has an important intermediary function. It receives a lot of information, but itself distributes even more. Who, then, are the occupants of B1 and B4? Before commenting on the positioning of individual network members, let us first consider the distribution of actor categories across the equivalence classes.

**Fig. 5.4**

*graphic representation of image matrix*

Baden-Württemberg

The values contained in Table 8.6 (Appendix) confirm our initial hypotheses of a state-dominated pattern, and they do that to an extent going beyond even Anderson's extreme view *a propos* "territorial networks of interest" in Germany. 93 per cent of the ministries and divisions of regional government occupy the "center" (B1) and "extended center" (B2) of the network. The only public institution not forming part of that group is a subregional planning unit without a significant institutional infrastructure, the Regionalverband Stuttgart. At the same time, all regional branches of industrial associations and trade unions, including the Chambers, are marginalized in the periphery. The only private actor with a slightly more advantageous contact portfolio is Daimler-Benz (P8) which shows up in the semi-periphery (B3).

This is the reverse image of the Sicilian ecology: a publicly controlled center and a periphery almost exclusively consisting of interest groups. The placement of one of the two major private companies (Daimler-Benz) in a position being structurally superior to the one occupied by interest groups, tends to corroborates Heinze and Schmidt’s (1994) characterization of the ecology as being enterprise-driven (*unternehmensgeleitet*). Given the strong domination of the network by the ministries, however, this claim would seem to require qualification and the authors' corporatist hypothesis is, at least, questionable. The same holds for van Waarden’s general description. That "German state-industry relations are (...) formalized", that "the German associational systems [is] much more integrated" than others and that, therefore, "privileged access poses less problems", with "less associations [being] excluded" (van Waarden 1995:345), may be true of the national level of interest intermediation and for the participatory mechanisms in some specific sectors -- it does not hold for territorial and industrial policies at the subnational level. If at all, the above "default pattern" of German state-industry relations, may materialize in a
somewhat unexpected way, namely in the peculiar center-periphery link of Baden-Württemberg’s political ecology. Although entirely excluded from the power center of territorial politics, interest groups in that region are both better integrated among themselves\(^{44}\) and, also, better connected to the networks "headquarter" than in most other regions\(^{6}\).

The allusion to an organization chart made in Chapter Four is now more relevant than before. The region’s ecology is structured as if it were a Fordist enterprise. It is a pure case of hierarchy, not only in terms of overall indicators such as, for example, centralization but, also, in terms of the location of actors within positions. This latter turns out to be entirely determined by formal attributes. Baden-Württemberg, then, is a "company state", not mainly in the sense of Heinze and Schmidt, i.e. of being company-driven, but, rather, of a company-like organization. The headquarters of that "Baden-Württemberg Inc." (B\(_1\)) is exclusively made up by ministries and a number of important para-state agencies that are strongly connected to the former, both in terms of formal status\(^{45}\) and of empirical ties. Directly attached to the headquarters – in B\(_2\) - - some less relevant ministries together with a handful of subregional institutions "assist" the corporation’s board of directors. Interestingly, while strongly relying on the center (density B\(_2\) → B\(_2\) = 0.33), with zero outdegrees in the image matrix, they hardly act autonomously\(^{45}\). This also means that the block status achieved by these "share holders" (17.71) entirely results from their adjacency to the center, not from possible functions they would have regarding the overall stability/connectivity of the network. The Ministries of the Interior (A\(_3\)), of Financial Affairs (A\(_3\)), and of Agriculture (A\(_3\)) are among this group, as are administrations of subregional institutions, i.e. the Regierungsbezirke (a\(_9\)), the Kreise (a\(_12\)), the Gemeinden (a\(_13\)), and the Städte, Kreis- und Gemeindetag (a\(_14\)). B\(_2\)’s cohesion is very low. With 0.27, it just figures slightly above network density (0.21). This, again, tends to confirm Anderson’s hypothesis of subregional fragmentation of interests and of resulting zero-sum competition at that level.

Daimler-Benz apart, the "semi-periphery" (B\(_3\)) exclusively hosts members of the category "finance and technology brokers", namely those less relevant for the politics of regional development. These are a number of transfer centers (B\(_3\)), the Max Planck Gesellschaft (B\(_3\)) and several local sections of the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft (B\(_3\)) plus the universities (B\(_3\)) and polytechnics (B\(_3\)). The only organization outperforming the members of its own position and those of the "extended center" both in terms of indigree centrality (0.23) and of reputation (0.28) is the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft. This, probably, is due to the fact that this institution operates a number of decentralized branch offices on the territory\(^{49}\).

Finally, at the bottom-line of the corporate hierarchy (B\(_4\)), we find all important interest groups such as the regional branch of the BDI (P\(_3\)), a number of sectoral business interest associations (P\(_2\)) and, on the side of organized labour, the regional branches of the DGB (P\(_3\)), the IG-Metall (P\(_4\)), and the Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekleidung (P\(_4\)). Within this group of marginalized organizations, the most important ones representing business interests are the two regional chambers, the Industrie- und Handelskammer (P\(_3\)) and the Handwerkskammer (P\(_4\)). Interestingly, both exhibit individual properties which, in part, reach beyond those achieved by members of the "headquarters"\(^{49}\). These are joined by the Regionalverband Stuttgart (a\(_11\)), by the

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\(^{44}\) The periphery is not exclusively occupied by interest groups. However, the cohesion achieved by this position is quite significant. The respective position in Wales apart, it is the only one of the entire regional sample whose density (0.21) is equal to or above average network density (0.21). It fulfilled the cut-off criterion and, therefore, "merited" a "1"-entry in the image matrix (see also the shading of the cell in Table 8.5 in the Appendix).

\(^{45}\) Since all associations are located in that position, they all possess more or less equal access to the "center". In other regions, interest groups were scattered across the entire space with only few of them strongly tied to the center.

\(^{46}\) Where these agencies are not directly state-owned, they at least are state-governed.

\(^{48}\) According to Cooke and Morgan (1994), there are 37 Fraunhofer Institutes in the Federal Republic, employing a total of about 6000 technicians and operational staff and having an annual budget of about DM 650 million (1989 figures).

\(^{49}\) With indigree centrality and reputation at 0.35 and 0.38 (IHK) and at 0.26 and 0.28 (HWK), the two Chambers, individually, rank higher than even the Landesgewerbeamt (A\(_13\)), the Steinbeis Foundation (B\(_3\)), the EU Liaison Office (B\(_1\)) and the GWZ (B\(_2\)) – all part of the center. This is significant. For the chambers, which partly perform the very same functions as, for example, the Steinbeis Foundation, the latter’s special treatment by the then Ministerpräsident Lothar Späth must have been rather disturbing. For quite a time, the Foundation was his “favorite toy”. The centralist incorporation of the Foundation into the region’s power center has on various occasions been criticized by the Chambers and by representatives of the Fraunhofer and Max Planck societies. It represented a monopoly, did not take account of market signals, and often merely served to finance research undertaken by university professors and commissioned by the Foundation (see, for this, Hofmann, J. 1991:76; and Beise et al. 1995:66-67).
regional credit institute, *Landeskreditbank* (B₁), and by the Euro-Info-Center/Business Innovation Center (B₄).

To summarize, the really important result of analyzing the Baden-Württemberg network is the marginalization of business and trade unions and, at the same time, the strong etatist pattern assumed by the entire regional political ecology. The main question that has guided us throughout this work has been how regional ecologies are actually structured. We have been less concerned with advancing hypotheses about the actual causes responsible for specific configurations. Most of these hypotheses must remain speculative. In the preceding chapter, a number of such speculative suggestions have been advanced *a-propos* the case of Baden-Württemberg. For example, the comparatively modest degrees of density and reciprocity of that network were attributed to the existence of a "high trust ecology", supported and sustained, at the same time, by strong public guidance and top-down coordination. We could now consider the extent to which this structural pattern is actually typical to German state-industry relations in general.

To claim that interests groups in Baden-Württemberg are of little relevance for the politics of regional development is out of question. However, their curious placement may also reflect something more deeply ingrained in state-society relations in general. Support for such an interpretation -- which is only counter-intuitive at first sight -- would have to be sought in the debate on private interest governments. Let us develop the argument step by step. What are the most characteristic features of this region’s interest group cluster? First of all, it presents a kind of reverse image of the Sicilian pattern. Secondly, it combines all relevant interest groups of the region. Third, it is the most marginal position of the region’s political ecology. Forth, despite the high number of actors in that position, it is, nevertheless, a relatively cohesive cluster. Apart from the respective position of the Welsh network, it is the only one of the entire sample “meriting” a "1"-entry in the image matrix. Finally, despite its marginalization, rather solid ties connect it to the network’s “headquarters”. Again, it is the only periphery position of the sample with a strong and reciprocal B₁-B₄ link.

Private interest governance (PIG), or "regulated self-regulation", has usually been ascribed to German interest groups and, in particular, to the German chamber system especially in the craft and artisan sector (Streeck 1989; Grote 1992). Both the IHKs and the HWKs form part of the marginalized interest group cluster. How comes? Several possible answers may be advanced. First, contrary to France, where the chambers are strongly involved in territorial development, their counterparts in Germany do not act as entrepreneurs or territorial managers of large infrastructure projects. Secondly, contrary to the case of the Mediterranean countries, territorial development in Baden-Württemberg is much less of a distributional policy domain. This can be shown with reference to the allocation of ERDF resources. In the late 1980s, "Germany received only four per cent of the total contribution of the Structural Funds but got 22 per cent of the total contributions of the R&D programmes while Spain, which received 16.5 per cent from the former source, got only one per cent from the latter" (Grote 1993:31). The share received by affluent regions such as Baden-Württemberg is even less significant.

The concept of PIG has been reserved for situations where "an attempt is made to make associative self-interested collective action contribute to the achievement of public policy objectives", i.e. where "it is in the interest of an organized group to strive for a `categoric good` which is partially compatible or identical with a `collective good` for the society as a whole" (Streeck and Schmitter 1985:17). As we now see, there is no such overlap in the domain of territorial development policies. German interest groups, at least those of this region, do not seem to have developed well-defined strategic objectives in that area.

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50 As we shall see, B₁ in Wales only consists of two organizations which, in addition, belong to the same category of actors (trade unions). The high cohesion of B₁ in Wales (1.00) can be discounted, as it is hardly surprising that two trade unions are connected by strong and reciprocal ties.

51 The topic of private interest governance (PIG) was first addressed systematically by Streeck and Schmitter (1985). Their contribution triggered off a vast international literature that sought to identify such arrangements in different sectors. PIGs are, first of all, a mechanism of sectoral economic governance.

52 Albers (1995), who only addresses the (regional) strategy deficit of Baden-Württemberg trade unions, argues that this deficit is less pronounced among unions of industrial crisis areas, for example, the one of the Ruhr in Northrhine-Westphalia. In any case, business associations are likely to suffer a similar strategic deficit.
The policy domain is not appetitible to both chambers and interest groups alike, not only because they have their "base point" (Crouch 1993:51)3) at others than the regional level but, in addition, because attempts to get involved in it are further discouraged by the strong control and monopoly position of public authorities. Interest associations, then, rather concentrate on those areas for which they possess a public mandate -- vocational training, the health domain, specific industrial sectors and, of course, industrial relations. It is these which have been described in terms of PIGs and it is their structural configuration which may additionally account for the curious position of the interest cluster in this region.

Suppose, we were studying another domain which were managed and organized by the principle of "regulated self-regulation". How would such a domain have to be imagined in organizational ecology terms? We have seen that, in general, Germany’s political economy -- or should we say ecology? -- is governed by an enabling state that is neither laissez-faire nor étatist (Streeck 1997:38). It is characterized by vertically fragmented sovereignty, by state-enabled collective action and quasi-public corporatist group self-management (ibid.). Within this setting, the state, though actively involved in civil society, merely uses the latter’s organizations "as intermediaries and ‘assistants’ in policy formulation and implementation" (Streeck 1995:339).

In ecological terms, PIGs would constitute private clusters of power which are both centrally placed and distinct from public clusters of power. Both private and public governments would jointly manage the domain, yet they would belong to distinct equivalence classes. At the same time, vedi the assistant function and the "regulated" of "regulated self-regulation", the two clusters would be strongly tied to each other. What we have in the case of Baden-Württemberg, then, is a kind of "latent PIG". The organizations forming it, are involved in a great many of more specific policies (social, environmental, health, training, etc.), but not in the more

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Tab 5.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>members of most central position ($B_1$) and their relational properties</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>A$_{10}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>B$_1$</td>
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</table>

3) Crouch (1993:50-53) argues that interests tend to have "base points" within political space. They are constrained by their capacity to bring people together at a certain vertical level. In addition, and irrespective of the spatial location of this point, "there may be institutional barriers inhibiting the formation of certain relationships and therefore entry into certain parts of the space." The politics of regional development is both too far removed from the base point and too strongly conditioned institutionally to represent an area to get involved in.
Moving on from these intriguing speculations, the really important organizations of the region are those placed in the ecology's center. As has been done in the case of the Italian networks, these, together with their individual relational properties, are presented in Table 5.6. Before considering any one of them individually, let us first turn to a couple of overall results. First, the rank ordering (ranks in brackets) of the eight members of "BaWu Inc’s board of directors" is largely compatible across the first three columns. The Economics Ministry (A5) figures highest on indegree centrality, on betweenness, and on reputation, immediately followed by the Prime Minister's Office (A1). The Steinbeis Foundation ranks fifth on all accounts, while there are slight divergences among the other organizations. Secondly, this is confirmed by responses given by the 219 members of the overall sample (column 4). Since most of these organizations represent subregional administrations and interest groups, we can assume the existence of a significant convergence of views a propos the relevance of BaWu occupants, on the part of both network participants proper and representatives of the more encompassing sample. Finally, the fact that the Foundation ranks third on reputation in column 4 (0.47), underlines the importance it has for organizations in the region’s different counties, districts and municipalities. Here, Steinbeis operates an impressive number of 120 different technology transfer centers for small- and medium-sized firms.

Within the "center", the scores achieved by both the MWMT and the Staatsministerium are outstanding. If, as seems to be the case, Anderson's et.al. characterization of territorial networks in Germany as essentially being hierarchical is correct54, then, not much has changed even after the demise of Christian-Democratic rule in 1992. Knodt's (1997a) claim of institutional inertia, therefore, is confirmed. The only significant change that has taken place since the early 1990s is that the Prime Minister's Office (A1), the previously dominant division from which Lothar Späth launched most of his initiatives in favor of both administrative re-organization and technological innovation, is now less important than the Economics Ministry, the Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Technologie (A5). At the time of interviewing, this latter was presided over by the Social-Democrat Dieter Spöri who had again, re-organized regional government and tried to bring the most crucial technological functions into his own domain.

The properties of the MWMT are particularly impressive from a comparative perspective. Apart from the Conseil Regional in Rhone-Alpes, it is the actor with by far the highest indegree centrality of all 254 organizations studied (0.81)55. Most importantly, it is the Economics Ministry which determines the region's outstanding global centralization. With C_{IB} = 0.64, Baden-Württemberg is the most hierarchical of all nine networks56. Moreover, the MWMT is not only one of the most powerful organizations among the 254 members of the entire sample, its centrality is further strengthened if we consider the distance dividing it from the institution that immediately follows, the Staatskanzlei. In terms of differences in centrality, this figures at 0.23 -- a value only achieved by some organizations of the Welsh network, a case whose overall situation is completely different.

The next organization requiring special mention is the Steinbeis Foundation. On a superficial level, its position is curious. This also applies to the Landesgewerbeamt, the EU Liaison Office for R&T, and the GWZ, the Agency for International Economic Co-operation. As we shall see later, only in the center of the Catalan ecology do we find an agency which, to some extent, is comparable to the Foundation. The latter’s prominent position, as well as that of the EU Office and of the Landesgewerbeamt, indicates that regional and industrial policy in Baden-Württemberg "are essentially organized in form of research and technology policy" (Bernschneider et.al. 1991:57). Although our respondents were not asked questions about the region’s institutional infrastructures for technology transfer, the Foundation nevertheless, ranks fifth on all

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54 Note that Anderson’s study was first made public in 1988 and essentially refers to the situation of the mid-1980s.

55 In terms of betweenness centrality, the MWMT’s position is matched only by one other organization in Wales, and in terms of reputation, it is outperformed only by the Conseils Regionaux of the two French regions.

56 As we shall see, only Wales (0.63) arrives at a global centralization index close to the one of this region, while even cases such as Rhone-Alpes, which is an example of relatively high centralization, follow with a distance of more than 10 points (0.53).
accounts and, within the “center”, occupies the third position, directly following the two powerful regional ministries.

Focussing mainly on its functions, we placed the Foundation within the category of “finance and technology brokers”. On closer inspection, this may not actually be justified -- it is more than a para-state agency operating at arm’s length from the ministries. Although 95 per cent self-financed, it would be misleading to depict this agency as an example of the privatization of public tasks. Founded in 1971, as a private peak organization of the technical advisory services (Technische Beratungsdienste) of the region, the Steinbeis’s functions changed in 1983, when its capital stock was increased to DM 18 million. At the same time, the Prime Minister (Staatskanzlei) established a public position within its office, of an “advisor for technology transfer”, who also held the presidency of the Foundation. After the 1992 elections, the Economics Minister, in turn, reacted to this domination by the Staatskanzlei, by creating a position of “advisor for European questions”. The advisor for technology transfer and president of Steinbeis was relocated to the MWMT, thereby substantially increasing that Ministry’s influence. The incumbent of these important positions, at the same time, also presided over the EU Liaison Office which, in turn, was based within the Steinbeis’ “European Center for Research and Development”. To complete the picture of intermingling private and public organizations and agencies in Baden-Württemberg, the Landesgewerbeamt, originally part of the MWMT’s administration, was formally transformed into an agency responsible for the promotion of SMEs. Together with the GWZ, it is located in the Haus der Wirtschaft in direct neighbourhood of the MWMT. The MWMT’s advisor for technology transfer, apart from being chairman of both Steinbeis and Steinbeis Europe, is also a member of the supervisory board of the GWZ. At the same time, the MWMT’s advisor for European questions is deputy chairman of the Steinbeis Foundation, while the chairman of the GWZ serves as curator on the latter’s board of directors. Elements of public governance clearly dominate in all of the organizations

The information on the four “technolgy brokers”, has largely been taken from Cooke and Morgan (1994:415-419); Hoffmann (1991:78); and Knodt (1997:270-273).

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Steinbeis is more than just a para-state agency. Together with most of the other "brokers" in B₄, it clearly belongs to the public sphere and further strengthens the impression of a hierarchical regional network with state agencies at the top.

This raises the question whether Niedersachsen exhibits a similar feature both in terms of its ecology’s overall configuration and of the prominent position of particular organizations within the region. In the hypothesis chapter, the first of these questions was answered positively. There was insufficient evidence, however, to make precise estimates about the second. In the absence of information, we turned, in particular, to Anderson’s work which generally characterized the German region’s as being hierarchical and fragmented by competing territorial interests. This hypothesis is now largely confirmed. It suggests that regional ecologies follow a national pattern -- just in the sameway as already encountered in the Italian cases. However, a number of differences distinguish the Baden-Württemberg and the Niedersachsen network and these concern both some general structural characteristics and the positioning of individual organizations.

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To get an impression of the Foundation’s power, consider the fact that it operates as many as 16 technical advisory services at various polytechnics (Fachhochschulen) and 171 transfer centers on regional territory. It is the largest single organization dealing with these issues not only in Baden-Württemberg but probably in Germany and in Europe alike. In 1994, the Foundation was running 220 transfer centers in Europe, employed 3.319 technicians and was engaged in a total of 15.274 different projects (Steinbeis 1994). This is unmatched by any other agency of that type in all of the regions studied.

---

The information on the four “technolgy brokers”, has largely been taken from Cooke and Morgan (1994:415-419); Hoffmann (1991:78); and Knodt (1997:270-273).
Let us first turn to the network’s graphic representation (Fig. 5.5). While Baden-Württemberg stood out with respect to the center’s role as a broker and to its capacity to connect incumbents of all other positions, members of B₁ in Niedersachsen are not able, or have little interest, in contacting either B₂ or B₄. They report strong and frequent contacts only with members of B₁. The “extended center”, in Baden-Württemberg, was exclusively occupied by public institutions and clearly depended on the center, but did not itself contact members of other positions. This is completely different in Niedersachsen, where B₂ is the most active position of the network. However, it also is a good example of the fact that outdegrees alone are not a sufficient indicator for centrality. The members of this position do not receive contacts from any other group. In Burt’s (1986) terms, B₂ would be a sycophant, spending a lot of relational resources without being rewarded for this activity.

As in Baden-Württemberg, the block density of the “extended center” is insignificantly above overall network density, suggesting high degrees of interorganizational fragmentation. However, while there has been a territorial fragmentation in the southern region⁵⁵, in Niedersachsen, the position is functionally fragmented. If we consult Table 8.6 (Appendix), we see that the members of B₂ represent completely different typologies of actors. B₂ hosts 33 per cent of this network’s public institutions -- most of which represent subregional administration -- 43 per cent of the interest associations, and 38 per cent of the finance and technology brokers.

More precisely, it is made up of the Staatkanzlei (A₁) -- an institution ranking second in Baden-Württemberg’s ecology -- the Regierungsbezirke (a₀), as in the latter region, and the counties of both the kreisfreien and the kreisangehörigen type (a₁₀ and a₁₁)⁵⁶. These public institutions are joined by three interest groups, the regional branch of BDI (P₁), a number of sectoral business associations (P₂), and the Land’s peak organization of labour, the DGB (P₃). Finally, three “brokers” also form part of this equivalence class, namely NATI, the Niedersächsische Agentur für Technologietransfer und Innovation (B₃), the Rationalisierungskuratorium der deutschen Wirtschaft (B₄), and the universities’ office for EU contacts (B₅).

The fact that it is the Staatkanzlei which guides the organizations of this position, in terms of the scores achieved on all four measures, tends to support the hypothesis of a more marked local differentiation of regional development policies in Niedersachsen. A₁ coordinates the activities of local authorities and is the main reference point for a₀, a₁₀, and a₁₁. Accordingly, these latter, albeit not on indegree centralization, clearly perform better on betweenness and reputation than do their equivalents in Baden-Württemberg⁶¹. However, the Staatkanzlei can hardly be said to coordinate the activities its own fellow Ministries as was suggested by the graphic representation of path distances in the case of Baden-Württemberg (Fig. 4.2). The sectoral ministries do not include it in their policy deliberations, something which especially concerns European policy issues⁶². NATI, although formally connected to the Economics Ministry, appears to be far less integrated into the ecology than Baden-Württemberg’s counterpart, the Steinbeis Foundation. It also has a different function. Whereas the latter mainly engages in technology transfer, apart from providing general information and supporting the development of inter-firm alliances, the activities of the former, the name notwithstanding, are essentially limited to the supply and diffusion of information.

Members of B₁ receive as many choices from members of other positions as do members of B₅. Indeed, like B₅, the “semi-periphery” is occupied exclusively by public institutions, namely by the Finance Ministry (A₄), the Ministry of Environmental Affairs (A₅), other ministries (A₆) and the Städte- Kreis- und Gemeindetag Niedersachsen (A₇), the region’s interest association of local administrations. This group of actors is extremely fragmented internally. The block density table in the Appendix shows it to be a perfect zero-block. This does not only concern the “self-choices” of members of this position. They have no contacts whatsoever with either incumbents of B₁ or B₄. The same is true for the B₁ → B₄ and

⁵⁵ The position in Baden-Württemberg consisted only of public institutions of different territorial levels (Land, Regierungsbezirk, Kreis, Gemeinde).
⁵⁶ For the composition of this region’s other positions, as for all positions of the other networks, a consultation of Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 (Appendix) is recommended.

⁶¹ This is most evident for the influence reputation ascribed to them by the 156 respondents of the region’s overall sample (column 4 of Table 8.2).
Case by case comparison

for the $B_3 \rightarrow B_1$ connections (all perfect zero-blocks). It becomes clear now that Niedersachsen’s entire political ecology is highly fragmented. In network-analytic terms, this is the case both for the "roles", i.e. ties between positions, of individual groups of actors within the network, and for the internal cohesion of the positions -- apart, of course, from that of the center which we shall now turn to.

Table 5.7 indicates both the high fragmentation of this network ($\Delta_{\text{Global}} = 0.17$), the high compactness, or cohesion, of its organizational center ($\Delta_c = 0.83$), and the relatively high centralization, or hierarchical pattern of the overall structure ($C_{\text{Global}} = 0.48$). We also see that Niedersachsen exhibits the same kind of corporate structure as Baden-Württemberg. These overall structural attributes apart, hierarchy is even more pronounced if we only consider the properties of this region’s "corporate headquarter".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NS</th>
<th>members of most central position ($B_1$)</th>
<th>communication contacts</th>
<th>power reputation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>code</td>
<td>block density</td>
<td>global density</td>
<td>global centralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Lambda B_1 = 0.83$</td>
<td>$\Lambda_{\text{Global}} = 0.17$</td>
<td>$C_{\text{Global}} = 0.48$</td>
<td>$n_b = 27$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A_1$</td>
<td>Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Technik u. Verkehr</td>
<td>0.62 (1)</td>
<td>0.27 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A_2$</td>
<td>Sozialministerium</td>
<td>0.35 (3)</td>
<td>0.07 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A_3$</td>
<td>Ministerium für Wissenschaft und Kultur</td>
<td>0.31 (4)</td>
<td>0.03 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A_4$</td>
<td>Innenministerium</td>
<td>0.08 (10)</td>
<td>0.30 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three of the four members of the "board of directors of Niedersachsen Inc." are identical to the ones encountered in the other German case. These are the Economics Ministry ($A_3$), the Ministry for Labour Affairs ($A_3$) and the Ministry for Science and Culture ($A_3$). The Minister of the Interior ($A_4$) which in Baden-Württemberg held a strong position within $B_2$ now forms part of the center, albeit clearly scoring below the figures totaled by its fellow divisions. Note this latter’s high betweenness (0.30). It is the highest value achieved by any other organization of the network and indicates that what is done in Baden-Württemberg by the Staatsministerium, is done in this region by the Innenministerium, namely inter-ministerial coordination.

Overall, the indegree centrality achieved by the Economics Minister (0.62) is the second lowest achieved by any of the other eight networks’ most prominent actors. This relative weakness, however, is offset by the distance, i.e. difference in scores, dividing $A_3$ from the actor following immediately after ($A_3$ with 0.35). With a difference of 0.27 points, the Economics Minister belongs to the most central organizations of the entire regional sample. This is corroborated by this institution’s influence reputation. Both the members of the network (0.74) and the 156 members of the overall sample (0.85) agree on the outstanding prominence of the Economics Ministry, while the other institutions follow a significant distance behind.

The position of the Industrie- und Handelskammern ($P_7$) and of the Handwerkskammern ($P_7$) is curious. As in Baden-Württemberg, these are "synthesized" actors, i.e. they reflect the performance of different individual chambers which have been aggregated to form one synthetic organization. This is important to note, since relying on the responses of the regional chambers alone might have distorted our results. The regional associations of chambers have little more than coordining functions, while the really relevant tasks are carried out by their branches at the subregional level, following the so-called Federführungsprinzip.

As in Baden-Württemberg, this Land’s chambers, despite their high performance on both indegree centrality (0.27 and 0.23) and reputation (0.46 and 0.33), only show up in the periphery of the network ($B_0$). Generally regarded as the most perfect examples of private interest governments in Germany, we again see that, as in Baden-Württemberg, the chambers are removed from the center of the political ecology. The policy domain regional development is both not appetizing for representatives of business interests and too strongly controlled by public authorities.

The overall conclusion for the case of Niedersachsen, then, would be the following. As its fellow Land in the south, its general political ecology is extremely

62 This was reported by members of various ministries during in-depth interviews carried out in Niedersachsen.
centralized. It is a typical case of a hierarchical and state-dominated network. At the same time, and contrary to the situation in Baden-Württemberg, state-society relations appear to be highly differentiated or even dissociated. While we had observed strong reciprocal ties between the southern region’s interest system and its most relevant public authorities, Niedersachsen’s interest groups are not only located in two different, albeit partly connected, positions (B_2 and B_3), they also perform extremely bad on an individual level⁶³. Most importantly, they are not approached at all by the region’s government. The divisions of the Landesregierung (A_1) exclusively occupy the center (B_1) and the semi-periphery (B_3), two positions which, in turn, do not host any other category of actors, the Städte- und Gemeindetag (a_12) apart⁶⁴. Self-choiced excluded, the sum of outdegrees jointly ”possessed” by B_1 and B_3 just amounts to ”1”. This single tie happens to connect regional-level institutions in B_1 to regional-level institutions in B_3. There is no relation originating in the public sector and directed to this sector’s societal environment -- a clear indication for of highly differentiated political ecology. Summarizing, then, we encounter a strongly hierarchical, highly differentiated and, at the same time, largely fragmented network structure in Niedersachsen. Contrary to the situation in Baden-Württemberg, this suggests the existence of ”state-dominated pluralism” -- a property reserved by Wilsford (1990) for a characterization of state-industry relations in France.

It is the counter-intuitive nature of the results achieved for both the Italian and the German cases that represents the most important findings of our work in theoretical terms. Clientelism may come in the guise of a perfect example of joint-problem solving, organized in form of non-hierarchical networks, while the modernizing policy networks of the mainstream debate, may actually reveal patterns of etatism that nobody would have expected. It is for this reason that considerable attention has been paid to giving a comprehensive description of the two German and the two Italian cases. As it happens, they are also the ones we are most familiar with. Accordingly, less space has been dedicated in Chapter Three, and will be dedicated in the present chapter to the qualitative and quantitative description of the French, Spanish and British cases.

Before looking at these other countries, an important and unexpected piece of information should be added to the present section. We were able to corroborate our findings for both Sicily and Lombardy by reference to previous research carried out in both regions (Grote 1992; Bramanti e Grote 1995). No material of that kind was available for Germany. However, while completing these pages, a body of work done by a former colleague at the MZES, and published only a couple of months ago, has provided strong evidence which supports our claim of state-dominated territorial networks in Germany.

König and Bechtel (1997) have undertaken a network analysis of inter-organizational relations and of patterns of interest intermediation in labour- and social policy-related issues in Germany. Based on samples of 121 (1988) and 100 (1994) national public and private organizations at the national level, they have compared the structure of the domain both before and after (re-)unification. Although addressing both a different level and a different policy domain, their results largely correspond to our own. In brief, the authors observe a shift, taking place within that period, from the corporatist-like features of interest intermediation that characterized much of the bargaining activity on labour matters at the national level, towards relatively clear features of ”etatism” observed in the mid-1990s. The political sector, that is, essentially Ministries and administrative offices both of the federal and of the Länder governments, have greatly increased their mediating capacity, at the expense of the peak associations of capital and labour which appear to have lost a lot of their representational monopoly⁶⁵. Despite this decline in corporatist properties, the German system of interest intermediation does not dissolve into the US-American

⁶³ For example, on indegree centrality, the BDI arrives at 0.08, the IG-Metall at 0.04, and other trade unions at 0.08.

⁶⁴ Given its region-wide coverage, this association of local interests could also be viewed as a regional rather than merely subregional organization. That would make the composition of both the ”center” and the ”semi-periphery” even more homogeneous and would further underline the strong state-society differentiation in this policy domain.

⁶⁵ Note, that representational monopoly, in the understanding of the authors, does not refer to the degree to which individual associations manage to aggregate the interests of their category but, rather, to their capacity to channel membership demands into the political sector, i.e. to act as brokers or intermediaries. It is a specific network-analytic, or relational, definition of representational monopoly.
type of pluralist competition. The transformation of the system tends to support "etatism", i.e. gains on the side of the executives and losses on the side of non-state actors. In the light of our own and, in part, daring claim, this is an unexpected, highly welcome, and quite reassuring result.

**FRANCE**

In terms of the structuring of its interorganizational relations, Rhone-Alpes mostly conformed to a typically northern, or central European pattern. This was the result both of its position in Figure 4.1 and, particularly, of the results of the cluster analysis presented in Figure 4.5. In the latter, the region joined both Baden-Württemberg and Wales at a relatively early stage before merging with Niedersachsen and Catalunya. The least one could say is that Rhone-Alpes’ political ecology is northern with respect to its hierarchical ordering and to the strong guidance exerted by public institutions. At the same time, it remains southern, with respect to the quantity of redundant contacts. In this case, high redundancy in contact is likely to be the joint effect of two characteristic features: first, the obligation of very different territorial units to cooperate and, secondly, interest groups’ formally institutionalized right to be consulted by public authorities in many issues regarding territorial development.

In purely quantitative terms, the most important actors in this network are deconcentrated state agencies at both the regional and the departmental levels. These are, on the one hand, Drir, the Direction Regionale de l’Industrie et de la Recherche (A3) part of the center (B3) and, in the extended center (B3), the Direction Departemental de l’Equipment (a13) and the Direction Departemental de l’Agriculture (a11) and, on the other hand, the offices and operational arms of various prefectures, i.e. the regional SGAR (A3) in the center and the departmental prefects (a11) in the extended center. Interestingly, and corroborating the picture of a rather territorially fragmented ecology, 67 per cent of the network members representing subregional interests (departments, municipalities, and subregional interest groups) show up in the center and the extended center. Of the ten organizations in these two positions, six operate in subregional space. Apart from the municipalities (a13) which occupy the center, the other subregional public institutions are all administrations and technical offices of the central state. The only democratically legitimized bodies, the Conseils Generaux (a15), are pushed into the periphery.

Apart from Drir, all other regional offices of the Parisian central Ministries are assembled in the semi-periphery B3. These are the Direction Regionale de l’Equipment (A3), the Direction Regionale de l’Agriculture et de la Foret (A3), the Direction Regionale du Commerce Extérieur (A3), the Direction Regionale au Commerce et a l’Artisanat (A3), the Direction Regionale a la Recherche et a la Technologie (A3) and the Direction Regionale du Travail et de l’Emploi (A10). Together with the regional Conseils Economique et Social which also occupies this position, these represent 70 per cent of the public institutions at the regional level. The dominance of departmental actors in the central positions and the fact that most of these are branches of central state agencies would tend to confirm Balme and Jouve’s hypothesis of a retour de l’Etat -- if it were not for one important aspect that has not yet been considered. This is the position of the Conseil Régional. This institution not only occupies the center but also, somewhat unexpectedly, turns out to be the most important organization in the entire network.

**Fig. 5.6**

*graphic representation of image matrix*

Rhone-Alpes

66 With a global centralization of CA = 0.53, the region ranks third behind Baden-Württemberg and Wales, even before Niedersachsen.

67 As shown by row A.13 of Table 4.2, together with the other French region (0.17), its network members report the highest number of contacts with unimportant organizations (0.18). This is particularly pronounced in row C9 of the same table, which reflects the percentage of private interest associations reporting contacts with irrelevant public institutions. With a value of 0.32, Rhone-Alpes on this indicator figures twice as high as Languedoc-Roussillon, four times higher than Lombardia, and eight times higher than Sicily.

68 The role of the communes is quite significant and probably results from the high importance of cities such as Lyon, Grenoble, Chambery, and St. Etienne which seem to count more in the ecology than the departements with their historically outdated boundaries.

69 Where they exhibit extremely low betweenness values, but quite acceptable values for centrality and reputation.
As in the four cases already considered, it is again a representative of the regional administration which dominates the network. With a contact indegree centrality of 0.81, a betweenness centrality of 0.16, and an influence reputation of 0.91, the contact and reputation portfolio of the Conseil is unmatched by any other organization of the nine networks. Although this must be qualified to some extent, it indicates the Council’s primordial role in the management of policies that address the entire regional territory. In this respect, it is, in fact, Parri’s thesis of a more balanced form of territorial political exchange emerging after the decentralization laws that is confirmed. While it may be true that the “default performance” of the Conseils Regionaux in France is characterized by dysfunctions in administrative organization and a lack of administrative and political capacities (Balme and Jouve 1996; Kukawka and Smith 1996), so that regional economic policies are no alternatives to traditional state dirigisme (LeGales 1994), this does not hold for Rhone-Alpes. This is now confirmed by the account of the region given by Jouve (1998), who elaborates the earlier exchange model first presented by Parri. Representatives of the Council have restructured the territorial exchange circuits in such a way that this institution can no longer be ignored by any of the traditional power brokers at the subregional level.

Of course, overall, the central State still dominates this region’s political ecology and, equally significantly, it is its deconcentrated agencies at departmental level which turn out to be the most powerful actors. For example, the entire second block is made up of departmental organizations: the prefets departmentaux, two departmental divisions of the central state ministries, and two departmental chambers (industry and craft). However, it is a state which has to share power and influence with the chambers -- as the representatives of departmental and regional business interests -- and with the Conseil Régional.

### Table 5.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RA</th>
<th>members of most central position ($B_1$)</th>
<th>communication contacts</th>
<th>power reputation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>code</td>
<td>block density</td>
<td>global density</td>
<td>global centrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta b_1 = 0.80$</td>
<td>$\Delta a_1 = 0.31$</td>
<td>$C_a = 0.53$</td>
<td>$n_a = 32$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1 Conseil Régional</td>
<td>0.81 (1)</td>
<td>0.16 (1)</td>
<td>0.91 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3 SGAR</td>
<td>0.65 (2)</td>
<td>0.05 (7)</td>
<td>0.78 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5 Direction Rég. Industrie, Recherche, Environnement</td>
<td>0.61 (3)</td>
<td>0.11 (2)</td>
<td>0.59 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a15 Commune</td>
<td>0.58 (4)</td>
<td>0.03 (11)</td>
<td>0.44 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1 Chambre Régional Commerc et d’Industrie</td>
<td>0.48 (5)</td>
<td>0.08 (3)</td>
<td>0.38 (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The block densities of both the center and the extended center ($\Delta b_2 = 0.75$) are comparatively high. While this is understandable for the case of $B_1$ which, as a “department block”, is rather homogeneous in its composition, a value of

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70 The results for the two Conseils Regionaux in Rhone-Alpes and Languedoc-Roussillon may be slightly inflated. Given that these bodies’ administration only counts 300 and 150 officials respectively and, in addition, that the Conseils are generally regarded to be rather secondary in the design and implementation of regional policies, we have declined to interview more than just one of these bodies’ divisions, namely their presidents’ offices. Now, the very fact that respondents who wished to indicate the existence of contacts with that division, or to point to their relevance and reputation, had no other option but to select just this single actor, must have diverted an over-proportionally high number of choices towards that organization. If we had included several "ministries" of the Conseil, then this high centrality would probably have been more equally distributed among these. However, the fact remains that even if we were to detract some points from the values achieved by the Conseil, it nevertheless is the most central organization.

71 The Council’s outstanding position is particularly evident with respect to reputation. The institution easily outperforms the SGAR (0.91 against 0.78). The 145 respondents of Rhone-Alpes’ overall sample confirm that impression: the Conseil Régionale is 0.20 points ahead of SGAR, the second institution in terms of reputation. Considering that the bulk of organizations of the overall sample operate at the departmental and municipal levels, the attraction of the Conseil, quite obviously, reaches far into the subregional space.
most central positions of the network, then, the Rhone-Alpes ecology would indeed come close to a perfect "forum"-type policy community in terms of Jobert (1995). In other words, the region could be seen as a political space for societal macro-representation, for regulation, and for the common definition of rules according to a logic of joint-problem-solving that incorporates almost all major actors and actor categories of different levels of territorial complexity under one single umbrella of association.

The "almost" is not unimportant. It accounts for the fact that this region, despite its comparatively collaborative spirit, cannot be classified as being either of the corporatist variety or of the concertation variety of Table 3.1. As underlined by all the literature on state-society relations in France, the region's interest groups are largely marginalized. The regional branch of the Patronat Français (P₁) reaches a quite significant 0.39 in terms of contact indegree centrality. However, in terms of structural equivalence, the association is clearly less relevant and joins the actors of the network's semi-periphery. B₁ is further made up of the Union des Industries Metallurgiques et Electriques de la Region (P₃), of UNITEX, the Union Intereentreprises Textiles de Lyon et Region (P₂), while the Federation Regionale de Travaux Publics (P₄) is pushed into the periphery. The unions, finally, belong to the least important actors of the network. The communist CGT (P₃) and the anticomunist FO (P₄) both get a reputation of 0.09 -- ten times lower than that of the Conseil Régional.

Contrary to our expectations, the region's agencies for technology transfer and information services do not figure within the group of most prominent actors. We had expected at least ERAI (B₁) to perform a function in some way similar to that of 0.80 for the center could not have been expected. It further confirms that members of this equivalence class really seem to pool their resources with the intention of generating major gains for the region as a whole. As a rule, a high block cohesion cannot normally be taken to indicate that actors occupying that block are allies or tend to coordinate their activities. In theory, the strongest antagonists may occupy the same position and this position may nevertheless exhibit a significant density. This is not the case for B₁ in Rhone-Alpes. Despite a traditionally rather competitive relationship, "the collaboration between the Regional Council's administration [A₁] and the Drir [A₃] has taken place in a positive climate: the region does not primarily perceive Drir in terms of a representative of Parisian strategies on the territory of Rhone-Alpes but, rather, in terms of a mediator which does not hesitate to bring forward specific regional needs vis-à-vis the central government in Paris" (Parri 1993:91; translation by the author).

That there are signs of a strategic alliance in B₁ which, Drir apart, also include the regional prefecture, i.e. SGAR (A₃), and the municipalities (a₉) is confirmed by Jouve (1998) for the case of Rhone-Alpes, and by Smyrl (1997) for particularly entrepreneurial regions in France. Smyrl argues that "the planning priorities set by regional political leaders and organized interests, were actively supported by the prefecture (...). The prefet and his technical staff [essentially, the services of SGAR] were active participants in the regional planning process; they mobilized the services of the state in defense of regional interests and became the active allies [sic!] of the region and its spokesmen vis-à-vis the outside world" (Smyrl 1997:7). If you also consider the marked role of the the regional and departmental chambers in the two cases by case comparison
Steinheis in Baden-Württemberg. In reality, this organization, which has an important symbolic weight especially in the outward-looking activities of the Conseil Régional, appears in the same marginal position (B₃) as the other members of the category "finance and technology brokers": ARIST Rhone-Alpes (B₄), the Business Information Centre (B₁), the research laboratories (B₃), and the universities and grandes écoles (B₀).

The following characteristics stand out from this analysis. If, due to the reasons outlined above, the Conseil Régional's centrality index were reduced by some points, we could see that the Rhone-Alpes ecology is dominated by a total of four public and one private (or para-state) organizations. Of the former, each individual actor represents highly specific interests, is linked to highly different administrative infrastructures, and organized at various territorial levels. The Conseil represents the regional level proper, the SGAR and Drir are sort of hybrids, in that they represent the central state while, at the same time, are also engaged in promoting the interests of the region. Finally, the Comunes represent local interests and, together with the Conseil, are the only democratically legitimized organizations. By Smyrl's standard, Rhone-Alpes is one of those cases where the two requisites for successful management of regional policies and, secondly, regional empowerment are fully present -- i.e. political entrepreneurialism and the existence of a proper regional policy community. Since there is no place for this highly specific form of regional variation in Table 3.1, Rhone-Alpes, as expected, would have to be positioned in the first row of the table, where it would oscillate between the first (a statist, or state-dominated ecology) and the second column (pressure pluralism), with some inclination towards the first.

Let us now turn to the results of the analysis of the southern case, where we are confronted with a major constraint. While Rhone-Alpes' ecology is clearly different from that one of Languedoc-Roussillon, and certainly not representative of the French regions' interorganizational relations in general, the Atkinson/Coleman model cannot distinguish between the two cases. Such a distinction, therefore, can only be made in the descriptive account of the empirical results. As in the other French case, it is the high prominence of subregional institutions which is particularly evident. 75 per cent of these are located in the center and the extended center. Again, very similar to Rhone-Alpes, half of these are departmental chambers, namely those responsible for industry (P₁₁), for craft industries and the artisanat (P₁₂), and for agriculture (P₁₃).

Contrary to Rhone-Alpes, and quite significant in terms of the region's power structure, the only regional organization proper in both B₁ and B₂ is the Conseil Régional. The Council apart, the bulk of regional institutions and of regional interest associations show up in the semi-periphery B₃ -- almost a carbon copy of the situation encountered in the other French region. This latter position consists exclusively of regional-level actors (eleven in absolute terms) and, therefore, forms a "regional block."³⁷

More important, however, is B₂ -- a perfect "department block". Members of this position do not appear to be particularly well-connected internally (Δ b₂ = 0.50) -- yet,
they maintain extremely strong ties with the center, with an outdegree density ($B_2 \rightarrow B_1$) of 1.00 and an indegree density ($B_1 \rightarrow B_2$) of 0.83. The position consists of two departmental offices of the central State, the Direction Départementale de l'Équipement (a8) and the Direction Départementale de l'Agriculture et de la Forêt (a9) and of the Chambre Départementale d'Agirculture (P13). Although not structurally equivalent, occupants of the center and the extended center are quite homogenous as regards their territorial "belonging". This territorial similarity is what probably accounts for the strong $B_1 \leftrightarrow B_2$ connection.

The Conseil Régional ($A_1$) dominates the network from all points of views (contact centrality, betweenness, and reputation) but, in terms of the level of territorial complexity represented by this body, remains an outsider within a purely departmental grouping. It is "surrounded" by strong subregional contenders and is under "assault" by traditional departmentalists who do not seem to be prepared to join

### Table 5.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LR</th>
<th>members of most central position ($B_i$)</th>
<th>communication contacts</th>
<th>power reputation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>code</td>
<td>block density</td>
<td>global density</td>
<td>global centralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta B_2 = 0.83$</td>
<td>$\Delta AB = 0.34$</td>
<td>$C_{AB} = 0.31$</td>
<td>$n_c = 30$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Conseil Régional</td>
<td>0.62 (1)</td>
<td>0.22 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a10</td>
<td>Conseil Général</td>
<td>0.55 (2)</td>
<td>0.03 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P11</td>
<td>Chambre départementale Commerce et d’industrie</td>
<td>0.45 (4)</td>
<td>0.05 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P12</td>
<td>Chambre départementale des Métiers</td>
<td>0.31 (7)</td>
<td>0.02 (11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Conseil Régional ($A_1$) dominates the network from all points of views (contact centrality, betweenness, and reputation) but, in terms of the level of territorial complexity represented by this body, remains an outsider within a purely departmental grouping. It is "surrounded" by strong subregional contenders and is under "assault" by traditional departmentalists who do not seem to be prepared to join

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78 The fact that the "department block" comes second in the ordering of center-periphery positions is a specificity of the procedure used for matrix partitioning (COBLOC). The procedure gives more weight to actors that result to be close to the most central position and less weight to the strength of connections towards marginal positions. Hence, it is the high block status of 20.98 determining the positioning of this equivalence class.

79 Indices from which, as in the case of Rhone-Alpes, some percentage points would need to be detracted.

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It in a common strategy. The fact that the only two public institutions in the most central position are both representatives of elected and democratically legitimized bodies, i.e. the presidents' offices of the Conseil Régional and of the Conseils Généraux (a10), may also indicate something that is particular to this case. In Rhone-Alpes, the Conseils Généraux showed up in the least central position, figuring relatively low on all indicators. If, on the contrary, Languedoc’s ecology is more "assembly-driven" and less dependent on regional technocrats and administrators, this, with some imagination, may be taken to point to a more decisive role of politics and, especially, party politics in the region. It would reflect the marked political divisions between a conservative-dominated regional assembly and a number of conservative strongholds at departmental level and, on the other hand, strong socialist and, in part, communit "subcultures" in other areas of the territory.

The exact opposite, namely the representation of a politically unequivocal force on which the expectations of many network members easily converge, would account for the high prominence achieved by the departmental chambers in both the center (P11 and P12) and the extended center (P13). In a situation of massive party-political, ideological and territorial competition, respondents seem to trust in the ability of chambers to represent and promote the functional interests of their respective constituencies (i.e. departments) better than relatively insignificant interest groups and, in any case, de centralized state agencies.

Comparing it with Rhone-Alpes, subregional actors occupy the same outstanding role in the region’s political ecology, with the noteworthy difference that, here, the region does not seem to represent a viable partner for common strategies. Localism and parochialist attitudes, understood in terms of zero-sum competition among functional and political representatives especially of the departments, has not yet been

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80 Another, but not necessarily alternative interpretation of the central role of the two Conseils in the network could be the remark made by Catherine Gremion (1993) a propos the declining role of the prefects in public opinion. She argues that "the symbolic presence of the state itself suffers from the new arrangements initiated by decentralization: for the voter, the department is now the president of the general council, the region is the president of the region, the state is in Paris" (Gremion 1993). Would this be true, then, the fact would be less dramatic that SGAR, the operational arm of the regional prefecture in Languedoc-Roussillon, had not responded to our questionnaire and, hence, had to be removed from the network.
Interestingly, and probably for similar reasons (low degree of politicization, medium-sized enterprises (P4) and the trade union CFDT (P3) are ranked lower within the semi-periphery B3, while the Syndicat de Transformation des Matieres Plastiques (P6), the Syndicat General des Industries Chimiques (P8) and the CGT (P9) are pushed into the periphery B4. Interestingly, and as expected, the Federation Regionale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles (P6) figures considerably higher both on contact centrality and on reputation especially among the 118 mainly subregional organizations (density 0.30) than, for example, representatives of industrial firms. The fact that agriculture is the most important sector, taking into account the regional territory as a whole, is also reflected by the equally high reputation scores achieved by \( \omega_9 \), the Direction Departementale de L'Agriculture (0.41), by P2, the regional Chamber of Agriculture (0.42)\(^2\).

The position of para-state agencies and finance and technology brokers does not require special mention. As in most other regions, the German and, as we shall see, the Welsh apart, these organizations all occupy relatively insignificant positions in the regional development network. The only exception is SORIDE, the Societe Regionale et Interdepartementale de Development (B1) which is awarded a contact centrality of 0.41 and is also the only representative of this category to figure among the first three positions. The regional branch of ANVAR, the Agence National pour la Valorisation de la Recherche (B2)\(^3\) and ARIST, the Agence Regionale pour l'Information Scientifique et Technique (B3)\(^4\), as well as a number of local research laboratories (B4), development agencies (B5) and the universities (B6) all appear in the periphery of the network.

**Spain**

Catalunya, like Wales, is an odd case among the nine regions. This is because it embodies a variable, cultural and territorial identity, that is relatively irrelevant in the other regions studied. The impact of this variable on the structuring of relations of the

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\( ^2 \) The figures all refer to the 118 members of the overall sample.

\( ^3 \) ANVAR was first located within the services of the Centre National de la Recherche (Parri 1993:46-47). It was founded as a national institution in 1969 "with the initial objective of encouraging the market application of results of public sector research. In 1978, ANVAR was restructured and given the objective of supporting innovation as such, and came to manage a series of schemes of assistance to firms which were subsequently gradually introduced. ANVAR was also regionalized at this time." (Debeshop 1989:74-75). After the decentralization of the agency, ANVAR employed 502 technicians and officials (1985 figures) of which 286 were working in the Paris headquarter and the rest in regional offices (Parri 1993).

\( ^4 \) ARIST's main task is to provide for real services (technological innovation) and to supply information about new norms regarding SMEs. The ARISTs, which are autonomous regional agencies, have been created by the various departmental, municipal and, later, regional chamber organizations and are now hosted by the regional Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Parri 1993:49).

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81 We have seen that, originally, the same kind of departmentalism also characterized interorganizational relations in the other French region. At least since the early 1990s, Rhone-Alpes Conseil now seems to have assumed the role of a primus inter pares able to re-direct and guide departmental efforts into a common strategy (Jouve 1998).
region’s political ecology is significant and may explain why Catalunya, while initially figuring among the southern group of regions (Fig.4.1), later shows up in the northern group in the cluster analysis performed on more than two relational indicators (Fig.4.2). The region remains typically mediterranean in terms of its high network density and low global centralization but is more northern with respect to relational attributes such as reciprocity, multiplexity, and redundancy.

A glance at Figure 5.8 demonstrates that it is the only region that possesses an isolate ($B_4$) among its positions. Going beyond the purely structural information and "opening" that position, it becomes immediately clear why this is the case: $B_4$, indeed, is the host of the only two organizations of the Catalan network representing central government, that is, the "old" provincial administrations ($a_8$) and the Delegacio del Govern Central de Catalunya ($A_{12}$). To some extent, this was to be expected. The fact that the representatives of central government do not possess either indegrees or outdegrees (zero cell entries both in the rows and columns of $B_4$ in the image matrix) is quite instructive with respect to the importance of the cultural dimension in that region. Contrary to the French cases analyzed in the previous section, central government in Catalunya is a foreign body and has become a social isolate.

An image that is the reverse of the marginalization and isolation of central government is represented by the configuration of the network’s center. As only in Niedersachsen so far, $B_1$ is exclusively made up of branches of regional government, i.e. of the Generalitat de Catalunya. Much more than in Niedersachsen, where block density of the center reached an impressive value of 0.83, Catalunya’s center exhibits perfect cohesion with $\Delta b_1 = 1.00$. The three institutions occupying that position are mutually connected by reciprocal ties. Again, as was argued a propos the case of these have largely diminished in relevance and, in part, are in a process of institutional dissolution and deconstruction at least in Catalunya.

Consider, moreover, that three of these blocks are "perfect" zero-blocks, while another is close-to-perfect with a density value of 0.06.

This is hardly surprising if one considers, for example, the verdict given by Heribert Barrerar, the later president of the Catalan assembly, during the constitutional debate in 1978: "Spain is no nation but a state consisting of a number of nations. Spain, also, is no fatherland, because you cannot have more than one, and the only fatherland of Catalans is Catalunya" (quoted from the works of Mercedé, F.; Hernández, B. and Oltra, B. 1983:24). Representatives of an institution not belonging to one’s own nation quite clearly are foreigners.
regional branch of UGT (P). While these are all strongly connected to the center, with densities of 0.56 and 0.74 for incoming and outward-looking choices, the representatives of the above two categories of actors appear to have few contacts among themselves (\( \Delta B_2 = 0.26 \)). This is even more pronounced for the semi-periphery \( B_1 \) -- a position essentially composed in the same way as \( B \). With a block density of 0.05, members of the semi-periphery are almost entirely unconnected with each other.

We have seen, in Chapter Four, that the first region with which Catalunya forms a cluster is Niedersachsen. The cluster-building was determined by general network-analytic properties such as density, centralization, multiplexity, reciprocity and so forth. We see now that this purely structural similarity also concerns the composition of the two most important network positions. As in Niedersachsen, the center of Catalunya’s network is entirely formed by regional ’ministries’, or ministry-led institutions and, as in the northern German case, the extended center consists of the more relevant interest groups and other public authorities representing different territorial levels. Contrary to Niedersachsen, however, this latter position is internally fragmented and its private and public actors hardly communicate with each other. In terms of state-society relations, then, our initial expectation of an outright marginalization of Catalan interests groups in the political ecology of the region is confirmed only in part. Interest groups, at least when compared to those of Baden-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Members of Most Central Position (( B_1 ))</th>
<th>Communication Contacts</th>
<th>Power Reputation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( A_2 ) Generalitat de Catalunya - Dep. d’Econ. e Finan.</td>
<td>0.52 (3)</td>
<td>0.12 (3)</td>
<td>0.64 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Württemberg, Rhone-Alpes and Languedoc-Roussillon, are relatively well-placed in the network. At the same time, communication within the positions occupied by them is relatively underdeveloped.

Before turning to the second Spanish case, let us say a few words on the center of the Catalan network. As was the case with Baden-Württemberg’s Steinbeis Foundation, it is a question of taste and relatively irrelevant whether the Patronat Catalan Pro Europa (\( A_3 \)) is grouped under the category of public actors or of para-state organizations. Formally, the Patronat has a private status. In practice, it is entirely controlled by the Generalitat. What really makes a difference, however, is that the Catalan network is the only one among the sample whose most centrally positioned actor is not a regional “ministry” or functional equivalent of a ministry. Although, in terms of influence reputation, it is the economics division of the Generalitat (\( A_2 \)) that attracts the highest values (0.64 and 0.55), both on the part of the network members (\( n_c = 22 \)) and on the part of the overall sample (\( n_s = 62 \)), it is the Patronat which is the most intensely and frequently contacted organization (0.67) and also the most relevant actor in terms of brokerage capacity (0.26). This prominent position of the Patronat is most likely due to its dual function -- serving internally as a consultancy and development agency and, externally, as an antenna of Catalan interests in Brussels. In fact, four years after the Patronat’s foundation in 1982, indeed, the organization established its own office in Brussels. It is at least as important as the regional outposts of the German Länder, the Länder und Informatiosbüros (Mehlich 1988:57).

By way of summarizing, these results fully confirm the initial expectation that Catalunya would belong to the state-dominated network variety. Due to its over-determination and control by nationalist political forces, Catalunya’s political ecology assumes similar features to those of the two German cases. At the same time, hierarchy is less pronounced in this case. Variance in centrality both amongst the most central organizations in \( B_1 \) and amongst organizations in \( B_1 \) to \( B_4 \) is less dramatic than in Baden-Württemberg or Niedersachsen. The ecology clearly is a
Case by case comparison

hierarchical one, however, compared to the southern German case, it is a flat hierarchy with no single organization controlling all the others. In this respect, Catalunya maintains its southern characteristics.

Flat hierarchy is also the most characteristic feature of the Andalucian network. Its most distinctive property is the high number of organizations forming part of the network’s most central position $B_1$. The center hosts a total of twelve organizations, i.e. 38 per cent of the public institutions, 25 per cent of the interest groups and 40 per cent of the finance and technology brokers (see Table 8.6 in Appendix). Despite this high heterogeneity, these organizations are not only centrally placed but also relatively well-connected with each other (cohesion). The position’s density ($\Delta B_1 = 0.35$) is the lowest of all network centers of the sample. Considering the multitude of organizations of the peripheries, these organizations are only marginally higher, with one important exception, the Delegación del Gobierno Central en Andalucía ($A_8$)\(^\circ\). On the other hand, the average centrality of organizations in the center and extended center is about 0.33, almost 30 points above that of the organizations in the two peripheries. In other words, there is a situation of flat hierarchy among the organizations forming the central positions, but a very pronounced hierarchy between the latter and the organizations of the peripheries.

Quite significant, also, is the high block density (0.63) of relations originating in $B_1$ and targeted at $B_1$. The majority of actors in $B_2$ are representatives of subregional authorities or of field offices of the central State at the subregional level, i.e. the "old" provinces or Diputaciones Provinciales of the Gobierno Central ($a_{11}$), the Consejo Andaluz de Provincias ($a_{12}$), the Municipios ($a_{13}$) and the Consejo Andaluz de Municipios ($a_{15}$) and, finally, the Mancommunidades ($a_{14}$). As argued on several occasions, it is hard, if not impossible, to draw conclusions from this type of information about who actually depends on whom in that kind of configuration. The qualitative analysis of Andalucia in Chapter Four, however, would suggest that this high block density can be read as a verification of the initial hypothesis according to which regional authorities in that region depend heavily on actors at the provincial and municipal levels and on the presence of central State authorities at these levels.

Two representatives of the provincial level even figure among the members of the network’s center. These are the provincial delegations of the regional Consejerías ($A_7$) and the provincial branches of the employer association CEOE ($P_2$). With respect to the composition of the the center as a whole (Tab.5.11), the following is important to note. As in all other cases considered so far, it is the representatives of Business and Innovation Centres ($B_3$). Both center and extended center, therefore, are relatively balanced and no single actor in any way dominates these positions.

\(^{\circ}\) A$_8$, the Economics division of regional government (Consejería de Economía y Hacienda) reaches 0.58 points and is followed by the Istituto de Fomento de Andalucía ($A_{12}$) with 0.56 points, by A$_7$, the Industry division of regional government (Consejería de Industria, Comercio y Turismo) and the universities both with 0.50 points. Apart from B$_1$, a scientific research institute, the lowest centrality value of B$_1$ and B$_2$ accrues to the Andalucian representative of the EU network of information about who actually depends on whom in that kind of configuration. The qualitative analysis of Andalucia in Chapter Four, however, would suggest that this high block density can be read as a verification of the initial hypothesis according to which regional authorities in that region depend heavily on actors at the provincial and municipal levels and on the presence of central State authorities at these levels.

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\(^{\circ}\) Unlike Catalunya, where the equivalent of this institution ($A_{12}$) was a social isolate, the centrality of the representative of the Spanish central government in Andalucia, consistently with our expectations, is higher than that of many occupants of the extended center $B_2$. 

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Grote, Jurgen R. (1998), The political ecology of regionalism : state-society relations in nine European regions

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regional government that occupy the most central positions, in particular, the Consejería de Economía y Hacienda (A₂) and, typically for that region, the Consejería de Agricultura y Pesca (A₆). This results from a simultaneous consultation of all four indicators of the table. The latter two ministries lead, particularly with respect to their brokerage capacity and their consultation of all four indicators of the table.

Looking only at contact centrality, however, it is clear that their position is not particularly outstanding. Subregional actors (A₇ and P₁) interest associations and, as expected, the unions, UGT (P₁₂) and CCOO (P₁₃), and technology and information brokers (B₁ and B₂) closely follow the ministries in terms of the strength of their contact portfolios. In other words, there is a clear lack of guidance on the part of regional authorities. At the same time, interest groups compete strongly for the most relevant positions in the network. In a sense, this is quite similar to the organizational ecology of the Sicilian case. The difference is that the absence of politico-institutional guidance is not counter-balanced by a high density of relations in the overall network, i.e. by the type of relational redundancy that was said to be typical of the southern ecologies. Andalucía’s low network density (Δb₂ = 0.23) runs counter to our expectations. The only reasonable, though not entirely unequivocal answer to this, might lie in the high ideological and party-political cohesion among organizations of that region, even if these pertain to very different categories of actors (public, private, para-state) and to different territorial levels (national, regional, provincial, municipal). In a situation characterized by a clear hegemony of one political party (PSOE), communication problems rooted in political frictions, opposing views, and open conflict seem to be largely absent. This may account for the low density of relations among network members. Information flow is more or less guaranteed and political cohesiveness makes for a situation where individual organizations do not need to “overinvest” in contacts as was the case in Sicily and in Languedoc-Roussillon. Apart from this political reason, there is also a structural reason for the low overall density of the network, namely the comparatively low cohesion of the network’s most central position B₁.

By way of summarizing, the following can be said. Andalucía, like Rhone-Alpes, fell outside the two clusters identified in Figure 4.1. We can now say that the cluster analysis performed later, (Fig.4.2) is more reliable with respect to the placement of the region. As demonstrated by the above results, Andalucía clearly belongs to the southern cluster where it joins Sicily, before merging with Lombardia and

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91 A₆, the Instituto de Fomento de Andalucía (IFO) is second on indegree centrality (0.56). IFO, like the Patronat in Catalonia or the Steinbeis Foundation in Baden-Württemberg, is an important para-state agency. Unlike the latter two cases, IFO is not concerned with technology transfer or the dissemination of business-relevant information but, rather, with the “management of unemployment”. IFO coordinates employment and vocational training programmes on a region-wide scale and is also concerned with promoting the image of the region in the tourism sector. Its high prominence in the network clearly reflects the problems the region is facing economically.
Languedoc-Roussillon. While our expectation a propos the density of this network has not been confirmed, it is verified with respect to the low degree of hierarchy, the absence of administrative guidance, and coordination problems among regional government units. Because the two unions, UGT and CCOO, and the regional branch of the Spanish business association CEOE, all form part of the center, the case of Andalucía tends to oscillate between the pressure pluralist and the corporatist network variety.

**WALES**

In many of the qualitative accounts of regional development networks presented in Chapter Three, most notably in the case of Baden-Württemberg, at least two partly contradicting views could be identified. The same also applied to Wales. According to the first view, represented by authors such as Philip Cooke, Kevin Morgan, Shari Garmise, Rod Rhodes and others, the region is dominated by territorial managers attached to Whitehall to such an extent that the emergence of indigenous strategies is quite uncertain and unlikely. This literature identified the Welsh Office (WO) and the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) as being the most relevant actors in the region. As was shown in Chapter Four, the alternative view is represented by Jeffrey Anderson who, without specifically addressing the Welsh case, generally underlines the propensities of local actors in the UK to mobilize support, pool their resources, and create private-public networks “under a single umbrella of voluntary association.”

As in the case of Baden-Württemberg, it is Anderson’s hypothesis that best accommodates our empirical results. Although the network is structured extremely hierarchical, it is the County Councils ($A_3$) -- what we identified as representing the functional equivalent of regional government in Britain -- that is placed at the highest point in this hierarchy, and not one of the divisions of the WO ($A_1$ or $A_2$). The Councils are joined, unexpectedly, by the TECs, the local *Training and Enterprise Councils* ($B_3$). Both organizations get very high, and identical, values for contact centrality and influence reputation (0.79 and 0.70 respectively). Concerning reputation alone, this result is largely confirmed by the responses given by the 116 members of the Welsh overall sample (0.73 and 0.60). Against conventional wisdom and contrary to any expectation, the third organization forming part of the center is the Welsh branch of the British CBI. The CBI occupies the first rank in terms of its brokerage capacity (0.30) -- indicating that it is organized business that holds the network together and guarantees cohesiveness.

Now, while by Anderson’s standards, these three organizations would be likely allies in the common strategic interest of improving the region’s endowment with public goods, this need not actually be the case. The secondary literature points to a number of incidents suggesting the prevalence of marked organizational self-interest among these actors which would negatively impinge on the formation of such alliances. For example, Crouch, Finegold and Sako (1998:166) mention that although “TECs are local”, there is “no necessary relationship to local government”. At least, “representatives of business associations quite explicitly have no role” (ibid:168).
This is confirmed by Martin who, in another account of local development in Britain, demonstrates that both TECs and local authorities increasingly resort to "go-it-alone" strategies. The relationship between County Councils, District Councils and TECs is often "fractured" and "locked in an increasingly hostile battle for survival" (Martin 1996:226)

Although the position of the Counties is not as surprising as might have seemed at the beginning, what about the TECs? Why do "externally imposed organs, established by central government and initially financed by it" (Crouch, Finegold and Sako 1998:171) play such an outstanding role in the Welsh political ecology? Crouch et.al. point to an interesting fact characteristic of these agencies. TECs have been created with the explicit task of supplying skills and providing training. At the same time, in order to win support among local business elites, they themselves "have found it wise to under-emphasize the 'training' part of their mission, as this is an issue which firms are often not very interested in discussing" (ibid:172). While it is by emphasizing their non-training, 'enterprise' services that TECs have won the attention of local businesses (ibid:176), they at the same time have acquired "a reputation among (...) young people as being the remedial agencies for those at the bottom of the skills heap" (ibid:172). In a sense, then, their high centrality in the network is likely to be a joint-effect of the attraction of this specifically British counterpart to the "corporatist structure of firms (...) represented by the German chamber system" (ibid:141) among both employers and employees (including the unemployed) and these two social classes' organizational representatives.

Apart from the composition of the network's center, two other things clearly stand out. The first is the high centrality achieved by the Counties and the TECs. With a contact centrality of 0.78, they clearly outperform the rest of the network participants and they do that to an extent unmatched by any other organization of the nine networks, the two German cases apart98. This is highly significant and runs counter to most descriptive accounts of the quality of development networks in Wales. Secondly, and related to the above, the representatives of those organizations that are usually ascribed the role of dominating the network, i.e. the Economic Development and Training Group (A1) and the Transport, Planning and Environment Group (A2) of the Welsh Office, turn out to be rather marginalized. Both units appear in the semi-periphery, a position they share with a large number of quite heterogeneous organizations, and amongst which they are not even among the most important99.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WA</th>
<th>members of most central position ((B_1)) and their relational properties</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>communication contacts power reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>block density global density global centralization indegree between centrality network (mean 0.27) overall sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta_{B_1} = 0.67) (\Delta_{ct} = 0.22) (C_{ct} = 0.63) (n_c = 20) (n_u = 20) (n_c = 20) (n_u = 116) (n_b = 53)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>County Councils</td>
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<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>(Local) Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Confederation of British Industry (CBI-Wales)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.79 (1) 0.15 (4) 0.70 (1) 0.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As mentioned above, due its strong sense of cultural belonging, identity, history and linguistic specificities, Wales represents an unusual case in our sample. As in Catalunya, parts of the network’s configuration may be determined by this cultural dimension which has not been considered in any great detail in the present work. As in Catalunya, the representatives of deconcentrated state agencies are pushed into one of the network’s more peripheral positions. The really puzzling aspect of the Welsh case, however, is the position of the trade unions, i.e. of the local branch of the

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98 The event reported by the author, in reality, would be an example of a County Council/TEC alliance. Yet, one may equally imagine an alternative grouping with the District Council joining the TEC against the County Council. "In 1994, Nottinghamshire County Council and TECs sponsored a separate Brussels Office from that which was funded by the District Councils, and the two worked largely in isolation from each other" (Martin 1996:226).

99 Removing the Counties and the TECs from the network, the average centrality of the remaining organizations is 0.16 - 62 points below the one achieved by the two most central actors.
British TUC (P3) and of UNISON (P6), a union specific to the region. It is puzzling for two reasons, a qualitative or, rather, political reason and a quantitative, structural reason. Let us first turn to the political puzzle.

Contrary to the expectation that trade unions, in a Labour-dominated political environment, would perform better than the representatives of capital interests, it is the CBI which joins the two most prominent actors in the center of the network. At the same time, the unions form a single block -- a "union block" -- which, although fully connected internally ($\Delta_2 = 1.00$), remains completely marginalized within the overall network. Ties connecting the "union block" to members of the extended center (B2) and the semi-periphery (B3) represent a perfect zero-block situation, i.e. a complete absence of contacts both in terms of indegrees and of outdegrees. The image matrix of this network exhibits zero outdegrees (row sum equal to zero) for B4 while, vice versa, the unions are contact targets only for ties which originate in the center. If this region's political ecology should in any sense be driven by inputs from the private sphere, then, it is now possible to say that it is enterprise-driven -- a fact that adds further evidence to the Welsh ecology's position within the northern cluster.

The quantitative, or structural puzzle is more of a purely methodological kind. The procedure of matrix partitioning into equivalence classes executed by COBLOC actually suggested a three-block solution to be the most appropriate representation of the Welsh network structure. As mentioned in the introductory section to this Chapter, both for purely "aesthetic" reasons and in the interest of assuring comparability across the networks, the programme was asked to execute a further partition for the case of the least prominent block B3. This led to the break-away of the two unions from the group of actors which now form part of the semi-periphery. On purely methodological grounds, this may not have been entirely correct. Given the interest of this study in the detection of state-society relations and considering the important role of trade unions in the shaping of these relations, their removal from the larger group and later separate treatment actually turned out to make sense and rather facilitated the description of the Welsh political ecology.

As with the contradictory accounts of, on the one hand, network-prone and, on the other, network-adverse organizational configurations of local development in Britain and Wales, there are quite explicit differences also among scholars which generally address the issue of state-society relations in that country. Two of these positions were already mentioned in Chapter Four. While, more than twenty years ago, Katzenstein had pointed to a "clear differentiation between state and society" that would belong to the "characteristic features of Britain's policy networks" (Katzenstein 1977:310), van Waarden underlined the "weak differentiation of the British state out of its civil society" (van Waarden 1995:357).

Now, considering just inter-governmental, and not inter-organizational relations in general, our results for Wales support Anderson's hypothesis of a strong mobilization of local authorities. They do not support his claim of all-encompassing private-public alliances at the subnational level. Katzenstein's differentiation hypothesis seems to hold also for the case of Wales. This, at least, is suggested by the following. Two of the rows of Table 4.1 contain information about the relations between public institutions and private interest associations both as senders/initiators and as receivers/targets of contacts. While contacts originating among organizations of the Welsh interest system and directed towards the region's public institutions arrive at a density of 0.21 which, from a comparative perspective, is quite close to the average, the same cannot be said of the reverse relationship, i.e. the intensity of represent a dramatic violation of the procedure (see, for a description of this, Kappelhoff 1987:116-117).

\footnote{The most frequently contacted organizations in B are, again, the Planning Units of the County Councils (a3) and the European Information Centres (B3).}

\footnote{Following the terminology of clique analysis, we have labeled this constellation a "labour clique" in the case of Sicily, where a similar pattern occurred.}

\footnote{At the same time, differences between the "goodness of fit" indices b which guide the clustering into different positions were not very marked, so that a four-block solution did not actually facilitate the detection of state-society relations and considering the
contacts originating among representatives of the public sphere and targeted at the interest system. The density of this relation stops short of zero (0.02). It is the lowest value gained by any of these relations within the entire regional sample. Somewhat troubled by this result, I consulted the original adjacency matrix containing the raw data, and discovered that it was just one single institution, or group of institutions, reporting such contacts, namely the region’s County Councils. It turned out that these were contacts directed both towards the CBI -- an organization with whom the Councils jointly form a common position -- and towards the "trade union block".

At the same time, there is a complete lack of contacts (perfect zero-blocks) between these latter and the occupants of B₂ and B₃ -- mostly representatives of public authorities and of development and/or technology centers -- and hardly any tie connecting the unions to members of the center. With a value of 0.17, block density for the relation B₃ → B₁ remains below average matrix density and, therefore, had to be coded as a zero entry in the image matrix. The result is a near-to-complete absence of relations between the unions and representatives of public institutions. This quite clearly corroborates Katzenstein’s hypothesis of a "single minded attention (...) paid to the maintenance of jurisdictional boundaries between state and society" (Katzenstein 1977:310).

Van Waarden, on the other hand, is not completely wrong either. The openness of British authorities to negotiations with business (van Waarden 1995:341) is suggested by the high cohesion of the center block B₁ (0.67) which assembles the County Councils, the CBI, and the TECs, a skill promotion and management consultancy itself formed of representatives of the CBI, the Councils and of individual entrepreneurs. However, the second characteristic of British authorities listed by van Waarden -- flexibility in rule formation -- does not hold here. The Counties possess very little power to impose constraints on business and it is precisely this lack of guidance which is likely to be responsible for the strange composition of the network’s center. Overall, therefore, it is the typology of a pressure pluralist network that best characterizes the Welsh situation.
6

The networks’ external relational performance

The Commission’s role and methods must be considered in terms of its needs to operate with networks of actors. These networks must be understood as being potentially constituted of national, regional and local administrative actors, private sector actors organized according to a variety of criteria and possibly transcending territorial and functional boundaries, and actors who challenge straightforward definition in terms of public or private sector. Similarly, these networks may be relatively fixed or they may be dynamically changing and they may have a relatively long duration or they may be more ad hoc arrangements. The ability of the Commission to operate with these networks depends not only on its ability to understand and enter existing networks but also on its ability to encourage their development and co-ordination to meet particular challenges.


REFLECTIONS ON INNER AND OUTER SPACE

Now that we know how the networks are structured internally, it might be interesting to examine their capacities for acting in outer space. The possibility of identifying possible correlations between internal network properties and these networks’ external performance would seem to be particularly promising. Unfortunately, correlations of this kind are hard to derive from the type of data we are working with. In addition, such an enterprise generally presents difficulties above and beyond the quality of the empirical material. It is conceptually onerous, if not impossible, to make reasonable forecasts about types of networks and the "behaviour" towards the outside world emerging from various typologies. Why, for example, should a regional political ecology of the corporatist variety be expected to have a stronger capacity for action and, hence, possess stronger and more solid ties with organizations at the national and supranational levels than an ecology of the pluralist type? Do networks with high density or, as argued in Chapter Four, low-trust ecologies, perform better on an extra-regional scale than do networks distinguished by high centralization, hierarchical subordination, or high trust? In our view, such claims cannot be made under any circumstances. This is because the networks studied here are different from those of the policy-network literature, they are no corporate actors, or quasi-organizations, with an identity of their own, with common strategies or with analogous interests. If this were the case, it might have been possible to argue, for example, that external strategies embedded within a structure of corporatist intermediation and shared values were more likely to be successful than those rooted in pluralist fragmentation and in precarious short-term agreements.

Most studies dealing with the region-national capital-EU-(Commission) link, be they of the 'Europe of the Regions', the 'Europe with the Regions', or of the 'multilevel governance' (MLG)1 type, have chosen to approach their subject within the realm of a highly specific policy, namely that of structural funding by EU agencies. This is warranted to the extent that structural policy interventions by the EU, first, since the IMPs (see, Bianchi and Grote 1991) and, second, since the subsequent and successive reforms of the ERDF regulations, at the turn of the decade, have made quantum leaps in terms of institutional engineering. It is the only area where multilevel governance is, at least, being envisaged as a conceivable option for the future, and where the Commission seeks the creation of both multi-level (territorial partnership and subsidiarity) and multi-actor networks (functional partnership and subsidiarity) that can then be assisted and

1 Essentially promoted by Bavaria’s Ministerpräsident, representatives of regional governments of initially, eight member countries have convened several ‘Europe of Regions’ conferences since 1989 to formulate demands for direct participation in the decisionmaking and legislative process at the European level. This has triggered an enormous literature trying to evaluate the scenarios in, more or less, academic terms.

2 The term was first suggested by Liesbet Hooghe (1996), but see also Hooghe and Marks (1997) and Heinelt and Randal-Smith (1996).
The external performance

Implicitly or explicitly, the handful of studies that set out to scrutinize regional organizations' access to external actors, with the help of survey research or other available empirical information, all refer to Anderson's resource dependence model (Anderson 1990). There, it was argued that the EU "can alter domestic networks by affecting the inter-member distribution of resources, and thus their level of interdependence" (ibid:422). Community initiatives can increase, decrease, or leave unchanged the resource endowment and resource dependencies of network members. Members essentially are national and subnational representatives of public institutions. This, in fact, is one of the major constraints of Anderson's model. Representing a critical response to a scenario that only considered governments to be of importance, the author's account of the "Europe of the Regions" itself remains inter-governmental in nature. Moreover, focusing on the prospective impact of stronger EU involvement in the domestic affairs of national and subnational governments it also adopts an essentially top-down approach. Both the focus on governments and the top-down perspective make this model difficult to assimilate with visions of multilevel governance.

Two of the three studies that have tried to verify Anderson's claims adopt instead a bottom-up perspective. Constantelos (1996), who uses the language of multilevel governance, was the first to subject the resource dependence model to an empirical test. Choosing the external activities of sectoral business interest associations in Liguria and in Provence-Cote d'Azur as empirical cases, the author, however, only provides information about these associations' national links (Genova-Rome and Nice-Paris) and fails to give any information about the European dimension. Constantelos' dependent variable is interest group strategies in the two regions, while his explanatory variable is the degree of state decentralization and regional autonomy, i.e., legal status, legislative, and financial autonomy. The results are not very surprising. First, regional interest groups in France choose to lobby the central government more frequently, whereas their Italian counterparts have more frequent contacts at the regional level. Second, even level organizations, this part of the analysis is of a more traditional, statistical kind and mainly deals

The term multilevel governance (MLG) made its first appearance in 1993 (Marks 1993) but has since then gained enormously in relevance (see, especially, Hooghe 1996; Heinelt and Randall-Smith 1996). For example, formal admission and institutionalized participation of business interests, trade unions, and other private actors in the Monitoring Committees of the Operational Programmes (OPs) are hardly indicative of MLG. In many cases, interest groups are widely excluded from decisionmaking in regional politics while, at the same time, and thanks to the ERDF regulations, formally participating in the monitoring of programmes and projects. These committees, on average, only meet twice a year and participation does not imply that private inputs were seriously taken into account. In many instances, even purely formal participation has not been achieved.

Working exclusively with 'outdegrees', i.e. with information about contact and influence reported by the respondents of the regional and subregional samples and concerning their ties to national and EU-

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Exchange models

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where regional interest groups are affiliates of national peak associations, they do not leave the representation of their constituent members' interest to these higher-order organizations but actively engage themselves in contacting national legislators and national administration. Third, neither corporatism nor pluralism are said to be appropriate labels for this activity. The picture emerging, is in fact one of a balkanized model of interest intermediation with groups responding both to negative regulatory impacts and to positive incentives in an ad hoc and selective manner. Had Constantelos considered the over-determining influence of domestic state-society relations in France and Italy and, secondly, had he taken into account the differences in the governments' resource endowment in the two regions, then his results would probably have been less prosaic. For example, the extent to which strategies of organized business deviate from, or are complementary to, the respective national default pattern of interest politics could then have been measured.

The attempt by Marks et al. (1996) to identify the causes underlying regional mobilization in Brussels is more ambitious. The questions raised by the authors are quite straightforward: Why have subnational governments been drawn to Brussels? Which subnational governments are represented and which not? How can we explain the emerging pattern of regional representation? However, as in Constantelos' work, Marks et al. do not manage to provide an empirically consistent and full account of multilevel governance. While Constantelos' study of forms of territorial interest intermediation failed to consider the "first" level of MLG, i.e. 'organized interests in the European Community' (Greenwood et al. 1992), functional interests are completely absent in Marks' et al.'s description of regional governments' ability to establish institutionalized outposts in Brussels. In addition, while Constantelos failed to provide evidence for the European level, this study fails to provide evidence for the national level. Finally, the study of institutionalized contacts is important but unable to capture the manifold relations making up a multi-level network. This is not, therefore, as claimed by the authors, a study on "the existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of government and the interaction of political actors across those levels (Marks et al. 1996:41)."

Five hypotheses are tested in that work: resource push, resource pull, associational culture, information exchange (drawn from the scope of competencies of subnational government) and, finally, regional distinctiveness. The hypotheses predict, in descending order, that "subnational governments having potential access to more resources at the European level are more likely to open an office in Brussels" (ibid:52); "subnational governments having greater access to financial resources will be more likely to be represented in Brussels" (ibid:56-57); "subnational governments in associationally rich regions are more likely to seek representation in Brussels" (ibid:57); "the larger the scope of political autonomy of a subnational government, the more it will seek information" in Brussels and the higher the demand for "information exchange" (ibid:44); "regions that are politically and culturally different from their respective national societies are more likely to mobilize in the EU" (ibid:60).

There is no statistically significant correlation between representation and the first two indicators. The authors find that resource-based explanations, "find little or no confirmation". At a superficial level, the third hypothesis, the presence of associational culture, seems directly related to our work. It concerns a dimension that was considered at length in the preceeding chapters. In fact, the results "provide indirect evidence supporting the hypothesis" (ibid:57), although the authors have to admit that they "are not measuring associational culture directly" (ibid:58). In reality, associational culture

\[ \text{DOI: 10.2870/6951} \]
can be discarded altogether as a factor co-determining the presence of regional
governments in Brussels. This is not only because of the authors' indiscriminating use of
a highly ambiguous concept8 but, especially, because the proxy chosen by them to reflect
high levels of associationalism (industrial share of the workforce), quite frankly, is
misleading and wrong'.

The only two hypotheses remaining are information exchange and regional
distinctiveness. The compound indicator constructed to measure the first property "is
very strongly and significantly associated with regional representation" (ibid:58) and the
results also "provide strong confirmation of the regional distinctiveness hypotheses" (ibid:60).
Importantly, there is a significant correspondence between the two factors. Strong
regional identity intensifies demands for regional governance while strongly
entrenched regional governments intensify regional identity. At the same time, this is
hardly surprising and is the least one would have expected. The possibility that strong
regional governments with competencies in a large number of areas that overlap with
Community competences (the German Länder and Belgian regions) would be more
affected by pending EU regulation and, therefore, be better represented at the European
level could be anticipated in much the same way as the positive external performance of
culturally and politically distinctive regions such as Catalunya, Wales and others could
be.

Structural approaches to multilevel governance

Both Constantelos’ and Marks’ et.al. are welcome contributions in a situation
characterized by metaphoric reasoning and partly unsustainable claims a propos the

8 Marks et.al. refer to Robert Putnam's notion of associationalism and to the concept's operationalization
critically referred to in Chapters Three and Five of this work.
8 The ambiguity of the concept apart. Putnam (1993) himself nowhere addresses explicitly the
relationship between industrial share of the workforce and associational culture. The only thing argued
is that "by the 1970s socioeconomic modernity is very closely related with the civic community" (ibid:153). The inference drawn by Marks et al. from this affirmation, therefore, is inappropriate. First, civic community is not identical with associationalism and, secondly, socioeconomic modernity in Putnam also includes "infant mortality" (ibid.), an indicator not considered by the authors.

9 Contrary to exchange theory which, according to the authors, underlies a lot of policy network
reasoning, for the structural approach it is the triad rather than dyad which is seen "as the most
fundamental unit of a network" (ibid:355).
10 The concept of 'role' is explained in Chapter Five, Section One.
but, rather, find themselves in constantly shifting alliances within the triad\(^\text{12}\). The approach possesses a number of conceptual implications. In fact, repeated games between and across partly conflicting, partly crossing alliances in which each level and, as I would add, each category of actors, defends its "dual networks", suggest the stability of "a 'middle ground', between strict intergovernmentalism and a strongly federal Europe" (ibid:350).

While, in the exchange perspective, third parties typically perform the function of alternative suppliers of resources, in the structuralist perspective, they are viewed in terms of a critical audience who can confer legitimacy on role claims or who can play a critical brokerage role between parties. Moreover, while in the exchange perspective, deals are often one-off exercises and are typically restricted to highly idiosyncratic policies, "the structural approach suggests that networks are more sticky" (ibid:356)\(^\text{13}\) and, therefore, as we would like to add, better able to reflect general power equilibria and disequilibria. The model not only considers situations of "pure" alliance -- opposition and strategic manipulation can equally be submitted to analysis\(^\text{14}\). In principle, all three dynamics are possible and "although the relative autonomy of the nation-state is not really in question, this model suggests that the creation of a triad is likely to increase the relative autonomy of the Commission and the regions" (ibid:358).

This, essentially, corresponds to what was argued in the preceding chapters. It is an extension of the perspective adopted for the study of internal networks and could be the starting point for powerful research to come in the future. The authors, unfortunately, lack the type of data necessary for substantiating their arguments. Apart from the sophisticated outline, the remainder of their work is merely a presentation of some interesting case studies of a number of Community initiatives and programmes that fit their conceptual framework. But in any case, the model accommodates most of the requisites necessary for the study of MLG. It is truly multi-level (regional, national, European), allows for multi-actor engagement (governments, private organizations, para-state and other agencies) and for "shifting involvements" and strategies (alliance, opposition, manipulation) and also makes it possible to approach the issue from various analytical perspectives (top-down, bottom-up, vertically, horizontally).

As in the work of Anderson, Constantelos, Marks et.al. and Ansell et.al., our own material is unable to cover the entire range of issues above. It remains bottom-up in perspective and no inferences can be drawn as to the strategies followed by different types of actors. At the same time, the analysis is particularly powerful in that it relies on first hand survey data not merely being collected among members of a more or less representative sample but, an important difference, among organizations of close-to-complete territorial networks in nine regions.

**THE REGIONAL-NATIONAL-EU LINK**

As before, respondents indicated first, from their own organisation’s point of view, which of the national and European actors on the organization list had a particular impact upon development policies of the region and within the region (influence reputation). Secondly, respondents were asked to record any sustained contact between their organisation and the national and European ones. In contrast to the network analysis of the preceding chapters, we here rely upon "outdegrees" alone. It would have been well beyond our resources and, I believe, generally impossible, to find contacts inside national and European administrations, associations and chambers who could verify or falsify the

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\(^{12}\) Formalizing these suggestions to some extent, considering that different actors will start initiating an alliance, and adopting, hence, an "ego-network perspective, at least six different configurations are conceivable: A-B-C; A-C-B; B-A-C; B-C-A; C-A-B; C-B-A. All of these would reflect unbalanced relationships. The equilibrated pattern, i.e. full-blown MLG, would add at least three further configurations: A-B-C; B-C-A; C-A-B.

\(^{13}\) Compare this to our own remarks on the stickiness of territorial networks where actors were said to be particularly footloose thus encountering many problems when faced with the options of exit and voice (Chapter Two).

\(^{14}\) Given A, B, and C, the first case (alliance) would see B and C in a common alliance against A. They only share a common opposition -- they need not engage in exchange. In the second case, A utilizes dual networks strategically to manipulate the B-C relationship, i.e. it gains control by playing one network off against another. Finally, a conflict between B and C unintentionally benefits A, as both B and C appeal to A to support their claims against the other actor (Georg Simmel’s concept of tertius gaudens).
returned data\(^\text{15}\). Analysis based solely on outdegrees suffers from at least two limitations. First, unlike the internal network analysis, it implies the risk of relatively inflated responses without the possibility of counter-checking their reliability. Given that inflation rates in responses are more or less evenly distributed across the nine regions\(^\text{16}\), comparability, nevertheless, remains assured. Secondly, it implies that individual actors are analysed only on occasion. The level of outdegrees reflects directly the answers of the respondents from the individual organisations. Reporting these answers would violate the assurance of anonymous treatment. This chapter, therefore, is restricted to an analysis of the external networking of actor categories and of equivalence classes or blocks identified above.

There is another point that needs special mention. Contrary to the studies referred to above and contrary, indeed, to most of the recent literature dealing with the EU-region link, the data presented in this chapter is not limited to EU funding in the context of structural policies. For example, if a region turns out to perform extremely well with respect to its external contacts to EU-level organizations, this does not imply that this region is particularly dependent on, or interested in ERDF or ESF resources. There was no explicit or implicit relation to specific EU policies in the question posed to the respondents. They merely indicated which actors on their organization list were of particular relevance for policies regarding territorial development in their own region and, secondly, to which of these actors they would maintain strong and frequent contacts.

\(^{15}\) Note, that the majority of the national and EU-level organizations contained in the nine organization lists are the same for all regions (for example, DG V, DG VI, DG XII, DG XVI of the Commission, the Council of Ministers, UNICE, ETUC, etc. or the Economics Ministry, the Social Affairs Ministry, etc.). In addition, some institutions reflect regional specificities (for example, the European office of the Patronat Catalan Pro-Europa, the Landesbüro Baden-Württemberg, the office Grand Midi which also represents the interests of Languedoc-Rousillon, etc.). Accordingly, the number of national organizations on the lists varies between 8 in Wales and 17 in the two Spanish regions and, as regards EU-level organizations, between 10 in the two Italian regions and 12 in Catalonia and Andalusia. The exact numbers are reported in Table 8.2. The outdegrees for each individual organization, of course, are normalized values and reflect percentages. For example, the Patronat Catalan Pro-Europa (\(A_{13}\)) maintains contacts with 33 per cent of the twelve EU-level actors (i.e. with four) of which one is its own Brussels-office.

\(^{16}\) Reciprocity of contacts in the internal networks may be taken as a proxy for rates of inflation in response. Table 4.2 (row 9) demonstrates that reciprocity oscillates around 43 per cent.

\(^{17}\) See the remarks make in Chapter Two on the low differentiation of policies from policy domains in territorial networks.

\(^{18}\) The reverse hypothesis, namely that internal centrality is determined by external contacts, can be discarded in this context. Such an expectation would be reasonable had we analyzed specific Community policy networks. This is not the case. The questions submitted to the respondents were aimed at identifying state-society relations in the policy domain of regional development.
EU connections would in fact indicate Ansell’s et al.’s third alliance strategy, i.e. compensate for the lack of influence at home. As EU institutions are relatively open, initiatives in the structural policy area may represent a window of opportunity for marginalized organizations, in particular for the region’s interest groups, Community small number of public institutions controlled the entire development network. For the EU-level actors. For example, imagine the situation in Baden-Württemberg, where a concerns the dyadic region-EU relationship. If we insert national organizations as a third actor in policy-making, but a device to reinforce national-level lobbying” (Keating 1993:307). As regards, more particularly, the German Länder, for example, it has often been argued that established links with Brussels “are not a means of bypassing national government, which remains the key actor in policy-making, but a device to reinforce national-level lobbying” (Keating 1993:307). As regards, more particularly, the Länder governments themselves, strong EU connections would in fact indicate Ansell’s et al.’s third alliance strategy, i.e.

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<td>Sicilia</td>
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<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
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<td>Niedersachsen</td>
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<td>Rhone-Alpes</td>
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<td>Catalunya</td>
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As regards links to EU-level organizations, in five of the nine cases (Baden-Württemberg, Niedersachsen, Rhone-Alpes, Catalunya, Wales) it is the center block which "controls" this connection. Concerning links to organizations based in the national
perform its role very well and monopolizes the contact structure within the region and serves as a powerful broker to the outside world” (Pappi 1996:3). According to Pappi, this is the typical German pattern\textsuperscript{20}. The second possibility was that in regions with weak regional government “dense networks can be seen as a substitute for a strong government actor. The contacts to the outside world are not monopolized by certain actors, but the diverse groups of actors within the power center all have in addition strong ties to the outside world” (ibid:4)\textsuperscript{21}. In some other regions, less central actors are stronger in their external contact portfolio than are members of $B_1$. As regards contacts with Brussels, this is the case for organizations of the extended centers of Sicily, Lombardia, and Andalucia. For the two Italian regioni, this again corroborates our initial hypothesis of an interest-driven political ecology. In both cases, these positions essentially consist of interest associations which, quite obviously, try to compensate for the relatively unsatisfying European performances of their regional governments. In Andalucia, the extended center is essentially made up of subregional public institutions (municipalities, provinces, mancomunitudes). The fact that it is these which compensate for the unsatisfying European performance of their highly heterogeneous center $B_1$, again, corroborates our initial hypothesis of Andalucia as a political ecology, “plus localiste et provinciale que regionale” (see Chapter Three).

The same argument used for the description of the Italian regions' EU-connection also holds for Catalunya, with the difference that, here, it is contacts with the national

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\textsuperscript{20} Pappi was "astonished that the most central actor, the Minister of Economics in Baden-Württemberg, did not report any ties to either the national government or the European Community (...) But even this is not a counter-example because a powerful Prime Minister may play the broker role and not his Minister of Economics’ (written comment given to Grote 1996a, MZES, University of Mannheim, May 1996). Consulting Table 8.2, we see that the Staatsministerium \textsuperscript{3} (A\textsubscript{1}) ranks second to the Ministerium fur Wissenschaft und Kunst (A\textsubscript{3}). Apart from the high formalization in the division of tasks, according to which it would be up to A\textsubscript{3} to both undertake inter-ministerial coordinator (see Figure 4.2) and organize the Land government's external contacts, this, in addition, reflects the high science orientation and technology bias of regional development policy in Baden-Württemberg.

\textsuperscript{21} This, of course, applies to Sicily. There, the three trade unions CGIL, CISL and UIL considered together “have better ties to the national government and even to the European Community than the Giunta Regionale” (ibid.).

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34 For example, members of Baden-Württemberg’s interest system, all hosted by the network’s periphery $B_3$, could in theory try to overcome this marginalization by investing in boundary-spanning activities with external organizations. However, this does not seem to be the case. Members of this region's periphery position again rank third and forth in the national and the European dimension. In other words, they "trust" and delegate the representation of their interests to government institutions.

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Part of this interpretation have been influenced and are underwritten by Franz Urban Pappi, who has had an opportunity to consult a first draft of my results (Grote 1996a). He saw two possibilities. "The first is that we have a strong regional government which
The external performance
capital. They would drop close to zero if it were there not for the region's interest groups in $B_2$ and the established links with their national headquarters. In fact, conforming to common sense expectations, $B_1$'s contact portfolio towards organizations in Madrid is extremely underdeveloped and is ranking third in Table 7.1. While this, quite clearly, is a combined effect of regional nationalism's centrifugal and of economic interests' centripetal approach to the nation State, this is different for Lombardia where the seven regional interest associations of the extended center rank highest on both the national and the European dimension. In the Italian case, this simply reflects political entrepreneurialism among interest group representatives and a strong embeddedness in boundary-spanning vertical organizational hierarchies. Overall, in fifteen of the eighteen linkages reported in Table 7.1, it is either members of the center or of the extended center that are best connected to either or both of the two other knots of the region-national-EU triad.

There are only three cases where formerly central positions now clearly perform worse and all three concern the national dimension: Catalunya (see above), Andalucia, and Wales. For the first and the last cases, this may not be surprising and somehow reflects the oddness of these regions in terms of historical, cultural, and linguistic specificities. For Andalucia, no unambiguous explanation can be offered. Given everything that was argued in Chapter Three and Chapter Five, one would have been led to expect a strong relationship between the region's most central actors and Madrid-based organizations. However, it are less central, local and other subregional institutions (in $B_2$), and less relevant interest groups (in $B_4$) that perform better in that respect.

Variance in external performance
In most cases, centrality within the networks overlaps with centrality in external relations and with brokerage. Organizations of the most central positions also "control" the outward activities of members of the regional ecologies. But what about the different

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22 $B_1$ consisted of two divisions of the Generalidad plus the Patronat Catalan. Other divisions of the Catalan government forming part of less central positions ($A_1$, $A_2$, $A_3$, $A_5$, and $A_7$) appear to be similarly under-connected to Madrid-based institutions and organizations.

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investigation are potential alliances and potential opposition. From a top-down point of view, the main issue at stake is strategic manipulation by the EU.

As mentioned above, the overall data set is considered first. We then turn, by way of successive disaggregation, to the members of the nine regional networks and, in a subsequent step, to the behaviour of different categories of actors. Proceeding this way, is also a strategic choice that serves to corroborate the quality of the data. In fact, as before, where they have been used as proof for the reliability of degrees of reputation attributed to single organizations (see column 4 in Table 9.2), the responses by members of the 1246 actor overall sample turn out to be largely identical to the responses given by the 274 network members. It can safely be argued, therefore, that the views of regional-level organizations and the views of subregional organizations amply coincide in respect to the relevance of actors both within and outside the region.

Figure 7.1 is a representation of the external contact portfolios of the regions in terms of responses provided by 1246 actors. This figure includes the 274 members of the regional networks. 1124 of the 1246 organizations are subregional, i.e. they are either provinces, Kreise, communes, departments or interest associations organized at these different territorial levels. Figure 7.2 represents the responses by the 274 network members. The data used for this second figure is contained in row 4 and row 9 of Table 9.7.

The standard expectation would be that regional-level actors, thanks to their organizational resources and, in part, to their formal involvement in national politics (cooperative federalism, cumul des mandates, conferenza stato-regioni, etc.) and EU partnership arrangements, should actually perform better in outer space than local-level actors. This expectation is not confirmed. Comparing the two figures, the regions essentially maintain their relative positions in the quadrants and sub-quadrants along both axes. Only two of them fall out. In relative terms, both Lombardia and Catalunya gain if their subregional

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23 The number of new organizations added to the number of network members, therefore, is 972.

24 In Figure 6.1 the national axis is given 0.10 as a minimum, 0.30 as a maximum and 0.18 as a mean. The EU axis reaches from 0.05 to 0.27 and takes 0.15 as its mean. The national axis in Figure 6.2 has the following values: 0.08, 0.25 and 0.17. The EU axis reaches from 0.05 to 0.18 and takes 0.14 as its mean.
organizations are removed and only responses by network members are considered. In comparison with the other cases, regional level organizations dominate these territories' external contact portfolios while subregional organizations are relatively passive.

Secondly, if one were to draw lines around the respective national cases, some degree of national patterning would emerge. For example, members of both the larger and the smaller samples in Rhone-Alpes and Languedoc-Roussillon are high and average-high on both dimensions. To some extent, the same applies to Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachsen which are average-high and low-average, and to Catalunya and Andalucia which perform high on the EU and low on the national axis. Sicily, the worst performer in both dimensions and in both figures remains stable in the left-hand bottom corner, while Italy's second region gains a lot on both dimensions if only responses by network members are considered.

Thirdly, considering the cases individually, a number of quite unexpected results emerge. The organizations of one of the regions most in need of external resources and, indeed, entirely dependent on them, remain entirely passive. This concerns both members of the regional and of the subregional sample but also their contacts extended to include both the national and the European dimension. No incidents of resource pull or of rent-seeking activities can be identified in the case of Sicily. There are two potential reasons for this. Either rent-seeking is organized in a such informal manner that the method used here clearly comes up against its limits, or the standard operating procedures fueling money into the economy are so firmly established that resources invested in the building of external interorganizational relations are hardly worth the effort. Both interpretations are likely to account for the inactivity of this regions' organizations. Although the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno had already been abolished at the time of interviewing, interventi straordinari were still performed in the same habitual and quasi-automatic way as before. ERDF allocations, on the other hand, of which Sicily holds a large share, only represented a tiny fraction of global resource transfers to the region and, at least at the time of interviewing, did not seem to have been particularly appetizing. In addition, the requirements made by the Structural Funds Reforms of the 1980s and 1990s clearly violated established practices of allocation and would have further added to the lack of interest in getting engaged at the European level. Finally, stewing in their own juice and bordering on near isolation, with internal relations both "very" and "extremely high" on density and reciprocity, the Sicilian organizations are left with hardly any spare resources to be spent elsewhere.

The case representing the exact opposite scenario is Languedoc-Roussillon. In terms of density and reciprocity, this region ranked second to Sicily which, among other indicators, made it a typical member of the southern European cluster (see Chapter Four). However, the 88 subregional and 30 mainly regional organizations of this ecology seem to possess the excess capacity Sicily is lacking. Of the nine regions of the sample they perform best on both dimensions. In a framework that is over-determined by the traditional French étatism, this is hardly surprising. Languedoc's fellow region, in fact, comes second in terms of contacts with organizations in Paris in this and in subsequent representations of the results. That Languedoc occupies an extreme position also on the EU axis is another thing and cannot merely be explained by the European vocation of its regional president. The large majority of members of this region's ecology are present at

The results for the Sicilian ecology presented in Chapter Five would somewhat support this interpretation.

The external performance
the European level with at least one and in most cases more than one contact. Considering that this is the case also for the 88 representatives of municipalities, departments, chambers and other subregional organizations, Languedoc-Roussillon clearly is the most open ecology of the sample, followed by Rhone-Alpes, Wales, and Baden-Württemberg.

With Wales being an associate member, these three regions all form part of the so-called Four Motors initiative -- a fact which certainly does not determine but helps to explain the relatively high openness towards Europe. The other two members of this initiative are the outliers that were mentioned before. Both Lombardia and Catalunya change their quadrants if the bulk of subregional organizations is removed from analysis. The 174 organizations of the Italian region perform very badly on both dimensions (low to low-average) which brings them close to those of their fellow region. However, Lombardy comes significantly up on the national and less significantly on the European axis if only responses by its network members are considered. The clearest picture, perhaps, is represented by Catalunya. Conforming to most of what has been written on this region (see Chapter Three), it is both territorial distinctiveness and aversion towards national institutions and organizations that explains Catalunya's position in the figures.

In these respects, it is very similar to Wales. Both regions which, as we have seen, form part of what has been called the northern cluster (see Chapter Four), rank between very high and average-high on the EU axis. This is the case despite the dramatic differences in their institutional set up and in guidance provided for by political authorities. It further adds to our guess that multilevel governance, contrary to the scenario of a Europe of the Regions, does not need firmly entrenched regional governments with constantly increasing competences and capacities for action. It is, rather, resource pooling and collective action within the region that explain Wales' outstanding performance. At the same time, organizations and representatives of that country whose regions most remarkably went for the Europe of the Regions option, occupy average and low positions in the two figures. This, in particular, applies to Niedersachsen which exhibits a similar kind of self-sufficient closure as does Sicily, albeit being dissimilar from the latter on almost all other aspects considered here. While Sicily was proof of the inadequacy of the resource pull hypothesis, Niedersachsen proves the inadequacy of resource push. In institutional and, generally, organizational terms and in terms of resource endowments of its government and its interest associations, Niedersachsen and its fellow region Baden-Württemberg would have been expected to perform better in the outer space than most of the other cases.

While no direct correspondence could be found between the internal and the external set up of relations of territorial networks, a more important lesson can be learned from a consideration of the varying performances of these networks' individual actors. In part, this issue was already touched upon in the previous section where we learned that those groups of organizations by which the networks were controlled internally also functioned as brokers towards the outside world. We shall now disaggregate the data, not according to structural equivalence but, more simply, to types of actors. Only two of the categories shall be considered in the following, namely public institutions and interest associations. We can expect the results to differ slightly from what we have found out before. This is because a number of individual organizations that did not belong to the networks' centers may, in fact, exhibit quite substantial activities that previously escaped our attention. Skipping through Table 8.2, one immediately finds evidence for this supposition. With regard to the EU dimension, take, for example, the regional branch of Force Ouvrier (FO) in Rhone-Alpes (P4), Daimler-Benz in Baden-Württemberg (P8), the Foment de Treball Nacional in Catalunya (P2), or the Centro Informatico Cientifico de Andalucia (B2), to find out how EU-oriented otherwise relatively insignificant organizations may be.

Re-aggregating these not in terms of their internal relevance and centrality but, rather, in terms of their juridical status may lead, therefore, to a quite different picture. The
results of this re-aggregation are reported in rows 1 through 3 and rows 6 through 8 of Table 8.7 and are represented graphically in Figures 7.3 and 7.4. In the figures considered before, some co-variation could be observed between the intensity of contacts to the national and the European level. The regions, more or less clearly discernible, were placed along the diagonals of the two plots. The information contained in Figure 7.3 clearly deviates from that rule at least with respect to half of the cases. While Sicily, Niedersachsen, Andalucia, Baden-Württemberg and Languedoc-Roussillon remain on the diagonal and only slightly change their positions in relative terms, i.e. in terms of the distance separating them from each other, the remaining four cases clearly fall out.

In three regions (Sicily, Andalucia and Languedoc-Roussillon) the performance of public institutions is representative of the performance of all these regions' organizations. Accordingly, their positions do not change significantly. Conforming to the etatist or government-driven patterns that characterized the German Länder, Baden-Württemberg now comes second to Languedoc-Roussillon, while Niedersachsen catches up significantly and now occupies a position close to the intersection of the axes. Sicily, as before, remains an isolate on all accounts, while the regional governments and subregional institutions (province, departements, communes, etc.) of two of the four outliers (Lombardia and Rhone-Alpes) now turn out to represent cases characterized by strong national entrenchment\textsuperscript{28}. Regarding the triad region-State-EU, it seems that, in these cases it is the national government which is entrusted with the task of representing regional interests \textit{vis-à-vis} Community institutions. The same applies to the other two cases. As with Rhone-Alpes, Languedoc-Roussillon is firmly aligned to Paris and Baden-Württem-

\textsuperscript{28} This result could not be expected for Rhone-Alpes. It is the only case to share the below average ranks together with the two Italian regions -- despite the fact that the departements of Ardèche and Drôme have been beneficiaries funding by the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. We would have expected them to have more frequent contact with European institutions than many other regions.
berg's national link also appears to be strong. The public authorities of these two regions, however, do not leave representation exclusively to their national governments but engage themselves in Community relations. Wales, second worst to Sicily, now turns out to be a bad external performer. Together with Catalunya's public actors, it figures very low on the national scale, something that is hardly surprising. However, one might have expected a better performance from its Counties and the Welsh Office's divisions at least in the European dimension. This cannot be attributed to a lack of interest. More likely, it reflects the poor organizational capacity of these institutions.

The really interesting information is contained in Figure 7.4. Several things stand out. First, the regions are again positioned relatively close to the diagonal. In other words, the external behaviour of private organizations does not indicate the existence of a kind of zero-sum outcome according to which strong connectedness in one dimension would correlate with weak connectedness in the other. Secondly, and most significantly, compared to their governments and public authorities, the private interests of various regions clearly steer in the opposite direction, namely in those cases where the former are either too strongly or too weakly engaged. An increase in contact building in one dimension also prompts growth in the other. The politically or ideologically determined aversion or lack of interest in organizations and representatives of the national capital or of Brussels that characterized the attitude of some of the public authorities, does not seem to have affected interest associations to the same extent. They do not seem to be prisoners of such reservations. They move freely around in the outer space.

There is an important idea in Schmitter and Lanzalaco's account of regions and the organization of business interests which, albeit aimed at explaining a slightly different phenomenon, fits perfectly the results of Figure 7.4. They had argued that business interest associations "instead of passively adapting themselves to existing institutional assets, might actively react to them in order to carry out, by means of their organizational structures, functions that cannot be accomplished by the state agencies due to their excessive centralization or decentralization" (Schmitter and Lanzalaco 1989:210). This observation essentially concerned internal organizational space, i.e. the region or the nation-state. We now see that the same compensatory logic may operate in external space and this even more so in cases where interests tended to be excluded from decisionmaking internally. It is surprising that the most active reactions against state inactivity come from regions with extraordinarily strong and with completely absent regional governments (Catalunya and Wales) and from regions characterized by dense but fragmented networks (Languedoc-Roussillon and Lombardia), while the interest groups of etatist and hierarchically organized networks do not try to compensate their internal marginalization with increased outside contacts (Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachsen).

The two most interesting cases are those characterized by high distinctiveness, namely, Wales and Catalunya. Both exhibited the lowest levels of external national networking in Figure 7.3 and ranked about average to average-high on the EU dimension. Now they are in the leading position for both dimensions. The French regions' positions are also considerably changed, at least along the national axis. In contrast to Wales and Catalunya, this is as a significant decline. Rhone Alpes rose considerably in the EU axis, where it now takes the top position alongside Wales. Given what we already know about these cases, this suggests that private actors are less likely to be constrained by institutional pressures and political-ideological calculations in their external contact patterns. Furthermore, they seem to "counteract" their respective public authorities if they have either too firm or too weak a contact portfolio in either dimension. Regarding at least the EU oriented performance of private actors in the economically strong and politically compact French regions, Vivien Schmidt's observation about French business associations in general seems astute: "French business now has the kind of access to policy formulation at the EU level that it never had at the

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29 This lack of interest group activity leaves Niedersachsen in the worst position in Figure 6.4. Nobody would ever have expected that territorial encapsulation of interests is stronger in a German Land than in Italy's south of the south.
Before concluding this chapter, the data will be submitted to two further tests. First, it may be interesting to check whether the contact portfolios of regional organizations towards organizations at the European level is in some way determined by the type of EU-level organization to which most contacts are directed. Among other things, the claim concerning evolving, multilevel (regional) business - EU Commission relationships will be put to an empirical test. Secondly, we will look at the degrees of satisfaction/saturation of extra-regional contact portfolios. With regard to the first question, the most frequently mentioned EU-level organizations both in terms of influence reputation and of communication contact are listed in Table 9.8. The result is particularly surprising with respect to the preferred European targets of interest associations. A number of divisions of the EU Commission are reported to be of significant relevance for associational interests and these associations' regions concerns. Although, for understandable reasons, it is DG XVI, the Directorate responsible for regional policies and structural funding, that is most frequently mentioned (in six out of nine cases) as the most relevant organization, some regional interest groups regard DG XII (Languedoc-Roussillon, Baden-Württemberg, Catalunya and Wales) and DG VI (Andalucia and Wales) very highly.

At the same time, the very same regional organizations maintain hardly any significant contacts to these directorates. In fact, apart from DG VI in the case of Languedoc-Roussillon and DG XVI in the cases of Lombardia and Wales, Commission divisions do not figure among the most frequently contacted EU-level organizations of regional interest groups. This does not necessarily undermine Vivian Schmidt's claim of significant relevance for associational interests and these associations' regions concerns. Although, for understandable reasons, it is DG XVI, the Directorate responsible for regional policies and structural funding, that is most frequently mentioned (in six out of nine cases) as the most relevant organization, some regional interest groups regard DG XII (Languedoc-Roussillon, Baden-Württemberg, Catalunya and Wales) and DG VI (Andalucia and Wales) very highly.

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The most uncontroversial responses are provided by public institutions as regards the reputation of EU-level organizations. The two French and the two Italian regions plus Wales chose DG XVI while the two German Lander and the two Spanish regions clearly prefer their respective information offices. As regards the contact portfolios of these institutions, these are essentially identical to their reputation portfolios, although, in Andalucia, DG XVI is added to the Brussels office and, in Languedoc-Roussillon, the Committee of the Regions, COREPER and the office Grand Midi are added to DG XVI. Interestingly, the Committee, a body that attracts great interest among academic scholars, is not mentioned at all among the most influential organizations, and the only region contacting it is the one that holds its presidency. To summarize, for those regions that run a well-functioning office in Brussels, it is this office which results to be viewed as the most influential actor which also attracts the highest number of contacts. This would also indicate that most members of the German and of the Spanish networks feel that they are properly represented at the EU level. On the other hand, the French and the Italian regions maintain better direct connections to the Commission. The other side of the coin of unmediated contacts is, of course, a much higher and "unprotected" exposure to attempts by the Commission of manipulate the structures and strategies of these networks. We shall come back to this issue in the concluding section of this chapter.

The last point to be touched upon is the one of saturation/satisfaction of/with external contacts. In the absence of evidence supporting either the resource pull or the resource push hypothesis, the external performance of regional organizations has been interpreted

Note the regions' unequal endowment of these offices. Lombardy just started to set one up while field work was being carried out, which explains why it is not mentioned by either public or private organizations. The Rhone-Alpes office has been performing so weakly that some members of the Conseil Regional have even opted for its closure. Languedoc shares a common office with other southern regions in France (Grand Midi) and the same is the case for Sicily (Ufficio per il Mezzogiorno). The Catalan ( Patronat Catalán Pro Europa) and the two German offices are the best equipped in terms of space and staff, which explains why these are so frequently mentioned among respondents of both public and private organizations.
in terms of political enterpreneurialism. Politically enterpreneurial organizations --
public, private, brokers, or entire networks -- figured high on either of the two or on both
axes simultaneously. The standard expectation would be that a strong external
performance corresponds to high satisfaction, i.e. to a saturated contact portfolio, while a
weak performance is in some way related to dissatisfaction. Although our data does not
allow for strong claims to be made in this respect\(^1\), it turns out that the standard
expectation does not apply to all cases. It is true only for some, but not for all regions.
The degree to which the external contact portfolio is saturated is not defined solely by
the intensity of contact. We take saturation here to mean the extent to which regional
ecology participants are content or dissatisfied by their level of external contact.

Table 8.7 shows that the responses given by network members on both relations
(contact and reputation) are most similar in the two French cases and in Baden-
Württemberg. The external contact portfolios of these networks can therefore be classed
as saturated. This more or less fits the information in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. Both diagrams
place the three regions in the upper right quadrant and locate them more or less along the
diagonal. In contrast, the regions which are "frustrated" by their external performance are
Sicily, Andalucia, Wales and Lombardy. This is understandable for the Sicilian "special
case" and for both Lombardy and Andalucia. In neither axis do the latter rank above the
mean value. Wales is more puzzling given that in both Figures it appears in the upper
right quadrant alongside the French regions and Baden-Württemberg. In terms of
saturation levels, Niedersachsen has a paradoxical position. In Table 8.7 it has about a
midpoint between convergence and divergence. Similarly, in the national dimension it
seems as "satisfied" as Rhone-Alpes. However it is also the only region in both figures to
share the lower left quadrant with Sicily. We leave it to the reader to decide whether this
reflects false pride, lack of interest, ignorance, naivety or alternatively, indicates
extensive autonomy and low dependency.

Discounting Sicily because of its inactivity, it seems that, of all cases considered in
this chapter, only two relatively stable patterns emerge for regions with strong external
connections. These are Languedoc-Roussillon and Catalunya, i.e. those cases which least
changed their positions across the four graphic representations. We still are not able to
draw the lines necessary to connect the knots of the triad envisaged by Ansell et.al.
(1997) and we only possess a limited amount of information on the possible "dual
network" games played within this triad. Drawing its contours in an unavoidably
truncated fashion, the following configurations come to the fore (see Figure 7.5). In both
cases, regional actors (B) are connected to organizations at the national (A) and the
supranational level (C).

In Languedoc-Roussillon, the B-A and the B-C connections are equilibrated. The
region’s public institutions and their interest associations maintain strong and frequent
contacts with organizations of both dimensions\(^2\). In addition, the external contact
portfolios of this region are very saturated, i.e. differences in the density values between
influence reputation (0.18 and 0.26) and communication contacts (0.17 and 0.25) are
minimal (0.01). Exchange theory would predict that if A-B is strong and positive and A-
C is strong and positive then A-C is very likely to be strong and positive as well. This
would suggest that the latter connection represents a potential alternative to B-C, or can
be activated and used in addition to B-C. Both private and public organizations in
Languedoc-Roussillon possess potential allies in A and in C which they can use
simultaneously or, if this better fits their interests, play off against each other. Their room

\(^1\) Information about degrees of saturation is drawn from the difference between the national and
European organisations’ reputation on the one hand and the contacts that are actually realised on the
other. It is assumed that a high reputation accorded to an extra regional organisation in the area of
regional policy decision making also implies a high incentive to make contact with these actors. If the
gap between the two values is wide then, regardless of the absolute figures, there is dissatisfaction or
frustration. We assume satisfaction or relational saturation when the values converge. The relevant
data can be found in Table 8.7 in the Appendix. The basis of calculation were the replies of members
of all policy domain networks (rows 4/5 and rows 9/10). Of course, establishing where exactly relative
convergence ends and relative divergence begins is a matter of subjective choice, but the following is
rather unequivocal.

\(^2\) Ties in bold face represent a configuration where both private and public actors maintain a connection.
A normal tie stands for a situation where only one of the two actor categories maintains a connection,
and dotted lines represent a potential link of the path connecting B to C.
for manoeuvre is relatively wide and the strategic options open to them make them less dependent on any one of the alternative levels.

**FIG. 6.5**

**Dual network games in the European triad**

Catalunya Languedoc-Roussillon

This clearly is different for the case of Catalunya. This region’s private and public organizations have strong ties with the EU-level, but only one category of actors (private interests) is tied to the national level. This reduces the region’s opportunities to play an active role in only one of the two dual network games. It remains part of two dual networks, but it is very much the object of national and of European interests and does not necessarily control these games. Catalunya appears to be more exposed to EU influence and has more problems than Languedoc in protecting itself from unwanted intrusion by European organizations. Although there is an A-C tie in Spain as well, this is no tie that could immediately be activated for regional interests. All this, of course, is based exclusively on unilateral types of information. We do not know which part in the game A and C are likely to play. Particularly important and instructive would be more information about the attitude of A, the point of the triad that suffers most from trends towards multilevel governance. Imagining the strategies followed by C, i.e. by Brussels-based organizations and institutions, presents less of a problem. We shall now turn to this.

The reverse image: strategic manipulation and the Europeanization of networks

Having looked at the external connections of different networks and of different categories of actors, it may now be asked whether strong or weak connections, in particular in the EU-dimension, are able to influence the behaviour of individual organizations and the structures of networks as a whole. This requires a change in perspective. Until this point, we have been concerned exclusively with one of the three knots of the triad. It is the only one for which we possess reliable data. If we now adopt a top-down perspective, some speculation is unavoidable.

Throughout this work, one of the main arguments has been that high density in networks is not necessarily a positive asset. In fact, it has most often been associated with low trust, internal fragmentation, and with high transaction costs. Some of the regions characterized by these properties appeared to fare very well (Languedoc-Roussillon, Catalunya), although others (Sicily) clearly turned out to be isolates in terms of connections with EU organizations. In a recent contribution on a similar problem, Beate Kohler-Koch and Michele Knodt (1997) ask whether one should not expect “changes in routines resulting from frequent interaction” and whether it is not possible that “changing network structures and influencing shared belief systems is one important way of influencing institutional development” (ibid:8)?

Some have argued that this need not be the case and that, on the contrary, the “prior existence of a regional policy community for territorial economic development is an essential precondition for regional empowerment through ECRP [European Community Regional Policies]” (Smyrl 1997:12). Yet, Smyrl’s analysis only dealt with the transfer of material resources and not with the exchange of ideas and of concepts. He measured the effectiveness and capacity of regions to scream public funds, but his analysis only covered the period since the late 1980s. In reality, if institutional change is to come about, much more time is needed. In order for learning processes to be initiated, a lot of obstacles have to be removed and structures organized to allow such learning to take
place. Few studies to date have undertaken the painstaking task of scrutinizing such processes over a period of more than just a couple of years. The most comprehensive account available is that by Ingeborg Tömmel (1993) who set out to analyze Community structural funding in Italy over a period of more than two decades. Although she demonstrates that institutional learning took place in that country in a highly contradictory manner, with frequent backlashes and breakdowns of contacts, she also shows that the Commission, ultimately, managed to achieve most of its objectives in an ongoing and largely invisible process of constant push and pull. As elsewhere, there is still much institutional inertia in Italy preventing from sudden deviations from established paths. However, given the relatively strong incentives from the EU, it could be argued that many of the innovative schemes such as, for example, the territorial pacts (see Bonomi 1996) between local authorities, businessmen and trade unionists are, in the last instance, results of decades of slow but consistent attempts to strategically manipulate domestic institutional settings.

Marc Smyrl argues that it is only well-developed territorial networks based on other-regardness, mutual consideration of interests and aimed at the achievement of common goods and benefits that ultimately gained from recent Community initiatives. Similarly, Kohler-Koch and Knodt (1997:11) argue that “when policy styles are close to ‘network governance’, regions are more likely to be active participants in transregional networks and make effective use of European resources offered.” Although this may often be the case, the picture changes if we consider the results presented above and, in addition, the long time needed to trigger salient institutional changes. Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachsen, no doubt, are well-organized networks, but they are certainly not of the type usually envisaged by policy network approaches -- equilibrated, horizontal, equitable, with joint problem-solving as the guiding principle, etc. At the same time, from a comparative perspective, they do not fare very well on external relations. Although this may be a joint-effect of affluence, administrative capacity and, in particular, constitutional status, it is this very same self-sufficiency and lack of need to adapt to a changing European institutional environment which, over time, may turn out to become disadvantageous.

The fact that institutionally and economically weaker regions -- apart from Sicily -- perform relatively well on the European scale could also be read, therefore, in terms of achievements in institutional adaptation. As many of these regions exhibited internally fragmented ecologies, it would then be possible to speak of an “advantage of heterarchy”. This tends to support a claim once made by Robert Keohane a propos the economic adjustment to globalization by weaker and by stronger states. He argued that “hegemonic powers can avoid adjustments longer than others, precisely because they are powerful. Yet, this ability to evade the necessity to make unpleasant changes can itself contribute to long-term decay. If weaker states adjust more readily than strong ones (not necessarily because they are more far-sighted but because they have less choice), their economies will become more efficient, and they will become stronger” (Keohane 1984:37). Institutional adjustment to an emergent scenario of multilevel governance is clearly something other than economic adjustment to globalization. We may also question whether a Land such as Baden-Württemberg can reasonably be labelled a hegemonic power within European regions. The underlying logic, however, is very much the same as in Keohane. If German regions have been among the strongest advocates of a Europe of the Regions scenario, this is not because they were particularly sympathetic to multilevel forms of governance. It is, essentially, because such a scenario would support and reinforce their powerful status on a European scale and, in fact, help to avoid internal institutional change.

The Commission does not share the interest in a Europe of the Regions. Its decision to set up a Committee of the Regions can, in fact, be read in terms of an attempt to

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The author adds that “no law prescribes that hegemonic powers will necessarily decline at any given time, but that they are subject to the temptation to take the easy path. Their power gives them enough rope with which to hang themselves” (ibid.)

We had argued before that this type of arrangement would imply significant changes to interorganizational relations on the “home front” — something that public authorities may be less prepared to do in Germany than in other regions.
prevent the emergence of such an arrangement\textsuperscript{35}. There seems to be a clear preference for politically less ambitious and functionally more appropriate solutions. The option of multilevel governance is closer to the Commission’s philosophy and fits better with the need to come to grips with problems of democratic representation facing politicians everywhere in Europe. The important point to be made, however, is that MLG can best be implemented under conditions of heterarchy, while hierarchically ordered and territorially encapsulated regional ecologies prevent the emergence of such an arrangement. Heterarchy, at the same time, is not only conducive to the development of MLG, it is also one of the semiofficial aims of decisionmakers with an interest in strategic manipulation\textsuperscript{36}.

This is not purely speculative. A recent Commission report on (new forms of) "Governance" provides ample evidence for the above claim (CdP [96] 2216). Measured by the standards of this institution’s everyday publication output, the report is unusually

\textsuperscript{35} The Committee has little power and an extremely heterogeneous composition. Representatives of regional governments are in the minority.

\textsuperscript{36} It is as if Community policymakers had re-discovered Madison and his realistic insight that if the vice of faction cannot be come by through authoritarian verdicts and regulations, then turn factional interest into a virtue or, at least, take it seriously and guide it towards the achievement of common goals. Unlike the structuring of interests in institutionally saturated national politics in a number of high consensus societies, the Commission has set a very low threshold. It has defined a lowest common denominator of interest politics including the most fragmented and least organized interest systems. On these grounds, both the concept and the practice of MLG could also be criticized as a strategic device for the de-institutionalization and de-politicization of entrenched functional and territorial interests in the broader "Communitarian interest" of making them assume a "gemeinschaftsvertragliche" perspective (Scharpf 1993). The fact that a number of scholars (see, in particular, Streeck 1996) attack this version of MLG is understandable considering an opinion such as the following advanced by "the best writer in the world at summarizing the fast-paced changes in international business" (book jacket). The writer’s "point is simple: in a borderless world, traditional national interest -- little more than a cloak for subsidy and protection -- has no meaningful place. It has turned into a flag of convenience for those who, having left behind, want not so much a chance to move forward as to hold others back as well." Also, it is "a point about what usually goes wrong when economic activities and interest groups are bundled together in a single nation state, not about the value of co-locating such activities in the same geographical area." These areas perform better "when they be across political borders and so are free of the burden of national interest" (Ohmae 1995:64).

While national "political aggregations no longer make compelling sense as discrete, meaningful units" (ibid:79), "the territorial dividing line that do make sense belong to what I call 'region states' -- geographical units like northern Italy, Baden-Wurttemberg (...) Wales (...) the Rhone-Alpes region of France, centered on Lyon, with its tight business and cultural ties to Italy [sic!]; the Languedoc-Roussillon region centered on Toulouse [sic!], with its tight linkages with Catalonia" (ibid:80).

\textsuperscript{37} This report does not necessarily reflect the official view of the Commission but primarily the opinion of its authors and of the group of experts participating in its production. The Cellelde de Prospectives (CdP) which produced it, is a relatively autonomous unit attached to the President’s Office. Many would doubt that the CdP’s influence is noteworthy at all. However, this does not imply that the opinions expressed in the report deviate from what what the Commission has been doing and is currently doing in a vast number of policy domains. In my view, the report explains perfectly what structural policy interventions have been all about over the last couple of decades.
cognitive resources] at the national, regional and local levels” (ibid:3-4). Several options are offered. The Commission is advised to help in creating the "opportunities for the formulations of problems which brings together all affected actors in settings in settings where there is the possibility for collective and mutual learning" (ibid:9) and to harness and encourage "the emergent reality of new modes of governance at other levels" (ibid:11). The Commission, therefore, should become and "operate as a body which can animate collective action or networks of actors" (ibid:17); it should "assist in the diffusion of these methods and thus contribute to an enhanced European democracy and the effectiveness of governance at all levels (ibid:17); it should "identify stakeholders" (ibid:18) to "ensure that all can participate meaningfully", that "some measure of equity in the process is guaranteed"\(^\text{38}\), and that participation is not limited to "a one-off event but needs to be an ongoing process" (ibid:18). More particularly, with regard to the structural funds, where "European, national, regional and local actors are involved along with other social and economic actors" (ibid:23), the report argues that "this mode of organization of collective action has the potential to allow the co-ordination of European action with the interests, needs and capacities in particular contexts insofar as the definition of projects and of means of implementation is an inclusive collective process" (ibid:23).

Not much needs to be added to the above. The scenario envisaged here reflects not only the thoughts of a handful of intellectuals within the services of the Commission. Rather, it tends to reflect in essential ways much of the practice of European structural policies and the philosophy guiding these policies over the years. Reality has caught up with even the wildest speculations about the future of the European Union. The document discussed above demonstrates that multilevel governance, however fragile, remains written in the genetic code of European integration. It is constantly threatened by other genetic contenders and some even see it as a germ that needs to be combated by antivirus protection programmes. The actors that will reap the highest benefits from multilevel governance of the type envisaged by the Commission's think tank, are those that already have a prominent presence in Brussels. Although used in a different context, Fritz Scharpf's intriguing analogy of interface standardization (Schnittstellen-Standardisierung)\(^\text{39}\) seems peculiarly apt here. An equilibrated version of MLG will be able to progress only to the extent that all actors in European regions undertake similar investments in external relations and EU institutions are able and willing to offer them equal access. For the time being, this is quite an utopian vision. Also, it is far from clear whether those that achieved low scores in the figures in this chapter should actually go for MLG, or would benefit from it. That would be the case only to the extent that there is a law of motion making this form of governance as inevitable as other secular trends such as, for example, globalization. Both equal mobilization and equal access are unlikely to come about and if we consider that even interface standardization would need some degree of top-down imposition, the type of multilevel governance that would eventually emerge would be so unbalanced that the very notion of governance is altogether misleading. The alternative label of variable geometry can only be a provisional and auxiliary device for describing a highly unstable transitory situation.

What is quite clear and supported also by the results of this analysis, is that diversity in the regional dimension of both national and European policymaking will persist and that, therefore, no single catch-all concept will be able to gauge this diversity appropriately, at least not in the foreseeable future.

Properly understood, multilevel governance would both require and reflect a change of regime. All members of the triad would have to agree on the procedures and the evolving institutional implications of such a transition. Even if the procedures were to rest on and promote joint problem solving, and if the institutions were permeable and inclusive, MLG is unlikely to emerge in the absence of political authority. As has always been the case, the locus of such authority, quite naturally, would lie at the top rather than at the bottom of new arrangements. If we were to take the scenario suggested by the

\(^{38}\text{Equity implies that "the less advantaged need to be supported and the better organized may have to be}

\(^{39}\text{subjected to certain constraints and obligations, e.g., disclosure of information" (ibid:18).}
Forward Studies Unit as indicating a form of strategic manipulation, then it may well be that MLG is the carrot which, over time, would be replaced by the stick of rather traditional instruments for the organization of the economy and the guarantee of social order in an ever closer union. The long-term results of the regions-EU rendezvous are, therefore, far from being clear. It may well be that the regions, and the scholars studying them, may have second thoughts on the event when the process of change has become irreversible.

39 Interface coordination is shown to be superior to hierarchically imposed unitarian technology not only in the area of regulating European-wide technological standards for computer hardware but, also, in an institutional perspective (see, Scharpf 1993).

41 Fully aware of its political incorrectness and inappropriateness, the image coming to my mind here is the one painted by Honoré Daumier (1808-1879) a propos the coup d'état of Napoleon III. The lady rather willingly stretched out on the chaise longue, in this case, is not the French bourgeoisie, but the regions, and the obscure person in the habit noir behind the curtain some gentleman from Brussels. Daumier, as also Marx who used the same allegory in his “18th Brumaire”, leave no doubt about who is the loser of this rendezvous: the constitution and parliamentary democracy.
Collecting the information, developing the arguments and elaborating the data presented in the preceding chapters took a substantial amount of time. The exercise of bringing the results to paper was the least labor-intensive of the entire enterprise. The question is warranted, therefore, whether the insights gained did actually justify the effort. It is not easy to answer this question for somebody having lived with that data for such a long time in a not necessarily unproblematic relationship. Others, being less biased in that respect are likely to be better judges. The greatest difficulty in commenting the overall results, perhaps, is represented by the fact that we are not able to come up with easy generalizations about the causes and the effects of specific types of structures of regional political ecologies. Structure, quite obviously, matters, but it does that in ways and to an extent that could not be anticipated. This, then, may be the most important message to be drawn from this analysis -- the generation of structural information on nine important regions of five Community member states that, so far, has been unavailable. The riches of this information is contained in the different chapters themselves and hardly lends itself to brief summarizing comments.

The data’s interpretation has been guided by a comprehensive review on available secondary literature with particular emphasis on an issue in general under-researched in recent contributions to territorial politics -- state-society relations. Although we have not been able to come up with a theory about how these relations are generated, sustained and develop at the regional level, our analysis provides important elements for such a theory. In the process of differentiation, de-differentiation and eventual re-differentiation of state-society relations, European regions may find themselves at very different ends on the continuum. Yet, this is not necessarily, or only in part, reflected in their organizational ecologies’ structure. In purely structural terms, it is not possible to distinguish, for example, between not yet differentiated and highly de-differentiated cases. The need of building networks in response to increasing problems with social and political governance, therefore, must have the most diverse effects on these structures. It raises the question whether there is something like a default path social systems would need to take to approach modernity or, alternatively, whether societal modernity is something that can be expressed in the most diverse interorganizational settings.

This also touches upon the question whether seemingly pre-modern, or less developed organizational cultures, may not actually possess a kind of comparative advantage when it comes to develop answers to what once has been called the „re-internalization of the state into society“. In a somewhat different context, this issue had been addressed in terms of the „advantage of heterarchy“ in Chapter Six. The problem is whether qualitative leaps from relatively pre-modern towards relatively post-modern societal structures which, per se, are not impossible, can be sustained over time. In a sense, this bears a lot of resemblance with economic development theory which regularly raised the question whether a system of production such as the region that circumvented industrialization by taking the direct path from an agrarian production pattern towards a service economy can actually be expected to develop autonomously without persistent assistance given by external forces.

These are only some of the questions implicitly resulting from this analysis of organizational ecologies. Not being able of coming up with concluding and generalizing remarks that would not repeat what had been argued in the different chapters, the following points can, nevertheless, be made. Firstly, the method chosen, quite obviously, has generated important and largely unexpected results. It is the first time that network analysis has systematically been applied to the study of territorial politics. The results demonstrate that even with qualitatively rather poor information it is possible to arrive at far-reaching insights. This, of course, has been due to the relatively large number of
cases presented in the study. The strength of the analysis, indeed, lies in its comparative perspective. We have been able to present data being easily verifiable not only for a number of traditionally over-researched regions (Baden-Württemberg, Rhone-Alpes and, in part, Wales) but also for cases that have been step-children of past research of territorial politics (Niedersachsen, Andalucia, Sicily). Future research along similar lines may either try to repeat this large scale operation for other regions or may try to embark on in-depth studies of individual regions. In the latter case, it would be advised to enlarge the scope of analysis by focusing on issues which resource constraints have made impossible to address in this study: resource exchanges, policy event participation and the identification of alliances and of opposition structures.

Secondly, the data and the results have a high degree of reliability. The boundary specification of the networks has been done by following a lengthy and resource intensive procedure of ex-ante interviews with regional experts and with the help of handbooks and other written material that is difficult to get hold of under normal circumstances. In this, we have been assisted by the members of external teams who were quite familiar with their respective regional cases. The results achieved for the networks and their individual „members“ are largely confirmed by our control variable, so to speak, namely by the responses provided by members of the overall sample. In addition, our diachronic analysis of the Sicilian ecology has provided ample evidence for the claim made by structural analysis that networks are fairly stable arrangements that are unlikely to change in the absence of dramatic societal transformation. Although this is not unequivocal, we may expect the other ecologies to have reacted in a similar way would they have been subjected to the same kind of treatment.

Thirdly, our cautious approach to the subject should be defended. This is a research area in which the results of a comparative study that was itself limited to a single nation state (Putnam 1993) have been subjected to heavy criticism. Potential generalizations should therefore be approached with due restraint. Comparative regional research in a political science perspective remains an underdeveloped field. Network analysis itself has not only never been applied to this specific area but, generally, has remained an underdeveloped tool in most comparative research on national, European and regional questions. Before coming up with more wide-ranging generalizations about regional political ecologies, we would need to generate more and higher quality data. This study, hopefully, made a first step into that direction.

Fourth, we hope to have contributed to the insight that certain structural features of actor systems (e.g. high density, low centralization) only have a positive impact upon policy development in the context of specific political cultures and institutions. For example, redundancy in regional development does not necessarily lead a priori to reflexive development strategies based upon co-operation. This is because it may also reflect institutional and political deficits. The opposite is also true. Highly centralized network structures hampered by redundancies may result in a higher potential for action amongst corporate actors than is the case amongst regions characterized by flat hierarchies and apparently egalitarian structures. The concrete political-institutional context can not be disregarded. If it is, then information based upon relational data becomes ambiguous and equivocal. So too do the attributive features frequently emphasized in the literature such as trust or identity.

Fifth, and this goes beyond the area of regional research, it is difficult, if not impossible, and risks the commitment of fallacies of all kinds, to ascribe, a priori, attributes of political systems specific relational properties. In purely interorganizational terms, corporatism, for example, is as little less hierarchical, more equilibrated, denser and more redundant in its contact portfolio as pluralism, statism, or all other forms of societal governance are the opposite. This opens up quite a new horizon for future research. The question up for verification would be whether changes at the system level of political order are able to come about in relative independence of underlying structures. In other words, are long-term corporatist agreements within a specific domain or in a polity possible under conditions of a pluralistically fragmented organizational ecology? Similarly, may pluralism become the dominant pattern of policymaking even in
Concluding remarks

societies generally characterized by robust, relatively unitarian and encompassing organizational structures? It seems that state-society relations or, more precisely, interorganizational relations between representatives of the public sector and those of interest groups do not necessarily co-vary with shifts from pluralist towards corporatist governance and vice versa. In any case, the attribution of the term of network to systemic properties of societies (corporatism, pluralism, étatism, clientelism, etc.) does not represent a value-added. Conversely, the ascription of systemic attributes to networks is equally futile and often misleading. This study should, therefore, be understood as an appeal in favor of operating the term of network primarily in a methodological sense, not necessarily as a characteristic of specific forms of governance.

Finally these results have considerable potential for the future of European structural policy and, more in general, of European governance. The EU Commission’s Forward Studies Unit was much preoccupied with network management and with the question as to how far „tools can be defined which can help to identify stakeholders, co-ordinate their participation and ensure the flexibility required to retain an openness to the possible emergence of new stakeholders.“ The method outlined here might provide a promising instrument for the identification of existing and functioning networks. In particular it might reveal which organizational nodes from these networks could be chosen as the starting points for a reformulation of innovative governance strategies that had both efficiency and democratic accountability as its key priorities.
### TABLE 8.1
List of network members per region

#### RHONE-ALPES

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>2. Conseil Economique et Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>3. Secrétariat Général pour les Affaires Régionales (SGAR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>4. Direction Régionale de l’Equipement</td>
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<tr>
<td>A5</td>
<td>5. Direct. Régionale de l’Industrie de la Recherche et de l’Environnement</td>
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<td>6. Direction Régionale de l’Agriculture et de la Forêt</td>
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<td>A7</td>
<td>7. Direction Régionale du Commerce Extérieur</td>
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<td>9. Direction Régionale à la Recherche et à la Technologie</td>
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<td>10. Direction Régionale du Travail et de l’Emploi</td>
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<td>B1</td>
<td>11. Entreprise Rhône-Alpes International (ERAIR)</td>
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<td>12. Chambre Régionale de Commerce et d’Industrie (CRCI)</td>
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<td>14. CGT</td>
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<td>P15</td>
<td>15. FO</td>
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<td>P16</td>
<td>16. Union des Industries Métallurgiques et Electriques de la Region</td>
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<td>17. Fédération Régionale des Travaux Publics</td>
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<td>18. Union Intereentreprises Textiles de Lyon et Région (UNITEX)</td>
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<td>19. Préfecture de département</td>
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#### LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON

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**BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG**

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DOI: 10.2870/6951

### APPENDIX

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**CATALONIA**

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Grote, Jurgen R. (1998), The political ecology of regionalism : state-society relations in nine European regions
European University Institute

DOI: 10.2870/6951
### Table 8.2

| Members of equivalence classes $B_1$ to $B_4$ and their relational attributes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| position | matrix rank | code | indegree centrality | betweenness centrality | reputation $n = 32$ | reputation $n = 145$ | outdegree EU (11) | outdegree NAT (10) |
| 1 | $A_1$ | 0.81 | 16.94 | 0.91 | 0.79 | 0.18 | 0.30 |
| 3 | $A_3$ | 0.65 | 4.91 | 0.78 | 0.59 | 0.36 | 0.50 |
| 5 | $A_5$ | 0.61 | 11.14 | 0.59 | 0.48 | 0.18 | 0.60 |
| 12 | $P_7$ | 0.48 | 8.24 | 0.38 | 0.37 | 0.27 | 0.40 |
| 24 | $a_{16}$ (x) | 0.58 | 2.62 | 0.44 | 0.54 | 0.18 | 0.10 |
| 19 | $a_{11}$ (x) | 0.26 | 1.64 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 0.09 | 0.40 |
| 20 | $a_{12}$ (x) | 0.29 | 3.08 | 0.28 | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.40 |
| 21 | $a_{13}$ (x) | 0.32 | 1.14 | 0.38 | 0.36 | 0.00 | 0.20 |
| 25 | $P_5$ (x) | 0.29 | 5.56 | 0.25 | 0.34 | 0.18 | 0.00 |
| 26 | $P_6$ (x) | 0.29 | 0.13 | 0.25 | 0.41 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 2 | $A_2$ | 0.35 | 5.45 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.50 |
| 4 | $A_4$ | 0.45 | 1.69 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 6 | $A_6$ | 0.52 | 0.57 | 0.34 | 0.40 | 0.27 | 0.20 |
| 7 | $A_7$ | 0.23 | 1.57 | 0.22 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.50 |
| 8 | $A_8$ | 0.29 | 1.80 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.20 |
| 9 | $A_9$ | 0.48 | 0.38 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.09 | 0.10 |
| 10 | $A_{10}$ | 0.42 | 2.37 | 0.44 | 0.36 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 11 | $B_1$ | 0.32 | 1.17 | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.36 | 0.20 |
| 13 | $P_3$ | 0.39 | 1.79 | 0.19 | 0.26 | 0.18 | 0.10 |
| 14 | $P_7$ | 0.13 | 1.35 | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 15 | $P_8$ | 0.13 | 4.16 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.91 | 0.30 |
| 16 | $P_9$ | 0.29 | 1.66 | 0.19 | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 18 | $P_1$ | 0.32 | 6.46 | 0.22 | 0.17 | 0.45 | 0.50 |
| 29 | $B_3$ | 0.23 | 1.42 | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.00 | 0.20 |
| 30 | $B_4$ | 0.10 | 0.31 | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.20 |
| 31 | $B_5$ (x) | 0.13 | 0.65 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 0.27 | 0.20 |
| 32 | $B_6$ (x) | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.10 |
| 17 | $P_6$ (x) | 0.23 | 3.12 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.30 |
| 22 | $a_{15}$ (x) | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 0.10 |
| 23 | $a_{16}$ (x) | 0.23 | 0.01 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 27 | $P_{10}$ | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.10 |
| 28 | $B_2$ (x) | 0.10 | 0.23 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0.30 |
### 2. Languedoc-Roussillon

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Grote, Jurgen R. (1998), The political ecology of regionalism: state-society relations in nine European regions
European University Institute

DOI: 10.2870/6951
Appendix

6. Niedersachsen

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Grote, Jurgen R. (1998), The political ecology of regionalism: state-society relations in nine European regions

European University Institute

DOI: 10.2870/6951
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Grote, Jurgen R. (1998), The political ecology of regionalism: state-society relations in nine European regions
European University Institute

DOI: 10.2870/6951
### TABLE 8.3

**Block models**

Density tables and image matrices (including no. of actors per block and block status)

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<td>8.21 1 0 0 0 1</td>
<td>0.31 0.12 0.08 0.09</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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### Appendix

#### Fig. 8.1

**Graphic representation of positions and roles (communication contact)**

- Rhone-Alpes
- Languedoc-Roussillon
- Lombardia
- Sicilia
- Baden-Württemberg
- Niedersachsen
- Catalunya
- Andalusia
- Wales

---

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DOI: 10.2870/6951
### Table 8.5

Cohesion and 'self esteem' of members of positions and composition of equivalence classes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RA</th>
<th>LR</th>
<th>SI</th>
<th>BW</th>
<th>NdS</th>
<th>CT</th>
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<th>WA</th>
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<td><strong>center (B1)</strong></td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td><strong>extended center (B2)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>semi - periphery (B3)</strong></td>
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</table>

Notes:
Values for cohesion correspond to the values of the main diagonal of the block models for the contact relation (Tab.9.x). Values for self-esteem reflect the values of the main diagonal of the block models for influence reputation. Evidenced are those values lying above the average density of the respective networks.

### Table 8.6

Distribution of actor categories across the four positions (in %)

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<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>P2</th>
<th>P3</th>
<th>P4</th>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>42</td>
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</table>

Notes:
The table represents the percentage distribution of members of the categories 'public actors' (A), 'private actors' (P) and 'finance and technology brokers' (B) across the four equivalence classes of the respective network. The category 'public actors' is further disaggregated into regional authorities (A_r) and subregional authorities (A_s). Only the Sicilian policy network 'SMEs' (SI-1) has been partitioned into five positions. B_5, in that case, hosts 50% of the public institutions, 10% of the interest associations, and 62% of the brokers.

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### Appendix

**Table 8.7**

| Intensity of external contacts of different actor categories towards organizations and institutions at the national and EU-level plus reputation scores “totalized” by the latter two |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | RA | LR | LO | SI | BW | NdS | CT | AN | WA | mean |
| A. 1. public actors | 0.11 | 0.20 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.19 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.14 |
| 2. privat actors | 0.22 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.18 | 0.12 | 0.22 | 0.14 |
| 3. both | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.06 | 0.15 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.14 |
| 4. all (incl. broker) | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.05 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.14 |
| 5. reputation (all) | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.28 |
| B. 6. public actors | 0.24 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.05 | 0.21 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.17 | 0.06 | 0.16 |
| 7. privat actors | 0.15 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.12 | 0.21 | 0.11 | 0.31 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0.21 |
| 8. both | 0.20 | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 0.13 | 0.20 | 0.17 | 0.22 | 0.19 |
| 9. all (incl. broker) | 0.21 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 0.11 | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.17 |
| 10. reputation (all) | 0.27 | 0.26 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.27 |

**Notes:**

The first three rows of the respective dimension A (1-3) and B (6-7) exhibit the values for contact density of relations that originate among members of the categories 'public institutions' and 'private organizations' and are directed towards EU-level and national-level organizations. Rows 4 and 9 contain the same values for all members of the respective network, i.e. including the category of 'brokers'. Rows 5 and 10 contain the density values for the influence reputation relation, i.e. the reputation all members of the respective networks have ascribed to EU-level and national-level organizations. All values exclusively reflect non certified choices, i.e. outdegrees.

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**Table 8.8**

| The most relevant and most intensively contacted EU-level organizations viewed from the perspective of public authorities and private associations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RA | LR | LO | SI | BW | NdS | CT | AN | WA |
| reputation | public | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 3 |
| private | 3 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 6 |
| contacts | public | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| private | 6 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 8 |

**Notes:**

Listed are first ranks in terms of the mentions they have "totalized" on the two types of relations.

1 : Commission DG VI (agriculture)
2 : Commission DG XII (R&D)
3 : Commission DG XVI (regional policies & struct. funds)
4 : Committee of the regions
5 : COREPER
6 : regional information and/or representation office
7 : UNICE
8 : ETUC

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References


References


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