EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

Department of Political and Social Sciences

CONFLICT, CONSENSUS AND REPRESENTATION:

The Party Groups in the European Parliament

Philomena MURRAY

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the
Degree of Doctor of the European University Institute
Department of Political and Social Sciences
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June 1989

ABSTRACT

The thesis presents an analysis of the transnational political groups of the European Parliament, relating this to theories of political parties, parliaments and representation, while emphasising that existing comparative studies applied to Europe are of limited value in explaining the nature of political organisation at the European level. The thesis postulates that it is essential that the political groups be analysed in terms of the nature of the European Community itself as a fluid polity and illustrates the problems of understanding European Integration as a political process. An analysis of the functions and role of the political groups is carried out and the study concludes that the groups function effectively as organisers of the European Parliament, with integrative and representational functions, but that at this stage of their development they cannot be seen as European parties. The study is based on research and analysis carried out through interviews conducted by the author as an active member of the European University Institute Survey team for the Study of MEPs, and supplemented by interviews with EP and political group officials.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABBREVIATIONS

Agalev	Alternative living (Flemish Party)
ARC	Rainbow group
Cons	Conservative and Unionist Party
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CD	Christian Democrat
CD (Denmark)	Centre Democrats
CDA	(Netherlands) Christian Democratic Union
CDS	(France) Centre of Social Democrats
CDU	(Germany) Christian Democratic Union
CNIP	National Centre of Farmers and the Self-employed
COM	Communist and Allies group
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives of the EC member states
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSU	(Germany) Christian Social Union
CVP	(Flemish) Christian Social Party
DC	(Italy) Christian Democracy
DCF	French Christian Democracy
DP	(Italy) Proletarian Democracy
DP (Luxembourg)	Democratic Party
DUP	(UK) Democratic Unionist Party
Ecolo	Ecology Party
EAEC	European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)

EC	European Community/Communities
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ECU	European Currency Unit
ED	European Democratic group
EDA	European Democratic Alliance (RDE)
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EPEN	(Greece) National Political Union
EPD	European Progressive Democrats
EPQ	European Parliamentary Question
EPP	European People's Party
ESC	Economic and Social Committee
EUI	European University Institute
FF	Fianna Fail Party
FG	Fine Gael Party
FN	National Front
GPA	(Netherlands) Green party
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
Ind	Independent
Ind Sin	(Italy) Independents of the Left
KF	(Denmark) Conservative People's Party
KKE	Greek Communist Party
KKE es	Greek Communist Party (of the interior)
LDR	Liberal and Democratic Reformist group

Lab	Labour
Lib	Liberal
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MRP	(France) Mouvement Républicain Populaire
MSI-DN	Italian Social Movement - National Right
NA	Non-affiliated members
ND	(Greece) New Democracy Party
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PCF	French Communist Party
PCI	Italian Communist Party
PCR	Réunion Communist Party
PCS	(Luxembourg) Christian Social Party
PLI	Italian Liberal Party
POSL	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party
PPR	(Netherlands) Radical Party
PQ	Parliamentary Question
PR	Republican Party
PR (Italy)	Radical Party
PRI	Italian Republican Party
PRL	(Walloon) Party for Reform and Freedom
PS	Parti Socialiste
PSC	(Walloon) Christian Social Party
PSDI	Italian Social Democratic Party
PSP	(Netherlands) Pacifist Socialist Party
PvdA	(Netherlands) Labour Party

PVV	(Flemish) Party for Freedom and Progress
Rad	Radical Party
RPR	Rassemblement pour la République
S	(Denmark) Social Democratic Party
Soc	Socialist
SDLP	(UK) Social Democratic and Labour Party
SEA	Single European Act
SF	(Denmark) Socialist People's Party
SGP	(Netherlands) Calvinist Party
SNP	Scottish National Party
SPD	German Social Democratic Party
SVP	South Tyrol People's Party
TC	Group for Technical Coordination and Defence of Independent Members
UDF	Union for French Democracy
UDR	Union des Democrates pour la République
UNICE	Union of Industries of the European Community
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party
UV-PSdA	Union of the Val d'Aosta - Sardinian Action Party
V	(Denmark) Liberal Party
VAT	Value Added Tax
VU	(Flemish) People's Union
VVD	(Netherlands) People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

Introduction

Conflict, Consensus and Representation in the European Parliament.

The European Parliament as a marginalised parliament

The European Parliament (EP) is not a "real" legislature in the sense used in national political systems or political theory. It does not consist of or relate to an executive body, although it forms part of an established system of institutions where executive functions are exercised on a legal basis. While the direct elections accorded a legitimacy to the EP, its mandate is not clearly defined. The nature of its representative functions has yet to be clarified and the onus lies with the members to express this functiion. The national parliaments and the Council of Ministers are reluctant to increase the Parliament's powers and to fully recognise its electoral legitimacy. In some ways, so too are its electors. This is partly due to the nature of the electoral systems and the variety of constitiuencies represented by the MEPs. Contacts with the national parties are not of a regular nature, and so many party representatives in the EP are isolated from the mainstream of political life in the member state.

The concept of representation is therefore crucial to the understanding of the EP and its members. The problem we face is - Who are the political actors in the European Parliament and what is their representative role? How are opinions and interests articulated in the EP? The Eurobarometer (surveys of public opinion in Europe) indicates that the EP has little or no meaning in the daily lives of the citizens of the European Community (EC). So the EP is, in a sense, alienated from the electors.

This dissertation examines what and whom the EP purports to represent. While by the very nature of its constituent members, the EP represents the views of many national political parties and to a certain extent those of the national government and polity, there is also a certain Europeanisation of the party positions. This can be attributed to the party group. It is also worth noting that the MEPs are to a large degree isolated from the national party, the national parliament and the mainstream of national politics. The thesis thus examines whether members of the EP can be seen as acting on a distinctly European representative basis or rather as constituency delegates.

"Party group" or "political group" are the names given to the parliamentary groupings or alliances of party representatives of different nationalities along the lines of a perceived alignment or common traditions. These are groups which are officially recognised by and operating within the EP. They reflect in some measure the major political forces in the Community. "Party delegation" is still the term normally applied to representatives of a national party within its group although in fact the MEPs may not necessarily be delegates in the sense applied before 1979, when they were automatically delegates from the national legislature, with dual national and European mandate.

The question as to the nature of the party groups in the EP is therefore relevent. What is the political group in the EP context? The issue of whether the group represents the sum of the policy positions and attitudes of the component party delegations, or a political entity in itself, must be addressed.

For example, some scholars and at least one group itself (the European People's Party), have claimed that the groups are European parties of the future.

In addressing the issue of whether political parties at the European level are feasible, it must be kept in mind that such a system may not evolve in the EP or in the present European party federations. Coombes (1979, p. 106) reminds us that it is not even certain that the present political groups in the Parliament will form the basis of future European political parties. So the analyst of the EP groups must next examine the wealth of literature on parties and party systems. The groups may resemble parties but the group system may not actually constitute a system, and it is postulated that the groups are in such an embryonic, pre-party stage at this point that only a discursive sortie into the literature and discussion of the prospects for such a system is all that is necessary and useful at this point. In addition, the EP does not relate directly to a "polity" as such, but rather to a set of member states and to an institutional, albeit constitiutional setting of the European Community. There is no European government, for example, although we are aware that the EC possesses its own governmental process, albeit not established in a single institution.

What then is the role of the representative? Does the group fulfill the functions of the provider of structure, representative of interests and opinions, focus of communication and other functions of parties, for example? Does the group, as the major political organisation in the EP , have a coherent identity of its own and what would this consist of? Is the group cohesive, and in what

ways? If not, what are the strains on cohesion? What are the major cleavages
in the EP, and are these identifiable along group lines? What is the level and
degree of inter- and intra-group cooperation and conflict?

Methodology

In the light of these queries, we must then ask what is the conflict of
loyalties, the cleavage structure, and the nature of the representative function
in the EP as a *sui generis* institution in the EC structure? In order to
address these problems, this researcher carried out two distinct sets of
interviews over time.

Informal interviews were carried out from 1980 to 1986 with officials of the EP
secretariats, group secretariats and party federationsas well as discussions
with Commission and Council officials. These were unstructured interviews
which were carried out by this researcher with officials of several different
nationalities and in several different languages. Basic questions were
presented to all respondents and replies were given in confidentiality. Some
information was not forthcoming when respondents chose not to reply and this
has in some cases resulted in incomplete data. The intention of these
interviews was to probe these actors - bureaucratic and support staff - on
their perceptions of the role of the EP, the functions of the groups, and the
present and future development of the system of political groups in the EP.
These interviews, approximately sixty in all, lasted from thirty minutes to
eighty minutes each. The interviewees were probed for their information on

specific groups and activities, as well as for their general perceptions of the groups and individual political actors. The questionnaire for these respondents forms Appendix A.

In addition, this researcher was co-author and active participant in structured survey interviews which formed the European University Institute study of the European Parliament - a survey of members of the EP which sought to examine the experiences, attitudes and perceptions of MEPs with regard to the performance of the first directly-elected Parliament, the role of national parties and the groups, the commitment to Europe, the need for institutional reform and MEPs' representational roles and career patterns, as well as their perceptions of the distribution of power in the EC bodies.

This EUI survey afforded researchers special access to MEPs by providing them with the opportunity to interview each MEP in person. A scholar attempting this task alone would have been unable to draw up such a comprehensive survey and administer it to MEPs from ten member states. However, this cooperative method of comparative, multilingual research has resulted in a unique data set which will be illustrated throughout the text.

MEPs were interviewed in 1983 by this researcher and other members of the EUI survey team. (See Appendix B for questionnaire used). Interviewers administered a partially structured and pre-coded questionnaire while interviewees were also allowed to "speak their minds" at some length through the use of open questions. Attempts were made to interview all MEPs and the

overall response rate was 80.7%. This rate refers to 331 respondents from nine

member states (Spain and Portugal had not yet joined the EC and Greek MEPs

were interviewed some months later for technical reasons) and all political

groups. Tables 0.1 and 0.2 give the number of respondents according to

nationality and group. Full individual confidentiality was assured by the

research team and replies to open questions are quoted anonymously. This

survey is unique in that the questionnaire was translated professionally by EUI

translators and was administered in the mother tongue of the MEP being

interviewed in order to ensure an accurate set of data and comprehensive

interviews. On average, each interview lasted 60 to 90 minutes.

The questions reflected the major concerns of analysts of the EC and the major

crises and developments of the time. Hence, it is historically based for that

reason. The Ionescu/Morgan study (1988) of the EP complements the EUI survey

as it tackles different and more recent issues in the development of the

European Parliament.

On the basis of these result:, the issues of loyalty and cohesion in the

political groups and the question of what are the minimum criteria for the

group to constitute a political organisation are examined.

The methodology adopted for this thesis is designed to facilitate an evaluation

of the current conceptions and theories of the EP, its functions and

prognostications for the future. This researcher further investigated both

recent and historical attempts to define the EP and to challenge many of the

Table 0.1   Respondents to EUI Questionnaire by party group.

V394   S-23:PARTY GROUP

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
SOCIALIST	1.	96	29.0	29.7	29.7
EUROPEAN PEOPLES	2.	88	26.6	27.2	57.0
EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC	3.	49	14.8	15.2	72.1
COMMUNIST AND ALLIES	4.	32	9.7	9.9	82.0
LIB. AND DEMOCRATIC	5.	28	8.5	8.7	90.7
EURO. PROGR.DEMS.	6.	16	4.8	5.0	95.7
TECH. COORD.-INDEPS.	7.	5	1.5	1.5	97.2
UNAFFILIATED	8.	9	2.7	2.8	100.0
DK,NA,NOT ASCERTAINE	9.	8	2.4	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	331	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES   323   MISSING CASES   8

Table 0.2 Respondents to EUI Questionnaire by nationality.

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
BELGIUM	1.	23	6.9	6.9	6.9
DENMARK	2.	13	3.9	3.9	10.9
GERMANY	3.	68	20.5	20.5	31.4
FRANCE	4.	52	15.7	15.7	47.1
IRELAND	5.	14	4.2	4.2	51.4
ITALY	6.	67	20.2	20.2	71.6
LUXEMBOURG	7.	6	1.8	1.8	73.4
NETHERLANDS	8.	23	6.9	6.9	80.4
UNITED KINGDOM	9.	65	19.6	19.6	100.0
	TOTAL	331	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES   331   MISSING CASES   0

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assumptions of previous comparative studies which relate the EC and the EP to the context of either a nation state or of an international organisation. This involved an examination of the literature on comparative political development and political parties. Next, the documents of the EC and the EP were submitted to analysis, along with documentation of the political groups of the EP. The political actors and officials were then interviewed again, and finally the data sets were analysed in order to place the EP in the context of comparative studies and to understand the role of political groups.

The party groups in the European Parliament: -

The notions of cohesion and of political integration suggest a sense of identification with the group to which one belongs - indeed a sense of belonging to the group itself. This implies a similarity of interests or goals and a structure whereby such consensus is achieved, whether it be in generalised, normal or specific conformity. Generalised conformity is defined as a decision to conform automatically in response to patronage and pressure, while normal conformity signifies a disposition to support the party "by and large". Specific conformity denotes adherence to the leader's position on a particular piece of legislation or decision (Barber, 1966). The group is the only feasible agent of integration which resembles the political parties of which most MEPs are members. But the EP is a relatively recent institution in a fluid polity whose rules are made, maintained, and amended not by the European institutions but by the representatives of the member states. Coombes admits that the role of the political groups resembles that of political parties in EC member states. He adds:

But their own internal cohesion, and their distinctiveness in terms of
political principle and attitude, while they are greater in some groups
than in others, are much less than in major political parties at state
level" (1979, p. 31).

The groups are new political phenomena which may not always adequately address
themselves to the needs and aspirations of their entire membership, or of the
amalgam of very diverse members. Such diversity will be explored throughout
the thesis.

The purpose of this study is to explore the cleavages, cohesion and
representational roles of the party groups in the directly-elected EP. The
underlying theme of this exploration is the obverse to that of belonging in the
group, i.e., marginalisation or even alienation. There are strong indications,
from observation and empirical research, that there is a sense of frustration,
alienation and estrangement on the part of the MEPs with regard to their
groups, the EP as an institution, and their relationship with the political
structure of the decision-making in the EC, and also with the member states.

The problem might be expressed as follows:
- Firstly, there is an estrangement from the national political
environment, and from domestic political parties, and from the national
parliament, especially with the decline of the dual mandate.
- Secondly, the EP has been in a position of alienation from the other EC
institutions, particularly up to the time of the Single European Act of

1986, due to the EP's lack of substantive legislative power. While the SEA
made only a slight alteration to the formal powers of the EP, that body
is attempting to interpret these powers widely.

- Thirdly, MEPs have expressed their frustration with regard to the
fulfilment of their needs, aims and interests. The groups may offer the
only viable means of counteracting these frustrations, although in some
cases they increase such problems, depending on the notion of
representation of the individual MEP. If the group happens to be a
vehicle for the expression of the MEP's interests, it cannot be fully
successful in this function, due to the very nature of its
transnationality, diversity of membership and the disparity of
representational roles.

- Finally, the EP presents different career options for different MEPs. In
general it is often seen as a stepping stone to other prospects of
careeradvancement or as a final experience before retirement. Others see
it as a viable career in itself or as a forum for convinced Europeans to
advance the cause of a federal Europe. For another set of MEPs, it is a
means to achieve the execution of policies perceived as worthwhile.

With regard to the political environment, the thesis examines whether the
groups operate in a political vacuum with little relation to the tangible
realities of political power. The Parliament regularly passes or approves
reports and resolutions, (often on issues over which the EP has no control),
which result in no action being taken on them at national or EC level. The EP
has in the past been regarded as ineffectual in its relations with the Council.

The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1985-86 on institutional reform of the EC treaties is an example of this, when most member states remained reluctant to relinquish to the Parliament power or any opportunity for input into the proceedings of the IGC.

There are suggestions that the desire of the EP for increased powers may constitute an attempt to evolve as a "real" parliament. The Assembly of the Council of Europe has no real powers but an important difference from the EP is that the EP has mostly full-time politicians and operates in a quasi-federal structure where there is a legally based delegation of some national decision-making functions to the EC. A large number of MEPs are full-time political activists and are dedicated to a term of five years to work in what remains at first sight an ineffectual debating assembly.

Representation

With regard to identity and national representation, the MEPs remain national delegates and are chosen on national party platforms in their own country. Non-nationals are not permitted to stand for election in another member state at present. MEPs hence remain national delegates in a European institution while at the same time finding it difficult to maintain contact with the national party and domestic political scene and policy making.

On the European level, meanwhile, MEPs had little immediate impact on EC policy making and few powers of control over EC decision-making processes, apart from

its budgetary powers, although the SEA has increased the Parliament's scope of legislative participation.

Representational roles are rendered difficult to define by the scarcity of direct constituency links. This poses the problem of whom to represent and with whom to identify. The analysis of how MEPs feel about representation is therefore pertinent, as seen in the EUI study of the EP. With regard to group membership, we attempt to investigate how the MEPs function in groups. The constraints of group membership, as well as the benefits, will be referred to when appropriate.

The following are some of the questions which emerge in the study of groups as political organisations. Is there a logic in collective action in the groups? What does it achieve? How necessary are the groups and how well do they function? Are they handicapped by the lack of government and opposition in the EP, and by the absence of real power, in order to function well?

Furthermore, the EP's isolation from both EC and national decision-making centres is compounded by its geographical isolation. Although the U.S. Congress also involves travel, the representative there belongs to the political community in Washington, while there is no permanent EP presence at the level of politicians in the European Community system. Hence, no single city is identified with the EP and its work, and there is little sense of continuity, stability or focus, although Brussels is becoming the focus of the Parliament's work.

The MEPs also have less contact with the national parliaments and parties, thereby increasing the distance from domestic politics. We examine briefly the efforts being made by MEPs, the domestic parties and national parliaments in order to overcome this isolation and sense of "representation in a vacuum", of "a floating cocoon out of orbit", expressed in survey interviews by many MEPs.

This thesis further argues that a legislative socialisation process in the form of Europeanisation is taking place. There is a development from initial marginalisation of members from states on the periphery, and the newer members, to adaptation to the continental system of legislative practices. A procedural alienation precedes the learning process of norms of parliamentary and committee behaviour as an initial normlessness gives rise to the need to learn the rules of the game in this new institution.

Alienated linguistically in a plurinational and multilingual parliament, many MEPs find it difficult at first to establish informal contacts with each other, and find that this must be done through the formal group network and structure, or through advisors and assistants. Therefore, the essence of political intrigue and some of the elements of bargaining and informal coalition-formation are lost. Mechanistic cooperation appears to be the norm at first rather than a type of emotional solidarity, although legislative socialisation later plays its part in deepening cooperative methods.

Isolation from the nuances and national political traditions of one's own party

and political culture is another factor. It soon becomes obvious to the MEP
that new political languages must be learnt. There is also marginalisation of
some MEPs from the standard consensus in the group to which s/he belongs, and
from the voting patterns of other group members. The context of such non-
conformity are also analysed.

Institutional marginalisation from the EC institutions is also examined. The
formal powers of the EP are limited and examples of the EP flexing its muscles
and attempting to exert real power and become more institutionalised are
relevent.

In conclusion, there is evidence of isolation from the exercise and influence of
power in member states, the Council of Ministers and the European Council.

Membership of the European Parliament implies certain environmental conditions
which do not apply either in a national parliaments or in other international
assemblies. Such membership comprises different offices, roles and con:.traints
from those in national parliaments. Behaviour is different and subject to
different influences, as are attitudes and policy-formation processes, and the
ways and means of making decisions. This thesis asks whether there is a
problem of cohesion in the groups and in belonging to the groups. Are there,
for example, major problems of adjustment to the dictates of the group? What
are the costs and benefits to the individual MEP of group membership? Are the
MEP's aims and ambitions fulfilled in the group ?

Cohesion

It will also be asked, in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, how cohesive the groups are, if at all. What are the most salient cleavages and how are they expressed? Is there alienation from or contact with the other groups? How easy is it to join a group and what are the pressures to join, remain a member and conform? What are the conditions of group membership? This leads to the broader question of how the power game - the struggle for influence and bargaining - is carried out in the group.

In studies of political parties and legislative behaviour, legislative cohesion of the party is regarded as the desired norm in order to ensure stable voting on issues of relevance to the parties, their electors and to their chances of holding governmental office. Janda (1980) states that, in a cohesive party, the party members tend to vote in the same way on issues before the chamber. For Janda, the concept of coherence (which is operationalised with reference to six basic variables, the first of which is legislative cohesion) relates to Anderson's definition of consensus as "the degree of congruence in the cultural orientations of various individuals and groups comprising an organisation". He points out that party scholars are interested in the issues which obtain consensus, in the level of consensus obtained for different issues, and in the distribution of consensus across party organs (1968, pp. 396-397). Janda points out that consensus deals with attitudinal agreement, primarily, among party members, in this conception. Janda feels that attitudinal agreement is important, but it is also important to know how, if at all, that disagreement is expressed in intraparty politics. He therefore chooses to focus on the concept

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of coherence, which he defines as the degree of congruence in the attitudes and behaviour of party members.

Janda also refers to studies of party cohesion and factionalism which have sought to identify the source of coherence and its consequences upon party effectiveness. The notion of party/group effectiveness will be referred to in assessing the reasons and rationale for group pressure on MEPs.

Ozbudun (1970, p.305) sees party cohesion as the extent to which, in a given situation, group members can be observed to work together for the group in one and the same way. This definition is useful as a pointer to legislative behaviour. It is concerned, however, with observed behaviour and omits any reference to attitudinal questions and agreement on policy priorities. These are encompassed in Janda's definition. Observed behaviour would include roll-call voting and the maintenance of conformity as defined by Barber (1966), for example. The nature of cohesion probes the extent to which parties of similar ideological persuasion resemble each other across national boundaries. This attempts to go beyond "similarity" to "agreement" on the nature of the political system, its goals and its future. This is particularly pertinent to the attitudes of the party groups and their members regarding the very existence of the EC political system and of the EP in the EC.

Cohesion or conflict may be explained by the following variables:
1) Leadership and the exercise of leadership presssure
2) Internal group structure and allocation of offices

3) Number and diversity of nationalities in the group

4) Ideological variety and diversity

5) Policy differences and priorities

6) Different heritages of party systems and origins of the constituent parties
in the group

7) Different origins of the groups and their raisons d'etre

8) Disparate goals and aims of the MEP vis-à-vis the group

9) Perception of group membership

10) Perceptions of the nature of the EP and of its role

11) Sense of identification of the MEP with the group

12) Nationalism

13) Europeanism

14) A different type of Europeanism to that professed by the group

15) Personal desire of the MEP to stand out or be different (and pay the price
if necessary).

16) Party loyalty

17) Concept of representation

18) Loyalty to specific interests or interest group

Incentives to cohesion include:

1) Payoffs, e.g. positions in committees, on group Bureau, spokesmanships,
appointments as rapporteur/report draftsman

2) Publicity in the group

3) Use of group resources, i.e. information, public relations machine, know-how
and expertise, network of contacts and of experts, political and technical

advice, back-up and support for committee meetings. The group network offers some form of procedural socialisation and saves having to find everything for oneself and by oneself

4) Membership and sense of belonging. Possibility of influencing the group and the leaders, peer group support and solidarity

5) Payoffs in the group leadership structure after a certain amount of time

6) Fear of alienation from the group and of isolation within the group, with loss of peer group esteem and support. Fear of disapproval of colleagues.

The strains on group conformity would include the persistent recourse by the MEP to conformity in voting and general behaviour on only certain specific issues (specific conformity), rather than generalised conformity. In addition, recourse by the individual member to the use of the legislative instruments at his/her disposal, e.g. parliamentary questions, motions for resolution, own initiative reports, etc., either as an individual or as part of an alternative grouping or informal club, may place strains on the maintenance of cohesion. Pressure from the national party or government source on an MEP or a party delegation in a group, for support on an issue upon which the group has a different position or voting record, places constraints on the loyalties to the group as the primary source of discipline and mandate.

Evidence of cohesion on policy attitudes is expressed in a number of ways. These include policy statements, statements on ideology or belief system, overt behaviour in general, general attitudes (EUI survey), agreement on issues and expressed willingness to follow the group line and the leadership.

The EP as _sui generis_: -

Finally, the EP must be seen in the wider political environment. There is no theoretical or practical model which is directly comparable to the EC. It is _sui generis_. It has to be explained in known categories although these cannot fully describe the political community of the EC. Federalist and functionalist approaches seem to yield little in current analysis of this "quasi-polity".

Rather, I would suggest that the European Community may be seen as a "fluid polity", in Sartori's terms, where parties and party systems have not as yet assumed the role which they occupy in established polities (Sartori, 1976, p. 255). Sartori reminds us, in the study of quasi-parties or semi-parties, that inchoate forms not only tend to defy classification, but tend to be misrendered by classification.

The European Parliament qua parliament is neither a legislature nor the forum of government and opposition debate. It does however possess legally-based powers of law making under the EC Treaties. The _sui generis_ nature of the EC itself has a separation of powers which do not run along the lines of a national system. Whereas in the national systems, parliamentary government is normally seen as "party government", the executive body of the EC is the Council of Ministers and to some extent the Commission. The parties play a mainly supervisory role at the European level in the EP and party competition takes on a different hue than in the national parliaments of the EC member states. The parties have no influence on the determination of the tenure of office of the

Council of Ministers, although they possess the power, as yet unexercised, to dismiss the entire the entire Commission, but not individual members.

While the EC is a normative federation or confederation, in substance it has intergovernmental features. The European Community has been referred to as a "would-be polity", and while it is not within the scope of this thesis to investigate the complicated question of whether the EC constitutes a polity, we shall seek to describe the political environment within which the EP has its place. The EC is not yet a political community as defined by contemporary political theory but we do not rule the possibility that it might become a fully-fledged political community. The nature of the EC remains a crucial question for political scientists as attempts are made to understand and define it. Hearl's notion of a "two-tier polity" (national and Community) might be mentioned at this point as an illustration of the state of the art of the definition of the system of national political systems and the upper structure of the European institutions (1977). This is useful to keep in mind in the analysis of the conflicts of loyalties in the EP, with regard to the primacy of national or European loyalty or representation in the groups.

In this regard, we shall assess the institutionalisation of the EP and the role of the party groups in the Parliament, the changing functions of representation at the EP level and the prospects for the development of a European party system.

Chapter One

The European Community: A Fluid Polity

The European Community has not so far conformed wholly to existing definitions, either of an international organisation or of a federation of states, while it displays features of both. the EC is distinctive for what is absent within its structure as much as for what it consists of, although our concerns centre on whether it can be said to constitute a political community or a polity in the making.

It is useful to begin by focussing on the tangible, observable nature of the Community. This is important since delving into the complex network of theoretical approaches to federalism and functionalism may result in a feeling that one has not quite put one's finger on the essence of the Community.

The Community is a political organisation of twelve democratic states, who are to some extent interdependent and hence have surrendered some measure of national sovereignty in order to cooperate on certain policy areas . This interdependence is the crux of the interrelationships and the mosaic of complex relations in the EC at several levels. These tiers encompass national, regional, European, and other or special interests.

These states have certain policies in common. It has been persuasively argued that the member states have reached a stage of interdependence where they need a common economic policy, to maintain equilibrium between thri economies, provide a framework for their economic development, safeguard their interests

in and contribute to the management of the wider international economy". For Pinder (1986), despite the fact that the EC is a trading power (and partner) on the scale of the United States, "far too little" had been done in order to build up an internal market, with common policies and a transfer of powers to the Community from the states' banking institutions and finance ministries. Such interdependence, Pinder argues, merits further integration with presumably a transfer of some sovereignty to the Community. While the EC constitutes a trading power and an organisation of states, the Single European Act has further established the structures for a single internal market. The EC is also a customs union and a community organised around the central concept of a commmon market with its basic freedoms of movement for goods, labour, capital and enterprise, with common policies and its own resources. These elements are based in the founding Treaties, related legal instruments and the SEA (1).

This Community was established in 1952. The EC was not a movement which emanated from a ground-swell of public opinion which felt that, in the era of post-war recovery and of disenchantment with the nation-state, European cooperation was necessary. Rather, the European cooperation process was imposed from above by courageous political actors of the time such as Monnet, Schuman, Spaak, de Gasperi and Adenauer, who sought an alternative to nationalism and who considered it opportune, for a variety of motives, to attempt to form a supranational means of cooperation.

The European movement was largely a movement of intellectuals and former resistance leaders, and as such, the EC was an initiative of the élite, which

did however succeed in gaining government support and eventually somepopular

support. Political parties were not actively involved, except through their

governments. The nation-state was, and still remains, the basic unit of the EC.

EC membership was not defined by region or interests, but by member state.

Representation in the various institutions was according to member state size

and political weight and the nation-state remained supreme (2).

The original conception of the EC was of a community of economic or functional

integration by sectors - beginning with the areas of coal and steel production

- which would then lead to a political community in a federalist United States

of Europe. The writings of the early decades anticipated a "spill-over" effect

from the economic to the political, and from the nation state to the Community.

The assumption behind this approach was that the functional integration as a

counterweight to national alliances was expected to bring about a "transfer of

loyalties" from nationalism to European loyalties, on the part of the economic,

political and administrative elites of the member countries (Haas, 1966,

Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970 and Wallace, 1985.) and also on the part of the

political actors, as analysed in the study on the alleged "Europeanisation" of

the MEPscarried out by Kerr in 1964 (Kerr,1973). The reader is referred to the

many studies of the original conceptions of the EC, and the notions of

federalism, functionalism and divided loyalties in the European Communities,

which do not fall within the scope of the present work (Wallace, Wallace and

Webb, eds. 1977, Keohane and Nye, eds. 1972, Kolinsky, ed. 1978).

H. Wallace holds that interest in the EC had already decreased by the 1960s as the national government regained its self-confidence as a result of the economic boom of the 1950s. The 1950s saw exciting initiatives for European political, economic and security co-operation, many of which - the most far-reaching - also failed during that decade. The 1950s are as distinctive for what they did not achieve as they are for what they did succeed in launching. Failed initiatives include the proposals of the Ad Hoc Assembly on a European Political Community, and the proposed European Defence Community. The mooted deep-seated changes in the political system (i.e. towards a process of confederalism) did not mobilise popular support or much party support during this period.

So what endured were the "minimalist" compromises of economic integration, by functional methods under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the progressive establishment of a common market (EEC) and common atomic energy programmes (Euratom). While these were innovative Treaties, the more radical European Defence Community (EDC) never really saw the light of day. This initiative, although ratified in some member states of the ECSC, was not ratified by the French Assembly on 30 August 1954. The de Gasperi proposal for a European Political Community, which was regarded as the necessary political corollary to the EDC and which envisaged both a common foreign policy and an integrated internal market directed by a European Executive subject to the democratic control of a directly-elected European Parliament, was seen as "an attack upon the core issues of national sovereignty" (W. Wallace, 1983, p.2) and was never ratified.

Over three decades later, the internal market proposed by de Gasperi is now approaching realisation. The date of 1992 has been set as the target date by the Commission's White Paper on the Internal Market in 1985, and by the Single European Act.

With regard to de Gasperi's proposed "common foreign policy" and Executive, the European Political Cooperation procedure does not fully constitute a common foreign policy, and a European executive does not appear to have ever been mooted as a serious possibility at the political level. The EP was directly elected for the first time in 1979, even though such elections were provided for in the Treaties (Article 138, EEC Treaty), and the notion of a European Executive subject to a directly elected EP's "democratic control" would not be accorded serious debate by national administrations or academic scholars, despite the aspirations of the EP's Draft Treaty on European Union (1984).

Much of the literature on the EC in the 1960s refers to a European Government and some also proposed the idea of a European party system (Vredling, 1971, and Bonvicini, 1971 and 1975). Neunreither (1972) had proposed that the Commission become a European Government, and this was one of the original roles which it was considered would devolve to the High Authority/Commission in the original plan of Monnet and others, that the Commission would be the "motor of integration" and take upon itself some quasi-executive functions.

It is useful to point out that there was no overt need for a new "state" or political community in post-war Western Europe. The states and political

systems were already well-established. There was no revolution, no invasion of territory (since 1945) and no general anarchy which had to lead to the creation of a new political order. However, confederations and unions of states come about for a variety of reasons and not only because of a need (perceived or otherwise) for a new "state". The "confederation" of states of the EC came about for a very specific purpose which has since then developed in depth and scope.

1.2.1 The legal and intergovernmental nature of the Community

While there is no central executive or European party system, there are four main institutions, provided for in the founding Treaties and the 1965 Merger Treaty. These are the Council, the Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice, and there are some auxiliary institutions and "complementary entities" which have legal status (Bieber, 1985, p.9). The EC possesses a body of law, upon which it is based, and although it has been called an "incomplete legal framework", nevertheless, the Community's legitimacy is based on its legal system.

Weiler and Modrall (1985, p.163) state that the Community was and is a creature of law. They point out that while there would be a more or less organic socio-political entity without a constitution (or a France without the 1958 constitution), there would not be a European Community without the Treaties, and they surmise that it will be a long time before the Community assumes an organic social/economic/political identity apart from its legal framework.

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Elsewhere, Veiler suggests that the most dramatic incident in the evolution of
the EC as a supranational legal order, was not in the "empty chair" crisis of
1965-6 when the French withdrew from the Community for several months, a
crisis resolved by the Luxembourg agreement on the importance of "vital
national interests", but rather in the legal revolution whereby the Community
"Grundnorms" (basic norms) were established in 1963-4. This was when the
European Court of Justice introduced the doctrine of the same "Direct Effect" of
Community law as of national law and the possibility of individual claims,
should a member state introduce or fail to introduce a law which has the effect
of disturbing the Common Market's operation. This commenced with the Van Gend
en Loos case (Veiler, 1985, p.4). The second "Grundnorm" is the "supremacy
clause", whereby Community law was to be held by national courts as supreme and
over-riding any conflicting national law (Veiler, ibid, p.5).

These elements of Community law are raised as they illustrate the essentially
legal nature of the Community (3). This is despite the fact that the Community
has no enforcement mechanisms, and that Community law is the most visible sign
of a European authority and this authority has weakened in recent years
(Wallace, 1982, p.2). The EC, legal in origin, is legal in the bases whereby it
might be amended or radically changed. The issue of "extra-territoriality"
advanced the scope of the Community's legal mechanisms, with the decision of
the Court of Justice on 27 September 1988 that the EC can apply its competition
rules to companies which are based outside the EC territory. The political
impact for the 1992 scenario could be widespread.

The IGC, the Intergovernmental Conference of EC member states, which resulted in the Single European Act, further reinforces the Treaty-based nature of the EC, including the decisions to incorporate European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the European Monetary System as they operate at present, in the EC, despite the evolving nature and previous extra-Treaty status of these means of cooperation. In addition, the EC is not simply a legal entity. It has an impact and influence even on a daily basis on the lives of citizens of Community member states. The incorporation of the environment, monetary policies, economic and social cohesion and other policy areas into the SEA illustrates that such issues are regularly dealt with by the EC and involve transnational cooperation.

It must be emphasised that the EC is a political entity, albeit a fluid one, and not simply a legal conception. It is characterised by daily inter-relationships of the Community and national institutions. However, the EC does not legally or politically control or manage such policy issues as the creation of a common security policy, the establishment of a central bank with a common currency, energy, development aid, education, culture, foreign policy and European citizenship (EP Resolution on the SEA, Doc. A2-176/88).

It is postulated by this writer that the EC is still limited by its very nature, i.e., firstly, it began as a legal concept, and secondly, as the IGC amendments to the Treaties have illustrated, it is largely intergovernmental in structure and decision-making. The IGC itself was a conference of the representatives of the member states, with some minimal participation by the Commission and the

Court of Justice, and some cursory attention paid to the EP. The EC is *sui generis* and is also a creation of the member states. The EC's legal basis provide for a common market, and implementation of these provisions is not intergovernmental, although extension of the EC's powers beyond these provisions is a matter for the member states to decide.

The EC has set itself ambitious objectives in most spheres of activity and as these objectives evolve, the means to achieve them fall outside the EC legal system. The Draft Treaty on European Union of the European Parliament was very attentive to this problem which was not tackled to the same extent by the SEA.

The EC constitutes a "democracy of nations" (Weiler and Modrall, p.173), as it can be viewed as democratic with regard to the representation of the member states by the Councilof Ministers, and the decision-making processes of the EC Council. However, "democracy of the peoples" remains undefined. The Citizens' Europe (or Peoples Europe) was the subject of a European Council statement at Fontainebleau in June 1984. A Peoples Europe Committee, known as the Adonnino Committee, reported to the Dublin European Council in December, 1984, and to the Brussels European Council of March, 1985 on the measures to implement a People's Europe. Some of these measures form part of the 1992 Internal Market initiatives.

The concept of a democracy of peoples directs us towards the question of where the EP fits in and how it represents its voters. W. Wallace (1982, p.5) maintains that the Community was not created to be representative. He contends

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that its essentially technocratic nature was counter-balanced to a limited extent by the creation of the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. He perceives that the problem of representation has become more acute as the European Council and the Council of Ministers have become the focus for policy making.

While he does remind us that governments are represented in Brussels and oppositions are not represented effectively in the Council-Commission dialogue, he does not refer to the direct representation of the voters by the EP, and he appears to conceive of the Parliament as a means of balancing the interests of different governments and groups (1982, p.5). I would contend that this underestimates the scope of the EP as a representative body. The Parliament, in accordance with the EEC Treaty (Art. 137), is composed of the representatives of the peoples, represents the people who voted for it in 1979 and 1984, despite the fact that these direct elections were organised in member states.

The nature of the EC's formal powers, and may be summarised with regard to its legal system and the Treaties,in particular, as we have seen. However, there had been a substantial increase in the exercise of non-Treaty-based fuctions and powers in the Community over the last decade in the fields of EPC and monetary cooperation, for example. The SEA gives Treaty status to such cooperation, although in effect it describes the situation as it existedserved perhaps to "freeze" in a legal framework those cooperation processes which were still in a state of evolution.The notion of competences refers to powers accorded to the Community's institutions by the member states. The member

states possess the power and authority, as a body in Conference, to amend or increase the competences accorded to the institutions, under Articles 235 and 236 of the EEC Treaty, by means of an Intergovernmental Conference.

The EP does not possess the competence to carry out such amendments or increase in Community competences, although it has taken upon itself to propose such initiatives. With regard to the EP's Draft Treaty, Weiler and Modrall (1985, p. 173) suggest that in some way it can lay claim to greater legal legitimacy than either the American Constitution or the Swiss Constitution, as the Parliament which provided the impetus for the Draft treaty was directly elected by citizens of the member states. However, the Community's claim to "legitimacy" is only valid through the agency of the governments of the member states. V. Wallace (1982, p.1) states that the acceptance of a European Community has not been accompanied by any transfer of loyalties from the national to the European level. There is however a relationship nature due to the direct elections which links the EP with the citizens by the very act of holding those elections. This thesis investigates, *inter alia*, the concepts of the groups and MEPs of representation and the nature of the representative function.

1.2.2 The EC as a political community.

In order to set out the political environment within which the EP operates, it is considered necessary to understand the EC as a political community. The EC is a non-unitary system, i.e., it consists of several member states in a

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constitutionally quasi-federal organisation. The Council can arrogate new
authority to itself with member state agreement. The intergovernmental nature
of the EC ensures that such amendments to the decision-making process cannot
in fact be effected in the face of opposition from a member state. The Danish
referendum on the SEA of 27 February 1986 (like the British referendum on
continued membership of the EC in June 1975) is an example of opposition by
some political parties and some portion of the electorate to the perceived
threat to national sovereignty and the continued protection of vital national
interests.

The European Community has been referred to as a "would-be" polity, thereby
implying that it has not attained the status of a polity. It is not within the
scope of this chapter to fully investigate the complicated question of whether
the EC constitutes a polity, but rather to seek to sketch the environment within
which the EP has its place. We can only briefly refer to the other largely
unsuccessful attempts to define the EC and illustrate thereby that the EC has
no comparable model. Haas, Lindberg and Scheingold, among others, attempted to
define the Community but little progress has been made in clarifying its
complexities and evolving nature. The EC has been a prisoner of its own
institutional set-up and of its historical origins. It is historically
determined by its post-war origins and objectives. How it is to survive and
even surmount its origins as represented in the member states is a question
which must at least be raised here, and although several scholars have devoted
time and effort to this problem, its intergovernmental quality has been
enhanced rather than undermined by the EC's development.

Most of the writings, and some press coverage, about the EC over the last

decade or so have informed us that the EC is in crisis, and limps weakly from

one crisis to another. Many of these studies are value-laden in expecting the

EC to perform in certain ways along certain norms. Pinder, for example, is

explicit about his "decentralist, federalist" normative approach, in advocating

full economic union of the Community. He concludes that the "root cause of the

Community's failure to develop may be identified in the right of veto" (1985,

p.103). Thus, Union legislation enacted by majority votes of both Council and

Parliament, as proposed by the EP's Draft Treaty, would "eradicate this cause of

Europe's impotence". It is noted that the SEA went some way in that direction

by introducing majority voting in some aspects of internal market decision

making.

Other writers point to the divergence of the economies of the member states and

suggest solutions to this divergence by introducing the concepts of

differentiation, a two-speed Europe and variable geometry. Such an approach

suggests that there is a need for the Community to combat the problems of

divergent economic development of the various member states and to reduce the

alienation of the peripheries from the centre, and so proposes a reformed

Community-level Regional Policy, coupled with common industrial and

environmental policies and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. The world

economic crisis has been seen as necessitating more urgent EC action to fight

unemployment and inflation (Levi and Pistone, 1980, pp. 16-18, Wallace, 1982,

Veiler, 1985). Europe, it is suggested, needs to present a common voice in
world politics, and to act as a competitive unit as a viable trading competitor
with the U.S. and Japan.

The Community was for some time severely handicapped by its inability to create
new forms of revenue. The limit on VAT receipts at 1.6% of the tax base
remained insufficient for the effective implementation of existing policies, let
alone new ones. Common policies were therefore not deemes feasible at a time
when a tiny percentage of the GNP of the member states constitutes the
Community budget. In recognition of this situation, member states have agreed
to the raising of the VAT limit.In addition, the EC was seen as being
institutionally unwieldy, especially in the wake of several enlargements, and
thus in need of institutional reform. Veiler (1985, p. 11) succinctly
summarises the disease as follows: "in an almost religiously observed ritual the
Community engages two or three times each decade in a process of discussing
institutional reform". The malaise is always the same: lourdeur, Democratic
Deficit and irrelevance. The proposed cures are always the same: improved
decision-making, more powers to the European Parliament and an increase of the
competence of the Community (see, for example, the Vedel report, the Tindemans
report on European Union of 1975, the report of the Three Wise Men, etc.). The
political will, it was constantly stated, was lacking, while the "lourdeur" of
the Community's institutional procedures reinforced the Community's negative
image, some national governments' disillusionment with the Community and the
weakening of European cooperation.

The Three Wise Ken's report in 1979 validly pointed out that institutional

reforms alone are unlikely to improve the "climate", particularly in the absence

of the priorities of the Community itself (Wallace, 1982, p.7). Wallace places

the responsibility for Community inertia on the national governments. The

issue of institutional reform was re-opened in 1985/6 by the IGC in the wake of

attempts by the European Council to improve the institutions (e.g. Dooge report)

and to make the Community more relevant (the Adonnino People's Europe report).

The nature of the EC's legitimacy, representativeness, authority and meaning in

citizens' everyday lives also deserve attention in this context.

Some observers have suggested that without a European Government, common

policies are not possible, whether in the areas of economics or of foreign

affairs (Levi and Pistone, 1980, p.67). The EC's decision-making structure

forms a mosaic of ill-assorted pieces with many lacunae. Michelman (1981)

reminds us that the EC decision-making process is carried out by national,

Community and private sector bureaucrats and by the upper echelons of the

national political élite. He further states that the EP remains weak due to the

fact that the decision-making is élite-dominated, bureaucratic and non-

democratic.

Power resides with the national governments in the absence of a government at

the EC level of decision-making. The EC is not a political organisation of

representatives as is evidenced in the United Nations, as it possesses a quasi-

federal body, the Commission, and a directly elected assembly. Neither is it a

state. It has no government, no territory which is by first claim its own possession, no full power system and it is not a confederation of states.

In the EC's relationship with the member states, the EC was viewed at first as something beyond the nation-state, and Hoffman (1966, p.909) suggests that it was also something less than the nation-state. For many member states, the EC was seen - and still is to a large degree - as a part of state foreign policy. Hoffman refers to nation states that pour into their foreign policy the collective pride, ambitions, fears, prejudices, and images of large masses of people (p.862). Each state participates in the Community as a separate entity, each with its own political culture, norms, institutional structure and decision-making procedures. Each of these is to a certain extent merged into the Community acquis, while each state also attempts to maintain and protect its perceived vital interests. Nationalism succumbs to consensus politics at Council level on those issues which are not perceived as vital, and a certain amount of redefinition of "vital" takes place in the national governments and administrations. The acceptance of the right to invoke the veto in the protection of vital national interests under the 1965 Luxembourg agreement implies the acceptance by the Community actors of the importance of national interests.

The SEA alters this situation by limiting the number of situations within which the veto may be used by majority voting for a greater number of areas and policies than hitherto. The SEA is therefore significant as a political compromise between those participants at the Milan European Council who

favoured major institutional reform and those adamantly opposed to it who

favoured the retention of the veto. The SEA links institutional changes to

efficiency in decision making in specific areas, such as the internal market, by

greater use of majority voting, such as harmonisation, freedom of establishment,

mutual recognition of qualifications and the Regional Fund (Fitzmaurice, 1988).

1.3 EC decision-making and the institutional system

The Commission acts as the "motor of integration" in initiating EC legislation,

with some management and implementation powers (Article 145, EEC Treaty). The

Single Act (Article 10), while conferring on the Commission powers to implement

EC rules laid down by the Council, also allows the Council to reserve the right

to exercise powers of implementation itself, in an amendment of Article 145.

This illustrates that while the Commission has more latitude in its role, the

Council reserves the right of a final say. The Commission is regarded

primarily as the guardian of the Treaties (Noel, 1985, p.11), which implies that

the Treaties are in need of a protector. This is a task which is normally

assigned to the head of state in the constitutions of many member states. It

is the Commission which monitors the implementation into national law of EC

directives, regulations and decisions, which takes infringement proceedings

against member states, and manages the Community funds and implementation of

policies such as food aid to ACP countries.

The Council of Ministers makes the final decision on what becomes EC law.

Observers have suggested that there are legitimate concerns about preserving

democratic accountability in the Community, relating to the Council of Ministers "whose authority seems set to grow as increased majority voting steadily shifts more decision making to the centre". Its "direct accountability to either the European or national parliaments is often tenuous", it has been contended (4). The European Parliament is consulted on most EC policies, Commission draft legislation and on the EC Budget.

The European Council, the Conference of Heads of State and Government, which is outside the Treaties and institutional structure, meets three times a year in order to iron out major problems of coordination of EC policy in a top-level intergovernmental structure. Bieber (1985, p.34) rightly points out that the Conference of the Representatives of the member states (COREPER), which is not an institution of the EC, but "formally a type of intergovernmental cooperation" often prepares or complements EC legislation. This is a regular meeting of officials from member states at diplomatic level. Unresolved issues are then referred to the Council.

Legislative and executive functions are, according to Bieber, horizontally divided between the Council and the Commission. The Parliament fulfills co-decision and control functions and judicial control is exercised by the Court of Justice. However, the Council remains the closest to an executive decision maker within the institutional structure, while the Commission has management competences and proposes legislation. The Parliament's co-decision powers had been limited to the conciliation procedure until the Single Act expanded this

procedure, while not going as far as the Italian proposal on co-decision put forward during the IGC.

Bieber states that the composition of the institutions aims essentially at legitimacy, and therefore all member states are represented. However, representation and legitimacy may not coincide happily and the fact that member states are represented in all institutions and that the members of the institutions are, according to the Treaty, not given any mandate from any member state, does not imply legitimacy (5).

Bieber presents a succinct list of criticisms of the institutions of the EC in terms of efficiency, legitimacy and balance. Each of these criticisms will be addressed briefly. Firstly, he states that the institutions of the Community are still not considered by its own citizens as producing and guaranteeing solutions for vital problems. This implies that the problems are soluble, and at the EC level, this may not always be the case. In addition, the Community has no real executive. Its role, for example as a problem solver for vital problems, has never been clearly defined, except perhaps in strictly legal terms. Nor has the scope of its actions and power.

Secondly, Bieber reiterates the criticism that the political options underlying decisions are hardly ever made public and are only indirectly subject to influence and control. The Community citizens do not see themselves as participants in the system, as seen in the EC's Eurobarometer surveys. I would add that the E P is alienated from the electors, and this in turn relates to the

question of image and the relationship, if any, which the EC would wish to have with its citizens.

Bieber asserts that the Community lacks legitimacy and hence has not attracted the loyalty of its citizens. Legitimacy is not equal to, or even necessarily conducive to, loyalty, however, rather it comprises other aspects of the political process.

Thirdly, Bieber suggests that "the legitimacy of the system when producing decisions is doubtful", and he elaborates that decisions are often not taken according to a "proper common interest", but rather according to a lowest common denominator. This is a form of diluted intergovernmentalism, a decision-making process between and among states, where each state makes its views clear and surrenders little.

Bieber admits that the above criticisms could also be levelled at states, but he adds that the European Community is complicated by three main factors. The first of these factors is an incomplete legal framework governing the relations between the institutions. This is central to the problem of the EC as a fluid polity. The EC is an incomplete system with some powers, some checks and balances, a system of partial competences which possesses no European qua European executive, but rather decision-making by national representatives.

The second complicating factor constitutes what Bieber refers to as the "dynamic" conception of the organisation. I would suggest that the Community

be regarded as "fluid" or evolving and in this context the IGC represented an attempt to adapt the institutions to the dynamic nature of the Community. The third complicating factor is "the position of Parliament which differs from that in national constitutions". Basically, the EP does not constitute a Parliament in form or function (see Chapter 2).

1.4.1 The EC as a radical innovation

It has been suggested that the EC was a radical experiment of a quasi-federal organisation which attempted to pre-empt the nation state in at least some of its functions and powers, as well as its sovereignty. This assumption must be questioned. Was the EC really such a radical innovation? It continued to represent the interests of the member states and there was no yielding of substantial power in the key areas of defence or security, in monetary union, or, until the SEA, in the internal market or foreign policy. As a radical movement qua radical, its effect on the political organisation of the member states is limited. The assumption is made in many textbooks on the EC that the seeds of full economic - and, for some, political - union, were sown in the 1950s and much disenchantment is expressed with regard to the Community's perceived inability to fertilise the seeds and reap their benefits adequately in order to yield full "union". It is possible, however, that functional integration is the optimum that can be achieved in practice and that talk of a political community is hence not realistic or practical.

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Within the constraints of consensus governments, attempts at more profound European integration were made repeatedly, e.g., the Committee for a United States of Europe, the Monnet Committee, which met at official level for several years, the attempt of the Ad Hoc Assembly in 1953-1954 to establish a Political Community, and the Constitution which that Assembly wrote to that end, the Defence Community initiatives in the 1950s and the initiatives in the 1960s of de Gasperi and Fouchet.

1.4.2 The EC as a fluid polity

The EC functions as an economic community, as provided for in the Treaties. As such, it is achieving its goal of economic integration. The assumption that it should be a political community places the EC on an entirely new and more complex level of interaction, political communication and power structure. It is not a People's Europe, although this has been encouraged in recent years by the European Council, resulting in renewed efforts to bring about a European passport, flag, symbols, abolition of many frontier controls, removal of some residence controls, increased rights of residence and establishmentand in the movement for a "Europe sans frontières" for a Common Internal Market in 1992.

The legitimacy of the EC in legal terms is not questioned. It exists, legally, therefore it is. However, its legitimacy in terms of representativeness has not been recognised. Its legitimacy is also bound up with the notion of its effectiveness (V. Wallace, 1982).

Wallace (1982, p. 2) suggests that legitimacy in any political community depends on:

1) Authority: acceptance of its decisions and actions

2) Relevance: link between its actions and the concerns of those it affects

3) Equity: a sense that costs and benefits are spread out fairly

4) Effectiveness: satisfaction of expectations with speed and efficiency

5) Representation: the balance between political groups and interests achieved in bringing influence to bear upon the process of policy-making

6) Boundary: recognition that there is a framework of interests and obligations which ties each group to all others within the community, and which differentiates the whole as a community from groups outside that community.

The Community possesses authority in legal terms and in its primacy of law. Its relevance has been questioned in many spheres but the member states' governments themselves are in agreement as to its relevance and benefits to them. Attempts are being made to bring about more regional equity in the areas of convergence, regional policies and economic and social cohesion, through the ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) regulation of June 1984 and the incorporation of cohesion in the Single European Act. The latter aims at "reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions", and member states' economic policies are to be coordinated in order to achieve this and to promote the Community's "overall harmonious development", using the Structural Funds and financial instruments (Sub Section IV of Single Act, providing for a Title V to be added to Part Three of the EEC Treaty). Satisfaction as to the effectiveness of the Community is

low, as seen in the Eurobarometers, and its boundary is defined in legal terms and the EC is easily recognisable as an entity in trade with nations or blocs outside its boundaries. Representation is explored in Chapter 3 with regard to the European Parliament.

We have examined the nature of the EC as the political environment of the European Parliament. These discussions have explored the elements of the system of distribution of power in the EC and their implications in EC decision making. The EC lacks fundamental features of a polity, such as sovereignty. While sovereignty lies with the member states, the EC cannot be seen as a polity as it lacks its own sovereignty. However, the present evolution of the EC points to a recognition of the political power of the EC's institutions in terms of compliance with Treaty-based obligations and hence a surrendering of some national sovereignty in decision making.

It is therefore suggested by this writer that the EC be described conceptually as a "fluid polity" in Sartori's definition, where parties and party systems, for example, have not as yet assumed the role which they occupy in established polities. The place of parties and party systems is relevant to this present discussion as we seek to understand the EP's party groups. The literature on parties tends to assume the existence of a polity, and to relate parties to national political systems, regardless of whether such a polity came about at the same time as the political parties, which then exercised an integrative function in state building, or whether the polity evolved before parties were formally constituted.

So, at present, Sartori's "fluid polity" suggests the concept of some form of political "system" in a state of flux, which has not yet fully defined its terms of reference. For example, the EC has doubled its membership over the last decade or so, from six to twelve. It has also more than doubled the representation of MEPs in the European Parliament, which come from twelve countries and over sixty national parties. The membership of the European Parliament has also altered its mandate, as it now consists of mostly single-mandate members who are directly elected, in terms of political groups and membership. The EC's other institutions have also increased in representative size since the enlargements.

This fluid polity has defined itself in legal terms and in so doing has also defined its parameters. It has not fully defined itself in political terms. Its policies are widening in scope and extent, as it is now involved in more areas of activity than stipulated in the Treaties. The SEA has recognised this expansion of Community policies in environment, research and technology, in addition to social policies and economic and social cohesion. The Community has been widely seen as becoming more politicised since the mid-1970s (Henig, 1979) and its scope now includes European Political Cooperation and the EMS. In addition, the creation of the European Council has signified another political step in the "structural consolidation" (Sartori, 1976, p. 244) of the EC as some form of polity.

The EC is situated between a "formed" and "formless" polity. For Sartori, a formed state consists not only of a modern political system but also of the

political systems whose identity is provided either by an adequate historical record or by a consolidation that has occurred prior to their independence. Formless states are polities whose political process is highly undifferentiated and diffuse or polities which are in a fluid state in a highly volatile and initial stage of growth (p. 244). "Formed" is broader than "structured" for Sartori and he instances Latin America where states are formed (i.e. differentiated and characterised by stability of interactions) "but one of their subsystems, the party system, has seldom acquired, during its intermittent life-cycles, structural consolidation" (p. 244). This study suggests that while the EC is not fully formed, its party group system is acquiring structural consolidation.

The EC is fluid and in a state of growth. It is also already formed in terms of legal establishment through the Treaties. Sartori speaks of "structural consolidation" (in preference to Huntington's "institutionalisation") of formless states. Such a process is taking place in the EC, as seen in the institutional reform of the Community and in the developments in policy-making and institutional cooperation. Terms such as "fluid" or *sui generis capture the flavour of an evolving "would-be polity", as they best describe the political hinterland within which the European Parliament operates.*

REFERENCES

1. The basic legal texts are the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty, the EEC (European Economic Community) Treaty and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) Treaty. In addition, the 1965 Merger Treaty created common institutions for the three Communities. Throughout the thesis the EC, or European Community, refers to the three communities, unless otherwise specified.

2. For example, appointments of the Commissioners are made by the governments of the member states, according to size, in political decisions at the national level, and then in Conference of the member states. Their "independence is beyond doubt" (Article 10 of the Merger Treaty). The European Court of Justice has one Judge appointed per member state, although the Treaty stipulates that they too are independent of mandate (Article 167 of EEC Treaty).

3. Weiler and Modrall express this as follows:

   The Community system displays a much higher level of constitutional/legal integration than institutional/political integration (1985, p.164).

4. Financial Times, 29 September, 1988.

5. Bieber suggests that "consent within the organisation - legitimacy - presupposes an identification of its members with the organisation". As Pitkin illustrates, "identification with" might signify representation. Chapter 3 analyses the nature of representation in the European Parliament.

Chapter Two

The European Parliament in the European Community
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The European Parliament and the concept of the legislature - functions and powers

2.1 The EP and its working environment

> The danger is of becoming engrossed in a game which is parliamentary in appearance but which is often without any political impact, and of seeing this game in isolation, as end in itself; of succumbing to the illusion that they are playing an authentic parliamentary role on a European scale while in fact they lack the means either to exercise power or to check its exercise (1).

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the place of the EP in the EC's institutional system. We examine the EP in its immediate environment, the EP as a legislature, and the distinction between formal powers and real functions of the European Parliament. We examine the EP as an institution, and the possibility that it is a pre-parliament with controlling and legislative powers in the EC and with regard to the nature of legislatures in theory. This will then prepare us to examine the party groups in the EP as parliamentary actors. We examine what kind of powers the EP possesses in the EC decision-making process and attempt to evaluate the political weight of such powers.

The theme is that the EP does not relate directly to a full polity, but rather to a a set of member states in the EC context, and even then in a marginal way, and to an institutional setting which possesses no central executive body. The

MEPs are representatives of national states in an essentially "federal parliament". The EP has alienated from the EC's political decision making to a large degree. In addition, it is also estranged from the national political environment and the mainstream of political life. So it is doubly alienated, from other EC institutions and from those of the member states.

The European Parliament is not a parliamentary body in the sense used in national political systems or in the theoretical analysis of legislatures. It is not parallel to a parliament as (i) it does not elect an executive (2), (ii) it does not make policy decisions of the EC, and (iii) the EP's powers are not concerned with all aspects of economic, political and social activity as a national parliament would be, as its powers relate only to policies laid down in the Treaties. Article 4 of the EEC Treaty stipulates that those tasks entrusted to the Community should be carried out by the institutions. Constitutionally, also, the EP differs from national parliaments although its members come from states with a tradition of parliamentary government. It operates in a different framework and within different parameters, while at the same time possessing some functions which are similar to those of national parliaments. The fact that the EP's powers are Treaty-based does not preclude its concerning itself with any subject it chooses.

In general, in the relationship of the EP with other EC institutions, the Commission submits proposal to Council, which then consults the EP. The EP then issues its opinion (report) which is then submitted to the Council and Commission. The Council takes note of the EP's opinion and the Commission

transmits a definitive (amended) proposal to Council. The Council of Ministers makes a decision on the basiis of this latter proposal. So in many issues, in the elaborating of proposals, the EP's has little or no role. In the consultation phase, the EP is consulted by the Council in an active though limited role. With regard to the decision making phase, the EP's opinion might have been taken into account by the Commission before re-submitting its proposal to the Council.

Its minimal influence over the Council and its limited power over the Commission have until 1986 placed the EP is what it regarded as a very unsatisfactory role, except in the coopreation procedure with regard to the Budget. In addition, while the direct elections accorded a formal legitimacy to the EP, its mandate had not been clearly defined, nor had its empirical legitimacy (e.g. the content of a programme of government). The nature of its representative and other functions have not been clarified although they are taking shape. The SEA altered the balance of power of the EC institutions with regard to the cooperation and assent procedures, however, as will be illustrated.

The Parliament has found itself in a situation of institutional marginalisation from the other EC institutions. EC issues have on occasion proven to be more divisive in parliaments of the some member states than in the EP itself. The EP's formal powers are limited and its influence is undermined by environmental constraints, by relative lack of interest on the part of other EC institutions in its work, and by the reluctance of the media to accord it regular reporting.

It is, however, becoming adept at flexing its muscles and at attempting to exercise its Budgetary and control powers, and new powers under the assent and cooperation procedures, particularly since the implementation of the SEA as seen in its critical resolutions on the the SEA results (Doc. A2-176/88 of the EP).

We first set the EP in its immediate environment, as the democratic political party (and group) is the creature of its environment, and the most important aspects of that environment are, for Schlesinger (1985), those which shape the expectations and ambitions of the office seekers in the parties.

The EP plenary sessions normally take place in Strasbourg and occasionally in Luxembourg, which is also the location of the general secretariat of the EP, committee secretariats and of some parts of the political groups' secretariats. The Parliament also meets in Brussels, where the committee meetings are held most of the time. The rest of the time they meet in national capitals, or other cities of relevance to a particular investigation or hearing. Brussels is also the location for meetings of the groups, and the seat of most group secretariats.

This Parliament is a multipartite and multilingual assembly, with over sixty national parties; it is multinational, with twelve nationalities; it is organised in eight transnational political groups, and eighteen committees and delegations, and 518 members, which sit in three cities in three different countries (3). The Parliament works in a multi-level political system, composed of national, supranational, transnational and sub-national levels (Hrbek, 1983,

p. 2). In the EP, therefore, political conflict is multinational, multipartite and multilingual, with cleavages of left-right, urban-agrarian, North European-South European and other scales.

The parties are far more disparate and varied than in the national multi-party system, as they differ not only according to origin, development and links with the domestic party leadership, but also in terms of national mores and political culture. Party discipline is not maintained by such factors associated with national political parties such as the desire to attain offices or the power to remove a government from office, as these elements do not feature in the EP.

An additional feature is the language of politics. Firstly, there is the linguistic element, which places a strain on the ability to establish and maintain informal as well as formal contacts, and these must perforce be done through the formal network and structures of the party group, or through intermediaries such as advisors and assistants. The essence of political intrigue and some elements of bargaining, informal coalition formation and voting agreements, which are so much a part of legislative behaviour, are therefore to some extent lost to the MEP. This is a form of linguistic alienation which is experienced by many MEPs, although some MEPs may use their linguistic ability in a positive way to enrich their political vocabulary and scope for action.

The second element of the language of politics is the language of discourse and the associated process of legislative socialisation. Each party's political

vocabulary is not easily translated or rendered explicable. Each party possesses its own coded political language, an intrinsic element of its political culture. The novice MEP is therefore obliged to become involved in a learning process, in addition to the normal legislative socialisation process. The MEP attempts to form a comprehensible mosaic from the myriad of pieces of language, culture and norms, in order to be better equipped to be an effective political actor in the Parliament. There is a tendency for differences in political culture to be talked out in committees, rather than in plenary and this is perhaps the major importance of the committee system, when attempts are made to explain what is meant in the continuing learning process in the EP.

It has been suggested that activity in the legislative arena "proceeds on the assumption that all legislators are aware of and are in basic agreement" about their goals and actions, the actions of the assembly and the "game" to be played (Wahlke et al, 1962, p. 138). This is not the case in the European Parliament since the direct elections, as these elections provided the EP with new, mainly full-time politicians for whom the nature of the game was not yet clearly defined.

The geographical factor involves a regular dislocation of several hundred politicians and officials, which inevitably places considerable strains on the actors involved and on the results of legislative activity. There is no fixed seat for the Parliament, despite the EP's efforts to have one established (4). The EP requested the governments of the member states to come to a decision on this matter, as it is not within the competence of the Parliament, but rather of

the national governments, to do so. Thus the EP is alienated (it need only be consulted on the matter) from the decision of the Council regarding where it should meet. Although the U.S. Congress, for example, also involves travel, there is a sense of belonging to an established political community in Washington. The EP has no such central meeting-place. There is no permanent EP presence in any one city.

The MEPs are tied to a political calendar and legislative agenda which are under executive control. The calendar is set in part by the Commission's initiatives and the Council's decisions, and partly by the EP's Bureau, its decision-making body . The EP can, however, decide when to deal with Council decisions and hence exercise some autonomy.

Travel and time constraints render regular contact between the M EPs and national political actors difficult, while at the same time the MEP is not deeply involved in the core of EC decision-making, which is removed from its focus, in the Council of Ministers, COREPER and the European Council. So the EP is alienated from the two main loci of power, the national and Community foci.

2.2 The European Parliament and the functions of legislatures

Coombes (1979) points out that the European parliament cannot be compared to parliaments within member states, not because it lacks the power or status we commonly associate with a parliament, but because the Community itself is unique or *sui generis*, despite being the creature of the member states and hence

its role was designed with this *sui generis* Community in mind. It is a body in search of a role, although it possesses very clearly defined functions, set out in the Treaties, and working methods, set out in its own Rules of Procedure, over which it has full control, along with its own Budget. The EP was not intended to be a legislative body, however, in the EEC Treaty.

The EP is both more and less than a national parliament in terms of functions and scope. While the EP cannot legislate or influence a government, it possesses certain features which few national parliaments possess. These features may be summarised as follows:

(a) institutional autonomy - control over its internal organisation and rules of procedure (Article 142 of the EEC Treaty)

(b) budgetary autonomy - control over its own budget within certain limitations, under Council decision of 22 April 1970 and Court of Justice case 208/80

(c) control of resources, and facilities (material and non-material) of its members (secretarial assistance, documentation centres, office accommodation, etc.). This is a form of professionalisation of the EP and such resources may assist in promoting careers in the EP (Mayhew, 1974).

(d) certain budgetary control powers, with margin of manoeuvre over the non-obligatory aspects of the EC Budget.

(e) control powers over the Council, the "executive" body, through its equal legal status with the other EC institutions, permitting it to take

the Commission and Council to Court for failure to enact determined policies (Articles 137-144, EEC Treaty).

(f) cooperation procedure,

(g) assent procedure in external relations, under Art. 8 of SEA, applied to Article 237 (accession agreements) and 238 (cooperation agreements) of the EEC Treaty.

The status of the EP is that of a representative assembly, which consists of representatives of the peoples, according to Article 137 of the EEC Treaty. It controls amendments to the estimates of expenditure of the EC (4). In addition, it is autonomous of governments' tenure of office and its term cannot be altered by any executive or constitution.

For Loewenberg (1971, p.3), the structural characteristics of a legislature are:

(1) Its members are formally equal to each other in status, distinguishing parliaments from hierarchically ordered organisations

(2) The authority of their members depends on their claim to representing the rest of the community.

Loewenberg suggests that, because of the equality of their status, members of parliament are reluctant to employ sanctions against one another and hence parliamentary rules of procedure are reinforced by "folkways" and implicit rules of the game. On this point, with regard to the EP, see Question 7 of the EUI Survey of MEPs, which sought to determine whether such informal rules of the

game exist in the EP, according to the MEPs. Some 75.5% (N=331) of the MEPs interviewed stated that such informal rules exist in the EP.

Table 2.1   Question 7, EUI Survey of the MEPs

Question 7.1: It is said that every legislature has its own "informal rules of the game", that is, there are certain things members must do or must not do in order to be able to get things done. Do such informal rules exist in the EP?

CATEGORY LABEL	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ
YES	250	75.5%
NO	70	21.1%
REFUSED	2	0.6%
DK, NA, NOT ASCERTD.	9	2.7%
TOTAL	331	100.0%

VALID CASES   320

MISSING CASES   11

Question 7.2: Could you tell me what some of these informal rules are and what happens if they are not obeyed?

Replies to the open question (7.2) referred repeatedly to the need for compromise, achieving the consensus of most political groups, preparing

colleagues in one's own group and other groups to support a motion. Respondents emphasised that it was important not to appear aggressive in promoting national or constituency interests but rather to learn to speak on behalf of Europe rather than on a regional problem.

Loewenberg's first characteristic of the legislature, equality, applies to the MEPs, unlike the differential weight of votes of the member states in the Council, while the second, authority based on representation, raises the question of the authority and perhaps even the legitimacy of the European Parliament and causes us to ponder whom or what it represents. It is not clear that the MEPs do, in fact, claim to represent the rest of the community nor what this community consists of.

Mayhew (1974, p.8) sees the functions of the U.S. Congress as those of legislating, overseeing the executive, expressing public opinion and servicing constituents. The EP, like the U.S. Congress, operates in a system of a separation of powers. In the EP, that executive consists of the Council of Ministers, who are elected nationally and the Commission, which has some executive functions and is not elected at all. In the U.S., Congress undisputedly has substantial power in legislation, unlike the EP, particularly in Budgetary control and committee hearings.

A cursory overview of the traditional role accorded to parliaments, and the function of the parliament, as enunciated by Bagehot (1867) is relevant at this point. The original functions of statebuilding and consent to policy, which

relate to earlier stages of institutional development, can now in the twentieth

century be broadly restated as linkage, conflict management, law-making, policy-

making and recruiting leaders.

Bagehot saw the functions of the British parliament, the "Mother of Parliaments"

as elective, expressive, teaching, informing and legislative (including

financial) and these functions retain much validity as a yardstick to explain

the EP's role in the EC process. The first functions of the House of Commons

was as an electoral chamber; "it is the assembly which chooses our President".

The second is what Bahegot calls the expressive function, whereby Parliament

expressed the mind of the English people on all matters which come before it.

The third, the teaching function, is to alter society for the better, and to

teach the nation what it does not know. The fourth, the informing function,

lets us hear what otherwise we would not. Crick (1970, p. 46) suggests that

this informing function may first involve informing itself, and he includes

methods of inquiry, parliamentary questions, and the notion of answerability

under this function. Lastly, the legislative function is as important as the

executive management of the whole state, or the political education given by

parliament to the whole nation. For Bagehot, the financial function is part of

the legislative one, as he chose not to distinguish between financial and other

legislation.

Von Beyme (1974, p.11) redefines these functions differently, in the light of

late 20th century developments in Western European parliaments, as

representation and articulation, communication, controlling, participation in the

appointment and dismissal of the executive, legislative and recruiting. Each perspective places the legislative function as one among many other functions. Indeed, von Beyme suggests that communication rather than legislation appears to be the main sub-function of Parliament.

He states that the strength and functions of national parliaments are determined by a series of external constraints which he classifies as (i) juristic and (ii) socio-economic constraints. Juristic constraints do in fact include the norms of the constitution, particularly the interplay between parliament and government in the appointment and dismissal of the executive. The European Parliament is in fact subject to defined juristic constraints in its relationship with the executive. Socio-economic constraints comprehend the party system which influences the government-forming function and helps to shape policy output, and also the system of interest groups and institutionalised channels for the expression of interests in the system.

While keeping in mind the danger of falling into a "functional trap", we summarise the EP's powers and functions in order to understand its character and how it works. Parliamentary "check-lists" runs the risk of resulting in a static view of the political system and the mechanics of such a system. What follows is an attempt to describe the EP's work, taking Bagehot's and Von Beyme's functions as a yardstick so as to better understand the EP and the environment of the political groups.

Function 1: Representation and Articulation -

This is dependent on several factors:

(a) Unicameral or bicameral assembly: the EP, a unicameral assembly, could also be viewed as a directly elected upper house for the European tier of the EC as a multi-tier polity, where the EP represents the people and the Council the states.

(b) The EP represents some 300 million citizens and is directly elected by plebiscite, which is organised by the governments of the member states. Article 138 provides for its direct election by universal suffrage.

(c) The institutionalisation of the articulation of interests in parliament, including constituency or special interests.

Function 2: Communication/Expression (Linkage) -

This function of linkage between parliament (and government) and people is seen by many scholars as primary (Blondel, 1975), although von Beyme suggests that it is a disappearing function, as it is reputedly being undermined by interest groups and the development of the government's direct links with the mass media. The EP represents the peoples of Europe as representatives of states, of political parties, and in some cases, of interest groups.

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<u>Function 3: The controlling function (including financial) –</u>

One observer referred to the EP's political weight by holding public debates,

questioning the representatives of other institutions, holding committee

investigations and issuing reports and passing resolutions as Parliament's role

of tribune, as MEPs act on behalf of the electors, at times by "sheer moral

pressure and simply by making themselves a nuisance" (Coombes, 1979, p. 22).

(a) <u>The right to put questions</u> – This is utilised exhaustively by MEPs. The

Treaty (Article 140) stipulates that the Commission reply to the EP orally or

in writing. MEPs utilise the written questions and oral PQs extensively, and in

this way the activities of the "executive" of the EC are subjected to public

political scrutiny by the EP. In the 1972 Summit Conference, Council also

undertook to reply to EP Questions and if necessary to contribute to the EP's

debate on the basis of a reply given by the Council (EP, 1984a). Council

undertook to improve this procedure in the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on

European Union (6). The 1974 Paris Summit undertook to associate the EP more

closely with the work of the Presidency through reply to EPQs on European

Political Cooperation. The use of PQs also acts as a means of following up on

the actions of the Council and the Commisssion on the legislative amendments

made by the EP. These PQs and replies are all published in the Official journal

of the European Communities. Both the Council and the Commission have

officials present at Question Time at all EP Plenary Sessions to reply to

Questions.

b) __Interpellation with motions__ - This is also a major feature of EP sessions. Hearings, committees of enquiry, and question time are also utilised by the directly-elected EP. Such controlling and supervisory powers also include the right to debate the Commission's annual report and the Presidency programme, to cross-examine the Commission in committee and to question the Council.

The only equivalent to a formal vote-of-no-confidence in the government is the EP's vote of censure on the Commission, its ultimate weapon, which although threatened, has never been utilised, as the EP has no say in the reappointment of the Commissioners and the Commission President (Article 144, EEC Treaty).

The function of control of the administration makes the Commission in effect collectively, and not individually, responsible to Parliament. This supervision of policy outside the legislature, is seen by Loewenberg and Patterson as one of the most effective functions of the modern legislature. Combes (1979, p. 19) states that the real power of a representative assembly depends not only on its constitutional powers in relation to legislation, the budget and the appointment of the executive, but also on the political weight it is able to carry by holding public debates, holding committee investigations, issuing reports and passing resolutions. He surmises that the EP is now well-equipped for such purposes. The Council has now adopted the practice of inviting an Opinion from the Parliament on the Commission's draft legislation even in cases where this is not formally required by the Treaties.

c) Budgetary control – Parliament's most important power is its budgetary control. Although the EP has specific powers over EC expenditure, which amounts to co-decision in the field of non-obligatory expenditure, it has no power over the raising of revenue (8). It has the power to audit the accounts of the EC. Under Article 19 of the Merger Treaty, the EP grants a discharge to the Commission on the implementation of the Budget after monitoring the income and expenditure of the current year and examining weaknesses and irregularities. Budgetary control provides for the control of obligatory expenditure up to a ceiling already determined by the Council and of non-obligatory expenditure, on which the EP has the last word, and for the possibility to reject the entire Budget of the Community (by a vote of the majority of its members and two thirds of the votes cast under Article 203(8) of the EEC Budget and the 1975 Merger Treaty). On this issue a broad consensus has been reached by the EPover the last decade. In December 1979, the EP rejected the 1980 Draft Budget by 288 votes to 64 with one abstention. A provision was made by a joint declaration of the Council, Commission and Parliament on June 30, 1982 on measures to improve institutional collaboration in the context of the Budgetary procedure (9). This is commonly referred to as the conciliation or cooperation procedure, first initiated in 1975 regarding legislative acts with financial implications, and proposals have been made on several occasions to apply it to other policies.

The Budgetary procedure consists of the Commission sending estimates to the Council, which adopts a draft Budget, and this is sent to the EP for a first reading and then back to Council. The Council gives it a second reading,

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considering the EP's request for changes, and then the EP gives it its second reading, the most important stage, when it reconsiders the entire Budget and may reinsert earlier amendments which the Council might have rejected. After the meeting of the EP's Budget Committee, the EP then decides whether the Budget is adopted or rejected. Furthermore, the EP also devotes its attention to the problem of insufficient resources, the future financing of the Community, budgetary imbalances and budgetary guidelines for the forthcoming year. The EP, like the House of Commons, may not introduce bills to raise taxes or increase government expenditure. That is the function of governments.

Moreau Defarges (1985, p.8) points out that the EP has the power to increase expenditure - a margin of manoeuvre - which the French national assembly, for example, does not possess. The amount within which the EP has this margin of manoeuvre is, however, limited to non-obligatory expenditure, which consists of a little over 20% of the EC Budget. The EP, like national parliaments, is bound by its previous legislative decisions.

Since the Community acquired its "own resources" for financing its expenditure in 1970, and the Budget has expanded to include intervention in agricultural markets, support for social, regional and industrial development, and aid to developing countries, the EP has been involved in this process through its substantial budgetary powers, which are related to the allocation and distribution of resources. The EP is reaping the benefits of the use of these powers in order to influence the policies and orientations of the Community.

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This consists of participation in government formation or vote of investiture, the defeat of government by a parliamentary vote, and the dissolution of parliament by government. None of these exists in the EP framework. The parties in the EP do not compete for government, and do not appoint an executive for the Community. While one cannot assert that parties in the U.S. Congress, for example, compete for government, nor that Congress creates an executive, nevertheless it wields real powers, while the EP has limited powers of control over the executive and policy formulation.

The opinion of the EP's Bureau (the agenda setting body of the EP consisting of the President and twelve Vice-Presidents, who are elected by the MEPs) is sought on the appointment of the President of the Commission, according to the Stuttgart Declaration (10), although the EP has no parliamentary investiture of the Commission President. The Commission is in practice appointed by the governments of the member states, and the EP has no influence over their tenure of office. The EP is not involved in any appointment procedure apart from the Court of Auditors, although some proposals in this regard were put forward and rejected at the IGC on the SEA.

The Commission as a body can be dismissed under Article 140 of the EEC Treaty in a motion of censure with no EP power of reappointment. While the Commission is formally answerable to the EP, it is not the equivalent to an executive. Neither can the Council be considered as an executive as a unit, as it is a

"highly segmented institution with its powers divided among different sectoral compositions" (H. Wallace, p. 180). H. Wallace correctly points out that the Council lacks the collective identity which would render it directly accessible to political control by the EP.

The Council, national politicians who are answerable to their national parliaments, has some "executive" functions, but it is dependent on the Commission as its source of legislative intiative. This division of functions, where there is no direct political link between the EP and the locus of executive power in the EC, and where there is no exercise of a comprehensive control function presents a confusing myriad of intricate functions which result in a sense of frustration on the part of many MEPs.

Function 5: The Legislative Function

Under Article 137 of the EEC Treaty, the Assembly exercises advisory and supervisory powers conferred on it by the Treaty. In a study of national parliaments in Western Europe in the mid-1970s, it was generally agreed that the legislative function has generated into a "bill-reviewing role" (Von Beyme, 1974, p. 16). In the EP, there is no formal right to initiate legislation. That power lies with the Commission. The Parliament exercises the right to promulgate own initiative reports and motions. These are not, however, legally binding on any government or institution. It may also produce documents of a quasi-constitutional nature, such as the EP's Draft Treaty establishing the European Union. The EP's Secretariat states that few parliaments in the world

possess the right to introduce legislative initiatives and those which exercise this right do so within narrow limits (EP, 1984a, p. 43). However, national parliaments, unlike the EP, have the final right of decision on legislative proposals put forward by governments.

The EP's "legislative powers" can be summarised as (i) the right to be consulted by the Council (Article 137, advisory powers); (ii) the right of intiative: Article 138 provides for the Assembly to draw up proposals for a uniform procedure for its direct election; (iii) optional consultation of the EP by the Council (Council minutes of 24/25 Feb. 1964, p. 23); (iv) reconsultation of the EP by the Council; (v) rejection of the Commission's proposals (Rule 35 of EP's Rules of Procedure and amendments thereof); (vi) the conciliation procedure (European Parliament, 1984a) (vii) cooperation procedure under the SEA, with regard to the internal market and (vii) the assent procedure on the conclusion of international agreements, consent to accession (Art. 237) and cooperation agreements such as Lomé, Mediterranean basin agreements and their associated financial protocols (Art. 238) under the SEA.

The EP therefore possesses a legislative role, but there are limitations to a power of amendment which cannot be backed by final approval. Such limitations include basing EC actions on Treaty articles which do not stipulate that the EP must be consulted; prior discussion of proposals by COREPER, before the EP examines such proposals and the Council's emphasis on unanimity, even at COREPER level, thereby delaying the transmission of such draft legislation to the Parliament (Coombes, 1979, pp. 22-23).

The consultative powers of the EP have evolved in two ways: the extension of consultation beyond those cases provided for in the Treaties, and the development of procedures whereby consultation develops into co-decision (Lutton, 1985, pp.37-38). The Council consults the Parliament on numerous cases, in accordance with the 1964 resolution wherby it agreed to the extension of consultation with the EP, and in addition the Commission invites the EP's opinion on its programme and on documents of a general nature. Consultation is also improved in amendments to Commission documents. Consultation by the Commission has increased since the direct elections and the SEA due to the Commission's desire to improve the balance of powers in the interinstitutional triangle. The specialised committees of the EP carry out in-depth and often critical evaluations of proposed EC legislation, and produce reports on Council action and Commission proposals. These are not necessarily taken on board by the institutions concerned.

Coombes (1979) is of the opinion that the EP's lack of formal power of initiative in legislation is no real departure from normal parliamentary practice. What he does perceive as a serious limitation is the EP's lack of formal power to reject legislative proposals. While such a formal power would not be likely to be the prerogative of the EP, he questions whether the EP's present powers could give it an effective means of amendment to draft legislation and positive use of the veto and he urges this utilisation of its present powers (p. 20) although the cooperation procedure under the SEA provides that the common position of the Council may be rejected in the EP's second reading stage.

The SEA introduced a new "cooperation" procedure, which applies to very specific cases, between the Council and the Parliament. These cases include legislation on the elimination of discrimination under Article 7 of the Treaty on the freedom of movement of workers, the right of establishment (Articles 49 and 54) and on the establishment of the free movement of services (Article 57) and finally harmonisation directives under the new Article 100a on the functioning of the Common Market. This latter provision excludes tax harmonisation, freedom of movement and provisions relating to the rights and interests of workers, thereby limiting the scope of the EP's involvement.

The Parliament, in its resolution of 27 October 1988 on the results obtained from the SEA's implementation, pointed out difficulties with the cooperation procedure. Despite the political will expressed, when the SEA was finalised by the Council, for more involvement of the EP in the EC legislative process, in the first twelve months after the entry into force of the SEA fewer than half of the amendments which the EP had adopted at first reading and less than 25% of those adopted at second reading had been incorporated into legislation which the Council adopted. The Parliament has also criticised what it regards as the Council's failure to participate adequately in the planning of legislation introduced by the EP and the Commission and the fact that there is no requirement on the part of the Council to complete its first reading "within a reasonable time limit". The EP has also taken the Commission to task for not always publishing its modified proposals following the EP's first reading and for abandoning positions of the EP which it had previously accepted. A clarification of this procedure is clearly necessary (Doc. A2 - 176/88) and the

EP is rightly seeking to make maximum use of this cooperation procedure in order to combat its perceived marginalisation from EC decision making.

The Parliament's dissatisfaction with the SEA in general with regard to its limited scope, and the fact that it falls short of the EP's own project for European Union, has prompted the EP to consider the drawing up of a new draft proposal for European Union "before the 1992 deadline and it will be for the Parliament elected in 1989 to accomplish this task" (Point 23, EP Resolution on SEA, Doc A2 - 176/88). It should be pointed out that the position adopted by the Parliament on the SEA in October 1988 is not a united position, as there are distinct differences of opinion within the Assembly on the SEA and the Parliament's role under the new procedure. In addition, the EP decided to reap the benefits of the SEA by amending it working methods in order to exploit its participation in the legislative process, to comply with the strict deadline during the second reading in accordance with the SEA and to ensure a political link between the first and second readings as well as the achievement of an absolute majority of the EP as a whole.

Function 6: The recruiting function

This function refers to the recruitment of leaders for executive offices, from the legislative body, Bagehot's elective function. The EP is not involved in the selection of government, as there is no legislative/executive overlap, or in the provision of MEPs for governmental posts. It has provided MEPs for Ministerial positions at national and regional levels in the member states, and in this way

the EP can be seen to function as the training ground for the executive, albeit a national executive. In addition the EP makes decisions concerning the elections of its own President and Bureau and the allocation of committee chairpersonships and positions. In this way, the EP's Bureau performs a recruiting function on behalf of the MEPs although this is limited in scope and these decisions do not greatly influence national or EC politics.

Despite the expectations of some observers that the direct elections would lead to the formation of a European government, the political forces which dominated the elections made no effort to take on this function (Steed, 1984, p. 228). Neither was the office of the President of the EP a feature of public discussion during the elections, although the election of the EP President is a highly politicised issue within the EP with the formation of voting coalitions by all groups.

It has been stated that the U.S. Congress exerts it influence not by choosing the executives but by controlling them, once in office, through the exercise of law-making, appropriations and investigative powers (Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979). This is clearly not the case in the EP which has limited powers regarding some aspects of law-making, none in the raising of revenue, and few investigative powers, although it is seeking successfully to further utilise public hearings and conferences, thereby also exercising its educative function.

2.3 Formal powers and real functions: decisions that matter

An important aspect of the EP is that it has legal status, which is similar to
that of other institutions, which allows it to bring actions before the Court of
Justice on constitutional and other matters. In this respect, along with its
institutional, organisational and budgetary autonomy, the EP enjoys an authority
which is lacking or not fully utilised in national parliaments (Coombes, 1979,
p. 12). Organisational autonomy in adopting its own Rules of Procedure is
provided for in Article 142 of the EEC Treaty. The EP has also sought to come
to a decision on its working place, and its position was upheld in the Court
case of Luxembourg versus the European parliament in 1981 (case 230/81).

Budgetary autonomy relates to the expenditure for the MEPs (excluding salaries
which are paid by national governments as no European Statute for MEPs has yet
been adopted), staff, equipment, organisation of meetings, secretarial cost of
the general secretariat and political groups, and recruitment. Staff expenditure
is covered by the EC Staff Regulations. The EP's general budget consists of a
little less than 1% of the Community Budget.

Under Article 175 of the EEC Treaty, the EP can take a Court action "should the
Council or the Commission, in infringement of this Treaty, fail to act". Such
an action, known as "recours en carence", was taken successfully by the EP with
regard to the Council's "failure to act" in bringing about and implementing a
common Transport Policy, which was provided for in the treaty. Such a
precedent will no doubt sharpen the political interaction between the Council

and Parliament. It also illustrates that the EP takes the undertakings of the Treaties seriously, and it is willing to act as "guardian" of such Treaties, despite the allocation of this title to the Commission, when it considers this necessary. It is willing to sharpen its political will in any other situations of failure to act, given its success in the Transport case (11). This case in effect constitutes the right of the EP to bring actions against the Council and the Commission, and in this way, to exercise control over the Council.

This ability of the EP to take the Council to Court had been contested in the past. The Court, in stating that the action was admissible, in effect recognised that the EP is able to institute proceedings against the Council for failure to act, and the report of the Parliament's Directorate General for Research and Documentation correctly stated that "the Parliament has thus secured a new power, providing it with a genuine right of supervision over the Council (EP, 1985, p. 177)".

The Parliament lacks the formal powers to reject legislative proposals and therefore it is important that it exercise its influence fully in obliging the Commission to respect its positions on draft legislation and to adhere to all provisions of the SEA, in order to pursue its representative role. A further lacuna in the EP's sphere of influence is the fact that pre-proposal consultation by the Commission of interest groups, which is an elaborate process of some weeks' duration, is not subject to parliamentary involvement.

The EP has been seen as a pre-parliament, a parliament in the making, attaining legitimacy in the wake of the direct elections. Many scholars foresee a positive future for the parliament in its participation in the EC process. This discussion of its enhanced role is most often linked to its legitimation, its own institutionalisation, and improvement of its internal decision making, its Rules of procedure and institutional reform, for example, and also to the future development of a European party system.

The literature on institutional reform suggests, for example, that by giving the EP co-decisional power, the democratic deficit would be reduced and the SEA went some way in that direction. Weiler's fears that reform would "render a decisional process which is already heavy almost unbearably so" (Weiler, 1986, p.13) have not been borne out. Institutional reform by its very nature involves extensive review of the present system, streamlining of the decision-making process, as in the case of the IGC on the SEA, and hence a less cumbersome decision-making machinery. The allocation of co-decisional powers to the EP (already initiated in the SEA) merits the risk of complicating the decisional process if it serves in some way to legitimise the EP's role and involve it in the legislative process in a more active manner than hitherto.

The institutional provisions of the SEA provide for some co-decision (in the shape of cooperation), as a cooperation procedure is provided for in Articles 7, 49, 54(2), 57, 100a, 100b, 118a, 130e, 130q(2) of the EEC Treaty as amended by the IGC. Consultation of the EP is replaced by cooperation, and the Council's qualified majority decision-making provided for under Articles 49, 54(2), and

56(2), as amended by the IGC, lays down that the Council act and issue directives in cooperation with the EP and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee. The tendency had previously been to associate the EP with the Economic and Social Committee in a purely consultative role under the founding Treaties.

In addition, the provisions of Article 149 have been substantially amended in favour of speedier and more efficient decision-making by the Council and fuller consultation of the Parliament. For example, the Council and Commission should inform the EP of the reason for the Council's common position, and also of the Commission's position on draft legislation (new Article 149, 2a and 2b). Hence, the notion of answerability is strengthened in the EP's favour. Parliament is to approve the common position of the Council, or to take a decision on it, within three months, thereby reducing some delays (or lourdeur) in the process of making EC law. Specific time stipulations for the re-examination of the EP's position by the Commission are also laid down in the Single Act (new Articles 149, 2(c) to (g) inclusive). The assent of the Parliament, by absolute majority of its members, is also required, under the new Article 237, paragraph 1, with regard to applications for EC membership, and regarding agreements concluded by the Council under Article 238 and this latter process has worked smoothly in the first year of implementation.

The EP is a representative assembly where policies are debated and where, regardless of the outcome and institutional impact, parties engage nevertheless in policy-making, in the party groups, which may be at variance with the EC

Council, national governments or domestic parties. The assumption that the EP should be involved in "real" decision-making is normally made on the grounds that the EP is the "legitimate" directly-elected representative of the citizens of Europe and so should consist of real decision-makers. The EP's members are in fact decision-makers within their own institution, with regard to reports, voting, passing resolutions, setting the agendas for committee and plenary, and in the election of its members to leadership positions. The crux is, however, whether these decisions matter in terms of (a) their result and impact on and for the body politic, and (b) the organisation of power of the EC and of the member states.

The problem is not simply who makes decisions, as here the EP would qualify adequately as inits proposed reduction of agricultural prices in the debates of, and rejections of, the draft EC Budget, but rather who makes the important decisions. A large number of its decisions have little impact on the governments of the member states, or the EC power structure. The EP possesses limited power and central power resides elsewhere. While the EP may have few powers, possesses influencein its attempts to ensure that it is not ignored by the other institutions and governments. Its use of part-sessions on such topics as unemployment and environmental issues is a case in point. National parliaments have had up to several centuries in which to arrogate power to themselves. The EP, over its three decades, has attempted, in the age-old tradition of parliaments, to emulate this example in a relatively short period. It is flexing its muscles, as in the rejection of the Budget and the Transport "failure to act" Court case, and this is a pattern which will continue.

Furthermore, the EP's powers and influence are more than the sum of its formal powers granted by the Treaty and statutory instruments (Coombes, 1979, p. 2). Its potential is not limited, although the utilisation of this potential depends on the perseverance and interests of its members and party groups. Marquand (1979, p. 70), in his discussion of the conditions for the emergence of a "new European political class", in the EP, suggests that the EP can choose to be a virile and assertive parliament or a parliament of "has-beens and never-will-bes". However, the alternatives are not as stark as Marquand suggests as the EP consists of a wide variety of political actors, some more dynamic than others. H. Wallace (1979) phrases this dilemma slightly differently. She asked whether the newly-elected EP would find a role for itself in grasping the nettle of the debate on the future political orientation of the EC. It is clear that the EP has taken on this role in its debates on institutional reform and especially in the writing of the Draft Treaty on European Union adopted in 1984 and its consideration of a future Draft Treaty in the light of the SEA.

Not only is the EP different from national parliaments in practice and from legislatures in theory, its constituent parties are also different. The main functions of parties may be summarised as agenda-setting, policy choice formulation, policy decision-making, policy implementation and policy coordination. While the political groups engage in agenda-setting, policy choice formulation and policy decision-making, there are differences from parties in an established political order of a nation state as the party groups operate in a *sui generis* political organisation at the European level. As in all parliaments, the MEPs are faced by some nearly perennial problems with

regard to their functions of "lawmaking". These include the formality of the
debates, the overload of the Parliamentary calendar, the complexity of the
proposed legislative texts and the problem of maintaining contact with the
constituency (Libération, La Vie Quotidienne à l'Assemblée, 5 Nov. 1988, p. 11).

Parties in the EP participate in the secondary level of politics, in the EC,
where the primary loyalty is, or is assumed to be, to the national arena, in a
multi-tier political system. The problems for parties in the EP, compared to
those in the member states, are as follows:

Firstly, the problems of the EC have been traditionally put forward in the EP
in generally non-political language and so the immediate environment is non-
conflictual. Secondly, parties are not competing for governmental office and
cannot influence the tenure of office of the "Government", whether conceived of
as Commission or Council. Lastly, party groups, unlike national parties, are
not the organisers of the electoral campaign, or of party competition in the
election to the European Parliament. The political groups, as groups, lack any
distinctive organisation for seeking support among, and maintaining contact
with, an electorate (Coombes, 1979, p. 32). This lack of effective contact,
despite some involvement of transnational federations, increases the EP's
political parties' estrangement from the voters.

The EP has developed from a relatively consensual parliament to a more
conflictual one, where the party groups were themselves fraught with cleavages
and by fewer pro-European members. The EP became a less "federalist"

parliament, reflecting the major cleavages and interests within the EC. This institutional development could be interpreted as the beginning of the EP's turning away from a nominally federalist approach, supportive of the Commission, to a Parliament carving out a role for itself as a more dynamic institution. The pre-1979 EP was a parliament of dual mandate members and in that context the "divided loyalties" of these members (Kolinsky) became apparent. It had been suggested that the directly-elected EP would be more nationalistic and parochial than the pre-1979 one, as the latter had consisted of "good Europeans" who put Europe first (Marquand, 1979, p. 70). The EP and the national parliaments have generally been viewed as conflicting in competence and in claims to sovereignty, rather than as being complementary. This view of a nationalistic parliament has not been validated by the evidence of legislative socialisation and Europeanisation of the views of the MEPs. The EUI Survey points to a growing awareness of the positions held by the other group members and other nationalities and has led to intragroup cooperation on issues perceived as of transnational relevance. The issue of loyalty to a European party system presents a more fundamental problem, in assessing the MEPs' conception of representation in the EP.

We have attempted in this chapter to sketch the roles, functions and formal powers of the EP as compared with national parliaments and legislative theory. We have, in the process, become aware that there are several role differentiations between the EP and national parliaments. We have also been reminded of the problems of understanding the nature of the EP itself in the context of parliamentary democracy, and the problems of treating the EC as if

parliamentary democracy were relevant to it. Rather the EP and its groups should be analysed in terms of the nature of the EC itself and the problems of understanding integration as a political process.

Many scholars and political actors have devoted some attention to the extension of the powers of the European Parliament. These would consist, for example, of more use of public hearings; extension of the conciliation procedure to all major areas of legislation; use of the motion of censure on the Commission; participation in EPC and in the composition and appointment of Commission and the appointment of a parliamentary Ombudsman. The development of legislative powers would involve more extensive use of own initiative reports; co-decision on the Community Budget; control over the Council in the failure-to-act cases; increase of co-decision and cooperation in other policies and agreements (now in the SEA); power in the raising of revenue and the ratification of Treaties with third countries (the latter now in the SEA). In order to relate the integration process in the EP to member states, the establishment of formalised relations with national parliaments and parties and participation in the committees of national legislatures have been mooted. Furthermore, the elimination of the dual mandate while maintaining links with national parties; more influence for the party groups in candidate selection and the preparation of the electoral campaign, throughout the EC, and reform of the internal organisation of the Parliament have all been the foci of a desire to further politicise the EP and to develop the role of its actors therein. This would develop the EP as an institution, place it more firmly within the decision-

making process of European integration and provide a forum for the development of the party group system.

It has been stated that in the modern parliamentary system of the EC states, parliament still exists as the highest formal level for the settlement of conflicts, despite attempts as conflict resolution by interest groups in extra-parliamentary settings and the recurrent crises of "parliamentary legitimation" (Von Beyme, 1975). This statement cannot stand alone without reference to the conflict-resolution capacities of political parties. Henig (1979, p. 4) aptly suumarised this point by stating that party systems are still a useful indicator of the degree of consensus which it has been possible to establish in society. We are aware that political groups operate in a fluid polity where they, and the party system, have not assumed the role their counterparts play in established polities. In order to understand the role that party groups actually play in the European Parliament, we must consider the question of who or what it is that the EP actually represents.

REFERENCES

1. Vedovato, President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, regarding that Assembly and the European Parliament, in speech made in Rome, 1975, quoted in Kolinsky (ed.), 1978, p.124.
2. Although the French National Assembly does not appoint the government (rather it is appointed by the directly-elected chief executive and head of state), the government is nevertheless responsible to the Assembly.

3. The party groups, following the second direct elections in 1984, were, in order of size, Socialists, European People's Party, European Democrats, Communists and Allies, Liberal and Democratic Group, European Democratic Alliance, the Rainbow Group and the Group of the European Right.

4. The decision of the Heads of government of 8 April 1965 stated that Strasbourg was to be treated as the official meeting place of the EP.

5. Council resolution entered in the minutes of 22 April 1970, quoted in EP Report on the Competences and Powers of the European Parliament (1984a).

6. Bulletin EC-6-1983, point 2.3.3.

7. The vote of censure was moved four times and each time was defeated or withdrawn. The EP adopted a resolution in 1980 that its right of censure implied that it should be consulted on Commission policy and have the right to express its opinion in a vote on the Commission's annual programme. (EP, 1981, pp.6-7).

8. Compulsory or obligatory expenditure "largely means the expenditure resulting from the Common Agricultural Policy, which is in turn dependent on the level of common farm prices fixed by the Council". In practice, non-compulsory expenditure relates to new Community policies created or strengthened over the last ten years. These include the common regional, through the European Regional Fund regulation, the common social policy, through the European Social Fund, policies on energy, research, the environment, etc. These policies accounted in 1986 for 26% of the general budget of the EC as the CAP accounts for 65% and 4% is automatically refunded to the member state to offset the cost of collecting own resources.

Source: EP - Forging Ahead, p. 179.

9. Official Journal of the European Communities, C, 28 July, 1982.

10. Bulletin EC-6-1983, point 2.3.3.

11. Case 13/83, European Parliament (Intervener: Commission) versus the Council (Intervener: Kingdom of the Netherlands). The Court of Justice ruling declared that:

> The Council has infringed the Treaty by failing to ensure freedom to provide services in the sphere of international transport and to lay down the conditions under which non-resident carriers may transport services in a Member State.

Quoted in European Parliament, Directorate General for Research and Documentation: Progress towards European Integration, 1984-1985.

Chapter Three

Elections Vihout Representation?
Representation in the European Parliament,
the Political Actors and the Significance of Direct Elections

The real problem.... is to understand what sort of political system it is
to which the European Parliament belongs. If there is no central
government, if the Community is the result essentially of international
treaties designed mainly to set up a common market, and if there are no
real political parties, then what is the purpose of electing a body called
a parliament in such a system? (Coombes, 1979, p. 5)

This quotation raises the problem of whether the Community can, or should, be
subjected to the principles of parliamentary and representative democracy. We
are positioning the EP in the "fluid polity" system of the EC and we examine
the Parliament's representative function, in particular in the wake of the direct
elections. The EP is the only institution of the European Community which
directly represents the citizens of its twelve member states.

3.1 The concept of representation

The concept of representation is a complex one. Most scholars acceptthat it is
through the process of representation that legislatures are empowered to act
for the body politic and are legitimised (Wahlke, 1962, p.257). The basic
concept is the relationship between the representative and the represented. It
could be seen as an *idem sentire*, of "coinciding in opinion with" (Bagehot,
1867). There can be political representation without election in liberal
democracies. The direct elections to the European Parliament raised the
question of whether we can have elections without representation. It is a
hypothesis of this study that the EP and its members, the representatives, are

in fact largely alienated or marginalised from the voters, the represented. There is little direct relationship, despite the "direct elections", between the electors and the MEPs.

This is attributable to such factors as the nature of the EC as a fluid polity, the nature of parliamentary democracy in that setting, and the special circumstances and environment of the EP, its constituencies, and the nature of the actual elections. We examine these factors in order to illustrate that there is no clear consensus on the nature of representation in the EP. The representatives' tasks are influenced and shaped by constitutional and organisational parameters, the expectations of the other participants and of the representative him/herself, the job to be done, and by the norms of the political culture.

Theories of representation have tended to concentrate on the notion of the representative as the <u>representative of the constituency</u> (involved in the redress of the grievances of that geographical district) or as the <u>representative of the nation</u>, the whole body politic (involved in the debate of policy). As Pitkin (1967) points out, these have normally been regarded as mutually exclusive, or with only minimal impact on each other. There have also been conflicting expectations of parliaments in this regard. Studies have been carried out on the role of the member of the legislature as the trustee or delegate of the geographical constituency, the messenger of the locality, who "goes about persecuting civil servants", or making representations, in the pursuit of the local interest or on behalf of a constituent (Chubb, 1966, Dexter,

1963). That denotes a "deputy", involving patronage, clientelism, regular contact with the voters, and, in some countries the holding of "clinics" or "surgeries" as often as several times a week, in order to deal with the problems of the constituents. The constituency member could therefore hope to be re-elected largely on the basis of his/her constituency work record, with the assistance of a group of party activists. The constituency representative catered for the individual and collective interests of the constituency, and the electoral connection was never forgotten in the representative's legislative behaviour. This member was entrusted to bring the interests of the electoral district to the attention of the executive and to protect those interests from the encroachment of central power in specific areas.

The representative was understood to be "standing for" the voters, and the degree of autonomy conferred on the representatives varied according to the conceptions of whether they had role orientations as a delegate, following the instructions of the constituents with fervent regularity, or as a trustee, entrusted to act as they see fit, and to judge the means to carry out the mandate of representation on their own intuition, as free agents. This distinction might also be described as plenipotentiary versus ambassador ad referendum. The third major role orientation, which expresses orientations of both trustee and delegate, are referred to as politicos. These role orientations characterise representational style, i.e., how the representatives relate themselves to their decision-making behaviour (Wahlke et al, 1962, p.285). In many ways, the representative is conceived of as a delegate, as was apparent in the EUI study of MEPs, Question 1.1, which was phrased as follows:

When you were elected to the European Parliament you probably had quite a few expectations regarding your role as an MEP, the work of the Parliament, its development and so on. Could you please outline what your major expectations were?

The open-ended replies to Question 1.1 revealed that many MEPs, particularly neophytes, regarded themselves as "ambassadors to Europe", defenders of special, national or regional interests. Few held expectations that they would further European integration as a primary commitment. Perceptions were largely constituency-oriented. Expectations included the representation of the constituency or state against the EC's perceived encroachment on national policies; protection of special interests such as farmers, environmental groups and the workers. Others sought to improve policies on unemployment, prices, fisheries, agricultural surpluses, EC institutional reform, European defence, the increase of the EC's own resources and commitment to European Integration.

Table 3.1   EUI Survey: Question 1.2:

       Would you say that, on the whole, these expectations have been fulfilled, partially fulfilled or not fulfilled?

	Respondents	% of respondents
Fulfilled	90	27.2
Partially fulfilled	180	54.4
Not fulfilled	48	14.5
Refused	6	1.8
DK, NA, not ascertained	7	2.1

Intrinsic to the constituency focus is the fact that the representative is linked to a defined geographical district, which implies residency and strong territorial ties. The representative links the constituency to the capital and central government. This is the case in the U.S., Great Britain and Ireland, for example. In all cases, re-election is taken to be the desired goal (if not necessarily the primary objective) of the actors involved and the re-election quest establishes the relationship of accountability with an electorate (Mayhew, 1974).

Accountability involves the fact that the election of parliamentary representatives is linked to the election prospects of the party. Representatives, according to Loewenberg and Patterson, act to affect their tenure of office and feel held accountable before the electors. Representativeness refers to how legislators show that they represent the constituency, and resemble it. Representatives are also communicators as they have the means to deliver their messages, attract publicity and go on record as representative of a specific interest. This aspect of the job and the desire to keep that job are introduced as a pointer to the activities of the representative. This emphasis on re-election should not detract from the representatives' sense of duty, in the achievement of a desired result for the constituency.

Searing (1985b, p. 378) points out that the redress of grievance was Parliament's original function and that this function is still its most popular, as it allows ordinary citizens to have their problems dealt with by the MP's

mediation. Criticisms of this function have been made in literature concerning the political process in the U.S., southern Italy, Japan and Ireland, and by some political actors themselves. They have focussed on what they see as the primary role of the legislator being undermined by the concept of the representative as a type of "social worker" who concentrates on local interests. They see this as the creation of a detrimental dichotomy between the people and the administration as constituents seek assistance from their representative rather than administrative units. This raises the issue of representation of national interests, as distinct from constituency-based interests, and the dilemma faced by representatives in the perceived conflict of interests at the local level and those of the "commonweal".

Burke, in his famous speech to the electors of Bristol in 1774, was quite unequivocal that Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests to be maintained by the representative in the role of agent and advocate. He stated that parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole. In that assembly, the general good rather than local prejudice ought to guide. He concluded thus:

> You choose a member indeed, but when you have chosen him, he is not a
> member of Bristol, but a member of Parliament....

Friedrich (1965) raised the issue of accurate representation of groups and cleavages in the electorate, in proportional representation to accurately reflect the various divisions of the electorate. Yet, he stated that an important part

of representation was to represent the citizenry as a whole, and not just the divisions among them.

Given that conflict management and its resolution are functions of legislatures, then the legislature, through its representatives, legitimises the conflicts and cleavages in society. Such legitimation has also served to construct a nation-state of such groups, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have illustrated. The representative parliament had the primary role of state-building, and, in some cases, in contributing to nation-building (Farrell, 1975). Cleavages were thus politicised in an acceptable parliamentary context rather than in extra-parliamentary groups.

The representation of the "commonweal" has been a feature of political writings since Hobbes' _Leviathan_. Several national constitutions stipulate that members of the assembly act for the whole nation (Pitkin, 1967, p. 216). So, at least constitutionally, representatives are not bound by the voters' (or party's) mandate. The dual task, then, of agent of the locality and governor of the nation, is difficult, but not impossible, to reconcile. In some cases, the constituency _is_ the nation, as representatives are elected nation-wide. This poses a theoretical problem in the evaluation of the focus and mandate of representation in the case of the EP, since direct elections, as the conception of representation differ according to member state.

Although for Bagehot, "constituency government is the precise opposite of Parliamentary government", as the former is regarded as "immoderate",

mutually exclusive, if only because the MP represents in a parliamentary setting
with other political actors, and, in most cases, within a political party. In the
institutional setting, the political process of conflict resolution, management
of agenda, is acted out and here the role of the representative become
pertinent.

The term "constituency" has so far been referred to in geographical terms. The
representative is also responsive to a a party constituency and in some cases
to a "special interests" category. The notion of representation is dealt with
primarily as political representation, i.e., the representation of political
interests (or interests which have been politicised) in an institutionalised
political context. The concept of representation has undergone change with the
passage of time. The theoretical definition of representation has altered as
parliaments themselves have altered and faced threats to their sovereignty,
including the many debates concerning their decline.

The stages of development of parliaments and representation, which we will
apply to the EP, might be briefly sketched as follows:

   (i) The extension of the suffrage and in particular direct universal
   suffrage and the rise of organised mass parties.

   (ii) The alleged decline of parliament and the rise of executive power.

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(iii) Urbanisation, industrialisation, bureaucratisation, and the appearance of new challenges to party government; the rise of new interests (neocorporatism) and the use of direct access to the executive by economic and social interests.

(iv) The new styles of political leadership, influenced by the media, with direct linkage between the leaders of government and the electorate, over the head of the parliament.

(v) The search for new levels of decision-making both above and below the nation-state, i.e., regionalism and the influence of movements of the periphery, on the one hand, and of supernationalism and transnationalism on the other, in the realisation by party governments that they are faced with problems which cross national boundaries. The appearance of alternative parliamentary arenas was perceived by many observers as a threat to the sovereignty of the national parliaments.

Parliaments have thus been in a constant state of flux and evolution since the 13th century, in terms of membership, relationship with the executive and perceived functions - in particular, the legislative and representative functions.

For the representative, members of the legislature may also make policy as the executive comes from their ranks. Many legislatures elect the executive and participate actively in the process of government. In all these processes, "party" is the distinguishing label of the representative. This party identification is also true of the European Parliament, although the EP is subject to constraints as the process of government formation is lacking, as is the power of legislation of policy, and the nature of party competition is distinctly different in the EP, both at the electoral and parliamentary levels.

3.2 Representation in the European Parliament and Direct Elections

Representation in the EP

The ambiguities of the representative process in the EP emerge when we attempt to study the groups, as they consist of national party "delegations" who are also representatives of a transnational group, yet are directly accountable to a geographical constituency which has elected them primarily on issues of domestic relevance. The European party group illustrates the tensions of loyalties in the political organisation which is the European Community.

Just as political parties in a parliament may politicise and legitimise conflicts in a nation-state, so too the parties in the Community may politicise conflicts. Fitzmaurice (1975) states that the parties in the EP served to politicise the Assembly. Since legislatures seek to manage conflict, the parties were also involved in conflicts in the EP, especially in the conflict of loyalties, and in the differing conceptions of political representation.

Representatives in the EP may see themselves as the watchdogs of the EC institutions, but the public conception is of national or local representatives seeking objectives which would ultimately be advantageous to the pertinent member state. There persists a sense of double accountability in EP membership with the ties of national loyalties and transnational cooperation.

The dual representation referred to by Pitkin of constituency representation and representation of the whole (i.e. the nation) is complicated by the fact that, for the MEPs, the body politic as a whole is the EC and hence representation of the whole is not necessarily representation of the nation state. We can refer to representation in the European Parliament as "triple", with reference to the European Community, the nation and the constituency.

Conflict resolution and representation take place in a multi-level system, which encompasses national and European elections and party competition. In each of these levels, party competition is determined by different factors, given that at least theoretically the direct elections may be considered as "second-order" elections, as they do not feature competition for "first-order" governmental office or attain the primacy of a general election (Reif, 1980).

Representation in the EP and its responsiveness to the expectations of the citizens may be defined according to the focus of responsiveness (the constituency), the propensity of the MEPs to respond (representative style), and the components of the responsiveness (the ways in which they respond). The

focus of the constituency relates closely to style, as we have seen, for example in the case of the constituency, national or special interest representative.

The development of representation in national parliaments and challenges to legislatures have also had an impact on representation in the EP. The whole issue of European representation has been reopened by those who have questioned the need for a European-level parliament, when the usefulness of national parliaments and their "representativeness" are already the subject of critical scrutiny. We now move on to a brief examination of parallel developments in the EP.

(i) The extension-of-suffrage challenge, in the EC, was the provision for direct participation by voters in the election of the EP which came about in 1979, although it had been provided for in the EEC Treaty. The nature of representation thus altered with the extension of the suffrage at the EC level, replacing the method of appointing delegates from national parliaments.

(ii) The conflict between the parliament and executive power is also mirrored at the EC level of political decisions. In this case, the EP wields little power, as the Council remains supreme. The absence of a European government or single executive unit at the EC level of politics results in clear role differentiations between members of the EP and national parliaments. The role of the political party is also distinctly different in the EP, as the national party competes for governmental office and has direct linkage with the voters.

In the EC the link between the party and the voters is often a tenuous one. Party groups in the EP do not compete for power or office in the EC.

(iii) The EP is weak because decision making is élite-dominated, bureaucratic and non-democratic, according to Michelman (1981). Its powers in the Treaty are considerably weaker than those of the Council. With regard to the by-passing of the EP by functional interests, the Commission conducts consultation with national and European interest groups on proposed legislation with little reference to the EP. Interest groups have not been immune to the development of the EC's functions in several policies, as the EC has deeply pervaded the business and commercial life of the member states. These interests have taken cognizance of the fact the EC is veritably a common market, by establishing European offices in Brussels. Lobbies of trade unions (ETUC), industries (UNICE), farmers (COPA), and others have made their presence felt in the EC and have attempted, often successfully, to influence EC legislation. Such bodies often by-pass the national parliaments in seeking to directly influence the actual EC decision-makers. The political vacuum in the EP remains and the "inertia of European political forces" is only now being awakened (Bonvicini, 1971). Coombes (1982) emphasises the need for a parliamentary body at the EC level in order to aggregate and integrate special interests by-passing national parliaments into policies designed to serve the common interest. The UNICE (industry) and COPA (agriculture) groups now meet the EP Bureau members regularly and hold information meetings which are often given media attention.

These interest groups actively lobby the EP more now than when it was a delegated parliament. In the EUI Survey Question 35.1 asking MEPs how often they meet people from certain European interest organisations, the results were that 27% met UNICE (industry) often or on occasion, 28% met COPA (agriculture), 19% met COCEE (chambers of commerce), 38% met ETUC (trade unions) and 37% met other interest groups representatives. Observers have pointed out that for many lobbies and businesses in the EC member states, their major source of information are the committees of the EP, "the most open - perhaps because it is the least powerful" of the EC's institutions (1).

Kirchner (1984, p.557) states that until the mid-1970s, the EP was not perceived as an important channel of influence by most interest groups, but that with the granting of budgetary powers to the EP in 1975, the direct elections and the right to amend the Regional Fund since 1978 and "the EP taking up social, regional, environmental and small and medium sized business issues from 1975, the EP became increasingly seen as a target for interest group activities" on the EC level of decision making. Some committees, party groups and individual members of the EP endeavour to meet with interest groups and do not necessarily await the lobbying of such groups. The directly-elected EP provided a forum to represent the interests of special groups in a new way after 1979, and such groups have not been slow in contacting and attempting to influence the MEPs, particularly when such contact could be made at constituency level, as well as in Brussels through the umbrella (EC) organisation. Representation of functional interests therefore takes place in the EP, in addition to the other concepts of representation. MEPs regularly receive visits of interest groups as

well as local party activists during its plenary sessions. These can range

widely in scope. For instance, in December 1984, the President of the EP

received Senator Dooge and the President of the French farmers organisation

(the FNSEA) (2). Those interest groups range from local to umbrella

organisations of sectors of industry, social groups and trade or employer

groups.

The EP's desire to promote contacts with interest groups is analysed by

Kirchner (1984, pp.561-562) who suggests that the EP needs (a) to attain

specialised information from groups in its "legislative" functions of preparing

opinions or working on budgetary issues and (b) learn how such groupings

lobbied the Commission and the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) for its own

bargaining portion and (c) develop links with the general public. Thus the EP

could develop mutual consultation with interest groups, use public hearings

effectively (one of the few tools available to the EP) and become involved in

regional interests. Kirchner proposes a "more formalised link" (p.565) between

the EP and the ESC although it must be kept in mind that the ESC is a largely

advisory body whereas the EP possesses powers, particularly in the financial

running of the Community, which the ESC could not aspire to possess.

Neither must it be forgotten that MEPs may have contact with trade unions

through their political parties and this is true of almost all parties in the

Socialist group, continental members of the Christian Democratic/European

Peoples Party group, and of the Liberal group.

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In addition, MEPs may represent interest groups from all their constituency (e.g. agriculture, business, producers' groups) and may also belong to several extraparliamentary groups or interest islands which seek to influence EC policy (e.g., chambers of commerce, social groups, European movements, European federalist movements, businesses, movements for national sovereignty, organisations for the underprivileged or socially deprived). This is one of the threads of representation woven through the EP's structure and representational pattern.

In April 1985, a grouping of British Labour members launched an initiative to have all MEPs and EP officials register their membership of secret organisations. The MEPs are obliged already, "if they have particular material interests of a personal kind in one of the issues debated in Parliament, to admit so" (3). This declaration demanded that membership of organisations deemed to be secret (including freemasonry) should be information open to the public in order to encourage openness in the EC institutions. The Code of Conduct of the EP's Rules of Procedure of 1987 oblige MEPs to disclose a direct financial interest in a subject when speaking on that issue. In addition, each MEP is required to make a detailed declaration of professional activities and other paid functions (4).

With regard to the bureaucratisation of political decisions, and the need to specialise, the EP possesses specialised committees which address themselves to the intricacies of the EC decision-making process. The Parliament has been criticised as being too specialised, in addressing itself to many, often very

technical interests, and in failing to follow some selected clear-cut approaches to the exercise of its powers in the Community, where it could have some influence on the results and the content of Community legislation, should it choose to be selective in its specialisation.

(iv) The Council has direct contact with the electors of the member states, while the EP is often associated in the public eye, and in the media, with the Brussels bureaucracy, rather than with representation of Europe and hence is marginalised from the EC process. There is no European media.

(v) Lastly, the EP is aware that some national parliaments, particularly in the UK and Denmark, are wary of the EP's strength and influence and any increase in its powers. The EP is attempting to establish and maintain regular contacts and exchange of information with the national parliaments, and their committees dealing with the EC, in order to promote cooperation through this process of mutual socialisation. Parties are aware of the EP as a new forum of political activity by means of electoral competition, particularly since the direct elections obliged the domestic parties to become more involved in European Integration.

3.2.2 The Direct Elections

An observer in the decade after the founding of the Community stated in 1964:

As qualified as their members are and as favourable as the supranational exchange of thought is, European parliamentary institutions will have

little actual weight as they lack legitimation through direct elections and as long as they carry out only insignificant advisory functions (Bracher, 1971).

One problem for the voters was to understand what sort of body they were electing in the first direct elections (Coombes, 1979, p.1). The election took place in unfamiliar and confusing circumstances. Reif and Schmitt (1980) suggested that the direct elections were second-order elections rather than primary elections like national elections. There was less at stake, with a lower level of voter participation, brighter prospects for small or new parties, a higher percentage of spoiled votes, and a mid-term verdict on government parties resulting in fewer votes to those parties.

A second feature was the specific arena circumstances in the political and institutional context. It was a new and unfamiliar arena for all concerned, whether voters or candidates. It transcended national boundaries in terms of the European institution to be elected, while linking first-order political systems. It was a European election where European party groups and federations were largely uninvolved in the electoral campaign.

A third feature was the electoral procedure, which differed according to member state, as did the number of constituencies. Lijphart and Grofman (1984, p.3) state that electoral laws are no longer regarded as unalterable facts and this is true of the laws governing the elections to the European Parliament in the different member states. A uniform electoral procedure for direct elections has

not yet been established, and although there has been agreement on the part of member states and the Parliament that some form of proportional representation should be used, some member states have expressed a reluctance to bring this uniform system into effect.

Reif and Schmitt (1980) surmised that the more distinct the European electoral procedures from those used in national elections, the lower was the turnout. The number of constituencies also varied according to member state. While there were 3000 parliamentary seats in the EC national elections for some 1500 electoral units, direct elections in 1979 involved 410 seats for 106 European constituencies, in accordance with the differing conceptions of the constituency among the different member states.

The issue of national representation was also accorded attention in the wake of the second enlargement of the Community. Morgan (1982, p.150) suggested that the representatives of the new member states in the EP would be likely to be under considerable pressure from their domestic constituencies to use the EP as a channel to promote national or regional interests more strongly than the members from the other member states, and this would reinforce the "existing tendency to make the Parliament an arena for the presentation of national claims". This pressure from the national constituency is a feature of representation in the EP, as the MEPs are deemed by some governments to be representative of these constituencies through direct suffrage.

Table 3.2 Number of seats and constituencies per member state in the 1979 direct elections to the European Parliament

Member state	Seats	Number of constituencies
Belgium	15	3
Denmark	16	2
France	81	1
Germany	81	1-11*
Greece	24	1˙
Ireland	15	4
Italy	81	5
Luxembourg	6	1
Netherlands	25	1
United Kingdom	81	79#

Notes:

* One linked national constituency and/or 11 "land" constituencies.

78 single member constituencies in Great Britain and one three-member constituency in Northern Ireland. In Britain, the first-past-the-post system was used, and the proportional representation, single transferable vote system in Northern Ireland.

˙ Greek MEPs elected in 1981.

Source: European Parliament (1982): Forging Ahead. Thirty Years of the European Parliament, Luxembourg.

The nature of the electoral campaign also influenced EP representation. Many parties and voters themselves were already suffering from a surfeit of elections and the European elections placed a burden on each element of the political process, from organisation and mobilisation of voters to the act of voting itself. In addition, in some member states, the European elections took place on the same day as elections to other assemblies or councils.

In the electoral campaign, the EP had no government-forming responsibility, so there were no interparty negotiations, or media and party and voter speculation, regarding the content of governmental coalitions or the election of the EP's President. There was little interest in the party groups during the campaign. EC issues and European party cooperation had little impact as the elections were fought in the main as national or local campaigns. While in some countries, like Britain and Denmark, the issue of EC membership was conflictual, there was little conflict or discussion in the campaign on this issue.

The election of the EP in 1979 constituted the first direct elections on an international scale, held more or less concurrently, to a parliament which was to be a representative of some 280 million citizens. These elections are significant in many respects. They opened up renewed opportunities for transnational party cooperation, within the EP's party groups and in the extraparliamentary transnational federations. They also opened up new routes of entry to a political career, at the European level. This was also interpreted as a springboard from the EP to re-entry to national or regional politics, and so constituted a new route of entry to national politics.

In some cases, the elections also signified the emergence in domestic political parties of a "European column" which was engaged in the EC level of political activities who would act as the party's specialists on Europe. The direct elections established new terms for the distribution of power in the national party system. With regard to rperesentational roles, the decline of the dual mandate would place a strain and distance on the relations between party representatives in the EP and those in the national parliamentary party, leading to an estrangement and alienation of the MEPs from the national body politic. This can also be interpreted as the appearance of a distinctive and autonomous political class, or European party group system. The function of the MEP as national party representative was not clearly defined during the elections and was to be the subject of debate during the EP's first legislative period.

Furthermore, party representation in the EP no longer reflects representation in the national parliament, and while parties control candidate selection, the party is no longer in a position to select delegates from its national party ranks. It has been suggested that, with direct elections, we now have a political élite which is not based on national political institutions, but a "supranational élite" (Cotta, 1984, p. 126). While this is optimistic at this stage of the political development of the Community, the direct elections raised the theoretical consideration of a European party system as a new form of representation in a uniquely European context.

The European elections were seen by many observers as a means (a) to legitimise the EC institutions, (b) to rectify the democratic deficit in the EC's

institutional structure, (c) to bring about a shift in the power base of the Community from the other institutions to the Parliament and (d) to hail the conception of pan-European political parties. The EP, after direct elections, was also to provide the political dynamism to further European integration. It was expected that the EP would fill the democratic deficit in a Community system where no single institution or body is unambiguously answerable for anything.

Moreover, the very act of holding direct elections does not automatically provide for democracy in the Community. It has been suggested that a uniform electoral procedure is necessary in order to take into account the full effects of being directly elected (Coombes, 1979, pp.3-4). The direct elections were to be the panacea for all ills in the Community, despite its obviously limited power and marginalisation from the EC decision-making process. On the other hand, the very holding of the direct elections is considered by Coombes to have endowed the EP with political authority and "this is precisely why it has been resisted". In 1988, the EP issued a declaration on the right of nationals of member states of the EC to stand for election to the EP in each and every member state (Declaration 12/88 of EP), thereby denoting a transnational flavour to European elections, which would not necessarily have national representatives for member states and would break the mould of party group membership being organised along the lines of domestic party delegations.

Whereas the EC Council was to continue to represent the interests of the member states, the EP was to represent those of the EC public, an amorphous mass of

almost 300 million people in widely divergent geographical constituencies. One observer has suggested that the MEPs take it upon themselves to defend the interests of a given region and that in this regard the Assembly would resemble a general council where each defends his/her own canton (5).

The direct elections could be interpreted as conferring legitimacy on the actions (however limited in scope) of the EP. The Patijn and Tindemans Reports both envisaged that these elections would confer on the exercise of power by the Community a legitimacy which had hitherto been lacking. This "legitimacy" has often been confused with authority and increased powers for the EP. Piet Dankert, on being elected President of the EP in January, 1982, stated that the EP's greatest asset was its legitimacy, "which we owe to the direct elections in 1979 but which is not, in reality, a permanent quality". He set the debate on authority and representation of the electors on a sound footing in the same speech:

> A Parliament can have no authority, unless, in the eyes of those for whom it speaks, it is the representative of the electors. It cannot be (their) representative unless it makes their problems its own, unless it seeks realistic solutions to those problems and uses the powers formally conferred upon it to transpose those solutions into laws. We have neither that authority nor that power" (6).

Considering these limitations, the EP possesses at best a "legitimacy" solely because of its direct mandate. This legitimacy must be linked to actual efficacy of the EP is as a representative assembly and power-wielding

institution. Lodge (1982, p. 262) suggests that rather than pursuing "democratic legitimacy" directly through an increase in the EP'spowers, the MEPs have concentrated on their expressive and representative functions, and not on their legislative ones, in their attempts to carry out a publicity and educative function with the voters and in attempting to put its own house in order by means of the improvement of its Rules of Procedure (see, for example, the Nord Report).

3.2.3 The MEP as representative and party member

In the present system of electoral procedures for direct elections to the EP, it is very difficult to compare rather disparate procedures, methods and norms. A representative of several million voters cannot be expected to perceive of his/her role in the same way as a representative of a province or region of some half a million people. Thus the linkage mechanism with the constituency is complicated by the electoral laws. The communication function between the MEP and the electors is placed under considerable environmental constraints. Sartori (1976, p.1x) argues that parties are the central intermediate and intermediary structure between society and government. It is not possible to view the relationship between the EP's political groups and member states as such a structure.

There are few structures for linkage between the MEPs and national or local party organisation in most member states, although efforts to improve relations and cooperation are being made by the EP and the national political parties

(Ionescu and Morgan, 1988). The MEP is not a "national parliamentarian" and so is not privy to party and national parliamentary rights and privileges. These include the right of access to the national parliament, its resources, facilities and information and yet the MEP does not relate to or have a direct linkage with an EC structure either. MEPs in some member states do however have access to their national parliaments. In Belgium, for instance, MEPs are full members of their national parliament's European Affairs Committees.

The MEP is subjected to a double accountability or divided loyalties in the EP, as national and EC politics are so often seen as being conflictual, and yet the MEP is not directly linked to the power nucleus of either decision-making process. Loyalty to the party group, the equivalent of Sartori's intermediary structure, is not dependent on participation in a government party, and so party loyalty is not necessarily primary.

The eight party groups in the EP are the parliamentary groupings or alliances of party representatives of different nationalities along the lines of a perceived alignment or common traditions. The study of parties assumes the existence of a polity, whether it came about at the same time as parties, who then played an integrative function in state-building, or whether the polity evolved and took shape before parties formally appeared. The problem then is to analyse the party groups within a structure of power which does not fully constitute a political community. Can one assert, for example, that only when (or if) European parties emerge at the EC level of politics can we really talk

of the European Community as a polity, or does this place too high a value on the importance of political parties in the polity?

While parties have often played a major, if not decisive, part in the establishment of political communities, this is not yet the case with the party groups in the EC. Lipset and Rokkan point to the pertinence of parties in the building of the legitimation of the state, its conflicts and cleavages. Will the European Community then only become truly legitimate when it possesses its own political parties? How much political power must exist at the European level before the marginalised political forces of the Community could be Europeanised and institutionalised? These questions will be kept in mind in the study of the MEP in the party group, while it is realised that these problems will continue to tease political scientists for some time, given the fluid state of the EC as a "polity".

As MEPs do not sit in national delegations, party (group) representation is the characteristic which is most evident in the EP, at first sight. MEPs join committees on the basis of their own interests, but such placements are allocated according to group in a political allocation of resources, decided by group representatives in the Bureau, who run the EP's political organisation according to strict rules which are developed in order to favour the groups.

The relationship with the voters also merits attention. The responsiveness of the legislatures to the political expectations of the citizens is pertinent in this context, and the understanding which the MEPs may have of these

expectations and their role orientation in this regard. Linkage and responsiveness in the EP are undergoing analysis at present as the EP remains alienated from those functions to a large extent.

The EP is constitutionally representative of "the peoples of the Community", and yet the direct elections constituted an election without (direct) representation as the EP is one step removed from the national party and political systems and from the linkage (communication between MEPs and constituents) mechanisms for effecting representation of the voters. The MEP cannot link the constituency to the capital when there is no EC or EP capital. Representation of the constituency is in accordance with national interests, and, for those MEPs representing regions, regional as well as national interests come to the fore.

As we have come to understand the environment of the EP, its functions, powers, nature of representation, and possible future development, we are in a position to state that the EP is not completely alienated from decision making at the national and Community levels, although it is estranged from direct influence in either arena. This is due to the fact that the EP consists of parties whose national leaders are often ministers in the Council of Ministers, or in opposition in the national parliament, and so they are not totally divorced from EC decision making. They are however estranged from this system in that they are not directly involved in the EC as political actors. The debates in the EP often mirror, at a different level, the issues which may be before the Council for decision and the Parliament gives these issues a public airing in an

atmosphere of less political intensity, as there is less at stake in terms of governmental office and security of tenure. In this aspect, it resembles the Upper House of some national systems.

The thesis addresses itself to the nature of representation and whether the party groups provide for the representation of the MEP within the groups. The focus of representation is also analysed, as it is represented through the group structure. We shall therefore attempt to examine the variables relating to party representation in the next chapters. Representative roles are examined in relation to the styles and foci of representation, and a consideration of the loyalties and conflicts of interests regarding the ties of the party group, the national party, geographical constituency and special interests. These will be examined by party group, in order to understand the representation of the nation, group and other interests and the prospects for cohesive party-like groups which attempt to direct the EP towards a deeper involvement in the European Community and its political decision-making process.

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6.   Speech quoted in Lodge, 1982, p.259

Chapter Four

The Study of the Party Groups in the European Parliament -
Origins and Development

4.1 Introduction

The creation of ties between members of different nationalities on the
basis of related political opinions was only to be expected (Kapteyn, 1960,
p. 247).

This thesis explores the representativeness, cohesion and expression of
interests in the party group and whether it can speak with one voice in the EP.
The following chapters will therefore explore the origins of each of the groups
in the EP - the organisation, distinguishing features and changes over time.

The political groups are described in the following chapters on the basis of
historical accounts of and literature on the groups' formation and development,
and of group documents. In addition, unstructured interviews were held with the
members of the group secretariats and the Secretaries General of most groups
over time, from 1980 to 1986. The full interview schedule is outlined in
Appendix A. Each of approximately 40 respondents were interviewed on an
average of three occasions.

4.1.1 Approaches to the study of groups

There is a general lack of a comprehensive theoretical approach to the study of
the EP's groups over time. While some analysts have concentrated on the
attitudes of national parties in the national arena of politics to the European
Community, others have chosen to investigate the transnational links of party
organisations in the extraparliamentary federations (e.g., Neidermayer, 1981)

and within the party groups (e.g. Pridham and Pridham, 1981), in particular in recounting the activities of the groups in Parliament. There is no general consensus, whether among academic observers or the political actors themselves, as to the status of the groups as political entities.

The literature on the party groups in the European Parliament has so far tended to concentrate on three broad approaches. The first is to relate and explain the parliamentary activities of the transnational groups in the EP and to attempt to draw some hypotheses from them, with reference to the future of a European party system, for example Fitzmaurice, 1975, Pridham and Pridham, 1979, 1981. The Jouve (1984) study of party groups provides little further information as it confines itself to a description of the groups on the basis of their documents rather than their activities.

The second treatment of European transnational party cooperation consists of an examination of the position adopted by various national parties towards the EC and attitudes to European policy in general. This has generally been analysed in the context of the national political system, and of the influence of the party's "external relations" policy in that arena, e.g. Lodge on the SPD (1980) and Brown on the Irish Labour Party (1981). The focus of the third approach has been the elaboration of the transnational links and programmes between parties of similar ideology in extraparliamentary federations or confederations at the European level (Neidermayer, 1981 and 1986, Menke, 1980).

In these treatments of the international cooperation of political parties, the national party remains the nucleus of the analysis. In the EP before direct elections, parties were represented on the basis of results of national elections. All MEPs held a dual mandate on the basis of party strength and were part-time delegates to a part-time parliament.

The three broad lines of study highlight the lacuna in the theoretical approach to the study of our subjects, the directly-elected members of the party groups. The cooperative approach to the study of political parties leaves much to be desired for the analyst of the EP, as the groups are not parties in themselves, but rather are an amalgam or coalition of interests, which are for the most part delegations of parties.

Much of the literature on the EP groups over the last decade examined enthusiastically the possible evolution of the groups as proto-parties. Such approaches were more optimistic than has been borne out in the development of the groups. Early writers in the first phase of the literature, such as Van Oudenhove (1962) and Fitzmaurice (1975), suggested that party groups were in the ascendant. In the late 1970s, a more negative approach was evident in the literature and it is postulated by this writer that groups are now in a steady state of development.

While Pridham's writings on the EP suggested that the discontinuity of the groups from parliamentary groupings to real parties was being bridged over, this does not appear to be the case, and evidence suggests that the

confederations have no real role to play as extraparliamentary wings of the proto-European parties. Even the federations' role of paymaster has been negated in the wake of the May 1986 Court case concerning the financial allocations for the 1984 electoral campaigns.

The rich body of literature on the study of parties provides us with some models for the understandings of "parties" in the EP, while ultimately the groups may be viewed as new phenomena, perhaps as party federations in the sense used in the U.S. before the Civil War, that is, as loose amalgams or coalitions of interests, influences, ambitions and pressures. The groups constitute "combinations" of such interests, as parliamentary "groupements" for voting and other instrumental purposes, rather than as European-wide parties in a European party system.

The party groups resemble the U.S. style electoral parties which form cartels in order to campaign for elections. They are not in a position in the EC to act as a political party. Between European elections, the group is cut off from its electors and from the source of its electoral support. Despite the fact that direct elections have now taken place, the domestic party at first took even less interest in the EP's activities than during the phase of the dual mandate and it perception of the EC is different (Ionescu and Morgan, 1988). Each category of deputy, national and European, has its own life and lifespan and there are relatively few meetings between and overlap of the two. Rather, the representational styles of the two have become more disparate, despite the

existence of transnational electoral federations, the European confederations of parties with electoral common programmes for direct elections.

This rather pessimistic configuration does not suggest that the groups and their members have no function in the European Community. Rather it suggests that the EP may not be the forum for the simple transplanting of national party politics and cleavages from the national arena to the arena of the European Community. There is no matching relationship between the political families at the national level and the European party groupings. Groups, of allegedly the same ideology in the EP, have component parties which are often very different at home.

The EP may prove to be the forum for parliamentary groupings (not parties) which choose to represent interests rather than nationalities. The EP manifests elements of a "lobby parliament", with a conception of representation which encompasses European-wide as well as regional interests and constituencies (and not necessarily national interests, which are already evident in the Council and European Council). The EP may thus evolve, not as Spinelli's "constituent assembly", but rather as an assembly which develops its own expertise, and its own European initiatives, which need not be Treaty-based. The EP already possesses its own powers of control in the Budget, and it has also gone beyond the Treaty and its formal powers to the elaboration of a critical role, as evidenced by its reports on defence and security. On technology a similar pattern is emerging. The conclusion to be drawn is that the classical role of parliaments and of political parties has limited relevance to the EP and its

party groups, and hence a new notion of the representation of interests and promotion of policies is emerging in the EP. It lies with the groups to become more disciplined and cohesive in order to advance their policies and interests in the EC.

In the literature on parties, a comparison may usefully be made across ideologies and national boundaries. The groups may be compared with each other, for example, with regard to such common problems as the maintenance of cohesion, leadership struggles and voting patterns in plenary. The groups constitute a form of political organisation, which varies according to group, in which members cooperate in order to serve political or personal interests, whether as cohesive units, or whether they focus on such cooperation as a means to serve the individual ends of the members. The study of political parties is itself a discipline of disparate strands, not least with regard to the description of the party itself. The debate as to the "partyness" of party government has served to clarify some of the terms, approaches and functions of parties in Western societies (Castles and Wildenmann, eds., 1986), while on the other hand the actual criteria for what constitutes a party remain problematic. Analyses and definitions of parties, party typologies, coalition theories, lists of criteria based on ideological lines, electoral strength and type of party system (the "number of parties" debate) have all contributed to the study of party systems. In this chapter we describe what is known about the groups in the EP and their origins.

A study of a political party involves the study of the party's origins, its organisation (e.g. Michels) and of its membership. It traces the origins, the internal structure and the motivations and behaviour of the actors, the ways in which the functions of leadership recruitment and issue-formulation are carried out and the ideological content of the programmes and pronouncements of the party.

In addition, it examines the interaction between these parties and the political systems in which they function (Lawson, 1980, p.20). While Riggs (1968) sees party as "any party which nominates candidates for election to a legislature", Schlesinger sees it as "the political organisation which actively and effectively engages in the competition for elective office". Lawson puts forward the following definition:

> A political party is an organisation of individuals that seeks continuing electoral and non-electoral authorisation from the public (or a portion thereof) for specified representatives of that organisation to exercise the political power of particular government offices, claiming that such power will be exercised on behalf of that public.

She continues by saying that only political parties fit the terms of this definition (Lawson, 1976, pp.3-4). However, political parties or parts thereof, in the European Parliament, do not compete for governmental offices. Sartori refers to Barnes' definition of party as "the communication network that functionally specialises in the aggregation of political communications....for a party" (Barnes, 1967).

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It is not useful to speak of parties in a political structure which is not a polity. The assertion that we may have parties on the European level - a Common Market of parties - is dependent on whether one sees Europe as a would-be polity. In this fluid polity, the party group system has not as yet assumed the role which it occupies in established polities (Sartori, 1976, p.255).

There are several approaches to the study of parties. There is the historical approach which places emphasis on the origins of the parties, and on their growth. While Epstein (1967) emphasised the importance of parliaments as the focus "of party organisational efforts", the extraparliamentary origins also deserve investigation. La Palombara and Weiner (1966) develop the approach by studying the party system. The structural approach looks at the formal organisation of political parties and the role relationships among the party members. Ostrogorski (1902) and Michels (1912) were the pioneering spirits in their studies of power and leadership. A third general approach, a behavioural one, poses the question - what do people do in and about political parties? The focus is on three types of behaviour related to a party - leadership, activism and voting. Emphasis is placed on the effectiveness of party leaders, on the behaviour and background of party activists, and the characteristics and roles of the voter.

A fourth approach has been labelled the functional-systemic approach. The literature inquires into the relationship between the subject and its environment, for the effect one has upon the other (Lawson, 1976, p. 11). The salient question is:

What, if any, function does this party perform in making the political system operate as it does (e.g., persevere, change, self-regulate, perish)?

A development of this, taking the substructure as the dependent variable, is the exploration of the function of a democratic constitutional system, in producing and maintaining competitive political parties. Parties are presented as intermediary agents or brokers, or the performers of interest aggregation, especially in the role of giving structure to political conflict. This takes us on to the concept of national integration and the role parties play in building a sense of nationhood, in three distinct ways - expressing, directing, or absorbing public opinion. Some observers hold the view that parties may have a negative effect or no role to play in integrating a nation (Grodzin, 1960), or that parties may have a limited role to play in Western democracies (King, 1969). This is relevant in our assessment of the limited role played by the parties in Europe in the early phases of European Integration (Haas, 1968).

A fifth approach is the ideological approach. Here, the party's ideology is the main concern of the researcher, who asks what the party "stands for" and examines the tenacity of that stand and the goals set to achieve it. Those who represent this approach examine the ideology, party programmes, and goals of parties, centring attention on the issue orientation of parties, and the intensity of the ideological commitment, often compared with its legitimate voting record.

For the purposes of the present study, certain characteristics are assumed to be more important than others, given the *sui generis* nature of the subject under investigation. The political groups are not parties, although they may in some respects resemble parties. Definitions of parties do not advance the study of party groups in the European Parliament. Rather, one should accept Schlesinger's (1985, p.1152) advice with regard to the new American political party, that one should use a theory that accepts party groups for what they are, rather than imposing on them impossible norms which are implicit in so many models of party.

The difficult task of comparing party systems in the national political arena with the EP is complicated by the lack of adequate measurement of the variables to determine the major features of the two systems (i.e. national and European). The 12 member states are not directly comparable to the supranational level of the *sui generis* EC. Generalisations from one political system to another are hence difficult and may not be relevant as existing comparative studies are of limited use in explaining the EC. However, Harmel and Janda (1982) emphasise that a democratic political party is a creature of its environment, and they introduce two categories of factors involved in the development of the party. These are:

(1) The structure of political opportunities.

Careers (Schlesinger, 1966), the offices, the rules for attaining them, the general pattern of the behaviour surrounding their attainment.

(2) The party system.

The relationship between parties, particularly the relative chances that each

party has of winning various elective offices. The control variable of the

level of competetitiveness for each party office differs among the offices and

over time. In the EP, the elective offices are controlled by the party group.

Sartori (1976) focuses on party sub-units, the major and most significant

breakdown below the party level, on the basis that a party is an aggregate of

individuals forming constellations of rival groups. The party is a system

whose parts are sub-units, which may be national blocs, or individual voting

blocs, e.g. pro or anti EC blocs. Some EP groups, such as the Socialists or

Communists, possess readily identifiable factions, while others speak with one

voice on many issues, but have fractionalised voting on others. The group is a

combination of sub-units which emanate from the national polity and which then

operate in a fluid polity.

4.1.2.   Party cohesion.

Party cohesion has been the subject of a number of studies in recent years, as

it is a salient feature of political parties. The assumption has been that

parties, in order to constitute parties, must appear to be coherent in some way

which distinguishes them from a non-party. On the other hand, the actual

dynamics of internal cohesion and discipline remain unknown variables in

political studies. Daalder reminds us that internal party processes remain very

much a blank spot in comparative analysis (1984, p. 3).

The party groups are now faced with the problems of reconciling the aims of cohesion with the fact that they constitute combinations, many of which are l arge and unwieldy. They now confront a problem of how to aggregate interests and diverse styles of representation within the group. The political scientist must come to terms with different modes of political and organisational behaviour in the study of the EP.

The groups are legally recognised in the EP's own organisation and procedure. The main benefits of group membership include the opportunity to realise one's party programme or individual goals through the group. Members could avail of group acquaintances in order to influence group partners' stand on and knowledge of specific issues. Increased parliamentary resources, votes, secretariat, research and development resources, financial aid and speaking times were available in greater amounts than to individual party delegations or to smaller groups. Funds are allocated to groups as a basic amount for each group, with a pro-rata amount for each group member plus (since 1973) a percentage increase in pro-rata amount according to the number of working languages used in the groups. Expenditure control procedures require that each group submit a periodic report to the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Control on the use of the appropriations.

4.1.3. The groups as agents of integration

The groups' representative function is not clear. They are combinations of representative functions and pressures. The groups have been seen by some

observers as agents of integration, and as such they would integrate the cleavages of the EC in a legitimate, politicised manner in the EP. In this way, they resemble articulation parties rather than governing parties and their role as channels of information is relevant in the performance of their representative functions. They articulate the needs and interests of those whom they represent. It is essential to seek to understand the relationship of the MEPs to the political groups and the significance of that relationship for national, group, party and other allegiances.

Since the origins of the ECSC, various analysts including Haas (1959) and Bonvicini (1971) have studied the relevance of the party groups as agents of integration in a quasi-federal European Community. Haas saw the Assembly's parliamentarians as crucial actors in the process of integration for two reasons. Firstly, they seek to create a federal Europe in their parliamentary activity, or they choose to negate such a federation. Secondly, such parliamentarians could enhance the practice and code of behaviour which would be typical of federations. Haas did not regard the groups as parties, but rather as actors involved in international diplomatic relations roughly equivalent to trade unions. As such they function as centres of communication, of contacts and value-sharing.

For Haas, a federation-wide party is made up of "strongly autonomous, if not independent" state and local units, with no direct contact with the citizens. Such parties would have internal cohesion, with solidarity in the election of federal officials. The principle of binding party voting would not be accepted.

In order to merit the label of " federal", the party would need to be supported

by and identified with groups which enjoy federation-wide membership and

interests. In the present EP, some groups have affiliations with trade unions

at the national and Community level, as well as business and consumer groups.

The party groups are not, and have never been, autonomous of state units,

although the distance between them and the nation state grew afterdirect

elections. The principle of binding voting behaviour is not a norm, but it is a

feature of voting behaviour of the groups in some cases, and an explanation of

vote is normally requested when members vote against the group line,

particularly in issues related to the Parliament's control of the Budget. Haas

also stipulates that in a federal parliament, federal law would determine the

means whereby the MEPs are elected. He pointed out that the Assembly of the

ECSC fell short of that criterion, and the EP still does in the late1980s, as no

single electoral law has been agreed by Community law (see Sasse et al, 1981).

With regard to representation at the Community level, Haas (1958, p.408) ponders

whether the Assembly of the ECSC represented the totality of the Community, or

are the parliamentarians spokesmen of their nation states. That problem is as

relevant in the wake of the direct elections as it was in the first decade of

the Assembly. There is also an awareness of a Community position qua

Community in foreign policy, unemployment and economic policy, for example, and

many MEPs are critical of the EC when it appears to fall short of its tasks of

combatting major transnational problems. The EP has institutionalised sessions,

regular committee and plenary meetings, and is less dependent on national

events than before 1979. With regard to national influence on representation in

the EP, Haas's statement still holds true that: "in case of ambivalence between national and supranational assignments, national pressure carries the day, since it is here that re-election is obtained, and not on the basis of anything said, done or voted in Luxembourg or Strasbourg" (p. 409) on the basis of the interviews held with EP officials.

We must ask whether the groups constitute party-like entities and whether the term "party" can be applied to them, or only, for example, to those groups which maintain extraparliamentary transnational party links in an institutionalised structure such as the party federations. At the time of the first direct elections, there were expectations that somehow the parties in the EP would fill a political vacuum at the EC level, attain political power, and eventually become European political parties. We question what form of political organisations the groups are and what distinguishes them from parties which operate solely in the national arena. Compared to national parties, we ask to what extent they consist of factions or "tendences", or are their cleavages of a nature which is mostly pertinent to the arena of EC politics?

4.2 The origins of the party groups: the development of transnational party links

When the precursor to the present EP, the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) first met in 1952, party groups were not envisaged in the Treaty of Paris. Nevertheless, early observers of the Community process saw the creation of such groups as inevitable. Boisson (1959, p.81), for

example, suggests that it seemed "natural" for parties to come together in ideological groupings with their counterparts because they were dealing in common with European affairs. Kapteyn (1962, p.84) saw groups as foreseeable due to the prior existence of international party activity in the shape of Internationals. The Christian Democrats and Liberals had formed such transnational organisations in the 1940s, in the shape of the CDs' Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI) (1947) and the "Liberal International" (1947). The Socialist International had by this stage a long and chequered history of party cooperation.

The original political families were set up in the ECSC in 1952 along the lines of established political and party traditions - Christian Democrat, Socialist and Liberal - in the six founding member states. Duverger (1966, p.25) suggested that, despite the disparity of national origins and developments of the political parties in the Assembly, European political parties were part of a "grand movement" throughout Europe, while Houdbine simply saw the Assembly's groupings as a new political opportunity to be grasped by the parties in the new Community. The formation of the groups was a historically-based phenomenon in the post-war period. It was an alternative to the seating of national delegates in national groupings, which did not appear to fit in with the mood of the time - a near abhorrence of the nationalism of the era - and with the emergence of a federalist movement in a war-scarred Europe. It was the party groups who were responsible for the organisation and operation of the new parliament, acting as the "politicising" agent of the EP (Fitzmaurice, 1978).

The continued existence and growth of the groups is attributable to their internationalist leanings, particularly the Socialists and CDs, which was also evident in the Council of Europe. In addition, the self-perpetuating mechanisms of the groups' institutional structure and benefits to members became institutionalised in a structure which, once established, was difficult to dismantle, particularly in view of its permanent staff. This, unlike the parliamentary membership of the EP, did not alter with changes of national governments. Benefits of group membership were soon grasped by the members (and were to be more fully explored with direct elections) although they were also to place limits on the freedom of legislative action of some MEPs within the group structure.

By 1947, earlier transnational contacts had been established within each of the three major European tendencies of Socialism, Christian Democracy and Liberalism. There was little Communist transnationalism on a purely European level. Each tendency contributed to the Community structure, through its involvement in the ECSC Assembly. The ECSC parliamentarians attributed the ease of creating party groups partly to the communication channels opened by early contacts as well as to the habit of inter-party consultation in the Council of Europe's Assembly since 1949 (Haas, 1959).

While the Socialists were perceived as the most international of the tendencies and as the founders of the political groups in the Assembly, the Christian Democrats stressed the fact that the great founding fathers of the European Community were numbered among its ranks (Claeys and Loeb-Mayer, 1979, p.462).

irregular, with little organisation on the part of those parties who were distinguished by their characteristics as individualistic parties of notables rather than as mass parties. These transnational links of three of the major tendencies in the Communities provided centres for exchange of perspectives, but did not constitute foci of support for a united Europe. They served to provide a reference point for cooperation across national frontiers and for an awareness of common political positions. The other major tenedency, Communism, was not accorded representation in the Assembly by the national governments during and just after the Cold War period.

4.2.1 Institutionalisation of the party groups

There is no evidence to suggest that, once the incentive to form groups, along the lines of shared common beliefs, was taken, any other alternative political organisation was discussed in detail as a feasible means of action. The option of national delegations was rejected within a year of the creation of the ECSC Assembly. The group structure quickly gained recognition, particularly with the unprecedented allocation of generous financial resources, in addition to secretarial and research staff, thereby greatly facilitating the organisation of the group network. The politicisation of the party groups began in the 1950s, with their initiatives regarding the European Defence Community, as the Ad Hoc Assembly, and with their debates on the politically sensitive aspects of the European Coal and Steel Community.

The institutionalisation of the group system thus came about with the early politicisation of the Assembly itself, when it debated the EDC and the European

Political Community in 1953-55, and set up a Working Group for the promotion of intensified efforts at European Integration (Haas, 1959, p.400). The Assembly in 1953 established permanent committees, with fixed national quotas and recognition of equitable party representation, and undertook committee investigations. It was during this period that it sanctioned the legal establishment of the political groups with Community funding.

Table 4.1 Composition of political groups of the EP: 1953-1979

	CD	SOC	LIB	EPD	ED	CON	TC	NA
1953	38	23	11					5
1958	37	22	17					2
1963	65	35	26					15
1965	62	35	26					17
1970	62	35	26					17
1975	51	49	25	17	20	15		6
1979(Jan)	53	66	23	17	18	18		
1979(Jun)	108	112	40	22	64	44	11	9

KEY: CD   Christian Democrats

     SOC   Socialist

     LIB   Liberal

     EPD   European Progressive Democrats

     ED   European Democrats (Conservatives)

     CON   Communists and Allies

     TC   Technical Coordination of Independents

     NA   Non-affiliated

Unlike the Assembly of the Council of Europe, where the status of party groups never replaced the primary importance of national delegations, the establishment by the EP of a definitive group structure yielded practical results fairly soon. The first benefit was financial. In 1953, a block grant of 500,000 Belgian Francs plus allocations for each group member was made to the group. Members were to form the groups according to political persuasion and no person could be a member of more than one group. The minimum number necessary to form a group was nine, in order to afford representation on each committee (Rule 34, Rules of Procedure, 1953). In addition, the following features which served to increase the influence of the group in the Assembly were introduced:

(1) The seating arrangement was changed from alphabetical order to seating based on group affiliation, ranging from the Left to the Right of the political spectrum.

(2) Groups began to express a common group position, usually through a party delegation leader, in debates of the House.

(3) Speaking time was allocated mainly according to the size of the group, resulting in an apparent "increased incisiveness on the part of the speakers" (Lindsay, 1960, p.21). Non-membership of a group implied the allocation of a very small ratio of speaking time. The EP's present Rules of Procedure (Rule 65.1.2) provide for allocation of speaking time after consultation with the chairpersons of the political groups.

(4) Increasing importance was attached to resolutions and amendments by groups as distinct from individual motions, and this was to be institutionalised in the Rules of Procedure with the requirement that

motions for resolutions be signed by a stipulated number of MEPs or by a
group.

(5)   The introduction of the representation of group opinion at the
enlarged Bureau's agenda-setting meetings. The enlarged Bureau consisted
of the Bureau (President and Vice-Presidents) and group Presidents.

(6) Group affiliation rather than national representation came to be the
determinant of the allocation of positions in the Assembly (committee
positions and chairmanship and rapporteurship) in accordance with the
d'Hondt system of proportional representation, with points allocated to
each group and a value of certain points to each report to be drafted in
committee.

In the present Parliament, under the Rules of Procedure, members may organise
themselves into groupings according to political affinities (Rule 26.1), and a
member may not belong to more than one political group (Rule 26.4). The Rule
concerning the minimum membership of groups encourages the formation of
transnational groups from the very beginning. Under this rule (26.5), a
minimum number of 23 members is required to form a political group if all the
members come from the same member state, or 18 if they come from two member
states, and 12 if they come from three or more (EP Rules of Procedure, 1987).

Finally, the financial support ensured the establishment of group secretariats
for research and documentation, allowances for group meetings and for group
preparation for debates. Lindsay (1960) adds that the party groups gave

members a new bond with their own parties in other such assemblies throughout Europe. He remarks of the Council of Europe's Assembly:

> "There is less need for political groups, because the work is not of such a nature that it demands continuous cooperation by a steady majority, as in national governments, where parliament legislates and maintains a government." (1960, p.65).

He further suggests that the emergence of political groups and their official recognition was the strongest single element in changing the character of the ECSC Assembly (p. 23).

The Assembly of the ECSC was far from being a legislating parliament, however, although its powers were enhanced somewhat by the scope of the new Treaties in 1957. The Assembly primarily constituted a forum of political debate. Its members were dual mandate MEPs, who represented their party in the EP on a part-time basis and whose term of office was determined by national elections. National considerations determined their EP legislative term.

The influence of the national polity on the EP was counter-balanced by the commitment to a federalist assembly and a certain amount of legislative socialisation and inter-party cooperation among the MEPs, which amounts to a "Europeanisation" of views and attitudes, as illustrated by Kerr in 1973. Socialisation took place primarily within the group structure. The real costs of not being a member of a group were evident as benefits weighed in favour of the group, once the institutional structure was established.

Lindsay informs us that some Council of Europe Assembly members deplored the creation of ideological allegiances as "artificial allegiances superimposed on existing individual and national divisions" but it was precisely these divisions which were to provide the essence of political conflict throughout much of the EP's existence. It became apparent in the 1950s that pro-European aspirations had been dashed to a large extent in the Council of Europe, or at least were to be expressed in terms of cultural and social cooperation, and so it was to the European Assembly that federalists turned for political cooperation and enhanced integration.

It was this Assembly (1953-55) which, in its role as an Ad Hoc Assembly on the European Political Community, framed a draft statute intended to serve as the basis for such a political community. This proposal, the first major political achievement of the Assembly, indicates the level of political initiative and sophistication in a very new Assembly which was not paralleled in the other "internationalist" assemblies of the day and has perhaps only been equalled by the EP's own-initiative Draft Treaty on European Union in 1984.

The Assembly in the ECSC period worked closely with the High Authority, precursor to the Commission, although there were factions for and against the High Authority which was at the time being considered as a proto-European Government, at least up to the mid-1960s. This role was to be reassessed by the early 1970s as a form of "European Secretariat" (Neunreither, 1972, p. 235). The Christian Democratic Group, in particular after 1956, became so closely identified with the High Authority as to be dubbed the "government party".

The CD group remained in favour of European Union from the origins of the ECSC to the present day and unlike the Socialists, has never had MEPs who opposed the actual existence of the Community. Haas suggests that parties in the Common Assembly had drifted into "normal federal legislative positions" in the evolution of the "government" and "opposition" parties, which formed part of the integrative behaviour of the actors in the Assembly (Haas, 1958, p.432).

The Assembly envisaged a wider role for itself in the Community, in its European Political Community proposals and the exercise of pressure in favour of direct elections. One measure of the Assembly's political success in the ECSC phase was the willingness of the founders of the EEC and Euratom to designate the Assembly as the Common Assembly of the three European Communities, although its powers were not greatly enhanced. This new Assembly differed both quantitatively and qualitatively from its predecessor. Its membership of 142 now ranged from committed federalists or foreign policy specialists to members representing a broader base from their national parliaments (Lindsay, 1962, p.43). Wider scope was also afforded by the enlarged agenda of EP debates, brought about by its representation of the three distinct Communities, with issues now ranging from agricultural policy, the Common Market, the elimination of trade barriers, competition policy and customs tariffs to the free movement of persons, services and capital.

The creation of the Common Assembly altered the orientation of its members, as some MEPs were less federalist and a new group was formed in the 1960s. However, the first enlargement of the Community in 1973 was to be the major challenge to the political composition of the Assembly and its groups. This came about some years after the admittance of the Communists to the Assembly, thereby reflecting more accurately the political composition of the national legislatures of the Six.

The first enlargement, when Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark joined the Community, placed considerable strain on group homogeneity, especially in the Socialist group, and led to the creation of three new political groups and to a reorganisation of the procedural mechanisms of the EP with the introduction of new norms and the increased use of the parliamentary question. The enlargement also coincided with a new spirit of criticism within the EP of the European Community which questioned not only the direction of the Community but also the existence of the EC and the EP. The majority of the British Labour members and most Danish MEPs pronounced themselves as anti-marketeers, and a new cleavage, which had relevance to the Community and not simply to the national arena, was now expressed in debates on the distinctly European issue. This undermined the cohesion and unity of the Socialist group, as it had to make allowances for two distinct voices within that group on many EC issues.

The voting consensus of the Socialists was thus diminished and the notion of representation was redefined, de facto, as the British Labour MEPs claimed to

represent anti-EC sentiment, and hence transnational party cooperation was placed under considerable strain.

The party groups were also challenged by the Westminster model of parliamentary behaviour, as experienced by the British and Irish MEPs. Irving (1978, p.247) suggests that the EP became a more active body in the 1970s "not least since the British Conservatives, especially under Peter Kirk, tried to exploit its powers to the full". He suggests that the groups then became more active, and cites the CD group, which held 80 meetings in 1974-75 compared with 60 meetings in 1972-73.

When the British Labour Party joined the EP in 1975 (they had abstained until after the British referendum on Community membership), the Socialists, for the first time in over twenty years, replaced the Christian Democrats (51 seats)as the largest group in the EP, with almost one-third (68) of the seats. But this increase in numbers was at the price of tension and cleavages within the group. Palmer (1980, p.73) suggests that before the 1973 enlargement, the Socialist group was the best whipped and most consistently united of the groups, with respect to both voting and the expression of political attitudes. The degree of unity achieved by the group had also reflected the common ideology and economic policies shared by Socialists in the six original states of the Community. The British did not share their colleagues' faith in a mixed economy, unlike their continental social democrat peers. The group was further weakened by the different political stance normally adopted by the French Socialists. The dominant national party delegation in the group was the German SPD. Palmer

sees this dominance as the reflection of the major role played by Germany in the Community as a whole. The group ideology ranged from Marxist to reformist, although it tended to be dominated by the moderate tone of the SPD. The numerical dominance of the British Labour Party in the Socialist group was not reflected in comparable influence on group policy, as Labour was divided among pro- and anti-marketeers.

The traditional groups were also challenged by the creation of three new group alignments, mainly created to avail of group status and its benefits. This introduced a new type of political group which differed from the early groups in terms of ideological affinity. While these groups were less "ideological" in overt terms than the three original groups, their component political parties possessed distinct ideologies of their own. The Gaullists had broken away from the Liberals in 1963 and had founded the UDE, the Union Démocratique Européen, in 1965. In the wake of their poor national electoral results in 1973, they formed an alliance, the European Progressive Democrats, with the Irish Fianna Fail party, which had also found itself without a natural niche in the group structure while its main electoral competitor, Fine Gail, had joined the CDs.

The Italian Communists were admitted into the EP in late 1969, due to a national government decision rather than to any EP action, that party having "accepted and endorsed the principle of European political and economic collaboration" (Leich, 1971, p.271). As the only communist party in the EP at the time, it claimed to represent all European communists and working class interests until the arrival of the French Communists in the EP in 1972. The

two parties then formed the first Communist group which was also divided by the pro/anti EC cleavage, with the French expressing an anti-supranational approach compared with the more conciliatory and pragmatic attitude of the PCI. The Communist participation in the work of the EP constituted a change in the EP's climate of debate, which hitherto had been predominantly centrist. In the late 1960s, Zellentin (1967,p.420) had regarded the Parliament as "representing the government and moderate opposition parties". The early 1970s therefore saw the arrival of some left-wing extremism, in addition to features of bi-national groups and parliamentary criticism of the European Community.

A third bi-national group was founded in 1973. This was the European Democratic Group of British and Danish Conservatives. The group chose not to align itself with other right-wing or centrist groups in the Parliament, and Coombes (1973) suggests that this was to constitute a blow to the spirit of supranationalism in the EP. The ED Group, headed by Peter Kirk, expressed dismay at what they and some other EP neophytes saw as the pro-European and uncritical stance of the Parliament as an institution, unlike national legislatures. The 1973 enlargement served as a catalyst to alter the procedural style of the EP itself, which was a continental model, by the introduction of such Westminster-style procedures as Question Time, especially with Oral PQs, which enabled members to question members of the Council and Commission directly on all aspects of Community policies. Scalingi (1980, p.125) describes this aspect of the Parliament's institutionalisation as follows:

"The new British members along with the Irish delegates were outspokenly critical of the low-key style of the debates, the stress on unanimity for

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adopting resolutions, and the Parliament's willingness to support the
Commission in order to present the Community's critics with a united
front."

The political roles of the groups also developed in the debate on the future of
the Community, in particular as it became more politicised in the 1970s, with
European Political Cooperation, Defence and European Monetary Union appearing on
the Community (and newly-formed European Council) agenda, as in the 1980s, with
the Single European Act and growing momentum for a common internal market by
1992. A feature of the political development of the groups since the 1950s was
the evolution and development of a new role by one group, to be followed or
imitated by other groups. During the 1950s, the Socialists acted as the main
proponents of more advanced European integration, within the EP, and it was
this group which had first instigated clearcut policy proposals in the form of
group programmes in the Assembly. Furthermore, it consistently criticised the
High Authority for its alleged failure to prompt further integration and
progress in the field of social policy.

The Socialist Group went so far as to threaten the use of the Parliament's
ultimate weapon of the motion of censure on the High Authority, concerning the
effective implementation of the latter's role. Although this policy of
commitment to European integration was to be shaken in the 1970s, for two
decades the Socialist Group served as an impetus to the other political groups
to clarify their own positions on issues of Community policy and development.
Thus Fitzmaurice (1975, p.36) concluded that only the Socialists, by the

dissolution of the ECSC Assembly in 1958 "had gone any way towards the formulation of clear-cut ideological positions at the European level, and that this alone had been the catalyst to the politicisation of the Assembly".

In a similar manner, Kirk's Conservative group sought to utilise all the procedural tools and opportunities for lively debate to a greater extent than did their predecessors of the Six, with the result of increased parliamentary activity. This trend was a form of stimulus-response mechanism which served to further institutionalise the party groups in the EP.

Finally, the national parties in the member states began to take an interest in the activities of their delegates in the EP, in the mid-1970s. Such embryonic interest was centred on the party federations and was hastened by the pending direct elections, which prompted parties into some form of electoral activity, and often into adopting a position on the European Community.

Study groups had been set up within the EP since the 1950s in order to promote and prepare for direct elections, and the Socialist group had produced a "Common Programme" with these elections in mind as early as 1962. Transnational links in the shape of party federations were not finally established until the 1970s, and then mostly in response to the decision to hold popular elections to the Parliament.

Claeys and Loeb-Mayer (1979b, p.116) suggest that the prospect of European elections acted as a stimulant to the party groupings, despite the uncertainty

as to whether such elections would result in increased powers for the directly-elected Parliament. There were also other factors involved in the foundation of the federations, which were organisations set up by national parties on an international basis and having certain connections with EP political groups, especially for purposes of direct elections. One such factor is the opportunity to discuss European problems beyond the simple consultation process previously in operation in the international organisations, and the federations' role was to elaborate political programmes and to prepare for the electoral campaign. Their general task was policy coordination.

Pridham and Pridham (1979, p.64) see these federations as significant because, unlike the traditional Internationals, they were confined to parties in the EC member states and they required some binding (albeit minimal) commitment to political activity, especially for the forthcoming direct elections. It is evident that these federations acted as mobilising forces for the parties only on an informative level, however, and they had little long-term significance as political actors.

Although meetings of the leaders of the federations and party groups have taken place since direct elections, they have been little more than an exchange of views. Such meetings are irregular and lack the organisational and institutional support which the political groups possess. The federations are loose formations, whereas the party groups are small bodies of practising politicians who work closely on a regular basis on problems which are debated

regularly in the EP plenary and in committee, and which demand the formulation of a definitive group position.

The first federation was founded by the Socialists as a means of vivifying the existing transnational structures. While it was confined to EC parties, it was established within the framework of the Socialist International. It was founded on 5 April 1974 and consisted of nine parties from eight countries, excluding the British Labour Party which joined in early 1976. It was founded before the direct elections were announced at the European Council summit of December, 1974. Unlike the other foundations, the Confederation of Socialist parties of the EC had possessed an institutionalised machinery since the 1960s. It held regular meetings, and until 1976, when the British Labour delegates first attended, was fairly united in its aims and pronouncements.

The Liberal parties founded the European Liberal and Democratic (ELD) Federation on 26 March 1976, at the first meeting of the International Liberal Conference since 1972. It elaborated an electoral programme which was viewed as perhaps the most federalist of the three major federations, in its commitment to European integration. These federations may include member parties from non-EC states and may not necessarily directly reflect representation in the EP.

European Union was also the theme of the Christian Democrats' European People's Party (EPP) which was founded in April 1976 under the leadership of the major proponent of European Union, Mr. Leo Tindemans. Ideals of freedom, justice, the

interdependence of nations, commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, the CSCE, further EC enlargement and European Monetary Union formed part of the EPP programme, entitled "Towards a Europe of Free People". This detailed programme contrasts with the Socialists' more muted Political Declaration and Appeal to the Electorate.

In April 1978, the British Conservatives, German CDU/CSU, Danish Conservatives and Centre Democrats, French Gaullists and Giscardiens (the latter as observers) formed the European Democratic Union (EDU) and declared their common political lineage and purpose to "fight the Communist threat". This placed considerable strains on the EPP. The EDU, unlike other federations, did not establish an institutional framework or secretariat and constituted an informal alliance which met irregularly.

During the first three decades of their existence, the groups in the EP have consistently reflected societal changes. The 1950s can be characterised as a period of post-war cooperation, with a movement away from nationalism. The 1960s saw a revival of nationalism and the successful implementation of the first European policy (CAP) side by side with the Empty Chair Crisis, the Luxembourg Agreement and French opposition to British entry to the EC. The 1970s saw the politicisation of the EC and its party groups in reaction to the Oil Crisis, the Middle East crisis and the entry of Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland to the EC. These developments were reflected in the groups' debates, structure and membership, and the groups were to be further challenged by the first direct elections to a supernational assembly.

Chapter Five

Party Groups after the Direct Elections

In the midst of the contemporary debate on the "decline" of parliaments and problems facing party governments and of the asserted supplanting of parties by public administration and interests groups, parties in Western Europe have become aware since the 1970s of a new forum for political action which is open to them through electoral competition at a national level (1). In the European Parliament, party representatives take part in a transnational exchange of views, coordinate policies and determine priorities. The EP is seen by some domestic parties as a forum which cannot very well be ignored. For optimists, it conjures up ideals of a European party system which would be distinctly separate from the national one. Levi and Pistone (1980, p.67), for example, suggest that direct elections gave the Community the status of a state with a new political order.

The direct elections in 1979 and 1984 also highlighted the need for a uniform electoral procedure in order to help make the elections a European event rather than a series of national polls (Millar, 1986, p.49). Millar rightly juxtaposes the lack of a European electoral procedure with "the notable absence of commitment by national parties to the European campaign of 1984 which resulted in the predominance of national issues, the weakness of Community themes and the...low turnout".

The elections brought about a major alteration in the balance of left and right in the European Parliament and there was no overall majority of one group in

the EP. The six major groups in the first directly-elected EP were the Socialists, Christian Democrats, European Democrats, Communists and Allies, Liberals and European Progressive Democrats. The allocation of seats is set out in Table 5.1. Electoral turnout was lower in 1984 than in 1979, with eighty million abstentions (Table 5.2).

Table 5.1 EP groups' strength after first direct elections, 1979

GROUP	SEATS	
		In July, 1979, the "Group for Technical
		Coordination and Defence of Independent
SOC	113	Groups and Members (TC/DI) was recognised
EPP	107	as a group. This was formed by previously
ED	64	non-aligned parliamentarians to avail of such
COM	44	benefits of group membership as financial
LIB	40	assistance and positions on committees.
EPD	22	
Others	20	

TOTAL   410.

Table 5.2 Turnout at direct elections to the European Parliament

(in million voters and in %)

Member state	Registered voters 1984	Turnout 1984	Registered voters 1979	Turnout 1979	Number of seats
Belgium(1)	6.97	92.2	6.80	91.4	24
Denmark	3.80	52.2	3.72	47.8	16
Germany	44.45	56.8	42.75	65.7	81
Greece(1)	7.79	77.2	6.80#	78.6#	24
France	36.83	56.7	35.18	60.7	81
Ireland	2.41	47.6	2.18	63.6	15
Italy	44.44	83.9	42.20	85.5	81
Luxembourg(1)	0.21	87.0	0.21	88.9	6
The Netherlands	10.70	50.5	9.81	58.1	25
United Kingdom	41.92	32.4	40.53	32.6	81
TOTAL	199.52	60	190.18	62	434

(1) Voting compulsory

\# Elections of 18 October 1981

Source: Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 6, 1984.

Table 5.3 Holders of dual mandate in the EP elections

Nation	Dual mandate 1984	Dual mandate 1979
Belgium	0	18
Denmark	1	6
France	6	22
Germany	1	28
Greece	5	-
Ireland	8	12
Italy	16	21
Luxembourg	5	6
Netherlands	0	2
U.K.	7	9
Total	49	125

N.B. Many MEPs resigned after election and were immediately replaced by substitutes.

The next major phase in the development of the party groups was the phase of direct elections which resulted in the alteration of the nature of representation at the European level, as the MEPs were no longer obliged to be members of the national parliament.

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The dual mandate had ensured the maintenance of close links with the national parliamentary party and its leadership, and with the constituency organisation or selection body for candidates for election. It had also ensured close contacts with the national government or opposition in the national legislature, and links with the essence of national political conflict.

The groups in the EP after the 1979 elections functioned in a forum of 410 members, with a fall in the average age of members and a marked decline in the dual mandate to less than one-third of the members. The single mandate resulted in a more active role for the groups and their members, and MEPs were now linked to a specific constituency to represent, although the differing national notions of representation results in widely different constituencies.

Transnational party cooperation in groups may alienate the MEP from the domestic political party, unless provisions are made to maintain contacts with the party on a regular basis. Should the national party choose to ignore its representatives in the EP, the Assembly and the groups may find themselves involved in politics in a vacuum, or else may take it upon themselves to pursue their own group or individual goals in the EP. Should this occur, a European group system divorced from the national system may evolve, but, without an adequate basis of sustained contact with the electorate it represents, its success would be limited.

The direct elections altered the conception of representation in the EP, as the MEPs were no longer delegates but elected trustees or plenipotentiaries,

accountable to a constituency, political party, group and region. As representatives of public opinion, their accountability is limited, as public opinion remains largely uninformed as to their activities and there is no European media. The second direct elections further altered the representation of political forces in the EP along with Community enlargement.

Table 5.4   EP groups and nationality: 1982

	SOC	EPP	ED	COM	LIB	EPD	CDI	NA	TOTAL
Belgium	7	10			4		2	1	24
Denmark	4	1	2	1	3	1	4		16
Germany	35	42			4				81
France	22	9		19	16	15			81
Greece	10	8		4				2	24
Ireland	4	4			1	5	1		15
Italy	14	30		24	5		4	4	81
Luxembourg	1	3			2				6
Netherlands	9	10			4			2	25
United K'dom	18		61				1	1	81
Total	124	117	63	48	39	22	11	10	434

Source: EP: On the right Road, a report on the first legislative period 1979-84, Luxembourg.

5.2 The Party Groups as Political Organisations

5.2.1 The functions and aims of the group

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In the EP it is the groups which wield influence, through their leaders, through their position on committees and delegations, and through the procurement of rapporteurships. The groups also nominate and elect the President and twelve Vice-Presidents (who together form the Bureau) in a highly politicised election twice per legislative term. Coombes (1979, pp. 30-31) points out that the President, unlike the Speaker in the British Parliament, actually exercises functions of political leadership of the EP and "plays a crucial part in decisions about organisation and procedure which in Britain are the preserve of the government of the day".

The structure of political opportunities (the offices and rules for attaining them), ensures that group influence is exerted through the enlarged Bureau which ensures Group supervision of administration, selection of committee members and the drawing up of the Parliament's agenda. The fair representation of political affinities on committees and the rule that it is obligatory for those oral qurstions which are tabled by political groups to be debated illustrate the group's influence on Parliament's working (Forsyth, 1964, p.278).

Pridham and Pridham (1979b, p.248) elaborate two aims of the groups. While the ultimate aim is to influence Community legislation emanating from the Council and Commission, the main aim within the Parliament itself is to present a

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common political view on all matters arising in the committee and Parliament. Palmer (1981, p.68) adds a third, significant goal - to act as a projection of the philosophies and policies, both national and European, of the domestic political parties from which the groups are constituted. Palmer thereby acknowledges the influence of the national polity on the discussion of Community policy in the Parliament, while recognising the anomaly which has been evident since ECSC Treaty, namely that of the MEP in the role of Community representative and national delegate.

Steed (1976, p.138) regarded the groups as a "minor success story" because they had helped accustom members to certain party linkages, and a handful of party politicians in the skills of cross-national political activity. He also attributed their success to the fact that they had pushed the "less supranationally inclined parties into accepting the logic of European parliamentary groups". However, I would suggest that the point of such "logic" is not necessarily to attain supranationality, given that groups are not necessarily formed for transnational ideological cooperation. Rather, it is evident that many parties formed groups in the 1970s and 1980s in order to cooperate only on specific issues as well as to avail themselves of the considerable advantages of financial benefits, speaking time and committee membership.

The chairpersons of the group take part in the agenda setting meetings of the Parliament and directly influence the work of the committees, the delegations, and plenary sessions. Peter Kirk supported this assessment:

"One of the things I have discovered......is that this place is virtually run by five men........the leaders of the five main political groups" (Pridham, 1979, p.5).

In debates on EC legislation, it is notable that the European Parliament is characterised by a continental style of shifting majorities. The confrontational gladiatorial style of British or Irish politics is not a feature nor is a government/majority versus opposition position. The Socialists are participationist rather than confrontational and their attitude to their political role can at times appear ambivalent. The Socialists can be in a voting majority only as a combined Left (with some Communist and Rainbow MEPs) but never as the Socialist group alone. The building of majorities in the EP varies according to issue and the notion of a majority normally denotes an opposition, yet few parties in the EP are willing to define themselves as opposition.

While the centre-right has presented a fairly consistent voting coalition in the EP since 1979, the Socialists (although the largest group) have often found themselves in a position of opposition to the centre-right majority of the EP, while the CDs are at the centre of political gravity in the Assembly.

In this analysis of the organisation and functions of each of the groups in the
EP following direct elections, the groups are described according to the
following indicators.

1. Transnationality. This denotes membership, number of parties and
nationalities, and conflict of cohesion and transnationality (Niedermayer and
Jouve).

2. Internal organisation. This refers to rules, structure and members. Each
group possesses its own formal or informal rules concerning membership and
allegiance. It also involves the group's resources, traditions, customs and
culture. The frequency of formal and informal meetings and the allocation of
positions are also pertinent.

3. Cohesion. This refers to norms for conformity, discipline and means for
attainment and maintenance of cohesion in the group, and of group agreement.
There is a measure in most groups to deal with disagreement with group policies
and stands, which is a great deal less drastic than expulsion. This is the
"conscience clause", whereby those members who are unable to support the group
position due to national or other specific reasons may explain their position in
advance of the vote in plenary, and this is usually accepted by the group. This
use of the conscience clause must be declared at the group meeting in advance.
In the case of the EPP (European Peoples Party/Christian Democrats) the members

are also afforded an opportunity to state their reasons for non-conformity with the group position before the plenary (EPP Rules of Procedure). Bonvicini (1971) sees the variables affecting cohesion as the number of national parties; internal discipline; informal contacts between nationalities in the group; and the political program with regard to the EC.

A free vote is allowed for all members in the Socialist, Christian Democrat and European Progressive Democrat groups on issues which would show up a great deal of division in the political group. For the Liberals, the free vote is in practice the norm, and this is seen to be in keeping with the spirit of liberalism and free expression of political views (2). The Communists do not have a unified group voting position in general, although the major individual parties, Italian and French, are well-whipped internally as delegations.

The European Democrats maintain a tight discipline and a strongly cohesive approach to voting in plenary and in committee. Indeed they are said to possess lists of attendance of all members at all plenary sessions and meetings, and the attendance of substitutes is well coordinated so that full European Democrat attendance is ensured at all committees at the time of voting. As, until 1986, the vast majority of the group's members were British and came from the same party, cohesion was easy to maintain.

By contrast, free voting had been the norm in the Technical Coordination group (group for the Technical Coordination and Defence of Independents). This group

had little agreement on any policy subject and consisted of such disparate elements as the federalist Italian Radicals and the Danish anti-marketeers.

4. (a) Policy conflict and cleavages.

 (b) Representation of interests in the group. This refers to representativeness, relationships with the electorate and conflict of loyalties of the representative.

5. Group leadership and conformity. This concerns the role of leaders, Secretary General, and relations with group members as well as attendance at group and plenary meetings. A recurrent problem in the EP has been the irregular attendance of MEPs at plenary sessions, group sessions and committee meetings. This affects some groups more than others and is dependent on leadership styles and relationships with the domestic party. The EP itself has made an attempt to forestall non-attendance by issuing, on behalf of the Quaestors, a statement that attendance of MEPs at less than 50% of the plenary and other sessions would result in the sanction of payment of only half of the members' secretarial allowance. This was to be calculated on a six-monthly basis (3).

The groups have at their disposal the means to admonish members who fail to vote according to the group line in committee or plenary sessions of the Parliament. Sanctions in these cases include the withdrawal of rapporteurship (draftmanship) in committee or of shadow rapporteurship (i.e., the close

following of a report in committee by a member of a political group when the report has been assigned to a member of a different group). This can also apply to the group spokesmanships which can be withdrawn if the member responsible fails to appear at the appropriate meetings. S/he is simply replaced. Other sanctions include the non-allocation of new rapporteurships or spokesmanships, thereby alienating the member in his or her group or committee. In addition, oral questions to the Commission or Council tabled by a "recalcitrant" member fail to receive the support of the group, and other questions receive prominence from the group instead. This also applies to motions for a resolution. Group support for MEPs' motions and questions ensures that more attention is paid to such proposals than to a motion or question individually tabled.

While attendance and sanctions are relevant to the groups, it is political discipline which remains central for the political groups. Sanctions are applied not for "laziness" but rather to dissidents from the group line and hence for failure to turn up in order to vote in accordance with the group line. The fact of attendance is a necessary but not sufficient condition in order to be nominated as rapporteur for politically important reports.

6. The extraparliamentary links of the group.

   (a) This refers to relations with national parties and parliaments, including autonomy from parent party.

Since the 1979 direct elections, there has been a marked absence of a liaison structure between the EP political groups and the national party, and the decline of the dual mandate has further undermined communications, as MEPs are now no longer automatically members of the national legislature. Time and travel constraints make regular contact by MEPs with the parent party difficult.

The party group could develop a life of its own where ties with national parties are weak and so become less dependent on the party at home, and so evolve into a "new" political structure, with the recognition of a European constituency and a different mandate from the national one, although this speculation also depends on the role (paramount, at present) of the national party in the selection of candidates for the elections.

Many parties have set up national committees on European affairs, particularly since the second direct elections. MEPs sit on these committees, which meet a few times per year, and this serves to alleviate the marginalisation of the single-mandate MEP in the national party. The political groups represent a geographical constituency which is decided at the national level, and there are few direct links between the groups on the one hand and the regional or local party organisations on the other.

In the member states, arrangements vary as to the participation by MEPs in the meetings of their national parliamentary party. In Belgium, MEPs may attend parliamentary party meetings by invitation and the main parties have introduced an MEP onto their Bureau. In Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands,

MEPs may participate in their parliamentary party meetings, and this is also the norm in the U.K., where participation is by invitation. In France, there is no objection to such participation, and in Germany, MEPs regularly participate in Bundestag party meetings. In Italy, there is no provision for formal participation by MEPs, although the the CDs have joint MP/MEP study sessions.

In all these cases, MEPs participate as party, as distinct from group, members. There is no network of the coordination of policy by groups with the parent parties, apart from occasional meetings of groups and parent parties in the transnational party federations. The importance of interparliamentary links through political parties was stressed by the British Labour delegation leader in 1979, when he stated that the MEP's political party should ensure that he attend meetings on the same platform with members of the House of Commons and of local authorities and that he is knit into the real political life of the country (4).

Informal contacts between the party members and Council members vary greatly according to member state. As the EP consists of parties whose national parliamentary leaders are ministers sitting in the Council or in opposition in the national parliament, the parties are not entirely divorced from the EC decision making at the national level. There is also communication between ministers and their party colleagues in the European Parliament, on a formal level at Question Time in the Plenary Session of the Parliament and in written parliamentary questions to the Council of Ministers.

A network of group-parent party liaison is not always desirable as both national deputies and MEPs are under severe time constraints. It has been suggested that the coordination of the national group delegation with the parent party can lead to differences between the delegation and national party on EC issues (5). Each unit, group and parent party has its own competence in different areas. This constitutes a system of concurrent competences of these units. This could act as a counterbalance to the influence of domestic political parties on the EP. In 1972, Coombes suggested, concerning British membership of the EP: "British delegations of all parties can be expected to retain close ties with national parties and to act in accordance with national party decisions" (1972, p.141). The direct elections have altered such relationships and reinforced the system of concurrent competences.

National parliament

Several member states have in recent years established committees of national deputies and MEPs on European affairs. While Belgium has a European affairs committee of 10 national deputies and 10 MEPs, Denmark has no specific EC committee, although its Market Committee's attention is directed almost exclusively to the scrutiny of European Community legislation and policy-making. Germany established a Europe Committee in the Bundestag in October 1983, consisting of 10 Bundestag deputies and 11 MEPs. While France has no EC committee consisting of both national and European representatives, both the Assembly and the Senate each have internal committees entitled " delegations pour les Communautés Européenes" which consist of national parliamentarians.

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Although these committees meet MEPs on occasion, such links remain informal. The Netherlands has a special committe which consists of MEPs and the lower house has an External Relations committee which meets two to three times per year. Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK have no such committee. Ireland has a Joint Committee on Secondary Legislation of the European Community, consisting of members of the lower and upper Houses, and MEPs are often invited to attend.

There are few links between the EP's groups and the national parliaments. The EP is at present attempting to increase cooperation with the national parliaments. Members of EP committees have met national parliamentary committees and between 1981 and 1984, 24 meetings were held between committees of the EP, or its delegations, with committees of national parliaments (EP, 1984c, p.47).

The EP in 1985 in a resolution (Doc. A 2-16/85), of 17/4/1985 on European Union, has pointed out that in such a matter, "the widest possible contact between national parliaments and itself is necessary" and the EP's Committee on Institutional Affairs has taken steps to increase contacts with national parliaments on European Union. In early 1985, for example, delegations from the Institutional Committee visited all the capitals of the member states with the object of explaining the EP's draft Treaty on European Union to the national governments and parliaments, and of seeking their opinions and reactions.

6. (b) <u>Relations with interest groups or unions.</u>

6. (c) <u>Extraparliamentary transnational cooperation in federations</u>

Although in most groups there is no institutionalised network for the coordination of groups with the national (parent) parties on an individual level, the party federations of the Socialists, Christian Democrats and Liberals provide some limited opportunities for an exchange of views on a European level at annual conferences and occasional study days.

6. (d) <u>Informal power structures in the EP, which cut across the group system</u>. These include such intragroup structures as the Crocodile Club and the Federalist Intergroup.

7. <u>Effectiveness of the groups in solving problems and reaching decisions?</u> This refers to the influence of the group in the EP.

5.3 The European Parliament as an organisation for the advancement of groups: the structure of political opportunities

The party groups operate within a structure of limited political opportunities, limited scope for the attainment of political power and influence, and in the knowledge that their policy positions, decisions and bargaining may well result in little attention from the Commission and Council, and, possibly, a cursory reference to their actions in the national media. The party groups attempt to combat alienation on the level of organisation, internal cohesion, leadership and the utilisation of the opportunities for the wielding of power in a concrete sense, such as it exists, in the use of the political opportunities afforded by the institutional structure of the EP and its Rules of Procedure.

We also study the MEP in the party group and the EP, given this context of frustration with the limited role of the EP, as we are aware of the parameters set by the EC institutional structure for the representation of constituencies, however these constituencies may be perceived by the representatives.

The groups are examined within the dynamics of an evolving Community, where they are attempting to find a role as political entities. These are loose political units in terms of cohesion, organisational structure and voting in the plenary. The groups are the instruments of political debate in the Parliament. Their function is that of a "screener" of the political process, rather than a major actor in terms of political results in the development of the Community. They perform a "filter function" in political decision-making at one remove from

the basis of national or regional power, and at one remove from the centre of

Community decisions. The groups also attempt to represent their constituencies.

The functions of the groups are analogous throughout most of the groups and are

generally governed by normal conformity, i.e. majority decision. No national

delegation (unless it constitutes the majority of members) can block a majority

decision (Laprat, 1985, p.82). The Communist group is an exception to this

rule.

The groups perform useful functions of communication of policy and ideology to

and from the national and the Community arena of politics. This aspect of the

filter function is fundamental to the maintenance of group organisational

structure. The groups provide a forum for deputies of different nationalities

of similar political or ideological persuasion.

This serves to combat the sense of alienation to a large extent, as it provides

a sense of belonging to a political entity. This is illustrated in the replies

to question 3 of the EUI MEP Survey (see Table 5.5), where over 70% of the 331

respondents from all political groups favour cooperation in a political group or

even closer links in a European party.

<u>Table 5.5 European Party Cooperation</u>

Question No. 13 - EUI Survey:

    Some people believe that the cooperation between political parties of the

    European Community countries should be intensified. Which of the

    following alternatives seems closest to your own views?

(a) The various parties should be independent within the European Parliament

(b) Closely related parties should have a common Parliamentary group within the

European Parliament

(c) Closely related parties should have a common group within the European

Parliament <u>and</u> organise their collaboration outside the EP

(d) Closely related parties should form consolidated European parties

	Respondents	Relative frequency (%)
(a) Independent	20	6
(b) Close in EP	53	16
(c) Close in/outside EP	146	44.1
(d) European parties	79	23.9
(e) Refused	21	6.3
(f) N.A. don't know	12	3.6

Valid cases 298

Missing cases 33

Total 331.

In Table 5.6, a cross-tabulation of the cooperation variable by party group, 94% of the Socialists favoured party cooperation and 74% favoured cooperation with collaboration outside the EP or in consolidated parties. This trend is also evident in the EPP which has a 75% membership in favour of cooperation within and outside the EP or as European parties. The EDs favour this to a lesser degree (55%), while the Communists had 49% in favour of such intensive cooperation. 63% of the Liberals favoured close cooperation in contrast to the EPDs which had a high percentage (37.5%) in favour of the status quo.

We examine the groups' attempts to carve out a niche for themselves in the EP and in the EC, and stave off potential alienation as groups. The potentially dynamic role of the EP's party groups is explored within the parameters of a parliament with limited, albeit developing, powers and spheres of influence. The groups are acting in concert against alienation. They constitute a new form of representation in a supranational setting and act as agents of integration in their relations with the EC and in their development of policies, irrespective of the positions of member states with regard to that Community.

Chapter Six and Seven explore the organisation, distinguishing features and functions and changes over time of the groups of the Left, Centre and Right in the European Parliament. We do not attempt to describe the groups on a left-right scale. The EUI Survey revealed how the groups identify themselves in left-right terms according to self-perceptions (see Table 5.7). The political environment of alienation from national politics and the EC provides the

V394

Table 5.6 European party cooperation by Group.

COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT — V56	ISOCIALIST IT (11)	EUROPEAN PEOPLES (21)	EUROPEAN DEMOCRAT (31)	COMMUNIST AND AL (41)	LIB. AND DEMOCRA (51)	EURC. PR OGR.DEMS (61)	TECH. CO ORO.-IND (71)	UNAFFILI ATED (81)	DK,NA,NO T ASCERT (91)	ROW TOTAL
1 INDEPENDENT PART	6 / 30.0 / 6.3	3 / 15.0 / 3.4	3 / 15.0 / 6.1	3 / 15.0 / 9.4	3 / 15.0 / 10.7	1 / 5.0 / 6.3	1 / 5.0 / 20.0			20 / 6.0
2 COOP. IN EURPARL	16 / 30.2 / 16.7	4 / 7.5 / 4.5	10 / 18.9 / 20.4	7 / 13.2 / 21.9	5 / 9.4 / 17.9	6 / 11.3 / 37.5	1 / 1.9 / 20.0	1 / 1.9 / 11.1	3 / 5.7 / 37.5	53 / 16.0
3 COOP. IN-OUT ELR	53 / 36.3 / 55.2	33 / 22.6 / 37.5	22 / 15.1 / 44.9	13 / 8.9 / 40.6	12 / 8.2 / 42.9	5 / 3.4 / 31.3	1 / 0.7 / 20.0	4 / 2.7 / 44.4	3 / 2.1 / 37.5	146 / 44.1
4 CONSOLIDATION	18 / 22.8 / 18.8	42 / 53.2 / 47.7	5 / 6.3 / 10.2	3 / 3.8 / 9.4	6 / 7.6 / 21.4	1 / 1.3 / 6.3	1 / 1.3 / 20.0	2 / 2.5 / 22.2	1 / 1.3 / 12.5	79 / 23.9
8 REFUSED	2 / 9.5 / 2.1	2 / 9.5 / 2.3	8 / 38.1 / 16.3	4 / 19.0 / 12.5	2 / 9.5 / 7.1	1 / 4.8 / 6.3		2 / 9.5 / 22.2		21 / 6.3
9 DK,NA,NOT ASCERT	1 / 8.3 / 1.0	4 / 33.3 / 4.5	1 / 9.3 / 2.0	2 / 16.7 / 6.3	2 / 16.7 / 12.5	2 / 16.7 / 12.5	1 / 8.3 / 20.0		1 / 8.3 / 12.5	12 / 3.6
COLUMN TOTAL	96 / 29.3	88 / 26.6	49 / 14.8	32 / 9.7	28 / 8.5	16 / 4.8	5 / 1.5	9 / 2.7	8 / 2.4	331 / 100.0

CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE	MIN E.F.	CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
89.52276	40	0.0000	0.181	35 OF 54 (64.8%)

STATISTIC	SYMMETRIC	WITH V56 DEPENDENT	WITH V394 DEPENDENT
LAMBDA	0.10238	0.05405	0.14043
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT	0.07845	0.08827	0.07060
SOMERS' D	0.00046	0.00043	0.00049
ETA		0.18062	0.22233

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Table 5.7   Self-placement: Left-Right scale by party group

EUI Question S.1.

In a number of studies, people have been asked to place themselves on a left-right scale indicating their overall pollitical position. For purposes of comparison, would you mind telling me where you would place yourself on this scale.

	Soc	EPP	ED	--					DK	Total
1 Left	4	-	-	14	-	-	1	1	-	20
2	21	1	-	6	-	-	-	1	-	29
3	30	3	-	8	-	-	1	-	-	42
4	15	7	-	2	5	1	3	2	3	38
5	6	18	-	-	6	5	-	-	1	36
6	1	29	3	1	6	4	-	-	-	44
7	-	10	15	-	3	1	-	-	-	29
8	-	8	9	-	2	-	-	2	2	23
9	-	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	4
10 Right	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	4
In the middle	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Does not apply	17	10	10	1	3	4	-	1	1	47
DK, NA, not asctd	2	2	5	-	3	-	-	-	1	13
Total	96	88	49	32	28	16	5	9	8	N=331

backdrop to this analysis and to the attempts by the groups to develop a
working system within the confines of limited powers.

For the purposes of clarity, it is useful to provide a brief summary of the
roles of the major actors in the EP. The EP's Rules of Procedure state that
members of the EP possess an "independent Community mandate" carrying on the
tradition of the Treaty of Rome as representatives of the people (6). Members
are directly elected, and shall vote on an individual and personal basis, and
are not bound by any instructions and shall not receive a binding mandate (Rule
2, subsections 1 and 2, my emphasis).

Speaking time in plenary and part-sessions is allocated, largely according to
the size of the group, by the President, after consultation with the presidents
of the groups (Rule 65). Nominations for committee membership are made in the
EP's Bureau. The Bureau's proposals are designed to ensure "fair representation
of member states and of political views" (Rule 92,1). The political groups
appoint permanent substitutes for all committees (Rule 93,1).

Members join parliamentary committees according to their specialisation or
interest in promoting a specific direction in the development of Community
policies. A member remains on the committee for a period of two and a half
years, half the legislature's life. Decisions in committees are taken by
majority vote. Members are usually full members of one committee and alternate,
or substitute, members of one or two other committees. In addition, members

may attend committees on behalf of absent colleagues, resulting in full attendance in cases of vital relevance to the group.

Voting is organised under the rules of procedure, and voting is normally by show of hands, counted by the committee secretariat. In the case of a tie, the President or chairperson of the committee, who has already exercised the right to vote, does not have a casting vote, and the amendment or proposal is deemed defeated.

Each political group possesses its own decision-making body, the Bureau, which is responsible for implementation of group policy and controls the group's resources. The group coordinator acts as the equivalent to a "whip", and is assigned to the group members of each committee. The coordinator places pressure on members to have amendments and proposals submitted within the time limits set down by the committee rules. The group coordinator chairs the meeting of the group when the voting position of the group is being debated. While the principal role of the coordinator is that of management of group personnel and administration in the committee, it also incorporates leadership qualities and a crucial political function. The group coordinators meet regularly in order to allocate reports in accordance with a points system, whereby each report is valued at a certain number of points and each group in committee is allocated a number of points.

The rapporteur (draftsperson and spokesperson on a specific report under debate in committee) is the voting leader for the group members in the committee.

This does not imply, however, that the Rapporteur maintains a strict party or group view as s/he must produce a report which is based on the majority opinion of the members of the parliamentary committee, and so must adapt to the climate of opinion within the committee. The rapporteur may include several amendments in the report to be submitted to plenary from the other committee members of entirely different political allegiances or from those who possess varying conceptions of the representation of interests, constituencies or party positions. The rapporteur acts as voting leader for the entire committeee, given that, as each amendment is voted upon, the rapporteur is first called upon to state whether s/he is in favour or not and normally gives reasons for the position adopted.

Within the EP's structure of political opportunities, the president of the group acts to a large extent as the intermediary between the Presidency of the EP and the MEPs of the group (Laprat, 1985, p.89). The Secretary-General acts as an intermediary between the EP's administration and the MEPs of the group, although the role and range of functions of the Secretary General vary according to the group.

The group controls the presentation in plenary of urgency motions. It is the group which determines the input of MEPs on compromise texts on the basis of several motions. The Rules of Procedure discriminate in favour of motions put forward by large groupings. Control of the decisions regarding committee membership, allocation of rapporteurships and places on interparliamentary

delegations is also in the hands of the groups. The group possesses the financial means and personnel which weigh in favour of membership.

Finally, no single group controls the voting majority in the plenary, although the political forces are aligned on the centre right and this has prevailed since the EP was directly elected. The second direct election had resulted in the alteration of the configuration of political forces with the election of fifty members representing extremist or regionalist groupings.

The groups overall do not constitute a polarisation of left and right in the assembly and the left and right do not act as voting blocs in emergency motions. There are no composite motions of the left and centre-right. There is some cooperation in debates on committee reports, for example with a centre-right majority. The lack of regular voting coalitions has been criticised as a serious failing of the groups in the only task they could successfully carry out within the EP. The groups nevertheless possess distinctive structures of organisation and patterns of decision making which are analysed in the next two chapters.

REFERENCES.

1. See, for example, Von Beyme (1984), Castles and Vildenmann (eds), 1986 and Katz, 1987 and papers presented at the ECPR workshop on Problems of Party Government, 1982.

2. Interview with official of Liberal group secretariat.

3. Communication of Quaestors to MEPs, no. 24, October 1982.

4. Speech to House of Commons, Official Report, House of Commons29 March 1978, col. 933, quoted in Kolinsky (ed), 1978, p.125.

5. Interview with Group Secretary General, June 1986.

6. European Parliament (1987) Rules of Procedure, 4th edition.

7. Interview with member of EP secretariat, May 1986.

Chapter Six

The Party Groups of the Left in the European Parliament

6.1   The political forces of the left in the directly elected European

Parliament

Europe can only be stabilised on the basis of something approaching a
common policy by the left. Social democracy and democratic socialism can
only be achieved today as European concepts (Glotz, 1985, p. 30).

The left-wing political trends of the member states are represented in three
political groupings in the second directly elected EP, Socialists, Communists
and Rainbow. Since direct elections, new political groupings were formed, the
Group for the Technical Coordination and Defence of Independents and the
Rainbow (Arc en Ciel) group. The latter brought together MEPs representing
ecological, regionalist and anti-Community groups in 1984.

The European Right (the French National Front, the Italian Social Movement and
the Greek National Political Union) formed a new group in the 1984 Parliament,
and thus the extreme tendencies of both ends of the political spectrum are
represented in groups in the EP. The directly elected EP also saw a more
clearly defined allocation of titles to the groups in an attempt to define and
reflect the component elements within their ranks and to reach compromise
among the many member parties.

Table 6.1 Composition of political groups in the European Parliament, 1984

Group	March 1984	July 1984
Socialists	124	130
European People's Party	117	110
European Democrats (1)	63	50
Communists and Allies	48	41
Liberal and Democratic	38	31
European Democratic Alliance (formerly European Progressive Democrats) (2)	22	29
Technical Coordination (3)	12	-
Rainbow (4)	-	20
European Right (5)	-	16
Non-attached	10	7
	434	434

(1) British and Danish Conservatives

(2) Fianna Fail (Irl) and the Union of the Republic (Fr)

(3) Danish People's Movement against membership of the Community, Italian Radical Party and Italian Social Movement

(4) Federation of the Green-Alternative European Link, Agalev-Ecolo, the Danish People's Movement and the European Free Alliance in the European Parliament

(5) National Front (Fr), Italian Social Movement, National Political Union NPU (GR).

Table 6.2 Composition of the groups in the European Parliament, Nov 1, 1988.

	B	DK	D	ESP*	F	HE	IRL	I	L	NL	PORT*	UK	TOTAL
SOC	8	3	33	28	20	10	-	12	2	9	7	33	165
EDP	6	1	41	1	7	8	6	27	3	8	4	-	112
ED	-	4	-	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	66
COM	-	2	-	3	10	4	-	26	-	-	3	-	48
LIB	5	2	-	2	14	-	1	6	1	5	10	-	46
ERD	-	-	-	-	20	1	8	-	-	-	-	1	30
ARC	4	4	7	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	20
ER	-	-	-	-	9	1	-	5	-	-	-	1	16
NA	1	-	-	8	1	-	-	3	-	1	-	1	15
TOTAL	24	16	81	60	81	24	15	81	6	25	24	81	518

Source: Les Echos du Parlement Européen, no. 34, 3 Nov. 1988.

* Joined EC on 1 January 1986. Members appointed by government pending organisation of direct elections. Direct elections in Spain (one constituency) held on 10 June 1987.

Maier (1982, p.231) suggests that international cooperation of socialist and social democrat parties has developed at a slow pace due to four factors, which are in fact equally applicable to other parties in the EP. These factors are, firstly, that closer cooperation at a supranational level involves a loss of power of the existing party elites; secondly, larger socialist parties have to

accept considerable limitations on their freedom of action, and, thirdly, that basic differences between the individual parties have not been overcome. Finally, considerable regional differences in political attitudes and activities exist, with a broad spectrum of programmes and aims, thereby rendering it impossible "to establish a clear political line by means of majority decisions in the common European party body of Socialists".

Despite these difficulties, common objectives of "European Socialists" are in evidence, such as aims of social equality, support for development programmes, the objective of full employment, the elimination of regional disparities, equal opportunity in education, environmental policies, and "the democratisation of the European economy and the development of uniform and socially balanced policies" (Maier, 1982, p. 231-232).

The political forces of the left in Europe are in a position of having well-developed policies, with certain ideologies and belief systems held in common and with some individualistic and nationally-based traits. These latter render co-operation in the EP feasible although not to be taken for granted in all cases.

6.2   The Socialist Group

"European socialists in their transnational interactions are, in respect of issues, highly coherent; in respect of behaviour, largely undistinguished;

in the machinery with which they equip themselves, still uncommitted"
(May, 1975).

Since the British Labour members took their seats in 1975, the Socialist group
has been the largest group in the European Parliament. It now has 165 members
in the 518-member assembly and has never attained a majority of members in the
Parliament. The group has been referred to as a "mammoth with feet of clay"
because of its difficulty in achieving united action on the part of all its
members (1). In order to ensure that its policies are passed in the plenary, it
engages in a voting coalition with the other left-wing parties or groups, or
with centre groups like the Christian Democrats and this latter trend has
increased in the latter years of the second legislature. The Socialists,
although the largest grouping, are obliged, as in the past, to rely on
cooperation of like-minded MEPs of other parties in order to ensure the safe
passage of their proposals, often with substantial modifications as a result of
this trade-off of concessions. This issue of forming coalitions has itself been
a cause of dispute in the group, as to whether it should pursue an independent
line or act with the Christian Democrats. The German, Italian and Belgian
members would experience little difficulty in working with the EPP, for example,
due to their coalition experience at national or regional levels of conflict-
resolution. The group is "participationist" rather than clearly opposed to the
centre-right majority and seeks committee chairmanship and active involvement
in committees and policy decisions.

The group possesses a sizeable membership from all member states of the Community, apart from the Irish Labour Party, which did not succeed in winning any seats in the 1984 direct elections. With the arrival of the Spanish and Portuguese members, observers had predicted a shift of the political balance in the Parliament to the left, and indeed the left gained 45 MEPs, but the predominant voting majority of right and centre-right was maintained (2).

Some observers had regarded the influx of the Iberians as placing the left-wing parties in a closer position to a majority in the Chamber, and some pointed out that "the new complexion of the Strasbourg chamber still leaves the left some 20 votes short of an outright majority" (3). This assessment, however, omits to mention that the party groups of the left do not co-operate as a matter of course, as Socialists and Communists experience difficulties in presenting a united front together in the assembly, although political orientations do accord on many ideological matters. It is pointed out that the ability of the Parliament's left to "challenge the centre-right will depend on greater voting discipline within the socialist group. Discipline has often been lax in the past, with left-wing deputies not bothering to vote (4) ".

The Iberians' arrival contributed to a more equitable distribution of political orientations between left and right in the European Parliament, which reflects the political configuration of the member states of the Community. Given the new equilibrium within the Parliament, effective organisation and party discipline are now essential, and this may well be accompanied by the strengthening of the groups as the organisers of the European Parliament. The

arrival of the Iberians thus obliged the Socialists to re-examine the workings of their largely unwieldy group, and the Spanish MEPs in particular reform of the internal organisation of the group. They urged stronger discipline, greater policy coordination and a move towards greater cohesion in the group.

The name and symbols of the Socialistgroup are easily recognisable throughout the Community, and the group has long been associated with the Socialist International and the Confederation of Socialist Parties since 1974 (5). The socialists, like the communists, possess a common vocabulary, and it is in the nature of socialism to be opposed to nationalism and to be active in the promotion of transnational party cooperation. The tradition of international and transnational cooperation among the member parties had its Community origins when the EC was founded, as illustrated by the Vredeling initiative for a European Socialist Party (Vredeling, 1971).

Transnationality

The group, founded on 23 June 1953 with 23 members, consists in late 1988 of 165 members and 12 political parties, and 11 nationalities (see Tables 6.3 and 6.4). Membership is open to parties affiliated to the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community, at their request, and applications of other parties are examined by the group Bureau and then submitted to the group for decision (6). Such parties could join as allies, and one such example is the French Radicaux de la Gauche.

Table 6.3 1984 Election Results: The Socialist Group's membership by
nationality and party

Belgium (BSP/PSB)   7

Denmark (S)   4

France (MRG/PS)   20

Greece (PASOK)   10

Italy (PR/PSDI/PSI)   12

Luxembourg (POSL)   2

Netherlands (Pvd A)   9

Germany (SPD)   33

United Kingdom (Lab, SLDP)   33

TOTAL   130

Table 6.4 Membership of the Socialist Group After Enlargement, 1986

Belgium	7
Denmark	4
France	20
Greece	10
Italy	12
Luxembourg	2
Netherlands	9
Germany	33
United Kingdom	33
Spain	36
Portugal	6
Total	172

Organisation of the group

The Socialist group possesses a set of Rules of Procedure, electoral procedure,
and standing orders (7). The Bureau consists of not less than 12 members,
"each member state being represented by at least one member" (rule 10). The
Bureau is charged with the co-ordination of the activities of the group's
organs, decisions regarding the group's secretariat's working methods, and the
maintenance of contact with the Confederation, the organs of the Socialist
International and the Socialist members of the EC's Council and Commission. In
addition, it is responsible for the drawing up and implementation of the group's

annual budget. It deals with all matters referred to it by the group, and appoints group representatives for conferences "where such appointments are not made by the Chairman (rule 11)".

Table 6.5 Membership of the Socialist Group by nationality - 1 Nov 1988

Belgium	8
Denmark	3
France	20
Greece	10
Italy	12
Luxembourg	2
Netherlands	9
Germany	33
United Kingdom	33
Spain	28
Portugal	7
TOTAL	165

The Socialist group meets formally at least once a month during the week preceding the plenary session of the Parliament. It is during these meetings that group positions are elaborated, and voting intentions are prepared for debate and voting in the plenary. Spokesmanships on behalf of the group are

allocated to members and the speaking time is divided among the members. The group has study groups on issues which it considers of particular relevance.

Such working parties are set up by the group at the group Bureau's suggestion and are responsible for preparing the group's opinions (rule 12). These study groups meet regularly and also organise group study days on social issues such as unemployment, the environment and industrial policy, which are held in the various member countries of the Community.

The group possesses a political staff of some 70 officials, headed by the Secretary General and several deputy Secretaries General, who are responsible for the day-to-day running of the Group, the administration and co-ordination of policies of the group, and the preparation of common group policy documents. The secretariat's tasks include:

"(a) assisting members of the group in the performance of duties arising from active participation in the work of the European Parliament or its committees;

(b) drawing the group's attention to problems affecting the European Communities and preparing studies thereon." (8)

Although policy coordination is in theory the responsibility of the Union of Socialist parties of the European Community, which is the Socialist confederation, this is the work of the Secretariat of the Socialist group, which

has a large staff, as distinct from the Union, with its staff of six. As a
large multinational group, its problems of coordination are practical ones of
size and language, as well as ideological ones.

Another feature which is not as evident in smaller groups of fewer
nationalities or in most national party systems is the fact that nuances are
lost in the language of politics in unilingual discussions or in translation.
And so the leaders of all groups are obliged to have a deep understanding of
the national political systems of their members and of the constraints placed
on these members by such systems and backgrounds.

Cohesion of the Socialist Group

The Socialist group has often been criticised for being disorganised and one
official has suggested that it is too disorganised to align itself with the PCI
and less extreme elements of the Rainbow group in order to form a voting
coalition in the plenary. In addition, Socialists have been criticised for their
absenteeism problems and for the dificulties arising from their disparate
membership. The group's dynamics are greatly influenced by national rivalries.
In the past, the Germans and British have competed for group positions and the
President has been obliged to make concessions when Labour threatened to leave
the group.

For almost a decade, the public informed perception of the Socialist group has
been as an inefficient grouping of relatively autonomous factions or tendances,

which was divided on most issues under debate in the plenary sessions of the EP. However, in the group's report of activities in 1980 (9), it was reported that the group had reached agreement of 80% of the policies discussed by the group and voted upon in plenary. This agreement is arrived at by a system of majority voting, and agreement by unanimity is not a feature of the group's working methods. The system of majority voting is considered by the group as being as democratic as the decision-making in the national parties and parliaments (10).

In the group's Rules of Procedure, the use of the conscience clause is accorded importance, and has in the past been utilised mostly by the British members, and its format and working are comparable to the clause used by the British Labour party. The members, having explained to the group why they are not in a position to vote with the group, then abstain from voting in plenary, but they are obliged to explain their actions in the group meeting, as an explanation of their dissent from the group.

In the event that the member is unable to present an explanation, in advance, of the reason for dissent from the group line, the member may be subject to sanctions. Such sanctions may include the withdrawal of speaking time, on behalf of the group, for three months, for example, as spokesperson or as group member. This primary right of the MEP to speak as group member is taken away, and thus is an indication of group influence over its members, although the MEP is still able to avail of the individual right to speak in the 90 seconds of the explanation of vote in the chamber.

Majority voting in the group is the norm (Rule 7) and the Rules of Procedure elaborate the conscience clause as follows:

"A member of the group, who, before the vote is taken, brings forward weighty political decisions which may cause him to dissent from a particular majority decision shall not be bound by that decision."

There has been fractionalised voting in well over half of the cases which come before the plenary (11). In such cases, the conscience clause is utilised, with reference to the primacy of the local, regional or national interests which the MEP may represent. The group aims at the achievement of a balance of loyalties, at the group and national levels, and constituency interests are overtly recognised within the group. The group states that it emphasises the need to respect those interests which the MEP may represent (12).

Unanimity is an exception at meetings. If a member votes against the group in committee, this is not taken as seriously as in the plenary, as it is considered that the MEP may later choose to alter his/her position and vote with the group in the plenary session. There have also been situations whereby the group in plenary may choose to vote against the position adopted by the Socialists in committee, should the group decide, at the group meeting in the week preceding the plenary, to adopt an alternative proposal based on a compromise solution.

<u>Maintenance of cohesion in the Socialist group</u>

The Socialist group is often described as a "laborious" one, torn by conflicts of personalities within its ranks. The split on the issue of membership of the EC has highlighted differing attitudes to European Integration. One participant has referred to the attitude of anti-EC members of the British Labour Party as "parliamentary terrorism". (13)

The group coordinator may, in the maintenance of group cohesion in the committee, recommend the appointment or non-appointment of a member on the basis of that member's record as a contributing deputy within the group and committee structure. If a member is absent on a regular basis, s/he is not nominated to group offices, spokespersonships, presidency of committees or to study groups. Such members constitute a small number and are considered to be Socialists in name only. Absenteeism continues to be a cause for concern among the group leadership.

<u>Group agreement</u>

The group has a history of majority agreement on agricultural prices, and the use of the conscience clause for "dissenters" is the norm on the issue of agriculture. There is, according to a group official interviewed before the 1984 elections, unanimous agreement on issues such as social policy, transport, energy, human rights, cultural policy, development cooperation, and the rights of minorities and minority languages. These latter policies do not however constitute the kind of "money" politics which best illustrate the conflict within the group, concerning the allocation of the Community's resources. Here

the conflicts of national, constituency and group representation, as well as special interests, are most apparent.

The group first developed a Common European Programme in 1962, and it has consistently attempted to promote the democratisation of the EC and an increase in the EC's powers. It has been critical of the CAP and in favour of increased social and regional policy and funds, and social cohesion.

The issue of the EC budget in December 1979 was an example of cohesive and effective organisation of the Socialist group by the rapporteur on the budget, Mr. Piet Dankert (Netherlands), who persuaded almost all the Socialist members to vote to defeat the 1980 budget in December 1979. Effective whipping resulted in concerted action by the group except for the Irish and five of the French members and this led to the first ever rejection by Parliament of the budget for the European Community. This is not however typical of the Socialist group.

The group holds conferences on issues of policy most relevant to its programmes. One such example is the European conferences on steel policy which took place in Sarrebruck in December 1983 and in Luxembourg in May 1985, attended by politicians, workers, representatives and experts from the EC member states as well as MEPs (14). It is clear that the representation of issues depends on contact with the relevant actors outside the EP.

The Socialist group initiated a new stage in the interpretation of its political role when its delegation visited Moscow in December 1985. It was the first delegation from the EP received by the USSR. After the visit, Mr. Arndt (the group president) suggested that the visit be followed by similar visits of other political groups and later the creation of formal ties between the EP and the Supreme Soviet.

Further politicisation of the EP and its groups was in evidence in September 1988 when the Socialist group invited Mr. Yasser Arafat of the PLO to the Parliament (15). This led to an intense reaction on the part of several party groups and divisions in the Socialist group itself, especially among the French who were at the time involved in cantonal elections at home and who came under considerable criticism from Jewish groups and from those who considered the timing as well as the principle to be wrong (Le Monde, 11-12 Sep. 1988). The PSF sought to underline the fact that the Arafat visit was not an official one and emphasised its relations with Israel and the need for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The Liberals, Christian Democrats and British Conservatives also expressed their opposition to the visit, while the Communists, the Rainbow group and most Socialists were in favour. Lord Plumb, the President of the EP, chose to receive Mr. Arafat although he was not obliged to do so, as did the representative of the Greek Council Presidency, Mr. Papoulios, while Mr. Dumas, the French Foreign minister, travelled to Strasbourg to meet Mr. Arafat. The political and distinctly polemical role of the EP in this matter was illustrated

by the protests of European Jewish movements and some opponents to what was regarded as Palestinian terrorism. The Socialist group president's reaction to this was that a century's struggle for peace, liberty and democracy has taught them that such meetings are necessary (Le Monde, 11-12 Sep. 1988).

Policy conflict and cleavages

The group consists of a heterogeneous gathering of ideological trends, with a membership which spans almost the entire Community in geographical terms and which reflects the contemporary problems of European socialism, rather as the Communist group reflects the issues facing contemporary communism in Europe. Three tendances may be identified within the Socialist group, although the dividing lines may on occasion be obfuscated by national considerations or cross-cutting cleavages. The first tendance consists of those who are in favour of European integration and the active promotion of European union, and encompasses the German SPD, the Dutch, the Belgians and some Italian PSI members. This tendance wishes the Socialist group to pursue a more active role in the EP and thus to avoid alienation from EC decision-making institutions and the consistently minority position in the EP arising from the cleavage over European Integration. These members are also the most flexible with regard to voting coalitions with the Christian Democrats.

The second tendance consists of those who are pragmatically in favour of European integration (some British members, PSF, some PSI, some Greek PASOK, some Danes) and the third is composed of deputies who actively oppose the European Community (some British, some PASOK, some Danes). The major

difficulties with the issue of the role of the EC institutions include the nature of the EP, the issue of the Common Agricultural Policy and economic policies.

In addition, the Socialist group is often isolated with regard to the other groups on ideological grounds, given the more conservative or centrist orientations of the Parliament. The group had expected a majority position in the first directly-elected Parliament, and hence a different alignment of political forces in the EP from the existing one.

Given that the group does not usually cooperate in voting with the Communists, it is unable to push most of its policies through in Parliament without the agreement of the EPP. The group consists of Social Democrat, Socialist/Marxist, Labour and other elements, and its voting record is not markedly cohesive. There had even been speculation that after the second direct elections in 1984 the group would split into two smaller groups, one broadly socialist and the other social democrat (16).

Lack of ideological coherence is the group's principal weakness. There is a consistent left-right tension within the group and within some party delegations, such as the British Labour Party and the SPD. The PSF has in the past been divided along rocardien and pro-communist lines, and has adopted a consistently nationalistic line in the group, particularly on the issue of the CAP, and is less likely to favour voting coalitions outside the group. The

Italians are represented by two socialist parties, the PSI and the PSDI, and the
Danes also have several socialist parties.

The policies of the socialist parties and of the group concerning the European
Community and the development of support for European Integration are described
by Featherstone who suggests:

> "Perhaps the most notable long-term trend discernible........ is of the
> gradual increase in support among socialist parties for the principle of
> supra-national integration within the European community" (1983, p.3).

Most socialist parties have now adopted the practice of calling for a "Europe of
the Workers", with employment policies, job retraining programmes and better
working conditions as well as institutional reform and the redressing of
regional and social imbalances which this entails. This commitment to Europe
is not based on supranationalist tendencies *per se*, however, as the attitudes
adopted towards the EC, and membership thereof, are based in many cases on
"nationalist" responses to the issue, and so to speak of a "European Socialism"
in contemporary Europe is thus misleading (Featherstone, 1983, p.16).

Agreement on the principle of supranational integration within the EC had come
to a stage in 1983 where only the Labour Party in Britain was committed to
withdrawal from the EC (Featherstone, 1980, p. 243). While the Belgian,
Luxembourg and Dutch members have been in favour of European unity since the
ECSC, other parties have evolved positions from total opposition to Europe
towards ambiguity or support for the EC. Thus the French PS, which has been

divided on the issue of a European Defence Community (EDC), has been in favour

of the EC ever since, although the CERES tendency has been opposed to the

Community as a hindrance to the development of socialism in France. The

German SPD was cautious at first with regard to the ECSC and the EDC, but since

1957 has become more pro-European. In Italy, the PSI were against the ECSC and

EDC, and later pro-EC, while the Social Democrats were in favour of the ECSC

and the EDC. The position of the Danish Socialists has evolved from opposition

to the ECSC and the EDC to a more positive attitude since 1961. The Irish

Labour Party has been opposed to EC membership until after the Irish referendum

on membership in 1972, which resulted in Ireland's joining the EC in 1973.

The British Labour Party's opposition has not been total throughout its

membership but its policy remains critical although British Labour MEPs are

divided on the issue of the EC within the Socialist group in the EP. The Greek

PASOK government had wanted renegotiation of the terms of Greek membership in

1983, but since then, its position has evolved to acceptance of the Community

and its benefits, while demanding reform of the EC's institutions. Both the

Spanish and Portuguese Socialist Parties are in favour of European unity and

have been active proponents of the EC since they joined the Socialist group in

1986 (Featherstone, 1986, p. 244). The Spanish and Portuguese members also

tilted the balance of policy interests within the group in favour of

Mediterranean policies.

British Labour decided to accept the "deathly embrace of Europe" on 6 October

1988 when its annual conference adopted a resolution "formally recognising

Britain's political and economic integration in the European Community" (17)
which most of the party accepted. Labour called for a "social Europe"
characterised by high standards of working conditions and workers' rights.
Increased expenditure in social and regional funds would serve to counteract the
EC's "inevitable pull of wealth, production and jobs towards the centre". The
Conference also called for radical reform of the CAP and environmental
protection and reiterated its commitment (like the Conservatives) to ensure that
control over national and European decision making rests with (Westminster)
parliament. This approach is a reflection of British attitudes to the EC
despite the pro-European sentiments of Mr. Kinnock's speech at that conference.
Pragmatic reasons for the policy change were in evidence, such as fear of
insularity in economic terms, the need to compete in European markets
effectively and the need to improve social conditions with an implicit
assumption that this would entail a harmonisation upwards for the British work-
force.

Group leadership and conformity

In the period of the first term of the directly elected EP, leadership of the
group was considered not so much a question of power as one of diplomacy,
compromise and a mutual understanding of the positions being adopted by the
various members. After the second direct elections, the group's chairman, Ernst
Glinne, was replaced by Rudi Arndt, and this changeover from the style of
"chairman" to "chief" resulted in division and opposition to the latter's style
of leadership, which has been regarded as being quite peremptory and decisive

at times. Mr. Glinne had been characterised as a patient, competent, but uncharismatic, group leader who was skilful in producing compromises (18).

Mr. Arndt commenced his presidency by stating that his group's first priority would be to fight unemployment and to promote the establishment of a programme for youth employment. He also urged the full use of the EP's powers, including the censure of the European Commission should the latter fail in its task (19). In September 1984, he expressed the group's commitment to enlargement when he informed Parliament that his group would use all means possible including holding up the 1985 EC Budget to put pressure on the Council to guarantee the entry into the Community of Spain and Portugal.

The Secretary General is an elected official and has been described by Group officials as the equivalent to a parliamentary secretary (in national systems these are deputy- or under-ministers who assist their chiefs in their parliamentary duties) who works closely with the President of the group. His function is both an administrative and a political one, and he is the primary advisor to the MEPs and the head of the group administration, attempting to maintain a balance of views. The Secretary General is present at all meetings of the group's Bureau.

The extra-parliamentary links of the Socialist group

The Socialist group, like others, has held meetings with individual Council members, particularly when their political persuasion is similar. One such

meeting took place "en marge" of a Council meeting with the EP, in February 1980 (Agence Europe, 20 Feb. 1985).

(a) Relations with national parliaments

Under the Socialist group's Rules of Procedure (Rule 11e), the group's Bureau shall "establish and maintain contact with socialist groups in the parliaments of the member states". The Socialist group has initiated meetings with delegates from national parliaments, for example on the issue of Turkey. It has also organised hearings with national parliamentarians and visits with socialist members of national parties. Such contacts are strengthened by the cooperation which takes place in the Socialist International and the meetings of the Confederation. This cooperation with national deputies, part of a tradition of close links with domestic socialist parties, serves to redress the marginalisation of the MEPs from national parliamentary life, which was an effect of the direct elections. One example of such cooperation with parties in national parliaments was in October 1985, when the Socialist group organised an international conference in association with the SPD group of the Bundestag and the Georg von Vollmar academy on the fight against unemployment in Europe (20).

The dual mandate is ruled out by the Dutch, Italian, Luxembourg, French, Danish and Belgian socialist parties. MEPs may participate at meetings of their socialist parliamentary party in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the UK (by invitation). In France, this is a matter for internal party decision.

The Confederation consists of the Socialist, Social Democratic and Labour
Parties of the member states of the EC and included parties from Spain and
Portugal before their accession to the Community.

In theory, the Confederation is charged with the coordination of the policies of
the member parties, although in practice this is not a realistic task, as the
Confederation's staff is too small compared to that of the group. The
Confederation is also responsible for the management of the elections, and is
allocated some group funds in order to carry out this task.

The Socialist group's Rules of Procedure provide that the Bureau of the group
maintain contact with the Confederation, although the nature or frequency of
such contact are not specified. However, the Confederation has few contacts
with the group and meets informally, possessing little power and few functions.
The group documents on policy reveal a more concrete form of policy agreement,
the result of negotiation and socialisation on a regular basis, than do the
Confederation's statements. There is some overlapping of personnel between the
group and the Confederation. The group President is a member of the Union, and
MEPs may attend the Congresses of the Union, which meet every two or three
years. Such attendance is not obligatory for MEPs.

The 14th meeting of the Confederation took place in Madrid in April 1985, while
the Socialist International met a week later in Brussels. Participants included
the Chairman of the group, Mr. Rudi Arndt, and leaders of the Socialist parties

of the member states and the president of the EC Commission, Mr. Delors, as well as some Commissioners (21). Mr. Delors stressed that the future of the Community depended on the willingness of government to commit itself to a solution to the EC's institutional problems and he called for an extension of the powers of the European Parliament.

The presence of Mr. Delors at the "Socialist Federation" illustrates the sense of alliance felt by individual Commissioners with the parties to which they belonged. MEPs retain frequent contact with the Commissioners of sister parties on many issues. In December 1984, for example, the future President of the EC Commission, Mr. Jacques Delors, and two future Socialist Commisssioners, Mr. Ripe di Meane and Mr. Clinton Davis, attended a meeting of the Bureau of the Confederation of Socialist parties of the EC on 6 December 1984 (22).

This Conference of the Socialist Confederation set out five guidelines in the fight against unemployment. These guidelines are not binding as policy on the party members but they do serve to indicate the orientations of the Socialist parties in Europe. They include the setting up of a large internal market and abolition of frontier controls by 1995, a restructuring of economic policies, the launching of public investment programmes for energy, communications, transport, urban renewal and environmental protection, and the adoption of new EC-level initiatives in the area of industry, research and development and a redistribution of work with the goal of a 35-hour working week (23).

In addition, a reinforced EMS, free trade, an end to worker discrimination, reform of the CAP and increased powers for the EP, were among the recommendations adopted at the Congress. They did not however constitute decisions on policy. This Congress is useful to the analyst of policy cleavages among European socialist parties as it brings to light some of the differences of national positions of these parties. For example, the different stance adopted by the French Socialist Party with regard to the CAP became apparent when the French representative disagreed with the line adopted by colleagues in proposing an "adaptation" of the CAP which did not call its basic principles into question (24).

On the issue of the strengthening of the EC institutions, the British Labour Party was the only party to abstain from voting in favour of such proposals, while the intergovernmental nature of the coordination of Socialist policies was upheld by Labour. This contrasts with most of the other parties, the most vocally pro-European of which was in favour of advancement to greater European integration (25).

The attitude adopted towards Star Wars (SDI) rejected dependence on the US and sought to create an independent European profile. This approach was enthusiastically proposed by the Dutch members in particular and it reflected differences between Socialists in power (like the Italians) and the more radical parties who condemned the SDI and entertained ideas of a Europe independent of the U.S.

On a general level, the high aspirations on the part of many observers that the Confederation would form a proto-party on a European scale have remained unrealised. The Confederation finds itself in a state of crisis at present, as its main raison d'etre is the preparation of the five-yearly election campaign. This election campaign is fought out in the national polities, however, by national prospective MEPs, and here the involvement of the Confederation is minimal. It is in many ways a "periodic" federation, which meets on an irregular basis and is attended by different national representatives at each meeting, thereby undermining the continuity of its work over time.

The Socialist group, on the other hand, meets regularly, and the MEPs are obliged to be present. It is accustomed to reaching policy decisions on a regular basis and there is a continuity which is lacking in the Union. The group itself constitutes the more effective machine of European politics and cooperation, in its ability to work towards creating documents or a policy line acceptable to a majority of its members.

Effectiveness.
Finally, we refer to the seventh indicator of group organisation, the effectiveness of the group in solving problems and reaching decisions. Research indicates that the group has adopted a modus vivendi with regard to internal organisational structure, leadership and voting which undergoes review on occasion. It has adapted to the challenges of new membership while at the same time maintaining the ideal and tradition of transnational cooperation.

6.3 The Group of Communists and Allies

Transnationality

The group, founded on 16 October 1973 with 14 members, consists of 48 members and six nationalities, with the largest delegation being the Italian with 26 members (see Table 6.6). The MEP for the Italian PDUP, Mrs Castellina, became affiliated to the Communist group when the PDUP became affiliated to the PCI in 1985 (26).

Table 6.6 Membership of Communist group by nationality, 1 Nov 1988

Denmark (SFP)	2
Spain (PCE)	3
France (PCF)	10
Greece (KKE)	4
Italy (PCI)	26
Portugal (PCE)	3
TOTAL	48

Organisation

Recent accounts of the activities of the Communist group point to its "tradition of solidarity" between the member parties and within the group, and in its actions on Third World issues, liberation movements, and anti-apartheid movements. Laprat (1985, p.83) points to the tradition of the primacy of the

party in the parliamentary group and informs us that national delegations apply decisions which have been taken by their party at the national level. Some autonomy on the part of the individual MEP is acceptable. Group decisions, qua group, the ideal of the Socialists, are not acceptable as a *modus vivendi* in the Communist group. The parties, for Laprat, who is the Secretary General of the Communist group, form the unit of any analysis of the group, and it is they who are the principal actors.

Cohesion and leadership

The Communist group has elaborated two working principles. These are, firstly, the independence of the components of the groups in decision making, guaranteed by the financial and material means of the national delegations, and, secondly, the refusal to take decisions by majority and the insistence on agreement by all parties in the group. The most important feature of the group, therefore, is the principle of autonomy of the national delegations (27). The national positions of the national delegations must be preserved at all times, and each is considered as a delegation of the national party at home, and never as an autonomous or semi-autonomous body from the domestic party. The latter issues orders and instructions on policy positions and voting in the EP to its delegations on a consistent and regular basis. Each party therefore votes according to nationality. For example, in the 1979-84 Parliament, there was division along national lines on the issue of enlargement of the Ten to the Twelve (PCI in favour, PCF against) and the institutional reform of the Community (PCF against, PCI in favour).

The component parties of the groups of Communists and Allies have adopted very distinctive attitudes to the European Community and international relations in general. Daniels (1987, p.140) points to the attempt by the PCI to find a new role for itself in the international arena, which was marked by the PCI's entry into the European Parliament and its official acceptance of Italy's membership of NATO. The PCI has been tempted by the prospects of the development of a more cohesive left (Eurosinistra) and the party leader described the PCI as "an integral part of the European left" at the party's 17th Congress. Daniels suggests that the PCI would see the EC and the institutional base in the European Parliament as "the forum for the convergence of forces of the left, a more cohesive European left" (p.141). The evidence of voting behaviour and attitudinal indications as revealed in the EUI Survey and research carried out by this researcher reveals that the pro-EC and "pro-democratic" stances of the PCI often coincide with those of the Socialist group. Participants have informed this researcher that the PCI is trusted by their groups to reveal a consistent and pro-European line in debates and committee and are seen as participants in the EP consensus formation. It is interesting that Daniels suggests that the PCI's "overriding fear of political marginalisation" has provided an "almost frantic search for political allies" by that party. The PCI has managed to alleviate signs of such a marginalisation by a constructive approach to political debate and participation in the Parliament.

With regard to "greater convergence of Euroleft forces", it has been suggested that the most likely institutional base for such convergence would be the EP, but "this body remains weak and even here the SPD and PCI belong to different

political groupings (Daniels, 1987, p.141). With regard to SPD-PCI relations, however, intraparty and intragroup cooperation takes place frequently in the EP framework, as instanced by a visit of Lombardian PCI delegates to the EP which led to discussions of relations between the PCI and other parties in the EP. One PCI delegate, Mr. Cervetti, pointed to a good affinity with the SPD while there were great differences between the PCI and the French Socialists and Communists (28).

Left-wing alliances of the majority of the Socialist group with the PCI have worked well in voting in plenary, especially since direct elections, although there is not prior agreement to cooperate in general but rather on specific issues. The PCI tends to put forward moderate motions which are in favour of European integration and are of a centre-left perspective. The tasks facing parties of the left in the EC member states are seen as the development of a socialist political programme and the building of an electoral basis which encompasses new social movements as well as traditional working-class constituencies. The building of such programmes and bases is being initiated to some extent within the EP and its left-wing political groupings.

As its members attend regularly, sanctions on this issue are not considered necessary in this group. All MEPs attend the national delegation or group meetings in advance of the plenary although there is not full attendance at the plenary itself. A feature of this group which is not shared by others is the fact that it includes "allies", i.e., MEPs who appeared on the PCI lists but had not been PCI members. A well-known example is the Italian novelist, Moravia,

who joined the PCI electoral list in May 1984 (29). Moravia stated that he joined the list in order to promote peace and development and combat hunger in the world. Altiero Spinelli also featured on the PCI list. There are no rules of procedure in the group as these are not deemed necessary as each nationality retains its own independence.

Policy agreement

With regard to policy agreement, the group members share a common approach to some aspects of foreign policy, such as the Middle East, South Africa, Turkey and the problems of peace and disarmament in general. Development policy and food aid are actively promoted by the group, as is the programme for workers' rights. In addition, socialisation has played its part in teaching the members to work together on common themes (Laprat, 1985). There is, however, a fundamental difference of policy regarding the very existence of the European Community. The PCF has been traditionally opposed to the EC as a @supranantional capitalist structure, while the PCI and PCE support European integration and its benefits to their member states. The PCI electoral campaign in 1984 had concentrated on promoting an autonomous Europe in a framework of peace and social and economic development (30).

The Danish People's Socialist Party and Greek Communist Party are traditionally opposed to EC membership although the latter has softened its position somewhat while the PCI and the Greek KKE-E wish to strengthen the EC's institutions in the progress to European Union. The PCF wishes to participate in the EC institutions but with very specific (often national-oriented or USSR-

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oriented) objectives. Diversity in composition and diversity of opinions form the hall-marks of this group (Laprat, 1985). Diversity has been apparent on the very issue of EC membership, of enlargement of the EC to twelve, of the role of the EP, on the CAP and on foreign policy, including nuclear and military policy (see Tables 5.9 and 5.10). In most of these parties, with the exception at times of the PCI, nationalism and pragmatism are in evidence in policy formation, with adherence to national representation and representation of geographical constituencies.

The group of the Communists and Allies holds study days on specialised subjects regularly. One such day was held in Rome in November 1984 on the issue of the relationship between employment and technical innovation, and was attended by all parties of the group as well as trade union leaders, academics and leaders of major European technological industries (31).

While there is some consultation between the PCF and the PCI on an irregular basis, they remain autonomous components in the group. They do not have common spokesmen, but favour national ones. There is some agreement on world peace, policies towards the Third World, and some aspects of social policy, such as the 35-hour working week. Disagreement on national lines concerns enlargement and the institutional reform of the European Community, with the French opposed to each of these issues and the PCI in favour.

Policy conflict and cleavages

The major cleavage in the Communist group is the issue of European Integration. The Italian members are in favour of the European Community and have made known their willingness to work within the EP, whereas the French Communists are opposed to European Integration and do not take part in the work of the Parliament to the same extent and so are less involved and more isolated from the work of the EP than other party delegations.

The extraparliamentary links of the Communist group

There is no established linkage among the Communist parties of the EC member states outside of the EP. Each national delegation at the EP maintains close links with the domestic party. In the 1970s, there was academic and political interest in the supposed threat of Eurocommunism but in fact the Communist parties of the member states did not cooperate on policy issues, particularly with regard to the Soviet Union. Some meetings of the party leaders took place in 1977 but national and ideological differences remained pertinent.

It is only in the European Parliament that the Communist parties of Europe come together as a political group and share resources and secretariat as well as some common policy stances. Daniels (1987, p.141) states that the PCI has moved beyond the Eurocommunist phase as the French, Spanish and Portuguese parties no longer make any pretence to adhere to a common line. Courtois (1988) goes so far as to suggest that throughout Europe, communism, the agent

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for the modernisation of society for several decades, is at present obsolete (Le

Monde, 11-12 Sep. 1988).

Table 6.7   Positions adopted by the member parties of the group of Communists

and Allies

ISSUE	PCI	PCF	KKE	PSPD	KKE-E
Membership of EC	Pro	Moderate	Anti	Anti	Pro
Strengthen European Union	Pro	Anti	-	Anti	Pro
Strengthen EC Institutions	Pro	Anti*	-	Anti	Pro
Enlargement	Pro	Anti	Anti	Anti	Pro
Reform of CAP	Anti	Pro	Anti	-	-
EC foreign policy	Pro	Anti	-	Anti	-
More regional policy	Pro+	Moderate#	Pro+	-	-

Notes

* = Moderate regarding the EP

+ = Emphasis on IMPs (Integrated Mediterranean Programmes)

= Common Agricultural Policy is more important

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Table 6.8 Comparison of policy positions of PCI and PCF

ISSUE	PCI	PCF
EC	Community reinforces Italian independence	EC threat to sovereignty
U.S.	Dependence on U.S.	Independence of U.S.
Nuclear power	Pro, adopts EC line	Anti EC involvement. French self-defence, own nuclear power
European Union	Pro Dooge Report	anti-Dooge Report

6.4 Group for the Technical Coordination and Defence of Independents (TC group)

During the lifetime of the Group for the Technical Coordination and Defence of Independents, in the 1979-1984 EP, there was no attempt to reach common positions, although a majority of the group was committed to support for human rights and opposition to world hunger and to nuclear energy. World hunger was energetically pushed by Mr. Pannella onto the EP agenda. Unlike most other groups, this group did not claim a common philosophy or ideology, apart from adhering to democracy and a left-wing tendency, and it was formed to avail of the advantages of group membership, such as the right to put forward amendments, allocated speaking time and positions in committees. A point of common interest was the defence of minorities and minority languages. For

example, the group held study days on 8-10 January 1983 in Brussels on "Peoples without a state: Regionalism, Autonomy and Self-Government in Europe". Unlike the Communist group, the group had no common President, but a rotating presidency which changed every four months among Jens-Peter Bende, Neil Blaney and Marco Pannella. The Secretary General post also rotated.

As the group (some observers insist that it is not a group at all) consisted of seven parties, it appeared that there would be seven cleavages, although three subgroupings had been identified - the Danes, the Italians, and the "others", in numerical terms. "The Economist" suggested in 1981 that the groups' biggest victory has been to avoid being strangled at birth (32).

Rainbow Group

The Rainbow group (Arc en Ciel), formed after the second direct elections, resembles the TC group in that it is a gathering of disparate elements from throughout the Community. It is an essentially left-wing grouping of twenty MEPs who were elected mostly as single-issue candidates or in order to promote very specific policies. The tone is distinctly "Rainbow Green" in the continental sense (i.e. ecological issues) and they represent "alternatives" to the common political moulds in the member state. Rudig (1985, p. 70) described such parties as follows: "the rainbow-type Green Party attempts to represent a broad alliance of ecological, youth, feminist, peace, minority and New Left groups". Such activity is also extra-parliamentary. Differences between purist Green and Rainbow.Green have arisen in many member states and there were many difficulties encountered at the level of European co-ordination. Rudig adds

that the Belgian, Dutch and German Green MEPs were unable to agree on forming a common parliamentary group after the 1984 direct elections, mostly due to German and Dutch unease at dependency on the numerically stronger Belgians. The result, Rainbow, was a larger group involving "small parties of radical/socialist/regionalist persuasion" (Rudig, p. 71).

Transnationality

The group includes left-socialist Italian MEPs, the Danish movement against the EEC and three regionalist MEPs known as the European Free Alliance - 2 from Flanders (Volksunie) and one from Sardinia (Partito d'Azione Sardo), as well as one Basque and one Belgian former ECOLO member. In addition, GRAEL (Green Alternative European Link) forms part of the Rainbow group and includes seven members from the German Greens, 2 from the Dutch Greens (GPA), one member from the Belgian AGALEV and one member from the Italian Democrazia Proletaria. The Italian Radical Party, which had been active in the TC group in the 1979-84 Parliament, did not take part in the Rainbow group and Rudig explains this "as a result of widespread disillusion with the erratic leadership of Marco Pannella".

The German Greens have adopted a rotation system among 18 "MEPs" who wish to avoid "becoming professional politicians" as they say that this can lead to alienation from the general public. The GRAEL has described itself as an association of parties united in their opposition to the EC as it exists today and with its present priorities.

Policy agreement

The Rainbow group frequently acts with the Socialist group on environmental issues. One recent example is when the two groups sought to have motions on the Cattenom Nuclear Power Station debated urgently in October 1988 (Docs. B 2-806/88 and B 2-828/88). The roll call vote, called for by the Rainbow group, resulted in 113 voting for, 124 against, with 6 abstentions (33). The Rainbow group's Green Party MEPs may find that as environmental issues are adopted by other established parties in the member states, their impact and electoral influence may lessen.

The group has outlined a list of interests which it wishes to promote and these include: the protection of the environment; peace and disarmament; human rights; immigration; the Third World; improved social policy (including the aim of a 25-hour week by the year 2000 to be paid for by a tax on new technology) and a basic minimum income for all.

Internal organisation

The organisational structure of the group is minimal. Given that it includes Dutch and German Greens, Danish anti-marketeers, left-wing parties, Basque and Sardinian left-wing nationalists and Belgian Ecolo (ecologist) groupings and Volksunie, there is a problem at times with finding a common language and use of translators even for such a small group. The group meets regularly like the other groups to discuss the work of the plenary and administration and policy positions on major political issues, in the week before Plenary. In addition, it possesses working groups who work on the content of policy such as

agricultural and economic and social issues. These working groups have autonomy. The structure is essentially decentralised to reflect the group membership. The initial socialisation process within the group has now led to a knowledge of each others' policies and approaches. The Group has a staff of eighteen and it emphasises that no staff is employed to do auxiliary work such as photocopying, typing and similar services, since GRAEL's policy is not to separate manual and intellectual work (Rainbow, 1988).

Cohesion

Cohesion is not a goal for the Rainbow group and it is considered that cohesion is not necessary.

Policy agreement

The group members have few policy areas in common, and agreement is reached on Green or alternative political positions. The group claims that it has differences in tactics rather than ideology. It is opposed to the EC in its present form and places priority on small-scale farming and alternative energy forms. In the Paris declaration before the second direct elections, the GRAEL stated that its common commitment was to a new, neutral, decentralised Europe made up of self-administering regions, each maintaining its own cultural individuality (Rainbow, 1988). It opposes the deployment of nuclear missiles in Eastern and Western Europe, promotes a no-compromise policy on the environment so as to protect the ecological balance, promotes equal rights for women in all areas of society, demands action on unemployment and social security cuts and is in favour of the free exercise of fundamental civil rights and an ecological

form of agriculture. In addition it calls for a policy towards the Third World based on equality.

Representation of interests

The group is representative of interest groups and an official has suggested that it is representative of movements rather than of constituencies. Constituency-oriented parliamentary questions are rare. The system of evolving representation applies to the German Greens and in the present EP the German members (with 3 exceptions) were replaced by their alternative while the former members continue to work with the group as "elder statespersons". This system of rotation is justified by that party's desire to avoid professional politicians. One Dutch GPA member also rotated after the first half of the legislative period (Rainbow,1988, p.5).

Conformity/attendance

Given the relatively small size of the group, one MEP only is allocated to each committee and hence regular attendance is considered essential. The group emphasises the need to vote, attend the plenary and committee sessions and play the game according to the parliamentary rules.

Extraparliamentary links of the Rainbow group

The group has a great deal of contact with extraparliamentary movements and small groupings outside the EP and has been known to hold meetings with such groups with the use of the EP's facilities. Issues discussed have included West European security (meetings with left-wing groupings), the European judicial

area, youth and racism (meetings with youth groups), reproductive technology, alternative workers' production and guaranteed minimum income. The group members experience at times a conflict in terms of time management in the commitments to parliamentary duties (as distinct from extraparliamentary duties), as the latter include contact with several different movements and speaking at rallies and demonstrations.

REFERENCES

1. The Economist, 22 March 1980, pp. 55-56

2. The Times, 13 Jan. 1986

3. ibid

4. ibid

5. This contrasts with the other EP groups, apart from the Communists, which have a plethora of symbols, colours and names of parties

6. Socialist Group's Rules of Procedure, Rule 2, Doc. PE/GS/276/81, Luxembourg, 4 November 1981

7. Doc PE/GS/276/81 of 1981

8. Socialist Group's Rules of Procedure, Rule 14

9. Socialist Group: Report of Activities, 1980

10. Interview with member of Socialist Group secretariat, April 1983. Officials of the EP secretariat kindly agreed to give unstructured off-the-record interviews. Confidentiality was assured and this denies me the opportunity to thank them individually for their assistance and insights

11. Interview with member of Socialist group secretariat, April 1983

12. Ibid.

13.Interview with member of staff of EP secretariat, June 1986

14.European Report No. 1128, Business Brief, p.3.

15.The invitation was issued by the Socialist group's Bureau. The groups can avail of the right to invite "personalities" to the EP but cannot invite them to speak in the hemicycle except on official visits. This function has been used on a number of occasions with political effect.

16.Interview with EP secretariat officials, April 1983.

17.Financial Times, 7 October 1988.

18.The Economist, 22 March 1980.

19.Agence Europe, 6 September 1984

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Chapter Seven

The Party Groups of the Centre and Right in the European Parliament

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Chapter Seven examines the organisation, distinguishing features and functions
and changes over time of the political groups of the centre and right. It is
not the intention of this chapter to place these groupings in a definitive left-
right scale, or to point out the nuancing of the definition of centre to right
and vice versa. Rather we analyse the organisation, programmes and performance
of the groups in the EP, in the period after direct elections.

The party groups of the centre and right in the EP (apart from the
Conservatives) have traditionally been in the forefront of the movement for
European Integration and in that capacity have provided some of the leadership
in the drive towards the unification of Europe along with the Socialists. The
common ideology of the Christian Democrats, in particular, provided a base for
the promotion of European reconstruction and the ideal of a united Europe, while
the Liberals also consistently favoured a United States of Europe.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the CDs were at the height of their influence in Europe
and were major partners in most of the governments in the member states of the
ECSC and, later, the EC. The ECSC Treaty was signed by five CD Prime Ministers
(de Gasperi, Schuman, Adenauer, van Zeeland, Bech) and one Liberal Prime
Minister (Beyen). The CD's role in the shaping of the Community's structure
has decreased as the parties involved have become less dominant and their
leadership less commmitted to European unification. Henig (1980) sees this
contribution of the CDs as historically time-based as he points out that
Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of Europe was a concentration of

elites and opinion-formers which placed parties in a passive role in consensus promotion and interest aggregation.

Nevertheless that Committee served a purpose in uniting parties and trade unions representatives in a political forum which dared to contemplate a united Europe and this legacy remains alive today among many of the centre and right parties of the European Parliament, as much as with the Socialists who were the inheritors of the Socialist Movement of a United States of Europe. However, European Integration is not an issue which is associated more with one part of the political spectrum than another. It cannot be seen solely as the creature of the right or the left. Nevertheless, in the formative decades, the CDs and Liberals have been vociferous in their support for the European Community and its further political development.

The avowed goal of the EPP group and its federation is a united Europe and the EPP states: "we are firmly committed to the final political objective of European unification, the transformation of the European Union into a unique European federation". Its slogan is "together towards a Europe for free peoples" (1).

The 1960s saw the arrival of fewer pro-European MEPs and a less federalist approach which reverberated in the centre and right groups. The enlargement of 1973 which placed strains on the homogeneity of some groups had less impact on the centre-right than on the left, however. The 1973 Enlargement substantially altered the political balance of the EP as the Socialists, for the first time,

of representation is therefore apparent. At the same time the structure of political opportunities remains such that the career advancement of offices within the European Parliament remains group-oriented and the groups more than ever appear to be combinations of different representative functions and pressures.

The centre and right-wing political trends of the member-states are represented in five political groupings in the second directly elected EP. Since 1984, a new political grouping has appeared, the group of the European Right, and the 1986 enlargement of the Community saw the arrival of the Spanish and Portuguese members. These changes affected the composition and even the titles of several groups. The problem of the aggregation of interests in the EP's political groups of twelve member states became more complex with the arrival of the Spanish and Portuguese members.

The alterations of the groups over time and in reaction to political developments are also reflected in the voting behaviour and use of the informal rules of the game of the EP. Chiti-Batelli points out that what is important to know is not so much the rules of the EP in toto, but rather the internal rules and the relative praxis and customs of each group (1982, p.162). Some of the groups possess minimal Rules of Procedure, but the role of leadership and the use of facilities and resources which are made available to each group reveal the attitude to the role of the MEP, the EP and the nature of the EC itself.

Table 7.1 The party groups of the Centre and Right in the EP. 1988.

Group	No. of members.
EPP European People's Party (CD)	112
ED European Democratic Group (Con)	66
LDR Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group	46
ERD European Renewal and Democratic Alliance	30
ER Group of the European Right	16

The centre and right do not present a voting bloc within the Parliament, even
on issues of the institutional development of the Community, although discipline
in the EPP on key issues may result in a centre-right majority or a substantial
minority which then reaches a coalition of interests with specific
representatives. As the national and party delegation compositions differ
according to group or issue, cooperation is not always ensured on a centre-
right platform, and it is not unusual for the CDs to form a voting bloc with
the majority of the Socialist group members on issues of common interest. It
is notable that as the EP nears the end of its second term, a pattern of
EPP/Socialist cooperation on voting is evident, characterised by the names of
the group Presidents as the Klepsch-Arndt axis.

Hurwitz (1983) carried out a study of voting patterns in the first directly
elected EP, and he points to the IVC, the Index of Voting Cohesion, in the
groups and gives the highest IVC to the three right-wing groups, i.e. the

European Democrats, the EPD and EPP, followed by the Communists, Liberals and Socialists.

7.3 The European Peoples Party.

Transnationality.

The group of the European Peoples Party, founded as the Christian Democratic group on 23 June 1953 with 38 members, consists of 112 members and eleven political parties, with eleven nationalities (Table 7.3). The British are the only nationality which is not represented within the Group. Membership is open to Christian Democrat and similar parties who subscribe to the positions and political actions of the group (Jouve, 1984).

Like the EPP federation (the European extra-parliamentary umbrella organisation of CD parties), the group claims to be the European party for Christian Democratic movements and states that its statutes make it possible for further parties of the centre to join if they are ready to subscribe to Christian Democratic values (Catholic or Protestant).

The group hence allows for the representation of likeminded parties from member-states which lack a tradition of Christian Democracy (2). Observers view the EPP group as traditionally being run by certain dominant nationalities, such as the Germans and the Italians, with a few Iberians among them, at both the level of political leadership and secretariat.

Table 7.2 Membership of the EPP group by nationality - 1 Nov 1988

Belgium (CVP/EVP/PSC/PPE)   6

Denmark (CD)   1

Germany (CDU/CSU)   41

Spain   1

France (UFE)   7

Greece (ND)   8

Ireland (FG)   6

Italy (DC/SVP)   27

Luxembourg (PCS)   3

Netherlands (CDA)   8

Portugal   4

TOTAL   112

Organisation of the group.

In general, internal organisation is regarded as being efficient and cohesive in secretariat and management. The group organises regular study days and keeps members up to date on the activities of the group and its national leaders in the monthly magazine and its annual reports on activities.

There are four main working groupings within the EPP group, which meet regularly when the entire group assembles during the week before the plenary session. There is a full group day (a meeting of the entire group) in order to

discuss policy when spokesmanships on issues in plenary and the EPP's speaking time are allocated among the many applicants to represent the group line.

Cohesion:

The EPP group is regarded as the best disciplined of the party groups in the EP. This is evident in general voting records. The level of consensus or dissent on specific issues is difficult for the observer to assess, as the group's political disagreements tend to be shrouded in silence, for the most part.

An official of the group suggested in the 1980s that the group is highly cohesive for two main reasons (3). The first is that the group does not include an anti-EC faction or grouping, unlike the Socialist group or the European Progressive Democrats. The group asserts that its dedication to the promotion of European Integration contributes to group unity. The CD group regards itself as the most "European" of the groups in the Assembly and often refers back to the involvement of the Christian Democrats in the formation of the ECSC and the EC. It remains cognisant of the fact that this involvement was an engagement of an elite movement, and, in referring to attempts to form a constituent assembly of a European Political Community, states "This attempt at a 'revolution from above' was carried out almost exclusively by the European Christian Democrats" (4). It does not tend to acknowledge the contribution of socialist and liberal parties to the process of European Integration.

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The second reason for alleged cohesion is that there has long been agreement of basic principles and tenets, such as Christianity, and on mainly Catholic values, which are held in common by the group members since the group's formation. There is general agreement on the need for peace, human rights, the freedom of the individual, the fight against poverty, and the promotion of social progress in a pluralistic community of free individuals within an essentially Christian framework. The group asserts that the Christian Democratic ethos goes hand in hand with European unification. It elaborates that the ideas of reconciliation, neighbourly love and a desire for peace are a biblical heritage, and concludes "the basic ideas of federalism can be traced back to Thomas Aquinas"! (5).

Group agreement

The EPP members can be roughly divided on social questions according to their membership of a trade union. The Belgian and Dutch members are more progressive on social issues such as unemployment, retraining schemes and job creation, than their more conservative colleagues who would represent the employer side of industry. Some Italian DC and German CDU members, however, are also active in trade unions and quite progressive on social issues. It has been suggested that the CD group expresses agreement only on the issues of European Union and Christianity, with little or no agreement on economic and social issues (6). There is a left-wing divergence on social issues and here the Dutch members play a central role in achieving compromises between right and left.

Despite the outward claim to cohesion, the EPP has been distinguished by some personality conflicts, particularly with regard to the leadership of the group after direct elections in 1979. This group also lacks the presence of British members, although it does include representatives from three of the "Big Four" member states - Italy, Germany, France. There was some cooperation between the CDU/CSU and the British Conservatives in the period before the direct elections, with the formation of a European Democratic Union, an "anti-marxist" meeting of right-wing parties. This cooperation caused some problems for the EPP group's cohesion, as its liberal members did not consider the Conservatives as their natural bedfellows. This caused some division in the EPP superstructure, the EPP federation, although less so in the group itself.

The EPP political programme reflects the agreement reached on policy, and it places emphasis on a pluralist Europe with its own identity and its own self-determination, which is open to the rest of the world and especially its problems of hunger, poverty and violence. The dignity of man and his dependence on the community, especially on the family, "which is the mainstay of our society", are given priority, as is the safeguarding of human rights and basic individual freedom in political democracy, with the aim of the decentralisation of political power (7). Policy has evolved from support for the High Authority in the 1950s to the promotion of maximum functional integration in the Community in the 1960s with a strengthened EP and Commission. There was then a progression from support for an enlarged Community in the 1970s to enthusiastic support for European union in the 1980s.

The group faces problems of a disciplinary nature - problems which have

political implications in terms of the achievement of its goals within the

plenary. These problems include the irregular attendance of members at the

Group and plenary sessions and the fact that it is accepted that national

politics may take up a great deal of time, as MEPs are also members of the

national arena of political conflict and are often involved in national or

regional campaigns at home (8). This is the case even for single mandate

politicians, although it is hoped that increased European socialization will

contribute to increased commitment to attendance at the requisite number of

sessions and committee and group meetings. The fact that some MEPs throughout

the political groups are not financially dependent on the daily attendance

allowance at plenary is a disincentive to attend. There have been attempts

since the early 1980s to enforce cohesion in attendance at the voting sessions

in plenary, in order to vote as a cohesive bloc, and vote as appropriate in

cooperation with the Socialists in order to ensure the successful passage of a

motion or initiative.

Policy conflict and cleavages.

The cleavage most in evidence within the EPP group occurs on the issue of

agriculture, due to the differences of priorities between the members of the

northern parts of Europe and the Mediterranean members, and due also to the

differing conceptions of representation at the EP. In general, a free vote may

be permitted on the basis of some minimal compromise, rather than insistence on

the adoption of a definitive group position.

With regard to the preparation of policy positions, it may be noted that agreement of policy is not reached by the group en bloc, but rather by a small grouping of MEP specialists who put a motion together and sign it, with the agreement of the Group President, in the name of the group, and this document normally constitutes the basic text on the policy attitude although it may be later modified (but rarely radically altered).

The group represents centre-right interests including trade unions in continental Europe, and like other groups has been lobbied by interest groups regarding input into and influence on forthcoming EC legislative initiatives. In these matters, the differing notions of representation become apparent, as in the case of a Belgian EPP MEP who tabled amendments to a report of the EP which were allegedly identical to IBM positions. A Socialist MEP criticised the MEP of "behaviour (as) incompatible with his position as a member of the Parliament. and dubbed the MEP as "IBM's messenger-boy" (9). The group traditionally represents management, business and agricultural interests. Conflicts had arisen in the 1950s and 1960s concerning attitudes to the Socialists and Communists as some nationalities, particularly the Germans (for national reasons), were opposed to these ideologies, whereas the Italians, Dutch and Belgians were accustomed to co-operation with the left. The Dutch have traditionally been anti-CAP, a factor which has caused problems for the rest of the group.

Leadership.

The leader of the group is regarded as being more than "primus inter pares". Given that the group is a large one, with international elements and a large array of problems as a consequence, a good strong presidential-style leader has been regarded as necessary (10). The present German President, Mr. Klepsch and the Italian Secretary-General Guccioni contribute to the present reputation of the group as strong and cohesive, combining a balance of influence of both leaders.

The role of the Secretary-General depends to a large extent on the personal relationship and level of efficiency maintained between the President and Secretary-General. In the EPP, the role of the latter is generally more a political rather than a purely administrative one. The political role encompasses decisions on the distribution of rapporteurships within the group, of the offices, benefits and "spoils" in general, and on the formation of group and parliamentary delegations. In the cases of the distribution of offices, the MEP's channel of communication is normally to approach the Secretary-General first, and then, if necesssary the President, in order to be considered for a specific office within the group.

The extraparliamentary links of the EPP group.
(a) Relations with national parliaments and parties.
There are very few formalised contacts with the national arena, although the group invites national leaders to its group meetings and conferences and publishes speeches made on such occasions. Speeches and articles by national leaders also figure prominently in the group's magazines.

The EPP group met with representatives of Christian Democrat groups from national parliaments on 10 April 1986 at The Hague and launched an initiative that, during the ratification of the SEA by the national parliaments, these parliaments "adopt resolutions clearly indicating the need to go even further than the Luxembourg package of reforms" (11).

The EPP group, on March 1987, at the celebration of 30 years of the signing of the Treaty of Rome setting up the EEC and Euratom, called for closer relations between the EC institutions, particularly the EP and national parliaments, in the realisation of European Union. Group vice-president, Mr. Gravazzi emphasised that the EP and national parliaments needed to know each other better, and former MEP, MR. Pfennig, suggested that national parliaments should "intervene more actively and effectively in the European process" and strengthen their contact with the EPP (12).

In July 1987, the EPP group and the federation further called for progress towards European integration and to this end set up a European Union working group. It has proposed a "programme for increasing awareness and mobilising the member parties of the EPP", with the goal of reinforcing European political action of the CDs within their respective parliaments and governments. The working group has called for the EPP and other European political forces to speed up the process towards European Union and its representative role became apparent in its emphasis on the need "to make the European actions more popular with the people" and to provide solutions to economic, social, security and

defence problems, all in the framework of the People's Europe, which is a primary objective of the EPP group (13).

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With regard to the EPP's other extra-parliamentary links, the EPP and the Konrad Adenauer foundation, at a joint conference in July 1987, stressed the role of local representatives and local government in the European Community's policies. Particular reference was made to the provisions for assistance to less favoured regions under the SEA (14).

(b) The Confederation: The European Peoples Party.

The confederation meets regularly and congresses are well-attended by both national leaders and MEPs. The confederation, which also maintains links with CDs in non-Community states, within the World Federation of Christian Democratic parties (the World Christian Democratic Union), claims to be the only "European party" on the European level of politics, although its actual role resembles that of the Socialist Confederation, in the preparation of the electoral campaigns and of basic electoral programmes. It has three organs, Congress, the Political Bureau and the Executive Committee, as well as an electoral programme committee. It was founded as a federation of the CD parties of the member states of the Community in Luxembourg in April 1976 as a successor to the Political Committee of the Christian Democrat parties in the Community which had been set up in 1972.

7.4   The European Democrats   (Conservatives).

The European Democratic group has until recently been less effective than its

numerical strength and bargaining potential might suggest. It consisted of

essentially one nationality and was not accustomed to making compromises and

attaining working majorities within the EP. It was never obliged to bargain for

a majority within a group as it always constituted the majority. Its public

image in the media has been as the defender of national interests in a position

of splendid isolation, as a quasi-uninational group. The group was on occasion

also involved in heated exchanges within the Bureau of the Parliament, as the

Presidents of other groups expressed anger at the "nationalist" line taken by

the Conservatives' President, who often referred to the need for honesty and

reform as if to suggest that his group had a monopoly on that matter (15). In

addition, the party which represents the largest political force in Britain is

not reflective, as a political elite, of political and social forces, interests,

differences and cleavages in modern British society. Nevertheless, a

combination of legislative socialisation and a growing awareness of the need

for contact with other groups and nationalities have altered this view of the

group. Like the MEPs who do not belong to a group, who loses out on the

availability of information, expertise and international contacts, so too the

groups with few national delegations experienced a certain alienation from the

workings of the Parliament and relations with the EC instiututions and foci of

political debate.

<u>Transnationality:</u>

The European Democratic Group of the EP, founded on 16 January 1973 with 20 members, consists of 66 members of three nationalities, 45 British Conservatives, four Danes (KP) and seventeen Spanish members. The only Ulster Unionist member, Mr. John Taylor had resigned due to his opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, signed by the British Conservative government and Irish government. The group greatly benefited from the fact that the Spanish Allianza Popular joined it on the enlargement of the EC to twelve member states in 1986, as at last it shed its image of a narrowly bi-national grouping with a strong identification with Toryism and only a handful of Danish members. It is now a more broadly-based group. It is also now perceived as less British-dominated and the Danes benefit from the presence of a new nationality and hence some more equilibrium with the inclusion of their Spanish colleagues. In addition, the very fact that the group now includes a new nationality greatly increases its share of the "spoils" of the EP system. This is possible as the EP controls its own budget and its financial allocations and management of parliamentary resources.

While the group is, in general, committed to membership of the European Community, it is more pro-European than its co-evals in the parent party, and a minority of its MEPs. In the past, other parties were reluctant to join a group where they would perhaps be dominated by the 61 British conservatives in the 63-member group in the 1979-1984 EP, and so always remain a minority element in the group. Britain was the only member state to be mainly represented in only two party groups (although a Scottish Nationalist MEP sits in the EPD).

In terms of transnational party cooperation, this is one of the disadvantages of the predominantly two-party system in Great Britain, as British influence has decreased in terms of input into EP decisions, and also because the parties are less well-informed than other nationalities, as they became aware of intiatives in other groups at a later stage, as they were not in regular contact with parties in other groups.

Organisation of the Conservative group.

The group's Rules of Procedure (1980) provide for a Bureau, group meetings and secretariat. It states that the group determines the policies to be pursued in the EP and the parliamentary business and administration of the group. Secrecy of the proceedings of group meetings is required.

The group possesses a sturdy tradition of good organisation and strong discipline. It organises regular study days in addition to ad hoc working groups on, for example, the EC budget and the Common Agricultural Policy. Mr. Christopher Prout, former Conservative group whip in the EP, is President of the EDs since 11 February 1987, when he was elected by the group to replace Sir Henry Plumb (Group President since 1982) who became President of the EP. Mr. Prout places emphasis on the international nature of the group, rather than its traditionally limited representation of nationalities.

Cohesion.

The group is perceived as being tightly disciplined until recently as English was its common language and most of its members formed one single party

delegation. It consists of relatively young and enthusiastic MEPs, most of whom have little parliamentary experience. The group even travelled together in a separate aeroplane from Britain to Brussels or Strasbourg, and maintains a high level of organised attendance at voting sessions of the Plenary, along with an efficient system of replacement of members, or substitutes, in committees. In addition group meeetings were, until Spanish members joined, almost invariably held in Britain or Denmark. The group in 1986 has become less cohesive and more transnational.

Policy conflict and cleavages.

The Rules of Procedure (Rule 28) provide that motions, PQs or interventions which are contrary to the policy of the group should be given prior notice to the group chairman. There is no explicit "conscience clause" for policy conflicts. The British Conservatives welcomed the entry of the Spanish into the group as it now has a structure which enables it to speak on issues of relevance to the CAP, such as olive oil, as well as policies towards South America, for example. On the issue of fisheries policy, however, the Danes and Spanish may encounter resistance from the British. For the Conservatives, representation is synonymous with representation of geographical constituency, as the Conservatives often see themselves as the agents of local industry. On the issue of the CAP, the Spanish Allianza Popular finds itself under pressure to vote with the European Peoples Party.

There is regular contact between the British Conservative MEPs and Downing St. and the delegation receives regular instructions on policy issues, particularly

on the Budget. Since 1979, the autonomy of the Conservative MEPs from the parent party has been curtailed. Most of the MEPs are regarded by London as being more progressive than the national MPs.

Attitudes to membership of the European Community and the future of European integration constitute a divisive issue among the Conservative Party's MEPs. Before 1979, the approach to European integration was markedly tepid and one observer suggested that up to the 1979 European elections, "the Conservatives hardly distinguished themselves from Labour as regards their general attitiude towards the functioning of the institutions" (16). After direct elections, many Conservative MEPs showed themselves to be pro-European but conflict on this issue has arisen on occasion. The group has also experienced difficulties in relations with other groups regarding its representation of the Tory government position, for example in 1980, on the issue of the British demand for a reduction of its Budget contribution. The Tories in the EP then felt obliged to repair the strained relations especially with the EPP and the Liberals.

Reports in autumn 1988 pointed to rows between the pro-Thatcherite Blue Circle group which favours an approach of "Britain first" and those federalist Conservative MEPs who advocate a stronger EP and new EC policies. Estimates would suggest that each of these groupings constitutes a third of the MEPs, while the remaining 15 were devoting their energies to the development of publicity or business contacts for 1992. A leader of the Blue Circle group suggested that the group should take a stronger pro-British line. The group leader, Mr. Prout, denied any divisions in October 1988, and added that "we all

share the Prime Minister's firm commitment to Britain in Europe and her

practical step-by-step approach to the future development" of the EC. He added

that it was on this basis that the British Conservatives would fight the direct

elections in June 1989 (17). This is slightly less enthusiastic than the

information leaflet "Conservatives in the EP" produced before the 1984

elections, which stated unequivocally "Being in Europe means trade investment

and jobs for Britain " and that "2 1/2 million jobs now depend on our trade

with the European Community". Nevertheless, the pragmatic step-by-step

approach of the domestic party is at times Europeanised by the group.

The party leader, Mrs. Thatcher, has made a speech in Bruges on 20 September

1988 in which she regarded a centralised European government as a "nightmare".

This view is not shared by at least a third of the MEPs of the Conservative

Party. Her opposition to "a European superstate exercising a new dominance

from Brussels" was tempered somewhat by her assertion that "certainly we want

to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of common purpose" although

national identity was underlined (18). Furthermore, such "arcane institutional

debates" as giving the EP direct legislative power were, for her, a waste of

energy. In such matters, her attitude was not unlike that of the traditional

RPR stance of de Gaulle and the French newspaper Libération referred to her as

more Gaullist than ever in refuting a European superstate and suggesting a

simple cooperation between sovereign independent states (19). The national

leader of the Gaullist RPR, Mr. Chirac, has also made a statement to young RPR

members in which his support for Europe was less than enthusiastic. He stated

that a large number of French people are worried about Europe, about its

consequences for daily life (20) although he expressed qualified support for
European integration.

The issue of policy attitude to the European Community remains a conflictual
one among the Conservative group's British members. In the wake of Mrs.
Thatcher's Bruges speech, the EP's Institutional Affairs committee wished to
express its opposition to Mrs. Thatcher's vision of Europe. On this occasion,
Mr. Derek Prag, Conservative MEP, felt obliged to write to the Financial Times
(5/10/88) in order to state that "we warded off a threat by a Dutch Liberal
member of the committee" to table a motion criticising Mrs. Thatcher. In fact
several political groups drafted resolutions for the plenary urging that her
remarks be "deplored", including the British Labour MEPs. He continues that the
45 British Conservative MEPs "cannot all be expected to hold the same views of
the future of Europe" and indeed "they hold 45 different sets of views". He
sees this as the essence of democracy. His attitude serves to illustrates the
diversity of opinion among a grouping which had until comparatively recently
(i.e., the second direct elections to the EP) been regarded as well-whipped and
united on the issue of the EC.

Leadership.

The group leader attempts to reconcile the divergent views on the development
of the EC within the group while at the same time, he has regular meetings with
the Conservative Prime Minister on policy attitudes to be adopted by the group.
The leader places emphasis on regular attendance at plenary and committee
meetings.

The extraparliamentary links of the Group.

(a) relations with national parliaments and parties.

Within the UK, relations between the domestic Conservative party and the MEPs are not always smooth, as the public image as well as the conception of the party workers at home is that the MEPs are overpaid (21). In addition, the Conservative MEPs are, in terms of legislative socialisation and knowledge of Europe, becoming Europeanised in a manner which may alienate them from the policies of the national party and of the Prime Minister. The group's self perception and performance bears this out since the first direct elections. By February 1987, the newly-elected President of the European Democrats could state :

> "we are an international group and we are sometimes at odds with the Council of Ministers, one member of which is a British Minister. This is a form of constitutional conflict which the Prime Minister understands well, and I may say that on no occasion has a British Minister attempted to impose the government's view on the group" (22).

This has not proven to be true, as seen in the case of the Bruges speech. The fact remains that the domestic party and the Prime Minister carry the day on issues of conflict between national and European interests.

With regard to the parliamentary links of the group, the Conservative party in Westminster formed in 1980 a "Conservative European Reform Group" with the aims of:

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1) eliminating the CAP and returning farm policy to national centres

2) reforming the EC budget system

3) restoring to national governments the right to deal with unfair trading practices by outsiders

4) reassertion of national parliament's powers which have been transferred to Community institutions.

The group stated that it was attempting to renegotiate from the inside (i.e. within the EC) to improve conditions of Britain's membership (23)

(b) Informal associations of the group and other parties.

The individual member parties of the Group have links with other national political parties, although the Group possesses no formalised federation-type structure. The British Conservatives have had electoral cooperation with the German CSU/CDU. Mrs. Thatcher spoke at a CDU meeting in Hanover before the 1979 elections, and the Conservatives and the CSU/CSU hold many policies in common, and there is regular attendance of delegates of each party at the party conferences of the other.

In addition the European Democratic Union, an electoral combination of right wing parties, formed in April 1978, was based on a CDU/Conservative agreement. The EP's publication, Forging Ahead, states that in 1978 previous informal contacts between Conservative and Christian Democratic parties were "strengthened by the setting up" of the EDU, which also included Portuguese and Spanish members (1982, p.137).

7.5   The Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group.

Transnationality.

The group, founded on 20 June 1953 and formerly called the Liberal and
Democratic group, consists of 46 members from nine member states of the
Community (see Table 7.3).   The British Liberal party was the largest liberal
party in Europe, in terms of votes both at national and European elections.
However, the party has not been represented in the EP since direct elections,
due to the nature of the electoral laws in Great Britain.   The system of "first-
past-the-post" has resulted in a situation whereby over half a million votes
(12.6% of the votes in Britain) are not accorded representation in the European
Parliament and the 5% threshold in West Germany resulted in the FDP winning no
seats.   As a result, the issue of electoral laws has posed more problems for the
Liberal group than for other groups.   The basis of representation of member
states in the EP is for the present controlled by the individual member states
and not by the EP or other EC institutions, thereby linking the European
elections irrevocably to the national polity and even alienating the EP MEPs
and Groups from the means to influence the method whereby they are elected.
The British Liberal leader Mr. Steel has called for "a common voting system for
the European Parliament based on proportional representation so that every vote
cast throughout the Community is given equal weight" (24) and the Liberal Party
Council of Britain called for such a voting system for the 1989 elections at
its meeting in Sheffield in May 1985.   Through the Liberal federation's liaison
of all Liberal parties in Europe, those parties not represented in the EP

maintain a close contact with their sister-parties in that umbrella
organisation.

Table 7.3 Membership of the Liberal group by nationality -1 Nov 1988

Belgium (PRL/PVV)	5
Denmark (V)	2
Spain	2
France (UFE)	14
Ireland (Ind)	1
Italy (PLI/PRI)	6
Luxembourg (DP)	1
Netherlands (VVD)	5
Portugal	10
TOTAL	46

The Italian representatives come from two small political parties, the
Republicans and Liberals, both of whom have played important roles in the
national polity in contacts between the Christian Democrats and the parties of
the left. The two parties are seen in some regards as rivals in Italy, and the
Republicans had objected to the use of the name Liberal for the Group, and so
the name "Democrat" was added to its title. In the 1979-84 EP, as in the 1984-
89 EP, the largest national delegation in the Liberal group was the French one
(14 MEPs from Simon Veil's electoral list of several French parties which split
among the EPP and the Liberals). The fact that the list included MEPs from

parties who ho joined the EPP group angered the Liberal group. The 1984 direct elections heralded a further decline in the number of Liberals in the EP and in elected office in the member states.

Organisation of the Liberal Group.

The group possesses few formal rules and relies on compromises rather than strictly outlined procedures in organisation. It has a Secretary General and group secretariat and holds regular working group meetings and study days. The Secretary General of the group is Dominique Catet who replaced Massimo Silvestro on 6 May 1987. This role has been largely administrative in the organisation of the group and less politicised than in other groups.

Cohesion.

The Liberal group lacks cohesive structures and consists of members from very different political backgrounds, from traditional conservative to socially very liberal. The Liberals are seen as being traditionally very disparate in their views and this is regarded as part of their principle of freedom of speech although it presents problems at the organisational level. The group has experienced more difficulties in maintaining group discipline than any other group in the EP.

The Liberal group has many problems of internal discipline, with members each tending to follow their own ideas. The group has the worst attendance record of all groups as, like other groups, many of its members who have alternative incomes are absent in their capacity as journalists, lecturers or lawyers. The

problem of internal group discipline came to a head in 1983, when Mr. Calvez the Chief Whip recruited a staff assistant to whip and put pressure on MEPs to attend the plenary sessions of the Parliament. This had previously been an ad hoc arrangement, as members of the group secretariat responsible for a specific issue had attempted to raise support within the group on the relevant issue, and ensure attendance (25). This method had been largely unsuccessful. The group leader also speaks to the leaders of the parent party and lodges a complaint about bad attendance records. The limitation of speaking time for recalcitrant members has been used to good effect and by 1983-84 the group was becoming more cohesive than it had been in the past. Since 1984 it has further had a major restructuring in recognition of the fact that it lacked members from several member states and had not been as successful as anticipated in the second European elections.

Agreement on policies.

The group sees itself as a progressive group, and points to the fact that it pioneered the discussion of defence and security in the European Parliament, with Lord Dodwin in the pre-1979 Assembly and Mr. Haagerup in the 1979-1984 one. It was a Liberal initiative which led to a working party on Human Rights outside the Community. It was also a Liberal rapporteur who was responsible for a major report on Northern Ireland, the Haagerup report. In addition, the Liberals have expressed clear support for the enlargement of the scope of the EC to a European Union, increased powers for the EP, majority voting in the Council and the adequate financing of Community policies. The group has actively supported the EP's Draft Treaty on European Union initiated by

Spinelli, the conclusions of the Spaak II (Dooge) Committee and the holding of

an intergovernmental conference (IGC) on the SEA with Parliament's involvement.

Unlike some groups in the Parliament, the group has no division along the lines

of pro or anti-EC. The group has more women than other groups and the largest

proportion of Jewish members. The group also consists of members who are not

traditionally party politicians, and hence there is a great disparity of ideas,

ideology and parliamentary practice.

Policy conflict and cleavages.

The group encompasses very disparate interests within its ranks, from extreme

right to left on social issues such as abortion, as became apparent when Irish

member Mr. T.J. Maher and French Member Mme. Simone Veil voted at opposite

poles on abortion. The group's proposal on introducing abortion in Ireland,

Greece and Belgium was withdrawn in September 1984 due to internal group

disagreements (26). There is no consensus on the signing of motions for

resolutions, on behalf of the group. However, the Veil UFE list members of the

group have often shown themselves to be more sceptical of the Community than

the other members of the group.

The cleavages within the group are most apparent on economic issues. The

Liberals consider themselves as anti-conservatives and as critics of the status

quo, whether conservative or socialist. Their belief is in free enterprise and

welfare policies, and they point out that the welfare concept was essentially a

liberal initiative, with regard to free education and pensions, for example.

The Liberals profess themselves as anti-Marxist in ideology but not fully laissez-faire either, although the Belgian Walloon Liberals are essentially laissez-faire and are considered the most right wing party of the group. As the EP does not tend to concern itself with national economic issues conflict can in many cases be avoided within the group on such economic issues.

On the issue of agriculture, there are regional and geographical problems. The Liberals have been strongest in rural constituencies in the past, and this is reflected in the interests which are represented in the group. The group has internal tensions on the northern European issue of butter and dairy farming and the southern European issues of olive oil and wine. Such conflicts are also apparent in other groups of the EP. Industrial or urban interests and trade unions are represented in fewer numbers than in other groups.

The major subject of conflict on grounds of national interest in the group is fisheries, which has been a divisive issue within the Assembly itself. The group has also had some divergence of opinions in the past over the issue of security. When the group met in Lisbon on 2 April 1987, it advocated a discussion by the EC on European security and the Washington-Moscow negotiations on "Euromissiles" (27). There were however some reservations on this position within the group as the matter does not strictly fall within the EC Treaties.

Observers have suggested that the Liberals could be compared with the Socialists in that both groups in the mid-1980s had come to resemble little

more than federations, with little cohesion or discipline and a lack of organisation which, it was suggested, bordered on chaos. The Liberal group is a grouping with diverse parties in the tradition of liberalism of thought and expression.

Leadership.

Leadership in the group has concentrated on conformity for issues of central relevance, with specific conformity rules on particular policy issues applying normally.

The extraparliamentary links of the Liberal group.

(a) Relations with national parties and parliaments.

The group has contact with other liberal parties through its federation. In addition, meetings are held at "summit" level of leaders of the group and national liberal leaders. One such conference was held in Copenhagen in April 1985 and prepared for the federation's congress in June of that year in Groningen. This conference called for economic and political progress in the community, with facilitating of customs formalities, increased R and D, and technological cooperation, along with a liberal external trade policy, and lastly a change to be promoted in order to encourage awareness of the opportunities offered by a united Europe (28).

(b) The Liberal Federation.

The group possesses a federation structure outside and alongside its EP grouping. There is a close and overlapping link between the group and the federation. The federation also acts as a linkage mechanism for the British Liberal party, who are not represented in the 1984 EP and for the German FDP which did not top the 5% threshold in the direct elections in West Germany. The Federation of the Liberal and Democratic Parties of the European Community was founded in March 1976 at the Constituent Congress in Stuttgart. The Stuttgart Declaration, which was based on the Oxford Manifesto of the Liberal International in 1947 outlined the federation's policy towards the EC.

The Liberal group of the EP and the Liberal and the Radical Youth Movement of the EC are member organisations of the Federation (EP, 1984d, p. 137). The Spanish Liberals were members of the federation before accession to the community. The Vice-Chairperson of the federation, Colette Flesch, stated at the federation's executive meeting of 10 December 1984:

"Today we have expressed our support to Spain on its return to democracy by giving the Partido Reformista Democratico observer status in our federation" (29).

The Irish political party, the Progressive Democrats, joined the Federation of Liberal Democratic and Reform parties in May 1988. It is the sixteenth member party to join the federation and has a pro-European stance. It is not represented in the EP. Its application was fully supported by the Alliance party in Northern Ireland, also a member of the federation and with no

representation in the EP. These parties are hence afforded a political voice at the EC level through the medium of the federation.

7.6 The group of the European Democratic Alliance.

Transnationality.

The group was founded on 20 January 1965 with 15 members. The Gaullists had previously sat as associates of the Liberal group until relations became so strained that the RPR left the group. It was trinational until recently and resembles to a lesser extent the Conservatives in the dominant role played by one party. It is made up of the French RPR (19 members), eight Irish Fianna Fail party members and one member of the Scottish Nationalist party. In 1985 it was joined by the Greek former Minister Mr. John Boutos and in 1986 by one Portuguese member, thereby adding new nationalities, with their concomitant advantages which accrue to both MEP and Group. It now has 30 members and five nationalities (Table 7.4). The largest party of the Group, the RPR has been seen as the classic nationalist party and the party is seen as dominant in the group and as undermining the Irish members with its traditional Gaullism. The Group's parties are defined by very personalised leadership in nationalist parties. Nationalism is more important than class interests, and both the Irish and French parties have strong political machines at home. The group has few transnational features and the representatives formed this party group as a result of a "chance party configuration" in the 1973 EP rather than that of a "clear party-political option" (Stammen, 1982, p.223).

Table 7.4   The EDA group: membership by nationality

France   19

Ireland   8

Greece   1

Portugal   1

U.K.   1

Total   30

Organisation of the Group.

The group of the European Progressive Democrats changed its name from the Union Democratique Européen (European Democratic Union), a uninational group founded on 20 January 1965, when the 12 RPR members were joined by the 5 Irish Fianna Fail members (who had been sitting as Independents) and one Dane in 1973. The group then changed its name in 1979 to the European Progressive Democrats and in 1986 to the group of the European Democratic Alliance.

The organisation of the group was subjected to a radical overview in 1984, when the group underwent a fundamental change. In June and July of that year, the Fianna Fail party caused some controversy in Ireland regarding its continued membership of the group, and other options (such as opting out of the group and even joining the Socialist group) were examined and ultimately rejected. The Irish saw the group as a form of "coalition" with specific agreements such as the refusal to discuss the issue of defence . The Irish MEPs have adopted a unilateral approach, as they have been meeting separately since 1984. A set of

rules governing the functioning of the group have now been agreed on as the basis of the statutes of the group. Joint political programmes are no longer a feature of group organisation, unlike the 1979 group document on behalf of the constituent parties. Internal cohesion, already under threat, was further undermined by the arrival in 1986 of four Portuguese PRD MEPs, which led to a dilution of internal cohesion. Some observers have cast doubt on the continued existence of the group in its present form after the third direct elections, due to internal divisions (30).

Until the French law of 1986 eliminating the Cumul or the holding of several political elected positions at the same time, the French members of the Group were often absent and the other nationalities had a large share of the speaking time in plenary. The Cumul law and the decline in the dual mandate have resulted in a more active participation by the French members, who are now anxious to avail of their full quota of speaking time. They also wish to re-establish the image of the group in line with the majority political thinking within the group, with less emphasis on left of centre ideas or on Irish preference for neutrality. The French members now express a more participatory approach to group membership and wish to have a more consensual group.

Cohesion.

Stammen (1982, p.223) rightly claims that there is no fundamental agreement between the Gaullists and Fianna Fail on policy which might justify their cooperation. The group possesses no formalised Rules of Procedure although MEPs are penalised by the leadership for non-conformity in informal ways,

rather than by formal sanctions. Such penalisation would include the removal of members from committees and delegations, or the withholding of spokesmanships from the "offender".

There is a provision within the group for a conscience clause, whereby the member may vote against the group line on moral grounds. A sanction is applied if a member fails to comply on a matter considered to be of paramount importance that requires conformity with the group line. Precedents on conformity are established on EDA study days and positions are recorded at group sessions. The President of the group decides on the sanctions and the Secretary General implements them, and while the MEP may be aggrieved, s/he can have little recourse to appeal and finds him/herself in an isolated position.

It is common practice, as an unwritten rule, that group members sign motions for resolutions only after checking with the group, and this forms the basis of discussion at every group meeting, when time is allocated to deal with private members' motions.

Divisions within the group have until the second direct elections been rare in public. The Irish member Mr. Niall Andrews has publicly criticised what he considers the right wing stance of the RPR on some international political issues, such as human rights and international issues. Mr. Andrews had stated that he regarded the Gaullists as right-wing on human rights issues and they had failed to vote with Fianna Fail on such issues as the health hazard from the Sellafield nuclear plant in England. He stated that he hoped that Fianna

Fail would be able to find other "centrist" partners in the Parliament before
the 1989 elections

These statements reflect tensions within the group although Mr. Lalor, the FF
delegation leader, described this tension as an agreement to differ on issues
such as nuclear power to European defence. In November 1985, when the conflict
between the party delegations arose, Mr. Lalor stated that the two parties
worked closely together on most issues, notably on the defence of the CAP, and
"agreed to differ in areas such as nuclear power and defence". He continued
"Mr. Andrews should accept that the Gaullists are not a French version of
Fianna Fail" (31). Mr. Lalor is reported as further stating that the French had
consistently supported Fianna Fail in the CAP. He said that the "Gaullist
Republican Party" was the best possible alliance for Fianna Fail in the
Parliament.

There have some attempts in the past to expel members from the group.
Expulsion is threatened by the leadership only on an issue which would damage
the group's image vis à vis the national party or the public. Although the
group would lose the concomitant amount of speaking time and financial
allocations for numbers in groups, this is considered preferable to loss of
image (32).

Both the major parties of the group, the RPR and the Fianna Fail party, have
similar origins, developments and leadership patterns. Neither party is
completely in favour of European Integration although neither is totally opposed

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to the Community, and each appreciates the advantages to be gained from the Common Agricultural Policy of the Community.

Group cohesion has in the past been severely weakened by the RPR's turnstyle (tourniquet) system, whereby members are obliged to resign from the EP after one year in order to provide an opportunity for all candidates on the 1979 electoral list to sit in the Parliament. This has weakened the group's influence in the EP as there was a rapid turnover of French members who lacked an in-depth knowledge of the workings of the Parliament. French influence in the group was also weaker than their numbers would at first have suggested. Some Gaullist MEPs defied this system of tourniquet, and were expelled from the party at home, while remaining in the EP as French Progressive Democrats. This was the case of Vincent Asqueur and Gerard Israel, for example.

The reputation of the RPR had thus been damaged in the group and in the Parliament as a whole. Coordination of policy at group meetings is based on the awareness of the national stance of the national parties, and the conscience clause theme is evoked here, although the EPDs have no rules of procedure, unlike the Socialists, the CDs and the Liberals. Conformity is based on precedent decisions of the group, from Group Study Days, and decisions from all groups are on record.

Policy conflict and cleavages.

At the group meetings in advance of the Plenary, national positions on issues of debate are clearly enunciated. In the early years of the group's formation,

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fisheries policy was the main issue of divergence, although this is a less contentious issue now. In this case and in other cases of dissent, a free vote is accorded to the MEPs in the group. This is decided after all attempts to reach a compromise have failed. A negotiated compromise position or policy document is considered preferable to division or a free vote, even if the result is a weak parliamentary initiative. If the issue under discussion is of "vital national interest", a free vote is still the norm, and here the importance of the representation of national interests is made clear. Each party remains aware of the other's national political approach and hence a mutual sensitivity to these positions develops.

With regard to the formulation of issues it has traditionally been held that Fianna Fail had a pragmatic approach to Irish economic issues. Although FF is in favour of the maintenance of neutrality for Ireland, it would have no objection to debating European Political Cooperation, the EC's foreign policy, at a European level, as it considers that EPC is relevant to the European level of politics, but not to the national arena (33).

The SEA has been a major issue of debate within the group, as the Fianna Fail party is in favour of its content while the RPR has expressed its vehement opposition to the Act, particularly its supposed denial of national sovereignty. As early as 1975, the group had differed over an issue of European Integration when the Gaullists abstained from voting on the Patijn report on direct elections while FF and the Danish member voted in favour (Jouve, 1984, p.16).

Leadership.

A political leadership role is played by both the group's president, Mr. de la Malène and Secretary General, Mr. Earlie, in attempting to reach compromises and a common voting position among the two major parties.

The extraparliamentary links of the EDA.

(a) Relations with national parliaments and parties.

Although there is no specific or formalised liaison structure, both the Fianna Fail and the RPR parties maintain links with their parent parties on a regular basis. The FF party leadership has had some conflicts with its MEPs and the Secretary General of the group, based on cleavages with the national party and personality issues. The RPR delegation reflects to a large extent the pragmatic attitude towards Europe which its parent party adopts in the French National Assembly.

(b) Federation.

There is no federation of the EDA and there are no indications that one could be considered useful or necessary by either the MEPs or the parent party.

7.7   The group of the European Right.

The group of the European Right is characterised by the labels of right-wing totalitarianism which are appended to it by observers and other groups.

Transnationality.

The Group consists of 17 members of parties and four nationalities. Its most recent member is Mr. John Taylor, of the Ulster Unionist party, who joined it on his resignation from the European Democrats, on 21 January 1987.

Table 7.5 Group of the European Right: membership by nationality

France (National Front)	10
Italy (MSI)	5
Greece (EPN)	1
U.K. (UUP)	1
Total	17

The Group's policies include a stand against international terrorism and in favour of NATO and Western European Union. The group's leader is Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the French National Front, a controversial force in both national and European politics. He is regularly criticised by members of other groups in the EP, for such matters as absenteeism, a personality cult in the person of Mr. Le Pen and for fascist theories. In September 1988, Mr. Le Pen was qualified as "anti-semitic" by the leader of the Socialist group, Mr. Arndt, and as being opposed to human rights by the British Labour MEPs, especially Mr. Glenn Ford. A great deal of political advantage accrues to the critics of the group of the European Right.

The emergence of the extreme right in the EP has presented problems to the right in the EP which have also had echoes in France, home of the extreme right-wing National Front leader Mr. Le Pen. The right does not wish to be identified with the European Right and tends hence to leave them to their own devices. It ostracises the European Right and that group is never included in even the compromise amendments tabled by all groups. The EPP never seeks the European Right's voting support and that group is never invited to meetings, when such compromise amendments are being drafted. The ER group is ignored in the legislative business of the EP and constitutes a small number of MEPs in a parliament of 518 members. It is noted that in the EP's publication, the calendar of meetings in 1988 (committees, groups, delegations), no meetings were scheduled for the group of the European Right to meet as a group.

The group experienced a great deal of criticism amongst much controversy when the Parliament made a declaration on the fight against racism and xenophobia. The extreme right-wing MEPs did not countenance the existence of racism or xenophobia in the Community.

In October 1988, the group of the European Right sought to introduce on the agenda on 12 October a motion for urgent debate on the restoration of the death penalty (Doc. B 2-815/88). The motion was rejected by a roll call vote, in which 210 MEPs voted. 10 voted in favour, 199 against and one member abstained (34). The French authorities, in late 1988, requested the waiving of Mr. Le Pen's diplomatic immunity in connection with statements made by him concerning other French politicians.

<u>Non-aligned members:</u>

Mr. Ian Paisley is perhaps the best-known of the non-aligned MEPs in the EP.
He is known for his frequent interventions in plenary on the issue of Northern
Ireland, particularly regarding his strong opposition to the Anglo-Irish
agreement between the governments of Ireland and Britain. Mr. Paisley, dubbed
as "vocal Protestantism's gift to the European Parliament" (35) concerns himself
largely with matters relating to Northern Ireland, especially regional social
policy, with occasional forays into moods of volatile attacks on the Pope as
"anti-Christ" and the EC as a Papist plot. Mr. Paisley's presence serves to
illustrate one of the current cleavages within the EC in a very vocal manner.

In September 1987, a new political group of non-affiliated MEPs was formed and
named the "Group for Technical Coordination and Defence of Independent Groups
and Members". The members are seven members of the Spanish Social Democratic
Centre Party who are pro-Suarez, three Italian Radical MEPs (Pannella, Bonino,
Cicciomessere), and a Dutch non-attached MEP, Mr. Leen van der Vaal. The MEPs
wished to avail of the benefits of a political group, such as speaking time,
secretariat and other resources, "while remaining independent from the big
parties dominating the assembly" (36).

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Chapter Eight

Conclusions - Party Groups in a Fluid Polity

The literature on the complex subject of political groups in the EP serves as a descriptive, pragmatic body of information which is largely historical. The problem, nevertheless, challenges the political scientist to undertake a different approach, involving attitudinal and behavioural research within scientific perspectives. For this reason, I have attempted to study representation by the groups in the context of organisational cohesion and ideological cleavages. Much research still remains to be carried out on the subject of the European Parliament and the party groups. On the basis of the research carried out since the first direct elections, we now draw together the themes of the study in order to form some conclusions. The EUI Survey has been utilised throughout the thesis insofar as it is pertinent to the theme of representation by the party groups in the EP.

The groups and the nature of conflict, consensus and representation in the EP can be studied from different approaches. A comparative study of the EP with national parliaments would not have been worthwhile, as the EP and its actors are different from national parliaments in the ways outlined in this thesis. There is a need to reassess the EP, not with regard to parliaments or even as a supranational parliament, but rather as an EC institution.

8.1   The EC system of decision-making and the EP's powers and influence.

In the development of the EC as a "fluid polity", the EP has attempted to assume new authority and influence in its growing institutionalisation. The balance of initiative has, to an extent, altered as the EP is beginning to take over some

of the functions expected of the Commission, as it drafts its "own initiative" reports. The Parliament's draft Treaty on European Union and the declaration on fascism, both "own initiatives", were accepted by the Commission and the EP regularly institutes public hearings, unheard of in the pre-1979 EP. It now threatens to take action on infringements of the Treaty, under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty, which had previously been the prerogative of the Commission.

The Parliament is still far from redressing the "democratic deficit" of the Community. Despite its weak electoral basis and isolation from central power, it is involved in the decision-making processes of the EC, especially in its relations with the Commission. In addition, the EP already forms part of the EC Budget authority. It is now asserting itself as it attempts to shed its alienation and is putting pressure on the Commission and the Council to carry out their functions and threatening censure. In addition, the Commission has shown an increased willingness to accept the Assembly's own initiative reports and to use them as the basis of the Commission's initiatives to the Council. It also accepted many of the EP's amendments even before the implementation of the Single Act.

The Single European Act has challenged the EP to become aware of new procedural demands, as it realises that it needs to fully utilise its role under the SEA in order to attain political leverage with the other institutions. The SEA offers the party groups of the EP a new objective rationale to strengthen group cohesion and leadership control of those groups. The SEA has also given rise to new procedures in the EP and its decision-making circuits. In particular,

the procedure for emergency debate challenges the political groups to reach compromise in order to have motions adopted under Rule 48. This procedure can be quick and effective in an informal manner if compromise can be achieved. The political groups are the agents which ensure if a compromise can come about.

Under the SEA, the EP is now obliged to come to a decision on its strategy, particularly on the EC Budget, swiftly, for the second reading, in order to form a coherent long-term strategy. For this it is obliged to trust the group whips and expert MEPs to attempt to reach consensus. In order to achieve consensus, therefore, the vote coalition-building process must be handed over to the political groups. The SEA and the enlargement of the EC to twelve member states have both served to challenge the EP and their groups to create a revised political organisation.

It was the EP which brought about the European Union (Spinelli) Treaty initiative. This in turn led to intergovernmental analysis in the Dooge Committee and to the Intergovernmental Conference on the Single European Act. The EP is emerging from its comparative isolation as it becomes more politicised. This has been due in large part to the active role taken by the political groups, and also by the committees which act as forums for the exchange of ideas and for negotiation on compromised texts.

The EP produced three reports in late 1988 which evaluated the first 15 months' application of the Single European Act and these pointed to the fact that much

remains to be achieved in the quest for European Union. The MEPs denounced the democratic deficit in EC decision-making, which alienates them from the representation of the voters and from control over the other EC institutions. The majority of the MEPs consider that the SEA has led to some progress and believe that due to improved decision-making procedures the EP is more closely associated with the legislative tasks of the Community. "Association" does not however denote "powers" and the EP itself has pointed out that decision making still lacks "democracy" as the Council can adopt a text rejected by the Parliament (1).

Because of problems encountered by the European parliamentarians with regard to the three different locations of the major Community institutions, the EP has again called on the Council to take the initiative to fix one EC institutional seat. The French Government had taken the EP to the Court of Justice against the Parliament's resolution adopted on 24 October 1985, concerning the holding of EP sessions in Brussels. The EP has therefore taken the initiative regarding its place of work and has been successful in this regard.

The Parliament has noted that the Single Act has extended and strengthened the Community's legal competences in three ways: firstly, by adding new chapters which deal with previously understated or ignored policy areas such as economic and social cohesion, the environment, monetary affairs, research and the social sector; secondly by formalising the process of foreign policy coordination known as European Political Cooperation; and thirdly by setting the year 1992 as the deadline for the completion of the Internal Market (Doc. A2-176/88). It

has welcomed the allocation of adequate financial resources to the Community in order to ensure the success of the SEA, and it noted that the SEA sought to enhance the effectiveness of the EC in decision-making, and in this area the number of Council decisions taken by majority vote, rather than unanimity, has increased. Nevertheless, with regard to the EP's role, the Parliament is aware that the genuine power of co-decision of the EP and the Council applies in a very limited way (in the assent procedure which applies to only two articles of the Treaty).

The EP has criticised the Council and Commission on several counts, in its resolutions of November 1988 on the results obtained from the implementation of the Single Act, on those institutions' involvement in the aspects of the legislative process which also relate to the EP. It believes that the fact that the Council can adopt legislative texts which it has rejected is anti-democratic. The EP has called on the Commission to provide an undertaking that it will withdraw proposals rejected by the Parliament "in order to ensure that Community legislation is acceptable to the elected representatives chosen by the electorate specifically to ensure democratic control at this level" (Doc. A2-176/88, point 6). In this way, the EP is emphasising its representative role as a watchdog of Community legislation. It further wishes to extend its exercise this function and its information function (as representative of EC citizens) by recommending that it be informed of the Council's position under the cooperation procedure and of the position adopted on each amendment and vote of each member state (Doc. A2-176/88, point 11). The EP also sees a role for active involvement in European Political Cooperation where its role could be "extended",

where it could "exercise political control" (Doc. A2-201/88, point C of resolution), and in the appointment of the Commission, which under the Treaty is limited.

In general terms of legislative roles, the EP has often requested the Council that the conciliation procedure be extended to all major areas of legislation. It justifies this request, which is tantamount to joint decision making, on the grounds that this allows a dialogue in the "search for compromises between the two arms of the legislative authority" (Doc. A2-176/88, point 14). The EP has never been regarded by the other EC institutions as one of two arms of legislative authority, yet it is attempting to assume a substantial legislative function as it develops as a *sui generis* body. With regard to its political relationship with the national parliaments, the EP has urged those assemblies to secure an undertaking from the governments to "take a stand in Council against any proposal rejected by the EP" (Doc. A2-176/88, point 7).

8.2   The changing functions of representation in the European Parliament.

While national parliaments are composed of legislators involved in first order elections, the EP's election is a second order election in terms of political importance and the conception of political representation. The national arena caters for a system of conflict-resolution which results in the formation of a government coalition or government of one party as the spoils of electoral competition. In the EP, there is no government within or directly related to the Assembly, and no stable opposition (a prerequisite in Anglo-Saxon studies

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of parliaments). Whereas in the national arena of politics the links between

the constituency and the capital are already established and self-evident, in

the EP there is no direct link between the constituency and the EC capital.

We can provide an answer to what the groups are as representative organisations

only by rethinking our premises with regard to the EP. We enquire into the

nature of representation, not in relation to national parliaments, but rather in

relation to the development of the EP as a Community institution in a fluid

polity. In analysing the groups, we find an uneasy co-existence of modes of

political and organisational behaviour, where some MEPs have adopted an

individualistic concept of MEPs as single actors while others see themselves as

MEPs "in combinations" recognising the advantages of group membership and yet

others perceive the MEP as the representative of different things at different

times.

The MEPs who choose to participate in groups, something which is encouraged by

the EP's Rules of Procedure, perceive an advantage in acting together and

pursuing the logic of collective action despite the Free Riders. Olsen (1965)

has pointed out that it is wrong to assume that if everyone in a group has an

interest in common, the group would always tend to further that interest. The

disadvantage to group participation is that as the groups are often large and

aggregate interests from diverse origins, the great diversity among MEPs of

several regional bases and nationalities becomes clear. The representative

function of the MEPs is evident with regard to agricultural interests (e.g.

dairy or Mediterraneanfocus, or increased CAP expenditure versus industrial

policy), fisheries, regional interests, industrial and other sectors. Here the sometimes uneasy coexistence of the concepts of group representation and individual representation becomes apparent. The groups are now adapting themselves to the coexistence of different representational styles. There is a form of collective representation in the group which gives the group its identity and unique character which is the result of collective experience and shared concepts and political language.

The major cleavages which emerge in the EP concern the future of the EC, the financing of the EC and the social issues of cohesion which have left-right relevance. These cleavages are not always identifiable along group lines. The vote on the Spinelli Treaty on European Union reveals this cleavage (207 in favour, 63 -British Socialists, Danish anti-marketeers, Rainbow, EDA -against, 40 abstentions, and this concurs with the EUI survey replies by groups on the future of the EC. The voting on the Single Act was EPP 78, Socialists 67, Communists 22, Liberals 16, ED 5, and 4 non-aligned in favour, while 19 ED, 7 Rainbow, 5 liberal and 2 Socialist members voted against the Act in January 1986. In most groups there is a cleavage on the issue of the EC, its political role and the future development of the EP therein.

The nature of conflict in the EP has evolved since the direct elections as a tension between representatives of agricultural interests and the proponents of a more developed industrial policy, with more overt differences between the groups. For example, the Socialists places emphasis on employment whereas the EDA favours the primacy of the CAP. Tensions within the groups also reflect

this cleavage, as when the Irish and French members of the Socialist group place the CAP higher on their priority lists. These tensions reflect problems which also face national party governments, regarding agricultural interests versus other interests of the industrialised society such as unemployment, environmental and consumer issues. On the whole, Bourguignon-Wittke et al have demonstrated that the EP as an institution has shown an inconsistent voting record on agricultural prices, leading to a lack of credibility of the assembly. They point out that the political groups sometimes experience problems in finding an acceptable balance among different regional and national interests and they instance the conflict between the agrarian lobby and those forces in favour of a reduction of agricultural costs.

The groups, in addition, are in the process of politicising the EP, not only by their behaviour but also by political developments in which they are involved, such as the Court of Justice case in May 1986 regarding the use of financial allocations for electoral campaigns, when it was considered that the political groups overstepped their roles in this regard.

A criticism that is occasionally levelled at the groups is that they have too much money at their disposal and waste it on unproductive activities such as trips which may not yield tangible results. It is also alleged that the groups' secretariats are overstaffed and overresourced (3).

A criticism levelled equally at the EP and the group concerns the procedural organisation of the Assembly which makes it possible to put forward several

similar motions for urgent debate rather than composite motions by compromise. This duplication of motions illustrates that in such issues there is little cooperation between the eight groups on legislative initiatives. For instance, in September 1988, motions for emergency debate (urgency procedure under rules 64 and 75 of the EP's Rules of Procedure) were put forward on such subjects as the wine market, European photography, torrential rain in Spain, Bangladesh, Northern Ireland, Burma, South Africa and Burundi by all groups. It is not unusual for all the motions to be defeated, rather than a compromise ensuing. This is a serious failing on the part of the groups as each of the groups appears to be aiming to seek the limelight for its own ends. While efforts were made in 1983 to curb the proliferation of the motions, the system is still in need of organisation and rigorous adherence to discipline.

Discipline is also a key word in the organisation of the groups' membership as absenteeism continues to be high, partly because many of the members do not need the sessional allowance in order to remain financially buoyant. Most groups are large and made up of disparate elements, and none are unitary actors. It has been suggested that the Socialists and the Liberals now resemble little more than confederations, as their organisation and discipline are regarded as disorganised and uncohesive.

Many analysts view the weakness of the EP as an institution as directly pertinent to the weakness of the constituency system of representation and the differences in the electoral systems in the member states. As direct contact with the constituency is not easily maintained, contacts are difficult to

establish. MEPs attempt to compensate for this by tabling urgency debates on specific issues of relevance to the citizens.

The EP is developing as a body of interest representation, particularly in the second directly-elected Parliament. Criticisms of the EP members as the agents or even tools of multinational as well as national industries are not unusual. The 1984-1989 Parliament is remarkable for the fact that there is more "Big Business" than Union representation in the House. The Tories in particular refer to their representation of business interests, and many MEPs are anxious to meet interest groups in order to fulfill the communication function of the EP.

8.3 The European Parliament as a new form of institution.

In order to provide a meaningful contribution to knowledge on the EP, it is important to start with the proposition that the EP be analysed first and foremost as an EC institution. It is also important to bear in mind what exactly the EP has achieved as an EC institution and to analyse the sum of such achievements. In this light it would seem that the EP is fulfilling the functions assigned to it in the Treaties and is adapting to new challenges such as the reexamination of its role following direct elections and the impact of the SEA. It is no exaggeration to say that many of the predictions of academics and politicians regarding the future role of the EP were quite simply wrong. It is necessary to understand why this is so. Without doubt we need to study the EP in new ways. The focus should be on the EP as a participant institution in the decision-making process of the European Community.

The political actors have been challenged in procedural terms by institutional developments which illustrate the evolving nature of the EC as a fluid polity. The SEA requires a clear majority (in practice 260 votes at least in the EP) on a position or amendment within a three-month deadline. Organisation and discipline are new imperatives in the formal (group/committee) structures and informal groupings. The committees have been criticised as being interest coteries of specialised lobbies such as agriculture or the environment and hence their "representativeness" has been questioned. On decisions to be made under the SEA, there is a tendency developing to utilise an informal structure of contacts between coordinators of the groups and the more influential members of the groups along with secretarial contacts. Such informal structures as these assemble a negotiation package which could be capable of attracting the necessary majority even for the first reading stage.

In order to achieve the success of a "package" and the 260 plus votes in this new legislative process under the SEA, a core coalition is essential. Observers maintain that this "core axis" must be worked out by the EPP group and the Socialist group, the two largest groups in the Parliament, in order to ensure a majority on an acceptable common position. Coalition building will thus be transformed in this scenario and such a pattern is already in process (4).

The EP is now obliged to be more precise, in the style of a legislature which takes decisions rather than passes resolutions or vague legislative proposals. It possesses a large and capable staff and could avail of Commission advice on parliamentary drafting and now has established contacts with interests groups

and is obliged to avail of these resources effectively in its new role as a quasi-legislative body.

This scenario illustrates a process which began with the creation of the Crocodile Club, founded by Altiero Spinelli, which met regularly to discuss the future of European Union. The result was the Draft Treaty on European Union, adopted by the EP in 1984. What is striking about this Club is that it crossed group boundaries and consisted of MEPs of all political persuasions and nationalities who had an abiding interest in intensified European Integration.

In 1987, a Federalist Intergroup for European Union was founded in the European Parliament by MEPs, Lizin, Roelants de Vivier, Pannella, Graziani and Efremidis. Its aims were to inform public opinion of all aspects of European Integration and to ensure that the EP is given the mandate of drawing up the text of a European constitution (5). The group consists of 180 MEPs and has raised the problem of the effective application of the Single Act.

The Intergroup wishes to create similar intergroups in national parliaments and joint EP-national parliament committees on this matter and thereby reduce its potential political alienation from the member states. In this regard, it supports the declaration of the Union of European Federalists, calling for a general assembly made up of MEPs elected in June 1989 and MPs from the member states (Agence Europe, 2 June 1988). In April 1988, the Intergroup called for "the holding of a plebiscite on the political union of Europe and the constituent powers of the European Parliament". In this declaration, it called

on the Spanish Presidency in January 1989 to call an extraordinary summit of the European Council for the purpose of defining the powers to be conferred on the EP, in its aim to achieve "democracy". The declaration was supported by MEPs from all political groups. It illustrates the desire on the part of the MEPs to have a distinct political role and to abolish marginalisation from the other EC institutions and member states. The vagueness of the declaration, however, required little commitment to action, even by those MEPs who were less than enthusiastic about European Integration.

Other intergroups have also been formed across group boundaries in response to perceived interests or needs which may not be fully dealt with in committee. They vary in subject matter from cycling to hunting and environment to Chile to the disabled to minority languages. These illustrate the diverse interests of representatives in the EP, often in response to pressure from the relevant interest groups. The intergroups focus on specific issues rather than general policy questions, and alleviate pressure on the group to cater for all interests in its ranks as intragroup coordination is quite productive in these cases.

8.3.1 The party groups of the EP as future European parties.

The EP is the only EC body with a "European and party flavour" in the sense that the members are elected on party platforms to a distinctly European mandate which does not have political ties to the home base other than electoral links. Although it is expected that some MEPs maintain contacts with

their national party, this is not always the case, especially given that the parliamentary dual mandate is on the decline.

Some MEPs experience difficulty in maintaining contact with the national party. This separation results in contact with only EC decision making on policy, although some contact with the constituency would be maintained. This has led to the question of whether the possession of a single European mandate might lead to a European party system with primary loyalty to the European arena of politics, or a system where loyalty to the group or the EC is the primary loyalty of many MEPs. Even before the debate on the single mandate, many early observers, such as Van Oudenhove, Fitzmaurice and Pridham, had believed that groups would constitute proto-parties in a European federal political system.

Bonvicini (1981, p.3) points out that European party organisations cannot be considered true political parties with an identity and role distinct from that of the national parties which make up their structural base and that it is difficult to consider the attitude of a particular European party organisation as a unit. The parties in the EP are not comparable to national parties because of the fact that they work in an EC institution and not a national one.

The hypothesis that the origins of a European party system will emerge from the EP is undermined by the actual development of the Parliament following direct elections. However, there has been a shift of loyalties from the national to the European level of politics rather as Haas had optimistically

predicted in the 1950s, as evidenced by the creation of a European bureaucracy in the Commission.

This European awareness is marked by the process of legislative socialisation and a congruence of attitudes and behaviour of group members through procedure, the exchange of views in groups and an acquaintance with the EC institutions and their workings, and contacts with European Brussels-based interest groups such as ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation), UNICE (Union of Industries in the EC) and COPA (Agricultural Co-operatives Movements). The replies to EUI questions illustrate that MEPs have emphasised that many problems can only be solved transnationally and the Ionescu-Morgan study (1988) further reinforces this in showing that MEPs frequently express the view that "communitarian" solutions are preferable to national solutions.

The domestic parties have on the whole failed to create and maintain consistent and reciprocal contact with their MEPs and groups, although formal links remained in the dual mandate. The lack of such relations creates a dependence on the part of the MEP on information and the resources of the party group and the MEP inevitably receives the group or "European" perspective on the issue.

The European party federations failed to live up to expectations in the mid-1970s that they would constitute the European extra-parliamentary element of the party group and have since virtually vanished, as they are handicapped by the fact that any decision made by the federation is not binding on their constituent parties. They do not (and indications are strong that they never

will) reach the stage of being a European party. The minimum criteria for the group, however, to constitute a political organisation are set out clearly by the Rules of Procedure of the EP and are further elaborated by the informal and formal rules of the political groups so that a distinct pattern of behaviour and organisational network emerges.

The issue as to whether the Groups constitute European proto-parties or pan-European parties remains unresolved, and this may not be the pertinent question as the groups are not comparable to parties (transnational or otherwise), given what we know of the developing role of the EP.

While a certain "European" influence and "Communitarian" commitment is evident in the party groups, MEPs remain at present nationally based politicians in terms of their constituencies and local party organisations, with some shift of loyalty to the political group. Not only is the EP developing as an institution, there are also signs of a distinct Europeanisation of the members on the basis on legislative socialisation and shared experiences in a transnational and multicultural environment. This is borne out in the replies to some of the open questions of EUI survey of the MEPs and the Ionescu-Morgan study and has been the subject of studies as early as the 1960s (Kerr, 1973).

In addition, frequent changes of EC and EP membership reflect its very nature as a fluid polity and the nature of the groups as political organisations evolving in a process of institutionalisation. The Iberians' arrival levelled out the Left-Right balance in the EP and this process should strengthen the

groups as organisers of conflict resolution in the Assembly. This reorientation has taken place at Council level and it has forced the groups within the EP to take more notice of Mediterranean issues and to reexamine attitudes to the EC in the light of the Iberians' generally positive stance with regard to European Integration.

Furthermore, the input of the Iberians to the ED (Conservative) and Socialist groups has emphasised the need felt by many Socialist MEPs that their group tighten up its organisation. The Spanish Socialists in particular have challenged the group to reform its workings, impose stronger discipline and ensure policy co-ordination among all delegations (including the French and British, who have been criticised for lack of co-ordination). A similar challenge was given to the Conservatives. In addition, the Right no longer has an absolute majority unless it chooses to seek the support of the extreme right.

Under the SEA, the EP needs to decide on strategy early in the legislative cycle and evolve a coherent long term strategy on the Budget in particular. For this, the Parliament must trust the whips and experts in order to achieve consensus. This consensus can best be achieved by handing over the coalition-building to the political groups. The committees would thus be allocated the very substantive technical details of the political agreements, once they have been elaborated by the groups.

8.3.2 The cohesion of the party groups in the EP:

The groups in general maintain a modicum of cohesion based on specific conformity. There are bonds and influences which encourage cooperation among group members, generate positive feelings towards the group and encourage them to remain in the group and even in some cases develop an esprit de corps. With regard to group cohesion, critics have suggested that the groups do not make substantial attempts to discipline their members or to oblige them to attend the plenary session of the Parliament. The lack of dependence on the sessional financial allowance renders any such attempts difficult. Turnout for voting is seldom over 50%.

In the groups, decisions on voting are not binding on members but some form of conformity is demanded by the group leadership. Barber (1966) asserts that the legislative party leader seeks to establish conformity of which the three degrees are generalised, normal and specific conformity. Results of non-structured interviews with leaders of the groups' secretariats suggest that generalised conformity is never expected by the group leadership, in recognition of the national or local representative functions of the members. Normal conformity is demanded on issues such as the European Budget vote, although even in these matters comprehension of other considerations is in evidence, as witnessed by the "conscience clause" appeal. Specific conformity applies in most case of group voting in the EP.

Hurwitz (1984) suggests that the specific party group is a stronger explanatory variable for voting behaviour than national identity. This needs to be qualified, however. While on many issues the groups vote cohesively there is evidence that such a vote is already the result of compromise on both the group and national stances, in the committee and even in plenary. The MEPs are afforded the opportunity of an explanation of vote or the use of the conscience clause in cases of non-agreement with the group line. In these cases, nationality is most consistently the reason for not voting with the group.

With regard to the explanatory variables for cohesion enumerated in the introduction, we can summarise the following points. Firstly, leadership and the exercise of leadership pressure, although strong, varies according to group, and selection of leadership for the EP is indicative of the desire for an involvement in European politics. In reality, according to respondents, allocation of offices is in accordance with party or group membership and nationality as distinct from attitude towards Europe (see Table 8.1).

The factor of transnationality, relating to the number and diversity of nationalities in the group, is a strain on group cohesion due to the perceived need to reach compromise across a broad spectrum of interests. This also applies to ideological diversity which results in specific and, in some cases, normalised conformity. All groups experience problems with regard to policy differences and priorities. This is due as much to the different heritages of party systems and origins of the constituent parties in the group as to the fact that the EC and its institutions are *sui generis*.

	QU. 36.1 : IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH CRITERIA AND QUALIFICATIONS OUGHT TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SELECTING M E P'S FOR LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THE E P ? PLEASE RANK THREE MOST IMPORTANT.			QU. 36.2 : AND IF YOU THINK OF THE WAY APPOINTMENTS ARE ACTUALLY MADE, WHICH TEND TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT? PLEASE RANK THREE MOST IMPORTANT:		
	COUNT	PERCENT OF RESPONSES	PERCENT OF CASES	COUNT	PERCENT OF RESPONSES	PERCENT OF CASES
ATTITUDES TO EUROPE	182	23,9 %	67,4 %	26	4,0 %	10,9 %
EUR.PARL. WORK	2o1	24,3 %	74,4 %	39	6,0 %	16,4 %
EUR.PARL. SECURITY	13	1,7 %	4,8 %	7o	1o,8 %	29,4 %
IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS	4o	5,2 %	14,8 %	34	5,3 %	14,3 %
NATIONALITY	19	2,5 %	7,o %	161	24,9 %	67,6 %
NATIONAL SECURITY	8	1,o %	13,o %	44	6,8 %	18,5 %
PARTY OR GROUP MEMBER	49	6,4 %	18,1 %	17o	26,3 %	71,4 %
PERSONAL STANDING	149	19,5 %	55,2 %	8o	12,4 %	33,6 %
SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	1o2	13,4 %	37,8 %	23	3,6 %	9,7 %
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES	763	1oo,o %	282,6 %	647	1oo,o %	271,8 %

Hurwitz (1984) suggests that the specific party group is a stronger explanatory variable for voting behaviour than national identity. This needs to be qualified, however. While on many issues the groups vote cohesively there is evidence that such a vote is already the result of compromise on both the group and national stances, in the committee and even in plenary. The MEPs are afforded the opportunity of an explanation of vote or the use of the conscience clause in cases of non-agreement with the group line. In these cases, nationality is most consistently the reason for not voting with the group.

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	COUNT	PERCENT OF RESPONSES	PERCENT OF CASES	COUNT	PERCENT OF RESPONSES	PERCENT OF CASES
ATTITUDES TO EUROPE	182	23,9 %	67,4 %	26	4,0 %	1o,9 %
EUR. PARL. WORK	2o1	24,3 %	74,4 %	39	6,0 %	16,4 %
EUR. PARL. SECURITY	13	1,7 %	4,8 %	7o	1o,8 %	29,4 %
IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS	4o	5,2 %	14,8 %	34	5,3 %	14,3 %
NATIONALITY	19	2,5 %	7,0 %	161	24,9 %	67,6 %
NATIONAL SECURITY	8	1,0 %	13,o %	44	6,8 %	18,5 %
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PERSONAL STANDING	149	19,5 %	55,2 %	8o	12,4 %	33,6 %
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TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES	763	1oo,0 %	282,6 %	647	1oo,0 %	271,8 %

Moreover the groups have different origins and different agendas, such as those who had transnational links from the 1950s and those who form groups for pragmatic or specific policy attainment or the use of the advantages of the group structure. Within the groups, MEPs have different goals and objectives, whether defined by nationality or other interests. See Tables 8.2 and 8.3, where the Communists in particular place priority on nationality. The perception of group membership shows that although there is no overt opposition to the group structure, there is some evidence of dissatisfaction as 28% of EUI Survey respondents thought that group meetings took up too much of their time (Table 8.4).

With regard to the perceptions of the EP and its role, most MEPs (84%) across all groups favoured the increase of the EP's influence on policy formation, while 8.6% said it should remain the same (Table 8.5). This variable is therefore not a factor influencing group cohesion in general, although there are internal divisions in some groups, such as the Socialists where the Danes, British and Greeks are less in favour of increasing the EP's powers. In the Communist group, the French and Greeks do not wish to increase the EP's powers. The Liberals in particular favour such an increase in line with their promotion of European Integration.

The sense of identification of the MEP with the group is linked to legislative socialisation, the learning of the rules of the game and the need to initiate group as distinct from individual motions. Nationalism is predominantly the divisive issue, although many MEPs and officials point to the need to follow the

Table 8.2 RUI Question 4.1: Nationality or Group Priority: Total respondents.

v6

Q4.1-VOTE INFLUENCE GROUP OR NATIONALITY

Q4.1 - An MEP's position on political issues in Parliament might be
influenced by EP Groups membership or by nationality. On the basis of
your observations, which do you think, generally speaking, is likely
to be more important?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EP GROUP MEMBERSHIP	1.	139	42.0	59.1	59.1
NATIONALITY	2.	96	29.0	40.9	100.0
REFUSED	8.	67	20.2	MISSING	100.0
DK,NA,NOT ASCERTAINED	9.	29	8.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	------	------	------	------
		331	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES   235   MISSING CASES   96

0   V394   Table 8.3 EUL Question 41: Nationality or Group Priority By Group.

V6	COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	SOCIALIS PLEPLES 1I	EUROPEAN DEMOCRA 2I	EUROPEAN T AND AL 3I	COMMUNIS DEMOCRA 4I	LIB. AND OGN. DEMS 5I	EURC. PR ORD.-IND 6I	TECH. CO T AND ATED 7I	UNAFFILI DK,NA,NO T ASCERT 8I	RDW TOTAL 9I	ROW TOTAL
NATIONALITY											
EP GROUP MEMBERS 1	44 / 31.7 / 45.8 / 28.1	52 / 37.4 / 59.1 / 32.7	16 / 11.5 / 32.7 / 15.6	13 / 9.4 / 46.4 / 12.5	2 / 1.4 / 12.5 / 1.4	2 / 1.4 / 40.0 / .7		6 / 2.9 / 50.0 / 1.0		139 / 42.0
2	27 / 28.1 / 45.8	12 / 12.5 / 17.6 / 32.7	17 / 17.7 / 34.7 / 15.6	15 / 15.6 / 46.9 / 15.6	5 / 5.2 / 10.4 / 62.5	3 / 3.1 / 60.0 / 12.5				96 / 29.0
REFUSED 3	14 / 20.9 / 14.6 / 28.1	13 / 17.6 / 14.8	14 / 20.9 / 28.6 / 34.4	11 / 16.4 / 34.4 / 17.9	8 / 11.9 / 28.6 / 18.8	3 / 4.5 / 22.2 / 18.8		2 / 3.0 / 25.0 / 12.5		67 / 20.2
DK,NA,NOT ASCERT 9	11 / 37.9 / 11.5 / 11.5	11 / 37.9 / 12.5	2 / 6.9 / 4.1 / 6.9	2 / 6.9 / 3.4 / 3.1	1 / 3.4 / 6.3 / 7.1			1 / 3.4 / 12.5 / 12.5		29 / 8.8
COLUMN TOTAL	96 / 29.0	88 / 26.6	49 / 14.8	32 / 9.7	16 / 4.8	5 / 1.5		8 / 2.4		331 / 100.0

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	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE	MIN E.F.	CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
59.74743	24	0.0001	0.438	18 OF 36 (50.0%)

0
STATISTIC	SYMMETRIC	WITH V6 DEPENDENT	WITH V394 DEPENDENT
LAMBDA	0.07728	0.13021	0.03404
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT	0.06217	0.07614	0.05253
SOMERS' D	0.08877	0.08235	0.09570
ETA		0.12279	0.20985

0
STATISTIC	VALUE	SIGNIFICANCE
CRAMER'S V	0.24529	
CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT	0.39103	
KENDALL'S TAU B	0.08877	0.0253
KENDALL'S TAU C	0.08816	0.0253
SOMERS' D	0.03717	0.0253
PEARSON'S R	0.11724	0.2502
GAMMA		

Table 8.4   EUI Questions 34.2 and 34.3: Allocation of Time by MEPs.

	QU. 34.2 : COULD YOU TELL ME IF ANY ACTIVITIES FROM THIS LIST TAKE TOO MUCH OF YOUR TIME ? PLEASE INDICATE UP TO THREE.			QU. 34.3 : COULD YOU ALSO TELL ME ON WHICH ACTIVITIES YOU WOUL. WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO SPEND MORE TIME ? PLEASE INDICATE UP TO THREE.		
	COUNT	PERCENT OF RESPONSES	PERCENT OF CASES	COUNT	PERCENT OF RESPONSES	PERCENT OF CASES
PLENARY MEETING	46	23,0 %	33,3 %	25	8,2 %	13,1 %
BUREAU MEETING	6	3,0 %	4,3 %	5	1,6 %	2,6 %
PARLAMENTARY GROUP MEETING	56	28,0 %	40,6 %	9	3,0 %	4,7 %
NATIONAL PARTY DELEGATION	8	4,0 %	5,8 %	14	4,6 %	7,3 %
COMMITTEE MEETING	34	17,0 %	24,6 %	42	13,8 %	22,0 %
INDIVIDUAL EUR.PARL. CONTACT	2	1,0 %	1,4 %	36	11,8 %	18,8 %
INFORMAL POLICY DISCUSSIONS	2	1,0 %	1,4 %	79	26,0 %	41,4 %
ADMINISTRATIVE WORK	33	16,5 %	23,9 %	8	2,6 %	4,2 %
OWN OTHER EUR.PARL. WORK	13	6,5 %	9,4 %	86	28,3 %	45,0 %
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES	2oo	1oo,0 %	144,9 %	3o4	1oo,0 %	159,2 %

Table 8.5 EUI Question 19: Position on Increase of EP's Powers, by Party
Group.

V374 QU. 19: GIVEN THE PRESENT OVERALL BALANCE OF INFLUENCE AMONG THE FOLLOWING BODIES, DO YOU THINK THEIR INFLUENCE ON POLICY-FORMATION SHOULD BE INCREASED, DECREASED OR REMAIN THE SAME?

COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT	SOCIALIS 11	EUROPEAN PEOPLES 21	EUROPEAN DEMOCRA T AND 31	COMMUNIS UGR.DEMS 41	LIN. AND DEMOCRA ORD.-IND 51	EURO. ATED 61	PR TECH. 71	CO UNAFFILI T ASCERT 81	DK,NA,NO ASCERT 91	ROW TOTAL
1 REASED	3 / 37.5 / 3.1	1 / 12.5 / 3.1		1 / 12.5 / 3.1	2 / 25.0 / 12.5		2 / 25.0 / 40.0			8 / 2.4
2 AIN THE SAME	10 / 37.0 / 10.4	1 / 3.7 / 8.2	6 / 22.2 / 18.8	1 / 3.7 / 3.6	4 / 14.8 / 25.0	1 / 3.7 / 25.0	3 / 3.7 / 11.1	1 / 3.7		27 / 8.2
3 EASED	81 / 29.0 / 84.4	85 / 30.5 / 96.6	37 / 13.3 / 75.5	24 / 8.6 / 89.3	25 / 9.0 / 3.6	9 / 3.2 / 56.3	3 / 1.1 / 60.0	8 / 2.9 / 88.9	7 / 2.5 / 87.5	279 / 84.3
8 ISED		1 / 16.7 / 1.1	4 / 66.7 / 8.2	1 / 16.7 / 3.1						6 / 1.8
9 IA,NOT ASCERT	2 / 18.2 / 2.1	1 / 9.1 / 1.1	4 / 36.4 / 8.2	2 / 18.2 / 7.1	1 / 9.1 / 6.3			1 / 9.1 / 12.5	1 / 9.1 / 12.5	11 / 3.3
COLUMN TOTAL	96 / 29.0	88 / 26.6	49 / 14.8	32 / 9.7	16 / 4.8	5 / 1.5	9 / 2.7	8 / 2.4		331 / 100.0

STATISTIC	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE	MIN E.F.	CELLS WITH E.F. < 5
QUARE 41873	32	0.0000	0.091	35 OF 45 (77.8%)

STATISTIC	SYMMETRIC	WITH V122 DEPENDENT	WITH V394 DEPENDENT
AINTY COEFFICIENT D	0.03484 / 0.02083 / 0.00418	0.00000 / 0.15867 / 0.00282	0.04255 / 0.05423 / 0.00806
84 D	0.25284		0.13144

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STATISTIC	VALUE	SIGNIFICANCE
GENCY COEFFICIENT	.25...	

group line and play down the nationalist element. The "Europeanism" of the groups differs according to group with the Liberals and EPP appearing most in favour of European Integration. A different type of Europeanism to that professed by the group is not a conflictual issue as most groups can accommodate varying measures in favour of European Integration in the drafting of compromise proposals.

The personal desire of the MEP to stand out and be different is normally related to the individual MEP's concept of constituency or interest representation. In replies to EUI open questions, respondents refer repeatedly to the need to couch personal constituency interests in European or group terms. Party loyalty is the second issue undermining group cohesion although once again accommodation and compromise have been cited as keys to a modus vivendi. The concept of representation and representational styles is developing as the MEPs react to the need to represent special and constituency interests. Loyalty to specific interests or interests groups is therefore more evident in the election literature and the newsletters of individual MEPs or group delegations than in group documents. These would undermine group cohesion if generalised conformity were always required but in practice the group structure demands less then total conformity.

Interviews with MEPs and group and EP officials confirm that the following incentives to cohesion apply to all groups. These include pay-offs such as committee positions, spokespersonships and rapporteur appointments. These are allocated by the group in their function as organisers of the EP and constitute

the major structure for the attainment of political advancement. Publicity in the group is ensured by working diligently on an issue and producing a group document or committee report which is well received in plenary or the media. The use of group resources, contact networks and support is essential to all MEPs. The group network, as organiser of political debate and documentation on controversial issues, offers a form of procedural socialisation, thereby saving the new MEP from having to find everything for him/herself. The sense of membership and belonging offers not only the possibility of influencing the group and its leaders, but also peer group support and solidarity.

Pay-offs in the group leadership structure and the allocation of offices are offered to members after a certain amount of time "in training" proving themselves competent. Moreover, conformity to group membership serves to combat fear of alienation from the group and loss of peer group esteem. The fear of disaproval of colleagues, according to EUI respondents, is strong as MEPs realise that such disapproval undermines the chance of collaboration with peers on an issue where they require support.

The behaviour of the party groups follows three lines which fall into recognisable theoretical categories. The first is that of the classic European ideologies whether Marxist/Socialist, Communist, Conservative, Liberal or Christian Democrat, and the second strand is European federalist, in favour of the expansion of the European Community and of European Union, and the deepening of cooperation between member-states and the supranational structures of the EC institutions in an integrationist manner. The third general catagory

is that of delegations or trends which can be found within most groups on a cross-cutting cleavage. These are the MEPs who choose to represent and defend precisely defined national (or in some cases regional) interests.

This latter trend is being supplemented by the defence of special interest groups and lobbies, giving rise to the definition of the EP as a lobby parliament. The groups are facing up to the need to provide effective organisation and party discipline which will serve to strengthen their power in their role as political organisers of the EP.

The members of the European Parliament can also be classified according to their representational roles and conceptions of their role as a European deputy. These can broadly be described as, firstly, the "expert" or legislator, secondly the agitator and thirdly the "surgeon" who holds a high regard for geographical constituencies and "clinics" (Vildenmann, 1963). Barber (1972) also describes the lawmakers according to the differing conceptions held regarding the representational function.

The EUI MEP Survey questioned the MEPs on their perception of their commitments (Tables 8.6 and 8.7) and the results indicate that the lawmaker/control function was accorded some 23% of preferences, while 20% regarded it as important to look after the constituency.

Table 8.6 Commitments of the MEP.

Question 37 (EUI Survey).

As an elected representative, you may feel yourself to be under a
number of commitments. Please rank the the three which you regard as
being most important.

	Respondents	% of respondents.
(a) Advance national interests	20	6
(b) Adhere to national party policy	27	8.2
(c) Contribute to European policy making	36	10.9
(d) Further European integration	29	8.8
(e) Look after special special/local	14	4.2
(f) Oversee European executive bodies: Commission/Council/Summits	77	23.3
(g) Oppose European Integration	2	0.6
(h) Represent ethnic/linguistic/	12	3.6
(i) Look after constituency	67	20.2

No. of respondents: 331.

	QU. 37.2: AS AN ELECTED REPRESEN-TATIVE, YOU MAY FEEL YOURSELF TO BE UNDER A NUMBER OF COMMITMENTS. PLEASE RANK THE THREE WHICH YOU REGARD AS BEING MOST IMPORTANT.			QU. 38.2 : WOULD YOU CARE TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THIS LIST AND TELL ME WHAT YOU THINK YOUR CONSTITUENTS EXPECT YOU TO DO WHILE IN OFFICE. PLEASE RANK THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT.		
	COUNT	PERCENT OF RESPONSES	PERCENT OF CASES	COUNT	PERCENT OF RESPONSES	PERCENT OF CASES
a) ADVANCE NATIONAL INTERESTS	88	9,8 %	28,4 %	77	15,3 %	40,7 %
b) ADHERE TO NATIONAL PARTY POLICY	68	7,6 %	21,9 %	30	6,0 %	15,9 %
c) CONTRIBUTE TO EUROPEAN POLICY MAKING	221	24,6 %	71,3 %	82	16,3 %	43,4 %
d) FURTHER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	193	21,5 %	62,3 %	66	13,1 %	34,9 %
e) LOOK AFTER SPECIAL/LOCAL INTEREST GROUPS	26	2,9 %	8,4 %	72	14,3 %	38,1 %
f) OVERSEEN EUROPEAN EXECUTIVE BODIES : COMMISSION/COUNCIL, SUMMITS	134	14,9 %	43,4 %	44	8,8 %	23,3 %
g) OPPOSE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION'	7	0,8 %	2,3 %	8	1,6 %	4,2 %
h) REPRESENT ETHNIC/LINGUISTIC/ REGIONAL INTERESTS	18	2,0 %	5,8 %	19	3,8 %	10,1 %
i) LOOK AFTER CONSTITUENCY	144	16,0 %	46,5 %	104	20,7 %	55,0 %
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES	899	100,0 %	290,0 %	502	100,0 %	265,6 %

With regard to constituency representation and the influence of socialisation processes, the MEPs experience a learning period, concerning EP rules and attitudes. While for many the constituency is of prime importance, the political actors come to see it within the overall machinery of the EP and the political environment of the European Community, and realise that the structure of the EC is not necessarily geared towards brokerage politics. Lobbies have meanwhile discovered the importance of the EP, and approach committees, groups and individuals.

8.4   The EP's institutionalisation.

A measure of the Parliament's institutionalisation and politicisation is the development of greater emphasis on policies which had previously not been discussed in the forum of the EP or even of the EC itself. Disarmament and security issues are examples of this. In addition, the Parliament consistently urges the Commission to greater cooperation and consultation, an approach to which the Commission has proven open. The Commission reports regularly to the EP on the action it takes in response to Parliament's amendments to its proposals, and on emergency aid granted by the Commission (6).

The educational function of parliaments espoused by Bagehot finds expression in the education by MEPs of each other in the Assembly, most particularly in the committees, and this is one of the most important functions of the EP committees.   The European Parliament is largely a forum for the exchange of ideas and for mutual education. In the committees, it is imperative that

members cooperate with others of all shades of opinion and all nationalities. It is often in the committee that the political hue of the plenary is determined by the groups. Positions adopted in plenary may reflect this.

It is in committees that the members learn to cooperate and appreciate each other's expertise. They come to know each other so well that it becomes common practice to invite committee colleagues to conferences and national events. This is also true of the party groups and parties now invite group colleagues of other nationalities to their national party congresses and conventions. The younger members adapt to the EP's institutional system with more ease than the older ones, and often bring fresh ideas to the organisation of the Parliament.

In the EP, MEPs have learnt to use the constituency as a microcosm of representation and to then look to the EP for an overall Community approach. The first directly-elected parliamentarians learnt that local questions cannot be put to the EP in plenary, as under Rule 47 of the EP's Rules of Procedure such questions are referred to the competent committee. This misuse of parliamentary time and resources has thus declined as the questions are rejected for debate in plenary. Many new MEPs need to learn the essence of European politics and compromise, rather than of a polarised governmental versus opposition system. The very fact that representatives of twelve member states come together in a parliament on a regular basis is in itself a compromise.

The MEPs therefore undergo a learning period with regard to both rules and attitudes, and this results in many modifications of attitude and behaviour, as witnessed by the replies to questions of the EUI MEP survey, regarding the need for adaptation to the rules of the game in the EP and the norms of acceptable behaviour.

8.5 A new look at representational styles - the EP and the groups

The EP is evolving as a multinational, multiparty and group-based institution which is attempting to represent ideologies and interests in a sui generis environment in which it is combating its original isolation at both the EC and national levels. The diverse strands of political Europe are brought together and combined in a manner which is unique to the EP's *sui generis* role. This is a function of integration which is specific to the EP and its groups and not to national parliaments in general. This functional integration is based on the interdependence of MEPs in the groups and the need to cooperate in order to achieve group goals and policies.

Membership of the EP has had varying implications for the careers of the individual MEPs. While some view it as a stepping stone to career advancement, others view it as viable and interesting career in its own right. The EP has also been offered as a consolation prize in some circumstances due to purely national considerations. An example of the EP playing second fiddle to the national legislature can be seen in the internal conflicts of the parties of the right in France when a candidate to the National Assembly "accepted a deal"

when opposed by a more successful candidate of the right, i.e. "the promise to become an MEP" (7).

The dual mandate system has been opposed by the EP itself and on 7 July 1988 it passed a resolution calling for a ban on the members of national parliament from being MEPs. Article 5 of the Council Act regarding the direct election of representatives of the EP provides that:

"The office of representative in the assembly shall be compatible with membership of the Parliament of a Member State" (O.J.L. 278, 8 October 1976).

The EP itself however cannot pass any legislation on this matter and so it has called on the national governments to make the necessary amendments to the 1976 election legislation. Some MEPs opposed their national parties' ruling on the dual mandate, for example when the Irish Fine Gael MEPs voted in favour of the EP Resolution (the Hoon Report) despite the national party's decision to permit the dual mandate after the 1989 elections.

The abolition of the dual mandate raises the issue of a separate political entity and the practical problem of linkage with national political structures, should this be considered desirable. A two-way linkage between the EC and member state is under active consideration by parties in the EP and the member states, as it is not only the MEP who might be isolated from contact with the national capital but also the member state which could suffer from a lack of

political information from the EP. Structural links between parliaments and the EP have for this reason been considered by most member states.

In the EP after the 1979 elections, almost one third of the MEPs (125 of 410) held a dual mandate. By 1984, just before the second direct elections, this had reduced to 13% (57 of 434, including the Greek members who had joined in 1981). The trend continues to favour single parliamentary mandates but the involvement of MEPs with interest groups and business or other associations has increased. The representational styles of the MEPs has inevitably been influenced by the single mandate. If we consider that the purpose of the political group is to express opinions and exercise a communications function, then it has been successful. If its role is to enact political decisions, then it falls short. The problem of representation at the Community level has not been adequately dealt with by the old EP and by the Economic and Social Committee. The party groups now, in this institutionalising Parliament, are claiming for themselves the role of active representatives of the citizens of Europe. They have a distinct advantage in the EP as the groups are part of a constitutional body and have a legally recognised role, unlike national parties in most national political systems where many parties have no constitutional role.

In this thesis we have queried whether the groups represent the sum of the policy attitudes of the individual party delegations. The groups are amalgams of disparate parts and on that basis it would not be reasonable to expect them to manifest any measure of conformity beyond Barber's specific, or in some cases, normalised conformity. Nevertheless, they come to agreement on issues

which do not always reflect the positions of the domestic party. Furthermore, they are the major providers of structure in the EP and provide a coherent identity for the MEP with an adequate amount of lee-way for representation of constituent or social interests by individual MEPs.

We have asked whether the members of the EP can be seen to be acting on a distinctly European basis or rather as delegates from parties and constituencies. The conclusion to be drawn is that the MEPs and groups are neither distinctly European nor party/constituency representatives and their representational styles do not necessarily conform with their perceptions of the expectations of the electorate. Table 8.5 bears this out in the illustration of the commitments of the MEPs and their perceptions of constituency expectations. The MEPs in the EUI survey place more emphasis on advancing national interests and adhering to national party policy than they presumed the constituents expected. It is with regard to the contributions to European policy making that the gap between the conceptions of representation is most evident as most MEPs wish to advance European Integration despite the perception that this is not required by the constituency. The representational style of the MEP therefore appears to be that of trustee rather than delegate according to these figures.

Moreover, the very fact that MEPs in reply to the EUI survey actually stated that EP group membership influences an MEP's position on political issues in the EP more than nationality (although voting records tend to bely this) is an

indication that the representational style is becoming increasingly European-oriented.

The European elections were second-order elections. They concentrated on many issues which differ from those facing party governments in the member states. A new type of political élite is therefore involved and this carries with it a new type of representational style. The MEP relates to a fluid polity which can by its very nature render effective representation and political action challenging in a new way. The groups are the aggregates of these new tensions and representative styles, and they act as the sifters of interests in a political entity which is developing organisational skills and integrative functions.

In conclusion, therefore, it is clear that the groups are undergoing institutionalisation with regard to membership, rules and the means to attain policies. It has become apparent in this study that the nature of the political entity under the microscope, the party group, contains within itself the contradictory strands of group organisation and differing concepts of the MEPs' notions of the representative and political role.

The research has shown us that there are pressures and tendencies which reinforce group cohesion. However, there are very real limitations to the freedom of action of the groups in pursuing that cohesion. One major limiting factor is the lack of power of the groups within an institution which is often alienated from the centre of EC decision making.

Pridham (1975, p.376) argued that the main reason for the party groups' alleged lack of legitimacy is that the members then were largely national politicians following national political careers. The party groups had been seen as ambassadors of their national political parties before being European parliamentarians. While the ambassadorial notion is still evident in the representational styles of the MEPs, the composition and aims of groups have altered with the fact that their members became full time politicians and that they assumed a legitimacy from direct elections which strengthened their influence if not their power. Thus the conflict of political roles referred to by Pridham has now been resolved into a process of allocating priorities. Even when nationality is more important than party group, the group remains the nucleus of political organisation and debate in the Parliament.

It is clear that the EP is developing its "competences" concurrent to the national political parties and that the groups are now maturing politically in terms of organisation and conflict resolution. All the while the EP is functioning in the environment of a still fluid polity which is developing its own identity and function.

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1. Les Echos du Parlement Européen, Paris, 3 November 1988, p.23.
2. The Court upheld the EP's resolution on the basis that the EP could hold special or supplementary plenary sessions during those weeks which were

dedicated mostly to meetings of parliamentary committees or political groups. This power of the EP does not, according to the Court in its ruling of 3 November 1988, go beyond those measures which t he Parliament is authorised to take in the organisation of its work, nor does it violate the decisions of the governments of the member states concerning the provisional working place of the committees (Les Echos du Parlement Européen, 3 Nov 1988, pp. 19-20).

3. Interview with official of EEP Secretariat.

4. Interviews with participants.

5. Agence Europe, 19 June and 29/30 June 1988.

6. See for example Doc. SP (88) 2090 of the Commission's Secretariat General, 9 September 1988, regarding cooperation with the EP.

7. Agence Europe, 9 June 1988.

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APPENDIX A

In the interviews with the officials of the secretariats of the political groups, a number of standard questions were asked. These were supplemented by additional questions depending on the time available. These questions were administered orally, over time, 1983-1986, with some follow-up interviews in 1988 (22 February 1983 to 14 March and 2 April to 28 April 1983, September 1983 to February 1984, May to July 1984 and May to July 1986).

Standard Questions:

1. Profile of the group:
1.1. How would you describe your group?

1.2 How would you describe the other groups (named individually) e.g. with regard to attitude to Europe, cohesiveness?

2. Cohesion, agreement in the group:
2.1 Would you say that your group is, in general, a cohesive structure?

2.2 What are the major problems in gaining agreement in the group?.

2.3 What would you describe as the major divisions or cleavages in your group?

2.4 Is there a left-right cleavage in the group?

2.5 Is there a North-South division in the group?

2.6 What problems, if any, tend to occur at group meetings?

2.7 Does the group possess formal rules of procedure?

2.8 How does the group come to agreement on policy and voting positions?

2.9 Are there any unwritten rules or expectations in your group with regard to behaviour and discipline?

2.10 On which issues is there a free vote, and on which is a whipped one obligatory, in your group?

3. Group Conformity:
3.1 How can a member express dissent from the group line? Is there, for example, a conscience clause?

3.2 What is the position of the group leadership and what are the sanctions, if any, in cases of non-conformity by individual MEPs.

3.3 What is the group's attitude if a party delegation chooses to differ from group policy?

4. Leadership and group positions:
4.1 How would you describe the role of the leaders of the group?

4.2 How are offices, spokespersonships, rapporteurships etc., allocated by your group?

4.3 What is your role, as Secretary General/higher official, within the group and in the EP?

5. Group structure, development and future:
5.1 How would you describe the group structure in the EP?

5.2 What was the impact of direct elections on the EP and on the groups?

5.3 How would you envisage the future of your group?

6. European party System.
6. What do you think of the idea that the EP groups may develop into a European party party system?

<u>Additional Questions</u>

7. Are there any general comments or criticisms you would care to make about the group system in general and specific groups in particular?

8. How long does it take new MEPs to get to know their job and become competent at this job?

9. How would you describe the relationship between the group and the extraparliamentary federation?

10. What is the relationship between the group and the national parties?

11. In general, what is the relationship between the political group leadership and the group's senior officials.

<u>Characteristics of the respondents</u>

The ranks of the officials interviewed were as follows:

Secretaries General- EPD, EPP, Soc, Lib, Comm, TC, Rainbow,

Deputy Secretaries General- Lib, Soc(2), Comm, ED,

Higher officials- 2 EPP, 3 Comm, 2 Soc,

Council and Coreper officials responsible for relations with the European Parliament.

Officials of Political committee, Energy committee,

Commissioner responsible for relations with the EP

Head of Division for Parliamentary Committees, EP.

2 Officials of Social Affairs committee, EP.

4 officials of EP Secretariat.

Officials of Division responsible for relations with the European Parliament, Secretariat General, EC Commission.

3 officials of the federations.

APPENDIX B

European University Institute
Study of the European Parliament, 1984

Directed by: Rudolf Wildenmann

With the cooperation of: Karlheinz Reif and Carsten Lehman Sorenson.

Research Personnel: Luciano Bardi (General Coordinator), Robert Danziger
(Computer Assistant), Patrice Manigand, Philomena Murray, Hermann Schmitt,
Sieglinde Schreiner Rau (Methodological Assistant), Martin Westlake.

Services also rendered by: Paolo Bellucci, Edi Clijsters, James Hanning, Mario
Hirsch, Klaus Schubert and Silke Vollweber.

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than members of the research team, all those wishing to use/quote from the
study must have written consent from Rudolf Wildenmann.

1. Nature and Aims of the Study

The EUI study is based on a survey of members of the European Parliament. The
principal aims of the survey were to discover and examine the experiences,
attitudes and perceptions of MEPs with respect to:

-their satisfaction with their work as individuals and more generally, with the
performance of the first directly elected European Parliament
-their perceived roles and status within their own national parties and party
groups within the Parliament, the committees and other decision making bodies
of the Parliament
-their commitment to European development in general and the Parliament in
particular, and their commitment to national politics and institutions
-their perception of the distribution of power between the various bodies of the
EC and of the need for institutional reform
-their opinions as to the policy problems confronting European politics, the
magnitude of such problems and possible solutions or approaches to them
-the career patterns of MEPs
-the demographic, social and political backgrounds of members.

In general, the EUI Study of the European Parliament represents a concerted,
carefully planned attempt to direct the instruments of social science towards

the Parliament and its individual members. It is one of the first large-scale systematic studies of the new Parliament.

2. Organisation and Time scale

Preparations began in 1982, and a preliminary version of the questionnaire was reqdy by December of the same year. "Pretest" interviews were carried out in the UK, Italy and Germany, and the final English version of the questionnaire was ready by the middle of March 1983. It was then translated into the other official languages of the EC. The interviewing began at the end of March 1983 and most of it was carried out in Brussels and Strasbourg, although a few interviews were also carried out in the various members' countries. For technical reasons, we were unable to interview Greek members of the EP contemporaneously. Greek interviews took place between April and May 1984. Interviewing was completed by August 1983. Atempts were made to interview all MEPs and the overall response rate was 80.7%.

Interviewers administered a partially structured and pre-coded questionnaire, while interviewees were also allowed to "speak their minds" at some length (through the use of open questions).

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE STUDY
OF
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

DIRECTED BY

PROFESSOR RUDOLF WILDENMANN,
E.U.I., FLORENCE

AND

DR. HABIL KARLHEINZ REIF,
UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM

QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
.1. When you were elected to the European Parliament you probably had quite a few expectations regarding your role as an MEP, the work of the Parliament, its development, and so on. Could you please outline what your major expectations were?	_____ _____ _____			deck 1
	_____			
	_____			
	_____			
	_____			
	_____			
	_____			
	_____			
	_____			
	_____			
	_____			
	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -			
1.2. Would you thus say that, on the whole, these expectations have been fulfilled, partially fulfilled, or not fulfilled?	a) fulfilled b) partially fulfilled c) not fulfilled	1 2 3		11
2. There has been some discussion about the effect of Membership of the European Parliament upon a politician's career. What do you think of it? INT.: WRITE DOWN ANSWER AND MARK PRE-CODE..	Pre-code a) beneficial b) detrimental c) not applicable (e.g. not interested in a future political career).	1 2 3		12

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3. What do you think are the fundamental problems facing the E.C.?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

4.1. An MEP's position on political issues in Parliament might be influenced by EP Groups membership or by nationality. On the basis of your observations, which do you think, generally speaking, is likely to be more important?

a) EP Group Membership   1   13

b) Nationality   2

4.2. In addition, various factors may influence the voting behaviour of MEPs. In cases of doubt, how often would you say each of the following bodies have a decisive influence on the votes of MEPs?

INT.: SHOW LIST 1.

	Never				Very Often		
						1 - 5	
a) Their national party's delegation in the European Parliament	1	2	3	4	5		14
b) Their EP Group	1	2	3	4	5		15
c) Their national party leadership	1	2	3	4	5		16
d) EP Committee(s)	1	2	3	4	5		17
e) Other: specify	1	2	3	3	5		18

5.1. I would like to show you a series of statements concerning the powers of the European Parliament over the next few years. Do you think they should be decreased, remain as they are, be increased within the present Treaty framework, or increased beyond the present Treaty framework?

INT. SHOW LIST 2. ONLY ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE.

	Code	Col.
a) The powers of the EP should be decreased.	1	19
b) The powers of the EP should remain as they are.	2	
c) The powers of the EP should be increased within the present Treaty framework.	3	
d) The powers of the EP should be increased beyond the present Treaty framework	4	

5.2 To be more specific, could you tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

INT.: SHOW LIST 3

	Disagree strongly	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Agree strongly	1 - 5	Col.
a) The concertation procedure between the Council and the EP should cover all EC legislation, not only the budgetary field.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2		20
b) The EP should be given power to authorise international treaties.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2		21
c) The Parliament should have full power to revise all budget proposals.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2		22
d) The President of the Commission should be elected by the EP instead of being appointed by the member states.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2		23
e) The Parliament should be given powers in selecting and dismissing individual members of the Commission.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2		24
f) The EP should have power to act as a constituent assembly for the purpose of amending the treaties.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2		25

	QUESTION	ANSWER		Code	Go to Question	Col.
6.	There is a feeling among members of various parliaments that they have little influence on the decisions of their parliament. In those policy areas with which you have concerned yourself particularly, do you feel that you, personally, can have an influence on decisions of the European Parliament?	a) Yes b) No		1 2		25
7.1	It is said that every legislature has its own informal 'rules of the game', that is, there are certain things members must do and must not do in order to be able to get things done. Do such informal rules exist in the EP?	a) Yes b) No ⟶		1 2 ⟶ 8)		27
7.2	Could you tell me what some of these informal rules are and what happens if they are not obeyed?					

8. I'm going to give you a set of cards showing certain qualities. Could you please tell me how important each of these qualities is for pursuing - as you see it - your role as an MEP?

INT.: MIX AND SHOW WHITE CARDS

	Not at all import-ant				Very import-ant	1 - 5		Col.
a) Capacity to negotiate	1	2	3	4	5			28
b) Political experience	1	2	3	4	5			29
c) A good knowledge of European affairs	1	2	3	4	5			30
d) Specialization in a particular field	1	2	3	4	5			31
e) Respect for opposing views	1	2	3	4	5			32
f) Capacity to find compromise	1	2	3	4	5			33
g) Strength of political convictions	1	2	3	4	5			34
h) Eloquence	1	2	3	4	5			35
i) Readiness to follow national party line	1	2	3	4	5			36
j) Readiness to follow his or her European party group position	1	2	3	4	5			37
k) Personal standing	1	2	3	4	5			38
l) Feel for public opinion	1	2	3	4	5			39
m) Other: specify								
_____	1	2	3	4	5			40

9. Could you tell me how effective you personally find each of the following positions and actions in helping you to reach your policy goals?

INT.: MIX AND SHOW YELLOW CARDS

	Not at all ef-fective				Very ef-fective	1 - 5		Col.
a) Personal contacts within the Parliament	1	2	3	4	5			41
b) Attendance at group sessions	1	2	3	4	5			42
c) Committee attendance	1	2	3	4	5			43
d) Committee rapporteurship	1	2	3	4	5			44
e) Group motions and/or parlia-mentary questions	1	2	3	4	5			45
f) Individual motions and/or parliamentary questions	1	2	3	4	5			46
g) Speaking in debates	1	2	3	4	5			47
h) Voting in plenary sessions	1	2	3	4	5			48
i) Press releases and publicity	1	2	3	4	5			49
j) Other, specify								
_____	1	2	3	4	5			50

	QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
10.	What changes in the way the EP is organised would increase your personal effectiveness as an MEP?				
11.1.	The directly elected European Parliament has been in existence for four years now. Do you think this fact has raised or decreased the expectations and demands of the European public with respect to the European Community in general, or do you think there has been no change?	a) raised ⟶	1	(11.2 11.3 11.4	69
		b) no change ⟶	2	(11.2 11.3 12.1	
		c) decreased ⟶	3	(11.2 11.3 12.1	
11.2	Why? -- ⟶				
11.3	Do you think this is a good thing?				
11.4	Should these raised expectations and demands be met by change in the EP?	a) Yes	1		70
		b) No ⟶	2	⟶12.1	

QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col

| 11.5. | Could you tell me which of the following possible changes of the European Parliament should be made in order to make it more responsive to these raised demands? | | 1 - 2 | | |

INT.: SHOW LIST 4

	Yes	No	
a) Better organised European Parliamentary Groups	1	2	71
b) Revised rules for the functioning of the committees	1	2	72
c) A more specialized committee system	1	2	73
d) Revised rules of procedure in the European Parliament	1	2	74
e) Stronger ties with national governments	1	2	75
f) Weaker ties with national governments	1	2	76
g) Better coverage of the EP in the mass media	1	2	77
h) An increase in the binding powers of EP decisions over the member states	1	2	78
i) An increase in the binding powers of the EP over other EC institutions	1	2	79

11.6 Can you think of any other possible changes which you would find helpful?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
12.1 Are you in favour of constitutional changes in the present structure of the EC?	a) Yes	1		deck 2 11
	b) No ⟶	2	⟶12.3	
.2.2 What kind of constitutional structure do you envisage and why? Could you mention some major elements?				
	⟶		⟶13	
12.3 What are your reasons?				
3 Some people believe that the cooperation between political parties of the European Community countries should be intensified. Which of the following alternatives comes closest to your own views? INT.: SHOW LIST 5. ONLY ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE	a) The various parties should be independent within the European Parliament	1		12
	b) Closely related parties should have a common Parliamentary group within the European Parliament.	2		
	c) Closely related parties should have a common group within the European Parliament and organize their collaboration outside the European Parliament	3		
	d) Closely related parties should form consolidated European parties	4		

	QUESTION	ANSWER					Code	Go to Question	Col.

14. How do you feel about the present groupings in the European Parliament: for each of the following groups, would you rate its overall position on key issues as very close to that of your own national party, or as rather close, rather distant or very distant?

INT.: SHOW SCALE 1. READ GROUPS

Code: 1 - 5

	Very distant from your own national party				Very close to your own national party		Col.
a) Socialist Group	1	2	3	4	5		13
b) Group of the European People's Party (Christian-Democratic Group)	1	2	3	4	5		14
c) European Democratic Group	1	2	3	4	5		15
d) Communist and Allies Group	1	2	3	4	5		16
e) Liberal and Democratic Group	1	2	3	4	5		17
f) Group of European Progressive Democrats	1	2	3	4	5		18
g) Group for the Technical Coordination and Defense of Independent Groups and Members	1	2	3	4	5		19

15. We would also like to know how you would rate the other political parties in your own country, using these same categories. Could you tell me where they fall?

INT. STILL REFER TO SCALE 1. READ PARTIES. OMIT RESPONDENT'S OWN PARTY

Code: 1 - 5

Very distant from your own national party — Very close to your own national party

British Respondents

							Col.
a) Conservatives	1	2	3	4	5		20
b) Labour	1	2	3	4	5		21
c) Liberal	1	2	3	4	5		22
d) Social Democrats	1	2	3	4	5		23
e) Plaid Cymru	1	2	3	4	5		24
f) Scottish Nationalists	1	2	3	4	5		25

Northern Irish Respondents

							Col.
g) Ulster Unionist Party	1	2	3	4	5		26
h) Social Democratic and Labour Party	1	2	3	4	5		27
i) Labour Party	1	2	3	4	5		28
j) Democratic Unionist Party	1	2	3	4	5		29

Irish Respondents : over page

	QUESTION	ANSWER						Code	Go to Question	Col.
15	_Irish Respondents_	Very distant from your own Party					Very close = your own Party	1 - 5		
	x) Fianna Fail	1	2	3	4	5				30
	l) Fine Gael	1	2	3	4	5				31
	m) Labour	1	2	3	4	5				32
	n) The Workers' Party	1	2	3	4	5				33

			Code	Go to Question	Col.
16.1	Do the aims and expectations of your national party sometimes conflict with other interests you may wish to further in the EP?	a) Yes	1		35
		b) No ⟶	2	⟶ 17.	

			Code		Col.
16.2	Which of the following interests and/ or expectations come into conflict with those of your own national party?		0 - 1		
		a) Your party delegation's	( )		36
		b) Your EP party group's	( )		37
		c) Special interests: please specify.			38

INT.: DON'T SHOW LIST. DON'T READ OUT LIST, JUST WRITE DOWN ANSWERS AND ASSIGN TO INTERNAL PRE-CODE. MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWED.

		Code	Col.
ca) Agriculture	( )	39
cb) Industry	( )	40
cd) Commerce	( )	41
ce) Financial, banking	( )	42
cf) Environment	( )	43
cg) Workers	( )	44
ch) Unemployed	( )	45
ci) Ethnic Groups	( )	46
cj) Linguistic Groups	( )	47
ck) Regions	( )	48
cl) Religious Groups	( )	49
cm) Aged	( )	50
cn) Handicapped	( )	51
co) Youth	( )	52
cp) Women	( )	53
cq) Self-employed, free professions	( )	54
cr) Peace movement	( )	55
cw) Others: please specify	( )	56

QUESTION	ANSWER					Code	Go to Question	Col.

17.
I would like to hear your views on certain political issues. Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

INT.: MIX AND SHOW ORANGE CARDS

1 - 5

	Disagree strongly	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Agree strongly			
a) Stronger public control should be exercised over the activities of multinational corporations.	-2	-1	0	1	2			57
b) Nuclear energy should be developed to meet future energy needs.	-2	-1	0	1	2			58
c) More severe penalties should be introduced for acts of terrorism.	-2	-1	0	1	2			59
d) Public ownership of industry should be expanded.	-2	-1	0	1	2			60
e) Government should play a greater role in the management of the economy.	-2	-1	0	1	2			61
f) Western Europe should make a stronger effort to provide adequate military defense.	-2	-1	0	1	2			62
g) Women should be free to decide for themselves in matters concerning abortion.	-2	-1	0	1	2			63
h) Employees should be given equal representation with shareholders on the governing boards of large companies.	-2	-1	0	1	2			64
i) Economic aid to Third World countries should be increased	-2	-1	0	1	2			65
j) Stronger measures should be taken to protect the rights of individuals to express their own political views.	-2	-1	0	1	2			66
k) American medium-range missiles should be installed in EC countries to counterbalance Soviet ones.	-2	-1	0	1	2			67
l) The EC should use economic sanctions as an instrument in foreign policy cooperation (EPC).	-2	-1	0	1	2			68
m) The CAP should be maintained as it is.	-2	-1	0	1	2			69
n) The exploitation of natural resources should be more strictly regulated.	-2	-1	0	1	2			70
o) Cultural relations among European countries should be intensified.	-2	-1	0	1	2			71
p) Reduction of unemployment should be the major aim of economic policy.	-2	-1	0	1	2			72
q) Greater efforts should be made to reduce inequality of wealth.	-2	-1	0	1	2			73

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QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
18. The present EC budget is less than one percent of the member states' GNP. Disregarding how the budget is distributed, what percentage would you prefer within the next two or three years?	a) less than 1% b) about 1% c) more than 1% d) at least 5%	1 2 3 4		74 (deck 3)

19. Given the present overall balance of influence among the following bodies, do you think their influence on policy-formation should be increased, decreased or remain the same?			1 - 3	
	Decreased	Remain the same	Increased	
a) European Council (Summits)	1	2	3	11
b) Council of Ministers	1	2	3	12
c) Commission	1	2	3	13
d) European Parliament	1	2	3	14
e) Court of Justice	1	2	3	15
f) European Political Cooperation	1	2	3	16
g) European Interest Groups	1	2	3	17
h) European Party organizations	1	2	3	18
i) Other: please specify	1	2	3	19

20. There has been some discussion that the Court of Justice has been too assertive in the development of the European Community, while others would say that it has not been assertive enough. Could you tell me briefly how you feel about this?

	QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
21.					

The policies that I am about to describe can be performed in various ways. I shall now read out four alternative ways of handling these policies.

1. By national governments acting independently.

2. By national governments, through prior consultation with other European community governments.

3. By European Community institutions, with member governments retaining the right to veto.

4. Entirely by European Community institutions, through majority vote.

INT. SHOW LIST 6.

How should each of these policies be performed in the near future? Just tell me the number for the alternative you prefer:

Code: 1 - 4

	National government	with consultation	EC with veto	EC through majority vote	Col.
a) Agricultural policy	1	2	3	4	20
b) Regional development	1	2	3	4	21
c) Aid to Third World countries	1	2	3	4	22
d) Foreign Policy	1	2	3	4	23
e) Fiscal Policy	1	2	3	4	24
f) Defense policy	1	2	3	4	25
g) Environmental policy	1	2	3	4	26
h) Monetary policy	1	2	2	4	27
j) Social and welfare policies	1	2	3	4	28
k) Fisheries policy	1	2	3	4	29
l) Commercial relations with non EC-countries	1	2	3	4	30
m) Control of multinational companies	1	2	3	4	31
n) Energy policy	1	2	3	4	32
o) Economic development	1	2	3	4	33

QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
				34
22. In the future, how should the European Community develop its relationship to the super-powers?	a) More independence from both super-powers than hitherto.	1		
	b) More coordination with the USA than hitherto.	2		
INT.: READ PRE-CODE. ONLY ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE. NOTE DOWN IF RESPONDENT OPTS FOR "REMAIN THE SAME AS NOW"	c) More coordination with the USSR than hitherto.	3		
				35
23. Several events in recent years have intensified the debate about the future of the policy of détente. Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion on this matter?	a) The policy of détente has never been realistic	1		
	b) The policy of détente is no longer realistic	2		
INT.: SHOW LIST 7. ONLY ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE.	c) There is no alternative to the policy of détente	3		
24.1 Assessments of security are based upon people's perception of foreign policy goals of the USA and the USSR. Which of the following statements regarding these two super-powers comes closest to your own assessment?	With reference to the USSR	—		36
	a) The USSR is mainly interested in maintaining the status quo	1		
	b) The USSR wishes to expand its sphere of influence	2		
INT.: SHOW LIST 3. ONLY ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE FOR EACH SUPER POWER.	c) The USSR is intent on world dominance	3		
	With reference to the USA			37
	a) The USA is mainly interested in maintaining the status quo	1		
	b) The USA wishes to expand its sphere of influence	2		
	c) The USA is intent on world dominance	3		
24.2 How do you personally assess the willingness of the superpowers to engage in general disarmament?	With reference to the USSR			38
	a) The USSR is willing to engage in general disarmament.	1		
	b) The USSR is not willing to engage in general disarmament	2		
	With reference to the USA			39
	a) The USA is willing to engage in general disarmament	1		
	b) The USA is not willing to engage in general disarmament	2		

| 25.1 | When did you join your party? | a) Year joined _____ | N | | 40-41 |
| | | b) I'm not a member of any party | 1 | | 42 |

25.2	Have you been a member of any (other) party?				43
		a) Yes	1		
		Which? _____	KEY 3		
		During what period?			
		From _____	N		44-45
		To _____	N		46-47
		b) No	2		43

| 26. | What national or regional offices, if any, do you hold or have you held in your national party? Do you still hold these offices? | | | | |

		Permanent	Ad hoc Organisations	Do you still hold that office	(1-2/0-1)	.- _9
National offices	_____	1	2	1		48,49
	_____	1	2	1		50,51
	_____	1	2	1		52,53
Regional offices	_____	1	2	1		54,55
	_____	1	2	1		56,57
	_____	1	2	1		58,59

27.1	ELD, EPP, USE EDU AFFILIATED RESPONDENTS ONLY! FOR OTHER RESPONDENTS GO TO QUESTION 25.1.				60
	Do you hold or have you ever held an office in the .... e.g. ELD, outside the .... (e.g. LIBERAL) party group in the European Parliament?	a) No ⟶	1	25.1	
		b) Yes	2		

	QUESTION	ANSWER		Code	Go to Question	Col.
27.2	What were these offices and do you still hold them?	Office	Still held	Key 4/(0-1)		
	INT.: IN CASE OF PARTY'S DOUBLE AFFILIATION EPP/ EDG, PLEASE INDICATE RESPECTIVE ANSWERS.	_____	1			51
		_____	1			52
		_____	1			53
		_____	1			64
		_____	1			55
		_____	1			66
						67
28.1	Do you hold or have you ever held an office in another organisation or association, like a professional organisation, union or the like?	a) No ⟶		1	⟶29.	
		b) Yes		2		
28.2	Which has shown itself to be the most important of these offices for you as an MEP?	_____		Key 5		
29.	Do you hold or have you ever held an elected public office, like Mayor, member of a local council, member of a national parliament or the like, other than being a Member of the European Parliament?	a) Yes		1		58
		b) No ⟶		2	⟶30.2	
	National Office	Executive Legislative	Still held	(1-2/0-1)		
	_____	1 2	1			59,70
	_____	1 2	1			72,72
	_____	1 2	1			73,74
	Regional Office					
	_____	1 2	1			75,76
	_____	1 2	1			77,78
	_____	1 2	1			79,30
	Local Office					Deck 4
	_____	1 2	1			11,12
	_____	1 2	1			13,14
	_____	1 2	1			15,16

365

	QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
30.1	If you had to choose between your being a member of the European Parliament and any other mandate you currently hold which one would you keep?	a) European mandate b) Other mandate, (please specify if necessary)	1 2		17
30.2	How do you feel generally about MEPs being members of their national parliaments at the same time as being members of the European Parliament. Should it be prohibited, allowed or required?	a) Prohibited b) Allowed c) Required	1 2 3		18
30.3	Should MEPs be prohibited from holding, at the same time, any other public office? (e.g. regional parliaments, local councils, etc.)	a) Yes b) No	1 2		19
31.1	INT. : TO BE FILLED OUT BY TEAM OR INTERVIEWER, AND CHECKED AND/OR COMPLETED IN INTERVIEW. IF NECESSARY, INCLUDE BUREAU, ENLARGED BUREAU AND QUAESTORS AS APPLICABLE I have here a list of your EP offices in the Bureau and in the Enlarged Bureau. Could you please check if it is correct and complete	Office(s): _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____	KEY 6		

31.2

> INT.: ALL ASSIGNMENTS AND POSITIONS SINCE 1979,
> MEMBERSHIP AND POSITIONS IN COMMITTEES INCLUD-
> ING RAPPORTEURSHIPS AND SUBSTITUTES.

KEY 7/
KEY 9/
N/N

Also, could you please check this list of
your committee offices since 1979.

Committee	Office	From	To
_____	_____	___	___
_____	_____	___	___
_____	_____	___	___
_____	_____	___	___
_____	_____	___	___
_____	_____	___	___
_____	_____	___	___
_____	_____	___	___

31.3

What posts or offices or tasks within
your EP-group and your national
party's delegation within this group
do you hold or did you hold since
you joined the group? For what
period did you hold this office / these
offices?

KEY 9/N/N

Office	From	To
_____	___	___
_____	___	___
_____	___	___
_____	___	___
_____	___	___
_____	___	___
_____	___	___

	QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
32.	If you had free choice, which committees of the EP would you like to join? INT.: PROBE FOR THREE	1st choice: _____ 2nd choice: _____ 3rd choice: _____	KEY 7		
33.	Which EP Committees do you regard as being the most influential on European Community decision-making? INT.: PROBE FOR THREE	1st choice: _____ 2nd choice: _____ 3rd choice: _____	KEY 7		

34.1 With regard to those days and weeks you spend in Strasbourg, Luxembourg and Brussels, at plenary sessions, group and committee meetings, how much of your time is taken up by each of the following activities?

INT.: SHOW LIST 9

Code: 1 - 5

	None of your time at all				Very much of your time	Col.
a) Plenary meeting	1	2	3	4	5	20
b) Meeting of Bureau	1	2	3	4	5	21
c) Parliamentary group meetings	1	2	3	4	5	22
d) Meetings of national party delegation	1	2	3	4	5	23
e) Committee meetings	1	2	3	4	5	24
f) Individual contacts with EP administrators and members of group secretariat	1	2	3	4	5	25
g) Informal policy discussions with other MEPs	1	2	3	4	5	26
h) Administrative work	1	2	3	4	5	27
i) Other EP work on your own	1	2	3	4	5	28

QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
34.2 [INT.: STILL REFER TO LIST 9] Could you tell me if any activities from this list take <u>too much</u> of your time? Please indicate up to three.	1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____	1 - 9		29-30 31-32 33-34
34.3 [INT.: STILL REFER TO LIST 9] Could you also tell me on which activities you would like to be able to spend <u>more</u> time? Please indicate up to three	1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____	1 - 9		35-36 37-38 39-40

	QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to question	Col.

	QUESTION			ANSWER	Code	Go to question	Col.

35.2

INT.: STILL REFER TO LIST 10

Could you name those bodies with which you would like to have <u>more</u> contact? Please indicate up to three:

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

Code: 1 - 21

Col: 62-63, 64-65, 66-67

35.3

INT.: STILL REFER TO LIST 10

Are there any bodies with which you could have <u>less contact</u> without it hindering your work? Please indicate up to three:

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

Code: 1 - 21

Col: 68-69, 70-71, 72-73

deck 3

36.1

In your opinion, which criteria and qualifications ought to be taken into account in selecting MEPs for leadership positions in the EP?

INT.: IF NOT CLEAR, MENTION BUREAU AND ENLARGED BUREAU, COMMITTEE, NOT GROUP. REFER TO LIST 11.

	YES	NO	Col
a) Attitude towards Europe	1	2	11
b) Commitment to work within the European Parliament	1	2	12
c) Seniority in European Parliament	1	2	13
d) Ideological views	1	2	14
e) Nationality	1	2	15
f) Seniority in national offices	1	2	16
g) Party or groups membership	1	2	17
h) Personal standing	1	2	18
i) Specialized knowledge	1	2	19

Code: 1 - 2

Please rank three most important

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

j) Other:specify

_____

_____

Code: 1 - 9

Col: 20-21, 22-23, 24-25

QUESTION	ANSWER					Code	Go to Question	Col.
	Never				Very often	1 - 5		

J5.1 With regard to the time you spend outside the European Parliament and its plenary committees and political groups, how often do you meet people from the following institutions, organisations and groups?

INT.: SHOW LIST 10

People from:

QUESTION		Never				Very often	Code	Go to Question	Col.
a) Your own national party		1	2	3	4	5			41
b) Mass media		1	2	3	4	5			42
c) Associations, organisations, unions of your country, please specify:									
INT.: ASSIGN ANSWER TO INTERNAL PRECODE	Employers' Ass.	1	2	3	4	5			43
	Farmers' Ass.	1	2	3	4	5			44
	Trade Union Ass.	1	2	3	4	5			45
	Other, please specify	1	2	3	4	5			46
_____									
_____									
d) Your national parliament		1	2	3	4	5			47
e) Your national government		1	2	3	4	5			48
f) Your national civil service		1	2	3	4	5			49
g) Your country's local or regional elective assemblies or administrations		1	2	3	4	5			50
h) Your constituency		1	2	3	4	5			51
i) Your European party federation		1	2	3	4	5			52
j) European interest organisations, which ones?									
INT.: ASSIGN ANSWER TO INTERNAL PRECODE	UNICE	1	2	3	4	5			53
	COPA	1	2	3	4	5			54
	COCCEE (Commerce)	1	2	3	4	5			55
	ETUC	1	2	3	4	5			56
	Other, please specify	1	2	3	4	5			57
_____									
_____									
k) The Commission and its administration		1	2	3	4	5			58
l) The Council, COREPER, and the Council's secretariat		1	2	3	4	5			59
m) Other EC or EPC institutions or agencies, please specify:		1	2	3	4	5			60
_____									
_____									
n) Non EC/EPC international organisations please specify:		1	2	3	4	5			61
_____									
_____									

38.1	If you think of your constituents, do you think they have formed any particular expectation as to what you should do in office?	a) Yes b) No ──────────⟶	1 2	 ──⟶39.	47

| 38.2 | Would you care to take another look at this list and tell me what you think your constituents expect you to do while in office. Please rank the three most important

 INT. STILL REFER TO LIST 12 | a) Advance national interests <br> b) Adhere to national party policy <br> c) Contribute to European policy-making <br> d) Further European integration <br> e) Look after special/local interest groups <br> f) Oversee European executive bodies: Commission/Council/Summits <br> g) Oppose European Integration <br> h) Represent ethnic/linguistic/regional interests <br> i) Look after constituency

 1st rank:_____

 2nd rank:_____

 3rd rank:_____

 j) Other, specify: | 1 - 9 | |

48-49

50-51

52-53 |

| 39. | Towards whom do you feel you have the greatest responsibility as an MEP?

 INT.: REFER TO LIST 13. ONLY ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE | a) Your country's electorate at large <br> b) All citizens in your constituency <br> c) People who voted for you <br> d) Your national party <br> e) Your European party group <br> f) Other, please specify | 1

 2

 3
 4
 5
 6 | | 54 |

372

	QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
36.2	And if you think of the way appointments are actually made, which tend to be the most important? INT.:STILL REFER TO LIST 11 Please rank three most important	YES NO a) Attitude towards Europe 1 2 b) Commitment to work within the European Parliament 1 2 c) Seniority in European offices 1 2 d) Ideological views 1 2 e) Nationality 1 2 f) Seniority in national offices 1 2 g) Party or group membership 1 2 h) Personal standing 1 2 i) Specialized knowledge 1 2 1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ j) Other, please specify:	1 - 2 1 - 9		26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35-36 37-38 39-40
37.	As an elected representative, you may feel yourself to be under a number of commitments. Please rank the three which you regard as being most important. INT.: SHOW LIST 12	a) Advance national interests b) Adhere to national party policy c) Contribute to European policy making d) Further European integration e) Look after special/local interest groups f) Oversee European executive bodies: Commission/Council/Summits g) Oppose European Integration h) Represent ethnic/linguistic/regional interests i) Look after constituency 1st rank: _____ 2nd rank: _____ 3rd rank: _____ j) Other, please specify:	1 - 9		41-42 43-44 45-46

				55
40.1 Will you seek re-election in 1984?				
	a) Yes, definitely	1		
	b) Yes, perhaps	2		
	c) No, probably no ⟶	3	⟶40.4	
	d) No, definitely not ⟶	4	⟶40.4	

40.2 INT.: REFER TO LIST 14		1 - 5		
Which of the following reasons best describe your desire to stand for re-election? Please rank up to three:	a) to continue your work in the EP?			
	b) to pursue your political career?			
	c) to guarantee/further the continuity and efficiency of the work of the EP?			
	d) to further European unification?			
	e) party obligations			
	1st rank: _____			56
	2nd rank: _____			57
	3rd rank: _____			58

QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
40.3 Generally speaking, which of the following factors would you say are likely to increase your chances of being re-elected?		(0 - 1)		
	a) Hard work in EP	( )		59
	b) Responsiveness to the people who voted for your party	( )		60
INT.: HAND OVER LIST 19	c) Responsiveness to constituency opinion	( )		61
	d) Following the national party line in the EP	( )		62
	e) Obtaining personal visibility	( )		63
	f) Promoting national issues	( )		64
	g) Promoting local issues	( )		65
	h) The support of interest groups	( )		66
	i) Quality of party's campaign	( )		67
	j) Setting up personal campaign in addition to the party campaign	( )		68
	k) High degree of commitment to European integration	( )		69
	l) Support from your party leadership	( )		70
	m) Support from your party's rank and file	( )		71
Please rank the three most important		1 - 13		
	1._____			72-73
	2._____			74-75
	3._____			76-77
	n) Other, please specify:			
	_____			
	_____			
	-----		-- 5.1	

QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
4C.4 Which of the following reasons best describe your desire not to stand for re-election? Please rank up to three INT.: REFER TO LIST 16	a) Private commitments b) Substantive work in the EP is impossible c) The EP as an institution is ineffective d) I seek other elective/public office e) I want to retire from politics f) I don't expect to be nominated	1 - 6		
1st rank: _____				78
2nd rank: _____				79
3rd rank: _____				80

QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
S.1.	In a number of studies, people have been asked to place themselves on a Left-Right scale indicating their overall political position. For purposes of comparison, would you mind telling me where you would place your-self on this scale?	1 - 10		deck 5 11-12
	INT.: REFER TO SCALE 2 MARK REFUSALS UNDER REFUSAL			
	LEFT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 RIGHT			
	Refusal	1		13
.2	Are you pursuing another occupation in addition to your political work?			14
	a) Yes	1		
	b) No	2		
	If yes, what is it? _____			
	If no, what was your last occupation?			
	_____			
	INT.: WRITE DOWN OCCUPATION AND MARK THE INTERNAL PRE-CODE.			
	1) Farmer, fisherman	1		15-16
	2) Professional (e.g. lawyer, accountant)	2		
	3) Businessman (owner of shop, craftsman, proprietor)	3		
	4) Manual worker	4		
	5) White collar (office worker)	5		
	6) Executive (top management, director)	6		
	7) Retired	7		
	8) Housewife (not otherwise employed)	8		
	9) Student, soldier	9		
	10) Unemployed	10		
S.2	You were thus active in:			17
	a) Primary sector of the economy, (i.e. agriculture, fishery, mining)	1		
	b) Secondary sector of the economy, (i.e. productive industry)	2		
	c) Tertiary sector of the economy (i.e. trade, banking, services, public administration)	3		

QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
S.4. And you are/were in the:	a) Private part of the economy →	1	→S.6	18
	b) Public part of the economy or Civil Service	2		
S.5 Is/was this a permanent life-time tenured position?	a) Yes	1		19
	b) No	2		
S.6 At what age did you finish your full-time education?	At _____ years of age	N		20-21
S.7 What is your highest degree or qualification?	University	1		22
	Non-university	2		
INT.: WRITE DOWN TITLE OF DEGREE QUALIFICATION AND INSTITUTE AND MARK PRE-CODE.				
	_____			
	_____			
	_____			
S.8 Do you regard yourself as belonging to a religion?	a) Yes	1		23
	b) No ⟶	2	→S.11	
S.9 Which one?	a) Protestant	1		24
	b) Catholic	2		
	c) Other	3		
S.10 How often do you attend religious services?	a) Several times a week	1		25
	b) Once a week	2		
	c) A few times a year	3		
	d) Never	4		

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QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col

S.11 Can you please tell me the occupation of your father at the time when you were a child?

Father's occupation:

_____

INT.: WRITE DOWN OCCUPATION AND MARK THE INTERNAL PRE-CODE

		Code		Col
	1) Farmer, fisherman	1		26-27
	2) Professional (e.g. lawyer, accountant)	2		
	3) Businessman (owner of shop, craftsman, proprietor)	3		
	4) Manual worker	4		
	5) White collar (office worker)	5		
	6) Executive (top management, director)	6		
	7) Retired	7		
	8) Housewife (not otherwise employed)	8		
	9) Student, soldier	9		
	10) Unemployed	10		

S.12 Your father was thus in the:

				28
	a) Primary sector of economy	1		
	b) Secondary sector of economy	2		
	c) Tertiary sector of economy	3		

S.13

				29
	a) Private part of economy	1		
	b) Public part of economy or Civil Service	2		

S.14.1 Can you tell me about your father's political orientation in general terms? When you were a child, what was your father's political orientation?

Would you say his orientation was far left, left, centre left, centre, centre right, right, far right?

				30
	a) Far left	1		
	b) Left	2		
	c) Centre-left	3		
	d) Centre	4		
	e) Centre-right	5		
	f) Right	6		
	g) Far right	7		

S.14.2 Can you also tell me your mother's political orientation at the time of your childhood?

				31
	a) Far left	1		
	b) Left	2		
	c) Centre-left	3		
	d) Centre	4		
	e) Centre-right	5		
	f) Right	6		
	g) Far right	7		

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	QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	COL.
S.15.1	When you were a child was your father politically active?	a) No ⟶	1	⟶S.15.1	32
		b) Yes	2		
S.15.2	Was he a member of a political party?		KEY 3		
		a) No			
		b) Yes			
		If yes, which?			
		_____			
L.15.3	Was he a candidate for public office?	a) No			
	INT.: MARK LEVEL OF HIGHEST OFFICE ACCORDING TO INTERNAL PRE-CODE.	b) Yes			
		If yes, which?			
		_____			
		Internal Pre-code			
		National	1		33
		Regional	2		
		Local	3		
S.15.4	Did he hold a public office?	a) No			
	INT.: MARK LEVEL OF HIGHEST OFFICE ACCORDING TO INTERNAL PRE-CODE.	b) Yes			
		If yes, which?			
		_____			
		Internal Pre-code			
		Supra-national	1		34
		National	2		
		Regional	3		
		Local	4		
S.15.1	When you were a child was your mother politically active?	a) No ⟶	1	⟶S.17	35
		b) Yes	2		
S.16.2	Was she a member of a political party?		KEY 3		
		a) No			
		b) Yes			
		If yes, which?			
		_____			

QUESTION	ANSWER	Code	Go to Question	Col.
S.16.3 Was she a candidate for public office?	a) No			
	b) Yes			
INT.: MARK LEVEL OF HIGHEST OFFICE ACCORDING TO INTERNAL PRE-CODE	If yes, which?			
	Internal Pre-code			35
	National	1		
	Regional	2		
	Local	3		
S.16.4 Did she hold a public office?	a) No			
	b) Yes			
INT.: MARK LEVEL OF HIGHEST OFFICE ACCORDING TO INTERNAL PRE-CODE	If yes, which?			
	Internal Pre-code			37
	Supra-national	1		
	National	2		
	Regional	3		
	Local	4		
S.17 Are there any public offices, outside the European Parliament, to which you aspire?	a) No ⟶	1	→END	38
	b) Yes	2		
S.18 Which?		1 - 2		
INT. MORE THAN ONE ANSWER ALLOWED				

		Executive	Legis-lative		
a) supra-national		1	2		39
b) National		1	2		40
c) Regional		1	2		41
d) Local		1	2		42

E'N D : THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PATIENCE AND YOUR COOPERATION

QUESTION	ANSWER	CODE	Go to Question	Col.
S.19 BY INTERVIEWER OR TEAM:		KEY 1		
Country:	_____			
.20 Region:	_____	KEY 10		
S.21 List:	_____	KEY 2		
S.22 Rank on list:	_____	N		43-44
S..3 EP Party group now:	_____	KEY 11		
S.24 MEP since:	_____	N		45-46
S.25 Was MEP before 1979?:	Yes / No	1 / 2		47
S.26 If yes,	From _____ To _____	N / N		48-49 / 50-51
S.27 Year of birth:	19_____	N		52-53
S.28 Sex:	Male / Female	1 / 2		54
.29 How long did the interview last: (in minutes) _____		N		55-57
.30 Degree of interest?				
S.31 Specific comments:				