PROVIDING PRIMARY EDUCATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
A Social-Literacies Perspective

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Abstract

The provision of primary education in the Netherlands has become increasingly
problematic in recent years. This study examines the role of social-literacies in
understanding the challenges faced by educators and students in this context.

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DENOMINATION AND PRIMARY EDUCATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
(1870-1984)
A Spatial Diffusion Perspective

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CHAPTER ONE  INTRODUCTION

1.1 Verzuiling and ontzuiling

This study deals with the processes of verzuiling and ontzuiling in the Dutch education system. Before explaining in section 1.2 what relation exists between education and verzuiling I will in this section briefly discuss what is understood by the concepts of verzuiling and ontzuiling. In chapter 2, where existing theories on verzuiling are examined, I will look at these concepts more closely. At this moment the reader is only provided with tentative definitions of verzuiling and ontzuiling, which will suffice to understand the considerations in the first chapter.

Broadly speaking the Dutch debate about verzuiling has been centered around a number of key publications. The debate was initiated by an issue on verzuiling of De Sociologische Gids, a leading Dutch sociological journal in 1956 and an issue of Socialisme en Democratie, the theoretical journal of the Social Democratic party, in 1957. The background of the new academic interest in verzuiling was the growing criticism by a group of prominent Socialist and Catholic intellectuals with the static, culturally divided nature of Dutch society in the 1950s. They were interested in the questions to what extent Dutch society had become divided into networks of social and political organizations completely separated from each other, and what function this structure performed for society as a whole. The blocks of political and social organizations they referred to were based on the Catholic, Protestant and Socialist ideologies respectively.

Although their interest originated from strongly normative opinions about verzuiling they were able to transform it into academic scrutiny. Nevertheless the first definitions of verzuiling showed clear traces of the political context in which they were formulated. The definition given by Van Doorn can serve as an example of this. ‘Verzuiling is the process of including the ideological subgroups of society in organizational systems which exert a strong social control. Once these systems are established the tendency exists that the organizational aspect becomes more important than the ideology, and that organizational
control is increasingly justified through ideology. The central elements of this definition are the presence of ideological subgroups, the incorporation of these subgroups into organizational systems by means of social control, and the role of ideology a medium of social control.

The element of social control obviously referred to the open attempt made by the Dutch Catholic Church in the 1950s to control the Catholic population. In 1954 the bishops forbade the members of the Catholic Church to join the Socialist trade union, threatening excommunication. The Catholic ideology, which said that a good Catholic could not be a member of a Socialist union, hence a member of the Socialist union could not be a good Catholic at the same time, was an important medium through which social control was exerted.

Despite the normative context of the initial debate on verzuiling a number of strongly empirical studies was published in the subsequent years. The subject received ample attention of Social Democratic intellectuals, who argued that this outdated social structure should be broken, hoping in this way to attract Catholic and Protestant members or votes. Attempts were made to quantify the newly discovered sociological phenomenon. Even if it is true that these studies now seem to us rather limited in their understanding of verzuiling, they continue to be a valuable contribution to the literature on verzuiling. Taking a critical distance to the segmentation of Dutch society in their academic writings the authors of this first period were themselves a symptom of the declining influence of the structure of verzuiling and an acceleration in the process of ontzuiling, which is roughly the reverse of the process of verzuiling, i.e. the dissolution of the organizational blocks. But it was probably too early for them to fully realize that this was the case. At least we do not find reference to the concept of ontzuiling in these initial studies.

The focus of the second key publication, which appeared in 1968, was not on verzuiling as such, but on the consequences of the existence of deep ideological cleavages for the governability of a country. Lijphart, the author of The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, was first and foremost interested in the question why Dutch democracy, despite these cleavages, had been stable during the long period from 1917 until 1967. For reasons of comparability with other countries he defined the concept of verzuiling in a very general way as block formation in a culturally divided nation.

1. This is a free translation of Van Doorns definition as given in J.J.A. van Doorn, Verzuiling, een eigentijds systeem van sociale controle, in: Sociologische Gids, 1956, pp.41-49.
Stuurman, who published his study on verzuliring in 1983, defined verzuliring as a structure of social control. He rejected to apply this concept, however, to each of the organized subcultural groups in society. In his opinion the concept of verzuliring should be limited to the organization of subcultural groups with a religious ideology, since the origin of verzuliring had been the attempt by the religious elites to incorporate the expanding working class through organization. For historical and theoretical reasons he rejected the notion of verzuliring among the Socialists, which he considered a contradictio in terminis. Although he observed that verzuliring was not a linear process and that counter tendencies had been present since the end of the nineteenth century he did not seriously pay attention to the process of ontzuiling.

The definitions of verzuliring presented here have made clear that opinions considerably diverge. Depending on the question they asked the authors arrived at different definitions and different interpretations of verzuliring. It seems to be quite difficult, if not impossible, to bring these together in one theory. Conversely, the scholarly attention given to the process of ontzuiling, particularly of sectors outside the political system, has remained relatively scarce, and clear definitions are hard to find. Without pretending to arrive at a final decision concerning the various interpretations we define verzuliring on the basis of this brief review as the historical transformation of religiously based subcultural groups into highly integrated complexes of organizations, whereby contacts between people belonging to different organizational complexes were almost excluded, except at the level of the elites. The preliminary definition of ontzuiling then maintains that this process is roughly the reverse of verzuliring, i.e. the dissolution of the organizational systems and the growth, in number and intensity, of cross cutting contacts between the members of different subcultural groups, also between non-elite members. Armed with this provisional understanding of verzuliring and ontzuiling we will now look at the role of education in these processes.
1.2 Primary education and its relation to verzuiing

In the previous section verzuiing has been presented as an all pervasive process, touching on every aspect of an individual's life. This was true for verzuiing among the Catholics as well as the orthodox Protestants. The Catholic and Protestant spiritual leaders wished to bring every single activity of their following within the orbit of the church, and to keep a large say for the church in the social and political Catholic and Protestant organizations. Of course some activities were more important to control than others, depending on the extent to which an activity contributed to sustaining the faith. Primary education was thought to have a special task in this respect, hence it is not surprising that primary education played a crucial role in the process of verzuiing among Catholics and orthodox Protestants. In this section I will examine this central role of primary education in the process of verzuiing. Three points have to be discussed here:

- the conflict about the position of private education as the issue initiating the process of verzuiing,
- the central position of education as an agent of socialization,
- the example for subsequent conflict resolution set by the compromise on education.

How and why did the conflict on the position of religious educational establishments in primary education mark the beginning of verzuiing? The issue of religiously oriented education was hotly disputed from about 1840 until 1917 and centered around the question of the identity of the national education system. Despite the fact that the separation of state and church had been realized in the constitution of 1815, elementary education organized by the state had to be Christian, that is, the teaching had to follow the general principles of the increasingly latitudinarian Dutch Reformed Church, which was the majority church. This state of affairs met with growing criticism of fundamentalist Protestant groups, and was one of the factors behind several opposition movements within the Dutch Reformed Church. From the beginning different opinions existed about the strategy to follow to counteract the latitudinarian orientation of the Dutch Reformed Church. Some people wished to bring the latitudinarian tendencies in the main church to a halt and to make national education truly orthodox Protestant. Others preferred to realize their religious ideals outside the 'old'

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2. The categories of 'primary education/school' and 'elementary education/school' refer to the education followed by children of the 6-13 age-group and are used interchangeably throughout this study. In chapter 5 the category of 'basic education' is introduced. 'Basic education' is the recently (1985) established combination of pre-primary and primary education, attended by children of 4 to 12 years.
church. Their aim with regard to education was to obtain the right to open their own schools.

The disagreement between these groups was only growing after 1848, when it was written in the new constitution that the public education system would be neutral. The struggle between the Liberals and some orthodox Protestant groups on the one hand, which favoured a system of neutral public education combined with private denominational education, and a large part of the Dutch Reformed Church and other orthodox Protestant groups on the other hand, which both favoured a Protestant public school but differed about its degree of orthodoxy, became one of the central political themes of this period.3 The Catholics sided at first with the Liberals, thinking that a neutral public education system would protect them against Protestant domination. The liberal bill on education formulated in 1854 made them realise, however, that in a liberal state their status would be reduced to that of a private group and that they needed to create their own organizations in order to maintain their position. This bill was also the focus of strong opposition by those orthodox Protestants who strived for positive orthodox Protestant public education.4 After a newly formulated bill had been passed in 1857 the Catholics opted for private denominational education, whereas the opinions in the orthodox Protestants circles began to converge in the same direction.5 Once the question of the character of the public education was definitely settled in favour of a system of neutral public education and denominational education in private schools the debate shifted to the problem of state financing of private education. From 1860 to 1890 this point was high on the political agenda. Moreover it sparked widespread efforts at organization and mobilization from the side of the orthodox Protestants. The chief moments marking this process of mass mobilization were the following:
- the founding in 1861 of the Vereeniging voor Christelijk Nationaal Schoolonderwijs (Society for Christian National Education);
- the transformation of this association into the Anti Schoolwet Verbond (Anti Education Act League) in 1872. The Anti Schoolwet Verbond was a national organization having over a hundred local branches. Local branches were usually started by orthodox Protestants who had founded, or wished to found, a private, Protestant school;

3. This distinction is made by Ph. J. Idenburg, Schets van het Nederlandse schoolwezen, 1960, pp.92-93.

4. The bill presented in 1854 was drawn up by Van Reenen. In 1855 Van Reenen made a second attempt at formulating an education bill, which differed only slightly from the first one.

5. The bill which was finally passed was drawn up by Van der Bruggen, who succeeded Van Reenen after the fall of the Cabinet.
- mass mobilization in the form a second petition movement against the Education Act proposed by the Liberal government in 1878.
- the founding of the Anti Revolutionaire Partij (the Anti Revolutionary Party) in 1879. This was the first truly national political party and it organized the orthodox Protestants.

From this brief account of what has become known in history as the ‘school conflict’, it is clear that the education system did not coincidentally become the catalyst of the process of verzuiling. Already during the first half of the nineteenth century there had been groups within the Dutch Reformed Church dissatisfied with the liberal tendencies of this church and with the diminishing influence of religion in society at large. From the beginning one of the main points of criticism concerned the weak religious character of the elementary education system. Hence it is not surprising that after 1850, with the rise of mass organization and mass politics, the orthodox Protestants were the first to organize and that education was the central issue around which they did so.

Mobilization of the Catholic part of the population was much slower. For a long time the Catholics did not act as a separate political group and mainly supported the liberal position on the issue of education. During the 1850s they realised, however, that the assets gained in 1848 began to turn against them. The liberal reform of the constitution, which had made possible the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy, at the same time relegated the Catholic Church to the position of one among many other private organizations within the state. In 1868 the Catholic Church broke with its previous position: the Bishops condemned the neutral orientation of public education and advocated the establishment of Catholic schools. Despite the similarity between the political position of the orthodox Protestants and the Catholics the education issue did not mobilize the Catholics to the same extent as the orthodox Protestants. This was caused by the very hierarchal organization of the church which left little room for initiatives by the common people and at the same time was a very efficient organizational tool for the establishment of denominational schools. Other organizations were in fact superfluous. The Petition movement of the orthodox Protestants was supported by more than 150,000 Catholics, but the education issue did not lead to the formation of Catholic organizations particularly aiming at the founding of denominational schools or of a Catholic political party. In 1888, however, the alliance between orthodox Protestants and Catholics and the first coalition cabinet resulting from this, made it possible to pass a bill which introduced the partial financing of denominational schools from public funds.

The second point, education as an agent of socialization, is related to the general aims of education systems. It is obvious that formal schooling has always served other purposes in addition to the mere teaching of knowledge and skills. In section 1.3 we will see how the church’s interest in religiously inspired
teaching was made subordinate to the interests of the nation-state in the first half of the nineteenth century through the new emphasis on teaching loyalty to the nation and other civic duties. Marxist sociologists of education have pointed out the importance of formal schooling for the functioning of a capitalist economy in teaching children discipline and obedience and getting them accustomed to the rhythms of the working day. Through the verzuiling of the education system the church tried to recapture some of its influence lost in this field to the other actor, the nation-state. At an early stage the leaders of the orthodox Protestants and the Catholics were aware that if the people's faith was to be the guiding principle of their entire lives, religiously inspired education was of the utmost importance. They recognized the education system as an important agent of socialization, besides the family. Control by the churches of the education system and of youth organizations was an effective medium to increase the need for denominational organizations in other sectors of social life. The education system thus belonged to the core of the structure of verzuiling.

In this respect primary education was more important than secondary education because it was omnipresent, closely connected to the family and the local community, and because children entered school at an early age when their personality was still rather fluid. The private Catholic or Protestant school made it possible to bring children from day to day into contact with the principles of the true faith, and it kept them for a very large part of the day away from the influence of other, dangerous ideologies. Being such an efficient and effective medium of religious socialization private denominational education was not only the issue around which the process of verzuiling started, but also the activity in which verzuiling has been most persistent. Even at the beginning of the 1980's some 70% of the children of primary school-age attend a private school.

Third the school struggle of the second half of the last century determined the development of the social and political cleavage which dominated in the Netherlands until the 1960s, i.e. the opposition between religious and anti-religious forces. The Catholics and the Orthodox Protestants belonged to the one side, the Liberals, and in a later period the Socialists, to the other side. After 1889, however, the school struggle was supplanted by the socio-economic problems as the principal political issue. Around the socio-economic problem another cleavage developed, that between Socialists and Liberals. The Catholics and the Orthodox Protestants usually sided with the Liberals on this problem. By 1910 Dutch society was divided into four socio-political blocks, each strictly separated from the three others.

Despite these divisions the political leaders managed to formulate a compromise on the two political issues which threatened to paralyse politics in 1917. They agreed about completely financing private education and about extending the suffrage to include the entire male population. According to Lijphart the significance of the Pacification of 1917 reached far
beyond the fact that two long-standing, apparently intractable problems had been solved, because of the following reasons.

First the dispute was settled by exchanging a vote in favour of the suffrage issue for a vote in favour of subsidies to the private education sector. The majority rule was thus replaced by bargaining and consensus, which gave the result much stronger backing.

Second the agreement implied recognition of the equal rights of the four main subcultural groups, by including the right to subsidies for denominational education in the constitution and by introducing the principle of proportionality in the allocation of public money to these four groups. Catholic and Protestant schools would be entitled to state subsidies on the same basis as the finance from the public purse going to the public sector and proportional to the number of children attending the school. Proportionality as a way of allocating funds to public, Protestant and Catholic schools set an important example for distribution of public money in a great number of sectors such as that of health care, and of social work. A further consequence of the allocation of public money to private institutions was that it initiated a policy of delegating the implementation of tasks which were generally considered to belong to the domain of the state (e.g. education) to private organizations. The presence of an intermediate 'layer' of private organizations, via which public money was distributed to society, became a salient feature of the Dutch welfare state.

Third the agreement was the result of negotiations between all four parties, irrespective of their position as a government party or an opposition party. Hence the political elites of the four blocks temporarily set aside their usual enmity and worked together to arrive at a solution which satisfied all parties. Lijphart called this elite behaviour 'prudent leadership'. According to his analysis the style of problem solving adopted in the 'Pacification' of 1917 remained of crucial importance in the Netherlands for the next half century.

In the education sector it meant two things in particular:
- the preparation of every decision in committees in which each of the four mayor blocks was represented, and mutual recognition of the interests of all four parties in the negotiations, and
- a legalistic approach to problem solving. Once the equality of public and private education was written in the constitution subsequent issues were settled along the lines of this constitutional principle. The juridical-technical transformation of essentially political problems prevented that the position of denominational education again became a source of conflict until the 1970s.
1.3 Alternatives for a segmented system of primary education: an international overview

The struggle between state and church for hegemony in the education system resulted in the Netherlands in the establishment of a pluralist education system in which the balance of power gradually shifted towards the religious forces between 1850 and 1930. The adjective pluralist has a double meaning here. On the one hand differentiation occurred with regard to the ownership of schools. Besides the public, state owned, schools an extensive network of privately owned schools evolved. Freedom of education, this is the freedom of private groups to set up their own schools, was laid down in the constitution of 1848. On the other hand differentiation developed within the private sector along the lines of different religious affiliations. This differentiation within the private sector is one of the points at which the Dutch education system diverges from the education systems found in most other Western European countries. It resulted from the fact that in the Netherlands the state did not confront one, monolithic church but at least two and in particular periods even more churches: the Dutch Reformed Church, other Protestant churches and the Catholic Church. The relation between the churches to a large extent determined the course of the struggle about the position of denominational education. The conflict between state and church, which found its most profound expression in the problem of religious education but was by no means restricted to this issue, was not a feature peculiar to the development of the nation-state in the Netherlands in the nineteenth century. In many of the Western European states which were involved in a process of nation building the distribution of power between state and church formed a source of a long-lasting and fierce political conflict.

The education-issue was almost everywhere the centre of this struggle. This is not surprising since education, together with poor-relief and health care had historically belonged to the sphere of influence of the church. For a long period, until the emergence of the nation-state with its national education system, formal education, i.e. education which is given in institutions specialized for this purpose as opposed to informal education which takes place during every day activities, was mainly provided by the churches. Because of the activities of the church formal education considerably expanded between 1500 and 1800. The average increase of literacy was impressive, although great differences in the growth rate existed between countries. In the Catholic church schools the teachers were usually members of religious orders, but in the Protestant schools they were ordinary church members. The position of verger was often combined with that of teacher. Apart from teaching the children

6. The word Church has here the general meaning of the religious institutions in society, and does not refer to the various churches existing in reality.
some reading, writing and arithmetic the main aim of education was to instruct the doctrine of the church. Generally the Protestant churches were more active organizing formal education than the Catholic Church, because of the greater importance attached to reading the bible among the Protestants.

In several countries in the course of the 17th century the local authorities began to organize education, in order to provide free education to the poor. Yet for a long time to come these public schools did not threaten the dominant position of the churches in education. To describe the situation which characterized this period Archer introduced the concept of mono-integration. Mono-integration refers to a situation in which the education system is owned and controlled by one, dominant group. The education system, for instance the length and the contents of the curriculum, its methods and its participants, is subordinate to the interests of the dominant group. In the case of West Europe this was the religious elite. Mono-integration also meant that other institutions, like the state, the military or the market, were not directly served by the education system.7

In the course of the 18th and 19th century, however, the central position of the Church with regard to education was broken down by the state. I have already mentioned that in the period preceding this process the importance of education for the accomplishment of social and economic tasks was relatively small. Both in agriculture and in the crafts, the two major sectors of the economy, training was done informally, on the job. Only for those employed in the administration and in commercial activities a certain level of schooling was a prerequisite. This explains why in the countries that were heavily involved in trade, the Republic of the United Netherlands and England, the diffusion of schooling was greater than in other Western European states.8

7. M.S. Archer, Social origins of educational systems, 1977, p.60 and p.220. The concept of mono-integration is opposed to the concept of multiple integration. A multiply integrated education system is no longer dependent on one social actor but maintains relations with several social actors. The shift towards multiple integration has the effect of lifting education from its position of subordination. The autonomy of the education systems increases.

8. At the beginning of the sixteenth century England and the Low Countries had literacy rates as high as around 10%, whereas the German states and France had rates between 5 and 10 percent. In 1800 the literacy rate was over 70 percent for males and almost 60% for females in the Netherlands and in England and Wales these figures were respectively 60 percent and 45 percent. The rates of the Netherlands and England were only surpassed by those of Scotland and the United States. J.E. Craig, The expansion of Education, in: Review of Research in Education, 1981, p.170.
With the emergence of the nation-state and the rise of industrialisation in the 19th century education got a new task, that of enhancing social control and political integration. It was in the interest of political elites to expand education as a means of integration with national political cultures and in this way to ensure the stability and legitimacy of the national political communities. Hence the interest of the state in education increased strongly. But as long as it did not have formal control of the system it was difficult to impose this new demand on education. The only way to obtain more influence on education was to break the near monopoly of the church, by establishing a national, state-owned education system. It had to be state-owned to diminish the influence of the churches and it had to be national to prevent that regional subcultures, which hindered the development of a national identity, continued to exist.

This coup-de-force on the side of the state did not imply that the church completely lost control of education. After a period of struggle, lasting up to a hundred years in some countries, arrangements were made to accommodate the claim of the church to retain some of its influence on education. In most countries this struggle consisted of three phases. In the initial phase the religious forces tried to influence the character of education provided by the state. In the subsequent phase they concentrated on attaining freedom of education and in the last phase the demand for financial support by the state for religiously inspired education was the central issue.

Three factors determined the length of the period of conflict and the sharpness of the debate.

a. The constitutional position of the church, that is the question whether or not state and church were completely separated. In some countries the church retained its position of national church, whereas in others the status of the church was reduced to that of a private organization among many others.

b. The position of power of the secular versus the religious forces in those States in which the separation between state and church was complete.

c. The degree of religious homogeneity or heterogeneity in a country. This factor did not only influence the shape which a possible solution could take, but was also related to the existence of internal cohesion or fragmentation within the confessional faction of the political elite.

The resulting national education systems differed from each other on a number of points:
- the ideological character of public education: religious or religiously neutral;
- the character of religious public education: general or following the doctrine of one particular church;

- the right to organize private education in those countries where public education kept its neutral character;
- the financial support offered by the state to realize the freedom of private education.

Examining the position of the church in the Western European education systems resulting from this struggle Knippenberg and Van der Wusten distinguished three broad categories. In the first type a secular government retained exclusive responsibility for the school system. This type of education system was in particular found in countries where the secular elite did not want to compromise with the national church on this issue. As an example of this type Knippenberg and Van der Wusten mention France which developed a long way in this direction in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. In the course of the present century, however, the secular forces have been forced to make considerable concessions on this point. The second type was the uniform national system operating under a single set of rules in which, however, a large part of the responsibility remained in the hand of the major church, be it the Catholic Church, as in Italy, or a Protestant church, as in Norway. The third type allowed for different sets of rules within a national framework. This type was found in religiously divided countries, such as the Netherlands and Belgium.

Knippenberg and Van der Wusten used two criteria for their typology: the relation between state and church and the presence of private education besides public education. In figure 1.1 I have tried to account for more differentiation on this point.11

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In figure 1.1 the distinction between countries providing religiously public education and those providing religiously and ethically neutral public education is presented on the vertical axis. As we will see this distinction corresponded largely with another one, that between political regimes which were formally related to the church and regimes which did no longer maintain a formal relation with the church.\footnote{12} Countries in which the public education system remained religiously inspired were usually those with a rather homogeneous population with respect to religion. In the period of nation-building the religious elite, which did not experience internal fragmentation due to the presence of different churches, succeeded in obtaining the hegemony over the secular part of the elite. In these countries a formal separation between state and church did not take place. The state remained a religious state. The interrelatedness of state and church became most clearly expressed in that area where ideology played an important part, namely education. The church was given a strong influence on the public education system. As we see in figure 1.1 in most of the countries of this category the private education sector has a

\footnote{12. This correspondence does not exist in the case of the West Germany where none of the churches has the position of national church.}
rather weak position in the sense that it does not receive any financial support from the public authorities, be it the government at national, regional or local level. This is not surprising since the church to a considerable extent controls its future existence and its future influence on society through the public education system. The establishment of private denominational education is simply not necessary.

The religious education given in public schools has in some countries, e.g. the United Kingdom, a general character, but in other countries it is based on the doctrines of the national church. It should also be noted that this category comprises countries which are homogeneously Catholic as well as countries in which the state church is a Protestant church.

In the lower half of figure 1.1 we find those countries in which the separation of state and church has been completed. In the constitution of these countries the church was relegated to the position of a private organization which formally could not exercise any power over the institutions of the state. The attempt undertaken by the confessional forces to christianize the state did not succeed. In correspondence with the liberal character of their constitutions these countries established a neutral public education system. The establishment of a neutral public education system did not mean, however, that the confessional forces were completely defeated in that area. As a consequence of the neutral character of public education the struggle between confessional and secular forces shifted from the question of the ideological orientation of public education to the issues of freedom of education and state funding of private education. Great differences exist between the European countries as regards the moment at which the confessional parties succeeded in securing the position of private education and as regards the extent to which their demands were fulfilled, but the outcome of the struggle between secular and religious groups was rather similar: besides the neutral public education sector private denominational schools were established. At least in two countries, Belgium and the Netherlands, the position of the confessional parties was so strong that the private sector soon was bigger than the public one.

The fact that the existence of a religious public education system is often accompanied by a refusal on the side of the state to finance private education whereas most states with a neutral public education system do subsidize private education has implications which go beyond the position of denominational education. It shows that even nowadays the religious cleavage is most fundamental in shaping the education systems in Europe. Private schools which are explicitly based on a different pedagogical or philosophical conception are in themselves usually not considered worthy of state-financing and the political
strength of their adherents is not sufficient to successfully claim such state-financing.\textsuperscript{13}

The last remark concerns countries with a religiously heterogeneous population. From figure 1.1 it is clear that these countries have not opted for the same solutions. In the Netherlands religious education was provided in private religious schools of different denominations. In West Germany, however, religious pluralism was expressed within the public sector, that means the main denominations have their 'own' public schools. In the United Kingdom, lastly, public education is religious, but free of the teaching of any particular church's doctrines.

This brief investigation of the relation between church and education has made clear that a large variation exists. Still it has shown that the situation in the Netherlands, with its large and divided private sector which is wholly financed by the state, is not unique. Particularly with the education system in countries like Belgium, France and Denmark it has much in common.

\textsuperscript{13} In the Netherlands private schools based on the philosophies of Rudolf Steiner and Maria Montessori are indeed financed from the public purse. The aim of the 'Pacification' of 1917 was to secure state funding of denominational schools, but the way this was done created the possibility also for other types of private schools which at that time existed to successfully claim financial support from the state.
1.4 The local and regional levels as focus of research

In section 1.1 it has been observed that although the studies of verzuiling in the Netherlands have been undertaken from different perspectives and have yielded different theoretical conclusions, at one point they show a striking similarity. This is the choice of the level at which the phenomenon of verzuiling has been studied. A large majority of the authors has focused on aspects of verzuiling in society as a whole, on the importance of national denominational organizations in the construction of the welfare state and on the alliances and conflicts of the national elites of the zuilen.14 This is not surprising since the main authors of verzuiling, Kruyt, Van Doorn, Lijphart and Stuurman, were interested in verzuiling at that level. The debate which followed when these authors published their studies, obviously took the same perspective, since the scholars taking part in the debate argued against or in favour of its initiators. Thus in the trail of these 'core' studies an extended body of literature on the origins, the evolution, the effects etc. of verzuiling at the national level was produced. This was, however, not the only direction which the discussion took. Lijphart's intention had never been to make a thorough study of the general characteristics of Dutch society. From the beginning his aim had been to write 'an extended theoretical argument based on a single case of particular significance to pluralist theory'.15 To support and elaborate his theoretical argument he later applied it to a number of other cases of divided societies. From his work, and from the work of Swiss, Belgian and Austrian authors who published on the same theme, it appeared that the Dutch case of verzuiling had many similarities with the political and social situations in other small European countries. A considerable number of comparative studies on 'segmental pluralism', to use one of many concepts introduced, was published. In all of these the level of research was the national one.

There are some clear limitations to this exclusive emphasis on the national level. The most important of these is the lack of differentiation. The implicit assumption is often that the process of verzuiling followed a more or less similar path in every region and that developments within the different segments of the population were largely identical. The question of the potential for organization and mobilization, which most likely varied greatly from one community to another and within communities between one group and another, is overlooked. Consequently too little attention is paid to the possible

14. The Dutch noun 'zuilen' refers to the networks of subcultural organizations.

existence of conflicts and opposition to the process of verzuiling. In this respect Stuurman’s perspective differs somewhat from that of authors like Lijphart and Daalder. Whereas the latter two are mainly concerned with the co-operative behaviour of national political elites in a divided society, Stuurman puts emphasis on the social control of the working class and the repression of the labour movement through the structure of verzuiling. This perspective makes it at least easier to discover the presence of resistance to verzuiling and of movements in the opposite direction. Despite this attention for the underlying groups in society Stuurman’s analysis remains largely focused on national developments. Questions about the necessary conditions to be fulfilled for setting up an organization and about the reasons for individuals to join an organization, can not be answered at this level.

What has been said here about the deficiencies of research which exclusively focuses on the national level is even more valid for comparative studies. Because of their broader scope and the difficulties encountered in collecting detailed data for a number of countries this type of studies has usually been based on global data concerning the number of organizations, the size of the organizations, common elite behaviour etc., in societies where well-organized subcultures exist.

Besides examining aspects of verzuiling at the national level it is necessary to study verzuiling at the level of local communities and regions, and at the level of the individual. I do not mean to say here that further research along ‘traditional’ lines will no longer yield any new insight. On the contrary I think that comparative research is still very much underdeveloped, especially concerning the process of ontzuiling. One has to be aware, however, of the fact that the exclusive concentration on the national level may very well limit one’s understanding of verzuiling. When I ask for new approaches I do this hoping to increase the knowledge and understanding of verzuiling and ontzuiling by combining the outcome with what is already known. The choice for one approach or another is not determined by theoretical considerations but by the question from which the researcher departs. Each of the approaches sheds light on different aspects of verzuiling and the combined result provides us with a more complete picture.

The shortcomings of studies in which national developments are central have recently been noted by several scholars. Both de Rooy and Stuurman have pointed out the need for more empirical research at the subnational level. Moreover Stuurman mentioned the need for studies of verzuiling at the level of the

individual. After an early essay by Verwey-Jonker little attention was given to this aspect of verzuiling. Stuurman proposed to study the relation between verzuiling and individuals in terms of ideology, or better, ideologies. Following Gramsci and Althusser, Stuurman defined the relation between ideology and individual as the way the subject feels addressed by a particular ideology and this ideology influences the subject. The ideology of the subject shapes the way it perceives its experiences. How the ideology of verzuiling affected the everyday experiences of the Catholic and Protestant population in practice is, however, a rather 'underresearched' aspect of the verzuiling studies. Some attempts at research in this direction were undertaken by Verrips and Bots and Noordman. Like Stuurman and De Rooy, Daalder too stated in his contribution to the reader in commemoration of Stein Rokkan which was published in 1981, that a more empirical study of the interaction of regional, religious and social cleavages over time was needed.

This challenge has been taken up by few scholars, among whom the historian Blom. Blom initiated some years ago new research on verzuiling which was to pay special attention to spatial and temporal variations. Local case studies seemed to be the best instrument to increase our knowledge of geographical and historical differences in the process of verzuiling. 'It is necessary to pay attention to irregularities in the process of verzuiling. It is of course tempting, but unjustified, to start from the assumption that the course of events was inevitable, and that developments were gradual and always influenced by the same factors. One has to be attentive to the possibility that in certain periods a different combination of causal factors was at work than in other periods.' In 1985 the first results of this


research were published in a voluminous reader, which included case-studies of eight medium sized towns in the provinces of North and South Holland. Each of these case studies provides a detailed account of aspects of verzuiling in one of these towns. Despite the richness of details and the comprehensive approach of the studies, the result is disappointing because of the lack of integration of the case studies. Blom had explicitly mentioned the need for integration of the results of these historical community studies but did not fulfill this promise in a concluding chapter of the publication.\textsuperscript{22} Did he renounce to do so because the partial results were not comparable which, as he stated himself, is a necessity for any attempt at comparison? If this is true, Blom was at least to some extent himself responsible since he refused to start the study from any theoretical framework or set of hypotheses. The only attempt to give the case-studies some unity was found in a list of five ‘points of attention’ for the study of verzuiling. Related to the first criticism, but more important, was the fact that the study was rather unsystematic. On what grounds, for instance, were the cases chosen? In other words, in what respects did they differ from each other and what similar characteristics did they have? To select the cases in a systematic way, by systematically varying the factors used as criteria for selection, and to include the variation in the selection criteria as the explanation of variation in the process of verzuiling is a necessary prerequisite to arrive at an understanding of verzuiling which, although based on local studies, reaches beyond the level of individual towns. As long as the attempt to compare local studies in a systematic way is not made, the number of local studies may increase, but our understanding will not necessarily grow at the same rate. In order to provide a methodologically sounder basis for case studies on verzuiling Passchier and Pennings presented in a recent paper a ‘typology of local contexts’ based on two criteria relevant for the study of processes of verzuiling, the dominant religion and the socio-economic dynamics of a community.\textsuperscript{23}

If case studies of local communities hitherto have contributed only in a limited way to our understanding of verzuiling, what should studies at the local and regional level then look like and why are they important? The answer to this question is twofold. First methodologically rigid studies of verzuiling at the local and regional level, for instance along the lines suggested by Passchier and Pennings, will readjust the picture of verzuiling as a unitary, linear process. Instead these will make it possible to discern wide but systematic variation,


both in time and place, in this process. In short they will enable us to discover local and regional patterns of verzuiling. The questions to be addressed in such research are: In which areas did the process of verzuiling start? Which areas were touched latest by verzuiling? What was the rate of verzuiling in different types of communities? Does a correlation exist between early verzuiling and the rate of verzuiling? Which segments of the population were the first to move in the direction of verzuiling? Did this group of people keep its initial ‘advantage’? Which sector was the first to become segmented and in which other sectors segmental organizations were only much later set up?

Hence, the first step is to arrive at a systematic description of subnational patterns of verzuiling. The second step will be to go beyond description and to look for an explanation of these patterns. One of the central questions will be how and why did segmental organizations come into being. What were the political, social, economic and cultural local settings in which verzuiling first appeared? What were the particular conditions for the formation of segmental organizations? How much importance should be attributed to the role of local leaders? Which cleavages were the most important and did the cleavage structure undergo any change in the course of the verzuiling process? To what extent did the presence of local oppositions play a part? Did local subcultures exist before the verzuiling started? Did verzuiling start around a key-issue? Which relation existed between national organizations and local branches of these organizations i.e. did widespread local organizational initiatives precede the setting up of national organizations or were local organizations started as branches of national ones? If we are able to answer these questions for a number of carefully selected local communities and look for meaningful relations between the answers we will improve our understanding of the phenomenon of verzuiling.

A final remark has to be made here with regard to the process of ontzuiling which can to a certain extent be considered as the reverse of verzuiling. Although there are many more data concerning this phenomenon systematic empirical study is lacking here too. Given the totally different historical context in which the process of ontzuiling took place, characterized by for instance the existence of mass transport and the widely diffused ownership of means of mass communication, it is not very likely that local and regional variation in the process of ontzuiling is as wide as in the process of verzuiling. As far as variation exists it will be more likely due to the geographical distribution of particular denominations which are more or less influenced by secularization tendencies than to other local circumstances which favour or hinder ontzuiling. At the present stage, however, this is only an assumption. It seems justified to ask for studies at the subnational level here too.
1.5 Research problem, construction of the study, sources

The central concern of this study is the process of verzuiling and ontzuiling in the primary education system. This research theme is not new. Because of the special function of the primary education system in the process of verzuiling it has received quite some scholarly attention in the past. As part of theoretical studies on the structure of verzuiling as a whole, students of politics have looked into the contribution of the school struggle to the origin of verzuiling, and they have studied the exemplary function of the 'Pacification' of 1917 for subsequent problem solving in a culturally divided nation. Scholars with an interest in the juridical aspects of verzuiling examined the way the equal rights of subcultural groups were elaborated in the Education Act of 1920. Finally students of the history of education have looked at verzuiling as a particular evolution of a national education system. Apart from these three categories of studies the process of verzuiling of the education system has been the subject of a number of historical studies dealing with the development of education in one specific town or region.

In the present study I have opted for the approach indicated in the previous section, that is the systematic study of data concerning the processes of verzuiling and ontzuiling in the education system at the local level. The aim of the study is to give a detailed description of the patterns of verzuiling and ontzuiling in the elementary education system, to test existing hypotheses about the variation in time and place in the origin of verzuiling on the basis of findings for the education sector, and to specify existing theories on verzuiling and ontzuiling. The main research problem is thus formulated as the description and interpretation of subnational patterns of (participation in the processes of) verzuiling and ontzuiling in the primary education system.

Some of the concepts used in this formulation need further explanation. The general adjective subnational is taken because it leaves room for the study of geographical as well as sectoral, that is, between various subcultural groups, variation. The concept of participation implies that we are interested in the way different groups have reacted to the granting of an alternative to the public education system. Some of them opted for private education as soon as the possibility came within their reach, that is, as soon as denominational education was.

organized nearby, but others rejected the alternative, until they were forced to participate in the process of verzuiling at a later stage. As regards the period of ontzuiling the issue of participation centres around the possibility to withdraw children from denominational schools and to make use of the section in the Education Act which forces local governments to provide public education if a sufficient number of parents so requires.

In section 1.4 I have criticised the lack of method of historians while producing local cases studies, since these do not provide a basis for theorizing. It is clear, however, that the approach taken in our study has some disadvantages too. Contrary to local cases studies, in which the whole range of social and political activities involved in the structure of verzuiling is covered, research based on quantitative information for a large number of units necessarily focuses on the verzuiling of one sector only, because of the time consuming tasks of data collection and data handling. Therefore I do not pretend to arrive at more than tentative conclusions concerning the general patterns of verzuiling and ontzuiling. To be able to make more definite conclusions detailed studies of the evolution of verzuiling in other sectors, for instance in politics, labour organizations, the welfare sector, are needed. The education sector, however, is a very good point of departure, because the choices connected with education concerned every single family with children. The level of participation in elementary education was as high as 82 percent in 1870, which is about the start of our study, and was very near to 100 percent in 1900. Where appropriate, however, I will compare my findings with existing, unfortunately less detailed publications on verzuiling of the political system in order to determine whether the patterns of verzuiling determined for the education sector allow for careful generalization.

The unit of analysis will be the lowest administrative level existing in the Netherlands, that of the municipality. There are advantages and disadvantages connected with this choice. The major disadvantage of the municipality as the unit of analysis is that to a certain extent verzuiling of the education sector took place across municipal boundaries. This means that children, precisely for ideological reasons, attended schools situated in municipalities other than the one in which they were resident. Serious as this problem may be, it is difficult to account for, except when interpreting the deviations of the patterns found. The only way to avoid this source of error is to shift the analysis to a higher administrative level. Since the province is too large a unit, the Netherlands has only eleven provinces, the only level appropriate for a more detailed analysis above the municipality would have been the level of the
The main advantage of the municipality as the unit of analysis is the crucial role of this level of the administration in many decisions concerning education, such as the decision to open or to close a primary school. For this reason, and because of the possibility of richer detail we have preferred the municipality over the schooldistrict as unit of research, despite the distortions this will entail.

Our study covers the period from 1870 to 1930, which is roughly the period of verzuiling, and that from 1977 to 1984, during which the process of ontzuiling became manifest. Ideally it would have included the whole period from 1870 until 1984, but this was not possible because of the lack of information concerning the intermediate period.

I have taken 1870 as point of departure because previous research has shown that since the Education Act of 1857, which emphasized the neutral character of the public school and thus reinforced the call for denominational schools, the institution of the denominational school began to diffuse rapidly. By 1870 the new law was fully effective. The analysis of the participation in denominational education, however, focuses on the years between 1900 and 1930 for three reasons. The first, methodological, reason was that compulsory primary education was introduced only in 1900. Hence before 1900 the decision to participate in education as such interfered with the decision to participate in a particular type of private education. The overall level of participation in Catholic or Protestant education was thus influenced by two factors, the demand for education in general and the demand for Catholic or Protestant education, of which the effects could not easily be separated. The second, empirical, reason was that participation in denominational education was still low around 1900, as shown by research at the provincial level. Differences in the level of participation before that date would be difficult to discover. The third, practical, reason was that data about the participation in denominational education before 1900 were available for only very few municipalities. The arguments to end the first part of the analysis in 1930 were two. On the one hand the verzuiling of the elementary education system was more or less completed by that year. On the other hand data for the subsequent period were scarce. Information about public education at the level of the municipality was lacking altogether after 1936, and data on the pattern of religious affiliation were not available for the period between 1930 and 1947.

Data about the verzuiling of the primary education system are not available at this level. It would only have been possible to do the analysis at the level of schooldistricts by joining the data for the municipalities which together made up a particular schooldistrict.
The beginning and end of the second period which will be examined were also determined by the availability of statistical data. Theoretically it would have been more interesting to have started the analysis at a much earlier moment, for instance in 1965 or 1970, since several empirical studies have pointed out the second half of the 1960s as the period in which ontzuiling gained momentum. As far as the education sector was concerned, however, ontzuiling seems to have started rather late.

I concluded the activity of data collection and data handling in the summer of 1986. The most recent data available at that time were those of 1984. The years between 1930 and 1977 will thus not be included in our study because of data problems. On the basis of research at the national level I assume that this is not a great omission. Between 1935 and 1975 the level of verzuiling of the elementary education system was fairly stable. As said before the diminishing attractiveness of denominational education seems to be very recent.

With regard to the last decade the analysis will not only focus on the increasing secularization and educational preferences but also on the relation between the demographic developments and the economic decline on the one hand and the verzuiling of the primary education system on the other hand. Given the profound demographic changes which became effective in the primary education system during the second half of the seventies the question has arisen to what extent the pluralist education system has been maintained under the pressure of a diminishing number of pupils in a period of a severe economic recession. Have the organizations which promote denominational education been able to defend the existence of a fragmented and costly, but pluralist education system? Or have they made concessions in the direction of a unitary education system or a less privileged position of denominational education, under pressure of the political forces that support a national public education system? And to what extent have the written and unwritten rules which hitherto determined the functioning of the segmented education system been adapted to the new situation of a shrinking market for education?

The empirical part of the study is reported in three chapters, the chapters 3, 4 and 5, which are preceded by a theoretical chapter, chapter 2. In the second chapter I discuss the direction in which the debate on verzuiling has gone, and define my own position. I start with the theories that take verzuiling as the independent variable and concentrate on the mode of decision making in culturally divided nations. Next the studies in which verzuiling is understood as a specific process of mobilization will be examined. The third section focuses on theories of verzuiling as an instrument of social control and the fourth group of authors puts emphasis on the local and regional contexts of verzuiling. In the last paragraph I will summarize my own views on verzuiling and ontzuiling and formulate operational definitions of these concepts with regard to my own research.
Chapter 3 to 5 are the empirical parts of the study. Chapter 3 opens with a short discussion of the most important juridical developments in the area of elementary education and the rules governing the opening and closing of primary schools during the entire period. The national trends of vierzuiling and ontzuiling in the education sector are discussed as an introduction to the analysis at the local level. In the fourth chapter I give a description and interpretation of the patterns of vierzuiling in the 1870-1930 period, based on newly collected data. The evolution of primary education in the most recent period is the subject of chapter 5. Apart from a description and interpretation of the pattern of ontzuiling, attention is paid to the effects of the declining number of births and the budgetary crisis on the existing rules for school planning. In the last chapter I present my conclusions with regard to the major findings of this sector study.

I conclude this chapter with a brief account of the sources from which the data were collected and the institutes visited to obtain further, qualitative, information.

The data concerning the process of vierzuiling in the education sector in the years between 1870 and 1930 are derived from three sources. The first source is the series ‘Annual Report of the Provincial Deputies to the Provincial Estates’ (Jaarverslag van Gedeputeerde Staten aan de Provinciale Staten) which was published from about 1816 until 1940. In particular for the period around the turn of the century these reports are very rich sources of information about many aspects of provincial administration. In a number of provinces the Annual Reports of the years between 1900 and 1920 contained exhaustive lists of all schools in their territory, ordered by municipality.26 With regard to information concerning 1930 and those provinces in which the information in the Annual Report had always been much more limited, I used as much as possible the Annual Reports of the municipalities as an additional source.27 Finally to obtain more information on the religious identity of schools I used the statistics presented in the Yearbooks of the national

26. It is not clear why this was done since the control by the Provincial administrations of the organization and management of primary education was extremely limited. The introduction of the Education Act of 1920, which clearly put the responsibility for all primary education in the hands of the local authorities, probably caused the sudden decrease of information in the provincial reports after 1920.

27. According to article 182 of the Municipality Act each municipality had to report on its activities once a year.
organizations of Catholic and Protestant education. The data published in these Yearbooks made it possible to distinguish better within the private sector between Catholic and Protestant education.

The education data for the recent period come from two existing data files, one of the Central Office of Statistics, the other of the Ministry of Education and Science. Other statistical data used (on religious affiliations, modernization) were made available by the Institute of Human Geography of the University of Amsterdam. Apart from these quantitative data I obtained much qualitative information from documents published by the Centraal Bureau voor Rooms Katholiek Onderwijs and de Vereniging Besturenraad Protestants Christelijk Onderwijs, and the Ministry of Education and Science.

28. The Nederlandschen Rooms Katholieke Schoolraad (Netherlands Catholic School Council) was founded by the episcopate in 1910. All Catholic schools were associated with this organization, which published a Yearbook from 1912 to 1921. After 1921 it was the Rooms Katholiek Centraal Bureau voor Onderwijs (Catholic Central Office for Education), created in 1920 to stimulate Catholic education, which published the Yearbook. The Protestant peak organization, the Schoolraad voor Scholen met den Bijbel, united four national organizations. These were the Vereeniging voor Christelijk National Schoolonderwijs, the Gereformeerde Schoolverband, the Unie School en Evangelie, and the Vereeniging voor Christelijk Volksonderwijs. The peak organization for the Protestant sector was founded somewhat earlier (1890) as that for Catholic education. Publication of its Yearbook started in 1891.
CHAPTER TWO THEORIES OF VERZUILING AND ONTZUILING AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR THE PRIMARY EDUCATION SYSTEM

2.1 The consociational model of rule making

The concept of consociational democracy is central to the work of Lijphart. On several occasions he has given this concept a very broad meaning, describing it as a situation of social and political segmentation in combination with concordant democracy. At other times he was more precise, stating that verzuiling was the independent variable causing the development of a consociational democracy. Lijphart did not pay much attention to the process of segmentation proper, except for his discussion on the importance of cross cutting memberships. Instead he focused on this specific type of democracy he called consociational democracy. His ideas will be discussed not because I am interested in types of democratic regimes and their respective qualities, but because his model of consociational democracy provides me with some tools for the analysis of decision making in the field of education. My hypothesis is that in the Netherlands, but also in a country like Belgium, policy making in education is one of the best examples of consociational government because the political positions taken in that conflict correspond to the basic ideological positions which determined the segmentation of society and because the education issue had so much influence on the historical evolution of this segmented society. Whereas it has appeared difficult to empirically prove the existence of consociational government as the dominant mode of government in the Netherlands, the model seems to have some validity when applied to decision making in education.


2. A.Lijphart, Democracy in plural societies, 1977, p.5. Another author laying a direct relation between a segmented social structure and concordant democracy was Lehmbrouch. Lehmbrouch developed his theory independently from, but in the same period, as Lijphart. G. Lehmbrouch, Proporzdemokratie. Politisches System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz und in Österreich, 1967.
How and when did consociational democracy develop in the Netherlands? The prelude to consociational democracy was roughly the period from 1850 to 1910, since this was the period in which a religiously plural society began to develop. A plural society was defined as a society in which religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic cleavages had given rise to the existence of various groups which were strongly isolated from each other. In the Netherlands the major cleavages were the religious and socio-economic cleavages. The religious cleavage developed rapidly because of the education issue. Orthodox Protestants opposed Catholics and together they fought the more secularized part of the population which was mainly oriented towards liberalism in politics. Towards the end of the nineteenth century a new social and political dividing line, cutting across the secular group, evolved. The rise of Socialist organizations added a fourth subcultural group to the three already present. In Lijphart's view of the plural society the Socialists and their organizational structure had the same status as the Catholics and Protestants, but, as we will see later, this idea was contested by scholars such as Stuurman and Scholten, who saw Dutch society primarily as a class society, in which religious conflict was used to mitigate the dominant socio-economic cleavage.

Around 1900 all four groups Lijphart distinguished participated in the political system. However, since neither of these four groups was near to obtaining the absolute majority in parliament, the political process was paralysed. Particularly on two issues opinions differed widely. These were the problem of state financing of denominational schools and the problem of integration of the working class into the political system through universal male suffrage. Pressed by the unstable internal situation caused by long-standing political conflicts, the liberal prime minister who came in office in 1913 set up two committees, charged with the tasks of finding solutions to the two problems. He urged the political parties to set aside their hostilities and to contribute to the pacification process. Thus it happened that the representatives of each of the seven political parties (the three Liberal political parties, the two political parties of the Orthodox Protestants, and the Catholics and the Socialists), sat together to accommodate the existing antagonisms.

Lijphart considered this an important event, because it set a new way of problem solving in Dutch plural society. First the solutions proposed were not merely supported by a majority, but by a unanimous parliament, which gave the solution a much wider backing. Second consensus was reached through a process of exchange of votes: the vote of the right, that is the Catholics and the Orthodox Protestants, in support of suffrage extension was exchanged against the vote of the left, the Liberals and the Socialists, in support of education subsidies. Third the

principle of proportionality was introduced in the Dutch political system. At the same time as it was decided to extend the suffrage to the entire male population the system in which each constituency elected one or more candidates was substituted by a system of proportional representation. The most important consequence of this change was that it stabilised the relations between the four main political currents in the sense that it relegated each of them to the position of a minority party. Being minority parties they were forced to cooperate, if they did not want to completely paralyse decision making. The position of minority parties also implied, however, that they had to seek ways other than striving to obtain a majority to secure their interests. The adoption of the principle of proportionality as a device to allocate public money appeared to be an effective way to protect the rights and to recognise the autonomy of subcultural minority groups. This principle was applied for the first time in the primary education system, where the existence of state financed private schools was accepted. The size of the state subsidies was decided to be proportional to the number of pupils. In Lijphart's opinion the pacification of 1917 formed the beginning of accommodationist politics, which lasted roughly until 1967. During this 50 year period the Dutch political system was stable because the political elites kept to the rules of the consociational political game, such as pragmatism, a business-like approach to politics, the importance of summit meetings, proportionality, depolitization of issues, secret negotiations, and the domination of government over parliament. Another factor enabling the success of the politics of accommodation was the lack of interest in political matters on the side of the public, which Lijphart, after Daalder, saw as a historical characteristic of the Dutch. After 1917 negotiations between the political elite slowly became institutionalized in many councils and committees, recognised by the government or sometimes explicitly created by law for the purpose of consultation. The most important overarching bodies instituted in the economic sector were the Hoge Raad van de Arbeid (High Council of Labour), the Stichting van de Arbeid (Foundation of Labour) and the Sociaal-

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4. All schools would be entitled to an equal sum of money by pupil, hence the total sum reversed to a school would be proportional to its size. The close relation between the principle of proportional representation and subcultural autonomy was also noted by Daalder. H. Daalder, Extreme Proportional Representation - The Dutch experience, in: S.E, Finer (ed.) Adversary politics and electoral reform, pp.235-236.

5. Daalder pointed out the passivity of the Dutch population with regard to politics in his inaugural speech entitled 'Leiding en lijdelijkheid in de Nederlandse politiek', in: H. Daalder, Politisering en lijdelijkheid in de Nederlandse politiek, 1974.
Economische Raad (Social and Economic Council). Similar bodies existed in other sectors. In the education sector the Education Council was established in 1919.

Lijphart subsequently elaborated this theory in a study published in 1977. He attributed not only a theoretical value to the consociational model, as a refinement of the theory of pluralism, but also a normative value, presenting it as a valuable type of government for divided societies such as South Africa and Northern Ireland. In the empirical part of the study he used it to explain the political stability in the smaller European democracies, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland.

In his review Van Schendelen concluded that the theory of consociational democracy needed to be reconsidered, because many elements had been contested. He did not completely reject Lijphart's view but asked for a less rigorous application of one theoretical standpoint and, instead, the use of different theories (marxism, neo-corporatism, the theory of elite control) to understand Dutch politics in the twentieth century. Such an approach would make it possible to use the consociational model for understanding decision making in one sector, for example the education sector, without having to apply it as the dominant model of problem solving in Dutch politics in general. It has already been mentioned that consociational arrangements played an essential part in resolving the conflicts concerning the desirable relation between private and public education in the Netherlands.

6. In 1919 the Hoge Raad van de Arbeid (High Council of Labour) was founded, which was transformed into the Stichting van de Arbeid (Foundation of Labour) in 1945. In 1950 the Sociaal-Economische Raad (Social and Economic Council) was set up. Both the Stichting van de Arbeid and the Sociaal-Economische Raad consist of representatives of the employers' organizations, of the unions and of independent members nominated by the government.


The pacification of the Dutch school conflict in 1917 has been of the utmost importance in the subsequent development of the education system. A remarkable aspect of the agreement was that the equality of private and public education was anchored in the Constitution. The confessional parties made this demand because of the simultaneous introduction of the principles of universal suffrage and proportional representation, which reduced them to minority parties that even when forming an alliance could no longer be sure of easily obtaining and maintaining a majority. The confessional parties were particularly aware of this danger since they had lost the majority in the elections of 1913. Being anchored in the Constitution, state financing of private schools could not be undone by a simple majority. A Constitutional reform would at least need a two-thirds majority.

The agreement of 1917 soon got the status of being the most efficient mode of settling disputes among the confessional and the secular parties. The relation between private and public education at other than the elementary level of the education system was established along similar lines. The principle of proportionality as applied to subsidizing private elementary schools became the main device for the allocation of government money in the entire education system and in other sectors of the social system as well. The solution of conflicts along this cleavage line became to a high degree standardized.

The principles agreed on in 1917 were elaborated in subsequent education legislation. The original arrangement was never substantially altered during this period. The Minister of Education was supported by the Onderwijsraad (Education Council), a body of independent advisors, nominated by the government and carefully selected from the three education sectors, whose special task it was to see that new legislation was in accordance with the agreement of 1917. Rigid application of the principle of equality after 1917 avoided the emergence of new conflicts between supporters and opponents of private education. It also gave rise, however, to the criticism that education legislation was too much concerned with juridical hair-splitting and too little with improving the education system.

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9. The number of seats in the Lower House of parliament held by the three confessional parties declined from 60 in the 1909 elections to 46 out of 100 in the 1913 elections. H. Daalder, 1981, p.206.

10. The Onderwijsraad was established in 1919. Because of the development of various structures for advice and concertation between government and education interest groups, of which the CCOO presently is the most important, both the task and the composition of the Onderwijsraad have been brought up for discussion. J.M.G. Leune, Besluitvorming in het onderwijsbestel, in: J.A. van Kemenade, Onderwijs: Bestel en Beleid, 1981, pp.330-500.
Only during the 1960s the democratization and modernization of the education system started. The demand for new curricula and new educational methods was accompanied by the wish to restructure the entire school system. The need of the confessional forces to influence the decision making process, in order to guard the rights of private education, increased. It was felt that representation of the confessional interests in parliament did no longer suffice, since legislative power was slowly shifting to government and bureaucracy. In order to secure interest representation it became necessary to penetrate the administrative process. Hence a rapid growth of the number of interest organizations, which managed to obtain a considerable influence on decision making in education, occurred. Research pointed out that nowadays the leaders of the educational interest groups much more frequently communicate with the civil servants of the Ministry of Education than with parliament.\(^{11}\) Among the interest organizations the national peak organizations, bringing together all the relevant education interest organizations, are the most important. At the beginning of the 1970s concertation of the four peak organizations, representing the Catholic, the Protestant, the public and the neutral private education sectors, was institutionalized in a body which showed all the characteristics of a grand council. The Centraal Comitee voor Overleg over Onderwijs (Central Committee for Consultation on Education, CCOO), established in 1972, is a permanent advisory committee, consisting of representatives of the peak organizations and departmental staff. This composition makes the widest support possible. Through the CCOO the interest organizations have a substantial say in decisions concerning developments in the education sector. Every proposal formulated by the Minister and his staff is discussed in this committee, before it is presented in parliament. Once consensus is arrived at in the CCOO it becomes difficult for the political parties not to agree. The CCOO has been criticised, particularly by the non-confessional parties, for being a closed body, that is, it would be very hard for a new organization to become a member. The existing peak organizations would exert a real oligopoly.\(^{12}\) This problem has been recognised by Scholten who argued that the most important question was not whether representation was  

\(^{11}\) J.M.G. Leune, Onderwijsbeleid onder druk, 1976, pp.290-291.

\(^{12}\) Van Schoten and Wansink listed the requirements potential new member organizations have to fulfil: new member organisation of the CCOO have to have a ‘reasonable size’, to represent a part of the educational field which is not represented by the peak organizations, and to represent at least two different interest groups, e.g. parents and staff. Moreover the Minister of Education has to consult the peak organizations that are already represented on the issue. F. van Schoten and N. Wansink, De nieuwe schoolstrijd, 1984, p.12.
proportional or not, but to whom proportionality was granted in a system of functional representation.\textsuperscript{13}

Summarizing we can say that private education has a very strong juridical position in the Netherlands and that the consociational model of conflict resolution has shown to be relatively successful to appease conflicts which divide the nation along the traditional, religious cleavage such as education conflicts. On the basis of critical literature it seems justified, however, to doubt the validity of the model in the socio-economic sector.\textsuperscript{14} Whether consociational arrangements in the education sector will survive the new situation of declining natality, growing secularization and a shrinking government budget will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

\textsuperscript{13} I. Scholten, op. cit., p.333.

2.2 Verzuiling as a process of mobilization

Although Lijphart devoted several chapters of 'The Politics of Accommodation' to the segmented social structure in the Netherlands, his main interest lay in the problem of political stability in a segmented society. In this section, however, the formation of the segmented social structure, that is the process of verzuiling, will be the focus of our attention. We review the work of several authors who looked for an explanation of the historical development of segmental cleavages. Both scholars who studied historical processes in the Netherlands and scholars who took a theoretical approach to the problem will be discussed. Before questions about the cause and the background of verzuiling could be formulated, however, segmented pluralism had to be identified as a particular social phenomenon, and the concept of verzuiling had to be given its place in academic thought. It was the sociologist Kruyt who made the greatest contribution to the initial conceptualization. Before he published his first essay on verzuiling the word was already known, however. It had been introduced just before the Second World War as a metaphor referring to the vertically segmented structure of Dutch society (verzuiling literally means 'pillarization': the formation of pillars). The segments (in Dutch: zuilen) formed the structure supporting the overarching whole of the nation. In the middle of the 1950s verzuiling became the focus of an intense debate among intellectuals. The contradiction of this period was that a phenomenon which was at the height of its development, but which only started to be discussed, at the same time began to show marks of decay. The first change of the socio-political system had occurred at the end of the Second World War, when the former Socialist party had been transformed into the Social Democratic Party, explicitly open to all, thus also to Catholics and Protestants. This move corresponded with the wish of many intellectuals of the Dutch Reformed Church to break the existing, oppressive social structure. Criticism of the existing situation was not limited, however, to latitudinarian members of the Dutch Reformed Church, many Catholic intellectuals held similar views. Against this attempt to abandon the traditional

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15. Kruyt perceived this as the first occasion on which the idea of the opposition between confessional and secular forces, the anti-thesis as put forward by Abraham Kuyper at the end of the last century, was replaced by a new concept, that of 'the breakthrough'. J.P. Kruyt and W. Goddijn, Verzuiling en Ontzuiling, in: A.J.N. den Hollander (ed), Drift en Koers, 1968, p.234.

16. This movement among intellectuals was referred to as the 'breakthrough movement'. At that time critical reflection on verzuiling was found mostly among intellectuals who, inspired by the co-operation between the various subcultural groups during the war, rejected the rigidly divided social structure which was
structures the Catholic Church used the powerful instrument of religious sanctions: members of the Catholic Church who joined a Catholic union risked excommunication.17

All these events evoked a debate between supporters of verzuiling, who emphasized the integrative force of the segmental structure, and those who argued in favour of breaking down verzuiling. The latter group emphasized the desintegrating influence of verzuiling on society and its oppressive influence on individuals. Kruyt, who himself was part of the 'breakthrough' movement, meanwhile stressed the importance of verzuiling as a subject of sociological research. He argued that to arrive at a proper judgement of verzuiling, the phenomenon first had to be objectively examined, which was the task of sociologists. Accordingly each of his early writings showed this concern with objective description and measurement. In a subsequent article he opted for a functionalist interpretation of the subject.18

Kruyt started his work by an attempt at defining the concept of zuil. The metaphor 'zuil' (plural: 'zuilen') refers to a particular segment of the population.

'Zuilen are ideologically based, juridically equal, blocks of social organizations with their related life-styles, within a wider ideologically heterogeneous, but with respect to race and ethnicity homogeneous, democratic society.'19

Three elements of this definition stood out:
- although he used the word ideology the subsequent discussion made clear that the meaning of this word was limited to religious ideologies;
- zuilen only existed in plural democratic societies, in which all population segments enjoyed equal rights.
- a zuil had two aspects: on the one hand it was a block of organizations, on the other hand it represented a particular way of life.

immediately reconstituted after the war. The concept of ontzuiling, as opposed to verzuiling, was used only much later, when large parts of the population became disloyal to denominational organizations.

17. This was written in the pastoral letter issued by the Dutch bishops in 1954. It is remarkable, and indicative of latitudinarian tendencies in this church that the Dutch Reformed Church held a much more liberal standpoint. In a synodal meeting in 1955 it was accepted that members of the church could not be obliged to join Protestant organizations only. J.P. Kruyt, Levensbeschouwing en groepssolidariteit in Nederland, in: Sociologisch Jaarboek, 1957, pp.39-40.


Kruyt’s definition appeared to be so complete that it has influenced academic writing about verzulzing until today.20 Once he had defined the concept Kruyt used it for the empirical study of verzulzing. His aim was to arrive at a precise description of the extent and intensity of verzulzing. Because the organizational structure of verzulzing was better visible, and thus easier measurable, than the effects at the level of the individual’s psychology he concentrated on the first aspect. He developed four indicators to measure organizational verzulzing: the ‘index of organizational verzulzing’, the ‘index of internal integration’, the ‘density index’ and the ‘segmental quorum’.21 With the help of these four indices it was possible to compare e.g. the degree of verzulzing between several sectors and within one sector across time. Kruyt’s own empirical work was an important contribution to the mapping of verzulzing in the 1950s’ when segmental organization was most intense. To give an impression of the extent of verzulzing in these years two of Kruyt’s tables are presented in a condensed way.22

Table 2.1 Percentage of confessional organizations, by sector, 1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>social work</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youth organizations</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sports</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>health care</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural organizations</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. Even Stuurman’s recent definition of verzulzing corresponded with that of Kruyt at two crucial points, the attention given to non-organizational aspects of verzulzing and the exclusive focus on religious ideologies. S. Stuurman, Verzuiling, Kapitalisme en Patriarchaat, 1983, p.71.

21. The first indicator gives the number of denominational organizations as a percentage of all organizations in a particular sector, hence this is an indicator at the level of organisations. The second index measures to what extent relations exist between organizations of the same denomination, thus it measures the internal cohesion of the organizational complex. The third index gives the percentage of people belonging to a certain denomination, which joins an organization based on the same denomination, in a particular social sector. This index measures the participation of individuals. Likewise the segmental quorum is an indicator of the level of participation: it is the proportion of all organized people in a certain social sector that is member of a denominational organization.

labour unions 20.0 17.7 62.3 100

Table 2.1 shows that verzuiling at the level of organizations was particularly influenced by the large number of organizations among Protestants. Moreover it appears that the organizational verzuiling was highest in the sectors which have a socializing function, education, social work and youth organizations.

Table 2.2 Index of density for various sectors in the middle of the 1950s

| Choice of a confessional organization/institution | Catholic | Orthodox | Dutch
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Choice of elementary school (1957)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>±50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Membership of farmers’ organization (1953)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>±37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Membership of employers’ organization (1953)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>±30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Vote in Lower House election (1959)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Daily newspaper (1955)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Active membership of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- only confessional, or</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- confessional and non-confessional organizations</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In table 2.2 is shown that among the Catholics as well as among the members of the Orthodox Reformed church loyalty to organizations and institutions of the own denomination was high during the 1950s. Members of the Dutch Reformed Church tended to join denominational organizations to a far lesser extent, the reason for this being that the Dutch Reformed Church was divided into an orthodox and a latitudinarian wing. Although Kruyt’s methods for measuring verzuiling have found some response abroad, they have not resulted in systematic international, comparative research. The only attempt at comparative empirical research has been undertaken by Lorwin. He found that Belgium and the Netherlands were much stronger segmented than Austria and Switzerland.23 Van Haegendoren and Vandenhove, and Dobbelaeere did empirical research on verzuiling in Belgium.24 Recently


Righart published a comparative study on the formation of the Catholic zuil in four European countries. This study, however, contains more qualitative than quantitative material.\(^{25}\)

The merit of Kruyt's work is in his description of verzuiling. He did not address the question why Dutch society had developed in this direction. At several places his work gives the impression that he simply considered a segmented social structure to be a logical corollary of denominational pluralism. Other authors, however, have taken up this question and they have answered it in very different ways. Their views will be discussed in the remainder of this section.

One group of authors has explained the development of a segmented society with the help of the concept of emancipation. Their hypothesis was that 'verzuiling developed because the groups concerned strived for emancipation from their minority position, not through a process of assimilation, but through an evolution in the direction of a pluralistic minority.'\(^{26}\)

The concept of minority had to be taken in its sociological meaning as a relational concept, i.e. the social, economic and cultural position of a minority group in relation to the social, economic and cultural position of the dominant group.\(^{27}\) The

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\(^{26}\) W. Goddijn, Catholic minorities and social integration, in: Social Compass, 1960, p.167. The definition of pluralistic minorities is that they have equal rights and try to overcome their minority position by using these rights democratically. They try to preserve their identity as much as possible.

\(^{27}\) Goddijn was the first to explain verzuiling among the Catholics in terms of emancipation of a social and economic minority. Thurlings, however, questioned the backward social and economic position as the most important reason for segmental organization. He put more emphasis on the oppression of the Catholic religion until the 19th century. The issue of social versus religious emancipation also played a part in the discussion regarding the segmental organization of the orthodox Protestants. Hendriks focused on the position of the orthodox Protestants in the Dutch Reformed Church, but he assumed at the same time that the orthodox Protestants belonged to the socially and economically marginal groups in society. Brunt and Verrips contested the latter idea. W. Goddijn, Katholieke minderheid en Protestantse dominant, 1957; J. Thurlings, De wankele zuil, 1971; J. Hendriks, De emancipatie der Gereformeerden. Sociologische bijdragen tot de verklaring van enige kenmerken van het huidige
emancipation hypothesis enjoyed considerable popularity at the
beginning of the debate, when the subject mainly aroused interest
among scholars who took a defensive stand and were inclined to
present the story of the group to which they belonged as a story
of successful emancipation. As the debate developed, however, the
hypothesis was increasingly criticised, because it was
undifferentiated and appeared to have little empirical value.
According to the critics of the concept of emancipation this
concept was not important because of its explanatory value but
because of its value to point out the role of ideology in the
mobilization and organization of subcultural groups.28 The
emphasis put on the minority position of Catholics, Orthodox
Protestants etc., and the call for emancipation from this
backward position by their leaders, contributed to the
development of a polarised and combative attitude among the
members of these groups. 'If perceived this way, the concept of
emancipation does not solve the problem of verzuiing, but is
part of it,' Stuurman concluded.29

Verwey-Jonker described Dutch history of the second part of
the nineteenth century as the history of four emancipation
movements, the movements of the Catholics, the orthodox
Protestants, the Socialists and the women's movement.30 Each of
these movements aimed at a maximal proportion of the expanding
electorate and the instrument to attain this aim was political
organization. With this approach Verwey-Jonker comes very near to
those of Steiniger and Rokkan, whose central concept was that of
political mobilization. Steiniger developed a specific theory to
explain verzuiing in the Netherlands and Austria, whereas Rokkan
aimed at a general theory of political mobilization. The meaning
of the concept of political mobilization as used by Steiniger and
Rokkan is that of an accelerated process of interest articulation

Gereformeerde Volksdeel, 1971; L. Brunt, op. cit.; J. Verrips,
28. R. Steiniger, 1975, op.cit.; S. Stuurman, Verzuiling,
op. cit. p.75.
Kapitalisme en Patriarchaat, 1983; L. Brunt, The Kleine Luyden
as a disturbing factor in the emancipation of the Orthodox
as a disturbing factor in the emancipation of the Orthodox
Calvinists in the Netherlands, in: Sociologica Neerlandica, 1972,
p.89.

29. S. Stuurman, op. cit.
den Hollander (red.) Drift en Koers. Een halve eeuw sociale
verandering in Nederland, pp.105-127.
among the masses in order to influence the sphere in which the State is active.31

According to Steiniger verzuiling was a political process. He described verzuiling in the Netherlands and Austria as '... a process of political mobilization and simultaneous, ideologically motivated, complete concentration of social relations on the members of the own category'.32 Steiniger argued against a theory of verzuiling built around the notion of a process of socio-economic or religious emancipation. The ideological notion of emancipation only served to mobilise the various population groups, he said. His major criticism was that in the emancipation studies the question of who were the agents of the verzuiling process had been neglected. He considered the theory of Thurlings, that the confessional organization of the entire social life had been undertaken by the churches in opposition to rationalist tendencies, unlikely, given the fact that opposition to the penetration of liberal ideas had existed since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Steiniger's theory of verzuiling as a political mobilization process was supported by the fact that verzuiling began to develop during the period that the formation of the political parties also occurred. Political leaders took advantage of existing social oppositions to mobilize particular parts of the population. The political parties that were established were based on the ideologies which had created these oppositions. In the Netherlands the major oppositions existing at the time that the political parties originated were religious and socio-economic. Consequently the party system that evolved reflected these cleavages. The political leaders exploited existing social cleavages to be certain of a potential electoral market in which to operate. Obviously this also had the negative effect of limiting the potential following, since it could never be larger than the population segment concerned. Steiniger 'solved' this difficulty by arguing that the leaders of the main parties for a long time hoped for the segment they addressed to grow so as to include the majority of the population in the long run.33

31. This meaning corresponds to the narrow definition of political mobilization as formulated by Van Doorn. It includes the mobilization of religious and political groups which make specific demands on the State. Van Doorn prefers, however, a more abstract definition of political mobilization as any accelerated process of interest articulation and power legitimation resulting in social change. J.A.A. van Doorn, Politieke mobilisering: een korte introductie, in: Sociologische Gids, 1971, pp.114-124.


33. Part of the Protestants groups hoped to rechristianize the nation through their influence on the state; the Socialist assumed that with the growth of the industrialization soon over
order to maintain their power the political leaders needed to create a stable electorate, which would be loyal to the political party in spite of political events. Two factors contributed to party loyalty. Firstly the fact that denominational parties were parties of affection, that is they attracted voters on the basis of their ideologies, not on the basis of their political programmes, was important. Since ideological preferences tend to change much slower than concrete political demands the electorate of parties of affection showed a high degree of stability. Secondly verzuiling played a part. The division of society into internally strongly integrated and externally strongly isolated blocks, appeared to be an effective method to make voters refrain from switching from one political party to another. Verzuiling created such a large social distance between segmental groups, that it became virtually impossible to be a member of more than one group, or to change membership over time.

In Steiniger's view the religious factor was only important in so far as it was part of the ideology through which the party leaders addressed the electorate, and in so far as the churches supported the growth of verzuiling. He even explicitly excluded the possibility that both institutional agencies, political parties and churches had an interest in the verzuiling. Because of that point of view his explanation was rather teleological: verzuiling was the intended outcome of the strategy of one particular group, the elites of the political parties. There was no room for unintended consequences resulting from the mutually counteracting or reinforcing strategies of the various social groups. Steiniger avoided, however, the reductionist position that verzuiling was a process of political mobilization in the name of religion, thus completely subordinating religion to politics. Instead, he argued that it was political mobilization with the help of religion.

Although there are similarities in the works of Steiniger and Rokkan the differences are clear. Whereas Steiniger was concerned with the interpretation of concrete historical processes of verzuiling in two countries Rokkan's aim was to formulate a general theory of mass mobilization during the evolution towards full suffrage party systems. Originally Rokkan was mainly concerned with explaining the emergence of political parties: '...the timing of the growth and the stabilisation of organizations for the mobilization of mass support through these new channels, the formation and the 'freezing' of organized party

half of the population would belong to the working class; the Catholics hoped to obtain the majority as a result of their population strategy. R. Steiniger, Pillarization (verzuiling) and political parties, in: Sociologische Gids, 1977, pp.248-249.
alternatives within each national political system.' In his later work the focus shifted to the relation between organization building in the electoral channel, that is the formation of political parties, and in the corporate channel, that is the formation of other types of mass organization. Instances of large overlaps and tight intertwining were called verzuzing.

Before Steiniger Rokkan had observed that the formation of political parties in Western Europe was based on the ideological cleavages existing at that time. Rokkan, however, did not only attach importance to the electoral strategies of the political elites. In his view most efforts at organization started at 'the bottom', in local communities, but were used by electoral entrepreneurs as the expansion of the electorate continued. In the structuring of the party system cleavages were sorted out as possible identity bases for mass mobilisation. Two variables preconditioned this selection process because they preceded the formation of political parties: the centrality/peripherality of the territory and the outcome of the Reformation. Other potential cleavages were related to processes such as industrialization, urbanization and modernization, which occurred at the same time as the process of mass mobilization. Among the old and the new oppositions a hierarchy of cleavages developed, determining which cleavage became expressed in the emerging party system and which did not. Rokkan clearly left the possibility open that organization formation occurred along religious as well as socio-economic cleavage lines. The hierarchical structuring of cleavages was often consciously manipulated by political leaders, who tried to put a particular issue, around which it was possible to mobilize part of the population, on the agenda.

It is not difficult to see how Rokkan's model fits the Dutch case. In the Netherlands the party system was the outcome of the mobilization of two cleavage lines, the religious one and the socio-economic one. The religious cleavage was traditional: opposition between orthodox and latitudinarian strands had been present in the Dutch Reformed Church since the 17th century. Moreover, from the Reformation onwards strong antagonism had existed between Protestants and Catholics. The economic cleavage, on the contrary, was a new cleavage, developing with the expansion of the industrialisation process. Remarkable was the

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36. Particularly Daalder has contributed to the analysis of cleavage structures in the Netherlands. Two important articles are: H. Daalder, The Netherlands: Opposition in a segmented
role of the education issue in the mobilization of the orthodox
Protestants. It was the focus of initial mobilization and the
main reason to form a political party. Rokkan pointed out that
the Netherlands was no exception in this respect, as private
education was the most important issue around which religiously
oriented movements revived everywhere in Western Europe.37 There
are indeed striking similarities in the development of the
religious cleavage between the Netherlands and Belgium. In the
latter country too the school issue aroused a severe conflict
between Catholics and anti-clerical forces and it contributed to
a large extent to the mobilization and organization of the two
major parties. In Belgium the religious cleavage was the only one
to become fully institutionalised, Urwin wrote.38

Rokkan's main contribution to the discussion on verzuiling,
however, concerned his notes on the linkages between mass
mobilization through political parties and mass mobilization
through interest organizations. Analogous to the structure of
Dutch society he proposed to use the concept of verzuiling as a
general concept which described a situation of a high degree of
interlocking between cleavage-specific organizations active in
the corporate channel and party organizations mobilizing for
electoral action.39 Mobilization in the corporate channel, for
instance the formation of religious movements, was attributed a
significant role in the incorporation of the masses into
politics. The precise relation between organizational efforts in
the two channels during the period in which the party system
developed was the subject of a new research programme. In each
phase, Rokkan wrote, one should look for developments in both
channels, in order to examine how organizations in the corporate
channel were exploited by those in the electoral channel and vice
versa, and to compare the policy outcomes of the activities of
both types of organizations.

Although Rokkan based his generalized concept of verzuiling
on the concept developed to analyse the social structure which
existed in the Netherlands from the end of the last century until
the 1960s, his concept differs somewhat from that used by the
Dutch authors. In Rokkan's definition the concept refers to
linkages between two types of politically relevant, state-
oriented organizations. Just as the organizations in the
electoral channel, the organizations in the corporate channel


38. D.W. Urwin, Social cleavages and political parties in

39. S. Rokkan, Towards a generalized concept of verzuiling:
serve to aggregate political demands. Both types of organizations differ in the way they put their claims on the state, but their functions are similar. An important characteristic of verzuiling in the Netherlands was, however, that many organizations, especially those created before the Second World War, did not perform any political function. They served to strengthen the internal cohesion of the zuil, by keeping its members in any of their daily activities away from the ideologies of other groups, and by transmitting the values and attitudes of the own group. Examples of this type of organizations were denominational youth and leisure organizations set up by the churches. Verzuiling involved someone's entire life, his activities, his social contacts and his ideology. The influence of verzuiling on society went far beyond the organization of the interests of a particular group. In a similar way the generalized concept of verzuiling differs somewhat from the concepts used by scholars who compared the Dutch socio-political system with that of other small Western European countries, such as the concepts of segmental cleavages, vertical cleavages and segmental pluralism. Each of these includes more than just political organizations. Despite this slight difference between the particular and the general concept of verzuiling Rokkan's attempt at generalization is a valuable contribution to the study of the emergence of mass politics.

Notwithstanding the existence of variations in the interpretation of verzuiling of the authors hitherto discussed their views can be summarized by saying that each of them perceived verzuiling in the Netherlands as a process of mobilization and organization on the basis of different values. Verzuiling, in the most general sense of the word, was the organization of subcultural groups around specific values and interests in a number of spheres of life.

So far we have not asked the question how long this mobilization continued, and, if it ended, when, why and how it ended. Was ontzuiling, which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, the reverse of the process of verzuiling, or was it something different? Very few authors discussed here have written on the other end of the continuum, the process of ontzuiling, or demobilization of the ideological dividing lines. The reasons for this vary. Most of the authors supporting the emancipation hypothesis, for instance, lived in a period when ontzuiling had not yet started, although small changes already announced the decline of the traditional social structure. Thurlings, writing about the decline of the Catholic zuil in 1978, is an exception to this. He devoted some chapters of his study to the breakdown of verzuiling among the Catholics. Steiniger, Rokkan and Daalder limited their discussion of mobilization and verzuiling almost

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40. This observation was also made by Passchier and Van der Wusten. N.P. Passchier and H.H. van der Wusten, Het begrip 'Verzuiling' en vergelijkend onderzoek, paper presented at a conference of political scientists, Helvoirt, 1984, p.5.
completely to the period of emerging party systems. Because of this specific historical concern they paid little or no attention to the phase of onttzuiling.41

Steiniger pursued his interests a little further and remained with his explanation of the start of the onttzuiling entirely within the logic of his own theory. Onntzuiling became desirable, he argued, when the party leaders realised that their majority strategies would never succeed and the segmented social structure thus became an obstacle to further expansion. This awareness made the Socialists create a new, de-ideologized party in 1946 and aspire to participate in coalition governments. But the confessional parties maintained their ideological principles until the mid-1970s, the reason for this being that they together managed to keep a majority until 1965. The rapid loss of support in subsequent elections forced them to give up the strategy of onntzuiling and to create a new party based on a political programme instead of an ideology.42 Steiniger’s analysis of onntzuiling was not only little developed, but also rather narrow, because of his exclusive focus on the party system. If he had included sectors other than politics he would have discovered that onntzuiling occurred at the same time at other places in society, and that other than political consideration played a role in this process. Moreover he would have been more sensitive to differences between developments among the Catholics and among various strands of Protestants.

Thurlings, whose analysis only concerned onntzuiling among the Catholic part of the population, focused on the changes that had occurred within the Catholic Church. He observed a movement towards lesser orthodoxy and onntzuiling from the centre, the Catholic hierarchy, to the edge, the ordinary church members, of the Catholic world. Therefore he called his hypothesis the internal crisis hypothesis.43 In this hypothesis the changes

41. The processes of secularization and onntzuiling have been the focus of a number of recent publications, which will be further discussed in chapter 5: C.P. Middendorp, Onntzuiling, politisering en restauratie in Nederland, 1979; J.J.A. Themassen i.a. (eds.), De verstande revolutie, 1983; L. Laeyendecker & O. Schreuder (eds.), Religie en Politiek. Verkenningen op een spanningsveld, 1985.

42. It took some 10 years to transform the former three denominational parties into a Christian Democratic catch-all party in the middle of the political spectrum.

43. In his original study on onntzuiling among the Catholic part of the population Thurlings devoted only a short chapter to the decline of the Catholic zuil. J.M.G. Thurlings, 1971, op. cit. He elaborated his views in an additional chapter in the second edition, published in 1978, and in an article of the Sociologische Gids in 1979. J.M.G. Thurlings, De onntzuiling in
taking place in the thinking of the leaders of the Catholic Church at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties were central. The transformation of the church as described by Thurlings started among the clergy, but rapidly found its way to lay Catholic organizations, causing a process of de-mobilisation of the Catholic population. As a result of declining orthodoxy many organizations lost a large part of their members and this forced them to dissolve or to merge with other organizations. Simons noticed that the Catholic zuil, created as an efficient instrument for the transfer of norms, values and attitudes, itself contributed to the diffusion of new ideas and the acceleration of its own liquidation. He called this 'the reversed working of the zuil', i.e. the reversed working of the same socio-cultural mechanism in a different cultural-historical context. Growing deconfessionalisation, doubts about the meaning of Catholic organizations and increased opposition to authoritarian relations, those factors all contributed to the falling apart of the Catholic zuil. The crucial issue of Thurlings' explanation was of course the question why this sudden change in the thinking of the clergy had occurred, and why it had occurred at that particular moment. How was it possible that the Dutch Catholic Church, which hitherto had been one of the most loyal national churches, suddenly turned into one of the most rebellious ones?

Thurlings' answers to these questions, based on the emancipation hypothesis, were not completely convincing. By the beginning of the 1950s, he argued, the Catholics could no be


44. The profound influence of the Second Vatican Council on the Dutch Catholic Church has been documented by Goddijn. W. Goddijn, De beheerste kerk, 1972.


longer considered as a religious minority in the sociological sense. The process of emancipation, began in the last century, was completed. Their new position enabled the Catholics to be more open towards other groups, and to start a critical evaluation of their own principles, since the Catholic belief was no longer threatened. The debate which subsequently developed within the Catholic church was so radical that it resulted in a deep crisis of the Catholic community and finally the breakdown of the Catholic organizations.

Van Heek criticised the internal crisis hypothesis because it did not pay attention to the context of the deconsecionalization process. In his view it was the friction between the rigid attitude of the top of the Catholic Church on the one hand, as expressed in the pastoral letter of 1954 and in the conservative stand with regard to birth control, and the development of a 'permissive society' around the Catholic Church on the other hand, which made conflicts inevitable. The disorganization of the Catholic Church and the erosion of the Catholic organizations were the outcome of two opposite movements: the church trying to consolidate its hold on the Catholic population by enforcing its rules and the world outside the church developing in the direction of the abolition of authoritarian rule and a more liberal morality. In the conflict between the conservative church and the liberal forces in society the latter were victorious.

The explanation of ontzuing among the Catholic part of the population put forward by Van Heek and Thurlings are largely complementary. Social processes such as the rationalization and expansion of welfare institutions, the greater geographical mobility which increased contacts between people from different regions, the diffusion of means of mass communication which made people aware of the values, opinions and behaviour of other groups, urbanization, changes in the production process, all played a role in the decline of the structure of verzuiling, since they forced people to move in an ever widening social environment, in which traditional group values appeared to be of little relevance and therefore lost their absolute meaning. At the same time it is clear that the modernist theology which diffused among the Catholic elite influenced the attitudes of rank and file Catholics.

The conclusion of this review of ontzuing theories is that ontzuing was not exactly the reverse of the process of verzuiling, as I stated in 1.1 for the sake of simplicity. One difference between the processes of verzuiling and ontzuing is particularly important. This is that, although both processes contain cultural and structural elements, central to the process of ontzuing were the events in the sphere of culture, whereas in the process of verzuiling emphasis was on the structural component. I have tried to picture this difference in figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 The movement of processes of verzuiling and ontzuiling

- high

ontzuiling

- low

level of structural segmentation

low level of cultural division high

verzuiling
The process of verzuiling occurred in a society which was already characterized by a highly divided culture. The cultural divisions became frozen through the formation of tight networks of subcultural organizations. The cultural divisions thus became the structuring principle in society. The process of ontzuiling, on the contrary, was marked by cultural changes in the form of a diminishing social distance between various subcultural groups. Society became more homogeneous as far as the 'old' divisions were concerned. Initially this did not result, however, in a decline of organized segmentation: the mentality of ontzuiling preceded change at the structural level. Only after a certain time the decline of the structural segmentation started. The latter process was very uneven, being radical in one sector and moderate in others, like the education sector. In chapter 5 we will see that education belonged to those sectors in which the structure of verzuiling continued to exist, despite profound changes at the cultural level.
2.3 Verzuiling as a means of social control

Since Lijphart's study on verzuiling and pacification in the Netherlands was published there has been a debate among marxist scholars about the importance of the class struggle for the rise of verzuiling. Like Lijphart nearly every other author had noticed that one of the effects of verzuiling had been to mitigate the socio-economic dividing lines. The denominational segmental organizations united people irrespective of their social position. Lijphart's definition of verzuiling was formalistic in that he considered every group of people with a common ideology, religious or other, part of that structure. A similar position was taken by Rokkan when he defined his generalized concept of verzuiling. Kruyt, on the contrary, restricted the term verzuiling explicitly to blocks of organizations based on a religious ideology. The formation of economic interest groups was a fundamentally different process in his opinion. The first to criticise Lijphart for not distinguishing between zuilen, defined as organizations based on a religious ideology, and classes was Fennema. He argued that because Lijphart did not analyse the class relations of Dutch society, the controlling function of verzuiling remained unclear. Before Fennema only Van Doorn had emphasised that verzuiling was a means of social control, used by the elite to subordinate the masses. Van Doorn did not specifically refer to class relations, however. In the 1970s however Marxist scholars further explored the integrating function of the zuilen in an attempt to arrive at a new interpretation of the modern political history of the Netherlands. Central to their research was the question of the relation between the process of class formation and the process of verzuiling. In this context we will not deal with each of the authors of this group, but concentrate on the main contribution to this 'school', Stuurman's 'Verzuiling, Kapitalisme en Patriarchaat'.

According to Stuurman developments in two domains, that of class relations and of morality (the relations between the sexes), were central to the process of verzuiling. Verzuiling was both the particular form of hegemony of the ruling class and the specific form of dominance of bourgeois morality which evolved during the formation of the modern Dutch nation in the 1850-1920 period. The process of nation-building centered around a number of problems, the first of these being the relation between state and church. Despite the formal separation of state and church in the constitution of 1815 the Dutch Reformed Church continued to function as a semi-statal church. Among the elite opinions differed as regards the position of the church. The conservative Protestant faction saw the Dutch nation as a Protestant nation, in which the Dutch Reformed Church was an important instrument of power. The democratic faction, instead, aimed at a secular state in which the church had the position of a private organization. In the course of the 19th century, as a reaction to the conservative and democratic views a third conception of the state was formulated by the orthodox Protestants who wished the state to be truly orthodox.

The second problem connected with the formation of the modern nation was the demand for political democratization. Around 1850 the enfranchised population was still very small, but pressure to extend the suffrage increased. Universal suffrage was one of the central demands of the Socialist movement, and a large part of the orthodox Protestants also asked for further democratization.

The third element of the transformation towards modern society was the problem of morality, the family and the relations between the sexes. The development of a capitalist economy, and the increasing degree of industrialization and urbanization, brought about a disruption of the moral order of the traditional rural society. The growth of an impoverished, demoralised urban population evoked a profound uneasiness among the liberal and confessional bourgeoisie.

Stuurman called the modern, capitalist nation-state which resulted liberal, bourgeois and confessional. The first adjective referred to the domination of the Liberals in the economic domain, the adjective bourgeois referred to the set of norms and values with respect to the family, marriage, and sexuality which prevailed and confessional referred to the political and ideological domination of the denominational parties. The modernization of the economy and the society made it necessary to reconsider and adapt the ‘old’ ideologies. What resulted was a particular relation between political power, social structure and religious ideology.

Verzuiling began to develop in the years between 1850 and 1895, yet the number of organizations remained initially low, Stuurman noted. Moreover verzuiling was mainly limited to the orthodox Protestant part of the population. The motive for the early mobilization of this group were the Education Acts of 1857 and 1878 which aroused strong opposition. Without the charismatic
leadership of Kuyper, however, education policy would not have resulted in the formation of the first mass organizations of orthodox Protestants at that time. There were still very few Catholic mass organization in these years. The hierarchical organization of the Catholic Church made that other mass organizations of Catholics were still considered superfluous. Socialist organizations of any consequence were only set up around 1890/1900, when the industrialization of the Netherlands gained momentum. Rapid expansion of the number and size of confessional organizations only took place after 1895, when the Socialist influence increased. The relatively low degree of social conflict during the first phase of industrialization has by other authors been attributed to the mitigating effect of the already existing network of Catholic and Protestant organizations. Stuurman, however, rejected this view. In his opinion verzuiling had first and foremost been a reaction of the Churches and the confessional bourgeoisie to the rise of Socialist workers' organizations. The founding of confessional mass organizations had been part of the strategy of the Catholic and orthodox Protestant parties to fight secularization, demoralization and other vices caused by the spread of Socialist ideas. Stuurman found support for his hypothesis when he examined in which years workers organizations had been founded and when he studied the arguments of those who supported the confessional organization of the workers. Although at the political level the formation of Socialist organizations had not preceded the formation of religious parties, in the socio-economic domain the organization of workers in Catholic and Protestant unions had clearly been a reaction to the organization of the Socialists. The sequence of events had been similar with respect to the formation of youth organizations.\textsuperscript{53}

Stuurman thus attributed a crucial role to the confessional bourgeoisie and its ideology but he cautiously avoided to suggest that verzuiling was the outcome of a master plan. Instead he stressed the internal fragmentation of the religious parties and the existence of many opposite movements. Particularly among the Catholics opinions on the desirability of separate organization differed. The dispute about the inter-confessional workers' organizations was perhaps the best example of the division of the Catholic clergy. Interconfessional workers' organizations had been founded in the eastern and southern part of the country,\textsuperscript{53}.

\textsuperscript{53}. According to Pennings, who argued on the basis of a study of organization formation in 45 municipalities, the reactive behaviour of the confessionals was only characteristic for the events in the field of labour relations. In other sectors the number of Socialist organisations began to grow only after 1905, which was late as compared to the formation of orthodox Protestant organizations. P. Pennings, Lokale verschillen in verzuiling. Een onderzoek naar de oprichting van verenigingen in 45 gemeenten, 1880-1925, 1988, p.17.
under the influence of developments in Germany. The conservative part of the Catholic clergy strongly resisted interconfessional organizations because of their unionist character. They aimed at traditional organizations of employers and workers under the guidance of the Catholic Church. After a struggle of almost 20 years the interconfessionalists were definitely defeated.\textsuperscript{54} The example of the formation of the confessional workers' organizations also shows that Stuurman considered verzuiling to be far from a spontaneous mobilization of the Catholic and orthodox Protestant parts of the population. He emphasized the disciplining role of the leaders of the Churches which frequently threatened to apply church sanctions as a means to enforce membership of confessional organizations. He also quoted historical studies in which the resistance of the population against verzuiling had been described. Stuurman's interpretation of verzuiling as a process of mobilization and organization mainly imposed by the elite ran counter to the emancipation theory in which verzuiling was understood as emanating from the collective wish of Catholics and orthodox Protestants to improve their social and religious position. His focus on the strategical interests of the confessional bourgeoisie did not imply, he argued, that he thought the behaviour of the masses to be completely determined.

From the preceding paragraph it is clear that Stuurman rejected theories that explained the origin of verzuiling from the deepening of religious oppositions. Verzuiling was not the outcome of religious conflicts, but had to be understood in terms of adaptation of existing religious ideologies to the new organization of modern capitalist society. The developments at the socio-economic and political levels required a transformation of the hitherto dominant, conservative ideology. Still, the new ideology of verzuiling included many elements of the traditional religious ideologies which apparently were still functional for the dominant, confessional class in modern society. The competition between the factions of the dominant class to organise as large a share of the population as possible was at the same time a struggle between various ideologies such as Liberalism, orthodox Protestantism and Catholicism. From this struggle the religious parties emerged victorious.

Verzuiling was considered as the unplanned result of the partly conflicting strategies of factions within the ruling class and of the strategies of the labour force itself. At the political level Stuurman discerned four oppositions: between the Socialist party and non-Socialist parties, between religious

\textsuperscript{54} The issue of Catholic versus interconfessional organizations has been described by W.G. Ubink, De kerkelijke overheid en het ontstaan van de Katholieke arbeidersorganisaties, in: Jaarboek van het Katholiek Documentatie Centrum, 1973, pp.48-72.
parties and non-religious parties, between Catholics and Protestants and between advocates and opponents of verzuiling within the Catholic and Protestant sectors, in descending order of importance. In the 1890-1920 period the confessional parties slowly improved their position and once they had obtained dominance they were not successfully challenged until the 1960s. In the domain of morality the patriarchal ideology of the confessional bourgeoisie continued to prevail, and at the economic level the liberal ideology of the last century remained unimpaired. Elements of this ideology, although not supported by a strong political party, have deeply penetrated the entire society. Stuurman concluded that in the formation of the modern nation state three social forces played a role, the liberal bourgeoisie, the Churches and the Socialist movement. Verzuiling of the society implied the creation of tight relations between organizations and religious ideologies. The character of these relations as understood by Stuurman differed, however, from that in Van Doorn's definition. Van Doorn defined verzuiling as a network of organizations explicitly built up to maintain ideological segregation, thus resulting from the intentions of the elite. In Stuurman's view, however, verzuiling was the unintended outcome of the efforts of the confessional political factions to incorporate the working class in the political and social system. He defined a 'zuil' as a hierarchically structured complex of socio-political and ideological institutions
- which included people from all classes,
- which included the private as well as the public sphere,
- with a religious ideology of which core elements were class cooperation and patriarchy, and
- which had a political element.55
An important aspect of this definition was that it restricted the concept of verzuiling to the Catholic and Protestant worlds. In Stuurman's opinion it was evident that the Liberals never constituted a zuil since the number of Liberal organizations remained very small. The Socialists, on the contrary, created a large network of organizations. Nevertheless this had a fundamentally different character because of its social homogeneity and its class based ideology. For these reasons Stuurman preferred to speak of the Liberal sphere and the Socialist movement. Becker and Van Oenen noted that the position of Socialists and Liberals in the political-ideological conflict differed because they never had the same influence on their following as the religious parties had through denominational education.56

Stuurman's book was an original contribution to the study of verzuiling because it shed new light on the relation between the religious and the socio-economic cleavage. Instead of being

55. S. Stuurman, 1983, op. cit., p.71
considered as cross cutting cleavages, one cleavage mitigating the centrifugal effects of the other, verzuiling was seen as the gradual formation of a specific social structure to regulate the class conflict. Since his study was a historical study about the rise of verzuiling Stuurman did not pay much attention to the effects of verzuiling for the political system, which had been the focus of Lijphart's work, hence at that point their studies are difficult to compare. On the basis of a few sections on developments after 1920 we may assume, however, that Stuurman agreed with Lijphart about the importance of the segmented social structure for the continuous domination of the confessionals in the Dutch politics during the 1917-1963 period.

Stuurman's critics have pointed at a number of shortcomings and omissions such as the lack of empirical proof of his theory (57), his narrow definition of the concept of verzuiling (58), the issue of accommodation of conflicts between factions of the elite (59), and the rise of Socialist unions as starting point of the process of verzuiling (60). Most relevant with regard to the education issue was the criticism that Stuurman's analysis left little room for the independent influence of the religious factor. He indeed mentioned developments within the Churches, without, however, paying much attention to their organizational implications. Conflicts within the Protestant church, for instance, necessitated the building up of separate organizations, even at the level of the church itself. The formation of, first, the Christian Orthodox Reformed Church and subsequently the Orthodox Reformed Church resulted from intra-church conflicts and


59. H. Daalder, 1985, op. cit. p.63. Stuurman disputes Daalder's 'conciliant' interpretation of history. According to Daalder, however, the difference between the 'conciliant' and the 'conflict' interpretations is not philosophical but results from the fact that they start from different questions.

had wide implications. The second aspect of this problem concerns the autonomy of religious ideologies. Stuurman emphasized the functionality of these ideologies, which enabled the confessional elite to obtain control of the masses through religious organizations. Religious conflict was almost reduced to the class struggle and the struggle between the sexes. An example of this was the rise of the orthodox Protestant movement in support of the Protestant school in the second half of the 19th century. The fundamental reason for this mobilization was an intra-Church conflict between latitudinarian and orthodox Protestants. Although this certainly also was a conflict between groups with different social positions, it should not be reduced to a socio-economic conflict expressed through a religious dispute. If one attributes the domain of religion an autonomous explanatory value one has to take the wish for a more orthodox religious experience as authentic.

Was the education issue of the 1870s the crucial factor for the start of the process of verzuiling? Many authors have thought so, but Stuurman did not agree. He recognised that the issue had been the beginning of the process of verzuiling among orthodox Protestants. At the political level it resulted in the formation of a mass political party based on a religious ideology and at the social level in the development of denominational education. An important motive for the establishment of these organizations was to check the influence of modern ideologies. Although the Catholic clergy supported the position taken by the orthodox Protestants in the school conflict, verzuiling among this part of the population did not start until the 1880s. A real Catholic political party was not even founded until 1926. Verzuiling thus remained initially limited to the orthodox Protestants, and to a few sectors, such as politics and education. Moreover the geographical diffusion of this new type of organization was limited. According to Stuurman the main impetus for verzuiling came from the spread of Socialist workers’ organizations in the last decade of the 19th century. The formation of confessional organizations was thought to be the most effective weapon against the growing strength of the Socialist unions. In the course of

61. The Christian Orthodox Reformed Church (Christelijk Gereformeerde Kerk) were formally established in 1869. It united a group that left the Dutch Reformed Church at that time and a group of people which had already left the Dutch Reformed Church in 1834. The Orthodox Reformed Church (Gereformeerde Kerk) was formed in 1892.

62. Verrips devoted an interesting section of his study to the development of various orthodox strands in a Protestant region. He related the orthodox tendencies among these Protestants to their rural way of life and their dependence on agriculture as a means of subsistence. J. Verrips, op. cit., p.35.
the process of organization formation, however, the aims of the confessional forces widened: the intention was no longer merely to create confessional organizations in the sectors in which the Socialists were strengthening their position. In accordance with Kuypers' concept of the anti-thesis, the new aim was that people's entire life was enacted within confessional organizations. This would maintain the high group cohesion and at the same time protect the group against the influence of other ideologies. The rapid diffusion of religious organizations indeed started only after 1900 and lasted until the 1930s.63

Stuurman's comment on 'traditional' studies of verzuiling that in most of them the expansion of verzuiling has been seen starting too early seems justified, but this had already been observed by Daalder.64 However, there is no reason to exclude the school conflict of this period from the process of verzuiling. Verzuiling indeed gained momentum through the social conflict of the 1890s but it started with the education issue of the preceding decades.

63. The second period of increasing verzuiling was the period in which the welfare state was being built up (1945-1955).

2.4 Local contexts

In section 2.2 we discussed verzuiling as a process of political mobilization. It was perceived as a process of politicization of traditional and new social dividing lines in the period in which the number of voters increased because of extension of the suffrage. Each of the political leaders addressed a particular part of the electorate, in this way contributing to an even further subdivision of the electoral market. Existing social cleavage lines became fronts of mobilization and organization and determined to a large extent the structure of the emerging party system. The organizational expression of social dividing lines in the party system and in society at large was called verzuiling. Mobilization, however, did not only occur in the sphere of politics. In his essay on the concept of mobilization Van Doorn pointed out that such a process of accelerated change could also concern value systems or sets of rules and norms, in which cases one could speak of cultural mobilization.65 The common feature of these processes was that they implied concentration of action in time, which broke tradition and routine.

Hitherto we have mainly concentrated on the outcome of the mobilization process, verzuiling of the political and social structure, at the national level. Because of this approach a suggestion may have gained ground that national organizations played an important part in this process from the outset, but this was not always true. Mobilization often started through the formation of local organizations, which was, for example, very much so in the case of the mobilization of the orthodox Protestants. National organizations became often only important after there had been a certain level of differentiation of organizations at the local level. Once this differentiation had taken place coordination at the regional and national level became necessary, to create unity, to support the local and regional organizations and, in case it concerned organizations with political aims, to aggregate demands at the national political level. In these cases the process of mobilization went from the bottom to the top. Mobilization could, however, also occur from the top down.

Eliassen and Svaasand tried to develop an analytical framework for the formation of mass political organizations. The formation of organizations can be seen as an effort to structure a mobilization movement, in order to concentrate and direct its force. They distinguished between internally and externally generated political parties.66 The development of internally generated parties began with the creation of a parliamentary group. This led, in the second phase, to the appearance of


electoral committees at the local level, and in the subsequent phase to the establishment of permanent links between the two levels. Externally generated parties, on the contrary, emerged when new groups of the population were given the right to vote and founded organizations to aggregate their demands. In the first case the mobilization process went from the national political centre to the periphery, whereas in the second case the movement went the other way.

Eliassen and Svaasand formulated their definition of externally generated parties on the basis of the study of the period of suffrage extension and party system formation in nineteenth century Scandinavia but explicitly attributed a more general value to it. The historical element in their study did not imply, however, that the second half of the nineteenth century was the only period in which parties were externally generated.

The slow expansion of the electorate, the increasing level of education, and the improvement of communication were some of the general conditions for the rise of local mass organizations which eventually merged into national mass organizations. Political entrepreneurs were actively engaged in this process. Appearing as soon as the first local organizations for the promotion of particular collective interests had been set up, they formulated a coherent ideology which served to aggregate these interests and to address new groups of people. On the one hand they were the key persons of the organization to whom demands were made, on the other hand they transformed these demands into political issues.

Once regional and national organizations had been established further mobilization and organization no longer depended on the diffusion of local initiatives only, but were also initiated by the central organizations through the establishment of local branches. Hence in the second phase of the growth of mass political parties emphasis shifted from the bottom-up development to the top-down development through which hitherto unorganized communities were integrated into national politics. Apart from being opposites, applying to different types of organizations or different groups of people, the bottom-up and the top-down developments could also be phases of one and the same process of organization. Local branches of an organization could thus appear at different points in time in various parts of the country, and there could be important differences in the environment between communities that were innovators and those that were late comers.

Although Eliassen and Svaasand concentrated on the formation of political organizations it seems possible to generalize their theory and to apply it to other types of mobilization and organization as well. In much the same way as they distinguished between internally and externally generated political parties one could distinguish between internally and externally generated organizations. Externally generated organizations resulted from the uniting of local mobilization movements into a national organization. Internally generated
organizations were started in the centre, for example the national organization of a church, where the strategy of the campaign was defined and from where it spread over the country. If we think of verzulining as a process of organization formation we observe that among the orthodox Protestants this was initially very much a bottom-up process, starting from local initiatives. The bottom-up movement was not typical for verzulining, however. Among the Catholics, for example, verzulining was to a much greater extent an enforced process, imposed on the masses by the elite, although local leaders, the priests, also played an important catalysing role.

The difference between the processes of party formation and the formation of other types of organizations thus mainly concerns the purposes for which they were set up. We do not agree with Steiniger and Rokkan that mobilization based on religious value differences, as verzulining to a large extent was, only served political aims. The process of verzulining also generated organizations which served the internal cohesion of the movement, or contributed to safeguarding the survival of the movement in the long term, such as religiously oriented schools.

Given the fact that in mobilization movements, whether expanding mainly from the national centre or from local cores, local organizations formed the basic units, one can ask why temporal and spatial differences occurred in the mobilization and organization process. In other words, one can try to determine which factors conditioned or facilitated the formation of local organizations. Very little empirical research has been done in this area but the theoretical literature lists a number of factors that might play a role, such as the motives for organization, and the contextual conditions. The presence or absence of these factors explain a large part of the geographical and historical variation in the rate of verzulining between communities.

First there has to be a motivational basis for the formation of an organization. A motivational basis is understood as a set of demands, derived from common values and common interests, made upon the elite. The nature of the values and interests can be cultural, religious, linguistic, regional or economic. Because they rival with the interests and values of other groups they motivate individuals and potential leaders for mobilization and organization. Hence the formulation of demands and the formation of political organizations centres around cultural, religious, linguistic, regional or economic cleavage lines. Although values and interests can be very general and abstract, mobilization and organization usually occur around one or more concrete issues. If the conflict around these issues results in the development of a tight network of organizations it is very likely for these organizations to continue existing even after the conflict issues are off the agenda. Common values and interests are not enough, however. The costs and benefits related to the formation and maintenance of an organization are also important motives for organization. If the costs are considered greater than the
benefits people will look for alternative ways of achieving their aims within the existing social arrangements. A third type of motive is found in the organizational context. The presence or absence of organizations will influence the timing of the establishment of new organizations, particularly when the new organizations oppose or compete with the existing organizations.

Second, some environmental conditions have to be fulfilled before organizations will be created. These are of a macro structural nature. One of them is the juridical situation with regard to the formation of organizations and with regard to joining these organizations. If a particular type of organization is forbidden or its existence is only accepted under certain restricting circumstances, it is unlikely to be formed. In the history of private education in the Netherlands, the Constitution of 1848 was very significant in this respect. This Constitution not only introduced freedom of education in the sense that private schools were allowed to be established, but also freedom of association. The latter freedom was an important stimulus for the use of the freedom of education: the formation of an association appeared to be an efficient way to organise people with the aim to found a school. Before this freedom was granted a few communities had already established a private school, but it was only after 1848 that local associations supporting the creation and maintenance of schools became much more numerous. By the time the first national organization of private education was founded, some tens of local branches already existed. Another example of a formal, though not juridical, obstacle to the formation of organizations was the ban on joining interconfessional unions by the Catholic Church, which was a major constraint on this type of organization in the first decades of the 20th century. Another macro structural condition for the formation of modern mass organizations is the existence of a certain development of the communicational infrastructure. The presence of a relatively well-developed communication system is indeed crucial in the phase of institutionalisation, when links are established between local, regional and national levels of organization. Without a certain development of the physical infrastructure, railways and roads, and institutions of communication, such as the press and postal services, which enable rapid and frequent contact between members and between organizations and thus increase organizational density, fully developed mass organizations are hard to imagine. Other conditions that play a part are the general level of education of the population, the level of economic development, which is related to the development of a communicational infrastructure.

67. The first national organization for private education was the Vereeniging ter Bevordering van het Christelijk Nationaal Schooldonderwijs founded in 1861. This was the forerunner of the Anti Education Act League, which campaigned against the proposed law on education because of its liberal character. When the league was formed some 100 local branches joined.
the level of literacy, the social, economic and cultural heterogeneity or homogeneity, the size of the community and the degree of urbanisation. Stinchcombe called them basic variables affecting the organizational capacity of a population.  

In the Netherlands religious and socio-economic divisions were the major motivations for mobilization in the period of emerging mass organizations. Territorial oppositions as a basis of organization, which got much attention in the work of Rokkan, were hardly existent in this country. Daalder examined the opposition between centre and periphery and concluded that it was rather weak. He attributed the near absence of regional oppositions to the small geographical size of the country which facilitated interaction between regions and diminished cultural variation. As far as a centre-periphery cleavage did exist it was the territorial expression of the ideological oppositions between the orthodox rural areas and the modern urbanized centre, but even this observation was ambiguous since neither centre nor periphery were homogeneous.  

The periphery, for example, consisted of the modern, secular northern provinces and the backward, orthodox provinces in the south. Likewise the centre was made up of modern and conservative groups. A certain opposition existed, however, within regions between cities and countryside. The rural-urban electoral imbalance continued existing until proportional representation was introduced in 1917, but it never became an independent and successful basis for the organization of political parties or interest groups.

The religious and socio-economic cleavages formed the motivational basis for organization formation in the Netherlands. However, it depended on the local cleavage structure whether organizations actually were established. The relative strength of one opposition versus another and the sharpness of oppositions determined when organizations were formed and which organizations were formed. We assume that differentiation in space and time in the process of verzuiling, and variation in verzuiling between subcultures, depended to a large extent on these factors. It is probable, for instance, that the first organizations were founded in communities where rivalry between groups was strongest and that in the absence of sharp opposition the motivation for organization was much weaker. Eliassen and Svaasand elaborated this assumption and argued that the presence of organizations created an important motive for other groups to form organizations, which implied that the areas where mass organization emerged first kept their advantage for some time.

Daalder followed the same line of reasoning when he

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formulated some hypotheses on the initial geographical variation in the process of verzuiling. He tried to explain this variation from the spatial patterns of religious heterogeneity or homogeneity and secularization existing at the time of the rise of mass organizations. The main criterion for his regionalization thus was the religious variable. With the help of this variable he distinguished four types of areas: 
a) areas of a mainly latitudinarian and increasingly secular orientation, e.g. parts of Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe and North Holland, the large cities in the West, Zeeland and a few areas in Gelderland and Overijssel; 
b) areas of an overwhelmingly orthodox Protestant character, in the centre-belt ranging from Friesland and North Groningen to the Southern part of Holland; 
c) areas of complete Catholic domination, mainly located in the south, some adjacent areas in Gelderland, Twente, and a few pockets in Holland; 
d) areas of a mixed character, predominantly in the West, but also in Utrecht, Gelderland and parts of Friesland.

The classification shows that in Daalder’s opinion the simple opposition of an urbanized centre in the western provinces versus a rural periphery in the rest of the country did not exist. Regional variation in the relative importance of the cleavages between Protestants and Catholics and between the confessional forces and non-confessional forces resulted in variation in the type of organizations that emerged and in the time that local oppositions led to the formation of organizations. In the mixed areas, that is the areas mentioned under d), the incentive to organize was strongest, because here confrontation of different denominations was most frequent and thus the conflict most acute. Another reason was that both class and religion could become the dominant principle of organization, making it on the whole more likely that organizations were formed. In the mainly secular larger cities the Socialists emerged victorious in the struggle: a large part of the population joined Socialist organizations. But in the smaller towns, and particularly in the rural areas, the confessional parties managed to maintain their position. The areas classified under a) became easily divided along class-lines, although the clear presence of Socialists also caused any Catholics and orthodox Protestants living in these areas to organise relatively early. Concerning the areas grouped under b) and c) Daalder’s hypothesis was that because of their religious homogeneity, a strong need for organization was lacking. In these areas segmental organizations developed only much later, when differentiation of local organizations in other regions had already created the need for coordination at the national level. From the national centre local branches were set up where these did not yet exist, which meant that regions and local communities

which hitherto had been peripheral to the verzuiling process were increasingly incorporated in national processes.

Stuurman's picture of geographical variation in the process of verzuiling was quite similar. Like Daalder he distinguished between regions where segmented organizations developed in the early phase of this process and regions which were only later incorporated in the structure of verzuiling, during the period of consolidation. Stuurman based his regional classification explicitly on two criteria, the degree of religious homogeneity/heterogeneity and the evolution of the industrialization process. Underneath these variables, however, he discerned a more basic one: the geographical pattern of feudal socio-economic relations preceding the development of modern society. The areas in which feudalism never became the dominant socio-economic order corresponded largely to the areas where secularization spread at an early time. Stuurman explained this by the supposedly 'more democratic popular traditions' in communities with a low degree of feudalism. The wide acceptance of secular ideologies made these areas more receptive to progressive Liberal and Socialist ideas, which evoked the early formation of Socialist organizations and, in reaction to this, early organization by the orthodox Protestants. Stuurman was of the opinion that the presence or absence of feudal traditions was the fundamental explanatory variable of the variation in verzuiling. The development of modern industrial or agrarian capitalism had an important independent explanatory value but did not completely explain regional variation in verzuiling, whereas the urban-rural and religious factors contributed only to a little extent to explaining this variation. Economic developments, and the social conflicts these produced, were fundamental in his analysis. The basic idea of his study was that verzuiling was a reaction to the rise of the Socialist movement, which left little room for the independent working of the religious factor. The opposition between various groups of orthodox Protestants and between Protestants on the one hand and Catholics on the other hand remained rather underexposed. Daalder, on the contrary, had both oppositions, that between confessional and non-confessional forces and that between Protestants and Catholics, in mind when he defined the mixed areas.

The regionalizations presented are important tools for the analysis of geographical patterns of verzuiling of the education system. Although Daalder based his hypotheses on preliminary findings concerning the development of the party system it is put in the form of general statements which have a wider application than the political system. His work is a first step in the direction of a more differentiated analysis of the rise and diffusion of mass political organizations in the period when the

electorate rapidly expanded, as proposed by Rokkan and Eliassen and Svaasand and of the diffusion of mass organizations in general. As we observed initial mass mobilization and organization was not only expressed in electoral organizations and interest organizations which focused on the State, but also on mass organizations set up for other purposes. In the countries in which religious cleavages dominated in the period of nation-building, for instance in the Netherlands and Belgium, the wish for free, denominational schools formed an important motive to organise local interest groups. Since education in principle concerned all people as parents, whereas politics concerned only a restricted number of people as long as full suffrage did not exist, the diffusion of denominational education was, at least as far as the earliest period was concerned, probably a better indication of the development of modern mass organizations than the emergence of local electoral committees. In the second half of the last century verzuiling of the education system had spread relatively widely whereas the growth of political and economic organizations only accelerated from the last decade of the nineteenth century. We may assume, however, that the territorial patterns of these processes were largely similar, since the same cleavages, the multiple religious cleavage and the opposition between secular and confessional groups, lay at the root of the segmentation process.
2.5 A summary of theories: operational definitions

In the preceding sections the debate on verzuiling and ontzuiling since the 1950s has been summarized and its influence on general theorizing about segmented societies has been indicated. I have paid more attention to the process of the formation of subcultural organizational complexes than to their dissolution because of the predominant focus in the literature on the first process. In the present section I will sum up these views by comparing their main elements and putting them in two broad categories. Secondly I will examine existing concepts and definitions with reference to the empirical study of processes of verzuiling and ontzuiling in the education sector and formulate operational definitions of these concepts.

Summarizing the preceding discussion it seems useful to make a distinction between what can be labelled the sociological approach and the historical approach to verzuiling. The two approaches differ with respect to many elements such as the question of the origin of verzuiling, the emphasis on stability versus change and the possibility to generalize concepts and definitions. The sociological approach to verzuiling and ontzuiling is broad and applies to other countries than the Netherlands as well, whereas the historical approach is more narrow, referring to a specific period in Dutch history.

The authors taking a sociological approach are above all interested in the structure of segmented societies at a specific moment. Their definitions have a number of elements in common, such as:
- the presence of several subcultural groups in society,
- the fact that these subgroups are based on a common characteristic like ideology, socio-economic position or language,
- the effort made by each subgroup at building up a block of organizations, and
- the stability of the segmented structure, resulting from the social control mechanisms at work within each group.

Each of these elements was found in the definitions of Van Doorn, Kruyt and Goddijn, Lorwin, Steiniger and Lijphart, who were all concerned with segmented social structures in the Netherlands and other plural democracies. Their work aimed at describing, defining and comparing these structures and they developed a number of objective indicators to do so. These enabled them to particularly study the quantitative aspects of verzuiling: the share of the population that was organized in subcultural groups, the density of the organizational networks, the sectors which were most and those which were less segmented. The quantitative approach also facilitated cross national empirical research and the evolution of the aspects measured across time, but the latter type of studies remained rare. In spite of the interesting start made by Kruyt and Goddijn with this type of research it has not been continued in a systematic manner. The analysis of verzuiling usually remained rather static, one of the consequences being
that the process of demobilization, ontzuiling, received little attention.

Another characteristic of the sociological approach was the concern with the structure of the cleavages, i.e. the question whether social cleavages reinforced each other because they were overlapping or had mitigating effects because they were cross cutting. With regard to the Netherlands it was generally assumed that the religious dividing line was the most important, and that it cross cut the economic cleavage. The network of confessional organizations was most extensive and had a high internal connectedness. The groups based on the socio-economic cleavage, on the contrary, were far less organized, in that their organizations covered fewer sectors and relations between several types of organizations were sometimes loose. This group of authors, with the exception of Steiniger, was less concerned with explaining the origin of verzuiing than with the functioning of a segmented society. Their definitions of verzuiing and ontzuiling were in terms of structures and functions.

A historical approach to verzuiing was taken by authors like Thurlings, Stuurman, Daalder and Hendriks. Central to their work was the historical development of verzuiing in the Netherlands. In contrast to the first group which studied fully developed segmented societies, the second group examined how and why this process started in the last century. Their approach was more dynamic since verzuiing was not mainly seen as a particular social structure but as a process of which the intensity differed in each period. From 1910 to 1930, for example, segmental organizations developed rapidly, as they did again from 1945 to 1955. Until 1910 and during the rest of the Interbellum developments were relatively slow. Verzuiing was not at all a linear process. Besides, the concern with process made that the occurrence of opposite movements was recognised. The process of verzuiing did not only vary in intensity, it also experienced temporal and local set-backs. Elements of ontzuiling had been present from the very start, Stuurman argued. Although he did not analyse the decline of verzuiing in the Netherlands he perceived verzuiing and ontzuiling as two simultaneous, opposite movements, the first dominating until the mid 1950s and the second being dominant after 1960. Particularly with regard to the dynamic aspect of verzuiing and to its evolutionary course the historical approach differed from the sociological one. Because the first approach was concerned with developments in the Netherlands only verzuiing was on historical grounds exclusively defined as segmentation along religious dividing lines. It was also the reason that the Dutch words verzuiing and ontzuiling were maintained whereas in the comparative studies these were often replaced by more general concepts like vertical pluralism, segmented pluralism or segmentation. Only Rokkans’ attempt at formulating a general theory of verzuiing combined dynamic, explanatory and comparative elements.
Given the focus on changes over time in the study of the primary education system it is necessary to define verzuiling and ontzuiling as dynamic concepts. We will be less concerned with the functioning of the entire social structure and the place of the education system in this structure but, instead, concentrate on geographical and temporal variations in the growth and decline of verzuiling and ontzuiling in the education system. On theoretical and historical grounds the concepts of verzuiling and ontzuiling will be limited to organizational segmentation along the religious cleavage line (separating religious groups from secular groups and Catholics from Protestants). At the theoretical level we follow Stuurman, Becker and Van Oenen and Kieve, who argued that fundamental differences existed between the concepts of zuilen and classes. Whether one belonged to a particular social class was determined by one’s objective position in the production process and the formation of the Socialist movement took place on the basis of these objective positions. Although not every worker joined the Socialist party it was logical to do so from the point of view of his economic position. Therefore the social positions of the followers of the Socialist and Liberal political parties were much more homogeneous than that of the confessional parties. By contrast, the membership of Catholic or Protestant organizations was not based on objective positions but on the religious ideology one adhered to, though it was true that the more society became segmented and social pressure to remain within the own social circle increased, the more being Catholic or being Protestant took the form of an objective position. The above mentioned authors did not deny, however, that the form of the mobilization process along the socio-economic cleavage line was rather similar to that along religious cleavage lines. Particularly because in the Netherlands both categories mobilized in the same period, the organizational structures that resulted resembled very much. Stuurman, for example, contrasted the development of the Socialist movement to the formation of the Catholic and Protestant zuilen, but he did not deny that structural similarities between the process of organization building among the Catholics, the Protestants and the Socialists existed.

Historically the formation of religiously oriented organizations was mainly a reaction to the increasing influence of the Liberal and, later, Socialist ideologies, in our view. The formation of religiously oriented organizations was, apart from a genuine effort to preserve orthodox religious values, also an attempt to control the secularizing working class. Wendrich showed that this was also true as far as verzuiling of the

Although religious considerations and the wish for individual social mobility played a part among the masses, denominational education was also an instrument of social control by the elite. In that sense verzuiling of the education system, which started at an early time, was not particularly evoked by the emergence of workers’ organizations, as Stuurman stated, but by the general processes of industrialization and urbanization which entailed an attack on the traditional values and the desintegration of the old social patterns.

Following this line of thought Socialist organizations for theoretical as well as historical reasons were not considered part of the process of verzuiling in this study. The Socialist organization process might have resembled that among Catholics and Protestants, but with regard to its basis it was fundamentally different. The concept of verzuiling is thus limited to organizational processes along religious cleavage lines. With regard to the education system this definition of verzuiling is even more relevant since only the Catholics and the Protestants established their own schools. Despite the fact that some teachers in public schools were known to sympathize with the Socialist cause, the ‘red teachers’, the public school remained the school of the secular parties, Liberals and Socialists alike. In contrast to the denominational schools, which were exclusive, the public school was open to all children and as such it did not make part of the structure of verzuiling.

Historically the process of verzuiling in the education sector departed in a number of ways from verzuiling in other sectors in that educational institutions existed long before ideological segmentation gained ground. Whereas in many sectors verzuiling was the particular way institutions emerged, for instance in politics, the struggle for denominational schools was waged long after a national education system had been set up. Thus instead of competing with the Socialists in the same market that hitherto had remained unexploited, the development of the Catholic and Protestant education sectors implied the simultaneous shrinking of the already existing public education system. Moreover the initial development of denominational education occurred some two decades before the Socialists were strong enough to expand their network of organizations. Wendrich considered this fact of particular importance for the understanding of the Socialist education policy, which had to be developed in reaction to existing Liberal and confessional policies.76 The education conflict of the 1870s was a conflict


between the Liberal and the confessional conceptions of education, he wrote. The Liberals perceived education as an important means for individual social mobility. In accordance with their rationalist ideology and their opinion about the importance of greater State intervention, the Liberals were in favour of secular education organized by the State. The Catholics and Protestants objected to the secular national school, because it did no longer guarantee the preservation of traditional values and, instead, supported a religious school which was free of State intervention. These notions, developed in the school struggle of the 1870s, influenced the formation of the Socialist stand on education to a considerable extent. Central dilemma for the Socialists was that they were in favour of strong State intervention, but only in a Socialist State. They solved this problem by a policy in favour of a national school system but against too much influence of the State on the content and methods of education. From the very beginning the Socialists rejected the idea of a private school based on the Socialist ideology. Consequently the process of verzuiling of the education system did occur without the establishment of Socialist or Liberal institutions. To limit the concept of verzuiling, in the case of education, to the Catholic and the orthodox Protestant groups is therefore not only justified on theoretical but also on historical grounds.

From this discussion it is clear that a working definition of the concepts of verzuiling and ontzuiling should contain the following elements:
- verzuiling has to be perceived as the process of formation of a segmented social structure. This structure was not static but subject to continuous changes in the direction of greater verzuiling at some places and ontzuiling at other places;
- verzuiling historically emerged in reaction to the social transformation brought about by process of industrialization and urbanization. The process of ontzuiling resulted from the rapid social and economic developments after the Second World War and the concomitant changes within the churches;
- verzuiling and ontzuiling were processes of mobilization and demobilization of religious cleavages. The development of a network of Socialist organizations was a process very similar to verzuiling among Catholics and orthodox Protestants but theoretically it was a different phenomenon;
- verzuiling was perceived as the particular form in which Dutch society was transformed from an agrarian, static society into a dynamic, industrialised society in which functional organizations became important. Instead of giving the concept of verzuiling the

77. For electoral reasons, however, the Socialists consented to state-financing of private denominational education as early as 1902. K. Geertsema, De vrijheid van schoolrichting en de SDAP, 1931.
widest possible meaning I opt for a narrow, historical approach which focuses on developments in the Netherlands.

The preliminary definitions that were given in section 1.1. can now be made more precise and adapted to the purpose of our study. **Verzuiling** is defined as the historical process of mobilization and organizational segmentation along religious cleavage lines which occurred in reaction to the growing influence of secular ideologies such as radical liberalism and socialism and to the desintegration of traditional society due to processes such as industrialization and urbanization. Verzuiling was the dominant social process in the Netherlands from 1850 to 1950. It accelerated between 1890 and 1930 but reached its highest intensity only in the 1950s.

**Ontzuiling** is defined as the historical process of demobilization of the religious dividing lines which subsequently led to the breaking down of organizational segmentation. The demobilization of the religious cleavage was the result of macrosociological processes such as the rapid economic growth, the technological development and the diffusion of the means of mass communication as well as of changes within the churches. Ontzuiling tendencies have been present since the beginning of the present century but became the dominant social process only after 1960.

A few notes have to be made with regard to these definitions. First emphasis is put on organizational processes resulting from the mobilization and demobilization of religious divisions. The role of religious ideologies in an individuals' life and in the interaction within small groups such as the family is not mentioned in the definition. This choice was made because the study of the diffusion of verzuiling and ontzuiling in the education process focuses on the organizational aspects of these processes. Second the definitions do not contain any statement about cooperation of elites in segmented societies. With many other authors on verzuiling we concluded that the issue of elite behaviour, although related to the question of political stability in divided societies, is a quite separate problem. Therefore we will not include it in our definition of verzuiling. Nevertheless we agree with Lijphart that verzuiling increased the governability of Dutch society in that it produced a political system in which parties had a stable following and were forced to cooperate. Third the definition of verzuiling concentrates on the historical process of building up social segmentation. Therefore no attention is paid to the forces at work in the period between the moment the segmented social structure was more or less completed and the moment the structure started to crumble, roughly the period between 1930 and 1950, during which the segmented structure was relatively stable. These forces were central in the work of Van Doorn who considered verzuiling as a means of social control, thereby indicating that once the process of segmentation had been completed the social control exerted by the elite, but also by the people themselves, made verzuiling a very stable structure. The existence of this stability will,
however, not be studied.
CHAPTER THREE THE EVOLUTION OF VERZUIILING AND ONTZUIILING IN PRIMARY EDUCATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Introduction

In the present chapter we will examine national trends in the primary education system from about 1870 to 1984. On the one hand close examination of the numerical development at the national level will provide us with some insight in the basic pattern of the development of the education system and serve us when we will analyse these developments in more detail in chapter 4 and chapter 5. On the other hand our understanding of the growth and decline of verzuiiling of the education system on the basis of these data will still be very general, and the shortcomings of an analysis at the national level will be evident.

I will start this chapter with a description of the legislative developments since 1800. This year was more or less the starting point of legislation at the national level. In a short period the education system was transformed from a number of regional subsystems into a national, unitary system of education provisions. The basic features of the Dutch education system as it presently is, centralized as regards the curriculum and decentralized as regards ownership and management of schools, were determined in the last century. With regard to the relation between public and denominational education the adoption of the Education Act of 1920 was the most important development. The Education Act of 1920 was the outcome, however, of seventy years of legislation in the field of education, during which the supporters of denominational education gradually improved the position of 'their' education. Until very recently this act governed the development of the primary education system. It was replaced by the Basic Education Act in 1985 only.

The second section will deal with the evolution of the main denominational groups in the Netherlands from the last century until the present. In order to analyse processes of religious segmentation and desegmentation we need to know how the denominational groups in absolute as well as in relative terms developed. In other words we need to know from which numerical basis the processes of verzuiiling and ontzuiiling started. We will first look at the continuous fragmentation of the Protestant part of the population during the 19th and the 20th century and at the attitude of each of the orthodox Protestant groups with regard to
denominational education. Moreover we will pay attention to orthodox and liberal tendencies within the Catholic church. Finally we will examine the rate of growth of each of the denominations which resulted from internal fragmentation as well as from differential demographic developments.

In the third section the numerical evolution of public and private primary education in the last hundred years will be presented.

3.1 Legislative developments

Before the period of French domination (1795-1813) education was organized at the regional level. Earlier attempts at the formation of a national education system, for instance at the Synodal Meeting of Dordrecht in 1618, had failed. The fragmentation of the Dutch State, as compared to the highly centralized administrations of France and England, had an increasingly detrimental effect on the administrative capacity of the Netherlands. In the second half of the 18th century the Dutch state was in a deep economic and social crisis. Despite this general state of malaise, the level of literacy was high as compared to that in other European countries. During the period of French domination the education system was nationalized. The first national legislation on education was adopted by the national assembly of the Batavian Republic in 1801. The law which established a truly national education system was the one formulated by Van de Ende and adopted in 1806. Neither upon the establishment of the Kingdom of Holland in 1806, nor upon the incorporation of Holland in the French empire in 1810 this law was altered. As De Geus and De Jeu noticed the development of the education system was largely autonomous, that is independent of the changes of the political system, even during the French domination.

The introduction of a national education system was contested by the regionally based aristocracy. This group, having close relations with the Dutch Reformed Church, wanted to maintain the influence of the church on education. Until that time this influence had been very strong. This is demonstrated,


for example, by the requirement that teachers should be members of the Dutch Reformed Church and from control of textbooks by the church. In the Education Act of 1806, however, the central government was given control of education, and denominational education, that is education on the basis of the dogmas of a particular church was forbidden. Nevertheless inspection of schools remained under control of the Dutch Reformed Church. Besides the law said that national education had to be Christian, which meant a formal recognition of the role of the Dutch Reformed Church in education. Democratic ideas, as put forward by modern educational societies, had very little influence on the Education Act of 1806. Education did not yet develop into an instrument of social emancipation. On the contrary, the conservative elite of the period before 1789 kept a large say in educational matters, and an important function of schooling remained the teaching of the values of a conservative society. Since the law was so ambiguous concerning the role of religion in education it was not surprising that it attracted much opposition in the subsequent period.

The orthodox Protestant groups, the democratic liberal faction of the bourgeoisie and the Catholics were the main adversaries. The orthodox Protestants criticised the Education Act of 1806 because of the latitudinarian character of the public school as well as the lack of freedom of education. The liberals on the contrary aimed at a complete separation of church and state. They also wanted to end any intervention in education by the church. Finally many Catholics were against the situation created by the law of 1806. Their opposition was stronger in those regions where the Catholics were a numerical minority than in the southern, predominantly Catholic part of the country. In Brabant and Limburg teachers in public schools were de facto Catholic but in the northern provinces the Catholics feared the influence of the rationalist, Protestant ideology in the public schools. The limited possibilities to found Catholic schools were the second reason for this protest. The demand by orthodox Protestants and Catholics for greater freedom of education was to a certain extent met in the Royal Decree of 1842 which made it easier to obtain permission to open a private school. Moreover it introduced the possibility to appeal to the Provincial Executive when the municipal authorities refused this permission. Between 1842 and 1848 the first four Protestant schools were founded. They were situated in Nijmegen (1844), 's Hertogenbosch (1846),

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4. Two of these societies were the Maatschappij tot Nut voor 't Algemeen (in which the freemasonry had considerable influence) and the Zeeuws Genootschap der Wetenschappen.

5. Catholic opposition to the lack of freedom of education was also part of the Belgian struggle for secession from the Netherlands. After the establishment of an autonomous Belgian State Catholic opposition indeed diminished somewhat. H. Knippenberg, 1986, op. cit., p.49.
Nijkerkerveen (1847) and Amsterdam (1848). This concession did not end the opposition against the Education Act of Van den Ende. The Liberal government of 1848, however, reformed the constitution in such a way that first, public education would be neutral, second, the State would be responsible for the 'sufficient' provision of public education, and third, there would be freedom of education, i.e. private entities, individuals or groups of individuals, would have the right to open schools.

These constitutional principles were elaborated in the sections 3 and 23 of the Education Act of 1857 after a long struggle between Liberals and liberal Catholics on the one side and orthodox Protestants and the conservative elite of the Dutch Reformed Church on the other side. The Education Act of 1857 was the beginning of the development of a dual education system, in which private denominational education competed with public neutral education. The new denominational schools that were founded had five different forms of management. Schools were governed by: 1) associations of parents, 2) church committees, 3) independent committees, 4) societies and religious orders, 5) individuals, usually teachers. Societies and religious orders were from the beginning the most frequently chosen forms of management.

State-financing of denominational private education then became the central issue for the orthodox Protestants, who considered the development of denominational education a means to put the growing influence of secular ideologies to a halt as well as a means of collective social mobility. The Vereeniging voor Christelijk Nationaal Schoolonderwijs (Society for Christian National Education) was founded in 1861 to financially and politically support the cause of the Protestant school. This organization was built on earlier established local groups of orthodox Protestants who had tried to gain more influence in the Dutch Reformed Church after the Church Order had been revised in 1852. As a result of ideological differences among orthodox Protestants another association, the Vereeniging voor Gereformeerde Onderwijs (Society for Orthodox Reformed Education) was founded only a few years later (1868). In the same period, however, initiatives were taken by the supporters of public education to defend national education against the orthodox Protestant offensive. At the beginning of the 1870s, for instance, the Frisian Society for the Promotion of National Education (Friesche Vereeniging tot Bevordering van

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6. L.C. Stilma, De school met den Bijbel in historisch-pedagogisch perspectief, 1987, p.44. No information is available on the emergence of the first Catholic schools.

7. In this context the term neutral has the meaning of non denominational. According to the constitution the ideology of public education would be Christian, since Christian values were considered the basic values of society as a whole. The Education Act of 1957, however, interpreted the constitution in such a way that public education would be neutral.
Volksonderwijs), which was soon transformed into a national organization, was set up. In this period the struggle between denominational and public education was indeed most intense in the province of Friesland.

In the 1870s improvement of the education system was also one of the central issues of the political programme of the Liberals. The Liberals particularly emphasized the possibilities for individual social mobility resulting from better education. The education issue therefore was the cornerstone of the Liberal political programme, also at the local level. First of all the education system needed to be expanded, to increase the participation rate. Next teaching had to be made more effective by a reduction of the pupils/teacher ratio, by demanding higher qualifications of teachers and by improving the quality of school buildings. Schooling should be compulsory and free according to many Liberals. The Liberal cabinet led by Kappuyne proposed to change the education act in this sense. The majority of the orthodox Protestants and Catholics, however, were against compulsory schooling, free education and better qualified, thus more expensive, teachers, as long as they did not receive any state-aid. They were doubly harmed, they argued, because they had to completely finance their own schools and also to contribute to the public education system (by paying taxes). Case studies of attempts by small groups of Protestants and Catholics to found a denominational school have shown that this often meant a considerable financial burden for these people.

Despite the well organized protest of orthodox Protestants and Catholics (the petition movement organized by the Anti Education Act League yielded over 300,000 signatures of orthodox Protestants and some 160,000 of Catholics) the education bill presented by Kappuyne in 1878 was adopted in parliament. The new act, however, satisfied neither the radical Liberals nor the orthodox Protestants. Kappuyne had not introduced compulsory free education, nor had he accepted state-financing of private

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schools. Still the Education Act of 1878 brought considerable improvements of the education system. Figures presented by Dasberg and Jansing show that municipal expenses for public education by pupil increased from an average Dfl 19.43 in the 1876-1881 period to Dfl 28.86 in the 1881-1886 period. Moreover the pupils/teachers ratio in the public sector rapidly fell between 1875 and 1895 but unfortunately we can not estimate the separate effects of the Education Acts of 1878 and 1889. An important change with regard to the preceding period was that after 1878 the national government paid 30% of the education expenses of municipal authorities. This mainly concerned public education since the larger part of the private sector still was not eligible for any financial aid at all. The rule that public schools were not obliged to ask school fees, which made these schools more attractive for the lower classes than the denominational schools, was maintained.

The orthodox Protestants were not defeated though. In the subsequent decade they continued to ask for financial aid to denominational schools. They no longer used the means of extra parliamentarian actions but increasingly concentrated on the electoral channel to reach their aims. In 1887 they agreed to extend the suffrage, an issue very dear to radical Liberals, in exchange for recognition of the Liberals that the Constitutional article on Education did not exclude the possibility of state-financing of private education. The attitude of many orthodox Protestants and Catholics was determined by the hope that expansion of the electorate would bring the confessional political parties to power and that they would be able to realize their ideas that way. In the elections of 1888 the confessionals indeed obtained the absolute majority. The government of orthodox


13. The ratio decreased from 65.8 in 1875 to 39.2 in 1895. In the private sector, where the pupils/teacher ratio had always been lower, these figures were 37.4 and 42.6, hence at the end of the period the ratio was highest in the private sector. L. Dasberg and J.W.G. Jansing, op. cit., p.49.

14. Contrary to denominational schools, however, private non denominational schools were eligible for state-financing. By 1880 there were still some 350 schools of this type, but these schools usually were very small.

15. Reform of the Constitution with regard to the lowering of the suffrage occurred in 1887. The number of voters was increased from 12% to 26% of the male population over 23 years of age. S. Stuurman, 1983, op. cit., p.135.
Protestants and Catholics which was formed was the first coalition government. Under this government the Education Act was again revised in 1889. The major changes were:
- public as well as private denominational schools would be entitled to financial support by the national administration, the total sum depending on the number of pupils and the number of teachers. For private denominational schools this meant that they would receive a subsidy of about 30% of their total expenses;
- municipal authorities would be entitled to a contribution by the central government for the building costs of public schools;
- municipal authorities would be obliged to cover the remainder of the expenses of public schools from fees.

The conditions for private denominational schools to be eligible for state-financing were that the school had to have a minimum number of pupils (25 in 1889) and that it had to be administered by a corporate body such as a society, foundation or institution. The Education Act of MacKay (1889), which introduced the principle of state subsidies for private denominational education, thus formed the end of the second stage of the school conflict. The next step was to obtain full state-financing.

As a result of the introduction of state-financing of denominational education, government expenses for education rapidly augmented. In 1900 5.8% of the total budget for education was spent on these schools.16

Meanwhile the political struggle for extension of state-aid to private education continued. In 1901, because the Compulsory Education Act became operative, as well as in 1905, subsidies were raised. The latter improvement took place during the government of Kuyper, the leader of the orthodox Protestants. Other measures taken by his government were recognition by the state of degrees obtained at the university of the orthodox Protestants and admittance of teachers of private schools to the pension fund.17 Further improvement of the financial situation of private education, to the extent that private and public education were equally and fully financed, needed amendment of the constitution. Two committees, one to present proposals with regard to the education issue and the other to present a proposal with regard to a new electoral system of which full suffrage and proportional representation were the key concepts, were set up in 1913 to prepare the reforms. In chapter 2 the different interpretations of the political situation of this period were already discussed. Some authors argue that the pacification committees were formed because the government was under strong political pressure to solve the problems which tended to disrupt society, but others are of the opinion that the committees only had a technical task, namely to work out the solutions already reached by the political parties before 1910. The second

interpretation is more plausible than the first one, although it is true that the Liberals continued opposing full state-financing of private schools until they were completely certain that the parties of the right agreed to the introduction of full suffrage.

Most important was, however, that in 1917 the constitutional article on education was altered in such a way that change of the Education Act in the sense of introducing full and equal state-financing of private education became possible. The new article on education included the following elements:

- the central government was responsible for education, financing all schools on equal terms;
- private bodies had the right to open a school;
- in public schools everyone's belief was respected;
- it was the task of the local authorities to organize sufficient public primary education; under certain conditions, however, local authorities could be released from this obligation;
- to be entitled to state-financing private schools had to meet certain requirements concerning the quality of education. These requirements did not interfere, however, with the free choice of teaching methods and educational staff of these schools.\(^{18}\)

Compared to the situation existing under the constitution of 1848, however, the new constitution gave the national government much more control of denominational education. Before 1917 only the formal qualifications of teachers were checked, whereas after the implementation of the Elementary Education Act in 1920 the standard of education in private schools was subject to control. The constitution did not specify whether the central or local authority would bear the costs of private education.

The constitutional article on education was elaborated in the Elementary Education Act of 1920, which became operative on the first of January 1921.

Before the Elementary Education Act of 1920 municipal authorities were the most influential actors in the decision making processes concerning the opening and closing of schools. According to the constitution of 1848 municipal authorities were responsible for the provision of public education. It was the municipal council which decided when and how many public schools were founded. The influence of the central government was small but growing, as appears from the obligation to levy schoolfees (1889) and the introduction of compulsory schooling (1900). Still very few regulations with regard to the implementation of the constitutional responsibility for public education existed. There were, for instance, no rules about the minimum number of pupils required to found a school. The number of pupils per class and the minimum age at which pupils were admitted to public schools were autonomously determined by the municipal authorities. The role of provincial government was limited but not unimportant. On the one hand it had to approve all decisions taken by municipal authorities and to check whether these did not go against current

legislation, i.e. its authority to control. On the other hand it had to decide in cases of conflict within or between municipalities. With regard to private schools the situation was different. Provided that municipal authorities gave permission the founding of private schools was free. Even individuals had the right to open a school. The founding of private schools was not subjected to any regulations concerning a minimum number of pupils, the geographical location of the school in relation to the distribution of the already existing schools, the levying of fees or the minimum age of pupils. The central government only had control of the qualification of teachers. In case municipal authorities refused to give permission for the opening of a private school the provincial authorities decided.

The Elementary Education Act of 1920 changed the existing situation considerably. It contained a number of rules concerning the financing of elementary schools which were operative until very recently, without undergoing any major changes. They provided an answer to the following questions: who decided about the beginning/ending of the financing of a school, who could take the initiative to found a school, and what were the minimum norms for the opening of a school?

Local authority had for a long time been responsible for primary education, not the least because primary schools had always functioned in a local context. In 1917 the responsibility of the local administration for all elementary education was embedded in the Constitution. With regard to public education local governments held their specific responsibility. According to article 19 of the Elementary Education Act municipal authorities had the responsibility to provide sufficient public education and thus they decided about the opening and closing of public schools. With regard to private education the municipal authorities also decided. In this sector, however, the possibility of an autonomous local policy was very limited, since municipal authorities were obliged to agree to financing a private school if all the conditions stated in the law were met. This 'automatism' was the core of the financial equality obtained with the Elementary Education Act of 1920.

As far as public schools were concerned the local authorities held the right of initiative. Parents did not get this right until 1964. With regard to private schools the request could be made by an individual or group of individuals, if they were incorporated. In most cases the request for a primary school was thus made by an already existing educational society or foundation. Moreover the board of such a society or foundation, which also functioned as the school board of the schools it operated, had to be affiliated with a central organization of school boards. Finally the request for a private

19. This was stipulated in article 19bis of the Act of 1920.
school had to include a declaration by the parents, which proved that a minimum number of pupils would attend the new school.20

According to the Elementary Education Act private schools had to have a minimum number of pupils to be eligible for state-financing. This was in municipalities of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Range</th>
<th>Minimum Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>more than 100,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than 100,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soon after 1920, in the Technical Revision of 1923, these figures were changed as follows: 100 in municipalities of over 100,000 inhabitants, 80 in municipalities of between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, 60 in municipalities of between 25,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, and 40 in municipalities of less than 25,000 inhabitants.21 For public schools, however, no such minima existed until 1937.

Thus local authorities had much more autonomy with regard to public education than with regard to private education. To cut expenditure on education, for instance, they often made an arrangement with a neighbouring municipality in order to open an intermunicipal school. Whether by setting up an intermunicipal school local authorities fulfilled article 19 of the Education Act, which said that municipal authorities were responsible for the provision of sufficient public education in a municipality, was decided by the provincial executive. Article 19 has generally been given a liberal interpretation, with the result that in many municipalities no public school exists. In the 1920s, however, the number of municipalities without public education was still much more limited.22 Another instrument of local policy making,

20. These conditions were laid down in article 73. The reason for stipulating that the new school had to be member of a central organization of schoolboards was to restrict the establishment of new schools. The central government delegated in this way the screening of requests for new schools to private organizations. In practice the effect of this requirement has mainly been to prevent the emergence of schools with other ideological orientations than the existing ones (Catholic, Protestant, private neutral).


22. In 1929/1930 188 municipalities (17.4 %) did not provide public education. These were distributed as follows: Overijssel 2, Gelderland 12, Utrecht 26, North Holland 4, South Holland 19, Zeeland 15, North Brabant 72, Limburg 38. By 1935, after the great reorganization of the public education sector, this number had risen to 310, which constituted almost 30 % of the municipalities. Most of these municipalities were situated in the homogeneously Catholic provinces of North Brabant and Limburg, where the demand for public education was extremely low. During
which concerned both public and private education, was an agreement about the admission of children from a neighbouring municipality. The municipality in which the children attended school received a fixed sum for every pupil from the municipality where the children resided. The agreements about school attendance in neighbouring municipalities, together with the possibility to found intermunicipal schools, made it possible to provide education even in very sparsely populated areas, without the cost of education becoming too high.  

The Education Act of 1920 thus very precisely described under which conditions and in what way public and private education were going to be financed in order to avoid that differences of opinion about its interpretation would arise. The claims on subsidies of private schools were as much as possible withdrawn from the sphere of influence of local authorities. The negative side of putting forward extremely detailed rules was that the Education Act left the local authorities hardly any possibilities for the development of a policy on private education. With regard to public education they had a far greater say, although matters like the time table, the curriculum, and the general development of the system of elementary education remained the domain of central government. However, the education policy of the central administration was also restricted by the technical character of the Elementary Education Act of 1920. For a long period after 1920 the central authorities mainly focused on the juridical-administrative aspects of the education system. Santema pointed out the paralysing effects of such a technical approach to policy making. In his opinion this approach reinforced the segmentation of the schoolsystem as well as the centralised and hierarchical way of policy making. Changes which went beyond technical details, e.g. those concerning the decentralization of policy making or the introduction of comprehensive education at secondary level, were blocked or retarded by this approach.  

the 1960s the number of municipalities without public education was as high as a third, but by 1978 it had declined to 23.9%. Onderwijsverslagen 1929/1930, 1935. S. Boef-van der Meulen and R. Bronneman-Helmers, Planning van educatieve voorzieningen, 1982, p.17.  

23. In 1929/1930 there were 29 intermunicipal schools in the Netherlands, predominantly in North Brabant and South Holland. Onderwijsverslag 1929/1930.  

24. This type of radical changes could indeed possibly cause a deterioration of the position of private education. M. Santema, Het schoolrichtingenvraagstuk I, in: Intermediair 26-10-1973, p.23. Idenburg used the concepts of allocative and constructive approaches to policy making. Allocative policies dominated until
A clear example of the juridical-administrative approach to policy making was the revision of the Elementary Education Act in 1922. The changes of the Elementary Education Act of 1920 were motivated by the need to slow down the growth of the expenses on education which had occurred. The first measure taken was a complete ban on the construction of schools without ministerial permission from March 1922. A couple of months later, in July 1922, a radical reform of the Elementary Education Act of 1920 was proposed. The proposed reform was called the Technical Revision, suggesting that it only concerned the improvement of a number of imperfections in the law of 1920, but in reality it was meant to put a halt to the increase of education expenditure. As such it formed part of the cuts in the total expenditure of the State, proposed at the presentation of the state budget in 1923. The coalition of the Catholics and Protestants, which together had obtained 59 out of 100 mandates in the elections of July 1922, was interested in one thing only: to balance income and expenditure of the State in order to support the Dutch currency. Its starting point for the financial year 1923 was that expenditure should not exceed that of 1922. As regards the education sector this implied a reduction of 35 million out of a total budget of 180 million guilders. Some 30 million of the 35 million to be economized had to be found in the primary education sector. The most important economies proposed in the state budget and in the Technical Revision concerned the:
- technical requirements for the construction of a school,
- maximum number of pupils of a school,
- teachers' salaries, pensions and unemployment benefits,
- teachers' training facilities,
- seventh year of primary education, and
- the minimum number of pupils required to start a private school in municipalities of different size.

Not surprisingly these measures aroused sharp protest from the left as well as from the right but despite these objections the Technical Revision Act was adopted without major changes of the original proposal. As table 3.1 shows total expenditure on the beginning of the 1960s and were mainly concerned with equal allocation of resources (funds, manpower) to the public and the private sector. Constructive policies concerned with the content of education and the optimal educational structure only became important in the 1960s and 1970s. Ph. J. Idenburg, Theorie van het onderwijsbeleid, 1975, pp. 140-141.


26. This measure was in force until April 1923.
primary education indeed stabilised in 1923 and diminished after that year.

Table 3.1 Development of total expenditure on primary education in Dfl x 1000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>gross expenditure</th>
<th>income</th>
<th>net expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>66,500.</td>
<td>4,715.</td>
<td>61,786.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>107,900.</td>
<td>5,019.</td>
<td>102,881.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>131,960.</td>
<td>5,040.</td>
<td>126,920.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>157,002.</td>
<td>5,802.</td>
<td>151,200.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>168,917.</td>
<td>11,091.</td>
<td>157,826.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>150,376.</td>
<td>16,429.</td>
<td>133,947.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examination of the reforms of 1922 shows that the issue of education continued to evoke hostilities between the left and the right even after the pacification of 1917. The ideological character of the debate distracted from the serious financial problems of the state, and as such had an important function. The changes proposed, however, could hardly be called political since the position of neither private nor public education altered. The adaptation of the quantitative norms did not limit the rights of the private sector.

After 1922 similar technical reforms followed in 1924 (reduction of teachers' salaries, increase of the pupils/teacher ratio, no extension of compulsory education from six to seven years), in 1928 (introduction of 7th year, increase of the pupils/teacher ratio), in 1932 (increase of the pupils/teacher ratio) and in 1937 (introduction of a minimum norm to open and maintain a public school). The juridical-administrative approach to policy making continued until the discussion about a more fundamental reform of the primary education system started in the 1970s. The Basic Education Act of 1984, which brought the integration of primary and pre-primary education, was the first piece of constructive policy making regarding this level of education since the last century.

In the preceding pages we have briefly described the evolution of the legislation on primary education and we have particularly paid attention to the relation between public and private education. On the basis of this description we are able

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to formulate operational definitions of the concepts of public and private education. The distinction between public and private education is based on three criteria:

a. the institution which has direct control. In the public sector direct authority is exerted by public bodies. In the case of primary education this is the local administration. Direct control on private education is exerted by private bodies.

b. the ideology of the school. Public schools are neutral and open to all children. Private schools, on the contrary, have a religious or ideological basis. They are allowed to refuse children of families that adhere to a different ideology.29

c. the extent to which schools are financed from public funds. Before 1920 private schools were in a disadvantaged position compared to public schools because they were only partly financed from public funds. Until 1889 they did not even receive any financial support from the public authorities. In the period after 1920 this criterion was no longer of use.

On the basis of these three criteria we arrive at the following definitions. Public schools are schools directly controlled by public bodies and they can be attended by any child, irrespective of its religious or ideological orientation and they are fully financed from public funds. Private schools are schools directly controlled by private bodies. Education in these schools is based on the norms and values of a particular, generally religious, ideology and admission can be restricted to adherents. They are at least partly paid from public funds.

29. The private, not ideologically based, commercial schools which still existed in the last century but had almost disappeared by the turn of the century, thus do not fit the definition. Since we will mainly focus on the period after 1900 this will not cause too much confusion.
3.2 Denominational heterogeneity

As Daalder pointed out the Netherlands has formed part of the zone of 'mixed' religions, in which Reformation and Contra Reformation alike left their imprint, since the 16th century. However, Daalder's statement did not only concern the fact that there has always been a considerable number of Catholics in the Netherlands, which has often wrongly be considered to be a Protestant nation, but also the differentiation which has taken place within the Protestant world. Because we have defined verzuiling as a process of organizational segmentation along religious cleavage lines, it is important to examine the religious map as it existed when this process started and as it developed in the course of the verzuiling process. The fragmentation of the Protestant world partly occurred as a consequence of purely religious conflicts but it was also caused by the process of verzuiling itself. In the second case it was precisely the question of whether one should form social and political organizations based on a particular denomination which led to secession. In other cases, however, both religious and organizational factors played a part.

In this section we will not only examine the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the religious segmentation, but also look at the attitude of each group or denomination with regard to the phenomenon of verzuiling. This information will be useful for the next chapter in which we will study the level and rate of verzuiling.

At the beginning of the 19th century the greater part of the population belonged to the Dutch Reformed Church. Apart from this church some other very small Protestant churches existed. From its origin there were groups of varying degrees of orthodoxy within the Dutch Reformed Church, but until the nineteenth century these differences had not resulted in secession and the formation of new churches. However, when the Dutch Reformed Church, because of the new Church Rule of 1816, increasingly became an instrument of power of the ruling class a clash between the largely latitudinarian, ruling groups and the often more orthodox ordinary members of the Church was imminent. The influence of modern theology, as taught at the universities of Leiden and Groningen, was spreading rapidly among the Dutch Reformed population. Orthodox and latitudinarian Protestants increasingly drifted apart. The opposition of the orthodox group to the rationalistic ideas of modern theology focused in practice on the Church Rule of 1816. The first small, middle and upper class, opposition movement, called Reveil, which wanted to repudiate this Rule, arose in 1823, but did in the end not evoke a definite rupture. The second wave of, more popular, opposition, however, resulted in secession from the mother-church in 1834. This event was not immediately followed by the formation of a new

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church. Only in 1869 the Christian Orthodox Reformed Church (Christelijk Gereformeerde Kerk) was established. Meanwhile state control on the organization of the Dutch Reformed Church was abolished in 1866, which at the same time put an end to the privileged position of this church.31

During the second half of the last century, evoked by the attitude of the Dutch Reformed ruling class towards religious education, a new movement of orthodox Protestants arose within the mother-church. Under the leadership of Abraham Kuyper this movement was transformed into a tight political party. Moreover at many places the orthodox Protestants organized themselves in the struggle for denominational education. The conflict between Kuyper and the authorities of the Dutch Reformed Church ran so high that in 1886 Kuyper and his Amsterdam parish decided to leave the Dutch Reformed Church. Within two years their example was followed in 140 other parishes, of which the majority was located in Friesland, Gelderland, Utrecht and South Holland.32

Secession of orthodox Protestant parishes diffused so rapidly because it had been prepared by the 'Nederlandsche Vereeniging van Vrienden der Waarheid tot Handhaving van de Leer en de Rechten der Gereformeerde Kerk', a society of orthodox Protestants which had tried to obtain influence on individual members of the Dutch Reformed Church since its formation in 1863. Like in many social movements bonds of kinship and friendship provided important channels for the diffusion of the new ideas.33

The core of the secession movement of 1886, which became known as the 'Doleantie', was locally often made up of two or three extended families.

At many places sharp conflicts arose after 1886 between the orthodox Protestants who had remained within the mother-church and those who had left it about the nomination of ministers, the use of church buildings, and the management of other properties of the church. In 1892, however, the parishes of the Doleantie were brought together in a new church, the Orthodox Reformed

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31. A new Church Rule had been introduced in 1852, but the article on the election of the members of the Church board only became operative in 1867. Under the old Church Rule the nomination of the members of the higher church bodies had to be approved of by the King. Verrips, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

32. These parishes are listed by Algra. H. Algra, Het wonder van de negentiende eeuw, 1965, p.327.

Church. The Orthodox Reformed Church increased so rapidly in number that in 1899 it constituted 7.1% of the population. Soon after the turn of the century (1917) the third orthodox Protestant community was established, the Orthodox Reformed Communities (Gereformeerde Gemeenten). This denomination was formed by people that did not join the Christian Orthodox Reformed in 1869 and a number of people which left the Dutch Reformed Church in 1841.35 The Orthodox Protestant Communities were the last denomination founded during this first wave of secession and church formation. The second wave, which started at the end of the Second World War, resulted in the establishment of another six orthodox Protestant churches.

Like the Dutch Reformed Church the three orthodox protestant denominations which came into being between 1850 and 1920 were all based on the dogmas formulated at the time of the General Synodal meeting in 1619. As regards the religious practice the difference between the old church and the new ones was mainly situated in the importance attached to personal religious experiences. Particularly in the Christian Orthodox Reformed Church and the Orthodox Reformed Communities there was a strong pietist influence.36 As regards organization the members of the Dutch Reformed Church emphasised the need for unity in spite of the differences, thus they did not agree with those who saw secession as the only way to solve internal conflicts. The members of the Orthodox Reformed denominations, however, gave priority to their desire for a more authentic religious experience. Another difference, very relevant to our research, between the Dutch Reformed Church and the Orthodox Reformed denominations concerned their view of the position of the church with respect to the state. Among the orthodox Protestants the notion of a complete separation of state and church prevailed. Religion should indeed pervade the entire individual and social life, but this ideal should be realised through the formation of autonomous social and political organizations. In the Dutch Reformed Church, however, the notion of the unitary peoples' church, which left no room for separate organizations, was

34. The Dutch Reformed Church, on the contrary, incurred heavy losses. Between 1879 (54.7%) and 1889 (48.8%) it lost the absolute majority.

35. The first parishes calling themselves Orthodox Reformed Community originated in 1907. Only in 1917, however, they joined to form a separate denomination called the Orthodox Reformed Communities. We refer to the Orthodox Reformed Communities as a denomination instead of a church, since religious authority remained completely decentralized.

adhered to.\textsuperscript{37} The different conceptions of the relation between state and society were very clearly expressed by the attitude of both groups of Protestants to the verzuiling process. It were the members of the Orthodox Reformed denominations who were most in favour of denominational organizations.\textsuperscript{38}

Only minor differences existed between the Orthodox Reformed denominations. Van Putten pointed out the similar social background of the members of the Christian Orthodox Reformed Church and those of the Orthodox Reformed Church. Another similarity existed with regard to their attitude towards denominational education. Both groups strived for equal rights of denominational schools and were prepared to wage a long political struggle about the education issue.\textsuperscript{39} One of the differences between these two groups of orthodox Protestants was that among the following of Kuyper a considerable number of intellectuals and well-to-do people were found, which enabled it to obtain a great influence on the political and social life in the Netherlands, whereas the other church mainly consisted of poorer, lower class people. Another factor which contributed to the positive presence of the Orthodox Reformed in Dutch social and political life was that they explicitly aimed at rechristianizing the state and society.

Despite the fact that many people who opposed the latitudinarian ideas of the ruling group left the Dutch Reformed Church, this church even then was not at all homogeneous. On the contrary the situation within the Dutch Reformed Church was very complex. Even among those who remained a member of the Dutch Reformed Church varying degree of orthodoxy existed and the differences between the varous subgroups of the Dutch Reformed Church were often as great as those between the members of this church on the one hand and those of the Orthodox Reformed Church on the other hand. Orthodox Protestants within and outside the


\textsuperscript{38} However, the studies of Bevaart and Verrips clearly show that adherence to the 'own' organisations was not always spontaneous. Both noticed that the rules of the new church and the rules of the new community (e.g. the rule to send one's children to the Protestant school) often had to be enforced by disciplinary measures taken by the council of the parish. Examples of disciplinary measures against parents whose children attended the public school were found in each of the two areas studied. C. Bevaart, op. cit. p. 156; C. Verrips, op. cit., p. 128.

\textsuperscript{39} J. van Putten, op. cit., p. 201.
Dutch Reformed Church tended to be very similar as far as the contents of their belief were concerned, but disagreed about the question of separate organization. For those who continued to form part of the mother-church the unity of the church was primordial, whereas for those who left the Dutch Reformed Church the need to practise their religion together with like-minded people was more important.

In his study of a Protestant rural community in South Holland Verrips indeed discerned three groups in the Dutch Reformed Church after the secession of 1886:
-first, those who neither agreed with the idea of reformation of the Church nor with Kuyper's political ideal of a rechristianization of society, thus the latitudinarian members of the Church,
-second, those who agreed with these ideas but not with Kuyper's strategy of secession,
-third, those who agreed with the idea of reformation of the Church but neither with Kuyper's strategy nor with his political ideas. 40

Verrips' community was an example of the situation in the Church as a whole. In 1864 the 'Confessionele Vereeniging', an association of orthodox members of the Dutch Reformed Church was founded. This was in fact very much the continuation of the Reveil movement of 1823. The reason why the society was created was the influence of modern theology which could only be checked, according to its members, by organization of the orthodox members of the Church and by their participation as an organized group in the elections of the Church. The Confessionele Vereeniging kept strictly to the dogmas formulated in 1619 and also aimed at an orthodox, national church.

The majority of the second group which Verrips distinguished joined the 'Gereformeerde Bond', founded in 1906. Like the Confessionele Vereeniging, the Gereformeerde Bond adhered to the dogmas of the synodal meeting at Dordrecht in 1619, but it did not believe a reformed Dutch Reformed Church could obtain the position of national church again. Nevertheless they were against secession. Instead they preferred isolation within the old church.

Very much in reaction to these conservative organizations the latitudinarian part of the Dutch Reformed Church organized too. In 1913 a national organization, the 'Vereeniging van Vrijzinnig Hervormden' was founded. Regional organizations, however, existed already since the 1870s. An important reason for the organization of latitudinarian members of the Dutch Reformed Church was the growing number of nominations of orthodox ministers. Particularly in the large cities these tended to outnumber the nomination of modern ministers to a large degree. Between the conservative and the modern societies stood the 'Ethische Vereeniging', founded in 1921. The 'ethical theology',

however, was much older than this date. The thinking of this group on the one hand included many orthodox elements, but on the other hand was open to modern ideas and academic interpretations of the bible. The organization of this group was weakest.41

The members of these four associations were not equally distributed among the Dutch Reformed parishes. Very often the entire community was either orthodox or latitudinarian, and communities belonging to the same strand were to a certain extent geographically concentrated, which showed that the diffusion of religious orthodoxy strongly depended on personal contacts. The orthodox strands prevailed in the provinces of Gelderland, Utrecht, South Holland and Zeeland, whereas the latitudinarian groups were more influential in Groningen, Friesland, Drente and North Holland. The entire process of fragmentation of the Dutch Protestants is schematically presented in figure 3.1.

Finally we turn to the development of the second largest church of the Netherlands, the Catholic Church. The position of the Catholic Church had been deteriorating ever since the dominance of the Dutch Reformed Church had been established in 1619. The Catholic hierarchy, for example, was suspended and Catholics were excluded from public offices. The ban on organizing religious services formed an obstacle for maintaining group cohesion and forced Catholics to keep their belief in the private sphere. In 1795 the Catholics were given the same civil rights as the Protestants. However, the Catholic minorities in the northern and western part of the country continued keeping a low profile in public life in order to avoid conflicts with the Protestant population. The power position of the Catholics improved after the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy in 1853. One indication of this process was that at the political level the Catholic elite no longer formed part of the liberal or conservative faction, but increasingly participated in politics as a separate Catholic faction. During the second half of the 19th century the relative number of Catholics still showed a slight decline compared to the share of the Protestant group as a whole, but from 1910 it went up.42 Whereas in the 1850-1920 period the Dutch Reformed Church went through the processes of


42. The percentage of Dutch Reformed people fell more rapidly, however, than the percentage of Catholics, due to the emergence of the Orthodox Reformed denominations. Between 1849 and 1909 the Catholics lost 3.1 point, whereas the Dutch Reformed population lost 10.4 points.
Figure 3.1 Fragmentation of the Dutch Protestants 1830-1930

Source: Janse, 1985, p.63
internal fragmentation, loss of social influence and numerical decline, the Catholic Church experienced a period of consolidation, growing influence on the political and social life and rapid numerical expansion in absolute terms.

Like the Protestant part of the population the Catholic part was not at all homogeneous. Around 1850 the liberal trend was the most influential. As already said the Catholics did not even form a separate faction in parliament at that time and were certainly not in favour of the formation of Catholic organizations. By 1857, however, the conservative Catholics had improved their position to such an extent that the Catholics chose the side of the orthodox Protestant in the political debate on religious education, which meant that the idea of separate organization had more or less become accepted. The papal letter Quanta Cura of 1864 supported the setting up of denominational organizations, particularly in education. In the subsequent decades the liberal Catholics slowly lost ground to the orthodox, ultramontanist tendency in the Catholic Church, although it took a long time to really expel all liberal influences. In the province of Limburg, for example, it lasted until the second decade of the present century until the last liberal Catholics lost their positions of power, and the process of verzuiling accelerated. Diffusion of verzuiling in the Catholic areas generally corresponded reversely with the importance of liberal ideas among clergy and laity. The growth of segmental organizations among Catholics might also have been influenced by their geographical position: the Catholics living in the mixed areas in the north and the west of the country were quite strongly aware that they formed a minority.

The relation between the orthodox Protestants and the Catholics was not unproblematic either. Despite the alliance they made in the education issue some serious obstacles for close cooperation were present. Within local communities often outright hostility existed between the two groups. Kuyper, the leader of the orthodox Protestants, did not fully succeed in making the ideological opposition between the confessional and the non-confessional groups the dominant one. At the national level he co-operated with the Catholics in coalition government but at the local level relations between orthodox Protestants and Catholics remained antagonistic.

Resuming what has been said about the verzuiling behaviour of the people of various denominations we can say that the building up of the Protestant education sector was mainly the result of the efforts of the members of the orthodox Protestant churches, particularly of the Orthodox Reformed Church and the Christian Reformed Church. Moreover the orthodox Protestants who continued to form part of the Dutch Reformed Church contributed to the expansion of protestant education once it was established. Protestant education will have met very little support among the liberal members of the Dutch Reformed Church.

Catholic education will have been supported first and foremost by the orthodox part of the Catholic Church. In many
places the more liberal part of the Catholic Church, however, did not have enough influence to effectively oppose verzuiling. Support for the public school was thus the result of a process of negative selection: all those who were not in favour of religious education continued to attend the public school. The two most important groups supporting public education were the growing number of people without religious affiliation and a considerable number of the Dutch Reformed.

Figure 3.2 shows the numerical evolution of the three main churches and of that part of the population that did no longer belong to any denomination for the Netherlands as a whole. The overall trends are that of increasing differentiation and declining importance of religion. In 1849 the population basically consists of two groups as far as religion is concerned: the Dutch Reformed, which form by far the largest group, and the Catholics. In 1981 the picture is very different: the share of the Dutch Reformed is less than half of that in 1849 and it is even lower than the share of people that do not belong to any denomination. The Catholic Church shows a remarkable stability during the entire period, its share fluctuates from 35.0 to 40.4. This stability was not only due to the strong internal integration of the Catholic community as a result of the verzuiling but also to demographic factors. The relative growth of the Catholic Church between 1919 and 1960 can certainly also be attributed to the higher birth-rate of the Catholics. The share of the Orthodox Reformed has remained small but stable since 1889.

There are three periods in which the evolution was particularly dynamic. Between 1879 and 1889 the Dutch Reformed Church incurred heavy losses because of the emergence of a new church, the Orthodox Reformed Church. The second phase of heavy losses of the Dutch Reformed Church was the period from 1899 to 1930. This time the loss was not caused, however, by the competition of another church but by the rapid diffusion of secularization in some parts of the Netherlands. By the end of this period the Dutch Reformed Church was no longer the largest: it had been outnumbered by the Catholic Church. The third period that is interesting to look at starts around 1960. The trends of the Dutch Reformed and the secularized group again accelerate and the growth of the Catholic share stabilizes. For the period after 1971 we unfortunately do not have census figures. The two figures for 1981 represent the score on a trend line derived from a number of surveys with questions similar to that of the census (a) and the outcome of one particular sample survey (b). They

43. The figures for the Orthodox Reformed part of the population comprise all Orthodox Reformed denominations.

44. The formulation of the question concerning religious affiliation included in the survey differed from the formulation used in the censuses. This is probably the most important factor
Figure 3.2 Relative strength of the four major ideological groups 1849-1981

Sources: 1849-1971: population census
1981a: estimate by Oudhof and Beets (18 years and over)
1981b: survey by Bommeljé and Doom (16 years and over)
show a continuation of the secularization process which does no
longer only affect the Dutch Reformed Church but the Catholic and
Orthodox Reformed Church as well, be it that the loss of the
latter is still limited. In an interesting article about the
developments within the Dutch Reformed Church De Loor has pointed
out that an important consequence of the continued loss of the
latter church at its latitudinarian side has been that by the
middle of the present century the general character of the
'reduced' church was no longer latitudinarian, but moderately
orthodox.45

The analysis of the global trends of religious affiliation
has focused our attention on a phenomenon which hitherto has not
been discussed, namely the secularization process. Until the
beginning of the twentieth century formal non-religiousness was
almost unknown in the Netherlands, but there had of course always
been people who had only a very weak link with the church. The
situation began to change in the last decade of the nineteenth
century when, as a result of processes such as industrialization
and urbanization, a growing number of people began to turn away
from their church and from religion in general. De Loor holds the
conservatism with regard to social problems as well as the
theological pluriformity of the Dutch Reformed Church responsible
for the decline of plausibility the Church suffered in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century. This lack of plausibility
was expressed in a strong latitudinarian tendency within the
Dutch Reformed Church, which in its turn gave rise to a growing
secularization.46 Secularism was spreading particularly fast
among the rural labourers of the northern provinces and in the
other areas which Hofstee marked as zones of early
modernization.47 The fact that these people explicitly called
themselves non-religious at a time when this was still a new and
socially little accepted status makes it likely that they also
showed a clear preference for public education. Therefore we can

explaining the difference between the two results. This problem
will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

45. H.D. de Loor. Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk. Terugtocht of
aftocht?, in: W. Goddijn and G van Tillo (eds), Hebben de Kerken

46. H.D. de Loor, op. cit., pp.61-68.

47. The secularization process in Friesland has been very
well documented in the studies of Kruyt and Staverman. J.P.
Kruyt, De onkerkelijkheid in Nederland, hare verbreiding en
oorzaken. Proeve ener socio-grafische verklaring, 1933; M.
Staverman, Volk in Friesland buiten de kerk, 1954. See for the
modernization pattern discerned by Hofstee. E.W. Hofstee, De
groei van de Nederlandse bevolking, in: A.N.J. den Hollander,
i.a. (eds.), Drift en koers. Een halve eeuw sociale verandering
in Nederland, 1961, pp.13-84.
expect that the loss of support for the public school caused by the decline of the Dutch Reformed Church was for a great part counteracted by the growing support of the group without religious affiliation. On the basis of the available literature we may doubt whether the same is true for the situation in the 1970s. The secularization which took place among the Dutch Reformed people and the Catholics in this period seems to have only to a little extent affected the demand for denominational education. We will look at this question in more detail, however, in chapter 5.
3.3 Basic trends of verzulina in primary education

The growth of the Dutch population has been very fast in the last hundred years. From about 3 million in 1850 the population increased to roughly 14 million in 1980 and this means that the population of the Netherlands increased at a faster rate than in most other European countries. The remarkable growth of the Dutch population was mainly determined by the evolution of one of the demographic parameters, the birth-rate. In 1850 the birth-rate of the Netherlands was much higher than that of Belgium, France and England, but lower than that of Germany. By 1930, however, the Netherlands had a higher birth-rate than all its neighbouring countries. The birth-rate remained high until the middle of the 1960s causing, together with a low mortality rate, a very high natural growth. Because of the high natural growth attendance of primary education has of course also gone up during most of the period since the middle of the last century. In figure 3.3 the evolution of the total number of pupils in elementary education between 1870 and 1984 is presented.

Because primary education was only made compulsory in 1900 the course of this curve is until that year determined by two factors: the increase of the 6-13 age group and the increase in participation in education. Between 1870 and 1900 the participation in primary education increased from 82.9% to 91%. The main characteristics were a period of stagnation between 1878 and 1883 and a period of fast growth between 1885 and 1890. The curve of the absolute number of pupils moved rather smoothly upwards, showing an acceleration after 1880 and a slight deceleration just before 1900, when the Compulsory Education Act became operative. After 1900 the course of the curve was mainly due to the growth of the age group concerned. Only in the first decade of the century improvement of the participation rate will also have contributed to the increase of the number of pupils.

48. In 1930 the figure for the Netherlands was 23.1 whereas that of the other Western European countries lay between 19.6 and 17.6.

49. The participation rate is defined as the number of children, expressed as a percentage, of a certain age category, that attends school. The figures given here refer to the 6-12 age-group. Whereas between 1878 and 1883 the participation rate declined from 84.3 to 84.0 it increased from 85.1 to 88.5% from 1885 to 1890. Knippenberg, 1986, pp.250-251.

50. Change of the age-group concerned, however, also played a part. The law which was passed in 1900 made school attendance compulsory for children of the 7-13 age-group. Later the age at which school attendance was compulsory was lowered to 6, making the 6-12 age-group the relevant one.
The 1900-1905 period was indeed one of the periods in which growth was very fast.\textsuperscript{51}

From the turn of the century the number of children attending elementary education showed a steady growth from about 740,000 in 1900 to about 1,070,000 in 1925. Between 1925 and 1930 the rate of growth in absolute terms accelerated again.\textsuperscript{52} It is very probable that this increase was caused by demographic developments only. The evolution of the birth-rate indeed showed a peak just after the First World War.\textsuperscript{53} The sharp increase of the birth-rate implied a more than 'average' increase of the number of live born. The generations of 1919-1923 influenced the evolution of the number of pupils in elementary education from the mid-1920s to the beginning of the third decade. After 1930 the number of children attending elementary schools began to decline and this trend lasted until about 1935, after which a stabilization of the figure took place. Contrary to the growth of the 1925-1930 period the decline between 1930 and 1935 is not explained by demographic variables only. It is indeed true that the average birth-rate was much lower in the second half of the third decade than in the first but political and socio-economic variables probably had a much greater influence than the evolution of the demographic variables.\textsuperscript{54} Two factors were of particular importance. The first of these was the difficult situation of the state budget for education in the beginning of the 1930s. The government was forced to economize and the measures it took, such as closing small schools and increasing the pupils/teacher ratio, influenced school attendance in a negative way. The second factor was also related to the economic recession of this period but at the micro-level. The high unemployment rate and the general lowering of the standard of living of many families was a reason to keep children away from school. In some cases it was the lack of money to pay the small school contributions, in other cases people felt ashamed because they could not afford to dress their children properly and therefore they kept children at home. Older children especially

\textsuperscript{51} Participation of the 7-13 years increased from 89.8 to 94.7%. The figure for the 9-12 years went from 93.6 to 98.4. Knippenberg, 1986, p.108.

\textsuperscript{52} The growth is all the more remarkable since after 1925 the pupils attending advanced elementary education are no longer included in the figures.


\textsuperscript{54} The average birth rate showed the following evolution: 1916-1920 25.9, 1921-1925 25.9, 1926-1930 23.4. E.W. Hofstee, op. cit., p.41.
Figure 3.3 Total number of pupils in elementary education 1870-1984*

*) 1870-1925 concerns ordinary elementary education, continued ordinary elementary education and advanced elementary education; 1930-1955 concerns ordinary elementary education and continued ordinary elementary education; 1960-1984 concerns ordinary elementary education.

Sources: 1870-1955: Onderwijsverslagen
1960-1984: CBS, Statistiek van het gewoon lager onderwijs/basis onderwijs
had to leave school to do some work and thus add to the family income or they cared for smaller children when both parents went out to work. Because of the improvement of the economic situation in the years just before the Second World War the number of children attending primary education was more or less stable in this period.

Just after the Second World War the pattern of the 1920s was repeated. Because of an extremely high birth-rate in 1946 (30.2 as compared to 22.6 in 1945 and an average of 26.0 between 1946 and 1950) the number of primary school pupils augmented rapidly in the beginning of the 1950s and reached a peak of 1,450,000 in 1955. The high level of the mid 1950s was followed, however, by a period of slight decline which lasted until 1965. The highest number of pupils hitherto registrated in elementary schools was in the beginning of the 1970s when nearly 1,500,000 children attended such schools. Again this was the result of the demographic variable: between 1960 and 1964 the number of live born climbed from 238,789 to 250,914, from where its decline started. Between 1970 and 1975 the number of pupils remained more or less at the same level but after the latter date a dramatic decline occurred. In a period of 10 years the decline of primary school-pupils was almost 25%: from the high level of 1,462,376 in 1975 to only 1,094,980 in 1984. The decline of the number of pupils in the last ten years has been an all-European feature but it has been particularly dramatic in the Netherlands because it happened so fast. The number of live born fell from 245,200 in 1965 to 177,900 in 1975 and the birth-rate fell some 7 points in the same period, from 20.0 to 13.0. These developments together brought the number of pupils in elementary schools at the same level as in 1925.

Before we will examine the increasing verzuiling of the primary education system, i.e. the growing tendency among Catholic and Protestant children to attend denominational schools, we will first look at the numerical evolution of the public and the private education sectors.

After 1848 private education slowly started to expand. It has been rightly observed, however, that in the 19th century the category of private education was not always similar to the category of denominational education. The Education Act of 1857 introduced the difference between subsidized and non-subsidized private education. To the first category belonged those schools which received financial aid from municipal or provincial funds. These schools were not allowed to discriminate on the basis of a pupils' denomination. Besides it was forbidden to teach against the convictions of any of the pupils in these schools. Obviously denominational schools could not make use of these financial

55. H. Knippenberg, 1986, op. cit. See pp.55-56 where Knippenberg describes the types of schools existing before the Education Act of 1857 and pp.62-63 where the situation after 1857 is explained.
arrangements. Most of the schools belonging to the first group were held by individual teachers who operated schools for profit making purposes. To the group of non-subsidized schools belonged all the schools owned by corporate bodies such as the charity schools of the churches and the schools founded by denominational educational associations and religious orders. It was the latter type of schools which developed fastest, and became the only form of private education at the beginning of the 20th century.

The difference between non-subsidized and subsidized private education replaced the old difference between 'first class private schools' and 'second class private schools' which had existed until 1857. Within the category of 'first class private schools' the ratio of charity schools to schools held by denominational societies and religious orders changed rapidly after 1848, to the detriment of the first type of schools. Because of this shift it has been suggested by Van der Laarse who studied verzolging among the Catholics in a small provincial town that the verzolging of the education system was not a matter of the public neutral sector losing pupils to denominational schools, which is the current notion of verzolging, but a process of charity schools run by lay Catholics, being replaced by denominational schools more directly controlled by the churches. This is not true, however, since private non-subsidized schools initially had different forms of government. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the balance shifted towards schools governed by private associations and religious orders. Some of the schools which had been governed by independent committees at first were taken over by societies and religious orders in a later stage. The overall growth of denominational schools owned by religious societies and orders was only to a very limited extent due to this type of transformation. The relative loss of the public sector to the private denominational sector was of much greater importance, particularly after 1900.

Figure 3.4 shows that after a brief period of rapid growth the number of non-subsidized schools declined between 1860 and 1865, which was partly due to the closing of schools because of financial problems. The financial situation of non-subsidized schools was particularly bad and these schools often had

56. The share of denominational schools owned by societies and religious orders increased from 26% in 1853 to 33% in 1857. Knippenberg, 1986, op. cit., p.62.

57. R. van der Laarse, 'Verzwolgen door den Ultramontaanschen Vloed'. Leken en clerus in katholiek Delft in de negentiende eeuw, in: J.C.H. Blom and C.J. Misset, op. cit., pp.84-87. Although this type of transformation occurred at several places it has been far from the dominant source of growth of the denominational schools operated by private denominational associations and religious orders.
Figure 3.4 Evolution of the number of public and private elementary schools 1825-1900*

1. public
2. private second class
3. private first class
4. subsidized private
5. non-subsidized private

*) Figure from H. Knippenberg, 1986, p.61. The figures for 1825-1845 do not include Limburg

Sources: Onderwijsverslagen
difficulties to compete with the free public schools. From 1880, however, the non-subsidized sector increased steadily and after 1889 the curve of the non-subsidized sector is even steeper than that of the public sector. The law of 1889, which made subsidies for private denominational education possible, did not exert a great impetus on the growth of this sector.

Table 3.2 Non-subsidized private schools 1868-1920

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Source: Onderwijsverslagen 1868-1920.

In table 3.2 the evolution of the various types of non-subsidized schools is presented. In 1868 the category of schools owned by individuals, which were often rather small schools, was still the largest but in 1900 it was the category of denominational schools operated by religious orders and societies that had the first position. The growth of the non-subsidized sector as a whole between 1870 and 1900 was only caused by the growth of Protestant and Catholic schools belonging to the latter category. The number of Protestant schools governed by societies particularly increased between 1889 and 1900, apparently to the detriment of the private schools held by individuals. To what extent the private schools held by individuals were confessional is not clear from the statistical sources.58

Figure 3.5 gives a picture of the evolution of the absolute number of schools of each of the three main sectors since 1870.

58. In the statistical sources this group is sometimes divided according to the denomination of the owner. It is not certain, however, that the education provided at this schools was also religious.
In 1870 the public sector was by far the largest and for a long time it continued to be so. The number of non-subsidized private schools was much smaller though it was growing faster from 1889. In the beginning of the period studied the number of denominational schools operated by associations and religious orders formed only a small part of the total number of non-subsidized private schools but the relations within the private sector were already reversed by 1885. The category of ‘other’ private schools declined rapidly until 1885 and again from 1895. After 1910 it consisted mainly of industrial schools and schools operated by a liberal education society: the charity schools and the schools owned by individuals had almost disappeared. Just before 1900 the number of Protestant schools outstripped the number of Catholic schools, which was quite remarkable because the Catholic population was much larger than the Orthodox Reformed population, which was the main supporter of Protestant education at that time. Between 1920 and 1925, however, the relation again changed. As the Catholic Church became the largest denomination in the Netherlands the Catholic education sector first outnumbered the orthodox Protestant sector and then passed the public sector.

An important period in the entire evolution of primary education during the twentieth century was that between 1920 and 1930. The last years before 1920 both Catholics and Protestants had hesitated to invest in new schools, but this attitude changed once the Elementary Education Act became operative. The law initially stimulated the growth of the public and private sectors alike. The new financial arrangements for primary education entailed in this law were not only profitable for the private sector, which had hitherto for a considerable part depended on private contributions, but also for the public sector which was from that moment completely at the charge of the central administration.

59. The liberal education society mentioned here was the Maatschappij tot Nut van 't Algemeen, which had been founded in 1784. One of its central aims was the improvement of education.

60. Just after 1917, when the financial responsibility of the central administration was embedded in the constitution, many private schools were opened. By 1920, however, the mood had changed. The deteriorating economic situation made people doubt whether the new Education Act would become operative. A.P. Bouwens, De schoolstrijd in midden West-Friesland in een politiek-geografisch perspektief, 1984, p.65; J.P.A. van Vugt, De verzuiling van het lager onderwijs in Limburg 1860-1940, in: Jaarboek van het Katholiek Documentatie Centrum, 1980, p.27.

61. Whereas the municipal authorities kept decision making capacity about the public schools the central administration became financially responsible for public education. This resulted in an enormous expansion of the number of public...
Figure 3.5 Absolute number of primary schools by sector 1870-1984*

*) 1870-1925 concerns ordinary elementary education, continued ordinary elementary education and advanced elementary education; 1930-1955 concerns ordinary elementary education and continued ordinary elementary education; 1960-1984 concerns ordinary elementary education. The categories 'Catholic schools' and 'Protestant schools' do not include schools owned by one person and the category 'other private schools' does not include subsidized private schools, therefore the figures for the various categories do not add up to the total until 1910.

Sources: 1870-1955: Onderwijsverslagen
1960-1984: CBS, Statistiek van het gewoon lager onderwijs/basis onderwijs
Figure 3.6 Relative number of primary schools by sector 1870-1984*

*) 1870-1925 concerns ordinary elementary education, continued ordinary elementary education and advanced elementary education; 1930-1955 concerns ordinary elementary education and continued ordinary elementary education; 1960-1984 concerns ordinary elementary education. The categories '% Catholic schools' and '% Protestant schools' do not include schools owned by one person and the category '% other private schools' does not include subsidized private education, therefore the percentages do not add up to 100 until 1910.

Sources: 1870-1955: Onderwijsverslagen
1960-1984: CBS, Statistiek van het gewoon lager onderwijs/basisonderwijs
The relative number of pupils in Protestant, Catholic and other neutral education has been determined on the basis of the relative number of schools in each sector.

1870-1925 concerns ordinary elementary education, continued ordinary elementary education and advanced elementary education; 1930-1955 concerns ordinary elementary education and continued ordinary elementary education; 1960-1984 concerns ordinary elementary education. The categories 'pupils in Catholic schools' and 'pupils in Protestant schools' do not include schools owned by one person and the category 'pupils in other private schools' does not include subsidized private education, therefore the percentages do not add up to 100 until 1910.

Sources: 1870-1955: Onderwijsverslagen
1960-1984: CBS, Statistiek van het gewoon lager onderwijs/basisonderwijs
around 1925 when it entered a period of rapid decline because it could no longer withstand the competition of the private sector. In contrast to the public sector the growth of the Catholic and the Protestant sectors continued. Around 1930 the number of Protestant schools stagnated, suggesting that the process of verzuiing of the Protestant population had reached its saturation point, as far as education was concerned.

The post-Second World War peak of the birth-rate caused a new wave of construction activities in each of the three sectors between 1950 and 1955. The most interesting developments took place, however, after the middle of the 1960s. Between 1965 and 1970 the decline of the Catholic sector started. This decline was due to the rapid decline of the number of devoted Catholics that we attributed to internal as well as external forces in chapter 2. After 1975 this trend was reinforced by the effect of the declining number of births since 1969. The same effect was noticeable in the other two sectors, in which it, however, caused an inversion of the trend. In fact this inversion has come rather late, more than ten years after the inversion of the trend of the demographic variable. The continued expansion of the protestant and the public sector was due to various factors, such as shifts of the spatial distribution of the population and rising differentiation between the Orthodox Reformed Church and other orthodox Protestant churches. The evolution of the primary education system of the last ten years will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. Figure 3.6 pictures the growth or decline in relative figures. It is easy to see in this diagram that the public sector started to lose from about 1885. Before that date the growth of the schools administered by private denominational organizations had been at the expense of other types of private schools.

Figure 3.7 gives a picture of what Kruyt called the segmental quotient, i.e. the distribution of the total number of pupils between the four education sectors since 1870. Because only the share of the private sector as a whole is known the figures for the distribution of pupils within the private sector before 1930 are estimates based on the distribution of schools within the private sector. This means that we have to be careful interpreting the positions of the three private sectors with regard to each other.

Just as in the case of the schools the public sector was by far the largest at the beginning of the period. We know, however, that the decline of this sector had already started. Figure 3.7 shows that this trend continued for three quarters of a century education provisions.

62. During the first years after the Education Act of 1857 the share of pupils attending public education went up. The turning point came between 1865 and 1870, when the figure fell from 79.3 to 77.2.
until it came to a stand-still. At that moment the public sector had lost some 48 points as compared to its initial level, registering only 27% of the pupils. Although the decline had been gradual two periods in which the rate of decline somewhat accelerated can be observed, the first lasting from 1905 to 1910 and the second from 1920 to 1930. The first acceleration can probably be explained from the improvement of the conditions of private education which had taken place in 1905, when the possibilities for state-financing as stipulated in the Education Act of 1889 were changed.\textsuperscript{63} The developments of the second period were clearly influenced by the Elementary Education Act of 1920. The decline of the public sector continued throughout the 1930s, although at a somewhat slower pace. Between 1945 and 1965 the level of participation in public education remained more or less stable, oscillating between 26 and 29%. In 1965, the year in which the share of public education reached an all-time low, the trend reversed. Between 1965 and 1980 the public sector gained 6 points which brought its share at a level similar to that just before the Second World War.

Obviously the trend of the private education sector as a whole has been the reverse of that of the public education sector. However, the evolution of the participation in the Protestant and the Catholic sector showed some interesting differences. The shares of the Protestant and the Catholic sector did not differ very much at the beginning of the period studied but they were probably somewhat higher than they are shown in figure 3.7.\textsuperscript{64} From the mid-1920s, however, the two lines started to diverge, the Catholic sector continuing its growth for a much longer period than the Protestant sector. As regards the rate of growth we observe that the Protestant sector increased the most between 1905 and 1910 and between 1920 and 1925. Thus expansion was fastest immediately after legislation which improved the conditions of private education. The evolution of the Catholic sector on the contrary was most intense between 1925 and 1930. The faster growth of the 1925-1930 period as compared to the five year period preceding it makes clear that the Catholics more than

\textsuperscript{63} In the same period the number of private schools was also growing faster (see the figures 3.5 and 3.6). The larger subsidies for private education apparently stimulated the founding of private schools and probably also had an influence on the level of the school fees charged by private schools.

\textsuperscript{64} From other studies about private education in the second half of the nineteenth century it does not appear that the average size of Catholic and Protestant schools differed, therefore our estimates of the shares of these sectors with regard to each other are quite reliable. The estimate of the share of the participation in other private schools is very likely too high, since particularly the schools operated by individuals were small.
the Protestants adopted a waiting attitude.65 The growth of participation in Catholic education in the first fifteen years after the turn of the century was probably also influenced by the introduction of compulsory education. According to Knippenberg participation in education was comparatively low in the two Catholic provinces, North Brabant and Limburg, in 1900.66

By 1945 the situation was completely reversed as compared to that in 1870. Participation in public education had fallen below that in the Protestant sector (27% and 28% respectively), the first now being the smallest, except for the neutral private sector, which will be discussed below. The Catholic sector, registering 44% of the pupils attending primary schools, was far ahead of the other two sectors. In the next twenty years, until 1965, the Catholic and the Protestant sectors developed in similar ways, and in reverse to the public sector. During the first ten years both sectors lost a few points, but thereafter they regained this loss again. The loss of the Catholic sector was all the more remarkable because in the first half of the 1950s the peak of the number of births of 1946-1947, to which the Catholic population contributed more than any other part of the population, augmented the overall growth of the 6-12 age-group.67 Compared to the period before 1945, however, fluctuations in the 1945-1965 period were small. After 1965 the curves of Protestant and Catholic education again diverged. Whereas the Protestant sector maintained and even improved its share, participation in Catholic education began to fall. The public sector and the neutral private sector gained from the loss of pupils in the Catholic sector.

The third private sector consisted after 1910 almost completely of ideologically neutral schools, such as industrial schools, schools of the Maatschappij tot Nut van 't Algemeen, and, later, schools which were based on particular pedagogic philosophies, such as those of Maria Montessori and Rudolf Steiner. Because these schools already existed when the Elementary Education Act of 1920 was drawn up provisions were made to incorporate these schools in the Act. The law was clearly

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65. According to the study of Van Vugt the catholic population of Limburg was often reluctant to adopt the new type of schools, because it disturbed the existing power relations in the local communities. J.P.A. van Vugt, op. cit., pp.26-32.

66. H. Knippenberg, 1986, op. cit., p.134. In 1900 school attendance of children of the 5-14 age-group was ten points higher in Groningen (79%) than in Limburg (69%).

67. From the third quarter of the last century until the mid-1960s the Catholics had a higher birth-rate than any other group of the population. H. Knippenberg., De demographische ontwikkeling van Nederland sedert 1800: een overzicht, in: Geografisch Tijdschrift, 1980, pp.60 and 69.
made to accommodate the needs of those who supported religious education but also left room for the existence of schools based on other ideologies if these fulfilled all the requirements listed. Participation in this sector remained from 1925 to 1975 at 2%. Only very recently it has become more important numerically and politically. The discussion about this type of education has focused in particular on the question whether it can be considered as a substitute for public education, since it is not based on a religious ideology. The argument that public and private neutral education are more or less the same has frequently been used by confessional local administrators who were reluctant to accept the founding of a public school.

Finally the figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the differences between the shares of Catholic and Protestant pupils and the shares of Catholic and Protestant children under the age of 20, which roughly form the reference categories from which the Catholic and Protestant education sectors draw. Unfortunately the curves of the Catholic and Protestant children under the age of 20 are not very detailed since these are based on the results of the population censuses which were only taken every ten year.

The size of the differences is determined by the evolution of the share of the pupils in denominational schools on the one hand and the demographic and religious evolution of the denomination on the other hand. The process of verzuiling in the Catholic sector can be divided into four periods. The first one of these runs from the middle of the last century, when the first Catholic schools appeared, until about 1940. During this period the share of the pupils in Catholic schools was much lower than the percentage of Catholics in the age group concerned. The difference between the percentage of Catholic children and the percentage of pupils thus was negative. Verzuiling was the dominant social trend. When the share of Catholic pupils began to rise after 1920 the difference diminished rapidly. By 1940 the verzuiling of the Catholic population had reached its saturation-point, as far as the education sector was concerned.

After World War Two the process of ontzuiling which had started as early as the 1920s in some regions, gained importance. Particularly among intellectuals the need was felt for greater openness between the members of different churches on the one hand and between religious people and the Socialists on the other hand. The decline of verzuiling in the education sector, which we notice in figure 3.8, corresponds to this general trend. Other examples of ontzuiling were the fact that some Catholics and some Protestants joined the new Social Democratic Party, and the membership of Catholics of Protestants of the Socialist trade-union. This cultural change was an urban phenomenon, as can be seen in figure 3.10, in which information concerning nineteen municipalities has been presented. The degree of urbanization, as indicated by the number of inhabitants, shows a clear correlation with the growth or decline of the share of the public school.
Figure 3.8 Difference between the share of pupils in Catholic schools and the share of Catholics in the 0-20 age-group 1870-1980*

1. Catholics in the 0-20 age-group
2. Pupils in Catholic schools

*) data for 1869, 1879, 1889 and 1981 concern the entire population instead of the 0-20 age-group

Sources: educational data: Onderwijsverslagen; CBS, Statistiek van het gewoon lager onderwijs
religious affiliation: population census 1869-1971; estimates Oudhof & Beets and Bommelje & Doorn
Figure 3.9 Difference between the share of pupils in Protestant education and the shares of Orthodox Reformed and Dutch Reformed in the 0-20 age-group 1870-1980*

*) data for 1869, 1879, 1889 and 1981 concern the entire population instead of the 0-20 age-group

Sources: educational data: Onderwijsverslagen; CBS, Statistiek van het gewoon lager onderwijs
religious affiliation: population census 1869-1971; estimates Oudhof & Beets and Bommelje & Doorn
Figure 3.10 Growth or decline of the share of pupils in public education in nineteen municipalities of different size between 1950 and 1955

Sources: municipal annual reports
sector. To what extent the individual and contextual variables measure the same can not be established on the basis of this analysis. The process of ontzuiling resulted in a small negative difference in the Catholic education sector. In the middle of the 1950s, however, it came to a halt. In 1954 the Dutch episcopate condemned the loss of interest of Catholics in Catholic organizations in one of their pastoral letters. The bishops did not only penalise membership of the Socialist trade-union but also pressed the Catholic community to give their children a Catholic education.

The bishops' call seems not to have been in vain, since in the second half of the 1950s the process of verzuilende temporarily increased again. Looking back on this period, however, it is clear that they never completely restored their authority. For the time being the old social order was maintained but the modernizing influences emanating from processes such as urbanization, industrialization and increased geographical mobility could no longer be pushed back. Among the clergy as well as among the ordinary church members the function of Catholic organizations was more and more doubted.

The major breakthrough, however, came only around 1965, when the process of ontzuiling definitely gained pace. The Catholic political party (KVP), for example, fell almost 15 points between 1963 and 1972. In education the loss of the Catholic sector also started in the middle of the 1960s but it was less serious. To what extent these losses were due to a declining importance attached to Catholic organizations and to what extent it was the result of the spread of secularization is difficult to establish since we do not have data about the religious affiliation of the Dutch population in the 1980s similar to the census data that are available for the period up to 1971. Starting from a conservative estimate of the % Catholic children in the 0-20 age-group in 1981 we arrive at the conclusion that the loss of the Catholic education sector has been faster than the loss of the Church itself, hence a process of ontzuiling in the strict sense of the word has taken place. Other estimates, according to which the percentage of Catholics has declined much more rapidly, suggest that hitherto the education sector has quite well resisted the ontzuiling process. This problem will be discussed more extensively, however, in chapter 5.

As regards verzuilende and ontzuiling processes in the Protestant sector the situation has always been more complicated, since several denominational groups were involved. Figure 3.9 shows that the percentage of Orthodox Reformed children, who were most likely to attend protestant schools because the Orthodox Reformed denominations were the main supporters of separate religious organizations, has remained far below the percentage of children attending Protestant schools during the entire period
from 1870 to 1985. \(^{68}\) Protestant education thus has from its very beginning also been attractive for the orthodox members of the Dutch Reformed Church. From about 1915 the Dutch Reformed Church contributed numerically more to the Protestant education sector than the Orthodox Reformed church. While Protestant education rapidly expanded, however, the decline of the Dutch Reformed continued. After the number of Dutch Reformed initially fell because orthodox members joined the new Orthodox Reformed churches the Dutch Reformed Church was subsequently losing as a result of secularisation processes among the latitudinarian members. In this way the Dutch Reformed Church has probably slowly been reduced to a more orthodox core. By 1971 the percentage of Dutch Reformed and Orthodox Reformed children less than 20 years old was only just as high as the percentage of children attending Protestant schools, and it is all the more surprising that the Protestant education sector has comparatively been growing since that year as all the estimates of the religious affiliation of the Dutch population have pointed out a further decline of the Dutch Reformed Church. The Protestant denominations participated in the ontzuiling process but to a far less extent than the Catholics. At the political level, for example, only one of the Protestant political parties, the CHU, lost a large number of voters whereas the other political party, the ARP, more or less kept its ground. The education sector clearly forms an exception to the ontzuiling in the other sectors.

The national trends presented in this chapter provide a general understanding of the growth and decline of public and private primary education and processes of verzuiling and ontzuiling of the education system. Verzuiling and ontzuiling appeared to be non-linear, differentiated processes. We noticed considerable differences between the Catholic part of the population and the Protestant part of the population concerning the level of verzuiling at the beginning of the century, the rate of increase of verzuiling, the level of verzuiling reached at the time stabilization set in, the moment ontzuiling started and the rate of ontzuiling. Moreover it has been shown that it is wrong to perceive verzuiling and ontzuiling as two successive processes. Analysis of the 1945-1965 period suggests that both processes were at work, resulting in the first ten years in a slightly stronger trend towards ontzuiling, whereas in the next ten years verzuiling dominated again.

Examination of data for the Netherlands as a whole has been instructive because it has given an overview of the trend during the entire existence of private denominational education. It did not enable us, however, to go beyond very general statements. The trend for 1945-1965, for instance, suggested that verzuiling as well as ontzuiling occurred. The general trends of verzuiling and

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\(^{68}\) The curve of the Orthodox Reformed population includes the members of all Orthodox Reformed denominations in each year.
ontzuiling resulted from numerous events at the local level which initially worked in the direction of verzuiling and later made ontzuiling the dominant process. Important factors causing local variations in the pace of these processes were discussed in the preceding chapter: the degree of religious heterogeneity of the population, the degree of urbanization, the degree of industrialization, centre-periphery differences. Variation is particularly likely to have existed in periods of a rupture or an acceleration of the general trend. The geographical variation in the levels of verzuiling and ontzuiling that appeared in these periods is then to be understood as a time-lag. In the next two chapters the geographical diffusion of verzuiling and ontzuiling in the education sector based on the regional distribution of the various religious segments of the population will be discussed in more detail.


70. Knippenberg and Van der Wusten observed that the acceleration of verzuiling of the primary education system between 1920 and 1928 was regionally a far more varied phenomenon than the increase in the earlier period. Knippenberg and Van der Wusten, 1984, op. cit., p.184.
CHAPTER FOUR  THE DIFFUSION OF DENOMINATIONAL PRIMARY EDUCATION
1870–1930

Introduction

In this chapter the diffusion of denominational primary education between 1870 and 1930 is examined. As has been shown in chapter three, the diffusion of a segmented primary education system started in the middle of the last century and remained initially very slow. Between 1860 and 1900 the number of pupils enrolled in private denominational education rose from 10.5% to 25.4%. The relative number of private denominational schools went up from 12.5% to 25.8%. Although we will briefly look at the spread of denominational education before 1900 our main objective in this chapter is to analyse the spatial diffusion after this year. The reason to focus on the post 1900 period is twofold.

First it is difficult to analyse the situation before 1900 in the same way as the situation after 1900 because of the introduction of compulsory education in 1900. In the second half of the last century the level of participation in elementary education was determined by two factors: the wish to participate in formal education as such and the wish to participate in a particular type of education, e.g. public or private education. The importance of each of these two explaining variables is difficult to establish. Parents probably gave up the wish for formal education when there was no denominational school nearby or when they considered the opportunity costs of schooling too high. After 1900, however, they were obliged to send their children to school, so in case there was no denominational education they had either to send their children to a public school or to campaign for the founding of a denominational school. The more urgently the need for private education was felt, the earlier private schools were set up or enlarged. The choice between these two types of behaviour is one of the central aspects of the process of verzulking.

Second most of the official sources do not, as far as the period before 1900 is concerned, distinguish between the different types of private education. In chapter 3 we have presented data about the numerical evolution of different types of schools for the Netherlands as a whole. The evolution of the relative number of pupils attending each type of school had to be deduced, however, from the data concerning the schools. At the level of the municipality, which is the unit of analysis in this
chapter, the official sources do in most cases not distinguish within the category of private education, neither with regard to the number of schools, nor with regard to the number of pupils. Therefore the analysis of the pre-1900 period will be limited to the diffusion of the private sector as a whole. The analysis of the period after 1900 will be more specific.

Chapter 4 is divided into three sections. In section 4.1 we will make some initial remarks about diffusion theory, the hypothesis about the spatial diffusion of verzuiing put forward by Daalder and Stuurman and about problems of operationalization. Section 4.2 deals with the diffusion of private schools between 1880 and 1930. Finally in section 4.3 we will look at the diffusion of the participation in private elementary education.

4.1 Diffusion theory, Daalder's hypothesis and problems of operationalization

The theory of diffusion of innovations is an important part of modern geography. It got an impetus by the work of Hägerstrand, who further developed what is now called the traditional approach to diffusion studies. The traditional approach focused on the demand side of the diffusion process, that is on the adoption of an innovation and on the generative processes underlying adoption or resistance to adoption. Whereas in traditional geography features of the landscape were found to be major obstacles or stimuli for the diffusion of a particular innovation, Hägerstrand's basic tenet was that the spread of an innovation was the outcome of a learning or communications process. Thus in order to understand the process of diffusion one had to examine the effective flow of information. In his empirical work Hägerstrand discovered important regularities in diffusion both in time and in space.

Over time, the cumulative level of adoption approximated an S-shape, corresponding to the primary stage in which the innovation was adopted by only a few people, a diffusion stage and a condensing or saturation stage. The adopters themselves were divided into innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. The exact form of the S was determined by the rate of adoption. The spatial expression of this movement was a process starting from initial diffusion centres, then spreading to areas near diffusion centres, and finally filling in the last blank spots. Apart from the fact that it is very hard to measure the effective flow of information in the age of mass media Hägerstrand's work has been criticised

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1. The S-shaped curve of diffusion processes had been described earlier by sociologists. For a major review of their work see E.M. Rogers and F.F. Shoemaker, Communication of innovations. A cross-cultural approach, 1971. Hägerstrand, however, elaborated the spatial expression of these processes.
for two reasons. The first of these was that Hagerstrand’s research exclusively focused upon the diffusion of manufactured innovations, to be distinguished from the diffusion of ideas or behavior patterns. The second is that Hagerstrand only paid attention to the spread of information as factor underlying the diffusion process. Other variables were relegated to the status of resistance factors. Nevertheless many public policy studies have started from the adoption aspect of diffusion.

The traditional approach assumed that all have equal opportunities to adopt and thus focused on individual characteristics to explain why adoption occurred at different moments in time. By contrast, the market and infrastructure approach focused on the process by which an innovation and the conditions to adopt were made available to individuals, that is the supply side of diffusion. Individual behavior does not present free will so much as choices within a constraint set and it is governments and private institutions which establish and control the constraints. Over time there are again three stages in the diffusion process. The initial activity is the establishment of diffusion agencies through which the innovation will be distributed to the population. The second activity is to establish the innovation, that is to implement a strategy to induce the population to adopt the innovation. Only during the third stage adoption occurs. The supply side of diffusion thus shifts the emphasis from the adopter to the diffusion agency. The location of these agencies and the timing of their establishment determine the spatial pattern of diffusion. L.A. Brown, who has been one of the major theorists of the supply side approach of diffusion, has stressed, however, that the two approaches are complementary and only together provide a comprehensive view of the innovation diffusion process.2

It is clear that to explain the diffusion of verzuiling in the education sector the traditional adoption approach to diffusion will not do. The adoption of verzuiling behaviour, that is the decision to send one’s children to a denominational school instead of to a public school, did not only depend on the adoption of the idea that it was better to do so, in order to protect them against the influences of Liberal and Socialist ideologies, but also on the availability of denominational education. The availability of denominational education, if it was present in the region at all, was to a large extent determined by the distance to a denominational school and the costs of this type of education. Apart from contextual variables, such as the religious heterogeneity of an area, and the ideologies of different denominations with regard to the question of separate organization, which influenced the demand for denominational education, the expression and realisation of this demand was itself determined by the sheer presence of this type

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of education. Precondition for the adoption of verzulling behaviour, but not for the adoption of the idea of separate organization, thus was the diffusion of denominational schools.

The denominational schools were not similar, however, to the diffusion agencies which were central to the supply side approach of diffusion theory. It is true that their location and the timing of their establishment determined the spatial pattern of adoption of segmented education, but the location and timing of denominational schools were, at least as far as the Protestant sector was concerned, not the outcome of a centrally planned strategy, as is often the case in the diffusion of a public good or the diffusion of a private good by a firm. On the contrary, the diffusion of denominational schools usually resulted from the concerted efforts of a small group of users themselves. Supply of the innovation was not from above, instead the innovation was made available by those who had already adopted the idea of the innovation, the early adopters in diffusion terminology. National organizations, such as the Vereeniging voor Christelijk Nationaal Schoolonderwijs, had a coordinating role for the Protestant denominational schools that had already been set up and gave advice to groups of people who wanted to establish one, but they did not have an initiating task. Local organizations, e.g. the churchboards, certainly played a part in the founding of schools, but this was usually in cooperation with some of the future users of the schools. In the Catholic world, with its hierarchical structure, the situation was probably somewhat different. Case studies of verzulling processes among the Catholic part of the population have shown that the local clergy played an important and often even a decisive role in the formation of a closed Catholic community by creating a tight network of Catholic organizations. Verzuiling of the Catholic population was much more a process organized from above than a movement among ordinary churchmembers. As such the local clergy can be compared to Brown’s diffusion agencies. Whether the local clergy acted at the instigation of the higher clergy, the bishops, or at their own initiative is a matter that needs further investigation. The influence of the bishops probably depended strongly on the individual character of the various persons who held this office and also differed by type of activity.

Since we have established the presence of the institution, i.e. denominational schools, as the precondition for the diffusion of innovative behaviour, we prefer to study the verzulling of education at two levels. Therefore we will first look at the diffusion of verzulling at the level of the institution, that is the spread of denominational schools, and subsequently at the diffusion of verzulling at the level of the behaviour of individuals, that is the diffusion of participation in denominational education. Despite the fact that the founding of denominational schools often resulted from the efforts of a

3. Following marketing theory Brown calls the diffusion agencies also outlets.
group of early adopters themselves this did not imply that the S-shaped curves of both diffusion processes, that of the institution and that of the participation, were identical or that they occurred at the same time. Hanham and Brown found that the diffusion of a particular institution often preceded the adoption of the use of or participation in this new institution. Thus, while a service gradually became available to all, it was for a long time used by a small group of people only. Whether diffusion of segmented education followed a similar pattern will be established in the next two sections.

Many authors have combined the theory of diffusion of innovations with the theory on central places, supposing that most innovative process started in urban areas, then moved to the lower order urban places and finally reached the rural hinterland. If one considers the availability of information as the most important generative process underlying the diffusion of an innovation this is to be expected since more information is produced in a town because of its cultural and social climate and its denser interaction. However, if one recognises other factors as important variables in the explanation of the diffusion of an innovation it is not certain that innovations will always start in an urban environment. Rural opposition movements, for example, have not always been incited by urban groups, but sometimes were genuinely rural. Likewise the orthodox movements which sprang up during the last century were all overwhelmingly rural movements.

According to Dealder and Stuurman the most important process underlying the diffusion of verzuiling, that is a process of increasing segmentation of society along religious dividing-lines, was not the availability of information but the ideological polarization which developed between the religious orthodox and latitudinarian groups, between Protestants and Catholics, and between the churches and the Socialists, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Hence they put the socio-cultural factor central to the process of verzuiling. Ideological conflicts were of course most likely to arise where interaction between members of different groups was most frequent which was in areas of a mixed religious character and in areas with sharp social oppositions. Geographical proximity of people with conflicting ideologies strengthened the need to emphasise the own identity, firstly, to increase the internal cohesion and secondly, to increase the social distance between the own group and other groups. Social segregation seemed to offer subcultural groups the best way to maintain their independence. Thus the essence of the process of verzuiling was the expression of the need for social segregation at the organizational level. Competition and imitation were important mechanisms which

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contributed to the emergence of separate networks of organizations.

Starting from the assumption that the ideological heterogeneity of an area was the most important factor underlying the need for social segregation, Daalder and Stuurman stated that the nuclei from where the process of verzuiling began to diffuse were situated in the rural parts of Friesland, in the mixed religious areas of rural Utrecht and Gelderland and the mixed areas in the western part of the Netherlands. The latter area included the southern part of the North Holland, and part of rural South Holland. Other areas of early verzuiling, because of the increasingly secular orientation of their population and the growing influence of the Socialist ideology, were supposed to be parts of the three northern provinces, the northern part of North Holland, the larger cities in the West, and a few areas in Gelderland and Overijssel. Religious orthodox groups, when they came in conflict with the latitudinarian or secular ideas of other groups in their vicinity, functioned at many places as catalysts for verzuiling. Since the orthodox movement was strongest in the rural areas of Holland, Gelderland and Friesland, it is clear that many of the original centres of verzuiling were rural communities. Only in a later stage, which Stuurman referred to as the consolidation phase, the process of verzuiling touched the remaining parts of the Netherlands. These were the areas where orthodox Protestantism and Catholicism were the dominant ideologies. The orthodox protestants were concentrated in the center-belt ranging from Friesland and North Groningen to the southern part of Holland and the Catholics in the two southern provinces plus some adjacent areas in Gelderland and Overijssel.

Daalder rightly noticed that the second stage of the verzuiling was a process which not only divided the nation but also was an integrative force. The diffusion of verzuiling as a new way to organize social and political life meant at the same time that geographically and socially peripheral groups were integrated in the nation. At that stage verzuiling was indeed largely a matter of national organizations which filled in the blank spots. He did not pay attention, however, to the fragmentation, discussed in section 3.2, that existed within the orthodox Protestant world and the possible consequences of this process for the verzuiling behaviour of orthodox groups. On the basis of studies about the history of the Protestant churches in the second half of the last century we would expect that the overwhelmingly orthodox Protestant areas were not so homogeneous as they appeared to be at first sight and that the severe conflicts which often existed between various orthodox groups formed an important motivation for the founding of separate schools. In that case the areas of conflicting orthodoxy will also have been part of the zone of early diffusion of segmented education. It will be interesting to see whether this hypothesis will be upheld by the data.

The hypothesis of Daalder and Stuurman about the diffusion of verzuiling was mainly formulated on the basis of qualitative information about the geography of the rise of the orthodox
Protestant party, the confessional trade-unions and denominational schools. Its character was very general, as it did neither specify according to sector, nor differentiate between various levels at which verzeling could take place, for instance the individual level or the institutional level. Nevertheless we will take it as the starting point for our analysis and try to establish its validity with regard to the process of verzeling in the primary education system. We will also compare our findings with the work of authors who mainly focused on the development of the political system to find out whether any similarities between the process of differentiation of the political and the education system existed.

Finally we will discuss the problems concerning the data on education which have been used in the analysis of verzeling during the 1880-1930 period. The operationalization of the other, explaining variables will be discussed when they are introduced in the subsequent sections. Concerning the data on education we first have to formulate operational definitions of private education versus public education, and of primary education versus other levels of education. Secondly, the use of the municipality as unit of analysis caused a few problems, particularly with regard to border crossing school attendance and changes of the units over time because of alterations of the administrative borders.

In chapter 3 we have seen that throughout the entire nineteenth century several categories of private education have existed. After 1857 there were two types of private schools, neutral schools of which some received a small subsidy from the municipal authorities and schools based on a religious ideology which could not count on any financial support. The Education Act of 1889 created the possibility that the hitherto non-subsidized private schools were financially supported by the central government. Officially, however, they continued being called non-subsidized schools, since the word subsidized referred to the municipal subsidies made available to a small group of neutral private schools since 1857. Until the first decade of the twentieth century most subnational statistical sources unfortunately did not distinguish the different types of schools within the category of non-subsidized schools. Consequently when we will examine the evolution of the denominational education sector we necessarily operationalize the concepts 'denominational schools' and 'attendance in denominational schools' with the categories of 'non-subsidized schools' and 'attendance in non-subsidized schools'. Because of this problem the data need very cautious interpretation. The second difficulty concerning the pre-1910 period was that the Education Act of 1889 created confusion about the categories of subsidized and non-subsidized

5. This support amounted to 30% of the operating costs of these schools. H. Knippenberg, 1986, op. cit., p.53.
education. The question whether to continue listing the denominational schools which hitherto had not received any municipal financial support, as non-subsidized schools (despite the subsidies they received after 1889) or to put them in the category of subsidized schools was unfortunately answered in different ways at different administrative levels and in different administrative units at the same level. In the tables in the preceding chapter, which were based on national education statistics, the categories of the period before 1889 were maintained until 1900. As regards the provincial statistics which were the basis of the regional analysis presented in this chapter, similar continuity did not always exist. In the statistics of Limburg, for example, the categories appeared to have the reversed meaning, the category of subsidized schools also including those which were only entitled to subsidies since 1889. Only by comparison with other sources it was possible to redefine the data for each of the Dutch provinces so as to produce similar categories.

Two other problems concerning the education statistics were connected to the question how to define elementary education. The Education Act of 1878 abolished the distinction between elementary and advanced elementary education. It only mentioned elementary education although in many schools apart from the required subjects other subjects were also taught to children after they had completed six years of elementary education. In practice these schools were known as schools for Advanced Elementary Education (ULO-scholen) when only a few extra subjects were taught, and schools for More Advanced Elementary Education (MULO-scholen) when all the extra subjects were taught for a period of three years. Both advanced elementary education and more advanced elementary education were usually provided in schools for ordinary elementary education. Advanced elementary education was again juridically recognised in 1910. The Elementary Education Act of 1920 brought a definite separation between ordinary and advanced elementary education. Advanced elementary education was still organized by the Elementary Education Act but became organizationally, and therefore often also administratively, separated from ordinary elementary education. The main consequence of the position of advanced education before 1921 was that statistics did not differentiate between ordinary and advanced elementary education. They simply

6. We do not know exactly, however, what the quality of these statistics is. If the national statistics were composed of provincial statistics they contain some distortions. But it is also possible that the national statistics were based on the figures collected by the school districts, the smallest administrative unit within the education system, in which case they might be more accurate.

gave the number of children attending elementary education and only the list of subjects taught in a particular school showed whether it merely concerned elementary education or advanced elementary education as well. Therefore the figures in the datafile concerning the total number of pupils attending elementary education probably are in many cases somewhat too high. More important than the total number, however, is the distribution of the pupils attending advanced education between the three major sectors: public, Protestant and Catholic education. The assumption that just as many children in public schools as in private schools continued education after six years of compulsory education seems at least somewhat doubtful as regards the Catholic part of the population. Because the number of children continuing education after six years was still rather low in the first two decades of this century the error caused by the differential attendance in advanced education is probably not too serious. Since 1921 attendance in advanced elementary schools has been distinguished from that in ordinary elementary schools. In the statistics this distinction is, however, only made after 1925.

Similar to the previous problem is that related to the existence of continuation classes and evening classes. The Compulsory Education Act of 1900 again introduced continuation classes, which had been abolished in 1878. These were organized for the benefit of young working class adults, and therefore teaching was usually done during the evenings. Thus conceptually the difference between continuation classes and evening classes was not very sharp. Again part of the statistical sources is not very precise. They often do not distinguish between attendance in dayschools, which concerned the 7-13 age-group, and attendance in continuation and evening classes, which concerned older children and young adults, for whom education was no longer compulsory. In the course of the 1900-1930 period the importance of these types of education gradually diminished. Again the question arises whether the inclusion of pupils of evening and continuation classes has influenced the relative figures concerning school attendance in any of the three sectors. Statistics that differentiate between the day schools and evening schools show

8. The study by Matthijsen revealed that until very recently the Catholic part of the population attended to a much smaller extent secondary and tertiary education than the rest of the population. One of the reasons that the Catholics lagged behind as far as participation in these types of education was concerned was the fear of profane influences. The economically backward position of the Catholics probably also contributed to this. Although advanced elementary education was rather traditional compared to teaching in secondary schools, since it was often linked to elementary schools, it is possible that also in advanced elementary education relatively fewer Catholics participated. M.A.J.M.Matthijsen, op. cit.
that the second were more often connected to public schools than to private schools. The error made by including attendance in evening classes, however, is not too serious because just for those provinces, e.g. Overijssel, in which evening classes were quite popular these were mentioned separately in the statistics.

Finally we have to look at the problems of border crossing school attendance and changes of borders. Attending a school in a municipality other than the municipality of residence was a quite frequent phenomenon, particularly in rural areas. The numerical importance of this phenomenon varied between municipalities. Sometimes it concerned just a few children, whereas in other cases a considerable number of pupils, usually residing in a subcommunity of the municipality, was involved. The most important reason for school attendance in a neighbouring municipality was the distance to a school in the own municipality. Another reason, however, was the absence of a particular type of education in the own municipality. The two or more municipal authorities concerned had to conclude an agreement to allow children to be sent to each others schools. These agreements, which could at one time be advantageous to a municipality, because it was exempted from the task to open another school at its own expense, could at another time be very detrimental, for instance when it badly needed more pupils to fulfil the minimum requirements to keep a school open. In such situations the agreement was terminated as soon as possible. The occurrence of border crossing school attendance also is a source of error in our study, since the municipality is the unit of analysis, but it is difficult to estimate how serious this error is. It is known that a great number of municipalities had concluded agreements, and that these showed a particular geographical concentration. However, we have neither information about the size of this flow, nor about its evolution.

Changes of the administrative borders also occurred in a number of municipalities. Only in case these involved the administrative transfer of a group of people, not merely the transfer of a certain area, from one to another municipality they influenced the analysis. First they made longitudinal analysis somewhat less reliable, because the units of analysis were not exactly the same at each point in time. Moreover, one has to be cautious with the interpretation of the position of individual municipalities at several points in time. Second modifications of borders may have caused border crossing school attendance when a group of people was administratively transferred to another municipality and their children continued to attend a school in the former municipality of residence. In case one municipality merged with another during the period concerned, the two were taken as one unit from the beginning.
4.2 The diffusion of denominational schools

In section 4.1 we have discussed the work of L.A. Brown on diffusion. Brown stressed that it was important to examine the diffusion of a new institution separately from the diffusion of the use of that institution, that is the diffusion of innovative behaviour. These processes might show differences, in time as well as in their spatial distribution. Hanham and Brown's empirical research pointed out that the stage in which the innovation becomes widely accepted sometimes considerably lags behind the stage in which the diffusion of the institution is completed. Since the physical availability of an institution is the most important precondition for its use, it is obvious that we will first look into the diffusion of denominational schools.

If we want to know more about the location of denominational schools in the Netherlands before 1900 we are immediately faced with the lack of data which are sufficiently differentiated. For the study of the diffusion of private education in the period after 1910 the Yearbooks of the national Catholic and Protestant organizations of schoolboards are indispensable sources of information, apart from the Provincial Annual Reports. In case precise information on the size of denominational schools was missing or the information given in the Provincial Annual Reports was ambiguous, the Yearbooks often provided additional data. The national organizations began to publish their annual reports in 1912, just before the committee which had to prepare a constitutional solution to the education problem was set up. Pending the introduction of equal financial support for public and private schools the Catholics and Protestants improved their organizations, and a centralized registration of their schools formed part of this. For information on the situation before 1900, however, we are completely dependent on official statistics. The main problem of these sources is that, although they provide detailed data at the level of the municipality, they do not differentiate between various types of private education. This does not merely imply that it is impossible to distinguish between Catholic and Protestant education. It also means that we are unable to distinguish between denominational schools and the schools operated as a private business by an individual. Therefore map 4.1, which pictures the situation in 1880, gives the spatial distribution of the entire non-subsidized private sector.9 According to the figures of the Onderwijsverslagen (Education Reports) there were 1010 private schools in the Netherlands in 1880. Some 300 schools out of these 1010 did not have a denominational basis. They came in the category of schools operated by individuals instead of societies, which were mainly found in the larger towns. Since most towns had quite a number of private schools, it is plausible that there were, apart from schools held by individuals, denominational private schools as

9. For South Holland and Zeeland no data are available.
Map 4.1 Municipalities with non-subsidized private primary education in 1880.
well. Therefore we can safely assume that map 4.1, in which only the presence or absence of non-subsidized private education is indicated, gives a fairly good picture of the spatial distribution of denominational education. The number of private schools operated by one person showed a steady decline during the second half of the 19th century, a process which became irreversible after the Education Act of 1889 had prohibited the financing of these schools from the public purse.

The first remarkable feature of map 4.1 is indeed the wide diffusion of private education. Leaving South Holland and Zeeland out, 38.6% of the remaining Dutch municipalities had a private school. This figure compared favourable to the percentage of private schools in 1880, which amounted to 28.6%, and the percentage of pupils in private education, which was only 24.6%. Irrespective of the variation in the intensity of verzuiling it is clear that by 1880 private schools were a common feature of the education system in most parts of the country. Already at this early stage, only 20 years after religious education had been definitely restricted to private schools through the Education Act of 1857, these private schools were found all over the country. This finding suggests that at the very beginning of the evolution of the private sector there had not been one but several nuclei from where private education began to expand, which supposes that communication between various parts of the country was relatively well developed. The widespread diffusion of private education in 1880 is all the more remarkable if we bear in mind that the founding of a private school required considerable level of mobilization and organization, and a great financial effort by the founders of the school. In some cases the construction of a school was paid for by a few rich members of the religious community, who became the 'share holders', but in other cases a financial contribution was asked from all members. This contribution could even be obtained in an indirect way, by providing the members of the parish with young livestock, of which the proceeds upon selling were given to

10. Map 4.1 is somewhat deceptive in that the shading of the large municipalities in Friesland, Gelderland and Groningen gives the impression of more widespread verzuiling than the shading of the smaller municipalities in the Western and Southern provinces. Map 4.1 only indicates the presence or absence of private education in a municipality. It is very well possible, however, that only one of the villages within a municipality had a private school. The distortion which is related to the different size of municipalities in various regions has to be kept in mind when interpreting all the other maps presented in this study.

11. The latter two figures, however, concerned the entire country, including South Holland and Zeeland.
the school board. In general the construction and maintenance of a denominational school meant a great burden for the people concerned. The construction continued to be at the expense of the founders until the Elementary Education Act of 1920. Thus the competition of the public school was strong, particularly because most of the public schools did not even ask a school fee although they were entitled to do so. After the principle of equal financial support for public and private schools was established, the founding of a denominational school was much easier.

Going beyond the first impression of widespread diffusion one immediately observes regional differences in the occurrence of private schools. Diffusion was widest in Friesland and parts of Groningen, Gelderland and North Brabant. Drente as well as parts of Overijssel and North Holland lagged behind as far as the diffusion of private schools was concerned. In Friesland, the number of municipalities with private education was over 70%. Groningen, Gelderland and North Brabant had figures between 45 and 50%. In North Holland, Drente and Limburg this figure was less than 25%. This finding corresponds largely to data at the provincial level for the period before 1880. In 1878 over 300,000 Protestants supported a petition in which the King was asked not to contrasign the liberal education bill drawn up by the government led by Kappuye. Nearly 30% of the supporters lived in South Holland. Friesland, Gelderland North Holland and South Holland together counted for almost 70% of the signatures. Expressed as percentage of the their total Protestant population the provinces Friesland, Gelderland, Utrecht, South Holland and North Brabant were the main contributors. The distribution of private schools in 1870, given in table 4.1, shows a similar geographical concentration. Friesland, Gelderland, Utrecht and North Brabant and Limburg have a relatively high percentage Protestant schools, and Friesland, Utrecht, South Holland, Zeeland and North Brabant have the relatively highest percentage Catholic schools.

Table 4.1 Distribution of Protestant and Catholic private schools by province in 1870

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prov</th>
<th>% of schools</th>
<th>% of population</th>
<th>a/c</th>
<th>b/d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

12. This method of fund raising was common in the Catholic Church. The young animals were raised by members of the parish and when sold the proceeds were donated to the parish.

13. The total number of Protestants is defined as the sum of the members of the Dutch Reformed Church and the members of the Christian Orthodox Reformed Church. North Brabant and Limburg naturally had a very low number of signatories since the figure of 300,000 only concerned the Protestants. Among the Catholics, however, another 164,000 signatures were collected. N.M. Feringa, Gedenkboek betreffende het Volkspetitionnement, 1878.
Map 4.2 Pattern of dominant religious orientation in 1920

Catholic
orthodox Protestant
latitudinarian Protestant
mixed
other municipalities not included
To what extent does the pattern of nap 4.1 confirm Daalder’s hypothesis? To answer this question we have to systematically compare the distribution of private schools with the geographical occurrence of religious heterogeneous and homogeneous areas. Map 4.2 gives a picture of the dominant ideological current in 642 municipalities. Four types of municipalities were distinguished: Catholic, Orthodox, Latitudinarian and mixed zones. The situation in the mixed parts of North Holland and Friesland seems to partly fit Daalder’s hypothesis that the mixed areas were the first where denominational organizations were set up. In the southern part of North Holland, and in the northern fringe of Friesland many of the municipalities indeed had private education. Utrecht, and the mixed part of Gelderland bordering on South Holland and Utrecht, however, did not show a particular strong diffusion of private schools, although according to table 4.1 the percentage of denominational schools was high as compared to the percentage of Catholics and Protestants. Unfortunately we do not have any information about the province of South Holland but table 4.1 showed that in this province as a whole verzuiling also started early and we may assume that this figure particularly concerned the north-western, mixed religious, fringe of this province. As early as 1878 the enfranchised population of this area voted in favour of the ARP, the political party of the orthodox and latitudinarian Protestants will be further discussed in section 4.3.

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14. Passchier and Pennings made this map with the aim to select a number of municipalities which could be used for case studies on processes of verzuiling. The municipalities with less than 1500 people in each of the three major categories were left out because their numerical basis for the formation of segmental organisations was considered to be too low. N.P. Passchier and P. Pennings, Een selectie van Nederlandse gemeenten voor lokale studies van ‘verzuiling’, 1987. The empirical distinction between orthodox and latitudinarian Protestants will be further discussed.
Orthodox Reformed whereas in Friesland this only happened ten years later.15

The second type of area where verzuiling supposedly diffused early was that characterised by an increasingly secular orientation. Part of Friesland, Groningen, Drente and North Holland, the cities in the western part of the country and a few areas in Gelderland and Overijssel came in this category. It is to be noted, however, that according to Daalder class, not religion, would form the major dividing line in these areas. This complicates the comparison somewhat in that class did not play a part in the formation of segmental organizations in the education sector. Consequently, the strong adherence to both Socialist and Liberal ideologies was, as far as education was concerned, expressed in a continued high level of public education and the absence of denominational education.16

Examining map 4.1 we find that in only some of the areas listed denominational education had spread in 1880. In the latitudinarian central and southern part of Friesland denominational education was known, but many of the latitudinarian municipalities in Groningen still did not have private education. In Drente and in the northern part of North Holland private education was conspicuously absent in 1880 and the same was true for the latitudinarian municipalities at the border between Gelderland and Overijssel. The latitudinarian Dutch Reformed population preferred the public school over the Protestant one. Moreover their ideology did not arouse strong antagonism of other denominations. Map 4.1 shows that Friesland clearly was the area where private education had most widely been accepted and this is confirmed by Feringa, who attributes the strong diffusion of denominational education among the Frisians to the active resistance offered by the Liberal part of the population. The Liberals founded the Friesche Vereeniging voor Volksonderwijs, which was soon transformed into a national organization and which fought the influence of Vereeniging voor Christelijk Nationaal Schoolonderwijs.17 In Drente and North

15. Van Tijn's data concern the elections for the second chamber. Th. van Tijn, The party structure of Holland and the outer Provinces in the Nineteenth Century, in: J.S. Bromley and E.H. Kossman, Britain and the Netherlands, Metropolis, dominion and province, 1971, pp.205-206. The election results should, however, be used with great care for comparative purposes because the enfranchised population was still very small: in 1880 only 12.3% of the adult male population was entitled to vote. This figure increased to 49.0% in 1900 and to 63.2% in 1910. H. Daalder, 1981, op. cit., p.200.

16. Apart from the absence of religious conflict the relatively weak numerical position of the religious part of the population was of course also a barrier for establishing denominational schools.

Holland the latitudinarism of the Dutch Reformed Church was just as strong as in Friesland, but in these provinces it did not evoke an orthodox reaction (see map 4.2) and therefore neither resulted in early verzuiling.\(^{18}\) In Groningen, on the contrary, the reaction was twofold: some communities turned orthodox, whereas others became predominantly Socialist.\(^{19}\)

Finally we turn to the areas which were rather homogeneous as far as religion was concerned: the orthodox Protestant belt running from the south-west of Friesland, along the edge of the Zuiderzee, through the rural areas of South Holland to the islands belonging to this province, and the Catholic provinces of North Brabant and Limburg. The situation in the municipalities with an orthodox orientation in Overijssel was as Daalder assumed, in that they did not belong to the early adopters of denominational education. However, in the remaining orthodox zones, as far as we have information about them, public education began to retreat early as a consequence of the rising call for denominational education. Against all expectations another region of intense diffusion of private education was found in the central and western parts of North Brabant. This province was, except for the north-western municipalities bordering on South Holland and Zeeland, completely Catholic, which implied that religious opposition did not play a part.\(^{20}\) Although there was quite some industrial activity in this part of North Brabant a militant Socialism did not exist, so the early diffusion of Catholic schools in this area can neither be explained by strong antagonism between secular, Socialist groups and the Catholic Church.\(^{21}\) The key to this problem is probably that all but a few of these schools were girls' schools, operated by religious orders. Education provided by congregations was popular because these schools were relatively cheap, since no salaries had to be paid for. Women's congregations were active in education on account of the little interest attached to the education of girls. Investing in the education of boys was considered more important, therefore they were preferably sent to public schools.

\(^{18}\) In both provinces more than 80% of the members of the Dutch Reformed Church was latitudinarian.

\(^{19}\) Particularly the south-eastern part of Groningen became an early stronghold of the Socialists.

\(^{20}\) In 1900 the average proportion of Catholics in the municipalities of this province was 85%.

\(^{21}\) As the period 1897-1913 is concerned Stoppelenburg at least found a very low level of political conflict in North Brabant. C.M. Stoppelenburg, 1984, op. cit. pp.37-50. Van Tijn's study also suggested a high level of political stability in the last quarter of the twentieth century, after the Liberals had been defeated. Th. van Tijn, 1971, op. cit.
where better qualified lay teachers taught. The diffusion of private schools in North Brabant indeed corresponded with the spatial distribution of women's congregations and the much lower number of women's congregations in Limburg corresponded with a low diffusion of denominational schools.\(^22\)

Map 4.3 gives a picture of the situation thirty years later, in 1910.\(^23\) The diffusion of denominational education had progressed considerably: only 384 municipalities, 34.7%, out of 1106 municipalities did not have any type of denominational school whereas this relation had still been 499 to 811, 61.5%, in 1880.\(^24\) The country was almost completely covered by the network of denominational schools. The pattern as discerned for 1880 had basically remained the same, only the number of municipalities without private education had decreased. The main concentrations of resistance to the denominational school were the central part of the country, covering Utrecht and adjacent areas in South Holland and Gelderland, Drente and the south-eastern corner of Groningen, the rural part of North Holland, Zeeland, central and southern Limburg and some units in southern and eastern Overijssel. In Utrecht, however, the lack of denominational education may have been due to the relative concentration of the Catholic and orthodox Protestants in most urbanized municipalities, thus not to a low degree of verzuiling. In Drente and rural North Holland, where modern, liberal ideas were widely accepted, the near absence of ideological rivalry was the main factor underlying the little interest in denominational education. The dominant orientation was liberal as was also clear

\(^{22}\) This explanation is adopted by both Brok and Knippenberg. C.J.M. Brok, op. cit., p.198; H. Knippenberg, 1986, op. cit., pp.218-221. Knippenberg also found that the variable 'sex' explained 38% of the regional variation in attendance in private education and he attributed this outcome largely to the preference for a Catholic upbringing of girls in North Brabant and Limburg.

\(^{23}\) Map 4.3 and map 4.4 contain more precise information than map 4.1 in that they present the spread of denominational education instead of the category of private education as a whole. The difference between the categories of denominational education and private education was not very big anymore by 1910: 1816 schools came in the first category and 200 more in the second one. In map 4.3 and map 4.4 a picture of a dichotomous variable is given: the presence or absence of denominational education. This made it possible to work with a far greater number of units than we have done in the analyses in the subsequent section.

\(^{24}\) From the total number of municipalities in 1880 are deducted those in South Holland and Zeeland.
Map 4.3 Municipalities without denominational primary education in 1910
from the election results between 1878 and 1913. As far as denominational education had diffused in rural North Holland it had done so in the predominantly Catholic municipalities of West Friesland. The high absence of denominational education in the central part of the country was due to other factors although the liberal orientation of the western part of Gelderland possibly also played a part. In this zone, however, it mainly concerned rural municipalities of very limited size, in which the absolute number of inhabitants of a particular denomination was probably too small to support a school. The high level of verzuiling in Utrecht suggested by the figures in table 4.1 must have been mainly an urban phenomenon. In Zeeland the same factor as in the central part of the country explained the relatively low number of municipalities where denominational schools had been founded. The area was very sparsely populated, which made it quite difficult as far as finances were concerned to set up a private school. The number of children of primary school-age was often too small to operate more than one school with a certain degree of efficiency. Moreover in that part of the province which was almost completely orthodox Protestant, such as Tholen and in that which was predominantly Catholic, such as Zeeuws Vlaanderen, where no strong opposition existed between the denominations, the call for denominational schools will not have been strong, also because education in many of the public schools was de facto denominational. Likewise it appeared from the election results that Catholicism in Zeeuws Vlaanderen was predominantly liberal oriented. In Limburg, where verzuiling of the education system was strongly stimulated by the bishop, the liberal Catholic elite for a long time resisted the increasing influence of the orthodox current in the Catholic Church and their support of the public school was part of this resistance. Among the ordinary members of the Catholic Church little interest in denominational schools existed since public education had in fact a Catholic orientation in this area.

The greatest blow to public education came in the 1920s, after the new Education Act had become operative. As we have seen


26. In each of the elections between 1897 and 1913 this area elected a liberal representative. The dominant religious orientation was latitudinarian Dutch Reformed (see map 4.2)

27. The explanation particularly focuses on the absolute number of people belonging to a certain denomination. Most of the municipalities in the province of Utrecht were indeed very small: the three major towns, Utrecht, Amersfoort and Zeist, together comprised a little over 50 % of the total population of this province.
in chapter 3 the Protestant sector was faster to exploit the new opportunities than the Catholic sector. The latter sector expanded most between 1925 and 1930. In table 4.2 it is shown what this implied for the public sector.

Table 4.2 Percentage change of the share of public schools 1915-1930

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-5.3</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
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<td>-6.6</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limburg</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-23.5</td>
<td>-15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The greatest average decline of the public sector happened between 1925 and 1930, and it happened particularly in the provinces of North Brabant and Limburg. In Limburg the rapid decline of the public sector even continued in the 1930s. In the predominantly Protestant provinces the rise of denominational education was a much smoother process, being on the whole somewhat faster between 1925 and 1930 than in the years preceding and following this period. In Overijssele and Gelderland, however, the public sector lost much just after full state-financing of denominational education had been introduced, and this figure may also concern the Catholic communities present in this area.

By 1930, after the boom of the 1920s, the number of municipalities without denominational education had been reduced to 178. Map 4.4 reveals that these municipalities were clustered in a few areas: the north-western part of North Holland, the islands of Zeeland, the border of Gelderland and South Holland (right in the middle of the country) and in Limburg. These were all rural areas in which the administrative units were small. The average number of inhabitants of these municipalities was only 954, as opposed to an average of 2800 for all municipalities, thus many of them were simply too small to sustain more than one school. Other characteristics of these municipalities were a below average percentage of Orthodox Reformed, a far below average percentage of Catholics and a Dutch Reformed population which was largely non-orthodox. Besides the extremely small size of these municipalities, in general the lack of a sufficient religious basis for such schools was an additional factor relevant for the explanation of the absence of denominational education. The same factor explained the absence of Protestant education in 468 municipalities and the absence of Catholic education in 483 municipalities. The municipalities without
Map 1.4 Municipalities without denominational primary education in 1930
Protestant education had a rather low average percentage of Orthodox Reformed people, (2.6%, whereas the national average was 8.9%) and a high share of Catholics (67%, whereas the average was 41.2%). The municipalities without Catholic education had a low average percentage of Catholics (13%) and a high average share of Orthodox Protestants (16.7%). On the basis of this information the conclusion is drawn that by 1930 the process of verzuiling, as far it concerned the diffusion of denominational schools, had reached its saturation point.

The overall picture that appears from the examination of the diffusion of denominational schools is that this has been a relatively fast process which started with four schools in the 1840s, began to spread in the third quarter of the last century and had touched a considerable part of the country long before 1900. The diffusion probably started more or less simultaneously in several regions and as early as 1880 the whole country was involved in this process, although to a different degree of intensity. The diffusion of the phenomenon of the denominational school did not move from one side of the country to the other but almost immediately involved the population in several parts of the country. After 1910 the diffusion of the denominational school was only a matter of filling the blank spots.

28. In municipalities without Protestant or without Catholic education the overall number of inhabitants was not really an obstacle for the founding of denominational education. In both cases the average size of the population, 2651 and 2781 respectively, was about the same as the average size of the total number of municipalities.
4.3 The diffusion of participation in denominational primary education

The central problem of this section is the evolution of participation in denominational elementary education between 1900 and 1930. In other words the question addressed is to what extent did people belonging to different denominations and living in different regions withdraw their children from public education, in order to send them to denominational schools. As has been discussed in chapter 2, verzuiling of the education sector took a course different than that in other sectors because the institution itself was not new. Whereas Socialist, Catholic and Protestant trade-unions each entered 'the market' for workers' organizations at more or less the same time, denominational education competed with a service, public education, which hitherto had held a monopoly. An increasing participation in denominational education thus was at the expense of the participation in public education. Erosion of the public sector and growth of denominational education were two aspects of the same process of verzuiling. When looking for explanations of regional variation and variation between several denominations in the process of verzuiling I will thus focus on factors which increased the affinity with private education and decreased the support for public education. Since the municipality, not the individual, is the unit of analysis, I will only pay attention to sociological and environmental variables which influenced the behaviour of communities as a whole. The most relevant of these variables were the predominant religious affiliation, the degree of ideological heterogeneity, the degree of urbanization and the degree of modernization of the municipalities. The influence of these factors on the participation in denominational education will successively be discussed.

I assume that the religious variable has exerted the greatest influence on verzuiling of primary education as regards participation. Verzuiling has been defined as the process of increasing organizational segregation along religious dividing lines. Mobilization of religious groups with the purpose to found separate social and political organizations on the basis of denominational principles was the essence of the process of verzuiling. Variation in this process was therefore to a considerable extent determined by the characteristics of the different denominational groups. In some groups the urge to found separate organizations was more strongly felt than in others and, as a result, the presence of these denominations in a particular area thus positively influenced the diffusion of participation in verzuiling. Likewise some denominations participated in verzuiling at an earlier time than others. Thus the presence or absence of such a group of innovators determined to a large extent the early diffusion of verzuiling in a particular region.

In section 3.2 we have examined which denominations were, according to their central dogmas, and their position relative to other denominations, the most inclined to form their own
organizations. These were, as far as the Protestants were concerned, the people who had formed respectively the Christian Orthodox Reformed Church in 1869 and the Orthodox Reformed Church in 1892. About the orthodox Protestans who remained within the mother-church we have contradictory information. According to some authors the main difference between the orthodox Protestant within and outside the Dutch Reformed Church was their attitude to separate political and social organizations whereas others are of the opinion that the major cleavage line was that between the orthodox Protestants on the one hand and latitudinarian Protestants on the other hand. In the Catholic world it was the ultramontanist strand which strongly criticised the liberal orientation of the public school and supported the formation of Catholic organizations.

In the next pages I will try to determine how strongly the denominational education was supported among the various denominations at various points in time. It is important to remember that only those municipalities where denominational education was available, that is, where at least one school of a certain denomination had been founded, were included in the analysis. Inclusion of those municipalities where participation in denominational education necessarily amounted to zero because this type of education was not available would have seriously distorted the analysis. The technique that will be used is that of linear regression. The choice of regression was based on the following considerations. In regression analysis the nature of the relation between two or more variables is established. It is a descriptive technique, which means that it measures the nature of the relation existing between two variables without specifying a causal relation between these two variables. In contrast to measures such as Pearson's correlation coefficient regression it is not a symmetric technique, that is, regression of y on x does not yield the same result as regression of x on y. Usually it does not even make sense to change the position of the variables, because of the presumed causal relation between the variables. As already indicated, causality is not specified by the results of regression analysis, but determined in advance by the researcher on the basis of theoretical or empirical considerations. In the preceding pages, for instance, it has been made plausible that membership of particular denominations strongly determined the growth of participation in denominational education. Regression analysis does not determine which variable explains a phenomenon, but to what extent a certain variable is able to predict the phenomenon concerned. A second comment to be made is that regression is not necessarily linear. In some cases a straight line is not the best way to represent the relation between two or more (in case of multiple linear regression) variables, and in other cases the use of linear regression is even utterly wrong. Whether application of linear regression is justified can not be read from the outcome of the analysis but has to be decided in advance, on the basis of a visual representation of the data in a scatterplot. Curvilinear regression lines, however, have the disadvantage that their shape is difficult to express in a
mathematical formula. In fact the only way to establish the shape of the curve is a process of trial and error, which is rather time consuming. A very common solution to the problem of a non-linear distribution of the units is to divide the data set in several parts and to predict a straight line for each of these parts. We have in fact opted for this solution when we decided to include only those cases in the analysis where denominational education was at least available.29

To what extent does the size of a particular denomination predict the participation in denominational education and what is the strength of the relation between these two variables? In table 4.3 the results of the regression and the values of $r^2$ are presented. It should be noticed that the size of the denominations concern the entire population instead of the 7-13 age-group. It would have been possible to determine the proportion of each denomination in the 7-13 age-group on the basis of original census data but instead we have preferred to use existing computerized data files for our explanatory variables, which were unfortunately somewhat less detailed. We assume that the error caused by this impreciseness in the operationalization was not too serious (see annex 4).

An important problem concerning the operationalization of orthodox Protestantism was the distinction between liberal and orthodox members of the Dutch Reformed Church. It is known that the orthodox strands generally prevailed in the provinces of Gelderland, Utrecht, South Holland and Zeeland, and that the latitudinarian groups were more influential in Groningen, Friesland, Drente and North Holland. However, detailed data on the importance of these groups, and on the geographical distribution of their members do not exist. For that reason in most studies on verzuiiling the authors have focused on the members of the Orthodox Reformed denominations when examining the development of the network of Protestant organizations. The members of the Dutch Reformed Church have often necessarily been taken as one category, that of the liberal Protestants. One may assume, however, that among the conservative strands of the Dutch Reformed Church many people were in favour of verzuiiling and in fact contributed to the development of the network of denominational organizations in much the same way as the members of the orthodox Protestant churches did. In order to solve this problem Khippenberg, Stoppenenburg and Van der Wusten developed an index of orthodoxy, which enabled them to distinguish at the level of the parish, which is the basic administrative and geographical unit of the Dutch Reformed Church and largely

29. To determine the degree of verzuiiling, that is the extent to which denominational groups participated in denominational education, the municipality (our unit of analysis) has to have at least one denominational school. Municipalities that do not have denominational education at all have thus been excluded from the regression analysis.
coincides with the municipality, the size of the orthodox group versus the latitudinarian group.\textsuperscript{30} After having reviewed the literature on the Dutch Reformed Church they distinguished between the Gereformeerde Bond and the Confessionele Vereeniging on the one hand and the Vereeniging van Vrijzinnig Hervormden and the Ethische Vereeniging on the other. The first two societies represented the orthodox strand within the Dutch Reformed Church, the second two the latitudinarian strand.\textsuperscript{31} No information was available about individual membership of these four societies, however. Therefore their index was based on information regarding the orthodox or liberal orientation of the minister(s) appointed by a particular parish. Most parishes had only one seat. It may be assumed that the minister who was appointed usually belonged to the trend which was dominant in the parish.\textsuperscript{32} In the index of the orientation of the minister working in a parish defined its 'color'. In large parishes where more than one minister was stationed, the 'color' of the parish was assumed to be proportional to the distribution of 'colors' among the ministers. In case the Dutch Reformed community in a particular municipality was too small to form an autonomous parish, or when information was lacking, the index was given the same value as that of neighbouring municipalities. Only when such information was ambiguous, or when neighbouring municipalities did not have a Dutch Reformed population at all, a situation occurring in North Brabant and Limburg, a missing value was assigned. The index of orthodoxy was not merely valid for one specific year but for most of the period between 1900 and 1930, since it was based on information not only about the assignment of a minister in 1930 but also about his entire 'career-path'. The information about former assignments suggested that very few parishes changed 'color' between 1900 and 1930.\textsuperscript{33} With the help of the index of


\textsuperscript{31} About the position of the Ethische Vereeniging exist some doubts. The members of this group were open to modern, scientific ideas but at the same time they had a more orthodox way of believing than the members of the Vereeniging van Vrijzinnig Hervormden.

\textsuperscript{32} The reason for this is that according to the Church Rule of 1852 the members of a parish were entitled to directly or indirectly nominate a minister.

\textsuperscript{33} Verrips stressed that the degree of orthodoxy did not only vary between units but also within a unit over time. This was certainly true for the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when the Protestant world was very much moving. By 1900, however, most Protestant people had defined their position. C. Verrips, op. cit., p.32.
orthodoxy the Dutch Reformed population was in each of the municipalities divided into an orthodox part and a non-orthodox part. The average percentage orthodox members appeared to be highest in the parishes of Overijssel, Gelderland, Utrecht and South Holland. The few Dutch Reformed communities in North Brabant were also predominantly orthodox. In Groningen, Friesland, North Holland and Zeeland most Dutch Reformed parishes belonged to the latitudinarian strands.

In table 4.3 the results of the regression are presented. The participation of pupils in public education is predicted by the percentage latitudinarian members of the Dutch Reformed Church and the percentage of people not belonging to any denomination, the participation of pupils in Protestant education sectors by the relative number of the Orthodox Reformed people as well as the percentage of orthodox members of the Dutch Reformed Church and the participation in Catholic education by the percentage of Catholics in the population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>N of cases</th>
<th>Beta 1st step</th>
<th>R² 1st step</th>
<th>Beta 2nd step</th>
<th>R² 2nd step</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>constant</td>
<td>coefficient</td>
<td>constant</td>
<td>coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34. The (linear) regression equation goes as follows: \( y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2. \)

35. The members of the small latitudinarian Protestant churches were quite evenly distributed over the country, except for a concentration in North Holland. Since the latter province was excluded from our analysis because of lack of data the fact that the small latitudinarian churches came into the category of 'other' churches, which was not used as explaining variable, was not considered problematic.

36. Data concerning 1900 are available for the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, Drente, overijssel, Gelderland, Utrecht, Zeeland, North Brabant (sample), and Limburg. Data concerning 1910 are available for the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, Drente, Overijssel, Gelderland, Utrecht, South Holland, Zeeland, North Brabant (sample), Limburg. Data concerning 1920 are available for the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, Drente, Overijssel, Gelderland, Utrecht, South Holland, Zeeland, North Brabant (sample). Data concerning 1930 are available for the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, Drente, Overijssel, Gelderland, Utrecht, North Brabant (sample). See annex 5 for information about the sources from which the data are collected.
1900 314 0.27 (A) 0.13 54.9 0.23 (A) 0.15
1910 527 0.30 (A) 0.14 44.8 0.25 (A) 0.18
1920 488 0.35 (A) 0.18 36.7 0.31 (A) 0.22
1930 325 0.66 (A) 0.40 16.9 0.56 (A) 0.51

Table 4.3b Stepwise regression of % pupils in Catholic education on % Catholics (A) (1900-1930)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>N of cases</th>
<th>constant Beta</th>
<th>R² coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>12.1 0.34</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>16.0 0.33</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>13.2 0.51</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>4.1 0.85</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3c Stepwise regression of % pupils in Protestant education on % Orthodox Reformed (A) and % orthodox Dutch Reformed (B) (1900-1930)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>N of cases</th>
<th>Beta coefficient</th>
<th>R² constant Beta</th>
<th>R² 1st step</th>
<th>Beta coefficient</th>
<th>R² 2nd step</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0.58 (A) 0.23</td>
<td>12.6 0.60 (A)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>0.72 (A) 0.22</td>
<td>14.6 0.78 (A)</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>0.72 (A) 0.22</td>
<td>18.0 0.78 (A)</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>0.50 (B) 0.30</td>
<td>15.2 0.49 (B)</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 shows that verzuilzing among the three major denominational groups, Catholics, latitudinarian Protestants and orthodox Protestants was rather uneven, at least as far as the education sector was concerned. An important similarity was that in each of the three education sectors the size of the denominational group concerned appeared to have a low explanatory value until 1920. This confirmed the general finding that participation in denominational education increased only slowly in the course of the first quarter of the twentieth century.

The predictive value of the proportions of non-orthodox Dutch Reformed people and secularized people for participation in
public education was low between 1900 and 1920. Throughout the entire period the intercept was quite high and the beta coefficient of the most important explaining variable was low, which indicated that the public education sector was on average much larger than would be expected on the basis of the proportion of the two reference groups. Only by 1930 the intercept was much lower and the beta coefficient of the main explaining variable ‘% of non-orthodox Dutch Reformed’ had gone up. Participation in public education was best explained by the proportion of non-orthodox Dutch Reformed Church and the proportion of non-religiously affiliated in 1930. 27% of the variance was explained by the percentage of non-orthodox Dutch Reformed people, and together the independent variables explained 51%. Particularly between 1920 and 1930 the importance of the presence of a secularized population as explanatory variable increased. The proportion of latitudinarian Dutch Reformed people remained the most important factor, however. In 1900, 1910 and 1920 the explained variance of the model was so low, that the strength of the relation between participation in public education and the proportion of latitudinarian and secularized population could be said to be very weak. Apparently factors other than the presence of certain ideological groups accounted for the variance of the proportion of pupils in public schools.

At the start of the period the proportion of Catholics did not explain the participation in Catholic education very well. The regression line cut the y-axis at 12.1 and had a slope of 0.34. This implied that a change in the size of the Catholic population of 1 percentage point did not match with a similar change in participation in Catholic education and that particularly in municipalities with a small proportion of Catholics the estimated participation in Catholic education was somewhat too high. This remained more or less so until the 1920s. Between 1920 and 1930, however, participation in Catholic education rapidly increased and prediction of participation in Catholic education on the basis of the proportion of Catholic became much better, the regression line nearing the ideal position in which the constant is equal to 0 and the beta coefficient equal to 1. We may assume that if we had disposed of data of the 1930s, when verzuiling of the Catholics as far as primary education was nearing completion, the constant and the beta coefficient would still have been higher respectively lower. From the beginning the relation between the relative size of the denominational group and participation in denominational education was stronger in the Catholic sector as compared to the other sectors: the proportion of Catholics explained as much as 37% of the variance of the percentage of pupils in Catholic education in 1900. In 1910 the percentage the explained variance declined somewhat, but in 1920 almost 50% of the variance of the share of pupils attending Catholic education was explained by the percentage of Catholics in the population and in 1930 the proportion of Catholics was an almost perfect indicator of the percentage of children attending Catholic schools: the explained variance had jumped to 84%.
The evolution of $R^2$ of the regression of Protestant education on the orthodox part of the Protestant population followed the pattern of the other two sectors in that it only slightly improved during the first two decades and subsequently quickly rose to 54%. However, the point at which the regression line cut the y-axis remained quite high indicating that for the lower values of the variables 'percentage of Orthodox Reformed' and 'percentage of orthodox Dutch Reformed', the value of the variable to be explained remained systematically higher than that of the explaining variables.

It is remarkable that whereas in 1900, 1910 and 1920 the proportion of Orthodox Reformed, which included the members of the Christian Orthodox Reformed Church and the members of the Orthodox Reformed Communities, explained more than the proportion of orthodox Dutch Reformed people, the situation was reversed in 1930.37 In the last year the variable '% orthodox Dutch Reformed' was included at the first step and explained 30% of the variance of participation in Protestant education. The variable '% Orthodox Reformed' was included at the second step and added another 24% to the explanation. The entire evolution points at a rapid diffusion of verzolling behaviour among orthodox Dutch Reformed only after 1920. The regression results show that this group had indeed participated in the development of the Protestant education sector since the last decade of the nineteenth century, but that verzolling only became popular among these members of the Dutch Reformed Church when the material conditions for verzolling were fulfilled.

In the work of Verrips an excellent example of this behaviour is given.38 In the community he studied the major cleavage line was that between two groups of orthodox Protestants. This division had existed for a long time but only got a more formal character at the time of the Doleantie in 1886. Once the division at the level of the church had become definitive it diffused to the social, political and economic realms. Soon a situation had developed in which the members of one group, except for a few leaders, had no contact whatsoever with the other group. One of the first expressions of this social

37. The datafile concerning the religious affiliation of the population was not so detailed as to distinguish between the three Orthodox Reformed denominations. The members of the Orthodox Reformed Church were taken as a separate category, but the other two denominations were put in the category of 'other' denominations. With the help of more detailed data for 1920 I was able to determine in which municipalities the category 'other denominations' was mainly made up of members of the Christian Orthodox Reformed church and the Orthodox Reformed Communities. In these cases the category 'other denominations' was added to the category 'Orthodox Reformed'.

38. C. Verrips, op. cit., pp.137-144.
segregation was the establishment of a Protestant school by the Orthodox Reformed in 1890. Whereas before 1890 all children had attended the same public school, after that year the public school was the school of the orthodox Dutch Reformed only. The public school was de facto Protestant since the headmaster was member of one of the orthodox strands in the Dutch Reformed Church. Thus the Dutch Reformed population was not against the Protestant school because it officially provided religious education but simply because it was the school of the Orthodox Reformed. Only in 1929 the political discussion about a second Protestant school, for the orthodox Dutch Reformed, started. In this particular case, the orthodox Dutch Reformed did not succeed in obtaining their own school. Because they had less political power and lacked strong internal cohesion, the Dutch Reformed were at that time defeated by the Orthodox Reformed in the struggle for the second Protestant school. The results of the regression point out, however, that in similar situations the orthodox Dutch Reformed usually either succeeded to found their own Protestant school or sent their children to the Protestant school founded by the Orthodox Reformed when the antagonism between the two groups began to weaken.

To what extent did the orthodox members of the Dutch Reformed Church really behave differently from other groups of Protestants? To answer this question we must compare the verzuiling behaviour of the orthodox Dutch Reformed, first, with the behaviour of the latitudinarian Dutch Reformed and second, with the behaviour of the members of the Orthodox Reformed denominations. In order to make a systematic comparison between the orthodox and the latitudinarian part of the Dutch Reformed Church I have drawn two selective samples from our population, one consisting of those municipalities in which all Dutch Reformed were latitudinarian, and the other consisting of those municipalities in which the entire Dutch Reformed population was orthodox. The first group consisted of 516 observations and the second one of 349 observations. For both groups of municipalities the following index was calculated:

\[
\frac{\% \text{ public education}}{\% \text{ Dutch reformed}} \times 100
\]

The value of the index should be interpreted as follows: the higher the percentage of public education is in relation to the percentage of Dutch Reformed, the greater is the index, and the lesser is the degree of verzuiling. Conversely, when the proportion public education is low in relation to the proportion Dutch Reformed the value of the index is low, which means that the degree of verzuiling is high. 39 The development of the median

39. A problem with this index is that the level of public education is also determined by the presence of a secularized population. However, when the groups of Dutch Reformed and
value of the index clearly shows that the two groups reacted differently with regard to the public education sector.\(^{40}\) The most significant result is that the value of the latitudinarian group is higher than that of the orthodox group in each of the three years. The interpretation of the trends is more difficult since the samples differ over time. The rapid decrease between 1920 and 1930 of the index of the municipalities where the Dutch Reformed population is orthodox is remarkable, however, and indicates a shift from public to denominational education in these municipalities.

Table 4.4 Median value of the index for municipalities with a latitudinarian or an orthodox Dutch Reformed population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>latitudinarian N</th>
<th>orthodox N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>127.0 308</td>
<td>91.3 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>108.1 234</td>
<td>80.6 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>106.5 143</td>
<td>49.9 117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences in verzulding behaviour between orthodox Dutch Reformed population and the Orthodox Reformed denominations are more difficult to establish. Again two samples were drawn, one including the municipalities in which the orthodox population consisted of orthodox Dutch Reformed only and the other including the municipalities in which the orthodox population consisted of members of the three Orthodox Reformed denominations only. However, the problem arose that the first sample was too small (22 cases in 1910, 17 in 1920 and 15 in 1930). Therefore new, less rigid criteria were used to define the samples. On the one hand those municipalities in which the Dutch Reformed Church was entirely orthodox and the Orthodox Reformed denominations did not exceed 5% were selected, on the other hand those municipalities in which the Dutch Reformed population was latitudinarian and the percentage of Orthodox Reformed denominations was greater than 5% were taken. If we look at the values of the indices for these two types of municipalities the following picture emerges\(^{41}\): secularized people were taken together the index values showed the same trends.

\(^{40}\) The mean is a less good measure here because some of the municipalities have an extremely low value due to the presence of a very small latitudinarian Dutch Reformed population.

\(^{41}\) The indices are:

\[
\text{% Protestant education} \times 100 \\
\text{% orthodox Dutch Reformed}
\]

and

\[
\text{% Protestant education} \times 100 \\
\text{% Orthodox Reformed}
\]
Table 4.5 Median and mean values of indices for orthodox Dutch Reformed and Orthodox Reformed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Orthodox Reformed</th>
<th>Dutch Reformed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>median</td>
<td>mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The median value of the index of the orthodox Dutch Reformed population was extremely small because a large number of these municipalities had a very low proportion Protestant education or no Protestant education at all which is in itself an important fact. Therefore the mean value is also presented. In each of the three years the proportion Protestant education is generally very low compared to the proportion orthodox Dutch Reformed. On the contrary the values of the index of the Orthodox Reformed show that in many municipalities the proportion children attending Protestant education was much higher than the share of the population belonging to the Orthodox Reformed denominations, even though there was no orthodox Dutch Reformed population. Apparently children belonging to latitudinarian strands of the Dutch Reformed Church sometimes also participated in Protestant education, once it was available.

We summarize our findings with regard to the verzuiling behaviour of the three groups of Protestants, latitudinarian and orthodox Dutch Reformed and Orthodox Reformed as follows. The latitudinarian part of the Dutch Reformed church largely continued supporting the neutral, public school. Some children belonging to this group attended the Protestant school, but this was not the rule and it will only have occurred when Protestant education was already available. Among the Orthodox Reformed population the wish for denominational education diffused quickly and at an early stage. The presence of this group explained much of the variation in the participation in Protestant education. The attitude to verzuiling of the orthodox Dutch Reformed was the most complex. Table 4.4 suggested that among these people support of the public school was certainly much less stronger than among the latitudinarian part of this church. But does this mean that the phenomenon of verzuiling diffused in a similar way among the orthodox Dutch Reformed and the members of the Orthodox Reformed denominations? If we assume that both groups in the same way founded and supported autonomous, denominational organizations, we make their common religious orthodoxy the central force behind the process of verzuiling. We can also start, however, from the assumption that the orthodox Dutch Reformed population did not behave in the same way as the Orthodox Reformed and that they continued preferring a unitary public education system, just as they continued believing in a national Protestant church. In that case they agreed with the Orthodox Reformed as far as religious values were concerned but not with the political and social objectives of the Orthodox Reformed. If the second assumption
were true we can say that political considerations about the role of the state and the relation between Church and State, more than religious orthodoxy, determined the behaviour of the orthodox Dutch Reformed.

The tables 4.3 and 4.5 and the study by Verrips suggest that two mechanisms, imitation and reaction, played a part in the verzuilung behaviour of the orthodox Dutch Reformed. Table 4.5 showed that in most municipalities where the orthodox population consisted only of members of the Dutch Reformed Church either Protestant education was completely absent or made up only a very small part of the population of Protestant schools. Apparently the need for denominational education was much less strong when this was not stimulated by the presence and activities of an Orthodox Reformed community. When being the only orthodox group present, the orthodox Dutch Reformed did not see the necessity of denominational education. When living next to an Orthodox Reformed community, however, the behaviour of the Dutch Reformed was different. In case antagonism between the two groups was not too strong the orthodox Dutch Reformed imitated the behaviour of the Orthodox Reformed in that they also sent their children to the same Protestant schools or they set up their own denominational schools.42 Between saturation of the process of verzuilung among the Orthodox Reformed and full incorporation of the orthodox Dutch Reformed in this process, however, a time lag of some thirty years existed. Whereas the contribution of the variable 'Orthodox Reformed' to the explanation of the development of Protestant education did not substantially increase after 1900 the variable 'orthodox Dutch Reformed' gained considerable importance between 1920 and 1930 (see table 4.3). From Verrips' study we know, however, that in case strong antagonism existed between the two orthodox groups the result was sometimes that the orthodox Dutch Reformed continued sending their children to the public school. Whether in such situations the orthodox Dutch Reformed opened their own school at a later stage depended not only on the availability of funds for denominational schools after 1920 but also on coincidental factors, e.g. the nomination of an active minister in the Dutch Reformed parish. Another possibility was that the antagonism between the two groups of orthodox Protestants diminished and that Dutch Reformed children started to make use of the schools founded by the Orthodox Reformed population.

42. Even within the Protestant education sector differences between schools existed. Some were explicitly Orthodox Reformed, others were nearer to the Dutch Reformed denomination. The 'Unie School met den Bijbel' (the 'Union') was the national organization promoting the establishment of schools based on the dogmas of the Dutch Reformed Church. Statistical data on the number of each of these types of Protestant schools are not available.
Finally we turn to the spatial diffusion of participation in denominational education. In 1880 the relative number of pupils attending private education was much lower (24.6%) than the relative number of private schools (28.6%) which suggests that the adoption of innovative behaviour by the masses was a much slower process than its diffusion among the innovators. In the course of the following decades this difference became smaller: in 1910 38% of the schools were private schools and the same proportion of pupils attended private schools. By 1930 the percentage of pupils attending private schools (63%) had surpassed the percentage of private schools (55.3) which suggests that attending private education was no longer restricted to an elite. Apart from the initial time lag between the adoption by innovators and by the majority we may assume that in the early stages spatial variation in the level of participation in denominational education also existed and that in some areas the level of participation had attained a much higher level than in others at a particular moment. The maps 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 give a picture of regional variation in the level of verzuiling. Both the positive and the negative residuals of the regression analysis on the data for 1910 are shaded. We assumed that around 1910 spatial variation in participation was greatest, given the fact that the diffusion of participation in denominational education only began to accelerate after 1900 and that after the introduction of the Education Act of 1920 regional differences rapidly disappeared. Moreover 1910 was chosen because in this year the datafile was most complete.

In the maps only those municipalities are marked that had a residual value greater than the standard error or smaller than the negative value of the standard error. In the municipalities with a great positive or a great negative residual too the level of participation was explained by the strength of the denominations but specific local situations caused a time lag or a lead in the level of verzuiling.

In map 4.5 the residuals for the regression of the percentage of Protestant education on the percentage of Orthodox Reformed and the percentage of orthodox Dutch Reformed are marked. A high residual means that the observed participation in Protestant education was much higher than the estimated participation, thus the rate of verzuiling of the education system was more than average. A high negative residual value means, on the contrary, that the process of verzuiling in that particular municipality was slow in comparison to the same process in other municipalities.

The map shows that the observations with a high positive residual were rather dispersed. Most of these observations were found, however, in the central part of the country and in the south-western part of South Holland. This is exactly where we had expected not to find them since these areas formed part of the overwhelmingly orthodox Protestant belt. Daalder supposed that this zone only became denominationally segmented in the last stage of this process. How is the high rate of verzuiling then to be explained? Further examination showed that an important
Map 4.5 Residuals greater than the standard deviation or less than minus the standard deviation of the regression of the percentage of pupils in Protestant primary education on the percentage of Orthodox Reformed and the percentage of orthodox Dutch Reformed in 1910*

* North Holland and part of the municipalities of North Brabant not included
characteristic of the municipalities in South Holland and Zeeland was that many had a very high share of orthodox Dutch Reformed. The zone may have been overwhelmingly orthodox Protestant but this did not mean that it was homogeneous as far as religion was concerned. In some municipalities the conflictuous relation between Orthodox Reformed and orthodox Dutch Reformed communities apparently was for both sides an important motivation for organization formation. Overall, however, this pattern remains something of an enigma.

The observations with a high negative residual show a different geographical pattern. There is a strong concentration of these units in the north-eastern part of the country. The less than average level of verzuilings in the south-east corner of Friesland and in Groningen at the border with Drente was the result of the strong influence of the Socialists in these regions. The population of the area of Groningen bordering on Drente had a strong secular orientation: around 10% of the population in these municipalities said not to belong to any denomination at the time of the 1899 census. Moreover it was the only region in the northern part of the country with considerable industrial activities, the main industries being the paper, sugar, metal and shipbuilding industries. Many of those who did not find employment in these industries worked as wage labourers in the peat colonies. The south-eastern corner of Friesland was also an early stronghold of the Socialists. The first Socialist MP, elected in 1888, came from this area. The municipalities which made part of it had high percentages of non-orthodox Dutch Reformed and secular people, hence public education kept a strong position. The ideological dominance of these groups apparently did not immediately cause verzuilings tendencies among the Orthodox Reformed population, probably because in these sparsely inhabited municipalities the numerical base of the Orthodox Reformed population was too small to easily

43. 14 of the 22 municipalities with high positive residuals in this province had an average share of orthodox Dutch Reformed of 67%. The other 8 municipalities, on the contrary, had no orthodox Dutch Reformed community at all.

44. More towards the border with Germany this figure was even much higher, going up to 30%.

45. Domela Nieuwehuuis was the winning candidate of the Radical Socialist Party (SDB) in the constituency Schoterland.

46. Particularly in the Frisian municipalities secularization tendencies were strong. In 1910 their secular population amounted to between 12 and 20% of the total population. In 1930, however, this figure already ranged from 18 to 42% in these municipalities.
establish a private school. Two other clusters of high negative residuals were found in the central part of Overijssel and at the border of Overijssel and Gelderland. In section 4.2 we already observed that the central area of Overijssel, where orthodox Protestantism was the dominant orientation, did not belong to the municipalities which had a denominational school as early as 1880. Why the process of verzuiling was slower here than in the rest of the country is not easy to explain. In the first place one could think that the popularity of the interconfessional and neutral organizations among the textile workers of Twente diffused among the population in the neighbouring municipalities. This possibility is contested, however, by the fact that all MP's elected in this particular part of Overijssel between 1897 and 1913 belonged to the ARP, the political party of the orthodox Protestants. Secondly, the low degree of participation in denominational education by the population of this area might be attributed to the fact that they belonged to a specific strand of orthodox Protestantism. Each of these municipalities was characterised by a high percentage of orthodox Dutch Reformed and in two of them the smaller Orthodox Reformed denominations had quite a number of members. From other studies we know that the members of these latter denominations sometimes explicitly rejected the culture of the main Orthodox Reformed church, just as the orthodox part of the Dutch Reformed Church sometimes did so. To distinguish themselves from the Orthodox Reformed they rejected, for example, the Protestant school. Verrips noticed this behaviour among the orthodox Dutch Reformed in the southeastern part of South Holland, the Alblasserwaard. This mechanism probably also was at work in the municipalities with high negative residuals at the border between Overijssel and Gelderland and on the islands of South Holland and Zeeland. The conclusion of this analysis of residuals is that the group of orthodox Dutch Reformed played a key role in defining the position of a municipality. If both the Orthodox Reformed and the orthodox Dutch Reformed groups participated in the verzuiling process this could result in an above average attendance in Protestant education. If, on the contrary, these groups expressed their antagonism by opposite behaviour, the non-participation of the orthodox Dutch Reformed in Protestant education sometimes caused a negative residual to appear. Particularly before 1920 a large part of the orthodox Dutch Reformed was not in favour of denominational education, either because they were not yet interested in segmental organizations at all or because they

47. For example, one of the Frisian municipalities concerned, Weststellingwerf, consisted of 35 small hamlets of between 100 and 800 inhabitants.

48. The average percentage of orthodox Dutch Reformed was 55.3%.

Map 4.6 Residuals greater than the standard deviation or less than minus the standard deviation of the regression of the percentage of pupils in Catholic primary education on the percentage of Catholics in 1910*  

* North Holland and part of the municipalities of North Brabant not included
considered the Protestant school as the school of the Orthodox Reformed. These findings thus confirm the conclusions about the verzuiling behaviour of the orthodox part of the Dutch Reformed Church drawn earlier in this section.

Map 4.6 pictures the large positive and negative residuals of the regression of the participation in Catholic education on the relative number of Catholics in the population. We can divide them into two groups, those found in the Catholic provinces of Limburg and North Brabant and those found in the other provinces. As far as the second group was concerned positive values were mainly found in predominantly Catholic municipalities in the mixed areas of South Holland and Utrecht. In accordance with Daalder's hypothesis participation in denominational education diffused rapidly in these municipalities so that by 1910 a large part of the population was involved in this process. This supports our findings with regard to the spread of the institution of denominational education in this zone, which took place in the early stages of the process of verzuiling. The negative values were mostly found in the predominantly Catholic municipalities in Overijssel and Gelderland. In the eastern part of these provinces the low level of participation in denominational education was particularly due to the influence of the Socialist and Liberal ideologies. In the southern part of Gelderland the absence of conflicting ideologies probably played a part. Culturally this part of Gelderland formed an extension of North Brabant: a homogeneous Catholic area, where ideological rivalries, other than between orthodox and latitudinarian Catholics, were absent. In each of the elections between 1897 and 1913 a Catholic representative was elected in this part of Gelderland.

Turning then to North Brabant and Limburg we find some positive as well as some negative residuals. In neither of these homogeneously Catholic provinces ideological rivalries were strong, except for the most southern part of Limburg where the orthodox clergy resisted the influence of Socialism and interconfessionalism among the miners. In the city of

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50. The number of positive and negative residuals in North Brabant is of course low because the data for this province concern a sample of 20% of the municipalities. The same factor plays a part in map 4.7.

51. After the turn of the century the stable social structure and religious homogeneity of southern Limburg rapidly disappeared because of the development of the coal industry which attracted non-Catholic migrant workers from the northern part of the country and from abroad. Atheist and Socialist ideas, which were already widely accepted in the industrial areas of Belgium and Germany, were in this way introduced in Limburg and broke the social stability and homogeneity of this region. The Catholic clergy reacted to these changes by attempts to form Catholic
Maastricht the major conflict was that between Catholicism and Socialism. Since 1878, however, all constituencies in these two provinces had voted in favour of Catholic, largely conservative, candidates. In North Brabant the institution of the denominational school rapidly diffused, probably as a result of the presence of many religious orders in this province, and no real fight took place around the issue of Catholic education. In Limburg the situation was somewhat different. There were fewer schools maintained by religious orders and Catholic schools thus had to be founded by the people themselves. Given the high costs involved in setting up a school and the low level of ideological conflict not much interest in denominational schools existed. The diffusion of Catholic education was consequently slower than in North Brabant. For both provinces it can be said that in case Catholic education became the only type of education provided whereas the population was not entirely Catholic, a positive residual could be the result. In other cases one or two public schools continued existing for some time, whereas the population was almost entirely Catholic, which resulted in a negative residual. Neither of these two situations necessarily was an expression of ideological conflict.

In map 4.7 the residuals of the regression of public education on the share of the latitudinarian Dutch Reformed population and the share of the secular population are marked. This map is largely complementary to the preceding two. A strong positive value means that the level of participation in public education was above average, thus the level of participation in denominational education was below average. Conversely, a strong negative value implies that the level of participation in denominational education was above average.

Concentrations of positive residuals are found at the border of Groningen and Drente and in Overijssel. This corresponds with the concentrations of negative values for the regressions on Protestant and Catholic education in the same areas. In the south-eastern part of Groningen and the north-eastern part of Drente many people were attracted by the Liberal and secular ideologies. For example, 66% of the population of Drente belonged organizations, in order to establish a barrier to further diffusion of the new ideas. Until 1910, however, their attempts were not very effective. J.J.A. van Vuigt, op. cit., pp.21-26.

Before the 1870s the Catholics did not form a distinctive political current. The representatives of both southern provinces either belonged to the Liberals or to the Conservatives. At the end of the 1860s Conservatism rapidly dwindled as a separate political current and the Liberals lost all support in North Brabant and Limburg due to the education issue and pressure by the Catholic Church: Liberalism was strongly rejected in the encyclical letter Quanta Cura of 1964. Th. van Tijn, op. cit., 1971, pp.191-195.
Map 4. Residuals greater than the standard deviation or less than minus the standard deviation of the regression of the percentage of pupils in public primary education on the percentage of people without religious affiliation and the percentage of latitudinarian Dutch Reformed in 1910.

* North Holland and part of the municipalities of North Brabant not included
to the latitudinarian part of the Dutch Reformed church in 1910. In Groningen the Socialists therefore succeeded in gaining considerable influence but in Drente the orientation at the political level remained Liberal.\(^{53}\) In both situations the result was that denominational education was rather slow to diffuse.

The less than average level of verzuring in the eastern part of Overijssel was probably due to the homogeneous culture of this area. Just as in the homogeneously Catholic area in Gelderland the call for denominational education was also weak in this predominantly Catholic part of Overijssel. Moreover the ideologies of interconfessionalism and Socialism, very popular among the textile workers in the towns, might have exerted a certain influence in the rural areas of Twente as well. In the education sector this could have been the reason for a greater orientation on the public school. The remaining positive values were found in the orthodox Protestant belt running through Utrecht and South Holland to the islands of Zeeland. They quite precisely reflect the negative residuals marked in map 4.5 The possible reasons for the low participation in denominational education in these municipalities have been discussed in the preceding pages.

The two clusters of negative values to be discussed were situated in the most northern parts of Friesland and Groningen and in the north-western part of South Holland. The orthodox orientation which had developed in Friesland was in the first instance a reaction to the latitudinarian tendencies within the Dutch Reformed Church and the growing secularization.\(^{54}\) Each of the orthodox Protestant movements which arose during the nineteenth century was strongly supported in this area. For example, over 20% of the separate Orthodox Reformed parishes which were formed in 1886 and 1887 was situated in Friesland. The sharp opposition which developed between orthodox Protestants and Socialists during the last quarter of the century resulted in a period of intense organization formation. The highest number of regional branches of particular Socialist or orthodox Protestant

\(^{53}\) One should not forget that a large part of the working class in this area was not yet entitled to vote by 1910. The same was true, however, for the south-eastern part of Groningen, where Socialism was a strong social and political force. The difference between Groningen and Drente was probably explained by the level of industrialization, which was high in Groningen and still very low in Drente.

\(^{54}\) The figures in annex 4 reveal that secularization was very fast among the younger generations in Friesland and Groningen. The secularized part of the population in the Netherlands as a whole, which was however mainly concentrated in the two northern provinces, rose from 1\% in 1879, to 6.3\% in 1899 and to 10.6\% in 1909.
organizations was often found in Friesland. In the education sector this resulted in a rapidly increasing number of Protestant schools, which evoked the founding of the Frisian Society for the Promotion of National Education. Given the early presence of Protestant education in Friesland and the orthodox orientation of the most northern zone it is not surprising that the level of attendance in denominational schools was above average. The negative residuals in the north-western part of South Holland show, clearer than in map 4.5, that in this religiously mixed, densely populated area denominational education was very popular as early as 1910. The zone of early verzuiling extended from the coast to the border with Utrecht and perhaps also in the urbanized part of North Holland. The pattern of religious affiliation in this region was dominated by the three main denominations. The Orthodox Reformed church was, in relation to its strength in the Netherlands as a whole, well represented here. Secularisation, on the contrary, was hardly known. It is not surprising that the Protestants in the area bordering on Utrecht early participated in denominational education given the fact that this was the second core from where the secession movement of 1886-1887 began to spread. Here as well as in the coastal region the orthodox strands of the Dutch Reformed church were also well represented. The elections of 1905, 1909 and 1913 were decided in favour of the Christelijk Historische Unie (Christian Historical Union), the orthodox Protestant party rivalling with the ARP. The third group, the Catholics, were a sizable minority here. They, too, sent their children to denominational schools at an early time.

55. For instance, 26 out of 82 branches of Patrimonium, the Protestant industrial organization, were found in Friesland in 1891. B. Kruythof, "Trouw aan het beginsel". De Christelijk-Sociale beweging in Nederland van 1875 tot 1909, in: Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis, 1981, p.372

56. In 1879 Friesland had the highest number of Protestant schools. Particularly the Society for Christian National Education was active in this region. H. Knippenberg, op. cit., 1986, p.219.

57. Map 4.1 showed that already in 1880 the institution of the denominational school had widely diffused south of the North Sea canal, so participation in denominational probably also was higher than average in the southern part of North Holland.

58. In 1894 the conflict between Abraham Kuyper and A.F. de Savornin Lohman led to a breakup of the ARP. The CHU, which was formally founded in 1908, represented the orthodox Protestants who did not agree with the ideas of Abraham Kuyper. The following of De Savornin Lohman rejected the concept of separate organization. Instead they asked for the restoration of orthodoxy as the official state religion.
If we again evaluate our findings in relation to Daalder’s hypothesis the following conclusions can be drawn. In the largely latitudinarian areas, Groningen, Drente, the northern part of North Holland and parts of Friesland, Gelderland and Overijssel verzeling of the education system was rather slow. Daalder supposed that these areas would be among the first to become incorporated in the verzeling process, but he also assumed that class would be the major cleavage line here. Verzeling of the education system, however, was only based on religious dividing lines, hence the difference between his hypothesis and the outcome of our research. The Socialists as well as the Liberals were in favour of neutral, public institutions as far as education was concerned. If the Socialists or the Liberals had decided to found their own private schools the outcome would probably have been very different and more in line with Daalder’s hypothesis. However, both groups, each on the basis of their own ideology, considered the provision of primary education an important task of the state.

The second zone where segmental organizations were thought to be formed in the early phase of the verzeling process were the mixed zones in the Western part of the country and in Utrecht, Gelderland and parts of Friesland. Of these particularly the Western part of the Netherlands and the mixed areas of Friesland appeared to confirm the hypothesis. The mixed zones of Utrecht and Gelderland showed an average level of verzeling. With regard to the diffusion of denominational schools we even noticed a relatively slow rate of verzeling. This was probably due, however, to factors which were not related to ideological homogeneity or conflict, such as the strong administrative fragmentation.

Daalder underestimated the importance of the opposition within the orthodox Protestant world and therefore assumed that the zone of orthodox Protestantism would only be incorporated in the verzeling process at a later stage. In general, however, the diffusion of participation in Protestant education, like the diffusion of the institution of the denominational school, took place at an early stage. Only in some municipalities the negative attitude of the orthodox Dutch Reformed towards denominational education caused a below average level of verzeling. Daalder also paid little attention to the tradition of religious opposition which played a part in the northern periphery of the country. Important religious reform movements, such as the development of modern theology during the 18th century and the reaction against the latitudinarian orientation of the Dutch Reformed church in 1834, started in this region.

Following this tradition the major centres of orthodox opposition, which

59. One of the centres of modern theological thought was the university of Franeker, which existed until 1811. The orthodox reaction of 1834, the Secession movement, started in Ulrum (Groningen).
eventually led to the secession of 1886, were found in the northern part of Friesland and, to a less extent, Groningen.

A second point at which Daalder was not entirely right concerned the homogeneous Catholic zone. Because of the specific situation in North Brabant, where the diffusion of Catholic schools strongly correlated with the distribution of religious orders, denominational education was a widely accepted phenomenon even before the turn of the century. In Limburg the situation was different in that in many municipalities the first Catholic school appeared only after 1920 and only under considerable pressure of the local clergy. In most of the municipalities where Catholic education was founded before that year the participation in this type of education was at the average level. The Catholic areas in Gelderland and Overijssel, however, lagged clearly behind. In Overijssel this probably was caused by the influence of interconfessional and Socialist organizations among the Catholic population of Twente, whereas in the Catholic area of Gelderland the call for Catholic education was possibly low because of the homogeneous cultural setting.

It is important to remember, however, that Daalder formulated a general hypothesis about the diffusion of verzuiing and that it is not possible to evaluate this hypothesis on the basis of the events in the education sector only. The fact that the Catholics in the southern part of the country soon became involved in the verzuiing process was to a greater extent due to the supply side, that is the fact that many congregations offered education, than to the wish for segregation and polarisation, although the importance of the antagonism which existed between the liberal and ultramontanist tendencies in the Catholic Church was somewhat underestimated. Daalder based his hypothesis mainly on observations of the evolution in the political system. With regard to politics the Catholics did indeed only arrive at drawing up a common political programme in 1896 and at forming a strong national organization in 1926. Nevertheless the population had overwhelmingly been voting in favour of orthodox Catholic candidates since the 1870s, whereas before 1870 conservatism and liberalism had been the most influential political ideologies. This shows that even within the political sector the evolution of the process of verzuiing was not a linear movement.
3.3 The influence of urbanization and industrialization on verzuiling

In section 4.1, where diffusion theory was discussed, it was stated that innovations do not always necessarily diffuse from urban centres. If one does not consider the flow of information as the only factor underlying the diffusion process, there is no reason to believe that centres of innovation are always found in the most urbanized areas. In fact when we tried to explain the diffusion of denominational schools and the participation in this new type of education we assumed that it was the degree of ideological conflict in a certain area which played a central part in this process. At the same time, however, it was recognised that factors like urbanization and industrialization are not unimportant since they influence to a certain extent where ideological conflict arises. In urbanized areas, due to their high population density and the heterogeneity of their population as a consequence of being centres of strong immigration, ideological conflict is generally supposed to arise easier and to be sharper than in rural areas with a more or less stable population and a much lower population density. The process of industrialization started in the Netherlands around 1850 but only gained momentum after 1880. Industrialization, which in its initial phase only partly coincided with the process of urbanization since many industries were based on agrarian resources, can be considered as a process of economic modernisation. This process involved radical changes in the social structure of the previously agricultural or commercial communities, and consequently easily led to abandoning of traditional values and behaviour. Economic modernization did not only create the need for different forms of social organization, it also entailed a growing differentiation among the population. Particularly the latter aspect makes us assume that the process of industrialization may have had an independent effect on the verzuiling of society.

In section 4.3 we have in an indirect way only paid attention to the relevance of these processes for verzuiling in that part of our analysis which focused on the mixed urbanized areas of the country. We did not systematically distinguish, however, between the areas characterised by a high degree of urbanization or industrialization on the one hand and the rest of the country on the other hand. In the present section we will examine in more detail the effects of these factors, within the limits of the available data. The regressions of which the results are presented in table 4.6 are an attempt to do this for the factor urbanization. The complex concept of urbanization is here reduced to one dimension, the number of inhabitants of a municipality. The regressions of the previous section are repeated but only for the municipalities which had over 5000
inhabitants. It probably would have been a better operationalization if we had put the limit somewhat higher, e.g. at 10,000 inhabitants, but this would have diminished the number of cases very much. Moreover in the typology discussed in the next pages the line is drawn at the same number.

Table 4.6a Stepwise regression of % pupils in public education on % non-orthodox Dutch Reformed (A) and % without religion (B) for municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants (1900-1930)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>N of cases</th>
<th>Beta coefficient 1st step</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>constant</th>
<th>Beta coefficient 2nd step</th>
<th>R²</th>
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<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0.30 (A) 0.18</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>0.26 (A) 0.20</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>0.43 (A) 0.24</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>0.35 (A) 0.28</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0.48 (A) 0.28</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>0.43 (A) 0.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0.83 (A) 0.55</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0.73 (A) 0.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6b Stepwise regression of % pupils in Catholic education on % Catholics (A) for municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants (1900-1930)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>N of cases</th>
<th>Beta coefficient</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>constant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6c Stepwise regression of % pupils in Protestant education on % Orthodox Reformed (A) and % orthodox Dutch Reformed (B) for municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants (1900-1930)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>N of cases</th>
<th>Beta coefficient</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>constant</th>
<th>Beta coefficient</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

60. Another possibility for examining the effect of the variable urbanization would have been to include the number of inhabitants as the third variable in the regressions of table 4.3. and to compute partial correlation coefficients. We preferred, however, to look at the separate effect of the variable urbanization by holding this variable constant and therefore drew a selective sample from the dataset. As the dataset is divided in only two groups, the number of cases does not become too small.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1st step</th>
<th>2nd step</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.52 (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>1.01 (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>1.15 (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>1.34 (A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Data are available for the same provinces as for the regression in table 4.3.

The differences between table 4.3 and table 4.6 are remarkable. The first thing that strikes us is that each of the explained variances is higher for the category of municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants than for the regression on the total number of municipalities and some of the values are even considerably higher. The fit of each of the regression lines for 1930 is extremely good, and for the Catholic as well as for the Protestant sector the explained variance is already over 0.5 in 1900 and 1910 respectively. Particularly participation in Catholic education closely corresponded to the relative number of Catholics. In 1930 the regression line approximated the ideal position. The conclusion is that generally speaking in the larger towns ideological differences were more pronounced than in the countryside and that this resulted in a stronger wish for segmental organization. We have to consider, however, that part of the difference between urban areas and the country as a whole may also be attributable to the fact that our data for the smaller administrative units are probably less precise, due to border crossing school attendance and the existence of common schools. Likewise the fact that in the very small municipalities the absolute number of children we are talking about is so low, that errors immediately cause considerable changes of the percentage values on which our analysis is based, contributes to this impreciseness.

The second difference to be noticed is the evolution of the participation in denominational education in the Protestant sector. For the country as a whole the effect of the Education Act of 1920 was marked by a strong rise of the explained variance between 1920 and 1930 in each of the three sectors. This pattern was also found for the public and the Catholic sectors when the regression was limited to the larger towns. In the Protestant sector this was not the case. The diffusion of attendance in Protestant schools appears to have been much smoother in the urbanized areas. In 1910 the explained variance was already as high as 59% and the increase of this figure between 1920 and 1930 was not spectacular compared to the increase for the country as a
On the contrary, the rise between 1900 and 1910 was considerable and differed from the trend for the entire country. It shows that participation in denominational education had not only more widely diffused in the urban than in the rural areas but also that the popularity of segmental organizations spread in an earlier period in the towns than in the countryside. As far as the urbanized part of the country was concerned the period between 1900 and 1910 was the one of the most rapid change. This was obviously related to the intense conflicts in which the Protestant world was involved between 1885 and 1910, but what this relation exactly looked like can not be determined on the basis of these data. The regression results make clear, however, that the debates between orthodox and latitudinarian Protestants and that between Kuyper and his following on the one hand and De Savornin Lohman and his following on the other sooner resulted in the establishment of denominational education in the urban rather than in the rural areas. This might have been caused by the greater numerical strength of the various Protestant strands in the more densely populated zones, which made it easier to mobilize the resources necessary for establishing a school. The second point to be noticed with regard to the outcomes of the regressions for the Protestant sector is the fact that in the towns even in 1930 the variation of the percentage of Orthodox Reformed people contributed more than the percentage of orthodox Dutch Reformed people to the explanation of the variation of the percentage of children attending Protestant schools. This is not surprising since the orthodox movement within the Dutch Reformed Church was stronger in rural areas, whereas the movement of the Orthodox Reformed was also strong in the cities. The effect of the variable 'percentage of orthodox Dutch Reformed' was thus stronger in the general regression presented section 4.3 than in the regression for the urban municipalities.

In table 4.7 the results are given of the regressions for four types of municipalities which represent different socio-economic contexts in which verzuiling occurred. The typology of municipalities incorporates aspects of urbanization as well as of industrialization, hence it differentiates more than the simple criterion of the number of inhabitants used in the previous analysis. The typology is based on three criteria: the number

61. The evolution of the explained variances between 1900 and 1930 should be interpreted with care since the four regression do not include the same number of cases, due to the availability of data. This does not alter the fact that the differences between the regression results for the entire country, and for the urbanized areas are remarkable.

62. The typology used here was the provisional typology made by N. Passchier in 1986. In a more recent paper he changed the immigration criterion for the criterion of population growth and took data for 1930 as the basis of the typology. N. Passchier and
of inhabitants in 1899, the number of people engaged in non-agrarian activities in 1899 and the rate of immigration in a municipality between 1900 and 1913. With regard to the first criterion the line is again drawn at 5000 inhabitants and with regard to the second criterion at 40% of the male population. These two criteria are taken together and thus distinguish between two types of municipalities. With regard to the third criterion the limit is put at a growth rate of 10% or of 1000 persons. The following four types of municipalities result when these criteria are applied.

a. Municipalities having more than 5000 inhabitants, more than 40% of the working population engaged in non-agrarian activities and a high rate of immigration. These were the larger towns with many industrial activities, fast growing administrative centres and the fast growing mining- and transport centres.

b. Municipalities having less than 5000 inhabitants or less than 40% of the working population engaged in non-agrarian activities, but with a strong immigration. These were the growing villages at commuting distance from the towns, old suburbs and that part of the countryside where industrialization recently started.

c. Municipalities having more than 5000 inhabitants and more than 40% of the working population engaged in non-agrarian activities, but with a low rate of immigration. These were the old, larger municipalities in the countryside which industrialized before 1900, and small regional centres which provided services to their hinterland.

d. Municipalities having less than 5000 inhabitants or less than 40% of the working population engaged in agrarian activities and a low rate of immigration. This is the agrarian countryside.

Table 4.7a Regression of % pupils in public education on % non-orthodox Dutch Reformed (A) and % without religion (B) for four groups of municipalities (1910)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>group</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
<th>constant</th>
<th>Beta coefficient</th>
<th>R^2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>0.39 (A)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.49 (B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>0.40 (A)</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.93 (B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>0.33 (A)</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.06 (B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>0.27 (A)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.48 (B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7b Regression of % Catholic education on % Catholics (1910)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>group</th>
<th>N of cases</th>
<th>constant</th>
<th>Beta coefficient</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7c Regression of % pupils in Protestant education on % Orthodox Reformed (A) and % orthodox Dutch Reformed (B) (1910)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>group</th>
<th>N of cases</th>
<th>constant</th>
<th>Beta coefficient (A)</th>
<th>Beta coefficient (B)</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.37 (A)</td>
<td>0.35 (B)</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>0.64 (A)</td>
<td>0.13 (B)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.70 (A)</td>
<td>0.38 (B)</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>0.86 (A)</td>
<td>0.22 (B)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The regressions are only done for 1910, the year for which the highest number of observations is available and which corresponds best with the data on which the typology is based. The results show a very clear pattern. As we would expect on the basis of the foregoing findings verzuring was strongest in the municipalities which were most urbanized and most industrialized, i.e. the groups A and C. In the Protestant sector the participation in denominational education was even somewhat better explained by the proportion of orthodox Protestants in the older industrialized rural zones than in the recently industrializing towns. In third position came the agrarian rural communities (group D). The regressions for the Catholic and Protestant sectors still showed a reasonably good fit for this group but in the public sector the explained variance was very low. This also corresponds with previous findings. A remarkable bad outcome was noticed for the suburbs and the fast growing, non-industrialized centres around the larger towns. In the case of the Catholic sector the fit of the regression equation was so bad that the model could be said to have no validity at all. The most obvious explanation of this phenomenon was that the dynamic situation caused by a fast growth of the population resulting from immigration, in combination with a rather small population,

63. The typology of modernization could also have been included in the regression as a dummy variable. By doing that we would have avoided the problem of the low number of cases but lost lack of clarity in the interpretation.
created a situation in which the demand for various types of education was badly attuned to the supply of education. It is also true, however, that the wealthier part of the population living in this type of area (industrialists, professionals) were the main supporters of middle class liberal values and that religious orthodoxy was not very widespread among them. Finally the low number of cases may also have played a part. On the contrary in the large, industrialising towns (group A) the changes of the social composition of the population resulted in the rapid build up of the denominational education sector, something which was made possible by the greater numerical strength of the various denominations.

The main conclusion to be drawn from these outcomes is that in the first decade of the century verzeling was much stronger in the larger, industrialized towns than in the rural, less industrialized areas and that this was true for each of the sectors. In the Catholic sector a difference also existed between the newly industrializing cities and the old industrial towns, the first ones showing a higher participation rate than the latter ones. The heterogeneous culture of the large, industrializing cities, where all major ideologies were represented, was the major reason for this intense participation in segmented organizations. Hence a positive relation between verzeling and early industrialization certainly existed. Verzeling was, however, not merely a reaction to the rise of industrialization, as Stuurman concluded. The main fact arguing against this conclusion was that verzeling had started long before the industrialization process began to influence the working and living conditions of large groups of people.
5.1 Ontzuiling and stagnation.

In chapter 2, following Thurlings (1978) and Van Heek (1973), we have concluded that ontzuiling of the social structure was the result of developments within and outside the churches. Both contributed to the emergence of discontent with the existing rigid social structure and the wish to break the traditional social patterns. The radical rupture with the previous period in which people's lives had been completely controlled by the denominational elites through the network of denominational organizations gave many people a real sense of liberation.

Empirical research into the conditions and the causes of the rapid process of ontzuiling has been done by relatively few authors compared to the large body of literature about the process of verzuiling. In this section we will first examine the explanations of ontzuiling put forward by Thurlings, Van Heek and others. The empirical evolution of the ontzuiling process in sectors other than education will be discussed next. Particularly the developments in the political system have been the subject of several studies. Finally we will pay attention to some reactions to the progressive movements of the 1960s.

Van Heek starts with the rapid economic transformation of Dutch society after the Second World War. As a consequence of technological innovations the number of people employed in the industrial sector and commercial services increased to the detriment of the number of people employed in the primary sector of the economy. In 1947, when the economic recovery of the Netherlands started, 19.3% of the economically active population was employed in the agrarian sector whereas in 1960 this figure had fallen to 10.7%. Since agricultural activities had always been connected to a particular rural way of life this movement meant that the traditional way of living was rapidly disappearing. More and more people lived in urban centres, where the tight social control common to small communities did not
exist to the same extent. The decline of the rural way of life and the rise of the welfare state, which took responsibility for the support of old age people, caused the extended family to completely disappear. This was another factor contributing to the loosening of traditional patterns of social relations. Each of the developments listed, however, was in fact a continuation of movements which had already started at the end of the last century when industrialization began. The major difference between the pre-war and the post-war period was that after 1945 the technological changes resulted in rapid economic growth which created a situation of relative affluence for the masses. Durable consumer goods, including means of mass communication and private means of transport, came within reach of all people.

The effect of this was that communication between people living in different regions and belonging to different social groups, increased. The interaction between various groups broke the isolation in which people had been living hitherto and created, if not understanding, at least acceptance of other norms and values. This was one of the preconditions for the emergence of mitigating cross pressures in the segmented structure. In fact this tendency towards greater interaction between population segments was a continuation of the war situation, during which people had been forced to co-operate in order to resist the Germans and to survive a situation of deprivation.

Out of the resistance movement rose the first initiatives for the creation of an entirely new social order. Two events stood out. Firstly the communist oriented Eenheids Vak Centrale (Communist Trade Union Federation) was founded in the spring of 1945. Although it had not explicitly been created to abolish the structure of verzuiling the EVC constituted a real threat to the

1. The number of people living in communities with more than 20,000 inhabitants rose from 48.7% in 1930 to 60.2% in 1960 and the growth of the urban centres was faster before than after the Second World War. This movement has to be distinguished from the suburbanization which started in the 1960s and which was initially a movement from the towns to the rural centres just outside the urbanized area.

2. Between 1900 and 1948 the increase of the index of the net national income (1963=100) was 35 points, whereas in the 1948-1963 period the increase was 47 points. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Zeventig jaar statistiek in tijdreeksen 1899-1969, 1970. The rise of the net national income was not accompanied by a similar rise of the wages, however, since the government kept wage increases under control until 1964. By that time pressure of the unionized labour force had mounted so high that a 'wage explosion' was inevitable. Nevertheless the position of most people at the end of the fifties was much better than it had ever been before.
Catholic labour movement which had not yet been reorganized. Because the Catholic elite in the southern part of the country, already liberated in September of 1944, had not yet re-established its position of power, many Catholic labourers in North Brabant and Limburg joined the EVC, which showed a rapid growth in 1945-1946. As soon as the Catholic elite was aware of the danger they re-organized their own social infrastructure. They did not succeed to do so, however, without putting great pressure on Catholics who had dared to join the EVC (and also the Nederlands Vak Verbond, the Socialist Labour Union Federation). Membership of Socialist and Communist organizations was explicitly forbidden and Catholics who continued their membership risked excommunication.

The second event concerned the formation of the Labour Party in 1946, which was no longer a 'party of affection', based on the Socialist ideology, but a party based on a political programme and thus open for people of different ideological backgrounds. The new party attracted quite a few Catholic and Dutch Reformed intellectuals, who made it clear that their political activities within this essentially Social Democratic party were not incompatible with their religious beliefs. The bishops did not forbid membership of the new party, but it was evident that they preferred other political arrangements. The attitude of the Dutch Reformed Church differed from that of the Catholic Church in that it did not object to membership of a non-confessional party. During the synodal meeting of 1955 the leadership of the Protestant church formally stated that its members were free to choose a political party.

3. Until 1946 the organization of the Catholic labourers was called Roomse-Katholiek Werkliedenverbond. Thereafter this name was changed in Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging. In 1964 the Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond (Netherlands Catholic Trade Union Federation) was formed.

4. F. de Jong, Om de plaats van de arbeid, 1956, p.300.

5. This opinion was officially proclaimed in the pastoral letter of 1954. In this letter the Catholic population was reminded of their moral duty to remain loyal to the Catholic organizations and the ban on membership of the Socialist Union was repeated.

6. In 1946 as well as in 1948 the bishops attempted to influence the Catholics during the electoral campaign by pointing out the necessity 'to remain politically united'. H. Bakvis, Catholic power in the Netherlands, 1981, pp.77-79.

7. The situation within the Orthodox Reformed Church was quite different. Instead of being faced with radical demands the leadership of this church met internal disagreement about the interpretation of synodal decisions, which led in 1944-1945 to
The events described here teach us two lessons. First a clear, although by no means general, wish existed for a new, less segmented social order. The aim of these people was to create the possibility of establishing cross cutting relations. Once the relation between the religious affiliation and the choice for denominational organizations was weakened, however, the segmented social structure would rapidly crumble. The 'breakthrough' movement of the post war years was the result of ontzuiling tendencies among small groups of people and as such it can be distinguished from the secularization and concomitant decline of confessional organizations which got momentum at the beginning of the 1960s. Second the denominational elites still had sufficient power to re-establish the old order for some time. These elites succeeded to reconstitute the segmented social structure: at the organizational level verzuiling even culminated in the 1950s.

Coleman saw this as the third phase in the sequence of changes, namely the phase in which the agencies of control, the bishops, tried to hold the problem at bay.

However, the success of the structure of verzuiling did not only depend on the power of the elites, but also on the fact that during the post-war period an extensive system of state-financed social services, segmented along ideological dividing lines, was being built up. The welfare state was realised through a network of state-financed private organizations based on Catholic, Protestant, Socialist or Liberal principles which functioned as an intermediate level between state and society.

Only because of this state-financing the elites were able to meet the demands of their respective markets and thereby to maintain the loyalty of the founding of a new church, the Gereformeerde Kerk Vrijgemaakt (Free Orthodox Reformed Church). The other, small Orthodox Reformed churches were also in a turmoil: secessions occurred in 1952 and 1953. C.S.L. Janse, op. cit., pp.62-81.

Kruyt and Goddijn provided some figures about verzuiling in the 1950s and 1960s: 80% of Catholic children attended Catholic secondary schools, 95% of Catholic farmers were members of a Catholic farmers' organisation, 84% of the Catholics gave their vote to the KVP, 89% was member of the Catholic broadcasting corporation. The last two figures for the Orthodox Reformed population were 95% and 94%. Kruyt and Goddijn, op cit, 1961, p.242.


A very clear essay on the relation between the church, private initiative and the state with regard to social services as it was perceived in the first post war years is the advice to the government by J. Loeff. J. Loeff, Taak en onderlinge verhouding van kerk, particulier initiatief en overheid ten aanzien van de maatschappelijke zorg, 1949.
of their followings. Underneath this apparent success at the structural level, however, cultural changes continued, stimulated by the development of an affluent, secular society in which the old ideologies only played a subordinate role. Hence it was the combination of the experience of co-operation dating from the war and the rapid economic recovery during the 1950s, which created a sense of great optimism and stimulated the wish to reform the existing social order, which provided the setting for a rapid dismantling of the segmented social structure. The process as described before corresponds largely with Van Heek’s explanation of the cultural changes in the Catholic world, including the ontzuiling tendencies, which occurred in the 1960s. The crumbling of the Catholic organizations resulted in his opinion from the mounting tension between the conservativism, as exemplified in the pastoral letter of 1954, of the bishops on the one hand and the declining influences of ideologies in the post-war society on the other hand. The desorganization of the Catholics was the result of an erosion process which slowly extended its influence from the outside to the core of the Catholic world. Since the process of ontzuiling was initially much more intense among the Catholics than among the orthodox Protestants the debate about the process of ontzuiling has largely focused on the developments within the Catholic Church and the Catholic community.

Contrary to Van Heek, Thurlings almost exclusively focused on the internal dynamics of the Catholic church in this debate. In their reaction to the developments outside the church the Dutch bishops had suggested a unanimity that in reality no longer existed. Part of the higher and lower clergy was increasingly influenced by the thinking of modern theologians such as Cardinal Suhard of Paris, and Congar and Lubac. The question was posed whether isolationism, in the form of verzuiling, was the best way to reach people and the best way to preach them the word of

11. The market function of the segmented services and institutions was emphasised by Bakvis who argued that the Catholic institutions helped to cement the loyalty of Catholics to the Catholic subculture by providing services that were competitive with those of other blocks. H. Bakvis, 1981, p.177; Coleman called it one of the main resources of mobilization. Coleman, 1978, p.86. It has been noted, however, that internal loyalty was particularly strengthened in case the state did not fully finance the services and people thus also had to contribute themselves.

12. Congar and Lubac were part of the French nouvelle theologie movement. In the Netherlands E. Schillebeeckx, a reform-minded theologian, played an important part in revising the Catholic doctrine.
By 1960 many core members of the Catholic Church had become very receptive to criticism of traditional theology and traditional morality as proclaimed by the Catholic Church. Thurlings explained this openmindedness by the state of self-confidence the Dutch Catholic Church had reached by the middle of this century. In his opinion the emancipation process of the Catholics was completed because they were numerically the largest denomination and socially on equal terms with other denominations. Because the Catholic Church had succeeded to establish such a powerful position it no longer needed to take a defensive, isolationist position, and more room for discussion was created. One of the consequences of this development was, however, that differences within the Catholic Church became apparent. The confusion and conflict resulting from the discussions were, according to Thurlings, the major cause of the crisis in the relation between bishops and lower clergy on the one hand and between church and laity on the other hand which eventually led to deconfessionalization and onzuiling. Following Goddijn we are inclined, however, to attach more importance to the rapid social transformations described above than to the balance of power hypothesis when we try to explain why the attitude of the Catholic clergy changed so profoundly and so rapidly in the second half of the 1950s. Had not the Catholics already shaken off their subordinate position at a much earlier time? Since 1918 the Catholic Party had been the largest and therefore central party of the Dutch political system and already between 1920 and 1930 the Catholic Church had passed the Dutch Reformed Church in numbers. In our view the social and numerical position the Catholics had reached by 1950 should be considered as one of the preconditions, not as the cause, for the growing impact of modern ideas. Nevertheless the internal dynamics of the Catholic Church remain an important element in the explanation of the onzuiling process.

The critical attitude of the Catholic intellectuals and the greater openness of the Catholic community in general, in combination with the nomination of a few progressive people in the Catholic hierarchy triggered off a reform movement which had


wide implications. The progressive attitude of the Dutch Catholic Church found its clearest expression during the Second Vatican Council (1959–1965) where the bishops had a leading role in the discussion about the aggiornamento, the reform of the church as an institution, and the rinnovamento, the renovation of the dogmas and the personal religious experience. They continued this discussion in a National Council, when the Second Vatican council had been concluded and more orthodox tendencies again became influential in Rome and in some of the surrounding Western European countries. The negative sanctions of the pastoral letter of 1954 were officially recalled in 1965. On a number of issues the Dutch clergy held rather unorthodox positions: in 1963 one of the Dutch bishops made a radical statement on the use of contraceptives and from a survey among Dutch priests in 1968 it appeared that 75% of the respondents were of the opinion that priesthood should not necessarily be tied to celibacy.

However, the ideas of the progressive Catholics were not accepted by the entire church. Their positions during the Second Vatican Council aroused strong criticism of a group of orthodox Catholics, who were at first organized around the review ‘Confrontatie’ and later in two other conservative groups. From the end of the 1960s the reform movement stagnated. During the next twenty years the conflict between progressive and orthodox Catholics became so intense that the concept of internal conflict of cultures used by Thurlings seems to be an adequate description of the situation. The influence of the orthodoxy tendency increased when Rome began to intervene directly in the development of the Dutch Catholic Church. In 1970 a conservative bishop was nominated in Rotterdam, one of the most progressive urban dioceses, and this policy was repeated in Roermond in 1972. From that moment on the distance between the top of the Catholic Church on the one hand and the lower clergy and the Catholic laity on the other hand started to grow. Goddijn speaks in this regard of a regressive movement, in contrast to the movement between 1958 and 1968. The refusal by the bishops to


18. Goddijn perceived the evolution of the Catholic Church in the 1950–1970 period as a a sequence of progression and regression. More democratic decision making procedures, free scientific research and free discussion of religious issues were characteristic of the progressive movement. Regression was defined as a movement in the opposite direction as regards these three points. W. Goddijn, 1973, op. cit., p.26.
accommodate the preferences of a large part of the Catholic community was for many an additional source of growing latitudinarianism and indifference towards the church.\textsuperscript{19} \textsuperscript{20} This is not to say, however, that the bishops formed a homogeneous bloc. Since the beginning of the 1970s differences have arisen between the extremely conservative bishop of Roermond on the one hand and the other bishops on the other, culminating in the drawing up of two new Regulations for Catholic schools in 1987 (see below).

The Protestant churches, although not experiencing a similar rupture with the past, also had to adapt to the rapid social changes. Both the Dutch Reformed Church and the Orthodox Reformed Church were influenced by the ecumenical movement of the post war years and introduced reforms with regard to the liturgy. The Orthodox Reformed Church abandoned its former isolated position, which led to greater openness of its members for what happened in the other churches and more contact with members of other denominations. A slightly diminishing degree of orthodoxy and a certain level of secularization were the result. In general, however, the Orthodox Reformed Church has been able to maintain its numerical strength quite well and it has also largely succeeded to preserve the loyalty of its members to Protestant or Orthodox Reformed organizations. In the Dutch Reformed Church, in which cohesion had always been much lower than in the other Protestant church, the influence of modern society caused a growing indifference with regard to church life and verzuiling. The membership of the Dutch Reformed Church continued to decline and the support for Protestant organizations did so too. The consequence of the disappearance of the most latitudinarian members was that the character of the Church became conservative, ideologically more and more approaching the Orthodox Reformed

\textsuperscript{19} As a matter of fact the census of 1971 showed for the first time a declining percentage of Catholics. This was not only due to a declining birth-rate among the Catholics but also to growing secularization. More recently (1985) the fact that the bishops refused a dialogue between progressive Catholics and Pope John Paul II when the latter visited the Netherlands was for a number of people the reason for cancelling their membership of the Catholic Church out of protest against the paternalistic, conservative attitude of the Catholic elite.

\textsuperscript{20} Contrary to the period 1870–1930 it makes sense for the present period to distinguish between orthodox and latitudinarian Catholics. Just as in the case of the Dutch Reformed these categories refer to Catholics who are strongly resp. weakly attached to the church (see also note 21).
An indication of this was that the percentage of the most orthodox ministers in the Dutch Reformed Church increased from 17.7% in 1972 to 22.3% in 1982. Since the 1960s both churches have increasingly been working together with regard to pastoral work, sharing of facilities etc. Forced by financial problems the two churches have in some communities even formed a federation, which is a remarkable development given the origin of the Orthodox Reformed Church from a conflict with the Dutch Reformed Church.

However, the group of orthodox ministers just mentioned has resisted narrow co-operation between the two churches at the national level. In contrast with the efforts at co-operation between Dutch Reformed and Orthodox Reformed communities, among the Orthodox Reformed there have also been further tendencies of fission, which caused a growing distance between the main Orthodox Reformed Church on the one hand and the small Orthodox Reformed denominations on the other hand.

Summarizing these positions we can say that Van Heek sought the causes for the processes of declining orthodoxy and ontzuviling in factors external to the church, particularly in the growing tension between the liberal attitudes which spread in society at large and the rigidity of the Catholic Church, whereas Thurlings saw the differences developing among the Catholic Clergy as the factor behind the decline of the Catholic Church and its organizations. Thurlings position was supported by Bakvis, who attributed the disappearance of the Catholic subculture to the loss of cohesion of the Catholic block. This loss was due to changes in the Catholic Church such as the demythologization of the church doctrine, the introduction of democratic elements and the fact that people were made responsible for their own acts.

In our opinion, however, the external factors were the most fundamental. The developments among the Catholic clergy were not

21. In chapter 4 the words orthodox and latitudinarian in relation to the Dutch Reformed Church referred to distinct theological currents. In the present chapter, however, they are used to distinguish between Dutch Reformed who were still strongly attached to the dogmas of the church and to the norms and values of the Dutch Reformed community on the one hand and those for whom the church had lost much of its guiding spiritual and moral role.


so much due to the position of power the Catholic Church had attained, as well as to the changes in society at large. The external factors, which so profoundly affected the Catholic laity, at the same time made the Catholic clergy receptive of modern ideas, hence we share the opinion of Goddijn that the external factors caused an erosion process from outside and from within. In this view the internal developments formed one of the mechanisms through which the influence of the social changes was felt.

Whether one puts greater emphasis on the events within the churches or on external, social factors, it is clear that these developments brought about a cultural movement which deeply affected church life and, subsequently, the structural ties between religion and social activities. This movement already emerged during the Second World War, but was in the Catholic Church temporarily suppressed by the elite at the beginning of the 1950s. From the first half of the 1960s the intensity of the movement rapidly increased, particularly in Catholic circles. In this regard it is interesting to refer to the hypothesis of Simons who argued that the Catholic block was falling apart so rapidly exactly because the cohesion of this subcultural block was so high. It took little time before the effects of this process, which was so clearly visible as a cultural process within the churches, were visible in the social and political system, i.e. before the cultural transformation began to affect the socio-political structure. When the decline of the segmental organizations started it was, in the terminology of Andeweg, ‘fed’ by three different processes: ontzuiling, declining orthodoxy and secularization. Andeweg used the concept of ontzuiling for situations in which the religious attachment remained very strong but where this religious attachment was no longer automatically translated into a choice in favour of religiously oriented social and political organizations, because people increasingly differentiated between the religious and social functions of their adherences. Coleman called this a process of structural differentiation in which the functionality of the Church with regard to economic, political and social tasks diminished. Declining orthodoxy was a process of declining attachment to church and religion, which also diminished the interest in confessional organizations. Declining orthodoxy could finally result in secularization, i.e. a situation in which


27. This distinction is made by Andeweg. R.B. Andeweg, Dutch voters adrift; an explanation of electoral change (1963-1977), 1981.

28. He also recognised a second aspect to the process of structural differentiation, namely the weakening of the relation between the the community of believers and the organizational apparatus of the church. J.A. Coleman, op. cit., p.8.
people had opted out of the church. This process will have been accompanied or, more often, have been preceded by cancellation of their membership of denominational social and political organizations. In this study we have not followed Andeweg's definitions. Instead, the concept of onttuing has been given a broader meaning, referring to the entire complex of declining orthodoxy, weakening attachment to confessional organizations and the disappearance or transformation of the organizations themselves.

At first the secularization process only seemed to be at work within the Dutch Reformed Church, which lost members at an accelerated pace between 1960 and 1971, whereas the membership of the Catholic and the Orthodox Reformed churches more or less remained at the same level in this period. Behind the stable figure for the Orthodox Reformed Churches as a group, however, one could discover a difference between the main Orthodox Reformed Church, which kept its position, and the other small Orthodox Reformed denominations, which relatively lost. The results of sample surveys held since 1965, in which the question about people's religious affiliation has usually been formulated somewhat different from the census question, show that the following of the churches is rapidly shrinking. According to one of the most recent surveys the Catholic Church can only count on 29.1% of the population, the Dutch Reformed Church on 15% and the Orthodox Reformed Churches on 7.5%. On the contrary 44.5% of the respondents said not to belong to any church. Formal secularization, that is expressed in formal church defection, thus had also become a serious problem for the Catholic Church.

In each of the three situations distinguished by Andeweg the changes taking place at the cultural level had consequences for the political and social structure. The support of denominational organizations drastically decreased, to the advantage of religiously neutral organizations. When this shift first appeared in the political system, it caused a great shock, since it meant a destabilization of a situation which had lasted almost fifty years. In table 5.1 one can read that the rupture with the past came between 1963 and 1967 and that the decline of the confessional parties continued until 1977, when the newly formed

29. The membership of the Dutch Reformed Church fell from 28.3 to 23.5% of the population between 1960 and 1971. The following of the Catholic Church remained at 40.4% and that of the Orthodox Reformed Churches even rose from 9.3 to 9.4%.

30. The last figure concerns all the Orthodox Reformed Churches together.

31. This survey was held in 1982-1983 by Inter/View. The data were processed and published by P. Doorn and Y. Bommelje. P. Doorn and Y. Bommelje, Maar... men moet toch iets wezen, Nieuwe gegevens over ontkerkelijking in Nederland, 1983.
Christian Democratic party CDA, presented as a programme party in the centre of the political spectrum, appeared to be able to put the decline to a halt.

Table 5.1 Results of parliamentary elections 1963-1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHU</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KVP</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total confessional parties</strong></td>
<td><strong>49.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>44.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>36.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>31.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>31.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total five traditional parties</strong></td>
<td><strong>87.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>78.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>71.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>73.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>83.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total other parties</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>21.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Between the elections of 1963 and 1972 the Catholic Party was almost halved and the same happened to the party of the orthodox Dutch Reformed people between 1967 and 1972. The loss of the confessional parties does not mean, however, that religion has played a less determining role in politics since the mid-1960s. The study by Thomassen has demonstrated that a strong correlation between the degree of attachment to the church and voting for a confessional party still exists. Mainly because religion itself has lost ground in society have the confessional parties lost part of their voters. Thus the effect of secularization on the political system is much more profound than that of the entzuing process in the sense of structural differentiation (see the preceding discussion of Andeweg and Coleman).

At first the loss of the confessional parties went to what Andeweg called the non-party system parties, which together

32. The ARP was the party of the Orthodox Reformed, the CHU the party of the orthodox part of the Dutch Reformed Church and the KVP the party of the Catholics. ARP, CHU and KVP went together in one Christian Democratic party, CDA. The VVD is the part of the Liberals and the PvdA the party of the Social Democrats.

obtained 28% of the votes in 1971, but later the traditional non-denominational parties benefited from the decline of the confessional parties. The non-party system parties were founded since the end of the 1950s, out of discontent with the politics of the political parties which had formed part of the political system since this had been established in 1917.\textsuperscript{34} The growth of the non-party system parties in the second half of the 1960s was a clear sign of the generally felt discontent with the old structures. Andeweg tried to explain the sudden changes in party preference between 1963 and 1967 by relating them to changes in the religious characteristics of the electorate, to post-industrial socio-economic changes, to the rejuvenation of the electorate and to the political and social upheaval of the 1965-1967 period. Of these factors only the religious one had some explanatory value. His conclusion was that the losses of the confessional parties were caused by a gradual erosion of orthodoxy more than by an acute crisis in the churches. Our description of the developments within the Catholic Church has shown, however, that in 1965 the real crisis still had to come. In the middle of the 1960s the Catholic church was on the move, but it was not yet in crisis. A crisis only developed when the reform movement increasingly clashed with the orthodox forces and the orthodox forces regained the territory lost. From that moment many people turned their backs on the Catholic Church. The Dutch Reformed Church, on the contrary, lost so heavily between 1960 and 1971 that this situation can easily be characterised as a crisis, be it indeed a crisis without much conflict.

Stagnation and regressive tendencies already occurred at the end of the 1960s and were dominant in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{35} The losses of the confessional parties seemed to be irreversible, which forced these parties to go together in a new Christian Democratic centre party (Christen Democratisch Appel, CDA). The new party brought the decline of confessional politics to a halt but was itself an expression of the ongoing process of ontzuiing: it did no longer recruit its voters on the basis of denominational principles but translated these principles into a clearly political programme.

\textsuperscript{34} These were the PSP, a leftist party in which pacifism was the central ideology, the Boerenparty, a party defending the interests of the farmers with an anti-statist repertory, and D'66, a party which explicitly focused on reform of the political system.

\textsuperscript{35} We prefer to use the concept of regression instead of restauration, which is used in the study of Van Schendelen, to characterize some of the developments in the 1970s. The concept of restauration implies that the previous situation is restored in its old form, whilst regression refers to a backward movement which is not a return to the old situation. M.P.C.M. van Schendelen, Verzuiling en restauratie in de Nederlandse politiek, in: Beleid en Maatschappij, 1978, pp.42-76.
There were more signs of regression in the political system: in 1973, for example, a new orthodox Catholic party, the Rooms Katholieke Partij Nederland (RKPN), was founded.

In other sectors one could also discover ontzuiling tendencies. The abolishment of the ban on Catholic membership of Socialist unions by the bishops paved the way for a federation between the Socialist and Catholic national labour organizations. The Protestant unions preferred to continue their activities as separate organizations. In the sector of the press ontzuiling started relatively early, but here factors other than declining orthodoxy and secularization of course played a part as well. Technological innovations made rationalizations and mergers financially and economically necessary and in this process the confessional identity of many newspapers and magazines got lost. With regard to the non-profit sector, but excluding education, Van Wersch found different patterns of ontzuiling but his overall impression was that by 1977 the process of ontzuiling had developed quite far.\(^{36}\)

In the meantime new verzullings tendencies emerged not only in the conservative wing of the Catholic Church but also in some of the smaller Orthodox Reformed denominations. During the last twenty years a completely new network of extremely orthodox Protestant organizations has been formed, as contrasted to the Protestant organizations of the main Orthodox Reformed Church and the orthodox part of the Dutch Reformed Church.\(^ {37}\) The organizations are still rather small but growing very fast. One of the most interesting developments was the expansion of the orthodox Protestant schools from nearly 7,500 pupils in 1960 to almost 20,000 pupils in 1985.\(^ {38}\)\(^ {39}\) These schools were affiliated

\(^{36}\) P. van Wersch, Demokratisering van het bestuur van non-profit instellingen, 1979, pp.38-39.

\(^{37}\) A newspaper (Reformatorisch dagblad) has been published since 1971. An organization of employers (Vereniging Reformatorisch Getuigenis in het commercieel leven) existed since 1963 and a union of employees (Reformatorisch Maatschappelijke Unie) was formed during the national strikes in 1983. In the medical sector three associations mainly concerned with issues such as abortus provocatus and euthanasia were set up in 1978 and 1980.

\(^{38}\) C.S.L.Janse, op.cit., p.161. These figures concern primary schools. The growth of the pre-primary and the secondary schools was just as spectacular.

\(^{39}\) The schools of the major strands of orthodox Protestantism (the Orthodox Reformed Church and the orthodox part of the Dutch Reformed Church) have been called Protestant schools
171
to the Vereniging voor Gereformeerd Schoolonderwijs, dating from 1921, or the Vereniging tot Bevordering van Schoolonderwijs op Gereformeerde Grondslag, established in 1975.

In this study; the schools of the minor stands of orthodox Protestantism (the Christian Orthodox Reformed Church etc.) are called orthodox Protestant schools.
5.2 New conditions for the education system

During the last twenty years the conditions under which primary education had functioned since the Elementary Education Act had become operative, have changed considerably. In the 1920-1970 period Dutch society showed two characteristics which were relevant for the evolution of the primary education system. In the first place its population increased continuously. Secondly the segmentation of society along religious dividing lines showed a great stability. Both characteristics were important for the demand for education in that they provided a growing market for elementary education and made the demand for a particular type of education easy to predict. On the supply side the situation was determined by government spending on education on the one hand and the activities of the organizations of schoolboards on the other hand. As long as government spending increased, and it did so for most of the fifty year period, and organizations of schoolboard could expand the number of schools because of the numerical growth of their respective parts of the market, the system functioned rather smoothly, without too many conflicts between the four education sectors.40

In the 1970s and 1980s the conditions which determined the development of the primary education system altered, however. Not only did the number of pupils rapidly fall, but it was also necessary to find new justifications for the segmentation of the system in the face of growing deconfessionalization and secularization of the population. The total market for elementary education was shrinking and the various market segments were much less clearly defined. Moreover the education budget came under pressure because a structural deficit in government spending had developed. As a result the system lost the flexibility it had had because of the earlier possibility of expansion, competition between the four education sectors increased and conflicts frequently occurred. In this section we will look in more detail at the new conditions under which the elementary education system had to function and will function in the near future.

The context of the primary education system was first and foremost altered by what is the most important demographic feature of the last twenty years: the declining birth-rate and, as a consequence of this, the declining number of live born. These features have been a characteristic of all the Western European societies, but were more dramatic in the Netherlands than in most other countries because they occurred within an extremely short period. In the Netherlands the birth-rate was

40. The four central organizations of schoolboards were the Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG, public sector), the Centraal Bureau voor het Katholiek Onderwijs (CBO, Catholic sector), the Vereniging Besturenraad Protestants-Christelijke Onderwijs (VBPCO, Protestant sector) and the Verenigde Bijzondere Scholen (VBS, neutral private sector).
still 21.0 in 1960/61 and this was particularly due to the high birth-rates of the Catholics. In Belgium, France, West Germany, England and Denmark the figures were respectively 17.1, 18.1, 16.7, 17.3 and 16.6. The high-birth rate of the Dutch Catholics thus was not a common feature of the Catholics in Western Europe. By 1975, however, the birth-rate of the Dutch population was more or less in line with that of the surrounding countries: 13.0 as contrasted to 12.2 in Belgium and 14.1 in France. The evolution of the number of live born, determined by the demographic composition of the population and the birth-rate, was even more interesting because it showed such a steep decline. The growing use of contraceptives and the increasing number of women that performed wage labour resulted in a lower number of children per fertile woman and postponement of the first birth. Between 1964 and 1983 the number of live born fell from 250,914 to 170,246. Not only for politicians and planners but also for demographers the decline of the birth-rate came as a quite sudden development and they only included this information in the decision-making process after the demographic changes had already begun to affect the education system.

The fact that even demographers had difficulties to realise the depth of the changes that had taken and were taking place in society is clearly demonstrated by figure 5.1, which shows that each of the three estimates of the demographic evolution in the next four years made even in 1980 was too high. After 1980 the figure again started to decline until 1983 when the lowest point since the Second World War was reached. The primary education system is

41. The birth-rate is expressed as the number of live born children per 1000 inhabitants.

42. In the two predominantly Catholic provinces the birth rate was 2 to 5 points higher than in the other provinces between 1945 and 1960. E.W. Hofstee, Korte demografische geschiedenis van Nederland van 1800 tot heden, 1981, pp.122-123.

43. F. van Heek, Het Nederlandse geboortepatroon en de godsdienstfactor gedurende de laatste halve eeuw, in; Mens en Maatschappij, 1963, p.85. The figure given for West Germany concerns 1958.

44. That planners found it difficult to grasp the magnitude of this phenomenon appeared from the fact that population estimates were only drastically revised at the beginning of the 1970s. In the middle of the 1960s the Central Office of Statistics still estimated the population of the Netherlands in the year 2000 to be 21 million. In 1970 the estimate of the population in the year 2000 had fallen to 17.1 million and in 1972 the estimate was 16.1 million. CBS, Berekeningen omtrent de toekomstige bevolkingsgrootte in Nederland in de periode 1970-2000, 1971, p.43; CBS, De toekomstige Nederlandse bevolkingsontwikkeling na 1972, 1973, p.27.
Figure 5.1 Number of live born children and number of pupils in primary education 1945-1984

extremely sensible to demographic change, simply because all children have to pass it and because they do so already six years after the changes have occurred. The lower number of live born was felt in the first year of primary education in 1970 and began to affect the total number of children participating in primary education from 1975.

The second condition for the continued existence of the segmented primary education system that changed was the preference for Catholic and Protestant education. As long as society remained segmented along religious dividing lines each of the four education sectors was active in a clearly distinguishable part of the market. In the previous section we have pointed out, however, that a rapid cultural transformation occurred during the 1960s which severely diminished the cohesion among the Catholic and Dutch Reformed parts of the population and reduced the wish to participate in Catholic and Protestant organizations, both among the elites and among the ordinary people. The declining preference for denominational organizations equally existed as far as the education system was concerned. Nevertheless the education system was one of the few sectors in which denominational organizations succeeded to consolidate their position throughout the 1970s. Thurlings explained this by stating that the rate of ontzuiling in a particular social sector depended on the importance of such a sector for continuing the system. Since primary education was an important agent of socialization, and thus contributed to keeping up the existing social segmentation, it had been one of the first sectors where organization along religious dividing lines occurred and following this line of thought it was not surprising that it was also the last sector to be influenced by ontzuiling. However, Van Kemenade, who studied the importance of Catholic education for the Catholic community, discovered that as early as 1966 the success of the denominational schools was not only determined by a high and stable need for denominational education but also by the fact that these schools fulfilled a number of other demands. Many parents did not send their children to Catholic schools because they wanted to give them a Catholic upbringing, but because they attached importance to some sort of general religious education. Only for lack of an alternative, non-exclusively Catholic school, for example an oecumenical, or interconfessional, school, they continued to send their children to Catholic schools.45 The interest in interconfessional education was a rather temporal thing though, which gradually lost attention after the mid-1970s.

The relative indifference towards denominational education, as contrasted with the actual choice in favour of Catholic and

Protestant schools, was confirmed in a number of other surveys. Table 5.2 shows how the indifference with regard to denominational education among church members rapidly increased between 1966 and 1975.

Table 5.2 Preference of Catholic and Protestant church members for public or denominational education

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>public school</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>denominational school</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indifferent</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1,116 1,179 1,016 1,051 885 839


Remarkable was that the preference for denominational education was lowest in 1970, when more than 40% of the people belonging to a denomination did not show a particular interest in this type of education. The preference for denominational education again climbed somewhat in the second half of the 1970s. Another striking development was that the preference for public education among these parents fell from 16.8 in 1966 to 10.6 in 1981. There are a number of possible explanations for this development. The first is that most people that said to prefer public education in 1966 were found among the latitudinarian part of the Dutch Reformed population who by 1975 had already left the Church, or at least did no longer define themselves as members of a church, even if they were still registered as such. In other words, it is possible that the reference group had changed as far as religious orthodoxy was concerned. The second possible explanation is that the preference for public education, in contrast to denominational education, became less outspoken because the character of the denominational school had changed. Becoming less orthodox, denominational education no longer evoked a strong reaction, hence the slight decline of the preference for public education and growth of the group that was indifferent.

Among the population as a whole the lack of preference for a particular type of education increased from 6.3% in 1966 to 26.7% in 1983. Preference for denominational education was 55.2% in 1966, 40.7% in 1970, 41.1% in 1979, 38.6% in 1980 and 36.6% in 1983.46 Another survey of the Sociaal-Cultureel Planbureau (Social and Cultural Planning Agency) distinguished between the various churches as far as the evolution of the attitude towards denominational education was concerned. These figures showed differences between the members of the Catholic Church and the

Dutch Reformed Church on the one hand and Orthodox Reformed Churches on the other hand.

Realizing that many children no longer attended denominational schools for reasons of religious orthodoxy the Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau has tried to determine in recent surveys what are parents' motives for choosing a particular primary school. As table 5.3 demonstrates the religious factor was of only minor importance.

Table 5.3 Motives for the choice of a primary school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The school should ........</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. provide a good preparation for secondary school</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. maintain a lot of contact with the parents</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. be based on the same ideas on education as the parents have</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. be at walking distance</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. provide facilities for staying at lunch time</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. be attended by children from the neighbourhood</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. value the same religious principles as the family does</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. offer a lot of additional activities</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. be housed in a modern building</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A= 'very important' and 'important'
B= 'indifferent'
C= 'unimportant' and 'very unimportant'

Source: Schoolkeuzemotieven en meningen over onderwijs, SCP, 1983.

The distance to a school and the supposedly higher quality of private than of public schools were much more frequently listed.

47. 95.7% of the Orthodox Reformed respondents said to prefer Protestant education whereas of the Dutch Reformed respondents only 67.2 did so and 70.3% of the Catholic respondents answered that they preferred Catholic education. Although the orientation of the Dutch Reformed Church nowadays can be characterised as moderately conservative the attitude towards denominational education of some of its members is still negative. This is quite different from the situation at the beginning of the century when the orientation of the Dutch Reformed population was predominantly liberal and it was the main supporter of the public school. S. Boef-van der Meulen and R. Bronneman-Helmers, Schoolkeuzemotieven en meningen over onderwijs, 1983.
The supposedly higher quality of private education has been an important issue in the discussion about public versus private education. Whether the quality of private education is really higher than that of public education has not been established by research. The reputation of public education declined, however, as a consequence of the fact that these schools were attended by relatively more children from the lower classes and more children of migrants from the Mediterranean countries than private schools. According to the law private schools were allowed to refuse Muslim children but public schools were not. Public schools, particularly those in the old urban areas, thus had an overrepresentation of 'problem children', which very probably affected the teaching in these schools. The results of public schools, in terms of the number of children continuing in general secondary versus vocational education, were indeed lower. Private schools were also considered to be better because they usually put more emphasis on qualities such as discipline, obedience and respect for authority.

Many people appeared to be in favour of private education simply because it gave them various options, which they would no longer have in a national public education system. Whether it was a choice in favour of denominational education or a choice in favour of high quality education did not matter very much: the existence of a certain degree of pluralism was essential to their demand.48

The declining preference for denominational education was the reason that during the 1970s a number of alternatives to the existing system was developed. In the denominational sector the discussions between those who were looking for 'new forms' of education centred around three alternatives. These were the oecumenical or interconfessional school, attended by Catholics.

48. In France a similar discussion took place. When in 1984 the Socialist minister of Education Alain Savary, tried to restrict the freedom of private schools to independently select and nominate teachers, and to open schools irrespective of the geographical distribution of public schools, a strong protest movement, supported by the Catholic Church, arose. Surveys made clear, however, that the main reason for people to support the private school was not the religiously oriented education provided in these schools, but the assumed higher quality of private education. The concept of free choice performed an important ideological function in this protest movement. The slogan was no longer 'freedom of education', as it had been during the conflicts about private education in the 1950s, but 'free choice', which gave the movement a liberal character. The choice between public or private education was for the majority of parents no longer a choice for or against religious education but the choice between consumer goods with different characteristics. See for further discussion of the French education conflict in 1984: A. Savary, En toute liberté, 1985.
and Protestants children alike, the 'closed' combined school, in which Christian and non-Christian children were taught together except for the classes in spiritual education, and the 'open' combined school which was based on the concept of the encounter between children belonging to different ideological groups.\[49\] The actual number of oecumenical and combined schools formed remained very low, however.\[50\] The supporters of new forms of education were in the Catholic and Protestant world limited to a number of influential individuals, but none of the interest organizations concerned made it its policy to advocate co-operation between the three major sectors. Some of them, e.g. the national interest organizations Nederlandse Katholieke School Raad (NKSR) and Nederlandse Protestant-Christelijk Schoolraad (NPCS), and the organizations of schoolboards CBKO and VBPO, made clear policy statements in favour of segmented education during this debate.\[51\]

As far as other social and political organizations were concerned the dividing line between those in favour and those against intersectoral co-operation ran largely parallel to the division between right and left which dominated the political climate in the Netherlands in the 1970s: the Christian Democratic party (CDA), the Liberal party VVD and the Christian trade-union Federation (CNV) thought it necessary that denominational education continued existing and strengthened its identity, whereas the leftist political parties and the Socialist trade-union federation (FNV) expressed themselves against the segmentation of the education system, though not against the principle of freedom of education.\[52\] The progressive parties criticised the dominant position of denominational education, because it no longer was a reflection of the real importance of

\[49\] Combined schools are in Dutch usually indicated as 'samenwerkingsscholen'.

\[50\] According to the the study by Pelkmans only 28 oecumenical and combined schools were formed at the level of primary education between 1967 and 1983. At other levels of education these types of schools were slightly more popular: around 1980 some 370 oecumenical and combined schools existed at all levels. A.H.W.M. Pelkmans, Samenwerkingsscholen in ontwikkeling, 1984, pp.109, 147, 219.

\[51\] In 1971, however, the NKSR had still been much more positive about the idea of a community school. This change of opinion is characteristic for the more conservative tendency which slowly spread in the confessional part of the education system during the 1970s.

religion in society. Most of them did not want to abandon the constitutional principle of freedom of education, but to use this freedom to create schools which responded to the varied needs of a modern, ideologically, socially and ethnically plural society. In their opinion the concept of the identity of education should not be restricted to the sphere of religion but encompass the entire social, political and cultural environment in which a school functioned.\(^{53}\)

The criticism of the Vereniging voor Openbaar Onderwijs (VOO), the organization of parents in the public sector, and some prominent members of the Social-Democratic party went beyond the ideological segmentation of the primary education system though, and also touched upon the existing forms of management of schools. They proposed to create intersectoral schools with a different type of management containing elements of private and public law.\(^{54}\) Article 61 of the Municipality Act provided an instrument for creating this new type of school, which would on the one hand reduce the distance between parents and school characteristic for the public school, and on the other hand eliminate the undemocratic situation existing in many private schools. Moreover it would be an instrument for realizing a far reaching decentralization of education policy making, which was considered indispensable for the innovation of education. Lately this idea has fallen into the background. The attention of all parties involved in education has been focused on the reorganization of the primary education system, which will be discussed in section 5.4, and on the question how to avoid a more than proportional decline of the own sector and this concern left little room for experiments so far. The concept of a school based on article 61 has been put into practice on a very limited scale only.

In the first half of the 1980s the discussion about alternatives for the segmented education system did no longer arouse much interest. This was due to the development of the general social climate, which tended to put more emphasis on continuity and less on change. No longer was the need felt for a radical rupture with existing social and political relations and as far as these had happened in the beginning of the 1970s these were sometimes partly turned back. The left wing political parties gradually left their polarization strategy, for example. Verzuiling was no longer an issue, because it had disappeared in some sectors, because it further eroded in other sectors, and

\(^{53}\) Van Ooijen is one of the authors who argues a wider interpretation of the concept of identity. D. van Ooijen, Vrijheid voor onderwijsverstrekkers of voor onderwijsgebruikers? in: Socialisme en Democratie, 1977, pp.359-360.

\(^{54}\) See for example A.A. de Bruin, i.a., Doorbraakpartij, ontmoetingsschool, vrijheid van onderwijs, in: Socialisme en Democratie, 1975, p.202-219.
because of a greater indifference towards ideological differences in general. In the education system, possibly because developments took place with a certain time lag, verzuing still played a part. The discussion focused, however, less on possible alternatives and ways of co-operation between the sectors, e.g. in interconfessional schools, but was characterized by a defensive stand and an upsurge of conflicts between public and private education.

Characteristic of the more conservative attitude of this period was the greater emphasis on the religious identity of the denominational schools. The Catholic and Protestant education organizations were aware that, given the continuing decline in orthodoxy and the secularization of the Dutch population which was clearly shown by every survey about this subject, the profile of denominational education needed to be strengthened instead of weakened. The future of Catholic and Protestant schools could not be safeguarded by the attempt to retain the latitudinarian part of the population, which was indifferent as regards the choice of a school, but by proving that they met a particular demand for denominational education. This tendency existed among the Catholic and Protestant education interest organizations alike, but the developments in the Catholic sector attracted more attention because firstly, the evolution during the first half of the 1970s in the opposite direction had been more pronounced and secondly, a conflict developed among the Dutch bishops about the identity of Catholic education. We have to keep in mind, however, that the tendency to emphasize the denominational identity again only existed at the ideological level but that in reality, out of the need to enroll as many pupils as possible, both Catholic and Protestant schools remained open for children of other ideological orientations.

As early as 1977 the bishops issued a letter about the situation of Catholic education, in which they made a choice clearly in favour of the Catholic as against the community school and expressed the wish to strengthen the identity of Catholic education. To this end the selection of teachers should be more strict as far as their religious life was concerned and parents elected as members of the schoolboards should be willing to subscribe to the religious principles on which the school was based. Ten years later the message was much more radical, at least as far as the bishop of Roermond was concerned.

In 1987 the bishops reformulated the General Regulation on Catholic Education in such a way that the Catholic identity of the schools belonging to this sector was reinforced. This did not mean, however, that the ecclesiastical hierarchy would exert greater control over Catholic education: the responsibility for the greater emphasis on the Catholic identity of the schools was entirely put with the people who were daily involved in education, like the teachers, the parents and the schoolboards. The NKSR, central interest organization of the Catholic education sector, had no problem to comply with the new Regulation since it confirmed ideas which were already present in this organization.
The bishop of Roermond, still the conservative man appointed in 1972, wanted a much more radical expansion of the control of the Catholic Church, but he did not arrive at an agreement with the other bishops. As a consequence he issued a separate regulation for the diocese of Roermond, which covered the whole of the province of Limburg. According to this regulation the bishop would nominate a representative of the diocese in each schoolboard, preferably a priest. This member of the schoolboard would have considerable power and right of veto as regards matters which were contrary to the regulation on Catholic education or the Catholic identity of the school, e.g. the nomination of a teacher which did not strictly live according to the instructions of the Catholic Church. The Catholic schools in the dioceses of Roermond were given time until 1993 to join the regulation.

A very confused situation was the result of this action of the bishop of Roermond. First of all there was a severe conflict between the six other bishops and the one from Roermond. Secondly, questions were posed as to the legal situation of those schools in Limburg which would not join the separate regulation but would continue to call themselves Catholic. Thirdly, the relation between the bishop of Roermond and the NKSR, which had ranged itself with the regulation drawn up by the majority of the bishops, with regard to the Catholic schools in Limburg was unclear. For some time the NKSR tried to compromise with the bishop of Roermond about the status of Catholic schools which would not join the regulation on Catholic education in force in the diocese of Limburg, but its attempts did not yield any result. When this was clear, in the spring of 1988, the NKSR announced that it would confer the Catholic schools in Limburg unofficial recognition. If the statutes of a Catholic school were in line with the New Regulation sanctioned by the majority of the bishops the NKSR would issue the school a declaration stating that it was recognised according to the ecclesiastical law in force in the rest of the country. This bold step of the NKSR was not without self-interest: an important motivation was to refrain the Catholic schools in Limburg from changing their status into that of a neutral private school.

Nevertheless an interesting situation has been created. Until the spring of 1988 none of the Catholic schools in Limburg had joined the regulation issued by the bishop of Roermond, thus it remained a conflict between the dioceses of Roermond and the other Catholic parties. However, if the bishop of Roermond will succeed in convincing a number of schoolboards to join the regulation of his diocese a new situation will develop in which two types of Catholic schools will exist. Like the rise of the orthodox Protestant schools the difference between the Catholic schools following the main regulation and the Catholic schools following the Roermond regulation might have consequences for the future planning process in the sense that the orthodox Catholic schools might ask for recognition as a separate denomination just as had been done for the orthodox Protestant schools in the years before (see below).
The third factor which conditioned the evolution of the primary education system in the 1980s was the macro economic situation. After the second oil crisis the Dutch economy came in a deep recession because of which between 1980 and 1983 thousands and thousands of jobs, mainly in the old industries, disappeared. In the following years the performance of the economy, particularly of the export sector, was much better but unemployment remained high. The increasing number of unemployment benefits contributed to the pressure on government spending, along with factors such as the increasing number of people relying on old-age pensions and the growth of the costs of public services such as health and education. Recently the declining income from the export of natural gas has complicated the situation. Between 1981 and 1983 the deficit of the budget of the central government rose from 6.6% to 9.1%. Reduction of this deficit became one of the central aims of successive governments and the main policy pursued to realize this aim was to cut expenditure. The education sector was not spared. Between 1978 and 1984 expenditure on primary education first stabilised and then diminished and this was certainly not only due to the lower number of pupils enrolled at this level of education although it is true that the decline of the number of pupils gave the necessity to cut expenditure an even more urgent character.

Table 5.4 Public expenditure on primary education in absolute terms (Dfl million) and as percentage of total education expenditure by the central government 1978-1984.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditure on primary educ.</th>
<th>As % of total expenditure on education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>5,010</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5,135</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>5,221</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>5,284</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>4,983</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>4,679</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Apart from a lowering of teachers' salaries, the closure of a considerable number of schools, result of the reorganization of the primary education system in the period 1983-1985 and the integration of primary and pre-primary education in 1985, 55. Centraal Plan Bureau, Macro-economische Verkenningen 1985, 1984. The budgetary deficit is expressed as percentage of the national income.

56. The amounts include the salaries of teachers and other personnel, equipment, interest and investments.
contributed to the diminishing expenditures. The expected output of the reorganization was even explicitly stated in financial terms: it should save Dfl 100 million in a period of four years. It was also said in advance that if this saving would not be reached a second reorganization would follow in 1988. Reduction of expenditure thus has become one of the central guiding principles for policy making, even though these policies are announced as seeking to improve the quality of education.

Because of the changed context in which the primary education system had to function, characterized by a shrinking market for primary education, a growing indifference to the religious orientation of education and the necessity to reform the pattern of public expenditure, the four education sectors faced new problems. The good relations which had existed between the four sectors in the period of expansion came increasingly under pressure when their markets were no longer clearly distinguishable and at the same time a drastic restructuring of the system appeared to be necessary. The increased competition between the four sectors aroused much discussion about the issue of public versus private education, so much so that the media and even the parties involved referred to it as 'the new school conflict', recalling the conflict between supporters of and opponents to private education of the last century.

The discussions centred around four issues. Firstly a debate arose about the position of small rural schools and the question whether the only school in a village should have a private or public form of management. The problem of small village schools was particularly urgent in the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, Drente and Zeeland. The number of children attending these schools had often already for a long time been far below the minimum norm, but this had been tolerated as long as there was no clear need to economize on the costs of education. Quite some jurisprudence in favour of maintaining such schools had developed. When in the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s the pressure to close these schools or to merge them with other schools increased the issue of private versus public management became topical. The Vereniging voor Openbaar Onderwijs VOO (Society for Public Education) published a policy paper about the position of small and declining schools, in which it stated that

57. In the summer of 1988 the Under Secretary for Education indeed announced a second reorganization of the primary education system which would lead to the closure of more small schools.

58. Almost a quarter of the schools in these provinces were schools with one or two teachers in the middle of the 1970s.

- the numerical norms for opening and closing of schools should not be related to the number of inhabitants of the entire municipality but of the settlement in which the school was located; moreover the distance to the surrounding villages and the importance of the school for the viability of the village community should be taken into account;
- in case only one school remained in a village this school should be incorporated under public law, the argument for this being that the public school character of the school would guarantee that all children had access to this school and that the administration of the school represented the entire community.60

This point of view was immediately contested by the organization of Catholic and Protestant education but it was remarkable that the sharpest reaction to this 'striving for a monopoly of public education' came from the VBS (Verenigde Bijzondere Scholen voor onderwijs op algemene grondslag), the organization of schoolboards of neutral private schools. This organization strongly disputed the idea that the form of management of a public school, of which the schoolboard is formed by the municipal executive authority, is more democratic than that of a private school, of which the members of the schoolboard are sometimes elected (in the case of a society), sometimes co-opted (in the case of a foundation).61 It pointed out cases in which the municipal executive did not represent the entire community and also referred to the fact that in some municipalities the executive authority, clearly preferring one type of education over the other, had difficulties to combine the responsibility for public education in particular with the responsibility for primary education in general.62 The VBS somewhat vaguely argued that, since the only school in a village should be a school for all children and cooperation between various groups was thus required, the private school was the most appropriate type of school because it allowed for the


61. In the neutral private sector most schoolboards had the juridical form of a society and the same was true for the Protestant sector. In the Catholic sector, however, most schoolboards had the juridical of a foundation. Leune, 1981, op. cit., p.335.

62. The difficulties and ambiguities arising from this double position of the municipal authorities have certainly been recognised by many of the supporters of public education. Their answer consists of a school which combines elements of public and private law in its management structure. It would be possible to found such a school on the basis of article 61 of the Municipality Act.
participation of all parties concerned, parents, staff and management alike. The policy paper of the VBO did not have much success in that it did not evoke any formal statement on the side of the political parties about the position of small rural schools. The segmentation of the education system was still too sensitive an issue to become the subject of a political debate. Instead the accommodation model of problem solving was still preferred, even under adverse budgetary circumstances, as became clear during the first phase of the restructuring of the primary education system in 1984 when many small schools again got dispensation for another three years.

The reaction of the VBS on this issue was characteristic for the uneasy relation that existed between the neutral private sector on the one hand and the public sector on the other hand. The neutral private sector included mainly schools based on a particular educational philosophy, such as the Rudolf Steiner school, the Montessori schools and other types of 'free schools'. These schools were predominantly located in urban areas and attended by children from the upper middle and higher social classes (see map 5.1). Not only the philosophical basis, but also the private form of management of this type of schools, which indeed stimulated the involvement of parents in the educational process, were important elements of the argumentation in favour of neutral private education. Public schools, because of their different form of government, traditionally did not know the idea of parent participation. Although there were more similarities between neutral private and public education than between neutral private and denominational private education the relation between the first two was characterised by a greater antagonism. The reasons for this were that first they competed in the same market and second, by being rather similar to the greater public, they ran the risk of being confused. This opposition became clearer once the demand for non-confessional education increased, i.e. from the middle of the 1970s, particularly because research pointed out that many parents and pupils were not fully aware of the difference between public and private neutral education.

The third issue related to the tension caused by a segmented education system faced with a shrinking market for education concerned the differentiation within the Protestant sector. As we discussed in 5.1 the 'latitudinarianization' of Protestant education

63. For the VBS the issue of the public or private character of the last school in a municipality really was an ideological one, since its own schools were mainly located in the larger municipalities. The average number of inhabitants in municipalities with neutral private education was 59,122 in 1981.

Map 5.1 Municipalities in which at least 2% of the pupils attends neutral private primary education in 1981
from the second half of the 1960s evoked a reaction in the form of the establishment of orthodox Protestant ('Reformatorische') schools. As long as the number of pupils was still growing, the demand for orthodox Protestant schools did not pose a problem. The orthodox Protestant schools usually had a regional function, attracting children from a relatively large area. By withdrawing only a few pupils from a great number of other schools, the new schools did not directly compete with the existing ones. Problems arose, however, when the government proposed in 1983-1984 to subject the planning process to stricter rules and to reorganize the existing network of primary schools. The proposals formed a threat to the continuity of orthodox Protestant education since they mentioned only four types of education: public education and Catholic, Protestant and neutral private education. Hence they ignored orthodox Protestant education as a distinctly different type of education. This could imply that in case the location of some Protestant schools was found to be too near, and it was decided to close one of them, the particular orientation of the orthodox Protestant schools would not be taken into account. The Vereniging voor Gereformeerd Onderwijs, the organization of the orthodox Protestant schools, therefore asked for recognition of orthodox Protestant education as a separate type of education. Their case was quite strong because de facto this had been recognised for a long time. Moreover with regard to the neutral private sector it had been informally accepted that anthroposophical 'free schools' differed from Montessori and Steiner schools. Although the orthodox Protestants did not succeed in getting their schools formally recognised as a different type of education, in the course of the consultations about the reorganization of the primary education system the other parties informally agreed to recognise the special position of this denomination.

The fourth and last issue concerned the ideological basis of Catholic and Protestant schools in relation to their attitude towards children belonging to other denominations and particularly towards muslim children. The number of foreign children, mostly having the Moroccan or Turkish nationality, increased rapidly from the beginning of the 1970s when many migrant workers decided to settle more permanently in the Netherlands and to have their families join them. In the old urban areas their children attended Protestant and Catholic schools in large numbers. The schools were in desperate need for pupils after most young middle class and many working class families had left the cities on a large scale and the old urban residential areas had become the domain of old people, students and young childless couples. Admittance of foreign children was for many schools the only way to survive. In some schools the number of foreign children even rose to over 50%, which of course implied that the Catholic or Protestant identity of these schools
This development evoked strong criticism from the side of the VOO, which accused the Catholic and Protestant education sectors of hypocrisy, because on the one hand they reinforced their numerical position by admitting these children to their schools, whereas on the other hand they objected to giving the parents of these children more influence in the decision making process. However, the doubtful status of these schools as Catholic or Protestant schools did not remain unnoticed by the organizations concerned. It was one of the factors behind the revival, particularly in the Catholic world, of the 'identity debate'. This debate had started in the 1960s when people like Van Kemenade had asked the question how Catholic schools should react to the changing demand for a less dogmatic, more open type of Christian education. At the beginning of the 1980s, however, the content of the 'identity debate' had changed: central concern was then how to preserve the Catholic identity. It was felt that in a rapidly secularizing world it was more than ever necessary to underline those things that distinguished Catholic education, in order not to be forced in a defensive position once a reorganization of the school system was planned. The movement for a more pronounced Catholic identity was strongly pushed by the conservative bishops, but the Catholic educational interest organizations also participated, if only because they realized that too much a diluted type of Catholic education would become a danger to the position they had.

Discussion of these four conflict issues makes clear that contrary to the evolution of the political system, of the socioeconomic order and of many social services, which under the pressure of secularization tendencies and the need for rationalization arrived at far reaching forms of co-operation between formerly rivalling organizations, in the education system the willingness to collaborate diminished compared to the mid-1960s. In the discussion about the reorganization of the schoolsystem the central interest organizations of the various sectors tended to defend their own position, without looking for possibilities to strengthen their position through the formation of larger organizations. An important reason for this behaviour was that their existence did not depend on the approval or disapproval of a segment of the public at large, as was the case.

65. An example of the Catholic school with 70% non-Dutch speaking children was mentioned in an article in the weekly magazine Haagse Post. J. Kuitenbrouwer, De nieuwe schoolstrijd, in: Haagse Post, 25 June 1982, pp.67-68.

66. This accusation refers to the debate on the democratization of schools, in which the Catholic and Protestant education organizations refused to grant parents and staff a say in matters concerning the religious orientation of a school.

with the political parties and the unions. Whereas in the political system declining orthodoxy and secularization tendencies first had been translated in a rapid decline of the confessional parties and second in a change of the character of these parties, in the education sector the consumers of education had no direct influence on the policies of these central interest organizations and thus the effect of the declining orthodoxy of the population, namely a less pronounced preference for denominational education, could largely be ignored.\(^{68}\)

It is interesting to note that the ideological conflict between denominational and public education was partly fought under the cover of the debate about public versus private management of schools. In this debate both parties accused the other of maintaining an undemocratic form of management. Private schools were not democratic, according to the interest organization of public education, because they could exclude certain groups of parents from obtaining influence in the management of the school and exclude certain groups of children from attending these schools, whereas the public school was open to all children, irrespective of their ideology.\(^{69}\)

The supporters of denominational education argued that public education, managed by the municipal authorities, was undemocratic because parents had no direct influence in its management at all and because of the neutral character of its education, which made it unacceptable for large groups of people. Whether the issue of public versus private management really interested many others except for politicians and policy makers is doubtful, however. Although no thorough study has been made of the relation between the preference for public education and the particular form of management of this type of school some indications exist that

\(^{68}\) It is of course also true that secularization was not always immediately translated in an increased demand for public education. Many liberal Christians attached great value to some form of religious education for their children, be it only to make them acquainted with the origins of the norms and values on which the Western European societies are based. The opposition to the old system was thus less strong and less widespread than in the case of the political system.

\(^{69}\) The majority of the schoolboards of Catholic schools have the juridical form of a foundation, in which the members are recruited by co-optation. The majority of the schoolboards of Protestant school are societies, which elect their boardmembers. However, the statutes of most of these societies contain clauses which restrict membership of the schoolboard to those people which subscribe to the basic ideological principles of the school.
this characteristic is only of minor importance for choosing public education.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{70} S. Boef-van der Meulen, Ouders en het openbaar onderwijs, in: F. van Schoten and H. Wansink, Opstellen over openbaar onderwijs, 1985. pp. 89-90.
In the previous section, when we discussed the changing preferences for denominational education, we already mentioned the fact that from 1965 a gap developed between people's attitudes and their actual behaviour as far as the choice of primary schools was concerned. The choice of a denominational school was very often based on arguments that were not at all related to the religious orientation of the school. Several reasons for this situation were already listed, such as the de facto changing orientation of education from dogmatic Catholic or Protestant to a more general type of Christian education, the higher quality of education in denominational schools and the relative rigidity of the supply of education due to the strong position of the educational interest organizations. In section 5.2 we only supported these statements with data on the evolution of people's preferences. In this section the development of people's behaviour with regard to denominational education in the 1965-1985 period will be empirically analysed on the basis of data at municipal level. As in chapter 4 we will also pay attention to regional variation in the degree of support for denominational or public education.

The first indication of the development of a gap between preferences and actual behaviour with regard to verzuiling of the primary education system was that the attendance of private schools remained invariably high. The sharp rupture which occurred around 1965 as far as preferences were concerned was not reflected in a decline of the position of private education vis-a-vis public education. The first changes only came in the 1970s when in the churches and in politics stagnation and regression had already become predominant.

Table 5.5 Percentage of pupils in private or public education 1960-1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>public schools</th>
<th>private schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS, Statistiek van het Lager Onderwijs.

The changes of behaviour which took place since 1965 were very gradual and much smaller than the attitudinal changes. The

71. Hence we are dealing with collective, not with individual behaviour.
preference for denominational education declined almost 20 percentage points between 1965 and 1983, whereas the Protestant and the Catholic sectors together lost only 8 points in reality. Moreover the percentage of children attending denominational schools was far above the importance attributed to denominational education in surveys: 72% versus 55.2% in 1965 and 65% versus 36.6% in 1983/84. Most remarkable, and in line with what we said before, was that the decline of the denominational education was entirely due to the Catholic sector. The Protestant sector maintained its position until 1975 and has even grown in the most recent period. Part of this growth can certainly be attributed to the rise of the orthodox Protestant schools which we discussed in section 5.1. In 1984 nearly 2% of the total number of pupils attended orthodox Protestant schools. The third private sector, which includes schools based on the theories of Montessori and Steiner, and other free schools, has also expanded. One of the causes for the growth of this sector was that it sometimes functioned as a substitute for public education, particularly in the predominantly Catholic regions where local authorities often offered passive resistance to the founding of a public school.

In order to obtain a better insight in the present level of verzulling of the primary education system we have done a regression analysis of the education variables on data concerning the religious affiliation in the beginning of the 1980s. The choice of 1981 and the fact that we restrict the analysis to one year were completely determined by the availability of data. The information we obtained about the development of the education system covered the period between 1977 and 1984. A comparison of the situations at the beginning of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s appeared to be impossible. Another problem existed with regard to information about the numerical development of the churches. Recent census data on the religious affiliation of the Dutch population are not available since no census has been taken since 1971. The data eventually used in the regression analysis were estimates, derived from the national estimates of Oudhof and Beets for 1981 and the census data by municipality for 1971. The argumentation underlying the choice of the method of estimation is given in annex 6. Central to this choice was the question whether to start from a two-step question, in which the respondent is first asked whether he belongs to a denomination and second to which denomination he belongs, or from a one-step question, in which the respondent is directly asked to which denomination he belongs. The latter type

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72. Two data files were at our disposal. The first was made available by the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Agency for Statistics) and contained data on pupils for 1981 to 1983. The second data file, which was put at our disposal by the Department of Education, contained data on schools and pupils between 1977 and 1984.
of question yields a more conservative estimate of the process of secularization.

The choice of Oudhof and Beets' conservative estimate at the national level as the starting point for deriving figures about developments at the municipal level has some important implications for the formulation of our hypothesis with regard to the outcome of the regression analysis. When using the one-step structured question, and thus including the latitudinarian or marginally involved members of the churches, the outcome of the estimate will show a relatively high proportion of Catholic and Dutch Reformed people and a relatively modest proportion of secularized people. A greater share of the population will still be classified as belonging to one of the denominations than in case we had opted for the use of a two-step question. Given the choice of the conservative estimate and the fact that the decline of the denominational education sector has been much slower than that of other types of denominational organizations, we may expect that the regression equation better approximates the ideal one than in case we had used the 'bold' estimate, excluding all the marginal church-members from the data. Distortions may occur, however, because we are not able to distinguish between the orthodox and the latitudinarian or marginally involved Dutch Reformed, as we did in the analysis in chapter 4.73.

Has ontzuiling, more than verzuiling, been a national process? In the diffusion of verzuiling the conflictuous relations between various denominations at the local level and the decentralised structure of the Protestant churches both played an important part in giving the process a regionally and even locally varied character. The cultural transformation starting in the 1960s, of which declining orthodoxy and secularization, both leading to the desegmentation of the social structure, were the most conspicuous features, influenced the entire nation. The greater geographical mobility and the rapid spread of means of mass communication were not only important factors underlying the cultural changes, but contributed also to the national character of these changes because of their integrating influence. One would expect that the accessibility of the modern urban culture nowadays is so overwhelming that the spread of this culture is no longer restricted to the urban areas only. Recent research by Knippenberg and De Vos showed, however,

73. It is to be noticed that the meaning of 'latitudinarian' in this chapter differs from the meaning it had in the analysis of the 1900-1930 period. In the beginning of the century latitudinarianism was a particular theological current, with its own doctrine, within the Dutch Reformed church. As used in the present chapter, however, it refers to a weakening attachment to the official doctrines and morality of the church. In this sense it is more or less identical to Andeweg's concept of 'declining orthodoxy'.
that as far as the secularization process was concerned, clear regional differences were present and that a certain correlation existed between the urban or rural character of a region on the one hand and the degree of secularization on the other hand.\(^74\) We can not directly assume on the basis of their findings that a similar correlation exists between the decline of confessional organizations and urbanization, but given the fact that declining orthodoxy, which is the major factor behind the weakening of confessional organizations, very often leads to secularization, it seems worthwhile to investigate the strength of this correlation.

Variations in the level and rate of ontzuiling probably also existed between denominations. Each survey held in the last 15 years, whether focusing on ontzuiling at the attitudinal or behavioural level, has shown that ontzuiling tendencies were much stronger among Catholics than in Orthodox Reformed circles and that the situation in the Dutch Reformed Church remained ambiguous. The latitudinarian members, as far as they continued their membership, will have participated in the ontzuiling process, whereas the orthodox groups, which were relatively growing in numbers, are more likely to have had a similar small inclination to weaken the relation between religion and social organization as the Orthodox Reformed population.

In table 5.6 the results of the regression analysis of the 1981 data are presented.

Table 5.6 Results of the regression analysis for 1981.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>Beta coeff.</th>
<th>(R^2)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.34 (A)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>1.19 (A)</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.45 (B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protestant education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>1.20 (C)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>572</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.99 (C)</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>572</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.54 (B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Catholic education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>1.01 (D)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>546</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^74\) 37\% of the variation in the process of secularization between 1971 and 1985/86 was explained by degree of urbanization of a region. H. Knippenberg and S. de Vos, Onkerkelijkheid en verstedelijking: recente trends in een oude relatie, pp.17-18.
A = % not belonging to a denomination, B = % Dutch Reformed,
C = % Orthodox Reformed, D = % Catholic

The coupling of particular types of education to particular denominations in these regressions needs a few comments. The regression of Catholic education on the Catholic population is least problematic, although it cannot be taken for granted that children of other denominations did not attend Catholic schools too, for instance in the Southern provinces where Catholic education often had a monopoly. The coupling of the Protestant denominations to Protestant education is more problematic because of the heterogeneous character of the Dutch Reformed Church. The difference between latitudinarian and orthodox members of this church seems to be relevant for explaining the size of the Protestant education sector. When taking the Orthodox Reformed Church and Dutch Reformed Church together we have the maximum reference group for the Protestant education sector. Conversely, the group which is not religiously affiliated according to our figures provides a minimum estimate of the demand for public education. The group of other denominations can not be assigned to any of the education sectors, since it was very heterogeneous.

As we expected the variation in participation in each of the three education sectors was in 1981 still very well explained by the religious affiliation of the population. The fit of the regression equation was best in the Catholic sector, where the regression line cut the y-axis just below 0, the regression line had a slope of just over 1 and the explained variation was very near to 100%. Hence not only the variation in the size of the Catholic education but also the size itself was well explained by the size of the Catholic population. Contrary to the transformations that have taken place in the party system, in the trade-unions, in the press and in various types of social organizations, the situation in the Catholic education sector thus has been highly stable. When all the marginally involved Catholics are counted as part of the denomination the strength of the Catholic denomination is a very good indication of the relative importance of Catholic education. In the Protestant and the public sectors the situation was indeed complicated by the intermediate position of the Dutch Reformed Church. In both sectors the variation in the percentage Dutch Reformed people contributed substantially to the explanation of the variation in participation in the respective education sectors. In the Protestant sector this factor contributed somewhat more, by augmenting the explained variation with 22 points and considerably correcting the intercept. It is a great disadvantage that we were not able to divide the Dutch Reformed population into an orthodox and a latitudinarian part, as we did in the preceding chapter, because this would probably have had a strong positive effect on the results of both regression equations. In accordance with our expectations entering the group of other
denominations as explanatory variable in the regression for public education did not yield a better result.\textsuperscript{75}

In table 5.7 the frequency distributions of the differences between the size of a particular type of primary education and the size of a particular denomination in a municipality are given for the 'conservative' estimate as well as the 'bold' estimate. The figures show that, whichever method of estimation approaches reality best, in quite a number of municipalities a gap existed between the actual use and the (potential) demand for denominational education. Denominational education appeared to be no longer merely overrepresented in relation to the expressed preference for this type of education but also in relation to the potential demand for Catholic and Protestant education.

Table 5.7 Frequency distributions of the differences between the size of a particular type of primary education and the size of a particular denominational group at the municipal level, 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conservative Estimate</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Public ed. - (% Dutch Reformed + % not religiously affiliated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than -25</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>less than -25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-25 thru 0</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>-25 thru 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>greater than 0</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>greater than 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bold Estimate</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Public ed. - (% Dutch Reformed + % not religiously affiliated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than -25</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>less than -25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-25 thru 0</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>-25 thru 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>greater than 0</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>greater than 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| % Protestant ed. - (% Orthodox Reformed + % Dutch Reformed) |
|---------------|-----------|-----------|
| less than -10 | 33.8% | less than -10 | 24.8% |
| -10 thru 10 | 62.7% | -10 thru 10 | 63.4% |
| greater than 10 | 3.5% | greater than 10 | 12.3% |

| % Catholic ed.- % Catholics |
|-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| less than -5 | 21.7% | less than -5 | 6.1% |
| -5 thru 5 | 70.2% | -5 thru 5 | 53.8% |
| greater than 5 | 8.1% | greater than 5 | 40.0% |

The first part of table 5.7 shows that a certain shortage of public education very likely existed. Taking the conservative estimate as the starting point an absolute majority of the municipalities appeared to have a shortage of public education compared to the demand for this type of education. This figure is somewhat too pessimistic, however, because only part of the Dutch

\textsuperscript{75} The explained variation remained at 71%. The intercept, however, was somewhat nearer to nil.

\textsuperscript{76} The borders of the categories have been empirically defined and therefore drawn at different values for the three types of education.
Reformed population preferred public education. In case we had identified the demand for public education with the secularised group only a smaller number of municipalities would have shown a shortage of public education. The same is of course true for the difference between public education and the 'bold' estimate of the demand. In that case the percentage of municipalities that had a great shortage of public education appeared to be so high, however, that the general trend would not have disappeared if we had related the size of the public education sector to a more accurately defined reference group. The situation with regard to the Catholic and the Protestant education sectors was the reverse of that of the public education sector. Here we notice that the actual use of these types of education often exceeded the demand. The different development of the ontzuiling process among Catholics and Protestants, which was so clear in the political system, the labour organizations and the press, and in surveys which tried to determine the preference for denominational education, was also illustrated by these figures. In 40% of the municipalities the supply of Catholic education exceeded by 5 points or more the demand for Catholic education. Even when we assume that the Catholics who were only marginally involved in church life also preferred Catholic over public education still in at least 8% of the municipalities Catholic schools were attended by a number of children for whom Catholic education probably was the 'second best' option.

The most striking feature of the situation of the primary education system in 1981 thus was that the level of verzuzuiing remained high, in spite of the clear signs that support of the churches was waning and differentiation occurred in almost all other social sectors. Apart from this dominant characteristic two trends were determined. The first was that the small decline of the relative size of the denominational sector since the beginning of the 1970s was entirely due to the cultural transformation which took place in the Catholic world. The second was that in the course of the 1970s, because of the continuing secularization process, the positive difference between the supply of denominational primary education and the demand for this type of education became more pronounced. The latter development was quite remarkable since in other sectors the decline of confessional organizations was initially stronger than the decline in support of the churches. In the education sector the development has for some reasons been the other way around.

In the beginning of this section we have already mentioned some of the reasons for the fact that the denominational sector succeeded to preserve its strong position. The first of these was

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77. According to table 5.7 there is also a considerable group of municipalities in which the actual use of Protestant education is much smaller than the potential demand. These figure are, however, again due to the fact that the Dutch Reformed population is not divided into a latitudinarian and an orthodox group.
that by changing its ideological orientation the denominational sector was able to fulfil new demands. Van Kemenade discovered that many Catholics did not ask for Catholic education as such, but for education that would teach children about the bible and about basic Christian moral and social principles. Many people believed that such education was just as well provided by ecumenical and public schools and some even believed that an exclusively Catholic upbringing could be counter-productive in this respect. Most of the Catholic schools changed to such an extent that they succeeded to answer the new demand for Christian, non-doctrinal, education. The lack of 'evidence' of ontzuiling in the education sector should thus also be attributed to the fact that the developments within the denominational schools themselves were part of the ontzuiling process. The relation between Catholic schools and the parishes in which they were situated became less close, the teachers that were appointed did no longer have to prove that they were firm believers and the schools also accepted children of other denominations. In this respect the fact of the declining number of potential pupils and the growing number of migrant children of school-going age were relevant. Particularly the fact that so many Muslim children attended Catholic or Protestant schools evoked a lot of protest among the supporters of public education who argued that the parents of these children had been misinformed about the religious orientation of the school chosen. Another effect of the less orthodox character of denominational education in the 1970s was that an internal conflict emerged between the supporters of clearly profiled denominational education and supporters of more general denominational education. This conflict was just as intense in the Protestant sector, where the same tendency towards general Christian education had taken place, as in the Catholic sector. In the Protestant sector it resulted in the founding of new, orthodox Protestant schools, which counted over 20,000 pupils by 1985. In the Catholic world, which is much more hierarchically organized, the conflict was largely fought between conservative bishops on the one hand and the organizations of schoolboards and teachers on the other hand.

The demand for Christian education was not the only demand denominational education had to fulfil, however. Another function of denominational schools was to provide high quality education. For reasons discussed before the image of the public school had deteriorated. Moreover part of the more conservative tendencies which became dominant in society in the 1970s was that parents attached less importance to democratic educational aims such as personal development, participation in decision-making, and cooperation of stronger and weaker students, than to traditional

78. According to statistical sources of the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek over 40% of the children of Turkish, Moroccan or Tunisian origin living in the Netherlands attended denominational education in 1979. CBS, Statistiek van het gewoon lager onderwijs.
values such as discipline, obedience and excellence. The latter group of values was still more central to the education in denominational schools, despite the loss of a clear profile, than in public schools. Hence whereas in the 1960s emphasis had been put on the wish to abolish doctrinal education, in the 1970s the denominational schools first and foremost fulfilled the demand for high quality education. Both these explanations for the continued appeal of denominational education are situated at the ideological level, that is they concern the supposed educational qualities of denominational education. Many other parents opted for denominational education, however, for very practical reasons, such as the distance to a school, the participation of parents etc. The ideological orientation of a school only played a subordinate role in the decision of this group: it accepted a predominantly denominational education system as an unimportant given.

The existing supply of educational facilities was itself the third reason that ontzuiling of the education system only slowly and partly developed. The supply of educational facilities is to a certain extent static: schools can not be opened and closed at random. When in a certain municipality a group of parents concluded that the public education they preferred was not available they had two options. The first of these was to try to change the ideological orientation of an existing denominational school and the second to ask for the opening of a new school. The first possibility was virtually excluded, however, as long as the advisory bodies in which parents and staff participated did not get a say in matters concerning the ideological orientation of the school. With regard to this matter power remained in the hands of the schoolboards, of which in most cases only those people could become member who subscribed to the basic ideological principles on which the school was founded. The second possibility was often equally difficult because it depended strongly on the co-operation of the municipal authorities, which were responsible for ‘providing sufficient public education’ in a municipality according to section 19 of the Education Act of 1920.80 Because of the role of the municipal and provincial authorities Idenburg spoke of a subjective element in the procedure to found a public school.80 This subjective

79. The decision of municipal councils is of course subject to the approval of the higher authorities, i.e. the provincial authorities, hence the decision-making power of the municipal councils is not absolute.

80. A subjective element, in which the decision about the opening of a school depends on the interpretation of the law by the authorities, is not present in the procedure with regard to private education. If it can be demonstrated that a new school will be attended by the required minimum number of children, and these children are not withdrawn from another private school
Map 5.2 Municipalities without public primary education in 1981
element made the political 'color' of the municipal council and the executive authority of the utmost importance. In case these bodies consisted for the larger part of representatives of the confessional parties, the chance that they agreed to the request of parents for a public school, was much smaller than in case the non-confessional parties had a majority. A confessionally oriented municipal administration was more likely to look for possibilities of sending these children to a public school in a municipality nearby. At other occasions it would argue that already available private neutral education could fulfill the wish of these parents. According to section 19 of the Education Act of 1920 each municipality had to provide sufficient public education, but the jurisprudence with respect to article 19 made it possible for municipalities not to do so if an arrangement could be made with another municipality. 81

Given the power of the municipal authorities with regard to the supply of public educational facilities the question can be raised whether the strong position of denominational education during the 1970s despite the decline of religious orthodoxy has been caused by the central position of the Christian Democratic Party not only in national but also in local politics. Although the new Christian Democratic Party was itself one of the results of the ontzuiling process, it can not be denied that it was still a centre party with many confessional elements. In fact, the power of the confessional parties has been the major source of continuity in Dutch politics. Therefore the obvious assumption is that the process of ontzuiling, as indicated by the growth of the public education sector, depended much on the presence of a local government in which the non-confessional parties were the majority parties, and that on the contrary the continued existence of private education corresponded with a strong power

within four kilometres from their homes, the municipal and central authorities have to consent to the founding of the new school, according to the Education Act of 1920. Because it only depends on fulfilling the requirements listed in the law, Idenburg called this procedure objective. The fact that the opening of a public school partly depends on subjective factors makes it more difficult, according to him, to found public than private schools. P.J. Idenburg, 1960, op. cit., p.258.

81. It was left to the higher authority to determine whether a municipality fulfilled the requirement of the law that it should provide sufficient public education by such an agreement. The possibility of 'sharing' schools has certainly contributed to the situation that in 1981 in 20% (151 out of 771) of the municipalities no public education was provided, although the lack of demand for public education in the Catholic areas seems to have been the major reason. As map 5.2 shows nearly all these municipalities were located in the two southern, Catholic provinces.
position of the confessional parties. To investigate this assumption we have developed an index of political confessionalism of municipal executives, and determined how much this variable attributed to explaining the variation in strength of the Catholic and Protestant education sectors. The index related the number of members of confessional parties of the Court of Mayor and Aldermen to the number of members of non-confessional parties, and thus varied from 100 in case all were members of confessional parties to 0 in case the entire group belonged to the non-confessional parties. In table 5.8 the results of regressions, which include the index of political confessionalism of the municipal executive authority, are given.

Table 5.8 Results of multiple step-wise regression analysis, including the political orientation of the municipal executive authority, 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>Beta-coefficients</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestant education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>1.20 (A)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.00 (A) 0.56 (B)</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>0.92 (A) 0.61 (B) 0.21 (C)</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>1.01 (D)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>0.98 (D) 0.05 (C)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>-0.60 (C)</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>-0.51 (C) 0.31 (B)</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>-0.26 (C) 0.35 (B) 0.74 (E)</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = % Orthodox Reformed, B = % Dutch Reformed, C = political orientation of the municipal executive authority, D = % Catholic, E = % not belonging to a denomination.

There appeared to be a remarkable difference between the contribution of the political orientation of the municipal executive authority to explaining the variation of the denominational education sectors on the one hand and the public sector on the other hand. As far as Protestant education was concerned the political composition of the municipal executive authority was entered as the last variable into the regression equation and it augmented the explained variation with only 6 %.

Although formally the municipal authorities, council and executive alike, are responsible for primary education, the index is based on the political 'color' of the municipal executive authority, the Court of Mayor and Aldermen, since this body has shown still to have more power in practice, despite the democratization tendencies of the last twenty years.
points, which indicated that this variable explained largely the same as the two variables concerning the religious affiliation. The same was true as regarded the Catholic sector. Here the variation explained by the % of Catholics was already so high that the second variable could hardly contribute to the explanation. In the regression equation for the public sector, however, the political orientation of the municipal executive authority was entered at the first step, before the two variables concerning the religious affiliation of the population. The first variable contributed 61% to the explanation of the variation of the public sector whereas the other two factors contributed only 8% and 7%. For the size of the public sector the composition of the municipal executive authority thus was of the utmost importance: if this body was mainly made up of representatives of confessional parties the public sector generally was not very strong. If, on the contrary, the Liberal party and/or the leftist parties held the majority of the seats in this body it meant that public education was much more likely to be expanded. The causal relations between the three variables seemed to be as follows. As far as the denominational sector was concerned the strength of the religious affiliation continued to influence the strength of the confessional parties and the position of the denominational education sector alike, therefore the political situation only had a rather small independent influence on the size of the denominational education sector. As far as the public sector was concerned, however, the decline of religious affiliation affected the size of the public education sector, but only indirectly, with ontzuliding of the political system as the intervening variable. It would be very interesting to test this finding, particularly the importance of ontzuliding in the political system for the relative strength of the public education sector, on data which cover the evolution of the education system in a certain period, that is, to relate the level of ontzuliding in the political system to change in the education system. We will do this in the next section where we examine the evolution of the number of public schools between 1977 and 1984.

The maps 5.3 and 5.4, in which the residuals greater than 1 or less than -1 of the regression of table 5.8 are marked, give a picture of the regions in which verzulizing of the education system persisted despite growing secularization. Apart from the regional variation connected to the presence or absence of a particular denomination in a certain area, the following points can be noted with regard to map 5.3. The municipalities which had a positive residual, hence an overrepresentation of Protestant education, were mainly found in the traditional orthodox Protestant belt running from the western part of Friesland to the south-western part of South Holland. In

83. In both cases the demand for denominational resp. public education of course also played a part.
Figure 5.2 Causal relationships between the patterns of religious affiliation, the political orientation of municipal executive authority and the size of the public and denominational education sectors.
Map 5.3 Residuals greater than the standard deviation or less than minus the standard deviation of the regression of the percentage of pupils in Protestant primary education on the percentage of Dutch Reformed, the percentage of Orthodox Reformed and the political orientation of the municipal executive authority in 1981.
Map 5.4 Residuals greater than the standard deviation or less than minus the standard deviation of the regression of the percentage of pupils in Catholic primary education on the percentage of Catholics and the political orientation of the municipal executive authority in 1981.

- Less than minus the standard deviation
- Greater than the standard deviation
Map 5.5 Residuals greater than the standard deviation or less than minus the standard deviation of the regression of the percentage of pupils in public primary education on the percentage of people without religious affiliation, the percentage of Dutch Reformed and the political orientation of the municipal executive authority in 1981.
this belt a large majority of the population, if not the total population, had always been orthodox Protestant and consequently the primary schools in the municipalities concerned had also predominantly belonged to the Protestant sector. A decline of the relative number of Protestants, for example due to immigration of people belonging to other denominations or to secularization among latitudinarian Dutch Reformed people, was not everywhere immediately reflected in a decline of the pupils attending Protestant primary schools, simply because in some cases there was no public school nearby. This was particularly so in the smaller rural municipalities which made up 45% of the cases with a positive residual. The vested power of the orthodox Protestants, both in the local political system and in the schoolboards made it difficult for those who wished to create or expand public schools to do so.

Outside this belt, but still in the Protestant part of the Netherlands, i.e. in North Holland, Zeeland, Groningen, and Drente, two different situations existed. In North Holland the secularization of the Protestants had been accompanied by a shift between Protestant and public schools to such an extent that no under or overrepresentation of Protestant education existed. The same was true for large areas of Zeeland.

The situation in Groningen and Drente, which showed concentrations of negative residuals, was most likely due to the fact that we included the Dutch Reformed Church as a whole in the analysis: if we had been able to distinguish between latitudinarian and orthodox members the demand for Protestant education, as measured from the size of the Protestant population, would probably have been much smaller. In that case Groningen and Drente might not have shown any negative residuals at all. The underrepresentation of Protestant and overrepresentation of public education (see map 5.5) shown by some of the municipalities on the islands of Zeeland and South Holland was most likely due to the same inaccuracy.

The positive and negative residuals of the regression on Catholic education were quite evenly dispersed over all the areas where major concentration of Catholics were found. Moreover the variation in attendance of Catholic schools was generally very small: the standard error was only 6.14.84 No particular geographical pattern could be discerned, except for the clustering of the positive residuals in Limburg and the absence of negative residuals in both this province and in the eastern part of Overijssel called Twente. In the two southern provinces complaints about the dominant position of Catholicism in political and social life and about the difficulties encountered when groups of parents tried to get a public school opened have become more frequent since the end of the 1970s. They are a sign that the stability of the Catholic education sector will soon

84. Compare this to the standard error of the regressions on public and Protestant education, which were resp. 11.6 and 12.1
definitely belong to the past. The growth of the Social Democratic party and the decline of the Christian Democratic party in the southern provinces in the local elections of 1986 is an indication of the decline of Catholics in local power politics.85 This will, according to our analysis, eventually result in a relative decline of Catholic education. The municipalities with a positive residual were on average small, the mean number of inhabitants being 8,104, and almost half of them could be characterised as rural.86 Therefore we can assume that the occurrence of positive residuals was mainly due to the lack of choice latitudinarian and secularized Catholics in small rural communities faced. Very significantly in the central part of Limburg, around the city of Roermond where Rome nominated an extremely orthodox bishop in 1972 a slight clustering of positive residuals was found.

The underrepresentation of Catholic education, indicated by negative residuals, must mainly result from the fact that the regression analysis was based on the conservative estimate of the membership of the Catholic Church, which in some municipalities will definitely have yielded a too elevated percentage of Catholics.

Apart from the two Catholic provinces map 5.5, in which the residual values of the regression on public education are presented, is very much the reverse of map 5.3. A shortage of public education was found in the traditionally orthodox Protestant belt and in the central part of Holland, whereas an overrepresentation was noticed for the small municipalities in the provinces of Groningen, Drente, Zeeland and in the Catholic concentrations in North Holland, Overijssel and Gelderland.87 The absence of positive or negative residuals in Limburg was remarkable: it was a sign of an as yet continuous stability whereas the demand and supply of Catholic primary education was concerned. As regards the supply side we think this was the result of the continuous Catholic domination in local politics and it seems that at the demand side the declining orthodoxy of

85. In the municipal elections of 1986 the Social Democratic party gained in many municipalities of Limburg and North Brabant to the detriment of the Christian Democratic party and the Liberal party.

86. This characterisation is based on the typology of municipalities made by Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars and De Vos. R. van Engelsdorp Gastelaars and S. de Vos, Typologie van Nederlandse gemeenten, monografie Volkstelling 1971.

87. It is indeed true that the only school in small rural communities is often a public school. This state of affairs has been a central issue in the discussion about the restructuring of the primary education system and the role of small village schools for rural communities.
the Catholics did not yet lead to overtly admitted secularization.
Planning of the provision of primary schools, that is the process in which according to a set of rules and norms based on the study of past and possible future trends decisions are made about the financing and distribution of schools, received very little attention until recently. The municipal authorities of course applied certain rules and norms in the decision-making process concerning the opening and closing of schools, namely the conditions for financing given in the Education Act, but this is not the same as a comprehensive approach to planning. Decisions about opening and closure of schools were taken ad hoc, isolated from other decisions. In a comprehensive approach, on the contrary, planning is envisaged as an ongoing process, in which factors which go beyond the concern of individual municipalities or sectors are taken into account. In a period of expansion the need for such planning is less urgent because potential and real conflicts can easily be solved by giving in to both parties. The lack of clear planning procedures becomes problematic, however, when amicable settlements can no longer be the solution to each problem because they are too expensive. An example of such a situation is the planning of elementary schools in a new residential area. As long as it is possible to build three relatively small schools, each belonging to one of the three major sectors, conflicts between supporters and opponents of various types of education can be avoided. When for economic reasons the number of schools has to be limited to one or two, and this means that either two sectors have to share a building or some children have to attend an already existing school somewhat further away planning becomes a much more complex process.

The planning of elementary schools was until the beginning of the 1980s governed by the rules laid down in the Elementary Education Act of 1920. Decisions concerning the financing of schools, which de facto determined whether or not a school could exist, were grounded in this law, which remained basically unaltered between 1920 and 1985. The fact that the Elementary Education Act of 1920 had been a compromise between the confessional and the non-confessional forces and that hostilities between these two parties continued to exist for a long time after 1920 explains why the status quo, which had been reached after so much political struggle, was maintained. After 1920, however, many details were added to the existing legislation in order to arrive at an even smoother organization of the relation between public and private education.\textsuperscript{88}

The situation regarding decision making about primary schools was in the 1960s and 1970s as follows. The municipal
authorities (the council and the Court of Mayor and Aldermen together) had decision making power concerning opening and closure of schools. Regarding private schools their decision making power was very limited, however, since they were obliged, in case the request for a private school met all the requirements listed in the law, to give their consent. The number of actors involved in the whole process was limited. As far as public schools were concerned the initiative to open a school could be taken by the municipal council or by a group of parents (the latter right was only granted in 1964). In the case of private schools the request had to be made by a privately incorporated body, for example an association, and it had to include a petition of a number of parents specified in the law. Both in the public education sector and in the private education sector parents thus could influence the planning process by using their right of initiative, but in reality they probably did not use this right frequently.

The minimum norms for establishing or maintaining a school had been slightly raised since the reform of 1923 as can be seen in table 5.9.

Table 5.9 Minimum norms for establishing and maintaining elementary schools in municipalities of different sizes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>number of inhabitants</th>
<th>minimum norm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 100,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000&lt; x &lt; 100,000</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000&lt; x &lt; 50,000</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 25,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This concerns the minimum norm for establishing a school. The minimum norm for maintaining a school remained at 125, 100, 75 and 50.

In two situations deviations from these norms were accepted. Firstly municipal authorities had the right to open a public school even if the number of pupils to be expected was only 20, in case this was the first public school in a municipality. Secondly the Minister of Education could decide to exempt a municipality from applying these norms, i.e. to allow lower norms to be applied, in case at least 25 pupils of an existing small school did not have the possibility to attend another school within four kilometers from where they lived. Such requests were in fact quite common.89

Moreover municipal authorities had two other instruments to influence the number of public schools in their jurisdiction:

89. This brief, and therefore not very detailed, discussion of the conditions for opening and closure of schools is based on the articles 19, 23, 72 and 73 of the Elementary Education Act.
they could agree with a neighbouring municipality to send children to a school in that municipality, so that they did not have to open a new public school themselves, or to found an intermunicipal school, thereby also limiting the number of schools in their own jurisdiction. The liberal jurisprudence in relation to the two articles in which these possibilities were laid down was one of the reasons that quite a number of municipalities did not provide public education (see map 5.1 for the situation in 1981).

Jurisprudence was also important with regard to the interpretation of the freedom of ideological orientation of education. The concept of ideological orientation was understood to be the same as a denomination, which almost reduced it to the major education sectors which existed at the time the Elementary Education Act had been drawn up.\(^9^0\) As long as society continued being segmented along the dividing lines which had developed during the last century this did not pose a problem, but the more social demands were made on education the more this interpretation was felt to restrict freedom of education. At the same time it is clear that the narrow interpretation of the concept of ideological orientation prevented the system from becoming even more fragmented and inefficient.\(^9^1\)

The practice of the 'planning' procedure did not always exactly follow the rules as described here. Particularly with regard to the planning of schools in new residential areas different procedures existed. It was, for example, quite unusual

\(^9^0\) In practice, however, schools based on particular pedagogical conceptions were not excluded from state-financing and considered as constituting the fourth, neutral private sector. But in the jurisprudence only the neutral private schools based on anthroposophical ideas were recognised as an ideological orientation since these was considered to form a real philosophy. As we pointed out in chapter 5.2 recently subdenominations such as orthodox Protestant schools have been informally recognised as a separate ideological orientation. See for a discussion of the jurisprudence on the concept of ideological orientation: J.B.J. Koelman, Kosten van de verzulling, 1987, pp.110-112.

\(^9^1\) During the discussion about the proposal for the new Basic Education Act the scope of the term ideological orientation was an important issue. According to the Social Democratic Party, the interest organisations of public and neutral private education, and even a few people involved in Protestant or Catholic education, this concept needed a wider interpretation than just the ideological orientation of a school. Instead it should include particular pedagogical and other orientations as well, in order to be able to provide for a changing social and individual demand for education. S. Boef-Van der Meulen and R. Bronneman-Helmers, 1982, op. cit., pp.125-126, 203-204, 206, 224-225.
to postpone the construction of a new private school until all
the new inhabitants had settled and these had formulated an
official request, including the required petition of parents. The
municipal authorities determined the required number of schools
by sector on the basis of some numerical indicator: in some cases
on the basis of the strength of the various denominations
according to the population register, in other cases on the basis
of the actual percentage of a particular type of school in a
municipality.

The conclusion of this brief account must be that the
planning procedure at the level of elementary education as it
existed until the beginning of the 1980s was extremely poor and
that it suited a situation characterized by an expanding
population and stable ideological preferences. Planning of
educational facilities took place with the help of quantitative
norms which were laid down in the law and on the basis of a
narrow interpretation of the concept of ideological orientation.
There were very few possibilities for broadening the supply of
education and there was hardly any coordination of planning
between the four education sectors nor between educational and
other facilities. This type of incremental planning, as opposed
to comprehensive planning, has made the expansion of the Catholic
and Protestant education sectors much easier.92

With the Basic Education Act, which became operative in
1985, the first step was made in the direction of a more
comprehensive planning process. Only the new schools that were
included in an annually revised, ongoing three year plan, would
be considered for financing. The plan had at least to contain a
forecast of the number of pupils, a description of the area
serviced by the new school, and an indication of the location of
the school. Requests for inclusion in that plan had to be made by
the municipal council, in case of a public school, or a private
school board, in case of a private school. The plan had to be
approved by the provincial executive authority.

The minimum norms for establishing schools, which had already
been changed in 1979, were again raised.93 This rise was only
optical, however, because the minimum norm now concerned basic
education, which comprised pupils of the former primary and pre
primary schools. The introduction of different minimum norms for
maintaining schools was new: a school would no longer be financed
if the average number of pupils in three subsequent years had

92. Boef-van der Meulen and Bronneman-Helmers differentiate
between incremental planning, which is the addition of new
facilities without paying much attention to the existing
facilities, and comprehensive planning, which does take into
account other factors. S. Boef-van der Meulen and R. Bronneman-

93. The new norms were resp. 200, 160, 120, 80.
been less than this minimum norm.94 There were, however, several built-in possibilities for schools in particular circumstances to be exempted from the minimum norms for establishing and maintaining a school. Hence only a first step has been made in the direction of a better organized decision-making process. Comprehensive planning would imply the continuous study of the present supply of schools and the evolution of the demand for education, in the light of changing social and individual needs. The monopoly of the four existing education sectors has not been broken as yet and the instrument that has been developed to measure the real demand for different types of education, the 'preferred education survey', still shows many deficiencies.95

In section 5.2 we have pointed out that most people involved in the planning of education were rather ill-prepared for the rapid changes starting from the 1970s. They never fully realized the scale of the decline in numbers and they lacked the planning instruments to timely adapt the primary school system to the new developments. The incremental approach to planning, which is based on ad hoc, isolated decisions, made it very difficult to drastically change the upward direction which had characterized the curve of the number of schools ever since the Second World War.96 Even when the government realized that something had to be altered the reforms carried through, e.g. the introduction of an advancing three year planning process, were rather modest. Until now no political party has had the courage to propose a fundamental change of the existing, segmented education system. The pressure of the interest organizations, particularly the organizations of school boards, will certainly have contributed to this result. Table 5.10 makes clear that changes came only at a very late moment.

Two series of illustrative figures are presented of which the first gives the annual number of new primary school between 1978 and 1984 and the second the schools that were closed during the same period.97

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94. This norm was put at 125, 100, 75 and 50 for municipalities of different sizes.

95. The most serious problems with the preferred education survey are firstly the costs in time and money and secondly that it has to be repeated every few years because people's preferences change and because the composition of the population in the area served by a particular school is not stable.

96. Except for the period between 1930 and 1945 the number of primary schools had continuously increased since the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

97. To be exact, the figures in the first column represent the number of schools of which pupils were registered for the first time in a particular year. Normally this will have been in
Table 5.10 Number of elementary schools that were opened, resp. closed between 1977 and 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>opened</th>
<th>closed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table, which is based on a data file made available by the Department of Education, shows that the number of elementary schools that were closed remained more or less at the same low level until 1982. Only in 1983 the number of schools that disappeared increased substantially. This was just before the Interim Basic Education Act was introduced, which was to be substituted by the Basic Education Act in 1985. In 1983 also preparations started for a major, one-time reorganization of the primary education system, which was to take place in 1984 and will be discussed below. However, the first column shows that until 1983 the number of schools that opened their doors by far exceeded the number of schools that closed and only very gradually went down. The number of closures only surpassed openings in 1983. In 1984 the situation was again reversed, but we have to keep in mind that the first column does not give the exact number of schools opened in a particular year because it is based on the first registration of the number of pupils (see note 9). If we add the figures in both columns for the years 1983 and 1984 the number of closed schools just exceeds the number of schools opened (405 against 394). Putting these figures next to the evolution of the net number of schools as given in the official education statistics (represented in figure 3.5) we can conclude that the years 1983-1984 really have been the turning point.

Presented by sector we discover the following pattern:

Table 5.11 Number of schools opened and closed between 1978 and 1985, by sector

the same year as the school opened. Slight differences may occur, however, because of schools that were opened at the end of a particular year and only included in the official registration in the subsequent year.

98. The period covered runs from September 1978 until October 1985 as far as the opening of schools is concerned and until May 1985 as far as it concerns the closures.
The figures confirm the development of the sectoral division of
the net number of schools. The declining curve of the Catholic
sector is the combined effect of a much lower number of new
schools than in the Protestant and the public sectors and a much
higher number of closing schools. The high difference of -12.9
indicates that the Catholic sector was losing in relation to the
other sectors. This may be caused by two factors. First the
Catholic schools in North Brabant and Limburg faced a greater
decline of the number of pupils than the schools in other
provinces because of the rapidly decreasing birth rate in these
provinces in the preceding period. The decline was so fast that
it is very plausible that it resulted in an accelerated closure
of Catholic schools at the end of the seventies. The Catholic
school in North Brabant and Limburg could easily be merged in
larger units because the area was religiously homogeneous, hence
even if some of the too small schools disappeared this would not
make Catholic education less accessible. Second the figures of
table 5.10 probably also indicate that the Catholic education
organizations were much less prepared than the Protestant and
private neutral sectors for the new situation, in which the
numerical strength of a particular sector was no longer
automatically secured but needed a clear strategy on the part of
these organizations. The Protestant and the private neutral
sectors were on the whole gaining in relation to the other
sectors, the Protestant sector even somewhat more than the
private neutral one. Compared to the share that each of the
sectors had in 1977 the growth of the number of new schools in
the private neutral sector was fastest though. The position of
the public sector was balanced: its share of the new schools was
about as high as its share of the schools that were closed.

We have just said that the educational interest
organizations need to develop clear strategies if they want to
maintain their position in a period in which contraction is a
more important characteristic of the education system than
expansion. Such a strategy can focus on a number of variables
which influence the planning process. First of all it can focus
on the actors who decide about the framework in which planning of
schools takes place. The policy makers do not only include the
legislative powers but also the judiciary, because of the

99. The birth-rate of North Brabant fell from 23.4 in the
1960-1965 period to 15.7 in the 1970-1975 period. In Limburg the
figures for the same periods were 22.0 and 13.5.
importance of jurisprudence for the interpretation of the education laws. Examples of this type of strategy are the attempt of the smaller Orthodox Reformed denominations to get their schools recognised by the Department of Education as different from the general Protestant schools and the discussion between those who want to preserve the existing situation and those who want to vary the supply of educational facilities through a broader interpretation of the concept of ideological orientation. The second strategy we have discovered is to focus on the content of the education provided and to emphasize its special features. This strategy has particularly been embraced by the conservative Bishops who have tried very hard to re-establish the Catholic identity of the Catholic school during the last ten years. The Protestant sector never experienced a crisis similar to that in the Catholic sector but nevertheless the interest in strengthening the Protestant character of its schools also increased. The appearance of orthodox Protestant schools was a manifestation of the same strategy. The third strategy is to closely study the development of the geographical concentrations of the actual and potential supporters of a particular type of education and to focus attempts at expansion on those concentrations. It can be doubted whether before 1983, when the rationalization forced them to do so, this has been systematically done by any of the educational interest organizations, which are probably still more used to a defensive than an aggressive approach to planning. In the tables 5.12 and 5.13 we have tried to analyse in which type of environments the four sectors have best succeeded in establishing new schools. The geographical patterns which appear from these tables might be the result of conscious strategies on the part of the educational interest organization, but are also important indications of the direction in which strategies will probably be developed out of self-interest.

Table 5.12  Percentage of new elementary schools by sector and by region, 1978-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cath.</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prot.</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutr. pr.</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total  | 30.5| 28.8| 25.5| 15.2| 35.4| 21.3| 27.1| 16.1|

a= central regions, b= intermediate regions, c= semi-peripheral regions, d= peripheral regions.
820 valid cases, 86 missing cases.

Table 5.13  Percentage of new elementary schools by sector and by type of municipality, 1978-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cath.</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prot.</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutr. pr.</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total  | 30.5| 28.8| 25.5| 15.2| 35.4| 21.3| 27.1| 16.1|

a= central regions, b= intermediate regions, c= semi-peripheral regions, d= peripheral regions.
820 valid cases, 86 missing cases.
public 39.5 11.0 28.1 21.4 21.1 13.0 15.1 50.7
Cath. 44.2 10.0 19.0 26.8 56.7 5.8 8.3 29.2
Prot. 44.4 10.0 23.2 21.5 50.0 9.0 13.4 27.6
neutr. pr. 55.8 23.4 9.1 11.7 47.8 21.7 8.7 21.7

Total 44.1 11.8 22.0 22.1 42.2 10.8 12.1 35.0

a= urban municipalities, b= wealthy suburban municipalities, c= newly expanding municipalities, d= rural municipalities.

820 valid cases, 86 missing cases.

Table 5.12 gives for two subsequent periods the distribution of the number of new schools by sector and by region. The division into four regions is based on the typology made by Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars a.o. It is based on the factor which indicates the level of socio-economic development of a region. The central areas cover the western urbanised part of the country, the intermediate areas function as spillover area for the activities in the central areas and mainly surround these. The semi-peripheral zone covers Zeeland, parts of North Brabant and parts of Friesland, Drente and Overijssel, whereas zones such as parts of North Brabant, Limburg, Friesland and Drente, are peripheral in the geographical and socio-economic sense of the word. The periodization was chosen for two reasons: the 1978-1982 period was the end of the era of expansion of the education system and also the period in which the confessional parties still had a strong position in local politics, particularly in the rural areas, whereas the 1982-1985 period was characterised by the start of the reform of the education system and by a weakening of confessional power at the local level.

Table 5.13 gives for the same periods the percentage-wise distribution of new elementary schools by sector, and by type of municipality. The division into four types of municipalities is also based on the typology of Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars and De Vos. Four types of municipalities have been discerned on the basis of three dimensions, which indicate the socio-economic status, the presence of 'urban minorities' and the age structure of the population. The intraregional division is not independent from the interregional division, since the dimensions used to classify the municipalities are standardized by region. The municipalities classified as urban thus have the same characteristics, but the extent to which they have these characteristics varies: the urban municipalities in a central region have different values from those in the semi-peripheral region.

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100. Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars and De Vos use the concept of minority in a very general sense as referring to all sorts of households deviating from the nuclear family, R. van Engelsdorp Gastelaars and S. de Vos, p.23.
Comparing the observed percentages for a particular sector with the percentage observed for the total number of new schools the following conclusions can be drawn.

At the end of the 1970s public schools were at a more than average rate set up in the intermediate regions. Moreover they tended to be concentrated in the new growth centres that were the result of policies developed to limit the drift of the suburbanization. The suburbanization movement of the second half of the 1970s, which implied the transfer of a great number of former town-dwellers with a low socio-economic status to the countryside, apparently created important new possibilities for the expansion of the public sector.\footnote{The process of suburbanization shows a clear periodization which is of importance for understanding the expansion of the public sector in the intermediate areas. The movement to the countryside was at first the privilege of the more well-to-do people. From the mid 1970s onwards, however, it was increasingly the lower socio-economic groups that moved to the countryside. They were forced, by the housing policy of the government which was itself the result of the high landprices around the cities, to go to live much further away from the towns than those who had left the cities ten years earlier.} By the beginning of the 1980s, however, the process of suburbanization had lost its momentum and the policy of concentrated outmigration was gradually phased out. The effect of the saturation of the newly expanding municipalities was counteracted by a new trend: the rise of public education in the Catholic areas of the Southern part of the country. Public schools were relatively more often opened in the semi-peripheral and peripheral regions. The figures in table 5.12 and 5.13 do not tell us which regions this concerned but on the basis of other publications we can be fairly certain that most of these schools will have been concentrated in North Brabant and Limburg. As far as the type of municipality was concerned a strong concentration in the rural municipalities was noticed, in contrast to the relatively few public schools opened in the urban municipalities.

The geographical pattern of new establishments in the neutral private sector proved to be very pronounced too. Region-wise new schools were more often found in the central and intermediate areas, although during the period covered the emphasis shifted somewhat from the central to the intermediate regions. The regional concentration was combined with an even stronger tendency for these schools to be located in the urban and wealthy suburban municipalities. That this type of education was preferred by the well-to-do, well educated urban population was thus convincingly confirmed by the figures in table 5.12 and table 5.13.

The location of new denominational schools showed a somewhat less clear pattern. Between 1978 and 1982 Catholic schools were still mainly founded in the traditional Catholic stronghold, the rural areas of North Brabant and Limburg. In the first half of
the 1980s this concentration disappeared, however, and the regional distribution of new Catholic schools showed a fairly normal pattern with only a very slight emphasis on the semi-peripheral and peripheral areas. Regarding the type of municipality the developments were the other way around: before 1982 new schools were normally distributed between the four types of municipalities, but in the second period a strong concentration in the urban municipalities existed. The focus of the Catholic education sector shifted away from the rural areas which had been its traditional concern to the larger urban centres which is probably explained by the fact that the towns of North Brabant and Limburg, contrary to the towns in the Western provinces, were still growing in this period.\footnote{102} The Protestant sector followed region-wise the overall geographical distribution of new schools during the entire period between 1978 and 1985. As regards the type of municipality a tendency to cluster in the urban municipalities was noticed. The fact that the efforts of both the Catholics and the Protestants were no longer mainly directed at the rural environment, where these two sectors have always had a strong position, probably resulted from the fact that in these areas the saturation point had been reached and that new possibilities were sought in the areas where traditionally the public sector was very important.

Putting aside the neutral private sector, which remained the preferred sector of a socially clearly distinctive and geographically concentrated part of the Dutch population, the conclusion can be drawn that as far as the spatial distribution of new elementary schools was concerned each of the other three sectors has in the last few years tried to further penetrate those areas where it hitherto had been relatively weak. This conclusion confirms one of the findings of Ostendorp that interregional cultural variation is disappearing.\footnote{103}

In section 5.3 the influence of the political situation at the local level was studied and it was concluded that a certain correlation existed between the position of the non-confessional parties and the size of the public education sector in 1981. We were also interested, however, in the question whether a similar correlation could be established between the level of ontzuiling in the political system and the ontzuiling process, measured as the growth of the neutral (public and private) sector, in education. Table 5.14 shows that between 1978 and 1982 a certain

\footnote{102. All but two municipalities in North Brabant and Limburg which had over 25,000 inhabitants in 1978 showed a population increase ranging from 1% to 33% (this high figure was caused by a reorganization of the municipalities) between 1978 and 1986.}

correlation indeed existed between the political orientation of
the municipal executive, confessional or non-confessional, and
the number of schools of a certain type founded.

Table 5.14 Relation between the number of new schools of a
certain type founded and the political situation at the local
level between 1978 and 1982.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sector</th>
<th>non-confessional</th>
<th>confessional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>parties dominant</td>
<td>parties dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cath.</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prot.</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutr. pr.</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*130 missing cases because no information about the political
configuration was available

Although more than half of the total number of new schools was
set up in municipalities which had a confessionally dominated
municipal executive the situation was clearly reversed as far as
non-denominational education was concerned. Both public and
neutral private education stood a better chance to expand in
municipalities with a Socialist and/or Liberal majority. This
tendency was even somewhat stronger in the neutral private sector
than in the public sector. The Catholic sector showed the
reversed tendency, that is more Catholic schools were opened in
the municipalities in which the confessionally parties dominated
politics. In the Protestant sector the distribution between the
municipalities with a confessionally dominated or a non-
confessionally dominated executive closely resembled the
distribution of all newly opened schools. In three sectors,
however, a correlation seems to have existed between the degree
of confessionalism of the local political system and the
orientation of new schools in the 1978-1982 period. On the
basis of table 5.14 we can not determine whether a causal
relation existed between the two variables, in the sense that
Socialists or Liberals would favour the setting up of public
schools and the confessional parties the founding of
denominational schools. It is much more likely that the political
orientation of the municipal executive acts here as an
intervening variable and that the founding of a certain type of
school is primarily the effect of the pattern of religious
affiliation of the population. The figures concerning the 1982-
1986 period are not presented here since they are less reliable

104 This conclusion needs of course further exploration
since it is very well possible that the relation between the two
variables is spurious, i.e. the relation disappears when the
pattern of religious affiliation is taken into account.
due to a high number of missing cases.\textsuperscript{105} They seem to point out, however, that the correlation has weakened.

So far we have focused on the establishment of new schools, which was mainly determined by the religious composition of the population and the local political situation. Politics at the national level were also important. As soon as a case could be considered to deviate from the general rules the influence of national interest organizations on decision makers, through personal ties or more structured relations, was considerable. In matters other than the establishment or survival of individual schools participation of the educational interest organizations in consultative bodies was the most important channel for influencing policy making. The most influential consultative body was the Centrale Commissie voor Onderwijsoverleg (CCOO), established in 1972 with the aim to institutionalize consultations about general matters concerning pre-primary, primary and secondary education, and to formulate as much as possible common points of view.\textsuperscript{106} In this way the CCOO was of course not only an important instrument of representation but also of legitimation. It gained such an importance in the phases of education policy preparation and formulation that the existence of corporatist elements in this consultative structure could not be denied. Representation in the CCOO was along the traditional, ideological dividing lines: only the central interest organizations of the four education sectors participated.\textsuperscript{107} Organizations of employers and trade-unions were not invited to this forum, nor was it possible for education interest organizations representing a particular part of the education system, e.g. lower secondary education, or a particular group of people involved, e.g. organized staff, to participate in

\textsuperscript{105}. Due to administrative reorganizations during this period for quite a number of municipalities the political orientation of the local government could not be established. Because of a certain geographical concentration of these municipalities their score on the variable 'political orientation of the municipal executive' was probably not randomly distributed.

\textsuperscript{106}. J.S. Crone i.a., Overleg over onderwijs: het functioneren en de betekenis van de Centrale Commissie voor Onderwijsoverleg binnen het onderwijsbeleidsproces, 1986, p.33-34.

\textsuperscript{107}. These four central interest organizations were the Nederlandse Protestants-Christelijke Schoolraad (NPCS, Protestant sector), the Nederlandse Katholieke Schoolraad (NKSR, Catholic sector), the Nederlandse Algemene Bond van Scholen (NABS, neutral private sector) and the Contactcentrum Bevordering Openbaar Onderwijs (CBOO, public sector). In each of these four sectors the most important members of the central interest organizations are the organizations of schoolboards.
the CCOO. Hence the set up of the consultative arena provided a maximum guarantee that the status quo would be preserved.

Ad hoc consultations, outside the CCOO, also occurred in particular situations. Such a situation was the reorganization of the primary (and pre-primary) education system which took place in 1984 and 1985. We will discuss this reorganization to show how important the consultative process was for the outcome of the reorganization and how the interest organizations of the four existing education sectors, because of their vested position, were able to avoid radical adaptation of the system to the new situation of decline.

The direct motivation for the reorganization was the fact that the number of pupils in many schools was far below the minimum norm, as a consequence of a too lenient application of existing rules. From this policy the public sector, having a lot of small village schools which easily came under the special planning rules, had benefitted most. Immediately when the first plans for the reorganization were tabled, in the spring of 1983, the interest organizations saw the need for close cooperation with the government, to prevent that their own sector would be disproportionately affected. As early as June 1983 the first consultations between the government and the organizations of schoolboards, the VBPCO, the CEKO, the VBS and the VNG, took place. This was the beginning of a long period of cooperation which was not limited to implementing the decisions taken by the government, but also concerned the formulation of policies. Cooperation was not completely voluntary: if the reorganization would not yield sufficient results, in the sense of a considerable reduction of the number of small schools, the rules and norms which guided the reorganization would be accepted by parliament and thus become inescapable.

108. The plans for this reorganization were finalised in 1984. The realization of the plans took partly place only in 1985 when the Basic Education Act, according to which pre-primary and primary education were merged in one type of school, became operative.

109. This reorganization was called the Herstrukturieringsoperatie Scholenbestand Basisonderwijs or H.O.B.

110. The minimum norms for maintaining schools had been increased in 1979 to 125, 100, 75 and 50 for municipalities of different sizes.

111. The Vereniging Besturenraad Protestants-Christelijk Onderwijs (VBPCO) is the organization of schoolboards in the Protestant sector, the Centraal Bureau voor het Katholiek Onderwijs (CEKO) in the Catholic sector, the Verenigde Bijzondere Scholen (VBS) in the neutral private sector, and the Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG) in the public sector.
Before the discussion about quantitative norms started, however, some basic principles were formulated which guaranteed the interest organizations concerned that the status quo of the relation between the private and the public sector would be preserved. The first three of these principles stated that:

- the reorganization would take into account the constitutional position of both public and private education,
- the distribution of the schools would not be disturbed, neither as far as the location was concerned nor as far as the ideological orientation of the schools was concerned,
- in principle the same reorganization rules would apply for the public and the private sectors.\(^{112}\)

Thus right from the beginning it was made clear that the government did not intend at all to cause major changes in the existing segmented education system and that an intrasectoral approach would be taken to the rationalization of the school system. There was no attempt whatsoever to try and force the interest organizations to merge their schools, and indeed no such mergers took place. The reorganization did not yield any oecumenical schools or schools in which Christians and non-Christians worked together. In the 1970s these types of schools, which were an expression of the desegmentation of society, had enjoyed a certain popularity. The results of the reorganization showed that the desegmentation of the education system, as far as the suppliers, i.e. the organizations of schoolboards, had an influence on it, did not develop any further. On the contrary, the fact that the wish of the orthodox Protestants to be treated separately from the Protestants was respected confirmed the basic principles of the existing system.

The interest organizations were involved in formulating the rules regulating the reorganization and they will certainly have tried, with varying degrees of success, to influence this process to the benefit of their own sectors. The special norms for isolated settlements within a municipality are an example of this. It was mainly the public and the Protestant sectors which benefitted from this special norm because most of the isolated village schools outside North Brabant and Limburg belonged to these sectors. However, for the old residential areas in the cities, where many Catholic schools were in a difficult position, no special rules were drawn up.

The interest organizations did not only exert influence on the content of the rules of the reorganizations but also on its procedures. At the explicit request of the CERK and the VBPOO, for example, an interim evaluation was introduced which would make it possible to investigate whether the public and the private sector had been equally treated during the second round when the requests for maintaining more schools than planned in the first round had been examined. In case the public sector

seemed to profit more than the private sectors measures would be taken to readjust this situation.

Table 5.15 Results of the reorganization of 1983-1985 in terms of the schools that were closed, by sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sector</th>
<th>closed in first round for requests</th>
<th>closed in second round for maintaining</th>
<th>total number closed 1983</th>
<th>share in round of total number closed 1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>public</td>
<td>132 (40.1%)</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>38 (50.7%)</td>
<td>170 (42.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cath.</td>
<td>91 (28.2%)</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>12 (16.0%)</td>
<td>103 (25.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prot.</td>
<td>98 (30.4%)</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>24 (32.0%)</td>
<td>122 (30.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutr. pr</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1 (1.3%)</td>
<td>2 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.15 shows that the public sector, which had until 1983 benefitted the most from the planning policy towards small schools, was now hit hardest. The percentage of public schools closed was higher than its share of the total number of schools. As far as the Protestant sector was concerned the relative number of schools that disappeared more or less equalled the share of this sector in the total number of schools. Of the three major sectors the Catholic sector did not only lose the least in absolute terms but its loss was also limited compared to its overall share.

In the light of the different policies of the Protestant and the Catholic sector, however, the difference in the loss of these two sectors was rather modest, particularly in the first round. The Catholic sector, hierarchically organized and centrally managed, provided each schoolboard with the most recent prognosis about the evolution of the number of pupils and advised on the policy to follow in drawing up the reorganization plan, whereas the Protestant sector, which had always left more room for the schoolboards to operate as they thought fit, only supported and advised schoolboards of individual schools upon request. The thorough preparation of the reorganization by the Catholics contrasted with their approach to problems of rationalization in the preceding period when the Catholic sector lost more than the other sectors (see table 5.11).

The difference in approach between the Protestant and the Catholic sector had slightly more effect in the second round, when 32% of the closing schools belonged to the Protestant sector and 16% to the Catholic sector. The public sector was losing far more and did even worse than in the first round. The weak performance of the public sector could, however, not only be attributed to the relative advantage this sector had before the reorganization started because of the policy towards small rural schools. It was probably also due to the fact that the VNG, being the general interest organization of the municipalities, did not

have the same interest in preserving as many schools as possible like the Catholic and Protestant organizations of schoolboards did and therefore acted less well as a pressure group.114

114. In general the VNG has considerable power as interest organization of the municipal governments. In the educational field, however, its position is logically less strong than that of the specialized education interest organizations of the Catholics and Protestants. On other occasions, e.g. in the CCOO, the interests of the public sector are defended by the CBOO, the educational interest organization of the public education sector. In the consultations about the reorganization of 1983-1985 only the organizations of schoolboards were involved, however.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

We started our study by discussing general theories of verzuiling, and by describing the national socio-political environment in which verzuiling of the education system occurred. Moreover we pictured the international context of this phenomenon. These discussions provided a theoretical and empirical framework for the analysis of the rise and the partial decline of verzuiling in the primary education system. In this concluding chapter we will reflect on the wider implications of the outcomes of our analysis by trying to relate them to the general frameworks set out in the chapters one and two.

In the initial chapters we were strongly concerned with the question of definition of the concepts of verzuiling and ontzuiling: what were their main characteristics, and were the two processes comparable? Because of the important function of the primary education system as an agent of socialization, and resulting from this its high sensitivity to issues of ideology, the study of the evolution of this system appeared an appropriate way to approach the processes of verzuiling and ontzuiling. In the provisional definitions of section 1.1 verzuiling and ontzuiling were presented as reversed movements, verzuiling being the mobilization of religiously based subcultures and their incorporation into integrated complexes of organizations and ontzuiling the dissolution of these complexes of organizations and the withering away of the subcultures. Close examination of the theoretical and empirical work of other scholars resulted in a refinement of these definitions. In figure 2.1 we schematically presented the idea that verzuiling generally was a process of organizational segmentation in a culturally already divided society, whereas ontzuiling started as a cultural process which only in subsequent stages resulted in a crumbling of the traditional social structures. The evolution of denominational education confirmed this sequence within the two processes, even though the developments in this sector deviated somewhat from those in other sectors. Verzuiling of the primary education system meant capturing a public that was already largely organized in an ideologically stable environment. Although fragmentation of the Protestant world still continued and the socialist ideology only became a social force of some importance at the end of the nineteenth century the subcultures which corresponded with the three sectors developing in the education
system were on the whole clearly established ideological currents with more or less fixed social boundaries: Catholicism, Protestantism and anti-confessionalism as an element of Liberalism and, later, Socialism. The potential following of a segmental organization was there, it only had to be mobilised and organized. In doing so the Catholic and Protestant agents of verzuiling had to face the fact that their publics were already provided for as far as the cognitive functions of primary education were concerned, in that all children had access to public education and the vast majority went there. In order to successfully compete with the existing facilities they had to emphasise the ideological function of primary education, its importance for strengthening the children's faith and the ties with the church community to which they belonged. In other words, they had to adapt the functionality of primary education in such a way that it contributed to the aim of creating closely knit communities of Catholics or Protestants which only participated in Catholic or Protestant organizations. In chapter 4 we have seen that for several reasons among the Catholics the national and local elites concerned with the build-up of verzuiling needed more powerful means to convince people of the importance of denominational education than was necessary for the Protestant elite.

A study of the developments in the primary education system also makes clear that the social structure which evolved in the second half of the last century and the beginning of the twentieth century resulted from the dynamics of the whole complex of the ideological oppositions and should not be reduced to only one of them, e.g. the opposition between the Socialists on the one side and the confessional bourgeoisie on the other. Stuurman's emphasis on verzuiling as the answer of the conservative confessional elite to the rise of Socialism as a social and political force is too limited. Verzuiling started in the primary education system as an attempt of orthodox Protestant groups to withstand the rationalization of society and the modernization of the State, as pursued in the ideas and proposals of the radical liberals. Until 1857 the age-old opposition between Catholics and Protestants also played a part in the struggle for Protestant education. Whereas the latter opposition was accommodated at the national level by the formation of the first coalition cabinet in 1889, new tensions arose at the end of the nineteenth century as a result of the emergence of the Socialist movement.\(^1\) The process of verzuiling, that is the formation of segmental organizations, had already become so strong that the Socialist movement was immediately incorporated into this dynamic. The anti-confessional element in the Socialist ideology gave an important impetus to the development of the ‘anti-thesis’, the idea of the opposition between confessional

\(^1\) At the local level, however, the opposition between Protestants and Catholics continued determining the dynamics of organization formation.
and anti-confessional forces as the principal opposition in society. As Stuurman pointed out this opposition was an important structuring force particularly in the field of labour relations and in the formation of the party system. In the education system, however, it was included in the existing oppositions. The public school became the school of both the Liberals and the Socialists be it that the reasons behind this support were very different. The intraprottestant conflicts which developed in some regions during the same period, however, intensified the process of organizational fragmentation in the education sector and in the party system but did not influence the formation of labour organizations. The initial struggle of orthodox protestant groups against growing rationalist tendencies among the Dutch Reformed elite and the intraprottestant conflicts of the end of the last century clearly show that verzuiling should not only be perceived in social but also in religious terms.

The existence of clearly defined ideologies with a more or less stable following was only one aspect of the environment in which the structure of verzuiling evolved. The second aspect was that the elites of the several ideological currents managed to secure an expansion of the resources, money and organizational capacity, needed to do so. Without the gradual expansion of the State financing of denominational education the rate of participation in denominational education would have increased at a much slower pace. The question can also be raised whether verzuiling would have had a similar lasting influence in the social structure without these subsidies. Surveys held during the 1960s and 1970s, when the old ideologies lost influence, have shown that the mere fact of the general presence of denominational schools exerted a strong influence on the actual attendance in such schools. Whether the denominational sector would have succeeded in maintaining its position without being financed by the State can be strongly doubted. The same factor has played a part in the verzuiling of the health and the welfare sectors and the development of the mass media organizations. On the other hand it is likely that a certain degree of private financing would have strengthened the mobilization capacity of these sectors, hence that 100% financing by the state also had contraproductive effects.

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2 Much depends, however, on the direction in which the education system would have developed. If education would have been left entirely to the forces of the private market the Catholic and Protestant might have succeeded in making denominational education attractive for ideological reasons only. More plausible would have been the evolution of an education system in which privately financed denominational education had to compete with State financed neutral education, in which case the chances of success of the Catholic and Protestant elites' strategy would have been less certain.
The context of the process of ontzuing was a completely different one. Ontzuing occurred when the publics of the several ideological segments of the population had started to drift because the old ideologies did no longer have the same appeal in the rapidly changing society of the post-World War Two period as they had in the relatively stable society of the previous era. There was an overall decline in church adherence and in religious orthodoxy. Although this tendency was not entirely new – secularization tendencies had existed since the end of the last century - the scale at which it occurred from the end of the 1950s was unprecedented. The effects of the loss of functionality of denominational organizations on the verzuiling of the social structure were not felt, however, until only ten years later. They resulted in a separation of ideological and functional roles and the development of more specialised structures. The reorganization of the party system, the trade-unions, the mass media, the health system and the welfare system implied the disappearance of many denominational organizations. Social processes like professionalization also contributed to these changes. The process of ontzuing thus started as a cultural movement which destabilised the ideological system, and affected the social structure as a result of this.

In contrast to the events in the sectors mentioned above the cultural part of the process of ontzuing had relatively little impact on the structure of the primary education system until recently. Two factors accounted for this. First the Catholic and Protestant schools succeeded in adapting to the changing social demand for education, which put more emphasis on other qualities than the ideological orientation of a school and shifted from a preference for strictly defined denominational education to a preference for interconfessional or general Christian education. Just as in the political system, where the Christian Democratic party evolved as a programme party in the centre of the political spectrum with a general Christian ideological basis, the educational programme of a school became more central to the choice of a school than its Catholic or Protestant orientation and as far as the ideological basis of educational facilities remained important, its character became less outspoken. Moreover, many people who no longer maintained any relation with the church continued to appreciate a Christian education for their children, probably more out of a sense of tradition than out of a religious motive. Second the vested power of the educational interest organizations acted as a barrier in defense of a maximal number of denominational schools. Third external factors such as the necessity to expand the scale of educational facilities in order to rationalise and professionalize the school system did not play a part at the level of primary education system in the 1960s and 1970s.

From the beginning of the 1980s, however, the primary education system experienced the same problems as other sectors had faced at an earlier moment. The decline of religious ideologies finally reached the education system. This factor, together with the decline of the number of pupils, made a
rationalization of the primary education system particularly urgent. Hence, contrary to verzuiling, the process of ontzuiling of the primary education system took (and still takes) place in an environment in which ideological preferences were not longer fixed and the available financial resources were declining. The necessity to rationalize contributed strongly to the decline of the structural segmentation which was initiated by the declining orthodoxy and secularization of the population, in sectors like the health sector and the mass media sector, but whether we may expect the same to happen in the primary education system can be doubted. At least during the rationalization of 1983-1985 all parties succeeded in maintaining their relative position. As far as a decline of the denominational sector has taken place it seems to have occurred as a result of a weakening of ideological preferences more than as enforced by the necessity to rationalize the school system.

Figure 6.1 Stages of verzuiling 1870-1984*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>strong ideological preferences</th>
<th>weakening ideological preferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>growth of the available resources</td>
<td>I 1870-1922 1945-1960 structural segmentation increases to a high, stable level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decline of the available resources</td>
<td>II 1922-1937 level of segmentation remains high, but conflict of interests becomes more intense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The years between 1937 and 1945 are excluded because of the many intervening factors in this period.

In figure 6.1 the stages of structural verzuiling and ontzuiling during the 1870-1984 period are identified on the basis of the two characteristics discussed before. It is to be noted that the growth and decline of the number of pupils is not included in this typology. The years between 1870 and 1960, with the exception of the 1925-1935 period were the years during which verzuiling of the primary education system intensified because ideological preferences were to a large extent strong and there
was no shortage of funds to develop a multiple education system. The budgetary measures taken between 1925 and 1935 did not decrease the level of verzuiling, since the level of ideological attachment remained high but caused considerable tension at the political level between the advocates of public education on the one side and advocates of denominational education on the other side. The 1960-1975 period was characterised by a weakening influence of the traditional ideologies. Verzuiling of the education system continued existing, however. The main reason for this was that the educational interest organization succeeded in maintaining the number of denominational schools due to the fact that resources were still readily available. The financial situation of the education system changed at the end of the 1970s because of the growing budgetary deficit. This has not yet forced the various parties to cooperate but might do so in the future. The declining interest of the public in denominational education has, however, started to erode the position of this sector.

The fact that a coalition was formed between the Protestants and the Catholics in 1889 was of enormous importance for the further development of verzuiling of the education system. The majority strategy of the confessional forces made it possible that the concept of a multiple education system became financially supported by the State and the pacification politics of 1917 provided an opportunity to make state financing of denominational primary education constitutional and complete. Without these developments denominational education would most likely have had a much less prominent position in the primary education system than it has now. It is an interesting question whether the confessional forces in other countries in which a separation of State and Church existed but a state financed denominational education developed, like Belgium and France, pursued a similar strategy, and if so, whether this resulted in complete state financing of denominational education.

In Belgium, which is an overwhelmingly Catholic country, the Catholic party obtained the majority in 1884, a few years after the opposition of the Catholics against the education proposals of the Liberals failed. By using considerable pressure the Belgian episcopate had succeeded in raising the number of children attending private elementary schools from 13% in 1879 to 61% in 1880. After the Catholic victory the position of the

3. In the period 1870-1910 the ideological preferences were strong but still to a certain extent fluid, as the emergence of the Orthodox Reformed denominations and the growth of the Socialist movement showed. However, the basic differentiation of the education system had already come into existence in 1870.

4. The episcopate launched a very successful campaign to convert as many as possible municipal schools in Catholic schools during the summer break of 1879. The percentage of Catholic schools increased at one time from 13 to 61. J. Billiet,
Catholic schools was strengthened. In 1895 partial state financing was made possible for all types of private schools.\(^5\) The demand for state financing did not become strong until just before the First World War when proposals were launched to abolish child labour and to make elementary education compulsory and free. This was rather late as compared to the situation in the Netherlands where the demand for state-financing of denominational education had been high on the political agenda since the 1880s. Up to that time, however, the conservative Catholics in Belgium had been against compulsory and free primary education and therefore had considered the question of state financing irrelevant. Another reason for the difference between the Netherlands and Belgium was that in the latter country private education was predominantly Catholic and that Catholic schools were cheaper than Protestant schools because of the cheap labour provided by congregations, whereas in the former country an important part of the schools was Protestant. The Loi Poullet of 1914, which introduced compulsory school attendance and increased state financing of private schools, was not implemented, however, until after the war. Because of the introduction of universal male suffrage and proportional representation in 1919 the Catholic Party lost its majority and thus had to accept the compromises of coalition governments. In the conciliatory mood of the years just after the war, however, state financing of private primary education appeared to be acceptable to both Liberals and Socialists. In the subsequent period the system of state financing was slowly extended.\(^6\) This brief account of the developments in Belgium makes clear that the supremacy of the Catholic party between 1884-1914 substantially contributed to the consolidation of the Catholic education system. Like in the Netherlands the eventual solution to the issue of state-financing of private education was reached in a period of national reconciliation. A notable difference was that in the Netherlands the confessional forces succeeded in laying the principle of state-financing of private education down in the constitution, whereas in Belgium the right to state-financing was settled in a number of laws and royal decrees.\(^7\) This difference

Secularisering en verzuing in het onderwijs, 1977, p.16.

\(^5\) From 1884, however, private schools had been entitled to subsidies from the local governments, the communes, which were made fully responsible for education as part of the Catholics' decentralization policy.

\(^6\) The development of the Belgian education system is described extensively by V. Mallinson in Power and Politics in Belgian Education, 1963.

\(^7\) Article 17 of the Belgian constitution states that education is free, that any preventive measures for exerting this freedom are forbidden, and that public education is paid for by
has not affected the stability of the financial support of primary education by the state, but probably contributed to the emergence of the second education conflict in Belgium during the 1945-1958 period about the issue of state-financing of private secondary schools.

The situation of private primary education in France, also a Catholic country, was very different but equally showed that major improvements were only made in periods in which the pro-Catholic political parties were in power. Private education was state-aided for the first time during the Pétain regime of the war period. Before the Second World War private education had been in a rather difficult position, not only because it had to be financed from private sources, but also because it had been strongly opposed by the Republicans during the periods they were in power. The law of 1905 on the separation of church and state was followed by a period of repression of Catholic education and the same happened during the 1920s.

In 1945 state-aid of the private sector, which is numerically much less important than in Belgium and the Netherlands, was abolished under pressure of the left. Moreover the advocates of private education failed to get the principle of freedom of education included in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic in 1946. In the subsequent years the protest of the Associations de Parents d’Elèves (Associations of pupils’ parents) against this state of affairs grew stronger since it became more and more difficult to maintain private schools, due to the growing professionalisation of education and the concomitant shift from clerical to lay teachers. In 1959, upon the establishment of the Fifth Republic, the Loi Debré offered private schools the possibility of entering into a contract with the state. Private schools with a contract would be entitled to state-aid, but would have to allow control by the state in exchange. The Loi Debré brought the rapid decline of the private sector which had occurred in the 1950s to a halt. Although this law was meant to offer a temporary solution it was in fact reinforced by the Loi Guenneur of 1977 which even improved the

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8. The decision to subsidize private schools was taken in November 1941. After the liberation in 1944 the Gaullist Minister of National Education decided to maintain the subsidization system but the leftist parties forced him in 1945 to abolish the system. E. Plenel, L’Etat et l’école en France, 1985, pp.365-366.

9. During the first half of the twentieth century the number of children attending private primary education fluctuated around 20%. In the 1980s the share of private education was stable at 15-16%.
financial situation the private sector. Like in Belgium the decisions about state-financing of private schools were not part of the constitution but only laid down in education laws. In the case of France this clearly means that the position of private education is vulnerable to political change, as was demonstrated by the attempt of the Socialist Minister of Education Savary (1981-1984) to increase state control of private schools that received aid from the public purse.

Summarizing we can say that, as was to be expected, the strength of the confessional political parties has had a strong influence on the position of private, denominational education and on the moment at which freedom of education and state financing of the private sector got a legal status. The fact that the Protestant and Catholic political elites in the Netherlands realised at such an early moment that they would only reach their aims if they cooperated, and that this confessional coalition succeeded in retaining the political majority from 1917 until 1963 was the decisive factor for the unique position of private education in the Netherlands.10

Two other issues will be briefly discussed here: first the differences in the processes of verzuziling and ontzuiling between the denominations and second the spatial patterns of verzuziling and ontzuiling.

The most remarkable difference between verzuziling and ontzuiling of the orthodox Protestants and the Catholics is that verzuziling started among the orthodox Protestants and remained very strong even during the era of declining orthodoxy and secularization, whereas verzuziling of the Catholic world began much later and rapidly lost intensity after 1965. During the 1950s, when the process of verzuziling reached its heigth it was equally strong among the two major denominations. In this study this variation has been explained by the differences in the organization of the Catholic Church and the Protestant churches, and the concomitant difference in the relation between the church organization and the community of believers.

The Catholic church is in two ways a very hierarchically organized church. In the first place this means that a vertical line of command exists between Rome and the national churches and between the national level and the levels of the diocese and the parish. Very little room existed for independent action or diverging interpretations. The hierarchical character of the church is, however, also reflected in the relation between the clergy on the one hand and lay Catholics on the other hand. Until very recently lay Catholics only participated in church life in subordinate roles and their participation is still limited. Their role was that of an obedient and docile public which was not supposed to think for itself. As long as they followed the church

10 The co-operation of Catholics and Protestants at the national level was all the more remarkable because it was accompanied by increasing segmentation at the subnational level.
doctrines and received the sacraments they were 'good Catholics'.
As a consequence of this relation the lower clergy exerted
a great influence on the daily life of the Catholic population.
The importance of this influence for the rise of Catholic
organizations has been demonstrated by several authors. It has
also been made clear that the activities of the lower clergy
initially met with much indifference of the lay Catholics and, in
some regions, with outright opposition. In the latter situation
denying people the sacraments, or threatening to do so, appeared
to be an effective means to enforce discipline. Given that
mobilization of the Catholic population was predominantly top-
down the diffusion of the process of verzuiling depended very
much on the attitude of the Catholic clergy towards
denominational education and the moment they began to perceive
denominational schools as an urgent need. Because of historical
and geographical factors, the education issue started as a
conflict between orthodox and latitudinarian Protestants and was
less urgent in the homogeneous Catholic areas. In these areas
denominational schools, particularly those for boys, only
appeared in large numbers after denominational education had
become popular among the orthodox Protestants.

The Protestant churches were much less hierarchically
organized and this implied that lay people participated to a
large extent in the organization of the church and did much
pastoral work. The Protestant faith also put much more emphasis
on individual responsibility and on the personal relation of the
individual with God. Hence when the demand for denominational
education began to diffuse it often emanated from very strong
personal motivations, a personally felt responsibility for
preserving the orthodox Protestant character of education. Local
and national leadership of course played an important role in
organizing the orthodox Protestant population, but nevertheless
verzuiling of the orthodox Protestants can be considered as
mainly a process of bottom-up mobilization.

The same difference between the Catholic and the Protestant
churches determined the variation in the process of ontzuiling.
When the leaders of the Catholic church became more open to
criticism of their leadership, and began to seek less rigid
interpretations of the bible and the church doctrine this caused
a certain confusion among the ordinary Catholics, who were not
used to decide for themselves in matters of the faith or in other
domains. For many years they had been told to vote for the
Catholic party, for example, and then they were suddenly held
themselves responsible for the choice between a Catholic,
Socialist or Liberal vote. Once control from above weakened,
however, many Catholics appeared to be less attached to Catholic
organizations than one would have thought on the basis of their
participation in the previous period and many Catholic
organizations rapidly fell apart. The rapid social changes of the
post-war society, which had exposed them to many new ideas,
contributed to this process. Of course the last factor also
worked among the orthodox Protestants. Nevertheless they showed
much more resistance to ontzuiling tendencies than the Catholics.
due to their more personal beliefs. Because of the various reasons discussed in chapter 5 it took a decade before the structural effects of the process of ongrowing became visible but once this happened the rate of change was indeed much faster in the Catholic education sector than in the Protestant one.

A main finding with regard to the spatial pattern of ongrowing was that it started more or less simultaneously in several areas and that the phenomenon of denominational education rapidly spread through the entire Netherlands. Within a period of thirty years (1850-1880) the whole country except for a few areas was covered with denominational schools. This shows that in the Netherlands as early as the middle of the nineteenth century a high level of national integration, characterised by the presence of relatively dense network of communication, existed, at least at the level of the local elites. The exchange of information was an important stimulus for the diffusion of ongrowing among the local leaders. At the level of ordinary people the factor information was of much less importance. The spatial diffusion of the participation in denominational education was a much slower process, in which ideological conflict played a crucial role. The most important factor determining regional variation in the intensity of the process of ongrowing was the presence or absence of socio-religious conflicts around the issue of the ideological orientation of education. In figure 6.2 the working of this factor has been schematically summarized.

The concentration of the Catholics in the religiously homogeneous, southern, part of the country entailed that the expansion of denominational education increased relatively slowly. Variation was widest around the turn of the century, when in some areas participation in Catholic and Protestant education was still very low whereas in other areas the participation rate was almost 100%. After 1920 the situation in the various regions (and sectors) gradually converged, due to state-financing of denominational education and strong pressure from the ecclesiastical authorities, for instance in Limburg. By 1975 more than 90% of the Catholic and orthodox Protestant children attended private schools.
Figure 6.2 Attitude in the school conflict in various regions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Opposition to neutral education</th>
<th>Public school de-facto Prot./ Cath.</th>
<th>Preference for denominational education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiously homogeneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lat. Prot. Cath.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiously heterogeneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lat. Prot. Cath.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adaptation of figure by A.A. de Bruin, 1976, p.261.

The diffusion of the process of verzuiling thus reflected the religious relations and in the resulting situation the main dividing line was that between orthodox believers on the one hand and the latitudinarian and secularized part of the population on the other hand.  

The process of ontzuiling in the education sector which currently takes place has the following characteristics. Firstly, the degree of structural desegmentation still lags behind the degree of secularization. One of the reasons for the slow diffusion of ontzuiling is that, just as in the case of

11. In chapter 4 the adjective liberal was used for the Catholics in North Brabant and Limburg which opposed the ultramontanist tendencies. For the sake of simplicity the adjective latitudinarian is used in this figure.

12. There were probably very few latitudinarian Catholics in religiously heterogeneous areas. They at least did not act as a distinct category.

13. This division is more true for the Protestant than for the Catholic part of the population because in the Catholic world the latitudinarian churchmembers also participated in segmented organizations, due to the greater discipline existing in the Catholic Church.
verzuiling, education is already provided to all children. 'New' organizations thus have to compete with the existing ones which as far as their technical function is concerned are usually satisfactory. The second similarity between the processes of verzuiling and ontzuiling is that the build-up of public education organization occurs to a certain extent as a result of imitative behaviour, for example where it concerns the demand for a survey among parents about the desired type of education. Thirdly the level of ontzuiling in the education sector is influenced by the degree of political support of public education at the local level. Unfortunately the influence of this variable could not be tested for the process of verzuiling due to lack of data. Fourthly the desegmentation of the education system has been much more uniform spatially than the process of growing segmentation, although differences between the most urbanized areas and the countryside do exist. As far as a regional component exists it is fully determined by the different rates of ontzuiling of the several denominations and the geographical distribution of these denominational groups across the country. Religious opposition does not play a role since ontzuiling is basically a process of weakening ideological preferences. Variation is due to the internal characteristics of the Catholic and orthodox Protestant communities: the greater the orthodoxy, the higher the cohesion, the stronger the wish to remain a distinct group in society and the greater value attached to the 'own' organizations.
**GLOSSARY**

**Churches/denominations**

- Nederlands Hervormd Kerk
  - comprising four strands:
    - Confessionele Vereeniging
    - Gereformeerde Bond
    - Vereeniging van Vrijzinnig Hervormden
    - Ethische Vereeniging

- Gereformeerde Kerk
- Christelijk Gereformeerde Kerk
- Gereformeerde Gemeenten
- Gereformeerde Kerk Vrijgemaakt

*Orthodox Reformed Church*

*Dutch Reformed Church*

*Christian Orthodox Reformed Church*

*Free Orthodox Reformed Church*

**Education organizations**

- Anti Schoolwet Verbond
- Nederlandschen Rooms Katholieke Schoolraad (NKSR)
- Rooms Katholiek Centraal Bureau voor Onderwijs (RKCBO)
- Schoolraad voor Scholen met de Bijbel
  - comprising:
    - Vereeniging voor Christelijk Nationaal Schoolonderwijs
    - Unie School en Evangelie
    - Vereeniging voor Christelijk Volksunderwijs
    - Vereeniging voor Gereformeerd Schoolonderwijs
    - Gereformeerde Schoolverband

- Vereeniging Bestuursraad Protestants Christelijk Onderwijs (VBPO)
- Friesche Vereniging tot bevordering van Volksonderwijs

-Schoolraad
- Centraal Comite voor Overleg over Onderwijs (CCDO)
- Verenigde Bijzondere Scholen

- Vereeniging voor Openbaar Onderwijs
- Vereeniging tot Bevordering van Schoolonderwijs op Gereformeerde
Political parties

- Anti Revoluticnaire Partij (ARP) - Anti Revolutionary Party
- Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP) - Catholic party
- Christelijk Historische Unie (CHU) - Christian Democratic party
- Christen Democratisch Appel (CDA) - Social Democratic party
- Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) - Orthodox Catholic party
- Rooms Katholieke Partij Nederland (RKPN) - Liberal party
- Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)

Other organizations

- Hoge Raad van de Arbeid - High Council of Labour
- Sociaal-Economische Raad (SER) - Social and Economic Council
- Stichting van de Arbeid - Foundation of Labour
- Nederlands Vakverbond (NVV) - Socialist Trade Union Federation
- Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond (NKV) - Netherlands Catholic Trade Union Federation
- Rooms Katholiek Werklieden Verbond - Communist Trade Union Federation
- Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging (KAB) - Association of Dutch Municipalities
- Eenheids Vak Centrale (EVC)
- Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG)
## Annex 1

**Absolute and relative number of public and private schools 1870-1984**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>total number</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>3727</td>
<td>2608 (70.0)</td>
<td>260 (7.0)</td>
<td>279 (7.5)</td>
<td>404 (10.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>3817</td>
<td>2688 (70.4)</td>
<td>270 (7.1)</td>
<td>332 (8.7)</td>
<td>392 (10.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3880</td>
<td>2771 (71.4)</td>
<td>333 (8.6)</td>
<td>360 (9.3)</td>
<td>307 (7.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>4097</td>
<td>2923 (71.3)</td>
<td>413 (10.1)</td>
<td>442 (10.8)</td>
<td>254 (6.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>4258</td>
<td>2959 (69.5)</td>
<td>486 (11.4)</td>
<td>517 (12.1)</td>
<td>249 (5.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>4442</td>
<td>3052 (68.7)</td>
<td>533 (12.0)</td>
<td>559 (12.6)</td>
<td>270 (6.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>4607</td>
<td>3127 (67.9)</td>
<td>645 (14.0)</td>
<td>616 (13.4)</td>
<td>204 (4.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>4942</td>
<td>3255 (65.9)</td>
<td>788 (15.9)</td>
<td>742 (15.0)</td>
<td>155 (3.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>5305</td>
<td>3289 (62.0)</td>
<td>979 (18.5)</td>
<td>898 (16.9)</td>
<td>139 (2.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>5671</td>
<td>3351 (59.1)</td>
<td>1123 (19.8)</td>
<td>1065 (18.8)</td>
<td>132 (2.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>5947</td>
<td>3437 (57.8)</td>
<td>1186 (19.9)</td>
<td>1178 (19.8)</td>
<td>146 (2.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7352</td>
<td>3751 (51.0)</td>
<td>1680 (22.9)</td>
<td>1796 (24.4)</td>
<td>125 (1.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>7439</td>
<td>3325 (44.7)</td>
<td>1805 (24.3)</td>
<td>2175 (29.2)</td>
<td>134 (1.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>7175</td>
<td>2738 (38.2)</td>
<td>1911 (26.6)</td>
<td>2383 (33.2)</td>
<td>143 (2.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>6991</td>
<td>2506 (35.8)</td>
<td>1916 (27.4)</td>
<td>2425 (34.7)</td>
<td>144 (2.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>7029</td>
<td>2423 (34.5)</td>
<td>1911 (27.2)</td>
<td>2568 (36.5)</td>
<td>127 (1.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>7117</td>
<td>2394 (33.6)</td>
<td>1964 (27.6)</td>
<td>2623 (36.9)</td>
<td>136 (1.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>7597</td>
<td>2496 (32.9)</td>
<td>2141 (28.2)</td>
<td>2816 (37.1)</td>
<td>144 (1.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7672</td>
<td>2485 (32.4)</td>
<td>2227 (29.0)</td>
<td>2814 (36.7)</td>
<td>146 (1.9)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>7923</td>
<td>2498 (31.5)</td>
<td>2365 (29.8)</td>
<td>2905 (37.0)</td>
<td>155 (2.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8225</td>
<td>2670 (32.5)</td>
<td>2501 (30.4)</td>
<td>2891 (35.1)</td>
<td>163 (2.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8568</td>
<td>2881 (34.0)</td>
<td>2658 (31.3)</td>
<td>2837 (33.4)</td>
<td>192 (2.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8727</td>
<td>3027 (34.7)</td>
<td>2706 (31.0)</td>
<td>2746 (31.5)</td>
<td>248 (2.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>8454</td>
<td>2959 (35.0)</td>
<td>2621 (31.0)</td>
<td>2536 (30.0)</td>
<td>338 (4.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 1870-1955: Onderwijsverslagen

* 1870-1925 concerns ordinary elementary education, continued ordinary elementary education and advanced elementary education; 1930-1955 concerns ordinary elementary education and continued ordinary elementary education; 1960-1984 concerns ordinary elementary education.

1) Subsidized private education is not included.
## Annex 2

### Relative number of pupils in primary education by sector 1870-1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Public (%)</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>466,779</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>509,690</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>540,995</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>593,656</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>642,978</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>690,566</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>739,810</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>845,096</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>904,142</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>981,428</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1,031,694</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1,077,952</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,182,528</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
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<td>25.7</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>1938</td>
<td>1,143,114</td>
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<td>26.0</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>27.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
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<td>27.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,451,289</td>
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<td>27.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>27.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>27.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,453,467</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
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<td>31.7</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>37.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,094,980</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
- 1870-1955: Onderwijsverslagen
- 1960-1984: CBS, Statistiek van het gewoon lager onderwijs/basisonderwijs

1) The relative number of pupils in Protestant, Catholic and other neutral education has been determined on the basis of the relative number of schools in each sector until 1925.  
1870-1925 concerns ordinary elementary education, continued ordinary elementary education and advanced elementary education;  
1930-1955 concerns ordinary elementary education and continued ordinary elementary education; 1960-1984 concerns ordinary elementary education. The categories '% pupils in Catholic schools' and '% pupils in Protestant schools' do not include schools owned by one person and the category '% pupils in other private schools' does not include subsidized private education, therefore the percentages do not add up to 100 until 1910.
Annex 3

Growth or decline of percentage of pupils attending public education between 1950 and 1960 in 20 municipalities of different size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>municipality</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>(b-a)</th>
<th>(c-b)</th>
<th>nr of inh. in 1947</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waddinxveen</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maassluis</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>10506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldebroek</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>11296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wierden</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>14750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tietjerksteradeel</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>18613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barneveld</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>19064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sittard</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>19473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middelburg</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>20505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soest</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>21548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enschede</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>26539</td>
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<td>Bussum</td>
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<td>21.9</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>33432</td>
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<tr>
<td>Velsen</td>
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<td>39.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Vlaardingen</td>
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<td>33.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<td>43340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmen</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Amersfoort</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>55996</td>
</tr>
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<td>Delft</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>62018</td>
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<td>Schiedam</td>
<td>33.5</td>
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<td>Leiden</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
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<td>Arnhem</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>97350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>646248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the table are given, by province, the differences between the shares of the 0-20 age-group for various denominations and the shares of the same denominations in the population as a whole. The figures in the first column concern the Dutch Reformed denomination. In case the figure is positive it means that the proportion of Dutch Reformed people in the entire population is somewhat larger than the share of Dutch Reformed in the 0-20 age-group. Reversely, in case the figures are negative it means that the proportion of Dutch Reformed in the population as a whole is smaller than 0-20 age-group in the Dutch Reformed church. The second, third and fourth columns give the figures for the Orthodox Reformed Church, the Catholic Church and the people without religious affiliation. The figures for one province in a particular year do not necessarily equal 0 since the group of people belonging to various smaller denominations has been excluded.

The conclusion is that the differences between the two percentages is in most cases small. The majority of the values is less than 1%, either positive or negative. The values exceeding 1% do not show a large deviation, however. The greatest positive value is 4% and the greatest negative value -5%. Differences of more than 1% most frequently occurred for the Dutch Reformed denomination. The continuous decline of the Dutch Reformed Church in the 1900-1930 period was not only due to secularization among the younger generations, but also to the substantially lower birth-rate among the Dutch Reformed. The category of non-religiously affiliated people also had a great number of values exceeding 1%. Most of these values were positive, implying a gradual increase of the secularized part of the population.

If we look at the data by province the following is noted. High, positive or negative, values are concentrated in three provinces, Groningen, Friesland and North Holland. The pattern of religious affiliation considerably changed in these provinces in the 1900-1930 period and this was expressed in a gradual change of the pattern of religious affiliation among the younger age-categories. North Brabant and Limburg, on the contrary, hardly show differences between the values of the two indicators. The other provinces do show differences between the proportion of the various denominations in the total population and in the 0-20 age-group, but these differences are small.

Finally it is to be noticed that the figures in the table steadily increase over time. In 1930 almost half of the figures is greater than 1%, which indicates that the changes of the pattern of religious affiliation accelerated during this period. All denominations experienced relative expansion or contraction among the younger generation, and this was no longer a regionally concentrated but a general phenomenon.

Given the generally small deviation of the pattern of religious affiliation of the total population from that of the 0-
20 age-group operationalization of the religion variable in the first way does not cause serious errors in the analysis. Only for municipalities in Groningen, Friesland and North Holland, and more in particular for the Dutch Reformed in these provinces it is a factor to keep in mind when trying to explain higher or lower than average levels of verzuilings.

Differences between the shares of various denominations in the 0-20 age-group and in the total population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dutch Reformed</th>
<th>Orthodox Reformed</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>No religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groningen</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friesland</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drente</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1909</td>
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<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overijssel</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelderland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1920</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Holland</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>South Holland</td>
<td>Zeeland</td>
<td>North Brabant</td>
<td>Limburg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1899</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1930</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1930</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<td>-1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-1.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1909</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- = no difference between the two values
The data on the evolution of the public, Protestant and Catholic education sectors for the greater part originate from provincial statistical sources, the Provincial Annual Reports. Only a small part has been collected from municipal statistical sources, the Municipal Annual Reports, as far as these could be consulted in provincial archives. In case of a number of provinces, however, neither the Provincial Annual Report did provide information on education, nor the Municipal Annual Reports had been preserved in provincial archives. Hence for particular provinces and for particular years data were not available. Data concerning North Holland were lacking in the entire period. Apart from this in 1900 no data were available concerning South Holland, in 1920 concerning Limburg, and in 1930 concerning South Holland, Zeeland and Limburg. The data concerning North Brabant consist of an a-selective sample of one fifth of the municipalities.

The regression analyses for the four years 1900, 1910, 1920 and 1930 thus do not include exactly the same (number of) cases. This makes comparison over time somewhat less reliable, in the sense that we compare statistics calculated on different populations. The trends we discover for a certain period might be partly attributed to the fact that the population was not the same in each year. This is possible when the cases for which data are lacking in a particular year are similar as far as their verzuilings behaviour is concerned.
Annex 6 Religious affiliation in the 1980s

The population census taken until 1971 form a consistent source for the study of patterns of religious affiliation at the municipal, provincial and national level. Census data have always been preferred over data of municipal administrations since the first were more up-to-date and more reliable. The registers of the churches are largely based on those of the local administrations and thus suffer from the same shortcomings. Only the Orthodox Reformed Churches keep a fairly accurate register.

Being the most reliable and the most comprehensive source of information on the religious affiliation of the Dutch population, the decision to 'delay' the census planned for 1981 has been a serious disadvantage for researchers, particularly because surveys have pointed out that a rapid transformation of the religious affiliation took place in the 1970s. More confusing than this transformation itself has been that the outcomes of different surveys varied widely. Some researchers found that the trends of the 1960-1970 period continued at the same pace, while according to others the growth and decline of various denominations occurred at an accelerated rate. A systematic comparison of these surveys undertaken by Oudhof and Beets revealed, by means of regression analysis, that the variation in the survey results was best explained by the structure of the

1. In the Netherlands the civil registration contained until recently information about someone's religion. Registration of the religious affiliation was done at the moment of birth and at the moment someone took up residence in another municipality than the municipality of birth. Very few people bothered to change this information when they became member of another church or when they were no longer registered in any church. Another source of inaccuracy in the figures provided by local administrations was that, due to the prior central position of the Dutch Reformed Church, all children born of parents of which one belonged to the Dutch Reformed Church, were registered as belonging to this church, even when parents did not explicitly ask for this.

2. This situation is going to change, however. Within a few years local administrations will no longer register someone's religious affiliation. The churches have therefore started to improve and to computerize their own data files, for which they receive some subsidies from the government. The Orthodox Reformed Church and the Dutch Reformed Church work closely together in this matter.

3. In 1988 it was decided by parliament to abolish the census completely.
question posed to the respondents. The surveys which asked about the religious affiliation of the respondents by means of a two-step question tended to yield much lower shares for the Catholic and Dutch Reformed Churches, and to yield a higher percentage of secularised people than the surveys in which a one-step question was used. Their explanation was that with a one-step question the respondent was given an aid to memory because the main denominations were listed as answer categories, whereas in the case of a two-step question the respondent had to directly answer yes or no. The difference between the outcomes of studies based on a one-step question and of studies based on two-step question would be an indication of the existence of a considerable group of people that is only marginally involved in the churches. This group would be included in surveys with a one-step structured question (see figure 1).

With the help of regression analysis Oudhof and Beets made estimates for 1981, first assuming that a one-step question was asked and second assuming that a two-step question was asked.

Table 1: Estimates of the size of the major denominations in the Netherlands as a whole, 1981, 20-64 age-group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>denomination</th>
<th>one-step question</th>
<th>two-step question</th>
<th>difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>31.8 %</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Reformed</td>
<td>20.8 %</td>
<td>15.1 %</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Reformed</td>
<td>8.7 %</td>
<td>7.3 %</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other denominations</td>
<td>4.7 %</td>
<td>4.1 %</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no religious affiliation</td>
<td>28.2 %</td>
<td>43.7 %</td>
<td>+15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The result of the estimate starting from a two-step question was confirmed by a large scale survey which was held in the same period (during 1982/1983). These are given in table 2.

4. In the regression analysis they used seven explanatory variables, of which the year in which the survey was held and the structure of the question appeared to contribute most to the explanation of the variation in survey outcomes. J. Oudhof and G.C.N. Beets, op. cit.

5. The one-step question asks directly for the denomination to which someone belongs. In the two-step question the respondent is first asked whether he belongs to a denomination and second to which denomination he belongs.

6. This survey involved 20,000 respondents of 16 years and over. All but a few surveys analysed by Oudhof and Beets were based on samples of between 1000 and 2000 respondents.
Figure 1 Size of the group of religious affiliated people in 1981 according to different sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>strong church affiliation</th>
<th>latitudinarian or marginal church members</th>
<th>secular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>two-step survey (1981 Oudhof &amp; Beets)</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one-step survey (1981 Oudhof &amp; Beets)</td>
<td>72.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil or church register</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Diagram with options for religious affiliated and not religious affiliated]
Despite the differences each of these estimates made clear that the developments during the 1971-1981 period were a continuation of those during the 1960-1971 period, whether or not at an accelerated rate. The Dutch Reformed Church continued to lose members and so did the Catholic Church. The Orthodox Reformed Churches remained more or less stable whereas the secular part of the population kept growing.

For the purpose of the regression of education on religion we needed information about the size of each denomination in 1981 at the level of individual municipalities. Sample surveys at the national level thus did not help us any further. We therefore estimated figures at the level of the municipality for 1981 taking the 1971 census figures for the municipalities as our basis. Because we did not want to pretend that by applying complicated arithmetic transformations we could arrive at accurate estimates, we have used a very simple method to estimate the figures for 1981: the difference between the share of each denomination as measured in the census of 1971 and as estimated by Oudhof and Boets for 1981 at the national level, has been added to or detracted from the share of the respective denominations in each municipality.

Table 3 Difference between the census data for 1971 and the estimates for 1981 at the national level.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Census 1971</th>
<th>Estimate 1981</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Reformed</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Reformed</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religious affiliation</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have taken the estimate of Oudhof and Boets in which a one-step question was assumed as my starting point in order to make the estimate for 1981 consistent with the data used in the analysis of the 1900-1930 period, and because the data of the census of 1971, which are the basis of our estimate, were

7. The data in this table concern people of 18 years and over, and therefore differ somewhat from the data presented in table 1.
themselves the result of a one-step question. This choice has
some important consequences for the hypotheses formulated with
regard to the regression results. These have been discussed in
the main text (section 5.3).
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