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Catholic Churches and Mass Mobilization in Austrian Galicia, 1890-1914

Zoriana Melnyk

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization
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European University Institute
Department of History and Civilization

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Introduction

For the citizens of Europe, the late nineteenth century was marked by the beginning of mass mobilization. In many states, including the Habsburg Empire, people were transformed from subjects into citizens and the representatives of certain political preferences and national identities. I research the beginning of this mass mobilization process with specific attention to the role of the Catholic Church in Austrian Galicia, as the Church was a leading social institution and set an example of action for its laity. With this thesis, I aim to contribute to the history of mass mobilization and social history by emphasizing the changes and challenges that the mass mobilization process brought to the Catholic Church (divided in Galicia into the Greek Catholic and the Roman Catholic churches) and its laity during the *fin de siècle*.

The Greek and Roman Catholic churches, which I understand as consisting of high hierarchs, clergy, and laypeople, were important players in the mass mobilization process and managed to influence it dramatically. The beginning of mass mobilization challenged the strong position of the hierarchy and clergy and stimulated them to produce new strategies and values in order to remain influential and important, especially for their laity. By laity, I mean those who were part of these institutions, more precisely the peasants.

I organize case studies around important manifestations of the mass mobilization process (such as the participation of the clergy and laity in elections, mass gatherings, demonstrations, and activities related to elections). Through these events, I explore the role the churches played in mass mobilization and, in particular, how belonging to a specific rite and tradition was used for the purposes of mass mobilization. At the same time, I ask how the two Catholic churches interplayed with secular or governmental authorities on the local and state levels. I emphasize how mass mobilization began, what ideas and methods were used to mobilize followers, and which political ideas intersected with traditional Christian ones.

The process of mass mobilization can be viewed from a threefold perspective: firstly, as the meeting point between modern politics and the social role of the Catholic Church; secondly, as a process of the nationalization of the Church (during the nation-building process, the Catholic churches became more closely aligned to particular nationalities: in this case, Greek Catholics became Ukrainian-orientated and Roman Catholics Polish-orientated); and, thirdly, as a challenge for the churches to become more

active in the public domain in order to maintain their authority among the laity. All these effects resulted in significant changes in the relations between clergy and laity, as well as between clergy and the local administration (starostas, teachers, etc.). While the Habsburg Empire treated clergy as state officials, the parish priests were competing with secular officials for the attention of laypeople.

The novelty of this study lies in a comparative approach to the history of the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic churches. What similarities and differences were there between clergy and laity who belonged to one universal Catholic Church but also represented two different Christian traditions, occidental (Latin) and oriental (Orthodox)?¹ The Greek Catholic Church emerged as a result of the union between the Vatican and the Orthodox metropolia of Kiev-Halych in Brest in 1596. The new Church retained its Orthodox traditions and rituals while being under the authority of the Vatican and belonging to the universal Catholic Church. Thus, a comparative approach enables us to gain an insight into how confessionalism² functioned within the Austrian province of Galicia.

The two different rites of Catholicism represented in Galicia makes this territory a unique case study. The rites simultaneously reveal which aspects of Catholicism were similar for almost any province of the empire and which were related to this local space only. Additionally, the Galician context demonstrated the flexibility of Catholic practices and the potential to incorporate them into the different social conditions of the two nationalities.³ At the same time, Galicia was part of the imperial space and was experiencing the same changes (social, economic, and political) as the rest of the empire⁴ and Europe in general. These questions have been raised in numerous studies on Galicia and the Habsburg Empire,⁵ but not in a comparative framework. I study the two

¹ Although there was an overarching Catholic authority in the Vatican, the existence of two separate clergies and laities (Roman and Greek Catholic) intensified social divisions in Galicia.

² I use the term ‘confessionalism’ to mean the equal rights and influence of the two Catholic churches (rites) in the province of Galicia and to highlight that religious rite meant not only a difference in performing religious practices, but also linguistic and ethnic differences that were transferred into the realm of state and society. Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, *Monumento Ucrainae Histórica*, 14 vols. (Rome, 1964), vol. 14, 77.

³ Brian Porter-Szücs, *Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland* (New York, 2011), 15.

⁴ Larry Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford, 2010), 6.

⁵ Israel Bartal, and Antony Polonsky, ed., *Focusing on Galicia: Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, 1772–1918* (Portland, 1999). Serhiy Choliy, *Mobilizatsiya na peryferiyi. Viyskovyy obov'yazok yak faktor modernizatsiyi imperiyi Habsburhiv 1868-1914* (Kyiv, 2016). Krzysztof Fiołek and Marian Stala, ed., *Kraków i Galicja wobec przemian cywilizacyjnych (1866–1914)* (Kraków, 2011). Alison Frank, *Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia* (London, 2007). Wilhelm Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne w Galicyi 1846-1906*, 2 vols. (Kraków, 1907), vol. 2. Christopher Hann and Paul Magocsi, ed., *Galicia: A Multicultural Land* (Toronto, 2005). John-Paul Himka, *Socialism in Galicia: Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism, 1860-1890* (Cambridge, 1983).

nationalities as religious groups and thus contribute to the social, religious, and political history of Eastern Europe. I am convinced that studying a combination of the religious and social specificities of the time has great potential and will reveal plenty of unanswered questions.

With this research, I aim to contribute to the history of Catholic Church and the Habsburg Monarchy. Basing my argument on the works of John-Paul Himka, who studied the role of the Greek Catholic Church in Austrian Galicia from 1772 (the beginning of Habsburg rule in Galicia) until 1900, I focus on the next decade (1900-1910), which was marked by the intensive involvement of the masses and the desire of the Church to influence them. On the one hand, I agree with Himka that “the Church played a great role in the national awakening of the Ukrainian masses and in shaping the national movement,”⁶ which is also applicable to the Polish masses and the Roman Catholic Church. On the other hand, the case studies I analyze connected to violence and tensions between the clergy and local administration are in line with Pieter Judson’s arguments from the book *The Guardians of the Nations*. In this work, Judson introduces two concepts essential to my work. The first is that rural violence did not necessarily imply national commitment and was interpreted as such only by nationalists.⁷ By ‘nationalists’, I mean different social groups like teachers, craftsmen, small businessmen, clerks, priests, peasants, etc., who supported and/or promoted the idea of the existence of separate nations like Ukrainians and Poles.

Liliana Hentosh, *Vatykan i vyklyky modernosti* (Lviv, 2006). Stella Hryniuk, *Peasants with promise. Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia 1880-1900* (Edmonton, 1991). Börries Kuzmany, “Center and Periphery at the Austrian-Russian Border: The Galician Border Town of Brody in the Long Nineteenth Century,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 42, (2011): 67-88. Börries Kuzmany, *Brody: Eine galizische Grenzstadt im langen 19. Jahrhundert* (Wien, 2011). Dariusz Masiak, *Proba porozumenia polsko-ukrainskiego w Galicji w latach 1888-1895* (Warszawa, 2006). Andrei Markovits, and Frank E. Sysyn, ed., *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, 1982). Iryna Orlevych, ed., *Natsionalna identyfikatsiya ukrayintiv Halychyny u XIX - na pochatku XX stolittya* (Lviv, 2016). Paulus Adelsgruber, Laurie Cohen and Börries Kuzmany, *Getrennt und doch verbunden: Grenzstädte zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1772–1918* (Wien, 2011). Alexandr Victor Prusin, *Nationalizing a Borderland* (Alabama, 2005). Joshua Shanes, *Diaspora, Nationalism, and Jewish Identity in Habsburg Galicia* (New York, 2012). Danuta Sosnowska, *Inna Galicja* (Warsaw, 2008). Slawomir Tokarski, *Ethnic conflict and economic development: Jews in Galician agriculture 1868-1914* (Warsaw, 2003). Oleh Zhernokleyev, *Ukrayinska sotsial-demokratiya v Halychyni (1899-1918)* (Kyiv, 2000). Larry Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford, 2010). Piotr Wróbel, “The Jews of Galicia under Austrian-Polish Rule, 1869–1918,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 25, (1994): 97–138. Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848–1915* (Wien, 2001). James Shedel, “Emperor, Church, and People: Religion and Dynastic Loyalty during the Golden Jubilee of Franz Joseph,” *Catholic Historical Review* 76, (1990): 71-92. Stefan Kieniewicz, *Galicja w dobie autonomicznej (1850-1914)* (Wrocław, 1952). Mykhailo Demkovych-Dobrians'kyi, *Ukra'ins'ko-pol's'ki stosunki u XIX storichchi*, (Munich, 1969).

⁶ J. P. Himka, *The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society in Austrian Galicia* (Cambige, 1986), I.

⁷ Pieter Judson, *Guardians of the nation* (Cambridge, 2006), 218.

Judson's second concept is that rural violence was a widespread phenomenon in the Austrian Empire but such events were not as nationally homogeneous as represented by nationalists. Similarly, the clashes with the involvement of the Catholic Church discussed in the thesis demonstrate that while some of the clergy supported national ideas, many were only looking for the best path to follow and trying to cooperate with different political forces. Thus, I argue that the attention and support of the laity was at the core of the clergy's priorities, while the ideas of national development were rather a method for engaging the laity.

Additionally, by discussing the phenomena of mass celebrations and rallies, I expand the discussion raised by Keely Stauter-Halsted, Kai Struve, Daniel Unowsky, and others on the politicization of the subjects of the empire through mass events. Stauter-Halsted emphasizes that ideas of the nation became important in Galician villages "at roughly the same historical moment as institutions of civic and political expression."⁸ Similar to Stauter-Halsted, I highlight that political rights and civic space shaped the relations between clergy and laity, as well as those between citizens and the local authorities. However, I do not focus on the national aspect precisely as it was explicit only in the rhetoric of some newspapers: in reports from the police or starostas, as well as in the Church's documentation, the main emphasis was on loyalty to the empire and the desire to maintain its laws and rights.

Drawing on Kai Struve, I organize my case studies around two transformative events: first, the agrarian strikes of 1902 and, second, the campaigns for election reform in 1906 and the elections themselves in 1908. Struve highlights that this particular period was decisive and resulted in numerous mass events that provoked the active involvement of peasants in political life.⁹ Some of these mass events were related to violence and even pogroms. Daniel Unowski emphasizes that a complex view of the riots against Jews, including Catholic action in them, can bring deeper insights on the nature of and reason for the anti-Jewish riots.¹⁰ Thus, this thesis attempts to contribute to our understanding of the active involvement of peasants in politics and the place of Catholic values and institutions in this process.

As I analyze numerous conflicts of the clergy with state and church authorities, I also explore in detail how the relations between these two institutions functioned. I build

⁸ Judson, *Guardians of the nation*, 556.

⁹ Judson, *Guardians of the nation*, 113-114.

¹⁰ "Only by looking at Catholic action, Jewish reaction, and the role of government in preserving order can we come close to understanding how the riots themselves were experienced." Robert Nemes, Daniel Unowsky *Sites of European Antisemitism* (Brandeis University Press, 2014), 20.

on and develop further the ideas of the American historian John W. Boyer, who claims that “the public authority of the dynastic state had long been closely associated with the institutional Church” and that the relationship between the Church and the state was cooperative and mutually accommodating.¹¹ Boyer highlights the role of the clergy in mass mobilization as well, stating that “the clergy were often behind a variety of different kinds of rallies, political events, and money solicitations.”¹² Upon closely investigating the police and local administration reports, I found that the clergy in Galicia was very active in organizing peasants, and even used religious services and sacraments to do this: such behavior brought state and church institutions into conflict.

In other words, I aim to demonstrate that Galicia had its particularities as a multi-national and multi-Catholic space. However, it also manifested similar processes to those occurring in other provinces of the empire, like rural violence, strikes, the development of mass mobilization, and nationalization. The main novelty of my study is the comparative approach to the two confessions of the Catholic Church, which aims to reveal how flexible and inclusive the response of the Church was to the challenges of mass mobilization.

Scenery and protagonists of the study: Galicia and Galicians

Galicia was a large province on the border with the Russian Empire. It was both one of the largest and poorest provinces of the Habsburg Empire.¹³ Galicians shared various identities: religious (Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Jewish), linguistic (Polish, Ukrainian, Yiddish, German), ethnic (Polish, Ukrainian, Jewish), and provincial.¹⁴ Religiously, the Galician population of around 6.3 million consisted of Greek Catholics (44.83% of the population), Roman Catholics (44.74%), and Jews (9.69%).¹⁵ Linguistically, 52% of the population was Polish-speaking, 43% Ukrainian-speaking, and 5% German-speaking (Jews belonged either to Polish- or German-speaking groups).¹⁶ As each census of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy included only questions

¹¹ John W. Boyer, “Political Catholicism in Austria, 1880-1960”, in *Religion in Austria*, ed. G. Bischof, A. Pelinka, H. Denz (New Brunswick, 2005), 7.

¹² Boyer, *Political Catholicism*, 164.

¹³ J. P. Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Macmillan press, 1988), XXII.

¹⁴ “Galician identity was fundamentally provincial, and its evolution suggests the importance of the provincial as an ideological force overlapping with the forces of the national and the imperial.” Larry Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford, 2010), 6.

¹⁵ Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, 7.

¹⁶ Himka, *Galician Villagers*, XXIII.

about religious and language differences, the data concerning nationalities is only approximate.¹⁷

There was a strong co-dependency between religion and language, which had its roots in the mutual coexistence of the nationalities of the province. Therefore, in most cases the Ukrainian (ethnic and linguistic)¹⁸ population was associated with Greek Catholicism and the Polish with Roman Catholicism. According to ecclesiastical law, it was not possible to change rites without permission of the Vatican.¹⁹ However, these changes of rite were frequent, and both clergies struggled for the attention and loyalty of their followers in order not to lose them to the other rite.

Aside from rite, other factors influenced the division between Poles and Ukrainians, or Ruthenians as local Ukrainians called themselves. Polish was the official language of the province; however, it was used by 54.6% of Galicians while Ukrainian was used by 42.29%. This means that Poles and Ukrainians were almost equal in terms of the number of inhabitants in the province. Geographically, however, the eastern part of the province was larger and more diverse (with 58.9% people speaking Ukrainian),²⁰ while Polish speakers made up the vast majority of the rather homogenous western part (96%).²¹ This division led many times to ideas (introduced by Ukrainians) to partition the province into Ukrainian and Polish parts, but these plans never succeeded (see map p. 10).

Another factor was the strong association between the Galician elite and the Polish language and culture (and also Roman Catholicism). I focus on this relationship between language and nationality, as the language issue contributed to the successful mobilization of Poles and Ruthenians alike. The language difference was also a source of opposition between Polish-speaking village officials and Ruthenian- (Ukrainian-)

¹⁷ Włodzimierz Osadczy, "Roman Catholic-Uniate Relations and the national question in eastern Galicia in the 19th and early 20th centuries" in *Politics and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: Traditions and Transitions* ed. William H. Swatos (Westport, 1994), 247.

¹⁸ 'Ukrainian' was not a term used at the time: the common name was 'Ruthenian'. However, I use 'Ukrainian' here for the sake of simplicity.


¹⁹ Osadczy, "Roman Catholic-Uniate Relations," 247.

²⁰ Beata Holub, "Historical-geographical study of the nationalities in Eastern Galicia in the light of the population censuses in the years 1890-1910," *Annales UMCS 2*: 15-40. Last visited November, 25, 2017. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Beata_Holub/publication/265292407_Historical-geographical_study_of_the_nationalities_in_Eastern_Galicia_in_the_light_of_the_population_censuses_in_the_years_1890-1910/links/5429ce240cf277d58e86fed3/Historical-geographical-study-of-the-nationalities-in-Eastern-Galicia-in-the-light-of-the-population-censuses-in-the-years-1890-1910.pdf?origin=publication_list (last visited 30.08.2017)

²¹ According to the statistics of 1900, in Galicia in general Polish was spoken by 54.6% and Ruthenian by 42.29%, while 45.7% were Roman Catholics and 42.5% Greek Catholics. "Mapa językowa i wyznaniowa Galicji", last modified November, 25, 2017, <http://www.pbc.rzeszow.pl/dlibra/doccontent?id=4831>

speaking Greek Catholic clergy. Some representatives of the nationalist-oriented Greek Catholic clergy refused to communicate in Polish and used the language issue to emphasize their political preferences.

The population structure of both churches varied as well. Galicia was mainly inhabited by peasants: the vast majority (78%) of the Galician population (according to data in 1900) worked in agriculture, while 9% worked in industry (mainly artisanal occupations and inn keeping) and 2% were professionals (mainly clergy and civil servants).²² The Greek Catholic Church (and the Ukrainian-speaking population) consisted of rural peasants, whereas the Roman Catholic laity was largely made up of the urban inhabitants of the province. This comparison shows that the Roman Catholic laity was much more diverse and included representatives of all social layers, while the Greek Catholics lacked representatives among intellectuals and the elite.



Map 1. Areas inhabited by Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics.²³

Further division between the Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics was also stimulated by inequality in their access to power. Galicia gained autonomy in 1861, which provided better opportunities for the Polish nobility, intellectuals, and urban

²² J.-P.Himka, "Dimensions of a Triangle: Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Austrian Galicia," *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry* 12 (1999): 28.

²³ Based on Beata Hołub, "Studium historyczno-geograficzne narodowości," 15-40.

middle class.²⁴ however, this deepened the conflict between the Poles and other nationalities, putting them into competition. The majority of the schools, the universities of Cracow and Lemberg, and the provincial administration all became Polish-speaking after 1867.²⁵ At the turn of the century, this inequality was one of the key stimuli for growing nationalism.

Both rites played a very important role in the life of their laity. As noted by Jerzy Kloczowski, “the Church continued to include the vast majority of Poles, from the aristocracy to the poorest peasants”, and it was fused with Polish life mainly because of the connection between traditional culture and religious practices.²⁶ The same was true for the Ruthenians (Ukrainians). The emerging secular movements challenged the dominant position of both churches. The threat came from national movements, socialism,²⁷ the establishment of political parties by Ruthenians and Poles, and, subsequently, the involvement of the masses in ‘modern’ social and political life. The main factor that stimulated politicization was electoral reforms: thus, I take elections and the widening of voting rights as case studies to analyze how social, Catholic, and political ideas came together and were used as mobilizing tools.

I analyze the introduction of universal male suffrage, agitation for and spreading information about elections, and the preparation and holding of elections. I focus specifically on the elections to parliament (*Reichsrat*) and the local diet that took place between 1895 and 1908. Especially important was the period between 1906 and 1907, when the universal suffrage reform was prepared and implemented. As pointed out by the American historian Hugo Lane, the introduction of universal male suffrage changed the nature of political power: “if the peasantry did not have a clear idea of the nation as

²⁴ The dominant elite of Galicia were big landlords and aristocrats. The urban middle class was strong only in Cracow and Lemberg. Thus, these cities were becoming more attractive and offered wider possibilities for their inhabitants: however, political messages should have been adapted to the peasant population as it made up the majority of the province.

²⁵ As Larry Wolff brilliantly summarizes on the issue of autonomy, “the emancipation of the peasantry from feudal obligations in 1848, followed by the full emancipation of the Jews and the constitutional guarantee of civic rights to all citizens in 1867 ... laid the legal foundations for modern society in the Habsburg monarchy, including Galicia.” Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, 239.

²⁶ Jerzy Kloczowski, *A History of Polish Christianity* (Cambridge, 2000), 216-217.

²⁷ I use the term ‘socialism’ in the same sense as John Himka: “to denote people and groups that describe themselves as such and were so described by their contemporaries”. More in: J. P. Himka, *Socialism in Galicia. The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism (1860-1890)* (Cambridge, 1983), 1.

a political community, they did have de facto political community based in their common socioeconomic grievances”.²⁸

Research questions and structure

I concentrate my attention on three manifestations of mass mobilization. First, **mass participation**: how did the widening of political rights influence the secular lives of the Greek and Roman Catholics of Galicia? And in what ways were the new forms of political and social life combined with religious behavior? **Second, new identities**: how did Greek and Roman Catholics react to the emergence of various mobilizing ideas, such as the idea of the nation? Why did Galicians combine religious identity with other identities (political, provincial, and national)? Why was national identity so appealing for the Catholic churches? **And third, secular and religious tensions**: how did the election reforms of the Austrian state influence local communities (especially relations between parochial priests and laity)? How did relations between local authorities and parochial clergy change under the influence of mass mobilization?

In order to provide a complex view on these issues, I engage with various aspects of the process of mass mobilization throughout the thesis. In particular, I concentrate on the cooperation between Church and State, the interplay between the hierarchs of the churches, the clergy, and the laity, and relations among the clergy and laity of the same Church. I trace the process of mass mobilization as a social phenomenon by taking into account the top-down and bottom-up directions of mass mobilization and analyzing how the reaction of the higher authorities to mobilization influenced the local provincial clergy and administration (and vice versa). Comparing the two churches, I demonstrate how Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics, working separately from each other, faced similar problems and created similar approaches to deal with them.

Main concepts and case studies

In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Catholic Church was strongly connected to the state. Together they formed an influential partnership supported by the “legacy of God and Law”. As a result of this connection between the Church and the empire, the “Habsburg state was an institution legitimated in the minds of its people by a public

²⁸ Hugo Lane, “Class Interest and the Shaping of a ‘Non-historical’ Nation: Reassessing the Galician Ruthenian Path to Ukrainian Identity” in *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, ed. Z. Gitelman, L. Haida, J.-P. Himka, R. Solchanyk (Cambridge, 2000), 386.

moral vision”, as John W. Boyer noted.²⁹ Boyer concludes that “the public authority of the dynastic state had long been closely associated with the institutional Church” and that the relationship between Church and State was cooperative and mutually accommodating.³⁰ Due to such close interaction and cooperation between the state and the Church, the Catholic clergy had a similar status in the empire to that of public officials: they received a salary and were, as part of the local authorities, responsible to the central government.

This strong connection between Church and State is a significant factor to consider when researching the social role of the Catholic churches in Galicia. Both churches demonstrated deep loyalty and respect towards the emperor and the state. However, this idea of loyalty was interpreted differently depending on the circumstances. Clergymen never challenged the authority of the state or the emperor, but the authority of state officials was something very different. As the clergy performed some official duties, they received certain powers from the state and played an important role at the lower levels of the social hierarchy. For example, parish priests were responsible for registering and reporting demographic data. I seek to unravel how this alliance between the state and the Church worked on the provincial level and how it was challenged by electoral reforms and especially by growing nationalism. In particular, I explore the developing interest of politicians and intellectuals in the formation of national ideas and values specific to each of the nationalities of the province.

The Church and the state, as institutions, provided mutual support for the authority of the other. This was especially apparent as nationalism, which questioned the authority of both institutions, spread. The other side of the close relationship between the Church and the state was that challenging the authority of one institution meant also challenging the authority of the other. This cooperation between the two institutions was reflected in Galicia, where the high church hierarchy was very loyal to the monarchy. However, this loyalty also created conflicts among the clergy: between hierarchs, who needed to be an example of loyalty to the monarchy first of all, and the other layers of clergy, whose priority was to gain support from their parishes. In this way, the higher echelons of the Catholic institutions of Galicia looked upwards to highlight their loyalty and cooperation with the other authorities of the empire, whereas the lower clergy

²⁹ James Shedel, “Religion, Public Morality and the Rechtsstaat in the Habsburg Dominions,” in *Churches, states, nations in the Enlightenment and in the nineteenth century*, ed. M. Filipowicz (Lublin, 2000), 240.

³⁰ Boyer, “Political Catholicism,” 7.

remained reliant on more localized support to retain their social positions. This difference took place because the mass mobilization process stimulated the lower clergy to fight for the attention of their laity and protect it from anti-Catholic mobilizing ideas. I develop this argument in detail when analyzing various trials against priests in which both church and state authorities were involved.

Another important topic for my research is the politicizing of Catholicism and the influence of the *Christlichsoziale Partei* [Christian Social Party] in Galicia. I develop this issue while elaborating on the activity of the Roman Catholic priest Stanislaw Stojalowski (1845-1911), as well as on the difficulties of establishing a political party with explicit Catholic ideas. Stojalowski aimed to be a follower of Karl Lueger, the mayor of Vienna and leader of the very popular Christian Social Party.³¹ The success of political Catholicism in Vienna was reflected in the provinces, including Galicia, where Stojalowski was promoting his Christian Peoples' Party, based on the ideas of social Catholicism. Stojalowski used the same strategies as Lueger, like attracting the common people to politics by introducing anti-semitic sentiments on the basis of social inequality.³² Stojalowski always emphasized that he was supporter of Lueger in his political strategy and planned to cooperate with Lueger's party in parliament, so I investigate to what extent Stojalowski managed to become a 'Galician Lueger' and why this was only partially successful.

Carl Schorske argues that the defeat of the liberals in the 1890s stimulated the development of new mass movements, such as Christian, anti-Semitic, socialistic, and national ones.³³ According to Schorske, Lueger managed to unite the anti-liberal ideas of Catholicism and combine them with others that were popular within society, such as democracy, social reform, anti-semitism, and loyalty to the Habsburgs.³⁴ In Galicia, Stanislaw Stojalowski was a passionate follower of political Catholicism. He positioned himself as a follower of Lueger and intended to use similar methods and ideas for mobilizing his followers. Simultaneously, the results of my research show why political Catholicism was not as popular and vital in Galicia as in Vienna.

My hypothesis is that the failure of political Catholicism can be explained by the more powerful process of nation-building that had a strong influence on the

³¹ Jean Berenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1700-1918* (London, 1997), 247.

³² James Shedel, "Emperor, Church, and People: Religion and Dynastic Loyalty during the Golden Jubilee of Franz Joseph," *The Catholic Historical Review* 76, no. 1 (1990): 89.

³³ Carl E. Schorske, *Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture*, (London, 1980), 6.

³⁴ Carl E. Schorske, "Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Triptych," *The Journal of Modern History* 39, no. 4 (1967): 361.

transformation of Catholic identity in the region. With the rise of nationalism, the ethnic and religious tensions between Greek and Roman Catholics grew stronger as the association between rites, ethnicity, and nationality expanded. The relationship between Catholicism and nationalism in the region has been a subject of interest for various scholars working on Polish or Ukrainian history. According to the Polish historian Jerzy Kloczowski, the mixture of Catholicism and traditional existence brought to life a patriotic religion that became an important characteristic of a considerable part of the Polish elite.³⁵ Brian Porter-Szücs suggests that “the strong ideological link between faith and fatherland emerged in full force only at the start of the twentieth century”, and even afterwards it needed a while to for it to become “unquestioned common sense that Poles were necessarily Catholic.”³⁶ Himka emphasizes two important changes that took place within the Greek Catholic Church under the impact of nationalism. On the one hand, the Greek Catholic Church was under the influence of a national movement and in danger of losing some of its identity because of its increased involvement in the construction of what was principally a national identity. On the other, the Greek Catholic clergy were an important source for the formation of intelligentsia, mainly because they could marry and had some finances, which meant that their children received better educations.³⁷ Throughout the following chapters, I raise the question of the transformation of the clergy in the processes of mass mobilization and the nationalization of the churches. Additionally, I explore why social Catholicism was not very popular in Galicia while national ideas were.

The role of Catholicism in the nation-building process is essential for my research questions. In particular, is it important whether religious identity was reinforced by the strengthening of national identities or not? And how did Catholicism serve as a useful background for national mobilization? Both churches represented a certain nationality and built their own strategies for mobilizing their followers.

The nationalization of the churches had a deep influence on their mutual coexistence. Chris Hann describes how the emergence of nationalism changed the relatively tolerant coexistence between the two religious groups. According to him, “the mobilization of religion in the service of modern nationalism ruptures traditions of pluralism everywhere. More specifically, the old forms of coexistence and sharing seem to be incompatible with the new ideal, which holds that the coexisting communities

³⁵ Schorske, “Politics in a New Key,” 227.

³⁶ Porter-Szücs, *Faith and Fatherland*, 9-10.

³⁷ Himka, *Priests and Peasants*, 3.

should be *equal*”.³⁸ Hann emphasizes that the struggle for equality was reinforced by national movements, which considered pluralism and tolerance as the reasons for inequality. Thus, for example, Juraj Buzalka claims in his study that “Ukrainian nationalism favored the expurgation of Latin [Roman Catholic] elements from the Greek Catholic Church.”³⁹ The rise of the nation-building process was therefore not some foreign force that challenged Catholic identity, but rather one that worked from within and was stimulated by the clergy and laity of both rites.

The widening of political rights and seeking a new role for the Church were mutually influential processes that should be analyzed together. Thus, I investigate the complex relations between the parish priest, local authorities, and laity through the prism of how the widening of political rights influenced these relations. In addition, I bring together Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic public activity and women’s rights activism to demonstrate how the Catholic Church was seeking a new role in sacral and secular space. Female activism was a new challenge for Catholicism, as it required rethinking the existing social hierarchy. The active involvement of clergy in political debates also questioned traditional authority and provoked discussion on how distant the Church should be from politics. While the Greek Catholic clergy had lost their leading roles to political activists, they had kept their position as religious leaders and thus managed to influence political activists and the Church as an institution.

The increasing importance of national ideas caused tensions between the two religious groups in Galicia, mainly because new identities, Polish and Ukrainian, were thrust upon them. The tension produced by new identities even led to displays of violence in the province. The violent actions and their interpretation were used to reinforce the political ideologies of the time (especially national and socialist ones). However, a closer look at the violent clashes can reveal interesting functions of the violence. The local national activists (mainly students, lawyers, journalists, officials, and educated peasants), according to Judson, believed that nations were already well-defined entities whose members shared eternal and easily recognizable traits. However, such an idea, as Judson states, was far from reality because the nation-building process was only one of the political projects and not the main one.⁴⁰ This consideration is important for

³⁸ Chris M. Hann, “The limits of Galician syncretism: pluralism, multiculturalism and the two Catholicism,” in *Galicia: a multicultural land*, ed. Chris Hann and Paul Robert Magosci (Toronto, 2005), 213.

³⁹ Juraj Buzalka, *Nation and Religion: the Politics of Commemoration in South-East Poland* (Münster, 2006), 162.

⁴⁰ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 218.

my research, as the case studies I use prove that violence had backgrounds other than only national difference. I discuss the causes of violence in detail in Chapter five. The chapter contributes to challenging the way in which the historiography explains violence in terms of the nation-building process.

Judson demonstrates that rural violence was a widespread phenomenon in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Through these events, the national activists (who, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, were mainly students, local intellectuals, clergy, and educated peasants) “wanted to portray violence as part of a larger, coherent political struggle in order to win broad popular support and to mobilize that support fully.”⁴¹ Violence proved to have the potential to advance different perceptions and explanations that were able to shape society. In the last chapter of this thesis, I categorize violent clashes according to the area in which they happened, into rural or urban. Clerical involvement in the clashes was further used by different political forces as arguments *pro* or *contra* all clergy. In the case of urban violence, the example of which is the assassination in 1908 of the local governor Andrej Potocki in Lemberg, the whole Greek Catholic community was blamed because the murderer appeared to be Greek Catholic/Ukrainian. The assassination of the governor was the culmination of conflicts between Poles and Ukrainian that became especially strong after the introduction of universal male suffrage and the first elections to the local diet [Galician *Sejm*].

If violent events provoked a lot of attention, the other displays of mass mobilization, such as gathering and celebrations (religious and patriotic),⁴² were already common activities. Mass celebrations (organized by the government or local activists) combined different elements that revealed something about the social make-up. Kai Struve demonstrates in *Peasants and Patriotic Celebrations in Habsburg Galicia* that many celebrations involved a combination of the liturgy, a patriotic sermon by the priest, and speeches regarding historical and political themes of the region, all accompanied by patriotic songs and poetry.⁴³ In this thesis, I research further the role of the clergy in mass gatherings and celebration and demonstrate how such tools of mass mobilization were used for the politicization of the laity: I also discuss how religious practices were influenced by political ideas.

⁴¹ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 200.

⁴² These happenings are well researched for example in Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism*.

⁴³ Kai Struve, “Peasants and patriotic celebrations in Habsburg Galicia,” in *Galicia: a multicultural land*, 111.

Drawing on Struve, I investigate the behavior of the clergy and authorities in relation to the mass gatherings that occurred alongside electoral process. I am interested in how the clergy was involved in these localized mass events and what ideas they were spreading to their laity. Very often, depending on the participants, a mass event had the potential to become a realm for debate and conflict. The clergy and political activists managed to use mass events as a common space where various issues could be proposed and discussed.

The reforms of the electoral law were an important stimulation to mass participation and active involvement in politics. The electoral reforms of 1873, 1882, and 1896 that widened the number of electors and finally introduced universal male suffrage in 1907 completed the politicization of almost all the subjects of the empire. According to Pieter Judson, the result of these reforms was twofold. First, the changes led to a decrease in the political influence of the nobles.⁴⁴ Second, they resulted in social conflicts that were rooted in crises of self-definition because of the vast increase of social groups that gained access to the political system and needed to define themselves somehow. According to Gary B. Cohen, the possibility to participate in politics for those who had not it before resulted in competition for the control of local government, and this “growing competition of the mass-based parties and interest groups for popular support led directly to the radicalization of political demands and rhetoric.”⁴⁵

The introduction of universal male suffrage in 1907 was therefore a turning point in politicizing life in the Austro-Hungarian Empire because it allowed the resolution of tensions and problems through parliament and other authorities. However, it was also a turning point in the relations between the two churches (and nationalities) because of the deepening tensions between Poles and Ukrainians due to unequal access to power.

I have concentrated on the elections as the focal point of my research for three reasons. Firstly, they provoked a broad debate within Galician society. Secondly, they influenced and transformed the relationship between the two nationalities of the province and stimulated further antagonism between them. Thirdly, the governors (the head of imperial government in the province), namely Kazimierz Badeni and Andrzej Potocki, who were responsible for organizing the elections in the province, had strong support from and were protected by Vienna. Both Badeni and Potocki launched similarly

⁴⁴ Pieter M. Judson, “Introduction: Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe” in *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe*, ed. P. Judson and M. Rozenblit (Berghahn Books, 2005), vol. 6, 9.

⁴⁵ Gary B. Cohen, “Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914,” *Central European History* 40, no. 2 (2007): 268.

autocratic policies in the province. The elections between 1895 and 1908 were examples that demonstrated the approach of the two governors.

Sources and methods

For this thesis, I have selected newspapers, the documents of the Church, government paperwork in the office of the Vice-regency, and political brochures as the main sources. Such sources provide a lot of information on various mass events and social conflicts. As various newspapers supported different political ideas, they are valuable sources to trace rhetoric around religious or secular life. The analysis of newspapers with various ideological orientations reveals that conflicts were present not only between different nationalities or confessions, but also within one and the same confession. More importantly, conflicts within one rite were the most dangerous for this rite, so the hierarchs tried to minimize them through public speeches or pastoral letters. The press spread and even criticized these official declarations of church hierarchs. Thus, the press was a pool of the various interpretations of the events and ideas of the time and served simultaneously as a tool for unification or separation. Newspapers shaped discussions on the most exemplary issues in society and interacted with each other to respond to any conflicting or intersecting points in the discourses.

Official documents both from the Church and local and central authorities also provide key primary sources. Such documents represent official institutions' versions of events during the elections and reveal how the relations between the two churches and local authorities [Galician Vice-regency] functioned. By 'official documents', I mean documents that were sent to the Vice-regency, church authorities, and local officials: however, this does not necessarily mean that the documents represented the official positions of the authorities or that they were widely available. Some of the documents concerning trials or strikes were strictly confidential. With these sources, I trace the position of the churches and local government towards the elections or violent events connected with them.

In pastoral letters (which were published and thus widely known), the hierarchs of the churches emphasized certain values and behavioral strategies that the clergy and laity should follow. In addition, documents like reports or responses by the Church's government to the requests of state officials reveal the difference between the desired behavior promoted by the church hierarchy and the actual behavior of the clergy and laity. Court files, testimonies, and complaints from clergy or officials that involved the

Vice-regency are also an extremely informative sources to reconstruct interactions between secular and sacral authorities.

Working with the aforementioned types of sources provides us with a combination of official and media materials that allows us to reveal how the influence of mass mobilization surfaced on a public level and in the closed environment of state and church administrators, and how different ideas were constructed and discussed on these levels. This approach also allowed me to highlight the individual contributions of the most influential actors (mainly state officials and parish clergy) to mass mobilization. By focusing on both secular and religious sources, I unveil attitudes to the rising tension between the different identities in Galician society, how state officials and the clergy contributed to mass participation events and acts of political violence, and how the press pushed its readers to take an active position and even sometimes encouraged radical responses.

The creators of the above mentioned sources were the representatives of various social groups. The church hierarchy and local authorities included mainly aristocrats, while officials and clergy throughout Galicia were close in their lifestyle to intellectuals and the middle class (teachers, lawyers, journalists). Unfortunately, there were not many representatives of the peasants (maybe just a few authors of the articles) among those who worked in the local administration or newspapers, but this this was a specificity of the time, when peasants were only starting to participate in the public sphere. Thus, the contribution and response of the peasants to mass mobilization can be traced only through sources (such as reports of police and starostas, court files) created by other social groups: as such, these sources present a view on the peasantry from the outside. Additionally, there are no private sources involved in the thesis (as I have not found any), which prevents us from tracing how important mass mobilization was in the private sphere or everyday life. Private sources could have great potential for further research on mass mobilization in Galicia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In essence, the suggested combination of sources makes it possible to trace different aspects of the mass mobilization process from top to bottom (i.e., from the representatives of the religious and secular authorities to participants from broader religious and secular groups) and from bottom to top (from the press and its readers to the representatives of power).

In terms of methodology, I use critical analysis of the sources as well as social history and microhistory. This allows for an in-depth analysis of the representation and

role allocation of social actors, providing us with the analytical tools needed to investigate which social actors were put into the foreground and which were “de-emphasized”. I am particularly interested in the social position of the peasants and how it changed under the influence of mass mobilization. Mass mobilization provoked a struggle for power and influence between clergy and local officials that also had an effect on the lives of the laity. In terms of social history, I focus on social changes like the transformation of relationships inside village communities and religious groups (e.g., the relationship between priests and laity and between different Catholics), the importance of economic position in terms of unequal access to power and the promotion of certain political ideas, and the social motivation of peasants to engage into politics.

Structure of the thesis

The thesis begins with a general overview of the role of the clergy in the social domain and their first experiences of mass events, such as the agricultural strikes in 1902 that had involved plenty of Ruthenian peasants in the eastern part of the province. The example of the strikes demonstrates what potential the clergy had as mobilizers and how the church authorities reacted to mass events that threatened the social order. After the strikes, the clergy became active supporters of the movement devoted to widening electoral rights in 1905-06. Based on this example of mass movements aimed at supporting electoral reform, I unveil the general role of the clergy in mobilizing their laity and preparing them to practice the new opportunities for public participation (according to the new electoral law of universal male suffrage).

Chapter two turns its attention to the actual participation of the clergy in elections after universal male suffrage became reality. I analyze pastoral letters and newspaper discussions on how the clergy should participate in elections and involve their laity. A significant part of Chapter two is devoted to the role of women in political debates. As more political and social rights were available to men, the role of women also became more important for the churches. Both Catholic churches and women’s rights activists were actively engaged in discussing and shaping the new role of women in society.

Chapter three looks at the example of the priest Stanislaw Stojalowski, who was the most active Roman Catholic clergyman in the mobilization of the masses. Taking his example as a case study, we unveil the influence of mass mobilization on the relations between the government and the church hierarchy, on the one hand, and the relations among clergy and between clergy and laity, on the other. The case of Stojalowski demonstrates which ideas and tools served best to mobilize the faithful and how the

hierarchs of the Roman Catholic Church and state officials reacted to the popularity and successes of Stojalowski and cooperated to control the activity of the politically involved clergy. This chapter delves into relations at the top level of the society (i.e., interactions between state and church authorities, the involvement of the Ministry of Justice and the Vatican), while the next chapter is about similar processes at the local level (the tensions between local officials and clergy in village communities).

Chapter four concentrates on Greek Catholic priests and the problems they had with local secular and ecclesiastical authorities because of active engagement in the mass mobilization process. Through the analysis of cases linked to the misuse of clerical positions, the chapter reveals how local secular (i.e., starostas and village mayors) and religious (parochial priests and the Consistory) representatives of power exercised their influence on the laity in Galicia and how these two powers competed with each other in order to keep control and maintain their effectiveness.

The fifth and final chapter is about the violent clashes and conflicts connected with the elections. This section discusses what role the clergy of both rites played in the conflicts and what effect violent events had on both the laity and national activists. The fifth chapter also unveils a shift in the interpretation of local conflicts from social tensions (mainly between landowners and peasantry) to national ones (between Poles and Ukrainians), and discusses the culmination of such tensions with close reference to the assassination of the local governor.

All of the case studies discussed in this research are related to the election process and public activity and reveal different aspects of mass mobilization. In some cases, the focus is more on the personalities of the priests and their motivation to engage in mass movements. In others, attention is shifted towards mass events and their interpretation and importance for mobilization. It would be beneficial to reconstruct more stories of the peasants regarding the importance of mass participation; however, there are no reliable detailed sources for such a purpose. This is the reason why I dedicate a lot of space to analyzing the relations and balance of power inside village communities.

Our knowledge about village communities can be deduced from sources that reconstruct relations between starosta or other officials and the clergy, such as reports to the governor and court processes against priests. The reconstruction of issues in village communities provides significant insight into the participation of peasants in mass mobilization, demonstrating how important the support of the peasants was for the parish priests and how they managed to mobilize their laity. I analyze these questions in detail

in Chapter three, which is based on documents related to court trials against priests and reveals the competition for power at village level.

In analyzing religious and state authority, this thesis reveals a complex pattern of struggles and competitions for power, control, and influence in Galicia at the start of the twentieth century. It is through understanding the unique environment of mass mobilization amongst the laity, workers and peasants, that the conflict between the Greek and Roman Catholics, as well as with the secular authorities, becomes apparent.

Chapter 1. The beginning of mass mobilization: between agricultural strikes and the struggle for electoral reforms

Introduction

The first decade of the twentieth century was an exceptionally intense time for mass mobilization. The massive agricultural strikes of 1902 and preparation for electoral reform in 1907 were the key events that stimulated the growth of peasant involvement in the political domain. Under the influence of mass politics, the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic churches became nationalized and strongly connected to certain national projects (Polish, Ukrainian, or Russophile). Simultaneously, the clergy and laity started to be more and more actively involved in political life and develop intersections between Catholic ideas and political goals in Galicia.

During strikes and public gatherings, Galician society (elites, local officials, and the clergy) became acquainted with the power of the masses. For the authorities, it was a time to experience power; for political parties, a time to test their ideology; and for landowners, a time to deal with the demands of peasants requiring improved salaries. This was also a time for the local Catholic churches (mainly Greek Catholic, as the strikes mostly happened in Eastern Galicia) to test the extent of their influence and to mediate relations between the laity and local officials. The most essential aim of both churches was to retain their control and influence over the laity and prevent the popularization of socialist ideas. The main strategy for the clergy to keep their influence over the laity lay in active participation in the lives of the laity, including their political education.

The case studies in this chapter are vivid examples of how the demands on the clergy to be more involved in politics combined with ideas of being better Christians. The duties of the good Christian intersected with the duties of the good citizen, and in this way new strategies of social behavior emerged. The aim of the chapter is to seek answers to the following questions: how were the clergy and laity influenced by growing politicization? Why were the churches interested in lay participation in politics? Which tools and methods did the clergy use to mobilize the laity in the struggle around the electoral reforms? These questions unveil the issues addressed in the introduction: the nationalization of religious life and the transformation of the Catholic Church under the influence of mass mobilization.

Pillars of local Catholicism: the role of parish priests in their communities

Parish priests were the main agents of the Church for communicating with leading parishioners. They knew the parishioners best and had authority as representatives of God. The strong position of the parish priest had its positive and negative sides. On the one hand, when parish priests decided to be more publicly involved and lead their parishes into active public and political participation, they held a better position than other activists because of their existing influence. The priests simply already had the established networks and tools required to lead and influence. On the other hand, the priest's intense involvement in politics often resulted in the worsening of relations with the local administration and could also cause conflicts with the laity (particularly regarding different political views).

It is important to keep in mind that priests had certain obligations towards government authorities, and this created a space of necessary interaction with the local government, schools, etc. In addition, congregations were dependent on their priests, as the priest was needed to perform the sacraments that took place in the life of every Christian, such as baptisms, weddings, and funerals. The importance of sacraments in the life of every peasant provided the priest with an opportunity to exploit his position for personal benefit, and in some cases to spread his convictions.

The vision of the Church's hierarchy of the behavior of the parish clergy was summarized in the document called *Tabel Svojsv* [*Table of Virtues*]. The *Table of Virtues* was simply a blank form with several fields to fill in, and its function was to provide information about a priest in case he moved from from one place of work to another. The *Table* was filled in for each priest and served as a personal dossier that evaluated a priest's various qualifications. A closer look at the *Table* reveals which qualities were considered to be essential for priests.

The characteristics assessed can be grouped into four categories (though the *Table* itself did not arrange the questions in any particular order): personal qualities and loyalty, ecclesiastical duties, secular duties, and school duties. The focus on these specific categories means that the role of the priest was set out within various spheres: the sacral and secular domains for duties and opportunities were thus clearly defined. The first category of data included: loyalty to the emperor, information about the trust and respect of the priest in the parish, the wisdom and prudence of his behavior, and

what weaknesses and insufficiencies he possessed.⁴⁶ Thus, these categories generally defined how well a priest fitted into the social hierarchy, as well as what kind of issues (weaknesses) he might have.

With regard to ecclesiastical duties, the Church hierarchy inquired about preaching and holding services, taking care of the sick, participation in clerical meetings, the support of temperance brotherhoods, and donations to the foundation for supporting widows and orphans. This category reveals an emphasis on the social work of priests in their communities. The services that the priests performed were their greatest opportunity to get to know and influence their parishioners as well as to manipulate them and collect money.

Priests' secular and school obligations were the fields where they interacted with local authorities, in particular with starostas and teachers. The maintaining of parochial records in an orderly manner and the proper organization of the parish register and other government documents were among the secular obligations of the priest. In some cases, priests used their secular obligations to block the work of local officials, for example by not providing records about births and deaths in their parishes.

The final category, related to the sphere of education, addressed questions such as: does the priest contribute to good order in the school? Does he have a good relationship with the teachers? Does he teach religion at the school?⁴⁷ The relations between the local teacher and the priest were very important, as both were educated and motivated to make a difference in the village. However, they were not necessarily allies: in some cases, teachers were modern and skeptical of religion, while in others teachers and clergy had conflicting visions of political issues. This might even divide the community between those who trusted the teacher and those who trusted the priest.

Unfortunately, the *Table of Virtues* did not provide any details regarding the priest's skills in financial management or his political activity. This information is crucial for understanding the various cases of priests abusing their positions, as most reports by the secular authorities on priestly abuses addressed either financial or political misbehavior.

⁴⁶ *Sprava pro zynuvachennya svyashchennyka Kovcha Hryhoriya (z Lisovtsiv) v ahitatsiyi proty Avstriyskoyi vlady 1907–1908* [The case of the prosecution of priest Gregory Kovch (from Lisovtsi) in the campaign against the Austrian authorities]. TsDIAL [Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv] Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 5041.

⁴⁷ *The case of the prosecution of priest Gregory Kovch*, sprava 5041.

From the financial perspective, priests were responsible for the parish and the church lands that served as their source of income. Good management of this land could enrich a priest, but if it was managed badly priests could be tempted to raise the rates they charged for performing various sacraments to offset their losses. Additionally, priests' political engagement became increasingly important as their parishioners' political engagement grew. From the perspective of local authorities, politically engaged priests were a threat to peace within the community; from the Church's point of view, priests needed to compromise between their pastoral duties and their involvement in mass mobilization.

In most cases (unless there was a significant reason such as health conditions), priests were expected to teach religion at school;⁴⁸ this was the arena in which they could interact with and influence pupils. As was stated above, schools were places where priests could make alliances with other teachers or, conversely, develop mutual hostility. In many cases, teachers held views that were too secular for the priests to stomach; in addition, teachers, as secularized intellectuals with a modern worldview, often saw priests as overly traditional and conservative. In short, the relationships between local priests and teachers varied greatly. The quality of such relationships mattered a great deal for communities because they could be a source of reconciliation or confrontation.

An example of the arguments presented in this chapter is the case of Teodor Cegelskyj, Greek Catholic parish priest of the village of Strusov. It demonstrates how the secular duties of the priest and his political activity led to the involvement of secular and religious authorities in his own life and that of the village. The issue was addressed by the school inspector. He wrote a report which informed the Galician administration that Cegelskyj was using school pupils to organize and agitate people to take part in a political meeting.⁴⁹ The involvement of pupils in such an activity was a problem, as it raised the issue of the abuse of priestly duties. After receiving the school inspector's report, the Galician administration formally informed the Metropolitan's Consistory (a high-level church institution) that Cegelskyj was believed to be asking his pupils during religious education classes to spread an invitation to a Ruthenian/Ukrainian political gathering.⁵⁰ As priests were under the authority of religious institutions, it was now the

⁴⁸ *The case of the prosecution of priest Gregory Kovch, sprava 5041.*

⁴⁹ *Sprava pro zynuvachennya parokha s. Strusova Tsehel's'koho Teodora u vykorystanni uchniv dlya svoiykh nuzhd, hnoblennyu prykhozhan i nemoral'niy povedintsi* [The case of the prosecution against pastor Teodor Cegelskyj, parish priest of the village of Strusov, because of using students for his needs, the oppression of parishioners, and immoral behavior] 1906. TsDIAL: Fond 201, opys 2, sprava 788.

⁵⁰ *The case of the prosecution against pastor Teodor Cegelskyj, sprava 788.*

responsibility of the Metropolitan's Consistory to investigate what had really happened and to prevent future recurrences. The Vice-regency suggested prohibiting all priests from distracting pupils from their studies.

The Consistory stated in their response to the Vice-regency that Cegelskyj was not involved in encouraging pupils to participate in or organize any gatherings; rather, the pupils seemed to be acting on their own initiative. The Consistory's investigation proved that the Ruthenian political gathering was only for a small group of people: none of the pupils had been present. The only possible guilt that could be attributed to the priest was that he had not monitored the pupils' presence during his lessons, but a mistake of this sort was totally unrelated to politics or distracting the pupils from their studies.⁵¹ As a result of this careful and clearly structured answer from the Consistory, Cegelskyj was exonerated of any blame.

Thus, the Consistory, as an institution responsible for the proper behavior of priests, had the duty to re-assure the Vice-regency that priests were performing their work properly and were not causing any political problems. In addition, the case reveals that the representatives of communities, including priests, were tied together and observed one another's actions (like a teacher reporting a priest), especially in the field of political activity and mass mobilization. As discussed with regards to the *Table of Virtues*, priests had plenty of domains where their duties intersected with the duties of teachers and officials: thus, the position of the priest was multisided and allowed him to have influence on different spheres of public and religious life (i.e., social work, education, providing data on the population). In the next section of the chapter, I address the potential the priest's position had during the agricultural strikes of 1902, as the strikes were mass events that involved many villages and almost all their representatives. The example of the strikes provides more insights on the relations between different members of communities and demonstrates how the priests were able to contribute to mass mobilization in their parishes.

[Shaking the pillars: the agricultural strikes of 1902 as the first active involvement of the Greek Catholic clergy in mass mobilization](#)

Emerging out of a growing number of smaller strike actions, the agricultural strikes of 1902 were the first mass events with active peasant participation. Strikes throughout Europe were becoming a form of social manifestation, resistance, and demands for more

⁵¹ *The case of the prosecution against pastor Teodor Cegelskyj, sprava 788.*

rights.⁵² The agricultural strike of 1902 and the preparation for electoral reforms were a rehearsal and approbation of social activity for both clergy and laity. This strike was mainly addressed against landowners and demanded from them an increase in wage for peasants as well as allowing mobility for the villagers, and an allowance for peasant mobility. The strike was one of the first manifestations of mass mobilization in Eastern Galicia. It thus provides a good insight into the dynamics of mass mobilization as they developed from these early stages to the wider involvement of clergy and peasantry during the first election to use universal male suffrage (1907).

The agricultural strike was an example of coordinated action between peasants and their leaders, who very often were either local agitators or priests (sometimes one and the same person). The Greek and Roman Catholic clergy were challenged by the choice of whether to take an active or passive role during the strike, while the hierarchs were very worried about preserving peace and order among the laity. Thus, the strike was an opportunity, brought about by mass mobilization, to rethink the interactions between the clergy and laity in the public sphere.

The main reason for the strike of 1902 was the unsatisfactory salaries of peasant workers. They demanded increased salaries, as it was not possible to survive with the existing ones. The peasants threatened the landlords for whom they were working that they would not take part in collecting the harvest as the wage was too low.⁵³ Additionally, the peasants noted that they would prefer to travel to Prussia for seasonal work, as the salaries there were much higher. From their side, the property owners refused to raise salaries, arguing that they did not have enough money. The landlords threatened the peasants that they would invite workers from other parts of the province or even the empire, so the peasants would thus lose their only source of income for at least one season.⁵⁴ However, encouraged by information in the press, the peasants did not believe such threats, knowing that migrants would be much more expensive for the landlords than increasing salaries. Furthermore, it would take too long to actually bring them to the fields: the harvest would not be completed in time. As the peasants and

⁵² C. A. Bayly, *The birth of the modern world, 1780-1914: global connections and comparisons* (Malden, 2004), 455-469. Keely Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848-1914*, (London 2001), 12. Charles Tilly, *Durable Inequality* (Berkeley, 1998), 57.

⁵³ *Donesennyya starostv i orhanov politsyy o khode selsko-khozyaystvennykh zabastovok* [Reports from starostas and the police on the progress of agricultural strikes Volume 5, 1902]. TsDIAL: Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 3783.

⁵⁴ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3783.

landlords were quite codependent, they both had the means to pressure each other in disagreements over pay.

Poverty and the disadvantaged position of the peasants were discussed in the press and official documentation as the main causes of the strike. At most risk were those in regions where the peasants did not have enough land in their possession and needed to work for a landowner in order to earn some of the harvest for themselves. The starosta from Kolomyja, for example, was not worried about the strike because at his Bezirk [starostwo] peasants earned enough. He wrote to the Vice-regency that the strike would not be successful as the peasants were quite wealthy and worked for themselves, not the landowners.⁵⁵ Thus, the reason for the strike was initially economic: however, in the process of the strike other dimensions became visible, especially the difficulty in organizing the peasants to strike.

The main problem with the strike was to convince the majority of peasants to take part (not go to work), since, just as with workers breaking the picket line, this would inevitably weaken the strike. If all potential workers refused to work, then the pressure on the landowners would improve the chances of receiving higher salaries. Without the help of agitators, it would clearly be problematic to organize an effective strike.

The national democrats and socialists from the Ruthenian side supported and promoted the idea of strike action. Special brochures with precise descriptions on how to organize it were even spread in the villages. The brochure⁵⁶ advised that it was very important to prepare correctly before establishing strikes: it was particularly vital to elect a strike committee that would organize others, select the most effective time to strike, and then negotiate with landowners about salaries. The most important factor during the strike itself was to behave calmly and to be united. One of the agitators characterized it thus: “it should be as quiet in the village as in church.”⁵⁷ If there were any open tension, then this would be a reason for the starosta to use the military, an unnecessary turn for those on strike. So, the idea of united group pressure was probated by strikes. In various villages, the strikes led to better salaries for peasant work.

⁵⁵ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3779.

⁵⁶ Semen Vityk, *Yak Postupaty V Chasi Strayku?* [How to act in a time of strike?], (Chernivtsi, 1902). TsDIAL: Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 3785.

⁵⁷ Lonhyn Tsehel's'kyy, *Straykovi prava abo chy vil'no straykuvaty?* [“The right to strike, or is striking allowed?”], (Lviv, 1903), 6. TsDIAL: Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 3786.

This brochure used the slogan “from house to house, from hand to hand” as part of its title, emphasizing the importance of spreading it around.

Besides the peasants and agitators who organized the strike together, the clergy and local authorities were important actors that influenced the positive or negative outcome of the strike. In terms of the strike itself, the parish priests often were selected as negotiators between the landowners and the peasants. One of the best examples of clerical involvement is the case of the Greek Catholic priest Bohachevsky, who was also a deputy in parliament. Bohachevsky, together with the starosta, had to agree on the salaries for peasants: however, the negotiations did not go smoothly, as the starosta and the priest could not come to an agreement between themselves. The starosta suggested that the peasants agree on the landlord's proposition of an increased wage lower than the one the peasants required. He argued that nobody would give them a higher price. The priest supported the peasants in continuing the strike, and because of this the starosta accused the priest of blowing up the negotiations. The priest claimed that he was chosen by the governor to reach an agreement with the landlords and that the starosta was blocking him from doing so. In addition to this, priest Bohachevsky intended to collect factual information about the strike in order to discuss the issue in parliament and provide statistical data to clarify the reasons for the strike.⁵⁸

So, both negotiators, the starosta and the priest, had other motives for participating in the negotiations besides reaching an agreement for the peasants. For the starosta, it was important to end the strike and resume normal relations between the peasants and the landowners, while for the priest it was interesting to research the nature of the issue. Bohachevsky travelled to other villages to negotiate and collect data. There, other local starostas also expressed suspicions about him, as he was negotiating the prices only until April 1903. One starosta wrote to the Vice-regency that Bohachevsky was probably planning a new strike in 1903 with demands for higher salaries.⁵⁹ Therefore, the starostas suspected this priest of agitation and having a bad influence on social order.

Taking into account the possible danger of priests' communication with peasants, some starostas convinced the Vice-regency to send gendarmes to services in Greek Catholic churches, especially during religious holidays,⁶⁰ in order to keep an eye on what priests communicated to the laity. In addition, the gendarmes had to report their observations to the Vice-regency and organize regular watches during the Easter holidays. Thus, the holidays, with crowds of participants and the active role of priests,

⁵⁸ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3785.

⁵⁹ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3784.

⁶⁰ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3779.

were seen as potential preparation for future strikes. The local authorities were clearly concerned by the nature of holidays, which brought together and united large numbers of participants and presented opportunities for spreading dissent or fomenting it into public disturbance. Thus, the strike created the circumstances for a clash between the authority of the starosta and the priest; the future widening of the electoral laws only intensified this.

As the strikes were mostly organized by Ruthenian activists and clergy against a background of social injustice towards peasants, the question about the role of Roman Catholics in these events appears very natural. Even though the eastern part of Galicia had a majority of Greek Catholic Ruthenians, the villages had mixed Polish-Jewish-Ruthenian populations. Everything regarding the social position of Ruthenian peasants held true for Roman Catholic Poles. However, this was not true for Jews, as they normally did not work in agriculture. Therefore, the idea of uniting against injustice and the low payments offered by property owners was as hot for the Polish peasants as it was for the Ruthenians. However, it was the Ruthenian priests and activists who inspired the strike, and they posed the question: “What to do with Roman Catholic peasants?”⁶¹ The answer to this question was not easy, as some of the agitators appealed only to oppressed Ruthenians and named Poles as a cause of suffering. Other agitators encouraged engagement with the Roman Catholic peasantry in order to inspire them to strike as well: after all, they “had the same problems and all peasants are united by the same interests.”⁶²

The local lawyer Lonhyn Tselhel's'kyy's brochure *Straykovi prava abo chy vil'no straykuvaty?* [“The right to strike, or is striking allowed?”], published in Lemberg in 1903, elaborated on this idea, arguing that both types of peasant (Roman and Greek Catholic) “were neighbors, blood relatives, having one language and one tradition and thus should be united”.⁶³ However, the problem was that there were interested parties (the Roman Catholic clergy and Polish agitators) who wanted to convince Roman Catholics that they were different from Ruthenians.⁶⁴ At this point in mass mobilization (the initial stage), there were still a lot of bridges that united the two rites, especially among those belonging to same social stratum (peasantry). In addition, mutual and long-

⁶¹ Tselhel's'kyy, *Straykovi prava*, 9.

⁶² “The Latin (Roman Catholic) peasant has the same problems and all peasants have the same interests”. [all translations are my own]. Tselhel's'kyy. *Straykovi prava*, 9.

⁶³ Tselhel's'kyy, *Straykovi prava*, 9.

The author of this brochure was the son of a Greek Catholic priest: a lawyer and political activist, he was elected to parliament (1908) and the Sejm (1913). I. Datskiv, M. Polych, “Lonhyn Tselhel's'kyy v istoriyi ukrayins'koyi dyplomatyi” [Lonhyn Tselhel's'kyy in the history of Ukrainian diplomacy], *Ukrayins'kyi istorychnyy zhurnal* [Ukrainian historical journal] 522, no. 3 (2015): 108-121.

⁶⁴ Tselhel's'kyy, *Straykovi prava*, 9.

lasting coexistence had created plenty of similarities between the Greek and Roman Catholics (Poles and Ruthenians, respectively). With the further nationalization and politicization of the Ruthenian and Poles, these similarities were undermined while differences (rite, origin, etc.) were emphasized. This is very visible in the preparation for the election of 1907, which I discuss in chapters four and five.

The Roman Catholic clergy was also seen as breaking the unity between the Roman and Greek Catholic peasantry by, for example, supporting and promoting the idea to ignore strikes among Roman Catholic peasantry, since this peasantry had to support Roman Catholic property owners.⁶⁵ However, this hypothesis regarding the role of the Roman Catholic clergy was expressed by Ruthenians, so it is unlikely to have been true. The important idea behind this statement was that Roman Catholics were considered potential supporters of Ruthenian ideas: there was still no clear way to distinguish between Ruthenians and Poles besides rite.

The hierarchy of the Church could not ignore the strike and felt the need to express their opinion about it. The Roman Catholic Archbishop Jozef Bilczewsky stated: “The peasants had a right to fight for their rights in a calm and just way”⁶⁶ however he emphasized that it is important for the peasants to ask for a realistic wage, not one that is too high. The Ukrainian oriented newspaper *Dilo*, while discussing instructions of the Roman Catholic archbishop, wrote immediately that the Roman Catholic clergy was against strikes and instead of supporting peasants, the priests were scaring them, claiming that those who strike would go to hell.⁶⁷ Certainly, *Dilo* is not an adequate source if we take into account its ideological preferences. However, what is important is that the newspaper emphasized the negative attitude of the Roman Catholic clergy towards strikes, thus contributing to worsening the relations with the Roman Catholic clergy and discouraging the laity from possible participation in the strikes. This concern highlighted that the position of the local clergy, as well as the interpretation of this position in the press, was a very important condition for the successful outcome of the strike.

The position of Greek Catholic Archbishop Andrej Sheptytsky was similar to that of the Roman Catholic bishop. Sheptytsky emphasized in his appeal about strikes that “parish priests had to remind peasants to act calmly, legally, and to avoid any kind

⁶⁵ Tsehel's'kyy, *Straykovi prava*, 8-9.

⁶⁶ “Straykovi Spravy” [Strikes' deeds], *Ruslan*, July, 26, 1902.

⁶⁷ “Khlops'ki Strayky” [Peasants' strikes] *Dilo*, July, 17, 1902.

of violence.”⁶⁸ However, the archbishop also provided precise instructions for the clergy, asking them to report to him about the strikes and to remember that the parish clergy could do a lot regarding the matter of strikes, as they lived close to the people and could be a mediator between the peasants and property owners.⁶⁹ Thus, the Greek Catholic archbishop defined clearly what the role of the clergy should be during strikes. Publishing the appeal of the archbishop, the Ukrainian-oriented clerical newspaper *Ruslan* stated that there were no doubts that priests would listen to the words of the archbishop and act accordingly. So, actively engaged priests were seen as a good tool in the success of strikes, since they could calm the peasants and help them to get better wages.

As was already discussed, local authorities, mainly the starostas, saw a mobilizing potential in priests and thus kept an eye on them. The starosta of the town of Rohatyn was extremely worried that the clergy would be inspired by radical politicians and help them to organize strikes. The starosta explained his fear: “the priest in each parish could prepare the ground for the strike without any additional efforts and gatherings.”⁷⁰ For the starosta, the most serious problem was that it would be very hard for him to predict the strike, as the priest could organize everything silently and without drawing unnecessary attention. Thus, the starosta was powerless to prevent the strike from happening. Under such circumstances, local officials were more suspicious about the parish clergy and transmitted the message to local government that the clergy were the main, or at least very important, organizers of the strike.

Earlier, the same starosta claimed that his district was very calm, mainly because the clergy were against strikes. The starosta argued that “the priests wanted the peasants to be submissive and obedient to clergy.”⁷¹ This, in his opinion, was the reason why strikes had not occurred in the district: “In the case of the clergy’s neutral attitude to the strikes, the strike would spread.”⁷² As is evident from the paragraph above, the priests had actually changed their attitude and become supportive of the strikes. In his turn, the starosta became more attentive to their behavior, as for him the opinion of the priest was decisive. Thus, the clergy were becoming important public leaders in their communities and were treated as such by starostas. Later on, this experience would motivate priests

⁶⁸ “Kurenda vseopreosvyashchenoho mytropolyta” [Kurenda of His Eminence, the Metropolitan], *Ruslan*, July, 30, 1902.

⁶⁹ “Kurenda vseopreosvyashchenoho mytropolyta”.

⁷⁰ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3788.

⁷¹ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3786.

⁷² *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3786.

to become the active promoters of electoral reforms and to mobilize peasants to support them.

There were examples of priests who were not successful organizers of strikes. For example, the starosta from Borshchov reported that the priest of the village of Dzvinyachka, Dmytro Kurdydyk, had criticized his laity during the sermon, claiming that the laity “were sitting like fools and not taking part in strikes.”⁷³ He advised the peasants to take those who were striking as an example, as such people were caring about themselves and their children.⁷⁴ Such a speech during a religious service was reason enough for gendarmes to detain some peasants and question them as witnesses. However, the peasants told them that they had not understood the speech or were standing too far from the altar to hear it properly. Apparently, the laymen did not want to testify against their own priest. The local starosta was not so worried about the priest’s speech, explaining that the priest gave it after the harvest and thus it was too late to strike.⁷⁵ Peasants could succeed if they struck before or during the harvest because the property owners had a limited window of time. Afterwards, they could hire peasants from other regions and the strike would not be fruitful. The example of the priest Kurdydyk shows that some priests were even using religious services to mobilize peasants and to criticize their laity for being passive. Additionally, the laity, even after being criticized, aimed to protect their priest from possible accusations/court trials, most likely out of respect for or fear of the priest.

Little is known about the political orientation of the clergy who were actively involved in the strike. Two types of priestly political behavior were most evident according to the observation of starostas. Thus, it is possible to assume that at least two political parties were engaged in the strikes. One priest-activist, Stephan Onyshkevych, was characterized by a starosta as one of the leaders of the Ruthenian Radical Party.⁷⁶ This priest, besides agitating for a strike, also supported the idea that bishops and archbishops should be elected, not appointed, in the Greek Catholic Church. In this way, the Church sought to become more independent from the preferences of local or state power. Most likely, the idea that the priest belonged to the Radical Party was just assumption of the starosta, as this party was criticized⁷⁷ by Church hierarchs and the

⁷³ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3786.

⁷⁴ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3786.

⁷⁵ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3786.

⁷⁶ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3779.

⁷⁷ For more details, please see chapter 2.

priest could have been persecuted for such a political preference. Nevertheless, the Radical Party was an active organizer of the strikes.⁷⁸

In contrast, the Russophile Party and the priests involved in it were spreading ideas about the negative side of the strikes and trying to prevent them from happening. The main argument that Russophiles used against strikes was that the landowners were the only source of income for peasants; by striking or damaging landlords' property, the peasants would only become poorer.⁷⁹ Thus, the engagement or support of certain political parties created mutually exclusive ideas among the clergy and contributed to their division into hostile camps.

The clergy therefore held considerable influence and sway over the laity. They were able to influence mobilization in terms of strikes, depending upon the level of political engagement or motivation of an individual priest. The examples detailed above clearly show the potential of priests as political organizers. They also show that while priests were not universally political active, some were willing and able to work on their own initiative, independent of their religious superiors. In terms of society overall, it is also evident from the strikes of 1902 that the peasants were becoming increasingly aware and courageous about exercising the power to withhold labour as a form of protest or political influence. In addition, the desire of the starostas to always retain quiet public order put them at odds with the more politically engaged priests. Whilst both the Church and the secular authorities had an interest in maintaining public order, it is clear that the religious paternalism felt by priests towards their laity shaped their relationship to mobilizing peasants. For priests who saw their role as being more political, supporting their laity in political mobilization would undoubtedly create tension with the local starostas. With the growing politicization created by universal male suffrage in 1907, the role of the Catholic clergy and tensions with starostas were only to increase.

[Building new pillars: electoral reforms and the role of the Catholic clergy](#)

In 1906, the Austrian monarchy was widely discussing the idea of universal male suffrage to elect deputies to imperial parliament and the utility of such a reform throughout the empire. The provinces saw great potential in such a reform, as it would bring more local representatives to the imperial parliament. Galicia was no exception. During strikes, numerous peasants had learned to move their fight with the property

⁷⁸ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3788.

⁷⁹ *Reports from starostas and the police*, sprava 3783.

owners into the public sphere: electoral reform seemed to be the next step for gaining better living conditions. Kai Struve and Keely Stauter-Halsted emphasize that the peasants had learned how to be active in this public and political spheres,⁸⁰ and this brought them skills and the desire to fight for their own rights, such as the right to vote. John Boyer highlighted that for many contemporaries the reform of 1907 seemed like “the equivalent of giving the Habsburg Empire a new constitution.”⁸¹ Boyer claims that certain groups, such as “the Czechs, the workers, and the petite bourgeoisie, and from an ideological perspective, both the Social Democrats and the Catholics”,⁸² were great supporters of the electoral reforms and saw huge potential in them. In the 1950s, William Jenks analyzed in detail the antecedents and mechanisms of the reform.⁸³ Pieter Judson focuses on the results of the reforms of 1897 and 1907, emphasizing that the reforms themselves “repeatedly challenged existing political movements either to absorb and mobilize new classes of voters into their ranks or to risk obsolescence.”⁸⁴ In summary, the reform was welcomed warmly throughout the empire as it offered new possibilities for different social and national groups.

In Galicia, the clergy of both rites were also trying their best to mobilize the peasants to support the planned reforms. After the experience that parochial clergy had gained during the strikes of 1902, they were more aware of the power within the mobilized masses. Thus, in 1906-1907, when the acceptance of the new electoral law was on the table, the clergy already had respect for mass power and an idea of how to organize peasants in support of this reform. The parish priests knew that they could play an important role in mobilizing their laity. The chance to practice this role was provided by the preparation and discussion of a new electoral law that would provide any man over 25 in all the crown lands of the empire with the possibility to vote. This was a huge new opportunity for the peasants, who until then had no real influence on the political powers. The change was even greater for the so-called Ruthenian ‘minority’ (actually, their population was the same size as the ‘majority’ but held the legal status of a ‘minority’). The political reform was more significant for Ruthenians as they could redress the balance of ‘ethnic power’ by electing more representatives to parliament and

⁸⁰ Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village*, 2. Kai Struve, “Citizenship and National Identity: The Peasants of Galicia During the 19th Century,” in *Societal Change and Ideological Formation Among the Rural Population of the Baltic Area 1880–1939*, ed. Piotr Wawrzyniuk, Piotr (Huddinge, 2008), 90.

⁸¹ John W. Boyer “Power, Partisanship, and the Grid of Democratic Politics: 1907 as the Pivot Point of Modern Austrian History,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 44 (2013): 148.

⁸² Boyer “Power, Partisanship, and the Grid of Democratic Politics,” 154.

⁸³ For more details see: William Jenks, *The Austrian electoral reform of 1907* (Columbia University Press, 1950), 227.

⁸⁴ Pieter Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Harvard University Press, 2016), 206.

challenge the Polish-centric representation of Galician interests. Thus, for the Greek Catholic clergy it was even more important to engage the laity and push them into actively supporting electoral reforms and further elections: in doing so, they could really change the existing order of things.

In most cases (based on the reports of starostas and responses from the Vice-regency), the main activity of the priests was to organize or participate in the gatherings that supported electoral reforms and use their position in the community to encourage the laity to do the same. Below, I analyze the typical motivation and scenario of such gatherings, the role of the priest and laity, and the political ideas they spread. Such an analysis unveils how mass mobilization began in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, why the clergy were important activists in it, and what ideas served best to mobilize the peasantry into the political domain. Certainly, not all the representatives of the parish clergy were involved in the mass mobilization of the laity. However, based on official reports about gatherings from starostas, the priests were very active participants in most of the meetings in 1906-07.

The main motivation for the clergy was to encourage the laity's participation in elections, and thus elect deputies with strong Christian values and Catholic support. For the laity, the most important motivation was the possibility to improve their status and position within society. The gatherings themselves were an opportunity to discuss various ideas related to electoral reforms, as well as issues that were not directly related but were considered extremely important. One such issue was the inequality of access to power for Ruthenians and Poles, as well as the economic disadvantages of the peasantry in comparison to property owners (the latter was a continuation of the issue that caused the strikes in 1902).⁸⁵ Certainly, the priest and laity were not the only participants in the gatherings: there were also local officials and, in some cases, gendarmes who observed and upheld public order. In many cases, representatives of the political parties participated at the gatherings, as they were preparing the ground for the future election. All these participants brought their own perspectives and motivations on the importance of the reforms and the opportunities they brought.

Speaking about the Ruthenian gatherings, one of the starostas characterized them in the following way: "the agitators are the youth and professors from the gymnasium ... students and priests that put on themselves the role of participants and organizers of the movement. In general, the idea of agitation is to enlighten Ruthenian peasants and

⁸⁵ Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, 93.

encourage them to be patriotic, but they (the agitators) are also stimulating hatred towards Poles and landowners.”⁸⁶ Thus, the starosta briefly characterized the audience and motivations of those organizing the gatherings. He explained further his struggle with this movement: “it is hard to trace the movement, as it is developing in reading houses, during closed meetings or gatherings of the clergy.”⁸⁷ In such circumstances, the details of the movement were not accessible to the starosta, and he could not identify what level of hatred between nationalities and social groups would emerge.

Some parish clergy were not politically engaged. On the one hand, the clergy lost their importance in communities to political agitators. As John-Paul Himka summarized, “priests taught peasants the importance of political action, but this necessarily implied their own displacement from the center of the political stage.”⁸⁸ Very often, the political activists took the leading role in mobilizing peasants. The starosta of the town of Nadvirna stated that political agitators mobilized peasants in the town and made them aggressive towards the clergy and nobility.⁸⁹ On the other hand, there could be other explanations for why some clergy avoided politics (not only fear of agitators). In a few cases, the parish priest had not realized the importance of mass mobilization and the need to be actively involved in it, whilst others considered public activity as optional or as a distraction from their core priestly duties. Very often, the clergy saw their role as mediators or keepers of public order. In such a situation, the parish priests were not leaders but still participated in public activity to calm the peasants when things became tense.

The actions of the Greek Catholic hierarchy were especially motivating for the behavior of priests. The bishops preached how crucial it was for the clergy to organize the peasants to support electoral reforms and how much potential the clergy held given that they were the ones closest to the peasants. The role of the clergy in the public sphere was motivated not only by instructions from the bishops but also by the possibility to improve the social and economic position of the laity. I emphasize economic improvement as an element of agitation in the next chapter when discussing cases about the political preferences and conflicts that the clergy experienced.

The Catholic clergy and Jews in light of future mass suffrage

⁸⁶ *Materialy pro borot'bu za zahal'ne vyborche pravo* [Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage]. TsDIAL: Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 3642.

⁸⁷ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3642.

⁸⁸ Himka, *The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society*, 450.

⁸⁹ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3636.

The other motivation for clergy to become active mobilizers was to prevent peasants from possible troubles, such as imprisonment and clashes with Jews: the gathered crowds might become uncontrolled and aggressive. Very often when raising the issue of societal inequality, one of the reasons given for such inequality was the position of Jews, who rented various things (but mainly the right to sell vodka) from the nobility and then sold them to peasants.⁹⁰ Thus, the Jews were seen as speculators who did not work hard but extracted money from the industrious peasants. For the parish priest, it was extremely important to calm any agitations against the Jews, mainly because the threat to public peace would result in the imprisonment of peasants and a long prohibition on gatherings. As mentioned previously, the priests were influenced by a paternalistic view of the laity and their rights, and so were reluctant to see actions that would allow starostas to cancel the right to assemble. Furthermore, if gatherings were prohibited the potential for the Church to get their message to the flock and influence political change would be seriously damaged. However, some priests found a way to deliver their message in such circumstances, as is visible in other chapters of the thesis: they managed to use sermons during the religious service as a tool to agitate the laity.

The attitude to Jews, which was announced at various gatherings, had two sides. On the one side, various gatherings, while requiring election reforms for Ruthenians, also mentioned the importance of electoral reforms for Jews, in particular the opportunity to have their own representatives in parliament. At first glance, such declarations seem like evidence of tolerance; however, this was not the sole factor. Ruthenians were concerned that if Jews did not have their own representatives, they would try to be elected as Ruthenian representatives. In addition, Jews were considered as possible allies against Poles. This was actually a practice during the 1907 parliamentary elections, when the Ruthenians and Jews allied and supported each other's candidates.⁹¹ If Ruthenian representatives were not available to vote for in some places, then they voted for the Jewish candidate, and vice versa: this was tactical vote swapping.

The other side was the presence of agitation against Jews based on clearly anti-semitic ideas. Such agitation was not dominant, but it was present: at least two priests were active representatives of it. The starosta of the town of Rudky (50 km from Lemberg) complained to the Vice-regency that the local priest Stefan Onyshkevych was writing articles with an anti-semitic message for the newspaper *Dilo*: the starosta noted

⁹⁰ Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, 305.

⁹¹ Joshua Shanes, Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern "An Unlikely Alliance: The 1907 Ukrainian Jewish Electoral Coalition," in *Nations and Nationalism* 3, (2009): 483-505.

that because nobody knew about his writings, it was easy and secure for him to continue doing so.⁹² The neighboring priest Julian Humieckyj (from the village of Horozhava Velyka), who encouraged people to boycott Jewish business and goods, was definitely an ally of Onyshkevych.⁹³ Thus, there were two mutually exclusive ideas: to fight with the Jews (by supporting Jewish candidates in the absence of a Ruthenian one) or against the Jews (boycott them and their businesses). Both were present in the gatherings and developed further in the press.

Relations between Poles and Ruthenians

Also at the core of most gatherings were the relations between Poles and Ruthenians. During various gatherings, the main subject of attention besides electoral reform itself was social inequality and injustice. In many cases, the reason for social inequality was seen in the advanced position of some other nationality. Poles, like Jews, were blamed for causing the poverty and suffering of the Ruthenian peasants. Some activists distinguished between the Polish nobility, which actually possessed most of the resources in Galicia, and Polish peasants, who were just as unprivileged as Ruthenians.⁹⁴ However, some activists generalized and built an argument against the Polish nation as the cause of all social problems. Such generalization and polarization between nationalities is extremely visible in the violent clashes that I analyze in the last chapter of the thesis.

Upcoming election reforms and the woman question

The widening of women's rights was also among the questions raised at the gatherings. However, this issue was not as popular as discussing relations between nationalities or social injustice. The reasons for this are quite evident: the women's rights movement was still growing and the question of emancipation was more typical for the urban sphere than the rural one. Even so, a couple of gatherings spoke specifically about women's rights. At a gathering in Vrozhniava, the priest Andrij Pelenskyj agitated for political equality for women, arguing that women had duties equally as complicated as men's and thus needed to have equal rights.⁹⁵ Pelenskyj repeated the same arguments at other gatherings.

The participation of women was mentioned in a number of other gatherings. In most cases, women were part of the gathering and thus participated in all actions related

⁹² *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3636.

⁹³ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3636.

⁹⁴ Himka, *The Greek Catholic Church*, 435.

⁹⁵ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3662.

to it. At the gathering in Gorlice in 1906, the female activist Kazimiera Bujwidowa spoke. She argued that women should have the right to vote as they worked even harder than men: at home *and* at work.⁹⁶ A number of gatherings led by priests also supported women's suffrage using similar arguments. This was a very important sign for women, as in the majority of cases they were very religious and would not have become involved without the blessing of the clergy. Thus the support of local clergy encouraged women to be politically active within the constraints of the time. Further in the thesis, I refer to other ideas and examples of women's roles in politics and the struggle for electoral rights.

In conclusion, the role of the parochial clergy was very important in organizing and leading various gatherings. The parochial priests knew their laity and had authority among them, making them able to transmit the message most appealing to the lay people. Most of all, the priests worked on keeping the peace in their villages: this was essential in order to avoid prohibitions against gatherings or the involvement of gendarmes and the military, which would totally stop any public participation for a while. Whilst the clergy were separated between the Roman or Greek Catholic rites and generally along national lines, there was a clear understanding that national or ethnic motivations for uniting could lead to unwanted disorder. Thus we see the clergy operating flexibly within their own lay communities as mediators or, more directly, as political agitators.

The common scenario and the message of the gatherings

The gatherings served two main purposes: to inform peasants about electoral laws and to help them recognize the possible benefits of universal male suffrage; and to gather signatures in support of the electoral law. Thus, the core activity of the gatherings was to adopt some resolution, sign it, and send it as a telegram to the Minister of the Interior. The main goal of the organizers was to emphasize that the peasants were ready for political change and to fight for this change. In various rallies, the idea was brought up that the peasants would organize a massive strike if they were defeated.⁹⁷ This threat was a direct result of the strikes discussed in the previous section. These events revealed to peasants that strikes were a powerful tool for influencing society and that they actually had something to use against social injustice.

The gatherings devoted to the support of electoral reform needed to receive approval from the local authorities (starostas) to be legal. Normally, if all the paper work

⁹⁶ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3664.

⁹⁷ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3638.

(this included announcing the program and topics of the gathering) was organized properly, the starostas allowed gatherings.⁹⁸ Typically, the gatherings took place on Sunday in some large hut in the village or at the priest's home. Very often, it was the priest who took care of the organization, place, and agenda of the gatherings. In a majority of the rallies, a representative of the Vice-regency was present and observed if the gathering was properly organized and followed the topics announced to the starosta.⁹⁹ Frequently, the gathering took place just after the religious service, and most of the laity present at the service, including women and children, moved to the place of the rally. This meant that there was a wide and varied audience at the gatherings: a priest was also very often at the core of the organization.

When a priest was the leader of a gathering, he started it with a prayer and then moved on to a short lecture about what the electoral law meant and how it would contribute to improving the lives of the laity. The lecture itself could be prepared by a priest or be read from the very popular brochure *Proch z kuryyamy! Proch z panovaniyem paniv* [Away with the curias! Away with the dominance of the nobility], written by Lonhyn Tshel's'kyy.¹⁰⁰ At some gatherings, only the priest spoke. Even when the priests encouraged discussion or suggested giving the stage to other presenters after his speech, villagers preferred to remain passive. Most likely, they were not confident and knowledgeable enough to express their thoughts at this stage of mass mobilization. As will be visible in other chapters of the thesis, this passivity changed with time (especially during the election in 1907) and the laity became much more active in voicing their needs. Thus, the public work of priests bore results.

There were also gatherings that involved more presenters than just a priest. In most cases, these were gatherings in larger villages or small towns with participants from neighboring villages. The priests of these villages encouraged their laity to participate and attended the rally together with them to serve as an example.¹⁰¹ The most dynamic were gatherings in which political activists took part along with the priests. In these cases, the same message about the importance of electoral reform was expressed from both secular and sacral representatives. In addition, such gatherings were also an

⁹⁸ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3639.

⁹⁹ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3639.

¹⁰⁰ Lonhyn Tshel's'kyy, *Proch z kuryyamy! Proch z panovaniyem paniv* [Away with the curias! Away with the dominance of the nobility], (Lviv, 1905).

The brochure was an instruction on what electoral reform was, how to explain it to peasants, and how to organize lectures on the subject. It was a useful manual for clergy and political activists who were just starting to work with the peasantry. During some gatherings, the only activity was to read the brochure aloud. *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*. TsDIAL: Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 3642.

¹⁰¹ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3639.

example of dialogue between active priests and agitators.¹⁰² This dialogue might have been mutually supportive or mutually antagonistic. However, intense confrontation was not possible because of the presence of the representative of the Vice-regency, who could cancel the gathering at any moment if he considered it a threat to public order. None of the presenters wanted this to happen, so they tried not to cause deep confrontation.

At the end of the gatherings, the participants normally signed or voted to support some resolution on the issue of electoral reforms. Typically, they appealed to the Minister of the Interior to grant universal male suffrage, more representatives for their nationality, and the right for women to vote (in some cases).¹⁰³ Occasionally, there was a threat in the appeal that if the requests were not fulfilled, then the peasants would organize a large strike.¹⁰⁴ Some brochures (for example, *Away with the curias! Away with the dominance of the nobility*) read at the gatherings stated that “the imperial government agreed to introduce the electoral reforms because of the fear that the Austrian monarchy would fall apart.”¹⁰⁵ According to the brochure, citizens should pressure the government to implement the reforms.

After the gatherings, the appeal was telegraphed to Vienna. So, the aim of the gatherings to give participants the feeling that important action had been accomplished was partially achieved. This feeling became even stronger after the introduction of universal suffrage, as it was seen as a victory to those who supported electoral reforms in the gatherings. The victory also proved that it was possible to require more equitable laws from the government.¹⁰⁶ Thus, after the agricultural strikes, the electoral reform was seen as the next win by common citizens and inspiration for the future fight for a more just society.

The last, but by no means least, element of the gatherings was the ending. At the end of many gatherings, its participants sang songs and organized a march through the streets while singing. The repertoire of songs depended on the atmosphere and political context of the gatherings. If the atmosphere was neutral, they sang religious songs about God and his love for his people, but if the gatherings had a patriotic component, the songs were devoted to a certain nationality or even against other nationalities in the cases

¹⁰² *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3638.

¹⁰³ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3638.

¹⁰⁴ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3640.

¹⁰⁵ Tsehel's'kyy, *Proch z kuryyamy! Proch z panovaniyem paniv*.

¹⁰⁶ In reality, it was not the appeals from peasant gatherings that had the most effect on the adoption of universal male suffrage, but the peasants were not familiar with complex politics of the state. They rather saw tevents from their own perspective: from this view, it looked as if the appeals from the gatherings had made a big difference. *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3640.

of more radical gatherings (for example, the Ruthenian song “It is not a time to serve Poles”).¹⁰⁷ Thus, the participants, even when passive during the gatherings themselves, had a chance to take an active part in spreading ideas in a more informal and relaxing way, in particular by composing and performing songs with certain messages.

Even though Galician villages normally consisted of more than one nationality and the widening of the electoral system was beneficial for every nationality, gatherings in support of the electoral reforms were organized separately. One of the reasons for this separation was the leadership role of the priest. As the priests were organizers and encouragers of the gatherings, they had access only to their own laity, which mainly consisted of one nationality. This worked to exclude other nationalities from participation (especially the Jews, who had a totally different religious leader). The other reason was a slightly different interpretation of the electoral reforms by the activists. The Ruthenian activists, including clergy, highlighted that an increased number of deputies would be a fairer and more desirable solution for the problems of Ruthenians. However, Polish activists, also including clergy, emphasized that the number of Ruthenian deputies should remain low: otherwise, the Ruthenians could challenge Polish dominance in the province.¹⁰⁸ Certainly, these two ideas could not work well together at the same gatherings: they were mutually exclusive and contributed to tensions between the nationalities.

Nobody was interested in having gatherings that had representatives from different nationalities. For local officials, this was a threat to public order; for the priest, a threat to his authority and influence over the laity; and for national and other activists, an awkward situation that required the defense and explanation of their views. Only a few gatherings were multinational. One of them took place in 1906 in the village of Rodatychi, where Ruthenian and Polish parish priests led the gathering. The gathering itself did not express strong political ideas and was characterized as calm. However, the Roman Catholic priest was not a good speaker: he had not prepared properly and spoke about the threat of socialism rather than electoral reforms, so he was asked to stop. The gathering ended and the majority of its participants walked to the Ruthenian gathering in a neighboring village.¹⁰⁹ In this case, the mutual gathering was not very effective or interesting for its participants, as one of the priests was more active than the other.

¹⁰⁷ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3638.

¹⁰⁸ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3655.

¹⁰⁹ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3658.

The other example of a mutual gathering was the Polish-organized gathering in the village of Lanky. At this gathering, the Ruthenian peasants wanted to present in Ruthenian, but the leader of the rally, the Roman Catholic priest Lozinsky, objected to the use of Ruthenian, saying: “At a Polish gathering, the Polish language should be used.”¹¹⁰ This statement provoked quarrels between the Ruthenian and Polish participants. Thus, the local officials and gendarmes present announced the cancellation of the meeting. The starosta wrote in his report that this was a Ruthenian plan to sabotage the Polish gathering and thus only have Ruthenian gatherings in the region.¹¹¹

In conclusion, this closer look at the gatherings reveals precisely how the parish priests acted and motivated the laity to take part in mass mobilization. The most important observation is that religious practices were integrated into the public sphere, demonstrating how the Church and its representatives were incorporating Catholic and political actions into mutually complementary social behavior. Gatherings centred around the priest of a particular rite therefore took on a degree of ‘ethnic’ exclusivity. For priests of different rites, nationality and political mobilization were becoming intertwined.

The component of nationalism in the gatherings

The political and social ideas expressed during the gatherings were the basis on which the main motivation for mass participation was constructed. As I already discussed, the core of this motivation was social injustice and the poor economic position of the peasants. This focus was used by all nationalities and so was not national at its core. However, due to disproportionate representation in parliament as well as the increased activity of national activists, nation-building processes were more and more associated with mass mobilization and even equated with it.

A poster advertising a Ruthenian gathering is a great example of the political-religious reinforcement discussed above. Firstly, the poster made a point about the disparity between the number of deputies that peasants and nobles had in parliament. Then it stated that a new electoral law would challenge this inequality for the good of the peasants and that the peasants totally deserved this change as they were more hardworking and useful for the state than the nobility. The poster summarized the main motivation in the following words: “At this gathering should be everybody who values our faith, who appreciates our native language, who wants good for himself, his children,

¹¹⁰ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3656.

¹¹¹ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3656.

and grandchildren, who values his holy land, and who wants to be his own host/master on his Ruthenian land”.¹¹² This quotation is an excellent example of the intersection of sacral and secular values (and, respectively, of the sacral and secular spheres), as well as of a certain logic of establishing equivalence between the religious and the national (faith as equal to native language, the good, and holy land). This was a common strategy for integrating pre-established sacral values into new political values (native land, culture, faith, etc.). Within the next few years, this connection between Catholic and national values would develop further: in the following chapters, it will be demonstrated how the Church actually incorporated the equivalence between love of God and love of the Motherland.

The Roman Catholic Church was following the same process of rapprochement between patriotic (and, in some interpretations, nationalistic) values and religious ones. At the gathering in Brzezia (in 1906), the representative of the People’s Party, Franciszek Bardel, emphasized that equality in the election law was required to fulfil the Christian principle of the equality of people before God and the law. The other speaker at this gathering, Kaetan Kalas, emphasized the importance of solidarity between working people, nobility and clergy: “People should unite for the love of Motherland and respect of religion.”¹¹³ This example reveals how political party (in this case Stronnictwo ludowe [People’s Party]) was using alliance with the Roman Catholic Church for promotion of their own ideology.

A similar message was pronounced by the politically active clergy of the Roman Catholic Church. For example, the priest and deputy Zyhulinsky stated that electoral reform was a requirement of the times and that the Catholic Church had always been very good at adapting itself to such needs. Thus, the electoral reform would only reinforce the social role of the Church, which meant the clergy should openly support this reform.¹¹⁴ A similar idea was expressed by the priest Stojalowski, who emphasized the importance of Christian love and unity under the motto of “God and Motherland”, as well as relying on Evangelical and patriotic values.¹¹⁵ Thus, through the mutually supporting mottos coming from clergy and political activists, the Roman and Greek churches were, step by step, becoming part of political life by adopting elements of the nationalist movement.

¹¹² *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3639.

¹¹³ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3638.

¹¹⁴ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3662.

¹¹⁵ *Materials on the struggle for universal suffrage*, sprava 3662.

Conclusions

Within Galician communities, the clergy held a position of influence. Through this influence came the opportunity to motivate and coordinate peasant involvement in mass mobilization. The extent of a priest's involvement depended largely on an individual priest's goals and perceived responsibilities. What is evident is that many priests, in line with the *Table of Virtues*, perceived it as their duty and responsibility to take a fatherly view of the peasants, which increasingly included becoming involved in politicisation.

One of the the first opportunities for priests to explore their potential role in exercising influence on the laity was as mediators for strikes. In some cases, priests took an active role in assisting with the mobilisation of peasants for strike action. In other cases, they acted solely as mediators between disgruntled strikers and landowners or local officials. In both these instances, the involvement of priests created tension with the local starostas, who wanted to retain public order. The strikes of 1902 thus show the emerging signs of an increasingly political role for priests and the potential areas of tension that would later increase between individual priests, starostas, the Church hierarchy, and the secular authorities.

The 1906 political movement subsequently presented the opportunity for priests to have a more official role as mediators or even leaders and become more widely involved in community life. The Catholic Church recognised the need to take on this role but also that it had to more closely guide the involvement of its priests. The foci of the Church emerge more clearly – countering socialist threats; cementing their ‘religious role’ alongside the political duty to further the well-being of their ‘flock’; and demonstrating the importance of Catholic values and institutions in public life. It is through the active involvement of the clergy in 1906 (organising gatherings, preaching, and publishing news articles and brochures) that we see how the Church was trying to maneuver during a time of great upheaval.

Chapter 2. The Catholic hierarchy on the role of clergy and women in the process of mass mobilization

The two important aspects that served as guidelines for the clergy's involvement in the mass mobilization process were the vision of the Church's hierarchs on clerical political participation and the perception of women's role in the social and political fields. I combined these two issues into one chapter as they have a number of similarities and were directed to groups whose traditional role was in question. Both topics had the potential to very strongly question the existing societal order and even threaten the domination of the Catholic Church. Clergymen and women were developing their own strategies on how to respond to and act in the new circumstances of mass mobilization. For the Church, it was also important to examine and evaluate the social and political involvement of the clergy and women and support them if such activity was not contrary to Catholic doctrine or the hierarchy.

In this chapter, I analyze the activism of the parochial clergy as well as the Catholic women's movement inspired by the activism of the clergy. This is why I suggest discussing the activity of clergy and women together, as it was strongly interconnected. In the case of the Roman Catholic Church and its highly urbanized laity, clerical and women activists focused their work on the socialization and education of workers and servants. The Greek Catholic Church had a different approach, as the majority of its parochial clergy were married and so had wives and daughters involved in helping them take care of the laity. Greek Catholic women related to the clergy were often the only educated women in the village and set an example to peasant women.¹¹⁶ Despite the difference in rite, both sets of clerical and women activists had a similar task: to work closely with the laity and promote Catholic-based views among it.

For both clerical and women activists, universal male suffrage brought new, unexplored opportunities: through pastoral letters, sermons, and the press, Catholic hierarchs and intellectuals sought to clarify those opportunities and address them in a proper Catholic manner. Both clerical and women activists had much in common as social groups: they were educated, restricted by their social position (because of their

¹¹⁶ *Nyva* characterized a wife of priest as the only intelligent women in the village and advised such clerical women to establish contact with the peasants, particularly at all ceremonial events. Hnat Mykhaylovych Ts-sky, "Zadachi svyashchenychoho zhinotstva v nashiy tserkovno-suspil'niy pratsi" [The tasks of priestly womanhood in our church social work], *Nyva*, September, 1, 1911.

church or family duties and hierarchy), and excluded from the peasants while seeking to work with them.

Clergy and elections

The Roman Catholic and the Greek Catholic churches had similar visions of their roles among the laity and society in general. The two churches, as institutions, faced the challenges of mass mobilization and nationalism and responded to them by integrating and linking Catholic values to the demands that emerged in society at the time (i.e., democratization, nationalization, and the politicization of individuals). The aim was to influence mass movements within society in such a way that they did not threaten the authority of the Church or of Christianity. The Galician elections provide telling examples of how the Catholic churches implemented their goals.

A Greek Catholic priest summarized the mission of the clergy as follows: “we [the clergy] need to push ourselves through doors and windows to places where the fate of Ruthenian/Ukrainian peasants is decided.”¹¹⁷ A Roman Catholic bishop reframed a similar idea a bit differently: “you [the clergy] have a duty to go hand in hand with the people.”¹¹⁸ Such statements brilliantly reveal the essence of the approach taken by the clergy and the Catholic Church, with their main idea being to participate actively in the life of the laity. Further in the chapter, I analyze in detail how this idea was realised and what opportunities and problems such activity raised for the clergy.

The Vatican was also very much concerned about the implementation of universal male suffrage in the Austrian parliamentary elections. In Vienna, the Vatican nuncio Granito Pignatelli di Belmonte Gennaro reported in detail how the Habsburg Empire adopted and then implemented the suffrage reform. In his report, the nuncio indicated that “the elections demonstrated the strength of Catholicism” and that “a majority in parliament would act on behalf of the Church.”¹¹⁹ In the same report, he underlined the importance of young and active bishops who could guarantee Catholic mobilization and the further integration of Catholic values into politics.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ “Z krugiv duhovenstva: po vyborah” [From the circles of the clergy: after the election], *Dilo*, June, 14, 1907.

¹¹⁸ Józef Teodorowicz, “Enuncyacye wskutek reform wyborczej” [Enuncyacye as a result of electoral reform], *Przegląd powszechny*, 153 (1907): 125.

¹¹⁹ Granito Pignatelli di Belmonte Gennaro, nunzio: Corrispondenza riguardante rapporti politici. Fond 733, fascia 1. *Rapporti politici, prevalentemente riguardanti le questioni d’Austria (1904-1911)*, 207.

¹²⁰ Corrispondenza riguardante rapporti politici, 207.

The Vatican was carefully observing the development of mass mobilization and requested its nuncios to report about the results of the elections. The observation of the nuncio confirmed that the active position of the Catholic clergy was bringing about a positive outcome and thus strengthening the position of the Church in the realm of politics (i.e., preventing the adoption of a divorce law).¹²¹ Additionally, it is clear from the report that the nuncio saw great potential in the younger clergy, who understood the challenges of the time and acted upon them. As the Vatican was encouraging the participation of bishops in mass mobilization, the bishops were sending the same message to the parish clergy and the parish clergy to the laity. The example of the Galician churches provided in this chapter demonstrates how this message about the active involvement of the clergy actually travelled from the Vatican to the laity and how it worked in a specific multi-rite space.

The attitude of the Church hierarchies towards elections

The hierarchy of the Catholic churches and their clergy viewed electoral reforms as a positive change so long as they corresponded to Christian values. The main concern of the church hierarchs throughout the Habsburg Empire was ensuring the election of deputies who were loyal and faithful Christians in order to preserve the unity of Church and State. Thus, the attitude of the high-ranking hierarchy was very similar throughout the Catholic world, but at the lower level, where the clergy were in close contact with the laity, the situation was much more complicated. The laity became more and more politicized. Political movements were internally fragmented and very often pursued mutually exclusive or conflicting programs. On the one hand, the clergy certainly needed to promote Christian ideas and follow the instructions of the hierarchy, but, on the other, they needed to remain influential among the laity and, in addition, had their own outlooks on political life. This complexity of views intersected in local villages, with all the issues of different forces and institutions coming together and frequently resulting in violent clashes.

The Roman Catholic hierarchy of Galicia shared these values whilst emphasizing the importance of the Catholic Church taking an active role within society. The Armenian Archbishop Teodorowicz,¹²² whose appeals were cited widely in the Roman Catholic press and used as a basis for explaining the role of the Church and the clergy in elections, argued that democracy had its origins in Christianity and only Christian

¹²¹ Corrispondenza riguardante rapporti politici, 207.

¹²² There was an Armenian Catholic Church with a residence in Lemberg: Archbishop Teodorowicz was its head at the time.

democracy could unite all layers of society. Teodorowicz emphasized that the duty of local parishes and their clergy was to be active in social and political work. He also underlined that “elections are not only a civic duty for everyone but also a moral and ethical one.”¹²³ This meant that participation in an election was very important for every male Christian: it also demonstrates the combination of sacral and secular duties and the unity of Church and State.

The rationale behind the aforementioned strategy was that deputies would potentially be able to influence the laws of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, including those laws that dealt with religious and family life. The fear of the Catholic Church at that time was the socialists’ proposal for parliament to adopt laws creating a secular school system and permitting divorce.¹²⁴ These laws, in the long run, could have led to the total separation of Church and State (similar to the secularization that took place in France).¹²⁵ The Church felt a moral obligation to preserve the existing social balance and saw elections as an opportunity to secure its power.

The bishops of the Greek Catholic Church had a very similar view of the elections. In a 1907 pastoral letter, the three main hierarchs of the Greek Catholic Church emphasized the importance of the Christian faith in all parts of life, including politics. The importance of Christianity in politics was legitimized by their claims that the clergy were also the leading force in protecting Ruthenians¹²⁶ as a national group. Faith was crucial, according to the letter, because atheism and other dangerous ideas that repudiated religion, the Church, or the clergy were spreading. Thus, the Greek Catholics aimed to maintain the faithful’s loyalty to the Church and Christian values and to preserve a close bond between the people and the clergy. Only electing deputies who were good Christians and patriots could ensure this.¹²⁷ The link between rite and nationality was strong in the eyes of the Greek Catholic hierarchy.

¹²³ Józef Teodorowicz, “Wobec zbliżających się wyborów w Galicji” [In view of the upcoming elections in Galicia], *Przegląd powszechny* 154, (1907): 1-23.

¹²⁴ The Greek Catholic newspaper *Osnova* wrote on the matter that “the enemies of the Church (most likely socialists) want to achieve the approval of the divorce law. At the time, only separation was permitted, but not repeated marriage.” *Osnova* stated that Jews, socialists, atheists, and apostates from the Catholic faith had given their signatures to support the divorce law. “Reforma supružhoho zakona” [Reform of marriage law], *Osnova*, December, 19, 1906.

¹²⁵ Józef Teodorowicz “Wobec zbliżających się wyborów w Galicji,” 1-23.

¹²⁶ I use the term ‘Ruthenian’ as a self-identification for ethnic Ukrainians in Galicia. The term ‘Ukrainian’ was borrowed and was used for indicating those Ruthenians who supported the idea of a separate Ukrainian nation living in Galicia and the eastern part of the Russian Empire: basically, the label ‘Ukrainian’ corresponds to the current definition of Ukrainian.

¹²⁷ “Pastyr’ske poslannja” [The bishop’s letter], *Ruslan*, April 20, 1907, April, 23 1907, April 24, 1907.

The other difference in attitude towards the elections between the Greek and Roman Catholic hierarchies concerned the engagement of high-ranking church officials in the election process. For the Greek Catholics, their bishops were one of the tiers that connected them with the emperor and the local authorities because the secular intelligentsia was not yet numerous or influential enough within parliament and the local diet.¹²⁸ One example of this close bond between the political and religious spheres was the leading role the Greek Catholic hierarchy played in a delegation to the emperor in 1906, which emphasized to Greek Catholics the importance of implementing universal suffrage and electoral reform.¹²⁹ It appears that the rationale behind the delegation was the conviction that elections would give Greek Catholics more chances to fight for their rights and benefits on the local and imperial levels. Participation in politics would provide a means to educate and train people to better organize their social and religious lives and duties. Last but not least, the hierarchy argued, Greek Catholics would be a strong opponent in the face of the socialist challenge.

The churches and local [Sejm] elections

The issue of electoral reform at the local level persisted and remained unresolved until the end of the empire, despite the efforts to implement it.¹³⁰ Even though this project was not successful, it is important to analyze the clergies' vision for this reform, mainly because it was different from that of the political parties. For political parties, especially those who represented Ruthenians, universal suffrage could guarantee that Ruthenians would gain greater influence in the governing process. For the Polish parties, such a reform meant greater competition with Ruthenian political forces, challenging their hold on leading positions in the province.

The Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic clergies supported the idea of applying universal suffrage to the elections for the Galician Diet. From 1907, elections to the Parliament were conducted on the basis of universal male suffrage: elections to the

¹²⁸ Struve has demonstrated the significant differences between the formations of the Polish and Ukrainian nations. According to him, the Polish nation was formed by opening the early modern concept of the Polish nation (consisting of the gentry) to other social strata, mainly the peasantry. However, Galician Ukrainians became a nation with the transformation of a religious identity into a national one. Struve "Citizenship and National Identity," 75-76.

¹²⁹ "Kil'ka uvag pid hvylyu" [Several notes for the wave], *Nyva*, February 1, 1906.

¹³⁰ The compromise between the Polish and Ruthenian nationatities (regarding representation in the local diet) was widely discussed in 1911-1914. This agreement was signed by the emperor in July 1914: in October 1914, there should have been elections that guaranteed one third of the seats for Ruthenian deputies but it was not implemented in practice because of WWI. Ivan Monalatij, "Galyc'kyj kompromis 1914 roku: start chy finish ukrai'ns'ko-pol's'kogo prymyrennja?" ["Galician" compromise in 1914: start or finish of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation?], *Ji*, 64 (2010), last modified April 17, 2017, http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n64texts/monolatij_kompromis.htm

Galician Diet in 1908, however, were held according to a curial system that favored large landowners, while the working class and peasantry had very limited representation. In this way, the domination of the nobility among the local authorities remained untouched despite the changes brought by the new electoral law.¹³¹ Local power structures endured, and this provoked two sets of conflicts within the local public sphere.

The first set of conflicts concerned the inequality between nationalities and social classes in access to power; the second arose because of a slowing in the democratization process at the local level, where it was most important for Galician citizens. Since Galicia maintained autonomy in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, participation at the local level of politics was more essential than at the imperial one, because doing so gave the opportunity to manipulate the implementation of imperial laws within the province as well as provide immediate control over the locals.

The ideal way of electing representatives for the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic clergies was the idea of community representation.¹³² The suggested suffrage system would provide each community (national, religious, social, and professional) with representation in the diet. For example, teachers of both nationalities would have a representative who could speak and act on behalf of their interests. Jews would not need to join Polish or Ukrainian socialists or radicals in order to be elected; and nationalists of different nationalities would not need to use nationalist arguments about injustices to gain support among electors.¹³³ The number of representatives from each group would depend on the size of the group. As each group would have own its representatives, the conflicts between different nationalities, classes, and religious groups would be limited or even disappear over time.¹³⁴

The Catholic Churches considered this plan as just and democratic and believed that it would minimize the threats brought by mass mobilization. The goal of this vision was to manage and control the masses in order to hamper their autonomous democratic agency and prevent the possible domination of socialists and radical nationalists in the

¹³¹ Universal male suffrage was applied only to the imperial parliamentary elections, while local representative authorities were elected by curial law. This law did not allow everybody to vote and favored noble representation.

¹³² “Z powodu ostatnich wyborow do sejmu” [Due to the recent elections to the Sejm], *Gazeta koscielna*, April 10, 1908. “Proekt vyborchoi' reformy zi stanovyshha cerkovnyh i suspl'nyh interesiv” [The project of election reform from the perspective of the Church's and societal interests], *Nyva*, December, 15, 1908. “W sprawie reform wyborczej” [Due to the reform of the election], *Gazeta koscielna*, November, 16, 1908.

¹³³ “W sprawie reform wyborczej.”

¹³⁴ “Proekt vyborchoi' reformy zi stanovyshha cerkovnyh i suspl'nyh interesiv.”

local diet. Thus, the process of mass mobilization would not challenge the established social hierarchy and would remain under control.

Public activity of the clergy and Catholic parties in Galicia

In the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic churches, the role of the clergy in the public sphere, especially during the election campaigns, was understood very similarly.¹³⁵ The clergy's first task was to observe local political parties and their activities in order to see whether their programs corresponded to Christian values and, consequently, to counteract the growing popularity of parties and candidates whose ideas were incompatible with Catholic values. They considered the biggest danger to be the socialists and other parties that denied the importance of religiosity or suggested increased secularization. For example, the success of socialist-leaning parties was not only attributed to a lack of understanding among voters as to what socialism represented but also to the limited social activity of the clergy in places where socialists had received support. Thus, the clergy of both rites needed to participate actively in all public events (particularly those that dealt with politics).

The clergy were expected to educate their parishioners about the ideological differences between various political parties and to improve the quality of life in their parishes. The strategy behind clerical efforts was to organize cooperative efforts, charity, or a mutual aid society. In this way, the clergy would demonstrate what an important role they played in local life and gain a level of trust that no political party could challenge. Overall, this strategy was rather idealistic and merely a recommendation; in practice it played out very differently. In the cases analyzed below, we see more clearly the practical side of the clergy's role during elections. Briefly speaking, in some cases priests became more involved in politics than in religion, while in others they were simply not active at all. However, returning to the rhetoric employed by the churches regarding the clergy's public activity, no clergymen resisted it or disagreed with the aspiration for increased political activity.

Both the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic clergies considered the possibility of supporting and participating in a Catholic party. In the case of the Roman Catholic

¹³⁵ "Na chasi" [On the time], *Nyva*, May 15, 1907.

"Do fiziognomii' social'noi' demokratii" [To the physiognomy of social democracy], *Nyva*, July, 15, 1907.

"Do hvyli" [To the wave], *Nyva*, October 15, 1907.

"W sprawie udzialu duchowienstwa w zyciu politycznym I spolecznem" [On the participation of the clergy in political and social life], *Gazeta koscielna*, February 28, 1908, March 6, 1908.

Church, such a party actually existed and was called *Centrum* [Center] (following the example of an extant German party),¹³⁶ but this party was not very popular and did not receive any positions in local or imperial institutions. The Roman Catholic priest Michal Sidor, in his article *W sprawie udziału duchowienstwa w zyciu politycznym i spolecznem* [On the participation of the clergy in political and social life] (published in 1908), pointed out that one of the reasons for the party's poor performance was that some priests counted on being elected without being politically active, relying only on their respected position as priests.¹³⁷ In addition, *Centrum* did not have an attractive political program¹³⁸ and, as a result, the support needed to make a difference in politics.

In the case of the Greek Catholic clergy, the idea of a representative party was never realized, as the national activists claimed that it was a dangerous and useless idea. National activists viewed a potential Catholic party as a threat that could divide society between national and religious identities and result in an inability to elect national representatives. A nationally-oriented priest emphasized that “the clergy must not move away from the secular intelligentsia and isolate themselves in their own parties and organizations”.¹³⁹ He went on to explain why this unity was so significant: “together with the secular intelligentsia we need to enlighten the nation, and by being present everywhere [in all public activities] we [the clergy] can destroy anti-clerical propaganda and tie our nation to ourselves [the clergy] and through us to the Church”.¹⁴⁰ Thus the clergy were seen as possible leaders in almost any party, not only in a Catholic one.

The nationally-oriented newspaper *Dilo* emphasized the necessity of public work by the clergy, arguing that such work should take precedence over that of insulating themselves in parties or organizations because the clergy would divide the voters if they supported their own party.¹⁴¹ Apparently, national activists knew how useful the support of the clergy was for the nation-building process and the mobilization of the masses. The clergy adopted the same approach: they realized that their only chance to gain support from the laity and to control the mass mobilization process would be with the support of

¹³⁶ Ilona Zaleska, “Wokół idei stronnictwa katolickiego w Królestwie Polskim” [Around the idea of a Catholic party in the Polish Kingdom], last modified May 18, 2014.

<http://wydawnictwoumk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/KLIO/article/viewFile/KLIO.2013.003/618>

¹³⁷ Michal Sidor, “W sprawie udziału duchowienstwa w zyciu politycznym I spolecznem” [On the participation of the clergy in political and social life], *Gazeta koscielna*, March 6, 1908.

¹³⁸ Mainly because *Centrum* was oriented on attracting clergy instead of promoting its ideas for laity.

¹³⁹ “Z krugiv duhovenstva: po wyborah.”

¹⁴⁰ “Z krugiv duhovenstva: po wyborah.”

¹⁴¹ “Zamitky nad proektom zasnovannja klerykal'noi' partii” [Notes about the project of the establishment of a clerical party], *Dilo*, November 14, 1907.

secular activists.¹⁴² Therefore, they were mutually reliant on each other and on sticking to their own strengths.

What the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic clergies had in common was the need to cooperate with influential secular leaders and parties (that did not conflict with the Church).¹⁴³ In supporting secular leaders ‘friendly’ to the Church, the clergy could gain influence and improve their political skills. It was no longer enough simply to be a member of the clergy to be elected or to participate in politics: now an understanding of the political and social spheres was needed. The Ukrainophile *Dilo* argued: “a priest can even be the leader of a political party, not because he is a priest but because he is a good politician”.¹⁴⁴ Priests could no longer count on the support of the laity just by virtue of their role; gaining that support required intensive work fulfilling the needs and demands of the laity. Thus, priests’ public activity was a bridge for the clergy to participate in politics and gain the necessary skills to become influential politicians in the future. This was also a way for the clergy of both rites to control the presence of Catholic ideas in the process of mass mobilization.

The churches did not officially support any political party (in order not to divide or lose support from the laity), but active participation in civic meetings and expressing opinions during political meetings was encouraged in both rites. The main difference between the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic clergies lay in the intensity of their engagement in the political arena. As the Greek Catholic – and therefore Ruthenian – laity occupied less privileged positions and their political activity was less developed, the Greek Catholic clergy were more active in the mobilization of their flock. Roman Catholics had better access to administrative positions and political life, so their engagement was more moderate. The other difference was the absence of a single national identity among Greek Catholics (some were Russophile, some Ukrainophile), which further developed into conflicts inside the clergy, as well as between clergy and laity.

A brief overview of the parties is useful to understand the political alliances that were possible for the clergy of both rites. Polish political life consisted of five main parties: Democrats, Populists, Social Democrats, Conservatives, and Catholics (*Centrum*).¹⁴⁵ The Populist Party was the most influential and successful. This party

¹⁴² “Słowo pro klerykaliv” [A word about clericals], *Ruslan*, May 12, 1907.

¹⁴³ “W sprawie reform wyborczej.”

“Zamitky nad proektom zasnovannja klerykal'noi' partii'.”

¹⁴⁴ “Zamitky nad proektom zasnovannja klerykal'noi' partii'.”

¹⁴⁵ “W sprawie reform wyborczej.”

promoted the Church and Catholic values, so the Roman Catholic clergy recommended supporting it so long as voters made sure its candidates were proper Christians. The Conservatives were considered reliable as well, as this party consisted mainly of the gentry, which had always favored the Church. The Social Democrats, along with any type of socialism, were dangerous for the Church, because of their idea of a secular state, anticlerical views, and promotion of divorce. The clergy were supposed to condemn this kind of political ideology; even reading socialist literature and press was considered a sin.

The Church's attitude toward the National Democratic Party was neutral, as its program contained nothing contrary to the Catholic Church. However, this party was still viewed with suspicion because of its liberal ideology and active Jewish participants. In addition, some National Democrat representatives wanted to subordinate religion to national needs and to confiscate the Church's property.¹⁴⁶ Priests were permitted to belong to the National Democratic Party in order to influence and change its ideology from within to one more favorable to the churches. In the conclusion to his overview of political parties, the Roman Catholic priest Michal Sidor emphasized: "the clergy should actively participate in public life, because the clergy should set the example of a good citizen. And they [the clergy] need to remember the different political views of their laity so as not to participate in agitation but keep their distance".¹⁴⁷ Therefore, the clergy worked on developing their own precise position to political parties and engaged the laity to support this same position.

The Ruthenian political movement consisted of Russophiles, Radicals, Socialists, and National Democrats. Though a few sympathized with the Radicals, the majority of the clergy considered the Socialists and Radicals a threat to religious and Christian values for the same reasons as the Roman Catholics. The Socialists' values were seen as opposite to the existing social order and religion; the Radicals were anti-clerical and saw religion only as a tool for national mobilization. As an antidote to the dangerous ideology of the Socialists and Radicals, the clerical newspaper *Nyva* [Field] suggested that "priests have to become Christian socialists, and, as it is more significant to gain the support of the village, to become Christian radicals."¹⁴⁸ In this way, the clergy

¹⁴⁶ "Wybory do Sejmu" [The elections to the Sejm], *Gazeta koscielna*, February 14, 1908.

¹⁴⁷ Sidor, "W sprawie udzialu duchowienstwa."

¹⁴⁸ "Jeshhe v spravi nashoi' organizacii" [More about our organization], *Nyva*, August 1, 1907.

could pose an alternative to the Socialists and Radicals: “if a priest is mobilizing the peasants, then the radicals and socialists will not have anything to offer.”¹⁴⁹

In the Greek Catholic Church, there were two political forces in line with Catholic doctrine and thus officially supported by clergy: the Russophiles (pro-Russian) and National Democrats (pro-Ukrainian). The Russophiles’ political party was based on the idea that Ruthenians were part of the Russian nation and language (their newspapers were issued in Russian even though Ruthenians of the region spoke Ukrainian). The Russophiles’ ideology provoked intense debates with the National Democrats and their press (who viewed Ruthenians as Ukrainians). This disagreement over Ruthenian identity demonstrated that the Ruthenian movement was polarized and caught up in a struggle over self-identification. This process of self-identification manifested itself in intensive rhetoric and conflicts in the Ruthenian part of the province (Eastern Galicia). Such confrontation was most visible in newspapers, as the Ukrainophile newspapers *Dilo*, *Ruslan*, and others frequently polemicized and criticized the Russophilic *Galychanin* (and vice versa). The elected Ruthenian deputies, who belonged to either the Russophiles or the National Democrats and thus brought their confrontation to parliament, deepened this tension. These conflicting identities prompted disagreement within the Greek Catholic clergy as a group and affected the relationships between the clergy and laity, as in some cases the clergy and laity supported different parties. Political preferences shaped the clergy from within and resulted in tense relations with those representatives of the laity who shared different preferences.

The politically active Greek Catholic clergy took part in both conflicting parties, Russophile and National Democrat (some clergy were also involved in the Radical Party). This political division among the clergy was problematic for them as a group, as it resulted in hostility within the clergy and culminated in the public attacks of priests against each other.¹⁵⁰ For example, the Russophile newspaper *Galychanin*, issued in Lviv, constantly attacked one of the Greek Catholic bishops, Bishop Khomyshyn. In March 1907, the newspaper claimed that Bishop Khomyshyn was giving preference to Ukrainian-oriented priests and openly discriminating against those who supported the Russophiles.¹⁵¹ *Galychanin* described Khomyshyn in the following way: “the bishop has

¹⁴⁹ “Na chasi.”

¹⁵⁰ “Do hvyli.”

¹⁵¹ “Epyskop odnoj partyy” [The bishop of one party], *Galychanin*, March 27, 1907.

“Pravda o ukrajnskom epyskope” [The truth about the Ukrainian bishop], *Galychanin*, April 9, 1907, April 10, 1907, April 11, 1907, April 12, 1907, April 13, 1907.

“Arhyepyskopskoe neblagorazumye” [A bishop’s imprudence], *Galychanin*, June 9, 1907.

no tact, no pastoral skill, and no wisdom. We are not going to list all the facts that prove this because they are already well known from the newspapers or from private stories”.¹⁵² The Ukrainophile *Dilo* defended the bishop, writing that he was innocent.¹⁵³ Thus both newspapers, focusing on the personality of Bishop Khomyshyn, used him to promote their own political ideas. So, the church hierarchy, as well as their political preferences, was now also a target for attention and analysis in the newspapers.

In conclusion, the hierarchy of both churches saw the clergy as a tool to ensure that candidates were good Christians, but they preferred for the clergy not to represent any particular ideology themselves. However, it was not easy to implement a neutral strategy, especially in places where a priest and the laity had different political views and preferences. The hierarchy preferred not to be involved in this type of conflict, insisting only on legal and Christian methods of politicking. Furthermore, local governments used the conflict between Ukrainian- and Russian-oriented parties as a way to reduce the number of Ruthenians in the local diet. Additionally, priests used their power to support particular parties or candidates. Thus, the politicization of both clergy and laity changed the role of the clergy in their parishes, as it brought politics to this relationship. How exactly the change happened is discussed in the last chapter of the thesis, which explores incidents of violence during the elections.

The Catholic churches and the mass mobilization of women

Even though women at the time had limited rights, they were important actors in church and public life. Women took care of the priest and the church buildings, participated in organizing services and religious celebrations, and either discouraged or encouraged their husbands and sons to be politically active. Certainly, mass mobilization affected the position of women in society and in the Catholic Church. However, this process was quite slow as the role of women was limited to family life.

The family lives of Greek and Roman Catholics were different. The Greek Catholic Church allowed priests to marry, thereby giving rise to a whole group of women – priestly wives and daughters - who were Church insiders. The American-Ukrainian historian Marta Bohachevska-Chomiak has emphasized that in the case of the Greek Catholic Church, the priests’ daughters and wives were the first to acknowledge the

¹⁵² “Arhypastyrskoe neblagorazumye.”

¹⁵³ “Z pryvodu zahodiv kolo stvorennja klerykal'noi' partii” [About the idea of establishing a clerical party], *Dilo*, October 30, 1907.

importance of an active role for women in society; they were the ones who started to promote women's organizations and press.¹⁵⁴ Later women's rights activists focused only on the secular role of their movement, but ideas introduced by secular organizations, such as kindergartens, were infrequently adopted later by the Church.

In the interplay between the Catholic churches and women's activism, there were no explicit conflicts or discussions. The general impression gleaned from the press (religiously-oriented and that of women's rights activists) is that both sides tried to avoid possible confrontation or active debate. One of the reasonable explanations for such tactics was the desire of both sides to avoid conflicting ideas that would divide supporters. This strategy was productive for both women and clergy, as it provided them with enough space to develop their positions on similar questions without conflict over audiences. A good example of how this process worked was the discussion of women's social activity by the clergy and female activists.

The clergy of both local churches emphasized that women's main role was caring for their families, but social activism was not banned or forbidden. Thus, moderate activists claimed that their programs were aimed at those women who successfully managed their family duties and still had extra time to spend on activities outside the home. Therefore, the Church's position only came into conflict with radical, mostly socialist female activists who called the entire social hierarchy into question, thereby contradicting the Church's views. However, even those radical activists did not enter into discussion with the church hierarchy: on the one hand, they were not looking for compromise, but, on the other, they were not very popular and thus were not considered dangerous.

The main realm of intersection between the churches and women's rights activists was family life and social work. On the first matter, the clergies of the two local churches both supported the idea of men having the leading role in family life.¹⁵⁵ On the second matter, women's rights activism within society was inspired by the churches in the sphere of charity and care, not in the political domain.¹⁵⁶ As the legal framework of

¹⁵⁴ Martha Bohachevska-Chomiak, *Feminists despite themselves: women in Ukrainian community life, 1884-1939* (Edmonton, 1988), 62.

¹⁵⁵ One clerical newspaper put it in these words: "by nature, due to their spiritual and physical strengths, women must only be complementary to men" (Vid pryrody zhinka svoyimy dushevnyimi i fizychnymy sylamy povynna buty lyshe dopovnennym muzha). "Deshcho pro zhinoche pytannya" [Something on the woman question], *Nyva*, December 15, 1912.

¹⁵⁶ In another article that *Nyva* published, the author used an interpretation of Pius X's words that a woman, due to her nature, is called to raise the family and be a supporting angel for humanity. "Przebudzenia dla kobiet" [The awakening of a woman], *Nyva*, September 15, 1911.

the Austro-Hungarian Empire prohibited the political activity of women¹⁵⁷ and the churches were close allies of the state, they could not preach against existing laws.

Among one of the first demands of the women's movement was access to education and participation in public life, for example through elections. As Zofia Chyra-Rolicz has emphasized, the main aim for women was to achieve the opportunity to function in society on their own.¹⁵⁸ For both Polish and Ruthenian movements, the most important struggle revolved around access to education. Katherine David notes the same fact about Czech women, who were observing the progress of the education question in other nations and planned to be even more successful.¹⁵⁹ The Ukrainian activist Kobrynska emphasized that as soon as Czech women sent a petition to the Reichsrat in 1890 to request access to high education, the Ruthenians had followed this example. Viennese women also sent a similar petition.¹⁶⁰ Thus, the women of Austro-Hungarian Empire were inspiring each other to raise women's issues at the state level.

The concerns about increasing educational and social possibilities for women were true for the Russian Empire as well. Malgorzata Fidelis emphasized the dilemma of Polish women in the Russian Empire: "women were concerned with both creating opportunities for women outside the home and strengthening their role in the family. The double commitment made their feminist messages seem contradictory and difficult to interpret."¹⁶¹ The researcher of Ukrainian activism Bohachevska-Chomiak highlights that educated middle-class women "saw themselves as functioning within a European context and looked toward concepts developed in Western Europe". However, the problem was that these activists "did not share the Western European middle-class ideal of mothering and domesticity."¹⁶² A similar situation was true for Polish and Czech

¹⁵⁷ Walentyna Najdus refers in her book to §30 of the Austrian Law of Associations, 15 November 1867. Walentyna Najdus, "O prawa obywatelskie kobiet w zaborze austriackim," in *Kobieta i świat polityki. Polska na tle porównawczym w XIX i w początkach XX wieku*, ed. A. Żarnowskiej i A. Szwarca (Warszawa 1994), 99.

¹⁵⁸ Zofia Chyra-Rolicz, "Kościół katolicki a ruch kobiecy przed 1939 rokiem.," in *Spoleczno kulturalna działalność Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce XIX i XX wieku*, ed. Regina Renz, Marta Pawlina-Meducka (Kielce, 1994), 149.

¹⁵⁹ Katherine David, "Czech Feminists and Nationalism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy: "The First in Austria,"" *Journal of women's history* 3, (1991): 32.

¹⁶⁰ The Ruthenian female activist Kobrynska criticized this article for discouraging female participation in gatherings and for an unrealistic vision of the family: teenagers were leaving their homes quite early, meaning mothers had little influence on them. Nataglia Kobrynska "Feuilleton", *Nasha Dolia* [Our Fate] 3, (1896); 24-25.

¹⁶¹ Malgorzata Fidelis "“Participation in the Creative Work of the Nation:” Polish Women Intellectuals in the Cultural Construction of Female Gender Roles, 1864-1890," *Journal of Women's History* 13, no 1 (2001): 110.

¹⁶² Bohachevska-Chomiak, *Feminists despite themselves*, xxiii.

women as well, whose surroundings promoted first and above all the ideal of the “faithful wife, greatest mother, educated tutor, [and] good housekeeper.”¹⁶³

The beginning of women’s mobilization was certainly a challenge to society’s existing values and hierarchy and thus provoked a variety of reactions, ranging from mockery to attempts at control. Among those forces with a vested interest in the woman question were national activists and the clergy.¹⁶⁴ For nationalists, women were an important conduit for strengthening nationalistic ideas and raising future patriots.¹⁶⁵ For the clergy, women were responsible for supporting parishes and priests with their active participation in services and clerical households, as well as for promoting spirituality in their families. Neither Polish nor Ruthenian nationalists nor the clergy were fans of women’s liberation, as it could easily result in an unknown outcome and a revolution in family life.

The popular ideas of nationalism and national liberation influenced women’s activism as well. National activists were also interested in mobilizing women. It is clear from the writings of women inspired by national ideas that they saw the liberation of women as one of the elements in the liberation of the nation.¹⁶⁶ However, male nationalists saw this process in an alternative way: first came the liberation of the nation, then of women. In fact, no influential political party (except the Socialists) was willing to support women’s issues *per se*; women’s rights activists faced the same problem with the press, which was under the control of political – and thus male – authorities. Simply speaking, the male world was more worried about the actually-occurring mobilization of men around national issues than the mere possibility of mobilizing women.

In the framework of the whole of Eastern Europe, the women’s movement considered national identification to be most important issue, while women’s rights were at best second place. In her study on Czech women, Katherine David has emphasized that “women’s rights activists drew strength from their identification with the Czech national movement and viewed their Czechness as, in many respects, advantageous to

¹⁶³ Dasa Francikova, “Female Friends in Nineteenth-Century Bohemia: Troubles with Affectionate Writing and “Patriotic Relationships,”” *Journal of Women's History* 12, no. 3 (2000): 23.

¹⁶⁴ Bohachevska-Chomiak, *Feminists despite themselves*, xix.

¹⁶⁵ For example, the Ruthenian newspaper *Dilo* in 1891 wrote before a women’s gathering that their main contribution to national consciousness could be only as a mother in the family who taught the Ruthenian language, songs, and history and encouraged the wearing of national clothes. “Zbirnyk prac rıznych avtoriv,” *Nasa dolja*, last modified November 25, 2017,

<http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/anno-plus?aid=zbi&datum=1893&size=55&page=4>

¹⁶⁶ As Regina Renz put it in *Kobieta w społeczeństwie polskim*: “The primary goal is the independence of Poland, freedom, and statehood, then everything else.” Renz, *Spoleczno kulturalna działalność Kościoła*, 147.

their struggle as women.”¹⁶⁷ A similar argument is raised by Sylvia Paletschek and Bianka Petrow-Ennker, who emphasize that “the lack of full national sovereignty meant that Czech and Polish feminists were ambivalent about the Austrian and German women's movements.”¹⁶⁸ Thus, the women’s movement was under the influence of and codependent on the national one.

The conception of the role of women in the Catholic press produced by both churches was very similar, emphasizing the family sphere above all: “women are called to quiet, non-exhausting work within the family and devotion to their immediate environment”.¹⁶⁹ The article *Powolania kobiet* [Women’s vocation], published by the Roman Catholic newspaper *Niewiasta* [Woman] in 1908, elaborated that public work was not forbidden and that women could participate in such work if the opportunity presented itself. Analyzing the public sphere, the article continued that women could not be the equals of men: it was not their prescribed lot in life, as women’s duty was to care for the home and family.¹⁷⁰

According to the Catholic press, in the family sphere the priorities of women could be identified as follows: the woman’s relationship with her husband, parenting, and running the household. In relationships with their husbands, women were called upon to be helpful and obedient wives.¹⁷¹ The Greek Catholic newspaper *Nyva* emphasized that in Christianity “men and women share equal human nature and dignity”, thus “subordination to men is not a sign of inferiority, it is only hierarchical pragmatism.”¹⁷² The author claimed that it was actually Christ who stated that women are equal in God’s eyes, and recognition of such was real emancipation (in the opinion of the Church).¹⁷³ Similar arguments were used in the press for women throughout the empire: Galicia was no exception. However, the novelty for Galicia was the existence of a discussion on women’s roles and the recognition of its public presence in society.

The Roman Catholic newspaper *Niewiasta*, published by Stanislaw Stojalowski especially to promote a conception of the role of women in line with Catholic views, very frequently published articles written by women. However, none of these articles focused on real problems or practical advice for women. Thus, the aim for the Catholic

¹⁶⁷ David, “Czech Feminists and Nationalism,” 26.

¹⁶⁸ Sylvia Paletschek, *Women's emancipation movements in the nineteenth century: a European perspective* (Stanford, 2004), 327.

¹⁶⁹ *Niewiasta*, May 17, 1908.

¹⁷⁰ *Niewiasta*, May 17, 1908.

¹⁷¹ “Deshcho pro zhinoche pytannya” [Something about the woman question], *Nyva*, December 15, 1912.

¹⁷² “Deshcho pro zhinoche pytannya.”

¹⁷³ “Deshcho pro zhinoche pytannya.”

press was to again justify existing hierarchical relations between men and women and highlight that women should not challenge this hierarchy when increasing their participation in social activities.

The other frequent topic in the Catholic press was patriotism, which could be expressed in patriotic parenting and support for national businesses. The emphasis on patriotic parenting was a result of the influence of nationalistic ideas and fears of assimilation. For Catholic women of Polish or Ruthenian ethnicity, there was always a risk that their children would assimilate into the more prestigious imperial culture (in the Polish case, Russian or German¹⁷⁴; in the Ruthenian case, Polish or Russian). *Niewiasta* devoted a great deal of space to patriotic poetry, stories, and discussions on the importance of patriotic mothers: “mothers who are educating the fighters of the future, do not forget to impart the holy faith and love for all that is ours.”¹⁷⁵

In such terms, faith was considered a necessary part of Polish identity and ‘mothers’ an important tool for promoting Polishness along with Roman Catholicism. The final focus was the idea of woman as the head of a household. Here the rhetoric held that a woman should be a wise housewife who, on the one hand, knows how to maintain the house and how to cook well and, on the other, supports national production and trade by using locally-sourced goods for household needs.¹⁷⁶ Certainly, the focus on the household was not new: however, the idea of promoting national identity was rather new and present in most of the nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus, Catholicism and national activism created a mutually beneficial combination.

The view of the household as the most important domain for women was not only typical for the Austro-Hungarian Empire: it was also the case for the Russian Empire. Historian Malgorzata Fidelis uses the words of the Polish activist Maria Konopnicka “our homes will be fortresses” to emphasize that the household was seen as a “state unto itself, a bastion of resistance against political and cultural domination.”¹⁷⁷ Since women already had power and influence in the household domain, they could use it to spread their influence into the public one and strengthen the position of their nationality within the empire. Such a focus on the household was very convenient for the Catholic churches and national activists, as under these conditions the traditional role

¹⁷⁴ As Polish people were also leaving in Russian and German Empires.

¹⁷⁵ “Do polek” [To Polish women], *Niewiasta*, January 19, 1908.

¹⁷⁶ *Niewiasta* stated that a woman had to be a patron of Polish trade, crafts, and manufacturing.// “Do polek” [To Polish women] *Niewiasta*, January 19, 1908.

¹⁷⁷ Fidelis, “Participation in the Creative Work of the Nation,” 110.

of women would not be challenged: at the same time, new responsibilities could be placed on women, such as support for national ideas or the protection of Catholic values.

Speaking about women's equality, the Greek Catholic newspaper *Nyva* (1912) repeatedly stressed that women's natural occupation was care for their households and families. As such, the education of women needed to be properly geared towards the skills needed for these tasks: "By nature, due to their spiritual and physical strengths, women must only be complementary to men."¹⁷⁸ However, the author admitted that women's demands for rights such as equal salaries and access to education were just and thus deserved to be fulfilled.¹⁷⁹

The Greek Catholic Church made an effort to raise female spirituality and cooperation by organizing women-only retreats. A four-day spiritual retreat took place in Ternopol and Lviv, where women could get away from the home and focus on their spiritual needs. However, such an event was not seen as positive by all: some men were against it, as there was nobody to feed them or do other work at home.¹⁸⁰ Thus, it is possible to see one more challenge that the women's movement was facing, namely the economic one: households were totally dependent on women, so men's welfare could be put at risk. For this reason, the spiritual retreats for women did not become a popular practice. Thus, women could not postpone their duties at home even for the cause of religion.

Coming back to the comparison with Czech women, the important difference with Galician ones was the role of Catholicism. Even though the majority of Czech women, just as with Galician women, were Catholic, Catholicism was not seen as a tool of mobilization, but rather vice versa: Catholicism was associated with Habsburg dominance.¹⁸¹ The Protestant past and the Hussite movement was a source of inspiration as "feminists often recalled the role of Hussite women who defended their faith in battle alongside men".¹⁸² Thus, in the Galician case Catholicism was a positive inspiration for

¹⁷⁸ "Deshcho pro zhinoche pytannya."

¹⁷⁹ "Deshcho pro zhinoche pytannya."

¹⁸⁰ Kobrynska emphasized that women were very satisfied by the retreat but that men claimed to have gone hungry and that household duties such as the gathering of onions were neglected.

Nataglia Kobrynska "Feuilleton", *Nasha Dolia* [Our Fate] 3, (1896): 133. Last modified November 25, 2017,

<http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/anno-plus?aid=zbi&datum=1896&page=5&size=55>

¹⁸¹ Despite the formal adherence to Catholicism of over 90% of Czechs, their resentment against that celebrated ally of Rome and defender of the faith, the Habsburg Monarchy, combined with anti-clerical liberalism to form a potent brew. David, "Czech Feminists and Nationalism," 33.

¹⁸² David, "Czech Feminists and Nationalism," 32-33.

the women of both nationalities while in the Czech one it was negative and less used for mass mobilization.

As demonstrated by this short analysis of the portrayal of women in the Catholic press, both Greek and Roman Catholics had a mutually reinforcing concept of the role of women within the family. Their relationships with their husbands were seen from a very traditional perspective and granted women only a passive role. In contrast, in relation to their children and household duties women were seen as active and very useful for the needs of society, as they exerted influence over their children's upbringing and education and over household consumption. In these last two aspects, the national-building process had already made its influence felt, treating women as active participants. Catholicism left a clear space for women's activism, as it did not condemn it as anti-Catholic. This realm was a perfect opportunity for progressive clergy and laity to approve of women's activity, provided it did not challenge Christian hierarchical family values or the social roles of men and women.

The role of Greek Catholic women

As already mentioned, the Greek Catholic Church differed from the Roman Catholic one by virtue of a particular group of women among its faithful: the so-called 'clerical women'. These women were the wives or daughters of priests, as Greek Catholic clergy could marry. The Greek Catholic press, above all *Nyva*, certainly realized the importance of these women for the Church as an institution and for the communities in which their husbands served as priests. In several articles, *Nyva* discussed the behavior of 'clerical women' and suggested some actions for them to accomplish. The author of these articles emphasized that Galician women were actually not particularly aware of women's issues, making it essential to provide such awareness from the Catholic perspective.¹⁸³ This mission could be accomplished through improved religious education. In the opinion of the author, religious and theological education for girls would be useful from three perspectives. First, it would make them better wives for the Greek Catholic clergy; second, they could then serve as examples for and leaders among other women; and third, they could aid in spreading Christian ideas.¹⁸⁴ These were the main tasks suggested for members of priests' families.

An important concern of the Greek Catholic Church was to provide an alternative to the increasingly left-wing (socialist) mobilization of women, with the additional goal

¹⁸³ Onufriy Volianskyj, "V spravi relihiynoho usvidomlyuvannya nashoho svyashchenychoho zhinotstva" [On the religious awareness of our priestly women], *Nyva*, June 15, 1909.

¹⁸⁴ Volianskyj, "V spravi relihiynoho usvidomlyuvannya," *Nyva*, June 15, 1909.

of making use of women's zeal for the benefit of the Church.¹⁸⁵ As mentioned above, women were supposed to inspire their priest-husbands to better perform their duties and to understand the difficulties associated with this job. As an example of the sort of behavior these wives should avoid, the author cited a wife who yelled at her husband when he was late for dinner because of his social work.¹⁸⁶ The second important duty for 'clerical women' was to be actively involved in parish life, mainly by maintaining the church building and organizing religious social events and the parish choir. Thirdly, and most significantly, 'clerical women' were exhorted to develop closer ties with the laity, especially with regards to educating other women and encouraging them to be active participants in religious life.¹⁸⁷ This was an essential task: if the priests' wives did not serve as an example, Galician women would instead look to the female radical intelligentsia for leadership, meaning they certainly would not embrace Catholicism as a means of mobilization. Thus, 'clerical women' were seen as guardians of lay women against anti-Catholic ideas and behavior. Good guardianship entailed working together with their husbands to facilitate the political and social mobilization of their communities.

Last but not least, 'clerical women' were expected to continue supporting the clergy as a social group. Over time, the Greek Catholic clergy evolved into a separate class that enjoyed certain benefits: a better financial position than that of the peasants, a salary from the government as public servants, access to education, and partial exemption from field work (peasants donated their labor instead). To maintain these benefits, it was essential to close the group's ranks to a certain degree: peasants could occasionally become part of it and the daughters of priests were allowed to marry laymen, but it was not the preferred practice. Thus, one of the problems raised in *Nyva's* articles was the problem of priests' daughters preferring to marry laymen rather than priests and becoming more and more involved in secular activities. The fear was that fewer women would be involved in helping to spread the Catholic view of society and politics. This fear was exacerbated by the decreasing number of monks and nuns. Women were also expected to encourage their children to enter religious orders, thereby keeping the monasteries full.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵ Volianskyj, "V spravi relihiynoho usvidomlyvannya."

¹⁸⁶ Hnat Ts-skyj, "Zadachi svyashchenychoho zhivotstva v nashiy tserkovno-suspil'niy pratsi" [The tasks of the priestly women in our church social work] *Nyva* June 15, 1911.

¹⁸⁷ Ts-skyj, "Zadachi svyashchenychoho zhivotstva" *Nyva*, July 1, 1911.

¹⁸⁸ Ts-skyj, "Zadachi svyashchenychoho zhivotstva" *Nyva*, September 1, 1911.

In conclusion, the Greek Catholic Church saw ‘clerical women’ as essential, useful citizens for the prosperity of the Church. The clergy of the Greek Catholic Church recognized the importance of women for social and political participation and counted on women’s cooperation in managing such activity in the villages. The parish priests needed the support of their wives and daughters, as through them it was easier to reach the female population of the villages and their husbands. In the fourth chapter of the thesis, I explore how women were engaged observers during the election process and encouraged their husbands to participate actively in voting (in this case, the possibility for men to vote was not seen as an individual right but a right of the family that the man was representing). However, the Galician Catholic press had little interest in women’s issues like gaining more political and social rights or widening the list of professions available for to women.¹⁸⁹

Roman Catholic women and the Church

In comparison to the Greek Catholic Church, Roman Catholics did not have clerical women: however, the Roman Catholic Church had a higher number of working women. This was a quite specific group of women, who had to work because of their economic position. They worked in various plants and enterprises, in the postal service, or as maids. On the one hand, this group was more accessible than the peasantry. However, they were disconnected from their familiar communities and surroundings because of the need to move to the towns for work. On the other hand, this group was quite underprivileged (as only girls from poor families had to work) and needed real support.

Working women were a subject of interest for women’s rights activists, socialists, and the churches.¹⁹⁰ This combination of interests is essential for my thesis as it demonstrates how Catholic and national ideas intersected and why. For the Church, it was essential to win these women over, preventing them from becoming fascinated by immoral or ‘dangerous’ ideas such as socialism. For women’s rights activists, working

¹⁸⁹ There were a limited number of professions that women could have: teacher, post officer, worker in some factories, housemaid. These professions were also only available for unmarried women. Salomea Perlmutter “Polozenie lwowskich robotnic chrzescijanskich,” *Nowe slowo* 20, (Krakow): 484-487.

¹⁹⁰ The newspaper *Niewiasta polska* emphasized two issues connected to women’s work. On the one hand, women’s work was seen as dangerous for the welfare of the family and men (as it raised the number of workers and decreased salaries). Additionally, according to the article *Praca zarobkowa a kobieta*, men without work cannot marry, leaving both men and women lonely. “Praca zarobkowa a kobieta” [Earning work and a woman], *Niewiasta polska*, February 27, 1910.

On the other hand, for Catholic activists it was important to protect working women from any inappropriate/non-Catholic influence: this same newspaper advised girls who were far from home to contact Catholic organizations like *Stowarzyszenie Slug Katoliczek pod wezwaniem św. Zyty* [the Association of the Catholic Servants of St. Zyta]. *Niewiasta polska*, January 20, 1904.

women were proof that women's work mattered and that such work was useful for society. It is also worth mentioning that one of the aims of the Roman Catholic Church was to avoid the assimilation of Polish-speaking Jewish women into Polish women by emphasizing the importance of religion.¹⁹¹

As both Catholic churches were willing to support women's activism, especially when helping those in need, they encouraged organizations (most of all Catholic organizations) to help working women address their spiritual and material problems. The main concern for the churches was the possibility of working women "losing their virtue" and becoming prostitutes due to the difficulty of working life and the lack of oversight from family members.¹⁹² Fruitful insights into the development of church ideas about working women can be gleaned from looking at an initiative organized by *Czytelnia Katolicka* [Catholic Reading Room] in Lemberg in 1898. An awareness of poor working conditions for women sparked the idea of conducting a survey among Lemberg's working women in order to better understand their living and working conditions.¹⁹³ The survey asked questions about free time, organizational memberships, and reading preferences. This information was considered important for future mobilization, as it provided insights on the ways of life and priorities of working women and gave ideas about how to approach them.

Most likely, the interest in working women was the result of the highly popular encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. One of the main ideas was the Christian role in improving the position of workers.¹⁹⁴ The Galician women activists were also aiming to have their say on protecting those girls becoming workers in the towns. Thus, representatives of the nobility, probably Professor Tadeusz Pilat and Countess Helena Stadnicka, organized a survey to explore the lives of working women.

For this survey, 61 women from 18 occupations were questioned (among whom 5 were employers). The interviews were conducted by a male member of the intelligentsia and an unnamed countess. The survey confirmed popular conceptions of very poor working and living conditions among women workers. Major findings included their lack of time (due to working days of over 12 hours), low interest in any social, cultural, and public life, discrimination by employers, and the inability to support

¹⁹¹ The Roman Catholic Church, as well as national activists, supported the idea of an ethnic Polish nation united by the same religion and language.

¹⁹² Perlmutter "Polozenie lwowskich robotnic chrzescijanskich," 484-487.

¹⁹³ Perlmutter "Polozenie lwowskich robotnic chrzescijanskich," 484-487.

¹⁹⁴ Renz, *Spoeczno kulturalna dzialalność Kościoła*, 150.

themselves with the money they earned.¹⁹⁵ Most working women came from families that were employed and did not engage in intellectual or cultural pursuits; their only entertainment was reading religious or crime literature.

The results of the survey demonstrated that despite the mainly peasant population, there was a group of working women that had needs and problems. For the political activists, it was also important to mobilize these women: all means possible were used for this task. The goal of *Czytelnia Katolicka* in conducting the survey was to observe the position of working Catholic women from the perspective of involving them in national activism; that is why there was such a great interest in organizational memberships and reading preferences. Such an approach illustrates well that behind the emphasis on religious difference stood the idea of national belonging: their emphasis on Christian women workers immediately excluded Jewish and, in most cases, Ukrainian women (Greek Catholics did not refer to themselves as Catholics in order to highlight the differences with Roman Catholics).

This case demonstrates that Catholicism as a mobilization tool was important for women's rights activists. They used religious identity to exclude other nationalities from the Polish nation-building process. For Catholic women, the most important uniting features were religion and nationality rather than social group.

Universal male suffrage and women

The position of women was legally very restricted in Galicia, just as it was throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Before the introduction of universal male suffrage, the electoral law stated that all citizens above a certain level of financial means had the right to vote. These laws allowed women to have a vote as well if they fulfilled this criterion, but the vote had to be cast by a male proxy on the woman's behalf. The electoral law of 1907 gave all men the right to vote, regardless of their income, but it simultaneously removed the right to vote from those few women who had previously had it, albeit in an indirect fashion.¹⁹⁶

This development was very troubling to wealthy, educated women who earlier had the right to vote and suddenly lost it: after all, uneducated male peasants who were

¹⁹⁵ Perlmutter "Polozenie lwowskich robotnic chrzescijanskich," 484-487.

¹⁹⁶ Marya Tuzyma, the Polish activist, emphasized that electoral reform (1907) had taken away women's right to vote: now every analphabetic boy would have a representative while the female owners of large properties would not.

Marya Tuzyma, *Pozbawienie praw*. no. 8, 177-178.

not paying taxes had now acquired this right.¹⁹⁷ Educated women recognized this problem and saw becoming active citizens as the only possibility for change. Various women's organizations emerged to promote awareness of women's limitations within society and to construct a suitable approach to overcome them. The main ways they identified to change the position of women in society were promoting access to education, debating the role of women in the family and society, and demanding the right to vote.

Women's mobilization was highly influenced by universal male suffrage. On the one hand, the broadening of civil rights for men inspired women to voice their own claims to the right to vote. On the other, the majority of political forces were not interested in women's issues. The authors of the recent volume *The Struggle for Female Suffrage in Europe: Voting to Become Citizens*, published in 2012, discuss different aspects of why women did not receive the right to vote. Scholar Birgitta Bader-Zaar emphasizes that politics was seen as a male sphere in which women should not be involved.¹⁹⁸ Malgorzata Fuszara argues that the problem of women's voting was not connected to social traditionalism but to fear on the part of the privileged (male) gender.¹⁹⁹ Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz and Ruth Rubio-Marin further develop this thought, highlighting that women's issues were seen as a distraction from the central issue of constructing the concept of citizenship and could pose a threat to family unity in cases of different political preferences.²⁰⁰ Only the Austrian Social Democrats included a demand for women's suffrage in their program.²⁰¹ In reality, as women could not vote, there was no need to address their issues in political programs, especially as this might not be acceptable to more conservative male voters, thereby alienating them.

The Catholic Church did not issue any official statement in opposition to women's suffrage, but there was a strong tradition of the male public role and the idea of women's devotion to the family, which relegated women to the private sphere under the supervision of men.²⁰² In the Galician Catholic press, the issue of women's suffrage did not obtain significant attention. This issue was essential for neither of the Catholic churches, so there were no clear statements about it. The Greek Catholic *Nyva* highlighted that Christian doctrine presented no obstacle to women voting and the

¹⁹⁷ Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz, ed., *The struggle for female suffrage in Europe: voting to become citizens* (Leiden, 2012), 193.

¹⁹⁸ *The struggle for female suffrage in Europe*, 200.

¹⁹⁹ *The struggle for female suffrage in Europe*, 157.

²⁰⁰ *The struggle for female suffrage in Europe*, 10.

²⁰¹ *The struggle for female suffrage in Europe*, 192.

²⁰² *The struggle for female suffrage in Europe*, 200.

Catholic Church did not yet have a stated position on the matter, so individual Christians could come to their own conclusions.²⁰³ However, the author in *Nyva* saw a problem in the fact that voting necessitated participation in public life on an equal footing with men, and this could be dangerous for the family. On the one hand, according to the article, women could neglect their household duties in favor of social activism, while, on the other, they could come into conflict with their husbands over differing political views.²⁰⁴

Thus, in their struggle for universal suffrage the two main arguments activists made in favor of women's participation in elections were, first, the necessity of equality and universal rights regardless of gender and, second, the conviction that women's life experiences could contribute to a higher ethical level in public life.²⁰⁵ These arguments were intended to counter men's belief in the danger of women in politics. The same was true not just for Galicia but for the Habsburg Empire and other European states.²⁰⁶

The process of mass mobilization was not only oriented towards the active engagement of men in politics: it also had a strong influence on women's activism. The Catholic churches did not forbid or criticize women's social activity so long as it was not political or contradictory to social hierarchy. Moreover, the political and clerical activists recognized the importance and usefulness of women for spreading or supporting certain ideas. In the case of the Greek Catholic Church, there was a significant reliance on the help of 'clerical women', who would help priests to educate and activate peasantry. In the case of Roman Catholics, the Church was fighting for working women in order not to lose them to other political or national forces. Women activists themselves were building their own vision of the role of women not only in society, but also in politics. However, those voices were few and not available to the majority of the peasants, as women activists came from urban areas. In the villages, women took part in the public domain as a support for men and saw their husbands as representatives and actors for the good of the whole family. A village was a community of family units, not a community of individualistic positions like the city.

Conclusions

The clergy and Catholic women activists developed similar strategies and responses to the mass engagement of Galician society. The main aim of the Catholic Church for both

²⁰³ "Deshcho pro zhinoche pytannya," *Nyva*, December, 15 1912.

²⁰⁴ "Deshcho pro zhinoche pytannya."

²⁰⁵ *The struggle for female suffrage in Europe*, 148-149.

²⁰⁶ Paletschek, *Women's emancipation movements*, 3-10, 337-341, 301-333. 406-409.

groups was to promote Catholic values and ideas through the mobilization process and to be attentive to all anti-Catholic messages.

The Vatican and the high hierarchy of the churches encouraged clergy to be politically active, participate in gatherings and rallies, provide explanations about the differences between political powers, and be good leaders in their parishes in general. However, with the growing politicization of society, the clergy were not the only source of information for the laity; additionally, the clergy had their own political preferences and often worked to promote them. Thus the main difficulty for clergy was to establish new and quality contacts with the laity.

The similar need for new relations was true for women activists, who aimed to educate and unite women to increase women's rights. Women activists, as well as the clergy, supported the widening of political rights and combined them with the demand for more social rights. Both clergy and women activists most often supported national visions, considering the widening of national rights to be the most crucial issue.

The Greek and Roman Catholic churches were active supporters of universal male suffrage, and also discussed its possible implementation. One of the most popular ideas was to have community representation where each community could elect its own representatives to the diet. Similarly, the clergy of both rites had an interest in creating their own Catholic party that would be an example of proper Catholics in politics. However, neither group managed this successfully, as they were not numerous and homogenous enough to actually become an effective political power. Thus, the main strategy for the clergy was to participate in promoting existing political parties that supported the Catholic Church. Examples of how this worked will be provided in the following chapters of the thesis.

In regard to women, the Greek and Roman Catholic churches acted very similarly. Both hierarchies understood that women held a unique role in the community and, in particular, church life. As keepers of the home,²⁰⁷ they were the foundation of family life, but also the most active in volunteering support and assistance – be it cleaning and maintaining the church or assisting priests with household chores. Certainly, such an approach was common to all Catholic churches: however, the Galician particularity lay in the difference in rite.

²⁰⁷ As the newspaper *Niewiasta polska* stated, the main task of a woman was to bring God into the home: however, men tended to turn the house into a tavern, which is why women had to work to make the inhabitants of the house religious. *Niewiasta polska* 5, (1904).

The Greek Catholic Church, with women as wives and daughters of priests, had a more direct understanding of women's roles and grievances. The Greek Catholic clergy saw clerical women as an example of public activities for other women and as ambassadors of education in the parishes. In contrast, the Roman Catholic Church had more working women to worry about, as these women migrated far from their families and thus had no support. The Roman Catholic activists created various charity organizations to help working women in these new surroundings.

Throughout Europe, the Catholic Church was most concerned with defining the role of women in promoting their own message and educating those who would soon hold the right to vote – namely, the men. Thus, the church hierarchies worked on developing an intellectual process of consolidating the role of women in support of the clergy's role within the community. And they did this without going so far as to join or promote any struggles for universal suffrage. For the Church, retaining the established social hierarchy within which they were already strong was logical if they were to utilise their existing influences upon an increasingly politicized laity. There was no need to push for voting rights for women if they had not yet secured their own political identity within the scope of universal *male* suffrage.

There was consequently a desire from the Church to promote itself as aware of and sympathetic to women's rights and to maintain social unity within the framework of the Church's influence. Therefore, the clergy generally refused to criticize women's social activity so long as it did not encroach upon the established social hierarchy. Through this, we see that the priority of the clergy was to maintain their own levels of lay support and to avoid social confrontations with their own community. Finding ways to promote their support for women's social roles was important for the Church to maintain order and undermine the potential political growth of socialist activism. The interests of the Church were about appeasing women's concerns whilst preparing a political defence against any emerging adversaries that might seek to weaken its influence.

Chapter 3. Roman Catholics and social Catholicism: Father Stojalowski and his agitation

Introduction

The arrival of universal male suffrage thrust peasants and workers into the sphere of political significance. Inevitably, suffrage unleashed the hitherto unrealized potential for mass mobilization. The local administration, political organizations, and religious institutions vied for ways to retain their existing power and competed to extend their influence within the new dynamics of political elections. This vying for power led to conflict within society and between social and religious groups as complex, almost chaotic, clamors to legitimize existing or establish new authority ensued.

The extension of universal male suffrage across the peasantry created something of a ‘political vacuum’. The peasantry suddenly held a significant stake in elections, locally and nationally, and yet the existing authorities had previously operated without having to appeal for their support at the ballot box. For political activists, local officials, and nobles, this factor was obvious, and they sought to mobilize the mass support of those who had previously been disenfranchised to retain their position of privilege. For others, the mass mobilization of the previously disenfranchised was an opportunity to challenge and override the existing establishment in politics.²⁰⁸ In particular, the potential of the peasantry as a means for securing political authority led to the emergence of a targeted approach to appeal to and unite mass support. This chapter explores how the local Galician clergy of the Roman Catholic Church attempted to mobilize the potential power within the peasantry, as well as how social Catholicism manifested in Galicia.

The most politically active and successful representative of the Roman Catholic clergy was the priest Stanislaw Stojalowski. The mobilizing ideas he used are a great example of how the interconnection between politics and religion functioned, as well as an example of the nationalization of religious life. The political struggles of Stojalowski and the way in which the church and local authorities approached and dealt with him

²⁰⁸ As Daniel Unowsky brilliantly highlighted, “eventually, the balance of power shifts away from the central government, which is no longer able to exert control over the provinces.” Unowsky, *Pomp and politics*, 4.

Stojalowski, as well as the cases of Greek Catholic priests, demonstrated how this shift actually happened in Galicia and how the changing balance of power influenced relations between the clergy and officials of the province.

give us a deep insight into the tremendous importance of the peasantry and workers for political activists in Galicia and demonstrate the relations and co-dependence of all layers of society. This approach also reveals how the Austro-Hungarian Empire functioned at the bottom level and what loyalty and civic rights meant to citizens.

In his book *The Habsburg Empire*, Pieter Judson analyzes the mechanisms of the empire at the top level and emphasizes how the building of a liberal empire led to new possibilities for mass involvement, even though the property owner remained the core of the society and thus “limited the degree to which all citizens could participate in public life.”²⁰⁹ The case of Stojalowski demonstrates how a political activist and priest extended the limits of public participation and what reaction this provoked from the Church and the state.

The personality and actions of Stojalowski have already been the subject of analysis in a number of works: however, there are still new sources and questions to ask. Both Daniel Unowsky and Keely Stauter-Halsted have pointed out how successful Stojalowski was in mobilizing peasants and what influences this mobilization had on the balance between different social layers within the province. Unowsky emphasizes that, thanks to activists such as Stojalowski, Potoczek, and others, the peasants “were no longer content to seek fulfillment of their interests through the mediation of the conservative elites” and were becoming a political force themselves.²¹⁰ In her book *The Nation in the Village*, Stauter-Halsted elaborates on how peasant circles and organizations functioned and how fundamental Stojalowski's role was in this process. Andrzej Kudlaszyk explores the evolution of the idea of the peasants' political role from Stojalowski's mottoes “peasants should elect only peasants” to parliament and the Diet and “not to choose a nobleman and not to believe him”²¹¹ to the idea “with Polish nobility, Polish people”.²¹²

²⁰⁹ Judson, *The Habsburg empire*, 167.

In another section, Judson highlights: “As the needs and desires of citizens changed, so did the functions and meanings of the state. From schooling to military service to welfare benefits to postal services, the responsibilities of the state increased, and some of these responsibilities became understood as entitlements by their clients.” Judson, *The Habsburg empire*, 254.

²¹⁰ Unowsky, *Pomp and Politics*, 105-106.

²¹¹ Andrzej Kudlaszyk, *Katolicka myśl społeczno-polityczna w Galicji na przełomie XIX i XX wieku* (Wrocław, 1980), 92.

²¹² Andrzej Kudlaszyk, *Ksiądz Stanisław Stojalowski: studium historyczno-prawne* (Wrocław, 1998), 278. In this context, it is worth mentioning that Stojalowski's strategy was not simply to bring peasants to parliament, as while summarizing the results of the 1907 elections he stated that all elected peasant from the *ludowiści* and *socjaliści* [socialist and folk party] “do not speak German, do not have education and do not have sincere and fundamental Christian beliefs.” Kudlaszyk, *Ksiądz Stanisław Stojalowski*, 305. In 1907, Stojalowski, speaking about his own party, shared the following election results: “only 6 deputies [were elected], but from them 4 were priests ... With God's help we will elect from 6 to 8 deputies, from

In the framework of the existing analysis on the subject, I focus on the Catholic side of Stojalowski's ideas and behavior, as this was his way to doubt the existing conservative behavior of the clergy and lay people and consequently call them to actively participate in the political and public domains. I aim to contribute to the understanding of how Stojalowski used the increase in political rights to influence the secular life of Roman Catholics. Why did Stojalowski combine religious identity with other identities (political, provincial, and national)? How did the success of Stojalowski change the relations between local authorities and the parochial clergy?

Stojalowski, due to his mobilization strategy, was the most famous and politically active Roman Catholic priest in Galicia. He focused his mobilizing activities on workers and peasants. His main objectives were to combine patriotic and Catholic ideas and to encourage the lower layers of society to be more active in political life. The analysis of Stojalowski's political aims and methods of mobilization reveals that Stojalowski challenged the social hierarchy and looked to capitalize on the mobilization of lower classes to create change. Such views and strategies for mobilization created conflict between the Church and their congregation as the concept of the closer social and political involvement of the clergy was something new.

Stojalowski had built his career from a parish priest to a deputy in parliament and the Galician Diet [*Sejm*], which serves as an example of the possibilities that the Austrian Empire was offering at the beginning of the twentieth century. From the late nineteenth century until his death in 1911, Stojalowski was under the constant scrutiny of the Church, local government, newspapers, and politicians because of his intensive agitation and political activity. As a result of the close interest in Stojalowski, the clergy and high hierarchy developed strong opinions on the mobilization of the peasants and the role of the Catholic Church within this process. In chapters three and four, I discuss the examples of other priests (mainly Greek Catholic) who were politically active and, together with Stojalowski, brought the Church into modern politics and modern politics into the Catholic Church.

The personality and political image of Stojalowski

whom half will be peasants and the other half people able to [do] different parliamentary work." Thus it is evident that the participation of peasants in the election did not necessarily imply the need to elect peasants, especially because the peasant representatives were not educated and suited for politics. However without peasants' support, it was not possible to elect priests or middle-class deputies, as the nobility preferred to elect conservative noblemen instead. Kudlaszyk, *Książka Stanisław Stojalowski*, 321.

Stojalowski was born into a family of small Polish landowners in the village of Znesenia, near Lemberg. He joined a Jesuit monastery and studied philosophy and theology in Krakow. In 1873, he went to Belgium and became acquainted with the Jesuit Adolf Daens, who had founded the local Christian People's Party.²¹³ Certainly, this experience, as well as his fascination with Lueger and Pope Leo XIII's ideas, shaped Stojalowski's worldview. Later on, he started to implement these ideas into action in Galicia, bringing political Catholicism into the province.

Even though Stojalowski grew up among Ruthenian-speaking villagers (only during his stay in the seminary in Krakow did he meet Polish peasants), he was inspired to work with Polish peasantry and left the monastery to become a parish priest in the village of Kulikow, near Lemberg (1881-1896). Being a priest offered him the opportunity to use his clerical network as well as his flock as the foundation for the start of political career.²¹⁴ Stojalowski's criticisms of the church hierarchy resulted in the loss of the parish and suspension from the Church. However, he did not agree with the suspension and proved to the Vatican that he did not deserve it. After losing his parish, Stojalowski focused on politics even more intensively: he founded the *Stronnictwo Chrześcijańsko-Ludowe* [Christian People's Party], which received six seats in parliament during the elections in 1897. Stojalowski himself was also elected to the Galician Sejm between 1898 and 1911.

Stojalowski was often called a "demagogue in a cassock": however, he personally declared that this was a positive characterisation as he was protecting the common people. Baudouin de Courtenay argued that Stojalowski's image of himself as a chaplain and protector of the poor was his main strength and a key to success.²¹⁵ The court trials and constant persecution from the local authorities also influenced the popularity of Stojalowski, as he appeared to be just as much a victim of the local administration and nobility as the peasants.²¹⁶

Kudlaszyk, describing the political views of Stojalowski, emphasized that he was a follower of Leo XIII and Lueger. Stojalowski always highlighted in his newspapers that Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* and ideas on Christian democracy were his main values. In terms of his political background, Stojalowski wanted to collaborate in parliament with Lueger's Christian Social Party.²¹⁷ Kudrzyk pointed out that Stojalowski was also

²¹³ Tim Buchen, "Religiöse Mobilisierung im Reich," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 40, no. 1, (2014): 121.

²¹⁴ Buchen, "Religiöse Mobilisierung im Reich," 122.

²¹⁵ Romualda Baudouin de Courtenay, *Sylwetki polityczne: ksiądz Stanisław Stojalowski, Ignacy Daszyński, Jakób Bojko, Jan Stapiński, Karol Lewakowski* (Kraków, 1897), 8.

²¹⁶ Baudouin de Courtenay, *Sylwetki polityczne*, 8.

²¹⁷ Kudłaszyk, *Katolicka myśl społeczno-polityczna*, 102.

considered a follower of Lueger's testament.²¹⁸ Thus, Stojalowski managed to combine ideas about the Church's modernization from Leo XIII and the political ideology of the Christian Social Party as a means of mobilizing the peasantry and workers.

In the activism of the early twentieth century, the Church was confronting a new breed of determined, flexible, and intelligent activism. Stojalowski's successes in mobilization came not just from effective tools like the use of the press and mass assemblies, but also from his personality and flexible political behaviour, such as creating cooperation with different political parties or referencing the blessings of the Pope (discussed later in the chapter). The use of religion as a tool for uniting and mobilizing the peasantry was also combined with appeals to national identity by Stojalowski, showing that both religion and nationalism held strong potential for mobilization. Indeed, what could be achieved in terms of popular support by the charismatic personality of an activist who appealed to people through religion and national identity is evident in the example of the peasants' public backing for Stojalowski. In 1895, thousands of peasants, including women, signed a *Memorandum to the Imperial Government* (mainly to the Minister of Justice).

[The Galician Lueger: Stojalowski's mobilization strategy](#)

The ideas defined and spread by Stojalowski were significant for three reasons. Firstly, he introduced social Catholicism to Galicia, following the ideas of Pope Leo XIII and adapting them to the needs of the province. Secondly, his ideas, such as the focus on the importance of love for the Motherland and involving peasants in politics, were absorbed and modified by other political forces (mainly nationalists like *Narodowa Demokracja* [National Democracy]). Finally, and most importantly, Stojalowski set an example for other priests by uniting Catholic and political values. The combination of good pastor and politician was essential not only for Stojalowski but also for other clergy involved in politics. In the subsequent chapters of this thesis, I demonstrate the similarity of the ideas and strategies used by other Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic priests to Stojalowski's.

Stojalowski himself, in his newspaper *Wieniec-Pszczolka*, specified in 1908 the six main aims that he and his followers had been working on for over three decades. The first was "to awaken peasants from sleep and ignorance, and push them to cooperate on public matters", while the second was to overcome poverty and misery and teach the

²¹⁸ Kudłaszyk, *Katolicka myśl społeczno-polityczna*, 102.

peasants how to improve their economic position on their own.²¹⁹ The third aim was to construct “national strength” and to emphasize that the best way to realize this aim was to use the fourth aim of “adherence to the principles of Christ’s teaching, so-called Christian ethics”.²²⁰ In general, this strategy was to bring peasants into politics through Christian and national values.

Stojalowski stated in 1908 in *Wieniec-Pszczolka* that the Christian Peoples’ Party (organized by Stojalowski) had managed to realize those principles and transformed the “dark and beast-like mass of the population” into a politically and economically active one.²²¹ Stojalowski organized different initiatives to improve the lives of working people.²²² The political program of his party declared that it would always focus on the needs of working people: “the spread of education, awakening of national spirit, finishing poverty by raising farm and entrepreneurial sense, participation in political life by understanding the meaning and significance of elections”.²²³ Thus, Stojalowski emphasized that he had spent thirty years productively: he had mobilized the peasants and brought about an important change to their lives.

With the help of newspapers, local clergy, and active peasants, Stojalowski created the organizations *Kółka rolnicze* [Agricultural Circles] and *Towarzystwo oświaty narodowej* [National Education Society].²²⁴ In the beginning, *Kółka rolnicze* was a network of peasant organizations that focused only on enlightening and helping the peasants, but, in time, political parties started influencing the peasants and they began to work toward their own ideals, excluding Stojalowski's influence.²²⁵ For example, Stojalowski was not elected as a chief of *Kółka rolnicze* because the participants decided to involve local officials in the organization in order to influence the government.²²⁶ However, this did not discourage Stojalowski from organizing peasants, and he actively organized election committees in order to promote himself and his political party.

²²⁰ “Z Nowym Rokiem 1908” [Happy New Year 1908], *Wieniec-Pszczolka*, January 1, 1908.

²²¹ “Stronnictwo chrześcijańsko-ludowe” [Christian People’s Party] *Wieniec-Pszczolka*, March 15, 1908.

²²² Such as gatherings (rallies), pilgrimages, agricultural circles, Christian shops, agricultural machine purchases, parcelation, teaching the illiterate, peoples’ publishing, peasant electoral committees, the struggle for seats in the rural cura, a rural Polish rally in Ruthenia (Eastern Galicia), and newspapers for peasant women. “Obrachunek polityczny.”

Stojalowski realized very early in his career how useful it was to have a regular newspaper and how important it was to focus on small practical deeds that easily demonstrated the success of the political program.

²²³ “Obrachunek polityczny po 29 latach” [Political account after 29 years], *Wieniec-Pszczolka*, January 3, 1904.

²²⁴ Baudouin de Courtenay, *Sylwetki polityczne*, 6.

²²⁵ Stefan Kieniewicz, *Galicja w dobie autonomicznej, 1850-1914* (Wrocław, 1952), 233.

²²⁶ Kieniewicz, *Galicja w dobie autonomicznej*, 233.

The ideas and aims of political and social mobilization expressed and practiced by Stojalowski were a significant part of the mass mobilization process in Galicia, as they were effective and unifying. Stojalowski and, later, other political and clerical activists strongly emphasized three unifying ideas appealing to peasants: social injustice, Catholic values, and love for the Motherland (further developed into national devotion). Tim Buchen compares Stojalowski's approach with that of Jewish activist Joseph Bloch and demonstrates that religions and patriotic ideas functioned well in each national group.²²⁷ Buchen suggested that the biographies of activists like Stojalowski should be analyzed in the context of the history of empire and the history of religious groups as an intersection "between religion and Habsburg public life, or politics on the one hand and the empire and its religious community on the other."²²⁸

Stojalowski carefully observed the development of social Catholicism in Europe and tried to apply it in Galicia. The most essential example for Stojalowski and other representatives of political Catholicism was Leo XIII and his ideas of social work. Stojalowski always emphasized that he was a follower of Leo XIII.²²⁹ Also, Stojalowski paid a lot of attention to the development of Catholic movements outside Austria, especially in Germany:²³⁰ he focused on anti-episcopal movements.²³¹ This is shown well in the last case of the chapter, which analyses the conflict between Stojalowski and the bishops.

Lueger and his political behavior were the main inspiration for Stojalowski. Stojalowski was constantly monitoring the progress of Lueger and used similar methods in Galicia. Boyer has emphasized that Lueger's "'new' political language was really quite traditional in terms of its popular rhetoric and religion", which resulted in priests being "elected to seats in the Lower Austrian Landtag in 1890 because 'the people again trusts its clergy'."²³² The same approach used by Stojalowski worked in Galicia. Thus Stojalowski was building a strong connection between social Catholicism in Vienna, Germany, the Vatican, and the province of Galicia.

²²⁷ Buchen, "Religiöse Mobilisierung im Reich," 136.

²²⁸ Buchen, "Religiöse Mobilisierung im Reich," 119.

²²⁹ "The Christian People's Party mourned Leo XIII as its main patron and defender." "Leon XIII umarł!" [Leo XIII died], *Wieniec-Pszczolka* July 26, 1903.

²³⁰ "Stojalowski regarded himself in the Christian social movement as a realizer of the direction set by the German school". Kudlaszyk, *Książdz Stanisław Stojalowski*, 14.

²³¹ John Boyer has stated: "Anti-episcopalism was a central component of the Catholic side of the Christian Social movement". John W. Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement 1848-1897* (University of Chicago Press, 1995), 123.

²³² Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, 181.

Stojalowski wrote public appeals to both his patrons Leo XIII and Lueger at different stages of his career to ask for their support. He brought the pope's attention to his conflict with Galician bishops. In the *Fractionis Christiano-Socialis in Polonia Austriaca*, Stojalowski presented his political aims to Leo XIII and asked the pope to support his action. While the ideas themselves were about gaining more social justice and increasing the level of knowledge among peasants, the pope had no objection to them.²³³ Through out his career, Stojalowski very often referred to the importance of Leo XIII's support and the duty of the clergy to follow *Rerum Novarum*.

Stojalowski reached out to Lueger mostly for help in the political domain. In an open letter in 1897, Stojalowski asked Lueger to help him in the struggle with the 'nobilities party' widely present in government.²³⁴ In this case, Stojalowski most likely wanted to demonstrate that because of his similarity to Lueger and the latter's help, he was able to make the same change in Galicia as Lueger did in Vienna: he was also trying to scare conservative elites with this kind of change.

Stojalowski and Lueger represented social Catholicism and were active mobilizers. In 1897, Lueger confirmed that Stojalowski's program was compatible with the doctrines of the Church²³⁵ and thus recognized its social Catholic background. The Polish historian Andrzej Kudlaszyk has further emphasized that Stojalowski's aim to improve the moral, social, and political position of the working people was similar to that of all social Catholic parties in Europe, regardless of the administrative borders.²³⁶ The American historian John Boyer has focused on other manifestations of social Catholic movements, such as the active political behaviour of clergy, also typical for Stojalowski. Boyer highlights that "police reports from 1895-96 indicate, for example, that the clergy were often behind a variety of different kinds of rallies, political events, and money solicitations."²³⁷ Under such conditions, it is possible to analyze Stojalowski and his agitation in the framework of the ideas and actions of social Catholicism typical at the time. The closer look at the example of Galicia provides a micro-historical insight into how social Catholicism functioned in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Stojalowski 'spreading the word'

²³³ Kudlaszyk, *Książdz Stanisław Stojalowski*, 16.

²³⁴ *Książdz Stojalowski w świetle swoich własnych słów i listów. Przyczynek do historii Galicji* (Londyn 1898), 77.

²³⁵ Kudlaszyk, *Katolicka myśl społeczno-polityczna*, 92.

²³⁶ Kudlaszyk, *Katolicka myśl społeczno-polityczna*, 97.

²³⁷ Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, 164.

Stojalowski was particularly proud of his newspaper *Wieniec-Pszczolka* (The Wreath and the Bee)²³⁸ and the role it played in making his political ideas visible. He noted that his newspapers were the first and, for a while, the only ones in the province that printed a practical political-social program “speaking and writing for the people in an understandable way: [and] as to mature people and citizens rather than to children”.²³⁹ Certainly, other political forces used newspapers to spread their ideas as well. I examine Stojalowski’s newspaper as an example of how important the press was for mass mobilization, what ideas were most effective, and how it was possible to continue publishing despite censorship and prohibition.

The newspapers issued by Stojalowski, along with various meetings, were one of the most effective tools for mass mobilization. One of the distinguishing features was the almost 40-year duration of his publishing activities. Taking into account that Stojalowski was jailed, had financial troubles, and organized numerous meetings and other activities, the long lives and regularity of his newspapers was impressive. At the beginning of his editing career, he stated that there were no political aims in his newspapers, just compassion for the peasants.²⁴⁰ Furthermore, he characterized *Wieniec-Pszczolka* as the first and only newspaper in Galicia with political ideas for working people.²⁴¹ Besides the novelty in approaching this demographic, the newspapers were a great tool for communicating and discussing ideas. He wrote that all his important mobilizing activities were inspired through the newspapers: “pilgrimages, peasant organizations (*Kółka rolnicze*), shops, buying agricultural machines, etc.”.²⁴²

The two main elements of Stojalowski’s political rhetoric throughout all the issues of the newspapers were the importance of Christian values in politics and the increasing political involvement of the people (mainly peasants and workers). In 1906 in one of the articles in *Wieniec-Pszczolka*,²⁴³ Stojalowski declared: “in the work and struggle that we have undertaken for so many years, Christian truth and justice was for us, above all, the victory of socio-political work, which was first indicated in the Gospel

²³⁸ Stojalowski also edited the newspapers *Dzwon* (for the clergy) and *Niewiasta* (for women): these newspapers were not his main priority and were issued only for few years.

²³⁹ “Obrachunek polityczny po 29 latach.”

²⁴⁰ Baudouin de Courtenay, *Sylwetki polityczne*, 5.

²⁴¹ “Obrachunek polityczny po 29 latach.”

²⁴² “Obrachunek polityczny po 29 latach.”

²⁴³ As the newspapers were issued for more than thirty years (and only a few newspapers were as long lasting as his), it is possible to trace how his mobilizing ideas developed through them. He founded the newspapers with the aim to educate peasants about political possibilities in the 1880s and 1890s. He then developed the newspaper for the Christian Peoples’ Party, which Stojalowski led. I focus here on issues discussed in the newspaper from the beginning of the twentieth century, because at that time Stojalowski revised and summarized his ideas and achievements and clearly defined his political strategy.

of Christ, and in recent times newly recalled in the memorable encyclicals of Leo XIII".²⁴⁴ Thus, Stojalowski emphasized the leading role of Catholic values, and especially the continuity of Leo XIII's vision, on the modernizing of religious life and the social mission of the Catholic Church. The following might sound very typical for a Catholic priest; however, the link to Leo XIII's encyclicals and the conception of the general role of the Catholic Church in society was not common for all socially active priests, who rather focused on local problems and support for local bishops. While Stojalowski did not have the support of the local church hierarchy, he tried to emphasize the global, instead of the local, character of his movement. Stojalowski always stated that his newspapers adhered to all the requirements of censorship and followed all state and religious laws. However, as he very often criticized local authorities and even clergy, his newspapers were censored and sometimes prohibited. Stojalowski organized printing in Hungary and even planned to move it to Vienna²⁴⁵ in order to protect the newspapers from the Galician authorities. The decision to move printing from Galicia proved to be very useful, as the Galician government had difficulties to controlling newspapers issued far away from Galicia: in times of conflict and persecution, Stojalowski thus managed to keep publishing regularly. Galician starostas [*Bezirkhauptmänner*]²⁴⁶ constantly reported how hard it was to expropriate the newspapers when there was something inappropriate against local authorities and how helpless they felt.²⁴⁷ The plan to move the publication to Vienna was very expensive.²⁴⁸ So, the newspapers moved to Silesia, staying there until the death of Stojalowski. After Stojalowski was elected to parliament and the Sejm, he and his press were no longer persecuted. However, it was not only elections that worked to protect Stojalowski. His followers also learned how to defend themselves and their pastor.

When it was not possible to forbid printing, the next move for the starostas was to determine who Stojalowski's audience was and ask the Vice-regency to approve of confiscating newspapers directly from subscribers. With their reports about his audience, we find out who Stojalowski's supporters were. In various villages, they were the professional and educated peasants: foresters, local mayors and a few other officials,

²⁴⁴ "Płonne obawy" [Poignant fears] *Wieniec-Pszczolka*, March 18, 1906.

²⁴⁵ *Materialy po rozsliduvannyu spravy svyashchenyka Stanislava Stoyalovs'koho zvyynuvachenoho u vystupakh proty avstriys'koyi vlady* [Materials on the investigation of the accused priest Stanislaw Stojalowski against the Austrian authorities]]Volume 5, 1894. TsDIAL [Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv] Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 2371.

²⁴⁶ A starosta (district captain or bezirkhauptman) was an official responsible for the district.

²⁴⁷ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2367.

²⁴⁸ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2373.

reading houses, and teachers and other school officials.²⁴⁹ In 1895, thousands of peasants, including women, signed a *Memorandum to the Imperial Government* requesting an end to the persecution of Stojalowski and his followers.²⁵⁰ By ‘persecution’, they meant the confiscation of brochures and press and the banning of meetings. The issuing of such a memorandum demonstrates firstly the extensive support Stojalowski had mobilized and secondly how concerned local figures in the Galician authorities were by a mobilized peasantry.

The authors of the *Memorandum* expressed their discontent, as the Imperial authorities had ignored the previous memorandum with 5,000 signatures. The memorandum stated that not only had Stojalowski experienced injustice, but the people had also suffered due to a lack of civil rights, such as electing representatives, reading newspapers, or organizing gatherings.²⁵¹ The statement concerning the lack of civil rights is very fascinating, as it highlights some basic understanding of what civil rights are and why they matter. Certainly, this does not mean that all who signed the memorandum had clear understanding of it; however, they all definitely trusted Stojalowski over the local administration.

The memorandum was signed and sent to Vienna to explain what was taking place in Galicia and to ask for justice. Such an act reveals several important levels of Stojalowski's success. Firstly, his followers were well organized and informed on whom to reach in the empire's hierarchy to require justice when it was not present at the local level. Secondly, that these peasants found it important to support their leader even though doing so might mean they too had to face persecution means that political awareness was gaining more and more value. Thirdly, as secular and religious authorities did not support Stojalowski, his followers used the *Memorandum* to question the accuracy of those institutions on this particular matter. Such an attitude can be seen as a prime example of critical thinking among Stojalowski's followers about the conduct of social institutions.

This relatively short document (with more than 250 pages of signatures) demonstrated that even before being elected as a deputy, Stojalowski had managed to activate several thousand peasants and unite them around the idea of the Polish nation. The supporters had clearly stated in the *Memorandum* that they represented the whole

²⁴⁹ *Materials on the investigation, sprava 2369.*

²⁵⁰ Harald Binder, “Galizien in Wien. Parteien, Wahlen, Fraktionen und Abgeordnete im Übergang zur Massenpolitik,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 40, (2014).

²⁵¹ *Materials on the investigation, sprava 2372.*

Polish nation. Later in the chapter, I discuss the particularities of Stojalowski's idea of Polishness.

Even though the *Memorandum* seemed ineffective with regards to achieving its main goal, it was a significant mobilizing tool. It engaged people in reading and signing it. It demonstrated the actual presence of support for Stojalowski and the courage of the signatories in making their identities known to the authorities. The *Memorandum* was also a way of pressuring the local authorities to change their attitude towards the peasantry and guarantee such basic rights as reading newspapers and organizing gatherings.

In conclusion, the idea and strategy of issuing the newspapers was very effective for Stojalowski's political career. The newspapers summarized and constantly emphasized the political strategy of Stojalowski and his followers in the article *Nowy trzydziesty trzeci rok* [New 33rd year] of *Wieniec-Pszczolka* in 1907: "We demanded political freedom for the people and allowing them to participate in local government, to learn their civic duties, and to get used to rational, cooperative work for the good of the country and the whole nation".²⁵² From this statement, it is easy to see that Stojalowski reserved for himself the role of political enlightener and contributor to the construction of the nation. These and similar ideas were constantly repeated in his newspapers. In some articles, his aims and strategies were clarified in more detail.

The means of communicating and spreading any ideas which were not directly controllable posed a significant challenge to the Church, who held their authority by remaining a focal point for social cohesion in the villages. Activists such as Stojalowski sought to inflame the peasantry and challenge the existing hierarchical system. Thus through the means of communication and the intent to mobilize dissent, a perceivable threat was established towards the existing authorities.

Along with newspapers, the publication of brochures was a very effective tool to spread certain political ideas and to construct an effective political image. One of Stojalowski's brochures *Bogiem a Prawda* [God and Truth] was published in 1894. The brochure's content was so controversial that Stojalowski was put on trial for disturbing public peace and order following its publication. Stojalowski, however, managed to use trials and persecutions to increase his popularity and gain sympathy among peasants and workers. The brochures were very often a successful alternative to newspapers, because

²⁵² "Nowy trzydziesty trzeci rok" [New 33rd year], *Wieniec-Pszczolka*, January 6, 1907.

all newspapers, by law, were censored. Brochures were harder to trace and easier to spread from hand to hand.

In the brochure *Bogiem a Prawda*, Stojalowski described the conflict between himself, the bishops and the local authorities. He explained that the local powers persecuted and jailed him and, consequently, his followers because they could not do anything else to stop the growing movement of people: this was why the Galician bishops were involved. Stojalowski encouraged ‘the people’ to analyze the motives of the authorities because the latter intended to manipulate the former for their own benefit. Of particular interest to the Church, one of the important ideas of the brochure was critical thinking about secular and religious authorities, as well as fighting against any injustice.

Even though the majority of bishops were against Stojalowski at this moment, Archbishop Wierzchlejski tried to approach him calmly. He organized a meeting with Stojalowski and said: “My dear, I had a meeting with Count Alfred Potocki and he was complaining that you are storming people and asked me to forbid you the rallies, because you [Stojalowski] are acting on the territories that still remember 1846”.²⁵³ This reference to 1846 highlighted what a threat the nobility still saw in the peasant masses and thus why it was so important for landlords to keep the peasants calm and under control. Furthermore, Wierzchlejski continued that while he was defending Stojalowski before the court, he was really asking the priest to be careful with the authorities.²⁵⁴

However, Stojalowski did not take the bishop’s advice and criticized openly the behavior of the Galician governor Kazimierz Badeni and his relatives. He stated that Badeni’s family occupied the positions of power in Galicia²⁵⁵ and used them for their own benefit rather than “representing the justice of the Emperor”. In addition, the governor was using all his power to minimize Stojalowski’s activation of ‘the people’, mainly by persecuting his newspapers. One of Stojalowski’s intentions was to criticize and destroy the strong position of the nobility within Galicia and to create public accountability for officials so they did not misuse their power. Stojalowski was not

²⁵³ Kieniewicz, *Galicja w dobie autonomicznej*, 233.

In 1846, there was a bloody rally of peasants against their landlords.

²⁵⁴ Kieniewicz, *Galicja w dobie autonomicznej*, 233.

²⁵⁵ One of the family (a Jesuit and the editor of newspaper *Przegląd Powszechny*) was a police officer and delivered false messages to the Viennese authorities in order to control Galician society and present it as unsafe. Another, Stanislaw Badeni, was a representative of the nobility and its interests in parliament. The worst, Kazimierz Badeni was a viceroy of Galicia who instead of representing the justice of the emperor behaved like a king.

“Bogiem a Prawda.” *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2370.

attacking the governor's position but the governor as a person, since he was abusing this position and acting against the laws of the Austrian monarchy. This idea was often present in his newspapers, speeches, and brochures. The supremacy of the law for all classes of society was a core element of mass mobilization, and in Stojalowski's hands it was an effective idea, especially since such equality seemed to be possible in the empire.

At the end of the brochure, Stojalowski presented a strategy to contest the unjust behaviour of Governor Badeni and of the post authorities (who stopped delaying the newspapers) in parliament.²⁵⁶ It is noteworthy that Stojalowski always presented his supporters a strategy for action and assured them of the possibility of gaining justice. This was one of his most effective approaches to engaging his audience and influencing his enemies. In most cases, the way to fight against local injustice was to appeal to higher authorities. In contrast to local authorities, the imperial ones were seen as fair and reliable. Pieter Judson has emphasized that the building of liberal empire led to new possibilities for mass involvement, even though the property owner remain at the core of society and this "limited the degree to which all citizens could participate in public life."²⁵⁷

Unfortunately, there is no evidence of how the peasants viewed this brochure: it is easy, however, to reconstruct the reaction of local officials. As soon as the brochure started to spread, starostas from different districts reported its controversial content. As the brochure was not spread through the post but from hand to hand, it was hard to trace and confiscate. For example, in 1894 the starosta of Dobromyl²⁵⁸ pointed out that the brochure's target audience in his town were the servants of property owners.²⁵⁹ Thus, he was afraid of possible conflicts between landowners and their servants. Local officials and the Vice-regency considered the criticism of the governor as a threatening idea that could encourage active resistance to the existing social order.

In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in 1896, Stojalowski, taking into account the success of the brochure *Bogiem a Prawda*, distributed a new brochure, *Modlitwa chlopa* [Prayer of the Peasant]. The *Prayer* was written as an allusion to

²⁵⁶ "Bogiem a Prawda," sprava 2370.

²⁵⁷ Judson, *The Habsburg empire*, 167.

²⁵⁸ Dobromyl, a town 113 kilometers from Lviv.

²⁵⁹ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2370.

official prayers. The prayer glorified God but also described the peasants' miserable position in Galicia.²⁶⁰

Moneylender Jews, unkind lords are pushing the last piece of bread from the peasant's hands... And even pastors are in pair with wolves, because they, like Jewish golden gods, they [pastors] are cursing us, even though poor folks are worshipping at your [God's] altars.

This verse highlights that peasants worked to sustain other social classes, but they are 'despised' and 'averted' in society. In such a way, Stojalowski aimed to emphasize the peasants' importance and showed an understanding of their problems, which was always the core of his agitation. He positioned himself as the friend and protector of peasants, the one who helped them to realize their unjust place in the social structure and to improve it.²⁶¹ Since they were not many other 'protectors of peasants', Stojalowski gained more and more popularity.

The brochure contained strong accusations against the Jews and nobility for the unfair treatment of peasants, as well as a lack of priests who supported the peasants' interests. Stojalowski implied that unlike himself the majority of the clergy was not very interested in improving the peasantry's position²⁶² because of the instructions coming from higher hierarchy: such an approach would never lead the clergy to success in mobilization.

Throughout his whole career, Stojalowski stated that the behavior of the nobility and the positions of local officials were the reasons for backwardness in Galicia. Stojalowski's anti-Semitic ideas deserve attention as a separate topic. It is important to emphasize that Stojalowski saw Jews as an economic problem. In his opinion, the peasants were economically ruined by Jews, who advanced loans that were impossible to cover and sold vodka for a high price. The priests were also mentioned because during Stojalowski's conflicts with the Church authorities, the majority of Roman Catholic priests obeyed the orders of the Galician bishops to excommunicate Stojalowski's supporters from the Church. Stojalowski regarded the demands to excommunicate him as a betrayal by the bishops and priests, who were willing to cooperate with the nobility

²⁶⁰ "Even though the poor peasant is working for all, for all layers of the society (and) he has poured his blood at work, everyone despises him and has an aversion to him ..."

"Modlitwa chłopa," *Materials on the investigation*, sprawa 2370.

²⁶¹ "Modlitwa chłopa," sprawa 2370.

²⁶² Kieniewicz, *Galicja w dobie autonomicznej*, 242.

for their own good instead of joining Stojalowski's activities to protect peasants from unjust treatment.

Naturally, local officials viewed such a brochure, criticizing as it did the nobility and clergy, as dangerous, as at its core the brochure touched on the whole structure of society. The starosta of Wadowice, who was among the first to read this brochure, insisted on prohibiting it, as it could threaten the public peace and cause hatred between social classes.²⁶³ Furthermore, plenty of copies were found and confiscated. This fact showed that Stojalowski's agitation walked a fine line and was the main cause for his persecution and the prohibition of his materials. Such straight-forward criticism of the social structure prevented the possibility to create alliances and limited Stojalowski's influence, as his actions and ideas were considered illegal in many cases: respect for the law was one of the core values for many in the Habsburg Empire.

The other noteworthy thing is that while the *Prayer* intentionally appeals to people's emotions, there are no clear calls for action. This was one of the methods to approach and inspire the masses. Thus, we can observe how Stojalowski was making his agitation efforts simple and easy to understand and as a result succeeded with them. Stojalowski's methodology was just one of many that agitators of the time used: however, he was the most successful and well-known representative of the clergy who managed to turn religious ideas into mass mobilization methods.

Mass assembly as a mobilization tool

Bringing people together in mass assemblies is one of the main tools for achieving or spreading the ideas of any political force, especially when the majority is illiterate. In Galicia, Stojalowski was among the first to effectively utilize mass gatherings as a mobilization tool. Stojalowski's example gives us new insights into how mass rallies influenced the relations between the clergy and their laity and as a result led to the politization and nationalization of the subjects of the empire.

Stojalowski himself used rallies for different purposes, such as to create personal contacts with his audience, gain new supporters, spread his ideas, and convince his audience that they were not at fault for their unfortunate social position. Stojalowski's gatherings took place in urban and village spaces, so I analyze closely one rally in a city and a few in villages in order to demonstrate how and why they were organized and the perceptions of participants and local authorities. Such perceptions could be more

²⁶³ *Materials on the investigation, sprava 2370.*

important than the rally itself, as they reveal what fears, opportunities, and functions were behind the idea of the mobilization of masses.

In various cases, Stojalowski organized gatherings simultaneously with patriotic occasions or celebrations devoted to important events from Polish history. In this way, he connected the peasant movement (mainly led by him) with other Polish national movements (mainly led by conservatives). When organizing a rally, Stojalowski very often selected Krakow or Lemberg, the largest and most important cities of the province, in order to make the event and its participants visible to the local authorities and the press.

In the summer of 1890, Stojalowski planned a peasant rally in Krakow with a patriotic celebration devoted to the reburial of Adam Mickiewicz. Stojalowski encouraged the peasants to demonstrate their presence and importance in society by participating in the event. One police official reported that Stojalowski contacted Krakow's priests asking for their help in organizing the peasants.²⁶⁴ Thus, he was using his own clerical network to organize a gathering and to secure its participants from police attacks.²⁶⁵ Stojalowski's newspaper *Przszolka* (no. 136, 13.07.1890) described in detail how the peasants managed to participate in Mickiewicz's reburial, enhancing the ceremonial experience and thus deflating initial fears that the presence of peasants would be detrimental.²⁶⁶ According to Stojalowski, the participation of the peasants had reached its main goal in proving that the peasants were not "an ignorant mass" and were civilized enough not to ruin any public event. Stojalowski was proud that, besides his arrest, all went well, and he emphasized that persecution against him only highlighted the desire of the peasants to resist.²⁶⁷ For Stojalowski, this was a sign that the peasants could now organize themselves.

Stojalowski was inspired by this success and thus kept planning new mass rallies, despite the threat of arrest. One of his main plans was a massive Catholic gathering (in Krakow or Lemberg) with the aim of demonstrating how Catholic and political ideas could combine and mobilize the masses. The first plans for the gathering appeared in the summer of 1893, but it took around a year to make precise plans. The aim of the gathering was to establish a Catholic organization that would have participants all over Galicia. However, there was a delay in approving the organizational regulations. On

²⁶⁴ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2367.

²⁶⁵ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2367.

²⁶⁶ The newspaper makes an allusion here to the fact that the local administration feared numerous peasants arriving in Krakow and influencing the commemoration.

²⁶⁷ *Wieniec-Pszczolka* July 13, 1890. *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2367.

November 1894, Stojalowski arrived in Krakow to find suitable place for the gathering and sent invitations and announcements to the newspapers.²⁶⁸

The Vice-regency and local officials devoted a lot of attention to changing Stojalowski's plans. The police director in Krakow reported to the Vice-regency that it would be a great time to arrest Stojalowski and forbid him from settling in any Crown land. Apparently, the Vice-regency agreed to the former suggestion but not the latter. The arrest took place on 15 November, three days before the planned gathering. The police director knew that the event could take place without Stojalowski, so he banned the gathering itself, announcing to the participants that their political opponents might physically attack them. The peasants accepted the information calmly; they took part in a religious service (mass) and left Krakow.²⁶⁹

The behavior of the peasants reveals that they had learned how to organize themselves without Stojalowski. Certainly, the arrest of Stojalowski ruined the rally as such, but there were no threat to public order because of the peasants' presence in Krakow. So, the biggest fear of the city's authorities that a peasant mob would run out of control had not come to pass. As Stojalowski had devoted a lot of space in his newspapers to promoting calm actions at mass rallies, his activity was also the reason why the peasants behaved in an organized manner. At this point, the local administration had also proven to be effective, having managed to control Stojalowski and prevent rallies by arresting their leader. Thus, this case is an illustration of how both sides, agitators and the local authorities, were adapting to the strategies of the other and used their power to achieve the desired results.

For Stojalowski, it was very problematic to arrange a successful gathering in the cities: however, it was much easier and more fruitful in the villages. The peasant communities were small and thus served as tight networks where the priest could easily spread messages among peasants. Simultaneously, it was harder for local authorities to control gatherings in the villages. The villages were also a source of comfort for the peasants. The gatherings in different villages of Galicia were a regular part of Stojalowski's agitation. He organized these gatherings with different purposes: to arrange local organizations for the peasants (*Kolka rolnicze*), to agitate for specific candidates before elections, to consult with peasants about their problems, and to set an example. In the later stages of his career, the peasants of Galicia and Silesia organized

²⁶⁸ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2371.

²⁶⁹ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2371.

such gatherings themselves and sent reports about them to *Wieniec-Pszczolka*. The editors of the newspaper published these reports and in this way encouraged other villagers to arrange their own gatherings.

Certainly, Stojalowski was not the only agitator who used such meetings to promote his ideas, but he was one of the first to demonstrate how effective they were and to emphasize the importance of personal contact with the peasants. In addition, he managed to encourage the peasants to build their own clubs and networks, teaching them to be self-sufficient. This was very innovative for the time. For the Catholic Church, Stojalowski's success²⁷⁰ was a sign that peasants were responsive and attentive to ideas coming from the priest.

Stojalowski was constantly in touch with his audience and worked on increasing it. After being banished from Galicia, Stojalowski worked hard to establish connections not only with peasants but with workers as well. One of the reasons for this strategy was the mobility of this group and his desire to win workers over from socialism. He met with his supporters in informal atmospheres, drank alcohol, and embraced them.²⁷¹ In some cases, despite conflicts with the Church's hierarchy, he visited parish priests, invited them to his party, and agitated among the peasants to vote for them.²⁷² However, the conflict with bishops ruined his clerical network and made him an unwanted person in many villages.

One of the strengths of Stojalowski's strategy was that he tried to avoid open conflicts with local authorities or the clergy; if they disagreed, he simply looked for a new location and partner. Some starostas used Stojalowski for their own benefit. For example, the starosta of Gorlice reported to the Vice-regency that he would permit Stojalowski to organize a gathering because it would split peasant support between Stojalowski and the other candidate (Stapinski) in the parliamentary elections.²⁷³ This starosta did not specify why it was important for him to split the preferences of the villagers, but one can assume that he was counting on it to prevent the election of both candidates.

²⁷⁰ Stojalowski's newspaper *Wieniec* defined the success in following way: "This political freedom is, after all, a great prize and advantage of those struggles and hardships that Fr. Stojałowski [accomplished], along with the Christian People's Party." "Czy zrobili co dobrego?" [Have we done something good?], *Wieniec-Pszczolka*, May 5, 1907.

²⁷¹ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2368.

²⁷² *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2368.

²⁷³ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2374.

The example of Stojalowski shows that, for the clergy, the mobilisation of the peasantry was easier in rural areas, although mass assemblies in urban areas could have a more significant impact. It also reveals that an organiser of gatherings had to take care, particularly at first, when garnering the trust of the peasantry and preventing too much friction with the local authorities. Stojalowski was a leader that knew his laity well and understood their needs: thus he was successful in combining Christian values and practices with the political ideas of the time, using both religion and national identity to mobilize peasants. Additionally, Stojalowski managed to spread social Catholic ideas in the province and emphasized constantly the request of Pope Leo XIII to improve the position of the peasants. Last but not least, Stojalowski, with his printing strategy (spreading newspapers and avoiding censorship) and mass rallies, became an example for other priest engaged in mass mobilizations.

[Stojalowski forging and inflaming connections using national identity](#)

Nationalism was becoming a strong political idea and an important mobilizing tool by the turn of the century. Religious, linguistic, and economic differences reinforced mutually divided communities in Galicia and other provinces. The aforementioned differences were fruitful stimuli for emerging ideas of belonging to particular nationalities and the importance of national self-governance. In Galicia, national ideas were mainly based on the difference in rites (Greek and Roman Catholic) and language (Ruthenian and Polish) and were a nurturing ground for the growing separation and construction of diverse nations. During the process of enfranchising the peasants, appealing to certain national ideas was a very effective agitation method and a powerful way to increase the chances of being elected.

Stojalowski and other representatives of the clergy realized the mobilizing potential of nationalism and incorporated it into their political activity. The incorporation of national ideas by Stojalowski and other representatives of the clergy influenced their churches and laity and hastened the nation-building process. I demonstrate below, using the example of Stojalowski, how the intersection between national and religious ideas worked; later, I analyze similar processes among the Greek Catholic clergy. Certainly, both the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic clergies were closely observing and considering each other's behavior, especially because they shared the same territory and space of influence.

Stojalowski's approach to the different nationalities of the province can be reconstructed from his speeches, publications, and public gatherings. A great summary of his ideas is gathered in his parliamentary speech of 1898. This speech was the culmination of Stojalowski's struggle to be elected to the imperial parliament and served as a declaration of his political ideas and plans at the imperial level. Additionally, Stojalowski's actual behavior with the two other major nationalities in the province (Ruthenians and Jews) reveals how he implemented his ideas. This focus on the relation between nationalities is a vivid demonstration of how nation-building process occurred, how the national groups were shaped, and how they constructed exclusive ideologies against a background of ritual difference.

Stojalowski's speech was not only pronounced in parliament but was also published in his newspapers and as a separate brochure. This was a moment of triumph for Stojalowski as he finally, after the conflicts with the Galician government and church authorities, managed to be elected to parliament and had a chance to make a difference there. He stated that parliament is "the place of justice and lawmaking, the only place in Austria where a free word can be said."²⁷⁴ This claim about parliament's importance and justice was an essential element of his rhetoric. Parliament was seen as a place of freedom and change, where new thoughts and laws were created. The key element in mobilizing the masses was to emphasize that it was possible to manage injustices and improve one's position in society through elected bodies (parliament and the diet).

Historian John Boyer views the changing role of parliament from a different perspective. Boyer states that "until 1897 the Reichsrat served as a means for the representatives of the social elites of the nationalities to reconcile their differences and establish difficult, but workable, compromises." However, with the development of mass politics and the presence of deputies like Stojalowski, "the parliament thereby lost its role as an integrating force in imperial politics and became, instead, a forum for the expression of national and social discontent."²⁷⁵ Stojalowski definitely planned to

²⁷⁴ "Stanowisko polityczne chrześcijańsko-ludowego stronnictwa: pierwsza mowa posła X. Stanisława Stojalowskiego wypowiedziana w parlamencie wiedeńskim na 8 posiedzeniu nocnym rady państwa z dnia 31 marca na 1 kwietnia 1898," last modified November 25, 2017, <http://polona.pl/item/4740011/2/>

²⁷⁵ Philip Pajakowski emphasizes: "Until 1897 the Reichsrat served as a means for the representatives of the social elites of the nationalities to reconcile their differences and establish difficult, but workable, compromises. The emergence of a new style of politics directed toward the general public undermined the existing elites and, with them, the Reichsrat as an assembly of established notables. The parliament thereby lost its role as an integrating force in imperial politics and became, instead, a forum for the expression of national and social discontent." Philip Pajakowski, "The Polish Club, Badeni, and the Austrian Parliamentary Crisis of 1897," *Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes* 35, no. 1/2 (1993): 120.

express discontent, as focusing on social discontent was effective in seeking improvements for Polish peasants.

Stojalowski talked in the speech about his and his party's unique political strategy. He stated that the Christian People's Party would only support Christian social reforms and that it would not join the collection of Polish deputies in parliament known as *Kolo Polskie* [Polish circle]. *Kolo Polskie* was known for its conservative views. Even though Stojalowski had similar national views to them, he planned to join Lueger's party, as it was more Catholic. As the speech shows, Stojalowski did not ally himself with any Polish politicians in parliament and choose his own way, possibly counting on the support of Lueger's party because of their shared ideas about the importance of Christian social reforms.

John Boyer points out that clergy throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire was involved actively in politics: thus, Galicia was part of the wider picture of interconnections between the clergy and mass mobilization. It was easy to influence followers in conservative regions like Galicia or Tirol, while in other parts of Lower Austria this was no longer the case.²⁷⁶ The clergy sought to regain influence through politics or combining religion and politics together: thus, "many priests ran for public office and the vast majority of the Viennese and Lower Austrian clergy served as adept agitators in the political realm."²⁷⁷ In such terms, Stojalowski was not an exception but rather a confirmation of the general rule that the Catholic Church was becoming an important political player at all levels (from the laity to the high hierarchs).

Harald Binder, in his book *Galizien in Wien*, emphasizes Stojalowski's ability to contribute to setting up a 'solid Catholic foundation' in parliament with Galician representation. Binder associates this success with two factors: firstly, the wide popularity of Catholic movements thanks to Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* and, secondly, to "the charisma of the people's tribune Karl Lueger."²⁷⁸ Thus with direct and indirect help from Lueger, Stojalowski managed to establish his presence in parliament sessions. It is notable that Stojalowski did not suggest any actual solutions to specific political problems, which was very typical for his political campaign. However, he emphasized

²⁷⁶ As Boyer claims: "After 1869 the priests had no formal control over subject areas other than religion or over the behavior of teachers, although in many rural communities and conservative provinces such as Tirol, substantial informal influence of the clergy remained unimpaired." Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, 348.

²⁷⁷ Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, 365.

²⁷⁸ Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 177.

More on Stojalowski in parliament: Binder, "Die polnische Opposition: Abfall Stojalowskis und soziale Unruhen als politischer Inhalt" in *Galizien in Wien*, 396-402.

that, as always, he was a defender of the Polish people, justice, and truth.²⁷⁹ Those abstract ideas were very comfortable to use, as they were more compatible with moral issues than politics. As a result, Stojalowski became very popular in Galicia and through his activism taught peasants how to organize themselves to achieve different political aims.

Rerum Novarum was an important milestone for Catholic action in other provinces. Marija Vulesica shows that *Rerum Novarum* and “the parties set up with an explicitly Christian program like the Christian Social Party in Austria and the Catholic People’s Party in Hungary”²⁸⁰ were the main factors that stimulated the importance of political Catholicism in Croatia-Slavonia.²⁸¹

Vulesica states that although political Catholicism was not a well-organized movement, it managed to elect its candidates to one third of all available seats (29 of 88).²⁸² One of the reasons for such success was strong anti-semitic agitation, as was the case for Stojalowski. Anti-semitic ideas appeared to be fruitful in mobilizing Christians and were widely used by political Catholicism throughout the empire. The Catholic press in Croatia, similar to Stajolowski, used anti-semitism to increase their popularity.²⁸³ However, there was no real cooperation between the Catholic movements. The Croatian Catholic newspaper *Katolicki List* did not discuss Stojalowski, only briefly mentioning him in 1898 to call him “a ‘darling of the people’ who is going to protect the people and the faith.”²⁸⁴ Thus the movements in Galicia and Croatia-Slavonia, while both inspired by *Rerum Novarum* and Lueger and using a similar anti-semitic agenda, were developing in parallel but rather independently.

The parliament speech provided an overview of Stojalowski’s ideas, mainly on the importance of parliament as a tool to realize his plans. However, it also emphasized that Stojalowski had not developed suitable alliances among the Poles and was leaning on cooperation with Lueger’s party. This alliance had the potential to become a new level of political engagement for Stojalowski’s Christian People’s Party, but this did not occur, as apparently Lueger’s party was not that interested in constantly supporting such

²⁷⁹ He ended the speech by stating that he was aware of being called a ‘demagogue in cassock’, but that he did not mind this because it was the label of a defender of truth and justice. *Stanowisko polityczne chrześcijańsko-ludowego stronnictwa*, 25-26.

²⁸⁰ Marija Vulesica, “How Antisemitic was the Political Catholicism in Croatia-Slavonia around 1900?” *Quest. Issues in Contemporary Jewish History* 3, (2012): 199. Last modified August 29, 2017. www.quest-cdecjournal.it/focus.php?id=301

²⁸¹ Vulesica, “How Antisemitic was the Political Catholicism,” 199.

²⁸² Vulesica, “How Antisemitic was the Political Catholicism,” 205-206.

²⁸³ Vulesica, “How Antisemitic was the Political Catholicism,” 200.

²⁸⁴ Vulesica, “How Antisemitic was the Political Catholicism,” 211.

a controversial figure.²⁸⁵ Equally, Stojalowski was turning more and more towards nationalism.

Stojalowski's attitude to other nationalities

The idea of nationalism in the multinational space of Galicia was always connected to relations between the nationalities of the province. All three nationalities (Poles, Ruthenians, and Jews) shared the same territory, administration, economic conditions, and political rights: however, it was difficult for them to unite and act together against social injustice or the arbitrariness of the nobility and local administration. Thus, Stojalowski's focus on the needs of the peasantry and workers could have been equally important for all nationalities, but the Christian background of his ideas was not appropriate for Jews, and in any case Stojalowski himself raised anti-semitic ideas too often. Regarding Ruthenians, for whom the Christian background was not a problem, there were other problematic factors. Stojalowski never made a lot of effort to engage Ruthenians and did not emphasize the possibility of uniting the peasants around Catholic values. The cases below demonstrate the complex interaction between Stojalowski and the representatives of Ruthenians and Jews.

One of the reasons why the social Catholic ideas of Stojalowski were not attractive to Ruthenians was his emphasis on the Polish nation; however, he accepted the importance of the Ruthenian national project as well. A great example of Stojalowski's attitude towards Ruthenians and the Greek Catholic clergy was when Stojalowski was a parish priest in the Eastern Galician village of Kulikow. Kulikow was not only a Roman Catholic village, so Stojalowski had to interact with Ruthenians on a regular basis. Thus the village of Kulikow is just one of the examples of how national differences reinforced religious ones and vice versa at the very lowest level.

During this period, a funeral of a local judge's daughter took place in Kulikow. As the village was a mixed one (with Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic laities), the local judge invited priests of both rites to be present at the funeral. Such engagement of both rites in public religious services was very common in Galicia. A significant number of villages had a mixed population and thus had Greek and Roman Catholic communities and churches.

²⁸⁵ Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, 344.

During the funeral in Kulikow, Stojalowski refused to let the Greek Catholic procession into the Roman Catholic church. The Greek Catholics viewed this negatively as an affront to the Ruthenian nation. The local starosta stated that the reason for Stojalowski behaving in this way was the shape of the Greek Catholic crosses being carried. Stojalowski said that he could not let such crosses into a Roman Catholic church.²⁸⁶ Thus, Stojalowski used minor differences between the customs of Greek and Roman Catholics to highlight that two rites are not equally as important and could not be present in the same church. Such behavior delivered a clear message about Stojalowski's low level of respect for the gathered crowd and provoked an angry response. The Greek Catholics shouted: "for as long as the world exists, Ruthenians and the priest Stojalowski will not be brothers."²⁸⁷ After this short protest, the Greek Catholic priest wanted to calm his laity and convinced them to leave.²⁸⁸

This short episode demonstrated that within one village, there were no close relations between the priests of the two rites or their laities; indeed, there was enough space for nurturing disagreements instead. As a result, both rites preferred to seek their own paths in life. The emphasis on the inappropriate shape of crosses suggested that Greek Catholics were not proper Catholics. As the Greek Catholic Church resulted from a union between the local Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church at the end of the sixteenth century, there were many differences between the two rites. The Greek Catholic Church kept its Orthodox traditions and calendar. However, such differences became at a time of growing nationalism a reason to treat Greek Catholics, and thus Ruthenians, as inferior.

Stojalowski realized the benefits of Ruthenian support for his movement from 1896, after losing his parish and becoming more involved in politics. There were a few attempts by Stojalowski to encourage Ruthenians into his party. Besides the difference in rite, the peasants still lacked strong identities like a nation one, but they faced similar problems and needs.²⁸⁹ Stojalowski attempted to involve the Ruthenians in his political movement by organizing rallies in Eastern Galicia or intending to publish newspapers in Ruthenian in order to force a Polish identity onto them and gain more votes for the parliamentary elections.

²⁸⁶ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2367.

²⁸⁷ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2367.

²⁸⁸ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2367.

²⁸⁹ Some Poles could speak Ruthenian and went to Greek Catholic churches, and vice versa: some Ruthenians could speak Polish and went to Roman Catholic churches if there were no Greek Catholic one.

One such attempt was to issue his newspapers in Ruthenian,²⁹⁰ but it was never realized, probably due to financial reasons. In addition, the starosta of Jaroslaw reported that during a political gathering in Jaroslaw, Stojalowski gave a speech in Ruthenian (and there are other such examples).²⁹¹ During the elections in 1898, Stojalowski planned to spread his agitation to the eastern part of the province, inhabited by Ruthenians, if he had extra time: however, this never happened.

On the one hand, Stojalowski declared the importance of political rights for Ruthenians with the motto “Ruthenia for Ruthenians”²⁹² and his desire to grant them wider freedom in a future Polish state.²⁹³ On the other, he was suspicious of Ruthenian mobilization; writing about the strike of Ruthenians in 1902 that I analyzed in the first chapter, Stojalowski saw its main aim as agitation against Poles.²⁹⁴ However, the official reports of starostas, newspapers, and witnesses stated that this was an economic strike with the goal of increasing wages. He blamed the Social Democratic Party for the desire to inspire struggle against the Poles,²⁹⁵ but there was little evidence to prove this. It seems that Stojalowski was not satisfied with the success of Ruthenian mobilization and saw it as a threat.

The other source of competition with Ruthenians was that the Ruthenian language in Eastern Galicia was more widely used, so some Roman Catholics were speaking Ruthenian. There was an analogous case in Western Galicia, where Greek Catholics used Polish. The Roman Catholics in Eastern Galicia were important for Stojalowski, as well as other political forces, and he did not plan to let them become Ruthenians. In 1902 in *Wieniec*, he stated that “if somebody wants to be Ruthenian, I would tell him, go in the name of God and be Ruthenian”: the same should be true for Poles. Further, he emphasized that Ruthenians should not try to mobilize Ruthenian-speaking Greek Catholics.²⁹⁶

As the differences between the nationalities were not clearly shaped by national ideas, there was still a chance for agitators to engage the representatives of the other nationalities in their political programs. However, the difference in rite and competition between local national activists prevented a significant number of supporters of one

²⁹⁰ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2374.

²⁹¹ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2368.

²⁹² “Ruś dla Rusi” [Ruthenia for Russia], *Pszczółka* April 1, 1897.

²⁹³ Kudłaszyk *Książka Stanisław Stojalowski*, 26.

²⁹⁴ Kudłaszyk, *Katolicka myśl społeczno-polityczna*, 487.

²⁹⁵ Kudłaszyk, *Katolicka myśl społeczno-polityczna*, 487.

²⁹⁶ “Mowa ks. Posła St. Stojalowskiego” [The speech of priest deputy Stanisław Stojalowski], *Wieniec-Pszczółka*, August 31, 1902.

national project from joining another. For the Church's hierarchs, it was very important to avoid possible conflict between the politically active clergy of the two rites and prevent conflicts within its laity. As a result, both clergies and national activists cooperated separately with their nationalities/rites, and there were no leaders, or even an intention, to unite the needs of the peasants and address them together.

The relations between Stojalowski and Ruthenians reveal why Stojalowski's ideas, based on political Catholicism, did not attract much attention from Greek Catholics. The peasantry of Galicia had the potential to become a force united under the ideas of political Catholicism: however, Stojalowski's focus on the Polish nation prevented Ruthenians from joining this movement. The controversial personality of Stojalowski and his conflicts with the ecclesiastical and secular authorities were also important factors that discouraged clergy and laity from supporting him during elections.

It is hard to reconstruct, because of the limited sources, Stojalowski's exact attitude towards Greek Catholics and how it coexisted within the framework of the growing Ruthenian nationalism. It is conceivable that Stojalowski focused on the Polish nation and thus designed his program for Roman Catholics and Poles. However, he made a few attempts to involve Ruthenians as well and never directly rejected Ruthenian nationalism as such. As can be seen in the parliament speech analyzed above, Stojalowski promised to support the rights of Ruthenians in parliament. Most likely, national ideas overrode Catholic ones, preventing Stojalowski from cooperating with Greek Catholics to spreading social Catholic ideas together. Additionally, Stojalowski's newspaper *Wieniec* named all Ruthenian deputies as enemies: "we have 32 clear enemies, to whom belong Social Democrats and all Ruthenian groups".²⁹⁷ Certainly, there were some Greek Catholic priests among the Ruthenian deputies, but Stojalowski did not consider aligning with them a possibility. It is doubtful whether Stojalowski was actually seeking an opportunity to unite the two Catholic groups under the ideas of social Catholicism: rather, he was using Catholicism as a tool for national mobilization.

It is not explicit to what extent the example of Stojalowski's political activity stimulated Greek Catholic priests and the laity into active participation in politics. In most cases, the Greek Catholic periodicals and secular Ruthenians newspapers informed their readers about Stojalowski's actions and journeys, but only briefly. There was no comparison or reference to Stojalowski's activity as an example of successful Catholic

²⁹⁷ "Ostateczny wynik wyborów w Galicyi" [The final result of the Galician elections], *Wieniec-Pszczolka*, June 9, 1907.

mobilization, nor was there any criticism. Taking into account the fact that Stojalowski entered into conflict with the secular and ecclesiastical authorities, referring to him as a good example was not an option for Greek Catholics. Simultaneously, the Greek Catholic clergy were facing similar problems and had the same audience to deal with. Certainly, the constant attention paid to Stojalowski's ideas had an indirect influence on the Greek Catholic clergy, especially in terms of working closely with peasants and mobilizing them before other political activists could do so.

In conclusion, the example of Stojalowski shows that Roman and Greek Catholics were constantly making political choices that divided more than united them. Growing nationalism reinforced the differences between rites and became much more attractive than social Catholicism. The controversial activity of Stojalowski and the absence of a clear plan to involve Greek Catholics in his movement were among the main reasons why he was not able to unite all the Catholics of Galicia under his interpretation of social Catholicism. Additionally, as Stojalowski considered himself a leader of social Catholicism in Galicia, the movement had a strong association with his personality and thus was less attractive to Greek Catholics.

Stojalowski and Jews

The Jewish population was the third most numerous group in Galicia. Both Polish and Ruthenian activists, as well as the laity and clergy, had developed certain attitudes towards neighbouring Jews. As Jews were not peasants, and were mostly considered to be the owners of taverns and inns, relations with them were far from positive and tolerant. Stojalowski was among those who named Jews as one of the reasons for poverty and alcoholism. Stojalowski openly discussed this idea in newspapers and public speeches. He managed to use extant hostility and suspicion to increase his own popularity.²⁹⁸ Stojalowski built his argument around concern for Catholics: "Catholics cannot become disciplined, sober, hard-working modern people until they shun the Jews' taverns, alcohol, credit, and shops".²⁹⁹

²⁹⁸ Daniel Unowsky has elaborated on how this mechanism worked: "the vigorous Catholic press and the new political parties transferred "knowledge" of Jewish danger from other regions of Europe into the Galician countryside. They blamed all of the failures of modernization on the Jews, thereby confirming local knowledge of Catholic-Jewish difference and interpreting that difference as an immediate and mortal threat." Nemes, Unowsky, *Sites of European Antisemitism*, 32.

²⁹⁹ Unowsky, *Peasant Political Mobilization*, 34-35.

Stojalowski and his Christian People's Party developed strong anti-Jewish propaganda in the newspapers.³⁰⁰ Jews were a comfortable target to blame, as they did not belong to the Polish nationality and were associated with having a more privileged position in society than peasants. Stojalowski gave a simplistic definition of anti-semitism: he stated that it was "defense against Jews".³⁰¹ He differentiated between 'silent' and 'knightly' anti-semitism. The first one was about soft methods against Jews, such as via their economic and spatial isolation, while the second one was about actively fighting, such as through pogroms. He himself approved of the first one as useful to Galician peasants, while the second one was dangerous because it brought disorder and led to peasants being jailed.³⁰² Additionally, Jews who suffered from pogroms might receive compensation from the state for their losses,³⁰³ and thus would keep their privileged position. However, it was not so easy to control the interpretation of these ideas by peasants, and often the peasants acted more radically than expected, especially because there were rumors that it was legal to persecute Jews.³⁰⁴

The question of Stojalowski's involvement with anti-semitic propaganda and pogroms is well developed in the historiography.³⁰⁵ For example, Kerstin Jobst analyses this question in her article *Die antisemitischen Bauernunruhen im westlichen Galizien 1898*,³⁰⁶ while Daniel Unowsky looks at it in his *Peasant Political Mobilization and the 1898 anti-Jewish Riots in Western Galicia*.³⁰⁷ I focus in this section on why anti-semitic ideas were used for the mass mobilization of Catholics and how Stojalowski connected anti-semitism and Catholicism. Similar to Stojalowski, the national activists from both Ruthenian and Polish sides used anti-semitic ideas: from this perspective, it is interesting to trace how Catholics and nationalist had similar views on the same question.

Unowsky has described how "major incidents most often commenced in towns flooded with visitors from surrounding areas during market days, Corpus Christi and

³⁰⁰ Kerstin S. Jobst, "Die antisemitischen Bauernunruhen im westlichen Galizien 1898. Stojalowski und die polnischen Sozialdemokraten," in *Zwischen Abgrenzung und Assimilation. Deutsche, Polen und Juden. Schauplätze ihres Zusammenlebens von der Zeit der Aufklärung bis zum Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, ed. Robert Maier, Georg Stöber (Hannover, 1996), 139-150.

³⁰¹ "Galicyscy 'antysemici'" [Galician 'anti-Semites'] *Wieniec-Pszczolka*, September 14, 1902.

³⁰² "Galicyscy 'antysemici'."

³⁰³ "Galicyscy 'antysemici'."

³⁰⁴ "Those who heeded the calls of riot leaders and joined the crowds moving along the roads from market towns to village taverns almost universally justified their actions by citing widespread rumors that the violence against Jews had received permission from the highest authorities." Nemes, Unowsky, *Sites of European Antisemitism*, 22.

³⁰⁵ Nemes, Unowsky, *Sites of European Antisemitism*. Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village*. Tim Buchen, *Antisemitismus in Galizien. Agitation, Gewalt und Politik gegen Juden in der Habsburgermonarchie um 1900*, (Berlin, 2012).

³⁰⁶ Jobst, "Die antisemitischen Bauernunruhen im westlichen Galizien," 139-150.

³⁰⁷ Unowsky, *Peasant Political Mobilization*, 412-435.

other holidays.”³⁰⁸ This means that important religious holidays were associated in peasants’ minds with the possibility to attack Jews: they also gave them the feeling of being an organized and powerful group against possible Jewish plots. Unowsky elaborates further that only a complex view on the riots, including Catholic action in them, can guarantee us an understanding of how the riots occurred.³⁰⁹ Together with Nemes, Unowsky continues that “Catholic institutions, journalists, and politicians posited anti-Jewish action as the key to modernizing the rural economy.”³¹⁰ Stojalowski was a vivid example of this statement, since he encouraged his followers to block Jewish business whenever possible. A similar strategy was also used by national activists on both the Polish and Ruthenian sides.

Unlike Roman Catholics (and especially Stojalowski), Greek Catholics developed their own anti-Semitic agenda more slowly: as both Jews and Greek Catholics belonged to minority groups, they were looking for possible alliances against the Poles. During the elections in 1907, several Jewish representatives were elected to parliament thanks to the support of Greek Catholics. The details of such cooperation are analyzed in the works of Joshua Shanes and Johanan Petrovski-Stern, who states that Jewish and Ruthenian political activists benefited from mutual support during the first universal suffrage elections.³¹¹ Stojalowski, however, did not need such alliances because of his popularity and was only cautious about not causing trouble with the authorities by spreading anti-Jewish ideas. As Unowsky and Nemes show in the introduction to *Sites of European Antisemitism in the Age of Mass Politics*, “the history of antisemitism also can clarify important topics in social and economic history, including relations between city and countryside, the role of states in the lives of their citizens, and the place of religion in modern societies”.³¹² Stojalowski’s agitation was an example of the intersections that Unowski and Nemes have highlighted, as he was acting in the framework of state laws (encouraging people to avoid explicit violence) while using religion as a dividing line between Catholics and Jews and emphasizing how Jews were negatively influencing the economic position of peasants.³¹³

³⁰⁸ Nemes, Unowsky, *Sites of European Antisemitism*, 19.

³⁰⁹ “Only by looking at Catholic action, Jewish reaction, and the role of government in preserving order can we come close to understanding how the riots themselves were experienced.” Nemes, Unowsky, *Sites of European Antisemitism*, 20.

³¹⁰ Nemes, Unowsky, *Sites of European Antisemitism*, 7.

³¹¹ Shanes, *Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish Identity*.

Shtern, Shanes, “An Unlikely Alliance,” 483-505.

³¹² Nemes, Unowsky, *Sites of European Antisemitism*, 2.

³¹³ “Galicyjscy ‘antysemici’.”

As relations between the nationalities were built on an economic background, the changes in the economic and political sphere had a significant influence on the dynamic of such relations. Poles and Polish culture were associated with the nobility and the governing authorities, while Jews, who were mostly workers, merchants, and innkeepers, were seen as the reason for poverty and peasant drunkenness. For Greek and Roman Catholic priests, anti-Jewish agitation was naturally a part of anti-alcohol campaigns,³¹⁴ so even before mass male suffrage priests of both rites were slow to build relations with Jews. As such, the ideas of Stojalowski were not unique, just rather more reinforced and dispersed more widely thanks to his larger resources.³¹⁵

With the development of mass mobilization, Jews were associated with socialism, or at least sympathy for it.³¹⁶ Both churches saw the greatest threat in socialism, with its anti-clerical and secularist ideas. Unowsky and Nemes brilliantly summarize that “antisemitism as a distinctly modern phenomenon is inseparable from the emergence of mass politics across the continent.”³¹⁷ The novelty of Stojalowski’s approach was that he, following the example of Lueger, was developing this phenomenon in Galicia, giving it a strong political and religious background. Stojalowski combined the existing hostility towards Jews in Galicia with his political ideas and desire to become elected.

Reaction: the response of the Church and government to Stojalowski’s mobilization

Mass mobilization inevitably disturbed the existing hierarchical order in Galicia and prompted reactions from the local Church and the government. In particular, activists were seen as a threat, and there was a need to react accordingly. Yet, the reaction on a local level was not always supported by the high hierarchy of the Church or the state; the problems of mass mobilization were seen as a local problem which did not require imperial or Patriarchal interference. Whilst the Church and the local government were often at odds or in competition for support of the masses, they could still act together when defending their mutual interests against the common threat of mobilization.

³¹⁴ Himka, “Dimensions of a Triangle,” 43.

³¹⁵ “There were also other priests in Stojalowski’s party who actively spread anti-semitic ideas. For example Andrzej Szponder was known for his sermons and was elected to the parliament as well.” Nemes, Unowsky, *Sites of European Antisemitism*, 22.

³¹⁶ Himka, “Dimensions of a Triangle,” 43.

³¹⁷ Nemes, Unowsky, *Sites of European Antisemitism*, 5.

In the case of Galicia, mass mobilization was very much seen as a localized problem. Agitators such as Stojalowski tended to mobilize masses around issues of privilege and social injustice on a local level whilst appealing to *higher ideals* or even *higher authorities* to support their cause and challenge local power structures. In this way, as shall be shown through the examples of Stojalowski and later Greek Catholic activists (priests like Bachynskyj, Popel, and others discussed in chapter four), agitators exerted pressure from two sides: from the bottom, through the mass mobilization of workers and peasants, and from the top, by appealing to the senior authorities of the empire and the Church.

In the *Appeal to the Emperor*, Stojalowski listed all of his misfortunes and named the officials who caused them. The *Appeal* demonstrates how Stojalowski positioned himself within the hierarchy of the state and the example he gave to his followers. An appeal to the imperial authorities was normally the last step taken because it meant that the other attempts to solve the problem had not worked. It was popular among Galicians, who were convinced that the local government was unjust and that only the imperial government was capable of solving problematic affairs. The arguments used in the petition are essential, as they demonstrate why a certain situation (in this case, the persecution of Stojalowski) was dangerous for the whole state. Stojalowski wrote: “It would be a shame for Austrian justice and constitution if what was done to me could remain unpunished”. This was because it would mean that under the monarchy “a loyal and honest citizen cannot feel safe”, as at any moment he could be easily persecuted by the authorities.³¹⁸ Furthermore, Stojalowski explained that he was persecuted by the governor of Galicia for issuing a Christian newspaper loyal to the dynasty: this was because the governor was very conservative and disliked the content of Stojalowski’s newspapers.

Besides this, Stojalowski struggled with the local government and entered into conflict with the church hierarchs of Galicia. It was typical for the Christian Social movement to raise anti-episcopal and even anti-clerical sentiments:³¹⁹ Stojalowski expressed this anti-episcopal approach in terms of a history of personal conflict and accusations that representatives of the Church and local government had united against him. Certainly, Stojalowski, as a member of the Church, was not against church hierarchy as such, but, as is evident from his relations with bishops discussed below, he

³¹⁸ “Memorandum and petition of the Polish people to the high government, especially to the Minister of Justice,” *Materials on the investigation*, volume 6, 1895. TsDIAL: Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 2372.

³¹⁹ Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, 123.

relied on the authority of the pope much more than on the opinions of the Galician hierarchs.

Conflict with the Catholic Church hierarchy

The conflict with church authorities was one of the most significant problems for Stojalowski in his political and religious career. It is important to analyze it in depth as it provides us with an understanding as to why Stojalowski, who was a wholehearted supporter of Catholicism and actively wanted to bring Catholic ideas into politics, was not blessed by the bishops and was excommunicated by them. In addition, he did not have many followers among priests and was never able to restore good relations with the Galician clergy.

The conflict with the bishops shows that some methods of modern politics (such as questioning of the social and ecclesiastical hierarchy, populism, etc.) were not acceptable to the church hierarchy. However, Stojalowski, through his activism, involved the Roman Catholic Church in a discussion about what kind of modern politics is appropriate for the Church and how it should be implemented. Certainly for Stojalowski the main focus was the needs of working people, as they were the largest and most neglected group. The most essential contribution of Stojalowski was as tangible example that Catholic ideas and the Catholic clergy had the power to make a difference in the social and political spheres.

The first bishop who expressed his concerns about Stojalowski was Leon Wałęga, the bishop of Tarnow, in 1893. In this bishop's opinion, Stojalowski was putting dangerous ideas into peoples' heads and inspired them to disrespect the existing order of society. The bishop's greatest fear was that other clergy would follow Stojalowski's example and start to encourage peasants to be critical towards the secular and religious authorities. Tarnow's bishop asked the archbishop in Lemberg to forbid the clergy from supporting the gatherings of Stojalowski, which was done shortly after. However, the bishop later reported that Stojalowski was gaining support from local pastors and held a religious service with them in a small village house.³²⁰ Stojalowski's network proved to be more efficient than the prohibition of the bishops, especially because Stojalowski used this network for religious purposes and not to organise a rally (which was forbidden). In other words, Stojalowski was a huge challenge to the church hierarchy, as he was craftily combining his position as a priest with the role of a political activist.

³²⁰ *Materials on the investigation, sprava 2368.*

The next step for Bishop Leon Wałęga was to fight against Stojalowski's newspapers, so he requested the archbishop to condemn the newspapers. The bishop suggested damning the newspapers in a collective letter. However, he emphasized that such a condemnation would not be easy because Stojalowski would resist to it and probably would report it to the Vatican. Therefore, Wałęga saw a danger in Stojalowski's ability to build a good argument and so arranged for all three Galician bishops to act against Stojalowski together. Tarnow's bishop managed to create a strong opposition party of Galician bishops against Stojalowski, even though the other bishops were not primarily concerned about his behaviour and newspapers. The coalition of bishops significantly worsened the position of Stojalowski within the church hierarchy, as he did not have any support from the Church in Galicia.

However, the bishop of Tarnow knew that the alliance of bishops was not enough in the case of a well-educated and widely supported opponent like Stojalowski. Bishop Wałęga highlighted to the archbishop that it was extremely important to be precise and detailed when writing about the harm of Stojalowski's newspapers: "The Vatican does not understand the complexity of our position and is more eager to support Stojalowski, as he is better at arguing".³²¹ Then the bishop elaborated further on the problem with the newspapers: he emphasized that the church hierarchy could not forbid issuing newspapers (apparently only the state could do this), so the only solution was to forbid the clergy and laity from reading them. At the end of his letter, the bishop wondered where Stojalowski obtained all his money.³²² Stojalowski placed the bishops in a more demanding situation. Apparently, the church hierarchy was more afraid of controlling Stojalowski than he himself was of disobeying the church authorities and losing his position as a parish priest.

Stojalowski's reaction to Bishop Wałęga suggestions was immediate. He published in his newspaper *Wieniec Polski* that all the persecutions from the bishop were not significant and that most of the clergy who had agreed to join this persecution had done so under pressure. In addition, Stojalowski emphasized that his actions were not the responsibility of Tarnow's bishop as he belonged to the Lemberg diocese and thus was a subordinate of Archbishop Morawski. At the end of the article, Stojalowski highlighted: "our truth won in secular trials, it will win in religious ones as well".³²³ Such

³²¹ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2368.

³²² *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2368.

³²³ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2368.

"Na protesta księzy diecezji tarnowskiej" [For the protest of the priests of the Diocese of Tarnów]. *Wieniec polski*, October 14, 1893.

references to the truth were an example of populist agitation aimed at emphasizing that Stojalowski was a defender of just behavior. In addition, confidence in gaining justice was a way to highlight Stojalowski's strong belief that he had sustainable alliances with some representatives of the secular authorities.

There is not much evidence successful cooperation between Stojalowski and influential figures. One of the best known is the support of Katarzyna Potocka, who twice gave donations to his newspapers.³²⁴ When Stojalowski has left Galicia for Silesia, the local bishop had no issues with his activity. However, this was not the case for Galician bishops in the 1890s, where the situation escalated very fast and led to Stojalowski's excommunication.

Archbishop Morawski took the side of Tarnow's bishop and forbade reading and keeping all newspapers issued by Stojalowski. In addition, the archbishop suspended Stojalowski from his priestly duties for three months (from November 1893).³²⁵ Stojalowski wrote a telegram to Pope Leo XIII reporting that the Galician bishops were against Christian newspapers and asking him not to make a final decision before having heard the readers of the newspapers. In *Wieniec Polski*, Stojalowski argued to his readers that if the bishops were against a newspaper with Catholic values, it meant that in fact they were against peasant movements as such. Stojalowski concluded that the bishops had misused their authority in his case, because they persecuted something not acceptable to them from a socio-political perspective: "it is sad that bishops are using faith and the Church for politics."³²⁶ In other words, he was arguing that the Church and secular authorities did not support the peasant movement and were actually afraid of peasant activities: thus, the authorities were using all available means to stop a peasant mass movement. In addition, Stojalowski's accusation that the bishops were using Church for politics was quite ironic, since Stojalowski himself was doing the same.

In the next editions of *Wieniec Polski* (1894), Stojalowski continued to criticize the actions of the Galician bishops, emphasizing that they were not his authority because they supported the landowners and not the people's spiritual well-being. In his defence, Stojalowski claimed that the pope supported and praised his activities and the newspapers he issued.³²⁷

³²⁴ "Epitaph" *Wieniec-Pszczolka*, October 6, 1907.

³²⁵ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2368.

³²⁶ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2369.

³²⁷ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2369.

Stojalowski had little evidence to prove that the pope was really on his side. John Boyer has highlighted that Stojalowski simply manipulated the letter he received from the Vatican. Stojalowski sent congratulations to Leo XIII on the occasion of his jubilee and described his activity in Galicia. Since the Vatican received plenty of similar letters, it provided a typical response to it. This included thanks and blessings to the person who sent the missive, which Stojalowski interpreted as special recognition from the pope.³²⁸ Most likely, Stojalowski knew that this was not an act of support, as he was quite familiar with the Vatican and its processes. Regardless of whether the support of the pope was real or fake, it was one of the tools that Stojalowski used to bring a strong argument against the bishops, prove that his actions were in the framework of the Catholic Church, and protect himself and his political party from being banned.

After the bishops forbade people from reading the newspapers in question, local starostas started reporting to the Vice-regency about how many people stopped subscribing to them. This mutual cooperation between the secular and religious authorities is a good example of how they reinforced each other in Galicia. Meanwhile, Stojalowski took the same step as in the conflict with Governor Badeni: he appealed to the Vatican. In order to be more effective, he traveled there and was proved innocent by the pope. Afterwards, he decided to change diocese in order to avoid any further conflicts with the Galician hierarchs. None of the dioceses in the Habsburg Monarchy wanted to take him except Antinor in Montenegro.³²⁹

As Stojalowski had not stopped his activity in Galicia, the local bishops issued one more pastoral letter against him. In this letter, they were more precise, emphasizing that his newspapers provoked hatred between the poor and wealthy, as well as disobedience to the government. The bishops fought against the idea that the Pope supported him, saying that Stojalowski misinterpreted a personal blessing from the Pope (concerning the organization of a pilgrimage) as a blessing for his political activity. Thus, the bishops wanted to ‘protect’ the laity from Stojalowski’s lie and emphasize that the nuncio had proved that the pope was not supportive. At the end of the letter, the bishops condemned Stojalowski’s newspapers and the socialistic *Naprzod* [Forward],³³⁰ thus putting both into one and the same category.

The bishops’ letter is a telling example that for the church hierarchy in Galicia, the ideas of Stojalowski seemed the same as socialistic ones. Additionally, the attempt

³²⁸ Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, 519.

³²⁹ *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2371.

³³⁰ Pastoral letter of the Galician bishops. March 1895. *Materials on the investigation*, sprava 2373.

to condemn Stożalowski's newspapers and the way in which both sides involved the Vatican demonstrated how the bishops and this particular priest competed to represent 'real and actual' Catholicism in the province. The bishops saw their right as one given by their positions within the Church, while Stożalowski was convinced that he was the better representative of Pope Leo XIII's ideas, in particular the need to improve the living and working conditions of the lower classes. For the bishops, the importance of obedience was the principal component of their view on the lower class.³³¹ Only in 1900 did the new Archbishop Józef Bilczewski start to focus on following *Rerum Novarum* and preaching about improving the lives of the peasants and workers.

The most essential outcome of the conflict with the bishops was that Stożalowski actually won. He managed to prove to the pope that the accusations of the Galician bishops were wrong. After overcoming his excommunication in 1897³³² and receiving support from the Vatican, Stożalowski was able to emphasize that his ideas and actions had not deserve the fact inflicted upon them by the Galician bishops. In addition, he maintained that Catholic ideas were more important than the hierarchy because the latter was associated with and actively involved in supporting the nobility and cooperating with unjust local power. Stożalowski criticized the Church hierarchy for putting secular power higher than Catholic values and for persecuting him for such criticisms in tandem with the local Galician authorities.

Despite the conflict with the Galician bishops in 1894, Stożalowski tried to find an agreement with the higher hierarchy in the next decade,³³³ especially with the new archbishop supporting and promoting the ideas of Leo XIII. Throughout his political career, Stożalowski did not declare strongly anti-episcopal thoughts: he rather sought to highlight his loyalty to the Church and its hierarchy.³³⁴ It was essential for Stożalowski to receive at least some support from the higher hierarchy and especially the Vatican, as this brought him the necessary legitimization and allowed him to recover from accusations that he was not a proper pastor. In 1901-02, Stożalowski made an attempt to return to the Galician eparchy and receive support from Józef Bilczewski, the recently nominated Archbishop Metropolitan of Lemberg.³³⁵ This is an important episode to

³³¹ Pastoral letter of the Galician bishops. March 1895. *Materials on the investigation*, sprawa 2373.

³³² Stożalowski went to Vatican to demonstrate that his newspapers and actions had not violated any canonical laws, afterwards he was accepted as priest in Antinor eparchy in Montenegro in order to avoid canonic conflicts with Galician bishops forever. *Materials on the investigation*, sprawa 2371.

³³³ Józef Wołczański, ed., *Listy ks. Stanisława Stożalowskiego do arcybiskupa Józefa Bilczewskiego z lat 1901-1902*, (Kraków, 1998).

³³⁴ Kudłaszyk, *Ksiądz Stanisław Stożalowski*, 141-142.

³³⁵ Wołczański, *Listy ks. Stanisława Stożalowskiego*, 411.

mention: Bilczewski declared himself as a follower of *Rerum Novarum* and was very invested in social work, while Stojalowski's interest in Galicia remained intense, even after building a network in Silesia. Stojalowski corresponded with Bilczewski to arrange a meeting and establish a good image. Stojalowski emphasized that he had twice been in Rome (the Vatican) and that the Officium had not found anything in his actions that was against the faith: he also noted that he always sent his newspapers to all the consistories so that they could be checked any possible misinterpretations of Catholic values. However, nobody ever replied to him. Stojalowski concluded with a request that he not be judged before the meeting.³³⁶ In his next letter, Stojalowski explained further about the orthodoxy of his newspapers and suggested sending them to a censor nominated by the archbishop.³³⁷ In such a way, Stojalowski attempted to justify himself and his newspapers and tried to build relations with the new archbishop.

Apparently, Stojalowski hoped that the archbishop would be more open to him and his activity than the previous bishops and thus wrote a number of letters to him. Even though Stojalowski's activity was not criticized in the Vatican as it was in Galicia, he needed to have support from the high hierarchy in Galicia as well. However, this never happened. Unfortunately, we do not know how the archbishop replied to Stojalowski, but it is certain that they never met.

Stojalowski explained to Archbishop Bilczewski that his main motivation was to create unity among different Polish political Catholic movements, since this was the only way for them to be productive. When Stojalowski wrote the letter, he was a deputy in parliament, and as such cooperation between the political parties was very important for him. The tonnes of letters addressed to Bilczewski were very different from his previous writings because here he stressed his victimization and highlighted his obedience: earlier, during the conflict with the Galician bishops, he was more radical and proud.

The other strategy to influence the archbishop was to emphasize the uniqueness of his actions. Stojalowski wrote that he was the only one who had organized a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, a trip he was planning to do again if the archbishop would give his blessing. This blessing was very important because most of the pilgrims would be from Galicia, so for the pilgrimage to be valid the blessing was needed.³³⁸ Stojalowski explained further that his party, *Stronnictwo Chrześcijańsko-Ludowe* [the Christian Peoples' Party], would also take part in the pilgrimage. This should not have been a

³³⁶ Wołczański, *Listy ks. Stanisława Stojalowskiego*, 394-400.

³³⁷ Wołczański, *Listy ks. Stanisława Stojalowskiego*, 403.

³³⁸ Wołczański, *Listy ks. Stanisława Stojalowskiego*, 409.

problem because the ideology of the party was based on the teachings of Leo XIII and its aim was to improve social relations through better cooperation in the sacral and religious domains.³³⁹ Thus, Stojalowski demonstrated again how he managed to intersect politics and religion and how he used all available resources, such as rallies, newspapers, brochures, and the support of the religious authorities, to promote his party and its activity. Probably, this was the reason why Archbishop Bilczewski was not eager to cooperate with Stojalowski.

The conflict with the Galician bishops and the desire to establish cooperation with Archbishop Bilczewski shows how the local clergy were able to close ranks against political agitators, particularly when the agitator was preaching against them. The more Stojalowski failed to gain support or patronage from his fellow Galician clergy, the further he went to defend his own position and criticise the injustices and actions of his local peers. As a religious and political activist, Stojalowski was not playing the local political game according to the established rules of the Roman Catholic priesthood in Galicia. This example shows how those in positions of local authority could portray agitators as generic threats to existing religious or state power structures and thus unite support against them. The case of Stojalowski shows the conservatism and ‘togetherness’ of the clergy as they covered each other’s backs and even worked with government or local officials when it was mutually beneficial to defend the existing concentrations of power and authority.

Stojalowski’s conflict with the bishops reveals different vectors of behaviour in a time of mass politics. On the one hand, Stojalowski, as a representative of lower clergy, combined religious and political ideas to encourage more followers to be active citizens and increase the importance of the Catholic Church in the public domain. On the other, the growing mass involvement of laity was seen as a chaotic and powerful movement that might sweep away the existing social order and question the respect given to the high authorities. From their side, the Galician bishops tried to control and even stop the agitation of Stojalowski by excommunicating him from the Church and forbidding the reading of his newspapers. Stojalowski managed to prove to the Vatican that his newspapers were not anti-Catholic, but he failed to rebuild relations with the Galician hierarchs, even when a new archbishop arrived. The confrontation with the bishops led to Stojalowski’s move from Galicia and the continuation of his activism in Silesia. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the Greek Catholic priests who spoiled the relations

³³⁹ Wołczański, *Listy ks. Stanisława Stojalowskiego*, 410.

with the Church hierarchy because of their political activity also did not manage to continue their careers as priests in Galicia. Thus, the support, or at least neutrality, of the bishops was extremely essential for the clergy and shaped their actions in a political space.

Conclusions

The advent of universal male suffrage released the huge potential of the peasantry to influence the political landscape of Galicia. Various groups and ideologies competed over support from the newly franchised peasants. For the Church, there was a duality of interests: to retain control over the peasantry and ‘protect’ them from undesired influences within society. The second interest consisted of extending the Church’s own political influence over the laity and secular governing organizations. For both these interests, the Church perceived the peasantry as a tool when obedient to the status quo and as a threat when unified in opposition to the ruling hierarchy.

The example of Stojalowski shows that at the local level, preservation of the existing social hierarchy and order was at the heart of the Church’s reaction to mass mobilization of the peasantry. However, such an approach was not a priority of the laity, as working people were looking for the improvement of their economic position and the opportunity to have an influential role within society. New political ideas such as nationalism and social Catholicism were becoming more attractive and gaining popularity among the clergy and laity.

Stojalowski, through his own initiative and a variety of mass mobilization tools, demonstrated how Catholic values and practices could be used to mobilize the laity along different politically sensitive grievances, be they national identity struggles, legal injustices, or petty corruption. Stojalowski always emphasized that his politics was supported by the Pope and fell within the framework of Social Catholicism, and in this way legitimized his own political strategy and actions while being criticized by the Galician government and local bishops. With such an approach, Stojalowski claimed that the power of Vienna and the Vatican was the most important, while local representatives misused their authority for their own benefit.

Stojalowski also referred actively to national identity in his agitation and promoted combining of patriotism with Catholicism. On the one hand, Stojalowski was fully concentrated on Polish working people. On the other, he had plans to involve Ruthenians in his movement, but never developed them further. His relationship with

the Jews was much more complex and intense, as Stojalowski openly and repeatedly expressed anti-semitic ideas. While Stojalowski himself did not encourage violent actions against Jews, his constant blaming of them for all kinds of economic problems was an implicit call to action and resulted in pogroms in 1898.

Political activists like Stojalowski swiftly spread the ideas of their parties among the laity thanks to printed means of communication (newspapers and brochures) and public gatherings. Very often, these ideas were combined with religious ones and had a populist character. Stojalowski's agitation is an excellent example of how to construct, spread, and succeed in political mobilization by combining the sacred and secular. Thus, his political activism reveals a lot about mass mobilization, in particular how mass mobilization challenged the authority of state and church institutions and how these institutions responded to such challenges. However, due to his conflicts with the state and the hierarchy of the Church, Stojalowski did not manage to build a network of agitators (especially among the clergy) that would have the potential to cover the whole of Galicia and become a strong and decisive political force. This failure was perhaps due to an overly confrontational manner that turned other Catholic priests against him, but it nevertheless shows how Catholicism had the prospect of becoming a powerful player in the politics of Galicia. In the long run, Stojalowski's main achievement was not his political program but the development of mass mobilization strategies through gatherings, peasant clubs, newspapers, and participation in celebrations. He taught peasants and workers how to organize themselves in the public domain and inspired other political agitators to develop closer connections with the peasants and how to understand their needs.

Chapter 4. Greek Catholics and mass mobilization: conflicts between priests and local authorities

Introduction

After having explored the example of Stojalowski and his role in the Roman Catholic Church, it is fruitful to focus on similar processes that took place in the Greek Catholic Church. The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the influence of mass mobilization on Greek Catholic clergy and the interdependence of different spheres of power within Galician villages in the context of mass mobilization, as well as to reveal similarities and differences between the two churches. Careful observation of village governance and its interplay with the lives of priests and the laity provides a fruitful background for understanding the problems, challenges, and particularities that priests, the high church authorities, and the laity experienced. This chapter is an attempt at microhistory intended to represent the complexity of the issues connected with mass mobilization. My emphasis is not on political slogans or strategies, but on the interconnections between actors at different levels. It is a story of the behind-the-scenes struggle connected to mass mobilization, with the Greek Catholic parish clergy as the main heroes.

For the Roman Catholic Church, the most challenging issue relating to mass mobilization was the activity of Stojalowski. Stojalowski managed to successfully agitate laity to involve themselves in politics, question the existing social hierarchy, and promote Polish nationalism and anti-semitism. In the Greek Catholic Church similar issues existed, but they were stimulated by different priests. So, in this section, I discuss a few cases of the priests connected to mass mobilization. In comparison to the Roman Catholic Church, the Greek Catholic Church had to deal with threats by the laity to change their rite. Additionally, the Greek Catholic priests competed with local authorities and teachers for influence in the village. However, intensive political agitation that interfered with priests' religious duties and the rising national issues were common for both churches. The cases of four priests discussed below address each of these problems and together represent a general picture of the difficulties that the Greek Catholic Church faced as a result of mass mobilization.

I focus on relations between state power (county administrators, the provincial government, central ministries in Vienna, and the local and high courts) and

representatives of the Greek Catholic Church (from high church institutions, especially the Consistory and Ordinariate, down to the parishes). In some cases, I also consider the local intelligentsia: teachers, the lawyers of accused priests, and the writers of articles in the press. In particular situations, all these actors could simultaneously represent institutional and personal interests. It would be useful to trace the intersection of personal and professional motivations; however, the sources available (i.e., the archive of the Presidium of the Galician Vice-regency) are official documents that provide only limited clues as to where the line between professional duty and personal relations fell. For example, personal conflicts could lie behind the filing of a formal accusation. However, due to the paucity of personal information in the sources, this chapter focuses on actors as representatives of certain institutions or communities.

The dynamics between the actors changed depending on spatial proximity or distance to each other. It is clear from the archival record that for the local actors involved in this case study, the situation was much more tense, important, and emotional. Meanwhile, more distant actors (like the central government or high church officials) reacted slowly and often did not take the complaints of starostas or parishioners as very seriously.³⁴⁰ Indeed, such cases were of low priority as they were viewed as provincial problems. For example, one starosta complained about a priest over the course of several years, and yet there was no reaction from the Vice-regency or Ordinariate (the high authority of the Greek Catholic Church).³⁴¹ The only cases that resulted in an immediate reaction from the government were connected to strikes or political agitation.³⁴² Apparently, this was a serious matter for the Vice-regency, as strikes had economic consequences and were a danger to the public peace. Thus, such slowness in fixing problems in the village contributed to aggravating the tension between starosta and priest or priest and parishioners (depending on the sides involved in the conflict).

This chapter focuses on the cases of four politically active Greek Catholic priests who were accused of abusing their positions as parish clergy for their own benefit,

³⁴⁰ *Materialy po rozsliduvannyu spravy svyashchennyka sela Kolokoli Petryts'oho Petra, zvyynuvachenoho u vystupakh proty avstriys'koyi vlady 1882-1913* [Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj accused in agitating against the Austrian government 1882-1913]. TsDIAL [Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv] Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 7191-7193.

³⁴¹ *Sprava pro zvyynuvachennya ottsya Popelya Yoana (parokh Dovichopollya bilya kosova) v ahitatsiyi proty vyboriv v avstr parlament 1888-1908* [The case of the prosecution of priest Yoan Popel (parish priest of Dovichopollya near Kosiv) in the campaign against parliament elections in Austria 1888-1908]. TsDIAL [Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv] Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 4932.

³⁴² *Materialy po spravi svyashchennyka z s.Ropchytzi Bachyns'koho Mykhayla zvyynuvachenoho v orhanizatsiyi sil's'ko-hospodars'kykh straykiv 1900* [Materials on the case of a priest Michael Bachynskyj accused in organization of agricultural strikes 1900]. TsDIAL [Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv] Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 2502.

including “agitating against the Austrian government” or “against parliamentary elections” and the “organization of agricultural strikes.”³⁴³ All four priests mentioned in the archival sources had conflicts or misunderstandings on the local level that led to the involvement of the higher ecclesiastical and secular authorities; all of them were put on trial because of the accusations of illegal behaviour. From the sources, it is not easy to determine whether the priests were truly abusing their power or whether those who were against them accused them falsely. Examples of false accusations are presented in the next chapter, which deals with the election process directly. In the end, the veracity of the accusations is not particularly significant for the story of mass mobilization, in which the goal is not to discover how appropriate the behavior of the priests was but rather to trace the interconnections and complexity of relationships within Galician villages.

Threats by the laity to change their rite

The issue of changing rite was very sensitive in Galician society. On the one hand, the Greek and Roman Catholic clergies were interested in widening their parishes by attracting the laity of the opposite rite. As theoretically both rites were part of one Church and the religious rituals had equal value, there was a chance to substitute one rite for the other. This happened in territories that did not have two different priests, where the laity decided to use whichever priest was closer. However, due to historical tensions between the two rites, officially changing rite was allowed only with the approval of the Vatican. Attention to changes in rite became even more intense as a result of growing national differences between Poles and Ruthenians. While the relations between the Greek and Roman Catholics were already settled by religious and state laws, the problem of changing rite from Greek Catholic to Orthodoxy was quite new.³⁴⁴ Firstly, Orthodoxy was not considered a state religion and thus was not established or regulated by any law. Secondly, the intention to become Orthodox was strongly connected to one’s political background. As Orthodoxy was the state religion of the Russian Empire, a fascination with Orthodoxy meant sympathy for the Russian state and was considered as disloyalty

³⁴³ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

The case of the prosecution of priest Yoan Popel, sprava 4932.

Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj, sprava 2502.

³⁴⁴ In 1882 the Greek Catholics of the village of Hnylychky declared its intention to convert to Orthodoxy. This provoked a trial against the local priest as well as the resignation of Metropolitan Iosyf Sembratovych (1870-1882). However, this was the only case. Himka, *The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society*, 437.

to the Austrian Empire. Austrian officials were particularly concerned about possible disloyalty on the Russian-Austrian border.³⁴⁵

As was already mentioned, Orthodoxy did not have proper place in the Austro-Hungarian legal system. It simply did not exist as a rite, and it was not legally easy to implement. It was possible to be considered Greek Orientalist (the same as Orthodox),³⁴⁶ but people who wanted to change rite petitioned to convert to Orthodoxy; this complicated the starostvo's (county administration's) work, as such a change was not possible and put Orthodox people outside the law. However, it was not the starostvo's troubles which shook local communities, but newly converted Orthodox priests who established successful propaganda.³⁴⁷ These priests were often Austro-Hungarian citizens who traveled to the Russian Empire and became priests there. Afterwards they came back to Galicia and created their own congregations – again, congregations that were illegal. In addition, the Orthodox priests were not considered priests in the Austrian Empire. Such a change in rite was characteristic for Ruthenians with Russophile political preferences. Under such circumstances, it was essential for local authorities and Greek Catholic priests to put an end to such 'threats by the laity' and regain influence over their own subordinates.

The priest of the village of Hrabe, Fileman Kisilevskyj, had his own methods to deal with new converts to Orthodoxy. He refused to bury an Orthodox child in the absence of the Orthodox priest and pulled a cross out from the ground on the land of a parishioner who had converted to Orthodoxy, declaring that this parishioner was now a pagan.³⁴⁸ Similar problems beset priests from neighboring parishes.³⁴⁹ For example, in one village, newly converted Orthodox peasants stole the old Greek Catholic church building from one village by dismantling it and then reconstructing it again.

After the Greek Catholic priest Kisilevskyj, the starosta was the second person to become preoccupied with the peasants' desire to change rite; he wrote constantly to the Vice-regency, asking them to take action. The starosta explained that the Orthodox agitators were very crafty: they came to the village through forests and swamps, arrived

³⁴⁵ As the example of Hnylychky demonstrated, the imperial government and the Vatican were very concerned about changes to rite and did everything to prevent such actions in the future.

³⁴⁶ "Memorandum in the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox and Moscophile Propaganda in Austria," 18. Peregyska z ministerstvom vnutrishnikh sprav, Yaslovs'kym starostvom ta in, po spravi svyashchenyka v s.Hrabe Kysylevs'koho Filemana zvyuvachenoho v rusofil's'kiy propohandi [Correspondence on the case of the priest Kysylevski Fileman from the village of Hrabe, accused of Russophile propoganda]. TsDIAL: Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 5093.

³⁴⁷ "Memorandum in the Matter of Defeating."

³⁴⁸ *Correspondence on the case of a priest Kysylevski*, sprava 5093.

³⁴⁹ *Correspondence on the case of a priest Kysylevski*, sprava 5093.

at a pre-established place in the village at night, held a meeting with the peasants, and disappeared before morning.³⁵⁰ Generally speaking, the starosta claimed these agitators were invisible and therefore impossible to discover and punish.

The subsequent court proceedings brought against Kisilevskyj, as well as the local and church authorities, found him not guilty of any criminal actions.³⁵¹ The starosta gave Kisilevskyj a positive character reference, claiming that any possible hatred towards the priest was caused not by money but by his political views. As the priest was known to be a Ukrainophile, the Russophile³⁵² student Kolder had written the report against the priest. Bishop Chehovych also spoke positively about Kisilevskyj, reporting that his parish was well-organized.³⁵³ Thus, the idea that the priest was the reason that some of the laity converted to Orthodoxy was proven to be unrealistic.

The case attracted wider attention, including the interest of the Polish socialist newspaper *Naprzod*. Here, Tadeusz Tokarski highlighted the danger of Russophile propaganda, which had already inspired 46 families to convert to Orthodoxy; 36 others had expressed their determination to follow suit.³⁵⁴ According to *Naprzod*, the main reasons for Orthodoxy's popularity – and, correspondingly, that of Russophilism – was the lack of education among the peasants, too much trust in priests (unsurprisingly, given *Naprzod's* socialist leanings), and the lack of political rights, especially the exclusion of local Ruthenians (also known as Lemky) from electing their own representatives. The newspaper stated: “there is no deputy from the 90 thousand Ruthenians in Lemkivshchyna”.³⁵⁵ The article's author states that if this injustice was rectified, then there would be more political differentiation in the region and the Russophiles would lose their majority.

In addition, *Naprzod* named other reasons for growing interest in Orthodoxy. It criticized the government and the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church for not doing enough to change the current ‘dangerous’ situation; it also pointed out that Kisilevskyj was not suited to preventing people from changing rite because of his financial affairs.³⁵⁶ Several local starostas were even accused of supporting Russophiles as a remedy against

³⁵⁰ *Correspondence on the case of a priest Kysylevski*, sprava 5093.

³⁵¹ *Correspondence on the case of a priest Kysylevski*, sprava 5093.

³⁵² Russophiles supported the idea that Ruthenians should unite under the rule of the Russian tsar as Ruthenians were, in their view, part of the Russian nation. In contrast, Ukrainophiles claimed that Ruthenians were Ukrainians, a separate nation from Russians or Poles. Himka, *The Greek Catholic Church*, 4.

³⁵³ *Correspondence on the case of the priest Kysylevski*, sprava 5093.

³⁵⁴ “Moskalofilstwo i Szyzma w Galicya,” *Naprzod*, February 10, 1912.

³⁵⁵ “Moskalofilstwo i Szyzma w Galicya.”

³⁵⁶ “Moskalofilstwo i Szyzma w Galicya.”

growing Polish nationalism. At the end of the article, the author highlighted that local starostas had had little success in defeating the Russophiles and that only the government, with a wise approach and without repressions, could bring balance to the region.³⁵⁷

The question of repression is also raised in the *Memorandum on the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox and Russophile Propaganda in Austria*, which provided extensive analysis of the problem and suggested 14 steps that could be taken to overcome it.³⁵⁸ The author (name not indicated) argued that repression of peasants only made this type of agitation more attractive and thus more dangerous for the local authorities and priests.³⁵⁹ Persecuted peasants and Orthodox priests became heroes and martyrs in the eyes of communities, as there were no effective methods for dealing with Orthodox priests besides short-term arrests and warnings. The author of the *Memorandum* made an analogy with the case of Stojalowski, who was extremely popular while being actively persecuted. In the author's opinion, his popularity and persecution were mutually reinforcing.³⁶⁰ In addition, peasants were not afraid to be imprisoned because, on the one hand, imprisonment raised their importance in the community and, on the other, they were given better food in prison than at home.³⁶¹

As there were no regulations concerning how to legally combat Orthodoxy, Greek Catholic priests worked together with local teachers and gendarmes³⁶² to write reports about inappropriate behavior and then physically forcing peasants to go to court. This type of persecution was not very effective, especially in the winter as Lemkivshchyna (the region where all this took place) has a mountainous landscape.³⁶³ Sometimes priests behaved like Kysilevskyj, resorting to acts of rage like pulling out a cross from a new convert's land. All such methods did more to denigrate the authority of the Greek Catholic Church than to fix the problem.

³⁵⁷ "Moskalofilstwo i Szyzma w Galicya."

³⁵⁸ The *Memorandum* listed precisely all the agitation tools: "1) press and books; 2) wondering cinema; 3-5) theatres, lectures, brochures, posters; 6) fight against the indifference of Polish society towards Moscophiles (same as Russophiles); 7) remove Ruthenian Moscophile priests and teachers, some of whom fake being Ukrainian-oriented and are secretly loyal to Moscophiles; 8) oblige Ruthenian teachers and priests to organize counter-agitation; 9) oblige Ruthenian priests to preach more against Orthodoxy and in a more pro-Catholicism vein; 10) let the government and Greek Catholic hierarchy remove priests whom the parishioners are against; 11) let change rate from 25 years old not from 14 years old; 12) ignore all applications to change to the Orthodoxy rite as illegal; 13) avoid repressions as inappropriate." "Memorandum in the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox," 14-19.

³⁵⁹ "Memorandum on the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox," 10.

³⁶⁰ "Memorandum on the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox," 10.

³⁶¹ "Memorandum on the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox," 14.

³⁶² "Memorandum on the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox," 7.

³⁶³ "Memorandum on the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox," 8.

The *Memorandum* stated that the only alternative was propaganda against the Russian Empire: proclaiming the “barbarity of tsarism” could improve the situation in Lemkivshchyna.³⁶⁴ The author suggested using all sorts of methods: lectures, brochures, and wandering theatres and cinemas. The cinema was seen as having great potential because peasants were very responsive to visual images. Basically, the author suggested employing all forms of propaganda known at the time to deliver the message against Orthodoxy among the peasants.³⁶⁵ He was also very concerned about raising such awareness among Poles and Ruthenians because Orthodoxy, as a tool of the Russian tsar, posed a threat to Austria and aimed to assimilate Ruthenians into the Russian nation.³⁶⁶

The other method that would be effective in overcoming the problem, according to the *Memorandum*, was the selection of appropriate Greek Catholic priests who were not actively politically engaged.³⁶⁷ The political preferences of priests could be an inspiration for the laity and thus lead to either a Ukrainian-oriented parish or one that supported cooperation with the Russian Empire (Russophile). In the author’s opinion, there were a large number of unsuitable priests about whom the church authorities had no idea because when a problem arose the authorities questioned only the suspected priests without seeking a third opinion, from the parishioners for example.³⁶⁸ Thus, the *Memorandum* saw the clergy as a large part of the problem and suggested that priestly political activity be prohibited. The *Memorandum* also reveals that propaganda and counter-propaganda was viewed as an effective tool to encourage peasants to follow proper social behavior (being loyal to the Austro-Hungarian Empire) at the beginning of the twentieth century.³⁶⁹

A closer look at the problem of changing rite demonstrates how religious rites were the subject of agitation and mobilization, how a disadvantaged position provided fertile soil for certain forms of agitation, and how counter-agitation functioned as an essential element of mass mobilization. It was not very easy for Greek Catholic priests

³⁶⁴ “Memorandum on the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox,” 14.

³⁶⁵ “Memorandum on the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox,” 14

³⁶⁶ “Memorandum on the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox,” 15-16.

³⁶⁷ “Memorandum on the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox,” 11.

³⁶⁸ “Memorandum on the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox,” 3-4.

³⁶⁹ In points 7 to 10 ((7) remove Ruthenian Moscophile priests and teachers, some of whom fake being Ukrainian-oriented and are secretly loyal to Moscophiles; 8) oblige Ruthenian teachers and priests to organize counter-agitation; 9) oblige Ruthenian priests to preach more against Orthodoxy and in a more pro-Catholicism vein; 10) let the government and Greek Catholic hierarchy remove priests whom the parishioners are against), the *Memorandum* referred to Greek Catholic priests as instruments of a certain type of propaganda and called for them to be made use of for specific political purposes. “Memorandum in the Matter of Defeating the Orthodox,” 14-19.

to adjust to the role of being a counter-agitator against Orthodoxy. However, with the growing political engagement of priests and laity, confrontation in the religious realm was becoming unavoidable. Alongside bringing confrontation, the threat to change rite demonstrates how mass mobilization was also making the laity more aware of their own ability to challenge the authority of priests. Thus, although at this stage the threat to change rite was not political, it reveals the potential and growing awareness of the power of the lower ranks of society.

Competition for the influence in the village

The relationships between different village actors were complex and centred largely around competing for power or influence. Parish priests were very important figures in the life of the village, but they were not the only influence. The starosta, as well as other local officials, desired to exert authority and influence. Through analyzing the case of Bachynskyj, it will be shown that mass mobilization intensified relations between village community members as the peasantry became more aware of their own ability to exercise power and influence.

The story of the priest Myhaylo Bachynskyj is a great example of growing tensions with the local teacher: it reveals that teachers had mobilizing potential as well and could become alternative figures of influence in the public domain. Furthermore, the case of Bachynskyj, a Greek Catholic agitator, reveals many similarities with Stojalowski. There are common themes of national conflict and political agitation, as well as common tools such as mass gatherings, petitioning, and using the press. This reveals how the Greek Catholic Church, like the Roman Catholic Church, was struggling with the shifting environment of mass mobilization.

A closer look at the story of the priest Bachynskyj provides great insights into the relations between starosta and priest in the village and the role of the high church and state institutions in regulating these relations. The problems surrounding the Bachynskyj started very soon after he had arrived in the village of Ropchyci.³⁷⁰ He arrived with the intention of making a difference to his parishioners' lives, and started by trying to overcome alcohol problems in the village. The Greek Catholic Ordinariate at this point was satisfied with the priest and characterized him to the Vice-regency positively. The Ordinariate stated that Bachynskyj was a young, talented, intelligent, and enthusiastic priest, and his only fault was that he entered the priesthood with a great

³⁷⁰ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj, sprava 2507.*

desire to reform parish life. The Ordinariate further justified the priest's behavior by arguing that the parish itself was not ready for reforms: the former priest had not cared for his flock well enough, as a result of which the parishioners had become less moral and less sober.³⁷¹ Because Bachynskyj undertook to reform the situation and founded a fraternity of temperance, he brought the hatred of some parishioners on himself. In addition, the local teacher Uliarij Harbynskyj was opposed to the priest and had filed a false report about him. The teacher held anti-religious views and was strongly anti-clerical. Because of Harbynskyj's behavior, the Greek Catholic Ordinariate asked the Vice-regency to take action against the teacher.³⁷² Thus, the highest institution of the Greek Catholic Church supported and protected the priest and involved the Vice-regency to clarify the situation in the village (especially the behavior of the teacher).

There is no clear evidence why the teacher was against Bachynskyj: one possible explanation is that the teacher saw Bachynskyj as a bad priest and thus wanted to protect the laity from his influence. Other reasons could include differences in political preferences or personal conflicts. As both the teacher and the priest were represented in official documents as passive actors, the motives behind their actions are unknown. However, the methods and strategy of the participants in this conflict are clear enough and shine a lot of light on the competition between the teacher and the priest.

The teacher engaged in a fight with the priest for the attention of the peasants. The teacher was quite creative in mobilizing peasants against his opponent. Very likely he was writing and distributing anonymous letters. One such letter under the title "Letter of God" was written as if God himself had given instructions to the parishioners to act against the priest. It stated: "do not give a lot of money for the funeral because your relatives will be in hell...instead of giving money to the priest, feed your family and buy shoes for your kids."³⁷³ (This claim was quite ironic, as in many cases children did not go to school because they did not have proper shoes). The letter went on to refer to the fraternity founded by Bachynskyj, deeming it harmful: "if you go to the fraternity, I [God] will not let you into heaven."³⁷⁴ Then 'God' reveals that Bachynskyj had embezzled from the church treasury and would be punished with an early death. The letter concluded with the advice to read it twice a day, carry it at all times and share it

³⁷¹ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2507.

³⁷² *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2507.

³⁷³ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2507.

³⁷⁴ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2507.

with others; this would earn the reader remission of their sins and entry into heaven.³⁷⁵ In general, the letter appealed to peasant religiosity and used it against the priest.

We cannot measure the effectiveness of this letter, but Bachynskyj was definitely upset by the teacher and wrote personally to the Consistory, asking for help. He testified that the teacher was mentally ill and had already spent some time in a mental hospital. The most interesting thing about the “Letter of God” is its structure, mimicking Biblical language with prohibitions and promises. This was a language familiar to and understandable for parishioners. Although Harbynskyj was using Biblical language ironically, the similarity to Stojalowski’s actions should be highlighted. Like Stojalowski, Harbynskyj used peasant familiarity with Biblical language as a tool to aid in mobilization.

The teacher was not Bachynskyj’s only problem. With or without inspiration from the teacher, some parishioners initiated their own fight against Bachynskyj. Apparently, the laity were also dissatisfied with the priest and planned to involve state and church authorities to resolve this. The first complaints from parishioners were addressed to the starosta, and he forwarded them to the Vice-regency. The starosta claimed to have 2,500 signatures for these complaints, but he did not send any proof of this. In general, the parishioners complained about high prices for sacraments, impolite behavior, and pressure from the priest to support him during elections.³⁷⁶ As voting was not totally anonymous, it was possible for the priest to know who had supported him and refuse to provide sacraments to non-supporters afterwards. The parishioners stated in the conclusion that they wanted another priest, or else they would convert to Roman Catholicism.³⁷⁷ Thus, in this case as well as the one mentioned above, the laity understood their power and threatened the Church hierarchy with changing to another rite. This demonstrates how the peasantry was growing increasingly aware of their power to influence church authorities. Indeed the threat of converting to Orthodox Christianity was a common feature of mobilized peasantry in Galicia at this time.

A similar letter from parishioners was addressed to the Greek Catholic Ordinariate. In this one, the parishioners claimed that the priest stole 40 guildens from the parish treasury to pay for his court proceedings and that he always kept all the money gathered during services for himself; furthermore, he could be absent from the parish for

³⁷⁵ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

³⁷⁶ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

³⁷⁷ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

weeks and then arrive dirty and sleepy to serve mass.³⁷⁸ The priest baptized children not in the church but in a room that was dirty and stunk of his dogs. He had recently been beaten by Jews and only managed to survive because his wife protected him. In addition, he was about to be put in jail for his deeds, which was considered shameful even for a peasant, let alone a priest.³⁷⁹ On account of everything they alleged Bachynskyj had done, the parishioners asked the Ordinariate to remove him or else they would report the entire affair to the newspapers.³⁸⁰ It is worth noting that the letter was written in a very emotional and rude style: the parishioners employed many offensive words while speaking about the priest. It is clear that they were not making a request, but rather posing demands and threats. Again, this example demonstrates how the laity became more critical about their parish priest and saw different options on how to improve situation besides threatening to change rite. As the Ordinariate was not fast in their reply to another letter from laity, they wanted to make the matter more public than just involving high institutions.

When the Ordinariate did not act, the parishioners kept their promises and wrote to the local newspaper *Kurier Drohobyckyj* and to the major newspaper *Kurier Lwowski*. Their letter was published as a brief article, which stated that the priest was persecuting parishioners, and was involved in several court proceedings, and as the church authorities were unwilling or unable to take action, the parishioners would convert to Roman Catholicism.³⁸¹ Bachynskyj wrote a response to this article. He tried to disprove the parishioners' statements, claiming that he was not persecuting anybody – he had only refused to perform sacraments for serious sinners – and, what's more, the court had found him innocent upon appeal.³⁸² The parishioners wrote to the newspaper again, accusing the priest of new frauds: taking money from the treasury for his legal proceedings and using money intended for church renovations for his own purposes. The priest continued to defend himself in a subsequent article: he had applied to the government for funds to renovate the church, and the reason he took money from the treasury was because his legal affairs were directly connected with church issues. This was the end of the newspaper dialog between parishioners and priest. This dialog reveals that when the communication was not possible in the realm of the village, it became real in the newspapers and thus encouraged both sides to seek for the good argument.

³⁷⁸ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

³⁷⁹ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

³⁸⁰ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

³⁸¹ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

³⁸² *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

Certainly, such approach was one of the manifestation of mass mobilization, when besides direct participants a mass was involved through the newspaper to discuss the situation.

As this back-and-forth in the newspapers did not solve anything, the villagers kept complaining about Bachynskyj to the starosta. A new set of complains maintained that Bachynskyj had influential friends and relatives, who were protecting him. Among his friends were supposedly the lawyers Okynevskyj and Korosh, who supported the priest during the elections and helped him to publish a brochure entitled *Our weapon* [Nasha zbroia].³⁸³ Finally, the deanery of Greek Catholic Church conducted an investigation, which revealed that only three parishioners were actually opposed to Bachynskyj and consistently testified against him. The others found him to be a good pastor, who taught about religion and was respected in the community, and therefore he was elected to the local council. Such a mismatch between possible and real oppositionists of Bachynski is very fascinating as it suggested that either the peasants were still afraid to oppose openly to the clergymen, or there was indeed a little group of peasants that managed to arrange resistance to the priest and raise suspicion to his personality.

The political activity of Bachynskyj was becoming a central issue that determines relations in the village. On the one hand starosta was very much concerned about possible strikes in the village as they could lead to chaos and economic losses. In addition, political views of the priest were national oriented and could cause problems between nationalities. Bachynskyj's agitated the peasants to go on strike against the 'liakhy and Calvinists' [Poles and Germans], and to demand wages of at least two crowns per day.³⁸⁴ Starosta reported that the priest was using church and public space to spread his message and argued that Poles should be made to live on the other side of the river San, in Western Galicia. Furthermore, the starosta reported that all agricultural work was delayed because of Bachynskyj's rabbleroising. Such an interection between starostas and priest was very common during the preparation to election and elections itself, however in the case of Bachynskyj, their relations were more intense and thus well documented for the Vice-regency and the Greek Catholic Ordinariate. As was evident from the chapter on Stojalowski, politicaly active priests were always under careful observation by Church and State.

³⁸³ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj, sprava 2502.*

³⁸⁴ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj, sprava 2502.*

The starosta and the teacher were not the only enemies of Bachynskyj. Bachynskyj's activism was also influencing a local landowner who was afraid of Bachynskyj's popularity. This landowner, Juliusz Frej, alleged to the Vice-regency that Bachynskyj wanted to bankrupt him, as the priest encouraged peasants to go on strike and thus not work for Frej. The administrative council of the local charity fund (which consisted of landowners) also confirmed that Bachynskyj was campaigning against Frej, and in addition was fostering aggression between two "fraternal nationalities" (Poles and Ruthenians). Thus, the representatives of the fund asked the Vice-regency to do everything in its power to avoid further confrontations between nationalities, preferably by replacing Bachynskyj. Therefore, as a result of active political involvement the priest had provoked a major campaign against himself which included all representatives of the community (peasants, the teacher, landowners, and the starosta) and raised suspicion about his actions in the highest institution of the province. It is noteworthy that all the parties involved in the fight with Bachynskyj believed that the Vice-regency would take just action and suspend the priest. Thus, they demonstrated loyal and trusting behavior to the state authorities and addressed their complaints to them.

The involvement of Frej and other landowners reveals how closely economic and national interests were intertwined in Galician life and how these factors together influenced mass mobilization. Nevertheless, the fact that landowners were typically associated with the Polish nobility had already made the planned strike a national matter. This also provoked antagonism between representatives of the local authorities and Bachynskyj, as strikes were always complicated and dangerous events: they could disrupt the balance within the village and provoke disorder. Before the intensification of mass mobilization, priests were seen as allies of the secular authorities in supporting calm and order in society. However, the opportunities brought by mass mobilization gave the clergy a chance to decide how to use their social position and with what motivation. In the case analyzed here, it is very hard to separate Bachynskyj's personal hatred of the landowner from a noble intention to help Ruthenian peasants earn better wages. So, the real motives remain behind the scenes, but the priest's desire to get involved and be a decisive actor is evident.

Bachynskyj was apparently a very persistent agitator, as the Vice-regency paid a great deal of attention to him and instructed the starosta to take appropriate actions to control the priest. Normally, the Vice-regency was not very responsive to the complaints it received, especially when it came to priests, as the priests had their own leading institutions (Ordinariate and Consistory). However, in this case, the Vice-regency

reacted immediately, probably out fear for economic losses in the event of a strike, which could spread to other villages as well. The Vice-regency informed the starosta that the Ruthenian National Committee [*Narodnyj Ruskyj komitet*] was organizing a massive campaign to migrate for work to the Prussian Empire in addition to calling for local strikes. The campaign to go and work in Prussia was connected to the call to strike, because the possibility of other work opportunities could be used to pressure landowners into increasing wages. The Vice-regency recommended that the starosta take counter-propaganda measures, especially among wealthy peasants, explaining how harmful strikes would be for them and for the government.³⁸⁵

The school council was bothered that Bachynskyj recruited teachers from neighboring villages in his strike campaign and that the organization *Prosvita* disseminated brochures about strikes. A similar account of teachers' involvement was reported by the starosta as well. Meanwhile, the existing conflict between the teacher and the priest continued to escalate, especially because the priest had encroached on a sphere considered the teacher's realm of influence (agitating other teachers). Apparently, Bachynskyj's behavior had touched all empowered in the villages around and demonstrated how one active priest could make a substantial difference in his community.

Over the next few years, the Bachynskyj saga continued. The starosta repeatedly informed the Vice-regency of Bachynskyj's radical and systematic propaganda activities. The Consistory responded that there were not sufficient grounds to replace Bachynskyj, as he had not committed any crimes against his religion or the Church; in the same way, the legal proceedings against him were not enough to merit his replacement because the priest had never been jailed. This continuous replay demonstrated that despite the strong connections and cooperation between the sacral and secular authorities, in practice they had separate fields of influence, which gave a lot of space for maneuver to those at the bottom of the hierarchy.

The parishioners also came to the Ordinariate in person to report that Bachynskyj was neglecting his duties and participating in social and radical agitation.³⁸⁶ In addition, they suspected him of setting fire to houses belonging to Frej. The parishioners stated that many people believed that Bachynskyj conspired to burn Frej's property.³⁸⁷ The confused starosta wrote to the Ordinariate, requesting that they do everything they could

³⁸⁵ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

³⁸⁶ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

³⁸⁷ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

to maintain order and peace in the village. It is noteworthy that this starosta had no problem writing in Ruthenian when appealing to the Ordinariate. This time, Bishop Chehovych replied promptly. The bishop explained that because of various complaints against Bachynskyj, canonical proceedings against him were underway.³⁸⁸ When the parishioners complained again, the bishop issued very strict instructions to Bachynskyj to stop persecuting his parishioners, and in particular to drop the legal proceedings he had initiated against them.

It appears that Bachynskyj was angry at those peasants who had systematically complained about him. The bishop emphasized that the complaints against Bachynskyj were not particularly numerous, and they came from a minority of parishioners. The majority of the parishioners (as attested to by 162 signatures) supported the priest and stated that Bachynskyj had renewed the parish morally, economically, and intellectually. He had also contributed significantly to the development of local reading clubs (*Prosvita* and *Obshchestvo Kachkovskoho*).³⁸⁹ At any rate, as there were some discontented parishioners, the bishop promised to do his best to fix the situation, thus showing how the Greek Catholic Church was willing to bow to public pressure to retain its own security and the public peace.

Meanwhile, as Bachynskyj took the parishioners who testified against him to court, the Ordinariate finally decided to take action and replace Bachynskyj via a transfer to a less important parish (*oeconomica remotio a beneficio*). The Ordinariate asked the Vice-regency to agree to this transfer.³⁹⁰ Surprisingly, the starosta was the first to object to the idea of transferring Bachynskyj. His main arguments centered on the futility of this change, as the other village was already under Bachynskyj's influence and the removal would not affect anything in the existing situation. The priest had become a very famous campaigner and had an entourage of peasants who helped him to disseminate his propaganda. The starosta wrote that "the priest is too much involved in public activity, as none of the elections could happen without him."³⁹¹ From this perspective, the starosta insisted that Bachynskyj posed a threat to the public peace, and therefore it was important to move him to a place where he could not exert any influence. Again there is a reflection of Stojalowski in this case, with Bachynskyj being perceived as a potential threat to existing hierarchical authority.

³⁸⁸ *Materials on the case of the priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2502.

³⁸⁹ *Materials on the case of a priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2503.

³⁹⁰ *Materials on the case of a priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2503.

³⁹¹ *Materials on the case of a priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2503.

Eventually the proposed transfer was approved, but Bachynskyj was not happy about it and decided to lodge an appeal. He first applied to the Metropolitan's Court in Lemberg, and when that appeal was rejected, he made an appeal to the Vatican.³⁹² Such actions were also similar to Stojalowski's approach, who always involved the high state authorities to question the decisions of provincial bodies. As all these appeals took a while to be processed, the starosta and parishioners had to stay with Bachynskyj. The starosta continued to write reports denouncing the priest because the priest refused to obey the starosta's instructions to use a newly constructed cemetery. The parishioners continued to threaten to convert to Roman Catholicism, and 66 people even applied to do so.³⁹³ All parties in the conflict were patiently waiting for the authorities to resolve the matter. In the end, it is very likely that Bachynskyj was removed from the parish, as after 1908 no more complaints were filed against him.³⁹⁴

In conclusion, the case reveals how complex and interconnected the relations between village actors were. In particular, it shows how under the influence of mass mobilization, priests became politicized and driven by a desire to be the peasants' leader. Such an active public position was not appreciated by the local and church authorities, especially when a priest's agitation strayed across the line between legal and illegal actions (such as threatening public order). In addition, the starosta and teacher saw themselves as alternative village activists, and were not always satisfied with the growing popularity of the priest. Before the intensification of the mass mobilization process, priests and the secular authorities worked closely for mutual benefits. The case of Bachynskyj, like that of Stojalowski (for the Roman Catholic Church), shows that the relationship between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities was beginning to be put under strain. This strain was especially manifested in the local representatives of these authorities, such as parochial clergy and district administrators. Mass mobilisation was causing localised competition for power, one that was further affected by growing political agitation.

The priest and intensive political agitation

The intensification of political agitation was becoming a more and more significant factor in determining the relations between local authorities and parish priests. In the previous examples, there was not that much information about the political preferences

³⁹² *Materials on the case of a priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2503.

³⁹³ *Materials on the case of a priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2503.

³⁹⁴ *Materials on the case of a priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2503.

of the priest. The case of the priest Ioan Popel³⁹⁵ covers this gap. Popel was a very active supporter of the Ukrainian-oriented Radical Party and the national organization *Sich* (a network of radical semi-military nationally-oriented organizations), even though both the party and the organization were not approved by the church authorities. Support for the Radical Party not well suited to clergy, since it was considered dangerous by the authorities. The radical aspect of Popel's political agitation was very troublesome for local authorities and the Greek Catholic Church, as radicals generally had little sympathy for the Church's high hierarchy.

The other aspect of this case was a conflict with peasants and, as a result, the constant complaints of the laity against their priest. The parishioners took the initiative, showed persistence, and mobilized against the priest, resulting in his suspension from his duties. The local authorities accused the priest of two sorts of crime: immoral behavior and radical agitation.³⁹⁶ The first person to report Popel's actions to the Vice-regency was Jedzej Wierzajski, a lawyer from Bukovina, the neighboring crownland. He stated, as a spokesperson for other citizens, that Popel was once a priest there and had obstructed elections, agitated, and proclaimed himself a "martyr for the Ruthenian cause"; he also supported a lover and made his relationship with her public.³⁹⁷ This report led to an investigation and legal proceedings. However, Popel refused to take part in the trial, claiming that he was falsely accused. The starosta informed the Vice-regency of Popel's refusal and added that his political behavior was becoming dangerous, as at election time this priest was joining the Radicals.³⁹⁸

The large number of complaints drew the Greek Catholic Ordinariate in Stanislaviv into the investigation. The Ordinariate reported to the Vice-regency that witnesses under oath confirmed that Popel had been preaching against the doctrine of the Catholic Church; he spread atheistic and radical thought; he supported the spread of the anti-Christian *Sich*; and made alliances with people hostile to Church and State.³⁹⁹ After such a report, both the church and local authorities considered Popel a danger. While the authorities were not in the hurry to take action in Bachynskyj's case as his views were not radical or connected to forbidden political forces, in the case of Popel the response was much faster, as the priest was considered more dangerous.

³⁹⁵ *The case of the prosecution of priest Yoan Popel, sprava 4932.*

³⁹⁶ *The case of the prosecution of priest Yoan Popel, sprava 4932.*

³⁹⁷ *The case of the prosecution of priest Yoan Popel, sprava 4932.*

³⁹⁸ *The case of the prosecution of priest Yoan Popel, sprava 4932.*

³⁹⁹ *The case of the prosecution of the priest Yoan Popel, sprava 4932.*

As a final solution to this mixture of religious and political crimes, the Ordinariate decided to proceed with an ecclesiastical disciplinary court. However, the problem was that such a procedure took a very long time, and thus the Ordinariate asked the Vice-regency to take measures against the priest as soon as possible because he had the potential to inflict a great deal of damage with his agitation. From their side, the Ordinariate issued a suspension *ab officio et beneficio*,⁴⁰⁰ which forbade Popel from performing any religious sacraments. This sequence of actions revealed that it was not easy even for the secular and ecclesiastical hierarchies of Galicia to control and neutralize the problematic priest, even with each other's support.

At this point, Popel had lost the protection of both authorities; however, he was aware that it would still take quite a while until a final verdict would be passed and that suspension was intended to serve as a warning and could be lifted. In addition, he realized he could garner some support from politicians. The Vice-regency had already stopped his salary and a new priest had arrived in his village, but Popel refused to leave and instead drove away the new priest.⁴⁰¹ This episode was very confusing for the starosta, as the Vice-regency and Ordinariate confirmed their decisions while Popel refused to leave. The starosta appeared to be helpless against the strong personality of the priest, even while having the support of the state and church authorities.

There is no sufficient explanation of why Popel's suspension was lifted and he remained at his parish. From this point, the parishioners took the initiative. They reported in a letter to the Vice-regency that Popel was refusing to perform religious sacraments and was about to have a child with his mistress.⁴⁰² Clearly there was not much progress in relations between Popel and his parishioners, as more than a year later parishioners published an open letter to the Vice-regency and the bishop (probably in the newspaper *Ruske slovo*) with complaints that their demands were ignored and that Bishop Khomyshyn had done nothing to save them from an immoral priest.⁴⁰³ The laity claimed that the inaction of the bishop was a result of Popel's national position. There was a belief (mainly promoted by the Russophile newspaper *Halychanyn*) that Bishop Gryhoryj Khomyshyn had strong Ukrainian proclivities and thus supported priests with similar political preferences, even if these priests were unsuitable.⁴⁰⁴ In this case, it is

⁴⁰⁰ From Latin "from official (duties) and benefits". *The case of the prosecution of the priest Yoan Popel*, sprava 4932.

⁴⁰¹ *The case of the prosecution of the priest Yoan Popel*, sprava 4932.

⁴⁰² *The case of the prosecution of the priest Yoan Popel*, sprava 4932.

⁴⁰³ *The case of the prosecution of the priest Yoan Popel*, sprava 4932.

⁴⁰⁴ *The case of the prosecution of the priest Yoan Popel*, sprava 4932.

significant that political convictions were seen as good motivation to exercise the power of one's position and ignore inappropriate behavior. Political preferences were thus becoming dominant and influential on a social level. The idea emerged that protection came not just because one belonged to a particular social group but because of political views shared with the high hierarchy.

The starosta claimed that Popel himself was convinced that he had free license to behave as he liked because Bishop Khomyshyn, another Ukrainian nationalist, would protect him.⁴⁰⁵ There is no evidence to prove or disprove that Bishop Khomyshyn was a supporter of Popel. However, it is clear that political preferences were seen as a way to garner sympathy and patronage. Thus, political views were becoming a new moral category: one's position could be exploited for the good of the party or ideology, including increased leniency for like-minded individuals and severity for those who held different political views.

In conclusion, the story of the priest Popel demonstrates that priests' realm for freedom of action, including disapproved political behavior, was quite wide and gave the possibility to continue acting against the instructions of the authorities. Even the active involvement of the laity, who may have been mobilized by Popel's political opponents, could not force the displacement of the priest. Thus, the example of Popel, similar to that of Stojalowski, emphasized that if the priest wanted to misuse his position for his own politically motivated interests, he could do so for a while. Certainly, such behavior was not acceptable, and both secular and religious institutions were doing their best to prevent repetitions of such cases and moving the clergy away from extreme or radical political agitation. Furthermore, the case of Popel also suggests the arrival of political preference as a means for courting favor amongst the high hierarchy.

Rising national issues as a way to resist the starosta

The case of this section is focused on the role that national identity played in the relations between priests and local officials. It further builds on the use of strategies and tools for mobilization, and highlights how targeted approaches could unite fellow clergy behind a common cause. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to state whether the case was a conflict over gaining more power in the village or a national one, or indeed both. The beginning of the conflict was marked by the priest Petryckyj's delay in providing information from the parish register on population data (births and deaths) and a list of

⁴⁰⁵ *The case of the prosecution of the priest Yoan Popel, sprava 4932.*

those who were supposed to be recruited to the army.⁴⁰⁶ In the beginning, there were no national issues visible, only the problem of performing this duty. However, the obligation to provide population data was a very important one, as only parish priests had documentation on the subject for the state. The priests needed to fill in the standard forms and send them to starostas on a regular basis.⁴⁰⁷

As the Vice-regency and authorities in Vienna mandated and relied on these lists, the starosta was greatly distressed and reported to the governor that Petryckyj was impeding the local authorities' work; the same was reported to the Greek Catholic Consistory.⁴⁰⁸ In addition, the starosta provided a document in which parishioners complained about the high prices demanded by Petryckyj for sacraments. The starosta continued to complain about Petryckyj regularly and thus systematically constructed an image of a bad priest for the Galician government. As these complaints were not effective, the starosta used gendarmes to get the population data he needed.⁴⁰⁹ In comparison to three cases discussed above, the actions of the starosta here were much more determined and rapid: he also used all possible means to influence the priest. Most likely, this urgency was caused by the way in which the priest's irresponsiveness was ruining the diligent and loyal reputation of the starosta in the eyes of the Vice-regency.

However, Petryckyj was not an easy victim and continued to resist the starostas' actions with similar enthusiasm and methods. The priest reported to the governor, the archbishop, and a lawyer, Okunevskij, that the commissar and two gendarmes "had attacked" his home while he was ill and took the parish register books without his permission.⁴¹⁰ As a response to these accusations, the starosta wrote to the Vice-regency claiming that he was forced to take such measures, as he needed data on population changes as quickly as possible. Archbishop Sembratovych responded to the Vice-regency with dissatisfaction, arguing that parish registers should not be removed without permission from the Consistory.⁴¹¹ This interaction between different authorities concerning Petryckyj and the parish register lasted at least eight years. The case clearly shows two things; firstly, that Petryckyj stubbornly applied his rights and, secondly, that the Church was interested in defending its own power and influence as opposed to

⁴⁰⁶ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴⁰⁷ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴⁰⁸ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴⁰⁹ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴¹⁰ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴¹¹ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

resolving the conflict. During this time, the case took on other interesting and significant aspects; the dominant one was the priest's public activity.

Some of these clues were proffered by the starosta in his next report to the Vice-regency about the priest's participation in the local council and municipality. The starosta stated that Petryckyj was not elected as an advisor to the local council, and because of that he wanted to demonstrate his power and importance in another way. In addition, Petryckyj applied for the position of municipal secretary; he was elected, but then, according to the starosta, some of the locals protested that he was not suited to this position. The arguments against Petryckyj were that he was irresponsible and agitated against the local government. The starosta went on to elaborate how dangerous such behavior could be, as it inspired other Greek Catholic priests to be disrespectful towards the authorities and distracted them from their proper work. The starosta initiated legal proceedings against Petryckyj: as a result, Petryckyj was fined 150 guildens, to be paid into the local poverty fund. However, Petryckyj continued to neglect demands from the local authorities and ignored the court's decision. Again, it is clear that the priest behaved as if the secular authorities, especially the local ones, had little influence on him and their decisions were not obligatory. This example highlights once more that priests acknowledged their privileged position in society and very often abused it for their own benefit.

The starosta knew that he also had an opportunity to influence the priest through the laity, so he opened a new line of conflict with Petryckyj. This time the starosta used complaints from parishioners as evidence.⁴¹² The origins of such complaints are questionable because the low level of literacy in villages left a great deal of room for manipulation. Villagers could be tricked into signing documents or their testimonies could be elucidated in exchange for benefits offered by the starosta. There was a huge gap between the power and influence local authorities had over villagers and the villagers' ability to influence local officials. Simply put, because of illiteracy and an absence of knowledge about their rights, villagers were easy to manipulate, intimidate, and bribe. A mediator filed almost all the written complaints from villagers. In many cases, lawyers wrote the most effective complaints;⁴¹³ peasants were only able to write threatening complaints (for example, that if there were no improvement they would change their rite or write to the newspapers).

⁴¹² *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴¹³ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

In this particular case, the parishioners (with or without help of the starosta) addressed a letter to the Vice-regency and the Consistory, complaining that the priest was demanding inflated prices for sacraments, was in conflict with the local authorities and dragged villagers into this conflict, had managed the church's lands poorly and thus had no money, and was not teaching religion at school.⁴¹⁴ Apparently, all possible complaints were gathered together to emphasize how unsuitable the priest was. The solution proposed by the 35 parishioners who signed the petition was the same as for the starosta's: they asked for a different pastor to be assigned to their parish.⁴¹⁵ For the starosta, it was clearly important to mobilize, or at least be seen to have gained, the support of people from lower society because a group opinion from the priest's laity would give the starosta's appeal to the church authorities more weight. However, as there was nothing radical in the action of Petryckyj (unlike the aforementioned priest Popel), the authorities did not provide any response to the complaints of the peasants or the starosta.

Four years after the parish register affair began, Petryckyj finally explained his actions to the Vice-regency, writing why he was having problems reporting the population data. Petryckyj stated that he was receiving letters from the starosta in a language that he did not speak (apparently Polish); therefore, he expected the starosta to write to him in Ruthenian.⁴¹⁶ Even though Ruthenian was one of the official languages, the majority of correspondence, especially between secular authorities, was written in Polish. It is impossible that Petryckyj could not understand Polish: however, he also knew his right to request information in Ruthenian. Here Petryckyj was clearly playing the 'national card' to help him manipulate the situation and appear as a victim – notably eight years after the issue regarding data began.

Petryckyj managed to convince the Consistory that the violation of language rights was at the core of his tensions with the starosta. Archbishop Sheptyckyj stated that Petryckyj had not received all of the letters, but had responded to those written in Ruthenian and would keep doing that.⁴¹⁷ Therefore, in this instance the Consistory took Petryckyj's side and protected him from the starosta's accusations. Furthermore, the Consistory justified Petryckyj's delay in supplying information about the population by arguing that he had not received the appropriate blank forms to fill in. At the end of the

⁴¹⁴ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴¹⁵ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴¹⁶ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴¹⁷ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

letter, the Consistory asked the Vice-regency to respect existing language legislation and send Petryckyj the forms in Ruthenian.⁴¹⁸ In the matter of population statistics, Petryckyj was instructed to respond to letters written in Polish as well; in other cases, the Consistory asked him to inform them.

From the perspective of the Consistory, it was a question of respect for language legislation, not a problem of communication, as the starosta had framed the matter. It is absolutely impossible that Petryckyj had difficulty understanding Polish. He could have invoked the language law to prove his innocence and irritate the starosta; this would also have demonstrated his patriotic attitude towards his nationality and language. At this point, Petryckyj either desired to demonstrate his national position clearly or was using his national position as an opportunity to demonstrate neglect to the authorities. This situation appears similar to that of Popel; it once again demonstrates how growing politicization was used by priests as an important criterion to justify their actions.

Once again the starosta began to write to the Vice-regency, claiming that despite the Ordinariate's promises, Petryckyj was not responding to his letters, including those written in Ruthenian. He claimed that Petryckyj refused to accept letters from the postal service and that he had received the tables (which were without any text to avoid problems), but had not filled them out.⁴¹⁹ Also, the post confirmed that the letters had not been accepted. In response, the Ordinariate promised to give Petryckyj another strict warning. At the end of 1902, the Ordinariate suspended Petryckyj and assigned a new priest, Teodor Velychkovskyj, to take his position.⁴²⁰ The story appeared to be over.

In July 1903, the story repeated with the same scenario. The Vice-regency received a new letter from Petryckyj, where he claimed that the starosta was not following the language law. The starosta responded that, as always, Petryckyj refused to provide population statistics, and the Ordinariate responded that they would interfere only if Petryckyj ignored a letter written in Ruthenian.⁴²¹ The starosta claimed that statistics were not a local matter but a governmental one, and in this case he was allowed to use Polish as a governmental language. Here, it is visible that the starosta had no intention of accepting the conditions that priest was insisting on and that it was also essential for him to defend his rights before the Vice-regency.

⁴¹⁸ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴¹⁹ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴²⁰ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴²¹ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

The argument that Petryckyj was using to justify his actions served as an inspiring example for others. The priest Bachynskyj (mentioned earlier in this chapter) was also accused of disobeying the starosta's instructions regarding population data. Bachynskyj's reasons for failing to obey the starosta were the same as those given by Petryckyj: he demanded that the starosta write to him in Ruthenian or German, the languages he spoke.⁴²² This complaint seems strange, as this starosta was regularly using Ruthenian in his appeals to the Ordinariate and thus clearly was able to write in that language. Moreover, Bachynskyj's lawyer Olesnyckyj pointed out that the job description of a parish priest did not require him to know Polish. Most likely in this situation, Bachynskyj had heard about Petryckyj's case and decided to follow suit.

The Petryckyj case fell quiet for three years. There is no documentary evidence as to why Petryckyj remained in his position and how long his suspension lasted, but even six years later the situation had not changed significantly. In 1906, a new conflict arose between the starosta and Petryckyj. The starosta, convinced by past experience that no other methods would be effective in dealing with this priest, ordered his arrest for eight days. The starosta claimed that Petryckyj had organized a strike and put up resistance against the gendarmes.⁴²³ Petryckyj was convinced that he was mistreated in this case and thus made his dissatisfaction publicly known. One of the means he employed to attract attention was a petition to the Ministry of the Interior with a request to punish the gendarme's commissar for unreasonable arrest.⁴²⁴ Similar to the priests mentioned before, Petryckyj was convinced that the high state authorities would cancel the decision of the Vice-regency, or at least that the petition would postpone any decision about him by the Vice-regency.

In 1906 during a peasant strike, Petryckyj was arrested, which initiated a new wave of tensions between the starosta/gendarmes and the priest. In the strike, Petryckyj was reading a newspaper aloud for the peasants, and a gendarme named Isidor Derejko interrupted him constantly. Petryckyj told him to stop interrupting and instead go and make sure no crimes were being committed in the village; the gendarme took offense at Petryckyj's remark and filed a complaint against him. As a result, the commissar (a representative of the Vice-regency) sentenced Petryckyj to eight days under arrest. Petryckyj appealed and his sentence was shortened to three days, but he appealed that sentence as well. However, the starosta was not eager to postpone the punishment, and

⁴²² *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴²³ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴²⁴ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

the gendarme Derejko came to deliver the priest to the prison. During the arrest, Derejko walked around the room and hurled insults at Petryckyj in an attempt to offend him.⁴²⁵ This, in short, was the content of Petryckyj's petition to the Ministry of the Interior. The petition was not the only tool that Petryckyj used: he also involved newspapers.

The clerical newspaper *Nyva* reported on the case and characterized Petryckyj as a victim.⁴²⁶ The newspaper stated that the entire Ruthenian community was outraged because it was so unjust for local authorities to treat a priest and a citizen in this manner. As a reaction to Petryckyj's arrest, all the local priests decided to hold a meeting at which Petryckyj could give his account of what had happened. After that meeting, the clergy concluded that: 1) Petryckyj was acting according to the law in trying to force the local authorities to use the Ruthenian language, 2) it was because of this request to write in Ruthenian that the local authorities imposed fines on him (this was done by the court and not the local authorities, so here the priests were badly informed) and persecuted him, and 3) Petryckyj succeeded in forcing the authorities to translate certain tables into Ruthenian, but as a result he was persecuted even more and then brutally arrested in his home with the use of force.⁴²⁷ In conclusion, the meeting declared that all actions taken against Petryckyj were the result of a well-planned fight against the Ruthenian nation and clergy. This shows how a problem that began as a personal conflict transformed, with information from a manipulative agitator, into an issue about national equality.

It is likely unnecessary to point out that this clerical gathering was inspired by nationalistic views and preferred to view the situation in a simple manner. The priests then affirmed their solidarity with Petryckyj's brave behavior and decided to encourage all priests in Galicia to support him by reporting his case to the high church and state authorities.⁴²⁸ Everything the starosta had feared was coming true: other priests found Petryckyj's behavior inspiring and heroic. This is in contrast to Stojalowski, who tried but failed to gain the support of fellow priests. Whilst Stojalowski opposed the church hierarchy, Petryckyj was able to manipulate it. Petryckyj carefully fought his conflict on one front, the secular front, whilst Stojalowski also antagonized the sacral front: thus, in contrast to Stojalowski, Petryckyj managed to convince his colleagues to take his side.

Most importantly, the matter of Petryckyj's arrest was treated in the press not as misbehavior on the part of a particular official, but rather as a national conflict and a

⁴²⁵ *Materials on the investigation of the village priest Peter Petryckyj*, sprava 7191-7193.

⁴²⁶ "Chyya Vyna?" [Whose Fault?], *Nyva*, September 15, 1906.

⁴²⁷ "Chyya Vyna?"

⁴²⁸ "Chyya Vyna?"

threat to all Greek Catholic priests.⁴²⁹ Here Petryckyj was seen exclusively as a hero and an example of successful behavior, while the local authorities were demonized. Of course, the newspaper was not interested in discovering the truth about this case; what mattered was attracting attention, and facile conclusions and references to the national question served as excellent tools. As a way to avoid similar occurrences in the future, *Nyva* suggested founding an organization for the clergy that would protect their interests as a group.⁴³⁰ Unfortunately, no documentary evidence demonstrates how the matter against the arresting commissar was resolved. In 1911, the Metropolitan's Consistory declared that Petryckyj was suspended *ex informata conscientia* for his various abuses. This ended the documentary record on his case.

The details of this case unveil the nuances and complexity of the motivations of all sides involved in the conflict. On one hand, the starosta needed to fulfill the Vice-regency's request for population data and thus used all the means at his disposal against Petryckyj, mainly gendarmes and arrests. On the other hand, the Consistory was protecting the legacy and property of the Church (in this case, parish registers); they did not, however, react to complaints about the priest's behavior. Petryckyj's motivation is not made explicit in the documents; it is only the later development of the story that provides clues as to why he so systematically refused to provide information from the parish register.

What is particularly notable about this case is that both secular and religious court trials could drag on for years. This allowed all actors significant time to continue their former behavior, even if it was illegal; it also left time for them to become loved and hated, to gain support or rejection from the higher authorities. At the start of this case, the Ordinariate and the Consistory, the two highest institutions of the Greek Catholic Church, were on Petryckyj's side, but in the end he was suspended, which means that at some point he lost this protection and approval.

There was no national conflict in the late nineteenth century, but by 1906 the Petryckyj affair was tied to the national question. This case has demonstrated again that the relationship between the secular and religious powers was influenced by growing national ideas and was placed into a national framework. In the early years of his conflict with the starosta, Petryckyj did not express any nationalist leanings; he merely complicated the local government's work. As Pieter Judson summarizes in his study on

⁴²⁹ "Chyya Vyna?"

⁴³⁰ "Chyya Vyna?"

the conflicts in Bohemia: “Where nationalist accounts linked disparate events across region, province, or country in order to frame them as component parts of coherent conspiracies, the district administrator painted a picture of individual incidents...”⁴³¹

Conclusions

Mass mobilization influenced the complexity of relations between local Greek Catholic and secular authorities. The cases of four priests revealed various aspects of the clergy’s relations with secular and religious authorities, as well as the increasing power of the laity. Growing political engagement had significantly influenced these relations. The priests had control over certain aspects of their parishioners’ lives and were therefore able to exercise their power for political or personal gain. The secular authorities were dependent on the clergy to provide population data and fulfill other social duties: this gave priests a way to exert influence and express disobedience towards secular officials. At the same time, the laity was recognizing and exercising their potential power as a group. Thus, the position of the parish priest made the clergy important actors in the process of mass mobilization as they straddled both the secular and sacral arenas in a village. For the priests and secular authorities, this was not a new phenomenon. However, for the laity the growing mobilization of village residents amidst a climate of increasing political action presented new potential opportunities.

There are also clear similarities with the case of Stojalowski, namely that agitation was common to both Greek and Roman Catholic churches with just minor differences in the methods, tools, and personnel. The conflict between the priest and the starosta frequently began apolitically and gradually took on political significance, mainly from the national perspective or, in the case of Popel, from furthering one’s own influence through political agreement with high hierarchy. In the cases of Bachynskyj and Petryckyj, the nature of the conflict was interpreted in a national light. Simultaneously, the parishioners, intelligentsia, and press took an increasingly active role in these conflicts and in expressing their views on the problem. The parishioners felt a sense of their own importance and began to threaten ecclesiastical authorities to get them to fulfill their demands; this often took the form of threatening to switch rites. Legal proceedings in which both priests and peasants were involved served as important factors for mobilizing participants to play an active part in defending their own convictions, as in the case of the starosta versus Petryckyj.

⁴³¹ Judson, *Guardians of the nation*, 199.

Chapter 5. A crowd disease: priests, elections, and the transformation of local violence, 1897-1908

Violence in the village

The Greek Catholic clergy and the national activists of both nations connected to politics mobilized different groups within Galician society. Tracing such violent events unveils the relationships between different social groups (local administration/gentry, priests, and peasants) and demonstrates how the tensions between them morphed into a confrontation between two national groups (Ukrainians and Poles). Violence proved to have the potential to advance different perceptions, and these explanations of violent events were able to shape society. Acts of violence required an immediate reaction from the state and the Church because violence posed a threat to the political and moral order of society.

In this section, I focus on manifestations of violence during the electoral process in Galicia in order to demonstrate the complexity of priests' roles in these events. I have selected two cases of violent actions that took place during parliamentary elections (the clash in Dawidów 1897 and in Horucko in 1907) and one during the elections to the local diet (in Koropiec in 1908). These cases were directly connected to electoral fraud and took place in villages in Eastern Galicia. The fact that there were no similar clashes in Western Galicia demonstrated that the eastern half of the province was experiencing much more complex social turbulence, particularly because the majority of the population were neglected Ruthenians.

I have selected these elections (1897, 1907, and 1908) for three reasons. Firstly, these elections provoked a broad debate within Galician society, mainly because of the abuse of administrative powers and instances of political violence. Secondly, they influenced and transformed the relationship between the two nationalities of the province and stimulated further antagonism between them. Finally, the local governors, namely Kazimierz Badeni and Andrzej Potocki, who were responsible for organizing the elections in the province, had strong support and protection from Vienna (both implemented similarly autocratic policies in the province).

The elections of Galicia frequently resulted in violent clashes between locals and representatives of the authorities. This section aims to unveil how violence influenced relations between laity and clergy and what consequences violence had on the

coexistence of different nationalities in the province. Violent events in the Habsburg Empire were by no means confined to Eastern Galicia. In his book *Guardians of the Nation*, Pieter Judson emphasizes the important features of rural violence throughout the Austrian Empire. According to Judson, the most novel aspect of these events was not the acts themselves, but rather “the attachment of nationalist significance to such events”.⁴³² Thus, national activists viewed this spontaneous violence as “enduring local commitments to maintain national traditions in the face of increased challenges brought by outsiders to the community”.⁴³³ Through highlighting violent events, nationalists hoped to garner and mobilize popular support.⁴³⁴ However, their representation of violence conflicted with the government’s perception, which focused on the manifestations rather than the motivations behind these events.⁴³⁵

All the features named by Judson were present in Galicia. The violence in the province lacked strong national rhetoric: social differences within Galician villages were so extreme that they were the main focus of attention. This was the case especially for the peasants with their marginalized position. Those in the village community who had higher social status and, consequently, higher levels of education/literacy occupied more influential positions, with which came the ability to misuse their influence (without significant consequences). Therefore, the most prevalent sentiment in rural (and urban) communities was a sense of injustice and insecurity resulting from social inequality, rather than national differences.

I analyze immediate responses in the press to these events and the documented court hearings. Paying close attention to court hearings enables me to place violent events within a longer period (the court hearings took place more than half a year after the events themselves). This unveils the complex interactions between the accused and the authorities in the process of the investigation and court procedures, and restores multiple interpretations of the events. I emphasize the different roles the clergy played in those events: the ‘hated priest’ and the ‘pacifying priest’. In addition, by comparing cases from the end of the nineteenth century (1897) and the first decade of the twentieth century (1907-1908), I demonstrate how the role of the priests was transformed and even

⁴³² “Vandalism, name-calling, stone throwing, and brawling had long-established traditions in rural Europe but the attachment of nationalist significance to such events around the turn of the century was a relatively new phenomenon”. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 179.

⁴³³ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 179.

⁴³⁴ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 200.

⁴³⁵ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 178.

marginalized because of the successes of nation-building projects and the growing role of national activists in the villages.

As the events unfolded, it was not very clear what precisely was occurring: the official reports told one story, the witnesses told another, and each side blamed the other. I aim to analyze the role of violence in Galician society and its interpretation as well as further exploitation for ideological, political, and national purposes. My core argument is that interpretations of violent events were more important than the violence itself and furthermore that these interpretations had altered significantly over the course of a decade of election experience (1897-1908). No longer was public discussion focused on the unfair and oppressed position of the lower classes; instead, it had shifted to perceiving discrimination against one's national group.

The first mass elections in 1897 and local violent clashes

The election in 1897 was the first one in which the vast majority of peasants could participate (because of the curial election system). During this parliamentary election, in comparison to the ones following in 1907-8, there were significantly more trials of priests. One of the possible explanations for this high number was the popularity and success of the Roman Catholic priest Stojalowski during the 1895 elections to the local Diet. The other explanation for the particular attention paid to priests' activity was the fact that priests still exerted significant influence on the laity: there were not enough secular agitators and activists to take over the role of enlightening and agitating the peasantry.

Over the course of ten years, as the 1907-1908 case study demonstrates, the bond between priests and laity had changed and thus depended on good relations between priest and peasants. By 1907-8, the local authorities no longer viewed the clergy as a threat. By this point, political parties and nationalist activists presented, in the eyes of the authorities, a far greater danger. In 1897, the political forces of the province were still in a rudimentary state.

Several court trials against Greek Catholic priests took place after 1897. The priest Ivan Koliankovskiy was accused of spreading false and disturbing ideas; more precisely, he had allegedly threatened "to tear off the ears of the peasants who vote for the landowners".⁴³⁶ In his defense, the priest argued that he was only preaching peace and was helping peasants during the elections. He considered his help essential, as

⁴³⁶ "Povyborchjy Proces o Paragrafi 308" [Court trial after elections according to paragraph 308], *Dilo*, April 20, 1897.

previously elections were conducted contrary to the electoral law and without being properly announced in advance. Witnesses and Koliankovskiy's lawyer proved the priest's innocence.⁴³⁷ Another priest, Andriy Sumyk, was blamed for inciting violence against the local policeman Petro Vojevodka, and also for inappropriate behavior during liturgy. The report against him claimed that the priest had criticized the local authorities' behavior during the election.⁴³⁸ The priest was accused of shaming a policeman during liturgy, which resulted in people mocking the policeman. In response, the policeman pushed over a banner; the priest asked him to leave after this, but he refused. The parishioners themselves removed the policeman from the church. For this, the priest was accused of public violence. Later, during the investigation, it was revealed that the policeman had not announced the date of the coming election, which irritated the priest and laity. The priest was declared innocent, as his behavior during the liturgy did not fall under the secular authorities' jurisdiction.⁴³⁹ At this point, state authorities did not want to enter into the sacral domain, especially because the conflict with the policemen did not seem worth the trouble and had not threatened peace in the village.

These two examples revealed that priests took active part in agitation and the election process itself and that the local authorities were carefully observing the possibility of violent ideas or clashes that might result from a priest's agitation. The accusation of inspiring violent behavior or actually committing it was a serious charge that almost immediately led to arrest. In the case of Koliankovskiy, the violence was only verbal, but it was directed against the landowners and thus threatened the social order. In the other case, the priest Sumyk was accused of attacking the gendarme because the latter was violating the election process. Thus, the two priests were in some way protecting their laity against the injustices of the local authorities, while also the laity refused to testify against their priests.

The next two priests were brought to court over accusations of causing rebellion and spreading hatred. The priest Jeronim Barysh was charged with rebellion: according to some witnesses, he had encouraged his parishioners to attack the gendarmes and had asked them to pray for the peasants imprisoned after the election. According to other witnesses, the mayor, Vynnychuk, was the one who had made accusations against Barysh because the latter had instructed the peasants on how to vote, which might have prevented Vynnychuk from being elected as a deputy. The trial found that there was no

⁴³⁷ "Povyborchij Proces o Paragrafi 308"

⁴³⁸ "Proces o Andrija Sumyka" [The trial of the priest Andriy Sumyk], *Dilo*, August 25, 1897.

⁴³⁹ "Proces o Andrija Sumyka."

proof for such accusations.⁴⁴⁰ So Barysh, like his colleagues, was very concerned about the election results and was eager to use all his resources to resist possible injustices connected to the election process. It is worth mentioning that there were plenty examples from the past that characterized elections in Galicia as unfair, involving as they did the misuse of power by the authorities and corruption: thus the priests aimed to minimize the potential reoccurrence of such problems.⁴⁴¹

Another priest, Alexander Rotka, was accused of fomenting hatred towards Poles and agitating for Ruthenian candidates.⁴⁴² The local teacher (who was probably the person who reported Rotka to the authorities) emphasized that Rotka's behavior had made him so indignant that he had wanted to leave the church and encourage his pupils to do the same, but then he had changed his mind in order not to cause a scene. During the trial, the priest contended that he was not speaking against Poles or landowners, just against drinking, and that his precise words were: "vodka is the lords' dishwater".⁴⁴³ His intention, he said, was to make the peasants hate vodka and understand the importance of electing abstinent and honest deputies. The investigation also proved that the pupils had attended the church with their relatives, not with their teacher. In the end, the priest was found innocent.⁴⁴⁴

Village authorities normally composed the formal accusation against the priests and took care to provide witnesses to support that accusation in court. After the court trials, all of these priests were pronounced innocent, mainly because there was no evidence that they had broken the law in any way. Certainly, the witnesses did not provide enough evidence against the priests. Some witnesses even behaved so poorly that they were banished from the courtroom. One of the peasants appeared in informal clothing with tousled hair: "he looked like a scarecrow from the field, and it was not God's words that came out of his mouth" (apparently he was swearing a lot).⁴⁴⁵ In the end, all the trials were very similar and gave the impression of a constructed drama based on elaborate interpretations of the priests' words and behavior.

The significant aspect of this drama was its meaning and function. Above all, it demonstrates priests' importance in their villages and the significance of their role during

⁴⁴⁰ "Proces o. Jeronima Barysha" [The trial of the priest Jeronim Barysh], *Dilo*, July 2, 1897.

⁴⁴¹ Pieter Judson has emphasized that the newly enfranchised peasants "treated the hard-fought right to vote as critical to their lives." This was especially true for Galicia, where Ruthenians and Jews had less representatives than Polish peasants. Judson also adds on the huge role of the way that elections were held: the "crownland of Galicia generally had a reputation for corruption at the time." Judson, *Guardians of the nation*, 12.

⁴⁴² "Proces o. Aleksandra Rotka" [The trial of the priest Aleksandr Rotko], *Dilo*, September 6, 1897.

⁴⁴³ "Proces o. Aleksandra Rotka."

⁴⁴⁴ "Proces o. Aleksandra Rotka."

⁴⁴⁵ "Proces o. Jeronima Barysha."

elections. In all court cases, accusations against the priests came from local authorities, especially those whom the priests had criticized for their dishonest behavior during elections. Very often, local leaders simultaneously served as representatives of the authorities and were interested in being elected or promoting certain candidates.

The priests criticized dishonest behavior and fraud: in revenge, local leaders brought accusations against the clergy in order to discredit the priests in the eyes of the laity. In Zhydachiv district, the faithful wrote an appeal to the archbishop asking for his help to stop the persecution of priests.⁴⁴⁶ The parishioners claimed that priests were being arrested without sufficient cause: “imperial officials are undermining respect for the clergy in order to ruin their influence over the people. They [clergy] were treated like criminals and accompanied by gendarmes.”⁴⁴⁷ The peasants emphasized that all orders to arrest priests came from the starosta. The only reason for such treatment, the authors of the appeal maintained, was that the priests were chosen to be electors/voters (those who voted directly for deputies), while the mayor had a different elector in mind. According to the curial system, the voters elected electors and then electors voted for deputies. Therefore the clergy involved in the curial system could exercise influence but might also endure misfortune from political maneuvering.

The accusations against and persecution of priests revealed the tensions and struggles between representatives of local power and the clergy for the support of peasants. The priests were protectors and teachers of the peasantry when it came to this new phenomenon of elections. The local authorities strove to retain – and preferably strengthen – their access to the higher powers and thus used all the resources available to achieve that goal. One such resource was the possibility to employ gendarmes, another to compile fake accusations. It is noteworthy that in the cases mentioned here, the priests were proved innocent and there were no further investigations into their behavior, whereas in chapter four, the priests were long-term subjects of observation and investigation, and their fate was not always so kind.

A more precise look at the sentenced priests can be found in chapter 4, as the cases in this chapter are too short to understand the complexity of mass mobilization in the village. However, these cases are extremely important because they were directly linked to the election process and demonstrate that there were many actors (local authorities, teachers, landowners) involved simultaneously. For these actors, the priests’

⁴⁴⁶ “Memorial zhydachivs'kogo povitu do kardynala mytropolyta” [The appeal of Zhudachiv district to the Cardinal and Archbishop], *Dilo*, April 3, 1897.

⁴⁴⁷ “Memorial zhydachivs'kogo povitu do kardynala mytropolyta.”

desire to instruct the peasants to make a specific electoral choice was considered dangerous, which led them to attempt to defeat the priests by bringing them to court or causing their arrests. Furthermore, these cases demonstrate that priests were considered highly influential; this influence could be exercised mainly through the liturgy, preaching, and raising important public issues. At election time, the liturgy could serve as a great mobilizing tool because gatherings in the church could serve as a public space (as most of the village public was there) and provided a prime opportunity to discuss various issues raised by the priest after the religious service was concluded.

In 1897, it was not clear whether priests belonged to or sympathized with any particular political party. It was not clear whether there was a nationalist background for the conflicts between priests and the local authorities. Therefore, the struggle between priests and official authorities can be attributed to social causes. However, over time, as is demonstrated below in the cases from 1907, the national and political identities of the clergy became very important and thus were always emphasized. Such small details make evident the transformation that happened within ten years of political and social life in Galicia.

These events also demonstrate the connection between the activity of Greek Catholic priests and their Roman Catholic counterparts. As is clear from chapter three, the Roman Catholic priest Stojalowski was very successful in mobilizing peasants in Western Galicia. Certainly, his activity was widely known in Eastern Galicia as well. Therefore, Stojalowski's success challenged and undermined the existing social hierarchy, demonstrating that peasants had more power and influence than they realized. This approach was decidedly threatening to those who already had power (local authorities, landowners), and thus inspired them to prevent a possible strengthening of the peasantry in the province.

The killing of an elective commissar in the village of Dawidów

The tensions between the peasants and local authorities tended to worsen. During the election in the village of Dawidów, near Lemberg, on 13 March 1897, a frustrated crowd, which suspected the elective commissar and some other members of the election committee of fraud and falsifying the election, began to attack the elective commissar Stanislav Popel. While Popel was trying to escape, he shot one of the attacking peasants in order to defend himself. This made the crowd more violent; the peasants caught Popel and beat him to death. There were only two gendarmes in the village, so they could not

cope with the crowd.⁴⁴⁸ As Dawidów was known as a very calm and homogenous village, with around 1,300 inhabitants (mainly Polish and Roman Catholics),⁴⁴⁹ no one had foreseen any possible aggression towards the officials there.⁴⁵⁰

The skirmish in Dawidów was noteworthy for several reasons. First, it was the peasants who initiated the aggression and killed a local official (this had never happened before, nor did it occur again). Secondly, as Dawidów was close to Lemberg, the events made an impact on the provincial capital. The workers of Lemberg and the peasants of Dawidów supported the same candidate during the election. When the gendarmes delivered the accused peasants to Lemberg after the event, it provoked violence and disturbances in the city (attacks on the gendarmes, throwing stones, demolishing windows in the courthouse, etc.).⁴⁵¹ It is hard to determine whether this reaction in the city was fueled by sympathy for the peasants or if it was instead a way to rebel against the gendarmes and the army. Finally, the Dawidów case was significant because the priest was also involved as an active participant; in this case, as in other examples from 1897, he was in conflict with local authorities.

The violent event in Dawidów was one of the first to initiate an election-related court trial. It also revealed the gap in relations between peasants and the local authorities, emphasizing that this gap was not due to nationality (at least at the end of the nineteenth century). This event became part of the public discussion and raised a number of issues that remained important for society. It demonstrated that tensions between authorities and peasants were intense and were rooted in social differences. That is to say, even in the absence of national agitation, there were sufficient grounds in terms of social deprivation for violent clashes.

There were 29 peasants accused in the Dawidów killing, of whom 24 were sentenced to prison (with sentences ranging from five years to two months).⁴⁵² Almost half of them were Greek Catholic and supposedly identified as Ruthenian; however, the village was considered to be Polish, probably because the village land was owned by a Dominican monastery and the majority of the inhabitants were Polish. It is also likely that the Ruthenians did not have a clear national identity, and thus both Polish and Ruthenian activists recognized the village as a Polish sphere of influence.

⁴⁴⁸ "Krovavi podii' v Davydovi i rozruhy u L'vovi" [Bloody events in Dawidów and the violence in Lemberg], *Dilo*, March 13, 1897.

⁴⁴⁹ *Skorowidz wszystkich miejscowości*, 32. Last modified May 18, 2014.

<http://www.mtg-malopolska.org.pl/images/skany/skorowidz1918dju/skorowidz1918.dju>

⁴⁵⁰ "Rozruchy v Dawidowie" [The violence in Dawidów], *Czas*, March 13, 1897.

⁴⁵¹ "Krovavi podii' v Davydovi i rozruhy u L'vovi."

⁴⁵² "Rozruchy v Dawidowie" [The violence in Dawidów], *Czas*, June 11, 1897.

Most of the information about village dynamics came from upper-class villagers, as they were called as witnesses at the trial. One witness, a member of the election committee, testified that the peasants started to show interest in the election only after a candidate named Kozakevitch visited the village: this future deputy sparked the peasants' desire to participate in the election.⁴⁵³ The impact, effectiveness, and consequences of election campaigning are important markers for understanding conflicts and transformations in rural communities.

The relations between the local priest and starosta also had a lot of influence on the behavior of the peasants. The Roman Catholic priest in Dawidów, Fialkowsky, had a specific reputation in the village. On the one hand, the peasants had elected the priest as the elector, which was a demonstration of trust. However, a local blacksmith claimed that the peasants were dissatisfied with Fialkowsky as an elector because the priest demanded high prices for performing rituals: "one needed to sell a cow in order to ask the priest for a funeral".⁴⁵⁴ There is no other evidence for tension between priest Fialkowsky and the peasants, but there was a clear conflict between the local starosta and the priest. Fialkowsky, who stated that the starosta was also a part of election injustice (causing delays during elections, compiling a falsified list of voters, and putting all the responsibility on the elective commissar Popel, the one who was killed).⁴⁵⁵ The starosta responded during the court trial that the priest had personal issues with him. Such tension between the starosta and the priest most likely affected the behavior of the laity: the priest cast suspicion on the local authorities and thus the peasants took actions into their hands and enacted their own form of justice on Popel.

The speeches made by the lawyers and the public prosecutor during the trial reflected the different interpretations of the event. The public prosecutor emphasized the negative consequences of political agitation in the village, especially from socialist agitators (most likely candidate Kozakevitch) who had provoked hatred towards the landowners. He stated: "it was unbelievable that the lowest class of peasants armed with sticks had attacked the elective commissar and the gendarmes. The elections were fair and Popel was behaving according to the law".⁴⁵⁶ These words reflect the indignation and fear of the authorities towards the peasantry: they saw peasantry as a threat to the local social hierarchy, not only in terms of politics but also security. In addition, the term used by the public prosecutor to refer to the peasantry applied specifically to the lowest

⁴⁵³ "Proces Davydovs'kyj" [The trial about Dawidów], *Dilo*, May 31, 1897.

⁴⁵⁴ "Proces Davydovs'kyj," *Dilo*, May 31, 1897.

⁴⁵⁵ "Proces Davydovs'kyj." *Dilo*, May 31, 1897.

⁴⁵⁶ "Proces Davydovs'kyj," *Dilo*, June 8, 1897.

strata of peasants (*chern*); this term could have an offensive meaning. This understanding of peasants, not as citizens but as a very low and aggressive part of society, indicated the elite's perception of what was happening in the village and how violent clashes became connected with the peasantry and their supposed brutality.

The lawyers emphasized, in the contrast to the prosecutor, the negative influence of electoral fraud on the peasants. The first lawyer called attention to the complex dynamics in the village: the hostility between the priest and the starosta, the lack of leadership for the peasants, and the success of socialist agitation. He named these factors as the reasons for such a tragic death. The other lawyer spoke about the importance of justice among peasants and the desire to protect their votes.⁴⁵⁷ The other interesting aspect of the defense's argument was their appeal to crowd psychology and its influence on individuals' actions. The two lawyers underlined in their defense speeches that the crowd changed the psychology of people and made them behave differently. One of the lawyers asked the doctor present at the trial about a recently discovered 'crowd disease'. The doctor confirmed the existence of this disease, calling it a 'contagion' which enveloped the crowd and forced it to finish what it had started (in this case, catching and killing the elective commissar).⁴⁵⁸ The lawyer expressed similar ideas during Koropiec's court trial (analyzed below). He applied the ideas of the psychiatrist Kraft Ebing and his concept of 'paranoia politica' (obsession with politics) in order to explain the actions of the peasants during elections as a cause of mass unrest.⁴⁵⁹

Apparently, such psychological explanations aimed to make the guilt of the peasants less serious and blame everything on the effect of the crowd. Simultaneously, such an attitude towards the behavior of the crowd (as a danger and disease) is a significant element for attaining a historical understanding of the occurrences in 1907-8, when even a small crowd was sufficient reason to employ the harshest methods (shooting peasants). Associating a crowd with paranoia gave it an irrational and negative connotation and thus activated suspicions and fears.

Between universal male suffrage and the curial system: the elections in 1907 and 1908

⁴⁵⁷ "Proces Davydovs'kyj" [The trial about Dawidów], *Dilo*, June 8, 1897, June 9, 1897.

⁴⁵⁸ "Proces Davydovs'kyj," *Dilo*, June 5, 1897.

⁴⁵⁹ "Koropiec'ki podii' pered sudom" [The events in Koropiec in the trial], *Dilo*, October 23, 1908.

Horucko was a village of more than 2,000 inhabitants around 80 km from Lemberg⁴⁶⁰ where the vast majority of the population was Ruthenian.⁴⁶¹ Here, on 24 May 1907, six peasants were killed and more than ten injured because of clashes with gendarmes. The event in Horucko (today Hirske) can be analyzed on various levels: as national and social struggles (between Polish authorities and Ruthenian peasants) or an intra-Ruthenian conflict (a dispute over the election of a Russophile or Ukrainian candidate). It also highlighted the gendarmes' disdainful attitude towards the peasantry.

The most interesting aspects of this case relate to the conflicting political views of two Greek Catholic priests – one Russophile, the other Ukrainianophile. As mentioned above, active political engagement in mutually exclusive ideologies could lead to confrontation, either amongst the clergy or between the laity and clergy. In the case of Horucko, a large number (possibly the majority) of the villagers supported the election of the Russophile priest Vasyl Davydiak. The chairman of the election committee was the parish priest Feofil Skobelski, who was a Ukrainophile. Thus, the supporters of the Russophile priest suspected Skobelski of committing fraud in favor of the Ukrainian candidate.⁴⁶² The gossip and chaos surrounding this suspicion resulted in resistance from the peasants. It is not clear how dangerous this resistance was; according to local authorities, the gendarmes were forced to use their weapons, as the peasants were throwing stones and behaving aggressively. The peasants testified during the court trial that they had only shouted and were not throwing anything, while the gendarmes had shot at them without need.⁴⁶³

The Horucko event was widely discussed in the local press. The Russophile newspaper *Galychanyn* promoted a narrative that blamed the parish priest Skobelski, whose preference for a Ukrainian candidate in the village resulted in tensions between the priest and his faithful.⁴⁶⁴ The witnesses quoted by the newspaper had seen the priest committing fraud in order to support the Ukrainian candidate in this electoral district,

⁴⁶⁰ *Skorowidz wszystkich miejscowości z przysiółkami w Królestwie Galicyi, Wielkim Księstwie Krakowskim i Księstwie Bukowińskim* [Index of all villages with hamlets in the Kingdom of Galicia, the Grand Duchy of Krakow, and the Grand Duchy of Bukowina] (Lwów 1918), 77. Last modified May 18, 2014.

<http://www.mtg-malopolska.org.pl/images/skany/skorowidz1918djvu/skorowidz1918.djvu>

⁴⁶¹ *Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich* [Geographical Dictionary of Polish Kingdom and other Slavic countries], 5 vols., (Warszawa 1880-1914), vol. 4, 414. Last modified May 18, 2014.

http://dir.icm.edu.pl/pl/Słownik_geograficzny/Tom_IV/414

⁴⁶² “Dopys z krugiv duhovenstva: hto vynen” [Message from clergy circles: Who is to blame], *Dilo*, May 31, 1907.

⁴⁶³ “Dopys z krugiv duhovenstva: hto vynen.”

⁴⁶⁴ “Sobytaja v Horucko” [The event in Horucko], *Galychanin*, May 29, 1908.

thereby causing indignation among the peasants, who widely supported the Russophile candidate.⁴⁶⁵ The Ukrainophile newspaper *Dilo* blamed the local authorities, who were seen as Polish; *Dilo* claimed that over the years they had shown little respect for the peasants' lives and had not ensured a fair electoral procedure. In addition, the newspaper blamed the Russophiles for agitating against Ukrainian-oriented Ruthenians and for encouraging the peasants to suspect everyone, even their own priest, of being unfaithful: "the people were blinded and attacked their priest".⁴⁶⁶ The Polish Catholic newspaper *Glos Narodu* highlighted that the conflict was a local problem: "Why were the Poles blamed? The gendarmes were protecting a Ruthenian priest. This was a struggle between Ruthenians."⁴⁶⁷ *Glos Narodu* emphasized that the event in Horucko proved that "a situation could easily break out of control if the authorities do not react immediately."⁴⁶⁸ Similar rhetoric was typical for violent conflicts in other provinces of the Empire. American scholar Pieter Judson reveals in his research on the violent clashes in Bohemia that after the conflict "each side maneuvered to gain greater legitimacy for its political claims both in the eyes of its own public and with the imperial government."⁴⁶⁹ The situation was similar in Galicia, as newspapers were justifying the event in the eyes of their readers while deputies discussed it in parliament.

The Russophile priest Vasyl Davydiak, after he was elected as a deputy, gave a speech in parliament. In his opinion, the problem was not a conflict between priests or advocates of different political ideologies, but rather the behavior of the previous starosta, who had frequently committed fraud and was never punished.⁴⁷⁰ Davydiak stresses an alternative argument of what was occurring in this situation. He suggested that it was the local authorities were to blame for the clash and not the different political visions of the clergy.⁴⁷¹ It could have been combination of all these factors that caused tragic events in Horucko. Below, I elaborate on the trial to find more insights into the event.

Horucko became the focus of attention again with the trial of 66 peasants (among them 16 women, mainly the wives of the accused peasants). The trial started in October 1907, but was then postponed until February 1908, mainly because of the large number of defendants. The peasants were charged with provoking public violence (especially

⁴⁶⁵ "Sobytyja v Horucku."

⁴⁶⁶ "Dopys z krugiv duhovenstva: hto vynen."

⁴⁶⁷ "Krwawe zajscia w Horucku" [Bloody occurrence in Horucko], *Glos narodu*, May 28, 1907.

⁴⁶⁸ "Wyborcze "naduzycia"" [Election abuses], *Glos narodu*, June 15, 1907.

⁴⁶⁹ Judson, *Guardians of the nation*, 179.

⁴⁷⁰ "Horucko v svitli pravdy" [Horucko in the light of the truth], *Dilo*, July 15, 1907, July 16, 1907.

⁴⁷¹ "Horucko v svitli pravdy."

threatening to hurt/kill a priest) and with ignoring the officials' orders to disperse. The trial resulted in the conviction of 39 peasants, including two women. The convictions varied in degree and amounted to a number of months in prison.⁴⁷² 27 of the 39 peasants were set free.

During the trial, the accused peasants reported that they had behaved calmly and had not threatened anyone; they had not heard the gendarmes' order to disperse or the warning to stop shouting. What is noteworthy is that sixteen women were among the accused, including some who had been very active in the crowd. This means that elections and public activity were not exclusively male spheres. Women considered this domain important as well, despite not having a political voice at the ballot box. One woman, accused of threatening to hurt the Ukrainian priest, explained that she was innocent and that the sixteen witnesses who testified against her were scorned would-be lovers. The same woman, together with another, also faced accusations of offending the gendarmes.⁴⁷³

The election committee, including priest Skobelski, claimed that there was no fraud and that the elections were fair but that the crowd rebelled anyway. He testified that the crowd was rebellious because of propaganda.⁴⁷⁴ The commissar of the election committee (one of the few Poles involved in the trial; the other two were gendarmes) testified that the crowd became tense after the election results were announced. The peasants then supposedly started to call the priest a "fleecer" (*lupij*) and threatened to tear him to pieces. The other members of the election committee testified to the same effect. Most likely, the priest did not have good relations with his laity and thus could not control them at the moment of excitement.

The tense relationship between the priest and his congregation was obvious; however, it was not clear why the peasants did not like the priest, and whether, more precisely, it was a political or personal conflict. A peasant woman, one of those blamed for threatening to cut the priest into pieces and cook him for dinner, claimed that she was only calling the priest a "thief" and "potboiler" because he was stealing votes. The woman explained that people did not like the priest in general, as "he would beat and disgrace people during confession and called women 'slatterns'".⁴⁷⁵ Another accused peasant also denied that he had called for tearing the priest into pieces, but confirmed

⁴⁷² "Gorutskij process" [Horucko's trial], *Galychanin*, February 11, 1908.

⁴⁷³ "Gorutskij process" [Horucko's trial], *Galychanin*, October 31, 1907.

⁴⁷⁴ "Gorutskij process" [Horucko's trial], *Galychanin*, February 7, 1908.

⁴⁷⁵ "Gorutskij process" [Horucko's trial], *Galychanin*, October 31, 1907.

that he called him a “fleecer” because the priest declined to bury one of his relatives.⁴⁷⁶ These testimonies suggest that the priest had a conflict with at least some peasants; adding to this the suspicion in the unfair behavior of local administration, the laity decided to depend on their own strength.

The Russophile deputy Markov called the behavior of the priest into question in the Galician Diet. In his petition, Markov accused priest Skobelski of tactless and brutal behavior.⁴⁷⁷ The Greek Catholic Ordinariate responded to the petition, defending the priest. Bishop Chekhovych emphasized that if the priest had beaten someone, as the petition claimed, a complaint would have been filed, not only with the bishop but with the court as well. In addition, the bishop highlighted that there were no complaints against the priest in his current position or from his previous parishes, where the priest was viewed with sympathy and respect.⁴⁷⁸ Thus, the Russophiles’ attempt to make the priest’s political or social behavior the main cause for the peasants’ deaths failed. As in the cases in chapter four, the Ordinariate defended the priest against his accusers, assuming that the parishioners would have complained about their priest if he was actually misbehaving.

From the testimonies, it is difficult to conclude whether the disrespectful behavior of the priest during the elections in Horucko was what caused people to mistrust him, or whether it was the fact that he supported the Ukrainian candidate that made him a political enemy to some of his congregation. Most likely, a combination of these two factors (that he was both a bad priest and a bad member of the election committee) provoked this dissatisfaction and the threats of aggression towards him. As the second case of violence demonstrates, political differences by themselves were not sufficient to incite the faithful against their priest.

The trial did not particularly help in understanding who was actually guilty. The court did not question the behavior of the priest or that of the gendarmes and the head of the elective committee (Polish commissar Shyshka). Nevertheless, the court hearings do give important information about the life of the peasant community, namely the importance of political preferences (the struggle in the village was between two Ruthenians), the desire to resist fraud, and challenging the authority of the priest. The feeling of injustice was intensified during elections because, on the one hand, agitators emphasized the injustice faced by the peasantry in order to mobilize them for active

⁴⁷⁶ “Gorutskij process” [Horucko’s trial], *Galychanin*, October 30, 1907.

⁴⁷⁷ *Materials on the case of a priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2507.

⁴⁷⁸ *Materials on the case of a priest Michael Bachynskyj*, sprava 2507.

participation in the elections while, on the other, the same agitators strove to raise peasants' awareness of the possibility of fraud, because fraud would decrease the candidate's chances of being elected.

The killing of the election activist in the village of Koropiec

Koropiec was a village of more than 800 inhabitants (the vast majority being Ruthenians), where the land belonged to the famous Polish Badeni family.⁴⁷⁹ There, on 8 February 1908 (the day before the Horucko peasants' sentences were announced), gendarmes killed a peasant. A crowd of peasants worried about fair election lists gathered in the center of the village and refused to disperse at the request of gendarmes: then one of gendarmes killed the peasant Kaganets.⁴⁸⁰ In the case of the violence in Koropiec, the parish priest Ivan Proskurnytskij also had different political preferences than the majority of laity. However, the role he played in the event was very distinct. The priest tried to calm the peasants and warned the victim to be more cautious in dealing with the gendarmes. It is also possible that because of the calm behavior of the priest, there was only one victim in the clashes.

The event in Koropiec had a long-lasting impact. According to some newspapers, the Ukrainian student Sichynski, right before killing the Vice-governor of Galicia Andrzej Potocki, claimed: "This is for our [Ruthenian] injustice, for the elections, for the death of Kaganets".⁴⁸¹ During his trial, Sichynski cited the injustice committed against Ruthenian peasants as one of the reasons why he decided to kill the governor (the other was injustice towards Ruthenian students at the university in Lemberg).⁴⁸² I elaborate on the assassination of the governor below in the part especially focused on this case.

In general, the killing of the peasant Marko Kaganets received a lot of attention in various Ruthenian press reports. This event was presented as a noble act of sacrifice for justice and the good of others. The newspaper *Osnova* wrote: "Let us all be like Kaganets, with clean hands and with God in our hearts, and there will not be enough bayonets for all of us" ("us" meaning all politically-active Ruthenians).⁴⁸³ *Osnova's*

⁴⁷⁹ *Skorowidz wszystkich miejscowości*, 77. Last modified May 18, 2014.

<http://www.mtg-malopolska.org.pl/images/skany/skorowidz1918djvu/skorowidz1918.djvu>

In 1895-1897, Kazimierz Badeni was a prime minister of the empire: before that, in 1888-1895, he had been a governor of Galicia. During the elections of 1908, the candidate for the deputyship in Koropiec was his close relative Henryk Badeni.

⁴⁸⁰ "Protse iz-za krest'yanyna Kagantsa v Koroptse" [The process because of the peasant Kaganets from Koropiec], *Galychanin*, October 4, 1908.

⁴⁸¹ "Myroslav Sichyns'kyj pered sudom" [Miroslav Sichynsky at the trial], *Dilo*, July 1, 1908.

⁴⁸² "Ubytje namisnyka gr.Potoc'kogo" [The killing of the governor Count Potocky], *Osnova*, April 17, 1908.

⁴⁸³ "Pochalysja 'Galyc'ki vybory'" [The Galician elections have started], *Osnova*, February 12, 1908.

rhetoric was very important as it brought together ideas of justice, nation, and faith (“with God in our hearts”) into one narrative and presented such qualities as necessary characteristics of a national hero.

The role played by the priest in this event was completely different than in the Horucko case, even though he was a representative of the Russophiles when the village was very Ukrainian-oriented. The priest, Ivan Proskurnytskij, took an active part in pacifying the crowd, managed to give the last rites to the dying Kaganets,⁴⁸⁴ and participated in his funeral.⁴⁸⁵ He never emphasized his political preferences and testified during the trial⁴⁸⁶ that the killing could have been avoided if there had been a higher level of tolerance and less chauvinism among the participants. Also, the priest mentioned that he was trying to protect Kaganets by telling him to be more careful with the gendarmes because he knew that they hated Kaganets.⁴⁸⁷ This example reveals that the relationship between priest and community could play different roles in village conflicts: in some cases that relationship limited the conflict while in others it aggravated the issue.

Another important point was that the ability of the priests to manage their political and social functions successfully in the village depended partly on whether the priest managed to build a trusting and respectful relationship with his laity. The examples of violence listed above demonstrated the importance of the social role of the priest as a representative of the peasants. In the case of Horucko, the priest was assumed to be associated with the unfair electoral process and the unjust local administration; this impression was intensified because he had not taken the side of the peasants when the conflict started. In the case of Koropiec, the priest avoided strong involvement in politics and did his best to prevent further clashes by trying to calm the peasants. Proskurnytskij is an example of a priest who, through the combination of secular and religious involvement, managed to minimize conflict and tension in his parish.

The attention given to Kaganets’s death continued after the trial. With money collected from peasants and Ukrainian activists, a cross was erected on his grave. The inscription read: “Here rests Marko Kaganets, born 12 January 1881 and died 6 February 1908 from gendarmes’ bayonets in defense of national rights...Let the native land,

⁴⁸⁴ “Koropiec'ki podii' pered sudom” [The events in Koropiec in the trial], *Dilo*, October 21, 1908.

⁴⁸⁵ “Koropiec'ki podii' pered sudom” [The events in Koropiec in the trial], *Dilo*, February 19, 1908.

⁴⁸⁶ The court trial for the case of Kaganets took place in October 1908. 31 peasants were accused of threatening the gendarmes, among them two women: the sister and the wife of Kaganets. The sentences were quite mild in this case: from two months to 2-3 days of prison, while 18 of the accused were set free. “Koropiec'ki podii' pered sudom” [The events in Koropiec in the trial], *Dilo*, October 22, 1908.

⁴⁸⁷ “Koropiec'ki podii' pered sudom” [The events in Koropiec in the trial], *Dilo*, October 21, 1908.

watered with the innocent blood of a national martyr, be soft for him.”⁴⁸⁸ According to the Ukrainian scholar Olena Arkusha, this inscription was discussed by the governor and the local authorities because it mentioned “gendarmes’ bayonets”, thus raising the possibility of newly heightened tensions. Finally, in 1911, the local starosta convinced the governor not to destroy the inscription in order to avoid attracting attention to the event.⁴⁸⁹ This means that the death of Kaganets was already a very important national symbol and the manipulation with the inscription could have been an extra mobilizing stimulus.

Conclusion on the violence in the villages

This violence took place only in the eastern part of the province, in the territory where both nations were represented, the majority being Ruthenian. A close examination of the events does not reveal a clear national division as a backdrop to the events. The most evident reasons for antagonism between the sides involved in each conflict can be traced back to conflicts between social roles. As the two case studies above demonstrated, the most intense and tragic clash was between gendarmes and peasants. Nevertheless, these social conflicts were not the only causes that led to deaths. The other important factors were relations between different actors in the village, previous experiences with local authorities, the political preferences of the participants in the conflict, and the behavior of the clergy. In one case, the active role played by the priest intensified the conflict; in the other, it minimized the conflict.

The way violent events were interpreted had a strong impact on relations in Galicia. Each side directly or indirectly involved had its own version of the events, and they were framed accordingly. Ruthenian deputies used the violent events in order to attract attention in parliament to inequality in the province and to demonstrate the abuse of power by the Polish administration. The deputies demanded Vienna’s direct involvement to better enforce Austrian law. Ukrainian nationalists used the same events to increase mobilization of the masses and to emphasize how a national program would

⁴⁸⁸ *Lystuvannya Halyts'koho namisnytstva z Ministerstvom vnutrishnikh sprav, yshchoyu derzhavnoyu prokuratoriyeyu i Buchats'kym starostvom pro znyshchennya napysu na pam'yatnyku M. Kahantsyu, lystopad 1909 – berezen' 1911* [Correspondence of the Galician Vice-regency with the Ministry of the Interior, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the Buchach Starostvo about the destruction of the inscription on the monument to M. Kaganets, November 1909 - March 1911]. TsDIAL: Fond 146, opys 4, sprava 5057.

⁴⁸⁹ Olena Arkusha, “Andzhei Pototskyi: Biohrafiiia Polityka na Tli Ukrainsko-Polskykh Vidnosyn. Chastyna II: Halytskyi Namisnyk” [Andrzej Potocki: the biography of the politician in the context of Ukrainian-Polish relations. Part II: The Galician governor], *Visnyk LNY* 45, (2010): 246-247. Last modified August 26, 2013.

http://clio.lnu.edu.ua/Vipusk_45_files/45_169-282.pdf

help prevent such conflicts and guarantee a better life. In addition, the national activists started to create a very effective cult of national martyrs that may have increased mobilization and gave intense, even sacred, meaning to the importance of the nation. The opponents of these Ukrainian activists (mostly Russophiles) emphasized the danger of a national program because this would introduce hostility into village communities. Polish activists and representatives of the local authorities used these events to stress the effectiveness of the local administration in preventing the further escalation of conflicts and to demonstrate the violence of Ruthenian political movements. In conclusion, the violent events reveal the perceived polarization of national identities and thus highlighted how complex the involvement of the clergy and churches was.

Conclusions

Tracing events from 1897 to the beginning of the twentieth century reveals the changing role of priests in the villages. A decade later, the importance of priests became less evident and was much more dependent on the relationship the clergy managed to build with the faithful. While in 1897 the faithful attempted to protect their clergy against gendarmes and the local administration, in 1907 some of the laity (in the case of Horucko) were ready to physically attack their own priest. In addition, comparing trials demonstrates that the clergy was under more pressure from local authorities in 1897, while later there were no important trials concerning the actions of priests.

On the other hand, this comparison of trials reveals that political preferences and the successes of the mass mobilization of believers were very important challenges for the priests. If in 1897 the clergy only had to concern themselves with mobilizing the peasantry for participation in elections, in 1907-1908 they had to manage the political preferences of their parishioners and to adapt their own political views in keeping with their role as a representative of the churches. Relations between the clergy and laity were heavily influenced by nationalist and other political agitators, who not only actively promoted their political programs in the village but also taught the peasantry to be critical, even towards their pastors. This new situation was more demanding for the priest and forced them to be compliant (as in the case of Koropiec, where the priest played a pacifying role in the conflict).

Within a decade, social circumstances had changed as well. The emphasis in interpreting violent events had shifted significantly, from the unfair position of the peasants in society in 1897 to the unfair position of the national group in 1907-08. This longer perspective also demonstrates the progress of agitation and mass mobilization and the growing significance of political identity. A further stage in the interpretation of

violence and the role of the churches in society was provoked by the assassination of the governor of the province in 1908.

Violence in the city: the assassination of the governor in 1908

The displays of violence in connection with parliamentary and local diet elections manifested themselves in urban space as well. The most notable example of urban violence was the assassination of the provincial governor in 1908. This event demonstrated continuity with the previous examples of violence and the buildup of tensions within Galician society. As a result, a new challenge was posed to the Roman and Greek Catholic churches of the province for several reasons. They felt the need to maintain influence over the faithful, especially because Polish and Ruthenian nationalists interpreted the killing as the peak of antagonism between them, and to integrate popular patriotic ideas with Catholic values.

The Greek Catholic Church found it more complicated because the assassin was himself a Greek Catholic (his father was a Greek Catholic priest and a deputy to the Galician Diet) and considered himself a Ukrainian socialist.⁴⁹⁰ It seemed to some that the Catholic Church's nightmare had become reality because now the socialist threat was no longer purely theoretical. At the same time, this threat had a strong nationalistic component, as the killing was done in the name of the Ruthenian nation.⁴⁹¹ The Greek Catholic Church had to react clearly and quickly in order not to be suspected of sympathizing with the killer because of his nationality and religion, and thereby not to worsen relations with local and central authorities. However, it also needed to balance this with maintaining its influence among the laity, who could celebrate the killing as an act of justice.

The background for the Greek Catholic Church's actions was complicated by national activists (those who published articles in *Dilo* with anti-Polish messages) and previous experiences of violence and injustice. From the perspective of the assassin/murderer, the assassination was a natural solution that, at least, emphasized the unjust balance of power between the self-willed, autonomous administration (mainly comprised of the gentry) and Ruthenians, who were already mobilized and aware of their unequal position (mainly nationalistic peasants and students). From the perspective of activists in the Polish and Ruthenian national movements, the assassination

⁴⁹⁰ "Myroslav Sichyns'kyy pered sudom" [Miroslav Sichinsky in the court], *Dilo*, June 30, 1908.

⁴⁹¹ "Myroslav Sichyns'kyy pered sudom."

demonstrated a national division in the Galician population and thus resulted in a need to defend their own national interests. On the one hand, the Polish press exaggerated the danger of the Ukrainophile movement as rebellious, violent, and dissatisfied with the numerous changes made during the last decade. On the other, the Ukrainian press emphasized the unequal governing practices in Galicia and the resulting Polish domination in the province.

The most significant aspect of the event was the fact that it affected the whole province. The previous violent clashes with gendarmes during elections were rather local, focused mainly in Eastern Galicia. However, the killing of an Austrian official close to the emperor influenced not only Galicia, but Vienna as well. The killing was an unexpected culmination to the existing tensions and it significantly influenced relations in the province. Even nationally-oriented newspapers, while blaming the other nationality for injustice and violence, suggested that “the blood of the governor would bring peace to the two fraternal nationalities”.⁴⁹²

I do not closely analyze the national rhetoric surrounding this event for a number of reasons, above all because I view it as only one of the dominant tensions that existed in Galicia. The assassination certainly served to divide the population in Galicia and create a stronger sense of national belonging, at least for a while, but within time this effect wore off. I am more interested in examining the web of different mutually reinforcing tensions in Galician society. Using this approach, I emphasize the complexity of the issues (such as the clash between national and religious values) that both churches of the region dealt with, especially when the laity of the Roman Catholic Church participated in services for the murdered governor while some lay people of the Greek Catholic rite considered praying for clemency to be shown to the assassin.⁴⁹³

The assassination on Palm Sunday 1908

On the fatal day (12 April 1908), a Ruthenian student, Mirosław Sichynski, entered the room of the Polish Galician Governor Andrzej Potocki at the Landesgubernium and immediately fired three shots.⁴⁹⁴ When Sichynski left the room after committing the crime, he told the Ruthenian peasants still waiting for an audience with the governor: “This is for our [Ruthenian] injustice, for the elections, for the death of Kaganets”.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹² “Na smert!” [For death!], *Dilo*, July 1, 1908.

⁴⁹³ “Na smert!”

⁴⁹⁴ Arkusha, “Andzhei Pototskyi: Biohrafiiia,” 257.

⁴⁹⁵ “Myrosław Sichyns'kyy pered sudom” [Mirosław Sichynski in the court], *Dilo*, July 1, 1908.

After being shot, Potocki was still alive for approximately two hours. During this time, he managed to say farewell to his wife and children, confess and accept Holy Communion, and asked to telegraph the emperor that he was his faithful servant and would die at his post. Meanwhile Sichynski was taken to the police office and the investigation started. The police suspected that this action was organized by some group or organization, and members of his family and friends were arrested. The police looked for evidence in the offices of Ukrainian organizations. Eventually, the police investigation concluded that he must have acted alone and all who had been arrested were set free.⁴⁹⁶

Lemberg was shocked by the crime. All at once, the usual activities stopped, while newspapers (framed in black) spread the news and sought explanations for the murder. At the same time, officials telegraphed Vienna; the police searched for possible accomplices, suspecting a plot; and local youth took justice into their own hands.⁴⁹⁷

It is difficult to reconstruct precisely the events of the following few days. The Ukrainian newspaper *Dilo* reported that Polish youths started to organize demonstrations and threw stones at Ukrainian national organizations and activists.⁴⁹⁸ The Polish press preferred to marginalize these events by describing them as typical behavior of young gangs and to refuse to connect the Polish position with some street hooligans who threw stones through windows.⁴⁹⁹ According to an article in the conservative Polish newspaper *Czas*, the police dispersed these demonstrations and protected the buildings from future invasions.⁵⁰⁰ At the same time, *Dilo* described another reality, writing that the ‘stone demonstrations’ continued for several days and caused substantial damage to Ukrainian property; they claimed that the police only showed up during the very last moments and did not arrest anyone. One of the targets of the Polish protests was the Greek Catholic seminary and the dormitory of the seminarians. In the seminary building, some stones thrown by the protesters reached the room where the Greek Catholic bishops had gathered for the funeral.⁵⁰¹

The funeral became a mass event, with thousands of Polish participants from three empires (Russian, Austrian and Prussian) and representatives of the central powers, as well as the bishops of both Catholic churches. All the representatives of the local

⁴⁹⁶ Arkusha, “Andzhei Pototskyi: Biohrafia,” 257.

⁴⁹⁷ “Pogromy Rysuniv u Lvovi” [Pogroms of Ruthenians in Lviv], *Dilo*, April 14, 1908.

⁴⁹⁸ “Pogromy Rysuniv u Lvovi.”

⁴⁹⁹ “Demonstracye we Lwowie” [Demonstrations in Lviv], *Czas*, April 14, 1908.

⁵⁰⁰ “Demonstracye we Lwowie.”

⁵⁰¹ “Pogromy Rysuniv u Lvovi.”

Polish elite and authorities attended the funeral as well.⁵⁰² Thus, the funeral served as a unifying event for the Poles. However, the emperor himself was not present. The Ukrainian historian Olena Arkusha argues that the absence of the emperor and his heir at the funeral demonstrates that Vienna was trying to remain as neutral as possible in this situation.⁵⁰³

The symbolic value of the murdered and the murderer played a large role in mobilizing society. Their personalities were, to some extent, a reinforcing symbol of the tensions that existed in the society at that time: the social tension of gentry vs. peasants, the national tension of Polish activists vs. Ukrainophile activists, and the religious tension of Catholics vs. non-believers/socialists.

Andrzej Potocki, the governor of Galicia since 1903, was a member of a conservative, traditional aristocratic family that, from an economic perspective, was very influential in the province. Potocki, as a representative of the nobility and landowners in the minds of the Ruthenians in the province, was not only a symbol of the current inequity but also of previous injustices, like serfdom and the exploitation of the peasantry by the gentry. As the previous case studies have demonstrated, at the turn of the century, under the influence of national movements, tensions between gentry and peasants were evolving into tensions between two nationalities.

Mirosław Sichynsky was a young national activist and a student of philosophy. His family was always active in political life. His father was a Greek Catholic priest and a deputy to the Galician Diet, but he died when Sichynsky was a child. Sichynsky himself became an activist in the villages: he founded educational clubs there and took part in election campaigns as a social democrat.⁵⁰⁴ Sichynsky also had met (by coincidence) some of the peasants injured in the Horucko events in the hospital and was very shocked that they were injured from behind (not from attacking gendarmes, but while running away). In addition, he was an active participant in the student campaign for a Ruthenian university and was arrested during demonstrations. He claimed that his experience of injustice towards Ruthenians gave him the idea of killing of the governor. This idea emerged in Vienna, where he had first seen the governor. Sichynsky testified that he thought at that moment: “You [Potocki] are walking here [in Vienna], when over there [in Galicia] the people are dying and blood is flowing because of you”.⁵⁰⁵ The last straw

⁵⁰² “Pogrzeb Namiestnika” [The funeral of the governor], *Głos Narodu*, April 16, 1908.

⁵⁰³ Arkusha, “Andzhei Pototskyi: Biohrafiia,” 271.

⁵⁰⁴ “Myrosław Sichyns'kyj pered sudom” [Mirosław Sichynsky at the trial], *Dilo*, June 30, 1908.

⁵⁰⁵ “Myrosław Sichyns'kyj pered sudom.”

for Sichynsky was the death of Kaganets in Koropiec. After this, Sichynsky spent the money he had earned working for a professor on a Browning pistol and signed up for an audience with the governor.

With his act of killing, Sichynski contributed to the existing cycle of violent clashes in Galicia. He himself emphasized the huge influence of the Horucko and Koropiec events on his decision:⁵⁰⁶ however, these events did not only have an impact on Sichynsky. As the events were discussed in public space (press and parliament), this discussion influenced the masses and created a rhetoric on the subject. As Pieter Judson has brilliantly highlighted in similar cases, “every new example of violence only added to the existing catalogue, and over time journalists and politicians trotted out the growing collection to prove both the inevitability and the normalcy of nationalist violence.”⁵⁰⁷ In such terms, Galicia was not an exception but the rule.

Sichynski justified his actions by pointing to the need to improve the political position of his fellow Ruthenians in a province ruled by the Polish gentry. He claimed: “I wanted to achieve change, not revolution or paradise, but a change, especially rethinking the dominance of the gentry and attracting attention to injustice towards Ruthenians.”⁵⁰⁸ Legal methods were not effective or even possible in his view. He was hoping to give moral satisfaction to his nation and to stimulate an extralegal struggle in case the legal struggle was not effective. Sichynsky considered unfair local and parliamentary elections to be amongst the greatest injustices towards Ruthenians in the region. Sichynsky claimed: “previously people had not felt injustice so strongly and had perceived it as normal, because they did not know about elections and parliament.”⁵⁰⁹ According to Sichynsky, “Potocki was governing not as an official or an Austrian public servant but as a king, so he should be punished for supporting only the gentry and neglecting all working people regardless of nationality.”⁵¹⁰ Such a focus on Potocki’s negative qualities was a practical display of the national vision, which was at its core very one-sided: either positive or negative for the nation. Such a one-sided approach led to the radicalization of politics. From the words of Sichynsky, it was also evident that he and other activists had a lot of loyalty to and trust in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and were only requiring that officials behave in the framework of the law in Galicia. Thus

⁵⁰⁶ “Myroslav Sichyns'kyj pered sudom.”

⁵⁰⁷ Judson, *Guardians of the nation*, 180.

⁵⁰⁸ “Myroslav Sichyns'kyj pered sudom.”

⁵⁰⁹ “Myroslav Sichyns'kyj pered sudom.”

⁵¹⁰ “Myroslav Sichyns'kyj pered sudom.”

the assassination was an example of radical but loyal politics, and can be seen as a case of political radicalization in the public space of the Habsburg Empire.

Sichynsky's thoughts, which he shared during the trial, give significant insight into Galician political life. First, as in the cases of rural violence during elections, the main emphasis was on the struggle against an unfair system, especially the dominance of the gentry and the arbitrariness of local administrations. The second was the growth in peasant activities, mainly during elections, and the chaotic attempts to control or limit them. Instead of discouraging political activity, attempts to deny political participation stimulated it. The desire of students and political agitators to involve peasants in politics also resulted in bringing villages and cities closer together. This shortening of the distance between village and city was also furthered by trials regarding peasant violence that took place in the cities. The third aspect of Galician political life highlighted by the trial was the mutual reinforcement of nationalism (both Polish and Ruthenian activists motivated each other when manifesting their ideas in the public domain).

Sichynsky was sentenced to death after two trials, but the final decision belonged to the emperor. The new governor of Galicia, Bobrzynski, had insisted on amnesty because he understood the danger to the province's stability if Sichynsky were executed. Sichynsky's death penalty was commuted to 20 years of imprisonment. In 1911, helped by Ukrainian nationalists, he managed to escape from prison and immigrated to the United States, where he continued working as a local Ukrainian activist. He died at the age of 92, never regretting what he had done.⁵¹¹

Catholic vs national visions of the assassination

The Greek Catholic Church responded to the crime with a strong sense of urgency. This was mainly due to various accusations coming from the Polish side towards Ruthenians, in particular blaming Ruthenians for the murder and calling them rebellious. The Greek Catholic hierarchy produced several sermons on the assassination and thereby stimulated further discussions on the role of Catholicism and the clergy in the nation-building process. Here, I focus on the position of the Greek Catholic Church because the Roman Catholic Church did not provide any specific reaction to the event, mainly since it considered the matter only relevant to the Ruthenian population and therefore the Greek Catholic Church.

⁵¹¹ Aleksandr Janta, *We Lwowie, Pewnej Palmowej Niedzieli* [In Lviv on a specific Palm Sunday], (Warsaw, 1982), 390-499.

The Greek Catholic Church developed two main strategies in response to the assassination: (i) to set the Christian boundaries of political life in the province and (ii) to separate the crime from national discourse and reframe it as a moral issue. Soon after the assassination, Metropolitan Archbishop Sheptytsky claimed that “society had witnessed a public crime and this crime should be condemned publically and be actively protested by Christians.”⁵¹² Furthermore, he stated that a crime in the name of patriotism was a crime not only against God and society, but also against the Motherland. He emphasized that it was important to distinguish this crime from the Ruthenian political movement, especially because some press (literally the “hostile press”) put the responsibility for this crime on the entire Ruthenian nation. Also, Sheptytsky warned that young people would see this event as a heroic act⁵¹³ and the “unchristian” press believed that everything was allowed in politics and there was no need to follow Christian teaching.⁵¹⁴ Commenting on this sermon, the Greek Catholic newspaper *Nyva* added that the Greek Catholic Church had clearly omitted the national and political side of the crime and aimed solely to condemn it from the view of Christian morality.⁵¹⁵ Thus, the Greek Catholic hierarchy was doing everything possible to minimize the radicalization of the Ruthenian national movement and focus all the attention on Catholic values such as the priceless value of human life and the importance of morality in politics.

The Greek Catholic Church preferred to stay away from nationalist sentiments and tensions between nations. However, Sheptytsky’s official stance against the crime was not fully shared either by the Greek Catholic Church or by the national activists, among whom there were representatives of the clergy as well. An anonymous priest criticized the archbishop in *Dilo* by saying that the archbishop should not concern himself with a political crime.⁵¹⁶ In *Nyva*, a priest responded to this, saying that some priests, caught up in a pseudo-patriotic passion, thought that they had a better understanding of Christian ethics than their bishops and that the priests role-played as national activists: consequently, this pseudo-patriotic clergy saw political motives where there were none.⁵¹⁷ This rhetoric revealed that nationalism was not an external force that the churches had to reckon with, but an internal process that could cause division and

⁵¹² “Mytropolyt gr. Sheptytski pro Atentat” [Archbishop Count Sheptytsky about murder], *Dilo*, April 25, 1908.

⁵¹³ “Mytropolyt gr. Sheptytski pro Atentat.”

⁵¹⁴ “List Pasterski Biskupow Ruskich” [The pastoral letter of the Ruthenian bishops], *Czas*, May 9, 1908.

⁵¹⁵ “Goloso z Krugiv Dyhovenstva” [Voices from clergy circles], *Nyva*, June 1, 1908.

⁵¹⁶ “Goloso z Krugiv Dyhovenstva” [Voices from clergy circles], *Nyva*, May 1, 1908.

⁵¹⁷ “Ne Vbyi” [Do not kill], *Nyva*, November 1, 1908.

even antagonism among the clergy of the same Church. This is why it was so significant for the hierarchy to unite the clergy and, through the clergy, the faithful with their perception of the assassination.

For the Greek Catholic hierarchy, the solution for unifying interpretations of the assassination lay in condemning the crime and suggesting an alternative way to serve the nation. Archbishop Sheptytsky sought to provide a way that would combine Catholic and national identities. So the Greek Catholic bishops, in an episcopal letter, emphasized that nationality is blessed by God as much as family because the nation is a unity of families:⁵¹⁸ the “Motherland is after God the most sacred thing for a person; the love for the Motherland after the love for God is the best, the highest, and the most beautiful feeling.”⁵¹⁹ Thus, Sheptytsky was highlighting that serving the nation and the Motherland was a holy service dedicated to God and should be free of any crime (“for this service it is necessary to have clean hands, without any blood on them”).⁵²⁰ This is an essential point because it shows that the Church turned service to one’s own nation and Motherland into a strong and even sacred value. The Greek Catholic Church’s views were the result of a long-term transformation that began with the idea of enlightening parishioners and encouraging them to elect Catholic candidates and culminated in an allegiance with the moderate nationalists, the most successful political force.

For Archbishop Sheptytsky, it was important to state exactly how service to the nation should be performed: “it is necessary to serve the nation with love, sacrifice in work, virtue, and sanity.”⁵²¹ This particular vision aimed to be a long-lasting manifestation of the relations between Greek Catholic Church and Ruthenian/Ukrainian nationality. The words of the archbishop shaped in the desired way the discussion in the press on how to contribute to the well-being and future of Ruthenians. Commenting on the archbishop’s words, the Greek Catholic newspaper *Osnova* added the importance of education and economic development.⁵²² The other Greek Catholic newspaper, *Nyva*, looking to avoid conflict with the nationalists, emphasized that the role of the Church should be limited to keeping society in line with Christian views.⁵²³ In other words, the Greek Catholic Church hierarchy strengthened the importance of Christianity for

⁵¹⁸ “Zi Sviatom Voskresennia” [With the Resurrection], *Osnova*, April 23, 1908.

⁵¹⁹ “List Pasterski Biskupow Ruskich” [The pastoral letter of the Ruthenian bishops], *Czas*, May 9, 1908.

⁵²⁰ “List Pasterski Biskupow Ruskich.”

⁵²¹ “Mytropolyt gr.Sheptytski pro Atentat.”

⁵²² “Po Zasudi” [After the Condemnation], *Osnova*, July 9, 1908.

⁵²³ “Chogo Hochut Radycaly?” [What do the radicals want?], *Nyva*, December 15, 1908.

politics, but simultaneously underlined the necessity to dissociate oneself from political life and especially from tensions between nationalities.

Certainly, national activists (the journalists of *Dilo*) and priests with a strong national identity did not favor this approach. Sichynsky voiced one of the common complaints regarding the neutral position of the Greek Catholic Church. During the trial, Sichynsky stated that he was aware that Archbishop Sheptytsky condemned his deed, even though Sheptytsky was undoubtedly a Ruthenian patriot. According to Sichynsky, the Greek Catholic Church (especially its hierarchy) always had very close ties to state authorities, and it was the duty of the Church to condemn actions against the state.⁵²⁴ Thus, Sichynsky expressed the vision that many national activists had: on the one hand, the activists understood that the Catholic Church needed to support the state and its representatives while, on the other, the Greek Catholic Church was the proponent of national values imbedded in Catholic values.

The other issue raised by the Greek Catholic Church concerned the clergy's behavior and participation in mass politics. There is a distinct contrast here to the pastoral letter of 1907 that advised the clergy to be active in mobilizing peasants and to act as defenders of the Ruthenian national.⁵²⁵ After the assassination of the governor in 1908, the archbishop instructed the clergy to prioritize the religious sphere; the political-national sphere needed to be a secondary priority. The latter would not exclude participating in political parties so long as the clergy were not used against the Church and its discipline. These priorities were supposed to define a new identity for the priests: "most important was their Catholic identity, then Ruthenian, and lastly the Ukrainian national-democrats or Russophiles (the only parties clergy could belong to)."⁵²⁶ Thus, the growing power of the mobilized masses was influencing the Church and required adjustments of the latter to new circumstances. In this way, the Greek Catholic clergy were supposed to limit their involvement in politics, because rising nationalistic activism among the clergy was also dangerous for the Greek Catholic Church. This demonstrated the thin line between the clergy's need to be present in the political domain in order to protect Catholicism in politics and the danger of using the Greek Catholic Church's resources for the benefit of a particular ideology (mainly nationalism).

⁵²⁴ "Myroslav Sichyns'kyj pered sudom" [Miroslav Sichynsky at the trial], *Dilo*, July 1, 1908.

⁵²⁵ "Pastyr's'ke poslannja" [The bishop's letter], *Ruslan*, April 20, 1907, April 23, 1907, April 24, 1907.

⁵²⁶ "V Spravi Napasti *Dilo* na Mytropolyta" [About the accusation of the archbishop by *Dilo*], *Nyva*, September 1, 1908.

In conclusion, spurred by the assassination, the Greek Catholic Church developed its own methods and mechanisms for participating in the nation-building process. The Church's most important task was to find a narrative that could place nationalist tendencies within a framework of Catholic values. The hierarchy did this through assimilating national values (love for the Motherland, the importance of nationality) into Christian values and specifying a hierarchy of values by placing the Catholic above the national aspects. In this way, religious and national identities did not conflict and could only reinforce each other. The other important task facing the Church was setting rules for how the clergy should behave in order to unify and strengthen the Church's position among the laity. Finally, the Church's intention was to stay away from nationalist tensions and thus preserve their neutrality. Therefore, the Greek Catholic Church did not conflict openly either with the other Catholic Church or with the local authorities, made up of Poles. This approach was certainly idealistic and did not always work in practice because parish priests could act otherwise.

While the Church was strengthening the importance of Catholic morality in politics, activists like Sichynsky were developing their own vision on what was moral in the framework of mass mobilization. During his speech at the trial, Sichynsky stated that his moral approach was "*Mann für Mann*" [Man for Man], which meant that he believed the human value of the governor and of the Ukrainian-oriented student was the same because both had the same "human dignity."⁵²⁷ As Sichynsky expected to be hung for his crime, he assumed that he had exchanged his life for the life of the governor. Sichynsky saw himself as a sacrifice, maybe even a martyr, for the cause of the nation because he knew he would receive the death penalty.

Rhetoric regarding the moral aspect of the crime was particularly evident in the pages of the clergy-oriented *Nyva* and the *Literaturno-Naukovyj Visnyk* [Literary-scientific Herald]. *Nyva* argued that the distinction between just and unjust (moral and immoral) killing is determined by the presence or absence of self-defense or whether it could be seen as a punishment for a crime (death penalty) and an act to preserve social order and ethics.⁵²⁸ From this point of view, the killing of peasants could not be compared to killing authority figures because the former was an incident that could be avoided, whereas the latter was a planned and fanatical act.⁵²⁹ In this way, religious discourse

⁵²⁷ "Myroslav Sichyns'kyj pered sudom" [Miroslav Sichynsky at the trial], *Dilo*, June 30, 1908.

⁵²⁸ "Ubijstvo Namisnyka: Mytropolycha Propovid a *Literaturno-Naukovyj Visnyk*" [The killing of the governor: the sermon of the rchbishop and the *Literary-scientific Herald*], *Nyva*, August 1, 1908.

⁵²⁹ "Ubijstvo Namisnyka: Mytropolycha Propovid."

defended not only the importance of human life, but also a certain social order with a specific religious-based morality.

The writer, historian, and politician Mykhailo Hrushevsky contributed to the moral discussion of the assassination from a secular perspective. Hrushevsky criticized the bishops' position towards the assassination by stating that their real motives were to demonstrate loyalty to the political powers and that they were afraid of losing their privileged positions.⁵³⁰ His view represented a new morality that was separate from Catholic morality, introducing the idea of the importance of human life in all situations. Hrushevsky argued that the governor's murder was the result of social double standards. Society was protecting its 'order' while oppressing some of its representatives (in this case Ruthenians), thereby creating a sense of hopelessness and despair in those who were trying to legally obtain justice.⁵³¹ According to this view, Sichynsky and his generation were attempting to create their own moral code that legitimized Potocki's killing from a moral perspective because it was done in the name of justice.

As a result, the Greek Catholic Church was challenged by growing nationalism and the questioning of the Church's right to determine morality. Some nationalist clergy emphasized the separation between politics and religion and called for more freedom for clergy in their political views. The Greek Catholic hierarchy saw such freedom as a danger to church unity and morality. Intellectuals like Hrushevsky criticized the Church for its double standards and for caring more about the elite and the existing social order than about ordinary followers.

Conclusions

The assassination prompted religious and secular discussion over the morality of murder, and the emergence of new values that combined service to God with service to nationality. It made it necessary for the Greek Church to create its own visions of the limits between political and religious behavior, especially with the increasing participation of Christians in public life. In addition, the Greek Catholic hierarchy needed to respond to challenges from nationalists and intellectuals of the time in order to maintain their influence among the laity. The best solution, in the view of the hierarchy, was to limit the clergy's participation in the nation-building process in order

⁵³⁰ "Ne Vbyi" [Do not kill], *Nyva*, November 1, 1908.

⁵³¹ Mykhailo Hrushevski, "Krov" [Blood], *Literaturno-naukovyj visnyk* [Literary-scientific Herald] 5, (1908): 384-385.

to preserve the Church's neutrality in political life. As was mentioned in previous case studies, active engagement in politics was very dangerous for the Church as an institution because it threatened the hierarchy from within.

Galicia was not a unique place in the Habsburg Empire in terms of witnessing displays of violence at the time. Pieter Judson, in his book *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria*, analyzes examples of violent clashes between Czech and German activists. Judson highlights that the incidents themselves were quite minor, but that they managed to produce "political repercussions that were felt as far away as Prague and Vienna and at the highest levels of government."⁵³² The cases of Horucko and Koropets were discussed in parliament. The interesting observation is that the events in Bohemia researched by Judson happened in the same year as the trials of the Galician peasants from the Horucko and Koropets cases and the assassination of the governor: thus it is possible to suggest that different provinces influenced each other and that they simultaneously started a new way of making politics.

The above case studies contribute to a better understanding of the role of the Catholic churches in the Austrian Empire and in Galicia in particular; they reveal how the role of the clergy was transformed under the influence of mass mobilization and violence. The Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic churches emphasized the necessity of the clergy's active participation in the political life of their parishioners while still preserving distance from political parties and limiting the clergy's ability to manifest their personal political preferences. This strategy was intended to preserve the influence and control of the clergy over the politicization and mobilization of the laity and simultaneously to avoid clashes rooted in political differences amongst the clergy or between the clergy and laity. In some cases, this approach was effectively implemented (the case of Koropiec), while in others it was not (the case of Horucko). The reason for this difference lay in the complexity of clergy-lay relations in Galicia.

With regards to the relations between the clergy and the laity, there was a major transformation from the rather traditional and respectful vision of the clergy to one that contested their role. Under the influence of political and social changes, the laity become more critical towards their pastors and therefore demanded that the clergy participate in public debates and suggest effective responses to the challenges of the time. The cases of violence are excellent examples of how such challenges played out and how the

⁵³² Judson, *Guardians of the nation*, 178.

churches managed to handle them. As most of the events happened in Eastern Galicia, the Greek Catholic Church was mostly tasked with providing effective and fast solutions to the threats coming from inside (the political preferences of the clergy) and outside (the agitation of different political forces) of the Church. When the Greek Catholic Church feared the threat of socialists and radicals, the clergy suggested an alternative, Christian socialism and radicalism; when the nationalist movement became the most influential one, the Church emphasized the importance of love for the Motherland and service to the nation.

This accommodating nature of the Church's behavior was a crucial demonstration that both churches were not outside the influence of the nationalization process or the politicization of public life: rather, they were actually trying to be an influential actor in these processes. The most important task for the Greek Catholic Church, especially after the killing of the governor, was to re-contextualize national tendencies within a framework of Catholic values. This was done by assimilating national values (love for the Motherland, the importance of the nation) into Christian values. The Roman Catholic strategy was the same. Thereby, religious and national identities did not conflict and could reinforce each other. Certainly, this was not an easy task to manage, and very often the 'disease of the crowd' was much stronger than the social hierarchy or the importance of Christian values.

Final Conclusions

At the turn of the century, Galicia was influenced by historical transformations relevant to the whole Austro-Hungarian Empire. These phenomena included modernization, the radicalization of political movements, the emergence of political violence, increasing mass participation of citizens in public and political life, the development of the nation-building process and the widening autonomy of the provinces. These processes resulted in challenges for both Roman and Greek Catholics in a region where religious identity and the sense of belonging to either the Greek Catholic or the Roman Catholic churches remained an important marker in social relationships.

Both Catholic rites experienced similar challenges during mass mobilization: however, the churches managed them in parallel because of the differences in rite, language and social position. The priests of both rites acted as leaders of village communities by getting involved in mass rallies, being drawn into conflicts with local officials and, through their pastoral roles, actively influencing their laity. The clergy stated to their parishes that they felt responsible for caring for the good of the laity. Simultaneously, the motivation of the clergies stemmed from a need to adjust political and social ideas within Catholic doctrine to keep pace with changing circumstances. Both the Roman and Greek Catholic churches were loyal to the government, objected to violent or illegal actions and tried to prevent or limit the spread of socialist ideas.

The clergy in mass mobilization movements

The manifestations of mass mobilization discussed in this thesis are mass participation, the appearance of new identities and tensions between the secular and religious spheres. These displays were manifested in mass events such as strikes, celebrations and elections. The agricultural strike in 1902 was one of the first important opportunities for priests to explore their potential as secular leaders. The priests were often mediators in negotiations with landowners, as well as guardians of the peace in the villages. The clergy managed both roles successfully and gained experience and trust for the future moderation of mass events. The upper hierarchies of both rites emphasized how important it was for parish priests to regulate and control their laity in the secular sphere. Such regulation was a significant opportunity to build better and closer connections in the community and prevent possible conflicts between the secular and social spaces. Thus, social and political practices remained in touch with religious practices: they intersected and mutually influenced each other. For example, the majority of mass rallies

started and ended with a prayer or service and with the priests being the speakers or moderators of proceedings.

When the planned franchise reform was announced in 1906, the Catholic Church decided to support it: parochial clergy from across the empire were among the first to explain the meaning of the reform to the laity and to encourage them to support it. This was a new step that enabled the Catholic Church to position itself in the midst of mass mobilization and to develop its own way of participating in mass events. At this stage, the language and religious differences in Galicia became decisive when choosing which political program or party to support, as both rites had a certain number of representatives to elect.

The Catholic mobilization of women

If enfranchising men caused the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic clergies to have similar reactions, their attitudes to women's roles within society was slightly different. This difference was caused by two factors: the Roman Catholic laity consisted of both peasant and urban women, while the Greek Catholic Church was dominated by 'clerical women', the wives, sisters or daughters of priests who were widely involved in church life. Greek Catholic women from clerical families were educated to be an example for local women by supporting the active participation of their husbands in social and political life and by promoting ideas of education, particularly Catholic ones. Roman Catholic women were more active in the cities and worked there on educating and supporting working girls and women in order to engage them more actively in urban moral and cultural life.

The actions performed by women activists in Galicia were typical for Catholic women in other provinces, who often sent petitions to Vienna to achieve support for their educational initiatives (like schools for girls or kindergartens). The particularity of Galicia was the presence of 'clerical women', who, together with their families, worked on involving peasants in the public domain. Both churches saw the potential of women, especially in terms of their importance in the sacral sphere and their utility in influencing the choice of their husbands when actively participating in elections.

The probation of social Catholicism

The clergy of both rites intended to entwine emerging political visions with Catholic views and ideals. The Roman Catholic priest Stanislaw Stojalowski was the most successful leader when it came to combining national and social ideas with Catholicism. His agitation demonstrates the immense potential of Catholicism within politics and

shows how, by becoming increasingly drawn into the spheres of power and influence that had hitherto been largely secular, the Church was now linked to mass mobilization.

Stojalowski used a variety of mass mobilization tools to combine Catholicism with the social needs of the time, like education for the peasants, improving their economic position, developing a cooperative movement and struggling for wider civil rights. Stojalowski highlighted his intention to follow the policies of Pope Leo XIII and Karl Lueger on Galician soil and managed to gather a wide group of supporters. However, he was not very successful at building a network of activists and ran into problems because of his numerous conflicts with the ecclesiastical and secular authorities. Nonetheless, Stojalowski's political activity remains an excellent illustration of how to construct, spread and succeed in political mobilization by combining the sacred and the secular.

Anti-semitism, a component of social Catholicism, also had a special place in the agitation of Stojalowski, as well as in Lueger's. Jews, as a third large and non-Catholic group of the province, provoked much attention in the process of mass mobilization. In particular, the attitude towards the Jews was negative and, in the case of some political activists like Stojalowski, openly hostile. Stojalowski's newspapers encouraged boycotts of Jewish shops and goods as well as other kinds of non-violent actions against Jews. Violent acts were criticized because the organizers could be jailed. In the view of the clergy of both churches, Jews were also a reason for heavy drinking: thus, the laity should resist taverns or having any other business with Jews. The clergy of other provinces shared a similar attitude.⁵³³ With the growing nationalization of the churches, the relationship with Jews only worsened. In the following decades of the 20th century, these anti-semitic attitudes deepened the confrontation between Catholics and non-Catholics throughout the empire.

Stojalowski managed to perfectly combine the increase of political rights with national ideas to influence the secular life of Roman Catholics, especially when it came to encouraging peasants to participate in public life. The skillful combination of Catholic values with patriotic ones initiated the nationalization of the Catholic Church in Galicia and the sacralisation of the idea of the nation over the next few decades, which was typical for Greek Catholics as well. Thus, the intersection of different identities in Stojalowski's agitation only reinforced them and contributed to his popularity.

⁵³³ Vulesica, "How Antisemitic was the Political Catholicism."

The strong emphasis on national identity and conflicts with representatives of the Church and the state were among the factors that blocked the development of social Catholicism in Galicia. Stojalowski used Lueger's ideas and popularity to promote his own party, but he did not manage to achieve similar success, as he seemed more focused on the national background of his followers and his own popularity than on developing a strong network of leaders. The personality of Stojalowski was too controversial to unite even the representatives of the same church and nationality, so there was no way to involve the other rite in his movement.

At the same time, the political activity of Stojalowski was exemplary for other activists and clergy in the province. Explicitly or implicitly, Stojalowski's critical approach to the church hierarchy and the involvement of the Vatican or Vienna in his conflicts in Galicia encouraged other representatives of clergy to do the same, like the Greek Catholic priests Bachynskyj (appealed to the Vatican) and Petryckyj (petitioned the Ministry of the Interior). Thus, Stojalowski managed to initiate changes in the relations between the secular authorities and the parochial clergy and inspired priests to act more independently.

Clergy vs. local administration: a new struggle for power

When the clergy actively combined secular and religious leadership roles in their communities, they often came into conflict with local administrators or secular administrative processes. The priests of the Habsburg Empire had control over certain aspects of their parishioners' lives due to their closer relations with peasants; they were therefore able to use this relationship for political or personal gain. At the same time, the secular authorities were dependent on the clergy to provide population data and fulfill other social duties. The secular duties of priests provided them a space to exert certain influences or pressures on officials and their own laity. These social roles had the potential to extend church influence and power but coincided with a time when the laity was recognizing and exercising their potential power as a more politically active social group. At this time, the laity, constituted by peasants and workers throughout the empire, was becoming increasingly demanding and active in attempting to claim greater reform, which brought them into conflict with secular power structures. With priests holding sacral influence over their laity while also being instrumental to the secular authorities, it was inevitable that the priesthood would become embroiled in conflicts. Thus, the complexity of changing social and political factors during this period changed the dynamics of relations in communities and led to conflicts between secular and religious representatives of power.

In Galicia, the conflict between the priest and the local administration (starosta) frequently began apolitically and gradually took on political and national perspectives. Both the representatives of the Church and the state were often in competition for power and influence over the peasants. The parishioners, intelligentsia and the press took an increasingly active role in developing and escalating this struggle. Simultaneously, the peasants began to understand that they were at the core of the competition between clergy and local administrators and started to influence this competition in their own way. In some cases, the laity defended the priest against accusations from the starosta, while in others they demanded the replacement of their priest. Parishioners threatened the ecclesiastical authorities in an attempt to have their demands fulfilled. Legal proceedings in which both priests and peasants were involved served as important factors for mobilizing participants to play an active role in defending their own convictions.

Relations inside village communities were changing because widening political rights, which resulted in intensifying the competition for power. With the development of the mass mobilization process, loyalty to priests and local officials was put into question. The laity had could pick new identities, support certain political parties, and trust specific sources of information, either sacral or secular. Thus, not only local officials but also priests and other church authorities were questioned and needed to demonstrate that they had a solution to the social and political problems of their followers.

The Catholic churches and violence in mass mobilization

Violent clashes were another form of mass participation that combined secular and religious tensions and showed the potential of new ideas and identities in politics to mobilize the citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The specificity of such events was to have a long-lasting effect and provoked a wide discussion in the public domain. Additionally, different political powers used such events to shape society and gain popularity.

A close analysis of violent clashes during the Galician elections reveals how priorities in the interpretation of violence changed between 1897 and 1907. In 1897, the laity protected and supported the parochial clergy against the accusations of gendarmes and the local administration. Simultaneously, the clergy focused on explaining to the peasantry why it was important to participate in elections. By 1907, after years of increasing mass mobilization, the relationship between the priest and laity had shifted. For example, in 1907 the laity became more critical towards priests and were even ready

to physically attack them (in the case of Horucko). Similar political views between the clergy and laity proved to be, in some cases, an important factor in garnering sympathy and support towards the clergy. The manner in which violent events were interpreted in the press and public domain also changed in this decade. In the 1890s, the Galician press focused on describing the unfair position of peasants in society: this shifted to discussing the unfair position of the national group in 1907-08.

The culmination of the violent tensions was the assassination of the governor of the province in 1908. The assassination caused an intense reaction in both religious communities and provoked a discussion on the importance of moral and Catholic service to the nation. At the same time, the hierarchy of the Church was deeply concerned with the active involvement of the clergy in the nation-building process. The Church aimed to preserve overall neutrality in the political sphere, as an excessive engagement in politics could threaten the hierarchy of the Church from within. Thus, the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic churches searched for a balance between the clergy participating actively in the political life of their parishioners and the preservation of distance from political parties that could turn the clergy into political agitators. This strategy was intended to preserve the influence and control of the clergy over the politicization and mobilization of the laity while avoiding clashes rooted in political differences. The laity, however, demanded that the clergy participate in public debates and suggest effective responses to the challenges of the times. Thus, the churches were not outside the influence of the nationalization process or the politicization of public life, but were an influential actor in them.

The active position of the churches in mass mobilization aimed to guarantee the defeat of socialism or other anti-clerical movements and maintain the close ties between the secular and religious spheres. In comparison to other provinces, the Catholic Church in Galicia, with its different rites, was often torn apart from within, while its representatives were involved in violent clashes. However, the Church managed to distance itself from the political interpretation of violence and emphasize the moral side of it. Due to this strategy, the Catholic Church remained very influential in the province, even after the end of Habsburg Empire and the dissolution of Galicia in 1939. It has continued to be an important agent in the political and social space to this very day. The mechanism of this success was developed and tested at the beginning of mass mobilization and continued into the new century.

The Catholic churches and the nation-building process

The extension of universal male suffrage increased the politicization of the laity and presented new challenges to both the religious and secular authorities, with growing nationalist and socialist ideas questioning the traditional political dividing lines. The secular and religious authorities rarely competed directly against each other, as both were aware of the need to redefine their positions, strengthen their existing connections and pursue new sources of support. Whilst cooperation between Church and State was overall smooth and well established between the upper hierarchs of both bodies, at the local level clashes between representatives of the provincial administration and the clergy were often unavoidable. Consequently, at a more local level, Church and State can be seen to have been in constant, informal competition with each other, and thus an uneasy tension often boiled over into conflict. In pursuit of maintaining influence and redefining their position (so as to retain support), the priests of both Catholic churches utilized the opportunities presented by the close connections between religious and national identities.

These national distinctions held the potential to cause further tension between the two rites and between the Polish and Ruthenian nationalists. National ideas shaped the relations between clergy and their laity: both sides became more and more involved in the question of which nation they belonged to. The national idea was becoming a dominant one in the new 20th century because it offered a solution to social and economic issues (such as overcoming inequality in access to power and the opportunity to build their own states or autonomous regions with a fairer form of government) and easily matched Christian values and religious practices.

In first decade of the 20th century, the clergy of the Greek and Roman Catholic churches had already built close relationships with their laity whilst also being influenced by national ideas. In the next few decades, this became visible during the Polish-Ukrainian struggle after the fall of the empire in 1918 and in the new Polish state. Later, the Greek Catholic Church became the guardian of Ukrainian identity, while the Roman Catholic Church defended the Polish one. Similar processes of nationalization in the Catholic churches were typical for other provinces. The particularity of Galicia lay in the variety of religious groups, its borderland position and the presence of a contested territory where at least two nationalities planned to build their own national states. A fruitful angle for further research could be a focus on the Habsburg legacy, in particular with regards to the active role of the Catholic Church in the public sphere, its cooperation with the secular authorities in the new nation-states and relations between different religious groups.

Future research on the churches' role in the mobilization process at the time of dissolution of the Austrian Empire and the emergence of the Polish state could provide a more detailed picture of the political and social role of the Catholic Church in building public societies and nation-states. After the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, Galicia became an even more intense subject of struggle between the Poles and the Ukrainians. The occasional violence at the beginning of the century turned into everyday clashes during the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1918-19. Such circumstances were extremely challenging for the Catholic Church. On one hand, Catholics were involved in both sides of the conflict, but, on the other, the October Revolution in Russia that brought the Bolsheviks to power on the border of Galicia was even more dangerous to the Catholic Church. Further research on the role of rite in Galicia will be very beneficial, as it will reveal how relations between national communities and rites were modified during state- and nation-building. Some steps in this direction have already been taken by the Ukrainian historian Liliana Gentosh in her research *Vatykan i vyklyky modernosti. Skhidnoyevropeys'ka polityka papy Benedykta XV ta ukrayins'ko-pol's'kyy konflikt u Galychyni (1914-1923)* [The Vatican and the Challenges of Modernity. The East European Policy of Pope Benedict XVI and Ukrainian-Polish Conflict in Galicia (1914-1923)]. However, there are still a lot of uncovered questions. From my perspective, it would be extremely useful to research deeply how the relations between clergy and the local administration continued to change, especially after the disappearance of the arbitration of the multinational empire.

The processes of mass mobilization that occurred in the first decade of the 20th century opened a new page for the Catholic Church, one that was full of opportunities in political and social life. Across Europe, political Catholicism was one of the strongest movements in a variety of contexts.⁵³⁴ In Galicia, the Church not only maintained its strong influence, but reinforced it for future decades. The clergy of Galicia, as well as in other parts of Europe, embraced the ideas of *Rerum Novarum* and social Catholicism. The construction of national states intensified the nationalization of different parts of the Catholic Church and brought its laity to the point of even more conflict. However, the practices of mass mobilization established at the beginning of the century continued to work and prosper.

⁵³⁴ Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway, *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965*, (Oxford, 1996), 1. Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway also highlighted that “the structures, mentality, and character of Catholicism differed markedly in individual states of Europe as a consequence of a rich heritage of historical factors.” Buchanan, Conway, *Political Catholicism*, 8.

The Catholic Church continued to play an important role in the public domain during the crisis and war that started in 1914. This was possible because of the mass mobilization experience between the 1890s and the 1910s. During food and supply shortages, humanitarian disasters and, especially, the occupation by the Russian Empire in 1914, the Catholic Church provided the kind of support that all other institutions could not. When the Polish state was formed with the leading participation of the Roman Catholic Church, the position of Greek Catholics worsened: however, while both churches continued to promote the idea of a connection between a specific rite and nationality, the need for Catholics of both rites to remain tolerant towards each other continued to be emphasized.

The experience of mass mobilization in the *fin de siècle* proved to be very fruitful for the clergy and laity of both churches in terms of providing responses to the challenges of a politicizing world. Thanks to their active involvement in social and political questions, the representatives and laities of the churches cooperated and influenced each other in order to build a new type of relationship necessary for modernizing Europe. As a result, the Catholic churches managed to remain influential in the territory of Galicia for the entirety of the 20th century.

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