Political Parties in the European Union System: A Comparative Politics Approach to the Development of the Party Federations -

by

Simon Hix

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the European University Institute

Florence, December 1995
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Florence, December 1995
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SIMON HIX
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Preface

I first developed the idea for this thesis between 1990 and 1991. At that time I was working as a ‘political consultant’ on European Community (EC) affairs, while studying part-time for a Masters’ at the London School of Economics (LSE). The consultancy job involved closely monitoring the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) on political and economic and monetary union, and analysing the evolution of the ‘European policies’ of the British political parties. Almost by accident I found I could predict the agenda for the IGCs, and the domestic positions of the British Labour and Liberal Parties, by following the declarations of the Socialist, Christian Democrat, and Liberal party leaders’ meetings. It appeared that on a number of issues in EC politics there was a growing interaction between domestic and European party alignments, that was somehow channelled through the organisations of the ‘party federations’. My interest in this topic consequently grow after Article 138a (the “party article”) was inserted in the Maastricht Treaty, and three new European parties were subsequently born: the Party of European Socialists; the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party; and the European Federation of Green Parties.

When thinking about these developments in academic terms, I naturally began by using the theories I had been taught in my post-graduate studies. The Masters’ at the LSE was in ‘West European Politics’, taught in the Government Department, and based very much on Professor Gordon Smith’s seminal Politics in Western Europe* and the journal West European Politics, which he co-edits with Vincent Wright, of Nuffield College, Oxford. As I developed a theoretical framework for the research topic, however, I realised that most theoretical analyses of politics in the European Union (EU) comes from the field of International Relations and not in fact from Comparative Politics. Nevertheless, after several unsatisfactory attempts to apply theories such as ‘neo-functionalism’ to the topic, I returned to the Comparative Politics fold in the firm conviction that this is the appropriate framework for explaining ‘party-political’ questions in the emerging European-level polity.

* G. Smith (1990) Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, 5th edn, Aldershot: Dartmouth. For the students on the ‘Politics 7: Western Europe’ Masters Course at the LSE, this book was affectionately called the “Green Bible".
As a result of this realisation, this doctoral thesis operates on two levels. Firstly, the empirical aspect of the research is a detailed study of the development of the party federations between 1974 and 1995. Secondly, the theoretical aspect of the thesis is the development and application of a 'comparative politics approach' to the study of the EU. Within this theoretical framework, the research also utilises a 'general theory' of party development, that is tested in the specific environment of the EU system. Overall, therefore, the thesis is a traditional 'comparative politics' research project: where empirical analysis is used to make a theoretical contribution, firstly, to the understanding of a particular case in comparative research (politics in the European Union); and, secondly, to the understanding of a general phenomenon in many political systems (the development of political parties in 'non-classic' systems).

However, the thesis is also novel on empirical and methodological grounds. Empirically, the only major work (in English) on the party federations was published in 1981. Consequently, the documents collected and analysed in the empirical research (such as the party leaders' statements and European Election Manifestos) constitute a unique data set that could be used in other research projects. Methodologically, the research extends the standard content analysis techniques for locating parties in domestic politics to the party positions in the European arena; and develops a way of locating actors on a single Left-Right dimension from their positions in the two-dimensional 'socio-economic policy space'. These methods could also be used in future research.

Chapter 1 hence begins with a discussion of the limitations of the traditional approaches to parties and politics in the EU, and introduces an alternative framework which combines the theory and method of 'comparative politics'. In Chapter 2, the two theoretical levels are brought together in a "comparative politics theory of parties in the European Union". This theory is subsequently tested in three empirical chapters, each covering a different aspect of party federation behaviour in the EU: party organisational development (Chapter 3); the changing shape of party policy competition (Chapter 4); and the ability of parties to reap policy rewards from the European Council (Chapter 5). A description of the data and the methods used in the analysis is set out in a series of Appendices. Finally, the empirical and theoretical conclusions of the research are drawn together in Chapter 6.
Chapter 1

Theorising Politics and Parties in the EU: Towards an Alternative Approach

1.1. Introduction: Competing Research Programmes in the Analysis of the EU

Any discussion or analysis of a subject is conducted using a basic set of theoretical assumptions. Kuhn believed that these assumptions develop through revolutionary steps, where at particular points in time a dominant 'paradigm' is wholly replaced by a new approach, resulting in a "Gestalt-switch" for the theorists involved.\(^1\) Lakatos argued, however, that in reality theoretical development is evolutionary. He thus suggested that "criticism of a programme is a long and often frustrating process and one must treat budding programmes leniently".\(^2\)

In the study of European Union (EU) politics, the Kuhnian and Lakatosian views are both relevant. Since its birth in the 1950s, the European Community (EC) has mainly been theorised as an example of the supranational integration of, or intergovernmental co-operation between, (previously) sovereign nation-states. It was thus appropriate that the dominant assumptions came from the field of International Relations (IR). However, as the EC (and now the EU) has developed certain characteristics of a 'political system', such as powers of allocation of resources and values,\(^3\) competing hypotheses have begun to be proposed using a theoretical framework from the field of Comparative Politics.

Despite a diversity of empirical foci, these 'comparative politics approaches' share some common theoretical and methodological characteristics: they deliberately distance

themselves from the classic ‘integration’ theories; they study the ‘internal’ politics of the EU; and they analyse the EU as a “case study in comparative perspective”.4 For example, several ‘segmental approaches’ use the comparative method to analyse particular EU institutional structures,5 or policy frameworks.6 Moreover, there is a growing body of literature which analyses the structure of institutions and interests in the EU using traditional comparative politics concepts: such as federalism7, consociationalism,8 and pluralism or corporatism9. Despite these common strands, however, this motley collection of work can hardly be thought of as a coherent ‘comparative politics approach’. For example, lacking from these applications is an explanation of the ideological direction of EU institutional and policy development.10


A coherent comparative politics research programme must start with a core body of theory. The field of comparative politics originally differentiated itself from traditional formal-legal approaches to the study of politics by using the 'comparative method'. However, a discipline could not be defined by its method alone. It must have a 'core subject': the central theoretical concern of the field. In comparative politics the core subject has evolved through several stages: from the 'political system', through 'development', to a more general analysis of 'state-society relations'. Moreover, within this evolution there has been a movement away from a concentration on social determinants of politics (i.e. 'political sociology') towards a concentration on the interaction between economics and politics (i.e. 'political economy'). Nevertheless, despite the different theoretical fashions at each stage of this development, the basic tenets of the comparative approach to politics have remained constant: the channelling of societal demands (the 'demand' for political goods), the political bargaining and issue resolution (the decisionmaking 'black box'), and the adoption of government policies and state outputs (the 'supply' of political goods).

Hence, this focus on the 'internal' workings of the political system leads comparative politics to concentrate on such variables as the structure of society, the dimensions of ideological and party conflict, the institutional framework of the political system, the behaviour of political actors within this system, and the making of public policy. In contrast, IR is concerned with such things as national interest and sovereignty, inter-state power relations, economic interdependence, international institution building, and transnational policy regimes.

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17 Keman refers to this revision of the Eastonian system as the 'polity-politics-policy' triad. See H. Keman (1993) "Comparative Politics: A Distinctive Approach to Political Science?", in Keman, *op. cit.*.
Consequently, although particular international relations and comparative politics approaches may share a (pre)theory of politics (such as pluralism, Marxism or 'new institutionalism') in the operationalisation of these theories different hypotheses are generated and different conclusions are subsequently reached.

If we are to further our understanding of politics in the EU, however, there needs to be a debate between this emergent comparative politics programme and the previously dominant IR framework. However, the central theoretical cores of rival programmes cannot be compared directly. One can only ever test falsifiable secondary hypothesis, which have been derived from the core assumptions of one programme. Consequently, only once secondary hypotheses have been tested, can it be discerned whether it is appropriate to advocate a Kuhnian Gestalt-switch (with the Comparative Politics approach wholly replacing the IR programme) or propose a synthesis of the strongest elements of the two programmes in a general 'political science' theory of EU politics. A central purpose of this research is thus to propose and analyse a ‘Comparative Politics approach’ to EU politics, by testing its application to the behaviour and development of political parties in the EU system.

In this chapter, the research topic is introduced (in Section 1.2); the evolution of the traditional approaches to EU politics is discussed (in Section 1.3); and how these approaches have been applied to the research topic is shown (in Section 1.4). The chapter subsequently introduces the basic theoretical and methodological assumptions of a coherent 'comparative politics approach' (in Section 1.5), which are used in the construction of a theory of political parties in the EU system in the second chapter.

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18 Lakatos, op. cit., pp. 132-164.
1.2. The Research Topic: The Organisational and Political Development of the Transnational Party Federations

The history of transnational party co-operation in the EC (and EU) has three distinct phases.\(^{19}\) Firstly, there was a period of \textit{optimism}, from the birth of the federations in the early 1970s to the first direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) in 1979: when it was hoped that the new party organisations would establish a role in the EC institutional framework. Secondly, there was a period of \textit{stagnation}, from the aftermath of the first European elections to the third European elections in 1989: when it became clear that it would be difficult for the federations to develop beyond umbrella organisations for the drafting of perfunctory EP election programmes. Finally, however, there was a period of \textit{renaissance}, from the start of the negotiations on the Treaty on European Union, in December 1990, to the end of 1994: when there was renewed interest in the work and potential of the federations, a ‘party article’ (Article 138a) was inserted in the TEU, and all the federations experienced a ‘widening and deepening’ (increased membership and organisational development).

1.2.1. Optimism: Birth of the Party Federations

The catalyst for the formation of the party federations was the commitment to hold direct elections to the EP, at the December 1969 Hague Summit of EC Heads of Government. In 1957 the Socialist International (SI) had created a Liaison Bureau for co-operation between the EC parties, and in 1968 the SI had begun to prepare the formation of a ‘European Socialist Party’. Following the Hague Summit, however, the Liaison Bureau was entrusted to draft the ‘rules of procedure’ for such an organisation. The report was adopted by the SI on 5 April 1974 and the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the EC (CSP) was thus inaugurated.\(^{20}\)

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Also following the Hague Summit, the 1972 Congress of the Liberal International (LI) adopted a resolution asking the party leaders to examine the possibility of a Federation of Liberal Parties in the EC, within the structures of the LI. In May 1973, however, the Liberal leaders proposed an EC-based organisation independent from the LI. A working group was subsequently created to prepare a statute, which was adopted at the LI Congress in Florence in 1974. However, due to a delay in the ratification of the statutes, the Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties of the EC (ELD) was not formally founded until 26 March 1976.21

Similarly, the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) established a ‘Standing Conference’ and a ‘Political Committee’ of the EC Christian Democratic Parties. At the 19th EUCD Congress in Bonn, in 1973, a working group was set on closer party co-operation, which in 1975 was explicitly charged with drafting a statute for a ‘European Christian Democratic Party’. The statute was ready by February 1976, but the formal establishment of the European People’s Party (EPP) was delayed until 29 April 1976 because of a prolonged dispute over the name.22

Although no more ‘party federations’ were set up prior to the first EP elections, several other party families developed transnational links. The PCI and PCF held several ‘summits’, but refused to set up a formal EC organisation as they “excluded the idea of a simple decision centre for the European communist movement”.23 In 1978, several Regionalist parties established the European Free Alliance (EFA), with a ‘Charter for Europe’ calling for a


23 Fitzmaurice, op. cit., p. 104.
"Europe of the Regions". There was also limited co-operation between Green parties, and some informal contacts were made between extreme-Right parties.24 Consequently, the only other transnational party organisation created in this early period was the European Democratic Union (EDU), which was established in Salzburg (outside the EC!) in April 1978. The decision to form this broad Right-Wing alliance arose from three imperatives: the new Socialist party federation had members in every Member State whereas the EPP did not; there was likely to be a Left-Wing majority in the EP elections; and the CDU was particularly keen to overcome the isolation of the British Conservatives.25 However, the EDU was fundamentally different to the party federations in two important respects: it was never meant to be anything more than a loose-grouping of all the elements of the centre-right, including non-EC parties; and it did not seek a role in the EP elections.26 There was considerable optimism about the future role of the party federations. EC-watchers openly predicted that the new European party structures would launch a fundamentally new and democratic phase of European integration.27 These hopes for a new "Europe of the Parties" were hence summed up by Leo Tindemans, the former Belgian Prime Minister and the President of the EPP, when he proclaimed that, "only European political parties can bridge the gap between the hopes of public opinion and the powerlessness of governments to turn these expectations into proposals for concrete policies".28

1.2.2. Stagnation: In Search of a Role for the Federations

However, these optimistic predictions collapsed with the reality of the EP elections. In the drafting of election manifestos, all three federations were deeply divided. The first EPP

26 There were a number of reasons for this, the most prominent of which were pressures on the CDU from within the EPP, and the British Conservative Party's refusal to make any supranational electoral commitments.
election Manifesto was unanimously adopted by the EPP Political Bureau in February 1976, but the final Political Programme was not completed until March 1978. The main reasons for the delay were two-fold: a disagreement between the Dutch CDA and the German CDU/CSU over the place of 'Christian' principles in the programme; and a conflict between the desire to build an 'anti-Socialist' bloc and the Belgian, Dutch and Italian parties' domestic coalitions with Socialist parties. The 1979 ELD election manifesto aspired to be the most federal, but the member parties refused to be bound by its contents. Finally, the difficulties of drafting a common Socialist electoral programme were so great that the 1977 'Electoral Congress' was postponed to avoid drawing attention to the deep internal divisions. An election manifesto was finally abandoned in favour of a short 'Political Declaration' by the party leaders and an 'Appeal to the Electorate' passed by the CSP Congress in January 1979.

Moreover, when it came to the elections, the transnational parties were almost invisible. The EP elections were fought within the EC Member States, by the domestic parties, with domestic candidates, and on domestic issues. With limited financial resources and rudimentary organisational structures, the transnational party federations could be nothing more than 'clearing houses'; providing information, campaign materials, and organising (poorly attended) conferences. Most voters and party activists were unaware of the work of the federations, despite the use of some of the federation symbols.\(^29\) In all three elections, the national parties jealously guarded their control of the electoral campaign and agenda. They were not prepared to pass up the opportunity to present the European elections as nation-wide referenda on the incumbent governments. Consequently, the standard theoretical framework for analysing EP elections is to regard them as "second order national elections": where there is a lower turnout than in first-order elections, campaigns are fought on first-order issues, governing parties lose votes, and small and new parties perform well.\(^30\)

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Consequently, by the third direct elections it was increasingly acknowledged that the EP elections would not facilitate a 'party Europe' based on the party federations. At the European level, the EP groups predominated over the party federations, and the national parties had no real incentive to involve themselves in European level politics. After the recognition of the limited role of the party federations, Dick Toomstra, the Secretary-General of the CSP, told the Socialist Parties' International Secretaries that:

The Confederation has reached a crucial moment. Parties are finally called upon to make a choice, whether they want a Confederation with some political power or just a European Socialist Post Office box.\(^{31}\)

A fundamental problem was that it was impossible to envisage a role for the federations in everyday EC business without a fundamental reform of the EC’s institutions.\(^{32}\) As Pridham noted, "although parties, whether transnational or national, have an institutional point of focus in the EP, they do not have an institutional point of focus within the EC system as a whole".\(^{33}\)

Nevertheless, there were some indications that the party federations could develop further given the right institutional circumstances. In the 1989 elections all three federations agreed common manifestos without much difficulty, and for the first time there were two truly supranational issues in all the national campaigns: the environment and the Single Market.\(^{34}\) There was also increased awareness of the work of the federations in the domestic parties among the upper and middle-level elites.\(^{35}\) Moreover, on 1 April 1984 the 'European Coordination of Green Parties' (EFGP) was inaugurated. Finally, in all the party federations, leaders' summits began to emerge as the most important decision-making arenas.

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1.2.3. Renaissance: The IGCs and Nascent ‘Parties at the European Level’

The negotiation and ratification of the Treaty on European Union in the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) facilitated a renewed interest in the party federations. This new era was ushered in by the Rome European Council of 27 October 1990, which set the agenda for the IGCs. An EPP leaders’ meeting had been held on 25 October, where the Christian Democrat leaders unanimously agreed to support a fixed timetable for EMU in the European Council. In the build up to the Rome meeting, the British Conservative Government had stated that it would oppose any such move. However, the use of qualified majority at the Rome European Council meant that the EPP agenda, supported by the CSP parties, was accepted almost in its entirety. The British press consequently proclaimed that the British Prime Minister had been “ambushed”. Margaret Thatcher had been unprepared for this show of solidarity by the Christian Democrats because her advisors had underestimated the importance of the EPP meeting. The perceived effectiveness of the EPP leaders’ meeting led directly to the adoption of similar strategies by the Socialist and Liberal federations, of arranging leaders’ meetings to coincide with the IGC timetable and agenda.

This new organisational strategy meant that for the first time the party federations began to play an integral role in the formation of domestic party policies towards the European institutions. For example, prior to the IGCs British Labour Party policy on EMU consisted simply of policies to promote economic growth and job creation. After the CSP Congress in February 1990, however, the National Executive Committee (NEC) adopted a new ‘position paper’ on EMU, which advocated a “hardening of the ERM” but opposed a single currency. Nevertheless, at the Madrid CSP leaders’ summit in December, with some reservations, Neil Kinnock (the Labour Party leader) signed a Declaration which supported full EMU and

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40 Agence Europe, 12 December 1990.
“binding minimum taxation rates” to avoid “tax competition”.\textsuperscript{41} Due to Labour’s uncertainty over these proposals, however, at the next Socialist leaders’ meeting, in June 1991, Neil Kinnock attempted to overturn the policy on binding minimum taxation rates.\textsuperscript{42} Nevertheless, the new NEC policy adopted in July 1991 fully backed the CSP agenda, and in October 1991 the NEC stated that, “it is all too easy for fiscal interdependence to result in competitive deflation - Monetary Union will therefore require fiscal co-operation”.\textsuperscript{43}

Finally, when the Treaty on European Union was finally adopted, to almost everyone’s surprise it contained an article stating that:

Political parties at the European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.\textsuperscript{44}

In response to this so called ‘party article’, the Socialist, Christian Democrat and Liberal federation Secretaries-General presented a joint Working Paper on the “Political Follow-Up to Article 138a”, which called for joint pressure for the adoption of a “European Political Party Statute”. By 1995, the European Political Party Statute was still in the pipeline. Meanwhile, in November 1992 the Confederation of Socialist Parties was transformed into the Party of European Socialists; in June 1993 the Green Co-ordination was dissolved and the European Federation of Green Parties was established; and in December 1993 the Federation of Liberal, Democratic and Reform Parties of the European Community (ELDR)\textsuperscript{45} became the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party.

In sum, therefore, the evolution of the party federations towards ‘parties at the European level’ has two key components. Firstly, there has been an organisational change, with the ‘internal’ (institutional integration) and ‘external’ (connection to the EU decision-making process)

\textsuperscript{41} Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community (1990) “Party Leaders’ Declaration on the Intergovernmental Conferences”, CSP party leaders’ meeting, Madrid, 10 December 1990.
\textsuperscript{45} The name ELD was changed to ELDR in April 1986, after the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC, and the subsequent membership of the Iberian ‘reform’ parties in the Liberal federation.
development of transnational party structures. Secondly, there has been a *policy/ideology* change, with the increasing ideological coherence of transnational party policy on European issues. The question remains, however, as to how these developments can be explained.

1.3. Limits of Traditional Approaches to *Politics* in the EU

The two dominant theoretical frameworks for the study of EU politics come from the field of International Relations.\(^46\) Firstly, there is the *liberal/neofunctionalist* framework, which analyses the EU as a case of "supranational integration". Alternatively, there is the *realist/intergovernmentalist* framework, which regards the EU as an example of "international co-operation".

1.3.1. *The Liberal/Neo-Functionalist Framework*

The basic distinction between the two IR frameworks in the analysis of EU politics is the difference between the 'billiard-ball' and 'cobweb' models of international politics.\(^47\) In realist approaches, the State is a unitary actor, and international agreements are seen as examples of 'co-operation' between egocentric States: hence the billiard-ball metaphor. In contrast, liberal (or pluralist) approaches regard the State as a non-unitary actor, and international developments are thus a result of the complex interaction between numerous non-state actors, such as transnational businesses and interest groups: hence the cobweb metaphor. Within the liberal framework, however, there are a number of different (pre)theories of EU politics.\(^48\)

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\(^46\) It should be acknowledged, however, that much research on the EC is undertaken from a *sui generis* perspective, where theory is either absent or developed in an inductive fashion. This work is not addressed here because it does not attempt to use any type of deductive theoretical framework; whether from International Relations or Comparative Politics. For an example of the *sui generis* approach see most of the essays in J. Lodge (ed.) (1989b) *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future*, London: Pinter. Nb. Some of the ideas in this section are adapted from S. Hix (1994) "The Study of the European Community: The Challenge for Comparative Politics", *West European Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-30.


The first of these approaches is functionalism. This theory, associated primarily with David Mitrany, was the starting point of modern integration theory in general, and of neo-functionalism in particular.\textsuperscript{49} From the oft-quoted dictum that "form follows function", Mitrany argued that a peaceful world order should be constructed through the functional integration of economic sectors and political tasks. This should replace the existing structures of the nation-state, which had caused two catastrophic world wars in his lifetime. One of the main criticisms of Mitrany's proposals, however, was that he did not adequately address the problem of democratic control of the functionally-integrated tasks.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, although functionalism was derived from a normative position, because of its neglect of (and almost an antipathy to) democratic conflict, it has little to offer in the analysis of competing political interests and ideals at the European level. Indeed, in the wake of the Second World War, the functionalists sought to deliberately prescribe a system which would be devoid of political difference.

Developing from Mitrany's theory, one of the earliest formal 'integration theories' was the transactions (or communications) approach. Transactions theory suggests that an intensive pattern of communications between national units will result in a closer political or security "community" (Gemeinschaft).\textsuperscript{51} Because transactions theory concentrates on the level of mass society, as opposed to organised groups or elites, 'integration' involves the evolution of mass attitudes and behaviour from a national 'community' to a supranational 'community'. Consequently, one of the favourite activities of early transactions theorists was to retroactively explain regional integration by illustrating the increase in intra-regional communications, such as trade flows or even telephone calls. The main problem with the transactions approach, however, was that no correlation could be established between 'behaviour' and 'identity' (the defining characteristic of a 'community'). Moreover, the transactions approach had very little


to say about competing interests at the supranational level, or the 'political' orientation of these interests, and thus is of little use when studying the nature and structure of EU 'politics'.

A more 'political', and more resilient, liberal approach to the EU is neo-functionalism. In the pluralist tradition, the original formulation of neo-functionalism emphasises the importance of the activities and loyalties of the major societal groups, and in particular the political and economic elites.52 Neo-functionalist theory argues that a new European 'polity' is emerging because, "actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction of the pre-existing national states".53 The motor behind this process is the deterministic "logic of spillover"; whereby, "a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more, and so forth".54 As a result of this spillover process, neo-functionalism predicts the movement from 'negative integration', the removal of barriers to trade (such as the Single Market project), to 'positive integration', the proactive co-ordination of common policies in order to fulfil economic and welfare objectives (such as the Structural Funds and the Social Charter).55 Hence, although neo-functionalism failed to predict the stagnation of the integration process in the late 1960s, the theory has recently come back into vogue because of its ability to explain the development from the 'negative' integration of the Single European Act to the 'positive' integration of the Maastricht Treaty,56 and the role of the EU "supranational institutions" (particularly the European


54 Lindberg (1963) op. cit., p. 9.


Commission and the European Court of Justice) in the implementation of the Single Market project and the goal of Economic and Monetary Union.\textsuperscript{57}

Despite this renaissance of neo-functionalism, however, many of the original criticisms and limitations still hold. Firstly, there is a fundamental contradiction between its deterministic claims, and its fundamental reliance on the voluntary actions of European level elites to "cultivate" spillover. Furthermore, the theory does not distinguish between "low" politics (such as agricultural policy and market regulation) which can be easily integrated, and "high" politics (such as foreign and defence policy) which are traditional areas of national 'sovereignty'.\textsuperscript{58} Above all, however, neo-functionalism fails to take account of several intervening exogenous factors; such as continued economic growth, multinational economic interdependence, international defence and security interdependence, the continued salience of nationalism and national-identity and the inherent countervailing "logic of diversity", and the unpredictable actions of national leaders.\textsuperscript{59}

In the 1970s, however, these limitations led to the suggestion that neo-functionalist and transactions theories should be subsumed under the broader category of interdependence theories.\textsuperscript{60} Encompassing all variants of the 'cobweb model' of international politics, interdependence theory contrasts the diminishing importance of national boundaries with the growing globalisation (or Europeanisation in the case of the EU) of economic and security


\textsuperscript{58} Cf. S. Hoffmann (1966) "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe", Dædalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 872-7.


interests. Interdependence theory also argues, in contrast to the Realist school, that international 'regimes' possess a certain dynamic of their own, independent of the interests of the States.\(^{61}\) Unlike the other liberal approaches, however, interdependence theory does not explicitly apply to the EU. Nevertheless, a number of attempts have been made to explain the EC within the interdependence framework. For example, Puchala described the EC as a 'Concordance System', with a complex network of regional interactions between state and non-state actors.\(^{62}\)

However, despite emphasising the importance of the behaviour, attitudes and loyalties of non-state actors in the international system, none of the approaches within the liberal framework are able to fully explain 'politics' in the EU. Because the fundamental concern of these theories is economic and political 'integration', the behaviour and attitudes of the actors is analysed in terms of whether it facilitates further integration (spill-over) or leads to renationalisation (spill-back). Hence, even though as early as 1958 Haas himself placed great importance on the role of political parties in the integration process, the alignments of the national and supranational parties were analysed in terms of whether they were pro- or anti-integration, and not on the basis of a rival socio-economic interest. However, as the EU begins to address 'positive' integration issues (such as the Social Chapter), such a single-dimensional approach does not tell the full story. The problem, however, is that pluralist theories of the EC, which are fundamentally "integration theories", do not possess the tools or the discourse for a 'political' (i.e. Left-Right) dimension to be incorporated into their models.

Finally, a more fundamental problem is that these approaches in the liberal/neo-functionalist framework do not have a clear set of core assumptions. They share a classic 'liberal' view of human behaviour: that political identity fundamentally stems from economic rather than emotional factors, such that if an individual's economic well-being is enhanced by European integration her loyalty will shift to the European level. However, the liberal/neo-functionalist approaches do not develop this assumption into a parsimonious theoretical framework, from which a secondary research programme could be derived. The consequence

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of this initial epistemological negligence has been the proliferation of numerous contradictory hypothesis, and ever more complex reformulations of the original thesis. The result is that it has been impossible to verify or falsify the liberal/neo-functionalist framework in empirical research. In other words, neo-functionalism is always right!

1.3.2. The Realist/Intergovernmentalist Framework

Consequently, a fundamental difference from the liberal/neo-functionalist framework is that the realist/intergovernmental framework uses a basic behavioural assumption: that actors structure their preferences and make decisions according to a basic economic 'rationally'. Moreover, in the 'classic' Realist framework, the State is a unitary actor and international institutions are not independent from national authorities. However, developments in the field of International Relations has led to a watering down of these assumptions in contemporary 'neo-realist' approaches: with the development of inter-state bargaining models which incorporate domestic political divisions; and with the incorporation of theories of how international institutions facilitate co-operation between sovereign nation states.

The classic approach within this framework became known as intergovernmentalism, because of its emphasis on the resilience (and success) of 'intergovernmental' methods of co-operation in the EC. Whereas 'supranational' methods of decisionmaking withered after the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise, the EC proceeded to develop through intergovernmental practices; such as European Political Co-operation, the European Council, the evolution of COREPER, and the growing importance of the Council Presidency. As a result, rather than

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non-state interests determining the pace of integration, intergovernmentalism asserts that integration and disintegration is determined by the interests of the governments of the main Member States. Moreover, whereas neo-functionalism regards the integration process as a 'positive-sum-game', intergovernmentalism views it as strictly a 'zero-sum-game', where "on a vital issue, losses are not compensated by gains on other issues: nobody wants to be fooled". Consequently, intergovernmentalism argues that supranational integration will be limited to areas which do not affect the fundamental issues of national sovereignty. Moreover, in response to the renaissance of neo-functionalism since the Single European Act, there has also been a revival of intergovernmentalism; where the Single European Act and the Single Market Project are products of "conventional statecraft", and there have been problems with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty not because of waning ideological support for a United Europe but simply as a result of calculated national self-interest.

There are, however, a number of important flaws in the traditional intergovernmentalist argument. Firstly, there is an inherent contradiction between the notion of a rationally-constructed 'national interest' and Hoffmann's primordial conception of nationalism. Secondly, the proposition that EU policymaking is a simple zero-sum game is often untrue. The driving force behind the new dynamism of European integration in the late 1980s was the fact that in many policy areas, and for most Member States, EU bargaining was clearly a positive-sum game. Hence, one of the main drawbacks of the intergovernmental approach, which arises from both these points, is that the notion of 'national interests' is not properly defined. There is no differentiation between 'vital' (non-negotiable) and bargainable interests. Thus, although intergovernmentalism correctly points out that the 'national dimension' is important, there needs to be a less monolithic view of national interest, which incorporates competing views of what is 'vital' for a particular Member State. Consequently, by proposing a more subtle definition of the national interest and by involving the domestic context of


69 Hoffmann (1966) op. cit., p. 882.

national foreign-policy objectives, the two main refinements of intergovernmentalism attempt to address these drawbacks.

The first of these refinements is the **preference-convergence approach**. Rather than looking at the 'vital' national interests, this approach concentrates on the shape of national 'preferences'. Hence, this approach argues that European integration proceeds as a result of converging policy preferences among the major Member States. For example, the Single Market objective was agreed because Thatcher's desire to extend market deregulation to the rest of the EC coincided with Mitterrand's economic policy U-turn and Kohl's plan for a 'European' policy following the domestic economic *Wende*. On the other hand, the preference-convergence theory also suggests that these national preferences emerged as a result of domestic political factors; such as growing internal Conservative Party criticism of Thatcher's failed monetary policies, Mitterrand's plan to undermine the position of the Communists; and Kohl's need to re-establish authority after two damaging domestic political scandals.\(^{71}\)

The second refinement of intergovernmentalism is the **elite-bargaining approach**. This approach is similar to the preference-convergence theory, in that it waters down the classic realist assumption of the State as a monolithic actor. However, this approach differs from the preference-convergence theory because of a re-emphasis on rational zero-sum bargaining. The elite-bargaining approach argues that European integration proceeds through a set of agreements between domestic and international elites; in a kind of two-level game, where actors play simultaneous moves in the 'interlinked' national and European arenas.\(^{72}\) The Single Market objective and the Economic and Monetary Union agreement in the Maastricht Treaty are thus explained as a "hierarchy of bargains", where a series of agreements are reached because political elites are able to divide their preferences between "basic" and "subsidiary" objectives.\(^{73}\) Hence, the elite-bargaining theory amalgamates the traditional realist assumptions


of national interests of the intergovernmentalists, the emphasis on domestic politics of the preference-convergence approach, and a distinction between 'lower' and 'higher' political preferences.

A further theory of EU politics similar to the preference-convergence and elite-bargaining theories is the *domestic politics approach*. Taking the watering down of the assumption of the State as a unitary actor to its extreme, this approach seeks to explain European-level developments completely through domestic party and governmental politics.\(^7^4\) However, this approach is not formally within the International Relations paradigm. The three main advocates of the domestic politics analysis - Simon Bulmer, Stephen George and William Paterson - come mainly from the field of Comparative Politics, and the study of party and territorial politics in such political systems as Germany. However, although the discourse of the domestic politics approach is thus primarily from comparative politics, the EU is regarded as a 'transnational (i.e. international) system', rather than as an internal 'political system'. The approach thus inherently accepts the IR view of EU politics. Hence, although the theorists claim they accept the liberal conception of international politics, they argue that at the EU-level "the basic units are the nation states",\(^7^5\) and that inter-state politics is between the victors of the domestic games. As a result, the domestic politics approach is in fact a neo-realist variant within the overall realist/intergovernmentalist framework. As Bulmer thus admits: "The domestic politics approach might be accused of having somewhat mixed intellectual parentage".\(^7^6\)

However, even these refinements of the realist/intergovernmentalist framework are problematic. There is a fundamental contradiction between the realist assumption of the State as a single-interest unitary actor in the international system and the increasing emphasis on the different preferences of competing national elites. In addition, although it may be correct to play down the importance of non-state actors, it is difficult to deny that they have absolutely no influence in the integration process or on national policy; such as the pressure from the City of


\(^7^5\) Bulmer, *ibid.*, p. 353.

\(^7^6\) *ibid.*, p. 363.
London for economic and monetary integration. Furthermore, in the development from the Single European Act to the Maastricht Treaty, the EU did have a certain internal institutional dynamic. The institutional structures of the EU, such as the qualified majority decision rule in the Council of Ministers, not only ‘shaped’ the national actors’ behaviour but also their preferences. For example, qualified majority voting forces Member States to bargain on issues that are of ‘vital’ interest, which are regarded as inherently non-negotiable under the realist paradigm. Finally, in abandoning the reductionist assumptions of intergovernmentalism, there is growing recognition in the realist theories of the importance of party politics and of a difference between non-bargainable and bargainable issues (particularly those which are simply questions of redistribution). However, as with the pluralist approaches, the national party competition on these bargainable issues (a Left-Right conflict) is difficult to incorporate into a unidimensional model of EU politics; which views all actors as fundamentally ‘in favour’ or ‘opposed’ to further integration.

From a recognition of these limitations, Andrew Moravcsik has proposed a “Liberal Intergovernmental Approach”, which as yet constitutes the most sophisticated approach within the realist/intergovernmentalist framework. Although the name of the approach suggests a combination of the two dominant IR frameworks, the theory is derived from the core ontological assumptions of neo-realism, and develops through a detailed critique of neo-functionalism. The basic assumptions of Moravcsik’s approach are that political agency is fundamentally rational, but that actors consciously establish institutional constraints on their behaviour to reduce ‘transactions costs’. Moreover, in application to the EU, the theory combines a liberal (pluralist) interpretation of domestic group competition in the formation of ‘national preferences’, with a realist conception of ‘inter-state bargaining’ once the ideal preferences have been formed. This approach thus pushes the realist/intergovernmentalist...

77 The idea that not only behaviour put also preferences can be shaped by the institutional ‘frame’ of decisions is increasingly recognised in the rational choice literature. See, for example, J. Elster (1982) “Sour Grapes: Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants”, in A. Sen & B. Williams (eds) Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 219-24.

framework to its limits. However, apart from the methodological individualism, there are several secondary theoretical reasons why this approach is fundamentally different to the liberal/neo-functionalist framework. As Moravcsik states:

Where neo-functionalism emphasises domestic technocratic consensus, liberal intergovernmentalism looks to domestic coalitional struggles. Where neo-functionalism emphasises opportunities to upgrade the common interest, liberal intergovernmentalism stresses the role of relative power. Where neo-functionalism emphasises the active role of supranational officials in shaping bargaining outcomes, liberal intergovernmentalism stresses instead passive institutions and the autonomy of national leaders.  

However, there is an interesting conclusion of this synthesis of the best of the two frameworks. In a conscious effort to go beyond the debate "between 'intergovernmentalist' and 'supranationalist' ideal-types", Moravcsik argues that EU-theorists should henceforth concentrate on the changing balance of 'state-society' relations as a result of European integration. However, is this not admitting that the IR paradigm is redundant, and that we should now be turn to the core subjects of the field of Comparative Politics? As Moravcsik himself admits: "Liberal intergovernmentalism assimilates the EC to models of politics potentially applicable to all states". However, we already have such models, which have been developed for many decades in a fundamentally different sub-field of Political Science.

In sum, therefore, there are some important limitations in the application of the two traditional frameworks for the study of EU 'politics'. An inherent problem is that these frameworks are from the International Relations paradigm. They are thus appropriate for the analysis of what Morgenthau classically called the "politics among nations", and not for the study of politics within a political system, such as the EU. The limitations of these IR frameworks for the study of EU 'politics' are thus manifest in their application to the role of parties and party politics in the EU system.

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80 ibid., p. 519.
81 ibid., p. 519.
1.4. Limits of Traditional Approaches to Parties in the EU

Because, until recently, the dominant paradigm for the study of EU politics has been International Relations, it is not surprising that most analyses of the development of 'parties at the European level' have used one of the IR frameworks. However, a number of scholars have also written about the party federations from a *sui generis* perspective (treating the EU as a unique environment and not using IR or comparative politics theories), and some initial research has begun to use a comparative politics framework. However, as with the general frameworks for the study of EU politics, these specific approaches to parties in the EU system also have some important limitations.

1.4.1. Approaches Within the International Relations Paradigm

Since the Liberal approach in IR does not treat the State as a unitary actor in the international system, one area of interest is the development and operation of *transnational non-state actors*, such as the transnational party federations. To avoid the concept of “non-state actor”, however, Rosenau proposes the use of “sovereignty-free” actors, which he uses for multinational corporations, and “sovereignty-bound” actors, such as national governments and political parties. Under this framework, therefore, there is unlikely to be strong transnational party organisations because of the desire of the national parties to preserve their autonomy.

Also within the Liberal framework in IR, however, the early *neo-functionalists* placed great emphasis on the role of political parties in the European integration process. Haas

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85 In Haas' classic *Uniting of Europe* there are two full chapters dedicated to the role political parties in the integration process: chapter 4 on the national parties, and chapter 11 on the “supranational political parties” in the European Parliament and the Commission. See Haas (1958) *op. cit.*, pp. 113-61 & 390-450.
believed that "political parties are far more crucial carriers of political integration or
disintegration than even supranationally organised interest groups". Political parties are the
only institutions capable of linking elite behaviour at the national and European levels, and thus
facilitating the spillover process. However, neo-functionalism also argues that 'party
integration' arises from two separate spillover processes: competition between national political
elites ("political spillover"); and the desire to 'up-grade' the position of the European party
elites in the European Parliament and the European Commission ("cultivated spillover").

Neo-functionalism hence predicts that parties become integrated into transnational
groups, to obtain an advantage in the national party arena. Integration within the party
federations not only makes the European policy of a party more legitimate, but co-operation
with the European party elites eases the development of often difficult and complex policies.
According to neo-functionalist theory, therefore, the renewed development of the party
federations in the IGCs on Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union can be
explained as a two-pronged strategy of the national opposition parties, and the elites in the EP,
to develop a "back door" into the intergovernmental negotiations. However, as with the
application of neo-functionalist theory to the general process of European integration, the
application of Haas's approach to party integration does not always hold. For example, neo-
functionalist theory is unable to explain why the transnational party federations stagnated
between 1979 and 1989, despite the existence of directly elected party elites in the EP and the
transnational party secretariats, who according to the theory would have been able to cultivate
further party integration.

In contrast to the neo-functionalist theory, any approach within the
realist/intergovernmentalist framework is inherently cynical of the prospects of transnational

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86 ibid., p. 437.
87 For contemporary uses of this aspect of neo-functionalism to explain changes in national party policies
towards European integration see H.H. Haahr (1992) "European Integration and the Left in Britain and
Europe: The EC Policies of the British Labour Party and the Danish Social Democrats, Aarhus: Aarhus
University Press; and R. Ladrech (1993) "Social Democratic Parties and EC Integration: Transnational Party
88 In the original formulation of neo-functionalism, parties (like government agencies) tend to delegate
difficult problems to the European level. See Lindberg, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
89 See S. Hix (1993a) "European Integration and Party Behaviour: Party Adaptation to Extra-System
Challenges", Paper prepared for presentation at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium
for Political Research, 2-8 April 1993, Leiden.
party development. The Realist concentration on the State as a unitary actor in the international system explicitly excludes the possibility of non-state actors such as political parties obtaining any legitimacy independent of the existing national institutions. This inherent antipathy to transnational parties has thus meant that there have been few formal realist/intergovernmental applications to the transnational party federation. Where such theorists do discuss the development of the party federations, however, they emphasise the weakness of the transnational party structures in comparison to the national governments, and explain party federation development through the selfish ‘national interest’ motivations of the national political parties.90

However, as with the application of the realist/intergovernmentalist framework to the general nature of EU politics, these theories of party development miss some fundamental points. Although the operation of the party federations has not produced transnational alignments during the EP elections, the Realist approach has no explanation of why the party federations have turned their attention to policy-development at the European level, and why the national parties have subsequently been willing to trade-off immediate national electoral gains for European-level party policy-objectives. For example, during the process of ratification of the Treaty on European Union, all the leaderships of the member parties of the Confederation of Socialist Parties accepted the transnational party policy commitment to the Treaty, regardless of whether they were in government or opposition. This was particular important since in several countries (i.e. Britain, Denmark and Germany) the leadership strategy of the opposition Socialist parties - of turning down an ideal opportunity to defeat the national governments on a vital piece of legislation - created serious internal party divisions.

1.4.2. Approaches From Sui Generis and Comparative Perspectives

However, several theories of transnational party development have also been proposed from a sui generis perspective, and some recent research has begun to use methods and models from the field of comparative politics. Firstly, rather than using a deductive framework from IR or comparative politics, several scholars treat the EU as a unique environment, and inductively

develop theories from ‘intuitive reasoning’ or on the basis of empirical research. In the build up to the first direct elections to the European Parliament, it was popular to believe that the elections would lead to a “Europe des partis” (as opposed to de Gaulle’s “Europe des patries”). In 1971, Henk Vredeling suggested that a “common market of political parties … [would] arise from the shift in the structure of power in the EC from the national to the European level”. In a similar argument, Helen Wallace argued that party conflict would emerge at the EC level as a result of a ‘ politicisation’ of EC business. Although there was not any empirical proof behind such intuitive expectations, these predictions unintentionally corresponded with the Lipset-Rokkan ‘ideological’ model of party development from the field of Comparative Politics: which argues that parties form to articulate divisions in the political system.

However, other sui generis approaches, which induce hypotheses from empirical research, have come to different conclusions. For example, after the failure of direct elections to produce transnational parties, Lodge and Herman argued that a ‘uniform electoral procedure’ would force European election campaigns to be fought by supranational organisations. They believe that politicisation of EC business would not be sufficient to produce supranational party alignments, and that there would also need to be incentives for parties to present supranational programmes to the electorate. A common electoral procedure would facilitate the nomination and presentation of candidates at the supranational level. Consequently, although also using a sui generis approach, an emphasis on the institutional determinants of party behaviour leads to

a similar argument to the Duvergian ‘institutional’ model of party development from the field of Comparative Politics.96

However, these early sui generis approaches only go some way towards explaining the development of the party federations. Firstly, the direct elections to the European Parliament where not sufficient to create parties at the European level.97 A comparative analysis of the EU system reveals, however, that the European elections cannot effect the make-up of the EU executive (the European Commission) or fundamentally alter the legislative agenda - regardless of whether or not there is a uniform electoral procedure. Consequently, a formal application of the Duvergian theory to party development in the EU would have correctly suggested that European elections would not lead to European parties.

Secondly, the ‘politicisation’ of EU business, such as the agenda of the Single Market programme, did not lead directly to the development of the transnational party federations. A comparative analysis of political conflict in the EU system reveals, however, that even in the negotiation of Single Market legislation, the main dimension of politics in the EU is ‘national-territorial’, which is already articulated by the organisation of the national governments in the main EU legislative arenas (i.e. the Council of Ministers). Consequently, a formal application of the Lipset-Rokkan theory of party development, would stipulate that parties could only develop at the European level if there is a ‘manifest’ supranational political division (such as a ‘class cleavage’), which directly cross-cuts the system of ‘territorial’ representation.

However, also from a sui generis perspective, but using an inductive research strategy based on elite interviews, Geoffrey and Pippa Pridham proposed the most comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing transnational party development to date.98 The Pridhams argued that the EC system is inherently unique, and hence that “European transnational [party] co-operation can only be measured by the criteria of European party development”.99

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consequently state that "the comparative-political approach is useful in highlighting characteristics of transnational party co-operation ... although ... it can only be applied to a restricted extent because owing to the uniqueness of European integration as a form of politics".100

Pridham and Pridham hence call this *sui generis* inductive strategy an "integrative-proper approach".101 This approach subsequently produces three main results: a set of five progressive criteria (thresholds) for measuring the unique case of transnational party development in the EC;102 a 'triangular model' of the relationship between the transnational party federations, the EP Party Groups, and the national party organisations;103 and, a prediction that party politics in the EC will develop according to a two-way process (of a "Europeisation" of national party alignments in the EC arena, and an "Internalisation" of EC conflicts in the national arena).104

However, the Pridham-Pridham approach also has some limitations. Firstly, the five criteria for measuring the unique case of party development in the EC have proved to be inapplicable. As with the early *sui generis* approaches, the Pridhams' criteria are based on the assumption that the party federations are inherently office-seeking, through the process of European elections. Hence, according to the criteria, the party federations will only establish hierarchical decision-making structures after the federations have sole control over the selection of candidates for the EP elections. Because of the EU institutional system, however, where the European elections do not alter the direction of EU policy, the electoral arena is a less decisive site of party competition than the European Council. Consequently, all the federations have established hierarchical structures (one of the final measures of party integration according to the Pridhams) to develop common policies towards the European Council, and have not once attempted to influence the selection of candidates in the elections to the EP.105

100 *ibid.*, p. 279.
101 *ibid.*, p. 282.
102 Pridham & Pridham (1979c) *op. cit.*, pp. 64-5.
104 *ibid.*, pp. 282-3; and Pridham (1986) *op. cit*.
Secondly, although the Pridhams proposed the triangular model of relations between the party federations, the EP Groups and the national parties, they were unable to make any firm predictions about how the balance of power between the groups would change. The model was simply used as a descriptive tool, rather than as a deductive theory concerning the flow of financial and information resources between the three elements. The Pridhams raised the interesting question as to whether the party federations would be ‘superstructural’ (as extensions of the national parties) or ‘infrastructural’ (as elements of the EU institutional framework); and they hint that they party federations are more infrastructural than superstructural, since the national parties have been unwilling hand over decision-making power. However, this conclusion is based purely on the poor performance of the party federations in integrating the national parties during the first European elections. This is thus insufficient proof, firstly, from a temporal perspective and, secondly, from the point of view of the structure of opportunities for national parties in the EU system.

Thirdly, the Pridhams did not extend the Europeanisation-internalisation thesis far enough. They correctly recognised a trend towards the development of party-political conflicts in the European arena, and of European-level conflicts in the national arena as a result of the European elections and the development of the party federations. They also conclude that this two-way process has contributed to an "erosion of the traditional distinction between external and domestic politics". They thus admit that the EC is increasingly developing an ‘internal political arena’: where party policies and alignments on one level shape party behaviour on the second level. This is, however, similar to the structure of party politics in all federal systems. Consequently, rather than proposing a *sui generis* ‘Europeanisation-internalisation’ model, which only tells us about party behaviour in the EC system in the particular period surrounding the first EP elections, they could have used theories about party-interaction in federal systems to develop more enduring propositions about the structure of party politics in the EC.

Overall, an inherent weakness of the Pridham-Pridham framework is the way the theories were constructed. The inductive research was mainly based on elite interviews. This methodology is commonly used in the social sciences. However, one of two research

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strategies are often recommended when using such techniques: either the elite interviews should be "structured", which allows for the responses to be objectively compared using a form of 'coding'; or the researcher should introduce some basic deductive assumptions about elite motivations and the constraints on elite behaviour, which allow the interviews to be compared to 'expected' responses. Without adopting either of these strategies, it is difficult for the researcher to be objective in the interpretation of the interviews. Although the first technique may have been difficult to operationalise given the impressive number (110 in total) of interviews the Pridhams conducted between 1977 and 1979, they may have made some assumptions about the behaviour of party elites in the particular institutional and strategic environment of the EC system. As a result, working back and forth between deductive and inductive analysis may have led to more durable propositions and theories about the development of the party federations. Instead, the Pridhams' theories only apply to transnational party co-operation at a particular point in time, and within a particular structure of EC institutions.

Finally, the comparative politics paradigm has begun to be used in the analysis of political parties in the EU system. Although they did not develop their points to their logical conclusion, Haas likened the behaviour of parties in the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community to parties in the US and Canada, and Marquand mused that during the European elections transnational parties in the EC would be similar to the US Whigs and Democrats in the 1830s. In addition, comparative politics theories have been used to analyse the nature of party relations between the national and European parliaments, and to model the shape of the party system in the EP.

108 Haas (1958) op. cit., p. 437.
The most important development in the comparative politics approach, however, is the recent inclusion of the party federations in an extensive cross-national study of party organisational change.\textsuperscript{112} However, one of the conclusions of this work is that it is difficult to apply classic models of party organisation (i.e. Duverger) to the transnational party federations.\textsuperscript{113} For example, the internal organisation of the party federations is almost incomparable to parties in Britain, France or Germany. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility of analysing the parties in the EU using a general ‘comparative politics framework’, which applies a general theory of party behaviour to the specific institutional and political environment of the EU system. The task, therefore, is to build on this initial comparative empirical (and methodological) research, by adding a theoretical framework which regards party leaders’ behaviour in the EU as comparable to party behaviour in any other institutional or legislative environment, and contrasting party organisation in the EU with similarly ‘non-classic’ models of parties - as in Switzerland and the United States.

Consequently, a central point of the comparative politics approach is that everything can be compared, and that nothing is inherently unique! Hence, only by integrating the method and theory of comparative politics in a single theoretical framework can we decide whether the development of party politics in the EU should encourage us to abandon the IR framework.

1.5. Integrating the Theory and Method of Comparative Politics in a ‘New Institutional’ Framework

The discipline of comparative politics is jointly defined by the comparative method and the body of theoretical knowledge about the subject area of comparative politics - the internal


\textsuperscript{113} Bardi (1994) \textit{ibid.}, p.13.
politics of political systems.\textsuperscript{114} Firstly, the comparative politics 'method' is \textit{the comparison of how politics operates within different political systems}. In operationalising this method, one can either look for similarities between structurally different systems (the "most different systems design"), or differences between structurally similar systems (the "most similar systems design").\textsuperscript{115} Secondly, however, the comparative politics 'method' is also \textit{the body of empirical tools and techniques developed specifically for use in the analysis of the core subject of comparative politics}. An example of such a comparative politics empirical technique is the specific 'content analysis' method developed in the cross-national research on party election manifests.\textsuperscript{116} Hence, comparative politics 'theory' is \textit{the theoretical knowledge developed as a result of the use and elaboration of the comparative method}. Hence, examples of comparative politics theories are the rival 'institutional' and 'ideological' theories of party development.\textsuperscript{117}

Consequently, political parties are an ideal subject for an approach which integrates the theory and method of comparative politics. Not only were political parties one of the first political organisations to be studied in comparative perspective using general theoretical models, but after over one hundred years of research, the study of parties and party systems is still one of the largest and most active sub-fields within the discipline of comparative politics.\textsuperscript{118} There is thus a large body of knowledge and empirical techniques that have been developed specifically for the study of political parties, that can be used in the analysis of the


development of parties in the EU system. As pointed out in Section 1.1, however, to test the viability of the comparative politics approach we must derive some falsifiable propositions from a theoretical framework based on a consistent set of assumptions.

The choice of a theoretical framework is determined by the political phenomenon one is trying to explain. In general in political science there are two dimensions of explanation: a type/token distinction, between a generally applicable theory (type) and a specific example of a general class of phenomenon (token); and an individual/mass distinction, between analyses of individual or collective political behaviour. Therefore, an analysis of the development of political parties in the EU system is a 'token' explanation of 'mass' political behaviour: where "a general model [is used] to try to explain some real event, process or institution". In the methodology of comparative politics, this implies studying the EU as an "extricated case study with generic concepts". The particularism of the explanandum in this 'token-mass' mode of explanation necessitates a theoretical framework which "captures the important structural variable of the actual institution". This is thus the methodological approach adopted here, under the ontological and epistemological framework of what is commonly referred to as 'new institutionalism'.

'New institutionalism' in comparative politics consequently implies a concern with a particular type of agency and a specific set of structures. Peter Hall calls this an "institutional approach to state-society relations". The key agents in this approach are the leadership elites

119 Ibid., p. 115. Nb. Trivial examples for the use of the other three modes of explanation are: the two-person prisoners' dilemma game ('type-individual'); a miners' leaders actions during a strike ('token-individual'); and the phenomenon of collective action or class formation ('type-mass').
122 Dowding, op. cit., p. 115.
123 Indeed, Ken Shepsle and Barry Weingast have called for the more comparative politics research using the ('new institutional') theoretical and methodological framework of the studies of the US Congress, where sophisticated theoretical analysis, using behavioural assumptions, has been combined with empirical observation in order to explain the impact of institutional arrangements on political decision-making. See K.A. Shepsle & B. Weingast (1994) "The Future of Comparative Politics", APSA-CP Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 1. Also see P.A. Hall & R.C.R. Taylor (1994) "Political Science and the Four New Institutionalisms", Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1-4 September 1994, New York.
of political parties; and the key structures are the formal decision-making rules (political
institutions), the social group bases of political support (social institutions), and the political
value traditions (ideology). In more formal terms, therefore, this approach treats party leaders
as strategic actors who are bound by organisational, sociological and normative institutions.125

Consequently, the new institutional approach is different from a classic (or "first
principles") 'rational choice' theory, because it does not try to discover equilibrium solutions
simply as a result of strategic behaviour between actors, and does not assume that actors have
perfect information or that their preferences are exogenously fixed.126 It also differs from a
'sociological' or 'structural-functional' theory, because the political or social 'system' does not
have any overarching causal priority: that behaviour is simply a function of the institutional
environment.127 In contrast to these reductionist theoretical antinomies, the new
institutionalism makes a realistic assumption that there is an interaction (and 'interdependence')
between structure and agency over time.128 Any actor in the 'real world' understands that she
can make political choices, but only within certain boundaries. This interdependence thus leads
to a number of general assumptions about agency and structure. And from these assumptions,
we can analyse how party elites behave within the ideological, social and organisational
constraints of EU politics.

Firstly, actors are 'utility-maximisers': where utility incorporates the effect of the
diminishing utility of incrementally increasing rewards, and that individuals can also seek non-
economic benefits (such as ideological or social status wants).129 Rational decisionmaking

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125 For a more formal statement of "limited rationality" see M. Levi, K.S. Cook, J.A. O'Brien & H. Faye
(1990) "Introduction - The Limits of Rationality", in K.S. Cook & M. Levi (eds) The Limits of Rationality,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
126 Cf. Dunleavy’s "institutional (or 'radical') public choice approach"; P. Dunleavy (1990) Democracy,
Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, pp. 3-4.
127 As Hall states, a functional approach "suggests that the actions of individuals will be affected by the
institutional structures within which they operate; but neither institutions nor action are dictated by the
existence of a superordinate 'system' with a status beyond the institutions themselves"; Hall (1986), op. cit.,
p. 260-1.
128 See, especially, A. Giddens (1981) "Agency, Institutions and Time-Space Analysis", in Knorr-Certina
&Cicourel (eds) Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-
129 See J.C. Harsanyi (1973) "Advances in Understanding Rational Behaviour", in R.E. Butts & J.
thus has two sides: 'internal' rationality, of human decision-processes;\textsuperscript{130} and 'external' rationality, in relation to the external environment (natural uncertainty) and other actors (strategic uncertainty).\textsuperscript{131} One does not claim that an actor actually goes through the same methodological, and sometimes mathematical, processes as the observer when making a decision, but simply that she behaves "as if" she is following the basic rules of rationality.\textsuperscript{132}

However, political behaviour is always 'bound' by structure.\textsuperscript{133} This structure:

prescribes and constrains the set of choosing agents, the manner in which their preferences are revealed, the alternatives over which preferences may be expressed, the order in which such expressions occur, and generally the way in which business is conducted.\textsuperscript{134}

Firstly, there are internal structures, such as personal values, knowledge and ability. For example, research on human psychology has demonstrated that most individuals think according to an enduring set of social 'norms'.\textsuperscript{135} Secondly, there are external structures, such as objective social divisions and formal decision-making rules and laws. For example, in

\textsuperscript{130} For an individual to be internally-rational she cannot hold contradictory beliefs (i.e. if $P = \text{'preferred to'}$, either $aPb$ or $bPa$), and her preference ordering must be transitive (i.e. if $P = \text{'preferred to'}$, $aPb$ and $bPc$, implies $aPc$). These two basic rules are discussed in more detail in the opening sections of all the classic works in rational choice theory. See K.J. Arrow (1951) *Social Choice and Individual Values*, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 13; A. Downs (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York: Harper & Row, p. 6; W.H. Riker (1962) *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 22; J.M. Buchanan & G. Tullock (1965) *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 27-30. However, Tsebelis has added a third 'internal' rule: that decision-making should conform to the axioms of (subjective) probability calculus, such as Bayes' Theorem. See G. Tsebelis (1990) *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{131} For an individual to be externally-rational her strategies must be mutually optimal in equilibrium (i.e. the rules of game theory), and her subjective probabilities approximate objective frequencies. See Tsebelis (1990) *ibid.*, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{132} See M. Friedman (1953) "The Methodology of Positive Economics", in M. Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 42. Friedman illustrates his argument by suggesting that professional billiard players play 'as if' they are following the laws of physics.


most political situations final outcomes are often “induced” by the rules governing the way proceedings are conducted.\textsuperscript{136}

Finally, free individual choice is also constrained by temporal factors. When decisions do not take place in a ‘static’ environment, preferences are only ‘credible’ if they take account of past loyalties and future expectations.\textsuperscript{137} The most significant of these temporal constraints is ideology.\textsuperscript{138} As Hall states:

Some attitudes have a more exogenous character in the sense that they derive from fundamental beliefs about politics and economics whose origins are not to be found in any immediate institutional situation ... Ideologies of this sort can be held by individuals in a wide variety of social positions and their presence cannot be associated determinatively with any given institutional location. Thus the obvious role of such political ideas places a natural limit on the extent to which the attitudes of political actors can be entirely attributed to their organisational position in society or the state.\textsuperscript{139}

Similarly Hinich and Munger conceive ideology as: “An internally consistent set of propositions that makes both proscriptive and prescriptive demands on human behaviour”.\textsuperscript{140} Ideology thus solves important political problems of credibility, and imperfect (or incomplete) information about future behaviour. For example, ideology indicates the likely future positions of parties \textit{vis-à-vis} the electorate and each other.\textsuperscript{141}


\textsuperscript{139} Hall, \textit{op. cit.} (note 136), p. 278.


However, over time actors are able to alter their decision-making environment. Rather than viewing individuals simply as passive recipients of structures, as in a narrow structural-functionalist framework, in this approach politicians are 'entrepreneurs' who can shape social and political institutions. Over time, structural arrangements do not move by themselves from one equilibrium to another. The intervening factor in this process are actors' "institutional choices". For example, party leaders play a role in changing the organisational structure of their parties. New institutions can be created if the 'transactions costs' (such as the costs of information, time, and enforcement) under the existing rules are higher than under some alternative arrangement. Moreover, rather than simply reflecting the interests of the support bases, parties can "shape" mass preferences through public policies which alter the social structure. And where historical-normative constraints are concerned, parties can credibly alter their ideology by gradually reinterpreting the basic principles of party programmes.

The basic assumptions of this paradigm, and their application to political parties, can be summarised as follows.

- **Political objectives are formed endogenously.** Actors alter the shape of their preferences as they participate in the political process. Politicians thus tend to have a different objective in a different structural 'frame' of the same decision. For example, party leaders make trade-offs between office and policy aims at different stages in the political cycle.

- **Actors have imperfect information.** Politicians cannot accurately predict the effects of their actions because of the complexity of intervening factors. As a result, political actors are constantly adjusting their expectations, and trying new strategies, as they learn about the

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143 Tsebelis calls this "the politics of institutional choice". See Tsebelis (1990) *op. cit.* (note 142), pp. 92-118.


145 See Dunleavy, op. cit. (note 138), pp. 119-29.

structural limitations of their decisions. For example, political parties are never certain how changes in their policy position will alter their electoral performance.

- **There are structural constraints on political behaviour.** The most significant of these constraints are past and future expectations, external commitments, and decision-making rules. For example, party leaders are restricted by their ideological tradition, the interests of their core support group, and the institutional mechanisms of the political system.

- **Constraints can be changed by voluntary action.** Whenever deciding on strategy, political actors also bare in mind their limited ability to alter the shape of their environment. For example, parties can agree to change the constitutional structure of the political system, implement public policy which alters the interests of their support base, and even amend their ideological boundaries.

The theoretical framework outlined here thus emphasises the interaction between political action and structure: a realistic approximation of how political change occurs in everyday practice. Although rooted in contemporary economic and social science theory, this approach is also compatible with Marx's famous dictum that "men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please". In contrast, unrealistic rational choice or structural-functionalist theories either predict a stable outcome (equilibrium) or complete instability (intransitivity). In practice, however, politics is about 'process' from one decision, agreement or election to another, without any real cyclical tendency.

Furthermore, the addition of 'time' to a general structure-agency framework allows the theory to escape the tautology that all behaviour is rational because actors are rational! Decisions can be analysed by working "back and forth" between 'revealed preferences', the actual choices made (also called procedural rationality), and 'posited preferences', the expected choices derived from assumptions about individual motives (also called substantive rationality). The difference between expected and actual action over a particular time period, where there are different intervening structural variables at different temporal points, thus

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allows us to pinpoint under what conditions the various structural constraints influence political outcomes.

Finally, this theoretical framework helps resolve a pervasive problem of comparative politics: of "large variables, small-n". Using a universally applicable set of assumptions, and examples from actual institutional settings, we can construct an analytical model of a specific political phenomenon in a unique institutional environment. In this case, the phenomenon is party behaviour and the specific environment is the social, ideological and institutional structure of EU politics. Because "political parties are at the cross-roads between institutional and behavioural aspects of politics" they are an ideal comparative politics subject for the operationalisation of this framework. As a reflection of social divisions and ideological mind-sets, party strategy is dependent upon structural factors. However, parties also possess considerable resources to operate as independent adaptive organisations. Before empirical research can be undertaken, however, this general theoretical framework needs to be turned into a specific 'comparative politics theory' of political parties in the EU system.


Chapter 2

A Comparative Politics Theory of Parties in the European Union

2.1. The Development of Political Parties: Towards a General Theory

Political parties are peculiarly torn between two competing logics: the dependence on institutional arrangements, such as the need to establish a level of organisational coherence; and the dependence on ideological commitments, such as the need to implement a policy programme. These rival logics consequently produced two fundamentally different explanations of party development.\(^1\) Firstly, the *institutional theory* argues that parties evolve as a result of the establishment and reorganisation of the institutions of democracy; particularly the creation of a government accountable to a legislature, and the introduction of universal suffrage. In this analysis, behavioural differences between parties derive from whether they are created 'internally' to the parliamentary system, or 'externally' through the mobilisation of the electorate.\(^2\) Secondly, the *cleavage theory* argues that parties emerged as a result of 'critical junctures' in the system-building process. Each critical juncture produces a new conflict or 'dichotomy' in society, and political organisations arise to articulate each side of the argument. In this sense, parties emerge to fill a gap in the 'cleavage-map' - the matrix of ideological and social conflicts.\(^3\)

However, the application of these competing theories to the development of the political parties in the European Union (EU) is limited. The institutional theory suggests that direct

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elections to the European Parliament (EP) would facilitate the agglomeration of actors with similar positions into political parties. However, this ignores the institutional weakness of the EP, and the constraint of the existence of party systems and party organisations at the national level prior to the process of institution-building at the European level. Alternatively, the cleavage model suggests parties would develop at the European level once any political conflict is manifest at that level. However, a conflict between national interests would not facilitate parties in the EU, as these interests are already articulated through the structure of territorial/national representation of national governments in the Council of Ministers and European Council. Consequently, parties will only be able to fill gaps in the European cleavage structure where the cleavages divide social groups on party-political lines (i.e. Left-Right) rather than on national lines.

However, in recognition of the limitations of these two classic approaches, there have been two trends in comparative theories of party development: to integrate institutional and ideological logics in a single ‘structural’ approach; and to supplement these sociological theories with economic theories of party behaviour. As regards the first development, institutions and ideology are in fact different ‘structural’ determinants of party behaviour. In a structural approach to party behaviour, therefore, institutional and ideological factors should really be combined.\(^4\) For example, Kirchheimer’s analysis of the transformation from the ‘mass party’ to the ‘catch-all’ party combines a theory of organisational adaptation with an emphasis on ideological change.\(^5\) Similarly, although Lipset and Rokkan are renowned for their cleavage model, it is often forgotten that Stein Rokkan also proposed a model of how “institutional thresholds” determine whether a cleavage remains a ‘latent’ societal division or becomes ‘manifest’ in the party system.\(^6\) Hence, it is this combination of structural constraints

\(^4\) As early as 1956, Neumann suggested that a real “sociology of parties” should be based on an understanding of the organisational characteristics of parties themselves and their relationship to society structures. See S. Neumann (1956) “Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties”, in S. Neumann (ed.) Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


in a single theory of political parties that constitutes the theoretical core of the "European comparative politics" tradition in party research.7

However, the second development from the institution-ideology debate is the introduction of micro-level analyses of party behaviour. Most contemporary theories of party behaviour integrate the methodological individualism of the 'rational choice' approaches with the European research's emphasis on structural factors.8 This combination of structural and behavioural assumptions has consequently allowed party research to move beyond theories which apply to a particular area of party activity (such as electoral or coalition behaviour), or to party activity within a particular set of political institutions (such as a parliamentary system), towards a 'general theory' of parties in all political systems and arenas of politics: from competitive elections, to legislative behaviour, coalition bargaining, campaign management, and public policy implementation.9

Hence, the theoretical core of the contemporary 'comparative politics approach' to political parties is the interpretation of the interdependence between parties as egocentric political actors and the constraints of the structural and strategic environment. This consequently coincides with the trend in comparative politics away from the structure- or agency-biased approaches of the Structural-Functionalism and Rational Choice paradigms to the general theories developed under the umbrella of 'New Institutionalism', as outlined in Chapter 1. The purpose of this chapter is thus to develop a theory of parties in the EU system, to enable us to move beyond the reductionist institutional or ideological explanations of party development in the EU. The theory starts with the definition of party development as 'organisational change' (in Section 2.2), subsequently analyses the primary goals of parties in the EU (in Section 2.3), and looks at the two main structural constrains on these goals: the EU political institutions (in Sections 2.4), and the shape of the EU political space (in Section 2.5). This theory is operationalised through the measurement of the pursuit and reward of policy goal in European Council decision-making (in Section 2.6). Finally, from this theoretical and

methodological framework, an explanation is proposed for the three phases of party development highlighted in chapter one (in Section 2.7).

2.2. Party Organisational Change: Interests, Institutions, and Ideology

Many of the first scholars of political parties saw them primarily as political *organisations*. However, for a number of reasons, not least academic fashion, for decades the analysis of party organisation was ignored. Nevertheless, since the groundbreaking work of Angelo Panebianco, comparative theory and research has returned to the essential realisation that above all parties *are* organisations. Party development is thus fundamentally 'organisational change'. For example, the evolution around the turn of the century from a 'cadre party' (or 'party of individual representation') to a 'mass electoral party' (or 'party of democratic integration') was a change from an indirectly-elected parliamentary-based elite, to an integrated hierarchical structure with a large mass membership. Similarly, the transformation in the 1950s and 1960s from a 'party of mass integration' (or 'mass-bureaucratic party') to a 'catch-all party' (or 'electoral-professional party') was a change from the classic mass-membership organisation to a elite-directed professional bureaucracy designed to maximise electoral success. Likewise, the development of political parties in the EU system is fundamentally a case of party 'organisational change': an *evolution* of national party organisations, and a *formation* of new European party organisations.

In keeping with the 'new institutional' framework in comparative politics, party organisational evolution and formation results from changing 'collective institutional choices'.

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of the key political actors. Party organisation is thus treated as *endogenous* to the ongoing process of politics in the EU system, and the organisations of the party federations evolve as a result of self-interested actions of the European party members. In formal rational choice theory, political organisations solve 'collective action' problems by introducing ways of overcoming negative incentives (as in the 'prisoner's dilemma') and problems of strategic uncertainty (as in the 'battle of the sexes' problem). Exogenously formed party organisations thus facilitate stable choices between the political actors; i.e. 'structure-induced equilibria'. However, if political institutions are not exogenous to the decision process, they surely must suffer from the same problems of majority-rule instability as any normal policy choice. In reality, nevertheless, party organisational change is slow and almost never 'cyclical'. How can this mismatch between theory and practice be explained?

One possible explanation argues that political organisations are similar to economic organisations (such as the firm): which tend to be stable because they reduce "transactions costs". 'Transactions costs' are the costs of establishing and enforcing agreements between actors. In politics, where decision-making is highly complex and uncertain, these costs arise because actors (with subjective preferences) constantly need to gather more and new information about the structure of the environment and other actors' preferences. If actors have common informational requirements they will thus benefit from institutional arrangement which divide information-gathering tasks between the participants. Hence, the result of cooperation is a set of rules which determine who should bear the costs of gathering information.

14 For the classic ‘political science’ presentation of basic game theory see R.D. Luce & H. Riaffra (1957) *Games and Decisions*, New York: Riley.


17 A different explanation, which is not discussed here, is the ‘folk theorem’: where repeated iterations of the same collective dilemma produces a stable institutional rule. This is particularly the case if there is a high level of uncertainty about the effects of other institutional alternatives, and actors are ‘risk averse’. For a formal presentation of the ‘folk theorem’ see F. Fudenberg & E. Maskin (1986) “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting for Incomplete Information”, *Econometrica*, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 533-54.


of 'measuring' the costs of changing arrangements, and of punishing defectors. Once these basic organisational arrangements have been set up, the costs of defection are high.

Where political parties are concerned, this specialisation leads to a "delegation of tasks" between different party actors. Party activists provide labour and capital so that leaders can collect campaign information and implement the supporters' policy programme. In return, the party distributes benefits: selective goods for leaders and party bureaucrats, and collective goods for party activists and supporters. These arrangements consequently establish an organisational 'bond' between the party activists (the 'principals') and the party leaders (the 'agents'): a hierarchical organisational structure which corrects the failures of political action in a non-institutionalised environment. If a political activist defects from a party structure, she will lose the possibility of influencing the selection of party candidates and the direction of the policy programme. Hence, to combat declining party membership most European parties have increasingly delegated candidate selection and policy-influence to party activists. Similarly, if a party leader defects (or is expelled), the chances of remaining in political office are significantly marginalised: the ability to use the legislative seat to secure policy rewards for the leaders' supports is reduced, and the chance of securing nomination in the next election is lessened.

Once established, therefore, party organisations develop as a result of changes in the structure of costs. For example, informational requirements increase if there is a new actor (such as a Green Party) in the political system. Conversely, if two parties merge, information costs are reduced, there is less incentive for a party to remain organisationally coherent.

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Similarly, if another party adopts a new organisational form that appears to be more successful, this new information will create pressure for similar internal reform in the other parties.

There is, nevertheless, a missing link in this theory of institutional choice and change. A straight-forward application of organisational economics to parties would suggest that politicians and activists could join *any* political party. In real life, however, parties only *ever* form between actors with common policy aims. A possible answer to this dilemma is the existence and persistence of 'communities'. As Schofield points out:

> The fundamental theoretical problem underlying the question of co-operation is the manner by which individuals attain knowledge of each others' preferences and likely behaviour. Moreover, the problem is one of common knowledge, since each individual, *i*, is required not only to have information about others' preferences, but also to know that the others have knowledge about *i*'s own preferences and strategies.  

Taylor consequently argues that this 'common knowledge' only exists in "communities", where: individuals share common beliefs and norms; and there is a reciprocity of interest. In political interaction, these 'norms' and reciprocal interests arise from a common *ideology*.

An ideology is a set of beliefs about 'what is good', 'who gets what', and 'who rules'; which satisfies two basic criteria: *logical consistency*, and *temporal consistency* (i.e. it advocates the same action in similar situations across space and time). Party organisation is thus durable between actors with shared ideological positions, because they share a common knowledge of each others' positions, and desire the same information about other actors in the political system (about the strategic environment). As Hinich and Munger thus conclude, party organisation exists because: "Ideology provides the means by which credible communication is made possible, and allows the transformation of collections of individuals into communities".

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An example of the way ideology facilitates reciprocal interests is in the organisational implications of 'collective reputations'. Politicians who use the same ideological baggage to reduce the costs of information gathering and dissemination in electoral and legislative competition share a 'collective reputation'. However, each politician who uses the ideological baggage would like to tailor the reputation to suit her particular needs. If each individual does this, however, the collective reputation will be instantly destroyed. There is thus a need for a collective mechanism to resolve disputes over reputation, and to prevent shirking, which would undermine and discredit the reputation. The only solution, therefore, is to establish some organisational rules between the politicians with the same ideological baggage. In short, therefore, party organisations will only exist between activists and leaders with similar policy platforms.

Consequently, if this theory of party organisation holds, the internal development of parties in the EU system will satisfy the following two central criteria:

- Party organisations will develop if they can reduce the transactions costs of the participants in their pursuit of office and policy goals. In other words, there is no incentive for participating in collective action, if a party can secure the same goals at a lower cost from outside the membership of a party federation.

- However, parties will only form between actors with the same policy goals. Without a common ideological stance, there is little incentive against defection and membership of another party with lower transactions costs. The party federations will thus only want to attract parties from the same political family.

However, an explanation of party organisational change must also take into account the interaction between the goals of the party organisation and the external environment.

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2.3. Party Goals: Government Office and Public Policy

The notion of party 'goals' originates in the application of models of economic competition to party behaviour. These 'formal theories' usually assume that the primary goals of parties are either political office or the implementation of a policy programme. In the classic 'office-seeking' model, Downs asserted that "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies". From this model of electoral competition, Riker developed an 'office-seeking' model of coalition formation that predicted the formation of "minimum-winning-coalitions". However, rationalist theories of party electoral and coalition behaviour have also been developed from the alternative assumption that 'policy' is the primary goal. For example, Wittman proposed a model of "parties as utility maximisers", where 'utility' is measured against the goals of the electoral platform. Likewise, by using a policy-seeking assumption, Axelrod argued that parties will tend to coalesce with parties next to them on the policy spectrum.

As Strom points out, however: "A more general behavioural theory of competitive political parties requires an understanding of the interrelations and trade-offs between different objectives". Under certain circumstances policy and office goals do not conflict; such as when the ideal policy platform also secures government office. More often than not, however, there is a traded-off between office and policy objectives. Even in the process of coalition formation, when party leaders are perhaps most tempted to simply secure political office, they are constrained by the policy commitments in their electoral programme.

30 The most obvious economic application to political parties was the Hotelling model of competition between firms. See H. Hotelling (1929) "Stability in Competition", The Economic Journal, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 41-57.
37 For formal applications of the interaction between office and policy goals in coalition formation see D. Austen-Smith & J.S. Banks (1990) "Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios", American...
The ongoing process of democratic elections ensures that programme commitments can never be ignored. As Laver and Hunt explain:

Proposed programmes of action explicitly intended to bring about particular states of the world can be thought of as 'policies'. People's tastes lead them to prefer some states of the world over others, thus voters have preferences for policies based on their tastes.38

If one assumes a Euclidean structure of voter preferences, individuals vote for the party which is 'closest' to their ideal policy preference. Alternatively, a 'directional voting' model suggests that individuals vote for the party that is closest to them on the same side of the key issues on which they are aligned.39 In either of these voting models, therefore, voter's make their decisions about which party to support on the basis of the policy position of the party.

Overall, therefore, a central assumption of this theoretical framework is that there is a trade-off between the party goals of political office and public policy. The crucial question for this research is thus how parties weigh office and policy rewards in the EU system. In the EU, political office is rewarded through the control of the national government administrations (which secures representation in the Council of Ministers and the European Council), European Commission posts, and seats in the European Parliament. Policy goals, on the other hand, are secured through the outputs from the EU decision-making system: the short-term legislative agenda and decisions (from the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the Parliament), which the electorates see from day-to-day; and the medium- and long-term agenda (from the key Council of Ministers meetings, and the European Council), on which parties will have to take policy stances in the future. The distribution of rewards between these various office and policy goals is hence determined by the structure of political opportunities in the EU system.

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2.4. The Structure of Political Opportunities in the EU System

The institutional environment of the political system defines the "structure of political opportunities" for political actors: the structure of rewards; the rules for attaining these rewards; and the general patterns of behaviour surrounding their attainment.\(^{40}\) The structure of political opportunities in the EU operates on two dimensions: vertically, through the distribution of authority between hierarchical levels of government; and horizontally, through the allocation of power between the executive and legislature arenas, and the decision rules within these arenas. The ability to convert goals into rewards depends on whether these vertical and horizontal arrangements facilitate "majoritarian" or "consensual" behaviour.\(^{41}\) At the majoritarian extreme, the success or failure of an objective is decided by a simply majority in a single arena; whereas at the consensual extreme, outcomes result from a series of 'oversized majorities' in several arenas. Consensual procedures thus create a higher degree of uncertainty about the level of congruence between policy objectives and outcomes than majoritarian structures.

2.4.1. Vertical: 'Upside-Down' and Functional Federalism

On the vertical dimension, the EU is a federal system: "a political organisation in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions".\(^{42}\) However, rather than implying that the EU is an explicit federation of states, the concept of federalism can be used as "a descriptive tool in the comparison of different forms of

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\(^{40}\) This concept originated in the study of political career paths. See J.A. Schlesinger (1966) *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States*, Chicago: Rand McNally.


territorial organisation of government". For example, in federalist theory, the territorial
division of political organisation limits the possibility of power being concentrated in the hands
of a single political party, faction, or individual. This consequently has important
implications for political parties, since the key determinant of party behaviour is the way
political rewards are distributed between the various levels in this hierarchical system.
However, this distribution of rewards is a result of two independent factors: the level of
centralisation or decentralisation; and the degree of independence or interdependence between
decision-making on each level.

On the level of centralisation/decentralisation, federalist theory suggests that in most
cases the central institutions offer the most political rewards. At the higher level politicians
usually have power to decide on the prestigious 'high politics' issues (such as defence, security
and foreign policy) and have most control over the allocation of public revenues. In most
federal systems, party competition is thus most ferocious during the election of the federal
executive, with the election of the federal legislature the next most important site of electoral
competition. In the EU, however, the national arena is the key level of decision-making on
high politics issues, and the level were the majority of public resources are allocated.
Moreover, the institutional structure of the EU means that the European elections do not lead to
the "formation of government" or to the "formation of public policy": the two main functions of
elections in most democratic systems. As a result, elections to the EP are fought as separate
national referenda on the performances of the domestic governments in office.

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43 This is a central argument of one of the most prominent theorists of federalism, David Elazar. See, for
44 This is one of the classic normative arguments in J. Madison, A. Hamilton & J. Jay (1987) [1788] The
45 Since the distribution of political rewards is a fundamental characteristic of federalism, Riker argues that
"one can measure federalism by measuring parties". Riker (1975), op. cit., p. 137.
Press of America, pp. 188-232.
Federalism and the Role of the State, Toronto: Toronto University Press, pp. 152-5.
50 See, in particular, J. Lodge & V. Herman (1982) The Direct Elections to the European Parliament,
Consequently, whether parties seek office or policy, the rewards are higher if they control decision-making at the national level. The European arena is thus only a 'second order arena'. Hence, concentrating on the vertical distribution of rewards between levels, the political system of the EU is perhaps best described as an “upside-down federal system”.

On the second factor on the vertical dimension, the degree of independence/interdependence between hierarchical levels, competences in the EU are divided ‘functionally’ rather than ‘jurisdictionally’. A jurisdictional division implies that the central institutions are responsible for all decision-making in a particular policy area, whereas the local institutions are wholly competent in another area. Under a functional division of competences, however, the upper level decides the general framework of legislation in co-operation with the representatives of the territorial units, and the lower level is responsible for the legislative detail and for the implementation of policy. The final political outputs in a functional system thus arise as a result of a process of ‘joint decision-making’. Consequently, concentrating on the vertical interrelation of political rewards, the EU can be described as a “co-operative federal system”.

However, because of the upside-down distribution of competences, the policy areas subject to central policy-making in the functional EU system are not the same as in the classic ‘State’. There are three main policy functions of the state: economic redistribution, macro-economic stabilisation, and economic regulation. The classic European Welfare State played a significant role in the first two policy areas, and is developing an increasing role in the third

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51 The concept of Europe as a 'second order arena' of party behaviour was originally used in the analysis of elections to the European Parliament. However, it also holds in the general explanation for the way parties view EC politics. See K. Reif & H. Schmitt (1980) “Nine Second Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results”, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 3-44.


area. At the European level, however, EU policy-making is primarily concerned with the last of these functions. The size of the EU budget is less than 1.3 percent of the total GDP of the EU member states and less than 4 percent of the total government spending at the national level. Consequently, compared to the outputs of the national administration, legislation at the European level (on such policy areas as agriculture, fisheries, infrastructural development, and social programmes) can have only a marginal direct redistributional effect.

However, EU policy outputs achieve a certain degree of 'territorial redistribution'. For example, economic transfers under the EU structural funds constitute a significant proportion of the total GDP of several of the poorer Member States. Redistribution between different territorial units, however, is something fundamentally different to the classic 'socio-economic redistribution' function of the European Welfare State, where a large proportion of public policies are geared specifically towards the reduction of wealth differentials between different economic groups regardless of territorial location. Territorial redistribution under the EU structural funds is thus more an issue of territorial interests than social class interests. The question of the territorial transfer of resources is part of the whole topic of the level of overall redistributive power of the State - which is a core issue in all any system-building processes. In contrast, the question of the transfer of resources between different social groups is related to the ideological role of the State once it has been created. 'Party politics' is inherently more concerned with this intra-territorial redistribution than the trans-territorial questions. The lack of direct socio-economic redistributive powers at the European level, as compared to territorial redistributive powers, is thus a further constraint on the pursuit of party policy goals through the EU system.

Nevertheless, although the direct socio-economic redistributional possibilities at the European level are limited, the functional adoption of EU legislation changes the structure of policy-options at the national level in two other important respects. Firstly, the EU framework

indirectly decides the boundaries of national socio-economic redistribution. The establishment of a social policy regulatory framework at the European level, under the auspices of health and safety at work legislation and various Directives within the Social Action Programme, has a socio-economic redistributive effect. These effects are not paid directly from the EU budget but are born by the employers and national administrations who implement the legislation. Moreover, the ability of national administrations to use public resources to discriminate between producers and owners of factors of production on the basis of nationality has been significantly reduced. This has firstly been achieved through the setting at the European level of strict rules for public procurement and state aids. However, the implementation of EU competition and mergers policy has also encroached on the ability of national governments to defend their ‘natural monopolies’ against European-wide competition. Finally, European level decision-making sets an increasing number of constraints on national macro-economic policy-making, through the establishment of the ‘convergence criteria’ for Economic and Monetary Union, and the subsequent ‘multilateral surveillance’ in the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (EcoFin) to monitor national rates of inflation, interest and public debt.

Secondly, EU decision-making leads to the harmonisation and establishment of regulatory regimes. The size and rigidity of the EU budget has meant that the European Commission has only been able to expand its competences by proposing rules where the costs are borne directly by the firms and individuals who have to comply with them. Moreover, the national governments have been willing to adopt strict common rules at the European level to overcome problems of inconsistency and enforcement of different regulatory regimes in the various national arenas. In response to this demand from the national administrations, the European Commission has been able to supply European regulation in eight main areas: product standards, environment, financial and professional services, public utilities, air

transport, competition policy, anti-dumping rules, and public procurement and state aids.\textsuperscript{60} Hence, the several hundred regulatory measures in the Single Market programme was a culmination of the growth of European-level 'regulatory' policies which had begun in the late 1960s.\textsuperscript{61} In most federal systems, however, regulation at the central level is allocatively (Pareto) 'efficient' rather than 'redistributive'.\textsuperscript{62} As a result, the centrality of regulation in EU decision-making means that European-level governance is more like the 'fourth branch' (the independent regulatory agencies) of the US system than the traditional European 'redistributive administration'.\textsuperscript{63}

This dimension of EU politics is in fact a reflection of the changing structure of European public policy in the last twenty years. Before the 1970s, the main method of correcting 'market failure' in Europe was through nationalisation and the expansion of redistributational welfare policies. Since the mid-1970s, however, the European state has been "in retreat": public policy has increasingly been pursued through privatisation and the regulation of various economic sectors through quasi-autonomous government agencies. The significance of EU policy-making, nevertheless, the regulation of goods and services in the Single Market is almost exclusively decided at the European level. Moreover, from initial market regulation, EU legislation has rapidly grown in other policy fields, such as minimum standards for health and safety at work.\textsuperscript{64}

The problem for political parties, however, is that they are uncertain about how to react within this emerging regulatory framework set at the European level. As Müller and Wright point out:

\textsuperscript{63} G. Majone (1993b) "The European Community: An 'Independent Fourth Branch of Government'?", European University Institute Working Paper SPS No. 93/9; and Bulmer (1994b) \textit{op. cit.}.
Reshaping of the West European State has affected the style of state intervention, the form (in a more indirect, regulatory and enabling direction), the instruments (from direct to semi-autonomous or even private agents of public policy) and even in the substance of some sectors.65

A direct consequence of this change from 'redistributional' to 'regulatory' politics has thus been a floundering of rival policy ideas between the main party families. Although there was a relatively small policy difference between Centre-Left and Centre-Right parties during the 'social democratic consensus' of the 1950s and 1960s, there were fairly coherent competing visions about the means and ends of managing this consensus.66 Under the new politics of regulation, however, there is a high level of inconsistency in the various European Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, Liberal and Conservative positions.67

Consequently, the vertical distribution of rewards in the EU system creates a complex structure of incentives for political parties to organise at the European level. Firstly, in the functional division of responsibilities, parties are eager to secure a European legislative framework which does not constrain the policy promises made during national elections. If EU legislation is close to a party's ideological position it will be free to pursue its policy-agenda in the national legislative and governmental arenas. If the EU policy is closer to a rival party's policy stance, however, a party will want to alter the EU legislative framework, in the expectation that when it is elected to office it will need to implement the policy programme presented to the electorate.

Secondly, however, the dominance of the 'new politics of regulation' at the EU level, and the continued replacement of 'redistributive' norms with 'efficiency' requirements at the national level, means that party leaders are uncertain about the content of the policy goals that should be pursued at the European level. This uncertainty, nevertheless, is likely to facilitate party organisational development in the EU. Parties need to gather information and expertise in order to adopt policies on the new issues: such as the precise procedures for accountability of

regulators, and how to define the public interest requirement of regulation. Because of 'collective reputation', moreover, this organisational development is likely to occur through policy co-ordination between like-minded actors in similar domestic strategic environments.

2.4.2. Horizontal: Consensual Rules and the 'Crucial Site' of EU Politics

Turning to the horizontal dimension of the institutional system, however, political behaviour at the European level is constrained by the 'rules of the game' within and between the executive and legislative bodies at the European level. The structure of horizontal institutions also determines which arena provides the best opportunity for the attainment of party goals: the crucial "site of competition".68

The first point to note about the horizontal structure of EU institutions is that they are fundamentally 'consensual' rather than 'majoritarian'.69 All four classic decision-making characteristics that define a political system as a "consensus democracy" exist in the EU.70 Firstly, the federal-type division of competences between European and national institutions establishes a segmental autonomy, where the segments are defined by the cultural-territorial divisions between the European nation-states.71 As Lijphart states:

A special form of segmental autonomy is federalism ... federalism has a few significant parallels with consociational theory: not only in the granting of

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69 I prefer to describe the EC as a 'consensus' rather than 'consociational' democracy because, as Arend Lijphart states, "not just because the former is shorter - and easier to pronounce! - than the latter, but because ... I start out with an analysis of the majoritarian model, from which I derive the consensus model as an opposite"; in Lijphart (1984) op. cit., p. xiv.


71 A federal system does not necessarily possess consensual institutions. If many decision-making powers are concentrated in a single institution or political office at the federal level, the system is a 'compact federal' system, and thus inherently 'majoritarian'. See J.D. Robertson (1994) "Compact Federalism or Compound Republicanism as Competing Visions of Europe's New Community: Empirical Evidence Pertaining to Institutional Authority Patterns", Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1-4 September 1994, New York.
autonomy to constituent parts of the state ... but also the over-representation of the smaller subdivisions in the 'federal' chamber.72

In the 'federal chambers' in the EU, the Council of Ministers and the European Council, representation is by national government. Moreover, in these institutions the smaller Member States are over-represented.73

The second rule of consensus government, the principle of proportionality, is thus upheld in the EU in the system of territorial representation. However, proportionality also holds in civil service appointment and in the allocation of public funds: recruitment to the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament administrations is based on quotas for each Member State; and the allocation of resources is consciously measured against the national contributions to the EU budget. This proportionality constrains the development of cross-cutting systems of political representation and resource allocation. In territorially-divided systems, however, it is trans-national social group interests or ideological values, the normal bases of support and legitimacy for political parties, that are the cross-cutting political divisions. This thus presents a problem for transnational party organisation.

The third rule, of mutual veto when a decision threatens a special interest of a segment, was informally instituted into EU decision-making by the Luxembourg Compromise of January 1966. This agreement specified that on an issue deemed a 'vital national interest' to a particular Member State a decision requiring majority voting in the Council of Ministers could be postponed until unanimous agreement had been reached. In practice there has been a decline in the use of the Luxembourg Compromise such that: "A Member State can no-longer veto a proposal unless unanimity is explicitly specified as the decision-making method".74 Nevertheless, the rules for decision-making under the EU's functional division of competences imply that central government decisions are dependent upon the agreement of all the constituent governments. This de jure right of veto hence creates a "joint-decision trap", where legislative

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72 Lijphart (1977), op. cit., p. 42.
outcomes are systematically sub-optimal. This decision-trap nonetheless ensures that the present institutional rules in the EU - which define the cooperative and consensual system - are difficult to change.

Consequently, these first three formal rules facilitate the informal rule of government by grand coalition. Segmental autonomy, mutual veto and proportionality make it impossible for simple majorities to win in the EU. This is formally instituted in the qualified majority and unanimity voting rules in the Council of Ministers, and in the 'consensus' style of decision-making in the European Council. However, government by grand coalition is also facilitated by the non-'organic' separation of powers in the EU. In a classic organic separation of powers, as in the United States, executive and legislative powers are divided between different institutions: the government and the parliament. In the EU, however, executive and legislative powers are divided across several institutions: executive powers are held jointly by the Commission and the Council, and legislative powers are jointly held by the European Council, the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the EP. This system thus ensures that legislation can only pass with a series of oversized majorities in several institutional settings. For example, in many areas of Single Market legislation under the 'co-operation procedure' the medium-term legislative framework is informally set by the European Council and the precise details of legislation emerge as a result of a simple majority in the Commission, a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers, and a simple majority of those present in the EP (which in practice is a grand coalition between the Socialist and Christian Democrat Groups). The institutional requirement of grand coalition thus effectively prevents policy competition in the EU between a 'government' and 'opposition', or between two rival political 'blocs'.

Finally, the structure of horizontal institutions in the EU has facilitated the establishment of the European Council as the 'crucial site' of political competition in the EU.
system as a whole. The European Council emerged in the early nineteen seventies as the only institutional arena available to overcome decision-making inertia at lower levels in the European Community (EC) system.78 With the ad hoc EC Summits in the Hague in December 1969, and Paris in October 1972, the EC entered a new phase of institutional and political integration: with a strengthening of the EC institutions: the establishment of 'political co-operation'; the discussion of the goal of 'economic and monetary union'; a decision to hold direct elections to the EP; and an agreement on the first enlargement of the Community. There was thus a vital need to legitimise these bargains, by involving the elites at the highest political level.79 Bulmer and Wessels describe this interaction between domestic and European politics in the establishment of the European Council as the emergence of 'co-operative federalism' in the EC.80 However, it also fits firmly into the notion of consensual decision-making outlined above. In a territorially pillarised consensual system, any decision which threatens the vital interests of the pillars requires agreement of each of the territorial elites. To secure this agreement, however, an institutional procedure needs to be created. In the EC and EU system, therefore, this is precisely the role of the European Council.

The European Council was set up by an ad hoc EC Summit in Paris, in December 1974. As the Summit Communiqué stated:

Recognising the need for an overall approach to the internal problems involved in achieving European unity ... the Heads of Government consider it essential to ensure progress and overall consistency in the activities of the Communities.81

The Summit Communiqué also established that: the participants in the European Council are the Heads of Government (of State for France) and the Foreign Ministers, and the President of the European Commission and one of the Commission Vice-Presidents (i.e. the highest-level elites in the whole EC/EU system); and that the European Council meets at least twice a year (i.e. at the conclusion of each Council Presidency). The first European Council meeting was held in

80 Ibid., pp. 46-8.
Dublin in March 1975, and between 1975 and 1994 there was a total of fifty-seven European Councils. To facilitate decision-making at this level, the meetings routinely involve a full 'conference' of all the participants as well as a special 'fire-side chat' of just the Heads of Government and the Commission President. The European Council was formally institutionalised in the EC system by the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), and the status of the European Council as the supreme political authority in the whole EU system was confirmed in Article D of the TEU, which stated that: "The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general guidelines thereof." As Jan Werts concludes:

The European Council changed the decision-making of the [other EU] Institutions into a system of joint decision-making by the Member States and the Institutions ... The European Council may be seen as the system's political and initiating spine ... [providing] the political stimuli, to ensure progress and consistency, to pinpoint time limits, and to overcome the barricades developed at the lower levels of the Council.

The European Council is thus a "Provisional European Government: a collegial Legislative-Executive at the highest level".

In contrast, the directly elected European Parliament (the traditional arena for party competition in any system) has only limited powers. Under the 'cooperation procedure', the EP is restricted to influencing the detailed content of legislation rather than the general direction of policy. Moreover, this role can only be exercised under specific conditions: if the Commission supports the EP position, if the Member States are divided, and if the EP's position is preferable to the status quo. Under the 'codecision procedure', introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, the position of the EP was enhanced. However, the new procedure did not

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84 ibid., pp. 312-3.
establish true ‘codecision-making’ between the Parliament and the Council because the EP was only given the power of ‘negative assent’ over the legislative positions of the Council. The EP also has limited budgetary powers, and some influence in the selection of the Commission President. Compared to domestic parliaments, however, these powers are also weak.

If the role of the EP is significantly enhanced, it may become the driving force of policy at the European level. However, it would not be appropriate to develop a theory based on the possible shape of the EU system at some time in the future. In the present structure of EU institutions, therefore, the European Council is the main institutional point of focus for the pursuit of party policy goals. Whereas the EP struggles to positively change legislation, every meeting of the European Council shapes the medium-term policy programme of the EU.

Finally, the system of representation in the European Council determines that not all parties have the same incentive to co-operate in order to influence European Council outputs. The participants in European Council meetings are the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the domestic governments. Moreover, parties holding these positions have already secured a basic party goal: the highest office rewards in the EU system. In contrast, parties in opposition have no direct representation in the European Council, and have not secured a central party objective. Hence, in a co-operative situation between a party in government and a party in opposition who share a common policy interest, there is a strong incentive for the governmental party to ‘defect’ when bargaining in the European Council. In the European Council, a party in government can voluntarily choose whether to support or oppose a party federation’s position without being a member of a party federation. Hence, the price of organising around European Council meetings is likely to be a reduction of party cohesion and membership. Conversely, therefore, if there is a concomitant increase in party organisation around European Councils and in party membership and cohesion, the benefits of belonging to a party federation must far out-weigh the loss of decision-making autonomy.

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2.4.3. Parties in Comparative Institutional Environments

From the above analysis we can see that the structural phenomena of federalism and consensual decision-making rules "together furnish an importantly different environment for political parties ... particularly when parties have emerged in a period before much centralisation". However, the development of parties in the EU can also be analysed by looking at party organisation and behaviour under comparable vertical and horizontal institutional arrangements. There is a danger of stretching these direct comparisons too far. Nevertheless, a brief survey of the structure of parties in the United States and Switzerland illustrates that parties do operate according to general behavioural rules in other non-classic institutional and political environments.

For example, the division of political rewards between hierarchical levels (the first factor on the vertical institutional dimension) is a major hindrance to coherent party strategies in the United States. Eldersveld argued that as a result of the federal system parties in the US are "stratarchies", with a series of largely autonomous (but connected) layers, rather than a single structure of hierarchical control. For most of American history the sub-national states have had more control of public revenues than the federal government, and of more than 500,000 elected offices in the US less than 600 are at the federal level. It is thus not surprising that party political career histories suggest that state governorships are generally preferred to seats in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Katz and Kolodny hence conclude that "the most fundamental point about federalism as a factor conditioning the character of American parties is simply that the states are extremely important, both as loci for political careers and as independent decision-makers". As a result, the US parties only exist at the federal level for Presidential elections, and during normal decision-making processes there are only very weak organisational links between party behaviour at the state and federal levels, and between the

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executive and legislative arenas at the federal level. Eldersveld thus describes the relationship between the Congressional party organs and the extra-parliamentary structures as a “co-archy: a set of leadership units virtually isolated from each other in the formal sense, minimally collaborative, and jealously guarding their prerogatives”. Despite these constraints on the development of a classic ‘party government’ model in the US, however, the Democrat and Republican Parties remain the only political organisations that operate at all political levels and in every major decision-making arena.

Furthermore, jurisdictional and functional divisions of competence produce concomitant patterns of party behaviour. In jurisdictional federalism, as in the United States, party policy at the federal level often directly conflicts with party policy strategy at the state level. In functional federalism, however, as in Germany or Switzerland, political conflict at the upper level is about getting issues onto the political agenda and defining the general policy framework, whereas politics at the lower level is about the precise details of legislation within this framework. Consequently, the territorial party elites have an interest in shaping the policy of the party at the federal level, because the success or failure of the party on the higher level will alter the policy opportunities at the lower level. As Chandler and Chandler point out, therefore, “a functional division of labour ... provides a strong incentive for co-ordinated party positions and alliances between levels of government”.

Consequently, combining functional federalism with non-majoritarian horizontal institutions at the federal level creates a very specific pattern of party organisation and

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95 Riker (1975) op. cit.
competition in the Swiss system. Switzerland has a fixed-member collegiate executive (the Federal Council), which controls an oversized majority in the directly elected chamber of parliament (the National Council). In addition, a strong territorially-elected second chamber of the parliament (the Council of States), effectively prevents the development of trans-territorial partisanship.99 In this institutional structure, parties are thus unable to compete for executive office. Moreover, executive dominance of the legislative process, means that party competition in the parliamentary arena is more about “issue-saliency” (seeking to place more influence on some issues than others within a single political agenda) than about “issue-partisanship” (competition between issue-agendas).100 Overall, therefore, the lack of clear connection in the executive or legislative structures means that Swiss parties suffer from “congenital institutional weakness: internal decentralisation, territorial fragmentation, underdeveloped infrastructure in terms of personnel and resources, and diffuse patterns of leadership and recruitment”.101 As Bogdanor hence concludes, “there is, in Switzerland, hardly a national arena of party competition at all”.102

Nevertheless, the policy-making incentives created by functional federalism have forced Swiss parties to develop an almost unique institutional strategy. Party elites were the main actors behind the establishment of the system of the ‘pre-parliamentary hearing’ (Vernehmlassung).103 This process, where parties negotiate with each other (and with non-partisan interests) to decide which issues need to be addressed in legislation, shapes the overall legislative agenda of both the Swiss executive and the two chambers of parliament. Moreover, the lack of institutional location of Vernehmlassung means that in this pre-legislative competition, electoral costs of party strategies are low. This thus allows the Swiss parties to pursue partisan policy-agendas without creating severe internal divisions between different territorial interests. Consequently, federal and consensus rules of the game mean that party

competition in Switzerland proceeds through a "complex bargaining process" (Verhandlung) between institutional arenas, rather than through parties seeking to impose the will of a majority within the executive or the legislature. The procedures for competing over the pre-legislative agenda consequently ensure that "as in all competitive political systems, political parties in Switzerland play a critical role: they formulate alternative policies ... and fight to have them enacted".

In sum, therefore, the EU and Switzerland have similar vertical and horizontal institutional structures. On the vertical side, both systems are "upside-down federations" (where the lower level has the highest office and policy rewards), and both systems have functional rather than jurisdictional divisions of competences between levels of government (where the overall legislative framework is set at the federal level, and the specific details and the implementation of legislation is carried out at the lower level). Moreover, on the horizontal side, both systems have consensual rules of decision-making (through mutual veto, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and grand coalition), and legislative-executive relations are not divided 'organically' (where the legislative and executive powers are shared across institutions rather than divided between them). It is thus not unlikely that similar patterns of party organisation and policy-competition to the Swiss system, where parties seek policy goals by organising across decision-making arenas at the pre-legislative stage, would develop in the EU system.

From this analysis we have thus derived several conclusions about how the EU institutional system structures party behaviour and competition:

- **The major office rewards for political parties are in the national arena.** National government office gives control over the large domestic legislative agenda and over the allocation of the majority of public resources.

- **However, there are important incentives for parties to pursue policy goals through the EU institutional system.** European level decisions indirectly set the boundaries of national macro-economic policy, and contribute greatly to the transformation from 'redistributive' to

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'regulatory' policies. This thus introduces policy constraints and uncertainty on parties during competition for the crucial national offices.

- **The 'crucial site of competition' for party policy goals is the European Council.** This provides an institutional focus for parties at the EU level, in a somewhat similar manner to the pre-legislative arrangements in the Swiss system. Moreover, the European Parliament (the intuitive setting for party competition in any system) provides little incentive for the pursuit of transnational party policy goals.

- However, **the structure of representation in the European Council gives parties who already hold national office (a primary party goal) a greater influence in policy-making than parties in opposition at the national level.** Hence, a low level of 'defection' by office-holding parties from European party positions will only occur if the party federations are able to secure significant policy rewards from the EU system.

Consequently, "the complexity and fragmentation of the EU institutions present at once a barrier and an opportunity for the potential agenda-setter". On the one hand, the adoption of policy at the EU level in areas where parties compete at the national level, and the absence of mechanisms for co-ordinating the overall EU policy-agenda, is an incentive for parties to pursue policy goals at the European level. On the other hand, parties in the EU are constrained by the numerous obstructions against the translation of policy goals into rewards. However, even if parties are able to establish an institutional locus in the EU, party competition in territorially divided systems ultimately "rest upon the emergence and intensification of a dominant and persistent set of interests and issues which tend to cut through rather than to unify constituencies, especially the states, and which demand standardised national solutions". Hence, the structure of party competition in the EU system also depends on the shape of the EU policy space.

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2.5. The Shape of the EU Policy Space

When pursuing policy objectives, parties take up positions in a 'strategic environment'. This strategic environment has two central characteristics: the dimension of the policy space; and the location of the electorate within this space. These two elements thus define the "structure of political alternatives" in the EU: the set of party policy choices.108

2.5.1. Dimensions of Politics: Socio-Economic and Territorial Cleavages

In the pluralist theory of politics, each social group has a particular interest which creates competing demands on the political system.109 The transformation of these societal cleavages into political conflict has consequently been one of the central pillars of the analysis of party competition.110 As Rae and Taylor point out:

Cleavages are the criteria which divide the members of a community or subcommunity into groups, and the relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political differences at specific times and places.111

'Critical junctures' in the development of political systems create 'dichotomies' of group interests. For example, the National Revolution led to conflicts between the dominant and subject cultures (a 'cultural-territorial' cleavage) and between church and state interests (a 'religious' cleavage); and the Industrial Revolution produced conflicts between landed and industrial interests, and capital and labour interests (both 'class' cleavages).112 However, whether these cleavages remain 'latent' or become 'manifest' political conflicts depends on several 'institutional' factors: the nature of the system building process; the timing of the

110 The two classic expositions of this work are S.M. Lipset (1959) Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Garden City: Doubleday; and Lipset & Rokkan, op. cit..
mobilisation of the conflicts; and the level of institutional thresholds. Rokkan thus argues that the structure of political alternatives are determined by a "two step model": based on:

questions about the institutional 'rules of the game' in the given polity; and questions about variations in the culturally, socially and economically given opportunities for the articulation of protest, the aggregation of demands, [and] the mobilisation of support.\footnote{Rokkan (1970), \emph{op. cit.}, p. 78, emphasis in the original.}

The system-building process and the institutional factors have thus produced two main cleavages in EU politics: class and nation/territory. There were two critical junctures in the development of European integration: the Industrial Revolution and Supranational Integration. The industrial revolution established the capitalism system of economic exchange - which created a fundamental 'class cleavage'. This cleavage is manifest at the EU level when decisions affect 'class interests', such as the degree of regulation in the EU single market and the level of social protection for European workers. In contrast, supranational integration has meant the coming together of separate territorial groups, who have distinct identities based on cultural, territorial, economic and historical differences - which created a 'national/territorial' cleavage. In all systems, the centralisation of decision-making produces a 'centre-periphery' conflict, between the interests of the dominant central group and the subjugated groups in the territorial peripheries.\footnote{On the Rokkanian framework for centre-periphery cleavages, see S. Rokkan (1973) "Cities, States, and Nations: A Dimensional Model for the Study of Contrasts in Development", in S.N. Eisenstadt & S. Rokkan (eds) \emph{Building States and Nations: Models and Data Resources}, Vol. 1, London: Sage.} This cleavage is manifest at the EU level when decisions affect 'national interests', such as on questions of transnational economic redistribution. Other social cleavages which exist at the national level are not manifest in the EU because of the institutional factors. For example, the religious cleavage remains latent because: there are no EU policy competences on religious issues (the system-building factor); the system of representation in the EU is not based on religious divisions (the threshold factor); and EU integration has come after a decline in religiosity in Europe (the timing factor).

However, whereas the national/territorial cleavage is manifest as a single dimension in the political space, the class cleavage is manifest as two independent socio-economic dimensions. The formation of class consciousness is highly differentiated, with cross-cutting
occupation, consumption, education, and communication experiences.\textsuperscript{115} This differentiation has meant that citizens' 'core beliefs' tend to be clustered around two separate 'value dimensions'.\textsuperscript{116} The first (social) dimension emerged during the French Revolution, and refers to how far there should be 'political intervention in individual social relations for a collective good'. The issues on this "libertarian-authoritarian" dimension are the normative aspects of democracy: freedom of association, opinion, speech and decision versus restrictive, hierarchical, and 'traditional' practices. This was the main source of conflict in the 19th century in Europe, and has returned to prominence since the 1960s with the rise of post-material issues and the increased salience of 'new politics issues' such as ecology, nuclear disarmament, feminism, and minority rights.\textsuperscript{117} The second (economic) dimension emerged during the Industrial Revolution, and refers to how far there should be 'political intervention in individual economic relations for a collective good'. The main issues on this "intervention-free market" dimension are: the organisation of redistribution, employment, public ownership, and welfare versus laissez-faire practices.

There are thus three basic dimensions in the EU political space: the two socio-economic issue dimensions, and the national/territorial cleavage. However, these dimensions are not always manifest at the same time. If parties do not take up positions on one of the dimensions, or the positions of parties on two dimensions are closely correlated, the dimensionality of the political space is reduced. For example, a correlation between party positions on the two socio-economic dimensions allows party competition to be conceptualised as being along a single 'Left-Right' dimension. However, even when there is a low correlation between party

\textsuperscript{115} This 'plurality of life-spheres' has been emphasised by such diverse approaches as contemporary systems theory (Luhmann), critical theories of advanced capitalism (Habermas), institutional economics (Hirschman), cultural analysis (Bell), and post-structuralism (Foucault). For example, on the interaction between production and consumption relations in the formation of class consciousness see I. Katzenelson (1986) "Working Class Formation: Constructing Cases and Comparisons", in I. Katzenelson & A.R. Zolberg (eds) Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States, Princeton: Princeton University Press.


\textsuperscript{117} On the 'new' post-material dimension see R. Inglehart (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics, Princeton: Princeton University Press; and how these issues are related to a much older value dimension see Seliger (1976) op. cit..
locations on the two socio-economic dimensions, political parties often assume the existence of a single dominant Left-Right dimension. As Inglehart explains:

The Left-Right dimension, as a political concept, is a higher-level of abstraction used to summarise one's stand on important issues of the day. It serves the function of organising and simplifying a complex political reality, providing an overall orientation toward a potentially limitless number of issues, political parties and social groups. The pervasive use of the Left-Right concept ... testifies to its usefulness [so that] one can distinguish readily between friend and foe, and between good and bad positions on given issues, in terms of relative distances from one's own position on this dimension.118

In other words, the Left-Right serves a vital simplification function in most cases where party competition is primarily about socio-economic issues and policies.

However, because the national/territorial dimension is based on fundamental ethnic and cultural divisions, party positions on this dimension are unlikely to be related to positions on other dimensions. In most systems, therefore, cultural divisions are "unsqueezable".119 There thus tends to be at least two manifest dimensions of party competition in systems where society is 'segmented' into culturally distinct blocs.120 Nevertheless, if all parties simply do not take up positions on the national/territorial dimension, it is not a salient dimension in the political space. When this is the case, party competition in the EU will either be unidimensional or within the two-dimensional socio-economic space. The question remains, nevertheless, on where the parties are located within this EU political space.

2.5.2. The Location of the Electorate: Class and Territorial Interests

Parties position themselves in this matrix of cleavages to attract the voters whose policy preferences are closest to them. The distribution of the electorate within the political space is

determined by the structure of class and territorial interests. Traditionally, Socialist parties represent the interests of the working class, and 'Bourgeois' parties (Liberals and Conservatives) represent the interests of the business and landed classes. However, the structure of class in advanced industrial society is far more complicated than either a classical Marxian or Weberian notion of class would suggest: both of which see a fundamental dichotomy between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Since the Second World War, 'production styles' have fundamentally changed. The separation of management from capital ownership, the expansion of the service industries, and the growth of public sector employment, has produced a "new middle class" (a salariat) as the largest sector of the work force. These social changes have thus led to a concomitant 'dealignment' of class interests and political loyalties.

Despite complicated cross-cutting life-experiences, there is evidence nonetheless that social position remains a powerful determinant of political interest and action, and ideological orientation. Occupational groups can be differentiated on the basis of whether income is from profits or wages, they employ or manage other people's labour, work is manual or skilled, and employment is in the public or private sector: employers/owners and petty-bourgeoisie (business classes), private and public sector managers/professionals (salaried classes), and skilled and manual labour (working classes). This deductive reasoning also

121 In classical Marxism class is determined by the relationship to the means of production, whereas in Weberian terms class is interpreted as 'status group' - which depends on consumption patterns and the relationship to political power and authority.
appears to be confirmed by cross-national empirical evidence. Consequently, these class interests can be approximately located in the two-dimensional socio-economic issue space (see Figure 2.1).

FIGURE 2.1. Location of Class Interests in the Socio-Economic Policy Space

The oval shape of distribution indicates that there is some degree of correlation between attitudes on the two dimensions. As a result, the two dimensions could be 'squeezed' into a single dimension of politics, as illustrated by the 'Left-Right' line. The breadth of the oval nevertheless suggests that there is room for parties to compete on a tangential dimension to the Left-Right. Moreover, an interesting implication of this simplification is the observation that this Left-Right axis crosses the intervention-free market dimension on the 'free market' side of the centre, but cuts the libertarian-authoritarian dimension towards the 'libertarian' side. This

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location of the dominant dimension of party competition thus correspond with the Europe-wide support since the mid-1970s for general policies that reduce public intervention in individual economic and social relations, regardless of whether Socialist or Conservative parties have been in government.

However, how are these social groups located on the national/territorial dimension in the EU policy space? This consequently depends on the structure of 'territorial interests' in the EU. A 'territorial interest group' is an, "aggregation of individuals and groups who are aware of their bonds of identification with each other as well as with the past, present, and future of their territory".\textsuperscript{127} Even with this cultural element of territorial identity it is nevertheless possible to regard territorial questions as 'bargainable', as are issues on the socio-economic cleavage. If 'territorial politics' is defined as "not politics about territory, but rather politics across territory", issues on this dimension are less about the cultural content of territorial differences than the structure of economic interests between territorial groups.\textsuperscript{128} In contrast, purely 'national interests', derived from irreconcilable ethnic and cultural differences, are considered to be linked to notions of indivisible 'sovereignty' and are thus inherently non-negotiable. In the approach to EU politics adopted here, however, all issues are inherently 'tradable'. This is an essential requirement for the use of spatial analysis in the understanding and explanation of party competition.

The policy location of these 'national/territorial' interests is determined by the structure of the national economy: whether it is dominated by sectors which are internationally or domestically competitive.\textsuperscript{129} With the regulation of the Single Market exclusively at the European level, and the possibility of substantial financial and monetary policy coordination, the level of economic integration can determine how sectors compete on the domestic, European and world markets. As Frieden points out:

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} I.D. Duchacek (1986) \textit{The Territorial Dimension of Politics: Within, Among, and Across Nations}, Boulder: Westview, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{128} S. Tarrow (1978) "Introduction", in S. Tarrow, P.J. Katzenstein, & L. Graziano (eds) \textit{Territorial Politics in Industrial Nations}, London: Praeger, p. 1, emphasis in original.
\end{itemize}}
Financial integration has implications for the distributional effects - and therefore of politics - of national policies. The implication is that political line-ups over macro-economic policies are likely to change quite significantly.\textsuperscript{130}

The effect of transnational economic competition consequently produces five separate sectoral interests on an 'integration-independence' continuum.

Firstly, starting from the 'independence' end, the non-tradable public sectors need national economic autonomy to preserve the size of the welfare state.\textsuperscript{131} Secondly, the (low-wage) global producers, who compete for the world market, need stable exchange rates but oppose the harmonisation of European labour market rules. Thirdly, the international financial services, who also compete for the global market, favour European market integration and deregulation of financial markets, but oppose a reintroduction at the European-level of restrictions against third-country competition. Fourthly, domestic producers (particularly in the periphery regions), who compete with third-country imports for the domestic market, favour market integration but can only support a loss of national monetary autonomy if there are European-level import restrictions, or a substantial transfer of economic resources to maintain their competitiveness.\textsuperscript{132} Finally, at the 'integration' end of the continuum, the multinational European producers, who compete in the European market against third-country imports, support 'pro-active' market integration at the EU level, such as the use of EU competition policy to create 'Euro Champions'.\textsuperscript{133}

Combining the relative international competitiveness of the sectors with the structure of class interests consequently leads to an approximate location of social groups in the national/territorial and Left-Right EU policy space (see Figure 2.2). The implication of this social group pattern is that social groups in some systems are more inclined to support the EU than in others.\(^\text{134}\) For example, the Danish 'No' vote in the first referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was because of the anti-integration location of the public sector employees in Denmark, who constitute the largest single social group in the Danish system.\(^\text{135}\) Equally, in Britain, where the majority opinion is consistently ambivalent towards European integration, there is a


moderately sized public sector and a large low-wage workforce in globally competitive industry. Moreover, in the ‘core’ EU states - Germany, the Benelux countries, and France (and Austria) - large sections of the industrial workforce are employed in European-wide competitive industry (the ‘Euro-Champions’). Finally, in the ‘periphery’ regions - Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy - where most people are employed in production for the domestic market, the European project is popular so long as significant territorial economic redistribution can be secured through EU structural programmes and wage-costs are kept at a competitive level.

2.5.3. Party Location in the Two-Dimensional EU Policy Space

However, parties do not take up a different position on each issue on every dimension. Instead, they present “historically given ‘packages’ of programmes, commitments, outlooks, sentiments, and Weltanschauungen”.136 Hence, the electoral choice of packages in European politics is limited to the traditional ‘ideological families’ (familles spirituelles). When competing in the domestic arena, the member parties of these party families present radically different policy platforms.

Why, therefore, should they organise around common policy goals in the European arena? This is because of two important characteristics of the ‘political family’. Firstly, each political family has a ‘collective reputation’. As previously discussed, this common political heritage is much more important for organisational coherence (because of its role of reducing information costs) than short-term policy aims. Secondly, each member party of a political family shares a common position in the strategic environment. For example, the Spanish and French Socialist Parties have fundamentally different short-term policy platforms, but both compete for political office against a large party (or bloc of parties) further to the Right. A consequence of this strategic determinant of party organisation at the European level, however, is that if two political families find themselves in identical positions in the party system, and the member parties of each of the traditions do not compete against each other, there could be a merger of political traditions.

The problem for the party families, however, is that they have clear locations on the two socio-economic dimensions in the EU policy space (the Left-Right spectrum), but their ideologies are not always consistent on the national/territorial dimension in EU politics (the 'integration-independence' spectrum). This is because each party family emerged prior the process of political integration in the EU system.\textsuperscript{137}

- Liberalism emerged as an ideology of the European bourgeoisie against autocratic rule in the early 19th century. Although the ideology encompasses diverse 'radical/social', 'economic' and 'national' strands, Liberal Parties position themselves close to the interests of the middle classes on each of the dimensions of the EU political space: representing individual liberty on the 'social' Left-Right (emphasised in the 'radical/social' Liberal tradition), and embracing the market as the logical extension of individual freedom in the economic sphere on the 'economic' Left-Right (emphasised in the 'economic' Liberal tradition), and a strongly pro-EU attitude on the national/territorial dimension. 'National' liberalism, in contrast, is naturally anti-European integration, as it advocates 'national freedom' as a logical corollary of individual liberty. However, the only party where the national-liberal tradition is dominant is in the Austrian FPO. Consequently, this strand of the ideology is not really part of contemporary mainstream European liberalism.\textsuperscript{138}

- Conservatism initially emerged in 'reaction' to Liberalism, as the ideology of protecting the interests of the ruling landed and state elites. The ideology thus praises tradition and law and order, and (particularly since the emergence of the 'New Right') regards the market as the mechanism of the 'natural' economic order.\textsuperscript{139} Contemporary Conservative parties attract the support of the petty-bourgeoisie, the owners of production, and some elements


of the unskilled and skilled working classes. On the question of the EU, Conservative support is thus split between the anti-European interests of the petty-bourgeoisie and the pro-European attitudes of big business.

- With the gradual improvement of workers rights and conditions, the ideology of Socialism has evolved through two concomitant ideological steps: firstly, the acceptance of "the parliamentary road to power"; and, secondly, the acceptance of elements of the free market. On the question of individual social freedom, however, Socialism is torn between a philosophy of individual emancipation of the skilled working class and public sector salariat, and the rejection of 'bourgeois decadence' by the lumpenproletariat. Similarly, on the question of the EU, Socialist parties are torn between the anti-integration interests of the public sector, and the pro-integration interests of the private sector employees.

- Christian Democracy combines a traditionalist/authoritarian social doctrine with a paternalist and corporatist "social market" economic ideology. The decline of religiosity in Europe has meant that the traditional social base of the Christian Democratic parties has reduced. However, the Christian Democratic socio-economic ideology has allowed the parties to attract support from elements of the skilled working class, the petty-bourgeoisie and business employers and owners. On the national/territorial dimension, therefore, Christian Democrat parties are able to combine the strong allegiance to a supranational entity of their traditional supporters with the corporatist economic interests of large-scale multinational industry.

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145 Irving, ibid., Chapter 8.
Finally, although perhaps not a true *familles spirituelles*, 'post-materialism' (as the ideology of Green parties and movements) is radically anti-authoritarian and advocates market-management to secure environmental protection, Third World aid, reduced working time, and wealth redistribution. As a result, the 'new middle class', who do not fit into the classic 'interventionist-free market' dimension of class alignments, reveal a strong tendency to vote for and become organised in 'new social movements', such as Green parties. Because of the split location of this new middle class in the public and private sectors, however, most Green parties are ambivalent about European integration.

This deductive reasoning is confirmed by empirical research on the location of parties on each of the main dimensions in the EU policy space: where the party families are fairly homogenous on the Left-Right dimension, but are internally divided on the 'integration-independence' dimension. Firstly, the position of parties and party families on the general Left-Right dimension, using data from 'expert judgements' of the position of parties on the Left-Right spectrum (between 0 and 10), is shown in Table 2.1. The party families are positioned from Left to Right as one would expect. In simple numerical terms, however, there is a low level of distinctiveness of each party family. For example, 35.3% of the range of the Green party family overlaps with the Socialists; 82.3% of the Socialists' range overlaps with the Greens and the Liberals'; 87.1% of the Liberals' range overlaps with the Socialists, Christian Democrats and Conservatives'; and 93.9% of the Christian Democrats' and 100% of the Conservatives' ranges overlap with other party families. Consequently, different parties do not belong to the same party family simply because they have similar policy positions. An explanation of party family persistence, therefore, must emphasise deeper historical

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148 The parties included in this survey are from the five main party families. The Ethnic/Regionalist, Ex-Communist/Independent Socialist, Radical/Neo-Fascist Right, and Agrarian families are not included as none of these parties have ever held a position in the European Council, or are members of the party federations. The membership of the party families is taken from J.-E. Lane & S. Ersson (1991) *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, 2nd edn, London: Sage, pp. 103-11. For the key to the party abbreviations in the table see Appendix B.
connections: such as common relationships to other party families in each party system. Membership of a party family is thus more related to a party's strategic position within its own national system than on precise policy location on the Left-Right spectrum.

TABLE 2.1. Left-Right Position of Parties and Political Families

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEFT</th>
<th>Socialist</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Christian Democrat</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Christian Democrat</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bel.- Flemish - Francophone</td>
<td>AGA 3.40</td>
<td>SP 4.00</td>
<td>VLD 7.29</td>
<td>CVP 5.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECO 3.50</td>
<td>PS-B 4.20</td>
<td>PRL 7.40</td>
<td>PSC 6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DG 2.00</td>
<td>SD 4.22</td>
<td>V 8.11</td>
<td>KRF 6.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RV* 5.67</td>
<td>KF 7.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CD 6.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>GE 4.40</td>
<td>PS-F 4.13</td>
<td>RAD 6.67</td>
<td>CDS-F 5.75</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MRG* 4.75</td>
<td>RPR 7.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PR 7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>G 2.91</td>
<td>SPD 3.83</td>
<td>FDP 5.64</td>
<td>CDU 6.42</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSU 7.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>CG —</td>
<td>LP-I 4.10</td>
<td>PD 8.30</td>
<td>FF 5.80</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FG 7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>FV 2.60</td>
<td>PDS 3.50</td>
<td>PRI* 5.60</td>
<td>PPI 6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FLI 7.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rad* 5.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>GA/G 2.30</td>
<td>POSL 4.00</td>
<td>DP 7.60</td>
<td>PCS 7.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>GL 1.78</td>
<td>PvdA 4.20</td>
<td>VVD 7.20</td>
<td>CDA 6.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D'66 4.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK- G.Britain - N.Ireland</td>
<td>GP —</td>
<td>LP-GB 4.43</td>
<td>SLD* 5.21</td>
<td>OUP 8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>APN* 5.79</td>
<td>CP 7.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (1.81)</td>
<td>EA —</td>
<td>PASOK 4.60</td>
<td>HLP* 5.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (1.86)</td>
<td>OV —</td>
<td>PS-P 4.88</td>
<td>PSD 6.38</td>
<td>CDS-P 8.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain - Centre (1.86) - Regions</td>
<td>LV —</td>
<td>PSOE 4.00</td>
<td>CDS-S* 5.40</td>
<td>PP 7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FORO 6.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDC 6.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1.95)</td>
<td>GA 2.86</td>
<td>SPO 4.75</td>
<td>LF 6.33</td>
<td>OVP 6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (1.95)</td>
<td>VIHR 4.00</td>
<td>SDP 4.38</td>
<td>KESK 7.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SFP 6.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LKP 6.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (1.95)</td>
<td>MP 4.25</td>
<td>SAP 4.08</td>
<td>FPL* 5.92</td>
<td>KDS 7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MS 8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean:</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>6.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Deviation:</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range:</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.78-4.44)</td>
<td>(3.50-5.25)</td>
<td>(4.75-8.30)</td>
<td>(5.71-8.50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Huber & Inglehart (1995); Mavgordatos (1984); and Laver & Hunt (1992).149

149 For all the countries except Luxembourg and Greece, the data comes from the 1993 'expert judgements' survey by John Huber and Ronald Inglehart. The data for Greece is taken from Mavgordatos, and for Luxembourg from Laver and Hunt. The data for these countries is comparable as it was compiled using an identical process: where experts were asked to place parties on a scale from 1 to 10. See J. Huber & R. Inglehart (1995) "Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies", Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 73-112; G. Mavgordatos (1984) "The Greek Party System: A Case of Limited but Polarised Pluralism", West European Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 156-69; and Laver & Hunt (1992) op. cit. NB. the
Furthermore, whereas the Socialist and Conservative party families are fairly homogenous (with respective standard deviations from the mean of only .45 and 41, and ranges of only 1.75 and 1.13) the two party families to the Right of the Socialists and to the Left of the Conservatives are fairly heterogeneous - with respective standard deviations and ranges of .98 and 3.55 (Liberals) and .88 and 2.79 (Christian Democrats). Moreover, there are two distinct and internally heterogeneous groups within the Liberal family. The ten Liberal parties where the ‘radical/social’ stream is dominant (indicated by R) have a mean of 5.38 and a standard deviation and range of only .39 and 1.17 (4.75-5.92), and the other seventeen Liberal parties where the ‘economic’ stream is mostly in ascendance have a mean of 6.89 and a standard deviation and range of only .74 and 2.66 (5.64-8.30). In the party systems where both these strands of Liberalism exist - Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands - the two Liberal traditions straddle the rival Christian Democrat party. They remain part of the same political family, however, because they are closer to each other on ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ issues than either are to the Christian Democrat or Conservative families. This is illustrated in the left-hand diagram in Figure 2.3 below.

By similar reasoning, however, the Christian Democrat and Conservative parties could be represented as a single political family (a total of thirty parties): with a mean of 7.05 and a standard deviation and range of .91 and 2.79 (5.71-8.50). If this occurs, both Liberal strands would be to the Left of this broad Right bloc. This is possible if one considers that in some cases Christian Democrat and Conservative parties in different party systems share a common strategic position. Moreover, such an alliance is further enhanced by the fact that, as already discussed, the confessional (or religious) cleavage - which was the central reason why the two families emerged at different times in the national arena - is not manifest at the European level. There is thus no inherent reason why Christian Democrat and Conservative parties who are not placed either side of a rival Liberal parties in the domestic arena should not establish a common organisation at the European level. On Left-Right issues, therefore, a Christian Democrat-Conservative organisation at the European level would only really be problematic for the Italian

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Member States are in the order they are in the table because the period or the research begins in 1974, i.e. after the first enlargement of the EC but before the second, third and fourth enlargements.
Conservative and Christian Democrat parties, as they are likely to be positioned either side of the FLI. However, the main constraint on the formation of a common Christian Democrat-Conservative organisation is the different policy positions and strategic location of Christian Democrat and Conservative parties on the other main dimension in the EU space: the 'integration-independence' continuum.

### TABLE 2.2. Integration-Independence Position of Parties and Political Families

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTEGRATION</th>
<th>INDEPENDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Christian Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net</td>
<td>VVD+88 D’66R+88 CDA+88 GL+83 PvdA+81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lux</td>
<td>DP+78 PCS+95 GA/G+70 POSL+74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Por</td>
<td>PSD+79 CDS-P+66 OV— PS-P+75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ire</td>
<td>PD— FF+74 FG+68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ita</td>
<td>PRI+79 FLI+77 Rad+70 PPI+75 CDD+—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bel-Fi</td>
<td>VLD+59 PRL+80 CVP+74 PSC+64 AGA+66 BO+62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ger</td>
<td>FDP+83 CDU+60 CSU— G+55 SPD+64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spa-C-R</td>
<td>CDS-S+46 POR+— CDC—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fra</td>
<td>RAD+78 MRC+80 V+73 KRF+—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Den</td>
<td>V+78 RV+80 CD+87 KRF+—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gre</td>
<td>HLP+68 EA+40 PASOK+57 ND+57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-GB-N1</td>
<td>SLD+63 APM+42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Mean:       | +75.2 | +73.6 | +65.7 | +64.3 | +54.7 |
| StDev:      | 11.1  | 10.2  | 12.0  | 15.4  | 10.6  |
| Range:      | 42    | 35    | 43    | 60    | 36    | (46-88) | (60-95) | (40-83) | (21-80) | (34-70) |

Source: Eurobarometer, No. 37, 1992.

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150 This thus assumes that the PR and CDS-F could join the same organisation at the European level despite the fact that the RAD stands between them, as they are already joined at the national level in electoral and legislative competition in the UDF alliance.
On the second main dimension of EU politics ('integration-independence' issues), there is little recent data on the positions of parties, either from expert judgements or from the content analysis of party policy documents. Nevertheless, if one considers that parties are constrained by the political orientations of their electorates (as was discussed in the previous section), the general integration-independence position of parties can be measured from survey data.\footnote{151} From the 1992 Eurobarometer surveys, Table 2.2 thus shows the percent of 'party identifiers' that considered the EC to be "A good thing" minus the percent that considered it to be "A bad thing".\footnote{152} As the Table consequently illustrates, although the party families can be located from 'integration' to 'independence' stances on the basis of the mean position of the family, these locations are not very distinct. Looking at the standard deviations and ranges, all the party families are significantly heterogeneous. Moreover, compared to their positions on the Left-Right dimension, where overlaps between the party families are restricted to groups adjacent to each other, on the integration-independence dimension there is an almost complete overlap between all the families: the ranges of the Greens and Conservatives are completely contained within the range of the Socialist family; and the Socialist family overlaps with 60% of the Christian Democrats' range and 83% of the Liberals' range.

Furthermore, Table 2.2 confirms the suggestion that party competition on integration-independence issues would undermine the possibility of a single Christian Democrat-Conservative party organisation at the European level. Of all the pairs of party families, the Christian Democrats and Conservatives are furthest apart. The mean position of the Liberals is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the mean position of the Conservatives. However, there is less overlap between Conservatives and Christian Democrats (28% of the Conservatives' range) than between Conservatives and Liberals (67%). In fact, on the integration-independence dimension, the Conservatives overlap more with all the other party families than with the Christian Democrats.

\footnote{151 The positions of the parties on this dimension could also have been calculated using the codes on "Pro-" (109) and "Anti-EC" (110) policies from the ECPR Party Manifestos Project data set. However, the data for these codes does not go past 1987, and party positions towards the EC/EU have changed considerably since this time. Consequently, it is more appropriate to use the Eurobarometer data.}

\footnote{152 Scores are omitted for parties with fewer than ten respondents.}
Moreover, this division between the Christian Democrats and Conservatives is further enhanced by the fact that the Christian Democrats have the most clearly defined position on this dimension: with a standard deviation and range lower than all the other families, and with none of the Christian Democrat parties scoring less than +60 (i.e. the difference between the number of German CDU supporters who think the EC is 'a good thing' and those who think it is 'a bad thing' is 60%). This hence confirms the suggestion that Christian Democrat ideology is linked to question of European integration, whereas all the other political party world-views are almost exclusively based on socio-economic stances. A Conservative-Christian Democrat alliance could thus only arise if the Christian Democrats abandon this element of their ideology.

Finally, whereas on the Left-Right dimension the domestic party organisations were aligned across territorial boundaries, on the integration-independence dimension the positions of parties are less dependent on party family affiliation than on domestic territorial location. As the last three columns in Table 2.2 reveal, there are six Member States where all the parties are relatively pro-integration, regardless of party family membership (The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Belgium). This suggests that in these systems inter- and intra- (within) party competition on integration-independence issues is low. All these Member States are either 'core' members (as discussed in the previous section), or are significant net beneficiaries under the EU budget. Moreover, the other six Member States divide into two groups. In the first group (France, Spain and Germany), the average position of the political parties is only partially pro-integration, but none of the parties in the system are openly pro-independence. In these systems, therefore, inter-party competition on integration-independence issues is also low, but there is likely to be a higher level of intra-party competition (between the elites and the members). In contrast, in the second group, the average position of the parties is either moderately pro-integration (Denmark) or anti-integration (Greece and the United Kingdom), but there are significant differences between the parties. Hence, in these systems both inter- and intra-party competition on this dimension is high.

From this analysis, we can deduce some assumptions about the shape of the EU policy space:
• **There are two dominant dimensions in the EU policy space:** one derived from the national/territorial cleavage and the other from socio-economic cleavages. Because of the historically, administratively and economically reinforced territorial divisions in the EU, the national/territorial dimension cannot be subsumed into a single Left-Right dimension of EU politics. A national/territorial dimension is manifest when issues create divisions between 'integration' and 'independence' interests. A Left-Right dimension, on the other hand, is manifest when either 'libertarian-authoritarian' or 'intervention-free market' issues arise.

• **However, parties prefer to compete on the Left-Right dimension.** If the party federations compete on the 'integration-independence' dimension there is an incentive for member parties to break from trans-territorial alliances to secure the support of the majority of the particular territorial (i.e. national) interests in the domestic arena. On this dimension, all the party families are divided: between pro-integration parties (from 'core' and net beneficiary states) and pro-independence parties (from states with deep historical oppositions); and between pro-integration top-elites (party leaders) and pro-independence middle-level elites (national MPs) and/or rank-and-file members.

This structure of party positions and competition is illustrated in Figure 2.3. The party families are relatively homogenous on Left-Right issues (in the left-hand figure). However, in the general EU policy space (in the right-hand figure), inter-party competition on the integration-independence dimension is constrained by the indistinctiveness of the party locations.

**FIGURE 2.3. Shape of the EU Policy Space: Constrained Party Competition**
2.6. When Parties Matter: Policy-Rewards from EU Decision Making

We have established that parties are likely to pursue policy goals in EU decision-making, have some indication of the expected shape of policy competition at the European level, and that the primary decision-making arena for these goals is the European Council. To continue pursing these goals, however, parties must be able to reap policy rewards. If rewards are not forthcoming, parties will change their strategy; either by changing their policy position, or by abandoning the pursuit of policy at the European level. Conversely, if a competing party is able to secure rewards from a particular position in the policy space or from a certain organisational behaviour around a specific decision-making arena, the other parties will adopt similar strategies.

The influence of the party federations can thus be assessed by looking at how far they are able to influence the outputs of the European Council. The dates of all the European Council and party leaders' meetings since 1974 are contained in Appendix C. The policy positions of the party federations, which includes all government and opposition parties, is the "balance of party forces in the EU". This "balance of forces" has two elements: the strengths of the parties, and the alignments between the parties. In contrast, the representation of the Member States' governments in the European Council implies that decisions in this institutional setting reflect the "balance of government-party forces in the EU". We can use the difference between the party forces in the two settings to analyse how far the party federations are able to secure policy rewards through the European Council. If the party federation and European Council positions correspond, the inference is that the party federations have been able to impose the overall balance of EU party positions on the national governments in the European Council, and thus secure their policy goals.

To test this argument, we must be able to 'measure' the various policy positions of the party federations and the European Council decision. There are two elements to the concept of 'policy position': the location of a party or decision in a policy-space; and the relative saliency of the policy dimensions involved.\textsuperscript{153} Moreover, there are two different types of 'saliency':

\textsuperscript{153} This is the same as the concept of 'issue orientation'. See K. Janda (1980) Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey, London: Macmillan, Chapter 6.
system-specific saliency, the relative importance of the three dimensions within the policy space, which determines the dimensionality of the policy space; and party-specific saliency, the relative importance of the dimensions for each party, which determines at what rate how parties trade-off issues on different dimensions.

There are three main methods used in comparative research to calculate the location of parties and the saliency of the policy dimensions. Firstly, political scientists in a number of countries can be asked to subjectively construct pictures of the policy space; this is usually called the 'expert judgements' method. Secondly, mass survey data on the political attitudes of the electorate can be used to produce dimensions of party competition by calculating which portions of the electorate vote for each party. However, neither of these approaches fit this research topic or would equate with the assumptions about party behaviour used here. There are not enough experts on the transnational party federations, and there is no survey data relating directly to the positions of the party federations.

Moreover, the theory of party competition elaborated above assumes that parties compete in the European arena for the implementation of a particular policy stance; and that this stance reflects the interests of the social groups they seek to capture. This thus equates with the 'saliency theory' of party competition. The saliency theory argues that parties emphasise the policy issues that are most important to the voters they wish to attract, rather than simply present policies which are diametrically opposed to those of other parties. This seems to be confirmed by detailed analysis of post-war election manifestos in nineteen western democracies, which reveals that only a very limited number of direct references to policies of other parties are made in party programmes.

Budge thus argues that the saliency-theory:


155 E.g. G. Sani & G. Sartori (1983) “Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies”, in Daalder & Mair, op. cit. (note 1); and Inglehart & Klingemann, op. cit..


implies that the most important aspects of the documents is the degree of emphasis placed on certain broad policy areas, rather than each party's support for, or opposition to, a specific policy within these areas. The picture of party competition in other words changes from the classical 'great debate', or direct argument over a common range of problems, to one where parties talk past each other, glossing over areas which might favour their rivals while emphasising those on which they feel they have an advantage.  

Moreover, if party competition is about raising the issues on which they can win, rather than on the specific details of policy on these issues, we can measure the impact of parties by looking at the issues on which government declarations and outputs are adopted.

The main empirical implication of this theory is that party policy positions can be measured using a third method: the 'content analysis' of the issues raised in the major party policy documents. The closest documents to national 'party manifestos' or 'policy statements' for the transnational party federations are the Declarations from the party federation leaders' meetings, the party Congress Resolutions, and the European Parliament Election Manifestos. As with the national party election manifestos, these transnational documents are an accurate representation of the policy stance of the parties at a particular point in time. They are a product of careful deliberation because they are the only representation of the parties in the press. As the methodology requires, these documents are thus "the only clear and direct statements of party policy available ... and directly attributable to the party as such". For a complete list of the party federation and European Council documents used in the analysis see Appendix E.

The procedure for analysing the content of these documents involves placing each sentence, or part sentence ("quasi-sentence"), in one of the policy categories. The European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Party Manifestos Research Group project, where

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160 Robertson, op. cit., p. 72.
the technique was developed, uses fifty-four issue categories in seven major policy domains. The ECPR project also uses a two-step factor analysis technique to calculate the number of salient policy dimensions.\(^{161}\) For the purposes of this research, however, preliminary analysis of the party federation texts suggested that these categories were too vast, and that the factor analysis technique was difficult to apply because the federation documents are considerably shorter than national election manifestos. I have consequently been forced to develop a simplified version of the ECPR project to fit this research. The resulting method is thus "in the spirit" of the Party Manifestos project, with the same comparatively-derived category definitions, and with the simplifications and additions based on the above theoretical framework.

On the question of the number of coding-categories and dimensions, the research starts with the three dominant issue-dimensions derived from the deductive analysis of the structure of the EU policy space: the Integration-Independence, Intervention-Free Market, and Libertarian-Authoritarian dimensions. Each issue category is subsequently allocated to one or other side of each of the dimensions (see Table 2.3).\(^{162}\) Thirty-six of the categories used in the ECPR project constitute the majority of the coding frame used in the research (the corresponding Party Manifestos Research Group codes are in brackets). These categories are supplemented with several issues that are specifically related to EU politics. A description of the types of policy statements covered in each category is contained in Appendix D.

\(^{161}\) This procedure is described in detail in I. Budge, D. Robertson & D. Hearl (1987) "Appendices", in Budge, Robertson & Hearl, \textit{op. cit.}.

\(^{162}\) Laver and Budge use a similar method to develop a "common Left-Right dimension" from the Manifestos Project data set. See M.J. Laver & I. Budge (1992b) "Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalition Formation", in Laver & Budge, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 19-25.
TABLE 2.3. *Category Headings used in Coding of Party Federation Documents and European Council Decisions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Side of Dimension</th>
<th>Second Side of Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervention-Free Market Dimension</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREE MARKET</td>
<td>INTERVENTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 Open Market/Enterprise/Incentives (401, 402)</td>
<td>102 Planned economy/employment (404, 412, 413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103 Economic efficiency &amp; productivity (410, 414)</td>
<td>104 Social protection/regulation (403, 409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 Government efficiency (303)</td>
<td>106 Corporatism (405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107 Free international trade/GATT (407)</td>
<td>108 Trade protectionism (406)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109 Social services/education: negative (505, 507)</td>
<td>110 Social services/education: positive (504, 506)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111 Labour groups: negative (702)</td>
<td>112 Labour groups: positive (701)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113 Internal Market/Project 1992</td>
<td>114 Social Charter/Chapter positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115 EC/EU competition policy</td>
<td>116 Social ‘convergence criteria’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117 Economic ‘convergence criteria’</td>
<td>118 International Development Aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Libertarian-Authoritarian Dimension** |  |
| LIBERTARIAN | AUTHORITARIAN |
| 201 Freedom and human rights (201) | 202 Traditional morality (603) |
| 203 Democracy (202) | 204 Defence of traditional way of life (601) |
| 205 Environmental protection (501) | 206 Constitutionalism (203) |
| 207 Open government (304) | 208 Government effectiveness and authority (305) |
| 209 Women and minority groups (705, 706) | 210 Law and order (605) |
| 211 Peace/Disarmament (105, 106) | 212 Militarism (104) |
| 213 European Union citizenship | 214 European effort/social harmony (606) |
| 215 TREVI and Schengen: negative | 216 Common Immigration Policy |

| **Integration-Independence Dimension** |  |
| INTEGRATION | INDEPENDENCE |
| 301 Integration/Supranationalism (109) | 302 Independence/Intergovernmentalism (110) |
| 303 Subsidiarity/Federalism/’Europe of Regions’ | 304 Subsidiarity/Sovereignty/’Europe of Nations’ |
| 305 EPC/Common Foreign and Security Policy | 306 Enlargement/Widening |
| 309 Increased powers of European Parliament | 310 Involvement of National Parliaments |
| 311 Powers/accountability of Commission | 312 Powers/role of Council of Ministers |
| 313 Increased ‘majority voting’ | 314 Preservation of ‘unanimity voting’ |
| 315 Economic & Social Cohesion/Structural Funds | 316 Social Charter/Cohesion: negative |
| 317 ‘Two-speed’ Europe/’opt-outs’: negative | 318 ‘Two-speed’ Europe/’opt-outs’: positive |

Every major document of the four transnational party federations and all the European Council conclusions have been collected from 1975 until the end of 1994. After many months of collecting these documents in the archives of the party federations and of the Groups in the European Parliament, this is a unique data source. As in the Party Manifestos project, each
document has thus been coded by placing every 'quasi-sentence' into a one, and only one, of the coding categories. The 'final scores' for each category are expressed as a percentage of the total number of sentences contained in each document. On the basis of this raw data, three calculations were made:

- The system-specific saliency of the dimensions in the EU policy space is measured by calculating the mean scores for each dimension across all the party federation documents and European Council decisions.
- The party-specific saliency of the dimensions is measured by calculating the mean scores for each dimension for every individual party document.
- The policy-location of the party federations and the European Council decisions is calculated in two stages. Firstly, the frequency counts for the categories on each 'side' of the three dimensions are added together. Secondly, the final location on each dimension is computed as a total proportion of the document devoted to categories on the second side of the dimension minus the proportion devoted to categories on the first side of the dimension.


This "comparative politics theory of parties in the EU system" thus starts from the premise that parties are strategic organisations that seek office and policy goals in parallel. The main constraint on the procurement of these objectives derives from the institutional and strategic environment: the nature of the EU political system, and the shape of the EU policy space. The structure of the EU system ensures that the largest office reward is the control of a domestic government. However, the functional division of competences in the EU means that European-level decision-making constrains policy competition in the pursuit of this main office goal. As these constraints develop, therefore, parties increasingly need to pursue policy objectives in the European arena.

However, in the pursuit of a policy agenda at the European level, the inherent shape of the EU policy space is two-dimensional: with a national/territorial cleavage (on issues relating
to the system-building process) and a Left-Right cleavage (on issues concerning the role of public policy). Because parties are based on the classic ‘party families’ that arose prior to the EU system-building process, they would rather compete on Left-Right policies than on national/territorial issues. If they are unable to secure Left-Right policy aims, European-level party organisation is undermined: by divisions between sub-units with different territorial interests, and/or between pro-integration elites and anti-integration rank-and-file members.

From this theoretical framework, several propositions are hence derived about the development of parties in the EU system, that can tested in empirical analysis. Firstly, the structure of constraints in the EU produces several propositions relating to party strategy at the European level:

• *Organisational strategy.* In terms of ‘internal’ party organisation, the European ‘party families’ will seek common structures at the European level because of collective policy and informational requirements. Moreover, the constraints on the pursuit of domestic government office are an incentive for domestic party leaders to play a central role in European-level party behaviour. As regards ‘external’ organisation, parties will “go where the power is” to secure their policy goals. They will thus seek to influence policy-making the European Council (rather than in the European Parliament). These propositions are analysed in chapter three.

• *Policy strategy.* The structure of political interest and values in electoral competition means that parties will attempt to compete on ‘Left-Right’ issues, rather than on national/territorial questions which undermine internal party cohesion in the domestic and European arenas. Moreover, if EU decisions constrain domestic party policy strategies, the changing positions of the party federations in the European arena will be closely related to the changing locations and strategic interests of the parties in the domestic arena. These propositions are tested in chapter four.

However, for parties to continue pursuing these strategies, they must be able to reap the rewards they are seeking:

• *Policy Rewards.* The underlying aim behind the party strategies is to secure policy outputs from European decision-making. If parties thus concentration on socio-economic issues,
there should be a correlation between party organisational and policy development and the number of 'Left-Right' issues on the European Council agenda. Moreover, on these issues there should be a connection between the 'balance of party political forces' as represented by the party federations and the policy position of European Council outputs. These propositions are analysed in chapter five.

**FIGURE 2.4. Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Propositions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY STRATEGIES</th>
<th>EUROPEAN-LEVEL REWARDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ORGANISATION - CHAPTER 3</strong></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal: 'party family' integration; and central role of (domestic) leaders in pursuit of main office rewards</td>
<td>'Left-Right' outputs from European Council meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External: organise around European Council (rather than EP)</td>
<td>Connection between the 'balance of party forces' and European Council decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLICY - CHAPTER 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration on 'Left-Right' rather than 'territorial' issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common policy goals in accord with 'party family' positions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between these propositions is summarised in Figure 2.4. The connection between the strategies and rewards implies that there should thus be a link between the number and degree of the strategies pursued and the level of policy goals secured from European Council decision-making (as illustrated by the lines in the Figure).

Consequently, the falsification of these propositions constitutes a general test of the underlying thesis, that in the analysis of the development of the parties in the EU system a 'comparative politics approach' is of higher explanatory value than the traditional approaches. Because the propositions are derived from a framework rooted in the theory and method of a Comparative Politics research programme, they are inherently different to the explanations of
party behaviour in the EU offered by an International Relations programme of by the *sui generis* approaches (as was discussed in Chapter 1). Moreover, because the theoretical framework is based on a "general theory of party behaviour within specific structural constraints", the propositions should be more robust than the reductionist explanations of the traditional 'institutional' or 'ideological' theories of party development in the comparative politics literature.
Chapter 3

Organisational Development of the Party Federations: From Electoral Campaigning to Policy Pursuit

3.1. Introduction: Different Organisational Strategies for Different Party Goals

Different party organisational structures are better equipped for the pursuit of different party goals. Put another way, the goals a party is able to pursue is dependent upon the external and internal structure of party organisation. Internal party organisation is the structure of official and unofficial relations between the internal decision-makers. The stability of these relations depends on the level of ‘institutionalisation’ of the party. Institutionalisation is “the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability”.¹ As Panebianco states:

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this process implies the passage from a ‘consumable’ organisation to an institution. The organisation loses its character as a tool: it becomes valuable in and of itself, and its goals become inseparable and indistinguishable from it. In this way, its preservation and survival become the ‘goal’ for a great number of its supporters.²
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A party with a ‘strong’ organisation will have a stable recruitment structure and system of loyalties. This allows the party to minimise internal disputes, and to establish a co-ordinated strategy for the pursuit of the organisation's goals. Conversely, if a party has a ‘weak’ internal organisation, which lacks stable internal “opportunity structures”, there is an incentive for the different elements of the internal party organisation to pursue different goals.³

Party members (or "activists") - the individual members of the domestic organisations of the party federations - are primarily concerned with purposive and symbolic actions by the party. Like voters, therefore, party membership can be exchanged for promises of future party policy. On the other hand, the party bureaucracy - the paid officials of the domestic and European central offices and parliamentary factions of the party federations - is primarily interested in increasing, or at least maintaining, the size of the budget at its disposal. The rational behind this assumption is that large budgets help bureaucrats push up salaries and fringe benefits (such as pensions), as increased responsibilities merit higher remuneration. Finally, the members of the party as a governing organisation - the party representatives holding legislative and executive office in the national and European arenas - are fundamentally interested in maintaining or bettering their office position. A party official holding parliamentary office is thus likely to compromise policy promises if it secures the present office or leads to a higher office reward (such as participation in government). Consequently, only a strongly institutionalised party will be able to establish an internal reward structure which satisfies these competing interests, and thus enables the party to co-ordinate the multifarious actions necessary for the pursuit of the common policy and office goals.

External party organisation, on the other hand, is the link between the internal party organisation and the institutions of the political system. A party can be linked to a single institutional arena or political process, such as the election of the executive or the control of decision-making in a particular legislature. For example, in the United States, in both the Democrats and Republicans there is fundamental difference between the "presidential party organisation", which runs the Presidential elections, and the "congressional party organisation", which organises decision-making in the Congress. Similarly, in the EU system, a party can seek to compete only in the elections to the European Parliament. Alternatively, a party can be ever-present in all institutional arenas and political processes.

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where a single party organisation controls the electoral and decision-making behaviour of the party officials in the executive and the legislature. This later case accords with the classic model of European “Party Government”, where:

All major decisions [are] taken by people chosen in elections conducted along party lines, or by individuals appointed by and responsible to such people; ... policy [is] made by elected party officials ... along party lines, so that each party is collectively accountable to ‘its’ party position; ... and the highest officials [are] selected within their parties and are responsible to the people through their parties.7

The application of this to the EU system would thus imply the establishment of a party that organises the candidates for the European Parliament elections and for the nomination of the Commission President, and co-ordinates the behaviour of the party representatives in the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the European Council.

These different internal and external aspects of party organisation can consequently be combined to produce four types of party organisation, each of which is suited to a particular party strategy in the EU system:

- **a weakly institutionalised party that operates in a single arena or process** - this type of organisation is suitable for a party that makes only a limited attempt to secure a specific political office (such as a legislative seat or executive position), but does not attempt to co-ordinate policy behaviour of the party office-holders in any arena;

- **a weakly institutionalised party that operates in several arenas** - this type of organisation is suitable for a party that makes a limited attempt to secure legislative and/or executive office, and makes a limited attempt to co-ordinate the policy behaviour of the party office-holders in the various arenas;

- **a strongly institutionalised party that operates in a single arena or process** - this type of organisation is suitable for a party that makes a concerted attempt to secure a specific political office (such as a legislative seat or executive position), but does not attempt to co-ordinate policy behaviour of the party office-holders in any arena; and

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• *a strongly institutionalised party that operates in several arenas* - this type of organisation is suitable for a party that makes a concerted attempt to secure legislative and executive office, and to co-ordinate the policy behaviour of the party office-holders in all the various arenas (the classic model of ‘Party Government’).

The theoretical argument in the previous chapter contended that the changing institutional environment parties in the EC/EU system facilitated the development from organisations designed specifically for co-ordinating EP election campaigns to integrated organisations for the pursuit of policy goals at the European level. This proposition can thus be tested by applying this four-fold typology to the different stages in the development of the party federations. The first step in the analysis of party change is to look at the evolution of the party statutes and rules of procedure. As Duverger pointed out, however, “the organisation of parties depends essentially on unwritten practice and habit ... constitutions and rules never give more than a partial idea of what happens”. Consequently, in an analysis of where the party federation organisations fit in this typology, the “official story” told by the statute changes must be supplemented with evidence about the changing informal relations in the party federations.

The internal organisation of the party federations is thus analysed in Section 3.2, and the external organisation is analysed in Section 3.3. The changing structure of party federation membership is subsequently discussed in Section 3.4, and the conclusions about party organisational development are drawn together in Section 3.5.

### 3.2. Internal Organisation: Gradual Institutionalisation (of Leaders’ Meetings)

The development of the internal structures of the party federations since 1974 is characterised by a gradual institutionalisation of the party organisations. This is shown by a detailed analysis of the changes in the party federations’ statutes, and by a more general application of Panebianco’s institutionalisation criteria to the internal organisation of the EU parties.

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9 This research strategy is discussed in Katz & Mair (1992) *op. cit.*, pp. 6-8.
3.2.1. The Official Story: Increased Complexity and New Party Organs

An 'organigram' is a diagrammatic illustration of the workings of an organisation. The development of the party federations is easily analysed by comparing the party organigrams under the original and the most recent statutes. There are four basic organisational elements of parties in the EU system. Firstly, party organs are the internal decision-making arenas (in capitals in the organigrams). These are set out in Rule 3 of the 1974 CSP Rules of Procedure and Article 8 of the 1995 PES Statutes, Article 5 of the 1976 EPP Statutes and Article 7 of the 1994 EPP Statutes, Article 9 of the 1976 ELD Constitution and Article 16 of the 1993 ELDR-Party Statutes, and Article 3 of the 1984 ECGP Statutes and Article 8 of the 1993 EFGP Statutes. Secondly, constituent groups are the various organisations and groups with official membership status in the party federations (underlined in the organigrams). These are set out in Rule 3 of the 1974 CSP Rules of Procedure and Article 4 of the 1995 PES Statutes, Article 1 of the 1976 and 1994 EPP Statutes, Article 3 of the 1976 ELD Constitution and Article 2 of the 1993 ELDR-Party Statutes, and Article 1 of the 1984 ECGP Statutes and Article 4 of the 1993 EFGP Statutes. Thirdly, non-constituent groups are the organisations and groups that are attached to the party in an unofficial capacity (in plain text in the organigrams). Finally, party officers are the officials employed by the parties to fulfil the basic day-to-day administrative tasks (in italics in the organigrams). The connections between these elements are shown by the following arrows:

FROM CONSTITUENT/NON-CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OR PARTY ORGANS TO PARTY ORGANS:

- Has voting status in
- Has consultative status in

FROM PARTY ORGANS TO OFFICERS OF THE PARTY and BETWEEN CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS:

- Appoints/Elects
- Nominates

FROM PARTY ORGANS TO CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OR PARTY ORGANS:

- Makes binding decisions on
- Makes recommendations to

* = when these offices are held by a member of a member party.
The first statutes of any transnational European party organisation within the general framework of the EC Community (i.e. external to the Groups in EP) were the 1974 Rules of Procedure of the CSP (See Figure 3.1). The basic aim of the CSP was “to strengthen inter-party relations and, in particular, to define joint, freely agreed positions on problems raised by the existence of the European Community” (Article 2). Although there was thus an explicit link to the institutional structure of the EC, the organisation of the CSP was the European extension of the Socialist party organisations in the domestic arena and not of the Socialist representatives in the European institutions. This was reflected in the full voting rights of the national party representatives in the two main decision-making bodies, as opposed to the ‘consultative’ status of the EP Group representatives and the Socialist Commissioners. Moreover, the CSP was subservient to the

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Socialist International (SI): Article 1 stated that the new organisation was fundamentally based on the provisions for regional co-operation under the statutes of the Socialist International (SI).

Finally, the decision-making authority of the organs of the party were considerably weak. The Bureau and Congress could adopt non-binding ‘recommendations’ to the national parties (and not to the EP Group) by a simply majority. ‘Binding decisions’ could be adopted by unanimity in the Bureau and two-thirds of the Congress delegates, but the CSP had no means of enforcing such decisions as their were no provisions for fining or expelling member parties.

FIGURE 3.2. Organigram of the Party of European Socialists, 1995
Party of European Socialists, 1995. Consequently, the contrast with the structure of the PES in 1995 is striking (see Figure 3.2.). The PES now had nine aims (Article 3), to:
- strengthen the socialist and social democratic movement in the Union and throughout Europe;
- develop close working relationships between the national parties, the national parliamentary groups, the Group of the PES in the European Parliament and the Party;
- define common policies for the European Union;
- prepare structures for an ever closer collaboration between European socialist and social-democratic parties;
- engage parties' members in activities of the Party;
- guarantee close co-operation with the Socialist Group of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;
- ensure close collaboration in the Socialist International;
- promote exchanges and contacts with European trade unions, professional organisations, associations and co-operatives; and
- adopt a common manifesto for the elections to the European Parliament.

These aims are thus similar to the traditional aims of a Socialist party any political system: to secure political office for party representatives, to pursue Socialist policies through the institutions of the system, to provide channels of co-operation and communication for the various party office-holders, to involve the party membership in the organisation, and to establish links with the traditional Socialist groups in civil society - such as trade unions and co-operative associations.

Moreover, in terms of internal decision-making, as the organigram clearly illustrates, the picture is much more complex. The constituent elements of the PES include the Full Member Parties (of which two, the Norwegian DNA and Cypriot EDEK, are not from EU member states), the Associate and Observer Parties, the Socialist Associations (such as the EC Organisation of Socialist Youth (ECOSY)), and the Groups of the PES in the EP and the Committee of the Regions. The PES also has a new decision-making organ: the Party Leaders' Conference. Party leaders of the member parties had met unofficially since the birth of the CSP, but the Leaders' Conference was not formally instated in the inaugural statutes of the

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PES in November 1992. Under the new statutes, the Party Leaders’ Conference is the supreme organ of the PES. It is the only organ that can adopt resolutions and recommendations to the Bureau and the Congress, the member parties, and the Group of the PES in the EP. Furthermore, the right to take ‘binding decisions’ on the member parties was removed from the Congress and given to the Leaders’ Conference. Finally, the statutes provide for party leaders to adopt decisions by a qualified majority in all areas of policy where majority voting is used in the EU Council of Ministers (Article 9.4). If a member party declares it is unable to implement a specific decision taken by a majority vote it must declare so before the vote is taken. Although in practice it has not been used, decisions taken in a vote can be enforced by financial sanctions or even expulsion of the member party.

_European People’s Party, 1976._ Compared to the CSP, however, the first statutes of the EPP outlined a much more developed Christian Democrat party organisation at the European level (see Figure 3.3.). Unlike the CSP, from the outset one of the central aims of the EPP was to “support, co-ordinate and organise the European activities of the its member parties” (Article 3.d). Also in contrast to the CSP, another founding aims was programmatic: to “participate in, and support the process of, European integration and co-operate in the transformation of Europe into a European Union with a view to achieving a Federal Union” (Article 3.c). Within the EPP, moreover, decision-making was split between three organs: the Congress, the Political Bureau, and the Executive Committee; and the EPP already had provisions for the recognition of observer parties. However, although one of the explicit aims of the party federation was to co-ordinate national Christian Democrat policy on European issues, the first EPP statutes did not contained any provision for the adoption of binding decisions - although a member party could be expelled by a majority of the Political Bureau (Rule 15.b). Nevertheless, whereas all CSP decisions were officially taken by ‘consensus decisions’, all EPP positions could be taken by a simple majority (Articles 6.i & 7.h).

European People's Party, 1993. Like the PES, the story told by the 1993 statutes of the EPP is more complex than the original tale. The main difference relates to the establishment of three new official organs: the Presidency, the Office of the Secretary-General, and the Conference of Party Leaders and Heads of Government. The Executive Committee had been replaced by The Presidency, which involved the key European level EPP actors: the President, Vice-Presidents, Secretary-General, Treasurer, and the President of the EPP Group in the EP with full voting rights; a delegate from the Christian Democrat Commissioners, the

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Secretary-General of the EPP Group in the EP, and the President of the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) and the President of the EPP Group in the Assembly of the Council of Europe with 'consultative' status (Article 11). This gathering of the EPP elites is thus much more capable of managing the weekly business and ensuring the “permanent political presence of the EPP” (Article 11.c) than the more cumbersome Executive Committee.

The second new organ, the Office of the Secretary-General had existed under the original statute, but in the most recent statutes the post covers a much broader range of tasks, including supervising co-operation between the General Secretariats of the domestic parties (Article 14). Under the new statutes, the EPP is thus Secretariat at the apex of a large EPP bureaucracy which stretches from the domestic party administrations to the EPP Group in the EP.

FIGURE 3.4. Organigram of the European People's Party, 1993
Like the PES, the third new EPP organ is the Conference of Party Leaders and Heads of Government. This was first installed as an official organ of the EPP in the 1990 statute reforms. Although the official status of the EPP leaders’ conference is lower than the EPP Congress (as the Congress is the supreme decision-making organ), in reality the leaders’ conference is the dominant body of the EPP. Unlike the PES statutes, and whereas the EPP Political Bureau is instructed to make all decisions by an absolute majority of the members present (Article 9.c), the EPP Statute does not establish any formal voting rules for the EPP Leaders’ Conference. Nevertheless, like the PES, decisions of the EPP leaders’ conference have a special status. The EPP leaders’ meeting is the only body were all the top Christian Democrat elites from the European and domestic arenas meet: the national party leaders, the national Christian Democrat Heads of Government, the leading Christian Democrat Commissioners, and the President of the EPP Group in the EP. Consequently, decisions at the EPP leaders’ meetings are more legitimate than any decisions of the Congress or the Political Bureau, and thus in practice are more binding on Christian Democrat actors in the domestic and European institutions.

Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties, 1976. The decision-making structure established by the first statutes of the ELD was more like the CSP than the EPP. The ELD had only two official organs: the Congress and the Executive Committee. Also like the CSP, the official aims of the ELD were more organisational than programmatic; “to seek a common position on all the important problems affecting the European Community” (Article 2). The relationship to the party International was also similar to the CSP - with provisions stating that the Liberal federation would “act within the framework of the Liberal International (LI)”.

However, unlike the CSP, parties did not have to be members of the LI to be full members of the ELD. They simply had to accept the ELD Statutes and policy programmes of the Congress (Article 3). Like the EPP, however, from the outset the Liberal Group in the EP was a constituent element of the extra-parliamentary Liberal organisation (Article 10). Moreover, the

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ELD statutes did not establish any provisions for making decisions binding on the member parties. However, unlike either of the other transnational party organisations, the Executive Committee was instructed to make all decisions by majority rather than to seek the “largest possible consensus” (as close as possible to unanimity).

**FIGURE 3.5. Organigram of the Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties, 1976**

*European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party*, 1993. Again, the obvious contrast between the ELD and the statutes of 1993 ELDR-Party is in the level of complexity\(^\text{17}\). The aims of the ELDR were expanded to include a programmatic commitment (to “strengthen the liberal, democratic and reform movement in the EU and throughout Europe”) and a more detailed organisational aim (to “develop close working relationships among their national parties, their national parliamentary groups, the ELDR-Group in the EP and the Liberal, Democrat and Reform-Group in other international fora and the ELDR-Party”) (Article 3).

Moreover, rather than two main decision-making organs, the 1993 statutes provide for four. The activities of the Congress remained practically the same as under the original statutes. The Executive Committee, however, was replaced by the Council, and two new organs were created. Firstly, like the EPP Presidency, the Bureau of the ELDR was established to bring together the key European level figures - the President, Vice-Presidents, and the Treasurer with full voting rights, and the Secretary-General and the President of the ELDR Group in the EP with consultative status - and is responsible for the management of the day-to-day activities of the party.

FIGURE 3.6. Organigram of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party, 1993

Secondly, as with the PES and EPP, the second new organ was the ELDR-Party Leaders' Meeting. Unlike the other European party organisations, however, the ELDR leaders...
summit was not formally instituted into the statutes until 1995, although the Liberal leaders had met informally under the auspices of the ELDR federation almost every year since its creation. Consequently, the official institutionalisation of these meetings confirmed the position of the ELDR Leaders' Meeting as the central decision-making arena in the Liberal party federation. Although the ELDR Congress can make recommendations to the member parties, in the co-ordination of domestic party policy on European issues, the decisions of the ELDR Leaders’ Meeting are in practice more legitimate because of the authority of the participants. Nevertheless, whereas under the statutes of the PES and the EPP, the party leaders may be able to adopt positions by a majority, the ELDR statutes explicitly state that: “In all the organs of the ELDR-Party, efforts shall be made to establish the broadest possible measure of agreement among the member parties” (Article 16). This is thus in stark contrast to the statutory instructions to the old ELD Executive Committee. However, whereas most Executive Committee decisions were almost insignificant for the member parties, ELDR Leaders’ Meetings can decide on the direction of domestic and European party positions in many important areas of public policy.

FIGURE 3.7. Organigram of the European Co-ordination of Green Parties, 1984
European Co-ordination of Green Parties, 1984. The only other extra-European Parliamentary transnational party organisation to be established within the framework of the EC system was the European Co-ordination of Green Parties. However, as the inaugural statutes show, the ECGP was fundamentally different to the three main European party organisations. Full membership of the ECGP was not restricted to parties from the EC member states. The ECGP had only one decision-making organ: the twice-yearly Meeting of the Green Co-ordination. However, this gathering was similar to the CSP Bureau, the EPP Political Bureau, and the ELD Executive Committee in that its aim was to co-ordinate the activities of the member parties on European policy questions, and that day-to-day decisions could be taken by majority decisions whereas policy decisions needed unanimity. Moreover, although the statutes did not officially mention a Congress of the Green Co-ordination, a biannual Congress was held; and like the other transnational parties, the activities of the ECGP were organised by a Secretary-General.

European Federation of Green Parties, 1993. Consequently, it was not until the inaugural statutes of the EFGP that the European Green parties were members of a real 'transnational party'. The central aims of the EFGP are similar to the other three party federations, in that it seeks "to assure a close and permanent co-operation among the Members in order to accomplish a common policy" (Article 2). However, the institutional structure of the EFGP is a more like the first statutes of the CSP, ELD and EPP than the most recent European 'Party Statutes'. The EFGP only has three decision-making organs - the Congress, the Council, and the Committee - and there are no provisions for meetings of the Green party leaders within the structure of the EFGP. Nevertheless, the Committee of the EFGP is similar to the EPP Presidency and the ELDR Bureau - as an ongoing body that brings together the key political decision-makers. And, without a party leaders' meeting to resolve disputes at the highest political level, the EFGP has established a novel procedure for tackling such problems, in the form of the Arbitrage Committee.

However, there is a further fundamental difference between the EFGP and the other three EU party organisations: the EFGP is not EU specific. The membership of the party is open to any European Green party, and in fact a majority of the member parties are from non-EU states. Moreover, the EU as an institutional system is not mentioned anywhere in the statutes, and the official seat of the EFGP is in Vienna whereas the seats of the other three parties are in Brussels (the EU capital). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the EFGP is not an EU party. The EFGP still seeks to get Green representatives elected and nominated to offices in the EU institutions, and seeks Green policy outputs from the EU system. The EFGP statutes also provide for specific co-operation within the framework of the Green party federation among the member parties from the EU states. Consequently, the expansion of the membership of the EFGP beyond the boundaries of the EU is less a rejection

20 Article 7 of the EFGP statutes states that: "The Members of the Federation may organize themselves in sub-areas within the framework of the Federation", *ibid.*, p. 5. Leo Cox, the first Secretary-General of the EFGP, confirmed that this article was inserted to provide for a greater degree of co-ordination among the EU Green Parties.
of the EU system as a whole, than a reflection of the ideological commitment to a much wider European union. As the statutes state: “The Federation devotes itself to an open, active, constructive and critical approach to the ongoing integration process in Europe towards a world wide co-operation” (Article 2). Although the EFGP may still be an EU party, its internal organisation thus reflects its basic ‘anti-system’ characteristics - as a party that does not accept the territorial boundaries of the political system in which it operates.

In sum, therefore, the changing ‘official stories’ tell some important tales about the development of the internal organisations of the European party federations. All the party federations have establish more complex organisations since their creation: with several central main decision-making organs and a mix of constituent and non-constituent groups. There has also been a clearer definition of when and why different voting procedures should be used. Majority votes are used mainly for day-to-day management decisions, and the detailed policy decisions made in the executive committees. Unanimity is generally required, in contrast, for medium- and long-term policy objects and other decisions about basic party strategy. Moreover, these major decisions are increasingly made at the level of the party leaders. This hence accords with the ‘consensus’ (or Consociational) model of politics, where every-day decisions can be passed with majority support, but issues that are fundamental to the pursuit of the main goal in the EU system (domestic political office) can only be made by a consensus among the party elites.

Furthermore, in the three main party federations, the party leaders’ meetings were institutionalised as the central decision-making organ: with the supreme authority to co-ordinate party policy making on European issues in the domestic and European arenas. This situation arose from demand and supply factors. On the demand side, as the EU system developed, domestic party leaders were increasingly asked to adopt positions on detailed questions of European policy, but the old mechanisms of the party federation were unable to meet this demand. On the supply side, moreover, the International Sections of the national parties and the European-level party officials (in the executive committees of the federations) did not possess the political authority to make credible and/or binding commitmens. For the approval of new organisational and policy strategies, therefore, the consent of each party leader, or at
least a majority of party leaders, is essential. It was thus in the interests of both the domestic party leaders and the European party officials to institutionalise the informal leaders' summits as the main organ of European party co-operation. However, the EFGP does not fit this pattern. On the one hand, the internal structure of the European Green federation suggests that it is at the level of development that the other party federations were in the 1970s. On the other hand, however, the EFGP is a fundamentally different type of European party organisation: based more on the establishment and co-ordination of domestic Green party organisations through the whole of Europe (like a Socialist or Liberal International, or the EUCD), than on the co-ordination of party (and party leaders’) strategies within the European Union system.

3.2.2. The Level of Organisational Institutionalisation

However, this story of the changes in the internal party statutes and decision-making mechanisms does not necessarily mean that in the early 1990s the party federations were strongly institutionalised organisations. To assess the level of internal institutionalisation, we must also take into account various unofficial and informal indicators. The easiest way to do this is to apply Panebianco's five indicators of party institutionalisation:21

- the degree of development of the central extra-parliamentary organisation - where a central bureaucracy implies a strongly institutionalised party, and an “embryonic” structure implies a weakly institutionalised structure;
- the level of homogeneity of organisational structures at the same hierarchical level - where the local organisations are organised the same way in strongly institutionalised parties, and in weakly institutionalised parties they are heterogeneous;
- the structure of party finances - where a continuous flow of a large amount of resources from a plurality of sources implies a strongly institutionalised party;
- the relations with collateral organisations - where a strongly institutionalised party dominates its supporting organisations (such as a trade union), and a weakly institutionalised party is subservient to external groups; and

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• the degree of correspondence between statutory norms and the actual power structure - where strongly institutionalised parties tend to have a higher correspondence than weakly institutionalised parties.

An application of these criteria to the party federations thus reveals that despite their internal organisational development, the three true party federations are all still relatively weak political organisations.

Firstly, on the degree of development of the central extra-parliamentary organisation, the size of the European-level party federation bureaucracies have grown, but are still small compared to the Bureau's of their Groups in the EP. In 1974 the CSP Secretariat employed three full-time staff and one part-time staff, and in 1994 the PES Secretariat had grown to twelve full-time staff, three part-time staff and between two and three temporary stagiaires. In 1976 the EPP Secretariat had three full-time staff, and in 1994 it had thirteen full-time staff, three part-time staff and several temporary stagiaires. In 1976 the ELD Secretariat employed three full-time and one part-time officers, and in 1994 the ELDR-Party Secretariat had six full-time and two part-time staff and between one and two stagiaires. In contrast, in 1994, the European parliamentary bureaucracies of the three main party federations had over thirty full and part-time officials.

Moreover, of the three main party federations only the EPP Secretariat (in rue de la Victoire) is outside the offices of the European Parliament (in rue Belliard). Consequently, the maintenance costs of the offices and the salaries of most of the staff of the ELDR and PES Secretariats are paid for from the budgets of the ELDR and PES Groups in the EP. The running costs of the EPP Secretariat are paid from the EPP federations' own budget, and thus only partially and indirectly by the EPP Group. In addition, the EPP Secretariat shares its offices, and thus some of the maintenance costs, with the Secretariat of the EUCD. Of the three party federations, the EPP thus has the most developed and independent extra-parliamentary bureaucracy. However, relative to the size of the central offices of the member parties, all the European level party bureaucracies are 'embryonic'.

Secondly, on the homogeneity of organisational structures at the same hierarchical level, the European party federations could hardly be more weakly institutionalised. At the lower level of party organisation in the EU are the party organisations of the member parties of each of the party federations. At this level, in all three federations, no two domestic party organisations in the same party federation are the same. There are some similarities in the structure of party organisation in each party family. For example, Socialist parties tend to give more power to mass membership organs (such as the party congress), Liberal parties tend to be more internally democratic, and Christian Democrat parties tend to have closed elite cartels. However, there is generally a higher level of similarity of party organisation within each domestic system than within each party federation.

The organisational development of the party federations has led to some homogenisation of domestic party organisational structures. For example, the party federations have been responsible for changing the role of the International Sections of the parties, from minor positions for liaison with the party Internationals, to a more central role in the coordination of domestic-European party relations. Moreover, through the development of the system of party federation working groups, the European parties have increasingly involved middle-level domestic party elites in the development of common European policies. The organisation of party leaders' meetings has also enhanced the involvement of party leaders (and their offices) in European level politics, and thus contributed to the authority of the position of party leader. Regardless of the party federations, however, the increased 'personalisation' of domestic politics has meant the development of the party leader as the central party 'statesmen' in all systems. Hence, the overall effect of party organisations at the European level on party organisation in the domestic arena has been marginal. There is thus a low level of homogeneity of organisational structures at the same hierarchical level in all the party federations.

Thirdly, on the structure of party finances, the party federations gather their resources from two main sources. Until the middle of the 1980s, the majority of the operating budgets of the party federations came through the Groups in the EP - who were funded from the European

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Parliament section of the EC Budget. The national parties were required to pay yearly submissions, but these were small compared to the size of the direct contributions from the EP Groups. Since the end of the 1980s, however, all the party federations have asked for approximately equal subscription fees from the member parties and the party federation Group in the EP. For example, in the most recent budgets of the PES, the full member parties and the Group of the PES in the EP were both required to pay 7.2 million Belgian Francs in 1992, 8.4 million in 1993, 8.6 million in 1994, and 8.7 million in 1995. In contrast to the PES, however, the total financial contribution of the member parties of the EFGP was only 1.7 million Belgian Francs in 1991, and 1.8 million in 1993; thus less than 20% of the contributions of the member parties of the PES in the same year.

The budgets of the party federations have grown considerably. The total budget of the ELDR in 1991 was 11.6 million Belgian Francs, over three times larger than the 1982 figure of 3.5 million. Moreover, the total budget of the PES increased from 17.3 million in 1992 to 21.4 million in 1995. The PES budget in 1994 was 26.8 million Belgian Francs. This was more than in 1995 because it was the year of the fourth direct elections to the European Parliament, and the PES allocated an extra 7 million Belgian Francs to the regular annual costs to fight the electoral campaign. The size of the extra money for the 1994 PES election campaigning is interesting on two accounts. Firstly, this is only 26.1% of the total 1994 PES budget, whereas almost 78% of the 1979 budget of the CSP was spent on the 1979 EP election campaign. Secondly, almost an equal amount of money was set aside in 1994 for the organisation of PES party leaders' meetings.

Compared to the total budgets of parties at the national level, however, the budgets of the party federations are still pathetically small. In fact, the contributions of the national parties

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25 I have only been able to obtain exact budget figures from the PES. However, for the EPP, this general pattern of funding is confirmed in European People's Party (1993b) Règlement Financier du PPE, adopté par le Bureau du PPE, Bruxelles, le 9 septembre 1993; and the Secretary-General of the ELDR verified that a similar practice, of asking the member parties to match the contributions of the EP Groups, is also used in the Liberal federation.

26 These figures are taken from the draft budgets of the CSP and PES for 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995.

27 These figures are taken from the Minutes of the First EFGP Council Meeting, on 3 March 1994 in Vienna.


to the party federations are so insignificant that only a few parties mention them in their annual budgets.\(^30\) However, directly comparing the party federations’ finances with the total budgets of national parties is an unfair (and unscientific) measure. The relative size of the budget of a party organisation at a particular level of government is always relative to the expenditure (and thus significance) of government institutions at that level. Consequently, the party federation budgets should be compared with domestic party central office budgets (in a non-election year) as a percentage of government income at the level of party central office.

In 1993, therefore, the budgets of the PES and the ELDR were, respectively, .0000011% and .0000008% of the total EU budget. This thus compares favourably with the budgets of the central office of parties in federal systems. For example, as a percentage of the budget of the federal German government in 1989, the Head Office incomes of the SPD, CDU and FDP were, respectively, .0000043%, .0000023% and .0000002%.\(^31\) And, as a percentage of the budget of the United States Federal Government in 1989, the budgets of the Democrat and Republican National Committees were, respectively, .0000005% and .0000014%.\(^32\) Consequently, relative to government expenditure at the same level of party organisation, the budgets of the PES and the ELDR are smaller than the two main Germany parties, but are equivalent to the Democrats and Republicans in the US. Interestingly enough, moreover, the ELDR budget is relatively larger than the Central Office budget of the FDP - one of its member parties. Consequently, the structure of party finances of the party federations implies that they are at least as institutionalised as parties in the US, and not dependent upon a single source of income. Compared to the structure of most national party budgets,

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\(^31\) The budget of the federal German government in 1989 was approximately 447,000 million German Marks (DM), and the budgets of the Central Offices of the SPD, CDU and FDP in the same year were, respectively, 19.1 million DM, 10.1 million DM, and .8 million DM. The size of the German government was calculated from OECD National Accounts for 1990, and ECSC-EEC-EAEC (1991) *Basic Statistics of the Community*, 28th edn. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities; and the figures for the parties were taken from T. Poguntke & B. Boll (1992) “Germany”, in R.S. Katz & P. Mair (eds) *Party Organizations: A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 1960-90*, London: Sage, pp. 378-81.

nevertheless, they are relatively weak, and the party federations are forced to rely on only two main sources of revenue.

On the fourth of Panebianco's criteria, the relations with collateral organisations, the party federations are all in a fairly dominant position. Unlike most Socialist parties in the domestic arena, the CSP and the PES have had no formal links with the European trade union movement. On several occasions, representatives from the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) have attended various CSP and PES working groups, party leaders' meetings and even Bureau meetings, and ETUC representatives have been present at almost all CSP and PES Congresses. The 1995 reform of the PES statutes introduced new rules for the ex officio representation of various PES 'Associations', such as the EC Organisation of Socialist Youth (ECOSY), but the ETUC is not as yet covered by these provisions. In a similar structure to the CSP/PES, the only collateral organisation represented in the executive organs of the ELDR is the Federation of Liberal Youth Organisations.

However, the relationship between the EPP and collateral organisations is somewhat different to the other two federations. Since the very beginning, the EPP statutes granted special status to several EPP 'Associations' - such as the European Small Firms Association (ESFA), the European Union of Christian-Democrat Workers (EUCDW), and the European Association of Local Authorities (EALA). Moreover, unlike the PES and the ELDR, the Christian Democrat collateral organisations have full voting rights in the EPP Congress and Political Bureau. This still does not suggest, however, that these extra-party bodies have much of an influence on the political development of the EPP. Compared to the role of the trade unions in the British Labour Party, or the Catholic Church in the early years of the Italian Christian Democrats, all three main party federations are almost completely independent from direct pressures by social group organisations.

On the final of Panebianco's criteria, the level of correspondence between statutory norms and actual power structures, the party federations score relatively highly. The official story told be the statutes is a close indicator of the structure of political decision-making in the parties, and the balance of authority between the various organs. The subtleties of decision-making in organisations that operate in several languages, especially in the supranational or
international arenas, are difficult to ascertain. However, this linguistic constraint exists for participants in the process as well as for the observers. In all the party federations the statutes serve as a common point of reference for all the party actors, regardless of the language they use. The process of translating informal practices into the official languages of the organisation is in itself a process of formalisation, as it invariably involves careful legal deliberation and interpretation. This process thus makes the party statutes a truer picture of actual internal decision-making than the rules of most domestic parties. A similar observation has been made about the internal rules of the EP, as compared to the rules of national assemblies.33

However, there are two important rejoinders to this general rule about the correspondence between statutory and actual norms. Firstly, although party leaders’ meetings have in reality been the central decision-making bodies in the three main federations, they were not formally introduced into the European party statutes until the beginning of the 1990s. Consequently, prior to the institutionalisation of these meetings, the statutory statements about the power of the party Congresses and Bureaus did not accord with the reality of significance of these meetings. Hence, the institutionalisation of the party leaders’ meetings implies an increased correspondence between statutes and reality. Secondly, however, as the parties have developed more complex internal structures, the overall correspondence between rules and reality has decreased. This has been a natural consequence of the move from a monthly presence, like an international organisation, to a day-to-day existence, more akin to a domestic political party. This transformation is illustrated in an increased vagueness of the statutes in certain areas. In particular, where the first statutes all stated that the party Bureaus would hold a specific number of meetings every year, the latest rules all recommend that the executive committees meet “as often as necessary” - like a national party executive. Overall, nevertheless, there is a relatively high correspondence between the statutory norms of the party federations and the actual internal relations in the parties.

In sum, therefore, despite some development towards strongly institutionalised party organisations, all the party federations are still weakly institutionalised compared to almost all political parties in other party systems. The extra-parliamentary bureaucracies are embryonic

compared to the Groups in the European Parliament and the central offices of the member parties. The level of the homogeneity of organisational structures at the same hierarchical level (i.e. in the national arena) is in fact higher between parties of different party federations from the same party system, than between member parties of the same party federation. The size of the federation budgets is very small, and comes from only two sources; although they are less dependent upon the EP Groups, and the size is comparable to the budgets of domestic parties in federal systems relative to the size of government finances at that level. The only counter facts, however, are that the party federations are not dominated by collateral organisations, and there is a high correspondence between statutory norms and actual structures. One can only conclude, therefore, that all the party federation organisations are weak. However, with larger central offices and budgets, and an early institutionalisation of party leaders’ meetings, the EPP and PES are perhaps slightly more institutionalised than the ELDR.

The overall picture of the internal organisational development of the European party federations is thus uneven. In 1994, the three main party federations all possessed significantly more established and complex decision-making structures than they had at the end of the 1970s. However, many of the significant institutional changes in the federation statutes, such as the institutionalisation of party leaders’ summits, were made since the end of the 1980s. Moreover, the level of party institutionalisation is not evenly distributed between the various internal party organs. The party leaders’ meetings have established a high level of institutional development, whereas the official executive and party congressional bodies have either remained at the same institutional level as they were under the original structures or have stagnated. Consequently, the institution of the party leaders’ meeting is the only developed party-political organ in the EU system. In comparative context, however, this type of party arena is not unique. A similar role is played by the National Committees of the American parties, and the executive councils of the Swiss parties: of bringing together territorial and federal level party elites at specific times each year to decide on a common political strategy.34

3.3. External Organisation: From European Parliament to European Council

Turning to the relationship between of parties at the European level and the EU institutional system, the party federations have moved away from a concentration on the European Parliament towards a realisation of the importance of, and subsequent organisation around, the European Council. This change in the external organisation of the party federations is manifest in the changing statutory links between the central party organs and the party actors in the EC/EU institutions; and in the specific organisation of leaders' meetings 'close' to European Council meetings.

3.3.1. Relations to Party Actors in the European Institutions

The party organigrams, shown in Figures 3.1 to 3.8 above, illustrate the changing structure of linkages between the party organisations and the EU institutional arenas. This linkage is fundamentally a two-way connection between the party infrastructure and the party representatives in the European level institutions: the representation of the party members who hold political office at the European level in the decision-making organisations of the party (a link from the actors in the political system to the party organisations); and the ability of the party to control the behaviour of these actors (a reverse link from the party organisations to actors in the political system). Rather than taking the nature of these links for each of the party federation in turn, it is more appropriate to look at the four main EU institutional arenas separately and to analyse how the relation between the parties and party actors has changed as a whole.

The different relationships between the party federations and the EC and EU institutions are illustrated in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. In the tables:

- ‘-’ indicates that there is no formal representation of the party actors in a particular EC/EU institution in any of the decision-making organs of the party (where party actor ‘Representation’ in the party organisation is concerned), or that there are no mechanisms for making party demands on the actors in that institution (where party ‘Control’ over the party actors is concerned);
• 'low' indicates that the party actors in a particular EC/EU institution have some consultation or *ex officio* rights in several of the party organs and are thus unable to vote (Representation), or that there are some provisions for making recommendations to the party actors in that institution but not for enforcing these decisions (Control);

• 'medium' indicates that the party actors in a particular EC/EU institution have some full voting rights in some of the party organs but not all of them (Representation), or that there are some provisions for enforcing party decisions on these actors but not in all instances (Control); and

• 'high' indicates that the party actors in a particular EC/EU institution have full voting rights in all party organs (Representation), or that there are provisions for the enforcement of party decisions on these actors (Control).

As Table 3.1 shows, in the first party federation statutes, the only real linkage to the EC institutions was through the Party Groups in the European Parliament. In terms of representation of party actors in the party federation organs, the EP Party Groups had full voting rights in the EPP and ELD Congress and executive bodies, and consultative rights in the CSP and ECGP organs. As for controlling the EP Groups, all the party federations were able to make recommendations to their MEPs, but these recommendations could not be enforced. Only the EPP made any effort to enforce policy decisions - through the “Action Programmes” adopted by the EPP Congress at the beginning of each new European Parliament term. And, only the ELD required that the Executive Committee had to be consulted in the selection of candidates for the European Elections.

As for the party actors in the other EC institutions, EC Commissioners had full voting rights in all ELD organs and in the EPP executive bodies, and consultation rights in the CSP Bureau. As for the Council of Ministers, however, only the EPP made any provisions for the participation of Christian Democrat government Ministers in party meetings. Finally, the party leaders’ (including the Heads of Government) participated in the work of the party federations through the informal CSP, EPP and ELD leaders’ meetings. There were, however, no provisions for the delivery of party decisions to the party actors in these other EC institutions. Overall, therefore, under the first statutes, the level of participation of European level party
actors in the work of the party federations was low, and the ability of the party federations to influence the behaviour of these actors was practically non-existent.

TABLE 3.1. *Linkages Between Party Federations and EC Institutions, 1974-1984*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIES</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONS: European Parliament</th>
<th>European Commission</th>
<th>Council of Ministers</th>
<th>European Council</th>
<th>All EC Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSP, 1974</td>
<td>Representation: Medium Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELD, 1976</td>
<td>Representation: High Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP, 1976</td>
<td>Representation: High Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGP, 1984</td>
<td>Representation: Medium Low</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Main Parties</td>
<td>Representation: High Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Parties</td>
<td>Representation: Medium Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 3.2 illustrates, the situation in 1993-1995 was substantially different. The only element of continuity was the relationship with the EP Groups. In terms of participation, by the 1990s, the MEPs were fully active in all the organs of the main party federations - with the EP Group Leaders participating in the new leaders' conferences. In return, party federation control over the EP Groups increased slightly: with official recognition in the 'Internal Regulations' of the three main EP Party Groups that they are the 'Group of the PES', 'Group of the EPP', and 'Group of the ELDR'; and with provisions in the federation statutes for controlling party and individual membership of the EP Groups. In fact, in 1994, the post of EPP-Party and EPP-Group President was held by the same person - Wilfried Martens. However, in the EFGP, the relationship with the Green Group in the EP was reduced both formally (with no rights of participation in the EFGP Congress independently of the member parties) and informally (with the EFGP less dependent on the resources of the Green Group after the transfer of the 'Official Seat' to Vienna).

In contrast to the stability of the relationship with the EP Groups, the links between the three main party federations and the other EC institutions significantly increased between 1974
and 1995.35 As for the representation of European Commissioners in the party organs: they are full participants in all the ELDR Congress, Council and Bureau, and *ex officio* participants at ELDR Leaders’ Meetings; full participants in the EPP Congress, Political Bureau, and Leaders’ Conference, and *ex officio* in meetings of the EPP Presidency; and have consultative status in the PES Bureau and at PES Leaders’ Conferences. In return, however, there are hardly any provisions for influencing the actions of the party actors in the European Commission. Only the PES has begun to establish a way of introducing partisan influence into the work of the European Commission: through the launch of an informal “Socialist Caucus”, of the nine Commissioners from member parties of the PES in the Commission that begun work in January 1995.

There are, however, legal limitations on the ability of the party federations to influence the European Commissioners: Article 157.2 of the EC Treaty states that Commissioners should be “completely independent in the performance of their duties ... [and] shall neither seek nor take instructions from...any other body”.36 Nevertheless, this Article is explicitly aimed at the Governments of the Member States: it goes on to state that “each Member State undertakes to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the Commission in the performance of their tasks”. Without any explicit reference to ‘party’ influences on the European Commission, there is thus no formal legal reason why the party federations cannot seek to constrain the actions of the Commissioners.

Party federation actors in the Council of Ministers have also increased their involvement in the work of the federations. The Council of Ministers is formally mentioned in all the party statutes: Christian Democrat Ministers are full participants in the EPP Congress; a representative of the Liberal Ministers can attend ELDR-Party Leaders’ Meetings; and the President of the Council of Ministers (if s/he is from a Socialist Party) can participate in PES Leaders’ Conferences. Moreover, Ministers are increasingly involved in party federation business in an informal capacity: on several occasions Government Ministers and Opposition

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35 Although not discussed here, the party federations have begun to develop links with the members of the Committee of the Regions - through the establishment of a ‘Group of the PES’, ‘Group of the EPP’ and ‘Group of the ELDR’ in the Committee. However, these links are at an embryonic stage.

party ‘Spokespersons’ have got together under the auspices of the party federations to discuss current issues in the Council of Ministers; and Junior Ministers and party Spokespersons are increasingly involved in the growing number of party federation Working Groups that prepare the most important Congress Resolutions and Leaders’ Declarations. Moreover, through the work of the party leaders’ meetings, the activities of Ministers have begun to be constrained by the policies of the party federations. However, only the PES has explicit provisions for binding the member parties, by requiring that a majority vote is taken on any issue where a qualified majority is used in the Council of Ministers.

TABLE 3.2. Linkages Between Party Federations and EU Institutions, 1993-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIES</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONS: European Parliament</th>
<th>European Commission</th>
<th>Council of Ministers</th>
<th>European Council</th>
<th>All EU Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PES, 1995</td>
<td>Representation: Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control: High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELDR, 1993</td>
<td>Representation: High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control: Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP, 1993</td>
<td>Representation: High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control: High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control: Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFGP, 1993</td>
<td>Representation: Low</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control: Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Main Parties</td>
<td>Representation: High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control: Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Parties</td>
<td>Representation: Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control: Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most significant change from the early statutes, however, has been in the relationship between the party federations and the European Council. The institutionalisation of the party leaders’ meeting as the central organ of all three main party federations has led to the active involvement of Heads of Government in the work of the party federations. Although they are not represented in all the party organs, the Heads of Government have the most powerful position in the party federations, and not the EP Groups. In fact, the 1993 EPP Statutes explicitly state that in the Conference of Party Leaders and Heads of Government there is a special role for all “members of the European Council belonging to a member party”. This thus includes the Foreign Ministers, Prime Ministers and Commission President from any of the EPP member parties, even if they are not a Party Chairman or Secretary-General. This is not formally stated in the PES or ELDR Statutes, but in reality they practice the same
procedure. The level of control over the actions of party representatives in the European Council remains low, but the PES and EPP have certain provisions that can bind the actions of the party spokespersons.

In conclusion, therefore, the changing relation between the party federations and the EC/EU institutions can be seen as a shift away from the EP Groups towards a more general connection with all European-level actors. Moreover, this shift is particularly highlighted by the granting of the supreme internal decision-making powers to the participants of the European Council in party leaders' meetings. There has also been an increase in the influence of the party federations on the behaviour of the actors in the EU institutions, but the overall level of party 'control' of political decision-making remains relatively low. Nevertheless, the party federations have sought to maximise the limited influence they have by deliberately organising party leaders' meetings around the timetable and agenda of the European Council.

3.3.2. Organisation of Leaders' Meetings Around the European Council

The changing structure of the party federations' relations to the EC/EU institutional system (away from a single emphasis on the EP, and towards a special emphasis on the European Council) is further enhanced by the deliberate attempts to connect the internal party agenda to European Council meetings. The connection of party leaders' meetings to the European Council, rather than any other party organ, is specifically relevant as for two reasons. Firstly, leaders' meetings are the main internal decision-making organs of the party federations. Secondly, party leaders' meetings are the only European party organ where the European Council actors formally participate.

The annual, and tri-annual, number of party leaders' and European Council meetings is shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The figures for the party leaders' meetings include the official party leaders' conferences as well as all the informal party leaders' meetings held prior to the institutionalisation of the party leaders' conferences in the party federation statutes, and/or held alongside a party federation Congress. In the first few years of the party federations, several bi-lateral and multi-lateral meetings were held between various national party leaders of the same party family, and every year or so informal party leaders' summits were held under the
auspices of the Socialist International, the Liberal International, and the European Union of Christian Democrats. However, none of these other meetings are included here, as they were not linked to the organisation of the party federations. The complete list of European Council’s and party leaders’ meetings is contained in Appendix C.

### TABLE 3.3. Number of Party Leaders’ and European Council Meetings, Per Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CSP/ PES</th>
<th>ELD/ ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>All Parties</th>
<th>Euro. Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.4. Number of Party Leaders’ and European Council Meetings, Per Three Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>CSP/ PES</th>
<th>ELD/ ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>All Parties</th>
<th>Euro. Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974-76</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-79</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-82</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-85</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-88</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-91</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the Tables show, there has been a general increase in the number of leaders’ meetings of all the party federations since their establishment: from an average of about one meeting a year for each federation up to the mid-1980s, and increasing to an average since 1989 of about three leaders’ meetings a year for the EPP and PES and two a year for the ELDR. However, the party federations would not have increased their overall impact on European Council decision-making if the increased activity of the leaders’ meetings is simply in line with a concomitant increase in the total number of European Councils. As Tables 3.3 and 3.4 reveal, however, the number of European Councils each year has remained fairly constant
across the whole period. In other words, there has been an increase in the total number of party leaders' meetings each year relative to the number of European Councils.

However, this relative increased in the activity of party leaders' vis-à-vis the European Council does not necessarily mean that party leaders' have specifically organised around the European Council. Nevertheless, the changes in the number of party leaders' meetings in subsequent years does indicate that there is also a relationship between the annual number of European Councils and party leaders' meetings. In 1989, for example, when there were only two European Councils, there were only four leaders' meetings; and in 1990, when there were four European Councils, ten leaders' meetings were held. As Table 3.5 shows, the correlation between the number of European Councils and party leaders' meetings is relatively small (and thus insignificant) across the whole period. Nevertheless, in the ten years between 1985 and 1995, there was a higher correlation between the frequency of European Councils and party leaders' meetings: significant at the 90% level for the total number of leaders' meetings.

**TABLE 3.5. Correlation Between Party Leaders' and European Council Meetings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985-94</th>
<th>1974-94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSP/PES</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELD/ELDR</td>
<td>.292</td>
<td>.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>.512*</td>
<td>.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Federations:</td>
<td>.590*</td>
<td>.278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = significant at the 90% level

However, the increase and decrease of the number of party leaders' meetings each year in accordance with the number of European Councils still does not necessarily mean that party leaders' have specifically organised to influence the agenda of the European Council. The changing level of party leaders' activities is likely to reflect the changing intensity of political activity in the EU system (which is manifest in the annual number of European Council meetings). As Table 3.6 shows, however, there has not only been a growing correlation between party leaders' meetings and European Councils, but the party federation have increasingly organised a party leaders' meeting in the two weeks immediately before, or in the
week immediately after, a European Council meeting. Moreover, prior to 1989 the party federations did not pursue a common organisational strategy: in the build up to the first EP elections, in 1979, only the ELD and CSP held leaders’ meeting close to European Council summits; and in most of the 1980s only the EPP had a consistent strategy.

TABLE 3.6. Percentage of Party Leaders’ Meetings in the Weeks Before or After ('Close') and in the Same Venue ('S.Venue') as a European Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>CSP/PES</th>
<th>ELD/ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>ALL PARTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Close</td>
<td>S.Venue</td>
<td>Close</td>
<td>S.Venue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-76</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-79</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-82</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-85</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-88</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-91</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rationale of meeting before a European Council is that the non-governmental parties can put pressure on the party actors participating in the European Council (the Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Commission President and Vice-President). The incentive for governmental actors, on the other hand, is to form alliances with like-minded actors prior to the European Council bargaining. Moreover, by meeting immediately before a European Council, the party leader’s Declarations are reported in the European media, and may thus alter the political agenda surrounding the EU meeting. Similarly, by arranging a meeting immediately after a European Council, the party actors in the EU arena will be forced to defend their positions taken at the European Council to their fellow ‘European Party’ members. In addition, the impact on European Council decisions is further enhanced by holding the party leaders’ meetings in the same place as the European Council meeting. This increases the attention of the European media, that have gathered for the European Council jamboree, and forces the party leaders’ to directly address the issues under discussion in the EU meeting. Furthermore, the percentage of all party leaders’ meetings held in the same venue as a
European Council meeting is shown in Table 3.6 in the brackets. This strategy has thus only been followed by all three federations since 1990.

Furthermore, organising a party leaders' meeting close to a European Council, is also likely to secure the attendance of as many party leaders as possible. When a party leaders' meeting is held, many party leaders will choose to send representatives from their front bench team, or another senior party official instead. When there are pressing matters in the domestic arena, there is little point in wasting a day (or even two days) going to a party leaders' meeting, unless it can clearly contribute to a party leader's competitive position. If a party leaders' meeting is close to a European Council meeting, however, there is a greater chance for the leader to be seen in the European media (as a European 'statesman'), and also provides opposition leaders with access to the participants in the European Council. As Table 3.7 shows, therefore, there is a general tendency for the record of attendance at party leaders' meetings to be higher if the meeting is close to a European Council meeting.

### TABLE 3.7. Percentage of Party Leaders' Attending Party Federation Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>CSP/PES</th>
<th>ELD/ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>ALL PARTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Close to a E.Council</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Close to a E.Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-76</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-79</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-82</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-85</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-88</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-91</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, Table 3.7 also reveals two other significant trends. Firstly, the level of leaders' participation at leaders' meetings increased from 1974 to 1994. Moreover, whereas the average level of attendance in all leaders' meetings was high in the early years, low between 1979 and 1989, and high again after 1989. This thus accords with the three broad phases of party federation development: of 'optimism' in the build up to the first EP elections, of

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37 The records of attendance are from the minutes and agendas of the party leaders' meetings, which are in the official archives of the party federations.
'stagnation' in throughout the 1980s, and of 'renaissance' in the early 1990s. Secondly, however, these general trends (of higher participation in meetings close to a European Council, and of an increasing level of attendance across the whole period) only hold for the CSP/PES and EPP. In stark contrast to the Christian Democrat and Socialist party federations, the ELD/ELDR has experienced a generally lower attendance of party leaders at leaders' meetings close to a European Council, and has suffered a steady reduction in the attendance of party leaders' meetings across the whole period.

TABLE 3.8. Number and Percentage of European Councils with 'Close' Party Leaders' Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>No Party Meetings</th>
<th>1 Party Meeting</th>
<th>2 Party Meetings</th>
<th>All Parties Meeting</th>
<th>Total E.Councils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-76</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-79</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-82</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-85</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-88</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-91</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, in terms of influencing the outcomes of the European Council, it is also necessary that a growing proportion of European Councils should have had party leaders' meetings in close proximity. This thus requires taking the European Council as the subject of analysis, rather than the party leaders' meetings. This subsequently reveals that there has been a dramatic increase in the number and proportion of European Council meetings where at least one party leaders' meeting was held immediately before or afterwards. As Table 3.8 illustrates, until 1989 over 50% of all European Councils did not have any 'close' party leaders' meetings, and only one out of forty-one European Councils up to 1989 had more than one party leaders' meeting close to it (and this was probably completely by chance!!). In contrast, after 1989, more than 80% of all European Councils had at least one party leader' meetings in close proximity. And, after 1992, almost 80% of all European Councils had at
least two party leaders' meetings either immediately before or after them. Moreover, this coincided with the fact that from 1992 to 1994, all three party federations held over 75% of their leaders' meetings close to a European Council. Furthermore, over two thirds of all European Councils since 1990 have had at least one party leaders' meetings held at the same venue, in the days leading up to the EC meeting.

The evidence thus suggests that in parallel to the internal organisational changes there has been a substantial transformation in the external organisation of the parties federations: in their organisational linkage to the institutions of the EC/EU political system. Prior to 1989, the only channel of representation and influence of the party federations was through the Party Groups in the European Parliament. In this period, none of the federations pursued a deliberate organisational strategy to influence the European Council. Since 1989, however, the EP Groups are of less importance in the internal decision-making of the federations, and in the efforts of the party federations to influence the behaviour of actors in the various EU institutions, than the top-level leaders' of the member parties and the participants in the European Council. The party leaders' meetings determine the direction of party federation policy and strategy; and the specific organisation of these meetings around the agenda, dates, and venues of the European Council implies the attempt to link the political aims of the party federations to EU policy outputs at the highest political level. This was thus a fundamentally new party strategy.

Nevertheless, this change of external organisational strategy was not equally pursued by all the party federations. For the Socialist and Christian Democrat European parties, there was an increase in the number of annual party leaders' meetings, an increase organisation of these meetings around the European Council, increase attendance of party leaders at these meetings, and a higher record of attendance at meetings held close to a European Council. For the European Liberal party organisation, there was a completely different picture: a stability in the number of party leaders' meetings (and zero in 1994!), a reduction in the level of attendance at leaders' meetings, and a generally lower level of attendance at meetings held close to a European Council.
However, this countervailing experience of the ELDR fits with the general theory. Whereas the Socialists and Christian Democrats had many participants in the European Council, the ELDR had very few. For example, between 1990 and 1995, the EPP federation leaders’ meetings were attended by at least four Heads of Government (Kohl (CDU), Martens or Dehaene (both CVP), Santer (PCS) and Lubbers (CDA)) and at least two Foreign Ministers (Van den Broek or Kooijmans (both CDA), and at least one of Eyskens (CVP), Samaras (ND) and Scotti, Colombo or Andreatta (all DC)). Similarly, for most of the period between 1990 and 1995, the Socialist federation had between two and five Heads of State or Prime Ministers (Mitterrand (PS-F) and González (PSOE), and at different times Rasmussen (SD), Amato (PSI), Papandreou (PASOK) and Kok (PvdA) and between two and four Foreign Ministers (Poos (POSL) and Fernández or Solana Madariaga (both PSOE), and at different times Claes (SP), Papoulias (PASOK), De Michelis (PSI), and Spring (LP-I) in every European Council meeting. Consequently, in this period, the EPP and CSP/PES together represented about 60 percent of all the participants in every European Council meeting. In these meetings, the Socialist federation also had the additional influence of Commission President Jacques Delors (PS-F), who was present at all seventeen CSP/PES leaders’ meetings between 1990 and 1995. In contrast, the ELDR could only muster the support of one Prime Minister (Cavaçó Silva (PSD)) and three Foreign Ministers (Deus Pinheiro or Manuel Durão Barroso (both PSD), Genscher or Kinkel (both FDP), and Ellemann-Jensen (V) or Petersen (RV)). This thus constituted only 16 percent of the European Council participants. Moreover, the possibility of these ELDR participants influencing European Council outcomes was further exacerbated by the fact that the FDP, V and RV were all minor partners in coalition governments, where the

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38 The EPP also had the Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis (ND) from April 1990 to October 1993, and the Italian Prime Minister Andreotti (DC) until July 1992. With the change of government in the Netherlands, the CDA leaders (Lubbers and Kooijmans) ceased to be members of the European Council in August 1994.

39 Rasmussen became Danish Prime Minister in January 1993, Amato was Italian Prime Minister between July 1992 and April 1993, and Papandreou and Kok became the Greek and Dutch Prime Ministers in October 1993 and August 1994 respectively.

40 Claes was Belgian Foreign Minister from March 1992, Papoulias was Greek Foreign Minister from October 1993, De Michelis was Italian Foreign Minister until July 1992, and Spring was Irish Foreign Minister from January 1993. Until March 1993, the Socialist federation also had the support of the second French representative in the European Council: either Prime Minister Rocard, Cresson, or Bérgéovoy (PS-F), or the Foreign Minister Dumas (PS-F).
'European policy' of the government was presumably dominated by the parties holding the Prime Ministers' offices (i.e. the CDU in Germany and the KF or SD in Denmark).

Consequently, holding more leaders' meetings, and specifically orienting them to the European Council, was only likely to increase the linkage between the EPP and PES parties and the EU institutions. If there were no Liberals in the European Council, there was no great incentive for Liberal party leaders to attend Liberal leaders' meetings. The average level of attendance of national Liberal party leaders' at ELDR party leaders' meetings between 1989 and 1994 was thus only 54.1%. This hence explains why in 1993 and 1994, the ELDR-Party began to pursue a new organisational strategy. The ELDR stopped holding party leaders' meetings close to the European Council and began: firstly, to arrange for party leaders' to meet only at the ELDR Congress; and, secondly, to organise a special ELDR Council meeting close to every European Council. This way, recourses would not be wasted on holding meetings with a low level of attendance of the crucial participants, and the ELDR would still be able to issue statements (with the prior support of all the party leaders) aimed at influencing the European Council agenda. These ELDR Council declarations could thus be presented to the European press in parallel to the statements from the EPP and PES leaders' meetings.

3.4. Increased Party Membership and Strategic Coherence

A further central component of party organisational development is the changing level and structure of party membership. Membership of the party federations has changed in two different ways. Firstly, there has been an increase in the number of parties affiliated to the party federations. Secondly, there has been an increased coherence of party federation membership as a result of a growing convergence between 'party family' identity and party federation membership. This growing strategic coherence of party federation membership implies the emergence of a stable pattern of party competition at the European level.
### TABLE 3.9. Political Families in the EU and Membership of the European Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Green Parties' membership of ECGP/EFGP</th>
<th>Socialist Parties' membership of CSP/PES</th>
<th>Liberal Parties' membership of ELD/ELDR</th>
<th>Christian Democrat Parties' membership of EPP</th>
<th>Conservative Parties' membership of EPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be-Fr</td>
<td>AGA 3.84</td>
<td>SP 4.74</td>
<td>VVD/VLD 3.76</td>
<td>CVP (eucd) 4.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECO 3.84</td>
<td>PS-B 4.74</td>
<td>PLB/PRL/W/PRL 3.76</td>
<td>PSC (eucd) 4.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Den.</td>
<td>DG 4.89</td>
<td>SD 4.74</td>
<td>Y 3.76</td>
<td>KRF (eucd)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(CD) (EP-6.79)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fra.</td>
<td>GE 3.84</td>
<td>PS-F 4.74</td>
<td>PRS/RAD 3.76</td>
<td>CDS-F (eucd) 4.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V 3.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(EP-6.79)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ger.</td>
<td>G 3.84</td>
<td>SPD 4.74</td>
<td>FDP 3.76</td>
<td>CDU 4.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>CSU 4.76</td>
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<td>Ire.</td>
<td>CG 4.89</td>
<td>LP-I 4.74</td>
<td>PD 4.88</td>
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<td>EG (eucd)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>PDS 4.71</td>
<td>PRI 11.76</td>
<td>DCP/PP (eucd) 4.76</td>
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<td>Lux.</td>
<td>GAG 3.84</td>
<td>POSL 4.76</td>
<td>DP 3.76</td>
<td>PCS (eucd)</td>
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<td><strong>Netherlands</strong></td>
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<td>Neth.</td>
<td>QL 3.84</td>
<td>PvdA 4.74</td>
<td>VVD 3.76</td>
<td>CDA (eucd)</td>
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<td>DG 4.89</td>
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<td>GP 3.84</td>
<td>LP-GB 1.76</td>
<td>LDP 1.76</td>
<td>LP/SLD 11.76</td>
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<td>Gre.</td>
<td>EA 4.89</td>
<td>PASOK 2.89</td>
<td>HLP R 12.83</td>
<td>ND (eucd)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port.</td>
<td>OV 4.89</td>
<td>PS-P 1.79</td>
<td>PSD 1.86</td>
<td>CDS-P (eucd) 1.86-3.88</td>
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<td>Spa.</td>
<td>LV 4.89</td>
<td>PSOE 1.79</td>
<td>PRD/CDS-SR 12.85</td>
<td>PDP (eucd)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aust.</td>
<td>GA 6.93</td>
<td>SPO 2.90</td>
<td>LF 12.93</td>
<td>ÖVP (eucd)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fin.</td>
<td>VIHR 6.93</td>
<td>SDP 11.92</td>
<td>KESK 1.95</td>
<td>SKL (eucd)</td>
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<td>Swe.</td>
<td>MP 3.84</td>
<td>SAP 11.92</td>
<td>FPL 1.95</td>
<td>KDS (eucd)</td>
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Notes: The figures are the dates a party joined, or was a member of, a party federation (or the Group in the EP), or the date a certain membership status was obtained.

The parties that are underlined where founder members of a party federation.

EP = Member of Group of the European Party in the EP but not a full member of the party federation
eucd = Member of the European Union of Christian Democrats
edu = Member of the European Democratic Union
edu-o = party with status of 'Observer Member' of the European Democratic Union

R = 'radical' Liberal party
1 PD were established in 12.85.
2 PDS was established in 3.91.
3 Patto (Segni) was established in 2.94.
4 FI was established in 3.94.

As Table 3.9 shows, between the birth of the federations in 1974 and 1976 and the fourth EC/EU enlargement in January 1995, there was an increase in the total (net) number of parties from EU member states that were members of each federation. The number of member

41 See Appendix B for key to party abbreviations.
parties from EU states in the CSP/PES increased from 10 in April 1974 to 18 by the end of 1994. The membership of the ELD/ELDR increased from 8 parties in March 1976 to 23 parties at the beginning of 1995. Similarly, EPP membership increased from 9 parties in April 1976 to 15 parties in January 1995. Finally, the number of parties from EU member states that were members of the ECGP/EFGP increased from 8 in April 1984 to 17 in June 1993.

Moreover, Table 3.9 also shows that there has been a growing convergence between identity with a particular 'party family' and membership of the party federations. Whereas in 1974, the British and Irish Labour Parties refused to participate in the work of the CSP and PASOK did not join until 1989, by the beginning of 1995 there was not a single member party of the Socialist International in the EU that was not a full member of the PES. Similarly, whereas in 1976, the ELD was plagued with debates about whether it should be a 'centrist' or 'left' Liberal organisation, by the beginning of 1995 parties ranging from the more 'radical' Liberal RV, D'66 and SLD to the 'economic' Liberal FDP, PR, VVD and V saw benefits of being members of the ELDR. Finally, whereas in 1976 the EPP comprised the core 'Christian-Democrat' parties, by 1995 its membership had broadened to engulf a large number of traditionally non-confessional 'Conservative' parties.

This growing integration of the Conservative and Christian Democrat political families confirms the hypothesis discussed in the previous chapter as to the common strategic position of Christian Democrat and Conservative parties in the EU as a result of the absence of a religious cleavage in politics at the European level. The Christian Democrat family is fairly homogeneous, and most Christian Democratic parties are the largest parties on the 'Right' of the political spectrum. However, the EPP is at a disadvantage because Christian Democrat parties do not exist in every member state. Moreover, whereas in 1976 traditional Christian Democrat parties were the hegemonic party on the 'Right' in two-thirds of the EC member states, by 1995 this had been reduced to only one-third of all EU countries.

In 1976, the EPP sort to solve this organisational problem by allowing the formation of the European Democratic Union (EDU); which served as an umbrella organisation for all mainstream Right-wing parties in the EU. However, whereas the EPP established a role in the EU decision-making system, by the beginning of the 1990s the EDU was practically a
moribund organisation. Consequently, there has been an incentive for non-confessional parties to join the EPP. Until 1994, the EPP kept the criteria of requiring all applicant parties to be members of the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) before joining the EPP. Parties that did not join the EUCD could become “Permanent Observers”. However, this provision was abandoned after the EU enlargement in 1995, and any party that agrees to the goals of the EPP (but not necessarily the EUCD) can join the Christian Democrat party federation. This strategy has thus proved to be successful for the EPP; with an increasing proportion of all centre-right parties in Europe choosing to become full members of the EPP. By the beginning of 1995, therefore, seven Conservative parties were either full members of the EPP federation or had begun to sit with the EPP Group in the EP. In 1995, moreover, with the new governments in Italy and France (and the consequent changing representation in the European Council) there was even discussion of the RPR and Forza Italia becoming at least “Observer Members” of the EPP federation.42

As Table 3.10 shows, all the party federations have also looked to the future, and established provisions for ‘Associate’, ‘Observer’ or ‘Affiliate’ membership for parties in prospective EU member states. In the PES, Associate and Observer Membership entitles parties to participate in Bureau meetings, but only Associate parties are allowed to initiate proposals. In the ELDR, Affiliate Membership entitles parties to a single representative in the ELDR Council, but with full voting rights. In the EPP, Affiliate members can participate fully in the Political Bureau, whereas (Permanent) Observers can only attend. These special membership rights have been created out of a demand by non-EU parties and a supply by the party federations. On the demand side, membership of European level organisations reinforces legitimacy in the domestic arena (to compete either with unaffiliated parties, or to establish an equal status with parties affiliated to other organisations), and allows a party to participate in an arena where rival domestic parties may not be operating. On the supply side, the party federations want to provide links for parties outside the EU to increase party revenues, and to draw parties towards full membership from states that are prospective members of the EU.

42 Interview with Thomas Jansen, ex-Secretary-General of the EPP, on 19 May 1995.
### TABLE 3.10. Political Families in Non-EU States and Membership of the European Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Green Parties' membership of ECGP/EFGP</th>
<th>Socialist Parties’ membership of CSP/PES</th>
<th>Liberal Parties’ membership of ELD/ELDR</th>
<th>Christian Democrat Parties’ membership of EPP</th>
<th>Conservative Parties’ membership of EPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cypr</td>
<td>EDEK</td>
<td>DIKO</td>
<td>DISY (eucd) (As-11.92)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malt</td>
<td>AD 6.93</td>
<td>MLP (Ob-3.80)</td>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>PN (eucd) (As-4.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk.</td>
<td>SHP (Ob-2.90)</td>
<td>DYP</td>
<td></td>
<td>AP (edu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IceL.</td>
<td>AF (As-2.90)</td>
<td>FF</td>
<td></td>
<td>SF (edu)</td>
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<td>Liech</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nor.</td>
<td>MG 6.93</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>11.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swit.</td>
<td>PE 6.93</td>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>(As-2.90)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cz.R</td>
<td>CSSD</td>
<td>SD-OH</td>
<td>(Af-12.94)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hung</td>
<td>MSDP</td>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td>(Af-2.92)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pol.</td>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>UD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulg.</td>
<td>BGP 6.93</td>
<td>BSDP</td>
<td>BANU (eucd-o)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>EGP 6.93</td>
<td>BSDP</td>
<td>HSDL (Af-3.94)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Est.</td>
<td>EGP</td>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>ELDP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Latv.</td>
<td>LSDSP</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>KDS (eucd-o)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lith.</td>
<td>LSDP</td>
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<td>LCM</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. R</td>
<td>SSS</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>KDH (eucd-o)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Slov.</td>
<td>ZS 6.93</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>MKDM (eucd-o)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rom</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>PNT/CD (eucd-o/edu-o)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alb.</td>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>RMDSZ (eucd-o/edu-o)</td>
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<td>Bos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faroe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>ILP</td>
<td>MPM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mace</td>
<td></td>
<td>LPM</td>
<td>(Af-4.93)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.Ma</td>
<td>PSS</td>
<td>(Ob-11.92)</td>
<td>PDCS (eucd)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geor.</td>
<td>GG 6.93</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The figures are the dates a party joined a party federation, or a certain membership status was obtained.
Ob = party with status of ‘Observer Member’ of the PES, ELDR, or EPP.
As = party with status of ‘Associate Member’ of either the PES or the EPP
Af = party with status of ‘Affiliate Member’ of the ELDR
eucl = Member of the European Union of Christian Democrats
eucl-o = party with status of ‘Observer Member’ of the European Union of Christian Democrats
edu = Member of the European Democratic Union
edu-o = party with status of ‘Observer Member’ of the European Democratic Union

However, there are some differences between the party federations as to how they have proceeded to grant these different membership rights to non-EU parties. The EFGP has extended full membership to any Green party in a European country. The only other case where parties from non-EU states are full members of a party federation is in the membership...
of the Norwegian DNA and Cypriot EDEK in the PES. Moreover, whereas the ELDR and PES have sought to integrate parties directly into the party federation, the EPP has only allowed a few parties to become “Associate Members”, and has tried to use the EUCD and EDU as stepping-stones to full membership. Furthermore, the establishment of links with Central and Eastern European parties has been more difficult for the PES, because of the desire not to be associated with any party with links to the old ‘State Socialist’ regimes. A general rule, nevertheless, is that although the three main party federations have been explicitly European Union focused, they were all eager to establish links with parties outside the European Union from an early stage; either because the country was a prospective member state, to help strengthen democracy and the party system in a particular country, or simply to gain more financial resources.

3.5. Conclusion: From ‘Transnational Party Co-operation’ to ‘Nascent European Parties’

There was thus a significant organisational development of the party federations from their establishment in the mid-1970s to their position in the mid-1990s. As the internal (party decision-making structures) and external (linkages to the political system) organisation of the party federations have developed, there has been a movement between several different ‘types’ of European party organisation: where each type was suited to a particular structure of party goals and political competition. This is illustrated in Figure 3.9.

When the party federations were established - between 1974 and 1976 for the CSP, ELD and ELD, and in 1984 for ECGP - their internal organisations were weak and they concentrated on the establishment of a party-political presence in a single EC institutional arena (the European Parliament). With simplistic internal decision-making structures and few financial resources, there were no stable patterns of internal political behaviour. The main aim of these new European-level party organisations, however, was for the co-ordination of campaigns in the first few elections to the European Parliament. This organisational weakness
and concentration on a single institutional arena meant that the EP Groups played a significant role in the internal structures of the party federations: providing the majority of the running costs of the extra-parliamentary organisations, having representation in all the main party decision-making organs, and possessing a monopoly on party policy expertise and initiatives. This was thus the classic conception of "transnational party co-operation" described by Geoffrey and Pippa Pridham in the build up to the 1979 EP elections (and is shown in the top-left box in Figure 3.9).\(^{43}\)

FIGURE 3.9. Typology of the Organisational Development of Parties in the EU System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Party Organisation</th>
<th>SINGLE ARENA</th>
<th>MULTIPLE ARENAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WEAK</td>
<td>&quot;Transnational Party Co-operation&quot; (EFGP)</td>
<td>&quot;Nascent European Party&quot; (ELDR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>&quot;European Parliamentary Party&quot; (EP Groups of the party federations)</td>
<td>&quot;Party at the European Level&quot; (EPP?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the establishment of direct elections to the EP, however, the Groups of the party federations in the European Parliament developed large supporting bureaucracies, stable recruitment and decision-making structures, and substantial financial resources derived directly from the EC budget. Consequently, although still concentrating on a single institutional arena, the internal organisation of the EP Party Groups was significantly stronger than the flimsy structures of the extra-parliamentary organisations for 'transnational party co-operation'. This thus constituted the development of a different type of party organisation in the EC system: of

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the "European parliamentary party" (in the bottom-left box in Figure 3.9).44 The principle aim of this type of party organisation is to secure and maintain a particular set of political offices (namely the seats in the European Parliament), but also to co-ordinate the policy behaviour of the holders of this office as a means to this end. In type of European level party organisation, the extra-parliamentary parties are interested in establishing stronger internal organisations. There is little incentive for the International Secretaries of the national parties (who were the main decision-makers in the first party federation organisations) to control the behaviour of MEPs, as European Parliament outputs have little impact on their own political office. In contrast, the continuity and stability of the EP Party Groups is ultimately dependent upon their ability to co-ordinate the voting of their members.

However, independent of the development of the EP Party Groups, the extra-parliamentary party organisations increasingly turned their attention to the other institutional sights in the EC/EU system. Links began to be established with the party actors in the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. However, the most significant development in the external organisation of the party federations was around the European Council. On the one hand, the participants in the European Council - the Heads of Government, the Foreign Ministers, and the European Commission President and Vice-President - were given important roles in the internal decision-making structures of the party federations. Whereas the Groups in the EP were represented in the executive committees of the party federations, the party leaders' meetings (where the party actors in the European Council attend) were institutionalised as the central decision-making organs of the EPP, ELDR and PES. Furthermore, the party federations increasingly sought to influence the behaviour of the party actors in the European Council: through the specific organisation of party leaders' meetings in the week immediately before or after (and often in the same venue as) a European Council, and through the adoption of leaders' declarations on the specific subjects of the European Council.

This development of external party organisation from single to multiple institutional sights was thus a movement to a third type of European party organisation: a "nascent

European party” (in the top-right box in Figure 3.9). This type of party organisation is suitable for parties who seek some office rewards from the political system, such as the seats in the European Parliament and the post of the European Commission President, and who are interested in the co-ordination of policy pursuit by these office-holders. From the original shape of party federation organisation in the EC system to this new type of organisation, the central goal of the parties thus shifted from co-operation in the European election campaigns to the pursuit of common policy goals in the EU system, through the co-ordination of the policy aims and political actions at the highest political level (of domestic party leaders).

In the pursuit of this end, the internal and external aspects of party development went hand in hand. The establishment of EU policy-making in areas of domestic party competition created an incentive for party leaders to influence European level decisions. Domestic party leaders did not want political office at the European level, but did need to secure policy outputs from the European system. It was very difficult to use the party federations to secure the top political offices in the EU system: European Commission President and seats in the European Council and Council of Ministers. However, the party federations, and the institution of the party leaders’ meeting, were better suited for the pursuit of broad policy aims. The costs of involvement are low: little domestic party autonomy needs to be given up and the membership fees are small. Moreover, the weakness of the internal structures enables the party federation organisations to be moulded to satisfy the domestic party leaders’ aims - to turn away from the European Parliament and to concentrate on the European Council. The success of this strategy is thus reflected in the growing rates of party leaders’ participation in each party federation leaders’ meeting.

There are, however, two important limitations of this argument. Firstly, not all the party federations have followed the same pattern of development. The EFGP has not developed beyond the type of party organisation characterised by ‘transnational party co-operation’; and the ELDR has only partially made the transformation to a ‘nascent European party’. Nevertheless, these parties have not wanted (or been able) to pursue the same political strategy as the EPP and PES. The chances of winning high domestic political office are small.

for Green parties, and so EU policy-making has less of a constraint on party behaviour in the
domestic arena. Consequently, there is less incentive for the EFGP to pursue policy through
the EU system. Where the ELDR is concerned, as potential-office holders in the domestic
arena, Liberal parties are eager to pursue policies through the EU system. However, because
of the lack of Liberal participants in European Council meetings in the early 1990s, the
organisation of ELDR leaders' meetings around the European Council was likely to have little
impact on EU policy outputs. The ELDR was thus forced to pursue a 'holding strategy': of
linking the agenda of the ELDR Council to the European Council, and increasingly abandoning
the specific organisation of ELDR-Leaders Meetings close to EU summits. The fact that the
ELDR and EFGP do not fit the model of development of the EPP and PES thus fits with the
explanation based on the policy aims of domestic party leaders. Rather than refuting the
theory, therefore, this first limitation actual reinforces the argument.

However, there is a second limitation of this typology of party development. If the
main aim of parties is to pursue policy outputs from the EU system, it would be in their
interests to develop stronger internal organisational structures. Only with a stable decision-
making pattern, and measures to secure binding decisions, can party policy be enforced on
party actors in the various institutional arenas. This would thus imply the emergence of a new
type of European party organisation: of a true "party at the European level" in the classic
European model of 'party government' (in the bottom-left box in Figure 3.9).40 By the middle
of the 1990s, however, there is little indication that the transition from 'nascent European
parties' to real 'parties at the European level' is taking place. The EPP, with the most
sophisticated internal party organisational structure, has made some moves in the direction.
Nevertheless, the internal organisations of the PES and the EPP are still very weak in
comparison to parties at the domestic level.

The main reason for this lack of development is the institutional structure of the EU
system. Despite the pressure to establish strong party organisations to pursue policies through
the EU system, there are strong countervailing tendencies against this development. The

40 The "parties at the European level" comes from Article 138a of the Treaty on European Union. See
Council of the European Communities/Commission of the European Communities (1992) Treaty on European
division of political authority between the European and domestic levels is a fundamental constraint on internal organisational development of the party federations. Moreover, this administrative division of authority is reinforced by cultural and ideological divisions. These divisions lead to the emergence of the ‘national/territorial’ cleavage in the EU system, which cross-cuts the Left-Right dimension of politics and thus undermines internal party cohesion. All in all, therefore, there is a low level of “partyness of government” in the EU system (as there also is in Switzerland and the US).47 However, this does not mean that the theory is wrong; simply that there are significant limitations to the forces encouraging party development. The only possibility for European level party organisations to overcome this barrier is if their present organisational strategy can secure outputs from the EU system that accord with the policies of their parties in the domestic arena (i.e. on the Left-Right dimension). This would establish a higher degree of internal party cohesion, and would thus reduce the threat to national party autonomy of the emergence of real ‘parties at the European level’. The policy development and success of the party federations in securing policy objectives at the European level are thus the subjects of the next two chapters.

Chapter 4

Policy Competition: The Changing Shape of the EU Party System

4.1. Introduction: Party Competition and the Changing EU Policy Space

Party policy is a central element of party politics in the European Union (EU) for two main reasons. Firstly, having dealt with the question of party organisation in the EU in the previous chapter, it remains for us to deal with party policy, the other main characteristic of all party systems. In this sense, 'policy' refers to the professed political aims of a party organisation. Party policy is the official declaration of intent of the present or future political leaders. It is thus primarily through party policy that the actions of the elites are held to account. A party presents a particular policy position to the electorate in the promise that this is the position that will be pursued if it secures political office. If another party advocates a rival policy position, the electorate thus has a choice as to which policy should be enacted. Consequently, political legitimacy and competition between rival policy platforms are inherently linked. In the EU, therefore, the party federations are only legitimate political organisations if they actively compete over policy goals.

Secondly, party policy is of particular importance in the EU system for another reason. As previously discussed, the main political goal of party organisation at the European level is the pursuit of policy outputs from the EU institutions. The main political office in the EU is the office of Prime Minister of a Member State. Compared to this position, the offices of European Commissioner or Member of the European Parliament (MEP) command substantially less political power. The policies proposed by the party federations are thus designed primarily to secure these domestic government positions. Hence, if the party federations are forced to choose between an ideal policy position and one of the European-level offices they will always choose the former. This thus puts party federation policy in a special position. In most
political systems there is a trade-off between policy and office goals at the same political level. In the EU system, however, the policy positions of the party federations are mainly shaped for the purpose of rewarding the member parties with domestic office.

When competing for political office, parties make rival policy statements on a number of different political issues. In other words, parties take up different positions in a 'policy space'. The shape of this policy space has two main characteristics. The first characteristic is the *dimensionality of the policy space*: the number of salient dimensions of policy competition between the parties. A series of political issues, which relate to the same underlying ideological questions, together constitute a 'dimension' of the policy space. As discussed in Chapter 2, because of the structure of social and ideological cleavages in Europe, the EU policy space has three main policy dimensions: two 'socio-economic' dimensions ('intervention' versus 'free market' issues, and 'libertarian' versus 'authoritarian' issues), which compound to produce a classic Left-Right continuum; and a national/territorial dimension (issues of further EU 'integration' versus issues of national 'independence'). A policy dimension is 'salient' if all the parties address a significant proportion of their policy statements to issues on this dimension. A high level of saliency does not mean, however, that parties are necessarily competing on this dimension. Sometimes parties adopt the same policy position on a particular set of issues. Consequently, party competition only occurs when two or more parties take up different positions on the same issue or set of issues.

The second characteristic of the policy space is the *number and relationship between the political parties within the space*. In the early period of party development in the EU, between 1976 and 1980, there were only three party federations: the CSP, the ELD, and the EPP. However, in the most recent five-year period, between 1990 and 1994, there were four party federations in the EU system: the contemporary incarnations of the first three party federations (the PES, the ELDR, and the EPP) and the new EFGP. This increased number of parties suggests that there was a change in the pattern of relations between the parties in the EU system. On the one hand, the new party is likely to have emerged in a space in the system after the other parties changed their locations. On the other hand, the emergence of the new party
may have challenged the parties closest too it in the policy space - who are competing for the
same political territory - and thus forced them to adapt their policy positions accordingly.

We can thus analyse the development of the EU party system by measuring how the
two characteristics of the EU policy space have changed in the last twenty years. This involves
two main types of measurement: the relative saliency of the three policy dimensions, and the
specific location of the parties on each of these dimensions. The empirical method for doing
this was described in Chapter 2. Suffice is to say that the method incorporates a deductive
theory of the dimensionality of the EU policy space with the content analysis and ‘coding’
procedure used by the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Party Manifestos
Group. This procedure involves counting the number of references (‘quasi-sentences’) in a
policy document in fifty-two different issue categories. The full coding frame, and a
description of the type of policy statements covered under each issue category, is set out in
Appendix D.

In a particular document, the number of references on each particular issue are
expressed as a percentage of the total number of policy references in the document. The
saliency of a dimension is thus the total percentage of references made in a policy document to
all the issue categories on both sides of the dimension. Moreover, the location of the policy
document on a particular dimension is the total percentage of references to the issues on one
side of the dimension minus the total percentage of references to the issues on the other side of
the dimension. Finally, the position of a policy document on the compound Left-Right
dimension is calculated (using Pythagorean logic and simple algebra) from the policy positions
on the two socio-economic policy dimensions (see Appendix F). A complete list of the party
federation policy documents coded using this procedure, and the ‘raw scores’ for the saliency
of each issue, each dimension and the position of the documents on the dimensions, is
contained in Appendix E.

This empirical analysis of the policy positions of the European party federations is thus
a novel undertaking. This is the first time that ever party federation policy document -
including all European Election Manifestos, Party Programmes and Party Leaders’ Declarations
- has been analysed simultaneously. Moreover, this is the first time that the ECPR Party
Manifestos Group method has been extended to look at party policy at the European level. Finally, the method of calculating the Left-Right position of political parties developed for this research, from the position of the parties on the 'intervention-free market' and 'libertarian-authoritarian' dimensions, is a new political science method that could be used in the analysis of party politics in any political system.

Section 4.2 contains a description of the different ‘sources’ of party policy in the EU system, and some suggestions about how the source of the policy makes a difference to the saliency and position of the documents. Section 4.3 subsequently turns to a detailed analysis of the changing nature of the EU policy space, by looking at the variations in the strengths of the policy dimensions and the changing degree of emphasis given to the particular issues. Section 4.4. contains an analysis of the evolving party positions on the two socio-economic dimensions and the compound Left-Right continuum, and Section 4.5 follows the same procedure for party positions on the ‘integration-independence’ dimension. Finally, the empirical conclusions are draw together in Section 4.6.

4.2. Types of Policy Documents and Sources of Party Policy

There are five types of party federation policy documents, which derive from two main sources: a party congress or a party leaders’ meeting. There is no official hierarchy of policy documents. However, the significance of each type of document depends on two factors: the political purpose of the document; and the relative involvement of party elites (the national and European party leaders) or party activists (the national and European party officials who attend the party Congresses) in the drafting and adoption of the document. Consequently, the general order of importance of party documents in terms of influencing the medium- and long-term agenda of a party organisation is as follows.

Firstly, European Election Manifestos are adopted in the build up to the five-yearly elections to the European Parliament (EP). Most parties at the domestic level prefer to use their own materials in the European election campaigns. However, the EP Election Manifestos are
fair indicators of the policy positions of the parties in the European arena, as they take many months to prepare, and are invariably a result of a complex set of compromises. These documents are normally drafted by a special 'Manifesto Committee'; which is often chaired by a Vice-President of a party federation and brings together the Leader of the Group in the EP and high-level officials from each of the member parties. These documents are usually officially adopted by a party congress, often in an extraordinary 'Electoral Congress', but are invariably also unofficially approved by a party leaders' meeting immediately prior to or during the Electoral Congress. On occasion, moreover, the Manifestos were formally adopted by the party leaders' without the approval of a Congress. In general, however, the European Election Manifestos are drafted and informally approved by top party elites (national party spokespersons and leaders), and are formally adopted by the activists of the party federations (the middle-level elites of the domestic parties).

Secondly, Party Programmes were adopted by all the party federations in one of the first congresses or leaders' meetings, and were updated at key moments in the development of the party organisations: as in the transformation from the 'Confederation' to the 'Party' of European Socialists. These documents are more general than the EP Election Manifestos, and usually serve to define the common ideological goals of the party organisation. The role of the Party Programme varies somewhat between the party federations. In general, nevertheless, whereas the Election Manifestos are geared to the European media and the electorate, the Party Programmes are seen as 'basic texts', to which national and European-level parliamentarians and executive office-holders are expected to refer in their daily business. For example, all the party federations require the Party Programmes to be signed by any prospective member party; and failure to do so at the first asking can undermine the chances of become a full member. Moreover, whereas the Election Manifestos are drafted by a single Working Group, the Party Programmes are usually the product of several different Working Groups of European and national party officials, each of which specialises in a different policy area, and which are coordinated by a 'Programme Committee' of more senior figures. The Party Programmes are thus drafting and formally ratified (in a normal party congress) by the party activists of the

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1 For example, this was the case with the Scandinavian Conservative Parties' memberships of the European People's Party, after their Head Offices were reluctant to endorse the 1992 EPP Programme.
federations. Like the Manifestos, however, all Party Programmes are at least informally approved by a party leaders' meeting; and thus also reflect the positions of the top-level elites.

Thirdly, Party Leaders' Declarations are issued to the press at the end of almost every party leaders' meeting. Out of a total of over sixty meetings of the CSP/PES, ELD/ELDR and EPP Party Leaders, there were only thirteen occasions when a Party Leaders' Declaration was not adopted. There are two main kinds of these documents: Declarations that specifically respond to the agenda of an immediately forthcoming or preceding European Council meeting; and Declarations from the leaders' meetings that are not held close to a European Council. These less common Declarations are usually targeted to particular events in European-level politics; such as the agenda of an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the results of the EP Elections and the subsequently policy conditions for non-member parties to sit with the EP Group of a particular Federation, or more general events like the Gulf War or the Bosnian Crisis. There are three main procedures for drafting a Party Leaders' Declaration: by the Party Federation Secretariat, with the Party President co-ordinating the input from the other party leaders; by the personal office of the Party President, in co-ordination with the offices of the other party leaders; or by a Working Group of personal representatives from the offices of each party leader. Consequently, these are the only EU party policy statements that are formally drafted and adopted by the top-level party elites.

Fourthly, Congress Resolutions are the policy statements adopted by the party congresses that are not an Election Manifesto or an official Party Programme. In direct contrast to the Party Leaders' Declarations, these policy documents are the exclusive preserve of the middle-level elites. There are two main types of such Congress Resolutions, which derive from different sources and serve different purposes. Firstly, there are the 'main resolutions' on the central theme (or themes) of the Congress. These resolutions address general political and institutional questions of European level politics; such as the agenda for an IGC, or a Presidency of the European Council. These main Congress Resolutions are drafted by Working Groups of a Party Federation, and are usually adopted in the opening day of Congress proceedings. Secondly, there are the 'secondary resolutions', which are usually adopted on the second or third day of a Congress. These resolutions address party policy on a
specific question in EU politics; such as EU relations with the Middle East, or a particular legislative proposal from the European Commission. Moreover, these secondary resolutions are proposed by the delegates at the Congress, most often by one of the member parties, and are thus usually drafted by the International Sections (or domestic Parliamentary factions) of a single subsidiary party organisation. Consequently, both types of Congress Resolutions are equally binding on the Executive Committees of the Party Federations, but only the 'main resolutions' constitute a coherent set of policy goals and set a general political agenda for the top-level party elites.

Fifthly, Executive Committee Declarations are the policy statements adopted by the Bureau of the CSP/PES, the Political Bureau and Executive Committee (or Presidency) of the EPP, the Executive Committee and Council of the ELD/ELDR, and the Meeting of the ECGP or Council of the EFGP. In most cases, these declarations are on the day-to-day running of party federation business. Unlike the other four types of party policy statement, therefore, Executive Committee Declarations are only rarely issued to the press. In an analysis of the general policy agenda of the party federations (and particular of the party elites) these documents are of little relevance. However, Executive Committee Resolutions have been included in the content analysis in two exceptional circumstances; when they were in effect the product of the top-level party elites.

Firstly, the Declarations of the Meeting of the ECGP and Council of the EFGP are of higher relative value than the equivalent statements within the other party federations. The Council of the EFGP is the highest policy-making body in the Green Federation, as there are no Green party leaders' meetings or party congresses are only held informally. Moreover, because of the nature of Green parties in the domestic arena, as small non-governing organisations, the level of party elites that attends the Green executive committee meetings is higher than in the other federations (and is often the leader of a member party). In other words, for the ECGP/EFGP, Executive Committee Declarations are comparable with the Party Leaders' Declarations of the other federations.

Secondly, the changing organisational strategy of the ELDR has meant that in certain circumstances the Declarations of the ELDR Council serve the same purpose, and carry the
same weight, as statements made by the ELDR party leaders. As described in the previous chapter, in the 1990s the ELDR began to hold less leaders' meetings, but decided instead to replace these meetings with special party federation Councils which would be held immediately before a European Council meeting. Moreover, before presenting the official statements from these party executive meetings at a press conference, the President of the ELDR sought the approval of the private offices of each of the domestic party leaders. Consequently, on the two occasions when this occurred, these special ELDR Council Declarations were treated as equivalent to Party Leaders' Declarations.

TABLE 4.1. *Number and Average Length of Each Type of Policy Document*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT TYPE</th>
<th>PARTY:</th>
<th>CSP/PES</th>
<th>ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>ECPGP/EFGP</th>
<th>All Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euro. Election Manifestos</td>
<td>No. of Documents:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean No. of Codes:</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Programmes</td>
<td>No. of Documents:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean No. of Codes:</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leaders' Declarations</td>
<td>No. of Documents:</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean No. of Codes:</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress Resolutions</td>
<td>No. of Documents:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean No. of Codes:</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Documents</td>
<td>No. of Documents:</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean No. of Codes:</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consequently, only certain *types* of party policy documents have implications for the political behaviour of the top-level party elites. Bearing in mind that we are primarily concerned with the party actors in the European Council, only those party documents that are at some stage informally or formally approved by the domestic party leaders are of relevance to our analysis. The total number of party federation documents that meet this criterion, and were thus coded using the procedures described above, is contained in Table 4.1. As the Table shows, therefore, about 50% of all the policy documents included in the analysis are Party Leaders' Declarations. There are less documents for the Green federation as it only really began adopting co-ordinated policy positions in 1989. Moreover, between the three main party federations, the main difference was in the number of Party Programmes and Congress

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2 Over 17,000 sentences were coded in this analysis.
Resolutions of the ELD/ELDR. This is because, whereas the Socialists and Christian Democrats tended to adopt a new Party Programme at every second or third Congress, the Liberals did not use any subsequent Congress Resolution to replace the Party Programme (the "Stuttgart Declaration") from the first ELD Congress.

As Table 4.1 also illustrates, the average lengths of each type of document is an indicator of the different roles they play. Firstly, in general terms, Party Leaders' Declarations tend to be short statements on particular issues, whereas Party Programmes and Election Manifestos are much longer affairs, and Congress Resolutions are somewhat in between. Moreover, the average lengths of each parties' Programmes and Manifestos indicates a difference between the party federations. For the Socialist, Liberal and Green parties, the European Election Manifestos are longer than the Party Programmes. For the Christian Democrat party, however, the Manifestos are summaries of longer 'Action Programmes' - which combine general ideological statements with detailed commitments for policy action by the EPP Group in the EP and the Christian Democrat party leaders. These general and party-specific differences between Manifestos and Programmes may mean that these documents tend to represent different locations in the EU policy space.

However, it is the source of the document (rather than the type of a document) that is likely to have implications for the overall policy location of a particular group of documents: whether it is more centrist or more extreme. This hypothesis derives from the "Law of Curvilinear Disparity". This Law states that party leaders (the ruling party elite) are more moderate than party activists (the sub-leaders in the lower levels of party organisation). This different policy-position of these two groups derives from the structure of incentives within political parties. As discussed in Chapter 2, the political reward for party leaders is public office. To secure this reward, party leaders are eager to advocate policy positions close to the median-voter. In contrast, only those committed to party principles will get involved in voluntary party activism. Few sub-leaders ever run for political office. Consequently, the rewards of party activists are largely purposive: a role in party policy-making and in leadership

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selection (both of which are secured through participation in party congresses). Consequently, whereas party leaders are forced to compromise (trade-off) policy goals for office goals, sub-leaders can be 'true' to their political principles. Empirical evidence suggests that this law does not always hold.\(^5\) However, where it does not hold, an explanation is often found in a more complex and differential structure of internal incentives.\(^6\) For example, in two-level (or federal) systems, the Congress delegates of the central party organisation often hold paid political office at the lower political level. This is the case with the federal-level parties in Germany and Switzerland and with the party federations in the European Union.

### TABLE 4.2. Key to Type and Source of Party Documents in the Figures on Policy Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE:</th>
<th>SOURCE:</th>
<th>Party Congress</th>
<th>Party Leaders' Meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KEY</td>
<td>NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Election Manifesto</td>
<td>Bold Cross &amp; Filled-in Centre</td>
<td>4 CSP/PES</td>
<td>4 ELD/ELDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 EPP</td>
<td>1 ECGP/EFGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Programme</td>
<td>Plain Cross &amp; Filled-in Centre</td>
<td>1 CSP/PES</td>
<td>1 ELD/ELDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 EPP</td>
<td>1 ECGP/EFGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leaders' Declaration</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress Resolution</td>
<td>Filled-in Shape</td>
<td>4 CSP/PES</td>
<td>10 ELD/ELDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 EPP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL OF EACH SOURCE:</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, therefore, policy documents adopted at party federation congresses are likely to be more extreme than the positions adopted at party leaders' meetings. The delegates in party federation congresses are sub-leaders who only participate in party federation business voluntarily. In contrast, party leaders are constrained by their office aspirations. However,

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this picture is complicated by the fact that most congress delegates hold parliamentary office at the national level. The delegates are thus not completely free in their policy behaviour in party congresses because they are not pure 'activists' in the classic sense. Consequently, it is interesting to see how these differential incentives shape party policy in the EU: whether it changes the picture completely, or only contradicts May's Law on one of the policy dimensions. This can thus be analysed by looking at the average policy location of the documents from the two sources. The total number of documents from party congresses and party leaders' meetings is set out in Table 4.2, and a full list of the different 'types' and 'sources' of the policy documents included in the following analysis is contained in Appendix E. Before looking at the positions of the parties in the EU policy space, however, the next section focuses on the changing saliency of the issue-dimensions.

4.3. Changing Dimensionality of the EU Policy Space

One of the two main elements of the EU policy space is the number and saliency of the various issue-dimensions. As discussed in Chapter 2, moreover, change in the dimensionality of the policy space can be broken down into two elements: the total degree of emphasis placed on a dimension ('systemic' saliency); and the degree of emphasis placed on a dimension by each individual party ('party-specific' saliency). It is worth remembering that these figures do not relate to the position of the parties in these dimensions, simply the amount of content of each policy document dedicated to each set of issues. In other words, a party can devote 100% of a document to intervention-free market issues, but would be right in the centre on this dimension if the first half (50%) of the document supports interventionist issues while the second half (50%) advocates free market policies.

There is evidence to suggest, however, that all three issue dimensions were 'manifest' in the EU party system across the whole period. As Table 4.3 shows, an average of at least 28% of the contents of the party federation documents was dedicated to each of the policy dimensions. The analysis of the policy documents of the parties revealed that the two socio-
economic dimensions (of intervention-free market, and libertarian-authoritarian issues) were on average slightly less salient than the national/territorial dimension (of 'integration-independence' issues). However, the difference between the average saliency of the national/territorial dimension and the socio-economic dimensions was only about 10%; and the two socio-economic policy dimensions together constituted almost 60% of the policy statements. Moreover, as the scores for the standard deviations of the 'whole party system' indicate, there was hardly any difference in the degree of consistency of emphasis placed on each of the three dimensions.

TABLE 4.3. Total Party-Specific and Systemic Saliency of Policy Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY:</th>
<th>DIMENSION:</th>
<th>Intervention-Free Market</th>
<th>Libertarian-Authoritarian</th>
<th>Integration-Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSP/PES</td>
<td>Mean:</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD:</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELD/ELDR</td>
<td>Mean:</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD:</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>Mean:</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD:</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECGP/EFGP</td>
<td>Mean:</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD:</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole Party System</td>
<td>Mean:</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD:</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was, however, a considerable difference in the average emphasis placed on each dimension by the various parties (the levels of party-specific saliency). This is also shown in Table 4.3. Nevertheless, these scores correlate closely with the type of politics one would naturally envisage for each party federation. For the Socialist party federation, intervention-free market issues were clearly more relevant than issues on the other two dimensions. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the CSP/PES placed greater emphasis on integration-independence questions than libertarian-authoritarian issues. Moreover, as the individual standard deviations for the three dimensions illustrate, the degree of movement in the level of emphasis placed on each dimension by the CSP/PES was fairly similar.

In contrast to the Socialists, for the Liberal and Christian Democrat party federations, the integration-independence dimension was considerably more salient than the two socio-
economic dimensions. Moreover, because a central pillar of Christian Democracy is the commitment to European integration, the EPP placed greater emphasis on integration-independence issues than any of the other parties. However, the ELD/ELDR and the EPP placed different emphasis on the two socio-economic dimensions: with the Liberals aligned more on intervention-free market issues, and the Christian Democrats aligned more on libertarian-authoritarian issues. This thus reflects the different ideological bases of the two ‘Right-wing’ movements. Socialist and Liberal parties emerged to represent the interests of economic classes, and thus are primarily concerned with the shape of the ‘economic order’. Christian Democrat ideology, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the ‘social order’.

Finally, for the Green federation the libertarian-authoritarian dimension was by far the most salient (commanding over 50% of the content of all the Green policy statements). This score is also particularly striking when one considers the high level of consistency in the level of ECGP/EFGP emphasis on libertarian-authoritarian issues: with a standard deviation of 9.5. However, this confirms the expectation that the Green federation would naturally emphasise ‘post-materialist’ issues, and is less concerned than any of the other parties about the structure of the economic system (the issues on the intervention-free market dimension). Moreover, because the Greens are fundamentally a “grass-roots” movement, they are less concerned than the other parties with the elite-centred debate on European integration.

However, these levels of party-specific and systemic saliency of the policy dimensions were not constant across the whole period. As Table 4.4. shows, there were two main changes in the level of systemic saliency of each of the dimensions between the first five-year period (between 1976 and 1980) and the most recent five-year period (1990-1994). Firstly, whereas in the early period of party federation development the two socio-economic policy dimensions were considerably more salient than the national/territorial dimension, in the most recent period the situation was radically reversed. Compared to about 25% of the emphasis on the first period, between 1990 and 1994 integration-independence issues commanded almost 50% of party federation attention. This is thus against the hypothesis that the party federations would be eager to de-emphasise national/territorial issues, as they undermine internal party cohesion.
Secondly, between these two periods there was a change in the relative saliency of the two socio-economic dimensions. In both periods, libertarian-authoritarian issues were more salient than intervention-free market issues. In the first period, however, the difference was only 4.7% of the combined socio-economic policy emphasis of 74.1%, whereas in the most recent period it was 9.8% of the combined emphasis of 54.1%. In other words, the gap between the two socio-economic dimensions doubled.

TABLE 4.4. Changes in Party-Specific and Systemic Saliency of Policy Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION:</th>
<th>Intervention-Free Market</th>
<th>Libertarian-Authoritarian</th>
<th>Integration-Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARTY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP/PES</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELD/ELDR</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECGP/EFGP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole Party System</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 4.4 also shows, there were also some significant changes in the degree of emphasis placed on each of the dimensions by the individual party federations. Firstly, the status of integration-independence issues fundamentally changed for all three main party federations. Moreover, there was a surprising similarity in the amount of increased party-specific saliency of this dimension for the main parties: a 19.2% increase for the Socialists, 19.3% for the Liberals, and 20.9% for the Christian Democrats. This change also highlights the fundamental difference between the policy concerns of the main federations, and the new (or 'challenging') Green federation. Between 1990 and 1994, the Green federation was the only party that did not place greatest emphasis on the question of more or less integration of the EU system.

Secondly, the overall change in the relative saliency of the two socio-economic dimensions is explained almost exclusively by the emergence of the Green federation. Among the Socialist and Liberal federations, there was an almost striking continuity in the relative
positions of the intervention-free market and libertarian-authoritarian dimensions over the almost twenty-year period. The difference between the dimensions increased from 23.0% (of a combined total of 79%) to 24.7% (of a total of 58.7%) for the Socialists; and from 12.6% (of a total of 72.5%) to 14.8% (of a total of 51.2%) for the Liberals. Moreover, for the EPP the difference between the libertarian-authoritarian and intervention-free market dimensions increased slightly more than for the other two main federations: from a difference of 25.8% (of a combined total of 72.2%) to 38.8% (of a total of 46.8%). Consequently, the growth in the saliency of the libertarian-authoritarian vis-à-vis the intervention-free market dimension was almost completely dependent upon the huge difference of emphasis given to the dimensions by the Green federation in the 1990-1994 period: 46.5% of a combined total of 68.8%.

In sum, therefore, there are three main conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis of the dimensionality of the EU policy space:

- Firstly, the three dimensions were all manifest in the EU party system across the whole period from 1976-1994. Moreover, the degree of emphasis each party placed on the dimensions (the levels of party-specific saliency) was as expected: with the CSP/PES concentrating on intervention-free market issues; the ELD/ELDR emphasising intervention-free market and integration-independence issues; the EPP focusing on libertarian-authoritarian and integration-independence issues; and the ECGP/EFGP concentrating on libertarian-authoritarian issues.

- Secondly, among the two socio-economic dimensions, there was an increase in the saliency of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension vis-à-vis the intervention-free market dimension. However, this was not as a result of an increased emphasis on 'socio-political' issues of all the parties in the system. In fact, there was a marked consistency in the relative degrees of emphasis placed on the two socio-economic dimensions by the three main federations. Consequently, this change was a direct result of the emergence of the Green federation.

- Finally, and most importantly for the research, by far the most significant change in the dimensionality of the EU policy space was the large increase in the saliency of the integration-independence dimension: from about a quarter of party policy statements to nearly a half. Consequently, in the most recent period, only the Green federation did not
place greatest emphasis on these national/territorial issues. This appears to go against a central proposition of the theoretical framework: that it is in the interests of the party federations to play down these issues because they would antagonise internal party divisions. Clearly, therefore, the party federations were forced to address issues they would rather not touch. Hence, a fundamental question is how the party federations tackled this situation? A possible way of addressing this problem would be to change the pattern of inter-party relations - the other main characteristic of any policy-space. This is thus the subject of the next two sections.

4.4. Party Positions on the Socio-Economic Policy Dimensions

On socio-economic issues in the EU policy space, the party federations take up positions on the intervention-free market and libertarian-authoritarian dimensions. These positions may be correlated in some instances. As discussed in Chapter 2, however, the positions on these continua are often completely independent because the dimensions relate to fundamentally different aspects of political ideology. It is thus not inconsistent for two parties to hold the same view of the economic system (on intervention-free market issues) but hold opposing views of the socio-political order (on libertarian-authoritarian issues). Nevertheless, also as discussed in Chapter 2, in most systems these issues are 'squeezed' into a notion of a single 'Left' and 'Right' because of the inherent need to simplify information in electoral competition.

4.4.1. Dimension 1: Intervention-Free Market

Starting at the 'free market' end of this dimension, the Liberal party federation is the most free market party in the EU system, with an average policy position of +10.6. Moreover, as Figure 4.1 shows, the ELD/ELDR only marginally moved away from the centre from one end of the period to the other. There was also a high level of inconsistency of Liberal policy in the late 1980s, but a return to stable 'free market' positions in the early 1990s. The ELD/ELDR thus
tended to advocate policies in the European arena that were in line with the positions of Liberal parties in the national arena. Since the emergence of Liberalism in the middle of the nineteenth century, the core electorate of European Liberal parties have been the private sector middle classes, with an interest in a reduced role of the state in the economy. Furthermore, the general position of the ELD/ELDR to the Right of the EPP on these economic questions confirms the dominance of the 'economic' variant of Liberalism in the European party federation. The 'social Liberal' parties, who are closer to the EPP on these economic issues, appear to have not had as much impact on ELD/ELDR policy.

FIGURE 4.1. Position of the ELD/ELDR on the Intervention-Free Market Dimension

However, the 'Law of Curvilinear Disparity' does not apply to ELD/ELDR policy on the intervention-free market dimension: as the products of party leaders' meetings (+16.3 on average) were considerably more 'free market'-oriented than the congress decisions (+5.6 on average). There could, however, be two explanations for this. Firstly, because few Liberal party leaders hold government office in the domestic arena, they have little to lose by acting radically in the European arena. Many Liberal congress delegates, in contrast, would be concerned about their seats in the European Parliament. Secondly, however, the balance of forces between the 'economic' and 'social' variants of Liberalism is different between the party
leaders' meetings and the Liberal party congresses. There are only a few social-Liberal parties, which means they were in a minority at Liberal leaders' meetings. However, the size of the membership of the British Social and Liberal Democrats means that social-Liberals were a large constituent of ELD/ELDR congresses, and would have been pushing for more 'interventionist' policies. In both explanations, therefore, it is the unique structure of political opportunities for European Liberal parties that could have produced this counter evidence to May's Law.

The European People's Party consistently advocated the second most 'free market' policies in the EU system. As previously noted, the EPP placed less emphasis on these economic issues than on the other two dimensions in the EU system. Moreover, this lack of emphasis was matched by a certain ambivalence in the EPP position on economic policy questions. For example, most EPP statements that advocate a more free market policy (such as a the need for more 'open markets'), were invariably qualified in a subsequent sentence with a commitment to public intervention (such as the need for a minimum level of 'social protection' across the whole EU). Consequently, the average position of the EPP on intervention-free market issues (at -2.8) was almost exactly in the centre.

FIGURE 4.2. Position of the EPP on the Intervention-Free Market Dimension
Moreover, as Figure 4.2 illustrates, before 1982 the EPP positions were more interventionist. Since the mid-1980s, in contrast, the Christian Democrat position was firmly centrist. This thus reflects the general trend from the early 1980s onwards towards more free market policies of all the parties in the system. Specifically for the EPP, however, this movement may also have been a result of the more ‘free market’ Conservative parties joining the traditionally Christian Democrat organisation; such as the Greek ND and Spanish PP. Nevertheless, the stability of the EPP centrist position, and the occasional dash back to ‘interventionism’ (particularly in response the high level of unemployment in the early 1990s), suggests that this Conservative expansion of the EPP has had little impact on the EPP economic policy stance.

FIGURE 4.3. Position of the ECGP/EFGP on the Intervention-Free Market Dimension

On the intervention-free market dimension, the next party in the EU system is the Green federation, with an average position of -9.1. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, moreover, although there may have been a movement towards the centre on economic issues, the 1994 Green Election Manifesto was more interventionist than the 1989 Manifesto or the 1992 ‘Guiding Principles of the EFGP’. This consequently illustrates the dominance of the more Left-wing elements of the Green movement in the European organisation. Two of the most influential
member parties, in terms of supplying resources and actively promoting the development of a Federation of Green Parties, have been the Dutch Groen Links and the German Grünen. Compared to the British, Italian and French Green movements, these two parties are more openly ‘interventionist’: whereas some Green parties support a reduction of the role of the state in the economy, the German and Dutch Greens advocate using the state machinery to “direct the economy into a permanent pattern with economically-responsible production and consumption methods”.7

FIGURE 4.4. Position of the CSP/PES on the Intervention-Free Market Dimension

Finally, at the most ‘interventionist’ end of the economic policy dimension is the Socialist party federation, with an average position of -26.1. As expected, the CSP/PES was firmly on the interventionist side of economic policy questions. However, as Figure 4.4 shows, the position of the CSP/PES changed considerably between 1976 and 1994. Firstly, a high degree of inconsistency of the location of the CSP/PES documents on this dimension is shown by the level of variation from the mean: a standard deviation of 12.3. This is the highest degree of inconsistency of any of the parties on either of the two socio-economic dimensions. This thus seems to reflect the perception that since the mid-1970s, most Socialist

and Social Democratic parties in Europe underwent a process of programmatic renewal. Moreover, as revealed in the above section, because Socialist parties are more aligned on intervention-free market issues than libertarian-authoritarian issues, the renewal process had a more drastic effect on CSP/PES economic policies.

In general, therefore, the development of party federation policy on the intervention-free market dimension mirrored the changing fortunes of the European economy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Europe was wallowing in the aftermath of the two oil crises, all the parties were consistently interventionist (advocating Keynesian economic management). In the mid-1980s, with the new 'crisis of the Welfare State' and the tensions between a domestic and global economy strategy, there was a high level of inconsistency in party positions. Between 1989 and 1991, however, the parties seemed to have resolved this identity problem, and were all adopting more 'free market' position. However, with the onset of European recession after 1991, and the concern about the high level of unemployment in Europe - as was expressed in the Commission's 'White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment' - all the parties became more interventionist again (but were closer to the centre than they were in the 1970s). In other words, the changing policies of the party federations for action by the European institutions closely reflected the positions of parties in the domestic arena. Furthermore, although there was a general shift towards more 'free market' policies, the median position in EU politics is still somewhat interventionist. This may thus explain the difficulties of more openly free market parties in the domestic arena - such the British Conservatives (who sit with the EPP Group in the EP but have not joined the EPP federation), the French UDF (who left the ELDR to join the EPP), or Forza Italia - to find a home in the emerging European party organisations. Even the more free market Liberal and Christian Democrat federations are still staunch defenders of the Welfare State and the so-called 'Social Market Economy' (*Sozialmarktwirtschaft*).

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4.4.2. **Dimension 2: Libertarian-Authoritarian**

The most 'libertarian' party in the EU system is the Green federation, with an average position of +49.7. Moreover, although 'libertarian-authoritarian' issues command over 50% of the attention of Green party policy, ECGP/EFGP positions on this dimension were fairly stable, as Figure 4.5 shows. The standard deviation of Green positions on these socio-political issues was lower (only 7.9) than on either of the other dimensions (with standard deviations on intervention-free market and integration-independence issues of 9.0 and 11.3 respectively). Furthermore, the position of the ECGP/EFGP at the libertarian extreme on socio-political issues, and on the 'interventionist' side on economic issues, coincides with the conception of Green parties as "Left-Libertarian" organisations. The policies of the Green federation for the EU system (for EU policies to protect the environment, to promote the position of women, and to protect social rights) are thus constituent with the position of Green parties in the domestic arena. However, whereas the ECGP/EFGP position was stable on economic issues (or slightly more 'interventionist'), the Green federation moved towards the centre on socio-political issues. This thus implies that the ascendancy of 'Realos' over 'Fundis' in many parties affected Green policy on 'post-materialist' issues but not on economic issues.

FIGURE 4.5. Position of the ECGP/EFGP on the Libertarian-Authoritarian Dimension

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The second most 'libertarian' party in the EU system is the CSP/PES federation, with an average position of +20.5. In addition, the CSP/PES position on these socio-political issues was more stable than on either of the other two main dimensions in the EU system. Firstly, as Figure 4.6 illustrates, on these issues the Socialist federation did not move much away from, or towards, the centre across the whole period. In contrast, on economic issues (as previously discussed) and the integration-independence dimension (as will be shown), the position of the CSP/PES changed considerably between 1976 and 1994. Secondly, moreover, the degree of variation of Socialist positions from the average was lower on this dimension than on the other two dimensions: a standard deviation of 8.4. After the decline of the nuclear disarmament campaign with the end of the Cold War, one might have expected that Socialists to have become more centrist on this dimension. However, the CSP/PES replaced an emphasis on 'peace/disarmament' issues with a new concentration on 'environmental protection' and the position of 'women and minorities'.

FIGURE 4.6. Position of the CSP/PES on the Libertarian-Authoritarian Dimension
The next most ‘libertarian’ party at the European level is the ELD/ELDR, with an average position on this dimension of +19.9. The ELD/ELDR is thus very close to the position of the Socialist federation on libertarian-authoritarian issues. This thus reinforces the argument that the two socio-economic dimensions are inherently independent: where the Socialists and Liberals are on top of each other on one dimension, but at opposite ends on the other dimension. Moreover, as shown in Figure 4.7, the position of the ELD/ELDR on socio-political issues was very stable from one end of the period to the other, as was the CSP/PES. This presumably indicates that the Socialist and Liberals do not want to compete with each other on these issues. If they positively sought to compete over socio-economic policies they would have changed their positions in order to differentiate themselves from each other. Alternatively, one could assume that the Liberals and Socialists have converged on the position of the median voter on the libertarian-authoritarian, and are thus forced to chose other issues to compete on. Furthermore, for both parties, party leaders’ decisions were more centrist on these issues than congress decisions: thus in accordance with May’s Law.

FIGURE 4.7. Position of the ELD/ELDR on the Libertarian-Authoritarian Dimension

Finally, the most ‘authoritarian’ party in the system is the EPP, with an average position of -4.8. As Figure 4.8 shows, however, there was little movement in the general
position of the EPP on socio-political issues between 1976 and 1994. This was thus similar to the situations of the other two main party federations. Interestingly, however, the difference between the positions of the EPP party leaders and the congress on libertarian-authoritarian issues does not accord with the expectation that the leaders would be more centrist. The average position of the leaders was -6.4, whereas it was -2.5 for policy adopted by the congress. The EPP is thus the only party that goes against May's Law on this dimension of EU politics.

FIGURE 4.8. Position of the EPP on the Libertarian-Authoritarian Dimension

This could be explained, however, by the different structure of opportunities for EPP leaders on the two dimensions. The Christian Democrat leaders are more eager than their activists to make policy compromises to attract the Conservative Parties to join the EPP. Moreover, such a strategy would only really work on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension of politics, where most Conservative parties (who emphasis ‘law and order’ and ‘constitutionality’) are equally as authoritarian as the Christian Democrats. On economic issues, in contrast, the Liberal federation is closer to the ‘free market’ Conservative position than the EPP. If the EPP is to become a broad Christian Democrat-Conservative alliance, therefore, the EPP party leaders would allow a move towards more free market policies but
would actively avoid a move towards the centre on socio-political issues. Consequently, on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, EPP leaders tend to be more extreme than the EPP congress.

In sum, therefore, the shape of EU politics on libertarian-authoritarian issues was considerably stable. The Green federation entered the system, placing greatest emphasis on these issues and taking by far the most extreme position at the ‘libertarian’ end of the spectrum. However, this did not produce any significant realignment in the socio-political locations of the other party federations. The Socialist and Liberal federations remained moderately libertarian, and did not begin to advocate policies that diverged from each other. The EPP also remained moderately authoritarian. In other words, the emergence of the Greens may have shifted the centre of gravity towards libertarian issues, but the other parties did not respond to this. This could perhaps be explained by the fact that the Socialists and Liberals did not want to break from a stable pattern of competition between them. Moreover, remaining on the ‘authoritarian’ side of the ELDR, meant that on this dimension the EPP was closer to the non-aligned Conservative parties, which it was trying to attract. The interesting issue, therefore, is how this mix of stability on one socio-economic dimension (on libertarian-authoritarian issues) but significant change on the other (on intervention-free market issues) translated into the general shape of ‘Left-Right’ party competition.

4.4.3. The Compound Left-Right Continuum

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Left-Right dimension is an approximation of the two fundamental socio-economic issue dimensions, and is deeply rooted in the foundations of party politics. The concepts of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ serve to summarise a complex structure of political issues and positions, and are an approximation of the party positions in the two-dimensional socio-economic issue space. In other words, the actual location of the Left-Right dimension is the line of ‘regression’ that approximates the various party positions in the two-dimensional space. If one calculates a single regression line from the locations of all the party federation documents between 1976 and 1994, the position of the Left-Right in the EU system is the equation $y = -0.4x + 18$, where $y$ is the party positions on the authoritarian-libertarian
dimension and \( x \) is the party positions on the intervention-free market dimension.\(^{11}\) As illustrated in Figure 4.9, the shallow slope of the Left-Right implies that it is mostly correlated with party positions on economic issues, but is at least partially dependent upon the post-industrial (or pre-industrial!) questions relating to the socio-political structure. If one recalls the discussion in Chapter 2, this empirical result is thus almost identical to the description of the socio-economic political space that was based on deductive theoretical reasoning.

FIGURE 4.9. *Position of European Election Manifestos in the Socio-Economic Policy Space*

The overall change in the structure of party competition along this compound Left-Right dimension can hence by analysed by correlating the party positions onto the Left-Right dimension. These changes are simplified by focusing on the positions of the European Election Manifestos. Apart from reducing the number of documents to eighteen, the Election Manifestos are a good indicator of party movements for a number of reasons. Firstly, as discussed above, for the behaviour of party actors in the European arena, they are the most important 'type' of party document. Secondly, because they are drafted by leaders'

\(^{11}\) This equation was calculated using standard linear regression analysis on Statview 512+ for Apple Macintosh. Although the line is a regression line, it is used here as a line of best correlation. The line is thus purely a descriptive representation of a single dimension of party competition. See G.M. Clarke & D. Cooke (1983) *A Basic Course in Statistics*, 2nd edition, London: Edward Arnold, Chapter 21, and R.A. Zeller & E.G. Carmines (1978) *Statistical Analysis of Social Data*, Chicago: Rand McNally, Chapter 7.
representatives and middle-level elites, approved by the party leaders and adopted by the party congresses, they represent a trade-off between the positions of leaders and activists. Thirdly, for whatever reason, the European Election Manifestos reveal a high degree of consistency. They have the lowest deviation from the mean on socio-economic policy issues than another "type" of party policy document: with average standard deviations on the intervention-free market and libertarian-authoritarian dimensions of 7.5 and 4.9 respectively.

The movements between the various European Election Manifestos in the socio-economic space, and in relation to the Left-Right dimension, are thus illustrated in Figure 4.9. This picture consequently shows the two patterns from the above analysis: the movement of the three main party federations towards more 'free market' issues; but an overall stability of the main party positions on libertarian-authoritarian issues. However, the Figure also illustrates that the Green federation emerged in a 'gap' in the socio-economic policy space. As discussed in Chapter 2, changing societal structures since the 1960s have produced an increase in post-materialist values in the electorate. However, as the data shows, the three main parties did not significantly increase their focus on socio-political issues, or did not move towards more 'libertarian' politics. Consequently, when combined with the movement of the Socialist parties towards the centre on economic issues, an 'intervention-libertarian' (or 'Left-Libertarian') gap emerged in the European policy space, which was filled by the Green federation.

These developments are clearly illustrated in the changing positions along the Left-Right. The location of a party policy document on this dimension is calculated by mapping the two-dimensional co-ordinates of the document onto a single point on the Left-Right line, where a line through both points is perpendicular to the Left-Right dimension. Using Pythagorean algebra, the position of the 'Origin' (point 0,0 in two dimensions) is mapped onto the point (+6.2,+15.5) on the EU Left-Right line: +6.2 on the intervention-free market dimension, and +15.5 on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension. The angle between the Left-Right line and the line connecting point (6.2,15.5) to the Origin is ninety degrees. The 'Left-Right position' of a document is thus the distance of the new location from the position of the Origin on the Left-Right line. After mapping the 1979 CSP European Election Manifesto on the Left-Right, the distance of this point from (6.2,15.5) is 46.4. In other words, the Left-Right position of the
1979 CSP Election Manifesto was -46.4. *A more detailed explanation of this procedure, and the algebraic proof of the calculation of the Left-Right position of a party federation document, is contained in Appendix F.*

FIGURE 4.10. *Left-Right Position of European Election Manifestos*

Having made these calculations, it is easy to see how the shape of party competition on EU socio-economic issues changed. As Figure 4.10 shows, at the end of the 1970s the three main party federations advocated fairly Left-wing policies, with the Liberals closest to the centre. By the second European elections (in 1984), however, the Christian Democrats had moved closer to the Liberals. This thus accords with the acceptance of more free market policies by many European Christian Democratic parties, as in Kohl’s call for an economic *Wende* in Germany. However, the effects of Mitterrand’s famous ‘u-turn’ in the early 1980s (and the subsequent abandonment of an ‘Independent Socialist Strategy’ by many member parties of the CSP) had not yet filtered into Socialist positions in the European arena. Nevertheless, by 1989 the effects of the decade of economic transformation of the European economy had produced a concomitant change in European-level party politics. The Liberals had begun to once again move away from the Christian Democrats, and the Socialists had accepted a more free market agenda. Moreover, where the Socialists had moved from, the European Greens emerged. Finally, in the 1994 elections, there was an overall stabilisation of
these positions: with a consolidation of the differentiation between a Liberal 'free market-libertarian' agenda and the centrist position of the Christian Democrats on both dimensions of socio-economic policy.

In sum, therefore, there are two main conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis of party competition on EU socio-economic policy.

• Firstly, the pattern of party competition at the European level on these issues reflected the ebb-and-flow of party positions in the domestic arena: where there was a growing acceptance of free-market policies by European institutions, but a stability of positions on socio-political issues; and an emergence of the Green federation to fill a gap in the system. On a compound Left-Right dimension, these changes were manifest as a shift to the 'Right' of the three main party federations, but with a coherent distinction between their positions, and an emergence of the Greens to the 'Left' of the Socialists.

• Secondly, the policies of the party federations generally accorded with the expectation that policy made by party leaders would be more centrist than policy made by party activists. In the two cases where May's Law did not hold, it is explained either by the different balance of party factions between the party organs (where 'economic-Liberals' dominated ELDR leaders' meetings and the 'social-Liberals' dominated the congress), or by the specific structure of opportunities for party leaders (where the Christian Democrat leaders wished to establish common ground with the Conservatives).

Consequently, in their calls for EU-level policy on socio-economic issues, the party federations behaved much like parties in the domestic arena: where there was competition between rival party agendas, and between party leaders and activists. The question remains, therefore, as to how far this applies to party federation behaviour on the less traditional dimension of party competition: the 'integration-independence' dimension.
4.5. Party Positions on the National/Territorial Dimension

As discussed in Chapter 2, the other main cleavage in EU politics is one of national/territorial interests, which is manifest as a division between more or less integration of the EU system. On this dimension, the party federations take positions on an 'integration-independence' continuum. If a party emphasises issues such as a 'supranationalism', 'economic and monetary union' or 'common foreign and security policy' it is towards the integration end of the dimension. In contrast, if a party emphasises 'intergovernmentalism', 'national sovereignty' or 'enlargement' it is towards the independence end of the dimension. As with the Left-Right dimension, there was a considerable change in the shape of party competition on these national/territorial issues.

The most 'integrationist' party in the system is the EPP, with an average policy position of +36.5. This is thus in accordance with the deep Christian Democratic ideological commitment to European integration. As Figure 4.11 shows, however, the Christian Democrat position did not remain constant. There was a high level of inconsistency in the position of the EPP policy documents: with a standard deviation from the mean of 21.0. This was higher than any party position on any of the policy dimensions. However, this is partially explained by the fact that although the positions at the beginning and the end of the period were very close, there were several periods of change in EPP policy on this dimension. Firstly, up to the mid-1980s, the Christian Democrats were only moderately pro-integration. Secondly, from the negotiation of the Single European Act (following the 1983 Stuttgart European Council 'Solemn Declaration on European Union' and the EP's 'Draft European Union Treaty') the EPP became progressively more pro-integration. This was a period when the EPP advocated a complete transition of the European Community into a "Federal Union". Finally, however, in the wake of the public opposition to the (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union, by the end of 1993 EPP policy had returned to a more cautious pro-integration policy:


13 This position is most thoroughly outlined in European People's Party (1990b) "Résolution: Pour une Constitution fédérale de l'Union européenne", 8th EPP Congress, Dublin, 15-16 November 1990.
advocating further integration, but emphasising that this must not be at the expense of 'national sovereignty'. Moreover, for the first time the EPP considered the possibility of "variable geometry": where a 'first tier' of member states would establish a federation, and a 'second tier' would 'opt-in' (or 'out') of various elements of the federation - such as defence policy, a single currency, or social provisions.14

FIGURE 4.11. *Position of the EPP on the Integration-Independence Dimension*

The second most pro-integration party in the EU system is the ELD/ELDR, with an average position of +32.7. As Figure 4.12 shows, the Liberal federation policy on integration-independence was more consistent than the EPP: with a standard deviation from the mean of 14.0. However, ELD/ELDR policy was similar to the EPP in two other respects. Firstly, although the average ELDR position was less integrationist than the EPP, this was only marginal. Consequently, there was hardly any competition between the Liberal and Christian Democrat federations on the question of further integration of the EU system. Secondly, in the 1990s, the policy of the Liberal federation followed the same pattern as the EPP. In other words, there was growing enthusiasm for European integration in the build up to the signing of

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the Treaty on European Union, which was followed by a return to a more centrist position in the aftermath of the French and Danish referenda. Consequently, in 1994, although the ELDR still supported European integration, it attached an ever increasingly number of criteria on further institutional development: such as a 'democratisation' of the structures, an 'increased role for the national parliaments' and 'more efficient government'.


The next party on the integration-independence spectrum is the CSP/PES, with an average position of +17.3. As Figure 4.13 shows, the development of Socialist party policies on European integration was different to the other two main party federations. Firstly, compared to the ELD/ELDR and the EPP, the Socialist federation was on average closer to the centre. Secondly, CSP/PES policy positions were less erratic than the other two federations: with a standard deviation from the mean of only 10.0. Thirdly, and most significantly, whereas the positions of the other two large party federations did not change much from one end of the period to the other, the CSP/PES became gradually more 'integrationist'. Up to the mid-1980s, the Socialists were somewhat ambivalent to the process of European integration.

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15 For example, Federation of European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Parties (1993) "Leaders’ Resolution: The European Community Before the European Council in Copenhagen", ELDR party leaders' meeting, Copenhagen, 16 June 1993.
By 1989, however, the CSP/PES was strongly in favour of further integration. This enthusiasm thus coincided with the European Commission's insistence that a 'social dimension' (through the 'Social Charter' and 'economic and social cohesion') should be implemented "in parallel" to the Internal Market. However, public scepticism of the European project in the wake of the process of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty threaten Socialist unity more than in the other two main federations. Consequently, by 1994, the CSP/PES were still pro-integration, but on the condition that European-level policies must alleviate unemployment: through a "European employment programme" and the inclusion of levels of unemployment in the convergence criteria for EMU.16

FIGURE 4.13. Position of the CSP/PES on the Integration-Independence Dimension

At the other end of the spectrum, the ECGP/EFGP is the least 'integrationist' of the party federations, with an average position of -12.7. This also means, therefore, that the Green federation is the only 'anti-European' party federation. Although the Greens have increasingly organised in the EU system - with the development from the Green 'Coordination' to the Green 'Federation' - in policy terms they are against any further development

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of a European-level political system. Hence, the Green federation is in effect an "anti-system party". This was particularly highlighted in the process of ratifying the Treaty on European Union, when the member parties of the Green federation were the only parties to vote against the Treaty in the European Parliament and in every national parliament. As Figure 4.14 shows, however, since the end of 1993, the EFGP was more centrist. This may thus have been a response to the political paradox of organising a political party at the European level, but rejecting the establishment of a political system at that level.


Finally, as with the Left-Right dimension, the overall pattern of relations between the parties on integration-independence issues is illustrated by the positions of the various European Election Manifestos. As Figure 4.15 shows, in 1979 the ELD/ELDR and EPP were both fairly pro-integration, and the CSP/PES was positively opposed. By 1984, however, the CSP/PES held a position close to the EPP, whereas the ELD/ELDR advocated a more extreme integrationist position. In the 1989 election, however, the positions of the three main party federations had begun to converge on a moderately pro-integrationist position. This

convergence, however, had left ample room in the system for the Green federation to gain the 'protest' vote. It was thus no coincidence that this election saw the first European-wide success of Green parties - which was described as a "Green tide". Either in response to this success, or in reaction to public antipathy to the Treaty on European Union, in the 1994 election the three party federations were more centrist. The very close proximity of their positions, however, indicates that they had given up any idea of competing with each other on the question of institutional integration. The Liberal, Christian Democrat and Socialist federations still addressed issues of EU policy-making, such as the use of 'majority voting' or the implementation of the 'Social Chapter'. However, they either held exactly the same view on these issues or deliberately couched their policies in 'Left-Right' rather than 'integration-independence' terms.

FIGURE 4.15. Integration-Independence Position of European Election Manifestos

However, there is a further aspect to this shape (lack!) of competition between the three main party federations on integration-independence issues. The average position of party leaders' decisions was more extreme than party congress decisions for all the party federations. In other words, in contrast to the structure of internal party relations on the two other

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dimensions of EU politics, on party policy towards European integration there was a universal refutation of May's Law. On integration-independence issues, the average positions of policy made by party leaders' meetings and policy made by party congresses were respectively: +46.5 and +22.4 for the EPP; +36.6 and +29.3 for the ELD/ELDR; +17.9 and +15.9 for the CSP/PES; and, -13.6 and -11.1 for the ECGP/EFGP.

In all cases, therefore, there was a difference between the top-level and middle-level elites. For the three large federations, this reinforces the perception that European integration is largely an elite process: where the party leaders who participate regularly in party federation business become socialised into advocating further integration of the system. Moreover, any further development of the institutions at the European level would presumably reinforce the position of the party federations vis-à-vis the national parties; and thus the positions of the party leaders vis-à-vis the lower level elites. This also helps explain why the Green party leaders are more opposed to European integration than their followers. Whereas integration of the EU system may reinforce the three main federations it is likely to undermine the Green federation. Compared to the other parties, the Green elites have little chance of obtaining any of the main European level offices - in the Commission or the Council - which would increase in importance if the system develops. Since 1992, however, even the Green federation elites have become more pro-European.

In sum, therefore, party behaviour on the integration-independence does not accord with the classic pattern of 'party competition'. This is thus in contrast to party behaviour on the socio-economic dimensions of politics.

• Firstly, there was a convergence of Socialist, Christian Democrat and Liberal party positions on a moderately pro-European policy. As on the Left-Right dimension, however, the movement of the CSP/PES from an anti- to a pro-integration position left a space in the system for the Green federation to emerge. The Green federation thus represented the only party organised at the European level that was in opposition to the pro-European 'grand coalition'.

• Secondly, the policy positions of party federation leaders and activists on this dimension were directly opposite to the standard pattern of internal party relations. For all the parties,
the policies of party leaders' meetings were more extreme than the policies of the party congresses: in direct contradiction of May's Law.

However, these two elements fit together in a particular model of party behaviour on the integration-independence dimension, which is characterised by a "cartel of elites". As Dahrendorf described, in such a cartel: "Each interest seeks security and protection for the position it has already acquired, and together they rob political conflict of its dynamics". As European public opinion began to turn against the Maastricht Treaty, there was thus "a deliberate joint effort by elites to stabilise the system". This is classic elite behaviour in pillarised political systems, particularly in the period of 'system-building'. Moreover, the fact that this structure of party competition only exists on this dimension of politics reinforces the conception that the EU system is segmented along national/territorial boundaries rather than along socio-economic boundaries.

Consequently, we now have an answer to the question about how the party federations cope with the problem of the rising salience of European integration issues: they minimise competition, and present a 'united front' of elites against the party members. This implies that the increased saliency of European integration issues was not a choice of the party federations. Had they wanted these issues on the agenda, they would not have adopted this non-classic mode of party competition. In other words, whereas the rising saliency of the integration-independence issues appears to undermine a central hypothesis of the research, the fact that the party federations adopted a specific 'elite-cartel' strategy implies that the general theory was correct.

4.6. Conclusion: The Emerging Shape of Socio-Economic Policy Competition

There was thus a significant change in the shape of the EU policy space between 1976 and 1994. As Figure 4.16 illustrates, there was considerable movement in the location of the

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parties on both main dimensions of EU politics. Firstly, on socio-economic questions, the Socialist, Liberal and Christian Democrat parties moved ‘Rightwards’, and the Green federation emerging to the Left of the Socialists. Moreover, despite a convergence of Liberal and Christian Democrat positions in the early-1980s, by the 1990s there was a fairly coherent distance between the parties. In addition, on Left-Right questions, party leaders’ positions were generally more centrist than party congress positions. Overall, therefore, party competition in the European arena reflected party positions on the main dimension of party politics in the domestic arena.

FIGURE 4.16. *The Changing Shape of the EU Party System*

Secondly, however, on the integration-independence dimension, the standard patterns of party behaviour did not emerge. In contrast to the stable pattern of competition on Left-Right issues, on national/territorial questions the three main party federations gradually converged on a pro-integration position, with the Socialists only slightly less integrationist than the Liberals and Christian Democrats. This thus left the Green federation as the only party organised at the European level that was ‘anti-European’. Moreover, against the general rule of internal party relations, the Socialist, Liberal and Christian Democrat leaders were more ‘integrationist’ than their followers.
However, this non-conformist pattern of party competition on national/territorial issues goes hand-in-hand with the changes in the second characteristic of the EU policy space: the dimensionality of the system. The saliency of ‘integration-independence’ issues increased dramatically over the period. By the beginning of the 1990s, the three main party federations placed greater emphasis on this dimension than on either of the socio-economic dimensions. Moreover, the relative saliency of economic (intervention-free market) and socio-political (libertarian-authoritarian) issues remained fairly constant: with a slight increase in the saliency of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension because of the emergence of the Green federation.

As the theoretical framework suggests, however, the party federations would rather address socio-economic issues (on which the identities of the familles spirituelles are based) than national/territorial questions. One can assume, therefore, that the increased saliency of the integration-independence dimension was against the wishes of the European parties. In other words, the party federations were simply reacting to the central issues of European-level politics: from the agenda of the European Council or in the Intergovernmental Conferences. This was thus an indication that, unlike parties in the domestic arena (who play a significant part in shaping the political agenda), the party federations are still fundamentally dependent on their political environment. They were thus forced to adopt a common party strategy to minimise internal party divisions, by choosing not to compete on almost half of the issues in EU politics. In other words, on the main issues on the EU agenda, the party federations operated as a ‘cartel of elites’.

Where possible, however, the party federations couched EU policy questions in terms that were consistent with their ideological heritages (Weltanschauungen). This is not to say that party ‘ideology’ is an inherent phenomenon of politics, simply that the organisations of the party federations are fundamentally dependent upon establishing and maintaining a coherent “package” of policy ideas that their member parties (and only their member parties) share in common. This is illustrated in the different emphasis placed by each of the party federations on the individual issues within the three main dimensions of EU politics.
TABLE 4.5. Four Weltanschauungen of EU Politics: The Top Ten Issues Emphasised by Each Party Federation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSP/PES</th>
<th>Avg. % 76-80</th>
<th>90-94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Planned Economy/Employment</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Integration/Supranationalism</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Environmental Protection</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. International Development Aid</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Peace/Disarmament</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Social Protection/Regulation</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Social Charter/Chapter</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Democracy</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Economic and Social Cohesion</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Free International Trade/GATT</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECGP/EFGP</th>
<th>Avg. % 76-80</th>
<th>90-94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Environmental Protection</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Independence/Intergovernmentalism</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Peace/Disarmament</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Democracy</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Planned Economy/Employment</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Women and Minorities</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Integration/Supranationalism</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Subsidiarity/Sovereignty</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Social Protection/Regulation</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. International Development Aid</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EPP Avg. % 76-80</th>
<th>90-94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Integration/Supranationalism</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Subsidiarity/Federalism</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Traditional Morality</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. European Parliament Powers</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. EPC/CFSP</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. EMU/ECB/Single Currency</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Militarism</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. European Effort/Harmony</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Internal Market</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Freedom and Human Rights</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELD/ELDR Avg. % 76-80</th>
<th>90-94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Integration/Supranationalism</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. European Parliament Powers</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Environmental Protection</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Democracy</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Free International Trade/GATT</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Freedom and Human Rights</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Subsidiarity/Federalism</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Open Market/Enterprise</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. EMU/ECB/Single Currency</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. EPC/CFSP</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 4.5 shows, each of the party federations presented very different packages of policy commitments. The three main party federations devoted a significant proportion of their policy statements to the main integrationist issue ('integration/supranationalism'). This even became the top issue of the CSP/PES between 1990 and 1994. Consequently, the crucial difference between the main party federations increasingly arose on the socio-economic issues. On the 'Right' of the EU party system, where both parties where pro-European and free market-oriented, the difference between the Christian Democrats and the Liberals was fundamentally about 'libertarian-authoritarian' questions: highlighted by the contrast between the EPP emphasis on 'traditional morality' and the ELD/ELDR emphasis on 'democracy'. On the 'Left' of the EU system, however, the division between the Socialist and the Green federations was two fold: firstly, a fundamental division between Socialist 'integration' and
Green 'independence'; and, secondly, a more subtle difference relating to the degree of emphasis on the same socio-economic questions (as in the relative positions of 'planned economy/employment' and 'environmental protection' are in the Socialist and Green packages).

FIGURE 4.17. The Triangular Shape of Socio-Economic Policy Competition

Consequently, although the three main party federations reduced their competition on integration-independence dimensions, they increasingly proposed different socio-economic policy agendas. However, rather than these agendas being located next to each other from 'Left' to 'Right' in a single continuum, they were positioned at three different positions in the two-dimensional socio-economic policy space. There was thus a different structure of party relations on each of dimension of socio-economic politics. On economic policy questions, the centrist position of the EPP meant that it could either go with the ELD/ELDR (and emphasise 'free market' issues), or with the CSP/PES (and emphasise 'intervention' issues). However, on socio-political issues, the fundamental alliance was between the Liberal and Socialist federations (on 'libertarian' issues), and the EPP was isolated. As Figure 4.17 shows, therefore, the shape of party competition at the European level on socio-economic questions was fundamentally a "triangular party system". However, whether the party federations were able to translate the alliances of this triangular system into policy outputs from the EU institutions is a subject of the next chapter.

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Chapter 5

Political Party Impact on European Council Policy-Making

5.1. Party Policy Goals and EU Decisions: Agenda-Setting and Coalition-Formation

As the previous chapter illustrated, the party federations presented coherent policy positions in the European arena. Moreover, these positions accorded with the Socialist, Liberal and Christian Democrat "world-views", as represented by the ideological positions of the party families in the domestic arena. Furthermore, in Chapter 3 it was shown how the party federations increasingly organised their activities (at the level of party leaders) around the key medium-term agenda-setting institution in the European Union (EU) system: the European Council. However, if the theoretical framework is correct, this growing coherence of party positions in the European arena and changing organisational strategies should go hand-in-hand with an increasing ability of the party federations to translate these positions into outputs from the European institutions: in other words, with a growing ability to reap policy rewards from the European Council. If policy rewards are not forthcoming from the European Council, the party federations would not attempt to force party leaders to adopt common positions, often after acrimonious debates, and would organise instead around a different political arena (such as the European Parliament or the European Commission). The task of this chapter is thus to analyse the link between party policy goals and European Council decisions.

In keeping with the comparative-political framework, in the study of parties and party systems there are two main theories about the way parties influence political decisions, each of which is accompanied by a particular methodology for testing their validity. Firstly, a central element of democratic theory is that parties play a role in raising issues onto the political agenda during elections, which are turned into policy proposals once a party is in office. As Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge argue:
Parties sort through citizens' demands and turn these demands into political issues by working out policy alternatives in the light of the general principles for which the respective parties stand. In this way, political parties aggregate demands into loosely coherent policy packages. Political parties form governments and act as oppositions in legislatures. Thus, they are crucial to political decision-making and implementation.  

An implication of this 'agenda-setting theory', is that there should be a congruence between the policy issues advocated by political parties and the policy agenda of the executive and legislative branches of government. In other words, if the parties change their policy emphasis, political outputs should also change. This assumption of a congruence between changes in party policy and government outputs consequently allows the theory to be tested using multivariate statistical techniques. Using this method, and the data from the ECPR Party Manifestos Group, Klingemann et al. have thus compared party policy positions and government outputs (defined as public expenditures in different policy areas) in ten western democracies. The general methodological framework used by Klingemann et al. can also be applied to the party federations and the European Council.

The data on party federation policy was collected for the previous chapter using a similar method to the ECPR Party Manifestos Group (which is described in Chapter 2). Instead of looking at expenditure priorities, however, the Conclusions of the European Council have been coded using exactly the same content analysis and 'coding frame' as for the party federation documents (see Appendix D). This thus enables us to make a direct comparison between party policies and European Council decisions, which is probably more accurate than expenditure figures. A complete list of the fifty-five European Council Conclusions used in this research, and the raw 'scores' from the coding procedure, is contain in Appendix E. This 'agenda-setting theory' is applied in Section 5.2.

The agenda-setting theory hence concentrates on political parties as individual organisations, and the total amount of party influence on political decisions is the sum of the

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2 *ibid.*
individual party results. However, in addition to the individual party organisations there is a further central element of a ‘party system’: the relationships between the political parties. Consequently, a second aspect of the relationship between parties and political decisions is the impact of the structure of divisions and alliances in the party system on policy outputs. This theoretical connection thus underlines the growing interest of comparative research on political parties in the relationship between coalition-formation and government policy-making. The methodology for testing this theoretical connection between coalition-formation and political decisions usually involves ‘spatial analysis’: of plotting the positions of parties in a uni- or multi-dimensional space and comparing the ‘expected’ coalition position with the actual location of the government decision. This is initially an analysis of comparative statics: of the impact of the shape of the party system on political decision-making at different points in time. However, spatial theory also allows us to analyse the movements between different decisions, from one status quo to the next.

This method can thus be applied to party federation policies and European Council decisions. The location of the party federations in the EU policy-space were calculated for the previous chapter. It was found that the general shape of the relationships between the party federations is a ‘triangular party system’ in the two-dimensional socio-economic policy space (on the ‘intervention-free market’ and ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ issue dimensions). The location of all European Council Conclusions in the same policy-space has been calculated using the same method as for the party federations (the results are contained in Appendix E). However, to understand in more detail the connection between the party alliances and European Council decisions, it is also necessary to supplement the spatial theory with a descriptive analysis of party federation policies and European Council decisions at different points in time. Consequently, in Section 5.3, this ‘coalition-formation theory’ is applied to the six European

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Councils when all three major party federations issued policy positions at the level of party leaders in the build up to the EC/EU summits. Finally, the implications of the application of these agenda-setting and coalition-formation theories to the party federations and the European Council are drawn together in Section 5.4.

5.2. Party Federation Influence on the Agenda of the European Council

Using the Klingemann et. al. method, three different variants of the agenda-setting theory have been applied to the party federations and the European Council: the basic agenda-setting model, the party strengths model, and the party organisation model. Each model focuses on (and tests the influence of) a different aspect of party federation behaviour in and around the European Council. Before analysing the empirical results of this application, it is worth introducing the basic methodological elements of these three models.6

5.2.1. Three Models of Agenda-Setting

Basic Agenda-Setting Model. This model measures the general policy influence of all the parties on European Council outputs; from the assumption that policy outputs will reflect the programmatic emphasis of the parties, regardless of their level of participation (through varying levels of representation and/or organisation) in the decision-making process. This model involves performing a series of regressions matching the appropriate platform emphasis of the three (or four) party federations to policy outputs from the fifty five European Council meetings since 1975.7 The raw scores for the party federations and European Councils are the proportion of all policy documents in each year devoted to a particular political issue. In keeping with the method of the Klingemann et. al. research, all three models looked at the same ten policy issues: integration/supranationalism; planned economy/employment; international

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6 For a more detailed discussion of the statistical reasoning and method behind these models see Klingemann, Hofferbert & Budge, op. cit., Chapter's 3 and "Appendix B: Special Methodological Considerations".

7 As Appendix C shows, there were fifty-seven European Council meetings between 1975 and 1994. However, policy positions (contained in the 'Presidency Conclusions') were adopted at only fifty-five of these meetings. The two exceptions were in Athens, on 5-6 December 1983, and Brussels, on 15 July 1994.
development aid; European Political Co-operation/Common Foreign and Security Policy; environmental protection; European Parliament powers; Economic and Monetary Union/single currency; subsidiarity/federalism; democracy; and internal market. These were the ten most emphasised issues by the European Council and the party federations, and together constitute about 50% of all party and Council documents.

The regressions for the 'basic agenda-setting model' are in the form of the following multivariate equation:

\[
E_i = a + b_{\text{PES}_i} + b_{\text{ELDR}_i} + b_{\text{EPP}_i} (+ b_{\text{EFGP}_i})
\]

In this equation, \(E_i\) is the percentage of annual references in the European Council 'Presidency Conclusions' to a particular policy area \(i\), and \(\text{PES/ELDR/EPP/EFGP}_i\) is the percentage of references to the same policy area in the party federation documents of the same year. The \(a\) is the common regression term (alpha). The \(b\) is the regression coefficient showing the form of relationship - how much change in the policy output is associated with a 1.0 percent change in party federation emphasis. If the party federations influenced European Council outputs, the regression coefficients are positive. Only \(b\) coefficients which are significant above .05 (at the 95% level) are considered worth discussing. All values of \(b\) which do not meet this level of significance are in parentheses in the tables. The other statistic associated with the regressions is the 'adjusted \(R^2\)', which indicates the proportion of the variation over time associated with differences in party policy emphasis (regardless of the direction of the relationship).

**Party Strengths Model.** This model analyses the relationship between the representational strengths of the parties and political decisions; from the assumption that policy outputs will reflect the strengths of the parties who are participating in the decision-making, rather than simply the general emphasis of the parties in the system. The application of the model to the EU hence involves measuring the relationship between the representational strengths of the party federations in the European Council and political decisions. The method

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8 The type of policy statements included in each of these issue categories is contained in Appendix D.

9 In fact, the average amount of European Council and party federation documents covered by these ten issues is as follows: 51.2% of European Council conclusions; 49.1% of CSP/PES documents; 51.2% of ELD/ELDR documents; and 51.7% of EPP documents.
for testing the party strengths model is a second series of regressions, in the form of the following equation:

\[ E_i = a + b_{PES_i} + b(PES_i \times S) + b_{ELDR_i} + b(ELDR_i \times S) + b_{EPP_i} + b(EPP_i \times S) \]

All the terms in Equation 5.2 are identical to those in Equation 5.1, except for the addition of \( S \). This is a variable with a value between 0 and 1, which is derived from the average percentage of the participants each party federation has in the European Council in each year. The names and party affiliations of the participants in every European Council is contained in Appendix G.

**Party Organisation Model.** This model analyses the relationship between the level of party organisation and political decisions; from the assumption that outputs will reflect the policies of only those parties that back their positions with organisational resources and action. This model thus involves adding to the agenda-setting model the fact whether party federations held party leaders’ meetings close to (immediately before or after) the European Council meetings in a given year. By meeting immediately prior to a European Council, the joint declarations adopted by the party leaders’ will be reported in the European media, and may thus alter the agenda surrounding the meetings. Similarly, by arranging a meeting immediately after a European Council meeting, the party actors in EC/EU decision-making will be aware that they will be forced to defend their positions taken at the European Council meeting to their fellow ‘European Party’ members. The result is a third series of regressions, in the form of the following equation:

\[ E_i = a + b_{PES_i} + b(PES_i \times L) + b_{ELDR_i} + b(ELDR_i \times L) + b_{EPP_i} + b(EPP_i \times L) \]

All the terms in Equation 5.3 are identical to those in Equation 5.1, except for the addition of \( L \). This is a variable with a value between 0 and 1, which is derived from the percentage of European Council meetings in a given year where a party leaders’ meeting of a particular federation has been held in the weeks immediately before or after. This is my own model, developed specifically for the purpose of analysing the affect of the new organisational strategies of the party federations (as analysed in Chapter 3) on European Council decisions. It
is thus not taken from the Klingemann et. al. project. Nevertheless, by adding to the basic agenda-setting, it is “in the spirit” of their research.

5.2.2. The Basic Agenda-Setting Model

The results of the first set of regressions, using Equation 5.1, are shown in Table 5.1. The column of $a$ scores are the expected level of European Council emphasis in a particular area regardless of the involvement of the party federations. This is not a measure of the (lack of) influence of the party federations in European Council a particular policy area. Rather, these results are simply a ‘base point’ of policy emphasis, which the Presidency Conclusions do not go below.

TABLE 5.1. Basic Agenda-Setting Model, 1975-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY ISSUE</th>
<th>$a$</th>
<th>$b_{CSP/PES}$</th>
<th>$b_{ELD/ELDR}$</th>
<th>$b_{EPP}$</th>
<th>Adjusted R$^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integration/Supranationalism</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>(.57)</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(-.05)</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Economy/Employment</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>-.53</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Aid</td>
<td>7.01</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC/CFSP</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Protection</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament Powers</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU/ECB/Single Currency Subsidiarity/Federalism</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>(-.47)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>(-.06)</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Market</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY: Parentheses indicate that the relationship is not significant above the .05 level. Italics indicate that the relationship is significant, but is negative rather than positive.

As Table 5.1 shows, ‘integration-supranational’ issues (such as the questions of institutional reform of the EC/EU system) generally take up a large section of European Council Conclusions. Moreover, two other areas on the ‘integration-independence’ dimension
also make up a large proportion of European Council statements: questions of Economic and Monetary Union (‘EMU/ECB/Single Currency’), and issues covered by European Political Co-operation or the Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘EPC/CFSP’). On the two socio-economic dimensions of EU politics, there are only two issues which merit a significant proportion of European Council outputs over and above party federation policy commitments: issues of ‘planned economy/employment’ (such as spending programmes to combat unemployment); and questions of ‘international development aid’ (such as EC/EU aid under the Lomé Convention). To reiterate, this does not necessarily mean that the party federations have a low level of impact in these areas, simply that they always make up a large portion of European Council statements. For example, a relatively small proportion of European Council statements are devoted to questions of ‘environmental protection’, but all the party federations have a significant influence on policy-making in this area.

The values for $b$ and $R^2$ in Table 5.1 both support the interpretation that the party federations were only really influential in a few policy areas. The values for $R^2$ show that in only two areas (‘environmental protection’ and ‘internal market’) a change in the policies of the party federations produced a concomitant change in the content of European Council decisions. In all the other areas, the overall relationship was less than .20. From the $b$ scores, moreover, ‘environmental protection’ is the only area where all three party federations have an impact on European Council outputs which is statistically significant (and is not a negative relationship). ‘Internal market’, on the other hand, is one of only four policy areas (the others being ‘democracy’, ‘EPC/CFSP’ and ‘European Parliament powers’) where two of the three party federations have a statistically significant positive relationship with European Council outputs. Conversely, in two of the areas where $R^2$ is low (‘integration/independence’ and ‘international development aid’) none of the party federations have any sort (positive or negative) of statistically significant impact on European Council conclusions.

Turning to the individual values of $b$ in Table 5.1, between 1975 and 1994 there were only fourteen (out of a total of thirty) examples of where the changing policies of the party federations had a significant (and positive) influence on the content of European Council decisions. Reading down the CSP/PES column, the relationship of Socialist party policy to
EU outputs is significant in four main policy areas: 'EPC/CFSP', 'environmental protection', 'subsidiarity/federalism', 'democracy', and 'internal market'. Moreover, the high Socialist score for the 'internal market' suggests that EPP and ELDR policies to deregulate the Common Market (which they advocated from the mid-1970s) were effectively blocked until the Socialists began to support more free market policies. Similarly, the Liberal federation also had an influence in five different areas: 'environmental protection', 'EP powers', 'EMU/ECB/single currency', 'democracy', and 'internal market'. Moreover, the two most influential areas for the ELD/ELDR were those relating to Economic and Monetary Union and to 'internal market'. Finally, there was a concomitant relationship between EPP and European Council outputs in only four areas: 'planned economy/employment', 'EPC/CFSP', 'environmental protection', and 'EP powers'. However, there was a marked difference between the level of EPP influence in two of these areas ('EPC/CFSP' and 'planned economy/employment') as opposed to the other two.

On a cautionary note, however, the results indicate some problems in the application of the basic agenda-model to party federation influence on European Council decision-making. Although the series of regressions certainly produces some interesting results, it is important to note that there are several (a total of four) cases of a significant negative correlation (where the value of $b$ is negative and significant above the .05 cut-off point) between party federation and European Council positions. In other words, the general level of party federation influence on European Council positions is limited because in several instances where a party increased its emphasis on a particular policy area there was a concomitant decrease in the amount of European Council conclusions dedicated to this issue.

Nevertheless, where the model does appear to apply, there is a guarded confirmation of the general hypothesis. Firstly, the two policy areas where the party federations appear to have most influence are on the two socio-economic policy dimensions: 'internal market' on the 'intervention-free market' dimension; and 'environmental protection' on the 'libertarian-authoritarian' dimension. Conversely, in the main issue on the 'integration-independence' dimension (the question of 'integration-supranationalism') none of the party federations had a significant influence on European Council policy-making. Secondly, the ELD/ELDR and EPP
were influential on the policy issues on which they placed most emphasis (as discussed in the previous chapter). The Liberal federation was influential on 'libertarian' issues such as 'environmental protection' and 'democracy', on the 'free market' issue of 'internal market', and on the 'integration' issues of 'EMU/ECB/single currency'. The Christian Democrat federation, on the other hand, was influential on the 'intervention' issue of 'planned economy/employment', and on 'integration' issues such as 'European Parliament powers' and 'EPC/CFSP'. Finally, however, the basic agenda-setting model does not fit the policy profile of the Socialist federation quite as well as for the other two Euro-parties. The Socialists were influential on the 'libertarian' issues such as 'environmental protection' and 'democracy', but also influenced policy on the main 'free market' issue ('internal market') rather than on the main 'intervention' issue ('planned economy/employment').

5.2.3. The Party Strengths Model

As previously discussed, the participants in European Council meetings are the Heads of Government (and State for France), the Foreign Ministers, and the President of the European Commission. The exact persons who attended each European Council since 1975 is contained in Appendix G. As Table 5.2 shows, between 1975 and 1994 there was considerable variation in the distribution of participants in the European Council between the three party federations. In the Table, 'N' is the total number of participants in each European Council in a given year, which increased through successive EC enlargements. The column 'P' is the average number of participants in a given year in the European Council which are members of a party affiliated to the party federation in question, and the values for S are the proportion of 'N' represented by 'P'.

Table 5.2 thus indicates some general features of the party-political make-up of the European Council. Between 1975 and 1978, the Socialists comprised more than 40% of the participants. This proportion fell to around 20% until 1989, after which it rose again to around 40% by 1994. The Christian Democrats made up around 30% of the participants until 1983, above 40% to 1986, and around 35% from 1987 to 1992. However, in 1993 and 1994, the Christian Democrats in the European Council fell to only 17%. The Liberals comprised less
that 20% of the European Council participants prior to 1978, and were then only slightly above 20% until 1983, after which time the ELD/ELDR consistently comprised as little as 16% of the participants at EC/EU summits. Overall, therefore, across the whole period the CSP/PES and EPP together made-up about 55-65% of the European Council, whereas the ELD/ELDR comprised an additional 15-20%. The other 15-30% of participants were from parties that were not affiliated to any of the party federations, such as the British Conservatives (CP), the French Gaullists (RPR) and the Irish Fianna Fáil (FF).

**TABLE 5.2. Party Strengths in the European Council**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>CSP/PES</th>
<th>ELD/ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.0 .42</td>
<td>2.0 .11</td>
<td>6.0 .32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.0 .42</td>
<td>2.3 .12</td>
<td>6.0 .32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9.7 .51</td>
<td>3.0 .16</td>
<td>4.7 .25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.7 .40</td>
<td>4.3 .23</td>
<td>4.0 .21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.7 .30</td>
<td>4.7 .25</td>
<td>4.3 .23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.3 .23</td>
<td>4.0 .21</td>
<td>5.7 .30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4.7 .22</td>
<td>4.7 .22</td>
<td>6.7 .32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4.3 .21</td>
<td>4.3 .21</td>
<td>6.0 .29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.3 .11</td>
<td>4.0 .19</td>
<td>9.7 .46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.3 .16</td>
<td>3.7 .18</td>
<td>9.0 .43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5.0 .24</td>
<td>2.0 .10</td>
<td>9.0 .43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.0 .24</td>
<td>4.0 .16</td>
<td>9.0 .36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.0 .20</td>
<td>4.0 .16</td>
<td>8.0 .32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.7 .23</td>
<td>4.0 .16</td>
<td>8.0 .32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.0 .28</td>
<td>4.0 .16</td>
<td>8.5 .34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.0 .28</td>
<td>4.0 .16</td>
<td>9.0 .36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.0 .28</td>
<td>4.0 .16</td>
<td>9.0 .36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.0 .32</td>
<td>4.0 .16</td>
<td>8.0 .32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.3 .37</td>
<td>4.0 .16</td>
<td>6.7 .27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.3 .41</td>
<td>4.3 .17</td>
<td>4.3 .17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:**
- **E** = number of European Councils per year
- **N** = total number participants in each European Council
- **P** = average number of party representatives in each European Council
- **S** = party strength (average percent of participants from a particular party in each European Council)

How these varying strengths determined the level of influence of the party federations is thus the central feature of the ‘party strengths model’. The results of the second set of regressions, using Equation 5.2, are shown in Table 5.3. As one may have expected, the values for \( a \) (the “base points” before the influence of the party federations is taken into account) in this model are similar to those under the basic agenda-setting model. As the values
for $R^2$ show, however, when the varying strengths of the parties in the European Council is taken into account, there is a congruence between party federation policy emphasis and European Council outputs in a greater number of policy areas than under the basic agenda-setting model. Whereas under the original model the parties only really had an impact in two areas, by adding the party strengths to the framework, the policies of the party federations had a significant impact on six policy issues: 'environmental protection' and 'internal market' (the same two as under the original model); and 'integration/supranationalism', 'planned economy/employment', 'EPC/CFSP', and 'democracy'.

**TABLE 5.3. Party Strengths Model, 1975-1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY ISSUE</th>
<th>$a$</th>
<th>$b$ CSP/PES</th>
<th>$b$ PES x S</th>
<th>$b$ ELD/ELDR</th>
<th>$b$ EPP x S</th>
<th>$b$ EPP</th>
<th>Adj. $R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integration/Supranationalism</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>-2.69</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>(-.37)</td>
<td>(.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Economy/Employment</td>
<td>8.86</td>
<td>-.99</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>-7.82</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>-2.02</td>
<td>8.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Aid</td>
<td>7.12</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>-.84</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>-2.95</td>
<td>(-.36)</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC/CFSP</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>-1.87</td>
<td>8.94</td>
<td>-.99</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Protection</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>-2.06</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament Powers</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-1.79</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>-6.03</td>
<td>(-.04)</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU/ECB/Single Currency</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>-8.07</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>-2.79</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiarity/Federalism</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>-4.88</td>
<td>(-.31)</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>-1.07</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
<td>-.46</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Market</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>-4.93</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The $b$ coefficients in Table 5.3 also confirm that party strengths are more explanatory than the general changes in party policy. As the two columns for the CSP/PES show, the general Socialist policy changes only impact (in a positive way) on European Council outputs on two policy issues ('environmental protection' and 'European Parliament power'), whereas if the changing proportions of Socialists in the European Council are taken into account the CSP/PES had influence in six other policy areas (all the other areas except 'integration/
Even more strikingly, the EPP had a significant positive influence on European Council decision-making on nine out of ten policy issues when the number of Christian Democrats representatives are taken into account, but did not have a significant impact on any issue if the general policy changes are taken alone. The case of the ELD/ELDR initially appears to contradict this general rule: as general policy changes and party strengths are important on an equal number of policy issues (four). However, this is probably explained by the fact that there were so few Liberals in most European Councils, that the difference between 15% and 20% of the participants did not really effect the final outcomes.

Finally, by looking at the $b$ scores for each of the policy issues, a general pattern emerges as to which areas the political make-up of the European Council makes a difference. Firstly, there was not one policy issue on which none of the party federations influenced European Council decisions. Secondly, there were four policy issues where the policy changes by the party federations only influenced European Council outputs if they corresponded with changes in the political make-up of the European Council (these were 'planned economy/employment', 'EPC/CFSP', 'EMU/ECB/single currency' and 'internal market'). Thirdly, there were two policy issues on which the general policy emphasis of the party federations was important regardless of the political make-up of the European Council (these were 'environmental protection' and 'European Parliament powers'). Fourthly, on two policy issues the EPP and CSP/PES influenced European Council outputs in relation to their strengths in the decision-making process whereas the ELD/ELDR influenced outcomes regardless of the number of Liberal participants (on 'democracy' and 'subsidiarity/federalism'). Finally, on the two remaining issues, the overall influence of the party federations was low, as none of the general policy changes by the party federations influenced the outputs, and only one of the party federations had an impact if the political make-up of the European Council is taken into account (the ELD/ELDR on 'integration/supranationalism' issues, and the EPP on 'international development aid' issues).

As with the basic agenda-setting model, however, it is also necessary to note the limitations of this party strengths model: that there is a relatively high proportion of cases of a significant negative relationship between party federation policy change and European Council
outputs (a third of the regression coefficients). In the basic agenda-setting model, this value was only about one fifth. This thus suggests that the party strengths model is less accurate than the general model. Nevertheless, solace can be found in the fact that the number of negative relationships is considerably lower than the total number of significant positive relationships (which constitute almost 50% of all values of $b$). And, there are only a few cases where the relationships (whether positive or negative) were insignificant (about one sixth). It nonetheless remains to be seen as to whether the organisational strategies of the party federations were a more important indicator than the strengths of the party federations on European Council policy-making.

5.2.4. The Party Organisation Model

As discovered in Chapter 3, on several occasions the party federations held party leaders’ meetings immediately before or after a European Council in a deliberate effort to impose the policies of the parties on the participants in the EC/EU meeting. The dates of the party leaders’ meetings and European Councils which were part of this strategy are indicated in Appendix C. Moreover, the proportion of all party leaders’ meetings organised around a European Council meeting, and the (converse) proportion of European Councils with party leaders’ meetings held close to them, are shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 in Chapter 3. For the ‘party organisation model’, these figures were thus used to calculate the percentage of European Councils each year that each party federation organised a leaders’ meeting around. This percentage was subsequently expressed as a proportion ($L$) between 1 and 0. The results of the ‘party organisation model’, the series of regressions using Equation 5.3, are shown in Table 5.4.

As an initial check on the validity of the model, the values for $a$ in Table 5.4 (the degree of emphasis in European Council Conclusions before the influence of the party federations is taken into account) are again very close to the values under the ‘basic agenda-setting’ and ‘party strengths’ models. Looking at the values of $R^2$, moreover, the addition of the party organisational strategies increases the number of policy issues on which the party federations have relative impact. Like the previous model, under the party organisation model, changes in party federation policy influenced European Council policy-making on at least six policy
issues. What is particularly interesting, however, is that this list of policy issues is different under the party organisation model than under the party strengths model. This thus suggests that on some policy issues (such as ‘democracy’) the political make-up of the European Council is most important, whereas on other issues (such as ‘EMU/ECB/single currency’) the level of party organisation around the European Council is most important.

**TABLE 5.4. Party Organisation Model, 1974-1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY ISSUE</th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b) CSP/PES</th>
<th>(b) PES x L</th>
<th>(b) ELD/ELDR</th>
<th>(b) ELDR x L</th>
<th>(b) EPP</th>
<th>(b) EPP x L</th>
<th>Adj. R(^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integration/Supranationalism</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>(-.34)</td>
<td>(-.66)</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(-1.14)</td>
<td>(-.01)</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Economy/Employment</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>(-.18)</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>-.85</td>
<td>-2.59</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>-1.87</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Aid</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>(-.12)</td>
<td>(-.40)</td>
<td>(-.28)</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
<td>(-.46)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC/CFSP</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>(-.01)</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Protection</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>(-.07)</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament Powers</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>(-.02)</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.49</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU/ECB/Single Currency</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>-3.03</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>-.95</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>-1.77</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiarity/Federalism</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>-.93</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>(-.02)</td>
<td>(-.06)</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>(-.08)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Market</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>-2.17</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, the \(b\) coefficients in Table 5.4 indicate that for certain parties, and on some policy issues, the level of party organisation around the European Council is more explanatory than the general changes in party policy. Firstly, party organisation had the greatest impact for the Socialist party federation. As the second and third columns show, the degree of CSP/PES organisation around the European Council was significant on eight of the ten issue areas, whereas general Socialist policy changes were only significant on two policy issues. For the other two federations, organisation around the European Council was significant, but in less cases. For the ELD/ELDR, party organisation was effective on two policy issues (‘European Parliament powers’ and ‘EMU/single currency’), but the general
Liberal policy changes were significant on four other issues. Similarly, EPP party organisation was significant on two policy issues (‘EPC/CFSP’ and ‘internal market’), but the general Christian Democrat policy shifts had an impact on a total of six issues.

Secondly, the $b$ coefficients also reveal which policy areas were most affected by the organisation of party leaders’ meetings around the European Council. There is not a single policy issue where the organisation of all three party federations had a significant impact on European Council outputs. However, in four issue areas (‘EPC/CFSP’, ‘European Parliament powers’, ‘subsidiarity/federalism’, and ‘internal market’), the organisation of two of the party federations was relevant. Moreover, in four areas, party organisation had an effect for only one of the party federations, and in one area (‘integration/ supranationalism’) the level of party organisation did not have a significant impact on European Council decisions for any of the party federations. In other words, the organisation of party leaders’ meetings around European Councils did have an impact, but was limited compared to the influence of changes in the party-political make-up of the EC/EU meetings.

Finally, as with the other two models, it is necessary to point out the limitations of the ‘party organisation model’: that there is also a relatively high proportion of cases of a significant negative relationship between party federation policy change and European Council decisions (sixteen). As a proportion of the total number of cases (about a quarter) this is less than under the ‘party strengths model’, but is still considerably more than under the basic agenda-setting model. This thus suggests that, like the ‘party strengths model’, this framework is less accurate than the original model. Nevertheless, in the party organisation model the number of positive significant relationships between party federation policy and European Council decisions is a large proportion of the total number of cases (40%). Consequently, there is enough evidence to suggest that it can be taken seriously, and can thus be compared with the other two frameworks.

After this surfeit of regression coefficients, there is an clear need to simplify and summarise the findings of these models. Firstly, looking at the relationship between the party federations and the individual policy issues, the findings can be summarised by looking at how many of the
three models show a party federation to have had a significant positive influence on European Council outputs. As Table 5.5 consequently reveals, the party federations only really influenced European Council decisions on eight of the ten policy issues. There are two clear policy issues where the party federations had very little influence on European Council decision-making. The first of these, ‘integration/supranationalism’, is the classic issue on the ‘integration-independence’ dimension of EU politics. This thus accords with the theoretical explanation, and the empirical findings in the previous chapter, that the party federations do not seek to compete over policy rewards on this dimension. However, the second issue, ‘international development aid’, is formally on the ‘intervention-free market’ dimension of EU politics. This suggests, therefore, that the parties may have sought to influence decisions on this issue, but that European Council outputs reflected the ‘national interest’ alignments between the Member States (probably because of the link to the interests of former colonies) rather than the party-ideological alignments between the parties.

**TABLE 5.5. On Which Policy Issues Do the Party Federations Have Influence?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY ISSUE:</th>
<th>PARTY: CSP/PES</th>
<th>ELD/ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>Total Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integration/Supranationalism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Economy/Employment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Aid</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC/CFSP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Protection</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament Powers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU/ECB/Single Currency</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiarity/Federalism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Market</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Policy Influence:</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:** The figures refer to the number of models that show the party federation(s) having a significant influence on European Council decisions.
However, there was only one policy issue where all the party federations influenced European Council outputs under almost all three of the agenda-setting models: 'internal market'. It is not a coincidence that this issue stands out. The establishment of a single unified market in Europe is the ultimate economic policy question in EU politics, and thus the only real 'European issue' that all three party federations could "get their teeth into". The involvement of the party federations in this question thus confirms the expectation that on basic economic policy issues, the 'party-political' framework of the party leaders' summits was an important addition to the 'national-interest' framework provided by the Council of Ministers and European Council. Moreover, Table 5.5 also suggests that the Socialist and Christian Democrat party leaders were able to reap more rewards than the Liberal leaders. This is thus in line with the different representation strengths of the party federations in the European Council (where the Christian Democrats and Socialists each constituted more than twice the number of Liberals) and the varying levels of organisation between the party federations (where the Socialists and Christian Democrats increasingly organised party leaders' meetings around the European Council, and the Liberal federation changed to simply holding ELDR-Councils prior to the EC/EU summits).

TABLE 5.6. Which Agenda-Setting Model Fits Which Party Federation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODEL:</th>
<th>PARTY: CSP/PES</th>
<th>ELD/ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Agenda-Setting</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Strengths</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Organisation</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY: ✓ - this aspect of party federation behaviour significantly influences European Council decisions on a majority (at least six out of ten) of the policy issues.

X - this aspect of party federation behaviour does not significantly influence European Council decisions on a majority of the policy issues.

N.B. Parentheses around a tick indicate a significant influence on five out of ten policy issues.

Secondly, the findings can also be summarised by looking at which of the three models best fits each party federation. As Table 5.6 shows, the party-political make-up of the
European Council (under the 'party strengths model') is a more important determinant of European Council outputs than the general policy changes of the party federations (the 'basic agenda-setting model') or the level of party organisation around European Council meetings (the 'party organisation model'). Under the 'party strengths model', all three party federations had a significant impact on European Council policy-making on at least five of the ten policy issues.

In contrast, the organisation of party leaders' meetings around the European Council was only a successful strategy for the CSP/PES. In other words, the number of Socialists in the European Council was important, but the findings suggest that their coherence was strengthened when party leaders met before the European Council. For the EPP, in contrast, the number of Christian Democrats in European Council meetings was most relevant, and the level of party organisation was fairly unimportant. The ELD/ELDR was generally less influential than the other federations. The number of Liberals in the European Council did play a role on some policy issues, but was no more relevant than the changes in ELD/ELDR policy regardless of the representation or organisation of the party federation.

Finally, however, there are some limitations of this type of analysis. Apart from the problem of the number of significant negative relationships produced by the models, a basic constraint of regression analysis is the inability to 'prove' a direction of any relationship. The regression coefficients indicate that in certain cases when party federation policy changed, there was a concomitant change in the policy decisions of the European Council. The above analysis has treated the policies of party federations as independent variables, and the decisions of the European Council as dependent. However, this relationship could equally be round the other way: when European Council policies change, the party federations are forced to change their own policy emphasis in response. Nevertheless, it would be unlikely that the impact of European Council decisions on party federation policy would be altered by the numbers of party representatives in the EC/EU summits and the proximity of party leaders' meetings. The addition of the level of party strength and organisation in and around the European Council thus suggests that the direction of dependence is from the party federations to the European Council.

Council. Nonetheless, one can never by one-hundred percent certain. It is thus worth supplementing these results with a more detailed descriptive analysis of party federation activity in and around the European Council. This is hence one of the purposes of the next section.

In addition, a further constraint is that every year between 1975 and 1994 is treated as equally important. In other words, the models reveal the average levels of party federation influence across the whole twenty-year period. The theoretical framework suggests, however, that the party federations only really sought policy rewards from the European Council since the beginning of the 1990s. If this is true, it is not surprising that the overall impact of party organisation across the whole twenty-year period was small. The problem, however, is that from the beginning of the 1990s, there are too few years to be able to use regression techniques. Overall, the regression analysis may allow us to conclude that the average impact of party federation organisation between 1975 and 1994 been small. However, to test the theoretical framework more accurately it is also necessary to look at the specific cases in the last four to five years when all the party federations adopted the new organisational strategies.

5.3. Coalition-Formation Under the New Organisational Strategies

Before the end of 1994 there were six cases where all three party federations held party leaders' meetings (or issued statements with the explicit backing of the party leaders in the case of the Liberals) in the weeks immediately prior to a European Council. Before looking directly at these six European Councils, it is first necessary to outline how spatial coalition theory can help us analyse party-political alliances in the European Council.

5.3.1. Applying Policy-Driven Coalition Theory to the European Council

There is an initial problem in applying ‘coalition theories’ to European Council decisions: that a basic assumption of most coalition theories is that decisions are reached by a majority. Since its conception, however, European Council agreements are informally agreed by a (unanimous)
'consensus' of all the participants, with the exception of those who express their reservations in a footnote.\(^\text{11}\)

Nevertheless, majority-based theories have been used to analyse decision-making under the non-majoritarian rules of EC policy-making. For example, Bueno de Mesquita uses an 'expected-utility model' (where the outcome eventually converges on the position of the median participant) to analyse EC outputs in several policy areas where decisions are made by unanimity or qualified-majority.\(^\text{12}\) He assumes that in EC decision-making the forces either side of the median-position neutralise each other - thus making a "leap of faith" from conventional formal theory assumptions. Only on special occasions are decisions taken by a majority of the participants, as with the agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference on Economic and Monetary Union at the Rome European Council in October 1990. Consequently, if coalition theory can be used for deductive prediction, it certainly can be used as a descriptive (heuristic) tool, as it is applied here.

According to 'policy-driven' coalition theories, therefore, an inter-party agreement is 'policy-viable' when no credible alternative policy-package exists.\(^\text{13}\) The first such coalition theory was developed by Robert Axelrod.\(^\text{14}\) He argued that a "conflict of interest" between potential partners would lead to coalitions between parties next to each other ("connected") in the policy space. However, empirical applications of Axelrod's model suggested that policy-driven parties in fact coalesce with parties 'closest' to them, rather than simply 'next to' them in the political spectrum.\(^\text{15}\) Instead of looking at the ordering of parties, therefore, a policy-

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\(^{13}\) See Budge & Laver (1992a) *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7. In a non-cooperative bargaining situation, an agreement is thus 'policy-viable' when it is a Condorcet winner: an package that cannot be beaten by any other alternative in pair-wise comparison.


\(^{15}\) This development of Axelrod's theory is used in M. Leiserson (1966) *Coalitions in Politics*, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Yale University; and A. De Swaan (1973) *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation*, Amsterdam: Elsvier.
driven coalition theory should concentrate on the distances between the ideal policy-positions of parties.\textsuperscript{16}

FIGURE 5.1. The 'Core Party' in a Hypothetical Four-Party System

When applying this to several dimensions, however, one finds that no point exists which cannot be beaten by an alternative majority of legislators: the "chaos theorem".\textsuperscript{17} There is, nevertheless, one exception to this rule: in a two-dimensional space a stable coalition can form at the ideal-policy position of the largest party if this party is located within the 'core' of the policy space.\textsuperscript{18} This is shown in Figure 5.1. In the Figure, the shape ABCD is the "pareto

\textsuperscript{16} The following analysis assumes a Euclidean metric when measuring 'closeness'. There are, however, many other ways of modelling party policy preferences, such as the City Block, Minkowski or Infinity metrics. Nevertheless, it is legitimate to use the Euclidean metric as this is a basic assumption of almost all theories of party policy behaviour. For a detailed discussion on this question see M.J. Laver & W.B. Hunt (1992) \textit{Policy and Party Competition}, London: Routledge, pp. 15-22.


set" of the system: where it is not possible to move from any point in the set without making at least one party worse off. The ideal policy position of party A can be beaten by a majority agreement between the other three parties at point 'y'. However, policy 'y' would subsequently be beaten by policy 'z', supported by parties A and B; which in turn would be beaten by policy A, supported by parties A and D; and so on, ad infinitum. The situation changes, however, if party A moves to point A', which makes the triangle BCD the pareto set. The ideal position of A' cannot be beaten by any other position in the policy-space. Position A' is preferred to point 'y' by parties A', B and D. In this position, party A' is referred to as the 'core party'. It is thus easy to check if one of the party federations is a core party simply by verifying if the party federation with the largest number of participants in the European Council is situated inside the shape produced by connecting the ideal points of the other parties.

However, because of the requirement that the 'core party' is the largest party, this situation happens on rare occasions. Nevertheless, there are some important implications of this theory that can be used. If a stable coalition does exist, where under the chaos theorem it should not, there are two possible reasons for this. The most obvious reason is that the political space is in fact only uni-dimensional. Although parties do take up positions on a number of salient issues, when it comes to direct legislative competition, for what ever informational, psychological or sociological reason (that we may not fully understand!) parties choose to be aligned along a single continuum. To operationalise this when we have measured the existence of several salient dimensions, a single-dimension is constructed by calculating the line of correlation, and tangentially plotting the party positions along this line (as was done for the party federation and European Council positions on the compound 'Left-Right' - see Appendix F). Once a single-dimension is constructed, a policy-driven majority position is best predicted by De Swaan's "minimal range" reformulation of Axelrod: which suggests that a coalition will form that has the smallest possible distance between its most 'extreme' members.19

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19 De Swaan, op. cit. Axelrod's "minimum-connected-winning" theory would not be appropriate in this situation because we argue that parties think that the 'distance' between them is important, not just the fact that they are 'next to' each other on the policy-spectrum.
The second implication of the chaos theorem, is that if a stable majority exists in a multi-dimensional policy space, there may be an institutional arrangement restricting the number of ‘viable’ options to a finite set, which consequently produces a single point that is preferred to all other alternatives.\textsuperscript{20} This theory has been applied by Laver and Shepsle to government formation, where a finite number of policy options is determined by the location of the two main ministerial portfolios.\textsuperscript{21} In the bargaining over a European Council agreement, however, no such “jurisdictional constraints” exist.

FIGURE 5.2. Direction: \textsuperscript{1}Log-Rolling with Differential-Saliency of Policy Dimensions

Nevertheless, an application of the Laver and Shepsle approach can be applied to the ‘direction’ of movement between European Council decisions: where an agreement will move from one European Council agreement to another, if the second agreement is in the set of positions that defeat the previous position. If this ‘win-set’ is a construct of the positions and


preferences of the transnational parties, a European Council decision may have moved as a result of party-political bargaining. Moreover, by assuming that each dimension of policy has a different significance for each party (as was found in Chapter 4), the principle of "log-rolling" can be used to predict an outcome: whereby parties are most interested in securing positions closer to their ideal point on the dimension of policy that is most significant for their supporters. This 'directional log-rolling' is illustrated in Figure 5.2.

In Figure 5.2, party A values 'libertarian-authoritarian' issues about one-and-a-half times as much as 'intervention-free market' issues (a typical position for a Liberal Party), whereas party B values the 'intervention-free market' dimension as twice as important as the 'libertarian-authoritarian' dimension (a typical position for a Socialist Party), and party C considers 'libertarian-authoritarian' issues to be twice as important as the 'intervention-free market' issues (a typical position for a Christian Democratic Party). If we assume that log-rolling takes place, the next agreement should be in the shaded area. This is the only area of the total 'win-set of SQ' where a majority solution satisfies the most salient policy position of two parties. The other possible winning solutions are either only on the most important dimension for party A (the intersection of the indifference curves of A and B), or on the least important dimensions for parties A and C (the intersection of the indifference curves of B and C). Although this is not necessarily a stable (Nash) solution, log-rolling reduces the number of majority solutions, and narrows the expected movement between agreements to a single direction.

In sum, therefore, we have several assumptions about the connection between the "balance of party forces" at the European level, as represented by the policy positions and alignments between the party federations, and the policy outputs of the European Council:

- **if the EU policy-space is multi-dimensional**, the final agreement will be close to the ideal position of the largest party federation, if it is located in the 'core' of the party system;
- **if the EU policy-space is multidimensional, and a 'core party' does not exist, the outcome is likely to be 'in the direction' of a log-rolling agreement between several party**

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federations, where each party seeks to achieve a policy closest to its ideal position on the ‘most salient’ dimension for its supporters; and,

• if the EU policy-space can be represented as uni-dimensional, however, a policy-driven “minimum-distance” coalition will form, between the parties that are ‘closest’ together in the policy space, and other parties will be added once this initial coalition is formed.

These assumptions can hence be applied to the six European Councils around which there was the highest level of party federation organisation. The research concentrates on the party positions on the two socio-economic dimensions because, as the previous chapter discovered, the party federations did not compete on ‘integration-independence’ issues in this period.

5.3.2. Luxembourg, 28-29 June 1991: The Agenda of the IGCs

The Luxembourg European Council of 28-29 June 1991 was held in the middle of the Intergovernmental Conferences on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Political Union. The party-political make-up of the this European Council was as follows: nine EPP,23 seven CSP,24 four ELDR,25 and five other Right-wing leaders that were not members of any of the party federations.26 In the build up to the EC summit, the Luxembourg Presidency had prepared a “Draft Treaty on European Union”, and the party federations addressed this document at length in a series of party leaders’ meetings.27

The CSP party leaders met on 3 June 1991 in Luxembourg, and several of the participants in the Luxembourg Council were present at this meeting. The Socialist leaders adopted a 20-point “Declaration on the Intergovernmental Conferences”, which updated the statement they had adopted in Madrid in December 1990.28 The CSP Leaders’ Declaration urged the European Council to: keep a single institutional structure in the EU (i.e. to include the

23 Martens (CVP), Kohl (CDU), Andreotti (DC), Santer (PCS), Lubbers (CDA), Mitsotakis (ND), Lyskens (CVP), Van den Broek (CDA) and Samaras (ND).
24 Mitterrand (PS-F), González (PSOE). Dumas (PS-F), De Michelis (PSI), Poos (POSL), Fernández (PSOE) and Delors (PS-F).
25 Cavaço Silva (PSD), Genscher (FDP), Elleman-Jensen (V) and Deus Pinheiro (PSD).
26 Schlüter (KF), Haughey (FF), Major (CP), Collins (FF) and Hurd (CP).
27 A second important issue at the Luxembourg European Council in June 1991 was to decide on the European response to the crisis in Yugoslavia. However, I concentrate on the agenda for the IGCs because this was the central topic in the party leaders’ meetings that preceded the summit.
two ‘intergovernmental pillars’ in the main body of the Treaty); introduce an ‘EU citizenship’; extend majority voting on environmental and social policies; establish a co-decision procedure between the EP and the Council of Ministers; secure an agreement on EMU, with a Central Bank “democratically controlled” by the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (EcoFin); introduce ‘convergence criteria’ for EMU based on “social indicators” (such as levels of unemployment); and introduce a “cohesion policy” to ease the transition to EMU in the less prosperous regions.

The Liberal leaders subsequently met alongside the 14th Congress of the ELDR, in Poitiers on 6 June 1991. They gave their support to a declaration on “The European Union to Come”, which was then adopted by the full Congress. The Resolution established the ELDR agenda for the IGCs, which included; the movement to a full “Union of a federal type”; the establishment of EU citizenship, with guaranteed freedom of movement of people; increased EP powers and a uniform procedure for European elections; a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and an EU “defence identity”; and full EMU, with convergence criteria based on strict economic targets and with a primary goal of price stability.

Finally, the EPP party leaders’ met on 21 June 1991 in Luxembourg. All six Christian Democrat Heads of Government and several of the Foreign Ministers attended this meeting; which constituted almost half of the participants in the forthcoming European Council, including the European Council President-in-Office (Jacques Santer). In a brief Communiqué, the Christian Democrat leaders re-confirmed their commitment to: a fixed timetable for EMU; a common foreign and security policy, including the establishment of the Western European Union as the “European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance”; co-decision powers for the EP; the need for political co-operation to combat organised crime in the Single Market; and to conclude the IGCs at the next European Council, in Maastricht.

After seven hours of negotiations between the Heads of Government on 19 June 1991, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council were finally adopted. These

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Conclusions contained every point of the EPP party leaders’ agenda. The only issue that appeared in the final Conclusions that had not been on the EPP list was the establishment of ‘EU citizenship’, that had been supported jointly by the CSP and ELDR. None of the issues that had been put forward exclusively by the CSP leaders (such as the ‘social’ convergence criteria) or by the ELDR leaders (such as the uniform electoral procedure) appeared in the European Council Conclusions. This description thus accords with the coalition theory framework: where the EPP agenda was supported because it was the largest party and was in the ‘core’ of the party system; but there was an additional log-rolling agreement between the CSP and ELDR on the question of EU citizenship. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3.

FIGURE 5.3. Policy Positions at the June 1991 Luxembourg European Council

In Figure 5.3, the positions of the three party federations and the European Council Conclusions (‘X’) are the exact scores for the documents from the content analysis (see Appendix E). The position of the non-attached Right-wing parties is approximated from the fact that they are all Conservative parties, and thus usually more ‘free market’ and
‘authoritarian’ than the Christian Democrats. The position of the Luxembourg European Council agreement (+10.6, -1.1) is very close to the EPP position (+5.9, -5.9). The EPP is the largest party, with nine representatives in the European Council, and is inside the pareto set formed by the CSP-ELDR-Non-Attached Right triangle. Moreover, the Council Conclusion is within the CSP-ELDR log-rolling win-set over the pure EPP position. In reality, therefore, it appears that the EPP was prepared to add an issue proposed by the CSP and ELDR, to guarantee their support for the rest of the EPP package.

5.3.3. Maastricht, 9-10 December 1992: The Treaty on European Union
The agenda for the next European Council, at Maastricht on 9-10 December 1992, was the final agreement on the Treaty on European Union. The political make-up (including the individual personnel) of this meeting was exactly as it had been at Luxembourg: nine EPP, seven CSP, four ELDR, and five other leaders from non-attached Right-wing parties. Consequently, if a different agreement arose from the meeting (which derived from the behaviour of the party federations) it would be as a result of a change in the location of the parties in the EU policy space.

This time the Liberal party leaders met first, on 3 December 1991 in Brussels. In a final statement from the ELDR-summit, they emphasised: the federal characteristics of the Union; EU citizenship; opposition to the creation of two ‘intergovernmental’ pillars separate from the EC framework; full co-decision powers for the EP; a uniform European election procedure; a special article on “parties at the European level”; full EMU, with the central goal of price stability and strict convergence criteria for “price stability and budget deficits”; and a common policy on immigration and crime prevention.32 With the emphasis on price stability and European-level powers to restrict individual freedom, this position was slightly more ‘free market’ (+10.5 compared to +6.0) and considerably less ‘libertarian’ (+2.7 compared to +34.5) than the position taken at the Luxembourg Council.

The CSP party leaders' meeting was held on 3-4 December 1991, also in Brussels. The Socialist leaders also altered their policy stance compared to their position at the previous European Council. On the 'intervention-free market' dimension, the Leaders' Declaration emphasised the need for a 'social dimension' of the European Union, with economic and social cohesion policies and new areas of co-operation on social policy, and opposed the adoption of EMU convergence criteria based purely on the rate of inflation and public debt (the position on this dimension was thus -19.2 compared to -13.4 in Luxembourg). On 'libertarian-authoritarian' issues, however, the Socialist Leaders for the first time supported the need for a military/defence element of the EU, and as a result were (like the ELDR) considerably more centrist (+9.6 compared to +20.6).

Finally, the EPP heads of government and party leaders met on 6 December in The Hague. Again the EPP was at an advantage, because the meeting was attended by Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch Prime Minister and Chair of the forthcoming European Council. Consequently, the EPP heads of government were able to discuss directly with the drafter of the Maastricht Treaty. Compared to the position at the Luxembourg Council, however, the EPP Party Leaders' Communiqué was completely neutral on socio-economic issues (+/-0.0, +/-0.0), as they agreed to concentrate on the institutional aspects of the EU system: co-decision powers for the Parliament, more majority voting in the Council of Ministers, and new Community competences in a number of policy areas.

When the new positions of the party federations are plotted in the two-dimensional socio-economic policy space, as is shown in Figure 5.4, once again the EPP is the core party in the system. The dynamics of the EU party system were thus very similar to how they had been during the previous European Council. It is not surprising, therefore, that the outcome of the Maastricht European Council (+2.1, +2.4 - shown by the 'X') was: firstly, very close to the ideal position of the EPP; and, secondly, slightly moderated in the direction of a log-rolling agreement between the CSP and the ELDR. The Treaty on European Union consequently

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contained the entire institutional agenda of the EPP, plus a new section on EU citizenship that the CSP and ELDR had proposed. However, the Socialists had failed to prevent convergence criteria for EMU based purely on economic targets, and the Liberals had failed to secure an agreement on a uniform electoral procedure for the EP. Neither the Liberal nor the Socialist federation were wholly satisfied with the results, but both agreed to support the Maastricht Treaty in the ratification process.36

FIGURE 5.4. Policy Positions at the December 1991 Maastricht European Council

However, the outcome of the Maastricht European Council (the Treaty on European Union) also contains a reference to “parties at the European level” (Article 138a). This ‘Party Article’ was introduced onto the agenda of the Maastricht Council at the last minute, by Wilfried Martens - the Belgian Prime Minister and the President of the European People’s

The idea had originated, however, in a series of joint meetings between the Presidents of the three party federations (Martens, Willy De Clerq (ELDR) and Guy Spitaels (CSP)).

The party federation Presidents together stated that:

> Without the contribution of European parties, Union is neither thinkable nor viable ... they contribute to the formation of the political will of the people ... this essential contribution should be recognised explicitly in the new treaty on Political Union, in order to make possible, in the medium term in a way similar to national policy, European legislation that provides for a working framework for European Parties.

The federation Presidents also cited Article 21 of the German Basic Law as a possible model for an EU 'Party Article'. Opposition from several national governments meant, however, that this provision was absent from the Luxembourg 'non-paper', the Luxembourg Draft Treaty and the first Dutch Draft Treaty. Nevertheless, by the Maastricht Summit, the federation Presidents managed to secure the support for a 'party clause' from all the federation member parties. Consequently, the second Dutch Draft Treaty made a commitment to include an article on ‘parties at the European level’, which closely reflected the position of the party federation Presidents. This was thus the first real indication of the party federations being able to shape their own destiny. By securing the inclusion of the ‘party article’ the emerging European party organisations were thus able to achieve a new level of independence from their institutional environment.

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37 Agence Europe, 12 December 1992. No reference is made to political parties in either the Luxembourg or Dutch drafts of the Treaty on European Union. The first appearance of the ‘party article’ was in the draft of the final treaty, which was published the week before the Maastricht Summit.

38 Joint meetings of the three Presidents of the party federations were held on 18 September 1990, 12 December 1990, 17 June 1991 and 2 October 1991.


5.3.4. **Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992: Denmark, Subsidiarity, Finances and Enlargement.**

The next European Council when the party leaders of the federations met before hand was in Edinburgh, on 11-12 December 1992. The packed agenda for this summit included four main topics: a solution to the Danish referendum against the Maastricht Treaty; a clarification of the principle of ‘subsidiarity’; an agreement on the financing of the Community for the next five years; and a decision on the opening of enlargement negotiations. The party-political make-up of the European Council had changed since the Maastricht European Council: eight EPP, forty EPP, four PES, four ELDR, and five from Right-wing parties that were not attached to any of the party federations. The EPP was thus no-longer the largest party, and would hence not be able to impose its policies on the other party federations.

In the build-up to the Edinburgh meeting, the EPP heads of government and party leaders met first, on 4 December 1992 in Brussels. The Christian Democrat leaders highlighted several points for the European Council: to uphold the ratification timetable for the Maastricht Treaty; to call for an inter-institutional agreement for increased “transparency” of European decisions; and to launch enlargement negotiations immediately. The majority of the EPP agenda was thus ‘institutional’. However, the EPP also called for a common approach to combat unemployment in Europe, which meant that the EPP leaders took a slightly more Left-wing position than at the Maastricht summit (-3.8 on the compound Left-Right dimension, compared to the previous +/-0.0).

The Liberal party leaders subsequently met on 7 December 1992 in Brussels. The ELDR leaders’ resolution called on the European Council to: reject a re-negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty; fully enforce the free movement of persons in the single market; democratise the European Union (which should include a uniform European electoral procedure); “insist that the only path to economic recovery is through free and fair trade”; and ensure a more

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43 Dehaene (CVP), Kohl, Santer, Lubbers, Mitsotakis, Colombo (DC), Van den Broek, Samaras.
44 Mitterrand, González, Amato (PSI), Claes (SP), Dumas, Poos, Solana Madariaga (PSOE), Delors.
45 Cavaço Silva, Kinkel (FDP), Elleman-Jensen, Durão Barroso (PSD).
46 Schütter, Haughey, Major, Andrews (FF), Hurd.
efficient use of Community finances.\textsuperscript{48} The emphasis on 'free trade' and 'efficient finances' thus implied a move further to the Right (to +15.1 on the Left-Right dimension, compared to +8.8 at Maastricht).

Finally, the inaugural meeting of the party leaders of the Party of European Socialists was held on 9-10 December 1992, in Edinburgh itself. The central emphasis of the PES leaders' statement was the need for economic recovery in the Europe. The leaders called on the European Council to: start a co-ordination of national economies to stimulate economic recovery; launch a European works programme; and bolster EC cohesion policies.\textsuperscript{49} This was thus one of the most Left-wing positions taken by the Socialist leaders for several years (-25.8 on the compound Left-Right dimension).

A further important event at the PES leaders' meeting was a confrontation between Franz Vranitzky (the SPÖ Chancellor of Austria) and Felipé González (the PSOE Premier of Spain).\textsuperscript{50} González arrived in Edinburgh prepared to veto the opening of enlargement negotiations if the European Council would not significantly increase the money available under the new Cohesion Fund. Vranitzky insisted, however, that EU enlargement was paramount for European Socialists; and that Austrian, Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian membership would lead to more economic transfers to the less prosperous regions rather than less. Vranitzky apparently also pointed out that under the new statutes of the PES, a majority of the Socialist leaders could impose their wishes on the Spanish party.\textsuperscript{51} Under this PES pressure, González agreed to back down.

\textsuperscript{48} Federation of European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Parties (1992b) "Leaders' Resolution: The European Community Before the European Council in Edinburgh", ELDR party leaders' meeting, Brussels, 7 December 1992. Also see Agence Europe, 9 December 1992, p.5.


\textsuperscript{50} The Austrian was SPÖ was already a Full Member of the PES, despite the fact that Austria was not yet a member state of the European Community.

\textsuperscript{51} This argument was described in detail in interviews with Axel Hanisch (the Secretary-General of the PES), Peter Brown-Pappamikail (in the Secretariat of the PES) and Richard Corbett (in the Secretariat of the Group of the PES in the European Parliament).
Without a ‘core party’, therefore, it is more appropriate to model the Edinburgh European Council along a single Left-Right dimension than in the two-dimensional socio-economic space. This is shown in Figure 5.5. According to the coalition theory, and assuming that the non-attached Right-wing parties are somewhere to the Right of the ELDR, all the viable policy-driven oversized coalitions must include both the EPP and the ELDR: either PES-EPP-ELDR or EPP-ELDR-other Right. Moreover, because the EPP is closer to the ELDR than the PES, the coalition theory suggests that an EPP-ELDR core would be formed before any third party would be added. This explanation is hence confirmed by the position of the Edinburgh European Council Conclusions found in the content analysis: at +2.3 on the Left-Right dimension (‘X’). This position between the EPP and ELDR (but closer to the EPP) is manifest in the European Council’s adoption of a PES-EPP sponsored “Declaration on an Economic Recovery in Europe”, and an acceptance of some of the ELDR agenda for financial propriety in the Delors II budgetary package. Moreover, whereas everything on the EPP agenda was once again adopted, the PES call for a European ‘works programme’ was rejected. The influence of the PES leaders’ summit was felt, nevertheless, in the European Council decision to launch the enlargement negotiations at the beginning of 1993, without any opposition from González.

5.3.5. Copenhagen, 19-20 June 1993: The Employment ‘White Paper’

The next European Council was in Copenhagen, on 19-20 June 1993. Although some of the personnel had changed since the Edinburgh summit, the representational balance between the three party federations remained the same: eight EPP, eight PES, and four ELDR. The only difference in the political make-up of this meeting was in the non-attached members, where
there were four Right-wing leaders and one independent. The main issue on the Copenhagen European Council was how to turn the Edinburgh ‘Declaration on Economic Recovery’ into firm policies.

The EPP heads of government and party leaders met on 2 June 1993 in Brussels. The main topic on the EPP agenda was the war in Bosnia. However, they also agreed that they would support the Commission proposal to prepare a “White Paper” on economic recovery. The Christian Democrat leaders reiterated, however, that any co-ordinated European economic strategy must not endanger the convergence criteria for EMU by increasing public deficits or having an inflationary effect. Although the EPP leaders approved of a co-ordinated approach to the problem of unemployment, the general thrust of the EPP statement was thus fairly moderate (at -5.5 on the compound Left-Right dimension).

The ELDR party leaders met on 16 June 1993, also in Brussels. The Liberal leaders also supported the need to tackle the problem of unemployment. However, the ELDR statement insisted that “many instruments of the past cannot be used”, and encouraged the Copenhagen European Council to: introduce a more flexible organisation of the labour markets; encourage flexible work and retirement schemes; and to take the necessary steps to reduce production costs. Consequently, the Liberal leaders set out a clear ‘free market’ agenda against the more moderate EPP position (at +6.8 on the Left-Right dimension).

Finally, the PES party leaders met on 19-20 June 1993, in Copenhagen. This was thus the third ordinary European Council in a row (which excludes the Extraordinary summit in Birmingham) where Socialist party leaders met at the same venue in the few days prior. At this meeting the Socialist leaders declared that they “strongly urge the European Council to [support] co-ordinated and vigorous action ... to improve employment prospects across the Community”. The PES Leaders’ Declaration went on to propose: a co-ordination of national

52 Reynolds (FF), Major, Juppé (RPR), Hurd.
53 Ciampi, the Italian Prime Minister.
55 See Agence Europe, 4 June 1993, p. 3.
economic policies; an active industrial policy at the European level; specific measures to help stimulate job creation; projects to clean up the environment; public investment in communication and infrastructure; active labour market policies to promote skills; negotiations between the "social partners" (business and workers organisations); and reciprocal trade relations with developing countries. This was thus a firmly 'interventionist' agenda (at -29.5 on the Left-Right spectrum).

FIGURE 5.6. Policy Positions at the June 1993 Copenhagen European Council

Without a core party, however, the political line-up at the Copenhagen European Council was similar to the situation at the Edinburgh summit, as Figure 5.6 shows. The relative locations of the party federations were almost identical: they had all moved slightly Left-wards and the EPP was still between the ELDR and PES, but slightly nearer to the ELDR. In line with the general shift of the parties, the Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council were also further Left (at +1.8) than at the Conclusions of the Edinburgh meeting. Moreover, the location of the Copenhagen agreement was again between the EPP and the ELDR, as the coalition theory would suggest. However, this time it was slightly closer to the position of the Liberals than the Christian Democrats. This was manifest in the fact that the Heads of Government had agreed to mandate the Commission to draft its "White Paper", but that John Major (to the Right of the Liberals) had adamantly insisted that the main aim of the paper should be to reduce labour costs.58 The PES and EPP had thus secured the Council's backing for the Commission plan, but their more 'interventionist' agendas for the project were blocked.

5.3.6. Brussels, 10-11 December 1993: Adopting the Employment Initiative

By the time the Commission White Paper was ready for adoption, however, the balance of power in the European Council had shifted. At the next European Council, in Brussels on 10-11 December 1993, the political make-up was as follows: ten PES,69 six EPP,60 four ELDR,61 four from non-attached Right-wing parties,62 and one independent.63

However, not only were the Socialists the largest group in the Brussels European Council, but they had begun preparing for this meeting before the other parties. On 4-5 September 1993, the PES party leaders held their first ‘Conclave’, in Arrábida in Portugal. The institutionalisation of the PES leaders’ meetings had meant that they had grown into ‘mini congresses’, with the presence of over a hundred Socialist officials, party leaders, spokespersons, policy advisors, European Commissioners and their staff, MEPs, and representatives from Trade Unions and other organisations. The idea for a ‘Conclave’ was thus to allow the party leaders to hold an open and frank discussion just amongst themselves about a long-term Socialist strategy at the European-level, and without the pressure of agreeing on a ‘Declaration’. The outcome of the Arrábida discussion was the establishment of a Working Group on state-economy relations in Europe, chaired by Allan Larsson, the former Employment and Finance Minister of Sweden.64 This was the first CSP or PES Working Group that would involve personal representatives of the national party leaders, rather than people from the International Sections of the parties. The proposals from the Group would thus have the implicit support of the party leaders.

The “Larsson Report on The European Employment Initiative” was subsequently adopted at the PES party leaders’ meeting on 9 December 1993, in Brussels. This was thus immediately before the European Council that was to amend and adopt the Commission’s draft “White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment”. In approving the Larsson Report, the Socialist leaders called on the European Council to take action for: investment in

59 Mitterrand, Rasmussen (SD), Papandreou (PASOK), González, Claes, Poos, Spring (LP-I), Papoulias (PASOK), Solana Madariaga, Delors.
60 Dehaene, Kohl, Santer, Lubbers, Andreatta (DC), Kooijmans (CDA).
61 Cavaço Silva, Kinkel, Petersen (RV), Durão Barroso.
62 Reynolds, Major, Juppé, Hurd.
63 Ciampi.
education and training; a reorganisation of working time; equal opportunities in taxation and social security; a new investment partnership between the public and private sectors; a co-ordination of national infrastructure plans; tax reform to encourage ecological employment; new regional development policies; and collaboration between employers and trade unions.65 This was thus a clear Left of centre agenda for European-level action (-25.1 on the 'intervention-free market' dimension and only +6.8 on 'libertarian-authoritarian' issues).

Meanwhile, the EPP heads of government and party leaders also met on 9 December 1993, along-side the annual EPP Congress that was being held in Brussels on 8-10 December. The EPP leaders discussed the agenda for the European Council. Unlike the PES, however, they did not issue a declaration directly on the subject of the Commission White Paper. Nevertheless, the policy position of the EPP party leaders can be accurately judged because a central issue of the meeting was the leaders' approval of the draft EPP Manifesto for the 1994 elections to the EPP, before it could be adopted by the Congress. Moreover, a key area of the EPP Manifesto was the section on “A Strong Economy”, which referred in detail to the need for European-level action to reduce unemployment. As with their previous declarations on the subject, however, the EPP leaders advocated a fairly moderate position, which combined free market economics with the (neo-Keynesian) use of state authority to facilitate economic recovery, and a neutral approach to socio-political questions (-1.5 on 'intervention-free market' issues and +/-0.0 on the 'libertarian-authoritarian' dimension).66

Like the EPP, the Liberal party leaders met on 9 December 1993 alongside the Electoral Congress of the ELDR, which was held on 9-10 December in Torquay. Also like the Christian Democrats, the position of the ELDR party leaders at this point in time is revealed in the ELDR Manifesto for the 1994 elections to the EP. The document had been drafted by an electoral committee, but the ELDR party leaders negotiated a series of amendments before submitting it for a vote in the Congress. An opening section of the Manifesto was devoted to economic policy at the European level, and advocated: strict application of the EMU convergence criteria:

a reinforced commitment to a single currency; strict adherence by the Member States to a stable monetary policy; a tough policy to reduce budgetary deficits; and a reduction of the tax burden. This was thus diametrically opposed to the PES stance (at +14.7 on the 'intervention-free market' dimension). The rest of the document, moreover, committed the ELDR to a radical liberalisation and democratisation of the European institutions and society (at +21.9 on the 'libertarian-authoritarian' dimension).

FIGURE 5.7. Policy Positions at the December 1993 Brussels European Council

The December 1993 Brussels European Council consequently approved the Commission “White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment”. Of the eleven-page Presidency Conclusions, the first eight were devoted to this subject. Some of the proposals from the PES’s Larsson Report were included in the Conclusions, such as new procedures for co-ordinating national action to combat long-term unemployment. However, the bulk of the European Council’s proposals were ‘free market’ oriented, such as: stable

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monetary policies to combat inflation; a further opening up of international trade; and the creation of a low-tax environment to encourage small and medium-sized enterprises. The European Council also refused to address the ELDR demands for a democratisation of the European institutions in parallel to the employment strategy.\(^6^8\)

Consequently, as Figure 5.7 shows, the policy position of the December 1993 Brussels European Council Conclusions ("X") was close to the EPP. Theoretically, without the largest party being inside the pareto-set of the party system, a core party no-longer existed. In practice, however, the EPP again managed to secure an agreement that was very close to its ideal position. Interestingly, moreover, unlike the Luxembourg and Maastricht agreements in 1991, the difference between the EPP position and the output of this European Council was not in the direction of a log-rolling agreement between the PES and the ELDR. This suggests, therefore, that although the PES was now the largest proportion of the European Council, and had begun to organise specifically for this meeting as early as September 1993, it was unable to break the pivotal influence of the EPP. It also suggested that the EPP was beginning to bargain with the non-attached parties of the Right rather than with the PES.

5.3.7. **Essen, 9-10 December 1994: Towards the 1996 IGC**

However, this pivotal influence of the EPP would be really put to the test at the next European Council when party leaders' meetings were held in the build-up. By the Essen European Council on 9-10 December 1994 the party-political make-up had further shifted away from the Christian Democrats and towards the Socialists: eleven PES,\(^6^9\) five ELDR,\(^7^0\) three EPP,\(^7^1\) and six other Right-wing politicians from parties that were not attached to any of the party federations.\(^7^2\) The Socialist thus constituted almost 45% of all the participants, whereas the EPP had fallen to 12%. The topics for the Essen European Council were the various items on the long-term agenda of the EU: the implementation of the employment initiative: macro-economic co-ordination in EMU; North-South and East-West relations within the EU; the

\(^{68}\) See *Agence Europe*, 12 December 1993, pp. 1-15.

\(^{69}\) Mitterrand, Kok (PvdA), Rasmussen, Papandreou, González, Vandenbroucke (SP), Poos, Spring, Papoulias, Solana Madariaga, Delors.

\(^{70}\) Cavaço Silva, Kinkel, Van Mierlo (D'66), Petersen, Durão Barroso.

\(^{71}\) Dehaene, Kohl, Santer.

\(^{72}\) Berlusconi (FI), O'Hearn (FF), Major, Juppé, Martino (FI), Hurd.
application of the agreement on subsidiarity; and the agenda of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. There was thus unlikely to be any concrete policy decisions, but the Essen meeting would set the guidelines of long-term action in a number of key areas.

In preparation for this potentially crucial meeting, the ELDR Council adopted a resolution, with the backing of the party leaders, from a special meeting in Paris on 6 December 1994. The list of ELDR demands for the medium- and long-term agenda for the EU again included a radical democratisation of the European institutions - "the issue of democratic accountability of the Union’s political institutions should be central in the 1996 IGC" - and a European economic strategy that emphasises liberalisation rather than state direction.73 This was thus a classic Liberal combination of 'free market' economics (+11.1 on the first socio-economic dimension) and 'libertarian' social and political values (+25.0 on the second dimension).

The PES leaders' meeting was held on 7-8 December 1994 in Essen - in the same building as the European Council gathering on the following day. The Socialist leaders welcomed enlargement of the EU to Austria, Finland and Sweden. They also argued that because enlargement would lead to more Socialists in the European Council (with the SPÖ and SAP in government, and the expected victory of the SDP in the forthcoming Finnish elections) there was a real opportunity for a Social Democrat medium-term agenda in the EU.74 The Leaders' Declaration stated that the main elements of this agenda would be: a combination of private and public investment to improve productive capacity; a long-term European investment programme; an expansion of social services; co-operation between the social partners; new policies to protect the environment; and a common approach to combat racism and xenophobia.75 This was again a clearly 'interventionist' position (-21.6 on the economic issues), but also a more 'liberal' social programme than many previous PES positions (+16.9 on socio-political issues).

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74 See Agence Europe, 9 December 1994, pp. 3-4.
75 Party of European Socialists (1994) "Party Leaders' Summit Meeting: Final Declaration", PES party leaders' meeting, Essen, 7-8 December 1994.
The EPP heads of government and party leaders subsequently met on 8 December 1994, in Brussels. They agreed, however, that they would not adopt a common position on the forthcoming European Council. Instead, the Christian Democrat leaders decided that they needed an open exchange of views on the agenda of the EU, without the pressure to adopt a declaration (rather like the Socialist leaders' meeting at Arrábida). As the official minutes of the meeting reveal, concern was expressed about the relative minority position of the EPP in the European Council.\(^76\) In response to the concern of particularly the Dutch and Italian parties, however, Kohl, Santer and Dehaene promised that the positions taken by their governments in the 1996 IGC would be closely co-ordinated with the policies of the EPP party federation. Moreover, in a concluding comment to the gathering, Chancellor Kohl (the chair if the forthcoming European Council) assured the Christian Democrat leaders that the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty had taught the EU that no fundamental changes could be made by the European Council without the "broadest possible support". Kohl thus implied that he was eager to bring together the Christian Democrats in government and opposition, and to seek the approval of the other parties on the Right that were not members of the EPP.

Finally, the Committee of the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) issued a statement from a special meeting in Essen on 8 December 1994. Although there would not be any Green representatives in the Essen European Council, this was the first EFGP declaration directed specifically at a European Council. This hence indicated the Green federation's intention to copy the strategy of the more established Euro-parties. The EFGP statement called on the European Council to fundamentally change the institutional structure of the EU in the interests of 'democracy' and 'peace', and to undertake a common programme to protect the environment and reduce unemployment.\(^77\) This was thus moderately 'interventionist' on economic issues (-5.6), but radically 'libertarian' on political questions (+47.2).

As Figure 5.8 shows, however, the increased strength of the PES did not enable the Socialist federation to impose its views on the outcome of the Essen European Council. The

\(^76\) European People's Party (1994) "Compte rendu de la Conférence des Chefs de Gouvernement et de Parti du PPE", EPP party leaders' meeting, Brussels, 8 December 1994. Also see Agence Europe, 10 December 1994, p. 4.

movement from the Brussels to the Essen European Councils (shown by the two X's) suggests, nevertheless, that there was a reduction in the influence of the EPP. This hence supports the interpretation that without being in the core of the system and with only three representatives, the EPP could no-longer secure its ideal position. However, the position of the Essen agreement was still closer to the EPP than to any of the other parties, perhaps because Chancellor Kohl was the chair of the Essen meeting. And significantly, the movement from the Brussels to the Essen agreement was into the 'core' of the EPP-ELDR-Non-Attached Right coalition, rather than into the area of a EPP-PES-ELDR coalition (as had been the agreements at Luxembourg and Maastricht). This hence confirmed a shift in the dynamics of the European party system, away from the stable 'triangular relationship' between the EPP, ELDR, and PES of the previous four years, and towards a dominant Centre-Right bloc.

FIGURE 5.8. Policy Positions at the December 1994 Essen European Council

In sum, therefore, the application of policy-driven coalition theories to party federation behaviour in the European Council suggests that when the party federations pursued a deliberate organisational strategy (of holding leaders’ meetings close to European Councils)
they were able to influence EC/EU policy-making. A further finding, however, was that the position of the EPP was a substantial determinant of political outcomes. If the Christian Democrat party federation was in the core of the system it was able to enforce its agenda on the other parties. However, the EPP was also pivotal in any agreements even when it was no-longer the largest party or was outside the core: as was shown in the Brussels and Essen European Council. However, after the fall in the strength of the EPP, the Christian Democrats were able to keep a central position through a new policy-alliance with the non-attached parties of the Right. This enabled the EPP to resist the numerical dominance of the PES.

Nevertheless, as with the regression analysis, there are some important limitations in the methodology used here. The coalition theories have been used to make some general *a posteriori* interpretations of party behaviour in the European Council. However, we have *not* been able to determine the *exact* position of European Council decisions from the positions of the party federations. In all but the first two cases there would have been a cyclical effect if real majority voting had taken place. In addition, without also trying to model the positions of the national governments, derived from the various 'national interests', the party-political picture of European Council decision-making only tells part of the story. Moreover, a more accurate picture of party politics in the European Council would have been possible if we had also been able to measure the individual positions of the non-aligned parties. In the above analysis they were (as they were party of the Conservative family) assumed to be fairly homogenous. Moreover, the general location of the parties seems plausible given the British Conservative Government's submission on the Commission White Paper on Employment, which was more 'free market' than the Liberals and moderately 'authoritarian' on socio-political issues.78

The purpose of this analysis, however, was *not* to model (and predict) European Council decisions to a high degree of accuracy. The aim was simply to analyse whether there was *any* connection between the policy positions of (and alliances between) the party federations and European Council outputs - given that this was the explicit reason for

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organising party leaders’ meetings close to the EC/EU summits. For this purpose, therefore, the methodology is sufficient.

5.4. Conclusion: Limited Policy Rewards from Changing Party Strategies

In general, therefore, the total impact of the party federations on European Council decision-making between 1975 and 1995 was negligible. In the application of the agenda-setting theory, there was a significant correlation between changes in party emphasis and concomitant changes in European Council positions in only one policy area: ‘internal market’. However, this was a core issue on the main dimension of party competition in the domestic and European arenas: the ‘intervention-free market’ dimension. In contrast, the impact of party federation policy-making on European Council outputs on the main issue derived from the national/territorial cleavage (‘integration/supranationalism’) was practically zero. Consequently, the impact of the parties on the EU agenda was small, but was concentrated on the issues about which they were most concerned.

Furthermore, the agenda-setting models did not apply equally to each party federation. Without taking the representational or organisational strengths of the parties into account, none of the party federations had a significant impact on more than a few policy issues. In contrast, increases in the numbers of Socialist and Christian Democrat representatives in the European Council produced concomitant increases in the influence of the CSP/PES and EPP. With low levels of representation, however, changes in the number of Liberal representatives did not increase or reduce the impact of the ELD/ELDR. Finally, the level of party organisation around the European Council across the whole period only had a clear effect for the CSP/PES.

Nevertheless, when all three party federations held party leaders’ meetings in close temporal (and sometimes physical) proximity to a European Council, the ‘Presidency Conclusions’ closely reflected the “balance of party forces” on socio-economic policy issues. In other words, when European Council decisions touched on the policy issues that mattered to the party federations - the socio-economic policy questions that are the basis of party
competition for the key political offices in the EU system (the domestic governments) - they were only able to influence EU policy-making by changing their internal and external organisational strategies. This was clearly illustrated in the application of the coalition theories to six of the European Councils since 1990; where the triangular relationship between the EPP, the CSP/PES and the ELD/ELDR was the central dynamic of the EU party system. Notably, moreover, the pivotal party-actor in these meetings was the EPP, which was able to secure outcomes close to its ideal position even when it was no-longer the largest party and/or was no-longer in the 'core' of the system.

Despite these findings, it is necessary to point out some limitations of the two methods used in this analysis: regression techniques do not establish causation; and when the largest party is not in the pareto-set, coalition theory cannot predict a stable (Nash) equilibrium. It is impossible, therefore, to draw firm inferences from the findings in this chapter. Nevertheless, the research concentrated on the 'descriptive' rather than the 'interpretative' elements of the methods: the facility of linear regression to summarise large amounts of data; and the use of spatial game theory to compare 'posited' and 'revealed' outcomes. This strategy thus enabled the methodological constraints to be kept to a minimum.

In general, therefore, the results at least partially confirm the proposition that there should be a correlation between the level of party federation organisation around European Council meetings and the level of party-political impact on European Council decision-making. However, as with most political science research, more evidence is necessary for the theoretical framework to be convincingly confirmed or refuted.
Chapter 6

Comparative Politics and EU Parties: Empirical and Theoretical Conclusions

As discussed in the Preface, the research has empirical as well as theoretical implications. Firstly, in testing the specific propositions in Chapter 2, the research provides a particular explanation of party development in the European Union (EU) between 1974 and 1995. This empirical conclusion is discussed in Section 6.1. Secondly, the primary theoretical contribution of the research is in the proposition and application of a 'comparative politics approach' to the study of the EU. Within this framework, moreover, a subsidiary theoretical contribution is to the general study of party development in political systems where 'party government' does not exist. As in most comparative-political research, therefore, the research seeks to advance the understanding of a particular case in comparative politics (politics in the EU system) and of a general phenomenon in comparative politics (the development of political parties). These theoretical conclusions are tackled in Section 6.2.


In Chapter 1, three ‘phases’ of party development were described: ‘optimism’ (1969-1979); ‘stagnation’ (1979-1990); and ‘renaissance’ (1990 onwards). The application of the “comparative politics theory of parties in the EU” in the preceding empirical chapters consequently offers a particular explanation of why these periods exist. The details of this explanation are set out in Table 6.1.
### TABLE 6.1. Three Phases of Party-Political Development in the EU System

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<td>Socio-Economic Policy-Making</td>
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<td>internal market by 1992</td>
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<td>1st enlargement</td>
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<td>economic and social cohesion</td>
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<td>Lomé Convention</td>
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<td>budget reform/Structural funds</td>
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<td><strong>Basic Principles</strong></td>
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<td>centre vs periphery nations</td>
<td>high intra-party competition:</td>
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<td>Right/Fr-mkt:</td>
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<td>(higher in CSP,ELD,Cons)</td>
<td>high intra-party competition:</td>
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<td>2.'pro' elites/anti' rank-and-file</td>
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As Table 6.1 illustrates, the first phase of party-political development began at the end of the 1960s and finished after the first direct elections to the European Parliament (EP). In this period the 'consensual' system of European Community (EC) decision-making was established, whereby for several years European integration progressed through a series of 'intergovernmental bargains'. The basic features of the Common Agricultural Policy had been established in 1962, the Merger Treaty (which created a single set of institutions for the three Communities) had come into effect in 1967, and the Customs Union had been completed in 1968. However, it was the 1969 Summit of EC Heads of Government, in the Hague, that launched a new phase of institutional development. In this period of institutional establishment, the main issues on the EC agenda where the 'national/territorial' questions relating to "system-building": such as the size of individual Member States' contributions to the EC budget; the development of an EC foreign policy; and the definition of the territorial boundaries of the system (i.e. enlargement).

The crucial event for parties, however, was the 1969 commitment to hold direct elections to the EP. This commitment, and the subsequent decisions in 1972 and 1974, created the first real incentive for party organisations to be established at the European level. Between 1974 and 1976, the three main party federations were thus launched as "electoral campaigners": to draft common election manifestos, and co-ordinate the European election campaigns. However, even if the EP elections would have been able to change the direction of EC legislation, European level policy-making (on national/territorial questions) was unlikely to interfere with domestic party competition. There was thus no incentive for parties to go beyond basic policy principles, nor to enforce these positions on the party actors in the European institutions.

As Chapter 3 found, therefore, the internal organisations of the party federations in this early period were centred on the International Sections of the domestic parties. In the build up to the first elections to the EP in 1979, domestic party leaders increasingly participated in party federation activities, but only for photo-opportunities or to ensure that the party federations would not be an embarrassment in the domestic election campaigns. Consequently, the only external links to the EC institutions were the weak relationships with the Party Groups in the
EP. Moreover, as was discovered in Chapter 4, little effort was made in this early period to establish common policy positions: the election manifestos and political programmes concentrated on domestic issues, rather than on issues on the EC agenda. Rival territorial interests within the same political families also prevented the parties from taking (legitimate) decisions by majority rule, and undermined any attempts to enforce manifesto commitments on the member parties or the EP Groups. Party competition at the European level in the first period was thus less between the party federations (inter-party competition) than between the different domestic parties within each of the new party organisations (intra-party competition). Only the EPP was able to be openly pro-integration without provoking serious internal splits.

The second phase of party development in the EU began in 1979 and finished some time between 1989 and 1990. This phase coincided with the emergence of the 'functional/regulatory system' of EC decision-making. A relatively stable set of political functions were established at the European level: of macro-economic stabilisation (through EMS management); co-ordination of Member State action in the area of foreign policy (through the EPC framework); and limited territorial economic redistribution (through the Common Fisheries Policy, the CAP and the Structural Funds). The domestic State, in contrast, maintained control of the bulk of public policy-making, and was responsible for the transposition and implementation of the EC legislative framework. However, a further new development was the emergence of 'regulatory governance' at the European level: in areas such as state aids, environmental regulation, health and safety at work, and rules for the Single Market. Consequently, with the new EC social and environment policies and the macro-economic management function, European level politics began to touch on some classic 'Left-Right' issues. However, the bulk of decisions still concerned interests defined territorially rather than in socio-economic terms.

In this second period, the adoption of framework legislation at the European level on several issues in domestic party politics was a new incentive for parties to seek to influence EC policy-making. For several reasons, however, there was a delay between the impact of EC policy-making on domestic party competition, and the response of party leaders. Firstly, socioeconomic issues (which pitched one party family against another) were still significantly
less salient that questions of 'national interest' (which pitched parties from one Member State against parties from another). As a result, the cost of ignoring EC-level decisions in party competition for domestic government office was low. Secondly, the emergence of the new EC regulatory frameworks was broadly outside the realm of domestic party competition in the mid-1980s. The development of the functions of the 'regulatory state' at the European level paralleled the growth of regulatory regimes in domestic European government. Parties were thus not interested in influencing EC decision-making in areas where they were voluntarily reducing their influence in the domestic arena.

As Chapter 3 found, therefore, the internal and external organisation of the party federations in this second period was dominated by the interests of the Groups in the EP. With the new financial authority of the EP Groups, the EC parliamentary elites had a virtual monopoly on economic and informational resources in the party federations. In contrast, the International Sections of the domestic parties (the main participants in the executive bodies of the party federations) were caught between the activism of the MEPs and the intransigence (and ignorance of EC affairs) of the domestic party leaderships. The lack of necessity for common positions, and the dominance of territorial issues on the EC agenda, undermined any efforts by the EP Groups to use the party federation frameworks to develop policy initiatives. Moreover, as Chapter 4 found, when policies were presented in the European arena there was a high level of uncertainty and instability. This was a combination of sporadic interjections by domestic party elites into EC party positions, and a general policy uncertainty of many domestic parties in the 1980s on economic policy issues (which particularly afflicted the Socialist and Christian Democratic party families). However, the dominance of the EP party elites and the International Sections (which by now had "gone native") ensured that all three party federations were generally in favour of European integration in this period: thus a "pro-integration Grand Coalition". This led to a new dimension of intra-party conflict in the CSP and ELDR (between pro-integration European-level elites and ambivalent rank-and-file members). Divisions between pro- and anti-integration member parties only persisted in the Socialist federation.

However, a third phase of party-political development in the EU began between 1989 and 1990, in the build up to the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) that negotiated the
Treaty on European Union (TEU). In terms of changes in the institutional environment, the functional division of authority in the EC/EU system was not fundamentally altered from the second phase: with European-level decisions only setting general policy boundaries. The difference in the third phase, however, was that EU policy-making increasingly encroached on domestic party socio-economic policy choices. For example, domestic economic policies began to be constrained by: the 'convergence criteria' for Economic and Monetary Union, and the subsequent 'macro-economic surveillance'; the provisions under the Social Chapter and the Social Action Programmes for common minimum social standards; the common programme for 'growth, competitiveness and employment'; and the new EU competences on industrial policy, infrastructure development and consumer protection. However, for the first time, constraints were also imposed on domestic party policies on socio-political issues; as when the EU tackled: immigration policy and 'law and order' issues under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar; a common policy to combat racism and xenophobia; environmental and morality issues such as genetic engineering and animal rights; and the question of 'open government' at the European-level. Consequently, although national/territorial questions were still a central part of European-level politics, they were increasingly rivalled by classic Left-Right questions that constitute the central dimension of party competition in the domestic arena. For the first time, therefore, parties holding domestic government office were forced to moderate policy promises (such as reducing the level of unemployment) as a result of EU policy-making. Moreover, parties in opposition (who seriously sought domestic political office) began to recognise the electoral costs of not acknowledging the constraints imposed by EU decisions.

As the constraints were progressively imposed in the late 1980s, most party leaders preferred to ignore the reality of the situation. However, the vital catalyst for the transformation of party leaders’ attitudes was the preparation of the Treaty on European Union. Firstly, parties in government, and parties hoping to win office, would be directly affected by the output of the IGC. Secondly, the IGCs and the TEU became important issues in domestic party competition. With basic economic and social policy implications, the ratification of the Treaty would not be like a simple parliamentary stamp-of-approval for an ‘international agreement’. Moreover, in most cases the ratification required the support of opposition parties,
and many party leaders faced members of their own parties who refused to recognise the constraints of the EU system. On the one hand, therefore, governing parties were eager to find arguments for their European positions based on party-political logics. On the other hand, opposition parties were eager at least to break the governing parties' monopolies on information about EU decision-making, and at most to shape the drafting of the TEU.

It is my contention, therefore, that the party federations were the only appropriate vehicles available to channel these demands: the Groups in the EP had no access to the IGCs or the crucial European Councils; and the institution of the "party leaders' meeting" within each of the party federations was the perfect arena for co-ordinating action and exchanging information between domestic party leaderships. As was discovered in Chapter 3, the party leaders' meetings emerged as the central organs of parties at the European level: the supreme decision-making bodies in the internal workings of the parties; and the key party body for scrutinising the behaviour of the party actors in the EP, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the European Council. Consequently, during the negotiation and ratification of the Single European Act (from June 1983 to July 1987) there were eleven European Councils and only twenty-one party leaders' meetings. In stark contrast, during the Maastricht Treaty process (from June 1989 to November 1992) there were thirteen European Councils and thirty-six party leaders' meetings, twenty-three of which were held in close (temporal) proximity to a European Council. In addition, whereas in the early 1980s less than 60% of party leaders took time out of domestic part competition to attend the party leaders' meetings (preferring to send a junior figure, such as the International Secretary), in the early 1990s this had risen to an average of 90% at every meeting. A significant implication of the Maastricht Treaty process, therefore, was that the party leaders' meetings found a stable place in the EU system: of providing the party federations with a "cyclical presence" in parallel to the cyclical setting of the medium-term EU agenda in the European Council.1

As was discovered in Chapter 4, these organisational changes proceeded in parallel with the growth of party policy at the European level: a greater number of policy declarations

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were issued; they were more detailed than at any previous time; and they specifically addressed the agenda of the European Council. Moreover, after the incoherence of policy positions in the mid-1980s - mostly as a result of the conflicts between domestic and EP positions - in the early 1990s the main party federations began to present stable positions. These positions represented three coherent ‘world views’ of EU policy action: with the PES moderately ‘interventionist’ and ‘libertarian’; the EPP centrist on both socio-economic policy dimensions’; and the ELDR moderately ‘free market’ and ‘libertarian’. The parties also minimised their competition on the internally divisive national/territorial issues by all being cautiously in favour of EU ‘integration’. The result of this structure of socio-economic policy competition was a ‘triangular party system’, where the core alliances were: PES-EPP on ‘intervention’ issues; PES-ELDR on ‘libertarian’ issues’; and EPP-ELDR on ‘free market’ issues. By concentrating on these Left-Right issues, intra-party divisions between different member parties were kept to a minimum. The price for this strategy, however, was the growth of intra-party divisions in all the party federations between the unanimously pro-integration domestic and EP party leaderships (the elites) and the more sceptical rank-and-file party members.

However, these policy positions were by themselves of little use to the party leaders if they could not be translated into outputs from EU decision-making. In this third period, however, the party federations began to reap policy rewards from the European Council. As Chapter 5 revealed, when all the party federations held party leaders’ meetings in close proximity to a European Council, the ‘Presidency Conclusions’ reflected the balance of strengths and policy locations of the party federations. Consequently, the party federations were only able to secure any pay-offs when the (internal and external) organisational strategy of developing the party leaders’ meetings around the European Council was pursued in combination with a policy strategy of minimising competition on national/territorial issues while defining rival Left-Right agendas. A consequence of this pursuit of European Council policy, however, was that the EPP was increasingly forced to abandon the stable system of triangular alliances. When the number of Christian Democrats in the European Council fell after 1993, the EPP abandoned its pivotal position between the PES and the ELDR for a broad alliance with the non-attached parties of the Right (such as the British CP, the French RPR, the
Irish FF, and the Italian FI). The danger, however, was that the log-rolling within the triangular system, which facilitated a broad consensus for European Council policies, would be replaced by a ‘two-bloc’ division between the Centre-Left (PES/ELDR) and Centre-Right (EPP/Conservatives).

Nonetheless, the success of this strategy was indicated in the number of parties that joined the party federations who for many years had preferred to be independent: such as the Greek PASOK and the Italian PDS in the PES; the ‘social’ Liberal parties (such as RV and D’66) in the ELDR; and an increasing number of Conservative parties in the EPP. Moreover, whereas in the early and mid-1980s there was little incentive to prevent parties in government (who had already secured their primary office goal) to defect from the party federation positions, in the early 1990s parties in government participated in the work of the party federations at the same rate as opposition parties. PASOK joined the CSP while it was in government, the British and Danish Conservatives decided to sit with the EPP while they were in government, and after the election of Chirac as French President, the RPR began the process of joining the EPP. This thus implies that the party federations (and particularly the institutions of the party leaders’ meetings) offer an outlet for domestic party leaders to alleviate the constraints on government policy-making. For example, in the French Presidential election campaign, Chirac promised to reduce unemployment and to stick to the EMU convergence criteria. These potentially contradictory promises are unlikely to be fulfilled without parallel commitments at the European level, and by similar party leaders in the other EU Member States. The ‘Conference of Heads of Government and Party of the EPP’, which brings together the key Centre-Right actors at the domestic and European levels, is thus an ideal arena for the RPR to attempt to co-ordinate such a policy-framework.

Overall, therefore, the party federations have developed from “transnational election umbrellas” to “nascent party organisations in pursuit of policy goals”. However, this new structure of parties in the EU is still relatively weak. Firstly, this strategy has only been pursued for five or six years. Secondly, this structure of party federation organisation relies on the participation of the domestic party leaders; which may not be forthcoming if policy outputs from the European Council remain limited. Thirdly, the party federations are unlikely to be
able to break the monopoly of national governments as the 'gate-keepers' of the EU system: of controlling inputs onto the medium- and long-term EU agenda. In general, therefore, these constraints derive from the fact that parties in the EU system are ultimately dependent on their environment. The explanation of the three periods of party development in the EU is based on strategic choices by party leaders in response to changes in the institutional and strategic environment. In other words, under a different institutional and political configuration, the party federations could disappear! This is not so true of domestic parties.

There are some signs, nevertheless, that the party federations have begun to establish some independence. Firstly, the 'party article' (Article 138a) in the Treaty on European Union was a result of a joint initiative and implementation strategy by the three party federation Presidents. The legal basis of the article is unclear, but it is the first step towards a more secure legal and financial footing for the party federations. The article is particularly significant, moreover, as it may establish a rival source of legitimacy (and a parallel arena for bargaining) to the national governments. Secondly, the party federations have been able to secure at least limited policy outputs from the European Council through their voluntary action. In 1981, the Pridhams concluded that: "What stands out is whether the party federations in the EC remain as merely dependent variables of the integration process or begin to emerge as one of its active determinants". In the early 1990s, therefore, there are some signs that the party federations may be sufficiently active determinants to restrain institutional changes that would undermine the level of development they have reached so far. Consequently, the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference will be a test of this independence: whether the organisational strategies in the last IGCs can be repeated; and whether the party federations can use these strategies to secure greater party-policy outputs from EU decision-making, and to transform the 'party article' into a coherent framework of EU 'party law'.

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6.2. Theoretical Implications: The Particular Case and a General Phenomenon

In addition to these initial empirical conclusions, the research also has some theoretical implications. Firstly, the application of the 'comparative politics approach' contributes to the theoretical understanding of EU politics (the particular case under investigation). Secondly, and to a lesser extent, the thesis contributes to a general framework for studying party development in political systems where 'party government' does not exist (a general phenomenon in comparative politics research).

6.2.1. Towards a New Approach to EU Politics

As discussed in Chapter 1, the dominant 'paradigm' or 'research programme' for the study of politics in the EU was traditionally the International Relations (IR) approach. The basic assumption in this approach is either that the central actors in EU politics are the sovereign European nation-states, even if there is a recognition that their actions are sometimes constrained by non-state interests in the domestic and European arenas (in the Neo-Realist/Intergovernmentalist framework); or that EU politics is a complex interaction between nation-state and non-state interests (in the Liberal/Neo-Functionalist framework). The EU is thus either a case of 'international co-operation' (in the Neo-Realist variant) or 'supranational integration' (in the Liberal approach). In the IR interpretation, EU politics is hence essentially a conflict between 'territorial' interests - the "national interests" of the member states and/or the "European interests" of the supranational institutions - which are aligned on a single dimension according to whether they benefit from 'more' or 'less' integration or co-operation. With the dominance of national/territorial interests in this conception, the IR approach thus fundamentally treats the EU as a "Europe des patries": where 'patries' refers to the domestic and/or the European 'homelands'.

However, a diametrically opposing interpretation of EU politics has begun to emerge from scholars in the field of Comparative Politics: where 'comparative politics' is jointly defined by its method (comparison between political systems) and by its core theoretical subject

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3 In de Gaulle's infamous expression, however, 'patries' was only meant to refer to the persistence of the national identities.
(politics *within* political systems). In this interpretation, EU politics is a process whereby: political demands are channelled through a variety of organisations; decisions are made through a complex set of bargains mediated by a particular horizontal and vertical set of institutions; and policy is supplied through legislative outputs and public expenditures. In short, politics in the EU is not inherently different to politics in any 'polity' or 'system of governance'. Politics in most political systems is between rival 'socio-economic' interests. These interests are manifest as competing 'ideologies' (or 'world views'), which are articulated by political parties in the legislative and executive arenas of government. The centrality of political parties in this conception of politics leads to the presumption that "democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties".\(^4\) In the paradigmatic Comparative Politics approach, therefore, the EU is a "Europe *des partis*": where 'partis' refers to partisan interests, ideologies and/or organisations.\(^5\)

A transformation from a 'Europe of homelands' to a 'Europe of ideologies', from an IR to a Comparative Politics approach, would hence constitute a veritable "Copernican Change" in the way we interpret and analyse EU politics.\(^6\) The findings of the research suggest, however, that in reality politics in the EU is a complex mix of 'national/territorial' and 'partisan' ideologies and interests. Firstly, a significant proportion of economic, political and cultural interests coincide within the territories of the EU Member States. In other words, on the question of territorial economic redistribution (as under the Structural Funds) or on the issue of institutional design of the EU system, the average Frenchman believes he has more in common with another Frenchman than he does with a German, regardless of his socio-economic position. Moreover, these interests are articulated in EU decision-making by the national governments in the Council of Ministers and European Council, the national delegations in the Party Groups in the EP, and through the national affiliations of the European Commissioners.

The research thus found that the salience and persistence of this 'national/territorial' cleavage significantly undermined the development of the party federations. In terms of party organisation, the existence of 'national' party organisations, with their own independent

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interests and structures of loyalties, prevented the establishment of genuine hierarchical party leadership structures at the European level. In terms of party policy, moreover, territorial interests prevented the party federations from effectively competing on almost 50% of the issues in EU politics. Above all, however, the party federations have been patently unable to challenge (or even rival) the institutionalised system of articulation and representation based on these national and territorial divisions.

Secondly, nonetheless, in an increasing number of EU decisions, interests are aligned along socio-economic lines that cut across territorial differences. For example, on the redistribution of resources between social groups (as under the Social Action Programme or the convergence criteria for Economic and Monetary Union) or on the allocation of political values (as on environmental or anti-racism policies), members of the same social group in different member states tend to be of the same opinion, whereas different social groups in the same member state disagree. Moreover, these interests are increasingly articulated by transnational interest associations and the nascent transnational parties (the Party Groups in the EP as well as the party federations).

The research consequently found that the emergence of this socio-economic cleavage reinforced the party federations. Socio-economic issues are the defining questions of the European 'familles spirituelles'. These issues thus strengthened the 'party-political' identities of the party federations, and enabled them to be more clearly differentiated from each other. Moreover, this differentiation facilitated a growing 'capture' of the non-attached parties by the party federations. Many parties - such as the Conservatives, PASOK or the RV - that had remained independent from the party federations because they were uncomfortable with the party federation positions on 'national/territorial' issues (i.e. that they were too pro-integration), were increasingly eager to join the party federations once they began to focus on the socio-economic divisions between the party families. Consequently, it was on these socio-economic issues that the party federations were able to agree precise agendas for EU policy action, and to partially secure these positions in the European Council.

As a result, politics in the EU is essentially "des patries et des partis": of national and European interests, and party-political interests and ideologies. The IR approach may be
appropriate for understanding the national/territorial element of EU politics, but neither 'supranational integration' nor 'international co-operation' can adequately capture the essence of socio-economic politics. Similarly, a simple Comparative Politics approach (which uses theories from the study of 'classic' democratic systems) may be appropriate for understanding 'Left-Right' politics, but has problems conceptualising national/territorial conflicts (particularly under the non-majoritarian EU institutional structure). There is, however, a body of theory in Comparative Politics that has been developed for the particular purpose of studying 'non-classic' political systems: with cross-cutting territorial and ideological cleavages; and with non-majoritarian vertical and territorial institutions.

An appropriate 'research programme' could thus be developed from a combination of the Comparative Politics and IR frameworks. A contribution of this research is hence to an understanding of a particular element of EU politics: the interaction between European and domestic party competition, and how and why this interaction has begun to be channelled through the party federations. This may consequently help in explanations of particular events in EU politics. For example, a classic IR Neo-Realist approach can explain many of the "inter-state bargains" in the Maastricht Treaty. In this interpretation, the German Government was able to get its own way on the institutional provisions for Economic and Monetary Union because it had the least to lose from 'exiting' any agreement. However, Moravcsik admits that such a framework cannot explain what he calls the 'ideological' agreements in the Maastricht Treaty: such as the powers of the European Parliament, the provisions on EU citizenship, and the Social Chapter. My contention is that these are 'socio-economic' questions that can only be understood by integrating a theory of the interaction between domestic party policy commitments and political action in the European arena. These ideological issues are central in domestic party competition. Parties hence are interested to secure outcomes that accord with the positions on these issues in their programmes and election manifestos. An indication of this was that these issues were key elements of the Declarations from the party leaders' meetings immediately prior to the Maastricht European Council. As a result of this interaction,

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the outcome in the Maastricht Treaty on these so-called ‘ideological’ questions was less a result of an inter-state bargain than a serious of “inter-party bargains”: where the PES and EPP supported the Social Chapter; the PES and ELDR supported EU citizenship; and the EPP and ELDR supported increased EP powers.

In sum, the research does not claim to have developed a coherent new approach to replace the traditionally dominant IR research programme. Unless one accepts a pure Kuhnian interpretation, this project can only proceed through incremental steps. As Lakatos points out:

One may, of course, show up the degeneration of a research programme, but it is only constructive criticism which, with the help of rival research programmes, can achieve real successes; and dramatic spectacular results become visible only with hindsight and rational reconstruction.8

If anything, therefore, the thesis claims to have proposed a possible rival approach and to have applied this framework in empirical research. It remains to be seen as to whether the ‘comparative politics approach’ can produce “dramatic results” in other research areas.

6.2.2. Party Development Without ‘Party Government’

For this to be a genuine example of a ‘comparative politics approach’, however, the research findings must also contribute to an understanding of a general phenomenon in comparative politics: which in this case is the development of political parties in systems where parties are not the central actors in the political process. As discussed in Chapter 2, the two ‘classic’ frameworks for analysing party development emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. Firstly, initially derived from the work of Duverger, the institutional model posits that parties develop in response to the changing structure of the institutions of government (such as the electoral system or the structure of legislative-executive relations). This approach thus focuses on the ‘institutional’ environment. Alternatively, from the work of Lipset and Rokkan, the ideological (or cleavage) model argues that parties develop as a result of changes in societal and ideological

divisions in the electorate (such as the salience of the 'class cleavage'). This approach thus focuses on the 'strategic' environment.

However, most contemporary theories of party development add several assumptions about how parties behave within these structural constraints. This combination of behavioural and structural assumptions in an integrated theory of party development is part of the current trend in political science away from the reductionist agency- or structure-biased approaches of the early Rational Choice and Structural-Functionalist approaches towards the contemporary 'New Institutionalist' vogue. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the basic elements of most of the self-proclaimed New Institutional approaches are that: actors form preferences endogenously to the political process; they have imperfect information about their institutional or strategic environments, that they constantly upgrade; their behaviour is thus constrained by external commitments, decision-making rules, and past and future commitments; but under certain circumstances they are able to alter these constraints. These are consequently the underlying assumptions in this research: where domestic and European party leaders are goal-oriented actors within the constraints of the EU institutional and sociological/ideological environment.

Nevertheless, there have been few attempts to apply and test this contemporary approach to parties in 'classic' and 'non-classic' institutional and strategic environments. Most comparative research on political parties focuses on the traditional cases, such as Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries, and the Scandinavian countries. However, the theoretical findings of these projects are often difficult to apply in systems with radically different institutional and ideological/cultural configurations: such as in Switzerland, the United States, Canada, the South American states, or in the nascent European Union polity. A few projects have attempted to build more general theoretical frameworks, to apply to all cases where parties exist. However, these projects also often produce theories that 'best fit' the classic cases of 'party government'. For example, the EC was included in a recent comparative study of party organisations, but the conclusion was that it did not really fit with the general methodological and theoretical framework of the project.9

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9 See L. Bardi (1994) "Transnational Party Federations, European Parliamentary Party Groups, and the Building of Europarties", in Katz & Mair (eds) *ibid*. It is perhaps significant that Switzerland was not included in the party organisations project.
Consequently, a significant methodological constraint on the emergence of a general theoretical framework for the study of party development is that systems where parties are not the dominant political actors are invariably measured against the ideal of ‘party government’. ‘Party government’ exists when: decisions are made by elected party officials or by those under their control; policy is decided within parties, which act cohesively to enact it; and officials are recruited, and held accountable through parties.\(^\text{10}\) However, ‘party government’ is fundamentally dependent upon a particular set of institutional and political rules that produce a high level of “partyness of government”.\(^\text{11}\) Party government is thus only found where: the vertical (unitary) and horizontal (parliamentary) rules of the game are majoritarian; and where the cleavage structure can be approximated into a single dimension of political conflict (a Left-Right). Consequently, ‘party government’ is an ideal type that exists in a restricted set of systems (which are mostly European), and in a particular period of political history (the era of the ‘modern political party’ within the sovereign ‘nation-state’).\(^\text{12}\)

Nonetheless, even where the model of party government does not apply, parties operate with exactly the same goals and ambitions as parties in classic majoritarian parliamentary systems. The three requirements for an “ideal party” (as defined in the party government project) - “cohesive team behaviour; orientation towards winning control over ... political power; and claiming legitimacy on the basis of electoral success”\(^\text{13}\) - exist in Switzerland and the United States. However, neither case has ‘party government’ in the strict sense. If comparative political research is to explain political parties in non-classic cases, therefore, party development cannot be measured against this ideal type. Rather, a theory of party development needs to be based on general theoretical propositions about how party leaders react under any conditions, that can be subsequently compared against behaviour within particular constraints. In this framework, theory is deductively proposed from basic assumptions rather than inductively developed on the basis of the majority of the observed cases (which in most

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\(^\text{11}\) ibid., pp. 45-6.


\(^\text{13}\) Katz, op. cit., p. 40-2.
research are the classic parliamentary democracies in the European nation-states. For example, Strom integrates general behavioural assumptions with an analysis of the institutional constraints in three types of political systems to explain under what conditions political parties are ‘office-seeking’, ‘policy-seeking’ or ‘vote-seeking’.14

In this research, therefore, the party government model tells us that ‘party government’ is unlikely to exist in the EU because the EU system has a “low partyness”. Firstly, decision-makers in the EU institutions (the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the EP) may obtain their positions through party membership and party- competitive elections, and an increasing majority of these office-holders are members of the three main party federations. However, the behaviour of these partisan actors can be only weakly controlled by the party federations. Secondly, policy is increasingly developed within the party federations. However, the implementation of this policy relies on the voluntary adherence of the actors in the EU institutions rather than on the enforcement by the party federations. Finally, structures of party-political accountability have begun to emerge, through the constraints on the actors in the European Council presented by the party leaders’ meetings. However, these officials are held accountability primarily by their domestic party organisations rather than by the organisations of the party federations.

However, under the three requirements of the party government project, the party federations are “ideal political parties”: their behaviour in the EP and (in certain policy areas) in the European Council is cohesive; they seek to win control of the medium- and long-term agenda at the European level; and they claim legitimacy through the EP and national elections. Consequently, the measurement of the party federations against the ideal type does not explain how and why they developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s at least part-way towards the ‘party government’ model. A more general theory of party development, on the other hand, explains how the party federations evolved as policy-seeking party-political organisations without the existence of the classic institutions of European parliamentary democracy in the EU system. This approach shows that as long as the EP elections do not change the medium-term policy-direction of EU legislation, there is little incentive for the European party federations to

spend resources undermining the dominant role of national parties in these elections. In there activity around European Council meetings, in contrast, all the party federations actively sought to establish common positions, by a simple majority of the party leaders, and to encourage the member parties to abide by these positions. This dynamic organisational and policy strategy is thus grounded in the general office- and policy-motivations of the domestic party leaders within the particular EU institutional and strategic environment.

In other words, the thesis does not make a grandiose claim to have proposed a foolproof theory of party development that fits all institutional and strategic configurations. By focusing on the behaviour of parties in the extremely anti-party environment of the EU, however, the research can at least claim to make an incremental contribution to an understanding of political party change in a non-classic institutional setting. A fundamental constraint on conceptualising the role and development of parties in non-classic systems is that the objects of analysis are invariably poor approximations of their counterparts in any example of true 'party government'. This was the fatal mistake of the early scholars of parties in the EU. In the late 1970s it was fashionable to predict 'optimistically' that direct elections to the EP would usher in a new phase of "parties at the European level". By the mid-1980s, however, most scholars accepted 'pessimistically' that such a transformation was extremely unlikely. By using a general theory of party development, rooted in the theory and method of the field of comparative politics, this research thus hopes to have gone beyond this optimism/pessimism dichotomy, and to have provided a framework for understanding the forces behind the previous, the present, and the possible future development of parties in the EU system.

Appendices

Appendix A. Sources of Data

A.1. Primary Sources
The primary data for the research comes from: the 'statutes' and 'rules of procedure' of the party federations; the minutes and resolutions of the party congresses and leaders' meetings, and of several executive committee meetings; the party federation budgets; the Activities Reports of the Secretaries-General; and a number of Working Group reports. The research also involved collecting the general publications of the parties: the information booklets and PES-FAX-INFOs of the CSP/PES; the Vade-Mecums, Short Histories, ELDR Newsletters and press statements of the ELD/ELDR; the EPP Handbooks', Documentation Series, and EPP Bulletins of the EPP; and the press statements and European Greens Info Kit of the ECGP/EFGP. These primary sources were mainly obtained from the official archives of the party federations, which are in the party central offices in Brussels. Where documents were missing, they were obtained from the archives of the Party Groups in the EP (which are separate from the party federation collections), from the general European Parliament Library, and (in the case of the EPP) from the archives in the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn. The primary sources were also supplemented with over forty interviews of senior European and domestic party officials (in Britain, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and Italy) involved in the work of the party federations.

A.2. Secondary Sources
The main sources of secondary information on the party federations were Agence Europe and European Report, where every reference to 'parties' was collected from 1974 to 1995. These were supplemented with the annual articles on "Die europäischen Parteienzusammenschlüsse", in each of the Jahrbücher des Europäischen Integration. The data on who were the party leaders, to calculate the attendance records at the party leaders' meetings, was collected from Keesings Record of World Events and F. Jacobs (ed.) (1989) Western European Political Parties: A Comprehensive Guide, Harlow: Longman. Finally, the data on Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, to calculate the party-political make-up of the European Council, was obtained from Keesings Record of World Events; J. Woldendorp, H. Keman & I. Budge (eds) (1993) "Special Issue: Political Data 1945-1990, Party Government in 20 Democracies", European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 1-119; R. Koole & P. Mair (eds) (1992) "Special Issue; Political Data Yearbook, 1992", European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 347-547; and R. Koole & P. Mair (eds) (1993) "Special Issue; Political Data Yearbook, 1993", European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 361-572.
Appendix B. Key to Party Abbreviations

* = Party organisations no-longer in existence

B.1. Parties at the European Level

SOCIALISTS:
CSP* Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community
PES Party of European Socialists

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES:
EUCD European Union of Christian Democrats
EPP European People’s Party: Federation of Christian-Democratic Parties of the European Community*; and European People’s Party - Christian Democrats
EDU European Democratic Union

LIBERALS:
ELD* Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties in the European Community
ELDR Federation of Liberal, Democrat and Reform Parties of the European Community*; and European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party

GREENS:
ECGP* European Coordination of Green Parties
EFGP European Federation of Green Parties

B.2. Parties at the Domestic Level I - European Union States

MEMBER STATES IN 1974:

BELGIUM:
- FLEMISH:
AGA Anders Gaan Leven (AGALEV)
SP Socialistische Partij
PVV* Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang
VLD Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten
CVP Christelijke Volkspartij
- FRANCOPHONE:
ECO Ecolo
PS-B Parti Socialiste
PRLW* Parti des Réformes et de la Liberté de Wallonie
PLB* Parti Libéral Bruxellois
PRL Parti Réformateur Libéral
PSC Parti Social Chrétien

DENMARK:
DG De Grønne
SD Socialdemokratiet
V Venstre: Danmarks Liberale Parti
RV Det Radikale Venstre
CD Centrum-Demokraterne
KRF Kristelig Folkeparti
KF Det Konservative Folkeparti

FRANCE:
GE Generation Ecologie
V Les Verts
PS-F Parti Socialiste
PSR Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche
PRS* Parti Radical Socialiste
RAD Parti Radical
CDS-F Centre des Démocrates-Sociaux
UDF Union pour la Démocratie Française
PR Parti Républicain
RPR Rassemblement pour la République

GERMANY:
G Die Grünen
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union
CSU Christlich Soziale Union

IRELAND:
CG Comhaontas Glas
LP-I Labour Party
FF Fianna Fáil
PD Progressive Democrats
FG Fine Gael
ITALY:
FV Federazione dei Verdi
PDS Partito Democratico di Sinistra
PSI Partito Socialista Italiano
PSDI Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano
PRI Partito Repubblicano Italiano
PLI* Partito Liberale Italiano
FLI Federazione dei Liberali Italiani
Rad. Radicale
DC* Democrazia Cristiana
PPI Partito Populare Italiano
Patte Patto Segni
SVP Südtiroler Volkspartei (South Tyrol)
FI Forza Italia
AN Alleanza Nazionale

LUXEMBOURG:
GA/G Déi Gréng Alternative/Glei
POSL Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Luxembourgeois
DP Demokratesch Partei
PCS Parti Chrétien Social

JOINED AFTER 1974

GREECE: (From 1.81)
EA Ecologistes Alternatives
PASOK Panhellinio Socialistiko Kinema
EDEK* Enose Demokratikou Kentrou
HLP Hellenic Liberal Party
ND Nea Demokratia

PORTUGAL: (From 1.86)
OV Os Verdes
PS-P Partido Socialista
PSD Partido Social Demócrata
CDS-P Partido do Centro Democrático Social

SPAIN: (From 1.86)
- CENTRE:
LV Los Verdes
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español
PRD* Partido Reformista Democratico
CDS-S Centro Democrático y Social
FORO FORO
PDP* Partido Democràtia Popular
AP* Alianza Popular
PP Partido Popular

- REGIONS:
CDC Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (Cat.)
UDC Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (Catalan)
PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque)

B.3. Parties at the Domestic Level II - Non-European Union States

EU MEMBERSHIP PENDING:

CYPRUS:
EDEK Eniaia Demokratiki Enosis di Kendrou
DKO Demokratiki Komma
DISY Demokratikos Synagermos

MALTA:
AD Alternattiva Demokratika
MLP Partit tal Haddiemu
FDM Partit Demokratikko Malti
FN Partit Nazzjonalista
TURKEY:
SHP Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti
DYP Doğru Yol Partisi
AP Anavatan Partisi

MEMBERS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA:

ICELAND:
AF Alþhuduflokkur
FF Frasoknarflokkur
SF Sjálfstaedisflokkurin

LIECHTENSTEIN:
VU Vaterländische Union
FBP Fortschrittliche Bürgerpartie

NORWAY:
MG Miiljøpartiet de Grønne
DNA Det Norske Arbeiderparti
V Venstre
KrF Kristelig Folkeparti
H Høyre

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS

CZECH REPUBLIC:
CSSD Česká Strana Sociálově Demokratická
SD-OH Svobodná Demokratická-Občanské Hnutí
KDU Krestanská Demokratická Unie
KDS Krestanské Demokracie
ODA Občanské Demokratická Strana
ODS Občanské Demokratická Aliance

HUNGARY:
MSDP Magyarországi Szociál-demokrata Párt
MSZP Magyar Szocialista Párt
FIDISZ Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége
SZDSZ Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége
KDNP Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt
MDF Magyar Demokrata Forum
FKDP Független Kisgazda Párt

AGREEMENTS UNDER NEGOTATION:

BULGARIA:
BCP Bulgarian Green Party
BSDP Bulgarska Sozialdemokraticheska Partia
BPL Bulgarian Liberal Party
BANU Balgarski Zemedelski
OKZ Unified Democratic Centre
CDU-B Christian Democratic Union
DP Democratic Party
SDS Soyuz na Demokratichnite

CROATIA:
HSLS Hrvatska Socijalno Liberalna Stranka
HKDS Hrvatska Krškanska Demokratska Stranka
HDZ Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica

ESTONIA:
EGP Estonian Green Party
ESDP Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Partei
ELDP Estonian Liberal Democrat Party
EKLP ISAMAA-Pro Patria

LATVIA:
LSDP Latvijas Socialdemokrātiska Strādnieku Partija
KDS Christian Democratic Party

LITHUANIA:
LSDP Lietuvos Socialdemokratų Partija
LCM Lietuvos Centrų Sąjūdis
LLU Liberalų Sąjunga
LKDP Lietuvos Krikščionių Demokratų Partija
LC Tevynės Sąjunga
LDP Demokratu Partija

CZECH REPUBLIC:
PPS Polska Partia Socjalistyczna
UD Unia Deokratyczna
PC Porozumienie Obywatelskie Centrum
KLD Kongress Liberalno-Demokratyczny

SWITZERLAND:
PE Parti Ecologiste Suisse
SPS Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz/
Parti Socialiste Suisse
FDP-S Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei der Schweiz/
Parti Radical Suisse
CDV Christlich-Demokratische Volkepartei/
Parti Democrat chrétien
SVP Schweizerische Volkspartei/
Union Democratique du Centre

POLAND:
PPS Polska Partia Socjalistyczna
UD Unia Deokratyczna
PC Porozumienie Obywatelskie Centrum
KLD Kongress Liberalno-Demokratyczny
**SLOVAK REPUBLIC:**
- SSS Sociálndemokratická Strana na Slovensku
- MPP-MOS Magyar Polgári Párt-Madarska Obcianska Strana
- KDH Christian Democratic Movement
- MKDM Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement

**SLOVENIA:**
- ZS Zeleni Slovenije
- SDSS Socialdemokratska Stranka Slovenije
- LDS Liberalna Demokracij Slovenije
- SKD Slovenian Christian Democratic Party

**CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS:**

**ALBANIA:**
- PSD Parti Social-démocrate
- DP Democratic Party

**BOSNIA:**
- LSBH Liberal Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina

**FAROE ISLANDS:**
- FJF Føroya Javnadarflokkur
- TF Tjóðveldisflokkurin
- KFFK Kristeligt Folkeparti Framburds-Og Fiskivinnuflokkurin
- FF Folkaflokkurin

**ROUMANIA:**
- PD Partidul Democrat
- PSDR Partidul Social-Democrat Român
- PL Partidul Liberală
- PNT/CD Partidul National Taranesc-Crestind i Democrat
- RMDSZ Romania Magyar Demokrata Szovetseq

**ISRAEL:**
- ILP Israel Labour Party
- MPM United Workers’ Party of Israel

**MACEDONIA:**
- LPM Liberal Party of Macedonia

**SAN MARINO:**
- PSS Partito Socialista Sammarinese
- PDCS Partito Democratico Cristiano Sammarinese

**GEORGIA:**
- GG Georgian Greens
Appendix C. Party Federation and European Council Meetings, 1974-1994

S = Meeting of Socialist party leaders  
** = meeting held close to, and in the same venue as, a European Council  
CD = Meeting of Christian Democratic party leaders  
** = meeting held close to a European Council  
L = Meeting of Liberal party leaders  
G = Meeting of Green party leaders

26 November 1974  
9-10 December 1974  
10-11 March 1975  
16-17 July 1975  
1-2 December 1975  
18 January 1976  
26-27 March 1976  
1-2 April 1976  
12-13 July 1976  
5-7 November 1976  
29-30 November 1976  
25-26 March 1977  
29-30 June 1977  
18-20 November 1977  
5-6 December 1977  
6-7 March 1978  
7-8 April 1978  
23-24 June 1978  
6-7 July 1978  
2-3 December 1978  
4-5 December 1978  
11-12 January 1979  
22-23 February 1979  
12-13 March 1979  
21-22 June 1979  
29 June 1979  
29-30 November 1979  
15-16 February 1980  
24 February 1980  
3-4 March 1980  
27-28 April 1980  
12-13 June 1980  
1-2 September 1980  
1-2 December 1980  
23-24 March 1981  
27 April 1981  
12-14 June 1981  
29-30 June 1981  
26-27 November 1981  
29-30 March 1982  
7-8 May 1982  
28-29 June 1982  
12-13 November 1982  
3-4 December 1982  
6-8 December 1982  
21-22 March 1983  
20 April 1983  
17-19 June 1983  
3 October 1983  
26 November 1983

S - CSP Leaders' Meeting  
CD - 1st EPP Congress  
L - Constituent ELD Congress*  
S - 10th CSP Congress  
L - 2nd ELD Congress**  
CD - 2nd EPP Congress  
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting*  
CD - 1st EPP Congress  
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting*  
L - Constituent ELD Congress*  
S - 10th CSP Congress  
L - 1st ELD Congress  
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting  
L - 3rd ELD Congress*  
S - 11th CSP Congress  
European Council  
European Council  
L - 4th ELD Congress  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting  
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting  
European Council  
European Council  
L - 5th ELD Congress  
European Council  
European Council  
L - 6th ELD Congress  
European Council  
S - 12th CSP Congress  
European Council  
CD - 3rd EPP Congress  
European Council  
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting  
L - 5th ELD Congress  
European Council  
European Council  
L - 6th ELD Congress  
European Council  
S - 12th CSP Congress  
European Council  
CD - 4th EPP Congress*  
European Council  
L - ELD Leaders' Meeting  
European Council  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting*  
The Hague  
Paris  
Dublin  
Brussels  
Rome  
Helsingor  
Stuttgart  
Luxembourg  
Brussels  
The Hague  
The Hague  
Rome  
London  
Brussels  
Copenhagen  
Brussels  
Brussels  
Dublin  
Paris  
Strasbourg  
Paris  
Brussels  
Cologne  
Luxembourg  
Maastricht  
Amsterdam  
Copenhagen  
Luxembourg  
London  
Brussels  
Venice  
Paris  
Copenhagen  
Paris  
Brussels  
London  
Stuttgart  
Brussels  
Brussels
5-6 December 1983
9-10 December 1983
22 January 1984
8-9 March 1984
19-20 March 1984
31 March-1 April 1984
2-4 April 1984
12-13 May 1984
1 June 1984
23 June 1984
25-26 June 1984
3-4 December 1984
22 March 1985
29-30 March 1985
9-10 April 1985
13 April 1985
23 April 1985
5-7 June 1985
19-20 June 1985
28-29 June 1985
9 November 1985
2-3 December 1985
1 March 1986
10-11 April 1986
10-12 April 1986
26-27 June 1986
3 October 1986
5-6 December 1986
4-5 March 1987
27 March 1987
1-3 April 1987
30 May 1987
29-30 June 1987
23 October 1987
4-5 December 1987
11-12 February 1988
14 March 1988
8-9 April 1988
30 May 1988
10 June 1988
27-28 June 1988
19 October 1988
6-7 November 1988
7-8 November 1988
2-3 December 1988
8-9 December 1988
10 February 1989
11-12 March 1989
10 April 1989
26-27 June 1989
28-29 June 1989
14 November 1989
8-9 December 1989
8-9 February 1990
17 February 1990
17 February 1990
23-24 March 1990
28 April 1990

European Council
L - 7th ELD Congress*
L - ELD Leaders' Meeting
S - 13th CSP Congress*

European Council
G - 1st ECGP Congress
CD - 5th EPP Congress
L - 8th ELD Congress
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting
L - ELD Leaders' Meeting*

European Council
G - 2nd ECGP Congress

European Council
S - 14th CSP Congress
L - ELD Leaders' Meeting
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting
L - 9th ELD Congress
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting**

European Council
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting

European Council
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting

European Council
L - ELDR Leaders' Meeting

European Council
S - 15th CSP Congress
G - 3rd ECGP Congress
L - 11th ELDR Congress
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting

European Council
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting

European Council
L - ELDR Leaders' Meeting

European Council
G - 4th ECGP Congress
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting*

European Council
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting
CD - 7th EPP Congress

European Council
L - 12th ELDR Congress*
S - 16th CSP Congress
G - 5th ECGP Congress
L - ELDR Leaders' Meeting

European Council
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting*
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting

European Council
S - 17th CSP Congress
L - ELDR Leaders' Meeting
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting

European Council

Athens
Munich
Stuttgart
Luxembourg
Brussels
Liège
Rome
Brussels
Brussels
Rome
Fontainbleau
Dublin
Dover
Brussels
Madrid
Copenhagen
Luxembourg
Groningen
Rome
Milan
Brussels
Luxembourg
The Hague
Catania
The Hague
Hamburg
London
Lisbon
Stockholm
Lisbon
Brussels
Brussels
Paris
Copenhagen
Brussels
Turin
Antwerp
Bonn
Rome
Hanover
Brussels
Berlin
Luxembourg
Rhodes
Luxembourg
Brussels
Paris
Copenhagen
Madrid
Paris
Lisbon
Strasbourg
Berlin
Potsdam
Pisa
Vienna
Dublin
5 June 1990  
6-8 June 1990  
25-26 June 1990  
25 October 1990  
27-28 October 1990  
15-16 November 1990  
23 November 1990  
10 December 1990  
14-15 December 1990  
20 January 1991  
7 April 1989  
13 April 1991  
3 June 1991  
6-7 June 1991  
21 June 1991  
28-29 June 1991  
3 December 1991  
3-4 December 1991  
6 December 1991  
9-10 December 1991  
14 February 1992  
5 June 1992  
15-16 June 1992  
26-27 June 1992  
2-3 July 1992  
25 September 1992  
10 October 1992  
16 October 1992  
9-10 November 1992  
12-14 November 1992  
21-22 June 1993  
4-5 September 1993  
29 October 1993  
5-6 November 1993  
8-10 December 1993  
9 December 1993  
2 June 1993  
16 June 1993  
18-20 June 1993  
19-20 June 1993  
21-22 June 1993  
15 July 1994  
28-30 October 1994  
7-8 December 1994  
9 December 1994  
9-10 December 1994

S - CSP Leaders' Meeting**  
L - 13th ELDR Congress**  
European Council  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting*  
European Council  
CD - 8th EPP Congress  
L - ELDR Leaders' Meeting  
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting*  
European Council  
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting  
G - 6th ECGP Congress  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting  
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting**  
L - 14th ELDR Congress*  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting**  
European Council  
L - ELDR Leaders' Meeting*  
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting*  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting**  
European Council  
S - 1st PES Congress  
CD - 9th EPP Congress  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting*  
L - ELDR Leaders' Meeting*  
S - PES Leaders' Meeting**  
European Council  
L - 15th ELDR Congress*  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting*  
S - CSP Leaders' Meeting*  
European Council  
G - Inaugural EFGP Conference  
S - PES Leaders' Meeting**  
European Council  
S - PES Leaders' Meeting*  
European Council  
S - 2nd PES Congress  
CD - 10th EPP Congress  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting**  
S - PES Leaders' Meeting**  
L - 16th ELDR (Inaugural) Congress*  
European Council  
G - EFGP Council  
G - EFGP Manifesto Meeting  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting*  
S - PES Leaders' Meeting**  
European Council  
European Council  
G - 2nd EFGP Council  
S - PES Leaders' Meeting**  
CD - EPP Leaders' Meeting*  
European Council

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Appendix D. Coding Frame for Policy Analysis

D.1. Dimension 1: Intervention-Free Market

FREE MARKET

101 Open Market/Enterprise/Incentives
Favourable mention of private property; individual enterprise over state control; small businesses; wage and tax policies designed to induce enterprise.

103 Economic Efficiency and Productivity
Need for economic orthodoxy, e.g. balanced budget, low taxation, savings; support for Stock Market and banking systems; productivity.

105 Government Efficiency
Need for efficiency in government; cutting down on bureaucracy; improving government procedures; general appeal to make government and administration cheaper and effective.

107 Free International Trade/GATT
Favourable mention of principle of free trade; opposition to EU trade protectionism; support of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

109 Social Services/Education: Negative
As 109, but negative.

111 Labour Groups: Negative
Unfavourable reference to ‘labour’, working class, unemployed, poor; support for Trade Unions, free collective bargaining, fair treatment of manual and other employees.

113 Internal Market/Project 1992
Favourable mention of the Single Market; or ‘project 1992’; and support of the ‘four freedoms’: of people, goods, services and capital.

115 EC/EU Competition Policy
Support for EC/EU competition policy, based on free market criteria; opposition to creation of ‘Euro Champions’; support for an independent European ‘mergers agency’.

117 Economic ‘Convergence Criteria’
Favourable mention of ‘convergence criteria’ for EMU based on ‘economic’ indicators, such as interest rates, inflation rates, currency stability, and level of government debt.

INTERVENTION

102 Planned Economy/Employment
Favourable mention of economic planning, and nationalised industries; need for employment programmes; control over prices, wages, rents etc.

104 Social Protection/Regulation
Favourable mention of regulation to guarantee minimum social standards; and to make private enterprise work better; actions against monopolies.

106 Corporatism
Favourable mention of involvement of ‘social partners’ in economic planning; support for worker consultation and participation in management of firms.

108 Trade Protectionism
Favourable mention of extension or maintenance of tariffs, to protect internal markets; or other domestic (i.e. EC/EU) economic protectionism.

110 Social Services/Education: Positive
Favourable mention of need to maintain or expand welfare schemes; support for free basic social services; need to expand &/or improve education and technical training provision.

112 Labour Groups: Positive
As 111, but positive.

114 Social Charter/Chapter: Positive

116 Social ‘Convergence Criteria’
Favourable mention of ‘convergence criteria’ for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) based on ‘social’ indicators, such as levels of employment and standard of living.

118 International Development Aid
Support for increased EC/EU aid to Third World; separate line in EC budget for this purpose.
## D.2. Dimension 2: Libertarian-Authoritarian

### LIBERTARIAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>201 Freedom and Human Rights</strong></td>
<td>Favourable mention of importance of personal freedom, civil liberties; freedom of choice in education; freedom from bureaucratic control; freedom of speech; freedom from coercion in industrial and political sphere; individualism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>203 Democracy</strong></td>
<td>Favourable mention of democracy as method or goal in national, European or other organisations; support for involvement of all citizens in decision making; as well as generalised support for symbols of democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>205 Environmental Protection</strong></td>
<td>Favourable mention of preservation of countryside, forests etc.; general preservation of natural resources against selfish interests; proper use of national parks; soil banks, etc.; recycling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>207 Open Government</strong></td>
<td>Favourable mention of need for open and accountable institutions; increased public access to official documents; need to eliminate corruption in government; prosecution of government fraud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>209 Women and Minority Groups</strong></td>
<td>Favourable mention of the needs and rights of women; need to recognise the role of minority groups, such as ethnic groups, homosexuals, and handicapped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>211 Peace/Disarmament</strong></td>
<td>Declaration of belief in ‘Peace’ and peaceful means of solving problems; need for international disarmament; desirability of negotiating with hostile countries; opposition to military and defence spending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>213 European Union Citizenship</strong></td>
<td>Favourable mention of concept of European ‘citizenship’; right to freedom of movement of persons in the EU; right to vote and stand in elections in any EU Member State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>215 TREVI and Schengen: Negative</strong></td>
<td>Opposition to the TREVI group, of European interior ministers, and the Schengen Accord, particularly provisions for transnational police collaboration.</td>
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### AUTHORITARIAN

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<tr>
<td><strong>202 Traditional Morality</strong></td>
<td>Favourable mention of traditional morality, e.g. prohibition, censorship, suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour; maintenance and stability of family; protection of the unborn child/anti-abortion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>204 Defence of Traditional Way of Life</strong></td>
<td>Favourable mention of importance of defence against subversion, necessary suspension of some freedoms in order to defend this; support of ‘European’ ideas, traditions and institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>206 Constitutionalism</strong></td>
<td>Support for specific aspects of formal constitutionalism as an argument for policy as well as generalised approval for ‘constitutional’ way of doing things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>208 Government Effectiveness &amp; Authority</strong></td>
<td>Favourable mention of need to preserve government stability as an end in itself; government secrecy for effective authority; need to defend against media ‘meddling’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>210 Law and Order</strong></td>
<td>Favourable mention of enforcement of laws; actions against organised crimes; putting down of urban violence; support and resources for police; tougher attitudes in courts, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>212 Militarism</strong></td>
<td>Need for strong military force; for re-armament and self-defence; need to keep to military treaty obligations; need to secure adequate manpower in military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>214 European Effort/Social Harmony</strong></td>
<td>Appeal for united effort and solidarity, public spiritedness; decrying anti-social attitudes in time of crisis; support for ‘European interest’; appeal to bipartisanship.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>216 Common Immigration Policy</strong></td>
<td>Unfavourable mention of immigration; need for common policy to reduce the number of immigrants into Europe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### D.3. Dimension 3: Integration-Independence

#### INTEGRATION

**301 Integration/Supranationalism**
Support for development of 'supranational' institutions at the European level; support of goals of European 'integration' and European 'unity'; support for 'deepening' of EC/EU institutions.

**303 Subsidiarity/Federalism/'Europe of Regions'**
Support for 'subsidiarity', as a central principle of a federalism; end goal of "United States of Europe"; support for a 'Europe of Regions'; and regional involvement in EC/EU decisions.

**305 EPC/Common Foreign and Security Policy**
Favourable mention of provisions for European Political Cooperation (EPC), and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); need for common European political and defence identity.

**307 EMU/Single Currency/ECB: Positive**
Favourable mention of goal of 'Economic and Monetary Union'; support for a EC/EU single currency; and creation of an EC/EU Central Bank.

**309 Increased Powers of European Parliament**
Favourable mention of powers of European Parliament; increased role in decision-making; co-decision with Council of Ministers; direct election; and common/uniform electoral procedure.

**311 Powers/Accountability of Commission**
Favourable mention of European Commission; support for accountability of Commission President, either through EP, or direct election.

**313 Increased 'Majority Voting'**
Favourable mention of 'majority voting', or 'qualified majority voting' in Council of Ministers, Commission or European Council.

**315 Economic & Social Cohesion/Structural Funds**
Favourable mention of the goal of 'economic and social cohesion'; support for increase of EC/EU Structural Funds: ERDF, ESF, Guidance Section of the EAGGF, and the Cohesion Fund.

**317 'Two-Speed' Europe/'Opt-Outs': negative**
Opposition to the development of a 'two-speed'/"two-tier' Europe; or introduction of 'opt-outs' of common EC/EU policies by individual Member States.

#### INDEPENDENCE

**302 Independence/Intergovernmentalism**
Support for preservation of national competences; and for 'intergovernmentalism'; non-EC pillars in the Maastricht Treaty; and other non-EU types of cooperation, such the Schengen Accord.

**304 Subsidiarity/Sovereignty/'Europe of Nations'**
Support for 'subsidiarity', but to preserve national 'sovereignty'; need for preservation of 'nation-state' as the basic unit of legitimacy and authority in Europe.

**306 Enlargement/Widening**
Favourable mention of enlargement of European Community/Union, as an end in itself; importance of 'widening' of Europe, as opposed to 'deepening'.

**308 EMU/Single Currency/ECB: Negative**
As 307, but negative.

**310 Involvement of National Parliaments**
Favourable mention of national parliaments; increased power for national parliamentary bodies specialising in EC/EU affairs; possibility of an EC/EU 'chamber of national parliamentarians'.

**312 Powers/Role of Council of Ministers**
Favourable mention of Council of Ministers; preservation of Council's position; opposition to opening up of Council procedures.

**314 Preservation of 'Unanimity Voting'**
Favourable mention of 'unanimity' rule in business of Council of Ministers and European Council.

**316 Social Charter/Cohesion: Negative**
Opposition to Social Charter or EC/EU structural policies, as they restrict a national allocation of resources and values.

**318 'Two-Speed' Europe/'Opt-Outs': positive**
As 319, but negative.
Appendix E. Party and European Council Documents Coded and Scores for Policy Analysis

KEY TO TYPE AND SOURCE OF POLICY DOCUMENTS:
C/M  = European Election Manifesto, adopted by a Party Congress
L/M  = European Election Manifesto, adopted by a Party Leaders' Meeting
E/M  = European Election Manifesto, adopted by an Executive Committee Meeting
C/P  = Party Programme, adopted by a Party Congress
L/P  = Party Programme, adopted by a Party Leaders' Meeting
L    = Party Leaders' Declaration
E    = Executive Committee Declaration
C    = Congress Resolution

E.1. Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the EC / Party of European Socialists


17. "Leaders' Declaration", CSP party leaders' meeting, Dublin, 5 June 1990.


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TABLE E.2. Summary Scores from the Coding of CSP/PES Policy Documents

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E.2. Federation of European Liberal and Democratic Parties in the EC / European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party

17. “Resolution of the Summit of the Leaders, Ministers and Commissioners of the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Parties”, ELDR party leaders’ meeting, Copenhagen, 10 April 1989.
22. “Final Text of by the Political Leaders of the ELDR Member Parties commenting on the European Council Summit to be held in Maastricht”, ELDR party leaders’ meeting, Brussels, 3 December 1991.


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E.3. European People's Party - Christian Democrats


27. “Résolution: Conférence des Chefs de gouvernement et de parti”, EPP party leaders’ meeting, Brussels, 2 June 1993.


TABLE E.6. **Summary Scores from the Coding of EPP Policy Documents**

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E.4. European Co-ordination of Green Parties / European Federation of Green Parties


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E.5. European Council

24. "Conclusions", Session of the European Council, Copenhagen, 3-4 December 1982
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Appendix F. Calculating Left-Right Party Positions in the Two-Dimensional Socio-Economic Policy Space

In Chapter 2, the ‘Left-Right’ dimension of party competition is defined as the approximation of the two-dimensional socio-economic policy space in a single dimension. The exact location of the Left-Right dimension is the line of best correlation between all the party policy positions in the socio-economic space. The position of a political party on this Left-Right dimension is thus calculated on the basis of the original measurement of its position on the two primary socio-economic policy dimensions. If the positions of the socio-economic dimensions are expressed as the perpendicular axes of a Cartesian map, the exact Left-Right position of the parties can be calculated using Pythagorean geometry. This is illustrated in Figure F.1.

FIGURE F.1. Left-Right Position (p) of Party ‘S’ in the Socio-Economic Policy Space

In Figure F.1, the ‘integration-free market’ and ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ dimensions respectively constitute the x and y axes of a Cartesian map. In this map, the socio-economic policy position of Party ‘S’ is at point (x,y). The location of the Left-Right dimension is the line \( y = -mx + n \), where ‘m’ is a constant indicating the slope of the line, and ‘n’ is a constant indicating where the line crosses the y-axis. On this line, the original centre of the policy space (the ‘Origin’), becomes the point (j,k) on Left-Right line. The line \( l \), connecting the Origin and (j,k) is perpendicular to the Left-Right line.
The position of Party ‘S’ in the socio-economic space and the position of Party ‘S’ on the Left-Right line is connected by line $q$, which is also perpendicular to the Left-Right. The distance between the intersection of $q$ on the Left-Right line and the point $(j,k)$ is $p$. In other words, $p$ is: the position of Party ‘S’ on the Left-Right relative to the central point. To calculate the position of Party ‘S’ on the Left-Right line, therefore, we need to work out the length of $p$.

If $r$ is the distance from $(x,y)$ to $(j,k)$, then:

$$r^2 = p^2 + q^2 \quad \text{and} \quad p = \sqrt{r^2 - q^2}$$

The distance $p$ can thus be calculated from the values of $r^2$ and $q^2$.

**THE VALUE OF $r^2$ is:**

$$r^2 = (x - j)^2 + (y - k)^2$$

**THE VALUE OF $q^2$:** If $a$ is the distance from $(x,y)$ to the point on the Left-Right line for the same value of $x$, and $b$ is the distance from $(x,y)$ to the point on the Left-Right line for the same value of $y$, then the lines $a$ and $b$ are perpendicular to each other. Moreover, if $c$ and $d$ are the respective distances between the intersections of line $a$ and $b$ of Left-Right line and the intersection of line $q$ on the Left-Right line, then the following three rules are true:

- **Line 1:** $c + d = \sqrt{a^2 + b^2}$
- **Line 2:** $c^2 = a^2 - q^2$
- **Line 3:** $d^2 = b^2 - q^2$

From these three rules, $q^2$ can be calculated as follows:

Line 2 minus Line 3: $c^2 - d^2 = a^2 - b^2$ \quad \therefore \quad (c + d)(c - d) = a^2 - b^2

From Line 1 \quad \therefore \quad \sqrt{a^2 + b^2}(c - d) = a^2 - b^2 \quad \therefore \quad c - d = \frac{a^2 - b^2}{\sqrt{a^2 + b^2}}$

add to Line 1 $\Rightarrow \quad 2c = \sqrt{a^2 + b^2} + \frac{a^2 - b^2}{\sqrt{a^2 + b^2}}$

$\therefore \quad 2c = \frac{\sqrt{a^2 + b^2}}{1} + \frac{a^2 - b^2}{\sqrt{a^2 + b^2}}$

$\therefore \quad 2c = \frac{2a^2}{\sqrt{a^2 + b^2}}$

$\therefore \quad c = \frac{a^2}{\sqrt{a^2 + b^2}}$
From Line 2: \( q^2 = a^2 - c^2 \)

\[
q^2 = a^2 - \left( \frac{a^2}{\sqrt{a^2 + b^2}} \right)^2
\]

\[
\therefore q^2 = a^2 - \frac{a^4}{a^2 + b^2}
\]

\[
\therefore q^2 = \frac{a^4(a^2 + b^2)}{a^2 + b^2} - \frac{a^4}{a^2 + b^2}
\]

\[
\therefore q^2 = \frac{a^2 b^2}{a^2 + b^2}
\]

\[
\therefore q^2 = a^2 - \frac{a^4}{a^2 + b^2}
\]

If the Left-Right line is \( y = -mx + n \), then the values of \( a \) and \( b \) in this equation are:

\[
a = |y + mx - n|
\]

\[
b = \left| x + \frac{y - n}{m} \right|
\]

This can be illustrated with the example of the 1979 European Election Manifesto of the CSP, which was at -40.6 on the 'intervention-free market' dimension and +23.4 on the 'libertarian-authoritarian dimension. Using Figure F.1, the socio-economic policy position of this CSP document was thus (-40.6,+23.6). From the total positions of all the party federations’ policy documents between 1974 and 1994, the compound Left-Right in the EU policy-space is expressed by the line \( y = -0.4x + 18 \). Through simple calculation, the location of the Origin of the EU socio-economic policy space is hence at (6.2,15.5) on the Left-Right line. The value of \( a \) in this example is thus 10.64, and the value for \( b \) is 26.6. The value of \( q^2 \) is thus 97.59; and the value for \( r^2 \) is 2255.85. The distance \( p \) from the centre of the Left-Right dimension is consequently 46.4. In other words, the Left-Right position of the CSP in the 1979 European Elections was -46.4. In Chapters 4 and 5, this value was calculated for all the party federation policy documents and European Council Conclusions.
### Appendix G. Party-Political Make-Up of the European Council

#### TABLE G.1. Party-Political Make-Up of the European Council

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1 For each European Council: the figure in bold is the total numbers of participants; the figures before the parentheses are the number of participants of each party federation; the figures in the brackets respectively refer to the numbers of Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers, and European Commission President held by each party; and the name in bold is the President (Chairperson) of the Council.
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