A Cosmopolitan Republican in the French Revolution:
The Political Thought of Anacharsis Cloots

Frank Ejby Poulsen

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization of the European University Institute

Florence, 23 March 2018
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Examineing Board
Professor Martin van Gelderen, EUI (Supervisor)
Professor Ann Thomson, EUI (Second Reader/Internal Examiner)
Professor Richard Whatmore, University of Saint Andrews (External Examiner)
Professor Reidar Maliks, University of Oslo (External Examiner)

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9 March 2018
A COSMOPOLITAN REPUBLICAN IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
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The Political Thought of Anacharsis Cloots

FRANK EJBY POUlsen

Department of History and Civilization
European University Institute

Florence, 23 March 2018
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ABSTRACT

Republicanism has been on scholars’ research agenda since the 1970s, and several studies on eighteenth-century French republicanism have linked it to the Atlantic republican tradition. A central question that has puzzled intellectual historians studying republicanism is how this concept considered as antiquated or only adapted to small city-states became the concept of choice for a large modern nation such as France.

The works of Pocock, Skinner, and Pettit launched a vast research programme on Atlantic republicanism as a theory of liberty understood as ‘non-domination’. Focusing on eighteenth-century France and the French revolution, historians such as Baker, Hammersley, Monnier, Spitz, Whatmore, and Wright have argued against Furet, Ozouf, Maintenant, Nicolet, and Vovelle that this republicanism existed before and during the revolution as a language of opposition based on classical Greek and Roman authors. In particular, Edelstein has shown how the two languages of republicanism and nature collided to form a ‘natural republicanism’ that pervaded during the revolution and intellectually explains the Terror. Hammersley, on the other hand, has shown how English republican texts provided answers to the fundamental question for early modern republicans: how republican institutions and practices (securing liberty) could be made workable in the context of a large nation-state?

However, these studies on classical republicanism and natural republicanism have overlooked or insufficiently explained the universalist side of the language of republicanism in the French revolution: how could republicanism be made workable for the world, and how could it be argued that humankind formed a nation? This thesis provides an answer to how a ‘universal republic’ could be theorised in the French revolution by examining the writings of Anacharsis Cloots (1755–1794). It argues that Cloots was one of the leading proponents of ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. The thesis uses Cloots’s entire corpus of works, which have been published in a three-volume collection entitled Œuvres, as well as a collection of all his revolutionary writings in Écrits révolutionnaires. This thesis uses Skinner’s contextualist method to present an interpretation of Cloots’s writings by setting them in their political, social, and intellectual contexts.

The introduction presents a critical review of studies on Cloots from the nineteenth century to the present. Vilified or lauded, Cloots was considered a founding figure of cosmopolitanism by nineteenth-century authors, a fame that faded in the twentieth century. Agreeing with contemporary historians presenting Cloots as ‘cosmopolitan republican’, this study seeks to
identify what was cosmopolitanism in the eighteenth century. Based on a 1770 pamphlet entitled *Le cosmopolisme*, this study argues that an understanding of a political community of mankind tentatively emerged around several themes: classical republicanism, science and reason as exemplifies with the *Encyclopédie*, sentiment and humanity, and nature and natural law. It is around these themes that the thesis is organised in analysing Cloots’s political thought in context.

Chapter one presents a brief biography of the life of Cloots from his childhood in Prussia to his death in France after Robespierre’s indictment of espionage. It sums up the significant events in Cloots’s life such as his education at collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne in Paris and Académie des Nobles in Berlin, his intellectual affinity with his uncle the philosopher Cornelius de Pauw, and his early ambition to enter the Parisian intellectual salons with his first book presenting a deist argument against religions. It then focuses particularly on his revolutionary career as a pamphleteer and publicist, and his engagement in the revolution as the beginning of a universal revolution propagating the principles of the *Déclaration des droits de l’Homme* to the world.

Chapter two proposes an overview of Cloots’s body of works, focusing particularly on his revolutionary writings and presenting his ‘system’ of a ‘universal republic’ in a Wolffian paradigm. It argues that his choice of writing pamphlets over treatises was a revolutionary custom, and may explain why he has been overlooked by political philosophers. It presents the main elements in Cloots’s universal republic that will then be analysed in the following chapters.

Chapter three starts with an analysis of Cloots’s republicanism by looking at his self-appointed title of ‘Orator of the human race’, and his change of first name from Jean-Baptiste to Anacharsis. Looking at the educational context that Cloots received, it argues that his title of ‘orator’ was directly linked to classical republican works, which defined the orator as an important actor in a civis: at the same time a philosopher using reason (*ratio*) in search for the truth or *sapientia* with a *scientia civilis*, and a speaker who communicates the truth through the use of rhetoric (*elocutio*). Related to this ‘title’, the revolutionary context explains his unbaptising himself and choosing the name of a philosopher from Greek antiquity — Anacharsis — made famous in a best-selling historical novel published a few years prior, thereby self-fashioning himself as this foreign philosopher in the world capital of philosophy.

Related to this function of orator communicating a true *scientia civilis* obtained through *ratio*, chapter four presents the intellectual context of eighteenth-century philosophy to explain why Cloots referred to his universal republic as ‘system’, and why he considered it universally applicable. Cloots’s understanding of reason was in line with the Enlightenment, but
he used the expression ‘cosmopolitan reason’ rather than ‘universal reason’: a limited version of reason prevails if local disagreements proved it as not universal. The *scientia civilis* in Cloots’s writings is the ‘science of man’ as defined in the *Encyclopédie* in a Baconian fashion: just as nature can be studied scientifically for its physical phenomena it can equally be studied for its political and moral phenomena.

Building on this understanding of ‘science of man’ as an observation of nature, chapter five presents the intellectual background of the philosophies of nature, natural law, and natural rights. Cloots’s opposition to religion replaced God with nature, but also with humankind, creating a system of natural law where nature and humankind are both the supreme moral authority. Negating a passage from nature to society, and invoking a ‘legal despotism’ from the general will applied to the human race, Cloots’s thought is part of what Edelstein called ‘natural republicanism’.

Chapter six presents the intellectual context for considering humankind and individuality. Cloots considered that there was a single human race, even if he acknowledged its diversity. The human race is only composed of individuals, all vested with the same natural rights, and as such forming the single ‘nation of the human race’.

Chapter seven analyses republicanism in Cloots’s thought after presenting a brief overview of the historiographical controversy around republicanism in France before the revolution. As so many other revolutionaries, Cloots was not openly anti-monarchist before the revolution, but a classical republican. After the revolution Cloots switched from a republicanism with a puppet king to an anti-monarchist ‘universal republic’ aligned with ‘natural republicanism’.

The concluding chapter argues that Cloots’s ‘universal republic’ is better interpreted as ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. It then goes on to define what this cosmopolitan republicanism was in Cloots’s political thought. The combination of modern science with classical antiquity may explain why the concept of republicanism became applicable to large nation states since it was considered a solution to the whole world.

This thesis is the first contextual analysis of Anacharsis Cloots’s political thought and the first to offer a definition of ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’, with which other scholars have labelled his work. Thereby, this thesis contributes to studies of the Atlantic tradition of republicanism by proposing to study a new type of republicanism: ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. Rediscovering these eighteenth-century discussions on cosmopolitan republicanism sheds new light on contemporary ones regarding global governance: how can we improve democratic representation and participation in decisions affecting the whole of humankind without imposing certain views on others? While contemporary philosophers ask if cosmopolitan republicanism is the answer, this thesis sheds light on its origins in the French re-
volution with Cloots. But he was not an isolated case: Condorcet, Thomas Paine, and Volney were other major authors with a republican vision that can be characterised as ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’, and this deserves further research.
Dedicated to the loving memory of my father, Karl Ejby Poulsen
21 April 1948, København – 20 July 2011, Paris
I would like to take this time to thank the Danish Ministry of Higher Education and Science for all the funding they were able to provide me in order to make this thesis possible, and in particular the team in charge of EUI grants for their guidance and dedicated work: Marlene Wind (University of Copenhagen), Anders Bjørneboe, and Rudolf Straarup. More generally, I have to thank the Danish Welfare State for all the opportunities it has given me. I am deeply grateful for its education and research policies that made this thesis and my future research plan possible, and for its internationalisation policies that made it possible to expand my academic network and my intellectual, cultural, and personal experiences. I cannot stress enough how much I have benefited from them, and how consequent the disappearance of these policies will be for education, research, and trans-cultural understandings in Denmark.

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PROLOGUE

Salle du Manège des Tuileries, Paris, the Assemblée nationale constituante was discussing the organisation of the first celebration of the storming of the Bastille, the fête de la Fédération, when the doors opened to let in a curious delegation of thirty-six men dressed in folk costume representing varying nationalities. The Salle du Manège was previously used as a royal riding hall next to the Tuileries, but it had been de facto let out for private use, even if it still belonged to the King. The Assemblée moved there in 1789 from the previous Salle des Menus-Plaisirs in Versailles. One should imagine a long rectangular room lit by huge high windows perched under an arched ceiling, almost dominating the ceremonies. The room had been built for horse shows, and it was a show that the new revolutionary politics continued to provide to the spectators installed in tribunes above the two facing ranks of seats. On each side, the various constituted factions sat. In the middle, the president chaired under a majestic two-panel Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. To his left, the constitutionals. To his right the monarchists. People were coming to listen to their favourite deputies, each battling for attention with their oratory skills. In an anonymous pamphlet, the most popular ones were quickly nicknamed after and associated with horses such as: ‘le Pétulant’ Mirabeau, ‘l’Étonnant’ Barnave, ‘l’Intépide’ Abbé Grégoire, etc.¹

On this particular day, 19 June 1790, the audience was not disappointed by the spectacle. The leader of the colourful delegation introduced himself as the ‘ambassador of the human race’, but his name was already known in the intellectual circles and to the readers of the newly created newspapers where he contributed profusely. He was the Prussian born aristocrat Jean-Baptiste Cloots, baron du Val-de-Grâce, nephew of the renown philosopher, canon at St Victor’s cathedral in Xanten, and diplomat to the court of Frederic II of Prussia, Cornelius de Pauw. Perhaps the amused audience tried to identify each nationality by their costume and playfully tried to find a breed of horse to associate with each nationality: the ‘Arabian horse’, the ‘Belgian horse’, the ‘Icelandic horse’, etc.

There is no doubt, however, that the delegation had a scenic intention designed to make a visual impact on the audience in this ‘political theatre’,² and, considering the polemic that ensued, it worked. Many wrongly ac-

¹ Anonymous, Les chevaux au manège, ouvrage trouvé dans le porte-feuille de monsieur le prince de Lambesc, grand-écuyer de France (Paris: s.n., 1789).
cused Cloots of having hired unemployed actors to wear costumes, rather than his delegation genuinely representing oppressed peoples; a view later dismissed by historians. However, this ‘stunt’ was more than mere trivia. It had a deep message, in line with all the Enlightenment philosophy that fed the young baron and the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. The ‘ambassador’ gave a speech on behalf of the human race, asking that the first celebration of the storming of the Bastille include foreigners so it ‘... ne sera pas seulement la fête des Français, mais encore la fête du genre humain’. Their presence as well as their message was political and constituted a paradigm-shift as it placed the individual, the citizen, at the centre of the concept of sovereignty, rather than the state. Cloots expressed the view that the events of 1789 were not only French, happening in the Kingdom of France, but universal in their essence and impact. The sovereign is the people, each individual possesses a fragment of sovereignty, not the king. The people — now free in France — were waiting to be freed everywhere else:

Jamais ambassade ne fut plus sacrée ; nos lettres de créance ne sont pas tracées sur le parchemin, mais notre mission est gravée en chiffres ineffaçables dans le cœur de tous les hommes ; & grace aux auteurs de la Déclaration des droits, ces chiffres ne seront plus inintelligibles aux tyrans. Vous avez reconnu authentiquement, Messieurs, que la souveraineté réside dans le peuple : or le peuple est par-tout sous le joug de dictateurs qui se disent souverains, en dépit de vos principes. On usurpe la dictature, mais la souveraineté est inviolable, & les ambassadeurs des tyrans ne pourroient honorer votre fête auguste, comme la plupart d’entre nous, dont la mission est avouée tacitement par nos compatriotes, par des souverains opprimés.

Cloots expressed the idea that if sovereignty belonged to each human being, and if the rights of Man were universally applicable, then it was not only the French people that ought to be free and sovereign, but all the peoples of the world: the human race. A few years later, this ambassador named himself ‘Orator of the human race’, was granted French citizenship and got elected at the Assemblée Constituante where he developed the project for a universal republic based on the sovereign nation of the human race. His ideas will, however, be as short-lived as his own head. Robespierre launched a cabal against foreigners in the revolution and ordered his execution. The guillotine struck his neck on 24 March 1794. He was 39.

3. See chapter on Cloots’s life.
5. Ibid., 23.
INTRODUCTION

The merit of the ‘Orator of the Human Race’ consists in his having been the first to formulate Cosmopolitanism as a principle...

Bax, 1891

Who was Cloots? And how can his ideas be qualified? Cloots was not an obscure figure during the French Revolution; he was well-known during his life-time as he sparked controversies, while his name lived on throughout the nineteenth century. His fame transcended borders. A German study presented him as one of the ‘Helden der französischen Revolution’ who had an unfortunate fate despite loving and fighting for his chosen second homeland. His fame even crossed the Atlantic into the English speaking world as Herman Melville in his classic novel *Moby Dick*, as well as in two other successive novels, used the name Cloots for his descriptions of human diversity. He described Captain Ahab’s crew as: ‘Anacharsis Clootz [sic] deputation from all the isles of the sea, and all the ends of the earth...’ In French ‘popular culture’, a vaudeville comedy entitled *Athènes à Paris, ou le nouvel Anacharsis* staged a German baron and his son, both crazy about Ancient Greece. They are tricked into learning French, whilst being told they are actually learning ‘modern Greek’, and traveling to Paris instead of Athens. There, the young baron meets a woman reading *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce* (a reference to Barthélémy’s book that inspired Cloots to change his first name). The whole play is an obvious reference to Cloots, and a chauvinist mockery of the Germans: ‘Ah ! J’avre été attrapé comme un véritable Allemand’, says Anacharsis when he discovers the supercherie.

It is during the twentieth century that historians started to ignore or play down Cloots’s role in the revolution, despite one study at the start of the century. That Cloots is not well-known is true for the history of cosmopolitanism — where Kant is the uncontested eighteenth-century founding figure. It is also true, even more curiously, for the history of the French Revolution. A look at Furet’s history of the French Revolution, for instance, shows no mention of Cloots. No mention either in the Dictionnaire critique. François Furet ignores him all together, whilst Mona Ozouf and Allan Forrest mention him in Furet and Ozouf’s dictionary. Cloots is equally absent in different interpretations of the Revolution. He is also absent from a study in which he should be a centre piece. Most studies of the Revolution mention him in passing — some with a negative tone, and some more positive. Only recent studies with a global perspective or a study of the international system mention Cloots profusely.

When the historiography of the French Revolution does mention Cloots, it seems that historians have difficulties with how to evaluate him due to the reputation that precedes him. For instance, Ikni wrote in his article on Cloots in the Dictionnaire Historique de la Révolution Française: ‘Cloots souvent entraîné par ses visions fumeuses développa une activité brouillonne

qui masque mal un cynisme de nanti’. 17 Bronisław Baczko considers Cloots as one of the ‘sub-products... of the Enlightenment’. 18 In the *Histoire et dictionnaire de la Révolution française*, only a few acerbic lines are consecrated to him. 19

Cloots seems to have been accepted as a left-wing figure. His name stands on the website, ‘Marxists Internet Archive’, which published Mitchell Abidor’s translation of three of his speeches into English. 20 A dated biography by Georges Avenel has been re-printed by a left-wing publishing house. 21 This parti pris may be the result of the nineteenth-century polarisation between a republican pro-revolutionary left, and a monarchical anti-revolutionary right; each tried to find heroes and foes in the French Revolution.

This thesis reappraises Cloots’s political thought and seeks to restore him to his rightful-deserved place among Enlightenment thinking and revolutionary politics. In this introduction I will first present how nineteenth-century historians saw Cloots as a proponent of cosmopolitanism, but with a nineteenth-century understanding of cosmopolitanism as opposed to nationalism. I will then look at contemporary studies on Cloots’s political thought, which also consider him as part of cosmopolitanism, but more specifically a ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’, without a precise understanding of the notion. I will then present a short study of what was understood as ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ in the eighteenth century, in order to argue that Cloots’s political thought should be understood as ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’, understood as a language combining the language of nature and natural law, Enlightenment conceptions of truth, science and reason, humanity, and the language of republicanism. Cloots’s thought is thus akin to what Edelstein has identified as ‘natural republicanism’, but it is a particular branch that is more rightly called ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’.

**STUDIES ON CLOOTS**

Regarding Cloots’s ideas, nineteenth-century historians were clear that Cloots was the foremost proponent of cosmopolitanism. For better or worse.

For his advocates he was a visionary, and, because of his fate, a martyr. For his opponents he was a mere madman, and, perhaps even worse in their eyes, a German. However, they all agreed that his ideas represented the first and best example of cosmopolitanism as a political theory. An analysis of nineteenth-century conceptions of cosmopolitanism could be interesting to understand why Cloots was then identified as a proponent of cosmopolitanism, but this is not the subject of this thesis. The author’s political leaning often indicates whether Cloots is represented as a cosmopolitan visionary and martyr or a cosmopolitan madman and German. The French Revolution, after all, did not end with Napoleon, but lasted well into the nineteenth century as intellectuals and politicians fought over its legacy and over the restitution of monarchy or the foundation of the republic.

Nineteenth Century

On the one side, left-wing or republican historians are very sympathetic to Cloots, who is recuperated in its republican fight against monarchism, and its socialist fight against liberalism. The first historian to publish a portrait of Cloots, with a sympathetic view, was Léonard Gallois (1789–1851) in his *Histoire des journaux et des journalistes de la révolution*, noting that Cloots was famous. French historian Georges Avenel (1828–1876) published a flamboyant panegyric as an historical biography of Cloots. It is, nonetheless, the most comprehensive nineteenth-century biography of Cloots. His two-volume monograph has been reprinted by a Parisian publishing house, Éditions du Champ Libre, which is mainly publishing works from the far-left and communist tradition. His biography is written with a narrative technique conjuring up to an heroic style, whilst his sources are mainly Cloots’s own writings and confessions throughout his work. The tone is dithyrambic, and much akin to Cloots’s own lyrical expressionism — although the latter’s was in line with eighteenth-century revolutionary harangues, and the former’s was in touch with nineteenth-century romanticism. In many respects, Cloots is restored favourably in Avenel’s biography due to an appreciation for his personality and thoughts.

Jean Jaurès (1859–1914) attributed a great role to Cloots. In his ground-breaking *Socialist History of the French Revolution* Jaurès wrote enthusi-

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22. Furet, *La Révolution*.
astically about Cloots and his system, seeing him as a visionary, a political thinker superior to the other revolutionaries, combining Rousseau, Adam Smith, Diderot, Humboldt, Helvetius, and Spinoza.26 There is no doubt that Jaurès contributed to Cloots’s reputation as a left-wing thinker, without the Marxist’s stages of history in human development:

Il n’est pas vrai de dire avec les économistes que le libre échange des produits fera tomber les antagonismes nationaux. Il n’est pas vrai de dire avec les révolutionnaires que la propagande de la liberté fera tomber les antagonismes économiques. Il y a là deux aspects liés et inséparables de la guerre. Et l’harmonie ne sera vraiment instituée que quand la libre communication des produits et l’exercice politique de la liberté se produiront à l’intérieur d’un seul État, d’un État unique enveloppant toutes les activités humaines. J’ose dire que Cloots a admirablement posé le problème ; j’ose dire que l’histoire, dont le travail infiniment complexe paraît convenir si peu au schéma simple de Cloots, se meut en ce sens : ... elle tend à constituer, en effet, sous l’apparente diversité des nations et sous la violence persistante des antagonismes, l’État unique, l’État humain, expression de la civilisation générale.27

Jaurès praises Cloots’s analysis, but he tempers it with its shortcoming for jumping directly to the goal, notwithstanding Marxist historical materialism and the different steps leading to a unique state; the current step being nationalism. Cloots’s faith in the people, the sans-culottes, is readapted as a socialist view of the growing strength of the proletariat. Jaurès added:

Le nationalisme fragmentaire, le nationalisme national ne s’élargira pas d’emblée en nationalisme humain : il passera par des formes « d’internationalisme » et une de ces formes sera la fédération des États.28

Jaurès approves of Cloots’s analysis, but considers that he is too enthusiastic and too optimistic. The nation-state is the necessary step before internationalism, and finally the unity of humankind. Interestingly, Jaurès uses the terms of ‘national nationalism’ and ‘human nationalism’. Jaurès had a non-nationalist approach to nationalism and understood what Cloots meant by the ‘nation of the human race’.29 Ernest Belfort Bax (1854–1926), English

27. Ibid., 78–79.
28. Ibid., 80.
29. See chapter on concepts of community infra for an explanation of these concepts.
barrister, socialist and anti-nationalist philosopher, historian, and journalist, was another example of an author who recognised Cloots as a cosmopolitan thinker: ‘The merit of the “Orator of the Human Race” consists in his having been the first to formulate Cosmopolitanism as a principle...’ 30 However, not all socialist historians are favourable to Cloots. Albert Mathiez (1874–1932), another French historian specialised in the revolution and famous for his Marxist interpretation, sketched a derisive portrait of Cloots, stressing that he was ‘universal’ with quotation marks. 31 More interestingly, Mathiez presented Cloots as someone who wanted to ‘suppress the nations’, sarcastically noting that he believed that the human race was one despite the differences of colours, languages, and mores. 32 Even if Mathiez did not appreciate Cloots, he recognised in him an anti-nationalist, and a universalist.

However, the view of Cloots as a left-wing figure should be nuanced. On the one hand, it is true that Cloots favoured a highly democratic and egalitarian view of society; for instance, Cloots’s letter to Burke asking him to witness in person how enlightened the people of Paris were, to his motion defending the right to vote of servants, and the establishment of his system as the culmination of the march of history into a world society without war and without inequalities. 33 On the other, Cloots did favour a libertarian approach to capitalism considering that the end of national rivalries would lead to a fruitful redistribution of wealth through unbridled trade, without the need for much governmental regulation. Moreover, Cloots was adamant regarding the necessity to defend property:

La propriété est la base de tout régime social ; quiconque y porte atteinte aura contre lui tous ceux qui possèdent, et la majorité de ceux qui ne possèdent pas. 34

On the other side, non-socialist historians questioned his sanity, calling him a ‘madman’, and mostly wrote his name ‘Clootz’ instead of ‘Cloots’, in an attempt to accentuate his Prussian origins and extraneity to the French Revolution, as well as exacerbating nineteenth-century French nationalism and opposition to Germany. This is the reason why Barbey d’Aurevilly (1808–1889) criticised Avenel. Barbey d’Aurevilly was catholic, partisan of absolute monarchy, and a romantic novelist, who theorised his own dandyism in Paris. His criticism is not against Avenel’s method, but against what he perceives as a new trend to rehabilitate the least glorious deeds and actors

32. Ibid., 55.
33. See chapter 1.
of the revolution. Least of them all Cloots! According to Barbey d’Aurevilly, no one had ever thought of writing a biography celebrating

... ce jocrisse allemand, pesant comme trois jocrisses français, et qui s’était intitulé lui même, avec la solennité d’un fou dans sa loge : l’Orateur du genre humain.35

Not particularly informed about Cloots, Barbey d’Aurevilly’s knowledge seems to be based on what had previously been disseminated about this ‘madman’ by Cloots’s opponents during the revolution. His behaviour, reportedly, was nothing more than ridiculous, if not the the very definition of ridicule:

... Anacharsis Cloots était, lui, non pas ridicule, mais le ridicule en soi ; et sans la goutte de sang de Louis XVI qui lui tâcha la main, il serait le ridicule tout seul, le ridicule le plus complet et le plus pur de la Révolution française.36

Another reason, according to Barbey d’Aurevilly, for not holding Cloots in high historical esteem was that he was German. And a Frenchman like Barbey d’Aurevilly knows how idiotic being a German means. Even Voltaire, whom Cloots idolised, would have mocked such a German, who could venture to believe that one can change nationality like breeches:

... Cloots resta Prussien et mourut tel, avec son utopie dans la tête, comme tout bon Allemand doit mourir. Rien n’y fit ! Ni sa parenté maternelle qui était hollandaise, ni ses trente-quatre ans passés en France pour se faire vif et Français, ni son adoption par deux départements français qui l’envoyèrent à la Convention, ni ses livres écrits dans cet enthousiaste langage tudesque que sa tête et son oreille allemande croyaient bonne-ment du français, ni son culte à deux genoux et à plat ventre pour Voltaire, qui se serait, lui, le Français, diablement moqué d’un pareil Prussien s’il l’avait connu ! Cloots resta, sous pavillon bonnet, ou cocarde étrangers, l’incommutable Allemand primitif qu’il était. Il n’y a qu’un Allemand, et un Allemand d’excellente race encore qui puisse croire sérieusement qu’on peut se dépoiller de sa nationalité, comme on ôte sa culotte, pour marcher dans la beauté de la nature nu et superbe humanitaire au conspect méprisé des nations.37

36. Ibid., 226.
37. Ibid.
But Barbey d’Aurevilly’s main intention appeared to be ridiculing Cloots and thereby Avenel’s work. His absolutist monarchism and extreme nationalism may explain his opposition to a biography of Cloots.

François Laurent (1810–1887), a Belgian administrator, legal scholar, and historian also presented Cloots as the main proponent of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism. Kant is not mentioned under cosmopolitanism, but instead studied under ‘liberal protestantism’ and for his views on ‘law and perpetual peace’, where Laurent argues that his understanding of a republican regime is a regime under the rule of law.\textsuperscript{38}

Pourquoi donnons-nous une place dans des études sur l’histoire de l’humanité à un homme qui frise la folie ? C’est que l’orateur du genre humain prêchant la république universelle nous montre l’écueil du cosmopolitisme qui enthousiasma le dix-huitième siècle et qui donna à la Révolution cette ardeur immoderée de propagande dont Anacharsis est le représentant le plus exagéré. Or c’est un devoir pour l’historien de signaler les erreurs qu’il rencontre sur son chemin quand elles ont égaré d’illustres penseurs et une grande nation.\textsuperscript{39}

This was, of course a different time, when history served as a guide for policy-making. Today, the historian may adopt Skinner’s view on ‘the duty of historians’: ‘don’t write history like that!’ It is equivalent to foreclosing before even knowing one had to foreclose a whole gamut of explanations. Declaring a belief to be false and giving a causal explanation for what led to this delusion is solely the work of imagination and it is more likely to be wrong than historical.\textsuperscript{40}

\textit{Contemporary Studies}

During the nineteenth century, therefore, Cloots was not only still well-known, but he was known as a central figure of cosmopolitanism. This notoriety and this identification with cosmopolitanism disappeared during the twentieth century, except for a PhD thesis on Cloots and ‘French cosmopolitanism’.\textsuperscript{41} It is only recently that Cloots has reappeared from the


\textsuperscript{39} François Laurent, \textit{Histoire du droit des gens et des relations internationales}, vol. 15: L’Empire (Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1869), 186.


footnotes of history to the footnotes of cosmopolitan political theory. A couple of studies are devoted to him. Bevilacqua and Cheneval have written articles on his political thought. Cavallar has briefly compared his ideas with Kant’s in a study on a history of international law, while Kleingeld has dedicated a whole chapter to him equally comparing his ideas with Kant’s. Israel has also mentioned Cloots as part of these French Revolutionaries that were inspired by what he calls the ‘Radical Enlightenment’. However, this study will demonstrate that this is a gross generalisation of Cloots’s thought.

Intellectual historians who have studied Cloots have labelled him under different categories. Firstly, I would like to distance myself from Israel’s labelling Cloots as part of the ‘Radical Enlightenment’. Israel argues that Cloots is among the revolutionary leaders who derived their egalitarian and democratic concepts from the ‘Radical Enlightenment’. By ‘Radical Enlightenment’, Israel designates the intellectual movement that stems from Spinoza and the underground philosophical movement known as Spinozism that succeeded it, which, according to Israel, influenced the revolutionary rhetoric of Robespierre and the Jacobins, more than the English republican tradition. Israel considers Cloots as criticising Frederick notably for condemning monarchy and aristocracy, and for his ‘unenlightened’ intolerance of Jews. However, this study will show that Cloots praised Frederick in his pre-revolutionary writings. It is true to argue that Cloots defended the Jews, and that may be a ‘radical theme’, but it is a rather thin connection to the thesis of ‘Radical Enlightenment’. Israel also includes Cloots with


46. Ibid., 26.


49. Ibid., 495.
Mirabeau, Sieyès, Condorcet, Volney, Brissot, Paine, Maréchal, and Mercier for being in favour of ‘representative democracy’, but Cloots’s thought was to have all countries to send a representative to the national assembly in Paris, a rather unique proposition even if it had affinities with Volney, Paine, and Condorcet to some extent.\(^5^0\) Moreover, Cloots is perhaps closer to Maréchal and Mercier when it comes to the ‘natural republican’ tradition, but closer to Paine and Condorcet when it comes to the ‘cosmopolitan republican’ tradition, as this study hopes to demonstrate. In general, Israel puts Cloots in a group with other revolutionaries concerning very vague positions such as being anti-philosophes, or against kings and monarchy itself.\(^5^1\) That is true to some extent, but this is a very wide category, and again, Cloots had different ideas of what a republic without kings should be, and, like many others, was not opposed to kings before the revolution. It is wrong to affirm that Cloots ‘openly disdained the multitude for their ignorance and addiction to “superstition”’.\(^5^2\) As this thesis will argue, Cloots fought superstition, but believed in the progress of reason among the population as Parisians showed with the revolution; as explained previously, Cloots was even mocked by Burke for praising so highly the commoners of Paris in their philosophical knowledge.\(^5^3\)

Cheneval was the first to label Cloots’s political thought as ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’.\(^5^4\) Cheneval fleshed out many of the elements that this thesis will analyse in order to qualify Cloots’s system as ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. Cheneval notes the foundational role of the 1789 Déclaration des droits as a ‘primitive contract’ in Cloots’s system and how liberty granted by nature gives every individual sovereignty. Cheneval also notes how Cloots dismisses climate theory and Montesquieu in order to justify the universality of individual liberty, and how Cloots uses Rousseau’s concept of general will dismissing the need for a small population in any political association for the same reason that corporations should not exist. Cheneval very rightly explains Cloots’s concept of ‘nation unique du genre humain’ by noting how the concept of ‘nation’ was not yet nationalist and was used to express a revolutionary cosmopolitanism. Cheneval also notes the tension in such a view with the imperialism that followed the French Revolution after Cloots’s death, whilst emphasising how Cloots’s system is tolerant and inclusive of the diversity of religions and opinions. Cheneval also notes Cloots’s praise for a global liberal economic order, and how this goes hand in hand with world peace, albeit in a very different scheme than what other eighteenth-century peace projects had devised. This thesis analyses all of these elements in more detail. However, Cheneval does not give a defini-

\(^{50}\) Israel, Democratic Enlightenment, 644.
\(^{51}\) Ibid., 942.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., 915.
\(^{53}\) See chapter 1.
\(^{54}\) Cheneval, ‘Der kosmopolitische Republikanismus’.
tion or an understanding of what cosmopolitanism is, or at least not directly and explicitly, even if he compares Cloots’s thought with contemporary cosmopolitan theories such as ‘cosmopolitan communautarianism’.  

Cavallar argues that Cloots’s thought ‘can be labelled cosmopolitan republicanism or republican cosmopolitanism’. By that, Cavallar identifies Cloots together with other thinkers who tried to ‘reformulate republicanism with a focus on large states’, and classifies them into two categories: partisans of an alliance of republics, on the one hand, and Cloots, who is in favour of a world republic without states, on the other, because the ‘social contract should be global’. In a way, Cavallar is right in his description of Cloots. However, as the previous chapters have shown, there is much more to it, because there is much less to it: the republicanism that Cloots adopts is close to the natural republicanism of the Jacobins that Edelstein has identified. Cloots’s republicanism is actually the absence of any state and even government on the world scale. Moreover, it is wrong to see Cloots as being in favour of a global social contract. Again, the natural republicanism in which his thought emerges denies the existence of a state of nature that has been left through a social contract to join a state of society. Society is nature, and we all live in the state of nature, which is society. Unfortunately, humankind did not follow the natural order in which there are no borders. These divisions were, for Cloots and the Jacobins, the work of monarchs and priests, a result of centuries of wrong thinking and superstition. The French Revolution marked, for Cloots, the beginning of a new era under the sign of science and the application of the ‘science of man’. Finally, it is misreading Cloots and the revolutionaries to state that he represented cosmopolitanism as opposed to nationalism. It is debatable whether nationalism and cosmopolitanism could be said to exist at the time, and equally debatable whether they are opposed to one another.

Bevilacqua does not explicitly refer to Cloots’s system as ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’, but he does refer to it as ‘a chapter in the history of cosmopolitan thought’ and as articulated in the context of a ‘republican experiment’. Bevilacqua is also right in considering Cloots as articulating several political concepts in his own original way. However, as can be inferred from this present study, Bevilacqua is taking a limited view of the context of Cloots’s thought to characterise his system as the abolition of the state system for a world state and the abolition of politics, in order to situate Cloots as a precursor of anarchism. It is true that Cloots’s system considers the disappearance of the state system, but it is not exactly his identified purpose, as it would be the purpose for an anarchist. It is more rightly a consequence of

55. Ibid., 391–392.
56. Cavallar, Imperfect Cosmopolis, 103.
57. Ibid.
his analysis regarding nature and universality; as will be argued, a thought
closer to the physiocrats and their view that obeying nature leads to the
good functioning of society, and hence dispenses for the need of adminis-
tration. By the same token, Bevilacqua states that Cloots professed the end
of politics, and in a way this is true, but, again, this is the result of Cloots’s
analysis regarding nature and natural law: only through unity, which is ob-
served everywhere in nature, will conflicts seize between peoples, and the
respect of the laws of nature should render an executive government unne-
cessary.

Kleingeld considers Cloots’s thought in the second chapter, ‘Kant and
Cloots on global peace’, of her account of Kant’s cosmopolitanism.59 How-
ever, the chapter is more an analysis and praise of Kant’s federalist plan as op-
posed to a perceived imperialistic imposition of a despotic world state that
Cloots is supposed to represent. The mere use of the terms ‘world republic’
and ‘world state’ to Cloots’s thought is already problematic: Cloots never
used those expressions. ‘République du genre humain’, ‘république uni-
verselle’, ‘république régénératrice’, ‘république des hommes’, ‘république
des individus unis’, ‘république des droits de l’homme’, or ‘république des
sans-culottes’, those are some of the expressions Cloots employs, but not
‘république du monde’ or ‘république mondiale’, and even less ‘État mon-
dial’ since he rarely mentions the concept of ‘state’ at all. Once, Cloots
does write: ‘L’Univers formera un seul État, l’État des Individus-Unis, ...
la République-universelle’,60 but Cloots is hardly advocating a World State
the same way Kleigeld sees it, as I hope to argue convincingly by the end
of this thesis. Kleingeld’s analysis is not an historical analysis of Cloots’s
thought, but a philosophical appraisal of Kant’s, and, as such, misconstrues
Cloots’s thought not only historically but also philosophically. Perhaps the
first and biggest issue with Kleingeld’s view of Cloots is that she considers
him as founding his ‘world-state cosmopolitanism’ on a Rousseauian social
contract theory.61 As this thesis shows, Cloots moved intellectually away
from Rousseau through the years. In his revolutionary writings, if Cloots
mentions positively Rousseau and the Social Contract, it is in his answer
to Burke for justifying equality among men, and thus popular sovereignty,
from which the king’s authority derives, and leads Cloots to deride the at-
titude of the king’s brother claiming a right of passage, so to speak, the pre-
eminence of his royal coach over others in the streets of Paris.62 Otherwise,
Cloots is critical of Rousseau’s views on religion that he considers intoler-
ant, and characterised Rousseau’s small republics as a mistake, not only be-

59. Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, 40–71.
60. Anacharsis Cloots, Écrits révolutionnaires, 1790–1794 (Paris: Editions Champ libre,
1979), 396.
61. Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, 40.
62. Anacharsis Cloots, ‘Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais’, in Écrits révolutionnaires,
cause of their size, but also because of their multiplicity. Most importantly, Cloots rejects any notion of a transition from a state of nature to a state of society, and hence rejects the existence of a social contract. If contract at all, Cloots mentions a ‘primitive contract’ of the human race, which grants moral authority to humankind, thus conflicting with the moral authority of nature as argued in the chapter on nature and natural law.

Another troubling reading of Cloots by Kleingeld is that she seems to equate Cloots’s position with France in general concerning the revolutionary wars. It is especially puzzling to mention ‘Cloots’ military exploits’.63 Even though Cloots was educated at the Académie des nobles, he was not a soldier. First, Kleingeld seems to dismiss the fact that Cloots was originally against the war, subtitling the République universelle, adresse aux tyrannicides with a case that the pen (in this instance the quill) is mightier than the sword, thus as the populations become enlightened they will rise by themselves against their kings and queens. Secondly, if it is true that Cloots was subsequently in favour of the war with Austria and then Prussia, it is also true that he was arrested at the end of 1793 and executed in 1794. Should he be held responsible for the next two decades of European turmoil? As argued in this thesis, Cloots was against a monarch, a single person holding executive power, and especially a head of state in charge of armies. Therefore, it is very unlikely that Cloots would have looked kindly on Napoleon’s actions, had he been alive to witness them.

Kleingeld also reads the last pages of Bases constitutionnelles, citing pp. 40–42, as Cloots’s ‘paternalism’ for, she alleges, wanting to coerce the inclusion into the ‘World Republic’ on the ground that the judgement of populations living under a monarch is impaired.64 It may be page 39 instead that Kleingeld had in mind, in which, indeed, Cloots does advocate intervention to overthrow the ‘tyrants’ and liberate the populations that are not considered capable of freeing themselves on their own. However, Cloots does not include the coercive inclusion into his ‘universal republic’, but believes in all good faith in the veracity of his ‘system’ based on the Declaration, which no one would reasonably reject according to him. So Cloots believes that the ‘freed’ populations would join by their own volition. It is not known what Cloots would have to say if the populations would have denied joining the ‘universal republic’, but based on his concept of ‘cosmopolitan reason’, as argued in this thesis, it is possible to speculate that he would accept this position and either capitulate, or consider that it is a matter of increasing the intellectual conversations to convince these populations. Kleingeld’s reading of Cloots resembles a straw man fallacy against a

63. Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, 55.
64. Ibid.
contemporary theory of an imposed contractualist world state, which Cloots did not defend.\textsuperscript{65}

\textbf{COSMOPOLITANISM}

In this thesis, I argue on the same line as Cavallar and Cheneval that Cloots’s political thought should be called ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. However, unlike Cavallar and Cheneval, I argue in this thesis what we should understand by ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. What do we mean by ‘cosmopolitan’? If cosmopolitan refers to cosmopolitanism, so what do we mean by ‘cosmopolitanism’? It is here useful to separate this -ism into the signifié and the signifiant: cosmopolitanism as a mental representation, and cosmopolitanism as a word for describing this mental representation.\textsuperscript{66} It may then be easy to look at eighteenth-century occurrences of ‘cosmopolitanism’ in order to understand what that meant, and thus to describe Cloots’s ‘system’ as either cosmopolitan, universal or imperial.\textsuperscript{67} However, cosmopolitanism as a signifiant seems to appear under two denominations and not very often: cosmopolitisme and cosmopolisme. Cosmopolisme appears once as describing cosmopolitanism as a political thought before the revolution, as will be shown below. After the revolution, cosmopolisme and cosmopolitisme seem to be employed as derogatory terms to describe cosmopolitanism as practiced during the revolution.

Cloots never uses the expression cosmopolitisme, and only once cosmopolisme. However, Cloots does use the word cosmopolite, but he seems to give his own signifié to the signifiant. Cloots also uses the expression ‘citoyen du monde’, but only once during the revolution: ‘Le juif, avili dans le reste du monde, est devenu citoyen français, citoyen du monde, par nos décrets philosophiques’.\textsuperscript{68} Before the revolution, Cloots also used the expression ‘citoyen du monde’, but in a different understanding: ‘Messieurs, que nous importe le gouvernement, à nous citoyens du monde, à nous qui formons un cercle immense dont le centre est à Paris, mais dont les rayons pénètrent

\textsuperscript{65}. Pagden also mentions Cloots among other thinkers of universal peace projects, but unfortunately solely relies on Kleingeld’s reading of Cloots and is therefore not only misinformed on biographical elements, but also on Cloots’s project. Anthony Pagden, \textit{The Enlightenment: And Why it Still Matters} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 290–291.


\textsuperscript{68}. Cloots, \textit{Ecrits révolutionnaires}, 315.
Cloots expresses the view that the *musée* can work and meet in Paris because its publications can overcome censorship by publishing in Geneva, Neuchâtel, Bruxelles, or Maastricht.

Skinner has argued that a *signifié* may exist even if a *signifiant* does not; a concept is not necessarily based on a word, and a concept is not a necessary prerequisite for understanding the correct application of a corresponding term. Or, in Skinner’s own study, liberty can exist without liberalism, before liberalism. And liberalism may not necessarily be about liberty. What that means for cosmopolitanism in eighteenth-century France is that, even though the term rarely appears, it may exist nonetheless as a concept. In fact, the rare occurrences of the words *cosmopolisme* and *cosmopolitisme* may mark the beginning of the philosophical consciousness that such a thought exists (*signifié*), and hence needs a word to describe it (*signifiant*). What this also means is that the term ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘citizen of the world’ may or may not be related to cosmopolitanism. Moreover, it also means that, by the same token, the term *nation* may or may not be related to nationalism, and *patrie* to patriotism, but they may be related to cosmopolitanism. This is a position that some scholars have taken regarding cosmopolitanism, which I also adopt here.

**Historiography**

‘Cosmopolitanism’ is not a word that appeared frequently in eighteenth-century France, whereas ‘cosmopolitan’ was more popular. This would explain why some historians have rejected ‘cosmopolitanism’ as a significant historical category of political thought. For instance, O’Brien states: ‘Cosmopolitanism is no longer a term much favoured by intellectual historians: as an idea, it seems to lack intellectual content; as a category of political thought, it has no referent’. Works of reference on the Enlightenment do not mention cosmopolitanism. Neither the *Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought* nor the *Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy* mention cosmopolitanism or the term cosmopolitan, whereas they do mention either ‘patriotism’ or ‘nation’. Similarly, Kors’s

73. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, eds., *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Knud
Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment has an entry under ‘cosmopolitanism’ only to cross-refer to the entry on ‘sociability’. However, the entry on ‘sociability’ is not explicit regarding cosmopolitanism. Alternatively, some historians have undertaken a Begriffsgeschichte of the ‘citizen of the world’. Another related alternative is to write the history of supranational identities during the Enlightenment.

However, several historical studies have defined cosmopolitanism in the Enlightenment. Cosmopolitanism is then seen as elitist, abstract, and utopian. Schlereth for instance associates the following characteristics to cosmopolitanism:

... an aspiration of the elite intellectual class that Voltaire called the world’s petite [petit] troupeau des philosophes; ... more symbolic and theoretical than actual and practical; ... a psychological construct that prompted many philosophes to replace or to modify their attachment to their geographical region or sphere of activity with a more expansive, albeit abstract, attitude toward the whole world.

Facing these conceptions of cosmopolitanism as elitist and abstract, other historians have shown the contrary. Gauthier argues that natural law theory produced the Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen of 1789; a very concrete political result of Enlightenment cosmopolitan thinking. Belissa shows that a very concrete cosmopolitan policy, a ‘cosmopolicy’,

78. The expression can be found in Voltaire’s correspondance with d’Alembert: ‘Pourquoi faut-il que les fanatiques s’épaulent tous les uns les autres, et que les philosophes soient désunis et dispersés? Réunissez le petit troupeau; courage’. In Voltaire, Œuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol. 59 (Paris: chez Thomine et Fortic, 1822), 3293.
with the law of nations existed. It is not a study of cosmopolitanism as a philosophy, but Belissa identifies what he calls a ‘cosmopolitique du droit des gens’:

Les pratiques diplomatiques et juridiques de l'Ancien Régime sont soumises à une critique radicale qui permet l'élaboration d'une nouvelle perspective politique que l'on pourrait nommer une cosmopolitique du droit des gens, c'est-à-dire un projet visant à la construction d'une société civile des nations, dans laquelle le droit des gens cesse d’être une simple jurisprudence positive de la guerre et des ambassades pour devenir le lien éthique entre les peuples. La société civile des nations est la projection, dans la sphère des relations entre les peuples, de l'idée d'État civil à l'intérieur d'une société particulière. La perspective de la cosmopolitique du droit des gens revient donc à celle de l'organisation des droits de l'homme dans leur universalité. 81

The study of peace plans and of the law of nations is also a way of studying the ‘cosmopolitan ideal’. 82 By the same token, Toulmin argues that the idea of a cosmopolis — understood as a will to unify the world around a Newtonian conception of nature — has been present in Western philosophy since the seventeenth century, thus making it a key concept of modernity. 83

Cosmopolitanism was perhaps not so abstract, but some scholars studying cosmopolitanism have noted its opposition to nationalism and also often connected the view that the French Revolution represented a transition from cosmopolitanism to nationalism: ‘Il cosmopolitismo politico si inscrive in una prima fase di questa presa di coscienza, quella in cui la nazione è messa al bando dall’elite intellettuale’. 84 This narrative could be explained by the fact that ‘methodological nationalism’ has prevailed over ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ in the social sciences as a paradigm. 85 The fields of history, world history and global history have recently emerged as powerful alternatives to national history. There is nonetheless a lack of reflection regarding the theorisation of the subject, which is even more crucial for intellectual history. The triumph of the nation-state has become the dominant

84. Frijhoff, ‘Cosmopolitismo’, 23.
narrative, until globalisation questioned this. However, one of the very first studies in the history of cosmopolitanism, from an author paradoxically more famous for his history of the nation-state, contradicted the narrative of an eclipse of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism for nineteenth-century nationalism:

The current view is that an epoch of cosmopolitan thinking preceded the awakening of the national idea and of the idea of the national state in our country also. If we should demonstrate no more than that in this study, we shall have said nothing new. However, this same view also sees cosmopolitanism and national feeling as two modes of thought that mutually exclude each other, that do battle with each other, and that supplant each other. Such a view cannot satisfy the historical mind that has a deeper awareness of circumstances and that insists on a thoroughly detailed demonstration of every stage in the evolution of ideas.

Meinecke’s study of cosmopolitanism and nationalism rejected this Manichaean opposition between the two. Somehow forgotten by cosmopolitan thinkers, his views are indeed highly interesting for cosmopolitanism. Focusing on Germany during the Enlightenment and the nineteenth century, his ‘main objective [is] to illuminate the true relationship of universal and national ideals in the growth of the modern German idea of the national state.’ The concept of ‘humanitas’ could only grow out of the friction between two nations. And inversely, a nation could only come out of universal and cosmopolitan ideas. It is important not to understand cosmopolitanism as opposed to nationalism in studying Cloots and other revolutionary writers because it would otherwise not be possible to understand how Cloots could speak of ‘nation of the human race’, or how French principles of government are universal and not circumscribed to French borders.

Another historical study of the cosmopolitan by van den Heuvel equally contradicts such a basic opposition between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. If the cosmopolite has no national prejudice, and equally social difference played no role in this Salon culture, then:

86. See Bartelson’s argument that the nation-state is more rightly a mere parenthesis in the long history of political thought oriented towards achieving a world community, in Jens Bartelson, Visions of World Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., 20.
Das Selbstverständnis des cosmopolite und die Auffassung von dem, was *cosmopolitisme* sei, beinhaltete aber nicht ein politisches Programm in dem Sinne, daß eine Überwindung der noch kaum voll entwickelten Nationalstaaten angestrebt wurde. „Kosmopolitismus“ dokumentierte sich in einer Anteilnahme am Fortschritt aller Nationen, war somit international und nicht programmatisch anti-national orientiert.\(^90\)

Kymlicka is also skeptical about this opposition as he takes Max Boehm’s definition of cosmopolitanism: ‘the form which cosmopolitanism assumes is in general conditioned by the particular social entity or group ideal from which it represents a reaction’.\(^91\) Cosmopolitanism is thus defined as a ‘reaction’, an alternative against the dominant form of social entity. Kymlicka notes that the opposition between cosmopolitanism and nationalism is a ‘cliché’, and that the precise points of opposition are not clear. Cosmopolitanism according to Kylimcka assumes the assimilation of smaller ‘backward’ national identities into a larger ‘more advanced’ group, until eventually forming a single cosmopolitan one. Cosmopolitans did not predict any resilience of national identities because of the perceived lack of imposition by any dominant group, but rather because it favours a rational individual choice of choosing this option in order to attain free and equal citizenship. For Kymlicka, there are very limited disagreements between the two and much more commonalities. The disagreement ‘concerns the role of the state in protecting and affirming national identities ...’.\(^92\) For Enlightenment cosmopolitans the state is purely protecting individual liberties and not national cultures or identities, whereas it is the legitimate protector of those for liberal nationalists. Furthermore, cosmopolitans argue for the right of free mobility across borders, whereas liberal nationalists favour the right of the state to limit the numbers of immigrants. However, they both share the same commitment to universal values of freedom and equality. Therefore, it is preferable to say that ‘liberal nationalism involves a redefinition of cosmopolitanism’\(^93\). The same argument is made elsewhere, that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are not only mutually compatible, but their synthesis is necessary to build a stable world-order.\(^94\) On the same line, Conversi also argues that

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92. Ibid., 219.

93. Ibid., 220.

Cosmopolitanism and nationalism shared the same intellectual foundations in the idea of natural rights, but, once applied to real life, their interests increasingly and inevitably diverged.\(^ {95} \)

By the same token, as Surrateau argues, the discussion on the supposed contradiction between the concepts of patriotism and cosmopolitanism must be informed by a clear separation and definition of connected terms such as ‘nation’, ‘\( \text{patrie} \)’, and ‘cosmopolitan’.\(^ {96} \)

Moreover, the view then that cosmopolitanism is a united set of views should be challenged. This means not only that there are different versions of cosmopolitanism, as Kleingeld argues, but also that it should not necessarily be identified as ‘eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism’.\(^ {97} \) Rather, there could be something like an *eighteenth-century political thought with a cosmopolitan intent*.

Dédéyan intended a study of cosmopolitanism in Enlightenment France and Europe, but he is wrong when he argues that the word ‘\( \text{cosmopolitisme} \)’ did not exist in the eighteenth century and only appeared in 1863.\(^ {98} \) As I demonstrate below, one finds mention of it in 1756. However, he is probably right in his general assertion that cosmopolitanism as we understand it today, as a *signifiant* securely fixed to a *signifié*, appeared together with nationalism in the nineteenth century. This research is however out of the scope of the present work, but should be investigated in future studies. This would also explain why some historians have studied ‘cosmopolitanism’ in eighteenth-century French political thought with a contemporary understanding of cosmopolitanism, a negative view of an elitist, abstract, and utopian project, without being troubled by the rare apparitions of the word at the time. This understanding is of course opposed to nationalism as popular, concrete, and real, even though it was just as elitist, abstract, and utopian in the late 1780s and early 1790s. For other scholars, the conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism remained constricted to the concept of travelling without feeling attached to one particular country. As such, it was perceived as negative, an excess of travels is potentially dangerous for the soul or for public health in general. As van den Heuvel et al. note, the expression ‘cosmopolisme’ appeared together with ‘cosmopolitisme’.\(^ {99} \) ‘The fact that both words appear during the same period, and that they did not get any mention in


\(^{97}\) Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany’, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60, no. 3 (1999): 505–524.


\(^{99}\) Heuvel, Reichardt and Schmitt, ‘Cosmopolite, Cosmopol(i)isme’. 
dictionaries goes to show that neither was the signifié of cosmopolitanism fixed nor was there any agreement on what the significant was. Both words denote the existence of a will to create a neologism, and hence the existence of a conscience that such a thing exists. But what exactly did these neologisms convey?

In our present study of Cloots’s thought it is necessary to take these studies into consideration with the following lessons: cosmopolitan and cosmopolitanism are not necessarily related; by the same token nationalism and nation are not necessarily related, in that nation can be a concept used in cosmopolitanism, and that cosmopolitanism is not necessarily opposed to nationalism; finally, these two -isms are mainly products of the nineteenth century, and should therefore be approached contextually in the eighteenth.

Regarding Cloots, this leaves us to look at how he used the words ‘cosmopolite’, ‘citoyen du monde’, and how cosmopolitanism can be understood in his thought. As this thesis will show, Cloots used the concept of nation in his political thought, which can be called ‘cosmopolitanism’ in a revolutionary French context. Cloots was also not opposed to nationalism if we understand nationalism as the political congruence of nation and state, and if we understand sovereignty as belonging to humankind ultimately.

‘Cosmopolite’, ‘Cosmopolitain’

Fink’s account of cosmopolitanism during the Enlightenment starts directly with the definition of the word ‘cosmopolite’ being defined in Furetière’s *Dictionnaire universel* in 1690 indirectly under the article ‘patrie’: ‘Un philosophe est partout en sa patrie’. A clear reference to the stoic tradition.100 According to Hazard, the word ‘cosmopolite’ appears in French during the sixteenth century, but it is really during the eighteenth century that the word becomes popular.101 In the 1721 edition of the *Dictionnaire de Trévoux*, the article ‘cosmopolitain, cosmopolitaine’ explains from the Latin root:

**COSMOPOLITAIN, aine.s.m. & f. Cosmopita, Cosmopolitânu.** On dit quelquefois en badinant, pour signifier un homme qui n’a pas de demeure fixe, ou bien un homme qui nulle part n’est étranger. Il vient de κόσμος, le monde, & πόλις, ville, & signifie un homme dont tout le monde est la ville, ou la patrie. Un ancien Philosophe étant interrogé d’où il était, répondit, Je suis Cosmopolitain. L’Auteur inconnu d’un excellent Traité de Chymie, intitulé *Lumen Chymicum*, s’est donné le

The word embodied at the same time the idea of a traveller who could mingle easily in different cultures, and a philosophical stance about being a citizen of the whole world. It is probably for lexicographical reasons that the author suggested the adjective *cosmopolitain* rather than *cosmopolite*. This hesitation between *cosmopolitain* and *cosmopolite* shows the novelty of the word and the difficulties in fixing a good usage of the adjective. The French grammar had not yet incorporated a new understanding and usage of the existing *cosmopolite*.

The reference in this definition to the unknown author of a textbook on chemistry who signed as ‘Le cosmopolite’ is the Scottish alchemist Alexandre Seton (Alexander Sethon), who died in 1603, and whose pen name was later taken by Michał Sędziwój (Michael Sendivogius, Sendzimir) (1566–1636), Polish alchemist, philosopher, and medical doctor. Seton was called ‘the Cosmopolite’ due to his travelling from city to city to show the workings of alchemy. However, his story is a curious one since not much is known of him apart from the 3 years he spent travelling from town to town converting the skeptics to alchemy. It is not even known when he was born or if his name was indeed Seton. As for being called ‘The Cosmopolite’, was it only due to his travelling, or was there also a reference to the above mentioned philosopher, in search of truth?

The word ‘cosmopolite’ took a cultural meaning — became embedded in culture — in the popular novel of a colourful cynic (both in a philosophical and pejorative sense) named Louis-Charles Fougeret de Monbron (1706–1760). He famously opens his novel *Le cosmopolite ou le citoyen du monde* with a sentence resonating as a kind of motto, which Lord Byron actually quoted later as epigraph in *Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage*:

L’univers est une espèce de livre, dont on n’a lu que la première page quand on n’a vu que son pays. J’en ai feuilleté un assez grand nombre, que j’ai trouvé également mauvaises. Cet examen ne m’a point été infructueux. Je haïssais ma patrie. Toutes

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les impertinences des peuples divers, parmi lesquels j’ai vécu,
m’ont réconcilié avec elle. Quand je n’aurais tiré d’autre béné-
ifice de mes voyages que celui-là, je n’en regretterais ni les frais,
ni les fatigues.  

In this first paragraph that serves as the introduction to his travelling
memories in *Le cosmopolite*, one can sum up everything that Fougeret un-
derstands by ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘world citizen’. It is an individualistic rela-
tion to communities, and a cynical understanding of the term. To be certain,
a few lines later he ascertains that he was looking in his travels for ‘Diogenes’
man’. In other words, one is only born in a community by accident. It is but
a fate, and one is free to change it if one feels like it. Visibly, France, and es-
pecially Paris was boring to the eyes of Fougeret, and therefore he wanted
to find another community. Hence the travels. He was not travelling only
for the sake of being open-minded, but also to find this homeland, *patrie*,
where he could declare as in the epigraph of the book ‘*patria est ubicum-
que est bene*’ (‘the homeland is wherever it is fine’). It turned out that after
all his travels, this homeland was France. One should note here that Cloots
uses a similar Latin quotation as epigraph to one of his books: ‘*ubi bene ubi
patria*’.  

But the journey was necessary, and epitomised the supposed ab-
sence of attachment of cosmopolitans, as well as their individualistic refusal
of allegiance to a particular fatherland.

This cynical cosmopolite who despises his own homeland is also contrasted
by a positive understanding of the cosmopolitan, in legal and political
theory, especially by those considering theories of *jus gentium* (the law of
nations), and other attempts in natural law theory to defend the individual
human being against societies.

For example, Rousseau was highly influenced by the *Projet de paix per-
pétuelle et universelle* of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. So much so, that Rous-
seau re-edited his project. A position that provoked Voltaire’s mocking re-
mark in the parody of a letter by the Chinese Emperor, asking to be a mem-
ber of this so-called ‘universal’ project, which was in fact eurocentric.  

Thus, it is this spirit that Rousseau praises ‘quelques grandes âmes cosmo-
polite’ in his *Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité parmi les hommes* (1755):

> Le droit civil étant ainsi devenu la règle commune des citoyens,
> la loi de nature n’eut plus lieu qu’entre les diverses sociétés où,
> sous le nom de droit des gens, elle fut tempérée par quelques

106. Jean-Louis Fougeret de Montbron, *Le cosmopolite, ou Le citoyen du monde* (Lon-
don: [s.n.], 1753), 3–4.
in *Voltaire : Mélange*, ed. Jacques van den Heuvel, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Gallimard,
conventions tacites pour rendre le commerce possible et suppléer à la commisération naturelle, qui, perdant de société à société presque toute la force qu’elle avait d’homme à homme, ne réside plus que dans quelques grandes âmes cosmopolites qui franchissent les barrières imaginaires qui séparent les peuples et qui, à l’exemple de l’être souverain qui les a créées, embrassent tout le genre humain dans leur bienveillance.  

As for the Academy, it is only in the fourth edition of the *dictionnaire de l’Académie* (1762) that the word ‘cosmopolite’ appears, although with a negative connotation and very close to Voltaire’s definition of *patrie*: ‘Celui qui n’adopte point de patrie. *Un cosmopolite n’est pas un bon citoyen*’.  

From 1760 on, the word has acquired a wide-spread use, also as a synonym to what we would today call ‘transnational’. It is this transnational dimension that gives a negative dimension to cosmopolitans as citizens. My contention here is that since political thought moved towards a democratic republican understanding, a citizen had to ‘love’ his *patrie* in order for the Republic to function — as Montesquieu famously argues in *L’Esprit des lois*.  

According to Montesquieu ‘virtue’ is the principle of a republic, understood as ‘l’amour de la loi et de la patrie’. If the cosmopolitan is understood as in Fougeret’s meaning — an individualistic traveller — then he cannot be a good citizen in a republic since he is likely to lack the virtue necessary for its functioning.  

This would explain why Rousseau seemingly ‘changes’ his mind about these ‘cosmopolitans’ when he writes in *Émile*, I (1762):

Défiez-vous de ces cosmopolites qui vont chercher loin dans leurs livres des devoirs qu’ils dédaignent de remplir autour d’eux. Tel philosophe aime les Tartares, pour être dispensé d’aimer ses voisins.  

However, the use of ‘cosmopolite’ was also positive in tending towards a position above any identity — the above mentioned philosopher in search of a universal objective point of view, the truth, on national or international matters. One finds several examples of this throughout the century in pamphlets that seek to re-establish, in the view of their author, the truth  

110. Ibid., 360.  
about a social or political matter. In order to do so, they signed the pamphlet as ‘cosmopolite’ or using other similar names. Explaining this general phenomenon of ‘cosmopolitan monikers’, Rosenfeld argues that the Republic of Letters enabled the existence of some ‘transnational space’ for expression, in which authors deliberately placed themselves in an unrooted position:

the idea of political engagement was not yet necessarily dependent on one’s sense of belonging to a distinctive subgroup of humanity. Rather, public action often depended upon the opposite: deliberate deracination and namelessness on the part of the individual subject.113

The rhetorical stance is to present oneself both as a singular individual and as a representative member of a boundaryless community of humankind. This served several purposes. It ‘opened up a space for a new kind of non-nationally-specific political identity and engagement’, and it ‘rendered feasible a new type of secular political vision outside the related frameworks of both the nation-state and the locality’.114

In a way, this rhetorical position created a sense of cosmopolitan identity because of its reference to universal values and characteristics — be it conceptions of human rights or physical conceptions of the true laws of morality. Many of the uses of the monikers were associated not only with a sense of cosmopolitan identity and a-national positioning on political affairs, but also a certain claim of truth. This claim of truth is made possible by a century seeing morals and politics as a ‘science’ on the same level as the natural sciences that can be deduced by reason from nature and man. Humans obey rules of nature, be they physical or moral. By claiming the status of a ‘cosmopolitan’ speaker or writer, it is possible to assert an alleged universal truth. However, one has to note that the greatest thinkers of morals as a science did not use a pseudonym. Those who did use the title ‘cosmopolite’ or any other claim to speak for humankind did so with a claim to philosophical wisdom and truth to make their point, which makes it immediately as suspicious as any company claiming to offer the best product in the world. This is related to the fact that the word ‘cosmopolite’ at the time had a dual meaning grammatically, and philosophically. Proof of the success of the word, some authors abused it to remain anonymous and exploit the potential ‘objectivity’ behind the term ‘cosmopolitan’.

For instance, an anonymous pamphlet published around 1750 is simply entitled Réflexions d’un cosmopolite. It starts with this definition of the author:

114. Ibid., 32.
The self-proclaimed ‘cosmopolite’ is a sort of philosopher in search of truth, detached from any obligation, any government, power, or culture, and who ponders questions of interest to the benefit of humankind free from any interference. The ‘cosmopolite’ travels the world and hence knows about world politics. Referring to Ciceronian rhetoric, the author argues that he can take an opponent’s point of view (in utramque partem), anticipate them in order to refute them in advance. In this sense the ‘cosmopolite’ is a disinterested philosopher whose only goal is to reach the truth.

Another example is the Lettre d’un cosmopolite à l’ombre de Calas in 1765. The author does not explicitly explain who he is as a ‘cosmopolite’, but a few elements come out from this short épître. It is a poem dedicated to the defence of a ‘victim’ of the ‘furors of fanatism’ in the ‘most philosophical century’, which should scare the ‘reasonable reader’. Calas deserves the ‘truth’ against ‘errors and prejudices’, and his name is to be associated with the one of Socrates. The point of view taken by the anonymous author is the one of ‘reason’ in order to debunk ‘truth’ and vanquish ‘errors and prejudices’. In this sense, the ‘cosmopolite’ has little to do with the traveller or the ‘bad citizen’ of the dictionary. The ‘cosmopolite’ is the defender of truth, armed with reason and philosophy against superstitions, lies, and pre-
judges. In another letter, which may be from the same author,\textsuperscript{117} the writer named ‘cosmopolite’ claims his ‘patriotism and attachment for the sovereign’, but also his ‘love for truth and respect for the reader’.\textsuperscript{118} The author condemns the ‘injustice’ committed against Joly de Fleury, and against reason. Interestingly, another anonymous pamphlet backing ‘Le cosmopolite’ in his logic and use of reason against ‘sophisms’ was written by ‘un docteur de la sapience’.\textsuperscript{119} This ‘docteur de la sapience’ posits a claim to knowledge regarding all prosecutors and judges in order to denounce their power, and how they occupy all the three estates.

This is not an isolated case of political discussion on states’ policies. Another example, \textit{Le café politique d’Amsterdam} by Pellissery, is a political pseudo-discussion between a Frenchman, an Englishman, a Dutchman and a ‘Cosmopolite’ on foreign policy in Europe. In reality the ‘cosmopolite’ serves to deliver Pellissery’s own views, as former French minister, developed into long self-gratifying soliloquies on the state of affairs in these three countries.\textsuperscript{120} In other words, the ‘cosmopolite’ here is not necessarily a genuine philosopher, objective, looking for truth, but he is taking this assumed narrative claim by calling himself ‘cosmopolite’. This goes to show that this understanding was already culturally accepted among readers of pamphlets on state affairs.

This understanding of ‘cosmopolite’ is even taken and confused with the use of ‘cosmopolis’ by an anonymous author commenting on the aftermath of the affair between Johann Friedrich Struensee (1737–1772), a Danish statesman of German origins, and the queen of Denmark Caroline Matilda (1751–1775), known as ‘of Great Britain’. Struensee was subsequently arrested and executed. The anonymous author writes to a friend in York, claiming that he was a visual witness of the event, and expressing his disgust regarding a pamphlet published against the queen, \textit{Mémoires d’une reine infortunée}. Although stating that he is Danish and was a witness of the events, the author claims ‘... mon impartialité par ce Cosmopolisme que m’ont ac-


\textsuperscript{119}. Abbé Dazès, \textit{L’esprit des magistrats philosophes : ou, Lettres ultramontaines, d’un docteur de la sapience à la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Paris} (Tivoli: Chés l’auteur, 1765).

\textsuperscript{120}. Roch Antoine de Pellissery, \textit{La café politique d’Amsterdam: ou Entretiens familiers d’unFrançois, d’un Anglois, d’un Hollandois, et d’un cosmopolite, sur les divers intérêts économiques & politiques de la France, de l’Espagne, & de l’Angleterre} (s.l.: s.n., 1778), 211.
And a little further, the author states: ‘Ce n’est pas ici le Danois qui va parler, c’est l’homme, et l’homme vrai et impartial, dont l’unique but est de mettre simplement les choses dans leur propre jour’.\footnote{122}

Cloots uses the term cosmopolite several times with different meanings related to those above described. Cloots uses as the meaning given in the definition for ‘cosmopolitain’ — someone for whom the whole world is a homeland — when stating that Europeans do not want to be French, and cosmopolitans do not want to be Europeans, implying therefore that ‘cosmopolitan’ is related to cultural identities, and a citizen of the world should not be forced to be European.\footnote{123} The same meaning juxtaposed to other ‘nationalities’ is to be found elsewhere.\footnote{124} According to Cloots, his universal republic should satisfy everyone. Regarding this cosmopolitan identity, Cloots also notes that the sans-culottes are cosmopolitans as opposed to aristocrats: ‘L’aristocratie est fédéraliste, locale, isolée : la sans-culotterie n’est ni française, ni anglaise ; elle est cosmopolite, universelle.’\footnote{125} This is interesting in the context of federalism in France in 1793; Cloots opposes aristocracy as ‘federalists’ to sans-culottes as ‘cosmopolitans’, meaning not only universality and unity, but also liberty and equality as an identity above cultural and local ones — which do not disappear at all, but matter less than the passionate bond of liberty and equality to form the universal republic.

Elsewhere, Cloots uses ‘cosmopolitan’ with the meaning of someone embracing universality and humanity, but the use is also connected to the republic, thus making it close to a citizen of the world, or free world to be exact. Cloots writes about Paris in these terms:

La métropole du monde libre, le point de ralliement du cosmopolite, veillera, ainsi que le moindre hameau, sur le maintien de l’universalité, sans laquelle point de paix permanente parmi les hommes : vérité-mère qu’on peindra sur toutes les bannières de la république !\footnote{126}

Paris is also several times called ‘cosmopole’. Cloots also describes the National Assembly and its members as ‘cosmopolitan’: ‘Représentants de la France, dépositaires de la liberté universelle, législateurs cosmopolites’.\footnote{127} Cloots expresses here the idea that the French representatives are cosmopolitan in the sense that they make laws for the whole world, again the free

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{121} Christian Lovencrone, Lettre d’un Danois impartial au Chevalier Méanwell à Yorke. En forme de replique à un libelle infame, intitulé Mémoires d’une reine infortunée (Bréda: chez Pierre Telltruth, 1776), 3.
  \item \footnote{122} Ibid., 9–10.
  \item \footnote{123} Cloots, Écrits révolutionnaires, 443.
  \item \footnote{124} Ibid., 510.
  \item \footnote{125} Ibid., 642.
  \item \footnote{126} Ibid., 177.
  \item \footnote{127} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 251.
\end{itemize}
world, as they are the trustees of universal liberty for the time being. Cloots uses again the expression ‘cosmopolitan legislature’ for the future assembly of the universal republic. By the same token, Cloots mentions ‘l’innocence cosmopolite’ that had been trampled by so many crimes going unpunished due to the international system. This should no longer be the case in the universal republic where criminals would have no safe haven to escape to, and criminal justice would apply everywhere.

Moreover, there is in my view a very important notion that Cloots uses and is related to how he understands the ‘cosmopolitan’. This notion will be introduced in the chapter on nature with the opposition of ‘théos’ and ‘cosmos’. Wherever Cloots uses the term cosmos, it is in opposition to théos. Moreover, Cloots also mentions the terms ‘théocratie’, ‘théocrate’, and ‘théocratique’ as in ‘système théocratique’, as the system of the ancien régime portrayed by the revolutionaries: monarchism as a divine representation of God’s sovereign power on earth. The théos and ‘theocratic system’ is the religious system based on faith and ‘superstitions’ that goes together with monarchy. For instance, Cloots binds together ‘universal theocracy’, which he sees as opposed to reason, with ‘universal monarchy’, which he sees as opposed to liberty, and then opposes them to the ‘universal republic’.

The universal republic is thus opposed to universal theocracy and to universal monarchy, for Cloots. This forms the basis for my argument that Cloots’s thought should be called cosmopolitan republicanism, with the understanding of Cloots’s concept of cosmos. Cosmos is nature, the universe, outside any metaphysical consideration of creation by God. Cosmos is ruled by laws, which are the laws of nature, physical and moral. It is the task of the revolution to re-instate the natural order of the cosmos, and respect these natural laws, which can be scientifically discovered through reason. Cosmos is nature, science, reason, knowledge, natural law and natural rights, humanity. Théos is God, metaphysics, belief, superstition, arbitrary laws and the negation of liberty, inhumanity. As Cloots writes: ‘… avec le seul mot cosmos nous pulvérisons la théocratie…” And this understanding of cosmos opposed to théos and of the universal republic opposed to ‘universal theocracy’ leads us to the question of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and Rémi’s definition of cosmopolisme.

129. Ibid., 391.
130. Ibid., 177, 251, 306, 495, 496, 642.
‘Cosmopolisme’, ‘Cosmopolitisme’

The earliest eighteenth-century record of ‘cosmopolitisme’ I could find is in a 1756 critique of Rousseau’s _Discours sur l’inégalité_ by Italian mathematician and astronomer Giovanni Francesco Mauro Melchiorre Salvemini di Castiglione (1708–1791). It is not exactly clear what the author means by ‘cosmopolitisme’ as it is referred to in passing:

> Je ne m’arrêterai point à détailler les avantages de la communauté des biens. Ce sujet a été traité par plusieurs auteurs estimables, lesquels l’homme corrompu par les richesses n’a reproché qu’une pauvreté vertueuse & un cosmopolitisme trop profondément raisonné.\(^{133}\)

This excerpt is taken from a general discussion about ownership. It seems that, in this context, this ‘cosmopolitisme’ is a consideration about the general equality among men in the state of nature, which would justify a ‘community of goods’ to some philosophers, against whom even a corrupt man would only reproach a ‘virtuous poverty’ and a ‘too deeply reasoned cosmopolitanism’. It may be a direct reference to Rousseau’s mention of ‘les grandes âmes cosmopolites’ as quoted below in his _Discours sur l’inégalité_.\(^{134}\)

In a medical book written in 1775 about bathing waters, the authors write the expression ‘cosmopolitisme’ in italics because it did not exist in the dictionary, in order to describe the action of travelling. The authors warn against the potential risks of excessive travelling and lack of any restraint in experiencing new things, as the exact opposite of the fears, superstitions and restraints of the past, which surrounded the use of bath waters and prevented medical research to see their benefits on health. ‘Notre liberté, notre fureur d’aller, notre cosmopolitisme en tout genre, peuvent devenir excessifs & entraîner bien des inconvénients’.\(^{135}\)

The word ‘cosmopolitisme’ with the meaning of a conscious understanding of a political project for the world only appears in 1799, in several works linking the French Revolution with conspiracy theories. French journalist Jacques Mallet du Pan (1749–1800), who defended the royalist cause notably in _Mercure de France_, emigrated to England where he continued the

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\(^{133}\)_Johann von Castillon, _Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité parmi les hommes : Pour servir de réponse au Discours que M. Rousseau, citoyen de Gênes, a pub. sur le même sujet_ (Amsterdam: Chez J. F. Jolly, 1756), 164.

\(^{134}\)_Jean-Jacques Rousseau, _Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inégalité parmi les hommes_ (Amsterdam: Chez Marc-Michel Rey, 1755), 138–139.

\(^{135}\)_Théophile de Bordeu, Antoine de Bordeu and François de Bordeu, _Recherches sur les maladies chroniques, leurs rapports avec les maladies aiguës, leurs périodes, leur nature, et sur la manière dont on les traite aux eaux minérales de Barèges et des autres sources de l’Aquitaine_, vol. 1, Contenant la théorie générale des maladies et l’analyse médicinale du sang (Paris: Ruault, 1775), 65.
publication retitled *Mercure britannique*. He uses the expression ‘cosmopolitisme’ to describe the process of exchanges around the world between nations.\(^{136}\) Mallet du Pan’s argument, when using this expression, is that the eighteenth century saw a rise in exchanges of communication, movements of goods and people, access to education, science and philosophy, and distribution of wealth among the population that led to new social distinctions. It is not to contest the progress of philosophy, but the French Revolution and its republicanism that Mallet du Pan uses the term ‘cosmopolitisme’; what he contests is that the revolution was a destruction of the *ancien régime*, when it was rather a displacement to a different elite in power.

In the other two works, the word ‘cosmopolitisme’ is used as designating a political thought. In the 1799 French translation of Scottish physicist and mathematician John Robison’s (1739–1805) book *Proofs of a Conspiracy*, published in 1797, the term ‘cosmopolitisme’ is used five times in this translation of the original ‘cosmopolitism’ in a negative sense: ‘Milles faits semblables prouvent que la semence du cosmopolitisme licencieux avait pris de forte racines, & que quoiqu’on eut souvent fauché cette plante pernicieuse on ne l’avait nullement arrachée’.\(^{137}\) Again, later in the book Robison writes: ‘Il n’est point douteux que les Illuminés & d’autres sociétés cosmopolitiques n’ayent beaucoup contribué à opérer la Révolution Française, ou du moins à l’accélérer’.\(^{138}\) The author notes how a certain foreigner named ‘Campe, Illuminé’ participated in the early days of the revolution by praising the revolutionaries of their ‘… vrai cosmopolitisme…’.\(^{139}\) Again later, the sect ‘Les chevaliers du soleil’ and their ‘cosmopolitisme universel’.\(^{140}\) Of course, the whole conspiracy of cosmopolitanism would have been nothing without Cloots, ‘un des apôtres les plus fanatiques du cosmopolitisme’:

> Il s’abandonna tout d’un coup aux plus grandes extravagances, & ne parla plus d’autre langue que le jargon de l’Illumination. Citoyen du monde — liberté & égalité — les droits imprescriptibles de l’homme — la morale, la chère morale — les Rois & les Prêtres des êtres inutiles, n’étant que des despotes & des corrupteurs &c. &c.\(^{141}\)

And most importantly, German philosopher and founder of the Order of the Illuminati, Johann Adam Weishaupt (1748–1830) ‘zélé du cosmopolitisme’. To Robison, cosmopolitanism is thus the doctrine of the Illuminati,


\(^{138}\) Ibid., 111.

\(^{139}\) Ibid., 112.

\(^{140}\) Ibid., 128.

\(^{141}\) Ibid., 176–177.
based on liberty and equality and destined to be spread everywhere since
the French Revolution by some ‘citizens of the world’.

The French publicist and Jesuit priest Abbé Augustin Barruel (1741–
1820) also develops his conspiracy theory about the French Revolution, and
the ‘Jacobins illuminés’, who had disciples throughout Europe. Concerning
Prussia he writes:

Enfin en Allemagne, il est une autre espèce de Jacobins, qui
font aujourd’hui les plus grands progrès. Ceux-ci sont les dis-
ciples du Dieu Kant, sorti de ses ténèbres & du chaos de ses
catégories, pour nous dévoiler les mystères de son soi-disant
Cosmopolitisme.142

A satirical caricature follows of Kant’s thought as developed in Die Idee
tzu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, from a transla-
tion into French published in Spectateur du Nord in April 1798. In partic-
ular, Barruel mocks Kant’s idea of replacing all European monarchies with
republics.

A word that appears in parallel with ‘cosmopolitisme’ is ‘cosmopolisme’,
which had equally two meanings attached to it. The relation between trav-
elling, the act of ‘cosmopoliter’, and potential health risks are reiterated with
the expression ‘cosmopolisme’ as the psychological condition of confused
identity that the all too frequent traveller would fall victim of:

Cosmopolisme. Il faut aimer un lieu ; l’oiseau lui-même qui
a en partage le domaine des airs, affectionne tel creux d’arbre
ou de rocher. Celui qui est atteint de Cosmopolisme, est privé
des plus doux sentimens qui appartiennent au cœur de l’hom-
me.

Qui croirait que l’on peut exercer à Paris le Cosmopolisme, en-
core mieux que dans le reste de l’univers.
Cosmopoliter. Parcourir l’univers.143

However, this use does not have anything to do with a philosophical
and political conception of cosmopolitanism, but it may explain the rejec-
tion towards it since the action of cosmopolitanism is perceived as a dis-
ease. In another work similar to the above mentioned ones on cosmopol-
itisme, a ‘citoyen J. Lachapelle’ wrote some Considérations philosophiques
sur la révolution française, in which Cloots is mentioned for his ‘cosmopol-
isme ridicule’.144 The author is not sympathetic to Cloots and accumulates

142. Augustin Barruel, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du jacobinisme, vol. 4 (Hamb-
bourg: Chez P. Fauche, 1799), 245.
143. Louis-Sébastien Mercier, Néologie ou vocabulaire de mots nouveaux, à renouveler, ou
144. J. Lachapelle, Considérations philosophiques sur la Révolution Française (Paris: Chez
false statements about him, some of which have already been mentioned above (‘intolerant atheism’, ‘foreigner’, ‘possessed’). It is not explicit what is meant by ‘cosmopolisme’, but it comes with the mention of Cloots’s ‘universal republic’ and Paris as capital of the world.

The first formulated conception of cosmopolitanism written explicitly in an -ism form is Le cosmopolisme by Joseph-Honoré Rémi (1738–1782), priest in Toul, Meurthe-et-Moselle, and lawyer at the Parlement de Paris. Rémi participated to the first volume on ‘Jurisprudence’ of the Encyclopédie méthodique, project which was meant as an extension to Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie. Le cosmopolisme is a pamphlet that Rémi wrote on the occasion of the wedding of Louis XVI. There are several relevant excerpts for cosmopolism, which I will here quote and comment:

Pourquoi le Cosmopolisme est-il donc si rare sous cette plante ? A peine a-t-il un sens parmi nous : la plupart de nos langues si riches en mots honteux & barbares, n’ont rien qui peigne les premiers sentiments de l’homme social. Un sourire risiblement dédaigneux est la récompense de quiconque ose parler d’humanité aux nations. Noble & touchante humanité ! à ton foyer s’allume & s’épura dans nos ames le feu sacré des vertus privées & des vertus politiques (6) ; mais on t’abandonne, on te méprise, on t’insulte avec orgueil, on encense d’odieux simulacres, & tes temples sont déserts. Nous avons des Maîtres pour enseigner à nos enfans les langues des nations qui n’existent plus ; en est-il un seul destiné à leur apprendre celle de la nature ?

The endnote (6) is explained later in the book with a quotation of Fénelon:

(N°.6.) Page 25. « J’aime mieux ma famille que moi-même ; j’aime mieux ma patrie que ma famille ; mais j’aime encore mieux le genre humain que ma famille [sic: patrie] ». Telle étoit la morale de ce Fénélon, qui dans une Cour où l’égoïsme national étoit honoré des plus glorieux titres, osa prêcher éloquemment le Cosmopolisme, & érigea à l’humanité un monument digne du siècle de l’Encyclopédie. Le sentiment associé à la raison, n’a jamais rien produit d’aussi noble & d’aussi attendris- sant que le Télémaque.

147. Ibid., 73–74.
‘Cosmopolism’ is, for Rémi, related to the ‘first sentiments of social man’, which is to say that when man in the state of nature meets another man, he experiences a feeling, which is one of humanity for meeting with another human being. This feeling of humanity is about recognising one another as members of the same species, the same community of human beings. Rémi juxtaposes thus this feeling of love towards humanity, ‘cosmopolism’, to another feeling, negative this one, of egoism towards one’s nation. Nation should here be understood as ‘state’, or more rightly ‘kingdom’. This ‘national egoism’ proclaims the superiority of advancing national interest at the cost of human interest. What Rémi alludes to here with ‘national egoism’ are the wars led by Louis XIV in the name of absolutism, whose policies Fénélon criticised. This feeling of humanity, for Rémi, warrants virtues—‘private virtues’, and ‘political virtues’. According to the dictionary, virtue is a disposition of the soul to do good and avoid evil. So, for Rémi, ‘cosmopolism’ is the doctrine of doing what is good and avoiding what is bad for humanity, both in the private and public (political) spheres. Fénélon is cited as a leading figure of this movement of thought with his work *Telemachus*, combining sentiment and reason, that is to say humanity as a feeling and a rational argument for the love of other fellow human beings in the world. *Telemachus* is ‘worthy of the century of the *Encyclopædia*’, the work of reference for reason. This may be for Rémi a reference to how Telemachus, in the novel, fights morally, thanks to his wisdom, the excess of passions—both his and others’—that leads kings to wars and destroys the lives of his and other’s peoples. Mentor helps him throughout, but leaves him with the freedom of choice over his actions, and the novel is therefore perceived as an ode to liberty.

The reference to *Télémaque* in a pamphlet published for the wedding of Louis XVI, who was then fifteen, is certainly a way of hoping that the young king will follow the pedagogical advice set in the book that Fénélon intended for the education of the dauphin of France, Louis Duke of Burgundy (1682–1712). In search of his father, Telemachus goes to hell and visits Tartarus where he sees bad kings agonising; he then visits the Elysian Fields, where good kings, who govern their people wisely, rest in bliss. *Telemachus* was considered a work of ‘republican monarchism’ because it

‘combines monarchical rule with republican virtues’. It is a ‘classical republicanism’ that Fénelon develops in *Telemachus*, that is to say republican virtues from Ancient Greece and Rome. These republican virtues are the interest for the common good and disinterest for riches, or selfish and artificial gains and rewards by the court. In general the ‘country’ is opposed to the ‘court’ in classical republicanism, as noted by Pocock. In *Telemachus*, Fénelon displays similar ‘classical republican’ virtues. *Bétique* (Boetica in English) is a country described in book seven. There, the inhabitants are free and equal, live in accordance with nature, and are disinterested in the amounts of gold and silver that abound since they would not be of any use for the common good or can even provoke corruption. Edelstein’s interpretation of Boetica is that it is not an ‘utopian’ place in the same sense as More’s *Utopia* or Bacon’s *New Atlantis* because it is meant to be an example for contemporary society, and is not thought in isolation but with international contacts and with the prospect of perpetual peace. Moreover, Edelstein argues that it is a republican state because the basic political structure is participative, the inhabitants are free and equal, they are ready to fight to defend their liberty, and they shun luxury and corruption in favour of peace, union, and liberty, by wisely using their ‘right reason’.

Considering Rémi’s argument, it seems that a relevant passage in Fénelon’s *Télémaque* is in book 9, when Mentor addresses various Greek kings after they decided to make peace and avoid waging war:

> Tout le genre humain n’est qu’une famille dispersée sur la face de toute la terre. Tous les peuples sont frères, & doivent s’aider comme tels. Malheur à ces impies qui cherchent une gloire cruelle dans le sang de leurs frères, qui est leur propre sang. La guerre est quelquefois nécessaire, il est vrai : mais c’est la honte du genre humain qu’elle soit inévitable en certaines occasions. ... Quiconque préfère sa propre gloire aux sentiments de l’humanité, est un monstre d’orgueil, & non pas un homme : il ne parviendra même qu’à une fausse gloire ; car la vraie gloire ne se trouve que dans la modération & dans la bonté.

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155. Ibid., 59–60.

Shortly after, Mentor suggests that the Greek kings meet in an assembly every three years to renew their alliance and discuss matters of common interest. Mentor emphasises that being united is the only way to make Greece prosperous inside and stronger outside. In other words, Mentor suggests that the kings organise a sort of commonwealth or res publica.

Fénelon makes another direct reference to a ‘universal republic’ in book 17. Mentor advises king Idoménée of how to settle an international dispute between him and another king using arbitration. Mentor then takes a hypothetical example of a republic that the king would consider with horror if there were no laws and no legal institutions, but where each family would use violence against their neighbours to make their own justice, and asks Idoménée rhetorically:

croyez-vous que les Dieux regardent avec moins d’horreur le monde entier, qui est la République universelle, si chaque peuple qui n’y est que comme une grande famille, se croit en plein droit de se faire par violence justice à soi-même sur toutes ses préventions contre les autres peuples voisins?

Through Mentor, Fénelon argues for a ‘universal republic’, which does not mean a world state with a republican democratic government, but a state of law in international affairs, the same way there is a state of law inside a given ‘republic’. It is an argument against absolutism in that Fénelon emphasises that kings are not above the law, not even regarding internal state affairs. Fénelon’s argument is as much the need for legal settlement in international affairs — and thereby the reduction of wars — as it is the observation that the human race is one ‘family’ and therefore ought to be under a common law.

To Rémi, cosmopolisme is associated with the language of nature, of the very first feelings that men had when becoming social creatures. In other words, in the golden age of the state of nature before the social contract was formed, as described in natural law theories:

Cet heureux sentiment que la Nature inspire aux Individus de même espece ; Instinct sacré dont le Législateur des Chrétiens voulut faire un mérite à l’homme, en l’érigeant en vertu, & la plaçant à la tête de son code immortel ; la Fraternité combatdue par les maximes de l’intolérance, & avilie par le fanatisme du zèle, n’a commencée à rentrer dans ses droits que depuis la renaissance des Lettres. Elle doit la gloire dont elle jouit, aux efforts des Cosmopolites. Ramenée par eux dans l’Europe, sous les noms de Bienveillance & d’Humanité, cette vertu pourra

158. Ibid., 2: 483–484.
Fraternity — the feeling of being related and belonging to the same family — is a natural instinct that God — the legislator for Christians — inscribed as the first and most important law. Rémi is here referring to love as God’s law, particularly love towards fellow man: ‘you shall love your neighbour as yourself’. Rémi then goes on to argue that intolerance and fanaticism have been the enemies of fraternity, and it is only with the ‘renaissance of letters’ and the ‘efforts of the cosmopolites’ that fraternity was brought back. There is no doubt that Rémi refers here to the Republic of Letters, and the fight by ‘la petite troupe des philosophes’ led by Voltaire against religious intolerance, revealed religions, and in favour of humanitarian considerations. It is also exactly the same meaning of the word ‘cosmopolites’ that Rousseau used when writing about ‘quelques grandes âmes cosmopolites’, as seen above.

Rémi writes about the same as Rousseau: state wars that entail murders and other atrocities that are revolting to reason and nature, and that, nonetheless, are rewarded with the highest state honours. It is in that sense that Rémi concludes that this virtue of fraternity, which the cosmopolites brought back in Europe under the names of ‘benevolence’ and ‘humanity’, is the ‘daughter’ of ‘misery’ and ‘philosophy’. The ‘cosmopolites’, the philosophers, reflected upon the calamities of wars due to ‘national egoism’, to produce works of morality and ethics for humankind.

I think that there are several elements that can be taken from Rémi’s writings on what seems to constitute cosmopolitanism for him: nature, humanity, reason, sentiment, the Encyclopaedia, liberty, fraternity, individuality, belonging to the same human species, a sense of equality, and elements of classical republicanism. ‘Cosmopolitanism’, for Rémi, is the doctrine that ‘cosmopolites’ professed, that is to say the rationally argumented natural feeling of fraternity among individuals because they belong to the same species against any divisive passions or thoughts, such as national egoism, intolerance, or fanaticism.

Regarding Cloots, there is no record showing that he had read or knew this work. However, Cloots cites Fénelon several times as one of the great thinkers, and in particular his Télémaque once. There are many similarities between Cloots’s system and Rémi’s ‘cosmopolisme’; most importantly, the emphasis on humanity and the human race as a single species on the planet, reason, and nature.

If in Rémi’s view, there is sufficient material to form an -ism out of cosmopolitan views on the international order, this does not mean that there was a widely accepted view that ‘cosmopolisme’ actually existed. As Mercier’s Néologie, ou vocabulaire des mots nouveaux shows, ‘cosmopolisme’ was a new word even as late as 1801. It is not possible to ascertain historically a fixed understanding of ‘cosmopolisme’ or ‘cosmopolitisme’ in the eighteenth century. It is however possible to witness in eighteenth-century writings the rise of a philosophical consciousness of cosmopolitanism. Rémi’s general cosmopolitan sympathy is however not offering any concrete system to achieving this goal, besides an appeal to the king’s good will in foreign affairs, and a prayer to God to enlighten kings.\footnote{Rémi, Le cosmopolisme, 64.}

Cloots himself uses the word ‘cosmopolisme’ in a speech at the Convention on 17 November 1793: ‘Je dois à mes voyages continuels, à mon cosmopolisme indépendant, d’avoir échappé à la vengeance des tyrans sacrés et profanes’.\footnote{Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 617.} Cloots does not use the word in the same sense as Rémi does, and it seems to be related with the act of travelling in Mercier’s understanding. However, it has to be taken in the context of the whole speech. The paragraph preceding was a plea by Cloots for the Convention to circulate his Certitude, which the Assembly had cancelled on the recommendation of the bishop of Calvados. Cloots then reminds his audience of how philosophy, by attacking revealed religion, sowed on fertile grounds in France and gave rise to the revolution. Cloots then argues that he was a part of this philosophical movement before the revolution with his books, faithful to his own motto ‘veritas atque libertas’ (‘truth and freedom’), which, he claims, his enemies did not forgive him. But thanks to his travels, his ‘independant cosmopolism’, he escaped prison in Paris and death in Lisbon. Finally, the revolution broke out and allowed Cloots to come back and live in his élément naturel; car c’est la liberté, non le lieu, qui fait le citoyen, comme l’a fort bien dit Brutus et comme l’a très fort oublié votre rapporteur sur la loi contre les étrangers. Et moi aussi, j’ai eu l’ingratitude d’oublier mon berceau natal, pour ne songer qu’au berceau de la République universelle, si toutefois c’est oublier son pays natal que de propager les lumières dans le chef-lieu du globe.\footnote{Ibid., 618.}

We can see several elements of Rémi’s understanding of ‘cosmopolisme’ in the semantical context of Cloots’s mention of ‘cosmopolisme’: truth and liberty, the ideal that liberty is what makes a citizen and not the country, reference to classical republicanism. Cloots, however, does not have an explicit awareness that his political ‘system’, which I will present in this thesis,
is a cosmopolitan system, that is related to cosmopolitanism as Rémi formulated it. It needs therefore to be proven, which this thesis will attempt.

It would be interesting to continue this history of the uses of the terms ‘cosmopolitisme’ and ‘cosmopolisme’ in the nineteenth century and examine the correlation between royalists and republicans vis-à-vis their conceptions of cosmopolitanism. However, the study must stop here. After the revolution the term is used by opponents of the revolution as a derogative term. Also, the use of the word ‘cosmopolisme’ tends to disappear throughout the nineteenth century leaving only ‘cosmopolitisme’.

This present study shows that cosmopolitanism as a political thought was a vague ideal that few authors uttered explicitly with this word during the eighteenth-century. It was however identified as the philosophy uttered by the ‘cosmopolites’, that is philosophers in the Republic of Letters, who pondered questions of tolerance and peace between nations. From Rémi’s pamphlet, one may tease out several themes attached to this ‘cosmopolitanism’: nature, humanity, reason and science, moral and ethics from antiquity, and nature. After the revolution, several authors attached cosmopolitanism to the revolution itself as a political project. Although, these are negative views, they show an understanding of the French Revolution as a cosmopolitan project. Cloots is identified as one of its central proponents. But only Rémi’s writings seem to offer a guide as to what one should understand as eighteenth-century French cosmopolitanism. These themes will guide this present study of Cloots: science and reason, nature and natural law, humanity, and republicanism.

**CONCLUSION: COSMOPOLITAN REPUBLICANISM**

This thesis argues that Cloots formed part of what can be labelled ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’, which is the term used explicitly by Cheneval and Cavallar, and implicitly by Bevilacqua. However, unlike them, this thesis will provide a precise understanding of what is to be understood as ‘cosmopolitan’ and what form of ‘republicanism’ Cloots expressed.

Kant is still today considered the main figure of modern Western cosmopolitanism, not Cloots, nor any other revolutionaries such as Condorcet or Thomas Paine.  

166. This may be so because historians and political theorists take for granted that if one speaks of ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘citizen of the world’, one ought to be speaking of cosmopolitanism. Kant used the expression ‘Weltbürgerrecht’ or ‘law of world citizenship’.  


qualify as a theory of cosmopolitanism? On the other hand, Cloots used sporadically the expressions ‘citizen of the world’ or ‘cosmopolite’, and once ‘cosmopolisme’; is that why so few have been interested in studying Cloots as a figure of cosmopolitanism rather than Kant? This is rather curious given the relative brevity of Zum ewigen Frieden compared to how more theoretically developed Cloots’s ‘system’ is in three works of roughly the same length — L’orateur du genre humain, La république universelle, Bases constitutionnelles de la république du genre humain. Another reason why Cloots may not have been studied as a figure of cosmopolitanism may also have to do with him writing pamphlets and deliberately choosing a non-academic style of writing in order to reach a wider audience.

Recently, however, the influence of French philosophers — Rousseau in particular — and the French Revolution on Kant’s thought has been a topic of investigation. Indeed, during the French Revolution, and inspired by French philosophers, another important tradition that focused on individuals as sovereigns rather than states developed in Paris during the French Revolution with ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. This intellectual movement has not been much researched by historians, although contemporary political theorists try to develop it.

While other studies were limited to articles or chapter-size analyses, this thesis is the first in-depth analysis of the political thought of Anacharsis Cloots. In order to do so this study is adopting a contextualist approach, as developed by Skinner. The aim of the thesis is to situate Cloots’s political thought within the intellectual context in which it was formed. To what debates in moral and political philosophy did Cloots contribute? What did Cloots do when he wrote? What was Cloots’s overall political ‘system’? What did Cloots mean by ‘nation of the human race’? What did he mean by ‘republic of the united individuals’? What was he doing when he called himself ‘Orator of the human race’?


Studying Cloots is not only interesting because he has been overlooked, and his thought has not been closely analysed; it is also interesting because his conception of ‘universal republic’ sheds light on why republicanism, otherwise considered an antiquated concept, came to be used for large nations.

The reader will be led through several contexts of philosophical and political debates after introducing a short biography of Cloots in the first chapter, and a presentation of his works in the second. The next two chapters present the context of self-fashioning and rhetoric, then truth and science, in order to explain his self-proclaimed title of ‘Orator of the human race’, why he referred to classical authors and tropes, and why he claimed the universality of his principles. The next chapter examines the main key context of eighteenth-century political thought: natural law. This chapter considers the question of God, materialism, and nature in discussions regarding the legitimate sovereign. These questions lead to a parallel in the next chapter on the nature of humankind and individuality for explaining Cloots’s emphasis on the individual as the sole political unit, and the human race as the sole political group. Finally, the context of republicanism will be addressed in the last chapter, in order to explain how there can be a ‘universal republic’. The thesis argues that Cloots was the main defender of what I call a ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’ in the French Revolution. This ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’ is a variant of what Edelstein identified as ‘natural republicanism’ among the Jacobins.\footnote{Edelstein, \textit{The Terror of Natural Right}.} The concluding chapter presents why Cloots’s political thought should be considered ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’ and what it entailed.
THE LIFE OF CLOOTS

Citizens of the jury, enter!
Sit down. Take off your coats.
Men, I am Jean Baptiste du Val
De Grace, Baron de Cloots.
Citizens of the jury, enter!
Sit down. Take off your boots.
I think you have known me better
As Anacharsis Cloots.
You pale... No, you don’t pale.
What, no one? Ah, Posterity,
What crimes I’ve committed in your name!
What crimes! And you’ve forgiven me?
Ab so! Not even some anecdotes?
But out there, the Republic’s flag still floats.
Well floated, floater! next world, I raise goats...
To have bawled through life’s long witenagemots,
To have ground the axes for a hundred throats,
To have traded friends for jobs, and trust for votes—
This is to die in life, and live in footnotes.¹

Randall Jarell’s poem epitomises three characteristics of Cloots. Firstly, he is forgotten by history, he ‘live[s] in footnotes’. Secondly, when he is not forgotten, his reputation precedes him as a not so commendable figure. And thirdly, should his name be pronounced Cloots as in coats, or Cloots as in boots? Actually, being a Dutch name, it should be the former. Also, it must be noted that the name Cloots is not affiliated to the Yiddish klots that gave klutz in North American English, meaning an awkward, clumsy, and foolish person — despite, what Cloots’s detractors may think of him.

Cloots is, nowadays, not a well-known figure; he was more famous in the nineteenth century. His name has been forgotten, even if, rather curiously, it survived in the world of French indie punk-rock music as a band decided to name itself ‘Anacharsis Cloots’.²

One of the consequences, or reasons, of this posthumous anonymity is the numerous epithets wrongly attached to his name. ‘Utopian’, Cloots, who admired Machiavelli and saw in him a guide for ministers of State: ‘Un État ne saurait faire vie qui dure sans la science du profond Machiavel’ in *Chronique de Paris*, 27 July 1791. Cloots had also stated the following ‘realist’ view on politics: ‘Il suffit de connaître les éléments de la politique, pour ne pas ignorer que la morale y est étrangère’. ‘Mad’ or ‘insane’, the author of a thick and erudite first book compiling all the eighteenth century’s literature on the question of religion, and hammering home his argument, not without a certain sense of humour and derision?

There is no space here for an exhaustive biography of Anacharsis Cloots, and this is not the subject of this study either. Two excellent biographies are already dedicated to Cloots’s life, and I will here only highlight the most important moments. While Mortier’s biography has the quality of being well-written and amusingly narrated, a thorough referencing of sources is sometimes lacking. Labbé’s work is a good supplement and contains systematic referencing as well as a comprehensive analysis of Cloots and where he lived. Indeed, this text actually empirically verifies many of Mortier’s assertions.

There are also a few ‘portraits’ of Cloots in works of biographical reference. Cheneval, who wrote on the history of cosmopolitanism, studied in particular Cloots’s ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’ with some biographical elements, as mentioned previously. A book chapter on Cloots as the other ‘citoyen du monde’ appeared in a study on Thomas Paine. There was a book published on the occasion of an exhibition on Cloots in Cleves.

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Cloots had a tragic destiny. His uncompromising truthfulness to his own ideals and ideas led him to a certain death under the reign of terror. Born a Prussian aristocrat, and inheriting his father’s fortune at the age of twelve, he could have lived the life of a high civil servant in the Prussian bureaucracy under the ‘Enlightened despot’ Frederick the Great, whom he admired before the French Revolution. But he had intellectual ambitions that led him to Paris, the centre of philosophy and Lumières, in his eyes, the new Athens of Ancient Greece. In the French Revolution he saw the beginning of the end to tyranny on earth, and the accomplishment of the French Enlightenment ideas led by his intellectual idols Voltaire, and Rousseau. He dedicated his life and fortune to the French revolution, only to die from suspicion related to his Prussian origin.

But Cloots left a rich legacy. His writings can be considered as one of the elaborate examples of pushing the logics of Enlightenment and the French Revolution to a conclusion; what the universality of the rights of man meant to the concept of sovereignty — sovereignty of the human race. His intelligence, his wit, and his style should make his readers tolerant towards his equally prominent ego and sense of self-promotion. In a way, at a time when public opinion reigned in a new democracy led by freedom of expression, he invented and made himself his own public relation agent.

**Family and Youth**

Anacharsis Cloots was born on 24 June 1755 in the family castle of Gnadenthal (Val-de-Grâce in French) near Cleves (Kleve in German), a town near the Prussian border with the Netherlands. He was baptised and given the Latin names of Joannes Baptista Hermannus Maria, and the family name Klootz (later spelled Cloots in French), as recorded in the family register.

His family was of Dutch origins. His father, Thomas François Klootz, was a rich Dutch merchant from Amsterdam. He acquired the castle and property of Gnadenthal in Prussia as well as the title of baron. Cloots’s biographers do not know why he settled in Gnadenthal, but it is probably because it was the only available property that suited both his ambition and the interest of Frederic II in having new devoted subjects and servants at the Prussian borders. Cloots’s father was made a member of King Frederic II’s

12. Ibid., 37.
Council, *Geheimrat*, in 1748, and acquired Gnadenenthal shortly after.\(^{14}\) He obtained the title of baron in 1756. He died on 31 December 1767, at the age of 47, of unknown cause.

The maiden name of Cloots’s mother was de Pauw. Her brother, Anacharsis’s uncle, was the philosopher and canon of Xanten, Cornelius de Pauw (born 1739 in Amsterdam, deceased 1799 in Xanten). He is famous for writing *Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains*, an influential study rejecting travellers’ accounts of native American populations in favour of a more ‘scientific’ anthropology.\(^{15}\) De Pauw inspired Anacharsis, who always had a great admiration for his works, and maintained a correspondence with him throughout his life. Cloots was six years old when de Pauw became canon of Xanten, a village in the vicinity of Gnadenenthal. Cloots’s father procured this position for de Pauw in Xanten, and de Pauw’s presence was certainly beneficial to Cloots’s education.\(^{16}\) De Pauw spent most of his life in Cleves.

According to Cloots’s biographers very little is known about his childhood, and what is known stems from his own account, scattered through his work and correspondence.\(^{17}\) The Cloots were a typical bourgeois family desiring to climb the Prussian social ladder and become an aristocratic family. Anacharsis had an older brother, Egide, who died on 18 May 1766, making him the only heir of the family.

Cloots’s education was in French, but he also spoke French at home — a necessity for social advancement — even though his father did not speak it with ease. From the tender age of childhood to his coming of age, Cloots’s entire upbringing had been in French. In addition, Cloots knew both Dutch and German, but there are no writings from him in these languages. This is inferred by Labbé from his correspondence as he received letters written in these languages, as well as from his library of German and Dutch books.\(^{18}\) We know that some of his writings were translated, but not by him, so it is fair to assume that, if he knew Dutch and German enough to read and talk to Dutch and German foreigners during the revolution, he was probably not confident and fluent.

Cloots never married and, to the best of his biographers’ knowledge, never had any children. It is not even known if he had any lover, nor of


which gender. Cloots was discreet regarding his private life in his writings, besides the occasional boasting for his public feats. The little he did write about it was his ability to remain chaste. Mortier mentions that in the very first intimate letter written by his own hand to his uncle Adriaan Joan Cloeting van Westenappel about the death of a certain Miss Van de Mortel, Cloots sighed when he remembered her: ‘elle était mon appui sur la terre ; elle sera mon appui dans le ciel’. Mortier speculates that she may have been a governess, and, reading between his elegantly written lines, his lover: ‘… une gouvernante qui aurait pris soin de lui et qui, malgré une foi sincère, aurait failli aux yeux des hommes’. Labbé has the same suspicion quoting Avenel, who may have been in possession of documents that have, today, disappeared and who even wrote about a daughter they may have had together. There are two curious mentions of a wife in John Adolphus’s Biographical Memoirs of the French Revolution. This wife of Cloots allegedly proposed that a statue should be decreed to the first priest who had abjured christianity, and that the present æra should be denominated the reign of Nature. However, checking a reference to the source of this statement, there does not appear to be any mention of a wife.

One may add to this that in a letter ‘A mon frère unique’ in January 1793, Cloots wrote about his life away from Paris in the country side, where he found some relaxation: ‘Je mène la vie d’un curé gros décimateur, avec de bonnes fermes et de jolies fermières’. He compared himself humouristically with a parson, décimateur, the one who holds the right to levy a tax called dîme, a tax in nature levied by the Church on agricultural productions. The reference to the parson who levies a tax in nature on the farms and the mention of beautiful female farmers do not leave much doubt about his sexual orientation and his libertine nature. It was not uncommon in the eighteenth century to mock the hypocrisy of the clergy for its promiscuous life-style — famous examples being Diderot or Thérèse philosophe. This may be the case here with ‘la vie d’un curé gros décimateur’. This letter, addressed to Cloots’s ‘brother’, is rather curious since his only brother died when he was very young in 1766. However, the letter wished him, his wife, and his children a happy new year. It may simply be a very close friend of his, who lived in Gnadenthal.

24. Jean-Baptiste de Boyer marquis d’Argens [?], Thérèse philosophe, ou mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du Père Dirrag et de Mademoiselle Éradice (La Haye: s.n., 1748).
Anacharsis Cloots was sent on 26 June 1764, at the age of 9, to Brussels to a Catholic boarding school, Les Pères de Bruxelles, together with his brother. The boarding school was in the city centre, near the Saint Gudula Cathedral. Its director was a member of the clergy, father De Lannoy. Cloots was then sent to the Jesuits in Mons, probably before the death of his brother. At 11, and at his request, he moved to the Jesuit collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne in Paris probably because friends of the family, the Vandenyvers, had recently moved to Paris and could receive and lodge the young Jean-Baptiste. It is at their place that he became acquainted for the first time with members of the Parisian intellectual society, although it is not known who exactly. Philosophising on religion and its rituals, Cloots mentions in his Lettres philosophiques (added to Certitude des preuves) with pride an episode that got him into trouble: defiantly eating a bacon omelette on a Saturday, which was considered as a jour maigre (lean day: meat was not allowed). Cloots argued that uncertainty prevailed over how that dogma applied also to children, and that, accordingly, one should not consider something uncertain as prohibited in general.

Collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne

At the Pléssis-Sorbonne college, Cloots’s education was based on the study of rhetoric (argumentation and syllogism) and classical culture. Not much is known precisely about the curriculum there. One work by Marie-Madeleine Compère on the history of all the collèges in France from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries lists all the existing secondary works and archives on the collège. She notes, however, that there are few documents concerning the pupils. There is, however, no bibliographical reference on the Collège du Plessis. Regarding the actual curriculum, there are very few document regarding the time that Cloots spent there. His school fellows were, among others, future famous actors of the French Revolution such as La Fayette, as well as antiquary Millin de Grandmaison (1759–1818) and Antoine Joseph Gorsas (1752–1793), future publicist, but also the future lawyer Pierre Victurnien Vergniaud (1753–1793) and future politician Pierre

25. Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, 41.
26. Ibid., 42.
30. Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, 43.
Gaspard Chaumette (1763–1794). It was during his stay in Paris that his father died in Brussels.

Académie militaire des nobles

The idea of establishing a specific institution for the education of military officers came to Frederic II after the Seven Years' War in 1763. He considered Sulzer for the chair of professor of mathematics and wrote to him to present his project and to invite him to Berlin. According to Sulzer, Frederic II changed his mind and asked him to teach philosophy at the academy in 1764. Frederic also asked Sulzer to search and select the professor of history and the professor of law. It may therefore be argued that the *Académie* was very Sulzerian in these areas. It may also be argued that Frederic's ambition with the academy was representative of his own contradictions. It is well-known that Frederic would be present on the battlefields, and that waging wars did not stop his scholarly pursuit as he brought a library with him. On the one hand, Frederic wanted to modernise the army and educate officers to become not only good officers, but also to make sure that the nobility would be faithful to him. On the other, Frederic also wanted to offer the best education possible, to educate gentlemen. It is therefore not a coincidence that he chose some of the best professors and best minds to teach at the academy, but this contradiction between academic excellence and the formation of soldiers surfaced with the animosity between the director, a career officer, and the faculty, career scholars.

The place chosen was the property of an well-established family in Berlin named Mathias. Michael Mathias developed the Brandenburg postal service, which he directed until his death in 1684. The family house was on Burgstraße 19 on the bank of the Spree river, opposite the royal palace. A few meters from the house stood the Joachimsthalsche Gymnasium, where Sulzer taught mathematics. Situated between the two bridges Friedrichsbrücke and Lange Brücke, a special bridge was built to connect the Spreeinsel and the palace to the Burgstraße and the *Académie*: the Kavalierbrücke. Pupils, governors, and their servants had their accommodation in this build-

34. Ibid., 42.
ing, whilst the professors lodged in the building behind it, but connected, on Geiststraße.16

After the financial questions were settled, Frederic wrote his Instruction regarding the curriculum, the general organisation, and the objectives of the académie.37 The primary objective was to educate cohorts of 15 pupils aged around 12 and picked among the Kadettencorps by Major general Buddenbrock. Frederic’s idea was also to operate a ‘monarchisation of the nobility’ by binding the army with himself.38 Johann von Buddenbrock (1707–1781) came from a military family and was already overseeing the Kadettencorps when Frederic made him director of the Académie des nobles. Each cohort was supposed to study for six years, unless some pupil’s progress was deemed unsatisfying and they were sent back to the Cadettes, or unless they died, which happened, albeit rarely.

The Académie opened on 1st March 1765, and this date marked the anniversary of the institution with a ceremony and speeches every year.39 One example of these, and which coincided with the parting of the first cohort in 1761, is Toussaint’s Discours sur le fruit des bonnes études. Eight pupils had finished their education and were sent to the army and placed by Buddenbrock according to their abilities.40 This speech shows the importance that professors gave to their teaching and forming young minds to become ‘philosophers’, rather than soldiers. In his speech, Toussaint insists on the value of discipline and studies against laziness and any waste of time.41 Toussaint urges the former pupils in their future professional life to keep their passion for the sciences because they elevate the man and soften his mores.42 Man is made in the image of God, but his soul must be fed with culture and profound and frequent meditations.43 Even though the pupils, and most pensionaires, will become officers in the army, Toussaint praises the philosopher who fights prejudices, false opinions, and superstitions.44 The philosophers, the scientists have calmer and softer mores because of their passion for honest principles discovered through tranquility and meditation.45

40. Ibid., 86–88.
42. Ibid., 6–7.
43. Ibid., 7–8.
44. Ibid., 10.
45. Ibid., 12–16.
ences not only soften the mores, but also make them purer: the discipline of the mind dedicated to knowing and understanding leads to a better appreciation of arts and nature, and thus the highest form of pleasure.\textsuperscript{46} Toussaint finishes then with this invitation: ‘On vous dira que vous n’êtes pas faits pour devenir des Docteurs, des Académiciens ou des Professeurs. Laissez dire, & meublez toujours votre tête’.\textsuperscript{47}

Toussaint died the next year and was replaced by Jean-Alexis Borelly (1738–1810), upon D’Alembert’s suggestion.\textsuperscript{48} According to Friedländer, Borelly also made a speech entitled \textit{Discours sur l’objet de l’institution} on 2 March 1773, which was published by Decker, but is nowhere to be found.\textsuperscript{49} In this speech, according to Friedländer, Borelly rejected the idea that the \textit{Académie} was only a military school that educates officers in the art of war, but also to prepare for political administration. To this end, Borelly suggested to reinforce the teaching of French and Latin, and to teach all disciplines to the same extent, in order to form ‘des hommes universels’ according to Frederic’s wish.\textsuperscript{50} Just as Thiébault had difficulties with Buddenbrock, so did Borelly. It seems that there was a conflict between the professors and the director of the school regarding the curriculum and the pedagogy, which may have been related to their different professional backgrounds. Buddenbrock was a soldier, and so was Boaton, whilst Sulzer, Thiébault, Toussaint, and Borelly were scholars. Boaton wrote about the importance of obeying orders.\textsuperscript{51} Sulzer wrote about the importance of questioning authority to seek the truth, as will be shown below. Thiébault wrote about this power struggle with Buddenbrock, which resulted in many exchanges with Frederic, and resulted in Thiébault’s taking charge of the teachings.\textsuperscript{52}

As for the curriculum of the \textit{Académie}, Frederic set the guidelines of which disciplines should fill the young heads, but it is detailed in the \textit{Plan détaillé d’enseignement}. This \textit{Plan} was published in 1779 after Cloots’s time, but it is the only source about the curriculum at the \textit{Académie} and the organisation of the education.\textsuperscript{53} Since it is based on Frederic’s \textit{Instructions}, and since it is likely that it is Thiébault’s work, it has to be assumed that it was

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 17–28.  
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 29.  
\textsuperscript{48} Friedländer, \textit{Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule}, 90.  
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 91.  
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 92.  
\textsuperscript{52} Dieudonné Thiébault, \textit{Mes souvenirs de vingt ans de séjour à Berlin}, vol. 5, Frédéric, son Académie, ses écoles et ses amis littérateurs et philosophes (Paris: Buissin, 1805), 198–216.  
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Plan détaillé d’enseignement pour l’académie royale des gentilshommes fait d’après l’instruction générale du Roi par ordre de son excellence Mr. de Buddenbrock lieutenant général d’infanterie des armées du roi &c.} (Berlin: George Jacques Decker, 1779).
more or less the same organisation and curriculum in the years 1770–1773, when Cloots was there. It states that the fifteen pupils are chosen from the age of twelve and are supposed to stay for six years, as mentioned in the Instructions. 54 These six years are divided into three classes of two years each, with four semesters of increasing difficulty, where the third class is the one pupils start with at 12, and the first is the last one they attend when they leave at 18. 55 Pupils have exams at the end of each semester, but these exams are only meant to monitor the progress of pupils for the professors and the king. 56

The disciplines studied during these six years are French, German, and Latin, arithmetics for ordinary use, ancient and modern history, geography, rhetoric and eloquence with a short course on poetry (principally in French), a short history of fine arts, practical geometry for the foundations of the study of civil and military architecture, elementary geometry, mechanics and astronomy, logic, a course on moral theory, modern and ancient history of philosophy, a short course on law (natural law, law of nations, public law, and the Code Frederic). 57 Languages are taught with the objective that the pupils can write with style in all three and can express themselves correctly and with good diction in the first two. 58 Moreover, French is also studied for the course on rhetoric and eloquence.

The beginners’ class, or third class, focuses mainly on languages, with a little bit of history and geography, and elementary arithmetics and geometry, but its purpose is to prepare for the two other classes. 59 Languages are taught with the objective of ‘développer les facultés de l’esprit et du cœur’; for that purpose, the maîtres have two sets of notebooks in which what must be read in different languages and what sentences must be learned by heart are written respectively. 60 It seems that professors do not teach this class as it is taught by ‘masters’ (maîtres).

The ‘classe moyenne’ offers the following courses for the next four semesters: French, German, Latin, arithmetics, geometry, history, geography, rhetoric, logic, moral, and elements of civil and military architecture. 61 The guideline for the language courses is to choose works of literature that demonstrate the genius of each language and can show principles of style and diction. 62 The pupils are asked to make a translation from each language.

54. Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 3.
55. Ibid., 4.
56. Ibid., 5.
57. Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 6–7; Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegsschule, 97.
58. Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 6.
59. Ibid., 9–23.
60. Ibid., 14.
61. Ibid., 25.
62. Ibid.
into the other one, except for Latin that is translated only into French. The course of history deals with the history of occidental and oriental emperors until the partition of empires, and then a focus on the German empire from Charlemagne to Charles V with notions of Roman law and German public law. Rhettic and logic are limited to elementary notions in order to introduce the pupils to these arts with principles, definitions, and some exercises. The course on moral philosophy starts with an exposition of the first principles of moral and notions of the morality of actions, obligations, and duty. It aims at teaching the pupils the enthusiasm for and necessity of virtue.

The first class is the last one for each cohort. There are no more courses in German. Latin is devoted to the study of Titus Livius and Quintus Curtius Rufus' speeches, Cæsar's *Commentaries on the Gallic War*, Virgil's *Aeneid*, and some chosen passages of Horace's *Odes*. The course in French emphasises style and diction, and the reading of the best authors with exercises in the same genre. Equally in French, the course on eloquence proposes to read and analyse the best orators in the three genres: demonstrative, deliberative, and judiciary. In the last semester it is replaced by a course on poetry and a short history of fine arts. History and geography focus on the time of Charles V until the present day with an emphasis on new European states and the House of Brandenburg. The course in mathematics is divided into one semester for trigonometry, two semesters for mechanics and hydrostatics, and one semester on astronomy. The course on civil and military architecture teaches castrametation and fortification. The course on the history of philosophy exposes the doctrines and opinions of the most famous schools of thoughts, both ancient and modern ones, whilst presenting their strengths and weaknesses. The last semester is devoted to a summary of Locke's work on *Human Understanding*. The course in law presents 'notions préliminaires' based on Grotius: the first two semesters discuss the different rights and obligations attached to particular acts of law (natural, convention, or promisse). The third semester focuses on the application of natural law to different social states (economic, civil, public, and law of nations) in order to give the pupils an idea of the rights of the citizen, of the rights of a people, and the rights of a monarch. The fourth semester is de-

63. Ibid., 26–31.
64. Ibid., 33–34.
65. Ibid., 35.
66. Ibid., 36.
67. Ibid., 38.
68. Ibid., 40.
69. Ibid., 41.
70. Ibid., 43–44.
71. Ibid., 45.
voted to Frederick the Great’s Prussian Civil Code, and perhaps public law and law of the empire.\textsuperscript{72}

Cloots was admitted as élève pensionnaire number 16 on 15 August 1770, and left on 1 May 1773.\textsuperscript{73} That means that his family paid for his education at the Académie, but that he followed the same courses as regular pupils. However, that also means that Cloots did not have any obligation to join Frederic’s army afterwards, or be employed in the Prussian administration, although that was the purpose of the school.

Cloots only stayed three years instead of the regular six years. Given the fact that Cloots had previously studied at the collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne, it is likely that he received a dispensation and only had to follow half of the regular schooling time. Thiébault mentioned that normally new pupils were placed in the beginner’s class unless the professors deemed them advanced enough to be in a superior class.\textsuperscript{74} In the Plan détaillé, it is specified that the first class pupils join at the age of 12 is dedicated to learning French, German, and Latin correctly, before moving to learn the other disciplines.\textsuperscript{75} There is no doubt that Cloots knew French and Latin very well, but may have had issues with German, since he claims that he never really knew his ‘mother tongue’ well (as seen previously).\textsuperscript{76} It is not possible to know exactly what courses Cloots was enrolled in, nor which class. Looking at the other pensionnaires, one may note that they mostly stayed for one or two years, and some three years, while staying four or five years was uncommon, and the whole six years extraordinary.

It was not uncommon for the pensionnaires to leave the Académie without entering the service in the army, or becoming a diplomat, but it was the exception. A useful table shows what became of all the pupils and pensionnaires from 1765 to 1813.\textsuperscript{77} Out of the 69 pupils to enter, 2 died, and 6 were sent back, which left 61 pupils to finish their education at the Académie in total; 58 of them entered the army after finishing their education, whilst only 3 entered the administration as civil servants. Of the 71 pensionnaires, one died and none were sent back; 46 of the 70 who left the school entered the army, whilst 24 did not. Out of these 24, 9 left to become ‘Landedelleute’, one of which was Cloots; 2 went to university, 2 went ‘back home’, and 2 went to ‘Liegnitz’. Only 5 went to serve in ‘fremde Dienste’, and 4 in ‘Hofdienste’. Therefore, almost all the pupils entered the army, and about two thirds of the pensionnaires also joined the army. Cloots was not the only one to leave and become an ‘Landedelleute’, but these were few. If one believes a story that Cloots tells in one of his speeches, it does not seem that

\textsuperscript{72} Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 45–46.
\textsuperscript{73} Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule, 336–337.
\textsuperscript{74} Thiébault, Frédéric, son Académie, 182.
\textsuperscript{75} Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 10.
\textsuperscript{76} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 246.
\textsuperscript{77} Friedländer, Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule, 46.
it was well perceived. In his December 1793 *Appel au genre humain*, one of his last writings before the guillotine, Cloots wrote about Prussian minister Goltz, who apparently knew that, prior to the revolution, a ‘bad subject of the king’ was travelling around Europe without the king’s permission:

> Le ministre vraiment prussien crut m’insulter en publient qu’il n’avait jamais vu ma figure. En effet, dix ans auparavant, Goltz dit à un voyageur de ma connaissance, qu’il n’ignorait pas qu’un Cloots, mauvais sujet du roi, roulait le monde sans permission ; mais que par égard pour le célèbre philosophe Pauw, mon oncle, il ne m’envoyait pas à Berlin, pieds et poings liés.⁷⁸

Even though the whole passage is meant to give elements of Cloots’s revolutionary credentials by emphasising his lack of commitment to the Prussian king and his noble background, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of this anecdote. Wilhelm Bernhard von der Goltz (1736–1795) was ambassador of Prussia in Paris. According to Avenel’s biography of Cloots, after Goltz left Paris in 1792, he gave Cloots as example of traitor to the king, who ordered his effigy to be burned in front of his soldiers laying camp in France.⁷⁹ Goltz and Cloots had an indirect exchange through the newspaper *La gazette universelle* in 1791. Someone had claimed in a supplement entitled *les Jacobins toujours Jacobins* to the *Journal de la Cour & de la Ville* that Cloots was reporting to Goltz about the Jacobins as a Prussian spy.⁸⁰ An anonymous reader wrote a letter to the newspaper denying that Goltz and Cloots had any relations, claiming that Goltz and Prussia did not care enough about the Jacobins to send a spy, and Cloots should be cleared of these suspicions in front of his colleagues.⁸¹ A friend of Goltz’s (or Goltz himself using a pseudonym) wrote to state that Goltz did not know Cloots, and attacked Cloots for being an ‘enraged revolutionary’, opposite of Goltz’s character.⁸² Cloots answered sarcastically in the *Gazette Universelle*, on 8 September 1791, that indeed as a representative of oppressed populations he could not be more opposite in character to the representative of a despotic king oppressing his population.⁸³ There was therefore real animosity between the two. It is very likely that Goltz, as military officer and

⁸¹. s.n., *Journal de la Cour et de la Ville*, no. 60 (Lundi 29 Août 1791): 480–481.
diplomat, knew Cloots since he was a former noble pupil of the military académie. It is also very likely that Glotz despised him for not entering the army or the diplomatic corps afterwards, in accordance with Frederic’s plan to ‘monarchise the nobility’.

Given the fact that Cloots stayed for three years and that there are no other records than the Plan détaillé, it can only be assumed which classes Cloots had to go to, and inferred from this Plan, which courses he followed. It is fair to assume that Cloots may have skipped the third class for beginners entirely because he already received his education at Pléssis-Sorbonne. As the Plan states, the beginners’ class only teaches French, German, Latin, and some arithmetics; French and German with the goal of reaching correction and pure diction, and to write in a legible and elegant way, Latin with the goal of reading the essential works, and arithmetics for ordinary use in life.\textsuperscript{84} One can safely assume that Cloots after his time at Pléssis-Sorbonne knew French and Latin at the level required, and that he had learned enough arithmetics, geometry, history and geography for this level. His level of German is less certain, however. As seen above, Cloots claimed that he never knew his native tongue well.\textsuperscript{85} His education from the age of 9 to 15 was in French (and Latin) in Bruxelles, Mons, and Paris, but not in German.

It can also be safely assumed that Cloots was intellectually and scholarly good enough to follow the courses taught in Berlin without falling behind or being kicked out. Therefore, one can assume that Cloots followed the third class in its entirety, or two years divided in four semesters. There is one year left, which can be assumed to be half of the middle class, i.e. the last third and fourth semesters of the middle class. This would also make sense when considering that the curriculum for the first two semesters are also redundant for someone who had studied in Paris. Only courses in German and on military architecture were different, and perhaps the one on morals. The other ones, Cloots may already have studied: French grammar and writing, reading Cornelius Nepos, preparation to rhetorics, fundamental arithmetics and geometry, history of Roman emperors, history and geography of Western and Eastern empires, and catechism.\textsuperscript{86}

I will here focus on the courses in philosophy and the course in law because Cloots wrote mainly on these topics. Frederic gave as instruction to the professor of ‘metaphysics’ to teach two main disciplines. First, a short course on moral philosophy. This course should insist on the necessity of virtue in society and generate enthusiasm for virtue in the pupils; virtue being a state of ‘perfect disinterest’ (preferring honour over self-interest, the general interest over the particular one, and the life of the patrie over one’s

\textsuperscript{84} Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 6–7.  
\textsuperscript{85} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 246.  
\textsuperscript{86} Plan détaillé d’enseignement, 24–37.
Second, the history of human opinions from the Greeks to the contemporaries. For the Greeks, using Bayle and Cicero’s *Tusculanes* and *De natura deorum* translated into French. For the contemporaries: Descarte, Leibniz, Malebranche, and Locke, with an insistence on Locke as the endpoint of this history of philosophy. The professor should also make some exercises in rhetoric after the lecture, by giving two students the opportunity to take two opposite positions and argue against one another. He would then sum up their arguments, show their weaknesses and what their reason missed, as well as consequences.

In the *Plan détaillé*, moral philosophy is taught in the middle class. It starts with a presentation of the first principles of moral, the explanation of the first principles of the morality of actions, of obligation, of duty. It develops further on the essential duties of man in the state of nature and in the social state. There are no more instructions and no more sources regarding the content of this course. One must then extrapolate from Sulzer’s own writings, and from the understanding of morality at the time.

The professor of law was according to Thiébault, ‘… un M. Stoss, gardien du cabinet des curiosités du château, et adjoint au bibliothécaire du roi, bon jurisconsulte d’ailleurs, et très digne confrère’. In his *Instruction*, Frederic stated that it was not necessary to learn law at the level of a ‘jurisconsult’, but the sufficient knowledge necessary to a ‘layman’. Principally based on Grotius, the professor’s lessons should focus on ‘droit du citoyen’ (civil law), ‘droit du peuple et d’un monarque’ (public law), and ‘droit public’ (law of nations), with the insistence that the law of nations lacks a political authority to enforce it.

Cloots seems to have good memories of his time in Berlin. Cloots mentions his education in his writings before and after the revolution. In *Vœux d’un gallophone*, Cloots mentions Pierre-François de Boaton (1734–1794). In *Lettre sur les juifs*, Cloots mentions Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–1779). In contrast, Cloots did not mention any professor by name from his time at *Pléssis-Sorbonne*. So, these two persons must have made an impression on Cloots. It is my contention here that Sulzer, in particular, had an influence on Cloots. During the revolution, Cloots mentions the *Académie*, but it is difficult to assess the experience he had there.

On Boaton, Cloots writes:

87. Frédéric II de Prusse, ‘Instruction’, 93.  
88. Ibid.  
89. *Plan détaillé d’enseignement*, 36.  
90. Ibid.  
91. Ibid.  
92. Thiébault, *Frédéric, son Académie*, 169.  
93. Frédéric II de Prusse, ‘Instruction’, 94.  
94. Ibid., 94–95.
Mr. de Boaton, ci-devant capitaine suisse au service de Sar-ndaigne & mon ancien Mentor à l’académie royale des Nobles à Berlin, jouit encore aujourd’hui de la confiance de Frédéric, de l’estime de ses élèves & de la considération publique, par les vertus du cœur & les talens de l’esprit, par des ouvrages en prose & en vers marqués au coin du bon & du beau.\footnote{Cloots, \textit{Vœux d’un gallophile}, 14.}

The above quotation is taken from a general discussion about employing Swiss soldiers in France. Cloots notes how ruinous this is for the country, who should stop employing them. However, to prove that he has nothing against the Swiss, he uses the example of his former mentor to show that they were officers of excellent condition.

Boaton was employed as gouverneur, so it seems that he was Cloots’s governor, or ‘mentor’ as he calls him. It may be that the mention of Boaton was due to the close relation governors had with their pupils since they had to stay with them outside of the classroom to educate them to be gentlemen: check their homework, stand correctly, not fall into laziness. As the \textit{Instructions} states: ‘le gouverneur couche près d’eux; il doit avoir soin de les accoutumer à la propreté, à la civilité et aux manières convenables à des gens de condition. Il doit les reprendre des grossièretés, des mauvais propos, des manières basses et triviales, de la paresse, etc.’.\footnote{Frédéric II de Prusse, \textit{Instruction}, 95.} The académie had one governor for ‘trois et trois élèves’, according to Frederic’s instructions. In 1770, when Cloots entered the académie, there were 7 governors, and 6 from 1771 to 1773, when Cloots left.\footnote{Friedländer, \textit{Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule}, 327.} There were 15 pupils, and about 15, more or less, pensionnaires during Cloots’s time, so the instructions given by Frederic must have been that each governor had three pupils and three pensionnaires.

There is not much biographical information about Boaton besides \textit{Académie} professor of mathematics de Castillon’s \textit{Eulogy} for his death.\footnote{Frédéric de Castillon, ‘Éloge historique de Pierre François de Boaton’, in \textit{Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres}, vol. 1796 (Berlin: Chez George Decker, Imp. du Roi, 1799), 22–16.} Boaton was born in a huguenot family in Lingerod, Switzerland. He became a soldier in Sardaigne, and retired in 1768 as lieutenant-capitaine. He was appointed gouverneur at the \textit{Académie des nobles} that same year, and stayed for ten years (or twelve, according to Castillon).\footnote{Friedländer, \textit{Die Königliche Allgemeine Kriegs-Schule}, 327; Castillon, ‘Éloge’, 29.} Having a lot of time for himself as gouverneur, Boaton learned painting, mathematics, history, and German to the point that he could produce a translation of the \textit{Idyllen} Swiss poet Salomon Gessner (1730–1788).\footnote{Castillon, ‘Éloge’, 27–28.} After leaving the \textit{Académie des nobles}, Boaton became the tutor to the son of a rich family, and published a
translation into French of Wieland’s poems Oberon, and Gessner’s La mort d’Abel. According to Castillon, it is the latter that opened the doors of the Berlin Académie des sciences et des belles lettres to him in 1790. Travelling to England with his wife, Boaton learned English enough to read English authors, but they both contracted an illness there. His wife died in 1792, after which Boaton returned to Germany and died in 1794.

Castillon describes Boaton as ‘frank’, ‘sincere’, ‘honest’, and ‘straight’, a man proud of his noble heritage, but not in a vain fashion — rather as an obligation to be virtuous. Boaton wrote two speeches to the members of the académie that were published after Cloots’s time there, but could serve as a guideline to how Boaton felt about his pedagogical function. Cloots, as he wrote, admired Boaton for his works of poetry, his virtuous heart, and his talented mind.

From the above quotation, it does not seem that Boaton had a specific influence on Cloots, besides a general admiration and affection for his morality, wit, and sense of literary aesthetic. However, it indicates that he appreciated his education with Boaton and what role model Cloots took at the Académie des nobles: a sense of morality inscribed in the heart of men and a keen intellect, demonstrated through literary writings. One should note that virtue and morality were pet peeves of Sulzer’s pedagogical philosophy. But the point of agreement seems to stop on virtue and morality. It is striking to see the difference between Sulzer and Boaton on reason and the role of the mind. Boaton wrote a long speech in verses about the importance of obeying: ‘Puissé-je ... Au devoir d’obéir plier votre raison!’ Sulzer, on the other hand, considered that the youth should not only be educated towards having rational and sound opinions — thus the ability to form independent thoughts — but also that virtue comes through reason.

Sulzer was a Swiss philosopher and professor of mathematics who made career in Berlin at the Academy of Sciences. In his Lettre sur les juifs, Cloots...
ots reminiscences about his professor of philosophy, Sulzer, when answering to a polemic with Antoine Court de Gebelin (1725–1784) regarding this work at the Musée:

L'exemple de M. de Gebelin me remet bien vivement dans l'esprit les sages préceptes de l'illustre M. Sulzer, mon Professeur de Philosophie à Berlin. En commentant Platon & Cicéron, il nous recommandait de ne pas nous reposer sur l'autorité d'autrui, & de ne l'en croire lui-même qu'après avoir comparé ses paroles avec le dictamen de la raison. N'oubliez jamais Messieurs que la voie d'autorité est une voie de perdition. Cette maxime a germé chez moi, elle fait le bonheur de ma vie & le désespoir de mes antagonistes.\(^{109}\)

Sulzer was originally asked by Frederic to be professor of mathematics, but became instead professor of metaphysics at the académie, meaning that he taught moral philosophy and the history of philosophy. There is no way to verify the accuracy of this statement and it can only be assessed if Sulzer would likely have said that to his pupils at the Académie based on his writings. Based on his pedagogical and philosophical works it seems highly likely that Sulzer indeed said that. This will be clear after analysing them in the next section. It is not uncommon for an enthusiastic student to have fond memories about an equally enthusiastic teacher, who opened one’s mind to new ways of thinking and seeing the world. Often, one remembers vividly a few sentences that struck a young mind's imagination.

Sulzer’s method of teaching might explain why Cloots remembered him and his lessons, and perhaps even Cloots’s intellectual fondness for him. Sulzer’s method is oriented towards the child and following a child’s temperament and way to learn.\(^{110}\) For Sulzer, it is not about how much the child learns, but how he learns and how good he knows something. The main goal of education is to enlighten the mind of the child and to form solidly his judgement.\(^{111}\) For that purpose, education must be pleasant to the child, and the teacher should make teaching pleasant and must appear trustworthy, friendly, and caring to the children in order to make them want to learn.\(^{112}\) It cannot be known for certain how Sulzer taught at the Académie, but his children-oriented pedagogical method and the emphasis on making teaching pleasant in an atmosphere of trust, care, and friendliness, was probably put into practice during his teaching. It is then no wonder that Cloots remembered him, and perhaps with such fondness.

\(^{109}\) Anacharsis Cloots, Lettre sur les juifs, à un éclésiastique de mes amis, lue dans la séance publique du musée de Paris, le XXI novembre 1782 (Berlin: s.n., 1783), 44.
\(^{110}\) Sulzer, Pädagogische Schriften, 75-79.
\(^{111}\) Ibid., 80.
\(^{112}\) Ibid., 82.
Frederic was very attached to the school and followed closely its development and the progress of the pupils. Frederic knew individually each of them and how well they performed. Frederic was aware of the importance of education for the people, and it is interesting to wonder what pedagogical project he had in mind with the Académie. According to Friedländer, Frederic’s correspondance shows that he had read Rousseau’s *Émile ou De l’éducation*, but disliked it. Indeed, in a letter written on 10 February 1763 to the duchess Louise-Dorothée of Saxe-Gotha, Frederic writes that he is reading Rousseau’s *Émile*, but only finds it unoriginal and lacking solid reasoning to the point that he threw it away out of disgust. According to Friedländer, Frederic was not influenced either by the encyclopédistes for their pedagogical ideas, and instead the Académie was a product of the pedagogical environment of the time, which is to say Locke’s pedagogical theory introduced in early 18th-century Germany by August Hermann Francke (1663–1727). In any case, Frederic’s *Instruction* presents similarities with Sulzer’s pedagogical ideas.

Sulzer considered in his *Pädagogische Schriften*: ‘Kinder zu ziehen ist ein Werk eines Philosophen, und keines gemeinen Schulmeisters’. With this motto, Sulzer developed his pedagogical philosophy and his methodological programme for the education of the youth. The goal of education for Sulzer is:

... die Kinder, die Kraft ihrer Geburt Menschen sind, zu vernünftigen, tugendhaften, und wohl gefiteten Menschen machen, die im Stand und Amt, in welchen sie mit der Zeit stehen werden, nach Würdigkeit zu leben wissen.

The goal of education is to refine human beings for the purpose of happiness: the intellectual education serves the education of the mind and the will. This education comes in three parts, for Sulzer: first, the ‘Vernunft- und Verstandesbildung’; second, the ‘Gemüts- und Willensbildung’; third, the ‘Bildung zur äußerlichen Aufführung und zu guten Sitten’.

The foundational element in forming children’s mind is right thinking, which only comes through clear concepts. A clear concept is the notion of a thing that is sufficient to distinguish that thing from all other things, and the capability to give the reason for this difference. Clear concepts are acquired through attention and investigation, which are two qualities that

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113. Thiébault, *Frédéric, son Académie*, 186.
118. Ibid., 50.
119. Ibid., 51.
must be taught to children. Aufmerksamkeit and Nachforschen are necessarily time consuming, they require time and toil. Reason must be trained therefore, according to Sulzer, in order to focus its attention on things, and investigate them for hidden properties. It is a questioning by the mind in order to attain a ‘clear concept’. Moreover, children must be taught how to reach rational and sound opinion: to question in order to form their own opinion. Would that not involve, then, questioning authority and concepts and opinions bestowed by authority? Quite opposite to Boaton and Buddenbrock’s vision of the soldier destined to obeying the chain of command.

Sulzer also considered as part of education to make children virtuous and well-mannered. Reason and virtue are closely connected for Sulzer, but if some people have reason and opinion, they sometimes lack virtue, which can only come from a good education during the youth. This is why children must not only learn and know virtue, but love virtue. Sulzer defines virtue as the skill that enables to reach freedom of action following pre-written rules. It necessitates two things: an enlightened reason with clear concepts of human obligations, and a good will that can lift obstacles to virtue. Sulzer considers as the inclinations and qualities of virtue: love of virtue, love of order, love of real honour, love of fellowmen, frankness to self and others, will to work, steadfastness and patience, and a good spirit.

As for the content of this education, Sulzer emphasises that memory is an important quality of the soul as it gives elements to form one’s opinion, one’s Verstand: Strengthening memory through exercises help form the mind, which also serves the moral life. The content of education, the curriculum, is therefore important in forming young minds and hearts. Sulzer emphasises particularly the importance of language for this purpose. Pupils must learn their mother tongue in school: pronunciation, spelling, grammar, and the understanding of the power of words and metaphors. It is also important to learn languages, Greek and Latin in particular, and to translate from the one to the other in order to form taste for a language. Another subject that must be taught to children is history, which should be taught from original Greek and Roman historians, and geography, which should be limited to learning to read maps. Other Schön Wissenschaft should teach about beauty, nature, and greatness, through the best writers

120. Sulzer, Pädagogische Schriften, 54.
121. Ibid., 58.
122. Ibid., 83.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid., 83–84.
125. Ibid., 87.
126. Ibid., 67.
127. Ibid., 70.
128. Ibid., 71.
129. Ibid., 72.
and poets to build a sense of beauty and taste. Of course higher sciences should also be part of the curriculum with mathematics, as they form the basis for others such as calculus, mechanics, astronomy, etc., and physics. Sulzer also adds to the list the necessity to know about moral and natural laws, insisting on the value of making a strong impression on children about the social importance of moral concepts for the functioning of society. Finally, theology should be taught, but no catechism for children under 12; what matters is to teach natural theology first.

Comparing this curriculum in Sulzer’s pedagogical work with the actual curriculum at the Académie as set by Frederic, it seems clear that Frederic was influenced by Sulzer’s ideas. It is not the object of this paper to delve on Sulzer’s pedagogical ideas in the context of his time, so it is not possible to assess here the extent of this Sulzerian influence on Frederic as opposed to other education projects. Sulzer was himself influenced by Wolff, known for his critical rationalism, which got him extradited from Halle, only to be re-instated in 1740 by Frederic II. It seems that Frederic II had the same pedagogical objective of rationalism and criticism as superior than catechism. Frederic in his instruction noted that the professors’ teaching to the pupils had to: ‘remplir la mémoire de connaissances utiles’, ‘cultiver la raison’, ‘former le jugement’, and ‘faire des idées nettes et précises des choses’. Following Sulzer, Frederic instructed the professor at the Académie as such:

Il pourra leur faire un petit cours de poésie pour leur former le goût. Homère, Virgile, quelques odes d’Horace, Voltaire, Boileau, Racine, voilà les sources fécondes dans lesquelles il peut puiser; ce qui ornera l’esprit des jeunes gens, et leur donnera en même temps du goût pour les beaux-arts.

For the course in history, Frederic did not recommend using primary sources, unlike Sulzer, but he insisted on how history could serve as a basis for the professor to encourage them to think about historical events and form independant thinking: ‘... il fera accoucher leur esprit de réflexions soit morales, soit politiques, soit philosophiques ...’. Finally, Frederic also considered, like Sulzer, that morality was an important part of the pupils’ edu-

130. Ibid., 73.
131. Ibid., 74.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid., 75.
135. Frédéric II de Prusse, ‘Instruction’, 89.
136. Ibid., 90.
137. Ibid., 91.
cation: ‘... sans vertu la société ne saurait subsister’; ‘il tâchera de faire de ses élèves des enthousiastes de la vertu’.\textsuperscript{138}

Cloots also shared personal memories from his time at the Académie des nobles. They are mostly positive, but he then changed his tone to a negative one regarding the army after the war against Prussia broke out in 1792.

In \textit{Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais}, Cloots writes in a footnote to a letter to Edmund Burke:

\begin{quote}
J’ai constamment aimé la France, quoique mon berceau fût troublé, mon patrimoine rançonné, mes foyers ravagés par les armées françaises. J’écrivis mes \textit{Vœux d’un Gallophile en 1784} ; je les publiai en 1785, et les réimprimai en 1786. Mes derniers voyages et la révolution actuelle ont infiniment ajouté à cet amour presque inné, à cet instinct du beau et du bon, qui date de ma sortie du collège du Plessis-Sorbonne, et de mon entrée à l’école militaire de Berlin.\textsuperscript{139}
\end{quote}

In this passage, Cloots refers to the beauty and culture that Paris has to offer, which he loved so much and pleased him ever since he left the \textit{collège du Plessis-Sorbonne}. One should note how Cloots dates this ‘instinct’ between his leaving Paris and moving to Berlin: Paris was the centre of taste and cultural refinement.

There is a very short mention of his time at the \textit{Académie} in \textit{L’orateur du genre humain} considering the prescriptions of Doctor Tissot regarding masturbation. Cloots writes:

\begin{quote}
J’ai été élevé par des prêtres à Bruxelles, par des jésuites à Mons, par des ecclésiastiques à Paris, par des militaires à Berlin, et j’ai retrouvé Lesbos partout. Mais grâce à M. Tissot, je me suis préservé de l’embrasement général : ce médecin suisse m’épouvanta. Je voulais être grand et robuste, je voulais réussir au manège, à la danse et au maniement des armes ; j’aimais passionnément l’étude et l’exercice de la mémoire.\textsuperscript{140}
\end{quote}

Samuel-Auguste Tissot was a famous and influential Swiss physician who wrote that masturbation had dire consequences on boys’ health: their strength, memory, vision, and reason.\textsuperscript{141} But what is interesting is that Cloots writes how he wanted to be a good rider on horses, a good dancer, and a good fencer, disciplines particularly taught at the \textit{Académie des nobles}. And also how he loved passionately to study and exercise his memory, faculties

\textsuperscript{138} Frédéric II de Prusse, ‘Instruction’, 93.
\textsuperscript{139} Cloots, ‘Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais’, 52.
\textsuperscript{140} Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 125.
\textsuperscript{141} François-Auguste Tissot, \textit{L’onanisme. Dissertation sur les maladies produites par la masturbation} (Lausanne: François Grasset, 1760).
that would be compromised by this solitary practice according to Tissot. In this account, therefore, Cloots seems to have enjoyed his studies at the Académie.

In *La république universelle* Cloots writes about his language being French, and how it was taught at the Académie des nobles:

> Comme l’usage de la langue française, dans les pays étrangers, est la marque d’une bonne éducation, on apprenait le français par esprit d’aristocratie ; mais on l’apprendra désormais par esprit de démocratie. Beaucoup d’Allemands et d’autres septentrionaux affectent chez eux d’ignorer leur langue, pour se donner du relief dans le beau monde. Frédéric le Grand poussa la chose si loin, qu’on nous mettait en pénitence à l’école militaire de Berlin, lorsque nous parlions l’idiome du pays. Je ne risquai pas beaucoup, car je venais de faire mes humanités à l’université de Paris : aussi n’ai-je jamais bien su ma langue natale. Ce fut dans des livres français que j’appris à lire, dans le *Catéchisme historique* de Fleury et dans l’*Histoire de la barbe bleue*.

It is not exactly certain whether Cloots indeed knew German very well. Certainly, all his education was in French from the age of 9, and his parents were Dutch, so he may have spoken Dutch before that. However, his uncle, Cornelius de Pauw, may have taught him, in which case it would have likely been in French. At the Berlin Académie, as seen above, Cloots stayed three years, and it seems that German was not taught for the last two years, so he may have followed only one year in German. It is also possible that Cloots minimises in this passage his knowledge of German because of the suspicions and accusations he faced during the revolution. He therefore emphasises that French and France are more familiar to him than German and Prussia.

In ‘Recrutement de l’armée prussienne’, published in *Chronique de Paris* 31 March 1792, Cloots writes about the Prussian army as a first-hand witness of its condition. Cloots first tells the story of how for a mother it is considered a curse to have a son who is tall and in good physical condition; this means he will be recruited as Prussian soldier. Cloots notes:

> Les garnisons prussiennes sont ravagées par le suicide ; et la plupart des soldats qui périssent sur l’échafaud, ont commis tout exprès un délit pour mourir chrétienment. L’école militaire de Berlin est située sur la Sprée ; je voyais de ma fenêtre des cadavres dans la rivière, c’étaient des soldats suicidés.
soir nous entendîmes une décharge de mousqueterie sur la place d’armes ; c’étaient douze ou quinze braves légionnaires qui, après avoir fait ensemble l’unique bon repas de leur vie, se brûlèrent la cervelle aux oreilles du roi. Je n’entrerai pas dans les détails lamentables du régime intérieur des casernes, du régime extérieur de la parade et des manœuvres. L’ennui et la douleur dévorent ces prisonniers qui tiennent toute la nation prisonnière.  

This was written a year after _L’orateur_, and it seems that his memory of the _Académie_ changed to a negative one. Are these anecdotes about soldiers committing suicide true? Or are these only motivated by the current political events: the imminent war against Prussia after the Declaration of Pillnitz and the unfruitful demand by the National Assembly that the Prussian troops be removed from the French borders? It seems more likely to be the latter and that Cloots tries here to reassure the French (and himself) that the Prussian army would not be strong enough anyway. In his PhD thesis, Sikora has analysed the extent of desertion and the harsh discipline, and he seems to corroborate Cloots’s picture of distress among the Prussian soldiers. Sikora cites a source, according to which mothers made their male children work hard in order to make them malformed and inapt for the army, although it may be a self-justification for child abuse and child labour. It corroborates nonetheless Cloots’s writings about the curse of a son in good physical condition. By the same token, a study on a Prussian regiment in the year 1770–1771 shows that nine deserted and eight committed suicide. Another source reminiscing of his youth as soldier tells how soldiers committed a murder in order to be sentenced to death, and how they chose to murder children because they were believed to go directly to heaven as innocent souls. However, it seems that suicide was an option of last resort when desertion was not possible. An analysis of the army between 1717 and 1728 shows that out of 16,965 soldiers 1,542 died, out of which only 45 from accident or suicide, whilst 8,562 deserted.

**BEGINNINGS IN PARIS**

After finishing his education at the Berlin military academy, and being the heir of the family’s vast fortune, Cloots chose to go back to Gnadenthal to start working on a book that, from his own account, would occupy him

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145. Ibid.
146. Ibid., 67.
147. Ibid., 76.
for four years fifteen hours a day.\textsuperscript{148} The book was published a year later, in 1780, when Cloots was twenty-five. \textit{La Certitude des Preuves du Mahométisme} is the title of this book, which Cloots claimed to contain the definitive theist argument, which would put an end to theological debates about the one true religion.\textsuperscript{149} As Mortier notes, the field had already been widely covered and left little space for a beginner.\textsuperscript{150} The book compiles a synthesis of what some Enlightenment authors had to say against any dominant monotheism, in favour of a reconciling theism, but it is also an introductory guide to Islam. The title and the pseudonym used are a direct reference to the Abbé Bergier’s 1767 \textit{La certitude des preuves du christianisme}, in which Bergier argues that Christianity is the only true religion.\textsuperscript{151} Cloots takes the pseudonym Ali-Gir-Ber, alfaqui and doctor in theology, who is supposedly writing the book, which is translated and heavily annotated by the editor, whose footnotes are what constitute most of the book and Cloots’s own views. Ali-Gir-Ber is presenting the same arguments as Nicolas Bergier, but replacing Christianity with Islam, and in the footnotes Cloots refutes every single statement and argument under the cover of the editor and translator, quoting many philosophers of the Enlightenment to make his point (Bacon, Bayle, Blount, Collins, Hume, Leibniz, Locke, Mosheim, Nicole, Taylor, Voltaire).\textsuperscript{152} Doing so, the book works on several levels and the chosen narrative strategy allows Cloots to incorporate his arguments as part of this narration. By pretending to be Ali-Gir-Ber and reproducing the same argumentation as Bergier, but for Islam, Cloots demonstrates that Bergier’s argument about the certainty and the proofs of the one true religion being Christianity could be used similarly by any other revealed religion, such as Islam, and is therefore refuted. In the footnotes commenting this argument, there are many explanations of the Muslim faith and practice; the book can therefore be read as a guide to Islam to European readers. But most importantly, Cloots’s main argument in the footnotes is to refute Bergier, and any monotheist religion: if indeed there is a God, then this God would have intended his will to be accessible to everyone notwithstanding their intelligence or competence. God’s will should be accessible to all, and therefore no religion is necessary to translate His will. The argument is not new, and is definitively theist in that it concludes that there is one God, but that there is no one true religion; all religions could agree on the same ‘Supreme Being’, and should stop claiming to be the only true religion of God. After the revolution, Cloots will declare himself an atheist, although his ‘sys-

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149. Cloots, \textit{Certitude des preuves}.
150. Mortier, \textit{Anacharsis Cloots}, 42.
152. For more on Cloots’s \textit{Certitude}, see the chapter on reason and science.
\end{flushright}
tem’ will be based on nature, as a sort of new divinity or ‘Supreme Being’, as will be seen in the chapter on nature.

Cloots arrived in Paris in 1780 with his first publication as credentials. He joined the Musée, an intellectual circle for discussions and learning, where he remained a member from 1781 to 1791. The topic of religion occupied him in a second and shorter book published in 1783 and entitled *Lettre sur les Juifs.* With his characteristic tolerance and search for truth, Cloots refuted the rabbis who preached faith on ‘chimerical events’, but also refuted the false prejudices against the Jews among the general population. This created controversy with the president of the Musée, Antoine Court de Gébelin (1725–1784), which was published in the form of public letters at the end of the *Lettre sur les Juifs.* Cloots’s book discussed the reason for which the Jewish people had not been exterminated despite several attacks against them. Contrary to his ‘ecclesiastical friend’, who argued that God’s will had saved the Jews, Cloots argued that it was trade that saved them. Gébelin criticised Cloots for not only stating a truism regarding the Jews and trade, but also for being ignorant of religion in general and Judaism in particular—a ignorant, he notes, due to the passions that the *philosophes* of the *république des lettres* feel when discussing religion, confusing ‘truth’ with their one-sided theistic view. Cloots answered by denouncing the duplicity of Gébelin, who had previously praised his dissertation. Cloots defended himself against Gébelin’s attacks by stating that he had not obviously pretended to claim that he was the first to link the Jews with commerce.

The same year, Cloots joined another intellectual club, the Lycée français of Pilâtre de Rozier, who was the first to fly in a hot air balloon above Paris on 21 November 1783 together with the Marquis François Laurent d’Arlandes. It is in the Lycée that he met Gabriel Brizard (1744–1793), also known as ‘l’abbé Brizard’. He was named abbé due to his poor background that left him with only one option of receiving a catholic education. In reality he was not at all a member of the Church, but one of the philosophes of the *république des lettres* with whom he shared anti-clericalism. Cloots and Brizard became very close friends and their mutual admiration for Rousseau—if not sheer idolisation—sent them on a pilgrimage to Ermenonville, a commune in the *Oise département* in northern France, where Rou-

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Rousseau was buried. Rousseau had reached the status of adulation only saints enjoyed among believers. His fiends came to visit his grave. The owner of the property where Rousseau spent his last days, René Louis de Girardin (1735–1808), made it clear in his guide that the place was open to anyone who wished to visit. Girardin had designed the landscape of the garden at Ermenonville inspired by Rousseau’s philosophy, which was largely built by 1776. In this garden, he built Rousseau’s house, where he left copies of his last manuscripts *Les confessions* and *Rêveries du promeneur solitaire*. The highlight of the pilgrimage was visiting the small island with poplars, where Rousseau’s grave stood. Many people came to do the pilgrimage, including Marie Antoinette. Girardin wrote a guide for the visitor, whilst another guide mentioned Rousseau’s grave.

In Ermenonville, the two friends bought objects that supposedly were in Rousseau’s possession — some philosophical relics. They interviewed many of the town’s inhabitants about Rousseau. At the end of their pilgrimage, they burned works attacking Rousseau on his tomb — a form of cathartic expiation. In his later writings, Cloots distanced himself from Rousseau and preferred Voltaire. Nonetheless, he later acquired a farm and lands in the same département of Oise, where he was subsequently elected as a representative to the *Convention* in 1792. Brizard was editing and publishing the complete works of Rousseau from 1788 until 1793 when he died in poverty and oblivion.

Cloots frequented other intellectual circles such as the salons, thanks to his immense fortune that opened all doors easily. According to Avenel, he attended the salons of Madame Helvétius, madame de Cheminot, Julie Talmat, and Fanny Talmat. In particular, he frequented the salon run by the countess of Beaumains, which was frequented by Louis-Sébastien Mercier (1740–1814) and Nicolas Edme Restif de La Bretonne (1734–1806).

In 1784, Cloots started his *grand tour* of Europe. He spent the summer of 1784 in London, where he met Lord Shelburne, and Edmund Burke. They socialised at the time, but later Burke famously wrote his *Reflections*

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on the Revolution in France arguing against it. 164 This opus was meant as a reply to Dr Richard Price’s sermon to the Revolution Society in the United Kingdom. 165 Cloots responded with a letter that he subsequently published in May 1790, urging Burke to see how enlightened the Parisian crowd was and to forgive the ‘few’ barbaric acts that were to be put on the account of centuries of oppression. 166 Burke answered in French with some mistakes, but good enough to give a hint of his sarcastic tone when he stated that he would be delighted to meet the enlightened crowd in question. 167 There is however no proof that this unfinished letter was sent to Cloots or that he read it, but according to the editors of his correspondence, ‘the style Burke used suggests that it too may have been intended for publication’. 168 This can be confirmed by what Cloots wrote himself in Anacharsis à Paris in October 1790: ‘M. Burke m’a promis une réfutation volumineuse que j’attends encore’. 169 In another letter — published this time — Burke clarified his position regarding ‘his old acquaintance’ Cloots, and joined his voice to the many other ones regarding his embassy of the human race at the National Assembly and subsequently at the fête de la fédération. 170 Burke continued his critique against the French Republic and Cloots’s delegation of the human race by expressing a rather sarcastic form of consolation:

Pity that Cloots had not had a reprieve from the Guillotine ’till he had compleated his work! But that engine fell before the curtain had fallen upon all the dignity of the earth. 171

In February 1786, Cloots was perusing some books in a library in Amsterdam when he met someone introducing himself as Castriotto — from George Castriota, the great Prince of Albania, better known as Alexander Beg, or Skanderbeg. In reality, the Prince was Stefano Zannowich (or Štefan Zanović), son of a donkey driver, born in Montenegro. He was one

166. Cloots, Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais’.
168. Ibid., 135.
171. Ibid., 343.
of these many self-fashioned imposters of the second-half of the eighteenth century who seemed to have read too many pretender novels depicting commoners parading as kings, and acted in real life as one of their protagonists. Zanović actually used his alleged title of prince, not only to infiltrate the circles of French aristocracy, but also to publish himself in the hope of becoming an important author in the Republic of Letters. The most famous of all adventurers and, at times, pretenders — Casanova — mentioned him in his memoirs, as the brother of ‘... Premislas Zanowitch, qui après devint fameux comme son frère... Ces deux grands grecs [filous, fripons] moururent mal tous les deux’. Cloots was the last victim of his imposture as he was arrested for debt shortly afterwards. Zannowich had previously taken the false identity of a rich merchant from Dalmatia, deceiving merchants in Amsterdam. He slit his wrists in detention.

Cloots related this encounter in 1786 in *Les vœux d’un gallophile*, his second major book mixing his analysis of the political economy of France, and elements of his personal life, with one common denominator: his love for France. It also contained a small satirical play with Voltaire playing a last trick on a priest called to his deathbed, *Voltaire ou les prêtres déçus*. Interestingly, Cloots mentions influential authors that he read at that time, such as Bayle, Collins, Bolinbroke, Hume, Helvétius, Fréret, Boulanger, Voltaire, Rousseau, Robinet. During the summer of 1786 Cloots visited Vienna, Buda, Italy, and Switzerland. Cloots was traveling throughout North Africa, Spain and Portugal when the news of the storming of the Bastille and the revolution reached him. He rushed immediately back to Paris.

In the context of the print explosion of 1789, and particularly newsprint from July 1789, Cloots is one of those who benefited, and he started a new career as a journalist and political commentator. He changed his mind re-

177. Cloots, *Vœux d’un gallophile*.
178. Ibid., 78.
179. Labbé sorted out in a table when and where Cloots published his articles between 1790 and 1793, see Labbé, *Anacharsis Cloots*, 325.
Regarding his publishing strategy after the French revolution broke out. Rather than writing thick treatises of philosophy, read by just a few intellectuals, he considered the shorter genre of brochures and articles to be best suited for the dissemination of his ideas. As long as an idea is philosophically sound in his view it does not need long treatises. 180

Cloots was careful to remain independent and to reach as wide and varied a readership as possible. He thus wrote for many of the newspapers that appeared in the new public sphere, such as la Chronique de Paris, la Gazette Universelle, le Moniteur, le Patriote Français, la Révolution de France et de Brabant, les Annales Patriotiques et Littéraires, le Courrier de Paris et des 83 départements, le Journal des Jacobins, and le Batave. As Cloots wrote himself in 1793 in his Adresse aux Français:

En écrivant mes articles, je disais en voici un pour la flasque Chronique; en voici un pour le réservé Moniteur; en voici un pour la Gazette hermaphrodite, avant l’époque de sa perversion totale; en voici un autre pour le lourd Patriote, un autre pour le trivial Gorsas; un autre pour le mâle Carra. Je me servais de tous les carrosses, voire même des casse-cou et des tape-culs, pour faire voyager la vérité bien ou mal à son aise. 181

Mortier notes that Cloots was one of the great journalists of the French Revolution, and he enjoyed real popularity among a large audience. 182 Cloots made his opinion known. He wrote against the French émigrés, in favour of the separation of Church and state. However, he was not yet anti-monarchist as he still praised Frederic II’s Enlightened despotism in Prussia. In December 1790, he became a member of the Jacobins Club and wrote in favour of the return of the king to Paris (leaving Versailles), and against the king as head of armies because Cloots feared a potentially charismatic military chief who could overshadow the legislative power. 183 A fear eminently prophetic.

One of the most well-known actions that made Cloots instantly (in)famous is his ‘mediatic coup’ — so to speak — performed on 19 June 1790 at the National Assembly, as sketched in the opening paragraph of this thesis. Self-proclaimed ‘ambassador of the human race’, Cloots led a delegation of thirty five foreigners in their vernacular costumes representing the diversity of humanity to the French Assembly. The object of this mise-en-scène was to draw the members’ attention to the universality of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and thereby the universality of the French Revolution, which was to be celebrated for the first time on the first anniversary of the

180. See the chapter on self-fashioning and rhetoric for further details.
183. Ibid., 115–16.
Bastille-day, 14 July 1790. As Mortier notes, this shows, already before the publication of the *Universal Republic*, Cloots’s commitment to the people as the only legitimate sovereign, rather than the monarch or head of state.\(^{184}\)

In his *Discours prononcé à la barre de l’Assemblée Nationale* Cloots insisted that this celebration ‘… ne sera pas seulement la fête des Français, mais encore la fête du genre humain’.\(^{185}\) ‘Therefore, he asked that some foreigners be admitted to the celebration:

> Un nombre d’étrangers de toutes les contrées de la terre demandent à se ranger au milieu du Champ de Mars; & le bonnet de la liberté qu’ils élèveront avec transport, sera le gage de la délivrance prochaine de leurs malheureux concitoyens.\(^{186}\)

A vast polemic ensued about the authenticity of the delegates, which would last well into the nineteenth century, and even to the present days.\(^{187}\) Contemporary historians such as Roland Mortier, François Labbé, but also Selma Stern in 1914, have investigated the case and all agree on the unfair and polemical nature of the claim of inauthenticity of the delegates. It is undeniable, according to the National Archive and authenticated at the time by *commissaires*, that most of these representatives of the human race were political refugees in France (the Italian painter Francesco Giuseppe Casanova (1727–1803), Giacomo’s younger brother, was among them).\(^{188}\)

Mortier describes the vast polemic about Cloots’s endeavour that mocked unfairly the delegation for not being composed of real foreigners. In particular, a Turk was accused of being an actor in costume. In reality, he was a Turkish specialist in Arabic literature at the Royal Library, and felt that he had to write an answer to defend himself and Cloots’s embassy.\(^{189}\) This Turk, it has to be said, had had the unfortunate idea to express himself in what appeared to be an imperfect or unintelligible French, attracting the ill-intended and mean-spirited sarcasms of the aristocrats and monarchists. The other members of the delegation, according to Mortier, stemmed from the intellectual, financial, and economic world.\(^{190}\)

Cloots attended the celebration together with his delegation on the first *Fête de la Fédération*, a rainy 14 July 1790. His idea of an ‘embassy’ of the

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184. Ibid., 126.
186. Ibid.
190. Ibid., 127.
human race had much more importance in the evolution of Cloots’s political thought. In his view, and also in his enemies’, each of these individuals represented (or were supposed to represent) their country of origin better than official diplomats because the sovereign was not the monarch but the people. At the Fête, the ‘real’ ambassadors from these countries were equally present, and according to his own account, they did not seem very pleased by Cloots’s delegation claiming to represent their country by representing their people rather than their kings. The answer given by the President of the National Assembly, none other than Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, the theoretician of national sovereignty, was measured and cautious.

Diplomatically, the President reaffirmed that the king was the sovereign who reinstalled liberty for the people, and not the people. The foreigners were invited to go back to their native country to beseech their own monarch to follow Louis XVI’s example.

Sieyès’s affirmation is in very striking contradiction with what is already implied in Cloots’s thought, a bottom-up ‘regeneration’ of the people creating a revolution thereby freeing themselves, rather than a top-down grant of liberty from the king. And to Cloots this ‘regeneration’ should be extended to other populations not yet ‘regenerated’.

192. Labbé writes that De Menou was the president, Labbé, *Anacharsis Cloots*, 92. However, according to the listing on the website of the French National Assembly, the president in function on the day 19 June 1790 was Sieyès, http://tinyurl.com/mzfngry. Jean-François Menou de Boussay was president from 27 March to 12 April 1790, while Sieyès was president from 8 to 20 June 1790.
In his chronicle of 15 July 1790 for the *Chronique de Paris*, Cloots wrote about Holland and her geopolitical situation vis-à-vis Prussia. This marked the beginning of his thinking process on his ‘system’. He called it ‘nouveau système de la Gaule’, and introduced the idea of incorporating another country—Holland—to the French Republic with representatives sent to the Parliament. Cloots often insisted on the name ‘Gaul’ rather than ‘France’, showing a distinction to what he perceived as the embodiment of the French monarchy. France is the name given after all to the original kingdom ‘Ile-de-France’, and history shows the will of succeeding French kings to incorporate other provinces into the ‘French’ kingdom. The name France is thus tainted with the idea of monarchy. However, Cloots is not yet openly showing signs of a commitment to republican ideas, as will be studied in the chapter on republicanism. It is rather a re-appropriation of existing theses regarding the Frankish origins of aristocracy and the Gauls as the original people of ‘France’. Cloots mentioned the Franks who invaded Gaul to deprive its inhabitants of their liberty. Henri de Boulainvilliers (1658–1722) popularised this narrative of a progressive alienation of political liberty, also known as *thèse nobiliaire* against the *thèse royale* from royal apologists such as Jean-Baptiste Dubos (1670–1742). In this *thèse nobiliaire* narrative, the ‘conquest’ of Gaul by the Franks is the centrepiece, and Boulainvilliers identifies this moment as the foundation of the *nation française*, with an egalitarian republican government led by a ‘national assembly’; but progressively the French nation was stripped of its sovereignty through feudalism, leaving it ultimately enslaved under ‘despotism’ enforced by the monarchy.

1790 is also the year that Cloots began his own regeneration. The ‘regeneration of man’ was a common theme of the revolution, developing a general project of education of man as enslaved subject towards a free citizen, a regeneration of the old world into a new one.\textsuperscript{198} Cloots undertook a similar project with himself by changing his name and adding an epithet.\textsuperscript{199} In the \textit{Chronique de Paris} 15 March 1790, Cloots writes:

Je renonce à mon berceau tudesque et à mes titres gothiques
pour me revêtir de l’honorable qualité de bourgeois de Paris.
Article signé Cloots du Val de Grâce, baron en Allemagne, citoyen en France.\textsuperscript{200}

From February 1791 on, Cloots systematically signed his writings as the ‘Orateur du genre humain’. Since February 1790, Cloots had already rejected his Christian name Jean-Baptiste, and adopted instead the one of ‘Anacharsis’. According to Labbé, Cloots may have met the abbé Barthélemy, who published in 1788 a novelised biography of the Scythian philosopher Anacharsis.\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce} was a best-seller at the time.\textsuperscript{202} The book was a fiction based on historical erudition, and its success was instantaneous, even if short-lived.\textsuperscript{203} As Labbé notes, it is highly likely that Cloots identified himself with the Scythian Anacharsis since they both travelled from their native North to the Southern capitals of philosophy of their time — Athens and Paris. They both learned a second language in their youth that was the language of Enlightenment at their time — Greek and French. They both adopted this new country and witnessed the beginning of a new Republic.\textsuperscript{204} One may add that Cloots compared in many of his writings the current situation in France with classical Greece, and saw Paris as the central capital of philosophy as Athens had once been.

On 13 October 1790, Cloots received an invitation to join the Cercle Social for its first meeting at the Palais Royal. He attended the inaugural lecture given by the self-proclaimed \textit{Procureur Général de la Vérité} Claude Fauchet (1744–1793) — a radical socialist priest, who was at Versailles before being expelled after violent sermons against the court. He was elected deputy in 1791, and guillotined on 31 October 1793. Fauchet exposed his views of a sort of Catholic socialism and theocratic ideas, explaining Rous-

\textsuperscript{199}. This topic will be dealt with in the chapter on self-fashioning and rhetoric.
\textsuperscript{200}. Labbé, \textit{Anacharsis Cloots}, 98, footnote 181.
\textsuperscript{201}. Ibid., 99, footnote 184.
\textsuperscript{202}. Barthélemy, \textit{Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce}.
\textsuperscript{204}. Labbé, \textit{Anacharsis Cloots}, 99, footnote 184.
seau through the Bible in public lectures. This event at the Cercle Social received large publicity, but Cloots did not express himself even if he disagreed. It was only after Fauchet attacked Voltaire more directly that Cloots decided to write against him on 28 October 1790 in the Courrier de Paris dans les 83 départements. Until then, Cloots had been mainly a theist, as expressed in Les Certitudes and Vœux d’un galophile. Cloots affirmed his now materialistic and atheist convictions, and attacked Fauchet on this ground, and also for misusing and abusing Rousseau and Voltaire’s names and ideas. However, after a personal encounter with Fauchet, Cloots presented his apologies and accepted Fauchet’s ideas as some kind of temporary necessity, a transition to an eventual atheism and final liberation from religion. Nevertheless, the fight continued between Cloots and the Cercle Social, especially after the Cercle’s expression of its view that only Freemasons should be elected to official positions. In the end, Cloots continued his attacks and wanted to organise a public debate between him and Fauchet, which, disappointingly, could not take place as the two could not agree to the conditions of the debate.

This episode, and his later radicalisation from a theistic to an atheistic position, probably is the reason why Cloots would later be dubbed ‘personal enemy of Jesus Christ’, a sentence often written in the short entries in encyclopaedias. Mortier notes that the sentence that was later wrongly and apocryphally attributed to Cloots — ‘Je me déclare l’ennemi personnel de Jésus Christ’ — is nowhere to be found in any of his writings, and constitutes part of anti-revolutionary propaganda. One may add that it is quite possible that this epithet originated from Riouffé’s Mémoires d’un détenu, where he described Cloots as such: ‘L’orateur du genre humain, l’ennemi personnel de Jesus-Christ, Cloots...’. What was meant as an apocryphal semi-derisive addition to mark his atheism became part of his biography afterwards.

Mortier considers Cloots to be one of the most significant political thinkers in the years 1791–92. Not only as a journalist, but also as a pamphlet-

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206. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 87–89.


208. Ibid., 102–03.


211. Honoré Riouffé, Mémoires d’un détenu, pour servir à l’histoire de la tyrannie de Robespierre, 2nd ed. (Paris: Louvet, Anjubault, B. Mathé, 1795), 90.

eer, Cloots wrote extensively on the subject that, already then, obsessed the revolutionaries — the perils from abroad threatening the French Revolution. He put his education at the Berlin military Academy to use and his knowledge of the country for his military and geopolitical analyses. According to Cloots, there was no threat from Prussia.213

On 20 April 1792, a decree declared war on Francis II, King of Hungary and Bohemia, which was meant to avoid involving the German states. Cloots appeared at the National Assembly:

C’est la crise de l’univers : le sort du genre humain est entre les mains de la France. Nous combattons pour les droits de l’homme, et nos victoires ajouteront un nouvel éclat à la dignité humaine; nous frapperons les despotes et nous délivrerons les hommes.214

Cloots also donated ‘12.000 livres qui serviront à équiper, habiller, armer et solder 40.000 à 50.000 combattants’.215 Cloots added to this his new book entitled La République Universelle. In this 1792 pamphlet, Cloots developed his idea that there only can be one sovereign on earth, the human race, and that, therefore, the goal of the human race is to build a universal republic. The French Revolution is only the beginning of the universal revolution. One could interpret this as yet another act of megalomania, or one could interpret this as putting Machiavelli’s teaching into practice. Cloots was a student of ‘la science du profond Machiavel’, who wrote and famously advocated the need for Florence to have its own army of citizens because a polity’s own citizens fight better when they fight for their own land and know why.216 In other words, according to Cloots, the French soldiers were fighting for ‘the freedom’ other ‘oppressed sovereigns’, with the creation of the universal republic in sight. Moreover, it was common practice for the revolutionaries to educate the youth and re-educate adults to operate the ‘regeneration’ of the republic. As Hunt notes, ‘one of the most important “Jacobin” schools was the army of 1792–94’, and they sent them many newspapers and pamphlets as coursebooks.217 Cloots’s pamphlet was therefore only one among many others, and far from a megalomaniac idea, it was his attempt at spreading his ideas among the ‘pupils’ of the republic — the soldiers.

214. Ibid.
215. Ibid.
Cloots's pamphlet provoked once more a violent critique from the radical left of the Assembly. In ‘L’Orateur du peuple’, Martel wrote that Cloots was ‘un fou dangereux’, whose ‘folie surpasse celle de l’abbé Pierre; il feint d’ignorer les intrigues de la Cour...’. Cloots was suspected and openly accused of being a double agent: on the one hand, paying lip service to the revolution while, on the other, serving foreign monarchies. The zeal with which he pushed for war against these monarchies was perceived as a sinister plan to lead the French Revolutionary armies to a certain death. Martel concluded in terms not so different from the way Sieyès as President of the Assembly had answered Cloots’s embassy of the human race: ‘... que chacun dans sa patrie écrase ses rois, et il n’y aura de guerre nul part’. But not before he added that Cloots was a ‘philosophe insensé’, struck with ‘démence’. This political hatred vocalised in the form of a libel regarding Cloots’s sanity, and questioning his allegiance due to his foreign origins were already expressed in violent terms. The same hatred was to resurface in 1794; by then it was not solely limited to the rhetorical realm.

Cloots wrote an article entitled ‘Origine du mot « Ça ira »’ in *Chronique de Paris*, 4 May 1792, in which he expressed his belief that France would eventually get rid of her enemies the way America got rid of England in Boston.\(^\text{218}\) He insisted on the liberation of Savoie, Valais, Vaud, Fribourg, Bern, and Zurich, and presented his military tactics of mobility and harassment. In this article, one can see how Cloots recycled widely shared arguments in order to disseminate his own. Cloots added his own ideal of the liberation of the whole of humankind to the argument of expanding France to her ‘natural frontiers’. All extensions of France were based on the argument of ‘unity’.\(^\text{219}\)

In the *Chronique de Paris* on 29 May 1792, Cloots published, in a rare public display of his private life, his mother’s letter and his own answer to it. She implored him to find shelter in England as she was worried about the hatred that the Jacobins created in the rest of Europe, but Cloots refused. He was as much confident that the citizen-soldiers would prevail as he was confident that the Prussian army would be defeated because, unlike the French, Prussian soldiers were not treated right and had no personal motivation in fighting. He firmly believed in what he perceived to be the struggle for truth against tyranny. In a way, if ‘l’infâme’ was for Voltaire religion, it is for Cloots religion and any other form of tyranny, in this moment represented by monarchy; the motto ‘écrasez l’infâme’ took a literal turn.

During this period, Cloots became openly republican and anti-monarchist. Previously, he still had been an admirer of Frederic II as ‘Enlightened despot’. In his anti-monarchism, he found support in many others, and es-

\(^{218}\) Cloots, *Ecrits révolutionnaires*, 343.

especially the most famous of them all, Condorcet. He began collaborating with Condorcet at the *Chronique de Paris*, and the two were on good personal terms.\(^{220}\)

**French Citizenship and Election**

On 10 August 1792, the Tuileries — then centre of the executive power — was taken by a group led by the National Guard of the Insurrectional Paris Commune and revolutionary *fédérés* from Marseille and Brittany. When the insurrection of 10 August 1792 and the massacre of September occurred, Cloots was not yet engaged in political life, even if he considered — and rightly so according to Mortier — that his writings contributed to prepare the proclamation of the Republic.\(^{221}\)

After these events, the Legislative Assembly decreed the king’s removal and the convocation of a new ‘Constituante’ named ‘Convention’ on the model of the American revolution. Its purpose was to draw up a new constitution, after deliberation and vote for elected deputies. Elections were called, but Cloots lamented that he was not eligible because of the rule concerning ‘residency’. Cloots suddenly took pride again in being Prussian. He explained that high ranked Prussian military officers were in favour of the French Revolution, including Hertzberg — of whom he was highly critical in his 1791 *Dépêche du Prussien Cloots au Prussien Hertzberg*.\(^{222}\) Consequently, Cloots asked for the incorporation of Prussian officers into the French army.\(^{223}\) Condorcet supported his initiative. Mortier notes that Cloots was well aware of the ongoing trends in German public opinion.\(^{224}\)

The *député* Guadet took the initiative to promulgate a decree on 26 August 1792 to grant French citizenship to foreigners ‘who served the cause of liberty’.\(^{225}\) This honorific title was given to several foreigners, among the most famous Priestley, Paine, Bentham, de Pauw, Washington, Hamilton, Madison, and Schiller. This list was only honorific and did not have any consequence except for Cloots and Paine, who were both elected member of the Convention — and subsequently were both condemned to be guillotined. However, Cloots did not have the same incredible twist of fate that saved Paine.\(^{226}\)

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221. Ibid., 297.
224. Ibid., 290.
Cloots was declared a French citizen on 26 August 1792, with effect on 6 September 1792. Cloots thanked the National Assembly on 27 August 1792, praising it for associating the ‘philosophes cosmopolites’ to the work of the revolution, and swearing an oath ‘à la nation universelle, à l’égalité, à la liberté, à la souveraineté du genre humain...’. Cloots wrote on 28 August 1792 _Pétition des domestiques_, which took position against the law on the right to vote excluding those employed as domestic servants, showing his egalitarian views on society. In this pamphlet, Cloots defends universal suffrage for men and asks for household servants to be included. He later declared himself ‘sans-culotte’, and it is this social egalitarianism that made him a personality of interest to nineteenth-century socialist historians.

Cloots was elected to represent the Oise département, where he had bought a farm and land. He was elected at the second run with 279 votes out of 452 voters. ‘Nous ne saurons jamais si c’est le vote de ses fermiers qui aura été déterminant ou bien la préparation soignée des listes par les milieux de la capitale’. He was elected as ‘Jean-Baptiste Cloots, citoyen français, demeurant à Paris, connu sous le nom d’Anacharsis Cloots, orateur du genre humain’.

Cloots accepted his election on 5 September 1792:

> Mr le Président, j’accepte avec reconnaissance le poste honorable et périlleux où mes concitoyens m’appellent. Et je jure au nom du genre humain que le département de l’Oise ne se repentira pas de son choix ...  

Cloots was also elected in the département of Saône-et-Loire, arrondissement Châlon-sur-Seine, where someone had added his name to the list. However, Cloots chose the Oise because he had been elected there first. He added that he swore ‘... de maintenir l’unité de l’empire français, en attendant l’unité de la grande nation du genre humain’. Priestley was also elected, but he declined the position, arguing that he did not speak French good enough. Paine was equally elected in Oise, and also in Pas-de-Calais, which he chose, even if he did not speak very good French either.

The events on 10 August 1792, and the massacres in September were mostly due to the disaster of the war on the Eastern front for the French armies. Paris believed in a quick and easy victory. This situation created panic and an obsession of suspecting treason. The commune of Paris and

229. Mortier, _Anacharsis Cloots_, 301.
230. Ibid.
the blood thirst that ensued provoked tortures and executions of the most barbaric nature. The Girondins blamed the Montagnards, but many of them chose to leave these terrible events behind after the victory at Valmy on 20 September 1792. Condorcet was one of them.

Cloots did not take part in these events which occurred prior to his election and, hence, political engagement. Nonetheless, Cloots chose to take responsibility for these acts and tried to tone them down by considering them as catharsis by an oppressed population in a situation of crisis: ‘Salus populi suprema lex’. As Mortier notes, in an attempt to explain the posthumous propaganda surrounding Cloots: ‘Aussi est-ce sur lui, démuni de toute autorité politique, que l’histoire fera retomber le stigmate ignominieux d’un crime qu’il n’a pas commis’.

On 17 November 1792, Cloots published *Ni Marat ni Roland*. The pamphlet expressed Cloots’s opinion regarding the aftermath of the September massacres and the political opposition between the Gironde and the Montagne. Cloots denounced in this pamphlet what he viewed as populist manoeuvres by Marat, Roland, and Brissot, which manipulated popular emotion created by the massacres. They were his former Girondin friends. Instead, Cloots called for unity and for the people to rally around against the divisions of the fédéralistes. Cloots repeated his argument expounded in *La république universelle* regarding the unification of the human race. In particular, he recalled a conversation he had with Brissot and Paine in which Paine backed him in his view of a universal republic when Brissot thought that even France was too big a territory to be an undivided republic. This positioning above political parties and siding with his philosophical principles resulted in his isolation at the Convention. Ultimately, it garnered collective resentment, turning him into a scapegoat. In retrospect, the Girondin Guadet, who suggested that Cloots be granted French citizenship, regretted his motion.

As député de l’Oise, Cloots was very busy, but he did not care so much about local politics and individual interventions. According to Labbé, Cloots was not often present at the Convention. However, he participated in the *Commission particulière pour les Archives*, in charge of evaluating the state of national archives.

Concerning the King, Cloots, as many other revolutionaries, was initially not against a parliamentary monarchy. In a pastiche letter by Louis XVI to all the other kings on earth — ‘Le roi des Français à tous les rois de la Terre, salut’ published in *Chronique de Paris* 2 March 1791 — Cloots called

all monarchs to imitate the French king and change their inherited ‘despotic throne’ to a ‘throne over free men’.\textsuperscript{235}

A year later, in his article ‘Monarchie sans roi’ published in \textit{Annales patriotiques et littéraires} 27 July 1792, Cloots pleaded for a monarchy without a king, that is to say a presidential regime similar to the one in America with

Un monarque (\textit{Monoi}) à peu près comme Washington, élu pour cinq ans et salarié modestement \ldots\  Le \textit{veto}, entre ses mains, sera un contrôle national dont le peuple ne s’alarmera jamais ; le \textit{veto}, cette belle prérogative des tribuns romains, cette sauvegarde de la liberté contre les atteintes aristocratiques \ldots\ le \textit{veto}, qui ranimait les espérances du citoyen de Rome, est devenu chez nous un mot odieux, un cri de désespoir en passant par la bouche d’un roi des Français.\textsuperscript{236}

Cloots opposed his republicanism to the monarchists, whom he called ‘les royaumanes’.

The deputy Cloots finally voted for the execution of Louis XVI. In \textit{Chronique de Paris} 10 May 1790, he had argued against the death penalty, considering the sentence of being enchained far worse than death in a country of free men.\textsuperscript{237} But so had Robespierre, who changed his views on the death penalty. Cloots argued for the death of the king, invoking the precedent of modern England and ancient Rome in his \textit{Harangue}.\textsuperscript{238} According to Cloots, five hundred thousand copies of his \textit{Harangue} were printed at the National Assembly, and he wrote that this was not even enough as people had to copy these printed versions.\textsuperscript{239} This figure seems highly unlikely according to bibliographic surveys made on this period. It has been estimated that ‘the average print run for a single eighteenth century edition’ was ‘no more than 1,000 copies’.\textsuperscript{240} Economic reasons limited the number of copies printed to be above 500, and below 2,000.\textsuperscript{241} However, Hunt notes that, for instance, the Convention sent directly one million copies of the \textit{Père Duchesne} over nine months, and thirty thousand newspapers per day to the army.\textsuperscript{242}

It was not only the king, but also partisans of the king, counter-revolutionaries, who were denounced by Cloots. He called for a ‘purification of

\begin{footnotes}
\item [235.] Cloots, \textit{Ecrits révolutionnaires}, 98.
\item [236.] Ibid., 371.
\item [237.] Ibid., 23.
\item [239.] Labbé, \textit{Anacharsis Cloots}, 93, footnote 171.
\item [241.] Philip Gaskell, \textit{A New Introduction to Bibliography} (Winchester: St Paul’s Bibliographies, 1995), 161.
\item [242.] Hunt,\textit{ Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution}, 69.
\end{footnotes}
the Republic’, and to ‘execrate’ all monarchists. Cloots made here direct reference to Mirabeau, without mentioning his name. Mirabeau’s ashes were transferred to the Pantheon, but the case of the ‘iron chest’, ‘l’armoire de fer’, revealed secret documents and correspondance to the interior minister Roland, notably between Mirabeau and the king. Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau (1749–1791) was a figure of the French Revolution who used his oratory talents to favour the cause of the people, and a constitutional monarchy. He was a national hero when he died, and his ashes were transferred to the Pantheon. The correspondance revealed his duplicity because of his ties with the king and created a scandal among the revolutionary establishment.

One of the Convention’s tasks was to draft and adopt a new constitution. The members proposed many drafts in 1793. However, Cloots’s project Bases constitutionnelles was not one of them. Cloots presented his universal republic based on the recognition of the sovereignty of the human race, which was subsequently published as Bases constitutionnelles de la république du genre humain on this occasion, but his intervention was for taking a decree proclaiming the sovereignty of the human race in view of automatically incorporating any future country who would recognise the same principle. However, Cloots does acknowledge that this decree is formulated in the view of finding a stable constitution, for which the Convention was elected.243 This is also why Cloots suggested dispensing with the name Français in front of republic, and take instead the name ‘Germain’ as in ‘kindred’, so that there would be no misunderstanding for future countries about joining a cosmopolitan universal republic and not an imperialist French republic.244 He read the text of his proposition to the Convention, which was received with laughter.245

Main Political Writings and Execution

Cloots’s pamphlets that elaborated on his political ‘system’ are L’orateur du genre-humain, ou, Dépêche du Prussien Cloots, au Prussien Hertzberg (1791),246 La république universelle ou adresse aux tyrannicides (1792),247 and Bases constitutionnelles de la république du genre humain (1793).248 These three pamphlets constitute for the greater part the subject of this study on the political thought of Anacharsis Cloots because nowhere else did he develop as much his main political ‘system’.

244. Ibid., 493.
247. Cloots, La république universelle.
248. Cloots, Bases constitutionnelles.
The first pamphlet was written as an answer to Prussia’s Kabinettsminister (chief minister), Ewald Friedrich Graf von Hertzberg (1725–1795). As every year since becoming the curator of the Berlin Academy in 1786, Hertzberg read a mémoire presenting his political views. Hertzberg was initially in favour of the revolution as he praised its principles to be already implemented in Prussia, but he subsequently rejected it when he saw that it attacked the Prussian regime.\(^{249}\) It remains unclear as to which mémoire Cloots was responding. In his 1789 mémoire, Hertzberg praised the French Revolution for putting an end to the preceding ‘monarchical despotism’, and heading towards the Enlightened model already implemented in Prussia.\(^{250}\) It is only in 1791 that Hertzberg condemned the French Revolution for the violence exerted in its name.\(^{251}\) Nonetheless, in 1790, Hertzberg’s mémoire was more severe on the French Revolution than in 1789 as he condemned its policy towards abolishing hereditary nobility.\(^{252}\) Presumably, this is the mémoire Cloots answered to a few months later. However, in his answer Cloots cited Hertzberg’s attack on him and his embassy in his response. But this is nowhere to be found in Hertzberg’s mémoire. Cloots even quotes a passage from this mémoire where he is supposedly attacked.\(^{253}\) But this excerpt does not exist in the mémoire or in any of Hertzberg’s published works. What matters the most in his answer for the study of cosmopolitanism is that Cloots expressed for the first time the idea of a single society of the human race, extending the popular concept of ‘regeneration’ of the people to the whole human race organised in a ‘confederation of united individuals’.\(^{254}\) Cloots elaborated further on this idea a year later in La république universelle, written in February–March 1792. The occasion for publishing the pamphlet was the constitution of a group of tyrannicides with the aim of sending assassins throughout Europe to kill monarchs renamed ‘tyrans’.\(^{255}\)

\(^{249}\) See James van Horn Melton, ‘From Enlightenment to Revolution: Hertzberg, Schlözer, and the Problem of Despotism in the Late Aufklärung’, Central European History 12, no. 2 (June 1979): 103–123.

\(^{250}\) Ewald Friedrich Graf von Hertzberg, Mémoire Sur La Troisième Année Du Règne De Frédéric Guillaume II, Roi De Prusse, & pour prouver que le Gouvernement Prussien n’est pas despotique (s.l.: Académie des Sciences, 1789).

\(^{251}\) Ewald Friedrich Graf von Hertzberg, Mémoire sur les révolutions des états, externes, internes et religieuses, lu dans l’assemblée publique de l’académie des Sciences de Berlin, le 6, Octobre 1791: pour célébrer le jour de Naisance de Frédéric Guillaume II, Roi de Prusse, et la cinquième année de son règne (s.l.: Académie des Sciences, 1791).

\(^{252}\) Ewald Friedrich Graf von Hertzberg, Mémoire Sur La Quatrième Année Du Règne De Frédéric Guillaume II, Roi De Prusse, & sur la Noblesse héréditaire (s.l.: Académie des Sciences, 1790).


\(^{254}\) Ibid., 158–162.

In December 1790, Sylvain Maréchal (1750–1803) proposed to form a ‘légion sacrée des tyrannicides’, which aimed at enrolling young patriots to defend the Revolution against ‘tyrants’. The proposition was subsequently criticised, but the flight of the King, stopped at Varennes during the night of 20–21 June 1791, reignited the rhetoric of ‘tyrannicide’, although another project presented at the Convention on 26 August 1792 by Jean Debray (1760–1834) equally failed. Debray suggested forming an organisation of 1200 volunteers to individually attack ‘tyrants’, which was then dubbed ‘Vengeur de l’humanité’ by the deputies Chabot and Merlin, and was followed by a debate regarding the morality of such action and the possibility of attracting retributions against French generals between Vergniaud and Mailhe, who answered that it was a war between liberty and despotism and therefore beyond ancient questions of ethics and customs in war.

Cloots had been elected at the end of 1792, and his Bases constitutionnelles de la république du genre humain reiterated in length his idea of ‘universal republic’ finishing very succinctly by presenting three articles for a decree in order to integrate other countries during the revolutionary wars, notably: ‘Article I. Il n’y a pas d’autre souverain que le genre humain’. Cloots’s idea was that any nation (peoples) recognising this principle would automatically be included in the French republic.

Cloots’s last work, which remained unfinished, was a summary of the history of the French Revolution. This series of articles opened the first issue of a new publication named Le Batave created together with Dutch revolutionaries in Paris. Not surprisingly, the history of the revolution is written with a clear anti-monarchist tone, and is presented as the dawn of the universal revolution of freedom against despotism. It is also set inside a theoretical framework of scientific inevitability; revolutions are a healthy physiological reaction to the diseases of the political body.
From 11–29 November 1793 Cloots was chosen to be the president of the Jacobins. However, Cloots’s presidency was immediately followed by his exclusion from the Jacobins at Robespierre’s demand. Cloots often changed his affiliations and sympathies. He denounced his Girondin friends in *Ni Marat, ni Roland*, alienating the whole group against him. He criticised Robespierre and the theists in his own Jacobin group, as aristocrat he denounced the aristocrats and declared himself sans-culotte. As Prussian he refused his titles and criticised Prussian politics. As French he suggested that the country adopted the name of ‘Republic of Germans’. Cloots’s contrarian views towards his own friends and club attracted critiques easily. After writing the *Universal Republic*, and in particular his view that the French Republic should be called ‘Germaine’, understood in its original sense of kinship, he was accused of being German and of plotting the demise of France by taking her very name.²⁶¹ It was not difficult for Robespierre to accuse Cloots of opportunism and of being a Prussian spy.²⁶²

Cloots opposed Robespierre and his men on two fronts. Firstly, on the question of war in 1792, and secondly on the question of secularisation in 1793. Robespierre was initially sympathetic to Cloots and his ideas, and, according to Cloots, told him that he was the only one to raise adequately the question of sovereignty.²⁶³ Reading Robespierre’s writings and project of constitution in 1793, one cannot but draw a parallel with Cloots’s own ideas. For instance, Robespierre also spoke of speaking from a ‘universal tribune’ to the ‘human race’ in the name of ‘truth and justice’.²⁶⁴

As Robespierre’s influence grew, he succeeded in getting bankers, nobles, and foreigners expelled from the Jacobins; priests were also targeted, but Robespierre finally agreed to spare them. Cloots was one of those Jacobin foreigners. Robespierre managed to get important powers with the institution of the Comité de Salut Public in December 1793. He participated in the instigation of a movement of suspicion and verification among members of the various clubs. Foreigners were in particular under scrutiny and Cloots was called to explain himself on 12 December in front of the Jacobins, after several attacks in the newspapers, notably on his views of religion.²⁶⁵ Cloots, however, did not defend himself, and left without explanation. Instead, he responded only on 20 December 1793 in a brochure entitled ‘Appel au genre humain’, in which he explains his political orientations and

There is no doubt concerning his sincerity and the evolution of his philosophy, but it was too late; his fate was sealed. Cloots was the victim of a wider machination against the ‘Hébertistes’—a group he was not a part of—and a paranoid fear of foreigners. The Hebertists were a group formed around Jacques Hébert (1757–1794). Labbé quotes a contemporary, the fellow German Konrad Engelbert Oelsner, who met Cloots during this period and described his solitude and isolation: ‘On l’évitait pour ne pas être soupçonné d’espionnage. Il cherchait sans espoir un visage compatissant vers lequel se retourner’.

On 25 December 1793, Robespierre attacked violently the foreigners of Paris in a speech at the Convention. Cloots was subsequently arrested during the night of 27–28 December at his Parisian residence on rue Ménars, and sent to an improvised prison in the Luxembourg Palace. Cloots still had time to write a few letters in prison, before being transferred to Saint-Lazare, and on 20 March 1794, to the Conciergerie. His letters were desperate appeals to reason and common sense in a turbulent period of passion and terror. Cloots seemed to continue hoping for a change whilst accepting his fate in recognition of his own mistakes: ‘Si je pèche, c’est par trop de franchise et de naïveté... Effectivement, si mes principes sont universels, mes talents ne le sont pas...’ Cloots still believed that he could reason with Robespierre, and reminded him that they shared the same idea of the sovereignty of the human race. Remaining in prison, Cloots then believed in the people, this political entity that he wrote was never wrong, representing the general will; he wrote to the ‘Hommes de bonne volonté’, and signed himself ‘Anacharsis Cloots, homme’.

His very last recovered letter dated 1 March 1794, addressed to the ‘Amis du genre humain’, ended on these ominous words: ‘Citoyens-hommes, la liberté ou la mort !’.

Cloots was guillotined on 24 March 1794. According to witnesses, he remained courageous, even comforting his fellow inmates equally sentenced to death. One can find an account of his last moments in Mémoires d’un détenu, pour servir à l’histoire de la tyrannie de Robespierre by Honoré Riouffé (1764–1813), a politician. His account, retold almost word for word by Adolphe Thiers in his Histoire de la révolution française, depicts a prison scene where passions flared quickly between Hébert and other prisoners the night before going to the guillotine, each blaming the other for their con-

266. Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, 122.
267. Ibid.
268. Ibid., 123.
270. Ibid., 645–48.
271. Ibid., 652.
272. Labbé, Anacharsis Cloots, 123.
Cloots began to murmur a poem, apparently famous at the time, written by an ‘ancient poet’— Patris— that can be found in its entirety in an *Encyclopédie poétique*:

Le Rêve du Riche :
Je rêvais cette nuit que, de mal consumé,
Côte à côte d’un pauvre on m’avait inhumé,
Et que, n’en pouvant pas souffrir le voisinage,
En mort de qualité je lui tins ce langage :
Eloigne-toi, coquin, retire-toi d’ici ;
Il ne t’appartient pas de m’approcher ainsi.
— Coquin ! ce me dit-il d’une arrogance extrême :
Va porter tes coquins ailleurs ; coquin toi-même.
Ici tous sont égaux ; nous ne nous devons rien ;
Je suis sur mon fumier comme toi sur le tien.275

What Cloots called himself his ‘system’ refers to his political thought outlined mainly in three pamphlets he wrote during the revolutionary years: *L’orateur du genre-humain, ou, Dépêche du Prussien Cloots, au Prussien Hertzberg* (1791), *La république universelle ou adresse aux tyrannicides* (1792), and *Bases constitutionnelles de la république du genre humain* (1793). This ‘system’ defined in these three pamphlets is what forms the core of the analysis in this study, since Cloots did not develop it further in any other writings. Cloots does not present his system in a unified and structured way, as it would be in an academic treatise. Instead, Cloots wrote using revolutionary pamphleteering rhetoric. But that does not mean that he did not see himself as a philosopher developing a philosophical ‘system’.

This chapter is the first attempt at presenting a systematic and structured view of Cloots’s political thought as a system. Previous studies have not successfully done so, mainly because Cloots’s thought involves many different and intertwined ideas; it is an eclectic system. Cloots’s main idea is that the whole of the human race forms a single nation (in the political sense of the term), and that it is the only nation that should exist as a political entity. This principle is based on the observation of nature and of humankind—both universal—and using reason—also universal—therefore resulting in a universal principle. It is also based on observing its successful application in France by the most rational people in the world: the French. Therefore, the creation of the French republic, based on the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* is indeed the mere beginning of the coming republic of the human race. Every individual being born free and equal, all sovereignty stems from them and they form the only sovereign entity on earth all together. Moreover, since there are no differences among men besides su-

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perficial ones — such as the colour of their skin and cultural mores — there ought to be only one sovereign polity, a universal republic. This unification is not only guided by the study of nature and human nature, but also desirable as a means to end all wars in the world.

How to understand this system? I think it is best understood within the framework of German metaphysics, and particularly the philosophy of Christian Wolff (1679–1754). This understanding may seem far-fetched because Cloots never mentions Wolff in his revolutionary writings, and hardly any German philosopher besides Leibniz, whose *Théodicée* is quoted twice in *Certitude* for his argumentation on revealed religion and on Jewish religion, and in his revolutionary writings Cloots mentions also Leibniz as an example of noteworthy philosophers coming from abroad (outside France). Cloots studied in Berlin under Sulzer, whose course in ‘metaphysics’ certainly included Wolff, but there are only two mentions of Wolff in Cloots’s pre-revolutionary works (in *Certitude* as we will see later).

Wolff was the prominent name in German philosophy during this time between Leibniz and Kant; the latter’s writings, unlike Leibniz’s, Cloots was certainly not familiar with. There can be several hypotheses for explaining these few mentions of Wolff in Cloots’s writings. One is that Cloots intended his publication to reach a French audience primarily, which was not necessarily well acquainted with Wolff or, when it was, thought that he was simply recycling Leibniz. Therefore, it could be that Cloots did not mention Wolff because he was not considered that important to French readers or less so than Leibniz. Another one is that Voltaire was one of Cloots’s role models, and Voltaire, who read Wolff’s works on metaphysics, did not care much for his metaphysics and again considered it to be Leibniz’s, whom he refuted. This may therefore be why Cloots chose not to mention Wolff after his *Certitude*, but Leibniz at least, who was recognised by Voltaire and the French members of the *République des lettres*. Finally, it is also possible that Cloots’s knowledge of Wolff’s philosophy was through Sulzer, his

teacher in Berlin, and his text book *Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften*. There are no works from Wolff at the Gnadenthal library; only Sulzer’s.

It is nonetheless in a general Wolffian framework which I understand Cloots’s own ‘system’. However, it is only a framework and not a deep engagement with Wolff’s own system at an academic level. This general framework can be characterised as an understanding of the universe as a single system in which all sciences are included in a comprehensive unity, which philosophy, based on reason, can discover and explain. Specific branches of knowledge complement each other in a unified system that I will describe below. Cloots also used an eclectic range of philosophers and ideas within this framework, and sometimes attempts to reconcile opposite ideas and philosophers as if trying to reconcile all points of view into his ‘system’.

In order to demonstrate this Wolffian framework in Cloots’s ‘system’, despite the relative absence of mentions to Wolff, I will present several arguments here. First, I will argue that Cloots’s works published as pamphlets should be taken as serious works of (political) philosophy even though he was not an academic philosopher in the same sense that Wolff was; the choice of pamphlets was deliberate and is also contextually explained as common practice. Second, I will argue that Cloots’s system is one of many in the century (and the previous one) to attempt to solve the old European problem of peace and stability; doing so, Cloots is in line with Wolff’s separation between theoretical philosophy (metaphysics) and practical philosophy, which seeks the improvement of humankind. Third, I will argue that Cloots’s system that solves this old problem is very likely to have been inspired by his education in Berlin and his study of German metaphysics. Finally, this should shed light to understanding his system, which is reminiscent of Wolff’s conception of a system, of his organisation of philosophy and its various disciplines, and of his *civitas maxima*.

**Pamphlets Rather Than Treatises**

First of all, I wish to argue that Cloots should not be understood as a pamphleteer among others, but as a philosopher with a whole philosophical system. So, why did Cloots write pamphlets rather than treatises of political philosophy? After all, he did write his first philosophical work as a treatise on religion quoting and citing extensively other works of other authors. In these three pamphlets other authors are barely mentioned as inspirational sources, and various concepts are appropriated making it difficult to find

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exact references. The pamphlets are short and touch upon different genres
in a whole rhetorical device, from political comments to publicised letters,
proposals, and speeches delivered at the assembly. There are several reasons
for choosing this concise medium. First, Cloots became a strong believer in
the political enlightenment of the people, and pamphlets were more widely
distributed and read than academic treatises.

Ce n’est pas avec de gros livres qu’on opère des révolutions ;
les grands ouvrages de Paine et de Sieyès n’ont que cent pages
d’impressions ; ces deux brochures ont remué les deux mondes.
Le vrai moyen d’éviter le poids du papier, c’est de viser au
poids des idées.\footnote{Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 244.}

Second, there is such an intense exchange of ideas, so many debates, that no
one has time to read books that are too voluminous. ‘Nous n’écrivons plus
de gros volumes, parce que nous n’avons pas le temps, ni des les faire ni de
les lire’.\footnote{Cloots, ‘Anacharsis à Paris’, 76.} Third, as Delon notes, laconism and concision were held as the
only means to deliver universal truths.\footnote{Michel Delon, ‘Anacharsis Cloots : identité et légitimité révolutionnaire’, Revue de
littérature comparée 63, no. 4 (October 1989): 456.} As Cloots wrote himself,

Je me contente de poser des principes, d’indiquer des développements,
et d’éffleurer les résultats : car, en ne disant pas tout,
on est sûr d’être tout lu : donnons à penser, et non pas à bâiller.
Les têtes creuses mesurent la profondeur d’un écrivain sur la
grosseur de ses ouvrages ; mais les bons esprits ressemblent
aux gourmets qui préfèrent un consommé restaurateur à une
soupe allongée. C’est un grand mal qu’un gros livre, cela ne
sert qu’à cacher l’insuffisance des auteurs superficiels...\footnote{Cloots,
‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 130.}

Finally, Cloots despised academics, principally because he considered with
other revolutionaries that universities sided with the other two estates (clergy
and nobility against commoners). Therefore, there was no point exposing
them to his new political ideas about a universal republic since they were
biased towards maintaining the status quo ante. As Cloots wrote:

Mais les pédants de collège, qui circonscrivent l’univers dans
les limites d’une université, et dont l’esprit de corps franchit
à peine le cercle de quarante éplucheurs de mots, ces gens-là,
nonobstant la destruction récente des corps monastiques, des
corps héraudiques, des corps de métiers, des corps parlementai-
taires, des corps provinciaux, ne croiront jamais à la destruc-
tion de la plus nuisible des corporations, les corps nationaux.\footnote{Cloots,
‘La République universelle’, 317–18.}
Cloots does not hide that using metaphors and images are part of the necessary rhetorical arsenal of the post-revolutionary philosopher: ‘... je me servis efficacement de mon style figuré pour gagner le peuple par des images qui semblaient se détacher du Coran et de la Bible’. It is again the same reason for using a more colourful style of writing than dry academic prose:

Malheur aux écrivains monotones et prolixes, dénués d’images et de précision. Ne recommençons pas Smith, quand nous voulons parler de la richesse des nations; et en publiant des caractères et des maximes, ne répétons pas Théophraste et Epicrête.

Cloots was a man of his time, in line with the ‘rhetoric of Enlightenment’ and the ‘rhetoric of revolution’, to borrow the titles of chapters by Peter France and Lynn Hunt. In light with the ‘rhetoric of Enlightenment’, Cloots followed a Cartesian view of philosophical communication in that philosophy should not be restricted to a few professional, but should be ‘accessible to all men of common sense’. Incidentally, it is the exact argument used by Cloots in Certitude against all monotheist religions, and the Christian ones in particular; God’s word is meant to be accessible to all men of common sense, and needs not be deciphered or translated by professionals.

As for the ‘rhetoric of revolution’, Cloots operated a change of name and function associated with the ancien régime, by calling himself ‘orator’, in reference to ancient Rome, and Anacharsis, in reference to Ancient Greece. Cloots also wrote to a variety of the newspapers that emerged after the storming of the Bastille, addressing each one with the intent of convincing its specific readership. The early years of the revolution were marked by an explosion of newspapers, which were read widely, also read out loud in local clubs, Jacobins or other, which subscribed to several of them. Woloch notes that this reading of newspapers in clubs was not immediate, but once it took hold, clubs participated to the development of the press. Some clubs scheduled their meetings to coincide with the arrival of the mail, and held a public reading of their favourite newspaper. This did not mean, however, that the provincial Jacobin clubs followed automatically the views of the Parisan Jacobins. It must therefore be understood that Cloots’s writings published in these newspapers were meant to inform

19 France, Rhetoric and Truth in France, 68.
20 This will be the object of the chapter on rhetoric and self-fashioning.
22 Ibid., 80.
and convince their readerships all over France of his views regarding the universality of the revolution and the idea of a universal republic. Often, Cloots did address directly certain localities in the title of his opinions.

In the ‘rhetoric of revolution’, festivals also played a role in transferring sacrality and sovereignty,23 and Cloots suggested his own interpretation at the first fête de la fédération with the transfer from the king to the ‘Nation’ that he understood as ‘nation of the human race’. The lack of a definite centre of authority, as Hunt notes, resulted in that ‘... revolutionary political discourse was rhetorical; it was a means of persuasion, a way of reconstituting the social and political world’.24 This meant for Cloots that nature and her creature, the human race, were the new centres of authority, and Cloots wanted to reconstitute a new social and political world in which the whole human race lives under a single republic in peace and harmony. This resulted in a contradiction regarding the source of law — the human race or nature — as we will see in the chapters on natural law and on humanity.

Equally within the ‘rhetoric of revolution’, Cloots’s rhetoric is marked by secularisation and opposition to Christianity, based on his pre-revolutionary work with Certitude. Cloots should, for these reasons, be understood as a philosopher who used pamphlets, newspapers, and any other rhetorical occasion such as public celebrations or speeches, to hammer home his philosophical views. That Cloots should not be understood as a pamphleteer among others in the revolution can be demonstrated further by looking at the content of his writings. Cloots designed his ‘system’ as a solution to one of the problems that occupied philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: perpetual peace. Moreover, Cloots’s ‘system’ is, I argue, a philosophical system, very likely inspired by Christian Wolff during his education in Berlin under Sulzer. It is, however, an eclectic system, like Wolff’s, taking several sources of philosophical inspiration.

SOLVING AN OLD EUROPEAN PROBLEM

By Cloots’s own admission his system stems from trying to solve an old European problem: how to achieve peace in Europe (and, by extension, in the whole world)? To Cloots, and many contemporaries, the ‘old’ solution was a ‘political balance’ between states, governed by ‘l’horreur de la monarchie universelle’, which was only capable of ending wars temporarily.25 This is what Cloots describes as ‘la vaine science de nos vieux politiques’.26

26. Ibid., 111.
To which he proposes his own new ‘science’ based on Enlightenment philosophy from Newton to Diderot and Rousseau, Hobbes to d’Holbach, and even Machiavelli to the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

Cloots is in line with other philosophers who attempted to map out a political system that would bring peace to Europe and unite it, from the Duke of Sully’s Memoires describing the ‘magnifiques desseins’ of Henry IV, to Saint-Pierre’s Project for Perpetual Peace. Cloots acknowledges this line himself, but he considers his system to be unique and original. According to Cloots, people have compared his system to Saint-Pierre’s, which he rejected as a preposterous comparison since Saint-Pierre’s project was a council of monarchs, whilst his project is based on the individual.

The problem is posed in these terms: ‘Il en est des nations entre elles comme des individus dans l’état de nature ; les forts règnent’. If the solution to inequalities between individuals in the state of nature was to unite and form a political community, it should be the same solution for states, which are in a state of nature where the strong ones survive. Cloots finds the solution to this problem in the French constitution with national unity: ‘C’est dans la constitution française que je trouve la solution d’un problème insoluble jusqu’à présent’. The same way the new French constitution ended inequalities, which became unbearable under Louis XVI, between individuals according to their corporations or ‘classes’, the same unification shall end all inequalities in the world through national unity. However, there is only one single nation — the whole of humankind — and one single patrie — the globe. In other words, the French revolution is just a prelude to the universal revolution and the French assembly will one day become the world assembly:

Hommes de tous les climats, une vérité-mère doit vous être continuellement présente à l’esprit, c’est que la révolution de France est le commencement de la révolution du monde.

In order to do so, Cloots has to argue against climate theorists suggesting that various populations have various political regime because of the climate they live in, which influences their physical constitution. This will be the object of the chapter on humanity.

Here, it is useful to see how Cloots takes a theoretical reasoning — single nation of the human race and sovereignty of the human race, based on nat-

29. ibid., 248. I will discuss further Rousseau and Saint-Pierre in the chapter on nature.
31. Ibid.
32. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 266.
ure and science — in order to conclude a practical solution — therefore a universal republic for peace and economic prosperity. Wolff’s understanding of philosophy is similarly divided into theoretical philosophy, on the one hand, and practical philosophy, on the other. The theoretical part of philosophy comprises ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology. Practical philosophy comprises universal practical philosophy, natural law, politics, and moral philosophy, with the goal of attaining perfection for humanity. These are all branches of knowledge that Cloots considers in devising his ‘system’. In the next section I will present this system after arguing how Wolff’s philosophical system influenced Cloots, probably through Sulzer’s teaching.

A ‘SYSTEM’

Cloots refers to his political thought as a ‘system’: ‘mon système’;34 ‘mon système de la nation unique’;35 ‘mon système philanthropique’.36 I argue here that Cloots’s ‘system’ is very likely a product of German metaphysics, particularly Wolffian metaphysics.

Sulzer’s Teaching of Wolff

From the previous biographical chapter on Cloots’s education, I have shown how Sulzer seemed to have marked the mind of the young Cloots. I have equally shown that this was certainly due to Sulzer’s pedagogy, which had influenced Frederic in establishing the académie. This school was not only for forming officers, professional soldiers for the military, but also gentlemen, and the faculty had also a lot of ambition regarding their academic formation. Sulzer taught ‘metaphysics’, and it is not possible to find documents of his teaching besides the general guidelines written by Frederic. However, from Sulzer’s Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften one can infer some general direction of the sort of teaching he gave his pupils at the Académie. Interestingly, this work by Sulzer appears in the catalogue of the Gnadenthal castle library, together with Sulzer’s Unterredungen über die Schönheit der Natur (1750) and Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste (1771–1774). There are two editions of Kurzer Begriff, the first from 1745, and the second from 1759. In his introduction to the two editions, Hans

34. Cloots, La république universelle, 195.
35. Ibid., 7.
36. Ibid., 12.
Adler notes that the 1759 edition constitutes not only a quantitative improvement, but also a structural and qualitative one thereby constituting a ‘reconstruction’ with a reorganisation of the material. It is not possible to know which edition was in the library of Gnadenthal. Perhaps, these works by Sulzer are in the library because Cloots had to buy them all together as Sulzer was his professor. Grunert also makes the hypothesis that the Kurzer Begriff was written at the demand of his pupils or their parents. This would explain why the Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste and Unterredungen über die Schönheit der Natur are present in the library: there was a re-edition in 1770 of the Unterredungen über die Schönheit der Natur, and the other one began to be published in 1771. In this case, it would make more sense to acquire the 1759 edition of Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften, which perhaps Sulzer recommended to his pupils as text book, as well as the re-editions previously mentioned. I will assume that the latest edition was the one in the library, and I will assume that Cloots read it or that Sulzer taught from it or used it. These are a lot of assumption, but the best that can be made in the absence of more evidence, and very plausible ones since the Kurzer Begriff was meant to be a textbook for pupils; read out loud, every paragraph sounds like a lecture from Sulzer himself.

Just as the Encyclopédie by Diderot and d’Alembert was an organised representation of human knowledge according to a certain philosophy (Baconian), Sulzer’s Kurzer Begriff is also organised following a certain understanding of knowledge, albeit not alphabetically. In the Discours préliminaire des Éditeurs, d’Alembert laid out the programme of the Encyclopédie regarding the presentation of all the sciences, crafts, and arts. At the end of the Discours, a figure maps the state of human knowledge following Bacon’s understanding: memory, reason, imagination. While memory is dedicated to history, reason is dedicated to philosophy, which includes the science of nature, the science of man, as well as the science of God.

Sulzer follows a different presentation, which is Wolffian. The first branch of knowledge Sulzer deals with is philology, as it methodologically leads to the knowledge of other sciences; it is then followed by history, art, mathem-


atics, philosophy, law, and theology. Philosophy is divided between theoretical philosophy, or metaphysics, and practical philosophy. According to Sulzer, what is called metaphysics is the part of philosophy (Weltweisheit) he describes as theoretical or speculative, as opposed to the practical part of philosophy. What is called ‘German metaphysics’ is this theoretical or speculative philosophy without the study of logics. The theoretical part of philosophy is defined as ‘die Erforschungen über die allgemeine innerliche Beschaffenheit der Dinge’, whilst the practical part is ‘die Entdeckung des ersten auf die Verbesserung des Menschen und der menschlichen Gesellschaften an’. However, the two complement each other, for Sulzer, as the one is necessary for the other. Sulzer describes the content of this German metaphysics as the following fields of study described from §193 to §213, which cover ontology, cosmology, pneumatology, psychology, and natural theology. Sulzer notes that Bacon gave the name ‘metaphysics’ to the part of physics examining the final causes of forces and workings of nature. It is therefore very possible that Sulzer taught these disciplines, even if superficially, in his course on metaphysics at the Académie des nobles.

Following Wolff, Sulzer also presents natural theology as the last-but-not-least part of philosophy: the science of existence (Dasein) and the properties of the eternal Being who created and rules the world. Sulzer notes that humankind throughout history — from Ancient Egypt to Greek philosophers — had recognised the existence of an all powerful sovereign Being through the use of right reason (gesund Vernunft), but that this natural theology was repressed by the authority of a false religion established by men.

Throughout his presentation of philosophy, Sulzer sums up the history of various parts of philosophical knowledge, stating the origins in ancient Egypt, Greece, and the Orient. The history of philosophy seems to follow a linear progress with an insistance particularly on Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, then a period of philosophical halt during the middle ages except for scholastics and Thomas Aquinas, then Descartes, Leibniz, and finally Wolff. Sulzer describes Wolff as being a sort of end point for philosophy, having made philosophy a real science and having advanced many of its subdisciplines. As such, Wolff plays in Sulzer’s Kurzer Begriff the same role Locke plays in Frederic’s Instruction: he is the evolutionary end point in the history of philosophy. If Wolff is not mentioned in Frederic’s Instruction, it is however unlikely that Sulzer would not have taught Wolff’s philosophy at the Académie des nobles.

42. Ibid., 135–145.
43. Ibid., 145.
44. Ibid., 144.
45. Ibid., 145.
46. Ibid., 132.
47. Ibid., 133.
Sulzer’s philosophy and pedagogy were influenced by Christian Wolff. Did Sulzer’s teaching influence Cloots’s later thought? Is Wolffian philosophy present in Cloots’s writings? I consider here several aspects: German metaphysics, natural theology, systematic ordering, and Cloots’s cosmopolitan republicanism in relation with Wolff’s *civitas maxima*.

**German Metaphysics**

It is significative of the general interpretation of Cloots’s thought that the author of a history of the *Académie des nobles*, notes the following on him in his biographical research on all the former pupils and *pensionnaires*:

> In seinem elften Jahre nach Paris mitgenommen, erwirbt er hier seine niedere und höhere Bildung, man thut also Unrecht, ihn als ein Produkt der deutschen Metaphysik zu bezeichnen. 48

But in his writings, Cloots never mentioned his Parisian professors or the content of his education at *Pléssis-Sorbonne*. Cloots only mentioned an episode when he defiantly ate a bacon omelette on a lean day and argued about religious practices with an adult. 49 Was he then not influenced by ‘German metaphysics’? Did his education at the Berlin *Académie des nobles* have an impact on his political thought and future ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’?

It is difficult to cite any direct source. In Cloots’s writings, except for his first work, there are no precise references of works, and names are generally dropped as general examples. Wolff is never cited, and Sulzer is never cited either apart from the quotation mentioned in the previous chapter. Leibniz is sometimes cited, but then again, so is the *Encyclopédie* Diderot and d’Alembert, which follows a Baconian classification of sciences. 50 Cloots also mentions Bacon several times in his writings. Is this classification really different from Sulzer’s, as the latter claims it to be? Both have the same separation between history, philosophy, and poetry (or in Sulzer’s case it is art in general). For Bacon, there may be overlap between natural history and science of nature. For Sulzer, natural scientists and physicians are excluded from philosophy all together. For Sulzer philosophy is then the research of truths regarding the organisation and government of the world and moral affairs of men; it searches the inner and quasi spiritual or moral qualities of the world. 51 However, both understood philosophy as the most important part of knowledge. In the *Encyclopédie*, philosophy is the main branch of the ‘reason’ part of knowledge, and it is described as ‘general metaphysics’.

50. d’Alembert, ‘Discours préliminaire’.
It includes the ‘science of God’, the ‘science of man’ or ‘pneumatology’, and
the ‘science of nature’ or ‘metaphysics of bodies’.

In his revolutionary writings, Cloots takes into consideration all these
parts of German metaphysics into a whole system of a universal republic
prescribed by the laws of nature. It could be argued that this could have
just been influenced by the Encyclopédie and Bacon’s ordering of sciences.
However, there is something particular to Cloots, as opposed to other Fre-
ch thinkers, in that he tries to develop a systematic and unifying theory
of political science that takes arguments from cosmology, natural theology,
ontology, and pneumatology (psychology). For instance, Cloots opposes
‘théos’ to ‘cosmos’ in his presentation of cosmology, arguing that the cosmos
is sufficiently complex to human comprehension without adding the even
more complex questions of the existence of God and revealed religion.\textsuperscript{52} Revealed theology not only does not explain nature, but it makes it more com-
plex, to Cloots. With revealed religion discarded, Cloots considers natural
religion as sufficient for a theological explanation of human life and our ex-
istence, Nature is like a mother, and we are constantly reborn into various
combinations.\textsuperscript{53} This natural religion reconciles all revealed religions, who
are left to be practised freely in private.\textsuperscript{54} As for ontology, Cloots considers
that nothing is created, but everything exists eternally; humankind is as old
as mother nature.\textsuperscript{55} Getting rid of this ‘theocracy’, Cloots seems to present
instead what could be called a cosmocracy — in opposition to ‘theocracy’ —
in which the human race as a product of nature replaces God the creator in
natural law theory, and therefore the laws of nature must be respected in hu-
man affairs, starting with the ‘sovereignty of the human race’.\textsuperscript{56} Cloots also
considers elements of human psychology to explain why these natural prin-
ciples have not been respected. For instance, the natural instinct of good
and order that is characteristic of human nature, is denatured by despot-
ism and aristocracy, which generate vices whereas republicanism generates
virtue and is therefore the natural political solution for the human race.\textsuperscript{57}

All in all, it is possible to say that Cloots follows the tradition of German
metaphysics, as defined by Sulzer and Wolff, although it is difficult to pin-
point exactly which parts influenced him.

\textsuperscript{52} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 251.
\textsuperscript{53} Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 497.
\textsuperscript{54} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 255.
\textsuperscript{55} Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 495–496.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 494.
\textsuperscript{57} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 255.
Natural Theology

Is it a coincidence that Cloots’s first opus is dedicated to the topic considered as central by Wolff and Sulzer: natural theology? After his time at the Académie des nobles and Sulzer’s teaching in metaphysics, Cloots chose to dedicate five years to study and write about natural theology. This first monograph, published in 1780, and his later revolutionary writings, in which he develops his ‘system’ of a universal republic, are connected in that Cloots’s conception of natural religion is the overarching framework for his political system. In his first work, Certitude, Cloots develops an argument against revealed religion in favour of natural religion. Cloots makes only two references to Wolff (or ‘Wolf’) in Certitude. Once about a letter published in French by a Muslim trying to convince him to convert to Islam. Cloots writes that this letter has often been published in French, but I have not found copy of it. A second time, Cloots quotes a French translation of his 1712 Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauch in der Erkenntnis der Wahrheit, translated as Logique. The excerpt quoted by Cloots is the advice Wolff gives regarding authority, not unlike Sulzer’s own as seen previously: even geniuses have hesitated in their thinking, and therefore the awe we experience for them should not make us forget what they say with our reason rather than accept it as an yet another argument from authority. Cloots gives pre-eminence to natural religion, which is quite similar to the foundational place Wolff gives to natural theology in metaphysics.

Cataldi Madonna notes that Wolff had an essential impact on the development of critical theology in the German Enlightenment. In Discursus præliminaris, Wolff attacked orthodox theology and the sphere of the sacred with an epistemological reconciliation between reason and faith. Revelation can be supra rationem, but never contra rationem; it is possible to argue that the divine is beyond cognitive understanding, but never against it. Wolff also denies miracles and adopts the theory of double authors—divine and human—in the Holy scriptures.

In Certitude, Cloots notes how miracles are witnessed by men, and written in books by men, and that they are then analysed by learned men who

59. Ibid., 504.
attest to their veracity to the rest of humankind lacking in erudition. It goes against reason that one should believe these men and believe that God chose to speak only to them rather than to the whole universe and to nature.  

During the revolution, a cult of reason and natural religion developed, with an enthusiasm for ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome. The nature goddess Isis was often represented in celebrations because Egypt was thought to be the first natural religion. Cloots also reiterated, perhaps from his lessons with Sulzer, that the Romans were taught by the Greeks, who were taught by the Egyptians, who were taught by the Indians, in order to emphasise the universality of natural religion, of reason, and how humankind is equal and united in knowledge.

However, these were widespread ideas, opinions, and beliefs, which are difficult to pinpoint to one precise influence in Cloots, or for French revolutionaries in general.

There is an interesting *supplément* in Cloots’s *Certitude* in which he writes to a ‘canon’, probably his uncle Cornelius de Pauw. Cloots writes that if one had to choose between ‘papism’ and ‘protestantism’, it is best to choose the latter because papism is based on the premise that one should believe without examination, and it is opposed to reason, truth, philosophy in a word. It seems, therefore, that Cloots held protestantism learned in Berlin in higher esteem than catholicism learned in Bruxelles and Paris. Or, that Cloots saw protestantism as closer and truer to natural religion than catholicism.

*Systematic Order*

In his revolutionary writings, Cloots’s ‘system’ — as he calls it himself — of a ‘universal republic of the human race’ is comprehensive as it includes questions of cosmology and the creation of the universe, God, natural theology, and some elements of ontology and human psychology, as well as natural law. This ‘system’ is opposed to other ‘monstrous’ systems such as the ‘aristocratic system’ including monarchism, the ‘system of federation’, or the ‘theocratic system’. Cloots declares that his system stems from his observation of nature itself: ‘c’est en consultant la nature que je découvre un système politique ...’. Cloots’s ‘system’, or political philosophy, is meant to be a comprehensive theory of human organisation around nature and its laws. Whether Cloots succeeds or not is another question, but it is clear that he means to develop a whole political system that is universally valid.

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64. Edelstein, *The Terror of Natural Right*, 184.
67. More on this in the chapter on reason.
for all time and the whole humankind. That is the reason why, for Cloots, the whole humankind would agree to it, without the need to impose the system on anyone.

Wolff advanced the idea of a *intellectus systematicus*, meaning that man seeks a system in understanding everything:

 Intellectus systematicus percipit voluptatem ex systematis, veri nempe nominis, consequenter systemata amat, nec in cognitione rerum acquiescit, nisi eam ad systema reduxerit.70

Did Cloots get the idea of building a systematic political philosophy from Wolff? It is again hard to prove a direct connection in the absence of reference. The description of a philosophical system appears also in the *Encyclopédie*, which could also have influenced Cloots. However, I think that Cloot's overall inclusion of all the disciplines of ‘metaphysics’ into a unified theory called a ‘system’ presents a strong argument for a Wolffian understanding of his thought.

Wolff's understanding of system is placed in a context of ‘paradigmatisation’ of geometry inherited from Leibniz and Malebranche, who both developed the idea of complete system or true system imagined by rational thinkers against the system advanced by religious scholars.71 By the same token, for Wolff the ‘intellectus systematicus’ creates a desire for true systems because it has a higher rate for proving the veracity of knowledge, extending its memorisation, and its reproduction rather than the contradictions and prejudices mediated by authorities.72 Wolff’s definition of system is as follow: ‘*Systema enim dicitur veritatum inter se et cum principiis suis connexarum congeries*, which can be translated as ‘A system is the combination of the truths, which are interwoven with one another and with their principles’.73 Wolff does not make a difference for building this system between the mathematical method and the philosophical method, and considers philosophy in a Euclidean paradigm.74 In such a mathematical paradigm therefore, there can only be true and false systems, which can be proven true or false universally.

73. Wolff, *Discursus praeminaris*, §889.
Cloots consistently referred to geometry and mathematics regarding his system. For instance, to argue why Paris is the capital city of France, Cloots writes:

Paris est à la France ce qu’un point mathématique est pour les géomètres : quatre-vingt et tant de rayons [allusions au nombre de départements] aboutissent à la commune nationale.\(^{75}\)

In another text, Cloots again makes a reference to the hierarchy of powers, mathematically ordered:

La hiérarchie ingénieuse des cantons, des districts, des départements, l’Assemblée nationale et le roi, cette gradation mathématique jette la France dans un seul moule, d’où sort, par une fusion parfaite, un ouvrage que vous adorerez quand vous le connaitrez, la constitution française. L’attraction inhérente à notre nouveau système politique tend évidemment à réunir des parties détachées sous l’Ancien Régime, telles qu’Avignon, la Savoie, Liège et le Brabant. Les forces centrifuges de ce beau système n’auront d’action que pour repousser les ennemis du dehors.\(^{76}\)

For Cloots, therefore, the new French constitution is a ‘system’, and it is the ‘true system’ because of its mathematical quality: every part is mathematically calculated in proportion, and is represented gradually in a pyramid of powers, with such force that it attracts other parts that were hitherto not included in this whole. This political system works, contradicting what anti-revolutionaries said against the division into départements, and it works because it conforms to how the laws of political organisation should be, for Cloots. By the same token, it exercises its own laws in applying a ‘centrifugal force’ on ‘enemies’ who cannot join this system.

This reference to geometry and mathematics was, of course, not only Cloots’s, who only made reference to the geometrically equal division between French départements as a way of dividing a cheese in equal parts.\(^{77}\) As Cloots remarks himself, this ‘géométrie sublime’ belongs to Sieyès.\(^{78}\) Cloots also cites Giuseppe Antonio Giachimo Cerutti (1738–1792) — another foreigner in the French revolution — for using a similar metaphor between physics and politics using geometry:

Voici la métaphore de l’ingénieux Cerutti, au nom des électeurs de Paris : « Le plus hardi des géomètres disait : donnez-

\(^{75}\) Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 480.

\(^{76}\) Cloots, ‘Adresse d’un Prusien à un Anglais’, 47.

\(^{77}\) Cloots, *Ecrits révolutionnaires*, 209.

\(^{78}\) Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 283.
moi de la matière et du mouvement, et je crée un monde. Il dirait aujourd’hui : donnez-moi des hommes et la constitution française, et je crée une nation. »

On another related note, Cloots compares himself to Newton regarding his own system: ‘Newton a réuni tous les philosophes par sa découverte physique ; je réunirai tous les hommes par ma découverte politique’. What Cloots means by this is literally that politics is governed by laws that the philosopher must discover the same way the philosopher discovers the laws of nature that govern physics. In that sense, for Cloots, and other revolutionaries, the mathematical division of France into départements is one of these laws because it leads to political union or good government. Under an ‘aristocratic system’, in order to maintain union, one needs priests, a royal court, and corrupt ministries, whilst under the new French system, none of these are needed to maintain union; only a desire for order, and an industrious spirit. Therefore, Cloots defines ‘trust’ as the ‘centre of gravity’ (centre de gravitation), because this equal distribution between departments enables a harmonious repartition of populations in a way that is neither too large nor too arbitrary, so that people can trust each other and therefore maintain political union. Cloots then concludes that: ‘Le vrai système social est simple comme le vrai système planétaire : le génie le trouve ; le bon sens l’adopte’. Cloots’s ‘genius’ is to have discovered the law of ‘single nation’ based on the principle of ‘sovereignty of the human race’; a law discovered by observing nature and by observing the effects of its application by uniting the provinces of France and improving its government. Sieyès and other thinkers had the genius to find the system of departmental division, and the French people had the common sense to adopt it because, Cloots believes, it is an enlightened people using reason. By the same token, Cloots claims to have discovered the true system for the whole world which will be accepted by all the peoples as long as they can use their reason.

This leads to another similarity with Wolff: since the ‘intellectus systematicus’ creates a desire for a true system, Cloots also makes the difference between true and false systems, and the ‘true system’ is universally valid. The false systems are, obviously, the ones from the ancien régime, and particularly the so-called ‘harmony’ between the ‘religious system’ and the ‘political system’. The religious system in question is Catholicism, but also any other ‘revealed system’, which, as Cloots claims, he has demonstrated logically the falsehood in his Certitude. The political system in question is

82. Cloots, Écrits révolutionnaires, 394.
83. Ibid., 9.
monarchism, understood as the government of one by sanction of the religious system that posits the centre of sovereignty in God, anointing kings to be the earthly representative of this power. However, this political system is not worse than the religious or ‘theocratic system’, with its ‘convoluted’ metaphysics. Indeed, as we will see in the chapter on republicanism, Cloots was not anti-monarchist or anti-royalist until the trial of the king, like many other revolutionaries. Moreover, the accumulation of this system into multiple sovereign monarchies forms the (utterly wrong) ‘système atroce de la balance politique’ in Europe, which cannot provide perpetual peace (the philosophical project Cloots set himself to accomplish).

Perhaps this lack of opposition to the king explains why Cloots writes of his ‘true social system’ rather than ‘political system’; it is the order of society that revolutionaries wished to reform, and that Cloots wants to reform: equality through the abolition of privileges, and liberty through the representation of the sovereign at the Assembly. The king may well remain in the system, as long as the people is the real sovereign.

The ‘false’ systems can be proven false using logic, the same way a mathematical formula can be proven right or wrong. For instance, as already seen, the system of ‘revealed religions’ is wrong because it assumes that God’s word could only be accessible to a select few scholars rather than everyone. But even the ‘système des théistes’ is wrong because, according to Cloots, it states that the universe is an ‘ouvrage’ and therefore there must be an ‘ouvrier’, demonstrating the existence of God. However, common sense and reason takes this syllogism into pieces, and shows that the premise according to which the universe is a piece of work, is simply wrong, or it would mean that God is also a piece of work and therefore was created by another worker.

Civitas Maxima

A further argument for the Wolffian influence on Cloots is the similarity, another one, between his ‘universal republic’ and Wolff’s ‘civitas maxima’. They both involve a certain form of republicanism, and its extension to the whole world.

Wolff wrote about his civitas maxima in Latin, but it seems that civitas is best translated as republic rather than state, or civitas as preoccupation for the common good. Leibniz had a theory of an ascending series of societies from the family until a greater society, which Wolff seems to have taken with the civitas maxima as an association of moral persons, of civites, which

86. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 187.
retain their identity. Cloots’s universal republic is also an association, but it is based on the individual: it is an ‘empire des individus unis’ necessarily obeying the law, rather than an empire of corporations necessarily resisting the law. In contrast, Wolff’s *civitas maxima* is formed between nations by means of a quasi-agreement. However, it seems that both Cloots and Wolff argue on the same level that this ‘universal republic’ or *civitas maxima* is a product of the necessary law of nations rather than the voluntary law of nations, as Grotius argued. Necessary law describes a pre-existing law derived from nature, whilst voluntary law is the product of human agreement. However, the voluntary law of nations derives from the necessary law, and, in that sense, for Wolff, the law of nations is nothing but the law of nature applied to nations. For Cloots, there is no law of nations *per se*, because only the law of nature exists, and men are born in a natural state of society; nations (states) are only temporary human aberrations until the natural nation of the human race is formed. So, it is the same necessary law of nature that applies, and the same principle that there is a *civitas maxima* is this necessary law of nature.

By the same token, once this similarity is noticed between Cloots and Wolff, there is the same recognition of sovereignty belonging to the *civitas maxima* to rule over individual nations. For Wolff, this sovereignty is partial. For Cloots, this sovereignty is the only one, and therefore total. But both agree that sovereignty lies within the people, although again, this people is considered as a whole for Wolff, while it is the individual sovereignty that justify popular sovereignty for Cloots. There also seems to be a similarity between them regarding the right of one nation to act on the behalf of others. Wolff claims the will of all nations can be expressed by one if it follows the leadership of nature and uses right reason. Cloots also sees France as the leader and by establishing a republic is in fact establishing a universal republic, whilst the National Assembly is legislating for the whole human race. However, the comparison falls short here; for Wolff, this leadership and legislation becomes then a voluntary act—out of the necessary natural law—and this must be subjected to scientific discussion.

89. Ibid., 296.
92. Ibid., §3.
Cloots, on the other hand, seems to see it as a continuation of necessary natural law, but in his view the ‘universal republic’ is a very minimalistic state where only a few things are decided, whilst the former countries and new départements continue to decide locally of their social, economic, cultural, and political organisations. Cloots, on the other hand, seems to see it as a continuation of necessary natural law, but in his view the ‘universal republic’ is a very minimalistic state where only a few things are decided, whilst the former countries and new départements continue to decide locally of their social, economic, cultural, and political organisations.\(^\text{100}\)

The government of this universal republic is minimalistic. Cloots predicts a lesser need for decrees in his universal republic.\(^\text{101}\) All ministries will disappear and a ‘fraternal government’ will replace it:

La trésorerie nationale ne donnera plus d’inquiétude au public ; personne n’y puisera impunément ; car les impôts seront à peu près nuls, et chaque département entretiendra ses chemins, ses hôpitaux, ses tribunaux, ses ateliers, de manière que la dépense commune se réduira au salaire du corps législatif, et du gouvernement suprême, et de l’administration générale. Ce gouvernement fraternel ne sera qu’un vaste bureau central de correspondance pour avertir officiellement les cosmopolites, de tous les événements qu’il importe de savoir.\(^\text{102}\)

Cloots uses the word ‘cosmopolite’ as literally as citizen of the universal republic. Cloots estimates that with the consecration of liberty everywhere in the world there will be no need for an executive power. This is, of course, utopian, but it is related to two general views at the time regarding the executive power. First, the purpose of the executive power would be to apply the law decided by the legislative power and to maintain liberty, as Rousseau argued.\(^\text{103}\) Second, Cloots with other physiocrates and partisans of ‘natural republicanism’ (as we will see later) believed that the need for government, for an executive branch, would disappear since there would be no need to ‘maintain’ liberty in a world were liberty was restored, and since there will be less need to pass laws once everything runs smoothly in accordance with nature. It is only the lack of respect of the laws of nature in human affairs that leads to the need to pass laws to govern humankind. Moreover, the division into three powers will no longer be called ‘power’ but ‘duty’, because there is only one power, the power of the sovereign.\(^\text{104}\) Ministers in this ‘executive council’ would be handpicked from the Assembly, but would have no part in the making of laws except for expressing their opinion. The council would not have the right of veto, which can only be used by a sufficiently representative part of the public. As for the assembly, Cloots is in favour of unicameralism rather than bicameralism for the same reason as the one for

\(^\text{100}\) Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 265.
\(^\text{101}\) Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 489.
\(^\text{102}\) Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 265.
\(^\text{103}\) Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Du contrat social ou principes de droit politique’, in Rousseau : Œuvres complètes, vol. 3 (Gallimard, 1964 [1762]), Ch. 3.1.
\(^\text{104}\) Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 485.
the unity of the nation. If there is one nation of the human race, there is also one representative chamber:

Montrez-moi deux chambres dans la nation et je vous accorderai deux chambres dans la constitution. Un peuple homogène doit avoir une représentation homogène.105

CONCLUSION

Cloots’s political system thus summed up and explained, one can notice that there are many contextual elements that require further analysis. What was Cloots doing by calling himself ‘orator of the human race’? How did natural law theory claim a scientific status with laws of politics and morality? How was the human race the only sovereign possible, and how can it be a ‘nation’? What is this republic and how can it encompass the whole globe?

It is this system that the following chapters will address, each focusing on one of the elements needed to explain Cloots’s system. But before that, the next chapter will examine Cloots’s change of name to Anacharsis and the self-given title of ‘Orator of the human race’. It will argue that it was a way of self-fashioning and had roots in the study of classical rhetoric. Cloots fashioned himself as Anacharsis, a Northern wiseman who travelled to Ancient Greece and Athens. This is in line with his self-proclaimed title of ‘orator’. For Roman rhetoricians the orator was as much a wise philosopher as a talented speaker who could convince the audience of the truth he devised through reason. This leads to the next chapter on reason and truth, examining how Cloots considered French principles to be scientific. This chapter will then lead to the next one examining the context of thoughts on nature and natural law theories, which were dominant at the time, and how Cloots adapted these traditions to his atheist and scientific views. The following chapter will consider Cloots’s understanding of humanity as a unity, and of the individual as its most important part. The final chapter will examine the context of republicanism and how Cloots tried to extend its limits to the whole world.

105. Ibid., 481–82.
This study opened with the scene of Cloots’s ‘embassy’ to the National Assembly to ask that foreigners be included to the fête de la fédération, the first celebration of Bastille Day. Cloots led the delegation as self-proclaimed ‘ambassador of the human race’. Later, Cloots rejected his first name and adopted the one of Anacharsis. In his writings, he changed also his ‘function’ as ‘orator of the human race’, a designation applied after his name. Why did Cloots change his name, and what was his intention? This chapter argues that the reason was as much an act of self-fashioning during a time of complete social and political novelty, as it was a rhetorical act related to Greek and Roman antiquity: presenting the orator in a good light for the argument.

As Gay notes, an orator was facing several audiences at the National Assembly: his fellow revolutionaries, the public in the gallery, and Parisian and provincial clubs looking for polished performances not straying too far from the familiar patterns and past great figures of French rhetoric. The delegation led by Cloots was like a theatrical representation, but it was not an isolated one. There is no power without a theatrical representation of this power: the king’s coronation, the lit de justice, the parade preceding the reunion of the three estates, these are just examples of the theatricality of politics in the ancien régime. That Cloots decided to organise such a delegation should not be considered unusual. Nor should it be unusual that the delegation wore costumes — even if national folk costumes. During the first celebration of the storming of the Bastille in the town of Beaufort-en-vallée, in the Loire valley, eighty-three women ceremonially dressed in costumes representing the new departments. The deputies of the three estates

2. For an account of the preparation and the course of the celebration, see Ozouf, La fête révolutionnaire 1789–1799, 44–74.
also wore costumes symbolising their estate at the opening and during the sessions of the Estates-General. As Hunt notes, revolutionaries were concerned with dress because it was an expression of ‘symbolic forms of political practice’. Hunt notes that there was a project to create revolutionary official costumes, and that the way citizens dressed was the object of caricatures for how good or bad a republican they were. Above all, there was a concern for equality and abolishing social distinctions through dress codes. So, why did it provoke such a strong reaction among commentators when Cloots led a delegation in national costumes? Why was Cloots accused to have hired actors in costumes? This cannot be known, but what can be explained is Cloots's action.

Choosing the function of ‘Orator of the human race’ was deliberate for Cloots in his philosophical combat. French society at the time of the revolution was more literate than it had ever been, but the spoken word was still dominant. In 1686–1690, 29% of men and 14% of women were able to sign their name; the numbers rose to 48% of men and 17% of women in 1786–90. The ability to sign one’s name is not necessarily synonymous with the ability to read, but it is a rough indication. In this context, the well-spoken word, eloquence, was necessary in order to convince the illiterate. After the revolution broke out, Cloots and other pamphleteers continued to read their publications out loud as orators. At the National Assembly or the Convention, Cloots’s declaimed his République universelle and Bases constitutionnelles as speeches. The speeches made by the representatives of the people were carefully prepared in advance, and always written. At the occasion of the celebration of the bicentenary of the French Revolution, Furet started a collection of these speeches by the ‘orators of the French Revolution’.

It is easy to compare the oratory skills of many revolutionaries who received the same education in the collèges in classical rhetoric. They were trained not only theoretically, but very practically with various exercises, and even with theatrical representations of plays that were supposed to express moral values in the city.

But Cloots’s choice was not simply influenced by classical rhetoricians from his youth. There is a real self-fashioning in choosing a new name, Anacharsis. This name is not unrelated to the study of the classics and rhetoric. Anacharsis was known for his wisdom as a philosopher. The orator was a hero for Cicero in that he was a philosopher who had to seek truth through

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6. Ibid., 74–86.
reason, and then persuade his fellow citizens of this truth through the mastery of eloquence. Anacharsis was a foreigner from the North who came to the capital of philosophy Athens; Cloots came from the relatively Northern city of Cleves to Paris, centre of the Republic of letters. Anacharsis wanted to spread the Greek mores and philosophies back home and anywhere he went; the ‘orator’ Cloots would act through speeches for the whole human race. The philosopher Cloots self-fashions himself in the new régime as ‘Anacharsis’ after an obscure Northern philosopher in Ancient Greece, and devises a universally ‘true system’ with his reason, which he then tries to convince everyone to adopt as self-appointed ‘orator’.

**Self-Fashioning**

Self-fashioning is understood here in Greenblatt’s sense: a process of constructing one’s identity and public persona according to imposed social standards.⁹ Taylor wrote a rich study of the historical beginnings of the modern self. What is novel in the modern notions of natural rights, Taylor argues, is the place of the subject. ‘The Anglo-French Enlightenment culture’ is ‘individualist’ in three characteristics: ‘it prizes autonomy’; ‘it gives an important place to self-exploration’; ‘and its visions of the good life generally involve personal commitment’.¹⁰ Wahrman identifies a clear historical change between an ‘ancien régime of identity’ and the ‘cultural revolution’ of the self at the end of the eighteenth century.¹¹ The ‘ancien régime of identity’ has several characteristics: ‘malleability’ or ‘the sense that one’s “personal identity” … could be imagined as unfixed and potentially changeable’, and a ‘pre-self’ or the ‘time that lacked a sense of a stable inner core of selfhood like that which will emerge at the turn of the eighteenth century’.¹²

This is certainly the case with Cloots, as with many revolutionaries, and this ‘malleability’ that changed to a rigid self would explain why nineteenth-century commentators ridiculed Cloots for changing names, pretending to be French when he was German, and calling himself ‘orator of the human race’. There were of course political differences that motivated these attacks, but they crystallised on Cloots in particular, and not only on his ideas, but on his person in what could be called a historical ‘character assassination’. It was a general part of the cultural revolution after 1789 to rename everything according to new standards. It is very significant, that looking back on this period, historians and intellectuals of the nineteenth

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¹². Ibid., 168.
century started to mock this fluid position regarding identity, especially national identity. They also mocked the references to antiquity, Roman of course, but above all Greek. Cloots epitomised both sins as he embraced his French citizenship, and considered himself like the Anacharsis of yore, as a philosopher who came from the North to find the enlightenment of philosophy in the intellectual capital of the time. The satirical play Athènes à Paris attacked Cloots with his lofty dream of Greek philosophy. The ‘German’ origins were accentuated by intellectuals during the nineteenth century, underlining the whole silliness of the project for a ‘German’ to try and pretend being ‘French’. These examples mark the period of fixed identities based on ‘nationality’ during the first stage of modernity. It cannot be reduced to mere political differences either, as a left-wing historian ridiculed Cloots for the same reason, as argued in the introduction.

However, Cloots was simply a foreigner trying to find his place in this new setting, perhaps with too much enthusiasm to the taste of anti-republican commentators. To find his place, Cloots re-invented himself with a French identity as a free ‘citizen’, rejecting gradually his previous identity of Prussian noble ‘slave’. He also self-fashioned this new French citizen Cloots being atheist and aspiring philosophe by adopting the non-Christian name of Anacharsis. Cloots finally self-fashioned his function of ‘orator’, a Roman republican function, as a new position in the new regime. Moreover, throughout Cloots’s writings, as will be argued in the following chapters, the individual has a central place because of the natural rights inherent to her/him. Just as the revolution refashioned politics and the French institutions, Cloots refashioned himself. In the old regime, Cloots wanted to become a member of the Republic of letters, a philosophe. His name and his title were no issue or obstacle to this, on the contrary. His nobility and his wealth made it easier to be introduced to the salons, without the need to find a sponsor. If Cloots wrote his first book under a pseudonym, it was not only to escape censorship, but to assume a certain sarcastic narrative strategy; the real author was not hidden. The revolution, as any revolution, triggered a re-fashioning of the public space. Displays of power from the ancien régime were destroyed or replaced — statues of kings or saints, churches and cathedrals, Latin inscriptions on hôtels particuliers, and so on. If the public space was re-fashioned according to new ideas and ideals, intellectuals and actors of the revolution felt also the need to fashion themselves — Marat ‘l’ami du peuple’, Robespierre ‘l’incorruptible’. If some had their epi-

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13. See the nineteenth-century historians in the introduction.
16. Mathiez, La Révolution et les étrangers.
It was not an isolated case to use names of the antiquity, and this could be considered as social standard for constructing a public persona. For instance, Lucien Bonaparte (1775–1840), Napoleon’s brother, renamed himself Brutus, the Roman politician most famous for his participation in the assassination of Julius Caesar who had a king-like behaviour. 17 Many revolutionaries looked back to Antiquity to find role models, the same role models that fuelled their imagination during their formative years in collèges. 18 Monnier considers that this these references to Roman heroes were more than mere rhetoric, but also part of a republican system of values, in which Brutus is the major reference of republican duty and struggle against tyrants. 19 François-Noël Babeuf (1760–1797) changed his first name to Camille, and then, whilst in prison in 1793, chose Gracchus, from the Gracchus brothers, tribunes in Rome (2 BCE) who tried to pass a land reform redistributing aristocratic landholdings among the poor. 20 Before the age of modern nationalism, Cloots did not see any problem with identifying with the French Revolution, and he was not the only foreigner to do so, as Thomas Paine shows. Neither did the ‘French’ revolutionaries as they granted French citizenship to Cloots and Paine, but also Benjamin Franklin, Friedrich Schiller, and others. During the euphoria of the first years of the Revolution, the revolutionaries reinvented themselves in new roles that had been hitherto impossible in the system of the ancien régime.

A good illustration of this refashioning in daily lives is the use of citoyen as a title prefixing a person’s name. Geffroy argues that the use of the expression ‘citoyen’ started between 1790–1792, and became popular between 1792 and 1793–1800 as a replacement of monsieur, mademoiselle, and madame, or any other previous title in a spirit of egalitarianism. 21 Geffroy dates the first use of the title citoyen, in this fashion, at the end of 1790 in a letter by Augustin Robespierre. 22 Cloots called himself citoyen already in an article published on 15 March 1790 in Chronique de Paris, ‘On se rappellera que Mesmer est devenu millionnaire (…), signing ‘Cloots du Val-de-Grâce,

20. McPhee, Liberty or Death, 276.
22. Ibid., 72.
It is doubtful that Cloots used the term *citoyen* in a republican sense, as a citizen of a republic, since this use was uncommon as of yet. Geffroy notes that *citoyen* had three different values before the revolution: as the inhabitant of a country, legally as a person with ‘droit de cité’, and finally as a good and truthful person. It is possible that Cloots used it in all these three senses, mainly as inhabitant in France as the opposition with his birth country seems to imply. However, it is also a form of title as ‘truthful’ person, and even patriot or ‘good citizen’ (as opposed to the ‘cosmopolite’ as ‘bad citizen’ described in the introduction) of the new regime in France. Cloots opposed ‘citizen’ in France to ‘baron’ in Germany and his text is against French aristocrats who fled France to try their luck in America. Cloots compares himself to them as an aristocrat who came to France because of the revolution, rather than fled it for this reason:

Je renonce à mon berceau tudesque et à mes titres gothiques,
pour me revêtir de l’honorable qualité de bourgeois de Paris.
Si les mauvais Français s’expatrient, une foule d’étrangers ar-
riève sur les ailes de la liberté, du plaisir et de la raison.

One should note the *double entendre* behind ‘*titres gothiques*’: playing on the geographical and temporal understandings of the term, meaning at the same time that the title of baron is Prussian and archaic. One should equally note that Cloots uses the expression ‘*bourgeois*’: it meant both citizen of a city, and commoner as opposed to *gentil homme*, noble, and soldier. In the same spirit of egalitarianism, Cloots later identified as a *sans-culotte*. This expression metaphorically designated poor, anti-aristocratic, anti-monarchists, ‘honest’ people after 20 June 1791 (when the flight of the King was discovered and he was brought back under a complete silence among the Parisian crowd, as showing support and cheering had been forbidden), even though it previously was an insult and a salacious expression.

*What’s in a Name?*

Throughout his writing Cloots took numerous *noms de plume*. Cloots changed his name and added different designations to it. The first change he made was to frenchify his title of baron from *Gnadenthal* to *Val-de-Grâce*. Perhaps that was an attempt to enter the world of French philosophers with

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a name easier to pronounce and remember. After the revolution he rejected his Christian name to adopt the one of a figure of ancient Greek philosophy, Anacharsis. He equally rejected his aristocratic title in Prussia, and openly turned against the Prussian state in favour of the universalist French Revolution.

It has to be noted first, that the change of name was an idea that Cloots formulated early on in ‘Jean-Baptiste Cloots à Nicolas Bonneville, salut’, published in *Le Courrier de Paris dans les 83 départements* on 28 October 1790:

> Il est aisé de prévoir que le baptême en France se perdra bien-tôt dans la marche rapide de la raison universelle. Je proposerais pour lors de faire précéder les noms de famille d’un nom tiré des règles de la nature, des événements de l’histoire, des arts, des sciences, des vertus du genre humain. Si j’étais père d’une nombreuse progéniture, mon fils ainé s’appellerait 17 juin Cloots, mon puîné s’appellerait 14 juillet Cloots ; mes autres enfants porteraient le souvenir du 4 août, du 6 octobre, du 2 novembre, du 4 février, du 13 avril, du 19 juin, etc.  

Cloots did not have any legitimate children to name after revolutionary events (although perhaps this one daughter mentioned in the biographical chapter). Instead, he changed his own first name, but rather than choosing a key moment of the revolution he chose a figure from classical history — Anacharsis. There is more to changing one’s name than simply adopting Enlightenment philosophy in its critique against Christian traditions. There is also a clear self-fashioning of one’s own identity, and especially so with the addition of a designation — ‘orator’. The designation in particular plays the function of an identity in a period where all points of reference have been erased and everything is to be made anew. However, it has to be noted also that Cloots never meant to cover or falsify his origins; as he wrote in *Lettre sur les juifs* regarding his grammatical mistakes due to his German origins: ‘D’ailleurs il vaut mieux être soi qu’un autre ; & je me montre tel que je suis’.  

But why did Cloots choose Anacharsis as a model, whose name he decided to take? And why Anacharsis, an obscure figure of Greek antiquity nowadays? What was he doing by changing his name? To answer these questions, it is important to research who the historical Anacharsis was in order to understand why Cloots chose him, and what he meant to do by that. However, looking at the historical Anacharsis also means to look at what historical information was available at the time on the historical Anachar-

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sis. It is this information that Cloots used and that will help us understand his choice.

Anacharsis

It is first important to note that nothing is known historically about Anacharsis. According to contemporary historians, Anacharsis was largely a legendary figure, as historical sources are very scarce. Only Herodotus and Ephorus wrote stories about him. The Universal History written by Ephorus of Cyme was the first of this kind and it influenced historians after him, although his work did not survive him. Herodotus presented Anacharsis as an admirer and also a representative of ‘barbarian criticism’ of Greek ways (The Histories, book 4, chapters 76–77). Born a Scythian prince, Anacharsis travelled the then-known world and acquired a reputation for wisdom. He subsequently came to visit Greece. Diogenes Laertius, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers (1, 101–105) related how Anacharsis befriended Solon during his stay in Athens. Anacharsis knocked at Solon’s door and instructed one of Solon’s servants to ask him to welcome him to his home. When the servant asked Solon, the latter instructed his servant to tell Anacharsis that this was reserved for fellow countrymen. Anacharsis entered the house and went to Solon announcing that he was now in Solon’s country (therefore a fellow countryman). His freedom of speech gave way to an expression in ancient Greek: having a ‘Scythian conversation’. Diogenes’s Anacharsis preached temperance to men in their course of life. An unknown author used the name of Anacharsis to convey his own philosophic critique of Greek Cynicism in The Letters of Anacharsis. Although one of them was translated into Latin by Cicero (Tusc., 5. 90) it is dubious that the real Anacharsis wrote them. However, they inspired Montesquieu who took the same idea in Lettres persanes. Both Herodotus and Diogenes recognised the extraneity of Anacharsis and how he both adopted and criticised Greek ways. It is said that it is when Anacharsis came back to Scythia, that he was killed, perhaps by his own brother, while paying tribute to a Greek rite. However, some historians have questioned the authenticity of this event as it bears resemblance to the narrative of a tragedy, and to the fate of other figures. Kindstrand, who studied the historical Anacharsis in

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length, concludes that what Herodotus and other Greeks knew of Anacharsis was largely legendary, even though there may be a ‘historical starting-point, insofar that a man came to Greece from the North’.

Cloots’s understanding of Anacharsis was therefore historically inaccurate and based on these unverified accounts mentioned. Cloots’s idea to make reference to Anacharsis was probably inspired by Barthélémy’s 1788 ‘best-selling’ (for the time) historical fiction, in which the supposedly historical Anacharsis narrates his voyages to Greece and Athens. Barthélémy chose to write a sort of historical travel novel with Anacharsis as the central character. Although inspired by historical events, it is a work of fiction rather than non-fiction — the work of a novelist rather than of an historian. When Cloots writes that Anacharsis ‘was the witness of a great revolution’, it is probably a reference to Barthélémy: ‘Anacharsis fut témoin de la révolution qui changea la face de la Grèce, et qui quelques temps après, détruisit l’empire des Perses’. However, the ‘historical’ Anacharsis is without a doubt the prime source of reference for Cloots, who surely read Herodotus in collège, and Diogenes’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers is mentioned as source for Cloots by Cubières-Palmézeau. According to Cubières-Palmézeau, the Anacharsis in Barthélémy’s book is fictional (understood as loosely based on the writings by Herodotus, Diogenes Laertius, etc.), whereas Cloots’s choice of the name is directly linked to the ‘real’ Anacharsis as described in Diogenes Laertius. It may not only be the idea of a philosopher coming from the North to Athens, the capital of philosophy, that inspired Cloots, but also the ‘Scythian conversation’ or frankness and witty shake-up of customs and traditions. It is here useful to retrace the steps in Cloots’s writings towards the adoption of the name Anacharsis.

The given name ‘Anacharsis’ appears for the first time in Cloots’s writings in a letter to Camille Desmoulins on 28 August 1790, published on 20 September 1790 in Révolutions de France et de Brabant: ‘... J.-B. Cloots qui habite la France, comme Anacharsis habitait la Grèce’. It then appeared again in Cloots’s Anacharsis à Paris, ou lettre de Jean-Baptiste Cloots à un prince d’Allemagne, written on 6 October 1790. This published letter to a prince in Germany is written with the idea of being a modern Anacharsis. Instead of being Scythian, this Anacharsis is Prussian (Cloots), and instead of going to Athens to study Greek philosophy, he goes to Paris (to study

33. Kindstrand, Anacharsis: The Legend and the Apophthegmata, 16.
34. Barthélémy, Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce.
38. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 69.
French philosophy). In this short pamphlet, Cloots multiplies the parallels with Greek and Roman antiquity in order to present the French Revolution as a peaceful movement inspired by Enlightenment philosophy. For instance, ‘la société des Jacobins est le palladium de la constitution’. As such, the German prince is invited to come and witness by himself the situation. Cloots invites him in particular to visit the Lycée, intellectual centre no less famous than the one in Athens. Anacharsis is thus the link between Paris and Berlin, France and Prussia. Taking the name Anacharsis in the title is a way of setting the tone and the purpose of the ‘letter’. The letter is published and is therefore intended for a wide audience, but it is addressed to a German prince nonetheless, and as such Cloots sees himself as a Prussian witness and translator of the French Revolution to the German elites, which spoke French.

However, he still signed his following articles ‘Jean-Baptiste Cloots’. This shows that Cloots originally took the name ‘Anacharsis’ not immediately for himself as a way to fashion his atheist and non-aristocratic identity, but as a rhetorical strategy: a stylistic way of writing and presenting the political situation in Paris to his native land. Proof of this claim is that the turning point for adopting definitively the name Anacharsis is Cloots’s pamphlet against Hertzberg, *L’orateur du genre humain*. Cloots claims that, on 5 February 1791, he gave a certificate of participation to the celebration of the Federation on 14 July 1790 to a Joseph Cajadaer Chammas signing ‘Anacharsis Cloots, Orateur du genre humain à l’Assemblée nationale de France’. Cloots writes:

> J’inviterai donc tous les hommes sensés, qui connaissent l’influence pernicieuse de la religion chrétienne, de ne perdre aucune occasion de convertir leurs frères égarés ; et puisque l’exemple agit efficacement sur les humains, je ne balance pas à me débaptiser, comme je n’ai pas balancé à me déféodaliser. Et pour qu’il ne soit plus question ni de baptême ni de baronnie, je renvoie mon patron, Jean-Baptiste, en Palestine, après avoir renvoyé mes armoiries en Prusse. Je prends le contre-pied des Anabaptistes et, parvenu à l’âge de raison, j’abjure les fourberies de Pierre et de Paul. Et pour remplacer les saints du calendrier, je trouve parmi les philosophes de la Grèce un étranger qui a bien mérité d’un peuple libre, et qui fut témoin d’une grande révolution : j’adopte son nom, et je m’appellerai dorénavant Anacharsis-Cloots.

41. Ibid., 75.
43. Ibid., 154.
The use of the first name ‘Anacharsis’ has two clear objectives: ‘débaptiser’ and ‘déféodaliser’. It is a rejection of the two other estates: the clergy, and the nobility. As shown below, the cult of antiquity by the French Revolutionaries was inspired by their classical education in collèges. As Parker showed, antiquity provided also a model to follow for the republican movement, in particular after the King’s flight. The end of the ancien régime created a vacuum in political and moral philosophy that had to be filled. The Greek and Roman models of republic provided much of the material to fill this vacuum. However, as Montesquieu had shown in particular, a republic could only survive through ‘virtue’ and educated citizens. This task was equated to the ‘regeneration’ of the people. But if the previous institutions, such as the church, could not provide the required model for morality, another model had to be found. Antiquity provided such a model, with ‘heroes’ who showed their ‘virtue’ through their deeds. This use of a famous name from classical Greece and Rome also inspired Cloots’s friend, the poet Michel de Cubières-Palmézeau, to rename some of his personal acquaintances and leading politicians of his time, such as ‘Plato’ Sieyès, ‘Brutus’ Robespierre, or ‘Scipio’ Lafayette.

As Cubières-Palmézeau writes:

Et pour en revenir au Prussien Clootz qui, le premier, nous a donné l’exemple de nous débaptiser en prenant le nom d’Anacharsis, ne vaut-il pas mieux choisir ses patrons & patronnes dans Rome profane que dans Rome la sainte, & imiter des payens remplis de vertus & de génie, quoique damnés, que des moines & moinesses canonisés par le pape & solennellement placés dans le ciel, quoiqu’ils n’eussent d’autres mérites que de faire assidûment l’oraison & se donner la discipline?

As Parker notes, the identification with figures of the antiquity was a way of motivating themselves in the face of adversity. Durosé compared a naval commander with the Greek statesman Aristides, while Robespierre in May 1791 identified himself with the same Aristides in a speech. Later, during the Convention, it became very popular for victims of the revolution to compare themselves with the persecuted figures of the antiquity. But only Cloots among the revolutionaries changed his first name into one, rather than just liken his life and fate with one. There is therefore more to it than just following a rhetorical trend among revolutionaries in order to identify with the antiquity; there is a self-fashioning with a particular intent.

47. Ibid., 173.
In line with this function of foreign philosopher observing a revolution, Cloots subsequently added the designation ‘Orator of the human race’. If this designation still belongs to the self-fashioning it has to be explained by the explicit reference to Roman and Greek antiquity. Rhetoric played an important part in the education of the revolutionaries who read classical Roman and Greek rhetoricians. The Roman orator had a specific role and was often described as a hero. But it is first necessary to explain the role of rhetoric and how it was taught in mid-eighteenth-century collèges in order to understand the extent of the influence of classical literature, and the Greek and Roman classical republican cultures, on Cloots and the revolutionaries.

Rhetoric

In *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*, Skinner argues that Hobbes’s central aspiration to create a *scientia civilis*, a civil science, derived from classical theorists of eloquence and Cicero in particular. According to Cicero, there were two components of a *scientia civilis*: reason (the faculty to uncover truth), and rhetoric (the art of presenting truth with eloquence). Hobbes’s position shifted throughout his writings regarding the place of reason and rhetoric, from an initial agreement to a repudiation in favour of science, and a final acceptance of the power of eloquence in persuading the multitude. The reason for this change is mainly due to Hobbes’s consideration on the English revolution, which he considered as a triumph of the irrational and the power of rhetoric over science and rationality. As a result, Hobbes held the role of rhetoric high in persuading an audience of the truth acquired through reason, and he inaugurated a particular tone and style of writing philosophy by using ridicule and laughter as weapons of choice against his intellectual enemies.

The same can be argued with Cloots: truth is acquired through the use of reason, but the power of eloquence is then used to convince the audience of this truth. Truth, here, is the *scientia civilis* of the time, or the ‘science of man’ as developed throughout the Enlightenment. And for Cloots, it is also the idea of single nation of the human race and sovereignty of the human race. The revolutionaries developed a specific rhetoric during the heyday of the revolution. They received their education on *reason* from the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment, and their education on *rhetoric* from the ‘classics’ of Antiquity, notably Cicero. As a result, they were trained to think of the *new* civil science of the Enlightenment as truth, and to persuade the audience of it through classical rhetoric. As Brockliss states, education had a tremendous influence on the mindset of schoolboys: ‘... at no time before

49. Ibid., 435.
the French Revolution was it possible for any but a few members of the intelligentsia to reject the cultural inheritance of their schooldays'.

After the king’s flight to Varennes, republicanism became prominent as the only viable option for a new political order. Both the science and rhetoric of the revolutionaries were infused with Greek and Roman republicanism. Cloots’s conception of the true civil science and his rhetoric did not differ from this model. What is interesting is the particular view he had of this civil science, and the way he used his rhetorical education to persuade his audience. Cloots interpreted the French Revolution as the beginning of a universal movement towards the liberation of ‘oppressed peoples’. The ‘regeneration’ of the French people would spread throughout the world, and the French republic was only the beginning of the universal republic as all the countries would free themselves from monarchical tyranny. In doing so, Cloots perceived himself as a broker between France and other countries, for the whole of the human race. First, as ‘ambassador’, and then as ‘orator’. Cloots ‘orator of the human race’ used laughter as a rhetorical device to win the audience in the universal language that French was at the time.

The rhetoric employed by the revolutionaries played an important role in shaping the new politics. According to Hunt, the collège education not only structured all the revolutionaries’ speeches along Quintilian’s five-step structure, but also provided a powerful tool of persuasion infusing emotions and symbols into the new concepts of politics and the political. Cloots intended the same with his own ideas: emotions with the use of jokes, indignation, accusations, etc.; symbols with the use of common republican symbols such as the reference to the constitution, liberty with the Phrygian hat against slavery with chains, or the mention of Enlightenment philosophers (Rousseau, Locke, Voltaire, etc.). This was a time of enthusiastic creation in terms of politics and political concepts; especially so after the fall of the king. Constructing a republic became a possibility, and all the previous referents of power and sovereignty had to be replaced. Cloots followed this rhetorical explosion with the concept of ‘nation of the human race’ and ‘sovereignty of the human race’. At times Cloots followed the rhetorical norms of his time, but often he tried to influence concepts to shift their meanings according to his own views. The concept of nation is a good example of this as it was created as an abstract concept designating a community of free individuals, which Cloots then saw as applicable to the whole world.

Gay nuanced Parker’s assertion that the ‘revolutionaries’ vowed a ‘cult of antiquity’ as they neither quantitatively cited nor qualitatively admired

the ancients as often as to qualify as a ‘cult’. But if only a few revolutionaries qualify as admirers of antiquity, Gay does not provide an exhaustive list of them, although he mentions Desmoulin, Madame Roland, Saint-Just, Vergnaud, Brissot, and Robespierre. Gay’s point is that the historian should not simply disregard the category of a ‘secular religion’ that the revolutionaries used to replace catholicism. To avoid a simplistic approach to the rhetoric of the orators, Gay instead suggests to look at four streams instead: the tradition of eloquence, the ideology, the mental state of the orator, and the events surrounding the speech.

Gumbrecht has analysed the rhetoric of the revolutionaries under the angle of a Rezeptionsästhetik. While highly theoretical, the work analyses three texts in particular at three different moments of the revolution: 1789, 1792, 1793. In particular, the analysis of Mireabeau’s Projet d’adresse au Roi on 16 July 1789 shows how the rhetoric of the revolutionaries was structured by their classical education. Mirabeau’s speech is an example of the third type of Aristotelian orations, the genus deliberativum or ‘deliberative oration’, (Rhetoric, book 1 chapter 3).

The 1793 example of mourning after Marat’s death constitutes a case of epideictic oratory, or ‘demonstrative oration’.

In analysing Cloots’s rhetoric, and following Gay’s study of rhetoric, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt at analysing the mental state or any linguistic structure. Instead, I will focus on the historical context in general, and more specifically on how the tradition of eloquence played a role, and what sort of ideology Cloots had. The mental state implies elements of psychology, which is difficult to assess. I would here brush aside Gay’s suggestion to use Freud’s concepts of conscient and subconscient as these views are only studied in psychology as an introduction to the history of the discipline rather than actual tools of analysis. On another note, it is certain that physical and psychological exhaustion played an important role in revolutionary rhetoric, as Palmer notes, but these elements are beyond the scope of the present study.

Tackett has written a study on the psychological and physical state of revolutionaries during the terror. I will focus here on the education that Cloots received, the same as many other revolutionaries.

53. Ibid., 672–676.
tionaries, which was emphasising rhetoric. It becomes then very clear that the title ‘orator of the human race’ was related to this classical education and Roman republicanism. The orator was as much a philosopher as an eloquent speaker, with a specific role in society.

Education

Mercier in his first volume of *Tableau de Paris* writes this striking account of his education in Paris:

Le nom de Rome est le premier nom qui ait frappé mon oreille. Dès que j’ai pu tenir un rudiment, on m’a entretenu de Romulus & du Tibre. Les noms de Brutus, de Caton & de Scipion me poursuivoient dans mon sommeil. On entassoit dans ma mémoire les Epîtres familières de Cicéron ....

Les Décades de Tite-Live ont tellement occupé mon cerveau pendant mes études, qu’il m’a fallu dans la suite beaucoup de temps pour redevenir citoyen de mon propre pays, tant j’avois épousé les fortunes de ces anciens Romains.

J’étois républicain avec tous les défenseurs de la République ; je faisois la guerre avec le Sénat, contre le redoutable Annibal ; je rasois Carthage la superbe ; je suivois la marche des Généraux Romains, & le vol triomphant de leurs aigles dans les Gaules ; je les voyois sans terreur conquérir le pays où je suis né ; je voulois faire des Tragédies de toutes les stations de César ; & ce n’est que depuis quelques années que je ne sais quelle lueur de bon sens m’a rendu François & habitant de Paris.\(^{19}\)

Historians of the revolution have argued that the revolutionaries-to-be received an education that focused heavily on the ‘classics’ of Antiquity.\(^{60}\) These texts formed not only the background for the subsequent oratorical style and domination of public opinion, but also a romantic enthusiasm for republican values.\(^{61}\) There are several works of reference regarding the cur-

riculum that the revolutionaries studied as pupils of the *collèges*. It is here useful to retrace the history of these *collèges* in which both nobles and the well-to-do sent their children. This will enable us to appreciate the degree of impregnation of classical authors and the culture of classical republicanism in the formative years of the revolutionaries and Cloots. This short historical sketch shows that the curriculum developed around rhetoric and eloquence in order to educate future figures of established power, be it the church, the nobility, or the state. These real *collèges* have to be distinguished from others, also called *collèges*, but in reality functioning as annexes for religious orders. Colleges, such as the *collège de Cluny*, accepted poor pupils on a scholarship for ordination. This explains why several figures of the revolution and the Enlightenment were called ‘abbé’ although they never preached or very little, and wrote instead works of philosophy.

The French *collèges* were founded on the Dutch model initiated by the Bretheren of the Common Life. The curriculum was the same due to a constant exchange between the university of Paris and The Netherlands. It was based on the medieval *trivium*: rhetoric, logic, and philosophy and science. There was little rhetoric taught before the reform of the *collèges* during the sixteenth century, but it was gradually introduced mostly in Latin, and a little in Greek. This gradual interest by the political and religious powers for the teaching of rhetoric may be explained by the fact that society was prone to written rather than oral transmission of knowledge and information. The art of persuasion was therefore of utmost interest for the powers-that-be, which gave the *collèges* their function: forming young minds to become people of the spoken word in order to assume these functions for the church and other institutions of power. The dominance of rhetoric and the educational emphasis on Greek and Roman rhetoricians was influenced by authorities in order to perpetuate their power, and, ironically, was the reason for their demise.

In the *collèges*, rhetoric formed an important part of the education of the pupils. A seminal work is Parker’s *The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries*. Looking at the curriculum of several *collèges*, Parker takes ten

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64. For instance, Cloots’s friend the abbé Brizard, mentioned in the biographical chapter.
66. Ibid., 151.
67. Ibid., 197.
examples, of which the University of Paris is one. Parker does not include Cloots’s collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne, but considers three chosen collèges (Harcourt, Navarre, and Louis-le-Grand) as forming one example since ‘they were under a common regulation’: the University of Paris. By extension, Pléssis-Sorbonne, where Cloots went, must have had the same curriculum since it was also part of the University of Paris. Parker shows that the pupils in the collèges received an education heavily focused on the classics of Rome, and most importantly Cicero, who was studied during four of their six years at the collège, followed by Horace and Virgil each studied for three years. As seen in the previous chapters, the same authors were on the curriculum of the Berlin Académie des nobles, and Sulzer had the same emphasis on clarity for argumentation and concepts.

The study of rhetoric has a long history. Fumaroli retraced the development of rhetoric in France between 1550 and 1650, culminating towards a middle way with Balzac, who wished that the ‘Orator’ in the monarchy would unite the polished language of nobility with the heart of a ‘republican’ College professors had three different kinds of sources for their teaching material: theory with Aristotle, practice with Cicero, and pedagogy with Quintilian. Classical rhetoric, as taught in the collèges of the ancien régime, was built on Quintilian’s Institutio Oratorio. After a brief preambule dedicated to matters coming before rhetoric such as speech and definitions, the treatise divides five steps: inventio (discovering the topic), dispositio (ordering), elocutio (ornamentation), actio (delivery), and memoria (memory). The inventio deals with the status of the speech (deciding what is at issue), the material for persuading (the impression the orator makes, the emotions to appeal to, and the proofs), and the loci or topics (a checklist of possible material on a given subject). Regarding the impression made by the orator, it was considered normal that the orator established his own good character at the beginning of the speech. Regarding the appeal to human emotions, a knowledge of human psychology was necessary, and here Aristotle’s Rhetoric was a good guide through human passions. The proofs were not concerned with logic, but with a sufficient degree of probability. The dispositio deals with the order in which the loci should be composed and follows a rigid development. First, comes the exordium or general introduction in which the orator puts himself in a favourable light. Second, comes the statement of the case. Third, comes a narration of events in favour of

69. Ibid., 14–21.
73. Ibid., 8–13.
the speaker’s position and the refutation of points made by opponents. Finally, the peroration that sums up what has been said and attempts to sway the public’s opinion in the speaker’s favour through the use of emotion.

The *elocutio* concerns the stylistic effectiveness of the speech. The speaker can use figures of speech to impress or stir the audience such as tropes, or artistic alteration of words or phrases to another meaning (metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy), or figures that artificially alters a phrase rather than its meaning in order to communicate emotion. It can be a *figurae sententiae*, a departure from a normal statement to express or provoke emotion (rhetorical question, feigned hesitation, appeal to the audience, irony, apostrophe, impersonation, exclamation, interruption, etc.). It can also be a *figurae verborum*, a different arrangement of words (repetition, parallelism, asyndeton, enumeration, polysyndeton, gradation, etc.). One last element of *elocutio* is the rhythm of the prose and the construction of the oratorical period. The parts regarding delivery and memory are dealt with more rapidly by Quintilian.

There were numerous exercises to give the pupils the habit of composing speeches; those asked them to develop a sentence or a title with trites, periods, transpositions, figures, amplifications, and culminations.74 The most famous textbooks were written by professors of rhetoric such as *L’art de parler* by the Reverend Father Bernard Lamy (1640–1715) at the collège of Juilly,75 or *L’élève de rhétorique* by Joseph de Jouvancy (1643–1719),76 who taught at the collège Louis-le-Grand.77 Theatre was also an important part of the education at the collèges as it provided an exercise for memory and the oratory art through the mastery of gesture and vocal expression.78 Plays were used as instruments of collective moral lessons, and all the theatrical science — the backstage machinery, the stage set, the costumes — was geared towards captivating the audience’s imagination and heart.79

Throughout Cloots’s writings, the above mentioned names of the classics in rhetoric appear several times. Cicero is mentioned over twelve times,80

79. Ibid., 204.
Horace is mentioned four times,\textsuperscript{81} Ovid once,\textsuperscript{82} Homer three times,\textsuperscript{83} Livy once,\textsuperscript{84} and Aristotle once.\textsuperscript{85} Of the French rhetoricians, Malebranche is mentioned once,\textsuperscript{86} whilst Fénelon is mentioned four times.\textsuperscript{87} Quintilian and Virgil are absent, but it is doubtful that Cloots did not read them during his time in collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne. The complete works of Virgil, Horace, and Aristotle’s \textit{Rhetoric} are present at the Gnadenthal library. An example of French oratory style is also represented in the library with Bos-suet’s \textit{Oraisons funèbres}.

The point here is not to analyse how Cloots referred to them but what he wished to say doing so. This would also turn out quite difficult to do since Cloots only mentions these authors in passing, and mostly as examples of great intellect, behaviour, or intellectual dedication. For instance, as we will see below, Cloots mentions these classical authors and others when writing to his uncle and comparing his work and dedication to theirs. It is certain that Cloots received an education with a heavy emphasis on classical rhetoric, and that he had read the most famous authors. When Cloots calls himself ‘orator of the human race’, therefore, it is a \textit{speech act} that is influenced by this classical education. The choice of ‘orator’ is a deliberate reference to Roman republicanism, in which the orator was an important person with specific qualities and duties.

\textbf{Orator of the Human Race}

Before calling himself ‘Orator of the human race’, Cloots explained in the above-mentioned letter to Camille Desmoulins, published in \textit{Révolutions de France et de Brabant} 20 September 1790, how he wished to serve the new regime in France:

\begin{quote}
Je ne veux pas d’autre magistrature que celle dont la nature et l’éducation m’ont revêtu : la voix et la plume. Magistrature suprême qui juge les rois et les souverains ; magistrature qui ne dépend pas des ballottements d’un scrutin capricieux ; magistrature sans laquelle il n’y a plus de liberté nationale ....\textsuperscript{88}
\end{quote}

In the same letter Cloots emphasises the importance of freedom of speech and of the press. He sets himself the task to exercise this freedom since he is among the ‘citoyens non-electifs’, and wishes humbly that France could

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 135, 253, 291, 493.
  \item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 128.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 287, 336, 395.
  \item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 105.
  \item \textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 287.
  \item \textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 496.
  \item \textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 75, 164, 254, 544.
  \item \textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 69.
\end{itemize}
have one thousand like him so that ‘l’État fleurisse à jamais sous tous les rapports de l’esprit républicain, l’abondance du numéraire et la prospérité générale’. Cloots then praises Desmoulins and draws a comparison between him and two ancient orators: Demosthenes and Cicero. Cloots announces then, in this letter, that he wishes to become orator in France as in Ancient Greece and Rome, in order to monitor the powers-that-be: ‘Je ne veux pas d’autre place que celle de surveiller les gens en place’. He does so with a repetition and play on the two meanings of the word ‘place’ (called an antanaclasis in rhetoric).

The designation ‘Orateur du genre humain’ appeared first in Cloots’s fake article signed by ‘Le roi des Français à tous les rois de la Terre, salut’, published in Chronique de Paris on 2 March 1791. Cloots pretended to write as the king, and ended the article with ‘Signé : Louis. Et plus bas : Cloots, Orateur du genre humain’. Cloots wrote before the flight of the king, and the statement is not yet fully republican. However, all the references to Roman antiquity are there. The king is still considered the head of the executive, but only as chosen by the legitimate sovereign, the people.

The use of the designation ‘Orator of the human race’ as a rhetorical device of the inventio is clearly established in L’Orateur du genre humain, ou dépêche du prussien Cloots au prussien Hertzberg in March 1791. One should note that among all the used pen names (Jean-Baptiste Cloots, baron du Val-de-Grâce, ‘Anacharsis’, ‘baron en Allemagne, citoyen en France’, ‘Prussien’, ‘ambassadeur du genre humain’, etc.) Cloots chose to sign as ‘prussien Cloots’ and to entitle the pamphlet ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’. It was as ‘Prussian’ that Cloots addressed Hertzberg, but he intended to talk politically, hence the idea to take the name ‘orator’. The orator in classical Rome or Athens — as discussed by Aristotle, Quintilian, or Cicero — was at the centre of public life, taking three types of orations for three different functions: celebratory (religious), judicial, and political. It is the political orator that Cloots chooses to be, because it enabled him to exercise an independent power outside institutions, which he could not join as a foreigner.

Cloots defends his ‘embassy’ on behalf of the human race in front of Hertzberg and others’ pamphlets (Burke and Calonne). Cloots takes again the role of the one speaking on behalf of the human race — using the Roman symbolic republican rhetoric that his aristocratic title is nothing but a ‘titre d’esclave prussien’ — and writes in a binary opposition to Hertzberg, ‘l’ennemi de l’humanité’, speaking on behalf of the despots and the old regime. As ‘Orator of the human race’, Cloots sees himself as a philosopher

89. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 69.
90. Ibid., 70.
91. Ibid., 69.
92. Ibid., 97–98.
94. Ibid., 102.
with a mission to oppose monarchists, aristocrats, counter-revolutionists, etc.: ‘Sachez, Hertzberg, que je suis le représentant de toutes les Nations qui ont le malheur de ne pas jouir de nos dix-sept articles fameux’.\textsuperscript{95} The articles in question are of course the ones in the \textit{Déclaration des droits de l’homme}. Hertzberg and his pamphlet represent the opposite. Hertzberg wrote his ‘mémoires académiques’ declaimed in front of an elitist audience of academicians, as opposed to Cloots’s pamphlet declaimed in front of the people; he is a ‘démophage’ as opposed to a democrat; his is a ‘vizir’, in order to further ridicule his position in a ridiculous political system. Cloots makes several references to Hertzberg in relation to the Ottoman empire and to Persia. For instance, Cloots calls Hertzberg ‘Thamas Hertzberg’ (in italics in the original publication and not in the \textit{Écrits révolutionnaires}),\textsuperscript{96} certainly a reference to Thamas Kouli-Khan (1698–1747), emperor of Persia (1737–1746), who was popularised by several authors.\textsuperscript{97} Thamas Kouli-Khan was the name given by prince Thamas to his minister and general Nader Shah, which meant ‘the Khan Slave of Thamas’, but the latter turned against the former and declared himself king in 1736 after winning against the Turcs, with whom he would finally sign a peace treaty in 1746.\textsuperscript{98} This semantic relation with Persia and Thamas Kouli-Khan is related to the person of Hertzberg, who devised a diplomatic line against his king Frederick William II regarding Austria and Russia after their war with Turkey, and also to the ‘despotic’ nature of Prussia compared to France. Hertzberg had diplomatic plans of territorial extensions by offering mediation between Austria and Russia, whereas the king had war plans, and these differences appeared at the conferences at Reichenbach in summer 1790.\textsuperscript{99} Hertzberg had earlier forced a military intervention against his king’s wish in Holland in support of the stadtholder against the democratic French party, which is the origin of Cloots’s ire with Hertzberg, and his mocking title of Thamas. Ultimately, Hertzberg’s criticism of the king’s foreign policy led to his dismissal on 5 July 1791.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 103.
\textsuperscript{96} Cloots, \textit{L’orateur du genre humain}, 4; Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 102.
\textsuperscript{99} See Ewald Friedrich Graf von Hertzberg, \textit{Recueil des déductions, mémoires, déclarations, lettres, traités, et autres actes et écrits publics, qui ont été rédigés et publiés pour la cour de Prusse par le ministre d’Etat Comte de Hertzberg, dans les années 1789 et 1790}, vol. 3 (Berlin: Chez J. F. Unger, 1793), 97–234.
Cloots writes for a wide readership knowing that Hertzberg will probably not read his pamphlet. He recognises it himself in the opening of the pamphlet:

Je suis dans la même position avec mon vizir chrétien que Jean-Jacques lorsqu’il apostrophe son muphti baptisé, en ces termes énergiques : « Pourquoi faut-il, monseigneur, que j’aie quelque chose à vous dire ! quelle langue commune pouvons-nous parler ? comment pouvons-nous nous entendre, et qu’y a-t-il entre vous et moi ? ».\(^{100}\)

The identity of the audience is even more explicit at the end of the pamphlet when Cloots writes to Hertzberg to let the ‘free people’ decide who is right:

Ne soyez pas juge et partie : c’est aux hommes libres à prononcer entre l’orateur des nations et les oppresseurs des nations, entre le défenseur des souverains et les rebelles aux souverains.\(^{101}\)

The people will have a choice to listen to Cloots as republican ‘orator’ who claims to speak in ‘defence’ of this ‘sovereign’ people, or to listen to Hertzberg, as monarchical ‘oppressor’ who represents the king and is therefore nothing but a ‘rebel’ to the true ‘sovereign’ that is the people.

But what does it mean for Cloots to be an ‘orator’? It is highly likely that the choice of calling himself ‘orator’ is linked to Cloots’s readings as a young boy in collège and the definition that Roman rhetoricians gave to it. The orator was associated with a positive image of citizenship. According to Cicero in *De officiis*, the hero is the

*vir civilis*, the man who knows how to plead in the law courts for justice and to deliberate in the councils and public assemblies of the *respublica* in such a way as to promote policies at once advantageous and honourable.\(^{102}\)

For Quintilian too, ‘the true *vir civilis* is none other than the figure of the orator’.\(^{103}\) This *vir civilis* should not only be wise but eloquent; he must be a man of *sapientia*, a man of knowledge.\(^{104}\) Cicero even compares the orator to a philosopher.\(^{105}\) The *vir civilis*, this orator, must possess *ratio* in order to acquire *sapientia*.\(^{106}\) He must equally possess a certain number of moral virtues such as justice, fortitude, temperance, *fides* (trust), *amicitia* (friendship), *humanitas* (philanthropic feelings), *clementia* or *misericordia*.\(^{107}\) The

101. Ibid., 162.
103. Ibid., 91.
104. Ibid., 74.
105. Ibid., 75.
106. Ibid., 76.
107. Ibid., 76–78.
argument that Cicero and Quintilian put forward is that the orator must be able to not only teach and instruct his fellow citizens of what is the right and wise thing to do, but must delight and persuade them.\textsuperscript{108} Reason alone is not sufficient, as citizens would reject the plan laid out by a wise and visionary man; according to Cicero: ‘Eloquence is indispensable if men are to persuade others to accept the truths that reason finds out’.\textsuperscript{109} For Roman rhetoricians, it was thus the true goal of the \textit{ars rhetorica} to achieve a \textit{scientia civilis}; reason, or the faculty to uncover the truth, had to be exposed through rhetoric, the art of presenting with eloquence. As such, the orator was the hero of many of the treatises written on politics.\textsuperscript{110} A good orator is defined as someone who forces us to do what reason commands.\textsuperscript{111}

Cloots’s function as ‘Orator of the human race’ should be understood as the emulation of classical republicanism, coupled with the function of an Enlightenment philosopher. On the one hand, Cloots compares himself to Voltaire, when he proclaimed to represent the philosophers in the republic of letters:

« Je persiste à croire, disait Voltaire, que les philosophes m’ont daigné prendre pour leur représentant, comme une compagnie fait souvent signer pour elle le moindre de ses associés. »

Anacharsis Cloots persiste, avec la même modestie, à croire que les peuples opprimés ont daigné le prendre pour leur représentant.\textsuperscript{112}

The idea expressed by Cloots is simply that no one asked Voltaire in the so-called Republic of Letters to be the spoke-person, the representative, of its members, but he did so, and for the better. By the same token, no people in the world asked Cloots to be its representative, but he does so, and, to his own account, for the better. On the other one, this self-appointed title can be revoked by the said people. The intention is to give a voice to those who are not part of the revolution taking place in France, of the first political and legal construction of legitimate sovereignty located in the people. Moreover, Voltaire could be described as a philosopher engaged in public affairs after the Calas affaire, when he represented the philosophy of the Enlightenment and defended Calas. The title of ‘representative’ is also a reference to the representatives of the people seating at the National Assembly, the \textit{Constituante}. Cloots, as a foreigner but well-versed in French politics and philosophy, wants to act as a representative to all the other peoples in the world. First of all, they are not represented at the only legitimate sovereign assembly, where only Frenchmen are. Second of all, they are misrepres-

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 84.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 94.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 88.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 91.
\textsuperscript{112} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 244.
resented by ‘usurpers’ (monarchs or other despots), who act on their behalf. Hertzberg is one of these usurpators; as such, he is referred to as one of the ‘oppressors of the nations’, whereas Cloots speaks from the vantage point of philosophy and defends the principles of true sovereignty in a free society: ‘orator of the nations’. Cloots received an elite education and just as he wished to be part of the republic of letters as a philosophe, he fashioned himself as an ‘orator’ in the French Republic. However, he finds a role by defining himself as an outsider, a foreigner, who is lucky enough to be in the place where this revolution broke out. Cloots thus takes it upon himself to ‘represent’ all those who are not present, but should be.

J’ai acquis le droit de choisir librement mes épithètes, mes apostrophes contre les grands de la terre ; car l’Orateur officieux des souverains opprimés[,] eût été une des premières victimes de la rage de nos perfides oppresseurs.

The title is not official since the official authorities claiming to be sovereign are not bestowing this function on him. However, Cloots gives himself this title in the name of the real sovereign that is the peoples under the rule of undemocratic representatives, which are self-appointed monarchs.

In a letter to Cornelius de Pauw on January 1790, published in *La république universelle*, Cloots praises his uncle for his success with his *Recherches sur les Grecs*, and takes the opportunity to trace the Attic origins of philosophy and rhetoric, then continued by Rome and classical French authors such as Boileau, Bossuet, and Racine. For Cloots, his uncle, like Cicero, Isocrates, and Demosthenes, toils on his writings, burning the midnight oil, years spent studying, re-writing the same work until this dedication produces excellence, *a chef d’œuvre* that defies time, ‘immortality’. Cloots notes that ‘oratory talent’ was no improvisation, but careful study and preparation, with long quotes of texts in order to claim the authority of historians, poets, or the law. A clerk was even in charge of verifying the quotes as the orator performed publicly. The art of oratory, Cloots adds, was particularly present in exordiums and perorations, which were the objects of careful treatises for mastering this art. As a result, Cloots has nothing but contempt towards his contemporaries who claim to be orators by simply improvising some speech:

Les ignorants parleurs, qui fatiguent de leur babil, de leur logodiarrhée, les habitués d’un café borgne, se croient de sublimes improvisateurs, ils poussent la sottise jusqu’à répéter sérieusement qu’il suffit de prendre une plume et du papier pour être

114. Ibid., 291–292.
un écrivain. On aurait beau leur dire qu’il y a fagot et fagot, et qu’il suffit d’avoir une langue de commère pour improviser des sottises, ils élèveront insolemment le verbe, en demandant si vous les prenez pour des ânes ? Et voilà comme ces petits importants font eux-mêmes la demande et la réponse. C’est arracher à une truie ses cochons de lait, que de faire entendre la raison et la vérité à un vieux sot qui veut en imposer à des jeunes gens qu’il croit aussi mal instruits, et mal appris, et mal organisés que lui. Qu’est-ce que l’éloquence ? C’est la logique bien vêtue ….

One can see here Cloots’s education coming to the fore: ‘orator’ is a particular position, which requires years of apprenticeship and preparation, and it is not solely the act of captivating an audience whilst speaking publicly; it also involves a philosophical preparation regarding the content of the delivery, pondering a question for a long time until reaching a logical and true answer. It is also important to use reason, in order for eloquence to be effective: ‘… les prestiges de l’éloquence, … la popularité des orateurs tombent sans l’appui de l’invincible raison…’. As Cloots argues afterwards, the study of Roman and Greek rhetoric has shown how the tricks of rhetoric was abused by the ‘sophists’ to temporarily ‘inebriate’ their audience by their words, but that reason, in the end, shows how these are misused.

As such, only oratory talent counts, it is an intellectual meritocracy. Cloots takes up the function of orator because he thinks he possesses the skills, dedication, learning, and qualities that make a good orator. However, he is not the right judge for this, as his puts it himself at the end of the same speech: ‘… on se dira … je suis convaincu, par la logique bien ou mal vêtue d’Anarcharsis Cloots …’. It is not up to Cloots to judge of the quality of his own eloquence, but the audience. If any other person would present even better skills and qualities, the function would have to go to this better orator:

Si la majorité des citoyens me déclare indigne de la tribune universelle, j’en descendrai avec ma conscience, en félicitant celui qui m’aura surpassé par ses talents, et qui m’aura égalé par son zèle.

Or again, Cloots does not claim to be absolutely right, even if he thinks he is; he might be wrong, but then one should demonstrate it: ‘Si je me trompe, qu’on me réfute : on n’a pas d’autre droit sur un homme privé, sur un écrivain isolé’. There is a mixture of enthusiasm for Roman republican times.

115. Ibid., 292.
119. Ibid., 124.
and for contemporary French philosophy, both of which were emulated during Cloots’s education.

In a letter to a friend written on 21 August 1792, after the destitution of the king on 10 August, Cloots shares his joy, which would be complete if his friend would then be elected to the Convention. Cloots regrets not being eligible, but notes that his ‘... indépendance ne saurait s’accommoder avec le régime d’une fonction quelconque. ... J’exerce une magistrature inamovible, volontaire...’.

The reference to magistrature is most certainly connected to Roman republicanism, where there were several types of magistrates, one of which being the tribunus plebis or tribune of the people. They represented the plebs and, although they were not officially magistrates, they acted as such and could propose legislations to the assembly. Cloots was certainly doing so, and saw his ‘function’ as such, as we can see from his numerous interventions at the Assemblée nationale. He also used the term plébéien often in his speeches, designating the people he addressed.

There is strong evidence to suggest the influence of Cicero on Cloots for deciding on his title of ‘Orator’ besides the multiple mentions of him throughout his writings. In his speech to the national Convention justifying his decision concerning the execution of the king, Cloots notes in a footnote that Cicero, speaking about Rome in one of his Philippiques, said that he would stay there as long as he is let, because it is the place from where he could observe everything. Cloots then writes about Cicero: ‘L’Orateur romain ... se trouvait dans une position moins avantageuse que l’Orateur du genre humain...’.

It is clear in this passage that Cloots compares himself to Cicero, one ‘orator’ to another, or more rightly their respective situations as orators.

Cicero wrote about the perfect orator in De oratore where Crassus enumerates the qualities that an orator must possess:

Non enim causidicum nescio quem, neque proclamatorem, aut rabulam, hoc sermone nostro conquirimus, sed eum virum, qui primum sit eius artis antistes, cuius cum ipsa natura magnum homini facultatem darebat, tamen dedisse deus putaret; ut et ipsum, quod erat hominis proprium, non partum per nos, sed divinitus ad nos delatum videretur; deinde, qui possit, non tam caduceo, quam nomine oratoris ornatus, incolumis, vel inter hostium tela, versari; tum, qui scelus fraudemque nocentis possit dicendo subicere odio civium, supplioque constringere; idemque ingenii praeidio innocentiam judiciorum poena liberare; idemque languentem labentemque populum aut ad decus excitare, aut ab errore deducere, aut inflammare in improbos, aut incitatum in bonos, mitigare;

120. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 385.
121. Ibid., 451.
qui denique, quemcumque in animis hominum motum res et causa postulet, eum dicendo vel excitare possit, vel sedare.\(^{122}\)

At the beginning of *La république universelle*, Cloots explains in length what he means by ‘Orator of the human race’ in a way that is strikingly similar to Cicero; too similar not to be voluntary, especially with the same use of the same figure of repetition, *mesarchia*, amplifying the role and the qualities of the orator, and the use of similar other *tropi* such as the metaphor of fire (‘*inflammare*’ for Cicero, and ‘*brûle*’ and ‘*s’enflamme*’ for Cloots):

Qu’est-ce qu’un Orateur du genre humain ? C’est un homme pénétré de la dignité de l’homme ; c’est un tribun qui brûle d’amour pour la liberté, et qui s’enflamme d’horreur contre les tyrans ; c’est un homme qui, après avoir reçu la sanction de son apostolat universel dans le sein du corps constituant de l’univers, se dévoue uniquement à la défense gratuite de tous les millions d’esclaves qui gémissent d’un pôle à l’autre sous la verge des aristocrates ; … c’est un homme qui s’exile volontairement des foyers qui l’ont vu naître, des contrées qu’il a parcourues, des climats divers où un doux souvenir le caresse, pour rester inébranlablement assis dans le chef-lieu de l’indépendance, en renonçant à toutes les places honorables et lucratives où son zèle et ses talents l’appelleraient indubitablement. La mission de l’Orateur du genre humain ne finira qu’après la déroute des oppresseurs du genre humain.\(^{123}\)

We must remember that the first impression the orator makes, according to Quintilian, is important, and that it is normal for the orator to establish his own good character as part of the *inventio*. Similarly, in the *dispositio* the orator puts himself in a favourable light as part of the *exordium* or general introduction. *La république universelle* was another milestone in Cloots’s

\(^{122}\) ‘For in this talk of ours we are not seeking some pettifogger, declaimer or ranter, but that man who, to begin with, is high-priest of that art which, though unaided nature bestowed on mankind a great capacity for it, was yet deemed to have been the gift of a divinity, so that a property peculiar to humanity might seem no offspring of ourselves, but to be sent down upon us from heaven; who secondly can abide unharmed even on the field of battle, through the respect felt for his title of orator rather than any heraldic staff; who furthermore can by his eloquence expose to the indignation of fellow-citizens, and restrain by punishment, the crimes and iniquities of the guilty; who also, by the shield of his talent, can deliver innocence from legal penalties; who again can either inspire a lukewarm and erring nation to a sense of the fitting, or lead them away from their blundering, or kindle their wrath against the wicked, or soothe them when they are excited against good men; who lastly can by his eloquence either arouse or calm, within the souls of men, whatever passion the circumstances and occasion may demand’. Marcus Tullius Cicero, *On the Orator: Books 1–2*, trans. E.W. Sutton and H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 348 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942), I.LXVI.202, vol.1, pp. 140–143.

\(^{123}\) Cloots, ‘*La République universelle*, 243–44.
career after the ‘embassy of the human race’. It was intended as a speech to be made at the barre of the National Assembly; the barre being reserved for non-members of the assembly to present speeches. The published text must be read as a speech given in front of the audience of the National Assembly.

Cloots, here, uses the same rhetorical technique mesarchia as Cicero’s description of the good orator, but in a sort of inverted progression. While Cicero builds up on ‘that man who’ with various capacities eloquence can accomplish, Cloots builds from personal qualities of himself and personal experiences from his own life. One of the similarities between Cicero’s orator and Cloots’s is the emphasis on refusing any other title than the one of ‘orator’; that is after the one of ‘human being’, ‘homme’. Similarly, Cloots let go of his title of baron after the French Revolution abolished nobility. In the same Roman and republican fashion, Cloots as ‘orator of the human race’ refuses any title or position besides exercising his oratory skills in favour of those without a voice, those not represented in the National Assembly: foreigners, the peoples not living under a republican regime. This representative function of the ‘orator of the human race’ did not stop after he was elected to the Convention to represent the Oise département. He neglected the humdrum of his constituents in favour of his constitutional plan of a universal republic for the départements of the whole world.

Cloots makes another reference to Roman republicanism with ‘tribune’, who is an elected representative of the people put in charge of defending its interests against those in power. A tribune did not have the same power as an official magistrate of Rome, but progressively the Senate and the Patriarch had to recognise the power and the function of the tribune. As such, the tribunes constituted a legal defence for the common people, the plebeians, against authority and possible tyranny.

By the same token, Cloots states that the ‘orator of the human race’ received this function from the ‘corps constituant de l’univers’. Cloots sees the French assemblée constituante as this first representation of sovereignty by the people, in charge of drafting a constitution that would be valid for the whole world since it is based on the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man. However, the title is entirely self-proclaimed since Cloots did not yet have any official function or recognition. It is only a few months later, in August 1792, that Cloots officially received his French citizenship, and in September he was elected as representative to the Convention. Nonetheless, prior to his election Cloots stated his role in representing the weak and the voiceless by putting his sapientia and elocutio at their service: an orator in the Roman sense. In the same vein, Cloots defines these peoples as ‘slaves’, that is peoples who are not represented by the sovereign. This time the reference is as much to Rousseau — whose opening line of On the Social Contract is ‘L’homme est né libre et partout il est dans les fers’ — as it is to Roman republicanism.
The ‘orator of the human race’ is also a ‘universal apostolate’. The reference is Christian, but the signification of ‘apostolate’ changed during the revolution, even if this change was not recognised in the French dictionaries until after the second half of the nineteenth century. From the ‘ministry of the apostle’ it became used for designating the ‘propagation of new ideas’ during the Revolution. In this sense, Cloots sees the National Assembly as the place for legitimate representation of sovereignty, and as ‘orator’ Cloots is ‘sanctioned’ by the Assembly to spread the ideas of the French Revolution to the whole world. The reference to the Assembly as ‘constituting body of the universe’ is a reference to the function that it gave itself to draft a constitution for France. Cloots sees the whole process as universally valid since it is based on the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man. This is also what Cloots elaborates on in the rest of the pamphlet: the French Revolution is indeed the beginning of a universal revolution, and the constitution of the French republic the constitution of a universal republic. In another contemporary dictionary, one finds the following definition for ‘apôtre’, besides the literal Christian sense: ‘Figurément, homme qui prêche avec zèle, c’est un Apôtre. On donne aussi ce nom à des Missionnaires illustres’. In the Dictionnaire de l’Académie it is added: ‘On dit, Prêcher en Apôtre, comme un Apôtre, pour dire, Prêcher avec onction & d’abondance de cœur’. The reference to the ‘apostolat’ and ‘apôtre’ is therefore related to the zeal and passion with which Cloots spread the ideas of the revolution.

Immediate contemporary uses of the expression ‘dignity of man’ referred explicitly to the rights of man from the state of nature, in particular freedom that gives man his nobility and soul. For instance, in a short pamphlet written in response to a traveller’s account of America, and in particular to his attack on black people, Jacques Pierre Brissot (1754–1793), who would later become a leading figure of the Girondins, called for the ‘dignité de l’homme’, after mentioning Rousseau, Locke, and Sidney. In the next paragraph, Brissot takes upon himself to remind the recipient of his attack of the definition of the dignity of man as he reads it in the first chapter of the constitution of Pennsylvania (the declaration of rights):

La dignité de l’homme consiste dans sa liberté, dans son égalité de droit, dans son indépendance, dans sa faculté de n’être assu-


125. Jean-François Féraud, Dictionnaire critique de la langue française, vol. 1, A-D (Marseille: Chez Jean Mossy, 1787), 125.


D’Holbach, who influenced Cloots greatly as he mentions him several times, links the ‘dignity of man’ to the ‘greatness of the soul’ and ‘virtue’, and cites Plutarch and Seneca as examples of resisting insults and keeping a noble attitude in adversity. Furthermore, the moral science should incite politics to reward all acts that reinforce the links between individual human beings and the interest of the human race, and sanction the acts that are detrimental to the human race by stripping its authors of their ‘dignity’ and ‘rights’.

In his *Histoire philosophique de la religion*, the abbé Yvon (1714–1789), who never practised as an abbé and contributed to the *Encyclopédie*, starts with the first period of mankind under natural law; Yvon initiates his argument with nature and the ‘dignity of man’ as being what sets man apart from animals, not because of a lack of feelings or judgement, but because man possesses language, writing, arts, morality, and knowledge of God. These attributes elevate man above animals, and constitute this ‘dignity’.

The writer and dramaturgist Baculard d’Arnaud (1718–1805) tells a story about a 17 year old man named Joseph Chrétien, who saved three children from drowning, stating that this act showed in him ‘toute la dignité de l’homme, la noblesse de l’ame’ despite his young age. The expression seems to be linked to a certain higher status of the soul due to the humane quality of the person, such as the act of saving other human beings from a certain death. In another work by an obscure author, the expression ‘dignité de l’homme’ refers to an important element of the new *science morale*. Morale can only apply to man as opposed to slaves, the ‘dignity of man’ is linked to ‘l’horreur de l’humiliation et de la servitude’.

130. Ibid., 152–153.
134. Ibid., viii.
... [L]a dignité de l’homme ... exige l’indépendance la plus absoluë ; qui consiste à n’obéir qu’aux loix qu’on s’est imposées soi-même, et à être exempt de tout reproche.\textsuperscript{135}

The author also links the ‘dignity of man’ to the soul, a person of high virtue, a good citizen, husband, father, neighbour, respecting his duties; this ‘dignity’ is only possible when in possession of liberty, and not when answering to a ‘tyrant’ in a regime that corrupts the soul and the mores. There is thus a connection with Roman republicanism, as opposed to an implicit corrupted monarchy. The whole book is a general plan for establishing a ‘confederation’ in which each man is a ‘citizen’ in a ‘civil and political society’, that is a society where each man has recognised the benefits of constituting it while retaining his freedom and independence from nature.

Cloots, ‘orator of the human race’ possesses the true knowledge, the new science of politics, which he intends to instruct the people with, and perhaps persuade the ‘oppressors of the human race’. In this sense, Cloots refers to the political science believed and practised by Hertzberg and other statesmen in Europe as ‘la vaine science de nos vieux politiques’.\textsuperscript{136} This ‘vain science’ is monarchism and the balance of power in Europe. The new political and moral science is based on the \textit{Déclaration}, the sovereignty is in the people and not the monarch. But the ‘orator of the human race’ goes even further than his revolutionary contemporaries by extending the principles of the revolution to the full extent: the whole human race is the only sovereign, and hence the French republic can only be a universal republic. The \textit{sapientia} of the orator, the \textit{scientia civilis} that he induces through \textit{ratio}, in short the truth through reason, is the object of the next chapter on reason and truth.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 191.
\textsuperscript{136} Cloots, ‘\textit{L’Orateur du genre humain}’, iii.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Cloots fashioned himself as Anacharsis, a Northern wiseman who came to the capital of philosophy, and as ‘orator of the human race’, in classical Roman fashion. The ‘orator’ was a figure with special qualities. Possessing at the same time reason and knowledge, which gave him the capacity to access the truth, he was a philosopher. But he also possessed eloquence and through the mastery of rhetoric was able to communicate this truth and persuade the people of it through the appeal of emotions.

Whereas the previous chapter focused on the *eloquentia* as the important part of the formation of *scientia civilis*, this chapter focuses on the other part: *ratio*, ‘reason’, and *sapientia*, ‘knowledge’. Focusing in this chapter on the substantial part of Cloots’s rhetoric, other paradoxes come to the fore, such as the claim of a descriptive yet normative science, and the claim of determinism yet freedom through this science. The reason and the truth used by the orator of the human race are those of the Enlightenment. And even more particularly, of the atheist French philosophy as developed by Diderot or d’Holbach.

The *sapientia* during the eighteenth century was linked to the ‘science of man’. This human science attempted to discover a new definition of human nature in a ‘scientific’ manner, that is using the same observation and experimental tools as natural sciences. There were a plurality of different views of this science, but a work such as the *Encyclopédie* shows an agreement on two basic claims: the separation between secular and theological ‘scientific’ knowledge, and the universal nature of secular science.

This chapter examines how Cloots understood reason and science, and how it compares to other eighteenth-century traditions. Thomson has studied how religious and scientific debates on the soul developed in England in the early Enlightenment, and how these debates ‘echoed’ in France dur-

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ing the eighteenth-century, culminating with the materialists. Cloots was clearly influenced by these debates, even if he did not touch the question of the soul, as the influence of Collins, Locke, and Hume shows through his writings, as well as the French ‘echoes’ with Voltaire and d’Holbach, in particular.

For Cloots, sciences, communication, and arts, are gifts from nature to humankind to form one single ‘reasonable’ family — the human race. Reason is universal and singular; it leads to the unity of humankind in science and truth by forming a universal law. This universal reason, Cloots describes it as ‘common strength’. It is a social power in the end that moves nations, such as France, towards the truth, towards universal law. Particular interests must therefore be in harmony with this ‘common strength’, and this ‘universal law’, or they will sooner or later be overcome by it, as the revolution showed.

Reason and science are thus linked as the former leads to the discovery of the latter, and the latter allows the former to form a single community, for Cloots. The science that Cloots is considering is the ‘science of man’, that is the science of government and political organisation.

Cloots uses the concept of reason under two main aspects, which ultimately merge to form what he calls ‘cosmopolitan reason’. The first use of the concept of reason is in relation to debates on religion and revelation. The second use of the concept of reason is for understanding the world and for founding a ‘science of man’. I argue that these two uses of reason merge into one concept that Cloots calls ‘cosmopolitan reason’. By opposing a ‘théos’ to a ‘cosmos’, Cloots opposes two uses of reason — respectively a ‘bad’ use and a ‘good’ use — when considering matters of the metaphysical realm (théos) or matters of the physical realm (cosmos). Cloots suggests that we focus our reason solely on the cosmos, on the physical realm, for our political system. Doing so, leads to adopting the French constitution, and ultimately the universal republic. The world as a community will ultimately adopt the principles of the universal republic because it will use its reason, its ‘cosmopolitan reason’. Cloots used his reason to discover this scientific law of the single sovereign, the human race, forming the universal republic. Everyone possesses reason, but science is the product of long application of this reason. Ultimately, however, everyone with reason will recognise the principles of this science.

5. Ibid.
Cloots uses reason primarily as opposed to religion, but also as opposed to ‘despotism’, that is to say a monarchy where one person has an arbitrary power over others. In this sense, Cloots uses a republican understanding of reason, a sort of republican reason that has three further characteristics: first, reason is a source of morality; as such, and second, reason is used either correctly or incorrectly; third, reason is opposed to passions. Furthermore, Cloots considers reason as universal, eternal, and singular, which allows him to argue for a unique political system, the unity of the whole world in one polity. This leaves us with the expression of ‘cosmopolitan reason’, which Cloots uses that must be fleshed out.

Against Revelation and the Church

As a continuation of his reflection engaged in Certitude des preuves, Cloots mainly uses reason as opposed to revealed religions throughout his revolutionary writings. It is therefore important, in order to understand Cloots’s concept of reason, to have a look at Certitude des preuves. As mentioned in the biography chapter, the book is an answer to Bergier’s own book Certitude des preuves du Christianisme. Bergier was an important theologian and apologist of Roman catholicism in the eighteenth century. His first work, Le Déisme réfuté par lui-même (1765), was a critical and personal answer to Rousseau’s Émile and marked the beginning of his career. In 1769, Bergier came to Paris, and he published another answer to one of the philosophes, this time d’Holbach and his Christianisme dévoilé, with an apology of Christianity. Bergier actually frequented the same salon as d’Holbach, as well as Diderot, in Paris and this led him to publish a refutation of their materialism in a direct critique of d’Holbach’s Système de la nature. This provoked a definitive break-up between Bergier and the philosophes. Bergier continued his attacks, with a Suite de l’apologie oriented towards Voltaire’s Dictionnaire philosophique at the end of his second edition of the Apolo-
Towards the end of his life, Bergier published two important works of reference with a *Traité historique et dogmatique de la vraie religion*, and a *Dictionnaire de théologie* reedited several times. Bergier with this body of works constituted therefore one of the major proponents what has been labelled ‘anti-philosophy’ or ‘anti-Enlightenment’, despite the fact that they contributed with their critiques to the Enlightenment itself.

Bergier was a renowned figure of the opposition to the *philosophes*, and it is probably his opposition to Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, and d’Holbach — Cloots’s role models — that inspired Cloots to criticise him and the arguments he presented in one of his books. This book constituted for Cloots his letter of accreditation to the Republic of Letters to be admitted as *philosophe*. Cloots in the footnotes includes himself as one of the *philosophes* by using the pronoun ‘nous’ and often calling the attention of the reader as rational accomplice. At the end of the book, Cloots writes that

> Tout lecteur pénétrant se sera d’abord apperçu que cet Ouvrage, qui manquoit absolument à la République des Lettres, est très-propre à opérer une révolution générale dans les esprits....

The sarcastic tone Cloots chose for his comments is not far from Voltaire’s wit, thereby also attempting to garner the sympathy of fellow deists. It must be noted, however, that many apologists also adopted the rhetoric and the language of the *philosophes* in order to give a contemporary popularity to their arguments; they used irony and ridicule the same way Voltaire did, and used reason as well to argue for the rationality of Christianity. Bergier was one of them, and his works were prepared by studying an ‘entire library’ to provide a rational historical argumentation through ‘facts’.

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18. Ibid., 159.
contributes to the work of the *philosophes* (Voltaire and d’Holbach’s attack on the church). However, not everyone among catholics shared Bergier’s way of refuting the deists by adopting their style and rationalism. Jansenist André Blonde (1734–1794) provided a public display of these disagreements in the camp of Christian apologists with several refutations of Bergier and a much harsher condemnation of and general intolerance to Rousseau and other deists. Although, what he really means is that Bergier’s arguments are too poor to be taken seriously by a rational person and discredits therefore his side, rather than what contemporary historians mean by the ‘anti-philosophy’ contributing to the Enlightenment by taking their arguments seriously and trying to argue for revealed religion.

Cloots makes many citations, sometimes quoting excerpts at length. The goal with this is to publish in one single book a compilation of all the arguments against revealed religions by various philosophers for those who do not have the time to read much. It is therefore an ambitious first book that Cloots intended to write as he had to demonstrate not only a strong knowledge of the main monotheistic religions and other religions and sects, theological and historical, but also of the arguments presented by Bergier and others in favour of one of them as the true revealed religion, of the arguments against these presented by various *philosophes* and thinkers of the ‘Republic of Letters’, developing his own argument, and presenting the whole with a literary flair combining humour and seriousness. At the end of *Certitude*, Cloots added another short work entitled *Lettres d’un jeune philosophe à un jeune théologien*. The title shows clearly what Cloots thought of himself and what he intended to do: become a philosopher in the Republic of Letters and participate in the Voltairean campaign, ‘écrasez l’infâme’, with the use of reason.

Since Cloots intended *Certitude* to give the busy educated reader a compilation of the most important works and ideas by the *philosophes* on reason, deism, and natural religion, it is an excellent indication of his own intellectual influences. Obviously, it is also an indication of the most influential figures of the time for deist arguments, but Cloots does not mention all of them. The most cited author and work is Bayle’s *Dictionnaire critique*. Often, Cloots uses Bayle for his article on *Mahomet* to give an introduction to Islam to the reader, or about Spanish and Portuguese atrocities

22. Ibid., 529–593.
23. Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, 1st ed., 2 vols. (Rotterdam: Chez Reiner Leers, 1697). However, the Gnadenhal library catalogue mentions only an abridged version, which is the one Cloots may have used: Pierre Bayle, *Extrait du dictionnaire historique et critique*, 2 vols. (Berlin: Chez Chrétien Frédéric Voss, 1765).
committed in the name of Christianity. We may remember from the biographical chapter that Bayle was on the curriculum at the Berlin Académie des nobles. Voltaire is then the other most cited author, especially his Dictionnaire philosophique. Cloots quotes Voltaire, sometimes from his published correspondance, for some bon mots or well formulated reflections, mostly against the church and superstitions. The third most cited author is Collins with the French translations of Discours sur la liberté de penser, and less often Examen des prophéties qui servent de fondement à la religion chrétienne. Cloots quotes passages on individual freedom of thought, and the necessity to individually assess with reason all collective movements of thought. Cloots quotes Hume several times, mainly for his translated Histoire naturelle de la religion, but also his Essais with the tenth and eleventh essays, respectively on superstition and enthusiasm, and on human nature. Cloots also uses Locke for his Essai sur l’entendement humain, quoting passages on reason rejecting arguments based on faith. This work is fundamental in the history of reason and marked the beginning of eighteenth-century discussions on the limits of reason. Another frequent quote is the French translation of German Lutheran Church historian Johann Lorenz von Mosheim’s (1693–1755) Latin Institutionum Historiae Ecclesiasticae Antiquae Et Recentioris. Other notable authors cited several times are d’Argens’s Lettres juives, d’Holbach’s Système de la nature, De la cruauté religieuse, and, under Fréret’s name, Œuvres philosophiques.

24. This work had several editions, and the last one was published under the appropriate name: Voltaire, La raison par l’alphabet, 6th ed., 2 vols. (s.l.: Chez Cramer, 1769).
27. David Hume, Œuvres de M. Hume, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Chez J. H. Schneider, 1764).
30. Jean-Baptiste de Boyer marquis d’Argens, Lettres juives, ou Correspondance philosophique, historique et critique, entre un juif voyageur à Paris & ses correspondans en divers endroits (La Haye: Chez Paul Gautier, 1736).
Leibniz’s *Théodicée* is also mentioned several times. 34 Absent from the list of quoted authors are, among others, Condillac, Spinoza, Toland, Herbert of Cherbury, Matthew Tindal, Lessing, Samuel Clarke, William Paley, and Kant. These authors were otherwise important and influential at the time. 35 This confirms, therefore, the hypothesis that Cloots meant to develop his own argument by selecting authors with similar views to his, notwithstanding their own philosophy.

Indeed, these mentioned authors held different views, and were sometimes opposed; for instance Bayle and Leibniz, even though they both were writing letters to each other and held each other in high intellectual esteem. 36 Moreover, even apologists, whom Cloots mentions as well, had various views and used reason as part of their arguments to actually demonstrate the existence of God and the true revealed religion. It is therefore not a monolithic and homogenous block of *philosophes* against another homogenous block of *apologistes*, as Cloots presents, but an intricate and vast field of discussions around God, religion, and reason. It is beyond the scope of this chapter and this section to present this discussion. What is important here is to focus on Cloots’s views on reason, either directly or through quoted authors.

Cloots does not deny the existence of God, nor does he discuss it in *Certitude*. It is a deist argument that he presents, and the goal is to argue in favour of a natural religion. Reason is given to mankind by God, and it is universal; therefore, reason provides the same guide to everyone and Cloots can quote Confucius with the same argument to show that all populations on earth share the same view. 37 The main point that Cloots hammers home is that if reason is given by God, then religions should not ask to set reason aside in order to serve God; hence all the religions that ask to do so are false. Cloots quotes in length English Deist Charles Blount (1654–1693) in a French translation of his edited and commented version of *La Vie d’Apollonios de Tyane* by Philostratus (c. 170–c. 245 AD); reason is the surest guide to avoid falsehood from any religion: ‘Nous savons que tout ce que nous dicte la raison ordinaire, est vrai ; & nous ne pouvons pas croire ce que la foi enseigne : *croire* n’est pas *savoir*’. 38 Cloots also takes the same argumentation from members of the Church in order to show that theologians

38. Ibid., 26.
agree on that point. For instance, Cloots quotes abbot Daniel Le Masson des Granges in _Le philosophe moderne, ou l’incrédule condamné au tribunal de sa raison_, who cites French priest Louis Bourdaloue (1632–1704), who in his _Pensées_ notes that God gave the human race reason in order to serve as guide and never intended to exclude it even from religious matters; faith is a ‘reasonable submission’ to God, otherwise it would no longer constitute a virtue and would be vague and without principle.39 Cloots takes another example from Welsh deist (although he always denied being a deist) David Williams (1738–1816), who held a public service in a rented chapel in Margaret Street in London in 1776,40 and whose sermon, stating that reason was a gift from God for truth and tolerance, was translated in _Gazette littéraire de l’Europe_.41

By the same token, in his argument against the Muslim Gier-Ber, Cloots notes sarcastically that even the ‘good Christian’ Bergier regards reason as a universal gift from God (thus pointing at contradictions in Bergier’s argumentation).42 Cloots, then, uses reason ironically to form an argument against Bergier in favour of another revealed religion—Islam. Bergier’s argument was that ‘savages’ and even ‘civilised peoples’ would be able to distinguish among all the sects and religions between ‘true and false revelationism’. Since Bergier is transformed into the Imam Ali Gier-Ber in Cloots’s narrative, Cloots remarks ironically in a footnote that, he is right indeed: Islam is better equipped to convince anyone of being the true revelation because unlike Christianity and its ‘ridiculous’ ‘triumvirat’ of God, Islam only has one God; moreover, unlike Christianity and its incarnation of an unlimited God in a mortal Jewish man, the Muslim God is eternal, and His body is also not offered for ‘lunch’, and finally, unlike Christianity and its plurality of codes and versions of the Bible, Islam has only one Quran; not to mention the progress of incredulity among Christians with so many philosophers and scientists refusing revelationism.43 However, this was just meant as a counter argument to Bergier’s claim of the rationality of Christianity compared to other religions. The real rational religion is natural religion:

![Image]... puisqu’il s’agit de la raison (et de quoi s’agiroit-il sans elle?)
le Théiste a cause gagnée, il peut convaincre l’homme le plus stupide de la vérité de sa religion : son _Alcoran_ ne sera point un Livre inutile à ceux qui ne savent pas lire, & un Dédale obscur pour quiconque le lit, quoiqu’incomparablement moins inintelligible que l’ancien et le Nouveau Testament ; son _Coran_,

41. Cloots, _Certitude des preuves_, 166–168.
42. Ibid., 268.
43. Ibid., 256–258.
dis-je, sera le Ciel & la Terre ; la nature entière confirmera ses paroles.\textsuperscript{44}

Cloots imagines then a fictitious dialogue between a ‘savage’ and ‘Revelationist missionaries’. At the end of this dialogue, the ‘savage’ concludes:

La raison, l’évidence, poursuit le Sauvage, me disent de n’en croire aucun, puisqu’il est impossible à tout homme inéru-di de savoir lequel de ces argumentans, seroit Orthodoxe ; & cette impossibilité prouve qu’ils battent tous la campagne : c’est une leçon pour ne jamais s’écarter du chemin tracé par le sens-commun. Le Déiste a raison, car il me parle raison ; ses preuves sont à ma portée : le révélationiste a tort ; car il me tient un langage & absurde, & contradictoire, & inintelli-gible.\textsuperscript{45}

Cloots quotes thereafter Collins’s \textit{Discours sur la liberté de penser} in French, who quotes the archbishop John Tillotson (1630–1694) depicting the second Council of Nicaea — which discussed the use of icons — as ridiculous as an assembly of the most famous Greek mathematicians to decree that two plus two equals five. To which Cloots concludes:

Voilà ce que c’est quand la saine raison est bannie de l’esprit-humain ; sans ce \textit{palladium},\textsuperscript{46} les plus graves personnages se conduisent en enfants & font rougir les Sauvages.\textsuperscript{47}

For Cloots, reason is an individual assessment of how much religions make sense with their stories, customs, and traditions. The only religion that makes sense, in the end, is natural religion — a religion stripped of any scriptures, or human interpretations, an individual communion with God through nature and its observation.

In this sense, Cloots writes to his uncle de Pauw about religion in these terms:

Ces réflexions justifient assez la prédilection des Philosophes en faveur du Protestant. Quoiqu’il erre d’ailleurs, ses principes radicaux sont avoués, sont d’accord avec la saine Philosophie. Il y a toujours espérance de ramener des gens qui font cas, qui encensent la raison.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{44.} Ibid., 258.
\textsuperscript{45.} Ibid., 261.
\textsuperscript{46.} Palladium means what protects an individual or a thing. It is a figure of speech in relation to the Greek statue of Pallas, the icon protecting Troy. Cloots therefore, wittily extends the metaphor on the theme of the second Council of Nicaea regarding icons.
\textsuperscript{47.} Cloots, \textit{Certitude des preuves}, 261–262.
\textsuperscript{48.} Ibid., 618.
What Cloots means is that protestantism is more in line with d’Holbach, Voltaire, and his own views because it has been critical of Church traditions that led to abuses in Roman Catholic Christianity. Protestantism also suggested a critical reading of the Bible, and to consider it a higher authority than church traditions. Moreover, protestantism has equally emphasised the individual relation with God and religion—universal priesthood—rather than a dependance on a mediator between God and the people. All these elements, for Cloots, are part of the ‘écrasez l’infâme’ movement: denouncing the abuses and absurdities in the practices and traditions of the Roman Catholic Church, rejecting through rational critical reading of religious writings anything contrary to reason, and finding an individual, natural, and rational relation with God. However, protestants still roam in other matters, and Cloots may mean here, among other things, that they still believe in the Bible as an authentic document.

Cloots notes, in this ‘écrasez l’infâme’ battle, that God is not on trial, it is the institution of the church and its ministers who spread lies, false doctrines, and impose on other men to deny the use of God’s given gift that sets mankind apart from ‘brutes’. In any case, ‘la raison n’enseigne point l’Athéisme’. What reason leads to is a critical view of revealed religions and their customs and traditions in particular. This is an important argument because it is against Bergier, who argues that ancient traditions and customs observed by populations are proofs of revelation, beyond the need to know about written accounts such as the Scriptures. Cloots uses Bayle’s Dictionnaire, Collins’s Examen des prophéties, Voltaire’s La Bible enfin expliquée, and Locke’s Entendement humain to show historical and factual examples of how easily false traditions and customs entered various sects. In the end, reason is about common-sense applied to past events, and past testimonies: should one trust what some claim to have witnessed in the past? Are they trustworthy and impartial? Are their testimony in accordance with the normal observation of the rules of nature? All these questions must be asked as Locke pointed out in his Essay on Human Understanding.

Against Bergier’s argument that reason is part of faith, Cloots adopts Locke’s opposition of faith and reason, but Cloots seems to stay on the practical level of things in that he only quotes Locke on what is directly of use against Bergier. Cloots does not quote Locke, for instance, on his conception of reason as discussed in book IV chapter XVII, and instead quotes chapter XVI. If it seems that Cloots takes Locke’s conception of reason as based on sensible ideas (there are no innate ideas, and the bounds of ours as

49. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 254.
51. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 6–7, 46–47.
52. Ibid., 131–132.
senses cannot be overcome by reason), it is not clear if Cloots accepts Locke’s distinction of what is contrary to reason and what is beyond reason (a distinction rejected by Toland, self-proclaimed disciple of Locke, but whom Cloots does not mention). When Locke considered the resurrection from the dead as beyond reason, Cloots focuses instead on refuting the fact of believing in testimonies of resurrection by taking examples of many sects and religions that paid tribute to resurrected individuals and worshipped them with monuments and statues. Why, then, asks Cloots, would Christianity and Bergier only recognise one of them and not the other? For this, Cloots takes examples in other religions from Bayle’s *Dictionnaire* and Pluche’s *Histoire du ciel.*

Cloots does not directly write that resurrection is contrary to reason, or that it is beyond reason, but that many religions have made the same claim, and that it has been proven to be false by Christian authors who demonstrated how these errors entered religious traditions, and how the custom of worshiping monuments cannot be considered proof of its veracity. So, why believe Christianity, asks Cloots? Reason teaches scepticism towards man’s words. Cloots distinguishes between miracles that are simply based on ignorance quoting Mosheim regarding so-called miracles that can be explained by natural causes. In other words, some miracles are called so due to a lack of reason applied to natural causes. Other miracles reported by some witnesses, are due to their whole social and intellectual conditioning in believing that miracles do exist, so that they can persuade themselves of the veracity of a miracle; here, Cloots quotes La Bruyère’s *Caractères* (1688), famously depicting all the gamut of human psychology in various literary portraits.

All in all, Cloots seems to reject miracles — even when understood as within the bounds of reason, but extraordinary events — and only recognise one true miracle that he is witnessing himself with Bergier:

*c’est que dans le siècle où nous vivons, il se trouve, hors des petites-maisons,* un Personnage grave, qui débite sans pudeur, & avec privilège, des idées aussi creuses.

Although Cloots does not mention this affiliation and although he quotes Wolff only twice for his *Logique* rather than natural theology, he seems to be closer to Wolff than Locke in that he also considers natural theology within the strict boundaries of reason. It seems that Cloots agrees with Wolff’s theological rationalism in that theology is about certainty since God cannot have

53. Ibid., 46–48.
54. Ibid., 57.
55. Ibid., 201.
56. Ibid., 329.
57. Bedlam; institution for the care of mentally ill people.
revealed anything that would not be found outside the realm of human reason. However, Cloots avoids all these metaphysical discussions, and quotes Voltaire much more than Wolff.

Reason also leads to profound doubts. Scepticism was a theme explored by several philosophers, starting from Bayle, pondering the limits of reason. Cloots quotes Hume on reason and doubt, noting that philosophy presents itself as a shelter, whilst various superstitions fight one against another amidst widespread doubt, uncertainty, and irresolution. If any religion should be followed, it is natural religion. Cloots quotes this, for instance, Locke in a French translation of *Essai philosophique concernant l’entendement humain* with this argument:

L’Être suprême ... a accordé au Genre-Humain une assez grande mesure de raison pour que ceux qui n’ont jamais entendu parler de sa Parole écrite, ne puissent point douter de l’existence d’un Dieu, ni de l’obéissance qui lui est due, s’ils appliquent leur Esprit à cette recherche. Puis donc que les Préceptes de la Religion Naturelle sont clairs & tout-à-fait proportionnés à l’intelligence du Genre Humain...

Unlike revealed religion, natural religion does not depend on any human doing — be they writings or customs.

During the revolutionary period, Cloots revised this view in favour of atheism: ‘les athées ont raison contre les théistes’. This time, Cloots attacks the existence of God, and particularly the theist argument of design. There is no contention regarding the eternal existence of the universe, but the existence of a divine mould is contrary to reason, for Cloots: if something that exists is necessarily a creation (of God), then God is necessarily also a creation; hence, the syllogism makes no sense. As the chapter on nature will show, Cloots, in his revolutionary writings, moves closer to d’Holbach’s view about God in *Système de la nature* as a mere anthropomorphic way of talking about nature, which is eternal.

However, reason is still not opposed to religious practice, for Cloots, but to the domination of one religion in the state to the detriment of other religions. In *Chronique de Paris*, 27 May 1790, Cloots writes that he has just

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60. Cloots, *Certitude des preuves*, 190.

61. Ibid., 482–483.

62. Ibid., 10.

63. Cloots, 'La République universelle', 252.

64. See the next chapter on natural law.
finished reading *Le despotisme de la maison d’Orange*, by Mirabeau,\(^{65}\) mentioning the episode where the republican Barneveld was sent to the scaffold because of his republican sympathy against state religion. This serves Cloots in his argument to send Voltaire’s remains to the Panthéon. Cloots also notes that Voltaire fought against the domination of a state religion, and his works therefore ‘respirent le zèle de la raison et l’amour de l’humanité’.\(^{66}\) This qualification is reminiscent of Rémi’s understanding of *cosmopolisme*. Cloots explicitly rejects Rousseau and Mably in favour of Voltaire regarding religious tolerance, even equating Rousseau in his intolerance of religious zealots with the same zealots: ‘fanatiques de Rome et de Genève’.\(^{67}\) To Rousseau suggesting the expulsion of catholics from the state in his *Contrat social* (‘quiconque ose dire : hors de l’Église point de salut, doit être chassé de l’État’),\(^{68}\) Cloots answers that ‘... chasser les intolérants est la plus absurde des intolérances’.\(^{69}\) Cloots’s target is not only Rousseau and Mably, but the revolutionaries who use Rousseau and Mably ‘blindly’ and without thinking.

Cloots’s position must be understood in the context of the debates on religion before and during the revolution. As Tackett sums up, in the period after mid-century, the catholic clergy faced four sources of attacks; two from outside, and two from inside.\(^{70}\) From the outside, the most visible source was the *philosophes*, as already seen, and Cloots’s position among them has already been considered. Another external source of attack was ‘parliamentary Gallicanism’, which claimed power for the courts (*parlements*) over church matters. From the inside, the lower clergy identified with the general population, and expressed discontent towards the upper clergy and their outrageous privileges; principally, regarding rank in the church based on birth rather than merit, but also luxury and wealth. This movement has been called ‘curé syndicalism’ or ‘Richerism’.\(^{71}\) The other internal source of attack came from the Jansenists against the Jesuits, the former successfully suppressing the latter in the mid-1760s. All these groups had an influence on the deputies during the revolution.

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\(^{65}\) Honoré Gabriel Riqueti Mirabeau (comte de), *Le Despotisme de la maison d’Orange, prouvé par l’histoire* (Hollande: s.n., 1788).


\(^{67}\) Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 148.

\(^{68}\) Rousseau, ‘Du contrat social’, 469.

\(^{69}\) Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 148.


Cloots writes that he had ‘une part très active’ in the decree of 13 April 1790. It is not clear what part he had, but he may be referring to his pre-revolutionary writings against ecclesiastical institutions. It seems therefore to be a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument about his writings and his position influencing the Assembly, or participating to the intellectual climate, in issuing the decree:

Il a été décrété le 13 avril dernier, et je l’avais imprimé auparavant, et la raison l’avait décrété le premier jour du monde, qu’un corps national ne saurait avoir de religion ; cette relation ne pouvant exister qu’entre Dieu et un individu, « entre Dieu et ma conscience, et non pas entre Dieu et des consciences prises collectivement ».

In this decree, the national assembly refused to recognise a state religion. This was an answer to the third motion tabled by the right wing of the Assembly to adopt Catholicism as state religion; this time by the Carthusian monk Don Gerle on 12 April 1790, which led to ‘perhaps the single most impassioned and divisive debate since the beginning of the Revolution’. Not everyone agreed with the decree, and part of the assembly published a declaration expressing their disagreement and their refusal to vote on this decree because they considered catholicism to be the state religion as ‘une vérité de fait’. The refusal to adopt Catholicism as state religion was also motivated by the proclamation of toleration and civil rights for Protestants and Jews. Protestants had been granted religious liberty on 24 December 1789, and Sephardim Jews had been granted equal rights on 28 January 1790. However, the populations of some strongholds of Catholicism in the East and South of France did not accept them, and episodes of violence against these minorities erupted. We have already seen that Cloots expressed toleration and a defence for these religions. Catholic populations saw ‘the Revolution as a “Protestant attack” against their faith’. Considering Cloots’s own views—his preference for protestantism among revealed religions and his view of an individual relation to God—it was not far-fetched.

To this climate of violence and tension between religions, one should emphasise the tension also created by the civil constitution and the Oath of 1791. Gallican lawyers and Jansenists sympathisers passed a reform at the assembly regarding the ‘Civil Constitution of the Clergy’ on 12 July 1790.

73. Ibid., 139.
75. Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel, n° 104, mercredi 14 avril 1790.
According to Tackett, ‘[t]he great debates in the Assembly itself, which climaxed in the passage of the Civil Constitution on July 12, 1790, contributed in further exacerbating divisions between a clerical Right and an anticlerical Left...’. The Civil Constitution was a consequence of the abolition of privileges on 4 August 1789, as the remuneration of the clergy had to be re-organised accordingly. If several measures were asked in the *cabiers de doléances* by sympathisers of ‘curé syndicalism’, and therefore agreed upon, such as the suppression of some fees and a fairer remuneration of clergymen, other measures requiring a rationalisation of the clergy and the abolition of socially ‘useless’ positions gathered some resentment. However, it is the requirement of a formal oath in favour of the constitution that provoked a crisis in 1791, not so much because of the requirement of taking an oath — a common form of revolutionary allegiance — but because it seemed, for some clergymen, to impinge on spiritual matters and might be contrary to their oath to the church. Already on 27 November 1790, Voidel, the president of the *comité des recherches* proposed a decree on the oath, following a vehement speech pronounced the day before, denouncing part of the clergy as refusing to obey the will of the sovereign and obeying a foreign one instead (the papacy). The decree imposed clergymen to take the oath within eight days or to face prosecutions. The king reluctantly signed the oath on 3 January 1791, and the debates on 3 and 4 January at the Assembly demonstrated the stark polarisation between the left and right as a Manichaean position for or against the revolution. The Assembly later adopted a more conciliatory tone, and the oath was not required to be taken within eight days, and refractory priests would be retired with a small pension and not prosecuted, and so only after a replacement could be found.

Cloots is in the left camp against the right; he is in favour of the re-organisation of the clergy, even a radical re-organisation towards natural religion, particularly to save money: ‘La religion ramenée à sa simplicité primitive, épargnerait au peuple libre et éclairé de l’heureuse France, plus de cent millions annuellement’. But he also addresses these left radicals for their intolerance towards the intolerants. Cloots writes that, in the end:

> C’est vraiment un prodige que le parti national du corps constituant n’ait pas succombé sous les efforts de tout le côté droit, et des ministériels de la gauche, et des fourbes de la gauche, et

79. Ibid., 11–16.
des oissons de la gauche, et de la secte de Rome, et de la secte de Jansénius, et de la secte de Rousseau, dont la gauche offrait le funeste mélange.\textsuperscript{84}

In another example of perceived exaggeration from the left against catholics and refractory priests, Cloots addresses Charles de Villette (1736–1793), in whose home Voltaire died, and who therefore took the initiative to change the name of his home street from Quai des Théatins (name of the neighbouring church and congregation) to Quai Voltaire on 13 April 1791 and requested a decree to legalise the change.\textsuperscript{85} Villette wrote in \textit{Chronique de Paris}, on 5 June 1791, about a mass held by a refractory priest in precisely this Théatine church, next to his home.\textsuperscript{86} The event created a bit of an uproar among the local Parisians, accusing the priest of instigating hate against revolutionaries. Villette tried to defend the priest in the name of religious tolerance, but was won over the argument of potential danger caused by refractory priests. Therefore, Villette asked to evict refractory priests, and in this case, to use the church as storage for wheat. But Cloots answered to Villette that it was precisely the same irrational fear that led to the Saint Bartholomew’s Day massacre; the spirit of Voltaire is to let ‘eternal reason’ guide the policies of a ‘free people’ and tolerate masses held by refractory priests: ‘La persécution répercute le \textit{virus} religieux, et la liberté le fait évaporer par tous les pores’.\textsuperscript{87}

In the end, Cloots is an atheist who believes that reason ultimately prevails, and overcomes faith. Science and truth will reign instead of religion because freedom of ideas promotes truth — ‘Je ne crains rien avec les armes de la raison dans un pays libre. Dans la patrie du genre humain. Une proposition vraie peut y paraître choquante aujourd’hui ; mais elle sera revue, pensée, adoptée la semaine suivante’ — and because they are mutually exclusive — ‘La raison et l’illumination ne sauraient s’asseoir sur le même trône’.\textsuperscript{88} However, Cloots also believes in freedom of conscience and absolute tolerance of people’s opinions. Reason and science shall not prevail out of impositions and sanctions, but as a natural imposition in peoples’ minds as the best thing for society after a free exchange of ideas: ‘Laissons les églises aux prêtres, laisseons la messe aux dévots, jusqu’au moment où la raison donnera congé à la messe, aux dévots et aux prêtres’.\textsuperscript{89} Reason always triumphs, and violence must not and need not be used for that: ‘Discutons, disputons ; mais ne nous battons pas. La raison aura le dessus tôt

\textsuperscript{84} Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 148–149.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Chronique de Paris}, vol. 3 (1790–1791) (Paris: s.n., 1790–1793), 622.
\textsuperscript{87} Cloots, \textit{Ecrits révolutionnaires}, 192.
\textsuperscript{88} Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 127, 170.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 167.
The context of this sentence is the discussion following the flight of the king and the debates concerning the future of the country; Cloots calls for rational debates without violence. Cloots’s position regarding religion is equally that of a laissez faire of opinions, with the certainty that reason and truth prevail in the end: ‘c’est que la raison vient de renverser plus de murailles en peu d’heures, que l’oppression n’en éleve durant dix siècles’.91 To Claude Fauchet, Cloots writes: ‘Invoquez votre Saint-Esprit, j’invoque ma sainte raison’.92 To each his/her own rationale.

However, if freedom and tolerance entail the same equal right to expression, for Cloots, it does not mean that all opinions are equal in terms of right and wrong. Cloots in his revolutionary rhetoric systematically opposes a ‘wrong’ reason to a ‘right’ reason, mostly in relation to religious views, but also progressively in relation to counter-revolutionary and then non-republican views. For instance, Cloots writes on the power of reason against nonsense: ‘Le torrent de la raison entraînera les immondices de nos temples : et les orateurs du bon sens feront disparaître les prédicateurs du non-sens’.93 What makes the difference between a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ use of reason, besides the popular judgement, is the capacity to recognise one’s own errors and change opinion accordingly:

J’ai pourtant par-devers moi quelque chose qui me dit que je raisonne juste ; car la différence entre une bonne et mauvaise judiciaire,94 ne consiste pas à ne jamais errer, mais à ne jamais revenir de son erreur.95

Cloots makes a distinction between ‘wrong’ reasoning and ‘bad’ reasoning, where bad reasoning is linked to ‘aristocrats’ or those in favour of monarchy, and wrong reasoning are revolutionaries, who, according to Cloots, are making a mistake in their policies, which leads to the same result: anarchy. In this case, it is about prohibiting betting, rather than taxing the revenues from it, which would help consolidating the state’s finances:

Un des principaux phénomènes de notre révolution, c’est que nous soyons parvenus à établir la meilleure constitution de l’univers, malgré la foule des mauvais raisonneurs patriotes qui grossissent le nombre de méchants raisonneurs aristocrates. En effet, par je ne sais quelle débilité mentale, nous voyons

92. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 179.
deux classes diamétralement opposées, nous offrir le même résultat politique : l’anarchie, la contre-révolution.¹⁶⁶

Reasoning ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’ is also called ‘perverse’ or ‘stupid’, when it comes to a natural law such as the Rights of man:

Mépris aux raisonneurs pervers ou stupides qui oseraient encore nier la possibilité de l’établissement universel des Droits de l’homme : droits sacrés qui remplaceront l’universelle tyrannie, et qui répareront les maux de toutes les institutions barbaresques.⁹⁷

The revolutionary rhetoric easily shifts from ‘bad’ reason, to ‘perverse’ reason, to ‘enemy of reason’.⁹⁸ The category is close to that of ‘enemy of the human race’, which we will analyse in the chapter on humankind. Indeed, Cloots writes in an earlier article about the ‘genre humain raisonnable’.⁹⁹ It is therefore a thin rhetorical line that Cloots, together with other Jacobins, threads on. On the one side, freedom of speech entails the free expression of ideas and beliefs, even those contrary to one’s own. On the other, the rhetorical attacks ad hominem that ensues — ‘bad’ use of reason or ‘stupidity’ — is closely related to declaring someone an ‘enemy’, therefore justifying sanctions against him or her. It is however true, that Cloots never did cross the line, except when voting the death penalty for the king, but the rationale was his ‘treason’ against the nation, not a ‘bad’ use of reason.

This then leads to a qualification of ‘good citizen’ against a ‘bad citizen’ depending on how reason is used: a good citizen is a revolutionary anti-clerical republican.

Les préjugés, les opinions erronées prêtent des armes aux marchands, aux mauvais citoyens, contre les bons citoyens qui consultent la raison avant tout.¹⁰⁰

The argument behind this good and bad use of reason is that there is only one ‘single’ reason, ‘eternal’, ‘invariable’, ‘imperishable’ and ‘universal’. These expressions appear often in Cloots’s revolutionary writings.¹⁰¹ As previously mentioned, it is difficult to pinpoint intellectual origins for Cloots’s views since he wrote short pamphlets rather than academic treatises. However, we have seen how his education at the académie des nobles focused on Locke and very likely Wolff, through Sulzer’s teaching. It can

⁹⁹. Ibid., 236.
be useful here to compare Cloots’s views on reason with theirs, noting that nowhere Cloots mentions Kant, whose *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* was published in 1781 and could have been known to Cloots.102

There is an interesting justification of why Cloots was right in predicting an economic outcome without the need of experience, when commenting on the law regarding hats. Cloots writes that in 1789 he argued against those who predicted the ruin of French hat makers in favour of Spanish hat makers, supposedly because hares and rabbits were being destroyed in France:

... des raisonneurs dont la logique est d’autant plus caduque, qu’ils prétendaient raisonner comme tout le monde. Moi, qui me défie beaucoup des raisonnements de tout le monde, je soutins, en 1789, que nous aurions dorénavant plus de gibier que jamais, et que nos chapeaux seraient aussi communs qu’au-paravant. Cette thèse sonna mal aux oreilles un peu sourdes. Il fallut donc recourir à l’expérience, language dont l’homme clairvoyant n’a pas toujours besoin, mais dont le vulgaire des hommes ne saurait jamais se passer.103

What is interesting is less whether Cloots was right or wrong, and why, but what he writes in the last sentence regarding the need or not of experience. ‘L’homme clairvoyant’, which means the philosopher using reason, need not wait for the ‘experience’ of a thesis induced or deduced through reason, to be proven right. It seems, in this way of reasoning, that Cloots follows more closely a Wolffian rationalism rather than a Lockean empiricism in that experience and reason seem to be two different ways of acquiring knowledge for Cloots. Wolff explained this clearly in his *German Metaphysics*:104

§371. Weil man nun von demjenigen / was man durch blosse Erfahrung erkennet / daß es ist / nicht einsiehet / wie es mit andern Wahrheiten zusammen hanget (§. 325); so ist bey dieser Erkäntnis gar keine Vernunfft (§. 370) / und wird dannenhero die Erfahrung der Vernunfft entgegen gesetzt.

§372. Wir haben demnach zweyerley Wege / dadurch wir zur Erkäntnis der Wahrheit gelangen / die Erfahrung und die Vernunfft.105

Wolff then gives the example of the sunrise, which most people experience, but cannot explain, as opposed to those who know through reason that the

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104. See Hette, ‘Christian Wolff’.
cause for this is the movement of planets around the sun, and can predict it without the need of experience.

In Cloots’s view, another proof of the ‘progress’ of reason, and the proof by experience that the French Revolution provides, is the republican turn of institutions in the new regime. Republicanism will be dealt with in the final chapter; here, I will focus on Cloots’s argumentation of reason favouring classical republicanism.

**Against Despotism and Tyranny**

After the revolution, Cloots used reason not only against revealed religion and the Church, but also to argue for republican institutions by opposing reason to despotism and tyranny. They are both related in a republican meaning: against an institutionalised dominant religion (Christianity) imposing its views and demanding to set aside the use of reason, based on faith, tradition, superstition; against an institutionalised dominant political régime (monarchy) also demanding to set aside the use of reason because it requires an individual to obey another individual’s arbitrary will.

Cloots assigns a sort of Renaissance narrative to reason in political history, comparing monarchism and the nobility with the Middle Ages and its feudal structures. The 1789 revolution, with the progress and triumph of Enlightenment reason, is a rebirth of classical antiquity. In an article published in *Le courrier de Paris dans les 83 départements* on 21 August 1790, while commenting on the duel between Jacques Antoine Marie de Cazalès (1758–1805) and Antoine Barnave (1761–1793), Cloots condemns this ‘medieval’ practice that is the equivalent of letting God decide human affairs instead of human reason through laws and institutions:

La raison nous a délivrés du joug féodal ; elle nous délivrera, sans doute, des tristes effets de ce joug atroce ; l’indiscipline et le mépris des lois faisaient partie de l’héritage des nobles…

Prenons l’Antiquité pour modèle, servons d’exemple à nos contemporains, si nous voulons mériter les suffrages de la postérité. Votre génie donnera l’impulsion à la raison éternelle.106

A little later, in a letter to Madame Beauharnais published in August 1790, Cloots comments the day after the first celebration of the fête de la fédération:

Cette fête nationale vous transporte à deux mille ans en arrière, par je ne sais quelle teinte d’antiquité ; elle vous transporte à deux mille ans en avant, par les progrès rapides de la raison dont cette fédération est le fruit précoce et délectable.107

Classical antiquity seems to be a model, to which Cloots combined Enlightenment reason, to create a sort of *modern antiquity*. The Revolution is the result of *modern antiquity*, but also its future. Such a futuristic vision based on classical antiquity was not uncommon in the second half of the eighteenth-century. It was perhaps best materialised in some monuments and buildings (actually carried through or left as projects) labelled as ‘neoclassicism’. The architects Claude-Nicolas Ledoux (1736–1806) and Étienne-Louis Boullée (1728–1799) played a major role in this movement. Cloots’s renewal of antiquity through enlightened reason towards a futuristic utopia is akin to Boullée’s 1784 cenotaph for Newton and 1785 project for a royal library, or Ledoux’s 1804 project for the ideal city of Chaux.

Reason led revolutionaries to form a ‘cult of reason’, reminiscent of antiquity, replacing the void left with abolishing religion. This ‘cult of reason’ was preached by Jacques René Hébert (1757–1794), Pierre Gaspard Chaumette (1763–1794), Joseph Fouché (1759–1820), and Antoine-François Momoro (1756–1794). Hébert was the most famous of them for founding the ‘worship of reason’ and organising the ‘festival of Reason’ on 10 November 1793 for which many churches were re-assigned to the new cult of reason.108 Women were dressed in Roman togas in order to represent the new goddess of reason, Liberty.109 They were called the ‘Hébertistes’, and since they opposed Robespierre and his ‘cult of the Supreme Being’, they were sent to the guillotine, together with Cloots even though he was not one of them. However, Cloots’s thought bears many similarities with the Hébertistes regarding his cultic view of reason:

> Croyez à mes prophéties ; car ce n’est pas le ciel qui m’inspire ; ma vaticination ne descend point du Vatican ténébreux, mais elle jaillit abondamment de la nature des choses.110

There is paradoxically a risk of isolation in seeing ‘truth’ and thus claiming to be its missionary; ‘Comme s’il ne suffisait pas de la faculté de voir la vérité et d’exprimer la vérité, pour en être le missionnaire’.111 On the one hand, Cloots accepts criticism, but on the other he is blindly convinced of seeing everything. His faith in the cult of reason is a reflection of the general spirit of his time.112 It is also a reflection of the danger of producing an intellectual terror. It is perhaps best represented with Robespierre’s own celebration of the Supreme Being on 8 June 1794 in Paris, where he descended from a mountain like God or the messiah.113 However, to Cloots and his

contemporaries there is only one truth. This truth for Cloots comes from the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and the whole of humankind will understand it and benefit from it, like oracles in classical antiquity:

Le genre humain comprendra les oracles de la raison invariable.
J’occupe la tribune de l’Univers, et la catholicité de nos principes doit frapper l’oreille de tous les hommes. Les dénominations de français et d’universel vont devenir synonymes, à plus juste titre que les noms de chrétien et de catholique.114

Republicanism was an antiquated idea, as the chapter on republicanism will show. One did not think that it was applicable to a large modern nation, such as France. But, for Cloots, reason reinterpreted anew this old concept, which proves to be the future for France and the world. The feudal regime that was monarchy was based on the rationale that one should accept to belong to one man, but that is obviously irrational; instead, one ought to belong to reason:

Appartenir à un homme au lieu d’appartenir à la raison, subordonner le choix de mon domicile et ma manière d’être à la volonté arbitraire d’un individu !115

With these words, Cloots explains to Hertzberg why he chooses to inhabit revolutionary France rather than Prussia, and thereby also characterises monarchical as opposed to republicanism. Monarchism is the realm of superstition, tradition, authority, faith, whilst republicanism is the rule of reason, truth, and science: ‘on est vigoureux avec la raison, on est invincible avec la vérité. Une fierté républicaine m’inspire le mépris des tyrans’.116 The opposition between this irrational monarchism and rational republicanism is exacerbated by the fact that Cloots defends the revolution representing the new regime as opposed to Hertzberg, representing Prussia and the ancien régime. The revolutionary rhetoric of classical republicanism serves to accentuate the opposition of a country of liberty, of free citizens, to a country of slavery, of enslaved subjects: ‘la raison est la seule politique des peuples libres’.117 This is a theme that Cloots continues throughout the revolution, and opposing despotism imposed by monarchs with despotism imposed by reason, is similar to the ‘legal despotism’ that will be analysed in the chapter on republicanism as a main component of ‘natural republicanism’. Cloots writes in these terms about the ‘despotism of reason’:

116. Ibid., 102.
117. Ibid., 119.
Le despotisme de la raison est aussi exclusif que celui des monarques. Une note ineffaçable couvrira d’infamie quiconque prêchera désormais la pernicieuse doctrine royale.\textsuperscript{118}

In a speech to the Assembly on 9 September 1792, Cloots addresses an audience well-versed in classical antiquity, men who followed the same curriculum in the collèges as described in the chapter on rhetoric. In order to make his case for the rational principle of sovereignty of the human race, Cloots presents the irrationality of the plurality of national sovereignties, with a parallel from Greek antiquity and republican Florence:

Le polythéisme historique est aussi déraisonnable que le polythéisme mythologique. Les hostilités divines sont des guerres civiles imaginaires ; mais les hostilités humaines sont des guerres civiles trop réelles. Vraisemblablement, la ridicule diplomatie de notre petite planète a fourni les matériaux de l’histoire fabuleuse du ciel d’Homère et de l’enfer de Dante.\textsuperscript{119}

Cloots makes here a reference to the internal wars in Ancient Greece and 14th-century Florence — the Trojan wars in Greece and the battle between the Guelphs and Ghibellines in Florence — that inspired Homer for his poem explaining war between gods in the sky, and inspired Dante for his poem explaining the circles of hell in the afterlife.

Cloots modernises classical republicanism with Enlightenment reason, thus, re-actualising republican themes of despotism, tyranny, and authority: ‘toute autorité doit reposer sur l’inébranlable raison’.\textsuperscript{120} For Cloots, reason is not only the basis of natural religion opposed to faith-based revealed religion, but also the basis of good government with republicanism built on liberty as opposed to authority being the cause of bad government in monarchical regime that is equaled with slavery. The power of theology, or ‘théocratie’, is against reason, and the power of one person, monarchy, is contrary to liberty: ‘La théocratie universelle persécute la raison ; la monarchie universelle persécute la liberté ; la République universelle rend à chacun ce qui lui est dû.’\textsuperscript{121} Liberty is universal, reason is universal, therefore the regime combining both is bound to be universal as well.

In his historical account of the French Revolution, Cloots notes:

Mais l’époque du règne de la raison, de la liberté et de l’égalité, l’époque du règne du peuple, en un mot, était irrévocablement arrivée ; il n’était plus au pouvoir des oppresseurs d’arrêter les progrès de la vérité ; il n’était plus en leur pouvoir de

\textsuperscript{118} Cloots, \textit{Ecrits révolutionnaires}, 388.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 395.
\textsuperscript{120} Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 153.
\textsuperscript{121} Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 488.
concentrer le génie humain dans le cercle de l’ignorance, des préjugés et de l’esclavage : toutes les idoles étaient renversées.\textsuperscript{122}

The narrative in which Cloots interprets the revolution is one of modern antiquity with the re-instatement of Ancient Greek and Roman principles within Enlightenment reason. Republican reason is nothing but the renaissance of the Republican Athens and Rome of the revolutionaries’ schoolbooks, fired up with the power of imagination that reason cast for the future.

\textit{Cosmopolitan Reason}

In Cloots’s project for a decree he uses the expression ‘cosmopolitan reason’:

Le salut du peuple repose sur le nivellement complet des autorités constituées, sur l’indépendance respective des citoyens, sur le despotisme de la loi qui enchaine tous les despotismes individuels. Ce serait une erreur bien funeste de ne songer qu’à nous ; l’humanité nous fait un devoir de ne pas oublier les autres hommes. Si la constitution française ne peut conve nir au reste du monde, elle sera mauvaise ; elle s’écroulera aux applaudissements du genre humain, de la raison cosmopolite dont la sanction est indispensable. Le genre humain, régénéré dans toutes les branches législatives, ne connaît ni plage étrangère,\textsuperscript{123} ni souveraineté partielle, ni deux volontés suprêmes, ni deux majorités et deux minorités contradictoires, incompatibles.\textsuperscript{124}

The context for this project of a decree is the perceived menace of federalism in France, and the issue that new territories at the French borders represent. The solution, for Cloots, is the establishment of the universal republic, of which the French constitution is the foundation, with the recognition of the principle of ‘sovereignty of the human race’. Any new population that would recognise this principle would automatically be part of the universal republic. Therefore, the Constitution as it now stands and is being discussed is French, but it is has to be universally valid in order to be applicable to the whole world in the long term. This is only possible when political science is a universal truth, and the human race is universally equal. When the human race is ‘regenerated’, like the French nation was ‘regenerated’ after the revolution, it will participate in the making of laws in the same universal republic. There are therefore no ‘foreign countries’, and

\textsuperscript{122}. Cloots, ‘Résumé historique’, 537.
therefore the same philosophical reasoning behind the making of laws in a nation applies to the nation of the human race. These are the ‘supreme will’ and the ‘majority’, of which there can only be one and not several.

Cloots is therefore engaging with the same concepts used by others about national sovereignty, but instead of a nation confined within the limits of a country, it is the whole human race. The same questions discussed between the concepts of general will and the issue of majority over the minority apply, but for Cloots on the global scale. For instance, let us see what Condorcet writes about the issue of majority and minority, and the question of the general will and reason. In *De la nature des pouvoirs politiques dans une nation libre*, published in 1792, Condorcet writes:

La raison, d'accord avec la nature, ne met qu'une seule borne à l'indépendance individuelle, n'ajoute qu'une seule obligation sociale à celles de morale particulière : c'est la nécessité et l'obligation d'obéir dans les actions qui doivent suivre une règle commune non à sa propre raison, mais à la raison collective du plus grand nombre ; je dis à sa raison et non à sa volonté, car le pouvoir de la majorité sur la minorité ne doit pas être arbitraire ; il ne s'étend pas jusqu'à violer le droit d'un seul individu ; il ne va point jusqu'à obliger à la soumission lorsqu'il contredit évidemment la raison. Cette distinction n'est pas futile : une collection d'hommes peut et doit, aussi bien qu'un individu, distinguer ce qu'elle veut, ce qu'elle trouve raisonnable et juste.\(^\text{125}\)

When Cloots writes of ‘cosmopolitan reason’, it is a way to emphasise that reason is not limited to the borders of the French polity, but it is the reason of the whole future polity of the human race. That is because reason is universal and is the same to all humankind. In this way, Cloots argues that the French Constitution must conform to ‘cosmopolitan reason’, and this is not only about the French constitution adopting universal principles, but also about not imposing itself on other as ‘French’, which is to say a minority on the majority of the rest of the world. Cloots continues with this thought in the following paragraph in presenting a procatalepsis by raising an argument made against him: that he wants to submit the whole world to French domination, the majority to a minority. Cloots answers that he knows nothing of any ‘French domination’ or ‘French constitution’, he only knows of the rights of man that gather all individuals under the domination of the human race.\(^\text{126}\) In other words, the natural rights of

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\(^{126}\) Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 493.
man and the citizens are not ‘French’, they are universal, conform to and
discovered by ‘reason’, and therefore, the constitution based on them is not
‘French’, it is universal, conform to ‘cosmopolitan reason’, and the republic
it establishes is not ‘French’ but ‘universal’.

Source of morals

If faith and revealed religion are contrary to reason, and therefore rejected,
what is to be the source of morals? For Cloots, it is nature and its obser-
vation through reason. Already in *Certitude*, Cloots stated that, in natural
religion, reason replaces authority and faith as source of morality:

La vérité de sa Religion ne se fonde point sur des preuves
équivoques, obscures, banales, il ne fait pas dépendre sa foi
d’un fatras de vieux Livres ; mais le Ciel & la Terre, voilà sa
Bibliothèque. Le Révélationisme est multiple, parce que les
livres sont des productions humaines : la Religion Naturelle
est unique; parce que l’Univers est l’ouvrage de Dieu : comme
si la Morale n’était pas naturelle à l’homme : comme si le Créa-
teur en lui donnant la raison, l’étit privé de ce qui constitue la
raison. Pour faire naître, ou plutôt, pour développer la Mo-
rale dans notre entendement, il ne faut que la Société de deux
individus, comme pour la formation du fétus, il suffit que
l’homme connaisse la femme, le reste s’achève de soi-même.

„Les grands préceptes de la Morale, observe le Pape Clément
XIV, sont les mêmes chez toutes les Nations, parce qu’ils sont
empreints dans nos coeurs. La même main qui traça, l’image
de sa Toute Puissance dans les Cieux en caractères de feu, grava
dans nos ames nos principaux devoirs. Notre coeur est une
table, un Décalogue que rien n’a pu briser ; mais que nos pas-
sions effaceront si le cri de notre conscience ne nous repro-
choit nos écarts.”

Cloots develops the same idea even a little further in his revolutionary
writings, and to simply get rid of any ecclesiastical institution, as well as any
book containing principles of morals; they are not universal but temporally,
spatially, and culturally located:

... les places publiques, les plaines, les bosquets rassembleront
la commune, le septième jour de la semaine, autour du plus
vertueux paroissien, qui développera les maximes salutaires de
la raison universelle. Comme la morale est de tous les temps et
de tous les lieux, je conseillerais de ne faire aucun usage ni du

Coran, ni de l’Evangile, ni du Zend-Avesta, sous prétexte de quelques bons préceptes clairsemés dans ces livres fameux.128

However, Cloots does not elaborate here on what universal principles of morals could be, nor why and how ‘the most virtuous parishioner’ could find them. Cloots’s goal is first and foremost to undermine the Church institutionally, but not by force, these are merely suggestions for a post-ecclesiastical society. By the same token, Cloots praises clergymen who turn to natural religion such as Antoine de Cournand (1742–1814), abbot of the Parisian church Saint-Étienne-du-Mont, member of the Jacobins, who defrocked himself in 1790, and married secretly in 1791 after lobbying for clerical marriage. Cloots calls him ‘Prêtre de la raison, prédicateur de la nature’.129

Cloots elaborates a little more on morals with the debates surrounding the first criminal code adopted between 25 September and 6 October 1791 by the National Assembly, shortly after adopting the constitution on 3 September 1791. Cloots states that against the saying ‘point de moeurs, point de lois’, it is, on the contrary, the law that makes the mores: ‘mauvaises lois, mauvaises moeurs ; bonnes lois, bonnes moeurs’.130 Therefore, Cloots urges the Assembly: ‘Consultez la raison en dictant votre code, et vous effacerez nombre de péchés mortels et véniels de votre catéchisme barbare’.131 Cloots’s target are so-called ‘sins’ prescribed by religion’s law that translated into human law with crimes and sentences. It concerned, in this case, the domain of sexuality such as ‘sodomy’, which included many non-procreative sexual acts.132 It has to be noted that the identification of sodomy with male homosexuality dated from the end of the eighteenth century, but that the crime of ‘sodomy’ in this sense had not been applied since 1750.133 It had become less a matter of criminal law, and more a matter of social policy in Paris to make homosexuality less visible.134 It also concerned ‘imaginary crimes’, such as blasphemy or sacrilege. Cloots’s views are part of the general discussions of the time comparing these practices with nature. For instance, Jean-Baptiste Boyer d’Argens (1704–1771) in Thérèse philosophe argues that God created

129. Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 120.
130. Ibid., 122.
131. Ibid., 123.
132. ‘In the eighteenth century the word “sodomy,” derived from the name of the Biblical city destroyed because of the sins of its inhabitants, could be applied to a considerable variety of nonprocreative sexual acts, ranging from masturbation to bestiality, including anal and oral intercourse within marriage’. In Jeffrey Merrick, ‘Sodomical Inclinations in Early Eighteenth-Century Paris’, Eighteenth-Century Studies 30, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 290.
everything that exists, including desires and inclinations that are found in nature, which are therefore not ‘antiphysiques’, not against nature. Cloots’s analysis with the observation of nature goes perhaps even further in using a metaphor with the laws from physics in order to talk about physical acts, particularly among the youth:

On s’étonne de la corruption des gymnases, comme si des corps électriques revêtus de houpes nerveuses, pouvaient se mouvoir ensemble, sans éprouver de fréquentes détonations. J’aimerais autant appeler les chatouillements et les démangeaisons, des crimes contre nature.

What matters is more the issue of physical exhaustion and loss of energy than the identification of crimes, and Cloots quotes here the work by Doctor Tissot on onanism, suggesting abstinence to avoid physical degeneration. Regarding anything else, Cloots suggests considering the relativity of what is considered vice and virtue, and therefore crime or not, which has been different among societies and through time. Cloots concedes that nothing is outside the domain of legislation, but instead of religious views, Cloots suggests using reason (universal) and argues that, by defining vice and virtue, one can find a universal standard. The definition is set in terms of usefulness or harmfulness to society: ‘Tout ce qui est utile à la société est vertue, tout ce qui lui est nuisible est vice’. In that sense, Cloots suggests softening the law, and to agree that only a minimal list of crimes that are truly hurtful to society: rape, kidnapping, seduction, and adultery.

Cloots never mentions Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) in his writings, but this definition is close to Bentham’s principle of utility based on the acceptance that nature gave man two leading forces of behaviour with pleasure and pain — as described in Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, printed in 1780 and first published in 1789. It is not clear if Cloots knew about Bentham, but Etienne Dumont translated Bentham’s 1790 Draught for a New Plan for the Organization of the Judicial Establishment in France as Sur le nouvel ordre judiciaire en France in 1790 and the text was presented to the National Assembly.

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137. Tissot, L’onanisme.
139. Ibid., 124.
Perhaps, more directly, Cloots’s reference may be Helvétius. Claude-Adrien Helvétius (1715–1771) believed that humans were born with equal aptitudes and only slight differences. As such, and since they are motivated by pleasure and pain, laws and education could mould individuals. However, Helvétius was not interested in the human race as an entity, as the diversity of laws and models of education meant a great diversity of societies. As Thomson argues, Helvétius posited a utilitarian form of natural law in stating that the ‘sole inviolable law’ was the ‘general interest’, the ‘happiness of the majority’. Cloots mentions Helvétius several times, and quotes Helvétius on God and religion:

Helvétius disait que si Dieu avait daigné se révéler aux humains, il aurait fait descendre du ciel un bon plan de législation sur la terre. En effet, une religion quelconque est inutile ou nuisible, sans une bonne constitution : celle-ci tient lieu de toutes les religions possibles.

Against Raynal, Cloots quotes Helvétius who allegedly advised precaution towards l’espion Raynal. Helvétius is cited elsewhere among other great French thinkers, or cited as part of an argument for his work on friendship — probably from De l’esprit on ‘need’ as the engine of friendship.

In République universelle, Cloots reiterates the idea of reason against religion being the source of morals:

En effet, toutes les religions battent en brèche la raison ; car la Divinité disparaît en y réfléchissant une heure tout au plus. Or, plus les hommes seront raisonnables, et plus ils seront vertueux, c’est-à-dire utiles à la société : donc la religion est une maladie sociale qu’on ne saurait guérir trop tôt.

What follows is a diatribe against religious men, who pretend to be virtuous, but are corrupt because they let ‘prejudice’ and ‘sophism’ be the masters of their entendement. When clergymen, they lead to ‘ruin, anarchy, slavery’, unless rational men (bons raisonneurs) police them.

What reason leads to, according to Cloots, is the respect of nature (‘… la nature est plus sage que les hommes’), which the law should encourage,

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143. Ibid., 253.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid., 254.
147. Ibid., 189.
149. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 142, 255.
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid., 255.
since reason also leads to republicanism. Cloots writes: ‘La Loi bienfaisante remplace un Dieu insignifiant’. But leaving nature unhinged is not the solution, for Cloots, who takes the argument of determinism from revealed religion to natural religion. The law is there to balance nature, which is globally good, but leaves moral freedom to men; therefore, virtue and vice do exist. Laws, for Cloots must take these into consideration, and as a result: ‘La société présentera des appâts à la vertu et des obstacles au crime’.

In this sense, reason is also opposed to passion, which is again correlated with revealed religion and monarchism. For instance, regarding the ‘aristocrats’, encompassing both the nobility and the clergy, Cloots writes: ‘L’orgueil et l’avarice sont les démons familiers de nos aristocrates’. What follows is the need to re-establish reason in the the highest law of the republic, the constitution:


The bizarreries in question is the tendency of the people, as Cloots notes, to express sympathy towards the king and the ancien régime, which Cloots excuses as one of the consequences of attaining a higher degree of civilisation. Cloots refers to the need, according to him, to suppress the liste civile (civil list), which defines the expenses supporting the monarch. One of the decrees taken on 10 August 1792, following the storming of the Tuileries and the suspension of the king, abolished the civil list.

Education, or elsewhere called ‘regeneration’, is the solution that Cloots and the revolutionaries saw for the future of the nation: ‘Moins la raison est développée, plus les passions sont déchaînées. En améliorant l’éducation, nous amélioreron la nation’. Education had been the monopoly of the clergy, and became an important project for the revolutionaries in their plan for the ‘regeneration’ of the nation, which will be explore more in details in the chapter on humankind. The basis of this education of reason is of course based on ‘science’ as understood in the second half of the eighteenth century. The role of nature in Cloots’s thought will be analysed further in the next chapter. It is now time to say a word about the result of reason with science in the next section. The last subsection on the ‘science of man’, will then continue this discussion on reason as the source of moral.

154. Ibid.
155. Ibid., 255.
156. Ibid., 299.
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid., 312.
We saw in the first part of the first section how Cloots aligned with Voltaire’s position regarding reason against faith, and thereby authority and tradition. Cloots opposed reason to the church based on superstition, and which maintained ignorance to usurp moral and social authority. The solution to this, for Cloots, is its opposite — the product of reason — science, and the education of people to science:

L’ignorance étant l’attelier de l’imposture, il devoit s’ensuivre, par la raison des contraires, que la science remédieroit aux ravages de son ennemie : la force des préjugés, le respect-humain, la cupidité, l’empire de la coutume, s’opposent, il est vrai, à la destruction totale de l’erreur ; mais du moins la principale partie des hommes, celle qui donne le ton aux autres, brise ses fers, & cela suffit.\footnote{559}

**Universality and Unity**

Science is universally valid and understandable, and because of that, Cloots means that it is the reason why the whole humankind should unite rather than be divided. Science means the development of transports, exchanges, communication technologies, all possibles means for Cloots to make one human understand one another and share things together despite great distances, as opposed to animals:

Ce morcellement est d’autant plus honteux et funeste, que la nature nous a doués de la parole et de l’invention des arts et des sciences, de l’imprimerie, et de la poste et de la navigation, pour ne former qu’une seule famille raisonnable sur notre petit globe. Je pardonne aux singes de Sumatra de n’avoir aucune parenté avec les singes du Paraguay ; mais l’homme des Indes occidentales, qui ne fraternise pas avec l’homme des grandes Indes, est doublement inépète, doublement coupable et doublement puni. Ses relations incohérentes deviennent criminelles : il en résultera des guerres, des fratricides, tant que tous les intéressés particuliers ne seront pas en harmonie avec une force commune, avec une loi universelle.\footnote{160}

Another example of the universality of science, for Cloots, is that it is imported from abroad, and every country’s scientific improvement is built on

\footnote{159. Cloots, *Certitude des preuves*, 324.}
\footnote{160. Cloots, ‘*La République universelle*’, 299.}
another country’s discoveries. Cloots seems to paraphrase the Latin metaphor of dwarfs standing on the shoulder of giants (‘nanos gigantum humeris insidentes’), also expressed by Newton, when he writes this defence of foreigners: ‘Rappelons-nous que chaque nation doit ses arts, ses sciences, ses lumières, sa philosophie aux étrangers.’

This science, for Cloots, is of course the one gathered in the Encyclopédie, it is the science of all the philosophes who identify with the intellectual principles of ‘les lumières’, the ‘Enlightenment’:

Malgré le penchant de l’homme vers la superstition, l’Encyclopédie parviendra néanmoins, tôt ou tard, à son but, en tirant l’esprit de l’assoupissement qui le rend crédule.

Cloots sees the Revolution, and the ‘new regime’ as the result of the progress of reason and of ‘les lumières’, hence the defeat of ignorance, superstition, corruption, and all the ills associated with the ancien régime, which was not based on reason and science; it was an ‘encyclopaedic explosion’:

Le délabrement des finances, voilà la cause; la philosophie, voilà les moyens. Les frondeurs ridicules, sous les Mazarin, sont devenus révolutionnaires sous le Breteuil, grâce à l’explosion encyclopédique.

The science of the Enlightenment created the revolution, and the ‘new regime’ enacts the scientific principles of the Enlightenment in the fields of morals and politics, opposing therefore an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ science, in Cloots’s revolutionary writings: ‘La vaine science de nos vieux politiques est en défaut depuis le jour de l’insurrection parisienne’. Of course, the context of this pamphlet is the perceived attack on the French Revolution and Cloots by Prussian minister Hertzberg, and therefore Cloots attacks him and his profession as ‘charlatanerie’. Later on in the revolution, Cloots also attacks Fauchet and other writers on the same premise: ‘Le malheur du jour, c’est cette nuée d’écrivailleurs nés d’hier à la science profonde des publicistes…’ ‘This old science is based on the founding principle of universal monarchy, that guides certain policies such as the European ‘balance’ of power. Cloots denounces this policy based not on moral or reason, but on reason of state calculated to maintain an equal amount of power among European states so no one is closer to achieving a ‘universal monarchy’. That

162. Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 330.
163. Louis Charles Auguste le Tonnelier, baron de Breteuil (1730–1807), was the last prime minister of Louis XVI, appointed a few days before the storming of the Bastille.
165. Ibid., 111.
does not mean that Cloots considers this true political science solely based on morals. As Cloots writes in *Chronique de Paris* on 27 July 1791, justifying his postponing of putting an end to the slave trade: ‘La morale est essentielle dans l’intérieur d’un ménage, mais un État ne saurait faire vivre qui dure, sans la science du profond Machiavel’.168 This ‘old science’ in politics is also based on tradition and authority, particularly the deference to older men in society, as is the case in the Orient and was the case in ancient republics, which is why republics failed and despotism succeeded, according to Cloots.169 However, despotism is bound to fall, even if Cloots admits that sciences and arts may some times flourish because a despot decides to sponsor them. Ultimately the corruption of a despot and his court will ruin the talent of the best artists (and scientists).170

The ‘new’ science, the science of the *philosophes*, is universal and unified, because it is based on nature and the observation of its principles. As one of the *philosophes*, the ‘Orator of the human race’, claims to have found a basic principle of this ‘new science’ of human organisation by observing nature: the single sovereignty of the human race leading to the universal republic (as opposed to the single sovereignty of God appointing monarchs, leading to the universal monarchy). This new science is based on the *Encyclopédie*. The *Encyclopédie* aimed at containing and describing all the sciences and gives the following definition of science:

> science, en terme de philosophie, signifie la connaissance claire & certaine de quelque chose, fondée ou sur des principes évidents par eux-mêmes, ou sur des démonstrations.171

The article continues by stating that, in this sense, science is opposed to doubt, and opinion is in between the two.172 Science is clearly connected to philosophy, and refers to the clear and certain knowledge of something. There is no mention of a scientific method beyond the reference to what is ‘self-obvious’ or ‘demonstrations’. The relation to philosophy is even clearer in Jaucourt’s following article classifying the various types of ‘Sciences (connaissances humaines)’, in which he makes reference to classical rhetoric and the understanding of science as needing eloquence to be communicated; he mentions, for instance, Aristotle and Cicero, and, later in the article, Quintilian.173 Science to Jaucourt and the Enlightenment is related

169. Ibid., 147.
172. Ibid., 788.
to philosophy and also to rhetoric and the *vir civilis*, who must acquire this *sapientia*, this science. Jaucourt even equates the reign of sciences with Ancient Rome, the fall of which was the fall of sciences and the beginning of centuries of superstition and prejudice that only the scientific ‘revolution’ put an end to by rediscovering antiquity. At the end of the article, Jaucourt emphasises that nobles of Ancient Greece and Rome devoted their time and fortune to the advancement of sciences, and he encourages the present king to do the same.\(^{174}\) Sciences are the way forward to enlighten and reform society for the better.

What was understood as ‘science’ during the Enlightenment was different from our contemporary understanding of it, even if it is during this period that the categories of science that we know today began to form. ‘Science’ was also known under the general label of ‘natural philosophy’ or simply ‘philosophy’, as Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717–1783) states that the two are synonymous.\(^{175}\) In the *Discours préliminaire des Éditeurs*, d’Alembert laid out the programme of the *Encyclopédie* regarding the presentation of all the sciences, crafts, and arts.\(^{176}\) At the end of the *Discours*, a figure maps the state of human knowledge following Bacon’s understanding: memory, reason, imagination. While memory is related to history, reason is related to philosophy, which includes the science of nature, the science of man, as well as the science of God. Science is everything that is the product of reason, branches of knowledge gathered under the general term of philosophy.

### Science of Man

The eighteenth-century ‘science of man’ continued to advance the project that started in the preceding century with the ‘knowledge of ourselves’.\(^{177}\) In France, the search for a science of man before the revolution was linked to the pressing necessity for reforms as the organisation of society and the state was increasingly inefficient and ineffective — most notably the collection of taxes, from which the wealthiest were exempted, whilst the participation in the American revolutionary wars emptied the state’s coffers. In this context, already before the revolution, Turgot (1727–1781), when he was a minister of Louis XVI, explained to the king the necessity to develop a ‘new objective science of society founded on the constants of human nature and the mutual needs of all men and women’.\(^{178}\) Condorcet was a friend of Turgot’s, and together they were the first to use the term ‘social science’ based on

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\(^{174}\) Jaucourt, ‘Sciences (connaissances humaines)’, 789.

\(^{175}\) d’Alembert, ‘Discours préliminaire’, xlviii.

\(^{176}\) Ibid.


reason and experience as opposed to traditions. Turgot and Condorcet’s views were that science would allow to bureaucratic reform because it could replace its opacity, inefficiency, and secrecy with universality, openness, and mathematical precision. According to them, ‘politics itself was to be subjected to scientific rule’ and ‘natural reason, rather than political will, was to be the source of order and authority in political affairs’.

The science of man is included in the *Encyclopédie* as a particular branch of scientific knowledge regrouping morals, logic, and ‘science of the soul’. The science of the soul is about the knowledge of the human soul through theology. The remaining division between logic and moral is explained by the fact that the science of man is presented following the faculties of man, which are *Entendement* and *Volonté*: The *Entendement* must conform to ‘truth’, which is the goal of logic; *Volonté* must be subjected to ‘virtue’, which is the goal of morals. It is in this paradigm that Cloots wrote:

... tous les humains seraient vertueux, s’ils pouvaient en avoir la volonté. Rien au monde n’est plus volontaire que la volonté qui nous conduit irrésistiblement. On ne saurait donc trop rectifier notre jugement par des notions saines et lucides. Les lois doivent être assises sur ces données fondamentales.

Cloots seems here to apply Diderot (otherwise often cited by Cloots) directly in submitting human *volonté* to legal *entendement*, albeit with gentle incentives towards virtuous behaviours and obstacles to vicious ones.

The moral science is then divided between a general and a particular one, the particular one concerning ‘laws or jurisprudence’: natural laws, economic laws, and political laws. ‘Moral’ comes from Latin *mores*, meaning custom, manners; the moral sciences study human behaviour, the everyday life of human beings. It is within this science of man that Cloots wants to make a breakthrough, particularly with the discovery of natural laws and political laws. These laws, can be discovered through reason by observing nature, just as the laws of physics by a natural philosopher such as Newton. Here, Cloots claims to have made a discovery in the science of man with the principle of ‘sovereignty of the human race’.

As Hankins notes, “The ideology of Enlightenment tended to make natural philosophers into heroes, and in France the greatest hero of all was Newton.” Newton’s accounts were circulated widely, and discussed by

179. Ibid., 159.
181. Ibid., 64.
183. Ibid., xlviii.
educated elites, for example Voltaire and Mme du Châtelet.\textsuperscript{186} What remains important in how Newton was perceived after the publication of *Principia Mathematica* in 1687 is that the physical world, the universe, nature, was an orderly place governed by laws, and that human reason was capable of discovering and understanding them.\textsuperscript{187} Newton was certainly a hero to Cloots, who mentions him several times as an important figure of philosophy, together with other scientists or philosopher such as e.g. Galileo, Copernicus, Leibniz, Locke, or Voltaire.\textsuperscript{188} Cloots also adopts Newton’s view of the world as an orderly place governed by laws — a ‘system’ as analysed in chapter two — and Cloots sets himself the goal to discover them in the realm of politics with the principle of sovereignty of the human race: ‘Newton a réuni tous les philosophes par sa découverte physique ; je réunirai tous les hommes par ma découverte politique’.\textsuperscript{189} This sort of comparison was not unusual in eighteenth-century France; although, it was made by *philosophes* to other *philosophes*: Bernardin de Saint Pierre called the work of the botanist Tournefort similar to what Newton did to astronomy; Quesnay was referred to as the Newton of economics.\textsuperscript{190}

*Nature and God*

There is a clear indication that, for Cloots, philosophical principles induced through reason are as universal and perennial as the laws governing the physical realm. His principle against all religions is universally and eternally valid. Early in Cloots’s thought there was a recognition that philosophy, the act of thinking, the use of reason, was connected to truth and science. In *Vœux d’un gallophile*, Cloots writes: ‘Le Musée fera pour la philosophie ce que l’académie des sciences fait pour l’astronomie...’\textsuperscript{191} To Cloots all this scientific development is a replacement of Christianity with the equivalent of human science in philosophy. As such, ‘nature’ and the observation of its manifestations constitute the bulk of philosophical reasoning. Misusing reason leads to falsehood and sophisms, and a strong candidate for that is religious thinking, but also any idea based on ‘prejudices’. In a letter to Charles Stanhope published in *Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais*, Cloots writes: ‘C’est à la philosophie de réparer les fautes des hommes et des

\textsuperscript{186} For the introduction of Newton in France see J. B. Shank, *The Newton Wars and the Beginning of the French Enlightenment* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2008).


\textsuperscript{188} Cloots, *Ecrits révolutionnaires*, 74, 163, 187, 392, 422, 501.

\textsuperscript{189} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 477.


\textsuperscript{191} Cloots, *Vœux d’un gallophile*, 84.
It is clear to Cloots that knowledge and reasoning should serve the truth and be disseminated in order to ‘fix’ the errors of men (monarchism) and gods (the church).

For this purpose, Cloots opposes a théos and a cosmos as the two explanations of the universe. The théos is the immaterial universe or God, the cosmos is the material universe or nature. Cloots writes:

Quant aux causes finales, il n’est pas plus étonnant de les trouver dans la nature éternelle que dans la divinité éternelle. C’est un grand phénomène que la nature, je l’avoue ; mais votre dieu invisible, indéfinissable, serait un phénomène bien moins compréhensible. Vous voulez expliquer une merveille par une autre merveille. Il est clair qu’en ajoutant un incompréhensible théos à un incompréhensible cosmos, vous doublez la difficulté, sans la résoudre. Je m’en tiens à ce que nous entendons, à ce que nous palpons, sans chercher midi à quatorze heures. Je vais remonter à la source de toutes les questions insolubles. Pourquoi existe-t-il quelque chose ? Pourquoi votre soi-disant Dieu existe-t-il ? Pourquoi le très réel univers existe-t-il ? Nous n’en savons rien ; mais on ne conçoit pas non plus le néant absolu. Il me semble que l’espace existe nécessairement. Or si quelque chose existe nécessairement, il n’en coûte pas plus d’admettre le contenu que le contenant. Laissons donc les soleils et les planètes innombrables rouler éternellement dans le vide.\(^\text{193}\)

Cloots is here answering to and arguing against two theses in the side of the théos: the \textit{a priori} cosmological argument, and the \textit{a posteriori} teleological argument. The ‘cosmological argument’ — or \textit{a priori} argument — is a type of argument that seeks to explain the existence of the cosmos with the existence of a prior being, God.\(^\text{194}\) The other argument regarding the existence of God is an \textit{a posteriori} argument, also called \textit{teleological} argument. This argument starts from the awe that strikes the observer of nature and the universe, whose structure, interconnectedness, balance, and order can only be explained by deliberate mind behind it all; there must be a \textit{design}.\(^\text{195}\)

Cloots’s argument against theology is that it does not explain nature, but adds complexity to explaining nature. Theological explanations are really

\(^\text{192}\) Cloots, \textit{Ecrits révolutionnaires}, 59.

\(^\text{193}\) Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 251.


only adding complexity and even more questions, when physical questions are already complex enough. Therefore, for Cloots, it is better to stay within the realm of the physical and try to solve its mysteries with questions from physics rather than from metaphysics. In this way Cloots dismisses the ‘cosmological argument’—‘why is there something rather than nothing?’—and the necessity argument for the existence of God as a watchmaker, prime mover, or designer. Cloots simply rejects the utility of metaphysical considerations regarding who created what we observe and why; what matters is to focus on explaining what is visible and material. In his next pamphlet, *Bases constitutionnelles*, Cloots reiterates this argument against searching for metaphysical explanations. This time, Cloots opposes what he calls ‘divine nature’ to ‘palpable and visible nature’, which is sufficient to explain natural phenomena:

Quelque chose existe éternellement : c’est une vérité simple ; mais n’allons pas nous perdre dans les spéculations d’une nature divine et créatrice, pendant que tout s’explique avec la nature palpable et visible. Je nie l’existence d’une nature créée, et vous ne m’endormirez pas avec votre prétendue nature créatrice et motrice. Je ne veux point de fabrique, et par conséquent point de fabricateur. Le bon sens rejette le premier moteur d’un mouvement éternel.\(^\text{196}\)

The observation of nature is, for Cloots, the beginning of starting to reject theology; or, nature is the only revelation acceptable, revealed religions should be rejected:

Ma doctrine est la révélation de la nature ; les autres révélations se dissipent devant elle comme les spectres du sommeil devant les veillés de la philosophie.\(^\text{197}\)

Cloots rejects the watchmaker argument. The world may not have appeared by itself, but the question of its origins is asked in a wrong way because asking for the origins of something and answering that a pre-existing being must have existed to create it leads to an endless chain of pre-existing beings: if the world did not create itself and therefore there must be a God to create it, then must there not be a God who created this God who created the world? In laying this argument Cloots makes an important distinction for his own argument later between *théos* and *cosmos*, which we will see in the conclusion more in details:

Les croyants disent que le monde ne s’est pas fait lui-même, et certainement ils ont raison, mais Dieu non plus ne s’est pas

197. Ibid., 496–97.
fait lui-même, et vous n’en conclurez pas qu’il existe un être plus ancien que Dieu. Cette progression nous mènerait à la tortue des Indiens. La question sur l’existence de Dieu (Théos) est mal posée ; car il faut savoir préalablement si le monde (Cosmos) est un ouvrage. Demandez donc la question préalable, et vous passerez à l’ordre du jour dans le silence de vos adversaires stupéfaits.\textsuperscript{198}

The Indians’ tortoise in question is a reference to Hindu mythology in which a world turtle, named Akupāra, holds the world on its back; or in some versions holds elephants on its back, who hold the world on theirs. It is very likely that Cloots takes this comparison from the French translation of Locke, who in \textit{Essays Concerning Human Understanding} (book II, ch. 13, and ch. 23), writes about how wrongly some argue with \textit{substance} to support an \textit{accident}, comparing with an Indian arguing for a turtle supporting elephants supporting the world.\textsuperscript{199} In other words, Cloots uses Locke’s argument about the limits of human understanding: explaining the world by being created by a God, leads to the question of who created God, similar to how the Indians’ turtle leads to the question of who or what supports the turtle, which supports the elephants, which support the world.

Following this passage, Cloots refutes the watchmaker argument because comparing the universe with a watch is comparing apples and oranges: the watch is man-made, whilst nature is not. Doing so, Cloots is paraphrasing Hume’s argumentation in part II of his \textit{Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion} when he explains that when we see a house we know by experience that it is man-made and has an ‘architect’, but that we cannot make the same analogy for the universe because we do not have the same experience of someone creating the universe to infer this cause/effect reasoning.\textsuperscript{200} Cloots writes: ‘... mais cette différence ne me fera pas adopter une similitude entre l’architecte de ma maison et le prétendu architecte de la nature’.\textsuperscript{201} As we have seen previously, Hume’s \textit{Dialogues} was one of the sources for Cloots’s \textit{Certitude}, and it is likely that he remembered this part of the \textit{Dialogues} in this argument, although he does not mention Hume.

Cloots also puts forward an argument similar to Bayle’s regarding creation and time, equally one of his sources for writing \textit{Certitude}.\textsuperscript{202} For Cloots, the universe and nature exist and must be accepted as facts, which are

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 495.
\textsuperscript{200} David Hume, \textit{Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion}, 2nd ed. (London: s.n., 1779), 51.
\textsuperscript{201} Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 495.
\textsuperscript{202} See note (H) under the article Zabarella in Pierre Bayle, \textit{Dictionnaire historique et critique}, 3rd ed., vol. 3: N–Z (Rotterdam (Genève): s.n., 1715), 898–899. For its interpreta-
eternal, without wondering about their creation and therefore the concept of time outside the creation. Bayle intervened in a discussion about the eternity of creation and God. For Christian orthodoxy, the world was not eternal and had been created at some point in time by God. For some scholastics, like Aquinas, the world was created \textit{ab æternam}, but adversaries argued that it was not possible that God, eternal, also created the world eternal. Bayle recycled the argument already put forward by Anselm of Canterbury, Augustinus, Boethius, Aquinas, Suarez, and others, by making a distinction between \textit{eternity}, that can be counted, and \textit{sempiternity}, that cannot be counted.\textsuperscript{203} God is sempiternal, but has created the universe eternal:

\begin{quote}
C’est dans les idées de Dieu que se trouve la vraie mesure de la quantité absolue des choses, tant à l’égard de l’étendu qu’à l’égard du temps. L’homme n’y connaît rien ; il ne connaît que des grandeurs ou des petites relatives.\textsuperscript{204}
\end{quote}

Cloots takes this argument of eternity, but again, drops the theological argumentation. Nature is eternal, and its creatures (animals and the human race) are equally eternal; this is a given fact that must be accepted and studied in order to explain it, but it should not be studied and explained by adding another ‘fact’ of an eternal or sempiternal God outside this world:

\begin{quote}
… la nature ne produit rien. Tout ce qui la compose existe éternellement : ce que nous appelons vulgairement l’enfant de la nature est aussi vieux que sa mère. N’allons pas expliquer l’existence de la nature incommensurable par l’existence d’une autre nature incommensurable. Vous cherchez l’Éternel hors du monde, et je le trouve dans le monde. Je me contente du \textit{cosmos} incompréhensible, et vous voulez doubler la difficulté par un \textit{théos} incompréhensible !\textsuperscript{205}
\end{quote}

Cloots, then, seems to feel a need to fill the void that these theological answers then leave, once discarded; void, which is ultimately an existential one. A new type of secular natural religion based on science replaces revealed religion for this purpose, once theology has been discarded. Observing nature leads one to discredit theology, and to replace existential questions hitherto addressed by theology: why are we here? What is death? Cloots compares nature to a ‘good mother’, and death to a good night’s sleep until a rebirth under a different form, alluding, perhaps to decomposition and recomposition:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{203}. Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{204}. Bayle, \textit{Dictionnaire historique et critique}, 5, 899. \\
\textsuperscript{205}. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 495–496.
\end{flushright}
La nature est une bonne mère qui se plaît à voir naître et re-
naitre ses enfants sous des combinaisons différentes. Un pro-
fond sommeil ne laisse pas que d’avoir son mérite.206

In general, Cloots wants to propose a, philosophically-speaking, ecumen-
cical system, one that is valid for all regardless of one’s view on religion and
one’s belief. Only the observation of nature can lead to universal laws of
morality, valid for any system of beliefs, any religion:

Ma philosophie est trop vraie pour être chagrinante ; et les es-
prits faibles qui ne sauraient soutenir cette clarté, devraient
consulter la nature, qui couvre tous les systèmes spéculatifs
d’un voile consolant. En effet, soyez athée ou déiste, matéria-
liste ou spiritualiste, vous irez toujours votre train ordinaire
dans le cours de la vie.207

For Cloots, revealed religions led to a clouding of reason and the applica-
tion of false laws, which were wrong because they were man-made against
nature. Men’s laws are particular and temporary, whereas the laws of nature
are general, universal, and eternal. Cloots there adds that the ‘science’ of the
Enlightenment, physical sciences, in order to lay the principles of a scientia
civilis. However, this scientia civilis, being also based on a ‘religion of nature’,
also has some repercussions on how to replace the metaphysical questions
that are thus rejected. Thus, instead of a theological teleology with a be-
ginning and an end, Cloots suggests a parallel to what Lavoisier expressed
about the transformation of elements in nature by stating that plants and
animals do live and die, but they are elements that decompose to form new
ones in an eternal law of nature — a rebirth in other words:

La vaine curiosité des métaphysiciens et le furieux despotisme
des théologiens ont rendu obscures les plus lucides notions
de notre entendement. On a substitué, aux lois générales et
immuables de la nature, les lois particulières et vacillantes de
l’homme. Les modifications végétales ou animales, que nous
appelons la naissance et la mort, nous ont fait supposer un
commencement et une fin au grand tout, quoique nous avou-
ions que rien ne s’anéantit dans l’univers. Les formes changent,
les éléments se combinent et se décomposent ; mais les lois
sont éternelles.208

‘Rien ne se perd, rien ne se crée, tout se transforme’ is a quotation attributed
to Lavoisier, but in reality a paraphrase of Anaxagoras, even if Lavoisier in

206. Ibid., 497.
208. Ibid., 252.
his *Traité élémentaire de chimie* writes about matter in the same, but less catchy, terms:

… car rien ne se crée, ni dans les opérations de l’art, ni dans celles de la nature, & l’on peut poser en principe que, dans toute opération, il y a une égale quantité de matière avant & après l’opération ; que la qualité & la quantité des principes est la même, & qu’il n’y a que des changemens, des modifications.  

Cloots declared the same from nature to political organisation: ‘La nature ne gagne rien et ne perd rien’. Observing humankind like a scientist means observing human nature, and Cloots draws a parallel between humankind and other social animals like bees. Unlike animals, humans lack instinct and must use reason to palliate this handicap. Cloots uses an argument completely at odds with his ‘cult of reason’. Reason is actually the faculty that led man to deviate from the natural principles on which social organisation should be based. One must thus look at the ‘primitive laws’, study human nature like a scientist in order to find the laws that govern it for designing the best government. However, it might be a ‘wrong’ use of reason, as opposed to a ‘right’ use of reason.

Cloots’s argumentation is solidly based on the claim to scientific truth, and he reflects this by making countless parallels and metaphors with scientists and scientific elements. His favourite one is to draw a parallel between political and moral sciences and physics. ‘La fameuse expérience d’Otto Guericke étonna les physiciens de l’Europe, et l’expérience de nos Français déconcerte vos publicistes modernes.’ Physics and politics are equally hard sciences based on ‘experimentations’, in line with the Baconian division of sciences, and the programme set out by the *Encyclopédie*. To be sure, Cloots is nothing but the Newton of political science: ‘Newton a réuni tous les philosophes par sa découverte physique ; je réunirai tous les hommes par ma découverte politique’. ‘Discovery’ had a particular meaning, as the *Encyclopédie* emphasised:

On peut donner ce nom en général à tout ce qui se trouve de nouveau dans les Arts & dans les Sciences ; cependant on

212. German scientist Otto von Guericke (1602–1686) reached scientific fame for his work on the physics of vacuums. He invented a vacuum pump in 1654, and conducted an experiment in 1657, which disproved Aristoteles’ theory that that nature abhors a vacuum: substances are not pulled by a vacuum, but are pushed by the pressure of the surrounding fluids.
ne l’applique guère, & on ne doit même l’appliquer, qu’à ce qui est non-seulement nouveau, mais en même temps curieux, utile, & difficile à trouver, & qui par conséquent a un certain degré d’importance. Les découvertes moins considérables s’appellent seulement inventions.²¹⁵

D’Alembert then states that discoveries are mainly made by genius, and sometimes by chance or both. Cloots’s ‘genius’ is thus to have come to realise that another principle from nature, which ensues from natural rights, is the sovereignty of the whole human race, and not individual peoples or ‘nations’. Mathematics or geometry are also often used comparisons.²¹⁶ Or writing about his system of the single nation of the human race:

Cette dernière découverte, dont l’universalité est aussi indubitable que l’ascension universelle de la montgolfière, renversera plus d’erreurs en douze ans que les pères de famille n’en accumulent sur la tête de leurs enfants depuis mille lustres.²¹⁷

All these parallels with physics or mathematics point to the same intellectual project of developing a system based on nature, a natural system of politics and morals:

C’est en consultant la nature que je découvre un système politique dont la simplicité sera parfaitement saisie par quiconque désire toute l’indépendance, tout le bonheur dont l’homme est susceptible.²¹⁸

Or again a little later in the same work: ‘Ma doctrine est la révélation de la nature’.²¹⁹ However, these arguments are just using nature, science, and reason as cautions for the ‘truth’ in Cloots’s argument. This is not to say that Cloots, the politician, cynically tries to manipulate his audience in order to convince it of his views. Cloots does believe sincerely in his views, he sees himself as a philosopher who discovered that nature was preaching unity to humankind, and hence the science of man should preach unity of humankind in its political organisation: ‘L’unité, l’unité ! la nature entière nous prêche l’unité’.²²⁰ There are various reasons to be found in nature for claiming unity as a universal principle. There are no frontiers in nature, rivers and seas are naturally connected, and so mankind should imitate this natural

²¹⁹. Ibid., 496.
principle. By the same token, mankind is one single species, and therefore should not be separated politically and economically, as it is against nature. These questions will be dealt with in the two following chapters on natural law and humankind.

These questions of God and metaphysical arguments in theology are important political ones too because they relate to the concept of legitimate sovereignty and legitimate moral authority. Cloots the philosopher fits the mould of revolutionary rhetoric in simplifying the world into ‘us’ against ‘them’, ‘modern’ against ‘ancient’, ‘republic’ against ‘monarchy’, ‘nature’s laws’ against ‘scholastic natural law’, ‘the people’ against ‘God’, ‘théos’ against ‘cosmos’. In these simplifications, the question of sovereignty is central, as Cloots seems to consider all natural law tenets as one and identifying God as the source of sovereignty deferred on earth to kings, priests, and any variant of them as there are cultures and civilisations. Natural law was the paradigm within which all these discussions took place. It was not a unified view, and many different schools and thinkers had opposite views.

What this chapter showed, was the will for Cloots to expel any ecclesiastical influence from these debates, and ultimately, to expel any metaphysical consideration regarding the existence of God. Only the observation of nature through reason (as opposed to faith) should guide the establishment of the science of man, as orderly and obeying laws as physics. For those who considered God, the Supreme Being, as the creator of nature, sovereignty and morality were located in His will. For Cloots, the absence of God from the discussion leads to locating sovereignty and morality somewhere else: in nature, and in the human race. These are the objects of the next two chapters.

221. Cloots, 'Bases constitutionnelles', 494.
One of the central claims in the numerous cabiers de doléances (notebooks of grievances) drafted in preparation for the reunion of the estates general was the reference to rights that were not respected even though they were considered natural. This is why one of the very first acts by the national assembly was to draft the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen on 26 August 1789. The Declaration is a central document in the Revolution, and it is equally central in Cloots’s political system.

The Déclaration in itself was the product of many projects and discussions, and only what was meant to be a draft of seventeen articles came out of the meeting held on 4 August. However, the National Assembly never came back to the 1789 Déclaration after completing the constitution in 1791. The preambule of the Declaration states that:

Les représentants du peuple français, constitués en Assemblée nationale, considérant que l’ignorance, l’oubli ou le mépris des droits de l’homme sont les seules causes des malheurs publics et de la corruption des gouvernements, ont résolu d’exposer, dans une déclaration solennelle, les droits naturels, inaliénnables et sacrés de l’homme, afin que cette déclaration, constamment présente à tous les membres du corps social, leur rappelle sans cesse leurs droits et leurs devoirs ….

The rights of man are natural and as such are inalienable. The end of the preambule mentions that these rights are declared ‘sous les auspices de l’Être

2. That is in all of the cabiers written by the third estate, in most of those written by the nobility, and in a few of those written by the clergy. See Stéphane Rials, La déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, Pluriel (Paris: Hachette, 1988), 115–118.
natural law

suprême’: this is a reference to the deist arguments against all religions as source of ‘prejudice and superstition’, but admitting the existence of a ‘supreme Being’ to avoid the mention of God. Therefore, these natural rights are also ‘sacred’.

When, in 1793, the Convention met to discuss a new constitution after the rejection of constitutional monarchy following the flight of the king, the députés presented almost three hundred projects. The question left by the principle of liberty and equality was the organisation of the making of the law and the participation of the people, which was a central point of discussion among the projects in 1793, showing a great political creativity. The amount of drafts for a constitution reflects the variety of interpretations of the Declaration, on which a radically new society was to be built. Cloots’s project for a decree is not one of them, but he used the occasion to express his views on the basic principle the constitution should be based on: the sovereignty of the human race as the only sovereign on earth. Cloots’s idea of ‘sovereignty of the human race’ is based on his analysis of the Declaration, in particular the principles of individual liberty and equality. Based on these principles, Cloots expresses the view that individuals have sovereignty over themselves, but that upon encountering another individual they merge their sovereignty, and so on until the whole mass of individuals on earth have merged their individual sovereignty into the only political body that is in accordance to natural law: the ‘nation’, but of the whole human race.

In order to understand Cloots’s political system, and to situate it in the context of his time, it is necessary to look at natural law and the debates on natural law in the French Enlightenment that led to the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. Many aspects are important, but most of all for this discussion the presence of a ‘supreme Being’, the ‘political association’ (article 2), and the principle according to which ‘sovereignty resides essentially in the nation’ (article 3), the definition of liberty as ‘doing anything which does not harm others’ and limited only by law (article 4), and finally the understanding of law as the expression of ‘general will’. From this understanding of the context of natural law theories it is then possible to move on to the context of republicanism in their interpretation of natural law. Historians have long discussed these various interpretations, not

10. This will be the object of the last chapter.
only in relation to the French Revolution and the French declaration, but also to the American revolution and Declaration of Independence.\(^\text{11}\)

Natural law had had a long history before the French Revolution in all Europe. There are various positions and various traditions, which are necessary to present before moving on to the natural law debates in France, and whose views influenced Cloots’s. Synthesising here all the debates and the richness of the natural law tradition is attempting the impossible. I will here only sketch the main lines of the debates and present the main characters that are useful to situating and understanding the French debates on natural law and Cloots’s views. This is thus only a sketch of the basis on which eighteenth-century jusnaturalists commented upon.

In this chapter, I argue that Cloots replaced God and His moral authority with the human race, and that he did so within the voluntarist school of natural law. Natural law traditions were built upon the idea that it was the law from God’s will. However, the Enlightenment was a period of attacks upon revealed religion. This is why there is mention of ‘Supreme Being’, rather than ‘God’, in the 1789 Declaration. God is the moral authority decreeing and sanctioning natural law and natural rights. Men can only find them through reason; hence, the natural rights are ‘declared’. Cloots was part of this Enlightened movement with Certitude, but in the Revolution became atheist, as the previous chapter showed. However, Cloots also based his political system on the Declaration. Therefore, the source of natural law cannot be God, or the Supreme Being, for Cloots, and the previous chapter already showed that Nature was the source of morality. Nature, seems to be the source of natural law and natural rights for Cloots. However, Cloots also writes about the people being the equivalent of God as a source of law with general will leading to ‘legal despotism’, but also with moral authority based on reason leading to ‘rational despotism’.

The central question in natural law is the location of absolute sovereignty. As Cloots points out:

On ôta la souveraineté au genre humain pour en revêtir un prétendu souverain dans le ciel, dont les représentants sur terre étaient des rois, des empereurs, des papes, des lamas, des bonzes, des brahmanes, et tant d’autres grands officiers ecclésiastiques et civils.\(^\text{12}\)

Cloots makes here a reference to natural law traditions, in which God was the moral sovereign authority with natural law, and His representatives on

\(^{11}\) I will present this literature in the chapter on republicanism.

\(^{12}\) Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 494.
earth were monarchs and religious figures with political sovereignty, and who struggled to monopolise it by claiming to be the representant of God’s moral authority. It is here useful to sum up the natural law traditions that form the context of Cloots’s political thought regarding sovereignty and moral authority.

There is a vast literature on the history of natural law, particularly rich in German countries and therefore called German natural law (also called modern, Protestant, post-scholastic, or secular natural law). It can be described as a non-unified ‘tradition’ or a ‘genre in moral and political philosophy’ with a variety of views. By the eighteenth century, it was a well established discipline in almost all universities and colleges in Protestant Europe. Hartung points to the Roman origins of natural law in the German debates with a Begriffsgeschichte of obligatio naturalis (natural duty) and the duties implied by the lex naturae (natural law). Until the eighteenth century, the paradigm of scholastic natural law was the proper division between law and morals, and natural law appeared as much of a law as statutory and customary law on the basis of obligatio naturalis. It is on this religious basis that other natural law theorists subsequently discussed natural law.

In the eighteenth century, most of the debates on natural law focused on the issue raised by Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) regarding the paradox in scholasticism that, on the one hand, man used reason to understand natural law, and, on the other, was supposed to create positive laws conform-


15. Ibid., 91.


17. Ibid., 22, 36, 50.

18. Ibid., 167.

ing to natural law: how can one man’s reason be objectively said to be better or more right than another one’s? It is this conundrum regarding the relativity of individual reason that occupied most of natural law debates and led to two schools of thought: realism (also called rationalism or intellectualism) and voluntarism. Representatives of the realist school are chiefly Gottfried Wilhelm (von) Leibniz (1646–1716) and Christian Wolff (1679–1754), whilst representatives of the voluntarist school are chiefly Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) and Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), as well as Thomas Hobbes. The realist tradition is called like that because these thinkers assumed that there was an existing structure of moral and action, metaphysical (from God’s natural world) but inherent in reality (in humanity’s cultural world), which could be analysed and understood by the human mind. Since this structure was accessible to human reason, they are also called ‘rationalists’. The voluntarist tradition, on the other hand, emphasised, mainly, that the human mind had no access to the divine mind through reason. In order to palliate this lack of knowledge of values and morals through rational probing of God’s will, they suggested understanding human nature without considering any divine intention. It is therefore only possible to understand the values in humanity’s cultural world by focusing on the human will.

Wolff’s natural law was a teleological vision of human life in which humanity’s destiny is perfectibility. Wolff then distinguishes between the ‘original state of natural liberty’ in which an individual exercises freely one’s individual right to perfection, and the ‘adventitious state’ of ‘relations of governance’ in which the individual exercises one’s liberty to give up the future exercise of this liberty to a governing body more apt to maximise perfection and happiness than the individual on one’s own. In other words, this is the Wolffian version of the social contract. Pushed to its limits, this natural law theory posits a universal society encompassing humanity as a whole in a civitas maxima. There are several ways to translate ‘civitas’, from city to polis, to state and commonwealth, but Onuf argues convincingly that republic would be the best understanding of what Wolff meant by ‘civitas’. The Wolffian metaphysical framework for moral philosophy ultimately became dominant in German universities, and hence this was the doctrine taught to the governing elite.

22. Ibid., 96.
24. Ibid., 392.
25. Ibid.
Pufendorf was arguably one of the central figures in modern natural law, although some questioned whether he could be considered a founding figure. Together with his follower, Thomasius, Pufendorf took the debate on natural law towards what they considered a 'true science of natural law'. Continuing the separation between theology and natural law, Pufendorf argued that, God’s mind being inaccessible to the human mind, it could not serve as a basis for the organisation of social life; therefore ‘humanity had to rely on empirical observation of the world’. This kind of method that Pufendorf introduced, and his followers continued, was based on a Baconian understanding of science, and following in the footsteps of Grotius. Natural law was to be described using the same method as physics, a ‘quasi-mathematical approach’, to produce a ‘theoretical coherence’ and ‘empirical plausibility’. However, in his later works, Pufendorf also used the historical works of various authors, including classical ones, forming a more ‘eclectic’ method. Equality among individuals is presumed to be natural since all moral categories are human made, and therefore inequality is a result of human interference in nature; as a consequence, there is no natural right to equality since all rights are created in social settings. God and nature are framing human life in that they provide ‘laws of nature’, including the ‘law of sociability’, which regulates social interactions, but rights are human inventions that depend on the duties imposed by the law of sociability. In any case, it is important to note that natural rights were not a central notion in early modern natural law, and it is only with Scottish, Swiss, and American thinking that it became so. Pufendorf was translated into French and annotated by the Huguenot Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744), whose work then dominated discussions in French. This led to the creation of a Swiss ‘school’ of natural law, whose

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32. Seidler, ‘Pufendorf’s Moral and Political Philosophy’.


35. Ibid.


writings in French influenced in turn French philosophers and physiocrats in particular.\textsuperscript{38} Barbeyrac’s main concern was with freedom of conscience: it was a gift from God and as such was not only a right but a duty and could not be alienated in the contractual agreement between the people and the government.\textsuperscript{39} Following Locke, Barbeyrac argued that this was in fact the very reason government was created: to protect this right. He thus contributed to make ‘Lockean ideas part of natural law in the Enlightenment’, which would influence Rousseau and later the French and American Revolutions.\textsuperscript{40} For Barbeyrac, if ‘man’ is the philosophical starting point, then natural law should come from the will of God.\textsuperscript{41} Barbeyrac thought of the concept of a moral community of humankind with the ‘communauté de Droite Raison’.\textsuperscript{42}

Other figures of the ‘Swiss school of natural law’ were Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694–1748) and Emmer de Vattel (1714–1767), who formed the intellectual context in which Rousseau conceived his views on natural law.\textsuperscript{43} However, Cloots does not mention them, and it does not seem that his political thought was marked by their ideas. It is however useful to give a brief account Burlamaqui’s thought because he was a reference for the Encyclopédie, and Diderot wrote against his ideas, as we will see below. Burlamaqui introduced his own original ideas, notably with the refutation that society was based on self-preservation, as Hobbes and Pufendorf argued, but instead was based on the pursuit of happiness, since God created man to be happy.\textsuperscript{44} Man’s natural qualities were a gift from God and comprised ‘understanding, will, and liberty’; as a consequence, social institutions had to preserve and not corrupt them.\textsuperscript{45} Another innovation from Burlamaqui was his distinction between a primitive and a natural state of man, in which what Hobbes and Pufendorf understood as ‘natural state’ is redefined as ‘primitive state’ by Burlamaqui in order to reject their negative standard that justified constituting the sovereignty of a superior, in favour of a nat-

\textsuperscript{39}. Haakonssen and Seidler, \textit{Natural Law: Law, Rights and Duties}, 393.
\textsuperscript{40}. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41}. Tim J. Hochstrasser, ‘Conscience and Reason: the Natural Law Theory of Jean Barbeyrac’, \textit{The Historical Journal} 36, no. 02 (June 1993): 289–308.
\textsuperscript{42}. Ibid., 298.
\textsuperscript{45}. Ibid., 213–214.
ural state in which nature is a normative ideal to be preserved by the sovereign.\textsuperscript{46} The issue that Burlamaqui identified is inequality, since the sovereign governs the rest.\textsuperscript{47} However, this is contrary to the state of nature in which men are equals. Burlamaqui argues for the necessity of a distinction between a sovereign and a population governed by the sovereign, but rejecting Hobbes and Pufendorf he argues that ‘… le droit de Souveraineté dérive d’une Puissance Supérieure, accompagnée de Sagesse & de Bonté’.\textsuperscript{48} God is wise, kind, and superior and thus universal sovereign who imposed a natural law on humankind that Burlamaqui defines as such:

Loi Naturelle, une Loi que Dieu impose à tous les hommes, & qu’ils peuvent découvrir & connoître par les seules lumières de leur Raison, en considérant avec attention leur nature & leur état.\textsuperscript{49}

Order in the world derives from God’s principle of ‘Sociability’ given to humankind, from which all human laws and duties should come: ‘Common Good’; the spirit of sociability is universal; we are obligated to consider ourselves naturally equal and treat each other as such, except when just defense is invoked.\textsuperscript{50} These two societies—civil society and natural society—are connected in that civil societies must respect natural law from natural society, but the only sanction for disregarding it occurs during Judgement Day.\textsuperscript{51} God is thus the sovereign moral authority of natural law.

Cloots does mention Barbeyrac’s preface to Pufendorf as ‘excellent’ in a lettre philosophique to a friend.\textsuperscript{52} As seen in the previous chapters, Cloots studied Grotius at the Académie des nobles in Berlin, and it is very likely that Sulzer also taught Wolff’s views on natural law. But, regarding natural law, Grotius, Wolff, and Pufendorf through Barbeyrac seem to be distant references to Cloots, compared with Rousseau and French authors such as d’Holbach, Diderot, and Helvétius (Helvétius for his principle of pain and pleasure as seen in the previous chapter). There are also physiocratic elements present in Cloots’s thought, although he does not mention any of them. However, it is a revolutionary natural law that Cloots also adapts and transforms, and this may be why he does not acknowledge the variety of traditions, but refers to all as imagining a ‘sovereign in the sky’, by definition illegitimate, with representatives on earth, illegitimate as a consequence. Instead, Cloots replaces the sovereign God with the people and nature, but doing so, Cloots seems to mix the voluntarist and rationalist traditions in their

\textsuperscript{46} Douglass, ‘Rousseau’s Debt to Burlamaqui’, 215.
\textsuperscript{47} Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principes du droit naturel (Genève et Coppenhague: Chez Cl. & Ant. Philibert, 1756), 72.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 111.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 149–150.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 246–248.
\textsuperscript{52} Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 540.
attempt to answer the deterministic conundrum of reason: using reason to understand natural laws, but also applying natural laws in human laws. Cloots seems to accept the voluntarist view of abandoning God from natural law, but replacing God with nature, Cloots seems to follow the rationalist view of understanding and observing nature and its laws. The next sections will present Cloots’s views on natural law, compared with these authors to see what he took from them, where he differed from them. It must be noted here, as Thomson remarks, that, in French, one used two expressions: ‘droit naturel’ and ‘loi naturelle’. These expressions were not the equivalent to the distinction in English between ‘natural right’ and ‘natural law’. Depending on the context, these expressions could be used synonymously, and ‘droit naturel’ could refer either to ‘natural law’ or ‘natural right’.

That Cloots focused on nature to find social and moral laws is not an isolated case. As shown above, other philosophers took the observation of nature as the starting point for building their legal and moral systems. Some, as Cloots did, also claimed a natural religion as the only true and universal religion. We have already seen in the previous chapters that a fascination with classical republican authors led Cloots to call himself ‘orator’, a philosopher in search of truth and charged with the mission of educating and convincing others of this truth with the ‘scientia civilis’. We have also seen that the ‘science of man’ in the typology of all sciences including physical sciences, and was thought to be the precursor of the social sciences. Daston explains this relation between scientific observation of even tiny parts of nature such as insects, and a personification and valorisation of nature. In a way, Daston argues, the dedication that naturalists put in the practice of observation and description of what was otherwise considered ‘trivial’ objects of knowledge, such as intestine worms or flower pistils, was a celebration of God in the marvel of His creation. This ‘natural theology’ in the practice of observing nature, its tools and rituals, was a way of admiring ‘God the artisan’ in the carefully crafted works such as a beehive or an anthill. These practices linked the work of the naturalists with the work of political economists through the analysis of ‘utility’ or ‘fitness’ in nature and how systems are regulated.

56. Ibid., 102.
ity’ by naturalists in their studies, with the utility of the works of artisans as described for arts and crafts in the *Encyclopédie*. The works of insects and the works of locksmiths deserved the same respect according to naturalists and *philosophes*.57 They believed that everything in nature was created to a particular end, it had a ‘utility’.58 In art, nature so depicted as creating utility in all details was represented through personification as ‘Nature’, often a goddess in a Greco-Roman fashion, ‘mother Nature’. For Daston, this practice of observing nature and its values led to vesting nature of moral authority.59

This moral authority vested in nature, and which justifies its study and the respect for its laws, can be found in Cloots. His ‘system’, based on a science of nature and a science of human mores, is heavily influenced by d’Holbach and Diderot, although Cloots disagrees with their views regarding borders and the organisation of society. There is also some physiocratic elements in Cloots’s views about economic organisation, and, most importantly, the ‘despotism of the law’.

*Moral Authority*

Paul Thiry d’Holbach (1723–1789) rejected metaphysics in natural law associated with religious dogmas, and instead established a science with physical laws of nature. This move is very much in line with the question of how natural law became a parallel of the laws of nature, i.e. morality as a science obeying laws in par with the natural world.60 Nature, for d’Holbach, is the only source of knowledge on humankind.61 Nature is also a superior power that universally sanctions excesses (for example gluttony) with consequences (a short life-span).62 It is therefore a System of nature with laws of *Natural politics*, and one must observe nature scientifically by accepting the world as it really is rather than trying to shape it according to metaphysical ideas of how it ought to be.63 Therefore, man is in society not because it is better than a so-called state of nature, which only exists in some *philosophes’* mind, but because it is the natural state: ‘L’homme ... fut toujours en Société’.64 However, d’Holbach recognises the plurality of societies, rather

58. Ibid., 123.
59. Ibid., 126.
60. Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis, eds., *Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008).
62. Ibid., 448–452.
63. Paul Henri Thiry baron d’Holbach, *La politique naturelle ; ou, Discours sur les vrais principes du gouvernement, par un ancien magistrat*, vol. 1 (Londres [i.e. Amsterdam]: s.n., 1773).
64. Ibid., 5.
than one society of humankind. Moreover, the sovereign power is then based on the observation of nature and man, and must therefore protect it and do what leads to ‘happiness’.

Chapter two already showed how Cloots designed his political thought as a ‘system’, which seems to be in a Wolffian paradigm because of Cloots’s understanding of knowledge. Moving away from natural theology, Cloots’s revolutionary thought seems close to d’Holbach’s understanding of nature: morals is akin to a science with laws to be respected, nature is a superior power, and natural laws must be respected as human laws because the state of society is the state of nature. We have seen in the preceding chapter how Cloots replaced faith with reason to find the source of morality in nature and its observation rather than scriptures. Very clearly, Cloots writes that nature is the guide for morality as it is wiser than men: ‘la nature est plus sage que les hommes’. In another speech to the National Assembly on 9 September 1792, Cloots reiterates the same view in order to argue for the single human race, and therefore the need to organise his universal republic:

La nature, plus puissante que les hommes dénaturés, nous ramène impérieusement à l’arbitrage de la famille humaine ; et cette famille est unique comme la nature.

In his speech ‘Diplomatie révolutionnaire’ on 5 October 1793, Cloots declared again that ‘La nature n’a rien fait en vain, et une république fondée sur les lois naturelles ne contrariera jamais la nature’.

By the same token, Cloots often compares the human race to other species of animals in order to accentuate how humankind is a ‘child of mother nature’ just like other living beings on earth. ‘La famille humaine est soumise à des lois primitives, comme la famille des abeilles ou des castors’. This primitive law, as we will see below, is natural law, which is in fact a political and social law since society is the natural state. Just like animals are observed naturally in flocks, so are human beings. Therefore, Cloots makes the comparison between bees and men, and a beehive and a city. Just like other animals, like castors, man is naturally ‘sociable and industrious’. Society is nature, sociability is nature, there is no separation between a state of nature and a state of society, we live in both according to Cloots.

The comparison with other animals, and bees in particular, is not fortuitous. The allegory of the bees and the beehive is an old trope in Western literature and its representation of human society as industrious and chaste was still present in the eighteenth-century through the enduring influence

65. Ibid., 13.
66. Ibid., 20.
68. Cloots, Ecrits révolutionnaires, 393.
69. Ibid., 614.
of Virgil and Aristotle. So much so, that a book inverting the trope to argue in favour of vice for the collective good — The Fable of the Bee by the Anglo-Dutch philosopher and political economist Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) — was ordered to be burned on a public square in Paris in 1740 when its French translation was published. Many books were ordered to be destroyed, but it is interesting that the book was burned because it inverted the trope. Through this inversion of the trope, Mandeville really wanted to deflate the anthropocentric view of humankind as superior and rational, ‘naturally good’, and through this Mandeville showed how the use of ‘nature’ had value attached to it and was not neutral. What Mandeville really denounced was the confusion made between authority and nature by moralists using the bee trope ‘cunningly’ in order to mask authority without seeming to.

Physiocratic Elements

Cloots’s thought contains physiocratic elements, particularly when it comes to economics, even if he never acknowledges any of the physiocrats. His economic programme is in line with the ‘laissez faire, laissez passer’ of the physiocrates, as well as respecting the natural order in the socio-economic organisation of society:

La nature a donné à tel pays du vin, à tel autre du blé ; un pays occupe le haut d’un fleuve, un autre en occupe les bouches. Tout se détériore en élevant un mur entre le pays de la vigne et le pays du froment, entre la montagne des sources et la plaine des embouchures, entre les pressoirs de l’huile et les mamelles de la génisse ... et comme toutes les rivières, les fleuves et les mers communiquent ensemble naturellement, c’est à nous de multiplier ces communications par des chemins et des canaux, et non pas de les interrompre par des constitutions, des frontières, des forteresses, des escadres. Imitons la nature, si nous voulons être ses heureux enfants.

For Cloots, there is a virtuous circle between the economy and peace in aligning political and economic organisations with nature. The absence of obstacles to trade produces peace, and peace produces a surplus of goods that even natural calamities cannot undermine:

72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., 79.
74. Ibid., 80–85.
Le mal physique n’étant plus aggravé par le mal moral, on supportera patiemment l’inclémence des saisons et tous les maux naturels. ... La paix perpétuelle maintiendra un niveau perpétuel entre la consommation et les consommateurs, entre l’ouvrage et les ouvriers.76

Physiocracy is a term coined from the Greek words physis (φύσις), nature, and kratos (Κράτος), power or government (from the god Kratos in Greek mythology).77 Physiocracy is better known for its economic theory of minimal state intervention in trade as summed up in the motto ‘laissez faire les hommes, laissez passer les marchandises’, coined by French economist Jacques Claude Marie Vincent de Gournay (1712–1759).78 Physiocracy was the precursor of liberalism, and stood opposed to mercantilism that defended protectorist state intervention in trade. Its prominent figure was the physician and economist François Quesnay (1694–1774) and the statesman and economist Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727–1781). Other notable members were the marquis de Mirabeau (1749–1791), Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours (1739–1817), and Pierre-Paul-François Le Mercier de

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76. Ibid., 488–489.
78. See Albertone, ‘Physiocracy’.
La Rivière de Saint-Médard (1719–1801). Quesnay wrote several articles for Diderot and d’Alembert’s *Encyclopédie* disseminating physiocratic principles regarding agrarian economy: ‘Fermiers’, ‘Grains’, ‘Homme’. Under his supervision, Le Mercier de la Rivière wrote *L’Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques* (1767). Diderot recommended this book to the Russian tsarina for reforming her empire.79 Since physiocracy considered economics as a science about organising society according to a natural order, it was also a political theory, and was focused on maintaining natural law.

In order to maintain natural order, physiocrats argued that a strong political power was needed, which they call ‘legal despotism’.80 There was therefore a tension between a general freedom and absence of state intervention, and the need for a strong state power to implement and protect the free order of nature. The physiocrats developed a different theory of representation, which departed from the representation according to estates or orders, emphasising the role of representing economic interests such as landowners. This theory of representation in turn influenced the revolutionaries in shaping the representative system of the republic, particularly through Condorcet and the Girondists.81 Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) was a close friend and protégé of Turgot who procured his position as ‘Inspecteur général de la Monnaie’.82 Condorcet in his *Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain* writes about physiocracy as a ‘nouvelle science’, ‘système si simple’, ‘doctrine nouvelle’, ‘progrès dans la politique et dans l’économie politique’.83

Regarding the French physiocrats, Cloots did not cite any of them with two exceptions. First, Dupont de Nemours, but only in his summary of the French Revolution mentioning his pamphlet defending the ‘pacte de famille’ (alliance treaty between the French and Spanish crowns) ‘en esclave’, when Sieyès attacked it ‘en homme libre’.84 Second, in *Vœux d’un gallophile*, Cloots criticised Mirabeau’s book *Ami des hommes*:85

J’ai lu Mirabeau & ne puis comprendre comment son *Ami des Hommes* a fait une si grande fortune. Ce livre peche par le principe. *Repousses l’or & attirez les denrées de l’étranger,* nous dit-il. Maxime extravagante ! Je dis, au contraire : *attirez*

80. Albertone, ‘Physiocracy’.
81. Ibid.
Cloots underlined the importance of gold in the international economy. In the Gnadenthal library catalogue, there are no listed books of the physiocrats. However, it is difficult not to see some parallels with physiocracy in Cloots’s thought, even if he disagreed with Mirabeau’s economic doctrine and did not cite any other physiocrats. In *Vœux d’un gallophile*, Cloots showed interest and emphasised the importance of ‘économie rurale’, the importance of cultivating and exploiting the land.

Cloots advocated, as the physiocrats did, a minimal political organisation based on simple principles derived from nature. Cloots also called his political thought a ‘simple system’, and ‘inspired by nature’, reminiscent of Condorcet’s formulations. This simplicity of a system based on nature is obvious in quotation used as epigraph to chapter two, or again here: ‘Mon système est si simple, si beau, si analogue à la nature humaine...’. In the last chapter on republicanism, we will see how Cloots’s universal republic was meant as a minimal form of government, also in line with physiocratic views that following nature requires the absence of state intervention. But it is really the concept of ‘legal despotism’ that shows the affinity of Cloots with physiocratic political thought: ‘... la liberté civile est une force coercive qui enchaîne tous les despotismes individuels sous le despotisme de la loi’. Cloots’s expression of legal despotism is however different from the physiocrats’ in that Cloots opposes it to monarchical despotism, on the one hand, and, on the other, attaches it to his conception of general will, as we will see below. Then again, Cloots also modifies Rousseau’s general will in adapting it to the whole human race as one single sovereign. The expression of general will is the law, that ‘despotically’ applies to all: ‘La paix ne sera faite sur la terre, que par l’expression unique de toutes les volontés individuelles ; par le despotisme de la loi universelle’. We will analyse Cloots’s conception of general will further below.

However, unlike the physiocrats, Cloots disapproved of having a political representation based on economic orders. Physiocrats rejected the traditional division of corporate assemblies of constituted orders with a representation based on property. On the contrary, Cloots shared Rousseau’s concept of the general will and the necessity to reject any corporation that may accumulate a strong individual will against the general will, as we will see below.

86. Cloots, *Vœux d’un gallophile*, 42.
87. Ibid., 257.
90. Ibid., 159.
Natural Borders

Since nature is the basis for the new *scientia civilis*, and since one observes no borders in nature, Cloots considers that there can be no political borders either between human beings. However, his reasoning evolved and contradicted itself. Cloots moved from a position of ‘natural borders’ between countries to a position of ‘no borders besides the one between the earth and the firmament’. Prior to the Revolution, in *Vœux d’un gallophile*, Cloots expressed the idea, based on nature, of ‘Gaul’s natural borders’. He wrote that the ‘natural borders’ of Gaul are the Alps, the Pyrenees mountain, the Rhine, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. When Cloots wrote in 1786 that the Rhine was the natural border of France, he was the first to take such a clear position so early; the same position on natural borders and the Rhine was only taken by the revolutionaries after five years of lengthy debates. Cloots’s argument for the natural borders of France in 1786 was almost out of a sense of aesthetic and philosophical harmony; the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Atlantic ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Rhine, all seem to delimit naturally the historical Gaul. Other natural borders, other rivers, delimit in the same manner the other European powers, in such a way that no one could ever again claim territory over another, and Europe will live in perpetual peace. However, Cloots changed his position after the Revolution, after he ‘discovered’ his ‘system’ of the ‘single nation of the human race’. Early 1792, debates were renewed regarding the ‘natural borders’ of France. Cloots’s argumentation, against any border, natural or political, is, to him, as much an empirical observation of nature from which a general law for governing humankind is induced, and an observation of human history and its progress:

_On discute en Europe les intérêts d’un habitant des antipodes, et l’on doutera si une assemblée représentative des deux hémisphères peut exister pour le bonheur permanent de l’humanité ! Je ne connais de barrière naturelle qu’entre la Terre et le firmament._

91. See the biography chapter, section ‘Cloots’s first revolutionary writings’ for an explanation of the use of the name ‘Gaul’ rather than ‘France’.
The only natural border existing is the one that separates a planet from another one, or the earth from the firmament. And Cloots already recognises the progress in human communication and interdependence:

Les prétendues barrières naturelles qui s’opposent à cette union désirable sont des barrières aussi fragiles que factices. Les Alpes et les Pyrénées, le Rhin et l’Océan, dans les siècles nébuleux, n’ont pas été des barrières pour les Carthaginois et les Romains, pour les Grecs et les Scythes, pour les Goths et les Normands ; et l’on nous répétera un adage que nos possession dans les deux Indes réfutent aussi victorieusement que les armées d’Annibal et de César, de Charlemagne et de Charles Quint. Nous recevons chaque jour sur la Seine qui coule dans le centre des climats, à égale distance du Pôle et de la Ligne, nous recevons, dis-je, des courriers et des avis de Rome et de Dublin, de Lisbonne et de Pétersbourg, de Boston et de Batavia ; et l’on nous parle encore des barrières naturelles de la France !

Cloots thus contradicts himself and his previous position, actually debating against his own previous argument: the so-called natural borders were no borders at all to stop any foreign army. Moreover, communication between human beings is not stopped by any natural borders either. Therefore, according to Cloots, observing nature and observing human activities lead to the conclusion that borders simply do not exist in nature, and as a consequence neither should they in human societies, which must respect the principles set by nature.

Par exemple, les pacages de la Hollande et les guérets de la Beauce, et les graves de Bordeaux, et les côteaux de la Provence ne sauraient s’isoler sans se faire un tort mutuel ; et comme toutes les rivières, les fleuves et les mers communiquent ensemble naturellement, c’est à nous de multiplier ces communications par des chemins et des canaux, et non pas de les interrompre par des constitutions, des frontières, des fortresses, des escadres. Imitons la nature, si nous voulons être ses heureux enfants.

The only natural frontier that Cloots recognises is the one between the earth and the firmament. However, by stating so he directly contradicts himself from his former position on the extension of the ‘natural borders’ of France as expressed in Vœux d’un gallophile.
Furthermore, for Cloots, nature cannot stand the separation of the human race into different political units because man has been bestowed with an instinct and proselytism in order to build unity:

La nature abhorre ce morcellement dont nous sommes punis avec rigueur ; elle semble n’avoir donné à l’homme l’esprit de prosélytisme que pour rompre les barrières qui nous séparent.\textsuperscript{101}

It is true, however, that nature has given different colours of skin to mankind, but that should not be the principle on which to separate mankind into different sovereign states.\textsuperscript{102} After all, man has the unique ability to find through different means a common ground for all:

Cette heureuse tendance des hommes de tout climat, pour trouver, par des moyens différents, le niveau commun de la nature nous annonce l’approche du nivellement final : la souveraineté universelle, la nation unique, le peuple humain.\textsuperscript{103}

To sum up this section, it seems that Cloots replaced God in natural law theory with nature. Doing so, Cloots seems to be influenced by d’Holbach and physiocratic views of nature as imposing a natural order or system that humankind ought to respect in order to build a functioning society. It is therefore within the rationalist tradition of natural law that Cloots seems to base his system, perhaps remembering his courses on Wolff by Sulzer in Berlin. If nature has laws that can be observed and deduced by reason in order to be imposed in society through ‘legal despotism’, here Cloots takes the other natural law tradition into consideration and builds his system, which is original, but also contradictory.

\textbf{Nature and Society}

Natural law traditions had various views about how societies came to be. Cloots adopts d’Holbach’s position regarding the absence of a transition from a natural to a social state, and hence the absence of a social contract. The social state is the natural state, and the general will of the people is the sovereign law, the people being the whole human race. Regarding the general will, Cloots makes a distinction between the ‘despotism of law’ that it entails, and the ‘despotism of reason’. This seems to be the result of combining Rousseau and Diderot’s views on general will, and a reminiscence of voluntarism and rationalism in natural law theories.

\textsuperscript{101} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 306.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 271.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 316.
Absence of Social Contract

Cloots rejects the transition from a supposed ‘state of nature’ to a state of society. Already in *L’orateur du genre humain* Cloots makes it clear when he writes an account of the debates held at the *Cercle Social* — also called *le Cirque* due to its location in the Cirque du Palais Royal. Cloots praises Fauchet, who established the *Cercle Social* with Brissot, for criticising Rousseau, and showing the ‘mistakes’ of the ‘social contract’. After that, Cloots states that there is no transition from a natural state to a social state because the so-called social state is just as natural to man as it is to other gregarious animals:

> On a perdu plusieurs mois au Cirque, à mesurer le passage de l’état naturel à l’état social ; comme si l’état social n’était pas l’état naturel de l’homme, de l’abeille, de la fourmi, du gros bétail, du menu bétail, des volatiles et des poissons.\(^{104}\)

This rejection of a transition from a state of nature to society, and hence the rejection of a social contract, is what Edelstein identifies as the key element of ‘natural republicanism’.\(^{105}\) It has to be noted that Scottish philosopher and historian Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), although not a natural republican, had already stated this absence of transition, or equated the state of nature with the state of society, in *Essay on the History of Civil Society*.\(^{106}\)

However, Cloots never mentions Ferguson, and his works do not appear in the catalogue of the Gnadenthal castle library. Edelstein sees the two political languages of ‘natural rights’ and ‘classical republicanism’ as mutually compatible and as fusioning in the eighteenth century. The language of natural rights posited an imaginary state of nature from which individuals exited to a state of society by forming a social contract in order to either protect their natural rights — Lockean version — or to protect them against a violent state of nature — Hobbesian version. The language of republicanism implied a constitution between citizens to create a republic with laws to protect them. Edelstein identifies Mably as a perfect example of the fusion of these two languages, because he recognises the need for good laws, but also the need for political systems to obey the natural order.\(^{107}\)

Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709–1785), also known as Abbé de Mably, wrote *Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen* in 1758, but it was only published after his death in 1789.\(^{108}\) However, the manuscript was widely circulated

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before its publication.\footnote{109} The book opens with a quotation of Cicero from \textit{De Republica}, of which the book is a long commentary: ‘Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna...’\footnote{110} For Mably the state of nature was a state of perfect equality and freedom, where the only duty was to secure one’s own happiness.\footnote{111} However, individuals recognised its limitation and therefore made a contract to transfer their rights to magistrates, thus leaving the state of nature to civil society.\footnote{112} Mably criticises here other natural law writers here, caricaturing their positions and tarring them with the same brush: Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff, and Hobbes.\footnote{113} According to Mably, these authors are mistaken in conceiving the natural state as if it had to be ended and cancelled, when it had to be secured and perfected.\footnote{114} Mably argues that, in order to understand the state of nature, we must examine human nature. The most essential and noble attribute is reason, understood as Cicero’s \textit{recta ratio}.\footnote{115} Nature has bestowed upon us reason, liberty, and a desire to seek happiness; if any of these three faculties is threatened, one can invoke it against an unjust government.\footnote{116} The sovereign power belongs to the people, who bestowed it to the magistrates and can always revoke it.\footnote{117} Ultimately, Mably is a ‘classical republican’: he admired Athens and Sparta as republics. As such, he also admired the plurality of republics, as numerous as there are sovereign peoples.

Cloots often cites Mably,\footnote{118} but does not seem to follow him beyond his classical republicanism and following the natural order in laws. Cloots also agrees with Mably in that the natural state should be secured, although he follows d’Holbach in that there is no transition between the two rather than the need to secure the former in the latter. Cloots is very critical of Mably, as he was of Rousseau, regarding their views on religious tolerance, which he found intolerant.\footnote{119} And he is equally critical of both regarding their views on a plurality of republics and federalism, as we will analyse further in the chapter on republicanism.\footnote{120}

\footnote{110. ‘True law is right reason in agreement with nature, universal, unchangeable, and eternal...’, in Johnson Kent Wright, \textit{A Classical Republican in Eighteenth-Century France: The Political Thought of Mably} (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 72.}
\footnote{111. Ibid.}
\footnote{112. Ibid.}
\footnote{113. Ibid.}
\footnote{114. Ibid., 73.}
\footnote{115. Ibid., 75.}
\footnote{116. Ibid.}
\footnote{117. Ibid., 76.}
\footnote{118. Cloots, \textit{Ecrits révolutionnaires}, 147, 148, 410, 547.}
\footnote{119. Ibid., 147–148.}
\footnote{120. Ibid., 410.}
Cloots never uses the term ‘sociability’, the key concept to explain the transition from nature to society, throughout his revolutionary writings. Cloots only uses the term ‘sociable’ a little later in the same paragraph when comparing flocks of animals and humans:

... vous trouverez partout des peuples plus ou moins industrious et sociables que le castor, l’éléphant et l’homme. Fontenelle a rendu gaïement une pensée profonde, en disant que « Paris est à la campagne ». Une ville, une ruche d’hommes est l’ouvrage de la nature, pas moins qu’une ruche d’abeilles. La différence entre nous et les étrangers, et je ne connais pas d’autres étrangers que les autres espèces d’animaux, c’est que nous n’atteignons pas directement à la perfection, nous avons malheureusement le choix des modifications.

That the state of society is the state of nature is confirmed by observing how nature works, and how human nature behaves:

Il est dans la nature de l’homme d’aimer la société, et plus la réunion d’hommes est nombreuse, plus les agréments sont nombreux et variés. La foule attire la foule, et les déserts repoussent les humains.

So, man, this ‘industrious and sociable’ animal among others, is born in the natural state of society. And since nature does not know of any limit, of any border, this society of individual human beings does not recognise borders either. For Cloots, there is only one society as nature is one as well. Moreover, history shows how dangerous the plurality of societies, that is to say of sovereign powers, is: ‘La nature est une, la société est une : les puissances collectives s’entrechoquent comme les individus indépendants’. Nature requires unity: ‘L’unité, l’unité, la nature entière réclame l’unité !’

This unity of human society constitutes the sovereign: universal, single, and indivisible. Humankind takes therefore the role of God in natural law theories, in that it is the ultimate source of power. This is both a solution and an absolute contradiction.

Cloots makes the comparison several times in his works, but there is a confusion between God and nature. In his article ‘La monarchie sans roi’, published in Annales patriotiques et littéraires on 27 July 1792, Cloots wrote: ‘Vox populi, vox Dei : la voix du peuple est la voix de la nature. ... Le genre humain est Dieu, les aristocrates sont des athées.’ In Bases constitutionnelles, Cloots writes:

... le genre humain, l’Être Suprême.... Les attributs d’une divinité fantastique appartiennent réellement à la divinité politique. J’ai dit, et je le répète, que le genre humain est Dieu, les aristocrates sont des athées.

The confusion between humankind as God and Nature may not be fortuitous. It may be a sign of the plurality of approaches that Cloots took regarding natural law. As we will see below on the general will, Cloots followed Diderot’s version of general will replacing God with humankind, and based on reason and liberty. But Cloots also understood the general will with Rousseau as the sum of individual wills forming an indivisible general will. The problem is that the reason for taking each individual of the human race as forming a general will comes from having natural rights at birth. Being free and equal is what gives each individual the same equal right of sovereignty. So, who gave these natural rights to humankind if humankind is sovereign? If nature gave these rights to humankind, then how can humankind be sovereign at all in the way that God was sovereign in natural law theories?

By the same token, the ‘social contract’ is natural, or as Cloots puts it, ‘primitive’, and it is made by the whole human race:

Le genre humain ne doit trouver aucune résistance nulle part ;
il agit comme bon lui semble, il ne souffre point de co-associé.
Ce contrat primitif, cette condition éternelle est le seul cachet
de la souveraineté.

Since there is no transition from a natural state to a social state, there is no ‘social contract’. The contract, if any, is primitive and natural, as eternal as the human race and nature. This again emphasises the contradiction between nature and the human race as the moral authority that justifies sovereignty; the issue that Rousseau saw after writing his *manuscrit de Genève* when discarding a state of nature, and the reason why nature reappeared in the published version of the *Contrat social*.

**General Will**

Another reason that Cloots argues for the unity of society is the notion of general will. We have already seen that Diderot and Rousseau are two of the names that Cloots often cited. They each developed influential and opposed theories of general will. Despite the lack of direct reference to their works, there is little doubt that Cloots read them, and it seems that he developed his conception of the general will as a sort of compromise between the two. However, Cloots is more inclined to follow Diderot because of

127. Ibid., 477.
their common affinities with physiocratic thought. But Cloots also accepts Rousseau’s general will as indivisible and essential to the unity of a political body. Rousseau’s conception of general will is so crucial to the existence of society that he rejects any partition of it into any collective bodies. Moreover, Rousseau’s general will is not just any whimsical will of the majority, but based in natural law. Cloots uses the same notion of general will but enlarged to the whole human race, excluding any particular will of any other collective body.

Diderot did not discuss the questions of natural law traditions in any comprehensive treatise, but in various discussions or comments on other authors. Diderot’s critique of Christian morality led him to establish a ‘science of mores’ in the science of nature. As such, Diderot sees morals as another form of the physical life, and determined by it in a mechanistic way. As such, only politics can determine morality, as a scientific conditioning of consciences. With his views on political authority and general will, Diderot contributed to the political thought of his time and even preceded Rousseau despite having been eclipsed in this role by intellectual historians.

In his article on ‘droit naturel (morale)’ in the Encyclopédie, Diderot answered to Boucher d’Argis’s article in the same Encyclopédie ‘droit de la nature’, which was based on Burlamaqui. Diderot starts by stating that freedom is the precondition for any conception of justice/injustice, morality/immorality, good/evil, rights, or obligations. Secondly, reason is what sets the human race apart from other animals, and reason is the characteristic that leads to truth, which must be obeyed unless one is to loose the quality of being human. Once that is settled, one must recognise that an individual cannot decide alone what is just or unjust by virtue of his reason because that would be the equivalent of being judge and jury. It is therefore the ‘human race’ (‘genre humain’), which can decide what is good and evil, because of its passion for the well-being of all. Next, Diderot introduced the notion of ‘volonté générale’ (general will) as the guide for the individual to know the extent of his/her freedom: ‘Vous avez le droit naturel

128. Thomson, Materialism and Society, 248.
130. Ibid., 320.
134. Ibid., 116.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
le plus sacré à tout ce qui ne vous est point contesté par l’espèce entiere’.

This ‘general will’ is found everywhere in nature, from the jus gentium to the behaviour of peuples sauvages et barbares. The description is vague and includes the law of nations and anthropological observations about human nature, but the individual who solely responds to her particular will is an ennemi du genre humain’. The general will is deduced through reason without regard for any human passion or emotion, for Diderot. The general will is always right and legislative power must therefore be the general will and not individual wills, which can be wrong. As Proust notes, Diderot replaced the role that God played for Burlamaqui with the human ‘species’.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) contributed to a sentimentalisation of the language of natural law. As Hunt has shown, the rise of the discourse of human rights corresponded to a rise in best-selling novels such as Rousseau’s Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse (1761), and, with it, the development of sentiments and empathy, which led to an emotional acception of rights in all human beings. We have seen in the biography chapter that Cloots was receptive to Rousseau’s novels and was therefore likely sharing the same sentimentalisation of natural rights. Scholars agree that Rousseau had knowledge of natural law thinkers such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, and Burlamaqui, but they disagree regarding Rousseau’s intellectual position towards them. Rosenblatt has noted the importance of the intellectual and political context of Geneva to Rousseau’s position towards natural law, and notably the fact that natural law theories — Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui in particular — were used to support the unjust patrician regime in Geneva. However, Rousseau’s view of nature was close to Burlamaqui’s, which itself was close to Leibniz, in that he considered nature as a precise, harmonious, and ordered phenomenon, as his objection to Voltaire’s poem on the disaster of Lisbon shows in their correspondence.

138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Proust, Diderot et l’encyclopédie, 387.
144. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva, 88–89.
145. For an overview of the Genevan context see ibid., ch. 3, 88–158; also for a nuanced view of the importance of the Genevan context see Whatmore, Against War and Empire. Geneva, Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century, ch. 3, 54–97.
147. Douglass, ‘Rousseau’s Debt to Burlamaqui’.
presented his view on natural law and nature in his *Second Discourse On the Origins of Inequality*. In the *Second Discourse*, Rousseau attacks the discrepancy in the natural law theories of Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui in that, on the one hand, they have a positive vision of human nature, but, on the other, they posit that the state of nature is negative nonetheless and pushed men to restrict their liberty in favour of a sovereign. In general, Rousseau accused previous philosophers of a sort of philosophical anachronism by putting in conceptions of nature conceptions that are from society.

Rousseau identified the source of this issue in a discrepancy between describing man as God made him, and as he was. Natural man is described by Rousseau as strong, free, and virtuous; it is society that corrupted him. This observation on man’s strength stems from accounts published by travellers of their encounters with ‘primitive societies’: they are physically and psychologically strong. Why then did man enter society since there was no conflict and all lived in a state of independence? Rousseau mocked the concept of sociability and argued that it was some historical circumstances: when the first man found himself needing assistance and the first man found it useful to use other men as a result. Rousseau presents instead an incremental history of the emergence of dependency, first material with property, and then psychological with the development of social groups. A sort of self-sustaining vicious cycle was thus created in that dependency led to greater specialisation of workers, which led to inequality, which in turned fuelled the state of dependency. The social contract presented by Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, and Burlamaqui was presented as a way to avoid this exploitation, but as a matter of fact, Rousseau argues, it was a bogus argument, a trick for imposing a contract that only benefited a few, whilst taking away man’s freedom.

Rousseau only provides a solution in the *Social Contract* to this critique of natural law in the *Second Discourse*. Doing so, he reintroduced contract theory in France, which had not been used since the sixteenth century, by

152. Ibid.
154. Ibid., 166–167.
157. Ibid., 170–171.
merging the French conception of absolutist sovereignty and popular constitutionalist republic. Rousseau answered in the first version of his *Social Contract* to Denis Diderot’s (1713–1784) conception of ‘general will’ expounded in the *Encyclopédie*. In this *manuscrit de Genève* Rousseau rejects the idea of a ‘golden age’ of the state of nature. However, as Wokler argues, since this rejection of natural law led to a lack of overriding moral sanction for the social contract, he subsequently removed this part and wrote a new version. In his chapter on natural law, later cut in the published version, Rousseau argued that, unlike what ‘philosophes’ stated, the reasoning of entering society after being a man in the natural society of humankind was wrong and upside down: man is first a man in a natural sense after being a citizen in a society. Rousseau aimed directly at Diderot, and what he called the ‘cosmopolites’ (meaning probably the collaborators of the *Encyclopédie*), as Diderot based his article on natural law and his conception of the general will on Pufendorf and Barbeyrac.

Nous concevons la société générale d’après nos sociétés particulières, l’établissement des petites Républiques nous fait songer à la grande, et nous ne commençons proprement à devenir hommes qu’après avoir été Citoyens. Par où l’on voit ce qu’il faut penser de ces prétendus Cosmopolites, qui justifiant leur amour pour la patrie par leur amour pour le genre humain, se vantent d’aimer tout le monde pour avoir droit de n’aimer personne.

Rousseau’s view on how individuals become a people is similar to Hobbes’s, although Rousseau had a different answer: without unity, a group is an aggregation and not an association; hence, the community and the sovereign are the same, legitimacy depends on the people retaining sovereignty, even if not all inhabitants need be citizens. The transition operated through the social contract is an exchange of natural liberty for civil rights; through this act, personality is transcended in the contract and individuals gain self-mastery. Each particular individual particular will together combined form a moral person with a general will. The only sovereign must be this general will since it is the only force that can govern a state.

162. Wokler, *Rousseau, the Age of Enlightenment, and Their Legacies*, 90.
163. Ibid., 97–98.
166. Ibid., 178.
for the benefit of the ‘common good’. Sovereignty is therefore inalienable and indivisible or it is not for the common good.

The idea of ‘general will’ is an old one that dates back to theological discussions on God’s will as general will leading to natural law, and distinguished from God’s actions which were His particular will expressed through miracles. Rousseau recycled this originally divine general will already used by Pascal, Malebranche, Fénelon, or Leibniz, and directly as a political concept by Pierre Bayle in his *Pensées diverses sur la comète*. Similar to the distinction between God’s will and God’s actions, the general will of the people is distinguished from the particular interests of its individual members, in order to reach the objective of a common good. A difficulty arises in this transition from God’s will to the people’s general will: men’s will must be made general, and for Rousseau this is done through education. There is thus a conundrum between free will and morality, as Riley notes, but Rousseau’s solution is that man must be educated before becoming free; the capacity to decide is made and not innate.

Since general will is what identifies and sustains the existence of a collective body, Rousseau refused to see it diluted by allowing other collective bodies have a political role. The general will has to be willed by the citizens, but it is not equal to their whims; it is based on what sustains society as prescribed by natural law. Moreover, the general will is a principle of political right, and the object of political right is liberty and equality (as independence and procedure). A majority is the only means to achieve this political right for Rousseau, so it may be that the majority is wrong, but the citizens cannot override the general will. Some have called this view ‘illiberal’ as leading to a totalitarian despotism, although Rousseau would have disapproved of such a reading and would never have agreed that liberating the whole humanity would have ‘justified shedding the blood of a

172. Ibid., 133–134.
174. Ibid., 182.
175. Ibid., 182–183.
176. Ibid., 182.
single man’. Blum has argued that the vision of Rousseau as spreading the seeds of totalitarianism was related to the discursive construction of Rousseau and his conception of virtue by the revolutionaries.

Rousseau accepted the principle of representation of individual members by magistrates in the government; because the sovereign is democratic, whereas a democratic government would entail direct democracy, which would be impossible; the execution of laws willed by the democratic sovereign through the general will requires an intermediary, an aristocracy. The larger the state the weaker the relation between the government and the sovereign because the particular wills can be more powerful, which requires a more powerful government and thus less freedom. Moreover, Rousseau’s view of the role of government was intrusive in that some institutions, a Censor and a civil religion or any religion accepting other ones and other truths, should be in charge of public morality to ensure the morality of citizens — atheism being the worst for a republic.

Rousseau, however, was not against the project of a universal society, as he defended Saint-Pierre’s project. He believed, first, in the existence of a European society of interdependent states with a common history and culture. But this society should be organised by a ‘coercive force’, which can only be a union between the most powerful sovereign states in an assembly. Voltaire rejected with sarcasm this so-called ‘universal’ assembly, to which the emperor of China was not invited. Rousseau also accepted, before his ‘Social Contract’ that separated the world into as many societies as ‘general wills’, that natural law applied to all of them nonetheless because it was the ‘general will’ of the society of humankind:

... car alors la grande ville du monde devient le corps politique dont la loi de nature est toûjours la volonté générale, et dont les états et peuples divers ne sont que des membres indivi-

180. Ibid., 190.
As Riley notes, the idea of *generality* developed by Pascal, Malebranche, Fénelon, Bayle, and Rousseau is between *particularity* and *universality*, and in that it is distinctly French; as opposed to ‘German rationalistic universalism’ in Kant’s thought.\(^{186}\) This Rousseauist *generality* tends towards universality by rising above the particular, but is not building on reason and is thus lesser than Kantian universal will.\(^{187}\)

The first reference to general will by Cloots is in *L’orateur du genre humain* discussing the pamphlet *Supplément au contrat social* by Gudin. Paul-Philippe Gudin de La Brenellerie (1738–1820) was an author who wrote several plays and published this pamphlet as a praise to Rousseau’s original work, with the addition of his own views.\(^{188}\) Cloots criticises this pamphlet vehemently on various grounds, but what matters here is Cloots’s view on the general will. Cloots accuses Gudin of contradicting himself when justifying the royal veto to the acts of parliament. Regarding English bicameralism Gudin argued that the assembly had a great authority but was rightly subjected to the veto of a house of Lords, which was the product of feudal history and not of the will of the English nation — therefore contrary to liberty.\(^{189}\) Implicitly, Cloots makes the argument that a national assembly — the chamber of parliament with elected representatives of the sovereign people — is the only legitimate representative of the general will of the people. Cloots then also argues against Gudin’s view on ‘gradation’ that built upon Rousseau’s conception in *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne*.\(^{190}\) The book was published after Rousseau’s death, but was circulated in manuscript form already since 1773. Rousseau was more concerned with saving Poland by adapting existing social and political institutions than applying his own philosophy, and that is why the views expressed are not fully compatible with the *Social Contract*, particularly regarding the ‘gradation’ of citizens in a senate. In *Considérations*, Rousseau expounded in depth a system of gradation for citizens in order to climb to the top of their order in the republic, before entering the senate.\(^{191}\) Cloots argues that Rousseau himself would have rejected this system had he been living during the time of the Revolution. Cloots saw clearly the contradiction in having other political institutions capable of putting a veto to the general will of the people represented by an elected assembly. Unlike Rousseau, Cloots considered national polities as one of those corporations diluting the general will that Rousseau wrote against. As seen previously, and as the next

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\(^{186}\) Riley, ‘Rousseau’s General Will’, 134.

\(^{187}\) Ibid., 135.


\(^{189}\) Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 145.

\(^{190}\) Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa réforme projetée* (Londres: s.n., 1782).

\(^{191}\) Ibid., ch. 13.
The general will guarantees the unity of national sovereignty, for Rousseau, and that means a small republic. For Cloots, the larger the republic, the larger the general will and the stronger national sovereignty: ‘Et plus nos départements seront nombreux, plus ils seront subordonnés à la loi, à la volonté générale’.\(^{192}\) Contrary to Rousseau, Cloots believes that the larger the republic the stronger the union.\(^{193}\) Cloots’s reasoning on the necessity to enlarge a republic as much as possible is based on the historical observation that independent sovereign polities are more likely to fight with one another. In ‘Adresse aux Français, par Anacharsis Cloots, Orateur du genre humain’ on 22 May 1792, Cloots explains: ‘En effet, sans une loi commune, les moindres différends dégénèrent en hostilités longues et atroces.’\(^{194}\) Cloots then cites the example of Italy and Germany where sovereign entities wage war upon one another, as opposed to the national unity in France where two cities settle their disputes in court thanks to a common law for all, a common will. Therefore, Cloots asks rhetorically: ‘Voulez-vous étendre les hostilités d’Avignon et de Carpentras sur la France entière ? Rendez chaque district indépendant de la volonté générale’.\(^{195}\) The major use of the concept of the general will for Cloots is to put an end to wars between nations. The law expressed by the general will is supreme because it is the expression of the sovereign, the people. In that sense it is ‘despotic’, just like any other sovereign laws, but it is a legitimate despotism because it is democratically imposed and self-imposed. The individual wills are a threat to social and political cohesion, and therefore the individual wills of nations are a threat to global cohesion; they are synonymous with wars raged against one another: ‘La paix ne sera faite sur la terre, que par l’expression unique de toutes les volontés individuelles, par le despotisme de la loi universelle’.\(^{196}\)

This poses the same issue as in Rousseau’s conception of the general will: the charges of seeding despotism pure and simple. If it is possible to argue that Rousseau would have never accepted that the blood of a single person be shed to justify liberating the whole world (see above), the same may not be said of Cloots. He wrote the pamphlet *La république universelle* to argue against killing foreign monarchs on the ground that it would only kill the person but not the idea, while reason and the *Déclaration* were the real weapons of choice to kill the idea of monarchy.\(^{197}\) However, already in his *Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais* Cloots minimised acts of violence by

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193. Ibid.
195. Ibid.
the Parisian crowds, their killings and exhibition of severed heads on piques, as justified by centuries of oppression. Cloots also declared himself in favour of the war against Prussia and Austria in Spring 1792, going as far as sending money to the troops; although he also sent them a copy of his book arguing against killing foreign monarchs, *La république universelle*. Perhaps the best argument that can be put forth in favour of Cloots’s general will and ‘despotism’ of universal law is that, contrary to Rousseau, he saw the government as minimal in a universal republic. Unlike Rousseau, here Cloots is more influenced by the physiocrats in seeing nature as a sufficient system of governance. Establishing a universal republic would be assuring that the natural order is respected, and, everyone being free, there would be no more need for a government beyond the administration of taxes worldwide, as we will see in the chapter on republicanism. A further argument against despotism in Cloots’s system is that, as we have seen in the chapter on ‘reason’, Cloots introduced the concept of ‘cosmopolitan reason’ as a rational check on a particular reason, a sort of general reason checking particular reasons. Cloots’s ‘cosmopolitan reason’ seems to be different from the philosophers’ ‘universal reason’ in that it is respectful of possible dissent by other populations exercising their reason, but Cloots does not explain more on this concept. It is in line with the *communauté de droite raison* from Barbeyrac’s preface on Pufendorf. It is also close to Diderot. However, most importantly, Cloots’s conception of general will was, as Rousseau’s, an acceptance of the will of the majority, even if he did not think it was right. This is contrary to Diderot’s conception, for whom general will is always right and deduced through reason; or, it could be understood as conform to Diderot if one recognised that a general will that is wrong and contrary to reason was not the real general will but only the *common* will of the people, not conform to the real general will deduced through reason.

In *La république universelle*, Cloots accepts — because it is the general will — the compromise that has been made in keeping the monarchy and the church in the constitution of 1791. This is akin to Rousseau’s pragmatic *Considérations* recycling existing institutions despite their obsolescence into a republican constitution. The king and the church have been maintained in the constitutional settings because the people still believe in them. Cloots unites both institutions as the product of the same philosophy, an ‘artificial philosophy’ as opposed to a ‘natural philosophy’ — ‘artificial philosophy’ that is paradoxically equated with the ‘theocratic system of metaphysics’ — in other words, this is what Cloots identified as traditional natural law theory. Kings and priests are the enemies, declares Cloots, but the people will not remain stupid for long: armed with reason and obeying the law,

200. Cloots, ‘*La République universelle*’, 281.
the people will soon see the absurdity of paying for a ‘étrange roi’ (strange because it makes no sense) and a ‘culte étranger’ (foreign because it is governed from the Vatican). There will not be any violence between republicans and monarchists because republicans respect the law and the general will of the majority. Cloots believes that truth and reason will triumph in a state of free press and expression as everyone will have access to these opinions. Sooner or later, the people will rise to reject kings and priests. So, in this passage, Cloots adheres completely to Rousseau’s general will, including the fact that the majority may be wrong. However, it is Diderot’s general will based on reason that Cloots builds on:

Le principe de la soumission à la loi, au vœu de la majorité, nous préservera de la guerre civile ; car chacun se reposera sur la bonté de sa cause, et on attendra tout du bénéfice de la presse sans entraves. Cette réflexion est de la plus grande importance pour le crédit public et la prospérité nationale et la tranquillité des citoyens timides, qui craindraient une explosion désastreuse entre les royalistes et les républicains. Nous avons notre boussole dans une mer pacifique ; et l’amour du mieux ne nous fera jamais briser la règle qui rallie tous les individus autour de la volonté générale. Le despotisme de la loi ne provoque pas l’insurrection, il se plie tôt ou tard sous le despotisme de la raison. La France libre se lèvera un jour, pour jeter un cri éclatant et unanime : « Point de roi, point de prêtres. »

The ‘despotisme de la loi’ is created by the general will of the people as sovereign represented by elected députés, following Rousseau’s view. However, if it is contrary to reason, it should be respected as the will of the majority even if it is wrong, as Rousseau theorised, but it will eventually have to conform to the ‘despotisme de la raison’. The prevalence of reason is more Diderot’s conception of the general will than Rousseau’s, especially since Cloots sees it as a guide for moral decision. It is also most likely the ‘cosmopolitan reason’ that Cloots has in mind, that is the reason of the human race as a moral and political community.

Even if the general will is momentarily in favour of a constitutional monarchy — or ‘theocracy’, and ‘artificial philosophy’ — respecting the law is primordial because this law will sooner or later submit to reason and a democratic republic — or cosmocracy (although Cloots does not use this term), and ‘natural philosophy’. Of course, that entails that the law in question enforces free speech and liberty of the press. However, later on, Cloots

202. Ibid.
203. Ibid.
used the same argument of majority dominating the general will regarding the sans-culottes. This time, Cloots argued in favour of the ‘passive citizens’, who did not have the right to vote, and were called ‘sans-culottes’. In other words, they form the real majority, even though they cannot vote and cannot participate to the general will. In that, Cloots is faithful to Rousseau, for whom the sovereign had to be democratic, even if the government could not be. In ‘Vive les Sans-Culottes!’ published in Annales patriotiques et littéraires on 31 July 1792, Cloots thus argues:

La loi est l’expression de la volonté générale, vous en convenez : obéissez donc au souverain, c’est-à-dire aux Sans-Culottes ; ils prédominent en nombre et en sagesse dans les villes, les bourgs, les villages, les hameaux, les camps et les forteresses.\(^{204}\)

Cloots adds afterwards that these sans-culottes are ‘les gens honnêtes’, more numerous, as opposed to ‘les honnêtes gens’, less numerous.\(^{205}\) The distinction is subtle and was common at the time. Honesty did not only reflect a moral quality, but also a social respectability; radical republicans, such as Cloots, used the expression ‘honnêtes gens’ as a derisive term that designated those of higher social rank in the ancien régime who could afford to be refined and educated, honnête.\(^{206}\) ‘The real ‘honest’ people were those of lower social rank, les gens honnêtes, the sans-culottes.

In Bases constitutionnelles, Cloots gives a more precise view on the general will.

Toutes nos actions particulières sont soumises à l’inspection du souverain. Un homme solitaire sur le globe serait souverain, une famille solitaire serait souveraine, et cette famille, en croissant et multipliant jusqu’aux extrémités de la terre, ne perdrait pas ses droits imprescriptibles ; de sorte que le souverain est essentiellement seul, unique, indivisible : sa volonté est la suprême loi, l’inaltérable vertu, l’éternelle justice. … Si les droits sont les mêmes, les devoirs sont les mêmes ; or les droits de l’homme sont inhérents à notre nature. … Je sais qu’un homme ne sera jamais étranger à l’homme, et que la volonté particulière sera toujours subordonnée à la volonté générale. … Le droit de souveraineté ne s’altère point par des exceptions locales et passagères.\(^{207}\)

204. Cloots, Ecris révolutionnaires, 375–376.
205. Ibid., 376.
Sovereignty is part of an individual as a natural right. Every individual is sovereign, but by associating themselves they merge their particular sovereignty into a bigger one, since they all share the same right of sovereignty as the same natural right. For this position to work, one has to understand all men as equal and as the same. In this same paragraph Cloots explains his position on humankind, rejecting any sort of distinction: male and female, regardless of the colour of the skin, and regardless of any ‘advancement’ as a civilisation, all are included as a human being having the same equal natural right of sovereignty. The next chapter will develop more fully Cloots’s conception of humankind in the context of his time. Since there is no differentiation between individual human beings, and since all have the same natural right of sovereignty, on the one hand, and since, on the other, sovereignty is unique, single, and indivisible, there can only be one sovereign on earth, and that is the whole human race. The particular will of every individual on earth shall always submit to the general will of the human race.

Cloots’s conception of the general will seems therefore closer to Diderot’s in that it is based on freedom and reason, and considers from the start that individuals have the natural rights of freedom and equality. Moreover, it is the general will of the human race that is taken into consideration. In this understanding of the general will and the natural rights, it seems that Cloots considers them as laws of nature, which would explain the confusion between humankind as God and nature, which Diderot also does:

Deux hommes, ou deux peuples isolés sur la terre pourront se croire souverains ; mais au moment du contact, au premier signal des droits de l’homme, il n’y a plus qu’une volonté absolue dans le monde. Qui dit souverain dit despote ; ne soyons pas étonnés si les prétendus souverains ont ravagé les domaines du souverain légitime dont le despotisme est le résultat heureux et unique de toutes les volontés particulières. Une seule erreur a livré notre globe à une chaîne de calamités ; c’est de couronner toute autre puissance que le genre humain. Détrômons les fractions sociales ; et le tout, le despote par excellence, la loi universelle réalisera les fables de l’âge d’or.208

The fusion of sovereignties between two individuals or two peoples is automatic by contact. And what is more natural than social contact? As seen above, Cloots considered with the physiocrats that the state of society was the natural state. The rights of man are also natural, liberty and equality gives them the equal sovereign right over themselves through their individual will; therefore men are naturally merging their individual will into a general will, the legitimate sovereign of the human race. It is an ‘error’ not to respect nature by allowing any other corporation as sovereign, as having

an independent will from the general will of the human race. Only through the realisation of this general will of humankind, the sovereignty of the human race, is it possible to attain what other philosophers have called the ‘golden age’, even if Cloots rejects, as seen above, such a pre-existing period as ‘natural state’. Another argument worth noting is the despotism of the sovereign. Cloots here does not mean that the general will, the sovereign is arbitrary, but that it is unique and absolute by essence. It is therefore prone to abuses, and has been abused throughout history. The only legitimate ‘despot’, the only legitimate unique and absolute sovereign is the whole human race expressing the general will.

This use of ‘legal despotism’ is again in line with the views of the physiocrats, as described above. However, Cloots does not see any tension between the free will of men and the need for a strong state, or perhaps he thinks that he solved this tension by introducing Rousseau’s concept of general will to his physiocratic view of nature and society. Once the sovereignty of the human race has been established, once the general will of the human race is in place, there is no need for a government because respecting the natural order, natural rights, in a universal republic, will bring perpetual peace and the end to of any conflicts. As we will see in the chapter on republicanism, Cloots envisioned a minimal republic only in charge of collecting taxes and redistributing them evenly.

Cloots’s general will is a mix of Rousseau and Diderot’s. With Diderot, Cloots argues that only the whole human race can decide what is good and evil; only the human race can express the general will that is the supreme law, justice, and morality. Moreover, with Diderot, Cloots argues that all peoples are included, even so-called ‘primitive’ ones. However, the view of general will as indivisible and the rule of the majority is closer to Rousseau’s: the sovereign can only be the general will, it is unique and indivisible, and even if it is wrong, the minority must respect the majority’s will because it is stronger than particular wills.

Edelstein argues that natural rights earlier perceived as deriving from God came to be transferred to nature, resacralised as the new ‘divine legislator’, even for authors such as Diderot and d’Holbach. Cloots was certainly influenced by Diderot and d’Holbach, as he cites them often and his views are similar. Cloots removed God from the equation, and, doing so, he equally came to resacralize nature as the source of superior law to human law and sovereignty; the laws of nature that humankind should respect in positive laws. However, Cloots also resacralised the ‘children of mother nature’; hu-

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mankind. Cloots affirmed that the people was God and that the source of sovereignty came from the individual human being who delegated it to the whole of the human race, creating a ‘despotism of the law’ with the general will of the human race. The general will can however be wrong, contrary to the ‘despotism of reason’. That does not mean that it should not prevail in positive law, and Cloots only believe that eventually it reason will triumph. ‘Cosmopolitan reason’ as a moral guide superior in terms of truth to general will, seems reminiscent of voluntarism and the previous views of natural law where God was the superior moral authority. It seems close to Barbeyrac’s reading of Pufendorf and the ‘communauté de droite raison’.

The rejection of a transition from a state of nature to society, and the use of the term ‘legal despotism’, together with the belief in following nature as the solution to end all political and social ills draws Cloots towards the Jacobin ‘natural republicanism’, as expounded by Edelstein. However, Cloots had a larger vision for this natural republicanism, which was not limited to the French republic. In the concluding chapter, I shall argue that it constitutes a ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’, but it is first necessary to expound Cloots’s view of humanity and of individuality, and to appraise his republicanism in the context of his time. These will be the objects of the next two chapters.

210. Edelstein, The Terror of Natural Right.
Montesquieu published his *De l’esprit des lois* in 1748, which marked a milestone in European thought about human diversity and its cause. For Montesquieu, human diversity was related to the environment in which populations lived: climate, religion, laws, political principles, traditions, customs, and manners. However, to Montesquieu’s eyes, this did not explain what François Bernier had identified as the problem of immobility of Asian despotism in his writings on *les États du Grand Mogol*, later collected in the 1699 Amsterdam edition as *Voyages*. This is why Montesquieu pointed to the role of climate, a long tradition of thought stemming from Hippocrates and Aristotle that contemporary authors (Jean-Baptiste Dubos, Espiard de la Borde, John Arbuthnot) had written about. Montesquieu transferred this line of thought regarding the influence of climate on human character to the general laws governing populations: cold shrinks the body’s fiber and creates better blood circulation, hence stronger and more supple people who resist despotism; heat stretches the body’s fibers and reduces strength and suppleness rending people subjects to despotism. Montesquieu divides the world in three clear-cut zones according to a North-South axis: first, temperate climes with agriculture, herding, civilisation; second, cold climates with harsh nature and savage populations; third, hot climates with overly prodigious nature and equally savage, but indolent and lazy populations. The heat found in Asia is thus responsible for the lack of change in laws, manners, and customs, and the prevalent despotism.

7. Ibid., I: 360–382.
in Asia, according to Montesquieu. ‘The radical conclusion that could be drawn from such reasoning is that not all climates produce liberty, which is thus beyond some peoples’.  

Students of Cloots have often quoted this chapter’s epigraph regarding liberty and Montesquieu, but they have not paid attention in detail to its reference and context. It seems evident that, for Cloots, in order to convince his audience and readership of the feasibility of the universal republic, humankind must be conceived, not only as a unity, but that its diversity is not a challenge to republicanism, especially regarding liberty and the capacity to adopt and understand laws. Cloots’s remark on liberty as a plant that grows under any climate on earth is a direct challenge to Montesquieu’s assertion that not all climates produce liberty. Throughout Cloots’s work there is an understated reflection on humankind, its unity and diversity, which is in direct connection with eighteenth-century debates on that matter. The question: ‘What is human nature?’ was a fundamental one during the eighteenth century. This will be the object of the first section.

Humankind and humanity as opposed to ‘national egoism’ were themes that Rémi mentioned in his *Le cosmopolisme*. ‘National egoism’ referred to a state-centric chauvinism around a kingdom for Rémi. The revolution replaced the concept of kingdom with the nation as legitimate sovereign, with a loose definition of nation as population of free and equal individuals; a population whose rights are recognised and protected. Since for Cloots humankind is more united and based on individuals, and since all individuals can aspire to liberty and equality, there is no contradiction in considering the ‘nation of the human race’ as the only nation on earth. This will be the object of the second section.

The Gnadenhal Castle library catalogue mentions the presence of *Recherches sur l’origine du despotisme oriental* (1761), probably written by French philosopher Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger (1722–1759), who collaborated to the *Encyclopédie*. Boulanger, like Bernier, tries to understand the cause for widespread despotism in Asia. Boulanger does not criticise Montesquieu’s premise that there is despotism in Asia, but unlike Montesquieu, his answer is that a very ancient cataclysm led the survivors to adopt a just law inspired by divinity. Later, men usurped this divinity to govern as despots. Boulanger notes that Europeans were the first to try to escape despotism by establishing republics, but notes that they never managed to

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protect the liberty and equality that they hoped a republican regime would achieve. But Boulanger was wondering how men could get rid of liberty when it is connatural to them. For Boulanger, despotism has historical and religious roots, including in republicanism. Boulanger’s conclusion is that a European monarchy is the best regime because, as Montesquieu noted, it is characterised by honour and moderation, unlike republics, which require an inhuman and thereby immoderate virtue and thus have roots in despotism. Cloots most certainly disagreed with Boulanger’s thesis that a republican regime was immoderate and therefore had roots in despotism, but it is perhaps in response to Boulanger that Cloots formulated the principle of universal republic, since one of Boulanger’s criticisms of republics was that they were constantly at war by fear from external threats.

Part of the argument for a cosmopolitan view in Cloots is a certain conception of humanity as a united and single community. Cloots did not use the word ‘humanité’ and constantly referred to ‘genre humain’ (‘human race’) instead. When referring to humanity as the whole group of human beings, contemporary writers preferred the term ‘genre humain’ over ‘humanité’. It is however the same meaning, even if the term differs. The word ‘humanité’ also referred to two other meanings: human nature, and the feeling of kindness and compassion for the rest of mankind. There have been several studies on the word humanité and its use during the eighteenth century, which will serve in this chapter to illustrate the background of thought on humanité in which Cloots writes.

It has to be noted that, for Cloots, what constitutes this genre humain is the individual homme, understood not as man in terms of gender but as a human being. There is a dialectical construction between humanity and

14. Ibid., 11–12.
individuality in that what is noble is to be *homme*; the individual ‘homme’ forms part of humanity, and that humanity is what makes an individual *homme*. The quality of being human, *humain* in the first meaning of *humanité* as opposed to animals, is what makes an individual *homme*. In Cloots’s understanding, as in many other contemporaries’, ‘homme’ is the most honorific title in the aftermath of 1789 when aristocratic titles have been rejected: ‘Je veux être homme ou rien’.16

By the same token the concept of sovereignty is also involved in a dialectical construction between *homme* and *genre humain*: the individual man being free has sovereignty over the self, and upon meeting other free men they transfer their sovereignty to the group, ultimately to the human race. Being human is what gives natural rights such as liberty and equality (which will be further explained in the chapter on republicanism). In return these rights mean that no one can claim a power over someone else without his consent. Therefore, no polity can pretend to be sovereign at the exclusion of another without breaching this universal imperative. As a result, only the whole, the society constituted by every individual *homme* can hold the ultimate power that is sovereignty.

This chapter aims to identify Cloots’s understanding of the human race and the individual within the context of his time. Seventeenth-century humanist thinking influenced the political thought of the eighteenth. The idea of social contract based on natural law, as seen in the previous chapter, was a central preoccupation for political thinkers, and that meant that ‘man’ was equally at the centre. Society must tend towards the development of the individual’s happiness. Obviously, a state of constant wars is not achieving this goal and many thinkers proposed peace plans for the whole human race.17 The most famous of them, and first in the century, was Abbé Saint Pierre’s *Perpetual Peace* (1713), and the last ones were Piattoli (1795) and Kant’s (1795).18 Such a project also impassioned unknown individuals such as former galley condemned criminal (later declared innocent) Pierre-André Gargas (1728–1801), who addressed his plan to Benjamin Franklin, or general André Guillaume Resnier de Goué (1729–1811).19

Among Cloots’s possible readings and influence on his view of man and mankind, one can find Buffon and his *Histoire naturelle* in the library at

Gnadenthal, as well as Pliny’s *Natural History*. Of course de Pauw’s works are there as well as Voltaire’s complete works. Equally in the library, one finds *L’Ami des hommes, ou Traité de la population* by Mirabeau, although Cloots is critical of him. This chapter will show how Cloots possibly used these authors in his conceptions of the human race and the individual, and how he formulates his own idiosyncratic views.

**GENRE HUMAIN**

The eighteenth century debated extensively the question of humankind and the individual. As Thomson argues, there were many different positions that intersected in a nexus of complicated ideas and arguments.⁴² Several disciplines were involved, from Biblical studies to anthropological ones, physiognomy, travellers’ accounts, geographical accounts, history, or the science of government. If one marvels at the immense diversity between populations on earth, one also ponders the reasons, and answers are found through as many methods and beliefs as the period allowed. In England, several volumes already existed on the subject. In France, Voltaire’s *Essai sur les moeurs* (1756) is another example of a contribution to the historical study of humankind. Rather than writing the history of monarchs, Voltaire writes a history of the peoples, their cultures, and their societies. Voltaire wants to write a universal history of the populations, a history of mankind. Voltaire criticised nationalist views of history hitherto written: ‘Ceux qui mentent ainsi au genre humain sont encore animés souvent par la sottise de la rivalité nationale’.⁴² Not only is humankind a more worthy subject of study than monarchs and aristocrats, but it must be studied from an objective point of view. However, if humankind is considered as an entity, a unity that can and should be studied historically, it is also characterised by what seems to be an infinite diversity. Voltaire and Hume distinguish between human ‘races’ and were polygenists noticing some ‘obvious differences’. They were nonetheless abolitionists, and their view on races did not prevent them from writing a universal history of humankind.

The study of man in particular, and in general of mankind, is a project that was highly debated during the French Enlightenment. However, these studies did not include the term ‘humanité’ in the understanding of human race, preferring ‘genre humain’ (human race).⁴³ Monogenesis recognised dif-

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ferent variants in the human race, while polygenesis recognised several different human ‘races’, opening the way to what Todorov calls ‘racialism’.24 What is interesting here is the separation between racist doctrines of superiority and inferiority of races and their consequences on colonialism and slavery, on the one hand, and, on the other, the ‘racialist’ premise according to which societies are different and that the world is divided into as many societies as there are ‘races’ of human beings. These visions are essential in determining if this human race can live together despite its diversity. What was the context of ideas according to which varieties of men determined varieties of societies, and how did philosophers think and organise humankind into a single one? Cloots’s conception of humankind must be understood, and appreciated for its unique progressiveness, among these debates.

Cloots did not write much on women specifically, but that may be because he included women in his universal thinking about the human race, as shown below (‘êtres mâles et femelles’). Before the revolution, Cloots wrote already enthusiastically about the possibility of receiving an enlightened education in the lycées in Paris, which also included women, contrary to what was the case in previous centuries: ‘... les femmes, dans ce siècle-ci, sont relevées du vœu d’ignorance ...’.25 Cloots also considers having an education as a thing of ‘beauty’; the beauty of an educated women, of course,26 but also of ‘handsome’ educated men, thanks to Rousseau’s educational principles developed in Emile, which leads to the conclusion: ‘Il semble en vérité que la philosophie embellit, agrandit les corps et les âmes’.27 A very Platonic view of beauty expounded as an abstract idea in Parmenides (130b), as the value of the beauty of the soul in Phaedrus (250c-d), and of course the dialectical progression from the love of beautiful bodies to beautiful souls in the Symposium (210b-c, 211a-b). In any case, in a letter to Le Patriote français published on 12 March 1792, Cloots makes it clear that the domination of husbands over their wives is contrary to philosophy and to the Enlightenment. Cloots also calls on women to be the equal of men in the workplace and to work in factories to replace the lack of men: ‘On parle d’améliorer le sort du beau sexe ; eh bien, donnons-lui de l’ouvrage dans les fabriques et les manufactures !’28

Cloots calls upon Frenchmen to compare past enslaved France with present freed France, and the evolution of philosophy in history to observe how ‘l’oubli des droits naturels, la tyrannie des maîtres sur les domestiques, des maris sur les femmes, des pères sur les enfants’ were ingredients for future social revolts.29 And why should women not be as free as men are? After all,

29. Ibid., 321.
Cloots notices that women — and children — are also actors in the revolution, arming themselves with what they could find to fight, or sharing the same ardor for the revolutionary cause.\(^{30}\) In his short history of the revolution, Cloots also emphasises the role played by women in the revolution, not only in terms of ‘sacrifices’ for the patrie, but with the Women’s March on Versailles on 5 October 1789, when market women decided to ask the ‘baker in Versailles’ for bread following a steep rise to prices in the marketplace.\(^{31}\)

**Unity and Diversity**

There are various arguments along the eighteenth century regarding the unity, or not, of the human race. These arguments are based on various religious, historical, social, geographical, environmental, and biological positions. But even within one position, there can be disagreement; for instance, one can be a Christian and consider the human race in its entirety as the creature of God, or, on the contrary, consider that some populations are inferior and cannot be enlightened by God’s word. Fundamentally, there are two positions to be taken regarding the unity of the human race: either monogenesis considering humankind as one and the same, or polygenesis considering different races. Since positions are so intermingled, one way to present them is to proceed by authors. The authors chosen here are presented because they are the most representative and influential in Enlightenment thought, and also because their names are mentioned by Cloots.\(^{32}\) However, only in *Certitude* does Cloots actually quote and refer to the original works. Otherwise, the historian has to assume that Cloots had read the works described here, based on the catalogue of the works at the Gradental Castle library, in which they appear.

Voltaire is a theist, and even if he rejects religion — therefore the Biblical stance on monogenesis — he nonetheless considers humankind as equal before God, although he considers polygenesis as explaining diversity on earth. Voltaire states equality of the human race before God: ‘... Et Dieu nous pesa tous dans la même balance’.\(^{33}\) And even after any fall from paradise (or the opening of Pandora’s box in this poem) this original equality remains. Inequalities that were released into nature from Pandora’s box should not put an end to establishing equality among men in society; everyone should have the right to reach happiness:

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 352, 398.
\(^{32}\) For a general overview of the debates on slavery and racial theories, see for instance Carminella Biondi, *Mon frère, tu es mon esclave!* Teorie schiaviste e dibattiti antropologico-razziali nel Settecento francese, Studi e Testi 41 (Pisa: Editrice Libreria Goliardica, 1973).
On dit qu’avant la boîte de Pandore
Nous étions tous égaux : nous le sommes encore ;
Avoir les mêmes droits à la félicité,
C’est pour nous la parfaite et seule égalité. ³⁴

However, despite this equality among men before God and the right to happiness, Voltaire writes his polygenist statement as such: ‘... les blancs barbus, les nègres portant laine, les jaunes portant crins, et les hommes sans barbes, ne viennent pas du même homme’. ³⁵ It has to be noted that this was not intended for publication. However, specialists on Voltaire’s thought consider that it reveals his genuine thinking. In his Essai sur les mœurs, Voltaire made it clear for publication that he considered that there were ‘different races of men’:

Il n’est permis qu’à un aveugle de douter que les Blancs, les Nègres, les Albinos, les Hottentots, les Lapons, les Chinois, les Américains, soient des races entièrement différentes. ³⁶

As such, for Voltaire, there are inequalities in the development of these racial societies. Difference of race also means difference of culture and the incapacity for some races to accommodate to ‘European standards’ of humanity: ‘Les Peuples de l’Europe ont des principes d’humanité, qui ne se trouvent point dans les autres parties du monde ...’. ³⁷ For Voltaire, these races follow ‘sociability’ as a ‘natural instinct’ given by the ‘author of nature’ and form different societies. ³⁸ Voltaire is thus opposed to Montesquieu’s monogenesis and his theory of climate to explain diversity; he had started a manuscript before his death, Commentaire sur L’Esprit des lois, in 1777. ³⁹ But, despite his views on inequality among human races, Voltaire was a potent voice among abolitionists.

Buffon is a monogenecist, like Montesquieu, and was highly influential in the eighteenth century with his view on humankind. The human race is opposed to animals by the faculty of possessing reason. This opposition to animals based on reason is an idea shared by many philosophers, from the polygenist Voltaire to the monogenecist and materialist d’Holbach. Buffon writes:

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Il y a une distance infinie entre les facultés de l’homme et celles du plus parfait animal, preuve évidente que l’homme est d’une différente nature, que seul il fait une classe à part.\textsuperscript{40}

That being said, it did not stop Buffon from comparing some populations as closer to animals than humans, in particular in his horrible description of Eskimos.\textsuperscript{41} Buffon was the most influential figure in the eighteenth century for a non-Biblical explanation of monogenesis. Buffon’s argument in favour of monogenesis is founded on the observation that ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ can procreate together. There are therefore no different species in the human race, but there was originally only a single one:

Tout concourt donc à prouver que le genre humain n’est pas composé d’espèces essentiellement différentes entres elles, qu’au contraire il n’y a eu originairement qu’une seule espèce d’hommes, qui s’étant multipliée et répandue sur toute la surface de la terre, a subi différents changements par l’influence du climat, par la différence de la nourriture, par celle de la manière de vivre, par les maladies épidémiques, et aussi par le mélange varié à l’infini des individus plus ou moins ressemblants\textsuperscript{42}.

However, despite the monogenecist principle, Buffon identifies various hierarchies and classifications. If what the constitutive element of humankind is the faculty of reason, what constitutes the diversity of humankind is ‘sociability’: ‘... l’homme ... n’est homme que parce qu’il a su se réunir à l’homme’.\textsuperscript{43} Sociability pushed individuals to form societies, which explains the ‘varieties’ of human beings found in the world. Buffon then considers that what distinguishes a ‘nation’ is the degree of civilisation:

... toute nation où il n’y a ni règle, ni loi, ni maître, ni société habituelle, est moins une nation qu’un assemblage tumultueux d’hommes barbares & indépendans, qui n’obéissent qu’à leurs passions particulières, & qui ne pouvant avoir un intérêt commun, sont incapables de se diriger vers un même but & de se soumettre à des usages constants, qui tous supposent une suite de desseins raisonnés & approuvés par le plus grand nombre.\textsuperscript{44}


\textsuperscript{41} Thomson, ‘Issues at Stake in Eighteenth-Century Racial Classification’.


\textsuperscript{44} Buffon, \textit{Histoire naturelle}, 3: 491.
Buffon’s ‘science of man’ relates considerations of climate, cultures and mores, and the ‘variety’ of human being. Climate, and other environmental matters explain diversity among the human race, and by the same token, it implies that changing a people’s environment could improve its condition — argument used by abolitionists against the one that Africans were naturally inferior.

Buffon’s conception of humankind had a great influence on Enlightenment philosophers, and Diderot merely summarised it in his article ‘Humaine, espèce’ in the *Encyclopédie*. However, unlike Buffon, Diderot saw human nature as constantly changing, and therefore no classification was possible. Part of Diderot’s abolitionist argument, in *Histoire des deux Indes*, was to add moral factors to the existing external ones of climate in order to explain the inferior condition of slaves as a result of the treatment slave owners had inflicted upon them. However, Diderot, as a materialist, was not only interested in Buffon’s naturalist explanation of human diversity, but also in the intellectual capacities of man in the *Encyclopédie*’s article ‘Animal’, and utilised existing research on physiognomy. The religious account of intelligence had been linked to the soul, which obviously was an explanation rejected by materialists like Diderot. The question of intelligence was thought to be related to skull sizes.

Diderot engaged in a dialogue with Helvétius on intelligence among groups. Helvétius considered that all humans had the same intellectual capacities, but that differences appeared due to education and the type of government. Diderot refuted the argument of equal intelligence among human beings, and invoked physical causes such as climate and social and political organisation in determining human capacities, with climate being more determinant for nations, and organisation being more determinant for individuals. The view according to which the type of government impacted on people’s intelligence was also adopted by d’Holbach.

The study of the human species was fuelled by geographical discoveries, and reported in the popular genre of travelogues, in which the author — explorer, globe-trotter, merchant — often moonlighted as an ‘anthropologist’. An ‘amateurish’ genre that did not please Cloots’s uncle, Cornelius de Pauw, who had the ambition of writing a more scientific analysis on the human

47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
race, starting with the Americas, and doing so without leaving the comfort of his home—a travelogue of travel books, of sort. This first work, and his subsequent works, sparked stark controversies in the Republic of Letters, as de Pauw represented the native populations of the Americas as physically and mentally inferior to Europeans.\textsuperscript{54} There is no doubt, nonetheless, that for de Pauw the populations in the Americas are part of the human race and he uses expressions such as ‘l’universalité du genre humain’\textsuperscript{55} Even men considered the most remote from humanity (understood as European civilisation) are still part of the human race. De Pauw writes thus on the ‘sauvage chasseur’:

\begin{quote}
Jamais en paix avec les hommes ou avec les animaux, son instinct est féroce & ses mœurs barbares : plus son génie s’occupe-t-il des moyens de subsister, moins réfléchit-il sur la possibilité de se polirer. Il est dans le genre humain ce que sont les bêtes carnassières entre les quadrupèdes, insociable.\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}

De Pauw wrote his study on the Americans as forming part of the ‘human race’, but notes the ‘variety of the human species in America’.\textsuperscript{57} De Pauw classifies the human species into races as a polygenist. Other ‘savages’, from the North this time, close to the Arctic circle, are characterised as such: ‘Petits, basanés, foibles, dégénérés du genre humain, ils paraissent constituer la race la plus chétive & la plus méprisable...’.\textsuperscript{58} This description is reminiscent of Buffon’s concerning the Eskimos. Climate is however to blame for the ‘superiority’ or ‘inferiority’ that nature gave the various ‘races’ inside the human race, thereby agreeing with Buffon and Montesquieu’s explanation of human diversity, but within polygenesis instead of monogenesis.

David Hume in his ‘Essay on National Character’ refuted Montesquieu’s climate theory by noticing that a nation did not change even when moving to different climes, as Jews and Armenians, or even Europeans in their colonies, show.\textsuperscript{59} Instead, Hume proposes his concept of sympathy, as developed in \textit{Treatise on Human Nature}, to explain the diversity of populations: ‘the innate sociability of human beings drove them to share sentiments, passions, and inclinations, especially within the same political body, where occasion for contact multiplied’.\textsuperscript{60} This thesis presupposes uniformity of human nature, passions are at the origins of all human behaviour.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{55.} Pauw, \textit{Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains}, 49.
\textsuperscript{56.} Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{57.} Ibid., 131.
\textsuperscript{58.} Ibid., 278–279.
\textsuperscript{59.} Sebastiani, \textit{The Scottish Enlightenment}, 28.
\textsuperscript{60.} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{61.} Ibid., 30.
But if these principles of morality are fixed, their nature is socially plastic; space and time modified their evolution. However, Hume is a polygenist and takes his classification from Swedish botanist, physician, and zoologist Carl Linnaeus’s (1707–1778) *Systema Naturae* (1735), dividing into varieties, species, genera, orders, classes. Hume identified four main varieties of humans: American (red skin, black hair, obstinate, choleric, governed by customs), European (white skin, fair haired, blue eyes, acute, inventive, governed by law), Asiatic (yellow skin, melancholic, severe, governed by opinion), and African (black skin, curly hair, phlegmatic, indolent, governed by caprice). Hume was against slavery, but considered Africans as inherently inferior; not inferior due to external conditions such as climate for Montesquieu, but inferior due to internal moral conditions that explained why Europeans had been able to exploit them.

Adam Smith was probably influenced by Hume and his thesis on sympathy on the evolution of societies, but also the ‘relationship between “historical man” and “natural man” as elaborated in Buffon’s *Histoire naturelle* and Rousseau’s *Discours sur l’origine* was central to the Scottish definition of history’ and to Smith. Scottish philosophers were more inclined to follow Buffon’s characterisation of man with a natural social attitude than Rousseau’s, but added ‘stage theory’ as a distinctive feature. Smith formulated a development of societies through ages, evolving progressively from the first age of hunters, to the second age of shepherds, to the third age of agriculture, and finally the fourth age of commerce. According to Smith property and means of subsistence were the main factors of progress towards a ‘civil society’, civil being understood as ‘civilised’ and opposed to ‘savage’ and ‘barbaric’. Both Hume and Smith were interested in the relationship between feelings and reason; feelings could be a source of destruction, but also of social virtue if properly guided.

Cloots had in his library the complete works of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, Hume, Smith, Buffon, and de Pauw, and he mentioned d’Holbach and Helvétius frequently. How did his view on the human race equate or differ from theirs? Cloots, in *La Certitude*, often uses the expression ‘genre humain’ with the monogenesis argument. The aim of the book, as mentioned previously, is to find a universally valid religion for the human race. One of the main arguments is to argue that only a religion that is universally intelligible can be valid. What is implied in this reasoning is that the whole

63. Ibid., 34.
64. Ibid., 42.
65. Ibid., 45.
66. Ibid., 46.
67. Ibid., 47.
68. Ibid., 48–49.
69. Ibid., 51–52.
humankind has the same capacity for reason. However, Cloots notes that three quarters of the human race is ignorant of God’s message; not because of stupidity, but because monotheist religions require years of study in order to be able to understand God’s word.\(^{70}\) Therefore, Cloots refutes all the monotheist religions from Islam to Judaism and Catholicism, each claiming to be the sole religion for the human race, and each necessitating years of personal study or the authoritative translations of the word of God by such knowledgeable persons.\(^{71}\) Moreover, the accounts on the human race given by these religions, religious histories of the human race, are worthless at best if not dangerous (to human intelligence): ‘Chaque culte ramène & enchaîne l’histoire du Genre-Humain à celle de ses rêveries...’\(^{72}\) This is an obvious reference to the creation myth, and its history of the human race based on the Book of Genesis and God’s expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. Natural religion is the only accessible one to the whole of the human race because everyone has the same reasoning capacity and needs only observe nature to understand God’s message.\(^{73}\)

As for a non-religious argument of the origin of the human race, Cloots rejects the debate between monogenesis or polygenesis altogether. For him, what matters are the physiological human qualities, which make a human part of humankind. These are the five senses, reproduction, and the faculty of speech:

> Les êtres mâles et femelles qui ont cinq sens et l’usage de la parole, avec la faculté de faire souche, ces êtres appartiennent à la même famille, n’importe la descendance d’une seule tige ou de plusieurs tiges. Je ne connais rien de primitif dans le règne animal ou végétal.\(^{74}\)

Implicitly, Cloots accepts monogenesis in fact, but he rejects any external factors that would enable a classification as variety or race, such as climate or geography. Only a few internal factors matter to qualify as a human being: five senses, the faculty of speech, and the capacity for reproduction and therefore to start a family and a line of descendants. The reference to ‘primitif’ is a reference to the first, the original in an animal or vegetal species, as Bauzée’s article ‘Primitif (grammaire)’ in the Encyclopédie defines it.\(^{75}\) Cloots argues therefore that it does not matter where man comes from; he does not know who was the first man, or what was the first flower. Cloots

\(^{70}\) Cloots, Certitude des preuves, 5.
\(^{71}\) Ibid., 29–33.
\(^{72}\) Ibid., 32.
\(^{73}\) Ibid., 70.
\(^{74}\) Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 499.
adds what he does know: ‘Je sais qu’un homme ne sera jamais étranger à l’homme...’. Cloots has probably read at least all the above mentioned authors and their views on humankind, and it seems to him that none of their argument is satisfactory for the time being because science cannot show who was the first man anyway. Therefore, there can be no historical account and no stages of evolution, no elements to judge one society superior or inferior to another one. The solution Cloots proposes is simply to take how things are with a minimal definition of humankind. But it is indeed minimal, and perhaps too much so; La Mettrie had declared in *L’homme machine* that if one could teach an ape to talk, there would be no difference between a human and an animal.77

Another view on which Cloots slightly differed from his contemporaries is the traditional distinction between the human race and the animal race. Reason is what sets the human race apart, and defines its opposition to the rest of animals according to philosophers. For Cloots, reason is what sets the human race apart from animals, it is true, but in a wrong way as the human race does possess reason, but lacks therefore animal instinct. Animals in a way are superior to men because they possess a natural ‘instinct’, which allows them to follow the laws of nature and live in harmony with nature without thinking about it. Man does not have this instinct and must therefore use ‘reason’ to find these laws of nature and thus live accordingly and in the most perfect harmony (See the previous chapter on nature). However, here again, Cloots is not consistent. At times he writes that the human race does have a natural instinct — for order, for instance — and that it is mon-archism and clericalism that ruins this natural instinct:

> Le bien l’emporte généralement ; car l’instinct de l’ordre appartient à la presque totalité des hommes ; et cet instinct contrarié, dénaturé par le despotisme ou l’aristocratie, appelle tous les vices, au lieu d’engendrer toutes les vertus. Il résulte de là une apologie complète du gouvernement républicain....78

I examine in more detail the question of republic and virtue against mon-archy and corruption in the next chapter on republicanism, but it can be mentioned here that this is the reason for Cloots to justify the revolutionary wars, not as imposing French government on others, but liberating them from their despot government, in order to give them the choice of joining the universal republic, of which the French one is but the starting point. Furthermore, this shows that Cloots shares the thesis of organisation or government as influencing individuals, but opposing despotism to republicanism, and equating monarchism with despotism, when the above mentioned

philosophers were opposing civilised monarchism to savage anarchy or despotism (as it was thought to be in Asia by some). But as Cloots mentions a few lines after, he tries to reconcile everyone: atheists, deists, materialists, and spiritualists. The same could be said about his attempt at proposing a minimalist definition of what constitutes a human being on which polygenists and monogenists would agree, also despite their internal disagreements about inherent and external causes for diversity, as above mentioned. Man is neither good nor evil, it is the political organisation that determines his nature: ‘La nature toute nue n’est ni belle ni laide ; mais elle devient un Léviathan sous l’armure de l’ignorance et de l’oppression ; elle devient une divinité adorable sous l’armure de la constitution française’. Cloots attempts to refute the hypothesis on national differences, whilst maintaining national diversity — ‘national’ understood as it was at that time. In particular with his self-fashioning, Cloots argued at the same time for universality, but retaining roots and local particularism. Cloots does recognise diversity and differences, as his delegation dressed in folk costumes illustrates. Cloots himself, always referred to himself as ‘Prussian’, or ‘Belgian’ at the end of his life, while always maintaining his universal persona as ‘homme’ and ‘orateur du genre humain’. However, for Cloots, all these particularities are minor compared to how the human race is united in nature, not only in biological terms, but also in terms of natural law; liberty is universal, notwithstanding Montesquieu’s application of climate theory to differentiate among legal regimes in the world. Cloots expressly rejects climate theory as developed by Montesquieu in De l’esprit des lois implying that some populations may not be able to live with liberty. Moreover, liberty is also understood as a natural feeling, that is materially located in the hearts of individual human beings. I will develop more on liberty in the next chapter on republicanism, but it is sufficient to note here that Cloots seems to mix Rousseau’s sentimentalisation with Diderot and d’Holbach’s materialism.

Eighteenth-century conceptions of the human race combined the understanding of ‘nation’ with the understanding of ‘peoples’, forming a conception close to today’s ethno-nationalism. But for Cloots, this human race forms a nation, and in this ‘nation du genre humain’ there is no more for-

79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., 257.
81. See next section on nation.
82. See the first chapter on self-fashioning.
eigner as a consequence. Cloots defends the figure of the foreigner, and in particular those foreigners that were attacked by philosophers above mentioned, Africans and Indians:


Civilisations progress, perhaps, but also regress. As Cloots notes, the splendour of Ancient Rome and Athens, so admired by European philosophers, disappeared, and, more importantly, this splendour was also due to the external input of Egypt, and for Egypt, of India.

Not only Europeans should not feel superior of their civilisation, as it has roots in India and Africa and could just as well collapse like Rome and Athens, but Paris (the contemporary Athens) is not civilised simply because it is Paris. Parisians are not great because they are Parisians or French, but because they are men, for Cloots. Barbarism is not the other uncivilised, it can very well be the self-proclaimed civilised man expressing prejudice over perceived barbaric neighbours:

Les Parisiens ont fait des progrès si rapides dans la civilisation, n’étant ni parisiens, ni français, ils sont hommes. Il n’y a pas, monsieur, de plus grande marque d’ignorance et de barbarie que de supposer ses voisins ignorants et barbares, sans les avoir ni vus ni connus.\[^{86}\]

However, Cloots has hope, because man is a ‘political animal’: ‘Il est dans la nature de l’homme d’aimer la société’,\[^{87}\] This sentiment that is reminiscent of Hume and Smith applies also to the single society of the whole human race, for Cloots. Cloots takes this argument used to explain diversity in the human race and returns it to argue for the unity of the human race.

\[^{85}\] Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 143.
\[^{86}\] Ibid., 163.
\[^{87}\] Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 260.
As a result no one is a foreigner. Men are all the same and therefore no man is a foreigner to another man: ‘Je sais qu’un homme ne sera jamais étranger à l’homme...’. 88

The only foreigner then is the foreigner to the human race — animals:

La différence entre nous et les étrangers, et je ne connais pas d’autres étrangers que les autres espèces d’ani meats, c’est que nous n’atteignons pas directement à la perfection, nous avons malheureusement le choix des modifications. 89

However, as mentioned previously, the distinction is minimalistic and less than clear since the ability to speak is the main distinction for the human race, according to Cloots.

Genre Humain and Humanité

Cloots did not use the expression ‘humanité’ to refer to the entity composed of human beings. Following the usage of the time Cloots employed instead the expression ‘genre humain’, ‘human race’. When Cloots uses the term ‘humanité’ it is in reference to the feeling of kindness and compassion that is due to mankind. Therefore, Cloots participates to the ‘bouleversement des valeurs spirituelles’ that the Enlightenment constituted in its redefinition of humanity, departing from Thomism and the diffidence in man’s goodness since original sin. 90 However, Cloots departs from his intellectual mentors, such as Rousseau, Diderot, and Voltaire, who did participate in the laicisation of the Christian caritas as the renewal of the idea of ‘humanitas’. 91 Be it Rousseau in Emile, Diderot in his article ‘Législateur’, or Voltaire in his Dictionnaire philosophique, all suggest in one way or another the need to educate man to access the noble level of humanity.

For de Pauw, on the other hand, the human race is neither good nor bad. It is simply sick of its own passions, but a sickness that cannot be cured. There is no hope of educating the human race for this reason.

Il n’est pas question ici de faire la satyre ou l’éloge du genre humain, que ni le blâme, ni les louanges n’ont jamais corrigé : trop trompé par ses maîtres, trop avili par la servitude, trop corrompu par ses passions dégénérées en faiblesse, c’est un malade incurable, abandonné à son destin, ou à la providence. Il faut s’attacher aux faits, les exposer comme ils sont, ou comme

91. Ibid., 176.
on les croit être, sans haine, sans prévention, sans respect, si-
non pour la vérité.\textsuperscript{92}

For Cloots, on the other hand, there is no need for this. If anyone should be educated it should be those who are already overeducated due to their privileged social position. Aristocrats should be educated to the the dignity of being a man. The human race is one single family, and therefore one should treat another man as ‘brother’. This is how moral is reintroduced in politics for Cloots. There is no sense in getting richer when your brother is getting poorer as a result:

C’est donc pour être plus riche que vous vous réjouissez du
malheur de nos frères communs ; et vous ne souhaiteriez pas
la mort de vos proches parents, pour être plus riche ?\textsuperscript{93}

Cloots’s view is against Smith’s ‘circles of sympathy’ influenced by Stoic \textit{oikeiōsis}.\textsuperscript{94} It is a direct cosmopolitan view of basing our humanity on the communality of the human race, as argued by recent cosmopolitan theorists.\textsuperscript{95} There is no dilution of humanity with the distance of geography or culture. The human race encompasses all men, and thus the rights of man apply to all men: ‘Les droits de l’homme s’étendent sur la totalité des hommes’.\textsuperscript{96}

However, this position did not prevent Cloots, as other revolutionar-
ies, to paradoxically support \textit{inhumane} positions. Even though Cloots was against slavery, and in favour of the universal application of the rights of man, he yielded to the fallacious argument that abolishing slavery would lead to a disaster. In ‘Réponse de l’Orateur du genre humain aux citoyens de couleur et nègres libres’ published on 16 June 1791 in \textit{Le Patriote français}, Cloots argues tentatively that although he is in favour of the liberation of slaves, and considers slavery as a dishonest trade, he considers it politically damaging to free the colonies immediately for the interests of France, but Cloots promises that his

\[\ldots\text{ système de la libération générale n’admet ni colonies, ni mé-
tróles, ni différence de couleurs, ni différence de nations ;}
\text{et je ne demande qu’un peu de prudence, un peu de politique}
\text{pour arriver à ce but final de mes pensées. Ce plan régénéra-
teur m’occupe dans mon cabinet, dans mes promenades, dans}
\text{mes conversations ; il charme mes insomnies, il absorbe mes}\]

\textsuperscript{92}. Pauw, \textit{Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains}, 208.
\textsuperscript{93}. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 257.
\textsuperscript{94}. Fonna Forman-Barzilai, \textit{Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy: Cosmopolitanism and Moral Theory}, Ideas in Context 96 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
\textsuperscript{95}. Martha Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’, \textit{Boston Review} 19, no. 5 (October 1994).
\textsuperscript{96}. Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 476.
veilles. Et je renonce à toutes ces places, à toutes les élections dont le peuple français voudrait m’honorer ; et je ne m’attache à aucun souverain provisoire, à aucune fraction de l’humanité, pour ne m’occuper que de la révolution des deux hémisphères, de la manifestation du véritable souverain, du souverain éternel et unique, la nation du genre humain.97

Cloots’s good faith is not to doubt. Cloots did believe in his system, and did want to see his system concretised in a revolution of the whole world. However, Cloots is more prudent in the steps to take, and shows some political calculation that appears cynical and unusual to his, otherwise fervent, idealism. The real test of humanity is in the classification that Cloots and other revolutionaries made of the ‘enemies of the human race’.

*Ennemi du Genre Humain*

In relation to the conception of the human race, the eighteenth century also used the concept of ‘enemy of the human race’, or in Latin *hostis humani generis*, derived from natural law and the law of nations. Grotius in particular developed in *De jure belli ac pacis* on the idea that sovereigns must have the monopoly of executive power and the ability to give punishment. The people deserving punishment were ‘Barbarians’, ‘Beasts’, and also ‘Tyrants’.98 Vattel in his *Le Droit des gens* used the expression ‘*ennemi du genre humain*’ in characterising these ‘barbarians’ and ‘beasts’ that Grotius thought deserved punishment by death.99 Throughout the revolution, some revolutionaries made use of the rhetoric of beasts and monstrous creatures to characterise counter-revolutionaries.100

Cloots and the revolutionaries voted in favour of the death of Louis XVI. A death that was not politically necessary.101 The king had already been stripped of all his powers, but it was symbolically required to be killed as ‘the Jacobins substituted for the myth of magical monarchical authority the myth of a phoenix-like republic rising from the blood of the dead king’.102

In ‘Harangue de Cloots’ on voting the death of Louis XVI, he argues to kill a man in the name of ‘humanity’:

L’humanité prononce la sentence du client des aristocrates, de l’arc-boutant des contre-révolutionnaires. Quant à moi, je me croirais le plus inique des juges, le plus inhumain des hommes, le plus vil des esclaves, si en qualité de membre de la commission des six & de la commission des douze, après avoir fait le dépouillement du porte-feuille du ci-devant Monsieur, & de l’armoire de fer du ci-devant roi, je ne prononçais pas formellement la mort du directeur de tous les conjurés que la loi punit chaque jour.\(^{103}\)

The death of the king is an act of purification for the republic. By the same token, all the ‘crawling men’ who profited from the ancien régime, allegedly being corrupt, must share the same fate:

Il est temps enfin de purifier la République, en désignant à l’exécration du genre humain les hommes rampants, les ames vénales, qui préfèrent les largesses d’un traître couronné aux bénédictions du Souverain reconnaissant.\(^{104}\)

The rhetoric seems harsh, but it is very mild compared to the one of Marat in his newspaper *L’ami du peuple* or Hébert in *Le père Duchesne*. Louis XVI is a ‘roi’ and for this deserves death for his treason to the sovereign nation, but he is also a ‘monsieur’ who equally committed treason against people, and so do all other monarchs, and any monarchist or aristocrat: ‘Je conclus à la mort de l’ex-roi & de tous les rois qui seront amenés sur le sol de la terre libre. L’échafaud des monarques sera le tombeau des feuillants’.\(^{105}\)

The revolutionaries’ argument is that the human race is the only sovereign, and that monarchs do not recognise this principle and never will, thereby going against natural law as tyrants. However, if Cloots uses the expression ‘enemy’ several times, only to one person does he use the expression ‘enemy of the human race’: William Pitt.\(^{106}\) The reference to Pitt was related to his actions against people sympathising with the revolution in England and his repressive legislations against free speech. Cloots did not call Louis XVI an ‘enemy of the human race’. However, he did call other French kings ‘monsters’, such as Louis XI who murdered his brother, or Louis XIV for imprisoning his.\(^{107}\)

This denunciation of crimes committed by previous kings had been made by Louis-Charles de Lavicomterie (1746–1809) and Camille Desmoulins

\(^{103}\) Cloots, *Procès de Louis le dernier*, 8.
\(^{104}\) Ibid., 9.
\(^{105}\) Ibid., 10.
\(^{106}\) Cloots, *Ecrits révolutionnaires*, 610, 627.
\(^{107}\) Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 118.
It is very likely that Cloots is making a reference to this context. In this sense, Louis XVI was made to pay for the crimes against humanity committed by his forefathers. Cloots was not opposed to the death penalty, unlike Robespierre, but it is also likely that he voted for death for the same reason Robespierre and other deputies did because of the multiple threats to the revolution and the king’s inability to accept constitutional monarchism. In general, Cloots calls ‘monster’ the ‘tyrants’ or anyone supporting ‘despotism’ such as ‘aristocrats’, or abstract political systems related to these.

Cloots’s voice was just one of many in the revolutionary choir singing the ‘regeneration of man’, of the ‘human race’, a purification through the execution of these ‘enemies of the human race’, in the name of the human race, an act of real humanity where false humanity would be proof of being feeble. Louis XVI did not commit crimes against humanity, but he was guilty of treason, and plotting against the revolution, at a time when Brunswick’s Manifesto made it clear that all revolutionaries would be exterminated, and his refuge from the Tuileries to the Manège of the Assembly without telling his Swiss guard to stand down resulted in a blood bath on 10 August 1792.

Régénération, Éducation

As many revolutions, the French revolution had a general project for re-establishing order and transforming society through a redefinition of man. The expression ‘régnéré’ is widely used to refer to this process of transformation of man into a better man. ‘Regeneration was an active process of nation construction, driven by political will’. As Bell notes, ‘regeneration’ was a term used prior to the revolution in a theological context, but moved from the realm of God to something that humans could achieve, which they attempted to do with a messianic vocabulary. This messianic dimension of forming a homo novus with a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ has been studied by de Baecque, who notes how this regenerated man is supposed to be the future, perfection and innovation as opposed to the corrupt man of the ancien régime. It is also Furet and Halévi’s analysis that the term

110. Ozouf, L’homme régénéré.
112. Ibid., 76.
‘régénéré’ was used as a rejection of the past with its ‘feudal oppression’, ‘administrative despotism’, ‘aristocracy’, and ‘monarchy’, and a jump into the future with the nation.\footnote{Furet and Halévi, \textit{Orateurs de la Révolution française}, LXXXIII.} This left the question of what to do with the king, the ‘before’, and what to do with the nation, the ‘after’. Two issues that were highly contentious and debated.

For Cloots, according to the \textit{science of man}, as achieved by the Enlightenment, the nature of man is shown to be neither good nor evil, but rather driven by self-interest, in a Hobbesian way. In a materialist way, Cloots considers that man commits what is considered a crime in society by following his nature, and therefore punishment is a less enlightened way of treating this issue than understanding it:

\begin{quote}
Le progrès des Lumières nous montrera l’homme moins méchant que faible, plus entraîné vers le mal qu’ennemi du bien ; plus criminel machinalement que volontairement ; plus digne de compassion que de punition.\footnote{Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 257.}
\end{quote}

Understanding the nature of man is the object of the \textit{science of man}, and this science shows that, as noted above, the root of all problems, according to Cloots and many of his revolutionary contemporaries, is the absence of regard for nature, in general, and denial of natural rights, in particular. These natural rights as declared in 1789 must be enacted in order to put an end to the corruption that disregarding this eternal truth has produced, notably through monarchism. Because, as Cloots notes:

\begin{quote}
Tout languit, tout se corrompt, tout se détruit dans l’absence d’une vérité-mère. Si les princes ont pris la place des principes, c’est en rappelant les principes que nous chasserons les princes.\footnote{Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 482.}
\end{quote}

There is a little rhetorical play on words by opposing ‘princes’ and ‘principles’, which is characteristic of Cloots’s rhetoric.

What is needed therefore is a ‘regeneration’ of this man corrupted by monarchism. The revolution operated this ‘regeneration’ of this \textit{ancien régime} man by proclaiming the liberty and equality of man as the fundamental principles of a political regime.\footnote{See the chapter on republicanism for an analysis of Cloots’s conceptions of liberty and equality.} In this sense, France is the cradle of the regenerated human race: ‘C’est le genre humain régénéré que j’avais en vue, lorsque j’ai parlé du Peuple-Dieu dont la France est le berceau et le point de ralliement’.\footnote{Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 476.}
In order to operate this ‘regeneration’, it is necessary to establish two things: first, a republic that respects nature and natural rights; secondly, an education for this *homo novus*. This was one of the tasks that the new republic set itself, and there were many projects drafted in the 1790s, notably one by Condorcet in 1792, which was not implemented due to increasing difficulties in 1792–1793.119 This text later inspired the principles as established by France’s minister for Education Jules Ferry (1832–1893) but with a completely different project. Condorcet wanted to dispense knowledge to free individuals, whilst Ferry wanted an education at the service of the Republic.120 Instead a Jacobin education policy was passed in particular by the Bouquier law of 19 December 1793, instituting compulsory education for children aged 6–13, emphasising linguistic uniformity and republican and patriotic values.121 Talleyrand or the abbé Grégoire, among others, had expressed that French was the language of liberty and equality, and the result was to Frenchify the whole country around one language, thus crushing all regional dialects and identities.122

Cloots was arrested nine days after the Bouquier law was passed. Certainly, Cloots approved linguistic unity, and had also stated that French was the language of liberty that the whole world would learn. However, this does not mean that he considered that people should not learn their native tongue. Cloots did not survive the terror of the *comité de salut public*, and it is difficult to know how much he would have approved or disapproved of this particular law, but he made public his own plan for education, as we will see below. However, it is certain that he saw the ‘regeneration’ as extending to the whole world, and that ‘national corporation’ should be abolished: ‘La France s’est régénérée en abolissant les corporations et les provinces ; le monde sera régénéré en abolissant l’esprit de corps national’.123 Cloots also signs his article according to the new revolutionary calendar, but as marking for him the date of the regeneration of the world.124

Cloots feared for the revolution in 1793, like the rest of the revolutionaries. He saw this regeneration of the human race in danger. In February 1793, in the ‘preliminary discourse’ of his *Résumé historique de la révolution*, Cloots published his philosophical reflexions on the revolution. Cloots writes classically how the revolution happened naturally, biologically, in a country that was politically ill due to a corrupt regime. This patient recovers, his body ‘regenerates’ itself into a healthy one after a healthy revolution. How-

ever Cloots warns the reader. History shows how this regeneration could return into a state of illness, how the patient could relapse:

Semblables aux maladies du corps humain, les maladies du corps politique produisent des révolutions intestines, dont les secousses violentes opèrent de grands changements ; mais l’expérience des siècles nous prouve que, jusqu’à nos jours, les résultats de ces changements ont constamment différé entre ces deux corps. Dans un malade à l’extrémité, ramenant l’harmonie parmi tous les ressorts qui composent la machine, souvent la crise révolutionnaire a rétabli l’équilibre et fait renaître la santé ; au contraire, si l’on parcourt les annales des révolutions de tous les peuples, on n’en trouve pas une dont ces peuples soient sortis plus heureux qu’ils ne l’étaient avant ; loin de là ! presque toujours on voit les révolutions les réduire à un état de calamités, pire que celui dont elles les avaient tirés.\textsuperscript{125}

Cloots then states three causes for this relapse: the people have not been able to base its thinking on ’eternal reason’; the people has blindly trusted a few men, who are hypocritically profiting from the revolution; and, finally, the clumsiness and lack of foresight of the people that dooms it to relapse into slavery.\textsuperscript{126} It seems therefore, that Cloots would not have approved of an education in the service of the republic, that is educating — in the Latin sense of educatio, from ducere, lead, meaning breading, rearing — was not the republican enlightenment and regeneration he had in mind. It was probably an idea closer to that of Condorcet’s, rather than educating it was instructing — from the Latin instruo, build, arrange — giving the individual, the citizen, the tools to think independently so that no individual or group of individuals may take hold of their mind again. Moreover, as we will see in the next chapter on republicanism, his idea of the universal republic was minimal and more of a federal type with large independence for local populations to decide for themselves what they wanted, including in matters of education policy. One could also infer Cloots’s education policy from this remark in L’orateur du genre humain, in which he recommends the work on onanism by Swiss doctor Samuel Auguste Tissot (1728–1797).\textsuperscript{127} This work, as Cloots explains, recommends abstaining from masturbation during puberty and adolescence in order to grow stronger and more robust. It is obviously rather ridiculous today, but Tissot was otherwise trying to build a scientific method for medicine and was widely popular, also quoted by Voltaire and Kant. In this sense, it seems to me that

\textsuperscript{125} Cloots, ’Résumé historique’, 520.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 520–521.
\textsuperscript{127} Cloots, ’L’Orateur du genre humain’, 125.
Cloots is interested in educating the population with the latest scientific works, rather than crude patriotic propaganda.

Before being arrested, but after having been excluded from the Jacobins, Cloots was still a member of the Comité d’instruction publique and managed to make a speech on 26 December 1793. The comité had to answer a question regarding spectacles and public education, and whether they should be left to the public or private sector. Cloots starts answering by stating that there cannot be any example found in Antiquity or modernity, East or West, because this republic is unique in having a nation of equal men with universal principles. However, Cloots notes that ‘aristocratic governments’ need to have a monopoly on education and entertainment in order to maintain their domination on the population, in the countries ‘où les gouvernements sont tout et les gouvernés rien’ — winking to Sieyès. Cloots uses the word ‘instruction’ rather than ‘education’, and his vision of instruction for the people is minimalistic, in an echo to Rousseau’s view: ‘Lire, écrire, chiffrer, voilà pour l’instruction ; la joie et un violon, voilà pour les spectacles’. It is up to the government to provide a minimal education so that everyone can read, write, and count, and also some entertainment, the rest should be left to the private sector with the understanding that ‘le gouvernement doit simplement veiller à ce qu’on n’empoisonne ni le corps ni l’esprit, à ce que l’on débite une nourriture saine’. The rule of thumb is that something must benefit the whole nation in order to be paid for by the nation, for instance a school for engineers should be national, but a theatre should be left to the private sector under surveillance of magistrates. More importantly, regarding this instruction, it should not amount to mere propaganda:

La propagande des droits de l’homme doit se présenter pure et sans tâches à l’univers étonné. Ce n’est pas en apportant à nos voisins des dieux étrangers que nous faciliterons leur conversion ; ce n’est pas en élevant autel contre autel que nous relèverons leurs fronts prosternés.

Cloots uses the word ‘propaganda’ here, but it does not mean propaganda in the modern sense, but diffusion or communication, in the ecclesiastical sense that the Gospel was propagated. Even in France, Cloots preaches tolerance rather than imposition, regarding republican education. Cloots believes instead in nature and reason, and suggests to present a ‘table rase’

129. Ibid.
130. Ibid., 639.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid., 640.
133. Ibid.
134. See the article ‘Propagande’ in the *Encyclopédie*. 
so that everyone may combine their own ‘régime spirituel’, until ‘truth triumphs’ in the end when reason leads everyone to understand that nature, rather than any god, is the only ‘supreme being’, and ‘providence’ — nature’s word on earth, as opposed to divine providence — is a society of free and equal human beings.\(^\text{135}\)

Moreover, just like the nature of government as we will see in the next chapter, education and entertainment should be decided by the people rather than imposed by an ‘aristocratic’ government.\(^\text{136}\) In the end, Cloots suggests a decree to open military, music, horse riding, naval, and medical schools, as well as public libraries, laboratories for chemistry and physics, and botanical gardens. But then again, Cloots is a physiocrat and believes that this decree would only be temporary until ‘wealthy families’ and ‘free individuals’ provide for these needs because ‘[l]’éducation doit circuler comme toute autre marchandise ...’\(^\text{137}\) Cloots has faith in the liberty of nature (or the market in modern terms) and that education will be provided for locally by tutors and families, under the scrutiny of parents and the public; even taking care of orphans.\(^\text{138}\)

Cloots mentions vaguely that already people learn to read in places where the alphabet was unknown before the revolution.\(^\text{139}\) However, as Doyle notes, the educational enthusiasm of the revolutionaries was curbed by difficulties to implement these principles, and the existing educational system provided by the Church collapsed; as a result the number of pupils in the collèges fell from 50,000 in 1789 to 12,000 or 14,000 in 1790 in the écoles created, whilst the literacy fell from 37% in 1789 to 30% in 1815.\(^\text{140}\) The lack of time and money resulted in a failure to replace the education service and materials provided by the Church, with the example of Clermont-Ferrand having 128 pupils for a population of 20,000 in 1794.\(^\text{141}\) This was not a republican education that would ‘regenerate’ the sans-culottes in the population.

**NATION DU GENRE HUMAIN**

Together with the idea of unity of the human race, Cloots suggested the concept of ‘nation of the human race’. This sounds antithetical to contemporary ears and must therefore be explained contextually with the various understandings of nation. Cheneval notes rightly that when Cloots

\(^{135}\) Cloots, *Ecrits révolutionnaires*, 640.
\(^{136}\) Ibid., 643.
\(^{137}\) Ibid.
\(^{138}\) Ibid.
\(^{139}\) Ibid.
presents the idea of ‘nation du genre humain’, it was during a context when the concept of ‘nation’ was not yet nationalised and instead could serve as part of a revolutionary cosmopolitan ideal rather than a homogeneous nation-state.  

**Individual**

Baker emphasises the apparition of both society and the individual together during the eighteenth century: ‘To speak of collective human existence as société is to speak of it as an association of individuals. In this sense, the term is essentially voluntaristic’. Individualism is a distinct feature of Western society, and, for Baker, the Enlightenment conception of society was instituted in response to epistemological, ethical, religious, and political crises: epistemologically, society became the consolation for the acceptance of the limitations to understanding; ethically, sociability and civility became the substitutes to Christian morality; religiously and politically, society emerged as a consolation against the despair of a world in which God is hidden, and became a domain with stability, an autonomous ground where authority and absolute power dissolved.

Viguier notes that the ‘individual’ ‘entered politics’ with the change of socio-political vocabulary during the eighteenth century in France: first by a passage from religious metaphysical discourse to the civic and secular one of nature, in which the individual is opposed to the species; secondly, from natural law with natural rights bestowed on individuals. From 1770 to 1780, the ‘individual’ was not yet a term designating a political concept, but a social term in Nature. The term enters the socio-political discourse through the association between nature and society. The individual becomes the minimal unit in political arithmetic, from being nothing in nature to something in law: from 1770 to 1785 the ‘individual’ is used in demographical studies by Turgot and the physiocrats; from 1789 to 1792 the individual becomes important in counting ballots, it is the political unit as human being. 1789 also marked the correlation of liberty and equality united within the individual, with the difference that liberty is already there, whilst equal-

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144. Ibid., 100–104.
146. Ibid., 141.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid., 120–122.
ity is to be built since society must preserve natural rights. On the other hand, this also means that one individual can be replaced by another, since all are equal, and that it is justifiable to kill 10,000 individuals if it means saving 100,000, as the Terror showed. Propriety is a fundamental right, together with liberty and equality, in that it enables the emergence of the individual and is inalienable to the individual.

Cloots has made the individual the core of his political theory, and the centre of any political and moral theory. The universal republic is not an agglomeration of nations, or states, or any other collective polity, but a 'federation of united individuals'. To Cloots, the individual is sovereign, or, as he puts it, '[c]haque individu est un royaume', and thus all source of sovereignty stems from the individual. All societies are ultimately built by individuals who are the prime units from the natural world in the social world, according to Cloots. As seen in the chapter on nature, Cloots rejects a transition from nature to society, therefore natural rights and social rights are the same. Liberty and equality are the fundamental rights of the individual. As such, each individual is sovereign. But, upon meeting another sovereign individual, their sovereignty merges. This amalgamation continues until there is ultimately only the human race as legitimate sovereign. As a consequence, there cannot be any other sovereign:

Il n’ya a pas plus de raison d’ériger un département en souverain, qu’un district, un canton, une municipalité, une famille, un individu. Chaque homme, si vous le voulez, est un souverain, bien entendu que sa souveraineté n’empiète pas sur la souveraineté individuelle des autres hommes.... Une fraction de la grande famille ne saurait s’emparer de la faculté souveraine, de la faculté de vouloir absolument, irrésistiblement, sans un démenti formel au genre humain.

As such the expansion of the French revolution is not comparable with past empires for Cloots; if there is an empire, it is the ‘empire of reason’. Consequently, the annexion of neighbouring Savoy is but a reunion of individuals into the confederation of men:

Nous n’aurons jamais la guerre avec la Savoie, car elle ne s’est pas unie à la France par juxtaposition ; mais ces deux contrées ont formé un amalgame, une confédération d’individus qui ne laisse plus aucune trace de la ci-devant Savoie....

150. Ibid., 131–132.
151. Ibid., 136–137.
154. Ibid., 498.
In Mallet’s article ‘Confédération’ in the *Encyclopédie* (3:847), it is an ‘alliance’ or ‘league’ of states or princes; so a union between persons, families, or states. In Cloots’s political thought, it is instead the individuals who form this union or alliance. A country is nothing else than a union of free and equal individuals who want to remain free and equal, and therefore agree on a constitution and representatives to produce laws.

If the basis of a political system is to be the individual, it is the same basis that must be taken into consideration for the world political system.

La félicité de l’espèce est aussi incompatible avec les corps nationaux, que les corps particuliers sont nuisibles à une nation; et cela, par le grand principe, que tous les intérêts découlent de l’intérêt personnel. L’alliance des Nations, la fédération des peuples, est un lien éphémère dont se joue l’immorale politique. Il n’y a que la confédération des individus qui puisse pacifier les hommes.\textsuperscript{155}

Political philosophy does not distinguish between internal and external politics. For Cloots, as for the philosophes, the same way religion had to be universally valid by being understandable to every individual, so does politics. The individual is the basis for religious theory, and it is equally the basis for political theory.

It is therefore equally crucial to understand the nature of individuals in order to find the best constitution that will frame their liberty and maintain their equality. Human nature shows that individuals are selfish and want to expand this selfishness through conquests and enslaving others. The constitution must set limits to individuals in order to preserve society (the same way one’s liberty is defined as being limited by other individuals’ liberty). Through law all these selfish individual wills form the public interest:

\textit{Circonscrivez les individus dans de justes bornes, afin qu’ils ne nuisent point à la sphère sociale; car la nature nous pousse en avant, notre instinct est de tout envahir, de tout asservir, de renverser tous les obstacles. Chaque individu est un royaume: chacun dit que charité bien ordonnée commence par soi-même. Les soldats heureux et les prêtres habiles ne sont devenus rois que parce que les peuples ont ignoré les secrets de la nature humaine. On ne saurait trop se presser de faire connaître ces secrets importants. La guerre naturelle des individus a cessé, dès que la loi positive a parlé; et dès lors, les usurpations et les massacres ont fait place à la lutte et à l’émulation. Maintenez la loi, et l’égotisme ne sera qu’un jeu utile, un véhicule nécessaire. C’est la collection de tous les égoïsmes épars qui forme...}

l'intérêt public. Vouloir extirper l'égoïsme, c'est vouloir arracher le cœur, c'est ôter à la république son principal ressort. Une constitution ne saurait être bonne, si elle n'est bâtie sur toute les passions humaines.\footnote{Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 127.}

Cloots was in favour of extensive individual rights, notably the right to vote to be extended to women, blacks, and servants. This was also a position shared by Condorcet.\footnote{Viguier, ‘Individu’, 121.} It is this alliance between free and equal individuals that form the nation of the human race. However, the evolution of the concept of nation must first be understood in order to understand how Cloots could envision the whole human race as constituting one.

Cloots’s conception of the individual and the society formed by individuals falls within the conceptual framework set by Baker. It is a voluntaristic association, and ultimately it leads to a universal society, which replaces as ‘cosmos’ the previous ‘théos’, as seen in the previous chapter on nature: epistemologically, the limits of the understanding of nature and the universe is replaced by the consolation of living in society in accordance with nature; ethically, human nature is limited by the law in order to maintain a civil and well functioning society, whilst the achievement of peace in society will increase knowledge; religiously, nature as the social state is replacing progressively through reason the need for religion; politically, all human existence will be submitted to laws and elections so no order will be imposed from above.

\textit{Nation}

As Koselleck has shown, nationalism is the process of politicisation of the two concepts of people and nation, previously distinct and separate, and their unification and ideologisation.\footnote{Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Volk, Nation, Nationalismus, Masse’, in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, ed. Reinhart Koselleck Otto Brunner Werner Conze, vol. 7 (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1992), 147–148.} According to Koselleck, this happened particularly during the Satelzeit — the transitional period between the early modern and modern age, 1750–1870 — when concepts acquired the meanings they now have.\footnote{Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Einleitung’, in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, ed. Reinhart Koselleck, Werner Conze and Otto Brunner, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1972), XIII–XXVII.} Before that, the concept of nation was first understood in the feudal context: nations are peoples on a particular territory, as in German \textit{Volk}. In the seventeenth century a dictionary defined nation to be: ‘un grand peuple habitant une même étendue de terre renfermée en
certaines limites ou même sous une certaine domination’. At the turn of
the century, the *Dictionnaire de l’Académie* (1694), added a political and
cultural dimension with the elements of language and common laws: ‘La
nation est constituée par tous les habitants d’un même État, d’un même
pays, qui vivent sous les mêmes lois et usent le même langage’. The same
meaning continued during the eighteenth century, as the *Dictionnaire Trévoux*
shows: ‘un nom collectif, qui se dit d’un grand peuple habitant une
certaine étendue de terre, renfermée en certaines limites sous une même do-
mination’. The 1771 edition added several elements:

NATION. s. f. Nom collectif, qui se dit d’un grand peuple
habitant une certaine étendue de terre, renfermée en certaines
limites, & sous une même domination. *Nation*, *gens*, *populus*.
Alexandre a conquis, a dompté plusieurs *nations*, plusieurs
peuples...
On le dit aussi des habitants d’un même pays, quoiqu’il soit
partagé en divers états, & en différens gouvernemens. Ainsi
l’on dit la *nation* allemande, la *nation* italienne.
Ce terme dans sa signification primitive désigne un nombre
de familles sorties d’une même tige, ou nées dans un même
pays. On s’en est servi pour désigner un grand peuple gou-
verné par les mêmes lois. Quelquefois la *nation* se divise en
Tribus, comme la *nation* juive; en Cantons, comme la *nation*
helvétique; en Royaumes, comme la *nation* espagnole; en di-
vers peuples, comme l’ancienne Gaule, où le mot *nation* est ex-
primé par celui de *civitas*, qui comprenoit sous lui des peuples
particuliers. Plusieurs peuples sont une seule nation. Les Bour-
guignons, les Champenois, les Picards, les Normans, les Bre-
tons, &c. sont autant de peuples qui forment la *nation* Fran-
çaise.

The first part of the definition takes the current legal definition of a nation-
state in international law, at least in its first three components: a population,
a defined territory, and a government; the element of capacity to act in inter-
national relations is missing. It also notes that the original meaning of the
term was ethnic: ‘families stemming for an identical stalk’. It also notes that

163. *Dictionnaire universel françois et latin*, vulgairement appelé dictionnaire de Trévoux, 6e éd., t. 6 (Paris : Compagnie des libraires associés, 1771), 145.
several people can form a nation, notably ancient Gaul in which there were several people, each forming a civitas. As for this civitas, it is understood as cité in the Dictionnaire de Trévoux:

CITÉ, quand il s’agit de l’antiquité, signifie un État, un peuple avec toute ses dépendances, une République particulière, comme sont encore plusieurs villes Suisses. Civitas.¹⁶⁴

The word nation is more related to the concept of political community that people constitute. A single language forms the bond of this community, but also common law. However, in this understanding there is no ‘French nation’ since France was at the time divided into several regions with different laws, tax systems, and languages. Instead, the concept of sovereignty over the territory as exercised by the king is what unites the kingdom.

According to Dann, the Enlightenment, which opposed absolutist monarchism, separated the conception of monarchism from nation: ‘La nation est le corps des citoyens, le peuple est l’ensemble des regnicoles’.¹⁶⁵ It is a very republican understanding of the nation that separates the king from the citizens. However, it is probably the absence of any model of republic as large as France that explains the revolutionary reticence to dispose of the king, even so after his flight to Varennes. If the king is the common element that binds together the French nation, how could this nation survive as a single political community without him? But that was not yet a concern in the eighteenth century, which focused on the issue of absolutism. With ideas stemming from natural law, the concept of nation designated a political community of free and equal individuals as the article ‘Représentants’ in the Encyclopédie defined the characteristic of despotism where there is in fact no nation: ‘Dans un état despotique, le chef de la nation est tout, la nation n’est rien ; la volonté d’un seul fait la loi, la société n’est point représentée’.¹⁶⁶

In this sense, the nation only exists if its head of state, the king, is not a despot. This does not necessarily entail the end of monarchism, but implies a representative body of this ‘nation’, which deliberates on laws rather than a monarch legislating arbitrarily. Sieyès theorised the concept of the ‘civil society nation’ with the idea of the ‘Third estate’ as forming a complete nation. Moreover, he defined a nation by ‘associates’ living under a ‘common law’ and represented by the same legislative assembly: ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? un corps d’Associés vivant sous une loi commune, & représentés par

According to Fehrenbach, Sieyès’s concept of nation had three elements: it is an organised and unified community, it has a sovereign national representation of equal citizens, and it is the only source of law except for a superior natural law. After the revolution, the article 3 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man could state that ‘le principe de toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la Nation. Nul corps, nul individu ne peut exercer d’autorité qui n’en émane expressément’. The nation took power and became the sovereign. In the early years of the revolution, the nation was this civitas, this abstract political community of free and equal men deciding and obeying their own laws, a very republican concept that implies active citizen participation.

It is exactly this meaning of nation that Cloots uses in his ‘nation of the human race’. It is the abstract concept of a political group of free and equal men, commoners and workers—(sans-culottes, Cloots will specify in 1792–1793)—and not a conception of a particular people, Volk, or rather the whole of the human race under the 1789 Declaration as a particular people. Cloots states this explicitly:

Un peuple est aristocrate à l’égard d’un autre peuple : le genre humain est essentiellement bon, car son égoïsme despotique n’est en opposition avec aucun égoïsme étranger. La République du genre humain n’aura jamais de dispute avec personne, car il n’y a point de pont de communication entre les planètes. By ‘despotic egoism’, Cloots means the self-interest that is at the base of the concept of ‘general will’. To him, the problem with a world of multiple sovereigns is that it is a world of multiple ‘general wills’ or ‘despotic egoisms’ that cannot be reconciled under another general will; but, this is possible in a particular republic in order to avoid that individual wills—self-interested ‘despotic egoisms’—triumph.

To Cloots, and to many other thinkers who shared his views, such as Volney, Condorcet, or Thomas Paine, if the various peoples of the French kingdom were able to unite under one republic, one constitution, one rule of law, one nation, there is no reason it should not be possible to regroup all the populations of the world under the same nation. Cloots has long been a partisan of the name ‘Gaul’ instead of France, because he had in mind the thèse nobiliaire of the Franks who took over this gallic nation or ‘civitas’ regrouping several free populations, as described in the Dictionnaire Trévoux.

167. Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, *Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État?* (s.l.: s.n., 1789), 8.
This will be explained in further detail in the chapter on republicanism, as well as how this nation of the human race was highly decentralised and left many policy decisions to local citizens and their local representatives, thus allowing active citizenship worldwide. The concept of nation is first and foremost a concept of republican equality and freedom under a common law. Therefore, why not have a nation of the human race to put an end to wars and all the miseries they entail?

Cloots’s idea of political organisation was modelled around how France was organised between 1789 and 1793, where any form of authority had to be elected by citizens. Finally, the ‘nation of the human race’ is also a sort of *tiers état du genre humain*. This ‘nation of the human race’ is explicitly the one of the oppressed peoples (oppressed by any religious and monarchical authority, or any aristocrat). In this view of the nation, matters of identity matter less than matters of liberty, a little bit as in the Marxist theory of classes in which two proletarian from different countries would have more in common than a bourgeois and a proletarian from the same country. This is especially the case in Cloots’s view of the people as ‘sans-culottes’ without frontiers. As Cloots writes: ‘... rien ne ressemble plus à un Sans-Culottes du Nord qu’un Sans-Culottes du Midi ; rien ne ressemble plus à un aristocrate de l’Orient qu’un aristocrate de l’Occident’.

It is also for this same reason that Cloots insisted that the French Republic be called ‘German’, in order to emphasise its non-nationalistic (in the sense of national identity) character, and the idea of fraternity among human beings.

However, Cloots’s conception of ‘nation of the human race’, like the revolutionaries and their conception of ‘French nation’, would be challenged by the question of the king after the flight to Varennes. The absence of republican model on a large territory, and the long tradition of a king as uniting a diverse and divided country will make them doubt whether to dispose of Louis XVI, despite his obvious treason. But the nation is no longer the king, it is the body of citizens, and therefore Cloots and the revolutionaries will look for alternative solutions. This will be the object of the next chapter.

Je préfère la république européenne à la république française, et la république universelle à celle de l’Europe, parce que je suis homme parce que le meilleur m’est assez bon.

Cloots, 1793

Studies on Cloots’s political thought refer to his system, explicitly or implicitly, as a ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. I do not discuss here the cosmopolitan part of the expression, which I considered in the introduction. I will discuss here republicanism in Cloots’s thought and in reference to the context of his time. As we have seen in the previous chapters, Cloots was educated in classical republicanism, and used several classical republican references in his revolutionary writings. For Pocock, classical republicanism is characterised by several major traits: the reference to Roman constitution as model of respublica mixta, seeing trade as a source of corruption, the prevalence of law, and the prevalence of positive political liberty over negative political liberty. This distinction on liberty stems from Berlin — negative liberty being attributed to individuals as the absence of obstacles, and positive liberty attributed to collective organisations as the possibility of acting upon one’s life. Pettit later refined this conception of liberty as non-domination. With the example of Mably, Wright identified three chronological phases in the formation of classical republicanism in eighteenth-century France: the first, from the last decades of the reign of Louis XIV; the second, from the High Enlightenment to the eve of the revolution; the third, during the decade of the revolution. It is useful here to follow this chronological classification.

In the chapter on rhetoric a quote from Mercier’s Tableau de Paris demonstrated the extent of the education future revolutionaries received on Ro-

man republicanism. The following quote from the same book shows the confusion Mercier felt as a pupil after finishing his education: leaving his study bench and exiting through the collège’s gates to realise that he is indeed in Paris and not in Rome. It was equally a state of confusion to ‘forget’ all this republican knowledge and remember that he lives in an absolute monarchy, despite the fact that this absolute monarch paid for the professors inculcating this republican stories and ideas:

Il est sûr qu’on rapporte de l’étude de la langue Latine un certain goût pour les Républiques, & qu’on voudroit pouvoir ressusciter celle dont on lit la grande & vaste histoire. Il est sûr qu’entendant parler du Sénat, de la liberté, de la majesté du peuple Romain, de ses victoires, de la juste mort de César, du poignard de Caton qui ne put survivre à la destruction des loix, il en coûte pour sortir de Rome, & pour se retrouver bourgeois de la rue des Noyers.

C’est cependant dans une Monarchie que l’on entretient perpétuellement les jeunes gens de ces idées étrangères, qu’ils doivent perdre & oublier bien vite, pour leur sûreté, pour leur avancement & pour leur bonheur ; & c’est un Roi absolu, qui paye les Professeurs pour vous expliquer gravement toutes les éloquentes déclamations lancées contre le pouvoir des Rois : de force qu’un éleve de l’Université, quand il se trouve à Versailles, & qu’il a un peu de bon sens, songe, malgré lui, à Tarquin, à Brutus, à tous les fiers ennemis de la Royauté. Alors sa pauvre tête ne sait plus où elle en est. Il est un sot & un esclave né, où il lui faut du temps pour se familiiser avec un pays qui n’a ni Tribuns, ni Décemvirs, ni Sénateurs, ni Consuls.  

It is certain that revolutionaries were well versed in Roman republicanism, but even after the flight of the king arrested in Varennes on 21 June 1791, revolutionaries did not make the transition directly to republicanism and the king was re-instated. Cloots showed similarly the same hesitation and even tried to use Roman and Greek republican examples to advocate a ‘monarchy without king’ or a republic with a powerless and non-royal monarch, or elected monarch without heredity at the head of the executive branch.

The chapters on rhetoric and on truth and science have already shown how Cloots received an education focusing on classical republicans. Cloots called himself ‘orator’ in this classical republican fashion, with the view of spreading a scientia civilis. In this chapter, I shall focus on Cloots’s republican thought proper and I shall answer two questions: firstly, what is Clo-

ots’s republican thought; secondly, how is it situated in the context of its time?

In order to answer these questions it is first necessary to explain what is understood by republicanism. The vast ensemble of rules, principles, laws, concepts that are constitutive of or involved in the organisation of a republican system of government or a republican state constitute what is referred to as republicanism. There is no clear definition of what republicanism is, and scholars take various stances, but central to republicanism is the concept of liberty. Western historians and political theorists have grouped a number of political texts and authors under the denomination of republicanism due to their common rhetoric and ideas inspired by Roman and Greek antiquity. Such authors range from Renaissance Italy with Machiavelli, to Englishmen such as Milton or Blackstone, Frenchmen with Montesquieu or Mably, and American founding fathers with Jefferson and Madison for the most well-known of them. The interpretation of these authors, their inclusion in the list and their significance is subject to controversy. The concept of republicanism as a tool for interpreting and understanding the history of political thought has a particular history in English historiography, and its success in the second half of the twentieth century is no academic fashion but constitutes a paradigm in a Khunian sense.

There are two sorts of studies on republicanism, besides the many historiographical controversies inside each tradition. Firstly, historical works interpreting and situating republican thought, especially since the Italian Renaissance with Machiavelli. These are labelled as ‘classical republicanism’. Secondly, philosophical works relating these historical works to contemporary republican philosophy — mainly Anglo-American — or ‘neo-republicanism’. Berlin gave a definition of liberty that influenced many of the subsequent discussions on neo-republicanism during an inaugural lecture at the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, subsequently published in 1969. Berlin identified two concepts of liberty: a negative liberty understood as non-interference, and a positive liberty, understood as being able to exercise self-control, self-mastery. With this dichotomy, Berlin was influential in associating liberalism, in the context of the Cold War, with the only true liberty — negative liberty — as opposed to the

fake liberty — positive liberty — thus effectively framing the debates on republicanism around liberalism in this dualist sense.\textsuperscript{11}

Against this dualism, and perceived distortion of republicanism by a hegemonic liberalism, a ‘neo-republicanism’ rose as Pocock, Skinner, and Pettit proposed a different understanding of republicanism, anchored in a historical interpretation. Among this ‘neo-republicanism’, the historical work of Pocock represents a reference of ‘civic humanism’ even if it is a dense and complex argument.\textsuperscript{12} It provided an interpretation of classical republicanism that has been influential on historians and philosophers ever since. Pocock analysed a revival of Roman republicanism in Florentine political thought in the era of Machiavelli, and linked it to the ‘Atlantic republican tradition’ in Puritan England and revolutionary America. Skinner developed the same theme interpreting Machiavelli as the proponent of a neo-Roman conception of liberty, understood as non-domination, that influenced England, and chiefly Hobbes.\textsuperscript{13} The Roman conception of liberty was that of personal freedom marking the difference between slaves and free individuals as the absence of arbitrary power from anyone else. Several authors have studied along Skinner’s line of thought, forming a tradition called ‘civic republicanism’. Pettit has been particularly influential in developing a theory of liberty as non-domination, when domination over someone is understood as an arbitrary and uncontrolled power over one’s affairs.\textsuperscript{14}

Concerning French republicanism, the Anglophone and the French literature on republicanism depart in their interpretation of pre-revolutionary eighteenth-century French political thought. French literature, with a few exceptions, emphasises the absence of any republican thought prior to the French Revolution, or even until the flight of the King to Varennes, which sets the milestones for republican thought.\textsuperscript{15} Anglophone literature, however, has contested this view that amounts to an inexplicable and sudden switch from monarchism to republicanism. They identify a French ‘classical republicanism’ with philosophers building on Montesquieu’s paradigmatic differentiation between three forms of government — despotic, monarchical,


\textsuperscript{14} Pettit, \textit{Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government}.

\textsuperscript{15} See the first section for a literature review.
republicanism in eighteenth-century france

Such philosophers are: Rousseau, Mably, Saige, and Condorcet. The disagreement stems from a different understanding of the term ‘republicanism’, that the works in English understand as a theory of liberty, either liberty as non-domination or liberty as non-interference, when French historians have focused on finding anti-monarchical movements. In this chapter, I understand republicanism more widely as a theory of liberty.

The first section presents ‘classical republicanism’ in eighteenth-century French political thought. The successive sections will attempt to place where Cloots stands in this intellectual context. Republicanism subsumes many themes and concepts, and it is impossible to elaborate on all of them here. I chose to focus on some of them here, which I deem more important for the overall argument of cosmopolitan republicanism: the question of monarchy and royalty, the reference to classical republicanism, and the modernisation of republicanism with the question of size.

French historians have made the case against a ‘républicanisme des Lumières’.\(^\text{16}\) The fact that a republic was created at all is characterised as a ‘divine surprise’.\(^\text{17}\) For Goulemot, several arguments plead for this position: the fact that there was no republican party; the absence of the experience of a republic; Voltaire’s severe condemnation of the republic in England; and the belief in a historical paradigm opposed to the formation of a republic.\(^\text{18}\) This view, according to which the term ‘république’ and the ideology of republicanism is not yet fully fledged before the revolution, is also shared by Dumont and Nicolet. According to Dumont, the term ‘république’ was used to designate any type of state, also monarchical ones, or a regime in opposition to a monarchy.\(^\text{19}\) For Nicolet, the importance of, for instance, Condorcet and Rousseau for republican theory is a construction of nineteenth-century historians and republicans. It is the need to anchor deeply the Third Republic in a philological tradition in the 1890s that led to a retelling and re-discovering of — until then minimised — ‘republican authors’.\(^\text{20}\) Voelle equally denies any republicanism before the revolution, as well as any external influ-

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\(^{17}\) Ibid., 26.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 32–33.


ence on what he considers to be ‘l’exception française’. Maintenant equally limits republicanism before 1789 to Montesquieu’s discussion of antiquity and Rousseau’s discussion of a small republic like Geneva, noting that the cabiers de doléances did not demand the abolition of monarchy, but only reforms regarding abuses. According to Maintenant, only a handful of revolutionaries proposed a republican form of government between 1789 and 1792: Brissot, Desmoulins, Condorcet, Anthoine, and Lavicomterie.

On the other hand, Spitz refutes this version that he calls a ‘caricature’ of republican thought. According to him, this view benefited from the influence of Furet’s work. Spitz rejects not only the idea that republicanism is a strictly post-revolutionary serendipity, but that there is a particular ‘exception française’ of it, thereby anchoring the study of French republicanism in the Euro-Atlantic republican tradition as described below. Against the view that ‘French republicanism’ stems from Jacobinism and a conception of positive liberty, Spitz argues that the central role of the state was to guarantee equality and liberty as non-domination. Monnier understands equally republicanism as discussions on theories of liberty with Montesquieu, Mably, and Rousseau in particular, and is interested in investigating how these theories were expounded and received after the flight of the king in 1791. The capture of the king in Varennes opened the space for this debate of republicanism as anti-monarchism to become a reality. However, the word ‘république’ itself did not yet have the meaning it later took during the nineteenth century to designate a form of representative government.

A collective

23. Ibid., 101.
of French historians called Collectif l’Esprit des Lumières et de la Révolution published the proceedings of their conference adding the dimension played by natural law in France to this line of studies on Atlantic republicanism.\(^{30}\) Another collective of French historians dedicated an issue of the journal La Révolution française to the influence of English republicanism on the French revolution, anchoring their research to the ones initiated with Pocock and Skinner.\(^{31}\) However, as the editors note, these studies include the connection between natural law and republicanism, which Pocock considered as opposed.\(^{32}\)

If this link from the French revolution to the Euro-Atlantic republican tradition is new to French historians, it has inspired anglophone historians in their research for several decades. This tradition, or ‘paradigm’ in a Khunian sense according to Pocock, started with his seminal work The Machiavellian Moment, which sought to understand how classical republican thought migrated from Renaissance Italy to seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century North America.\(^{33}\) A collection of essays analyses this tradition in several European countries — the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France, England, Germany, and Poland.\(^{34}\) In the French case, Spitz argues that d’Holbach had his own ‘modern’ conception of liberty, different from non-interference or independence, but as achieving happiness without prejudice, in a general criticism of selfish patriotic virtue of classical republicanism that ought, instead, to be defined in contrast to self-interest.\(^{35}\) Wright tentatively sketches a ‘pre-history’ of French republicanism, with Boulainvilliers invoking the liberty of the ancients in the thèse nobiliaire against absolutism, Montesquieu, who gave republicanism great publicity, Mably, who draws attention on the constitution of the ancients, and Rousseau, who provides a theory of sovereignty based on the general will.\(^{36}\) Shklar argues

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31. François Quastana and Pierre Serna, eds., La Révolution française, no. 5: Le républicanisme anglais dans la France des Lumières et de la Révolution (2013).


that Montesquieu was, in a way, the Machiavelli of eighteenth-century French political thought in that he framed the way republicanism was to be debated throughout the century (obviously a very different republicanism).  

Venturi argues that the translation into French of Shaftesbury’s *Principes de la philosophie morale* in 1745 by Diderot started the discussions on republicanism.  

Venturi finds his proof of ‘existence of a republican ferment in France between 1745 and 1754’ in ‘the diaries of one of the most lucid and independent witnesses of that age, the marquis d’Argenson’. In 1758, Deleyre published in the *Journal encyclopédique* his ‘Pensées d’un républicain sur les mœurs de ce siècle’, which constituted a veritable republican manifesto. It stated that the revolt against tyrants was legitimate because kings were necessarily asocial beings. Venturi paved the way for future studies on the English influence in French political thought during this period. Hammersley suggests that English republican works and ideas were more important than ancient or American examples and texts. Hammersley also establishes a different classification of republicanism, between ‘ancient republicanism’, and ‘early-modern republicanism’. According to Hammersley, English republican texts provided answers to the fundamental question for early modern republicans: how republican institutions and practices (securing liberty) could be made workable in the context of a large nation state? In particular, the English political theorist James Harrington (1611–1677) and his ideas of democracy developed in *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656) had an influence on the Cordeliers Club.

Wright identified Mably as a ‘classical republican’ for declaring that sovereign power belonged to the people, who bestowed it to the magistrates and could always revoke it, and for admiring the Ancient Republics of Athens and Sparta. The surveillance of the governing bodies by its people constitutes the central element of what Baker calls ‘classical republicanism’.

39. Ibid., 73.
40. Ibid., 80–81.
42. Ibid., 6.
As a ‘language of opposition’ rather than a ‘belief’, Baker defines classical republicanism as such:

As a discourse of political will, rather than as a mere preference for the republican form of government, classical republicanism found recurrent expression in prerevolutionary France, not in the form of bookish nostalgia or cultural fantasy but as a language of opposition to the claims of absolute monarchy, to the governmental practices of a modernizing administrative state, and to the corrupting seductions of an expanding commercial economy.46

Indeed, the opposition between ancients and moderns was one of the essential dyads of the Enlightenment, as philosophers had a deep historical consciousness of the modernity of their time.47 Viroli has situated Rousseau as a representative of classical and modern republicanism because of the influence of Cicero and Machiavelli. In particular, Viroli argues that the republican constitution in Rousseau is similar to the vivere libero and the repubblica ordinata bene in Machiavelli.48 In a similar fashion, Spitz has analysed Rousseau’s conception of individual liberty as ‘republican liberty’.49

Whatmore considers that it is wrong to talk of a revival of classical republicanism because it was inconceivable to recreate ancient republicanism at the level of a large modern state.50 Instead, Whatmore suggests distinguishing between small state republicanism (discussions in the United Provinces, the Swiss Cantons, and Rousseau’s discussions of Corsica and Poland) on the one hand, and large state republicanism, on the other.51 Large state republicanism is a looser category that regroups different texts around the common theme of complaining against the backdrop of classical republicanism about the loss of virtue and patriotism, and the corrupting nature of luxury.52 In particular, Whatmore identifies Mably, Helvétius, and d’Holbach in this large state republicanism, although they never advocated

46. Ibid., 36.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
any revolutionary overturn of monarchy for a republic, but rather wrote
lessons for monarchs. Whatmore characterises a specific large state republicanism
in France, different from English republicanism, based on a consideration
of physiocracy as a political thought and not only as an economic theory:
‘... there was ... a distinctive kind of republicanism before the Revolution,
bitterly opposed to the British constitution and entailing the sovereignty
of philosophers, merchants, and farmers’. Prominent names among this
‘neo-physiocracy’ are Turgot, Dupont, Condorcet, Quesnay, Sieyès, Roe-
derer, Mirabeau, Say, and Clavière.

Albertone argues that this position, together with Israel’s study on the
Dutch republic and Urbinati’s on Condorcet, shows the existence of a
democratic republicanism, distinct from ‘classical republicanism’. For
Albertone, this ‘democratic republicanism’ is characterised by: a focus on
the concept of ‘civil society’; a focus on economy that leads to an egalitari-
anism opposed to the privileges of the ancien régime; and a focus on the
individual rather than the state.

Finally, Edelstein writes a ‘secret history’ of ‘natural republicanism’ be-
tween 1699 and 1791, characterised by mixing views of nature — especially
a ‘golden age’ — and natural rights with ‘imaginary republics’ in Fénelon,
Montaigne, Montesquieu, and classical republicans Mably and Rousseau.

But it is especially with the physiocrats that Edelstein sees a significant con-
tribution that influenced the Jacobins in amalgamating the state of nature
with the state of society, and in which natural rights alone are responsible
for civil legislation.

These various understandings of republicanism are directly relevant to
the study of Cloots’s vision of a republic encompassing the whole globe.
Was his republicanism inspired by English works? Was he a classical repub-
lican, an early-modern republican, a modern republican, a democratic re-
publican? What was his position before the revolution? It is again difficult
to ascertain his influences because of his namedropping some authors, and
not naming others. Shaftesbury, Harrington, Deleyre, are not mentioned

54. Ibid., 78.
55. Ibid., 61–84.
58. Ibid., 117.
59. Edelstein, The Terror of Natural Right, 45–86.
60. Ibid., 101–124.
in Cloots’s writings, but d’Holbach, Montesquieu, Helvétius, Mably, Rousseau, Locke, Cicero, and Machiavelli are frequently referred to.

Before the revolution, Cloots is very much in line with the ideas of the Enlightenment, favouring Enlightened monarchism. Just like he was a theist before becoming an atheist, Cloots was in favour of enlightened monarchism before becoming a republican. In *Les vœux d’un gallophile* (1786), Cloots makes the case for the ‘Philosopher King’. Nonetheless, he also makes the case for educating the people. Government and administration is a complex science that requires a well-read people. Cloots is therefore, as many *philosophes* of the time, both in favour of a government of a few elite led by a philosopher king, but governing a well-educated people capable of understanding their policies.

In particular, Cloots admires and praises Frederick the Great. He presents him to other monarchs as an example to follow, because he has managed to double the population under the direction of Hertzberg: ‘Ce grand ministre d’un grand roi n’y fait pas moins admirer son érudition & sa logique, que dans les Ouvrages sortis de sa plume...’ Or again in *Lettres sur les juifs*, Cloots takes as a time of reference ‘le siècle d’Alexandre jusqu’au siècle de Frédéric’. In the footnote, Cloots explains what he means:

> Mon roi est philosophe et nous vivons dans un Siecle Philosophe. L’Histoire ne montre que six époques honorables à l’esprit humain : les siecles d’Alexandre, d’Auguste, d’Aaron-al-Raschid, de Medicis, de Louis le grand, de Frédéric le grand. Ce dernier siècle est le mieux caractérisé. Il unit au mérite des autres tous les avantages de la plus saine philosophie. Ma dénomination lui convient absolument ; car Frédéric en occupe le commencement, le milieu & la fin. Frédéric a lui-même puissamment contribué aux progrès des lumières, par sa plume, son influence & ses libéralités. Il a opéré une heureuse révolution dans le monde par son Code & sa Tactique, par sa Prose, ses Vers & ses Victoires, par son Génie & son Sceptre, par son Héroïsme universel. Le culte de ce Dieu est si bien établi partout, que les autres Princes s’attirent des éloges en l’admirant & en témoignant quelque envie de l’imiter. On ne m’accusera pas de vouloir faire ma cour à mon Souverain, car je suis ici le

Sécréttaire de tous les Sages & personne n’ignore que Frédéric déteste les courtisans.64

Cloots’s support for the education of the people so that they understand the policies of their rulers is noteworthy; what sort of participation does it entail? Even if Cloots does not write it explicitly, a well-educated people can no longer be considered an idle group, easy to manipulate, but a counter-power with the potential to revolt when liberties or other fundamental principles are disregarded. Following Wright and Baker’s understanding of what constitutes ‘classical republicanism’, one could argue that Cloots was a ‘classical republican’ before the revolution. Cloots not only expressed that the people should be educated, but that it should understand the policies of its government. In any case, the people has no obligation to obey those it does not see fit for the task. Cloots writes:

Le peuple n’est tenu de suivre que ceux qu’il juge avoir mission de le conduire ; or si les preuves de cette mission ne sont pas à sa portée, il ne peut rien juger dans cette matière, & il est le maître de prendre tel parti que sa conscience lui suggère ; car il n’en est pas de la religion comme du gouvernement civil : l’une est l’objet de la persuasion, l’autre est l’objet des convenances.65, 66

Cloots uses the same argument for civil government as the argument he used against religion: anyone should be able to understand the ‘mission’ of the government, otherwise there is no possibility to evaluate this mission, just like everyone should be able to understand the message of God. Therefore Cloots seems to suggest, in this parallel, that there is a theism, so to speak, for civil government, just as there is a religious theism: the true religion should be accessible to everyone, or it is not God’s words; by the same token, the true principle of government must equally be accessible to all, or it is not valid. Moreover, one could stretch his argument to a logical conclusion: there is only one true type of government, which can be discovered by looking at nature. Just as there is only one true God for all, and all religions are wrong, there is one true government for all, and all other political governments are wrong. This argument, Cloots does not formulate quite yet, but it is already there in gestation.

However, if Cloots agrees on opposing absolute monarchy and on having an educated people, he disagrees on the ‘the corrupting seductions of an expanding commercial economy’, as Baker puts it. On the contrary, Cloots sees a correlation between luxury and the advancement of science in the example of the Dutch Republic, and for that reason he downplays the

64. Cloots, Lettre sur les juifs, 2–3.
65. Convenance here means that there is a link and conformity between the people and the government. See Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 4th Edition (1762).
66. Cloots, Vœux d’un gallophile, 103.
‘frivolités’ that luxury entails as minor side effects. Cloots mentions the Dutch republic in *Vœux d’un gallophile* at several occasions as a positive example of luxury. He congratulates France for having established economic ties with Holland and being an allied to this ‘opulent republic’.

In a letter to the abbé Brizard written in Amsterdam in 1786, Cloots praises the Dutch republic for its wealth, and even its luxury, which seems to contradict the argument of those who wrote against luxury such as Rousseau, or Helvétius.

Cloots walks on the harbour and describes the burgeoning commercial activities, and the international trade that makes Amsterdam, and Holland, so wealthy. But what Cloots praises in this wealth, above all else, is that it is well distributed among the different levels of society: peasants and bourgeois are well-off and better-off than their forefathers, whilst manual workers and day labourers have the means to live decently. This stimulates Cloots to consider luxury closely: it may seem frivolous at first glance, but it also leads to a greater interest in sciences and arts among the population, who is no longer solely focused on one’s own business and home. In fact, Cloots observes that the same can be said about Paris where luxury has brought frivolity in the form of an extravagant amount of wigmakers, but has also brought a great advance in science, art, and philosophy.

In this description, Cloots is closer to Montesquieu’s view of luxury, or Melon’s criticism of Rousseau.

Cloots gives an indirect definition of what the characteristics of a republic are when describing the *Musée*, of which he is a member, as a ‘republic’. In his speech made at the *Musée* on 20 December 1781, Cloots explains:

> Ce musée, oui Messieurs, est une république ; car il jouit du privilège d’exister sans protection aulique ; car la tolérance y appelle jusqu’aux livrées de l’intolérance ; car le bénitier, le prépuce & le turban n’y sont comptés pour rien ; car le musée tient à tout l’univers & par ses ouvrages & par ses correspondances ; l’univers sera donc instruit d’abord du résultat de nos opérations, des conquêtes de la vérité, de l’humiliation de l’erreur.

One can see in this way of characterising the *Musée* as a republic a sort of definition of the main attributes of a republic: negative liberty as non-

67. Ibid., 46.
68. Ibid., 253–254.
69. Ibid., 255–256.
republicanism; tolerance; positive liberty with freedom of expression and religion; philanthropic purpose in spreading knowledge and truth. The first characteristic that Cloots attributes to a republic is the ‘privilege of existing without the protection of a prince’s court’, so, in other words, an independence from external power, or ‘non-domination’. It is interesting also to note the choice of words here. ‘Privilège’ comes from Latin privilegum, from ‘private’ and ‘law’, designating someone or a group being set aside from someone else’s law. Here it is the law from ‘the prince’s court’, aulicus, ‘princely’. The second characteristic is tolerance in a wide sense, as tolerating even intolerant opinions. The third characteristic is liberty, as freedom of speech (without which the Musée would not be able to spread knowledge to the universe) and freedom of religion. Finally, Cloots seems to equate a republic with the spread of knowledge and instruction to the whole humankind. Perhaps, that is a consequence of the understanding of republic by the ‘republic of letters’. This view of what a republic is, seems very close to his subsequent revolutionary view of the ‘universal republic’. However, the res publica in question, the truth, is discovered and disseminated through the institution of philosophers as many ministers of this republic, whose goal it is to get rid of the worst atrocities and injustices committed in the name of religion. Through philosophy, enlightenment, Cloots hopes that the Musée will contribute to put an end to the darkness that religion casts on humanity and its history. This is the public good that the Musée shall engage in.

Although the Dutch Republic is considered as an example by Cloots, some of the authors that are considered important in the political thought of the Dutch respublica mixta, such as Spinoza or Pufendorf, did not seem to play a major influence on Cloots’s political thought.72 Cloots only mentioned Pufendorf through Barbeyrac’s preface to his translation, as seen in the chapter on natural law. Although, one should note that Bodin’s conception of sovereignty as indivisible and unique, which permeated the German and Dutch discourses of respublica mixta according to Bödecker, did have an influence on Cloots as well as the rest of the Jacobins. It may be that Cloots admired France and French philosophy much more than anything else, and more than the Dutch republican model. Cloots followed the general ideas of the French philosophes, even though he blended different positions, such as non-domination, free choice of government for the people, and free

trade and the accumulation of wealth. It may also be that Cloots still identified himself as Prussian at that time, rather than Dutch or 'Batave', as he would sometimes call himself after the revolution. After all, he had been educated at the Académie militaire de Berlin in order to become a high-ranking official in the growing Prussian bureaucratic state.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{Cloots and Republicanism during the Revolution}

Monnier notes that, with the exception of Brissot who understood republicanism as a form of government, most revolutionaries — such as Paine, Rutlidge, Boninne, Robespierre, and Desmoulins — understood republicanism as the theory of free state or commonwealth.\textsuperscript{74} The question of the organisation of powers and democratic procedures were only one aspect.\textsuperscript{75} The central problem for the concept of republicanism during the revolution was how to conciliate free will and obedience to the law, which took the form of classical opposition between freedom and slavery, or freedom and tyranny.\textsuperscript{76} The flight of the king radicalised the anti-tyrannical rhetoric in the republican language.\textsuperscript{77} Whatmore has identified Jean-Baptiste Say (1767–1832) as a figure of republicanism, who developed his political economy in a republican fashion, marrying commerce with virtue in a mix of themes taken by philosophes on various subjects. According to Whatmore, this position was shared by several revolutionaries, such as Sieyès, Rœderer, Paine, and Brissot, who all convinced Condorcet to join it in 1791.\textsuperscript{78}

One should note, that it is first in the antiquity, and Greece before Rome and Cicero, that the concepts of liberty and equality were formulated, and these concepts were taken and developed by the revolutionaries — particularly, when it comes to the rhetoric liberty/tyranny.\textsuperscript{79} The adjective \textit{libre} appeared first in Greek, \textit{eleutheros}, and was used for Greek freedom as opposed to barbarian tyranny, or being enslaved by a foreign power.\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Liberté, eleutheria}, appeared later when foreign tyrannies disappeared.\textsuperscript{81} Liberty was used as a term opposed to being subjected to the power of one person, not royalty, but monarchy — the power of one person — considered as tyranny.\textsuperscript{82} The Roman \textit{libertas}, however, is considered as menaced by roy-
ality rather than monarchy. Liberty was defined as opposed to slavery, as the capacity of being a citizen both civically and militarily, and the image of the land-owner turned soldier to defend the homeland was a widespread idealistic trope.

Cloots had already an anti-tyrannical rhetoric and was already anti-monarchist before the Varennes crisis. Moreover, a quick look at all his Écrits révolutionnaires shows an impressive use of the word liberté, found on almost every page. Often, the word liberty is opposed to slavery, which is also found on almost every page. Cloots is born a ‘slave’ in Gnadenthal. Cloots was thinking about liberty when the French people was still ‘enslaved’ before the revolution. ‘L’Europe esclave’ as opposed to ‘la France libre’ after the revolution. Tyranny and tyrants are also expressions often used both for absolute monarchs and for members of the church: ‘... nos tyrans spirituels et temporels...’. There are many examples of antiquity in Cloots’s writings. Figures and events from Rome and Athens are frequently evoked to illustrate current affairs during the revolution. These Attic and Roman references become even more frequent when the question of the king comes to the fore after the Varennes crisis, and they turn into comparisons with current affairs or serve to show they cannot apply to modern times.

**Anti-Monarchism**

Cloots is not immediately against the king and monarchism. Revolutionaries in general had an intellectual qualm about republicanism, even Robespierre. In ‘motion d’un membre du club des Jacobins, Société des Amis de la Constitution’, 18 March 1790, Cloots declares that it is good for patriotism that the king is back in Paris, and that it should minimise the possibility of uprise in the capital — the king having moved back to Paris from Versailles after the Women’s March on Versailles on 5 October 1789. However, in order to protect the Assemblée nationale, Cloots suggests to vote an amendment into the constitution that would take away the title of commander in chief from the king. Cloots fears the possibility that the king’s army may be turned against the revolution within an alliance with other kings.

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84. Ibid., 23.
86. Cloots, *Écrits révolutionnaires*, 137.
87. Ibid., 77.
91. Ibid., 13.
ots gives the example of the Republic of Genoa and the republic of Venice, where the doge is held hostage during his mandate by the citizens. In any case, Cloots argues that the liberty of movement of the king should be restricted. And to people arguing that it would be stripping the king of his liberty, Cloots answers that no person exercising a public mandate, not even the king, is free; as a matter of fact, the liberty of the king would mean the end of the liberty of the people. This limitation is not only for the present, but for the future, as the possibility of a charismatic warrior-king would turn the revolution back to absolutism:

Comme il s’agit de créer des lois pour tous les siècles et toutes les générations, notre constitution sera aussi fragile que vicieuse, si nous avons à redouter les vertus de nos rois. En effet, un monarque bienfaisant, actif, populaire, préparerait un trône absolu à lui-même ou à son héritier, si ce roi joint les vertus guerrières aux vertus civiles. Comment une nation légère, une multitude irréfléchie tiendrait-elle contre les prestiges charmants d’un monarque jeune, beau, éloquent, martial, généreux et victorieux ? Un roi capitaine, toujours gracieux, galant, aimable, jamais inaccessible, jamais dur ni capricieux ? C’est le dieu des armées, dirait le soldat ; c’est le dieu de la France, ajouterait la nation entière. Ce nouveau soleil éclipserait le pouvoir législatif, dont les membres clairvoyants et incorruptibles élèveraient vainement une voix républicaine dans cet émêlement universel, et le ridicule ne serait pas le moindre fléau qui saperait les fondements de la liberté.

Cloots equates here the executive power with the king, so, since the legislative power, representing the people, is the guarantee for liberty, the executive power is more a threat to liberty, or at best, an issue that has no philosophical solution yet.

In *Adresse d’un Prussien à un Anglais*, Cloots speaks of a ‘peuple-roi’ when relating his embassy at the first celebration of Bastille day. Cloots calls himself ‘ambassadeur des souverains opprimés’, who are the people living under a monarchical regime, as opposed to the ‘souverain triomphant’, the French ‘people-king’. Cloots tells them that they are born ‘slaves’, but that they only have to want liberty to be freed, leaving some ambiguity as to what that would entail precisely. The same image is taken again in *Anacharsis à Paris*: ‘Nous verrons arriver la grande époque où ... « les souverains, détrônés par les rois », reprendront leur couronne et leur toute-

92. Ibid., 15.
93. Ibid., 16.
puissance’. The expression quoted, Cloots notes, is from the poet Le Brun. The message is clear, the real sovereign is the people overthrown by the king.

In another article, ‘Ne regrettons pas les vingt-cinq ou trente millions...’ (allusion to the total population in France) published in *Chronique de Paris* on 1 September 1790, Cloots dehumanises the king as a person after having limited his powers, liberty, and called the people the true sovereign king, by suggesting the use of the term ‘crown’ instead, as the discussion is about an ‘abstract being’, the ‘throne’, not the person of the king himself. The discussion focused on the cost of the ‘crown’ to the people, a discussion taken up again later together with the cost of the church in *Anacharsis à Paris*. In this pamphlet, written on 6 October 1790, Cloots wrote again in favour of a king as head of state, but with even more limited powers.

> Il ne s’agit plus de dissimuler, répondons franchement aux mécontents, avouons hautement que le roi n’est pas libre, parce qu’il est à son poste, parce que « la liberté du prince est l’esclavage du peuple », et que la liberté du peuple est l’esclavage du prince.

Cloots uses the rhetoric freedom/slavery, and inverts the freedom of the prince and the slavery of the people: when the people are free the prince is not free to do whatever he wishes, and when the prince is free the people are not free to do whatever they wish. Cloots is still a theist religiously and politically: ‘Dieu est immuable, il nous faut un roi immuable’. The king is at the moment a necessity for representing the state, but if a king wished to travel he would be free to abdicate his throne. However, there is still the issue of public money spent on ‘God’ and the king in this system. Cloots presents a sceptical view regarding the maintenance of the king and the church:

> On nous a légué un Dieu qui coûte cent millions, et un roi qui en coûte trente. J’applaudis à l’adoption du prince considéré comme instrument nécessaire, mais vous conviendrez avec moi que le ciel serait plus satisfait, si, concentrant son culte dans nos cœurs ou dans des clubs, nous faisions en sorte d’être riches pour prendre des mesures avec l’Angleterre, afin d’effectuer la manumission de nos colons esclaves.

‘Manumission’ is the act of freeing a slave by a slave owner, and Cloots suggests that the now free French people gives the now ‘enslaved’ king back

98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., 84.
his liberty — gets rid of him. However, this is a mere suggestion, and the king is still the king even if the title changed from ‘roi de France’ to ‘roi des Français’, a change of title that will continue to fuel the battle between partisans of a constitutional monarchy and partisans of a republican regime in the nineteenth century.  

In ‘Roi des Français à tous les Rois de la terre’, published in Chronique de Paris on 2 March 1791, Cloots impersonates the king writing to all the kings of the world, urging them to follow his example by letting their people be free and join the ‘regeneration’ that the revolution started in France for the whole of the ‘human race’.

On the so-called Day of Daggers, 28 February 1791, a confrontation took place between the national guard and a group of nobles armed with daggers who wanted to organise the king’s escape. Cloots wrote a derisive account of the events in Le Courrier des 83 départements on 9 March 1791, calling them ‘Signori Poignardini’ as some sort of villains from the Florentine republic. But Cloots assures that the king is in fact safer with the national guard than with those ‘Signori’, and gives the example of the assassination of Henry IV in front of his courtisans, or of Romulus, who was not killed by the people, but whose blood quenched the thirst of the nobles.

Later on this same month of March 1791, before the flight to Varennes, 20–21 June, Cloots publishes L’orateur du genre humain, ou dépêche du prussien Cloots au prussien Hertzberg, a pamphlet that marks a decisive turn against Frederick the Great, Hertzberg, and ‘absolutism’, Enlightened or not. This time, the king’s manumission by the free people is not a mere suggestion any more. Cloots declares himself republican, as opposed to absolutism, and urges France to strip the king of all power, and of all ministers in favour of a representative assembly of the people:

Honneur et gloire à l’Assemblée nationale ! malheur et honte aux prêneurs des tyrans ! c’était une erreur, avant la révolution, de préférer un gouvernement absolu à un gouvernement républicain, une représentation vicieuse à une représentation populaire : mais c’est un forfait odieux, aujourd’hui que nous avons le premier modèle d’un grand peuple véritablement libre, où un roi ambulant devenu prince immuable occupe une place éminente, chère aux amis de la liberté, inaccessible aux démagogues, et funeste aux séditieux.

The king, however, should be kept. Cloots takes the example of ancient Athens, which, he argues, did not get rid of the royalty but of the tyranny
of royalty, keeping a sort of puppet king in place. The argument is twofold: first, there is a need for a transition from a state of absolutist tyranny to a state of republican liberty. That requires maintaining a royal head of state; second, maintaining this royal head of state preserves the republic from others claiming the place, such as powerful ministers of the king. Cloots writes:

On nous répète que l’Attique abrogea la dignité royale, en se rendant libre. Erreur. Les Athéniens ne firent qu’abolir la tyrannie royale ; ils sentirent l’importance de conserver le titre de roi, basileus, à un des gardiens, des conservateurs de la loi, et sa femme s’appelait reine, basilissa. Ce roi siégeait pompeusement sur un trône dans le portique royal. Si une nation peu étendue, si le plus ingénieux des peuples, si le plus démocrate des gouvernements a eu recours à cet artifice, comment une grande nation qui sort tout entière d’un long esclavage, et qui ne sortira que successivement d’une profonde ignorance, comment pourrait-elle se passer d’un roi légal, ou se garantir d’un ambitieux qui voudrait être illégalement roi ?

This also includes other institutions in charge in the absolutist state such as the Parlements, which Cloots considers as the magistrates applying the law of the despot, and not, as they argue, a counter-power such as the Areopagus of ancient Athens. Cloots then adds:

Je hais moins les rois que les ministres qui affectent un tendre amour pour leurs maîtres absolus. Voici le secret de l’Église et des cabinets : les royaumes libres sont des républiques, tout despotisme est aristocratique, et toute aristocratie est tyrannie.

Cloots calls for a universal republic, but still with the king as its head of state. When Cloots was not yet anti-monarchist, he considered the liberty of the people as the reason for the executive power, which the king exercised. In order to make it even clearer that the king is only at the service of the free people, Cloots calls him a ‘magistrate’: ‘... la liberté, qui décerne la magistrature unique ...’. According to the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 4th Edition (1762) and Jean-François Féraud’s Dictionnaire critique de la langue française (1787–1788), the definition of ’Magistrat’ is ‘Officier établi pour rendre la justice ou pour maintenir la police’; it is an officer in charge of a function under a higher power (normally the king). Here the higher power is the free people. However, Cloots probably does not mean that the king shall render justice or maintain order with a police force. As

105. Ibid., 141.
106. Ibid., 160.
argued above, it is a king without power or function other than ceremonial that Cloots considers here.

The flight of the king on 20–21 June 1791 provoked a shockwave among the French population. It was reported that on the king’s way back, the people refused to take off their hat to salute him in Paris, and were even more aggressive when he crossed the suburbs to avoid working-class neighbourhoods.  

The next day, Cloots delivers a speech at the Jacobins Club, proclaiming that ‘Nous ne sommes véritablement libres que depuis hier 21 juin’. Cloots then suggests changing the name of the king to ‘chief of executive power’ without altering the constitution and to abolish the name of French monarchy for a French Republic:

Il s’agit actuellement de guérir radicalement la nation de l’ido-lâtrie royale; et sans rien changer à notre sublime constitution, je propose simplement de nommer chaque chose par son nom, et d’abolir le titre odieux de roi, en laissant au premier magistrat les fonctions et le nom de chef du pouvoir exécutif. Le mot de monarchie française est une dérision : on dit la république de Pologne, et pourquoi ne dirions-nous pas la république de France ? Il est important, messieurs, de fixer les idées du peuple par la justesse des mots, car c’est souvent avec les mots qu’on obtient les choses ; et certainement le roi fugitif échouera plutôt contre une république, que contre un royaume.

Cloots wonders what the attitude of the king will be and does not believe that he will ever agree to a republican regime; even worse, Cloots fears that the king may feign to accept it in order to plot a coup with the aristocrats, the ‘ennemies of the human race’. What follows is a vehement attack on monarchy and the king, which should be replaced by the law, but Cloots is still not getting rid of him, and he suggests the name of a monarchical republic rather than republican monarchy:

Ma république-monarchique est bâtie sur les notions du bons sens, sur le maintien de la liberté ; au lieu que la monarchie-république actuelle est un monstre auquel nous ne saurions trop nous préparer à couper les vivres.

But Cloots hopes that the people will one day finally reject not only the church but the king. In the meanwhile, it is important to respect the law in order to avoid an open civil war between monarchists and republicans.

107. Tackett, When the King Took Flight, 83–85.
109. Ibid., 267.
110. Ibid., 277.
111. Ibid., 280.
112. Ibid., 281.
Next, Cloots puts forward the argument of the high cost of a king and a court; the millions necessary to maintain the ‘majesty of the king’ would better serve the ‘majesty of the people’ by investing it into improving agriculture and fishing.\textsuperscript{113} What Cloots qualifies as ‘hors-d’œuvre royal’ — *hors-d’œuvre* meaning ‘des choses dont un ouvrage peut se passer’, according to the *Dictionnaire de l’Académie française*, 5th Edition (1798) — is characterised as necessarily interested by its function in corruption, troubles, and ‘exalter le fanatisme des ignorants contre l’autorité légale’\textsuperscript{114}. Cloots argues here against those who want, yet again, to give the benefit of the doubt to the king who argued — falsely, as history shows — that he fled only because his advisers urged him to do so as they felt that Paris was unsafe for him and his family, and that he never meant to escape the country to reach foreign armies but to be safe close to the border.\textsuperscript{115} The solution is then to eliminate royalty, but not monarchy:

> La constitution républicaine des Français, combinée avec son gouvernement monarchique, sera le chef-d’œuvre de l’esprit humain, lorsque nos monarques ne seront plus ni rois, ni héritaires.\textsuperscript{116}

At this point, Cloots seems to be closer to the Roman *libertas* rather than the Greek *eleutheria*. But Cloots concludes by suggesting maintaining the *status quo ante* for the time being and to let ideas be freely expressed through the press:

> Quoi qu’il en soit, ne changeons rien à l’organisation actuelle par des moyens violents et illégaux ; laissons mûrir les esprits dans les serres chaudes de la typographie.\textsuperscript{117}

And if everyone should bring something to the table, ‘Conseillons au roi des Français de favoriser la propagation de nos principes constitutionnels dans le reste de l’Europe’; royalty should not be on the menu, but served as *hors-d’œuvre*: ‘Le véritable moyen de rendre la royauté supportable, c’est de prouver à tout le monde qu’elle est un hors-d’œuvre’.\textsuperscript{118} What Cloots suggests is that the French king convinces all other kings to do as Cloots hopes he will: re-establish liberty to the people by abdicating. Monarchs, writes Cloots, benefits from the ‘ignorance’ of the people in equating monarchy with royalty, heredity, and feudality.\textsuperscript{119} As mentioned before, Cloots knows his classics, and he knows that Roman republicanism was opposed

\textsuperscript{113}. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 284.  
\textsuperscript{114}. Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{115}. Tackett, *When the King Took Flight*, 102.  
\textsuperscript{116}. Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 284.  
\textsuperscript{117}. Ibid., 285.  
\textsuperscript{118}. Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{119}. Ibid.
to royalty, and that Greek republicanism was opposed to any real power to a monarch, a single person governing. What Cloots suggests is a monarch without powers and without heredity, and since liberty should spread only without menace from neighbours, neighbour populations should also rationally adhere to this plan, this French model of constitution, and elect a ‘European king’: ‘Un roi des Européens ne causera aucune alarme aux vrais amis de la constitution’.\footnote{120}

Waiting for the debates to ripen in the minds of the people, Cloots makes the distinction between a constitutional king and ‘unconstitutional king’.\footnote{121} Implicit to the term of ‘unconstitutional king’ is the idea that the king was not chosen by the people, the true sovereign, to represent it as head of the executive. Cloots reiterates Boulainvilliers’s thesis, without naming him, on the origins of French nobility with the Francs.\footnote{122} According to Boulainvilliers, the Franks invaded Gaul after the fall of the Roman empire and came from Germany, while the Gauls represented the third estate, and they established a king as \textit{primus inter pares}.\footnote{123} Cloots equates the end of Frankish nobility with the revolution, changing Boulainvilliers’s \textit{thèse nobiliaire} that argued for nobility as a counter power to the king. Nobility is against equality and liberty as declared by natural law, and if it was up to Cloots, the name of France would be changed to Gaul, or even German as seen previously, but not a reference to the Franks, and he even contests its original meaning:

\begin{quote}
L’empire des Francs s’est écroulé avec la Bastille, et la nation aurait repris son ancien nom avec son ancienne liberté, si elle avait su que le mot franc est synonyme du mot allemand \textit{vranck}, féroce. Mais les vaincus le rendirent synonyme du mot libre, par les privilèges attachés au nom des vainqueurs, des \textit{vrancks}.
\end{quote}\footnote{124}

Actually, the etymology of the word ‘Frank’ is uncertain beyond its German origin, meaning at times ‘the fierce ones’ or ‘the free ones’.\footnote{125} Cloots’s conclusion is unequivocal in any case: ‘Il résulte de là une apologie complète du gouvernement républicain’.\footnote{126} A republican government, if possible universal, and because for the time being it is unavoidable, with a monarch albeit without royalty and power.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[120.] Ibid.
\item[121.] Ibid., 290.
\item[122.] Henri de Boulainvilliers, \textit{Essais sur la noblesse de France, contenant une dissertation sur son origine & son abaissement} (Amsterdam: s.n., 1732).
\item[123.] See Nicolet’s analysis in Claude Nicolet, \textit{La Fabrique d’une nation : la France entre Rome et les Germains} (Paris: Perrin, 2003), 68–89.
\item[124.] Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 294.
\item[125.] See chapter 1 ‘The Early Franks’ in Alexander Callander Murray, ed., \textit{From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
\item[126.] Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 255.
\end{footnotes}
In *Annales patriotiques et littéraires*, 23 July 1782, Cloots calls for the French nation to get rid of royalty, which no longer makes sense with the *Déclaration des droits de l’homme*: ‘Otez la royauté de l’acte constitutionnel...’ 127

In a follow-up article, Cloots hammered home the same point in ‘Monarchie sans roi’ published in *Annales patriotiques et littéraires* on 27 July 1792. 128 Cloots proposes a monarch at the head of the executive power, separated from the legislative power, elected for five years like in Washington. This way the monarch’s veto would be under the control of the nation. Cloots then praises the system of a republic where the people is the only sovereign because this ‘grandeur nationale’ has the virtue of reducing the stature of an individual politician, and the larger the people the greater the nation and the harder it becomes for a single politician to amass too much power.

The war had been declared by the Assembly on 20 April 1792. This polarised the positions between republicans and monarchists (or more rightly between absolute monarchists and constitutional monarchists tending towards republicanism) as Austria and Prussia were perceived as aggressors and wanting to crush the revolution and re-instate monarchy — or so was the hope of counter-revolutionaries. The defeats of the French armies created not only anxiety and fear among the revolutionaries and the Parisian population, but also added to the anger present against the royal family, seen as complicit to the defeats. On 10 July, the Assembly declared ‘la patrie en danger’ and asked for support and sacrifice. The commander-in-chief of the Prussian armies, the Duke of Brunswick, issued a threatening ultimatum, promising revenge, execution, and destruction. This prompted the Parisian population to organise itself into a Commune and send 20,000 *sans-culottes* to join the national guard. Cloots thus celebrated the *sans-culottes* in ‘Vive les Sans-Culottes !’, published on 31 July 1792 in *Annales patriotiques et littéraires*. 129 Cloots praises Jérôme Pétion de Villeneuve (1756–1794), then mayor of Paris, whose bust should be placed between Phocion and Aristides, whilst the one of Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette (1757–1834), should be thrust on the ground. Pétion had displayed republican sympathies by being accused by the king of facilitating a crowd of Parisians to invade the Tuileries palace on 20 June, and was subsequently suspended. But the Parisians celebrated him and asked for his return on 14 July. He was reinstated on 3 August.

Lafayette, on the other hand, was a known royalist, and Cloots writes how he knew him at collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne, where he already displayed the prejudice of an aristocrat persuaded of being of higher birth and superior blood. One has to note that this was a common belief among nobles,

128. Ibid., 370–373.
129. Ibid., 374–376.
and it is a possibility that Cloots could have been mocked by Lafayette for his family being recently ennobled. Nobles, if they received an education at the collège like many of the revolutionaries of the Third-Estate, did not continue their education at university, but went to a military school where the emphasis was not on classical republican authors. There was thus a difference in the education of the nobles from the commoners. Cloots did go to the Berlin Académie des nobles, but he hated it, and chose afterwards to isolate himself in his studies for five years. To mock Lafayette and continue with the classical republican example, Cloots calls him ‘Gilles-César’, playing with his first name Gilbert, and Jules César, in French. That is a more high-brow play of words on names than what was otherwise common practice during the revolution; for instance, Pétion was called ‘Pet-hion’ (Donkey fart) by his pro-monarchist detractors. Cloots notes that liberty and equality were foreign concepts to Lafayette, who was therefore not at the service of the revolution, but of the king.

In ‘Adresse aux Français’ in the same newspaper, published on 6 August, Cloots continues to praise the sans-culottes as the real sovereign people, and call them to replace the executive power:

Français ! Nous sommes calomniés et trahis par la cour. Suppléons à l’inertie du roi par notre propre activité ; que l’Assemblée nationale, que chaque municipalité, chaque individu agisse par lui-même comme si le ministère royal était suspendu, et nous vaincrons tous les obstacles. Notre zèle, notre union, notreloyauté, notre législature tiendront lieu de pouvoir exécutif. 

The Parisian sans-culottes joined by fédérés from the province attacked the Tuileries palace on 10 August, forcing the king to take refuge in the Assembly, defended by Swiss guards, 600 of whom perished in the attack. This marked a ‘second revolution’, effectively deposing the king. He expressed regret at his ineligibility for nomination to the Convention in a letter to his friend Rousiès on 20 August, but consoling himself that he occupied another function as orator of the human race, Cloots was nonetheless granted French citizenship, bought some lands and a farm, and was elected to the Convention. After the discovery of inculpating papers in the armoire de fer (iron cabinet) in the Tuileries, the trial of the king was hastened and started on 11 December 1792. In a speech to the Convention on 2 January 1793, Cloots urges to hasten the trial and calls on the exemples of England and especially Rome to decide on the execution of the king: ‘non pas au

130. Ibid., 374.
131. McPhee, Liberty or Death, 156.
poignard des assassins, mais à la hache des licteurs’. A lictor was a Roman bodyguard who protected the magistrates, and the 
*fāscēs* with the blade of an ax was their symbol, re-cycled in the revolutionary imagery, most famously in Le Barbier’s painting of the *Déclaration des droits de l’homme* in the musée Carnavalet. Cloots perceives executing the king as a republican duty and a duty in the name of humankind: ‘... les droits de l’homme sacrifiés aux droits d’une couronne sacrilège...’

The king is in Cloots’s eyes an enemy of the human race, even if he does not use the term in this speech. The king must be executed for the crimes committed by him and all the other French kings before him. He is not a god and the people should not hesitate the sacrifice him at a time when he represents instability for France. There are dangers and uncertainties that accompany the lack of decision, when England and Spain are menacing outside, and inside the revolutionaries are tempted by dividing the country into a federation. The country is tense and on the verge of multiple divisions, which is not only against the unity of the republic, but the unity of Cloots’s universal republic. To Cloots, Paris must be strong and lead the way for all the other French cities fearing economic competition among each other, and for all other countries. This is the reason why Cloots, and other deputies such as Robespierre, changed their mind when they were initially opposed to the death penalty and decided on it against the king. Cloots concludes then this speech calling for unity and indivisibility with the instrumental role of the king’s death: ‘Je conclus à la mort de l’ex-roi et de tous les rois qui seront amenés sur le sol de la terre libre’. Cloots voted for his death without conditional terms, together with 360 other deputies. Of course, not all deputies at the Convention were in favour of the king’s death, and parts of the French population was opposed to it; even in Paris where a deputy was assassinated by a royalist. Girondins tried to organise an appeal to the people regarding the king’s punishment, but as Napoléon later remarked, if they had wanted to save the king they would have asked for his extradition. Not everyone was in favour of the death of the king, but the Girondins’ scheme of appealing to the people led to so much potential insecurity that it was like asking for a vote for or against the revolution, and it failed. Of the 721 deputies present for the vote, 361 was the single major-

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137. Ibid., 452.
138. Ibid., 455.
140. Ibid., 160.
ity, and 361 voted for death without conditions, 319 for imprisonment, and
the rest for death with various conditions. Louis XVI was guillotined on
21 January 1793.

Size and Federalism

Subsequent to the flight of the king, the question of a republic without
king had become topical, and together with this question the fear that such
a system would lead to a partition of such a republic into a federative sys-
tem. Some considered that it was safer to stay with a unifying monarchical
regime rather than risk splitting the nation into federative powers. France
was, after all, the most populous country in Western Europe with 28 mil-
lion people — by comparison, Britain had a population of 7.3 million. Also,
despite the rationalisation of the country into 83 départements, the re-
volution had just started to unify a country with many cultures, languages,
and traditions. As Woloch’s study of ‘the new regime’ shows, even though
the Assembly in Paris hoped to have local authorities as delegates to apply
its laws, those retained a lot of power especially because they were locally
elected and the populations regarded them as the surrogates of the state.
In order to avoid a federative solution, one needs to convince others that
such a large territory and population, and as diverse as France in the 1780s
was, could indeed be a single republic. The reality of local power, even with-
out a federal solution, was that ‘[w]hile asserting the primacy of national
law, the Assembly still left a large grey area for the competing imperatives
centralization and local autonomy’.

The pre-revolutionary and early-revolutionary debates on the impossibil-
ity of a republic on such a large territory as France is simply brushed off in
L’orateur du genre humain:

Des adages nous détournaient de la conquête de notre bien : la
souveraineté imprescriptible. Une nation corrompue, disait-
on, est incapable de secouer le joug. Une terre de ving-sept
mille lieues carrées ne saurait exister libre. Ces lieux communs
sont plus nuisibles que les contagions pestilentielle. Il a fallu
les hasards de l’occasion, les prodiges du courage, les lumières
de la philosophie, pour constater que la corruption n’est sou-
vient qu’un mot vague au moral comme au physique, et que
l’étendue territoriale est plutôt favorable que préjudiciable à
l’organisation républicaine. Il était permis de fluctuer sur ces

141. Ibid., 190–191.
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144. Ibid., 38.
matières avant 1789 ; mais aujourd’hui, ce n’est plus errer, c’est blasphémé, c’est étayer sciemment les dictatures usurpées.\footnote{145}

And later in the text Cloots calls for a universal republic, based on the Déclaration:

Une tête d’homme, trouvée sous les fondements du Capitole, fut, pour les Romains, le signal de leur grandeur future : les droits de l’homme, trouvés sous les fondements de la constitution française, seront pour les humains, le signal de la république universelle.\footnote{146}

Edelstein notes the ‘sacralisation’ of the 1789 Déclaration by the Jacobins in their ‘natural republicanism’; the Déclaration is the founding document of natural law, and is also the only needed document for a constitution for the republic, it is a ‘natural constitution’ that renders any other constitution redundant.\footnote{147} Cloots shares this ‘natural republicanism’ of the Jacobins with the foundational aspect of the Déclaration. But this universal republic is still led by the French king. Cloots calls on him and his heir to look at the future and embrace a ‘universal republic’ with representatives from all over the world at the national assembly in Paris.\footnote{148}

In La république universelle, written after the king took flight, Cloots repeats the neologism ‘loyaume’ (from loi, law, and royaume, kingdom), created by François-Urbain Domergue (1745–1810), in order to argue against the monarchist claim that monarchy is a better form of government than a republic because the latter would create anarchy and disunion. Domergue gave this definition of ‘loyaume’: ‘Nous nommons royaume un pays régi souverainement par un roi ; le pays où la loi seule commande, je le nommerai loyaume’.\footnote{149} So it is a country where the law is the governing power as opposed to the realm of the king, with a little play of words. Cloots argues that the fear of disunion and anarchy is precisely what makes the ‘loyaume’ so strong. The bigger the population and territory, the bigger the fear of disunion, and therefore the stronger the republic:

La force nationale augmente en raison de la multiplication des citoyens, et la force individuelle diminue, sous le régime de la liberté, en raison de l’accroissement de la masse commune. Par conséquent, plus la république sera vaste et peuplée, et moins

146. Ibid., 160.
on aura besoin d’un roi, si toutefois ce besoin ait jamais été réel nulle part.\textsuperscript{150}

As Cloots argues, one needs only look at the American example to understand that the size of a country and of a population is an advantage rather than an inconvenience for a republic. However, Cloots criticises the American choice of a federation over a single union. An argument he elaborates on in another article. It is ‘la loi unique’, which will rule once the universal republic is established.\textsuperscript{151} Therefore this ‘single law’ forms a universal loyaume where no one is a foreigner, and no one wages war for a family or a familial territory.

The example of classical republicanism is rejected because of the modernism of the French Enlightenment that founded human nature:

\begin{quote}
Un César trouvait dans Rome tous les matériaux de la tyrannie, parce que Rome conquérante régnait en tyran sur la terre conquise ; parce que Rome n’était pas homogène ; parce que la république romaine se concentrait aristocratiquement dans les murs de Rome. Un citoyen romain était un homme privilégié : et la foule des externes s’attachait naturellement à la fortune d’un Jules, d’un Auguste, d’un Tibère. Nous nous étonnons de l’avilissement des Romains sous les empereurs, et nous ne voyons pas que la majorité des esclaves et des étrangers fut l’ivraie qui étouffa le peuple-roi. Que de comparaisons insignifiantes on s’épargnerait en France si les yeux de l’entendement étaient moins rares ! Les Romains et les Grecs, avec leur système hétérogène et tyrannique, devaient périr en s’agrandissant ; les Français, avec leur nivellement admirable, s’assureront une durée éternelle, en s’agrandissant. Les Français ont fondé l’empire de la nature humaine : la république des hommes s’étendra et prospérera partout où il y aura des hommes.\textsuperscript{152}
\end{quote}

In other words, the empire of human nature is universal as opposed to the Roman empire founded on Roman nature. The question of identity is rejected in the French version of the republic because it is based on the ‘science of man’, the laws of human nature universally true and valid. As seen in the chapter on humanity, this does not mean that Cloots does not recognise differences as part of human nature, but, to him, the most important and unifying law of human nature is the universal desire for freedom: ‘la liberté ... est une plante qui s’acclimate partout’.\textsuperscript{153} The universal restoration of liberty through a republican regime will put an end to all wars, ‘l’âge de la

\textsuperscript{150} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 283.
\textsuperscript{151} Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 482.
\textsuperscript{152} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 286.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 249.
paix remplacera l’âge de la guerre’.\textsuperscript{154} Even the rivalry between Oxford and Cambridge: ‘Les heureuses rivalités d’Oxford et de Cambridge s’épureront et s’étendront partout avec la liberté et l’union du genre humain’.\textsuperscript{155}

It is also thanks to the principle of representation that a large republic is possible, even as large as the whole globe with the whole human race: ‘L’assemblée des comices à Rome était composée de 400 000 votants, et l’univers n’exigerait que 10 000 députés pour sa représentation !’\textsuperscript{156} However, this is quite an elevated amount of representatives. Probably Cloots considered that if each country the size of France had 83 departments, and considered that the National Assembly had 645 deputies, there would be around 10,000 deputies for the world. Later Cloots lowered the number to ‘1500 or 2000’.\textsuperscript{157}

What also makes a large republic possible, even a universal one, is that unlike a kingdom, it is not ruled top-down, but bottom-up:

\textit{Quand l’action d’un gouvernement part du sommet, l’étendue du territoire est nuisible, c’est le cas des royaumes ; mais un gouvernement qui tire son énergie de la base, plus vous élargirez cette base, et plus le gouvernement sera vigoureux ; c’est le cas de la République universelle. Les droits de l’homme partent de la racine, et par conséquent la plus petite municipalité fait partie du gouvernement populaire.}\textsuperscript{158}

However, Cloots is not very clear — but he also claimed he would not be, as he is only laying down general principles — about the actual details of this sort of grassroot democracy. Cloots’s general philosophical point is that a republican government — although it really is \textit{governance} that Cloots writes about, since his view of the executive branch is minimalistic — based on the \textit{Declaration of the Rights of Man} is necessarily organised by its constitutive unit, the individual, whose liberty and sovereignty is delegated to the republic. In the organisation of a kingdom, the king decides from the top without any regards for the individual, whose rights are not recognised, according to Cloots. Cloots’s view of ‘\textit{gouvernement}’ is closer to today’s \textit{governance} in that individuals are governing themselves at the level that seems best fit. Cloots writes for instance: ‘Notre République ne sera jamais trop vaste, car le gouvernement s’étendra avec elle’.\textsuperscript{159}

Modern wars are another reason why so much more money is wasted than in Ancient Greece. And here Cloots’s argument seems to be in want of reviving pre-1763 European hopes of seeing a republic of states due to

\textsuperscript{154} Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 286.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 160.
\textsuperscript{157} Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 487.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 490.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
the increasing control of the state of wars, which became so costly and efficient through public credit and standing armies. Cloots writes clearly about the difference between the *anciens* and *modernes*: ‘C’est que la guerre des modernes est plus dispendieuse que celle des ancien’s’. Unity is what brings peace, as Cloots notes, and two cities under one law do not wage war against one another, but two sovereign cities do. Before the issue of federalism and its specific context came to the fore in 1793, Cloots had already expressed his philosophical view for unity; it was not only based on the observation of unity in nature, but also on the historical example of corporations in France, and how they prevented necessary reforms. The idea of a separation into different bodies, or polities, is the scourge of humankind, for Cloots:

Les préjugés jettent de si profondes racines, que personne ne s’était pas même avisé de demander : « Pourquoi y a-t-il plus d’une nation ? » J’ai eu la hardiesse de présenter et de résoudre le problème, en accusant l’ignorance barbare de nos pères. La nature abhorrer ce morcellement dont nous sommes punis avec rigueur ; elle semble n’avoir donné à l’homme l’esprit de prosélytisme que pour rompre les barrières qui nous séparent.

There is thus an idea that humankind is a unified body, and should form one single polity. There are two main ideas to explain this argument. One is that ignorance and barbarism have collided against living in harmony on a single planet. Ignorance according to the 1762 dictionary of French academy defines a lack of knowledge, while barbarism is defined as cruelty and inhumanity, or as lack of politeness. Cruelty and inhumanity and a lack of knowledge result in divisions into rival corporations. The word corporation actually does not appear in the 1762 dictionary of the French academy, but appears in Jean-François Féraud’s *Dictionnaire critique de la langue française* (1787–1788):


*Corps provinciaux* and *corps nationaux* are equated with corporations—name taken from English to designate town communities. Anacharsis Cloots tries to show how local national communities still remain, whereas the

162. Ibid., 306.
163. Féraud, *Dictionnaire critique de la langue française*, §87.
French revolution managed to gather all these ‘provinces’ under one ‘nation’. However, this is still not enough. We all live on one single planet. Whereas ignorance leads to division into rival corporations, knowledge dictates unity of humankind on earth. As a result, Cloots predicts the end of wars since a single political community does not make war within itself. Disputes are only breaking out in the form of civil procedures. As such Italians, divided as they are, make war among themselves, while the French only have procedures: ‘Nous n’aurions jamais aucun démêlé sanglant avec Londres et La Haye, si la France s’étendait aussi loin au nord de Paris qu’au midi de Paris’.\(^{164}\) ‘This sentence could sound imperialist, but it is not meant this way. ‘France’ is not meant here to be a ‘French’ entity but the universal republic, which Cloots offered to change the name (see below). At other times, Cloots tries to find a new name for what he perceives as the country of regenerated people, free and equal, the beacon for universal freedom and peace, and the only true political system. Or as Cloots calls it, a ‘philanthropic system’; philanthropy understood as love for humankind.\(^{165}\)

In an article entitled ‘L’auteur de la République universelle à l’Auteur du Courrier des départements, salut’ published on 8 October 1792 in Le Courrier des départements, Cloots answers Antoine Joseph Gorsas (1752–1793). Gorsas was a publicist who was elected at the Convention and first sat with the montagnards before changing to the Girondins. Le Courrier des 83 départements was his newspaper. Cloots states, in the context of debates in 1792 in favour of a federative system as argued by the Gironde, that Rousseau was wrong and would change his mind if he had lived today:

> Quant aux erreurs de Mably, de Montesquieu, et de Rousseau, vraisemblablement ces grands hommes se rétracteraient s’ils vivaient aujourd’hui. Je ne demande que du bon sens pour décider entre l’empire des individus unis qui plient nécessairement sous la loi, et l’empire des corporations unies, qui résistent arbitrairement à la loi.\(^{166}\)

The mistakes in questions are the way these authors considered a plurality of sovereign entities rather than a unity: Mably and the plurality of sovereign peoples; Montesquieu and the different spirits of law forming different societies; Rousseau and the necessity of having a myriad of small republics. However, Cloots also agrees and builds on them. Cloots shares Mably’s criticism of all natural law theorists as if they were the same, and the necessity to protect the natural state in society with positive laws. Cloots shares Montesquieu’s view of the universality and consistency of laws governing nature and human beings. Cloots shares Rousseau’s criticism of natural law

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\(^{164}\) Cloots, ‘La République universelle’, 245.

\(^{165}\) Ibid., 247.

\(^{166}\) Cloots, Écrits révolutionnaires, 410.
Cloots and Republicanism during the Revolution

Theories used to trick the sovereign peoples into a fake social contract, and his conception of general will (as seen in the chapter on nature and natural law). In this article, Cloots refers to the newly published translation of *The Federalist Papers* by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. Without naming it, Cloots quotes a passage from one of the chapters that is supposed to support his own view against federalism and in favour of a single sovereign. Cloots quotes a French translation from paper 20, written by Madison. A relevant part of the quotation, here in the original version, is:

> Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting violence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of the sword in place of the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy.

It is confusing today to read Cloots and this text because what Cloots calls ‘federalism’ is actually what we, today, call confederalism when talking about French departments, and what Cloots equally called ‘federalism’ when talking about foreign countries joining the French republic is just an international system with sovereign entities. By contrast, what Cloots actually proposes as a universal republic respecting the principles of unity and indivisibility is more what we today indeed would call federalism. The historical context is crucial to understanding this, as I develop below. In another speech, ‘Anacharsis Cloots aux assemblées du Hainaut, du Brabant, de la Flandre, etc.’, on 23 November 1792, Cloots writes:

> ... je vous conjure ... de vous procurer un ouvrage nouvellement traduit de l’anglais, intitulé, je ne sais trop pourquoi : Le Fédéraliste. Cet excellent livre est le bréviaire des unitaires, et tout homme qui se dira publiciste, et qui n’aura pas goûté la partie élémentaire de ce livre, faites-le descendre de la tribune ; c’est un sot ou un coquin.

As Palmer notes, federalism in France meant ‘the opposite of what it meant in the United States at the same time’.

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168. Ibid., 125–126.
the title of the book is simply linked to the revolutionary vocabulary and the context of the time: the federalists are opposed to the principle of unity and indivisibility of the French republic, and want to organise a confederation of sovereign republics based on ancien régime regions; or so is the claim of Cloots and the Mountain. In reality, the Gironde was just as committed to the unity and indivisibility of the republic, but they had a vision of its organisation more oriented towards decentralisation, and they had no nostalgia about the provinces of the old regime. ‘Federalism’ had become another accusative epithet of being a counter-revolutionary during the French revolution, which not only had nothing to do with actual federalism, but was also misconstrued and false. Since republicanism had only been thought for small republics, there was a fear of complete disintegration of the republic in 1792–1793, now that monarchy was abolished. The bloody civil war in Vendée was omnipresent in the minds of the revolutionaries, as well as threats from Bordeaux, Caen, Marseilles, Toulon, and Lyon to go their separate ways. However, rather than federalism, the Girondins defended more autonomy for the departments, a sort of ‘departmentalism’; by contrast, the Jacobins had a more centralising vision of government, ‘Paris-centric’, which was exactly what some departments were fighting against as they feared Parisian radicalisation. Notwithstanding, Cloots considered Le Fédéraliste as providing a political theory against the ‘fédéralistes’. But his view of government, was paradoxically less centralising than his fellow Montagnards.

Interestingly, in Ni Marat, ni Roland, Cloots tells the story of one of his encounters with Jean Marie Roland (1737–1793) — minister of the interior until the king’s execution and one of the leading Girondists — during which he suggested the reading of an English book, which principles, he claims, where to be found in the last American convention. Unfortu-nately, it is unclear which book and what author he is referring too. It seems doubtful that it was a book from a well-known author such as John Locke, since Cloots claims Roland did not know the book. Roland contributed to the Encyclopédie, and as an economist he must have known about Locke. Some possibilities are Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana, or John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon’s Cato’s Letters. However, it is also possible that ‘ce livre anglais’ was a reference to the language and not the country of

the book; it could thus be *The Federalist Papers*, of which Cloots talked about previously, which had recently been translated into French. In the same speech, Cloots tells another anecdotic evening encounter with Pétion, Dumouriez, Brissot, and Paine. According to Cloots, Brissot argued against his universal republic because France was already too big, to which Paine interjected that, unlike a monarchy that can be too large to be governed, a republic based on human rights could cover the whole world. Cloots concluded that Brissot wanted several isolated republics and was thus worse than a *fédéraliste*, he was an ‘isoliste’.

Does Cloots want unity for the universal republic as an all-controlling state? I think it would be a mistake to understand it as such. Yes, Cloots is against what he calls ‘corporations’ of any kind, including ‘national corporations’, but he is also against despotism understood as the negation of human rights such as liberty and equality, and popular participation in government. The concept of ‘sovereignty of the human race’ is meant as a philosophical way of imposing peace and legal settlement in conflicts arising between different populations:

Frères et amis, retenez, méditez la maxime de l’Orateur du genre humain : « Deux familles se battraient pour un mur mitoyen, si une force majeure, une loi commune ne civilisait pas leur procès. »

What matters is the submission of all under a common law, and a law can only be common if it is decided by all, which points to a republic with elected representatives for the one thousand departments of the world, according to Cloots. It is best to understand Cloots’s ‘system’ of universal republic as an extension of how France was organised before 1793 rather than after 1793 when democracy and liberty were paradoxically reduced, and ultimately ended in the Terror. The question is how much Cloots can be held responsible and representative for that as a member of the Convention. It is the Convention after all that reconducted monthly the *Comité de Salut Public*, the *de facto* executive branch *in lieu* of the king, and voted for its extraordinary executive powers.

However, this was not the case at the time Cloots wrote. Cloots considered the principles of the French republic as universal. His optimism of the French Enlightenment and the revolution is very apparent in that Cloots justifies how being French or being part of France actually means less being French but being oneself and being independent:

Appartenir à la France, c’est appartenir à soi-même ; se gouverner à la française, c’est avoir une municipalité de son choix, une
The fundamental principle of the French republic is after all to respect individual liberty and equality, and thus to give the possibility to elect any official with authoritative power. During this time, there was actually an explosion of elections, as Woloch notes, since article 3 of the Declaration states that ‘no body and no individual may exercise authority that does not emanate from the nation expressly’. As a result, enfranchised citizens were called to elect any position of authority: mayors, municipal officers, municipal councils, sometimes national guard officers, and justices of the peace. Citizens also participated in large cities to assemblies of the neighbourhood sections, designating section officials and committees, ‘convened in primary assemblies to choose electors to fill a host of other elective positions’, and even the bishops and priests had to be selected by electors. This French government was therefore a highly grassroot-based and participative one, even if abstentions were high particularly for less local elections. This was what Cloots had in mind with his ‘se gouverner à la française’, and why he thought that it was not only unproblematic for a large republic, but even its strength — the larger, the stronger. Moreover, all these representatives are supposed to be working within a rigorous legal framework that would prevent any individual of becoming too important, or more important that the function occupied. But even so, the principle of an open and free exchange of ideas should put in check this individual in front of the sovereign — the electors.

With the execution of the king and the new republic without monarchy, Cloots begins to refer more intensively to the principles of unity and indivisibility, together with the theme of universality. Cloots starts to add the ‘year of liberty’ (meaning the year the Assembly proclaimed itself national) and the ‘year of equality’ (meaning the year the king was removed from power) to his writings. Then he states the birth year of the republic. Cloots also starts at this moment to accentuate the place, Paris, as ‘cosmopole’ or ‘chef-lieu du globe’. Cloots’s view is that Paris is not only the capital city of the French republic, but of the coming universal republic. This is a period of profound unrest with wars at the borders and enemies already on French soil, almost a civil war within the borders, still a financial crisis inherited from the ancien régime, and no executive branch. In order to palliate the absence of executive, the Comité de Salut Public was instated on 9 April 1793 with nine members; extended to twelve after Robespierre’s election on 27 July.

However, the political context of 1793 is not of significance for Cloots’s general view, except that he utters his last book, *Bases constitutionnelles*, with the vocabulary of anti-federalism and the mention of struggles between Girondins and Montagnards. But the principle of unity of the human race and sovereignty of the human race based on the universal principles of liberty and equality had already been mentioned in his previous writings. *Bases constitutionnelles* was published at the occasion of the debates on a new constitution, but Cloots had already written most of it before, as he mentions on 23 November 1792 in a letter ‘aux assemblées primaires du Hainaut, du Brabant, de la Flandre, etc.’. In *Bases constitutionnelles*, Cloots does mention these countries towards the end of his speech and how and why he would integrate them in the republic. Moreover, this published speech as pamphlet is not a proposition for a constitution, but a proposition for a decree that the Convention should take in order to incorporate automatically any country who would recognise the principle of the sovereignty of the human race.

*Bases constitutionnelles* presents Cloots’s suggestions to the constitutional debates, and a summary of his political thinking within the context of 1793 and the question of federalism. The same principle of a single universal republic as explained before:

Les corps provinciaux et les corps nationaux sont les plus grands fléaux du genre humain. Quelle ignorance, quelle barbarie de nous parquer en différentes corporations rivales, pendant que nous avons l’avantage d’habiter une des moindres planètes de la sphere céleste ! Nous multiplions nos jalousies, nos querelles, en divisant l’intérêt commun, la force commune. Un corps ne se fait pas la guerre à lui-même, et le genre humain vivra en paix, lorsqu’il ne formera qu’un seul corps, la nation unique.

Cloots’s republicanism is based on the principle of liberty, a liberty understood as non-domination. This liberty as non-domination is the source of the sovereignty of the human race and the universal republic of the united individuals. The reasoning, philosophically, is simple: nature is universal, and from nature comes natural rights, which are equally universal. Liberty is a natural right, universal to all individual human beings. Because of this very fact, an individual cannot be free on her own, meeting another free

179. ‘Je n’entrerai pas ici dans le fond de la question, car je monterai incessamment à la tribune de la Convention nationale, sans l’intermédiaire d’aucun comité quelconque, pour appuyer la demande judicieuze des habitants de Nice, de la Savoie, de Porrentruy, de Sipre, de Mayence, de Sarrebruck, et d’autres pays environnants. Mon travail vous parviendra : mais en attendant, ne précipitez rien’. In Cloots, *Ecrits révolutionnaires*, 432.
individual human being leads to the necessary domination of one over another. As a result, two individuals form a group in which they decide to delegate their sovereignty to protect their liberty over someone else’s domination. This group is thus sovereign, but upon meeting another group, equally sovereign according to the same natural principle, they have to combine in order to preserve the liberty of all. This is in the interest of peace and harmony for humankind. From this it results that, since only the human race inhabits the earth, only the human race can be sovereign in order to protect liberty for every individual on earth. Cloots does not trust that even independent republics would not seek domination over one another, as history has shown with the Italian republics.

*Federalism* — understood as a confederation of sovereign states — is a system to avoid because it is contrary to nature and against reason, according to Cloots. However, this does not mean that the system should be imposed on free populations; kings should be fought, but populations should be convinced. A free people will think about the principle and see the advantages that it brings — peace and independence.\(^{182}\) Moreover, this universal republic based on the sovereignty of the human race leaves local populations free to decide how to spend public money, once taxes have been collected and redistributed worldwide:

> Il n’y a pas d’autorité plus tutélaire que celle du genre humain ;
> il donne la plus grande latitude à chaque section de l’Empire :
> tous les individus, sous son gouvernement, jouiront d’une égale portion de liberté. … Qu’importe à la société, pourvu que l’impôt rentre, et que les députés arrivent en raison de la répartition universelle ; chacun fera le déboursé de ses fantaisies particulières. La différence des costumes, des cultures et des cultes ne troublera point l’harmonie sociale. Pas d’autre règle à cet égard que la convenance topographique.\(^{183}\)

Cloots makes it clear that it is not a centralised government that he has in mind, even if he sees Paris as the centre of everything. Local populations have got freedom to choose over matters that impact their lives in matters of politics, education, justice, industry and agriculture. Moreover, Cloots argues that this will enable greater solidarity when a region in the world is devastated by a natural disaster or plagued by famine.\(^ {184}\)

The executive branch will ultimately become redundant once the universal republic is established.\(^ {185}\) In this universal republic, according to Cloots there will be no more use for an executive branch since there will be no need

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\(^{182}\) Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 477.
\(^{183}\) Ibid., 478.
\(^{184}\) Ibid., 488.
\(^{185}\) Ibid., 489.
for foreign affairs, an army, a fleet, or stock market speculation in a universal republic.\textsuperscript{186} Only the ministry of Interior and the ministry of Justice will still be needed, under the control of the deputies, whose other only job will be ‘la surveillance générale’ and liaising with the ‘arrondissements administratifs’\textsuperscript{187}. The ministry of Interior, however, will no longer have to deal with obstacles due to wars, supplying the armies, dealing with obstacles to importations and exportations, debt, loan, or the stagnation of employment, since all barriers to trade and exchange will disappear.\textsuperscript{188} For Cloots all economic ills stemmed from wars and international instability. By the same token, justice will hardly be needed as there will be ‘le calme de l’harmonie universelle’\textsuperscript{189}.

But until then, Cloots laid out the plans for the organisation of the current executive committee. What Cloots calls the ‘executive duty’ — in order to emphasise that power resides in the sovereign human race — should consist of a committee of seven ministers nominated among members of the ‘legislative duty’. At the time Cloots was writing, there were six ministers for the Convention: foreign affairs, war, justice, interior, finance, navy and colonies. Cloots suggests adding a seventh minister, who would be in charge of ‘arts, sciences, agriculture, manufactures, and trade’.\textsuperscript{190} This composition of ministers stemming from the assembly aims at avoiding that the executive branch be elected directly, which would beget conflicts as it would create a \textit{de facto} a second chamber even worse than bicameral proposals.\textsuperscript{191} This is thus a revision of his earlier proposal to elect a European king in \textit{République universelle}.

It is therefore a very reduced kind of state that Cloots proposes. The universal republic will not even possess anything, as property will solely be private and not public. Here Cloots has infinite faith in the workings of economics without the need for any external intervention, except regulations for avoiding theft and other unfair competition. It is however unclear if this is plain wishful thinking considering the contemporary food shortages and economic difficulties, but Cloots states optimistically: ‘La paix perpétuelle maintiendra un niveau perpétuel entre la consommation et les consommateurs, entre l’ouvrage et les ouvriers.’\textsuperscript{192} Again, this is a thought very similar to that of the \textit{physiocrates}, as described in the chapter on natural law. By the same token, and with a sort of reverse argument, Cloots rejects another opinion in France about forming ‘sister republics’ or buffer republics at the borders of the French republic. Cloots observes that republics are

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 487.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 489.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 485.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 489.
more prone to trade than kingdoms, and since trade is the major source of
disagreement among individuals, it would be best to have only one republic
rather than several republics who could potentially go to war for economic
reasons.\textsuperscript{193}

\textit{Liberty, Virtue, Patriotism}

Throughout Cloots’s writings, liberty appears in the singular as ‘la liberté’.
However, there are several understandings of liberty behind this single label
‘la liberté’, as seen above. Cloots’s understanding of liberty is the absence of
domination over the individual’s life, as well as the absence of the threat of
domination over the individual’s life. Liberty is often expressed as a feeling.
This is the reason why Cloots considers liberty sufficient to form a com-
munity as humankind.

There are several examples of liberty expressed as a \textit{sentiment naturel} (nat-
ural feeling) throughout Cloots’s revolutionary writings: ‘Comme si le ciel
et la terre et le cœur humain n’étaient pas empreints des emblèmes de la
liberté’.\textsuperscript{194} Being a materialist, Cloots obviously does not believe that the
soul is the source of this natural feeling towards liberty. It is to be found
in the heart as an organ, just like the lungs enables one to breathe, the
heart enables to love liberty: ‘Tant que l’homme aura des poumons il res-
pirera l’air, et tant qu’il aura un cœur, il aimera la liberté’.\textsuperscript{195} And since it
is a feeling, more than a rational and abstract thought, it leads equally to
emotional actions: ‘L’amour de la liberté a son bandeau, et ses fureurs’.\textsuperscript{196}
This is also why Cloots \textit{excuses} several acts of violence, and even atrocities,
committed by Parisian crowds, as seen previously. But the most important
motor of this feeling is that it drives individuals, and populations to revolt
against slavery or any other attack on liberty: ‘L’enthousiasme de la liberté
l’emporterait sur le fanatisme de l’esclavage’.\textsuperscript{197} Had Cloots lived longer, per-
haps he would have developed this idea into a philosophy of history. This
cannot be known, but it is certain that liberty, for Cloots, has, as a natural
feeling, the value of a law of nature in the ‘science of man’.

It must therefore be taken into consideration when deciding on human
institutions in a constitution since it forms the basis of virtue and thereby
morality. It is certain, however, that Cloots theorised liberty as a moving
factor in history because, in a Machiavellian way, it makes citizens better
and more effective soldiers when they passionately defend their liberty:

\textsuperscript{193} Cloots, ‘Bases constitutionnelles’, 483.
\textsuperscript{194} Cloots, ‘L’Orateur du genre humain’, 105.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 110.
\textsuperscript{196} Cloots, \textit{Ecrits révolutionnaires}, 199.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 229.
Republican patriotism is therefore stronger than royal patriotism, and that is why French soldiers ought to be victorious against Austrian soldiers. Liberty is what unites the ‘citizens’ of a republic, and universal liberty is what unites the citizens of the world: ‘La liberté unit les citoyens du monde ; et les despotes se disputent la dépouille de Darius’. Darius (c. 550–486 BCE) was king of the Persian Achaemenid Empire and he is probably mentioned here by Cloots because he invaded Greece before a Greek revolt, supported by Greek city-states, defeated his armies at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BCE. Cloots perceives this episode as the victory of republican Athens and the city-states over the Persian kingdom.

With this understanding of liberty it can be said that it is spontaneous and universal to all men. Questions of the colour of the skin do not matter: ‘Mon système de la libération générale n’admet ni colonies, ni métropoles, ni différence de couleurs, ni différence de nations’. Nor do questions of climate and geography, as seen previously: ‘la liberté, quoi qu’en dise Montesquieu, est une plante qui s’acclimate partout’. Furthermore, given Cloots’s conception of humankind as truly universal, it can be said that liberty is a feeling shared by every single human being on earth. This is how and why it enables one to constitute a moral and sentimental community, the community of the human race. Moreover, since liberty is also the source of sovereignty, this entails that sovereignty is also felt, and if liberty is the sole source for a moral community of mankind, sovereignty is also something to be felt by mankind.

198. Ibid., 181.
The principle of the sovereignty of the human race, and thus of the nation of the human race, is not an abstract idea to be pondered by philosophers; it is a feeling to be ‘carved in the hearts of the citizens of the universe’. This way, in a universal republic, everyone being free, there would be no reason to fight anymore, since previous reasons leading to wars were kings’ capricious and insatiable will to conquer, or economic rivalries between competing republics. Patriotism, as the love of liberty, the love of laws, the love of the republic, is universal, and there is no one to fight wars against.

In considering liberty as a natural feeling, Cloots is close to Rousseau in *Discours sur l’inégalité* and *Émile*, Smith in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, and Hume in *A Treatise of Human Nature* on moral sentimentalism explaining the capacity of man, and therefore of humankind, to recognise good and evil. However, if liberty is a natural feeling and leads to a natural moral, it does not for Cloots entail that man is naturally good:

L’homme n’est ni bon ni méchant : il est ce qu’il doit être dans les circonstances qui le meuvent. Un confesseur expérimenté disait à ses pénitents : Dites-moi votre état, votre profession, et je vous dirai vos péchés. La connaissance du cœur humain est d’une importance majeure dans une république, et la liberté court moins de risques en croyant les hommes méchants que de leur attribuer une bonté chimérique. N’ayons pas la manie de vouloir être meilleurs que la nature : je suis bon comme elle et mauvais comme elle.

It is best to take as a starting point that man is hypothetically evil rather than good in order to decide how to establish a constitution, the legal framework which organises social, political, and economic life. Good and evil are equally present in nature and in man, it is therefore preferable to observe this consideration from nature rather than as an abstract notion of humankind as inherently good, in order to draft a constitution.

But when it comes to a constitution for a universal republic, it becomes then necessary to make a difference between universal virtue and local virtue. ‘O tempora o mores’, seems to say Cloots with Cicero, when he writes that virtue and vice should be defined as what is beneficial or detrimental to society as decided by its members. There is no mention of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) in Cloots’s work, but it sounds very close to his utilitarian principles developed in *A Fragment on Government* (1776). With this definition, Cloots argues, it is possible to distinguish between ‘universal virtues’ and ‘local virtues’. Cloots recognises that laws and ideas differ from one society to another based on diversity of needs explained by history, culture, or geography. Therefore, these discussions are left out of the constitution.

204. Ibid., 123.
of the universal republic to local self-determination. What matters most, perhaps, as a universal virtue is the freedom of expression and opinion: ‘... comme si la république pouvait exister six mois, sans l’indépendance des écrivains...’ 205 But the freedom left to local self-determination considering virtues and vices is quite large, since Cloots considers that Chinese laws allowing infanticide, or Plato’s advice on pederasty will be left to local determination.206 What matters in Cloots’s system is that laws protect the social sphere from natural individual instincts to conquer, destroy, and dominate.207 So, what will determine these laws according to this system is their social utility as considered by its members; as Cloots puts it, the better a law the more powerful.208 Self-interest, self-love, lead to common interest and the love of the patrie, meaning the country where liberty is protected, the republic: ‘la liberté civile est une force coercive qui enchaîne tous les despotismes individuels sous le despotisme de la loi’.209 One thing is certain, liberty in a republic is more likely to lead human nature towards virtue, and slavery in a monarchy is more likely to lead to vice and Cloots compares it to Dante’s depiction of Hell: ‘Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch’entrate’.210

As to equality, for it is also the laws of the republic that must take into account natural inequalities in order to protect the weakest against the strongest, and to reward individuals according to talent and virtue (as previously defined as civism, what benefits society). Natural law provides equality in rights by birth, but the law of nature provides inequality by birth. It is therefore the task of a republic to make sure that the equality of rights is maintained so that natural inequalities do not negate them.211

CONCLUSION: NATURAL REPUBLICANISM

Following the above analysis, it can therefore be said that Cloots’s thought is part of the language of republicanism with the following characteristics: reference to Roman constitution, liberty as non-domination, prevalence of law. What is missing from the language of republicanism in Cloots’s thought is the reference to trade and corruption, when Cloots considers trade as a positive part of a republic, and luxury even being source of many good side effects such as a higher interest in arts and sciences, provided that wealth is equally redistributed and that no one is left in poverty. Classical republicanism is omnipresent in Cloots’s writings, as well as Machiavellian themes of republicanism. There is in Cloots a clear influence of English re-

205. Ibid., 125.
206. Ibid., 123.
207. Ibid., 127.
208. Ibid., 129.
209. Ibid., 127.
publican authors, such as Locke, Hume, and the authors of _The Federalist Papers_. To these characteristics, one could add other ones in Cloots’s republicanism such as: the rejection of theology and ideology, republicanism as an alternative in political thought (although first with a discussion of the role of monarchy and royalty in a republic), the importance of social science for the functioning of the republic, of education of citizens in general, and a neo-Roman Ciceronian rhetoric.

But natural republicanism with Cloots is also a republic that takes into consideration the ‘science of man’, the observation of human nature, in order to insure that the equality in rights is respected among individuals when natural inequality may lead to the domination of one individual over another weaker individual. Regarding the prevalence of law, it is above all the law of nature that primes for Cloots in that the _Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen_ is the first law and constitution of the universal republic. And in that, and also because Cloots rejects the state of nature unless it is the same as the social state, Cloots’s republicanism can be said to be akin to ‘natural republicanism’. Cloots rejects the idea of a social contract; he writes about a ‘primitive contract’, by which he means the agreement made when a free human being meets another free human being and they need to decide on laws to maintain their independence (i.e. their liberty without domination by the other). But what is different in Cloots is that this natural republicanism is considered universal, and it must now be analysed for its universality. This is the object of the concluding chapter that considers cosmopolitanism historically and argues that Cloots’s ‘natural republicanism’ is a cosmopolitan republicanism.
CONCLUSION: COSMOPOLITAN REPUBLICANISM

La révolution française n’a pas eu de territoire propre ; ... elle a formé, au-dessus de toutes les nationalités particulières une patrie intellectuelle commune....

Tocqueville, 1856

Cloots, as the previous chapters argued, developed a classical republican rhetoric and self-fashioned himself as ‘orator’ of a single and united human race with the mission of discovering the laws of the ‘science of man’ in politics based on the observation of nature. This led him to proclaim the ‘universal republic’ of the ‘sovereign nation of the human race’. I have argued that Cloots’s ‘system’ was a part of what Edelstein has identified as ‘natural republicanism’ among the Jacobins. Natural republicanism is characterised by: the absence of a transition from a natural state to a social state, or considering that the social state is the natural state; hence, the absence of a social contract; a minimalistic constitution, since nature is the only guide with its laws, starting with the rights of man. But there is more to Cloots’s view than that — it is a universal republic, not only a natural republic. The universalism of the French revolution and the universalism of the French republic were not Cloots’s own and isolated views. Palmer notes the widespread ideological affinity of the French republic all across Europe, and cites Fichte who found it “evident” in 1799 that “only the French republic can be considered by the just man as his true country”. What Palmer seeks to show is the appeal of ‘democracy’ in Europe and America — ‘democracy’ understood as an ideal of equality or discomfort with ancient forms of social rank.

So, how should one characterise Cloots’s universal natural republicanism? Imperial universalism because it seeks to expand universally the re-

3. Ibid., 6.
volutionary principles, through war if necessary? But what about Cloots’s writings of convincing public opinions rather than waging wars? Cloots did change his mind and supported the wars of ‘liberation’, but then what about the concept of local self-determination for tax revenues in the universal republic? Universal republicanism? But what about his concept of ‘cosmopolitan reason’ as a limit to universal principles? Cosmopolitan republicanism? This is how other scholars have qualified Cloots’s political thought, but the study of the concept of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan in the eighteenth century shows the quasi inexistence of the former, and the unrelated meaning of the latter, as this chapter will argue. Moreover, how should one interpret Cloots’s concept of ‘nation of the human race’? Or ‘patrie of the human race’? Aren’t the concepts of nation and patrie opposed to a cosmopolitan ideal?

Cloots’s system, as fleshed out and explained in its context during the previous chapters, constitutes a cosmopolitan republicanism understood as a variant of what Edelstein has called ‘natural republicanism’ among the Jacobins. Other students of Cloots’s thought have explicitly or implicitly labelled Cloots’s thought as ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’. They have emphasised many of the key elements in Cloots’s system, which this thesis has expounded, but they have not defined exactly what should be understood as ‘cosmopolitan’ in Cloots’s thought, in eighteenth-century French political thought, and among the revolutionaries.

I suggested in the introduction to consider Rémi’s ‘cosmopolisme’ as the starting point for an understanding of late eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism. Rémi identified humanity as the ‘first feelings of social man’, with the need to speak ‘the language of nature’. Humanity was also associated with the work of the Encyclopédie, hence relating it to reason and the production of knowledge about humankind. Rémi also mentioned a republican work with Fénelon and republican virtues. Reason, science, nature, humanity, republicanism, those were the themes of the chapters of this thesis that illustrated Cloots’s political thought after explaining his rhetoric and self-fashioning as ‘orator of the human race’.

Sentiment and reason were two important sides of classical rhetoric in that a good orator was supposed to convince an audience of a philosophical truth by appealing to feelings. This constituted an important part of the revolutionaries’ education, put into practice in their childhood realisation of republican ideals at the national assembly. For the part based on reason, revolutionaries and Cloots followed the conception of science as taken in the Encyclopédie with a view to developing a ‘science of man’ in a Newtonian paradigm. This science was thus universal and based on the observation of nature, the nature of man. However, Cloots limited this universal reason to possible contestations, also reasonably argued. He used the expression of ‘cosmopolitan reason’ in order to express this. As such, Cloots considered
that there were some virtues that were universal, and others that were local, and that the determination of what was good or bad for society, civism, was left to local determination.

What are universal principles for humankind, however, are liberty and equality in rights by birth, and for each individual of the human race irrespective of culture, colour of skin, sex, geography, or any other determinant. The understandings of the unity of the human race, and of the individual as its prime unit, stem equally from the ‘science of man’ as contained in the Encyclopédie. Liberty and equality were also feelings, felt in the heart of every human being. And as such they are sufficient to form a communal bond in that all human beings want universally to be free and equal, and thus want a political system that would protect and maintain their liberty and equality. This system is the ‘sovereignty of the human race’. The only rational—until proven otherwise by ‘cosmopolitan reason’—system to warranty the protection of liberty and equality is republicanism. And the only way to warranty liberty and equality for individuals everywhere on earth is a ‘universal republic’.

Cosmopolitan republicanism considers sovereignty as single and indivisible. It is based on individual human beings, free and equal according to natural law, who, upon meeting, delegate their freedom and equality to a superior entity in charge of protecting and maintaining this state of liberty and equality. However, it is not based on contract theory, in that it considers the social state as the natural state. A republic is the only way individuals can organise their government as participative and deciding of the laws to frame their lives. Therefore, since sovereignty only belongs to the human race, the republic is the republic of the human race, or republic of united individuals.

However, this universal republic is highly decentralised and only composed of a capital (in Cloots’s case Paris) where the deputies representing all the rationally divided departments of the world decide of legislations deemed universal, and controlling the application of laws. The executive branch is reduced to a minimum, and all matters that are deemed local are decided locally by elected local representative.

For Cloots, republicanism was a feasible solution for a large nation, even as large as the whole human race, because of the modern science of man. Cloots considered the French revolution as a re-birth of political and social organisation, a republican Renaissance after the Middle Ages of monarchism. The re-discovery of Roman and Attic concepts such as republicanism was merged with modern concepts of the science of man such as the general will, reason, and natural law, all re-defined. Modern science combined with a view of a golden age of antiquity enabled to reinterpret republicanism within universal and rational principles. This Modern Antiquity led to cosmopolitan republicanism; the science of man shows the universal law
of liberty and equality among individuals, the unity of the human species, the absence of borders and the need to unite the human race as one sovereign. Only under a common law determined by the general will could the human race end wars and start to prosper. The larger the general will the stronger the republic, because it would weaken the possibility of particular wills gaining to much power, unlike what Rousseau believed.

Cosmopolitan republicanism in the French revolution has not been studied as such by scholars. Given the distinction between universal and local principles and needs, and given the highly decentralised and grass-root based government, it is best to describe Cloots’s republicanism as cosmopolitan rather than simply universal. Cloots demonstrated throughout his works a philosophical commitment to develop a universally valid social science that would find universal principles equally applicable in the world, whilst leaving particular principles to be decided locally. Contrary to what Habermas and other followers have argued, reason was not solely conceived as universal and therefore a rigid base for thinking cosmopolitanism. As Cloots’s case shows, there was already an understanding of the need to confront various rational views, to maintain a communication among world populations, what Cloots called ‘cosmopolitan reason’, very akin to Habermas’s ‘Kommunikative Rationalität’.

Cosmopolitan republicanism is therefore not only of interest to students of republicanism, and students of the French revolution, but also for a general understanding of the epistemology of social sciences and political theory in a globalised world.

It must be noted that the present study focused on Cloots, but that other figures also shared similar views of cosmopolitan republicanism and deserve further study. The most important and closest figures are Thomas Paine, Volney, and Condorcet, whose political thoughts in the French revolution should also be studied within the framework of cosmopolitan republicanism in order to have a more accurate picture of all its variants. Volney has been studied for his general view regarding empire and the false superiority of Europeans. Condorcet’s views on the global spread of republicanism has also been studied. Paine’s thought is perhaps better known to anglophone

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scholars, and he has been studied from the point of view of international relations theory, but also for his constitutional thought in historical context.\(^7\)

EPILOGUE

“Ich bin Clootsianer”

Joseph Beuys, 1978

January 1978, the German happening artist Joseph Beuys (1921–1986) is at Gnadenbal palace, near Cleves, to visit Cloots’s birthplace. He meets with a descendant of the Cloots family:


Anarchist, Cloots was not; he was only Anacharsis. It is not exactly clear in what way Cloots can be considered an ‘anarchist’, as this story tells us. Perhaps it is a reference for his minimalistic view of the state since following the laws of nature should suffice to ensure peace, happiness, and order. It is interesting to see how Cloots’s political thought managed to influence at least one person in the twentieth century. However, Beuys only knew of Cloots because he grew up in Cleves. Had he grown up elsewhere, he may not have come across this locally famous Cloots. There is no reason why Cloots should remain an obscure figure of political thought. Cloots pondered the problematisation that modern political thought is still struggling with, and formulated what he thought was a universal solution, not unlike Kant. Perhaps, the vehicle of pamphlets rather than scholarly written

2. Ibid.
3. As Bevilacqua also argues: Bevilacqua, ‘Conceiving the Republic of Mankind’.
treatises, and the rather short life-span that prevented him from developing his philosophical ideas into more atemporal works cost Cloots the price of intellectual legacy. He is nonetheless the frontman of a widespread revolutionary view regarding both universal reason, a metaphysics of nature, the view of a united humankind, and the universality of individual rights. Cloots lost the political battle on widening the concept of nation — already abstract and encompassing many different political entities with their own language, culture, laws, and taxations — to the logical extreme of the whole humankind. The idea of French nation, is still a concept that has roots in this abstract notion of naturally free and equal individuals as recognised by the Declaration. The best example of this is the electoral law that grants any French national world-wide the right to vote for the presidential election, because the president of the French republic represents the ‘nation’. On the other hand, the general elections for the representatives of the national assembly are reserved to nationals with a residency in France as they, paradoxically, do not represent the ‘nation’ as an abstract community, but the nation as the concrete community divided into circonscriptions throughout the territory. Much of this distinction within the concept of nation as an abstract entity opposed to aristocracy, and as an ‘ethnic’ entity has been lost in favour of the opposition between the principle of ‘national’ sovereignty, and ‘popular’ sovereignty.

It is therefore appropriate to compare and oppose Kant’s solution to Cloots’s, as Kleingeld did, although with a more contextualised and historically accurate view of Cloots’s thought. They both came with two different solutions that stem from a universal conception of individual rights. Cloots’s solution was based on the individual having sovereignty over herself and transferring her sovereignty to the only political entity that is the nation of the human race. Kant’s solution, on the other hand, was based on the nation-state, an international system of states in which a minimal law of world citizenship is recognised for the individual. In an international system, only sovereign nation-states are recognised, and the individual is not.

It is an intellectual shame that Cloots’s life was terminated at 39. At the same age, Kant had not yet published his Perpetual Peace, his Universal History, or, for that matter, any of the works he is today most famous for. If known at all, given one more year, it would be for his 1764 Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, which displays a blatantly racist view of the perceived inferiority of Africans and Indians, and superiority of Europeans. One can only dream of an alternate universe where Cloots would have escaped death and could have pursued his career as an intellectual. He may have written more and elaborated on his ideas, away from the stress, urgency, and extremely demanding psychological conditions of the revolution; perhaps in the peace and quiet of his bucolic home in Gnadenthal. But in our present universe, hopefully, this thesis would have con-
vinced the reader to consider at least the alternative between declaring ‘I am Kantian’ and ‘I am Clootsian’ when thinking about cosmopolitan republicanism.⁴

⁴. For this formulation, I am grateful for the informal comment made half in jest and half in earnest by Andrew Vincent after the presentation of my paper on Cloots at the conference ‘Cosmopolitanism in a Wider Context — Conceptualizing Past and Present’, organised by the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) at Södertörn University, in cooperation with the Nobel Museum, 24–26 November 2011.
APPENDIX: LIBRARY CATALOGUE GNADENTHAL

Digitised copy of the library catalogue of Schloss Gnadenthal (ca. 1800) from the Historisch Centrum Overijssel (HCO) vestiging Zwolle, Netherlands:
NL-ZIHCO, Historisch Centrum Overijssel, archive number 0568.1, Familiearchief Van Hoevell, Haus Gnadenthal, Akten, inventory number 172.
Catalogue des livres de la Bibliothèque de Gnadenthal

Histoire éclairci politique ancienne et moderne

Histoire d’Écosse

Origine des Lois des Anciens, des Sciences et de la Bûcherie

De la Recherche de la Vérité

Éléments de l’histoire générale

Histoire du Christianisme des Juifs

Derniers sentiments des plus illustres partisans de la

Logique

Origine des Deux du Paganisme

Recueil d’Opuscules

La Philosopahie applicable à tous les objets de l’Empire

Relation de la Cour de Rome

Histoire du Lutherismes

Histoire des Napoléons; Comté de Dieppe

Éducation des Princes

L’Homme de Cour

Histoire de France

Histoire des Anabalistes

la Mède

Amusements de la Melancholy

Paysans parvenus

Mélomorphoses d’Ovide, en vers

Les mêmes, en prose

Spectacle de la Nature

Don Quichotte

Robinson

Éléments de l’histoire

l’Épique Taurc

Lettres Cabalistiques
Histoire du Régne de Louis quatorze
Histoire des Révolutions d'Angleterre
Histoire de France avant Clovis
Histoire des Hollande
Vie du Roi
histoire de Charles dix-sept
histoire de Suède
Guerre de Hollande par Strada
État des Provinces unies
Conquête des Isles Moluques
Voyage autour du Monde
Voyage de Burnet en Surin Malai
Oeuvres de Sans souci
Voyage de Leibnitz dans l'Amérique Septentrionale
Description du Cap de bonne Espérance
Suik du Voyage de Siam
Deuxième voyage de Siam
Voyage de Savenier
Voyage de Grues
Voyage du Monde
Histoire du Cad
le Temple de Grâce
Le Paradis reconquis de Mollon
Culture de l'homme
Histoire des Amours d'Abelard et d'Héloïse
Oeuvres de Grosset
Alors Persephones
Oeuvres de P. Comelot
Poesies de Quarceau
Caractères de Sceptreaste
Poesies de Bemecorse
Usage de la Solis
III. Oeuvres de Régnard
2. Oeuvres de Brunet
3. Oeuvres de d'Arnaud
4. Oeuvres diverses de Locke
5. Oeuvres diverses de Fontenelle
6. Oeuvres de Boileau
7. Oeuvres de Boileau
8. Oeuvres du p. Rapin
9. Oeuvres de Malte-Brun
10. Oeuvres de Mme de Maintenon
11. Les Incas
12. Relation abrégée d'un voyage dans l'Amérique Méridionale
13. L'Esperance Chinoise
14. Essais historiques sur Paris
15. Lettres du pape Ganganelli
16. Règne de Charles Quint
17. Histoire de Philippe II, Roi d'Espagne
18. Annales de l'Empire
19. Siècle de Louis quatorze
20. Siècle de Louis quinze
21. Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France, c. 69
22. L'Ami des hommes
23. Émile
24. Philosophie de la Nature
25. Aléphron ou le petit philosophe
26. Oeuvres de M. de Condorcet de Shaftesbury
27. Averroès
28. Apologie pour M. de Voltaire
29. Oeuvres diverses de Poppe
30. De l'Esprit
31. Réponses aux questions d'un Provincial
32. Conjectures sur la Genie
11. *Histoire historiques*
   1. *Triumph de l'Évidence*
   2. *Vécam*
   3. *L'homme sensible*
   4. *Le parti-siècle trouvé*
   5. *Contes Moraux*
   6. *L'Esprit de l'Encyclopédie*
   7. *Pensees en Histoire de la Grèce*
   8. *Pensees théologiques*
   9. *Remarques sur les preuves du Christ dans*
   10. *Examen du Materialisme*
   11. *Remarques sur la Rébellion*
   12. *Histoire de France jusqu'à Henri IV inclusivement*
   13. *Œuvres de Virgilie*
   14. *Œuvres d'Horace*
   15. *Œuvres de J. J. Rousseau*

16. *Voltaire*
   1. *Contes de Comines*
   2. *Œuvres de Voltaire*
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   4. *Histoire de la Nativité*
   5. *Œuvres de P. P. Peaucelle*
   6. *Œuvres de Voltaire*
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   10. *Mémorial de Paris*
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1. Études sur les Événements populaires
2. Traités de théologie
3. Recherches sur les Américains
4. Vie de St. Théodule
5. Exposition du St. Sauveur
6. Critique de l'histoire des Huguenots
7. Discours et discours d'église
8. Oeuvres de Religion
9. Traité des Choses
10. Discours sur les Choses des Églises
11. Histoire des Variations
12. Exécution aux Prélatubs
13. État des superstitions
14. Le Désir retiré par lui-même
15. Confessions de St. Augustin
16. Élémens des familles
17. Sermons de Beaudeloue
18. Histoire du peuple de Dieu
19. Saute de l'Histoire du Peuple de Dieu
20. Histoire des Morts
21. Vies des S. Pères
22. Histoire du Manichéisme
23. Perpétuité de la foi de Clicharistique
24. Tableaux de la pénitence
25. Histoire de France jusqu'à Henri IV incluse
26. Jardiniers pour les Jardins
27. Histoire naturelle du Sénégal
28. Recueil des Mots (groupes de formes)
29. Allégres écrits de la Montagne par J. Régnier
30. Extrait d'un Dictionnaire de Dictionnaire
31. Le Paradis terrestre
Accord de la Grâce et de la Liberté
Vie de Henri le Grand
Guide des Voyageurs
Législation Orientale
Traité d'Origine contre César
La Religion Chrétienne
Histoire naturelle de Plin.
Histoire naturelle de M. de Buffon
Marie de Médicis entrant à Amsterdam
Sanvéri, Chorégraphia Brabantia
Sanvéri, Flanerie illustrata
Oeuvres de St. François de Sales
Dictionnaire Économique de Cheneel
Dictionnaire de Moréri avec le Supplément
Dictionnaire de Bayle avec le Supplément
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Lettres de St. Augustin

LES FEMMES DES DEUX CÉSARS
HISTOIRE DES ROIS DE FRANCE
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TRAITÉ CONTRE L'INDIFFÉRENCE DES RELIGIONS
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| 5. | Les jardins |
| 6. | L’Esprit de Job |
| 7. | Tableau philosophique de l’Esprit de Voltaire |
| 8. | Lettres de Voltaire à ses amis du Parisis |
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